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**The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong:  
A Study of Institutional Dynamics**

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
**Capstone project in partial fulfillment of the requirements**

**of the Master of Public Administration**

**Department of Politics and Public Administration**

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**2014**



## **Declaration**

We declare that this Capstone Project Report, entitled *The Central Policy Unit in the Governance of Hong Kong: A Study of Institutional Dynamics*, represents our own work, except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualifications.


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
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
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## **Table of Contents**

Declaration.....	P.1
Acknowledgements.....	P.2
Table of contents .....	P.3
Abstract.....	P.6
List of Abbreviations.....	P.7
Chapter One Introduction .....	P.8
Focus, Objectives and Background .....	P.8
Research Questions and Associated Propositions .....	P.10
Overview of the Analytical Framework and its Application to the CPU .....	P.11
Research Methodology .....	P.13
Chapter Overview.....	P.14
Chapter Two Analytical Framework.....	P.16
Introduction .....	P.16
Think Tanks in the Policy Process.....	P.16
Approaches to Analyzing Institutions, including Think Tanks .....	P.20
Concluding Comments .....	P.30



Chapter Three Policy Research, Advice and the Central Policy Unit:


Institutional Structures and Changes.....	P.32
Introduction .....	P.32
Period I: Pre-1997 era.....	P.32
Period II: Tung Chee-hwa era (1997-2005).....	P.38
Period III: Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era (2005-2012) .....	P.42
Period IV: Leung Chun-ying era (2012-Present).....	P.47
Concluding comments .....	P.51

Chapter Four The Central Policy Unit:


Institutional Foundations and Maturity.....	P.55
Introduction .....	P.55
Period I: Pre-1997 era.....	P.55
Period II: Tung Chee-hwa era (1997-2005).....	P.66
Period III: Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era (2005-2012) .....	P.77
Period IV: Leung Chun-ying era (2012 - Present).....	P.92
Concluding Comments .....	P.104

Chapter Five Conclusion and Recommendation.....P.107

Introduction .....	P.107
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
The research questions revisited.....	P.107
Some Lessons Learnt from Other Think Tanks.....	P.111
Recommendations .....	P.119
Limitations of the study.....	P.123
Concluding Remarks .....	P.124
Appendices.....	P.126
Appendix A - List of CPU Members .....	P.126
Appendix B - List of CPU research project available on the web.....	P.165
References.....	P.177



## **Abstract**

In any policy-making process, governments around the world use various institutions as sources of policy advice and the Hong Kong (HK) Government is no exception. Besides the government bureaux and departments, the Central Policy Unit (CPU) has a major role to play in providing policy advice to the Government. This project recognizes this role by studying the institutional dynamics of the CPU in the governance of HK.


Starting from its formation in 1989, the institutional structures and changes of the CPU are presented in four main periods, namely the pre-1997 era, the Tung Chee-hwa era, the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era and the Leung Chun-ying era. The institutional foundations of the CPU are then analysed based on the analytical framework comprising Ostrom's rules-in-use and Thynne's concept of institutional maturity. Some recommendations are also suggested for the way forward for the CPU.





## **List of Abbreviations**

AO	Administrative Officers
CE	Chief Executive
CPU	Central Policy Unit
CS	Chief Secretary
CSD	Commission on Strategic Development
FS	Financial Secretary
GGTTTI	Global Go To Think Tank Index
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
IAD	Institutional Analysis and Development
LegCo	Legislative Council
NAO	Network Administrator Organisation
POAS	Principal Officials Accountability System
RGC	Research Grants Committee
CE	Chief Executive
CPU	Central Policy Unit
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
TTCSP	Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the University of Pennsylvania
UK	United Kingdom




## **Chapter One     Introduction**

### **Focus, Objectives and Background**

This project addresses the effectiveness of the Central Policy Unit (CPU) in acting as a think tank for the governance of Hong Kong (HK). The objectives of the project are to evaluate the institutional dynamics of the CPU, including its change in leadership, role and institutional maturity, over its 25 years of history from its establishment in 1989 up till the present.

The project recognizes that for governments around the world, think tanks are one of the sources of policy inspirations and they can link “knowledge with power” for better governance (’t Hart, 2006). The CPU in HK is a governmental think tank which is responsible for providing advice on policy matters to the top government officials.


With 25 years of history, the CPU is expected to play a more prominent role in the governance of HK as a maturing advisory body. However, due to various changes in terms of institutional arrangement, the orientation and functions of the CPU have also been changing over time. The project analyzes the institutional dynamics of the CPU from its inception to the present with reference to the four foci below.



Firstly, while a governmental think tank in HK is supposed to maintain its legitimacy in producing policy advice, changes of leadership in both the CPU and the Government have affected CPU's core values over time. This observation brings clues to examine the impact of changing institutional arrangements on the governance of HK.

Secondly, echoing the first focus, the project looks at the history of the CPU in four different periods of time: the Pre-1997 era as Period I; 1997 – 2005 under the Tung Chee-hwa era as Period II; 2006 – 2012 under the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era as Period III; and 2012 – present under the Leung Chun-ying era as Period IV. In this way, the institutional changes of the CPU following these four distinctive periods are analysed.

Thirdly, given the specific periods of time, each of the four periods showcase their unique characteristics in institutional setting as a result of the change of political arena, the change of government leadership, and the dissimilarity in scope and authority of the CPU. The project further evaluates whether the CPU functions effectively with integrity under different periods of time.




Finally, as discussed, the CPU as the official think tank is expected to play a significant role in improving the quality of public policy even though there are changes in its institutional settings. Based on an analysis of the effectiveness of the CPU, the project makes recommendations and suggests future research directions.

### **Research Questions and Associated Propositions**

This following five research questions are addressed:

- What type of institutions could a government adopt to generate policy ideas?
- What institutions has the HK Government adopted to generate policy ideas - and, in particular why did it decide to establish and operate the CPU?
- How did the change in leadership, from the pre-1997 period to the post-1997 period, influence the role, structure and control of the CPU?
- To what extent is the CPU an effective and mature think tank contributing to effective governance in HK?
- How could the CPU be strengthened and/or be complemented by other institutions?

As the CPU is a governmental think tank with statutory status, it is relevant to consider how influential such a small unit can be in affecting the governance of HK.




On the one hand, institutional arrangement is a factor affecting the functions and impact of the unit. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that the CPU has long been criticized for being a “black box” which prevents the general public from knowing it well. At the times when HK faces urgent and important public policy problems such as those relating to municipal solid waste, shortage of land, ageing population, constitutional reform, and poverty, the effectiveness of the CPU in the governance of HK is in doubt.

### **Overview of the Analytical Framework and its Application to the CPU**

This project is structured and guided by an analytical framework consisting of seven institutional rules-in-use (Ostrom, 1999) and the concept of institutional maturity (Thynne, 2012), both of which are helpful tools for analyzing the institutional dynamics and the effectiveness of the CPU over different periods.


The analytical framework begins by considering three categories of think tanks, which are universities without students, contract research organizations, and advocacy tanks (Weaver, 1989). Among the three categories, the CPU is a fully publicly-funded government entity which is categorized broadly as a “contract research organization”.



Its main functions are to serve government officials and perform research as assigned by government departments and agencies. The policy advice provided by the CPU usually focuses on specific policy areas.

In general, scholars have various theoretical approaches for the analysis of think tanks. The policy elites approach, the pluralist approach, the statist approach and the institutional approach are the four major perspectives. In view of the limitations of the first three approaches which are described in Chapter Two, some political scientists adopt an institutional approach with more focus on the institutional structures of think tanks rather than their nature or role as a member of the policy-making community.

In this regard, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework developed by Ostrom (1999) addresses how problems in the community could be solved by analyzing institutional phenomenon, processes and expected outcomes. The IAD framework includes seven steps in analyzing diversified social issues, and the seven rules-in-use are adopted as part of the analytical framework largely because it provides a useful analytical lens for evaluating changes of an institution over time and also for comparing different institutions. The seven rules are: boundary rules,




position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and payoff rules.

An analysis using the seven rules can help reveal the uniqueness of an institution as a different set-up comparing with other bureaux of a government. It can be a tool for analyzing institutional changes over a particular period that influences the role, structure, and control of an institution. Analysis of the rules-in-use also exhibits the dynamics of an institution, with implications for how institutional arrangements affect governance and how institutions can progress over time. In this respect, the ideas on institutional maturity are relevant, including three broad levels : Level 1 which sees institutions as having “appropriate structures and processes in place”; Level 2 maturity which is achieved when an “institution is functioning very effectively”; and Level 3 maturity which is achieved when an “institution is meeting high standards of integrity” (Thynne, 2012).

### **Research Methodology**

This project primarily adopts a desktop research to obtain data and information for the empirical analysis. Newspaper clippings including news reporting, criticisms and




columns are the basis of the analysis. Governmental documents such as policy addresses, documents from the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the Administration Wing, reports and statistics are put into consideration. Various literatures form the foundation of the analytical framework. Other countries' experience is drawn as one of the recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the CPU.

A desktop approach is suitable for this project because different perspectives can be taken into review in the sense that governmental documents provide facts about the CPU and newspaper clippings provide information on how the society in general thinks about the CPU. Based on the analytical framework, the empirical material can be analyzed from different angles and the findings can be consolidated with recommendations.


### **Chapter Overview**

This project consists of five chapters including this introduction as Chapter One. Chapter Two provides the analytical framework by introducing the classification of think tanks, Ostrom's seven rules-in-use and Thynne's institutional maturity as the foundation for analysis. Chapter Three is the overall history of the CPU from the





colonial period to the present which sets out the necessary background information for the analysis in Chapter Four. Chapter Four uses the analytical framework of rules-in-use and institutional maturity as the bases for describing and assessing the history of the CPU to provide a thorough analysis of the institutional dynamics of the CPU, which results in different degrees of impact on the governance of HK. Chapter Five marks the conclusion of the project, including the main findings, limitations, selected overseas experience, and recommendations.



## **Chapter Two Analytical Framework**


### **Introduction**

In any policy-making process, governments around the world use various institutions as sources of policy advice and attempt to translate inputs from these institutions into appropriate public policies. Among the numerous governmental and non-governmental institutions participating in this process, think tanks have particular significance in terms of their institutional dynamics and the impact on governance. They can be defined, classified and analyzed in various ways, which are addressed here as constituting an analytical framework for the study of the CPU.

### **Think Tanks in the Policy Process**

#### *Definition and Significance of Think Tanks*


According to the data of the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program at the University of Pennsylvania (TTCSP), currently there are over 6,800 think tanks in the world (2014a). Although the term “think tanks” generally refers to non-profit and non-partisan organizations with a common desire to influence public opinion and public policy, the think tank community around the world is so diverse that it is



difficult to exactly define the term (Exploring Geopolitics, 2010). For present purposes, the TTCSP's definition of think tanks is adopted, with think tanks being "organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy issues" (2014b).

Think tanks could be independent organizations or may be affiliated with other parties such as governments, political parties, interest groups or the private sector. In many circumstances, they can play the role of bridging the academic and the policy-making community, translating academic research to "understandable, reliable and accessible" language for policymakers and the public (TTCSP, 2014b). Their output in public policy research and analysis are published through various channels including books, reports, conferences, seminars and social media.


While there is no consensus on the definition of think tanks, most scholars also argue that "there is no typical think tank" (Abelson 2009, p.22). Many think tanks vary in financial resources, human resources, recruitment patterns, commitment to academic standards and operating styles, and the degree of engagement with policymakers and



the public. However, despite all these differences, scholars generally agree that most think tanks fall into the categories as elaborated below.

### ***Classification of Think Tanks***


In the face of the thousands of diversified think tanks worldwide, scholars have suggested various methods of classification. For example, the TTCSP created a typology with seven affiliations of think tanks: 1) autonomous and independent, 2) quasi-independent, 3) university affiliated, 4) political party affiliated, 5) government affiliated, 6) quasi-governmental, and 7) for profit (TTCSP, 2014b). On the other hand, McGann (1995) sorted think tanks into seven dimensions: 1) academic diversified, 2) academic specialized, 3) contract/consulting, 4) advocacy, 5) policy enterprise, 6) literary agent/publishing house, and 7) state-based, whereas Weaver (1989, p.563) identified three major types of think tanks that exist in the policy-making environment: 1) universities without students, 2) contract research organization, and 3) advocacy tanks. Abelson (2009, p.34) agreed with Weaver and suggested the fourth and the fifth categories: 4) legacy-based think tanks and 5) policy clubs. Although the classifications from literature as mentioned above are based on different considerations and perspectives, they are complementary and mutually supportive in



nature. Key features are as follows:

(a) *Universities without students.* Based on Weaver's model, "universities without students" is understood as think tanks that rely on academics such as economists, political scientists and other trained academics to produce academic and policy-related research. One of their key principles is to produce book-length policy studies to facilitate a greater understanding of the diverse and important issues in the society. They devote the majority of their resources, which are funded "primarily from the private sector" (Weaver 1989, p.564), in research rather than proactively influencing public opinion. Institutions that provide economic forecast to social leaders would be a good example in this category.

(b) *Contract research organization.* According to Weaver (1989, p.566), this second group of think tanks have close ties to government agencies. Their principal clients are government officials and the research topics are set primarily for the specific government agencies. As a result, their research is confidential unless the agencies choose to make them available to the general public. Contract research organizations are created to give advice to the government on specific policy areas.




(c) *Advocacy tanks*. To Weaver (1989, p.567), “advocacy tanks” represents a group of relatively new organizations which have close ties to particular interests. This type of think tanks emphasizes “aggressive salesmanship” to influence public opinion and public policy on current social debates. They put efforts in translating policy research and book-length studies into brief reports and advertising materials, proactively appearing on media and newscasts to share their ideas and shape the views of the community on various policy issues.

### **Approaches to Analyzing Institutions, including Think Tanks**

In studying various institutions, including think tanks in the policy environment, scholars have adopted various theoretical approaches which are summarized into four perspectives by Abelson (2009, p.63): the policy elites approach, the pluralist approach, the statist approach, and the institutional approach. The first three of these approaches are addressed below, followed by a more detailed discussion of the last approach.

#### *Policy Elites, the Pluralist Tradition, and the Statist Approach*


According to Abelson (2009, p.63), some elite theorists believe that think tanks



dominate part of the political system by giving their advice to and maintaining close ties with policymakers concerning the advancement of common political, economic and social interests. The top American think tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institution are commonly regarded as elite organizations with abundant financial resources and networks. This elite approach assumes that with proper connections with policymakers and philanthropic donors, think tanks are able to shape public policy and would often serve as instruments of the ruling elite.

In reality, as pointed out by Abelson (2009, p.64-65), most think tanks do not receive generous donations and only live on modest institutional resources. Another limitation of the elite approach is that think tanks have different interests to pursue, so it would be impractical to assume that all think tanks are committed to advancing the political agendas of the ruling elite. This approach fails to address the question of how think tanks exercise influence in the policy cycle.


Another group of political scientists disagree with the elite approach. The pluralist approach views that think tanks “represent but one of many types of organizations that populate the policy-making community” (Abelson 2009, p.66). Think tanks act in



similar ways as other organizations, such as interest groups, non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and compete for the attention and resources from the public and policymakers. The role of the government is therefore only to oversee the competition among organizations. The proposals and research from think tanks are the outcomes of competition rather than the right connection with policymakers.

The pluralist approach is not without limitations. Abelson (2009, p.66) considered the major deficiency of this approach is its failure to explain why some groups can influence public policy, why policy institutes are often better positioned than other groups to win the competition, and the fact that they do not always face competition with other types of organizations in certain policy areas. The winning factors such as budgets, members or affiliations are unclear.

Further to the elite approach and the pluralist approach, some scholars adopt a statist approach which emphasizes “the relative autonomy of the state in making difficult policy decisions” (Abelson 2009, p.67). It is argued that when confronting international and domestic resistance, the state and its actors would ultimately strive to protect the national interest. However, the state theory cannot satisfactorily explain






why the central state actors would pay considerable efforts to consult the public and a wide range of organizations before making important policy decisions.

### *Institutional Approach*

Alongside the three approaches above, there are political scientists who adopt an institutional approach with focus on the institutional structure rather than the nature or roles of think tanks. This approach views think tanks as “a diverse set of organizations that have very different priorities and concerns” (Abelson 2009, p.67). It also concentrates on the involvement of think tanks in the policy-making communities and how policy decisions are influenced through discussions among different players in such communities.

Instead of trying to identify which societal groups have impact on the shaping of public policies in the crowded policy-making community, “Kingdon and Stairs, among others, recognize that not all organizations have the desire or the necessary resources to participate at every stage of the policy cycle” (Abselson 2009, p.69) and they have their own priorities of participation. This observation provides a useful reference to the understanding of the role of think tanks in policy-making. Some think




tanks are interested in articulating issues and expressing their concerns via various channels, but other think tanks may be more interested in participating at the later stages (policy implementation and policy evaluation) and tend to share their views with the public. The institutional approach focuses on the participation of think tanks at different stages of the policy cycle and provides the bases on which their roles and effectiveness can be assessed.

Ostrom's (1999) ideas concerning institutions are particularly valuable in their contribution to the development of a general framework that can be used to analyze all types of institutional arrangements. In her analysis, Ostrom recognizes that an “institution” can be an organizational entity or “the rules, norms, and strategies adopted by individuals operating within or across organizations” (Ostrom 1999, p.37).

In essence, an institution is referred to as “the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies” (Ostrom 1999, p.37).


Apart from the multiple definitions of institutions, other key difficulties she recognized in studying institutions include the invisibility of institutions, the need for institutional studies to encompass multiple disciplines and multiple levels of analysis, and the configural nature of rules (Ostrom 1999, p.36-37).



Ostrom developed the IAD framework as a whole set of tools to solve the problems in the community by analyzing the phenomenon, the process and the expected outcomes. In using the IAD framework for policy analysis, one takes seven steps to analyze diversified issues (Reardon, 2011): (1) defining the policy analysis objective and the analytical approach in which the action arena and actors are identified; (2) analyzing physical and material conditions; (3) analyzing community attributes; (4) analyzing rules-in-use; (5) integrating the analysis; (6) analyzing patterns of interaction; and (7) analyzing outcomes.

The IAD framework provides us with a foundation to comprehensively analyze a policy problem. Particularly relevant to our study is how rules affect behavior in the action arena and also the influence asserted by these rules on the outcome. Rules do not refer only to formally written rules, but they also include informal rules like customs and traditions which everyone observes. These are termed "rules-in-use" which provide a useful tool of analysis.


Institutions, down to its basic components, can be viewed as a cluster of rules-in-use which pose incentives, opportunities and constraints. The rules-in-use are



“prescriptions about what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom 1999, p.50), which explains how the rules of an institution affect the behavior of individuals.

The behavior of individuals is bounded by seven types of rules according to Ostrom’s rules configurations (1999, p.52). The seven rules are: boundary rules (also termed “entry and exit rules”), position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and payoff rules. These rules guide us to explain why an action is taken that brings impact to a particular position, leading to a rational choice or decision made and the accomplishment of particular goals and objectives.

In simple terms, boundary rules specify the criteria determining how participants hold particular positions and how they exit from the boundary. Position rules specify a set of positions and the number of participants holding each position. Authority rules specify the sets of actions that participants in particular positions must, may or may not take. Aggregation rules specify formulae to weigh and transform individual choices into collective choices. Scope rules specify the set of outcomes that can be affected. Information rules specify the information available to each position. Payoff




rules specify how benefits and costs are assigned to particular combinations of actions and outcomes, and establish the incentives and deterrents for action.

An analysis using the seven rules can help reveal the uniqueness of an institution as a different set-up comparing with other bureaux of a government. It can be a tool to analyze institutional changes and institutional dynamics over a particular period that influences the role, structure, and control of an institution.

The analysis of the rules-in-use also exhibits the dynamics of an institution, with implications for how institutional arrangements affect governance and how institutions can progress over time. In this regard, ideas about institutional maturity are relevant (Thynne 2012).


In essence, four governance perspectives – “constitutive governance”, “warranted governance”, “interactive governance”, and “ethical governance” - are particularly useful in addressing an institution’s core existence, power, relationships with other bodies, and moral disposition (Thynne 2012, p.38-39). Under each perspective are three “ascending levels of institutional maturity” (Thynne 2012, p.38), with Level 1



being the easiest to achieve and Level 3 being the most difficult to attain. The three levels of maturity are summarized as follows:

Level 1 maturity sees institutions as having “appropriate structures and processes in place” (Thynne 2012, p.40). This first level of maturity is relatively easy to accomplish. It emphasizes on formal establishments and the “matching of structures to functions”, and aims at either creating “appropriate institutions” or ensuring the “retention and enhancement” of the existing ones. Institutions that belong to this level are those “orderly shells” which exercise power based on law, interact with other bodies in a coordinative manner to satisfy specific and mutually advantageous goals, and have codes of conduct in place.


Level 2 maturity is achieved when an “institution is functioning very effectively” (Thynne 2012, p.41). This level of maturity is more demanding than Level 1 as structures, power, interaction and ethics must be aligned in such a way that people operate with each other through its structure, exercise power, collaborate with each other, and pay attention to ethical behavior. Institutions are expected to “synchronize their own tools and methods with the demands of acting on behalf of others and the



public good” (Thynne 2012, p.41). They get involved in “the exercise of lawful power” where the underlying and guiding value is a matter of concern. Collaboration and interaction are required in order to bring about “mutual understanding” and “collaborative success”. Ethical standards are internalized into the institutional culture.

Level 3 maturity is achieved when an “institution is meeting high standards of integrity” (Thynne 2012, p.41). Level 3 maturity, being the highest level, is best represented by “the emergence of institutions as living entities, supported by the endorsement of their power, the conflative quality of their relationships, and the embodiment of ethical standards in all of their activities” (Thynne 2012, p.42). While many institutions have the potential to progress from the stage of “an orderly shell” in Level 1, only a limited number of them can become “a responsive, adaptive organism with high integrity”. Thus, Level 3 is perceived as the ideal in each of the four governance perspectives.

The advancement of institutional maturity depends much on the specific types of leaders at different levels. Different leadership styles are likely to lead to different




conditions, operations and influences of the level of integrity of an institution.

### **Concluding Comments**


Given the multiple definitions and diversified classification of think tanks, it is useful to carry out institutional analysis by adopting Ostrom's definition of "institution" and the associated seven rules-in-use: boundary rules, position rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information rules, and payoff rules. These interrelated rules have direct impact on an action situation and they offer an explanation of the participants' actions and outcomes. While changes in the rules-in-use can reveal the development of organizations over time, the idea of institutional maturity is particularly relevant to analyzing the progression or regression of organizations in terms of their core existence, power, external relationships and moral disposition. The two concepts bring together a systematic method for analyzing the institutional arrangements of any organizations.

The related concepts form an analytical lens through which the CPU as a governmental think tank can be analyzed in detail. CPU's institutional structures and changes along its history from establishment to the present is first examined.





CPU's institutional foundations and maturity in four periods as guided by the analytical framework are then studied. The major findings and recommendations are presented in the final chapter.



## **Chapter Three**

### **Policy Research, Advice and the Central Policy Unit:**


#### **Institutional Structures and Changes**

##### **Introduction**

The HK Government, similar to other governments around the world, relies on different institutions for policy advice. They include internal sources, such as the government bureaux and departments; and external sources, such as external consultants, academics and think tanks. The CPU is one of the sources of policy advice for the HK Government. It was set up in 1989 as one of the recommendations of the Hays Consultancy (Ma 1998, p.128) and has continued its role from post-1997 handover until the present. This chapter presents the institutional structures and changes of the CPU since its formation in four main periods: the pre-1997 era, the Tung Chee-hwa era, the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era and the Leung Chun-ying era.

##### **Period I: Pre-1997 era**

HK was a British colony from the early nineteenth century to 1997. After the World War II, the British Government carried out a large scale research on the future




development of her colonies over the world, and that was the prototype of policy research for the HK colonial government. The focuses of the research were to maintain political stability of the colonial government, to consolidate colonial rule, and to guarantee the ultimate benefits to the British Government (Scott 2010, p.5).

The HK colonial government did not put emphasis on public policy research and did not set up any department with specialization in such area until the last decade prior to the 1997-handover. The policy advisory mechanism could be divided into three stages, which were “Prior to 1966”, “1966 to 1984” and “1984 to 1997 Handover” (Ma 1998, p.39-66).

### ***Prior to 1966***

As the British expatriates dominated most of the senior positions at the early stage of the colonial period, the Chinese had only minimal participation in the decision-making parties such as the LegCo and the Executive Council. The colonial government adopted a British style public engagement mechanism to gather public opinion before making final policy decisions. However, these engagement exercises only served a “cosmetic” function to enhance the public image of the government.




The Chinese community had low expectation on direct participation in the policy-making process. They would like to express their concern to voluntary organizations in the local community, such as Po Leung Kuk and Tung Wah Group of Hospitals. These non-profit organizations and other merchant's organizations formed an advisory network for the colonial government, but they could barely exercise any power in the policy-making process.

#### ***1966 to 1984***

The first turning point came when the riots took place in 1966. The social value shifted from “utilitarian familism” suggested by Lau (1982, p.68) to a more westernized and modern mindset. Social unrest after the riot in 1966 aroused public interest in participating in the policy-making process and social reform.


In order to respond to the pressure from the society, the colonial government carried out two major institutional changes. These were the establishment of City District Officers, and consultative boards and committees.

The role of District Officer in the late 1960s was a “Political Officer” to understand



the problems and feeling of the society, and to communicate with people on policy implementation (HK Government 1968). The City District Officer Scheme was then expanded to District Boards for urban and rural districts, in which the members were appointed by the government. In the early 1980s, the boards were developed into a partially democratic setting in which parts of the members were elected by universal suffrage. The colonial government also set up advisory organizations since the late 1960s. The government established 68 advisory organizations in 1967 (HK Government 1967) and the number of organizations was increased to 193 in 1983 (HK Government 1983).

The District Boards and advisory bodies formed a loose political community in HK. The development of District Boards released pressure from the society, and the advisory bodies strengthened the legitimacy for policy implementation. However, the colonial government tradition of top-down policy implementation approach was still being adopted. The Governor would only consult a few senior civil servants before implementing any new policies, and “on time” and “within budget” were two key principles of policy implementation (Scott 2010, p.9). The colonial government treated opposition from the society as obstacles in the implementation process. As




such, the set-up of District Boards and advisory bodies only retained the “cosmetic” function and was a strategy of “administrative absorption of politics” (Jin 1973, p.4) – absorbing potential opposition in the society rather than coping with the challenge before the implementation stage.

### ***1984 to 1997 Handover***

China and Britain signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984. The anxiety between London and Beijing during the negotiation, and the uncertainties of the “transition” caused “confidence crisis” in the society. The June 4th incident in 1989 worsened the “confidence crisis”. The society was apprehensive about the Chinese Communist Party and the change in sovereignty, and was worried that the British Government would sacrifice the interest of the HK people in the negotiation process so as to benefit her long-term relation with China. HK also faced economic transition since the late 1980s. The economy of HK had shifted from manufacturing-based to service-based, and the economic relationship with Southern China had to be strengthened (Central Policy Unit 1997, p.1).


To maintain political credibility and social stability, the colonial government decided



to set up new communication channels to gather the views of China on various policies, so that the British Government could have a more effective negotiation with the Chinese Government before policies were implemented in HK. Apart from the advisory committees, the colonial government also gathered intelligence through the establishment of the CPU (Lau 2012, p.168). The CPU served a political role to lobby support when new policies were implemented, and gathered political intelligence via members' network in the society. Members of the CPU also provided advice and possible solutions to the Governor, the Chief Secretary (CS) and the Financial Secretary (FS) when facing new problems.

The colonial government also appointed consultants to provide neutral and independent source of advice on various social issues during the transitional period, and to avoid “anti-Chinese” conspiracy in the fragile and sensitive relation between Britain and China.


In the colonial period, the senior policymakers believed in keeping a small government and incremental change in policy-making. Bureaucrats were not responsive to social problems, and would only slightly adjust the existing policies and



implement new policy ideas solely based on departmental proposals. Also, the increase in the length of service and age of bureaucrats implied diminishing quality of innovation and creativity. The “Management by Generalist” model caused the leaders of policy branches and the Administrative Officers (AOs) to become distant from the professional field they were managing. The structure and functions of the CPU could fill the gaps that the bureaucracy could not combat. The transitional period after 1984 was definitely a new challenge to bureaucrats, and their mindset and long tradition could not cater to the changes of constitutional development, sovereignty and economic transition, and social tension caused by these changes. In the meantime, China did not have strong opposition to the establishment of the CPU, since political “gu-wen” (adviser) were quite common in the Chinese political environment, and China could understand and accept the real function of the CPU.

### **Period II: Tung Chee-hwa era (1997-2005)**


In July 1997, the sovereignty of HK was handed over to the Chinese Government and HK has since then become a special administrative region under the "One Country Two Systems" Principle. The structure of the government remained the same, with the Governor being replaced by the Chief Executive (CE), the first one being Tung






Chee-hwa (Tung). However, due to the dialogue breakdown between the British Government and the Chinese Government, not all government institutions received the "through-train" arrangement. For instance, the LegCo was replaced by the Provisional LegCo, and the CPU was another government institution which did not receive the "through-train" arrangement. (Provisional Legislative Council, HKSARG 2007)

Just before the handover, the CPU became non-existent as the tenure of all Part-time Members and Full-time Members was completed by December 1996 and January 1997 respectively. After the handover, in August 1997, Gordon Siu Kwing-chue (Gordon Siu), a civil servant, was appointed as the Head of CPU and Part-time Members were subsequently recruited into the CPU in late 1997. By December 1997, 35 Part-time Members were recruited. However, not all these 35 members were new faces. In fact, 14 of them, constituting a percentage of 40%, had served in the CPU before (List of CPU members at Appendix A). The posts of the three Full-time Members had, however, been left vacant for more than one year. It was not until mid-1998 that the CPU announced the appointment of Tsang Tak-sing (Beijing-funded *Ta Kung Pao* chief editor), John Bacon-Shone (Director of the HK




University Social Sciences Research Centre) and Dr Lian Yizheng (HK Economic Journal chief editor) as Full-time Members, who took up their posts in July, August and September 1998 respectively (Cheung 1998). Together with the Full-time Members, 14 more Part-time Members were recruited at the end of 1998, making the total number up to 49.

Shortly after the appointment of the three Full-time Members, in November 1998, Gordon Siu returned to the civil service and in February 1999, Mr Edgar Cheng Wai-kin (Edgar Cheng), the former Stock Exchange chairman, was appointed to head the CPU (*The new line-up announced in Tung's third post-handover government reshuffle*, South China Morning Post 1998). In late 1999, when the two-year tenure of the first batch of post-handover Part-time Members finished, it was decided to greatly reduce the number of Part-time Members to 33 as it was opined that convening a meeting for nearly 50 members was not effective (*CPU focuses on Democratic Party members and takes in members from the IT and tourism sector*, Ming Pao 2000). The number of Part-time Members was then maintained at around 30 to 40 till the end of the Tung era.



In July 2002, when Tung started his second term of office as CE, he appointed Professor Lau Siu-kai (Professor Lau) to be the head of the CPU to replace Edgar Cheng. Professor Lau was working in the Chinese University of HK before joining the CPU and was famous for openly criticizing the government often. Deviating from the low-profile attitude of his predecessor, Edgar Cheng, Professor Lau acted as the spokesman for the government after taking up the role as the Head of CPU. (*Without political representatives, the middle class does not have much influence, Hong Kong Economic Journal 2002*)

The post-handover days had not been easy for the HKSAR Government. Challenges and governance crisis experienced during the Tung era include the Asian financial crisis and the bird flu in 1997, the new airport fiasco in 1998, the short piles public housing scandal in 1999, the security law issue and the SARS epidemic in 2003. It was intended that the introduction of the POAS could strengthen executive leadership (Scott 2010, p.51) and that the appointment of Professor Lau to the CPU could help improve the image of Tung, to show that Tung was willing to listen to all views from the society, including opposing views (*Hopes for new situation, Ming Pao 2002*). However, neither the POAS nor Professor Lau could manage to come to Tung's rescue.




On 1 July 2003, 500,000 citizens took to the streets to protest against Article 23 and other administrative failures, which eventually led to the stepping-down of Tung in 2005 before he finished his second term of office. In this incident, Professor Lau, as Head of CPU, also hit a great blow as he was heavily criticized for greatly underestimating the number of marchers at 30,000. (*CPU a black box, spending over \$40 million each year and not releasing information about its research*, Sing Pao Daily News 2003)

### **Period III: Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era (2005-2012)**

Donald Tsang Yam-kuen (Tsang) succeeded the position of the CE on 21 June 2005 from Tung Chee-hwa, who stepped down early on 10 March 2005 citing health reasons caused by “long time hard-works” and for the “overall interests of the HKSAR and the nation” with his unfinished second term of office (*Tung Chee-hwa resigns as HK chief executive*, China Daily 2005). Tsang remained as the CE till the end of his tenure on 30 June 2012 which marks the third period (“Period III”) in CPU’s history.


During Period III, CPU looked relatively stable than Period II with Professor Lau



continuing his position as the Head of CPU while his three “bosses”, i.e., the CE, the CS and the FS were mainly “old faces”. While Tsang was the former CS, the FS was Henry Tang Ying-yen who was later promoted to the post of CS and was succeeded by John Tsang Chun-wah in 2007 when Tsang began his second term of office. All of them remained in their positions throughout Period III. Rafael Hui Si-yan, the CS between 2005-07 when Tsang took up the remaining tenure of Tung, was ignored here for his relatively short period and transitional nature of service. Given this relatively stable composition, the parties ought to know the others well in terms of their working relationships and mutual expectations.

The structure of CPU remained more or less the same as Period II, composing of the head and its deputy, three Full-time Members supported by a team of in-house researchers with all of them appointed under non-civil service terms on contract basis.


The practice of appointing Part-time Members drawn from different sectors of the society to CPU continued though their number was raised to about 43 on average compared with that of about 35 during Period II based on the full-list of CPU membership obtained. (List of CPU members at Appendix A). For the three Full-time Members, Professor Lee Ming-kwan continued his office whereas Shiu Sin-por (the



incumbent head of CPU) replaced Tsang Tak-sing, who has been the Secretary for Home Affairs up to now. However, the appointment process of the third Full-time Member after Lian Yi-zheng left the CPU in September 2004 was not as “seamless” as the other two Full-time Members. It was not until 10 February 2006 when the HKSAR Government announced the appointment of Lau Sai-leung, who was an experienced commentator having connections with the mass media and pan-democratic camp. Quoting from the respective government press release, Professor Lau said he was extremely pleased with the wealth of media experience and background that Lau Sai-leung would bring to the CPU (news.gov.hk 2006).


Another influential development of the policy advisory mechanism during Period III which brought about institutional changes over the positioning of CPU was the substantial expansion of the Commission on Strategic Development (CSD), as announced by Tsang in his first Policy Address of 2005-06. Period III was also characterised by the return of the AO-ruling class as Tsang, a veteran AO, acceded to the position of the CE.

However, the action arena or contextual conditions surrounding CPU was not as




stable as its internal structure as just mentioned. The days of Period III were even more challenging for the HKSAR Government. Although the people's level of satisfaction with the HKSAR Government, measured by the Public Opinion Programme of the University of HK, did rise sharply from around 20% when Tung Chee-hwa resigned in March 2005 to its double within the next year and maintained roughly between 40% to 50% up to mid-2008, the figures dropped quite rapidly to between 30% to 20% towards the end of Tsang's tenure. (Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong 2014)

Economically, while HK was still recovering from the worst ever condition since the handover as a result of the outbreak of SARS epidemic in 2003, the global financial tsunami dragged the city into another round of economic downturn from 2008 to 2009. More fundamentally, HK lost its competitiveness and direction of development in the globalised economy. This "Pearl of the Orient" had lost its luster in the eyes of the people from Mainland China who commanded rising and much stronger economic power than Hongkongers. Due to the widening gap between the rich and the poor, social immobility and value conflicts between generations of the society, the Hongkongers were getting frustrated and divided among themselves.



On the political side, the “Quad-Fragmentation” of the local political system in the post 1997-era, i.e., the fragmentation between the executive and the legislature, their alliances, the civil servants, and the society, contributed to the governance failure of the HK Government since the handover (Lau 2011, p.9). The procrastination of constitutional development on democratising the CE and the LegCo elections processes during Tsang’s era even aggravated the political condition whereas the further expansion of the POAS by Tsang in 2007-08 failed to cater for the growing diversified or even polarised societal interests.

The governance challenges faced by the Tsang’s government were increasingly tough against the backdrop of a rising civil society marked by the mass demonstration on 1 July 2003, followed by a series of social movements of different scales that broke out in Period III. The more significant ones included the opposition to the removal of Star Ferry clock tower in 2006, the redevelopment project of Lee Tung Street in Wanchai in 2007, the Guangzhou–Shenzhen–HK Express Rail Link project in 2009, and those judicial review cases connected with reclamation within the Victoria Harbour in 2003, the initial public offering of the Link REIT in 2005, the removal of the Queen’s Pier in 2007 and the environmental impact assessment for the HK-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge






Project in 2011. Lau (2011, p.6) highlighted that those movements among the “activated” social masses not only reflected the pursuit of the post-materialistic values of the younger generations of HK, being “tagged” as the “post-80’s or post-90’s”, but also the actualisation of their own identities that were different from their parents of the older generations who are still in power. In a nutshell, the society as a whole was becoming more unstable, fragmented and politicised during Period III.


#### **Period IV: Leung Chun-ying era (2012-Present)**

The period from 13 July 2012 to the present marks the fourth period in CPU’s history. Although Professor Lau and his team of Full-time Members left the unit after completion of tenure on 30 June 2012, the head position was not filled until 13 July 2012 when the three Full-time Members positions were still vacant. As many speculated, CE Leung Chun-ying (Leung) appointed Mr Shiu Sin-por (Shiu) to lead the Government’s think tank. Shiu has been one of the unit’s Full-time Member since 2007. He is known for his pro-Beijing political stance and his close ties with Leung (*“King of the Leftists” Shiu Sin-por heads the CPU, Ming Pao 2012*) Prior to joining the unit, he was the Executive Director of the One Country Two Systems Research Institute where Leung is a former chairman, board of directors. He also served as the




Deputy Secretary General of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the People's Republic of China from 1985 to 1990, and as Member and Deputy Secretary General of the Preparatory Committee for the HKSAR from 1996 to 1997. He is a member of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Central Policy Unit 2012).

As a government think tank responsible for conducting policy research, the CPU should supposedly be headed by Full-time Members with substantial policy research experience who can take charge of various studies and research projects. However, except Professor Wong Chack-kie who is an experienced social and public policy researcher, the suitability of the other Full-time Members to fill the posts were put into question. Ms Sophia Kao Ching-chi is specialized in human resources management with no relevant policy research experience. The Government justified her appointment by pointing out the importance of cultivating and building up a reserve of talents in support of HK's future development, and this position would help enhance the management of the talents reserve (Administration Wing, HKSARG 2013). Mr Kwan Wing-kei served as a Full-time Member at the CPU temporarily from 3 October 2012 to 31 March 2013. As a professional in the publishing industry,




he was also criticized for possessing no relevant policy research experience (Yu 2012). In November 2012, Shiu proposed to the Panel on Public Service the creation of a non-civil service position of Full-time Member (4) in the CPU, who would provide advisory service in respect of the new media and public opinions (Panel on Public Service, LegCo 2012). Although the CPU eventually withdrew this staffing proposal due to overall objection from legislative councillors, its appointments were overshadowed by accusations of favoritism.

Other than the unconventional selection of Full-time Members, CPU nowadays has new responsibilities in the areas of managing talents reserve and collecting public opinions. In a television programme, Shiu remarked that CPU was a government tool and it would launch public opinion campaigns to lobby for public support for government policies (Panel on Public Service, LegCo 2012). A number of legislative councillors considered these to be an expansion of CPU's functions and the CPU has deviated its main role as a think tank to provide advice on long-term policies. The legislative councillors also expressed grave concerns that such a new work approach would politicize the society and turn CPU into a "propaganda department" of the Government (Panel on Public Service, LegCo 2012).



According to Professor Lau, the former Head of CPU, the CPU used to be more focused on conducting policy research and advising the Government on policy issues behind the scenes (RTHK 2014). As the CPU under Leung's administration came increasingly under spotlight, the relationship between the Government or the CPU and other sectors of the society has become worsened. In particular, the CPU went into conflict with the academic sector as it took over the administration of the Public Policy Research Funding Scheme since 2013-2014 without consulting the LegCo or the RGC. Worried about the interference with academic freedom, students and scholars from the eight universities protested against the Government's plan. Even though the RGC indicated its intention to continue with its function in approving research projects, and an alternative proposal was suggested in a LegCo Panel meeting, the Government insisted to let CPU revise the Scheme's operation (Administration Wing, HKSARG 2013b). As a result, the CPU began to administer the Scheme, including the identification of research areas and topics, invitation of applications, assessment, and monitoring. It is reported that after Shiu came to office, the CPU has awarded four out of 11 funded consultancy studies to the pro-Beijing One Country Two Systems Research Institute (Chong 2014) which Shiu used to head.




In less than two years' time, the CPU seems to have expanded its functions beyond the original think tank of the Government. In addition to advising the CE, CS and FS on various policy issues and conducting research, it now collects and monitors public opinion, oversees appointments to government advisory bodies through a Full-time Member, and resumes control of public policy research funding. While these changes indicate the unit's increase of power in a short period of time, they also imply more challenges for CPU from inside and outside of the Government.

### **Concluding comments**


The CPU, since its formation in 1989, has seen changes of sovereignty from the British Government to the Chinese Government. After the handover, it has also served three CEs.

Throughout its 25 years of history, the institutional structure of the CPU has remained relatively simple. It is led by a head together with three to four Full-time Members and a team of Part-time Members. The only changes observed in the institutional structure was the increase in the number of Part-time Members from under 20 in the pre-1997 era to over 40 under Tsang's era.



The most significant change observed in the CPU was its roles and functions. In the early days, the political environment was relatively simple, with the British government targeting to maintain political stability and maximize benefits to them. Opposing views were mainly dealt with by "administrative adsorption". Nevertheless, in the days near to the handover, the colonial rule faced "confidence crisis" and also the challenges of the change of economy from manufacturing-based to service-based. Under this circumstance, the CPU was set up to deal with the crises and challenges mainly by providing outsiders' advice and expertise to complement the management by generalists, that is, the AOs.


After the handover, various challenges and governance crises, such as the Asian financial crisis and the bird flu in 1997, continued to hit the HKSAR Government. The popularity of the CE, Tung, had plummeted. To help strengthen the executive rule, Tung decided to set up the POAS in 2002 for policy advice and positioned the head of the CPU, Professor Lau, as spokesman of the government. Besides doing policy research, the CPU had shifted focus to conducting polling in order to help the CE gather information about public sentiment.




Nevertheless, the CPU did not come to the rescue of Tung who eventually stepped down before finishing his second term of office. His successor, Tsang, a veteran AO, put more trust on the civil servants and brought back the old days of "rule by AOs". The CPU was further sidelined by the expansion of the POAS and CSD. Although Tsang enjoyed an honeymoon period of high popularity in the first couple of years, the rise of civic society, the demand for more participation in policy-setting and the unstable, fragmented and politicised society posed headaches for Tsang. Under such setting, the CPU, though spending millions of dollars on research each year, seems unable to offer good advice or solutions to the HKSAR Government.

Leung, being very different from Tsang, decided to expand the roles and functions of the CPU. On top of doing policy research, the CPU is now given the power to oversee appointments to government advisory bodies and control public policy research funding. It has also been given the mission to lobby for public support for government policies through public opinion campaigns.

To sum up, despite the CPU has not experienced rigorous changes in its institutional structures, its roles and functions have experienced various permutations, from



offering outside expertise in the pre-1997 era, to being spokesman for Tung, and subsequently being sidelined by Tsang and finally being empowered by Leung to control policy research funding. It is obvious that the roles and functions of the CPU depend on its "bosses" to a very large extent.





## **Chapter Four**


### **The Central Policy Unit: Institutional Foundations and Maturity**

#### **Introduction**

Having addressed the institutional structures and changes of the CPU in Chapter Three, this chapter examines the institutional foundations and maturity of the CPU as guided and informed by the analytical framework devised in Chapter Two. The four periods described in Chapter Three, namely the pre-1997 era, the Tung Chee-hwa era, the Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era and the Leung Chun-ying era, are analyzed using Ostrom's seven rules-in-use, including boundary rules, position rules, authority rules, scope rules, aggregation rules, information rules and payoff rules. The analysis leads to an assessment of the institutional maturity of the CPU over the four periods.

#### **Period I: Pre-1997 era**

HK entered a turbulent stage after Britain and China started to negotiate about the sovereignty problem in 1982, and after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984. In order to tackle the foreseeable crisis in economy, constitutional development and social stability in the transitional period, the colonial government




decided to set up the CPU in 1988 which was “tailored for the HK Government” (Yue 1992) so that the government could have practical and imaginative advice for its long-term policy planning before the 1997-handover.

### ***Boundary Rules***

The boundary rules specify whether the participants “enter freely, and the conditions they face for leaving” (Ostrom 1999, p.52). With reference to the boundary rules, participants enter the CPU by appointment, and exit by retirement, resignation and completion of tenure.

After deciding the scope of the CPU, Lord Wilson, the then Governor, invited Leo Goodstadt to be the Head of CPU in 1988 in view of his diverse background. As Goodstadt was neither an AO nor a civil servant, his appointment broke the long tradition of the colonial government structure. Goodstadt was a scholar specializing in economics and political trends in Asia and China, and was a consultant economist who provided consulting service to various corporations in the Far East from the late 1970s to 1989 prior to joining the CPU. He was also a senior journalist specializing in economic and political issues from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. He served “Far




Eastern Economic Review”, London “Times” and “Euromoney”, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Asia Television Limited (ATV) (leofgoodstadt.com 2014) in that period.

### ***Position Rules***

Position rules are understood as the positions established in an action situation (Ostrom 1999, p.52). The CPU was a small scale think tank which consisted of 4 to 5 Full-time Members and 18 Part-time Members. The Full-time Members were mainly civil servants, economists, and political scientists seconded from the private sector such as the Swire Group and Hang Seng Bank. Among the 18 Part-time Members, approximately 50% of them were from the business field, whereas approximately 25% were from the legal profession and the rest 25% were from the academic sector (Yue 1992). They usually served the CPU for 1 to 2 years, and some of them served the Unit for a maximum of 30 months if the member’s expertise was in need. The offer of short-term contracts facilitated creative ideas since members would not worry about whether their career prospects would be affected in the long run.

Members of the CPU in this period were the “elite”, especially the “economic elite”




of HK. They tended to have postgraduate qualifications and successful careers with involvement in public affairs. The Part-time Members could keep the CPU in contact with the reality of HK with their social, economic and political sentiment.

In 1991, the CPU formed a network and invited former Part-time Members to give their opinion. This network could extend the support from social elite. The CPU also formed two “Community Panel” in May 1991 (Yue 1992). The panels not only consisted of leaders of pressure groups in HK, but also the representatives of middle class, the silent majority in the society. Diversity of members was a definite advantage to consolidate comprehensive information from the society.

### ***Authority Rules***

The CPU was completely separated from policy implementation, and its authority and executive power were based on the acceptance of proposal and the annual Policy Address. To find out the acceptance of its proposals, the Unit developed a mechanism to check the CS’s office on the degree of implementation one month after the proposal was submitted, and the record would only be cancelled if the report was implemented. Up to 1992, the Unit submitted 400 reports with only 0.5% being rejected (Yue 1992).




It could be interpreted that the senior policy makers and the CPU enjoyed a trusted relationship, and the CPU actually had a “behind-the-scene” executive power in setting the policy agenda.

CPU was an individual policy branch attached to top policy makers and distanced from the government daily operation. However, it could monitor the public sentiment on government performance and had the mandate to study the policy areas under other policy branches. CPU in fact enjoyed a higher authority status than other policy branches.


### ***Scope Rules***

The drafting of Policy Address is known to be a major task of the CPU. It was originally a task of the CS to receive policy branches’ proposed projects for the coming year, but they usually lacked political and social sensitivity in preparing the projects. The mechanism of drafting the Policy Address was changed in 1989 and had become a political task after it was delegated to the CPU. In the 1989 Policy Address, the goal was to rebuild community’s confidence in HK, therefore the New Airport Development Strategy was introduced. Another example happened in 1992, before the



arrival of the new Governor, Lord Patten. CS David Ford would like to collect a wide range of social policy initiatives within a short period of time to serve as the foundation of colonial government in the coming 5 years. The policy branches refused to submit policy proposal, abandoning the traditional policy process. Finally, David Ford assigned the authority to CPU to design an inter-departmental and a huge scale socio-economic policy, which was announced in the 1992 Policy Address “Our Next Five Years: The Agenda for Hong Kong” (Ma 1998).


Another major task of CPU was to provide crisis analysis to the policymakers. The CPU provided exclusive and confidential service for 3 clients: the Governor, the CS, and the FS. The Unit would study the projects suggested by these three policymakers. Different positions in the CPU would work on social, political and economic problems that the existing colonial government did not have the expertise and resources to deal with. The Unit was expected to provide comprehensive studies and creative solutions to problems that the government encountered, and it was shown that the position of CPU might affect the scope of the Unit.



Sir Piers Jacobs, the former FS, expressed his concern when the Governor, Lord Wilson, decided to establish the CPU. Sir Jacobs was worried that the Governor and the CS would adopt CPU's suggestion against him and his Financial Branch when the social and political issue was controversial to economic and financial benefits. Finally the CPU agreed that the Unit would not undertake any public role on behalf of the Government so as to prevent any possible worries (Ma 1998).

Right after the CPU was formed in 1989, the June 4<sup>th</sup> incident happened. The CPU had a new mission to facilitate policymakers to tackle ad hoc political crisis, to collect intelligence, to give instant response to maintain dialogue with the Chinese Government through members' network, and to forecast the possible difficulties in future before the 1997 handover.

It was believed that the CPU was also responsible for identifying political elites who believed in western values, and nurtured them to become political leaders before the handover. The British government expected these leaders to influence the HKSAR Government after handover so that "One Country Two System" could be implemented as per the British government's expectation (Lau 2012).




### ***Aggregation Rules***

Aggregating public opinions into collective decisions was not the scope of CPU under Goodstadt's leadership, and information in this period was mainly based on the judgment and personal network of CPU members. A few panels had been set up to aggregate views from public; however, these panels were mainly representing business sector, middle class, and political groups, and the impact of their views towards CPU final reports and recommendations were unclear.

The public generally accept this mechanism of aggregating public ideas, since economic and financial benefits were the top concern among the society, and the expectation of participating policy process was low at that time.

### ***Information Rules***

The CPU enjoyed a higher authority than other policy branches, and was against publishing any recommendation the unit produced, since publications would break the trust with her clients. Goodstadt remained reticent about CPU projects even when he attended a LegCo Financial Committee Meeting in 1990 for the approval of annual funding (Yue 1992). However, the Unit paid effort to build up public image via having






interviews and giving information to media.

For internal communications of CPU, members' personal connection with Chinese and HK officials, businessmen, civil servants and academics formed a high quality, informal and confidential information network. As mentioned in the Position Rules, these networks enable the unit to have high quality expert advice and sensitive information, and facilitate the unit to produce analysis on crisis quickly.

Part-time Members met on alternate Saturdays, and meeting was chaired by the head of CPU. Meetings were well organized, reference materials and papers were issued to members one week prior to the meeting, and usually 2-3 issues were discussed in each meeting. The frequent and regular communication channel acted like a brain-storming session, and facilitated CPU to make quick response to social issue and public sentiment.

In 1991-1992, CPU strengthened the information network of CPU former Part-time Members via coordinating regular meeting every 6 months, and later, meeting every 3 months. These structured discussion provided extra source of expertise to existing




CPU members.

CPU aggregated public opinion via meeting selected representatives. Two “Community panels” representing leading pressure groups and middle class had monthly meeting with CPU members, and panel members would share their views on social topics with CPU members. However, panel members did not know the impact of their ideas, and information channel between panels and CPU was “one way traffic” (Yue 1992). Ideas from panel members would only be circulated to Deputy Heads of CPU for internal reference.

CPU submitted “Research Reports” and “Information Reports” to policy makers in clear and concise format in order to gain attention. Reports covered facts and recommendation of particular issue, and reports were checked by at least one person, and preferably two to three people to ensure accuracy and consistency.

### ***Payoff Rules***

For Payoff Rules, funding of the CPU comes solely from the government. However, the Unit was also subsidized by private sector in term of providing free expertise, intelligence, networks and professional advices. Big Corporation treated temporary




transfer of staff as information exchange in order to maintain a close ties with government under the unstable political condition before 1997 handover.

### ***Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity***

In the pre-1997 era, the colonial government believed in “governance by elitism”, and appointed elites from diverse background as members of CPU. The CPU had a trusted relationship with the Governor, the CS, and the FS, and enjoyed a higher authority than other policy branches. CPU was assigned various scope of important secret mission like studying the feasibility of inter-departmental policy and key political issue like 1997 handover and June 4<sup>th</sup> incident. Confidential information networks formed by members were the key information channel of CPU, and aggregating public views was not the major scope of work of CPU. However, the CPU was well-received by the public since Goodstadt paid efforts to build up CPU’s public image through media. People generally believed that the economic and financial benefits in Hong Kong were the result of “governance by elitism”, and the need of participating policy process was low in the society.

As an existing governmental institution, CPU can at least achieve Level 1 maturity.

As Level 1 maturity only requires an institution to have “legal structural




characteristics” and that “the main aim is to create appropriate institutions and to ensure the retention and enhancement” (Thynne 2012) in which its structure, tasks allocations and also task competencies are formed. CPU, from its first inception during the colonial era to the current government, the government offered CPU one of the main tasks is to advising policy address. There was no change on the core function of CPU under the legal status of the institution.

During this period, structure, power, interaction and ethics were quite clear. The membership of CPU was composed of elites from the society. Obviously, the structure was linked with the scope of CPU that it was to work on the problems that the rest of the government had no expertise and could only work on a project that was agreed by the three clients. The head of CPU could create collaborative relations with the three clients. Information flow within the CPU was flat internal decision making structure which made trust and support between the head and the research staff. During Period I, it is concluded that CPU can achieve Level 2 maturity.

### **Period II: Tung Chee-hwa era (1997-2005)**

During the handover in 1997, similar to the LegCo, the CPU did not get the "through-train" arrangement, meaning that all members had to "get off the train"




before the handover and a new batch of members were appointed to "get on the train" after the handover. Not only have the members have changed, but the role and the function of the CPU have also become very different from the pre-1997 era.

### ***Boundary Rules***

For the Boundary Rules, similar to the pre-1997 era, people enter the CPU by appointment, and exit by retirement, resignation and completion of tenure.

Three people have acted as the head of the CPU during the Tung era, firstly Gordon Siu, Edgar Cheng and finally Professor Lau. Gordon Siu was actually a civil servant and appointment of him as head of CPU deviates from the practice of the pre-handover period when the head of the CPU came from outside the government. Advice given by the CPU may thus be very similar to those given by the civil servants in the bureaux and departments. 2.5 years later, in early 1999, Edgar Cheung, coming from the financial sector outside the government, replaced Gordon Siu as head of CPU and this represented a return to the unit's origin as an alternative source of advice to that provided by the civil service and lots of finance-related research has been carried out during this time. Then, in 2002, Professor Lau who came from the academic sector was appointed in 2002, which was seen as a move to strengthen the




academic support for the research by the CPU. From the above, it is clearly observe that the appointment of the head of the CPU significantly affects its scope.

### ***Position Rules***

Similar to the pre-1997 era, the CPU consisted of Full-time and Part-time Members. Shortly after the handover, in end 1997, there were 35 Part-time Members in the CPU, which is already double of that in the pre-handover days. The number rose to 49 in end 1998. However, in early 2000, the number of Part-time Members was reduced back to 33 as they found it difficult to arrange meetings for such a big group. (CPU focuses on Democratic Party members and takes in members from the IT and tourism sector 2000)

In the pre-handover period, many of the members came from the business sector and were viewed as the 'elites', possessing the talent to offer advice to the government for the benefit of HK. However, after the handover, with the rise of the civic society, this 'elite' system was not working as well as it used to be. To cope with this change, people from different sectors of the society, including the academics sector, the social welfare sector, the political sector, and so on, were recruited into the CPU and its




composition has become more diversified. For instance, following the appointment of Professor Lau as head of CPU in 2002, many professors from the academics sector were appointed as Part-time Members as well. This showed a certain degree of shift from "governance by elitism" to "governance by network".


The diversification of the CPU members has facilitated the setting up of multifariousness panels under this era, including the Pan Pearl River Delta panel, social cohesion panel, Basic Law Article 23 panel, and so on. It has also resulted in diversification of the scope of the research, ranging from economic topics to social topics, such as housing, poverty, children, young people, elderly, families, art and culture, environment, education, health care, third sector, and so on. (List of research projects at Appendix B)

### ***Authority Rules***

Similar to the pre-1997 era, the CPU did not any explicit authority. Its influence depended really on whether the CE was willing to listen to the advice from the CPU, including its head and members. It is clear that the ones who take up different positions in the CPU and their relationship with CE would affect its authority.



The appointment of Professor Lau into the CPU was seen as a gesture by Tung to show to the public that he was willing to listen to the views of the public, in particular opposing views. Nevertheless, it seemed that Tung was never whole-hearted in listening to the views of Professor Lau and other members of the CPU and there was a lack of trust between them. In fact, in September 2003, just about one year after he took up the post of the head of the CPU, Professor Lau has openly said that he would like to go back to the Chinese University (*Lau Siu-kai: It is about time to return to the Chinese University*, Hong Kong Economic Journal 2003). In January 2003, Professor Lau has also written to the those who has been consulted regarding the Policy Address, to thank them and at the same time inform that that their opinion and advice has not been adopted in the Policy Address (Lee 2003). This clearly demonstrated that the authority of the CPU was really weak. The role and importance of the CPU further diminished after the implementation of the POAS in 2002, because the CE could rely on the Principal Officials instead of the CPU for policy advice. Indeed, it was the policy bureaux who got the authority for deciding the direction of the policies and its implementation, but not the CPU.





### ***Scope Rules***

Drafting the Policy address still remained as a main task of CPU. However,


Professor Lau added the following to the task list of the CPU:

- (1) Helping the CE obtain information about the political situation and public sentiment;
- (2) Providing the government with long term viewpoint as policy reference;
- (3) Strengthening its capabilities in respect of conducting surveys and analysis on public opinion; and
- (4) Fostering academic support for policies.

*(Lau Siu-kai took up the role as Head of CPU and challenged members with four missions, Wen Wai Po 2002)* These tasks seem to be a bit different from the Leo Goodstadt's days when the CPU was taking up tasks that no bureaux and departments wanted to take up.


Professor Lau worked very hard on these four aspects. During that period, the CPU carried out 70 polls each year (Ng 2004), which means more than one poll per week.

Topics of the polling were of a wide variety, ranging from prevention of avian flu, Victoria Harbour reclamation, Harbour Fest, constitutional development, etc and the



government admitted that the CPU would carry out opinion surveys of any topics which was of interest to the public (news.gov.hk 2004). In fact, he carried out so many opinion polls that some people called the CPU as the “Central Polling Unit” (Fan 2003). Professor Lau also took up the job of spokesman for the government. He frequently appeared in front of the media, defending government policies in front of the media and some people called the CPU as “Central PR Unit” (Fan 2003). Some people also called the CPU as the "Counting People Unit" (Yu 2004), as CPU somehow took up the role of estimating the number of people turning up in the protests.

On the other hand, though the number of polls carried out by the CPU under this era has increased, the number of public forums organized by the CPU has decreased. In 1998 and 1999, 10 public forums were organized each year, but in the year 2000 to 2003, the number has been greatly reduced to around 3 each year. (Eu 2005) It seemed that that method of aggregation of public opinions has shifted from open discussion in the front stage to doing secret polling in the back stage.




### ***Aggregation Rules***

Aggregating public opinion into collective decisions had been the main focus and scope of Professor Lau. Under his leadership, the CPU carried out lots of polls and Professor Lau often met with people from different sectors of the society to listen to their opinions. The composition of the CPU members had also been diversified to include people from different background. Nevertheless, Tung's policies did not seem to be able to satisfy public sentiments. As the matters discussed within the CPU were kept confidential, as described under the Information Rules, it was not sure whether CPU failed in its role of aggregating public opinion or that Tung failed to listen to the CPU.

### ***Information Rules***

Similar to the pre-handover period, the CPU was still a “black box”. Professor Lau had openly refused to release the results of the polling that CPU conducted, using the excuse that “it will arouse unnecessary public speculation about governance and direction of Government policy.” (news.gov.hk 2004). Nevertheless, starting from 2000, CPU had selectively put some of its research reports on its website despite many of the reports were still kept confidential. The confidentiality of CPU had not




only made research of its institutional foundation difficult, but it had also made members who took up positions in the CPU unhappy, as they did not know whether their advice had been listened to or not. The society was also unhappy about the confidentiality of the CPU and legislative councillors frequently challenged the payoff of public money for such a secret mission.

### ***Payoff Rules***

Similar to the pre-1997 era, funding of the CPU came solely from the government. Those who joined the CPU were not simply awarded in monetary terms, but they also received the benefit of getting access to insiders' information. They also enjoyed a higher social status of being closer to the core of the HK government. However, as described under the Information Rules, as the CPU was still a “black box”, it was difficult to find solid proof of the payoff of the CPU members.


### ***Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity***

Although the CPU in Period II remained as a “black box” and information about it was still kept highly confidential, the institutional foundations of the CPU had changed a lot. Its members in different positions had diversified background, showing a shift from "governance by elitism" to "governance by network". Rather than doing



secret missions as assigned, the CPU began to focus on polling and aggregating public opinions. The change of the CPU echoed the change in the political environment characterized by the rise of the civic society. However, despite the changes of CPU which went along with the trend in society, the CPU was not well-received by the public as its authority was very weak and depended on the relationship with the CE. Tung did not put much emphasis on the CPU and he even set up the POAS for policy advice in 2002. The CPU was thus left aside and its advice left unattended.


Given the above analysis, the concern here was whether the CPU can achieve Level 2 or even Level 3 maturity during this period. The four elements, i.e. the structure, power, interaction and ethics had been constructed for CPU to achieve Level 1 maturity at least. However, due to the change of “boundary” of CPU, it affected the interdependency and linkage of the four elements. With the appointment of Professor Lau as the head of CPU, and the appointment of Tung, a businessman as CE, the dynamics between Lau and Tung affected the main function of CPU. The lack of trust between them led to the absence of adoption of CPU’s opinion into the Policy Address, and it diminished the relationship between the head of CPU and the CE. Another clue explaining the ineffectiveness of the CPU was the new political arena. The expansion of POAS positioned CPU as the non-agent for deciding policy direction. The



authority of CPU was trimmed down and the scope of CPU was changed during Tung's administration. All of the above could not accommodate a healthy interaction between Professor Lau and Tung.

With the academic background of Professor Lau, CPU was strong at conducting polling to help CE get information about the political situation and public sentiment in the society with the nickname of "Central Polling Unit", "Central PR Unit" and "Counting People Unit". However, how much research and advice the CPU had provided to the three clients was unknown as there was no direct clue to investigate how the research and the policy implementation were linked to each other. It was hard to see the direct role of CPU with the three clients. The CPU entity could only give people an impression that it only worked on polling without substantial contribution on policy advice in which the power was narrowed down, and the interaction with other bodies was not clear.

In addition, most of the research data and polling were kept secret internally, making the public unable to access the information. This should be one of the easier ethical standards to be fulfilled. In summary, during this period, what CPU could do or could




not do was controlled by the CE. There was no alignment between the power of CPU should have and the people that CPU should serve. CPU could not function as a real think tank during this period and it could not achieve Level 2 maturity. It only regressed to an “orderly shell”.

### **Period III: Donald Tsang Yam-kuen era (2005-2012)**

As highlighted in the previous Chapter, the HK society during Period III was tensed up by the growing diversified societal interests that the fragmented political system failed to cater to, which in turns brought new economic, social and political challenges for Tsang’s government particularly on restoring the governance confidence that was hampered by the sudden step-down of Tung in Period II. In this regard, the need for high quality policy advice in a timely manner should thus be imminent for the government and CPU as its own think tank ought to play a key role under such dynamic and volatile environment.


#### ***Boundary Rules***

Given the sudden step down of Tung in the mid of his tenure, it was reasonable that Tsang ought to keep the resulting impacts minimal during his first two years of




service after taking up the remaining term of office from Tung. Assuming that Tsang followed this line of thought, the continuation of Professor Lau as the head of CPU would not be a surprise as they were not new to each other. By the same token, the “seamless” replacement of Tsang Tak-sing by Shiu was not surprising for their same pro-Beijing background and obviously to maintain the connections with the pro-establishment camp. The later appointment of Lau Sai-leung to CPU would be a clue to the deviation of the traditional role of CPU in producing policy advice and a piece of evidence of how Tsang stretched the boundary of CPU to accommodate the talent he needed without being hindered by the rigid appointment process of civil servant, since Full-time Members of CPU were not employed on civil service conditions and accordingly need not be bounded by the Civil Service Regulation and Code of Conduct.

Lau Sai-leung was an experienced commentator, former consulting chief editor of Tom Group, Cup’s Publishing chief executive officer, a member and executive director of the Democratic Party and believed of having affiliations with Martin Lee Chu-ming, the ‘Father of Hong Kong Democracy’ (Liu 2008) and the founding chairman of the Democratic Party, and Albert Cheng Jing-han, also widely known as





“Tai-Pan”, “Chief Executive before 10am”, who was the host of the popular radio talk show *‘Teacup in a Storm’* and an elected LegCo Member from September 2004 to September 2008. Around the same time of Lau Sai-leung’s appointment, Tsang also appointed Andy Ho On-tat as the CE’s office information coordinator. Cheng (2006) commented that their appointments had reflected the importance of public relations in the eyes of Tsang who vowed “strong” governance in his first Policy Address of 2005-06 themed “Strong Governance for the People”. Rather than focusing on the policy itself, it seemed to Cheng that Tsang just wished to win public opinion to suppress the voices of opposition, but at the same time acknowledged that his fellow AO ruling class might not have a good enough feeling for the community’s pulse. He went on to alert that “spin” alone would not solve the basic problem but make it neglected. While it was important to present government’s position to its citizens in a persuasive manner, it was considered more important for the administration to demonstrate its sincerity in listening to the citizens in a non-selective manner. Tsang’s appointments of his own spin doctors also meant silencing Professor Lau who used to be the spokesman for government on his own account during Period II. The shifting of focus from policy research to policy “marketing” could also partly explain the increase of publication of research reports and seminars held as the observable




outcomes of CPU during Period III under the Scope Rules below.

Last but not least, the boundary or more specifically the appointment for or exit of CPU's members, no matter for Full-time and Part-time ones, remained under the full control of the bosses of CPU and were kept opaque without giving any explanation to the LegCo, not to mention the press or the general public.

### ***Position Rules***


The size of CPU's part-time membership was in general larger than that in Period II which was increased from 39 in 2005 and 2006 to 51 in 2007. The figures dropped to about 40 between 2008 and 2011 but rose up to 46 in 2012 (List of CPU members at Appendix A). The backgrounds were as diversified as in Period II with members drawing from different sectors of the society.

In his first Policy Address of 2005-06, Tsang announced that he would substantially expand the membership of CSD by inviting talent from different fields to join and look upon it as the most important advisory body (HKSARG 2005a). Around a month later, he appointed 153 non-official members to the CSD drawing from a broad cross




section of the community comprising mainly professionals, academics, businessmen, politicians, prominent labour and media personalities, indicating that he was pleased to know a wide spectrum of prominent people and experts had accepted his invitation and agreed to contribute their time and efforts to the Commission (HKSARG 2005b). Comparing the CSD's official terms of reference (HKSARG 2005c) with the claimed works of the CPU, it seemed that the setting-up of the CSD was of a higher profile, more strategic and embracing than that of the CPU and it provided advice to the CE only. This more prominent standing of the much expanded CSD had exerted side effects over CPU's membership composition which had been downgraded in terms of their members' political, academic and economic standings. The reason behind was that while a few CPU members were being "promoted" to the more prominent platform of CSD, it would obviously be more difficult to refill the vacancies by equally "qualified" ones bearing in mind that the unwieldy CSD had already "absorbed" those "prominent people and experts" as Tsang referred while the number of CPU's Part-time Members were also increased during Period III.

No matter for CSD and CPU, their expansion of memberships by Tsang during Period III could, in essence, be interpreted as his playing of the old trick of "administrative



absorption of politics” (King 1975) to co-opt potential political oppositions into the establishment so as to make his administration look more “people-based” rather than really listening from the general public. Although the total number of CSD’s members dropped more than half to around 67 since July 2007 and remained unchanged till the end of Tsang’s term of office, it was still massive enough to counter balance any voices from those oppositions that ought to be minority given the “boundary” for members’ appointments are well controlled in the hands of the government and not transparent as mentioned in the Boundary Rules above.


As King (1975) had predicted decades ago that such “elite integration” or “administerisation of politics” could work only in a society in which the general public are primarily apolitical. Chan & Chan (2007) echoed that “civil society is no longer content to have important decisions made for it; nor is it satisfied with the role of keeping the government in check. It demands participation in policy-making. In other words, it wants to transform its role from watchdog to partner in governing HK.” Given the rise of civil society or the politicization of the “apolitical” strata, milestone by the massive demonstration in July 2003 and followed by a series of symbolic social movements happened in Period III as mentioned in Chapter Three,



the government is under the demand to work in higher dimensions of public participation or establish more direct and dedicated “elite-to-mass” communication channels not only to listen to the citizens’ needs of growing diversity but have them reflected in the government policy. However, as explained below, even with the much enlarged CSD and CPU’s part-time membership, public opinions seemed still unable to be aggregated into the policy advisory mechanism.


### ***Authority Rules***

CPU has not been an executive body since its inception. Its authority totally depended on how its three bosses adopted the advice it rendered based on their instructions. During Period III, Tsang obviously “dictated” the control over CPU and played a dominating role comparing with the other two bosses of CPU. Firstly, Tsang’s AO background made him fully acquainted with the institutional constraints of the normal policy advisory mechanism of government bureaux such that he knew where to place the CPU. On the other hand, Henry Tang was conceivably less active given the weakened position of CS since the introduction of the POAS by Tung during Period II coupled with his own “laissez-faire” style of leadership, whereas John Tsang was in fact promoted by and well recognized as an ally of Tsang. Under such circumstances,



what could be done by CPU was up to the aspirations of Tsang who seemingly placed much more reliance on another policy advisory institution, i.e., the CSD which has been established since 1997 by Tung under his own chairmanship with a membership size of around 12 prominent figures including the incumbent CE, Leung Chun-ying, Gordon Wu Ying-sheung, Victor Li Tzar kuoi, Victor Fung Kwok-king, Allen Lee Peng-fei, etc.

The expansion of the CSD, as announced by Tsang in his first Policy Address of 2005-06 and mentioned in the Position Rules above, has also affected the authority of CPU in various ways. First of all, the head of CPU joined the CSD together with the CS, the FS and the Director of CE's office as only one of its four official members. Secondly, the Secretary to CSD has been taken up by a team of civil servants within the CPU establishment. Apparently, these could be viewed as extending the authority of CPU to take leverage of the broader and more powerful membership base of the CSD with higher political and economic standing. However, it can be argued that this arrangement has displaced the traditional advisory role of CPU to a secondary and merely supportive position. Furthermore, the monitoring and control over the works of the CSD, such as agenda setting and members' appointment, etc., would have been




under the AO-led Secretariat to the CSD which obviously has a higher degree of affinity with Tsang.

Given Tsang's dominance, the authority of CPU essentially depended on him. From the appointment of Lau Sai-leung to CPU as explained in the Boundary Rules above and the substantial expansion of the CSD in this section, Tsang did not look to the CPU for policy advice which he could "comfortably" resort to his AO-ruling class occupying most of the posts of the directors of bureaux during his second term of office. Moreover, Tsang's further expansion of the POAS in 2008 for creating the second tier political appointees, who were supposed to take care of the lobbying work with political parties, also diminished the authority of CPU for its "politics role" that was once played, and played well, during Period I. Therefore, the authority of CPU was much reduced. Other impacts from the reduced authority of CPU were its deliverables.

### ***Scope Rules***

On the face of it, the CPU remarkably issued more research reports and conducted more seminars during Period III than in Period II if only those published on its




website since 2000 are considered. Having said that and as the only few observable outcomes of CPU, this observation can be interpreted in two opposite ways.

On the one hand, Professor Lau tried to maintain his presence by releasing more research reports through the outsourced projects undertaken by private think tanks and universities. On the other hand, the CPU was then displaced or downgraded based on the assumption that those important researches had been kept confidential or handled directly by the respective bureau when the POAS looked more “harmonized” due to the stronger affinity between Tsang and his AO peers who took up the majority of the posts of directors of bureaux. The possible outcome would be the CPU had “spare” hands and time to perform even the less important research that could be released to the public. This echoed with the reduced authority of CPU explained under the authority rules above.

### ***Aggregation Rules***

During the colonial days, with the support of its relatively small yet highly qualified pool of Part-time Members drawn from the economic elites of society, CPU managed to act fast in giving advice to its bosses, such as the New Airport Development






Strategy which re-built the community confidence after the June 4<sup>th</sup> incident in 1989 as mentioned in Period I. However, given the CPU membership has been opened up to a wider spectrum of the society and displaced by the more prominently positioned CSD, the main arena of aggregating public opinions would no longer be in CPU.


On the other hand, and given the massive CSD and CPU's membership as mentioned in the Position Rules above, it is doubtful how deep the deliberation among the members could be. Rather, they could only voice out opinions subject to the officials' decisions. The other dimension stemming out from the Position Rules was the "homogeneity" of the members' views given the majority of them would be those acceptable to the government, leaving behind the minority places for those to be "co-opted" as already explained under the Position Rules above.

In any case, no matter what advices were aggregated by way of CPU's own research team or provision through outsourced research project or from Part-time Members, it was still up to Tsang and his fellow AO ruling class in the bureaux to accept the advice or not. In the interview with an ex-CPU Part-time Member as reported in the RTHK TV programme (RTHK 2011), Mr. Kwong Chun-yu, the incumbent Yuen Long



District Councillor who was appointed from January 2010 to December 2011 to CPU and had participated in the social movement of the anti-Express Rail Link project in 2009, stated that whether the government actually paid any attention to the recommendations made by CPU's members remained in doubt. Even some of the members had the intention to contribute good opinions for government policies, the influences were not as high as people may think. He thus viewed that the CPU's advisory role has been fading out since the handover and doubted the government did not want to listen to the advisory body it established which contributed to its isolation from society and failure to aggregate public opinions into the policy-making process.

In short, given the dominancy of Tsang during Period III, both the authority of CPU and the manner and degree it could aggregate public opinions were dependent on Tsang and his AO ruling class. The closing remarks made in the RTHK TV programme aforementioned is recapped here: “the government seemingly just want advisors that will confirm them in paths that they have decided to take anyway rather than seeking plain and unvarnished advice from the advisors”. In reality, the “top-town” or “elite” way of policy-making since the colonial days continued during Tsang's era which was not surprising in view of his own AO-background and the




networks of elites among his peers.

### ***Information Rules***

The appointment of CPU's Full-time and Part-time Members remained secretive as in the previous periods. In terms of its outcomes, Professor Lau kept his stance of refusing to release the results of the polling conducted by CPU and those confidential research reports. CPU thus still remained as a "black box" during Period III. Although more un-confidential research reports and seminars were catered to the public, those were regarded as less important as mentioned above.

### ***Payoff Rules***


Same as Period II, CPU was still fully funded by public money but in view of the stronger public demand on accountability, citizens as taxpayers tend to ask for greater transparency on the operation of CPU especially on the "secretive" appointment mechanism for its Full-time and Part-time Members, who obtained the benefit of getting access to insiders' information and enjoyed a higher social status though to a lesser extent during Period III when CPU had been re-positioned as already explained under the Position Rules above. In fact, what is more worrying in the eyes of the



public was as Mr. Alan Leong Kah-kit, the leader of Civic Party, once commented in an interview of a RTHK TV programme (RTHK 2011b) that: “CPU may have been relegated to a body that only serves the selfish interests of Donald Tsang’s ruling line-up”. Unfortunately this seems to be even worse in Period IV.


### ***Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity***

Through the analysis on the interrelationships between the different institutional rules-in-use, it is observed that the CPU regressed further and became less significant than before in the eyes of its bosses including Tsang himself, who actually looked upon his own AO-ruling class for policy advice or ideas while maintaining the “top-down” policymaking approach under the cosmetic cover of “political co-optation” institutional arrangements like the expanded size of CPU and CSD membership. Although he might pragmatically make good use of his own “spin doctors” to market his policy for stronger political support which did bring with him a higher citizens’ rating during his early days of governance, the growing social turbulence by rising civil society who demands real civic engagement and partnership with government on policy-making punctured the cosmetic cover later as reflected by the significantly dropped people’s level of satisfaction with the HKSAR Government



as highlighted in Chapter Three.

With the change of CE, Tsang took up his duty from June 2005 to 2012, and Professor Lau was still appointed as the head of CPU during this period. The structure, power, interaction and ethical standard of CPU were disarticulated in this period. First, the breakdown of relationship between Lau and Tsang was intensified. It could be attributed to the prominent expansion of CSD membership and the diminished role of CPU as the CSD became the most important advisory body. It seemed that the structure was established with the appointment of diversified membership with an average of 42 Part-time Members to give advice. However, it seems that there is no direct outcome from the CPU and the real tasks of the unit were unclear. CPU was repositioned as a “policy advice coordinator” but their authority and scope did not match with each other. Second, Professor Lau was no longer the spokesperson of the government. Instead, Tsang invited Lau Sai-leung, a spin-doctor and an experienced commentator to join CPU as the Full-time Member. This was the “political marketing” campaign of Tsang’s administration (Cheng, 2013, p.118). It implied that the relationship between the head of CPU and CE was not intimate. The disarticulation of its structure, power, interaction and ethics results in the CPU in this period remaining on Level 1 maturity. CPU could not function well enough in this




period to achieve Level 2 maturity.

#### **Period IV: Leung Chun-ying era (2012 - Present)**

Since Shiu Sin-por assumed the position as head of CPU in July 2012, the CPU has come across as a politicized unit in support of the Government. Unlike his predecessors, Shiu attempted to bring changes to the CPU by extending the unit's role beyond a government think tank, and expanding influences in new dimensions. Comparing with the previous three periods, there are changes in Ostrom's seven rules during Period IV which affect the various features of the CPU.


#### ***Boundary Rules***

One of the more noticeable changes happens in the rules governing the entry and exit of participants. In the past, staff of the CPU entered their roles by appointment and left mainly for the reasons of resignation or retirement. This has been the norm over the years for the relatively small workforce of the unit. However, Xian (2012) reported that from July to December 2012, that is within six months after Shiu took office, one-third of the CPU's research team members were forcefully removed from their posts for the purpose of renewing the staff composition. Among the 6 staff



members concerned who were all appointed at the time of Professor Lau, two of them were respectively Principal Researcher and Senior Researcher with at least 7 years' relevant experience. The CPU's decision to terminate the appointments of 4 staff and not to renew the contracts of the other two staff was unprecedented. When asked about the controversial termination of appointments followed by recruitment almost conducted immediately, the CPU's spokesman replied that the personnel changes were for the "needs" of the unit, despite critics' argument that vacancies have been reserved for Leung's supporters.

On the other hand, legislative councillors also questioned the criteria for selecting and appointing the Full-time Members of CPU (Panel on Public Service, Legislative Council 2012). In this regard, Shiu insisted that "all the Full-time Members were appointed according to their expertise and capability, regardless of their political stance and whether they were well-known to the public." This statement did not convince legislative councillors who stressed the importance of objectivity in making public appointments. Apparently, the head of CPU have exercised influences in determining the attributes of its participants and thereby setting the entry and exit rules.




### ***Position Rules***

By adopting a different boundary rule to control entry and exit, the CPU can further control the establishment of positions, and the number and types of participants to hold the positions. Some subtle changes of the present CPU can be observed from its membership size and diversity of composition.

In general, the unit remains to be small composing of core members including the Head, the Deputy Head, 3 Full-time Members, the Research Director and 9 Senior Researchers (Central Policy Unit 2012b). Apart from having suspended the hiring of Principal Researcher since late 2012, the original organizational structure has remained largely in place.

The current term CPU intended to expand its membership size by increasing the number of both Full-time Members and Associate Members (formerly known as “Part-time Members”). In November 2012, Shiu briefed the Panel on Public Service on the proposal to create a non-civil service position of Full-time Member (4) in CPU who would deepen policy research in public opinion, particularly the new media (Panel on Public Service, Legislative Council 2012). The proposal was eventually






withdrawn due to lack of support in the LegCo. It was also observed that the pool of Associate Members has been increased from 23 in March 2013 to 31 in March 2014, with the possibility of offering more new appointments in future (news.gov.hk 2014b).

CPU's membership today has become diversified comparing with the past three periods. In addition to academics and representatives from the business and public sectors, CPU also appointed individuals with political, social enterprise or social service background as Associate Members to participate in the consultation work. The increase of members from various sectors of the community may reflect Government's demands on CPU for advice on new and pressing policy matters.

### ***Authority Rules***


With membership expanded and the types of members more diversified, the CPU has to review its authority rule so that participants in their particular positions have shared understandings about what actions they must, may or may not take.

Being a think tank in nature, the CPU's major function has always been "to provide



advice to the CE, the CS, and the FS” according to the Government (news.gov.hk 2012). Apart from conducting policy research and drafting the annual Policy Address, it also analyzes community concerns over public policy issues. However, as the CPU does not possess real execution power, the influence of CPU is dependent on its relationship with the clients, especially the CE.


Contrasting the relationship between Professor Lau and Tsang in Period III, Shiu appears to be Leung’s reliable and loyal partner. Since Shiu took office, the CPU has caught the attention of the media and the public with a few major events such as appointing Sophia Kao as a Full-time Member to coordinate appointments to about 400 government advisory bodies, and taking over the administration of the Public Policy Research Funding Scheme from the RGC starting from 2013-14. The former was treated as a new authority of the CPU since personnel management was never part of its major duties and responsibilities before. Although the CS reassured that the CPU is neither empowered nor entrusted to “approve, decide on or veto the appointments of candidates nominated by policy bureaux” (news.gov.hk 2012), the media revealed that Kao has de facto power originating from the CE (*Lam denial in doubt as Kao power revealed*, The Standard 2012). These incidents show that the



CPU under Shiu may not consult the policy bureaux, LegCo and other stakeholders even for controversial issues.

### ***Scope Rules***

While members of the CPU are assigned with additional sets of actions based on the Authority Rule, the potential outcomes that are linked to their actions are supposedly delimited by the Scope Rule. In Period IV, assisting the CE in preparing the Policy Address continues to be one of the important outcomes of the CPU. However, following the changes in authority, the scope allowed has been extended to providing advice on candidates suitable for appointment to statutory and advisory bodies, and collecting and analyzing public opinions for the Government's reference. Unlike the former heads of CPU, Shiu made an open remark that the unit, as one of the government organizations, is a "government tool" and should carry out duties as assigned by the three top Government officials (Panel on Public Service 2012). This aroused public concern that instead of providing objective advice to the government, the CPU would rally support for the government through the mass media. Should this be the case, the scope rules would be ineffective in delimiting the potential outcomes arising from CPU's expanding activities.




### ***Aggregation Rules***

As a “government tool” with expanded authority and a widening scope of functional domains, the CPU can arguably reach decisions without aggregating public opinions nowadays. This is manifested in the widening gap between the Government’s policies and the public’s expectations, despite CPU’s claim that its monitoring of various media would let the Government better grasp community sentiments. Moreover, the CPU has been criticized for allegedly not renewing the appointment of Associate Members with different opinions. If the majority of CPU’s members come from Leung’s camp, their similar preferences would likely be transformed into CPU’s collective and binding decisions.

### ***Information Rules***


As the CPU has become more inclined to serve the Government’s interest, it is not surprising that most of its information has to be held secret. Since Shiu become the new head of CPU, he has stressed the importance of confidentiality among its members so as to prevent the leakage of any immature policies of the Government. The CS echoed Shiu’s view and explained that CPU’s research is for the Government’s internal reference and discussion only (news.gov.hk 2014). Regarding



the availability of information to the public, the CS also commented that research projects undertaken by the CPU would be made public “as far as possible, provided that such disclosure will neither affect the proper and effective conduct of the research work of the CPU, nor inhibit the frankness and candour of discussion within the Government”. Although the current term CPU has made 14 of its research public on the website, only 6 of them are released as full reports and others as executive summaries. The CPU almost does not interact with the public as well; since September 2012, only one seminar and one forum have been held. Nevertheless, the CPU has become more responsive to media criticisms. It has published three “CPU Statements” and one “CPU’s response to media enquiries” since December 2012.

### ***Payoff Rules***


As a result of the above changes in boundary rule, position rule, authority rule and scope rule, the new and social media tend to associate the assignment of benefits and costs within CPU with political stance. A recent example is concerned about the allocation of funding from the Public Policy Research Funding Scheme. It has been reported that since 2012/13, the pro-Beijing think tank One Country Two Systems Research Institute has received approximately HK\$2.7 million for conducting



research commissioned by the CPU (*CPU research fund granted to One Country Two Systems Research Institute again*, Mingpao 2014). Owing to the fact that Leung was one of the Institute's founders, Shiu was its Executive Director and its current Executive Director was appointed by Leung to the Executive Council, CPU's allocation of such a large sum of funding to the Institute appeared to be problematic in the eyes of the public. It is generally perceived that the allocation of such a large amount of funding is a positive reward for political relations and support.

#### ***Overall Situation and Levels of Maturity***


The seven rules-in-use have changed further in Period IV under the new leadership, with cumulative effect on CPU's participants, positions, actions, outcomes, and information. With the new office of Leung in 2012, the role of CPU was strengthened in terms of its prominent political stance after Shiu became the head of the CPU. With a good relationship between Shiu and Leung, as both of them were the former executive director of the "One Country Two Systems Research Institute" and also the Chairman respectively, they may know the needs of each other. The relationship between Shiu and Leung should be the most harmonious when compared with the previous periods.



Various actions showed that the CPU is empowered in this period in some sense. Given the clue from the Authority Rules, the appointment of Sophia Kao as a coordinator to recruit the members for the 400 government advisory bodies and also the rescind of the appropriation of the public policy research fund demonstrated its power, even though the actions brought tremendous controversy in the society. In fact, the power of CPU in this period is quite strong because the CPU could eliminate the Associate Members with different opinion from the stance of government.

The power in the period was undoubtedly empowered given by the CE. Without CE support, CPU could not become a rather strong entity in front of the public and media. Although it had no real execution power, the influence of CPU was magnified under this period. The power and its interaction with other bodies were interlinked even though there were many controversies over the society. Same as the previous periods, its ethical standard was internalized that most of the research were kept confidential. It is concluded that under Shiu and Leung, CPU can achieve Level 2 maturity in this period.


The question now is whether CPU can achieve Level 3 at the moment. Level 3



maturity is the most demanding level. This level emphasized on how integrity can be built in into an institution. Being a living entity, exercise of power, endorsement of power and embodiment of ethical standards are the keys for this level. In some sense, this can be interpreted as the legitimacy of the institution.

As a living entity, it should be based on “institutional value infusion and maximization, leading to public consent and a capacity for social capital formation, with implications for the efficacy of policy development, implementation and review (Thynne 2012). When exercising of power, it involved in the “meeting of public needs... in which are not only accepted by a community, but actually endorsed as both authorized and justified. For the endorsement of power, meaning that “institutions being spontaneously drawn together an acting through an effecting meeting of minds, while retaining their own identities and sense of well-being without threatening their respective degrees of autonomy”. For ethics, the “ethical standards will be complemented by their embodiment in all institutional decisions and action”.

Given the above definition and the analysis, CPU cannot achieve Level 3 maturity in this period. When talking about Level 3, it emphasized on “value infusion and






maximization”. It is necessary for us to know what the value of CPU behind. But it seemed that the value was shifted and even somewhat unclear due to the change of the CE. Although, it is very clear that CPU served the CE, CS and FS, CPU gave an ambiguous impression to the public. CPU is just like the “Central Propaganda Unit” in Period IV. There was no central value that can be clearly conveyed to the public.

When talking about “exercising of power”, meeting public needs is the key for exercising of power. It seemed that CPU could not satisfy the public needs even CPU conducted different seminars, events and posting research reports on its webpage as the number of those activities and availability of research reports were minimal. Also, CPU was only confined to serve the CE, CS and FS, it cannot be proved how this government think tank can advocate the efficacy of policy development. Being a think tank making use of over HKD 88 million for its operational expenditure in 2012-2013 (Administration Wing, HKSARG 2013c), the public was doubtful about the existence of CPU.

The “endorsement of power” was also minimal throughout all the periods. Being said the exercise of power above, public needs could not be satisfied, the endorsement of




power then definitely could not be fulfilled as well. The relationship between CPU and the community was not close enough for the public to get to know what CPU was working on. The CPU definitely had its own degree of autonomy even though it was dominated by the CE, but its autonomy could not bring legitimacy to them.

Lastly, it is about the “embodiment of ethical standard”. As information within the unit is regarded as secret and government’s reference only, the CPU kept this as a “work ethics” and internalize into the institution. From the institution perspective, it can be seen that CPU could meet a kind of ethical standard internally. However, externally, the public should have some expectation to understand what CPU is actually working on in terms of their real functions in the government and for the public.

### **Concluding Comments**


Throughout the four periods, the existence of CPU in terms of its structure, power, interaction and ethics was mainly manipulated by the governor during the colonial period and the CE after 1997 respectively. The boundary for entering the CPU as the Head was largely bounded by favoritism of the governor or CE. But the dynamic




between the head of the CPU and the governor or CE could be different from the original intent of the CE as exemplified during Period II and Period III. The mistrust between them minimized the authority and scope of the CPU during Period II and III. In contrast, the head of CPU and governor or CE had a better relationship during Period I and IV, so that the authority and scope of the CPU was slightly magnified but also more politicized in trying to help advance the rule of the government.

Following the analysis above, the established structure of the CPU does not necessarily mean that it can achieve a higher level of institutional maturity. The evaluation shows that the CPU achieved different levels of institutional maturity in the four periods: it started at Level 2 in Period I but regressed to Level 1 in Period II and III; during Period IV, the CPU progresses to Level 2 maturity. The variation of the level of maturity during different periods is mainly attributed to the change of power and authority of the CPU which made it unable to function very well. The degeneration of the CPU is mainly caused by the change of the leadership of the HK Government which vacillates the positioning of CPU all over the period.

As HK citizens have increasingly high expectations on government departments and



publicly-funded bodies, the CPU is expected to progress steadily for both the long-term development itself and the betterment of the public. In the next chapter, the project is concluded with some recommendations for the CPU.




## **Chapter Five Conclusion and Recommendations**

### **Introduction**

The CPU, supposedly a think tank for the HK Government, has witnessed 25 years of history from 1989 through the handover up to the present. As discussed in the previous chapters, its role, structure and control has changed significantly over the years, depending heavily on the "bosses" that it was serving. This Chapter aims to conclude the main findings of the study. Learning from the history of the CPU itself and drawing from overseas experience, some recommendations are suggested for the way forward for the CPU.

### **The research questions revisited**


In Chapter One, five research questions were posed, the first one being "what type of institutions could a government adopt to generate policy ideas". Think tanks are one type of institutions which generate policy ideas and have particular significance in terms of their institutional dynamics and the impact on governance. Firstly, the definitions of think tanks were reviewed, which are diverse in typologies, depending on the perspectives taken when doing the classification. Yet, think tanks serve the



basic purpose to make policy advice available for policy-makers. Think tanks have the significant function of linking between the “knowledgeable” and “the powerful” of the society (’t Hart, 2006). They also deal with the “policy” and “politics” dimensions by serving the roles of “policy analyst” and “lobbyist” behind the scene in the policy-making process. This function is particularly important given the modern complex society as McGann pointed out: “In the world filled with tweets and sound bites that are often superficial and politically charged, it is critical to know where to turn for sound policy proposals that address the complex policy issues that policymakers and the public face.” (TTCSP 2014a)


Regarding the local context, this study does not look at any single, substantive policy problem that HK faces, but it focuses on how policy ideas are generated and in particular the effectiveness of the HK Government’s own think tank, i.e. the CPU, through the analytical lens of the seven institutional rules-in-use developed by Ostrom (1999) and the concept of institutional maturity of Thynne (2011) as described in Chapter Two across the timeline of CPU’s development since 1989.

Chapter Three gives an outline on the origin and history of CPU to address the




research question of why the government has decided to establish and operate the CPU. CPU's history since its establishment has been divided into four periods basically by the tenures of governors before 1997 and the CEs after the handover until now. Each period is distinctive from each other with the key contextual changes of CPU both internally and externally, especially highlighted was the impact caused by the changes in leadership. Moreover, it can be observed that such contextual changes interact in a dynamic manner and influence the positioning of CPU when it reacted to such contextual changes.

In Chapter Four, to evaluate "how the change in leadership, from the pre-1997 period to the post-1997 period, influenced the role, structure and control of the CPU" and "to what extent the CPU is an effective and a mature think tank contributing to the effective governance in HK", the facts of contextual changes as described in Chapter Three were collated with the seven institutional rules-in-use along the horizon of CPU's level of maturity. It is observed that the CPU would adjust or re-position itself along the seven rules-in-use in response to those contextual changes. However, the most important change was the change of government leadership which expanded or delimited CPU's boundary, authority and position, and led to further knock-on



influences over its scope or outcomes as well as the way information was collected or released, the way that decisions were aggregated among players and their pay-off given the seven rules-in-use are highly interrelated.

Such institutional dynamics also resulted in CPU's regression in terms of institutional maturity from Period I to Period III mainly due to the lack of trust between the CEs and Heads of CPU as concluded in Chapter Four. However, the progression made during Period IV has to be remarked with a caveat. Although the level of trust and working relationship between the incumbent CE and head of CPU are better than their predecessors of Period II and III, the CPU seems heading to a direction that deviates from the expected role of think tank as "policy analyst" for the government acting for the public interest of the society. There seems to be a growing "over-shadow" of the "public policy" elements by "politics" over the work of CPU. As mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter, think tanks do sometimes need to handle "politics" and the CPU had undertaken such tasks of maintaining liaison with the Chinese Government required during Period I and performed well for the interests of the society at that time. However, nowadays the CPU seems to be serving a narrow purpose for political line-up and propaganda at the expense of "public policy" development.






### **Some Lessons Learnt from Other Think Tanks**

In HK, the study of think tanks receives attention very recently as it was reported in July 2014 that the LegCo President, Jasper Tsang Yok-sing, planned a fact-finding trip to the United States to study think tanks before attempting to form one in HK and he had commissioned a group of experts to study how to nurture a mature think tank earlier on. Also in the same newspaper report, Andrew Fung Ho-Keung, the chief executive of the Policy Research Institute said: “the city might have very good infrastructure, but the software is still lacking and there is yet to be any policy research with great impact in this town.” (Lam, Cheung & Ng 2014).

In Mainland China, the importance of think tanks on improving policy-making process and strengthening of their development with Chinese characteristics have also been stressed by the Communist Party of China at its Central Committee’s meeting held on 12 November 2013 (Communist Party of China, 2013 and Hu, 2014) with the first ever think tank summit held in June 2014, Shanghai which was well received (Chang, 2014).


The think tanks in China and HK are generally smaller in numbers with shorter years



of establishment than their counterparts in leading western democratic countries and do not achieve prominent standings in the 2013 GGTTTI (TTSSP 2014a). For instance, only two private think tanks in HK appeared in the 2013 GGTTTI, namely Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research ranked 35 out of 80 in the sub-category of Domestic Economic Policy Think Tank, and Civic Exchange Hong Kong in the sub-category of Environment Think Tank ranked 44 out of 70 (Winn 2014 and TTCSP 2014a). Therefore, some successful cases of overseas think tanks are examined.


In the United Kingdom (UK), the Chatham House is one of the most renowned think tanks which is a key partner of the UK government on regional and international topics like global health, economics and international security (.chathamhouse.org, 2014). The institutional foundations and maturity of the Chatham House are briefly evaluated below, with highlights on lessons that can be drawn for the CPU.

The Chatham House got two clear core values, namely non-partisan and independence. These values are reflected in the mechanism of selecting its Presidents. The institution set up boundary rules to appoint three senior political figures from major political parties in UK as the Presidents of Chatham House. In 2014, Sir John Major, Lord




Ashdown and Baroness Scotland were appointed as the Presidents of the institute. Sir John Major, the former UK Prime Minister, represented the value of Conservative Party (UK); Lord Ashdown is the former leader of Liberal Democrats (UK) from 1988 to 1999; and Baroness Scotland, the former Attorney General for England and Wales, represented the value of Labour Party (UK) and racial equality because of her personal background (.chathamhouse.org, 2014). When comparing the CPU with Chatham House, setting an objective entry and exit rules and expanding the boundary for members with various political backgrounds may avoid controversy and ensure trusted research outputs of a think tank.

Besides its Presidents, the Chatham House established various positions to fulfill diverse functions. It is governed by one Patron, three Presidents, a Council and a Senior Advisors Panel based on the Chatham House Charter and Bylaws. The Queen of UK has been the Patron since 1952, and the three Presidents are senior political leaders from different political parties at Westminster. These arrangements reflect the high authority and influential status of the Chatham House. For Institution members, any individuals and organizations around the world could apply for a membership. Many of the members are from the business sector, media agencies,



non-governmental organizations, embassies, academic institutions, and even other think tanks. Council members are drawn from or elected by the institution member to ensure transparency and political neutrality. In contrast with Chatham House, the neutrality and transparency of CPU are being criticized since Shiu, Leung's key supporter, assumed the position as Head of CPU in 2012. A transparent, non-partisan and open governing mechanism might legitimize the scopes of service provided by the institution.


In addition to its Presidents and members, the Chatham House got more than 200 experts who provide expertise across a range of topics and issues, and carry out independent and rigorous research on global, regional and country-based issues such as climate change, global health, international economics, international security, Africa Programme, Americas Programme, Asia Programme and Russia and Eurasia Program. Researches are initiated by experts and are individually funded by each centre (Chatham House 2014). In contrast with Chatham House, the service scope of CPU is limited to local and cross-boundary issues. CPU was only given authority to provide policy proposals to the HKSAR government on regional and international issues. It has to rely on think tanks which work closely with the Chinese Government



with regard to international security and economics. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences carried out a continuous research on development in Africa since 1998 in order to facilitate the Chinese Government to boost its influence in Africa in the past decade (Ng 2014).


Besides carrying out research, another major task of the Chatham House includes producing regular publications like “The World Today”, a bi-monthly magazine which presents analysis and commentary on global issue, and “International Affairs”, a leading journal on international and public affairs. These publications and experts’ comments on website were frequently quoted by international media, and have a high impact on setting political and policy agenda and crafting new initiative globally. An expert of Chatham House, Dr. Tim Summers, posted his comments “White Paper Does Not Mark Major Shift on Hong Kong” on July 11, 2014 (Summers 2014), and his view has been widely quoted and discussed among HK media in the same month.

On top of publications, Members Events and Conferences are also the important outcomes of the Chatham House. The Chatham House organized around 100 members events, around 200 research workshops, and around 20 one- or two-day




conferences and various private roundtable discussion. Many of these events are open to members and the public, only some of them are by invitation only. Participants could exchange information and express themselves freely under the famous “Chatham House Rule”, which means that the source of information was being protected. The Chatham House could also aggregate public views before drafting research publications and recommendations which are highly influential in shaping the political arena. Also, most of the events are held on record, either in video, audio or transcription formats, and information could be accessed easily via internet. The openness of Chatham House gives the participants confidence that their voices are being heard, and Chatham House would remain neutral when discussions take place.

Regarding its source of income, the Chatham House is mainly funded by donations from philanthropists, corporate members and individual members. The membership-based funding is crucial to the independence of the institution, although some literature challenged that the Chatham House represents pro-establishment value since the institution is mainly funded by International Corporation and governments (Fotopoulos 2009).




In the aspect of institutional maturity, the Chatham House achieved Level 3 Maturity and met the “high standards of integrity” (Thynne 2012) through its structure, exercise of power, endorsement of power and ethical standard. Level 3 maturity focuses on whether the institutional values have been maximized. The value of the Chatham House is the “building [of] a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world” (Chatham House 2014). The Chatham House maximizes this value by carrying out trusted and independent analysis on regional and global issues, developing new ideas and recommendations to international challenges, and arranging open debates and events with world leaders and partners, such as the London Conference and the annual Chatham House Prize. The contribution of the Chatham House has given a clear image to the public. As an UK-based think tank, the institution won public recognition over the world. The institution ranked the No. 1 think tank outside the US for six consecutive years and No. 2 worldwide for 3 consecutive years according to the TTCSP (2014c).

To meet Level 3 institutional maturity, meeting public needs is the key for exercising power, and the Chatham House satisfied public needs and expectation through conducting conferences and seminars for members and the public, and records of



most of the events are uploaded to website for members' reference. This arrangement could ensure that the needs of participants were being heard in the aggregation process. Also, although the Chatham House does not have the authority to participate in policy implementation, the institution has a high impact on setting policy agenda in the policy-making process. For example, the institution delivers policy-relevant analysis and innovative ideas to policy-makers through Parliamentary Briefings and international conferences like United Nations (Chatham House 2014). The Chatham House enjoyed a close relationship with the community, and the public endorsed the institution's contribution and independence by giving financial support to the institution's research and activities. Financial independence also brings legitimacy to the institution's researches and findings.

Another key element for Level 3 maturity is the "embodiment of ethical standard". The Chatham House meets ethical standard both internally and externally. Since the institution is solely funded by members' donation, members are eligible to elect council members, the people who are responsible for management and operation of the Chatham House. Moreover, the Chatham House encourages openness and the sharing of information through the famous "Chatham House Rule". Such ethical






standard was widely used among governments and business corporations nowadays, and was treated as “morally binding” to encourage information flow.

## **Recommendations**

### *Act as Network Administration Organisation of the metagovernance network*


Taking into account that the CPU is now being distant from the community and learning from the example of the Chatham House, the CPU can adjust or re-position its institutional setting against different rule-in-use so as to play the role of “Network Administrator Organisation” (“NAO”) under the concept of metagovernance (Torfing, Peters, Pierre & Sorensen 2012) that provides new perspectives for public governance. Traditionally, the mode of generation of policy advice by the CPU or government departments is predominantly through self-production, i.e. bureaucrats to initiate the policies themselves that they believe are in the interest of the general public or solve the public problem in the way they perceive. Under the concept of metagovernance, the generation of policy ideas is viewed as a multi-centric network in contrast with the traditional “top-down” or “elite-mass” approach. The NAO in metagovernance is to govern the policy idea generation network.



To do so, CPU will need to adjust its different institutional rules-in-use. For instance, CPU's boundary and position will need to be expanded to be more embracing and balanced for its membership and composition together with a re-aligned and perhaps written statement of authority like the case of Chatham House having its own governing council, charter and bye-laws. The transparency of the CPU has to be enhanced too in the sense of the information rule for its members' appointment, researches topics selection and their publication, which helps to build trust and accountability in the eyes of citizens given the CPU is fully funded by public money. The CPU, if positioned itself as an NAO of the policy ideas network through adjusting its institutional rules-in-use, can enhance communication to build shared mental models among players in policy ideas arena, to develop reciprocity and trust among them. This new purpose or position, if to be adopted, is important driven by the fact that public problems are now becoming complex that demands "joined-up" solutions (Blair 1997) in a more integrative manner and no single party can now dominate the development of "policy recipes".

***Practise "Ideas brokerage"***

The NAO positioning of CPU also echoed with the new way of thinking of "ideas




brokerage” for think tank (’t Hart, 2006) which argued that “it is no longer about producing but about locating research, and it is no longer about getting “leverage” for one’s own ideas but about effective brokerage, i.e., organising interaction between and discursively connecting suppliers and consumers on the market for policy ideas.” As such, CPU can act as a “ideas broker”, who “do not engage in but rather facilitate ideas production probably by others so as to get the ideas evolve and “land” in the right places at the right times” as stated by ’t Hart. This involves CPU to work in a different way of aggregating public opinions as well as adjusting its scope of activities such that policy forums, briefings, conferences, publications and etc., like the case of Chatham House, will definitely need to be enhanced.

Following this logic, the priorities of the CPU will shift from maximizing its capacity to produce knowledge to building up expertise in the management of complex network and policy process.


***Nurture local think tank developments as a network***

Given the growing significance of think tanks in HK and even Mainland China in the recent years as highlighted above, how to provide the environment to nurture their



development is collateral to the quality of policy ideas that could be generated. In this regard, the CPU adjusts its mode of aggregation and scope by stepping back from self-production of policy ideas by itself to facilitate the development of think tanks in society, which could then be leveraged to identify and work with relevant stakeholders like the civil societies, political parties and government officials to work out solutions among themselves. Given local think tanks are generally green, CPU can adjust the payoff mechanism of the new policy ideas network to provide research grants or seed funds to nurture their development.


In short, CPU can re-positioned itself by adjusting its various institutional rules-in-use aforementioned so as to help to build a strong network of think tanks working on the principles of evidence-based, objectivity and policy analysis focus, which will be able to counteract with the emotional, superficial and populism driven war of words in current political habitat of Hong Kong. The move is also supplemental to practicing of “Deliberative Democracy” (Fishkin 2009), or more specifically Deliberative Polling, which requires the involvement of policy experts that think tanks can provide.



### **Limitations of the study**

This study mainly discusses how the institutional dynamics of the CPU in different period of times contributes to the effective governance of HK Government given the contextual background and challenges as outlined in Chapter Three. The study only looks from outside on how different parties involved in the CPU as mentioned in Chapter Four affected the effectiveness of the CPU according to the analytical framework integrating different institutional rules-in-use and institutional maturity set-out in Chapter Two when offering policy advice to the government. The analytical framework points to what institutional changes could be made to CPU towards its further development of institutional maturity with new positioning as what have been mentioned in the recommendations above. However, whether such changes could be realized or not requires other element that is beyond the scope of this study but needs to be looked into.


Moreover, the study is limited by information sources, which relies only on desktop research such as newspaper reporting, criticism, column, LegCo papers and official documents from the government as the main empirical evidence for analysis. No internal document and interviews are obtained and conducted to get first-hand



information from the previous Full-time or Part-time members and other government departments or bureaus. The CPU, as a “black box”, still lacks open access of information for the public and therefore the material obtained from the CPU is limited, not to mention its evidences of interactions with other departments or bureaus. Such a deficiency in information also leads to the analysis on the causal link between those researches conducted by the CPU and policies eventually adopted by the government as reflected in the policy addresses difficult if not impossible.


### **Concluding Remarks**

From this study, the CPU does need to change its positioning through different institutional rules-in-use for its further and sustainable development of institutional maturity in the effective governance of HK. In fact, no single institution can survive the tides of time without making any change and the only thing that does not change is change itself. The recommendations made while drawing lessons learnt from Chatham House shed light on the fundamental values that the CPU need to embrace for its long-term development and institutional maturity. However, the missing element is how to make it happen which is obviously not easy and actually depends on leadership. Think tanks provide with the knowledge for leaders to exercise powers.



However, “Knowledge is power but only if you know how to acquire it” (The Economist, 2003) and Krugman (2014) even remarked that “Knowledge isn’t power” nowadays when “[politicians] listened to economists telling them what they wanted to hear ... [they] pick and choose which experts or, in many cases, “experts” to believe, the odds are that they will choose badly ... All of which raises a troubling question: Are we as societies even capable of taking good policy advice”.

Leadership is a critical component of good public governance. Leadership leads to enhanced management capacity and organizational performance (OECD 2001). The CPU, with its adjusted positioning as NAO as recommended above, may result in the generation of good policy acceptable by the society. Whether such a change is to be pursued or not hinges on the vision of the leaders of CPU and its bosses. However, what is even more fundamental in leadership is how to gain trust between the leaders and their followers while implementing the change which in turns points to further research or study on ethics and integrity of leaders of think tanks in future.




## **Appendix A**

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### **List of CPU Members**

**(Obtained via 1823 hotline)**







**Annex I**

**List of Full-time Members of CPU**

<b>Member (1)</b>	Mr CHENG Hoi-chuen, Vincent	April 1989 – March 1991
	Mr WONG Kin-kwan, Anthony	April 1991 – March 1993
	Mr CHEUNG Chun-yuen, Barry	July 1993 – October 1994
	Mr HANSON Michael John James	May 1995 – January 1997
	Mr TSANG Tak-sing	July 1998 - June 2007
	Mr SHIU Sin-por	July 2007 – June 2012
	Ms HO Yin-fee, Fanny	November 2012 – Present
<b>Member (2)</b>	Mr CHEUNG Wing-lam, Linus	May 1989 – December 1990
	Mr HADDRILL Stephen Howard	January 1991 – July 1994
	Mr CHAN Kai-lung, Patrick	December 1994 – May 1996
	Dr John BACON-SHONE	August 1998 – October 2001
	Professor LEE Ming-kwan	December 2002 – June 2012
	Professor WONG Chack-kie	August 2012 – Present



<b>Member (3)</b>	Professor CHENG Yu-shek, Joseph	January 1991 – June 1992
	Mr YUEN Kee-tong, Norman	September 1992 – October 1993
	Ms CHENG Ngai-lung, Helen	May 1994 – October 1996
	Dr LIAN Yi-zheng	September 1998 – September 2004
	Mr LAU Sai-leung	February 2006 – June 2012
	Ms KAO Ching-chi, Sophia	October 2012 – Present
<b>Member (4)</b>	Mr KWAN Wing-kei, Charles	October 2012 – March 2013




Annex II

**Part-time Members of the Central Policy Unit**

**1989 - 1996**


<b>Name</b>	<b>Period of Appointment</b>
Dr Cecilia Chan Lai-wan, JP	01/05/1991 - 31/10/1991 01/11/1992 - 31/10/1994
Mr Johannes Chan Man-mun	01/11/1994 - 1996*
Mrs Pamela Chan Wong Shui, JP	01/06/1989 - 30/04/1991 01/06/1993 - 30/11/1994
The Hon Denis Chang Khen-lee, QC, JP	01/05/1989 - 31/10/1990
Mr Anthony Crowley Charter	01/05/1990 - 31/10/1991
Professor the Hon Edward Chen Kwan-yiu	01/05/1989 - 09/10/1991
Mr Christopher Cheng Wai-chee, OBE, JP	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1993
Mr Edward Cheng Wai-sun	01/05/1994 - 31/10/1995
Dr Peter Cheung Tsan-yin	01/11/1995 - 1996*
Dr the Hon Raymond Chien Kuo-fung	01/11/1989 - 30/04/1992
Mr Victor Chu Lap-lik	01/11/1993 - 31/10/1995
Dr Andrew Chuang Siu-leung, JP	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1992
Mr Robert Chung Ting-yiu	12/03/1994 - 1996*
Mr Gregory Leonard Crew	01/11/1991 - 31/12/1993
Mr Vincent Fang Kang	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1992
Mr Daniel Richard Fung, QC	01/11/1993 - 31/10/1994
Dr Victor Fung Kwok-king, OBE	01/05/1989 - 31/10/1991
Mr William Fung Kwok-lun, JP	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1993
Mr Hew Chow-tow	01/11/1994 - 1996*
Mr Herbert Hui Ho-ming	01/11/1995 - 1996*
Professor Ambrose King Yeo-chi	01/06/1989 - 31/10/1990

Note: \* Actual date not available.




Mr Stanley Ko Kam-chuen	01/05/1989 - 30/04/1990
Mr Gordon Kwong Che-keung	01/08/1993 - 30/04/1995
Mr Stuart Hamilton Leckie	01/06/1989 - 30/04/1990
Dr Jane Lee Ching-yee	01/05/1990 - 30/04/1992
Professor Rance Lee Pui-leung	01/05/1989 - 30/04/1991
Mr Peter Lee Ting-chang	01/05/1992 - 31/10/1994
Mr David Lee Tsung-hei	01/05/1995 - 1996*
Mrs Angelina Lee Wong Pui-ling	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1992
Miss Jacqueline Pamela Leong, QC	01/11/1992 - 31/10/1994
Mr Antony Leung Kam-chung	01/05/1992 - 01/05/1993
Dr Thomas Leung Kwok-fai	01/11/1992 - 31/10/1994
Mrs Sophie Leung Lau Yau-fun, OBE, JP	01/12/1993 - 31/10/1995
Mr Ray Man Leung	01/11/1992 - 31/01/1993
Ms Connie Leung Woon-ho	01/06/1995 - 1996*
Miss Gladys Veronica Li, QC	01/05/1990 - 31/10/1991
Dr Lawrence Li Kwok-chang	01/11/1993 - 31/10/1995
The Hon Andrew Li Kwok-nang, QC, JP	01/06/1989 - 30/04/1990 01/05/1991 - 31/10/1992
Dr Winston Liang Wee-paw	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1992
Dr Liu Pak-wai	01/05/1993 - 30/04/1995
Miss Peggy Liu Pik-yun	01/05/1994 - 1996*
Dr Lo Chi-kin	01/05/1991 - 30/04/1993
Mr Victor Lo Chung-wing	01/11/1992 - 30/04/1993
Dr Lo Ka-shui	01/05/1990 - 31/10/1991
Dr William Lo Wing-yan	01/11/1995 - 1996*
The Hon Christine LOH Kung-wai	01/05/1989 - 31/10/1991
Dr Lui Tai-lok	01/11/1994 - 1996*

Note: \* Actual date not available.




Mr Jimmy Lui Wing-yiu	01/11/1994 - 31/10/1995
Mr Roger Luk Koon-hoo	01/05/1989 - 30/04/1990
Professor David Lung Ping-yee, JP	01/05/1992 - 30/04/1994
Mr Trevor MacMurray	01/03/1993 - 30/04/1994
Mr Alexander Mak Kwai-wing	01/11/1994 - 1996*
Professor the Hon Felice Lieh-Mak, OBE, JP	01/06/1989 - 30/04/1991
Ms Barbara Meynert	01/06/1989 - 31/10/1990 01/11/1992 - 30/04/1993
Mr Johnny Mok Shiu-luen	01/05/1992 - 31/10/1993
Dr the Hon Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee	01/05/1989 - 31/10/1990 01/11/1991 - 30/04/1992
Mr Stephen Ng Tin-hoi	01/03/1993 - 31/10/1993
Mr Pang Yiu-kai	01/11/1993 - 31/10/1995
Dr George Clement Shen	01/11/1990 - 31/10/1992
Mr Gary Shing Kung-yu	01/11/1994 - 1996*
Mr Lincoln Soo Hung-leung	01/11/1992 - 31/10/1994
Mr Robert Tang Ching, QC, JP	01/11/1990 - 31/10/1991
The Hon Henry Tang Ying-yen, JP	01/05/1990 - 09/10/1991
Dr Tsang Shu-ki	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1993
Professor David Tse Kwai-che	01/05/1995 - 1996*
Mr Tsim Tak-lung, JP	01/05/1989 - 31/03/1990 01/11/1990 - 30/04/1992
Dr Amy Tsui Bik-may	01/11/1995 - 1996*
Mr Patrick Wang Shui-chung	01/06/1989 - 31/10/1991
Professor Byron Weng Song-jan	01/05/1992 - 31/10/1994
Mr Allan Wong Chi-yun	01/11/1991 - 31/10/1993
Mr Ronny Wong Fook-hum, QC	01/11/1994 - 30/04/1995

Note: \* Actual date not available.




Mr Anthony Wong Kin-kwan	01/05/1990 - 31/03/1991
Ms Frances Wong Wai-kwun	01/11/1990 - 30/04/1992
Professor Richard Wong Yue-chim	01/05/1991 - 31/10/1992
Ms Anna Wu Hung-yuk	01/06/1989 - 30/04/1990
Mrs Camille Yeh	01/06/1995 - 1996*
Mr Alex Yeung Sau-hung	01/05/1993 - 30/04/1994
Mr Robert Young Man-kim	01/11/1994 - 1996*
Mr Anthony Yuen Tak-tim, JP	01/05/1994 - 1996*

*Note: \* Actual date not available.*




1997 - 2002

Name	Period of Appointment
Mr Anthony Chan Cho-kit	10/1998-09/2000
Professor Chan Ka-keung, Ceajer	02/2001-12/2002
Mr Patrick Chan Kai-lung	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Chan Kam-ling	12/1999-10/2001
Dr Chan Man-hung	12/1999-10/2001
Mr S H Chan	02/2002-12/2002
Dr Chan Tsang-fai	10/1998-09/2000
Mrs Pamela Chan Wong Shui, JP	10/1997-10/1999
Ms Chan Yu	02/2002-12/2002
Ms Cecilia Daisy Chen	10/2000-12/2001
Mr Kenneth Chen	10/1998-09/2000
Mrs Cheng Law Wai-fun, Margaret	01/2002-12/2002
Mr Edward Cheng Wai-sun	11/1997-10/1999
Professor Joseph Cheng Yu-shek, JP	10/1997-10/2000
Ms Cheng Yuck-wah, Teresa	01/2002-12/2002
Dr Cheung Kwok-wah	10/2000-12/2002
Dr Peter Cheung Tsan-yin	11/1997-12/1999
Dr David W L Cheung	01/2002-12/2002
Mr Alex Y S Cheung	10/2000-12/2001
Mr Frank Ching	10/1998-09/2000
Mr Choi Kwok-kwong	02/2002-12/2002
Dr Philemon Choi Yuen-wan, JP	11/1997-10/2000






Mr George Chu Fung-chee	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Victor Chu Lap-lik	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Chua Hoi-wai	10/2000-12/2002
Mr Vincent Chui	10/2000-12/2002
Mr Robert Chung Ting-yiu	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Andrew Fung Wai-kwong	01/2000-12/2001
Mr Henry Ho Hin-hung	11/1997-10/1999
Professor Ho Lok-sang	11/1997-10/1999
Professor Richard Ho Yan-ki	10/1998-09/2000
Mr Herbert Hui Ho-ming	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Hung Ching-tin	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Ip Kin-yuen	11/1997-10-1999
Professor Ambrose King Yeo-chi, SBS, JP	11/1997-10/1999
Mrs Paula Ko Wong Chau-mui	01/2000-12/2001
Professor Kuan Hsin-chi	11/2001-12/2002
Mr Vincent Kwan Pun-fong	01/2000-12/2001
Mr Kwok Kwok-chuen, BBS	10/1998-09/2000
Mr Jason Kwok Wai-lut	12/1999-10/2001
Mr Wilson Kwok	10/2000-12/2001
Mr Kwong Chi-kin	12/1999-12/2002
Mr Michael Lai Kam-cheung, JP	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Lam Cheuk-kam	12/1999-10/2000
Mr Franklin Lam Fan-keung	10/1998-09/2000
Professor Lam Shun-chiu, Dennis	01/2000-12/2002
Mr Stephen C S Lau	10/1998-09/2000







Professor Lawrence J Lau	09/1998-08/1999
Professor Patrick Lau, SBS	02/2002-12/2002
Professor Lau Siu-kai	12/1999-10/2001
Ms Elizabeth Law	12/1999-10/2001
Mrs Law Shing Mo-han, Yvonne	02/2002-12/2002
Ms Lilian Law Suk-kwan	01/2000-12/2001
Mr Peter S T Lee, BBS, JP	01/2002-12/2002
Mr Peter Lee Ting-chang, JP	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Alan Leong Kah-kit	01/2000-12/2001
Ms Connie Leung	11/1997-05/1998
Mr Frankie F L Leung	10/1998-09/1999
Mr Donald K Leung	10/1998-09/1999
Mr Apo Leung Po-lam	11/1997-10/1999
Dr Lawrence Li Kwok-chang	10/1997-10/1999
Ms Li Pik-sum, Rachel	01/2002-12/2002
Mr Peter Li Wai-man	11/1997-10/1999
Dr Sarah Liao, MBE, JP	12/1999-10/2001
Professor Liu Pak-wai, SBS	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Donald T Liu	10/1998-09/2000
Dr Lo Chi-kin	10/1997-10/1999
Mr Lo Kai-shui	01/2000-12/2001
Dr Harry Lo Wai-chung	01/2000-12/2001
Dr Lui Tai-lok	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Mak Nak-keung	12/1999-10/2001
Mr Charles Mok	01/2000-12/2001



Professor Henry Mok Tai-kee	10/1997-10/1999
Dr Ng Cho-nam	10/2000-12/2002
Mr Simon Ng	02/2002-12/2002
Mr Kenneth S Y Ng	12/1997-10/1999
Mr Pang Yiu-kai	11/1997-10/1999
Ir Otto L T Poon	10/2000-12/2001
Mr Andrew S T So	11/2001-12/2001
Professor Sung Yun-wing	02/2001-12/2002
Dr Sze Nien-dak	07/1998-06/2000
Dr Tao Lai Po-wah, Julia	02/2001-12/2002
Mr Tam Siu-cheung	11/1997-10/1999
Professor Tsang Shu-ki	10/1997-10/1999
Dr Edward Tse	10/1998-09/2000
Professor Amy Tsui Bik-may	10/1997-10/1999
Professor Byron Weng Song-jan	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Andrew Wong	01/2002-12/2002
Mr Augustine H M Wong	01/2002-12/2002
Dr Wong Hin-wah	10/1997-10/1999
Dr L. Fai Wong	01/2002-12/2002
Sister Margaret Wong	02/1998-10/1999
Mr David P Wong	01/2002-12/2002
Mr David S Y Wong	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Wong Wai-yin, Zachary	02/2002-12/2002
Mr Wong Ying-ho, Kennedy	03/2002-12/2002
Mr Dennis Yang Kwong-fai	11/1997-10/1999



Mr Yau Chung-wan	01/2000-12/2001
Mr Stanley C T Yip	01/2000-12/2001
Mr Danny N T Yung	11/2001-12/2002
Ms Alice Yuk Tak-fun, JP	11/1997-10/1999
Mr Samuel Yung, MH	11/2001-12/2002




**1.1.2003 – 31.12.2003**

Professor K C Chan	Mrs Yvonne Law
Mr S H Chan	Mr Peter Lee, BBS, JP
Ms Chan Yu	Dr Li Pang-kwong
Mrs Margaret Cheng	Ms Rachel Li
Ms Teresa Cheng, JP	Dr Ng Cho-nam
Dr Cheung Kwok-wah	Mr Simon Ng
Dr David Cheung	Professor Sung Yun-wing
Professor Iris Chi	Ms Elizabeth Tang
Mr Johnny Chin	Dr Julia Tao
Professor Stephen Chiu	Mr Andrew Wong
Mr Choi Kwok-kwong	Mr Augustine Wong
Dr Chow Pak-chin	Mr David Wong
Mr Chua Hoi-wai	Ir Dr Greg C Y Wong
Mr Vincent Chui	Mr Kennedy Wong
Mr Ho Hei-wah, BBS	Dr L F Wong
Ms Sophia Kao, JP	Mr Zachary Wong
Professor Kuan Hsin-chi	Mr Danny Yung
Mr Kwong Chi-kin	Mr Samuel Yung, MH
Professor Patrick Lau, SBS	




**1.1.2004 – 31.12.2004**

Mr Richard Sei-kwok Au-Yeung	Mr Jay Leung
Professor Chan King-ming	Professor Leung Ping-chung, SBS, JP
Mr Raymond Chan	Dr Li Pang-kwong
Mr S H Chan	Mr Eddie Ng
Dr Chan Yan-chong	Mr Ng Shui-lai, JP
Mr Clement Chen	Mr Simon Ng
Ms Teresa Cheng, JP	Professor Alvin So
Mr Johnny Chin	Professor Sung Yun-wing
Dr Chow Pak-chin	Ms Iris S Y Tam, JP
Mr Robert Chow	Ms Elizabeth Tang
Mr Ho Hei-wah, BBS	Ms Jane P S Tsuei
Mr Ip Shing-hing	Professor Tuan Chyau
Mr Kan Chi-ho, MH	Ms Ada Y K Wong, JP
Ms Sophia Kao, JP	Mr Andrew Wong
Professor Kuan Hsin-chi	Mr Augustine Wong
Professor Lam Kin-che, JP	Ir Dr Greg Wong
Mr Alfred K C Lam, JP	Mr Kingsley Wong Kwok
Professor Patrick Lau, SBS	Mr Zachary Wong
Mrs Yvonne Law	Rev Michael Yeung
Mr Edmond C K Leung	




**1.1.2005 – 31.12.2005**

Mr Richard Sei-kwok Au-Yeung	Ms Sophia Kao, JP
Dr Eugene K K Chan	Professor Lam Kin-che, JP
Professor Chan King-ming	Mr Alfred K C Lam, JP
Mr Paul M P Chan	Mr Edmond C K Leung
Mr Raymond C K Chan	Professor Leung Ping-chung, SBS, JP
Dr Chan Yan-chong	Dr Li Pang-kwong
Mr Abraham Yu-ling Chan	Mr Eddie Ng, JP
Mr Y Y Chang	Mr Ng Shui-lai, BBS, JP
Mr Clement Chen, JP	Mr Steve Siu-pang Ng
Mr Johnny Chin	Rev Eric S Y So
Mr Chiu Ming-wah	Ms Iris S Y Tam, JP
Dr Chow Pak-chin	Ms Elizabeth Tang
Mr Robert Chow	Professor Tuan Chyau
Mr Fung Hau-chung, Andrew	Ms Ada Y K Wong, JP
Mr Fung Ka-pun	Ir Dr Greg Wong, JP
Mr Clement Siu-to Fung	Mr Kingsley Kwok Wong
Mr Ho Hei-wah, BBS	Ms Eirene Yeung
Mr Philip Ho	Rev Michael Yeung
Mr Ip Shing-hing, JP	Dr Zhou Ba-jun
Mr Kan Chi-ho, MH	




**1.1.2006 – 31.12.2006**

Professor Chan King-ming	Dr Gregg Li
Dr Chan Yan-chong	Professor Victor O K Li, BBS
Mr Clement Chen, JP	Professor Ma Ngok
Mr Eric K C Cheng, MH	Mr Man Hung-ye, Joseph
Professor Stephen Y L Cheung	Mr Ng Siu-pang, Steve
Mr Chiu Ming-wah	Dr Poon Kit, Kitty
Ms Virginia Choi	Mr Benjamin Y K Pwee
Dr Susan Fan	Dr Shih Tai-cho, Louis
Mr Fong Cheung-fat	Mr Thomas So
Mr Fung Ka-pun	Dr Tang Lap-kwong
Mr Fung Siu-to, Clement	Mr Daniel Y K Wan
Mr Philip Ho	Professor Wong Chack-kie
Mr Kam Chi-ho, MH	Mr Wong Kin-yip, Freddie
Mr Bankee Kwan	Mr Kingsley Wong Kwok
Mr Joseph W F Lai	Mr Robert Y C Wong
Mr Alfred K C LAM, JP	Mr Yau How-boa, Stephen, MH, JP
Mr Lau Kar-wah	Ms Catherine Yen
Mr Lee Luen-fai	Ms Eirene Yeung
Mr Lee Ping-kuen	Rev. Michael Yeung
Ms Lee Wai-king, Starry	Mr Zhu Wen-hui
Mr Lew Mon-hung	




1.1.2007 – 31.12.2007

Name	Profession / Title
Mr Chen Chung-nin, Rock, JP	Chairman Pacific Falcon Investment Group Ltd.
Mr Eric KC Cheng, MH, JP	Vice-Chairman VST Holdings Ltd.
Professor Stephen Y L Cheung, JP	Professor (Chair) of Finance Department of Economics and Finance Faculty of Business City University of Hong Kong
Ms Virginia Choi	Country Manager Cubiks
Mr Fan Kwok-wai, Gary	Sai Kung District Councillor
Dr Susan Fan	Executive Director The Family Planning Association of Hong Kong
Mr Fong Cheung-fat	Chief Executive Officer The Spastics Association of Hong Kong
Mr Fong Man-hung, David	Deputy Managing Director Hip Shing Hong Group of Companies
Mr Fung Ka-pun	Chairman Goodwill International (Holdings) Ltd.
Mr Bankee Kwan	Chairman & CEO Celestial Asia Securities Holdings Ltd.
Mr Joseph W F Lai	Vice President – Commercial Towngas International Co. Ltd.
Dr Lee G. Lam	Chairman Monte Jade Science and Technology Association of Hong Kong
Mr Lau Kar-wah	Principal Lau & Chan, Solicitors
Mr Lee Luen-fai	Director of Public Affairs Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.
Ir Lee Ping-kuen	Associate Director Black & Veatch Hong Kong Ltd.
Mr Lee Kwan-ho, Vincent	Managing Director Tung Tai Group of Companies







Ms Lee Wai-king, Starry	Kowloon City District Councillor
Mr Lee Wai-man, Maurice, JP	Partner Robertsons (Solicitors and Notaries)
Mr Lew Mon-hung	Executive Director Smart Rich Energy Finance (Holdings) Ltd.
Mr Li Lu-jen, Laurence	Barrister-at-law Temple Chambers
Dr Gregg Li	Principal Aon Regional Corporate Governance Practice Aon (Asia) Ltd.
Professor Victor O K Li, BBS	Chair Professor of Information Engineering Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering The University of Hong Kong
Professor Ma Ngok	Associate Professor Department of Government & Public Administration The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Mr Man Hung-yee, Joseph	Corporate Development Director Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui Welfare Council
Mr Ng Chau-pei	Vice Chairman The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions
Mr Ng Siu-pang, Steve	Ng & Shum Solicitors & Notaries
Dr Poon Kit, Kitty	Assistant Professor Department of Applied Social Sciences The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Mr Poon Chin-hung, Almon, JP	Consultant Wong & Poon, Solicitors
Dr Shen Xu-hui, Simon	Research Assistant Professor Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Dr Shih Tai-cho, Louis	Specialist in Dermatology and Venereology
Mr Colin Shipp	Barrister-at-law



Mr Shum Wai-cheong, Patrick	Chief Investment Officer, Greater China INVESCO Hong Kong Ltd
Mr Thomas So	Executive Director Hong Kong New Generation Cultural Association
Ir Song Sio-chong	Associate Professor Department of Law & Business Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Miss Sze Lai-shan	Community Organizer Society for Community Organization
Mr Tai Yiu-ting, Benny, MH	Associate Professor Faculty of Law The University of Hong Kong
Dr Tang Lap-kwong	Lecturer Division of Language Studies City University of Hong Kong
Dr Wan Tak-fai, Danny	Director Jungao Holdings Co. Ltd.
Mr Daniel Y K Wan	Group Chief Financial Officer The Bank of East Asia Ltd.
Professor Wong Chack-kie	Professor Department of Social Work The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Mr Wong Kin-yip, Freddie	Chairman Midland Holdings
Mr Wong Pang-sui, Joseph	Chairman The Hong Kong Association of International Co-operation of Small & Medium Enterprises
Mr Robert Y C Wong	Executive Director Residential Property Hongkong Land Ltd.
Mr Wong Yiu-ying	Research Officer One Country Two Systems Research Institute
Mr Yao Cho-fai, Andrew	Chairman & CEO Van Shung Chong Holdings Ltd.
Mr Yau How-boa, Stephen, BBS, MH, JP	Chief Executive International Social Service (Hong Kong Branch)




Ms Catherine Yen	Partner Ernst & Young
Dr Yeung Che-keung, Joseph	President C K Yeung Worldwide Ltd.
Ms Eirene Yeung	Director Corporate Strategy Unit & Company Secretary Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd.
Mr Frankie Yeung	Senior District Director American International Assurance Co. (Bermuda) Ltd.
Dr Zhu Wen-hui	Commentator Hong Kong Phoenix TV Ltd.




1.1.2008 – 31.12.2008


Name	Profession / Title
Dr Eugene K K Chan	Dental Surgeon
Professor Chan Kin-man	Professor The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Professor Chan Kwok-bun	Chair Professor of Sociology Hong Kong Baptist University
Mr Chan Ngok-pang, Ronald	Southern District Councillor
Mr Chan Yu-ling, Abraham	Chairman PuraPharm Group of Companies
Mr Chen Chung-nin, Rock, JP	Chairman Pacific Falcon Investment Group Ltd.
Mr Cheng Wing-shun, Vincent	Sham Shui Po District Councillor
Professor Stephen Y L Cheung, JP	Professor (Chair) of Finance Department of Economics and Finance Faculty of Business City University of Hong Kong
Mr Choi Kim-wah	Business Director The Hong Kong Council of Social Service
Mr Fan Kwok-wai, Gary	Sai Kung District Councillor
Mr Fok Kai-kong, Kenneth	Vice President Henry Fok Group of Companies
Mr Fong Man-hung, David	Deputy Managing Director Hip Shing Hong Group of Companies
Mr Fung Hau-chung, Andrew	General Manager & Head of Investment and Insurance Hang Seng Bank Limited
Mr Hu Yebi	Chairman Vision Finance Group
Ms Florence Hui	Head, Business Planning & Development North East Asia Standard Chartered Bank



Mr Lai Wing-hoi, Frederick	Service Head Youth & Community Service Social work/ Caritas-Hong Kong
Dr Lam Kin-chung	Chairman Zhong Yang Group (Holdings) Ltd. Lam Kin Chung Morning Sun Charity Fund
Dr Lee G. Lam	Chairman Monte Jade Science and Technology Association of Hong Kong
Mr Lee Kwan-ho, Vincent	Managing Director Tung Tai Group of Companies
Mr Lee Luen-fai	Director of Public Affairs Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.
Mr Liao Cheung-kong, Martin, JP	Barrister-at-law
Mr Ng Chau-pei	Vice Chairman The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions
Ms Pong Scarlett Oi-lan	Shatin District Councillor  Registered Pharmacist
Mr Poon Chin-hung, Almon, JP	Consultant Wong & Poon, Solicitors
Dr Poon Kit, Kitty	Assistant Professor Department of Applied Social Sciences The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Dr Elizabeth Quat	Founder and CEO CB Strategic Investment Limited
Dr Shen Xu-hui, Simon	Research Assistant Professor Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Dr Shih Tai-cho, Louis	Vice President Hong Kong Medical Association
Dr Song Sio-chong	Associate Professor Department of Law & Business Hong Kong Shue Yan University
Miss Sze Lai-shan	Community Organizer Society for Community Organization




Professor Tang Kwong-leung	Professor of Social Work and Chair Department of Social Work The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Mr Tsang Chi-hung	Chairman Chinaworld Trade Corporation
Mr Wong Pang-sui, Joseph	Chairman The Hong Kong Association of International Co-operation of Small & Medium Enterprises
Mr Wong Yiu-ying	Senior Project Officer Hong Kong Development Forum
Mr Wu Chi-wai, MH	District Councillor
Mr Yao Cho-fai, Andrew	Chairman & CEO Van Shung Chong Holdings Ltd.
Dr Yeung Che-keung, Joseph	President C K Yeung Worldwide Ltd.
Mr Yeung Man-chung, Charles	Principal Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Mr Frankie Yeung	Senior District Director American International Assurance Co. (Bermuda) Ltd.  Director Kai Fung Agriculture Development Co Ltd.
Mr Yin Tek-shing, Paul, BBS, JP	President and CEO Dah Chung Industrial Co Ltd.
Ms Yip Sau-wah, JP	Shatin Tsung Tsin Secondary School




**1.1.2009 – 31.12.2009**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession / Title</b>
Dr Eugene K K Chan	Director Dr Chan & Partners Dental Surgeons Ltd.
Mr Johnny K M Chan	Chairman Titan Works Ltd.
Mr Chan Ngok-pang, Ronald	Southern District Councillor
Mr Chan Yu-ling, Abraham	Chairman PuraPharm Group of Companies
Mr Chen Chung-nin, Rock, JP	Chairman Pacific Falcon Investment Group Ltd.
Mr Cheng Wing-shun, Vincent	Sham Shui Po District Councillor
Mr Choi Kim-wah, Cliff	Business Director The Hong Kong Council of Social Service
Dr Chow Chun-bong, BBS, JP	Consultant Paediatrician, Princess Margaret Hospital and Medical Director, HA Infectious Disease Centre Hospital Authority
Mr Fok Kai-kong, Kenneth	Vice President Fok Ying Tung Group
Dr Fu Ting-mei, Tim	Senior Adviser AID Partners Capital Ltd.
Mr Fung Hau-chung, Andrew	General Manager & Head of Treasury and Investment Hang Seng Bank Ltd.
Mr Hu Shao-ming, Herman, JP	Chairman Ryoden Development Ltd.
Mr Hu Yebi	Chairman Vision Finance Group Ltd.
Mr Lai Wing-hoi, Frederick	Service Head Youth & Community Service Caritas-Hong Kong
Dr Lam Kin-chung	Chairman Zhong Yang Group (Holdings) Ltd.  Chairman Lam Kin Chung Morning Sun Charity Fund






Professor Lau Kai-hon, Alexis	Director, ENVF/IENV The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Professor Lee Wing-on, MH	Vice President (Academic) and Deputy to the President Hong Kong Institute of Education
Mr Leung Cheuk-yan	Partner Baker & McKenzie
Mr Liao Cheung-kong, Martin, JP	Barrister-At-Law Martin Liao Barrister
Professor Ng Sik-hung	Chair Professor of Social Psychology City University of Hong Kong
Mr Ng Tze-wai, Anthony	Director & Chief Executive Allied Banking Corp (HK) Ltd.
Mr Ng Wang-pun, Dennis, MH	Managing Director Polaris Jewellery Manufacturer Ltd.
Mr Ngai Wah-sing, Francis	Founder & CEO Social Ventures Hong Kong
Ms Pong Scarlett Oi-lan	Shatin District Councillor
Dr Elizabeth Quat	Co-founder Internet Professional Association  Shatin District Councillor
Mr Suen Pang, Perry	Director CCIG Capital Management Group
Mr Sze Wine-him, Jamie	Founding Chairman The Y. Elites Association Ltd.
Mr Tang Wai-chung	Solicitor Tang, Wong & Chow, Solicitors
Mr Tik Chi-yuen, BBS, JP	Chairman The Committee on Youth Smoking Prevention
Mr Tsoi Tong-hoo, Tony	Chief Executive Officer Varitronix Ltd.
Mr Wong Kwong-yiu	Executive Director Wheelock Properties (HK) Ltd.
Mr Wong Ling-sun, Vincent	Executive Director AMS Public Transport Holdings Ltd.






Mr Wong Pang-sui, Joseph	Chairman The Hong Kong Association of International Co-operation of Small & Medium Enterprises
Mr Wu Chi-wai, MH	Wong Tai Sin District Councillor
Mr Yau Tat-wang, Dennis	Director General Federation of Hong Kong Industries
Dr Yep Kin-man, Ray	Associate Professor Department of Public and Social Administration City University of Hong Kong
Mr Frankie Yeung, MH	Senior District Director American International Assurance Co. (Bermuda) Ltd.
Mr Yeung Man-chung, Charles	Principal Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Mr Yin Tek-shing, Paul, BBS, JP	President and CEO Dah Chung Industrial Co Ltd.
Ms Yip Sau-wah, JP	Retired Secondary School Principal
Professor Yip Siu-fai, Paul	Professor Department of Social Work and Social Administration The University of Hong Kong
Mr Yuen Kwok-keung, Rimsky, SC	Senior Counsel




**1.1.2010 – 31.12.2010**


<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession / Title</b>
Dr Eugene K K Chan	Dental Surgeon Dr Chan & Partners Dental Surgeons Limited
Mr Johnny K M Chan	Chairman Titan Works Limited
Dr Alex Wo Shun Chan	Senior Lecturer The Hong Kong Community College The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Miss Chen Qing	Chairman Hong Kong Committee for UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)  Chairman Hong Kong Ocean Park Conservation Foundation
Mr Cheung Kwok-kwan	Solicitor
Miss Quince Chong	Director Corporate Affairs Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd.
Dr Chow Chun-bong, BBS, JP	--
Dr Chow King-sing, Gerald	Chow Sang Sang (Holdings) Int. Ltd.  Whole Person Development Institute
Mr Fan Chun-wah, Andrew	Partner C. W. Fan & Co.
Dr Fu Ting-mei, Tim	Senior Advisor AID Partners Capital Limited
Mr Hu Shao-ming, Herman, JP	Chairman Ryoden Development Limited
Mr Hui Wah-kit, Michael	Managing Director Freedom Industrial Corporation Ltd.
Mr Kwong Chun-yu	Yuen Long District Councillor
Professor Lau Kai-hon, Alexis	Director Atmospheric Research Center Fok Ying Tung Graduate School The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology



Mr Leung, Jerome TY	Manager Leighton Textiles Co Ltd.
Mr Leung Cheuk-yan	Partner Baker & McKenzie
Dr Leung Wing-tai	General Secretary Breakthrough Ltd.
Dr Shan LI	Vice Chairman Investment Banking UBS Investment Bank
Mr Lui Yin-tat	Vice-chairman Schroder Investment Management (HK) Ltd.
Professor Mok Ka-ho, Joshua	Associate Vice President (External Relations) Dean, Faculty of Arts and Sciences Co-Director, Centre for Governance and Citizenship Chair Professor of Comparative Policy Hong Kong Institute of Education
Professor Ng Sik-hung	Chair Professor of Social Psychology City University of Hong Kong
Mr Anthony Ng	Executive Director & Chief Executive Officer South China Financial Holdings Ltd
Dr Ng Wang-pun, Dennis, MH	Managing Director Polaris Jewellery Manufacturer Limited
Miss Winnie Ng	Director Kowloon Motor Bus Co. Ltd.
Miss Ng Yuen-ting, Yolanda	Wan Chai District Councillor
Mr Francis Ngai Wah-sing	Founder & CEO Social Ventures Hong Kong
Mr Pong Kin-ye, Paulo	Managing Director Altaya Wines Ltd  Co-founder Press Room Group (Restaurants)
Dr Elizabeth Quat, JP	Founder & Immediate Past President (2000 – 2006) Internet Professional Association  Shatin District Councillor
Professor So Wai-man, Raymond	Dean, School of Business and Professor of Finance Hang Seng Management College




Mr Suen Pang, Perry	Managing Director Max Creation Group Ltd.
Mr Sze Wine-him, Jaime	Founding Chairman The Y. Elites Association Ltd.
Mr Hamilton TY Tang	Managing Director Simon Murray & Co. (HK) Ltd.
Mr Tang Wai-chung, Herman	Partner Tang, Wong & Chow, Solicitors
Mr Tang Wing-chun	Kwun Tong District Councillor
Mr Tik Chi-yuen, BBS, JP	Chairman Committee on Youth Smoking Prevention
Mr Wong Kin-wai, Anthony	Chief Research Officer The Hong Kong Council of Social Service
Mr Wong Kwong-yiu	Executive Director Wheelock Properties (HK) Limited
Dr Wong Yau-kar, David, JP	Managing Director United Overseas Investments Ltd.
Mr Yau Tat-wang, Dennis	Director General Federation of Hong Kong Industries
Dr Yep Kin-man, Ray	Associate Professor Department of Public and Social Administration City University of Hong Kong
Professor Yip Siu-fai, Paul	Professor Department of Social Work and Social Administration The University of Hong Kong
Mr Rimsky Yuen, SC, JP	Senior Counsel




**1.1.2011 – 31.12.2011**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession / Title</b>
Ms Au Miu-hing, Alice	Managing Director Spencer Stuart
Professor Chan Ching-kiu, Stephen	Professor of Department of Cultural Studies and Academic Dean, Faculty of Arts Lingnan University
Mr Chan Pok-chi, Jonathan	Vice-Chairman China NTG Gas Group
Dr Chan Wo-shun, Alex	Senior Lecturer The Hong Kong Community College The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Ms Chen Qing, Judy	Chairman Hong Kong Committee for UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)  Chairman Hong Kong Ocean Park Conservation Foundation
Dr Cheng Lai-ling	Service Director HK Sheng Kung Hui Welfare Council
Mr Cheung Kwok-kwan, Horace	Partner Messrs Cheung & Liu Solicitors
Dr Ching Tang-foon, Stephen	Associate Professor School of Economics and Finance The University of Hong Kong
Ms Chong Wai-yan, Quince	Director Corporate Affairs Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd.
Dr Chow King-sing, Gerald	Executive Director Chow Sang Sang Holdings (International) Co. Ltd.
Mr Fan Chun-wah, Andrew	Partner C. W. Fan & Co.
Mr Fong Chi-hang, Brian	Lecturer Division of Social Studies Community College of City University City University of Hong Kong
Mr Ho Chi-hoo, David, BBS	Chief Executive Macy's Candies Limited




Mr Ho Kin-chung, Henry	Senior Manager Communications and Public Affairs Office The University of Hong Kong
Mr Hui Wah-kit, Michael	Managing Director Freedom Industrial Corporation Ltd.
Ms Kwan Ching-Yi, Miranda	Deputy Director, Systems & Services Certification SGS Hong Kong Limited
Mr Kwong Chun-yu	Yuen Long District Councillor
Mr Lam Kin-hong, Matthew, MH	Executive Deputy Chairman Lai Fung Holdings Limited
Dr Lee Yuk-lun	CPPCC Beijing Committee
Mr Jerome Leung	Chairman/CEO Global Wise Development Ltd.
Dr Leung Wing-tai	General Secretary Breakthrough Limited
Dr Li Siu-kei	Chief Executive Officer Bank of Communications Trustee Ltd.
Mr Liu Sing-cheong, JP	Chairman MyTopHome (China) Holdings Ltd
Mr Lui Yin-tat	Vice-chairman Schroder Investment Management (HK) Ltd.
Miss Mak Mei-kuen, Alice, JP	Vice-Chairman Kwai Tsing District Council  Vice-Chairman Hong Kong Ladies Dynamic Association
Professor Mok Ka-ho, Joshua	Associate Vice President (External Relations) Chair Professor of Comparative Policy and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences The Hong Kong Institute of Education  Director Centre for Greater China Studies, HKIED
Mr Mok Siu-lun	--
Dr Ng Chi-yun, Jeanne	Director – Group Environmental Affairs CLP Holdings Limited






Miss Winnie Ng	Director Kowloon Motor Bus Co. Ltd.
Miss Ng Yuen-ting, Yolanda	Wan Chai District Councillor
Ms Ngan Ming-yun	Director Sanya GaoSheng Investment Ltd.
Mr Pak Fu-hung, Frank, JP	Chairman The Y. Elites Association Ltd.
Ms Pau Heng-ting, Janet	Program Director Asia Business Council
Mr Pong Kin-ye, Paulo	Managing Director Altaya Group International Limited  Co-founder Press Room Group
Dr Pun Ngai	Associate Professor Department of Applied Social Sciences The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Professor So Wai-man, Raymond	Dean, School of Business and Professor of Finance Hang Seng Management College
Mr Sze Chun-fai, Jeff	Director of Research Savantas Policy Institute
Mr Hamilton Ty Tang	Managing Director Simon Murray & Co. (Hong Kong) Ltd.
Mr Tang Wing-chun	Kwun Tong District Councillor
Mr Wong Kin-wai, Anthony	Chief Research Officer The Hong Kong Council of Social Service
Mr Wong Siu-han, Rex	Director and Project Manager Kum Shing Group
Dr Wong Yau-kar, David, JP	Managing Director United Overseas Investments Ltd.
Mr Wu Shang-tun, Mason	Partner Prudence Investment Management (HK) Ltd

Note: Dr Pun Ngai served as a PTM during the period from 1 January 2011 to 1 August 2011.




**1.1.2012 – 31.12.2012**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession / Title</b>
Ms Au Miu-hing, Alice	Managing Director Spencer Stuart
Professor Chan Ching-kiu, Stephen	Academic Dean, Faculty of Arts, Professor of Department of Cultural Studies, and Deputy Coordinator, Kwan Fong Cultural Research & Development Programme Lingnan University
Ms Chan Ka-man, Ivy	President Cross-Strait Exchange Association  Vice-Convenor New Youth Forum
Ms Chan Mei-kit, Maggie	Director, Social Work Services Caritas – Hong Kong
Mr Chan Pok-chi, Jonathan	District Councillor Sai Kung District Council
Mr Chan Shung-fai, Frank	Chairman Samvo Hong Kong Limited
Dr Cheng Lai-ling, Crystal	Business Director The HK Council of Social Service
Dr Cheung Chor-yung	Dean of Students City University of Hong Kong
Mr Cheung Kwong-tat	Audit Partner Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountant (Practising)
Dr Ching Tang-foon, Stephen	Associate Professor School of Economics and Finance The University of Hong Kong
Professor Chong Tai-leung	Executive Director Institute of Global Economics & Finance The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Professor Chu Hoi-shan, Paul	Head and Associate Professor Department of Architecture Chu Hai College of Higher Education






Dr Chui Wing-tak, Ernest	Associate Professor Dept of Social Work & Social Admin The University of Hong Kong
Mr Fang Fang	Vice-Chairman, Asia Investment Banking J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Ltd
Dr Fong Chi-hang, Brian	Lecturer Division of Social Sciences Community College of City University City University of Hong Kong
Ms Hau Cheuk-ki, Lillian	Executive Director Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre
Mr Ho Chi-hoo, David, BBS	Chief Executive Macy's Candies Limited
Mr Ho Kin-chung, Henry	Senior Manager Communications and Public Affairs Office The University of Hong Kong
Mr Huang Hai-bo	Assistant Head Phoenix Chinese Channel Phoenix Satellite Television Co. Ltd.
Dr Hung Wai-man, Witman	Executive Vice President and Co-founder Next Horizon Co. Ltd.
Mr Kwai Ting-kong	Communication & PR Manager Listed Company
Ms Kwan Ching-yi, Miranda	Deputy Director Systems & Services Certification SGS Hong Kong Limited
Mr Kwok Wing-leung, Andy	Chairman NuBrands Group Holdings Limited
Mr Lam Chi-wing, Gordon	Vice President Li & Fung Development (China) Ltd.
Mr Lam Kin-hong, Matthew, MH	Executive Deputy Chairman Lai Fung Holdings Limited
Miss Queenie Lau	Barrister Temple Chambers
Dr Lee Yuk-lun, JP	CPPCC Beijing Committee
Mr Leung Wang-ching, Clarence	Director Sun Hing Knitting Factory Ltd.




Mr Li Man-bun, Brian, JP	Deputy Chief Executive The Bank of East Asia Limited
Dr Li Siu-kei	Chief Executive Bank of Communications Trustee Ltd.
Mr Liu Sing-cheong, JP	Chairman MyTopHome (China) Holdings Ltd
Mr Ma Kam-wah, JP	Consultant Senior Citizen Home Safety Association
Miss Mak Mei-kuen, Alice, JP	District Councillor Kwai Tsing District Council
Dr Ng Hon, Victor	President Hong Kong University Graduates Association
Mr Ng Ngai-man, Raymond	Partner Fung, Wong, Ng & Lam Solicitors
Ms Ngan Ming-yun	Director Sanya GaoSheng Investment Ltd.
Mr Pak Fu-hung, Frank, JP	Managing Director Home of Swallows Ltd.
Mr Jing Qin	Managing Director Deutsche Bank AG, Hong Kong Branch
Professor Shen Jian-fa	Professor Dept of Geography and Resource Management The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Mr Sze Chun-fai, Jeff	Director of Research Savantas Policy Institute
Mrs Tam Cheung Chui-fan, Mona	Board Director and Partner Keysbond International Holdings Ltd
Mr Tung Fung-tao, Nicholas	General Manager Lewis & Paul Investment Co., Ltd.
Miss Tung Kut, Kurtinia	Managing Director Promisky Holdings Group Limited
Mr Wong Siu-han, Rex	Executive Director Kum Shing Group
Mr Wu Shang-tun, Mason	Partner Prudence Investment Management (HK) Ltd
Mr Yiu Tze-leung, Ivan	Community Services Secretary Tung Wah Group of Hospitals



Note : Mr Liu Sing-cheong, JP, served as a PTM during the period from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2012.


Mr Sze Chun-fai, Jeff served as a PTM during the period from 1 January 2012 to 23 October 2012.

Mr Ho Kin-chung, Henry served as a PTM during the period from 1 January 2012 to 21 December 2012.




**Associate Members (Previously named as Part-time Members)**  
**of the Central Policy Unit**  
**(8.2.2013 - 7.2.2015) (position as at 1.6.2014)**


Name	Profession/ Title	Term of Appointment
Mr Chan Chi-yuen, Paul	Founder, Walk in Hong Kong	8.2.2014 – 7.2.2015
Mr Chan Kwong-ming, Johnny	Chairman, Titan Works Limited	8.2.2014 – 7.2.2015
Dr Chan Man-hung, Thomas	Director, Public Policy Research Institute and Head, China Business Centre The Hong Kong Polytechnic University	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Chang Ka-mun	Member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference  Managing Director Fung Business Intelligence Centre	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Dr Cheung Chor-yung	Senior Teaching Fellow Department of Public Policy City University of Hong Kong	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2014 1.6.2014 – 31.5.2015
Dr Cheung Kwok-wah	Dean, School of Education and Languages The Open University of Hong Kong	22.2.2013 – 21.2.2015
Dr Chow Man-kong	Policy Researcher	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2014
Mr Chua Hoi-wai	Chief Executive The Hong Kong Council of Social Service	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Fung Hau-chung, Andrew, JP	Executive Director and Head of Global Banking and Markets Hang Seng Bank Limited	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Hui Ching-yu, Christopher	Senior Vice President Mainland Development Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited	11.2.2014 – 10.2.2015
Dr Hung Wai-man, Witman	Co-founder Next Horizon Company Limited	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Kwan Ka-ming, Nicholas	Director of Research Hong Kong Trade Development Council	2.7.2013 – 1.7.2014
Mr Lam Chiu-ying, SBS	Adjunct Professor Geography and Resource Management Department The Chinese University of Hong Kong	22.2.2013 – 21.2.2014



Mr Lee Luen-fai	Director of Public Affairs Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited	18.2.2013 – 17.2.2015
Ms Leung Ka-man, Carman	Lecturer Department of Physical Education Faculty of Social Sciences Hong Kong Baptist University	8.2.2014 – 7.2.2015
Dr Li Pang-kwong, BBS, JP	Associate Professor Department of Political Science and Director, Public Governance Programme Lingnan University	18.3.2013 – 17.3.2015
Mr Li Wing-kuen, Phillip	Managing Director China Chengxin (Asia Pacific) Credit Ratings Company Limited	8.2.2014 – 7.2.2015
Mr Lo Sui-sing, Thomas	Chief Operating Officer RoadShow Holdings Limited	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Dr Luk Wai-ki, Elvis	Senior Research Manager New World Development Company Limited	8.2.2014 – 7.2.2015
Mr Ma Kam-wah, Timothy, JP	Executive Director Project Flame City University of Hong Kong	22.2.2013 – 21.2.2015
Dr Ng Hon, Victor	Convocation Standing Committee Member The University of Hong Kong	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2014
Mr Ng Wah-keung, Augustine	Former Chief Executive Officer Estate Agents Authority	20.3.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Ngai Wah-sing, Francis	Founder and Chief Executive Officer Social Ventures Hong Kong	18.3.2013 – 17.3.2015
Mr Poon Kai-tik	Director (Government & Community Engagement) The Link Management Limited	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Professor So Wai-man, Raymond, JP	Dean, School of Business and Professor of Finance Hang Seng Management College	2.4.2013 – 1.4.2014
Mr Tam Wing-pong, SBS	Member, Central Committee and Executive Committee New People's Party	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Tang Wing-chun, Cliff	Convenor New Youth Forum	1.3.2013 – 28.2.2014
Dr Tik Chi-yuen, SBS, JP	Chief Executive Evangelical Lutheran Church Social Service – Hong Kong	26.2.2013 – 25.2.2015




Mr Tse Kwok-leung	Head of Policy and Economic Research Bank of China (Hong Kong)	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Wong Kwong-yiu	Managing Director Wheelock Properties (Hong Kong) Limited	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Wong Pak-hong, Vincent	Secretary General Social Enterprise Summit	10.2.2014 – 9.2.2015
Mr Wong Yuen-fai, SBS, JP	Retired Banker	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Mr Yau How-boa, Stephen, SBS, MH, JP	Chief Executive International Social Service Hong Kong Branch	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015
Professor Yee Chun-chu, Angelina	Special Adviser to the President Director of Leadership and Public Policy Executive Education Programs The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	1.3.2013 – 20.8.2013
Professor Yep Kin-man, Ray	Professor of Politics and Assistant Head Department of Public Policy City University of Hong Kong	1.3.2013 – 28.2.2015
Ms Yeung Kin-ha, Yvonne	Chief Executive Hong Kong Young Women's Christian Association	8.2.2014 – 7.2.2015
Professor Paul Yip	Professor Department of Social Work and Social Administration The University of Hong Kong	8.2.2013 – 7.2.2015



## **Appendix B**


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### **List of CPU research project available on the web**






<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2014	A Study on Mainland Students' Adjustment in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Public Policy Research Centre
2014	A Study on Cross-Boundary Marriages in Hong Kong: Causes and Consequences	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2013	A Study on Living Across the Border: Migration Pattern, Social Integration and the Wellbeing of Hong Kong Families in Shenzhen	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2013	A Study on "Family Impact Analysis and Case Studies: Public Rental Housing and Comprehensive Social Security Assistance"	The University of Hong Kong
2013	A Study on "Epidemiology of Child Abuse and Its Geographic Distribution in Hong Kong: An Important Social Indicator of Different Districts and Communities"	The University of Hong Kong (Community Child Health Unit, Department of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine & Department of Social Work and Social Administration)
2013	A Study on "The Youth Problem"	Hong Kong Baptist University







<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2013	A Study on Multi-stakeholder Engagement: The Case of the Guangzhou- Shenzhen- Hong Kong Express Rail Link Project	The University of Hong Kong
2013	A Study on Promoting Hong Kong's Modern Service Industry in the Economic Cooperation between Fujian and Hong Kong	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
2013	A Study on Supporting Hong Kong Businesses to Tap into Domestic Consumption Market in the Pearl River Delta Region	廣東外語外貿大學南國商學院
2013	A Study on New Arrivals from Mainland China	Policy 21 Limited
2012	A Pilot Study on Cross-Boundary Families in Hong Kong	The University of Hong Kong
2012	Study on the Manpower Situation and Needs of the Arts and Cultural Sector in Hong Kong	Centre for Culture and Development, Chinese University of Hong Kong & Policy 21 Limited
2012	A Study on Encouraging Guangdong Enterprises to Go Global through Hong Kong	One Country Two Systems Research Institute Limited and Sun Yat-sen University
2012	Mobility and Welfare: The Family Strategy of Mainland Women Coming to and Giving Birth to Children in Hong Kong	The Centre for Studies of Hong Kong, Macao and Pearl River Delta, Sun Yat-sen University




<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2012	Hong Kong Elderly People Retiring in the Mainland	Consumption and Development Studies Centre, Sun Yat-sen University
2012	Ruling Wisely : A Study on the Wisdom-Pooling Decision-Making Model of the Central People's Government based on Case Studies of China's Five Year Plans	The Chinese University of Hong Kong
2012	National Consciousness in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Adolescents' Construction of Patriotism and Identity	The City University of Hong Kong
2012	Understanding Non-engaged Youths in Hong Kong: A Mixed Method Approach	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
2012	The Pattern of Urban Life in Hong Kong: A District Level Community Study of Sham Shui Po	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2012	An Investigation of the Perception of Social Justice across Social Groups	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2012	1st Round of Thematic Household Survey (Use of New Media) in 2011	MOV Data Collection Centre Limited
2012	A Study on the Hong Kong Container Terminal Trade	The University of Hong Kong
2012	Parental Perspectives on Child Neglect in Hong Kong	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University




<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2012	Exploratory Study of Neglect Among Elderly in Hong Kong: A Family Perspective	Lingnan University
2012	A Study on Family-Centered Prevention of Adolescent Girls' and Boys' Prostitution	The City University of Hong Kong
2012	A Study on Drug Abuse Among Youths and Family Relationship	The University of Hong Kong
2012	3rd Round of Thematic Household Survey (Topic on Hong Kong Families) in 2008	Nielsen
2012	2nd Round of Thematic Household Survey (Topic on Characteristics of Hong Kong Residents Having Resided/ Having Stayed Substantially in the Mainland) in 2007	Nielsen
2012	Study on Policy Recommendations for Further Liberalisation and Deepening of CEPA during the 12.5 Period	Greater Pearl River Delta Business Council
2012	Study on Hong Kong's Role in Supporting Chinese Enterprises Going Global	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
2012	A Study on China's Urban Future and Hong Kong's Business Opportunities	The University of Hong Kong
2011	Feasibility Study of Fishing Tourism in Hong Kong	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
2011	Case Study of Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation in Resource Recovery and Recycling	Sun Yat-sen University




<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2011	Study on Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation in Vocational Education: Current Status and Policy Suggestions	Sun Yat-sen University
2011	Case Study of Hong Kong-Guangdong Cooperation in Education and Science and Technology in Nansha	Sun Yat-sen University
2011	Consultancy Study on Socio-Economic-Political Trends in Guangdong Province (4th quarterly report)	Sun Yat-sen University
2011	A Study on Arts Administrators in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2011	A Review Study on Cultural Audit: the Landscape of Hong Kong's Cultural Infrastructure	Hong Kong Development and Strategy Research Centre Ltd
2011	A Study on Brand Building for Higher Education in Hong Kong: Prospects and Strategies	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2011	Study on Implementation of the Pilot Renminbi Trade Settlement Scheme in Guangdong Province: Evaluation and Policy Recommendations	Sun Yat-sen University
2011	Study of Hong Kong's Aviation Industry: Current Challenges and Future Strategies	One Country Two Systems Research Institute Limited
2011	A Study on Understanding our Young Generation	The University of Hong Kong




<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2010	A Study on the Postmodern Challenges of the Information Society to the Governance of HKSAR	The University of Hong Kong
2010	A Study on Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2010	A Focus Group Study on Subsidising Home Ownership	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
2010	A Study on Hong Kong's Post 80s Generation: Profiles and Predicaments	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
2010	A Study on the Meaning and Practice of Filial Piety in Hong Kong and A Review of the Research Literature on Filial Piety	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2010	A Study on the Process of Public Policy Decision Making at the Central People's Government: A Case Study on Health Care Reform Policies	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2010	A Research Study on Mainland Chinese Immigrant Artists in Hong Kong	Hong Kong Baptist University
2010	A Consultancy Study on China's Foreign Policy and Hong Kong's Position in Regional Developments	上海國際問題研究院
2009	A Literature Review of Family Policy in Four East Asian Societies	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	A Consultancy Study on the Needs and Integration into Local Communities of Hong Kong People	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University




<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
	Living in Shenzhen, Dongguan and Guangzhou	
2009	A Pilot Study for Public Health Policy Model and Development Indicator for Child Health in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	A Qualitative Study on 'Hidden Elderly' in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	Study on Yunnan's Co-operation with ASEAN and the Greater Mekong Subregion: Recent Developments and Implications for Yunnan-Hong Kong Co-operation	One Country Two Systems Research Institute Limited
2009	A Comparative Community Study of Tin Shui Wai and Sham Shui Po	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	A Study on Hong Kong in the Region: Role, Issues and Strategies	The University of Hong Kong
2009	A Study on the Social Networks of Residents in Tin Shui Wai	Hong Kong Baptist University
2009	A Study on Policies and Strategies of Israel and Singapore Governments to Attract, Develop and Retain Returnee Talents	Hong Kong Baptist University
2009	A Pilot Study on the Practice of Theatre in Hong Kong	Performing Arts Asia
2009	A Study on Singapore's Experience in Regional Cooperation	National University of Singapore
2009	A Study on Mapping the Associational Life in Tin	The Hong Kong



<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
	Shui Wai	Polytechnic University
2009	A Further Study on the Future Development of the Hong Kong Economy, Consolidation and Enhancement of Existing Core Industries and Development of Economic Areas with High Potential in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	Study on Hong Kong's Economy: Transformation, Competitiveness and Sustainability	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	Study on Cooperation of Producer Services Industries between Hunan and Hong Kong	《湖南与香港加强生产性服务业合作》课题组
2009	2008 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic and Political Developments in the Mainland, with Particular Emphasis on Regional Developments and the Guangdong Province, that Have Implications for Hong Kong	Teamone Economist Limited
2009	Study on Low-Wage Workers in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2009	Study on the Trends in Family Attitudes and Values in Hong Kong	The University of Hong Kong
2009	Study on Hong Kong's Professional Immigrants from Mainland China and their Strategies of Adaptation	Hong Kong Baptist University
2009	Study on Social Enterprises in Hong Kong	Chinese University of Hong Kong




<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2009	Study on A Cross-National Comparison of Family Policy	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2008	Consultancy Study on International Experience of Selected Countries in Supporting the Low-income Family in Helping its Members and their Applicability to Hong Kong	The University of Hong Kong
2008	2008 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic and Political Developments in Pan-Pearl River Delta Region (Except the Guangdong Province) and their Implications for Hong Kong	Not known
2008	2006/07 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic and Political Developments in Pan-Pearl River Delta Region, Covering Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan and Hainan	Not known
2008	2006/07 Consultancy Study on Social, Economic and Political Developments in Pan-Pearl River Delta Region, Covering Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan	Not known
2007	Action Agenda on "China's 11th Five-Year Plan and the Development of Hong Kong"	Focus Groups in the Economic Summit on "China's 11th Five-Year Plan and the Development of Hong Kong"
2006	Study on the Relationship between Hong Kong's Cultural & Creative Industries and the Pearl River	The University of Hong Kong






<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
	Delta	
2006	The Development of Economic Corridor–ASEAN–Guangxi–Hong Kong	廣西自治區政府發展研究中心
2006	Major Areas of Co-operation Between Yunnan and Hong Kong for Entering the Southeast Asia and South Asia markets	雲南省人民政府研究室
2006	Consultancy Study on Socio-Economic-Political Trends in Pan-Pearl River Delta Region	Not known
2005	Study on Tripartite Partnership - Local Research and Engagement	Civic Exchange
2005	Study on Tripartite Partnership - Benchmarking Study from an International Perspective	Hong Kong Policy Research Institute Ltd
2005	Report on Encouraging Guangdong Private Enterprises to Set Up Business in Hong Kong	廣東省政府發展研究中心
2004	Study of Mainland Policies and Practices to Facilitate Private Enterprises in Setting Up Business in Hong Kong	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
2004	Study on the Third Sector Landscape in Hong Kong	Five unrelated research teams, under the leadership of a Project Manager
2004	Background Report: Hong Kong and Pan-Pearl River Delta Regional Co-operation	One Country Two Systems Research Institute Limited



<u>Year</u>	<u>Title of Research Project</u>	<u>Consultant</u>
2004	Hong Kong and The Western Pearl River Delta: Cooperative Development from a Cross-Boundary Perspective	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2004	Hong Kong's Economic Integration with the Pearl River Delta: Quantifying the Benefits and Costs	Chinese University of Hong Kong
2003	Baseline Study on Hong Kong's Creative Industries	The University of Hong Kong
2003	Socio-economic impact of 24-hour operation of Boundary Control Points - Household Survey on 24-hr Passenger Clearance at Land Boundary Control Points	Marketing Decision Research Technology Limited
2003	Socio-economic impact of 24-hour operation of Boundary Control Points - The socio-economic impact of operation of land boundary control points on Hong Kong	One Country Two Systems Research Institute Limited
2002	Study on Corporate Philanthropy in Hong Kong	Golin/Harris Forrester
2000	Bringing the Vision to Life - Hong Kong's Long-Term Development Needs and Goals	The Commission on Strategic Development



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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