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New Mexico During the Civil War

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NEW MEXICO DURING THE CIVIL WAR

By WILLIAM I. WALDRIP

(Continued)

III Union Successes

SOON after General Sibley had decided upon a course of action, the Confederates acted quickly, and began their trek to the North. When the Texans reached Socorro on February 22, the militia stationed there surrendered almost immediately.¹ The townspeople were accused of disloyalty, and complaints were also raised against the native troops who deserted as the enemy approached.² Continuing on to Albuquerque, the Texans entered the town on the second of March.

The Federals, knowing of the Confederate approach, had given away and burned much of their military supplies just prior to the entrance of the enemy. Fear of destroying private homes by fire, however, kept the destruction from being complete.³ The townspeople in “. . . their insatiable desire for plunder . . .” frightened the Quartermaster into leaving much property undamaged.⁴ The Confederates descended upon these stores voraciously. Over six million dollars worth was seized, and then foolishly destroyed. One of the troops, who saw no purpose in such destruction, opined it occurred “. . . because our men were getting drunk on the whiskey and our commander had never been sober, . . .”⁵ On the thirteenth of March the Texans issued a proclamation which granted amnesty to all who would quit the Federal service in ten days.⁶ This was designed to weaken further the allegiance of the natives.

Governor Connelly complained of the conduct of the invaders when he wrote:

1. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 171. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 26, 1862.
2. *O. R.*, I, 9:605. *Major Charles E. Wesche Report*, April 25, 1862.
3. *L. R.*, *loc. cit.*
4. *O. R.*, I, 9:528. Enos to Donaldson, March 11, 1862.
5. Noel, *op. cit.*, p. 61. (Noel himself was a teetotaler, p. 40.)
6. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 171. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 26, 1862.

I am sorry to say that the Texans have not behaved with the moderation that was expected, and that desolation has marked their progress on the Rio Grande from Craig to Bernalillo. Exactions and confiscations are of daily occurrence, and the larger portion of those who have anything to give or to lose are here [Las Vegas] on this frontier, seeking a refuge from their rapacity, and have left their houses and contents a prey to the invaders.⁷

This ruthlessness which may have been forced by necessity was later to prove a serious handicap when the tables were turned.

Continuing on to Santa Fe, the Confederates resumed their burning and destruction, and soon again were short of supplies.⁸ At the same time ex-Surveyor General William Pelham was appointed Territorial Governor at Santa Fe by the Confederates, and everyone was required to swear allegiance on penalty of loss of property.⁹

With the Texans making such rapid progress, Canby again pleaded for more troops.¹⁰ This time Secretary of War Stanton ordered Major-General Henry W. Halleck, at that time the ranking officer in the West, to "re-enforce Canby by all means. We have felt great anxiety about him."¹¹ Halleck immediately suggested sending 4,000 to 5,000 men and raising Canby to the rank of Brigadier-General.¹² He added, "I know General Canby well. He is one of the best officers in the service."¹³ Washington was at last becoming aware of the conflict in New Mexico.

While Canby was pleading for additional troops, the Confederates were having their troubles. Although Union military leaders complained of the disloyalty and apathy of the natives, the Texans were equally dismayed. Not only were their stores in short supply, but they began to realize that their ruthless policy of confiscation had left them ". . . in the midst of a population of 80,000 souls possessing

7. *O. R.*, I, 9:651. Connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862.

8. Noel, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

9. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 175. Arny to General (?), March 19, 1862.

10. *O. R.*, I, 8:627. Halleck to Stanton, March 20, 1862.

11. *Ibid.*, I, 8:628. Stanton to Halleck, March 20, 1862.

12. *Ibid.*, I, 8:629. Halleck to Stanton, March 21, 1862.

13. *Ibid.*, I, 8:633. Halleck to Stanton, March 23, 1862.

no very friendly spirit toward us. . . ." Internal command problems were also causing concern.

. . . a spirit of insubordination and prejudice against General Sibley, which appears to have been aggravated by the fact that General Sibley was sick during the battle near Fort Craig (as he had been for some days previous) and did not command on the occasion—a prejudice that goes so far as to accuse him of a deliberate plan to deliver his command into the hands of our enemies.¹⁴

Although Pelham was established as Governor of the Territory in Santa Fe, Major Pyron was in command of the Confederate troops. Sibley had originally sent men to Santa Fe because Federal reinforcements from Colorado were reported at Fort Union. The capital was held by the South for about a month, and many friendly to the Confederacy were released from "durance."¹⁵ The prestige to be derived from the capture of the enemy capital was probably an additional motive for its seizure.

With Arizona and southern New Mexico under almost complete control, and the principal towns and the capital subjugated as well, the Confederate campaign had reached its apex. The position of the Texans was precarious however. With supplies running low, with the population indifferent to their welfare, if not actually hostile, the invaders could not remain idle. Too, Fort Craig to the south was manned by a strong force which cut them off from El Paso, and to the northeast was the menace of Fort Union.

In answer to the pleas from New Mexico, volunteer troops were sent to Fort Union by the Governor of Colorado.¹⁶ The journey was made over difficult terrain and in inclement weather. Such was the urgency of the call that over 400 miles were covered in only thirteen days.¹⁷ Al-

14. *Ibid.*, I, 3:793. Steele to Cooper, March 7, 1862.

15. *Ibid.*, I, 9:509. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862. F. S. Donnell in his "When Las Vegas Was the Capital of New Mexico," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 3:265, October, 1933, recalls that the Union government was removed to Las Vegas at this time for a short period.

16. Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 164. Governor Gilpin organized the troops from among the citizens of Colorado, and appointed John P. Slough, a lawyer and "War Democrat," as Colonel.

17. *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 2026. Bennett of Colorado, May 8, 1862.

though the additional men were welcomed, a controversy soon arose over command and strategy. Colonel J. P. Slough, leader of the Coloradoans, finding that Colonel G. R. Paul "... had completed the preliminary arrangements . . . by seniority of volunteer commission . . . claimed the command . . ."¹⁸

Colonel G. R. Paul, irked at being placed in a secondary position, angrily informed Washington of the action taken by Slough, and asked for the rank of Brigadier-General.¹⁹ At the same time he complained that Slough planned to leave Fort Union and meet Canby en route, although he (Slough) had been ordered to remain within the fort. Paul crossly added that "my object in this communication is to throw the responsibility of any disaster which may occur on the right shoulders."²⁰

Canby, a more cautious strategist, attempted to restrain the daring Slough by reminding him that the entire effort was intended to defeat "... the Confederates in such a way that an invasion of this Territory will never again be attempted."²¹ Canby, however, did decide to leave Fort Craig for Albuquerque, although he termed the action of Slough as "premature" and "... at variance with my instruction . . ."²² In rebuttal Slough, either intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreting his orders, declared that "... the instructions of Colonel Canby are not only to protect Fort Union, but to harass the enemy."²³ So with 1,300 soldiers, he started toward Apache Canyon where he had heard that the enemy had 1,000 troops prepared for battle.²⁴

Although the ensuing encounter was the turning point of the entire campaign, neither of the commanding generals participated. Canby was en route from Fort Craig, while Sibley was engaged in other pursuits. The barber who shaved Sibley on the critical morning of the 28th of February reported that the Southern leader was twenty miles

18. *O. R.*, I, 9:534. Slough to Wash. Hq., March 30, 1862.

19. *Ibid.*, I, 9:646. Paul to Wash. Hq., March 11, 1862.

20. *Ibid.*, I, 9:652. Paul to Wash. Hq., March 24, 1862.

21. *Ibid.*, I, 9:649. Canby to Slough, March 18, 1862.

22. *Ibid.*, I, 9:658. Canby to Wash. Hq., March 31, 1862.

23. *Ibid.*, I, 9:654. Slough to Paul, March 22, 1862.

24. *Ibid.*, I, 9:533. Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862.

away, and "... seems to have been supplied (perhaps for medicinal purposes!) with whiskey."²⁵

The engagement between the contending forces, Slough leading the Union, and Colonel W. R. Scurry in charge of the Texans, took place between Las Vegas and Santa Fe. The actual fighting occurred at La Glorieta, a pass at the southern end of the Sangre de Cristo range of mountains. This gap is a few miles long with narrow apertures at either end which widen out to about a fourth of a mile at the center.²⁶ The western part of the pass is known as Apache Canyon.²⁷ The beautiful growth of cottonwoods and pines which covered the mountains at this point gave the area its name, and later the entire pass was thus designated.²⁸

On March 26, the opening struggle began when a detachment under Major John M. Chivington entered Apache Canyon and met the Confederates, under Major Pyron, who were already established there. Although Chivington claimed a slight victory, only a few hundred troops were involved. The Texans retreated, but as night was falling, the Federals returned to Pigeon's ranch instead of pursuing the foe.²⁹ Bancroft deemed this engagement a Union victory,³⁰ which it was, although a small one.

The twenty-seventh saw no action, but on the twenty-eighth, the fighting was renewed. The region in which the fighting occurred made ordinary tactics difficult, and Slough, who now assumed command, termed "... the engagement of the bushwacking kind."³¹ The fighting lasted over five hours, and the Union leader considered it "... defensive from its beginning to its end ..." as the enemy was met unexpectedly.³² Colonel Scurry, however, regarded this as "... another victory ... added to the long list of Con-

25. Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 169. Noel, *op. cit.*, p. 62, said "The Commanding General of our forces was an old army officer, whose love for liquor exceeded that for home, country or God."

26. J. F. Santee, "The Battle of Glorieta Pass," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 6:66, January, 1931.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

28. Whitford, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

29. *O. R.*, I, 9:530. Chivington to Canby, March 26, 1862.

30. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 695.

31. *O. R.*, I, 9:533. Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862.

32. *Ibid.*, I, 9:535. Slough to Canby, March 30, 1862.

federate triumphs." The Texans claimed that the fleeing Union forces were followed until exhaustion demanded that the pursuit be terminated. The Texas leader found time for recrimination, when he accused the Federals of having fired upon a chaplain, who was caring for the wounded, and who had presumed he was immune from attack because of the white flag which he was carrying.³³

Regardless of the Confederate claims and charges, a successful coup by the Federals did much to bring about the Confederate retreat which followed. Colonel Chivington, who had been detached early in the morning, circled to the rear of the Texans, found their supply train, and burned the same. The Colonel found time to praise Collins, ". . . in some way connected with Indian affairs in this Territory, . . ." who acted as guide and interpreter, and who impressed Chivington with his good sense and bravery.³⁴

Apparently Major William H. Lewis of the Union Army was an important factor in this action, but never received the proper recognition. The *Rio Abajo Weekly Press* claimed that Lewis actually led the attack, and was forced to spend two hours in persuading Chivington to proceed.³⁵ Lewis was not promoted for this action although it had much to do with the eventual retreat of the Texans from New Mexico. This led Meline to observe sarcastically that this "served him right for not being on duty in some comfortable, quiet place."³⁶

Both sides claimed a major success. However, one Confederate soldier grandiloquently described the retreat from Glorieta as "every man for himself, nothing on the order of things. The retreat of Napoleon from Moscow would be about the only parallel in history."³⁷ Another less sanguine Confederate trooper felt that "if it had not been for those

33. *Ibid.*, I, 9:541-2. Scurry Report, March 30, 1862.

34. *Ibid.*, I, 9:539. Chivington Report, March 28, 1862. Collins was superintendent of Indian Affairs, Department of New Mexico.

35. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, March 8, 1864. Chivington, an ex-Methodist elder, was later condemned by a Joint Military Commission for the Indian Massacre at Sand Creek, Colorado, in 1864, *Santa Fe Gazette*, October 7, 1865.

36. James F. Meline, *Two Thousand Miles on Horseback* (New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 1873), p. 116.

37. Noel, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

devils from Pike's Peak, this country would have been ours" ³⁸ This testimony seemed to bear up the contention of Governor Gilpin of Colorado who insisted that his troops were the real victors, and started the Texans on the way out of New Mexico. ³⁹ Governor Connelly, however, complained that a more smashing victory could have been achieved if a more aggressive pursuit had been carried out. ⁴⁰ Later critics of the action at Glorieta emphasize the importance of the rear attack on the Confederate supply wagons as the primary cause for the retreat and eventual evacuation of New Mexico. Twitchell believed that the rear attack made it " . . . impossible for the Confederates to continue their offensive operations," ⁴¹ while Coan thought that it prevented any plan for attacking Fort Union. ⁴² Bancroft also felt that the Confederates retreated (even though they had an apparent victory) because of the operations of the men under Chivington. ⁴³

As the Texans hastened from the Territory in small groups, ⁴⁴ there were words of praise for some of the enemy. Mrs. Canby, the sister of General Sibley, was lauded by one of the Confederate troops for her aid to the wounded, and was declared " . . . a sympathiser [sic] with the south, . . ." The same soldier also called Canby himself " . . . one of the noblest men that ever served in any army." ⁴⁵ Another claimed that " . . . Mrs. Canby [Canby] captured more hearts of Confederate soldiers than the old general ever captured Confederate bodies." ⁴⁶

The Confederate retreat down the Rio Grande was not completed without some minor military action. Canby had come from Fort Craig (hastened by the action of Slough), and had met Paul and Slough thirty miles east of Albuquerque.

38. Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 380-1, note 303.

39. Hollister, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-7.

40. *O. R.*, I, 9:660. Connelly to Seward, April 6, 1862.

41. Twitchell, *op. cit.*, II, 385.

42. Coan, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

43. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, pp. 696-7.

44. *L. R.*, Micro No. 171. Collins to Dole, April 26, 1862.

45. Lansing B. Bloom, editor, "Confederate Reminiscences," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 5:315-24, July, 1930; H. C. Wright letter to T. L. Greer, September 7, 1927, p. 323.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 320. Harvey Halcomb to Greer, August 5, 1927.

que.⁴⁷ Canby demonstrated against Albuquerque as he said, to draw the Confederates away from Santa Fe,⁴⁸ but the townspeople suffered more than the Texans, so this maneuver was halted.⁴⁹

Sibley retreated south to Peralta, where the Union troops followed, and desultory firing by both sides was engaged in.⁵⁰ It was reported that the Texans became incensed at their leaders, and allegedly threatened to shoot Colonel Scurry, who had led them at Glorieta.⁵¹ During the night of April 13, 1862, the Confederates slipped away, and resumed their flight south. The Union troops pursued,⁵² but apparently without much enthusiasm. Colonel Roberts had desired to attack the Confederate position in the morning, but Canby had opposed this. He wished to drive them from the country without more killing on either side. Mills agreed that ". . . perhaps he was wise" in doing so.⁵³

Sibley, continuing south, decided to by-pass Fort Craig and thus avoid any further military action with which it would be difficult to cope. At the same time a different route would mystify the enemy.⁵⁴ The Confederates reached the river near Fort Thorn (near where Rincon now is) and from there on suffered many more hardships. Noel, who traveled the entire distance related that

. . . we walked and staggered along like the reeling, hungry, thirsty wretches that we were, with no head, nobody to direct or command, with the bloodthirsty Dog Canyon Apache Indian following in our wake and scalping the poor unfortunate boys whose blistered feet and enfeebled frame made it impossible for them to march farther.

En route to San Antonio the Indians who allegedly had been friendly to Sibley on his way west were now the reverse. Kit Carson was supposedly the instigator of their terroristic acts, which included the filling of the few available wells

47. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

48. *O. R.*, I, 9:550. Canby to Wash. Hq., April 11, 1862.

49. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 171. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 26, 1862.

50. *O. R.*, I, 9:510. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.

51. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 171. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 26, 1862.

52. *O. R.*, I, 9:551. Canby Report, April 23, 1862.

53. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

54. *O. R.*, I, 9:511. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.

with dead sheep.⁵⁵ In contrast to the account by Noel another Confederate soldier reported only a few deaths on this march south and noted that the pursuit was not close.⁵⁶

The Texans, although somewhat reduced in number, had managed to leave the territory. Canby was criticized for this. Bancroft mentioned that he was accused of not wishing to kill old associates (Sibley was his brother-in-law), of jealousy toward the volunteers (he complained continually about them), and even of cowardice.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the enemy had left, and many lives had been spared. The lack of food and supplies was an important deterrent to a more aggressive policy. Canby had complained on numerous occasions about the lack of sustenance available to him. The floods in the southern part of the territory slowed Union action.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, the Colorado troops, who had played such an important role, left for home because of this same lack of food.⁵⁹

Despite the Coloradoans leaving, the request for additional Federal troops was reduced from five regiments to two, as it was not thought possible to provide for more. Since the threat of another attack was believed unlikely,⁶⁰ Canby now set about reorganizing his military forces. Colonel B. S. Roberts was placed in command of the Central, Northern and Santa Fe Districts, and Colonels Paul and Chivington were each given columns to direct.⁶¹ Slough had resigned.⁶² The civil government also came to life again. Governor Connelly returned to Santa Fe and found that no one had taken his place. The *Gazette* noted that "the only memento they [the Texans] had left for our worthy Chief Magistrate was some of Sibley's proclamation's [sic] and empty champagne bottles."⁶³ Connelly did complain, how-

55. Noel, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-4.

56. Bloom, *op. cit.*, p. 323; Wright to Greer, September 7, 1927.

57. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 698.

58. *O. R.*, I, 9:676. Canby to Wash. Hq., June 21, 1862.

59. Hollister, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

60. *O. R.*, I, 9:669-70. Canby to Wash. Hq., June 21, 1862.

61. *Ibid.*, I, 9:664. General Order No. 30, April 16, 1862.

62. Santee, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 385, note 309, says that Slough resigned in disgust because he was not allowed to pursue the Confederates.

63. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 171. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 26, 1862.

ever, that the Texans had damaged his home south of Albuquerque (at Peralta) to the extent of thirty thousand dollars— “ . . . much of this through a pure vandalistic spirit.”⁶⁴

As the loyal forces in New Mexico were getting their house in order, General Sibley had a few parting shots ready for New Mexico. He believed that

. . . except for its political position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest. . . . The indispensable element, food, cannot be relied on.

He commented further on the difficulties of another attempt, saying “ . . . sir, I cannot speak encouragingly for the future, my troops having manifested a dogged, irreconcilable detestation of the country and the people.”⁶⁵

Accounts vary on the number of Texans who were able to return to the south. Mills believed that only 1,500 of the 4,000 ever got back to Texas,⁶⁶ while Roberts, a subordinate of Canby, said only 1,200 of the 3,000 returned and that the rest were facing complete annihilation.⁶⁷ A participant related that less than half who left San Antonio ever got back, “ . . . and the larger half of those who did lived a life of suffering because of their extreme hardships in this campaign.”⁶⁸

The campaign had been a difficult one for both sides. The Union forces, however, were to receive unexpected aid in the struggle. As early as July, 1861, troops were raised in California to protect the Overland Mail Route to the East,⁶⁹ but “treason stalked abroad” in the southern part of the state, and General James H. Carleton (then a Colonel of the 1st California Volunteer Infantry) was sent in that direction.⁷⁰ The Federal government also had prepared a

64. *O. R.*, I, 9:672. Connelly to Seward, May 17, 1862.

65. *Ibid.*, I, 9:511-12. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.

66. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

67. *O. R.*, I, 9:666. Roberts to Wash. Hq., April 23, 1862.

68. Noel, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

69. Ray Allan Billington, with the collaboration of James Blaine Hedges, *Westward Expansion* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. 635-6.

70. *O. R.*, I, 9:594. McNulty Report, October, 1863.

plan for an army to be raised on the coast.⁷¹ However, when Captain Hunter of the Confederate Army occupied Tucson with a few hundred men,⁷² the Commanding Officer of the Pacific instructed Carleton to go forward with the object of retaking “. . . all of our forts in Arizona and New Mexico, driving the rebel forces out of that country or capturing them”⁷³ The California column thus began its arduous march across the desert with the double purpose of preventing an invasion of the coast, and at the same time aiding the Federal Government. The difficulties encountered were “almost insurmountable.”⁷⁴

Early in May the California militia began its journey from Fort Yuma with over 2,000 troops,⁷⁵ but moved slowly because of the shortage of water.⁷⁶ The first important stop was Tucson, Arizona, which was occupied on May 20, 1862, “without firing a shot.”⁷⁷ In the face of superior numbers, the Confederates, who had boasted that “the entire population” was southern in sentiment,⁷⁸ retreated from this advanced outpost, while those private citizens who were sympathetic to the South departed for Mexico.⁷⁹

From Tucson Carleton sent word to Canby that he was enroute, but two of the three messengers were killed by Apaches, and the third was captured by the Confederates. Expressman John Jones, although captured, was able to get his message through. The knowledge that an additional enemy was so near hurried the Confederate preparations for departure from New Mexico. On July 4, a small advance force of California troops arrived near Fort Thorn and occupied it the next day. Confederate unpopularity now began to reach a head, and rumors were heard that the

71. Captain George H. Pettis, “The California Column,” *Historical Society of New Mexico, Publications*, No. 11 (Santa Fe, New Mexico: New Mexico Printing Company, 1908), p. 5.

72. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 690.

73. *O. R.*, I, 4:91. Wright to Carleton, January 31, 1862.

74. *Ibid.*, I, 9:595. McNulty Report, October, 1863.

75. Pettis, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

77. *O. R.*, I, 9:533. Carleton to Cal. Hq., May 25, 1862.

78. *Ibid.*, I, 9:707. Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862.

79. *Ibid.*, I, 9:533. Carleton to Cal. Hq., May 25, 1862.

native population was beginning to rise on all sides against the retreating Texans.⁸⁰

Governor Connelly received word that the southern retreat was due to their having

... consumed and destroyed everything even to the growing crops. The people here are with their eyes open toward the North, in the hope of being relieved from the devastations of these locusts. More than 1,000 men are waiting with open arms to receive the liberal Government of the North.⁸¹

The Confederate policy of living off the land was turning the natives from a feeling of indifference to one of actual hatred.

Colonel William Steele, who had been left in charge of Fort Fillmore by the Confederates, retired to Fort Bliss, July 8, 1862. In enumerating his reasons for leaving, the Colonel noted that he had only 400 troops to fight 1,500 Californians, besides those marching from Craig. Furthermore, outnumbered and with ammunition running low, the natives were not willing to accept Confederate paper money. When the Texans seized supplies, the people became aroused.⁸² In leaving New Mexico Steele informed the Union leaders that there was ill will between the Americans and the natives, and that he wanted the Americans who remained to be protected against possible reprisals.⁸³ When the Californians entered, they took advantage of this dissatisfaction and attempted to gain support by assuring the natives that "... the era of anarchy and misrule . . ." was at an end.⁸⁴

Canby ordered Carleton to remain within the Mesilla valley,⁸⁵ although the latter wished to pursue the Texans down the Rio Grande as he felt that "... it would be a sad disappointment to those from California if they should be obliged to retrace their steps without feeling the enemy." The Californian also suggested that now might be the time

80. *Ibid.*, I, 9:554. Carleton to Cal. Hq., July 22, 1862.

81. *Ibid.*, I, 50:1140-1 (part 1). Connelly to Canby, June 15, 1862.

82. *Ibid.*, I, 9:722. Steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862.

83. *Ibid.*, I, 9:687. Steele to C. O. U. S. Forces.

84. *Ibid.*, I, 9:602. General Order No. 15, August 15, 1862.

85. *Ibid.*, I, 9:683. Canby to Carleton, July 9, 1862.

to send troops into Texas where he had heard that the time was ripe for action.⁸⁶ Colonel E. E. Eyre, a subordinate of Carleton, complained that he had wished to proceed to Franklin (El Paso), but had been restrained by Chivington and Howe.⁸⁷ However, even though Carleton was not permitted to continue his aggressive policy, the appearance of additional troops had much to do with the flight of the Texans.⁸⁸

The success of this long journey was equally divided between the men and their commander. The troops were commended for their endurance and Carleton for the care taken of his charges. McNulty, the medical officer, believed that "to conduct this expedition successfully required a clear head, sound judgement, indomitable will, and perseverance. All these General Carleton possesses in an eminent degree."⁸⁹ A less charitable commentator felt that "the march was as good a one as could have been made under so inefficient a general."⁹⁰ There can be little doubt that the arrival was advantageous to the Union cause.

The aid which New Mexico and the Federal Government had received from both Colorado and California made it almost impossible for the Confederacy to achieve any lasting success. Texas alone was not able to furnish, or at least it did not furnish, enough troops or supplies. Confederate inability to gain much support from the native population was also a contributing cause to defeat.

IV Military Affairs After the Invasion

After the invasion attempt of the Texans had been repulsed, there were still many problems facing the military and civil authorities. Because the war was yet in progress in the East, and because the civil government had been superseded by the military in the Territory, the army continued to dominate the scene in New Mexico for several years. However, General Canby was not to be in charge

86. *Ibid.*, I, 9:559. Carleton to Canby, August 2, 1862.

87. *Ibid.*, I, 9:566. Carleton to Cal. Hq., September 20, 1862.

88. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, March 5, 1864.

89. *O. R.*, I, 9:602. McNulty Report, October, 1863.

90. Mowry, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

much longer, and on August 5, 1862, orders relieving him from duty in New Mexico were issued.¹ He had waged a successful campaign. His cautious policy had been criticized by more daring spirits, but a victory had been won with small loss. Too, his problem of defense had been more difficult than that of the Texans who were not responsible for the civilian population, and who could live from the land if they were able. Canby protected not only the private citizens, but was responsible for military supplies and personnel as well. The Texans were gone, and he could now recommend disposal of the available soldiery. He suggested that the New Mexico Volunteers be used in Indian fighting on the frontier.² The Indians had been unrestrained during the invasion, and the natives were recognized as excellent for that purpose.

General James H. Carleton now became the military representative of the Federal government,³ and was expected to protect the people of the Territory.⁴ With the Confederate departure, the most pressing remaining problem was that of subduing the Indians who had run wild during the hostilities with Texas. In handling this important matter Carleton was praised for his “. . . wisdom, energy, and indomitable perseverance . . .”⁵ The General, however, gave much credit to the citizens of New Mexico in aiding the army to rid the country of the war-like tribes.⁶

Although the policy of dealing firmly with the Indians and placing them on reservations was not original with General Carleton or even completely successful under his stewardship, a forceful beginning was made. The chance for a successful execution of policy possibly would have been greater except that three governmental agencies—the military, the Indian office, and, to a lesser extent, the territorial

1. *O. R.*, I, 9:688. S. O. No. 181 War Department, August 5, 1862.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 9:689. Canby to Wash. Hq., August 6, 1862.

3. *Ibid.*, I, 9:582. General Orders No. 84, September 18, 1862.

4. *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Sec'y. of War Stanton, Appendix, p. 29. December 2, 1862.

5. *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1866), p. 134. Graves to Cooley.

6. *O. R.*, I, 26:32 (part 1). General Order No. 3, February 24, 1864.

officials—concerned themselves with the problem.⁷ This division of authority created confusion and misunderstanding. Another deterrent to success was the limitation of money and supplies. Carleton thus through necessity proceeded slowly. The Mescalero Apaches in the southeastern part of the Territory were partially subdued and sent to Fort Sumner. In the spring of 1863 Carleton turned his attention toward the Navaho in the northwest.⁸

The problem of the Navaho was a much more difficult one. Carleton conceived the plan of placing all Navahos with the Mescaleros on a great reservation, the Bosque Redondo, at Fort Sumner.⁹ Many of the Navahos refused to leave their ancestral home and eventually Kit Carson, who was active and effective in the field, invaded their stronghold at Canyon de Chelly in January, 1864. During the next few years force and diplomacy were indulged in to persuade a greater number to go to Fort Sumner.¹⁰ However the entire group was never completely assembled.¹¹

The reservation policy forwarded at Fort Sumner by Carleton aroused a controversial storm. Michael Steck, who succeeded Collins in New Mexico as Indian Superintendent, although not opposed to the reservation idea, spearheaded the attack on the Bosque Redondo as a home for the Navaho.¹² Steck and his supporters also complained of the forceful tactics used by Carleton, claiming that greater success could have been achieved with less expense by a more peaceful policy.¹³ Steck gained the support of some citizens of New Mexico because they feared renewed Indian depredations and the loss of grazing lands. They also claimed that an additional barrier to the East was being erected.¹⁴

Although some of the charges against the Bosque reservation were not well founded, the reservation itself proved

7. Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 12:221, July, 1937.

8. *Ibid.*, 12:248.

9. *Ibid.*, 12:249.

10. *Ibid.*, 12:253.

11. *Ibid.*, 12:254.

12. *Ibid.*, 12:256.

13. Ralph H. Ogle, "Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 14:355, October, 1939.

14. Reeve, *op. cit.*, 12:258.

a failure for a variety of reasons. Carleton and Carson in concert did well in rounding up the inhabitants who were sent to the Bosque, but were not so successful in coping with less martial endeavors.¹⁵ The Steck-Carleton controversy did much to bring about the eventual abandonment of the Bosque Redondo. However, there were other causes as well. The site lacked an adequate wood supply, and a series of crop failures plagued the Indians in their efforts to adjust to the sedentary life of agriculturists. In addition the funds available for maintenance of the reservation were inadequate, and the hostile Comanches were troublesome as well.¹⁶ In evaluating the whole affair Bancroft praised Carleton for his policy of Indian removal and the vigor with which it was carried out, although he considered the location poor, and the reservation a failure as a means of civilizing the Indian.¹⁷ Twitchell, too, thought the Bosque Redondo a great failure as a means of civilizing the Indian, but deemed it a wise policy as a show of Federal power.¹⁸

Although control of the Indian was a matter of great concern, Carleton had other problems and duties of importance both to New Mexico and to the Federal government. The troops under Carleton not only opened new roads in New Mexico which were vitally needed and repaired others damaged by flood, but guarded wagon trains against Indian attacks as they crossed the barren wastes of the Territory.¹⁹ Some new forts were constructed during this period and old ones were repaired. The improvements made and the reconstruction work done by Carleton were held by the *Santa Fe Gazette* to be among his greatest achievements.²⁰

Although Carleton had internal problems to solve, he prepared for another invasion by Texans. This attack was never consummated, but the preparation was made with good reason. The Union leader found that ". . . rumors are rife, . . . that another demonstration is to be made against

15. Charles Amsden, "The Navaho Exile at Bosque Redondo," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 8:44, January, 1933.

16. Reeve, *op. cit.*, 13:24.

17. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 731.

18. Twitchell, *op. cit.*, II, 433-4.

19. *Santa Fe Gazette*, March 18, 1865.

20. *Ibid.*, December 24, 1864.

this country by a rebel force. . . ."²¹ He lamented that with such a wide area and so many entrances to defend a plan of action was necessary. The General planned to gather as much grain as possible, arrest possible enemies, and arouse the natives to the new danger and at the same time permit them to fight as guerrillas.²² This was in direct contrast to the method of Canby, who had attempted to use them in the same manner as trained troops were used. Carleton, in warning Kit Carson, emphasized the different tactics, which were more suited to the surroundings, when he wrote:

If a force of rebels come you know how to annoy it—how to stir up their camps and stock by night; how to lay waste the prairies by fire; how to make the country very warm for them and the road a difficult one. Do this, . . .²³

Possibly because Canby had feared an invasion either via the Canadian River or the Pecos, Carleton also kept a mounted company east of the latter.²⁴ On one occasion a group of native buffalo hunters was halted by this mounted group while going down the Pecos because it was feared that the 150 cattle which accompanied them might fall into the hands of the Texans.²⁵ A few months earlier some southern sympathizers were turned back from the Canadian.²⁶ There was, however, no report of incoming enemy troops, but Confederates were stationed not far from New Mexico.

Late in 1862 Colonel Baylor was placed in command of the northern and western Texas frontier,²⁷ although this was largely done to defend the country against Indian attack. The Colonel had his own ideas how the Indian problem should be met. He held that

. . . the general belief among the people is that the extermination of the grown Indians and making slaves of the children is the only remedy. This system has been practiced in New Mexico. There is not a family in that country but has Indian slaves derived from that source.²⁸

21. *O. R.*, I, 15:597. Carleton to Wash. Hq., November 16, 1862.

22. *Ibid.*, I, 15:599-600. Carleton to West, November 18, 1862.

23. *Ibid.*, I, 15:579. Carleton to Carson, October 12, 1862.

24. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 173. Collins to Dole, November 13, 1862.

25. *O. R.*, I, 15:153. Captain W. H. Backus Report, December 1, 1862.

26. *Ibid.*, I, 15:158. Lt. G. L. Shoup to Backus, December 1, 1862.

27. *Ibid.*, I, 15:858. S. O. No. 26, November 8, 1862.

28. *Ibid.*, I, 15:917. Baylor to Magruder, December 29, 1862.

The Confederate Secretary of War, displeased with the attitude of Baylor concerning Indian slavery, charged that he (Baylor) could not raise troops for his enterprises in his own Department.²⁹

Early in 1863 Carleton began to feel easier as he had heard of no new rumors, and believed that the only reason for an invasion (possibly sharing the opinion of Sibley as to the value of New Mexico) lay in "... the right of way to the Pacific, to which great importance is said to be attached by the Southern Confederacy . . .," or the acquisition of Sonora or Chihuahua.³⁰ Although the *Rio Abajo Weekly Press* had heard of an invasion by "Los Tejanos," the paper was confident that Carleton would handle the situation, especially since he knew how the natives could best fight,³¹ and further that they would be allowed to do so.³² The invasion threat was not an unmixed blessing, as it had the effect of keeping troops in the southern part of the Territory, where they were used to good advantage against the Indians.³³

There was, however, some pressure for an invasion of Texas from New Mexico. Canby had felt that such a move was not practicable because of his lack of confidence in native troops.³⁴ General Halleck, who was not aware of actual conditions, later wanted such an effort,³⁵ but Carleton was dubious because of lack of funds, and felt that "... if I can block the road from Paso del Norte, it will be as much as can prudently be done, . . ." ³⁶ Although differing in reason from Canby, Carleton now was no more anxious than the former for such an effort. Experience in New Mexico had brought about a change of viewpoint.

Again in 1865 the matter of a Texas invasion arose. An entry into southern Arizona from Mexico by a group of

29. *Ibid.*, I, 15:857. G. W. Randolph to Magruder, November 7, 1862.

30. *Ibid.*, I, 15:669. Carleton to Wash. Hq., February 1, 1863.

31. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, April 28, 1863.

32. *Ibid.*, May 26, 1863.

33. Pettis, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

34. *O. R.*, I, 9:574. Canby to Carleton, August 11, 1862.

35. *Ibid.*, I, 34:256 (part 2). Halleck to Carleton, February 6, 1864.

36. *Ibid.*, I, 34:673 (part 2). Carleton to Halleck, March 20, 1864.

southern sympathizers,³⁷ and a raid into New Mexico itself by “. . . a band of lawless desperadoes . . .,” was expected.³⁸ Nothing resulted from these threats. However, both Governor Luis Terrazas of Chihuahua³⁹ and Governor Evans of Colorado had proffered aid previously,⁴⁰ and possibly could be relied upon.

Carleton and the army had some difficulties of an internal nature as well. Southern New Mexico, the seat of earlier disaffection, continued as a center of irritation. Sylvester Mowry, the alleged Confederate sympathizer, was declared an enemy of the Union by a board of officers⁴¹ who probably acted more harshly because of the heat of recent conflict. Mowry, who held mining property in southern Arizona, was stripped of this under the Confiscation Act,⁴² and in June, 1862, was placed in prison.⁴³ He immediately raised a great outcry, and accused the General of profiting financially in the matter.⁴⁴ The *New Mexican* recalled that United States Marshal Cutler was later able to buy this property for \$4,000.⁴⁵ The matter was not of tremendous importance, except to Mowry, but it was a step toward weakening the position of Carleton, and indirectly placed the military in an unfavorable light.

In addition to the Mowry incident, the people in southern New Mexico were a source of annoyance and concern to Carleton. The General had retained the system of martial law which Canby had begun, and the citizens through their Grand Jury complained bitterly.⁴⁶ Carleton was not entirely pleased with the arrangement, as he felt that military officers were carrying a burden which belonged to civil authority.⁴⁷ When General Halleck received information of military interference in strictly civil affairs, he ordered that it be

37. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 8, 1865.

38. *Ibid.*, May 13, 1865.

39. *O. R.*, I, 15:701. Terrazas to Carleton, April 11, 1863.

40. *Ibid.*, I, 15:666. Carleton to Evans, January 28, 1863.

41. *Ibid.*, I, 9:693. S. O. No. 17, June 16, 1862.

42. Mowry, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

45. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, July 29, 1864.

46. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1864.

47. *O. R.*, I, 15:665. Carleton to Army, January 27, 1863.

discontinued, if true.⁴⁸ The *Gazette*, however, loyal to Carleton, denied that any military interference with civil authority had ever existed.⁴⁹ The southern part of the Territory was doubtless sensitive about past events and resented close surveillance by the military, although the general populace must have appreciated protection from the marauding Indians.

The military department was faced also with another matter, that of peonage and Indian slavery. The distinction between peonage and slavery was not easily determined, although the condition of peonage was brought about through debt, while slavery resulted from the capture of Indians who were forced to labor involuntarily.

The practice of peonage was recognized by law in New Mexico,⁵⁰ and there were actual Indian slaves in the Territory.⁵¹ Except for an occasional servant of an army officer, negro slavery was never a problem. Carson, who was familiar with Indian slavery, suggested that it be continued as a means of taking care of the people, and also of breaking up the tribes.⁵² Carleton strongly rejected the idea.⁵³ Eventually President Johnson learned of the practice and recommended its suppression.⁵⁴ Peonage was a more complicated matter, and had been accepted in New Mexico,⁵⁵ but was abolished by law in 1867.⁵⁶ The actual cessation was not such an easy matter, and there were slaves for many years after.

The relative merit and aid given by the troops who came from outside the Territory caused a minor tempest at the time which was touched off by a Joint Resolution passed by the New Mexico Legislature, shortly after the Texans

48. *Ibid.*, I, 34:245 (part 2). Halleck to Carleton, February 4, 1864.

49. *Santa Fe Gazette*, May 27, 1865.

50. *L. R.*, Micro No. 182. Executive Message of Acting Governor William F. M. Arny to the Legislative Assembly of the Territory, December 2, 1862.

51. *Ibid.*, Micro. No. 155. Arny to Dole, January 6, 1862.

52. *O. R.*, I, 26:234 (part 1). Carson to Carleton, July 24, 1863.

53. *Ibid.*, I, 26:235 (part 1). Carleton to Carson, August 18, 1863.

54. James D. Richardson, editor, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897* (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Literature and Arts, 1908), 6:342.

55. *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866*, p. 137.

56. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 325.

were driven from the area. Both California and Colorado were tendered thanks " . . . for their timely aid and assistance in driving the traitors and rebels from our soil." In addition, the Californians were praised for their march, and " . . . the utmost confidence . . ." was expressed in Carleton himself.⁵⁷ Carleton, too, issued an order at the time praising the troops who participated in the crossing.⁵⁸ The New Mexico legislators doubtless were attempting to ingratiate themselves into the good graces of Carleton without intending to belittle the role of the Pike's Peakers. One paper stated that Governor John Evans of Colorado was the only complainant regarding the Resolution, and that he was difficult to please anyway.⁵⁹ In answer to the complaint the Legislature attempted to atone handsomely with another Resolution, which fell short of the mark, when it stated

That it was not, nor has it been the intention of the Territory of New Mexico, to do the least injustice to the bravery and sacrifice of our neighbor Territory of Colorado, nor to place their brave and patriotic soldiers second to none in the defense of this Territory.⁶⁰

The troops at the disposal of Carleton were never large in number, considering the area to be protected. After the Texans had dispersed, there were 4,680 men available.⁶¹ During the year 1863 the number was decreased by approximately 1,000;⁶² by 1864, it had leveled off at 3,454,⁶³ and was slightly less the next year.⁶⁴ There was a further temporary reduction at the end of the war due to the mustering out of the California troops and the discontinuance of new enlistments.⁶⁵ As the discharge of the Californians took place, the

57. *Laws of the Territory of New Mexico. Passed by the Legislative Assembly, Session of 1862-1863.* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Charles Leib, Publisher of *The New Mexican*, Public Printer, 1863), p. 106.

58. *O. R.*, I, 15:576. General Order No. 85, September 21, 1862.

59. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, April 12, 1864.

60. *Laws of the Territory of New Mexico. Passed by the Legislative Assembly, Session of 1863-1864.* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Hezekiah S. Johnson, Printer "Rio Abajo Press," 1864), pp. 128-30. Joint Resolution, February 8, 1864.

61. *O. R.*, I, 9:696. Carleton Report, September 20, 1862.

62. *Ibid.*, III, 3:1198. Abstract, December 31, 1863.

63. *Congressional Globe*, 39th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix p. 7. Sec'y of War Stanton, November 22, 1865.

64. *O. R.*, I, 48:703 (part 1). Abstract, January, 1865.

65. Ogle, *op. cit.*, 15:12. January, 1940.

men who had served Carleton so well raised an outcry which was heard in Washington. Even the Governor of California supported them.⁶⁶

This troop protest reached its climax when the Secretary of War was asked to explain the matter to the House of Representatives.⁶⁷ Some of the Californians were chagrined over the amounts of travel pay received and over their discharge in New Mexico rather than in California. Carleton in rebuttal believed that many wished to remain in New Mexico (as they actually did) and also that the Territory could use such capable citizens. He advised Washington that

Political reasons connected with the filling up of the rich mineral lands by a hardy population of experienced miners, and by trained soldiers, who at any time can be called upon to defend the country, whether against savages within or rebels without its borders, should and doubtless will, have great weight with the government. Such timely forecast will give an impetus to Arizona and New Mexico which will be felt not only by these Territories but by the United States at large. For it is to such men the country must look for the speedy development of the precious metals, now so greatly needed.⁶⁸

Editorial opinion in New Mexico was divided over the affair. The *Gazette* dismissed the matter as the disappointment caused by inaction. It stated that Carleton had treated the volunteers better than would have been the case if another officer had been in charge.⁶⁹ The *New Mexican*, which was opposed to Carleton, reported that the troops were displeased with guarding peaceful citizens instead of fighting Indians.⁷⁰

Conceding that there was some dissatisfaction, Carleton had acted in a manner which reflected great concern for both the national and territorial welfare in attempting to fill a potentially valuable area with the proper type of citizenry.

66. *House Executive Document*, No. 138. 39th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1866), p. 2. Low to Carleton, May 22, 1865.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 1. July 26, 1866.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

69. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 15, 1865.

70. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, January 6, 1865.

Along with the settlement of individual troop problems, the matter of peace time military reorganization presented itself. New Mexico was dependent upon expenditures of the military establishment to a great extent, and naturally was interested in any alteration of the Military District of New Mexico. At the beginning of the conflict, New Mexico had been attached to the Missouri Department; later it was transferred to California and then returned to Missouri at the termination of the war.⁷¹ There was some agitation to make New Mexico a separate department, but that was unsuccessful.⁷² If New Mexico could have achieved this status the population would have benefited financially as more funds would have been spent locally, and the military would have received equipment and supplies more expeditiously.

With the end of the war, the critics of Carleton became more vocal. Much of the criticism stemmed from the policy of Carleton in establishing the Bosque Redondo as a reservation for the Navaho. The climax was reached when the Territorial Legislature went so far as to present a memorial to the Secretary of War, which condemned Carleton and demanded a Court of Inquiry as to his stewardship.⁷³ Finally, on September 19, 1866, the General was removed. A short time previously the *Santa Fe New Mexican* had complained that although Carleton had had more troops than at any previous time, he had done nothing but reward favorites.⁷⁴

Carleton had performed good service for the United States Government and for the Territory of New Mexico. His attempt to solve the Indian problem and especially his establishment of Bosque Redondo did not meet with universal approval, but it was at least an honest, forceful attempt. His defensive plans for the Territory were carefully made and well thought out, even though no further invasions were attempted by the Texans. While it is difficult to compare Canby and Carleton as each had a different problem, Carleton seemed to get greater cooperation from the natives

71. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, November 4, 1865.

72. *Ibid.*, December 9, 1865.

73. *Ibid.*, December 30, 1865.

74. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 198. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, October 27, 1866.

than did Canby. The willingness of Carleton to utilize the New Mexicans in a military way in which they were accustomed made for better understanding between the groups. Carleton was the more aggressive military commander. The *Gazette*, although an admitted partisan, deemed Carleton "... a gentleman officer who is more highly esteemed and appreciated for his genuine worth than any commanding officer we have ever had, . . ." ⁷⁵

V Politics and Loyalty to the Union

At the outbreak of the war, the Territory was placed in a difficult position because of the questioned loyalty of part of its military and civil leadership. Although Twitchell found that the principal army officers were not loyal to the Union,¹ the situation was clarified when actual conflict began. Those favoring the Southern cause resigned their commissions and joined the Confederacy. It was more difficult, however, to determine loyalties among those who held civilian positions. Ganaway has found in his study of New Mexico politics prior to the War, that the loyalty of some was questionable, largely because many Southerners had received appointments to public office in the Territory.²

When hostilities began, Abraham Rencher, a former Congressman from North Carolina, was Territorial Governor.³ Samuel Ellison, a close associate, considered Rencher "... conservative, honest, and intellectual. Was highly esteemed by the people of the territory."⁴ The Governor deemed himself a loyal Democrat, who would put his duty to his country above that to his party,⁵ while the *Gazette* felt that "he has our interest as much at heart as if he had been chosen by the free suffrages of the people."⁶ The Terri-

75. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 8, 1865.

1. Ralph E. Twitchell, "The Palace of the Governors," *Historical Society of New Mexico, Publications*, No. 29 (N. P., 1924), p. 27.

2. Ganaway, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

3. W. G. Ritch, compiler, *The Legislative Blue-Book of the Territory of New Mexico with the Rules of Order, Fundamental Law, Official Register and Record, Historical Data, Compendium of Facts, etc.* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Charles W. Greene, Public Printer, 1882), p. 118.

4. J. Manuel Espinosa, "Memoir of a Kentuckian in New Mexico, 1848-1884," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 13:9, January, 1937.

5. L. R., Micro. No. 133. Rencher to Collins, April 23, 1859.

6. *Ibid.*, Micro. No. 144. *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette*, May 22, 1860.

torial Secretary at the same time was the Irish-born A. M. Jackson, whose boyhood was spent in Mississippi.⁷

When President Lincoln assumed office in 1861, changes were made in high civil offices in the Territory. Henry Connelly was placed in the gubernatorial chair for the duration.⁸ The new Governor, although born in Virginia, had lived in New Mexico since 1828.⁹ He had married into a prominent native family—the daughter of Don Pedro Perea of Bernalillo and the widow of Don Mariano Chaves.¹⁰ The appointment by the President was a happy one according to Twitchell who considered Connelly to be “. . . an intensely loyal man. . . .”¹¹ Bancroft, however, said that Connelly “. . . was a weak man, of good intentions, who, notwithstanding his loyal sentiments, made no very brilliant record as a ‘war’ governor.”¹² Ellison also was somewhat critical, terming him as “. . . of a visionary, romantic, poetic turn, . . . [although] . . . tolerated because he was appointed from the territory. Still he was a good man.”¹³

At the same time that Connelly was appointed, Miguel A. Otero was given the post of Secretary. He replaced Jackson, who had gone over to the Confederates, but served only a few months because the Senate refused confirmation.¹⁴ Otero had been a strong advocate of the slavery code in New Mexico, and was called “disloyal to the core” by Twitchell.¹⁵ His son, Miguel A., Jr., governor of New Mexico from 1897 to 1906, has softened the charge, declaring that the sympathies of his father were with the South, although he never favored secession.¹⁶ Mrs. Otero, who had a strong influence

7. Ganaway, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

8. Ritch, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

9. Ganaway, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

10. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, November 21, 1863.

11. Twitchell, *Old Santa Fe*, p. 368.

12. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 705.

13. Espinosa, *op. cit.*, 13:9. January, 1937.

14. Miguel Antonio Otero, *My Life on the Frontier, 1864-1882* (New York: The Press of the Pioneers, Inc., 1935), p. 233. According to Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 391-2, the appointments of both Connelly and Otero were made entirely on the recommendation of John S. Watts, a native of Indiana, and the Territorial Delegate from New Mexico, “. . . in whose integrity and loyalty President Lincoln had great confidence.”

15. Twitchell, *Old Santa Fe*, p. 368.

16. Otero, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

upon her husband, ". . . came from one of the most prominent Southern families, and had grown to womanhood in Charleston, S. C."¹⁷ To replace Otero, James H. Holmes of Vermont received the position, but the next year W. F. M. Army succeeded to the post and retained it until hostilities ended.¹⁸

While the Texans were within the Territory, the civil government did not function successfully. As long as the invaders occupied Santa Fe, Connelly remained in Las Vegas. When the Confederates "had been whipped out" Connelly again took charge of his office.¹⁹ However, during the war the civil officers coöperated with the Commanding General in every way.²⁰

As the conflict was about to get under way, Baylor believed that "all" of the prominent Americans with the exception of Connelly were for the South.²¹ With many of the higher army officers and most of the government officials going over to the Confederate side, what was the position of the rank and file of the citizenry? One citizen, who had investigated the southern part of the Territory, believed that the only disaffection existed among the "Americans," who were mostly Texans.²² Canby judged the natives to be loyal, but deplored their apathy.²³ An editorial in the *Santa Fe Gazette* stated emphatically at the outset that New Mexico

. . . desires to be let alone. No interference from one side or the other of the sections that are now waging war. She neither wants abolitionists or secessionists from abroad to mix in her affairs at present; nor will she tolerate either. In her own good time she will say her say, and choose for herself the position she wishes to occupy. . . .²⁴

Baylor, who had sent such a glowing report of "American" sympathy, soon learned that the natives were ". . . decidedly Northern in sentiment, . . ." ²⁵ A Union investigator

17. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

18. Ritch, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

19. Espinosa, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

20. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 392.

21. *O. R.*, I, 4:109. Baylor to Texas Hq., September 24, 1861.

22. *L. R., Micro.* No. 160. Collins to Dole, June 22, 1861.

23. *O. R.*, I, 4:65. Canby to Missouri Hq., August 16, 1861.

24. Ganaway, *op. cit.*, p. 91, quoting the *Santa Fe Gazette*, July 13, 1861.

25. *O. R.*, I, 4:133. Baylor to Sibley, October 25, 1861.

confirmed the opinion of Sibley when he wrote that "the Mexican population is with the Government," although he admitted that the natives required "encouragement" to be effective.²⁶ Very many, however, waited until the Texans were on the run before showing any great sentiment either way. It was not until the Confederates were at last repulsed that the *Santa Fe New Mexican* trumpeted that

New Mexico is under loyal control. . . . The people with some few exceptions, are loyal in their feelings and wishes. New Mexico has no other destiny, aside from the north.²⁷

Aside from the expediency of backing the winning side, there were several factors in this apparently gradual shift from indifference to espousal of the Northern cause. The expulsion of the Texans had its effect, but there were deeper roots. Governor Connelly helped by canvassing northern New Mexico with speech and letter. He reminded the natives of the past claims of Texas, and of her ruthlessness. He attempted to stir up hatred for Texas, rather than emphasizing loyalty to the Union. He also recalled to memory that the Texans had been defeated in the past.²⁸ Fear of Indian depredation aided the Union,²⁹ especially as the war gave the redfolk greater opportunity to create havoc. The economic motive was possibly the greatest of all. Union currency, which had been spent in the past and also during the conflict, filtered into many pockets. On the other hand, the Texans, either because they were unable, or because they refused, did not pay as readily as the Union did. The natives were suspicious of the Confederate paper. Brevoort, who called the war "a great blessing to the natives," opined that

Naturally the people were inclined to favor the party that treated them fairly and seemed willing to protect them. That was the secret of their devotion to the northern side.³⁰

26. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 161. Steck to Collins, July 15, 1861.

27. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, November 21, 1863.

28. Ganaway, *op. cit.*, p. 96. Citing Watts to Lincoln, (N. D.: Washington, N. A.) Justice Dept. Records, Atty. Gen. Mss.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

30. Maurice G. Fulton and Paul Horgan, editors, *New Mexico's Own Chronicle* (Dallas, Texas: Banks Upshaw and Company, 1937), pp. 201-2. Extract from Elias Brevoort, "A Common Soldier's Impressions."

This matter of fair financial dealing and kind treatment rewarded the Union with tangible fruits. Although Canby complained of slow volunteer enlistments,³¹ Connelly was ". . . proud to say that my loyal and patriotic fellow-citizens of New Mexico have manfully responded to their country's call; . . ." ³² He placed the number in the field at 3,500,³³ although Twitchell said that Connelly and Canby between them achieved the seemingly impossible and signed up between 5,000 and 6,000.³⁴

The greatest sympathy that existed for the Confederacy was confined pretty largely to the south of the Jornada del Muerto. This region felt neglected by the government in Santa Fe,³⁵ and there was some sentiment for separation. As early as 1854, a representative from Doña Ana County had unsuccessfully requested division to the New Mexico legislature.³⁶ Sylvester Mowry, who later was to come in conflict with Carleton, was one of the leaders in this move. His mining interests in Arizona, which were not fully protected by the government, no doubt prompted this action, although he was lauded as a lover of that region.³⁷ Mowry wished to include within his proposed territory the settlements along the Rio Grande which lay south of the Jornada. as this area contained two-thirds of the population of Arizona, which he placed at 10,000. He believed that

The only effect of the present connection of Arizona with New Mexico is to crush out the voice and sentiment of the American people in the Territory; and years of emigration under present auspices would not serve to counterbalance or equal the influence of the 60,000 Mexican residents of New Mexico.

31. O. R., I, 4:61. Canby to Wash. Hq., July 29, 1861.

32. *Journal of the Council of the Legislative Assembly of New Mexico, of a Session Begun and Held in the City of Santa Fe, Territory of New Mexico, on Monday, the Second Day of December, A. D., 1861, It Being the Eleventh Legislative Assembly for Said Territory* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Putnam O'Brien, Printer, 1862), p. 20.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

34. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 374.

35. F. S. Donnell, "The Confederate Territory of Arizona, As Compiled from Official Sources," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 17:148, April, 1942.

36. Patrick Hamilton, compiler, *The Resources of Arizona*, (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co., Printers, 1883), p. 13.

37. Browne, *op. cit.*, 30:282. February, 1865.

New Mexico has never encouraged American population. She is thoroughly Mexican in sentiment, and desires to remain so.³⁸

The feeling in southern New Mexico reached a head in March, 1861, when a convention held at Mesilla resolved "... not to recognize the present Black Republican Administration. . . ." ³⁹ This was strong talk, and was backed up by threats to tar and feather a representative of the Indian Service. Labadi, the agent thus threatened, was permitted to leave unharmed because he was "a Mexican." ⁴⁰

This Confederate sentiment was not entirely unanimous however. There were requests to the governor from Mesilla for troops,⁴¹ and a Federal agent believed that

There is . . . a latent Union sentiment here, especially among the Mexicans, but they are effectually overawed. Give them something to rally to, and let them know that they have a Government worthy of their support, and they will teach their would-be masters a lesson.⁴²

In the northern part of the Territory, where seventy per cent of the population and resources were located,⁴³ Confederate sentiment was the exception rather than the rule. There were some efforts to escape service in the militia,⁴⁴ but the people in most instances coöperated with the military authorities.⁴⁵ The Armijo brothers of Albuquerque were important Confederate sympathizers. Sibley was so grateful for their support, both moral and financial, that he recommended that they not be forgotten in the final reckoning.⁴⁶

When the Texans were finally expelled from the Territory, resumption of the elective processes was in order.

38. Mowry, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

39. *L. R.*, Micro. No. 160. Resolution of Convention Held at Mesilla, March 16, 1861.

40. *Ibid.*, Micro. No. 160. Labadi to Collins, June 16, 1861.

41. *O. R.*, I, 1:605. N. M. Hq. to Paul, May 19, 1861.

42. *Ibid.*, I, 4:56. Mills to Watts, June 23, 1861.

43. *Ibid.*, I, 4:46. N. M. Hq. to Lynde, June 23, 1861.

44. *Ibid.*, I, 4:71. Chapin to Russell, September 27, 1861.

45. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, May 7, 1864.

46. *O. R.*, I, 9:511. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.

During the time of trial, politics were kept quiet, but in 1863 it was possible to hold the election for the important post of territorial delegate to the United States House of Representatives. Joab Houghton, ". . . a gentleman in every sense of the word . . .," was suggested as a likely candidate,⁴⁷ but he later withdrew to aid in the defeat of Jose Gallegos, ". . . the disgraced priest . . .,"⁴⁸ who had entered the lists. In opposition to Gallegos, who had a strong native following, Colonel Francisco Perea was entered by his friends.⁴⁹

The question of the fitness of Gallegos for the post was an important factor in the campaign which ensued, although the question of statehood was an issue too. The politicians opposed to statehood were accused of resisting the idea because of the possibility of losing their government posts. Attempts were also made to raise the bogey of increased taxation, and Federal troop withdrawals, if statehood were achieved.⁵⁰

In the meantime Arizona was detached from New Mexico by Act of Congress, and made into a separate territory.⁵¹ There was also some sentiment in Doña Ana County for separation from New Mexico. According to Arny there was a plan afoot to merge Franklin County, Texas, and Doña Ana County into a new territory to be called Montezuma,⁵² but this proposition was never consummated.

The Gallegos-Perea contest terminated in the quiet and comparatively honest election of September 7, 1863.⁵³ The two-to-one victory of Perea was determined by heavy majorities in Bernalillo, Valencia, and Socorro Counties, and

47. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, March 17, 1863.

48. *Ibid.*, June 30, 1863. The issue of June 16, 1863, relates that Father Gallegos came in conflict with Bishop Lamy, and was forced to leave the church in 1852. Twitchell in his *Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, p. 334, mentions that Gallegos then turned to politics, and was elected delegate from the territory in 1853.

49. W. H. H. Allison, "Colonel Francisco Perea," *Old Santa Fe: A Magazine of History, Archaeology, Genealogy, and Biography* (1:210-23, October, 1913), p. 219.

50. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, March 10, 1863.

51. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 409. The Act separating Arizona was passed February 24, 1863. Twitchell says that New Mexico had favored this since 1858.

52. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, April 21, 1863.

53. *Ibid.*, September 8, 1863.

was credited more to anti-Gallegos feeling than to any other factor.⁵⁴

The election of 1865 between Perea and J. Francisco Chaves for the position of congressional delegate was, for several reasons, a more bitter struggle than that of the previous campaign. The issues were more distinct, and the personal angle was altered. The most controversial issue arose from the placing of the Navaho at Bosque Redondo.⁵⁵ Those who opposed the reservation policy favored Chaves,⁵⁶ and those who defended the plan of Carleton supported Perea. Corruption allegedly entered the New Mexico Legislature for the first time over this matter, with bribery being used to support the policy of Carleton in order to make it more palatable.⁵⁷

A less controversial issue was the re-acquisition of Los Conejos, that section of New Mexico which had been granted by Congress to Colorado in 1861. The complaint was raised that the only reason for the change ". . . was to give evenness (sic) and symmetry to the southern boundary of Colorado." Further arguments in favor of reversion included the fact that the people were more closely aligned racially and linguistically with New Mexico.⁵⁸ Perea had introduced a bill to return the section to New Mexico, but Colorado refused to give it up.⁵⁹ The supporters of Chaves presumably thought that he would exert greater efforts for the return of the disputed area.

Carleton himself was an issue in the race. He was disliked by many in New Mexico,⁶⁰ and the long occupancy and control of the territory by the army probably wearied the citizens as well.

The campaign was a long and bitter one. Kirby Benedict, who had long held public office in New Mexico, was accused of wishing the position for himself,⁶¹ although he

54. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1863.

55. *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866*, p. 131.

56. *Santa Fe Gazette*, June 10, 1865.

57. Espinosa, *op. cit.*, 13:9, January, 1937.

58. *Santa Fe Gazette*, February 18, 1865.

59. *Santa Fe Gazette*, July 23, 1864.

60. *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866*, p. 131

61. *Santa Fe Gazette*, December 24, 1864.

supported Chaves for the post.⁶² When President Johnson removed Benedict from office, the Gazette had an opportunity to castigate its opponent (Benedict) when it chided that

He has gone up the spout, and if he is possessed of the 'fine legal attainments, and the thorough knowledge of the Spanish language and laws,' which he proclaims for himself, he will soon be in a condition to put them into re-quision, as well as his 'extended popularity' with the people. But if his success as a practitioner should be no more 'ample and brilliant' than has been his official and editorial career it will not be much to brag on.⁶³

Benedict continued his leadership of the anti-Carleton party, however.

Perea, who conducted a gentlemanly campaign, came out for the reservation policy of Carleton, and at the same time deplored the injection of the race issue into the election. He spoke highly of his opponent, as "friend and relative."⁶⁴

Both parties filled their platforms with platitudes, but at the same time took a firm stand on the principles upon which they stood. The Union Convention which had nominated Perea supported the reservation policy, praised Carleton and promised him support, thanked the troops, recognized the supremacy of the civil government, condemned the assassination of Lincoln, and denounced the raising of the race issue.⁶⁵ The "administration" party, which had chosen Chaves, opposed Carleton and his policies, plumped for internal improvements, and felt that

. . . the native citizens of this territory are entitled to the same rights, privileges and liberties as any other citizens from other parts in the United States who may establish themselves among us.⁶⁶

The day after the election, Chaves was proclaimed the winner by unofficial totals.⁶⁷ A short time later this count

62. *Ibid.*, August 5, 1865.

63. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1865. The *Gazette*, November 26, 1864, mentions that Benedict was editor of its rival, the *New Mexican*, for almost a year.

64. *Ibid.*, July 8, 1865.

65. *Ibid.*, June 21, 1865.

66. *Ibid.*, April 29, 1865.

67. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, September 8, 1865. Twitchell, in his *Leading Facts*

was made official, and Chaves was declared the victor with a majority of over 2,000 out of a total vote of over 14,000. Perea had been able to carry only Rio Arriba and Mora Counties.⁶⁸

Thus, with the end of the war, New Mexico returned to the practice of selecting her delegates to the U. S. Congress. Carleton and his policies were repudiated, and the native voters entered politics to a greater extent than had been the case previously. These early territorial elections set the pattern for later heated contests which were to become common.

VI Economic Conditions

Economically the Territory of New Mexico was not prosperous, but efforts were being made by her leaders to improve the situation. The strongest factor in economic retardation was the presence of the warlike Indian, but there were others as well. Lack of adequate communication with, and transportation to, the East kept the Territory in financial bondage. A short water supply and a sparse population were other important factors. The leaders of the area were aware of these difficulties, and were trying to alter or alleviate them, which boded well for the future.

To the above conditions, the war added another problem. The citizens of New Mexico had been hard hit financially. It was claimed that the war had caused an estimated loss of at least two or three million dollars.¹ To aid in making up this loss, various suggestions were presented. While the war was in progress, John S. Watts, the Territorial Delegate, proposed to Congress that large amounts of unsold Texas land should be confiscated and turned over to New Mexico. He pointed out that this would be just, as Texas had invaded New Mexico.² Another idea presented to Congress favored the confiscation of the property belonging to disloyal citizens. This confiscated property then might

of New Mexican History, II, 400, recalls that Colonel Chaves fought at Valverde and in numerous Indian campaigns. In the election of 1867 Chaves was seated after a contested election. He was re-elected in 1869, but defeated by J. M. Gallegos in 1871.

68. *Santa Fe Gazette*, September 30, 1865.

1. *Congressional Globe*, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4307. J. F. Chaves.

2. *Ibid.*, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, July 9, 1862, p. 3154.

be turned over to those who had remained loyal.³ Later, another plan was formulated. This called for Congress to make direct appropriations, and thus pay for the damage and loss due to "the Texas invasion."⁴ According to Bancroft, the claims of New Mexico citizens were never paid.⁵ Twitchell felt that the territorial delegates from New Mexico did not accomplish much for their constituents in this or other matters during this period.⁶

Although the Indians were a source of danger and loss, (Carson allegedly said that New Mexico would be impoverished as long as the Indian remained)⁷ their presence was of some assistance to the territory. Twitchell opined that much of the prosperity of Santa Fe depended on army spending,⁸ while Marcy held that not many would stay were it not for the army and the Indian contracts.⁹ J. K. Graves, special Indian Agent for New Mexico, said, "Let the government withhold the purchase of military supplies, . . . and New Mexico would instantly assume an attitude of mourning and sorrow, . . ." ¹⁰

But there was a bright side to the financial picture. If the citizenry had suffered a severe loss, and the Territory was not rich, its delegate could boast that the Territory did not owe a dollar anywhere.¹¹ This condition continued, and almost two years later her government still spoke of the ". . . truly prosperous conditions of its [New Mexico's] Finances."¹² Bancroft states that the Territory was never in difficult financial straits.¹³

Territorial leaders recognized that access to the outer world was a crying need. It was necessary to use troops to

3. *Ibid.*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, June 11, 1864, p. 149. Perea.

4. *Ibid.*, 39th Congress, 2nd Session, February 7, 1867, p. 1073.

5. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 719.

6. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History*, II, 399.

7. Meline, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

8. Twitchell, *Old Santa Fe*, p. 324.

9. Randolph B. Marcy, *Border Reminiscences* (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1872), p. 378.

10. *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866*, p. 134.

11. *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, February 27, 1863, p. 1349. Watts.

12. *Santa Fe Gazette*, December 10, 1864.

13. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 717.

guard and open new wagon roads.¹⁴ While the lack of roads retarded progress, the need for telegraph and railroad service to the East was of greater moment. Possibly despairing of government aid, an effort had been made before the war to finance a telegraph line from Denver to Santa Fe with private capital. An attempt was made to revive the idea.¹⁵ In 1862 Congress passed a bill to establish railroad and telegraph facilities between the Mississippi and the Pacific. New Mexico was hopeful that the route would pass through her lands. Perea introduced a bill in Congress to achieve this goal, but it failed to pass.¹⁶

Even though efforts along this line were unsuccessful, the agitation was continued. Some encouragement was received from Major General Dodge of the Missouri Department, who favored the building of the telegraph through the Territory, although he doubted very much whether the War Department would approve it.¹⁷ In advancing the idea of a railroad through New Mexico, the *Gazette* cited the advantages which would accrue to the nation, if such a step were followed. The lower altitude, the many passes, and the supplies of coal and water were all stressed,¹⁸ but to no avail, even though the need for a railroad was great.¹⁹

Trade with the East continued to grow, although more modern communication was denied the Territory. From a scant 200 wagons per year which had entered New Mexico in 1843, the number had grown to over 3,000 by the end of the war. Unfortunately, many of these were forced to return to the East empty.²⁰ During the war years almost all commerce was halted because of the Indians.²¹ By 1863 Carleton was able to notice the increased trade, some of which was occasioned by the establishment of the Bosque,

14. *House Executive Document*, No. 70, 38th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), XVI:30. Halleck to Stanton, November 15, 1863.

15. *Santa Fe Gazette*, November 5, 1864.

16. *Ibid.*, November 5, 1864.

17. *Ibid.*, April 15, 1865.

18. *Ibid.*, October 28, 1865.

19. *Ibid.*, October 21, 1865.

20. Meline, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

21. Bancroft, *op. cit.*, p. 644.

but thought that New Mexico would never be prosperous until the Indians had been forced out of the way.²²

By 1865 the price of goods in New Mexico had risen, even though they had fallen in the East.²³ Part of the responsibility for this was placed on the shoulders of the speculators,²⁴ but the rise of wages and of prices of local products due to the war was a contributing factor.²⁵

Although there was little tangible evidence that the population was increasing by immigration, the *Rio Abajo Weekly Press* hopefully expected such an influx.²⁶ The census figures, however, did not bear out this wishful thinking. In 1860 New Mexico had a total population of 93,516. Of this number 82,924 were white, with a free colored population of only 85. The Indians reputedly numbered 10,452, and half breeds were listed at 55.²⁷ Arizona County which was separated from New Mexico before the next census, was credited with a total population of only 6,428.²⁸ Acting Governor Arny believed that of this total of almost 100,000 over fifty per cent could not read or write. (There was not a free school in the Territory, except those conducted by the Catholic Church.)²⁹

When the Census was taken a decade later, New Mexico actually showed a loss in numbers. The figures then read 91,874. The loss of Arizona accounted for much of this decrease, but it was evident that the Territory was not making much progress towards increasing its population. The colored population, although negligible in number, had increased over 100 per cent from 85 to 172.³⁰

New Mexico was able to retain some of the soldiers who had come with the California Column, but was desirous of

22. *O. R.*, I, 15:723-4. Carleton to Hq., May 10, 1863.

23. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 1, 1865.

24. *Ibid.*, November 19, 1864.

25. *Ibid.*, November 12, 1864.

26. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, January 27, 1863.

27. *Census for 1860* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), p. 567.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 567.

29. *The Second Annual Message of Acting Governor Arny to the Legislative Assembly of New Mexico. Delivered December, 1866* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Manderfield and Tucker, Public Printer, 1862), p. 5.

30. *Census for 1870* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), pp. 8-12.

encouraging still further soldier immigration. The mining opportunities were emphasized to this group, as well as the chance to continue the adventuresome life which had been followed in the Army. The *Gazette* offered these "...high spirited, well-meaning fellows, but hard to manage, . . ." a chance to acquire "... not only wealth, but plenty of bush-whacking for those who have a passion for that sort of amusement."³¹

What resources the Territory possessed were bound up chiefly in mineral and pastoral wealth.³² The Pinos Altos region in the southwestern part of the Territory was the scene of a mild boom in 1860 when gold was discovered and 1,500 people were drawn to the area,³³ although there had been reports of earlier gold found there by the Mexicans.³⁴ During the war, however, mining and farming were practically abandoned within the area when the troops were withdrawn in the spring of 1861.³⁵ The region prospered again in the years 1862-1864, when mining operations were resumed. A new mining rush occurred in 1866.³⁶ In 1863 the first important silver in New Mexico was found near Magdalena and Pueblo Springs.³⁷

To encourage prospecting, or at least to assure more equitable opportunity in that field, the Legislature authorized every discoverer to register, up to the length of 600 feet, any vein found. The entire width of the vein was to be included as well.³⁸ A geologist was engaged by Watts to survey the mineral wealth of the Territory. He reported a visit to the Santa Rita area, and also to the Organ Mountains to the east of Las Cruces. Copper was the important ore in the above places. Deposits of kaolin used in the making of procelain were located in New Mexico. This was prized because known locations in the United States were

31. *Santa Fe Gazette*, August 12, 1865.

32. *Ibid.*, July 29, 1865.

33. Stuart A. Northrop, *Minerals of New Mexico* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press, 1944), p. 23.

34. R. S. Allen, "Pinos Altos, New Mexico," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 23:302. October, 1948.

35. Reeve, *op. cit.*, 13:284. July, 1938.

36. Allen, *op. cit.*, 23:305. October, 1948.

37. Northrop, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

38. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 8, 1865.

few. A five foot thick coal bed also was reported in the northern part of the Territory, along with several other smaller deposits.³⁹ None of these was a recent discovery, but promised something for future prosperity. In addition, gold and anthracite were reported north of Santa Fe, and copper near the Jemez pueblo.⁴⁰

Colonel Perea spoke glowingly of the mineral wealth to be derived in New Mexico, which he claimed was attracting attention in the East. He wrote of the

. . . mountains that have towered to the heavens from primeval time, in the sullen majesty of their hidden wealth, [and which] will now unbosom their treasures to the magic call of civilization, and your neglected country will rise, from the shades of an unrevealed wilderness, into the light of a brilliant and commanding development.⁴¹

Along with the optimistic predictions of wealth for New Mexico, there were definite drawbacks to utilization of the Territorial minerals. President Lincoln had noted the "great deficiency of laborers" not only in New Mexico, but in the entire West in both mineral and agricultural pursuits.⁴² Secretary of Interior J. P. Usher stressed the need for a railroad into the area,⁴³ and later complained that the mineral wealth was being "indifferently wrought" because of its inaccessibility.⁴⁴ A lack of water in certain areas was an additional drawback,⁴⁵ while the Indians again were blamed as a factor in preventing further exploitation of the metals in the region.⁴⁶

Aside from the minerals, the other principal sources of New Mexican wealth lay in pastoral and agricultural pur-

39. *Ibid.*, November 12, 1864.

40. *Ibid.*, November 26, 1864.

41. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1864.

42. *Congressional Globe*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, p. 1. Lincoln Address, December 8, 1863.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 26. Usher Report, December 5, 1863.

44. *Ibid.*, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 21. Usher Report, December 5, 1864.

45. *Santa Fe Gazette*, April 8, 1865.

46. *Journal of the House of Representatives of the Legislative Assembly of New Mexico, of the Session Begun and Held in the City of Santa Fe, Territory of New Mexico on Monday, the Seventh Day of December, A. D. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-Three; It Being the Thirteenth Legislative Assembly for said Territory* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Thomas S. Tucker, Public Printer, 1864), p. 21. Message of Governor Connelly, December 9, 1863.

suits. General Carleton considered the Territory as "... eminently a stock growing country" and thought that a market could be provided at home, if other settlement could be encouraged.⁴⁷ Although the possession of "many fine grazing lands" was extolled, a warning note was added that "energy and perseverance" were necessary because "drones cannot succeed."⁴⁸

Sheep, along with cattle, were also prominently in the picture. The same grazing lands were available to them. Recommendations were made for improving the stock, which would thus procure a higher price for the wool produced. New Mexican wool was bringing only fifteen cents a pound in the Eastern market in comparison with eighty cent wool from other regions.⁴⁹ Shortly after the Texans left, New Mexico was able to boast of at least a million pounds being shipped to Kansas City, but even though selling there for fifteen cents, it brought only four cents to the Territorial producers. These figures aided in the creation of a demand for the establishment of wool processing and manufacturing in the Territory itself.⁵⁰ During the next year the price paid in Kansas City per pound had risen to forty cents, which heartened the producers considerably.⁵¹ Still demands for local processing were continued.⁵²

When actual combat on New Mexican soil had terminated, the Territory still faced the problem of supplying itself with sufficient grain. In 1863 crop failures occurred in the Rio Abajo,⁵³ and the next year the eastern frontier and the area south of the Jornada suffered the same fate.⁵⁴ This contributed to the rise of food prices. In 1865 the region south of Albuquerque suffered, not only from frost and insects, but from river floods as well.⁵⁵ Although the wheat "failed entirely," the corn crop unexpectedly yielded

47. *Santa Fe Gazette*, January 21, 1865.

48. *Ibid.*, November 25, 1865.

49. *Rio Abajo Weekly Press*, April 7, 1863.

50. *Ibid.*, February 17, 1863.

51. *Santa Fe Gazette*, August 20, 1864.

52. *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866*, p. 135.

53. *Santa Fe Gazette*, June 21, 1865.

54. *Ibid.*, November 5, 1864.

55. *Ibid.*, June 17, 1865.

well. Carleton, after having experienced several near famines, ordered corn and flour to be brought in, although this move later proved unnecessary.⁵⁶

Irrigation, which had been practiced by the Indians for centuries, was an important answer to the problem of flood and famine which plagued New Mexico. It was suggested that if irrigation were increased, the greater acreage available would encourage further immigration, and that these new settlers would soon supply the population with the necessary food.⁵⁷ Systematic irrigation was expected to cover ". . . with luxuriant vegetation millions of acres."⁵⁸

The flood problem was not so easily answered, but Baldwin has blamed the war at least for the floods in the southern part of the Territory. In some cases lack of man power and finances caused by the conflict allowed irrigation ditches to be weakened, and thus fall easy prey to flood waters. The change of the course of the river which placed Mesilla on the east bank of the Rio Grande in 1865 was attributed to this.⁵⁹

The Territory was aware of the need for improvement of its economic condition, but was not entirely successful in coping with the situation. The comparatively meager resources available plus the lack of interest shown by the East were insurmountable difficulties. The problems of the 1860's are to some extent still present today.

56. *Ibid.*, December 2, 1865.

57. *House Miscellaneous Document*, No. 70, 38th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), III:1.

58. *Senate Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, 1860*, 37th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1862), p. 90.

59. P. M. Baldwin, "A Short History of the Mesilla Valley," *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 13:314-24. July 1938, p. 320.