



<b>Title</b>	<b>Managing inter-agency co-ordination : an analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong</b>
<b>Author(s)</b>	<b>Chan, Wing-kan; Cheung, Chi-ho; Lam, Man-ki, Jennifer; Lam, Man-yan; Sham, Chun-yin</b>
<b>Citation</b>	
<b>Issued Date</b>	<b>2014</b>
<b>URL</b>	<b><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10722/211008">http://hdl.handle.net/10722/211008</a></b>
<b>Rights</b>	<b>Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License</b>


# **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**

CHAN Wing Kan Brian (2012932140)  
CHEUNG Chi Ho Jerry (2012931574)  
LAM Man Ki Jennifer (2007052454)  
LAM Man Yan Emma (2007403976)  
SHAM Chun Yin Adley (2012931718)

Capstone Project Report submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of  
the Master of Public Administration

Department of Politics and Public Administration  
The University of Hong Kong

2014




## **Declaration**

We declare that this Capstone Project Report, entitled ‘Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong’, represents our own work, except where due acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or any other institution for a degree, diploma or other qualification.


[Signed]

CHAN Wing Kan Brian  
CHEUNG Chi Ho Jerry  
LAM Man Ki Jennifer  
LAM Man Yan Emma  
SHAM Chun Yin Adley




## Acknowledgements

We would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to Professor Ian Thynne, our capstone project supervisor, for his guidance and supervision throughout this project. We also want to thank lecturers and staff members of the Master of Public Administration Course for their support over the past 2 years.




## Table of Content


<b>Declaration</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>Table of Content</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Abbreviation</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b> .....	<b>12</b>
Focus, Objectives and Background of the Project.....	12
Research Questions and Related Propositions: Theory and Practice ...	14
Overview of the Analytical Framework .....	16
Research Methodology .....	17
Chapter Outline.....	18
<b>Chapter 2: Analytical Framework</b> .....	<b>20</b>
Introduction.....	20
Modes and Types of Governance .....	20
Elements of Old Public Administration .....	25
Elements of Collaborative Governance.....	29
Concluding Remarks .....	33
<b>Chapter 3: District Administration in Hong Kong</b> .....	<b>35</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>35</b>
<b>An Overview of District Administration</b> .....	<b>36</b>
Development of District Administration in the Colonial Era.....	38
Review on District Management after Handover of Sovereignty .....	42
Diversification of Modes of Governance in the Contemporary District Management in Hong Kong .....	46
Concluding Remarks .....	50
<b>Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong</b>	



<b>Chapter 4: Case (1): Street Management on Illegal Extension of Restaurants – Old Public Administration Alive and Well? .....</b>	<b>53</b>
Introduction.....	53
Background.....	53
Legislation and Enforcement Actions .....	55
<i>Food, Environment and Hygiene Department</i> .....	55
<i>Lands Department</i> .....	57
<i>Home Affairs Department</i> .....	58
Analysis with reference to Old Public Administration .....	59
<i>Primary Theory and Organizational Structure</i> .....	59
<i>Rationality of Human Behaviour</i> .....	64
<i>Conception of the Public Interest</i> .....	65
<i>Role of Government and Mechanism for Achieving Policy Objectives</i> .....	66
<i>Approach to Accountability</i> .....	68
<i>Administrative Discretion</i> .....	69
Concluding Remarks .....	71
<b>Chapter 5: Case (2): MTR Network Extensions.....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>– Collaboration Governance as Partially Hands-off Governance? ...</b>	<b>75</b>
Introduction.....	75
MTR Network Extensions .....	76
<i>West Island Line (MTR Corporation, 2014)</i> .....	77
<i>South Island Line (East) (MTR Corporation, 2014)</i> .....	79
<i>Kwun Tong Line Extension (MTR Corporation, 2014)</i> .....	79
<i>Shatin to Central Link (MTR Corporation, 2014)</i> .....	82
<i>Community Engagement</i> .....	83
Analysis with reference to Collaborative Governance .....	85
<b>Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong</b>	



<i>General System Context</i> .....	85
<i>Collaborative Governance Regime</i> .....	86
<i>Regime's Collaborative Dynamics and Actions</i> .....	87
Concluding Remarks .....	92
<b>Chapter 6: Conclusion</b> .....	<b>94</b>
Introduction.....	94
Summary of the Analysis .....	95
Case (1): Street Management on Illegal Extension of Restaurants .....	96
<i>Recommendations</i> .....	98
Case (2): MTR Network Extensions .....	101
<i>Recommendations</i> .....	103
Implications for Governance in Hong Kong .....	104
Concluding Remarks .....	110
<b>References</b> .....	<b>112</b>




## Abstract

This capstone project addresses the coordination role of the HKSAR Government through adopting different types of governance when handling district management issues. In Hong Kong, governance has largely been based on traditional bureaucracy, with control and authority being exercised through hierarchy to facilitate the implementation of public policies. However, under waves of public management reform in the last few decades, the ideas of collaborative governance have been incorporated, resulting in degrees of cooperation between the government, the market and the society.

An analytical framework is devised in Chapter Two to structure and inform the analysis of the governance-based approaches to coordination in the cases examined in this project. It consists of an overview of governance concepts from a broad perspective on its development to a more specific perspective on the elements of two contrasting modes of significance to coordination, namely old public administration and collaborative governance. Relevant academic theories such as the modes and types of governance addressed by Knill and Tosun (2012), the elements of old public administration

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






considered by Denhardt and Denhardt (2003), and the integrative framework for collaborative governance presented by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) are adopted in the framework.


In Chapter Three, an overview is provided of the development of district administration in Hong Kong, as mainly divided into two parts: the colonial era and the period after the handover of sovereignty in 1997. The analysis considers changes in district management resulting from the District Administration Scheme introduced in 1981, and the reviews in subsequent years which affected the selection of types of governance when dealing with various aspects of district management.

In Chapters Four and Five, two case studies involving the handling of street management issues and MTR extensions projects are presented in order to address the types of governance adopted by the HKSAR Government in different district management matters. The case studies illustrate how a matrix of governance types can or should be adopted with the aim of enhancing the government's coordination capacity at the district level.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




Chapter Six concludes the project by highlighting the key findings of the cases in relation to the research questions. Recommendations are made on how the government could enhance its legitimacy in public administration through selecting suitable modes of governance in seeking to coordinate district-level activities




## Abbreviation

<u>Abbreviation</u>	<u>Term</u>
CE	Chief Executive
CEDD	Civil Engineering and Development Department
CLG	Community Liaison Group
CGR	Collaborative Governance Regime
DAS	District Administration Scheme
DC	District Council
FLN	Fanling North
FEHD	Food, Environment and Hygiene Department
HAD	Home Affairs Department
HKSAR Government	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government
KTE	Kwun Tong Line Extension
Lands D	Lands Department
LCSD	Leisure and Cultural Services Department
Legco	Legislative Council



MTR	Mass Transit Railways
NENT NDAs	North East New Territories New Development Areas
NPM	New Public Management
PC/TKL	Ping Che/Ta Kwu Ling
Plan D	Planning Department
SCDA	Steering Committee on District Administration
SCL	Shatin to Central Link
SIL(E)	South Island Line (East)
WIL	West Island Line
XRL	Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link




# Chapter 1: Introduction

## Focus, Objectives and Background of the Project

This project addresses the coordination role of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (the HKSAR Government) in different types of governances when handling district management issues. The project considers the district management level of administration where problems closely relate to the livelihood of citizens and where the involvement of the society is prominent.

The street management of illegal extensions by restaurants and the Mass Transit Railways (MTR) extension projects are used as contrasting case studies which illustrate how a matrix of strategies are adopted in district administration by the HKSAR Government. The first case illustrates the persistence of old public administration, but with the need for more collaboration with the market and civil society. The second case recognizes that with the growing social needs and complexities of service delivery, collaborative governance arrangements serve to enhance the effectiveness and

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




qualities of public administration.

When handling the illegal extensions of restaurants, public interests are defined by the HKSAR Government in consultation with Legislators, District Council (DC) members and the public, and expressed in law. While public servants of a few bureaus and departments are responsible for the enforcement action, the fragmented but overlapping responsibilities are often criticized as inefficient. The discussion considers how the coordination capacity of the HKSAR Government could be enhanced by increased collaboration with the market and the society.

The MTR extension projects demonstrate how a partially hands-off approach can be adopted by the HKSAR Government to handle infrastructure projects at the district level. In contrast to the street management issue, the MTR Corporation, as a corporation with mixed public and private ownership and market objectives, has taken the lead in organizing coalitions between the HKSAR Government, MTR Corporation and the community to ensure the smooth implementation of infrastructure construction works. Although this approach to cooperative governance seems to work well, the role of the

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



HKSAR Government should not be ignored as it is still of vital importance in framing the collaborative arrangements.


In the analysis, the project aims to identify areas of improvement by the HKSAR Government to enhance its coordination capacity at the district level. Building on the District Administration Scheme (DAS) where the Home Affairs Department (HAD) takes the lead to oversee communication between the HKSAR Government and the public, the project recognizes the importance of the HKSAR Government adopting a matrix of governance strategies when handling public policy issues. Recommendations are made with a view to enhancing the coordination capacity of the HKSAR Government and thus its legitimacy in public administration.

### **Research Questions and Related Propositions: Theory and Practice**

The project address the following research questions –

- (1) What strategies are available to a government to foster inter-agency coordination?


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



- (2) What strategies has the HKSAR Government adopted to foster inter-agency coordination at the district level?
- (3) What factors affect the coordination role and capacity of the HKSAR government in fostering inter-agency coordination in different policy areas at the district level?
- (4) How could these strategies of inter-agency coordination at the district level be strengthened?

The coordination role of the government in managing inter-agency relationships in public administration varies from different forms of organization in handling different public problems. In the Hong Kong context, the administrative role of the HKSAR government has largely been based on Weberian type bureaucracy, with control and authority being exercised through hierarchy to coordinate the implementation of public policies involving the government, the market and the society. However, under waves of public management reform, the ideas of collaborative governance have been incorporated by introducing different forms of coordination involving cooperation between the government, the market and the society.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






Given the complex and various nature of social problems confronted by the government, there is no single perfect way for the government to coordinate different agencies involved in public administration. Instead, a mix of strategies is needed in different policy areas with different problems. In modern public administration, waves of public sector reform do not erode the importance of the government in public administration. Instead of a single and centralized role in delivering public services, the focus has been shifted to coordination functions involving government agencies organizing and mobilizing the market and society to contribute to public administration in the achievement of overall social objectives.

### **Overview of the Analytical Framework**

The analytical framework aims to structure and inform the analysis of the elements and approaches of public administration and coordination in the cases examined in subsequent chapters. An account is given of the general development of public administration and governance involving modes of governance (hierarchies, markets and networks) and associated types of governance (interventionist governance, regulated self-governance, cooperative

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




governance and private self-governance) – as addressed by Knill and Tosun (2012).

Within these modes and types of governances, it is possible to address matters of particular interest to the project. These include perspectives of Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) on old public administration, and of Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) on an integrative framework for collaborative governance.

## **Research Methodology**

The project is based on desktop research involving a literature review to establish the analytical framework. Discussions on the development of public administration by academics assist in examining different notions of public administration. Also, for the empirical analysis of the district management approaches adopted by the HKSAR Government, reference is made to official information and related data released by the government and its relevant departments and agencies, including the HAD, the Food, Environment and Hygiene Department, and the Lands Department. In addition,

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




newspaper critiques and commentaries are considered as sources to assess the effectiveness of the coordination role assumed by the government. Reports from watchdog organizations, such as the Ombudsman, are considered as authoritative references and yardsticks for assessing the government's coordinating capacities.

With the information collected from the above mentioned references, an analysis is made to understand the coordinating role of the government using different approaches to public administration in handling different district management issues. Echoing the research questions, concluding attention is given to how the coordination capacities of the government could be strengthened in different policy arenas at the district level.


## **Chapter Outline**

The project consists of six chapters, including this Introduction as Chapter 1. Chapter 2 establishes the analytical framework for the project, with reference to the modes and types of governance addressed by Knill and Tosun (2012), the elements of old public administration considered by Denhardt and

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



Denhardt (2003), and the integrative framework for collaborative governance presented by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011). Chapter 3 provides an overview of the general approach adopted by the HKSAR Government in district management through the District Offices of the HAD, the District Management Committees and the District Councils as the key players in the cooperation between the HKSAR Government and the society. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the governance types adopted by the Government in handling street management issues and MTR extensions projects, leading to a consideration of how a matrix of governance types should be adopted with the aim of enhancing the government's coordination capacity. Chapter 6 concludes the project by summarizing the key findings of the cases in relation to the research questions and providing recommendations on how the government might use a matrix of governance types to enhance its legitimacy in public administration.



## Chapter 2: Analytical Framework


### Introduction

This Chapter establishes the analytical framework for the project. It does this with reference particularly to the modes and types of governance addressed by Knill and Tosun (2012), within which it is possible to locate the elements of old public administration considered by Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) and the integrative framework for collaborative governance presented by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011).

### Modes and Types of Governance

Governance is usefully defined for present purposes in broad terms as a mode of political steering involving the collective coordination of individual action, including both hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes (Knill and Tosun, 2012). Under the framework of governance, basically three governance modes can be distinguished, namely hierarchy, markets and networks (Knill

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




and Tosun (2012). It is argued that public administration has not been completely shifted away from hierarchy to non-hierarchical arrangements. Different modes of governance may coexist in a society in different policy arenas.

Governance by hierarchy stresses the role of formal rules and procedures that are binding for both public and private actors. The state has a monopoly on the use of coercive power to bring the public and the private sector into compliance with public policy and to supply common goods. The government hierarchically intervenes to produce and supply common goods and services and defines the legal framework without which no economic activities could be realized (Knill and Tosun, 2012)

Governance by market is an opposing model to hierarchical governance as it is based on the ideas that goods and services are allocated efficiently based on market operations to allocate goods and services efficiently without intervention by the government. It is based on the assumption that actors are rational that they seek to maximize their own well-being. As such, the purpose of hierarchal control by the government serves to maintain

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




enforcement of rules for the emergence and functioning of markets (Knill and Tosun, 2012)

Governance by network emphasizes cooperation between interdependent public and private actors who interact informally to achieve distinctive but interdependent goals. It relies on mutual trust and complementarity if resources and are expected to result in reciprocal actions. Patterns of cooperation in policy networks can be in different forms, including horizontal coordination between public and private actors and societal self-governance. Different patterns of cooperation are non-hierarchical in nature which base on negotiations between the involved actors (Knill and Tosun, 2012).

With regard to these modes, Knill and Tosun (2012) propose two analytical dimensions, namely the degree of legal obligation and the level of cooperation between the public and private sectors, as bases for distinguishing four types of governance. Depending on the specific configuration of these two dimensions, four basic governance types can be distinguished as interventionist governance, regulated self-governance, cooperative self-governance and

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



private self-governance: see Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Four ideal types of governance


		Cooperation of public and private actors	
		High	Low
Degree of legal obligation	High	Regulated self governance	Interventionist governance (government)
	Low	Cooperative governance	Private self governance

Source: Knill and Tosun (2012, p. 210).

Interventionist governance is characterized by a hierarchical relationship between by a hierarchical relationship between public and private actors. The government intervenes from above into society through highly detailed and legally binding requirements such as clearly defined rules and regulations.

Regulated self-governance is distinguished from interventionist governance in a way that hierarchical intervention is accompanied by more cooperative relationships between public and private actors for the formulation and implementation of public policies. While the government may still plays

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






a dominant role in policy making, private sectors have a certain degree of participation in cooperatively developing policies and regulatory framework.

Under cooperative governance, negotiations and voluntary agreements are the dominant basis of developments of rules and practices. As such, the role of the government focuses to make arrangements to allow for negotiation of cooperative arrangements to allow for negotiation of cooperative arrangements and voluntary agreements between public and private actors.

Private self-governance emphasizes voluntary exchanges. The provision of public goods and services basically depends on the governance capacity of private actors. Nonetheless, the state can still play a part by providing complementary governance contributions, such as acknowledge the outcomes of private governance.

The above typology of governance types provides an analytical approach to understanding how public and private sectors might cooperate in policy making and how their relationship can be characterized by the dominant position of the state. Knill and Tosun (2012) suggest that when institutional

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




constellations enjoy high governmental but weak societal governance capacities, interventionist governance and regulated self-governance are the most appropriate ways to address societal problems; whereas in cases of weak governmental but strong societal governance capacities, private self-governance and cooperative governance are more suitable. These possibilities and the arrangements involved constitute a framework within which contrasting ideas of old public administration and collaborative governance can be located and addressed.

### **Elements of Old Public Administration**

Consistent with a high degree of legal obligation involved through the use of hierarchy and coercive powers, traditional Weberian bureaucracy accords with interventionist governance in Knill and Tosun's (2012) typology. As Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) appreciate, Weber's structural approach to bureaucracy as a basis of old public administration addresses a significant means of managing and controlling human behaviour in organizations. Weber described bureaucratic organizational structure as characterized by hierarchy of authority, regularized rules and procedures and formalized positions with fixed


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



duties (Gerth and Mills, 1946). By making the administrative processes as objective, rational and depersonalized, it is considered that bureaucracy is the best way to achieve efficiency. If an organization could be structured according to the ideals of bureaucracy and management systems could be put in place for control, the public organization could function properly for its intended functions.

Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) address the old public administration model by assessing a range of major aspects, including organizational structure, rationality of human behaviour, conceptions of the public interest, role of government and mechanism for achieving policy objectives, approaches to accountability, and administrative discretion. The model emphasizes the role of the government of rowing to design and implementing policies focusing on politically defined objectives. Through its existing agencies and establishment, a government implements programmes, as well as delivers public goods and services to achieve policy objectives. Under old public administration ideals, the public interest is politically defined and expressed in law.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




In a traditional bureaucracy, the organizational structure is characterized by top-down authority within agencies and control or regulation of clients. Administrators are accountable and responsible to political leaders under hierarchy and are required to act in accordance with defined rules and commands with limited discretion allowed.

In line with key features of Denhardt and Denhardt's (2003) analysis, Walsh and Steward (1992) have argued that the following five assumptions define how public administration functions under the old public administration model:

- (a) *The assumption of self-sufficiency* – that where a government is required to perform a function, it will normally carry out that function itself. The government will organize and equip itself, such as directly employing staff, initiating legislations to regulate and define public interests, in order to implement the programme to archive its policy objectives. In other words, the government is a self-sufficient actor that can act autonomously for the economy and the society.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




(b) *The assumption of direct control* – that control over the activities of a public organization is best exercised through hierarchy with continuous supervision and authority at the top of the organizational pyramids.

(c) *The assumption of accountability upward* – that the accountability of public servants to the recipients of public services is through a political process. The accountability flows upward from with public servants answering to their political masters who are responsible to answer the legislatures.

(d) *The assumption of uniformity* – that public service should be provided on a uniform basis. The government should treat all citizens equally and to provide the same benefits and deprivations to all similarly situated people.

(e) *The assumption of a civil service system* – that staffing policies should be an application of standardized procedures throughout




the services for recruitment, pay, grading and other aspects of internal management.

In sum, under the old public administration model, governance corresponds to the government and state interventions are dominant to perform collective decisions serving as a guardian of public interests (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The government is self-sufficient that it can rely on its own resources, especially its civil service system, to implement policies and programmes. The issue of co-ordination within the bureaucracy is handled by hierarchical control to hold the public servants accountable and responsible to attain efficiency. While the government performs administrative functions, its interaction with the market and the public is minimal in the sense that participation by the market and the public is limited.

### **Elements of Collaborative Governance**

With the emergence of unexpected social and economic problems, as well as the desire for democracy and participation in the decision making process, top-down policy making based on command-and-control and coercion

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




under traditional bureaucracy were increasingly perceived as ineffective for increasing public welfare.

Since the 1980s, significant ideas and practices have emerged with political attempts to reduce hierarchical governance and instead to rely on market coordination and cooperative interaction with the society. In the process, the role of governments has shifted at least partly from providing a whole array of public goods and services to that of establishing regulatory frameworks for the provision of goods and services by private actors. This development accords with Knill and Tosun's (2012) ideas about the nature and significance of cooperative governance involving considerable inter-organisational collaboration as a means of managing and coordinating policy and service delivery.

The collaborative basis of cooperative governance is appreciated by Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2011). In this context, collaborative governance is defined as “the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011, p. 2).


Under the integrative framework for collaborative governance, there are three nested dimensions, shown as boxes in Figure 2.2. The three comprise the general system context, the collaborative governance regime, and the regime’s collaborative dynamics and actions.

Figure 2.2: An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance



Source: Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011, p.6)

The general system context refers to the host of political, legal, **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






socioeconomic, environmental and other influences that affect and are affected by the collaborative governance regime (CGR). The system context generates drivers and constraints, including leadership consequential incentives, interdependence and uncertainty, which help initiate and set the direction for a CGR, which refer to a particular mode of, or system for, public decision making in which cross-boundary collaboration represents the prevailing pattern of behavior and activity.

Collaborative dynamics consist of three interactive components that are principled engagement, shared motivation and capacity for joint action. They work together in an interactive way to produce collaborative actions in order to implement the shared purpose of the collaborative governance regime.

The dynamics of collaborative governance are recognized by Salamon (2002) who addresses the shift over time in the “unit of analysis” from the operation of a program or public agency to the distinctive tools through which public purpose are pursued. Tool choices of significance to the work of the actors involved in governance become significant to structure the process, with the role of the government changing from command and control to negotiation

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




and persuasion to foster collaboration.


## **Concluding Remarks**

The analytical framework presented above provides an overview of governance concepts from a broad perspective on their development to a specific perspective on the elements of contrasting modes of governance and their coordinative significance, namely old public administration and collaborative governance. As argued by Knill and Tosun (2012), various types of governance may coexist in different policy arenas. The appropriateness of governance types for policy making and delivery of goods and services depends on the institutional context and political context. Due regard should be given to the organizational strength which defines the extent to which organizations are able to influence, monitor and sanction the behaviour of their members, which in turn affect the extent to which private actors are organized to contribute to the provision of common goods by the private sector. The degree of organization also determines the mobilization of resources of actors involved, including financial, personnel and technological capacities and expertise. (Knill and Tosun, 2012)

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



In the following chapters, the framework established here is adopted to empirically analyze and compare the strategies-in-use by the HKSAR Government in district level administration for solving different problems and accomplishing different tasks. The focus is on two contrasting cases: of old public administration involving interventionist governance in dealing with street management issues, and of collaboration as the basis of cooperative governance in the management of MTR extension projects.




## Chapter 3: District Administration in Hong Kong

### Introduction

As addressed in Chapter 2, old public administration involving interventionist governance and collaboration as the basis of cooperative governance are currently the main types of governance used in district level administration. In this chapter, the focus is on the development of the district management in Hong Kong brought forward by the DAS which was introduced in 1981 and the elements that changing the types of governance for district level administration from solely by interventionist governance to the coexist of interventionist governance and cooperative governance. Other than the components included in the DAS. As the disbandment of the Urban Council and Regional Council are one of the key elements contributed to the shift of mode of governance in district management after 1997, the functions of the two Councils are briefly introduced in this chapter. Throughout the chapter, the analytical framework developed based on different theories in Chapter 2 is applied.


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



## **An Overview of District Administration**

When revisiting the development of the district administration in Hong Kong, it is no doubt that Hong Kong has passed through a few remarkable turning points in the last 30 years. In the early period of the commencement of the DAS, the government dominates the operations and initiatives of the district management through the District Management Committee which chaired by the District Officer and comprising representatives from different government departments. Although the District Officer had no authority over the departments involved, the District Officer assumed the role of coordination and most of the policies relating to the district matters were initiated from the Committee in a “top-down model”. Moreover, due to the limited authority and impact of the District Board, the District Board remained in the advisory nature. Despite of this, the democratization of the District Board brought significant influence to the development district management in the future. In essence, the mode of governance in district management at the early stage of the DAS could be understood as traditional bureaucracy where the government took up the role to perform collective decisions with the consideration of the public interest in most of the policy

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




areas in the district level.

The case study of the street management discusses in the next chapter highlight how the old public administration approach involving interventionist governance could be adopted. As the operation of street management is all along more or less the same in the last few decades, the case is also one of the examples reflecting the dominated mode of governance on district management in the past where the government takes up the rowing role to enforce the law and regulations through exercising hierarchical control. However, the effectiveness of the government to assume the absolute role on handling some aspects of district matters and delivering the relevant services was diminishing with the growing demand from the citizens and the complexity of the issues.

A few reviews on the DAS were conducted after its introduction in the early 1980s. Those reviews were mainly aim at enhancing the element of democracy by increasing the number of elected members. The democratization on the election of the District Board enhanced the representativeness of the District Board members as well as their responsibility. The citizens started to demand the District Board members to voice out their

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




concerns in the district. Other than the demand for involvement in the district matters from the citizens, the complexity of the district matters also discount the effectiveness of the interventionist governance approach in some of the aspects, for instance, the urban renewal proposals and the new MTR projects inevitably affect the local residents in particular district. Such issues are more popular in the last decade where the nature of them are more complicated as more stakeholders are involved and the issues are difficult to be solved simply applying rules and regulations. In this connection, the government alternatively involving into those district matters with a steering role who joining up all the stakeholders and provide a panel for negotiation. The approach of handling such district issues are more focus on the degree of cooperation between the public and the private actors.

### **Development of District Administration in the Colonial Era**


There were two layers of organizations responsible for the district administration in Hong Kong until 1999 which are the Urban Council and Regional Council in the regional layer while the District Board in the district layer. The Urban Council and Regional Council were the two organizations

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



having solid authorities on managing the matters in the urban districts and New Territories as some of the public facilities were under their management with financial autonomy. The Urban Council and the Regional Council remained as the most important agents of district administration in Hong Kong until their disbandment in 1999. In 1980s, the population of Hong Kong expanded rapidly and the demand for better living environment from the citizens was increasing. In order to continue the effective governance in Hong Kong, more involvement from the public in terms of the district management level was found necessary. A mechanism allowing the public to voice out their views and the government officials to responds was then being developed and included in the District Administration Scheme. The DAS commenced in 1982 following the announcement by the government on launching the White Paper of District Administration in Hong Kong, the District Board was then established in each of the districts. A District Management Committee was set up in each of the districts as well. The aim of the scheme is to ensure that the government would responds to the problems in the districts promptly, encourage the public to participate in district affairs and achieve a more effective coordination of government activities in the provision of services and facilities at the district level (Home Affairs Department, 2014).

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






The District Management Committee and the District Board formed two critical components for district management. The District Management Committee was chaired by the District Officer who responsible for coordination with different government departments regarding the issues in the district level. The committee only consist government officials until 1996. The committee served as a panel for the inter-departmental coordination on district matters and the provision of public services and facilities the solutions on the district matters could be effectively resolved. The functions of the District Management Committee including identifying the district needs and ensure appropriate resources in government are being redeployed to meet the needs, ensuring different departments are well coordinated to work on the district matters concerned and consulting the residents regarding the district matters.

Other than the District Management Committee, the District Board was another important component of the DAS. The first election of District Board was conducted in 1982. Except the elected members, the government representatives in the District Management Committee were also the members


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



of the District Board. Moreover, the District Officer chaired the District Board as well.

The District Officer is the head of each district who represents the government at the district level and oversees the operation of the District Administration Scheme in the district. The District Officer has the role to implement and coordinate the execution of relevant district programmes and promotes residents' participation in district affairs. In addition, the District Officer maintains close liaison with different sectors of the community and reflects their concerns and problems to the government. The District Officer is also involved with the community at every level and mediates in disputes between corporate bodies and residents (Home Affairs Department, 2014). Headed by the District Officer, the District Office was responsible to provide supporting services to District Management Committee and the District Board in addition to the liaison work with the public. The liaison office under the District Office is an important executive arm for the District Officer to observe and identify the district issues and maintain a close relationship with the residents in the district (Home Affairs Department, 2014).

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




According to the introduction to the District Management Committee, the District Board and the District Office in the previous paragraphs, a comprehensive network to work on the district management is formulated. It is very important to note that all three organizations are chaired by the District Officer, a government official. Moreover, most of the district matters were still directly managed and handled by different governments with the coordination of the District Officer. From this perspective, the district management was still highly dominated by the bureaucracy and the whole district management mechanism still remained in a “Top-Down” style. As the district matters were relatively simple and the demand from the citizens was limited compare with the current situation as well as the needs of coordination and corporation between the government and private sectors and participation from the public was not a common practices, the old public administration approach was still operated in an effective manner.

### **Review on District Management after Handover of Sovereignty**


A few reviews on the DAS were conducted by the government before 1997. In 1984, more than 200 seats of the District Board are elected members,

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




all government officials ceased to be the members of the District Board while they still attend the meetings as government representatives. The District Officer ceased to be the Chairman of the District Board, the post of the Chairman was elected among the members. The democratization in the District Board continued in the 1990s, the proportion of elected members in the District Board kept increasing. Although the District Board still didn't have solid authorities on the district management, it is no doubt that the democratization of District Board in 1980s to 1990s raised the awareness of the citizens on their rights of expressing their views. Such development directly affects the changes of the district management after 1997 and the diversification on mode of governance in order to response to the request and demand from the citizens.

Although more than 90 percent of the District Board members were elected member in 1995, the mechanism of appointed members re-launched after the transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 due to political reasons. The Provisional District Board was established where all the original members of the board were retained and supplemented by the members appointed by the Chief Executive. As mentioned in the previous **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




paragraph, There were two tiers of organizations responsible for the district administration while the authorities of the District Board was relatively limited and in advisory nature. The situation changed upon the implementation of a policy reform on streamlining and centralizing the municipal services proposed by Mr. TUNG Chee-hwa, the former Chief Executive in 1999. The Urban Council and the Regional Council were dissolved in December, 1999 and two new government departments were created, namely the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) and the Leisure and Cultural Services Department (LCSD) to take up the function of the two Councils.

After the disbandment of Urban Council and Regional Council, the District Board became the only one tier of organization responsible for the district management in Hong Kong. With the influence of democratization in the 1980s to 1990s, the demand from the Hong Kong citizens for further engagement on the district matters kept increasing, There was a need to reinforce the functions and authorities of the District Board in order to strengthen the representativeness of the District Board and compensate the advert effect on the disbandment of the two Councils. In 1999, the Legislative Council (Legco) approved the proposal submitted by the government on the **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



establishment of the District Council. The bill also endorsed the compositions and functions of the District Council. With the name changed from “District Board” to District Council”, the government claimed that more authorities would be delegated to the District Council such that it could operate with the function of “Council”, instead of just an advisory board. People expected that the newly formed District Council would be the succession of the Urban Council and Regional Council in term of functions and authorities. There was two significant programmes were implemented since the establishment of the District Council, namely District Minor Works Programme and the Signature Project Scheme. The two programmes were launched in 2007 and 2013 respectively. The District Minor Works Programme is a recurrent project that targets at improving local facilities, living environment and hygiene conditions in the district, such as the provision of recreational and leisure facilities (Home Affairs Department, 2014). The Signature Project Scheme is a one of project that each district decides a works or non-works event which would address the needs of the district and have visible and lasting impact in the community, the budget of the project is no more than 100 million for each district (Home Affairs Department, 2014).

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




Besides enhancing the functions and authority of the District Council, the government also tried to reinforce the effectiveness of the governance by hierarchy as some of the district issues should be managed by the government with enforcement actions based on the rules and regulations. However, in view of the complexity of the district matters and limitation of authority, the level of the District Management Committee is unable to solve the inter-departmental issues. As such, the Steering Committee on District Administration (SCDA) was set up 2007 which chaired by the Permanent Secretary for Home Affairs and comprising heads of departments to handle the district management issues that require contributions from different departments (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2013). The members of this high level committee define the duties of different departments on particular district issues and direct the officers in the district level to exercise the authority and the duty of law enforcement.

### **Diversification of Modes of Governance in the Contemporary District Management in Hong Kong**


In theory, the District Minor Works and the Signature Project Scheme

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



are the only two programmes that are proposed, discussed and approved by under the authority of the District Council while most of the other district matters are still on the hand of the government or Legco. However, according to the experience in the last few years, the importance of the views and opinions from the District Council is increasing and may even affect the decisions of the government and the Legco. Such phenomenon could be explained by the status of the District Council members as well as the complexity of the district issues. Currently, most of the District Council members are elected members who are selected by the public. The representativeness and social status of the members are much higher than before. The views of the members are backed up by the public and they are obligated to express their discontent or opinion on any proposals that are not welcomed by the citizens in the district. Moreover, the district matters are more complicated and controversial than before, the Legislative Councilors would make reference to the views of the District Council members, who are more familiar with the district matters, to cast their vote of particular issues.


Other than the communication between the DC members and the government, with the assistance from the DC secretarial under the HAD, the **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**





relevant stakeholders, such as the bus companies and the MTR, will also be invited to attend the meetings on particular issues upon the request from the DC members. The representatives from the private companies or public corporations are required to respond to the questions from the District Council members and to address the concerns raised by the local residents. As the local issues are getting more complicated and citizens' awareness on their benefit keeps increasing, the communication channel through the DC meetings are not enough to meet their demand. The private companies note the importance of the view of the local residents would definitely affect the successfulness of their projects, they may take the initiative to form a liaison group in order to establish the direct communication channel with the local residents. The core parties of the liaison group are usually the relevant private companies or public corporations, the local residents and the DC members. Although some of the government representatives from different departments would also be invited to join the meetings, their roles are limited. During the liaison group meetings, the project managers, usually the representatives of the relevant private companies or the public corporations explain the impact that would bring to the local residents upon the implementation of the works and introduce the progress of the projects. The local residents could also raise the


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



concerns or discontent on the issues to the project managers. In order to ensure the project managers would address the needs of the residents, the project managers are required to report the progress of the follow up action that have to be taken to meet the requirement that raised by the attendants during the liaison group meetings. Based on the changes on the communication channel mentioned above, the cooperation between the public, private actors and the citizens are much higher than before which tally with Knill and Tosun's (2012) ideas on the four ideal types of governance. Although no much authority are delegated to the DC by the government, the increasing impact and informal authorities of the DC as well as the more complicated district issues contributed that the top-down policy making approach for the district management, which dominated by the bureaucracy is not effective and legitimate anymore. The collaborative governance approach becomes one of the main types of governance in the district management in the last decade.

With the development of the collaboration in the district management, some of the district matters are still handling by the government through the old public administration approach. However, in order to handle the more complicated district issues, such as the street management discuss in the next

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




chapter, higher level of coordination and closer communications within the government is required by setting up panel like the SDCA. After a clear division of labour is defined by the senior management of the departments, the top-down authority would be exercised and the front line level executes the policy based on the rules and regulations.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The background information in this chapter shows the development of the district management in Hong Kong in the last few decades. The management mechanism is shifting from solely on old public administration involving interventionist governance to the coexistence of the former and collaboration as the basis of cooperative governance. In the early stage of the commencement of the DAS, the setting of the components in the scheme, including the District Management Committee and the District Board as well as the role of the District Officer, formed a network that the government is the monopoly on providing a whole array of public services in terms of the district matters. By using the capacity within the government, public policies relating to district matters are designed and implemented. The single objective and


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




relatively easily defined nature is the features of the public policies delivered in that period of time. Such policies usually be delivered in the form of rules and regulations through use of hierarchy and coercive power. The private sector is obligated to comply with the policies and the level of cooperation between public and private sector is insignificant.

After a few reviews on the DAS were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, the numbers of elected members in the District Board keep increasing. The democratization of District Board enhances the representativeness of the District Board members and leading the citizens become more concern on district matters. Such situation is more significant after the disbandment of the Urban Council and Regional Council in 1999 as well as the further reform of the DAS where District Board renamed as DC. At the same time, the complexity of the district matters is increasing which more negotiation and cooperation between the public and private sectors is needed. Instead of using the coercive power to regulate which is commonly adopted in the old public administration approach, the government shifting its role to make arrangement to allow for negotiation between different parties and facilitate the negotiation in order to achieve a mutually agreed solution to tackle the district problems.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



To better understand the operation of the multi-type of governance on the district management in Hong Kong, two case studies based on the analytical framework developed in the Chapter 2 and the background of the district management in Hong Kong discussed in this Chapter are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. The two case studies on street management and new MTR projects focus on the interventionist governance and cooperative governance, respectively.



## **Chapter 4: Case (1): Street Management on Illegal Extension of Restaurants – Old Public Administration Alive and Well?**


### **Introduction**

This chapter appreciates that the handling of street obstruction caused by the illegal extension of restaurants, which is an interesting case that requires considerable inter-departmental coordination. The issue has long been a public policy problem existing in various districts and it often involves multiple stakeholders, interest groups and enforcement authorities. Even nowadays, the public managers tend to adopt the old public administration model in managing the activities and issues involved. These aspects of the case are addressed below, leading to conclusions concerning the efficacy of the arrangements involved.

### **Background**

In a traditional Chinese community, alfresco dining was a cultural


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



heritage and was popular among tourists and local citizens. On the other hand, restaurant operations beyond boundary of the licensed premises will create nuisance and hygiene problems in densely populated districts. The Office of Ombudsman has issued a direct investigation report in May 2013 on regulatory measures and enforcement actions against illegal extension of business area by restaurants. Under the old public administration model, the Food, Environment and Hygiene Department (FEHD) and Lands Department (Lands D) are the respective delegated authorities to take charge against restaurant operations beyond licensed areas and illegal occupation of government land. The FEHD will also actively participate in inter-departmental operations coordinated by the Home Affairs Department (HAD), such that relevant departments could take further action under their purview to stop such unauthorized activities (Ombudsman, 2013). All of the above-mentioned departments have to be answerable to the high-level steering committee.

The SCDA held the directing role to set out the division of departmental responsibilities within the civil service system. It was agreed that Lands D should tackle illegal occupation of government land by articles of a “more permanent nature”, while FEHD will deal with “movable articles of a

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



transient nature” (Ombudsman, 2013).


The following discussion addresses the operations of departments under a traditional bureaucracy governed by laws and regulations. The discussion includes a consideration of the deficiency of the existing system and how the policy problem could be better addressed.

## **Legislation and Enforcement Actions**

### *Food, Environment and Hygiene Department*

Under the existing legislative framework, FEHD can take charge against restaurant owner who is in breach of specified regulatory provisions, i.e. section 34C of the Food Business Regulation (Cap. 132X), section 4A of the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap. 228) and section 31(1)(b) of the Food Business Regulation. The first legislation could be lodged against licensees for “operating a restaurant otherwise than at the place delineated in the plan”. The second one will prosecute those who placed articles in public areas causing street obstruction. The last one could take action on persons selling cooked

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






food on government land other than a licensed restaurant. In practice, FEHD will assign frontline bureaucrats to perform regular site inspections at black spots and follow up with complaints referred by HAD and the government hotline 1823. Health Inspectors are majorly involved in enforcement actions, while Hawker Control Officers will play a supporting role. Their respective working hours are 8:30 am to 6:00 pm (Monday to Friday) and 7:00 am to 11:00 pm (Monday to Sunday, two shifts per day) (Ombudsman, 2013).

The Ombudsman (2013) pointed out a number of major inadequacies in FEHD's enforcement system. First, the peak hours of alfresco dining usually lie beyond normal working hours of enforcement officers. FEHD fails to restructure its frequency and mode of operations to respond to public's complaints and take charge against recalcitrant offenders. Second, FEHD lacked determination and objective to tackle culprits at the spots and the penalty was insufficient to establish a deterring effect. Third, the three-tier appeal mechanism under the demerit point system was too cumbersome and has lengthened the time needed for suspension or termination of the restaurant license. It is suggested that a two-tier system was adequate to cater these appeal cases. Fourth, the existing licensing system was too lenient as the offenders can


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



still apply for a new license upon previous cancellation or cessation without any restrictions. Unlicensed restaurants that encroached on government land normally continued to operate after being fined in court. The Ombudsman was of the view that the FEHD could intervene into the private sector as a mean to regulate illegitimate activities. (Ombudsman, 2013)

### *Lands Department*

Lands D can take enforcement actions against illegal occupation of government land through applying the Land (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 28). Under section 6(1), it could first post a notice to order removal of the object. If the offender complies at first but subsequently place the same or similar articles, Lands D needs to post another notice with a newly specified deadline. In other words, Lands D seldom institutes any prosecutions against restaurant owners. However, the Ombudsman did not concur with such interpretation of the law as restaurant owners of alfresco dining only temporarily remove those articles, and this would not constitute a cessation to illegal occupation (Ombudsman, 2013).




Apart from enforcement actions, as the administrator of Government land, Lands D possessed the control of land use rights. Only if the Lands D approves the grant of a land tenancy, FEHD can exercise its discretion to approve license to restaurant owners to operate an alfresco dining area outside their business premises.

Given the rigid nature of bureaucracy, the Lands D and FEHD are working level government agency belonging to two different policy bureaux, both of them lacked an incentive to cooperate under the Old public administration model. Similar to FEHD, the Ombudsman suggested the Lands D to take initiative to take charge against unlawful operators, given that it held the authority to allocate the rights of land use.

#### *Home Affairs Department*

Other than the two enforcement departments, HAD also plays a significant role in lobbying district support and fostering inter-departmental coordination. Out of the 4 955 complaints received by FEHD in 2013, around one-third came from Yuen Long and Tsuen Wan. By far, there were around 13

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



districts identified by FEHD that the problem of illegal extension of business area by restaurants exists. (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2014) In these districts, the HADs are responsible for coordinating joint-departmental operations in districts where illegal restaurant extension is regarded as a serious problem by the District Management Committee. When DC members received complaints in their community, they will refer the cases to the District Management Committees or related departments for actions. (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2014)


### **Analysis with reference to Old Public Administration**

The analysis here is in accordance with Denhardt and Denhardt's (2003) discussion of old public administration, as addressed in Chapter 2. Also, consistent with Chapter 2, the analysis is complemented with reference to the ideas of Knill and Tosun (2012) and Walsh and Steward (1992).

#### *Primary Theory and Organizational Structure*

The bureaucratic organizational structure under the old public

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




administration is characterized by a hierarchy of authority, regularized rules and procedures, and formalized positions with fixed duties. The belief is that bureaucracy could be achieved by making administrative processes as objective, rational and depersonalized as possible, that such a structure would lead to predictable and efficient performance (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003).

Under the District Administration Scheme, there forms a hierarchical relationship heading by the SCDA, supported by frontline enforcement departments including FEHD, Lands D and HADs. Amongst individual departments, there is a clear separation of turfs and duties, thus enables efficient tackling of the policy problem. Even though such hierarchical relationship is more operational than statutory, by means of shadowing power, the working units are expected to be answerable towards the steering committee.

Applying the Knill and Tosun (2012)'s classification of governance, the case in fact relates to a classical scenario of policy-making - "interventionist governance". Through exerting an interventionist control over the market, the street management case shows that public managers are actively


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



involved policy planning, implementation and evaluation. The central bureaucracy, which is assumed to possess the best available information, has undertaken the role to define the policy problem, set acceptable standards, formulates laws, sanction offenders and evaluate policy outcomes. Under a command-and-control system, the administration, mainly through the delegated powers on FEHD and Lands D, will use law enforcement regime to restore market equilibrium. In particular, FEHD can take enforcement actions against extension of business areas or illegal hawking by invoking relevant ordinances, and the Lands D curb shop front extensions which are illegally erected on private or government land, including overhead projections or ground level encroachments such as extended side posts and floor slabs. (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2014)

As mentioned by Walsh and Steward (1992), one of the assumptions of old public administration would be the “direct control” exercised by the government. To enhance inter-departmental coordination capacity, a high-level steering unit, the SCDA, was set up in 2007, chaired by the Permanent Secretary for Home Affairs and comprising heads of departments, to discuss and resolve district management issues requiring efforts of different


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



departments. (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2013) The SCDA is in indeed the high-level “superpower” that supervises and oversees the implementation progress of its subordinate departments, and it could place instructions from the top of the organizational pyramid. In other words, the central assignment of departmental duties indicates an exertion of hierarchical control from the top management. However, given the complicated nature of public policy problem, working units under the central bureaucracy have a tendency to evade from responsibilities and seldom take initiatives to coordinate.

Reflecting on the case, there is an overlapping of duties within different departments. According to the task assignment by the SCDA, Lands D should tackle illegal occupation of government land by articles of a “more permanent nature”, while FEHD will deal with “movable articles of a transient nature” (Ombudsman, 2013). In practice, Lands D did not have any frontline bureaucrats to perform patrolling in black spots; it solely relied on case referral by FEHD to lodge legal actions against the offenders. Given the uncertain definition of the statutory provisions, Lands D was rather conservative in supporting FEHD in rigorous actions against recalcitrant offenders. (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2014). It chose to take up a more generous approach in


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



sanctioning. Even if countered with repeated offenders, Lands D would not take the initiative to seek steering from the SCDA or the Department of Justice for revise the policy definition of articles of a “more permanent nature”, as street management was not its core departmental function.

Other than enforcement actions, inter-departmental coordination is also necessary for allowing the setup of legitimate alfresco dining areas. Lands D had the authority to determine the land use status of a government land so that FEHD could endorse on restaurant licenses to owners setting up outside seating accommodation. Besides, HADs could have taken up the role to lobby support from its community stakeholders to identify suitable areas to legitimize alfresco dining. In view of strong resistance from local community leaders and in lack of expertise in respective law provisions, HADs usually kept back in negotiating with DC members. (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2014) Since it is not a core duty for FEHD and Lands D to deal with politicians, these departments tend to evade themselves from political lobbying or public consultation. With lack of political incentives, the three working units preferred working within their policy scopes rather than collaborating. SCDA was a virtual committee comprised of departmental directorates, thus would not

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






interfere departmental operations unless the district problem caught attention from the media or the watchdog agencies. To facilitate effective governance through the old public administration model, SCDA shall undertake a more dominant role to facilitate inter-departmental coordination.

### *Rationality of Human Behaviour*

In the traditional bureaucracy, collaboration between market players, citizens and public managers were relatively minimal. Human behaviors are mostly contained within the same organisation, and hierarchical relationships prevail as the policy implementation involves position-based bureaucrats working under a command-and-control mechanism. (Denhardt, 2003) Similarly, Walsh and Steward (1992) have highlighted the importance of governing human behaviour in the civil service system in policy implementation. Staffing policies in a civil service system should be an application of standardized procedures. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, frontline bureaucrats are mainly in place to execute the enforcement actions. Besides, those working at the back office and at the management levels also come from the civil service system, conveying that their emolument package, benefits, recruitment,

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




appointment etc., will be subject to the government's internal policy, implying that uniform procedures will be adopted within the human resource management system.

Taking examples from the frontline bureaucrats working in FEHD, i.e. Health Inspectors and Hawker Control Officers, their duties were assigned on a position-based system and they have to obey the orders from the seniors. The pay and benefits of the civil service is the major force of motivation. Therefore, scientific management is an effective way to control human behaviour and attain efficiency. However, since civil servants are only bound to work within their assigned duties, it is not mandatory to collaborate with the stakeholders in the community. In forms of monetary rewards and promotion prospect, the public servants will be motivated to work for the central bureaucracy and provide uniform services to the public.

### *Conception of the Public Interest*

The street management policies and enforcement actions on illegal extension of business area by restaurants have demonstrated the exertion of

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




coercive power through hierarchical authorities. While land and environmental hygiene are of high public interests, the central bureaucracy has the responsibility to balance the needs between different stakeholders. Mirroring the interventionist regime proposed by Knill and Tosun (2012), such equilibrium will be achieved by establishing clear rules and regulations.

Under the ideology of old public administration, the government usually takes up the role to define policy. The legislatures will gather opinions from their voters and press the bureaucrats to take actions against the identified public issue. Policy makers often take the lead to define the concept of public interest, in a way to confine the scope of the problem and make it more manageable. Through establishing clear laws and regulations, including the Food Business Regulations, Summary Offence Ordinance and Lands Ordinance, the conception of public interest is politically defined and expressed in law.

### *Role of Government and Mechanism for Achieving Policy Objectives*

In lack of underlying incentive structure amongst the private actors,


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



the government had adopted the interventionist approach to exercise external control over the private sector. In this case, it is perceived that “street” is a public good and manipulation of it requires state intervention over the market. The government undertakes a rowing role to design, implement policies focusing on a single, politically defined objective. (Denhardt, 2003) As suggested by Walsh and Steward (1992), the level of “self-sufficiency” is one of the determination factors of old public administration. This factor shall examine whether a government is required to perform a function itself. (Walsh and Steward, 1992)

In the street management case, the government mainly used coercive power to intervene the private market. There is a clear set of calculable rules and the discharge of enforcement action is generally depersonalized. To achieve the policy objectives, existing government organizations including FEHD and LandsD are delegated with authorities to execute formal-rational laws. FEHD, in particular, have the legal obligation and took the initiative to restore a clean and pleasant condition in the public area. It is a common perception that “street” or “public area” belongs to everyone in the community, thus government will be the central authority to manage and maintain its order.


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



In cases of any disputes involving in the “public area”, the government held the central role to initiate policy, deploy manpower to implement policy, as well as regulate public interests.

### *Approach to Accountability*

Both theories put up by Denhardt (2003) and Walsh and Steward (1992) suggested that the accountability under an Old public administration model will be put forth via a “bottom-up” approach. The street management case demonstrates a classical policy cycle. (Denhardt, 2003) (Walsh and Steward, 1992) When a street obstruction incident was reported by the frontline bureaucrats or a citizen, enforcement action should be done in accordance with the execution plan. In turn, the administrators have to be responsive to the concerns put up by the legislatures and are accountable for the implementation of relevant policies. They are responsible to report the progress to elected DC members and Legco members to show their eagerness to attend to community values and citizen interests.




## *Administrative Discretion*

According to Denhardt (2003), the old public administration model places strong emphasis on objective laws and regulations. Such description shadowed on the “uniformity” factor put up by the Walsh and Steward (1992). (Denhardt, 2003) (Walsh and Steward, 1992)

In the street management case, the Food Business Regulations, Summary Offence Ordinance and Lands Ordinance were part of the statutory laws which aim to ensure the restaurant owners were not extending their business area beyond the legitimate premises. Street obstruction is a legal offence which may be liable for prosecutions. The penalties on law violators are stipulated in the respective law provisions, yet, whether to lodge a prosecution is highly dependable on the assessment and judgment of the frontline bureaucrats, and different outcomes could be associated from different interpretations law provisions. In real life, arrest and seizure require considerable manpower and such actions might lead to confrontation between the law enforcers, the offenders and the public. It is understandable that frontline bureaucrats may exercise administrative discretion when discharging

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




their duties.

Despite discretion in putting forth enforcement actions, all offenders will be treated equally in front of the law, i.e. either paying fines or subject to punishment under the Demerit Point System, and the legislation will be executed on a uniformed basis. When the administrators decided to take charge against the offender, prosecution is strictly governed by law and regulations. There are mainly two types of penalties, including fines and demerit points. A statutory fine for “operating a restaurant otherwise than at the place delineated in the plan” has usually been between \$2,000 and \$3,000, and those for “street obstruction” around \$1,000. The Demerit Points Systems empowered FEHD to suspend or cancel the restaurant license if it had accumulated a certain number of demerit points. In terms of considering the level of penalties, there has been limited administrative discretion to be exercised by the administrators. (Ombudsman, 2013)

In summary, the administrator relies heavily on the civil service system to exercise external control over the market. They will take the initiative to define public interests and thus are accountable for the legislatures, whom

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




will represent their voters. Given the open, fair and transparent legal framework, the level of discretion to be exercised by bureaucrats is relatively low and such policies are applicable on all citizens.

## **Concluding Remarks**

In connection with the above analysis, the street management is a live example that exhibits the characteristics of the old public administration model suggested by Denhardt (2003). The government can be regarded as self-sufficient in delivering its street management service as the SCDA could exert a direct control over the departments and thus regulate the private market. To fulfill the political goal, government officials should be accountable to legislatures especially for incidents revealing administrative malpractices or changes of public expectations. The statutory enforcement regime enables the administrators to exercise standardize treatment on all offenders. To maintain the implementation of the street management policies, the civil service system will take a dominant role in manpower deployment.

After reviewing the existing street management policies and


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**





implementation effectiveness, it is noted that the HKSAR government had been putting forth an interventionist approach to regulate the market. With lack of incentives, the levels of inter-departmental collaboration and private-public-sector interactions are limited. Even though the Ombudsman had pointed out several inadequacies present in the enforcement departments, the old public administration model is still a dominant form of governance to be adopted by the HKSAR government in the street management issue. To address the concerns of the public and legislatures, the administrator undertakes the rowing role to design policies, implement legislation and evaluate on policy outcomes. Through exercising hierarchical control, the old public administration model provides an efficient and effective channel to curb public policy problem.


Soon after the release of the Ombudsman report, FEHD has expanded its operations and the number of prosecutions from 2011 to 2013 (up to September) increased from 1 419 to 2 319. Despite more stringent prosecutions being put up by the government, the number unlicensed restaurants continued to grow with the same speed, from 208 to 265. This proves that solely by putting forth enforcement could only bring negligible progress. (Legislative **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




Council Secretariat, 2014)

The Ombudsman has also proposed a sustainable solution through promoting legitimate alfresco dining. However, even restaurant licensees may apply for setting up an alfresco dining area outside their premises, the number of successful applications were relatively small, as there are usually strong oppositions from local community. For instance, out of the 13 identified districts, most of the HADs replied that there were no suitable spots for alfresco dining in their districts. To facilitate the setting legitimate alfresco dining area in district, support from local opinion leaders and citizens is essential. In order to better address the problem of street obstruction, HAD should enhance its role in lobbying support from DC members and restaurant owners. (Ombudsman, 2013) The piece of recommendation put up by Ombudsman has indeed pointed out an array of inadequacies of the government adopted old public administration as the only mean of governance.

With reference to the above analysis, it is noted that strengthening inter-departmental coordination is necessary to alleviate the street obstruction problem. Moreover, in anticipation of higher public expectation on the **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



government's service quality, not only the interplay between government agencies will be crucial in curbing a public policy matter, collaborations between government and market players will be of equal importance. In the last chapter, further discussions will be made on ways to enhance governance capacity for this case.



# **Chapter 5: Case (2): MTR Network Extensions**

## **– Collaboration Governance as Partially Hands-off Governance?**


### **Introduction**

This Chapter analyses the MTR network extensions as illustrations of key features of collaborative governance. It considers whether government can ever be totally hands-off in such a model.

As discussed in Chapter 3, owing to the increasing demand for involvement in the district matters from the citizens and complexity of the district matters with multiple stakeholders involved, instead of simply applying interventionist governance approach to manage these matters, the government has adopted the collaborative governance approach as one of the dominant types of governance in the district management in the last decade.

The construction of MTR network extensions covers extensive construction areas with numerous affected communities and stakeholders

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




across the territory, top-down policy making based on command-and-control and coercion under traditional bureaucracy is ineffective in the provision of goods and services owing to the complexity of social needs in respective affected districts.

Hence, MTR network extensions adopts numerous processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished. The projects is a symbolic case of collaborative governance which defined by Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2011).

### **MTR Network Extensions**

MTR network extensions consist of five new rail extensions including West Island Line, Guangzhou - Shenzhen - Hong Kong Express Rail Link, Shatin to Central Link, Kwun Tong Line Extension and South Island Line (East). Upon the completion of all these extensions, it will bring a further

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



expansion of the existing 218 km rail network.


Since the construction of the five new rails cover extensive construction areas with numerous affected communities across the territory, the MTR Corporation, as a corporation with mixed public and private ownership and market objectives, has taken the lead to organize coalitions between the HKSAR Government, MTR Corporation and the community to ensure the smooth implementation of infrastructure construction works. It is a typical case that illustrated collaborative governance is an effective way to meet the growing social needs and complexities of service delivery nowadays.

*West Island Line (MTR Corporation, 2014)*

West Island Line (WIL) is an underground extension of the existing MTR Island Line from Sheung Wan to Kennedy Town covering the densely populated area of Western District.

In March 2009, the Chief Executive in Council authorized the WIL under the Railways Ordinance. The relevant project has been commenced

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




since July 2009 with numerous essential public infrastructure works entrusted by the Government in conjunction with the project, including a number of public pedestrian and transport links to the WIL.

Since the construction of WIL across the densely populated areas of the Western District and drill and blast is predominantly adopted for the construction works, the project has inevitably affect some of the existing public facilities and traffic arrangement. Hence, reprovision, remedial and improvement works on some of these facilities during the construction of WIL are implicated. For instance, modification of the footbridge linking Haking Wong Building of the HKU across Pok Fu Lam Road; reprovisioning of the Kennedy Town Swimming Pool; and reprovisioning of Hong Kong Central Dental Laboratory.

As the construction work of the WIL is directly supervised by the MTR Corporation in collaboration with the affected communities, the Corporation has engaged and consulted the community since the design stage of the project and regularly update the Central and Western District Councils on the work progress.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




*South Island Line (East) (MTR Corporation, 2014)*

South Island Line (East) (SIL(E)) is a railway connecting the MTR network at Admiralty to the Southern District of Hong Kong, via new stations at Ocean Park, Wong Chuk Hang, Lei Tung and South Horizons. The project was gazetted under the Railways Ordinance in July 2009 and commenced in 2011. MTR Corporation has been working closely with Southern District Council, which has provided strong support for the project, to accommodate local views on the new railway as much as practicable. Similar to the WIL, the construction work of the SIL(E) is directly supervised by the MTR Corporation with continuous consultation with the Legco, DCs and local public.

*Kwun Tong Line Extension (MTR Corporation, 2014)*

Kwun Tong Line Extension (KTE) extends the existing Kwun Tong Line which will run from Yau Ma Tei to Whampoa with one intermediate station at Ho Man Tin. In November 2010, the Chief Executive in Council

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






authorized the Kwun Tong Line Extension in an Ownership Approach. The relevant construction works is commenced in 2011 which is also supervised directly by the MTR Corporation.

The construction for the Kwun Tong Line Extension is carried out in the densely populated and fully developed Hung Hom and Whampoa areas with mainly the use of blasting and drilling. Hence, temporary traffic management scheme, pre-construction condition survey and ground investigation works are carried out to minimize the nuisance and disturbance caused to local communities.

*Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (MTR Corporation, 2014)*

Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL) runs from the terminus in West Kowloon, heading north to the Shenzhen/Hong Kong Boundary, where it connects with the Mainland Section. In October 2009, the Chief Executive in Council authorized the project of the Express Rail Link. In January 2010, the Finance Committee of the Legco

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




approved the funding application for the construction of the Express Rail Link and the construction commenced in late January 2010.

The railway runs beneath Yau Tsim Mong, Sham Shui Po, Kwai Tsing, Tsuen Wan, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long Districts operating entirely in dedicated tunnels. The dedicated tunnels will cover both the urban section and rural section. In the urban section, the tunnels run beneath well-developed area of West Kowloon. Hence, the major consideration in constructing the urban section is to minimize the impact of construction and operation on the local communities, traffic, and existing infrastructure and buildings, as well as to minimize private land and strata resumption.

For the rural section, the railway takes a direct route through the central New Territories, passing under Kam Shan, Tai Mo Shan, Kai Kung Leng and Mai Po before reaching the Shenzhen-Hong Kong boundary and connecting to the Mainland section. Therefore, the XRL covers the most extensive construction areas and the largest affected communities amongst the five new rail extensions.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




*Shatin to Central Link (MTR Corporation, 2014)*

Shatin to Central Link (SCL) will traverse several districts from New Territories to Hong Kong Island, including Shatin, Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon City and Hung Hom. The SCL will connect several existing railway lines to form two strategic railway corridors, namely the "East West Corridor" and the "North South Corridor". In March 2008, the Executive Council approved the planning and design of the SCL using a concession approach under which the project will be funded by the Government and the MTR Corporation is entrusted with its planning and design.

The railway project was gazetted in November 2010 under the Railways Ordinance and authorized by the Chief Executive in Council in March 2012. The Finance Committee of the Legco endorsed the funding of the SCL project in May 2012 and its construction has commenced in 2012.

Similar to other four railway extensions, the construction of the SCL is supervised directly by the MTR Corporation. As the SCL traverses so many developed urban areas, including some of the most densely developed

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




urban areas in the territory, it is inevitable that the railway line will pass under some private lots, thus requiring the resumption of their underground strata. In addition, during the construction of the SCL, some existing community facilities will be demolished and temporarily reprovisioned. Hence, to minimize the impact of these works on local communities, the Corporation will put in place the replacement facilities first before demolishing the existing facilities.

### *Community Engagement*

From the above, it can be observed that most works sites of the five railway extensions are close to residential areas, the works are inseparable from the daily life of residents. Therefore, the crucial element in successfully carrying out the projects is to facilitate the community's understanding of the nature of the construction programme, the works progress and possible impacts.


In this regard, Community Liaison Groups (CLGs) of respective projects have been set up as a channel to communicate with the affected local

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



communities. During quarterly CLGs meetings, reports on progress and construction impacts of the projects will be presented, while the concerns of the local stakeholders will be collected. CLGs were established with local district council members, village representatives, property owners' representatives, local parties, schools and representatives from government departments such as Home Affairs Department, Highways Department, Transport Department, Lands Department and Environmental Protection Department.

Meanwhile, temporary traffic arrangements are commonly required during the construction of new railway projects. These arrangements would affect the local district and can also have an effect on a broader scale. To prepare for the implementation of new traffic arrangements for each railway project, communication works have to be extended to relevant government departments including the Highways Department, Transport Department, Police Force, Home Affairs Department, and public transport operators, like franchised buses, minibuses and taxis, to ensure the arrangement can be implemented smoothly. Therefore, CLGs are the panel for negotiation and collaboration amongst the stakeholders in respective districts.




## **Analysis with reference to Collaborative Governance**

As discussed in Chapter 2, under the integrative framework for collaborative governance by (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011), there are three nested dimensions, namely the general system context, the collaborative governance regime, and the regime's collaborative dynamics and actions. These matters provide a valuable basis on which to assess the MTR network extensions experience.

### *General System Context*

The HKSAR Government entrusted the MTR Corporation to collaborate majority of the coordination in the projects as these rails will ultimately under the management of MTR Corporation upon completion. This provides MTR Corporation a strong incentive to collaborate with the affected communities and stakeholders to build community railways. Meanwhile, the HKSAR Government can minimize its resources for leading the deliberation amongst the MTR Corporation, affected communities and stakeholders.


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



Moreover, without the collaboration amongst the MTR Corporation, district councils and affected stakeholders, the implementation of the construction could not be accomplished on their own. Hence, with the above drivers, coupled with the complexity of social needs in respective affected districts, collaborative governance is adopted in managing MTR network extensions.

#### *Collaborative Governance Regime*

Turning to collaborative governance regime, it refers to the “system in which cross-boundary collaboration represents the predominate mode for conduct, decision making, and activity” (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011). In the case of MTR network extensions, the system or collaborative governance regime is established in the form of CLGs. CLGs performs cross-boundary collaboration with various government departments, district councils and affected stakeholders for decision making as discussed.




## *Regime's Collaborative Dynamics and Actions*

As for collaborative dynamics, the dynamics consist of three interactive components, namely principled engagement, shared motivation and capacity for joint action. The three components work together in an interactive way to produce collaborative actions in order to implement the shared purpose of the stakeholders within collaborative governance.

The MTR network extensions involved one or more public agencies, e.g. MTR Corporation, District Councils and the affected local communities, directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process. Hence, the projects are actually an illustration of collaborative governance, driving by collaborative dynamics consisting of three interactive components as mentioned above.

“Principled engagement occurs over time and may include different stakeholders at different points and take place in face-to-face or virtual formats, cross-organizational networks, or private and public meetings, among other settings” (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011).

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






As mentioned before, CLGs have been set up by MTR Corporation as a channel to communicate with the local community through engaging relevant stakeholders to formulate network. CLGs membership includes local district council members, residents representatives, and representatives from government departments such as Highways Department, Transport Department, Lands Department and Home Affairs Department. Through principled engagement, problems such as nuisance and disturbance caused during the construction works, are solved by the deliberation amongst CLGs members.

Shared motivation is defined as “a self-reinforcing cycle consisting of four elements: mutual trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment” (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011). It is held that repeated, quality interactions through principled engagement will help foster trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and shared commitment, thereby generating and sustaining shared motivation.

New railways in densely populated communities cannot be successfully built by only rely on precise railway design, detailed construction

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




arrangement and stringent monitoring. Since most works sites are close to residential areas, the works are indivisible from the daily lives of residents. Therefore, cultivating shared motivation is crucial for the implementation of the projects.

Taking the SCL as an example, in order to build up shared motivation on the nature of the construction programme, the works progress and possible impacts, MTR Corporation and relevant government departments held more than 100 consultation meetings with residents, district councils, local parties, professional institutes, concern groups and media to share and discuss the blueprint of the SCL in its design and gazettal stage (MTR Corporation, 2014).

Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2011) also suggested that collaborative governance must be able to generate a new capacity for joint action that did not exist before and sustain or grow that capacity for the duration of the shared purpose. Through the collaborative dynamics of principled engagement and shared motivation, the development of institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and resources will be stimulated, thereby generating and sustaining capacity for joint action.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




The establishment of CLGs actually helps to create capacity for joint action and reduce conflicts among stakeholders through negotiations and voluntary agreements. In fact, this sustaining capacity for joint action is inherited from the collaboration amongst stakeholders since the consultation, planning and design phases of the projects.

Apart from the above key features of collaborative governance illustrated by the integrative framework for collaborative governance by Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2011), the elements of collaborative governance can be also analyzed by the four ideal types of governance proposed by Knill and Tosun (2012).

The MTR network extensions case is an illustration of cooperative governance, symbolized by high level of cooperation between public and private actors but of low degree of legal obligation. This type of governance is characterized by the voluntary character of policy-making as well as the fact which private actors rather than the government plays a dominant role in formulation and implementation of policy (Knill and Tosun, 2012).


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



In contrast to the interventionist governance that public goods are provided on the basis of clearly defined rules and regulations with both the public and private actors are requiring to comply in accordance with the legal framework, the provision of goods and services under cooperative governance does not occur on the basis of legally binding requirements. Instead, negotiations and voluntary agreements between public and private actors play significant roles in goods and services delivery under cooperative governance. More importantly, policies are formulate through bargaining processes, in which both public and private actors participate on an equal standing (Knill and Tosun, 2012).

Through negotiations and voluntary agreements, the MTR network extensions case shows that public mangers are actively involved in bargaining process with private actors, such as concerned resident representatives, through CLGs. The CLPs play a significant role in the bargaining process, contributing to the formulation of policies at numerous districts where the new rails reached. Through establishing CLGs for the five new rail extensions, MTR Corporation builds coalitions of public, non-profit and private agencies to

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




meet mutually agreed upon needs, throughout the consultation phase of the projects, scheduling of blasting works and the collaboration of temporary traffic arrangements during the construction phase.

## **Concluding Remarks**

In connection with the above analysis, the MTR network extensions case is a typical illustration of collaborative governance adopted to solve more complex and complicated societal issues as suggested by Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh. In this governance model, the role of governments has shifted from providing a whole array of public goods and services to that of establishing regulatory frameworks for the provision of goods and services by private actors.

From the case study on MTR network extensions, it is observed that from local interest perspective, collaborative governance works well in solving complex issues involving numerous stakeholders, for instance, traffic diversion plan, coordination of blasting and construction works amongst affected stakeholders.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




It is observed that negotiations and voluntary agreements are the dominant basis of developments of rules and practices in the MTR network extensions case. Therefore, the role of the HKSAR Government focuses on making arrangements to allow negotiation of cooperative arrangements and voluntary agreements between public and private actors.

Finally, is collaborative governance means the government can ever be totally hands-off? Despite it is observed that the HKSAR Government plays a facilitator role and entrusted the MTR Corporation to collaborate majority of the coordination in the projects, the HKSAR Government is still monitoring the projects through Legco and DCs. Hence, the HKSAR Government is just partially hands-off in the governance of the MTR extension projects at district level.

Nevertheless, there are criticisms that the HKSAR Government is too hands-off amidst the implementation of the projects. Relevant observations and recommendations will be further discussed in the next Chapter.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




## Chapter 6: Conclusion

### Introduction

There are different types of governance based upon the degree of legal obligation and the co-operation between the private and public actors, making the foundation of Knill and Tosun's (2012) four ideal governance modes. In this project, the roles of district level administration were analyzed with regard to adoption of different governance modes in the real scenarios.

According to Chapter three, the governance mode of district level administration had been anticipated to develop towards more co-operative governance mode with increased market participation due to the enhanced numbers of elected District Councilors in the last decades. However, the district level administration still maintains a high degree of interventionist governance mode especially for some particular types of problems. Two street level cases, the enforcement against illegal extension of restaurants and MTR extension projects, were used to demonstrate such phenomenon of co-existence of two rather opposite governance modes in the present district

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




level administration of Hong Kong. This contradicts, to certain extent, to the theory of the trend of the shift of old public administration to the idea of collaborative governance in the modern administration era (Peters, 2001), as mentioned in Chapter two.

The above two cases has been two very common problems encountered in Hong Kong. Apart from Knill and Tosun's theory, the Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) theory about old public administration, and Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2011) theory about collaborative governance were used in Chapter four and five to analyze the two real scenarios to demonstrate the practice of the district level administration in dealing with problems of different nature and complexity.

### **Summary of the Analysis**

As recognized by most of the people, the street management largely utilized the interventionist governance mode while the MTR extension project largely utilized the co-operative governance mode traditionally. However, Knill and Tosun (2012) believed that no problem could be solved solely by a

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**





single mode. Instead, a mixture of governance modes was actually utilized to certain extent by the district level administration according to the nature of the problem to be addressed.


### **Case (1): Street Management on Illegal Extension of Restaurants**

#### *Key features of the analysis*

The street management demonstrated the example of interventionist governance mode with the government being the main party to deal with the problem of illegal extension of restaurant under the defined legal obligations. This is similar to the situation of traditional hierarchical governance mode.

According to Knill and Tosun (2012), interventionist governance emphasized the importance of using rules and procedures in both the private and public parties. As aforementioned, the street management case required the implementation of the formal rules and laws against any violation. The law enforcement departments thus took the lead among other parties to solve the problem as no other bodies could take the same role as the government in

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




this aspect. The government created the ground rules for other parties to carry out their own businesses.

This case has proved an existing alive-and-well example of the old public administrative model. The existing regulatory regime is an efficient and effective way to sanctioning street obstructions in alfresco dining blackspots. Those who are in breach of laws will be sentenced to fines and cessation of license. In order to improve policy outcome, the administration may fine-tune its enforcement strategies to cope with the latest social environment. As highlighted in the Ombudsman report, FEHD could better streamline its enforcement plans through re-allocation of existing resources, consultation with DCs for gaining public recognition and formulate specific strategies in each district. For Lands D, it could exercise its statutory powers more effectively and if necessary, review with SCDA the arrangement of handling illegal occupation of government land involving structures of a “more permanent nature”.

Even though modifying the system can improve enforcement performance, yet, the interventionist approach is not a one-way solution to

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




fulfill diversified needs of stakeholders. While coercive control exerted by the old public administration paradigm is insufficient to cater the versatile needs of the public, it implies that the government may need to tap views from the market and the civil society to make refinements on the current policy framework. Collaboration between the public servants and private sector is essential to attain mutually-agreed needs and enhance service standards.

From another perspective, the administrator may no longer be appropriate to retain its control to define the conception of public interests. The existing legislation and laws may be too rigid for execution mainly on two reasons. Firstly, the profits brought about by occupying public places for business are more than enough to offset the fines payable. Such punishment is clearly insufficient to deter illegal extension of business area by restaurants. Secondly, it has been a social trend in Hong Kong to protect nativism. In fact, some may perceive that alfresco dining is a symbolic activity in Hong Kong and it is important to protect such community values.

### *Recommendations*


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



Nowadays, the steering of the government to tackle the problem in the community was no longer sufficient and efficient. The traditional way to deal with the problem of illegal extension of restaurants could only result in temporary relief whenever the government agencies carried out their actions. That explained one of the reasons why the problem could never be solved after the problem was identified for some years. The involvement of different parties in the community, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is a suggestion to shift the hierarchical governance to collaborative governance. The shift of the modes could help to address the more complicated societal issues (Knill and Tosun, 2012). In other words, the government played a role towards a regulatory state instead of the interventionist state (Majone, 1994). The regulatory state means the government mainly provided the rules while the outcome is mainly determined by the society (Majone, 1994).


Promoting legitimate alfresco dining is a relatively viable option for balancing the diversified needs of community players. Apparently, this cannot be performed solely by any of the government department, whereas collaborative effort is of vital importance. To achieve such policy goals, the public managers might consider transforming part of the traditional hierarchical

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



relationships to non-hierarchical modes of political steering. To reduce the hierarchical components in policy and establish a new relationship between political and administrative actors, the administration should consider strengthening communication within the networked community, especially the District Officers, DC members and opinion leaders, so as to formulate policies via a bottom-up approach. In this regard, the SCDA shall take up a more proactive role in coordinating with different departments and involved community parties to enhance the concerted efforts effectively.

Through examining the inter-departmental dynamics in this street management case, it is proved that the old public administration paradigm is still a dominant type of public management model and is effective in catering traditional district-based policy issues, in which the government possessed good knowledge and information of such problems. In anticipation of the ever-changing interests of the public, rather than designing and implementing policies according to the designated framework, the policy makers shall consider enhance collaboration from the market and the civil society.




## Case (2): MTR Network Extensions

### *Key features of the analysis*

The cooperative governance mode is used for MTR extension projects, in which the focus is on cooperation between the government and the societal actors (Knill and Tosun, 2012). The governance mode emphasized about the interactions between the interdependent public and private actors to achieve certain aims. The actors of the network exchange their expertise, knowledge and resources during the process (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). The development of the governance mode mainly occurred since 1990s. One of the reasons was due to enhanced societal complexity and differentiation, which made the government no longer efficient to deal with the problems by itself only, but required the co-operation between the public and private actors to accomplish the tasks. This mode of governance requires the mutual trust in sharing information and resources (Knill and Tosun, 2012). As demonstrated in the MTR extension case, MTR Corporation made use of their expertise while the government provided resources such as lands and money in implementing the projects. Other than that, the government mainly played the

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




role in monitoring the progress of the project on a regular basis without the real power to intervene the policy of the MTR Corporation.

In the aspect of community engagement, CLG took the lead to negotiate with different community parties and the government departmental agencies during the progress of the projects. Nevertheless, the government cannot be totally hands-off in collaborative governance model, especially for issues involving public interests or of significant impact on the society.

In April 2014, MTR network projects director Chew Tai-chong said the storm occurred in March had flooded a construction site near Tsat Sing Kong and Tai Kong Po in Yuen Long along the project of XRL. The tunnel boring machine was seriously damaged and an investigation was pending whether to repair it or to excavate the remaining tunnel by other means. It is estimated that the construction of that part of the XRL project would be prolonged by at least nine months and the whole XRL would be opened in 2016. Chew also attributed the delay to complicated conditions at West Kowloon and complex geology at the cross-border section beneath a protected wetland.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




Although the government has entrusted the management of this project to MTR Corporation, the Corporation failed to notify the government about the case and it still informed the government that the XRL would be operated in 2015.

### *Recommendations*

The government should step in when some issues that may carry significant impact to the society happens, though it may not occur so often in most of the cases. In other words, the government still plays an important role in monitoring the work of MTR Corporation. With regard to the insufficiency of the government in doing its job in this aspect, the government probably required to build up more legal obligation to ensure the fulfillment of the promises by the cooperation.

The delay in construction progress unveiled recently meant the network governance mode was not sufficient to avoid the governance crisis in case of internal faults of the private actors. The importance of the hierarchical

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**






control during the process becomes crucial again. The government probably required more solid foundation of legal framework to allow them to participate in a more proactive manner. This meant the hierarchical governance was essential to some degree. Owing to the possible network failure, Torfing et al. (2012) suggested that meta-governance was required to enhance effective network governance through network design, network framing, process management and direct participation. It is opined that the desired outcomes of the network can be enhanced by these metagovernance tools. Therefore, direct participation of the government, such as state-intervention and hierarchical control is still required to govern the collaborative network in a bid to monitor the network and enhance its effectiveness.

### **Implications for Governance in Hong Kong**

In view of the problems of the two cases, any single governance mode is probably not enough to tackle the issues encountered every day in Hong Kong. In the reality, a mixture of different governance modes is commonly seen in problems solving. It is believed this approach is more comprehensive to address the issues. Although the government is important to play its role to


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



different degrees in different modes of governance, the current political atmosphere cannot allow efficient governance by the administration. This situation was developed due to its historical background.

Hong Kong was a British colony between 1841 and 1997. The government was designed to maintain political stability and colonial rule. The colonial government was lack of legitimacy as it basically had no consent for its rule from the Hong Kong residents. At the early stage, there was little interaction between the government and the Chinese citizens in the territory as the colonial officials were dominated by the foreign elites. The system continued until the deadly riots in 1960s, which were originating as a minor labour dispute and then developed to the grievances against British colonial rule. An efficient way for the colonial government to gain legitimacy was to perform well in its governance. It managed to develop the legitimacy due to the hyper economic growth and the improved social welfare system between 1970s and 1980s. In 1990s, the government tried to maintain the legitimacy by launching performance pledges to the public and being an accountable government (Scott, 2010).


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



Although the structure and functions of the HKSAR government remained mostly unchanged since the handover in 1997, its legitimacy has been deteriorating. In 1997, Asian financial crisis caused the economic recession, aggravated by the outbreak of atypical pneumonia in 2003. The financial surplus acquired by the colonial government was gone. The majority of people attributed it to the poor management of HKSAR government. In 2003, the attempt to enact Article 23 of Basic Law sparked the dissatisfaction towards the administration. After the incident, there was significant growth of civil societies which took their causes to street, making it difficult for policy implementation these years. The difficulty in gaining the legitimating was also related to the reluctance of the central government to introduce the universal suffrage (Scott, 2010).

In 2012, the third Chief Executive (CE) Leung Chun Ying was elected by small circle again. After the CE resumed the office, the credibility of the new administration was seriously undermined by a number of scandals. For instances, the CE was found having unauthorized building works at his residence, which has drawn much attack on his integrity because he also made similar allegation against his opponent during the CE election campaign. As a

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




result, the pro-democracy camp filed a complaint to Independent Commission Against Corruption, proposed a special Legco enquiry and a vote of no confidence in Legco and initiated judicial review in a bid to invalidate the result of the CE election.

The integrity of a number of CE's cabinet members were also under query. The former Secretary for Development MAK Chai Kwong was accused of abusing the rental allowance for financial gain, which led to his resignation. The Executive Council member LAM Fan Keung was also accused of selling two properties before the government announcement of measures to curb the property speculation.

These incidents rendered the CE overall rating hitting the lowest record among the three CE. The legitimacy of the government was getting lower and lower from the colonial stage to the current government. Together with the continuous attack of Pro-democracy camp, this becomes one of the main obstacles in its policy implementation and caused numerous political unrest since 2012 including the controversy over the implementation of Moral and National Education, The Development plan in North East New Territories,


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



the construction of Lung Mei Artificial Beach, implementation of Old Age Living Allowance and etc.

The development plan of North East New Territories could be taken for illustration. In 1998, the North East New Territories New Development Areas (NENT NDAs) comprising Kwu Tung North (KTN), Fanling North (FLN) and Ping Che/Ta Kwu Ling (PC/TKL) were suggested for development. The project was announced by the then CE Tung Chee Hwa in “1998-1999 Policy Address” but was shelved in 2003 because of the economic downturn and slower growth of population and housing demand (Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department, 2012). In 2007, the “Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy” (the HK2030 Study), completed by the Civil Engineering and Development Department (CEDD) and the Planning Department (PlanD) anticipated the population in Hong Kong will be raised to 8.4 million in 2030 (Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy Final Report, 2007). Because of the population growth and the corresponding increased housing needs, HK2030 Study recommended the development of New Territories to provide long-term housing supply and employment opportunities. The then CE Tsang Yam Kuen adopted the idea


**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



and announced the proposal of NENT NDAs as one of the “Ten Major Infrastructure Projects” in his “2007-2008 Policy Address” (The 2007-08 Policy Address, 2007).

The consultation for the plan has been underway since 2008 but it was only set under the limelight in September last year. Apart from the criticism of failing to reach the villagers living there and ignorance of public opinion because of the top-down approach in consultation process, the plan was also alleged for building the area into Shenzhen’s garden after the exposure of Leung Chun Ying’s affiliated think tank’s proposal to set up a special zone within the area to allow visa on arrival for mainlanders (Fang, 2010). Although the government repeatedly denied such allegation, the public still reacted fiercely, which resulted in a 6000-strong protest in the last public consultation forum in 2012 and some violent protests in the Legco in 2014 during the voting day to pass the motion of financially subsidizing the project. Moreover, the Legco members mounted the filibuster in the Legco against the proposal. The Legco members and the government were said to having the worst relationship since handover in 1997. The NENT NDAs issue is still ongoing and anticipated to be politicized and flare up again in the near future.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




The turbulence can be contributed by the low credibility and legitimacy of the government and the officials.

From the above demonstration, the legitimacy of the power played an important part in different context and traditions of governance. Under the political unrest environment, the government can hardly discharge its function no matter at the Legco or the district level. No matter which mode of governance is adopted, the government must earn the trust and support from the community and political parties to ensure the good governance in the future. At this stage, the government is facing a huge difficulty to step across this hurdle. There is no foreseen good chance, except the implementation of universal suffrage of CE in 2017, to have an improvement for such problematic situation. However, the issue of universal suffrage of CE, if handled unwell, can turn the situation even worse, making the governance of Hong Kong an unmanageable task.

### **Concluding Remarks**


To conclude, modes of governance in Hong Kong administration

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



coexist and different policy challenges might imply different strategy in combining different modes of governance for the sake of good governance, which is echoed with Knill and Tosun (2012). As mentioned in the beginning, the collaborative governance mode was observed to be the trend of contemporary governance mode. Although it means the increase of participation of the stakeholders other than the government, it needs not mean a reduction of hierarchical intervention. In fact, it may lead to a shift from the role of the provider of public goods to the role of the regulator of public goods.

It is generalized that the government played an important role of providing common goods regardless of the governance modes adopted. The government is essential to distribute the power and resources which are not belonged to the societal actors (Knill and Tosun, 2012). Nevertheless, the political predicament has caused the inefficient functioning of the current administration of Hong Kong. Only if the legitimacy of the government and the support from the community can be improved, the better governance can be achieved.






## References


1. Denhardt, J V & Denhardt, RB, (2003). *The New Public Service: Serving Not Steering*, M E Sharpe, New York, pp. 3-12 & 28-29
2. Emerson, Kirik, Nabatchi, Tina and Balogh, Stephen, (2011). An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 22:1-29
3. Fang, J. (2010). 香港邊界禁區發展策略研究. *One Country Two Systems Research Institute. Hong Kong*. pp. 18-21.
4. Gerth, H. Heinrich and Mills, C. Wright (1946). *Bureaucracy. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford University Press, New York. pp. 196-198
5. Home Affairs Department (2014), District Administration - District Officers  
<[http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public\\_services/district\\_administration/dis\\_officers.htm](http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public_services/district_administration/dis_officers.htm)>
6. Home Affairs Department (2014), District Administration – Liaison Officers  
<[http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public\\_services/district\\_administration/liaison.htm](http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public_services/district_administration/liaison.htm)>
7. Home Affairs Department (2014), Minor Works Programmes > Minor Works Programmes  
<[http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public\\_services/minor\\_works\\_programmes/minor\\_work.htm](http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public_services/minor_works_programmes/minor_work.htm)>
8. Home Affairs Department (2014), Signature Project Scheme  
<<http://www.had.gov.hk/en/sps.htm>>
9. Home Affairs Department (2014), Public Services – District Administration  
<[http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public\\_services/district\\_administration/admin\\_main.htm](http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public_services/district_administration/admin_main.htm)>

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**




10. Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy Final Report. 2007. <[http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland\\_en/p\\_study/comp\\_s/hk2030/eng/finalreport/pdf/E\\_FR.pdf](http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/p_study/comp_s/hk2030/eng/finalreport/pdf/E_FR.pdf)>. p. 103.
11. Hood, C C (1991). A Public Administration for all seasons?, *Public Administration*, Vol. 69 Spring 1991
12. Knill, C. and Tosun, J. (2012). Governance: A Synoptic Perspective on Policy-Making. *Public Policy: A New Introduction*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, chapter 9.
13. Legislative Council Secretariat (2013). Background brief prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat for the meeting on 18 February 2013 on District Administration, LC Paper No. CB(2)612/12-13(05), February 2013.
14. Legislative Council Secretariat (2014). Panel on Home Affairs: Information note prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat for the meeting on 24 March 2014 Illegal shop front extension, LC Paper No. CB(2)1060/13-14(06), March 2014.
15. Majone, G. (1994). The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe. *West European Politics*, Vol. 17, pp. 77-101.
16. Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (1992). Policy networks in British government. *Clarendon Press*.
17. MTR Corporation (2014). MTR Corporation Website: Express Rail Link, <http://www.expressrailink.hk/en/home/>, accessed on 2014-05-30.
18. MTR Corporation (2014). MTR Corporation Website: Kwun Tong Line Extension, <http://www.mtr-kwuntonglineextension.hk/en/home/>, accessed on 2014-05-30.
19. MTR Corporation (2014). MTR Corporation Website: Network Extension [http://www.mtr.com.hk/eng/projects/projects\\_new\\_index.html](http://www.mtr.com.hk/eng/projects/projects_new_index.html), accessed on 2014-05-30.

**Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



20. MTR Corporation (2014). MTR Corporation Website: Shatin to Central Link, <http://www.mtr-shatincentrallink.hk/en/home/>, accessed on 2014-05-30.
21. MTR Corporation (2014). MTR Corporation Website: South Island Line (East), <http://www.mtr-southislandline.hk/en/home/>, accessed on 2014-05-30.
22. MTR Corporation (2014). MTR Corporation Website: West Island Line, <http://www.mtr-westislandline.hk/en/home/>, accessed on 2014-05-30.
23. Ombudsman (2013). Direct Investigation Regulatory Measures and Enforcement Actions against Illegal Extension of Business Area by Restaurants, Office of The Ombudsman, May 2013
24. Peters, B.G. (2001). From Change to Change: Patterns of Continuing Administrative Reform in Europe. *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 1 pp 41 – 54
25. Pierre, J. and Peters, B.G. (2000). *Governance, the State and Public Policy*. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke
26. Planning Department and Civil Engineering and Development Department (2012). North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning and Engineering Study – Investigation. 25 Nov 2012 <<http://www.nentnda.gov.hk/eng/index.html>>
27. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2011). Comparative Public Management Reform: An introduction to the key debates. *Public Management Reform*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition Ch. 1.
28. Salamon, Lester M. (2002). The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction. *The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance*. Oxford University Press, New York.
29. Scott, I. (2010). The Public Sector in Hong Kong. *Hong Kong University Press*.
30. South China Morning Post (2014). South China Morning Post Website: **Managing inter-agency co-ordination: An analysis of district level administration in Hong Kong**



*“Concern over Future of MTR Archaeological Dig”*,  
<<http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1501945/concern-over-future-mtr-archaeological-dig>, accessed on 2014-06-15.>

31. The 2007-08 Policy Address. Hong Kong Special Administrative Area. 2007. <<http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/07-08/eng/docs/policy.pdf>>. P. 12.
32. Torfing, J., Peters, B. G. J., Pierre and Sørensen, E. (2012). Assessing and improving effective interactive governance’, *Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 166-185.
33. Walsh, K. and Stewart, J. (1992). *Change in the Management of Public Services*. Public Administration, Vol. 70, pp 499-518

