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C O N T E N T

CHAPTER I

Background

Introduction

While Lithuania, a former empire, is a small Baltic nation, wedged between major players on the global stage, Russia, Germany, Poland, which always made claims to being the "rightful" masters of Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours – Latvia and Estonia. The inconvenience of being at this geographic location was – and still is – based on the constant tension between such powers. Anytime they wanted to tear each other apart, they had to go through the Baltic States, which ware to become vassals of one or another major power. Of course, toward the last mid-century, the powers had a vast propaganda machinery, each claiming that they are "liberating" Lithuania, and the other Baltic states, from some contrived oppression. Thus the indigenous Baltic States had to be grateful for such favours. Having occupied Lithuania, the Russian empire, under the new name of Soviet Union and a new Tsar – Lenin, made sure that it will be a docile and subservient "republic" under the guidance of the all-knowing and all powerful Moscow "leadership". To achieve such aims vast segments of the population, above all the educated, productive and independent, had to be tortured, killed or sent to concentration camps for "re-education" and mainly death. After fifty years under the military rule Lithuanians decided that they do not belong to the Byzantine Russian Empire; they are Westerners and began to speak of independence. It was an opportune time, since Gorbachev was speaking of all sorts of reforms and told Lithuanians not to make trouble; after all, Soviet Union has done more for Lithuania than any other Republic. Despite such requests, Lithuania declared independence from the empire and faced a future that would be the West. This text is a philosophical investigation into the nature of this West that Lithuania turned to, initially by joining European Union, and through it entered globalization. Issues of national identity, i.e. retaining Lithuanian culture, tradition, history, language in the context of globalization have become of paramount importance. Other aspects, such as an opening to the West and the West becoming open, became a crucial issue concerning emigration. Will the expatriates return, or will all those talents and others are destined to disappear from Lithuania

and as Lithuanians. The globalising context, provided in this text, will offer some insights into these issues.

Since this is a philosophical text, in the sense of presenting arguments that aim at disclosing the principles which are inevitably presumed by any theme or system, the method used will be "Platonic" insofar as the latter is the preeminent way of helping to separate distinct types of globalization and then showing, in specific cases, their relationships and partial overlappings. Many would proclaim that such a method is based on "essentialism" or even "logocentrism" and thus no longer valid, since both concepts have been "relativised" and even "deconstructed", and above all shown to belong to one civilization – the West, and thus cannot be imposed on others. This is the charge levelled from numerous sides, such as postmodernism, deconstruction, feminism, Freudian Marxism, all the way to various hermeneutics – and all of them western, even if not written by westerners. Yet there is a methodological issue to such claims: to challenge the so-called essentialism, one cannot assume an essential position without a contradiction. In this sense to speak of Eurocentrism, or logocentrism is to make a claim that there is a recognition of what Europe is essentially; in other words, the notion that there is nothing essential and by extension there is no essence to Europe, and at the same time to claim that one recognises Europe as logocentric, is to grant essentialism. Moreover, the claims against Europe come from Europeans, suggesting that Europe is not only logocentric, but also contains within itself deconstruction, showing that there is not only an identity but also difference. But this is nothing new; the mentioned Plato discussed the topics of identity, difference, permanence, flux and so on. In this sense, our methodology of articulating different forms of globalization in order to show clearly what type of globalization has entered or is entering Lithuania is essential to anyone discussing current encounters in all areas of Lithuanian life.

This type of methodology is "Platonic" insofar as Plato was able to show differences, for example, among social systems, ranging from monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, in order to raise a question what sort of justice one could find in each. While our task is only tangentially relevant to justice, the methodological delimitation is essential. In addition, the method proposed avoids the current claims in Europe, that at base everything is power, whether it is military, technological,

ideological, discursive, feminine, social, psychological or cultural. Thus, while attempting to abolish essentialism, proposed in our study, such European thinkers posit absolute essentialism: everything is power. Of course the credit for this overdetermined claim goes to Nietzsche, but even Nietzsche was not blinded by his occasional playing with the notion of "Will to Power". All one needs to do is to be convinced of this is read Thus Spoke Zarathustra – and read it philosophically and not in the "Human all too Human" form. As a matter of argument, the "Platonic" method allows for a precise and careful delimitation of the great variety of globalizations, without the essentialist claim that they all are power laden. If post-modern Europeans presume that every claim falls apart into differences, and then add that all is power, then they assume an essentialism which is, in fact, abolished by Platonic method of differences and thus multiple typologies one distinct from others. There is also the constant appeal to relativism in light of different civilizations and their own symbolic designs, abolishing the Western claim to be the bearer of universal truth. The problem with such relativism is this: it is the result of the modern Western thinking and hence belongs to the West. This means that the post-modern and deconstructivist writers cannot grant it universal validity without a contradiction. This is to say, if relativism is invented by the modern/postmodern West, then it cannot claim that all civilizations are relative. As is evident from contemporary global confrontations, some civilizations would claim that everything is absolute, and any position of relativism is absolutely wrong. Why the argument against the so-called post-modern and deconstructivist theses must be emphasised depends mainly on the phenomenon of the leap toward the West; after the declaration of Lithuanian independence, there was a leap into the arms of the "latest thinking" in Europe: deconstruction and post modernism, with all sorts of proclamations concerning the death of philosophy, the death of the subject, truth, ethics and even the death of death. The only trend in philosophy holding its philosophical ground in Lithuania, is phenomenology. We shall address positivism and neo-positivism in the context of modern globalization.

Empires

Various mixed concepts appear with the question "what is globalization": one, that is very familiar in the west, could be called traditional "uni-

versalism". It purports to present an all-encompassing system of symbols, designed to give the structure of the world, with human place within it, and required rules of relationships for humans and in many cases – a divinity for humans and some designated supreme authority. This suggests a particular understanding that belongs to a given civilization, such that each civilization and its vocal representatives, make a claim that its symbolic designs, such as language, rituals, way of life, morality, interpretation of the universe, encompass all phenomena, including the symbolic designs of other civilizations. For Westerners, this is most clearly expressed in Middle Eastern civilization, consisting of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For example, Christianity, following the edicts of Rabbi Jesus, declared itself "Catholic" (*katholikos),* universal, with a duty to subject all the others to its one autocratic ruler. Its duty is to impose its symbolic design over the entire humanity. Islam, following the same monotheistic design claims to be the "universal civilization" subject to one Caliph and his edicts, legitimated by a posited supreme authority. And Christianity in general, as well as different branches of Islam, must treat the other civilizations as heretics, living under symbolic designs that are deviating from the only one universal law, willed by a sole figure. While for the initial tribe, having a sole Lord, the conquest of the "promised land" was the first step, others, who became the followers of this Lord, under the guises of his son, prophets, took for granted that the entire world must become the promised land to be conquered in the name of the supreme authority – either by "missionary" work or by the sword. After all, the popes regarded the conquered lands in the new world as his, and would parcel them out to his subordinates, the kings, as grants and thus their property.

There is no doubt, that if it were not for the modern Western enlightenment, with its secularism, the efforts to conquer the globe under one of the banners of monotheism would have been achieved. Of course, it could be objected that the three major trends of this "universal" civilization's symbolic designs do not agree and, in fact, are at odds all the way to violent confrontations among them; yet such antagonisms do not mean that there is a surrender of one or another to be truly universal. Each branch will claim that the other interpretations of Lord's will are "wrong" and thus they too must be conquered and brought in line with the true truth. Each, claiming to be universal, wants to be a master over the entire globe – a form of "glo-

balization" at any price, at the symbolic level which must be proliferated by missionaries. Sending expeditions around the globe to do whatever it takes to bring all others to their knees was sanctioned by highest authorities, such as popes, who absolved all the soldiers and missionaries from sin for whatever atrocities they might commit. The excuse for such atrocities is simple: those who are not subjects of the Lord, are at the service of his enemy – the devil himself,

The universal/global aim of this type of civilization is manifest in their "spread", with one common claim: one ruler, as the representative of the supreme Lord, such that the final reading of the Lord's will depends on the sole ruler – whether the latter is chief Rabbi, Pope, supreme ruler, Imam, the Byzantine emperor who is a head of state and church – extended to Russian emperors, or a Protestant pastor, declaring that the new world "discovered" by European Christians, is the promised land. It must be understood that the rhetoric of this universal/global symbolic design is couched in benevolent terms: the conquest is done for "the good" and/or "salvation" of the others who have not yet received the "word of the Lord", and who, so to speak, must be made aware of "the good tidings". The Byzantine and Russian empires strove mightily to extend this type of globalization till they were replaced by another, equally Middle Eastern mode of "saving" the world from its fallen state – Marxism. The latter is a secular disguise of the same universal symbolic design. Humanity was once paradisiacal community, then it transgressed the communal life, fell from grace and now "historical materialism" must slowly and painfully return humanity to its lost paradise – of course the price is high: those who are deviant and live a heretic life must be abolished in the name of "historical progress" and the laws of dialectics – known only to the "wise leader". But the final purpose is universal/global rule which is the recognition of necessity and inevitability of the final outcome – global salvation of humanity – and mainly by military conquest. This is the Christian and Islamic mode that includes sending "missionaries" with final intervention by force to guarantee the success of missionary efforts. After all, Soviet Russia sent missionaries around the globe to prepare the soil for final occupation of global Promised Land – under one paternal ruler who is infallible.

It is well established that the rulers, representing such universal symbolic designs, settled in the occupied territories not to provide some materi-

al benefits, but to insure that the populations learn to incantate the rhetoric prescribed by the symbolic designs. Of course, the extended rhetoric also intoned that a life of obedience to such incantations will bring – someday – material fulfilment, if not in this world, then in another. Here appears the difference between Christian and Russian/Marxian designs; the former offers paradisiacal rewards, the latter, always postponed, future rewards. The most obedient and subservient of the conquered territories, i.e. those most capable of repeating the rhetoric incantations, are offered favours, such as a more elevated position in the hierarchy of beings – yet not the highest position. The latter belongs to the centre from which infinite wisdom and power radiates. Since this type of globalization makes a claim to be universal, then it cannot rely on fallible humans, unequipped to understand the meaning of such symbols. In this sense, there must be a system of mediation with a constant presence of mediators who can translate the incomprehensible verbosity of the symbolic design "for the masses". Of course the masses had to pay the price: provide material sustenance for the vast hierarchy of the mediators.

The mediators, meanwhile, having taken control of a conquered place, proclaimed the right to legitimise and appoint any authority to rule such a place. We know well that the missionary excursions into the lands of the heathen and heretics did not go "to the people" but to the ruling figures that they had to convert to "true faith". Once converted, the rulers were, in turn, legitimated in the name of the "highest" authority. The spread of this symbolic design is very significant to Lithuania. No need to go into detailed accounts of historical events; it is sufficient to engage in philosophical explication of such events in principle. Missionaries began to appear, always demanding an audience with the rulers in an effort to convince them by the rhetoric of such symbolic designs to accept the "word of the Lord". Some of the missionaries were not well received, since Lithuania had its ancient traditions and did not appreciate being told that their beliefs are false. Thus the missionaries lost their lives and became "martyrs". It should be mentioned that symbolic designs, prescribing a way of life, comprise a frame of meaning for a given people. If another symbolic design is offered, then the traditional one is regarded as meaningless. In situations where peoples have lived for centuries in the context of their traditional symbolic design that provided a total understanding of the universe, then the intrusion of

another design would introduce a chaotic situation, to the extent that the old is regarded as invalid and wrong, and the new completely incomprehensible. One defence against such an intrusion is to resist and abolish it.

Of course, such missionaries were most interested to become martyrs and even to be declared saints – as mentioned – with a guaranteed rewards in "the other world". But the upshot of their success was the acceptance of the claim to universal symbolism by Mindaugas who is even now celebrated as having been coroneted by "the church", and thus became a vassal of non-Lithuanian symbolic design. Hence, his legitimacy to be a king depends on a mediator who has the appropriate rhetoric to make rulers into kings or to deprive them of that position, in the name of the higher, earthly authority who is the mediator and the true spokesman for the absolute author of the symbolic design. Legitimation comes from the new hierarchy which assumes higher authority over the now diminished rulers. The latter become subservient vassals at best, if not slaves, of the global empire of symbols design. While the de facto ruler is the local king, the de jure ruler is an appointed mediator from the centre of such an empire. With a wave of a magic wand, Lithuanians became a nation of slaves. It is no wander that the battle of Grunewald depicts Lithuanian warrior, Vytautas, in the middle of the battle, but the legitimated king Jogaila is depicted as kneeling, as any vassal, and begging for help from his Lord. It is an obvious sign of submission and subjection. While repelling the Nights of the Cross, who were also sanctioned by the Pope to "convert the Lithuanians" by sword, the acceptance of the new symbolic design allowed the mediators – in this case called the priests and bishops to be rulers. The priests, of course, sent to settle and create temples, became supreme authorities among the "ignorant masses", who were awed by the gilded robes and rituals incarnated by mysterious, magical words, incomprehensible to the local people. Thus the priest could "interpret" the message of such a language mainly in a threatening way.

Lithuania went through another form of the same global universalism: Russian promotion of the "Third Rome" as a replacement of Byzantium by an Orthodox symbolic design in which the emperor and the divinity were merged into one. Of course, the emperor was legitimated by the mediators – the prelates – who had the mission to save the world from its fallen state, appearing in its most decadent form in the West. Lithuania took the brunt of this salvific mission insofar as Lithuanian printed language

and its Latin script were forbidden and russification was an effort to make the empire universal. The Third Rome was an extension of the claim that there is one truth known only to the initiates who must keep the masses protected from contamination by forbidden ideas, and the latter were basically philosophical, i.e. thinking. And thinking must be decadent and dangerous, because it accepts any truth as long as the latter is fallible, leading to a challenge of the mediators who insist that their messages are the sole truth. That thinking and literate public is dangerous was revealed in Lithuania by expatriates who began to publish Lithuanian books and journals (by 1831) such as "The Dawn" (Aušra) or "The Bell" (Varpas) which were secretly transported across the border and distributed in Lithuania by dedicated persons called "book bearers". They were the wake up call to "nationalism" and resistance to russification. The images of farm mothers, in closed rooms, by their spinning wheels, reading such journals and books in Lithuanian to their children, still inspire generations to be Lithuanians.

The globalization of such a universal symbolic design in Russia was transmitted to the communist party with its strict hierarchy of positions – the emperor on top, and the trusted "friends" in lesser positions. Their task was not to help the public, but to promote a symbolic design inscribed in texts and its meaning transmitted to the masses by mediators. Their task was to provide a rhetoric that the masses could understand, since the meaning of sacred texts of Marx, Engels and Lenin, was known only to the mentioned ultimate authorities. The importance of such mediators lies in their missionary task to proliferate the message across the entire globe. Thus forming of local parties and cells was a prerequisite activity in any part of the world. The missionaries were sent everywhere not only to present their rhetoric, but also to solicit members of different nations to join and become vassals to the empire, i.e. to receive orders for their actions and to report to the centre in Moscow. The envoys of the latter would have to make legitimate the local parties, their leadership and insure that the new vassals were following the line, depicted in the symbolic design. The local leaders had to be monitored from the centre of the empire by authorities in Moscow and the activities of such leaders were judged, corrected, or dismissed (usually by death). The ritual of initiation into the empire was quite specific. The high officials of the communist party in some part of the world would travel to Moscow and petition the emperor or his subservient

to be accepted as members of the empire – going by the well-known name – Soviet Union.

As with the first universal globalization by Catholic symbolic design, Lithuania also was missionised by the communist rhetoric radiating from Moscow, soliciting adherents to the symbolic design of historical salvation of humanity, including Lithuania, from the decadent "bourgeois" society. The new converts formed a communist party whose leaders then travelled to the centre of the empire and humbly begged to become vassals to the emperor – at that time by the name Stalin. The "delegation" departed for Moscow with a mission to "bring the Stalin's sun" to Lithuania, declaring that Stalin is the "leader of nations". Of course, just as the old universal symbolic design required the adoption of the new arts, such as singing praises to the Lord, so this time, the delegation contained "poets" who heaped praises on the new emperor and pledged eternal allegiance and gratitude for bringing salvation to the Lithuanian masses. And thus, the new rulers of Lithuania became vassals to the "universal symbolic design", returning one more time to destroy national identity. Upon returning from Moscow, the new legitimated leaders took up the missionary work at home: first requirement – destroy all thinking, intellectuals, their books which, according to the new rhetoric, were erroneous and misleading relics of an outdated historical thinking, with such nonsense as freedom, honour, dignity, self-reliance. After all, with thinking people the new symbolic design, presented in fabulous rhetoric, would not have any effect – in fact it would be immediately specified as sheer nonsense. Thus evoking massive tortures, killings, and deportations to concentration camps. Meanwhile the new vassals, taking direct orders from the centre, establishing themselves firmly with the support of Russian military.

We must not be misled by the other side of the rhetoric of this symbolic design: scientific progress. Under its guise, the entire country was pushed towards poverty, lack of simple things like bread; with farms destroyed, farmers deported, collective farms established, but not in the name of progress. To the contrary, the easiest way to enslave the "masses" is to herd them into closely guarded collectives without a chance of ever leaving, and feed them daily rations and, of course, rhetoric about the great deeds and achievements of the new "sun" the leader of many nations. The very means of subsistence of farmers and traders was robbed, and thus what was left

ware the "masses" which were not allowed to perform a simple task without first being ordered to do so. Thus, collectivisation was not only a prison, but also a militarised prison where one lived in accordance with commands. There ware "brigades" to perform assigned tasks, there ware students brought to help dig potatoes, there ware writer unions which wrote praises to the great leader and praises to the exemplary worker, and there ware censors to make certain that the rhetoric designed to maintain the ultimate truth was enforced, and only designed news ware printed. In this sense any literacy, obtained through "education" coincided with the temporary edicts of the "immortals". It ought to be clear, that this sort of globalization was coextensive with colonisation, engaged in many parts of the world, including Western European. This brief delimitation of the globalization of symbolic designs ought to suffice to make distinctions among the variety of globalizations. As we continue investigating other types, we must also be cognisant that they become mixed and thus confusing, leading specific disciplines to select one or another as the "real" one.

There is another, somewhat simpler and limited mode of globalization: trade. One of the great examples is the "Silk Road" that connected civilizations and continents and provided an open space for encounters among diverse tribes and even empires. But such globalization lacked the transportation means to bridge the vast spaces, including oceans, to make a significant impact. Of course, China benefitted from this globalization, embracing different cultures and technical inventions, providing a place to discuss diverse mythologies, to learn about new technical inventions, and to deploy a fleet of ships unmatched in any other country. In one sense, trade opens contacts not only for commodities, but also minimal levels of cultural understanding of differences that create a modicum of tolerance of strangers – in brief, it allows the understanding of one's own limits, even if one might want to persist in claiming that his is the universal way. One danger to such a cross cultural encounter is the notion that the others are either totally wrong, or a threat to one's own identity and superiority. The one option is either to destroy the others, or to close ones borders and even within the geographical region, exclude the others, at least their cultural difference. This is the case of China which decided to abandon the trade form of globalization and closed itself from the rest of the world – leading to its complete exclusion of everything except Confucianism and result-

antly to its diminishment and exposure to other, globalising civilizations, which, as was the case of China, enter as colonial powers. This could be a warning to nations or even vast civilizations, that closing off is a disadvantage, since it prevents the necessary learning about the others, and the understanding of the capacities of what the others are and can do. In brief, China had no monotheism to be exported and imposed on the rest of the world as some sort of mandate from the Lord and his prophets. Not until Mao's "revolution" that China joined the Middle Eastern mode of globalization, spreading the word of salvation and, in fact, competing with Soviet Russia for supremacy in this venture of salvation.

Apart from globalization as trade, there is a dual form of globalization: military and wealth. The military form must define all others as enemies, comprising a threat to be deflected both internally and externally, whether the threat is real or not. To protect oneself against the threat lurking at the border, the best strategy is to eliminate it by "pre-emptive strike", or simply invading the neighbour. This globalization follows the logic of total conquest: first, the nation across the border is a threat, and thus has to be conquered, but then on the border of the conquered nation is another one and also poses a threat – must be conquered, till all nations next to the new border are conquered. Of course, the wealth of the conquered belongs to the victorious empire. This mode was another way that Soviet Russia pushed ahead to incorporate nations with Afghanistan being the latest. It is a common form of globalization everywhere; the Inca formed a centre and from there expanded their empire by conquest of the rich neighbours, making their rulers into vassals to Inca kings. Yet their expansion, as the expansion of the other forms of globalization was always thwarted, either by other globalising powers of the same type, or by limited resources, or, as we shall see later, by a very different form that redefined the very structure of the world.

After all, we marvel at the sea faring capacities of the Polynesians, the Inca superhighway across the Andes, stretching for thousands of kilometres, and the mathematical genius of the same Inca, and are in awe in face of the Great Wall of China, and marvel by China's technological genius that invented gun powder, compass – all the other marvels not found in the West. We also know of the conquests of vast spaces by the Mongols who, after all great efforts, shrank back into their own region. No doubt, Alexander took over from Cyrus an entire empire with its wealth and trade routes,

but the empire ended with him and the routes sank into the sands. We still marvel at the longevity of the Roman Empire, with its vast administrative network, roads and acceptance of every cult as long as none presumed to be above or equal to the goddess Rome. Unprecedented achievements in trade, manufacture, powered by armies of slaves, driven by arrogance of conquest for the sake of the conquest: "I came, I saw, I conquered". But all roads lead to Rome, and all edicts radiate from Rome. While Romans ruled and created diverse centres of power, they did not establish local rule, with local administration (unless it was completely subservient to Rome) and hence globalization was Roman. Russia took its own turn of expanding across Eurasia, forming an administrative network loyal to the Tsar, where all roads led to Moscow. Lenin did not deviate at all from the Russian reaches as an empire; he simply replaced the "head" while the rest remained the same.

Not to be outdone, Lithuania had its glory days of expanding Eastward and dominating the vast reaches, and it was sufficiently wise to welcome diverse ethnic groups to live in the empire, participate in trade and commerce, practice their cultural rituals, and even establish their secluded communities. But the expansion, even if it might seem to represent a global venture, did not reach beyond the occupied lands. All that the rulers wanted (while squabbling among themselves) is a recognition from the West in the form of the royal crown. Yet what was unique among Lithuanians is their establishment of "universal" laws that set limits to autocratic and aristocratic arbitrariness. This comprised the period of Enlightenment that resembled an emergent "democratic" West. What is at issue for this emergence is that Lithuania did not know the nature of its own identity. The nobility, which was acculturated by Polish mannerisms, regarded itself as a true representatives of Lithuania, while other groups, such as the vast peasant population, which spoke Lithuanian language, were not regarded as Lithuanians. It took the expatriates to introduce Lithuanian language as a principle of Lithuanian identity. We shall return to this topic subsequently in the context of globalization.

A claim could be advanced that great Civilizations, such as China, possessed sophisticated technical skills and made spectacular innovative strides in practical spheres. The question still remains concerning their globalization. It seems that they were restricted to military needs and the

ruling segment of the population, without becoming common means for everyone – above all not for the vast populations toiling the fields. In this sense if technology has something to do with globalization, in China it did not even reach China's population. To understand this phenomenon, we shall have to understand the difference between practical life technology, and Western modern technology, premised on entirely different philosophical foundations. This is not to deny philosophical credentials of Chinese genius; after all, Taoism has a lot to say about radical individualism, and Confucius is being discussed in contemporary West about ethical issues. Even China, today is "exporting" Confucian centres not as an effort at globalization, but as a legitimation of China as a civilization, possessing unique features. It would seem that China wants to preserve its uniqueness and, just as many others, resist the overwhelming flood of total globalization. In other words, this is an effort to preserve China's identity which is being swamped by the modern Western globalization, despite the claims to the contrary, viz. China's communist party has lost its claim to be a moral bearer of Chinese life and thus it must seek legitimation by extolling Confucian virtues. To extricate the essence of this state of affairs it will be necessary to bring in the nature of "communism" and its relationship to globalization. Once this aspect becomes clear, then China's toying with Confucianism will appear in a different light.

Colonial India, occupied by Britain, one of the major European powers, with a burden to civilise the deprived and depraved others, might seem as an example of being "globalised" and especially when it had to accept British law. The "acceptance" of course was under the strict supervision and guidance of Lord Governor. But for colonialised India the major "accomplishment" was the acceptance of such a rule, with added attraction of imposed judgments as to what is moral, what is decent, and mainly, what is a "true faith" and human interaction. The "globalization" was – and by virtue of enculturation – dependent on British symbolic design. While India was a local place, with its mode of dressing, its erotic sculptures and painting, including passionate poetry which, in terms of its own major stories, were cosmic, the British culture, in terms of its own interpretive context, had to regard all these cultural features as "immoral", uncivilised, and all the understanding of such features as cosmic, was made into Western "subjective psychology", inner and inappropriate feelings that had to be degraded and expunged. In such a

context, the cultures of India were immediately seen as low, uncivilised and thus requiring the British to accept the "burden" of paternal management of the newly acquired "subjects" of the crown. Any traditional arts were reinterpreted as immoral and damaging the virtues of such new subjects. This kind of judgment was not strictly Western, but was mixed with Middle Eastern personality cults and their "morality" which was radically fearful of anything that exhibits passion, erotic fire, and even images of the other as dancing with their own divinities. And thus the female temple dancers, exhibiting the cosmic passions and play, were regarded and subsequently made into an exotic allurement seeking customers. Direct descent from a temple dancing goddess to a street girl.

World Views

Having gone through the major forms of globalization, we have found out that they could not sway away from the centre or leave the centre behind, so to speak. This "inability" is dependent on the background awareness of the symbolic design which cannot be explicated as something to which one could point to, refer to, or base one's analysis on. It is the very "cosmic" composition in the context of which all things, humans, divinities, all relationships make sense. One just cannot leave this cosmos and still live a life that would make sense. Thus our brief task is to explicate various symbolic designs not as the previously delimited social and human worlds of civilizations and powers, but as a totally pervasive presence which needs not to be available to the awareness of persons living in such a cosmos. The understanding of the cosmos is distinct from the life world that has become a major part of European philosophy. A variety of the life worlds may belong to a similar cosmos, but the latter is present only as a symbolic design. Moreover, we must note one major aspect while analysing various forms of globalization: all awareness, all positions of persons, whether emperors or leaders, were given in terms of the "medium". The pope legitimates the king, the bringing of the "Stalin's sun" legitimates the Lithuanian communists, and so on. Now, we shall explore the mediating presence of the cosmos (in distinct forms) without which other mediations would make no sense. As we shall see, the modern globalization is possible on the specific cosmos that mediates all events, including humans. We shall distinguish to which extent diverse globalizations are parts of one or another cosmos and how

the possible mixture of cosmic awareness might retard or enhance the acceptance of the modern Western globalization. This is most the relevant for Lithuania, since it has gone through various mentioned globalizations, and after independence made a leap or, to speak in modern terminology, mutated into a globalised entity. At the outset a brief conception of "cosmos" must be presented. I make a philosophical claim that it is impossible to think or to depict any reality without a priori assumption of space, time and movement. These three factors are involved in all civilizations, in all globalizations and in all explanations – including those mediated by "eternal" beings. Hence our question is this: what sorts of interpretations there are of space, time and movement that frame a particular globalization.

Numerous stories, stemming from all cultures, point to an awareness of an initial identity of all events in such a way that each event is transformable into any other event. This is to say, each event can be identical with every other event, each saying, sketch, dance, can be the sketched, said, danced event. To understand this process requires a depiction of space, time and movement that comprises one way of having a cosmos. Let us begin with the meaning of the poetic sayings that are designed to be identical with what they say, with the very appearance of all things and events. What we call poetic is, at one level, associated with architectonic production of the ways people have a world. The poet's words set up the structure of the world and all events in it; it prescribes the ways that people live, and die, love and worship. Indeed, they establish the places of all that is sacred and profane, human and divine. It is by now known that initial language was – and continues to be – the power to be identical with and thus to make the very events which the language speaks. We can note this power in numerous spoken – poetic – rituals all the way from Vedic sayings to contemporary cults. In Vedic practices, the word is experienced as having capacity to enable and to deprive the power of making events happen. This happening is identical with poetic-ritualistic words. When a Vedic priest pronounces something, it is with the power of making that something is to happen. His very speaking is the happening. When the shaman performs a rain dance, the dance is identical with the power of rain. When a tribe performs a ritual of "killing" the sketch of an animal, the sketch is the very power that is identical with the powers of the animal. And when the members of the tribe consume the animal, they become the powers of that animal.

While our modern age is enlightened, our ritualistic practices still presume the world of identity. The poetic sayings and ritualistic practices have remained intact. Again, numerous examples can be offered. If there is a dry season, our shamans – the priests, ministers, presidents, governors, call the public to pray for rain. The prayer consists of rhetoric sayings that, once ritualistically performed, are identical with the power of rain, or the power of some maker of rain. When a modern shaman, such as a priest, minister, rabbi, or an herbal dispenser say eat of this, this is my body, drink of this, this is my blood, they offer a ritual which says that you will be identical with the body and power of the founder of the cult. For some major personality cults, such as Christianity, not only sayings, but the statues, the paintings, are not representations of some entities, but are identical with them. People kneel before them, kiss their feet and implore favours; the paintings, the statues are carried in processions and, at times, accused of not making events happen that the population wants, and as the result – are beaten. It must be clear that this identity is not one of representation, but one of the very presence of the thing or event. The statues are the divinities, the saints, the chanted words are the health, the curse, all the way to the stories of creation: some "highest" entity spoke, said "let there be light, and light appeared.

The identity in this cosmos extends to human individuality. Note how people claim to have an identity on the basis of verbal designations: I am the president, or I am a Christian, I am a socialist, or I am a priest, etc. Identity is gained from the very function, event, entity, which one enacts, speaks, and literally embodies. This identity is at times enacted in more mundane events, from television advertisements to sport events. Every advertised product is surrounded by pictorial and musical imagery in order to make the product identical with that imagery. If you buy these shoes, you will be the sports star, if you use this cream, you will be the Cher. Nonetheless, the imagery and sound comprise the ritual that makes the simple shoes and the overpriced cream into the power to make you identical with such an imagery. Similar identity takes place in athletic imagery. Some Spanish team wins a game, say in Brazil, the Spanish population in Madrid, sitting in a bar, will jump up and chant: we are number one, or we won. The persons in the bar were sitting and watching television thousands of kilometres away, yet they became identical with the team. Indeed, this type

of phenomenon occurs globally, all the way to performance of violent rituals on the streets. Fires are set, property is destroyed, and the lives are lost in the ritual chant of identity: we are number one. This phenomenon helps to account for the revolutionary mass movements, led by incantatory slogans, designed to make the population identical with the ideological chants and rhetorical sayings. Indeed, in such events one may become identical with the exaggerated paintings of the leaders who are the pure embodiment of ideology and revolution, and the population attempts to fit itself into the image of the leader.

Given the proliferation of this type of identity, we must now decipher it in terms of our proposed space, time, and movement requirements as cosmos, and not as a sum of things, events, and entities. A verbal incantation done here and now is identical with an event there and then. The rain dances, the call for prayers for rain, in every sacred space, are identical with the power of rain in every area of the sky. In this identity, there is no modern notion of distances, and is not dependent on events one after another and one next to the other, as a causal system. This is to say, that the ritual chants and dances are not the causes that make something happen; they are identical with the happening, and hence an immediate identity – without the distance – of the saying with the event. Of course, some might argue that a sports event in Los Angeles caused a riot in Detroit. Yet even such an explanation breaks down the laws of causality. After all, a cause must be (a) in space-time proximity, and (b) commensurate with the effect, i.e. the latter cannot be greater than the cause. Yet there is a vast variation between the sports event and the riot, or between a ritual dance and a hurricane. In this sense, the riot that is identical with the event cannot be related in any causal way. They are mutually identical as space, time, and movement events. And in the sacred rituals the bread and the wine are the body and the blood, and those who partake of them become one with the founder of this personality cult. Indeed, they become reborn, dramatically new, with different embodiments, important duties and responsibilities, killing and dying for the "lord" in order to join him in a rhetorically constructed place where he will become "one with" the lord.

One has only to consult the literatures of revolutionaries and the story line which such literatures disclose. We mentioned the Marxian story line of initial "paradisiacal" society, without social divisions, which failed and

"fell" from its perfection into corruption and evil ways, and history, with its "dialectical laws" is progressing to overcome the evil ways and to return to the "higher" level of society where everything will be mastered by "scientific discourses" to provide all human needs and to allow humans to be one with the utopian images of the Marxian story. Entire societies were subjected to this story, full of miracular rhetoric of "making a new man" by the power of scientific socialism. Just look at the literatures and arts emanating from the Marxian story line: romantic and erotic novels, such as "Olga meets her first Tractor", where a milk maid, on a collective farm, is promoted to be a driver of a new socialist tractor – she and the tractor are totally impassioned and the passion spreads throughout the collective farm and the entire region. Look at the statues of the heroes, the faces turned toward the glorious future, aglow with joy, revealing the presence of the "utopian tomorrow". We can marvel at the "major controversy" in Lithuania about the Soviet statues on the bridge. The rhetoric of the supporters of the statues focused on "art" and Lithuanian "history" but in this cosmos, the statues were identical with the glories of the empire and with the inevitable paradise. They were not representations, but the very presence of such paradise. It seems that Lithuanians are not averse to this cosmic structure, since it appears after the declaration of independence: "We are Western, we are Europeans".

The world of direct rhetoric, ritualised speaking, of incantations, and statues, suggesting the way all events can become all other events, is metonymic. Every term, event, entity, thing can be replaced by any other event, saying, ritual, and entity. If we strip away our modern presumptions of sequential awareness, we would be in a position to open this cosmos that is all pervasive and even dramatically effective. The awareness, at this level, is completely immersed in, and coextensive with the metonymic rhetoric wherein nothing is excluded from the logic of identity of all with all, of transposition of all into all without a distance. It could be said, in contemporary terms, that there is no specific essence of anything. Everything can become everything else. Nonetheless, this cosmos can be distinguished from another world. Indeed, the leap from the world of identity to another space, time, and movement, shows the forming of a different cosmic awareness.

While in the world of metonymic identification of any term with any other term, of sayings with the presence of divinities, of recitations that "are"

rain, and ritual dances as the very identity of the danced events, whether the latter are storms, demons, divinities, or ancestors, in the new cosmos where time and space depend on a different composition, the cyclical and rhythmic, of eternal return, all phenomena are reinterpreted. Thus ritual dance is no longer perceived as a power of rain, but assumes different symbolic pre-eminence. It's very style – the rhythmic – is an intimation of space, time and motion that comprise a cosmos within whose context all events are articulated. We must be clear about the use of dance as the most preeminent in this cosmos: dance is a metaphor for all events depicted rhythmically and in such a way that rhythmic movement composes music, seasons. Thus daily affairs could be regarded in the terms of rhythmic dynamics, such as seasons with their assigned labours, celebrations, all of which are repeated in annual cycles. Lithuanian traditional life was immersed in such seasonal rhythms that were repeated cyclically. The agrarian life was seasonal and seasons were divided by seasonal tasks and climate, vegetation, animal gestation, bird migrations, crop planting and reaping, forest bounties – seasonal wild barriers and mushrooms. Yet what is also characteristic of this dynamic is that it forms a cyclical closure. In daily affairs there is a rhythm of seasons, of life from birth, to life, to death, from death to birth to life, leading to cyclical repetitions. Thus, the entire universe moves in cyclical repetition of rhythmic dynamics. It is important to note at the outset that in this cosmos any essentiality is to be avoided. If we follow the activities in this cosmos, we shall have to learn to understand them as tracing and maintaining this world and not as a depiction of essential realities.

The first awareness that composes the art works in this cosmos is the polar dynamics such that a movement toward one is also a movement toward the other pole. The eminent literatures and stories in this world depict events – including human actions – as a bifurcation, an initial separation that offers the separated beings an exchange of positions and functions. What is high and divine, becomes low and demonic, while the demonic becomes divine. What is light becomes dark, and the dark becomes light, and in such a way that one cannot be without the other, one contains the other. Indeed, if we move to one, we are also moving to the other: movement toward love is also a movement toward hate, a movement toward sound takes silence with as a requisite polar aspect. The grand myths of the fall of a man are universal. At first there was a paradisiacal unity –

identity – of the human with the source of the world, then the human transgressed this identity and had to go down. Yet through the hard labour the human will go up again. From good and beautiful to evil and ugly, from evil and ugly to good and beautiful. These stories abound across the globe, even if Westerners are mainly familiar only with one version. What we must avoid is a dualistic interpretation. The latter, as we shall see, belongs to a different world awareness. Male and female are together in polar tension, and each gender carries traces of the other gender. This is to say, human is androgynous and, as Plato suggested, eros, an attraction of male to female is a way of uniting the two which initially was one being.

Preliminary hermeneutic that appears in texts, sayings, stories, and even philological erudition very strongly suggests that the stories, regarded as myths, stem from a concrete action of speaking: *mythenomai*, leading to the distinction between *mythos* and *logos*, with the former being originary with the spoken language and not deconstructable by the critics of logocentric prejudgments. *Mythos*, as the voicing-speaking, is never present without its polar counterpart, *mukas-mutus,* silent-mute. In this sense we encounter the domain that is pervaded by sound-silence. A further refinement of this cosmos is offered by other terms related to the first two: *myein*, to verbalise, mouth and music, and their variations by *mystes, mysterion, mystery and muse.* The connections can be made between music and muse, and indeed between them and the mother of all muses, *mnemosyne*, as the memory of a tradition and its "inspiration". The latter is the very soul, the *psyche* of orality. It connects with *spiritus, spirare*, the breath and breathing, the inspiring-expiring, with Russian *dusha-dichat*, or soul-breathe, the previously mentioned Indian Brahman-Atman, the cosmic breath and the singular breath, the *anemos*-wind, as the animating principle of the Greeks, and even the Newtonian cosmic psyche. It is to be noted that sound is voiced breath, and thus sounding is identical with psyche. The way we voice our words, is identical with the ways of oral expressivity and imagery. The expressivity is the aesthetic domain in the rhythmic cosmos. The voice is sad, indifferent, cold, distant, soft, warm, aggressive, bombastic, uncertain, hesitating, etc. leading to a direct presence of the psyche not as something interior, but as the imagery of the voiced breath, the spoken word. To say it in the other words, psyche is identical with oral expressivity, and the latter is identical with musical

imagery and poesies. Thus the oral musicality is inspirational, literally, breathing in the psyche in direct sound/silence encompassment.

A preeminent characteristic of the voiced breath is periodicity and rhythm; this is to say negatively, non-directionality. The rhythmic nature of the sound/silence cosmos is therefore coextensive with the rhythmic polarity of *mythos*. This is even expressed in the symbolic personae of mythological musicality: all divinities are poets and singers, and they are equally encompassed by the passions of their musical instruments and voices. This also intimates another characteristic: the voiced breath, the rhythm, is manifested in the dance. In this sense the body is primarily musical. Again, we can allude to mythical symbols such as Shiva as the cosmic dancer, or the wandering nymphs, made visible in the wreathing dance of young maidens. Across all the worldly phenomena, the cosmos to which they belong, provides inspirations that are sung, danced, or announced by "mystics". This is literally transmission of mythos in numerous ways, including musicality. The latter is a ground of sound-expression reflexivity, from the simplest binary sound/silence, each reflecting the other, to the complex expressive reflectivities, such as soft-hard, sharp-flat, irritating-soothing, dark-deep-desperate-tormenting – light-flat-frivolous-vibrant. Although this might still seem to be polar, the point is that intersections – oral imagery – come in clusters and ambivalent tensilities.

Sound and silence, just as much as the dance or the rhythm of waves, the cycles of the planets, the sun, and the seasons, are equally employed in aesthetic creations to articulate this type of world awareness. In the world of rhythmic cycles, there are no fixed, reified things and their neutral-objective empirical characteristics. All things are musical, enchanted, dancing, returning and vanishing, and hence in constant shift from polarity to counter-polarity. One could call such a shift periodicity. Associated with the cosmos of rhythmic cycles – the eternal return – are oral-sound imageries. Such imageries have been understood as constitutive of mood space. The argument for such a space is based on the notion that rhythms and their audial variants, carry with them moods, such as exciting, violent, pacifying, dynamic, indifferent, passionate, cool, sad, erotic, and in such a way that the entire environment is understood to be pervaded by such moods. Indeed, the latter draw everything in their imageries. It should be noted that the expressivities are not yet associated with objective or

subjective meanings, but with participatory dynamics. Hence, a particular musical rhythm moves a person to join the dance, the chant, the humming of the tune, the excitement of the environment. In brief, in this cosmos and its space, time and dynamics, there are no neutral things. While this dimensional space, time, and tensile movements are dynamic and with shifting polarity, they have no orientation, and neither do the participants in them. This can be seen in dance and music. Dance does not move in any linear fashion; the rhythms, so to speak, have no teleological direction, and hence do not aim at anything, just as sound and music, with their all-pervasive and overlapping volumes are going nowhere.

But this rhythmic, cyclical cosmos, which is pre-eminently musical, is most significant for Lithuanian understanding of its traditions. Let us take musicality in the sense that Lithuanians "sang everything". This unique saying means that they did not sing about something, but sang its very rhythm, whether it was the pattern of the bees dance, or the dawn inscribing the path of the sun, or the passionate voices of maidens "longing" to enter the path of womanhood. Whether it was a young man ploughing the field in the morning and "hymning" the sun with the songs of birds, or the women chanting with the rhythmic bending of their bodies to tie the just cut wheat into bundles – all chores were musical. This helps us to understand the mythical pronouncements (mythical in the sense articulated above) of those who participated in Lithuanian struggle for independence: "Who could defeat a singing revolution?" This saying is understood by any Lithuanian who recognises his tradition – belonging to a rhythmically understood cosmos.

We should note that the mutation from identity, time and space cosmos to the rhythmic and cyclical cosmos, does not abolish what was present in the identity cosmos. The logic of identity of everything with everything, of every word with an event, of every ritual with the power of the thing performed, is not gone. It becomes a background phenomenon that at times reappears as a significant one. Thus, in the polar movement of the fall of man, there is also a background of resolution wherein man will become one with the paradise lost, or one will become truly human, after the historical process will move the human from its fallen state of primitive communism to the utopian salvation where the human will become identical with the community and herself. The return to the lost identity may take various forms, such as reclaiming the sacred site that gives one identity, such as

would be the case of Lithuanians constantly returning to the same "sacred" forest, or the return of seasonal celebrations which are identical despite the changing seasons. The claim here is that the return is not a polar rhythm, a repetition of cycles, but an appearance of the past and future times, and sites. What appears is a leap in reconfiguration of space, time, and movement in a way that yields another awareness on whose background all events, things, and humans will find their significance and topology.

Of course, singing and dancing is part of every civilization and requires no globalization; what can be globalised is a particular style which becomes attached to and an aspect of a unique cosmos that provides a symbolic design for interpreting all events in ways that other civilizations lack or, even if they possess, such a cosmos is over determined by the two cosmic morphologies disclosed so far. This is philosophically important because the cosmic awareness cannot be derived from the traditional claims by various philosophical schools, such as empiricism or its counterpart, rationalism, which presume that a particular cosmic awareness is derivable from a specific sensory field. Thus, the identity of every saying with the thing, must be visual, while the rhythmic and cyclical cosmos must be explained by audial sense. But the argument presented so far suggests that the visual can be over determined by the audial and interpreted rhythmically. And as we shall shortly see, the cosmos that composes the modern western globalization also includes the audial, but in a very specific way, characteristic of this modern cosmos.

The mutation from the rhythmic and cyclical cosmos to the modern-western, consists of "fragmentation" of the polar into strict distinctions, such as high/low, forward/backward, past/future, implying a space, time and movement as linear, sequential, such that all things are deployed one after the other and one next to the other. The transformation of the rhythmic cyclical cosmos into a sequential, linear cosmos received an impetus with the disclosure of perspectival space and time. This disclosure refines the linearity by deploying space and time as having recognisable points on a line which can be identified and fixed, and a point in spatial depth that can be accessed from a positional point of the observer. Such positional points comprise a condition that allows things and events to be fixed, substantial, with characteristics that are also located on the thing. In addition, the positioning requires that anything without a position, anything that

is dimensional, such as moods and expressivities, must be located as qualifications of something. The world laden with psychic dimensions is relocated into a subject who is also an ego, having a perspective to the thing facing it. This means that the permanent ego, separate from other egos, requires an establishment of the sequentially and perceptively positional cosmos, such that things move from past to present, and from here to there. The ego is recognisable as a point in space-time position from which other space-time points can be accessed. Other positions, occupied by other egos, allow them to be equally separate individuals. Once again, the ego must also be the topos where the psychological worlds of mood dimensions become located as inner states. This new cosmos requires the transformation of the dimensional, expressive world, into subjective psychological states that, accordingly, can be projected on the impartially located things. Here the essentialism is born that allows things to have their determinable – eternal characteristics and their causal – space-time locations and sequence. In this cosmos, the individual is not transferable, since he has an identifiable space and time position that no one else can enter. The identity of each individual is premised on the identities of fixed locations. What happened in the past can be recognised on a designation of the specific point and special location.

Moreover, this cosmos also allows the continuous fragmentation of space, time and movement into smaller and smaller segments – space-time atomic fragments which can be always subdivided into smaller fragments. This is so obvious in the increase in disciplines. Each discipline has its own perspective that can be split into sub-perspectives where each sub-perspective can become an independent perspective. At the outset, this universe calls for reification. All things must be material and thus divisible into parts – perhaps into infinity. Yet we also notice that the reified, serialised and perspectival cosmos grants tacitly an incrementation in awareness. This incrementation becomes the condition for the possibility of the serialised cosmos. At the issue are the inevitable dualisms that are premised on the separation of space and time: space is articulated in terms of the deployment of material components, while time is the measure of this deployment in sequence. Thus, in principle, this cosmos is dualistic because the two fundamental aspects of general cosmic a priori, space and time are separated. This separation leads to a static conception of all things,

specifically when temporal movement is a measure separated from spatial things. The measure is allotted to the subject who is distinct from spatial body and thus can transcend the present moment in time toward the future and is in a position to recollect the past. As we shall see subsequently, this cosmos becomes the condition for modern western globalization. It is no accident that once this mutation of cosmos took place, the entire globe became a three dimensional space, to be explored, mapped, and conquered. The rhythmic, cyclical world was reinterpreted three dimensionally and all places on the globe became positions in measurable distances and fragmented time measures required to traverse such distances. Colonialism was a result of new world awareness.

Thus what was lacking in the kinds of universal/global ventures was a very different system of "world" morphology. As just stated, the latter was constructed in Western Renaissance, and consisted of deployment of all events in a sequential pattern and spatial proximity. Such space and time provided global coordinates and offered a framework for calculating directions and distances, required for efficient transportation of military forces and commercial commodities. There was hardly any doubt that this world morphology played a transforming role that lent Europeans an advantage over other civilizations. The explosion of explorations, mapping of geographical locations, centres of commerce and amassment of wealth led to the growth of European power and, of course, rivalry and colonialism. And the latter meant a growth of empires, new markets and cheap labour. The emergence of capitalism was premised on such a new cosmos. Of course, the initial explorations were a part of the old European kingdoms which maintained their Middle Eastern missionary zeal which, as just mentioned, appropriated vast tracts of land as if they had no inhabitants. If they were "discovered" they became material property of reified world.

No doubt, having invented a structure that could be regarded as global, European commerce turned global, exporting products and importing raw materials – and shipping slaves as agrarian labour in the new world. To keep slave, and other forms of labour, including in the colonies, working, one had to couple production and expansion of global trade and markets with another form of globalization – the missionary, charged with the duty to bring Christianity under the guise of "morality". Such a coupling had dire consequences for other civilizations and their modes of life. Schools

were established for indigenous populations as places of indoctrination to "Western" civilization under the false pretences that it is Christian and not secular. Yet it is not Christianity that was instrumental in promoting a morality of equality or freedom. It is clear that concerns for the poor have been a major debate among economic theorists and moralising clergy. The issue centred on how to reduce poverty without harming economy, and the rest was deemed to be irrelevant. But the economy had assumed a specific direction: it had to grow instead of remaining at the level of satisfying basic needs. In Europe from 16th century on, the poor were seen as a necessity for healthy economy. Such educated personsas B. de Mandeville – an economist – bluntly stated that without the slavery, economic wealth of a nation depends directly on vast numbers of working poor. This implied that for the good of economic development, there is no need to diminish poverty. Whatever measures were offered, they were not intended to relieve poverty, but to help the poor in catastrophic cases. There were even voices claiming that the poor are at fault because of their laziness, perhaps even ungodliness and lustful life. A preacher, T. Malthus, was one of the major propagators of this view; for him economic progress depended on technology that might even help the poor, but due to the lust, the poor will produce overabundance of offspring and thus will always be poor. Indeed, his views prompted new laws which outlawed any relief and thus forced the poor to rely solely on their workplace. A. Smith proposed a vague solution in relationship to the taxes that the rich pay, but no consequences flowed from his "vision". Marx of course had his solution: abolition of private ownership of the means of production, allowing the "masses" to take control of such means and thus become owners/workers. Lenin attempted to implement Marx's views but all that was achieved is a life above the poverty line for the majority, and a luxurious life for the minority, the "revolutionary elite", the de facto owners of all property, of course "in the name of the people", constituting "state capitalism". The "morality" coupled with economy was and still is a major factor in globalization.

A good example of encounter with the modern West is Japan. Japan was compelled to become open to the novelties of the West at the level of civilization – commerce, technology, military. What is known as the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which ushered in a contact with Western world and its philosophies. During the third part of the Nineteenth century the Meiji

reformers abolished 250 years of military rule, restored the emperor to the "immemorial" position of supreme authority and changed Japan from feudal to modern-westernised society. The revolution was accomplished quite peacefully by three groups: feudal lords who wanted to improve Japan's international position; bureaucrats who wanted to modernise Japan by emulating west, and low ranking warriors. Before this revolution, the supreme military ruler was from one of the great feudal "houses" the Tokugawa, whose secular ruler was known as *shogun*. While the emperor was the "spiritual" leader, and resided powerless in Kyoto, the shogun was in all matters a de facto ruler of Japan. He maintained peace among the lesser "great" lords, each possessing an army of warriors (*samurai*), who, due to imposed peace, had very little to do; many of them became poets and many more became adherents of Zen as a way of practicing their warrior art without any fear of "self-extinction". By the date of Meiji restoration, the warrior class numbered two and a half million – close to 7% of Japan's population. Yet despite this magnificent show of might, they were useless when United States was emerging as an empire and its squadron of ships, under the command of commodore M. Perry, arrived in Tokyo Bay in 1853 and demanded that Japan open up to the West. Up till then, under the rule of shogun, Japan was completely closed and no relationships with foreigners were permitted. (Zen Buddhism was brought to Japan from China way before the military rule by Tokugawa house). Shogun was forced to comply with American demands and was accused by Japanese elite as having formed an unequal treaty; rather than suffering under such humiliation, the emperor was restored as a supreme ruler and the previously mentioned three Japanese social levels decided to accept whatever the westerners have created in industry, technology and military as the best way to retain Japanese independence and identity and to compete with the west. The new emperor, Meiji, was associated with this vast transformation of Japan, abolishing feudalism and establishing modern bureaucracy, led by the samurai class. To compete with the west, Japanese bureaucrats attacked isolationism and sent individuals to study in Europe and United States. In this sense, while being globalised by the modern western cosmos, Japan decided to globalise itself and become western – at least at the level of modern West.

What happened to Japan is instructive: insofar as it was forced to open up to the West, it also accepted Western industrial mode of production and

a shift in its purpose. Instead of being closed, it assumed a role for Japan as globalization of as the spirit of Asia and a leader in modernisation, resulting in military expansion – equally in a global sense. After all, it was ready to conquer America – except that it had not yet acquired the means of mass production of every commodity, including military equipment. Due to this miscalculation, Japan has lost the war, but did not shake off all what the modern west had to offer. After the war, by choice or necessity, Japan's life world was being culturally colonised in all social areas, from dress to film. American and Japanese cowboy movies, large posters advertising Marlboro cigarettes with "Marlboro man" regarded as a heroic figure, baseball mania, and Beethoven mixed with Jazz. It is no wonder that the writer Mishima declared a protest concerning the disappearance of Japanese tradition, to the extent that he made a film "Rites of Love and Death" and subsequently committed a *seppuku,* an honourable Samurai ritual to demonstrate what the real Japan is. This suggests that at least the modern Western globalization does not only engage in trade of commodities, but introduces a mode of thinking that is materially and culturally different from previous types of global excursions.

While rapidly becoming western, Japan wanted to remain authentically Japanese. Is it possible to return to the "purity of the past" or is it best to face the philosophical problems introduced by the west and to offer some of the traditional aspects, such as Zen, transformed into some sort of philosophy? After all, if phenomenology proposed a solution to the issues raised by dualistic thinking – subject/object, man/god, time/eternity, then Zen has offered a solution to the same problem – even if it did so by borrowing examples from its own culture. Indeed, Japanese have agonised over this purity and identity, and even superiority over other races with which Japanese came in contact. It has been noted that since World War II, until 1980, no less than 700 books were published in Japan on what it means to be Japanese. The exceptionalism is promoted to most comical extremes: advertisements state that foreign made skis cannot be used in Japan because of the uniqueness of the Japanese snow, or foreign foods are not acceptable because Japanese digestive systems are different from others. Even at the end of the Twentieth century, the myth of homogeneity was "proven" by sociological studies which revealed that up to 90% of Japanese claim to belong to the middle class. This uniqueness became enshrined in 1889 in

Meiji constitution under the notion of "national principle" (*kokutai*). This principle provided a story of the uninterrupted continuity of Japan through the unbroken line of emperors as descendants from divinities; the ancestors of the entire tradition stand guard to protect the Japanese people. Even if they disliked Japan's lack of individualism and "human rights" Westerners tended to agree that homogeneity and cohesiveness of Japanese society is its advantage (work ethic, low crime rate), but also its failure – submission to tradition and thus to feudal mentality.

But Japan, and its tradition was interrupted, not by colonialism of the mentioned types, but by the Western modernisation. A brief indication of the spreads of globalization can be seen in Japan's becoming Western, not in terms of a colonial symbolic design, but precisely taking over the logic of globalization – at least in terms of military technology. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 also initiated Westernisation as a response to the humiliation brought by American gunships, forcing Japan to become "open" and face a possibility of being subjected to a foreign power, or becoming a modern power itself. Japan chose the latter and entered the path of global expansion. In two generations after the restoration, Japan became a modern power, under the slogan "rich country, strong army". Up to the end of World War II, war production was central to Japan's "progress". No need to repeat Japan's excursions into and annexations of lands across Asian countries; what is significant is the way Japan advertised itself as righteous and legal defender of the Asian spirit against the West. Indeed, the Western powers were equally impressed and invited their "student" to sit at the "global table" of major powers. It is of note that Asian nationalists admired the new Japan, and Asian intellectuals flocked to Tokyo to learn from an Asian power that was capable of expanding prosperity at home, and stand against the Western powers.

It is a point of contention what global modernisation does to societies. On the one hand, it is claimed that modernisation is not for war to commit aggression; rather the rhetoric was depicting Japan as a selfless defence of legitimate interests or a crusade against evils such as communism. In addition, the condemnation by the West of Japan's aggression was regarded as a hypocrisy: Japan was the liberator and natural leader of Asian nations, oppressed by Western symbolic design and colonialism. Pan-Asianism was the symbolic design propagated as a

justification of Japanese expansionism. For Japanese the years in which it fought and subjugated vast tracts of lands and peoples was a spiritual quest to build "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", requiring a beautiful modern war. It is necessary to distinguish between globalization and colonisation. While Japan was not colonised in the sense of becoming a territory of another power, it became globalised by the discussed logic of Western ontology and metaphysics; after all, it sent its bright young students to study in the West the latest "scientific" achievements and their application. It could be said, that it globalised itself and then used the innovations to become imperialistic coloniser under the pretence of an Asian symbolic design: allowing Asia to recoup its own traditions distorted by western colonialism and its symbolic design. The crucial question in the case of Lithuania is whether its escape from colonialism of symbolic design or Russia/Soviet type and entrance into the global life world means the total dissolution of its own tradition, or can it resist the temptation to submerge completely into the global logic not by external force, but by becoming self-globalising nation.

The example of Japan is introduced to provide a moment of reflection for Lithuania as it is mutating towards globalization. If an ancient and powerful civilization, including its large population, is tormented by the efforts to remain Japan, how such a small country as Lithuania can maintain its traditional culture in the global cosmos? This is more problematic since Lithuania has a mixed history; it had expanded as an empire, had a union with Poland, became a part of Middle Eastern personality cults, contained diverse ethnic groups and cultural customs, and hence up till the end of the Nineteenth century did not know its exact identity. Is Lithuania identical with the establishment of nationhood after World War One and the brief period between then and World War Two, or is it identical with the post-Soviet period which is permeated by globalization? We shall confront these questions as we unfold the logic of globalization at other levels in subsequent chapters. After all, we have only discussed the foundational morphology of the modern western cosmos, without showing other levels that are constituted philosophically and not merely posited as obvious. This is to say, there are other unique aspects of the modern western globalization not present in the previously mentioned modes and indeed in the two compositions of cosmos prior to the modern one.

Meanwhile, our depiction of Japan as being globalised and becoming globalising power, contrasts markedly with the British way of globalising. It is obvious that the British were most adapt to the modern cosmos, evidenced by the fact that the British engaged in global trade, above all in supporting an unabashed capitalism which needed markets to keep its emerging production and over production of cheap commodities, functioning. Indeed, the fuelling of this production created a need for the raw materials and cheap labour to extract such materials. No doubt, but it is the case that the hub of production remained in England, and such production needed expansion nowhere else than in England. There is no need to explicate the conditions of the British workers subjected to the whims of the "captains of industry", but there is a need to mention that neither the captains nor their workers could continue without the markets provided by colonialism. We might recall the concern of Gandhi when he declared a strike on British goods – the British workers will suffer for lack of work. This arrangement was not yet globalization but nationalism with the needs of its capital elite to continue its unabated greed for profit. National empires do not globalise, but nationalise. Even when there is the coupling of nationalistic colonialism with Middle Eastern personality cults and their "universal" moralities, the expansion is cultural, very distinct from modern globalization. Japan accepted such globalization and became itself a centre of it.

The brief examples presented so far, are a way of suggesting that to understand the question of what happens to a nation, and ethnic group, or an entire civilization, encountering the vast and complex phenomena of globalization. This might help understand the Lithuanian situation as it has entered the arena with which it was not familiar. After the declaration of independence by Lithuania, and its sudden encounter with the West, one colleague proclaimed that the Lithuanian population suddenly found itself between a plough and a computer. The latter, as we shall argue, is no longer a "thing" with a location and national identity – even if the logo says it is "Dell" and "made in China". No doubt that the latter, while having been dominated by Western colonial powers, was not globalised by them; they simply needed raw materials and cheap labour and markets for mass production and above all for anything that can be sold – including opium the sale of which and the resulting addictions by Chinese peoples, led to the great rebellion, ending with Mao's "liberation" of China. Today China is no

longer a colony, but an extension of and a participant in the modern western globalization. In brief, it has entered the "world" history. To understand the latter, let us note what are the philosophical arguments that led to the construction of such history.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER II

Basis of "World History"

Introduction

We have ended the last chapter with the notion that modern western globalization proposes to bring all civilizations into a world history. Indeed, as has been well established, not all traditions are historical, not even some that belong to the Western civilization. Let us take an example of China, which is emerging as one of the great global players in all the areas of modern West, but it also wants to retain its specific Chinese features. While speaking of the polar, rhythmic cosmos, it became clear that such cosmos does not have some of the positions which would be "above" in opposition to "below". The rhythmic process constitutes itself in polarities such that one depends on the other and can shift into the other without losing the balance between them. The cosmos is "polarities in becoming" where all fundamental aspects are symmetrically related, each requiring the other in order to have a full articulation, popularly presented as *yin/yang. Yin* does not transcend *Yang,* and conversely. *Yin is always becoming yang and yang is always becoming yin,* just as the night is always becoming a day and day – becomes a night. This world context is both, constituted by its elements and constitutes them. Let us be clear: the very notion of an element is to be transformed such that no element is separate as if it were some "transcendent" atom, but appears in its correlation to the rest. Each particular is only as an interaction with the other, and hence, we cannot speak of sequential causes as if one were a cause of another, since that would comprise a separation. Another way of saying this is that dualistic conceptions, ending in an asymmetrical relationship, which leads not only to creator/created, but also to substantive-essentialist ontology of discrete and independent components. Chinese understanding gives primacy to correlative terminologies appropriate for the dynamic cycles: condensing in differentiation and differentiating in condensation, scattering and gathering waxing and waning. Such understanding comprises a continuum on which all differ in degree and not primarily in kind.

This sliding process does not allow some degree of inception, absolute beginning from which other events would follow. One basic conception is

a cyclical cosmos of rhythmic order and readjustment. It should be obvious that social and political philosophy is equally explicated in terms of this cosmos: personal cultivation and public administration, knowledge and action, where each aspect defines and is dependent on other aspects that cannot be dualistically separated – as is evident from the lack of dualism of mind/body. Thus if we associate qualitative aspects of matter only to the western notion as "thing", Chinese will speak of *hou,* meaning physically thick and also generous, or *po* as physically thin and frivolous. This leads to another broad, yet intelligible difference between the modern West and China, the difference between history and tradition.

The modern West is historical in the sense that it appeals to the makers, the agents of history. We tend to enumerate events and who did them, where and when, who was the first to posit a philosophical theory, who came after to criticise it, and who followed the critic, each positing a new, and even a radically new theory, comprising a break in history and forming a new beginning. The great figures who invent themselves or are at the service of grand-transcendent purposes, of divine plan, of dialectical agonal battles, always constitute a transcendent "ahistorical" arche that can break in at any moment. Indeed, we even imagine how the great philosophers transformed the course of history – while sitting in their ivory towers of theory, they moved armies, destined nations to be formed and comprised a catalyst for great revolutions and finally purposive progress and environmental disaster. Of course, for comparative analyses, it is appropriate that history and tradition may overlap, but the question is one of predominance. History is made by personages, while tradition has a pervasive presence that does not yield to the positing of origination or creators. History is "rational" in the sense that causes, motives, or reasons are ascribed to events, even if those events might be chaotic. Events follow the linear cosmos, each having a location in space and time. It is quite different with tradition, since its rationality is not premised on transcendent justification, but is best maintained through rituals, customs, solidarity and stability. There is hardly any need for intervention from "all seeing consciousness" that is disruptive and abstract – a sort of universal discourse that, nonetheless, has to become particularised in specific situations. Meanwhile, historical societies tend to depend on positive laws and sanctions, obedience and disobedience to laws, backed by explicit and coded requirements. Positive laws are external and

transcendent, and are obeyed on the basis of "rational" self-interest. Hence one calculates to what degree one can escape the rule of law without being caught. This means that positive laws, despite their claim to universality, are individuating, fragmenting, since such laws do not bind a community but are external to it. In brief, once a tradition and its community fail, then the laws are established.

Lithuania also has a tradition as its foundation that is distinct from history replete with grand figures, located by dates of their births, important deeds that changed the course of history, their deaths and monuments in their name. But the tradition that carried the people was "immemorial" because it could not be given a beginning in a sequential historical time. One lived with the rhythms of nature, with the seasons and assigned labours, with songs and stories consisting of wise sayings and advice from the family members who were always present to guarantee one's position in the "extended" family. Thus those who died are not in the past, but belong to the family, village, regional community. Upon occasion the tradition would be disrupted by some historical figure or movement of expanding an empire so that Lithuanians became part of some grand scheme, but still, life had to follow the cycles and rhythms of a traditional cosmos. We shall have to consider this tradition after articulating the vast reaches and depths of globalization, specifically with the nagging question whether one can return to such a cosmos in light of a very different morphology of the modern western cosmos that became the basis for globalization.

Ontology

Meanwhile, it is necessary to explicate the philosophical aspects that gave rise to the conception of what, in the modern West, is called history. The understanding of this history is not possible without coming to terms with basic philosophical issues and their resolutions that are the background of historical reason. The subject matter that is at issue is one of ontology. The latter is reserved for the exposition of the basic principles that constitute the very essence of the nature. The latter has been a subject matter of debate within and among major schools of philosophy, yet all of them will have to be explicated at the level wherein the necessity for history arises. Despite some variations, classical Greek thought understood all natural events from their limits (*peras).* Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being

by the limit which cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in *topos noitos* (the place of ideas), or is the *morphe (*the inherent form of a thing) in each case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises its purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its intelligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, the essence, is what determines the way the given being will unfold its *dynamis, kinesis,* its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamics, therefore, is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its unfolding.

In this sense, every being has its own purpose which is its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them. Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of beings. An animal, engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpose, such as grazing, may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding its essence, would be considered an accident. Moreover, any notion of evolution is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other events. In the former case, a parent does not produce something essentially higher than itself. It is the rule of *aitia*, an efficient cause, since the result can be equal, but never more than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in specific settings. In brief, a human is born and will die a human. That we have Herodotus and Thucydides, as "historians" does not mean that there is anything necessary in "historical" accounts. Such accounts depict encounters, accidental intersections, which are subtended by the pursuit of human telos as the human essence. In this sense, historical events, such as encounters of armies, will be essentially forever the same, regardless of time and place. Essentially, there is no difference between Alexander, Napoleon, Bush or Hitler, battle of Gorillas or charge of elephants; they all pursue their essential natures. It would be nonsensical to speak of the history of Alexander or a history of a snail. All events and beings have their

essential natures which cannot be changed; conclusion follows naturally: nature neither has nor does it need history.

Given the fact that the Western civilization, interpreted as a modern Enlightenment, is at the centre of globalization, universalisation of science and technology, it is also most relevant to disclose what sciences and technologies are based upon. By "ontology" is meant the way that the composition of the universe is understood. Thus, if West is the main site of technological pursuits, then technology is not just a neutral mean, but also contains the modern Western ontological understanding and hence the philosophical issues from which such understanding results. This means that the modern West is not based on an arbitrary decision by some autocratic decree, but on rational debate, open to anyone and anywhere. The major philosophical problem concerning the nature of the universe is one of the whole and parts. It is concerned with the question of the ontological priority of the whole over the parts or of the parts over the whole. This question includes the issue of the attributes of the parts and the whole: does the whole possess attributes of its own, as a whole, or do its attributes equal the sum of the attributes of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue comprises the ground of instrumental reason and indeed of technological conception of the environment and – finally – of the human. Then what is the issue?

To face the issue it is necessary to point out that philosophy has no specific nationality or dependence on some ethnic language, its culture, or even its wise shamans. Rather, it takes an issue and in dialogical fashion sees what the issue is all about and offers a tentative resolution. In case of the issue of parts and wholes, it can be said that it can become obvious to anyone engaged in intelligent discussion. This issue was discussed and continues to be discussed in all disciplines, including the infamous Marxian "Dialectical Materialism", and thus deserves to be addressed in principle. In the experience of encountered things, including other people, we regard them as a given, whole entity: it is a tree, a dog, a friend, Lithuanian, Japanese, African, panda, and countless others We see their colours, movements, behaviour, their similarities and differences, and seek out their basic characteristics. But we also are aware that each entity is made of parts, leading to a question whether the whole perceived thing has characteristics of its own, or is it a sum of parts. If the latter is the case, then the whole, such

as water, would be identical with the parts of which it is composed. Water, as a substance, possesses a qualitative attribute of being wet; the parts of which water is composed, hydrogen and oxygen, are not wet. They possess their own attributes. The aggregation of the parts should then be equal to the whole, and the latter should be equal to the sum of the parts and their attributes. Since these elements do not possess the attribute of wetness, then their aggregation, to form water, should not possess wetness. In this case the whole is equal to the sum of its parts and their attributes. The philosophical debate reaches an impasse: either the whole is a basic unit of nature, or the parts are all there is in the universe.

This means that the basic ontological component of the universe would be the part and all things would be equal to the sum of the parts. But in this sense, the attribute of wetness of water is an ontological mistake .Wetness would have to be attributed to the "mistake of the senses". If one had a keen sight of Lynkeus, one could see right through wetness and recognise the basic reality as hydrogen and oxygen without any trace of wetness. In principle this position must claim that the experienced daily things, as wholes with their characteristics, are not the basic components of the universe; rather, the parts, to use the modern language, the "atoms", are real and can be the basis by which everything can be explained. This postulation is the basis of the modern physics and all the varieties of "materialisms" and even the metaphorical talk of the "building blocks of the universe". Up until now, the task of any science was to "explain" all human qualitative awareness of such factors as love, thinking, theories, mythologies, by genetics, biology, or chemistry. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between secondary and primary characteristics, and, by implication, the subject-object division. This is an opportune place to point out why the modern western globalization is different from the other forms discussed in previous chapter. Its foundations are theoretical, intended to argue for a position that would be universally accessible, and fallible. So far, the theory reached by argument that the entire universe is a sum of parts, has not yet lost its attraction. It will not object that no "smallest part" has yet been found; the theoretical position allows one to search not for qualitative features but for "material part". In addition, the notion of causal and mechanical functioning of the material world also presumes the modern theory of time and space. We can locate the parts in space and calculate

a linear succession of such parts in time, and predict the combination of such parts in the future. This cosmos is the condition for the functioning of mechanically conceived universe.

The consequences of this ontological decision were well developed by Galileo in natural sciences and by Hobbes in social and political philosophy, and accepted by Descartes as the ground of his mind-body dualism. For him, the perceptible qualitative attributes of the whole are not only appearances but are dependent on the mental states of the experiencer. If the atomic parts possess only the material qualities, such as extension, size, position in space and time, then the entity as a whole is a numerical sum of parts. Resultantly, any experienced attributes of the whole must be apparent perceptions of the subject. In turn, what the subject experiences are not attributes of the unified entity, while the parts of which this entity is composed cannot be perceived. In short, what is accessible to experience is subjective and what is objective, reality of the ontological world of material parts, is forever removed from direct experience.

Thus, subject/object division is, in principle, premised on the theory that universe is composed of material, homogeneous parts and, the experienced aspects of the world, the mentioned wholes and their characteristics, are not features of the parts and hence do not belong to reality. Yet since they are experienced, then there must be a "place" in which the characteristics of the whole must be present – the subject. All the perceived qualities, including typological distinctions between things, such as animate or inanimate, all values, cultural phenomena, stories and beliefs, purposes and aims, are not parts of reality, and hence they are features of subjective perceptions. To speak in precise modern terms, the universe has no value, beauty, meaning, purpose, good or evil, reason or passion; it runs its course mechanically such that the parts are ruled by causal relationships. Human beings, in their natural world, are also mechanically functioning sum of parts. The difference between humans and other things is not some essential feature that is a feature of human nature; the difference is in the aggregation of parts and their functioning as mechanisms. Of course, since the subject does not belong to the objective material nature, then it is excluded from reality. We shall not enter the numerous debates as to its ontological status – is it some sort of "supervening quality" over reality, or is it a phenomenal state of such reality; our only concern is its role in the understanding of modern history.

The initiating ground of modernity is a postulation of a self as an egological point whose primary activity is reflection upon itself, upon its own thinking, and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of all claims and the possibility of their realisation. All events must justify themselves in the court of the standards and rules established by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify itself before the self-reflecting subject. Hegel ended the modern tradition by demonstrating its ultimate principle: **no longer thinking and being are the same, but reflecting thinking and being are the same.** It will not do to argue that various philosophical trends of the last century posited various explanations, even of the egological subject, in terms of social conditions, material or economic conditions, biological conditions and numerous other claims. Yet all of them posit their methods and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Despite this inevitable ground, it is possible to disclose some aspects which do not allow such reflection to be the final ground, specifically in the context of the modern construct of history and its variants discussed above.

It is to be noted that the positing of a purposeless, mechanistic nature is the catalyst for modern historical consciousness. But this suggests that such consciousness does not primarily reflect upon itself, but at first **from the material world to itself as excluded from such a world.** The unfolding of reflection from something other than oneself comprises an opening to an awareness which traces first requirement to understand history. While discussing hermeneutics, it was noted that hermeneutics arose as a basic trend of humanities in distinction to the scientific or mechanistic explanation of nature. At the very outset hermeneutics assumes its own position by reflecting from the position of mechanical sciences. When hermeneutical understanding deals with scientific explanation and contrasts the latter with a broader linguistic process within which explanation is understandable, it assumes a comparative position which belongs neither to hermeneutics nor to scientific explanation. Although hermeneutics assumed that the linguistically transmitted historically effective consciousness is the final mediation of all awareness, in showing this final mediation as distinct from scientific claims, it must grant an inter-reflective awareness between hermeneutics and science, and be able to see the limits of each, even if one or

the other claims to encompass everything. Such an **in between awareness** is the condition for hermeneutical understanding of itself as historical and for the scientific awareness as explanatory. Moreover, hermeneutical understanding with its linguistic primacy in whose fluidum we live, have no signs disclosing that they are transmissions of a historical tradition. They become historical when they are mediated by inter-reflection which designates them as historical and, in addition, as temporally contingent. What is also to be noted is the return of both, hermeneutics and explanatory sciences to the rational world: the inter-reflection constitutes them both **as something, as essentially different one from the other** wherein they fall into the apophatic logic of rationality. Yet the appearance of this inter-reflexivity is both linguistic and yet transgresses the given parameters of language; thus it is **both language and explanation and also.** To phrase this otherwise, **it is neither one nor the other but is aware of both.**

Having established a subject distinct from the material world, the next step was to assign essential functions for this subject. There is no way of escaping the conclusion that the primary activity of the subject is reflection upon itself, upon its own thinking, and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of all claims and the possibility of their realisation. All events must justify themselves in the court of the standards and rules established by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify itself before the self-reflecting subject. In contrast to the classical tradition, the ultimate principle states that no longer the thinking and being are the same, but the reflecting thinking and being are the same. It will not do to argue that various philosophical trends of the last century posited various explanations, even of the egological subject, in terms of social conditions, material or economic conditions, biological conditions and numerous other claims. Yet all of them posit their methods and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Such adjudication is regarded to be critical and hence objective and universal. This universality is regarded as global and should be either imposed on or accepted by all rational beings.

A brief, although significant introjection must be added. In the first chapter it was noted that the colonising empires and their leaders, to be legitimate, had to be mediated by some figure representing a personality

cult – Rabbi Jesus, mediated by the pope, and the latter mediating a ruler's legitimation to be a king, till finally, the entire bureaucracy of prelates of various ranks, became mediators to the public of what constitutes reality. This means that any question of reality, of social position, of one's identity, appeared through a medium of some kind. The same thing occurred and continues to be the case in symbolic design systems, such as ideological constructs, which are the mediations of some presumed social, historical and economic laws which are mediated by the rhetoric of the leaders, and the pronouncements of the latter are mediated by local bureaucrats to "inform" the local public of the current truth. This is nothing extraordinary, since we know that the entire tradition of hermeneutics made a claim that human awareness is always mediated by interpretations which, in cases of "ultimate" pronouncements, require a "messenger" capable of telling the common people the will of the ultimate beings. The case is the same with modern theoretical sciences, having their "high" discourse that requires "scientific journalism" to translate such discourse into a rhetoric comprehensible by mortals. And this is above all the case for the modern western understanding: the "objective reality" must be mediated by a reflecting subject in whose court such a reality becomes judged, evaluated and exhibited. The exhibiting comprises a fundamental system of modern globalization. The latter will provide a sense of "human history" which everyone is invited to join. Let us turn to this fundamental, although complex, system.

Neo-Platonic Metaphysics

The arguments that led to the modern ontology are in place, resulting in the theory of atomism. Yet we still lack a specific theoretical method required to provide an access to modern ontology. What is at issue should be obvious from the theoretical division between objective reality and the subject. The awareness of the world by the subject is qualitative and is assumed to be subjective, while the objective realm is not given to qualitative perception and thus it is not accessible by sensory perception. This means that reality "transcends" empirical awareness and must be disclosed by a method that is not empirical. If the atomic parts have characteristics such as extension, size, location in space and time, then all the sensible phenomena, such as colours, sounds, tactility, do not offer us any awareness of the "objective" features. Given this situation, the modern, theoretically constituted, subject

must offer a reflectively constructed or, initially regarded as "discovered" appropriate method by the mind of the subject,. The latter cannot belong to any sense realm, even if the realm is subjective, such as psychological, consisting of feelings, images or traditionally transmitted qualitative stories. In turn, the method cannot be derived from the theoretical objective reality; after all, the latter is not accessible to experience and cannot be the ground of selecting which method would be appropriate. And thus it is necessary to explicate such a method not at the material, but a metaphysical level.

Although frequently confused, the two terms, metaphysics and ontology, cover different domains. Metaphysics is concerned with the formal, invisible, meaningful, and repeatable, while ontology focuses upon the nature of things of "this" world. No doubt, at times the latter might be interpreted equally as invisible, and thus assume a metaphysical character. This character depends on the ways that metaphysics assumes pre-eminence over ontology, and thus is placed in the position of defining what nature is. There is a protracted history of relationships between them, manifested usually in various dualisms: the formal and the material, the mental and the physical, the subjective and the objective. What interests us is the relationship between metaphysics and ontology for the understanding of modern history. To grasp this relationship requires a multi-directional and multi-layered exposition of a specifically selected logic.

The modern scientific rationality assumes metaphysics which excludes the direct access to the perceptual qualities of objects and events. This exclusion lends priority to the formal, mathematical, and logical domains as the bases of scientific thought. The resulting conception of theory is subtended by metaphysics of the "invisible" subsisting in a mental space of a subject. Among a variety of factors, the subject selects the most pervasive assumption of metaphysics that would offer clear and distinct ideas which are not encumbered by perceptual ambiguities and subjective differences. Such ideas belong to an ever increasing quantification of all theory and methodology. Indeed, this assumption comprises a major ambivalence for modern subject. Since metaphysics, for this subject, must be discarded as non-scientific, it must locate all metaphysics in the subject. At the same time it is compelled to posit this metaphysics, in the form of quantification, as purely objective. Moreover, what is regarded as empirical, qualitative experience, turns out to be different from the metaphysics of quantification. In terms of such metaphysics, the

qualitative experience must be completely irrelevant to science and, as noted above, is part of the immanence of the subject, subsequently designated in terms of psychology and physiology. The modern revolution designates reality to be the reflection of the metaphysical constructs of quantification. It must be measurable and thus only the ontology of material, atomic parts, can count as reality. Following this, the subjective morphology of awareness is borne by a theoretical position that what is beyond doubt is a constitution of a precise reflective metaphysics capable of "universal, impartial, and objective" access to a specifically constituted reality, consisting equally of universal, impartial and homogeneous materiality correlative to the precise structure of quantitative metaphysics.

For the modern West, mathematical or quantitative procedures are not only methodological, but founding for all theoretical thought. The specific composition of such procedures suggests that no intuitive, that is perceptual content is correlated to them. They contain structures and rules which can be formulated without any relation to perceptual qualities. Moreover, any concrete function such structures acquire, is not dictated by these structures. In other words, the function is a matter of will, but in such a way that the will is not compelled by such structures; they have no causal force. The implications of such non-necessary connections will be analysed subsequently. It is clear that in order for these procedures and structures to acquire any validity, the objective world must be constituted in accordance with these procedures. First, the procedures are indifferent with the respect to perceptual phenomena; they treat all events as if they were essentially homogeneous. Second, the perceptual phenomena, directly present to live awareness, are transcended in favour of metaphysical propositions and the posited homogeneous materiality. This is the source of the conception of mathematically idealised nature such that nature becomes a homogeneous mathematical manifold, i.e. everything can be treated as a sum of exchangeable components.

While we still might think in geometric metaphors, with mathematisation of geometry, and if one were to take the next step toward formalisation of mathematics, one would be able to regard the geometric as quanta, as numerical points, sums, and divisions, arranged in accordance with formal structures. Irrespective of the levels of quantitative-formal constitution, there is posited only one fundamental-transcendent reality. The problem-

atic of the constitutive processes both of metaphysical and the transcendent domains, lead to a particular contradiction which cannot be solved within the limits of the metaphysical postulations. The quantitative metaphysics is deemed to be universal, all-inclusive, and in a position to explicate all phenomena "objectively". Thus the subject who calculates, formalises, must be either subsumed under this metaphysic, or be the condition for the constitution of this metaphysic. If the former assumption is accepted, then metaphysics must be granted a position of supremacy over the subject, i.e. be objective; yet this metaphysic permits only one kind of "reality": homogeneous matter. The problem is that this metaphysic is not matter but ideality and indeed a necessary ideality. But, if the latter is taken for granted, then the ideality of metaphysics has no "place" in the subject, since the subject must be contingent and thus cannot be the basis for the metaphysical, mathematical and formal necessities. Such a subject becomes equally contingent.

Ambivalent metaphysics

The modern subject, as a theoretical result of the argument over parts and wholes, must be posited to account for modern metaphysics in the form of mathematics. Not having any other locus for the modern metaphysics, the thinkers of the modern age had to claim that mathematics belongs to the subject but, just as the subject, mathematics cannot have any reality – after all, the only reality is the homogeneous world of material parts. As any other metaphysics, mathematics belongs to the immanence of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet objectively speaking, it is a contingent substance. Moreover, even the mathematical domain is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the domain of mathematics swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules and choice. The importance of this "indecision" consists precisely in the option to either regard the mathematical as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as created in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one such expression. When this notion is coupled with the view that even the mathematical-formal domain is subject to an abso-

lute will, then the result is obvious: the emphasis is on the primacy of construction of the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the material world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual awareness. The mathematical procedures assume the modern cosmos of sequence and places, following a precise order: they must be arranged sequentially and uni-directionally. There is a progression from the "starting" point to the "finish". The problem of the finish is not to be taken in a finite sense: the mathematical procedures lend themselves to indefinite progression and articulation; hence what could be regarded as "finish" is a decision to stop calculations. As we shall see, the latter can be "applied" to any homogeneous matter to be quantified and calculated without regard to the traditional, qualitative distinctions among things and events in the perceptual world.

At the outset of modern ontology, the material world was regarded to be mechanical, yet that notion had to yield to the metaphysics of calculation, compelling the material world to surrender its necessary status in favour of the necessity of mathematical formulations, leading to the notion that the objective world is "contingent". Being inaccessible to experience, it must be posited in accordance with the formal definitions and procedures whose necessity would provide a model of explanation not for the perceptual components, but for possible processes present only in terms of calculations. Contingency excludes, at the same time essentiality, i.e. the possibility for a claim to maintain something permanent with necessary characteristics, accessible to perception, or in case of induction, essentiality with universal validity in the sphere of ontology. The abolition of essentiality (the Greek notion of essential composition of something real) opens the door to the notion of an access to this reality in terms of possibility. This is to say, since what is cannot be perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent reality does not offer any necessity for its composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in accordance with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is precisely the juncture at which it becomes "necessary" to regard this transcendent reality in accordance with what it

can possibly be. This means that there is no necessary connection between the theoretical methodological formalisms and the transcendent reality. The connection is arbitrary. This is to say there is no necessary law to connect the formal factors to the posited reality. The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the "application" of theory to "praxis", the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to "humanise" nature and the "human animal", the aims at improving nature, and the exclamations that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own prescripts. In principle, the intentional connection between the formal domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it needs not to respect any prescription and qualitative composition of the lived world. And yet it is a required nexus between the theoretical and the real. After all, the signitive formal compositions do not point to anything that would be intuitively similar to them. In this sense arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the real.

While this might seem obvious, there appears an unnoticed requirement for this correlation: concrete activity. The latter is directed by projected choices of what is materially possible, i.e. what can be made. The formal compositions, not having any similarity to anything present to perception, cannot be correlated to anything perceptual; if the perceptual awareness is excluded, then the correlation requires an active intervention and construction of the posited homogeneous world in accordance with the formal requirements. Since the latter are constructs, they too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction of the material reality in accordance with our chosen projects. All this seems to rest on nothing. Indeed, Fink has argued very cogently that modernity emerges as if out of nothing. This is to say that this complex state of affairs is implicitly designed to control the environment under whatever guise; thus it is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connection between theory and "reality", an arbitrariness of the priority of will over reason and nature. Arbitrariness, is a ground for power, and we have noted that empires are premised on extending power to control greater territory, more people, ob-

tain more wealth and thus the autocrats of empires intentionally use power, of course not restricted by any morality – they act arbitrarily with respect to others, all creatures, and the use of resources. But the modern western conceptions of formal methods and homogeneous atomism, as theoretical constructs, contain power to control everything in its own essence. In this sense arbitrariness lends itself to an emergence of power without "reason", or at best from psychological whim, enhanced, prompted, and fed by "unlimited possibilities" of formal and, as a result, material constructions. This turns out to be one of the bases of technology and of reason as instrumental.

It should be recalled that the modern western globalization, even if it has a practical-technical dimension, is premised on theoretical concerns and the issues such concerns must face. After all, modern form of materialism is not the discovery of practical, sensory observations, but the result of theoretical considerations. Once an issue is resolved, other implications follow – even if they were not explicitly articulated in the initial ontological and formal conditions. To be true to the philosophical requirements not to leave out of consideration such unnoticed aspects, we must point out that modern philosophical trends wrestled with the issue of the connection between the formal and the material, leading to two divergent philosophical trends – idealism and positivism. Both were theoretical positions, but neither could show how to account for the other. This includes the accepted judgment of Kant that the thing in itself, i.e. reality is unknowable. From our debate concerning parts and wholes and the modern acceptance of the atomic, homogeneous parts as the sole reality, it followed that there is no perceptual-empirical access to such a reality; it is unknowable. This is the crux of the issue: we have subjective formal metaphysics which, in its own structure does not imply any reality – it is empty of content; in turn, the homogeneous material world does not, and cannot be the ground of the formal domain. The difference between these two domains implies a connection of a unique kind: human activity. The latter must be such that it can apply the subjective formal structures to the homogeneous world. This activity was designated to be labour, work, leading to the ideology that man is *homo laborans,* and even to the value theory of labour, accepted by the capitalists and Marxists. This position is one aspect of a much broader theoretical stance: the material nature has no value, no beauty, no meaning, no rationality; all these aspects flow from the subject and how it imposes these features on nature.

At this philosophical level a precise composition appears. The formal domain is subjective and is a construct of the subject. Since the subject has no specific essence, then it has no given standards as to the structure of formal inventions. To say it again, they are arbitrary constructs. In turn, since the homogeneous material nature is directly unknowable, then it does not offer any standards how it should be treated; at best it is contingent. It means that their conjunction through labour does not need follow any rules – thus the formal rules are imposed by the subject's activity to arrange the indifferent matter in terms of subjectively invented rules. This is precisely how the modern West resolved the problem of a priori formal understanding that does not seem to have any empirical content – the formal structures are empty, but they can be projected as the possibilities to be realised by active intervention in the material environment, and thus a construction of reality that would fulfil the projected structures. The end result: a material product which is the synthesis of formal and material. In other words, the formally designed possibilities are also in the position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfilment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in an accord with the formal designs. This suggests that the modern world has two intentional histories: one, which is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals, and the second, a complete redesign of the world in accordance with the formal designs we ourselves posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is assumed and the intentionality of the will that swings between the formal and the transcendent is the decisive arbiter – without precedents.

This intentionality as will is not identical with the Kantian autonomous will and with the Nietzsche's will to power. This means that the traditional mode of will as making the choice between two things is no longer relevant. After all, the choice is between what is given – say honey and bread; but the modern will projects what is not there at present and not yet there in the future. Both will have to be made as a fulfilment of this will. Its engagement is with possibilitising constituents both at the formal and at the material levels. The possibilitising allows for formal variations and differentiations of processes into systems and sub-systems, until the sub-systems can become distinct sciences, carving out their own fields and

accessing the environment in accordance with their formal requirements. This simply means an increased refinement of the application and realisation of the formal constructs in the material sphere. This is the technological process. Technologisation posits formal operations with a total disregard or indifference to the meaning and the truth of nature in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with the homogeneous and "indifferent" reality, result in two structural processes when introduced in the lived world. First, a complete disregard of the perceptual phenomena and their horizons, including their enactments in the lived world, leading to increased contingency of the environment and second, the detachment of the formal and technological structures and processes from intentionalities that connect the subject to the morphologies and the phenomena of the experienced environment. These points constitute to the problematic of the relationship between contingency, detachment and nature, so well exhibited in the social battles over environmental damages.

Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent and disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal division and increased formalisation of the language in such a way that there emerges an increased formal differentiations of formal systems by themselves. Correlatively, the material world can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the transcendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. Every refined and produced material process offers possibilities for further formal refinements and material rearrangements. The lateral differentiation of formal systems and their correlative material structuration, provide the basis for disciplinary differentiations, each having its own formal approaches and each capable of possible construction of material realisations.

A brief note should be inserted to point out the reasons why the de-limited constitution is the condition for the possibility of discursive power.

The very languages, the formal systems and their differentiations, can access the transcendent world only by remaking it, by subjecting the material to formal and technical transformations. Thus the more one subdivides the formal domain into increasingly refined concepts, the more one is able to crisscross the material by technical procedures in terms of the formal definitions. In this sense, the very language of the disciplines is coextensive with the power of shaping the indifferent material to fit the formal requirements. One could argue, furthermore, that this continuous division and formalisation of discourses is coextensive with the militarisation of language and society. Each increasing refinement is correlatively a restriction of signs to signals followed by an attendant restriction of human functions to being a reaction to precise and efficient codes. In this sense the discursive power leads in two directions: the making of the environment, and the control of the human. In general terms, this process of militarisation is one of the bases for the emergent language of "war". We are at war with each other, with the environment, with poverty, with affluence, and with our own divided selves.

While this process requires the adherence to its principles of formal and material detachments, it "progresses" toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both "natural" and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-independent functions and "work". What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal constructs divide the human "material": the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated "behaviours", each semi-independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyse the obvious: the "power" of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of "expertise". Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary connection with the other spheres. Hence the results of "research" in a specific domain can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics for possible "application". The lateral differentiation decentralises

responsibility thus increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is increasingly unchained from any constraints. Every formal rule, and every material result made to fulfil the formal design, becomes totally arbitrary, offering possibilitising formal and material combinations without end. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an "expert" in its own sphere, no need to relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as "conclusive" evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and with the making they produce their "reality" and hence increment power and "prove" their momentary success.

The underlying linear cosmos is also shifting towards pre-eminence of the future, since all the calculations of possibilities are future projects. Whether it is pure capitalism or its correlate the communism, the aim is to construct the future world in which the mastery of the material world and the materialised human will be achieved. Capitalist systems calculate and trade "futures" and communism insists on establishing material conditions to yield a "new man". The classical question of "what is a man" received an answer as to a total, whole being with its essence. But having fragmented the universe into parts, including man, we can only tinker with the making and remaking him out of all the fragments into all sorts of caricatures. If a man is a sum of all the discourses that intersect to define a man, then we are an aggregate of incompatible parts. Our genes "want" to propagate themselves, our economic gains are deemed valuable because we can "go places for fun", our feelings care chemical imbalances, our ethics is counter to our feelings, our rights are to kill others, our religions are good for therapy and business. All this with a backdrop: our reality depends on the "conditions for possibility". If we change some of the conditions, then we shall become different – at least in some part.

We are in a thick of the constant transformations and it would be redundant to speak of the "needs" since the latter are part and parcel of the possibilitising procedures and become needs and fulfilment at the same time. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we wanted therefore we can make it. What this suggests is that the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness as the sources of power comprises a self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions for the "search for the truth".

After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, the relationships between the formal and material processes are determined by "science", i.e. the very self-articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any transscientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic "growth", no biological reasons to stop remoulding the living processes along new combinations, etc. Limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the "autonomy of research". Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.

Self-maintaining Purpose

Given the key intentionality which swings without any essential necessitation between the theoretical methodological and the transcendent homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is permanent: *progress*. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no "subject" that would progress. It must be recalled that for modern philosophy, despite various surface claims concerning human nature, the sole objective reality is basically a sum of material parts and humans are no exception; at this level humans cannot claim to be essentially different from all other material events. In this sense, humans are also a function to be calculated within the context of various formal systems and their ability to redesign man. All formal systems as rational are instrumental where a positing of a specific aim requires calculation of material means for the attainment of such an aim. Yet the attained aim will become material means for other aims, while the latter will also become means for further aims – but without any final aim. In terms of instrumental rationality, progress cannot have a final aim and hence it cannot have a direction. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and "perfectabilities" without, of course, attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without

possibilitising and hence "improvement". In this sense one could say semiotically, and yet on philosophical basis, that the signifier and signified are one. A brief note aside: this is the reason why Soviet Union, which also attempted to be progressive, could never say that it has reached communist society; the latter had to be forever deferred.

The question that arises in this kind of progress, and as pointed out, its proliferation of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all phenomena, is the appearance of crisis. What is immediately notable is the disproportion between the sub-system called science and the rest of the culture. The efforts by the theoretically-methodologically designed systems to "master" the "material" nature have become exponential. Let us be clear about this: there can be only one domain of progress, and this is the coded and formalised transmission of practices or "techniques". A culture can increase its mastery and practical control through the increase of formal differentiations and physical interventions in the environment, yet it cannot increase what the environment as a whole has to offer. There is no "progress" in nature. We cannot increase material resources, but only the efficiency of their uses. Only the latter can progress. And this is precisely the point of crisis: the sciences are entering human life on the basis of this "use" i.e. making humans function in accordance with the very prescripts that are imposed on the presumed physical world. Thus the question: is this the progress for human life, or is this the arbitrary treatment of the human and hence the subsumption of the human under arbitrariness and its opening up of power over the human? Obviously, the "use" and interference is inherent in the processes of modern science, requiring the intentionality which can connect the formal and the material. The human then is submitted to and subsumed under an arbitrariness which includes her own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a "power" which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of the modern understanding of theory and method and their "application". It is to be recalled that the methods and theories are not given objectively but are constructed as instruments to reshape the environment, and as instruments they are at the service of autonomous will. The latter sets its own criteria for increased mastery and therefore increased power to master. **We have**

reached a position of the metaphysics of the will that, while generating itself, it generates the very rules by which the world is to be constructed. This self-generation of itself and rules is the ground of modern anarchy and "human divine complex". After all, only divinities create themselves and the laws by which the world is constructed. Abolishing all the experienced limits, this will is an arbitrary source and power that abolishes all limits by its reductive and homogenising metaphysics.

The first problem that arises for this modern subject consists of a contradiction. The measurable material reality is posited to be objective, homogenous, and yet the method as formal mathematical is not an aspect or part of this homogenous material reality. Since the latter is posited as the only existence and everything else is designated to be subjective, then the scientific formal and quantitative methods must be equally subjective. In this sense, we come to a clash between objective, material, homogenous reality, and a method of science that has no objective validity. The sole solution to this problem is to take on the following structure: the subject constructs theories and methods to be tested in material reality. But the subject has no criteria by which to judge which constructed method is the correct one. Being subjective, they have to be adjudicated on the basis of objectivity which is perceptually inaccessible. Since the imperceptible objectivity depends on the constructed methodology which is inevitably subjective, then the only way to deal with this objectivity is in terms of subjective constructs. Our point here is that there is no way to demonstrate at this level how the subjectively constructed methods connect to the posited objectivity, i.e. the material reality. While the latter is posited as objective, it is also regarded as incapable of implying formal quantitative methodologies. In turn, these methodologies do not imply any empirical perception of this material reality directly, since by definition our direct perceptions are qualitative and therefore subjective.

The task then is to expound the results and implications following modern ontology and self-reflecting subject as the grounds of the universalistic – objective – logic of globalization, its modes of constructing self-generation and self-validation, and its metaphysical methodology and, in the final analysis, valuative and voluntaristic groundlessness. We have seen how this universalistic trend fragments itself into multiple logics and discourses as arbitrary constructs and thus abolishes its own univocal

position in favour of what current writers superficially call "power". We can show other grounds for the claim of power, at least in the sense of being groundless and arbitrary. This is to say we can show that the very exercise of power in globalising modernity has no other rules or criteria apart from its own self-reflective generation. The basis of universalising globalization is subtended and pervaded by conceptions that claim to explain power, whether social, economic, political, technocratic, while at the same time these very conceptions presuppose the self-generation of power within which they are included. This means that these conceptions are in principle the ways of demonstrating the inevitability of arbitrariness and its resultant expression as globalising power. In this sense, power is not something that is intended, but to the contrary all intentional awareness articulated in various modern disciplines and domains are constitutive of power that contains the logic of the transformation of the world. We hope that at this level we shall avoid any kind of psychological, valuative, genealogical, moralising explanations, since even the latter are equally at the service of power. All explanations without exception can be demonstrated to be participants in the very proliferation of power which such explanations may claim to challenge. Hence, the universality of globalization and its subsequent critiques make it impossible in principle to escape this universalisation in terms of its own logic.

Every rationality that will challenge this universalisation will accept its power logic, and hence will become inevitably part of that logic. As we shall show, even the breakdown of this universal logic into modern multiple logics, called scientific disciplines and discourses, are the means by which this universalisation proliferates itself and survives. In this sense, the claims by postmodernists to multiple discursivity and therefore multiple discursive powers is a continuation of the maintenance of modern universalisation. Thus, first it is the case that postmodernity is a continuation of modernity and has in fact globalised itself under the claim that it can save the other cultures from Western modernisation. It is no wonder that various regions of the world that want to acquire identity in the pretended context of modern globalization are constantly appealing to being postmodern. Second, the various claims to cultural self-identity, in contrast to modern universal individualism, is a variant of individualism at the cultural level. We know from philology that in the modern West the challenge to individual universalism

came from Herder who claimed that there is a cultural individualism with equal global rights. The notion of individuality at whatever level and its identity remains intact. Third, modern universalisation and postmodern challenge to it follow the same logic and therefore impose individuality and the rights to it on the basis of a rationality which, as we noted, is already power laden.

In this sense the language that postmodern theses propose for multi-cultural logic, allowing each culture to have its own identity, at the same time talk about empowering the other and thus assume the logic of power. This is an assumption that includes the others as equally engaged in power and all that they need is to be granted power from us. This is obvious in American and European feminist movements which wants to empower the Arab women to have their rights to be individuals. What is at issue here is not whether these movements are right or wrong but whether they already assume and therefore impose the modern universal individualism whether singular or cultural in the name of power. A more basic issue involved in globalization is one of mediation. The just mentioned example of empowering the others is to the point. We tell the others that their way of life is inadequate and must be mediated through our modern global individualism which, in turn, will be mediated by becoming a function in a proliferation of the mastery of the environment, mediated by formal systems and homogenised nature. In this sense. The others will have to evaluate their cultural practices and life worlds through media that are no longer their own. Let us look at the mediating phenomena for deeper understanding of this level of globalization.

While western modern scientific logic has been proclaimed to be universal globalising logic, it has not confronted its own fundamental issue of mediation. At one level it offered the notion that the connection between the subjective formal quantitative and the pure homogeneous material domain can be connected through application of method to "objective reality". The rhetoric of application is regarded as experimental testing of hypothesis in correlation to reality. Yet the very testing means intervention. There is no notion of direct method that looks at the way things are present in experience; rather applying and testing means that somehow we must intervene in order to avoid our perceptual awareness and therefore to construct the so-called imperceptible material reality in

terms of our methodological, that is subjective, structures. The latter are the first medium, the prism, through which the world will be seen. Yet there is an inevitable second mediation: the primary methodological mediation is not yet adequate to grasp the nature of this homogeneous world. To be able to conceive how it "works" we must intervene and construct the so-called material reality in accordance with our own subjective methods. The construct is also a medium and not some sort of direct access to the theoretically posited reality. It is no doubt that Kant drew the right conclusion: objectivity is synthesised by subjective a priori conditions. This means that we have modern science that connects different domains by a mediation which is our activity of applying the subjectively constituted logics and methods on the indifferent homogenous materiality, such that the very application constructs another medium. Third, at this level emerges a mediation that is neither the methodological, so-called formal quantitative rational, nor the so-called material homogenous sum of parts, but a dimension that ranges between the two of them and has no criteria how to apply the formal to the material. This is the first intimation of a constructive process that emerges as the modern will. It becomes a selective process that has not posited anything apart from its own self generation.

This point of mediation, even if not recognised for what it is, has been called by modern philosophers "autonomy" suggesting that every formal and quantitative rule is constructed without any conditions, that is has no cause. In this sense, the material world subjected to those rules can be transformed without any question concerning the traditionally known categorical differences among **experienced limits of** things – still present in the arguments concerning the priority of the whole over the parts. In fact, the formal and quantitative rules do not have within their own compositions any criteria for making such distinctions, thus they can be applied on everything indifferently. At the same time, the material world, the extended substance, must be regarded as homogenous and, therefore, constructible in accordance with the invented rules. What is at issue at this level is the choice of formal and quantitative rules over qualitative categorical distinctions. Since both are by modern definitions subjective, then there is no inherent criterion why one would be more objective than the other. We must look for an account within the very composition of those invented rules. First, it can be argued that it is impossible to gain any

advantage over the environment on the grounds of categorical, qualitative distinctions. Second, it is also the case that formal and quantitative rules comprise within their own structures techniques for transforming the material environment. This way the choice of formal quantitative rules already implies the choice of instrumentality and the possibility for application. The modern sciences whose theories and methods are framed within formal and quantitative structures are in principle technical. This is the reason why any scientific discipline that cannot be technically tested is not regarded to be scientific. Technical testing need not be through some laboratory experiment; what is needed is technical mediation – such as a formal construct, in order to be "scientific". In this sense, sociology, political science, psychology, education, can become scientific if they are mediated through a quantitative structure. If one were to say that in Kaunas there are hungry people, such a claim would be "anecdotal". Objective claim would require "numbers". This is another reason that all modern scientific and philosophical theories are premised on arbitrary power.

It will not do to argue that we have direct empirical evidence of the hungry, the poor, the incapacitated; such evidence, to be credible, cannot depend on surveys of such people, since even they might not know what is hunger, poverty, or capacity. After all, hunger means a quantity of calories per day, ounces of protein, chemical supplements and the weight, size and gender of the person in question and, after such analyses, the social and racial background of the person in question and, finally, statistical average of a group to which this individual can be assigned. Numbers do not lie. The counting is very interesting, since anything can be counted and presented as scientific and significant. Of course the research performed is selective on the basis of horizons of valuation, but there is no prescribed criterion to say what is more significant or valuable or not. Criteria, after all, suggest some sort of standard that might imply such outdated presumptions as "essentialism" and thus discrimination, interfering with freedom of scientific research. If one says that counting how many people coughed during a two hour movie, no one can say that such scientific research is insignificant, specifically given the background presumption that meaning is subjective and therefore cannot be judged by any objective standard.

If material events are counted in this purposive history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make of the indifferent,

mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims and presumed needs. We articulated the rest of the modern story as a progress of technology and human mastery of the material environment (including the material human as part of the environment). We also disclosed the story of the metaphysics of the will pervading all modern philosophies in such guises as power, autonomy, arbitrariness, and fierce adherence to personality cults (such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam). We also know the story of the efforts to impute into consciously constructed events some sort of causal connections and thus make history into science. Moreover, we have been told that historical writing is based on research and therefore is scientific. There is also a plethora of proposals to ontologize history by presuming that it is explainable in terms of some basic biochemical components, specifically genetic and evolutionary biology. Finally, there are even voices proclaiming the end of history. Such efforts are premised on a specific confusion between theoretical, continuous time, and historical time, wherein the latter, as phenomenon of human awareness, has no necessary continuous connections.

And then there is History

We began with the question concerning the nature of modern Western history, but it could not be understood without the ontology and metaphysics forming the foundation of the conception of the world. The notion that history is human and not natural phenomenon leads to the way that the modern Western thought had to account for time. All events, depicted mechanically, follow a causal sequence. What is given now can be explained by previous causes. Yet at present the previous causes are no longer available; they require an introduction of awareness of the past, called memory. The future not being at present also requires an awareness which is called projection of temporal possibilities. Both are, of course, phenomena of awareness. The latter must provide temporal connections, so well recognised by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and finally Sartre. Some, such as Hegel, realised that human memory and projection are inadequate to account for past events which are beyond human memory. Hence an introduction of an absolute consciousness, a sort of all encompassing, eternity, manifesting itself in a continuous historical time. Such an eternity is incompatible with temporality to the extent that eternity, as an infinite position, cannot be divided into historical, temporal periods, without ceasing to be infinite.

Kierkegaard made sport of Hegel on this point. Once the infinite collapses, what remains are contingent, historical events, having no necessary connections, apart from human memory and projected future. To save the day, scientific reason introduces the method of quantification and the ability to measure mathematically (presumed to be objective operation) of events of the past and expected events of the future. All is well, but the problem is not solved – only postponed. First, how can a subject, living in the present, extend its measures on the past if the latter is no longer and the future is not yet? What does one measure? Second, mathematical devices are not temporal and do not provide any clues whether what is being measured is in the past or in the future. Hence, one has to assume awareness of the past and of the future which, as was seen, are not given except in the present awareness. Space is no mystery; all spatial events are present now, deployed one next to the other but, as material, do not signify their past or their future. Hence, once again, the signification of both is conscious phenomenon.

Having said this, it is necessary to connect our discussion to the modern ontology and metaphysics. The modern world we live in, including the way we understand it, is "made", and in this sense belongs in the context of the modern subject as a maker, builder, such that its objectivity can only be deciphered on the basis of the subject's aims and purposes. At the same time it follows that human practical activity does not belong to, and cannot be explained in terms of the homogeneous world of matter and its mathematically designated space-time positions. To understand history as made, we must explicate what sort of maker – as a subject that translates the formal constructs into material, technical reality – is at the foundation of historical making.

Physiologically speaking, the body appears to be symmetrical and given in a location of a homogeneous space, yet functionally the body is asymmetrical and sets up differentiations that lend a structure to human situation. This is to say, homogeneous world cannot account for orientations, directions, places, leeways, and open horizons; it consists of an indifferent system of points. Anybody in such a world must be reduced to occupying an indifferent and ideal mathematical location. In contrast, the functional body is a condition for the possibility of practical structures and activities. Its asymmetry disrupts homogeneity and opens diverse directions: up-down, left-right, forward-backward. What must be noted is

that such directions are not exchangeable, but function as a situation in which the practical activities are deployed. What is up front, reachable by a forward movement, is distinct from what is in the back, and the latter can best be reached by a directional reversal. The same can be said of left-right.

It is to be noted that the traditionally conceived structure of practical activity concerned with ends-means relationship has to be subtended by the more fundamental composition of the bodily field of functions. The field of functions has a centre and the centre is a condition for an oriented space of activity; the latter always stems from "here" and is related to "there"; while one "there" can be exchanged for "another there", they cannot be equivalent to a "here". The here is always a bodily-kinaesthetic point of orientation. Now it is to be understood that orientation is prior to any stimuli and reactions, since the latter do not reveal directional functions, although directional functions are assumed in any discourse about stimulation, such as coming from the front, the right, etc. Orientation is not simply a structure of the physiological body or of objective world; rather it is a relationship of a lived body to the things of practical comportment. What is on the left and what is on the right belong to the domains of functions of reaching, grasping, appropriating, and even resisting. Irrespective of bodily position, it always maintains the right-left polarity, and indeed an asymmetrical polarity. The reaching for something with one hand does not demand a symmetrical reaching for the same thing with another hand. In fact the functioning of the two hands is differentiated in mutual support in face of a given task. Yet in this mutuality their differences of function are discovered prior to any thetic position of body as "mine". In turn, the practically oriented body allows things to acquire functional deployment: some are on the right, others on the left.

While the right-left differentiation depends upon movement, its functioning does not involve the entire bodily organisation, except in cases when shifting the entire body lends efficiency in the fulfilment of a task. A more pronounced movement of the entire body in function is structured by the difference of front and back. The forward orientation of the body and bodily motion are unequally favoured. The practical activity is fundamentally a frontal activity, although minimal backward movements are called upon as compensations for frontal and lateral activities. The backward movement has a circumspection that can be utilised in reaching,

and above all in Yielding and retreat. In any prolonged backward activity, there occurs its transposition into a frontal movement and activity. The practical body does not contend with objects behind it as it does with lateral and frontal domains. Of course the back activity is still "there" and the active subject is not set at the periphery of the world, yet it could be said that it is a most passive activity.

The preeminent frontal activity constitutes a basis for a language of goals and means. It is an activity that continuously discovers and interrelates various functions and opens new "frontiers". This activity is circumspective, planning, taking into account, leaving behind, and forward looking. In the context of frontal activity, the language of history and of goals is situated. The human looks ahead to better days, participates in the forward movement of history, faces the tasks and goals of today and tomorrow, and leaves the past and the troubles behind. The very language of overcoming, of surpassing, even transcending is a frontal language. What this suggests is that at this level the conceptions of history, interpretation, situation and context require a functional corporeity with its asymmetrical activities for the setting of laws, rules, and conceptions. The passively accepted corporeal activities are incorporated into, and provide a context for, the understanding even of our "highest" theories of history, development, purposes, and "ideals". Functioning corporeity is the "situation". The front-back structure includes not only directions of activity, but also temporal orientations of "already" and "not yet", the "gone" and the "yet to come". In this sense the functional body is a spatio-temporal situation for the deployment of objects and events.

As a situation, the functioning body is both singular and at this level contains a generality that is capable of mediating between the transcendental universality, historically transmitted intersubjective generalities, and the objects of the homogeneous world of space and time. This is to say, the application of laws, linguistic rules, prescriptions, and prejudgments, make sense in a situation because the situation itself is not a brute fact, but traces a corporeal generality which is not quite in accord with the "purity" or universal rules, but which is not quite idiosyncratically singular. The functional body can be both loosened up or tightened, can approximate although never reach the "ideal" and can relax to open up the ideal to variations. Thus for example an activity toward the goal can limit itself to very select means and a narrow interpretation of the goal, or it can relax and regard the means as fluctuating

and the goal as open to various directions. Functional body as a situation allows for tightening and loosening by virtue of its correlation to and being in a place. Practical objects and functions, inclusive of bodily activities, have oriented places. If something practical has its place, the latter depends on the customary convenience for the acting subject. Something is usually found or placed "there" and is accessible to activities. A particular object of practical use is not located in a point of a homogeneous space, but in a place with a slack that allows shifts without the object leaving its place. It is on the table, on a work bench, in front and a little to the right, and it is accessible to correlations with other objects in the vicinity. This variability of the object or an instrument with respect to its place allows both for leeway and for tightening of the place, although the latter cannot reach a geometric point.

The reason for this impossibility lies in the very composition of functional body and the practical objects with which it is concerned. Places with their slack are constitutive not only of the objects of use, but also of bodily functions with respect to use. The objects must not only have a place with a slack, but they must also be accessible, must be handy, cannot be too far, out of reach, or too close, too imposing, obtrusive, and hence a hindrance to activity. The functional body, constitutive of the oriented situation of praxis, is equally irreducible to a geometric point of a "here" and must be rather understood as a total situation with opening and tightening variations and parameters, constantly correlating to the variations of the place of an object of use. Indeed, the useful object's place is very much indicated in Heidegger's delimitation of "absence" of an implement. It is revealed as not being here, in its accustomed place, in its accessible handiness and is somewhere else, in some other place to be sought and hence having become a problem for the active body faced with a task of immediate concern. What this reveals is not only a place in correlation to the functional body, but also the practical world as a manifold of oriented places, comprising a shifting field of activities with leeways and functional adjustments. This does not mean that the practical world structured by the functional body is identical with the total lived world; rather it comprises one level of this lived world, although an important level whose language extends and contextualises the sense of various other levels.

Every place of practical objects, as suggested above, can be comprehended as an oriented structure in correlation to other places, thus offering

an oriented system of play-space with various options of non-arbitrary, although not precise, loosening and tightening of leeways and slacks. This oriented structure as a whole is also correlative to the functional body as a situation allowing the depiction of the structure of places in terms of whereto and wherefrom. One leaves some places "behind" to get to other places "ahead", and to avoid any deviations to the "sides". The structuration of the entire field of oriented places can be comprehended on the concrete activities of the practical body as it establishes functional orientations. Obviously, we should not confuse functional orientations with some sort of inherent bodily characteristics. Functional orientations are enmeshed in the world of praxis and correlate to the places and practical objectivities without which orientations could not make sense. To use the language of Waldenfels, the bodily orientations comprise an "in between" region, such that they are not reducible either to the subject's body or to the pre-given objects.

At this juncture of our discussion we should point out that the interconnection of oriented places in a field of practical activities does not guarantee the presumption of a historical continuity and intersubjective homogeneous field. Differentiated field of places and orientations at the same time contain a slack of practical time maintaining openness without a convergence into a singular future point or a progressive line that presumably would connect the historical events. Such a line is not given as phenomenon of practical activity; rather it is constituted at the theoretical level, as Landgrebe so aptly noted. In this sense the "application" of historically transmitted laws, rules, and prejudgments, requires contextualisation and situatedness that transform the theoretical presumption of continuity into a practical contingency which is not arbitrary, and yet which does not guarantee unity. Given the level of practical activity, constitutive of the open situation and of oriented places, the next level capable of situating and concretising the intersubjectively transmitted composition, idealities, and universal norms, could be called the "morphological" level of phenomena.

The following is the issue, at least for scientifically sophisticated modernity: the numerous ideal scientific designs, coded in geometric, logical, and mathematical languages, do not resemble, picture, or suggest anything in the lived world of practical activities. Resultantly their situatedness must take for granted not the experience and language of objects and their properties, but an experience that allows an approximation of the historically

transmitted language of sciences. The language would have to be of shapes, sketches, sizes, and in general morphologies that lend themselves to rough delimitations without assuming a complete precision. Thus we can speak of "oblong" table, "round" pot, "egg-shaped" balloon, "flat" and "wavy" surface, "smooth" or "rough" edges, without offering any precise delimitations. Yet what is peculiar about these characterisations is that they are corporeally accessible and can be either tightened up or loosened, without the loss of their morphological generality and at the same time specificity. They lend themselves to degrees of situational specification and at the same time intersubjective generalisation. Indeed, such morphological characteristics are within the range of situated visualisation and linguistic designation that is fulfillable in the process of activity.

At the same time the morphological compositions can be purified and lend themselves to geometric precision and logical articulations, open to historical and intersubjective continuity. Their application is a process of their contextualisation along corporeal orientations and leeways that never yield geometrical precision, and thus retain the possible morphological variations and extension. It is sufficient to claim that the practical activity is confronted by morphologically structured objects that lend themselves to what Husserl called "ideations" which, seems to me, are distinct from "generalisations". In this sense, it is possible to regard the morphological features of objects as a closer look at the ideationally acquired suggestions, i.e. their morphological looseness in the situated domain of practical functions. The egg-shaped object can vary and offer options that retain their ideality and nonetheless are situation-specific. It would be appropriate to say that these characteristics are the "in between" the ideational, lawful, precise, ideal, and purely factual, material, empirical. Within this level it is possible to have the intersubjectively accessible ideational identity and individual variations, required for historical transmission of a tradition and its application to a situated understanding. The application is possible if there are some features that can coincide without necessary collapsing into an oneness. It seems that the morphological domain is the hinge in this relationship.

The analysis of the functional body as the general situation of practical activities and a practical world as one condition for the possibility of application of historically transmitted knowledge, laws, prejudgments and

operations, and the opening up of the comprehension of the intermediary domain of morphological composition of phenomena opens another area of passive functions. This area is the practical body, constituting one level for the acquisition of personal identity and recognition of the others. The following analyses are designed to avoid the reduction of the person either to a body in space and time, or to a mind controlling the body; we will presume neither a materiality of the body nor an inherent facticity of its functions. The task is to discover the genesis of the practical body prior to fact and mind.

Body and Techne

The discussion of the practical side of the body assumed two major directions, termed the "I can" and the "lived body". No doubt, the contributions of these directions were ground breaking and opened fruitful avenues for phenomenological researches. The present task is to outline the important features of the "I can" and to develop them toward another level of practical functions that would delimit briefly the intertwining of such activities with the practical world and show the constitution of technical processes. The latter are not yet to be regarded as technologies, but rather as the activities that are capable of ranging across various functionally transposable environmental facticities. The claims of historical overdetermination of the individual by intersubjectivity are overhasty, since they have not answered the question of the differentiation of the intersubjective into individuals. At the historical intersubjective level there are no signs that could offer any clue as to the differentiation of individuals. Our task is to decipher in the practical domain of the "I can" a mode of intersubjective unity and individuality without fragmenting the human world. It must be noted that despite the numerous efforts to find an adequate exposition of the individual's self-recognition as an individual, there were no satisfactory results. We submit that the failures emerged from the lack of attention to the practical domain of human phenomena. The constitution of the "I can" rests on the more basic emergence of abilities in a very unique intersubjective and individuating process.

We are aware of the fundamental confrontation between the notions of individual and community, requiring a resolution that neither the community nor the individual would be given priority. The resolution of the issue can

be found in the practical domain and the way in which individuation and communalisation comprise one process. First, it is a phenomenological axiom that practical activities require corporeal base, and that the latter is not a brute fact but a system of kinesthetic events. Kinesthetic events are, in turn, functionally oriented, and correlated to the concrete field of objects to be handled. The latter are also not brute facts transmitting blind data, but are explorable systems with indices and horizons which preclude reduction to an object that would be a simple example of an applied rule or norm. Second, the kinesthetic constitution of abilities opens a multi-layered system of interactions not only with the field but also with others. A child does not learn to apply rules, but in a first instance acquires oriented abilities in relationship to others. The first moves are already exploratory, testing, and worldly, and constitutive of a double reflexivity. The simple effort to reach something reveals the possibility of misreaching and the latter is a direct reflection of "failure" and repeated effort. At the same time, while one cannot reach something, cannot lift or move something, the other can. This is the second reflexivity from the directly evident abilities of the other. Yet this reflexivity is composed of two important processes. First, the coextensive intercorporeal process shared by two active subjects: both are performing the same function, e.g. reaching, and yet this function is differentiated: one can reach something while the other cannot. The reaching is a commonality that is at the same time differentiated into singular abilities.

The constitution of intercorporeal individuality appears to be possible on the basis of activities comprising the first self-recognition of the individual and his/her coextensivity with the abilities of the others. The abilities are variations of two inseparable processes: first, a variation of a general ability shared by basic kinaesthetically functioning corporeity, and second, the individual variation of the ability, such as repeated efforts and retrials to accomplish a task. Here the first line of intersubjective recognition consists of pre-thetic enactments which are mimetic and continuous with activities of the other, and a mimicking that differs from what it enacts. It is a generality, which continues an intercorporeal function and a singularity that establishes variations of a function. Constituted abilities have a concretely enacted universality, accessible to all, and a concrete singularity that allows for variations. The universality is not an exemplified eidos in a single individual act, but the very activity that can proliferate across

variations. Because of this universality and singularisation "all at once" that both, what one can and cannot do are recognizable. The awareness that you can, but I cannot reach some specific object, already gives the generality of the reaching and its various articulations. In principle, each ability is a general and a singular variations without, of course, the loss of unity between individuals and individuation.

The generality is the precondition for practical activities and the use of technical implements. If human activity were a pure conjunction of sense data and physiological relays, it could never constitute practical implements. The latter are not based on reactions to a datum but require the transference of functions from one object to another. This transference is called by Husserl "analogisation". The form of analogisation in the practical domain is somewhat different than the one articulated in languages and even in relation to the constitution of the alter ego. Practical analogisation functions along the following interrelationships: first, the generality and specificity of an ability comprise a dimension that can range across diverse objects and constitute them as "analogous" to one another with respect to "what they can do". Second, "what they can do" calls for bracketing of pure "objective gaze" and a reduction of the given object to a factor in a corporeally functional system of orientations. Third, the analogisation is constituted 'on the basis of the task to be performed. The task sets the limit of analogical extension of "fitting" objects. One's ability can range over various functionally equivalent objects, e.g. a stick, a stone, a hammer, because each object is analogate of the other objects in face of the peg that has to be pounded into the ground. But one cannot pick a handful of sand to perform the same function. The task and the "means" are correlated, and the latter can be varied analogously up to a functional limit. At any rate, the dimensionality of an oriented activity is basic to the process of analogisation. Fourth, the dimensioned ability is extended "through" the instrument, and the latter becomes both a limitation and a specification of an ability. The range of an ability pervades the implement and is an extension of the power of the ability. No doubt, this principle is hardly recognisable in various complex technologies, be it transportation or computer, yet even these are pervaded by functional oriented bodily activities.

Apart from the constitution of abilities and their gradual sedimentation, the relationship between abilities-implements and the tasks dissolves the

distinction between what is "objective" and "subjective". It could be well argued that the abilities themselves are neither "inner" nor "outer", but are primarily effective. In the performance of a task, the abilities appear in the structure of the task and are transmitted through the various implements and material composition of the task. The substance of the task calls for and reveals the different abilities of the participants. In lifting, reaching, moving, using implements, we not only reveal what we can do, but also what others must do in order to "take up the slack" and "fill in" with their abilities the functions called upon by the given task. The "filling in" is called for and is both coextensive with and differentiated from the activities of others. The point of principle is that the mutual and at the same time differentiated abilities communicate directly through the task.

The communication here dissolves the brute materiality of the substance in a performance of a task and allows it to become a system of corporeal shifts and transmissions of requirements of the members engaged in a task. I "ought" to brace myself more firmly in order to pivot the load that the other is attempting to set into place. My "ought" is not read from my mind or from the others wishes but is transmitted through the load. Here I do not primarily observe his bodily moves, but sense the requirements of my activity directly through the load. This would be analogous to Merleau-Ponty's notion of the blind man's ability to see the composition of the surfaces at the end of the stick. If there are judgments, here, they are corporeal without being identical with brute facticity. The suggestions offered in this context and at this level of analyses are not designed to reject other functions of awareness, such as projects, rational deliberations, setting up of goals and plans; rather they fill a gap left by the over-intellectualised historicisms and sociologisms treating the bodily and the concrete world as instances of the pre-given rules, concepts and even linguistic generalities. Such historicisms are not wrong, yet they presuppose the concrete understanding of the functional corporeity and its sedimented abilities providing both intersubjectively general and at the same time individual context of activities. Without the practical domain, constituted by the acquisition of abilities within the parameters of the functional body, the historically transmitted understanding would be unsituated, two dimensional, and bodiless. The practical-functional body and its acquired abilities are not blind facts requiring mental illumination; they comprise

their own domain (knowledge that could be termed *practognostic*). No doubt intellectual activities can extend our practical knowledge, yet such an extension will have to take recourse to the acquired abilities, their generic dimensions. Individuated variations, intercorporeity, and analogical transpositions of implements and correlations to tasks.

The historical understanding suggested in terms of *practognosis,* is assumed even if not explicated by all theories of history, including pragmatism, Marxism, constructivism and even hermeneutics. Thus, historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections between temporal events, the assumption results in a positing of historical rules, be they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands, or some presumed evolution. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the invention of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant that the final purpose is in and part of history and hence one aspect of history and thus defies the very notion of a final purpose. After all, one historical event cannot be the aim of the whole. After this "final event" is reached, history does not cease and thus abolishes such an event as final. This outcome forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcendent historical aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot be historical and properly must be designated to be eternal. The results of this transcendent view are as follows: first, the best that can be obtained from it is a changeless dialectical structure or system and hence in principle static, yielding no historical development; second, transcendent, infinite being is unknowable by contingent historical actors (well noted by Kierkegaard) and thus cannot be a source of claims as to whither of human destiny; third, infinity has no temporal orientation and would not be an indice of a purposive direction of history; fourth, historical consciousness cannot escape self-destruction in terms of its claim to be universal and all inclusive, because, one, if all consciousness is historical (expressed pedagogically as an accumulation of knowledge) and must be historically contextualised, then such a conscious claim is equally historical and must be understood within its historical context; and two, the very ontology, which gave rise to the conception of mechanical world, is equally historical. Hence, if the mechanical universe were to be reinterpreted as one of having open meaning, i.e. signitive, then historical consciousness would

cease to be relevant. These aspects place current historical consciousness at a complete loss and a crisis. No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led numerous philosophical and scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of infinity, and cosmic order, all attempting to find some permanent component, even an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed and discarded like spring fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion.

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CHAPTER III

Life World

Introduction

The phenomenological and existential discovery in the twentieth century of what became known as "life world" is based on an effort to show that all sorts of modern western attempts to explain human life, its different customs, social arrangements, cults, scientific explanations, and even layers of interpretation, belong in a life world. Even the most novel event that might shock us to the roots of our being makes sense because it appears as alien to our life world. The alien event reflects back on the familiarity of our life world and the impossibility to doubt its presence. It can be argued that the famous method of doubt of Descartes did not encompass the life world as a whole. While doubting whether this or that thing exists, he did not suddenly see a hole in the world in such a way that doubting one thing after another we would be lefts with a sum of holes. To the contrary, no matter which thing might appear to be doubtful, the world we live in is never in doubt. The only way that the world for us can disappear, is if we disappear – but that is for us. Whether one is a farmer or a scientist, one has to contend with daily events, things, others, stars, their function in our nocturnal orientations and diurnal tasks which, in some civilizations are marked by time instruments – so to speak making us prisoners of our own inventions.

A cursory survey of works in a variety of disciplines shows a trend that tends to use the phrase *life world* or *lived world* as a basis from which to critique such cultural phenomena as literatures and positive sciences. It is common to treat the life world as everyday world, taken for granted prior to any cultural, literary or scientific engagements. It would seem then that life world is distinct from various human activities, such as sciences, literatures, rituals, and that the latter are founded upon a life-world. Thus, the forgetting of the basis in the life-world lend various cultures, and the current language of culturalism, an unwarranted pre-eminence. In the modern West, such pre-eminence is granted to sciences, as a cultural mode that wants to explain all life worlds. In order both to critique and limit such explanations, it is essential to show their basis in a specific life world. It is generally understood that a life world is an interconnection of meanings, where each thing is not

only categorised, but also "means" other things. A cup, as an implement, points to other implements, points to water, rain, rivers and clouds, places of pottery production, employment, wages, property rights and legal systems. Such "signitive" connections can be multi-layered, with meanings "overlaying" other meanings, forming not only horizontal connections, but also "vertical" obscurities. Thus a simple implement such as a cup has horizontal connections – as seen above – but can also have vertical overlays.

The material from which the cup is made can have scientific, chemical meanings, atomic and sub-atomic codes, each forming its own set of horizontal interconnections. Why we say "obscurities" because each overlay tends to intersect other layers and interpret them in ways that were not a part of the initial meaning of the level that is being interpreted from another level. For example, to speak in terms of physical sciences, one tends to use such language as "atoms" or "building blocks" and create a perception that everything is "atomic" and unrelated to anything else. In this sense we obtain a perception that the cup is simply one individual thing among others, or a human is an individual and society is a sum of "worldless" individuals, each having its own characteristics. Here we may, in fact, acquire two distinct modes of perception as to what a life world is: sum of individuals each with private interests – capitalism, and each individual, defined by social relationships – socialism. Then it would mean, that cultures, such as literatures, would make sense and have meaningful interconnections proper to their life worlds. Indeed, limiting cases can be used to show the veracity of such relationship between a life world and literary culture. In Christian, Marxian, fascist, Islamic life worlds, literatures that go counter to the requirements of their life worlds are banned and the writers punished. In turn, that the modern western life world has an overlay of scientific and above all technical cultures, does not mean that stripping away such an overlay would disclose the ontologically "primordial" and "pure" life world as a ground of meaning and sense..

Even if there were such a world, the disclosure of its sense is not a self-evident venture but depends on a specific phenomenological orientation. Such concepts as *ground of sense, origin of sense*, *sense overlay* and *sense transformation*, do not have a mundane meaning. They appear as traces of constitutive subjectivity; as a transcendental activity, the latter has a task of explicating both the life world and the transcendental genesis of sense of such

components as sciences, literatures within a life-world, and the very sense of a life world. Let us use an example of modern sciences: if we trace their genesis, we must "relive" the constitution of.specific sense configurations of sciences in order to trace them through various sedimentations all the way to the reconstitution of the originary scientific sense. This might be seen, initially, to be the historical task of the specific constitution of specific scientific structures during a given historical period. This historically transcendental approach may offer an access to the transformation of a life-world toward a scientifically reconstituted world. Of course, this does not yet demonstrate that there is the life world apart from the one now being globalised by the sciences and the one that the sciences left behind as, for example, the Medieval life world. This is to say, the extension of sense by the scientific constructions and their overlay of the prior life world does not imply that the previous life world was and is the originary, while the scientific is an overlay over the originary. If this were the case, then one would have to show why the Medieval life world, which was there before scientific life world, is the ground, and the modern activities are an overlay over such a ground. If this position fails to reveal the life world, then we are left again with a multiplicity of such worlds. The problem can be phrased in other terms: is there a pure life-world that is not intertwined with layers of cultural sense? The Medieval peasant as well as the Taoist perform minimal rituals that are totally coextensive with the formation of their sense awareness.

We can state that neither science nor other cultural constitutions of sense would comprise an overlay of an originary life world. Given this possibility, one is barred from finding an access to some originary life world. Thus if the modern life world is scientifically and technologically laden, then the constitution of modern life world is the very sense embodiments that comprise scientific-technological praxis. The functioning of transcendental subjectivity, as the genesis of sense is increasingly a complex and unencompassable process of those very sense constitutions that have assumed an embodied life of their own. In a manner of speaking, to trace the functioning of these embodied sense constitutions is to discover the ways they were intended initially. This is important in light of the possible claim that the embodied sense not only covers over the presumed originary life world, but that it has assumed a life of its own. This case is most obvious in the modern Western scientific/technical creations, and, in other cases, in

modes of comportment, rituals, all the way to "proper" emotional attitudes. All such givens are deemed to be "out there" requiring no legitimation; indeed, the very legitimation is deemed to be equally "out there" in the form of "higher beings" or scientific verities.

The composition of life world is "semiotic" in a sense that things are not just there in a homogeneous space and sequential time, but form a system of "signitive" interconnections. The moss on a tree points north, the morning star points to dawn, the bell in a school yard points to events such as danger, time for class, or departure. While such things are empirical, they also bear a meaning or several meanings, forming lateral and depth layers of signitive connections. In the main, such connections are social, cultural and purposive, and define what connections are relevant in a specific situation. An implement such as a cup has a purpose, but in addition has layers of meaning: thirst, liquid, such as water, coffee, juice, and also broader connections: rain, lakes, oceans, rivers, materials from which it is made, craftsmen, commerce, and even economy. A hammer signifies a nail, a nail signifies a board, a board points to a wall being built and the latter is a wall of a house, in a specific neighbourhood, etc. Road signs, such as 120 mean legal speed limit, required time to get from place to place, and legal system. Thus, while driving, one may suddenly see flashing light in the mirror. One does not react to such light as stimuli and simply blink one's eyes. The flashes mean police, signalling to stop, the signalling also means a violation of the speed limit, and the violation means possible fines, perhaps even an appearance before a judge; the flashing light discloses the connections in a lived world which includes us who are also activities which interconnect in such a world. The flashing light means that one has violated the law, will have to stop, be late for an appointment and miss a career opportunity.

Not all life worlds are alike; cultural anthropology has disclosed a great variety of them, each having its own set of signitive interconnections. While such a variety is interesting, our concern is with Lithuania and its life world which, in various ways, still contains traces of the Soviet Union and its imperial morphology. In that life world one had no such illusions as being born in an open society with duties to participate in public affairs and the right to challenge authorities. The latter could set signitive interconnections at will and thus change the meaning of social environment and all that belongs there and the meaning of a person. In that life world

Lithuanian language was secondary, while Russian was the official and counted as superior. In stores, the "attendants", many of whom were ethnic Russians, did not respond to Lithuanian language and, in many cases, told a Lithuanian person to "speak like a human". All events, from production to education, sciences and arts were signified as the best in the world. All "citizens" were living happiest lives and could not travel to see the misery of the rest of the world. Officials, i.e. the "immortals", were infallible, and the elite, due to its burdens, had to have luxurious lives. One knew that she could not worship her traditional saints, but had to adore the saints, such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, who had brought equality and prosperity. Living in such a life world became "normal" and indeed, after Lithuanians declared and gained independence, many of them longed for a return of the Soviet "order". In this order one did not have to think of what to do – the officials did the thinking; one did not have to look for work, the officials assigned one to a "brigade", and one did not have to think what to write – that too was a decision handed down from the officials. The future is clearly outlined and need not be of concern for the member of this society. In the new life world, suddenly one had to survive on one's own efforts and wits, and had to be responsible for his life, decisions and destiny.

Yet there was and continues to be another Lithuanian life world which was allowed in part by Soviet officials. It was a traditional "peoples" world, bereft of history in the sense of great figures, heroes, monumental victories, of an empire that once ruled Russia; it consisted of "peoples" arts and crafts, simple songs of nature, village, happy seasonal holidays (without saints or even pagan divinities), but full of chores and above all "communal sharing". Everyone was part of a community, full of warmth and joy, performing their common tasks without questions concerning the matters of the empire. Peasant, village life, attuned to the rhythm of nature and its seasons, although somewhat disrupted by "scientific socialism". Official literatures sanctioned and extolled this life world and in it the modern notion of "progress" did not play a role, even if the official language spoke of "production races" among collective farms. While this was a residuum of a capitalist competition, it was couched in joyous terms of the happiness to produce more than others "for the people". In this "peoples" life world, traditional Lithuanian customs could be maintained. A minor, but a telling point shows up if one pays attention to the simple names given to children

under the Soviet rule. The communist elite banned its rivals, Christianity with its correlates – Judaism and Islam – and thus the ritual baptisms. The latter sanctioned the names of the Middle Eastern famous figures, such as Mary, Joseph, Paul, David, Sarah, Peter, and so on; after this rivalry was abolished by the party, there appeared Lithuanian names, Rūta, Gytis, Birutė, Auridas, Daiva, Linas, and so on. This "peoples" life world is being purified of the Soviet rhetoric and is regarded as one of the fundamental cultural treasures of a tradition. It will be our task to note how it fares in the life world of globalization. But before that it would be beneficial to extend the composition of globalization in order to make clear the way that this little country rushes to enter "world history" and voices dismay at the prospects of vanishing as qualitatively distinct culture. To say "qualitative" is important insofar as the main metaphysical trust of globalization and its success is quantitative. This problematic was explicated at the level of modern ontology, and is relevant at the level of culture.

Modern Western Life World

Although by multi-cultural contemporary western logic, the modern western life world counts as one among many such worlds, yet it seems to be spreading its impact and "logic" globally, thus creating a global civilization without national borders. The task of this chapter is to extend the previously discussed ontology and metaphysics, including the making of history, toward another dimension of understanding suggested by the analyses of a signitive life world. This "logic" which is usually unnoticed is implicitly assumed as a ground of all global engagements. We know that throughout the course of the Twentieth Century scientific thought was in a quandary concerning its own basis: science with its theories and methods wanted to be logical, precise and rational; on the other hand, it also wanted to make ontological claims concerning the structure of the world. As was discussed in the last chapter, the world is deemed to be physical-empirical, regarded as the sole possessor of the honourable name "reality" and "objectivity" on which everything rests, by which everything must be explained, and from which all other modes of presence are derived. Resultantly, all else is subjective and to be excluded from scientific considerations. Moreover, science is value free and any valuation belongs to the subjective realm. It is our contention that the case is not only more complex but science assumes

the objectivity of something that is not derivable from any empirical facts. This is to say, the first condition of science – being logical or, in broader terms, formal – is not accessible from any empirical position; second, the notion that science, and indeed logic, as value free, is equally mistaken; given that there are various logical and self-consistent systems, the selectivity of one system over another is a matter of valuation and, above all, cultural valuation. Cultural valuation belongs to a life world that consists of intersections and overlapping of events, each pointing one to the other in complex ways, and each bearing various social meanings. In this context, science is one set of such meanings that must be located in its function in terms of its practical, cultural, and technical significance. This suggests that even technical inventions are not just entities, but comprise a complex system of life world interconnections, such as values, economy, education, productivity, politics, and even ideologies. This, of course, will have to be shown in a detailed and precise manner. We shall devote a more extensive analysis of values in subsequent discussions. Yet it is also essential to point out that the linear, mechanical time, as a basis for scientific causal explanations is surpassed and absorbed into the historical time which is more complex than the time of activity discussed in the previous chapter.

If social life is based on human experience and activity, then it is essential to understand the structures of such activity. Moreover, if activity and experience are temporal, then their temporal structures must also be delimited. There is a long tradition of thought proclaiming that time is linear flow of events in a causal succession. Although this tradition is still habitually assumed in many areas of human endeavour, it has been challenged by the best thinkers of the twentieth century. The problem of time, at least with respect to human experience and activity, is the following: if activity time is linear, then all past activities are no longer present and the future activities are not yet present and hence they can have no influence on our present activities. After all, past is no more and future is not yet. Of course it could be replied that the past is in our memory and the future is in our expectations; but if memory and expectation are functions of a subject living here and now, then such functions are here and now and cannot "go beyond" their temporal location. Real functions, be they mental or physical, are locked in their temporal moment. A theory of action, based on such a linear time conception is incomprehensible. The current action is all that is present, the

previous actions are remembered actions, i.e. in memory and the future actions are in expectation; hence any understanding of action's orientation would consist of memories and expectations. But since such memories and expectations are also present functions, then the temporal orientation of activity is reduced to a presently occurring subjective functions. The linear theory of time is thus totally inadequate for the understanding of human activity since such an activity is oriented temporally and assumes both present and future as field of that orientation.

It must be insisted that the objections to linear time conception do not invalidate its utility for sciences; they simply point out that linear time must be understood in a broader context. Such a context has been delimited by elucidations of the temporal structures of experience and action, and Luhmann's works complement and deepen these elucidations at the level of social theory. An analysis of human action and experience shows that they occur within a specific time-context. Whatever is experienced now sinks into a horizon which is not yet in the past but belongs to the present activity and experience. For example in the activity of speaking and listening, the entire statement or the entire speech is present. What has been said is a horizon of what is being said; the horizon is part of the understanding of the presently spoken words and sentences. Hence the present is not a point on a geometrical line but a presence comprised of horizons. It is still the same speech which is being spoken and heard. The past as such arises only when the present and its horizons are interrupted. Then we ask: "What did the person just say?" and orient ourselves deliberately to the past. In brief, memory-consciousness is distinct from horizon-consciousness.

The present also includes a future horizon of expectations of relevant possibilities providing an orientation for experience and activity. The relevant possibilities, belonging to the present speaking, are part of the speech in the mode of future horizon. The past horizon does not vanish into oblivion since it is required and retained for the comprehension of the future horizon. The present is thus a temporal field consisting of active past and future horizons constituting a field of orientations of human action and experience. Hence each activity occurs within a temporal field where the coming future and retained past are co-present and are manifest in the activity. What has been said in the speech continues to be present for the understanding of what is being said and is about to be said. Moreover, what

is about to be said is a condition for the understanding of what is and was said. Time of action and experience is a field. If human actions are based on temporal field then humans are not only temporal but also historical beings. This means that through actions humans make their history and since history arises through human action, then the very being of human is the history which she makes. But such a history is understandable only on the grounds of temporal field of action. This suggests that human conception of nature and its orientation plays differing roles at different historical times. But this means that what we call nature, and its assumed linear time, arises only as one class of phenomena within the temporal field of action. Before we can raise the theoretical question of natural time, we have already assumed the temporal field of action. Hence the orientation of the theoretical, linear time, if it is to make any sense as oriented time, must function within the understanding of temporal field of action.

This means furthermore that although we may analyse natural facts, their properties and temporal orientations, we shall discover that facts function and assume orientation within a context of significations. This suggests that each natural and historical event functions within the temporal field whose horizons are specified by signitive implications of such events. Thus historical events are not connected causally but signitively. Past events appear for what they are in terms of their signitive implications for the present and future. What is significant for human action continues not in some random heap of facts stored in some memory but in folklore, stories, monuments, architecture and myths which reveal the significance of past events and orient humans toward future possibilities. In this sense, history is the horizon of human memory implicit in the present temporal field and its horizons. Such horizons of memory do not reveal the entire past but make leaps connecting only the events functioning significantly in the present temporal field. This suggests that history cannot be understood as a succession of causal events but as events primarily connected significatively. In fact the understanding of causality arose within a temporal field. The notion of an uninterrupted stream of events, in the form of efficient cause, was developed in the Stoic reflections on nature. Before that "aitia" was not an efficient cause but responsibility. In brief, the temporal field of action and history did not arise from experience of uninterrupted events, but was developed from responsible activity and its time.

The signitive connection of historical events, coupled with the differentiation between the theoretical-linear and field time, account for the fact that there is no constant causal correlation between the changes in the natural and the historical spheres. Although natural events may change in accordance with linear causality, their significance and horizons of possibilities may remain constant within the temporal field of action. A tornado might uproot one section of a forest without changing the significance and horizon of possibilities of the trees: wood for the paper mills. The so-called material conditions may be similar, yet the structure of human action within a temporal field allows the conditions to assume an entirely different significance, function and horizon of possibilities. This thesis is admitted even by dogmatic Marxists, although they still wish to maintain, at least in principle, that the structure of human action must be derived from the material conditions. The same remarks apply to the technologically based notions of human progress.

Not all events play a role in human activity; they are selected and interpreted in accordance with the significance they have in the context of a particular activity and its horizons. Conversely, the horizons are also present selectively: significant possibilities are selected and insignificant rejected. The selectivity of events and horizons suggests a way to account for historical unity and continuity without the assumption of linear, causal succession. Although our process of selectivity may leap over events, their historical continuity consists of their significance within the temporal field. Even if the events are past and causally no longer efficient, their significance is still present. This does not mean that the significance of events follows a linear succession; rather the significance of the past event belongs to the present temporal field and its horizons of possibilities. It either expands or contracts the horizons by permitting the selectivity of more or less remote events as relevant within the present temporal field of action. It is also clear that the present field is multi-layered and thus replete with options such that certain options are taken up while others remain present in a tacit mode to be activated if the horizon discloses their relevance.

The expansion of the past horizon does not imply that the entire significance of history may be captured. There may be events whose significance and truth will manifest itself only in the future. Truth itself is historical and reveals itself in historical time. The social scientist and the

historian who know how to read events not as facts but significatively, may see the relevance of some past events reflected on the future horizon. In brief, the significance of an event transcends its present toward the past and future and the mere factual description of the event. The same holds true of past and future events. Moreover, the future horizon may reveal hitherto unnoticed significance of past or present events and add to the constitution of continuity and unity of social events and their historical development.

Life World and Limits of Selectivity

An in-depth investigation of the temporal field of activity is by itself inadequate without an extensive study of social structures as limitations to selectivity of significant and relevant events and possibilities. In the context delimited above, Luhmann has contributed extensively toward the understanding of the relationship between the temporal field and social structures. His suggestions are crucial for any progress in this area. Luhmann accepts the differentiation between temporal field and the theoretical-linear time and adds a qualification with respect to the selectivity of events. The past, present and future events assume significance and orientation not only within the temporal field of action but also within the horizons, views, aims and the prescribed selectivity by a social structure. Consequently, the structure of the temporal field of activity is limited by the social structure and its selected-selectable possibilities. At the same time the social structure functions within the temporal field which contains open horizons of history and its significance for the selectivity of future possibilities. Moreover, the open horizons constitute the region of possibilities outside the ken of the social structure: in terms of the social structure they are impossible. Yet precisely such "impossible-possibilities" define the limit of the social structure and its horizons and predelineates the orientation for fundamental social changes and revolutions. An awareness of the limits of a social structure and its possibilities is required for any fundamental social change. Yet the awareness of such a limit assumes a presence of a possibility by which to judge the limit and toward which to orient the fundamental social change.

Within a social context not all the possibilities are equal; some are more remote than others and thus not all are equally significant. It could be said that the socially impossible is the socially unrealisable; socially it is an "impossible possibility" and reveals the limits of social structure. Of

course the interrelationships between the socially possible and impossible are quite complex. What may be possible politically may be only remotely possible or even impossible economically; what is possible economically may not be possible technologically. Thus certain events may be excluded for the time being and become past for the social system. (Religions had become a private matter and no longer mixed into political-public affairs.) Yet they may be reinstated as significant for the social future provided a shift in social signification of events and temporal horizons has occurred. (Thus, more recently the same religions have assumed political meaning and shifted the interpretation of events thus transforming what is significant for today and the future). Of course, such a shift requires an understanding of "time-reflex" as a means of relating the social system to its possibilities and these in turn to the temporal field of action. The required complexities of time reflex cannot be here developed and will be reserved for the next section.

Although there are two major aspects constituting time reflex, their structures are similar. Hence we shall deal with one and refer to the other when necessary. The limits of the socially possible constitute a temporal horizon for the particular society which reflects the process of current events. Such events are temporal and their orientation, selectivity and significance are reflected from the future and past horizons. This is the first time-reflex. Since events are temporal, then the time reflex is also temporal with constantly shifting possibilities at the limit of the socially possible. The limits of the socially possible are manifest only with respect to the socially impossible possibilities. These constitute the open horizon of the temporal field of activity which is the basis for the historical development and orientation of social process. This is the second time reflex. It reflects the limits of the socially possible. Since the social selectivity process of events requires temporal horizons of the socially possible, then the temporal field constitutes a prerequisite for the understanding of the social processes, their limits and historical transformations. Were we limited to the current social conditions and socially predelineated possibilities, as sociologists claim we are, then no fundamental social transformation could occur. This is not to deny the limitations constantly imposed by the social structure and its possibilities; nevertheless such limitations are not absolute. We remain open within the temporal field of activity which manifests the limits of the social structure and the possibilities of its transformation. Hence the

temporal field is fundamental both for social transformation and for the relationship between social structure and its temporal development and orientation. This relationship can now be described as "time-reflex".

Any activity functions within society and time and consequently assumes the temporal field. In fact, as already noted, such an activity is totally correlated to the temporal field and its horizons. Hence, let us take as an example of an activity of investigating society and its temporal process. The investigation is correlated to the selected events and possibilities of a given social structure; yet the investigation requires a limit from which the social structure may be seen. As Luhmann would argue, a system reproduces its own memory of the history of selectivity .. of experience of the environment. (This is to say, a social system limits of what experiences will count as relevant and valid, what the factors of the environment will mean and which among them will be relevant for the social system) Yet beyond this it reconstructs a world-history of unaccomplished selectivity required to grasp the limit of its selectivity. (This is to say, a social system also reveals that certain things are not available, not allowable, and beyond the horizon of current possibilities) The limit is the socially "impossible possibilities" constituting an extension of the temporal field of activity of the investigator. Such a horizon of the temporal field reflects the limits of the social structure and its possibilities. Since both the social possibilities, as a temporal horizon of society, and the temporal field horizons are equally temporal, then the reflection of the social horizon of possibilities and their limit from the temporal field horizon constitutes a time reflex in time. In brief, the temporal field horizon has an indefinite depth of temporal possibilities which reflect the temporal horizons of social possibilities and their limits. Hence the time reflex, while relating the social structure to the temporal field of action, provides a fundamental context for the activity of socio-temporal investigations.

It is now possible to sketch briefly the role of the time reflex. Since the activity of investigation of socio-temporal processes relates the social structure to the temporal field horizons, then such an activity is totally correlated to the time reflex and, as noted above, to the temporal field horizons. Such an activity constitutes the "last interpreter" who, while dealing with socio-temporal processes, is herself temporal. The "last interpreter" does not have to assume an extra-social and/or extra-temporal stance in

order to investigate society and herself within it. This means at the same time that the changing, expanding or narrowing of the temporal horizons during the process or investigation also shifts the selectivity and significance of events and the continuation of social process by way of the time-reflex. Of course this occurs not only with the investigator of socio-temporal processes but with every member of society. Each understands events within the temporal horizons of possibilities co-present in the selectivity, orientation and definition of such events. Hence each member of society constitutes a time-reflex and hence the continuation of the social process.

It is ought to be obvious that the future horizon selects not only the current events and their temporal orientation and limits but also the relevant past horizon. In turn an investigation of past events and their possibilities may constitute an opening to the future horizon. Thus the influence of the past on the present and future is not causal but selective and significative. While moving toward the future, the investigative activity also selects and establishes the orientation and interrelationships of past-present-future events. Since activity is correlative to the time reflex, then the time reflex is the ground for the understanding of all temporal interrelationships comprising the temporal movement of society. It accounts for the distinction and interconnection between the present of the past, present of the present, and the present of the future. Each such present is given with its temporal horizons which intersect and are co-continuous with those of other presents. In brief, it accounts for the understanding of socio-historic presents as temporal fields with overlapping and co-continuing temporal horizons constituting the selectivity, significance, temporal location and orientation of events.

During the investigative activity the present shifts from one event to another that include shifts not only in the horizons of the present but also in those of the present of the past and the present of the future. Shifts in the present of the present include shifts in its horizons and correlatively call for the shifts in the horizons of the presents of past and future. Yet such a call is possible on the basis of the time reflex. The present temporal field, due to its time reflex, extends and overlaps with past and future temporal fields. What were still future possibilities and even impossibilities for the present of the past, may be realised in the present and even establish our future horizon of not yet realized possibilities and limiting impossibilities. (This appears in

various ways. In a legal domain of a social system, the constitution, written in the past, may be articulated at present for its possible reinterpretation as to what it might have meant in the past and what such reinterpretation might mean for future cases.) In all the cases the time reflex allows us to stay open within society and its limits and grasp such limits without leaving society or its temporal process.

If it is also the case that the current life world is interlaced by multiple scientific and technical discourses and practices, then they too must have meaning, and defy the modern claim that the world we encounter is meaningless. One cannot buy a cereal box without being exposed to multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, nutritional, caloric, etc. codes. All this also implicates productive, normative, and even legalistic interconnections as aspects of a life world. This is to say, the scientific and technical discourses and practices do not overlay some primordial life world, but comprise our understanding of the way our world and we are, live and relate. Our mass media are equally replete with reports of scientific "studies" and reports of inventions and progress, and even of protests against some scientific inventions and technical innovations – all being understood as aspects of our life world. No wonder, then, that our technologies are regarded equally as "objective" as trees and cucumbers. We already argued that the scientific practice translates into empirically constructed system through modes of praxis that gives us the common, everyday world of implements, nutrition, health systems, all of which are technical. There is an interpretation of the entire environment as accessible to technical management. In this sense, there is a pre-understanding that allows a given population to regard science as "value free" i.e. that all the things of our modern environment are "facts".

Signitive Life World

There are theoretical notions that something is either given as a fact or a proposition that is derived from a number of facts – a general proposition. Assuming that the move from facts to general propositions is even possible, such a move will not account for our disregard of the meaning of general propositions and their use in a context of formal demonstrations. This is to say that general propositions will turn out to be inadequate to demonstrate formal conditions. Hence, there is no connection between generalisation

and formalisation. Formal operations employ rules that need not respect the truth or falsity of general propositions. In this sense, formalisation is a signitive process that correlates to rules such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division in arithmetic; or rules of implication, inference, deduction in logic, which do not reflect anything that is available in generalised propositions. Thus we can operate by excluding both empirical facts and general propositions derived from them, and construct in turn empirical facts based on formal requirements. In brief, we can formulate mathematical rules and use any empirical fact to instantiate such rules. Moreover, using such rules, we can transform empirical facts by our practical activities in a way that the facts will be directly constructed on the basis of the formal rules. This is one level at which material technology arises.

Technology, at this level, is in principle a transformation of the environmental factors into signitive life world. This suggests that the very factual objectivity, transformed in this way, is a system of formal signitive relationships. Given that the modern conception of the environment is regarded to be the sum of material parts that are qualitatively and essentially indifferent, then such materiality can be used as a condition for any possible reconstruction on the grounds of formal systems. This state of affairs implies that our technical life world is more basically a system of signitive interconnections. In principle the formal systems already have a subtext: they themselves are technologies of reconstruction of the material environment. Thus despite scientific claims to be based on empirical facts, the practice of science that assumes the objectivity of formal systems as a condition for doing science is a process of application that treats the formal sciences as techniques requiring the reconstruction of the environment, in ways that the formal techniques imply.

While we granted the technical side of formal systems, which has been also granted by the modern sciences, we have not yet shown the connections between these formal systems and the material facts. Science takes this connection for granted without explicating how formal systems that science uses and the facts from which the formal systems cannot be derived are connected. One constantly talks about applying sciences to reality in order to test whether the application is warranted or not. In a superficial way, this is known as testing of hypotheses. Obviously, testing the hypothesis does not simply mean opening your eyes and looking,

but using highly sophisticated technical means. The latter are already constructed on the basis of formal requirements as a mediation between the so-called physical material world and the logic of science. In this sense, the very testing of hypothesis presupposes the background of formal systems that are imbedded in material techniques. Regardless how far we extend the notion of scientific testing, we should have to include the technological background as a condition both for the testing of hypotheses and as a scientific praxis that must translate every formal requirement into material conditions. Perhaps to our surprise, although it may not be at all surprising, there emerge phenomena that are self-generating and are beyond anyone's control: 1) formal systems that have no cause and no empirical base and disregard any empirical generalisation, and, therefore, can be used at will; 2) the empirical environment reduced to indifferent material substance that does not imply any qualitative differences; 3) any qualitative generalisations do not imply the formal systems; and 4) the view of the formal systems as hypotheses to be tested in the factual world implies that the factual world will have to be drawn into the signitive process of the formal systems. But as we said before this is technology – the formal systems are reified into sundry instrumentalities which, as mentioned above, compose the modern Western life world or, at least, intertwine with such world.

This logic of "self-generating" formal systems that get directly translated into material implements implies that even the material facts are co-extensive with the signitive domain of formal constructions. The latter, having no empirical ground and, therefore, not being caused by any psychological, social, evolutionary, or metaphysical components, may be regarded as a self-constituted and, thus, autonomous processes. After all, what is causally explained will have to have one to one correlation: given a specific cause, a specific effect will follow. But in signitive processes a specific formal condition will imply its consequences irrespective of causal requirements. This is to say that varying causal conditions will not correspond to the variation of formal conditions, and conversely. Formal-signitive implications are not of the same order as causal connections.

The transformation of materiality into signitive conditions implies that the social environment is a life world structure, consisting of a system of multiple implications. To speak in a limited traditional sense, all social factual phenomena are not merely factual, but already signitive. In this

sense, the world we live in is social, historical, scientific, and technical world of multiple signitive vectors, all comprising a modern life world. At this juncture, we no longer have to be worried about the mind-body problem where signification is somehow subjective, and what is not signitive is objective. The very practice of science has abolished this dichotomy, despite scientific metaphysics. Our argument so far grants that signification as meaning and/or sense making is already available at the formal level that is understood by anyone engaged in scientific venture and engaged in applying this venture to environmental material conditions. Once those conditions are "realised" and, therefore, science is "verified", we acquire a construct that purports to be explanatory and self-explanatory.

The reason for this self-explanation is the valuation which is in a background that grants certain formal systems the practical value to transform the environment in favour of the so-called "human needs". Once again, what is theoretically at issue is that human needs as empirical, be they psychological, sociological, nutritional, or economic, do not imply formal-signitive systems. Therefore, the latter will have to be constructed and selected as values to correspond to those needs. We must note that the selection of the formal systems as valuable to fulfil the needs has no direct connection with such needs. The latter are psychological, biological, social, economic, while the former are signitive. In other words, one is premised on empirical generalisations as various needs, the other is formal systems that must be connected to such needs by way of technical implementation. Therefore, the selection of the formal systems that would be relevant will have a criterion that has to be translated into formal systems. This means that the criterion will be some valuative principle that will facilitate the decision as to which formal system will be adequate to apply for the fulfilment of which needs. In this sense, there is again a way of saying that the formal systems have to become techniques to fulfil the criteria of empirical needs. Yet the process is still more complex: the needs themselves are also selected in terms of their significance in a given life world, and hence are not a mere observation and generalisation of empirical phenomena. In principle formal systems as signitive open a field for valuation to the extent that they can fulfil the desires that are equally articulated in terms of socially, psychologically, and economically signified needs. In other words, the very needs are significant by social and not by empirical definition. Not every

psychological wish, biological drive will be regarded as socially significant. In this sense only the significant needs will be granted value. What emerges here is a question of multiple valuations. What kind of valuations there are, and what kind of formal systems must be constituted to translate the material environment in order to fulfil the valuation of needs depends on the complex intersignification of the given life world.

The signitive logics that pervade the life world, with the latter's valuative selectivities, is also at the background of cybernetic revolution. This is to say, while the cybernetic revolution brought in computer science, it has at the same time included as a background of the self-generating process of formal systems that are translated and reified into the technical environment. The computerised logic as formal has no regard to anything that is environmentally, qualitatively differentiated. Its own logic does not need to respect the so-called "natural-qualitative" differentiations. Any living, working, suffering being in this logic of indifference that transcends such a being, can regard all events in terms of mutually replaceable variants. Social, economic, pedagogical, cultic, cultural givens are, in this logic, equivalences in normative exchanges. Whether something is labour power, art work, mysticism must subject itself to the requirements of formal rules of quantification. The latter, the quantification, must become the information to be transmitted globally. While previously tele-visual globalization was available and this globalization depended on valuative selectivity of large media organisations, the computerised globalization offers any arbitrary access to any selectivity. This means that rhetorical propositions as translatable into practices will be equivalent to other propositions. No external judgment is possible apart from an appeal to other computerised information whose credibility is simply the appearance in the global network. Computerisation opens up a domain of any space and any time accessed without history, without places and without times. It is a synchronic instrument premised on signification that is everywhere and yet not localisable. The age of the computer is a world of signification where there is no place and time and, conversely, where all places and all times are equivalently accessible. Our task is therefore to explore the domain of all places and all times. But before entering this domain, it is advisable to present another dimension of modern globalization which, in many cases, is seen as purely "objective" and value free. It is like saying that if we introduce

a technical means, the latter is simply a mechanical fact the use of which depends on a given community. The problem with such a claim should be obvious. The mechanism, such as a tractor, is built because of its value for agricultural production. Hence, its introduction in another region of the world, brings with it the value factor and adds another value: the tractor will enhance local "development" assuming the value of development and thus of bringing the local community closer to "world history". Thus, let us note what is at issue with fact and value in the modern west.

To understand more adequately the issue of value, we cannot rely on the initial modern notion that reality has no value and that value is a subjective imposition on an indifferent world of facts. The various major critiques of enlightenment, from Adorno through Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Levinas, to Deleuze fall within the parameters of one or another variant of this modern division, whether it is expressed as rationalism, psychologism, sociologism, economism, and even biologism. Valuations that are available, such as utilitarianism, deontologism, and voluntarism are equally variants of the modern West, accepted by its critics. Hence the brief task is to extricate the modern life world from such variants at its very limit in order to reveal its essence. The first is the well-known dualism of subject and object, the former is mind, the latter is matter, allowing the talk of values and value free facts. The subject is the unconditional source of all theories and values while the material world is an irrational and valueless sum of homogeneous matter to be constructed in terms of the subject's theories and values. Second**,** the subject is unconditionally autonomous source of all laws in both social and material realms. Since there is no other criterion concerning the material and social worlds, then all subjects are equal concerning the way that the material and social worlds are to be constructed. Third**,** construction is unconditional to the extent that no causes can be assigned to the structures and procedures by which the subject interprets and shapes itself, social relationships, and the material environment. In the language of the modern West, all are projections of human autonomy. Various terms have been used for projection: objectification, alienation, humanisation, and even self-realisation.

It is important to note that the term "projection" is basic to political and scientific enlightenments. Political enlightenment posits the subject as an autonomous centre of the public domain and all public rules and

appointments of governing entities. Moreover, the public domain of autonomous subjects is strictly distinguished from the private-social domain of needs, wants, desires and their fulfilment. If the latter entered the public domain, it would abolish autonomy and equality. Scientific enlightenment posits the subject as a rational bearer of theoretical and methodological constructs by which to manage the material environment in terms of projected human "needs". The latter are to be understood either biologically or psychologically and thus can be satisfied by scientific invention of "techniques" of fulfilment leading, to what is known, the reduction of scientific reason to instrumentality. The principle of "construction" inherent in the modern West, is the tacit basis of all post-modern and deconstructive "theories", extending the notion of constructivism to encompass all other cultures as equally constructed. In brief, such theories are another aspect of western globalization Fourth**,** invention of history and its progress toward a utopian society; the latter assumed various interpretations, yet common to all is the notion that humans can construct a material and psychological setting wherein all previous ills would be abolished. It is obvious that this utopian notion, as "the aim and end of history" is a mixture of political and scientific enlightenments. Fifth**,** the reason that this mixture had to be posited as a future aim is that political and scientific enlightenments became incompatible; the scientific enlightenment, and its promise to fulfil material and psychological wants, had to abolish the interpretation of human life as autonomous, unconditional and self-creative. The first requirement and interpretation of human life became material and psychological sum of wants and their immediate gratification. As we know, current reading of life and experience is regarded as a multiplicity of intensive pleasure nodes, each clamouring to be tickled, gratified, in order that new pleasure nodes could pop up for more gratification. Utilitarianism is the general ethical position wherein all things and humans have a value to the extent that they produce pleasure. Second requirement is the massive technology and its progress, designed for the constant fulfilment and constant invention of needs. The conjunction of these factors results in the abolition of historical aim and its replacement by progress for the sake of progress. This is obvious from the essence of instrumental rationality.

A brief mention of Lithuanian leap into the arms of the modern West appears at the level of hoped fulfilment of all sorts of "needs" previously not

even imagined as possibilities. This valuative ethos of expanding gratification has become a point of contention, framing Lithuanian debate between freedom and equality. The notion of autonomy, the view of the subject as self-creative had to be postponed and forever deferred, and also regarded as scientifically irrelevant and contradictory. It is impossible to claim that once the material and psychological conditions are fully established, then they will cause the human subject to be autonomous. As we know at the outset, autonomy cannot be caused. As just noted, this is equally problematic due to progress that can never reach any end and hence establish all the necessary conditions for emergence of autonomy. Every new condition, as a result of instrumental reason, becomes means for new conditions and new needs, and the latter split up into more novel needs. In this sense it is impossible to fulfil all human needs and then establish autonomy. Seventh, we are left with a democracy whose principle of human autonomy and the public domain wherein such autonomy is maintained and exercised is no longer available. It has been completely pervaded by instrumental rationality and the proliferation of needs and their fulfilment. Hence, the members of a political and democratic community are reduced to material life, psychological titillations, and chemical prolongation of boredom.

It is now possible to turn to the essence of the life world of the modern West is a process of valuation. Everything in the universe assumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that the world has no value, the world constructed by the modern West is full of values: labour theory of value values for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of life and even calculated death, social values and persons are judged as to their value in all of these settings. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valuative selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception are no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on its specific value. Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed relevant in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values are human and hence the primacy

is placed on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other categories and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values, such as technologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic biochemistry compel the understanding of the human to be equivalent to the rest of the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but will have to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus the environment, that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally objectively in terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such constructed technical values could be applied and thus useful and valuable.

We are now in a position to extricate the fundamental intentionality that constitutes this life world in its essence. To have some sense of this intentionality it is necessary to explicate the directly lived awareness that could not be posited as an object by the thinkers of the modern West. It ought to be understood that such a lived awareness is transcendental and hence accessible only reflectively from the meant objects that such a lived awareness intends. What then are these objects? While the process of valuation of events in favour of human "needs" was briefly indicated, i.e. various reductionisms of the human to biochemistry, genetics, and mechanics, the lived awareness subtending this process intends an objectivity which is unique to the modern West. One level of this objectivity is designed to be accessible to quantification and hence it has to be measurable homogeneous matter. This design, of course, is meant by a specific exclusion of the entire perceived world and hence in no wise accessible to experience. Yet covered by this homogeneous materiality as an intentional object is another intended objectivity: temporal possibility

The live awareness that intends such an objectivity is an empty will, prior to the question of its being free or determined. Phenomenologically speaking, there can be eternal possibilities, as Plato and Husserl have noted, but such possibilities have been already enacted theologically and in part metaphysically. The Modern West rejects eternal possibilities and is left with temporal, although in the first lived intentionality, empty temporal possibilities. It is to be noted that the term "temporal" does not suggest

"being in time", but an open horizon without any specific ontological locus. Hence any temporal location would have to be established within such a horizon. If we attend to the language of the modern West up to date, we shall note that subtending the question of "reality" there is a prior discourse concerning the "conditions for the possibility of reality". Such discourses are premised on the first lived intentionality of empty temporal possibility. It opens a horizon of possible intentions and their fulfilment, requiring a second constitution of objectivities: possible valuations of what the will intends as valuable for us, but recalling that at this level all value possibilities are open as temporal. In principle, it is possible for us to be all that we will as valuable in time. This is the alpha and omega of the modern West: empty temporal possibility and its temporal fulfilment by all that we value as our mode of final being. Both Marxism and capitalism offer the same intentionality. The intentionality of fulfilment of possible valuations as temporal does not lead to perceptual awareness, since the latter, in its naturalistic mode, is quite limited and merely qualitative. Hence the fulfilment requires a constructive intentionality that can establish possible conditions for possible reality. One minor aspect for this establishment is the shift of reason to instrumental rationality whose task is to calculate what reality is valuable for us and then calculate the conditions how such reality shall be achieved. Values, in this sense, are calculations of possible results realised solely as material. To achieve any value, the human has to be reduced to a system of interests, needs, desires, power and all must act aggressively against others to fulfil such wants. Indeed, language itself is split into numerous technical discourses.

The issue of temporal value possibilities is the driving force of the modern West at this level. Temporality is the pressure that demands a prolongation of our temporal existence. There is no other option; being temporal, we want to live as long as possible and hence the frantic rush for the latest technologies that promise to protract our lives. Such technologies have become equivalent to the value of life and death. The public domain is an arena for the struggle for life itself, and any means can be used, whether lying, killing, wars, all will do as well, as long as they promise to keep us safe, to insure our continuity at any price. All the changing technical inventions promote other inventions as values of life: we want to go on. *The transcendental rule of the Modern West, at this level, is ceaseless progress*

for the enhancement of the permanence of life. Thus the political shift to dramatic conservativism. The latter is a promise, by whatever means, to guarantee our security, safety, protection and continuity, as long as we surrender our freedoms to participate in the public domain and to engage in public dialogue. In other words, the public domain, as the condition for other democratic institutions, is no longer maintained, despite all the rhetoric about democracy and its "values". We are closer to the Hobbesian world than to that of Locke and above all Kant. The intentionality of the modern West has worked itself out to reveal its truth two centuries later. Indeed, we are living this intentionality as an awareness of our life world in such a way that while speaking of democracy, rights, equality and freedoms, we intend such a world as a struggle for temporal and technical continuity. Thus all is valuable that enhances this continuity – and purely materially – of course in complex formations that can be adapted for human life. We shall expound on the "ethics" of such adaptation in the next chapter.

The Meaning of Instrumental Progress

The ideology of science has been all along that there is a difference between value and fact, and that science is value free. We have argued that the required connection between logic and fact introduces a third component which at base is valuative. This is to say that the very understanding of application of logically framed theories or hypotheses introduces selectivity among various hypotheses and a selectivity what domains in the environment are relevant for application and hence techno-logical reconstruction. The reconstruction is an activity premised on human purposes and resultantly on various levels of valuation interpreted in various ways, such as sociological, psychological, economic, ideological, and even mythological. Since scientifically speaking values do not belong to objectivity, then they are part of the world either of subjective or intersubjective proposals. We are not contending that such proposals are totally arbitrary, based on individualistic desires, but we are contending that even when they are interpreted socially, they still are primarily values. Even if we quantify values and claim to have gained objective data, we have not, therefore, abolished their value function.

This leads us to the understanding of cyber rationality as purposive, value laden, and, therefore, premised on individual or social purposes. We

shall argue that the computer rationality consist of layers of value systems and in final analysis valuations that both promote autonomous selectivity and invention, and in turn place demands on individuals and groups. To engage in continuous proliferation of increasing efficiency and circular creativity requires that any logic that is translated into material implements becomes, in turn, the means to create more novel, encompassing, and efficient cyber logics. This is the subjecting process wherein one is compelled to constantly engage in research that is not designed only to discover new facts, but to invent new ways to establish logics that would become factually efficient. This is a magic circle. The more we constitute new logics that are translated into material implements, such ascyber systems, the more we are capable to use the same systems to open up new logics for their own material implementation. But the point of this magic circle is an increase in possibilities of valuative selectivity. The latest cyber machines can perform calculations that previous logics were incapable of performing. In this sense, the very latest machines can instruct us about the possibilities of new logics.

There is an available dogma that cybernetic science is objective and has no need for any values; after all, anyone can learn the latest computer programs and the required use of this technology. No doubt. Whether in China or Guatemala, the cyber mechanisms will be regarded as means to process and transmit information. Thus, the view is that computers are purely technical and indifferent means, usable by anyone, and therefore its only value is what particular groups or individuals want to give them. It is like saying that there are trees and whatever people want to make of them will give those tress their value. But this is a wrong analogy, because the computer systems are themselves information, and indeed selected information. First, the imbedded information is a particular logic of the computer (the software); second, its specific material design (the hardware); third, its economic system of values and the modes of production; and finally, the options that it suggests. In this sense, the objectivity of the computer embodies various levels of valuations. Those who acquire the latest machinery do not acquire means of processing and transmitting messages but also the messages of computer logic, embodiment, economy, and basically an entire life world and its social systems. Moreover, the logic of the programs is designed to process information in specific ways. While the user is told that he or she is free to access information, the information is mediated by the logic of the

program, the economy of affordability by specific group, in a specific part of the world, and its purposive rationality that would dictate the programs and the messages that the given population will access. In brief, the objective claim that computer rationality is merely a means for anyone dealing with messages is too restrictive to what computer logic is all about.

The point of our concern is this: first, the objectivity of computer logic is selective; second, the selectivity is imbedded in the production of the software; third, the software is restrictive to the extent that it prescribes and, we suggest, interprets the messages to be received; fourth, it constructs socio-economic parameters for the usability and affordability of this so-called value free instrument; fifth, the logic of the latest software demands the reproduction of hardware, leading to a constant rush for the latest technology. Otherwise the latest software will be in the hands only of those who can afford the latest hardware. In this sense, vast populations of the world may be able to afford the outdated hardware, and those so-called objective systems are split into the populations that can match the latest hardware with the latest software, and those who depend on the outdated hardware, and therefore cannot engage in receiving, producing, or processing the messages provided by the latest software. This is the paradox: as we have mentioned before, one requires a constant subjection to the efficiency and reconstruction both of the logics and the hardware that imply socio-economic valuation and the capacity, therefore, to acquire what would become, or for some has become, the latest.

The implication is obvious: vast populations of the world would be called upon equally to engage in valuation. Do we want the latest hardware to match the latest software? Or, do we want to protect the environment, to educate next generations, to afford decent housing or medical care? It is the case that all things cannot be accomplished at once, and to buy latest hardware may have to be postponed in favour of other human purposes and, therefore, to forego the receiving of messages that are deemed to be objectively accessible for everyone. We are suggesting that the introduction of the computerised systems around the globe is not an innocent presence of means to acquire information, but valuational requirements of peoples and their governments to deal with what is of greater value in a given society. In short, we are not rejecting the computer logic and its objectivity, yet we wish to show that it belongs in various value contexts. At the centre

of this valuative complexity, there is also the understanding that currently the valuations are computer mediated. They are systems of significations that are accessible to anyone and anywhere. Valuation here is part of the global selectivity, and the question is what type of value significations are currently prevailing?

While discussing time reflections in terms of horizons of possibilities, their calculations and reflections of possibilities within possibilities, we disclosed another level of meaning – temporal. This is to say that time (and space) wherein we locate empirical events is accessible only as a signitive framework of sense making to which everyone has access. Moreover, temporal possibilities turn out to be dramatically meaningful, since the technical (bio-technical, chemical, genetic, dietary) fulfilment means the prolonging of our lives, improving health, and even reversing the process of aging – being rejuvenated. Perhaps this is the basic reason that progress cannot cease: we want to live eternally – not in some other world but in this world. At this temporal-meaningful level, we find that the previously mentioned progress for the sake of progress, becomes instrumental. Given this shift of progress, it becomes clear that technologies are not only novel facts, laden with values, but also signitive in a different sense than discussed so far. Each technology bears a meaning prior to its being experienced as an implement. The researcher, dealing with some bio-chemical components, sees not only such components but primarily what they mean for future health, longevity, genetic engineering, for intelligence of future generations, and even excising certain human traits, such as "crime", abolishing some currently incurable disease. Although at one level, technical functions can be regarded as mechanical, to be fixed when broken, but at the signitive level they mean temporal possibilities to be fulfilled by the novel inventions.

To confirm this level of globalised logic, all one needs to recognise is the way biological research is discussed. Dealing with genetics, one literally calls the discovered genome in terms of alphabet. Thus, the genome is written in an alphabet of four letters – i.e. in human language which can be traced in DNA sequences. The real revelation appears in current research that promises to make it *possible to edit genetic information* quickly and cheaply. It is instructive that the research is not couched in the discovery of things as they are, but what they mean as a horizon of future possibilities which mediate the discoveries toward rearranging the "alphabet" in order

to improve its functioning. Thus, the research material is crisscrossed by signitive vectors as to what is to be done with the alphabetised materials. While the language of the "experts" might be mystical, their modern discourses are understandable. Thus there are bacteria can now make components that recognise viruses and can target them for destruction and prevent infections. Having this procedure at ones disposal, bio-engineers can make such bacteria that can target any sequence of genes stored in DNA, leading to a replacement of a defective gene with a new one. The process is regarded mechanically, where a defective part is found and replaced by a new part. If one were to use this biological technology in cells that make up sperm and eggs, the changes made would become inherited by subsequent generations. In short, we are entering a domain of "germ-line" editing, which is coextensive with the modern technical multi-discursive practices: if we can define it, we can make it. The attendant rhetoric is "world making" wherein any invention becomes part of our life world and thus changes this world. While popular rhetoric could be excused, since it is coextensive with all sorts of wondrous promises by political hacks, but this rhetoric has entered philosophy which speaks of "world making".

Going back to "eternal life" in this world, appears with the indication of the possibilities, such as curing genetically appearing "diseases" or defects, and rearranging the alphabet in ways that such defects would never occur again. And more to the point, the research heralds the distant prospects of parents building their children to order, i.e. selecting child's gender, intelligence, hair and eye colour, height, never failing vision and hearing, and emotional tonality. If consumerism continues, one could go "baby shopping" to a genetics outlet and order the desired product. To reach this stage, the rhetoric of progress is invoked. But the temporal reflections are also involved, since reflecting from the more remote future of baby shopping, such a future reflects other possibilities, such as enhanced chemistry, novel research facilities, such that these novelties reflect the technical work at present. It might seem that all this is "natural", unless one notes the "unnatural" language. In nature, there are no defects or diseases. If a specific gene functions differently, then it is natural for it to function the way it does. To assign to it a meaning of "defective" is a way of saying that it must be changed to have a "value" in terms of its meaning as being possibly what we want it to be.

And what we want is the promise of improved lives not only qualitatively, but above all quantitatively in terms of modern temporal measure – longevity. One prevalent aspect of quality is "things made easy," less effort, struggle, more leisure time "to enjoy" life, improved diet, lesser impairments and greater security at old age, and access to the latest health technologies to keep everyone young. Of course, economic "success" counts as one of the prerequisites, but no longer a guarantee of "happiness". These measures for western globalization provide a reflective contrast between the past "progress" and future "revolutions" with respect to longevity. In less than one century, more years were added to life expectancy than all previous thousands of years of human development combined. Indeed, the societies with extended individual lives appeared so suddenly that cultures, as a symbolic fabric that holds societies together are lacking behind. While this is a preeminent phenomenon in the West, it will be more visible with respect to cultures such as Lithuanian which, in its traditional sense, placed no emphasis on longevity, and during Soviet occupation, could not demand to be treated through technology, even including nutritional technology, to enhance the chances for longer life. Add to that other technologies, such as electricity, allowing for safe keeping of food; pasteurisation, water purification, disposal of waste diminished the spread of communicative diseases, and vaccination programs diminished premature deaths. While there was no genetic change for 10.00 years, the capacity of human organs improved dramatically. All these gains are at the macro level, even if they are results of technically enhanced life world. Indeed, the production machinery made our labours easier, all the way to the contemporary inventions of "The Internet of Things". They are household devices to relieve humans from a variety of "labours", from driving cars to cooking meals. They are "smart" devices that respond to sensory input without human commands. Example: the refrigerator can "read" the contents inside it, make a shopping list, and order right produce. Of course, the side effects of this "easier life" are also evident: obesity. Even this lack of activity and self-control is now regarded as a disease to be cured by new bio-engineering. While the already globalised world is rushing headlong into novelties, it fails to protect itself from its own inventions. The smart cars, for example, can be hacked and controlled by unknown intruders; the home gadgets can become an access to bedrooms and food dispensers, and the security devices can be hacked

to enter homes. This is a warning for those, such as Lithuanians, about the negative prospects of the rush to enter "world history".

The leap in time reflexivity, with its projection of possibilities within possibilities, leads to two mutually intertwined promises of longevity. First reflection from the future is the articulation of aging at the cellular and even genetic levels. Efforts are well underway to examine the various mechanisms of aging in order to slow it down stop it, or reverse it. The technical rhetoric is shifting from aging as inevitable decline of most functions, to aging as a disease that can and must be cured. The metaphors used are the likening of heart disease, liver problems, cancer, diabetes, to being seventy years old. The latter is just another condition to be treated by latest bio-engineering. No need to go into technical details, since our discussion aims at principles that play transforming roles of ourselves and our life world. After all, the varieties of research into the prevention of aging presume the same possibility: prevention and "curing". The second guarantee of longevity is "cure aging" before it begins. And this is the genetic engineering that will code the genetic alphabet to dispense with aging cells before they accumulate. Only the young cells will remain and keep a person young – at least postpone the aging into a longer future. As "scientific journalism" tells us, the baby born today in the West can expect to live up to 142 years. These excursions into the logic of globalization and its constant progress that promises virtual eternity, is relevant to Lithuania as it struggles to make sense of its position in the new life world.

Even if the linear cosmos is transgressed, the modern prejudgments remain: the world is a sum of discrete factors that can be analysed and rearranged at will. The rearrangements must be monitored carefully with respect to the possible negative side-affects – so prevalent in advertisements of latest "cures" of all sorts of illnesses and disease. But even these negative results are calculated as if they consisted of sums of discrete chemical or biological parts. Obviously, the researchers are not interested in the ontological questions as to the nature of such parts – they rely on the way that their arrangement works such that their rearrangement is equally tested for the way the latter works. This means that the rearrangement of genetic "letters" will result in higher intelligence, without understanding how a leap is made from genes to the presumed intelligence. Perhaps the latter will be tested quantitatively by requiring answers to specifically

proposed questions. At issue would be a question how the new quality – intelligence – is derived from the singular genetic parts which have no such characteristics as intelligence. Yet, when combined, they suddenly pop up with a qualitative characteristic not possessed by the discrete parts and thus form the mysterious thesis of "emergent properties". Such philosophical issues are significant to the ways that Lithuania is making a qualitative leap into globalization not realising that it might be exposed to the loss of what is qualitatively unique about Lithuanian culture.

The technical device, whatever it might be, does not appear as technical until it becomes misfunctional; otherwise it "disappears" in favour of its signitive aspects. The technological invention "joins" the life world and becomes coextensive with its system of interconnected meanings and is regarded by the makers of technology and the public as a "fact", forgetting that it is, more basically, a horizon of temporal possibilities, selected for its value in terms of its preeminent meaning for life. Of late there is much talk about "virtual reality", preceded by claims that all awareness and all images are simulacra. The post-modern crowd jumped for joy also proclaiming the discovery of virtual reality. They are too late because such a reality is the construct of the entire modern West with its progress that signifies never ending inventions which mediate our encounter of one another and nature – fully knowing that the latter, as it is experienced, is not reality; reality is the constructed, shaped, fabricated and constantly transformed "matter". But even the latter is mediated by the "presence" of future options for its reconstruction along novel and "improved" implements, such that the latter comprise an increased virtuality of our life world. We shall extend the notion of virtuality in the context of Lithuania and its shift to globalization. It is no secret that young intellectuals and academicians are enthralled by post-modern rhetoric and "virtual reality" constructs as surpassing modernity.

Meanwhile, the much lauded globalising process of cybernetic revolution is based on our ability to communicate irrespective of place and time on the globe, because we are not attuned to the instrument as a material entity, but to it as a bearer of meaning; indeed we know or understand what we and the others mean. This suggests that dealing with the computer technology we are presented with immediate access to the entire world, not because of our capacity to be empirically everywhere, but

because of the technical capacity to make present signitively constituted events no matter how far or near in the so-called measurable real space and time. It must be made clear that the modern life world, being globalised, is signitive, forming indefinite meaning interconnections, accessible anytime and anywhere. This ought not to suggest that signification is something eternal given beyond space and time; rather it is contingent to the extent that sense making systems are embodied in and maintained through the various technical means as carriers of such systems. When we speak of systems, we are in the same domain as logical or mathematical systems, assumed as given by any modern science. In this sense, when someone reads the computer messages, that someone does not question the presence of such messages, despite the empirical fact that those messages originated ten thousand miles away. One reads significations as temporally and spatially indifferent. In brief, prior to the question of where and when, there is an awareness what the message means and what sense does it make. Cyber space and time do not mean some "miraculous" world; rather it is the modern life world of realisation of embodied significations, with their indefinitely open horizons of possibilities. Yet it is also clear, that the notions of cyber space and time are metaphors which deviate from what was the ground of the linear construct of time, and the deployment of material components next to the other in a presumed homogeneous space. This is relevant at least at the level of production of novelties.

If the metaphors of modern construction of space and time will not do, then another ways must be offered to understand the global life world of signitive awareness. Mass media is replete with reports of events around the globe that are local and yet globally present through most varied means, each lending support or at least acknowledgment of such events. The so-called Arab Spring depended on instant communication and attraction of peoples globally, such that an event in one location signified similar events in other locations> Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, etc. all interconnected signitively with the meaning "revolution". Other examples are equally available. This suggests that the signitive connections are not sequential, but integrative in a sense that they are co-present "atemporally" and "aperspectively". We are aware of such events not only from our temporal point, but from other temporal points simultaneously, just as we are aware from our spatial perspective with the perspectives of others. At the outset,

we have left the fragmented modern temporal sequence and discrete points of space of modern cosmos. The logic of integration has very little to do with the forming a global unity; to the contrary, integration constitutes a field of differences in such a way that an understanding of a meaning demands the presence of different meanings. The simple term "high" means only because it is different from the term "low" and conversely. This logic of "difference" is as old as philosophy, but today it has become preeminent in dealing with cultures, to the extent that a recognition of globalization and its results is required to understand the difference between globalization and Lithuanian cultural identity.

In our argument, we note that the reading of a message is prior to and pervades the empirical means that transmit the message. Computer, as technological means, is in modern space and time, but it is designed to carry the presence of significations that have no specific space-time positions. This would be analogous to the construction of the non-Euclidean space. The latter has no empirically given intuitive component. It is a pure system of formal constructs that does not point to any material, mental, or other "realistic factors". Yet non-Euclidean geometry is regarded as an important way of articulating (if not actually constructing) other dimensions capable of transforming life world environment. This kind of non-positional objectivity is a condition for computerised communication to the extent that it does not require either the senders or the receivers of messages to have the same mental-physical experience. As we suggested above, there is a variation between the empirical and the signitive such that it is possible to have different empirical factors making the same sense and one empirical factor having diverse senses. Since the major level of computer signification is logic, then there is a constructive connection between this logic and various life world facts, and in turn such facts can be articulated and reconstructed by different computer logics.

Given the cyber technologies as bearers of non-positional logics, and given that they can be proliferated by other appropriate technologies, then in principle it is possible to select and to transmit the sense of any event as if it were immediately present to anyone. What is at issue is the process of selectivity that is not implied by the constructed logics and by the empirical events such logics frame. Here we encounter the question of selectivity as valuation. Among numerous events signified in a life world, some are

regarded as important and valuable. At this level, valuation does not have any rules that could be derived from either domain, the formal-logical or the technically constructed events of the life world. What is required by our analysis are the value conditions that connect signification and such events. We have reached the previously mentioned requirement of connecting logic with fact, mathematics with data, and sense making with events. Since the systems of signification are made at will, they themselves do not imply which of them are relevant to the social, economic, pedagogical, cultural aspects of a life world. Resultantly, the very constitution of signitive systems requires a value criteria which would say: 1) what formal systems among all possibilities should be applied to what aspects and events; and, 2) the criteria for the constitution of specific formal systems must be part of a society, a political society, political economy, political economical ideology, that would provide a clue concerning what is relevant among possible formal systems. In fact, we would argue that the very construction of computer technology based on logical signification is a technology that embodies valuation. This is to say, we elect to build this instead of other technology. This is simply to remind us that technology embodies valuative conditions and therefore it cannot be regarded as a mere empirical fact. Lithuania must also involve value selectivities of what is meaningful.

What is appropriate to the theme of space and time is that the technical means that embody the formal logic and its valuative subtext can be produced and set up anywhere and anytime around the world. Yet it is to be noted that such a set up carries with it the social-cultural, economic, and signitive life world. Thus, first world imports and transfers of the latest technologies to the third world in order to help "develop" the local populations, to make them aware of the rest of the world, in brief in order for them to be signitively accessible and accessing events no matter where and when. This globalising transference of technology brings with it non-positional space-time to all who can afford the technological means. We must remind ourselves that those very global means are not mere empirical data or facts, but carry with them valuative conditions and a signitive lofe world that is inserted into a local world. . For the modern Western understanding, values are deemed to be subjective, in contrast to the objectivity of the empirical, and as we have argued, to the logical-signitive domain. Yet the very selectivity of certain logics over others, and of their

connection to the events is valuative. Exporting cyber technologies also includes the export of values imbedded in technologies.

With regard to Lithuania, the cyber life world brings a great variety of means, from smart phones, through birth control to biological engineering – and all value laden in terms of their utility. But Lithuania, at one level, was, and continues to be, a colony of Middle Eastern symbolic design with its life world composed of values and signitive connections. Thus, certain technologies and their open availability would clash with Middle Eastern symbolic designs, ad do so absolutely. There are complaints that by joining European Union, Lithuania is forced to accept values incompatible and unacceptable to "Lithuanian tradition", i.e. Catholicism. This is not just the controversy over homosexual rights, but reproductive rights of women, chemistry for birth control, technical means to change one's gender, and educational programs. The strife is between two universal claims, one symbolic that is structured by value selectivity, the other secular, with the promise of longevity and pleasant, easy access to ever improved means of satisfaction. This is an indication of the global ethic that is a part of selectivity of what is relevant or significant from the future horizon. There is no need to enter the grand philosophical debates concerning the ultimate good, true and beautiful. Such debates have long since been discarded in favour of a modern quest for "happiness" as pleasure.

So far so good. But a question remains: why the rush for the newest computer logics, newest and fastest materialisation of such logics, and the very transformation of the materials into previously unheard of combinations: chips, conductive systems, miniaturisations, and massification that lead to increasing compacting of functions? Certainly not for the sake of scientific discovery of "objectivity", since the interests and valuations do not aim at objectivity but at its transformation. The more plausible conclusion is this: the entire process of metaphysical signitive constructions that are directly shifted to application and productivity, imply – strange as it may seem – signitive power. To understand the latter, we want to argue against the notion of causal power of classical tradition: all events in nature have their specific causes. Yet for modern understanding, signification, comprising at one level logical and quantitative interconnections, has no causal power. The logical connection "If P then Q" (if it rains then the ground will be wet) cannot cause rain, since it is an empty formulation that can be applied to

anything. Yet what modern understanding of constructing of logic implies is this: if we want rain, what logico-mathematical formulations must we invent and how such an invention can signify the production of the material conditions for rain. In this sense, valuation implies a selection of logics that are materially signitive and hence are "empowered" to transform the environment. Signitive power, in this sense, becomes the metaphysically preeminent regard toward the world. It appears in socio-economic currency as "power of ideas", or "clash of views", or "progress comes from ideas", or "we need people with creative ideas", etc. In the classical regard, creative ideas belonged to poetry, theatre, and rhetoric, but currently, they are the very power to elicit transformation of the environment, including the human as an aspect of the environment (e.g. genetic reconstruction of the human). Indeed, the battle for signitive power has intensified to such an extent that even some main stream journals are talking about "who owns your ideas?" In short, signification has to be adjudicated socio-economically and even legally. (Mann, 1998) Once again, one is no longer concerned with "pure metaphysics", but with metaphysics as power.

Here our argument becomes quite obvious; computer systems are embodied metaphysics of signification and hence have the power to increase the complexity and efficiency both of signitive creations and also of their applications for transformation of the so-called physical environment. Thus the talk of the new generation of "more powerful computers" is not an idle speculation, but must be taken literally. As signitive constructs, they are in the position to rearticulate and, through application, to transform events in a given life world, and, in many cases, to rearticulate the life world itself. Indeed, they are part of the events that they transform to the extent that they are interconnected laterally with all other events, from economic, through political to cultural. They are the very fabric of current "culture of information", and information is in principle signification.

The very formulation of logic as purposive and applicable implies that this logic is the basis of power. What we are suggesting is that the ground of various current theories, advocating the primacy of discursive power, are premised on the notion of application. Discourse as discourse would have no power unless its significations not only define but also prescribe the rules of transformation of events in a life world. What is at issue here is the radical arbitrariness and contingency of the notion of logic. While

initially logic was regarded as the bearer of necessary rules, capable of deciphering the rational structure of nature, now it is seen as a construct that follows unfounded purposes. In this sense, there can be many logics wherein each is designed to perform a task and hence to be the source of power. As we mention above, the age of information, or what some people call post-industrial society, is totally premised on transmission, appropriation, creation, and combination of signitive processes. Even the traditional notion of capitalism as producing and selling of material values has become redundant. What the material values embody is a level of information that is more important than the material value. In this sense, the information imbedded in computer logic is more valuable than the material production of the computer. This value is of course extended to all social domains. As Boudillard has pointed out, the social positioning of persons is not economical, but signitive (Boudrillard, 1981). People buy signs of importance, even if such signs are simulacra. I am not rich, but I post signs of wealth. This phenomenon of signitive importance is paraded in the mass media when people of the so-called third world exhibit their computer knowledge and indeed a possession of the latest hardware, despite the fact that the primary needs such as shelter, clothing and food are quite inadequate. In short, we are up to date, and therefore we are significant.

The computer logic is at the same time the logic of contemporary political economy and social self-understanding. In principle, the instrumentalisation of logic on the basis of valuative requirements is also instrumentalisation of all signitive domains that are deemed to be of value because of the power that signification opens. Computers are coextensive with the fabric of the globalising processes that are engaged in transmission of information about and through everything. It is of note that even the previously exempt areas of imaginatory signification, such as film and video production, have now become a prerogative of computer information. This is to say, there is a digital translation of material products such as tapes into pure signitive processes that can be access through computer logic everywhere, anytime, without any need to transport things materially. All one needs is a logic to deal with any materiality, and therefore, translate any materiality into signitive power.

What appears here as a conclusion of the Western modern modernity with its metaphysics and ontology is, at one level, a reversal of explanation:

the usual ploy was that we can explain everything materially, in terms of cause and effect. But our argument had already suggested that the primacy should be placed on the metaphysical side. In this sense, at another level, the current digitalization of signification and proliferation of information systems reveals that modern science and technology are basically metaphysical, that is signitive. To speak with historical hermeneutics, we can claim that the truth of modern sciences as metaphysical, appears in the globalised computer logic under the guide of the age of information. In other words, the truth of a particular position, even if not recognised by those who proposed this position may appear centuries later. Our argument can be supported by the following consideration: the transportation of material things that may depend on cause and effect is being replaced by processes that defy any kind of space time continuum. The metaphysical signitive processes are non-temporal and non-spacial since their meaning is transmitted directly. Yet this process is also immediately translated into materialisation and realisation of how to change material events in any part of the world, and therefore, to acquire material power. Not to be comical, nonetheless, we would suggest that this is Plato gone mad. At any rate, our argument that modernity consist of specific metaphysics and its correlate ontology is borne out by the current phenomena of signitive logics at all levels, although centred in the computer logic, that have become global preoccupation of peoples who had never heard about western political and scientific enlightenments.

Postscript

While current literatures are still talking about economic and material interests, psychological securities and insecurities, and desires of populations to become part of modern history, we contend that these designations are surface appearances of the Western modernisation with is metaphysical and ontological grounds that have been unrecognised so far. While we are not the first ones to suggest that formal and mathematical processes are involved in articulating the world, our claim is that there has not been a recognition that the formal-quantitative procedures are at base metaphysical and therefore free from the constrains of space and time, and that they have assumed priority over the material. We contend that the conditions for the possibility of globalization are not economic, psychological, even

ideological, but signitive. The reason for this claim is that before a particular people in global economy will acquire the economic conditions to better their lives they have been already informed signitively of what is the better life. And the better life is the possession of modern technology, specifically information technology such as computers and their logic, and above all the value preferences imbedded in this logic. This logic, in turn, is the end of temporality, end of history; it is all encompassing logic that can transmit its values to any village with promises of the production of anything that the logic signifies in global economy. Of course, the villages would be able to access the information once they have accepted the latest computer--to access this information. The latter is laden with value offers, specifically with images of the "good life" that will require the materialisation of this signitive power. We see the images, then we buy into the global economy to materialise those images in the forms of beauty, sun glasses, jeans, Kellogg's cereal, and sundry overproduced and overpriced cheap commodities. Computer is the metaphysical logic that has the power to accomplish this task. Of course, we shall not make a judgment whether this accomplishment destroys or saves the multiple ways people have lived or want to continue to live. This is to say, will they be absorbed into the metaphysics of transformation of their environments in order to join the global nexus? Or will they be able to maintain by virtue of the mass means provided by the acquisition of computers and their logic to maintain their own difference? This subtends the entire discussion of multiculturism, environmental protection, and even the rights of peoples to self-determination.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER IV

Past and Future

Introduction

The story of the demise of the Soviet Union and the preeminent role played by Lithuania in its demise is loud and clear. Equally, the transition from the Soviet life world to the European life world has been articulated. What is missing in this transition is the difference between the Soviet empire and Western globalization. In the first chapter the discussion focused on various tendencies to expand the symbolic designs of a particular dogma by power or deviousness, offered as some sort of benefit for indigenous groups. This level of empire building is global and involves military excursions and clashes, and a struggle for acquiring converts in each other's territory, but no other benefits. Lithuania found itself in this context twice. First, the Middle Eastern symbolic invasion in one of its variants – Catholicism (which had to compete with the appearance of another variant – Protestantism) the benefits of which were rhetorical. The pagan life world was recoded in terms of the Middle Eastern texts. Actions became moral or immoral, couched in the language of sin and forgiveness; class hierarchy was established with highest authority coming from another land, although exercised by "legitimate" clan of shamans. The fruits of human labour became a gift from a supreme patriarch, such that the people were his children. Meanwhile, there is the representative of this ultimate patriarch, and he is called "holy father" and his lesser functionaries equally called "father". While this symbolic design colonised the Lithuanian population, it did not add anything novel for understanding nature and the way that the population regarded its environment. Life still moved in season, even under a different rhetorical images such that the rebirth of nature in spring became a ritual of a sacrifice and the rising of a Rabbi from the dead, and the annual season at the end of a cycle, celebrated with a tree to signify the coming of the green spring, was replaced by the birth of Middle Eastern fable of a child; no new crops, no "divinely" enhanced and improved children came to populate the region. The transformation is ritualistic with an introduction of external autocracy.

Meanwhile, the emergence of another symbolic design which, in fact did not deviate from the first one, was brought in from Russia – a patriarchy

that reflects the absolute consciousness of historical materialism. The arguments in the first chapter demonstrate that "materialism" is not an expression of some given reality, but a modern acceptance of an ontology for the sake of mastering of the environment. Thus, it is already a position that cannot be taken as absolute and must be regarded as hypothetical, specifically in light of the fact that it cannot account for the many layers of signitive connections of any life world. Indeed, it could not account for the absoluteness of such consciousness, since the latter must also be a result of specifically devised material conditions, such that with the change of the latter, this "historical materialism" would have to change. In addition, the arguments in the second chapter indicate that not all traditions are historical, and that the history of materialism is of a very narrow scope: modern subject. With these remarks, we can return to this symbolic design of "materialism" and note that after the Russian change of the heads of the empire, nothing else has changed – except an increase in mass murder. All the nations that were conquered by Russian empire were incorporated into Soviet empire – not for some grand improvement or progress, but for maintaining the same patriarchy of a Czar; he is the head of state and the legitimate representative of divine plan – of course now in the guise of materialism. Occupied territories were reorganised under feudal agrarian system wherein the masses would be strictly controlled and monitored. The same secret police, invented to maintain the Czar's power, continued to maintain the new Czar's power.

Before the complete reincorporation of Lithuania into the Russian empire after World War II, the country was beginning to prosper and gain a modicum of creative independence – and that despite the tendencies of Lithuanian elected officials, such as a president, to be autocratic – and establish thriving agriculture and commerce with the West. Had Lithuania retained its new independence, it would have grown with the rest of the West; but the empire extinguished what progress had been made and returned the nation to traditional Russian serfdom – dramatically unproductive, backward looking and constructed to serve the needs of the less productive Russia. The latter, with its vast natural resources, fertile lands, could not even feed itself, not to speak of extending any productive and above all, technical capacity across the globe. In brief, Russia was not engaged in globalization and prevented any vassal nation under its rule to become part of the modern

global venture. Of course, there was the Potemkin sites of advertisement, such as Olympics, sending Bolshoi ballet to bring culture to the "sister" republics, and, above all, show its military gear. The rest – a drab life, long lines for daily staples, and crammed living spaces. After all, the "working class" has rejected the luxuries of the bourgeois. Who needs such luxuries as bread when potatoes will do – provided the serfs produced enough of them. It can be said that the reach of Russian empire by military and missionary means, was an extension of power without any significant addition to the lives of other nations. Russian country side was a residuum of 18th century, as became the case with Lithuanian agriculture when it was pushed back into serfdom (under the guise of collective production.) After Lithuanian winning of independence, the visitors from abroad were astounded that the level of innovation, present in simple food stores – even in major urban centres – has sunk below the pre-war level: calculation of customer purchase charges were done by abacus. Some visitors even suggested that this was the Russian way to demonstrate Russian authenticity. To be blunt, any significant novelty in technology that would serve the population was minus zero, although some propaganda innovations, such as Sputnik, were produced. Certainly the population was not globalised in the sense of seeing the rest of the world, either by traveling or at least through mass media. The world of patriarchy in which "father knows best", could not allow the children to be corrupted by decadence, even when the patriarchs and their retinue could "suffer" the luxuries of the decadent West. Brezhnev enjoyed a fleet of sports cars just for the sake of looking at them. Meanwhile, mass media was extolling the great achievements of the Russian empire (for rhetorical purposes renamed "The Soviet Union"), and the good news of the collapse of the "Western imperialism", which kept collapsing but never fell down.

A note concerning the claim that the Russian mass media during Soviet period, engaged in manipulation of public opinion, to the point of telling lies, presenting false data, and thus leading the public astray. This claim cannot hold for the following reasons. The Czar (head of the party during Soviet period), and the hierarchy of officials did not have to justify themselves, since there was no public which could play a critical role in questioning mass media statements. In brief, the patriarchs could say anything without fear of being contradicted. Manipulation of public opinion requires an open public domain in which an independent investigation could show

that the autocrats lie, and thus attempt to manipulate public opinion. That was not the case in Soviet times; no contestation was possible and checking of the media reports were not permitted. Those who dared raise a voice of concern, were immediately silenced. Manipulation makes sense only in a political society where a reflective domain is given: I can see otherwise on the basis of other information. Of course, reflection was available to the autocratic elite and its hierarchy of functionaries. The latter had to collect the data from all areas of productivity such that the latter had to correspond or surpass the five year plan. Hence, if a functionary submitted a report to a regional committee, and the report was not up to the five year plan, he was asked to "correct" the report such that at the final accounting the five year plan was surpassed by 10. 20, even 30 percent. This is to say, the functionaries and the elite were in a position to reflect what is there from a postulated plan "what must be there" and the latter was paraded in mass media as a fact. Perhaps "the people" suspected that not all is at it seems. Five years plan has been fulfilled and with surplus, but the lines for bread and potatoes are stretching around the block.

Another aspect of mass media pronouncements had to be counter-productive. If the West is so impoverished, if the people there are hungry and live on the streets, while the rich enjoy all the luxuries, then, first, why not let us see those places and tell the people how good we have and, second, why do the elites slip up once a while and proclaim that "we shall catch up to the West and even surpass it". Such rhetoric suggested that the West has become the dreamland: America. Even Russians, who came to Lithuania as visitors or were allowed to come on vacation, were awed: Lithuania has bread and meat, and vegetables and milk, and cheese – it is like America. Even under the conditions of serfdom, Lithuanians survived better and even fully supported the major Russian city Leningrad. Lithuanians had no question that they could do immensely better if the system would vanish. Moreover, while many intellectuals had to survive by adhering to the rhetoric of the empire, they were also cognisant of western literatures, philosophies, important intellectuals in the west and were ready for a radical change. As one colleague stated: "We were tired of being afraid". Sąjūdis, "the movement", was organised by thinking persons and not the technically trained functionaries. Philosophers, writers, artists, historians were at the front of demanding Lithuanian independence – and got it.

Into the Future

While still present in numerous forms and institutions, all that was part of the Russian/Soviet Empire, suddenly became the past, to be left and hopefully forgotten. All the safety, protection, familiarity of that life world ceased to have any meaning. This is not to say that vast numbers of Lithuanians suddenly acquired a new consciousness and became Western. Apart from what the Soviet press, education, culture told them about the West, their understanding came from rumours and stories. Yet in principle, the shedding of the past had to be absolute – revolutionary. Above, there was a brief discussion that the term "revolution" does not define changes of heads of empires; one autocrat is cast out, shot, hanged, poisoned, and is replaced by another who continues the traditional power policies. Young Catherine gets her husband Peter snuffed out and becomes acclaimed the ruler of Russia. Lenin deposes the Czar, and later Stalin deposes Lenin – in short, a traditional practice continues. For the population the only difference is the name of the autocrat occupying the throne and, some hope that the latest might be more lenient than the previous autocrat: Lenin had only 10 million killed, while Stalin was more "severe" and was successful of killing not only millions more, but also got rid permanently of his closest and more remote associates. In this context Lithuania was revolutionary, since it did not depose, shot, hanged, or poisoned the autocrat in Moscow, but formed a political society where the final arbiter in all public affairs would have to be the population, with no "leader" with power.

In this chapter we shall examine what sort of technological globalization is sweeping across Central Europe and what sort of means the national/ethnic groups are promoting to counter globalization and the creation of nomadic civilization. Some even go so far as to enlist diaspora and promote "ethnic pride" abroad, while others argue that those who have left for "better life" abroad, should no longer be admitted to claim their national birth right. While such debates are significant, it is also significant to understand what sort of power and attraction globalization offers that cannot be easily escaped. This is specifically problematic in the absence of any clear philosophy – if there is still a philosophy – capable of articulating fundamental principles not only of globalization, but also of what in essence is Europe and, within its parameters, what are the ethnic groups that *must* preserve their uniqueness as an enrichment of diversity and hence Europe

and humanity. After all, Lithuania is boasting that its culture is the main preserver of an ancient, Indo European and even Aryan tradition in its language, matriarchal customs, and attunement to nature. Whether this is true or not is left in the hands of scholars. For our purposes, the very notion that Lithuania has a distinct culture raises a question whether it can be preserved in the flood of globalization.

In principle, Lithuania is leaving a long tradition behind, discarding all of its familiar rhetoric and submission to arbitrary edicts, and standing alone, stripped of all ritualistic garb, its built in psychological factors, and simply pointing to a totally unfamiliar future. This is a revolution for "here we stand" at the inception of a new life world whose principles and contours we have to create by ourselves. It is a point of terror: what to do, how to live, whence and whither is our destiny, what or who await us: the shocking answer is equally strange. You decide and what you decide will be your responsibility without an appeal to authority, to prescriptions, not even to some standard of who you are. Even the latter has to be surrendered, because what up to know you knew of yourself belongs to the past. In face of this "terror" you will have to decide who you are. And yet, Lithuanians stood alone as if to say: here we stand and cannot do otherwise.

Meanwhile, an appeal to Lithuanian culture, as a stabilising cushion, was precluded by the lack of cultural information. The education in the empire had a curriculum where history was designed to suit Russian interests and the primacy of Russia in the entire Soviet Union. Russian language was a requirement, all great achievements throughout history were assigned to Russia, Lithuanian tradition literatures – apart from those that were favourable to Russia – were not available and if available, only to select and trusted persons who were charged with writing reports, showing the erroneous ways of such literatures. This meant that even Lithuanian culture was part of the future, to be either discovered or invented. It will be interesting to discuss some issues concerning the difference between discovery and invention, since the modern thinkers and their postmodern followers, take for granted that cultural dimensions are invented and that even the study of the past is an invention. Good examples are hermeneutics and deconstruction. For the former, any text is an interpretation and the language in which we live as an interpretation, cannot be surpassed: we live in that language. Any attempt to reclaim the real past as a culture, would be

an interpretation of an interpretation. Deconstruction makes a fundamental claim that there are no texts which could be regarded as belonging to a culture, and therefore there is no way to appeal to one's past culture that could be reclaimed and utilised for countries emerging from the Soviet Empire – even that Empire is questionable as to its identity. In this sense, the newly independent Lithuania is destined to invent itself as a unique culture – most likely from various vectors of diverse traditions, above all of the future which is pervaded by Europe and finally by globalization.

It is noteworthy that Russia also took a step toward the future and globalization. Initially it recognised the independence of the Baltic States and established mutual relationships. But this shift toward the future could not be maintained and Russia returned to its past and autocratic tradition, attended, of course, by all efforts to re-establish a traditional empire. The mythology that it espouses is one of a difference between "Atlantic" civilization with universal human rights, freedoms, responsibilities and a rule of law, and "Eurasian Civilization" where autocracy and military rule is the basis of social order. This means that by using any means, an autocratic ruler emerges, sanctioned by Middle Eastern tradition in the form of the Orthodox theocracy, representing a will of divinity. Here we have the traditional syndrome of "divine right of kings" with a resultant arbitrary activity by the ruler and the proclamation that any opposition or questioning of such an arrangement is anti-Russian. While mentioning that Lithuania is facing an intersection of many cultural vectors, one of them is an acceptance of Russian autocracy – return to the past. Here the tension between past and future is clearly demarcated. As we shall see, such a demarcation creates a dual consciousness not only for the post-Soviet countries, but also globally, providing a broader comparative context.

At this point, a specific conception of the world of time is divided into closed past and open future. This conception subtends or underlies Western modern globalization: anything in the past can no longer be changed and therefore to return to it would mean to return to something changeless and thus conservative, while the escape from it would require an open and undetermined future projected by the will as an amorphous horizon, and subsequently limited by social temporal reflective mediations. This is the confrontation between any given tradition as a determined history and its rejection in favour of constructed and undetermined future. It is of note that

the modern Western globalization is characterised by the shift of temporal awareness from the rejection of the "irrelevant" past to possibilising future. The Western globalization is premised on an implicit construction of time awareness that leads to the rejection of anything that is permanent or with set limits. Indeed, this tension includes theological concerns, still having a presence in Lithuania.

This is where a contrasting morphology appears that usually remains if not hidden, at least unexpressed: the very way that the modern human thinks first appears not as its own thinking and understanding, but as something cosmic and encompassing – traditional theology. For the latter, the world is a result of a divine will which creates the world from its own thoughts. The same could be said of the modern Western human who posits his own reflection as more fundamental than the logos of nature: the primacy of reflective thought is first attributed to a thought of a cosmic being and only subsequently is there an admittance of the thought that turns back upon itself as human. Thus the discovery by modernity of the ego that thinks its own thoughts, and knowledge as identical to power, is a discovery of a composition that was already invented and, so to speak, waiting in the wings to be recognised and appropriated. The structure of the priority of reflective thought and the power of the creative will was accomplished before the human would accept and recognise this structure as his own.

The priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought as the creative power also permits the priority of will as that which can choose what sort of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, with its own logos, has to be subsumed under a power that is in principle capable of dominating and altering nature and in principle making nature contingent. This is to say, the necessity shifts to the will and its creative power leaving nature exposed to arbitrary rule. Indeed, for all modern Western understanding, without an imposition of an order by the will nature would be without reason and form, without value and goodness. The composition here permits a direct translation into the domain where thought and will can have a direct influence and control; by now it is well known that practical-technical transformation of the environment is the sole interest of modern philosophies, sciences, and moralities. Knowledge and will are taken to be prior and transcendent to nature and hence capable of imposing an order on an otherwise irrational material nature. What comes along with

this structure from the cosmic assumption of the absolute power and its creation of nature is the shift of power toward thought and will over nature. Thought and will, logic and valuation become the necessary conditions for the being of the world for man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, blind phenomena.

This composition has an unavoidable consequence for theology. First, while accepting the world as a result of a cosmic will,, it must also regard the things of the world as having limits determined by some divinity. Hence, such limits cannot be transgressed or violated by human beings. Yet to allow human will priority over the created nature, some modern. theologians had to proclaim the remoteness of the divinity to such a degree that it becomes completely other and inaccessible. One could make a good case that it is no accident that by the nineteenth century claims were advanced that either the divinity is dead or it is so transcendent that for us it is completely incomprehensible: we neither know what it thinks, nor what it wants, hence we are left to ourselves to shift the best way we know how, i.e. to do anything we like with our environment and world, since no theological appeal can offer us any valid guidance. Any theological appeal could count as another wilful effort by the human to establish another order for the sake of power – and plausibly so. After all, the appeals that are made by theologians rest on *the will of a divinity*. It means that we are too late to appeal for any other criteria apart from those we ourselves invent and either impose on others through material power or submit ourselves to the very inventions we posit as objective. It will not do to argue, as do the Marxists, that the reason for the elevation of the divinity to unreachable heights is an ideological ploy by the ruling class, capable of keeping the lower classes in fear of the "unknown" and infinite power. Such an argument presumes that only some select elite can see through the facade of the ruling class, while the population is subsumed under its spell. If it is a facade that dominates a particular age, then no one can escape its spell, since there is no recourse, no vantage point from which to regard such a facade. But if someone can escape such a domination, then it would seem that the very system offers some recourse from which anyone can survey the system and be capable to be a wilful master of it. This is to say, the latter option suggests a reflexive domain capable of surveying the determinant factors of any system. But this is modernity open to all.

In this context, the leap of Lithuania into the global life world can begin to make sense, specifically with respect to what phenomena began to flood the "empty shelves" of discarded Soviet system. The first popular level is the universal proclamation that "we are free" and freedom was interpreted in its diffused form as "we can do whatever we want to". If an anecdote can help, then the author of this text can offer one from experience. While visiting Nida, where the most fabulous dunes are found, dotted with shrubs to hold the sand from sliding, and with marked paths for visitors, I saw two groups of school children, each with a teacher in charge, slide down the dunes, then climb back by holding onto the shrubs and pulling them out with the roots; they also had all sorts of new western things, such as candy bars and Pepsi cans and were discarding the wrappers and empty cans in the dunes. Being somewhat concerned, I asked the teachers whether they should control the children and instruct them about proper behaviour in such an environment. The answer I received was unaccustomed even for an American: "we are now free and we can do whatever we like". The question of responsibility was not even remotely present. The second dimension of the flood consisted of two aspects: all the novel things, coupled with advertisements promising a joyous life. Easy access to everything, and the "everything" flooded television images and all mass media means – newspapers, journals, and empty walls.

As if on cue, all sorts of "entrepreneurs" appeared who offered all sorts of services and were in competition with their rivals. This phenomenon is a combination of the former Soviet mass media depiction of the West and the conception of the new freedom. The former system depicted the West as "capitalist" where unrestricted and brutal competition ruled the day. One can do anything for profit, and create a society of "Wild West". Thus, the new acquired freedom was coupled with the Soviet images of what this freedom means: acquisition of all the "good" things in life by any means, including eliminating the competition. Lithuanians can recall this flood as the times of "Mafia" period. Attending this period was the mania of "privatisation" in a unique form. The ruling elite, the "immortals" of Soviet system, were suddenly "democratic" and kept their government positions, allowing them to privatise the properties that once belonged to the state. Meanwhile, being in the government they dispensed favours for new entrepreneurs for a price, leading to a continuing Soviet tradition of

"blat" or bribes. The emerging business became a predominant social force with direct access to elected public servants – also for a price.

Meanwhile, the flood of material commodities and their novelties increased and is increasing to such an extent that the Lithuanian citizen not only wants more and more, but is led by the mass propaganda to "want" more. In brief, the attractively packaged tinsel not only offer what you want, but insists that "you must want" the "latest", whatever the latest must be – and you must want it now. Coextensive with this flood, came the new styles of looking and behaving. The young ladies had to become western in dress as well as in body comportment. This is to say, the personal "look" became mediated and reflected from modelled attire, and the body look was copied from the advertisements which also guaranteed that the "look" is possible only with the latest chemical techniques: creams, powders, paint, hair curling technologies, and chemical codes in diet. The global bodies included specific mannerisms in walking – the way of swaying the hips, the protruding pelvis enhanced by extra high heels, the "chilly" look and frozen face expression – all to be practiced, technically enhanced by new exercises and implants. To be western did not mean just to accept the philosophical principles which form western life world, but more concretely, to "embody" the images, techniques, shapes, styles, that make one westerner. Thus the struggle for the latest technologies that promise a close approximation to the look of the West – i.e. a global look.

One could argue that the Russian/Soviet imposition of its symbolic design also required a specific mode of behaviour, a drab attire and a dour look. No doubt, the attire could not be stylish, because the "working class" does not need such irrelevant, useless, wasteful capitalist luxuries. Grey atmosphere, reflected in the clothing and one's look, one's heavy walk, sullen gaze, was part of the life world. "Individual" flair was not tolerated, since it might be an expression of one's psychological "abnormality", and the latter is part of the Russian life world where envy and jealousy ruled popular attitude. One could not be "better" than anyone else, and even the ruling elite looked grim and "serious". Laughter and enjoyment do not belong in such a life world. But such features were part of the oppression and did not have to be imitated. After all, the artistic images, advertising the happy future and the forward look of statues, were a clear contrast to daily reality. Meanwhile, the flood of plenitude streaming from the West, plastered everywhere, was not only a promise of a future, but filled every shop window and pervaded

the new and glossy journals full of styles worn by glamorous models. The novelties were media that contrasted to the Russian tradition, and thus had to be put on and worn. This is evident in the ideological conception of who one is, and one is how one "wears a body". Strange as this may sound, one's body was an acquisition to be put on and exhibited, signifying that the wearer has become global and joined world history.

Not to be one sided, the men had an equal share of imitation: they wore their new suits and jeans just as much as they suddenly sported a mobile telephone – each talking loudly to show the public their arrival on the global scene. Add to these phenomena the arrival of westerners, many of whom were American Lithuanians of a World War Two refugee generation, bringing their American manners and demanding unheard of services, and the shift toward the West and globalization went viral. Moreover, the mass media, in the form of television and cinema, came with serials such as soap operas, loose morals, portraying public scandals, mocking high authorities, and images of children and young people having a "blast", and above all new musical styles with gyrating and sexed bodies, and the wall is clear between past and future. But as noted, great numbers of Lithuanian population could not reorient themselves toward such a future and longed for the old days of "normal" life. The noises of the future were deafening and the "immorality" of the West, sweeping across the younger generations was shocking. By mid-nineties the new venturers, called "mafia" were sporting black leather jackets and mobile phones, indicating their sudden wealth and significance, and the youngsters, whether boys or girls, were imitating them by buying plastic mobile toy phones and pretended to talk on such phones while walking down the street. These phenomena are not only part of the new Lithuania – they are global. To be clear about the presence of these phenomena everywhere, one must become cognisant of the "others" residing on other continents.

Let us shift briefly to entirely different civilizations – Asian – and note the "globalising logic" that is clearly distinct from colonial empire building for exploitation of "the other". While western, this logic spreads in every direction across continents through standardised images and aspirations to catch up and join "human history". To joint this history one has to look western, to imitate the images of numerous advertisements that present the standards and criteria for all facets of life. The advertisements are designed to make everyone think that success and beauty are brand names, with

distinctly white look. There are World Wide beauty hints as to how Clairol-Markets Glamour can be had in any language. Such advertisements are products of India. Japanese do the same, where products must be "world branded" which must disregard national and cultural borders – but with white models. After all, they are the trend setters and consumers in Asia must aspire to look like such models. To join the future one must "join the club", smell, speak, dress and walk in style. The standardised success and beauty is a global image. For example, despite the magnetic beauty of Indian girls and young ladies, Indian advertisers of their product tend to use western models – movie stars or sports figures, and, if they will use an Indian girl, she will have to comb her hair in "latest" fashion from New York and bleach her skin to look whiter – with a look that says "she has joined human history". Of course this is a great global advantage to Lithuanian girls, with golden hair and blue eyes, and above all with the embodied image of the latest model from Paris, New York, or Los Angeles. Any depiction of success and well-being is presented in western images as global. In India, the so-called "sultans of cyberspace" must regard themselves as global and to show their standardisation they must live in a designed Florida Paradise Village built outside of New Delhi. Their products and programs are equally global and have no regard for nationality. This is to say, they are not builders of empires based on symbolic designs, but participants in a global venture with offices on every continent. They are no different from the Silicon Valley "geeks" in California who have global reach. Indian, Chinese, American, European and Japanese – they have joined human history as progress which cannot be stopped. As a saying in India goes: "If you mount a tiger, you will not get off". Lithuania is no different; it too imports and exports global figures in the form of beauties, technical experts, and global – basically Afro-American music. It is ironic that despite racism in American tradition, the only art form that is global comes from African slaves and their descendants. As comical as it looks, even Lithuanian "artists" attempt to be "rappers".

Lithuania as the Other

It would be helpful if a more precise logic of globalization were disclosed. The notion of the basic ontological status of the universe, as a sum of homogeneous parts, can and did result in the ability not only to treat everything as made of parts, but also to address any entity as amenable

to be treated in fragments, such that each part has a distinct function and can be changed, improved, modified, and connected to other parts. While this process requires the adherence to its principles of formal and material detachments, it "progresses" toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both "natural" and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-independent functions and "work". What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal constructs divide the human "material:" the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological, psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated "behaviours", each semi-independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyse the obvious: the "power" of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of "expertise". Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary connection with other spheres. Hence the results of "research" in a specific domain, can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces, can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics for possible "application". The lateral differentiation decentralises responsibility thus increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is increasingly unchained from any constraints. Every formal rule, and every material result made to fulfil a formal design, becomes totally arbitrary, offering possibilising formal and material combinations without end. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an "expert" in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as "conclusive" evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and with the making they produce their "reality" and hence increment power and "prove" their momentary success.

It would be redundant to speak of "needs" since the latter are part and parcel of the possibilising procedures and become at the same time needs and fulfilment. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we wanted therefore we can make it. Thus the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness, as sources of power, comprises a self-referential domain. This means that

there are no restrictions for the "search for truth". After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, the relationship between the formal and material processes are determined by "science", i.e. it's very self-articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic "growth", no biological reasons to stop remoulding the living processes along new combinations through genetics, etc. Limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the "autonomy of research". Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above. The same thing with needs, the more our technology invents and produces, the more we need what we have invented. In this sense, while economy might fund this process, the latter makes economy possible. In brief, we cannot stop progress.

At this juncture a debate that appears in social research and mass media must be addressed in order to avoid misunderstanding what Lithuania is acquiring with globalization. We have argued that the constantly "improved" latest technologies, including medicines, foods, foot wear, and of course, means of communications, from television through computers and "smart phones", are embodiments of values and presumed needs. Yet there is a counter argument that these global implements are "neutral" and their use and value depends on humans who can "take them or leave them", and thus depend on choices. It would be like telling a farmer where horses are no longer available and competition requires faster and larger production of grain, that a tractor is indifferent technology. The farmer's life world, his activities are coextensive with this technology. After all, if we make any kind of an instrument that extends our abilities and/or conveniences, then such an instrument is a value laden signitive system within our life world. Again if people move to follow their herds, and thus leave the shelter of caves, they build shacks. To tell them that shacks are there as indifferent means makes no sense, since the shacks have become a set of signitive vectors where humans seek shelter and from where their life world is oriented and correlated. The same must be said of every invention, since the latter will abolish what went before. Once huts are built, caves become "obsolete" and once tractors are

introduced, the work horse becomes redundant. I would like to type this monograph on an old typewriter, but no one will accept it for publication because the means are very different which signify that my romantic wish to use an old typewriter no longer belongs to the contemporary publishing world. If I write a text, my writing is coextensive with the novel technologies, and even my older computer disks have become redundant.

This state of affairs should not be regarded as some kind of metaphysical determinism, where one is forced to live on the basis of causes. This "causal" view is paraded by postmodern writers claiming that we are victims of our own inventions. The latter have become an independent "objective" environment that rules over human life as some sort of "cultural unconscious". This is not a novel claim; from classical times every posited objectivity of some ultimate reality was also regarded as our invention. Classical notion was "if horses had gods, gods would look like horses". Indeed, we define ourselves in terms of our own inventions, whether it is divinities in whose image we are made, or more recent inventions. Thus when we began to invent mechanical implements, we defined ourselves as mechanical beings, when humans invented communication through a system of wires, they defined themselves as a web of interconnected nerves, and when we invented computers, we became possessors of "hard wiring" and "soft programs". All this points to our argument that technologies of whatever kind are not separate from our life world and we interact with them as an extension of who we are and what we can do. In this sense, our daily activities are intertwined with the functional meaning of our inventions.

The modern life world of high-tech is unavoidably "cultural" comprising the way we live globally. This means that creative innovations no longer belong to the artistic geniuses but are creating and recreating us as we constitute and trace their novel significations – as we become co-creators of novel meanings and thus extend the process of globalization. This process can be called "global/local" insofar as it can be constituted anywhere and anytime and in a flash become available globally. Such a process is very different from the colonising globalization of symbolic designs, still prevalent at a rhetorical level – equally around the globe. Thus there is the rhetoric of "free market" and even "capitalism", or democratisation through global communication, where people can show the horrors of oppression for everyone to see, or even the rhetoric of empowering the impoverished

through latest technologies; but all such rhetoric means very little if the novelties and creative capacities are not present in the life world of the impoverished – the latter are equally a local/global phenomena, appearing in every continent, nation and tribe. Indeed, everyone can see these symbolic designs that claim to be the "best" solution of global problems at local levels, but the solutions come from a ready established global life world which surpasses nationalities, tribes, and civilizations. Once a group, no matter its size, joins the global logic, it becomes enculturated by it and its life world becomes resignified. One can just marvel at the rhetoric of a symbolic design paraded by European Union: *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development.* What is uniquely modern about this symbolic design is its time reflexivity discussed in our last chapter. Thus we have calculations, addressing the "Global Impact by 2030" implying the technical approach which states that if we want to have the mentioned impact, then, reflecting from it, what significative and valuative dimensions must we build into present technical systems. In this setting, as a member of European Union, Lithuania retains its status as being the other – not yet quite globalised, and participates in the European Partnership which regards the world to be saved as the other.

Once again, it should be emphasised, that the modern Western globalization is the global culture. The proliferation of cultural phenomena by new technologies, such as film, television, internet, bearing their new styles and music, new modes of creativity and behaviour, are not external to the modern life world, but coextensive with it. Technology, art, life styles, dress codes, even speech manners, vocalisation, phonetics become intertwined. All these domains are the media of global awareness that mediate other media, without disclosing any other dimensions. In short, when watching the media, one does not say "Did you see the images on television, of what is happening in Japan"? One simply says "Did you see what is happening in Japan". The media disappear, and yet there is nothing but the media. This phenomenon is now being presented to the public globally in the form of "virtual reality" technology where one puts on a gadget in front of the eyes and lives in a world of images, but in such a way that the images are not mediating anything. They are the reality. While this is the "latest" creation, in principle it is a variation of the signitive world of human creation.

The outcome has been depicted in a form of the flood of novelties in Lithuania. Each novelty, whether a "beauty cream" or a diet, or exercise, or a mannerism in movement must be regarded as parts each of which can be "improved" by the "latest" means. Her sex appeal can be improved by breast implants, his virility can be improved by Viagra – and there is no end of improvements of all other parts. It is a unique logic requiring, on the one hand, homogenising of all inventions such that any technical product can have its parts replaced anywhere and at any time, and meanwhile, every part can be changed "for the better" which means more efficient, faster, more compact ,healthier, and even more attractive. We get scientific journalism that informs us how to live longer – recall that the entire senseless progress has found a purpose as means for longevity. The information is, nonetheless, modern and global: how to maintain your parts healthy: eyes, skin, muscles, bones, lungs, brain, ears, heart, kidneys, gut – and each addressed by different biochemically devised parts. As the technical disciplines get fragmented into even increasing proliferation of "specialists", the latter fragment the human into an ever increasing parts, each to be treated by a "specialist".

At this level, we reach once again the principle on the basis of which the others of other parts of the world, who are cognisant of this globalising logic, such as Lithuanians, are to judge themselves whether they have established the conditions that would allow them to be free from all the blind material natural forces and be in a position not only to master such forces, but to create those forces in order to allow the human to use them for remaking himself to look modern, up to date, in fact be the latest. This is the subject as sui generis and the final reason for human history. In this sense, the efforts to deconstruct this kind of self-generating subject may fail because the subject at the outset does not have any identity. It promises the unconditional condition for everyone to acquire self-identity, to become any identity you choose. This way, the postmodern logic is premised on the modern autonomous subject. The postmodern logic in principle claims that all cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, natural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. This means that they still accept the self-creation of the modern subject that invents its own logic for mastery of its own world and for self-definition. The egological self-definition is only one among such options. The postmodern globalization assumes this universal self-generating subject that invents different cultures without any

natural, material, psychological conditions. After all, postmodernity claims that everything is a construct. The very notion of a construct is premised on modern autonomous unconditional subject. This subject is universalised as the possibility of identity for anyone. That is anyone can create of himself or herself whatever they want. To judge themselves, Lithuanians, as many others, have to live a double consciousness: their tradition, and what they must become, and what they must become is overwhelmingly present in advertisements, television image, careers, and happiness.

Autonomy, of which we shall speak extensively in the next chapter is the point of mediation of modern philosophers, suggesting that every formal and quantitative rule is constructed without any conditions, that is has no cause. In this sense, the material world subjected to those rules can be transformed without any question concerning the traditionally known categorical differences among experienced things. In fact, the formal and quantitative rules do not have within their own compositions any criteria for making such distinctions, thus they can be applied on everything indifferently. At the same time, the material world, the extended substance, must be regarded as homogenous and, therefore, constructible in accordance with the invented rules. What is at issue at this level is the choice of formal and quantitative rules over qualitative categorical distinctions. Since both are by modern definitions subjective, then there is no inherent criterion why one would be more objective than the other. We must look for an account within the very composition of those invented rules. First, it can be argued that it is impossible to gain any advantage over the environment on the grounds of categorical, qualitative distinctions. Second, it is also the case that formal and quantitative rules comprise within their own structures techniques for transforming the material environment. This way the choice of formal quantitative rules already implies the choice of instrumentality and the possibility for application. What we are pointing out is that modern science whose theories and methods are framed within formal and quantitative structures is in principle technical. This is the reason why any scientific discipline that cannot be technically tested is not regarded to be scientific. This seems to us to be also the ground for modern scientific power.

The globalising process that promises to improve everyone's life and to bring liberation to all peoples from want and oppression is premised on claim to universality of this technical active intervention in the world. This

intervention at the same time requires that all peoples anywhere and anytime must also engage in reducing their environments to required material resources for technical transformation and exploitation. The term we used "liberation" was at times replaced by humanisation in a sense that we as natural beings in a natural environment are subjected to forces that are not under our control – they are alien and alienating, inhuman. Therefore once the environment and our own lives are subjected to the scientific methods and their way of transforming the environment and us, then we shall reach a human stage which liberates us from natural necessities. At this level, this universal claim provides a rationale for teleology and progress. The teleology proposes that there is a stage in which man will be a total master of the environment and himself and this then provides a standard on the basis on which others, those who have not yet join human history will have to judge their positions and lives as inferior. This is the logic that is offered by numerous organisations caught in theories of development. It seems that Lithuania is partially on the way to being part of this history – but only on the way. After all, as the "other" that entered globalization, it must play the game of never ending "catching up", even if some citizens are equal in professional understanding to the "major" players. As pointed out above, such citizens become nomadic and leave Lithuania to serve global interests of the "advanced" and "developed" West.

Globalization is opening, standardising, and reshuffling cultures in ways that are mutually transformative and intertwining. Lithuanians practice yoga and Zen, applaud the global fame of their basketball players, and hire Afro Americans for Lithuanian teams. Global organisations are welcome and Lithuanian technical experts occupy important positions. Emphasis on technical training in Lithuanian institutions of higher learning produce globally qualified specialists who can work anywhere in the world – become nomadic. Perhaps this is one of the most significant results of globalization for Lithuania. While the costs of training highly qualified experts in many technical fields come from Lithuanian budget, the benefits are reaped by institutions and organisations that are global. As was just mentioned, exodus from Lithuania is severe, and most importantly, the exodus of technical talents which would contribute to Lithuanian economic "development" are lost. The loss is premised on the specific nature of the logic of globalization, expounded above. In brief, any technical discipline is, primarily an ability to treat everything as homogeneous matter (even

if it is a "living matter") and thus to disregard all the perceived qualitative differences, including the signitive life worlds. The specialist can work anywhere in the world in which cultural differences have a local, but not a global meaning. The experts are in a position to work anywhere without commitments to cultural contexts, including the civic responsibilities of a particular place. The expert is a detached personality and thus even in his homeland, Lithuania, he is no longer concerned with public affairs – with an obvious excuse: "I am not expert in these affairs and thus need not participate". Such a person is a detached nomad, relating to others who are equally detached and can work anywhere and be of any racial or national background which does not make any difference in the person's expertise. He, and his like are nomadic, whether they are the Sultans of Cyberspace, the Geeks of Silicon Valley, the graduates from Technical University in Kaunas, the Japanese from Niigata University or a teenager hacking into global corporation's records. One may have an "office" in London, but the office is equally global and can be accessed from any site. The newly trained technical experts in various fields in Lithuania have no qualms in seeking work around the globe where better laboratories, pay, and access to colleagues of the same field constitute a life world on the move. Why should one attend a Lithuanian opera in Chicago, when one is invited to a conference in Tokyo, focused on topics in his field? Collegiality is not national but global, and the relations transgress any national commitments. Experts gather anywhere and need not be concerned about civil duties and responsibilities, since nomads are transitory.

The specificity of Lithuania is the sudden transformation: under the rule of Russian empire, one could hardly exhibit a pride in one's ethnic identity without being accused of "nationalism" or worse – anti-Soviet sentiments and thus psychologically lagging behind historical progress. Meanwhile, before one could form a Lithuanian tradition and identity, one became Western and with open borders – global. Thus, even a cursory glance at the proliferation of texts raising the question of cultural/national identity suggests an issue that has been elicited by globalization, associated with the modern western technological standardisation. Most severe resistance to such globalization and its Western secular philosophy, comes from all sorts of personality cults, specifically those of Middle East. There is even a two volume Encyclopaedia of Identity, replete with contributions on cultural,

ethnic, race, religious, etc. identities. So far, the question of national and/or ethnic identity was analysed in terms of globalization as a mode of creation of "technical" (even if changing) standards, be they computer systems, internet, medical, attire or the "look". Various postmodern "thinkers" even suggest that despite multi-culturalism, there is a standardised Western culture both accepted and resisted by the "others", to speak in extreme, although metaphorical terms, the tension between "Jihadisation" and "McDonalisation".This tension is very much experienced in Central Europe, among the nationalities that either belonged to or were "satellites" of Russia/ Soviet Union. Having been liberated from the latter, they joined the West, with all of its "advanced" inventions and lifestyles. As some writers of that region suggest, the populations of this area found themselves "between a plough and a computer". Having rushed into the "computer" world, they found that they have lost their national/ethnic identities: became Americanised or at least "standardised" by European Union. While this region will be used as an example, the same process is occurring globally, and examples can be found readily in China, India, and Middle East. In the last chapter we shall discuss a global confrontation between the modern western globalization and the efforts to fight against it by the very means provided by globalization: high technologies, internet, economics and sophisticated training – although mediated by a "higher" purpose or calling.

Going under the terminology of "discursive practice", educational institutions (and governments) are emphasising the creation of technical disciplines in order to advance national economies, health care, competition with others and national prestige. In Central Europe, the teaching of huma- nities, and this includes national languages, cultures, histories, is pushed aside in favour of technical training in accordance with global standards. While this might seem trivial, yet national identities are premised on the understanding of local cultures and their difference from the globalised "culture". If the latter becomes preeminent, then the former will vanish.By virtue of gaining technical set of skills, be they medical, computer, managerial, the members of a given nation/ethnicity become global and in their interests are more "at home" in the global community of professionals in their area of expertise than with the members of their traditional cultures. They attend international conferences, form associations and common projects, and are accepted everywhere. It is to be noted that the proliferation of technical

disciplines is without a limit. Chemistry, microchemistry, macrochemistry, biochemistry, genetic biochemistry, etc., all the way to the changing "latest" and "improved" medications. The very language of such communities is discipline specific and inaccessible to everyday discourses.

The members, of the communities of specific technical fields seek better conditions to engage in their craft and either find positions or are invited by institutions to do research away from their native areas. They move from place to place where they are needed and thus settle – for a while – in a different nation and among different ethnic groups – meanwhile maintaining close ties to their community of technical peers. In this sense they become nomadic, without any national cultural allegiance or even political commitments. What is significant is that the members of these global-nomadic communities comprise a contemporary elite, separated and living apart from general populations. Being part of the global elite, they tend to promote technical programs at pedagogical institutions, thus creating an increasing gap between the elites and the populations. While all this may sound normal, the migration of technical elites to "better" institutions or research facilities, to better paying positions, depletes the local nations of the best means of developing their local "brain trust" and the building of expanded economies. For example, among the former Soviet Union members, the liberated Baltic States have joined the European Union with its open door policy that immediately began to deplete such states of the best talents. Lithuania alone, out of 3.7 mil. population, lost seven hundred thousand to emigration – not all are of the highest technical quality, but the best have become global nomads with high positions in every part of the world.

Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible for any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of choice between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, or the right of a particular group to respect its own identity. The globalising universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by postmodernity in such a way that the others in their own self-reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out their lives, between what they can be as universal individuals or what they can maintain as members of their culture. The autonomous self-creating

subject that is being globalised as universal has become a background on which the others, as culturally different would be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual, unique, with a right to self-preservation. This self-preservation is a phenomenon that has no basis in any ontological, metaphysical, or theological claims since all these are equally unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they will have to be adjudicated in power confrontations each calling for the maintenance of its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. Nonetheless in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this self-creation syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning the criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, the modern West, on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some of the intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, follow the same globalising logic of wilful destruction – and do so on a hidden premise of evolution: the others are on a lesser level of evolution and hence have to be brought up to the modern western instrumental rationality by discarding their outdated myths and modes of life.

Lithuania, as many other cultural nations, belongs to the "other" and thus has acquired a dual consciousness. Citizens became Lithuanians after independence, but with one leap they became Europeans and, by extension, global. Encountering the latter was facilitated by the mentioned flood of novelties and modes of life and, just as important, by the disappearance of the Iron Curtain – the world is open to explore. The metaphor for this openness among the young was: New York is closer than Moscow, not to speak of Paris, Rome, Berlin, Madrid, Morocco and London. More important than all the images seen in advertisements, the glamour and romance on television, became reality if one simply left Lithuania and found work elsewhere, with a direct access to all the novel things and sensations. This is the first level of exodus based on globalization. For a small country, the exodus was massive, with the likelihood that they will not return – and not retain their recently acquired Lithuanian identity. Students sought and obtained support to study in foreign universities, requiring no national identity or cultural adherence. While the consciousness of being Lithuanian remained and remains intact, what that being means is diluted by daily concerns in a foreign land – a land to which one must adapt.

Of course, the door to go back to Lithuania was always open, but the prospects for the "good life" were elsewhere. This also meant and means that for the immigrants, and those remaining in Lithuania – even if to a lesser degree – Lithuanian culture had and has to be "constructed" through the media of globalization, and thus through a continuous presence of a double consciousness. This is more so in case of immigrants who enter another country where the life world is interlaced by multiple scientific and technical discourses and practices. One cannot buy a cereal box without being exposed to multiple languages and quantities of bio-chemical, nutritional, caloric, etc. codes. All this also implies productive, normative, and legalistic interconnections as aspects of such a life world. This is to say, the scientific and technical discourses and practices do not overlay some primordial life world that traditional Lithuanian culture might appeal to, but comprise our understanding of the way our world and we are, live and relate. In this world the mass media are equally replete with reports of scientific "studies" and reports of inventions and progress, and even of protests against some scientific inventions and technical innovations – all being understood as aspects of this life world. No wonder, then, that global technologies are regarded equally as "objective" as trees and cucumbers.

We have reached a point at which every culture is regarded to be self-generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or theological grounds. This is to say that the modern globalising position led to the conclusion that all discourses are autonomously constituted and, therefore, are equivalent to one another. After all, there are no criteria external to such discourses which will allow the adjudication among them concerning any truth claims. If there is anything common among them, it is their difference. Given this level, the theories that at times are paraded inadvertently such that a discourse somehow represents something are no longer maintainable. But this also implies that there is no misrepresentation. A particular discourse that frames a cultural world view is in no position to either represent the others or to misrepresent them. The only thing that can be suggested is that each discourse inclusive of cultural discourses, will interpret others within the parameters of a giving discourse. This is of course premised on the basis of the abolition of an essential presence of a subject or a structure of the world. But this essentialism has been already destroyed by the assumption that even the modern subject has no essence, but must make

of himself in terms of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, the multicultural proposition is not premised on a pre-given essentialism, but in fact is constituted on the globalising modern self-destruction of an essential subject. The only criterion that this globalising self-invention, both of the individual subjectivity and multicultural identities, is its practical efficiency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of the subject, but a view toward what works given that a particular people will be offered practical solutions to whatever they think they are lacking in their lives, or what they are told they lack in their lives. No question that the lacks are unavoidable, since the global media parades images of things unseen by a given group and thus reveals a lack of such things in the group's life world. This was the case of Lithuania after independence. The flood of what one could have and be, created a lack and a new globalising subject; the latter will be discussed in the next chapter.

At the first glance it might be possible to argue that some of the forms of the acquisition of material well-being through the modern establishment of power allow the individual almost unrestricted freedom of choice without abolishing the principle of equality. One such form is offered by the symbolic design called capitalism. Granting the most implausible proposition that capitalism somehow promotes freedom of choice, it makes no sense here to speak of freedom as autonomous. Freedom of choice, compelled by the material forces, i.e. by the constant pressure to maintain one's material edge, is reduced to the struggle for the management of instrumental means in order to secure one's constantly vanishing position. Indeed, the more one engages in this "freedom of choice" in the technical material domain, the more one is exposed to the determinations of its necessities, and the more one neglects the public arena due to the "lack of time" for irrelevancies in face of "real concerns". In this sense the very notion of freedom is subverted and is paraded merely as an ideology to attract the unsuspecting and the innocent as a way of achieving power over them. What was just said must be understood at the symbolic level. The "material forces", interpreted as causes, still presume the initial shift in modern Western cosmos to a linear time, allowing to speak of causes as events following a determined sequence. But we already know that such a causal sequence has been abandoned, and belongs to symbolic design and not to the way time, with its reflective horizons, composes our life world. In this sense, causal compulsions are a

way of using a symbolic design to justify whatever one does, whether it is an exploitation of others or excuses for failures. In principle, the life world of signitive interconnections, is our own invention, equally on the basis of signitive connections which have no symbolically designed causal force.

Capitalism and communism, after all, believe that the only moving force of history is material and in principle any other view, such as the autonomy of the individual makes no sense in such a belief. In this context both would have to maintain that any worthwhile future is a continuous and increasing material fulfilment. And since the latter is a symbolic design, surrounded with images of values and meaning, then it seems that material forces rule the day. Of course, once valuations are imbedded in and become coextensive with material-technical life world, then it seems only natural to speak of "material forces" as causes. Yet neither capitalist nor communist symbolic designs are compatible with the global life world. While materialistic ontology – the unperceived world of atomism was a catalyst that unchained the material mastery of nature, in its own way it got lost in this very "labour" through history toward self-liberation from the material power, a self-liberation that set up the conditions for the opposite: it as ontological symbolic design created self-enslavement through the incrementation of material power and thus the reduction of the very arena that would guarantee one's self-liberation to the pervasive forces of material needs – which are constantly invented and thus never complete. The result of this peculiar paradox is the resurgence of man ruling over man and not of laws posited by freedom and freely accepted by the very creators of the laws.

The ideological solicitation of the individual to "freedom" is quite transparent with power. The public opinion is not only shaped, but has already taken for granted that "other freedoms follow" from the "freedom" of materialism, specifically in its economic form. Two consequences seem to follow from this state of affairs. First, the public arena is neglected unless one's own material interests are at stake, and second, the collapse of the public and the social into the material sphere of interests, making the public arena of freedom exposed to the possessors of greater material power, i.e. economic, technical, and scientific. There is no lack of complaints concerning the ways that public servants are bought and sold in Lithuania and, of course, around the globe. In the United States, it is taken for granted that the billionaires

will buy the presidential office; the only question is: which billionaires. But it must be pointed out that the major players, who possess those billions, are technology "moguls" whose wealth comes from technical innovations.

Going back to the question of causes and necessities, the issue is somewhat complex. The so-called material forces of history are regarded as conditions, causes, necessities to which one must adhere, submit, and even use as basis for the construction of "objective" theories of socio-economic and political life. In turn, such forces are structured in accord with human designs and rules of functioning, and hence possess a "subjective" base. Moreover, with political enlightenment, there were posited principles for adjudication in the material sphere and the possibility of realignment of this sphere for the benefit of a consensual public. Although one might argue that numerous "founding" fathers of various modern national entities, were most concerned with the maintenance of property discriminations and perhaps even the security of material wealth among the possessors of such a wealth, this very concern indicates that there was no longer any necessity to regard material force as preeminent. It appeared in its vulnerability and in principle required political adjudication. Hence all the arguments between those who stressed democracy, and those who opted for republic present a disrupted necessity. It is possible to adjudicate the material domain by the public by raising the question of rational legitimation of the appearance of material power in the hands of some against other members of society. This is to say, if laws are to rule, then any inequitable distribution of material power, leading to a rule of the human over the human, is a contradiction. Such a misdistribution precludes the free positing and following of laws and introduces necessities in the arena of inter-human relations. As we have already noted, the only viable POLIS is rational and free, and hence the introduction of material-irrational component is counter to the concept of a political society. No doubt, one may offer rational justifications for the inequities, but it should be noted that such justifications are either efforts to legitimate an established inequity by positing an irrational factor in human life, or means to explain human activities by constructing reasons for such activities, reasons which do not coincide with the activities. Such justifications, in principle, accept irrationality as the base of political life; given such a base, one then becomes "free" to justify one's actions by any arbitrarily constructed reason in the guise of ideology.

At any rate, the legitimation of the production of increased material power through science-technology conjunction is offered by the lure that such a power is for human benefit. More things, more benefits, more enjoyment, more health, more.. more.. One could even say that this power incrementation becomes self-legitimating in face of the public's demand for more securities in the material sphere. But this raises an immediate question concerning the legitimation of the public arena and the elected public servants?. What must constitute its main function? The free discourse for the public benefit is not an issue; the issue is material the well-being – private. Hence, the public domain, in order to be legitimate, must be reduced to the sum of private material interests. The political parties must shift their operations toward the fulfilment of material wants. But once this shift is made, there is no turning back, since in order to be legitimate, the political parties must fulfil the material promises. Failing this, they cease to be regarded legitimate. This is what constitutes the legitimation crisis of the political domain in modernity. In order for the political parties to maintain themselves in "power", they must possess material power capable of satisfying the demands of the masses. If not in practice, at least in mass propaganda, the two systems vying for "the minds of the masses" offer their lines of wares in terms of material fulfilment. Both economise every facet of socio-cultural and political life. The populations, in turn, take the economisation for granted and exert pressure on the systems to "produce" visible results. Failing such results, one can justifiably argue that the system has no legitimation. The system responds by either military power to keep the populations working, or by promises of future improvements, or finally, by political theatre in various forms, inclusive of rituals and above all, ideological incantations. There is a credibility gap between political rule and its legitimation. Since the gap cannot be filled by material means, i.e. neither system can fulfil its promises of material well-being, then it must fill the credibility gap. By symbolic designs where ideology is one preeminent mode of filling this gap and, at the same time, of providing an inexpensive way of obtaining legitimation.

Globalization and Cultures

For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is whether a given culture, with its own constituted discourses, has the same practical

global needs that the globalising autonomy is offering. This is to say does a particular cultural discourse allows the definition of the environment to be reduced to homogenous resources for arbitrary reconstruction? The first limit of modern non-essential conception of total and unconditional possibility of inventing any discourse for the sake of applying it for "human needs" may be given in the discourses of other cultures. In order to set a limit for globalising modernity, we must demonstrate that within the logic of this globalization there is also a reflective recognition that it, as invented culture, must respect the equivalences of other invented cultures without any other criteria apart from those that each cultural discourse possesses within itself. This means that if another culture has a different ontology and even metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology of metaphysics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not operate with the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the homogenised environment. The limit would be set with the lack of primacy of instrumental rationality. If the meaning of life of a particular people within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfilment of indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalising modern logic, permitted to pursue its own mode of having a life world.

To sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the discussion of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, we suggest that the very abolition of an any pre-given subject in favour of self-invention in modern sense leads to the notion not only that the others are equally self-inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self-invention to the modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumentality. This is to say that if every discourse is deemed to be invented and only valid within its own framework, then the very concept of discursive self-generation belongs within the framework of modernist and Western postmodernist discourse. But this means that even if the other cultures are regarded as self-generated, their self-generation may have very different self-conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practices that did not respect the logic of modernising and globalising ontologies and methods. Practically speaking this means that whatever purposes there are and however the environment is interpreted need no follow the logic of causal efficiency of reconstructing the world into our own needs and power. If a

culture regards that playing music, listening to the stories of the ancients is meaningful and the metaphysical entities are relevant for life as protectors of the environment then there cannot be an introduction of a criterion that would claim that such conceptions are not realistic, mystical, non-productive, since the latter concepts belong to another framework. In brief, the confrontation between the two is not between some truth and some falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein each will interpret the other in its own unique way.

Yet it is also the case that a globalising logic with its technical efficiency and promise of better life is an aspect of the others. They see themselves in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural necessities, which becomes part of their own self-understanding as different from and yet related to this globalising logic. This creates an internal tension within various cultures that constitute dual self-recognition wherein one still maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges those discourses in light of the global other. This is the source of alienation and destruction of cultural self-identity. We still want to maintain cultural identity, but we also like to be like the other, to judge ourselves from the vantage point of the other. This is an invention of a dual consciousness that frames the power struggles within various cultures. The modernisers who at the same time claim to be part of the same culture want to transform that culture into civilized, practically efficient, objective, and beneficial. While it liberates the individuals from her own culture yet there is a wish to claim against the globalising process the uniqueness of her own culture. In one sense, there is a demand to use the environment in a "desacralised" manner, purely for the purpose of the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, wages, employment, increased possessions as signs of the good life.

In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have our spiritual values that do not allow anyone to reduce the environment, including the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the adjudication cannot be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able to decide which is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. Hence, we witness the many confrontations between the groups within given cultures that promote modernisations and at the same time their intellectuals who resist modernisations. This means that a given culture is split into those who propagate the need to become globalised and modern

and at the same time those who, recognising the necessity of modernisation, propose a battle against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they claim that we may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalising logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-called passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems that the reason for this power confrontation rest in the failure to understand the already posited limit by the other within which the globalising process must function.

This limit is the very requirement that the other and its self-generated cultural framework is equivalent to the globalising logic. Therefore, the latter seems to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to or not to live within its own limitations. When we say whether it wants it or not, we do not mean a choice between two options, but a power confrontation that is inevitable since there are no external criteria in this confrontation that would allow a free decision, in favour of one or the other. What we have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one possibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is offered as the future. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states that the one from the past is conservative and traditional, while the other is liberal, individualistic open, and even humanistic. Whether this designation is true or false is not our concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, in their dual consciousness, will play out their roles as both maintaining their tradition and at the same time proposing future transformations. Of this confrontation we shall speak in our last chapter.

It is important to note that the filling of the gap is not offered by some purely conscious structure, i.e. ideality which would be distinct from materiality. Rather, the promises are of direct material fulfilment in the multi-levelled modern sense. The first principle that rules such a fulfilment is the final "ideal" of modernity: man is the maker of himself; the second principle is: man is on the way toward fulfilling this state of affairs. Thus incantations of symbolic designs and theatre constantly stress human self-realisation, fulfilment, material security, in an everyday language. The ideal self is already taken for granted by the modern man: material power to enhance oneself and to make of oneself what one wills. And the "ideals" of the symbolic designs become structures of consciousness pointing to directly perceptual, sensuous, bodily, fulfilment, offering everyone the means

to achieve those ideals in any corner drug-store, beauty parlour, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a skin-deep equalisation in numerous domains lending the appearance of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, even similar looking clothing – despite differences in quality – and hence the promises seem to be approximated. While there might remain vast differences in social class distinctions, economic and political power inequities, at the surface level there seems to be an apparent equitable fulfilment. Everyone is "enjoying" an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated images and looks. "She looks like a million" and this despite the fact that she is working on an assembly line and is not the manager of production or an owner of the means of production. This seems to be the rhetoric of a symbolic design inscribed in the commodities for the subservient classes' consumption, lending the appearance that the working class is fully participating in the "style of life" of the ruling class. The saturation of all domains with the images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, the working class is completely submitted to the power of a given symbolic design in "flesh". Semiotically speaking this constitutes the trick of codification of the lower classes with the signs of the power of the upper, ruling class.

If a symbolic design is to function at all, it cannot directly display power. Rather, it translates power into significance, and makes it "rational". We can no longer think of symbolic designs in terms of nineteenth century when it was deemed that such designs expresses the interests of a dominant economic class. Semiotics has dispelled this view by pointing out that economic power is not for the sake of economy, but for the sake of numerous socially coded important positions. This is to say, symbolic designs prescribe signs of prestige and significance and, with the material power of transforming all events into a humanly designed image, it also imposes the coded bodily "look" both "on the skin" and as an attire. Images of an ideal female, ideal male, ideal body, from toenails to hair, are proliferated for the "consumer". This is to say, a symbolic design is no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting the material-economic or technical conditions, but is an inscription in the body, in the images, the passions and desires appearing through the images and on the body. The so-called idealities of the ideologies of the capitalist symbolic design of the nineteenth century, due to the logic of globalization, have become. In the late capitalism and state-corporate systems, coextensive

with the daily discourse, daily imagery, mass-media, sounds and tastes, architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circulation thus making any art-form accessible and "popular", and mimetic activities of the subjects who have become "subject" to the codes.

The question must now be raised concerning the "credibility" of the political incantations, the verbal depictions of the good life, the material fulfilment and equality. It seems that the political promises, which would be merely depiction of conscious ideals reflecting the position of the ruling class, should have very little impact on the population. Yet it is to be recalled that the modern magic of language is one of power, an ability to transform words directly into deeds, indeed words having become deeds and material facts; hence there is a credibility of speech in all "educated" domains. And it is to be recalled that the political incantations are not dealing with such high and noble principles as autonomy, rights, dignity and liberality of the human but in a language of materiality, interest, incomes, shoes, cars, washing machines, crops, and "decent" incomes. And it is precisely this sort of discourse that is taken for granted by the public opinion as capable of "producing". Add to this sort of discourse some hints, veiled suggestions of utopian imagery, and the result will be a believing public. After all, the emphasis on materiality is already granted by the public opinion. To speak in modern terms, materialism of the sort depicted above – invisible atomism, is also an accepted form of idealism.

The Ideal of Globalization

The very constitution of ideality lends it a semblance not only of universality, but also of a natural law and sequence. The punishment and control seem to follow an inevitability of cause and effect, untainted by human arbitrariness. But this sequence must be established by representational associations, by relating signs in a precise manner of permissions and prohibitions, each having associated and inevitable consequences. While thinking of one, the person is immediately subjected to a represented effect. One is subjected to a representational habit which can become a calculus of punishments for transgressions and remunerations for obedience. Behind a beggar, there is a habit of laziness. Submit the beggar to work as a punishment and as a corrective. This will yield new associations, e.g. work pays, begging does not. If one is proud, do not punish him by physical

torture, since the latter will be useless; rather, submit the subject to public ridicule and shame. But all the penalties must be calculated for effect. If a penalty is permanent, then no reform would work, since there would be no hope of achieving the rewards for being reformed.

The early reformers of the power of law based their thought on a prejudgment of "productivity" and reward as a solution to transgression. This was enhanced by the shift toward the public as the arena of punishment where the public submits the guilty to collective and useful appropriation. Public works had two sides: one, to act as a punishment and a corrective, and two, to appear as a sign of punishment and as an evocation of representations in the public. This is a school for both, the condemned person and the public, a living lesson in the museum of order. The punitive arena would be everywhere; at the crossroads, bridges being built and repaired, workshops for all to see, mines and ship yards. The maintenance of the convicted in idleness creates more vices and fails to punish, while reform can be a sign to the public.

But the argument for the prescription of associated codes as representations of sequential events in nature – deed results in a punishment – had included another, and a more basic component that haunts modernity: implicit self-accusation and singularised guilt. It is deemed that each penalty derives directly from the nature of a crime; hence all arbitrariness is vanquished and the penalty does not depend on the whims of the magistrate, lawyer, legislator, and jury, but on the nature of the deed. It is not the human, or the public that does violence to the person, but the person's own actions do violence to him. He is imprisoning himself and is responsible for being punished. It is a kind of masochism. If penal codes assume a reified status, then indeed the transgressor is not punished by others or even the public, but has become a monster, an aberration, a violence to a normal sequence of causes and effects, calling for rehabilitation by any means necessary. As mentioned above, one of such means is labour.

The education through work would compel the individual back into a system of "normal" interests, showing that labour is more advantageous than idleness; the forced labour would be similar to a small community functioning to demonstrate that he who wants to live must work. But the work would be remunerated in order to instil a desire to produce for earnings. Coupled with work there was reinvented the monastic "solitary"

punishment, serving as a place where the individual could reach his conscience and spirit, and become converted. While Catholicism maintained the monastic cell in its cultic incarceration of "devotees", Protestantism took over this sort of monasticism as a model for prisons. This indeed was one of the basic designs in American penal system. It added a greater process of individuation and at the same time surveillance by inclusion of outsiders to determine the individual's character and eligibility for changing of penal duration. Such groups kept the records of the individual and monitored all the recorded acts and thoughts, feelings and dreams. The record was identical with the condemned, and followed him from the trial through prison and beyond. It was a private life constituted publically.

The public constitution was based on the classic discovery of the body in its twofold functioning. First, the invention of "human the machine", dealing with the anatomical metaphysics in purely mechanistic terms, and second, the political technology that structured the body by numerous regulations calculating the controls and shaping the functions of the body: military, school, hospital, and work disciplines. There was the metaphysical or the intelligible body of explanations, and the functioning body that can be submitted to utility controls. The body mechanism is one that reacts, and in itself is docile; it can be improved through manipulation, restriction, and enhancement. But the latter are not freeing of the mechanism, but miniaturisation, refinement, for utility. Structured movement, precision, rapidity, reaction, and individuation of functions for observation by the judges, rulers, supervisors, each keeping records. It is no longer the signifying functions, but the economic, the efficient, timeable, localisable, and exchangeable. Restriction bears upon power of resistance and not upon signs. One is engaged with the differentiation of time, space, location, movement, in a code that is horizontal, prior to the question of some final purposive meaning. The methods control directly the passive-utilisable body, and these controls subject the body to domination.

What is here formed is a political technology of coercion of the body, a mechanics of power that breaks the body down into parts and rearranges the functions. Such disciplines produce the bodies that are subjected and alienated, body of aptitudes and required functions. This, for Foucault, would be a body conjunct of material forces which allows one to read a culture at a level prior to meaning, allowing one to escape the cultural judgements

and metaphors. Objectified body submitted to material controls. Here, an increased aptitude is coextensive with increased power of domination.

The coercive materiality is equally designed: architectural enclosures, locating the body and its functions with precision. The architecture was modelled on monastery, with cellular access to supervision and monitoring. The barracks, the work place, the assigned machine and its precise requirements of body movements, the bells compelling the body to be at certain times in proper places, all excising the wasted body movements, the undisciplined functions. Such disciplinary spaces are subdividable in accord with required body functions and precise distributions. Access is provided for elevated bodies that oversee all the functions, which monitor all the movements and places – at all times. Here a body is individuated, where every function is seen, judged, adjusted, and subjected. Each part of the body is divisible into numerous functions of speed, skill, duration, capable of being judged and ascribed to the individual. The latter can or cannot perform the required functions, deserves or does not deserve a certain degree of remuneration, is correctable or incorrigible, i.e. docile or having residua of disruptive chaos.

Here the metaphysics of body-machine, founded on an ontology of partes-extra-partes, subjected to functional divisions and disciplines, lends itself for exchangeability of functions. Each not only occupies a place, but is arranged in a hierarchy, leading to the notions of hierarchy of skills. The place on occupies is dependent on the rank in a system of functions. Discipline, here, assigns social status in accordance to the degree of subjection and acceptance of the coercions, of increased "adaptation" to the materially designed functions of the environment. Accordingly the general form is one of militarism, of competition for higher positions, of upward mobility all the way to noble generalhood. The individual's power depended on greater subjection to the rule and the latter prescribed the ranking in a hierarchy. Speaking metaphorically, it is a pyramidal arrangement of body functions and utilisations. One's ability to subject oneself lent one an increasingly higher position in the pyramid. Thus each is constantly surveyed and judged, a function in a system of records, a completely individuated body. The given system whips the chaos, the multitude into shape, into individuality under the universal and material environment. Such arrangement is designed to maximise the economy of body utility. Wasted motion is uneconomical.

This is equally the source of classes, where individuals are classified in accordance with subjection. The greater the accepted subjection, the higher the class to which one belongs, in terms of which one is classified. It is both, the characterisation of an individual and the ordering of multitudes. Monasticism turned into disciplined military bodies. In this sense, the functional efficiency must be exhaustive both spatially and temporally. Here one creates an army of the fit, and the unfit, the imbecile who does not submit, does not become a subject, i.e. socialised. For these residual bodies one has to invent correctional facilities, the insane asylums, the prisons. In these settings there appear other authorities, legitimated by other knowledge – correctional. As in other cases, here too the mechanical body is slowly superseded by the functional body. Here a society is invented with social equality and functional inequality, leaving aside the question of freedom. Socially, freedom means a subjection to the disciplines required by the hierchised material environment and bodily functions. Education is no exception: one is subjected to the disciplines arranged in a hierarchy and the temporal requirements of novel techniques of subjection. Precise degrees of examination, supervising and recording levels of functional competence, designed to entice and lead to higher positions in the pyramid of power. Here one finds that it is not the numbers that count, but the efficiency and discipline that lead to success and advancement.

The attainment of a position requires not only a submission to spatial architectonic, but above all to temporal sequence and serialisation. These would be procedures that impose an economy of activities on the body; such activities are multifaceted and are subsumed under the general name of exercise: repetition and graded differentiation. The exercises are surveyed and measured by either the final stage, or in relation to other individuals, or in relation to an organised program. At the base are various observations of qualifications. Various, because the observer can look, listen, check the records, the reports, the histories, and the expectations with respect to functional bodies. It is of interest to note that the metaphysically conceived anatomical bodies, reshaped in accordance with the functional requirements of the reified environment, are reassembled into a mechanically conceived organisation. The latter needs precisely calibrated and graded parts that are individual and replaceable in accordance with their efficiency, lack of efficiency and required upgrading.

The measured functions of bodies must submit not only to the varieties of surveillance, but equally to precise commands that are brief and call for a univocal reaction, producing a cause-effect system of signals. Here language is reduced to signalisation, allowing no deviation. One perceives the signal and reacts to it without any intermediary of thought or other signs. This is the origin of nominalist, empiricist, and behavioural conceptions of language, appearing in the context of the efforts at behavioural modification. In this system all representations are excluded, all reflective possibilising vanishes, resulting in a despotic, militaristic, and blind obedience. The least delay is a slack and a deviation to be tightened up, reexercised, or punished. It is one modality of war of a system on the person. This war can be extended into a political war on a population through various mass media and propaganda. Sloganeering, repeated incantatory sayings, flashing of repeated images, parades, monumental architecture, and solicitation by simplistic promises and solutions.

What is being prepared is the new knowledge of the human, a new objective science and its technocracy. Every act must be seen and recorded, subjected to precise exercises and tests, exploited to the limit of variation and differentiation, leading to a total invasion of the functional body by the incisions of disciplines. This incisive omnivision is deemed necessary to exclude the least incompetence, slack, deviation. It is deemed that an overlooked slack in an organisation of thousand functioning bodies would multiply the wasted motion thousand fold, leading to minimised efficiency of the whole mechanism. Surveillance, thus, becomes a major militaristic and economic-technical preoccupation, not merely of serialised body functions but also as a disciplinary power. The new management is no longer left to the "boss" who observes the body functions of his underlings; it is the traditional Taylor's management system transformed into digital program which is no longer restricted to industrial workers, but to all who are in any kind of "productive" segment, including service workers, office personnel and managers themselves. The novel invention is a "sociometric" badge, worn around the neck that measures every movement, the tone of voice, the seconds one speaks or listens to others. This is to confirm the notion that while global logic is full of innovations, it also opens the possibility to abolish any choice of using or not using such innovations. If one wants to have a job, one will have to wear the sociometric badge. The latter determines the value

of a person in a system, and hence the signitive global life world decides what meaning a person has in a hierarchy of functions.

If we were still to speak of ideology, we could say that human sciences are techniques functioning to punish and reward. The student, the one who is exercised, is submitted to gradations, and is compelled to engage in mortal combat against others in order not to be punished, not to be left at a lower rank. After all, rewards and punishments come through comparison. In this context, the disciplinary power is invisible; it appears on the bodies and psyches of those who are subjected, in their competitions, punishments, rewards. Correlatively, the subjection made visible is an objectification both of power and the body. The objectification, here, has a different ceremonials, theatre, and rituals: revue, parade, examination, in which the subjects are presented as subjected objects for the vision of the power. The subject does not see the power directly, but feels it in the control of his/her muscles, gestures, feelings, and deviations.

In the next sixth chapter we shall have to offer a Lithuanian under-standing of a life world that is different from the global logic and the modern subject – to be explicated in the next chapter. At issue is the world understanding not in terms of modern ontology and metaphysics, but on the basis of the "way that the world turns". We shall argue that such a way is not of the past, but is lived by all, regardless of cultural and discursive practices and differences. The point is that an alternative to globalization is equally global and Lithuanian traditional language and culture will offer such an alternative. But meanwhile, it is necessary to explicate other dimensions of the logic of globalization, including "who" is it that is globalising and being globalised.

Suggested Readings

Choi, J. M., ed. (2009). *Globalization and the Prospects for Critical Reflection.* Delhi: Aakar Books.

Frank, R., Cook, P. (1995). *The winner-take-all society: Why the few at the top get so much more than the rest of us.* New York: Penguin.

Lyotard, J. F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge.* Minneapo-lis: University of Minnesota Press.

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CHAPTER V

The Global Subject

Introduction

The breakdown of the modern Western thought into multiple theories and sub theories, leading to separate and autonomous discourses with their power to make the world in accordance with their formal prescripts, has been extended by the postmodern writers into cultures as discursive systems, each different from and equivalent to others, and each having its own life world. In this sense, all understanding becomes cultural anthropology with all the attendant issues of theory and methodology. The term "culture" has become iconic, ranging from lyric poetry to nomadism. In brief, everything is culture and culture is how everything acquires meaning. The language about culture is equally instructive: there is multiculturalism, there are rights to discursive spaces – and those who grant them, there are pop and post pop cultures, public exhibitionisms, "selfies" and even corporate and military cultures. All in all, these facets are the media of currency and legitimation and provide the dynamics of culture as multiple incomprehension – not because of the pronouncements of various deaths – death of subject, poetry, philosophy, identity, text, humanism, modernity, all the divinities and their mothers, and even death of death, but because of their constant and mutual interpretation of one through the other. Shall we follow scientific culture or mythical stories, or are they equivalent simply because no specific culture can claim to be a representation of any reality: each constructs its own "reality". Yet a fact remains that such cultural constructs have become globalised and pose a question concerning their interpretation from one ethnic group to another, from nation to nation, and from language to language. Can rap culture be the same in Lithuania as it is in African-American community? It seems that there is a transition from one to the other that never maintains an identity assumed by the creators of this culture. In such a transition there is no transmission of the original, but its reinterpretation in a different cultural setting. By extension, it can be said that there is no original: everything is mediated by modern technologies.

The transition and reinterpretation suggests a mixing of differences into a novel and unique result. Islamic music guardedly resonates with jazz,

with American country music and even with hints of hard rock. While still Islamic, it is also in transition. Other cultures, such as political are equal in flux due to their mutual encounters. It is fascinating to hear of contemporary efforts to establish an "Islamic republic" as if the latter were akin to the traditional Islamic mode of social rulership by a Caliphate, or efforts to "export" democracy to parts of the world where democracy turns into license to appropriate public funds for private enrichment. The call by purists, such as Sadr to fight for the reestablishment of global Caliphate and not an Islamic republic are signs that political culture is in transition and it is too late to return to some purity – if it ever existed. In turn, it is obvious by now that exporting democracy turned out to be a disaster. Such cultural transitions seem to avoid cultural contradictions. But this also implies that there is no clear understanding of the other's culture and indeed no clear comprehension what comprises the historical and current cultural clashes – if they are cultural at all. Before this question can be articulated, a more precise delimitation of the issues involved in outlining what is the global subject matter or, indeed, the subject that is being propagated or rejected.

It is a global case that contemporary encounters among civilizations, as mentioned, provide a great variety of views concerning human "nature" and even "essence". There is the Hindu Atman, the soul that is coextensive with Brahman – the cosmic rhythmic "breath" exhibited by cosmic dancers such a Shiva, and made present by divinities – the avatars – in the form of Krishna. We see Krishna worshipers, attired in ritualistic garb, chanting up and down the streets of Vilnius, and we find institutionalised efforts to study other civilizations, as well as Yoga for health clubs, and even Zen clubs. Each offers a unique and distinct notion of who is the "self" – no doubt worthy of consideration. We want to know how to live and acquire means to "find ourselves". The West also has various traditional subjects, specifically pervasive in Lithuania, having names such as "soul", created by Middle Eastern paternal master, destined for rewards or punishments. There is also a residuum of Soviet self as a functioning social value, serving "the people", and traditional Protestant self, whose identity depends on his direct communicative access to the highest authority which guarantees worldly riches for being a faithful believer. Interesting and valuable as these "exotic" views offered by traditional Middle Eastern context and other civilizations are, we cannot examine them, because they are in trouble even

in their own life worlds. As was mentioned in the first chapter, joining the process of globalization, Japanese could not decide who they are, as evidenced by hundreds of books on that subject matter. Meanwhile, Middle Easterners are tearing each other apart concerning whose soul is closer to an absolute autocrat and who will be rewarded for what actions in this world. This is the result of globalization with a face of a modern Western subject. Who is, then, this subject, specifically since up to date Western philosophers themselves are in a quandary concerning its status. Not to be told that we picked the wrong subject as the instigator for globalization, we should offer a brief indication as to what sorts of subjects modern West has concocted or, to be more polite, constructed.

Sight and Reason

The well-known and constantly repeated credit states that Descartes is the father of modern philosophy. And he is also the father of modern subject, in one of its contestable forms. Renee Descartes proposed to establish science on undisputable foundations that would be secure against any scepticism and doubt. It is to be understood that this project against scepticism requires the context in which scepticism was prevalent. One major reason for this scepticism is the fact that during the medieval period philosophy had lost the classical Greek model of philosophical thinking: unrestricted challenge to any view, even challenges to the nature of philosophy, and became subsumed under theology. The task of philosophy was to prove the "theological truths" presented in cultic texts. Since the latter consisted of numerous contradictory pronouncements, such pronouncements led to a plethora of conflicting views, each demanding philosophical legitimation. This means that philosophy lost its independence and became subservient to proving the pronouncements of cryptic sayings. This led philosophy into wild speculations such that it was impossible to take any of them seriously. Thus, one had to become sceptical not only about the theological pronouncements, but also about the philosophical speculations that were constructed to legitimate these pronouncements. In this context, Descartes starts his venture from a pre-given ground of scepticism, which is to say, he wants to doubt the grounds of any claim to knowledge and truth such that if these claims cannot offer incontestable proofs, they must be rejected no matter how much they may seem to belong to everyday experience.

Descartes begins with this daily experience and, reflecting upon it, shows its lack of precision and certainty. It is precisely the reflective turn that characterises this venture, demanding the constitution of a subject who must guarantee knowledge within the subject's parameters. Descartes gives credence to his ultimate quest of founding philosophy to the mind. It is, for him a substance that is distinct from physical substance, a material thing made of material parts, but it is also (inexplicably) related to this physical substance. Yet the quest to understand the mind and what it consists of requires, for Descartes, methodical doubt. What is notable is that his methodical doubt is a "thinking reflection" upon the functions of his own mind. This allows him to claim that he knows that he is a substance the whole nature of which is to think. Thus the self which is the mind by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and is easier to know than the body. What the mind thinks as its own thoughts is radically distinct from the world of material objects.

It seems that in his sceptical reflections on all facets of experience, Descartes already assumes that the mind, as a self, is a reflective process that can discover, within the functions of the mind, what it will regard as worthy of the title knowledge and hence of the true self as a thinking mind. While mind possesses sense experiences, such experiences are unclear and hence could be doubted, specifically with respect to other aspects of the mind, such as dreaming. How does one distinguish clearly between dream sense experiences and "waking" sense experiences? These questions suggest the priority of the mind as a thinking self, and the latter is granted the status of being indubitable. The result is this: the Self is self-reflection but in such a way, that this self-reflection becomes a standard of everything: it reflectively sets up criteria as to what shall be accepted as true or false, as real-objective and subjective. For Descartes the self as reflective posits standards in terms of which it judges the world. Mind can show that we cannot trust our senses, because there are too many instances where our senses deceive us. Ahead of me I see a wet surface on the road, but when I come closer I find that the surface is not wet. Was my previous sense perception wrong, or is my current sense perception wrong? I am placed in doubt concerning my visual sense. My visual perception of the sun tells me that it is the size of a beach ball, and yet my mental calculations tell me that my vision is wrong. Meanwhile, the same sun appears to go around the

earth, while the earth seems to be stationary – in all cases showing that my sense of vision is wrong. Here Descartes points out that the characteristics of sense experienced objects, which we attributed to such objects, as if they belonged to them, now are doubtable without a contradiction. Following this argument, we can also doubt the existence of the object, of the thing, since all we can know about the thing are the sense impressions we have; but since the sense impressions are ours they do not imply the existence of things. The very notion of a thing as objective is placed into question. Regarding sense experience, it is the case that there are more vivid dreams than daily experience, leading to scepticism of the latter.

Next argument proposes the following: in searching for possible certainty, one discovers in one's mind mathematical ideas. According to Descartes, here we find clarity of thinking. After all, it is obvious that the proposition that $2 + 2 = 4$ is true. But, Descartes argues, even in this case we cannot be absolutely certain, since our minds are finite and therefore cannot guarantee that from an infinite mind the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$ will also be true. What Descartes is suggesting is this: there is a difference between clarity and certainty. We may show that when we extend our counting further, we may be clear that $4 + 4 = 8$ is also true. We can do this indefinitely and still be clear. Yet the continuous clear calculation, will never reach an end. This means that while up to the present we are clear about every proposition, we cannot be certain that from the infinite side, the propositions might be otherwise. This means that while our finite minds can be clear about finite propositions, they cannot be certain concerning the way mathematics would look from an infinite side. Hence I can doubt even the truth of mathematical propositions. This is the crucial point that allows a claim that mathematical method, as the metaphysical side of modern sciences/technologies, is equally a constructed technology. Now we are in a quandary: there is no proposition that we cannot doubt, and in this sense even the mathematical science that goes beyond our sense experience is in doubt. This most rational of all rational sciences cannot be used as a foundation. Which way should we turn?

For the next argument, Descartes points out that through all his arguments that led him to doubt everything, there was one thing that he did not doubt: the fact that he is doubting. Here one discovers that doubting is not just a natural scepticism but, above all, requires thinking. But to

think that one is doubting one must have an absolute certainty that one is thinking. In this argument Descartes points out that to doubt that one thinks requires thinking and hence such a doubt would be a contradiction. One can push this argument as far as possible and claim that "I am not thinking", and yet such a claim includes the notion that "I think that I am not thinking" and hence proves that the first statement is contradictory. From this Descartes concludes that the only thing that cannot be doubted without a contradiction is that we think. Hence his famous statement "I think therefore I am". This does not mean that what one thinks is true; all it means is that we have a basis that is absolutely certain: we think.

To demonstrate this certain knowledge, Descartes proposes an experiment in thought: assume an existence of an "evil genius" who has an infinite power to create all sorts of sense experiences, shifting images, contradictory thoughts, and uses this power to continuously confuse a person. Yet despite its power, the evil genius cannot do anything against the certainty that "I think that I am being confused". Here thinking guarantees its own certainty despite, against, and because of any power. According to Descartes, I may not be certain about the existence of anything or anybody else, but I am certain that I think and therefore that I exist. To say this in other terms, I can doubt my thinking only by thinking, and thus prove the certainty of my thinking. This is also a modern position concerning one level of individuality and the exclusion of all sorts of theological powers. While a divinity might throw all sorts of obstacles against me, it cannot abolish individual's independence. Here, Descartes must admit that he has proven a case that leads directly to what is known as *solipsism*, from "solus" (solitary one) "ipsus" (existing); While at the material-atomistic level there are distinct individuals, the same can be said of the subject, who is dramatically independent and a source of legitimation of any scientific claim. Such a subject is one form that has become globalised and a challenge to some sort of traditional power thrown against him.

The significance of this type of subject for globalization is known by the modern, although much debated, term "Egocentrism". The Ego is identified with the self in such a way that it is even closed within itself, and all that it possesses are his, such as his thoughts, feelings and even a mechanical body. This is one source of the modern notion of "individual rights" and even private property. The numerous and well known global

cases in national and international courts attempt to adjudicate various technical and artistic creations under the name "intellectual property". This means that if one invents a formal system that is applicable in some technical field, then the invention is a property. Moreover, the global reach of this Egological subject pervades the social arena, specifically in its cultural dimension: individual in confrontation with the cultural. This is to say, while symbolic designs of specific life worlds demand the submission of its members to cultural norms and demands, the same members or at least some of them, demand rights to be individual whose wants, thinking, opinions count. One of the most important aspects of Egological subject is an inevitable tendency to relate everything to itself, to be the centre of the universe and finally a narcissistic understanding of the world as his/her projection of wants, opinions, and interpretations. As mentioned, one result is the technology allowing everyone to record everything about himself/herself. Thus one photographs the coke she is drinking, the pizza he is eating, the surroundings he sees and herself in those surroundings. This Egological self is extended to include the virtual reality of her choice which she takes with her regardless of her surroundings. "Me and my world". The global "human sciences" have a tendency to take "opinion" polls and report statistics on what certain populations, in certain parts of the world think, want, and even fight for. While it might be pleasing to an individual who is asked for his opinion, he should also recognise that he is not an individual but a statistic. The Egological subject as a centre, is also present in the taken for granted "perspectivity" that pervades much of modern and postmodern terminology: "From my perspective", or "From the perspective of Hinduism", or "From the conservative perspective", or "From the perspective of morality", of "economy", of "the laws", and so on. Of course, there is no comprehension what philosophical arguments allow one to speak of "perspectivity" apart from the Egological subject. Since the thoughts belong to this type of subject, then rationality is his possession. One of the most telling indication of the pre-eminence of the Egological subject as "rational" appears in all areas of social life: everything this subject does is for "rational self-interest". This is purely modern notion of rationality which we have articulated in previous chapters: instrumental. To be philosophical, classical reason was completely "disinterested" and the rational human, who sought to disclose truth, had to exclude all of his interests and even

the self. Thus anyone, who joins the logic of globalization, does so from the "perspective" of self-interest. The latter means that reason is a cunning way to trick, manipulate, and gain advantages over others – even if that involves the cooperation of the others.

There is another major dimension of the Egological subject: security. Modern psychology has concocted a militaristic notion of the main activity of this Ego: Ego defences. Whether such defences are psychological or physical is not essential; what is crucial is the building of the novel means to make us "safe", even if such means would place us on the brink of extinction. This is different protection of the self than the one invented by Middle Eastern symbolic design. The latter, being a patriarchal autocracy and theocracy, regarded women to be the most dangerous, alluring, and conniving creatures against whom men had to defend themselves. Thus women had to be made "invisible" by means of dress codes, seclusion from men, leading men to build walled monasteries as fortresses where the sin bearing women could not enter. It is a curious fact that no women ever built monasteries – it is men who locked women up and wedded them to one male: in another world. The modern defences are of different kind, from economics through wealth, education, and above all technological protection. This includes the novel ways to detect enemies, build secure homes, neighbourhoods and even countries. Another way of understanding this Egological self who orients everything to himself is the pre-eminence given to the "middle class". The rhetoric from the West insists that if we help build middle class around the globe, then global stability will be secured. And to no one's surprise, the centre of middle class is the Egological self. She wants to acquire more things, be a consumer, and demand of governments to guarantee that anyone who is a "good" person, obeys the rules, works hard, deserves to reach the middle class status. Even psychiatry accepted this striving toward middle class: where Id was Ego shall be. This is to say, where the dark and dirty working class was, middle class will come about.

The Empirical Self

Within the context that frames modern philosophy, there are surface variations such that some give credence to reason as the ultimate arbiter among all events, others claim that only sense experience can secure understanding. We must point out at the outset that neither of these sides,

rational or rationalism, nor empirical or empiricism can argue for such aspects as human nature or essence, cause and effect, and a thing with characteristics that belong to the whole. What is left consists of arguments for the priority of one side over the other. As we have already shown, Descartes opens two sides of philosophy: the purely empirical, sense awareness, and the purely logical, mathematical, rational awareness. The latter, for Descartes, is "innate" in the mind, and is a requirement for science. The British empiricists, among whom Hume is preeminent, argue that there is nothing in the mind that does not come from the senses. Sensory experience is, in principle, all that we have and the rest, including ideas, must be derived from and explained by, the ways that sensory experience works. One major argument against rationalism and its claim to "innate ideas in the mind", is this. If everyone had such innate ideas, then there would be no need for learning through sense experience. All we would have to do in order to know is to search our minds and discover the truth. Yet it is not the case that this takes place, and we have to struggle to learn logic, mathematics, and to check truth claims about the world through sense experience. In this sense, according to empiricists, the best strategy is to begin with the senses and reject the claims of the rationalists.

It should be obvious why the Egological subject, with its rational self-interest, is significant for globalization – after all the self-interest to master the world on the basis of instrumental reason, is the innovation of all the novelties for this ego to live "forever". But the empirical subject is significant for other reasons. First, it is a residuum of the argument for the primacy of parts over the whole, such that the experienced characteristics – qualitative – do not belong to reality. They are impressions given to the subject and thus belong to the subjective experience. Empiricism simply rejected the aspect called "subject" and was left with pure, qualitative impressions and that the subject is nothing more than such impressions. At this level, it is not possible to speak of 'My impressions" since there is no one to claim them as an entity possessing them..Following this strategy, empiricism argues that sense experience is the basis of all knowledge claims. Whatever we can know depends on the discoveries by direct sense awareness. It is obvious that sense experience is very limited: we have impressions of colours, sounds, tastes, tactilities, etc., which do not imply anything more, such as an "object" that this sense experiences would suggest. Thus the question

arises concerning the "nature" of "real objects". Now in philosophy we must demand that any explanation must adhere to its first principles. For empiricism, the only claims we can make are based in principle only on sense experiences. Resultantly we can say that we have a colour impression of red, a tactile impression of smooth, a taste impression of sour, and by habitually associating these impressions we may say that there is an "apple". This is not to say that we have an empirical impression of an apple. An apple is a sum of associated sense experiences. This means that we cannot make claims apart from and beyond "constant conjunction of impressions" that come one after another. Constant conjunction means that anytime red appears, then smooth and finally sour, we begin to associate these impressions one with the other and call this conjunction an apple. In short, given this constant conjunction, we form habits of judgment and claim that we have an apple. The apple is a term that is applied to the conjunction of impressions but does not name an object, a substantial thing with its own characteristics underneath the impressions.

Given the parameters of empirical experience, empiricism then argues that what we call "ideas" in our minds are actually associations of present to previous impressions. This is to say that if one sees certain colours, hears certain sounds, etc. and has a vivid set of impressions that have been habitually associated to be called a "dog", the "idea of a dog" is simply a vague and diffused image that one has in the absence of current and vivid impressions. The image as an idea is equally empirical – it is simply less vivid concerning the detailed impressions. It must be maintained clearly that empiricism cannot permit the assumption that there is anything in the mind apart from the impressions and their vague "after affects". Regarding the term "affects" there is no implication of "cause and effect". For empiricism to speak of cause and effect is to speak, once again, of habitual association of impressions. For example, there appear a yellow, bright, at times orange flickering phenomena. One moves closer to it, and experiences an impression of warmth, still closer, one experiences a sensation of heat; then one moves away and experiences cold. Having repeated this movement a number of times, one forms a habitual association and claims that when one moves closer to this flickering phenomenon, one constantly experiences heat; thus one forms a habit of association and claims that this flickering (termed fire) "causes" heat. According to Hume, there is no "empirical impression of

cause:" How does a cause taste, what colour it is, how does it sound? None of these sense phenomena are given as parts of the term "cause". Hence, all one can say about causes is that they are our habitual association of the constant conjunction of impressions. Since cause is not given empirically, then there are no "necessary connections", but only "contingent" associations. All empirical impressions could be otherwise than they are. Resultantly, the only self that is available is identical with the impressions.

Following this logic, one can also claim that the only way we can understand ourselves is in terms of acquired habits. By performing certain actions habitually, and by associating the impressions, we form our "identities". One is a carpenter, because one has associated one's activities in a setting and can identify himself with those activities. In another setting and forming different associations, one would be a different set of habits and hence a different self. There is no substantial or essential human being under the habits. Take away all the habits and constant associations and there will be nothing left. This is part of the empirical theory of "behavioural modification". Present someone with different impressions and their associations, and there will be a formation of different habits and different personalities. The previous personality, as a "vague" image (Idea) will eventually fade and will be replaced by the new and more vivid image, as a sum of new association of impressions and habits. While for classical philosophy habit was a "second nature", for modern empiricism it is the only "nature". Given this understanding, it is impossible to speak of a continuous self through modifications of habits. In fact it can be said that if the modifications are fast, one could be totally different from day to day. A conclusion can be radically severe with respect to responsibility: who is responsible for the crime one year ago, if that someone, as a set of habits, is no more, and a new set of habits is now a different empirical being.

What we would normally call self-identity is, for empiricism, not only a set of associations and habits, but also a name attached to them. Hence, we claim who we are by acquiring a label that too is an arbitrary invention: "I am John the carpenter" or "I am Suzan the priestess" are not designations of some essential person, but given names. In this sense, what would be seen normally as a unity underlying sense impressions, would be "nominal" or a name. You get a name on the basis of your repeated activities that form you into a recognisable "person" with a name. One result of this sort

of understanding is that language performs the organising and unifying function, even though we presume that somehow it copies or represents the way things or humans really are. Yet as we already noted, if we adhere strictly to the empirical principle, language, taken at its empirical level, is simply another set of associated impressions. This suggests that empiricism must assume more than its principle allows without showing us what such an assumption would be or how it could be irrelevant for the way things are and the way they are understood. We should insert a brief indication that modern philosophy, including empiricism, cannot speak of substantial things and their characteristics, since the only aspects that we know of such characteristics are our impressions. The characteristics will change with the changes in our sensory changes. Thus, there are no criteria to demonstrate whose sensations are valid and whose not. The importance of the empirical "subject" for globalization will be discussed after we articulate the arguments that lead to the ultimate self and its unavoidable self-fragmentation.

Before we get to the other levels of pleasure, it is advisable to disclose another factor of globalization, going under the rhetorical code: "information age". The discussion of the logic of globalization contained another domain that implied the pre-eminence of information in modernity. But information is usually seen linguistically as a transmission of knowledge. The question that leads back to globalising logic is revealed by asking, why is it that European postmodern writers give language a dominating power? Such dominance is announced in claims that all discourse is fascistic. Taken as a universal rule it is comprehensible mainly within the context of Western modernity. In general, postmodern writers are concerned with discourse and the way it structures human socio-political and ideological life. This is a variant of a very broad conception where the claim is made that who controls language and, above all, mass media, determines the consciousness and behaviour of a population. In principle it is rhetorical power. Such rhetoric is employed by autocratic and theocratic systems which construct a symbolic design to maintain power and invent "reality", including historical "reality" to suit temporary needs of the rulers. The rhetorical designs may look like information, but it is not about anything, but about the perception of anything. If this claim is correct, we are still in the dark how modern discourses could assume such pervasive power. If the discursive domain is coequal to the productive-technical domain, then discursive knowledge and

its praxis implications become most significant. It is not difficult to see how any discourse will have to be translated into quantities of information, and anything that does not lend itself to such a translation will be discarded. This is the "discursive power" that rules the modern understanding that all "expert" speaking is a power of making. The producers and users of knowledge will have to perform this translation in order to continue producing and inventing. This requires not only a total exteriorisation of knowledge, but also of its reduction to the system of signals, its militarisation. Since the productive processes are already militarised, knowledge too will become a sought after product and will be used in new combinations and sold as any other commodity. It is no longer avoidable that, in this sense, information emerges as the major stake in the global competition for power. The battles range over information, as once they did over territories, raw materials and cheap labour. At the level of information one can find a conjunction of industry, wealth, military, and politics.

It should be obvious that the invented technical systems are not a simple technological fact, whether it is genetics, computers, smart phones; they embody information systems, the logic that was used to design technologies is carried by them and can be read as any other signitive text. In this sense, an exchange or proliferation of all sorts of technologies is equivalent to exchange of information. The latter is both material and intellectual, resulting in global controversies about "intellectual property". Global circulation of technology is circulation of information which can be picked up anywhere and enhanced transformed and become more valuable as information. By now, Lithuania is in a process of transforming its education precisely on the basis that technical knowledge is information. Characteristically, the "age of information" is coextensive with the technological systems and resultantly pervades the pedagogical process. While initial academic institutions of modernity were modelled on Berlin's university, stressing "science for the sake of science", the shift to discursive "signals" demands training in performative information, i.e. an acquisition of knowledge that empowers one to subject oneself to a function. Instead of universal, critical, and emancipatory education, the education is shifted toward the applied, the professional, technical, and basically functional information; although the "humanities" are still part of the curriculum, they are tolerated as a part of the tradition and are periodically paraded under

"values" and opinions, or denounced as disruptions of serious scientific acquisition of information.

This is of concern for Lithuanian pedagogy, specifically as the country is engaged in the debate about education reform. In essence, the reform hinges on the increase of universities after independence and the tendency of young generations to aspire to a university degree. The issue is the quality of such a degree in light of the competition by the numerous universities for a shrinking student population. Quality is lowered to attract less interested students, whose main purpose is to get a degree and not so much to achieve great learning. But a more prevailing tendency is revealed by the fact of Lithuania being drawn into the process of globalization, requiring "marketable" skills or professions. This is the juncture at which the local/global shows up. There is no lack of views claiming that the production of specialists is premised on expanding global economy which "inspires" educational institutions to shift toward "practical" skills, i.e. education is the principal domain affected by globalization. Currently there is no one global system of education, yet the trend is clear. Just to name organisations such as UNESCO with its agenda, expressed in rhetorically incantated phrase "education for all". Other global entities such as World Bank, and even the organisation for economic development, promote the notion that education should develop the pool of professionals needed for global economy. Local/global means that while local economies may require specific professions, the latter must also adhere to the demands of global technological innovations in order to be abreast of, or catch up to the new requirements – stay in human history. Although no global system of education is yet available, there are global tests and their comparisons, with a heavy emphasis on sciences and mathematics, placing Lithuania in an average range. Yet this might become significant, since EU has a vision for European professional training to be implemented by 2020.

At any rate, the power of humanities is merely rhetorical and has little bearing on "real" issues. Thus the university, in the true sense of the word, disappears; it becomes a contributor to the technical performance within the social system, and its funds are tied to its ability to produce subjected functionaries. This emphasis tends toward the abolition of emancipatory education in favour of subjecting training allowing no critical discourse. The latter is "soft" and offers no tangible rewards. The subject of peda-

gogy, the student, is no longer concerned with the political domain, with human rights, dignity, meaning, and the general well-being of the world. He is focused on narrow, technical expertise, private enrichment, and self enhancement. Once the public domain is abandoned, civic responsibilities and cultural identity become secondary issues – and they are secondary everywhere the logic of globalization appears. Once more, this is the reason why the technically trained can live anywhere as experts, without the need to participate in "local affairs. It is sufficient to point out that the current debates about the best societies introduce a major claim that the autocratic powers, such as China, can and has produced greater progress in creating a global technical reach than did democracies. The latter become past traditions which are no longer relevant for global affairs.

Given this context, it is impossible to offer an all-inclusive, universally acceptable "social theory". If democracy is irrelevant, and autocracy is also discredited with the fall of fascism and communism, then globalization is the sole remainder that might be expected to offer a theoretical framework. The evidence for this claim does not come from some critical view concerned with the failures of social theorists, but from the theorists themselves. If we accept the claim that civilization is the broadest social unit, offering explanations of all events, then we must also accept the notion that sociologists, engaged in the study of civilizations, are in disagreement as to the nature of a civilization and, in face of the fact that there are more than one civilization, no agreement can be reached which among them should be regarded as a universal standard. There is an agreement that each civilization has its own standards, different from others, and thus no universal social theory is possible. In addition, if a social theory is proposed by members of a given civilization, then such a theory rests on the context of understanding of such a civilization and thus is incapable of encompassing its own and other civilizations. This is the situation in which democracy and autocracy can become equivalent, each offering its own social theory, resulting in the logical conclusion that no encompassing social theory is possible. And yet, most distinct and even ideologically opposed publications – journals, monographs and media reports continuously mention "globalization" in two major senses: economic and technological. While the former is attributed to the power of global players that determine the destinies of local governments and

even the structures of societies, it is the latter that has become the leading edge of everything associated with progress.

Given that there is no universal social theory, it is possible to revert to universal "praxis" that, despite different civilizations, societies, cultures and life worlds, all accept the global requirements of technology and progress. By doing so, they also must accept the theoretical basis of technology and progress that are founding aspects of the modern Western civilization. Thus in the practical sense, it must be admitted that globalization has become equivalent to the acceptance of the Modern West as the universal practical horizon with its background ontology and metaphysics that allowed the West to become preeminent. Such ontology and metaphysics comprise the theoretical/philosophical and methodological base. The latter also founds the social and political order of the West that includes educational systems intertwining theory, praxis, civil society, economy and public participation in political affairs. It is well known that not all civilizations and even cultures within them, possess a public domain for the participation of all social members in making public decisions, having rights and duties to change laws and public representatives, and establish educational programs for younger generations. And yet, even such civilizations accept and compete for technical innovations and progress – immersing in one major aspect of the Modern West: *praxis.* In this context, there is currently an abundant literature offering a basic claim that diverse philosophical schools are converging toward a conception of practical activity and basically of praxis. This convergence has a tendency to assume that human activities are embedded in an intersubjective and historical horizon of sense comprising the lived world of a society. Such offers of convergence on the basis of praxis, and more generally, on practical activity, cannot be taken for granted at face value. We have no consensus among the various directions concerning the meaning of the lived-world, intersubjectivity, horizons of sense, social world, forms of life and action, etc. In addition, the emphasis on praxis continues to assume silently that it offers an overcoming of metaphysics in favour of human understanding and specifically of human social life world. The latter is precisely what humans make and how they act in relationship to the environment and to each other. It is to be noted that by the middle of 19th Century, there was a common premise that, ala Kant, the things in themselves, i.e. reality, is unknowable, and what is knowable depends

on the ways we organise the world of awareness. Indeed, the principles of philosophy were discarded and the notion of theory was not to "interpret" the world one more time, but to change it. This means that any theory will count as valid if it will serve practical affairs, practical human needs, whether at an individual level as is the case in American pragmatism, or at the grand social level, as seen by Marxism. In this sense, any theory does not depend on what it offers as an understanding of reality, but what value it has for human practical needs.

This means that any understanding of social technology, presupposes this modern Western conception of theory as a value laden instrument for human requirements. Above mentioned fact that not all civilizations and the cultures and societies within them contain a public domain that would allow the participation of all social members, rests on the question of social technology: who is to decide what technical needs are of social value; is it the general public, or the "leaders" with the advice of "experts" of all practical domains, from bio-chemistry, to weapons. This is obvious in the process of globalization that creates various selectivities by "authorities" who are intent on "protecting" the members of their communities from unacceptable influences. Thus the practical-technical domain might remain in place, and all societies to engage in globalization, but block all other suggestions, such as discussion of civil society, deemed to be disruptive of normal operation of "productive and progressive" life. China, and most of Middle Eastern societies, ban Western education which is outside the parameters of globalization. The problems they encounter are also technological; the latest technologies, which are the bearers of meanings, are difficult to control and allow all sorts of incursions of ideas and information into most protected regions. This incursion is equally problematic in the global world of the West in terms of "privacy" concerns. Once one enters the technological media, one is in a cyber world accessible to all, and to such an extent that legislative protections cannot keep up with the rapid technical innovations. On the other side, there is a proliferation of "anything goes", i.e. if we can make it let us make it. Of course, the public is immersed in all sorts of miraculous promises from "rejuvenation" to cures of all disease, to becoming rich and in fact, saving the world from poverty. This is evident from the engagement of European Union with a 2015 project to eliminate poverty around the globe – and all premised on social technology.

The Limit

The mentioned bans on globalization of Western education beyond technologies, reveals the final dimension of the globalising subject. While investigating the modern consciousness, we can reach a conclusion that the globalised modern subject has an awareness of itself and the world as if they were created out of nothing, as if they had no measure which could be used by humans to discover some stability for themselves that would lend a place in the scheme of the world, would release them from the bewitched circle of constant aim at the elevation of progress and power. The first glance would suggest that such a view overstates its own case, yet closer analyses of the modern ontological base and metaphysical method show that we were too mild. The modern consciousness is much more radical, and appeared with a sudden revolution. This revolution was directed against everything that was developed through the medieval period and even against the classical conception of cosmic order. One of the main directions of this revolution appears as a humanly constituted "divine complex". The latter consists of consciousness which rejects any claim that humans belong to nature or to divinities which rule over nature. The result is a dramatic effort by the Modern Western person to achieve an omniscient and omnipotent position. The understanding of the basis of this effort comprises the modern ontological consciousness. In the second chapter we presented ontological and metaphysical arguments which led to the birth of the modern subject, but the latter fell into distinct interpretations, all the way to being a mechanical function in a technological world. In light of the postmodern claims that the subject is dead, we shall have to address the issue of the subject and what kind of a subject that is proclaimed to be dead.

The first ontological act, comprising Political Enlightenment, is the devaluation not only of the "external" nature, but also of whatever humans would consider to be "inborn" in human nature or even essence, whether it is a soul, spirit, a mind having specific features. The rejection of anything predetermined, essential, is one of the fundamental reasons for the rejection of the notion of humans as belonging to nature, and indeed a proclamation of human as not yet defined entity. The words which announced the new ontology were written by Pico Della Mirandola. In his re-evaluation of the Old Testament concerning the "creation" of man, Pico shifted the base toward man's "self-creation" and even autonomy. While elevating human

dignity, Pico is rewriting the Old Testament to make man appear as a "grand miracle". According to Pico, after the world was fully created, after the standards and forms for all creation were completely exhausted, the divinity decided to create a "new son" (*novo filio*). Since all the standards and forms were exhausted, there was no standard by which the divinity could create man in accordance with a specific measure, nature or form. Moreover, if the world was completed and full, there was no longer any specific place for man in the cosmic scheme of things. Thus the human was created neither in accordance with a "nature" or "essence" nor for a specific place in the cosmos. In this sense, man finds himself without measure, without any limits and without a place. Resultantly, man must establish his own measure, his form, limits, his talents, in accordance with his wishes and decisions or in terms of his own "projects". The human is neither divine nor demonic, neither mortal nor immortal; all this depends on human will. According to Pico's "testament" humans can make anything they decide of themselves. To speak in terms of methodological hermeneutics, there appears a suppression of the text of nature, of essence in favour of autonomy and ultimately rulership over nature. As we saw in previous chapters, this domination over nature is an unavoidable consequence of modern philosophical shift toward materialistic ontology and quantitative metaphysics.

Not having any measure, above all not having any "limits" that comprised classical rationality, man is free to create himself by creating his own standards, his nature and his environment: he is completely a master of himself and his world. Individualistic American ideologues had no problem calling some achieving entrepreneur as "self-made man". Although there are various modern expressions of autonomy, extending from Pico through Kant, and all the way to Sartre, Pico was the first to express this autonomy in its full ontological dimension. In this dimension it does not mean that human autonomy is founded on will, a choice between two forces or attractions, be they from outside or from within. Every such attraction ties humans to natural events and assumes that humans have inborn needs correlated to such events. To be attracted in this sense means that one is still subjected to events of inborn needs and their natural fulfilment – one is not autonomous. The modern ontology of autonomy has an opposite meaning: not having any standards, humans are autonomous because they must create the standards and laws ex nihilo, and must follow such

standards and laws despite external and internal attractions and drives. The humans are law givers and thus are autonomous, completely free sources of laws. We ought not to miss the radicalness of this ontology: the modern subject has nothing from itself and from the world; thus anything that will count as laws, essence, and environment must first be created as if out of nothing. Thus even who we are is first established by us. The consciousness of modern man's ontological essence is "self and environment creation".

Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible for any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of choice between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, or the right of a particular group to respect their own identity. The globalising universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by postmodernity in such a way that the others in their own self-reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out their lives, between what they can be as universal individuals or what they can maintain as members of their culture. The autonomous self-creating subject that is being globalised as universal has become a background on which the others as culturally different would be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual, unique, with a right to self-preservation. This self-preservation is a phenomenon that has no basis in any ontological, metaphysical, or theological claims since all these are equally unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they will have to be adjudicated in power confrontations each calling for the maintenance of its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. Nonetheless in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this self-creation syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning the criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, the modern West, on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some of the intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, follow the same globalising logic of wilful destruction – and do so on a hidden premise of evolution: the others are on a lesser level of evolution and hence have to be brought up to modern instrumental rationality by discarding their outdated myths and modes of life.

Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their different reading of cultural, and indeed all other, phenomena. To say that the others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that we have a criterion of the "right culture" which belongs only to one culture. But in this sense, one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objectively and equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and require that all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requirements. Yet, by the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and without prejudice, we have just offered a position that requires (1) the treatment of other cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in terms of one culture's requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice of objectivity, and allowing other cultures their modes of awareness that do not regard themselves as either objective or subjective. Given this setting, we revert back to the problematic mentioned above: how can one claim to know the other "objectively" when one has imposed one's own cultural component of "objectivity" on others and hence not only did not understand the other culture, but failed to escape one's own culture. In this sense, the very claim to be able to treat one's own culture objectively, is to accept this very culture without any "objectivity", since one already lives and accepts the terms of her own culture. This problematic is a result of the globalization of modern subject who, despite the proclamations of its death, is a condition of such proclamations. The replacement of such a subject is based on the argument of such subjects in all sort of psychological guises.

In turn, as an ontologically autonomous being, man is the ground and source of laws and norms in the social/political sphere. From autonomy flow human value, respect, dignity, equality, rights and responsibility. Political Enlightenment, taking this base for granted, can be essentially political "liberation". Since every person is a source of standards and laws, there is an awareness that each person must have full rights to express his/her autonomy and to reject all traditions and customs. This is the suppression by autonomy. This simply means that autonomy implies equality of all persons as law givers and hence a prohibition of domination of a person by other persons, groups of persons, or traditional cultural forms. It must be noted that equality has different foundation from the one articulated in Classical philosophies. In the latter equality was based on the argument for common human nature which comprised human essence and human limit

and a natural place. Yet in the modern ontology all are equal not because of human essence and its limits, but because all are unconditional sources of laws and need not accept any limiting rules, unless such rules are agreed upon with other persons.

The question of modern subject and its responsible confrontation with globalization is *the* philosophical question for our day. In brief, it is impossible to practice philosophy and not to raise this question. We are confronted by modern philosophy in its ontological and metaphysical guises that require a serious consideration whether we can even think of the relationship between a philosopher as a modern subject and responsibility. It is our task, then, to consider what sort of position will open up for an intellectual that would be worthy of philosophy. Responsibility must be coupled with intelligibility, since to be responsible requires an awareness of what is the subject matter, what is a specific "reality" that we confront. The discussion in chapter two disclosed the basic issue of ontology – the nature of all things. On the one hand, classical thought demanded that a thing must be understood as a whole within its essential limits, if such a thing will be intelligible. On the other, the modern ontology excludes such limitations by positing a reality that is contingent, inaccessible to perception, and exposed to arbitrary treatment. Since human beings are part of this ontological reality, then they are not different from such reality. They too can be treated arbitrarily because they have no objective intelligible limit such as being essentially different from other material things. The question of responsibility is totally related to the question of self-limitation. At the first glance, self-limitation appears in an extreme form of a world created by globalization – a world which by all modern accounts is regarded as objective without recognising that it is humanly and indeed autonomously objective. Let us look at this "objectivity" in various contexts.

Self-limitation and Subjection

It was argued above that humans construct their symbolic designs which, in turn, become "legitimate" reality. Anything we do or become is dependent on such designs. A name is acquired ritualistically, as is one's social rank or one's possessions. Under the assumption that humans are autonomous, the symbolic designs become the limitation to autonomy. This is even the case in the political society – democracy – where a mutual and

free establishment of rules comprises a self-limitation of autonomy. In this sense we speak of obeying the laws which are inscribed as legal codes, given to all members of such a society as objective. As the common saying goes, we all are "subject" to laws. Regardless of the variant, we subject ourselves and in most cases demand that others do the same. Thus the strange preoccupation of "exporting" such designs, as was the case with Lithuania when it subjected itself to Middle Eastern theocracy, or is the case with the costly and fruitless efforts by the United States to "export" democracy; the clear case is an invasion of Iraq. More severe cases of the subjection to a symbolic design is present in Middle East, so well exhibited in our own time.

The figures and images of that design are regarded to be absolute reality to such an extent that the population is not only subjected to this design, but must worship such subjection by constructing sumptuous architectures on which reside these absolute figures where they are worshiped, adored, feared, begged, where the edicts are pronounced that limit human autonomy, and most torturous punishments are envisaged for the transgressors of such edicts. Give the global reach of technological means of communication we see the self-subjection of people everywhere: on their knees, on their bellies, worshiping what is regarded as reality. That "reality" becomes the medium of all understanding and the latter are the limits imposed upon ourselves. Symbolic designs may contain various discourses, including legal, moral, social, economic, selection of values, all designed to limit our being and action. A simple social discourse in feudalism allotted "divine privileges" to the lords, including the possession of the bodies of their subjects; in this sense, a serf could not claim to possess his own body, in contrast to a modern western person whose body is his individual first property. The latter is possible under a different symbolic design called political society. In principle, any system seems to be designed as a self-limitation of the autonomous subject – limitation which can be imposed and accepted reflectively by an individual or a group who does the imposing, or accepted as a "given". In autocratic/theocratic symbolic designs, there is established a system of surveillance of the public, carried out by spies and informants. It is said that an emperor has eyes and ears everywhere – a sort of pan-opticon with some variants, such as cosmic seer who knows what you do and think, extended to confessionals. In modern era, this kind of surveillance was superb in Russian/Soviet and Fascist empires.

It is interesting that the population under emperors was less concerned with the nationality of the emperor and more with his benevolence. Whether the emperor is Italian, French, German, or anyone else, is of little interest; as long as he does not constantly trample the fields and slaughter the stock for sport. But this cross-border nomadism is equally characteristic of our modern technocratic nomads. The population, now also subjected to various technocratic organisations – bureaucracies, corporations, parties, and social controls, is less interested what nationality a corporation wears, and more interested whether the organisation will be more benevolent than others. When Ford moves to Singapore, the people in Tennessee are more than grateful to accept Nissan. When an organisation, requiring technical professionals settles in Lithuania, mass media, the political figures, proclaim the great news as a benefit to the country and a creator of jobs. For the nomadic technocratic powers any national boundary functions either as a hindrance to be overcome, or a symbolic design to be used for maintaining controls over a given local population. One is building a global society on the basis of expanding technical power and its nomadic arbitrariness, and thus one has no need for a political society i.e. public political domain and public participation. In this context, whether in a mild or severe cases, all discourses are fascistic. Of course in all such cases the imposition is guaranteed by some force, whether it is the police, or some ultimate authority. In brief, we are living under a discursive power in such a way, that the discourses are ours and yet they assume a limiting power over human lives.

At this juncture it is possible to surmise a very different "discursive power" For modernity, its power lies in its realisation in the material environment. This realisation is what constitutes the concrete, material environment of the modern person. The latter faces a world which is an embodiment of the formal-quantitative methodology, and the arbitrariness underlying its application. In this sense we are in a position to appreciate the claim that post-modern age is confronted by a power capable of direct production of the proofs of its own truth. But this means that the production is technical and requires vast technical means, affordable either by governments or by organisations possessing sufficient economic power. In this sense, "proof" and truth are functions of wealth, possession of appropriate formal discourse, and the produced material results. We can extend this conjunction to include "justice:" thus, discourse, wealth, truth,

and justice. By now it is obvious that the widening gap between social groups also implies the difference in who will be in charge of justice. Those in charge of wealth, of governments, are the persons who are in a position to exercise technical power and establish their truths, their justice, in order to maintain the global "system". Thus, the system becomes self-legitimating; it constantly strives to increase its efficiency, and thus the increasing ability to produce its self-verification. Its truths will have to coincide with its value, its good, and its justice. What once were deemed to be laws derived from the consensus of autonomous individuals, become now performances in a technical system. Indeed, normativity of autonomous laws will be replaced by performativity of technical procedures. It is a peculiar kind of procedure: if reality is what provides the evidence of proof, and correlatively shows the prescription that includes normative, public and private results, then mastering the rules of a discourse is equivalent to the mastering of the produced environment. And this is precisely what is afforded by modernity. All these factors reinforce one another mutually and constitute a self-proliferating system. If the discursive power is performativity, efficiency, productivity, wealth, and effective verification of its own proposed prescripts, then science is legitimated by its material efficiency, and the latter legitimates science. Governments and economic syndicates become eager subsidisers of scientific ventures which, in the world of *praxis* is the global, objective environment. While radically pluralistic, with numerous semi-autonomous disciplines, the system tends to become self-generative and encompassing.

One creates the formal-quantitative discourse and subjects the material environment to its rules in order, thereby, to free oneself from the natural and experienced phenomena. One aims at achieving autonomy by establishing and increasing technical power over the material environment. Indeed, all materiality is deemed subjectable to formal discursive rules of construction. Thus the human body also assumed two dimensions. First, the invention of the "mechanical body" dealing with the anatomical ontology, and second, the "political body" to be structured functionally in accordance with the requirements of the produced and productive technical – signitive environment. The body is here structured by numerous regulations, calculations, controls that shape the functions of the body for utility, efficiency, miniaturisation, refinement, and restriction. Military, with its most current and sophisticated technologies and work "training" become equal functions.

The training is observed, judged, supervised, graded, and compared, resulting in an increased functional individuation and homogenisation. Each acquired profession, regardless of how limited, can fit anywhere in the global logic. And this process is visible everywhere: almost everyone is attached to an apparatus, whether it is a mobile telephone, iPad, Stay Young magazine, or virtual vision. Lithuanians on the street, in the shops, at work, in school, restaurants, are talking/listening, texting, searching, photographing, and even "selfying". The movement to gain independence and autonomy from Russian/Soviet Empire, switched to a countermovement to the autonomous process of individuation in modernity. Here the body, the thought, feeling, are individuated, singularised, correlated to technical means, judged, adjusted, and subjected. Each function of the body is divisible into numerous other functions of speed, duration, and skill, capable of being judged and ascribed to the individual. The latter can or cannot perform the required functions, deserves or does not deserve a prescribed degree of remuneration, is docile, correctible, or incorrigible, with a residuum of disruptive chaos, refusing or incapable of being subjected.

While individuating, such performative functions are formed for exchangeability. Each not only occupies a place and time but is arranged in a hierarchy of coded skills. The place one occupies is dependent upon the rank in a system of functions, and one can assume such a rank if one accepts precise subjection to the functional requirements of the global technical logic. Thus discipline, here, assigns social status in accordance with the degree of subjection and acceptance of coercion, of increased adaptations. The global logic whips the unrestricted and chaotic autonomy, the multitude, into shape, into individuality, under the universal law of modern discourse, whose increased subdivision into disciplines calls for an increased articulation and subjection of human functions. Here the meaning of this subject is *subjection*. Thus there appears an army of the fit and the unfit; the imbecile who fails to submit, to be subjected, who ceases to be a viable social subject. This is the reason why so many European thinkers claim that the subject is dead. While coextensive with the subjection by symbolic design and its discursive power, the globalising discourses subject one's actions directly – materially – in the signitive logic of global technology.

The coercive environment, the signitive life world, is equally designed: architectural enclosures, locating the body and its functions with precision. The

architecture was modelled on monastery, with cellular access to supervision and monitoring. The barracks, the work place, the assigned machine and its precise requirements of body movements, the bells compelling the body to be at certain times in proper places, all excising the wasted body movements, the undisciplined functions. Such disciplinary spaces are subdividable in accord with required body functions and precise distributions. Access is provided for elevated bodies that oversee all the functions, which monitor all the movements and places – at all times. Here the metaphysics of body-machine, founded on an ontology of partes-extra-partes, subjected to functional divisions and disciplines, lends itself for exchangeability of functions. Each not only occupies a place, but is arranged in a hierarchy, leading to the notions of hierarchy of skills. The place one occupies is dependent on the rank in a system of functions. Discipline, here, assigns social status in accordance to the degree of subjection and acceptance of coercion, of increased "adaptation" to the technically designed functions of the environment. Accordingly the general form is one of militarism, of competition for higher positions, of upward mobility all the way to noble generalhood, corporate manager and power. The individual's power depended on greater subjection to the rule and the latter prescribed the ranking in a hierarchy. Speaking metaphorically, it is a pyramidal arrangement of body functions and utilisations. One's ability to subject oneself lent one an increasingly higher position in the pyramid. Thus each is constantly surveyed and judged, a function in a system of records, a completely individuated body. The given system whips the chaos, the multitude into shape, into individuality under the universal technically signitive environment.

Such arrangement is designed to maximise the economy of body utility. Wasted motion is uneconomical. This is equally the source of classes, where individuals are classified in accordance with subjection. The greater the accepted subjection, the higher the class to which one belongs, in terms of which one is classified. It is both, the characterisation of an individual and the ordering of multitudes. Monasticism turned into disciplined military bodies. In this sense, the functional efficiency must be exhaustive both spatially and temporally. Here one creates an army of the fit, and the unfit, the imbecile who does not submit, does not become a subject, i.e. socialised. For these residual bodies one has to invent correctional facilities, the training for menial jobs, filling out welfare forms, and diminished chances of climbing

the social ladder. . In these settings there appear other authorities, legitimated by other knowledge – correctional. As in other cases, the mechanical body is also slowly superseded by the functional body. Here a society is invented with social equality and functional inequality, leaving aside the question of freedom. In *praxis* theory, freedom means a subjection to the disciplines required by the hierarchised technical environment and bodily functions. Education is no exception: one is subjected to the disciplines arranged in a hierarchy and the temporal requirements of novel techniques of subjection. Precise degrees of examination, supervising and recording levels of functional competence, designed to entice and lead to higher positions in the pyramid of power. Here one finds that it is not the numbers that count, but the efficiency and discipline that lead to success and advancement.

The attainment of a position requires not only a submission to spatial architectonic, but above all to temporal sequence and serialisation. These would be procedures that impose an economy of activities on the body; such activities are multifaceted and are subsumed under the general name of exercise: repetition and graded differentiation. The exercises are surveyed and measured by either the final stage, or in relation to other individuals, or in relation to an organised program. At the base are various observations of qualifications. Various, because the observer can look, listen, check the records, the reports, the histories, and the expectations with respect to functional bodies. It is of interest to note that the ontologically conceived anatomical bodies, reshaped in accordance with the functional requirements of technical environment, are reassembled into a mechanically conceived organisation. The latter needs precisely calibrated and graded parts that are individual and replaceable in accordance with their efficiency, lack of efficiency and required upgrading.

The measured functions of bodies must submit not only to the varieties of surveillance, but equally to precise commands that are brief and call for a univocal reaction, producing and extending the signitive life world into greater divisions of environment and human functions. Here language is reduced to signalisation, allowing no deviation. One perceives the signal and reacts to it without any intermediary of thought or other signs. This is the origin of nominalistic, empiricist, and behavioural conceptions of language, appearing in the context of the efforts at behavioural modification. In this system all representations are excluded, all reflective possibilising vanishes,

resulting in a despotic, militaristic, and blind obedience. The least delay is a slack and a deviation to be tightened up, re-exercised, or punished. It is one modality of war of a system on the person. This war can be extended into a social war on a population through various mass media and propaganda. Sloganeering, repeated incantatory sayings, flashing of repeated images, parades, monumental architecture, and solicitation by simplistic promises and solutions.

Based on our above considerations, there are obvious implications concerning the pre-eminence of information in modernity. If the discursive domain is coequal to the productive-technical domain, then discursive knowledge and its praxis implications become most significant. It is not difficult to see how any discourse will have to be translated into quantities of information, and anything that does not lend itself to such a translation will be discarded. The producers and users of knowledge will have to perform this translation in order to continue producing and inventing. This requires not only a total exteriorisation of knowledge, but also of its reduction to the system of signals, its militarisation. Since the productive processes are already militarised, knowledge too will become a sought after product and will be used in new combinations and sold as any other commodity. It is no longer avoidable that, in this sense, information emerges as the major stake in the global competition for power. The battles range over information, as once they did over territories, raw materials and cheap labour. At the level of information one can find a conjunction of industry, wealth, military, and society. Lithuania is shifting rapidly in that direction, specifically, as mentioned, in educational institutions. Going under the terminology of "discursive practice", educational institutions (and governments) are emphasising the creation of technical disciplines in order to advance national economies, health care, competition with others and national prestige. In Lithuania the teaching of humanities, and this includes national languages, cultures, histories, is pushed aside in favour of technical training in accordance with global standards. While this might seem trivial, yet national identities are premised on the understanding of local cultures and their difference from the globalised "culture". If the latter becomes preeminent, then the former will vanish.

What is being prepared by the global logic is a new knowledge of the human, a new "objective" science and technocracy. Every act must be seen

and recorded, subjected to precise exercises and tests, exploited to the limit of variation and differentiation, leading to a total invasion of the functional body by the incisions of disciplines. This incisive omni-vision is deemed necessary to exclude the least incompetence, slack, deviation. It is deemed that an overlooked slack in an organisation of thousand functioning bodies would multiply the wasted motion thousand fold, leading to minimised efficiency of the whole mechanism. Surveillance, thus, becomes a major militaristic and economic-technical preoccupation, not merely of serialised body functions but also as a disciplinary power. Exercise that disciplines requires observation, recording, and examination, and these function to qualify, classify, and to punish. In these techniques lies technocratic knowledge that is coextensive with power. If we were to speak of ideology, we could say that human sciences are techniques functioning to punish and reward. The student, the one who is exercised, is submitted to gradations, and is compelled to engage in mortal combat against others in order not to be punished, not to be left at a lower rank. After all, rewards and punishments come through comparison. In this context, the disciplinary power is invisible; it appears on the bodies and psyches of those who are subjected, in their competitions, where victory is of brief duration. Correlatively, the subjection made visible is our own invention which not only subjects us but above all watches us. Whether we are under surveillance by street cameras, governments collecting data on everyone, or internet programs which can access what we think, do, buy, talk to, or televisions which can watch you and record what you do and say, you are subject to a pan-opticon of very different kind. We are in an era of infinite examination, surveillance, and compulsory objectification, and writing is instituted as a mode of disciplining. Writing is not only classificatory, but is also used to record, to keep track of, and to singularise histories of the person, tracking detailed trajectories of lives, measuring gaps between individuals, specifying their fitness for "duty" or punishment, placing them in the curve of distributions. Written history, here, is not a monument of a life, but a disciplinary record. The mechanisms of discipline, the vigilant surveillance, maintain all in a state of an object.

Perhaps it is the inspiration of Plato's *Laws*, depicting the nocturnal council that would watch the population's activities, that reverberates across modernity. One can imagine the ability to see everything, to intervene in

all affairs, to have access to all records, having recorded all movements, gestures, thoughts, sayings of the population, one then would have a complete power, one would have a social technology. There are three models of such a vision: the first one is the divine vision that sees everything and is inescapable. In many cases it is mediated by a priestly class who assumes a position of prescribing disciplines, punishments and rewards on the basis of stories that people tell at confessionals. Every statement is subjected to a code of evaluations and resultantly of degrees of punishments. This form is extended to a contemporary psychiatry. Second form is one that walls off, incarcerates in order to watch and discipline, the third is more mobile, lighter, everywhere and invisible. The latter requires coded information on all social members on the bases of assessments, records, rumours, and intersecting hierarchies of power centres that mutually share informational records: police records go to banks, bank records go to work place, work place records couple with family records, confirming or contradicting police records, vacation, education, travel, medical records, crisscrossing from one disciplinary centre to another, as centres of competing powers exert greater subjection of the individual and specifically of the body. Discipline is then the technique that reduces the body to a political force at the least cost for maximising it as a functional element is the technological system: this creates a social anatomy that is intersected by diverse power centres and their constituted technical environments. The power centres may be called institutions of higher learning, or attractive research centres, health providers, credit card organisations, systems of transportation, bank accounts, and even purchasing practices.

Our delimited double movement from autonomy through formal-quantitative discourse to the production of an environment, to the restructuration of the lived world, and then to the structuring of body functions in accord with the efficiency required to correspond to the produced world, led to a shift from sign to signal. This means that communication between the human and the world is designed to be univocal. The more precise articulation of the human functions, their subjection to the exact environmental constructs, the more efficiently does the system function. It is a kind of militarisation of society: a precise command calls for univocal reaction, instituting a system of signals that must approximate a desired "information" society. Discourse is reduced to signalisation, allowing no

deviations of reaction, no horizon of a sign system, no slack. One perceives a signal and reacts to it without any intermediary of thought or of other signs. At the same time one is trained to deal with the technical world in the same manner: direct reaction to functional requirements.

At this level we reached another reason for the claim that the subject is dead. Remember that modern ontology presumes a mechanical, meaningless universe, such that if there is meaning, it comes from the subject. But if the outcome of the global logic is technical functionalism, then meanings have become redundant for modernity. The once autonomous enlightenment individual has been re-individuated by the system and its demands. One is measured, timed, clocked, examined, recorded, surveyed, observed, tailored, and hierarchised to assume precise functions and gestures, feelings and thoughts, required by a technological system. In turn, the system seems to lend an appearance and aura of "naturalness" to such functions. Thus one is extolled and elevated if one is capable of abolishing signs, of restricting their slack, in favour of signals. In this sense, the cultural practices can be described and analysed as if every sign were a univocal signal, as if lived perceptual meanings and their interconnections were replaceable by unmediated and repeatable responses to signals. Nominalism, behavioural theory, and explanatory theses of human action are variations on this fundamental conception. While this system is modelled upon monastic and militaristic disciplines, it can also be regarded as a war of the system upon the person. Anything personal, loose, and autonomous, cannot be tolerated; it is too democratic, human, inefficient, wasteful, and uneconomical. The more meaning can be excluded, the more one is subjected to identify oneself with the functions of the system, the greater are one's chances to advance in the prescribed hierarchy.

While subjection is one layer of global logic, shifting education toward professional training, this level, pervading global life world has excluded options to extricate ourselves from it. We are totally dependent on it. Enter any office, walk down the street full of carriers of smart phones, full of autos, soon to be controlled by computers and cyber technology, telling us that our driving skills are inefficient and thus driving functions, thinking functions will not be ours, although we shall depend on them – provided by the very extension of ourselves that we invented. Convenient, of course, releasing us for "other tasks" yes, but the latter will be a shift to other technologies and

their demands. The dependence is global, since any changes, innovations, variations in signitive practice vibrates across the globe. Globalising logic circulates our thoughts, inventions, friends and expertise. Such circulation is open to anyone, and anyone's personal life in all possible respects, once it is inserted into this logic, ceases to be persona. We know that there is a "noisy" concern about "privacy" or "anonymity" of information, but such a concern can no longer be addressed by closing some specific issue, such as private health information. Other systems, such as person's buying habits, educational level and taste in music will be accessed and through them, there will be a way to access one's health issues. The argument for such "right to information" on anyone is also technocratic. Scientific research cannot be denied data base if it is to be successful and beneficial. Such research is another pooling of information that becomes available to anyone and hence comprises self-proliferation of greater visibility of everyone, i.e. greater subjection and dependence.

Between Eternity and Pleasure

Above it was mentioned that while progress is its own purpose, there is a tacit "promise" of extending life if not eternally, at least at the beginning indefinitely. We want to life as long as we can and must do everything to postpone our entrance into paradise. Whether one is a beggar or a high priest, one avoids the inevitable at any price. Of course, there are those who joyfully jump for a chance to enter "the other world" but only when prompted and convinced by promises from the shamans that if they sacrifice themselves, they will be met by eager virgins and flowing wine in the other world, although the shamans themselves are not ready to abandon this life. Of course their justification is equally devious: they cannot perform acts of suicide because the ultimate Lord forbids it. So be it, but at any rate, there is no end of literatures – magazines, books, brochures – and institutions advising what latest technology will guarantee a prolonged life, all the way to such rhetoric as "turning back the clock". This is the egological subject, clinging to self-identity and its indefinite continuity. But this identity is also fragmented by global logic insofar as one is dependent for existence on a subjection to a specific function and thus dependent on it for continuation. While continuation is important, living at present is equally important, and with the vanished subject that was a source of meaning, what remains of

the present is a dispersed sensuality of "pleasures" or immediate gratifications. In this sense, the global logic has another task: massive production of gratifications. We must recall that the qualitative awareness, for the modern West, has been reduced to the subjective region and, given the arguments of empiricism, our awareness is identical with qualitative sense impressions, including the impressions of pleasure and pain. Why, then, is empiricism important for globalization? An answer is based on the previously discussed logic of globalization, with the final understanding that progress serves everyone's needs and their fulfilment. Most of the needs are invented by globalization which reveals "lacks" or what we do not have, but must have; nonetheless they are "qualitative" insofar as they depend on sense experience. "This new telephone is better" and "The genetically enhanced tomatoes taste much better", and "The pill relieves my pain, my anxiety, and increases my sexual satisfaction". This means that the vast network of old and new inventions have another level of meaning: it means a maximising pleasures and minimising pains. There is no specific definition what pleasure or pain mean – they are purely subjective as far as modern ontology is concerned, but "objectively" speaking, the global novelties, in whatever domain, present choices to satisfy most exotic tastes. The filling of lacks by global flood of novelties is regarded as "pleasant" and conforms to the utilitarian ethic: humans seek pleasure and avoid pain, and globalization offers the possibility of maximising pleasures – purely empirically. Indeed, globalization's one major production is "entertainment" and "tourism". Both are designed for pleasure, without a required identity apart from one's correlation to a specifically created environment that has "pleasant nodes" to which one could attach. There are the movie stars, deemed to be "sexy" and/or "great" and must be emulated in their attire, look, and walk. There was the "Madonna" look in Lithuania, creating an entire "industry" of cosmetics, underwear and miniskirts. There are clubs where one can "enjoy" the imported drinks and crashing "music" till the sun comes up, and there are shopping malls, full of latest styles, sexy images, and fast food. A pleasant life, something to talk about with "instant" friends who circulate on one's web site or internet and share their feelings and opinions. The latter, after all, cannot be contested, since there are no criteria as to what is true, good or just.

Being exhausted with the Russian/Soviet Marxist, Leninist rhetoric, which had to be repeated as Eminent Texts in all areas of intellectual work,

Lithuanian academicians, writers, intellectuals, and artists were suddenly exposed to the "intellectuals" of the West, specifically the European brand. Here they encountered most novel writings, specifically in "philosophy". There was the challenge to the entire Western tradition by Heidegger, offering the very gift of authentic Being and salvation from the mass collectivism so prevalent in Lithuania during Russian occupation. And then there were major figures in hermeneutics, such as Gadamer and Ricoueur, whose writings were read with speedy dispatch and led to the notion that everything is interpretation, based on historical traditions which had no other necessity apart from a claim that all understanding is identical with the language of one's tradition. The flood of post-modern texts, read hastily and appropriated uncritically, resulted – and continues to result – in a "liberation" from any principles, such that any question of truth, falsity, dialogue, became redundant. As the post-modern "rule" assumes: "It is true because I say so". In brief, anything goes and, there being no subject, all responsibility is abolished. Add to this shift from autocratic edicts of the Russian/Soviet period to the sudden liberation from such edicts, and the result is obvious: no edicts, no principles, no essences. This novel context was further enhanced by the rhetoric of "deconstruction" with the basic claim that there are no statements which could have a "univocal" meaning, since all meanings are divided into indefinite other meanings and the latter are fragmented into other meanings, etc. The only thing that is left is "the difference" without positive components. An addition of semiotics extended the notion that everything can be understood through discourses and their codes. In this sense, one need not study the world, but the language which is coextensive with the world,

The significance of this dramatic intellectual shift appears in the ease with which the younger generation of intellectuals became imbued with those latest "philosophies", and the ease with which the mixing and eclecticism of these novel trends was accomplished. Just as in globalization, new academic disciplines were sprouting and splitting into varieties of branches. Suddenly there are philosophy of film, of culture, of education, of feminism, of Orient, of nothingness, of and of… But just as the subject vanished, so vanished any in depth study of any subject matter to the extent that most diverse disciplines became mixed under the guise of multi-disciplinary topics. In this context, philosophy can be anthropology and the

latter becomes part of psychology and ethics, science becomes culture and politics, and reality, of whatever kind, becomes a construct. This mixture has impacted public discourse, specifically in light of the pervasive view that no one has any claim to truth. Political misdeeds by elected public servants are judged in terms of morality or psychological features such as "lacking a feeling of shame" but not as law breakers.No doubt, public debates are a most welcome feature, but one must be principled and logical, and not hide behind rhetorical figures of speech. Of course, this kind of "political" practice is part of globalization, but Lithuania need not be globalised by this trend. At any rate, the outcome is precisely the globalising logic at various levels: one can invent oneself, or one can live the life of "pleasure" and employ any means to achieve the means for global circulation. This circulation is also a way of weakening of personal commitments in family structure. Of course the latter is being "assaulted" at its very foundations.

For Western modern understanding, the hindrance to the immediate gratification was the myth of the Oedipus complex, providing the technique to locate some sort of deviance from the norms to which one is subjected, prevalent in social institution of the patriarchal family. The cure for any and all deviations that have no identity, is a reconciliation, mediated by the doctor, with the family, and a forming of a family of one's own. But this cure has an identity premised on the Egological subject who is no longer available. The desire for pleasure does not have an object; rather, it is invested in whole environments, impulses and fluxes, and is essentially nomadic. We always make love to the world. Eroticism pervades all; the way a technocrat oils the machinery, the way a judge pronounces a sentence, the way a corporation screws the worker. Only through articulation, exclusion, and isolation that pleasure becomes restricted to objects or persons. The restrictions result in a produced subject. Yet it is important to note that the objects or persons are intersections of agonistic and protagonistic confluences of biological, social, historical, and psychic fields which have been equally subject to investments for pleasure. Thus at this immediate level of "pleasure logic" organisms and environments formed from unformed sensations – are coextensive with their functioning: they do not signify or represent, aim at or mean anything. Their analysis must, thus, be functional. This is not to say that they function mechanically or even vitalistically in a sense of a particular anatomy or instinctual action – reaction connection. After all,

the organism for modern understanding is a massive number of chemical, genetic, cellular, etc. processes which can be technically transformed, although each of these processes combine into *Desire Machines*. The nutrition, the oxygen, the earth, the light, are analogues in nature; each system, with its own order, nonetheless connects with the organism as it connects with them. The bee is part of the reproductive system of clover, as is the wind, the human hand and the tail of a dog.

Lithuanians are contending with these notions as globalising process of attachment to any pleasant point but are not quite cognisant of the level at which this process "flows". To show this level, we must disclose its surface nature, without any depth or even any kind of self. It is assumed that our customary conception of ourselves as a unitary ego and will, an actor behind the acts, is a pretence of integrality: I am working, and I am enjoying, and I am in love all reveal at once an illusion of any unity, and the nomadism, the constant renaming of the self, and show that there is no inherent synthetic unity, but selective processes that overlap and accommodate, tense and adjust. The *Desire Machine* is productive of its environment to be correlative to pleasure and equally reproductive of itself. In this sense such processes never change to negativity, a desire because there is something lacking. The multiple processes produce environments to which they attach and find their pleasure. Thus the products, the technical innovations, constituting the signitive life world of univocal points of attachment, become regarded as pleasure fulfilling domains, the domains that the processes as desire consume. What this comprises is a dismissal of cultural inventions of symbolic designs, including the fixed family structure and social cohesion. In fact the latter, expressed in the Oedipal image, emerges at a certain conjunction of cultural history. In this sense, it ceases to have a universal and necessary validity, an all-encompassing explanatory force, and becomes contingent, historically limited, and a partial mode of speaking. Indeed, such an explanatory force is not at all a theoretical operation, but a social practical invention, leading subsequently to a specific concept of reason that no longer engages in a dialogue with its opposite, but is a monologue about the opposite, the linguistically deemed irrational. As we saw, the very notion of rationality is instrumental and productive and thus serves productive means of circulation of pleasures. This is a modern set up where the socially dysfunctional in terms of the logic of productive efficiency, are

regarded as irrational, deviant, too much attached to daily pleasures. Not sticking to prescribed schedules and thus unfit members of society.

Yet the "fit" members are left with nothing else except these surface pleasure processes that demand circulation to be a nomad, a tourist, to attach to some pleasing (even if it terrifying) point on the globe, to feel the live fish wiggling down one's throat in some Japanese restaurant, to feast ones eye on exotic advertisements of bodies, dressed only in space, to have a "secret" affair with an exotic dancer, to roll in sensuous waves with natives, or to get drunk and sent into ecstasy on drugs. In this sense, one's professional nomadism is paralleled by sensuous nomadism. One level circles the globe to carry the other level. The sensuous body is not only different from the functional system, but can be also contrasted with the organismic system. The corporeal surface is orgasmic and not organic. This surface is neither constituted by nor coextensive with the practical and functional operations that are a vectorial and oriented system of daily life with all its discursive articulations and connections of the world. The orgiasmic and the organic cannot be contrasted as physical with metaphysical. They overlap in a way that the organic surface is orgasmic and circulates its own intensities. Only due to the latter that an organic surface is constituted and extended. There would be no organic surface without the orgasmic. The organic would be a punctiformal discontinuity, a discrete and disconnected bombardment of stimuli deprived of communication even at the functional level. The surface excitations are out of all proportion to the stimuli. The latter are inadequate to account for the differential that allows an organism to have an extended surface. It must be noted that the very lack of punctiformity also abandons a notion of time for the intensive surface. It is an intensity in passing that does not trace a past or project a future. It is a singular TENSE that, in its surging, is an ephemeral, delocalised shudder. This delocalisation is what distinguishes it from punctiformal and organic stimulus.

The passing and delocalised intensities exhibit no direction or aim, as if they were copresent to a lack, a need, but incite other intensities without being complements or completions of one another, without forming a system. Their nexus is jealousy that is more primary than the Oedipal envy, and they excite one another without being causally connected. The term "jealousy" is laden with modern psychological meanings and fails to convey this domain in its fundamental "force". Perhaps the term "vital" is

more conducive to speak of these intensities and their nexus. The intensities cannot be called excitations without verging on intentionality. Rather, they are primary circuits that subtend the organic body; they do not point to external references, but first compose intensive distributions of the organic surfaces. The phenomenal field, then, is deployed in accordance with such distributions and not in accord with some prearranged system of objective or subjective stimulations resulting in excitations. The intensive nodes are positivities, affirmations of multiple and incompatible arcs; only upon slackening the intensities that the incompatibility is articulated and each intensity segregates toward something or other and thus becomes a sensuous and primary trace, a memorial sensuality. Here intensities become desires. It could be said that this distribution of delocalised and atemporal intensities is what primarily constitutes the extension of the organic surface. The intensities comprise a shifting theatre of inner political economy where all events, regardless of their location, become invested with an erotic intensity. This is the source of metaphor. At the same time, the intensive forces precede and constitute the organic body. This is clear in light of the breakup of the organism in erotic encounter an organism reverted to the orgasmic deployment of intensities jealous of one another, and thus forming a vital nexus one with the other.

For a worker, for example, Mr. Smith does not only signify a boss, a singular individual, but a guardian, all seeing, power over one's destiny, tool of exploitation and subjection, evoking and provoking tingles of anger, anxiety, hate deprivation and indifference. Mr. Smith covers a collage of intensive processes. The edicts by Smith are equivalent with divine edicts, since they regulate even the carnal functioning, demanding a deviation from what every other creature takes to be normal. But this may not be interpreted in dialectical terms of mastery and subservience. After all, Mr. Smith is not a designation of a unitary and sovereign subject, but the intensive effects evident in the workers intensive processes of disconnecting organic functions, allurements of rewards, intense ambivalences crawling up the skin wanting to thank and to choke at the same time and jealousies vibrating across contradictory feelings. Mr. Smith is equally in the same situation; in face of the worker he too can no longer maintain his identity. But this is not a face to face situation. Whatever each says, vibrates across all intensive nodes and in unpredictable ways such that even the formed habits that have

diminished the intensities to function as sensations, cannot be counted upon to maintain their patterns. Thus, there is no longer a subjectivity having a libido and radiating its vectors of signification from a central ego. The intensities are passions conducted by an anonymous circulation of surfaces of a dismembered body; these very surfaces undergo constant shifts and transformations. There is no hidden libido that strives for self-manifestation and expression in dreams, writing, sayings, myths, and cults.

Obviously, if the very surface of the organic body depends on, and is structured, extended by, the orgiasmic process, then it would be difficult to offer a localisation to the orgiasmic, a place "in" something like an organically delimited system. The intensities of the orgiasmic carnality are excitations at the conjunction of surfaces, whether one's own or another's, whether earth's, solar outlay's, or social system's; all are productive of the intensive flow. Following this passionate body and its by now global logic of pleasure, we can contend that there is an orgiasmic economy in the circulation of technically produced commodities, comprising the political economies of modernity. Is it not fascinating that such systems are regarded organically. No doubt, political economy is designed to circulate commodities on global skin, but there is also a circulation of a carnal and orgiasmic couplings with the pleasure nodes, the points of intensities, the tourist thrills at designated locales, proliferated by glossy advertisements of sumptuous images of feasts, orgies, extremely satisfied customers and happy hosts. Modern political economies are organic systems constituted by an orgiasmic extension of intensive excitations around the globe. Each node a city, a secluded enclave, a place for thrills and spills spreads the economic organism by allurement, jealousy of novel couplings, each node of intensity communicating its force directly without representations, through shivers and phantasms. Even the stoic and conservative stalwarts of modern economy in China and Russia can hardly maintain their territories against the pull of jealousies constituted by the "exciting" places that may well become replicated in those very territories. After all, this is what increased productivity the pain of being a functional body, promises. Thus we see post-communist Lithuanians on sunny beaches with borrowed wives, their eyes caressing young waiters and waitresses, we read of the "adventures" of mountain climbers, attached to icy nodes, and politicians on missions of national security to some region, such as Khajuraho in India, gazing at thousands of passionate statues embracing

each other. Indeed this global circulation is visible everywhere that is transforming ideological commitments. As an important Chinese member of political elite on a cruise ship, after an evening of watching a "girl show" suggested: social class distinctions must be maintained so that the "hard working members of society" could enjoy their appropriate rewards.

The Logic of Identity as the Other

We have reached a point of globalization at which every culture is regarded to be self-generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or theological grounds. This is to say the modern globalising position led to the conclusion that all discourses are autonomously constituted and, therefore, are equivalent to one another. After all, there are no criteria external to such discourses which will allow the adjudication among them concerning any truth claims. If there is anything common among them, it is their difference. Given this level, the theories that at times are paraded inadvertently such that a discourse somehow represents something are no longer maintainable. But this also implies that there is no misrepresentation. A particular discourse that frames a cultural world view is in no position to either represent the Others or to misrepresent them. The only thing that can be suggested is that each discourse inclusive of cultural discourses, will interpret others within the parameters of a giving discourse. This is of course premised on the basis of the abolition of an essential presence of a subject or a structure of the world. But this essentialism has been already destroyed by the assumption that even the modern subject has no essence, but must make of himself in terms of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, the multicultural proposition is not premised on a pre-given essentialism, but in fact is constituted on the globalising modern self-destruction of an essential subject. The only criterion that this globalising self-invention, both of the individual subjectivity and multicultural identities is its practical efficiency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of the subject, but a view toward what works given that a particular people will be offered practical solutions to whatever they think their lacking in their lives, or what they are told what they lack in their lives.

To sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the discussion of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, we suggest that the very abolition of a pre-given subject in favour of self-invention in

modern sense leads to the notion not only that the Others are equally self-inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self-invention to the modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumentality. This is to say that if every discourse is deemed to be invented and only valid within its own framework, then the very concept of discursive self-generation belongs within the framework of modernist and Western postmodernist discourse. But this means that even if the other cultures are regarded as self-generated, their self-generation may have very different self-conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practices that did not respect the logic of modernising and globalising ontologies and methods. Practically speaking this means that whatever purposes there are and however the environment is interpreted need no follow the logic of causal efficiency of reconstructing the world into our own needs and power. If a culture regards that playing music, listening to the stories of the ancients is meaningful and the metaphysical entities are relevant for life as protectors of the environment then there cannot be an introduction of a criterion that would claim that such conceptions are not realistic, mystical, non-productive, since the latter concepts belong to another framework. In brief, the confrontation between the two is not between some truth and some falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein each will interpret the other in its own unique way.

For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is whether a given culture with its own constituted discourses has the same practical global needs that the globalising autonomy is offering. This is to say does a particular cultural discourse allows a definition of environment that must be reduced to homogenous resources for arbitrary reconstruction? The first limit of modern non-essential conception of total and unconditional possibility of inventing any discourse for the sake of applying it for "human needs" may not be given in the discourses of other cultures. In order to set a limit for globalising modernity, we must demonstrate that within the logic of this globalization there is also a reflective recognition that it, as invented culture, must respect the equivalences of other invented cultures without any other criteria apart from those that each cultural discourse possesses within itself. This means that if another culture has a different ontology and even metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology and metaphysics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not operate with the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the

homogenised environment. The limit would be set with the lack of primacy of instrumental rationality. If the meaning of life of a particular people within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfilment of indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalising modern logic, permitted to pursue its own mode of having a life world.

Yet it is also the case that a globalising logic with its technical efficiency and promise of better life is an aspect of the others. They see themselves in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural necessities, which becomes part of their own self-understanding as different from and yet related to this globalising logic. This creates an internal tension within various cultures that constitute dual self-recognition wherein one still maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges those discourses in light of the global Other. This is the source of alienation and destruction of cultural self-identity. We still want to maintain cultural identity, but we also like to be like the other, to judge ourselves from the vantage point of the other. This is an invention of a dual consciousness that frames the power struggles within various cultures. The modernisers who at the same time claim to be part of the same culture want to transform that culture into civilised, practically efficient, objective, and beneficial. While it liberates the individuals from her own culture yet there is a wish to claim against the globalising process the uniqueness of her own culture. In one sense, there is a demand to use the environment in a "desacralised" manner, purely for the purpose of the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, employment, increased wages as signs of the good life.

In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have our spiritual values that do not allow to reduce the environment, including the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the adjudication cannot be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able to adjudicate which is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. Hence, we witness the many confrontations between the groups within given cultures that promote modernisations and at the same time intellectuals who resist modernisations. This means that a given culture is split into those who propagate the need to become globalised and modern and at the same time those who, recognising the necessity of modernisation, propose a battle against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they claim that we

may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalising logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-called passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems that the reason for this power confrontation rest in the failure to understand the already posited limit within which the globalising process must function.

This limit is the very requirement that the other and its self-generated cultural framework is equivalent to the globalising logic. Therefore, the latter seems to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to or not its own limitations. When we say whether wants it or not, we do not mean a choice between two options, but a power confrontation that is inevitable since there are no external criteria in this confrontation that would allow free decision. What we have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one possibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is offered as the future. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states that the one from the past is conservative and traditional, while the other is liberal, individualistic open, and even humanistic. Whether this designation is true or false is not our concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, in their dual consciousness, will play out their roles as both maintaining their tradition and at the same time proposing future transformations.

Our challenge at the cultural level is whether this time awareness is universal. The cultural logics must be investigated within the parameters of peoples' understanding of their world not only in terms of the life worlds and discursive practices, but also the life worlds that are subtended by the cultural preconceptions of what constitutes the universe as time. Within this context, we hope to articulate the limits wherein even the power confrontations of the dual consciousness find their own limitations. Each culture has its own world conceptions as conditions for their own self-understanding. If there is going to be any adjudication among cultures underneath the power confrontations such adjudications will have to articulate the world conceptions of various peoples. In this sense, the challenge to the globalising logic will not come from the acceptance by the other of the efficient technical means that make their own culture inadequate, but by the recognition that their own culture has a very different world understanding. We know from other cultures, whether Mayan, Hindu, or Taoist that the world understanding, even at the ontological

or metaphysical levels, is different from the Western scientific and linear conceptions. So the task of cultural studies is to find the cosmic awareness that underlie their cultural parameters. This is also the case of Lithuanian tradition: its life world is based on a unique cosmic awareness.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER VI

Clash of Civilizations

Introduction

In previous discussions of Western modern modernity the conclusion has been reached that its ground is metaphysics of the will. Regardless of the variants of cultures, such as scientific technology, personality cults (such as Judaism, Christianity or Islam), progress, political systems, from democracy to dictatorships, the common denominator is unconditional will. Here, human autonomy as the source of law to the environment and to all the institutional rules and cultural designs is equivalent to the will of the unconditional creator of the world – the paternal divinity. In this sense the modern Western person assumes a divine complex. He creates himself and the environment as if out of nothing. After all, he creates the logics by which the world is composed and then realised in material shapes he constructs. He creates the very conditions under which he defines what he wants to become, so well expressed in utopianisms, and he invents cultures without any reference to any reality. Indeed, all reality is equally a result of his culture. His numerous theories, belonging to numerous disciplines, comprise the magic of alchemy – everything can be made into everything – and in this sense his practical life, i.e. what he wants to do is closely tied to his theoretical understanding. In this modern life world that is designated as "scientific and technical" there appears an arbitrariness suggesting that all relationships are power laden. That means that the life of conscience, i.e. what tradition called "ethics" is equally engaged in power and indeed – violence. While there are all sorts of violence, the concern here is the discovery of endless and destructive violence that can be called anarchistic. It is necessary to articulate what sort of consciousness is anarchistic and how such consciousness is coextensive with conscience or the life of practical action. The action must be explicated in contemporary global confrontations between two major incompatible trends, each attempting to limit the other by any means. While no longer in style, we shall reintroduce the notion of "Clashes of Civilizations".

In the context of clashes of civilizations, we shall locate Lithuania as an alternative, even if it contains a symbolic design which belongs to one side of the clashes. Such alternative is based on Lithuanian cosmology that offers

a "natural" awareness, still prevalent in daily lives of peoples everywhere, from ecological concerns to counting longevity and even food production. While seemingly traditional and thus of the past, the Lithuanian life world is celebrated not in terms of more pleasures and surface circulation of intensive nodes on the skin of economy and technology, but as an attunement to the qualitative world awareness which could not be abolished by all the disciplines and discourses of globalising logic. The attunement is given in the search for "unspoiled" nature, for natural beauty, for the awe in the presence of sequoia giants, and in the silence of the wondrous nocturnal sky. While the modern dweller lives with light and noise pollution, he is drawn to deep contemplation and to joy (not pleasure) in confrontation with the "natural" cosmos. As discussed above, with the dawn of modern Western metaphysics, social sciences promised to explain all forms of human life across continents and civilizations. But the explanations rested on the modern prejudgments of *praxis* life world which, as we saw, not only fragmented social fabric into multiple claims and power confrontations, but also could not find a cohesive method to understand how humans could live together in a relatively peaceful way. Thus, the task of social researchers turned to ethnography which was designed to study small ethnic groups – the exotic – who would offer an "innocent" and primary structure of society and the "purity" of their life world. In fact such a life world was assumed to be "spiritual" prior to any major symbolic designs with their Parthenon of divinities: the spiritual life world belonged to the primitives. Such proposed studies rest on the notion that all the modern complexities cover over the direct awareness of the world that is common to all societies practicing rituals of attunement to nature. Of course, it is also methodologically admitted that there might be an unbridgeable gap between our modern cultural context, and those that belong to primordial human societies. Yet Lithuanian "primordial" life world is neither primordial nor of the past where we should seek alternatives. It is "ever present" even among the ethnographers who go in search of the primordial worlds. The search is in vain, since our lives and sustenance, our light and soil, are with us.

Global Confrontations

Having accessed the logic of globalization, its pervasive consciousness, and correlatively, the global utilitarian pleasure ethics, as its conscience, we

are in a position to find the limits within which such logic functions and what is posed as its radical opposition. We used the terms "consciousness" and "conscience" to show a basic background issue that frames global clashes. Various languages, including both German and English, distinguish between consciousness and conscience. Latin, in contrast, does not. For it the term *consciencia* covers both. On the one hand, the distinction seems warranted: philosophical, and even political systems, separate practical from theoretical domains. On the other hand, closer analyses of such systems, shows an inseparable correlation between these domains. Certain ontological modes of awareness are correlated to specific morphologies of norms, and vice versa. We can, then, suggest that a specific philosophical system contains both, and thus can be regarded as *consciencia*. What may be analytically separated in philosophy, is certainly connected in daily realms of awareness, such as religion, politics, sciences, and even arts. Structures of awareness (inclusive of theories), i.e. the modes of accessing the world of objects, subjects, and situations, are immediately linked with structures of selectivity and valuation, such as good and evil, right and wrong, abnormal and normal, true and false. We already know that theories are not free floating Platonic systems or some psychological components, but are direct modes of the way that the world is perceived and in the modern context made. As our discussion of the modern age has shown, we can look at the world "materialistically" as the only objective position, and hence treat the environment and ourselves as material. In this case our awareness and our practice will coincide to the extent that all our practical (ethical) engagements will have to be reduced to the variants of material explanation. In principle, since our materialistic perception of the world claims to be quality neutral, then our ethics will have to be one of "indifference" to experienced essential differences among things and resultantly our actions will have to treat everything with indifference. If we assume a nihilistic consciousness, then our actions will correlate to this assumption. In brief, theory-consciousness and conscience-action are constantly given in their correlation. In this writing, the term *consciencia* will be replaced by *practognosis* and used as a synthesis between consciousness and conscience, i.e. theory and praxis.

It is possible to trace a variety of practognoses. A careful reading of one's own history is a good source, while reading about, or an encounter with other

civilizations give solid indications of this, and our awareness of our modern Western life world, containing a high degree of cultural complexities, seem to reveal a multiplicity of practognoses. This is not to say that the cultural complexity guarantees that individuals and/or groups will maintain permanently their practognosis. They can change, and changes are not just a question of choice. The changes are governed by rules which are neither identical with, nor derivable from the rules of psychology, physiology, nature, economy, or sociology. No doubt, these diverse disciplines may propose their own rules, and claim that everything else is derived from them, as is our discussed case of multi discursivity, but for the present investigation they will be excluded. The focus will be on the processes that shape the different types of practognoses and in the formation of their genesis. Metaphorically speaking, practognosis can be understood as a constitutional system, such that not every type is directly comprehensible or understood by other types. As has been discovered in the problematic of cultural studies, a direct one to one translation is difficult if not impossible to achieve. Presumably it may be possible to find a synthesis among some types, while for others the shift from one to another requires a radical transformation. Moreover, some types are stable, and others most unstable.

Given current civilizations, each having varieties of cultures, it is appropriate that there is a constant crisis. Each culture, as a practognosis, has a tendency to claim totality. Hence there is an undeclared "war" among them. The current fundamentalists and their Middle-Eastern relatives have their holy war and doomsday, the Skinnerians their Walden II, the racists their pure nation, the capitalists their pure market and above all the modern scientific technocrats their utopia. Civilizational awareness is a precarious balance among varieties of practognoses. The price exacted for this balance by specific cultures and individuals committed to them, is the maintenance of their practognosis in a lukewarm or mild position, and hence as a potential bad conscience. A perfectly good conscience is tied to a striving for the establishment and or maintenance of consciousness, i.e. the way the world is perceived as reality without any qualifications. It is of absolute authenticity in its claim to the only truth. It must be obvious that each such perception is different from those of others, leading to the modern/postmodern claims that there are many "world views" given as discourses, and each with the power to construct its own world.

To make certain that we understand these claims it is necessary to point out that for the modern tradition discussed so far, there is no "world in itself". It is either a result of some "divine" speaking-making in accord with his view of what kind of world it wills, or it is a "perspective" from which all events are regarded. Such a perspective is not a "view" toward a pre-given world, but it is the only world that a particular person has. This perspectivism ranges from psychological, social, economic, biological, and the rest of "disciplines" all the way to cultic. For a follower of a cult, there is no "world" without a world view. Thus, for a Middle Eastern person, whether belonging to Judaic, Christian or Islamic personality cult, the world is "created by the will of supreme authority" and nothing else, and ones actions must comply with the wishes of such an authority. For a modern person, the world is technically constructed and can be regarded as a material mechanism. In principle, every variation in the metaphysics of the will does not permit a world of things and events that would be independent of metaphysical entities. In this sense the world can be violated by various value judgments, regarding the inadequacy of its composition. These same judgments will regard other world views as inadequate or even false with respect to the one possessed by his own group. If a world view is identical with the world present in a language of making, then any other world view must be regarded as false, an illusion, perhaps even constructed by some evil geniuses, an enemy of truth, good and god. That is why some civilizations maintain requirements of tolerance of diversity even at the peril of being attacked from within by members of one of the world views, regarding diversity as decadent and tolerant of evil. We shall see this shortly.

For persons who possess an absolute truth, being tolerant means being lukewarm or mild, having a potential bad conscience, may be a matter of an oversight, even neglect; yet there are available justifications that are advanced for this potentiality. Obviously the justification is a matter of consciousness. Broadly speaking, it is a claim to some inadequacy, failure, in human or social fabric, temptations of the body, being born a sinner, not having enough understanding, and even not being worthy to live with the highest truth. Various aspects are posted by consciousness to fulfil these purported inadequacies. The achievement of authentic practognosis is projected toward some future utopia, or a call to establish socio-economic conditions, or unreachable in this world, wherein we can simply read portents, point

out signs to others, wait for the power from above to act and hope for the best. The continuity of a complex civilization hinges upon the degree to which such posted aspects are integrated in all types of practognosis of a civilization. As noted, the mild practognoses are unstable. They can be awakened, heated up, and unfold an appropriate authentic practognosis. From the latter, the mild is regarded as inauthentic and, having transfigured to authentic, will be an object of bad conscience. The factors which were deemed to be justifications are, resultantly, regarded as false consciousness. They do not correspond to truth, the edicts of a divinity, the factual needs of humanity, and the social and/or individual nature of the human. Those who become awakened to their world view as the ultimate truth, such as being "reborn in Jesus", or pronouncing the appropriate words in Arabic to become a true Muslim, will regard their former tolerance of other views as immoral, as having allowed oneself to be a servant of some demonic forces. The "rebirth" must be taken literally, since in the modern world of the metaphysics of the will, one becomes exactly what the words demand – remade into a different being. The mild practognosis is, thus, temporarily at a distance to real authenticity.

Such a distance, nonetheless, can be founded in another type of practognosis. It is one constituting a reflexive view of the phenomena of all practognoses. Indeed, our engagement so far comprises this type of practognosis. Moreover, the method of this reflexive view is the status of human studies, leading to the positing of the different types of practognoses for analyses without accepting a commitment to any. The analytic engagement with them is a traversal, a going through all of them in order to disclose their invariants, variations, and if available, interconnections. Authentic types of practognoses would have to consider this type of conscience as the ultimate manifestation of bad consciousness, not committed to a specific truth and mode of action. A mild practognosis can be excused. Seen from the viewpoint of its authentic modification, it is only not fully aware of its position and hence can be illuminated, awakened and thus committed to its truth and action. In this sense even an opposed authentic or mild practognosis can be accepted – to a degree. Despite their different world views, the possibility of their conversion to an authentic one shows them to be of the same type. Each, in its authentic modification, has a goal to impose its practognosis on the whole civilization. Thus the

previously mentioned demand for the rule by King of Kings, or the current demands for a universal Caliphate, one Christian world, uniting "all faiths" or one utopia, comprise this effort to dominate by any means. Any means are moral in such an effort to serve the "kingdom".

The reflective traversal of human studies is preserving a multi-cultural civilization, and thus it must be in principle a Socratic, wondering, curious, and inquisitive practognosis. Its essential constitution is *tolerance*. It is rooted in a consciousness that has itself as its own type of tolerant practognosis. Every claim for objectivity of any practognosis is restricted in this reflective consciousness, and is considered as a moment in a network of claims. The appropriate aspect of conscience is a rejection of any absolute or unqualified commitment to one ethic and action. This practognosis does not coincide with anarchism. Anarchism is a type of practognosis which, in its authentic modification, demands the destruction of all social structures. It may possess a mild stage which consists of a universal distrust, and a demand for partial destruction of centralised power and highly organised systems. As every mild modification, this anarchism is compatible with human studies and its appropriate practognosis. Authentic anarchism, in contrast, is most radically opposed to human studies, not only because it is authentic, but above all, because its intention is a rejection of all theories, their use for justification of human and social life, and an ethic for specific action. Indeed it must accept destruction in principle without any justification. In this sense, the subsequent considerations about anarchism are developed from a non-positional stance which, by our logic, is radically opposed to anarchism. But there is no other way. Disciplines such as sociology and psychology will not make this admission, since it is not characteristic of scientific practognosis to be self-reflective. For philosophy, it is a requirement to recognise this reflection as a topic belonging to philosophical researches. Indeed, we could even say that the logic of this practognosis is Socratic-philosophical. Socrates did not claim to possess knowledge or truth; he claimed the duty to interrogate all claims.

Terrorism

In contemporary global life world, where technical systems of information interconnect, we are confronted with a phenomenon called "terrorism. Whether real or not, any "suspicious" act or look, is placed in the category

of being terroristic. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a global clash, and just about every side of this clash calls the actions of others as "terroristic". It is necessary, as a result, to explicate the essence of genuine terrorism which plays a role in contemporary affairs. Let us look at the basis of this phenomenon. An authentic modification of practognosis is one when a good conscience constitutes an identity between action and the language of morality and truth. It also includes an aggressive social activity. The anarchistic movements of 19ᵗʰ and second part of 20ᵗʰ centuries have such modifications. What links both periods, at the first glance, is an extensive terroristic activity. There are some aspects in anarchistic practognosis that would allow terrorism to be an appropriate social activity. Yet some distinctions will have to be articulated in order to offer an essential delimitation of anarchistic practognosis and its own modifications. To appreciate such modifications, terroristic activities should be brought to a clearer relief.

Terroristic activities are, in general, of a minority that lacks the power of direct and open revolution. They are focused on the weak links in the established powers and, in terms of a given law, are violations and are regarded as crimes. Terror, in some revolutions, is premised on a consciousness that such actions will be considered legal in post-revolutionary society. What is suppressed by illegal terrorism today, will be suppressed by the law tomorrow. If legal rules allow extreme exploitation of one group by another, then terror used against the interests of the exploiter can be justified by the claim that after a violent revolution exploitation will be prohibited by law. The anarchistic terrorism is founded upon a different consciousness. First, the overthrow of established powers is in a distant future. Thus all actions will be criminal for a long time. Trials, imprisonments, and executions, are to be expected, and indeed considered as an integral part of terroristic actions. Second, not only is a given legal and ethical system not recognised, but it does not regard its activities as justified by any legal and ethical system in a post-revolutionary period. It is purely destructive and does not have, as would be the case in other revolutionary terroristic activities, an introduction of a new legal and ethical system. We are suggesting, here, that a practognosis of terroristic activities that can provide a good conscience, need not always be anarchistic. Thus, in ethnic conflicts, the source of good conscience is the consciousness that one's own ethnic group has been violated in unpardonable ways and hence one has the right to use all means as self-defense. In turn, there

remains a lot of common territory in the practognosis of the two groups for some accommodations. The violated group can be reimbursed for its losses and rules can be formulated to prevent future violations. Thus, destruction is limited.

Some radical revolutionary movements which are engaged in terrorism need not be grounded in all instances in anarchistic practognosis. The good conscience of such movements is grounded in a consciousness which understands the given social, political, and economic order in general if not in particular, as the source of injustices. At the level of principles, the ruling groups might find some common ground with the revolutionary in their practognosis. Murder is murder, and science is science. Revolutionary movements of the 19th century used science as a corroboration of the positions of their consciousness. Obviously, the science of the revolutionaries was of a specific kind – one designed to fit the legitimation of revolutionary terror. Such positions were also the source of discipline and authority – obedience structure, promising guidelines for the post-revolutionary system of legal society. Even the obedience which the authority structure demands in concrete situations had to be justified by their brand of scientific analysis of the very situation. While there may be abuses and errors, no principle of consciousness is disconfirmed by error and abuse, especially when the revolutionaries could correct their science to fit the situation. The nimble ways that the Soviet Union, or Marxism-Leninism and Nazi Germany modified science to suit the current "revolutionary" interests, reveal a strategy of avoiding the inevitable conclusion of their being anarchistic. Revolutionary movements can apply terrorism. Whether they do or not, and whether they admit to such actions, is a matter of tactics. While the praxis is anarchistic, the practognosis is not. The good conscience follows such actions, since a legitimating account is being offered as a corroborating consciousness concerning the necessity of such action. We are not raising a question whether such efforts at legitimation are true or false, but that they are presented as such.

What is characteristic for an anarchistic practognosis in terroristic activity is a good conscience which has its justification in consciousness that provides no legitimating account for the truth or morality of action. Here we can distinguish two modes of anarchistic practognosis. Anarchism can be either the consequence of an intellectual movement in which the

significance of theoretical and moral or political justification is rejected a priori, or it can be a result of the deterioration of the positive positions of revolutionary consciousness, the discovery of the irrelevance or inapplicability of such positions for action.

Nineteenth century anarchistic practognosis has this general setting: its consciousness rejects all given social, legal and political institutions and their replacement by other institutions; all these are deemed obstacles to the freedom of individuals. Its conscience regards destructive activity as the only justifiable moral duty and rejects all other moral principles and justifications. It accepts as positive what are immediate implements for and consequences of destruction. Here anarchistic praxis has no interest in theoretical explanations, and specifically in scientific explanations. The only acceptable science is technology of destruction. Any other science that tends to explain events by causes, conditions, laws and rules is regarded as an obstacle to revolution. All such explanations serve as justification of existing realities; hence only pure action, without any justifying position, must be accepted. While the anarchist may belong to other revolutionary movements, he/she will regard such movements as relevant insofar as their members can be educated to the final meaning their revolution to be, in principle, anarchistic. Hence, the anarchist will have an elitist attitude and distance to other movements. This distance allows him to be radically individual and absolutely free of any position, including of his/her specific identity, although he will assume any identity that might be required for terroristic activity. The problem is what he has to do at the moment when he has to take up the task of revolution as his own.

The shift to practical activity without qualification elicits a crisis in the anarchistic practognosis. In order to constantly maintain the *arche* of the revolutionary striving, he has to reject any and all positivity of justification and establishment of any institutional structures in the public. Institutions, after all, have always enslaved the populations and their replacement by other institutions will continue to be oppressive. Thus her distance from any and all public institutions and individuals with positive wants and desires, theories and values, is absolute. Her individualism is a pure will of abstention from any positivity (and negativity as a position), and a pure will to "educate" the public not toward a better understanding, a better future, or freedom of choices of public options and legal questions, but complete

abolition of the public's taking any justifying position. This anarchistic stance, its practognosis, is radically unstable and unpredictable or, as we were presenting the case of the modern variants of metaphysics of the will, totally arbitrary.

Given this context it is now possible to explicate one major variant and its numerous sub-variants of anarchistic practognosis. It is constituted by what may be called diverse monistic contents of practognosis. While numerous revolutionary theorists, including Marx, Lenin, Hegel, used monistic language, such as materialism or dialectics, Marx and Lenin stopped short of attaining anarchistic practognosis. Hegel, meanwhile, is ambiguous on that score, yet most fundamentally his understanding is based on an unconditional will that is not compelled by any external reasons. The absolute, as consciousness, has no lacks; it simply "wants" to know itself by way of a fundamental self-division and unification, i.e. *Ur-Teil*. In this sense self objectivation of the absolute is based on the metaphysics of the will. No doubt, Marx and Lenin, despite their arguments against the anarchists, might turn out to be anarchistic too as cultural manifestations of modern Western metaphysics of the will expressed in an endless progress without a purpose. This we shall attempt to demonstrate shortly. The most appropriate invariant of anarchistic practognosis may be monistic positions expounded by Hegel. His language is at the outset anarchistic, specifically since we cannot claim to understand what the absolute is and what it wants. It is destructive of any essence and a block to the discovery of any natural and independent presence. His principle for our understanding of the world is that "essence is what has been". And what has been is a product of the form of the above mentioned *Ur-Teil* in whose context any judgment about anything is a split of self-identity and an immediate transcendence and negation of what is being judged. Hence, one can never know either the absolute or a permanent essence of anything, including any institutions. Their givenness as an essence is immediately pushed into the past while the transcendence toward the future is not accessible without it too becoming a past. Sartre built his entire metaphysics of the self as nothing on this Hegelian anarchistic ground. What is significant for our understanding, that while Hegel attempted to save the modern human from being grounded in nothing by bringing in the traditional patriarchal divinity as the wilful master of all phenomena, Sartre dispensed with the

images of such a divinity as residua of personality cults and boldly accepted the conclusion that the modern human generates himself, the meaning of his environment and world out of his own non-being, his own nothing as an inescapable ground of all destructiveness.

Absolute and Anarchy

Having established the context to understand anarchistic terror, it is now possible to address the contemporary world in which terrorism is seen as a major issue. The Middle Eastern personality cults, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, have a symbolic design where an absolute and inaccessible being rules over the given universe and its inadequate order. Thus, the absolute is, regarding all established social, political, educational, scientific and economic orders, absolutely destructive. After all, Middle Eastern eschatology assumes a complete reversal and absolute inadequacy of any given order. The practognosis of such movements ranges from peaceful acceptance of the world apart from the notion that the absolute (having variants such as patriarch, god, creator, source) is to be trusted to act in his absolute wisdom and power. The individual, here, regards her activity as self-perfection in order to be worthy of the heavenly kingdom at the time when the patriarch, the god, or his son, will act. At present we must tolerate the others despite their false world view and immorality. We may exclude ourselves the best we can from their evil influences and attempt to live in accordance with the will of the lord. As we saw, this position is lukewarm or mild in contrast to its authentic modification; in the latter members of these groups regard their duty to be direct agents of the patriarch in this world. They hear the call to duty, become reborn, and are ready to spread the word and challenge all established institutions and orders. This may move through passive resistance, refusal to cooperate with institutions, terrorist activities against institutions, such as bombing of clinics, or efforts to change the institutions by "purifying" them of corrupted and polluted views and influences and thus of attempting to form sacred institutions and a theocracy.

This anarchistic violence is prevalent in Middle Eastern civilization as exemplified by current jihadist activities. The propagators are "called" by their absolute Lord.to duty first to destroy all false consciousness and its attendant immorality, in order to establish the divine order on earth under one, faithful ruler. This means that any person or group, adhering to

a different view, is false, and cannot be tolerated; their actions are equally evil and must be forbidden and anyone performing such actions must be destroyed as an evil being, serving the enemies of the absolute. The destruction is regarded as legitimate and moral, since it is correlated to an absolute truth maintained by the jihadist. More generally speaking, anyone who even would propose a slightest deviation from such truth, would be regarded as a heretic. In this sense, all texts, whether contemporary or ancient, all authors, all monuments, cultural treasures, deviating from the announced truth and good, are false and evil and must be destroyed. This is a common feature of the practognosis of all Middle Eastern personality cults. The Spanish invasion of the "new world" was equally a destruction of all the literatures of great civilizations, such as the Inca, Maya, Aztec, destruction of the images of the symbolic designs of those life worlds, and their replacement by Christian images and temples, including an imposition of new texts containing the "only truth". This common feature can be called an interpretation of "false" texts, i.e. an interpretation which abolishes such texts. This practice was spread through other absolutist claims, such as those of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism and Fascism, who also burned "heretic" writings and their authors. This practognosis is anarchistic insofar as the destruction of the heretics, unbelievers, believers in "false" gods, are destroyed absolutely. Even those, who proclaim to adhere to the same absolute Lord, and yet deviate from one another in interpreting the eminent text, become absolute enemies.

Then there can be geographic movements to find a haven where an unpolluted life, in accordance with magical prescripts from ancient stories, will rule the daily life of everyone, or invading "promised lands" and by use of terror and violence destroying or expelling the settled populations, and there can be militaristic phase of seizing power in a holy war in order to establish the kingdom of heaven. While on the surface these movements might appear to offer some minimal legitimation by a promise to establish a "true order", they cannot sustain such promises due to the very composition of the relationship between the construct called "absolute" and (a) the possibilities of understanding what the absolute really wants. Human intelligence is in no position to grasp the ultimate message, and (b) the very establishment of "divine kingdom" on earth is never adequate, and hence must be constantly destroyed and its final realisation forever deferred. Here

we can see the absurdity of the consequences of this type of practognostic anarchy: after seizing power either in a peaceful or militaristic "revolution" it must turn against itself as an established power. The victorious church had a victory only because it has surrendered itself to the imperfect, unheavenly means of this inadequate world. The kingdom of the patriarch, a god, a prophet, has not been achieved. Various reformation movements are good examples of this failure. Protestant revolution's central claim is that the Catholic Church has surrendered to the "lord of this world" and abandoned the direct "truths" of the eminent text – the bible – in favour of secular-philosophical Greek texts. Moreover, the church had established power institutions from which it dominates entire kingdoms and populations and does so not only by verbal magic, rituals and thetoric, but by military means. While this protestant movement was deemed successful, it turned against itself by splintering into numerous groups, each accusing the other of having failed to understand the ultimate truth and thus having equally fallen into the hands of the lord of this world. Protestantism split and split into a universal falsehood. This anarchistic practognosis is repeated by all sorts of revival movements calling for the destruction of falsehoods and evils of non-believers. Yet all such efforts fail without, in the final analysis, offering any positive institution as a justification, since any established institution will not be adequate in principle to fulfil the demands of heaven and hence will have to be destroyed. This means that in the very centre of these personality cults is anarchistic violence without any justifiable result: terrorism for the sake of terrorism.

The problem is how an individual is to act in light of the demands or calls to duty by the highest authority in prophetic cults. As mentioned, there are various phases, such as self-perfection and thus identification with the absolute. But in this case one must accept the world as it is and count on the ultimate authority to act against the "evil" forces in the world. But this also means a lack of real content in the individual's consciousness, specifically for practical activities. If the ultimate authority is performing everything beyond the individual's understanding, then the individual is left out of participation. Since reality is unacceptable, such as the presence of the unbelievers, believers in wrong truths and actions, and even believers who tolerate such positions, and nature as corrupted by deviant demonic forces, then one must turn against such reality but in a totally negative

way – in the name of the ultimate authority. The negative way is simply a destruction of all institutions, terrorist violence against everything and, as mentioned, all without possible justification.

For this variant of practognostic anarchy, the destructive force is the ultimate, absolute being who is outside the reality of this world. The follower of the ultimate claims to be the agent of this authority and also maintains a position outside of this world by appealing to "morality beyond all moralities", to a justice higher than any other justice but whose positions are inaccessible to the individual. He must act purely on faith which demands pure will for violence for the sake of violence. The crisis in this practognosis appears at the moment when there are portents, signs, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storms, wars, disease suggesting the presence of the absolute authority and an imminent appearance of the "absolute kingdom" requiring immediate joining for the "final battle". The current activity of the "evangelicals" in the United States is a principle example of this terroristic anarchistic practognosis. But at present, the jihadists are more akin to the "mother of all battles". Indeed, this anarchistic practognosis must turn against the openness of philosophy which, in the modern West, had to become identical with world history, its progress and innovations. Here, the ultimate, as beyond the world, is lost among the multiple disciplines, cultural discourses and human self-invention; it dies – leading to one variant of "god is dead" theology – and the individual cannot act on his own to destroy the institutions in the name of the ultimate.

At this level, this type of anarchistic practognosis is called upon to act for total destruction of the world erected by faithless secularism and its tolerance of fallacies and evils. But this means that the one who hears the call, who reads the portents, does not have a positive position as to what is to be established after the destruction of the false and evil world is complete. After all, portents, signs are not a position but an indication, a pointing to, but what they point to – the ultimate – and what it wants is incomprehensible. One cannot think to it, since thought is rejected not only as human and inadequate in face of an absolute, but also as premised on interrogation of the truth of specific claims; one cannot argue through it, since arguments are a secular, faithless mode of life. Indeed, thinking is tolerant of a variety of claims if they seem to be rationally plausible. This simply means that philosophy is not permitted. If the portents were to indicate a kingdom to be erected, then such a kingdom

will fail. As mentioned, first, because we do not know what it would be in terms of the requirements of the ultimate, and second, we would use secular means, rational explication as to what to do, and hence would be in the hands of the philosophical devil and thus what we build would have to be destroyed as inadequate, and forever inadequate. In this sense, this type of anarchistic practognosis is the very core, periphery and foundation of the way one must live with monistic personality cults proclaimed to be ultimate. A slight variant could be added to indicate that one aspect of this type of the ultimate is "primacy of will". We should recall our previous discussion that according to the story, the patriarch makes a world by willing and hence it is in a position to change the way the world is "at will". Since the world is regarded to be inadequate and in a fallen state, then this will is against the world. But as noted above, pure anarchistic practognosis is also premised on unconditional will prior to any reason or justification.

Being empty it too is against all institutions and positions and its destiny is destruction in principle. In this sense, miracles and all reform movements claim the intervention in this world of the will of the absolute. While such movements may be seen as fringes within basic institutions established by cults, they also remind such institutions that the movements are the true spirit and the very essence of all institutions and their corner stone. As already noted, reform movements tend to "go back" to the pristine eminent text that has been corrupted by worldly interests and institutions created to promote and pursue such interests. In turn, it would be appropriate to say that reform movements fail, because they too want to establish institutions with the means of the fallen world, and thus are called back to the "core teaching" in order to repeat the reform and hence destroy the very institutions that reforms bring about. Hence, the new reform movement will have its corner stones and in a true spirit will again become on the "fringe" and may even be regarded as radical, but in accordance with the logic of personality cults, it will equally comprise the very core. It is one principal claim of the movements based on personality cults is that they are duty bound to "spread the word", transform and "save the world". Thus the appeal of such radical movements to vast populations, even if the latter remain mild in their own actions and tolerance of others.

This appears in a sharp relief in contemporary "debates" concerning the "radicals" and the "moderates" of the Islamic world, although the same

debate is relevant for the "liberal" and "fundamentalist" postures in Jesuist and Judaic cults. The radicals have declared a holy war against the "secular West" as the region where the great Satan rules. Secularism is an aspect of a classical philosophical tradition where open public debate decides all issues and affairs and where truth is sought by rational means. But this also means a necessary tolerance of others and in fact a duty to allow them to present their case, even the case for the relevance and value of personality cults. From the radical position the moderates have been partially corrupted by secularism, specifically by accepting to live under laws which are not strictly in compliance with the will of the supreme patriarch. In short, they have yielded to the temptation of philosophy, of thinking, they have fallen into errors and have become identifiable as the enemy of truth and good. The very institutions they built are false and destined for destruction. The very presence of the moderates is a sign of a total decline and corruption of the pure tradition and the supreme authority has issued a call to a holy war not only against the secular West, but against all who have been tainted by its presence. Once again, the will against the world is manifested in its glaring outline. The radicals promise to return the people to the only truth and good, but the price is a holy war against all who are "not of the faith". All corrupt, i.e. secular and worldly institutions have to be destroyed through terrorist violence and replaced by theocracy. Yet it is obvious that such a replacement will fail a priori simply because the institutions will be of this world and fallible, and new radicals will appear to challenge such institutions; but they too will fail – there will never be a heaven on earth and in the final analysis there cannot be any justification for terrorist violence except for its own sake.

We must not be misled by the phenomenon of some nations being Islamic, Christian, or Jewish and for two reasons. First, there is no agreement within the theocrats which of them represents the "pure text" and hence the terrorist violence among themselves cannot cease. Indeed the terrorist violence among such nations cannot cease since all claim that it is the only rightful heir to the initial founder of the cults. Hence the others are either outcasts from the "family" or have gone astray and must be destroyed with the rest of the evil world. It will not do to argue that one or another of these nations is moderate, since the moderation does not belong to that tradition but is a corrupting influence from the secular world, the Satanic domain of

the West. We must remember that the West also contains vast populations that are committed in a mild manner to Middle Eastern personality cults and thus can be awakened to the authenticity of the cause. In the main, they simply take on the duty to spread the word, to send missionaries to change the peoples around the globe to become members of their cult. While there is a rhetorical obfuscation concerning tolerance and respect of other modes of life, since the main protagonists of these cults demand that the followers "go and convert" those |others".

We may recall the last gentle pope who went around the globe many times promoting tolerance, and yet, as was the case with his visit to India, commanding the "faithful" to convert the Hindus. This mild stage is usually attended by a central presumption that if the word is not heeded by the infidel or the unbelievers, then more severe measures will have to be taken: power and violence against the indigenous populations. From crusades against each other to conquest by sword rules the day. To his embarrassment, the pope Benedict accused Islam of brutality for contributing to violence by traditionally extending its Islamic dominion by military conquest, forgetting not only the crusades, but also the actions of the knights of the cross who committed genocide against Eastern European ethnic groups. Second, as is well noted by leading writers within these personality cults, as long as there are worldly, secular and hence Satanic places, the heaven cannot come down to earth since any place where evil still remains will be a diseased area capable of polluting the entire theocratic world. In brief, there is a demand that the entire world must be conquered and one ruler established in the name of the given cult.

The anarchistic practognosis of these types may survive in another mode apart from the tradition of such radical groups. It is an integral part of that entire tradition itself. It survives for long periods in dormancy as a collection of literary stories. Such stories become revived and their purity may require actualisation or awakening. These awakenings have variations. Sympathy for the real commitment to the kingdom of the ultimate in former times, such as total self-sacrifice and a total rejection of the order of this world. The saints, the great prophets, the unyielding warriors defending their faith become examples to be emulated. This sympathy can also be transposed to present times and lived actively in a war of destruction both as a revenge for the wrongs done to the previous martyrs, and as a way

of actively sacrificing for the pure truth they had embodied. The difficulty of the reformers is that they cannot shake completely their position, since they are a part of and must accept the tradition that contains the abolition of the established worldly orders and the presumed theocratic order the reformers had established, but not in a quite complete form, since it too had declined and became obscured and covered over by false prophets, infidels, heretics and evil powers. In brief, they have to claim that they wish to abolish all orders as worldly and corrupt, and yet one aspect of such orders is the acceptance of the unsuccessful abolition of all orders as a sign that no success is possible and therefore all terrorist violence will remain forever anarchistic. In other words, parts of the available institutional powers were established by revolutionary reformations that were in principle unsuccessful and therefore anarchistic.

Once more, then, the difficulty of distancing from all positions of anarchistic practognosis reappears. The best demonstration for this is the present schizophrenia of all types of conservativisms: In order to actualise themselves they have to be, regarding established powers, a destructive force. Thus, since the dawn of the 20th century there are not only revolutions from the right, such as fundamentalisms, fascisms and Marxisms, but also their attendant anarchism and terror. The contemporary anarchistic practognosis of the type of prophetic movements in the West faces a world which is partially its own product. To face the religious establishments instituted by a variety of religious reformations is to face its own products as failures. The failures are obvious, since the institutions are works of this world and must be destroyed anew in subsequent reformations, ad infinitum. In this sense, and in principle, the anarchistic terror and violence of this type of practognosis can never establish the kingdom of heaven and hence its activity becomes self-referring and self-warranted. Violence and terror for their own sake. At least for this world, the members of prophetic traditions must engage in terroristic violence for its own sake without any justification. It could be said that all the joy about Heidegger and his deconstructive followers belong in this domain: there is nothing that we can say about a given text and what it means, but we can forever engage in deconstruction for its own sake without saying anything.

The argument from numbers will not help the claim that the majority of the members of these personality cults are moderate and are tolerant

of others. It is in the essence of such personality cults that anyone, even a singular person, can be inspired by a reading of fables in an eminent text and demand a return to truth, a call to armed resistance against the demonic and worldly secularism and be a catalyst in heating up others to their authentic position and correlative action. After all, the eminent texts, full of miraculous stories, can be read in indefinite ways suggesting, for the present times, all sorts of signs, miracles, and prognostications. It took one regular monk, Luther, to start a radical movement and a protracted "holy war" which would lead the erring populations back to the one truth beyond the worldly institutions such as Catholic Church and its reliance on the writings of heretics – the philosophers. The truth is in the text full of stories, fables, allegories, miracles and metaphors. It required one Islamic writer in Egypt – Sayyid Qutb – to create an "Islamic revolution" leading to followers such as Bin Laden and a "holy war" even against his own "erring" country, Saudi Arabia. The weeding out of all the influences of secularism in all places, including Islamic nations, is a way of reading the stories in an eminent text that seem to be inspiring, identifying, and uplifting. In principle, both Protestantism and Islamic revolutions are premised on the claim that each person is a "priest" and hence duty bound to spread the faith and save the world. Perhaps even a question of identity might be involved, specifically in times when secular Western globalization, with its promise to make everyone autonomous and self-creating.

Such anarchistic practognosis is exhibited most clearly by Islamic fundamentalists, demanding a return to a previous glory of Islamic Caliphate and its establishment as current "Islamic Republic". While attempts were made to do so in various regions, the constant demand to improve such attempts indicates that the Islamic revolutions were not quite successful and hence have to be radicalised. Hence the claims of the fundamentalists are indicative that (a) all that has been established so far has to be destroyed, and (b) that the destruction even of Islamists who are "polluted" by foreign ideas, such as tolerance of other views, including those of "infidels" are also to be destroyed. Their major enemy is the West, and specifically the secular West which, as we already noted, is the Great Satan. It goes without much discussion that the secular West is no longer located in the West alone; it is also a part of the Islamic world and hence the task is to remove it by terrorist violence everywhere. While numerous and well-meaning groups

both in Middle East and West claim that they object to the means used by the fundamentalists, some of these groups, equally fundamentalist, although Christian in the West such as the evangelical movement in the United States, agree that the ultimate enemy is secularism. Hence, when the Trade Towers in New York were destroyed, the evangelicals agreed with Faulwell's and Roberts' pronouncement that United States is being punished by God for its secularism. In brief, to please this divinity, secular institutions of tolerance of numerous truths, moralities, and ways of life must be destroyed since it is on the side of evil and falsehood. And we should remind ourselves how the current pope, who constantly insists that the real enemy is secularism, forgets to mention that it is secularism as a basic philosophical domain that allows others to speak, to question and to change. Of course for the pope as well as for the Islamic and protestant revolutions, philosophy is the seat of evil and hence its abolishment would bring back the good days when theocrats were the only ones who could have a voice in public – indeed were the voice of the public because there was no other voice possible. How could anyone else speak when a theocrat had announced the divine truth. In this sense there emerges a principle that can be used to decipher the approximation of commitment to terrorist activities: **the more conservative, the more fundamentalist these movements become, the more anarchistic violence they must exercise.**

Globalization and Anarchy

The contemporary theories, all the way from Nietzsche's regard that life is a wanderer, to postmodern conceptions of nomadism, and our analysis of the logic of globalization, are basically ontological. As we saw, the latter is structured by the innovated metaphysics of the modern subject who is also distinct from and transcends the natural world of direct awareness. It might turn out that the collision of western globalising logic and its radical opponents are based on a very similar metaphysical principle. Above was a summary of one civilization and its inevitable anarchistic terror, stemming from the requirements of an innovated being from "outside the world". Everything in this world is made by this being simply by its verbal power – the magic of discursive making as a manifestation of unhindered will. As noted, this will is being universalised in terms of a symbolic design devised to establish the world in accordance with the wishes of this will. Apart from

other examples, the West was colonised by the nomadic spreading of *one ultimate truth*, willed by one *patriarch*. Having subjected itself to this truth, the West became neocolonials and in turn went out to spread it through the rest of the globe and hence to engage in this type of nomadic colonisation – but to their advantage, they had instrumental

With the appearance of modern subject as distinct from and transcendent over nature, and indeed being the determining factor of nature, there opens up a reflexive region that lends nature not only a secondary status, but above all a being that is dependent on the metaphysical discourses of the subject – an innovator of modern sciences. This implies that thought being prior to nature is not determined by anything and hence can determine nature in many ways, dependent upon the *will*. This is to say, if thought is the starting principle irrespective of the "height" of its transcendence, the nature is determinable by it in more than one way. There appears a peculiar reversal: the classical understanding of the world, as independent from human power and obeying its natural *logos,* its own measure, with its enduring strength against which all powers were temporary and contingent now is forced to be contingent and unnecessary, a being dependent on the transcending thought which is deemed necessary and incontestable. The latter is the stable power that can determine the way that nature will be reconstructed. Here the Lord and its nomadic power, i.e. a will that needs not respect the logos, returns in a new guise, except now as a modern subject. Within this reflexive context the human finds itself in a position of transcendence over nature, in a position of being a source of all the law that, while not yet in total command of nature, is in a position to establish such a command. This is to say, nature can be regarded as dependent upon the subjects discourses, not in some ontological sense, but perhaps more fundamentally, in a practical sense, i.e. in a sense of being "made" in human image.

In this context, one becomes detached from a place, community, and can look upon the environment and others with indifference. This sort of practognosis has a consciousness, an intentionality toward the world, also justified by conscience of detached indifference. In the following the arguments of Western modern modernity will open up two intentionalities that subtend this global modernisation and its type of anarchism. The priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought as the creative

power also permits the priority of will as that which can choose what sort of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, with its own logos, has to be subsumed under a power that is capable of dominating and altering nature and in principle making nature contingent. This is to say the necessity shifts to the will and its creative power leaving nature exposed to arbitrary rule. Indeed, without an imposition of an order by the will nature would be without reason and form, without value and goodness. The composition here allows thought and will to have a direct influence and control over all, such that the latter becomes contingent and dependent on will and thought. This is to say, the composition of the ultimate creation of nature by the ultimate will is at the same time excluded as irrelevant for the human knowledge and assumed by the human as his own composition of knowledge and will. Knowledge and will are taken, nonetheless, to be prior and transcendent to nature and hence capable of imposing an order on an otherwise irrational material nature. What comes along with this structure from the cosmic assumption of the absolute power and its creation of nature is the shift of power toward human thought and will over nature. Thought and will, logic and valuation become the necessary conditions for the being of the world for man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, blind phenomena.

First result is the appearance of the initial syndrome of arbitrary power with respect to nature, except now in the guise of the subject who is "everyman", i.e. any individual is in a position to be the master of his own destiny by his own thought, will and ability to make the surroundings in his own "image". He neither has a nature, nor a nature to settle; he can become, with respect to the environment and geographic topography *nomadic*. This is to say, he is free from any place and can remake nature in his own image anywhere he decides to settle an image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. The modern western modernity is the nomadic power of the unchained rule over nature, appearing both in the guises of capitalism and Marxism. The land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons and of natural rhythms, and the local settler, regardless of spaceplace, are now exposed to become raw material and labour power for the technological edicts controlled by unknown "emperors" in distant regions. Although such emperors are most interesting insofar as they seem to possess what the current designation would call "economic power", the more interesting factor is the breakdown of traditional legitimation of power by birth right and demanded legitimation

by "the people". But the latter are either "labour power" to be constructed in accordance with the needs of production, or are mobile individuals capable of settling where there are not yet exploited "raw materials" for production this is to say colonisation. To understand this transience it is necessary to decipher the constitution of direct western modern modernity in its nomadic form, specifically with regard to technologisation that led to the establishment of vast bureaucratic machinery of experts comprising a privileged elitism.

There is no necessary connection between the formalisms, or their signitive discourses, and the transcendent "physical" reality. The connection is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality which is not necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive discourses to the posited discourses of material reality. The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the application of theory to praxis, the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to humanise nature and the human animal, the aims of improving nature, and the exclamations that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own tablets, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formal domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not respect any prescription and qualitative discourses of the lived world. And yet it is the required nexus. After all, the signitive formal discourses do not point to anything that would be visibly similar to them. In this sense arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the material. Such a connecting intentionality is empty and hence can shift from the formal to the material; its primary fulfilment is modal discursivity that has no specific attachment to any qualitative aspects of human life. *It is a priori nomadic and anarchistic*. In principle, one is in a position of a pure metaphysics of will to constantly violate both the formal, and the material worlds.

While this might seem obvious, there appears a background phenomenon required for the second level fulfilment of various possibilising transitions: corporeal activities. Such activities are directed by projected choices of what is materially possible. The formal compositions require active interventions to construct the posited homogeneous world in

accordance with the formal discourses. Since the latter are constructs, they too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction of the material reality in accordance with our willed projects. As we noted in previous chapters, all this seems to rest on nothing. This is to say that the "intention" to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connection between theory and "reality", an arbitrariness that allows volitional (currently psychologised into "desire") activity to subtend reason and nature.

The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the "real" swings between two possibilising structures: the formal discursive possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, and a realisation that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be reconstructed at will. These formally designed possibilities are also in a position to align the material reality toward intuitive fulfilment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in accord with arbitrary discourses. This shaping comprises the source of both, the labour theory of value and life the primacy of homo laborans and technology, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies which promise to redesign the "environment", and the "human" in line with the theoreticalmethodological discourses: a world produced by scientific technology that can wander everywhere and use the indifferent homogeneous material including the human as resource. Some scholars in fact suggest that the modern world has two intentional histories: one, which is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals, and the second, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the formal discourses we ourselves posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is assumed and the intentionality of will that swings between the formal and the transcendent is the decisive arbiter without precedents and without ground, although it comprises the ground of postmodernity within modernity.

Both, the formally designed discourses and the transcendent material reality, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and perceptual distinctions with indifference. The formal indifferent and disconnected discourses lend

themselves to a horizontal division and increased formalisation of language in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of formal systems themselves. Correlatively, the material world can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the transcendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. The lateral differentiation of formal discourses and their correlative material structuration, provide a basis for discipline differentiations, each having its own formal discourses and each capable of possible construction of material realisations. Thus the more one fragments the formal discourses into increasingly refined signs, the more one is able to crisscross the material by technical procedures in terms of the formal definitions. In this sense, the very languages of disciplines are coextensive with the power of shaping the indifferent material in accordance with definitory requirements. One could argue that this continuous division and formalisation of discourses is coextensive with a militarisation of language and society. Each increasing refinement is also a transition from signs to signals resulting in a restriction of human processes to reactions to precise and efficient embodied material codes. In this sense the discursive power to make leads in two directions: the making of the environment and the human, and the violation and destruction of all life worlds.

What appears here is the trace of anarchistic *practognosis*. All events must be destroyed in accordance with the multiple formal discourses in order to remake them into something other. The life worlds of peoples everywhere must be disregarded and transformed. While this *consciencia* requires the adherence to its principles of formal and material detachments, it "progresses" toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both "natural" and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where semiindependent spheres call for independent functions and work. What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal discourses divide the human "material:" the human is an intersection of economic, social, chemical, genetic, physiological, psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated discourses, each semi-independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyse the obvious: the transitional intentionality, expressed as the power of these differentiations,

comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to a society of semiindependent groupings of experts, each possessing a discursive power to make what his/her discipline constructs as reality. Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary connection with other spheres. This multi discursivity does not seem to offer any common world. Hence the results of "research" in a specific domain can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics or cosmetics for possible "application". Such a lateral differentiation decentralises responsibility and increases the contingency and the power of the transitional intentionality, appearing here in the image of arbitrariness. Every formal discourse and every material result become totally arbitrary. Each is empowered to go anywhere and make reality. This is modern nomadism. This means that there are no restrictions for the "making of truth". After all, such a making has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. All appear in the nomadic production, such that the transitional intentionality becomes self-warranting anarchistic enactment by *anyone*. Regardless of the domain there is no reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease proliferating more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic "growth", no biological reasons to stop remoulding the living processes along new combinations, etc. Any restriction is regarded as an infringement on the autonomy of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.

As was already discussed, this results in the notion of progress, such that the latter does not seem to have any purpose but itself. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal discourses and all transformations of the lived world must be remade to maintain this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no subject that would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is selfreferential. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and "perfectabilities" without of course attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilising and hence "improvement". But this suggests that

its presence cannot be deconstructed, since in its selfreferentiality it has no direction, no purpose, and hence every effort to deconstruct it will, perforce, enhance its self-referentiality. The prevalent deconstructivist theology, as writerly, is premised on this self-referentiality of progress without death. The human is also subsumed under an arbitrariness which includes his/her own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a "power" which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of modern *anarchistic practognosis*: *all that is given is in principle to be violated to yield progress. Progress as self-warranting can never be fulfilled; it is ruled by an arbitrary will whose only aim is in reconstruction of the environment and the human is a continuous destruction without a final justification. Willed self-warranting progress is anarchistic violence for the sake of violence.*

While this form of practognosis comprises the ground of globalization and anarchistic violence, the acceptance of it by indigenous peoples through educational processes, involves such peoples in the logic of globalization and thus produces global practognosis. This is to say, the universal effort by the "underdeveloped" nations calls upon their youth to attend Western universities and become versed in the instrumentaltechnical reason in order to bring progress. Thus, the local peoples become inadequate and must be brought into "universal" material world history and hence be treated as a homogeneous labour power to be shaped technically by "education" to become adequate producers of commodities for the "world market". In this sense, the elites, the local "bright lights" who get their "superior" technical knowledge in the West, the knowledge that is at base global also impose this acquired knowledge as a standard for their own populations. This type of imposition is deemed to be a way of dealing with indigenous issues "objectively". In this sense, the West need not engage in being traditional colonial the practognosis is accepted and practiced by other cultures, where training of the local becomes local/global. The power to rule will be distributed among those who possess the technical, instrumental rationality. Their skills are a condition for the running and/or "progressing" the entire society. This includes pedagogical retransformation of the local populations toward productivity and ability to "humanise" the homogeneous

environment. But this also means that the population will be released from its "logocentric" qualitative culture, its belonging to a region, an environment, and will become nomadic in search of materials for productive use and consumption. One outcome of this practognosis is the well-known language of commodification and consumption. This practognosis enmeshed in scientific technocracies and selflegitimating progress, cannot permit any other conception of the human apart from efficient producer, consumer, and a nomad that is calculating and calculated. The qualitative worlds of various communities around the globe, what they have to offer, are of local and not global value, specifically if such qualitative aspects cannot become nomadic, circulated for global consumption. Progress offers technical means for anyone and anywhere to become an image of modernity: to enhance oneself and to make of oneself what one wills, to obtain the "ideal" image, to listen to the "latest" rhythms, to become sensuous body, obtainable in any drugstore, beauty parlour, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a skindeep equalisation in numerous domains lending the appearance of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, even similar dress and walk. While there might remain vast differences in social class distinctions, economic and political power inequities, at the surface level there seems to be an apparent equitable fulfilment. Everyone is "enjoying" an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated ideals and looks. "She looks like a million" and this despite the fact that she is working on a global assembly line. The saturation of all domains with the images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, submit to the power of anarchistic consciencia in "flesh".

This is to say, idealities to be achieved are no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting the materialeconomic or technical conditions, but are inscriptions in the body, in the images, the passions and desires appearing directly as modes of bodily comportment. The idealities are coextensive with daily discourses, daily imagery, massmedia, sounds and tastes, architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circulation that make any artform accessible and "popular", globally commodified and thus nomadic. The anarchistic practognosis, at this level, stems from the very progress that posits unreachable "purpose" that can never be achieved, and hence a point forever deferred. One is never adequate, and hence is exposed to violation and continuous selfviolation terrorism of the body, inscription of

the "latest" that will be immediately outdated by the "improved", ad infinitum. From mechanical through electronic to bio-technologies as transcendental conditions, one can become any image, any shape, and anyone – but at a price.

The argument against such excelerating practognosis might be that it serves a more basic purpose – prolongation and indeed an indefinite continuation of life and, in this sense creates what is good for as many as possible – increased pleasure. This might be a solution to the anarchistic destruction and violence and democratically speaking, the right of all individuals who demand such progress. After all, Lithuania has joined this global logic and is filled with constant novelties, opportunities, latest styles, technical systems, attractive investments and, above all, better jobs and abundant commodities. In brief, all positive signs of the success of global practognosis – but at a price. The latter has various faces, among which a couple or so which stand out. First, the promise of prolonged life is being fulfilled as long as a person submits to being totally dependent and "attached" to the latest technologies, whether they are genetic, chemical, biological, or psycho/medical. Second, the protracted life is replete with "conveniences" that release a person from doing tasks, thinking, searching, wondering, imagining, striving, and even exercising. All of that is done by the attachments to which a person becomes subjected. To speak with the latest innovations, the person does not have to open an online library and look for a text, to read the text and to think about it. One can simply say "Suzie, what did Kant say about perpetual peace" and within seconds Suzie, in a pleasant voice will recount what Kant said and will offer the available interpretations of what he said. This is the price: one need not develop one's own abilities of research rethinking, interrogating, since such functions are taken over by the technically signitive life world. Third, and most significant aspect of global practognosis indicates clearly the anarchistic violence subjecting the human subject. To enhance human abilities, the very composition of what is left of a human being will have to be violated, changed chemically, genetically, and even physiologically. If now one gets Suzie to provide any and all information, any pleasant story, she will be replaced by a chip implanted in human physiology such that the information will flow directly, without having to listen to Suzie. Moreover, the same state of affairs is in place concerning the so-called "inner" person, such as feelings, emotions, sensations: all are being managed by chemistry

where to be sad or angry are regarded as inappropriate emotions; hence, one will have to feel good, be always happy, and in this sense one will no longer be able to say "I want to be angry" since one will not be allowed to have a career and show anger. The price is violation of one's "private" life.

The Clash of Civilizations

Having explicated two different life worlds at their anarchistic limit, we can now show their incompatibility and thus violent confrontation. The best way to disclose this clash is through commonly understood symbolic designs of both, specifically in light of declarations by members of Middle Eastern civilization that modern globalization, as secular, is in the hands of Satan. It is to be recalled that modern Western arguments have reached a conclusion that reality as such is unknowable or, at least, irrelevant and thus we are left with the praxis life world. This implies that there is no need to raise the question concerning the reference to any reality in the stories depicting the symbolic designs of these two civilizations. It was argued that each has its discursive practice, its practognosis constituting a specific life world, such that every claim about anything is interpretation – hermeneutics. For the sake of convenience, the type of hermeneutics, stemming from Middle East, could be designated as ultimate being, interpreted as "father", and his relationship to a son. The relationship presents a story of submission and rebellion. In this interpretation, the rebel is Lucifer. Initially, Lucifer was designed to serve his father, to maintain his order, to find transgressors of paternal edicts and bring such transgressors for paternal punishment. At this level, Lucifer does not have a personality or identity. His identity is given by his maker; it is a servitude in the maintenance of paternal edicts. Lucifer can be regarded as a chairman of the board of unheavenly activities. He compels all and one to adhere to paternal edicts and those who fail will be regarded as evil. As discussed in the previous chapters, there is first a creation of something, and once that something becomes accepted, whether it is a divinity, a world view, or a cosmic destiny, the very creators become subject it. It means that the innovation of a paternal subject turns against the innovators, the human subjects of the Middle East, and makes them sons of their own innovation, to be subjected to such innovation. Lucifer, the son, is subservient to the edicts of his father, and must make sure that all others become equally subservient. This cultural interpretation

constitutes civilizational phenomena that can be seen as dynamics designed to maintain permanence. In other words, father and son, maker and Lucifer, are interpretive modes that constitute these phenomena. His rebellion has been assigned various characterisations: being the first son, he cannot accept the shift of his father's love toward a younger sibling; he cannot endure his being created by and subjected to the total authority of his patriarch and thus not having his own personality – he wants to be his own author. Since the father is absolute, Lucifer's rebellion is unconditional and absolute: he wishes to replace the order of his father-creator with a counter-order. In the latter, he will be the sole master. This does not mean that he will be able to take over the paternal throne. This is made impossible at the outset. His throne is only temporary from which he can occasionally insult his father and even do some disruptions of his patriarch's order. In this tradition, Lucifer's psychological construction is one of envy, hate, guilt, and disruption. Since this tradition, in the final analysis, accepts the patriarchal rule to be absolute and changeless, and posited as good, then Lucifer's rebellion is disruptive and evil. In other words, he is a negative psychological being. He is not concerned with giving practical assistance or having empathy with others. If he were to satisfy someone's desires, such an act would have to result in gaining control of someone and through such a control disrupt the paternal order. In this tradition, rebellion is, in principle, evil, even when it would help the people to grasp the paternal designs.

Lucifer's rebellion introduces another moment of this civilization: dynamics that disrupts permanent order. Lucifer's rebellion has no power to change the paternal order. The latter is an interpretation of absolute permanence and cannot be changed; it predetermines and preordains all. There is not a single entity that does not belong to this permanent order. In this sense, the rebellion against such an order, its disruption, is doomed to failure; it might even be regarded as quixotic. Indeed, all disruptive activity is destined for annihilation; it is damned as total evil and a sign of non-being. As we saw, the absolute of this tradition is totally anarchistic in relationship to the established orders of humans, such that they are to be destroyed without any possible replacement. There is no space to establish institutions that would allow the change of edicts or to change the environment for the improvement of human lot. Moreover, it is not allowable to analyse, interrogate, challenge and change the permanent

edicts and order, and the institutions that support them, and thus to change the reading of justice, good and evil. These phenomena do not admit of independent personalities, empowered to make independent decisions concerning the given permanent order and edicts, the good and the bad, their adequacy and their replacement. Any fundamental challenge and interrogation would be regarded as human pride, and any proposition to change such permanence would be deemed as bad faith and evil disruption, based on finite human thought. After all, Lucifer cannot know more than his progenitor, and cannot decide what he wants to become, apart from attempting to imitate his paternal absoluteness in a negative mirror image.

Given the arrangement of the figures in this civilization one cannot derive what is known as democratic institutions where self-reliant and responsible persons decide their practical affairs – without any appeal to highest authority. A person acquires value only in subjection to the paternal edicts and order and, in case of need, becomes a holy warrior in the name of the highest authority. Such a personality follows the first moment of Lucifer's activity: dynamics that maintains permanence. This personality acts to maintain such permanence and is called upon to destroy all that is deemed disruptive of this order, and hence evil. These phenomena are experienced as justification for holy wars where everything must be mobilised and subjected for victory against absolute evil. At this level, there is no such option as an open dialogue to decide whether a holy war is justified or not; one either fights against evil, or one becomes an enemy of the good and the true. The absolute father and subservient son hermeneutics constitutes civilizational phenomena which does not equate with the one established in the West and proliferated as a logic of globalization.

Initially this logic was depicted in the images of a relationship of highest authority – Zeus – with Prometheus. This relationship appears in story of Prometheus, who rebels against Zeus' edict that forbids fire to humans. The supreme authority, Zeus, in his anger denies humans the use of fire. Divine intervention initiates human suffering, if not tragedy. Prometheus, moved by the unnecessary suffering of humans, steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Here we have practical assistance for which Prometheus does not ask anything. He does not wish to rule or to have others follow his way of life. He does not form a party or demands to be a judge on the court. There is no revenge present against anyone or an obedience to some divine

command. He simply regards Zeus' law as unjust and, indeed, premised on revenge by Zeus against the humans. What is interesting is that the Greeks accepted the action of such a rebel as a noble violation of bad or even unjust laws. Although speaking formally the act of Prometheus was "bad" or illegal, his personal nobility and his positive attitude and qualities outweigh his formally bad act. Prometheus could be regarded as practically rational, and worldly "materialist". His aim was to help others, but with this help he changes the notion of justice. Even Zeus accepts this change by admitting that his edict prohibiting fire to humans was a bad law.

The worldliness – secularism – of Prometheus appears in his personality which is independent from any authority. He has his own views and is capable of planning his own future based on his own knowledge and choices. If he makes mistakes, he admits them and corrects them. After all, Prometheus had decided to support Zeus in the battle against the Titans, but after the battle he recognised that Zeus had become a tyrant. Thus he decides to correct his mistake by rebelling against Zeus' laws simply because he decides that such laws are practically unjust. Here the highest authority is negated as unacceptable in principle without any question concerning one's own benefits. Humanity here is in charge of its own affairs and demands that gods no longer intervene. In this classical Greek story one develops the notion of personal responsibility for one's own action. Although one can make mistakes, he takes full responsibility for such mistakes and deems it his duty to correct them. While not having ultimate wisdom, humans are depicted as capable of managing their own affairs.

In Promethean story Zeus is the highest cultural symbol of permanence – as authority. Prometheus, in turn, is a cultural symbol of action. As an initial supporter of Zeus, he reveals an awareness of action that maintains permanence. He wants to insure Zeus' victory over the Titans and his permanent position as the ultimate authority. Yet by becoming a rebel against Zeus' bad law he reveals an awareness which is disruption and/or destruction of permanence. Such a disruption in the story of Prometheus reveals, in the final outcome, a very specific relationship between permanence and change: the highest symbol of permanence – Zeus – is compelled to agree with Prometheus and thus to change his absolutist position. In this sense, permanence can be open to the requirements of change. This means that at the cultural level, there arises a possibility to challenge any

authority, law, to interrogate them sensibly, and thus to change them. In other words, there emerges a dialogical relationship between permanence and change. Every position, tradition, even the thinking of the highest figures, can be interrogated openly and reasonably, can be investigated, analysed, and requested to justify themselves in a full light of public debate or in a public court. If a given position, and even an accepted tradition cannot be justified by reason and by the well-being of humans, then they can be openly rejected. This is the reason that classical Greece comprised an arena of intellectual tension among multiple positions, views, all calling for a debate among individuals. This open debate comprises a cultural symbol of permanence that tolerated and enhanced all creative flux. This classical thinking unfolded permanence as flux maintenance and enhancement and comprises the ground of every person's rationality and responsibility.

On this background of "practical rationality" appears modern, scientific secularism, with secular public institutions, above all open education accessible to all. As permanent, they enhance most diverse activities and the diverse positions maintained through such activities – each changeable in face of challenges, and specifically in face of practical needs and wants. Everything can be placed into question, discussed, accepted, rejected – in the open. This symbolic design continues to maintain one of the Promethean motifs: science and/or knowledge should serve the needs and benefits of humans. This motif comprises one of the more significant domains of confrontation between the two civilizations. In many cases, the father-son hermeneutic reads the modern West (with its Promethean worldliness and practicality) as the Great Satan that must be confronted by a holy war. It is worthwhile to sketch the parameters wherein the discord appears at the level of practical life. The Promethean hermeneutic reveals a practical need assistance syndrome. In brief, in face of practical needs that would benefit the human lot, it is possible to change not only divine will and edicts, but also natural events. The modern Western scientific enlightenment deemed science's primary purpose to be at the service of human beings, not only as an enhancement of such a well-being by changing the natural order, but also by changing the human itself. This syndrome of science as practical constitutes the environment and the human as technical. It allows the humans to reshape the environment and the human in terms of human rules and will. In this sense, the human is positioned to be the creator of the rules

for the environment and for her own self-construction – in brief, human creation of a total human-humanised world. The human subject interprets itself as the source of rules by which to reconstruct nature for human benefit, and to establish rules for human mutual life, and thus create a purely human domain. Although there might appear background claims that nature has its own laws, such claims also become instrumental for changing the environment and, gradually, circumventing such claims through technical innovations.

This practical-instrumental reconstitution of the environment and the human is in a total discord with the father-son reading of the world. The latter must proclaim that the entire nature is imbued with, pervaded by the paternal order and edicts and hence cannot be violated. Natural processes follow the rules of the creator. Nature is *imago dei.* Given this posture, it can be said that the transformation of the environment and the human in terms of humanly invented rules is a direct affront to the paternal authority. The human not only does not adhere to the created order, but, in the worldly domain, the order is being changed by humanly created rules that disrupt the divine order. In this sense, human activity comprises the phenomena of total disruption of divine law. Such a disruption is not permitted within the configuration of the father-son hermeneutic. Within the latter, the civilizational phenomena would have to regard the humanly established rules and the technical-practical transformation of nature as Lucifer's rebellion, and, in modern terms, as Satanic assault on divine creation. This logic must be extended one more step: the Promethean modern human not only disrupts the paternal order, but, by creating the rules by which such order is to be reconstructed as if out of nothing, this human subject creates itself and the world. In this sense, the human become the creator of the environment and the human. But such a stance is identical with the paternal creator and with Lucifer's rebellion: divine-demonic wrapped in one. This is the divine complex of the modern Western humanity. Yet, obviously, there is the noted difference between Promethean secular and Lucifer's theological rebellions; and this is what irks the members of the father-son hermeneutical culture.

In this context, all that Promethean modern secular subject enacts to transform the world, i.e. violates the creators order, will be regarded as evil and false, and destined for punishment and destruction. It is to

be noted that for the modern Promethean person the plans of paternal creator are totally irrelevant; such a person is interested in the instrumental reconstruction of the environment for human well-being. Seen from the father-son configuration, such a reconstruction must be regarded as a disruption of a true order. Thus the modern, secular human appears to be on the side of Lucifer's rebellion – satanic. Moreover, such a human, who reconstructs the environment and her own being in accordance with her own rules and activities, is also questioning the inadequacies of nature and, by implication, the inadequacies of the patriarchal creator and, perhaps suspecting that he is not as good as the believers claim. Those who maintain the father-son configuration as unconditionally permanent, and nature as the image of this permanence, have no choice but to regard the worldly human of enlightenment as pervaded by pride, self-reliance and audacity to question the highest authority and its order in order to make it serve the human needs and, as argued, the global ethic that promotes pleasure. This is, of course, impossible from the side of the supporters of father-son interpretation of the world. For them, pretences by modern subjects to be the final grounding, is not only false, but the ultimate evil, to be eradicated by a holy war. Given this setting, the two civilizations cannot accommodate each other's interpretation of the "making of the world, and at present both offer anarchistic violence of all phenomena, from the side of the Middle Eastern interpretation, violence against human deviance and inadequacy, from the global logic, constant disruption of the environment.

The Middle Path

Various political suggestions can be offered to confront the anarchistic practognoses? What is the basic configuration that would not allow either of the anarchistic practognoses to have their total sway is this: first, permanence is required for any awareness, as well as dynamics, flux. The permanence that is required is one that is open to dynamics. In western civilization this permanence has been regarded as a public domain wherein every member of society is both equal and autonomous, but above all, responsible for their actions and thus their life world. It is to be understood that such a domain is not a given; it is a phenomenon that must be permanently maintained by activity, participation, and engagement. One cannot simply say that there is a public domain, an open space for

decisions that cannot be purely global. Second, the local region, its streams and environment, its specific awareness, is local, and that means that one's responsibility is not from a stance of pure autonomy, concretised by a will, but from a local awareness correlated to local environment – and in depth. The surface circulation of global means is shallow and general where everything is granted the status of being categorically the same: chicken is chicken for the market, and chemical fertiliser is homogeneous and must be used everywhere. But by now we are somewhat aware that chickens and soils vary and depend on the regional conjunction of solar outlay, winds and storms, traditional nutrition habits and ritualistic celebrations with bounty from local soil and streams. Third, while being part of European Union, Lithuania must adhere to European rules, but Europeans should understand another form of interpretation: the universal rules cannot be seen in their purity without being translated into a local discourse, such that they will be understood only in such a discourse. And this is the conjunction: local/global.

What has been said with these brief remarks is an effort to point out that the anarchistic practognoses that may include the divine market, are phenomena; they do not grow on trees, nor are they derivable from some ineffable will. We enact them and we can re-enact them differently.

Yet the re-enactment of this difference requires an entirely new conception of "world". We can argue that the types of anarchistic practognoses, articulated so far, are worldless. Their proposed ontology and metaphysics appear only when humans "apply" them and thus assume, at the outset an inevitable violation of the directly experienced life world. In principle, any "application" is coextensive with deviation from what is toward what ought to be in terms of a constructed ontology and metaphysics – valuation that becomes the medium through which the immediately present life world is seen. In this sense a specific civilization, intent on articulating modern Western modernity with a view toward maintaining its own identity, can counter the globalising logic and theological autocracy at the level of cosmic and not metaphysical and ontological understanding. While there is no getting away from ontology, i.e. the way that the world and its events are present, there is a getting away from atomistic, fragmenting, quantitative ontology. What would remain is the classical Greek and Lithuanian ontology and cosmos.

First, let us look at ontology, which is regarded as "natural" and constitutes a legitimation for proper human activity toward the environment. While unnoticed, there is a dramatic shift in awareness: its medium is not language, discourse, method, explanation, divinity, but the world. The *ethos* of human activity is equivalent to the qualitative presence of all beings and events, with their requirements and limits. Thus it is natural for humans to use fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use autocraticimperial edicts to deprive humans of fire. It is appropriate for humans to raise crops and have animals, but inappropriate to mistreat the animals on which we depend, and discard them as waste. In this sense, the understanding of legitimation must be adjudicated discursively in the gathering of local public, with full attention to the primary medium – the world. To speak philosophically, the *logocentric* conception is what legitimates both, the awareness of natural qualitative environment and the place of humans in it. And being in the place means that humans are not "transcendent" subjects looking at the world from "outside" but direct participants in their world. Our being, as inhabitants of the world, also means that what we do in and to that world will be done to ourselves. If we poison the soil, if we pollute our waters, if we create mountains of refuse, then we poison ourselves, we pollute ourselves and will have to live in those mountains. After all, we breathe the air, drink the water, and discard synthetic materials by the ton. Mount Everest is regarded as a set of "paths" marked by discarded refuse – from plastic bottles, cameras to tents. Masses of "tourists" want to take a photo at the summit. This is the case everywhere, more severe in some places, where breathing clean air is a luxury.

In a logocentric world, there is a "rule by the best" who are not nomadic technocrats and bureaucrats, but the experienced who have direct awareness and contact with their world, who have lived and learned from the accumulated concerns of an entire tradition and who can be best advisors as to the needs of the local inhabitants – all of them. Such a rule would be partially justified by the logocentric conception of the world where wisdom is deemed to be in a position to decipher and hence correspond to, and indeed be capable of ruling in accordance with the all ruling logos. Thus those in possession of episteme, the councils of elders, or the ones who tend a specific domain, such as crops, gardens, bees, should rule by virtue of their knowledge. What is to be understood is that knowledge

could not be regarded as a legitimation to make, to transform the world. Knowledge of what is the case by nature is knowledge how one should act. This sort of rulership does not use power against a person or nature, but it can show discursively the mistakes the person might make with respect to the nature of the cosmos and its logos. If a person is made to understand what is natural, he/she will act in accordance with such an understanding. No imperative from emperors or wills of divinities could alter the enduring logos. To the contrary, emperors and divinities come and pass with the sway of the cosmic logos.

What is at issue here is that the cosmic logos is not to be understood as power, but as enduring and elastic strength that yields but cannot be defeated. Those who live in accordance with its sway are also the enduring, the ones who bend with the storms but remain unbroken. The difference between strength of logos and power is that logos is ever present and never vanishes, while power has its rise and fall. It can be conquered, dissipated, abolished, or decadent. In this sense it is distinct from the strength of logos that is not nomadic, it does not come and pass, even if it is never at rest.

These two modes appear globally with the inevitable supremacy of logocentrism, in the form of cyclical time and seasonal events which defy all metaphysics of will, whether in divine or modern form of a subject. We live by seasons, by what grows where and what can be raised in what place for human survival. Not only that, we live by such cosmic cycles every day, we take our seasonal vacations, and have seasonal celebrations, we get up in the morning and go to bed in the evening, we shop for seasonal fruits and vegetables, and buy appropriate seasonal attire, even if it is designed to adhere to the latest style, whether it is winter, spring or fall, and despite what the latest style of such an attire might be. We do not wear transparent bathing suits in January in Siberia or Minnesota, or Alaska, and do not dress in fur coats on Turkish beaches in summer, at this level of logocentrism, deconstructivists and their counterparts, the metaphysical anarchists will have to be silent, since they too must adhere to the cosmic rhythms. Thus, in contrast to the all enduring and ruling cyclical time, the shifting powers of kings, whether legitimated or not, have no say. Just as the nomadic rulers cannot completely transcend the logos, so the kings with their powers cannot escape the verdict of time. Given this context, the nomadic legitimation efforts should not be identified with a particular

ruler's wish to justify his rule, but more basically with the effort to extricate from the strength of the all-pervasive Logos, i.e. to make the transient power last and indeed become superior and transcendent to the strength of Logos. We shall argue subsequently that the current cult of deconstruction is premised on this notion of abolishing the enduring strength of logos, of "logocentrism". And this means that deconstruction wants to continue the transcending nomadic rulership with the aid of the old, recouped, divinities and their supplicant servants. This effort to shift toward the superiority of the detached, nomadic transcendence may constitute an effort to bend the rule of the logos, and if possible to exercise will over it.

Lithuania: Tradition and Future

An essential dimension of Lithuanian tradition is not just its past, with a grand history of an empire, significant titles from Western Medieval Powers, but the concrete life of the population: agrarian. The uniqueness of the agrarian life world was its total attunement to nature, seen as vital and alive, from a grain of soil to most powerful natural forces. Indeed, such forces stem from The Old matriarchal Europe which predates the Arian invasion with its Parthenon of natural patriarchal forces. The closeness to nature is apparent in Lithuanian language which is regarded as a sole preservation of Indo-European origins. It is also plausible that the language is not regarded as a medium of communication but as a direct "speaking of nature" without any distance. The customs were equally agrarian and depended on seasonal labours in the fields and forests. Even months were named after the specific creatures which would show up in spring and the sprouting of specific trees in summer and required labours in the fall. For example, April is *Balandis,* the showing up of the dove, and May is the month of the kuku bird *Gegužis,* June is the birch tree, *Birželis,* and August is the month for cutting the rye fields, *Rugpiutis,* and so on. In brief, they had a direct meaning because they were identical with natural entities and events. By now, they are abstract media to mark a temporal sequence.

As Lithuania immerses itself in globalization, it becomes increasingly urban, where the agrarian language and rituals are best paraded on a stage in a city and filmed for school children to see; but they are not performed in the fields, where the hard labour of tying the cut rye into bundles was performed by rhythmic bending and thus rhythmic chanting. In brief, the labours were

coextensive with the rhythms of seasons which had a cyclical repetition. The life world moved in cycles, from days, months, years, always repeating themselves. In this life world the cyclical cosmos did not allow for "progress" or historical direction. One is born. Lives and dies, as happens with every generation repeating the same labours and rituals. This kind of life world and cosmos was destroyed by Russian/Soviet Empire, with collective farms (panoptical prisons) and five year plans dictated by dialectical materialism that promises a radically new "Soviet man". Add to that the majority of population whose life world is based on linear progress, requiring daily novelties, fast pace transformations, and the result is obvious: two incompatible life worlds and two distinct ways of interpreting the cosmos.

Thus the challenge at the cultural level is the accommodation of two distinct cosmologies, leading to question the modern universe in terms of the traditional cosmos. In short, is the modern time awareness universal? This means that the cultural logics must be investigated within the parameters of peoples' understanding of their world not only in terms of a life world and discursive practices, but also a life world that is subtended by the cultural preconceptions of what constitutes the universe as time. Within this context, we hope to articulate the limits wherein even the power confrontations of the dual consciousness find their own limitations. Each culture has its own world conceptions as conditions for their own self-understanding. If there is going to be any adjudication among cultures underneath the power confrontations such adjudications will have to articulate the world conceptions of various peoples. In this sense, the challenge to the globalising logic will not come from the acceptance by the other of the efficient technical means that make their own culture inadequate, but by the recognition that their own culture has a very different world understanding. We know from other cultures, whether Mayan, Hindu, or Taoist that the world understanding, even at the ontological or metaphysical levels, is different from the Western scientific and linear conceptions, as is the case with traditional Lithuanian cosmos. So the task of cultural studies is to find the cosmic awareness that underlie their cultural parameters Lithuania is offering one such awareness, but whether it may be adequate to disrupt the modern globalising awareness is the main issue.

Indeed, as already suggested, there is logocentric thought that may constitute an intermediary between the willed discourse as the transcendent

rule over the world and the human, and all ruling logos. The intermediary is the rule by the best who know the logos not as inherent in the world, but as transcendent to it and hence to be brought to recognition pedagogically and not imposed by will. Nonetheless, this very promise of recognition assumes a position that is different from the world and hence a possibility to impose it as would be the case in Plato's Laws, or in the historicising of such laws to be achieved in a utopian state. What appears, here, is a claim that the world is an inadequate and hence a contingent process with respect to transcendent ideality discoverable by thought. The ideality, then, must provide a guiding principle how the worldly events must correspond to what thought provides. What is worldly cannot be destroyed by will, nonetheless it must be modified and hence violated. To speak with the modern Western technical modernity, there is a standard of beauty and you must get a facelift to come closer to the standard

What, then, can Lithuanian culture add to this middle ground? First, its understanding of the world, or more precisely "world understanding" is prior to any metaphysical or contrived ontological mediation. It is a direct awareness of the ways that the world turns, its seasons, the creatures and their habits, the taste of fields and the solar outlays of "vitality", the rains and flows of streams, the births and deaths, and above all the integral awareness of how things, creatures, life forms belong together. Lithuanian culture and language is regarded as one of the oldest Indo European languages due, perhaps, to the fact that up to Twelfth century there was little influence from external cultures – until the Christian knights/monks started their terroristic incursions. If one wanted to hear how the initial Indo European language sounded, one could simply speak to a Lithuanian farmer. His very being was impassioned by natural sounds of the environment. This suggests that Lithuanian culture allowed the environment to speak directly through the language, precluding the notion that language represents or points to "reality". Lithuanian language makes present the directly experienced world without obfuscations or speculative spider webs. In addition, the language retains seven cases and a proliferation of diminutives which capture the nuances of the richness of the environment and human attentive attunement to nature. While this might sound as a deviation toward linguistic poetics, but in fact it is a disclosure of a careful realism of the depth of awareness. No doubt, poetic nuances are present because the richness and variety of nature is "poetic.

The presentational value of language accounts for the cultural preoccupation with singing as a mode of displaying the phenomena of Lithuanian world. This means that Lithuanians do not "sing about" something; to the contrary, they "sing that something as it manifests itself in different daily shadings of sunlight, clouds, seasonal storms and celebrations. To use a metaphor, Lithuanian songs sound like the eyes of innocent creatures, seeing the world without any intermediaries. As oral culture, all wisdom acquired through ages, is passed on from generation to generation by songs, direct showing of the different features of plants, vegetation, their tastes, healing power, the places where they thrive, their beauty, which animals prefer which foliage, and which mushrooms are to be avoided. All such knowledge was not abstract, because specific herbs, weeds, leaves were integral part of the home – hanging in braids on kitchen walls and in hallways. Such local understanding is global not in the sense that it would be viable everywhere, but as an example how ecology is an integral part of a Lithuanian community. The latter also contains very unique features, allowing a continuation of a family with a place for each member in its composition. A person knows his/her identity not by verbal magic, pronounced by Middle Eastern shaman, but by being a thread in a web of relationships. Thus one was a great granddaughter of so and so and a niece of someone and a third cousin, and so on, composing an extended family. Those who died are not gone, because they too belong to the family and their place is significant to know one's own place and lineage. Even today it is common to say "Let us visit great grandmother, and at the same time "Check on uncle Ainis" – integral community as is its world.

Suggested Readings

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The text is designed to explicate the logic of globalization at various levels, in distinction from other forms of presumed building of global systems. The argument is presented to show that the latter is a building of autocratic empire on the basis of some national or theocratic basis. This type of global reach is not designed to involve the populations, whether they are local-national or subjected to the edicts of such autocratic/theocratic domination. Modern Western globalization is based on a unique ontology – nature is a composite of material parts – and on mathematical metaphysics – all material events can be constructed in accordance with calculations and thus transformed to serve human needs everywhere. In this sense, this globalization is regarded as a progress for human benefit. In contemporary epoch, there is a confrontation between the autocratic/theocratic structures and the modern Western globalization. Lithuania being in the "middle" between them, is in a position to offer an alternative culture which is both ecologically sound and ethically responsible. Thus the preservation of Lithuanian culture is significant for the preservation of all life.