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Radius Authentication in wireless lab environment

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Abstract

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The aim of the thesis was to learn and research the development of the Wi-Fi access control methods. This topic will be covered in a chronological order starting from old open-access networks ending to modern methods used today. The practical aim of the study is to implement network access control with an external RADIUS server and to create a RADIUS lab for students. This method has two main advantages. The use of the external server provides a possibility to use one database for many devices like access points and routers. Resources used for this thesis are MB316 classroom access points, hubs, computers and virtual machines of Mikkeli University of Applied Sciences.

In the beginning of the study, the theoretical foundation for the study is created with a literature review on authentication, authorization and accounting in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). In the practical part of the study, I implement three different forms of wireless centralized authentication. These forms were autonomous access point RADIUS, Medium business RADIUS setup in Windows server environment and Enterprise RADIUS setup in Windows server environment

The findings of the study suggest that autonomous access point solution is no longer a valid method even in small environments because it is not supported in Windows 10 operating system. The serverbased solutions either implemented with one or multiple servers are the best for centralized user authentication management and access control.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- 802.1x Wireless LANs
- AAA Authentication Authorization Accounting
- AD CS Active Directory Certificate Services
- AD DS Active Directory Domain Services
- AP Access Point
- ATM Automatic Teller Machine
- **BSS** Basic Service Set
- **BYOD** Bring Your Own Device
- CLI Command Line Interface
- **DNS** Domain Name System
- **DoS** Denial of Service
- **DSL** Domain-Specific Language
- **DSSS** Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
- FHSS Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
- GHz Gigahertz
- GUI Graphical User Interface
- **IEEE** Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers
- IoT Internet of Things
- **IP** Internet Protocol
- **IPS** Intrusion Prevention System
- \mathbf{IV} Initialization Vector
- LAN Local Area Network
- MAMK Mikkeli University of Applied Sciences

- MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output
- MU-MIMO Multi user MIMO
- NAC Media Access Control
- NAP Network Access Protocol
- NAS Network Access Server
- NIC Network Interface Card
- NPS Network Policy Server
- **OFDM** Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
- **OS** Operating System
- Pre shared key password-based authentication set on AP
- **RADIUS** Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service
- **RC4** Rivest Cipher 4
- **RF** Radio Frequency
- SG Study Group
- **SSID** Service Set Identifier
- TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access System
- TG Task Group
- VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
- **VPN** Virtual Private Network
- WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
- WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
- WPA Wireless Protected Access

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1 INTRODUCTION

With ever more developing new technologies and the rapid growth of wireless networks access became easier in the beginning of the 20th century. This provided users with more convenient connection to the internet, but also along with it arose many security problems. The biggest security issue is managing personal and enterprise wireless environments that only approved users are granted access to the networks. The authentication systems had to be centralized and secured.

The security policy mechanism methods as a network access control defined essential authentication rules and has played a big role the growth and protection of networks. Some organizations chose modern network-layer protection in the past, and relied on Windows authentication as their means for controlling network access. The limited network access controls were effective in the early 2000s, but soon after that they became unreliable with evermore expanding the variety of network devices and wireless networks.

The local area networks (LAN) are physical devices and wires that make closed and secure environment while the wireless local area network (WLAN) is based and works on the same principle. Yet, it is exposed to external factors. Wireless access points work as small radio transmitters and receivers with specific frequency and range. This allows devices in the range of the wireless access point to monitor wireless data traffic, even if the device is not connected to an access point or LAN. Based on this issue I decided to research it and find out the security methods practiced in personal and enterprise environments.

The theoretical aim of the study is to learn and research the development of the Wi-Fi access control methods. This topic will be covered in a chronological order starting from old open-access networks ending to modern methods used today. The practical aim of the study is to implement network access control with an external RADIUS server and to create a RADIUS lab for students. This method has two main advantages. The use of the external server provides a possibility to use one database for many devices like access points and routers. Resources used for this thesis are MB316 classroom access points, hubs, computers and virtual machines of Mikkeli University of Applied Sciences.

The structure of the study is as follows: The second chapter introduces authentication, authorization and accounting as well as network access control. In Chapter 3 the focus of the study moves to Wireless Local Area Network (WLANs) and their authentication methods. In Chapter 4 I focus on the practical implementation of the RADIUS server WLAN in the lab environment. Final conclusions of the study are then made in Chapter 5.

2 AUTHENTICATION AUTHORIZATION ACCOUNTING

AAA is a key security concept known as authentication, authorization, accounting and it defines network resource protection. It is a widely used model in the industry. However, there are other protocols and methods that can satisfy similar requirements. Earlier different machines used different authentication protocols, user profiles or small databases. For small networks using products from one manufacturer authentication worked well. But, when adding different equipment to the network with different authentication methods it created a big problem. According to Hassell (2002, 1-2), Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) formed an AAA workgroup to address system limitations at that time. Remote access services continually need standards to be improved to effectively verify and monitor users throughout the network.

There are three independent functions of AAA framework. Briefly, authentication is the verification of who the users are, authorization refers to what you are able to do and accounting to what the users did, when logged in. In the following sections they are described in more detail.

2.1 Authentication

The authentication process verifies a machine's or person's submitted identity. It allows to form a trust relationship between two points: the client and the service. Trust functionality allows granting access in the name of submitted identity in the following way: AAA spans over a network, for example in a proxy server. Authentication can work as a separate process or in a combination with authorization and accounting.

The everyday example is an ATM (Automatic Teller Machine). Before a user can withdraw money or do something else, he goes through two steps of authentication: First, the credit card is recognized, and second, the pin is checked.

The example above highlights that authentication can be based on multiple factors. The three main factors typically used are:

- Something users has (card, key)
- Something users features (biometrics as eye, fingerprint scan)
- Something users know (password or other relevant information)

When more than one factor is used, the system is called a multifactor authentication system. Some of the most popular authentication methods are described below.

Password is the most popular authentication method. This method is simple and fast requiring low processing power. In modern systems passwords are encrypted and big corporations as Google and Microsoft store them in separate databases. Service providers do not know what users password is. Some of the password method vulnerabilities are: simple and easy to guess, writing the password down, social engineering and eavesdropping (physically or in a network with the "man in the middle").

One time passwords were developed to solve the password reuse problem. This method is further grouped into two types: a password list and a challenge response. The password list means that after a password has been used it is no longer valid. It provides a user within one-time temporary access to the system.

Challenged response password in this model when connection is requested a user receives challenge value based on it he needs to provide a matching response value that can be based on a table or an electronic device. Similar authentication is used when connecting to an online bank account. In password based methods the connecting client is authenticated, but there is no authorization of the accessed system. Therefore, these methods are vulnerable to the man in the middle attacks and the spoofing.

2.2 Authorization

When a client is authenticated, authorization determines what the user is allowed to do in a system. This involves a set of templates and rules. For example, the system administrator determines rules according to which the client connects to the service and he can access only the services which are defined by the created rules. An example of authorization is a user of the ATM. With the use of multifactor authentication, a credit card is something user has and pin is something user knows. The user wants to withdraw money from the account with a balance of EUR 200. If he tries to withdraw EUR 100, he will get the money. But, if he tries to withdraw EUR 10 000, authorization checks that this amount exceeds the maximum withdraw limit and request is denied.

2.3 Accounting

The accounting system plays a huge role in the AAA framework. Implemented accounting systems track the number of users, login and log out time, session status, what data was sent what data was received, network load etc. Accounting helps an administrator to analyze and evaluate resources, capacity, the loads of the network and access request rules of the users, their actions which are permitted or denied. The system monitoring available tracks usage and how much it costs for a specific user group or individual users. Clearly, accounting uses spans more than just in the system administration. It helps to predict costs of services and much more. It is a very useful versatile system. In the ATM example accounting keeps a list of all the clients actions like withdrawals and deposits. Yet, in the computer environment accounting requiring generated reports, weekly or monthly, by the administrators to check that everything is in order. For critical services that might require daily observation.

2.4 Network Access Control (NAC)

Network access control or network admission control is a concept closely related to AAA. It has been used for many years as a part of Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) which come integrated into various products.

In the NAC-enabled networks a health check is performed on the connecting device before a new device is to the network. It is called posture assessment. Based on created authentication policies it checks if the devices are trusted, what anti-virus software it is using what applications are installed, if the device is mobile, and if the disk is encrypted and what OS the device uses. When the device does not meet the criteria, it can be quarantined, blocked, connected to a separate VLAN or given enough access for fixing the issue.

According to Margaret (2016) the implemented NAC method increases and reinforces security, restricting network resources, availability to endpoint devices. Usually when the NAS network access server authorizes and authenticates users, NAC adds the following functionality:

- Regulating user data access
- Regulating and restricting user's actions individually when he connects companies resources
- Implementing anti-threat application: firewalls, antivirus software and spywaredetection programs

In the physical network NAC is great at detecting and protecting LAN from rogue devices such as computer or access points. However, a wireless network has a huge number of devices and the variety of these devices requires a specific authentication approach. This creates a phenomenon known as (BYOD) Bring your own device.

Bring your own device presents challenge of control to smartphones, tablets and other appliances. To handle devices authentication correctly NAC vendors, cooperate with MDM mobile device management providers to ensure the compatibility and security.

3 WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORK AND AUTHENTICATION

There are many wireless internet standards developed by IEEE. These standards specify many different dimensions of the WLANs including transmission speeds, frequencies and their use, encryption and authentication methods etc. In the following section these issues are discussed in more detail.

3.1 WLAN standards

Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers (IEEEs) creates and develops LAN standards. Based on Hucaby (2016, 76-78) the project 802 is considered as a family further divided into work groups and each of them has a different index number assigned. Wireless LAN or the 802.11 workgroup was established in 1980. This was the beginning of the WLAN standard development. Later on the standards developed by the working groups have been used by wireless vendors to design wireless equipment.

Technology is constantly evolving, and for existing standards to meet new technological demands they are consistently improved. IEEE Study Group (SG) researches standards and if they need to be improved or updated to meet the latest technological needs. If yes, then a Task Group (TG) is formed for developing and improving the standard. Every new TG by alphabetical order is assigned a letter thru the standard the same process is repeated with a standard that already has a letter assigned and the second alphabetical letter is added: for example, already patented standard 802.11a requires further development and new TG is formed 802.11aa. As standard development takes a long time and is a continuous process IEEE keeps a document database of each standard. This allows vendors to use existing documentation for developing up to date appliances.

In 1997 IEEE published the original 802.11 standard also known as legacy. It was based on a single band steam of 2.4 GHz with 2.0 Mbps maximum theoretical bandwidth. RF (radio frequency) modulation used FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum) transmitted radio signals among different frequencies and DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum). In 1997, 802.11 was the first of its kind and placed strong a foundation for wireless technology. In 1999 IEEE published the 802.11a and 802.11b standards. 802.11a was a single band stream of 5 GHz with the maximum theoretical bandwidth of 54 Mbps. A range of 5 GHz provided less interference and high bandwidth, but drawbacks were high cost and low range (It cannot penetrate walls well.). The 802.11b standard a was single band stream of 2.4 GHz with the maximum theoretical 11Mbps bandwidth. Its advantages were good range (works through walls), but disadvantages were interference with devices on similar a frequency, and slow transmission speed.

In 2003 IEEE published the 802.11g standard. It was a single 2.4 GHz band with the maximum theoretical throughput of 54Mbps. It's advantages included good bandwidth and range disadvantages instead were interference with some RF devices such as microwaves. Compatibility with 802.11b allowed migration from one standard to the other and vice versa.

In 2009 IEEE published the 802.11n standard. It was a dual band using 2.4 and 5 GHz combination. By adding the MIMO technology it reached the maximum theoretical bandwidth of 600 Mbps. It's advantages were fast bandwidth with less interference in 5GHz and good range in 2.4GHz. This standard was designed with the OFDM backwards compatibility to 802.11a and 802.11g.

In 2013 IEEE published the 802.11ac standard. Works as 5GHz technology. The advantages of this technology is fast bandwidth with less interference. With improved MU-MIMO combined with OFDM maximum theoretical throughput is 1.3 Gbps. Table 1 below summarizes the development of the WLAN standards.

Year	Standard	Transmission type	GHz	Theoretical Bandwidth
1007	802.11	FHSS	2.4	1 2Mbpg
1997	002.11	DSSS	2.4	1 - 21vibps
1999	802.11a	OFDM	5	6 - 54Mbps
	802.11b	DSSS	2.4	5.5- 11Mbps
2003	802.11g	ERP-OFDM	2.4	6- 54Mbps
2000	802 11n	OFDM	2 1 8 5	150, 600Mbpg
2009	802.1111	MIMO	2.40.5	150- 000Mbps
		OFDM		
2013	802.11ac	MIMO	5	450Mbps- 1.3Gbps
		MU-MIMO		

 TABLE 1. Wireless standard table (Hucaby 2016, 76-78)

Wireless throughput relies on the enabled transmission type and the RF modulations as additionally accounting distance from the AP. It is Important to know that speed and modulation/ transmission type change accordingly, depending on the distance from AP.

3.2 Wi-fi Alliance

The Wi-fi Alliance was formed in 1999. This nonprofit organization makes sure that multiple standards meet today's requirements and that vendors comply with the standards Wi-fi Alliance test and certify various vendor device's that work with wireless technology. This certification is rigorous and done in authorized laboratories, and if some weakness / bugs are found the vendor can correct them to avoid bugs in mass production. After the certification the right to place a logo on the appliance and a certificate are received. Primarily the Wi-fi Alliance logo represents reliability that the product meets industry standards and it guarantees the interoperability between different manufacturer's devices. The Wi-fi Alliance certification is not mandatory, yet it unifies the quality of service.

According to Beal (2010) Wi-Fi does not mean "wireless fidelity". It is rather a trademark for Wi-fi Alliances that stands for the WLAN wireless local area network of IEEE 802.11x standards. As a term it was used only with the 802.11b standard, yet it got stuck ever since.

3.3 WLAN authentication and encryption

This chapter researches WLAN authentication frameworks that consists of the following: null authentication, MAC, WEP, WPA, WPA2, PSK, server based, 802.1x. The parts of this framework ensure security by authenticating and encoding information for wireless connection.

3.3.1 MAC Authentication

The MAC-Based Authentication method uses MAC physical (media access control) address to authenticate devices. Adding a layer of security and control in device authentication regarding various wireless devices as phones. MAC authentication efficiency is dependent on the number of clients, if it is used as the main authentication method.

More clients meant less efficiency. Therefore, this method is used in small scale environments that do not require high security. The working principle is a list of devices that are authenticated and granted the access while the rest, not listed devices, are denied. Additionally, this method be implemented alongside existing authentication structure. As the MAC list of denied or permitted devices, thus adding extra security (H3C, 2016).



FIGURE 1. Local MAC authentication (H3C, 2016)

Furthermore, this method has two modes: Local MAC authentication and RADIUS based MAC authentication. In the case of local MAC authentication, the MAC address list of permitted devices is configured. Devices that are not on the list will not be authenticated and will not connect to the network, as Figure 1 shows.

The RADIUS-based MAC authentication works by the same principle as described previously. The difference is that authentication is now performed by a RADIUS server. On WLAN, the AP takes care of the client's association requests and forwards them to the RADIUS server as shown in Figure 2. Both the local MAC and RADIUS based MAC authentication have security flaws. When the authentication is based on MAC addresses the attacker can use a spoofed address on its own device and this way gain the access to the network.



FIGURE 2. RADIUS-based MAC authentication (H3C, 2016)

3.3.2 Open authentication (null)

Also known as the open system authentication the null authentication method is used to verify that a wireless device uses 802.11 before it is permitted to join a BSS basic service set. It is required that a client device use the 802.11 standard. The open authentication carries out validation and as a result device hardware and protocols are authenticated to confirm that the device uses 802.11 standards. As shown in Figure 3, it is a two-step, simple algorithm process: First the client requests authentication, and second, the AP returns an authentication response. This is just device authentication. If a user authentication is needed, it must be handled in a different way (H3C, 2016).

With some public WLAN locations web authentication is used to agree to the terms of public AP and OS usually flagging and warns the client of unsecured connection. Another security disadvantage of open networks is that no encryption is used. Thus, all the data can be monitored and exploited.



FIGURE 3. Open authentication (H3C, 2016)

3.3.3 WEP

In 1999 IEE 802.11 defined the WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) standard. This method uses encryption and authentication and requires APs and clients to use WEP keys. Used in WLAN, a WEP can have up to four pre-shared keys configured, but only one of them can be active at the time. The wireless frame includes the key number with the sender the and receiver knows what key is used. For encryption the RC4 cipher algorithm is used. It uses WEP keys that consist of 40 or 104 bits which make up a string. Also the receiver and sender operate with the same key that encrypts and decrypts the data (Hucaby 2016, 360-361).

According to Wong (2003), in 2001 the major vulnerability of WEP was discovered and exposed. It makes it possible to recover a WEP key by monitoring for reused IVs. This made the standard no longer safe. In 2004, 802.11i was released to fill in security the gaps of WEP.

Due to backwards compatibility it is still used by many clients and can be found on many APs. WEP keys can be easily recovered with publicly available software e.g. *AirSnort, Aircrack, WireShark,* and there is a lot of documentation thus implementing an attack. The main problem is the encryption type RC4 cipher. Encryption keys can be recovered from network monitoring. With the security gaps filled this standard is widely used in publicly available WLANs and in homes providing unsecured network access. WEP is not used wireless networks that require security.

3.3.4 WPA/WPA2

According to Coleman & Westcott (2014, 481-483) WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access is upgraded version or WEP but instead of RC4 chipper this standard uses TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol that adds 20 additional bits in data frame. Furthermore, TKIP as data confidentiality protocol is compatible with WEP reinforcing existing RC4 exploit.

WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 uses stronger encryption to guarantee data security. CCMP Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Authentication Code data confidentiality protocol and AES advanced encryption standard. The example is shown in Table 2. WPA2 does not use TKIP due to deprecation, which is why it is recommended to use WPA2 instead of WPA and WEP.

Based on Hucaby (2016, 365) WPA/WPA2 have two authentication modes that depends on deployment scale personal mode and enterprise mode. Personal mode authenticates clients by pre shared key, on WLAN environment APs have identical pre shared key configured. Personal mode works without server. Thus PSK is vulnerable to social engineering and dictionary attacks. Enterprise mode uses dedicated server (NAS) to authenticate users, this mode also might be known as 802.1x, and this allows centralized client and device management and control. EAP RADIUS or other authentication method must be used to authenticate clients. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of WPA and WPA2.

	WPA	WPA2
Authentication	Pre-shared key or 802 1x	Pre-shared key or 802 1x
	The shared key of 002.1x	The shared key of 002.1X
Encryption and MIC	TKIP or AES (CCMP)	AES (CCMP)
Key management	Dynamic key management	Dynamic key management

Table 2. WPA and WPA2 Comparison (Hucaby 2016, 365)

3.4 Network Access Server Methods

As mentioned earlier one the essential part of modern WLAN networks is authentication. The focus of the study is in Radius based authentication. This implementation uses centralized server to authenticate and authorize users. Alternative names are RADIUS, 802.1X, NAS. All of these methods follow the logic show in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Principle of server based authentication (jakehe.blogspot.fi, 2016).

The authentication takes places in following steps. First, the client associates with the access point which denies communication, second an AP completes a handshake with the authentication server, third the authentication server sends a challenge to the supplicant, fourth the supplicant responds to the challenge using the specified authentication method. In step five the authentication server provides a session key for the supplicant and with a sixth step a supplicant is now synced with the authentication server and AP can now communicate on the wireless network. Based on (jakehe.blogspot.fi, 2016).

4 PRACTICAL PART

In the practical part, I will implement wireless centralized RADIUS authentication in three different ways. As shown in Table 3, the first method is based only on the access point, as the two other methods utilizes a separate authentication server. The second solution suits for medium-sized businesses with one virtual server and the third implementation is for enterprise setup with two virtual servers. All of the implementations are done in MAMK MB316 classroom.

Method 1	Autonomous access point RADIUS
Method 2	Medium business RADIUS setup in Win-
	dows server environment
Method 3	Enterprise RADIUS setup in Windows
	server environment

Table 3. Three methods implemented in the thesis

The presentation below is divided in to three parts, practice 4.1, 4.2 4.3. Then each part is grouped by the steps taken, which are represented step by step.

Each practical part requires the same amount of equipment that are the following: One physical computer, one hub and one access point (Aironet 1130AG or Aironet 1200). Software used for each practical implementations is specified in following chapters. The server based solutions use the latest available stable Windows server (Windows 2012R2) along with an available free Windows NAP role which functions as network access server.

4.1 Autonomous AP RADIUS

The following setup represents personal or small business AP autonomous authentication implementation. We will be working with two computers, one Hewlett Packard hub and AP Aironet 1130AG for RADIUS authentication configuration. The required software is Tera Term Web and a web browser. The logical scheme of setup is shown in Figure 5 and the IP settings follow the data provided in Table 4.



Figure 5. AP logical scheme

	VLAN1		
	Setup PC	AP 1130AG	
NIC	Cisco	BVI1	
IP	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.1	
Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	
Gateway	10.0.0.1		
DNS			

Table 4. IP Table

4.1.1 Environment setup

Firstly, before the start I have to reset factory default on AP, due to the previous configuration could compromise further work. According to following (Cisco, 2013) instructions resetting AP to default configuration. Then, based on the selected computer I refer to (Appendix 2), to connect the devices together with Ethernet and CLI. Note: On the computer I have to disable all NIC except for the cisco NIC because it connects hub to physical computer. After successful connection cisco NIC state should change to up Figure 6. And configure the ipv4 address 10.0.0.2, with a mask 255.255.255.0 and the gateway 10.0.0.1.



Figure 6. NIC states

4.1.2 AP configuration

I start the configuration of the AP with *Tera Term Web* in order to configure the AP with the CLI. First, I have to check the running configuration to confirm successful reset, disable DHCP services and set an IP address to *BVI1* interface, thus allowing to access AP GUI with web browser. After these basic configurations, I test the connectivity with ping from *setup pc* to AP to ensure that connection is working.

AP GUI was accessed by entering preconfigured IP address of AP to browser. Password and user name are *Cisco* with capital c. Then, following instructions of a Surendra

(2013) and a Sharma (2012) the autonomous RADIUS server was configured. Firstly, I go to *Security* > *Server Manager* and set AP IP address along with shared secret and the authentication, authorization ports. Second, I navigate to *Local RADIUS server* > *Generals setup*, where we enter the same IP address and shared secret thus enabling NAS. Furthermore, in here the users with password are created and stored. Third Authentication methods are selected and applied on NAS server. Fourth I assign a name to the SSID so it would be broadcasted from AP. Fifth step I turn on radio interfaces because due to the reset they are disabled by default.



Figure 7. AP user failed authentication

When attempting to connect and enter the created user credentials I receive following message shown in Figure 7. And in event log and Tera Term Web of AP it is possible to view notification of failed authentication shown in Appendix 1. According to support.microsoft.com, (2014) eap-fast and TKIP is no longer supported in Windows 10 OS. When attempted to create new wireless network on *setup pc* the TKIP option was hidden, and all available security types had only the default option available - the AES encryption. Despite attempting various ciphers from AP Figure 8 the outcome was the same and all attempts were unsuccessful.

	WEP 128 bit	
	WEP 40 bit	
	TKIP	
	CKIP	h
	CMIC	
1	CKIP-CMIC	ľ
	TKIP + WEP 128 bit	
	TKIP + WEP 40 bit	
	AES CCMP	
	AES CCMP + TKIP	
	AES CCMP + TKIP + WEP 128 bit	
	AES CCMP + TKIP + WEP 40 bit	

Figure 8. AP encryption modes ciphers

For older operating systems this method can still be used, but as it is not supported in a Windows 8.1 and the latest Windows 10 thus this solution has lost its meaning.

4.2 Medium Business Radius server

In the second implementation, I demonstrate Radius server configuration in Windows environment suitable for medium-sized organizations. Installation and configuration process is based on msdn.microsoft.com (2012) and Ethical Hacker (2013).

For RADIUS server I use existing Windows default role NPS (Network Policy Server) also known as NAS (Network Access Server). As an operating system I use *Windows server 2012r2 datacenter evaluation GUI* installed on virtual machine. Other devices include *Hewlett Packard* hub and *Cisco Aironet 1130AG* access point. Like in first set up I use *Tera Term web* to access the AP through CLI command-line interface.

The logical scheme of setup is shown in Figure 9 and the IP settings follow the data provided in Table 5.



Figure 9. Logical scheme

	Virtual environment		
		VLAN1	
	VM 2012R2	Setup PC	AP 1130AG
NIC	VM Bridge	Cisco	BVI1
IP	192.168.101.9	192.168.101.5	192.168.101.3
Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Gateway		192.168.101.9	
DNS	192.168.101.9		

Table 5. IP table

4.2.1 Settings and configurations

Using VMware I created VM and mounted 2012R2 iso file to start installation. The selected edition is Datacenter GUI. After finnishing installation work the environment was connected (as shown in picture above) in preperation for configuration.

On phycical computer *Setup Pc* I open *Cicso* NIC and configure IPv4 as shown in Table 5 above. Note that on local computer I leave only Cisco and MB316 interfaces enbled.

To setup and connect NIC of VM Server2012r2 first I navigate to *Virtual Machine Settings* > click on existing NIC then in network connection select *bridged* and *Replicate physical connection* > in *configure adapters* I select only NIC that represent Cisco NIC on physical computer (this step connects virtual NIC to desired physical NIC in computer). After completing this action I apply settings and and configure IPv4 of VM NIC according to Table 5 above. Figure 10 below shows the required settings of the virtual machine.

	Hardware Options			
orage !	Device Memory Processors Hard Disk (SCSI)	Summary 4.3 GB 3 60 GB	Device status Connected Connect at power on	
	Reideine Settinger	Using file M+\TSQ\W/indows\W/indo	Network connection	the shear and a shear of
Select th	e host network adapter(s) you want to automatically bridge:	Replicate physical network	connection state Configure Adapters
Microsoft Wi-H Direct Virtual Adapter Realtek RTL8192CU Wireless LAN 802.11n USB 2.0 Network Adapter Intel(R) 82579LM Gigabit Network Connection Realtek PCI GBE Family Controller		○ NAT: Used to share the host's ○ Host-only: A private network s ○ Custom: Specific virtual networ	IP address hared with the host 'k	
	(DK Cancel Help	VMnet0 (Auto-bridging)	~

Figure 10. NIC setup

Before AP configurations can be started I had to reset AP as previously metnioned in part 4.1.1. To setup right IP address for AP use Tera Term as described in previous section. After configuring the IP address, I was again able to access from *setup PC* to the AP Figure 11 via browser using Aps IP address.



Figure 11. APs connection

The next step is to install and configure server roles. It is done as follows. To start using authentication I need install following roles to the server ADDS (Active Directory Domain Services), DNS (Domain Name System) and NPS. It is worth pointing out that just ADDS and NPS installation is needed because DNS is a reuirement for ADDS and it will be automatically promoted to be configured after ADDS installation. Figure 12 below shows the properties for ADDS and configured domain *pkdomain.local*.

PROPERTIES For ADDS	
Computer name	ADDS
Domain	pkdomain.loca
Windows Firewall	Domain: On
Remote management	Enabled
Remote Desktop	Disabled
	Disabled
NIC Teaming	Disableu

Figure 12. Domain configuration

When ADDS is configured the next step is to create dedicated user group which is used in wirelless authentication. To do that I navigate to server manager *server manager* > tab *Tools* > *Active Directory Users and Computers*, select created domain and in user folder create *WIFIusers group*. The following user is created user:cisco, pasword: Passw0rd with capital p and 0 for o, and user:test the same passowrd as user cisco, then added to user group *WIFIusers* as shown in Figure 13. When creating users it is important to uncheck *User must change password at next login* to not interfere with authtnication process.



Figure 13. User group

According to Shinder (2013), for NPS to be installed correctly I need to disable IPv6 on NICs. First to install NPS role, from *Sever Manager* I add new role and follow an installation guidelines, according to Shinder (2013) documentation. Second NPS service are started and then registered in active directory, navigating to *Tools* > *Network*

Policy Server >*Action* tab > *Start NPS service* in the same *action* tab select the *Register server in Active Directory* a pop up message confirms successful registration.



Figure 14. NPS scenario wizard

Third I configure RASIUS using screnario wizard shown in Figure 14. By selecting wireless connections and writing policy name, then adding AP with information and generating shared secret that will be used in futher access point configuration, then adding created user group WIFIusers that are used for authentication and lastly authentication method EAP-MSCHAPv2. According to Ethical Hacker (2013) PEAP authentication method needs to be added newly created policy, which is done by navigating to *network policies* shown in Figure 14 selecting created policy and in tab *constraints* > *authentication* methods PEAP is added. With server configuration finished, lastly I need to configure AP with shared secret, servers IP address and generated shared secret.

Fourth step, according to Coldiron (2014) AP configuration using browser I navigate to *Express Security Set-Up* and configure SSID *WiFi33*, enable broadcasting, then select EAP Authentication thus allowing to input server IP address and shared secret as shown in Figure 15. As mentioned in previous AP configuration 4.1.2 radio interfaces are manually turned on.

Express Security Set-Up				
SSID Configura	ation			
1. SSID	WiFi33		Broadcast SSID in Beacon	
2. VLAN	No VLAN	Enable VLAN ID:	(1-4094) 🔲 Native VLAN	
3. Security				
	No Security			
	Static WEP K	ey		
		Key 1 🔻	128 bit v	
	EAP Authentie	cation		
		RADIUS Server:	192.168.101.9 Address)	(Hostname or IP
		RADIUS Server Secret:	••••••	

Figure 15. AP configuration

4.2.1 Testing and troubleshooting

Using one of MB316 classroom computer I disable all NIC leaving wireless NIC enabled for testing. When connecting to *WiFi33* SSID none with both users I received message *cant connect to this network*. Then using server *event viewer* > *custom view* > *Network Policy and Access Service* I was able to determine that access request message is recived from AP but is not validated (event id 18) as shown in Appendix 3. According to documentation.meraki.com (2016) this event id shows problem with shared secret. As a solution I changed shared secret in AP and server to manual, after this correction users successfully authenticated as shown in Figure 16. Additionally users can be authenticated in three methods first with user name second specifying domain name and third using domain email, also shown in Figure 16. Successful user authentication is also confirmed in event viewer of server (note it is important to refresh event log after user authenticates to view changes). Additionally users that are not in *WIFIusers* group have been tested and their access is denies event viewer logs information what user attempted authentication as shown in Appendix 4.

Sign in	Sign in
Sign in	Sign in
pkdomain\test	test
Passw0rd	Passw0rd
Domain: pkdomain	
Sign in	Wi-Fi
Sign in	- WiEi23
Q	No Internet, secured
	Disconnect
test@pdomain.local	
Passw0rd	

Figure 16. Connecting users

Conclusions technet.microsoft.com, (2013). ADDS and DNS are not recommended to be installed in any other roles additionally in to VM these 3 server roles requires powerful machine if following Microsoft recommendations but for company up to 100 people this is an optional solution. NPS provides control over users and devices connected to RADIUS server, furthermore it additional features can be added as allowed authentication time, device health test, multiple SSID authentication these are just few examples of many available features. NPS can work as standalone RADIUS server not connected to the domain thus providing more security to existing network setup.

4.3 Enterprise Radius

The third implementation is ment for multiple servers and targeted for larger organization. The logical scheme of setup is shown in Figure 17 and the IP settings follow the data provided in Table 6.



Figure 17. Logical scheme

	V	íirtual environmer	ıt		
	VLA	N1		VLAN2	
	VM Domain	VM R	adius	Setup PC	AP 1200
NIC	VM Host	VM Host	VM Bridge	Cisco	BVI1
IP	192.168.11.10	192.168.11.9	192.168.50.9	192.168.50.5	192.168.50.3
Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Gateway		192.168.11.10	192.168.50.5	192.168.50.9	
DNS	192.168.11.10	192.168.11.10			

Table 6. IP table

4.3.1 Setup and configuration

Firstly I have created two virtual machines as shown in Figure 17, VM DOMAIN and VMRADIUS both are connected with host only virtual network adapters. For VM RADIUS additional network interface is added in bridge mode thus enabling it to connect to physical cisco NIC setup process is the same as in 4.2 chapter. After renaming and configuring virtual machines NICs as shown in Table 6 I tested ping command and virtual machines can't ping each other as shown in Figure 18, according to (technet.microsoft.com, 2012. Nobody Can Ping My Computer) on firewall incoming icmp request is disabled, I also used provided instruction to allow incoming icmpv4 communication in both virtual machines and thus ping being able to ping.



Figure 18. VM RADIUS ping VM DOMAIN

Secondly I connected AP Aironet 1200 as shown in Figure 17 and restored default configuration of AP, IP address were configured from Table 6 the same way as mentioned in practical part 2. SSID used was *APradius*.

Third in VM DOMAIN I install ADDS DNS thus creating *mamkradius.com* domain as shown in Figure 19.



Figure 19. VM DOMAIN configured ADDS

		WIFlus	ers Properties	?	x
General	Members	Member Of	Managed By		
Membe	NS:	Active Dir	ectory Domain Service	s Folder	Ĩ
	er1 user er2 user2	mamkradii	us.com/Users us.com/Users		

Figure 20. User group WIFIusers

Fourth step is to create user and user group in VM DOMAIN the process is the same as in 4.2 chapter the created user:user1, pasword:Passw0rd with capital p and 0 for o, and user:user2 passwords are the same for both users, then they are added to user group *WIFIusers* as shown in Figure 20.

Fifth step is VM RADIUS virtual machine is connect to domain MAMKRADIUS. And I login with VM DOMAIN administrator to install and configure NPS. The NPS is installed, registered, started and configured in the same way as 4.2 chapter but this time I use manual shared secret, AP is configured in the same way as well using IP addresses from Table 6. I have encountered a problem when adding PEAP authentication method in *network policies* I received the following error message shown in Figure 21. Along with this protocol comes certificate required for successful communication between domain and NPS servers.



Figure 21. EAP certificate not found

4.3.2 Testing and troubleshooting

According to msdn.microsoft.com, Certificate Requirements (2012) ADCS is required in NPS server, because PEAP protocol does not have certificate associated with domain according to msdn.microsoft.com, Deploying Certificates for PEAP and EAP (2012) there are 3 ways to add certificate to NPS server: first *Deploy Client Computer Certificates*, second *Deploy User Certificates*, third *Deploy a CA and NPS Server Certificate*. In my case I have selected *Deploy a CA and NPS Server Certificate* because it is a simple few step process that requires installing ADCS in VM RADIUS server.

The ADCS role was installed to VM RADIUS based on instruction from msdn.microsoft.com (, 2012. NPS Server Certificate: CA Installation). After installation I navigated to NPS network policy and in the created policy > tab constraints > authentication method added PEAP as shown in Figure 22.

)verview	Conditions	Constraints	Settings	
Configure If all cons Constrain	the constrair traints are no ts:	its for this net t matched by	work policy the conne	r. ction request, network access is denied.
Constr Au Market Se	raints thentication e Timeout ession Timeo	Methods ut		Allow access only to those clients that authenticate with the specified methods. EAP types are negotiated between NPS and the client in the order in which they are listed. EAP Types:
	alled Station I ay and time re	D estrictions		Microsoft: Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2) Microsoft: Protected EAP (PEAP) Move Down
-	er 2014	M		Add Edit Remove Less secure authentication methods: Microsoft Encrypted Authentication version 2 (MS-CHAP-v2) ✓ Microsoft Encrypted Authentication version 2 (MS-CHAP) ✓ User can change password after it has expired ✓ Microsoft Encrypted Authentication (MS-CHAP) ✓ User can change password after it has expired Encrypted authentication (CHAP) ✓ Unencrypted authentication (PAP, SPAP) Allow clients to connect without negotiating an authentication method Perform machine health check only

Figure 22. Authentication method PEAP

After successful configuration and troubleshooting I again prepared one of the MB316 classroom computers and tested user authentication that the created users are able to authenticate and the successful authentication process is tracked on VM RADIUS virtual machine event viewer logs as mentioned above in 4.2.1 chapter. Users are able to login using same three methods as mentioned in previous chapter 4.2.1 as shown in Figure 23. Also user not belonging to domain has been tested and failed authentication as shown in Appendix 5.



Figure 23. WIFIusers authentication

This enterprise solution uses dedicated RADIUS server for the authentication thus allowing more features to be used based on server or computer performance. Additionally in second and third practical part the users are able to use single sign-on this allows easier management for domain administrators. More over dedicated RADIUS server can be configured as VPN, posture assessment feature can be added or day and time restrictions.

5 CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the study was to learn and research the development of the Wi-Fi access control methods. This topic was covered in a chronological order starting from old and ending at modern secure methods used today. The practical aim of the study was to implement network access control with an external RADIUS server and create a RADIUS lab for students. And that the created external server would provide a possibility to use one database for multiple devices management as access points and routers. The implementation was done on existing MAMK MB316 classroom equipment.

The theory part of the study introduced different authentication methods used in WLANs. In the practical part of the study the focus was on Radius based methods and I implemented three different Radius authentication solutions. The first method was based on autonomous RADIUS authentication. The results of the study clearly point out that this method is no longer valid as current operating systems do not support it anymore. The remaining two implementation methods are server based RADIUS that centralizes the services, device and users management in to one or several servers, virtual or physical. Windows server are limited by the amount of roles installed per server, due to roles requiring high amount computing power and network throughput thus creating delays and service issues. As in the second practical implementation part, active directory domain service should not be installed along with NPS.

For the future studies the created virtual environment can be used to design lab assignments for students or further developed by using available NAS features and policies. Authentication currently works with all windows based devices the android and ios require additional policy configuration. DHCP role could be added. Over all original goal of the thesis was fulfilled.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Authentication failure

hada =		o IOS Series AP - Home 🗙	2 XX W				
isco	Cisco Ai	ronet 1130AG Serie	es Access Point				
	Hostname ap		ap uptime is 12 minu				
ESS SECURITY	Home: Summary Status						
ORK MAP	Association						
ORK	Clients: 0		Infrastructure clients: 0				
RITY	Network Identity						
ICES ESS SERVICES	IP Address		10.0.0.1				
EM SOFTWARE	MAC Address		0015.c6ff.35ee				
T LOG	Network Interfaces						
	Interface Te	ra Term Web 3.1 - COM1 VT	× -				
	file E	dit Setup Web Control Winde	ow Help				
	Apr 17 05:59:13.411: %DOT11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b						
	1 Radio0-802.11G	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b				
	1 Radio0-802.11G *Apr 1 Radio1-802.11G dlf A	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT uthentication failed	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b				
	↑ <u>Radio0-802.11G</u> *Apr d 1 f A ↑ <u>Radio1-802.11A</u>	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b				
	Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf A Radio1-802.11A Event Log	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT uthentication failed	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr d1f ↑ Radio1-802.11A ►vent Log Time Apr 12.05:59:13.411	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed	Description				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf A ↑ Radio1-802.11A * ► rent Log * Time * Apr 17 05:59:13.411 *	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity ◆Debugging	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf ↑ Radio1-802.11A *Apr dlf ▶ Radio1-802.11A *Apr dlf ►vent Log *Apr 1 me Apr 17 05:59:13.411 Apr 17 05:57:41.016	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging 	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf ↑ Radio1-802.11A * ▶ Radio1-802.11A * Event Log * Time * Apr 17 05:59:13.411 * Apr 17 05:57:41.016 * Apr 17 05:52:49.798 *	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Information	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr d 1 f ↑ Radio1-802.11A ↑ Radio1-802.11A Event Log Time Apr 17 05:59:13.411 Apr 17 05:57:41.016 Apr 17 05:52:49.798 Apr 17 05:52:09.305	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Information Notification	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf ↑ Radio1-802.11A ▶ Radio1-802.11A Event Log Time Apr 17 05:59:13.411 Apr 17 05:57:41.016 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:08.305	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up				
		17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Debugging Information Notification Error Information	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, frequency 2422 selected				
		17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Information Error Information Notification Notification Notification	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, frequency 2422 selected Configured from console by console				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf A ↑ Radio1-802.11A ► Radio1-802.11A Event Log Time Apr 17 05:59:13.411 Apr 17 05:52:49.798 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:08.305 Apr 17 05:52:08.304 Apr 17 05:52:03.129 Apr 17 05:51:50.796	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Information Error Information Notification Notification Notification Notification Notification	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, frequency 2422 selected Configured from console by console Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio1, changed state to up				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf f A ↑ Radio1-802.11A If A ▶ Radio1-802.11A If A ►vent Log If Time Apr 17 05:59:13.411 Apr 17 05:57:41.016 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:08.304 Apr 17 05:52:08.304 Apr 17 05:52:03.129 Apr 17 05:51:50.796 Apr 17 05:51:50.796	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Information Notification Error Information Notification Notification	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, frequency 2422 selected Configured from console by console Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio1, changed state to up				
	↑ Radio0-802.11G *Apr dlf ↑ Radio1-802.11A ► Radio1-802.11A Event Log Time Apr 17 05:59:13.411 Apr 17 05:57:41.016 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:09.305 Apr 17 05:52:08.304 Apr 17 05:52:08.304 Apr 17 05:52:03.129 Apr 17 05:51:50.796 Apr 17 05:51:49.796	17 05:59:13.411: %DOT authentication failed Severity Debugging Debugging Debugging Notification Notification Notification Notification Error Error	11-7-AUTH_FAILED: Station f81a.6708.b Description Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed Station f81a.6708.bd1f Authentication failed DFS scan complete on frequency 5320 MHz Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio0, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio0, requency 2422 selected Configured from console by console Line protocol on Interface Dot11Radio1, changed state to up Interface Dot11Radio1, changed state to up				

Close Window Copyright (c) 1992-2009 by Cisco Systems, Inc.

Appendix 2. MAMK MB316 classroom wire scheme



Appendix 3. Not validated access request

102 NPS THESIS Windows Server 2012	2 - VMware Player (Non-	-commercial use only)						
Player 👻 📗 💌 🖨 🗖	5						» 🚄	
2			Event Vi	ewer				
File Action View Help			ALL CAN DOWN AND ALL CAN					
🗢 🄿 🙍 📰 🚺								
🚺 Event Viewer (Local)	Network Policy and A	ccess Services Number of	events: 123				line i	
⊿ 🛱 Custom Views	Number of even	ts: 123						
⊿ Server Koles ✓ Network Policy and A	Loud	Data and Time	5		Event ID	Tark Catagony		
Remote Desktop Serv	Level Error	5/13/2016 3:42:36 AM	N	ource	Event ID	None	Â	
TAdministrative Events	Error	5/13/2016 3:42:31 AM	N	IPS	18	None		
Windows Logs	Error	5/13/2016 3:42:26 AM	N	IPS	18	None		
Applications and Services Lo	Error	5/13/2016 3:42:21 AM	N	IPS	18	None	_	
Subscriptions		E 43 004 E 3 14 EE 114		180	40			
	Event 18, NPS						×	
	General Details							
	An Access-Reques	t message was received from	RADIUS client 19	2.168.101.3 with a Message	-Authentica	tor attribute that		
	is not valid.				Event ID Task Category 18 None 18 None 18 None 18 None 18 None x ssage-Authenticator attribute that			
	Log Name	System						
	Source:	NDS	Logged	5/12/2016 2:42:26 AM				
	Event ID:	10	Task Catagory	5/15/2010 5.42.50 AM				
	Event ID:	10	Task Category:	None				
	Level:	Error	Keywords:					
	User:	N/A	Computer:	PKserver.pkdomain.local				
	OpCode:							
	More Information:	Event Log Online Help						
< III >								

Number of eve	nts: 21			
evel	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Categ
Information	5/15/2016 7:42:40 AM	Microsoft	6273	Network Po
Information	5/15/2016 7:42:06 AM	Microsoft	6273	Network Po.
ent 6273, Microsof	t Windows security auditing.			
General Details				
Network Policy S	enver denied access to a user			
Interwork Policy 5	erver demed access to a user.			
Contact the Netv	vork Policy Server administrat	tor for more inform	ation.	
User:				
Security	ID:	NULL SID		
Accoun	t Name:	notworking		
Fully Qu	alified Account Name:	PKDOMAIN PKDOMAIN\notwo	king	_
Client Machine				-
Security	ID:	NULL SID		
Accoun	t Name:	-		
Fully Qu	ualified Account Name:	-		
OS-Vers	ion:	-		
Called S	tation identifier:	0015.2C48.2900 a0f3_c129_5bec		
Cannig	station racination	donone reproduce		
NAS:	2.2.2.2			
NAS IPv	4 Address:	192.168.101.3		
NAS Ide	o Address: ntifier:	- an		
NAS Po	rt-Type:	Wireless - IEEE 802.1	1	
NAS Po	rt:	276		
RADIUS Client:				
Client F	riendly Name:	Wifi33Radius		~
Log Name:	Security			
Source:	Microsoft Windows securit	ty Logged:	5/15/2016 7:42:06	AM
Event ID:	6273	Task Category:	Network Policy Se	erver
Level:	Information	Keywords:	Audit Failure	
User:	N/A	Computer:	ADDS.pkdomain.l	local
OpCode:	Info			
More Information	Event Log Online Help			

Appendix 4. Unauthorized user authentication pkdomain

ent 6273, ieneral	Microsoft Details	Windows security auditir	ng.				
Networ	k Policy Se	rver denied access to a u	ser.			^	
Contac	t the Netwo	ork Policy Server adminis	trato	r for more inform	ation.		
Usen							
USER	Security	D:	N	JLL SID		Ξ	
	Account Name:			duser		120	
	Account	Domain:	M	AMKRADIUS			
	Fully Qua	alified Account Name:	M	AMKRADIUS\bad	user		
Client N	Machine:					1	
	Security I	D:	N	JLL SID			
	Account	Name:	-				
	Fully Qua	alified Account Name:	-				
	Called St	on: ation Identifier	- 0016.46f8.4ee0				
	Calling St	tation Identifier:	f8	1a.6708.b4fd			
MAS.							
INAJ.	NAS IPv4	Address:	19	2.168.50.3		~	
.og Nan	ne:	Security					
ource:		Microsoft Windows sec	urity	Logged:	5/21/2016 12:35:18 PM		
vent ID	i -	6273		Task Category:	Network Policy Server		
.evel:		Information		Keywords:	Audit Failure		
Jser:	N/A			Computer:	WINNPS.mamkradius.com		
DpCode	:	Info					
More Inf	ormation:	Event Log Online Help					
			1	11)	

Appendix 5. Unauthorized user authentication mamkradius