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Pre-Intervention Trust-Building, African States and Enforcing the Peace: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the cold war, Africa has been host to an inordinate number of internal deadly conflicts. At no other time in contemporary African history have the masses of African people been forced to live amidst the violence and carnage that has manifested in the post cold war era. These phenomena have been exacerbated by systemic political and economic disengagement of Western states from Africa due to the devaluation of it's geopolitical stock. Hence, African states appear to be attempting to re-assert themselves as national, sub-regional, regional and even international power brokers in order to obtain or sustain legitimacy in the "new continental" and global order. This power brokering has created complex security dilemmas that have affected the internal and external balances of power in and amongst states. Both authoritarian and democratic regimes have endured internal and external military challenges to their authority. In addition, they have had immense and counterproductive pressures bestowed upon them by coercive international financial institutions. These circumstances have worked together to spawn and exacerbate deadly conflict. As a result, African leaders have been forced to originate and implement indigenous formulas to establish the necessary mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflict.¹

African states, in particular West African regimes, have demonstrated their commitment to build sustainable peace by proffering and securing African solutions to African problems. This point is best evidenced by the relative

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¹ The Organization of African Unity, "Resolving Conflicts in Africa Implementation Options," OAU Information Services Publication – Series II (1993), p. 1.

success of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997); Nigeria's popular intervention in Sierra Leone (1997); the Mission for the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB) in the Central African Republic (1997); Senegal and Guinea's interventions in Guinea-Bissau (1998); and South Africa's intervention in Lesotho (1998).² All of the above mentioned interventions were carried out without the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council and transpired between 1990 and 1998, the latter four taking place between 1997 and 1998. Notwithstanding, each mission had a distinctly different outcome, which I argue can be explained by qualitatively assessing the degree of trust-building that took place prior to each intervention.

This article is concerned with examining the dynamics of trust-building in a pre-intervention context.³ Specifically, it will analyse the concept of trust-building prior to the ECOWAS humanitarian interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone,⁴ although the general thrust of my argument will no doubt apply to other African interventions.⁵ Humanitarian intervention can be taken to mean: Intervention in a state involving the use of force (U.N. action in Iraq and Somalia or ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone) or threat of force (U.N. action in Haiti), where the intervenor deploys armed forces and, at the least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted—as it attempts to alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of the population of

² Moreover, the establishment of the African Court on Human and People's Rights in 1998 gives further prowess to this contention.

³ This would be after the decision to deploy forces has been made, but before forces are actually deployed.

⁴ A humanitarian intervention is one that is not authorised by the United Nations Security Council, and hence, in legal as opposed to operational terms, is unilateral.

⁵ My analysis is only concerned with examining the concept of trust-building prior to the deployment of armed forces in internal conflicts. I concentrate on humanitarian intervention as opposed to traditional peace-keeping since, as indicated (in fn.6 below) international law and U.N. law provide for what appear to be pre-intervention trust-building measures with respect to the latter.

a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale.⁶ Within this context, trust-building should be seen as the pre-intervention political processes that seek to demonstrate, assess and verify the predictability of behaviour of all parties to a given conflict, and forecast the consequences of that behaviour with respect to political outcomes (the probability that an intervention will succeed).⁷ In this sense, a viable pre-intervention trust-building scheme should seek to proffer all parties to a conflict, including the *de jure* government, factional leaders, civilian populace and humanitarian enforcers (herein relevant parties), a transparent and detailed overview of the political, legal and operational significance and ramifications of intervention. This does not necessarily mean that trust will emanate amongst the relevant parties by following this approach, nor that the conflicting parties would favour or support intervention if this method were followed, but only that they may attain a *confident expectation* that the intended operation is not ill-intended nor illegitimate. Simply stated, my thesis is as follows: Pre-intervention trust-building can determine post-intervention operational outcomes and the extent to which a humanitarian enforcement operation may succeed.⁸ Hence, I argue that the primary reason why the Liberian mission encountered many more problems than the one in Sierra Leone is due in part to the degree of pre-intervention trust-building that took place.

The mission led by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad, U.S.-led U.N. intervention in Somalia and U.N. intervention in Yugoslavia are prime examples of peace-enforcement missions that to a large extent failed due

⁶ Portions of this definition were extracted from Christopher Greenwood's definition of humanitarian intervention. Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?," *The World Today*, Vol. 49 (February 1993), p. 34. Hence, the standard pre-intervention "peace-keeping" criteria, which requires that, there exist a cease-fire, all parties to a conflict consent to intervention and that force is only used in self-defence, are not applicable to my analysis, as they are not elements of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

⁷ According to Morton Deutsch, trust can be defined as consisting of two elements: (a) predictability of another's behaviour and (b) the positive or negative consequences of that behaviour for oneself. Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2 (1958), pp. 265-279. See also, Ralph M. Goldman and Willard M. Hardman, *Building Trust: An Introduction to Peace-keeping and Arms Control*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p. 4.

⁸ The terms humanitarian enforcement and peace-enforcement are used interchangeably.

to a lack of pre-intervention trust-building. However, this does not mean that a humanitarian enforcement operation that includes a comprehensive trust-building component will not encounter difficulties or perhaps fail, but only that historic records show the likelihood of success is much greater when states engage in pre-intervention trust-building.

TRUST-BUILDING

Trust-building should be the first process of any viable preventive diplomacy plan and hence falls within the rubric of conflict prevention. In this context, pre-intervention trust-building should be seen as a latter phase of conflict prevention because it is a political process, which precedes the use of military force and seeks to avert or reduce post-deployment operational failure. "In this respect, it is much like preventive medicine, the purpose of which is to prevent illness before it occurs."⁹ I argue that trust-building processes should precede confidence-building and peace-building measures with respect to any humanitarian intervention scheme; confidence-building being a definitive feature of conflict management or containment and post conflict peace-building being a significant component of conflict resolution (see Exhibit 1 below).¹⁰ Stated differently, pre-intervention trust-building should be the first phase of any comprehensive conflict reduction system that entails the use of military force.

⁹ Mohammed Bedjaoui, "Preventive Diplomacy: Development, Education and Human Rights," in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. ed., *Preventive Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Basic Books for the Center for International Health and Cooperation, 1996).

¹⁰ It is beyond the scope of this article to explicate the very ambiguous and overlapping concepts of confidence-building and peace-building. For informative works on these concepts see, Fen Osler Hampson, "Can Peacebuilding Work?," *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1997); James Sutterlin, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), chapters 4 and 5.

Exhibit 1
Phases of Conflict Reduction

Stages	Political Processes	Operational Objectives	Political Objectives
1 ⇒	Pre-Intervention Trust-building	Promoting Trust	Conflict Prevention
2 ⇒	Confidence-building	Establishing Order	Conflict Management
3 ⇒	Post Conflict Peace- building	Maintenance of Order	Conflict Resolution

The concept of peace-enforcement is a trust-promoting activity itself, however, the process of carrying out an enforcement operation necessitates that pre-intervention trust-building takes place. As previously stated, the absence of coherent pre-intervention trust-building leads to operational tragedies of the type witnessed in Chad, Somalia and Yugoslavia. Trust-building measures should be initiated amongst all parties that have a vested interest in a conflict, including the intervenors, host state government, factional leaders and, when possible, the civilian populace of the target state. Interventionist states should work diligently to develop *institutional trust* before undertaking humanitarian enforcement activities. Institutional trust has been defined as the attitude of trust that results from and is reinforced by the predictable behaviour of the members of an institution, in this case the member states of ECOWAS.¹¹ In this context, trust may be promoted when political institutions work to make the conduct of conflicting parties "predictable and facilitate [relations] transactions among members from which they [both] derive positive consequences, that is, satisfactions and a 'sense of profit'."¹² This point is particularly important in the African context where distrust and political

¹¹ Goldman and Hardman, *supra* note 7.

¹² Goldman and Hardman, p. 265 (emphasis added).

disillusionment play a major role in the stimulation and exacerbation of conflict. The discussion below will explore several ways to promote trust by building and enhancing mechanisms for pre-intervention cooperation and organisation, and the effective deployment of contingents for peace enforcement operations.

The basis of my analysis with regard to how interventionist states may promote trust is based on four key principles: legitimacy, resource capacity, sub-regional doctrine formulation and transparency.¹³

First, interventionist states should ensure that a proposed intervention is *legitimate* under either U.N. law or customary international law. Once the decision to intervene has been made, and prior to intervention, the intervenors should prepare and deliver a legally coherent policy statement on the validity of intervention to the relevant parties to a conflict. This, for example, would appear to be a progressive way to stimulate dialog between warring factions and the intervenors, or provoke discourse amongst factions that have broken a cease-fire agreement or suspended negotiations.

Second, interventionist states should insure that *resources* exist to complete the proposed operation before troop deployment. A resource-starved operation may contribute to the exacerbation rather than the aversion of conflict, and frustrate future peacemaking efforts. When contingents are deployed into hostile surroundings, states put them at severe risk of injury or death by not providing them with the necessary equipment to effectively carry out their mission.

Third, African states need to fashion African approaches or methods to deal with the dynamics of African conflict scenarios. This may include formulating an African peacekeeping *doctrine* by "drawing up standard operating procedures to take account of the purely African dimension in preparations and orientation of troops for a peace-keeping mission."¹⁴ States

¹³ Transparency is an interdependent as opposed to a separate principle that gives viability to each of the other principles.

¹⁴ Informal Paper on Conflict Prevention and Peace-Keeping in Africa, submitted to the Secretary-General on the United Nations by HE Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, and HE Sir David Hannay, GCMG Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, April 11, 1995.

should seek to formulate and regularly revise such doctrines according to their sub-regional experiences. This would allow all parties to a conflict to confidently forecast the methods interventionist states would likely employ to forestall conflict. In this sense, the threat of forcible intervention may become a calculated consideration of warring factions and hence serve as a deterrent to continued conflict. Likewise, it could discourage opposition groups (including segments of a military) from attempting to carry out a *coup d'etat*.

Finally, *transparency* is an interdependent principle that gives viability to each of the above principles. For example, interventionist states should conduct pre-intervention technical survey missions in a target state in which detailed operational plans, including an assessment of resource requirements are formulated.¹⁵ Moreover, such states should coordinate the dissemination of information with regard to the basic objectives of the intervention to the relevant parties—without of course jeopardising the object and purpose of the mission. This would increase transparency and decrease the likelihood that the expectations of parties would not be fulfilled. As a result, the mission would have greater legitimacy from the relevant parties.

BACKGROUND

In the following section, we will discuss the pre-intervention circumstances that led to the ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was the first of its kind. It was the first time that the international community as a whole supported military intervention by a regional actor in a state without prior authorisation from the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, it marked the first time that the U.N. co-deployed a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with a peace enforcement mission already underway. The ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone marked the second time that both of these phenomena occurred. Hence, it is clear that the Liberian intervention served as a precedent for the one in Sierra Leone.

¹⁵ Gambari and Hannay.

Applying the logic of "critical juncture" as employed by Leonardo Villalon and Phillip Huxtable,¹⁶ the ECOWAS' decision to unilaterally intervene in the internal conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have demarcated a period of significant change in African attitudes toward enforcing the peace, which has left a distinct legacy. The missions have no doubt served as precedents for the other African interventions. Further, with the advent of this critical juncture, absolute compliance with respect to the "non-derogable" international law principles of non-interference and territorial integrity have, on several occasions, been compromised in the spirit of humanitarianism and regional security. African states appear to have accepted by way of practice a norm permitting exceptions to the once rigid OAU Charter prohibitions against non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and infringing upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.¹⁷ The post-1990 unilateral interventions by ECOWAS-ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria in Sierra Leone, MISAB in the Central African Republic, Senegal in Guinea-Bissau and South Africa in Lesotho evidence this fact. These cases demonstrate that a shift in customary international law, or, at the least, African continental law has taken place.

Despite the precedent that has been set by the ECOWAS, as previously mentioned, the Liberian and Sierra Leone missions had starkly different degrees of success. Neither intervention can be considered as an absolute operational success; however, it is necessary to explain why the Liberian mission encountered many more difficulties than the one in Sierra Leone. I attribute these different outcomes to the degree of pre-intervention trust-building that took place prior to each intervention.

¹⁶ Leonardo A. Villalon and Phillip A. Huxtable ed., *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

¹⁷ The Organization of African Unity, "OAU Charter and Rules of Procedure," Article III (2)(3) (Addis Ababa: OAU General Secretariat Information Service, August 1992).

A. Liberia

The Liberian Civil War began on December 24, 1989, when Charles Taylor,¹⁸ Liberia's current President,¹⁹ and a group of so called 'dissidents' launched a small-scale attack on security personnel in Nimba County (located on the Liberian-Cote d'Ivoire border), and advanced toward Monrovia with the sole purpose of overthrowing President Samuel K. Doe's Autocracy.²⁰ The group led by Taylor came to be known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The NPFL grew quickly, as politically disillusioned members of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups joined.²¹ NPFL fighters systematically defeated Doe's American- and Nigerian-backed regime, known for its violent and repressive military tactics. As a result, by May 1990, with the exception of Monrovia,²² Taylor's NPFL controlled more territory in Liberia than Doe's regime. Max Sesay reports that "within six months of the outbreak of the war [by May]...Taylor had already captured over 90 percent of the country."²³ At this stage, it is clear that Taylor was the only *de facto* authority in the Republic.

Doe, facing certain defeat, made unsuccessful appeals for assistance to the people of Liberia and U.S. government. Disgruntled and impaired by the

¹⁸ Former Liberian Director-General of the General Services Agency (GSA) under Samuel K. Doe's regime who, after having been charged with embezzlement in Liberia, fled to the United States, only to be arrested in Massachusetts. While awaiting extradition to Liberia, he escaped from jail. Unpublished document, Baffour Ankomah (Deputy Chief Editor, *New African*), Interview with Charles Taylor (Gbarnga, Liberia, July 30, 1992) pp. 1-17.

¹⁹ President Charles Taylor was inaugurated on August 2, 1997. United Nations, *Final Report of the Secretary-General On The United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia*, S/1997/712, September 12, 1997.

²⁰ Marc Weller, ed., "BBC Monitoring Report, 4 January 1990, Liberia: Curfew in Nimba County Following Alleged Coup, 2 January 1990," in *Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 32-33.

²¹ Weller, *supra* note 20 at xix. Taylor's NPFL included members from nearly every ethnic group in Liberia.

²² Monrovia is the capital of Liberia; it was named after U.S. President James Monroe.

²³ Max Sesay, "Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996), p. 37 (emphasis added).

collapse of his regime, dissolution of his military and the impending state of anarchy in the country, Doe appealed to ECOWAS to introduce a "[p]eace-keeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension...."²⁴

Since ECOWAS and the OAU were not able to mediate a peaceful end to the conflict,²⁵ on August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC),²⁶ created the ECOMOG for Liberia.²⁷ ECOWAS created ECOMOG to halt the "wanton destruction of human life and property...[and]...massive damage...being caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation."²⁸ ECOMOG was mandated to "restore law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections...."²⁹ On August 24, 1990, ECOMOG forces landed in Liberia, and immediately came under attack by NPFL forces.³⁰ In response, ECOMOG forces "fought back with mortars, artillery and automatic weapons."³¹ Hence, it is easy to understand why Taylor viewed ECOMOG as an occupying force and foreign combatant.

²⁴ Weller, "Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 July 1990," *supra* note 20, p. 60.

²⁵ Weller, *supra* note 20, pp. 38-9, 57-9, 63, 65.

²⁶ Weller, "ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision A/DEC.9/5/90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul Republic of Gambia, 30 May 1990," *supra* note 20, p. 38.

²⁷ Weller, "ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 7 August 1990," *supra* note 20, pp. 67, 71. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee included representatives from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mali and Togo.

²⁸ Weller, *supra* note 27, p. 67 (word replaced).

²⁹ Weller, "ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 7 August 1990," *supra* note 20, p. 68.

³⁰ Weller, "BBC Monitoring Report, 27 August 1990, Report: ECOMOG Force Lands; Met by Prince Johnson; Clash with NPFL, 24 August 1990," *supra* note 20, p. 87.

³¹ *Id.* Troops from Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Mali, Sierra Leone and Guinea participated in the intervention. See, "Mediation Committee Meets (Banjul)," *Africa Research Bulletin*, (August, 1-30, 1990), p. 9802.

B. Sierra Leone

In February and March of 1996, in the midst of a civil war, Sierra Leone held its first parliamentary and presidential elections in thirty years.³² As a result, the Sierra Leone People's Party led by President Ahmed Tijan Kabbah came into power.³³ In spite of the election, fighting continued between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who contested the election. On November 30, 1996, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, ECOWAS,³⁴ the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth States facilitated peace talks, which culminated in the Abidjan Accord, ending the civil war.

On May 25, 1997, approximately six months after the war, several junior military officers led by Major Johnny Koromah successfully overthrew the democratically elected government of President Kabbah, forcing him to flee to Guinea.³⁵

³² The election followed five years of civil war between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). During the war, Sierra Leone's Military Force (RSLMF), traditionally used for external defence, the national police force and civil defence militias (Kamajors) provided internal security. The Nigerian and Guinean militaries supported the RSLMF. The government also employed Executive Outcomes, a private South African mercenary firm. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone, S/1997/80*, January 26, 1997. ECOWAS, the OAU, the U.N. and numerous non-governmental organisations were involved in setting the stage for the elections. *African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 12733, June 1-30, 1997; *African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 12694, May 1-31, 1997; "West Africa," *A Coup in Freetown*, June 2-8, 1997, p. 887; "ECOWAS Intervenes to Restore Democracy," *Africa Today: Voice of the Continent*, Vol. 3, No. 4 July/August 1997, p. 24; and U.S. Department of State, *Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, January 30, 1997.

³³ United Nations, *supra* note 32.

³⁴ It is important to note that prior to and during the war in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS maintained a military base there for peace enforcement activities in Liberia.

³⁵ President Kabbah believes that the military junta seized power in order to profit from the country's rich supply of diamonds and gold. He accused the Revolutionary United Front of deceiving the regular army into staging the coup. Panafrican News Agency, "Kabbah Urges ECOWAS Leaders to Restore Him to Power," September 2, 1997.

However, before fleeing, President Kabbah officially requested that Nigeria and ECOWAS intervene to restore him to power.³⁶

During the *coup d'etat*, in order to prevent a counteroffensive by the Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) and ECOMOG, Koromah's forces tactically attacked both contingents.³⁷ The coup appears to have been successful due to complicity by NIFAG officers who unintentionally leaked information revealing when there would be a change of NIFAG guard units with other units stationed on the outskirts of Monrovia, Liberia.

The coup was condemned by the whole of the international community.³⁸ For example, during the OAU Council of Ministers' Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session in Harare, Zimbabwe in May 1997, the Council decided that it "[s]trongly and unequivocally condemns, the coup d'etat ... and calls for the immediate restoration of constitutional order [and] appeals to the leaders of ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the country..."³⁹

Soon after the coup, and pursuant to its obligations under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Republic of Nigeria (not ECOWAS) sent additional NIFAG troops to Sierra Leone to restore law and order.⁴⁰ NIFAG was met with strong resistance from the junta and RUF, and was forced to

³⁶ *African Research Bulletin*, supra note 32, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 12695; see also Panafrican News Agency, "Kabbah Urges ECOWAS Leaders to Restore Him to Power," September 2, 1997.

³⁷ The Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) was created pursuant to the Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Nigeria and Sierra Leone. SOFA is essentially a defence pact between the two countries under which Nigeria provides military and security support to Sierra Leone. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), "Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone Concerning the Provision of Military and Security Assistance to the Republic of Sierra Leone," Lagos, Nigeria, March 7, 1997. *Africa Today*, supra note 32, p. 24; *African Research Bulletin*, supra note 32, Vol. 34, No. 5, p. 12694.

³⁸ See, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, "U.S. Reaction to Coup in Sierra Leone," May 26, 1997; United Nations, "Statement by the President of the Security Council on Sierra Leone," S/PRST/1997/29, May 27, 1997.

³⁹ Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session, May 28-30, 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe, "Draft Decisions," C . (LXVI) Rev. 1, p. 14 (emphasis added).

⁴⁰ *African Research Bulletin*, supra note 32, Vol. 34, No. 6, p. 12734.

retreat. On August 30, 1997, during the 20th Summit Meeting of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS "officially" mandated ECOMOG to enforce sanctions against the junta and restore law and order to Sierra Leone.⁴¹ Similar to Taylor's NPFL, the junta and RUF viewed the situation as a purely internal affair and therefore scorned foreign intervention. However, unlike the NPFL, the latter were clearly aware that ECOWAS had a valid basis for intervention.

Liberia and Sierra Leone share a common history.⁴² The post-cold-war era did not change this reality, as both countries have suffered from perpetual warfare and economic stagnation, having been stifled by serious rebel movements, *coup d' etats*, state collapse and anarchy, not to mention the grand human suffering that the civilian populations of both states have been forced to endure. In light of the above, it is important to determine why the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was less successful than the one in Sierra Leone. Considering the fact that both states have had to face different international and macroeconomic realities, which have no doubt affected the nature of the interventions, the most definitive factor in this context has been the degree of pre-intervention trust-building that took place prior to the intervention.

PRE-INTERVENTION TRUST-BUILDING AND THE CASE OF LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

The following section will examine the proposed pre-intervention principles of legitimacy, resource capacity, sub-regional doctrine formulation

⁴¹ Panafrikan News Agency, "Tougher Measures Against Junta in Freetown," September 2, 1997. However, in early August 1997, pursuant to requests by ECOWAS member states, the late Nigerian Head of State and ECOWAS Chairman General Sani Abacha appears to have issued an "executive directive" authorising an economic blockade against Sierra Leone to be enforced by ECOMOG.

⁴² Christopher Clapham, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: An Essay in Comparative Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

and transparency in light of the ECOWAS humanitarian interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁴³

A. Legitimacy

The primary reason why the ECOWAS SMC and ECOMOG failed to bring about a cessation of conflict in Liberia was because the mission lacked *legitimacy* from the major party to the conflict, Charles Taylor's NPFL. Taylor opposed the ECOWAS scheme for two primary reasons. First, the ECOWAS SMC did not clearly articulate the basis for intervention or proffer a specific plan that explicated the politico-military aims of the mission, which led Taylor to question the authenticity of the ECOMOG operation. Second, he did not trust former Nigerian Head of State General Ibrahim Babangida, due to the latter's close relationship with President Doe. From this background, it is evident that the ECOMOG mission was launched despite the fact that trust did not exist between the peace-enforcer (ECOMOG) and the primary combatant (Taylor's NPFL).

Disagreement as to the legality of the ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia can be largely attributed to the fact that it failed to clearly specify the legal basis for and delineate the objectives of the intervention. This is an important point because neither the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978), nor the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981), permitted the ECOWAS to intervene in the *purely* internal affairs of its member states. More important, however, the U.N. Charter forbids states to intervene in the domestic affairs of states,⁴⁴ and

⁴³ This article will not include an analysis of the legality of the interventions with regard to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as I have thoroughly dealt with this issue elsewhere. See, Jeremy Levitt, "Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone," *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1998). Likewise, for a seminal article on the legality of the Liberian intervention see Max Sesay, "Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996), pp. 35-52.

⁴⁴ U.N. Charter Article 2(4).

to employ force without prior authorisation from the U.N. Security Council.⁴⁵ Perhaps, the ECOWAS' failure to proffer a basis for intervention was because its leaders simply did not know how best to justify it in light of the above mentioned legal limitations. This is not an illogical conclusion given the fact that it was a case of first impression.

From an operational standpoint, the ECOWAS did not conduct a technical or logistical survey mission prior to intervention, to enable it to forecast and prepare for what eventually transpired on the ground. As a result, the ECOMOG was ill prepared to deal with Taylor's forces upon landing, which forced it to take on an offensive character.⁴⁶ This again deligitimised the mission in the eyes of the combatants and some of the member states of ECOWAS.

The ECOWAS' failure to clearly communicate the legal as-opposed to the moral basis for intervention appears to have been one reason why Taylor objected to the mission. He was correctly under the assumption that under international law the Liberian conflict was an internal one, and that any intervention would be in violation of its territorial integrity and the masses' right to self-determination. However, he was unaware that the member states of ECOWAS were entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention due to the degree of carnage that ensued with the collapse of the state. This does not infer that Taylor would have favoured intervention had he been informed of its legal basis, but only that a coherent communication detailing the basis for and politico-military objectives of the mission, may have given him a *confident expectation* that the intended operation was not ill-intended or illegitimate. Likewise, the ECOWAS may have been able to earn Taylor's trust had the

⁴⁵ U.N. Charter Article 39.

⁴⁶ David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, ed. by Lori Fisler Damrosch (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 167-9.

SMC's pre-intervention trust-building framework for the resolution of interstate conflict been applicable in internal conflict scenarios.⁴⁷

Taylor's disdain for and distrust of Nigerian Head of State General Babangida stems from the extensive military assistance the latter provided Doe prior to intervention, and because he and Doe were friends.⁴⁸ On this point Sesay asserts that, "General Babangida was known to be a close friend of Doe. Before the war, Nigeria's financial support to the University of Liberia led to the naming of the Graduate School of International Relations after the Nigerian leader," and "Nigerian military assistance to Doe after the outbreak of fighting [but before intervention] were known in most circles, matters for which Nigeria was constantly pilloried by Charles Taylor."⁴⁹ As a result, Taylor did not believe that Babangida and hence the Nigerian military could objectively enforce the peace.

In addition, there was a great deal of mistrust among the SMC member states, and states contributing to ECOMOG.⁵⁰ This was partly due to pre-existing, post-colonial Anglophone-Francophone tensions, as the majority of ECOMOG troops were from English-speaking countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra

⁴⁷ Weller, "ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, Decision A/DEC.9/5/90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee," Banjul Republic of Gambia, May 30, 1990, *supra* note 20, p. 38. The decision "provides a system in which a member-state involved in a dispute or conflict could inform the Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS in writing of its intention to refer the matter to the SMC for settlement. *Id.* art. 2. The Executive Secretary then advises the Chairman of the AHSG and the governments of the other members of the SMC about the dispute, and takes measures to help the SMC in settling the conflict. *Id.* art. 3(1). The framework requires the AHSG Chairman to *inform the member-states involved in the conflict of the intention of the SMC to mediate their dispute.* *Id.* The AHSG Chairman must also report to the AHSG about the nature of the dispute, the parties involved, and the SMC's mediation efforts. *Id.* art. 4." Kofi Oteng Kufuor, "Developments in the Resolution of the Liberian Conflict," *American University Journal of International Law and Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994-95), fn. 16 (*italics added*).

⁴⁸ Wippman, *supra* note 46, p. 191.

⁴⁹ Sesay, *supra* note 23, p. 45.

⁵⁰ Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Côte, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 406-7.

Leone and Gambia).⁵¹ Further, the Francophone member states of ECOWAS, namely Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea "accused ECOMOG of being a force with a purpose only to foster the hegemonic interest of particular states."⁵² This view was exacerbated because at the time, approximately 70 percent of the troops that were to take part in the ECOMOG were Nigerian,⁵³ which, according to the Francophone states and Taylor, would give Nigeria unwavering influence over the mission. Further, inter-ECOWAS conflict was also provoked by several Francophone ECOWAS states, namely Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, as they provided military assistance to Taylor before and after the SMC and ECOMOG were established.⁵⁴ Therefore, some of the ECOWAS member states played dual roles as peace-enforcers and parties to the conflict. Taken together, Taylor's fact-driven suspicion of Nigeria, and ECOWAS' internal fighting culminated in an era of distrust. These events explain why Taylor so vehemently objected to intervention, and demonstrate that his distrust directly impacted the effectiveness of the intervention.

The ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was for the most part successful. The success of the mission can be attributed to the pre-intervention trust-building mechanisms that ECOWAS instituted in wake of the Liberian experience. These measures guaranteed that the mission would have a certain degree of legitimacy.

In 1993, the ECOWAS adopted a revised treaty,⁵⁵ which provided for a *de jure* mechanism for collective security that was not included in the original treaty. According to Article 58 of the treaty, "member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region" and pledge to "co-operate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the

⁵¹ Ibrahim A. Gambari, "The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Reconstruction," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. by I. William Zartman (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 230.

⁵² Gambari.

⁵³ Howe, *supra* note 50, p. 406.

⁵⁴ Howe, p. 407.

⁵⁵ Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty, Article 58 (July 24, 1993).

timely *prevention* and resolution of *intra-State* and *inter-State* conflict...⁵⁶ Likewise, the article calls on member states to "establish a regional peace and security observation system and *peace-keeping forces* where appropriate."⁵⁷ Hence, three years after the Liberian intervention in 1990, and four years before the Sierra Leone mission in 1997, ECOWAS established a permanent mechanism that obligated it to take enforcement action to resolve internal conflicts. As a result, Article 58 conferred unambiguous legitimacy to the Sierra Leone mission, which was not enjoyed during the Liberian intervention.

The mission was also legitimate because President Kabbah consented to it and the international community at large, including the OAU,⁵⁸ U.N. and U.S. supported intervention.⁵⁹ Under international law, Kabbah's request was sufficient enough to justify intervention since he was still recognised as the *de jure* head of state by the international community, and because his regime did not at any time lose *de facto* control of the state.⁶⁰ According to Louise Doswald Beck, the 'existence of *de facto* control is generally the most important criterion in dealing with a regime as representing the state.'⁶¹ Hence, by the time ECOWAS made the decision to intervene in Liberia, Doe's regime had lost *de jure* recognition by the international community, and was not in *de facto* control of the state; from Taylor's perspective, these factors deligitimised the ECOWAS mission. ECOWAS should have obtained Taylor's consent prior to intervention because he was in *de facto* control of the state. Consequently, since Koromah's *junta* was not internationally recognised and because it never obtained *de facto* control of the state, it did not at any time obtain international

⁵⁶ ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Article 58 (italics added).

⁵⁷ ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Article 58 (italics added).

⁵⁸ Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-sixth Ordinary Session, May 28-30, 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe, Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. 1, p. 14.

⁵⁹ United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/29, May 27, 1997; see also, U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, "U.S. Reaction to Coup in Sierra Leone," May 26, 1997.

⁶⁰ Louise Doswald-Beck, "The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government," in *The British Yearbook of International Law*, (LVI 1985), pp. 195-6. See also, Jeremy Levitt, *supra* note 43.

⁶¹ Louise Doswald-Beck, p. 194.

legal personality, as did Taylor's NPFL. This may explain why ECOWAS did not deem it legally necessary to obtain Koromah's consent prior to intervention. Moreover, it appears that the ECOWAS did not need to offer a justification for the intervention because "on [May] 27th a Nigerian frigate docked and began unloading troops at Freetown port *with the permission* of the country's new rulers."⁶² Nevertheless, as formerly alluded to, although it has been reported that the frigate docked with the permission of the junta, Koromah nor the RUF promised that Nigerian troops would not be attacked, if upon landing they demonstrated an offensive military posture.

Unlike Charles Taylor, after the junta seized power, Koromah predicted that ECOWAS may take unilateral humanitarian action to restore law and order, and appealed to the United Nations to forestall or dissuade ECOWAS from intervening.⁶³ Koromah's *pre-intervention appeal* shows that more likely than not he was aware that there was a legitimate basis for intervention, which may elucidate why he did not frustrate the ECOMOG mission in August of the same year. In contrast, Koromah and the RUF may have thwarted the Nigerian operation because they considered it illegitimate. Likewise, as previously stated, Taylor's NPFL appear to have attacked ECOMOG forces because they believed that the intervention was illegal. Hence at a minimum, it is evident that ECOWAS was obligated to proffer Taylor an explanation as to the legality of intervention, and alternatively why they were not beholden to do so in the case of Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding, both cases reveal that if a permanent pre-intervention trust-building were established to validate ECOWAS style interventions, violence between peace enforcers and combatants may be averted when troops are deployed in conflict scenarios.

B. Resource Capacity

Regardless of the degree of legitimacy a proposed humanitarian enforcement mission may have, unless peace enforcers have the material

⁶² *African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1-31, 1997, p. 12694 (italics added).

⁶³ *African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 12694-5.

resources to viably carry out an operation, it will more likely than not fail. An under-resourced enforcement operation not only threatens the object and purpose of a mission, but also puts at risk individual humanitarian enforcers and civilians, and encourages participant troop corruption. As a result, a conflict scenario may be exacerbated or additional conflict stimulated by a poorly financed operation.

Neither the Liberian nor Sierra Leonian interventions were exact operational successes due to the negligible amount of resources that the member states of ECOWAS (with exception to Nigeria) contributed to those missions. Nigeria provided over 70 percent of the troops for each operation and for the most part financed them.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Nigerian arrogance, poor pre-intervention intelligence gathering, and a lack of logistical support and reconnaissance capacity hindered and compromised both missions.

A comprehensive economic feasibility study based on data compiled from target state survey missions would allow states to determine the likely operational costs of intervention. If such data were to be provided to member states in the pre-intervention planning phase of an operation, they would be in a better position to determine whether the necessary resources exist to adequately finance a mission. A coherently planned operation, which includes an assessment of the resource capacity of contributing states is likely to decrease confusion, increase *transparency* and promote trust amongst the relevant parties to a conflict. This is especially important with respect to contributing member states, who as a result of such an assessment will know exactly what resources other states intend to proffer. This will increase accountability by obliging the former to work with the latter to raise the necessary assets. Most important, however, such information should be made available to the government of a target state and combatants, so that they know in advance the extent to which states are willing to go to resolve a conflict. In this sense, pre-intervention transparency may positively affect the nature of an operation as combatants may be deterred from fighting if they are aware that the intervention has regional or international legitimacy, and that continued

⁶⁴ Howe, *supra* note 40, p. 406.

hostilities may result in them being confronted by a conventional humanitarian force. Likewise, if the relevant parties are informed as to the material resources states are willing to expend to resolve a conflict, a mission may attain additional legitimacy from the combatants and simultaneously deter them from warring. For example, had Charles Taylor been "informed" that Nigeria was willing to invest vast resources (several billion dollars) to avert further carnage in Liberia, he may not have been so hostile toward the ECOMOG, and more apt to work toward resolving the conflict. Either he would have been hesitant to prolong the war knowing the tangible and intangible resources (military equipment, monies and human lives) ECOWAS was willing to expend to enforce the peace, or alternatively, the mission may have obtained legitimacy from Taylor had he been aware of the capital ECOWAS was willing to invest to secure peace.

Yet still, the ECOMOG mission in Liberia was greatly compromised because the ECOWAS lacked the necessary resources to maintain the ECOMOG in Liberia for seven years. Herbert Howe reports that "ECOMOG...lacked much of the equipment, maintenance, manpower, administration, and intelligence required for counterinsurgency in Liberia."⁶⁵ To undertake a humanitarian enforcement mission amidst a civil war, particularly in a state that has topography similar to Liberia, the intervenor must have at its disposal helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft. However, ECOMOG sought to enforce the peace in Liberia with neither. From a technical standpoint, incompatibility of military equipment, poor maintenance and a lack of operable communications equipment frustrated the mission. ECOMOG's fluctuating manpower base, weak command and control apparatus and lack of a viable intelligence gathering mechanism also caused major problems. In addition, its inability to ensure that troops received their wages in a timely fashion may have damaged troop morale and encouraged corruption. In short, the ECOWAS' failure to secure resources and develop a bipartisan and comprehensive pre-intervention scheme, contributed to the exacerbation of the conflict and the prolonging of the war.

⁶⁵ Howe, *supra* note 40, p. 421.

As previously stated, had the ECOWAS conducted a comprehensive technical survey mission detailing the material resources needed to effectively carry out the mission, it may have increased transparency and decreased the amount of distrust amongst its member states and between them and the NPFL. Likewise, it may have prevented hundreds of African humanitarian enforcers, combatants and civilians from being killed.

Although the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone encountered some difficulties, it was enormously more successful than the one in Liberia. This may be attributed to the above mentioned pre-intervention trust-building mechanisms that were instituted in wake of the Liberian experience. Moreover, this could also be because Nigerian forces were already in Sierra Leone before the *coup d'etat* pursuant to a bilateral Status of the Forces Agreement between the two countries,⁶⁶ and since ECOMOG maintained a small-scale military base there for operations in Liberia. Prior to the ECOMOG intervention it was evident that the necessary manpower (albeit unorganised) existed to quickly engage and subdue the junta.

It is probable that the ECOMOG mission was successful because its commanders learned from the blunders of the Nigeria intervention. For example, after Nigeria (not ECOMOG) unilaterally deployed troops to Sierra Leone to restore law and order, they came under attack by guerrillas from the *junta* and RUF.⁶⁷ Since Nigerian contingents were not provided with the necessary equipment (specifically ammunition) to enable them to repel the RUF, dozens of Nigerians were murdered and the mission commander was forced to halt the operation until reinforcements arrived.⁶⁸ *New African* reported that the Nigerians "with their array of modern weapons backed by frigates and all, were no match for the battle-hardened boys and girls of the RUF who had six years to test their reflexes in the bush."⁶⁹ By the time ECOMOG forces "officially" landed in September 1997, Nigeria SOFA and

⁶⁶ Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), *supra* note 34.

⁶⁷ *New African*, "Sierra Leone: RUF Comes Town", (July/August 1997), p. 16.

⁶⁸ *African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 6, June 1-30, 1997, p. 12733.

⁶⁹ *Id.*

ECOMOG Nigerian forces already present in Sierra Leone had established the necessary conditions for an "incident free" intervention. Similarly, the ECOMOG forces landed with the necessary equipment to enforce the peace and restore law and order to Sierra Leone. Although the mission can be referenced as an operational success in comparison to the one in Liberia, ECOWAS has yet to establish a viable command and control structure. Furthermore, the majority of the member states of ECOWAS have failed to put forth the resources to make such operations authentically multilateral. As a result, both interventions have had an overly intrusive Nigerian presence.

Due to the diplomatic efforts made by the ECOWAS, OAU and United Nations between the Nigerian intervention in June 1997, and the ECOMOG mission in September 1997, the junta and RUF were well aware of ECOWAS' intent to mobilise the ECOMOG humanitarian force against them. Therefore, unlike the ECOMOG mission in Liberia, the Sierra Leone mission was transparent, as the junta unquestionably had formal notice that ECOMOG intended to intervene.

Resource capacity and transparency are key pre-intervention trust-building principles. As the ECOMOG-Liberian and Nigerian-Sierra Leone interventions demonstrate, when states seek to enforce the peace ill-prepared and with inadequate resources, various politico-military problems will undoubtedly occur. Likewise, when operational transparency is apparent to the relevant parties to a conflict, the ECOMOG-Sierra Leone intervention seems to illustrate that humanitarian enforcers will encounter less resistance from combatants when they intervene in a state. This is not to assert that rebels will not attack or frustrate an intervention if they are not given notice, but only that pre-intervention transparency may give such rebels a confident expectation that the mission is not ill-intended nor illegitimate.

C. Sub-Regional Doctrine Formulation

The failure of the U.S.-led U.N. mission in Somalia and the Belgium-led U.N. mission in Rwanda appears to have been directly related to material flaws in Western-based U.N. peacekeeping practices (doctrine) with respect to

its demonstrated inapplicability and ineffectiveness in African conflict scenarios. This may, in part, be due to the fact that such doctrine is for the most part a byproduct of Western military experiences in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, such doctrine has been developed from and is a manifestation of interstate as opposed to internal conflict situations. Hence, to a large extent U.N. peacekeeping doctrine has been shown to be inadequate due to the internal character and harsh brand of conflicts occurring in Africa since the end of the cold war.

Standard or universal international peacekeeping doctrine as employed by the OAU in Chad and initially by ECOMOG in Liberia has proven itself ineffective and even counterproductive in the African context. As a result, there is a need for African states to re-evaluate and re-devise such doctrine to take into account the nature and complexities of African conflict, as the majority of internal deadly conflicts since 1990 have required forcible military intervention. This, however, does not mean to suggest that standard international doctrine should be discounted, nor that one African humanitarian enforcement doctrine can in fact be created. On the other hand, military leaders in Africa should seek to devise African peace enforcement doctrine within the rubric of universally accepted standards. Given Africa's enormous size and geo-political and military diversity, it would seem feasible for states to work through pre-existing sub-regional arrangements to conceive humanitarian enforcement doctrine along sub-regional lines. The ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, MISAB mission in the Central African Republic and South African (SADC) mission in Lesotho have demonstrated that states are working through sub-regional mechanisms to avert conflict, and therefore should complement such efforts by formulating doctrine based on their respective experiences.

The ECOWAS has yet to develop sub-regional peace enforcement doctrine. Although successful, the Liberian and Sierra Leone interventions were "ill coordinated" reactions to humanitarian crises, which from an operational perspective could have been greatly enhanced had they been guided by doctrine. "Failure by African states to establish an effective collective security system" based on sub-regional African peace enforcement doctrine has affected their capacity to effectively respond to serious humanitarian crises, and hence

contributed to African insecurity.⁷⁰ African fashioned sub-regional doctrine, as opposed to universal Western-styled doctrine, would appear to be more applicable and acceptable to states because as previously mentioned it would be a manifestation of their collective sub-regional experiences. To borrow an expression from Lord David Owen, African premised doctrine may increase states "self-discipline to be impartial" and add credibility to a humanitarian mission and force.⁷¹ The existence of such doctrine would seem to allow the military apparatus' of states to develop familiarity with, and a vested interest in comporting with agreed upon politico-military standards of operation. Doctrinal familiarity may promote interorganisational transparency and institutional trust, as participating states and perhaps conflicting parties would become familiar with the methods and procedures in which states have committed themselves to work.

CONCLUSION

The case of Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate that pre-intervention trust-building can determine post-intervention operational outcomes and the extent to which a humanitarian enforcement mission may succeed. The discussion above clearly shows that the ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was far less successful than the one in Sierra Leone due to the negligible amount of pre-intervention trust-building that took place prior to intervention. Legitimacy, resource capacity, doctrine formulation and transparency are key pre-intervention trust-promoting principles that African states need consider before partaking in peace enforcement operations. When

⁷⁰ Peter Mutharika, "The Role of the United Nations Security Council in African Peace Management: Some Proposals," *Michigan Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 561.

⁷¹ (Lord Owen was commenting on the need for the Security Council to be self-disciplined and impartial before a humanitarian intervention, so as not to undermine the credibility of the intervening force). Lord David Owen, "A Clinician's Caution: Rhetoric and Reality," in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. ed., *Preventive Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Basic Books for the Center for International Health and Cooperation, 1996), p. 317.

a state, group of states or regional actor intend to employ military force in a state, the above case studies suggest that pre-intervention trust-building may decrease the chances that the relevant parties will oppose intervention, and lessen the likelihood that combatants will violently resist an operation. If the relevant parties to a conflict have a confident expectation that a mission which entails the use of forces is not ill-intended nor illegitimate, then it appears from both a political and operational standpoint that the intervention is more likely to succeed.