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SOCIAL
VALUE
AND INDIVIDUAL
WORTH

Algis Mickunas

MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY

Algis Mickunas

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INDIVIDUAL WORTH

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Prof. Habil. Dr. Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Mykolas Romeris University

Author:

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PREFACE

This book is designed to investigate the given facts of daily life, then the cultural facts that are usually obfuscated by all sorts of explanations, till we come to the global phenomena and the manner in which such phenomena comprise both, an access to other cultures, and a narrowing down and flattening out of cultural innovations. For example, one such flattening may occur when the peoples, who liberated themselves from the Soviet Empire, were rushed into “the latest” and got stuck in the repeated cycle of accepting or inventing the latest. This is to say, there is an “eternal boredom” that has to be broken. It is also significant that many writers on culture follow the old trend that humans are dominated by their cultures – some sort of cultural unconscious – from which no one can escape. In this context, there appear various efforts to abolish the subject as conscious being, and to replace it by all sorts of forces, psychological wishes, power confrontations, and hierarchy of positions. Going through these invented factors we find that the essayists of these texts do not seem to be stuck and can levitate and tell us poor readers, that we are stuck, that underneath our conscious awareness we are being moved by all sorts of “nodes”, or body surface touches, and thus are completely intertwined in such nodes – of course our awareness is a simple node among nodes. If I know anything about these nodes, I must surrender any conscious being, because the latter is in no position to encompass all of them.

The cultural syndrome has to be addressed from a position that cannot be a position. Our awareness of others in their difference from ours, cannot be sequential, temporal, because we cannot “go back” to investigate what happened in the past or somewhere else. Our access requires signitive awareness, leading to the question what the others “meant” and not what they felt or endured. In brief, awareness is signitive and must be taken as such, and if we shift to the experience of the others, we must ask “what they meant” by specific words or how they saw a specific thing. There is no need for time machine to transport us,

because at the outset awareness is meaningful or signitive. In brief, we must ask the question of meaning that is not some interior psychological state of the subject, but points to, means something. I might disagree with someone on the grounds that certain perceptual meaning does not belong to a given fact, does not signify it in a specific way, and hence we can always ask “what do you really mean by that”. It could be that a fact will correct our signification, or a custom of a given time will reveal a mistake, but in any case experienced meaning is a fact and should be open to anyone.

The task of signifying, as a basic mode of awareness, allows us to be intersubjective, and present to others regardless of place and time. We used terms such as “atemporal” – between time and eternity, between yesterday and tomorrow, even between being and nothing. Our world is open and with globalization it is increasingly so, but we also must find room for local cultures, and above all for individuals. The text challenges Scientific and Political Enlightenment to the extent that it “forgot” the criterion for all the values that were based on an autonomous subject, without any ontological backing. In the text there are very close analyses that lead to the ontology of individual not as only socially valuable, but as having self worth for its own sake – the Kantian thing in itself whose denial would be a contradiction. Meanwhile, a question is raised concerning an appropriate culture for the thriving of an individual. At issue is the very ontological principle that cannot be mediated by any social, mythological, empyreal powers that would account for individual worth. Any claim that would offer an explanation, a mediation, would immediately shift the individual’s self worth toward some value, and thus would insert in the awareness that would be more important than self worth. The latter would lose its status as an individual, unique and irreplaceable. The text, in this sense is a movement from social value to individual’s self worth.

Algis Mickunas

CHAPTER I

FACT AND METHOD

To say the least, our venture is complex, specifically in light of the already available literatures on globalization, national and ethnic identities, individualism and collectivism, the numerous sciences offering explanations of globalization in terms of economics, propagation of divine word, psychological impulses, competition for power, genetic “will” to survive, and many others. Then there are quests for cultural identity, individual chauvinism, historical destinies, clashes among civilizations, and all having no relationship one with the others. Indeed, if we were to ask concerning even a general definition of what it means to be human, we would be told that each culture, society, each science, defines the human differently and hence it is of no use in looking for some human essence. Indeed, we are no different from other creatures that are part of evolution and human presence is only a momentary link in evolutionary “progress.” Obviously our task is not to present arguments for or against these various trends and scientific explanations, but to decipher the very principles on which such theories rest and hence to offer a common denominator that would help us in offering a framework in which the diverse views could be located and thus allow us to propose what comprises globalization, national culture, individual self-identity, and finally, the general struggle among the mentioned diverse views to resolve their own issues. But most of these views, while offering their particular analyses, do not tell us anything about the subject-matter being analyzed, in other words, there is no mention of a common methodology that would allow us an access to such analyses. Without a common access, it is impossible to adjudicate which among the many scientific or philosophical hypotheses can be counted as viable. Given this state of affairs, we must begin with an articulation of methodological requirements.

If our undertaking will count as objective and worthy of scientific status in the humanities, then it is essential to begin with the ways that human sciences should achieve accessibility and offer the latter to anyone. Hence, we shall sketch out the basics of a method that will have to count as universal. We know that in any science the problem of the beginning is one of the most crucial ones to be investigated first. It presents itself in two ways. First, the neophyte is introduced to the vocabulary and the practices now in force in the science which he wishes to help further. Secondly, researchers already familiar with and proficient in the sciences reflect upon the basic assumptions which have brought that science to its present state with a view to test these in the light of that present state and its portents for the future. These reflections upon the foundations of the science concerned address themselves to other researchers familiar with the field and their results find their way into basic texts only when they cause a major re-shuffling of basic premises and practices. A case in point is the development of new techniques for teaching mathematics based upon the work done in the last hundred years in the logical foundations of mathematics and in set-theory. Children in elementary school are learning to deal with notions seemingly very abstract as a matter of course simply because it has been discovered that only a mistaken tradition stood in the way of a proper classification of the notions involved. Theories unavoidably have a deforming effect. On the basis of the assumptions they make educated guesses are made as to the most plausible direction research should take, and only very destructive infirming evidence causes a re-examination of these assumptions. Even then, as testified by the epic battles around the question of the Copernican system, or that of the phlogiston, or spontaneous generation, relativity physics or the quantum theory, scientists will go to any length to preserve what they deem established. This is not put here as a reproof, merely as a statement of fact. Perhaps one of the reasons scientists cling in this manner to what they think of as established is that it provides the frame within which they map their work and their contribution to the summa of human knowledge. Moreover, no genuinely scientific procedure has up until recently been provided for the kind of critical review that concerns itself solely with basic as-

sumptions. Some philosophers have given the results of their critical review (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, to name some) but they have felt called upon to do so in the form of alternative system. Others (the positivists of all hue) have thought it simpler to peg their philosophy to the contemporary state of some sciences in order to keep abreast of these developments. In so doing, they abandoned the role of critic that philosophers should play by dint of their own avocation. The only attempt of description of a genuinely scientific procedure for the testing of assumptions in any field, the only modern acceptance of the claim of philosophy to be the first and the ruler of the sciences, were made by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who picked up the challenge of a presuppositionless and strictly scientific philosophy. Such a philosophy would be a “phenomenology”, that is to say a discourse about the manner in which “the things themselves” present themselves to consciousness. Let us examine briefly what this is all about.

We know that sciences place emphasis on fact, but what is a “fact”? A fact is a state of affairs the public description of which is not solely dependent upon the unique circumstances of a single individual. The occurrence of this description may be so dependent, the subject-matter of the description may be so dependent, the description itself as an act performed may be dependent thus, the description as an object, however, must be public and, as representative of the described, must focus primarily if not outright exclusively on these aspects of the described deemed exemplary – i.e. independent from the historical and psychological uniqueness of the circumstances described. This independence may seem ambiguous in that it involves not only (1) the independence of the description itself, as a new public “object”; but also (2) the independence and transferability of some of the features described, as chosen because of this “transferability”. Any “description” may be public in the way mentioned by virtue of (1) even when what is described is itself not amenable to independence in sense (2) to establish a matter of fact, however, we would maintain that independence of (1) and (2) have to be achieved in one and the same description. The case mentioned above, where (1) is achieved but not (2) is the case characterized as that of “proper sense” (as against “common” sense). It resembles the “pri-

vate language” thesis, but differs from it in that no “private” language is developed here; the common words are used in their usual way, only their concatenation is unusual. Under this heading, “duplicity drinks procrastination” would find a place, and the peculiar “sense” its use had for Russell at the time would be an example of the lack of independence in sense (2) for this expression. One might call it a poetic usage, and with it list paradox, metaphor, analogy, allegory and obvious self-contradiction as the methods of such expression. The problem of bringing independence (1) and (2), both, “events” which usually achieve only independence (1) through description is a continuing challenge to the sciences of man, one which a phenomenological anthropology will have to meet. But more on this later. When an individual wishes to transform a private occurrence into a “matter of fact”, he has to resort to a description which can be “fleshed” with the appropriate private experience occurring in any other individual’s private adventure. Only when such a description has been obtained will a “matter of fact” be established.

To arrive at such a description is the role lawyers and investigative officers assume as they compile and compare the accounts of diverse witnesses to a particular event. All factors indicating that some element in the description attaches solely to the unique circumstances of a single individual (drunkenness, myopia, psychological disturbances either pathological and prolonged or momentary, and the like) are sifted and their bearing on anyone description evaluated. Critical questions of essence are answered on the basis of these evaluations and eventually lawyers, judge and jury come to the final confrontation with the “evidence” and decide whether or not the event in its public description essentially fits as an example of “premeditated murder”, “accidental homicide”, or whatever, as the case may be. First the testimony is sifted, then the final picture is tested to see if, on the basis of the “facts”, what looked like premeditated murder still fits the essential features of such or whether, in the sorting process some essential features have disappeared, the lack of which transforms the “matter of fact” into a case of (an example of) accidental homicide.

I call “abstractive description” the process according to which an event occurring in the stream of lived experiences of a subject is made intersubjectively valid by the process outlined and illustrated above.

Although the example chosen is the co-operative effort of a criminal trial toward “matters of fact”, the example should not stand in the way of understanding. I am not unaware that errors of justice are made often enough for disquiet concerning the genuine independence of the matters of fact from the unique circumstances of some single individual. All too often what is taken as such is not really such in the actual case. But this only reinforces the point made by giving an example of a failure to fulfill the requirements specified: miscarriages of justice occur when – unknown to judge and jury (one would hope!) – some single individual succeeds in presenting as independent from his volition a description intimately subservient to it. Nor should the illustration given suggest that only in this kind of cooperative effort are “matters of fact” properly described. A closer look at the procedures of such a trial reveal that each individual participant (witnesses, lawyers, jury, judge and defendant alike) are asked by the situation to test for themselves each individually the descriptions they hear against previous descriptions and, for the witness and possibly the defendant too against their rememorated lived experience of the event.

Hence, everyone must individually sift and test and attempt to fulfill the overall aim of making the description itself independent of private circumstances. Eventually each juror will have to pit unaided his own “model description” against those of his cojurors not (ideally) on the basis of pride of authorship, but on the basis of its independence from himself. That is why prospective jurors whose beliefs would render them unable in principle to fulfill this ideal, are sorted out and disqualified or should be. A better analysis of this example shows each individual singly in the privacy of his own subjectivity, performing for himself the “abstractive description”.

A further comment to be made here concerns the next step to be taken by each juror in exclusive communion with himself: “exemplary universalization”. Once the “matters of fact” have been established to his satisfaction, the juror must look upon the individual and particular case thus pinpointed as a member of a well-defined, infinite or open group comprising all lived-events which differ from one another only in the specificity of the circumstances of their occurrence, and not at

all in some basic features deemed essential. The case is now tested for such basic features, it is looked upon as a purported example of “pre-meditated murder” or “accidental homicide” and as such it presents itself as fulfilling or not fulfilling in whole or in parts the requirements prescribed by such a role. “Taking something as an example” and “abstracting essential features” are synonymous expressions describing the act of “abstractive generalization” or “exemplary universalization”, two nearly synonymous expressions. “Abstractive generalization” points to the removal of the unique and private circumstances or features from the matter of fact; thus described as the representative of a complete group (whether finite or infinite)

At this point some may feel tempted to reinforce the “objectivity” of exemplary universalization by some sort of statistical corroboration or some other form of quantitative inductive generalization. Or one may be tempted to circumvent it altogether in order to avoid accusations of solipsism and of subjectivism. But the problem is that there can be no quantitative inductive generalization except on the basis of all three moves described above. One has first to achieve the public description of a state of affairs in order to have the matter of fact with which to begin a collection of instances and one has to do this not just in the first case, in each and everyone: before one can collect any kind of sample grouping, or even specify the conditions governing such a collection as well as the recognition of control groups, both abstractive description, abstractive generalization and exemplary universalization will have to have been performed. They will confer on the statistical sampling and the quantitative induction the frame which gives them continuity; the intentions to which they correspond will form the initial step and the final arbiter in the classification of any specific matter of fact, and hence preside over the performance of the whole experiment.

Men should not be judged guilty presumably based on statistics, but on the basis of the circumstances of the one unique case in which they are involved. I am not unaware of the fact that (1) some criminal laws specifically differentiate between a first offender and someone who has already been proven guilty of a similar crime before; (2) in some cases the possession of a criminal record is counted as a presumption of

guilt or circumstantial evidence; it seems to me that (1) ought not enter into consideration prior to the demonstration of guilt in the particular case involved, and that (2) can easily be demonstrated to offer no specific information in the particular case involved, with arguments similar to the ones used in its favor: statistical evidence. After all, statistics may predict the chances for and against some particular occurrence, they cannot say beforehand whether this one instance actually falls on this or that side of the statistical graph. The specific instance depends for its recognition and classification solely upon the three moves described: (1) abstractive description, (2) abstractive generalization, (3) exemplary universalization. All three moves constitute formal generalizations, as against quantitative generalization which the positivists and the traditional empiricists take as the only valid form. I have attempted to show how quantitative generalization is wholly dependent upon the first two steps in formal generalization as preliminaries, and how the third step is used in the actual gathering of the few samples upon which the quantitative induction will rest. It remains to be shown that in selected cases formal generalization needs no help from its quantitative counterpart, in order to establish formal generalization as a bona fide scientific tool in its own right.

Here too, the example of the trial serves us in good stead. The classification of a particular instance within a specific group, as we have seen, involves the recognition in the specific instance of features deemed essential to it, – i.e. features without which the instance would change completely. For instance, in the vernacular, homicide involves by essence the death of a human being. If there is no human victim actual or intended the act of killing cannot be called homicide. Murder is a special kind of killing involving the will to kill. Homicide, on the other hand, can be accidental, i.e. no will to kill was present when the act was committed. If the essential features of a case involve on the part of the defendant the independent description of a will to kill, to remove this essential feature would transform the case altogether from murder to, let us say, accidental homicide.

Notice that no specific case has been as yet presented, and any number of specific cases could fit. I could ask at this point that the read-

er recalls specific instances of murder and homicide and each one, within his own lived experiences would go to some news story or another or, more vividly still, whenever possible to some personal instances in which he/she was witness to, accessory to, or participant in some such act. But I was able to talk to this general level only because the recognition of essential features had been performed already at some time past on the basis of instances similar to the ones recalled at my bidding a moment ago. We not only perform this formal generalization as a matter of course, we use it and communicate at that level also as a matter of course. Historically, and psychologically, the genesis of each specific generalization may have involved a continuous retouching of original abstractions: this retouching is neither excluded a priori nor a priori mandatory. It belongs to a private history, not to a public description.

All the public description needs retain is that what governs the retouching is the same as what governs the original abstractions: the intent to uncover in the uniqueness of a single happening of those features which may change without essentially changing the nature of the event, and those which cannot. The recognition of such features – the intuition of essences – is a special mode of awareness to which a special object corresponds: the eidos. Ideally, this object fulfills the intention when it presents itself to it “with evidence”. In any case, the intention may not be fulfilled. It is not fulfilled when the object announces “with evidence” that it does not fit. It is not an essential feature of premeditated murder that it be performed by Lizzie Borden, otherwise there would not have been any other premeditated murder since she wielded her trusty axe. This is immediately obvious “with evidence”, as it is immediately obvious “with evidence” that the attempted killing of a human being is an essential part of premeditated murder. Neither of these depend upon a graph or a statistical evaluation. The argument against Lizzie being essentially to murder is not that others have committed such an act, but that the physical requirements for such an act involve a “human being” acting as aggressor, not anyone specific human being. “Theoretically” the agent can be varied as to sex, age, race, color, creed and national origin. Without budging from my chair, I can “vary in my imagination” some of the concrete features and in this

manner test them for “essentiality”, as it were. In so doing, I observe those features which, when I vary them and they disappear, cause by their disappearance the disappearance of the object I was observing. Without agent there is no murder; without intended victim – there is no need for a real one – there is no intended murder either.

The “object” obtained by public or independent description, abstractive generalization and exemplary universalization “transcends” by essence the concrete individual circumstances within which it is presented. The lived occurrence: a car almost ran over me, becomes the sentence “a car almost ran over me” which fits but does not belong to, the particular event it describes since this is ~ event and the sentence could serve as well for your event as for anyone else’s exhibiting the same essential features. Hence the sentence “a car almost ran over me” has a “reality” other than (1) that of the event it describes, (2) that of the instance of its being uttered, or written, or read, or heard, (3) its specific occurrence in any of those forms in anyone or any many streams of lived experiences – by being independent from anyone stream of lived experiences.

This realm may indeed have “representatives” in a specific stream of lived experiences – in this case the actual marks on paper or sound waves – but it is not in these representatives, rather they point to it as other than they. This realm transcends its representatives. It is ideal rather than real: it is the transcendental level, the level properly reached by formal generalization. To reach this level is the sine qua non for a science and although sciences may differ in subject-matter, principles and heuristic methods, they all have at least this in common that the matters of fact on which they base their findings have all undergone at least the full formal generalizations described here and often they have undergone a further transformation or further selection as required by the specific theoretical precepts of the science in question.

Classical Physics, for example, requires of all its “facts” that they be pared down to an independent description in terms of magnitude and magnitude alone. This requirement is over and above the more fundamental one with which we began which demands only an independent description. There is no essential move from the initial fundamental

requirement to the more specific one limiting the tools of description to “magnitude” only. The descriptions given here did not involve magnitude, yet they did involve “matters of facts” as well as universality. We were able to arrive at descriptions independent of anyone single individual, ranging universally and unequivocally, over all possible similar instances, and providing as well the definite conditions under which they wouldn’t apply in anyone single case. These are the basic requirements – by essence – of any science. These requirements are fulfilled by the limitation to magnitude but it is wrong to assert that only the description of magnitude can guarantee their fulfillment. Hence there can be science when the fundamental demand for independent description and formal generalization is met, whether or not it is met by the description of magnitudes. This fundamental demand is therefore both necessary and sufficient as the fundamental rule for the elaboration of scientific knowledge. Any further demand must therefore be warranted on the basis of descriptions satisfying the fundamental rule. Hence any science will have its grounding in the one elaborated by attempting to meet the one fundamental demand and no more.

Phenomenology in Husserl’s sense is an attempt to establish just such a fundamental science. Its sole requirements are (1) the independent description of “what is given” or “appears” in a “stream of lived experience” as it is given or as it appears – whence the dictum: “To the things themselves” and its peculiar meaning; (2) the careful formal generalization from the actually lived to the transcendental by way of (2a) abstractive generalization and of (2b) exemplary universalization. Historically, Husserl’s progress from (1) to (2a) is the progress from Philosophie der Arithmetik to Logische Untersuchungen; his path from (2a) to (2b) is the path from the so-called Gottingen Phase to Fuenf Vorlesungen and Ideen I. The phenomenological description of this path is announced in Formale und transzendente Logik and published in Erfahrung und Urteil. These results are used by Husserl in countless studies contained in all work subsequent to Ideen I where they serve to prescribe rules of description for the writer and rules of interpretation for the reader: all phenomenological texts stemming from the Husserlian school and claiming obedience to his epistemological doctrines

are to be read as exemplary universalizations placed by independent description and abstractive generalizations at the transcendental level.

This holds even when the subject-matter of the description is not itself eidetic or transcendental in nature. Take for example the above discussion on the sentence “a car almost ran over me”: there is nothing transcendental about being “almost run over”, yet this sentence is universally representative for any and all specific such instances no matter what the actual circumstances might be. The lived event the sentence denotes furnishes the essential features the sentence expresses; these essential features are lifted out of the particular experience by an abstractive generalization. An independent but not abstractive description would include many particular details which would prevent the paragraphs expressing them from being representative of anything but this one uniquely lived instance. This would not be a transcendental phenomenological description in the sense used here. On the other hand, a far richer description than the one obtained with the sentence “a car almost ran over me” could be given, involving as many of the essential features such an experience possesses “for anyone”: such a description, although its “lived” subject-matter would be neither “eidetic” nor “transcendental” from addressing to it “questions concerning its essence” and hence would place itself and the object it expresses – the essence sought – at the eidetic or transcendental level. Such a description would be the eidetic description of the essence or eidos of a non-eidetic object.

The universality of the descriptive method thus guaranteed independently of the lived-experience to which it is applied we can now give a closer scrutiny to “the things themselves” to which our description must turn and ask ourselves if further general guidelines may not be gained by a closer observation of the essential features of both the describing and the described. If we take up again the example of the use of the sentence “a car almost ran over me” given above we find that there are very many situations in which it could conceivably be properly applied. We find also that each of these situations could be described in itself in such a manner that it would be exemplary (i.e. define an open or infinite group of possible such instances). That is to say: the factors closing the group have nothing to do with the particular structure of the

group itself, but depend rather upon essential laws governing the group within which this group may fit. The group “I was almost run over by a Cadillac” will appear as a closed group on the empirical basis of what we know about Cadillacs and Cadillac-making. This has nothing to do with the actual structure of the example which says nothing concerning empirical limitations. “I” can be almost run over by countless imaginary Cadillacs countless times: the group thus defined is infinite solely because its essential structure says nothing as to number.

If I were to talk about the fingers on the hand of a five-fingered animal, although the number of such animals is left open, the number of fingers per hand is not and anyone hand could produce only five exemplars of such a group – member the group of which would then close itself of itself. That is why sixfingered animals belong either to a different species or are construed as “monsters” whose odd hand-configuration has to be “explained” by an appeal to a different grouping: the group of genetically damaged five-fingered animals, i.e. group so-defined that the number of fingers it might exhibit ideally is unlimited in the structure of the group either in less or in more. Or, to put this in a different way, we have removed from the example an essential feature without which the example is no longer an example of what it was supposed to represent. Other respects have remained equal, obviously, and so we still want to talk about five-fingered animals, but we have to do so in a negative or limited way. The “monster is a five-fingered animal who does not fit the example in the one specific instance in which he is meant to fit: five-fingeredness, but who should, according to other indices. And I know that he should on the basis of the closed-group of fingers deemed exemplary. Hence the exemplary group of fingers is limited as to number in its essential structure, although this in no way limits the group of five-fingered animals the structure of which contains no specification as to number at all.

This distinction, between groups the essential structure of which is limiting as to number and groups the essential structure of which has no such explicit limit, is fundamental to all we have to say here.

It is based on the distinction between the eidetic level and the empirical, the distinction between formal generalization and quantita-

tive generalization. Quantitative generalization goes beyond the finite group of samples quantified only by statistical projection. It is therefore at the mercy of the specific state of affairs in anyone single case not as yet collected, or any wider group of cases not as yet collected which may cause the statistical projection to be revised. This is both its defect and its strength: quantitative generalization presents itself as tentative and open to revisions according to specific empirical procedures usually grouped under the heading “scientific” or “empirical” methods. We have seen in the previous section that the traditional analysis of these methods was not precise enough in that it overlooked the crucial step we called “formal generalization”. This step we found to have a use beyond that of a preliminary to quantitative generalization in all those cases in which formal generalization is preformed on essential structures defining an open group. Quantitative generalization was found to be a more restricted (and within its restrictions possibly more powerful) heuristic device which could not be described as the only universally acceptable instrument of knowledge.

It was shown to depend for its adoption on the arbitrary preliminary selection of specific essential features to be found “in the things themselves”: to wit, magnitudes. The step leading to this selection was left undescribed and remains obscure even in the works of those who advocate it, for obvious logical reasons: it belongs to the realm of formal generalization, not to the lesser realm of quantitative generalization. Put in another way, the wellknown difficulties of Logical Positivists with the Verifiability Principle stem from the fact that the Principle is itself unverifiable per its own cannons and must depend on a higher order of concern for its justification. Since this higher order of concerns deals not with empirical and statistical corroboration but with an intuition and description of essences it is beyond the realm of quantitative generalization. The objects it presents are exemplary in an unlimited and essential way: they govern open or infinite groups; they are eidetic. In our study of the things themselves, of the describing and the described, we place ourselves in that realm beyond. Our descriptions are all descriptions of essences, prior to any quantitative generalization and in need of none. This clearly in mind let us proceed with the example

above, to show in what way the described depends upon the intent of the describer, and what this means concerning the true nature of “the things themselves” to which Husserl advocated that we should turn.

Given, the remembered situation in which I can say to myself: “I was almost run over by a car”. This happened at the corner of W. 46th St. and 6th Ave., at dusk, as I was crossing the avenue with the light on my side. Some idiot in a hurry didn’t see me running towards the sidewalk on his right side started full-speed ahead into his right arm turn. He bumped me in the leg as he was braking to a full stop, and, although he pushed me for a couple of feet, I escaped unscathed with only a momentary limp. I was in a hurry trying to get to a bookshop before it closed, as this was payday and I now had money to buy a book I wanted very badly then although now I cannot even think of the title. Some people hollered at me as I ran along “Get his number!” and “Sue him!”, but I had better things to do. The man in the black limousine – was it a Cadillac or a Lincoln Continental? – was stopped now but I can’t say I noticed for how long, nor did I see whether there were people with him in the car. I don’t think he was a chauffeur. I remember thinking: “If that’s the way you’ve got to go, might as well do it in style; still, I would have preferred a Rolls.”

Given the above description, I have thoroughly limited the number of people to whom it might apply in actuality. I might even limit it further by specifying who this “I” is who is speaking, give the date as I did, the place, and the like. There is no need of that for what I want to do here. Limited though the group of actual instances of incidents following this general pattern might be, it is still an infinite group since no limitation as to number has been specified in the account given here. I haven’t even given an explicit limitation to the actual; even if I had, there have been many dusks at the corner of W. 46th St. and 6th Ave., and one might imagine a particularly dangerous Cadillac driver repeatedly going home from work in a hurry and being a habitual traffic hazard there. The first thing I want to do here is to point to this possibility. Another possibility is that of an imaginary reduplication of the instance described. My description, as given here, is ambiguous in this way. It is ambiguous in a different manner as well.

Although most people would take it for granted that all I wanted to do here was to recount one particular incident of my personal history, according as I might accent my tale, my account might take on different meanings. It might be an instance of carelessness. It might be an example of independent lines of causation crossing to create an indetermined or chance happening. It might be the beginning of a highly personal encounter with “fate” introducing a meditation on singular divine intervention leading to a religious conversion, a “privileged moment” affecting the whole subsequent course of a lifetime – such as was experienced by Paul Claudel, for example, or Pascal. Hence, while my story may be taken as exemplary of a small traffic incident, or as an instance in my own personal life without such exemplary dimensions, it may also receive other meanings without any change in the basic features of the happening itself. As a matter of fact, the “happening itself” appears to be one more possible meaning from a series I may intend on the basis of what actually took place. One and the same object may be the basis for widely different descriptions depending upon the essential features selected.

Hence to choose one particular description and to accord it right of privilege over all the others is a self-warranting action only in the light of what is intended by such a choice. If I want to give the edifying instance which has transformed me from the miscreant I was into the bigot I now am, and proceed to talk merely in terms of an example of carelessness in crossing a street or in driving a car, my audience will rightfully ask themselves what the one has to do with the other. Only when I begin to introduce in my story elements interpreted by me as indicative of the personal attention of an irrate divinity will the tale fulfill the intention attributed to my recounting of it. Some may still quarrel with its appropriateness, but they will have to do so on the terms of my account, given my intention in telling it, and not because my account did not provide for the requirements of the intention I specified I had, i.e. in both cases the discussion centers on the appropriateness of the tale to the intention.

The same dependence upon an intention of signification may be demonstrated to hold in every instance of descriptions of a matter of

fact. If all I want to talk about is an example of a “close call” due to someone’s hurry, and I add to my account musings upon “independent lines of causation” and “indeterminism *versus* determinism”, these addenda will rightly be judged superfluous. If all I am asked is what is needed for a police report, mentions of “the Lord” or of “determinism” will not be retained by the traffic cop. The incident itself may support all of these significations as well as many others too numerous to mention, too esoteric to think of such as, for example, the philosophic use I am making of it right now.

Any one “matter of fact” can be the objective referent of an infinity of radiating intentions each offering a different perspective upon the particular matter of fact, each with meaning in its own different way, (one is reminded here of the old Winner at Jena, Vanquished at Waterloo, textbook examples) each therefore presenting its own aspect of that matter of fact, each doing so more or less felicitously – as per its own terms. Between the signification, the meaning, and the objective referent or matter of fact which “fulfills” or “supports” it, a distinction has to be made which is different from the distinction between the actual state of affairs and the essential features of the matter of fact. There are here four terms: the intention of signification, that signification, the actual state of affairs and the essential features of that state of affairs publicly described or as a matter of fact. The essential features of the “matter of fact” are the “reason” of the series of possible significations the matter of fact supports: they “appear” through every member of the series – that is how a member of the series is recognized – but they are not anyone particular series-member: if they were this one member, there would be no series because what binds the series together is the ghostly presence of its ratio of the series itself, its specific differences from every other purported member would become essential (exemplary or defining) distinctions which would prevent us from assimilating them the one with the others. The imaginary variations which enable us to recognize similitude among purported series-members do so because they aim at an ideal identity of essential structures apprehensible when specific features of each series-member are imaginatively removed – though in reality they remain untouched – and by their removal lead from one member to the next.

Thus the convert, the policeman, the indeterminist and the philosopher may all agree that they are talking about a traffic incident when each is willing to remove from his view of the event those features which the others do not share; this does not make this particular view privileged over others: it is only what they have in common, i.e. what is visible through each but belongs exclusively to none in particular. (Bear in mind that for the policeman or the insurance man a traffic incident comprises features to which neither convert, nor indeterminist nor philosopher need be sensitive): it is apprehended through each, embodied in none. The ratio is not itself a series-member and requires a particular view (formal generalization) of a series-member for its apprehension: a particular view, that is to say a particular intention, one whose object is an essence, an eidetic intuition. The series-member then appear as one possibility among many; some of its features appear removable not simply because they are mired in particularity but because they are dependent upon an intention of signification other than the one intuiting essences. The ordinary intention of signification fulfilled (or answered) by a particular series-member must be replaced by another intention which tests both the previous intention of signification and the object fulfilling it together for features dependent upon the previous intention specifically and not transposable to the object of any other intention.

The previous intention is said to be “suspended”, no longer enacted, not yet altogether dismissed, simply held for inspection; its object is “put” in “parenthesis”, i.e. no longer taken as “fulfilling”, as “objective”, as “the only objectivity”, the “only reality” and the like, but viewed as a particular answer to a particular question, as the object of awareness corresponding to a particular mode or structure of awareness. This “suspension”, this “putting in parenthesis” are the two parallel moves towards the intuition of essences; Husserl calls these parallel moves the epoche or the “phenomenological reduction”. The objects of such a move are the essential features – those features transposable from one series-member to the next and to all – of the thing itself taken now as exemplary by the new intention which upon enactment raises the question of essences. The “thing itself” is not simply the matter of fact which fulfilled the previous intention, it is both that matter of fact

in its essential features together with its signification and the previous intention in its essential features. Hence “describing” at this level is a particular act of signification consisting in the enactment of the particular intention asking about essences; the “described” as the object fulfilling this intention is a “matter of fact” consisting of both the intentional features (structures of awareness) and the fulfilling objective features corresponding to them (objects of awareness) which together make up the essential aspects of the “thing itself” that is the object of inquiry.

Because the question here is about “matters of fact” and the description is to be “public”, the agent engaged in the activity of describing is nothing more than an accident in an epistemological chain the anchor point of which is the ideal invariant to be described publicly i.e. independently of purely individual concerns, as explained previously. Hence, an essential description of the activity of any agent – an eidetic intention purporting to describe the essential features of the tandem “enacted eidetic intention – fulfilling objectivity” – will result in the apprehension of features valid for any such agents no matter how inadequate performers they may be, and for all matters of fact described no matter how wanting the description may have been – i.e. independently of any removable particular or singular circumstances. Such a description is perforce reflexive and has for paradigm the Cartesian move from methodical doubt to the indubitable evidence of a cogitatio albeit transformed almost beyond recognition by the removal of the ambiguous concreteness Descartes’ phrasing possesses which mixes with this recognition of intentionality by itself the ontological recognition by Descartes of his own existence (“cogito ergo sum”: I think therefore I am).

Clearly, the move is performable by reason of the essence of intentionality alone, whether or not there ever is (actually existing) anyone ready to perform it actually. The reflective move derives its legitimacy from essential possibility and not from actual performance. Hence, what the eidetic intention reveals is its own ideal possibility (on the basis of its own essence) to relate itself in any way to any object whatever in a continuing concretion of ever more particular and specific tandems “intention-intentional object”. This is the essence of consciousness (or awareness) and as such the “ratio” of the series comprising all actual

forms of awareness, visible through each, enacted by each, not in any one. Husserl calls this structure the “transcendental Ego” to mark its eidetic status, and its difference from its concrete and its psychological representatives.

The transcendental Ego in the apodictic evidence with which it is apprehended is the locus of all purely eidetic structures of awareness to which correspond all purely eidetic objects each to its respective structure or structures of awareness. These structures of awareness are called “noesis”, these objects of awareness are called “noemata”. Phenomenological description is the description of noemata and the corresponding noeses which “constitute” each noema. Just as non-eidetic objects may receive eidetic descriptions if they are taken as exemplary, so will noeses which do not constitute essences be amenable to eidetic descriptions under the same conditions – in both cases the move will be to a public description in the sense specified in section 2 above. Phenomenological description can range, therefore, over the full span of states of affairs from the transcendental level to the most concrete and private, the “lived” level as it is actually lived. The described will fall in different categories according as it belongs solely to the eidetic level in its essence as well as in its description, or as it belongs to more specific levels: the sociological or cultural, the psychological or even the concrete particular in its essence though not in its description.

4. Some subsequent topics.

The transcendental level, therefore, through the language-rules used in describing it, is the scientific level, albeit in the sense of formal rather than quantitative generalization, which we have outlined previously. It is the epistemic level at which all truths of essence have their place though they may be truths of essence about non-eidetic subject-matters. If a distinction be made within this level, it must be the one Husserl makes between the universal and the general particular in Er-fahrung und Urteil. The universal answers to the intuition of essences which transform the example taken in its particularity and tested for generalizable features into the index of an infinite group. The general particular is viewed in and for itself as an example upon which specific features may be varied in the way mentioned previously not merely

for the public description of a state of affairs, but rather for the representativeness of the item thus described which is still taken as a singular item in its specificity. This specificity is representative in its distinctness from other different specific items, and hence “general” in its detachment from the actual concrete and its specificities. But it is not yet looked upon as the essential characteristic of a group whose essential structures it divulges. A “switch of the glance” – a change of intention – is necessary to bring on the view of the general particular as a universal essence.

Below the transcendental or epistemic level (episteme=science) is the doxic (doxa=opinion) level at which states of affairs are accepted as they present themselves in their concreteness and their particularity so long as they fulfill the particular intention enacted, without any supervenient intention concerning either general or essential characteristics. “Things” are taken for “granted” in the unity of their individual meaning upon encounter, and not in the superior unity of the essence which they exemplify. Intentions of signification are enacted and fulfilled (fully, partially or not at all, as the actual case may be) in a continuing actual involvement in which no questions of genuine knowledge or scientific sign or universality are asked, only the still very sophisticated questions about the recognition of specific states of affairs as warranting specific linguistic representation. The unitary, the singular, the individual are constituted at this level by these intentions with the continuing use of symbols (most of which are verbal).

These “objects” are constituted each in its particularity, but this particularity is not yet “general”, it is “singular”. I unite the welter of colors in front of me into a single item involving many potential and actual experience: a lamp. Or I unite these other objects here on the table as: this bunch of pens and pencils. In neither case am I interested in the generalized particular: a lamp, or a bunch nor even a pen or pencil. I am interested in the individual particular: this lamp, this bunch, these pens and pencils. The use of these here may cause some to pause and question; it is rather a case in point: I am so little interested in the generalized particular that no abstraction is performed upon any individual pen or pencil, all of which are united individually by their contiguity in

place rather than by any “essential” characteristics. Each is apprehended as a member of the group “pens and pencils on this table” through the figurative aspects of the group (Gestalt qualities) as it is here encountered, and not *vice versa*: it is not the case that I first abstract from each pen and pencil universal aspects and then, on the basis of these aspects, define a group – as would be the case in the introduction of essences. On the other hand, the doxic level does involve the symbolic expression of unities of meaning usually best represented by language as the most common symbolic vehicle. These unities of meaning are already “constituted”, they are memorated and re-used within a stream of lived experiences and form a “vocabulary” (by this let it be understood: “a repertory of unities of meaning” if I am allowed the extension of the meaning of this word to include all types of unities of meaning whether they are verbal or not: a “gesture” or a “facial expression”, a “gait” or a “choice” are all “expressive” in the way vocabulary items are, even though in the usual sense of this term, they would not be included under it). Hence the doxic level includes not just “opinions” but all lived states of affairs in which already recognized “unities of meaning” are used, re-used and improved upon without a critical glance. I could describe eidetically the intention involved in looking for a pen and the essential structures of the fulfilling object in much the same way as was outlined in the example of the trial case or in the example of the sentence “I was almost run over by a car”.

But one might note as well that these particular intentions have all in common specific eidetic features which when described in themselves correspond to eidetic structures common to the diverse objects of each. A deeper, or wider (using this term in the traditional logical habit according to which a term has a wider extension when its intention is narrower or less specific) intention precedes structurally the more specific one as the genus does the species. Behind the “static” constitution lurks a genetic one involving an ever widening group of sequential intentionalities all leading back to the widest possible intentionality, the relatedness to an object revealed by the direct intuition of the essence of awareness in the confrontation with the transcendental Ego through the phenomenological reduction. The terms “relatedness to an object”

are purposely left as undifferentiated as possible, the first one thus revealing a mere openness toll any state of affairs whatever in any manner whatever as the fundamental law of essence of intentionality, i.e. as the widest possible intention of the genus intentionality, all other intentions being specifications (in the etymological sense) of the widest one.

To the static phenomenological description one must add therefore a genetic phenomenological description which alone provides the necessary grounding in the apodicticity of the transcendental Ego of the discrete tide uncovered by the intuition of essences. Thus, under the very specific intention which is only fulfilled by something that announces itself as universal, the wider intention satisfied by the appearance of a general particular object lurks the universal appearing as a species of the general (the general can range over an unspecified number of objects the universal must range over all the objects of a group). Under the general particular lurks the singular particular~ the individual which merely announces itself as “an unitary object of awareness” with its particular unity in answer to the wider intention seeking out such “objectivities” in and for themselves without any concern as to range or comprehensiveness. Clearly numerical groups, general objects, generalized objects, and universals are “objectivities” in the sense of unities of meaning, but they are “special”, i. e. specifications of the genre with group characteristics all their own answering to intentionalities subsumed under the wider one and the ones under the others.

Nor is the intentionality fulfilled by “unities of meaning” (doxic or epistemic) identical with the widest possible intention which we recognized as the “openness to an object”. Between the intentionality which generates the doxic level and the most fundamental intentionality there is a gap which genetic phenomenology must describe eidetically if it is to fulfill its promise of a “strict science” of the foundations. The move back towards the ultimate beginning leads below the doxic level – at which some quantitative consideration might seem still possible, since it is the level of common sense and of the vernacular so dear to ordinary language philosophers – to levels termed by Husserl as “proto-doxic” the better to underline their genetic function.

Paradoxically, the proto-doxic level as the most concrete level is the one in which the philosophizing philosopher (or the “psychological agent” of Brentano, or the “concrete particular” of Kant and the “man of flesh and bones” of Unamuno) in his concreteness “embodies” the undifferentiated openness to “an object” recognized as the eidetic structure of all awareness. This “openness” in its concrete enactment must not be confused with the psychological ego which is itself a “unity of meaning” of a special kind, having its own essential laws and its own “doxic” presence. Whereas the psychological ego (or the “philosophizing philosopher”, or the “psychological agent” of Brentano, or the “concrete particular” of Kant or the “man of flesh and bones” of Unamuno) all have specific “human” characteristics and the essential limitations of man in their faculties and as epistemological foundations, the enacted openness of the widest awareness to what comes is strictly the tandem “live-awareness – lived experiences” upon which lesser intentionalities constitute the unities of meaning upon which, other still narrower intentionalities eventually constitute the doxic judgement: “I am a man of this and such temperament.”

To the eidetic transcendence of the Ego, therefore, corresponds in the concrete, the concrete transcendence of subjectivity beneath its doxic concretions. The rock foundation upon which all genetic description must rest is the pre-doxic, pre-egological level of conscious life upon which all other levels are built. This level too is amenable to eidetic description, although it is clearly not eidetic in the slightest. Through this eidetic description, it can achieve the epistemic status of all essences. There is no danger here of a circle, since the legitimizing foundation is the essence, not the concrete, and since the phenomenological reduction is performable by law of essence upon any level whatever. The phenomenological method guaranties the vision of the essence of the concrete, and it is itself guaranteed by its fulfillment of the ideal requirements of knowledge in the direct confrontation with the apodictic essence of consciousness (or of consciousness with itself) described by Husserl in Ideen I.

The problem is one of strict application. We have now reached the true beginning about which we were asking earlier. This is not simply

the beginning of this or that science, this is the beginning of any and all sciences, their true foundation transcendental subjectivity. Our description must begin here, bearing in mind that the described answers the describing, that the object announces itself as what it is because it fulfills an intentionality, and not *vice versa*. Hence we shall have to turn from the object to the intention it fulfills and, by careful testing, from this tandem to the series of which it is a member, in a continuing retrograde progression towards transcendental subjectivity, bearing in mind that, the farther back we go, the more the descriptions we will have performed will take on new meaning and may have to be retouched. Philosophy, phenomenology, is an askesis, the climbing of the Petrarcan mountain in the course of which familiar landscapes distantiate themselves from us as they reveal interrelations we might never have suspected them to have. To enact this, or any other intention, is still to dance and be danced by the music of the universe. Let each one follow his own figure in this, our Brownian ballet.

CHAPTER II

GLOBALIZATION AND ONTOLOGICAL FACTS

INTRODUCTION

Following our brief discussion of methodological requirements to access facts, the basic philosophical issue must still be answered concerning facts that are the very arche of our understanding and ontological being of the world. The giants of philosophy, all the way to Aristotle contended that all thinking requires principles – archai – by whose presence an entire region is delimited for explication. The delimitation allows everything in a region to be seen in its essential configuration. The most astounding result in their exhausting efforts to justify such principles is that they are not only unjustifiable, but that any justification is based on these principles. Their knowledge is very different from knowledge that requires justification. It is to be noted that they are not identical to axioms which compel assent from themselves; but in turn they are not groundless, since they are not arbitrary; after all, justifications necessarily rest on them. They have a necessity that is distinct from the necessity of any other justification. They must be, then, self warranted to such an extent that every truth claim is based on them. Such archai determines the range and the limits of what sort of identity will be accorded to an individual, what sort of account can be given of culture, and what comprises a social world. Moreover, a given arche as an ontological fact is at the base of globalization, multi-culturalism, multi-discursivity, death of the subject, individual, even meaning. In this sense, we shall have to move through the variety of claims and po-

sitions to make certain that no accusations could be launched against the efforts to disclose unconditional foundations of individual, nation and culture. It is also important to note that an arche, as an ontological fact, requires a disclosure that moves through strict logical arguments and demonstrates that all arguments are founded on the ontological archai. Too many writings on culture, science, disciplines, cultural diversity, technology, and globalization are touching the surface, but not the ontological essence that carries these surface phenomena. Yet while usually overlooked, the archai are ever present and in our quest, will provide a background for all critiques of the most diverse theses.

Even a cursory glance at the proliferation of texts raising the question of cultural/national identity suggests an issue that has been elicited by globalization, associated with modern western colonialisms and technological standardization. There is even a two volume Encyclopedia of Identity, replete with contributions on cultural, ethnic, race, religious, etc. identities. In this chapter the question of national and/or ethnic identity will be analyzed in terms of globalization as a mode of creation of “technical” (even if changing) standards, be they computer systems, internet, medical, attire or the “look.” Various postmodern “thinkers” even suggest that despite multi-culturalism, there is a standardized Western culture both accepted and resisted by the “others”, to speak in extreme, although metaphorical terms, the tension between “Jihadization” and “McDonalization”. This tension is very much experienced in Central Europe, among the nationalities that either belonged to or were “satellites” of the Soviet Union. Having been liberated from the latter, they joined the West, with all of its “advanced” inventions and lifestyles. As some writers of that region suggest, the populations of this area found themselves “between a plow and a computer”. Having rushed into the “computer” world, they found that they have lost their national/ethnic and even individual identities: became Americanized or at least “standardized” by the European Union. While this region will be used as an example, the same process is occurring globally, and examples can be found readily in China, India, and Middle East.

The development of modern trends of thought, starting, with such figures as Descartes, Galileo, Bacon, the empiricists and rationalists would require the deciphering of the principles on which modern “philosophy” rests. Moreover, the extrication of such principles might even shed light on other domains, such as ethics, social systems and even conceptions of political orders. A cursory survey of philosophical texts dealing with the history of the emergence of modern thought reveals a lacuna of the way that a specific ontology and metaphysics were established that reasserted the preeminence of power and ultimately opened up the irrational metaphysics of modern will. The latter appears in numerous expressions, from Descartes’ conception of science as a means for the practical controls of “nature” through Bacon’s unabashed pronouncements of science as an instrument of human domination of nature, through Kant’s notion of Will as “working” in accordance with the ideas of reason. Hegel was not far behind when he announced that the Absolute “works” itself through history, and Marx called for the total “humanization” of nature and the human through human labor and technological mastery. The terms “mastery”, “control”, “work”, etc., comprise a syndrome dominating what could be called “the underside” of modern trends of thought. At times, the will to dominate, to be a total master over nature, and resultantly to be a law giver to all events, reaches from Bacon’s conceptions of De regno hominis (human rule) where the human must subordinate all nature under human will and needs, through Fichte’s and Schelling’s almost lyric calls for total human domination over everything. According to Bacon, if there is still something that escapes human understanding and power, then the human is still in an inferior position to nature. Only when all the secrets will be deciphered and ruled by humans, then he will be totally autonomous and all his surroundings will be remade in accordance with human wants and ultimately will. It is important to note that for Bacon the “secrets” of nature will not be disclosed by close and direct perception, but will be “tortured” out of nature by using the instruments of inquisition. Be that as it may, we still are in the dark as to the arche of modern thought without which all these “joyous” proclamations and promises make no sense. Thus, the next task is to disclose this arche.

PARTS AND WHOLES

Up to date, there are most diverse disciplines that wrestle with the problem of “emergent properties” or supervening qualities, dialectical syntheses of antitheses, without offering an explanation as to the source of such properties. This issue is at the base of modern Western civilization and its scientific/technological power. No doubt, historians have romanticized other times and other civilizations for having produced great technical wonders, but such wonders had very little impact on the global arena. West, meanwhile, has opened a fundamental theoretical problem whose solution led to modern Western civilization and both, to its power and attraction. Hence it is relevant to briefly outline this problem and then forge ahead with the current issues of national identities and globalization.

A cursory survey of philosophical texts dealing with the history of the emergence of modern thought reveals a lacuna of the way that a specific ontology and metaphysics were established that led to the preeminence of modern West. This preeminence appears in numerous expressions, from Descartes’ conception of science as a means for the practical controls of nature through Bacon’s unabashed exultation of science as an instrument of human domination of nature, through Kant’s notion of Will as “working” in accordance with the ideas of reason. Hegel was not far behind when he announced that the Absolute works itself through history, and Marx called for the total humanization of nature and the human through human labor and technological mastery. Pragmatism is one more variant of this trend. The terms “mastery”, “control”, “work”, etc., comprise a syndrome dominating what could be called “the underside” of modern reason as “instrumental”. Given this pervasive and unmatched claim in history, we must decipher the reasons for the emergence of this type of rationality. The latter is a result of a classical debate concerning the priority given either to the holistic-qualitative conception of reality, where things are experienced within the limits of their essential differences, or to the atomistic-quantitative ground where all things are aggregates of “smallest” material parts.

The problem of the whole and parts is concerned with the question of the ontological priority of the whole over the parts, or of the parts over the whole. This question includes the issue of the attributes of the parts and the whole: does the whole possess attributes of its own, as a whole, or do its attributes equal the sum of the attributes of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue comprises the ground of instrumental reason and indeed of technological conception of the environment and – finally – of the human. What then is the issue? The classical notion of a substance requires that a whole must possess its own attributes, beyond those of the attributes of the parts of which the whole is composed. This can be regarded as the natural awareness of things in our environment, each with its own essential characteristics that define the limits of what something is. Yet there is a fundamental ontological issue concerning a substantial entity; such an entity can be either an aggregate of parts, like barley and wheat in a barrel, or it can form a unity. If the substance is an aggregate, then it cannot possess characteristics apart from those of the parts. If it is a unity, then the substance as a whole must possess attributes qua the whole. The attributes of the latter must be more than the sum of the attributes of the parts. For example, water, as a substance, possesses a qualitative attribute of being wet; the parts of which water is composed, hydrogen and oxygen, are not wet. They possess their own attributes. The aggregation of the parts should then be equal to the whole, and the latter should be equal to the sum of the parts and their attributes. Since these elements do not possess the attribute of wetness, then their aggregation, to form water, should not possess wetness. In this case the whole is equal to the sum of its parts and their attributes. This means that the basic ontological component of the universe would be the part and all things would be equal to the sum of the parts. But in this sense, the attribute of wetness of water is an ontological mistake. Wetness would have to be attributed to the “mistake of the senses”. If one had a keen sight of Lynkeus, one could see right through wetness and recognize the basic reality as hydrogen and oxygen without any trace of wetness.

If the parts retain their specific properties, then there is no unity of the whole. On the other hand, if perceptual experience tells us that the

parts are unified into a whole and that we see its characteristics, then the parts cannot retain their individual attributes. If they were to retain such attributes, the result would not be a whole with its own attributes, but an aggregate, a sum of discrete parts. To form a whole, the parts must vanish as individual components into the whole in order for the latter to possess its own attributes. But if this were the case, argues Aristotle, then there would be a destruction of one kind of entity, the part, and a creation of an entirely new entity, the whole. This is to say, there would be no unification of parts into a whole, but a destruction of one set of substances and a creation of an entirely new substance. For philosophy this makes no sense, because in such a case there would appear some magical being who could pronounce a secret word and a new thing would come into being. After all, we are in philosophy and not the world populated by beings with magic powers. To make sense, the following points are proposed: (i) sense experience testifies that things are substantial wholes and therefore there must be a natural unification of parts into a whole; (ii) the unification cannot be a mere aggregation, since in such a case there would not be a whole with its own attributes, but a sum of attributes of the parts; and (iii) the parts and their attributes cannot be completely destroyed and a new substance generated, since in that case there would be a creation of something from nothing. It is absurd that something could come from nothing, although unphilosophical trends seem to offer such nonsense as if it were an obvious truth.

Hence the parts can neither maintain their individuality and attributes, nor can they vanish as individual entities. The classical, Aristotelian solution to this dilemma is the famous theory of potentiality. This theory is designed to resolve the following problem: how is it possible for parts to exist in the whole without losing their individual substantiality, and how is it possible for them to retain their individual characteristics without the whole being an aggregate and not a unity? If the latter case were true, then the attributes of the whole would be mere appearances. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between secondary and primary characteristics, and, by implication, the subject-object division. Aristotelian solution to this dilemma rests on a distinction between potential and actual existence. Since some things

are potential while others are actual, the parts, combined in a whole, can in a sense be and yet not be. The whole can actually be other than the parts from which it had resulted, yet the parts can remain potentially what they were before they became combined into the whole. In turn, the attributes of the whole are potentially in the parts. Those attributes become actualized when the parts are unified into a whole. With the unification, the attributes of the parts become potential. These arguments led to a claim that a whole composed of parts can have its specific attributes and be regarded as a basic ontological unit of the world. Most importantly, not every part can be combined with any other part to form a natural thing. One cannot take grains of sand and mix it with particles of oxygen to form nourishing bread. The parts do not have the potential characteristics for making bread. In brief, they are limited to what wholes they can actualize.

We must intersect, at this juncture, to point out an arche as an ontological fact that is disclosed in this classical solution of the problem. The parts become actualized only when they can unite in accordance with the essence – or form – of the whole. The potential of the parts, in turn, are potential for a specific form and not just for any form or essence. The latter, being more than the sum of the parts is also the “aim, or telos of the parts, their “good”. In this sense each thing as an actualized potency, also possesses an inherent value that need not obtain it from another. All things, unfolding or actualizing their potential have a form that is identical with its good, and both comprise a limit of a given thing. The latter is a designation that distinguishes one type of being from another, a tree from a tiger, a human from a monkey or angel, yet the individual can neither reach the perfect form nor can its potential be fully defined: it is always “more” and thus each individual is unique in its self-development. Another aspect, relevant for the understanding of a culture is as follows: a society and indeed a culture, is more than the sum of individuals, since taken together as cultural parts, they unfold their potential that is manifest as a characteristic of a whole society, and is irreducible to the actualized potential of a single individual. In this sense, a culture is an actualized potential of various individuals. Each culture as a whole, is a unique unfolding of the potential given in

a specific society, and such unfolding has an inherent value and even a purpose as aspects of the essence of what a culture is in its own right. Indeed, we can reverse the claim and point out that cultural purpose and value may comprise a symbolic design for the lifeworld of given people. This is to say neither values nor purposes are added from some external source. We shall return to this issue after explicating the problems and the appearance of a different arche, claimed by modern West.

While the solution to the parts-wholes offered by classical thinkers lasted throughout the medieval period, it was already challenged by Arab philosophers who followed Aristotle. The challenge points to a difficulty of the potential existence of the parts in a whole. The debate continues as follows: if the parts and their attributes in the whole become potential, then it can be concluded that the whole is composed of potential parts. Yet it makes no sense to claim that an actual thing is composed of potential parts. If the whole is actual, then the parts must be actual. Yet if the parts remain actual, then inevitably the whole is an aggregate, leading to the conclusion that the perceived qualities of the whole do not belong to the “things themselves” but must be illusions or appearances – mere phenomena. If the parts remain actual and maintain their attributes, then the perceived attributes of the whole are not identical to the attributes of the parts. Ontologically speaking the world is a sum of “smallest” parts. In this case the perceived whole, to say once again, is a “mistake of the senses”. Given this irresolvable dilemma, the thesis of the ontological priority of the whole was rejected, and a theory of the parts – atomistic – was accepted. It was granted that the basic ontological unity is a material part that cannot be altered or destroyed in the whole. This suggests that if the whole is a sum of parts, then there is no unity of a whole; everything is an aggregate of material parts in space and time. The visible whole and its perceived attributes have no objective basis; they do not belong to the “things themselves” but to the perceiver. What is perceived directly must have a “place”, and this place was designated to be a subject, containing the secondary qualities, while the real objective world, was composed of primary, quantitative particles. At this juncture there is the birth of the modern subject, a container of appearances that have neither status nor place in “real-

ity”. Everything is an aggregate of atomic or “smallest” parts which, in contemporary jargon are called “the building blocks of the universe” while the perceived characteristics of the whole have no objective basis. This means that the ontological constituents of the world cannot be experienced, and all experienced qualities offer no access to the fundamental reality. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this reality by other means. What is accessible to experience does not belong to the world but only to the “mind”. This mind does not know the world but creates all sorts of “representations” from which the world is reached by “inferences”. For our disclosing of the basic modern understanding, this newly invented mind thinks its own thoughts and decides what thoughts shall count as relevant for science.

While the modern choice of nature as a sum of material parts has been a dominant trend, sciences and indeed human sciences are in a constant quandary to understand characteristics of things that are different from the characteristics of the parts. All that scholars in various disciplines can come up with is a thesis of emergent properties attributed to an anonymous master called “evolution” or to “dialectical leaps” in nature. As is well known, this thesis dominated the dialectical thought of the 19th century, while evolutionism appeared again in biology, genetics, and even social and political sciences to “explain” the experienced phenomena of things. Hence, the modern Western scientific thinking is constantly facing its own limitations. It cannot derive the more in nature and experience than the thesis of a sum of parts would allow and at the same time must accept, due to their own theories, the appearance of “new qualities”. As if by unexplicated philosophical intuition they insist on the priority of perceived things as the most obvious presence to awareness. Yet the preeminence of modern arche – homogeneous material world – is never surrendered, leading to the already mentioned power over nature.

This “intention” to dominate through violence, dissection, fragmentation, is the underlying modern theme. In the German tradition this “intention” is quite obvious not only among the “idealists” but also among the “materialists”. For example, Fichte claims that nature is a human servant. Everything must correspond to human thinking and

will. The will masters the “inner” human nature through which the external world is established. While serving the will, all human powers are disposed to intervene in, and dominate nature. The human is secure and autonomous only when he subordinates nature under his laws and powers. Using different terms, Schelling proposes the same process: strive to attain such a state of freedom wherein you could subordinate every heterogeneous power under your homogeneous autonomy, and through it to extend your freedom toward an absolute and unlimited power. Nature would become a reflection of the self-development of the human. And the leading motive in the Marxian materialism is the attainment of technological-material conditions which would allow the human transform all, to make all into a reflection of human fulfillment, thus releasing the human from dependence on blind events, from necessities, and establishment of human autonomy and self-creativity. Such a state requires a total mastery of nature, i.e., where nature would become a direct reflection of human activity and powers; humanized nature and humanized humanity. But again we must remind ourselves why such pronouncements are unphilosophical; for one, we do not know what is the standard called “human” in modern writings, since the human is also what “we make of ourselves” without any essential standard. Second, if the world is encounter in terms of what we make of it, then “man is the measure of all things” and yet we do not know what this measure is. Third, how can we humanize nature when we have discarded any semblance of recognizable environment that for classical philosophy was composed of natural things unfolding within their essential limits. In brief, we have no idea what is nature that has to be humanized. Thus we are left once again with naked power of arbitrary will. It should be mentioned that for our thesis it is irrelevant whether such power is expressed in personality cults or in scientific formulations.

Apart from the conceptions of power and control over nature, there appear claims that the human is the source of law, that the laws of the state stem from the agreements of individuals. While there are all sorts of variants to this conception, from laws stemming from no longer understood human nature and rational self-interest, to laws posited by the will, nonetheless there is a common presumption that the source of

law in society is the individual forming a covenant with other individuals. As will be argued later, the initial conception of the individual as the source of law within the social context, is extended, due to modern ontology and metaphysics, to include nature, i.e., the human as a law-giver to nature. Needless to say, attendant upon these claims to power and control over nature and to the ability to be a law-giver to society and subsequently to nature, is a claim to progress. While theologians such as Langdon Gilkey would claim that progress is a concept derived from Christian thought, the arguments presented subsequently should cast some doubts on the theological claim. This is not to say that there is no conception of progress in Christian personality cult, specifically since Augustine's announcement of the human journey from the city of Rome to the heavenly city; rather it will be argued that the modern concept of progress has an entirely different ontological base from that of Jesuist personality cult, although both might accept the metaphysics of the will.

It must be noted that the discussion of modern understanding of metaphysics of will need not include the various views on the nature of science, the testing of hypotheses and the resolution of opposing theoretical paradigms. Rather, it is designed to account for the foundations of the various claims of the underside of the modern tradition, the side which offers human salvation, human utopian state, enhancement of human well-being, liberation from want, and even of "remaking" the human into a more desirable creature. This underside could be initially regarded as the banal thesis, rejected by classical Greek thought, as "man is the measure of all things". After all, if modern writers keep extolling power and control over nature to serve human "needs" then such thinking cannot be akin to the classical "unconcerned" engagement with the world of things. The offers to serve human needs are, after all, proposed from geneticists through social engineers and even to Marxists-Leninists proclaiming the birth of a "new man". All this presumes that the human, at least his arbitrary will, is the measure of all things. This means that we are too late to appeal for any other criteria apart from those we ourselves invent and either impose on others through material power or submit ourselves to the very inventions we

posit as objective. It will not do to argue, as do the Marxists, that the reason for the elevation of the paternal image to unreachable heights is an ideological ploy by the ruling class, capable of keeping the lower classes in fear of the “unknown” and infinite power. Such an argument presumes that only some select elite can see through the facade of the ruling class, while the population is subsumed under its spell. If it is a facade that dominates a particular age, then no one can escape its spell, since there is no recourse, no vantage point from which to regard such a facade. But if someone can escape such a domination, then it would seem that the very system offers some recourse from which anyone can survey the system and be capable to be a willful master of it – as were the Marxists and capitalists. This is to say, the mastery of a system suggests a reflexive domain capable of surveying the determinant factors of any system. It should not be a surprise that Marxism, in the form of Leninism, already accepted an arbitrary construction of the environment and the human not premised on any “causal necessity” but on a pure projection of a will deciding what the future world ought to be. In principle there is a recognition that all the claims to necessity can be disregarded and other necessities can be constructed by the will. But this is modernity open to all.

First syndrome of arbitrary power over nature appears in the guise of the subject who is “everyman”. Any individual is in a position to be the maker and master of his own destiny by his own thought, will and ability to shape the surroundings into his own “image”. He neither has a nature, nor a nature to settle; he can become, with respect to the environment, “nomadic”. This is to say, he is “free” from any place and can remake nature in his own image anywhere he decides to settle – an image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. Yet here the thesis of the difference between the despotic East and the democratic West finds an equivalence: the modern “philosophies” of the West become the ground of the nomadic power of the unchained rule over nature, appearing both in the guises of capitalism and Marxism, more recently called “globalization”. The land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons and of natural rhythms, and the peasant attuned to them, are now exposed to become raw material and labor power for the technological

edicts controlled by the will of unknown emperors located in luxurious towers of commerce. Although such emperors might be interesting insofar as they seem to possess what the current designation would call “economic power”, the more interesting factor is this equivalence. It has broken down the traditional legitimation of power by birthright, the aristocratic elitism that allowed edicts to be imposed from above, and demanded legitimation by “the people”. But the latter are either “labor power” to be constructed in accordance with the needs of anonymous production and market forces, or are mobile individuals capable of settling where there are not yet exploited “raw materials” for production. We shall treat the ontology and metaphysics of “raw materials” and the metaphysics that rule such ontology in the next section. Suffice it to say that both are silent assumptions, hardly considered as relevant for discussion and taken as self evident, although they must be a matter of philosophical interest, essential to our modern and indeed post modern acceptance of the silent dominance of the metaphysics of the will and its resultant arbitrary power.

The appearance of the individual and his assumed right to be the master of his destiny, the ruling power, the government, whose inevitable centralization was triggered by equality under the law, led to what could be called “post-modernity”. One major issue that had to be resolved was legitimation. The reason that this issue did not appear with modernity rests on the assumption that the democratic revolution, i.e. the political enlightenment, will lead to the conception of power concentrated in the hands of the people. This would comprise the first modern history with the autonomous power of the subject as the deciding factor. The dream of a completion of democratization by the second history, i.e. by scientific enlightenment and the establishment of a material power over nature and thus by the freeing of the human from any chains of established authority, turned out to be unattainable, and specifically due to the very scientific technologization of all processes in the social arena. As shall be noted, the technologization led to the establishment of vast bureaucratic machinery of experts comprising a privileged elitism. No doubt, the establishment is not something that must be forced on the populations. In most cases it is accepted on

two counts: first, on the all pervasive ideology of scientific power, its magic, to fulfill human wants in the material domain and thus to fill the gap of insecurity, to offer guarantees of well being that could not be otherwise attained. Second, as is the case with mass opinion, the material incrementation of well being demands, in its own right a submission of the population under the control of bureaucratic technocracies. The management of complexities created by the efforts to attain power over nature, creates its own material power that cannot be dislodged by political edicts established by members of the public. The population's demand for material fulfillment leads to a greater concentration of bureaucratic-technical power and hence to a continuous diminishment of the importance of the once autonomous and free individual as a law giver. Thus we reach a material paradox: the more the individual strives to secure his material well being vis-a-vis the appointed or self appointed powers of the technocrats, the more he surrenders his power to have any say in the increasingly centralized fabric of bureaucracies. After all, the individual is not an "expert" and must defer all decisions to technocratic elites. We hardly need reminding that the former Soviet Union claimed to be built on "science" and therefore scientific experts – technocrats – are best equipped to handle all public needs and affairs without public participation. The party elites know best what is good equally for everyone.

Going under the terminology of "discursive practice", educational institutions (and governments) are emphasizing the creation of technical disciplines in order to advance national economies, health care, competition with others and national prestige. In Central Europe, the teaching of humanities, and this includes national languages, cultures, histories, is pushed aside in favor of technical training in accordance with global standards. While this might seem trivial, yet national identities are premised on the understanding of local cultures and their difference from the globalized "culture". If the latter becomes preeminent, then the former will vanish. In this chapter this logic of "vanishment" will be explored in detail, yet one of its major components consists of the "disattachment" of any specific technical discourse from its local culture. By virtue of gaining technical set of skills, be they medical,

computer, managerial, the members of a given nation/ethnicity become global and in their interests are more “at home” in the global community of professionals in their area of expertise than with the members of their traditional cultures. They attend international conferences, form associations and common projects, and are accepted everywhere. It is to be noted that the proliferation of technical disciplines is without a limit. Chemistry, microchemistry, macrochemistry, biochemistry, genetic biochemistry, etc., all the way to the changing “latest” and “improved” medications. The very language of such communities is discipline specific and inaccessible to everyday discourses.

The members of the communities of specific technical fields seek better conditions to engage in their craft and either find positions or are invited by institutions to do research away from their native areas. They move from place to place where they are needed and thus settle – for a while – in a different nation and among different ethnic groups – meanwhile maintaining close ties to their community of technical peers. In this sense they become nomadic, without any national cultural allegiance or even political commitments. What is significant is that the members of these global-nomadic communities comprise a contemporary elite, separated and living apart from general populations. Being part of the global elite, they tend to promote technical programs at pedagogical institutions, thus creating an increasing gap between the elites and the local, including their own cultural populations.

While all this may sound normal, the migration of technical elites to “better” institutions or research facilities, to better paying positions, depletes the local nations of the best means of developing their local “brain trust” and the building of expanded economies. For example, among the former Soviet Union members, the liberated Baltic States have joined the European Union with its open door policy that immediately began to deplete such states of the best talents. Lithuania alone, out of 3.7 mil. population, lost five hundred thousand to immigration – not all are of the highest technical quality, but the best have become global nomads with high positions in every part of the world. We shall address their cultural identities as members of diaspora, and specifically the efforts to connect them to their “home” cultures and nations, and

point to the prospects and activities required of them to remain global/local. Some national governments even go so far as to enlist diaspora and promote “ethnic pride” abroad, while others argue that those who have left for “better life” abroad, should no longer be admitted to claim their national birthright. While such debates are significant, it is also significant to understand what sort of power and attraction globalization offers that cannot be easily escaped. Thus, we shall begin with a theoretical problem of archai whose solution and irresolution comprises a context wherein all controversies are located.

ACCESSING MODERN FACTS

While the “resolution” of the part-whole controversy led to atomism as the presumed arche, and the subjectivation of perceptual experience, the concern is the access to the imperceptible reality of the atomic parts as facts. There is no other avenue except through the subject who has to posit a method, and do so self-consciously and critically. Descartes, in his ultimate doubt, expresses this search for a method which is not derivable from the vagaries of perception, but must be certified by mind reflecting upon itself. Since phenomena, judged on the basis of perceptual awareness, offer no objective certitude, objectivity must be guaranteed by the mind in terms of clear and distinct ideas, a methodology which in its ideal structure excludes imprecise perceptual qualities. These ideas and this methodology are quantitative, i.e. metaphysical in the form of mathematics and, in accordance with modern ontology, must be mental and inevitably subjective. This is a reflective move of the modern thought which seeks within itself to offer the terms of what will be called and validated as reality. While classical philosophy understood vision and thought in terms of the visible, modern thought, turning back upon itself, understands the visible in terms of vision and thought. This subject has no other choice but to discover within itself what it will decide to call reality, and the latter will depend on which aspects of this novel “mind” will be selected as trustworthy to be objective.

The result is obvious: objectivity is relative to the powers of the subject; the world must be interpreted as accessible to the methods

which are guaranteed by reflective thought and to human controls. The subject has two modes of awareness: the perceptual, qualitative, and the thinkable, quantitative. Both are given equally to the reflecting subject and neither has any inherent criterion to indicate which is more appropriate to disclose reality. Obviously, the qualitative awareness is more direct and objective, more accessible to everyone than the quantitative-mathematical. For most persons the latter has to be learned through great effort and torture, while the former is present without any doubt. In brief, the choice of one over the other, specifically since both belong to the “mind” of the modern subject, has to be decided on other grounds. The latter suggests that the selection of a quantitative-mathematical metaphysics as a method is done on the basis of a will to control, to master the environment. It is obvious that if we know how to define something mathematically, we also know how to make it. Metaphysics, in the mathematical form as a method is, in principle, technical. It contains rules of construction and resultantly such rules can be applied on anything and force the thing to adhere to mathematical requirements. But this metaphysical method, and this ontological base take for granted that there are no essential distinctions, no qualitative differentiations among the objects composed of the “atomic” parts. The difference among composed objects is one of quantity. While dealing with the world of objects, the human does not change anything essentially, does not affect the ontological constituents of the world in any way. The human simply changes the quantitative aggregation of atoms, gives them a different arrangement in spacio-temporal proximity. Any qualitative and essential distinctions have been already relegated to subjective region and dismissed as scientifically and objectively irrelevant.

Moreover, the reflectively established access to the ontologically posited homogeneous reality is already technological in a very specific way: it can construct a priori metaphysical worlds – indeed utopian worlds – and then attempt to bring such worlds about by subjecting the environment and the human to possible transformations. Thus if nature is regarded mathematically, then, it is understood at the outset “technologically”. The next step introduces a question which is concerned with the “realization” of the reflectively calculated possibilities.

How do these quantitative, ideal manifolds can become thing-like, real, and metaphysical thinking made into visible reality? Precisely when the ideal, mathematical factors can be used for the possibility of the production of the calculated entity. Since mathematical procedures are at base “technical”, i.e. contain within themselves the rules of their own procedures and “production” then, when applied to a quantitatively conceived reality, the same procedures are productive of reality. This means that mathematical definitions are both productive and causal. The quantitatively conceived objects lend themselves to human calculations and manipulations; by calculating and arranging material processes, the human is in a position to calculate and predict the results of such processes. Obviously, this procedure requires human physical intervention in the reified nature. The quantitative, *a priori* calculations of the material aggregates requires that such aggregates be arranged in a causal sequence through physical, experimental activity such that the calculated arrangement can yield predictable results. This process excludes the perceptual-qualitative components and regards only the “underlying” reified aggregates which are arranged, experimented with, in accordance with the reflectively instituted calculations. The quantified arrangements of “matter” allow, correlatively, the quantitative calculation of “material” results. We should be reminded of the fact that by the eighteenth century, reality was no longer defined in terms of its being but in accordance with “the conditions for the possibility of being”. This is, in principle, the arche, the ground of modern instrumental rationality. It should be obvious, by now, that the modern fact is a product, understandable and accessible through the methods that human subject constituted.

Yet what leads the process is the possibility of increased formalization of mathematical propositions, resulting in the concept of formal systems which can be differentiated into formal sub-systems and of splitting up of systems into distinct “scientific disciplines”. Thus we have physics, macro and micro physics, physical chemistry, biology, evolutionary biology, chemical biology, genetic biology, psychology, psycho-genetics, mechanical genetics, social genetics, psycho-chemistry, behavioral chemistry, micro-chemistry, etc. each in a position to

define its formal domain and to make events happen by producing the required conditions. Disregarding the morphological composition of the lived world, this process pretends to subsume under itself all domains of the world not on the basis of perceptual content but on the basis of formal designations and differentiations. The result is obvious: each discipline is ruled by “experts” and each new discipline requires new experts whose range of understanding must be reduced to such expertise. The formal systems can be called “formal discourses” resulting from the basic conception of formal “lingua universalis” from which everything can be deduced.

The increased submission of events under human controls to yield increasing power for increasing controls is the source of what comprises the modern notion of progress. Progress is an inverted process; instead of calculating and arranging material forces to yield results, we project and calculate the desired results and thus design the material conditions to yield such results. But the more results we project and the more material conditions we establish to yield the results, the more power we gain to establish more conditions to achieve more desired results. In this sense it is a progress of technical power over nature. This is to say, progress does not mean an acquisition of greater knowledge or wisdom, but a constant growth of technological means to achieve novel projected material results; the latter can also become technological means or a quantity of material force to yield further results, etc. The modern human is convinced that every technological application leads to new technological discoveries and applications without end. Every transformation, i.e., quantitatively arranged material process, every shaping of the material stuff through technology, offers more possibilities and power to shape more matter into desirable results. Moreover, the shaping of matter into new technologies opens, in turn, a demand for other technologies and discoveries. If a technological means makes material discoveries possible, the new discoveries will call for their technological implementation to suit our needs, and indeed production of new needs, *ad infinitum*. No achieved technical stage is adequate; every stage calls for new and improved technologies to yield new intrusions into the material domain to yield new results. But this is the process

which increments the human power to control all events, to shape them in accordance with human wants and hence to liberate the human from “natural” calamities, from his residua of inner infirmities. Progress must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. All that is left is progress for the sake of progress – the purpose of progress is progress. We could say that it is a *sui generis* process wherein the human “evolves”.

In this context, an interpretation of “nature” as a material stuff to be used as conditions for the attainment of desired results, is only one side of the picture, since the human processes and activities are also regarded as both, the conditions required for the attainment of results and as results of conditions. The language of conditions-results and results-conditions constitutes one of the most pervasive metaphors in various modern sciences and humanities. Sociology, economy, psychology, etc. claim that humans are “products” of social, economic, biological, genetic, chemical, and any other invented discipline, such as psychology with its conditions. If we can calculate and establish certain conditions, then we can predict the resultant human behavior quantitatively. But conversely, it is possible to project a “desirable” human behavior, or in fact human “structure” and to establish appropriate conditions for the attainment of the projected result. To note, there is no qualitative human essence, therefore the human is part of the combination of material parts that, given different conditions, could be made into a “new” human being. While various theoretical theses have recognized this state of affairs, such as behaviorism, Marxism, various economic schools, they transformed that recognition into a deterministic ontology such that human behavior, human thinking, the very human morphology, became a result of “material conditions”. Let us be clear on this; such theses are not some past historical residuum: they are the rage of all the technical disciplines of today. In short, what was deemed to be a “liberation” of man from nature and from natural and indeed es-

sential humanity, turned around and made man a slave, a subject to his own “genius”. It is important to note that the notions of good and value have changed. Values are human and appear embodied in the produced facts. Whatever we can make, is value, but not a value in itself – it is a use value; there is no end of such use values. We have sent ourselves on a mad and wild journey, and we now no longer know where we are headed. As the saying from the East goes, once you mount a tiger, you will not get off.

GLOBAL CONTEXT AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES

The two major social arrangements, capitalism and socialism-communism, share the same modern metaphysical method and ontological materialism that allow both to be technocratic. The difference between them, at the level of the so called “objective” research, is which is more efficient in producing greater advances in technology, i.e new facts. Their confrontation is a competitive race to win in the arena of technology. Each had distinct features concerning who will dictate such a race, a state enterprise or private enterprise, and the ways that these two forms of enterprises would have to absorb or dismiss the quest for national identities based on culture, language, religion, or ethnicity. The Soviet state enterprises depended upon scientific research funded and managed by one bureaucracy and technocracy, while the Western research was distributed among different private organizations (or even universities that depended for research funds from such private organizations). Yet in all variants, the base is the same: technical “progress” and training of individuals to become efficient in specific technical fields, required by each type of society.

We should recall that for modern Western civilization, the sole objective reality are things, no matter how complex, composed of, and analyzable into smallest units. All the rest of human experience is subjective. This means that such aspects as values, ethnic histories, qualitative languages, divinities, arts, literatures, even nationality, are

expressions of subjective desires, images, inventions, results of inadequate scientific upbringing, to be excluded from the objective domain. Even if such aspects were allowed some status in the objective world, they had to be explained in terms of material conditions at the level of technical social states of affairs, whether such affairs were economy, level of chemical causes, biological drives, or genetic codes. In brief, to be consistent, the “production” of culture is based on “conditions”. If conditions change, then all these subjective categories will have to change. Soviet Union was regarded as the “grand experiment” to produce a new man in terms of the changing and shaping of conditions by “scientific-technical experts”, of course under the guidance of the autocratic and infallible communist leadership which knew the very aim of history, equally based on the claims that history moves in accordance with the dialectical laws of matter. This grand experiment demanded the homogenization and standardization of most diverse national and ethnic populations, such that technical experts could be moved to whatever location they were needed. They too became uprooted from their “subjective nationalistic” or even linguistic identities, and could function anywhere in terms of their “specialization”. Everyone belonged to the new “broad” society, full of promises that this type of society will be global. The reshaping of all sorts of ethnic and national groups into one new society, and the collapse of the latter, indicates that ethnic groups and national identities are temporary. New identities are invented and the old ones vanish. Indeed, there are strong arguments that nationalisms, and their identities are, from a broader civilizational perspective, abnormal. While capitalism might be different, yet it and communism, after all, believe that the only moving force of history is material and in principle any other view, such as the autonomy of the individual makes no sense in such a belief. Both would have to maintain that any worthwhile future is a continuous material fulfillment. This is comically designated as McDonalization, where every produced fact is global, since it can fit, as a part in the world-technology and technocracy, anywhere in the world.

The legitimacy of the production of increased material facts through science-technology conjunction is offered as a lure that such

a power is for human benefit. More things, more benefits, more enjoyment, more health, more... more.... The populations, in turn, take the technologization as economic progress for granted and exert pressure on the public institutions to “produce” visible results. Failing such results, one can justifiably argue that institutions have no legitimacy. The populations of the new nations are split concerning their current status: some claim that while their nations acquired Western standards and above all technical sophistication to have an indefinite variety of products, the distribution of the latter depends on the mechanism of the market that promises future improvements, or failing to fulfill such improvements, on political theatre in various forms, inclusive of rituals and above all, ideological incantations.

The first principle that rules such incantatory fulfillment is the final “ideal” of modernity: man is the maker of his world and of himself; the second is: man is on the way toward fulfilling this state of affairs – whose final purpose is human eternal life in the genetically improved material world.

The market distributes directly perceptual, sensuous, bodily technologies, offering everyone the means to achieve those ideals in any corner drug-store, beauty parlor, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a skin-deep global equalization in numerous domains lending the appearance of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, even similar looking clothing – despite differences in quality – and hence the promises seem to be approximated. Everyone is “enjoying” an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated ideals and looks. “She looks like a million” and this despite the fact that she is working on an assembly line. The saturation of all domains with the images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, lends technology a mystical power. Images of an ideal female, ideal male, ideal body, from toenails to hair, are proliferated for the “consumer”. This is to say, ideology is no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting the material-economic or technical conditions, but is an inscription in the body, in the images, the passions and desires appearing through the images and on the body. The idealities of the ideologies are coextensive with the daily discourses, daily imagery, mass-media, sounds and tastes, architecture, popular arts

carried by vast systems of circulation thus making any art-form accessible and “popular”, to be imitated by the activities of the “people”. This is to say, there is a global culture that is equally homogeneous, standardized, “sexy” and nationless. If one were to check the television programs in the Baltic states, there would be ample evidence of global “culture” in music, dance, talk shows, competition. Even the music of local cultures is an imitation of the global rhythms, sounds, body contortions, attire and make up. At the global popular level of culture, one’s identity is equivalent to identification with some super star (there are no longer any regular stars) by any means.

To make the point of globalization more impressive, it is sufficient to add some examples from India; it produces and exports countless technical experts to various continents and countries. They are diligent, industrious and, as Central Europeans, nomadic. But they do not bring their home cultural symbols with them and they do not adopt the symbolisms of the cultures in which they settle. They are detached experts and accept their assigned role by becoming consumers of the global standardized tastes, sounds, looks, advertised in all department stores, hair salons, exercise centers, and movies. They are no different in their wants as any other Westerner, and the men advertise for wives with specific properties: Western looks, model-like figure, at least a master’s degree, although a “real Indian woman”. At the “cultural” level they are as skin-deep as any Westerner. Yet they are most desired as technically superior in the area of their expertise. There are some thirty journals advertising for brides, and brides, with bleached faces, with jeans and saris for shirts, advertising their availability. This does not include the countless web-sites that allow women to become e-mail brides.

Yet one vast nation, the Soviet Union, collapsed, and there are many views as to the reasons for its collapse, but one fundamental thesis is unavoidable: its technological progress could not compete with that of the West – and this in all areas of society, from food production, medical technologies, to military hardware. It might be unbelievable that in the most “advanced” region of the Soviet Union, the Baltic Republics, in 1993 stores were using abacus instead of cash registers or in many cases computerized systems at checkout counters. Meanwhile the images, seeping in from the West, suggested the “good life” where

one could get anything, be anyone, look “great”, use the latest gadgets, appliances, exotic foods, have private possessions and thus be “free”. Above all, the “memories” of the past ethnic identities and national pride offered a chance to be separate and unique, independent from the great experiment and forge one’s own destiny. Not having been allowed to deviate from the homogeneous and standardized technocratic world, one hoped to discover one’s true identity. But the latter could not be had on individualistic grounds, since such grounds were lacking; hence, a demand to have a national autonomy with its own customs, language, traditions which, as has been noted, are for modern understanding subjective, and hence could have only symbolic value. Yet it is equally relevant to note that even the grand Soviet technocratic experiment could not dispense with symbolisms, so obvious in the grand parades, pride in the achievements of the “workers” and the victories in world Olympics.

Having escaped the Soviet Union, the Central Europeans immediately declared that they do not belong to the Byzantine Russian Empire but are part of the West. But the latter has many meanings and thus each “independent” nationality had to establish its own identity – in very tenuous ways. Some proclaimed to be Catholic, others Protestant, still others joined the Scandinavian traditions, and even groups within such new identities wanted to become more unique. After all, if one is a Catholic, then there is no difference between the Polish, Lithuanian, Italian, Southern German, Latin American and French symbolisms: same rituals, same tradition, same saints to be worshiped and same text to be followed. Thus these broad symbolic structures had to be fragmented along other symbolic designs, such as language, “pure” history of “our people” leading to the squabbles within these nations as to which history is correct, which ethnic group had been an enemy and which was a friend in the past. Good example is Yugoslavia which, as one nation, fell violently apart – and is still at odds which borders belong to which ethnic, religious, or linguistic group. Even little Czechoslovakia split into two different “nations”. Only two options remain: join the European Union under the banner of universal human rights – become European, and have a right to adhere to any national identity, any subjectively acceptable symbolism and history. Not that these are unimportant, but they have no necessity, apart from their rhetorical appeal.

What remains of Europe apart from the right to symbolic designs of identity is the entire modern Western civilization of scientific enlightenment: metaphysical systems applied on homogeneous material environment. While everyone has equal rights, the latter are, in a practical domain, the right to obtain a profession through education, the right to engage in private enterprise, and the right to move to any European region (and beyond) either to join global business ventures or to offer one's technical expertise where the living conditions are more favorable. This is to say, the right to become detached from one's specific region and its symbolic designs of identity, and join the emergent nomadic civilization of disattached experts whose only real commitments are to the technological or entrepreneurial global "progress". This is not to say that such nomadic civilization is negative in any way; it is most attractive since it introduces continuous novelties in every area of social life: conveniences, medicines, travel, and communications, establishing new communities, and allowing the maintenance of ethnic ties around the globe. Indeed, the new communities can be among a great variety of interests and purposes, or more specifically among the technical experts whose services are required at a moment's notice. In this global context, national and ethnic identities cannot depend on geographic locations, having national boundaries. With the global means of transportation, one can be home within a day.

Nonetheless, two concerns emerge: first, the global forming of communities along ethnic or national symbolisms is not the same as being in a concrete situation. In addition, such connections are fragmented in the sense of being assigned a specific segment of time, while the rest is detached professionalism in a cultural environment that has no symbolic value. Hence, one is reduced to living a nomadic life. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the trend in education is toward an abolition of cultural, national, ethnic, and even civic requirements in favor of greater technical competence in order for individuals to compete more successfully at the global level. National, ethnic, linguistic, historical cultures are irrelevant for the success of modern progress, based on technologies and experts, including experts in market economy. After all, cultural aspects add only subjective "enjoyment" while

serious objective life must follow a ceaseless competition for advancements in expertise and creation of “improved” means for the sake of more means. In this sense, the Central Europeans, having joined the European Union, find themselves in a quandary. The new European requirements at the university level, so called Bologna process, calls for a shift toward technical disciplines in order to produce experts capable of competing for positions at the global level and thus assuring Europe’s competitiveness with the United States. In this context, the smaller nations must shift their meager education budgets away from programs that would maintain their national identities toward production of globalizable technical experts in all kinds of fields. This means that even “at home” the symbolic attachments are being eradicated, allowing anyone with competitive edge to emigrate and live an abstract, disattached, nomadic global life. Even such notions as democracy, autonomy, freedom, and responsibility become equally subjective that is completely redundant for nomadic civilization.

POLITICAL TECHNOCRACY

We are now in a position to connect the public’s wish for material fulfillment with the appearance of modern technocracy. It was already noted that in principle everything should be makeable, producible, and the production of the human into an ideal image. This source of productivity is, in brief, irrational. Given a complex social fabric composed of irrational wants and their fulfillment, there must emerge a social class in the service of the state, capable of adjudicating the material resources of a society in a “rational way.” No doubt, this rationality is not to be confused with any presumed “natural” reason, with logos; it is instrumental reason that can calculate the distribution of states resources in accordance with ideologically designated rules. What is unique about a technocracy is that it is capable of adjudicating such a distribution by interpreting the rules in accordance with specific situations and unique settings. In this sense technocracy is given a direct power over the distribution and hence over the material well being of the population. In turn, the same technocracy is instrumental in writing the rules, since it

is staffed by “experts” on whom the inexperienced political figures are completely dependent. Hence technocracy guarantees for itself a position and, with increasing material complexities, it also demands for increasing staffing and expansion of power.

The arbitrary demands of the modern man must be rationalized, and with the increased demands, greater and more extensive rationalization must be instituted. In this sense technocracy enters the same logic of modernity: increased material power, controls, reshaping of the environment for human “consumption” is coextensive with the increased demands for technocratic controls of distribution, effects, side effects, and interrelationships among the materially achieved results. Scientific and political technocracies, stressing the increased fulfillment of human want, rush to produce numerous “miracles” and the latter bear with them numerous and unforeseen effects. The more demands the population places on technological production and on the political establishments to guarantee for everyone an access to the products, the greater risks will arise with respect to increasing effects. Hence the technocratic management of the results calls for a greater concentration of power and functional incrementation of technocracies. After all, the populations not only want material welfare, but are incapable of dealing with the results and side effects, and hence places demands on the political domain to guarantee the control of results. This pressure inevitably leads the political arena to be dominated by technocratic power. Hence technocracy performs two opposing functions: first, it is structured to enhance the expansion and distribution of material products, and second, it is called upon to control the effects of such production.

It is irrelevant whether the societies are nominally “free enterprise” or “state enterprise,” basically their modern direction of increasing material power and controls demands the appearance of vast technocracies as a faceless government that cannot be held responsible, although they have a direct power of adjudicating the political edicts. Technocracy could be called “material hermeneutics” since its interpretation of the political edicts is coextensive with an application of material means and material power. It is a hand that can give or withhold, liberate or suppress, and thus determine directly the levels of survival of a given social group. Technocracy is forced into a material interpretation of social

events, and by accepting this necessity; it inevitably acquires increasing material power. It is by now well noted that the efforts to “liberalize” society in Russia are running into a solid wall of technocratic power. In the West, the willful productions of the “free” enterprise system call for the increased controls of its results and effects and, coupled with the popular opinion that the political institutions should enter the arena of offering material fulfillment, technocracies are an unavoidable medium.

POSTSCRIPT

The modern metaphysics, in the form of mathematics, and the modern ontology, conceived as a sum of homogeneous material parts, allows the creation of novel metaphysical systems, their fragmentation into sub systems, and their application on the material environment in order to structure it in accordance with our “needs.” In turn, as the construction and reconstruction of the available materials becomes more sophisticated, complex and powerful, this very process becomes self warranting and produces its own “needs” that require constant modification of human technical skills in order to keep up with such increasing needs. Left to its own devices, this process becomes a progress without any purpose, requiring the functions only of technical experts. In principle, there are no criteria why this process should cease; it only needs more sophisticated experts to insure its continuity. There is, nonetheless, a danger which, according to the arche of modern West, rests precisely in the creation of technical experts who have no symbolic commitments to any ethos, any community, and thus can serve any tyrant and themselves be, basically, barbaric. The question then is, can there be a way to reestablish this nomadic tribe in the world that counts human behavior and interaction as based on norms other than technical functionalism? Yet, as will become obvious in subsequent arguments, the self, as already indicated in the classical thought, is more than any definition could encompass, and the “self-reflecting” mind of modern thought, cannot be reduced to any fragmented explanation; it is equally more and, indeed, it is the undefinable background on which the destinies of all the modern sciences, technologies, and technocracies, become transparent.

CHAPTER III

GLOBALIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION

The question of responsibility in confrontation with globalization is THE philosophical question from Socratic to modern philosophies. This question cuts across ideologies, theologies, individual and collective responsibility, and cultural determinants. In brief, it is impossible to practice philosophy and not to raise this question. It is well known that Socrates stood his ground unto death with the demand that he and others have a duty to interrogate all claims to truth regardless of their origin. Intellectual honesty was for him a requirement to keep open the discursive domain – called the polis – wherein the search for truth could be pursued. This means that the task of philosophy as such is identical with the maintenance of an open polis wherein all theories and propositions can be tested and contested. Hence, when we raise the question of the responsibility of the intellectual, we must recall the task for philosophy set by Socrates. Yet our situation is quite different from that of classical Athens. We are confronted by modern philosophy in its ontological and metaphysical guises that require a serious consideration whether we can even think of the relationship between intellectual and responsibility. It is our task, then, to consider what sort of position will open up for an intellectual that would be worthy of philosophy.

Despite some variations, Socrates as well as classical Greek thought sought to understand all natural events from their limits (peras). Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being by the limit which

cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in *topos noitos* (the place of ideas), or is the *morphe* (the inherent form of a thing) in each case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises its very purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its intelligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, the essence, is what determines the way the given being will unfold its dynamis, kinesis, its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamic is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its unfolding. In this sense, every being has its own purpose which is its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them. Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of beings. Two entities, such as an animal grazing in a field and a lightning may collide, but the collision is an accident. The latter may be mechanical, but not essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, any notion of evolution is excluded *a priori*. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other events. In the former case, a parent does not produce something essentially higher than itself. It is the rule of *aitia*, an efficient cause, since the result can be equal, but never more than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in specific settings. A human is born and will die a human.

GROUND OF MODERN WESTERN SCIENCES

The birth of Western modern modernity may be discussed in various ways and under different categories: sociology, theology, theoretical prejudgments, ontological grounds, and metaphysical conditions. These ways of accessing the entire domain of Western modernity are undeniable; the immediate task nonetheless, is defined by a reflective

requirement. Most diverse philosophical and theoretical trends in contemporary West have defined the nature of reason – indeed its very essence – to be instrumental. Given this pervasive claim, we are compelled to reflect from it and to decipher the birth of modernity that would comprise the conditions for the final emergence of this type of rationality. To speak in accordance with historical hermeneutics, the truth of a particular thesis might show up “much later” even if the founders of such a truth would not have recognized its presence. This is to say, various modern theoretical moves intimated instrumentality of reason, even if they have not presented the arguments that were the foundation of their implicit claims. The focus of this essay is on specific modes of awareness – ontological and metaphysical – that will best open the problematic of the modern/postmodern thought and the subject as individual with pure and unrestricted will. The following are essential factors that comprise the arguments, leading from one, the classical, to another, the modern, modes of awareness.

1. The rejection of the classical, basically Aristotelian, notion of a substance as a WHOLE possessing its own attributes, beyond those of the attributes of the parts of which the whole is composed.
2. The arguments leading to the primacy of reflective thought and hence to the primacy of the subject as the foundation and validation of theoretical and methodological avenues to objectivity. In turn, these arguments lead to a “voluntaristic individualism” and the primacy of self-determination. The success of these arguments is premised on the abolition of the whole and the positing of parts as the primary ontological components of nature.
3. The arguments of (1) and (2) lead to the conception of material-atomistic reality that is not accessible to perception, but only to a subject as calculating reason. The result is that whatever is deemed to be real, must be established, synthesized, worked over and shaped by the various activities of the subject. Some aspects of this trend are obvious in Kantian synthetic thinking, in Lockean and even Marxian notion of the labor theory of value, and even in Hegelian conception of the absolute idea as working itself through history to self-realization.

WHOLES AND PARTS. The problem of the whole and parts is concerned with the question of the ontological priority of the whole over the parts, or of the parts over the whole. This question includes the issue of the attributes of the parts and the whole: does the whole possess attributes of its own, as a whole, or are its attributes equal to the sum of the attributes of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue comprises the ground of instrumental reason and indeed of technological conception of the environment and – finally – of the human. What then is the issue?

Greek thought had brought to light a fundamental theoretical issue. A substantial entity, composed of parts, must be either an aggregate, like barley and wheat in a barrel, or the parts must be blended into a unity. If the first position is true, then the substance as a whole cannot possess attributes beyond those of the parts. If the second position is true, then the whole can possess attributes which are more than the sum of the attributes of the parts. Using a modern example, the problem can be formulated as follows: either water, and its attribute of wetness, is the basic unit of nature, or the parts, hydrogen and oxygen, with their specific attributes, are the basic elements of nature. Since these elements do not possess the attribute of wetness, then their aggregation, to form water, should not possess wetness. In this case the whole is equal to the sum of its parts and their attributes. But in this sense, the attribute of wetness of water is an ontological mistake.

The other side of the argument is as follows: if the parts are unified into a whole, then they cannot retain their individual attributes. If they were to retain such attributes, the result would not be a whole with its own attributes, but an aggregate, a sum of discrete parts. To form a whole, the parts must vanish as individual components into the whole in order for the latter to possess its own attributes. Here we have a dilemma, and Aristotle offered a specific solution to this dilemma. He argues that not only the parts, but also their attributes, cannot disappear entirely. If this were the case, then there would be no unification of parts into a whole, but a destruction of one set of substances and a creation of an entirely new substance. This makes no sense. To make sense, Aristotle posits the following: (I) there must be a unification of parts

into a whole; (ii) the unification cannot be a mere aggregation, since in such a case there would not be a whole with its own attributes, but a sum of attributes of the parts; and (iii) the parts and their attributes cannot be completely destroyed and a new substance generated, since in that case there would be a creation of something from nothing. It is absurd that something could come from nothing.

The basic problem that had to be solved is this: how is it possible for the parts to exist in a whole without losing their individual substantiality, and how is it possible for them to retain their individual substantiality without the whole being a mere aggregate? If the latter case were true, then the attributes of the whole would be mere appearances. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between secondary and primary characteristics, and, by implication, the subject-object division. Aristotle, meanwhile, attempted to solve this dilemma by a distinction between potential and actual existence. Since some things are potential while others are actual, the parts, combined in a whole, can in a sense be and yet not be. The whole can actually be other than the parts from which it had resulted, yet the parts can remain potentially what they were before they became combined into the whole. In turn, the attributes of the whole are potentially in the parts. Those attributes become actualized when the parts are unified into a whole. With the unification, the attributes of the parts become potential. These arguments led Aristotle to claim that a whole composed of parts can have its specific attributes and be regarded as a basic ontological unit. This also implied other levels of "reality". For example the state, while composed of individual citizens, is more than the sum of the interests of the individuals.

While this solution lasted throughout the medieval period, it was already challenged by Arab philosophers. The challenge points to a difficulty of the potential existence of the parts in a whole. If such parts become potential, then the whole is composed of potential parts. Yet it makes no sense that an actual whole is composed of potential parts. If the whole is actual, then the parts must be actual. Yet, in turn, if the parts are actual and retain their individual characteristics, then the whole is a sum of the parts, an aggregate. In that case the attributes

of the whole must be appearances, and appearances require a subject. Given this irresolvable dilemma, the thesis of the ontological priority of the whole was rejected, and a theory of the parts – atomistic – was accepted. It was granted that the basic ontological unity is a material part that cannot be altered or destroyed in the whole. This suggests that if the whole is a sum of parts, then there is no unity of a whole; everything is an aggregate of material parts in space and time. The visible whole and its perceived attributes have no objective basis. What is perceived directly must have a “place”, and this place was designated to be a subject, containing experienced qualities, while the real objective world was composed of material atoms or parts.

The consequences of this ontological decision were well developed by Galileo in natural sciences, and by Hobbes in social and political sciences, and accepted by Descartes as the ground of his dualism. The perceptible – qualitative – attributes of the whole are not only appearances, but are dependent upon the internal states of the experiencer. Since the atomic parts possess their attributes that cannot be altered, the whole is a numerical sum of the parts. Hence, any qualitative features of the whole are actually features of perceiving subject. In turn, this means that what the subject perceives are not attributes of the real, while the real, the atomic parts, cannot be experienced. In short, reality in itself is inaccessible to experience. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this reality by other means.

It must be pointed out that while the modern choice of nature as a sum of material parts has been a dominant trend, sciences and indeed human sciences are in a constant quandary to understand characteristics of things that are different from the characteristics of the parts. All that scholars in various disciplines can come up with is a thesis of emergent properties. As is well known, this thesis dominated the dialectical thought of the 19th century and appeared again in biology, genetics, and even social and political sciences. Hence, the modern Western scientific thinking is constantly facing its own limitations. It cannot derive the more in nature than the thesis of a sum of parts would allow.

The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic atomism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all be-

ings with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with mechanical laws. Therefore no beings of nature have any purpose. This ontological conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a thinking subject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing to do with the real, material world, including human bodies that function mechanically. Moreover, such thinking and its purposes have no fixed rules or laws; it is basically voluntaristic. Hence human actions, directed by will, make their way that is distinct from the world of ontologically posited reality. Humans make history as a purposive process which might aim at some final end. The latter has been depicted by various utopian images, including some versions of Marxism and capitalism. If material events are counted in this purposive history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make of the indifferent, mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims and presumed needs. We know the rest of the modern story as a progress of technology and human mastery of the material environment (including the material human as part of the environment).

REFLECTION

This implies another factor of modernity: a postulation of a self as an egological point whose primary activity is reflection upon itself, upon its own thinking, and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of all claims and the possibility of their realization. All events must justify themselves in the court of the standards and rules established by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify itself before the self-reflecting subject. Hegel ended the modern tradition by demonstrating its ultimate principle: no longer thinking and being are the same, but reflecting thinking and being are the same. It will not do to argue that various philosophical trends of the last century posited various explanations, even of the egological subject, in terms of social conditions, material or economic conditions, biological conditions and numerous other claims. Yet all of them posit their methods

and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Such adjudication is regarded to be critical and hence objective and universal. This universality is regarded as global and should be either imposed on or accepted by all rational beings.

The task then is to expound the arguments and basic claims of the universalistic – objective – logic of globalization, its modes of constructing self generation and self validation, and its ontological, metaphysical and, in the final analysis, valuative and voluntaristic groundlessness. At the same time, we shall show how this universalistic trend fragments itself into multiple logics and discourses as arbitrary constructs and thus abolishes its own univocal position in favour of what current writers superficially call “power”. Our task in this sense is to show the other grounds for the claim of power, at least in the sense of being groundless and arbitrary. This is to say we can show that the very exercise of power in globalizing modernity has no other rules or criteria apart from its own selfreflective generation. The basis of universalizing globalization is subtended and pervaded by conceptions that claim to explain power, whether social, economic, political, technocratic, while at the same time these very conceptions presuppose the self generation of power within which they are included. This means that these conceptions are in principle the ways of demonstrating the inevitability of arbitrariness and its resultant expression as globalizing power. In this sense, power is not something that is intended, but to the contrary all intentional awareness articulated in various disciplines and domains are constitutive of power that contains the logic of the transformation of the world. We hope that at this level we shall avoid any kind of psychological, valuative, genealogical, moralizing explanations, since even the latter are equally at the service of power.

It must be understood that in modern claims to universality and hence globalization there is a rationality that is distinct from what it wants to explain. Yet, as we shall show, this very rationality is not a ground for explanation but is itself an instrument to achieve ends and purposes that need not be rational. In this sense, rationality, as has been claimed by many, is instrumental and therefore power laden. All explanations without exception can be demonstrated to be participants

in the very proliferation of power which such explanations may claim to challenge. What we propose for the understanding of universality of globalization and its subsequent critiques is that it is impossible in principle to escape this universalization in terms of its own rationality.

Every rationality that will challenge this universalization will accept its power logic, and hence will become inevitably part of that logic. As we shall show, even the breakdown of this universal logic into modern multiple logics, called scientific disciplines and discourses, are the means by which this universalization proliferates itself and survives. In this sense, the claims by postmodernists to multiple discursivity and therefore multiple discursive powers is a continuation of the maintenance of modern universalization. What is central for our argument is, first, that postmodernity is a continuation of modernity and has in fact globalized itself, under the claim that it can save the other cultures from Western modernization. It is no wonder that various regions of the world that want to acquire identity in the pretended context of modern globalization are constantly appealing to being postmodern. Second, the various claims to cultural self identity, in contrast to modern universal individualism, is a variant of individualism at the cultural level. We know from philology that in modern West the challenge to individual universalism came from Herder who claimed that there is a cultural individualism with equal global rights. The notion of individuality at whatever level and its identity remains intact. Third, modern universalization and postmodern challenge to it follow the same logic and therefore impose individuality and the rights to it on the basis of a rationality which, as we noted, is already power laden.

In this sense, the language that postmoderns propose for multicultural logic, allowing each culture to have its own identity, at the same time talk about empowering the other. This is an assumption that pretends that others are equally engaged in power and that all that they need is to be granted that power from us. This is obvious in American feminist movement that wants to empower the Arab women to have their rights to be individuals. What is at issue here is not whether these movements are right or wrong but whether they already assume and therefore impose the modern universal individualism whether singular or cultural in the name of power.

Given this context our first task is to show how this logic of universal globalization is founded on various unquestioned prejudgments that comprise speculative ontologies and metaphysics without which they do not make sense. Moreover, the speculative metaphysics and ontologies are premised on the principle of modern Western theological symbolisms that lend priority to volitional arbitrariness and therefore anarchy over experienced perceptual differences. What we want to show is how a particular modern Western theological-mystical position has intersected the so-called scientific reason in favor of arbitrary construction of rationality as an instrument. The suggestion here is that what Max Weber has demonstrated to be the origin of capitalist ethics is much broader to the extent that even scientific reason is at base volitional, and therefore, scientific discourses have no other criteria apart from the criteria that science itself constructs. Thus, it is no wonder that even philosophers of science talk about world making or paradigm construction, and even verification that itself has to be logically verified. This reflexive circle indicates that perceptual awareness of the world is suspicious and that constructed awareness that is willful awareness is to be trusted.

In this sense, the world has to be constantly monitored by something that is not part of the world, and to the extreme extent the perceptual world would be inadequate and hence to be transformed to the higher constructive logic. Yet the higher constructive logics have no criteria by which we can judge them in terms of experienced world. This way metaphysics of the will that has no criterion becomes predominant and even our experiences that would make sense to us will have to be abolished and destroyed in favor of so-called logical rules that themselves are founded on an arbitrary will. After all, those logical rules have no other criteria or grounds in the experienced world apart from being arbitrarily posited. There is a continuous and direct denial and disruption of peoples experiences in their own worlds. They are deemed to be superstitious, inadequate rotten, inhuman, illogical, non-scientific against God, and therefore to be either destroyed or transformed to our constructs. This is how power operates: arbitrariness that leads to anarchy with respect to human experience in its diversity.

MODERN UNIVERSALITY

It has been said that the modern West has engaged in colonialisms in the name of economic expansion, capitalist greed, and search for resources both human and material. Yet, various indications suggest that even Western European peoples were equally colonized by a set of metaphysical, ontological, and theological positions. The task of this section is to articulate those positions that comprise the conditions for understanding the universal globalization that would subject not only the others but also the globalizing peoples. This is to say, we want to decipher the underlying intentionalities, the ways of looking at the world that became regarded as universal objective, scientific, and therefore dependable on methods and theories that are accessible to every thinking human anywhere and anytime.

To form this logic, the modern philosophical-scientific arguments require the rejection of the experienced perceptual world as untrustworthy, qualitatively ambiguous, and therefore requiring strict rules as methodologies by which to interpret the true reality. Without going to the protracted arguments in the Arab world concerning the primacy of wholes over parts we shall simply presuppose the modern assumption that any perceptual awareness has to be excluded from scientific and philosophical explanations in order to give a true account of reality beyond all senses. This is to say that sense awareness and its distinctions are to be excluded from scientific considerations. This means that human experience must be disregarded and its existence must be placed in an area which is scientifically irrelevant. This area is designated as subjective. What is left apart from this area is an objective method that demands certain features of the world to correspond to the objective method. As has been noted from Descartes to Kant, the objective method, as *a priori* is formal and includes logic and mathematics. Therefore, everything that has to be understood scientifically must correspond to formal and quantitative rules. In this sense, whatever we deal with, in science, must be quantifiable and therefore measurable. What we are pointing to is the presumption of the primacy of methodology and, by extension, theory over perceptual experience. Since formal quantitative

method must exclude anything that is qualitative, then whatever would count as objective would have to correspond to the quantitative methods: measurable matter that disregards any qualitative difference. This is the point at which the modern subject is invented. He is the possessor of qualitative experiences, but in order to be scientific he must also use the quantitative formal methods to deal with the measurable reality.

The first problematic that arises for this modern subject consists of a contradiction. The measurable material reality is posited to be objective, homogenous, and yet the method as formal mathematical is not an aspect or part of this homogenous material reality. Since the latter is posited as the only existence and everything else is designated to be subjective, then the scientific formal and quantitative methods must be equally subjective. In this sense, we come to a clash between objective, material, homogenous reality, and a method of science that has no objective validity. The sole solution to this problem had to take on the following structure: the subject constructs theories and methods to be tested in material reality. But the subject has no criteria by which to judge which constructed method is the correct one. Being subjective, they have to be adjudicated on the basis of objectivity which is perceptually inaccessible. Since the imperceptible objectivity depends on the constructed methodology which is inevitably subjective, then the only way to deal with this objectivity is in terms of subjective constructs. Our point here is that there is no way to demonstrate at this level how the subjectively constructed methods connect to the posited objectivity, i.e. the material reality. While the latter is posited as objective, it is also regarded as incapable of implying formal quantitative methodologies. In turn, these methodologies do not imply any empirical perception of this material reality directly, since by definition our direct perceptions are qualitative and therefore subjective.

In both cases, whether we start with the posited materiality as measurable, or whether we start with the subjective methodologies, we have not shown the connections between the two. The reason that the connection cannot be shown is that the qualitative experience that indicates the direct awareness of the difference among things, differences that are more than the sum of the material parts, is reduced to

qualitative subjective experience, while the sum of measurable parts is posited as the objective reality, thus constituting the principal differences between subject and object. Our concern is this: given that objectivity is the sum of material parts and, by implication, everything else is subjective, then the formal and quantitative methods are equally subjective and therefore there is no connection between the subjective methods and the sum of the material objective parts. In this sense, there has to be an account by virtue of some median aspect that would allow us understand how the posited objective material sum of parts can be connected to the subjective formal quantitative methodology. The modern issue here is one of mediation that goes from Descartes to Hegel and Marx, into the contemporary issues of the in-between domain the mediation. The point of principle that we want to articulate is how Western modern scientific logic proclaimed to be universal globalizing logic this issue of mediation. At one level it offered the notion that the connection between the subjective formal quantitative and the pure material homogeneous some of parts is through application of method to “objective reality”.

The application is regarded as experimental testing of hypothesis in correlation to reality. The very testing means intervention. There is no notion of direct method that looks at the way things are but rather applying and testing means that somehow we must intervene in order to avoid our perceptual awareness and therefore to construct the so-called imperceptible material reality in terms of our methodological that is subjective structures. In that sense, we give priority to the methodological structures that require our intervention in order to construct the so-called material reality in accordance with our own subjective methods. It is no doubt that Kant drew the right conclusion: objectivity is synthesized by subjective *a priori* conditions. This means that we have modern science that connects different domains by a mediation which is our activity of applying the subjectively constituted logics and methods on the indifferent homogenous materiality. Here at this level emerges a mediation that is neither the methodological, so-called formal quantitative rational, nor the so-called material homogenous sum of parts, but a dimension that ranges between the two of them and has

no criteria how to apply the formal to the material. This is the first intimation of a constructive process that emerges as the modern will. It becomes a selective process that has not posited anything apart from its own self generation.

This point of mediation has been called by modern philosophers “autonomy” suggesting that every formal and quantitative rule is constructed without any conditions, that is has no cause. In this sense, the material world subjected to those rules can be transformed without any question concerning the traditionally known categorical differences among experienced limits of things. In fact, the formal and quantitative rules do not have within their own compositions any criteria for making such distinctions, thus they can be applied on everything indifferently. At the same time, the material world, the extended substance, must be regarded as homogenous and, therefore, constructable in accordance with the invented rules. What is at issue at this level is the choice of formal and quantitative rules over qualitative categorical distinctions. Since both are by modern definitions subjective, then there is no inherent criterion why one would be more objective than the other. We must look for an account within the very composition of those invented rules. First, it can be argued that it is impossible to gain any advantage over the environment on the grounds of categorical, qualitative distinctions. Second, it is also the case that formal and quantitative rules comprise within their own structures techniques for transforming the material environment. This way the choice of formal quantitative rules already implies the choice of instrumentality and the possibility for application. The modern sciences whose theories and methods are framed within formal and quantitative structures are in principle technical. This is the reason why any scientific discipline that cannot be technically tested is not regarded to be scientific. This is another reason that all modern scientific and philosophical theories are premised on arbitrary power.

We have reached the point where the construction of methods that have no other criteria apart from being technical requires the process of application of scientific methods. While we have such methods, they have to be connected to the material homogenous world. This connection is provided by various theories, yet all theories assume body

activity as a mediation through which scientific methods are applied. At this level is born what is known as human as a tool maker, as *homo laborans*, as practical man, including the primacy of pragmatism. This is to say body becomes a sight which must be constituted in accordance with the abilities required of scientific application. This is to say such bodies must slowly become technical, productive, efficient, rule-bounded, and perhaps fragmented into diverse functions. At the outset we may note that the medium as body activity takes precedence over body as simple physiological object. The latter will be judge on the basis of its abilities or disabilities to perform technical functions. What is of theoretical importance is that this required mediation precludes in principle to access the world as it is in itself. We propose that this is the reason for Kant's claim that "the thing in itself" is unknowable. Any effort to deal with the world of direct experience is deflected toward active intervention and manipulation of the environment in terms of our own invented formal and quantitative rules.

The globalizing process that promises to improve everyone's life and to bring liberation to all peoples from want and oppression is premised on claim to universality of this technical active intervention in the world. This intervention at the same time requires that all peoples anywhere and anytime must also engage in reducing their environments to required material resources for technical transformation and exploitation. The term we used "liberation" was at times replaced by humanization in a sense that we as natural beings in a natural environment are subjected to forces that are not under our control. That is they are alien and inhuman. Therefore, once the environment and our own lives are subjected to the scientific methods and their way of transforming the environment and us, then we shall reach a human stage which liberates us from natural necessities. At this level, this universal claim provides a rationale for teleology and progress. The teleology proposes that there is a stage in which man will be a total master of the environment and himself and this then provides a standard on the basis on which others, those who have not yet joined human history will have to judge their positions and lives as inferior. This is the logic that is offered by numerous organizations caught in theories of development.

The universal claim to this construct that has equally become a logic of globalization is the ground of various theories of power. At the outset, the very instrumentalization of method and theory applied through the mediation of body activity on the material homogenized world has an implicit premise: the increasing application of our methods and the transformation of the environment in terms of our own controls lead to an increasing ability to master and control domains of the environment and, therefore, to acquire greater power over the environment and ourselves. It is to be recalled that the methods and theories are not given objectively but are constructed as instruments to reshape the environment, and as instruments they are at the service of autonomous will. The latter sets its own criteria for increased mastery and therefore increased power to master; all discourses are power laden. We have reached a position of the metaphysics of the will that, while generating itself, it generates the very rules by which the world is to be constructed. This self generation of itself and rules is the ground of modern anarchy and “human divine complex”. After all, only divinities create themselves and the laws by which the world is constructed. Abolishing all the experienced limits, this will is an arbitrary source and power that abolishes all limits by its reductive and homogenizing metaphysics.

MODERN WESTERN UNIVERSAL IDENTITY

Postmodern texts inclusive of deconstructive logics have proclaimed the death of identity and specifically the identity of the subject. The problem is that they were not seriously concerned with what is the subject that was challenged. Based on our previous notions of scientific method and reconstruction of the world in favor of humanity there is the background subject that has no pre-given definitions. The modern subject that has been universalized in various pronouncements that include the United Nations’ universal human rights, both individual and cultural, and postmodern claims that demand respect for different cultural styles to self determination are premised on a modern understanding of subject as self generating. At the dawn of Western moderni-

ty, Pico de la Mirandolla has announced that the human has no nature, has no essence, has no rules by which to live, and therefore whatever nature the human will possess whatever rules will be followed whether scientific or political will have to be invented as if “out of nothing”.

This is an initial suggestion that the modern subject intends to be self created without any other conditions, including theological, scientific, and ontological to the extent that the very distinctions between those terms are equally invented without precedence. This is the intentionality that comprises the background for the articulation of what a human is as self created, a being with divine complex. Therefore, there is no pre-given subject that can be used as a criterion to determine what human subject is. Even Descartes could not avoid this intentionality when he argued that despite the power of an evil genius, it cannot do anything against the fact that I constitute my own thoughts prior to truth and falsity. In short, the subject here escapes even and infinite power. The subject is posited as totally self constituting without any conditions or to speak with Kant, an unconditional subject. It seems that at this level, the constitution of modern subject has no essential criteria that would be used to judge what the subject is as identity. This type of self creative subject is totally autonomous, and its autonomy creates unconditional methods and theories that then through an autonomous will can create its own environment. One aspect of this creation is scientific methodology and technology. What we are pointing to is that while this unconditional subject is also the telos of modern Western science and philosophy. As Marx inadvertently noted, the future man, having gone through the labor of transforming the environment and the human in accordance with rules of total mastery of total nature such as a human, will be in a position to be totally self created. Hence, the beginning of modernity is equally its telos where the logic of self creation of the subject subtends the scientific, the social, the political theories that play a role of establishing the conditions for this “subject”.

At this level, we reach once again the principle on the basis of which the Others of other parts of the world are to judge themselves whether they have established the conditions that would allow them to be free from all the blind material natural forces and be in a position

not only to master such forces, but to create those forces in order to allow the human to use them for self creation. This is the subject as *sui generis* and the final reason for human history. In this sense, the efforts to deconstruct this kind of self generating subject may fail because the subject at the outset does not have any identity. It promises the unconditional condition for everyone to acquire self identity, to become any identity you choose. This way, the postmodern logic is premised on the modern autonomous subject. The postmodern logic in principle claims that all cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, natural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. This means that they still accept the self creation of the modern subject that invents its own logic for mastery of its own world and for self definition. The egological self definition is only one among the options. The postmodern globalization assumes this universal self generating subject that invents different cultures without any natural, material, psychological conditions. After all, postmodernity claims that everything is a construct. The very notion of a construct is premised on modern autonomous unconditional subject. This subject is universalized as the possibility of identity for anyone. That is anyone can create of himself or herself whatever they want.

Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible for any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of choice between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, or the right of a particular group to respect their own identity. The globalizing universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by postmodernity in such a way that the others in their own self reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out their lives, between what they can be as universal individuals or what they can maintain as members of their culture. The autonomous self creating subject that is being globalized as universal has become a background on which the Others as culturally different would be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual, unique, with a right to self preservation.

This self preservation is a phenomenon that has no basis in any ontological, metaphysical, or theological claims since all these are equally unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they will have to be adjudicated in power confrontations each calling for the maintenance of its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. Nonetheless, in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this self creation syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning the criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, modern West, on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some of the intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, follow the same globalizing logic of willful destruction – and do so on a hidden premise of evolution: the others are on a lesser level of evolution and hence have to be brought up to modern instrumental rationality by discarding their outdated myths and modes of life.

MULTIPLICITY OF CULTURES AND DISCOURSES

Cultural anthropology has to contend with the following issues, specifically ones that require methodological access to the cultural phenomena and their multiplicity, and the presumed objectivity which is required as a guarantee to truth claims by theorists of culture. First, there is a claim that any member of a given group belongs to and understands itself within and in terms of its own culture. But this would mean that there cannot be any privileged persons who could “escape” their own cultural understanding in order to see it from “outside”. How does one “alienate” oneself from one’s culture, if the very culture regards itself as alienating? One is already stuck in a cultural position and hence cannot claim to have any culturally impartial attitude. Indeed, the very comprehension of impartiality is an aspect of a given culture. Second, the major solution to this issue may be offered by some of the major comparative theories. The latter want to argue that it is possible to understand one’s own culture from the vantage point of comparison with another culture. This suggests that one knows another culture by being immersed in it and hence having obtained a similar comprehension as

the “natives”. This is to say, from this position one may claim that it is possible to see one’s own culture in terms of the limits that the other culture offers. The other culture is, after all, radically different, and we understand ourselves and the other in terms of the difference.

Given this complex claim, it is impossible to offer a methodology that would allow us understand our own culture, since, seen from the culture of the other, our culture is already incorporated and interpreted in terms of the other culture. This means that either one picks up another culture as a limit of one’s own and interprets it in terms of one’s own cultural grammar and hence has not escaped the problem of seeing one’s culture at its limit, or one adopts the other culture and translates one’s own culture in terms of the grammar of the other culture. In neither case has one gained any methodological access to one’s own, and indeed to the other’s culture. To speak pedagogically, if I am going to lecture on another culture, and claim that it is radically different from my own, I shall do so in terms of my language that is comprehensible to the audience to which I am communicating. Both, the audience and I understand the other culture by giving it our own cultural context and grammar of interpretation. The same can be said in reverse, when talking in terms of the other culture about our culture; in this case what we would get is the other’s incorporation of our culture into their context and grammar, and hence without offering anything more than their cultural frame – but comprehensible only to those who are part of, or have been immersed in the culture of the other. Third, we face, what could be called the hysteria of objectivity. By “hysteria” I mean the shock that objectively speaking other cultures have to be treated as equivalent to our own, leading to the efforts that deny other cultures their due and right to speak. This is to say, the scientific modern Western pronouncement that everything has to be treated with objective impartiality, requires the positing of our own culture as one among others, having no value claim to be privileged in its various pronouncements. But this is the hysterical point: the claim to scientific objectivity is one aspect of Western modern culture and belongs to the interpretive context of this culture. Hence, the very claim to Western scientific superiority as having methods to access all phenomena objectively, is a culture bound

position that cannot be universal. After all, “objectively speaking” other cultures, as equal, have very different understandings that do not include such tandems as “objectivity” or for that matter “subjectivity”.

Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their different reading of cultural, and indeed all other, phenomena. To say that the others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that we have a criterion of the “right culture” which belongs only to one culture. But in this sense, one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objectively and equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and require that all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requirements. Yet, by the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and without prejudice, we have just offered a position that requires (1) the treatment of other cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in terms of one culture’s requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice of objectivity, and allowing other cultures their modes of awareness that do not regard themselves as either objective or subjective. Given this setting, we revert back to the problematic mentioned above: how can one claim to know the other “objectively” when one has imposed one’s own cultural component of “objectivity” on others and hence not only did not understand the other culture, but failed to escape one’s own culture. In this sense, the very claim to be able to treat one’s own culture objectively, is to accept this very culture without any “objectivity”, since one already lives and accepts the terms of their own culture.

Given this problematic, we can note the minor variations that face the same nonsensical dilemmas. Various Western critical cultural movements posit implicit valuative postures that seem to show the limits of our own and those of other peoples’ cultures. The limits rest with the claim of cultural relativism. By the very logic of being culture bound, any claim to cultural relativism becomes an aspect of one culture and thus ceases to be a universal necessity. Moreover, the limit is also reached with the tacit assumption that despite their radical differences, all cultures are human. If this assumption were not present, then we would end up in a position wherein each culture defines its own members in a unique way such that what is human in one need not be human in another – indeed in some cultures there may not be “humans”

at all, since they may not have such terms as “human”. But if the claim is made that despite variations all cultures are human, then we have to admit an awareness of ourselves and others as human. This awareness has not been articulated in modern/postmodern philosophies.

We have reached a point at which every culture is regarded to be self generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or theological grounds. This is to say the modern globalizing position led to the conclusion that all discourses are autonomously constituted and, therefore, are equivalent to one another. After all, there are no criteria external to such discourses which will allow the adjudication among them concerning any truth claims. If there is anything common among them, it is their difference. Given this level, the theories that at times are paraded inadvertently such that a discourse somehow represents something are no longer maintainable. But this also implies that there is no misrepresentation. A particular discourse that frames a cultural world view is in no position to either represent the Others or to misrepresent them. The only thing that can be suggested is that each discourse inclusive of cultural discourses, will interpret Others within the parameters of a giving discourse. This is of course premised on the basis of the abolition of an essential presence of a subject or a structure of the world. But this essentialism has been already destroyed by the assumption that even the modern subject has no essence, but must make of himself in terms of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, the multicultural proposition is not premised on a pre-given essentialism, but in fact is constituted on the globalizing modern self destruction of an essential subject. The only criterion of this globalizing self invention, both of the individual subjectivity and multicultural identities is its practical efficiency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of the subject, but a view toward what works given that a particular people will be offered practical solutions to whatever they think they are lacking in their lives, or what they are told what they lack in their lives.

For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is whether a given culture with its own constituted discourses has the same practical global needs that the globalizing autonomy is offering. This is to say, does a particular cultural discourse allow the definition of

the environment to be reduced to homogenous resources for arbitrary reconstruction? The first limit of modern non-essential conception of total and unconditional possibility of inventing any discourse for the sake of applying it for “human needs” may be given in the discourses of Other cultures. In order to set a limit for globalizing modernity, we must demonstrate that within the logic of this globalization there is also a reflective recognition that it as invented culture must respect the equivalences of other invented cultures without any other criteria apart from those that each cultural discourse possesses within itself. This means that if another culture has a different ontology and even metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology of metaphysics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not operate with the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the homogenized environment. The limit would be set with the lack of primacy of instrumental rationality. If the meaning of life of particular people within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfillment of indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalizing modern logic permitted to pursue its own mode of having a lifeworld.

To sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the discussion of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, we suggest that the very abolition of a pre-given subject in favor of self invention in modern sense leads to the notion not only that the Others are equally self inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self invention to the modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumentality. This is to say that if every discourse is deemed to be invented and only valid within its own framework, then the very concept of discursive self generation belongs within the framework of modernist and Western postmodernist discourse. But this means that even if the Other cultures are regarded as self generated, their self generation may have very different self conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practices that did not respect the logic of modernizing and globalizing ontologies and methods. Practically speaking this means that whatever purposes there are and however the environment is interpreted need no follow the logic of causal efficiency of reconstructing the world into our own needs and power. If a

culture regards that playing music, listening to the stories of the ancients is meaningful and the metaphysical entities are relevant for life as protectors of the environment then there cannot be an introduction of a criterion that would claim that such conceptions are not realistic, mystical, non productive, since the latter concepts belong to another framework. In brief, the confrontation between the two is not between some truth and some falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein each will interpret the Other in its own unique way.

Yet it is also the case that a globalizing logic with its technical efficiency and promise of better life is an aspect of the Others. They see themselves in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural necessities, which becomes part of their own self understanding as different from and yet related to this globalizing logic. This creates an internal tension within various cultures that constitute dual self recognition wherein one still maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges those discourses in light of the global Other. This is the source of alienation and destruction of cultural self identity. We still want to maintain cultural identity, but we also like to be like the Other, to judge ourselves from the vantage point of the Other. This is an invention of a dual consciousness that frames the power struggles within various cultures. The modernizers who at the same time claim to be part of the same culture want to transform that culture into civilized, practically efficient, objective, and beneficial. While it liberates the individuals from their own culture yet there is a wish to claim against the globalizing process the uniqueness of their own culture. In one sense, there is a demand to use the environment in a “desacralized” manner, purely for the purpose of the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, employment, increased wages as signs of the good life.

In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have our spiritual values that do not allow reducing the environment, including the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the adjudication cannot be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able to adjudicate which is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. Hence, we witness the many confrontations between the groups within given cultures that promote modernizations and at the same time intel-

lectuals who resist modernizations. This means that a given culture is split into those who propagate the need to become globalized and modern and at the same time those who, recognizing the necessity of modernization, propose a battle against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they claim that we may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalizing logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-called passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems that the reason for this power confrontation rests in the failure to understand the already posited limit within which the globalizing process must function.

This limit is the very requirement that the Other and its self-generated cultural framework is equivalent to the globalizing logic. Therefore, the latter sees to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to or not its own limitations. When we say whether wants it or not, we do not mean a choice between two options, but a power confrontation that is inevitable since there are no external criteria in this confrontation that would allow free decision. What we have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one possibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is offered as the future. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states that the one from the past is conservative and traditional, while the other is liberal, individualistic open, and even humanistic. Whether this designation is true or false is not our concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, in their dual consciousness, will play out their roles as both maintaining their tradition and at the same time proposing future transformations.

At this point, a specific conception of the world of time is divided into closed past and open future. This conception subtends or underlies Western modern globalization: anything in the past can no longer be changed and therefore to return to it would mean to return to something changeless and thus conservative, while the escape from it would require an open and undetermined future projected by the will. This is the confrontation between any given tradition as a determined history and its rejection in favor of constructed and undetermined future. It is of note that the modern Western globalization is characterized by the shift of temporal awareness from the rejection of the “irrelevant”

past to possibilizing future. The Western globalization is premised on an implicit construction of time awareness that leads to the rejection of anything that is permanent or with set limits.

Our challenge at the cultural level is whether this time awareness is universal. The cultural logics must be investigated within the parameters of peoples' understanding of their world not only in terms of the lifeworlds and discursive practices, but also the lifeworlds that are subtended by the cultural preconceptions of what constitutes the universe as time. Within this context, we hope to articulate the limits wherein even the power confrontations of the dual consciousness find their own limitations. Each culture has its own world conceptions as conditions for their own self understanding. If there is going to be any adjudication among cultures underneath the power confrontations such adjudications will have to articulate the world conceptions of various peoples. In this sense, the challenge to the globalizing logic will not come from the acceptance by the Other of the efficient technical means that make their own culture inadequate, but by the recognition that their own culture has a very different world understanding. We know from other cultures, whether Mayan, Hindu, or Taoist that the world understanding, even at the ontological or metaphysical levels, is different from the Western scientific and linear conceptions. So the task of cultural studies is to find the cosmic awareness that underlies their cultural parameters.

THE LIMIT

What is crucial is the recognition of "value" as an invariant in this type of life world. What is at issue here is also the separation of value from fact. Facts, for modern ontology, have no value. Hence, values are constructed and imposed by us on facts. Such imposition takes on various forms, one of which is the globalization of "Western values" and above all of technocratic rulership by qualified experts. This globalization assumes that values can be exported; hence "democratic values" can be packaged and sent abroad on aircraft carriers, rockets, tanks and troops. It is deemed that anyone in the world would be more than pleased to welcome and "adopt" such values.

But values and valuations have to be evaluated not by their own self proliferating construction, but by a discovery of a constitutive awareness that is correlated to a tacitly lived eidōs offering the possibility of performing a suspension of commitment to a given life world. The transcendental requirement is to disclose this eidōs that would be an all pervasive presence demanding a transformation of a given, and specifically of the life world of political enlightenment. Instead of constructed values, this eidōs can be called WORTH. As we shall see, the latter cannot be constructed and it appears in the background of all values and valuations. It also provides a background on which every life world can be regarded in its essential morphology and questioned concerning its legitimacy. In this sense, the first task is to explicate the life world of enlightenment, inclusive of its two essential aspects, democracy and domination by experts, and to note their internal and inevitable connection and, in the final analyses inadequacy. The latter lies in its constructive character and hence comprises a fundamental crisis of democracy. This is not to say that it is therefore invalidated. Rather, its limits are exhibited from a transcendental lived awareness that demands “more” and does so on the basis of discovery what this more is. The constitution of this more – what will be called WORTH – is not a construction but a disclosure of an intentionality whose meant objectivity, its eidōs as WORTH, is present as absolute. We should not despair while using the term absolute; after all, in all awareness there are such terms comprising a pre-given ARCHE whose denial is its unavoidable inclusion. This is to say, to attempt to negate an arche is to include it in the very negation and hence to comprise its absolute affirmation. We shall call this the PRINCIPLE OF SELF INCLUSION and venture a claim that only transcendental phenomenology is in a position to function within this principle. Now we are in a position to expound on the crisis of democracy by showing what sort of life world it has established and the limits it has imposed upon itself.

It is necessary to turn to the essence of the life world of enlightenment in which we find ourselves. IT IS A PROCESS OF VALUATION. Everything in the universe assumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that the world has no value,

the current world, constructed by enlightenment, is full of values: values for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of life and even calculated death. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is evaluative selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception are no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on its specific value. Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed currently relevant in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values are human and hence the primacy is placed on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other categories and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values, such as technologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic biochemistry compel the understanding of the human to be equivalent to the rest of the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but will have to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus the environment, that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally objectively in terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such constructed technical values could be applied and thus useful and valuable. The public domain, once deemed the space of autonomous beings, has become a battle ground of values: what is more valuable, jobs or forests, production or clean air, god or freedom of choice?

In the life world of modern globalization there is a constant deflection away from the human and its replacement by systems of values that make the human into a secondary and dependent phenomenon. What Heidegger was afraid of in his Letter on Humanism – the centering of all modern thought on the human, turns out to be a mistaken

understanding. The human is not the center if we note the battle for values in current public “debate.” In the U.S. the much publicized issue of “family values”, leading to the emotional question as to who can marry whom, reveals a deflection from the human toward family, divine law, natural essentialism, social traditions, and genetic or cultural determinants. While these are values in the public debate, they release the human from any rights and above all from responsibilities. It is nature that makes us who we are, it is culture or social tradition that has shaped our way of being, and it is divine law that demands our compliance. In all cases of such public debates, which may be deemed to be democratically guaranteed free speech, there is a constant rejection of such freedom by enlightenments tendency to “explain” and thus abolish the very public domain as that of autonomy. Even the latter is interpreted as one aspect of a contingent fact based on a contingent history of one tradition. Given other tradition such a fact could not arise. Hence, its universality is particular and cannot be used to understand life worlds of other traditions.

One result of the introduction of contingency is the abolition of truth and its replacement by rhetoric. If all depends on historical traditions and their modes of interpretation, then different traditions have different interpretations, each claiming the right to its truths as equivalent with those of others. In addition, even a historical tradition is composed of a variety of histories with equal claim to their truths and hence to an increasing contingency of what truth is, ending in the notion that “truth is whatever a given history, a given culture, a given discipline, literary work, religious text may say”. They all have value and need not address any content; they all are equivalent rhetorical figures. And no one lies, since what an individual states depends on the framework of a particular culture and its requirements. In a business or corporate setting, where profit is of essence, one can tell anything as long as the statements made are valuable to enhance the incrementation of profit. One would be a fool to do otherwise. The same can be said of any discipline, specifically of any technical discipline. The latter are constructs and function on the basis of production of what is valuable for human consumption: whether it is designed food products or medications, the claim has to be

made that each product is “contingent” and cannot be a cure for all ills. In this sense, the claims are statistical: the value of this product is presented with various disclaimers: in seventy percent of cases it will cure the liver, but it might cause high blood pressure, impotency, dizziness, and nightmares. And all these disclaimers are equally contingent. Thus one cannot say that the producers lie; they simply say that given the complexity of a specific organism, we cannot account for all possible implications. If something goes wrong with a given biotechnology, the answer is “we did not have sufficient evidence to warn against all results”. In principle, nonetheless, the human is a complex organism and nothing more, and the entire constructed environment is to maintain that organism. This is one major aspect of the crisis of democracy in the life world established by enlightenment.

The awareness of crises constitutes a unique reflective moment that, at the same time, allows a suspension of one’s participation in a given life world. We are cognizant, by now, that while living in a particular life world we are not aware of its basic composition. We live in it as if it were self evident and all inclusive. There is nothing lacking in it to the extent that it would not offer relief and answers to all of our questions. If we claim to live in a democratic life world, we take for granted that our elected officials tend to lie, that we can vote them out of office, that the injustices can be corrected by legal means, and that those who work harder deserve more. We also know that we would not tolerate dictators or anyone who would deny our right to make our own choices and mistakes. There must be a unique situation which allows us to extricate from our life world and to raise the question of its legitimacy. That such a question can arise means that we rise to lived awareness which no longer belongs to a life world in which we live. This must be made clear: our awareness is always world oriented and our orientations, or intentional directions find, in their life world if not total, at least partial perceptual affirmation. This is an epistemic aspect which takes for granted the division of our life world into categories and the way they are concretized or given perceptual fulfillment. But the fulfillment of our taken for granted intentions and the categories to which they correlate, including the numerous value gradations – the epistemic under-

standing – leave out the legitimating question given in lived awareness that something is not fulfilled, something that no value can account for: INTRINSIC SELF WORTH. To reach the latter, the lived awareness must suspend the life world and explicate the access to the transcendental lived awareness that correlates to intrinsic self worth and demands legitimation of the life world in which one has so far lived in full belief and affirmation. The lived awareness and its intention toward self worth asks whether the life world offers any fulfillment and confirmation of this intention. At this level of awareness the categorical and epistemic understanding fails, and an existential question of action becomes preeminent. Can I act, as I have always acted, and fulfill the intention of my intrinsic self worth? The latter embodies such requirements as honor, honesty, dignity, self and other respect, and justice. If honor, honesty, dignity and respect cannot be fulfilled in my activities, then the legitimacy of this life world is placed in absolute question, revealing at the same time the awareness of ABSOLUTE SELF WORTH. It is at this juncture that the transcendental lived awareness recognizes that the world of values, constructed by Enlightenment, requires evaluation as to its adequacy for human worth. Such a question is one of principle that required an essential delimitation of the construct of democracy and whether the latter could be adjusted, discarded or become open to the absolute requirement of transcendental awareness of self worth. We are in a position, now to attempt our venture into lived awareness that is led by the intention correlated to self worth and thus a crisis in enlightenment.

There is no need to go into a variety of utilitarianisms since in principle they follow the logic of valuation on the basis of psychophysiological needs. Utilitarianisms have no philosophical importance, since they presume that we all seek pleasure and value things and others insofar as they will comprise some means to fulfill our pleasures. Indeed, such a psychologized ethos is precisely what leads to crisis of democracy insofar as the technical promises by elected officials to fulfill our pleasures lead the public away from public participation and hence maintenance of the public domain. Besides, striving to fulfill pleasures suggests our complete subjection to irrational drives and a loss of any

sense of autonomy. Hence, our task is to seek a more profound conception of enlightenment's failure to provide the ground of its ethos. We already know that the highest point of Enlightenment, Kant's critical works, have left us with a quandary regarding the final arbiter in human action. It was not the universal moral imperative demanding that we act out of respect for this imperative originating as it were out of total autonomy, but the empty condition called GOOD WILL. It is empty because it is purely formal and has no existential implications. There is no content by which to decide what sort of action would be recognizable as one that follows good will. It is to be noted that the universal moral imperative, having total autonomy as its source, does not require a commitment to others, apart from not treating them as means but always as ends. Being universal, this imperative does not singularize and does not require respect for the other as having intrinsic worth; it simply requires obedience to the imperative or, as Kant would have it, obedience out of respect for the law.

But respect for the law implies something more basic, some lived awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person beyond his/her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an honorable, noble, truthful, elevating manner for its own sake. This also suggests a crisis of democracy insofar as it has been reduced for the sake of other purposes such, as Regan once boasted, making money and getting rich. It seems that the loss of democracy for its own sake is premised on the reduction of the human to a purposive value and thus the exclusion of worth for its own sake. The transcendental rule that emerges at this level of awareness is THE DEGRADATION OF THE HUMAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO A PURPOSIVE VALUE AND, BY IMPLICATION, VALULESNESS. Yet both democratic ethos and the final arbiter of all values cannot be value; they are for their own sake and comprise a lived awareness that already recognizes intrinsic self worth as that which is coextensive with democratic ethos. Self worth and democratic ethos for their own sake comprise the lived awareness of the missing aspect of the way that enlightenments intentionality has unfolded. Here a person is exposed to treat the lived world, and her im-

mersion in it, as inadequate and thus place such a world and herself out of play, in brackets.

It is, then, the task to unfold the lived awareness that is compelled to bracket, to place out of action, the life world of enlightenment and to note the presence of this lived awareness across diverse phenomena. All the intentional orientations toward a life world in which she has been immersed appear to be groundless constructs; the life world of public domain, which is no longer maintained, requires and recognizes a presence of intrinsic self worth even in its denial. In the most degraded figures that our age has produced there appears an intimation of self worth. Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world where everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions and expressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not only of themselves but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an indication of intrinsic self worth of others. It would be impossible to be a racist and degrade others without recognizing the other as a possessor of intrinsic self worth. We cannot degrade a creature who, in its life world, does not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to make a choice between two life worlds; in short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a degradation nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only another person can be degraded on the basis of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is to say, degradation, reduction, insult, are possible only when we recognize hers and our own intrinsic worth, honor, and dignity. This recognition is the ground of numerous events of our sophisticated age, among which is racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and even homophobia and religions.

Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself, is an indication of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other's intrinsic self worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the other's self worth, we condemn her to death and thus prove that we are unwilling to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and cannot withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self worth of another. Such an awareness is demonstrated by Viktor Frankel's depictions of life in concentration camps. This is an extreme case where the officers who ran the camps would immediately condemn to death anyone who showed self

and other respect, dignity and honor, thus revealing the lack of honor and dignity in the very officers – and all degraded to a mere value for the state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, to legitimize the life world in which they live and to ask whether such a life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to say, the very presence of the other who is aware of her intrinsic worth performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and hence challenges a blind inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether such a life world is worthy of one's intrinsic worth.

Intrinsic self worth, as a discovered given, appears not only through degradations and oppressions, but also through actions demanding mutual recognition of self and other. And it appears irrespective of culture, historical period, or social standing. Gandhi angered colonial rulers by his bearing, his dignity, his dignifying those who were at the lowest social rung, his demand that the colonial rulers have truthfulness and honor and thus made them recognize their own intrinsic worth and not merely their value for the empire. Gandhi reminded all that the life world of an empire is illegitimate because it does not allow the fulfillment of the lived awareness of intrinsic worth. Hence he asked for legitimation of his own value in such a life world and whether he must rise to a transcendental level and reveal a crisis in his own life and that of the empire based on recognition of what is the ground of final human self awareness and all the values. While being an object of derision and quixotic depictions, he took the blows with dignity, demanding dignity from those who administered the blows. It is to be noted that he did not claim intrinsic self worth as a value of a specific culture, but as an unconditional and absolute ground that raises the question of legitimation of any life world and demands the fulfillment of transcendental awareness that correlates to self worth. Einstein once pondered the phenomenon of Gandhi by wondering “that such a person could have walked among us”. In face of the intrinsic self worth of this slight person, the British Empire lost all of its moral, political, and military superiority.

We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philosophy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate So-

crates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with the demands of the good as one expression of intrinsic worth. Only under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and caricatures. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for “whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after all, demands self degradation and thus the denial of self worth. Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warning: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.

The responsibility of an intellectual is to raise the question of the legitimacy of any life world with respect to the lived fulfillment of in-

trinsic self worth. Here, all cultural value constructs as to what human being is are rendered transparent as to their arbitrariness and inadequacy, demanding the recognition that despite the variation of cultures and their values, there is a transcendental trace of self and other worth that is taken for granted even if not recognized. Such a recognition is the limit which cannot be transgressed without making cultures and their values meaningless.

What was given in modern Western as a background awareness, is now in the foreground of the life world of enlightenment and the unfolding of the constructive-valuative intentionality that has become prevalent. Being in the foreground or “positional” and thematized this awareness points to the problem of legitimation and to the illegitimate ways that the basic awareness became obfuscated, degraded, perverted, and empty. It questions the claim of this life world to be the only legitimate reality. This claim to sole reality appears only when the self worth becomes a foreground, enacted by a singular being in quest for an authentic fulfillment of self worth in a life world that at one stroke is made inactive, placed out of play. On the background of the life world that is placed out of play in its totality there appears a quest to act in favor of a world that would contain self worth. With the placing out of play, the life world without human worth is exposed to temporality: it becomes chronoscopic, i.e. an inadequate temporal perspective on the reality of the essence of the human. Such temporalization suggests that there is an atemporal, non-positional awareness which, inevitably can appear only chronoscopically. It is equally important to note that since the disclosure of self worth revealed it to be solely as activity and not accessible through categorical intuition, then honor, dignity, nobility, truthfulness and justice appear only as enacted phenomena and hence have validity to the extent of their enactment. In addition, the striving to enact intrinsic worth is also a chronoscopic awareness, since no single activity, whether honorable, noble or truthful, does not fulfill the entirety of the search for self worth. As an activity for its own sake, self worth also demands, as already suggested, public domain wherein such activity can be performed, resulting in the notion that such a domain is to be maintained for its own sake. Both, self worth and public domain

are phenomena that mutually require one another and hence are to be maintained as purposes in themselves.

Yet even the awareness of such purposes in themselves requires one more domain of awareness. The disclosure of intrinsic worth as atemporally present, but only chronoscopically experienced, requires a specific constitution of activity. As we know, awareness is oriented toward the world. Yet such orientation is experienced reflectively, such that the world becomes represented and the self becomes represented as awareness that is turned toward the world. In view of her orientation as intentional aim, she also finds confronted by herself. Such orientation toward the world in face of oneself is the ESSENCE OF ACTIVITY. Given the awareness of such activity, the latter places another demand: not only reflection that represents an aim toward the world and the one who intends such an aim, but above all asks for legitimation as to the worth of such an action. At this level one does not ask whether such a world is known – this is already granted, but is this world worthy of one's activity. The possibility of constituting a worthy life world is the reflective condition from which the failures of our degraded life world become visible.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND OF ALL VALUES

INTRODUCTION

Following the analyses of the two trends of Enlightenment, it has been suggested that democracy is in crisis, and crisis means a transition from one life world to another. This chapter is devoted to fill a gap left by the founding of Political Enlightenment, its constitution of an open public domain, and the reduction of the enlightenment to multiple interests and power confrontations. One question that will have to be answered is whether the public domain, constituted by political enlightenment, led to such confrontations, and what is the ground of the latter. In addition, there is a need to explicate the clash between two major life worlds that the enlightenment founded and hence to reveal the contradiction in such founding. The contradiction, here, has two senses: one formal, the other temporal. The latter too, in the final analysis, faces its own contradiction that cannot be resolved on the grounds of enlightenment. Yet our contention is that all the contradictions will have to be resolved at another – transcendental – level by opening up a dimension of lived awareness that cannot be accessed by the categories of enlightenment, even when the latter has tacitly assumed and lived such awareness. This means that such awareness was and is available, but, as a transcendental intentionality, could not be fulfilled in the life world of the enlightenment. To understand this intentionality it is necessary to make a phenomenological distinction between constitution and construction. Constitutive intentionality opens up or discloses an *eidōs* that either can

or cannot be fulfilled in a given life world. The latter is a signitive inter-connection of all events and objectivities, including a self interpretation of the subject as being in this life world. It is given as self evident and taken for granted that all events and objectivities in it are realities in their own right. For example, in the West and East it is granted that we live in an economic world, where things, processes and people have economic value. Whether we like it or not, we understand this world as our reality and cannot see any reason to doubt it – despite our complaints that this reality is unfair to some or even should be rearranged differently – and still economically. Even our scientific and technical achievements have the same value. What is crucial is the recognition of “value” as an invariant in this type of life world. What is at issue here is also the separation of value from fact. Facts, for modern ontology, have no value. Hence, values are constructed and imposed by us on facts. Such imposition takes on various forms, one of which is the globalization of “Western values” and above all of technocratic rulership by qualified experts. This globalization assumes that values can be exported; hence “democratic values” can be packaged and sent abroad on aircraft carriers, rockets, tanks and troops. It is deemed that anyone in the world would be more than pleased to welcome and “adopt” such values.

But values and valuations have to be evaluated not by their own self proliferating construction, but by a discovery of a constitutive awareness that is correlated to a tacitly lived eidōs offering the possibility of performing a suspension of commitment to a given life world. The transcendental requirement is to disclose this eidōs that would be an all pervasive presence demanding a transformation of a given, and specifically of the life world of political enlightenment. Instead of constructed values, this eidōs can be called *worth*. As we shall see, the latter cannot be constructed and it appears in the background of all values and valuations. It also provides a background on which every life world can be regarded in its essential morphology and questioned concerning its legitimacy. In this sense, the first task is to explicate the life world of enlightenment, inclusive of its two essential aspects, democracy and domination by experts, and to note their internal and inevitable connection and, in the final analyses inadequacy. The latter lies in its constructive

character and hence comprises a fundamental crisis of democracy. This is not to say that it is therefore invalidated. Rather, its limits are exhibited from a transcendental lived awareness that demands “more” and does so on the basis of discovery what this more is. The constitution of this more is an intentionality whose meant objectivity, its *eidos* is *worth*, and is present as absolute. We should not despair while using the term absolute; after all, in all awareness there are such terms comprising a pre-given *arche* whose denial is its unavoidable inclusion. This is to say, to attempt to negate an *arche* is to include it in the very negation and hence to comprise its absolute affirmation. We shall call this the **principle of self inclusion**.

THE LIFEWORLD OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The various major critiques of enlightenment, from Adorno through Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Levinas, to Deleuze fall within the parameters of one or another variant of enlightenment, whether it is rationalism, psychologism, sociologism, economism, and even biologism. Valuations that are available, such as utilitarianism, deontologism, and voluntarism are equally variants of enlightenment. Hence the task is to extricate the life world of enlightenment from such variants at its very limit in order to reveal its *eidos*. The **first** is the well known dualism of subject and object, the former is mind, the latter is matter. The subject is the unconditional source of all theories and values while the material world is an irrational and valueless sum of homogeneous matter to be constructed in terms of the subjects theories and values. **Second**, the subject is unconditionally an autonomous source of all laws in both the social and material realms. Since there is no other criterion concerning the material and social worlds, then all subjects are equal concerning the way that the material and social worlds are to be constructed. **Third**, construction is unconditional to the extent that no causes can be assigned to the structures and procedures by which the subject interprets and shapes itself, social relationships, and the material environment. Scientific enlightenment posits the subject as a rational bearer of theoretical and methodological constructs by which to manage the

material environment in terms of projected human “needs.” The latter are to be understood either biologically or psychologically and thus can be satisfied by scientific invention of “techniques” of fulfillment leading, to what is known, the reduction of scientific reason to instrumentality. **Fourth**, invention of history and its progress toward a utopian society; the latter assumed various interpretations, yet common to all is the notion that humans can construct a material and psychological setting wherein all previous ills would be abolished. It is obvious that this utopian notion, as “the aim and end of history” is a mixture of political and scientific enlightenments. **Fifth**, the reason that this mixture had to be posited as a future aim is that political and scientific enlightenments became incompatible; the scientific enlightenment, and its promise to fulfill material and psychological wants, had to abolish the interpretation of human life as autonomous, unconditional and self creative. The first requirement and interpretation of human life became material and psychological sum of wants and their immediate gratification. As we know, current reading of life and experience is regarded as a multiplicity of intensive pleasure nodes, each clamoring to be tickled, gratified, in order that new pleasure nodes could pop up for more gratification. Utilitarianism is the general ethical position wherein all things and humans have a value to the extent that they produce pleasure. Second requirement is the massive technology and its progress, designed for the constant fulfillment and constant invention of needs. The conjunction of these factors results in the abolition of historical aim and its replacement by progress for the sake of progress. This is obvious from the essence of instrumental rationality. **Sixth**, the notion of autonomy, the view of the subject as self creative had to be postponed and forever deferred, and also regarded as scientifically irrelevant and contradictory. It is impossible to claim that once the material and psychological conditions are fully established, then they will cause the human subject to be autonomous. As we know at the outset, autonomy cannot be caused. As just noted, this is equally problematic due to progress that can never reach any end and hence establish all the necessary conditions for emergence of autonomy. Every new condition, as a result of instrumental reason, becomes means for new conditions and new needs, and the lat-

ter split up into more novel needs. In this sense it is impossible to fulfill all human needs and then establish autonomy. **Seventh**, we are left with a democracy whose principle of human autonomy and the public domain wherein such autonomy is maintained and exercised is no longer available. It has been completely pervaded by instrumental rationality and the proliferation of needs and their fulfillment. Hence, the members of a political and democratic community are reduced to material life, psychological titillations, and chemical prolongation of boredom. No doubt, progress for the sake of progress requires ever novel projects and future promises for the “benefit of humanity,” but it is also clear that such projects are to be regarded as expanding fulfillment of equally projected novel material and psychological needs clamoring for pleasant fulfillment. As we well know, in the current West, it would be impossible to elect a person to a public office if that person did not promise to improve our material life.

It is necessary to turn to the essence of the life world of enlightenment in which we find ourselves: it is a process of valuation. Everything in the universe assumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that the world has no value, the current world, constructed by enlightenment, is full of values: values for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of life and even calculated death. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valuative selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception are no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on its specific value. Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed currently relevant in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values are human and hence the primacy is placed on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other categories and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values,

such as technologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic biochemistry compel the understanding of the human to be **equivalent** to the rest of the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but will have to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus the environment, that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally objectively in terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such constructed technical values could be applied and thus useful and valuable. The public domain, once deemed the space of autonomous beings, has become a battle ground of values: what is more valuable, jobs or forests, production or clean air, god or freedom of choice?

In the life world derived from enlightenment there is a constant **deflection** away from the human and its replacement by systems of values that make the human into a secondary and dependent phenomenon. What Heidegger was afraid of in his *Letter on Humanism* – the centering of all modern thought on the human, turns out to be a mistaken understanding. The human is not the center if we note the battle for values in current public “debate”. In the U.S. the much publicized issue of “family values,” leading to the emotional question as to who can marry whom, reveals a deflection from the human toward family, divine law, natural essentialism, social traditions, and genetic or cultural determinants. While these are values in the public debate, they release the human from any rights and above all from responsibilities. It is nature that makes us who we are, it is culture or social tradition that has shaped our way of being, and it is divine law that demands our compliance. In all cases of such public debates, which may be deemed to be democratically guaranteed free speech, there is a constant rejection of such freedom by enlightenments tendency to “explain” and thus abolish the very public domain as that of autonomy. Even the latter is interpreted as one aspect of a contingent fact based on a contingent history of one tradition. Given other tradition such a fact could not arise. Hence, its universality is particular and cannot be used to understand life worlds of other traditions. One result of the introduction of **contingency** is

the abolition of truth and its replacement by rhetoric. If all depends on historical traditions and their modes of interpretation, then different traditions have different interpretations, each claiming the right to its truths as equivalent with those of others. In addition, even a historical tradition is composed of a variety of histories with equal claim to their truths and hence to an increasing contingency of what truth is, ending in the notion that “truth is whatever a given history, a given culture, a given discipline, literary work, religious text may say.” They all have value and need not address any content; they all are equivalent rhetorical figures. And no one lies, since what an individual states depends on the framework of a particular history and its requirements. In a business or corporate setting, where profit is of essence, one can tell anything as long as the statements made are valuable to enhance the incrementation of profit. One would be a fool to do otherwise. The same can be said of any discipline, specifically of any technical discipline. The latter are constructs and function on the basis of production of what is valuable for human consumption: whether it is designed food products or medications, the claim has to be made that each product is “contingent” and cannot be a cure for all ills. In this sense, the claims are statistical: the value of this product is presented with various disclaimers: in seventy percent of cases it will cure the liver, but it might cause high blood pressure, impotency, dizziness, and nightmares. And all these disclaimers are equally contingent. Thus one cannot say that the producers lie; they simply say that given the complexity of a specific organism, we cannot account for all possible implications. If something goes wrong with a given biotechnology, the answer is “we did not have sufficient evidence to warn against all results.” In principle, nonetheless, the human is a complex organism and nothing more, and the entire constructed environment is to maintain that organism. This is one major aspect of the crisis of democracy in the life world established by enlightenment.

We are now in a position to extricate the fundamental intentionality that constitutes this life world, that means it in a very specific way. To have some sense of this intentionality it is necessary to explicate the directly lived awareness that could not be posited as an object by the thinkers of enlightenment. It ought to be understood that such a

lived awareness is transcendental and hence accessible only reflectively from the meant objects that such a lived awareness intends. What then are these objects? While the process of valuation of events in favor of human “needs” was briefly indicated, i.e. various reductionisms of the human to biochemistry, genetics, and mechanics, the lived awareness subtending this process intends an objectivity which is unique to enlightenment. I had suggested in some writings that one level of this objectivity is designed to be accessible to quantification and hence it has to be measurable homogeneous matter. This, design, of course, is meant by a specific exclusion of the entire perceived world and hence in no wise accessible to experience. Yet covered by this homogeneous materiality as an intentional object is another intended objectivity: temporal possibility. The live awareness that intends such an objectivity is an empty will, prior to the question of its being free or determined. Phenomenologically speaking, there can be eternal possibilities – as Plato and Husserl have noted, but such possibilities have been already enacted theologically and in part metaphysically. Enlightenment rejects eternal possibilities and is left with temporal, although in the first lived intentionality, empty temporal possibilities. It is to be noted that the term “temporal” does not suggest “being in time”, but an open horizon without any specific ontological locus. Hence any temporal location would have to be established within such a horizon. If we attend to the language of enlightenment up to date, we shall note that subtending the question of “reality” there is a prior discourse concerning the “conditions for the possibility of reality”. Such discourses are premised on the first lived intentionality of empty temporal possibility. It opens a horizon of possible intentions and their fulfillment, requiring a second constitution of objectivities: possible valuations of what the will intends as valuable for us, but recalling that at this level all value possibilities are open as temporal. In principle, it is possible for us to be all that we will as valuable in time. This is enlightenment’s alpha and omega: empty temporal possibility and its temporal fulfillment by all that we value as our mode of final being. Both Marxism and capitalism offer the same intentionality. The intentionality of fulfillment of possible valuations as temporal does not lead to perceptual awareness, since the latter, in its

naturalistic mode, is quite limited and merely qualitative. Hence the fulfillment requires a constructive intentionality that can establish possible conditions for possible reality. One minor aspect for this establishment is the shift of reason to instrumental rationality whose task is to calculate what reality is valuable for us and then calculate the conditions how such reality shall be achieved. Values, in this sense, are calculations of possible results realized solely as material. To achieve any value, the human has to be reduced to a system of interests, needs, desires, power and all must act aggressively against others to fulfill such wants. Indeed, language itself is split into numerous technical discourses, and in public to the crudest form and lowest common denominator, designed to attack, insult and demean. The publicly appointed figures act in the same way: to use their positions in order to fulfill their own and the interests of their friends and not to maintain the democratic institutions for their own sake. It must be understood that such reductionisms are not a given, but are intentional constructs that fulfill intentionally constructed needs, valuations, and desires. This is the background on which postmodern writers can talk with justification that our life world and all relationships and events within it are constructions and hence bear no ontological status or necessity.

The issue of temporal value possibilities is the driving force of enlightenment at this level. Transcendent or eternal possibility is abolished; hence temporality is the pressure that demands a prolongation of our temporal existence. There is no other option; being temporal, we want to live as long as possible and hence the frantic rush for the latest technologies that promise to protract our lives. Such technologies have become equivalent to the value of life and death. The public domain is an arena for the struggle for life itself, and any means can be used, whether lying, killing, wars, all will do as well, as long as they promise to keep us safe, to insure our continuity at any price. All the changing technical inventions promote other inventions as values of life: we want to go on. The transcendental rule of enlightenment at this level is change as permanence enhancement. Thus the political shift to dramatic conservatism. The latter is a promise, by whatever means, to guarantee our security, safety, protection and continuity, as long as

we surrender our freedoms to participate in the public domain and to engage in public dialogue. In other words, the public domain, as the condition for other democratic institutions, is no longer maintained, despite all the rhetoric about democracy and its “values”. We are closer to Hobbesian world than to that of Locke and above all Kant. The intentionality of enlightenment has worked itself out to reveal its truth two centuries later. Indeed, we are living this intentionality as an awareness of our life world in such a way, that while speaking of democracy, rights, equality and freedoms, we intend such a world as a struggle for temporal and technical continuity. Thus all is valuable that enhances this continuity – and purely materially. This is not to be taken as criticism, but as an opening up of the lived awareness of enlightenment and the life world to which this awareness correlates. In this life world we value freedom, equality, and establish public domain as the condition for both, but we no longer maintain them. Unmaintained freedom and the public domain vanish. After all, they are humanly constituted temporal phenomena. Is it the case that one possibility within the horizon of enlightenment – democracy – is equally temporal and ceases to have value? We are at the level of temporal value fulfillment that comprises its own history. This is to say, democracy is one more passing event in history, specifically when the value of freedom and equality have become redundant in the working out of the fundamental intentionality of enlightenment. This means that we are in a period of transition from democracy to not yet fully understood another life world. What the latter might be is a matter for discovering what lived awareness appears at the time of **crises** and what comprises the overlooked ground of political ethos.

THE CRISIS OF ENLIGHTENMENT’S LIFEWORLD

The awareness of crises constitutes a unique reflective moment that, at the same time, allows a suspension of one’s participation in a given life world. We are cognizant, by now, that while living in a par-

ticular life world we are not aware of its basic composition. We live in it as if it were self evident and all inclusive. There is nothing lacking in it to the extent that it would not offer relief and answers to all of our questions. If we claim to live in a democratic life world, we take for granted that our elected officials tend to lie, that we can vote them out of office, that the injustices can be corrected by legal means, and that those who work harder deserve more. We also know that we would not tolerate dictators or anyone who would deny our right to make our own choices and mistakes. There must be a unique situation which allows us extricate from our life world and raise the question of its legitimacy. That such a question can arise means that we rise to lived awareness which no longer belongs to a life world in which we live. This must be made clear: our awareness is always world-oriented and our orientations, or intentional directions find, in their life world if not total, at least partial perceptual affirmation. This is an epistemic aspect which takes for granted the division of our life world into categories and the way they are concretized or given perceptual fulfillment. But the fulfillment of our taken for granted intentions and the categories to which they correlate, including the numerous value gradations – the epistemic understanding – leave out the legitimating question given in live awareness that something is not fulfilled, something that no value can account for: intrinsic self worth. To reach the latter, the lived awareness must suspend the life world and explicate the access to the transcendental lived awareness that correlates to intrinsic self worth and demands legitimation of the life world in which one has so far lived in full belief and affirmation. The lived awareness and its intention toward self worth asks whether the life world offers any fulfillment and confirmation of this intention. At this level of awareness the categorical and epistemic understanding fails, and an existential question of action becomes preeminent. Can I act, as I have always acted, and fulfill the intention of my intrinsic self worth? The latter embodies such requirements as honor, honesty, dignity, self and other respect, and justice. If honor, honesty, dignity and respect cannot be fulfilled in my activities, then the legitimacy of this life world is placed in absolute question, revealing at the same time the awareness of absolute self worth. It is at this juncture that

the transcendental lived awareness recognizes that the world of values, constructed by Enlightenment, requires evaluation as to its adequacy for human worth. Such a question is one of principle that required an essential delimitation of the construct of democracy and whether the latter could be adjusted, discarded or become open to the absolute requirement of transcendental awareness of self worth. We are in a position, now to attempt our venture into lived awareness that is lead by the intention correlated to self worth and thus a crisis in enlightenment.

There is no need to go into a variety of utilitarianisms since in principle they follow the logic of valuation on the basis of psycho-physiological needs. Utilitarianisms have no philosophical importance, since they presume that we all seek pleasure and value things and others insofar as they will comprise some means to fulfill our pleasures. Indeed, such a psychologized ethos is precisely what leads to crisis of democracy insofar the technical promises by elected officials to fulfill our pleasures lead the public away from public participation and hence maintenance of the public domain. Besides, striving to fulfill pleasures suggests our complete subjection to irrational drives and a loss of any sense of autonomy. Hence, our task is to seek a more profound conception of enlightenment's failure to provide the ground of its ethos. We already know that the highest point of Enlightenment, Kant's critical works, have left us with a quandary regarding the final arbiter in human action. It was not the universal moral imperative demanding that we act out of respect for this imperative originating as it were out of total autonomy, but the empty condition called good will. It is empty because it is purely formal and has no existential implications. There is no content by which to decide what sort of action would be recognizable as one that follows good will. It is to be noted that the universal moral imperative, having total autonomy as its source, does not require a commitment to others, apart from not treating them as means but always as ends. Being universal, this imperative does not singularize and does not require respect for the other as having intrinsic worth; it simply requires obedience to the imperative or, as Kant would have it, obedience out of respect for the law.

But respect for the law implies something more basic, some lived awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person beyond his/her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an honorable, noble, truthful, elevating manner **for its own sake**. This also suggests a crisis of democracy insofar as it has been reduced for the sake of other purposes such, as Regan once boasted, making money and getting rich. It seems that the loss of democracy for its own sake is premised on the reduction of the human to a purposive value and thus the exclusion of worth for its own sake. The transcendental rule that emerges at this level of awareness is the degradation of the human and the environment to a purposive value and, by implication, valuelessness. Yet both democratic ethos and the final arbiter of all values cannot be value; they are for their own sake and comprise a lived awareness that already recognizes intrinsic self worth as that which is coextensive with democratic ethos. Self worth and democratic ethos for their own sake comprise the lived awareness of the missing aspect of the way that enlightenment's intentionality has unfolded. Here a person is exposed to treat the lived world, and her immersion in it, as inadequate and thus place such a world and herself out of play, in brackets.

It is, then, the task to unfold the lived awareness that is compelled to bracket, to place out of action, the life world of enlightenment and to note the presence of this lived awareness across diverse phenomena. All the intentional orientations toward a life world in which she has been immersed appear to be groundless constructs; the life world of public domain, which is no longer maintained, requires and recognizes a presence of intrinsic self worth even in its denial. In the most degraded figures that our age has produced there appears an intimation of self worth. Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world where everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions and expressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not only of themselves but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an indication of intrinsic self worth of others. It would be impossible to be a racist and degrade others without recognizing the other as a possessor of intrinsic self worth. We cannot degrade a creature who, in its life world, does not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to make a choice between

two life worlds; in short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a degradation nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only another person can be degraded on the basis of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is to say, degradation, reduction, insult, are possible only when we recognize hers and our own intrinsic worth, honor, and dignity. This recognition is the ground of numerous events of our sophisticated age, among which is racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and even homophobia and religions. Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself, is an indication of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other's intrinsic self worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the other's self worth, we condemn her to death and thus prove that we are unwilling to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and cannot withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self worth of another. Such an awareness is demonstrated by Viktor Frankel's depictions of life in concentration camps. This is an extreme case where the officers who ran the camps would immediately condemn to death anyone who showed self and other respect, dignity and honor, thus revealing the lack of honor and dignity in the very officers – and all degraded to a mere value for the state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, to legitimate the life world in which they live and to ask whether such a life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to say, the very presence of the other who is aware of her intrinsic worth performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and hence challenges a blind inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether such a life world is worthy of one's intrinsic worth.

Intrinsic self worth, as a discovered given, appears not only through degradations and oppressions, but also through actions demanding mutual recognition of self and other. And it appears irrespective of culture, historical period, or social standing. Gandhi angered colonial rulers by his bearing, his dignity, his dignifying those who were at the lowest social rung, his demand that the colonial rulers have truthfulness and honor and thus made them recognize their own intrinsic worth and not merely their value for the empire. Gandhi reminded all that the life world of an empire is illegitimate because it does not allow the fulfillment of the lived awareness of intrinsic worth. Hence he asked

for legitimation of his own value in such a life world and whether he must rise to a transcendental level and reveal a crisis in his own life and that of the empire based on recognition of what is the ground of final human self awareness and all the values. While being an object of derision and quixotic depictions, he took the blows with dignity, demanding dignity from those who administered the blows. It is to be noted that he did not claim intrinsic self worth as a value of a specific culture, but as an unconditional and absolute ground that raises the question of legitimation of any life world and demands the fulfillment of transcendental awareness that correlates to self worth. Einstein once pondered the phenomenon of Gandhi by wondering “that such a person could have walked among us.” In face of the intrinsic self worth of this slight person, the British Empire lost all of its moral, political, and military superiority.

We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philosophy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate Socrates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with the demands of the good as one expression of intrinsic worth. Only under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and caricatures. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their

own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for “whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after all, demands self degradation and thus the denial of self worth. Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warning: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.

Even at the other end of Socratic tradition the lived awareness of intrinsic self worth is apparent in the most dire pronouncements of Nihilism. The latter not only challenges the continuous life world of values, but attempts to devalue all values, to discard all meaning, aim and purpose, and to set human life adrift on a turbulent ocean in a ship without a rudder. What is left over is blind, irrational, clashing powers expressed by Nietzsche as will to power. Yet the same Nietzsche strives to find an answer to a question: given the meaningless, devalued, directionless and purposeless universe, how shall we live? As we all know by now, for Nietzsche will to power is no longer adequate to understand events and human life. The shift from ontology to cosmic awareness made his power thesis untenable and redundant. Not being able to revert to values, even new values, since “new values have short legs,” he opens the lived awareness that intends self worth as self creation. It is significant that such self creation is precisely what is required of self worth: its own purpose, having no value for anyone, and above all for social functioning, it creates itself for its own sake. The metaphor of life is no longer will to power but self creation as its own worth. Thus his constant striving to find the great creators, those who dared become clay for self molding, those who did not want to lead or be followed, those who answered a question with a question: this is my way,

what is yours? In this sense nihilism and the devaluation of all values does not abolish philosophical quest for self worth; to the contrary, it clears away all obfuscations and offers a higher opening to transcendental self awareness. After all, it elevates awareness to encompass the cosmos as meaningless, and asks the ultimate question whether this cosmos is open for self worth. And the answer, for Nietzsche, is absolutely yes, and precisely because the constructed and purposeful values have obfuscated the most fundamental human awareness: only open cosmic awareness is adequate to human self creation. The universe, for Nietzsche, is the life world.

Literatures, in this search for intrinsic worth, do not lag behind philosophy. They too reveal figures that are in crises and are demanded to extricate themselves from their life worlds in order to ask the legitimating question: is such a world adequate for intrinsic worth. Let us look at one of the Spanish works, *Don Kichote*. He is a figure at a juncture of two worlds. One vanishing and the other emerging, one of knighthood, and the other of a new iron age. The iron age – the modern – is characterized by degradation, aggressiveness, crudeness, greed, cunning and calculation, where everyone acts with purpose and is out to get all he can in riches at any price. Language is debased and splits up into numerous practical-technical jargons, full of curses and complaints. Quejana already lives in this life world, yet he is engaged in reading literatures about knighthood, thus giving him an awareness of another life world. This awareness disclosed his position as swinging between, as being in crisis, and demands of Quejana to legitimate the life world in which he already resides. In this world everything has value to the extent that it serves all sorts of base demands, such as greed, selfishness, power, but fails to address, indeed excludes, actions that would be honorable, noble, vision of others as having self worth, truthfulness, and justice. These actions are those that belong to intrinsic worth, and they have no place in the iron age. Thus Quejana reaches a living awareness, direct experience, although perceptually not fulfilled in the life world of iron age, of another world, a contrasting life world, containing self worth. The latter calls for legitimation of the iron age life world in which Quejana happens to live. Can my self worth be enacted and fulfilled in an iron age? Can others be

regarded, and be asked to regard themselves as having intrinsic worth? And this is when Quejana takes on the name Don Kichote and sets out to demonstrate what the iron age is missing. What is significant is the way that the crude, the degraded, the dirty become transparent with a nobility, grandeur, and honor of self worth. Through the farm maid, Aldonsa Lorenzo shines Dulcinea, his neighbor, Sanson Carrasco, is revealed as a noble knight, worthy of honorable battle. Having encountered a possibility of another life world, Quejana finds himself confronted with an option to release himself from his life world and at the same time compelled to raise a question of legitimation of such a life world, i.e. does his life world allow an enactment of intrinsic self worth. Once more it is to be emphasized that this question does not have any relative boundaries. Quejana does not ask whether this life world is worth for me, since he, as an actor in this world belongs to, and is bound by it. Thus he must ask whether this life world of iron age is worth being in absolutely, leading then to his own existential question: if I have only one life, is such a life an authentic representation of intrinsic worth, if I were to live this life in the life world of iron age.

ESSENTIAL AWARENESS

The point has been reached where a question of awareness of self worth can be answered. First aspect of this worldly awareness is the possibility to extricate oneself from a specific life world. Second, the resultant disattachment, or bracketing of this immersion is the awareness of self worth demanding the possibility of world orientation that would answer the question of absolute legitimation of fulfilling in practice and action what the awareness always tacitly maintained as self worth. Third, it is to be noted that such awareness transgresses any specific life world, since any life world may offer partial-perceptual or signitive fulfillment of intrinsic self worth. Under any other circumstance, intrinsic worth would be an intentionality of a given life world, interpreted, for example as value, equivalent to other values, and hence a self understood part of such a world whose refusal would go counter to what is categorically self evident in such a world. At this level a refusal to participate in such

a world would be impossible. In other words, intrinsic worth is not a perceptual given, but arises “perspectively” to the extent that we can regard our lived world as a total from the perspective of intrinsic worth. This perspectivity is the price for our freedom to survey any life world and ask the question of legitimation. In this context, the persons who were mentioned, whether Socrates, Gandhi, or Don Kichote become phenomena that disclose intrinsic worth and demand of us to recognize our degraded state. As already stated, the recognition of other’s intrinsic worth is equivalent to the recognition of our own and conversely.

The awareness, correlated to intrinsic self worth, is a transcendental background on which any life world must be legitimated concerning its adequacy for fulfilling such awareness in activity. It was noted that the life world of enlightenment, at its epitomy, offered us a world of values which had no other source except unlimited construction and hence unbound from any restriction concerning the manner in which such values are used. This leads to arbitrariness and power to the extent that power must decide which values are victorious – for a while. But the transcendental background of intrinsic self worth was and is equally a given and provides a limit concerning the unrestricted valuations. The founders of enlightenment and its correlate – political democracy – were persons who extolled honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness and justice in their actions and demanded no less of their adversaries. This comprises the background on which the crises of democracy appears. At the founding just as well as now, there appears a first transcendental rule of awareness: maintenance of permanent self worth, or currently its reclaiming. This rule then demands an establishment of a first democratic institution –public domain – in which every person must fulfill their self worth, for its own sake. This very fulfillment demands, in turn, the second rule of awareness: permanent maintenance of the public domain for its own sake. Such maintenance requires the bracketing, exclusion, of arbitrary constructed valuations – such as economic, power, religious, ethnic, racist, that would promote the abolition of the public domain and self worth; indeed, such valuations do produce rhetorical means to obfuscate their degrading and disruptive tactics. Such oxymorons as “free enterprise”, “public leadership” and even “free expression”

comprise some of the rhetorical means. This sort of engagement comprises a third rule: valuations as disruptions of permanent self worth. This rule is quite prevalent and has been at the background of such events as public apathy, non-participation in public affairs, and pervasive anti-intellectualism and anti-education. When the public arena is filled with all sorts of private interests, needs, desires, cultic dogmas that are at odds with each other, then either we too push for our interests or, lacking knowledge of such interests, we decline to participate. It must be emphasized that self worth and the public domain are not objects of knowledge but are constituted in our active engagement. If we cease to act honorably, justly, nobly, respectfully, we shall not have self worth or public domain wherein self worth is enacted. It must be also noted that freedom as autonomy is a result of self worth; after all, we extricate ourselves from our own and all other life worlds and demand legitimation of any life world as to its adequacy for self worth. On this ground we then select the life world that permits autonomy for its own sake. But autonomy, at this level, is valid only if it is correlated and subject to self worth. Without the latter, autonomy may become reduced to “free choice” among things and lose its legislative dignity.

It seems that the initial or founding intentionality of enlightenment has permitted a partial fulfillment of self worth in the awareness of autonomy, yet the interpretation of the latter became restricted to the understanding of its period which mixed scientific explanations with freedom of research, rights to self invention and subject to no one. Scientific explanations were extolled as the sole avenue to truth, and offered categorical divisions of all things, while humanities, wanting to be scientific, engaged in equal categorization of its own disciplines, from theologies and their classification, to literatures. Categorization also subjected the human activity to become substantiated into categorizable characteristics: so and so is honorable, just, noble, while so and so is valuable, a business person, a teacher, etc., thus excluding the quest to return to activities that could be the sole understanding of what such categories mean. As we know, suddenly such categories, defining a person, could be acquired by numerous means, including money. Self worth, as an enactment, a participatory engagement vanished behind

epistemic terms. We are all citizens, with characteristics such as rights, freedoms, and even entitlements, but if citizen is only the one who actively maintains the public domain as a space of self worth, then how can one speak of inhabitants who refuse to participate in public's life world? This is the point of crisis, requiring of all inhabitants of a society to become citizens.

It is self worth that discloses the partial fulfillment by enlightenment and hence demands more from the inhabitant, not as a Kantian duty in face of a law, but as a demand of self respect and respect of others. Once the trust in a life world turns to mistrust and is placed into doubt, then the already stated issue of legitimation comes to the fore. It is possible to state that the legitimation crisis, suggested by Habermas, has located the crisis at the level of value of multiple interests, demanding a public arena where such interests could be articulated, in competent speech, equivalently by any group. Yet the crisis, as was contended above, must be sought at the primary level of awareness of self worth, and not at the level of participatory interests. What is more important is that the question of legitimation of a life world leads not only to activity, but to the transcendental awareness of singular commitment, to a question of existence and not knowledge. The appearance of partial life world, i.e. incapable of supporting self worth, gives rise to a fragile resistance with the question of the individual's existence in such a world, search to fulfill the more in awareness than the world offers. The "more" is a striving to disclose whether I myself am more than this life world and whether I have a choice and worth to live otherwise. To understand this shift toward requirements of active existence we need to specify more precisely the transformation from epistemic understanding that depends on second and third grammatical persons, to a first person's self understanding and the recognition that the latter is not a narrowing down of the epistemic categorical field but has a very different logic. For example, if categorical language has truth in perceptual fulfillment of a proposition, existential proposition has truth as an honorable act of not lying. Categorical language is designed to open some general characteristics, while existential is singular and unique, and even non repeatable. This kind of requirement is what led Sartre to existentialism as a

humanism, Nietzsche's Third and Fourth books of Zarathustra, and to Taoism's discovery of total, singular authenticity. Even Heidegger attempted to articulate such an authenticity, but failed by giving priority to historical hermeneutics that contextualized authenticity within the parameters of early Greek and contemporary German languages.

What was given in enlightenment as a background awareness, is now in the foreground of the life world of enlightenment and the unfolding of the constructive-valuative intentionality that has become prevalent. Being in the foreground or "positional" and thematized this awareness points to the problem of legitimation and to the illegitimate ways that the basic awareness became obfuscated, degraded, perverted, and empty. It questions the claim of this life world to be the only legitimate reality. This claim to sole reality appears only when the self worth becomes a foreground, enacted by a singular being in quest for an authentic fulfillment of self worth in a life world that at one stroke is made inactive, placed out of play. On the background of the life world that is placed out of play in its totality there appears a quest to act in favor of a world that would contain self worth. With the placing out of play, the life world without human worth is exposed to temporality: it becomes **chronoscopic**, i.e. an inadequate temporal perspective on the reality of the essence of the human. Such temporalization suggests that there is an **atemporal, non-positional** awareness which, inevitably can appear only chronoscopically. It is equally important to note that **since the disclosure of self worth revealed it to be solely as activity and not accessible through categorical intuition, then honor, dignity, nobility, truthfulness and justice appear only as enacted phenomena and hence have validity to the extent of their enactment. In addition, the striving to enact intrinsic worth is also a chronoscopic awareness, since no single activity, whether honorable, noble or truthful, does not fulfill the entirety of the search for self worth.** As an activity for its own sake, self worth also demands, as already suggested, public domain wherein such activity can be performed, resulting in the notion that such a domain is to be maintained for its own sake. Both, self worth and public domain are phenomena that mutually require one another and hence are to be maintained as purposes in themselves.

Yet even the awareness of such purposes in themselves requires one more domain of awareness. The disclosure of intrinsic worth as atemporally present, but only chronoscopically experienced, requires a specific constitution of activity. As we know, awareness is oriented toward the world. Yet such orientation is experienced reflectively, such that the world becomes represented and the self becomes represented as awareness that is turned toward the world. In view of her orientation as intentional aim, she also finds confronted by herself. Such orientation toward the world in face of oneself is the essence of activity. Given the awareness of such activity, the latter places another demand: not only reflection that represents an aim toward the world and the one who intends such an aim, but above all asks for legitimation as to the **worth of such an action**. At this level one does not ask whether such a world is known – this is already granted, but is this world worthy of one’s activity. The possibility of constituting a worthy life world is the reflective condition from which the failures of our degraded life world become visible.

POSTSCRIPT

The figures mentioned in this essay, from Socrates through Don Kichote, to Gandhi are almost pure embodiments of intrinsic worth. But we also know that such figures are targets of attack at every turn in their lives. In the daily life of commerce with commodities, religions, family values, political cunning, and rhetorical obfuscations, such figures are quixotic. Imagine a business person in a position to make a solid profit in a shady – although legal way – would refuse to do so in order to act in an honorable manner? He would be an object of jokes, indeed a Quixotic figure. But this also means that he has not yet reached a reflective awareness at which his intrinsic self worth is disclosed. At the same time, such a person has no ground for political ethos, and resultantly cannot be an autonomous being in a free public domain. We must recall, nonetheless, that the ethos was constantly in the background of the continuous founding of democracy through self worth. Those who understood that democracy is not an entity but a constant founding activity, also regarded their honor to be sacred.

CHAPTER V

SELF IDENTITY AND ITS DISRUPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Among various questions of phenomenology, there is one that has ranged throughout methodological and theoretical discussions – self identity. Is there an egological self? If so, can it be regarded as *the* self or merely as an aspect of a self? Is there a symmetry between a self and an ego, and between reflecting self and the self as an object of reflection? Are there any traceable rules of consciousness that would comprise connections among such factors as self, ego, and reflection? Which among these factors is more basic? This essay will explore these factors and the rules of consciousness, if such there be, that might comprise some of the connections and disconnections of self and ego, reflection and its object. The deciphering of such rules, and the ways they relate the appearance of self, ego, and reflection, could provide symbolic evidence for a level of constitution of the self and the ego – this being constituted where the play of the dissolution of the self and/or the ego, and the disconnection of the ego from the self take place. The symbolic evidence will be regarded as traces of a more basic, genetic constitution of the self, ego, and reflection.

This means, then, that the basic issue of tracing direct or unmediated consciousness wherein all factors of subjectivity and objectivity are instituted will require a manifold understanding. First, the problems inherent in the experience of the self in direct evidence. Second, the origin, necessity, and the manner in which self constitutes as self. Third, the level of self at which self identity is achieved in contrast to another, an alien being or presence, and the manner in which the consciousness of other-

ness arises. Fourth, the constitution of we-consciousness that is cognizant of a variety of selves and others and their relationships. Such relationships will be explored by analyzing complex relationships between temporal phenomena and their source in the functioning of the atemporal self. These analyses will include rules that subtend both memories and expectations. On the basis of the problematic of self identity, memories may become free floating and attached to others, to other egos and even to an anonymous environment. While these areas of discussion are not separated one from the others in concrete life of awareness, they will be treated as if they were separate in the process of exposition. Such separations cannot be avoided for methodological reasons.

THE RADICAL SELF

Phenomenological reflections have revealed that the human self has a basic composition called the living present (Held, 1966). In turn, the latter manifests two fundamental moments – the flowing and the static. While enacting the flow, the self is confronted with the missing aspect – the permanent. The permanent is excluded from, and yet referred to, by the flow. While flowing, the self is engaged in countering a stasis. On the other hand, while the self assumes a position of permanence, it is referred to a flow. The standing forever battles the flux. While being exclusive, neither can be given without the other. They are mutually referent. What is at issue in the quest for the Self and its identity is the access to these two moments of the living present and their most diverse relationships. It is to be noted that the relationship between permanence and flux is never given in its purity; it is always mediated by symbolic designs of a given culture. Thus in our questions concerning self and ego, those two terms will comprise symbolic tandems of the two basic facets of the living present. We shall begin the investigation by tracing the moment of flux in the constitution of the self.

Through increasing radicalization of reflection we confront the problem of the primordial, passive stream, the “Heraclitean flow” as fundamental domain of awareness, for whose constitutive moments we

lack names; there is nothing found in the flow that would be an objective identity. Names, after all, apply only to the constituted identities, to objectified sense units (Landgrebe, 1963, p. 200). Such units, such identities, rudimentary components of reference, are discovered only in reflection that traces something constituted in the flux, such as an identity of a color, a sound, a trace of smell, a number, or an ego. All may find themselves and be seen as identical or constant in the flow. They are apparent as stasis moments. If our concern is with the ego then, at this level of awareness, it is glimpsed across the shifting phases of flow. How can this static ego, discovered in the flow, be identical with a self that enacts the flow and indeed maintains the ego in the flow as self-same or identical? A note of caution must be added: the self that symbolizes the enactment of the flow does not encounter the permanent ego due to reflection, but due to the very composition of the flow that immediately calls up its mutual and yet exclusive referent – the stasis. At this level, the moment of stasis can only be constituted as a recognizable act of the self that is flowing away and is given a symbolic designation – ego. The ego marks a distance between the acting self and its own enactments. In their static identifiability, the latter refer to the flux enacted by the self, and exhibit a characteristic that is different and exclusive of the self. This context suggests that the self cannot be exhausted in the identifiable act that is symbolized as an act of an ego. And yet the ego is present as a reflected self prior to an act of reflection. The self recognizes, in the ego, one of its already accomplished acts. The identity of the self that enacts the flow is not that of the ego as a stasis – a stasis that can be discovered in the flow. In this sense, the self is not reducible to a nameable ego or even to a recognizable act of the self (Held, 1966, p. 81). The self that constitutes the flow is anonymous and its anonymity cannot be eradicated by reference to an ego found in the flux. The problem, thus, emerges concerning the access, if any, to the primordially acting self.

Following this statement of the problem, we can attempt to trace various levels of constitutive activities in an effort to exhibit the extent of phenomenological visibility of the active life of the self. To do so we must follow various modalities of self experience. Yet each modality reveals only an impenetrable wall of anonymity, being too late, and an

identifiable stasis in the flow that has been defined as an ego. Thus the presence of the experienced ego in the flow to the experiencing self reveals a distance between them, a distance that is the very condition of such an experience. How is this distance to be understood? We must trace it within the limits of the living present and its two self-referring constituents. This present cannot be understood in an ordinary, i.e. ontological or psychological sense; the present of the self is not given on the basis of a presupposed temporal position. A radical reflection also excludes the preconception of temporal succession. The present of the self, its presence, could be called *ur-modal*, *atemporal* or *originary* (Landgrebe, 1963. p. 20) Any temporal regard requires an identifiable point of reference appearing in the flow of awareness. If the ego marks the first identifiable act in the flow, then the distance between the self and the ego is equally atemporal. At this level of awareness there are no traces of any memory that would hint at temporal locations.

Temporal locations emerge not with the passive constitution of the flux, but with an active engagement of the self that, in the first instance, attempts to identify itself with the ego. Thus, the very effort positions the ego in relation to, either something that has been done as an act of the self, or something that is to be done. Here emerge the overlapping temporal phases which provide a ground for subsequent locations of the ego and the distinction between acts of memory and expectation. If the flow is structured temporally, then the active engagement of the self already takes for granted the distance between itself and the ego. This is such that the enactment of temporal phases intimates tacitly a rule of self-awareness. This rule we shall call *permanence maintainance*. By constituting the temporal phases, the self maintains the distance from, and the identity of the ego. In turn, this suggests that the enactment of the flow as having temporal phases and ego locations, may be seen as sense-making. The latter is the first mode of awareness that is premised on temporalization, since sense is a basic expression of directionality. Experience without directionality lacks sense. In other words, temporalization is coextensive with sense making. At this level various characteristics of this sense making present themselves. We may speak of it as a permanent flow of all sense, or as an atemporal and ineradicable

presence. Regardless of the linguistic designation, the originary activity of the self is the source of sense. Thus the self is traceable as the endlessly reiterratable “this makes sense”, and is granted in correlation to temporalization that establishes locations in the stream of lived awareness. Yet, any reflection on the sense-making, on the primal function of the self, reveals it as a located ego in the context of temporal phases. In the very enactment of the flow, the self is traceable as the source of the sense of this enactment in an atemporal mode. Thus the ego is different and distant in “time” from the self. The tracing of the present of the self reveals it to be an atemporal stasis of sense making in transformation – a transformation that is a permanent enactment of sense-making flow – a transformation which nonetheless appears as an identifiable ego, in a context of already structured atemporal phases.

This analysis yields adequate, but not apodictic evidence of the life of the self as constant stasis in flux. The best that can be attained is its constant self reference from another – from a stream that contains the traces of the original enactment of sense. Thus, the insight into the sense of temporal phases (prior to temporal loci) and simultaneous reflectivity that reveals the self as an ego, leads phenomenology to experience its ultimate, critical, and apodictic foundation (Landgrebe, 1982, p. 111). According to this experience, the temporalizing self is grasped as already temporalized ego. This is adequate to the extent that we regard the ego in the flux of temporal phases as a trace of the self. Enacting the permanent sense making that is present in all the differentiations of, and locations in the flux. At this juncture we encounter the first layer of self that is involved with the distancing ego, not as a mere sinking away, but as a mark of identifiable permanence that must be maintained and enhanced. As already suggested above, this constitution of temporal sense and identifiable loci reveals the activity of the self in its maintenance of the permanence and identity of the ego. Thus, the first rule relating the self and the ego is permanence maintenance. Yet, this rule also opens the possibility of marking a temporal locus for memory of any object and for the sense of otherness. Marking a temporal distance from the self, the ego, or whatever object maintained as permanent, becomes a condition for reflection.

For the self to turn back upon itself, to revert to itself, it must already have constituted a gap between the experiencing self and the experienced ego. At the same time, and despite the gap and hence a division, a mutual reference between them ought not to be lost. In order to reflect, the self must refer to the ego in the flow of temporal phases, not by becoming one with it, but by maintaining its permanence. While reflective reference is adequate to establish the identity of the ego, it is inadequate to provide self identity of the flux enacting self. In what sense can the functioning, the acting self, obtain its identity from the ego encountered as a distancing ego in the flux? Is the just enacted given as an ego or merely as an act? If it is given as an ego of a particular act, then the currently reflecting and acting self is more than the just enacted ego. The former contains all the possibilities of enactment of sense, while the latter is exhausted in the act that is attributed to it. But if the just enacted is an act, then it cannot be fully identifiable with the currently acting and reflecting self, since the self is reflecting from the just performed act. Here appears an asymmetry between them. Such asymmetry is a condition, both for distancing and even disassociating ourselves from the ego. Even our daily discourse testifies to this condition. We distance ourselves from an act which we attribute to our past by claiming: "What I did then could not have been the real me". Whatever else we may say, this suggests an already given distance between the self and the act attributed to an ego that is located and identified in the flow, and subsequently as past.

While this is a condition for dissociation of the self from an ego, and indeed from a variety of egos, it is equally a structural condition for the possibility of the self to collapse into an ego and to become dissociated from the self. The latter possibility can occur when the currently sense making self is no more than the sense making act which is flowing away, and in this flow it can be attached either to the self or the ego. In this sense there appears an equivalence between the self and the flowing ego. Even if there is no guarantee of their identity, this equivalence comprises the basic condition for surrendering any priority of the self over any specific ego. This condition results in the self that is identical to a set of dissociated egos. Such an array of egos appears as a normal state

of affairs in our social understanding. We play different roles in different settings and become the sum of our social roles: who we are, thus, depends on our role models. This intimates that the self has become ineffective in integrating the various activities and the various egos attached to such activities. As we shall see later, the possibility of such an integration is the *sine quo non* for a mastery of ones variety of activities and the egos under which such activities are stabilized.

We must, nonetheless, explicate reflective awareness prior to reflection, i.e. inner-reflectivity between the self and the ego. This reflectivity, the ego is a trace of an accomplished act, of the just having acted self as retended. In turn, the self that is reflecting from the ego grasps itself as acting. For the reflecting self, the distance between the act being performed and the just enacted is seen as bridged. Reflection experiences unity in separation, identity in difference. The reflecting unification with itself, constituting the experience of bridging the distance and keeping an identity of itself at the present, is given since the self enacts a constant streaming. The possibility of self reflection emerges on the basis of the constancy of streaming, as well as on the basis of the streaming constancy of the self as it is traced by the ego. In inner reflection the self has unified itself with the ego, and bridged this distance in its streaming. This is the originary passive and active constitution where the transitory synthetic presencing of the self to its egological traces occurs. Thus all inner reflection is self presencing of the originary functioning self before temporalization. In the transitional synthetic unification of the living present, the self connects with itself before this unity is grasped in reflection. The pre-accomplished presencing of the self in its traces is the self actualizable reflectivity of the self with respect to its own egological traces. As Brand (1955, p.66) states, it is the functioning of “reflection in inception”.

The dynamics of the living present is experienced as atemporal pre-accomplishment of passive and active transitional syntheses that are equivalent to self presencing. Thus, in each recouping reflection, the self of the pre-temporal living present encounters itself as the streaming, self temporalizing stasis traced in the ego. In any added reflection, the ego is encountered irrevocably as a temporalized object – as an-

other. Thus, reflection upon the dynamic of the living present can never encounter the standing streaming self, the living present in its atemporality. This is not an inadequacy of reflection; rather it reveals that there is no self presence which is not presencing and thus self presencing. In this sense, the self is never a pure self, never a pole without a temporalized objectivity. The self has itself as an object and as a sense of first transcendence, otherness, such that a pure self requires self transcendence and a self tracing in the ego. The notion of a self that constantly establishes a stream of conscious life is relativised to the extent that all direct awareness requires a sense of the other. This sense is the first experiential moment that allows us to grasp the world as transcendence, as different from the experiencing self. This is to say, the otherness of the world is already encountered in the living stream. The latter is already constituted with a sense of temporality as first and thus an immanent transcendence, a sense of otherness within the very composition of the self. The very distancing of the ego from the self and their partial unification opens the sense of the ego as temporal and worldly and yet as an index to the enactment of the flow of the self.

This immanent transcendence as primordial objectification, constitutes a temporal objectivity, encounterable in an objective topography of time and thus is reproducible. The passing, streaming present as objective past, is the first objectivity in immanence, the first meaning of transcendence and of radical otherness of the self. At the same time it is the foundation of history in the form of first temporality. Objectification and temporalization of the enacted stream constitute the topography for all objectivities and for historical events. This can be called the “always and already pregiven ground of history” (Landgrebe. 1968). History of the self is located at the level of first temporalization breaking out of immediate self and establishment of temporality. In other words, the pre-reflective synthesis as traced on the primordial flow of the ego and its constitution of the ground for differentiation, is at the same time a constitution of the history of the self. One must note that this history is not yet in time; rather, it is the basic condition that allows subsequent locations of activities and other egos. All this is prior to any objectified mediation: I am present to myself in a specific form of the now with-

out becoming objective, without mediation (Brand, 1955, p. 65). But still one can point out that this already shows a presence of objectifying temporalization; the very naming of the “now” destroys immediacy and assumes a temporal field (Held, 1966. p. 105).

If reflection is temporalization and the primordial life is atemporal, then any reflection will have to explicate the atemporal in a temporal way. It has been a persistent phenomenological finding that any temporal awareness is essentially incomplete and can never obtain apodicticity – of course, we may add, that we have eidetic and apodictic awareness of this incompleteness. Any grasp of atemporality must remain at the prereflective level. Once the atemporal life is given to consciousness, it becomes identifiable as a temporalized object, an object in flux.

The difficulties in the delimitation of the anonymous and atemporal life of awareness come to the fore with respect to time. Since all temporal designations originate with traditional metaphysics and ontology, they not only fail to enlighten, but are most misleading. Hence, it is necessary to exclude various temporal preconceptions. Both, the theoretical – linear and the psychological – polar cyclical constructs of time ought to be avoided, as well as their opposites, eternity and duration. Also, the various spatial and linear metaphors and mythical regions are to be bracketed. What is left consists of such possibilities as “everywhere and nowhere” (*ibid*, p. 4), fixed once and for all as “all time” or “all temporality”, and “all temporality of the identical being as the universality of its past, present, and future” (*ibid*, p. 12). Since the term atemporal seems to be most neutral and yet encompassing, it has been used to designate the living present in this writing. It states a position between eternity and time. Atemporality avoids the metaphysical prejudgments concerning fixity and the ontological assumptions concerning time. Thus the relationship between the experience of permanence and flux, or the passive and the active, can best be designated as a transition between them. It could best be seen as permanence in transition.

Permanence in transition is indeed more appropriate for the constitution of the ground of self and ego relationship. It offers an access to the sense of otherness. All the theoretical constructs of apperception, associative pairing, appresentation, and empathy, assume *a priori*

sense of alterity. Thus the origin of the experience of the sense of the other is already given in the atemporal activity of the self. This can be maintained not only on phenomenological, but also on logical grounds. Since the self is anonymous to itself and its apodictic evidence of itself then it cannot claim to be more certain of itself than of the sense of another. Waldenfels agrees with this assessment. If the self is an anonymous life, then it cannot have the slightest power of disposal over itself. In this context, it is difficult to say which activities are of the self and which belong to an ego as distancing from the self, as the sense of otherness. Thus, even at the anonymous level there emerges a first connection between a self and an alter-ego. This emergence is necessitated by the slippage, the stance in transition. The reflective recouping of the self in that transition is a direct recognition of itself as other and self. Originary self constitution of a streaming awareness of the anonymous self is coequal with a “we” constitution. Thus the “other functioning” is at this level of anonymity not yet distinguishable from self functioning. The only difference is the sense of self and other, and the first and second person designation (*ibid*, p. 76). These are, of course, dependent on linguistic traditions.

Having a sense of the other, as being with another, is not separable from being of the atemporal, anonymous self, in self-presenting as the ego. This means that common ontification, temporalization, presupposes an anonymous intersubjectivity that is already present. It is present in the constant slippage of the self constituting the transcendental “activity” of atemporality, containing the copresence of other functional presents, of the sense of others as permanent markers in the stream of this activity of the self. This sense leads to the notion that each experience of the other, in its originary ontification, for example its immanent transcendence, constitutes a horizon. Upon this horizon, the experience of all others as copresent leads to the notion of the living present as an indefinite horizon, encompassing all selves and their self-temporalization. What is to be noted is that such an encompassment is given to the originary reflection, and hence constitutes an originary temporalization, and an originary compulsion toward ontification. This is what appears to be the ground of all possible we-consciousness

and the history of the self that can instantiate permanent egos as senses of otherness, yet containing continuous relationship to the self as the anonymously constitutive stream.

The self can enact the flux in ways that empower, maintain, support, enhance the permanence of any ego in the flow. We called this the activity of permanence maintenance. At this level, the ego and the acts attributed to it acquire a sedimented and repeatable identity. It becomes a recognizable personality. Indeed, it claims that it is all that the self is, and thus can usurp the place of the anonymous self. The latter, nonetheless, is what constitutes the flow of awareness that maintains the stasis of the ego. One clusters various habits, repeated activities around the ego, which become the very history of the self.

HISTORY, SELF AND EGO

There has been a number of outstanding discussions on the question and problem of individual and collective history. These include the experience, foundation, and aim of history. Central to these discussions are the late works of Husserl. They not only focus on the historical development of philosophical issues, but above all depict history as the grand fact of being. At the same time, he saw the appearance of crisis in modern Western history. There are three major reasons that lead us to focus on this issue in relationship to the question of self, ego and alter-ego.

First, the emergence of various historical schools of philosophy, ranging from life philosophies, through methodical hermeneutics, to philosophical hermeneutics. These trends lent priority to a trans-human dimension called historical understanding that makes the human subject to its force. Second, the difficulties in resolving the above discussed issues of the self and the ego as the living present. Yet, if history is experienced humanly as we-consciousness, then its ground is already prepared by this consciousness. The latter could neither be bounded by a specific synchronic milieu nor limited by any particular dogma. Third, at the level of history of the self and the we, the given plurality of egos or others are imbued with meaning and can be regarded as traces of

the constitutive activities of the anonymous self. Without the latter as a self constituting flux, history of the self and its traces in multiple egos has no foundation and may become posited as a self generating event that dominates over a people. Such domination has been assumed by too many modern thinkers, specifically in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

While avoiding such historicizing, we must also take care not to become entangled in psychologizations of the self. Such entanglements would either reduce sense to inner psychological states, or abolish sense as irrelevant to psychological facts. If the latter is chosen, then neither the self nor the other as an ego would function in experience. Psychological states do not bear indices of selfhood and egology. Yet if the latter factors make sense, then to disconnect fact from sense would lead psychology to posit both the self and the distancing ego as two entities with immanent or inner characteristics and their own histories if, indeed, they would be identifiable at all. Yet our brief considerations have suggested that the more originary phenomena of the anonymous self are not founded on natural or the identifiable egos as others of the self. The first task then, is to show that the history of the self, traced across various egos as its given accomplishments, as facticities, is not antithetical to these very facticities even in their psychosomatic interpretations, in at least two important ways. First, history of the self is completely tied to the sense of the others and their experience, and not to psyche. Second, the historical extension of awareness from ego to ego, and even from generation to generation, is not material but significative. This is to say, what it transmitted is the sense-making of the others, the other egos, and not brute facticity. Indeed, the latter is not even a given in any phenomenological sense. Basically speaking, every factual activity is an awareness of a system of sense implications. Historical communication, dialogal encounter, has the conditions for its possibility in the anonymously functioning absolute self and its first traces of temporalization and its primordial institution of the sense of “we consciousness”, in the flow of acts. This means that any identifiable ego and its activity, encountered in time, is an index, a trace of the absolute life, leading to the experience that the historical facticities are not excludable contingen-

cies, but are essential traces of the constitutive acts of the self. Indeed, the already given egos in flow are sedimented modalities of the process of judging, predicating, perceiving, as constituted by pre-predicative life of consciousness (Landgrebe, 1963, p. 200). The sense of the real, encountered in experience, implies a specific consciousness process wherein the ego appears as this “kind” or having this “type” of being. Thus the question is: What kind of experience is, or was required, in order for a particular kind of being, having a particular meaning, to be present? This means that a question about the essence of specific egos, their sense, becomes a question of consciousness activities – intention-activities. Every given ego in flux is already subtended by, and correlated to the temporalizing activities, and the essential structures of such activities (Landgrebe, 1968, p 79). The egos are historical in the sense of being points of reference from which enactments toward the world are articulated. Such enactments are read as attributes of a given ego, the other from the self, that can be enhanced, denounced, disclaimed, or completely rejected: “It was not me, it could not have been me, I am not that kind”. They are not imbedded in nature but are significations that comprise a way of making sense of the world and are accessible to all. The accessibility hinges upon the primordial life and its incessant transformative syntheses, its “slippage”, that exhibits self distancing and unification of a self-ego, an originary we. Thus, every ego encountered in historical sedimentation is accessible to any self and to any other ego in terms of sense constitution and the type of ego it is.

If the atemporal awareness has no given temporal location, if it can regard itself from then to now, and can attach itself to any now as a locus of any possible ego, then any identifiable ego in time is traceable “vertically” to the self as a founding condition required for the constitution of this egos sense. Every established ego is not only a system of activities, but also an index, a clue. The totality of clues need not stem from present awareness, from the manner of present activity. Yet they can be relived, reanimated as achievements of my others and thus open to totality of subjects. Because of the atemporality of the self, it can form attachments to any of the egos and reclaim their stasis by maintaining the flow that enhances the stasis. The enhancement may “forget” itself

completely and become regarded as the very activity of the maintained ego. This, then, excludes other egos and the background anonymous self. Indeed, the latter may become simply another, alien, and not a voice to heed.

Even if forgotten in their uniqueness and singularity, the egos are settled in one's surroundings bearing the typological structures for continuous re-experiencing, as memorial traces that may focus ones appropriate enactments in correlation to an ego that "remembers" the very requisite activities. This is to say, the environment is equally a sedimentation of typological givens and their sense interconnections and not a mere sum of facts. By reading the typological structures of the surroundings one also reads the correlative activities that are required for the very constitution of such typologies and their sense connections and overlays. The typologies are various, inclusive of the acts of others. To encounter such typological activities one may revert to one of the egos and its enactments and either maintain it as stasis by constituting the flux, or to disown it, to reject it as an alien being, totally different from the self subjected to alien forces that do not affect the self. The disconnection from, and thus the rejection of the ego as an alien being, allows one to constitute a position of detachment, of a non-participating gaze. The condition of such a gaze is the function of the self as its own self disruption. The permanent constitution of flux that maintains the stasis of the ego must be disrupted and the sense connection between the self and the ego severed.

The disruption may assume various forms. First, the ego may usurp the position of the self by enacting one sedimented orientation to the world and thus disrupt the flow that connects with other egos. Second, a particular typology in the environmental field may evoke one type of constitutive activity on the part of the ego and thus restrict the horizon of sense interconnections of the sedimented surroundings, This intimates a flux disruption of the self in favor of the egos direct attachment to some type of environmental subjectmatter or activity of another. Third, the permanent flux may be disrupted by chronic flux reclaiming activities that call for constant doing. But the doing becomes for its own sake and never constitutes any novelties. Such activities are

still able to maintain the varieties of instantiations of egos, but the latter remain dangling, dead relics one do not choose to vivify. They are all so boring, and one's entire life has been nothing but a sequence of various egos, each maintained for a while and then discarded: none were worthwhile, and neither seem to connect with others to form a common history. Fourth, any specific ego can disrupt the flow by constituting its own fragmentation and dissolution. In this sense the flux is disrupted insofar as there are no identifiable tandems, such as an ego, to mark the flow of awareness. If, for example, a past activity attributed to a particular ego is not acceptable, then the ego ceases to be enhanced; it is not only disconnected from the flux of the self, but also ceases to mark an orderly temporal loci in the history of the self. The latter also loses its orientation and the possibility to obtain self identity in the other, the ego. The vanishment of the latter is the disruption of the former's orientation, continuity, and permanence as flux.

So far we have traced two basic compositions of the life of the self and ego; permanence enhancement, its maintenance, and permanence disruption, its fragmentation and disorientation. The compositions allow us to regard all events of the experienced world, its objectivities, to be treated as traces of the activities of the self, the history of its own correlations to the world. The self in its others, the diverse egos and the world are typological sedimentations of sense. The sedimentations need not be explicitly recollected as those of the self. Rather, they are a historical past that is attributed to others, the very egos distanced from the self from whom one may be completely detached. Mainly, they offer themselves tacitly as sedimented enactments of a specific ego, that remain identifiable either as past or as possible enactments of the future. These passively available accomplishments are not a substructure, purely associative mechanisms subtending perceptual life, but are always accessible as an open horizon of indices of activities that one must do in order to reenact the same experience. They are present in their sense implications and relationships horizontally, and in their constitutive, atemporal activities vertically as accomplished by others, by the other egos accessible to the atemporally present self. The passive connections of indices bearing all experience, comprise the meaning of intention-

alities and motivations already found in the history of the self. Such connections can be either enhanced or disrupted, leading to a world of continuity, history, or to a world of disattached egos, with chronic and momentary activities without horizons, without other egos.

Each, then, must function in its solitary reiteration as if it were marking time, attempting to generate a flux and a horizon, yet remaining caught like one nervously waiting for something to happen, some sense connection. This could be called a reduction to the past-present such that while it is being maintained, it is also disconnected from all horizons and thus from a possibility of constituting another ego, another point of sense making of the world. This is all I am, this is the sole reality of myself and the world; it only makes sense to maintain it the way it is, and if terrible things are happening to me it must be my fault. Thus the ego does not open to possibilities, but searches for direct factual causes of the events afflicting it. "I must have done something to deserve this". This does not allow the search for otherness, the opening up of a flux in which another ego, enacting the world differently, might occur, but the very search for reasons is a flux that maintains one's permanent position of being subject to the burden one must bear. Indeed, the others, the alter egos, are equally bearing their load, are also subject to their deserts – even if they are not cognizant of them. This is to say, their options are no broader than the factual activities they performed that led them to the current predicament. By maintaining my own reasons and restricting myself to the factual "all there is", I also read the possibilities of the others in the same restricted way. This is to say, being stuck on the sedimented reiteration of indices, I cannot catapult into a horizon of flux marked with other egos, deploying diverse possibilities of identity and self reflection.

The passive indices, in addition, constitute the field of expectations in a passive mode. It is not necessary to orient oneself to what is expected explicitly. Being in a particular modality of awareness and activity, one assumes a passively open horizon that contains an inherent orientation. The latter can be regarded provisionally as a collective concept of interconnection of indices, a tacit sketch of possibilities of sedimented experiences as possible enactments by any ego. The enact-

ments, in turn, point to a continuous effort of teleological unification, integration, and synthesis of sense. The unification does not mean a system of thought designed to explain all events, but an unexplicated preconception that the most remote and the nearest historical others and events can be understood, can make sense without reduction to one modality of a self that is maintained as an ego in its disconnected way from the self. Even if such sense contests our own, even if we proclaim that this cannot be me, this other is totally alien to who I am, we can understand the contestation, and thus extend our awareness by its presence.

The indices lead to the self and its vertical constitutive achievements which are already enacted, and are accessible to any ego in its activities of reiterating the sense implications of correlative environment and its typological traces, as either sense recouping, or sense disrupting. Each novel determination of already enacted others, the distanced egos, each new articulation of world and ourselves, is a new clue for the interrogation of sense implications inherent in the encountered egos. This novelty is not free floating; it inheres in and is co-constituted by the horizons of the other egos. What can become a clue is prefigured by the situation of the self and its experiential treasury of sense. As was suggested above, we cannot understand ourselves any deeper as a self than would be allowed by the clues encountered in the temporalized horizon of the other egos (*ibid*, p. 81). Thus the tracing of the situations of the other egos, their typological environments and their typological self understanding either as flux or stasis, comprising the context for their activities, becomes equivalent to tracing the all temporal, everywhere and nowhere of the life of the ultimate self. If all beings, including ourselves as worldly in a specific self understand of who we are, are taken as clues, then they would no longer function as accidental or contingent facticities, serving to exemplify necessities, but would be beyond the difference between them. Each, including our own current ego, becomes a constituted factual necessity of sense, answering to the question of what is necessarily presupposed in the constituting activities. What sense constitution, for example, is required as both universal and factually contingent to yield a being of a specific perceptual type and mean-

ing? This is exactly where the difference between fact and sense must be surrendered. Whatever is given as an individual ego, a perceptual facticity, is already a perceptual index of the constitutive achievement. The relationship to the perceptual, the factual, is incorporated into the clues, incessantly pointing to the tacit ground of their constitution. Through free variations, as an attainment of sense, the factual is not abolished but unfolded in its complete sense. In this process, the transcendental subject, the self becomes transparent to itself in its horizons. The region of the constituted sense, the anonymous process, can be reached through a reduction to the passively enacted and accepted field of egos as indices and interconnections, capable of either maintaining or disrupting them. Such interconnections are also traces of the way that the environmental typologies are prefigured. What is given for each ego, in its enactments of sense, is totally correlated to a history of sedimented typologies and their connections. If the egological enactments become disruptive of the permanent flux and its open horizons, then the horizon of the typologically constituted and interconnected world of sense, becomes equally disrupted. Yet both, the egos and their world are traces of the absolute, anonymous self. Obviously, the tracing of the latter is an enormous task. This process must be seen teleologically, as an aim of the self explication of the self in the living present. This is to say, what are the conditions of awareness that would allow the maintenance of an integral self across its own history, deployed in distinct egological pasts and future possibilities?

THE THEORETICAL VENTURE

In an essay entitled “The Philosophical Problem of the End of History”, Landgrebe (1968) contends that historical process cannot be grasped from within history without a contradiction (p. 230). If the aim of history were in history, then it would be only one part of history; the whole of history could not aim at one of its parts. On the other hand, the aim of history could not be something completely alien, transcendent, and unknowable. Thus, the meaning of historical events, in the sense of

localizable experiences of identifiable egos, cannot be understood without their common aim, i.e. a cognizance that they all have a purpose. Since traditional answers to the aim of history – immanence and transcendence – are no longer viable, phenomenology must fill the gap and demonstrate the necessity of an ultimate aim from the side of multiple egos and their consciousness (ibid, p.231). We hope to trace the experiential access to this ultimate aim.

No normal awareness is closed – it points to open horizons where each determination is transcended by indeterminations. This is already evident with every minimal impression that breaks up into protentional expectations and retentional diffusions (Landgrebe, 1968, p. 23). These include the constant breaking up of the present and self into an incessant sense of self communalization, building a base for an intermonndie totality. The latter, as a focus containing all possible experiences, perspectives, is the telos. Here we open the notion of atemporally constituted supra consciousness. For Husserl, the supra consciousness is bound by the historically constituted multiplicity of perceptions that comprises a “poli-centric” field. Thus my perception is not only mine; I borrow the perceptions of others and thus extend my own awareness through theirs, and they through mine. The field is extendable temporally in that the intentional awareness, such as memory, transmit the experiences of egos, as others of previous times. Such experiences were unified by the typological content toward which the others, the members of the poli-centric community, have oriented themselves and thus became accessible to egos of subsequent times. This assumes an implicit telos of temporally constituted poli-centric supra consciousness. The understanding of others, living at other times, presupposes a possibility of unification.

Phenomenological reflection glimpses this telos by tracing the anonymous life of the self in the egos to its own maxim of procedure. Only such a procedure leads to the resolution of the problem of tracing the self on the basis of temporally sedimented clues. It proposes the diminishment of the distance between the already temporalized, sedimented, and the atemporal, anonymous life. This is the telos of history. The everywhere and nowhere of the atemporality is thus always present

vertically as an incessant recouping of the self communalization in a flow. It is thus a constitution of a premordial we-consciousness, of the copresence of others, and the infinitely remote totality of all selves. This attains a most encompassing focus of a sole inter-egoic universe experienced by the totality of actual and possible selves. An absolute and apodictic prefiguration of an absolute poll-idea of teleology is opened. One reaches, here, the all as a focus that is incomparable to any other focus, and hence it is unrealizable in any adequate intuition. It is an infinite, although apodictic focus (Held, 1966, p. 63). This is the poli-idea of a complete unification of the logos, the sense giving principle assumed by the anonymous life. Thus the telic logos lends the anonymous life its rationality. The sense of this life stems from teleology. The latter is the ground of all awareness, and the locus of grounding is the experiencing poli-centric consciousness. Yet the latter is never a complete grounding for an all encompassing self as a functioning present.

But in what sense can the telos be a foundation? Given the phenomenological grounds, it is *a priori* excluded that the telos could be identified with either an ego, or even a we-functioning, or that it could be something transcendent. Phenomenology has bracketed transcendence. Even prior to phenomenology, modernity has closed all access to anything transcending human experience. Phenomenology must find an access to the telos in the very life of awareness. Initially the-poll-idea seems to fulfill the demands of telos as rational unity and logos. While it may seem to be beyond any worldly experience, it is given apodictically as an anonymous self, whose flow institutes the sense of self as other ego and as comprising a field of temporal unity of a we-consciousness, a telos toward which functioning and constituting egos move. The eidos of a final unity of all possible experience transforms all worldly experiencing and constitutive life into a teleologically ordered, although never closing, movement. Yet the poll-idea is still problematic. The poll-idea of absolute unity, while present in an unattainable distance, is constituted as all temporal trans-reality, trans-truth, and trans-self. Yet the telos cannot be seen as constituted in the activities of the anonymous self, since it too aims at unification that is presupposed as intuited in apodictic evidence. Phenomenology must adhere to the limits of experience

and grasp the anonymous life as all temporal. Could the telos be understood then as an all-encompassing poll-idea of unity? Since the anonymous life of the self as constant self communalization can constitute the poll-idea in complete apodicticity, it cannot constitute the certainty of unification of the self communalizing life of self. While the poll-idea is an apodictic aim, it does not guarantee the unity of the multiple egos. After all, each is experienced as distancing from, and other than, the self. And yet, throughout the various levels of analyses concerning intersubjectivity phenomenology takes for granted the necessity of such a unity. In this sense, the telos is not to be understood as the poll-idea, but as the inner ground, the pre form, that is already assumed in the formal unification of self communalizing life. It is only on the basis of such a pre-form that the we-consciousness could have a telos. This suggests that the ordering principle of the self must be found in an absolute self which is not identical with the self communalizing primordial consciousness, but is its unifying pre-form. It is the latter that can offer an *a priori* correlation to the poll-idea of a telos of our awareness. Thus the originary form of teleology is no longer the unreachable unification, but its anonymous pre-form correlated to the eidōs of polio-centric core, of an ultimate and all encompassing awareness of the world. The telos, then, is the tacitly present unifying ground of self communalization of the self, forever correlated vertically to the poll-idea of all egos as a teleological principle. The latter is not a future but a vertical presence.

Another way of approaching the same question, leading to the same conclusion, is suggested in Husserl's thought. According to him, we would not be able to offer an account of our break with the mundane mode of egological immersion and continuity in the world, and our turn to phenomenological reflection without having the presence of the unifying pre-form. Only the phenomenological stance leads ultimately to a justification of all knowledge and activity, and demands that I must not only accept the world but become responsible for it. The anonymous and prereflective life, comprised of the self communalization, is not a reaction to blind compulsions, causes, and necessities, but a constitution of free ties, subtended by a pre-form of unity of the polio-centric historical process. The pre-form calls for a poll-idea of an all

encompassing experience of the totality of a meaningful world. Hence I am not only responsible for others, but also for the world. The self communalization, subtended by the pre-form as a unifying telos of all awareness is uncompelled, prior to temporalization, and hence free. In other words, the telic pre-form of unification is the very immanence of the subjects freedom and responsibility.

It is important to note that at this level knowledge and value, epistemic judgment and ethical responsibility coincide. The very communalization as a process of knowing through the others stance and perception, is the very value of the other and my complete responsibility toward the other. At the same time my unification with the other hinges on the assumed pre-form of this unification, and hence on the telos functioning in and through intersubjectivity.

The latter being self communalized plurality expressed in the sense of other egos, requires the pre-form for its unity, the telos. Hence history of the self in its diversity and theoretical purposiveness and value coincide.

POSTSCRIPT

No doubt, other issues are opened. Perhaps the most noted concern is the question of time constitution. It seems that the interpretation of this question assumes a direction which rests on

mundane prejudgments. Must acts of reflection constitute a temporal distance to the active life? After all, such life is atemporal, and the introduction of temporalization in reflection constitutes an unwarranted ontologization. Can the protentional and retentional phases be thought as sinking into depth and not into past? Our analyses seem to suggest that the sense making processes need not be successive. It is not necessary to employ temporalization in order to grasp the meaning of time phases and their initial flow. Indeed, the various designations offered as “all-time”, and “atemporal”, suggest an escape of temporalization.

No doubt, there are difficulties presented with the distinction between the phenomena and the exposition of the phenomena. While the phenomena of sense of the other as the distancing self might be all present, their linguistic exposition is temporal, leading to the view that the phenomena are equally successive. We simply point to these issues not because the readers are not aware of them, but due to their own inherent problematic.

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CHAPTER VI

INDIVIDUAL SELF IN THE CONTEXT OF TWO WORLDS

INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary turmoil of globalization, creating a nomadic civilization of technical elites, having their identities and values as specialists or even workers in different positions, we are at a loss concerning who we are, what is essential, and what to believe or think. The global pop culture, replete with the images of stars, the Michael Jacksons, gyrating huge crowds around the world into mass orgasms, we no longer discriminate between individual, social roles, values and worth: in brief, we have no conception of arche, of ontological base from which to judge. The declaration of universal human rights, cultural rights, national sovereignty, has lost its force and every mini-tyrant can proclaim his right to be the ruler of his people according to the customs of his “culture”. But at the end of last chapter we indicated that there is a difference between the immediacy of individual self awareness, and the mediated, social and even cultural selves, the egos, the gurus, the stars, the shamans. The task of the following chapter is to disclose two major signitive worlds and their cultural symbolism at the most fundamental level – their arche – to note wherein the individual identity belongs.

Lithuania and the entire Central Europe has lived under the rule of a vast empire, we could call it Byzantine, despite its other various names, such as communism. The latter is simply a variant of a tradition with a specific arche which is not present just in one location, but can be explicated in various modalities. Thus, it might turn out that

groups of peoples living in the same geographic regions and claiming to be of the same nationality, at the cultural level they might belong to an entirely different symbolic signification as to the very essence of the cosmos. For example, persons of scientific enlightenment and rationalism, although living in China, belong to greco-roman symbolic design, while fundamentalist Christians, living in the west, might belong to midwest symbolism. In this sense, the signitive phenomena, as basic ways of awareness, are neither derivable from nor reducible to particular nationality or geographical site. Yet, on the basis of symbolic awareness, there will be a radical disagreement concerning the ground and form of public institutions, purposes of life, and the very meaning of the self. Indeed, each will want to expand and bring such public institutions to all peoples. It is the case that globalization, and by extension universalization, are claims made by every culture. This is to say, at the level of awareness, which we call cultural, members of a given culture will make a claim that theirs encompasses everything. Greco-Roman naturalism and rationalism, up to day, claims that all peoples must follow this mode of awareness in order to be realistic and open and hence have public institutions ruled by citizens. But the same universality and encompassment is claimed by a Hindu: the founding text of our civilization, the *Mahabharata*, it is claimed, includes all humanity. The Mid-Eastern Judaic-Christian-Islamic monism will claim to be subject to one law and ruler. In this sense, there appears to be no room for the Other. Each cultural awareness will confront the Other with an effort to subsume the other under its own logic. Each culture, as a symbolic design, will interpret the Others and attempt to locate them within its own parameters. If cultural modes of awareness are irreconcilable, there arise confrontations that may lead to mutual destruction. We have holy wars and racial genocide, we exert efforts to reeducate the Others, to make them sane, convert them to true beliefs, and do so for the good, the salvation, the enlightenment of the others. Thus, if we bring them better material life, medicine, etc., we are doing them a favor. In turn if we bring them faith and salvation even if they resist, we can baptize them and send them to heaven. At one level, the modern Western scientific and above all technically signitive level, there seems to be a

transcultural and intercultural communication and even exchange of modes of thinking, creating various technical and pedagogical uses. Yet these very uses will not be regarded in the same way. One will regard these uses as traces of material, pragmatic, or rational civilization, while the other will regard them as implements for a holy war. By holy war we do not mean necessarily a religious war, but any claim to a position that has to be defended at any cost, such as nationalism, market, ethnocentrism, Hitler as well as Stalin and just as well as Reagan can claim to have a holy war against those who are culturally different.

Given this context, there appears another significant fact, as part of our methodology, that is currently unavoidable: intercultural awareness that inevitably locates the individual "between" cultures and makes one visible in correlation to and different from others. This is to say, we are no longer capable of being restricted to one culture, since we have already incorporated the cultural means of the others, either at the technical or at the lifestyle level – even if we reject that lifestyle. In this sense, we do not deny that we belong to a culture, but we also recognize the fact of cultural intersections. Hence, we shall not borrow a method from any culture, because in the current global interconnections the cultures are already transparent one through the others – they are in transition. Whether we do or do not accept theoretically our own inheritance in a culture, we are finding ourselves in an in-between domain. This means that the self constitution of awareness of current cultures, even if not recognized positionally, is in-between, in transition. Whether one belongs to Mid-Eastern, Greco-Roman, Mayan, or Hindu culture, one has already recognized, at the cultural level, oneself being in transition between them. This fact of transition and at times confrontation is currently the unavoidable methodological consciousness. Any other fact, or significant awareness, would be inadequate with respect to the phenomena of our current global encounters. Here our efforts will focus on modes of awareness in order to note how such modes either deny or attempt to subsume the other modes, and how both attempts fail, leading to different understandings and inevitable mixtures of cultures.

In the last chapter we noted that the individual, as more than any cultural or social definition, is the ground of cultural symbolic designs.

Regardless of a variety of symbolic cultural design, there appear two mutually exclusive and mutually indicative phenomena, composing distinct signitive modalities: frame and energy, form and power, law and love, organization and spirit, boundary and transgression, li and ch'i, all implicating the phenomena of structure and action, permanence and change. What sorts of relationships are available between these basic phenomena of awareness, they will always appear in the analyses of cultural symbolic designs. Meanwhile, at whatever symbolic level and in whatever culture, whether in depictions of nature, metaphysical "realities", empirical givens, subjective constructs, it is deemed that structures are in principle definable. Thus any ego, as having a recognizable position, belongs to socially established requirement – value. On the other hand, change and action do not yield themselves to full delimitation and can challenge any position – and this action is what defines an individual as worth. In turn, there seem to be two "languages", the exoteric, appropriate for structure, and esoteric, appropriate for action. If they become confused, for example if structural language were to be used to frame the awareness of flux, then one can expect an ironic consciousness. The same can occur in the opposite direction, where dynamic language may be used to depict an awareness of structure. Regardless of cultural variations, all trace the living present of structure and change as the basic modes of individual awareness and its self identification with some of its "others". Yet what makes for the differences among cultures is the way that structure and change are related. In brief, the modes of awareness are these very relationships. Live awareness is the sense making composition which, as phenomena, are tacitly present through all cultural symbolic designs. This suggests, once more, that what phenomenology calls transcendental awareness at its most primordial level, is coextensive with social and cultural architectonic. In this sense, our analyses are phenomenological.

For our purposes in the investigations of contemporary cultural intersections and crises, we shall open four types of relationships between stasis and flow at the level of individual awareness. First, any change can maintain and even enhance a static self, i.e. a social self. Second, any change can disrupt or ruin stasis, regardless how either

are understood at the symbolic levels of culture. Third, stasis can allow and even promote change. Fourth, stasis can completely suppress flow, by inevitable laws. These four awareness compositions may appear synchronically as if they belonged to one culture. The reason for such appearance is that at the cultural level there seems to be mutual acceptance of varieties as long as the varieties are not pushed to the limit and, reveal incompatible architectonics. Our following task is to reveal these intersections and crises, even among members living presumably under the same national banner. Such members might have a greater affinity to groups of other nations and regions than to those living next door. Thus, a battle concerning the nature of public institutions, cultural clashes, become inevitable.

TRACING CULTURAL DESIGNS

As is the duty of philosophy, we must make things as clear and precise as possible, even at the expense of some psychological discomforts to persons who would want to claim that radically different and contradictory positions can be “accommodated”. Thus, first, let us look at the Western culture and what is its arche, its very condition, this is to say what is Europe and the Occident in principle. The term “Europe” is 2700 years old, and stems from Fonecia as *ereb*, *erebos*, meaning westward where the sun sets. First conception was of a direction toward the Western Aegean coast, toward a formless Occident. Europe is not a name for a precise geographic location, and was not even named by “Europeans” but peoples from Asia Minor and its first glance across the Aegean sea. In this sense, Europeans knew their identity in a diffused way as a reflection from others, lending Europeans a specific movement as a distancing from what is familiar to something that is totally strange – it is a tearing away from what is fixed and established and opening to the unfamiliar, the open and strange. The last movement to tear away from the Middle East was the mortal battle against the invasion by Persian autocracy (the cradle of all sorts of monotheisms, and divine rulers). The Greeks drew a line not only between Asia Minor and the West, but also a cultural divide. Three hundred Spartans

stood against hundred thousands “obedient to the laws of Sparta”, and Athenians sent a fleet to close the access to Occident – equally in obedience to the laws of their own creation. We can say that for the first time in human “history” appeared a human as human, living in accordance with human rules, not kneeling before some self declared divinities, and rejecting any efforts by the then “great” civilizations of Middle East, to make humans subject to some “higher” laws or edicts. We prefer to die on our feet than to live on our knees. The line was drawn such that the Occident was born as “philosophy”, as searching for the individual and responsibility, and realized through *paidea*, education.

No doubt, the shamanism holy men, and persons who have obtained their education in the West, have justly accused the Occident of being imperialistic, colonialist, exploiters, arrogance, and slavery; but we must immediately note that it was the same Occident which critically assessed and denounced these practices and demanded their abolition globally. This is in accord with the Occidental human arche: we are limited, fallible, and responsible for our mistakes; thus we must correct them and make certain that they are not repeated. No people, within the contexts of their own cultures, have admitted to having been wrong, or making mistakes. The Africans, who were the major suppliers of slaves, have not admitted their responsibility; the Muslim slave traders would not even consider that such an action is wrong. The intellectual fury of western intellectuals against western practices is well known: there are libraries of books and articles analyzing various ideologies and their condemnation as not belonging to the Occidental culture, as to be forbidden by law – whether it is communism or fascism, as against human rights. We find an interesting global contradiction: the denouncement of the Occident, coming from members of other cultures and demanding admittance of “guilt”, at the same time constantly appeal to the West to help abolish inhuman practices in their own cultures, to intervene and to bring “democratic” reforms, to help build education, health, and to welcome the others as immigrants to the West. In brief, the West is guilty, but at the same time it is only the West where the others seek refuge and protection. It offers and demands rationality, universal, yet modifiable laws, responsibility, and accountability. Let us then look at the very creation of the Occident in Greek life.

We could take some well known cultural and social phenomena and demonstrate our case of contemporary cultural intersections and clashes quite easily. But we do not wish to be accused of following the easy path. Hence, we shall select cultural symbolic designs that operate at the level of what currently would be regarded as interesting stories. We shall begin with the rebels found in the stories of evil. Such stories should also reveal the psychological states and social relationships of the rebels. Literate persons are familiar with the assertion that Western world is rooted in classical Greek thought. The latter was also rich with stories one of which was a depiction of a rebellion against the law of highest authority and thus a violation of the rules of action. This appears in the myth of Prometheus, who rebels against Zeus' edict that forbids fire to humans. Prometheus, moved by the unnecessary suffering of humans, steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Here we have practical assistance for which Prometheus does not ask anything. He does not wish to rule or to have others follow his way of life. What is interesting is that the Greeks accepted the action of such a rebel as a noble violation of bad laws. Although speaking formally, the act of Prometheus was "bad", his personal nobility and his positive attitude and qualities outweigh his formally bad act. Prometheus may be regarded as practically rational and secular naturalist. His aim was to help others, but with this help he changes the notion of instituted symbolic designs. Even Zeus accepts this change by admitting that his edict prohibiting fire to humans was a bad law. The secularism of Prometheus appears in his personality which is independent from any authority. He has his own views and is capable of planning his own future based on his own knowledge and choices. If he makes mistakes, he admits them and corrects them. After all, Prometheus had decided to support Zeus in the battle against the titans, but after the battle he recognized that Zeus had become a tyrant. Thus he decides to correct his mistake by rebelling against Zeus' laws simply because he decides that such laws are practically unjust. Here the highest authority is negated as unacceptable in principle without any question as to one's own benefits. In this classical Greek story one develops the notion of personal responsibility for one's own action. Although one makes mistakes, he takes full responsibility for such mistakes and deems it his duty to correct them.

This story suggests a cultural symbolism that points to a lived awareness, composed of a specific relationship between stasis and flow, structure and action. In Promethean story, Zeus is the highest cultural symbol of stasis – having a social definition as authority. Prometheus, in turn, is a cultural symbol of action. As an initial supporter of Zeus, he reveals an awareness of permanence maintenance and enhancement, and hence become socially identifiable. Yet by becoming a rebel, he discloses an awareness which is disruption of stasis, and hence of his position in society. Such a disruption in the story of Prometheus reveals that an individual is more than any social position would allow and, in the final outcome, a very specific relationship between stasis and flow: the highest symbol of stasis – Zeus – agrees with Prometheus and thus abolishes his permanent social position. In this sense, stasis can be open to flow, allowing the reappearance of an individual in action prior to social positions and cultural designs. This means that at the cultural level, there arises a possibility to challenge any authority, law, to interrogate them sensibly by an active individual, and thus to change them. In other words, there emerges a dialogical relationship between active individual and stasis of society. In our setting, cultural symbolic designs can compel social changes. Given this composition of awareness, classical Greek understanding could not escape radical individualism. Every position, every tradition, even the thinking of the highest figures, can be interrogated openly and reasonably, investigated, analyzed, and requested to justify themselves in a full light of public and political debate. If a given position, and even an accepted tradition cannot be justified by reason and by the well being of humans, then they can be openly rejected. This is the reason that classical Greece comprised an arena of intellectual tension among multiple positions, views, all calling for an open public in whose context such a tension could be maintained if not resolved. The agonal culture, a play between active individuals who challenged their own positions and the social positions of divinities and themselves. This active individualism had to create an open public space that comprised a cultural symbol of stasis that tolerated and enhanced all creative flow of individuals. The individual's "law" is this: it requires a maintenance of stasis that allows individual's flow be-

yond any social norm. This lived awareness comprises the ground of every person's rationality and responsibility, and also founds classical and the modern Western democratic understanding that demands autonomy and equality of all persons in open public institutions.

Yet there is another important aspect for the creation of Western culture that distinguishes it from other cultures. This aspect is known as "Oresteia" tradition, disclosing the arche of what it is, in essence, a human life. Let us look briefly at this aspect. Without having done any deed to deserve either favors or disavors, Orestes is placed in a situation between the polar powers: the furies, the earthy-maternal and Apollo. As we know, Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, is called upon to murder his mother and thus avenge the murder of his father. But he has not placed himself in the situation to murder his mother in order to be true to his father. His only "guilt" is being a son. None of his own passions should move him to the tragic deed. Only the command of Apollo, the master of his world, binds him irrevocably to murder his mother, even in contrast to all his efforts to resist such a deed. And yet he must also accept the consequences of his deed and be guilty in face of the powers of blood of earth goddesses. Orestes is gripped by the clashing cosmic divine forces and the human is only a play of such forces that are impossible to overcome, resist or escape. He reflects on the stage all that constitutes the essence of Greek tragedy. Whichever side he selects, he will be culpable. If you don't, you are damned, and if you do you are damned. Hence, if there is a way out it will be his burden to find it.

With his origin from the worlds of spirit and blood, his descent from mother's right and father's rule – two images of distinct and separate powers each having a part and equal claim in one person, the son – he is placed on the stage for the first time in human history as a mere human. The gruesome battle between the forces comes into focus in Orestes. In order to be adequate in deed to his father he must murder his mother. Without a slightest deed by the individual, the human finds himself in a setting of tragedy. While not having chosen this life, he is called upon to be responsible for its direction; while not capable of denying his heritage for which he is not guilty, he is made to be guilty. While he resolves to act, i.e. to accept his heritage and in turn to rec-

ognize the responsibility and guilt for his act, he discloses seriously for the first time the magnificence and the decay as characteristic of what is human – a human who is his own greatness and poverty. Here freedom and responsibility cannot live without guilt. Orestes recognizes his own tragedy. Tragic life of man consists of being the sole entity who in his freedom is called upon to struggle for life and in an absurdly paradoxical way he is a play thing of this very struggle. His consciousness and conscience is a playing field needed by great cosmic forces to test their own powers. Our human story runs the gauntlet of clashing cosmic forces depicted in divine imagery and human gender antagonisms. The struggles and sufferings of humans are designed to bring into relief and foreground the forces that have heretofore dominated human life in invisible, cunning and secret ways.

It was a divinity that demanded the murder of the mother and the spilling of blood to atone for the spilled blood of the father. It is Apollo who provoked the furies. There should not be any reason to demand Orestes blood unless he is guilty against himself. In this sense for the furies Apollo is not only one of the guilty parties, he is *the* only one who is totally guilty. Apollo is confused by such logic, since more sacred and most dear to man than ties of blood is honor. The strife between Apollo and the furies is not just between two divine regions, but between two world orders each sanctified by its own divine images. The region of Apollo, the sky, does not spring from the earth and is not held together by blood, but is an invention of man proclaiming his freedom from the earth. If man's imagery is to survive his own short life span, he must be concerned with his continuation through blood. The children, born of mother, must become his own. Hence man had to accept family life and to transform it in a way that he becomes a master of the woman and submits both to the rules not derived from life, but imposed from above. Following this path he becomes a chief, a leader of a tribe, a king, and his order, sanctioned by sky figures such as Apollo who guarantees man's social identity and position, he is not yet a master of himself. There is no question that man can gain his identity by identifying himself with higher authority, be it social or transcendent, but not yet having identity of his own.

Apollo sees the claims of the furies as wasted nonsense originating with barbaric times. With his rule, a superior order has been established. He is so certain of the higher position that for him even the natural mother right – which cannot be avoided without surrendering man's continuity – must stem from man. For the divinity of light this state of affairs seems unquestionable and he demands and receives praises for his achievements. This does not provide the resolution between the two forces, and Zeus appoints Athene as a mediator. Athene is well aware that gods and goddesses must have an equal claim as valid powers of cosmos. As became obvious, the situation ends in a dead end such that the case of Orestes is well beyond the solution by divinities such as Apollo or the furies; it seems hopeless. Athene does something completely unexpected. While she was appealed to by humans, who have reached a hopeless situation, to resolve the issue by her wisdom, she simply pointed to a terrestrial human possibility that would be fitting to make humans into what they are in essence. But the possibility was unheard of and radically new, invented and founded by the goddess of the city of Athens. This is a moment in human history where the healing and welfare of humans is handed back to them. It is not handed to some singular hero who is usually a supporter of his own group, but to the totality of individuals who, in their mutual work with each other, will establish harmony. This mutuality is valid only if it stands under the rule that all matters of life and death shall be the affair of the humans. Athene suggests that to escape the strife, humans must establish their own court. The time and place for the establishment of such a court must be immediate, since the law of blood vengeance, whether demanded by mother earth or the will and honor of the sky god, became helpless to solve this human problem and thus must surrender its unworkable and destructive solution. If humanity as humanity is to continue, it must find a new way. The stage is set: there is a place into which enters the murderer of his mother, Orestes, and right behind him the entire blood demanding swarm. Not willing to abandon his favored Orestes, Apollo also shows up to show his contempt for his opponents in this peaceful setting. How will Athene protect the people of her city from being drawn into this self destructive strife?

A surprise follows: not only she does not protect the citizens from the angry encounter, but in fact pushes them into it. From among the honorable citizens she devises a court that will be empowered to decide the case of Orestes. She throws the gauntlet at the citizens' feet that demands the abolition of blood vengeance without abolishing the sanctity of life. Of course, Athene does not leave the citizens "hanging" with this problem; she leads them to the only way that it could be mastered: court should take over the responsibility of making judgments concerning guilt or innocence of any citizen and thus break the chain of blood vengeance. But what lends the court such wondrous power and wisdom that no divinities possess? It is significant that by proposing a court Athene excludes the passions of affected persons; an impartial court need not consider personal hates, loves, commitments to blood line or allegiances to groups. Thus the question of revenge is equally abolished. Moreover, a judgment does not come from one person, whose views might be narrow, but from persons who are selected for their known honor, honesty and truthfulness. The court, in its judgment, will be charged not only to consider the well being of the individual, but above all of the entire society. The judgment should follow the majority vote cast for or against a person after careful consideration of motives, witnesses, and validity of arguments. Yet another possible suspicion should be avoided: the conspiracy of the judges to rule in a specific way in a given case. Thus, while the court proceedings are common, each judge will make his decision without consultation with others. In brief, no "party" formation is allowed. Only individuals with their sense of responsibility for the community comprise final decision. Truth here is integrated from partially available decisions where each brings to bear on the whole to the extent that each judge has also a view as to the good of the whole.

The arche, the principle of this story so far is that humans are fallible, and yet they must turn back to themselves as individuals and, as best they can, decide all matters by themselves. This reminds us of our first chapter and the quest for the essence of "fact". There, each individual, participating in public affairs, must exclude his private, psychological etc. aspects and deal with the case as it is, and do so as an individual

judge. This is what Athene demands: each individual must test the facts, weigh the evidence and make a decision – as an individual. At this level, the founding by Athene her city is a celebration of a birth of individualism, responsibility and factual “objectivity”. Here, humans are free to decide and agree, but must also observe the limit which would be fatal if transgressed. The limit is transgressed when the court fails to perform in accordance with the conditions set out above or when citizens fail to adhere to the rules requiring each to respect the humanly established laws. If these implications are accepted, then the human settlement, established by Athene, will become Polis. But the citizens must be reminded what occurs when the limit is transgressed. That is why given the tragic human condition, the understanding of Polis (political society), does not come *after* the age of the lion – the hunter and hunted, but *from* its very essence. This is a complex proposition; after all, Aeschylus parades the entire blood bath sequence on the stage in full force to demonstrate that the very clashing forces must be visible in the Polis. In order for the forces not to explode the newly built Polis of light, each citizen must be watchful for the explosive powers which are built directly into the Polis. This light would allow the exclusion of blood guilt from entering into judgment of person’s responsibilities and duties. The goddess of Athens speaks for the new light and the new age that begins the epoch of “Orestism” such that the dangers of blood vengeance are replaced by the world of human common sense. Person’s pride is invested in being a citizen of his Polis and the responsibility for its freedom. The Polis is built by homo humanus must be constantly realized and maintained by each citizen if the human order is to prevail. The Polis is, the primal image of human order in principle, and hence an *idea* in the full sense of the word in Greek. Orestie is used to make visible this *idea as human individual arche*. The established Polis is permanent, but all the forces that were directly active in tragedy, are to be revered and present to remind the citizen of the consequences of forgetting his responsibility. This is a first and unique way of separating political society and religion. Religious figures cannot be banned, divinities must be present, but no longer as images of worship, but as a presence to remind the citizen of what would happen if he failed in his

responsibility: return of the strife of divine forces in the midst of human affairs such that the strife would demand of humans to take sides and battle for their various divinities – back to tragedy. Perhaps this should be a lesson to our current age where political society is attempting to introduce divine strife into human life, leading to vengeance of one group against another, where mass murder, holy war, murder in the name of “historical inevitabilities”, murder in the name of a nation, murder with impunity, seems to be acceptable.

We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philosophy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate Socrates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with the demands of the good as one expression of individuals’ intrinsic worth. Only under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and caricatures. Essential to Socratic individualism is his admission that we are fallible, and yet responsible to correct our mistakes by finding truth. In this sense, Socrates is part of the enlightenment of Athens and a daring to question any authority, whether divine or human. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social

value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for “whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after all, demands self degradation and thus the denial of self worth. Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warning: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens. At base, Socrates challenges values, as socially accepted individual positions, and hence fitting for categorically definable persons, and opens himself as an undefined and anonymous individual who is more than any social function could exhaust. He demands the primacy of culture over a social system of values.

PERMANENT OPEN PUBLIC DOMAIN

The praxis, initiated by Promethean revolution, and by founding of the city of light, has a mode of action which is the positing of the human as an object of human signification, such that none is superior to others. It signifies the reality of the universal equality of the human as human. The individual, thus, is equal to any other individual, recognizing no dominance of one person over others, and no authority which is not affirmed by the individual’s reflection upon herself. Every individual is independent from others, and in a free association with others she only recognizes authority of others only if confirmed, agreed upon, and appointed by her. The representatives must be accountable to the individual and the public. This equality also leads to independence and freedom of each. If all are equal, then all should be submitted to the same laws, chosen by all. Obviously, this general tendency of equality to establish common laws may be specified” by regional and more spe-

cific laws, but the first impetus is “equality under the law” of all. Thus, a central rule. After all, in face of equality, it would be most distressing if a law were to apply to one and not another citizen. This includes the legislative power, irrespective of what origin this power might be; it too must submit to the laws as any individual.

Yet we should point to a difference between democracies: some have emerged among the people who had an understanding of independence and freedom prior to calling for equality. Once they have gained equality, they retained a strong sense of individual freedom and a sense of opposition to any governmental decrees that would limit freedom. Others have begun with equality, e.g. the European monarchic absolutism which had established equality without offering freedom. In this case the European development tended toward equality and the call for state guarantees of equality even if freedom is to be either limited or suppressed. This is the difference between the Anglo-American and the Continental trends. The English, who settled in the new world to found a democracy, were accustomed to deal with public matters. They were accustomed to freedom of thought, of expression, personal freedom, and participation in local self-government. They took these freedoms as self evident and built their new world of democracy. Equality was founded on freedom. For the Americans, thus, freedom is the older over equality. For the Europeans the case is reversed. Thus in France, when the democratic revolution was established and equality achieved, all power went to the state. The lacuna could not be filled by any other means. Equality requires that there should not be any rank distinctions, and indeed not even singular differences in freedom.

The eidos of the democratic revolution is equality through freedom. Yet the equalities established by freedom pose dangers for freedom. One wants to be free in order to be equal, yet once equality takes root, freedoms begin to shrink. As the French revolution has shown, with one act the people acquired freedom, and having established equality, again abolished freedom. But what is more troublesome and unintended is the tendency of equality toward the median, the average, and a distrust of any outstanding, or at least publicly unglorified personalities. This does not lead to a blatant tyranny, does not abolish

public institutions, but has a peaceful pressure against freedom. Freedom of course can never vanish in a POLIS that maintains the hard won equality. Equality could not long survive without the former. Thus democracy is criss-crossed by two trends: on the one hand, the trend calling for the centralization of political power and the rejection of such a power, and a tendency to demand freedom.

The democratic revolution takes for granted that there is no rigid or fixed form that democracy should assume; it remains open and variable. Usually, there is a concern with the well being of the public, but not an overly great concern with grand purposes. The individual is "independent", although the social enterprises tend to subsume him and exercise power over him. While customs are established and maintained, they do not have the force of law or inevitability. Even the laws have become "humane" guaranteeing not only rights, but many other amenities such as protections against social powers and their incursion into the private lives, possibilities of public education without ideological impositions and manipulations. Of course life lacks the magnificence that was once the province of the rulers, at the expense of the ruled. Novelty itself seems to be the main outline of the democratic life. Provisionally we must point out that while education is a requisite democratic institution, in the age of political-administrative technocracy, it tends toward technical, fragmented knowledge for social and private interests and thus neglects the civic knowledge. Here education becomes an equal opportunity for technical mastery of a disconnected field. This is shown in our articulation of various modes of technological power, scientific enlightenment, discursive power, and legitimation crisis.

If there are drawbacks in democracy, there is one basic means of checking them: political freedom. If freedom, which owes its realization to equality, is not to disappear behind equality, then these two determinations shaping democratic consciousness must be reversed. The democratic consciousness has assumed equality to be preeminent. In this sense, freedom is used for the establishment of equality. But if this is not to lead to the despotism of equality, freedom must be backed by equality of freedom. This is not a surrender of equality, but rather a recognition of the main factor which made equality possible. This reversal

allows the establishment of the initial equation of freedom and equality: the will to equality becomes the basis for the will to freedom, while freedom becomes the determining viewpoint for the will to equality. But the transformed consciousness is not adequate for the realization of the eidos of democratic polis. We suggest the fulfillment of three conditions:

1. The thought of freedom cannot be forced upon a person externally. No placards and proclamations can make one free; one must recognize one's own task and responsibility. Indeed, one in a way "knows" this freedom and responsibility, yet one must insist upon exercising it. This "knowledge" is equality and the latter is a prop for the reversal of equality and freedom in order for freedom to be regarded as a basis of equality.
2. The establishment of this transformation in reality is called for when one recognizes its necessity, i.e. when it is endangered. If freedom is not seen as threatened, then one will continue to maintain equality, but not allow, or at least will not call for, the founding of equality on freedom. It could be well argued that freedom currently is endangered and precisely by equality. The more equality becomes preeminent, insisted upon, the more is freedom restricted. Thus what has to be limited is the all pervasive power stemming from equality, appearing in the phenomena of mass opinion, political non-participation, privatization, etc. This power is what necessitates the transformation of democratic consciousness toward the priority of freedom.
3. This necessity is a task to be taken up; if the citizen does not take up the task, then freedom ceases to be a factor. Freedom is not a state of being but a deed, an insistence and persistence: it is the very moment when an individual appears in her action and reveals herself as undefinable, as more than a social value. No doubt, this kind of transformation of democratic consciousness elicits in the social arena numerous tensions and conflicts. The will to freedom reentering the domain of the polis, turns against all the tendencies in democracy to limit or even abolish freedom in favor of equality. Yet such a will is in a position to

dissolve the contradiction into which democracy sinks. While this discussion has suggested a distinction between freedom and equality, it did not imply that a democratic polis could exist on the basis of either one or the other. Ultimately, both are a condition and must be treated as mutual. The culture of Prometheus and Athene of permanence as maintaining and enhancing a flow, are present as phenomena by the actions of individuals who maintain their own individuality only in this action. It is important to note that the initial founding of political society in the case of Orestes trial, the selected judges did not yet have any notion of prescribed social roles and their value; they were simply asked to act individually, truthfully, with honor and dignity; the same can be said of Socrates.

The modern subject that has been universalized in various pronouncements, including United Nations' universal human rights, both individual and cultural, and postmodern claims that demand respect for different cultural styles to self determination, are premised on a modern understanding of subject as self generating. At the dawn of Western modernity, it was recognized that the human has no nature, has no essence, has no rules by which to live, and therefore whatever nature the human will possess, whatever rules will be followed, whether scientific or political, will have to be invented as if "out of nothing". This is an initial suggestion that the modern subject intends to be self created without any other conditions, including theological, scientific, ontological to the extent that the very distinctions between those terms are equally invented without precedence. This is the intentionality that comprises the background for the articulation of what a human is as self created. Therefore, there is no pre-given subject that can be used as a criterion to determine what human subject is. The point we are arguing is that even Descartes could not avoid this intentionality when he argued that despite the power of an evil genius, it cannot do anything against the fact that I constitute my own thoughts prior to truth and falsity. In short, the subject here escapes even an infinite power that can cause anything.

The subject is posited as totally self constituting without any conditions or, to speak with Kant, an unconditional subject. It seems that at this level, the constitution of modern subject has no essential criteria that could be used to judge what the subject is as identity. This type of self creative subject is totally autonomous, and as autonomous it creates unconditional methods and theories, and through them its own environment. One aspect of this creation is scientific methodology and technology. What we are pointing to is that this unconditional subject is also the beginning and end of modern Western science and philosophy. In Promethean terms, practical self creation of the subject subtends the scientific, social, and political theories. Technocracy and its various disciplines are one aspect of this practical self creation to become anything one wants. In this sense, the efforts to deconstruct this kind of self generating subject may fail because the subject at the outset does not have any social identity. It promises to be the unconditional condition for everyone to acquire self identity, to become any identity. In this sense, the postmodern logic is premised on the modern autonomous subject. The reason we say this is that the postmodern logic in principle claims that all cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, natural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. This means that postmodernity and deconstruction accept the self creation of the modern subject that invents its own logic for mastery of its own world and for self definition. The egological self definition is only one among many options. Our point is that the postmodern globalization assumes this universal self generating subject that invents different cultures without any natural, material, psychological causes. After all, postmodernity claims that everything is a construct. Our point to this claim is that the very notion of a construct is premised on modern autonomous unconditional subject.

This subject is universalized as the ground of identity for anyone. Anyone can create of himself or herself whatever they want. We are not saying that there is one specific identity that is offered, but the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the identities offered by their societies. In short, it is impossible for any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of choice

between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, or the right of a particular group to respect their own identity. What is at issue here is that the globalizing universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by postmodernity in a way that the others in their own self reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out their lives – between what they can be as universal individuals or what they can maintain as their culture. The autonomous self creating subject that is being globalized as universal has become a background on which the Others as culturally different would be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual, unique, with a right to self preservation.

THEOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Now we must turn to a culture, originating in Mid-Eastern absolutist conceptions, appearing in Persian imperial arche and personality cults of Judaic, Jesuit, and Islamic types. These seem to constitute an entire history that is counter to the philosophical efforts born in the West with classical Greece. These Mid Eastern conceptions were not only unphilosophical, they were and continue to be aggressively anti-philosophical. While members of these cults may claim that they were and continue to be engaged in philosophy, the forbidding and banning of philosophical texts, the burning of books and their writers, belies such claims. No doubt, the members of these cults wrote vast texts and even used logic borrowed from philosophers, such texts are a good testimony to their anti-philosophical character. All they are designed to do is translate their stories about the figures they worship into “philosophical” language and pretend to “prove” the figures in such fairy tales really exist. Not only exist, but are the most real among all that is real. To one’s surprise, what we experience as the world of things, given to direct awareness, is regarded as completely dependent upon the figures in their stories.

There seems to be a glaring East-West tension in terms of the history of Orient and Occident. Speaking precisely, East and West is the

ultimate issue, since the winner will determine the kind of world we shall inhabit: despotism or democracy, autocracy-theocracy or philosophy. From the outset, the difference between them was decisive. One was completely autocratic, Persian, Byzantine, despotic, lending itself solely to an interpretation of “imperative ordering” by the autocrat. While it is possible for an autocrat to be benevolent toward the population, his benevolence depends purely on his momentary dispositions, and the latter can coincide with the power of the laws the autocrat prescribes. We hear the chains from Siberia, the cries of holy wars from Middle East, and Middle Ages, the torture cries from the dungeons of the autocratic papacy, the threats of total destruction by the magically reborn “in faith” and their second coming, the occupiers of “promised land” and the holy warriors committed to the establishment of divine laws under one universal ruler – and all armed with the latest means of technical and military power. The division into East and West is not geographic but composed of cultural topography. Hence the West has imported, or accepted an exportation of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition of personality cults, stemming from, and completely correlated to the Persian autocratic mode of exercising power. This is well reflected in one, among numerous others, structural designs: imperial Persia and the divinities signifying such a structure. To understand this correlation we must turn briefly to a discussion of legitimation.

We must recall that for Occident, legitimation comes from individuals forming rational agreements and living by such agreements. For Mid-Eastern culture legitimation is “magical” wherein the world is peopled by figures that are structurally isomorphic with the power holders inhabiting the “solar palaces”. There is the celestial Lord-King, his Queen, their retinue, their subservient supplicants and worshipers, each with a sign of appointed and anointed rank, and hierarchical position. This is precisely the imperial regality, and in the final analysis the celestial region of stories, inhabited by divinities, that coincides with this ruling composition. This is to say, there is no legitimation here, since the stories do not justify the imperial deeds but are identical with them. The emperor can claim without a fear of contradiction that “we are divine”. Thus we find that the Persian imperial morphology and the

Judeo-Christian-Islamic composition also coincide. The ruling emperor is the law giver and the law, and there should be neither deviations nor questions concerning the power of such law. The language here is one of edicts and imperatives. All that lives and exists must obey and be subordinate to the edicts, indeed must act in ways that would constitute a support and enhancement of the edicts. No one can question the imperial force of the law, specifically when the law coincides with the story imagery that is also the magic of “making of the world”. The imperial powers make the world by their commands, and their divinities make the world by uttering appropriate words. “Let there be dogs” and dogs appeared by verbal magic. Hence the divine edicts are not some ethical commands of how humans must live, but are identical with the way humans are. At this level, we are faced with an understanding of verbal power that becomes coextensive with making, and indeed with an indistinction between word and event. The power holder’s every uttered wish becomes coextensive with law, deed and reality.

Up to date the cult personalities are called “lords, masters, lord of lords, king of kings” and the followers of such cults must live on their knees, slither on their stomachs, sing their “praises to the lord”, go to “places of worship”, be grateful and thankful to the lord, pronounce that everything depends on the “will of the lord”. The lord is an absolute and infinite power; he knows and does everything – a sort of panoptical being and demands that the transgressors of his rules confess their misdeeds. He is magnificent, perfect, vengeful and, once a while may be merciful. Let us be clear on these points at the metaphysical level. The human being, made by the power of magical words, must continue to be shaped and ruled by additional words. Hence, he may be declared a “sinner” not as some characteristic of his human essence, but as the very essence he acquires due to the verbal pronouncement. When some high shaman of these personality cults pronounces that a person has been “excommunicated” it does not mean, as is usually taken, that he is separated from the group, but that he has become by the power of excommunication a transformed entity. This verbal power to make and remake is evident from the rituals of “forgiveness”. One can become transformed back into a humble follower not by one’s own efforts but,

in the final analysis, a declaration of forgiveness by some supreme authority or by an appointed servant empowered to forgive the “sinner” and remake him into a valuable being. It is important to understand the extent to which the notion of being a “sinner” is pushed. While one is made in the image of the lord and master, one is born inadequate, a “fallen angel” and must be made complete by a magical ritual, usually called “baptism” where mysterious words are pronounced to ensure that this being is truly a human and therefore a valuable worshiper and, if need arises, an obedient warrior in the service of the lord’s army. Another significant aspect of these cults is the ranking of human beings in a hierarchy of social positions: while everyone is made by the same magic words, in this life each is destined to have a specific place in society which he cannot alter. If he is born a peasant, he will not be able to become aristocrat, no matter what he does. It is the will of the lord that he is born and must be nothing else but a peasant. An aristocrat is born to be nothing else and regardless of his fortunes or misfortunes, he and his children will be aristocrats. While everyone is equal in the eyes of the lord, this equality is postponed for a life in the “other world” but not in the world of flesh and blood. And everyone is watched to insure that the established identity and rules are observed – one cannot escape the all seeing eyes of the lord.

Thus it is not only the emperor who has spies everywhere – eyes and ears that see and hear everything – but the ultimate authority forever knows everything a priori wherein no one can escape his gaze. Any hope of hiding is completely abolished. The servants, the appointed shamans of this “panopticon” are empowered to “hear the confessions” of the sinners and to pass judgment as to the status of the very being of those who confess. While the shamans act as eyes and ears of the supreme master in the sky, the extent of their vision depends on the total vision of the master: the sinner may attempt to get away with some omissions in the confessional, but he cannot escape the vision of the ultimate master, the lord of lords. This is evident from the rituals of the personality cults where no mediating shaman is required for confessions. The individual must admit his misdeeds and transgressions directly to the master and proclaim that he was forgiven and therefore

restored to the “ranks of the faithful”. One aspect of this ritual shows up with the so called “evangelicals” who are “reborn” as one with their master. The appropriate shouts and noises, words repeated from some fable, empower them to become totally different as persons and, in principle, they too become empowered and commanded to “spread the word” by any means. The current fever in the United States among such groups to “spread the word” around the globe that translates into military crusades for the conquest of the “unbelievers” or “infidels” is just one outcome of such empowerment. Some may object that the members of their group do not use weapons to spread the word, but are engaged in good works among the poor and the unbelievers, or believers in “false gods”. That may be the case, but using weapons to kill may be more kind than destroying peoples entire worlds as a way of life that made sense, was meaningful and allowed them to live in their simple ways. To make these people live on their knees in front of imported personalities is worse than death: it is enslavement and destruction of any vestige of human dignity. Of course, among the fables of the original texts of personality cults slavery is sanctioned. That is why the slave trade, practiced by the members of these cults, was not considered to be evil. In fact, it was regarded as doing a favor to the unbaptized, heathen savages who needed to be subjected to the true faith and thus saved from their own erroneous ways. As we know, the conquest of the new world included the destruction of total populations in order to make them subservient to the new masters and their divinities. These actions were not based on the arche of Occident, but on that of Mid-East.

The suggestions so far also delimit an entirely different concept of the human than that offered by Occident. Not the free person empowered to question and interrogate all positions in an open forum with others, a fallible and yet responsible individual, and not even the initial autonomous subject of modern thinking, but the one that is “subject to...”, is subjected to edicts, to the various strategies and techniques of controlling human actions and his very essence. In Mid-Eastern culture there are no humans without their articulation as an “ought”, as permitted and prohibited, normal and deviant modes of being, decreed by authority. At the very outset the humans (and all things of the world)

are defined by what they “ought to be” and thus given a social value. They are a priori mediated and defined by another. If there would even arise a question of more than their social value, such as their self worth, the latter would be conferred, and thus mediated, by some lord of lords, king, heavenly being. Such notable as Emanuel Levinas, while rejecting philosophy, could not escape the pull of his culture, where the “ought” is prior to everything, where everything is measured by mysterious infinity who “freely” creates the other. Here we have a reappearance of the arbitrary will at the highest level of the tradition of personality cults.

Thus in the West also there is also another culture, with an arche from Middle East, and is expressed at the symbolic levels by Hebraic, Christian, and Islamic culture. This arche could also be understood from stories that depict a rebellion against authority. In this culture the rebel is, initially, Lucifer. His rebellion is presented in various guises. First, being the first born, he cannot accept the thought that his father-creator has turned his love toward a younger sibling. Second, he cannot accept that he was created by another, and hence does not possess his own personality. He wants to be the author of his own being. Third, Lucifer’s revolution is absolute: he wants to negate the order of his father and replace it by his own empire. In the latter, he would be the sole ruler. This does not mean that he can take over the throne of his father. In this arche, such a replacement is in principle impossible. Lucifer can only have a temporary empire which can mock and at times disrupt the empire of his father. In this tradition, the personality of the rebel is formed by envy, hate, and destruction. Since the rule of the father is absolute and changeless, it is regarded as good, while the disruptive rebellion of Lucifer is deemed to be evil. Symbolically, he is a negative being, and is not interested in helping anyone, in alleviating the suffering of others. Even if he fulfills some wishes of others, he does so to corrupt and thus to disrupt the order of his father.

At the beginning, Lucifer was created to serve the father, to maintain the father’s order by discovering the transgressors of paternal edicts and thus deserving of punishment. In this sense, Lucifer cannot have a personal identity of his own. His entire being coincides with his service to his father, with his maintenance of father’s laws. To speak

metaphorically, Lucifer is the chairman of the board of unheavenly activities, charged with suppressing all who defy his father. Indeed, those who defy the father, will be regarded as evil. At the level of the arche of this culture, the awareness here is activity that maintains absolute permanence. In other words, Lucifer is a cultural symbol of this arche of awareness. Lucifer's rebellion constitutes another moment of this culture: actions that are disruptive of permanence. Yet this disruption and its purpose is radically different from the one depicted in the story of Prometheus. The latter did not wish to establish a counter empire to that of Zeus. His rebellion was born of personal responsibility and individual decision which, in the final analyses, was capable of changing the order at the highest symbolic level. Lucifer's rebellion has no possibility of changing the paternal rules; the latter are absolute and omnipotent. There is nothing in the world that is not a subject to this symbol of permanence. In this sense the activity of rebellion against this permanence, its disruption, is a caricature of action. It cannot make any impact on such a permanence. All disruptive activity is destined to extinction, damnation and evil as a sign of non-being.

The father-creator and Lucifer symbolism reveals an awareness as a cultural arche that is irreconcilable with the one revealed by the Zeus and Promethean symbolism. The first awareness does not permit an establishment of institutions which would promote the changing of laws and even the changing of such institutions for the sake of human well being. Moreover, this awareness would preclude any interrogation, analyses, and changes in the symbolically expressed permanence of this awareness, and thus to change the very notion of truth and ethics. This arche cannot tolerate independent personalities, individuals, who would be capable of an autonomous and rational decision whether a given permanence is adequate or inadequate for human needs, and whether such a structure should be modified. Such an interrogation would be regarded as human pride, and any proposal to change such permanence would be judged as bad conscience that introduces chaos and evil, based on human inadequate thinking. After all, Lucifer cannot know more than his father-creator, and cannot decide what he wishes to be – apart from sitting on a tyrannical throne as his father – a pure imitation. This cultural arche does not imply democratic and open in-

stitutions where rational and responsible persons can decide common issues – without appeals to “highest authority”.

Democracy and its open dialogue concerning human ways of living and working together, cannot equate with father-creator and Luciferine symbolism and its basic cultural awareness. In the latter, one acquires a personhood and value from the obedience to another. Such a person finds himself in the first phase of Luciferine symbolism: he must act to enhance the absolute permanence and destroy everything that poses any threat to such permanence. Obviously, this also provides the logic for “holy wars” where everything is mobilized, subjected, and sacrificed for the victory against evil. In this arche there is no permission for open dialogue or choice. One either fights for, or is an enemy of the one true truth. The Promethean cultural arche, where permanence enhances change, and allows itself to be changed, endures through the Western modern thought and comprises the ground from which originate democratic, open public institutions. As permanent, they allow most diverse activities and tolerate various positions – even the symbolic design of father-creator and son Lucifer. Within the Promethean civilization, the Luciferine is regarded as one among others and accorded equal status. Its followers can discuss and critique openly other symbolic designs, and in turn can be evaluated by others. Everything can be accepted, rejected, challenged, and questioned. Yet the Luciferine awareness defines everything as a creation of a changeless structure which cannot be moved by any questioning and dissatisfaction. If there are wrongs in the world, they are wrong only due to the shortness and inadequacy of human vision. Seen from the symbolic design of father-creator, all is absolutely right and changeless truth. Everyone must be obedient to this truth and right. Those who fail to serve or have other truths, are, by definition, wrong and evil. Moreover, since this cultural arche is militaristic, requiring mobilization for war against all falsehoods and evils, the followers of this awareness cannot tolerate others who think otherwise. If one’s consciousness belongs to absolute truth and good, then such a consciousness will regard those who think otherwise as absolutely deviant and evil.

While the birth of human as human arche demanded a direct action of fallible and yet responsible individuals, with a duty to question others and above all themselves, the Mid Eastern arche has no individuals who are not mediated by an authority and given values in a hierarchy of preestablished positions. This arche has its variants in the theologies of communism and fascism, where there are no responsible individuals because everyone is mediated by social class, functional values, race, and hierarchy of commands. Moreover, such theologies proclaim the rule by inevitable historical laws (moving humanity from the city of man to the city of god) to which everyone is subjected. Of course, those who demand to live by Promethean cultural arche, are immediately disqualified from these theological value systems and, as is well known, eradicated. In brief, the individual as such is never allowed to appear, since for these theologies, there are no unmediated individuals – except those who are the “leaders”.

This cultural arche appears in contemporary globalization in the guise of various fundamentalisms and their activities. These movements also include various fascistic. They have an affinity with theological symbols, although expressed in a secular guise. Just like the Hebraic, Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms, they too are called to a holy war – until a total destruction – against all the deviant and evil others. All these trends have a dictatorial hierarchy of rulerships. Regardless of the symbolism that reveal this mode of awareness, one thing is clear: in its militaristic phase, it has a task of establishing its absolute truth and changeless good, and at the same time of destroying all that does not comply with such truth and good, all who doubt, interrogate, or reject this mode of awareness. Given the latter, it cannot tolerate, above all, the Promethean mode and its cultural – individualistic – arche. After all, such a mode tolerates various truths and numerous goods, and thus in accord with the Luciferine mode, tolerates falsehoods and evils. In this sense, the first task of father-creator and Lucifer son is the destruction of Zeus-Prometheus, and Athene’s mode of awareness and all that flows from it, including democratic institutions, and rationally, autonomously and responsibly thinking persons. The most urgent task is to destroy such persons, since they maintain the permanence of

open and changing institutions that allow flux and require tolerance. The basic divergence of these two modes of architectonic awareness, in the West, frames the cultural crises, social tensions and confrontations, specifically with respect to public institutions: either fallible humans with their flawed and correctable institutions and views, or an absolute theocracy – one lord over all nations, one truth, and the bearers of this truth shall have a voice.

Meanwhile, the Promethean awareness extended to political and scientific enlightenments whose basis was open institutions promoting a rational public interrogation of all truth claims and promotion of tolerance of differences of opinions. Although our opinions may diverge, we shall not only permit, but regard it as our duty to allow others, with whom we disagree, to speak. This duty is necessary to challenge and to test our own opinions in face of those presented by the others. This mode of awareness, at the level of scientific enlightenment, constitutes a serious component in the confrontation between the two cultural arches. One of the founding conceptions of scientific enlightenment is, basically, Promethean: sciences are to serve practical human concerns. At this level resides one of the main reasons why those, who are living and acting in accordance with the father-creator, Lucifer son mode of awareness, call the modern West “the great Satan”, and demand a holy war. Such calls come even from within the West in the form of clinic bombings, demands for a religious war against those who think and act differently etc. This simply indicates that the modes of cultural awareness are not geographically bounded.

To understand this demonization of Promethean “secularism”, we shall suggest the way scientific enlightenment “transgresses” the rules established by the Luciferine mode of awareness. Scientific enlightenment is premised on practical assistance conception. In other words, in case of need, one can go counter to the will of divinities and their edicts, but also to change natural processes in favor of human practical needs. This practical conception, leading to technological mode of rationality, offers possibilities to transform nature in accordance with human requirements and even rules. In this sense, the human can become a creator of his/her own environment and even humanity, and to manage

all affairs in a secular manner. Although claims may be advanced that there are “natural laws”, even such laws can be used for human well being and, given increasing technical sophistication, can be changed. We have explicated this „instrumental rationality“ all the way to the formal-signitive level.

In this context there appears a basic opposition to the father-creator symbolism. The latter must claim that nature is pervaded by and obeys the rules established by the creator. To speak metaphorically, nature is “*imago dei*”. Thus any change of nature in accordance with humanly constructed rules suggests the transgression and violation of the divine rules. In other words, humans not only do not accept the rules, but can change them and thus disrupt the creator’s permanent order. Moreover, humans take the place of the creator by establishing their own rules and by changing nature in accordance with such rules. Human action turns out to be an absolute disruption of absolute permanence. Such a disruption is not allowable in the consciousness expressed symbolically by the father-creator imagery. For this imagery, the Promethean human is identical with Lucifer’s revolution: total disruption of father’s order. This is possible only if we fail to note that the Promethean mode is premised on assistance to humans, while the Luciferine mode is designed to subject all in order to rule and to mock his father. We can extend this comparison even further. The secular human not only disrupts the order of the father-creator, but also creates the rules “as if out of nothing” and restructures the world and herself by such rules. In this sense the Promethean human becomes the creator of itself and its world. But this means that such a human becomes identical with the father creator and, at the same time with Lucifer’s revolution. After all, Lucifer had to establish his own rules “out of nothing” in order to establish his counter empire.

Obviously, Lucifer’s empire is radically distinct from the Promethean world. The latter allows others to create their own lives and to be responsible for them. In Lucifer’s world, all has to be used for the intentional battle against the father. All that the modern Promethean and secular humans achieve will be regarded as evil (in principle) and is destined for destruction. For the modern human of scientific enlight-

enment such symbolic designs as the natural plan of the father-creator are completely irrelevant. Modern humans are interested in mastering nature for their own purposes. Seen from the active followers of father-creator, such human mastery and transformation of the world is an intent to destroy the order of the creator. This is one major reason why the modern Promethean humans are regarded by various Hebraic, Islamic, and Christian fundamentalists as the Great Satan. In other words, such humans, in their invention of rules and in their technical changes of the world, are also interrogating the inadequacies, partial evils, imperfections of the world and, by implication, the inadequacies and perhaps evils of the creator. Those who maintain in their actions the father-creator as an unconditional permanence, and nature as the image of permanence, cannot avoid in regarding the secular, Promethean modern human as full of pride, self assurance, and eager to challenge the highest structure of Being in order to make it one among many options in a democracy. This type of awareness is impossible for the followers of the father-creator. Since there is, for them, only one and changeless truth, then any interrogation of “ultimate grounds” is in itself an ultimate falsehood and evil; the only way of dealing with such interrogators is a call to holy war.

Contemporary crisis (parting of the ways) in the West and, due to the Western presence, perhaps a global crisis, between two modes of awareness, two cultural arche, cannot be resolved at the level of cultural or social changes. Although in the West both, the scientific and political enlightenments have softened the Mid-Eastern mode of awareness, the latter is reborn in its most virulent form, specifically in face of the globalization of the secular, Promethean mode of awareness. The virulence is expressed in the efforts to reestablish fascist dictatorships, various theocracies, and even capitalist “market” orders. This maintenance of permanence will be seen in its limits solely when it shows up in its final, anarchistic mode of awareness. Yet this mode will have to be left for a further study, since it is not yet fully manifest at the cultural level of symbolic designs. This means that a political culture is split into those who propagate the need to become globalized and modern and at the same time those who, while recognizing the necessity of this mod-

ernization, propose a battle against it as imposition of alien civilization. In principle, they claim that we may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalizing logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-called passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems to us that the reason for this power confrontation rest in the failure to understand the already posited limit within which the globalizing process must function. This limit is the very requirement that the Other and its self generated cultural arche, is equivalent to the globalizing logic. Therefore, the latter ceases to be universal and must accept whether it wants to or not its own limitations. When we say whether it wants to or not, we do not mean a choice between two options, but an inevitable power confrontation, since there are no external criteria in this confrontation that would allow free decision. What we have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one possibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is offered as the future.

Central Europe, and specifically the Baltics and Lithuania, have lived under one of the variants of Mid-Eastern arche – the Byzantine type, under the name of communism. Any philosophy, any Socratic interrogation, was evil, to be destroyed with the destruction of Socratic individuals. In brief, it was anti-western autocracy whose every pronouncement was an absolute and unquestionable edict. All the “enemies” of the sole truth and good were, by definition, evil. Tens of millions were massacred with impunity – the very essence of autocratic rule, perched on the necessity to save the fallen world. Lithuania lived in this autocratic setting, but still the western arche, as ancient paganism, was part of its awareness, creating an inbetween non-positional status, till finally there was an upsurge of saying “enough” to the autocrats and their servants, enough of living on the knees, and time to stand up as humans – even under the threat of death. It must be emphasized that this sudden explosion is the most uncanny experience, since it rejects all authority, all social positions and their value, and proclaims that all is in our hands, that we start without any theocratic, autocratic, authoritarian edicts, that we do not know what awaits us; we do not apologize to

the masters in their palaces, we take on the responsibility to start our lifeworld, with all the mistakes, uncertainties, and options. What we shall enjoy and suffer, we shall do so freely. Each of us is an irreplaceable individual who can propose to others and to himself what laws must be established, and what institutions must be erected. No one yet has appointed anyone to have a social value, but every individual is aware of his/her dignity, honor, truthfulness, and nobility, no subservience. This was a choice to become Western-Occidental, a Promethean rebellion, an Athenian enlightenment that has carried the west across two millennia. This was a cultural upsurge to live as open beings, open to its traditions, history, to its Occidental – unknown future. This means that Lithuania chose to have the arche of basing everything on individual self identity wherein each is more than any society and each is a creator and co-creator of this culture.

Each individual had to be totally cognizant that the ultimate powers, whether lords of lords, autocrats, theocrats, had to be excluded from human affairs, since their inclusion, as was pointed out by Athene, opens the door to tragedy, destroys responsibility, and makes humans playthings of all sorts of “higher” beings and forces. As we pointed out above, the current upsurge of Mid-Eastern personality cults, their introduction into human affairs is obvious in tragic wars, revenge of one tribe of the same people against another, demands for submission to my Lord, my prophet, denouncement of the others and call for their destruction. The Greeks, and the Lithuanians said enough, and set up a culture that allowed humans to live within their own arche. Culturally speaking, Lithuanians chose to be humans, to be Occidental. They too have allowed the presence of all sorts of cultic images, but they should be advised that those images must be a reminder to avoid their becoming ruling powers over humans, medium that would cover over what humans are in their very essence.

POSTSCRIPT

Our focus on the two cultures does not exhaust all of the transcendental modifications. We selected the two modifications due to their contemporary relevance. What is significant to note is the difference and correlation we maintained between cultural symbolic designs, and our unavoidable being in between. Once such an awareness is cognizant of itself –even tacitly –then the differences between cultures also become visible. But in this case, the differences that cannot be reconciled also become obvious. But the differences that we articulated are transcendental and cannot be avoided; they belong to the very constitution of the sense of all other –symbolic –cultural levels. The issue that the Baltic and specifically the Lithuanian people face is living in the not yet gone Byzantine arche, and still emergent Occidental arche. It is plausible that the exodus of people from Lithuania may have another reason, apart from professional advancement or better life: the educated are more Western than anything else, and yet the autocratic attitude and behavior of the elected servants, is still from an old, Byzantine world. While Russia is openly Byzantine and is not at all embarrassed to rehabilitate the empyreal autocrats, such as Stalin, there are Lithuanians who attempt to rehabilitate the servants and supplicants. Such as Peleckis, Venclova, of Stalin. These Lithuanians have no clue what it means to be Western and thus human. It will be a while for such Lithuanians to get off their knees and stand on their feet – to become Promethean, Athenian, to stand without any socially provided shields to hide their human frailty.

CHAPTER VII

ANARCHIES IN COLLISION

INTRODUCTION

It is said, after all, that the global process is designed to eliminate anarchistic and even terroristic violence, and replace it by market based democracy as a NEW WORLD ORDER. There is no need to debate the contradictory phrase “market based democracy”, since the task of this discussion is to explicate the way that this phrase (and more basic ontological-metaphysical preunderstandings) belong to anarchistic violence. To make sense of anarchistic violence it is necessary to distinguish among its various forms and locate the ARCHE of anarchy as it appears in various modifications. Once this task is accomplished, the globalizing processes will appear in a very different light than the one that is paraded by the protagonists (including “objective” journalists) who regard globalization as a bearer of universal french fries and potato chips made from genetically enhanced, although locally grown spuds by indigenous peasants, and reaped by colorfully dressed native maidens. In brief, the modifications of such violence will show to what extent there arise confrontations among anarchies and, in the final analysis, how they might belong to the same metaphysics, or, as Karl Heinz Volkmann-Schluck points out “metaphysics gone insane”. But before this confrontation can be understood, a brief logic of anarchistic violence should be sketched in order to show its unique characteristics that are different from other modes of violence, such as revolutionary - despite the fact that anarchists invariably are defined as revolutionaries. It must be noted that as other modes of violence, the anarchistic is also a phenomenon that first of all belongs to experience and not to some as-

sumed “ground”. This is to say, it is part of human conscious life. Therefore, the term “consciousness” will be used to designate a given mode of perception that is basically a theoretical or a philosophical system. Another term that is relevant for this investigation is “conscience”, and it stands for ethical awareness. Although there are theoretical efforts to separate consciousness from conscience, in daily discourses the two are closely interrelated. Each basic consciousness - theory - is closely intertwined with its attendant conscience - ethics. For this reason Latin unites the two terms as *consciencia*. This term will be used throughout this essay.

LOGIC OF ANARCHISTIC VIOLENCE

A complex civilization is in permanent flux; every *consciencia* is intent to govern the whole. Hence there is a tension among them, since each has an intension of its own dictatorship. Skinnerians have their Walden II, the fundamentalists have their holy wars, the capitalists have their market, and the Marxists have their utopia. Complex civilization is a continuous balancing among different types of *consciencia*, and the price each pays is that its conscience is inauthentic and hence potentially a bad conscience. Inauthenticity is a matter of justifying consciousness: we would like to impose our *consciencia* absolutely, but, for example, the weakness of human nature does not allow us to reach our aims, or the fulfillment of our aims must be postponed to some remote future while we wait for the right signs from heaven, from historical conditions, or from the wise leaders.

Inauthentic *consciencia* lack stability and thus can awaken to their authentic purity, such that the previous tolerance of other types of *consciencia*, and one’s own previous position, will be regarded as unethical conscience and all the justifications of such tolerance as false consciousness. They must be destroyed. Hence anarchism, in its authentic mode, demands the destruction of all given social structures and the bodily practices which exhibit such structures. Anarchistic violence is basically terrorism. It is nonetheless necessary to distinguish anarchistic terror-

ism from another major form of terrorism - that of social revolutions. The latter are instigated by groups which attack the established powers and violate a given law. Hence, they are defined as crime. Yet revolutionary terrorism is accompanied by consciousness that such actions will be legal in post-revolutionary society. What a revolutionary group suppresses by terror today, will be suppressed by law tomorrow. Legalized exploitation and slavery are solid examples. A revolutionary group terrorizes established centers of power, both political and economic and thus commits a crime by attempting to abolish exploitation and slavery, with a justifying consciousness that in a post-revolutionary society exploitation and slavery will be forbidden by law. This can be called horizontal intentionality that allows temporal justification, such that the disruption of currently imposed laws is designed to enhance and establish different laws in the future. Terrorism of this type of consciencia is not grounded in anarchistic consciencia, since the good conscience of a revolutionary is grounded in a consciousness both of the current social, economic, and political factors and the future remedies. The latter might point to an invariant that has some overlapping features with the rules even of the currently established laws and relationships - specifically in today's general adherence to scientific consciousness.

Anarchistic consciencia has no interest in theories, and specifically in scientific consciousness. All theories, therefore, are at the service of existing and future realities. They must be rejected in order to enhance anarchistic violence as unconditional disruption of any permanence. Only the science of destruction is of interest. But what is central is the dictatorship of PURE WILL of the anarchist (as Bakunin insisted). The transition to the terroristic praxis without qualification posits a crisis in anarchistic consciencia. In order to be "eidetically pure", the anarchist has to reject any and all positive content in her consciousness. There is no content that can be used to justify violence, since any justification would require an establishment of a positive structure. In this sense, the anarchist's distance from the public is absolute, and hence his individualism is pure autonomous will unlimited by any legal, institutional, ethical, and scientific norms.

It is noteworthy that this anarchistic consciencia offers numerous variants that are relevant for the discussion of modern globalization. While there is no content for the consciousness that could be used to justify anarchistic violence - destruction without justification - the anarchistic writings of the 19th and the 20th centuries seem to suggest otherwise. To help articulate this issue it must be noted that the language of persons such as Bakunin was quite akin to theological edicts couched in Hegelian dialectic. There are good reasons for this: first, modern theology has posited a content of its consciousness that is inaccessible: it is a vertical awareness that grants an infinite presence whose access is denied for a finite being, and all the institutions and laws that would be established in its name are inadequate and indeed false. In this sense, everything that humans build, establish and make must be destroyed if one is to remain true to the infinite demand - and indeed destroyed without any hope of revolutionary horizontal justification (one manifestation of this is the now famous deconstruction - meaning as forever deferred).

Second, the later part of the 20th century, exhibited for example by the Baden Baden group, shows a slightly modified version of anarchistic consciencia. It is premised on two arguments: first, the Baden Baden group were Marxian revolutionaries, and yet they realized the background contradiction in utopian Marxism: if there is a historical purpose - an eschatology - then it cannot be in history, since history cannot aim at one of its events; but also it cannot transcend history, since that would be theology - and the latter is not acceptable. Hence, any activity of violence has no other purpose apart from destruction without a positive content. Second, there arose an awareness that all Marxian revolutions established post-revolutionary regimes and power structures and constantly claimed that the inevitable attainment of communism must be deferred, and deferred, and hence constantly varied. This is to say, there appears a continuous decay of the pure content of scientific Marxism toward numerous fragments that abolishes the one purpose history. In this sense, any revolutionary praxis loses its horizontal justification by a future society and becomes violence for its own sake.

Third, Hegel, in this sense, can be shown to be anarchistic, since no content of human consciencia is final, and the vertical presence of the absolute removes any hope of temporal success to offer a final resolution. Whatever is given historically must be abolished without justification. The absolute here is a pure will that wills self-relationship. Given this logic, it is now possible to explicate its functioning and its limits in modern Western globalization and its resistances.

NOMADIC VIOLENCE

The contemporary theories, all the way from Nietzsche's regard that life is a wanderer, to postmodern conceptions of nomadism, are basically ontological. Yet the latter is granted *a priori* without arguments, apart from the tacit assumption of the metaphysics and ontology of modern Western modernity. The following comprises a brief articulation of two major variants of nomadism that frame the current debates and also comprise, in principle, a conception of globalization and anarchistic violences that are in collision. It might turn out that the collisions are premised on a very similar metaphysical principle.

There is a close correlation of universalization of a particular discourse or text as ultimate truth to colonialism, militarism, and nomadism. The imperial colonial movements have a logic that claims to be an embodiment of some ultimate (in some traditions called divine) will which is the source of all. In turn, the will demands total adherence to its edicts and the edicts of those who are legitimate bearers of the truth of this will. Hence, the legitimation of rulership comprises an isomorphic structure between the willed truth and the power of those who are charged with establishing such a truth over all peoples. In the final analysis the edicts of those who bring the "universal" discourse are identical with the ultimate will of the maker of the world. In this sense, the ruling emperor and the ultimate (divine, scientific, etc.) discourse, inclusive of imperatives, are one. At this level, no one is to deviate from the edicts, couched at times in moralistic pronouncements of prophets. The latter are there to insure that the ultimate authority is enhanced without in-

terrogation. Moreover, since the world is regarded as founded upon the will that made the world by speaking - a discursive practice - then those who speak with the voice of this will, are entitled to make the world by virtue of their edicts. Imperial powers tend to place themselves in this position – divine right of kings. At the outset we are confronted with the conception of discourse as power to make - magical. The power holder's every uttered wish becomes coextensive with deed and reality.

The unbelievers become *a priori* evil and destined for destruction or to be subjected and hence transformed into obedient bodies - but bodies that are required to change their comportment: lower, praying, on their knees and respectful of the higher who are in authority. It is of note that this type of universalized discourse is usually accompanied by monistic consciousness. Apart from other examples, Europe was colonized by the nomadic spreading of ONE TRUTH, willed by ONE PATRIARCH. Having submitted to this ONE WILLED truth, the Europeans became neo-colonials and in turn went out to spread it through the rest of the globe and hence to engage in this type of nomadic colonization. There is no need to offer a protracted argument concerning the temporal priorities of such a colonization: do the nomads come on horse (one nomadic technology) and subjugate the indigenous populations and then establish their monistic discourse in order to legitimate their rule, or do they come already armed with monistic truth and then impose it by sword on the indigenous peoples. The concern here is with the establishment of various means of domination (building castles, temples, fortresses) and above all of positioning the nomad as a superior being - an aristocrat. One condition for the latter, as Nietzsche noted, is to be more violent, more efficient killer, who is preoccupied with the art of war - a warrior priest. Meanwhile the indigenous must gear the body to perform the "lower" tasks in order to relieve the aristocrat to perform his "higher duties".

It could be said that the economy of the settled peoples, the productive bodies, is an attraction for conquest by nomads who are basically robbers, yet who claim to be superior in birth, power and truth. Although they may manage the places they subjugate with prudence, they may also exhaust the land and the population, and wander on to

find other places and peoples to subjugate; after all, their supreme authority - the will that made all things - has not only granted them a permission to occupy any place, but also demanded that the truth be brought and imposed on all. Their universalized discourse also implies that every land is their promised land.

The brief suggestions concerning this modification of nomadic conception lead to some eidetic invariants: First, the world is a matter of WILL AND DISCOURSE, and therefore has no inherent nature of its own; second, the making of the world is arbitrary, and those who rule the world - the nomads - can do so by edicts couched in the language of truth; third, the very mobility of the nomadic ruler leads to the notion that there is a TRANSCENDENT, detached, pure (unsoiled by the eternal peasant, proletarian, and the pleb), truth and will, independent from the contingencies of locality and time. This suggests a specific type of anarchistic consciencia: First, the nomad is free to impose his discourse and rules by force, and hence violate - indeed destroy - the modes of life of indigenous peoples. Second, the consciousness is a claim to a universality of a discourse which is premised on unquestionable pronouncements. Any questioning of them will be regarded as disruptive and replete with falsehoods. Third, the conscience is an unconditional adherence to duty to impose the discourse on everyone by any means. Fourth, this imposition is teleological praxis such that all conquered social orders will have to be reversed.

Another modification of anarchistic consciencia stems from some aspects of LOGOCENTRISM and its regard of naturalism. What is "natural" is what constitutes proper legitimation. Thus it is natural for humans to use fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use autocratic-imperial edicts to deprive humans of fire. There is a possibility to strike bargains, to change them, contest them in the public arena. Greek mythology, for example, reflects this way of natural bargaining. The understanding of legitimation must be adjudicated discursively in the public and not imposed by prophetically pronounced edicts. The LOGOCENTRIC conception is what legitimates the subsequent conception of natural equality of all persons. Of course, within such an equality there were marked differences between abilities and developments of

human potential, as was evident from Platonic and Aristotelian writings, leading to the Platonic call for a POLIS ruled by the BEST. This was of course the answer to the inadequacies of the rule by the many. In fact such a rule by the best would be partially justified by the LOGO-CENTRIC conception of the world where EPISTEME was deemed to be in a position to decipher and hence correspond to, and indeed be capable of ruling in accordance with the ALL RULING LOGOS. Thus those in possession of EPISTEME should rule by virtue of their knowledge. What is to be understood is that knowledge could not be regarded as a legitimation to make, to transform the world. Knowledge of what is the case by nature is knowledge how one should act. This sort of rulership does not use power against a person or nature, but it can show discursively the mistakes the person might make with respect to the nature of the cosmos and its LOGOS. If a person is made to understand what is natural, he/she will act in accordance with such an understanding. No imperative from emperors or wills of divinities could alter the enduring LOGOS. To the contrary, emperors and divinities come and pass with the sway of the cosmic logos.

While the life in “accordance with nature” seems to offer a settled and peaceful context, requiring no building of empires, there is in it an incipient disequilibrium that may tend toward a rulership by the best. The latter, such as Plato, might regard the population as being in error, in need of correction, and hence to be ruled from above in order to move it to the utopian state. Of course, the latter for Plato may be the most real, although it is value laden. What is at issue here is that the cosmic logos is not to be understood as power, but as enduring and elastic strength that yields but cannot be defeated. Those who live in accordance with its sway are also the enduring, the ones who bend with the storms but remain unbroken. The difference between strength of logos and power is that logos is ever present and never vanishes, while power has its rise and fall. It can be conquered, dissipated, abolished, or decadent. In this sense it is distinct from the strength of logos that is not nomadic, it does not come and pass, even if it is never at rest.

These two modes seem to appear in the Brahmanic contrast between the all enduring and ruling KALA and the shifting powers of

kings, whether legitimated or not. Just as the nomadic rulers cannot completely transcend the logos, so the kings with their powers cannot escape the verdict of time. Given this context, the nomadic legitimation efforts should not be identified with a particular ruler's wish to justify his rule, but more basically with the effort to extricate from the strength of the all pervasive LOGOS and KALA, i.e. to make the transient power last and indeed become superior and transcendent to the strength of Logos. We shall argue subsequently that the current cult of deconstruction is premised on this notion of abolishing the enduring strength of logos, of "logocentrism". And this means that deconstruction wants to continue the transcending nomadic rulership with the aid of the old, recouped, divinities and their supplicant servants. This effort to shift toward the superiority of the detached, nomadic transcendence may constitute an effort to bend the rule of the logos, and if possible to exercise will over it.

Indeed, as already suggested, there is logocentric thought that may constitute an intermediary between the willed discourse as the transcendent rule over the world and the human, and all ruling logos. The intermediary is the rule by the best who know the logos not as inherent in the world, but as transcendent to it and hence to be brought to recognition pedagogically and not imposed by will. Nonetheless, this very promise of recognition assumes a position that is different from the world and hence a possibility to impose it as would be the case in Platos LAWS, or in the historicising of such laws to be achieved in an utopian state. What appears, here, is a claim that the world is an inadequate and hence a contingent process with respect to transcendent ideality DISCOVERABLE by thought. The ideality, then, must provide a guiding principle how the worldly events must correspond to what thought provides. What is worldly cannot be destroyed by will, nonetheless it must be modified and hence violated. To speak with modern Western technical modernity, there is a standard of beauty and you must get a facelift to come closer to the standard.

With the appearance of thought as transcendent over nature, and indeed being the determining factor of nature, there opens up a reflexive region that lends nature not only a secondary status, but above all

a being that is dependent on thought. Thus in order to discover this dependence, one must turn to the composition of thought and how nature must correspond to, and become subsumed under thought and, in the final analysis, under projects of will. This calls for thought to reflect upon its own activities and content and to decipher its own standards by which nature becomes DETERMINABLE. The last term is selected to suggest that thought being prior to nature is not determined by anything and hence can determine nature in many ways, dependent upon the WILL. This is to say, if thought is the starting principle irrespective of the “height” of its transcendence, the nature is determinable by it in more than one way.

There appears a peculiar reversal: the logos, with its enduring strength against which all powers were temporary and contingent now is forced to be contingent and unnecessary, as being dependent on the transcending thought which is deemed necessary and incontestable. The latter is the stable power that can determine the way that nature will be reconstructed. Here the emperor and its nomadic power, i.e. a will that needs not respect the logos, returns in a new guise, except now as a supreme ruler. Within this reflexive context the human finds itself in a position of transcendence over nature, in a position of being a source of all the law that, while not yet in total command of nature, is in a position to establish such a command. This is to say, nature can be regarded as dependent upon thought, not in some ontological sense, but perhaps more fundamentally, in a practical sense, i.e. in a sense of being “made” in human image.

A fascinating syndrome appears that usually remains if not hidden, at least unexpressed: the very way that the human thinks first appears not as its own thinking and understanding, but as something cosmic and encompassing. The same could be said of the human positing of its own reflection as more fundamental than the logos of nature: the primacy of reflective thought is first attributed to a cosmic thought and only subsequently is there an admittance that such thought is human. Thus the discovery by modernity of the ego that thinks its own thoughts, and knowledge as identical to power, is a discovery of a composition that was already invented and, so to speak, waiting in the wings

to be recognized and appropriated. The structure of the priority of reflective thought and the power of the creative will was accomplished in Western theological metaphysics before the human would accept and recognize this structure as his own.

The priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought as the creative power also permits the priority of will as that which can choose what sort of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, with its own logos, has to be subsumed under a power that is capable of dominating and altering nature and in principle making nature contingent. This is to say the necessity shifts to the will and its creative power leaving nature exposed to arbitrary rule. Indeed, without an imposition of an order by the will nature would be without reason and form, without value and goodness. The composition here allows thought and will to have a direct influence and control over all, such that the latter becomes contingent and dependent on will and thought. This distinction appears at the dawn of the modern age; it is claimed that while for some ultimate reality or being $2 + 2 = 4$ need not hold, for us it is sufficiently certain, and resultantly we need not concern ourselves with questions for which answers are inaccessible. This is to say, the composition of the ultimate creation of nature by the ultimate will is at the same time excluded as irrelevant for the human knowledge and assumed by the human as his own composition of knowledge and will. Knowledge and will are taken, nonetheless, to be prior and transcendent to nature and hence capable of imposing an order on an otherwise irrational material nature. What comes along with this structure from the cosmic assumption of the absolute power and its creation of nature is the shift of power toward human thought and will over nature. Thought and will, logic and valuation become the necessary conditions for the being of the world for man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, blind phenomena.

First result is the appearance of the initial syndrome of arbitrary power with respect to nature, except now in the guise of the subject who is "everyman", i.e. any individual is in a position to be the master of his own destiny by his own thought, will and ability to make the surroundings in his own "image". He neither has a nature, nor a

nature to settle; he can become, with respect to the environment and geographic topography, NOMADIC. This is to say, he is free from any place and can remake nature in his own image anywhere he decides to settle - an image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. Modern western modernity is the nomadic power of the unchained rule over nature, appearing both in the guises of capitalism and marxism. The land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons and of natural rhythms, and the local settler, regardless of space-place, are now exposed to become raw material and labor power for the technological edicts controlled by unknown "emperors" in distant regions. Although such emperors are most interesting insofar as they seem to possess what the current designation would call "economic power", the more interesting factor is the breakdown of traditional legitimation of power by birthright and demanded legitimation by "the people". But the latter are either "labor power" to be constructed in accordance with the needs of production, or are mobile individuals capable of settling where there are not yet exploited "raw materials" for production - this is to say colonization. To understand this transience it is necessary to decipher the constitution of direct Western modern modernity in its nomadic form, specifically with regard to technologization that led to the establishment of vast bureaucratic machinery of experts comprising a privileged elitism.

NOMADIC MODERNITY

How is it that one becomes detached from a place, community, and can look upon the environment and others with indifference? What sort of consciencia is granted that has a consciousness, an intentionality toward the world, also justified by conscience of detached indifference? In the following the arguments of Western modern modernity will open up two intentionalities that subtend this global modernization and its type of anarchism.

If not deliberate, there is a specific "bracketing" that is enacted by the philosophies and sciences of the modern age that allows the attribution of power primarily to the linguistic articulations. While at first sight outlandish, this claim will be more than justified by the subsequent analy-

ses of modern ontology and its metaphysically laden scientific method. Our approach will trace out this “bracketing” and show what phenomena become discarded and what “phenomena” remain in order to be constitutive of legitimate discourses and nomadic colonialism. It is hoped that the result of this investigation will reveal specific formations which belong to no one and yet comprise transformative power of signs in modern multi discursivity and awareness. What is meant here by “awareness” consists of specific activities correlated to specific forms of objectivities lending such activities their anarchistic detachment and indifference. The latter is expressed in numerous ways across various socio-political, economic and scientific formations, aims, and imageries. It lends an appearance of arbitrariness to the activities at all levels. The concept of “activity” includes what the human actually does in her various relationships to the world of objects and events of whatever type.

All this rests on a specific constitution of the given: it is regarded as “transcendence”, beyond experience and inaccessible to sense perception. The composition of the given requires an exclusion of qualitative awareness and hence the construction of a modern subject that contains all such qualities in its immanence. This immanence is subsequently designated in terms of mind-reason, psychology and physiology. This form of exclusion can be called the Cartesian skepticism. As has been shown in numerous works, the modern revolution deems reality to be a material extension of atomic parts that are inaccessible to sense experience, although manageable by a method of quantitative manipulation. Following this, the entire modern view is borne by a prejudgment that what is beyond doubt is a constitution of a precise reflective method capable of “univocal, universal, impartial, and objective” access to a specifically constituted “reality”. It is presumed that the latter consists equally of an univocal, universal and impartial rationality correlative to the precise structure of methodology. There is a need to show the ways in which both, the methodology, and the “reality” are constituted, correlated, and assumed to be isomorphic. For modernity mathematical or quantitative procedures are not only methodological, but founding for all theoretical thought. The specific composition of such procedures suggests that no intuitive, that is perceptual content is correlated to

them. They contain structures and rules which can be formulated without any relation to perceptual qualities. Moreover, any concrete function such structures acquire, is not dictated by these structures. In other words, the function is a matter of will, but in such a way that the will is not compelled by such structures; they have no causal force. It must be understood, at the outset, that the notion of “will” is not a discovery but one constructed aspect to fill the gap between the mathematical and the material. In order for these procedures and structures to acquire any validity, the “objective” world must be constituted in accordance with these procedures. First, the procedures are indifferent with respect to perceptual intuition; they treat all events as if they were essentially homogeneous. Second, the perceptual domain of intuition, directly present to live awareness, is transcended in favor of theoretically-methodologically posited homogeneity, i.e. posited in accordance with the methodological requirements.

The transcendence in this context is minimally double: first, it is required that one disregards the awareness of the qualitative sphere, deemed to be subjective and, second, one must regard the homogeneous domain as transcendence, as a reality in itself and independent of the perceiver. Thus awareness has no access to this transcendence. Its “reality” can be secured by a theoretical and methodological postulation. The latter is the source of the conception of mathematically idealized nature as a homogeneous mathematical manifold. We should not be misled by the concept of homogeneity. The latter seems to have geometric associations, and hence accessible to perception. The problem revolves around the substitution of geometric formations, the translation of the forms into a mathematical set of signs which do not offer any semblance or intuitive comparison to the geometric domain. The geometric understanding would still offer a field posited as “matter”, yet with mathematization of geometry, and if one were to take a next step toward formalization of mathematics, one would be able to regard the geometric as quanta, as numerical points, sums, and divisions, arranged in accordance with formal structures. Irrespective of the levels of quantitative-formal constitution, there is posited only one fundamental-transcendent reality. The problematics of the constitutive processes

both of the theoretical-methodological domain, and the transcendent domain, lead to a particular contradiction which cannot be solved within the limits of the theoretical-methodological framework. The method is proclaimed to be universal, all-inclusive, and thus able to subsume all phenomena “objectively”. Thus the subject who calculates, and formalizes must be either subsumed under the method, or be the condition for the constitution of the method. If the former assumption is accepted, then the method must assume a position of supremacy over the subject, i.e. be objective; yet this very method permits only one kind of “reality”: homogeneous matter. The method is not “matter” but “ideality” and indeed a necessary ideality. And yet, if the latter is taken for granted, i.e. that the subject too is to be submitted under the method, then the ideality of the method has no “place” in the subject, since the subject must be contingent and thus cannot be a basis for the methodological mathematical and formal necessities.

In either case, the theoretical-methodological composition is something other than the posited transcendent reality, and the latter is not something given. In fact, the morphologically constituted and directly given world, a world of shapes, pathways axes for practical activity, multi-leveled interconnections, is regarded as complex phenomena that are not identical with the strict homogeneous reality. This non-identity precludes the possibility of deriving the theoretical-methodological formations from the phenomenal-morphological composition of the lived world. As a result, the former are neither correlative to the intuited morphological world and its interconnections, inclusive of the “real” subject, nor are they abstractable from the posited homogeneous world and above all its physicalistic discourse. On these terms, the transcendent world, the world of theoretical objectivity, is not given and cannot be a source of theoretical-methodological compositions.

The morphological world is GIVEN, and yet it too is not a source for the understanding of the transcendent world, and neither can account for the theory and method of the modern sciences and the positing of the world of transcendent and perceptually inaccessible homogeneous world. Yet the theoretical-methodological composition is regarded as GIVEN, and indeed with full evidential necessity. What kind of ne-

cessity? Purely quantitative and formal constructs, having their own rules and procedures, where the morphological or the “material” side is completely contingent and arbitrary. With respect to the rules of the formal domain, the morphological and intuitive side of shapes, sizes, relationships, is arbitrarily selectable and changeable. This is one of the more fundamental and initial designations of the formal discourses as necessary and the material discourse as arbitrary. This suggests that the connection between them is not direct, not immediate or GIVEN, but must be INTENDED by an entirely different act. While it is possible to posit perceptual acts, and even motives, that can constitute this connection, such as interest, they are excluded *a priori*. There must be, therefore, a specific act that has to be deciphered in its own right. This act is concerned with the conjunction of two radically distinct domains and discourses: the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent. To repeat, the former is regarded as necessary and GIVEN, while the latter is regarded as transcendent, material and contingent, although NOT GIVEN.

As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed otherwise, the quantitative-formal, is not within the domain of the contingent world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intuited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as different from the discourses of these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the thinkers of the modern age invented a container called “mind” in which these quantitative and formal components reside. Just as the qualitative and the morphological discourses, they too belong to the immanence of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet it is factually contingent substance. This contingency is expressed in Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical expression of a conception which offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal domain swings

in the transition between necessity and will, rules and choice. The importance of this transition consists precisely in the option to either regard the formal as *a priori* given or as a construct of the subject.

Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as created in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one such expression. When this notion is coupled with the view that even the mathematical-formal domain is subject to an absolute will, then the result is obvious: the emphasis is on the primacy of construction of the formal discursive systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the material world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual content and its discourses. And yet anyone dealing with scientific issues of observation, assumes a transition from the signitive to the morphological modes of signification. This transitional domain is an unannounced background that provides a silent nexus between otherwise disconnected domains. What this background is cannot yet be stated.

Being inaccessible, it must be posited in accordance with the formal definitions and procedures whose necessity would provide a MODEL of explanation not for the perceptual components, but of POSSIBLE PROCESSES DESIGNATED AS MATERIAL. The contingent is so designated because its necessity comes from another, and in two senses. First, from the formal articulations presumed to be correlative to the posited transcendent reality, and second, from a presumed act of an absolute creation (Galileo) such that the theoretical and methodological composition is the very way in which reality is created. This is the legitimating support designated to necessitate the functioning of this reality and to guarantee that our theoretical-methodological forms constitute adequate descriptions of reality. This persistent insistence on securing legitimation for necessity of the processes of the transcendent reality indicates a fundamental realization that left to itself such a reality is contingent, unless it acquires its necessity from elsewhere. This is to say that an appeal to an absolute geometrician is not an attempt to placate

the ecclesiastics, but a symbolic effort to legitimate the necessity of an otherwise contingently construed reality and the correlative necessity of the presumed objective theory and method.

If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we would be left with a contingent reality whose necessity would come from another and this is to say from the theoretical-methodology. This opens the door to the notion of an access to this reality in terms of POSSIBILITY. This is to say, since what IS cannot be perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent reality does not offer any necessity for its composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in accordance with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is precisely the juncture at which it becomes necessary to regard this transcendent reality in accordance with what it can possibly be. Continuing this line of constitution, it is advisable to trace the first moment which offers itself through the phenomena articulated so far.

There is no necessary connection between the formalisms, or their signitive discourses, and the transcendent “physical” reality. The connection is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality which is not necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive discourses to the posited discourses of material reality. The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the application of theory to praxis, the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to humanize nature and the human animal, the aims of improving nature, and the exclamations that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own tablets, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formal domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not respect any prescription and qualitative discourses of the lived world. And yet it is a required nexus. After all, the signitive formal discourses do not point to anything that would be visibly similar to them. In this sense arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the material. Such a connecting intentionality is empty and hence can shift from the formal to the material; its primary fulfillment is modal discursivity that has no specific attachment to any qualitative aspects of human life. IT

IS A PRIORI NOMADIC, and ANARCHISTIC. In principle, one is in a position of a pure metaphysics of will to constantly violate both the formal, and the material worlds.

While this might seem obvious, there appears a background phenomenon required for the second level fulfillment of various possibilizing transitions: corporeal activities. Such activities are directed by projected choices of what is materially possible. The formal compositions require active interventions to construct the posited homogeneous world in accordance with the formal discourses. Since the latter are constructs, they too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction of the material reality in accordance with our willed projects. All this seems to rest on nothing. Indeed, Fink has argued very cogently that modernity emerges as if out of nothing. This is to say that the “intention” to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connection between theory and “reality”, an arbitrariness that allows volitional (currently psychologized into “desire”) activity to subtend reason and nature.

The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the “real” swings between two possibilizing structures: the formal discursive possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, and a realization that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be reconstructed at will. These formally designed possibilities are also in a position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfillment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in accord with arbitrary discourses. This shaping comprises the source of both, the labor theory of value and life - the primacy of homo laborans - and technology, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies which promise to redesign the “environment”, and the “human” in line with the theoretical-methodological discourses: a world produced by scientific technology that can wander everywhere and use the indifferent-homogeneous material - including the human - as resource. Some schol-

ars in fact suggest that the modern world has two intentional histories: one, that is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals, and two, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the formal discourses we ourselves posit. Yet in either case arbitrariness is assumed and the intentionality of will that swings between the formal and the transcendent is the decisive arbiter - without precedents and without ground, although it comprises the ground of postmodernity within modernity.

This intentionality is not identical with Kantian autonomous will and with Nietzsche's will to power. Its engagement is with contingent constituents both at the formal and the material levels. The contingent can be possibilized in terms of formal variations and differentiations of processes into discourses and sub-discourses, until the sub-discourses can become distinct sciences, carving out their own fields and accessing the environment in accordance with their formal requirements. Both, the formally designed discourses and the transcendent material reality, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and perceptual distinctions with indifference. The formal indifferent and disconnected discourses lend themselves to a horizontal division and increased formalization of language in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of formal systems themselves. Correlatively, the material world can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the transcendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. The lateral differentiation of formal discourses and their correlative material structuration, provide a basis for discipline differentiations, each having its own formal discourses and each capable of possible construction of material realizations. Thus the more one fragments the formal discourses into increasingly refined signs, the more one is able to criss-cross the material by technical procedures in terms of the formal definitions. In this sense, the very languages of dis-

ciplines are coextensive with the power of shaping the indifferent material in accordance with definitory requirements. One could argue that this continuous division and formalization of discourses is coextensive with a militarization of language and society. Each increasing refinement is also a transition from signs to signals resulting in a restriction of human processes to reactions to precise and efficient embodied material codes. In this sense the discursive power to make leads in two directions: the making of the environment and the human, and the violation and destruction of all lifeworlds. In general terms, this process of militarization is one of the bases for the emergent language of war. We are at war with each other, with the environment, with poverty, with affluence, and with our own fragmented selves.

What appears here is a trace of anarchistic CONSCIENCIA. All events must be destroyed in accordance with the multiple formal discourses in order to remake them into something other. The lifeworlds of peoples everywhere must be disregarded and transformed.

While this CONSCIENCIA requires the adherence to its principles of formal and material detachments, it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion of all events, both “natural” and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally differentiated world where semi-independent spheres call for semi-independent functions and work. What is relevant in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which the formal discourses divide the human “material”: the human is an intersection of economic, social, chemical, genetic, physiological, psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated discourses, each semi independent on the others. It would be redundant to analyze the obvious: the transitional intentionality, expressed as the power of these differentiations, comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of experts, each possessing a discursive power to make what his/her discipline constructs as reality. Yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no necessary connection with other spheres. This multi discursivity does not seem to offer any common world. Hence the results of “research” in a specific domain, can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concern-

ing the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics or cosmetics for possible “application”. Such a lateral differentiation decentralizes responsibility and increases the contingency and the power of the transitional intentionality, appearing here in the image of arbitrariness. Every formal discourse and every material result become totally arbitrary. Each is empowered to go anywhere and make reality. This is MODERN NOMADISM. This means that there are no restrictions for the “making of truth”. After all, such a making has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. All appear in the nomadic production, such that the transitional intentionality becomes self-warranting anarchistic enactment by ANYONE. Regardless of the domain there is no reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease proliferating more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic “growth”, no biological reasons to remould the living processes along new combinations, etc. Any restriction is regarded as an infringement on the autonomy of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.

Given the key intentionality (sometimes exemplified as autonomous will) which swings without any essential necessitation between the theoretical methodological discourses and the transcendent homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is permanent: PROGRESS. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal discourses and all transformations of the lived world must be remade to maintain this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no subject that would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny: PROGRESS FOR THE SAKE OF PROGRESS. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and “perfectabilities” without of course attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing and hence “improvement”. But this suggests that its presence cannot be deconstructed, since in its self-referentiality it has no direction, no purpose, and hence every effort to deconstruct it will,

perform, enhance its self referentiality. The prevalent deconstructivist theology, as writerly, is premised on this self referentiality of progress without death.

The human is also subsumed under an arbitrariness which includes his/her own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e violently. Arbitrariness is a “power” which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of modern ANARCHISTIC CONSCIENCIA: ALL THAT IS GIVEN IS IN PRINCIPLE TO BE VIOLATED TO YIELD PROGRESS. PROGRESS AS SELF WARRANTING CAN NEVER BE FULFILLED; IT IS RULED BY AN ARBITRARY WILL WHOSE ONLY AIM IN RECONSTRUCTION IS CONTINUOUS DESTRUCTION WITHOUT A FINAL JUSTIFICATION. WILLED SELF WARRANTING PROGRESS IS ALSO VIOLENCE FOR THE SAKE OF VIOLENCE.

While this form of consciencia comprises the ground of colonialism, the acceptance of it by indigenous peoples through educational processes, comprises neo-colonialist consciencia. This is to say, the universal effort by the “underdeveloped” nations calls upon their youth to attend Western universities and become versed in the instrumental-technical reason in order to bring progress. Thus, the local peoples become inadequate and must be brought into “universal” material world history and hence be treated as a homogeneous labor power to be shaped technically by “education” to become adequate producers of commodities for the “world market”. In this sense, the elites, the local “bright lights” who get their “superior” technical knowledge in the West, the knowledge that is at base colonial, become neo-colonials by imposing this acquired knowledge as a standard for their own populations. This type of imposition is deemed to be a way of dealing with indigenous issues “objectively”. In this sense, the West need not engage in exporting its colonial structure; it is imported by the educated elites as neo-colonial masters. The power to rule will be distributed among those who possess the technical, instrumental rationality. Their skills are a condition for the running and/or “progressing” of the entire society. This includes

pedagogical retransformation of the local populations toward productivity and ability to “humanize” the homogeneous environment. But this also means that the population will be released from its “logocentric” qualitative culture, its belonging to a region, an environment, and will become nomadic - in search of materials for productive use and consumption. One outcome of this colonial neo-colonialism is the well known language of commodification and consumption. This conscientia enmeshed in scientific technocracies and self-legitimizing progress, cannot permit any other conception of the human apart from efficient producer, colonizer, and a nomad that is calculating and calculated. The qualitative worlds of various communities around the globe, what they have to offer, are of local and not global value, specifically if such qualitative aspects cannot become nomadic, circulated for global consumption. Progress offers technical means for anyone and anywhere to become an image of modernity: to enhance oneself and to make of oneself what one wills, to obtain the “ideal” image, to listen to the “latest” rhythms, to become sensuous body, obtainable in any drug-store, beauty parlor, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a skin-deep equalization in numerous domains lending the appearance of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, even similar dress and walk. While there might remain vast differences in social class distinctions, economic and political power inequities, at the surface level there seems to be an apparent equitable fulfillment. Everyone is “enjoying” an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated ideals and looks. “She looks like a million” and this despite the fact that she is working on a global assembly line. The saturation of all domains with the images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, submit to the power of anarchistic conscientia in “flesh”.

This is to say, idealities to be achieved are no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting the material-economic or technical conditions, but are inscriptions in the body, in the images, the passions and desires appearing directly as modes of bodily comportment. The idealities are coextensive with daily discourses, daily imagery, mass-media, sounds and tastes, architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circulation that make any art-form accessible and “popular”, globally com-

modified and thus nomadic. The anarchistic consciencia, at this level, stems from the very progress that posits THE IDEAL that can never be achieved, and hence a point forever deferred. One is never adequate, and hence is exposed to violation and continuous self-violation - terrorism of the body, inscription of the "latest" that will be immediately outdated by the "improved", ad infinitum. From mechanical through electronic to bio-technologies as transcendental conditions, one can become any image, any shape, and anyone.

TRANSCENDENTAL WILL

What has been argued so far leads to the variants of anarchistic consciencia, specifically in relationship to modern Western modernity and its multi-discursive postmodernity in their globalizing sweep. First, it was noted that PROGRESS is self warranting and requires, for its continuity constant violence and destruction without either vertical or horizontal legitimation. Any legitimation would be another story among stories, each designed to invent its own reality. Subtending both progress and its multiple legitimations is a transcendental will that functions without criteria - a will that wills its own groundlessness. If it had a ground, it would be limited by some ontological-essential experience. Yet such an experience is unavailable both for modernity and its postmodernity. Since no morphology offers any resistance to such a will, it has a total distance to both methods and ontologies, and does its selections as pure inventions. In this sense, it comprises an anarchistic consciencia whose consciousness is FLUX ENHANCING FLUX, and continuously destructive, and whose conscience is radical indifference. As contemporary children like to say: WE ARE CHILLY TO THE MAX - continuous destruction for the sake of destruction. Second, such a metaphysical will is premised on the assumption that "scientific" discourses are empowered to make and remake the environment and hence that to speak is identical with "to make." But the latter must constantly violate all that has been made. Here a formal-material global anarchistic consciencia is at play. Any opposition to it in terms of the

same formal-material logic is, at this level, equally anarchistic. Hence from the first to the fourth world cultures, attempting to maintain their identities by this very anarchistic logic, will be part of it. What will appear here are anarchies in collision. Such anarchies may assume various shapes, such as capitalism, communism, fascism, yet assume *a priori* the transcendental conditions of modern consciencia: formal-material logic. What has to be added is a brief discussion of civilizational consciencia and their efforts to resist the Western modern – postmodern globalization, with its nomadic personalities.

We have already mentioned some modifications that may be in collision with the modern and postmodern Western anarchistic consciencia. At the outset there were suggestions of these types, but it is now appropriate under what transcendental rules they play out their destinies. First, the resistance to globalization by other cultures will not allow us to grasp them at the level at which they attempt to resist globalization. After all, the latter walks in with every car, every television, beauty cream, web-site, walking style, and breakfast cereal. It is necessary to treat such resistance in civilizational terms. It is understood that to engage in multi-culturality may be an aspect of one civilization. But other civilizations may regard such an aspect as chaotic, requiring strict rules – a Hitler, a Jahw, an Allah, a Market – to insure order. The suggestion here is that particular type of civilization (not bound by geography) promotes multiplicity, while other civilizations suppress it. Civilizational scholars from Sorokin through Dumont, to Kavolis, have argued that civilization is the broadest symbolic architectonic of conscious life, expressed in various cultural terms. A given architectonic may not respect cultural boundaries, such as language, arts, religions, and even economies. Hence Chinese Tao is more akin to Greek Demos, and Lockean-Kantian individualism than both to various Christian, Judaic, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalisms. In brief, these affinities suggest a civilizational consciencia that does not respect geographic borders, but has a global topography.

If this state of affairs is plausible, then it is possible to speak of a specific civilizational consciencia that would disagree radically with modern-postmodern Western globalization. It is not feasible to articu-

late a number of such civilizational consciencia (what elsewhere I called “civilizational architectonics”), but one very visible and vocal consciencia goes under the title FUNDAMENTALISMS, appearing in various parts of the globe. Irrespective of their differences, they have a consciousness that includes some forms of essentialism, basically claiming that the human is bound by specific limits derived from some supreme authority. The maintainance of those limits requires a conscience that calls for the destruction of all who transgress such limits since (a) the limits are expressions of human nature, (b) they signify the very presence of the ultimate personality that established such limits. Hence anyone who disrupts such limits has an evil conscience and false consciousness. If one wishes to be authentic, one is duty bound not only to resist the disruptors, but to destroy them. In turn, one is also duty bound to spread the one and only truth and good by any means (one cultural means is holy war) in order to maintain such a truth and a good. In brief, the virulent activity is required to bring the word of the supreme authority to this world and make everyone subject to it.

This subjection will, nonetheless, require endless violation without a temporal future

justification for such violation. This is a consciencia that requires continuous destruction to maintain its permanence enhancement without qualifications. Yet, its consciencia, at the level of enactment, will be in collision with that of modern – postmodern Western, and for the following reasons. First, because it is multi – discursive and hence open to diverse truths. Such a diversity cannot be tolerated in face of the claim that there is only one truth and one good. All other claims are false and evil and are destined for destruction. Second, since the world has been established by supreme authority and its will, then the modern transformation and deessentializing of all events is a disruption of supreme will. Hence the rule of consciencia of modern-postmodern modernity for the FUNDAMENTALIST consciencia is FLUX AS PERMANENCE DISRUPTION AT VARIOUS LEVELS: It is the work of the devil. After all, it violates all the metaphysical and theological structures and edicts imposed by supreme will. Third, the authenticity of this theocratic consciencia calls for the destruction of this demonic-secular, this-worldly

process. There is no need to enter into discussion of the origins of this conception; all that has to be pointed out is the designation of the humanistic tradition as unwarranted pride.

These two types of consciencia are in collision, since they cannot be accommodated one to the other – despite both being anarchistic. The modern-postmodern modernity comprises an architectonic of FLUX AS FLUX ENHANCING WITHOUT PURPOSE, while the various global moves of sacralizing consciencia are CONTINUOUS VIOLATION IN AS FLUX OF PERMANENCE ENHANCEMENT. Both may be similar to the extent that the world is premised on the arbitrary metaphysics of will.

THE MIDDLE PATH

Various political suggestions can be offered to confront the anarchistic consciencia; what is the basic configuration that would not allow either anarchistic consciencia to have their total sway is this: first, permanence is required for any awareness, as well as dynamics, flux. Yet the permanence that is required is one that MAINTAINS AND ENHANCES FLUX. This permanence has been regarded as a public domain wherein every member of society is both equal and autonomous. Yet it is to be understood that such a domain is not a given; it is a phenomenon that must be permanently maintained by activity, participation, and engagement. One cannot simply say that there IS A PUBLIC DOMAIN; rather it vanishes as soon as the members of a political society cease to maintain it by virtue of their activities. In this sense, a participatory requirement is a principle which disallows any group to leave this domain without forfeiting and indeed destroying it. It must be argued, further, that the permanence of this domain includes rules allowing to change this domain. Yet the very changes are a matter of public concern and cannot be relegated to some old or new divinities such as THE MARKET. The latter, as permanent, is actually FLUX SUPPRESSING, since it fails to take into account rational considerations concerning the insatiable metaphysics of the will that subtends the

MARKET ECONOMY. It is quite obvious that the permanent market is also enhanced and maintained by human activities, but is only one form of the modern-postmodern anarchistic consciencia. It is a public matter to what extent it may run wild and to what extent the permanent public domain, if it is maintained and enhanced, will establish rules to adjudicate this new divinity.

What has been said with these brief remarks is an effort to point out that the various Anarchistic consciencia, including the market, are phenomena; they do not grow on trees, nor are they derivable from some ineffable will. We enact them and we can reenact them differently. Yet the reenactment of this difference requires an entirely new conception of "world". It must be argued that the types of anarchistic consciencia articulated so far are worldless. In this sense specific civilizations, intent on articulating modern Western modernity with a view toward maintaining their own identities, can counter such a modernity at the level of cosmic and not metaphysical or ontological understanding.

CHAPTER VIII

OLD AND NEW WORLDS

INTRODUCTION

There is a conflation of terminologies concerning immigrants, refugees, and at times refugees who change to immigrants. Immigrants are persons who leave a particular country in order to seek a place regarded as more acceptable or promising. They are usually allowed to come to the new country legally and obtain some modicum of legal protection and, in time, citizenship. This is the case with most of the immigrants from Eastern Europe during late 19th and early 20th centuries. They were coming to the promised land in waves, with no demands, upon arrival, from legal hacks for protection for their universal human rights or clever designs for welfare support. They knew that only hard work for pay awaited them and they gladly accepted the chance offered them.

Refugees are persons who are thrown out of their homes by wars or persecution for expressing unacceptable views, or for some transgression of laws and an inevitable punishment. They leave for a temporary duration with a constant search for ways of returning back to their homeland. Hence they do not immigrate to another country, but may be accepted for “safe keeping” till the danger to their lives is over and the door is open for return. In a sense, they do not specifically know where they are going, as long as they escape with their skin: as a saying from Eastern Europe goes: I am running where my eyes lead me. In most cases, they leave everything with the hope that someday upon returning back all that will be regained.

Refugee-immigrants are persons who first are forced to leave by some cataclysm, usually a war, and unable to return to their home coun-

try immediately. They will seek legal status as immigrants, or seek other countries which would accept them as legal immigrants. Hence, they cease to be refugees and acquire a status of immigrants. Such groups tend to come in waves and are also grateful for a chance to make a life in a new country, yet they tend to maintain hopes of returning home once the social or political conditions would permit. More recently, there is a category that is used to cover a peculiar combination of motives: economic refugees. In their own countries they survive and are not persecuted or become victims of wars, but regard their means of subsistence as unacceptable and seek a better life elsewhere. They tend to move as families or individuals or small groups, and tend to enter the host countries illegally. They tend to regard their countries of origin as their real home and point of self identity, and are in the host country to make a living. Indeed, this living is not just for them but for their extended families. This group is more current and in part is relevant for a designation of waves of Eastern Europeans in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter will consider all three waves and their main attitudes toward the melting pot. It could be stated that the melting pot was not even a question for most immigrants. They expressed their belonging, exclusion, or self-exclusion by their actions and commitments, by their words, their pride, dreams, hopes, disappointments, and aspirations.

WAVES FROM THE OLD COUNTRY

The wave of immigrants from Eastern Europe at the end of 19th and the dawn of 20th centuries consisted of peoples basically from the land. The Poles, Ukrainians, Balts hardly knew the wider place of their origin, and only a story, a mystical place of destination – the land where streets are paved with gold. They might have known their village, or even a provincial town, and perhaps that they were from Russian empire. Yet these did not spell a nation or provide a national identity to inspire pride, commitment, patriotism and sacrifice. They might have fled from 25 years of military service in an army whose commands and edicts were in a language they did not understand. But mainly they left

places that were replete with degradation, misery and pain. Day after day, season after season, life returned in cycles of repeated subjection and exploitation by the big pan (master), gospadin (proprietor) and the extended hand of a priest to be kissed on one's knees. Their reflection upon the conditions consisted on the impossibility of being a pan or a gospadin, or a "father" since all of these positions were reserved to those with birthright of being most valuable, highest in social rank, while the eternal peasant could not even imagine being born into such positions or having concerns about her nation. It would be against divine order itself. He was born to be a muzhik, a serf-peasant whose position was eternally fixed. This suggests that they did not immigrate as economic refugees or those seeking political asylum from oppressive rulers or rulers who denied universal human rights. They were illiterate and hence oblivious to such lofty concepts. Their situation was ontological-essential. Their reflection from the others, the Misters and Masters, the Lords and Gods, the Tzar as Father-God positioned them ontologically to be essentially tied to the hard toil, to be illiterate, to live in the same log cabins and straw roofs with their beasts of burden, and at times to be treated as lesser than them. Hence, their leaving was not identical with economic refugees seeking more money, better life, but a totalizing move to drop their ontological identities, their degraded positions and to be able to be addressed and to address one another in terms of what they only heard reflectively: mister, master of my own domain, and a proprietor of my work. Here we should not introduce such psychological "wisdom" of envy, greed, rebellion, and even pride. In plain terms, they could not afford such psychological complexities. In principle, they wanted to be humans and live like humans.

The immigrant from the land had another reflexive awareness. His position on the land was sanctioned by a terminology that constantly appealed to a tradition, to a past: through all the ages and their eternity, as it was in the past so shall it be forever. This is almost a Hegelian dialectics with a slight modification: the essence is what has been, and yet the essence is repeated as the future. For the Eastern European muzhik the move to the new world was also a move away from the past and the tradition that inscribed him with indelible ontological mark of restric-

tions, while the future consisted of the new world with very different, and mainly unknown prospects. Yet precisely such an open future, as an aspect of the peasant's awareness, comprised a reflexive horizon that revealed the limitations of the old world as past, as an essence that has been, a frozen and changeless position without prospects, without being able to be a Mister and his wife a Missis, a Lady. This temporal and in turn essential interreflexivity was the constitution of awareness that pitted ontology against its temporal dissolution, and hence toward a radical rearticulation of the peasant who will become a worker for his own living and with prospects to be equal to any other Mister, indeed to be a human, and above all human. After all, the "father" calls us human from the pulpit, and yet we live with, and as beasts.

This wave of immigrants knew that hard work awaits the illiterate and linguistically mute in the new world. Not only their old language skills were limited to the tasks appropriate for land labor, but also the new world's language was beyond their ken. This aspect compelled these immigrants to form their own linguistic communities, concentrated around centers of production requiring heavy and menial labor. These enclaves comprised a context for acquiring a national identity that was broader than the village and narrower than the distant empire they left behind. They were from other villages and, at times towns, and yet spoke a similar language. This is to say, the identity appeared as a reflexively constituted recognition of us as distinct from the Americans and from the Russians, the Ukrainians we are Lithuanians, thus positioning us as distinct from others. The same can be said of the Ukrainians, the Russians, the Poles and others. They too acquired reflexive identities and became different from other enclaves. It must be noted that the term American was reserved to designate the others, the American speaking Yankees who were literate, at ease in their world and even superior. Indeed, they had a different religion and regarded it as enlightened and far above the Catholic and the Orthodox religions of Eastern European immigrants. The latter could hardly count as Christians.

Here, the new immigrant was placed in various ambiguities. She was in America: equal being among all others, and yet not an American in contrast to the real Americans. She lived in an enclave among her

linguistic neighbors and indeed had acquired a national identity that belonged to the old country and at the same time defined her community in the new world. She lived in a Lithuanian neighborhood, and contributed to the maintenance of that community by donating hard earned funds to build a parish and even a club. The building of ties to the community was dramatically enhanced by the clergy who came with the waves of immigrants to tend to the flock. The clergy were educated and literate and hence enjoyed a similar status that they had in the old country. As in the old country, they commanded respect and exercised authority. Moreover, they played a mediating role between an ethnic community and the American world, to the extent that they were literate and could even read American newspapers and documents. Hence, they were positioned both as opening the immigrant to the American world, and as a barrier that prevented the immigrant of speedy integration. From their position, the clergy also provided a powerful reflexive aspect toward establishing national identities among the illiterate immigrants. The latter were told that they are not just from a village or some gubernija, (governorship) but from a country with borders, usually extended to include the broadest geographic area derived from historical records. Hence, a Lithuanian from a village or some gubernija, perhaps was aware that he also belongs to the empire of Tsar Alexander, but not that he is residing in Lithuania. Yet as an immigrant in the new world, he is building a community and a church, and acquires an identity as Lithuanian through the talks with the clergy who also point out that Lithuania once ruled from the Baltic to the Black sea, and that the Tsars trembled before the Lithuanian rulers. While constituting a national identity in the new world and retroactively acquiring a vague sense of the nation left in the old world, the immigrant tended to regard the latter as past, while the new world of America as a place for his future.

Apart from parishes and churches from which radiated the linguistic boundaries and national identity and acceptance of the immigrant, there were established clubs which were basically pubs with dance floors, and a few piece band that could play the old country tunes and rhythms. At times a kitchen for old country foods was also added and thus enhanced ones national identity, and also a separation from

the American world. The church basement, as well as the club, were the gathering places that allowed for community organizational work, specifically concerned with aiding each other to find jobs, places to live, meeting of available marital partners, and mutual support to open ethnic businesses, such as grocery stores, barber shops, shoe repairs, and even production of ethnic food commodities, such as sausages, breads, and cheeses. No doubt, such increase in self-sufficiency tended to block integration into the main stream America. Yet it is also no doubt that the new immigrant regarded herself as American, specifically in manners and efforts to speak American. It must be understood that most jobs were outside of such ethnic communities: steel mills, coal mines, slaughter houses, doing laundry and cleaning homes of the Yankees. Each of these occupations required a specific, although very limited American vocabulary. For the immigrant Yankees did not speak English; they spoke American. Such a vocabulary consisted of greetings, calling out names that had been modified or Americanized, and terms required for the performing of jobs. "Au you?" "Purty gut". "Kep your missis?", "Vai you standin, no vorkin?" etc. Yet this vocabulary was immediately brought into the ethnic community and became a common mode of conversation mixed with the immigrants' ethnic language. In many cases American words were given ethnic endings resulting in a unique language worthy of linguistic studies. "Paidiom stritovat", (lets go for a walk) with street modified to streetovat as a verb. Or, "Gi mi ames" (Give me ham). Such usage was also regarded as a sign of being American.

Other signs of being equal to Americans consisted of attire and addressing others by Mister and Missis. One bought a suit, a hat, a vest with a watch chain across the middrift, a dress with somber or flowery patterns, and was able to say on Sunday church gatherings that I am just as good as the boss, he wears a suit, and so do I. The Yankee lady wears a flowery dress and a bonnet, so do I. The boss is Mister, and so am I; his wife is Missis, and so is mine. The latter case is very pronounced. The men did not speak of wives; they would rather ask "au you missis", and the women would not speak of husbands but ask "au you mister". (How is your missis, and how is your mister). Such designations and attires

were not even on a horizon in the old country. In this sense, they were becoming Americans, even if symbolically. But the symbolism for them was the reality of being American, wherein the old country was sinking into the past, while the new world was becoming almost the sole future.

This symbolism became dramatically enhanced when the immigrant went back to the old country to visit relatives and former neighbors. In that setting he was an American. He wore his suit, she wore her dress and bonnet, and the whole village would come out to gape at The Americans. He was now addressed as pan or gospadin and even the local priest or landlord would seat him and her at the table and treat them as equals. In this setting there was no question that he and she are no longer muzhiks but members of another society that was regarded as superior. Being members of the new world, they too were higher in rank than what they were when they left. This aspect also comprised a reflexive moment that allowed the immigrants to identify themselves with the new world and upon returning to it to be proud of their new identity. They proudly proclaimed to those who just landed on the shores of the new world that “ash Amerikons”. And no doubt, despite the back breaking labor, the long hours, they scrounged and acquired homes, and their future, appearing in the new generation, was radically different from the past of the old country. Thus they melted into the melting pot but in quite a unique way. While constantly reminded of their difference manifest from language through religion, music, illiteracy, through endurance and patience, they strove to surround themselves with paraphernalia of normal American life: Protestant work ethic, saving money, frugality, private property, children in schools preparing for good jobs, and, of course, becoming more patriotic than the real Americans. This was indeed in contrast to the reserved Yankees who did not wear their patriotism on their sleeves. The pride would increase even more when the clergy would organize parish fund raising for relief in the old country. “We Americans can afford to do the job, while those in the old country can’t dig themselves out of their holes”.

One aspect that cannot be overlooked is the emergent workers movements and the left wing politics. Being members of working class, these immigrants were easy targets not only of left wing politics, but

in many cases of communist organizations. Leaders of such organizations found fertile ground among these workers, and held meetings in ethnic clubs to explain the workers position in the world of capital. Indeed, while not engaged in radical activities, these working persons, many of whom have become citizens, supported left wing democratic candidates. They did not regard such activities as un-American, revolutionary, or destructive of America, but a continuation of their hopes and dreams in America. After all, in the old country they could not assemble and organize, demand changes, and even help elect representatives. The latter would be empowered to speak with the voice and power of the people and establish laws and programs for the people. For example, Roosevelt was a president who established social security and other benefits for workers and he was regarded as the best there ever was. Reaching retirement years, these immigrants were now secure and this security was equally given by America. Meanwhile, following our theme of individual self worth, the immigrants gained self respect for their achievements on their own, and in their left wing politics, they regarded their activities as genuinely American – all are equal, and if the company and the owners think that they are not, we must tell them otherwise. It is important to note that the self respect was not yet founded on modern notion of being valuable to society, country, or politics, but primarily, of being one's own person. This is their tacit awareness of self worth, manifesting itself actively with reflection on the difference between the old and new worlds. The old was past and bad, and the new was future and good, and thus the immigrants "human essence" was confirmed as action and doing with an open future.

A brief note concerning the real tug of war to join real Americans comes with the second generation. While the parishes tended to establish schools and newspapers, they were basically parochial, with an emphasis on maintaining ethnic and religious identities, the public schools were a battle ground for the second generation. The battle consisted of many levels. The youngsters were made to be ashamed in public schools of being different on the basis of strange names, at times accents, shy and unsure manners, and lesser wealth. Hence, they did their level best to become, the best they could, Americans. This also comprised a war

at home: the parents were ignorant, did not know how to speak, had no manners, and hence objects of shame. One could not bring such parents to a public school. One was ashamed of them and would be exposed to ridicule – even by teachers. At home, the children knew everything better than their parents, and their manners were American in contrast to the moralities that the parents wanted to impose. “Look ma, I can come home anytime I like; this is America and not the old country”. While growing up, this second generation of Eastern Europeans tended to Americanize their names by shortening, or even completely adopting American names. Thus, from Adamkiewitzch one becomes Adams, from Ivan one becomes John, from Stankevichius one becomes Stankus, and from Stanislav one turns to Stan. In brief, this generation ran from the customs and language of their parents, and indeed from the enclaves in order to erase their ethnicity and be normal Americans without any other trace. It is only by third and fourth generations that this effort became redundant and one was born American and names, if they still lingered in some families, no longer signified shame, being outsider, or even degraded. The immigrant grandparents, for the third generation, were not objects of shame or avoidance, but at most of curiosity: “Mom, how come grandpa talks funny?”

THE WAVES FROM TOWNS

The second wave of Eastern European immigrants stemmed, in the main, from towns and cities. This wave is a result of the Second World War. To understand this type of immigrant, a brief context has to be delineated. After gaining independence from the Russian empire, and others having established national boundaries, there emerged a sense of national identity among peoples of this region. Whether a peasant or a doctor, one knew that she was Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Czechoslovakian, Estonian, etc. More importantly, education was established for all, and became extolled as the highest good. One reason for education was the growing industrialization, trade, and a need for various services, from teachers through doctors, engineers, and officers. Another

reason was a need for an avenue to reduce agrarian populations in order to avoid the division of land into increasingly smaller lots among children and grandchildren. One son, usually the first born, inherits the land, and perhaps one daughter can be provided with a good dowry for marriage, but others have to go and make their way in the world through education. These factors provided a split between town-city as populated by cultured, educated, more prosperous members – the elite – and the agrarian population that, while literate, nonetheless not highly educated. High education was a prestige and those in such positions were cultural and national leaders. Of course, their interests were not only to have such positions, but also to insure them through the maintenance of national integrity. Although stemming from agrarian backgrounds, the educated looked upon agrarian life and people from a distance of a position in town-city, and a hierarchy of well rewarded professions. They were addressed as “ponas”, in short as Mister or Sir. Indeed, their spouses were also entitled to the titles: they were Missis Engineer, Missis Doctor, Missis General, Missis minister, Missis professor, etc. and demanded deference from the lower ones, including their servants. They premised their being on their value position in society; they were not yet Western in the previously articulated sense.

There is no need to speak of various World War Two battles and territorial redistributions among the warring powers; what is important is that the Soviet Union was acquiring Eastern Europe. It is also an a priori truth, that for Soviet Union any educated elite was regarded as the most dangerous threat to absolute dictatorship and hence to be eliminated first. Whether it is the murder of 10.000 Polish officers at Katyn, or the rounding up of tens of thousands of educated persons, from teachers, through doctors, lawyers, to priests and officers during the first Soviet invasion of Baltics in 1940, it was the educated group that bore the brunt of being transported in cattle cars to the Gulag. Hence, the final invasion of Soviet Union on the heels of retreating German armies spelled the death of any educated person who would decide to stay in the home land. Very few chose that fate and hence fled in mass toward the West as refugees. Obviously they were not immigrating, but simply running toward any safe haven from the red terror. This very

designation they used already suggests that they were mostly conservative and that anything, resembling communism under whatever guise, would be an enemy. This is not to say that their anti-communism was unfounded – after all, thousands of their colleagues, friends, and family members were tortured and murdered or sent to concentration camps and death. The main populations staying at home were farmers who later also bore the violence of the red terror for owning property, their farms, and hence being bourgeois and exploiters of the working class. At any rate, the national elite, the head of various nations of Eastern Europe left.

Most ended up in refugee camps in what then was called West Germany. Despite hardships, there was no lack of enthusiasm for education. In such camps schools were formed and education of their children, disrupted by war, resumed at all levels. While the range was from first grade through gymnasium (high school), the teachers included university professors and thus added to the high level of educational preparation for the children of the refugees. At the same time they knew and extolled their national identities, and knew the enemy in the East that was enslaving our people. The point is that these refugees built up strong immunity against being totally integrated into a society of their next destination. The latter was still unknown and it took a number of years for them to be invited to immigrate to Australia and to the Americas. For most, the latter were narrowed down to North America and most preferably to U.S.A. The choice of the U.S.A. was not by chance. The Eastern European immigrants from the first wave, were still alive – even if old and some already retired; hence they were contacted through parishes and were called upon to invite relatives – even if remote – to their communities by agreeing to provide contracts of support. Hopefully the support would be short and jobs would be found for the new immigrants through contacts by the old immigrants and specifically through parishes and organizations. This also located the new immigrants in the enclaves already established by the first wave and, at the very outset, provided a national setting.

The new world offered jobs similar to those occupied by the first wave – menial labor, factory work, store and restaurant attendants, and

even servants. Their elite positions of the old country were disqualified for obvious reasons: first, high level professions, such as law, medicine, diplomacy, generalhood, teaching required sophisticated language skills; second, even if one had good language background in English, the professions required very different preparation and also legal conditions: one had to engage in a protracted reeducation in order to pass examinations required by laws of the new world. Hence an unavoidable dilemma for the mostly middle aged immigrants with families: have to work to earn a living for the family, and have to try to obtain reeducation in the profession acquired in the old country. Few made it. Thus, concentration on the next generation: young persons were pushed to go for higher education at any cost. Due to their good educational preparation in camps, the youth of the new immigrants finished high schools with a breeze and entered universities in unprecedented numbers of any other group. It is regarded that up to eighty percent of this youth earned university degrees – mainly in practical disciplines, such as business, medicine, engineering, physics, mathematics, etc. At the same time, such professions, even among Americans, were peopled by persons of conservative ilk. Very few entered such things as humanities and liberal arts. Such professions were deemed leftist, intellectual, and suspicious – at least pink if not red.

But what of the push to melt into the melting pot? The situation is somewhat complex. We must understand the relationship of the new wave with the old one. The latter received the new immigrants from a position of superiority; after all, they were Americans giving aid to those from the old country, those who do not understand what it is to be a Mister and Missis, and to speak American. After all, the new immigrants were backward, from a country which the old immigrants long since left behind and regarded as being more or less the same as their memories have retained. They have established their lives in the new world and were proud of being citizens of this world. Meanwhile, the new immigrants regarded themselves educated, with high positions, elite of their nation, and hence far superior to the old wave immigrants. The latter were seen as simple, though good hearted, and to be tolerated but not taken seriously. After all, they did not realize how much

things have changed in the old world, and hence hardly partners in any intelligent conversation. Moreover, and most importantly, the old immigrants were a lost cause. They had no nationalistic (apart from being American) passion and could not be counted upon to join ranks to help liberate their true home land in the old world. In addition, the old immigrants and even their children, were left leaning. As pointed out above, they were working class people and Roosevelt was the man who provided all sorts of social benefits. If the old country is communist, and if communists take care of working people, then there was no reason for anyone to leave. Why did these people run away; the best thing for them was to go back, unless they were real enemies of the people. This was a very sore spot between the old and the new immigrants. For the new, Roosevelt was the worst thing that happened to Eastern Europe. Hence the positive adoration of this president by the old immigrants was incomprehensible, antinationalistic and to be rejected. The new immigrants, meanwhile, were in the new world for a short duration. The West, no doubt, will come to its senses, people will elect leaders who will not tolerate the red terror spreading its enslavement across the world. Indeed it will be stopped and rolled back. This is just a matter of few years and then....we shall go back and resume our positions, returning as rightful national elite. This means that there was not even a desire to enter the melting pot. Of course, we must work to live, and even strive to advance in our jobs, but only for now.

What one added to insure one's return as untainted as possible is immediate forming of organizations, and taking over of schools and mass media that were established by the first wave immigrant clergy and religious orders. Teachers from the new wave took over instruction in parochial schools and organized language classes to insure that the children of the new immigrants would be fluent in their ethnic tongue, culture, geography, history, and all the glorious kings, princes, and heroes. At the same time the clubs were expanded, meetings and lectures organized to solve all sorts of national problems and to organize pressure on governments for liberating the home nation. In these organizations the new educated immigrants, while working in factories in the daytime, called themselves by old titles: Mr. ambassador, Mr. engineer,

Mr. doctor, and their ladies, packing cookies in factories during the day, called each other Missis doctor, Missis professor, etc. They not only carried their national identities, but also their elite positions within those nations. In their clubs, and the youth buildings they built with libraries, they held meetings and balls to which they came dressed as best they could to look regal and extolled their old titles. There were hardly any of the simple, good hearted first wave immigrants who were invited or wanted to attend.

Meanwhile the children of the new wave were also organized, nationalized and positioned to go back to their country and help revive it after the red terror had completely distorted it. Hence, all sorts of youth organizations, summer camps, schools for language and history, and even summer courses at the university level for ethnic groups taught by ethnic professors for credit – all designed to revive, instill, and maintain national identity, pride and separation from the main stream American culture. As mentioned above, the young flocked to universities and were instilled with the notion that they were smarter, of higher culture and class. Part time menial jobs were acceptable only as temporary support for their education. After work and/or school, they gathered in their ethnic clubs, restaurants, youth buildings to discuss in their ethnic languages all issues, to listen to poets, diplomats, professors, to watch theater and listen to opera – and all performed in their languages by ethnic artists. Marriage too was expected to be with partners from the same ethnic group. After all, next generations had to continue the national line and to return home to take up their rightful place that the parents, and even grandparents had occupied. Moreover, all the illegal misappropriation of property by communist governments will be reversed and we shall hold legal titles to such properties. In contrast to the first wave, the second wave idealized the old country as the best, most cultured, and historically most significant.

In contrast to the first wave immigrants who could not join the main stream because of linguistic, literacy, religious, and educational barriers, yet who prided themselves of being Americans, the second wave overcame those barriers due to their literacy, high level of education and the presumption of their own elite status, and yet closed them-

selves off from American life. The latter was to be of short duration and will be left behind once we return home. But the return home began to demand all sorts of activities, chief among them the organized efforts to insure that the West, and specifically the American government, refuse to recognize the illegal occupation and incorporation of the home nations into the Soviet empire or satellite status. This means that participation in American politics was keen and conservative. Roosevelt, the arch-liberal, the red, sold Eastern Europe to communism, while the conservatives regard communism as the ultimate enemy. Hence political organization to support conservative American politicians, not necessarily from one's own nationality, but perhaps someone from Eastern European origin and conservative ideology. As already mentioned, this political stance provided a rift between the old and the new immigrant waves. The only thing they had in common was religion. Yet even here, the clergy of the new wave immigrants set a conservative political tone. It is impossible to go to all the varieties of the rift between old and new, but it may be interesting to point out some aberrations forming among the new immigrants, specifically among intellectuals in human sciences.

Intellectual groups, formed by academicians in humanities, had a unique position as immigrants. They became more integrated in American world for a unique reason: liberalism. It is liberalism that provides arguments for tolerance of ethnic differences and hence for the possibility of maintaining ethnic and national identities in North America. In this sense such groups seemed to be counter to the conservative majorities which regarded the liberals as reds. In turn, just as the conservatives called for the liberation of the old nations from communist yoke, the liberals argued on the basis of universal rights of nations to self determination, and at the same time of universal rights of members of different societies to political freedoms. But this meant that in principle, even communist views must be tolerated if they are not imposed by force. Hence, if we go home again, we will have to tolerate peoples' choices of political parties and governments, even if they choose communists. Such liberal views were branded as unpatriotic, to be stamped out, and not to be allowed when we get back. Liberal and democrat, we recall, was associated by the majority of the second wave with red. In a pecu-

liar reversal, the liberals were contributing to the liberation of thought in Eastern Europe by simply being intellectually interested to read literatures, humanities, philosophies of the academicians, writers, and poets in their home lands. This led to the establishment of personal contacts and careful dialogues. Western views appeared, even if underground, with increasing frequency and impacted Eastern European intellectual life, helping in its liberalization and at the same time of slow distancing from the Soviet empire and gaining greater national identity. This impact was admitted much later – after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the conservative majority regarded such intellectual contacts as being worse than sacrilege: complete sellout of country to the reds.

AS TIME GOES BY

While initially unwilling to be Americanized, the new immigrants acquired an American way of practical life: middle class, property, and even reputation among the Americans as being equal professionals and solid citizens. Indeed, not only good Americans, but perhaps even better than the naive and careless locals who did not understand the dangers posed to America by world communism. Here, their conservatism extended to American patriotism against communism – specifically in the context of the Cold War. America and we Americans stand against communism. Those who do not stand with us are not worthy Americans. This bifurcation of the world also allowed one to think that after all those generations in the old country brought up under communist rule must surely be communist. As just mentioned, any contact with them is a sellout not only of one's nation but also of America. Eastern European countries are written off and the new aging immigrant becomes better American than the real Americans. After all, prospects of going home are dimming, the positions which one once had are not only gone, but also one is getting too old for any position, apart for retirement and social security provided by America. While supporting and maintaining the newspapers, book publishing, radio and even television programs (in larger centers), the more interesting and relevant

news come from American media; more interesting programs (including high culture) are better done on American television, American movies, and American opera. Of course, we still belong to the elite, but we discover that America contains cultural options unavailable anywhere else. Those poor folks at home, under communism, have nothing cultural in comparison to us Americans. Those admitted for a visit to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would point out to their acquaintances in the old country what great culture, science, creativity America possesses, and, of course, I am American. If you could come and visit, you would not believe your eyes. It became an indirect, reflexive awareness from the old country that constituted a moment of practical and psychological immersion into the melting pot. Now their concern with the old country shifted toward Westernization and even liberalization through cultural, even if initially narrow, channels. The old country has to be Americanized in order to be able someday to join civilization. This effort was enhanced by the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

GOING HOME

This event, for the now aged immigrants, was a sign of the correctness of their conservatism that was exhibited by the conservative government in Washington. Moreover, this correctness was also confirmed by their conviction that it is Eastern Europe, and above all Lithuania, that finally cracked the iron curtain and forced the collapse of the Soviet Union. The most significant demonstration of acceptance of America by the aged immigrants was the refusal to return home to live; yet now they returned as American tourists to meet the members of their families who speak with Russian accents, and have manners that belong to enslaved people. The time for the Americans has come to undo the damage and to bring back the nationalism they have cherished for fifty years of exile. Yet what they brought was and continues to be America. Customs, manners, behavior, political demands, commerce, education, privatization, and even language were American. We shall teach them not to look over their shoulder if anyone is watching; we shall show them how to speak freely and without fear in public gather-

ings – each individual in her own name. We shall bring back the true nation that was there before Soviet empire. Of course, this would mean forgetting that in numerous cases the pre-Soviet governments did not allow free speech without police supervision, and did not allow challenges to petty dictators who were continuing in their offices for the benefit of the country. This simply suggests that these returning nationalists have been completely integrated into the melting pot, even if they still maintained their enclaves, clubs, and parishes. This is more so valid of the young children of the second wave: well educated and experienced, they also joined in the Americanization of East European nations. Indeed, the indigenous populations formed an ambivalent attitude toward them. These returning nationals were temporary visitors who spoke the local language with an accent, but condemned the Russian linguistic acquisitions, accents, and terminological mixtures, and did their level best to replace such borrowing, yet this time by American terms that were deemed normal. Indeed, such normalizing began to be regarded, in the old country, as Americanization and indeed leading away from nationalism and toward cosmopolitanism. There are notable shifts in attitudes among the common people, although not the elite and young educated groups toward the tourists. The former regard the returning visitors as foreigners, with curious manners and attitudes, indeed, unsettling liberalism. The latter are all for becoming Westerners and indeed Americans. Both aspects comprise a reflection upon the visiting immigrants and their offspring that they are genuine Americans. This brief sketch suggests that melting pot does not prohibit the immigrant from forming its communities and maintaining her old country nationality, yet also indicates that enculturation is equally inevitable.

Yet such nationality, for the first immigrant waves, was basically formed in America. For it the only identifiable nation they inhabited was America. The reflexive forming of the old country nation was remote, and the experience of it in the past. This is to say, they were American nationals at their present while the birth place, that was not a nation, was, as a nation in their imagination, but not in their past experience. Hence it would seem that to be American national was much easier for them. For the second wave, the nation was experienced and main-

tained in immigration; the problem was that it had vanished into Soviet Empire or its sphere of dominance without national sovereignty, and hence the immigrants had to become the sole bearers of these nations as separate and independent entities. This reversal from the first wave consciousness called upon the second wave to maintain the authenticity of their nationalities. This factor added another tension between the returning Americans to visit their old nations (freed from Soviet Empire) and the indigenous populations. The latter, after all, have assumed Soviet nationality, ways of thinking and pervasive Russification. Hence, such a population was tainted and the returning visitors had no qualms in claiming that they are the true bearers of old country nationalities. But as already suggested, they were Americans despite themselves, and they brought a nationality from fifty years ago that no longer made much sense in contemporary setting. Indeed, what they regarded as their separate national identity, brought with them to the new world, became only a memory of comfortable Americans fifty years later.

Yet their Americanism, paraded in the old countries, also provided a catalyst for the younger and more daring members to seek the good life in the West. In contrast to the Soviet shabby life, they were offered instant images of material abundance, leisurely life, unimaginable variety of commodities, and easy money. Coupled with newly elected governments who still operated in the old Soviet style – inefficient, completely removed from daily concerns of citizens, bureaucratic, and dictatorial – the only option was and is to leave. This new, post Soviet wave consists of educated professionals who have not yet become nationalistic, but who have a view of life as opportunistic. Partially this opportunistic view stems from their Soviet education where the West was constantly depicted as capitalistic anarchy, where anything goes as long as you make money. If you make money, you will be respected and have a good, although alienated and decadent life, and the making of money has no rules. Resultantly, the current wave does not come to bring its nationality and its preservation, but to exploit any opportunity – and in many cases criminal – to enrich themselves. This does not mean that they are economic refugees whose home life is almost unbearable, almost on the verge of starvation. They want what is paraded from the

West in advertisements, in luxuries, fun, and immediate gratifications. While educated in specific professions, they take any job, or engage in any activity that gives them the good life. There is one specific conception that is quite complex and quite common. They come to the West, and in the main to America, to make money. They know all the latest styles and would be insulted if offered hand me downs from previous immigrants. They also know all the legal and social tricks and can find immediately all sorts of loopholes in order to circumvent legal requirements for their stay. They also claim that apart from making money life in America is low, mean, brutal, uncultured; hence, once we enrich ourselves, we shall go back home. They follow the Soviet saying that in America one has everything, but one has no life. Upon returning, we shall have everything and life. The reason for this view stems from the inherited attitude toward work in Soviet period. Most received equal pay, with most other amenities guaranteed, and work was very minimal: do as little as possible, enjoy being with others over a bottle of vodka, and let the government take care of the rest. In short, no hustle, no rush, no worries. In America, in contrast, there is no time for leisure, for friendly gatherings; one must run from morning till night and become spiritually exhausted. At the end of all that one is given a fare of dull, unintelligent, television programs. Yet if they return to their homeland it is for more gratifications and not to build or extol their nation. Upon returning, the latter is equally bad in contrast to the fun one could have on the beaches of Florida, gambling casinos in Las Vegas, and Jazz in New Orleans. In all fairness, this wave of immigrants does not have to be concerned with its nation, since anyone can go back anytime without serious restrictions. Thus there is no need to be patriotic and, above all, culturally interested in their tradition. Their culture, now, is global.

Another, and perhaps usually overlooked aspect, is that the regaining of national autonomy occurred as a resistance against a foreigner that has restricted ethnic and national “showinism” (except for Russian), and barred all contacts with the rest of the world. One could enjoy the “great country” the vast reaches of the Soviet Union and hence forget one’s ethnicity. After autonomy, Lithuanians found themselves open to sudden transformation, to unimaginable “playthings”, to mu-

sic, arts, sports, and none of these wondrous things were imposed upon them. If you wanted, you could be nationalistic, Budhistic, sun worshiper, and do so as a citizen of the West. The release from oppression was also release from being concerned with ones culture or national identity. After all, Lithuania is there, we can come and go as we please, and if we fail to maintain our ethnic identity in the West, the folks at home can do that. Of course, to join the West is equivalent to obtaining “valuable” skills that are in demand somewhere – this, as already mentioned, is the creation of a nomadic civilization of “unattached experts”.

There is a tension between the second wave, old immigrants and the new opportunists who are not committed to their home nation as nation, and care less for American liberties and individual worth. Hence, they are regarded, in the main, as freed Soviets who think that freedom means everything goes and that no civilized or civic rules are to be respected. The difficulty that this immigrant has stems from a lack of identity. She has learned not to trust governments, since the Soviet government was a priori oppressive and devious, and hence one had to learn devious ways of circumventing authority. Yet after the breakdown of Soviet empire, the newly and freely elected governments came from the ranks of the former communist ruling elites and, once in power, behaved in the old ways – with one exception: the members of governments became unabashedly corrupt and, as the saying goes, they did not establish democracy but cleptocracy. If such governments are representative of new national identities, then there is nothing new from the old system apart from setting an example how the rest should live a corrupt life. As immigrants, they do not pay attention to legitimate authority, since for them all authority must be corrupt and not heeded. Thus illegal immigration, false visas, criminal activity are taken as normal. In principle, for the most part, the post-Soviet wave of immigrants will not be melted into anything, be proud of belonging to a specific nationality, have allegiance to a flag, or to any specific conviction. It is unabashed self interest, and any means, any country will do as long as it serves as many interests as possible.

It might be the case that this group is in transition and may be regarded as an aspect of globalization. The latter, after all, is abolishing

national boundaries, even of identifiable national and powerful entities such as the U.S.A., nations of Western Europe, and draws into its sphere areas that have hardly began to form their national identities. Such identities are being easily dissolved in the sweep of organizations that have no borders. If we couple this phenomenon with the immigrants from the newly proclaimed (or recouped) nations of Eastern Europe, we can see that the immigrants might never have experienced their currently emergent nationalities as points of their identity. Soviet Union, and by extension its satellites formed, more or less, a country wherein they were safe and at home. They could travel (with permission) across vast regions, from the Baltic to the Black sea, to Irkutsk, Ural mountains to ski, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Prague as one continuous nation. Persons brought up in this expanse regarded it as *bolshaya strana* (the grand country) and, apart from Russian linguistic chauvinism (a universally mandatory language) regarded it as their own. In this sense, while the break-up of the Soviet Union led to an establishment and reestablishment of nationalities, the immediate incursion of the West and globalization offered no window of opportunity to obtain a strong national identity. Apart from opportunism, they may be regarded as nomads without any serious search for, and adherence to, any national identity. They would melt into the pot if it suited them, but without proclaiming that we are proud to be American. One notable aspect of their psychological attitude is irony, scepticism, and cynicism. Whether this is a passing fad is to be seen with the next generation both, in the old world and the new. After all, some, who come to America only temporarily, settle down, acquire property, raise children who attend American schools, wear the latest teenage styles, and, while well versed in the old world languages, answer their parents in English while being addressed in their parents native tongue. If they visit the old world with their parents, they regard themselves as tourists who must get home before the start of school.

POSTSCRIPT

This essay comprises a compact disclosure of the essential aspects of awareness of the Eastern Europeans in the contexts of their own origins and their appearance in America. The essential aspects were explicated in terms of variants of different waves of immigrants in order to show the ways that these waves coped with their experience, what they brought with them, what they found, and what they retained and discarded. What appeared across the variants (apart from the latest, post-Soviet wave) is the reflexive positioning of the immigrant as American, despite the efforts to maintain some semblance of former national identity. The reflexive awareness comprised a transcendental condition for the immigrant to see herself in terms of the other, for example the other who has become part of the Soviet Empire and hence no longer a member of the nation that the immigrant cherished. She then became real American in contrast to the Soviet Empire, and in turn the only one who has the right to speak about the rights to self determination of all peoples. But such rights are, for this immigrant, American. In this sense our offered variations had a focus: in what ways did the immigrants become Americans, despite their psychological, rhetorical, and even political claims. It is hoped that some light has been shed how the melting pot functions and the ways that it cannot be avoided. This unavoidance, for these immigrants, is restricted to North America, and specifically to the United States. The latter, after all, allows one to maintain and even extol one's national identity, and hence this very permission by America and acceptance by the immigrant is being American.

Mickunas A.

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The text centers on the issue of individual identity, its relationship to other individuals, its social value and ultimately the „self worth“ as a criterion for evaluating all values and diverse societies. Nonetheless the problem of individual self identity is multi-layered and requires an investigation of diverse factors, such as the nature of cultural determinants, the specific social structure which might suppress any kind of individual presence, or a social structure that promotes individual identity. Social structures and cultural factors lead to the question of civilizational contexts wherein such structures and factors find their limits. To reach such limits, the text offers methodological procedures that allow a disclosure of the „essential“ aspects of societies and cultures, their inherence in civilizational logics, and the way that the latter provide qualitative differences for interpreting the meaning of identity. At the methodological level, the text offers arguments for the primacy of qualitative understanding over the modern Western quantitative procedures and their limitations. Finally, the question is addressed and articulated as to the civilizational conditions that permit individual identity to unfold, and the way such unfolding might take diverse routes either in one's own native land or in diaspora. The latter is quite significant for the Baltic nations, and specifically for Lithuania which is losing significant numbers of citizens to immigration.

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