Depoliticisation of Desalination Discourse: Media Analysis of Hydro-Policies for (Climate) Resilience in Israel (2001-2018)

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Abstract

As the impacts of climate change accelerate, Israel has experienced three long droughts since the turn of the century: 1999-2001, 2004-2011 and 2014-2017. In response to this recurring water scarcity, seawater desalination (SD) now supplies 80% of the country's household water consumption. Whilst promising steady water supplies, SD is a specific hydro-policy that has long-term environmental, health, economic and political implications.

This thesis applies a resilience perspective to investigate the historical development of hydro-policies discourse in Israel. It analyses how, over an eighteen-year period (2001-2018), Israeli newspapers and governmental public communication campaigns (PCCs) discursively represented the drought risks and the hydro-policies promoted to solve them, particularly the debate on SD as the preferred resilience policy. In doing so, the thesis addresses a research gap in media analyses of environmental discourse in Israel, and in the mediation of water scarcity more generally. Moreover, it innovatively employs the resilience perspective in communication studies to analyse (de)politicisation of policy responses to environmental and climate risks.

Bringing two longitudinal methods in conversation with literature on resilience and post-politics, this thesis critically evaluates the role of the media as contributing to the (de)politicisation of the hydro-policy debate and SD. The first method is a critical discourse analysis of newspapers concentrated on pre-identified critical discourse periods, one for each drought (2001-2002, n=432; 2008-2010, n=377; 2018, n=127), which coincide with periods of formal governmental inquiry into hydro-policies. Selected newspapers in Hebrew are: *Haaretz* (an elite broadsheet) and *Yedioth Aharonoth* (a popular daily) and their economic sub-papers *TheMarker* and *Calcalist*. The second method is a multimodal discourse analysis of videos from nine PCCs produced by the Israel Water Authority to reduce household water consumption (2008-2018, n=35).

Findings show that in every period, newspapers framed the drought as a "water crisis" due to "governmental failure-to-act" and a supply and demand imbalance, with the connection to climate change marginalised and questioned. While delegitimising political disagreements between the contesting discourse-coalitions (Agro-Zionist, Economic, Environmental and Social-Municipal), the newspapers generated a consensus around the continual expansion of privatised SD. Furthermore, the longitudinal findings reveal the expansion of techno-managerial, expert-based discourses in the newspapers, which became hegemonic over time, mainly in the form of economisation. The multimodal video analysis shows how the PCCs audio-visually reaffirmed the "crisis" frame and strengthened its depoliticisation, but in a different way: by making the issue an ethical-individual one. Finally, in both mediums, the scope of the discourse on resilience was limited to drought risk and not wider anthropogenic climate impacts, neglecting the relationship between SD and climate change.

Keywords:

Environmental Communication, Resilience, Depoliticisation, Hydro-Policies, Israel, Climate Change, Desalination, Environmental Risk, Drought, Water, Newspapers Discourse

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AZDC	Agro-Zionist discourse coalition
BD	Brackish water desalination
CA	Competition Authority
CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CDP	Critical discourse period
CDM	Critical discourse moment
DoB	Director of Budgets
EC	Environmental communication
EcDC	Economic discourse-coalition
EnDC	Environmental discourse-coalition
ENGO	Environmental non-governmental organizations
FLA	Federation of Local Authorities
IDE	Israel Desalination Engineering
IUED	Israel Union for Environmental Defence
IWA	Israel Water Authority
IWC	Israel Water Council
MEP	Ministry of Environmental Protection
MK	Member of Knesset
MCM	Million cubic meters
MDA	Multimodal Discourse Analysis
MoE	Ministry of Energy
MoI	Ministry of Infrastructures
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIC	National Inquiry Committee for the Water System, or Bayan Committee
PA	Palestinian Authority
PIC	Parliamentary Inquiry Committee

PCG   Purifying contaminated wells

PCC   Public Communication Campaigns

PM   Prime Minister

P-SD   Portable seawater desalination

PPP   Private-public partnership

SCR   State Comptroller Report

SER   Social-environmental Resilience

SES   Social-environmental systems

SD   Seawater desalination

SDT   Sewage desalination treatment

SMDC   Social-Municipal discourse coalition

SoE   State of Emergency

YA   Yedioth Ahronoth

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Acknowledgments

Declaration

I declare that the research contained in this thesis, unless otherwise formally indicated within the text, is the original work of the author. The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other university for a degree, and does not incorporate any material already submitted for a degree.

Signed

Shai Kassirer

Dated

1.4.2020

Introduction

One cannot argue with Israel's need for and the success of the creation of national resilience in the area of water supply. Today, Israel is well prepared for climate change and drought in terms of water supply for drinking and industry. With worsening climate change in the region, the increase in the demand for water and the depletion of the quantity and quality of natural water sources, Israel will have to intensify efforts and increase the production capacity of desalinated water.

(Israel's Office of Nature Protection Chief Scientist, Netanyahu 2017:39)

Desalination is the action of making saline water, such as seawater and salty groundwater, suitable for human consumption and irrigation. The Fifth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in a chapter entitled *Climate-Resilient Pathways: Adaptation, Mitigation, and Sustainable Development,* states that using desalination in coastal areas is an innovative way for coping with greater water scarcity induced by climate change (Denton et al. 2014). In Israel, seawater desalination (SD) has become the leading solution for achieving resilience for the water supply. Over the past two decades, Israel built some of the world's largest SD facilities, which currently supply 40% of its annual water consumption; the government aims to increase this to 70% in the near future (Netanyahu 2017). This policy came as a response to a series of dry winters, which according to NASA constituted the longest drought in the Eastern Mediterranean for 900 years (Cook et al. 2016). As a consequence of these changing environmental and climatic conditions, there have been dramatic alterations to Israel's hydro-regime, that is, the institutionalised, technological, legal, economic and socio-environmental systems of water ownership, collection, allocation, distribution and pricing (Swyngedouw 2015). This represented a transition from a regime based on water transfer, state ownership and subsidies (mainly for agriculture) to a regime based on water production by desalination and sewage recycling with economic principles guiding decision-making over pricing, management and development of infrastructure (most of the desalination facilities are privately owned, for example) (Feitelson 2013).

This thesis critically examines the discursive aspects of the transformation of the hydro-regime as a response to the droughts through its media representations. It looks at the mediated discourses of droughts and hydro-policies (policies are components of the hydro-regime) in Israel from 2001 to 2018, through a longitudinal critical discourse

analysis (CDA) of newspaper reporting and a longitudinal multimodal discourse analysis (MDA) of governmental public communication campaigns (PCCs), which were televised from 2008 to 2018. The newspaper CDA studies the reporting of these hydro-policies (which includes SD) as a response to the droughts in Israel by focusing on three pre-identified critical discourse periods. The overall timeframe examined include the droughts of 1999-2001, 2004-2011 and 2014-2017; this timeframe includes the construction of five large-scale SD facilities on Israel's Mediterranean coastline (at 2005, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015). The selected periods of analysis represent times of official governmental inquiry: a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee (2001-2002); a National Inquiry Committee (2008-2010); and a State Comptroller investigation (2018). The CDA of newspaper reporting focuses on two daily newspapers in Hebrew: *Yedioth Ahronoth*, a popular newspaper in a tabloid format and *Haaretz,* a broadsheet elite newspaper, and their economic sub-papers *Calcalist* and *TheMarker*. The MDA focuses on nine separate PCCs produced by the Israel Water Authority[a] during a period of 11 years (2008-2018) and broadcast on Israeli television. PCCs are considered in the literature as reinforcing and shaping existing discourses (Rice and Atkins 2013). As such, the analysis of these campaigns encouraging viewers to reduce household water consumption contributes further insight into the development of the hydro-policies discourse during this time.

Situated in the field of environmental communication, this thesis takes a resilience perspective to primarily study the discursive role of Israeli newspapers in the hydro-policy debate during those years; and secondarily, to examine how governmental PCCs work alongside to reinforce and challenge the developing discourses of hydro-policy in the media. Whilst this thesis offers an important, and hitherto underexplored, focus upon Israeli media coverage of an environmental issue, it also takes the emerging approach of resilience theory within environmental communication studies to examine developing discourses of hydro-policies as a response to drought within the broader context of climate change. Resilience is a relatively new way to conceptualise policy response to environmental risks. Originating from ecology and biophysical sciences in the early 1970s, resilience is a way of explaining and analysing systems' and communities' reactions, and the ability to recover from external shocks and disturbances. Etymologically meaning 'bouncing-back', resilience is described as the ability to cope, regain control and reduce

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[a] The Israel Water Authority (IWA, established 2007) is an independent non-ministerial governmental body. Further details on the IWA are in Chapter 2.

vulnerability (McGreavy 2016). As a research approach for social-environmental systems, resilience is used to study processes of reaction to a specific environmental disturbance. An examination of the 'sources' and 'f/actors' of resilience and the nature of reaction (resistance, adjustments or transformation) is used to question dominant views, behaviours and policies connected to climate effects and adaptation. Recently, critical ecological resilience has started addressing its political aspects and discursive elements by not only studying resilient 'from/to what', but also 'by/for whom?' (Cretney 2014). This thesis incorporates these questions into communication studies by asking: how is this process of resilience mediated in the context of drought and hydro-policy debate in Israel? Even though there are some studies that consider resilience as a discourse (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010; Cretney 2014; Mathmann and Oles 2016; McGreavy 2016), this perspective has yet to be used for analysing newspaper reporting or PCCs, nor for understanding the role of the media in the discursive process. Resilience is used in this research not just as subject of study, but as an analytic tool for mapping discursive changes over time and for revealing what effected that change (i.e. contextualising the dynamic of change inside and outside the reporting). In doing so, through a case study of drought, this thesis brings together two under-researched areas of environmental communication: a longitudinal study (Hansen 2015c) of Israeli media coverage of drought and hydro-policy debates, and the application of resilience theory to the study on environmental risk communication.

By using the resilience perspective to analyse contesting discourses over hydro-policies in Israeli newspapers, this thesis shows how this perspective contributes to our understanding of the processes of (de)politicisation of environmental risk by the media. This thesis considers the changes in Israel's hydro-regime as part of a larger trend of neoliberalisation of the environment, which is characterised by a techno-managerial, depoliticised discourse of environmental risks and solutions. Writing on SD in Spain, Swyngedouw and Williams (2016:69) explain how this technology "bears all the hallmarks of a post-political techno-managerial project". The 'post political era'[b] relates to the perceived inevitability of market capitalism as the only possibility for social-economic structure (Mouffe 2005). In this era, a technocratic expert-based management perspective organises governance around problem solving with a focus on consensus building (Wilson

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[b] Alternatively called 'post democratic' or 'post-ideological' (Maeseele 2015a).

and Swyngedouw 2014). Depoliticisation is the process of transforming an issue of ideological contestation to a matter of administration, that is when decision-making is not a question of political position and values, but of expert knowledge, reserved for scientists or economists (Maeseele 2015a). Depoliticisation of environmental crises, according to Swyngedouw and Williams (2016), leads to technical consensual 'solutions' with a hidden neoliberal agenda. In many cases, it is a policy that offers a socio-ecological *fix* (in both senses of the word) of the conditions that produced the problem in the first place (Kenis and Lievens 2016; Swyngedouw 2010). Swyngedouw (2013) already identified SD in Spain as demonstrating similar depoliticised attributes. Over the past few years, post-political theory has been implemented into critical studies of newspaper discourse on subjects such as climate change, genetically modified food and nuclear power (Deneckere and De Cleen 2017; Maeseele et al. 2017; Pepermans 2015).

Building on these theories and studies, this thesis asks, how do Israeli news media and PCCs communicate drought and hydro-policies between 2001 and 2018? What forms of resilience are constructed through these mediations, and how might these contribute to the (de)politicisation of droughts, hydro-policies and desalination in Israel? This thesis is the first to use critical discourse analysis to study the depoliticisation of hydro-policies and desalination in Israeli newspapers (or elsewhere) and in governmental PCCs. Thereby, this thesis addresses a research gap in environmental communication through its focus upon Israel and water as an environmental issue. Non-western countries are a marginalised subject of interest in the field of environmental communication, and despite growing work in this field, only a few studies on Israel to date have been published (Fischhendler et al. 2015; Katz-Kimchi 2013; Nossek 2019). In addition, this thesis draws on the geography literature dealing with discourse-coalitions shaping the Israeli hydro-policies debate. Menahem and Gilad (2013) mention journalists as members of these coalitions; however, they do not explain what the institutional role of the media is in the policy contestation between them. This thesis addresses this gap in knowledge. In contrast to the small amount of research on Israel, water has been the subject of environmental and risk communication for many years; nonetheless, due to the global-north tendency of these fields, they have concentrated on the risk of pollution and contamination (Driedger 2007) or floods (Bird, Ling, and Haynes 2012) while water scarcity and droughts remain

understudied.[c] Additional contributions are derived from the study of the video campaigns, firstly, as visual analysis is an understudied area of environmental communication (Hansen and Machin 2013b), and secondly as discourse analysis is an understudied method for PCCs (Rice and Robinson 2013).

Methodologically, this thesis responds to repeated calls in the fields of risk and environmental communications to conduct longitudinal and historical studies of news coverage and media representation that can contextualise reporting on the environment and follow the social and discursive evolution of a topic (Anderson 2015; Bakir 2010; Hansen 2015c, 2015b). To achieve this, the newspaper analysis in this thesis builds on past longitudinal studies that used CDA to examine climate change, newspaper reporting and depoliticisation (Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Maeseele 2015a; Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017; Pepermans 2015), but with the necessary adaptations for a critical study of resilience. A longitudinal approach is also used for the analysis of the audio-visual discursive construction of resilience by using MDA methods (Kress 2012); for this part, this thesis builds on past studies of PCCs (Rice and Robinson 2013) and visual environmental communication (Hansen and Machin 2013b).

The chapters of this thesis proceed as follows. The literature review (Chapter 1) is divided into three main parts and two smaller ones. Part one introduces the field of Environmental and Risk Communication and the theory of Risk Society. The second part presents the political theory of the post-political era, its connection to the climate crisis and hydro-policies. The third part explores the theoretical framework of resilience, alongside how this research looks at the process of change related to risk. The literature review ends with one section on environmental discourse in Israel, and another dedicated to PCCs. The second chapter, Case Study Context, gives a detailed review of Israel's water system, it current and historical hydro-policies and introduces the implications of the use of seawater desalination. Chapter 3 presents the methodological approach of this research of critical discourse analysis, the CDA and MDA methods, and the data collection process for the newspapers and the PCCs. The empirical part of this thesis is composed of five

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[c] Over the past few years, there has been growing attention to environmental communication and water, which even led to the 15th Conference for Communication and Environment in Vancouver to choose water as its main theme. Six papers in this conference included the words 'drought' or 'water scarcity', including mine (Kassirer 2019); many more had engaged with policy making. This growing interest in the field is yet to be reflected in printed publications.

chapters, each of the first three present the findings of one time period of the newspapers' analysis: Chapter 4: 2001-2002, Chapter 5: 2008-2010, and Chapter 6: 2018. Following these, Chapter 7 presents the findings of the audio-visual analysis of the governmental campaigns. Finally, Chapter 8 offers a discussion of the findings from a longitudinal perspective, comparing the time periods and integrating the findings of the CDA and MDA into a theoretical debate about resilience, depoliticisation and desalination. This thesis ends with a conclusions section summarising the key findings with reflection on this research and suggestions for further studies.

Chapter 1 - Literature Review

Introduction

In one of his last papers, Ulrich Beck describes our current era as one that is in constant "metamorphosis" due to the globally complex risk of climate change:

> *All of the discussion about climate change up till now has been focused on whether it is really happening, and if it is, what can we do to stop or contain or solve it? […] What no one has seen is that the focus on solutions blinds us to the fact that climate change has already changed the world – our way of being in the world, our way of thinking about the world, and our way of imagining and doing politics (Beck 2015:76).*

Beck might overstate the 'blindness' of public debate to the changes already caused by climate change, but he does raise a prominent issue in that the focus of the discussion should change from 'is it happening?' or 'how it can be stopped, contained or solved?' to 'how does climate change transform society?' With this approach, Beck (2015) considers climate change not as a future risk, but as a current issue. For him, it is a multi-aspect risk that already affects all life on earth at all levels of realisation: physically, sociologically, culturally, ecologically, economically and politically; or in Naomi Klein's words on climate change: "This Changes Everything" (2014). Beck (2015), thus, points out the connections between climate change and *acting* ("being in the world" or "doing"), processes of *meaning making* ("discussion", "thinking" or "imagining") and *politics*. The patterns of relations between these factors are at the centre of this research. The following sections further explore these three aspects.

The literature review is comprised of three major parts and two minor ones. The larger parts begin by exploring (1) the *meaning making* of nature and environmental discourse, as understood in the field of environmental communication. It then presents Beck's theory about a risk society, followed by a more detailed examination of the sub-field of environmental risk communications and its relevance to this research. The second major part is on (2) *politics* and explores one of the theoretical perspectives used in this research: the political theory of the post-political condition. Research by Swyngedouw, Maeseele and others, and the theoretical work of Mouffe they built on, is used for explaining the objectives of this research in relation to risk communication and politics. This part ends by presenting the concept of hydro-policies and Swyngedouw's work on the connection between water and power, and its manifestation in policy, technology and discourse. In the third major part, (3) on *acting,* the theoretical framework of resilience is presented, alongside how this research looks at the process of change related to climate

risk, that is in connection to the case study on the hydro-policies discourse in Israel. The first minor part presents studies on (4) *environmental discourse in Israel.* Finally, the last part on (5) *public communication campaigns* (PCCs) briefly defines these discursive tools and reviews certain key studies in the field.

1.1. Part 1 - Meaning Making: Environmental Communication

Environmental Communication (EC) is the act of communicating about nature and the environment (Cox 2010). Similar to other aspects of life, we understand *nature* and the *environment* through a symbolic process of presentation, mediation and interpretation where messages about nature and the environment are culture dependent and related to the context of time or place. These communication processes take many forms (oral, written or visual) and can be mediated by different means, mediums or technologies. The field of EC is interested in understanding these processes or representations (Anderson 2015; Cox and Depoe 2015; Hansen and Cox 2015). EC takes as its starting point that communication is "not only reflecting but also constructing, producing, and naturalizing particular human relations with the environment" (Milstein 2009:344). According to Cox (2010) our beliefs, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards nature and the environment are constructed and influenced by language and mediated by different media and communication forms (including newspapers, storytelling and photography). Therefore, Cox states that:

> *it is impossible to separate our knowledge about environmental issues from communication itself*
> *[…] the way we communicate with one another about the environment powerfully affects how we*
> *perceive both it and ourselves and, therefore, how we define our relationship with the natural*
> *world. (2010:2)*

Cox (2010:20) claims that this is a *constitutive* and *pragmatic* process: how we talk about the environment constitutes or constructs the environment, and it is pragmatic because it has an effect. In other words, how communication constructs an issue also affects it by influencing behaviour or causing action, which comes in variable forms, such as policy making. Cox (2010), thus, articulates the premise of EC in which environmental issues are real and occurring, that is they have a material cause and effect; however, the way in which we understand and act on them are shaped through discourse and media. This dependency on mediation to give meaning to nature and the environment is particularly crucial when it comes to environmental risks that cannot be sensed without technological assistance, such as radiation or chemical contamination (Cottle 1998), as discussed in Section 1.1.2.

Anderson (2015) elaborates on Cox's (2010) definition and defines EC not only as interested in understanding the symbolic medium of human-nature relations, but also in being able to criticise its representation (mainly in the media) to aid social-environmental change. To phrase it differently, EC explains how people and social actors

communicate, mediate, represent and/or understand environmental topics, combined with the ethical goal of promoting changes to human attitudes towards nature and the environment. These actors vary as the field of EC grows, investigating: governmental, non-governmental and business sectors; collective and individual action; verbal, textual and visual mediums; and face-to-face, printed, electronic and digital communication (Hansen and Cox 2015). According to Doyle (2011:4), to best address an environmental issue "we must recognize the institutionalized knowledge systems and discursive practices through which [it] has come to be identified and made meaningful". Doyle (2011) focuses on how climate change has been mediated by drawing attention to *institutionalized knowledge systems*. That is, the social process that defines which issues and discourses gain attention and importance over others, and the institutions involved in this. Doyle (2011) uses science as an example of the institutionalisation of knowledge when examining climate change communications. Mass-media communication and organisations, such as the news, are frequently mentioned among these types of institutionalised knowledge systems (Lester 2015). Drawing on years of research of western environmental representation, Hansen (2010) demonstrates how mass-media communication (such as newspapers, television and advertising) are central to how we understand the environment, define environmental problems and respond to them. According to Hansen (2015c), identical to other fields in communications or media scholarship, studies of EC can be largely divided into three focal areas: content, production and audience. The first "has focused on the analysis of the content/messages/discourses/language of media/mediated, and other communication about the environment" (Hansen 2015c:386). This thesis follows this by analysing discourse through the use of newspaper content and PCCs. This research concentrates mainly on a traditional mode of representation, actor and institution: the news media. The next subsection looks more closely at researching EC in the news.

1.1.1. News and the Environment

Leading scholars in EC (Cox 2010; Hansen 2010; Lester 2015) pay central attention to the construction of environmental discourse in and by the news. This attention is built on two premises: (i) that nature "does not speak for itself" (Hansen 2010:8), and for that reason, environmental problems only become a matter of public concern and decision-making through *claim-making* by others; and (ii) that news is not a "representation" or "reflection" of reality, but is an "actively constructed" operation (Hansen 2010:76), which formulates a public arena (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). Processes of environmental claim-

making by the media are the engagement, lobbying and advocacy activities of the environmental movement, organisations or individuals, their discourses and rhetoric used to raise issues and to promote change in belief and opinion and the regulation, policy, action or conduct through using media tools[d] (Hansen and Cox 2015; Lester 2015). Within the process of claim-making and the construction of discourse by the media, the political communication researcher, Wolfsfeld, asks us to look at how the news is playing a significant role in any political conflict:

> *Each antagonist attempt to promote its own frames of the conflict to the news media is an attempt to mobilize political support for its cause. If we can understand the roles of combat and the factors that lead to success and failure in the arena, we will be one-step closer to understanding the role the news media plays in such conflicts (Wolfsfeld 2003:81).*

Wolfsfeld (2003) built a five-rule model for understanding political contest over the news, based on analysing the news in Israel and Europe. His first rule is to acknowledge that the political process (and the political system) has more influence on the news than vice versa. Second, when the authorities dominate the struggle outside the media, they are able to control media representation. When they start to lose control to challenging groups, the media pays more attention to those challengers who could then be potentially able to change the framing of the news and its discourse. Third, the role of the news in a political conflict changes over time, and it is influenced by a range of factors, such as: resources, skills, players' political power, events, public opinion and other such issues on the political agenda. Fourth, success in the struggle over the meaning of the reporting can gain political support. Wolfsfeld (2003) observes that antagonists compete to achieve this within two dimensions: structural and cultural, over access and over framing. Structural factors, such as interactions and connections between sources to the media or journalistic routines are important, but so are cultural norms and beliefs. The fifth rule, the authorities can use their political power to dominate coverage (in terms of quantity and quality); conversely, the challengers could be said to use the media to gain political power. Wolfsfeld's (2003) model suggests that these mediated conflicts are nonlinear, nor do they remain consistent over time, and that any contest is based on unequal power relationships.

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[d] Traditionally, the main media tool for claim-making was the news. Claim makers also produce flyers, magazines and documentaries. Nowadays, with changes to the cost and technologies of media production and internet communication, media tools include: videos, blogging, social media, alternative news sites and more.

In a later work, Wolfsfeld (2011) reviews the influence that these political conflicts might have on the public. Wolfsfeld claims that "the most important effects of the news media on citizens tend to be unintentional and unnoticed" (2011:121). He points to three main indirect effects: *agenda-setting, framing* and *priming*. None of these three suggest a direct effect of the media on the political conflict; in contrast and in terms of the above discussion, it is possible to view the media as another *actor* within this political process, influencing the ways an issue is understood, and the importance and attention dedicated to it. Hannigan (2006) set five "winning" roles for constructing a victorious account of environmental problems by claim makers via the news. Firstly, in view of the need to gain prominence, the problem must be framed in terms that resonate with existing and general cultural concepts. Secondly, it must be articulated by and through the agenda of authority figures and institutions. Thirdly, elements of social drama are likely to attract more coverage and attention. Fourthly, this problem must be able to relate to the present and not to a distant future. Following to this, it should uphold an action agenda on one or more levels of decision-making (be it personal, local, national or global). Both Wolfsfeld and Hannigan are basing these claims on the notions of *agenda-setting* (McCombs and Shaw 1972), *attention-cycle* (McComas and Shanahan 1999); *framing* (Goffman 1974) and *primary definers* (Hall 1978).

As an environmental sociologist, Hannigan (2006) bases this list on reviewing other media research, rather than on his own empirical findings. When identifying where further empirical work is needed within EC and the news, Hansen (2015c:386) pays attention to the fact that "[m]uch of this [content] research in turn has been (often for predominantly *practical* reasons) focused on specific media, issues, and events, with a relatively limited short-term time span". Therefore, he suggests conducting longitudinal analyses for "mapping the significant fluctuations over time in media attention to climate change and other environmental issues" because these methods "have facilitated and enhanced our recognition of the key roles of claim-making practices, news values, journalistic practices, and media organizational routines in determining the extent and indeed framing of coverage" (Hansen 2015c:387). This thesis takes a similar historical perspective by using longitudinal methods.

To conclude this section on EC, I return to Anderson's (2015) definition of EC in that it also investigates the influences of communication on environmental engagement. Research in this field usually concentrates on a particular issue to understand how the process of communication facilitates the engagement and activism of individuals

and/or organisations for the protection of the environment (Doyle and McEachern 2008; Hannigan 2006; Hansen 2010; Hansen and Cox 2015; Herve-Bazin 2014). Due to the tendency towards understanding the connection between EC and engagement, Cox (2007) defines EC as a "crisis discipline". He questions the purpose of such definitions and in response suggests that they are due to the need to make decisions without full knowledge. Therefore, EC requires an ethical conscience in times of an environmental crisis to assist in finding this knowledge. Moser (2015:406) calls for a 'humanistic' turn in the field for "communicating meaningfully and supportively to those living through crisis". She argues that individuals will act and react when experiencing the direct and indirect impact of changes to natural resources (Moser 2015). Moser (2017:2) claims that for that reason rigorous efforts have been focused on making EC more "effective" in influencing public or political engagement and assisting claim-making. However, the invisibility of environmental impacts and the complexity of communication processes make it difficult to prove and explain their connections to behavioural changes (Herve-Bazin 2014) or to changes in policy (Hannigan 2006). This thesis investigates the facilitation of engagement within two areas: the role of the news media in the hydro-policy debate, and the role of PCCs in changing public behaviour over water consumption. Much of the work implemented from the perspective of a crisis discipline can be described as researching environmental risk, which will be explained in Section 1.1.2. Before this, the next section focuses on visual studies in EC.

Visual Studies in Environmental Communication

In this research, I analyse televised public communication campaigns (PCCs) produced by the Israel Water Authority to motivate reduction in water consumption. The PCCs construct an audio-visual environmental discourse, hence this subsection reviews some of the literature from EC that informs this part of the analysis. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the newspaper discourse analysis does not include visual analysis (please see the Chapter 3 for an explanation). EC researchers have examined visuals from a broad variety of sources and mediums: print (advertising, news and magazines), television news and advertising, films, environmental campaigns and more (Hansen and Machin 2013b). Hansen and Machin (2013b:159) contend that "there has been much less discussion [in the literature] of how audio/sound […] anchor or complement the meaning of visual representation of the environment".

Much attention in visual EC is given to how *nature* is visually represented and to images' ability to decontextualise environmental issues. Hansen and Machin (2013b) argue that the invisibility of some *environmental problems* makes their visual representation more open to interpretation and ideological[e] manipulation than the textual counterpart. Furthermore, according to them, "the invisibility and slow development of many environmental problems provides an obstacle to their realist representation" (p.157). They emphasise that visual EC tends towards abstraction, that is, decontextualisation from identifiable geographic images to generic or iconic "representation" of an issue or the environment. As shown by Lester and Cottel (2009:926) in television news reporting, this tendency invites the creation of a language of images to bridge this gap and "bring home the threat and reality" of environmental problems. They divide these images into three categories: iconic, symbolic and spectacular. *Iconic visuals* represent specific issues, such as a visual of an island in a news story on rising sea levels. *Symbolic visuals* go beyond the literal to represent a larger issue, as in the case of a single smoky chimney to represent industrial pollution or one logged tree to represent deforestation. *Spectacular visuals* are meant to create an emotional response, as with ones showing the destructive force of extreme weather. This language of iconicity is not only used to simplify the complex (invisible) subject, but also to obtain emotional engagement and for the intended audience "to care" about the issue (Lester and Cottle 2009:972). Similarly, this symbolic language of images is used by environmental campaigners and advocacy groups (Doyle 2011).

Medeiros and Gomes (2018) expand this idea of iconicity to non-photographic visual metaphors. They studied non-photographic visuals in environmental documentaries and claim that digital animation and illustrations are widely used in these movies not only to explain and illustrate complex environmental issues (such as genetic modification), but also to serve as complex metaphors for discursive persuasion (such as comparing industrial agriculture to a 'war against nature'). According to them, digital visualisation methods are not only in use to portray future environmental degradation, but also to discursively illustrate and reconstruct the ideas behind the current environment crisis. I look for the use, creation and reconstruction of such iconic language and metaphors in the PCCs.

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[e] For a clarification what I mean by *ideology*, see Section 3.1 and comment a in Chapter 3.

Hansen and Machin (2013b) extend the notion of *cultural packages* by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) to cover the cultural construction of the environment. Cultural packages are conventions, narratives and values that "normalize, naturalize or leave-unquestioned their fundamental assumption and world views" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:161). This notion is close to what I have referred to in this thesis as hegemonic or consensual discourses. They suggest a cultural package or hegemonic discourse on nature, which includes the tensions of considering it both as a resource to use and control and conversely as an entity that is fragile and requires protection. This idea strongly connects to the perception of water in arid countries, such as Israel, as a limited resource in danger. In the analysis, I look at how this cultural package meets other hegemonic discourses (such as nationalism or economic consumerism).

Hansen and Machin (2013b) note in their review analysis of the visual EC that representations favour individual responses over structural socio-environmental changes of the current "resource greedy nature of capitalism" (p.157). My review of the literature has not found studies that visually and discursively analyse PCC videos even though a great deal of work has been done in EC research on advertising in a discursive, visual and textual manner (Hansen 2015a). Despite its resemblance in format and medium, the 'communicative context' (as Hansen and Machin (2013b) call it) of PCCs differ to advertising, and they could be considered as a separate genre. This is mostly due to the non-commercial aspects of PCCs and because they are produced by governmental institutions and not companies. More importantly, because of these differences, viewers see, engage and interpret in a more sensitive way than they do with advertisements. More literature about PCCs is reviewed in Part 5.

1.1.2. Risk Society

The field of environmental risk communications is based on Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens' (1990) theories of Risk Society, which argue that modern society experiences technological changes. These technologies produce new forms of risk, which societies are then constantly required to respond and adjust to. The risk society is, therefore, systematically affected by hazards that are induced by modernity and can only be understood by science and/or institutionalised knowledge. These risks come in many forms and can be expressed in different aspects of life: it could be a rise in car accidents (due to faster and newer cars) or a rise in unemployment (due to a decrease in the need

for manual labour). Beck uses air and water pollution, radioactivity, soil contamination (1992) and later climate change (2015) as environmental examples for his theory. Risk is not a disaster, but rather the ability to predict, anticipate and prepare for one (Beck 2006). Beck (1992) describes a three-step sociological process: a circular process of change that includes risk manufacturing, evaluating and taming. Firstly, industry and technology systematically create *invisible* effects that are unevenly distributed within society. The invisibility of the risk (compared to pre-modern hazards, such as war or famine) is based on the inability to use our senses to detect them. We cannot smell or taste pollution or see radioactivity. We cannot sense it, only observe its *side effects*, such as in the flora and fauna or in the resultant human health degradation. We need technological and sociological monitoring devices to make it *visible*, knowledge to understand the cause and effect and ways to communicate this knowledge. This is why, in the second step, institutions are created for or given responsibility to monitor and protect from these hazards. On many occasions, these are risks with multiple aspects, which simultaneously affect society in political, economic and environmental ways; hence, the social institutions created to address them come from different fields. In Beck's words, "threats are produced industrially, externalized economically, individualized juridically, legitimized scientifically and minimized politically" (Beck 1995:2). These privileged institutions are the creators and identifiers of threats that they cannot control anymore. This creation-identification process is socially contrasted in public discourse, which Beck calls *relations of definitions* (Cottle 1998):

> *Relations of definitions include the rules, institutions and capacities that structure the identification and assessment of risks; they are the legal, epistemological and cultural matrix in which risk politics is conducted. (Beck 1997 in Cottle 1998:7)*

In the third step, Beck (1992) introduces the concept of *organised irresponsibility*: when political and economic elites mask the origins and consequences of risks by using cultural and institutional mechanisms, and that prevention of these risks changes into managing its distribution. In this final stage, society is occupied with debates and conflicts between claim-makers that stem from these risk society dynamics. These processes are not linear, but circular, according to Beck (1992), and the risks defined by experts are addressed by technologies (or policies or a combination of both) that later create new risks that are 'solved' by science and technology.

Beck acknowledges that the risk society creates a paradoxical situation: "the political constellation of industrial society is becoming unpolitical while what was

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unpolitical in industrialism is becoming political" (1994:18). The old system according to Beck was based on three aspects: (1) the 'polity', the institutional constitution of the political community; (2) 'policy', a political programme to shape social order; and (3) 'politics'', the process of political conflicts over positions of power (Mouffe 2005). In his later writings, Beck (2006) explains that governments' target on risk solving differ from classical modern governments that aim to re-organise society according to a comprehensive political agenda, with a defined sense of 'right and wrong' and 'do's and don'ts'. As mentioned above, the uncertainties of a risk society transfer the power of evaluating and reacting to phenomena from the political sphere to the expert spheres with risk-assessment mechanisms, such as science and economics.

Beck (1992, 1995) calls the outcome of this power transfer an organised irresponsibility. Conflicts are no longer over wealth distribution, but on risk and responsibility distribution. Traditional political institutions, as with labour unions, lost their power because they were incapable of responding to the side effects of these risks, modernity and the (political) conflicts that derived from it (Beck 1992, 1994). This is because they were established under the logic of the conflict of capital versus labour, which was over positives (money, profit and benefits) while in the risk society, the conflict is over negatives (sickness, disease and disaster) (Beck 1995). Beck (1992) theorises this change as part of a second modernity, also called a *reflective modernity*. This theory is conceptualised by three different trends that affect and radicalise each other: risk society, individualisation and globalisation. Reflective governance occurs, according to Beck, when the three trends of the reflective modernity transfer the power of decision-making from the nation state to scientists, non-governmental organisations, global-businesses and the individual (1992). As part of the new politics of the reflective modernity, Beck introduces the idea of *sub-politics*, which refers to sub-systems of extra-parliamentary political activity that take place outside the modern party-based political system (Mouffe 2005). Beck (1992:78) warned us about the possibility of a silent revolution that uses risk to transform society "without an exchange of elites and while the old order is maintained".

Despite how the above quote might be understood and in view of the concepts of organised irresponsibility and uneven risk-distribution, Beck considers risk creation-reaction processes not only as a social-environmental suppression mechanism, but also as a tipping point with a revolutionary potential (1992:77–78), and as an opportunity for social-environmental change (Beck 1995). He argues that acknowledging a problem, that is identifying a risk, can become a step towards changing the current situation, and this

change has multiple and probable future directions. For this reason, he explains the process of risk definition and contestation as a *political reflective* process (Beck 1995). As part of this political process, invisible dangers and their effects become visible. Beck (1992) emphasises the power of lay people to perceive change caused by risk and to express it (which he refers to as the *voices of the side effects*), and the power of institutions (mainly scientific ones) to explain, interpret and effect this process. The voices of the side effects entail situations where institutionalised (or rather scientific) knowledge (of experts) has not yet been able to prove a risk's cause and effect. By contrast, certain lay people, who have been affected by the risk, hold and express bottom-up knowledge of the situation, and are able to call for a change to the regulations and mode of conduct to prevent a reoccurrence (Beck 1992).

Pelling et al. (2012) remind us that risk society includes the disassociation of the hazard from everyday life since the risk becomes harder to detect without the scientific techniques. And so, this alienation makes it more difficult for the public to connect it with existing political movements and agendas of change or resistance. Climate change is, according to them, an example on how risk is both embedded in everyday life, increasingly effecting change and being affected by it, and simultaneously remaining invisible and seemingly separated from life. This is an existential gap between what could be done to "what culture and power determine is reasonable and proper for society to do" (Pelling et al. 2012:1). In this context, Beck situates a premise for any use of his theory: that a risk society "is always also a knowledge, media and information society" (1992:46). Therefore, analysis of these aspects should be included when studying risk. Beck (1995) places the mass media as *symbolically mediating* the invisible threats to the public and the political system during the political reflective process. He writes that "given that many threats lack any sensory character, the only way that culturally blinded daily life can become 'sighted' is through culturally meaningful and publicly exhibited images and symbols" (Beck 1995:3).

1.1.3. Environmental Risk Communication

Beck's (1995) call for the study of the interactions between risk and media has given rise to the field of risk communication. Cottle (1998, 2006) explains how Beck's risk society theory leads to the theoretical identification of the media as a site for the social construction, contestation and criticism of risk. By linking Beck's concepts, such as the

voices of the side effects and *relation of definitions*, Cottle (1998) shows how a matrix of interests and ideas on risk are expressed as different rationality claims through the media by scientists, politicians and lay people. Cottle explains why analysing "processes of claim-making and their institutional allegiances and institutional interdependencies" are important for understanding the media's role in risk definition and for achieving a sociological and historical understanding of it (Cottle 1998:25). Cox also refers to Beck's (1992) voices of the side effects, in his writings about the media exclusion of those "who suffer from the effect of a risk society" (Cox 2007:14). Cox (2007) argues that sociosymbolic representations of environmental problems depend on institutional culture, communication practises and the political economy of their production. Exclusion from the process of defining risk is related (and compared to) exclusion from the process of decision-making about it. The media's involvement in risk has been summarised as: "[by] translating scientific knowledge into the idiom of popular discourse and amplifying risk claims, the media are key actors in public perceptions of risk" (Carvalho 2007:1457).

The ways risk are understood, contested and formulated by and through the media is being researched extensively (Anderson 2010, 2014; Bakir 2010). Early work in the area of media and risk society came from Cottle (2006) who challenged Hall and colleagues' (1978) concept of the 'primary definers/definition', by using Hilgarthner and Bosk's (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) *public arenas* model. Cottle (2006) called to move away from a media-centric research on risk towards seeing the media as an arena of struggle over meaning making of environmental risk that is open to simultaneous interpretation and contestation in other areas. The public arena model of communication (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) stipulates that processes of *problem definition* arises in particular arenas (e.g. news media or scientific laboratories) which have particular norms and values, carrying capacities and time-cycles, and those determine how issues become discussed, selected, defined, framed, dramatized, packaged and presented to the public. This model, as Hannigan (2006) and Cottle (2006) point out, is often used for explaining the 'rise and fall of social problems' and the news attention to it. This model is also used by Carvalho (2007) and Pepermans (2015) in their research into the news coverage of climate change (discussed in more detail in section 1.2.3). Drawing on this work, this thesis views the media both as an institution, thus with an active role in shaping the debate, and as a public arena where other social groups and institutions compete over social claims. Also, it presents how two different arenas (newspapers and PCCs) discursively interact.

Bakir (2010) gives a detailed macro-review of current trends in risk communication research, summarising the media's role in risk communication process:

Providing risk knowledge to inform citizens; generating and determining public acceptability of different risks; motivating the public to take responsibility for, and action regarding, risks; and providing imaginative schemata regarding voluntarily chosen risks (Bakir 2010:5).

Bakir highlights findings from thirty years of risk communication *news* research by commenting on: how risk reporting, which is influenced and governed by journalistic norms, such as news values, interest in controversy or commitment to 'balance' and 'truth', is detached from actual threat trajectories; how event orientation of reporting risk ignores long-term and complex cause and effects; how the ideological orientation of media institutions and the tendency to accept the frames of dominant institutions plays an active role in risk meaning making; how institutions are capable of media packaging information according to their needs; how the media influences policy agenda through its ability to frame risk and generate attention to it and conversely failing to impact policy decisions. Bakir (2010) asks researchers to move beyond examining new risks and case studies towards filling the gap in knowledge about the features of risk and "what make it an issue" (p.5); and to study the media roles in regard to policy-making on risk and the discursive roles of institutions, pressure and interest groups. In her words, "greater attention should be paid to how different media forms make visible risk debates between stakeholders" (p.7). She also observes that the role of the media as a site for contestation between adversaries with different interests and social claims over risk needs further investigation. Bakir's (2010) directions for future studies and her conclusions from the past are taken into consideration in the analysis here.

More recently, Maeseele and his colleagues had established a list of assumptions and guidelines for the study of contestation of risk in the media (Maeseele 2010, 2015b; Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017; Pepermans and Maeseele 2014). In a set of papers Maeseele (2010, 2015a, 2015b) argues for the study of 'risk conflicts', which refers to the contestation over risk definitions and responses to uncertainty; these definitions are based on the confluence of competing (i) scientific rationality claims, (ii) values and (iii) interests, with various social actors selectively using contradicting knowledge claims as a (discursive) resource to pursue alternative futures. Maeseele's (2015a) approach is based on a body of literature on the post-political condition, which will be presented and discussed in Part 2 on *politic*s. Based on post-political critique, and similar to Beck (1992), Maeseele (2015b) defines risk conflicts as a political conflicts, and he asks us to politicise the questions we

ask when analysing risk communication. A similar politicised approach of looking at the claims, values and interests of different social actors engaged in the debate is taken in this thesis for analysing the role of the media in the risk discourse over droughts and hydro-polices in Israel. In order to do so, Bakir (2010), Anderson (2015) and Hansen (2015c, 2015b) recommend conducting longitudinal research that follows the evolution of risk as a social-environmental issue. In line with these authors, this thesis employs longitudinal methods the newspaper and governmental campaigns discourses of drought risk. A further discussion on the advantages of longitudinal risk analysis, and how they are utilised in this research, are described in Chapter 3.

To conclude Part 1, while EC studies the media content of particular topics within a specific time (see Hansen (2015b) above), risk communication is interested in understanding their mediated evolution from *unknown* (*silenced* or *invisible*) to *risks* and then to *issues* (affected by the claim, values and interests of the social actors involved). This process of evolution, according to Bakir (2010), requires further investigation through the use of longitudinal methods. What these "call[s] for further studies" (Anderson 2015; Bakir 2010; Hansen 2015b) above have in common, besides recommending longitudinal methods, is promoting a perspective that helps to contextualise reporting on the environment. Maeseele's (2015b) risk perspective, similar to other studies on EC, focuses on a short time period or events. It gives an analytic tool on how to map claims, values and interests, but it lacks tools for explaining how they change over time, and what effected that change (that is contextualising the dynamic of change outside the reporting). In search of new tools and perspectives to study a process of change related to climate risks, this thesis suggests using the concept of *resilience*, which is discussed in the third part of this literature review (1.3). The next part of the literature review (1.2) is on *politics*, it returns to the discussion on risk conflicts, by presenting writers investigating what is known as the post-political condition.

1.2.   Part 2 - Politics: the Post-Political Condition

As explained in the first part of the literature review, meaning making of environmental risks, such as climate change induced risks, is a *reflective political process* (Beck 1992, 2015), which takes place in and is influenced by the media and the news, among other arenas (Bakir 2010; Cottle 2006). The second part of the literature review explores this claim by expanding on the ways in which we are imagining and doing politics in the era of climate change. Firstly, (1.2.1) I present a critical approach describing our current era as *post-political*. This post-political critique explains how the current debate over environmental policies occurs in a discursive zeitgeist of *depoliticisation*. In the following section (1.2.2), I focus on an essential concept in post-political writing – *consensus*, explaining how consensus building is used as a discursive strategy in a political debate, in and outside the news. In the third section of this part (1.2.3), I explain what it means to consider the climate crisis as a political crisis. Then, based on Machin (2013), I present different approaches for understanding and reacting to climate change, and how each approach uses consensus building and contributes to the (de)politicisation of climate change and related policies. At the end of this section, Kenis and Lievens' (2014) work on the depoliticisation of a green-economy and Swyngedouw's (2010) work on post-political populism explains how environmental risks are articulated in the context of post-politics. The final section of this part (1.2.4) focuses the post-political discussion to the connection between water and politics by introducing the concept of *hydro-policies* and Swyngedouw and Williams' (2016) work on the SD.

1.2.1.   The Political and the Depoliticisation of Nature/Environment

In recent years, extensive literature across the social sciences has conceptualised a political zeitgeist in western societies after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, described as "post-political", "post-democratic" or "post-ideological" (Hammond 2018; Maeseele 2015a; Mouffe 2005; Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). These terms represent the idea that in the post-cold war era, there is no alternative to the established social and political order of the industrial, (neo)liberal, capitalistic and democratic regime. There is an absence of a clearly defined meaning of the post-politics as it is highly contested, but Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014:6) define it as:

> *[…] a situation in which **the political** – understood as a space of contestation and agonistic engagement – is increasingly colonized by **politics** – understood as technocratic mechanism and consensual procedures that operate within an unquestioned framework of representative*

democracy, free market economics, and cosmopolitan liberalism. In **post-politics**, *political contradictions are reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and legitimated through participatory processes in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in advance [emphasis added].*

To explain this quote, I will first use Chantal Mouffe's distinction between *the political* and *politics* given in her book *On The Political* (2005). The Political, according to her, is a space of power and conflict, a dimension of antagonism while *politics* is the "set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence" (Mouffe 2005:9). The political is about antagonism, which is "constitutive of human societies", and politics is about hegemony and its objection. Democratic processes and institutions are built to reduce *antagonism* (friend/enemy conflicts over alternatives) to *agonism* (we/they disputes over alternatives), that is making rivals into adversaries and having fair mechanisms to solve disagreements.

Similar to Wilson and Swyngedouw (2014) above, Mouffe sees post-politics as an hegemonic project connected to neoliberalism[f] and the perceived inevitability of market capitalism as the only possibility for social-economic structure (2005). Promoters of post-ideological thought, known as third-way centrists who became popular during the 1990s, suggested the idea that "the market and the state should work together (…) in a new entrepreneurial spirit to guarantee better economic **and** social outcomes" (Phelan 2014:51, emphasis in the original; in Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017:5). In this era, a technocratic experts-based management perspective organises governance around problem solving with a focus on consensus building (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). This is similar to the role of experts in the final stages of the risk society as an organised irresponsibility mode of governance. Furthermore, the aim of democratic politics in a post-political climate is defined in terms of consensus building and overcoming conflict (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017).

According to post-political thought, depoliticisation is the process of transforming an issue of ideological contestation into a matter of administration, that is when decision-making is not a question of political position and values, but of expert knowledge, such as from scientists or economists (Maeseele 2015a). Maeseele and

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[f] In line with Cammaerts (2015:527-8) "Neoliberalism is understood here as a worldview that not only advocates a minimalist state, but above all promotes the primacy of the free market, capitalism, property rights and individualism in all walks of life. Neoliberalism can thus be seen as an ideological project that not only aims to reduce the power of the state to intervene in or regulate economic and social life, but also as championing values such as excessive greed, widening inequality and individual self-interest".

Raeijmaekers (2017) emphasise the hegmonic aspects of this process, based on post-foundationalism arguments. According to them, any established social order is shaped by idelogical concepts that limit the possibilities of everyday practice, but these political foundations can always be socially contested and transformed:

> *However, when their contingent and historical nature is concealed or misrecognized, and there is an attempt to establish a **final** foundation, then we speak of depoliticisation. Depoliticisation concerns not only the concealment of those particular politico-ideological values, perspectives and choices that underlie a social order and shape its politics, but also – and more importantly – the misrecognition of the fact that **any** social order is **always** the provisional product and expression of a particular configuration of power relations. Indeed, once society's ideological nature has been made invisible, the established social order comes to be defined in terms of necessity and fate (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017:6, emphasis in the original).*

Depoliticisation of environmental crises, according to Swyngedouw and Williams (2016), leads to technical consensual 'solutions' with a hidden neoliberal agenda. In many cases, it is a policy that offers a socio-ecological *'fix'* of the conditions that produced the problem in the first place (Kenis and Lievens 2014, 2016; Swyngedouw 2010; this is discussed in further detail in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.4). This is similar to Beck's concept of a risk society where risks defined by science are addressed by technologies that later create new risks, which are then solved by science and technology (Beck, 1992).

Perhaps due to the similarities between ideas in the post-political and the risk society, Mouffe (2005) dedicates her attention to Beck's and Giddens' writing. She regards them as contributors to the creation of the post-political condition.[g] I concentrate on Mouffe's (2005) critique of Beck's writing because it's more relevant to my work. Mouffe (2005:38) reminds us that, according to Beck, "in a risk society political conflicts can no longer be ordained by left/right metaphor […] but are better characterized by the following dichotomies: safe/unsafe, inside/outside, and political/unpolitical". Mouffe rejects this argument and claims that Beck's and Giddens' "main argument is that in post-industrial societies we no longer find collective identities constructed in terms of we/they" (2005:48), which means the end of adversarial modes of politics and a rejection of the possibility of agonistic forms of political disputes. Mouffe contends that Beck ignores the power relations of risk distribution and the inherent class structures of a reflective society. She further points out that Beck's and Giddens' rejection of the left/right dichotomy is

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[g] I agree with Mouffe's criticism of Gidden's work as his books Beyond Left and Right (Giddens 1994) and his writing on The Third Way (Giddens 1998, 2000) played an active role in promoting post-ideological thought by blurring the differences between right and left in western-democracies (e.g. third way centrists).

ever more problematic when looking at environmental issues. This is because many of these problems are deeply connected to neoliberal policies, prioritising profit making and market mechanisms and impacting in different ways on those who have less (economic) means to reduce risk (Mouffe 2005:51).

Beck (1995:5) does address these issues in his paper entitled Politics and Risk Society where he claims that once "[t]he influential middle class are increasingly affected by the damage" and suffer, when it harms the lifestyle they worked for (and their property, such as yards, houses, vacations), then 'the alarm bell goes off' in the political system. When the system starts to work towards overcoming the ecological problem, Beck adds that "the first thing that everyone sees is the opportunity for industrial expansion" (1995:5). This thesis examine such case, of an industrial expansion by desalination as a response to the risk of drought. Beck's (1995) recognition of the class struggle and continuation of capitalistic mechanisms in a risk society does not appear in Mouffe's (2005) critique. She concludes her critique of Beck's work by claiming that antagonistic dimensions of politics did not disappear in the risk society; they just manifest themselves differently, as a political exclusion mechanism, or rather as a discursive strategy aimed to silence contra-hegemonic contestation, which is justified by a scientific rhetoric. The importance of exclusion and inclusion in the political debate, and the discursive strategy of a *consensus* rhetoric and scientific claims are discussed in the next section.

In addition to the meaning of 'political' discussed above, it is important to mention that in its current use in Hebrew, commonly, to describe an issue as *politic* (adjective, פוליטי) means that it is concerned with 'party politics' or 'partisan' rivalries. As for instance, when saying in Hebrew that 'a policy has a political motivation' or 'it was promoted for political reasons'. In these two examples, the word political can operate as a criticism, it can colloquially be used to evaluate the policy as serving party-politics (not the public) or even as a populist (and not ideological). In this way politicians, and the policies they promote, are framed as serving their own interest in getting re-elected or as trying to appeal to a specific interest group. This differentiates between positive acts of statesmanship or leadership and negative acts aimed at advancing a political career. This specific use of the word politic as derogatory is a particular manifestation of post-political discourse in Israel. It is an example of how depoliticisation transforms any political move from being motivated by an ideological position and values into a performative action of self-serving interests. Expert-driven policies can then be

positioned as lacking such negative (self-interested) motivation.[h] This use of the word can only be understood as a strategy of depoliticisation once post-political hegemony has been achieved. This occurred when 'politics' was assigned a negative meaning, allowing an issue to be separated from the political and to be appropriated as a techno-managerial, non-political subject.

1.2.2. Consensus in Post-Politics and Depoliticisation in the News

As mentioned earlier, agonistic political thinking sees disagreement as a positive and constitutive aspect of human society, providing it remains within a we/they dichotomy and does not transfer into a friend/enemy antagonism. Hence, consensus is an unachievable and undesirable political aim, according to agonistic writers, as there should always be space for contesting the status quo (including its rules, norms and policies) (Mouffe 2005). In other words, consensus building in agonistic thinking is closely related to Gramscian 'hegemony' and 'common sense' because it is a tool for suppressing alternative discourses (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006; Maeseele and Pepermans 2017). As discussed above, post-politics is a situation combining two trends: minimising the space for disputing the liberal-democratic-capitalistic consensus **and** presenting politics as aiming at achieve consensus and overcome disagreements (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017). The need to attract support behind environmental policies and goals not only represents an act of contesting the current (perceived as) consensual status quo, but could also be an act of creating a new consensus that forecloses any radical alternatives (Kenis 2015). A growing body of academic work is dedicated to revealing the discursive mechanisms of depoliticisation of environmental discourse in different arenas, among them the news media. The next section (1.2.3) explores this claim by using climate change while this section (1.2.2) is dedicated to the discursive strategies of using consensus in the news.

Based on work by Mouffe (2005), Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017), identify discursive mechanisms of exclusion in the media. That is, it refers to ways in which reporting political disputes creates 'insiders' and 'outsiders', in a way that protects particular demands or a particular ideology from being contested, "and resultantly, closing

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[h] This means that on some occasions, when newspaper items stated that a specific hydro-policy issue was "political", this was actually a discursive strategy to delegitimize the issue and to depoliticise the discourse.

democratic discussion" (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017:8). Based on empirical case studies, they recognised three key discursive strategies for closing (i.e. depoliticising) or opening (i.e. politicising) debate: *positioning*, *(de)legitimisation* and *(de)naturalisaton*. A positioning strategy can be located in the context of reporting, which is used for convincing the audience that certain claims and actions are preferable to others. A (de)legitimisation strategy creates a sense that certain claims or actions are (un)justified to be part of the debate. Through the use of moral or rational criteria, this strategy creates boundaries between who or what can be contested. Presenting alternative ideas as 'invalid', 'irrational' or 'immoral' imply those who promote them are outsiders, and vice versa. A (de)naturalisation strategy imposes the idea of a social consenus on particular claims or actions, either by completely rejecting an option (i.e naturalisation) or explicitly supporting it (i.e. denaturalisation) (ibid). By making certain claims or actions seem natural, the speakers or reporters are "emphasising that there is simply no alternative" (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017:17).

Maessele and Raeijmaekers (2017) identified these strategies in case studies analysing reporting on: genetically modified food (Maeseele et al. 2017), climate change (Maeseele and Pepermans 2017; Pepermans and Maeseele 2014) and trade unions (Raeijmaekers 2018). Other studies dedicated to consensual depoliticisation of environmental discourse (but not analysing the news) looked at the depoliticisation of environmental policies (Kenis and Lievens 2014, 2016; Swyngedouw 2010), environmental activism (Kenis 2015) and more specifically the depoliticisation of hydro-policies (Swyngedouw 2013a, 2013b). I return to studies on depoliticisation of hydro-policies due to their relevance to my thesis in the last section of this part of the literature review (Section 1.2.4); and in the Methodology and Methods chapter I explains how these discursive strategies of depoliticisation are used in my analysis. In the next section, I present why the climate crisis is also a political one. By adopting ideas from Machin (2013), I present different approaches with which to address climate change, their political meaning and use within consensus building. Subsequently, I use Kenis and Lievens' (2014, 2015) work on the depoliticisation of green-economy and Swyngedouw's (2013a, 2013b) work on climate change and depoliticised populism as an example of such new consensus building.

1.2.3. Climate Crisis as a Political Crisis

Voices that describe the climate crisis as political are not new (Pepermans 2015), and these ideas gained prominence outside academic discourse (Carvalho, Van Wessel, and Maeseele 2017; Hammond 2018). For example, Former US Vice President Al Gore expressed that: "In order to solve the climate crisis, we need to solve the democracy crisis. And we have one" (Gore 2008 in Pepermans 2015:6). Activist and author Naomi Klein (2014:36) defines climate change as a "democracy crisis", and she calls for the democratisation of economic relations and engagement of citizens in climate politics. Klein (2014) sees grassroots pro-democracy climate-justice movements around the world as a local and global solution to the environmental crisis. Similarly, Pope Francis promotes democratisation of citizens' political engagement with climate change: "[u]nless citizens control political power […] it will not be possible to control damage to the environment" (Carvalho et al. 2017). On the other side of this political debate sit writers and thinkers that see democracy as the problem and not the solution. These thinkers, who are sometimes described as eco-authoritarian, such as Shearman and Smith (2009 in Machin 2013), claim that decision-making on climate policies should be made by experts, rather than politicians. It has been suggested, in the words of the ecologist James Lovelock, that we "put democracy on a hold for a while" even if just temporarily (quoated in Pepermans 2015:6). This call is, per se, promoting the *depoliticisation* of climate change. As argued in this literature review, the depoliticisation of climate change also occurs within current western (liberal) democracies, and thus needs to be identified even when it is not as apparent as part of an eco-authoritarian agenda.

Several authors (Hammond 2018; Machin 2013; Pepermans and Maeseele 2014; Swyngedouw 2010) have argued that the disagreements over the politics of climate change as necessary "to revitalize debate and revive engagement" while "questioning proposing alternatives to fundamental aspects" of it (Carvalho et al. 2017). These authors identify different approaches on how to fight climate change and analyse their political meaning. In this section, I examine these approaches by incorporating Machin's (2013) post-political critique of them. Her concepts are used in my thesis to identify the type of discourses promoted in the newspapers and the governmental campaigns. The first approach is the *techno-economic* one. This approach relies on either a technological advancement or on an economic change (promoted by regulations such as taxation or those achieved by market forces) that bring a dramatic change to the current greenhouse gas emissions status quo. Machin explains that, according to this approach, "[t]he right

technology […] will allow us to live the lifestyle that some have become accustomed and to which others aspire" (2013:13). This approach is being criticised (Kenis and Lievens 2014; Swyngedouw 2010) as reaffirming the same behaviour that caused the problem and as depoliticising climate change, which is explained further in the next section.

The second approach Machin (2013) identifies as an *ethical-individual* one. This approach places emphasis on changing behaviours and attitudes in order to fight climate change. However, this approach is problematic, in Machin's view, as it relies on the assumption that individuals will change their actions and individually arrive at a decision about how to do so, without politically and/or culturally collective action to guide them. Ethical and green consumerism is also criticised as being based on the same assumptions as market capitalism and consumerism, and as transferring the identification of the problem from the social-political sphere to the personal one (Pepermans 2015). The third approach is the *green-republican,* a semi-utopian sustainable eco-future, which Machin identifies as being close to the eco-authoritarian one. Contrary to the first two approaches, it identifies collective action as the road to solution, but it relies on the belief that a consensus of "what is good" (that is what is considered desirable sustainable behaviour) can be achieved by a democratic process not by authoritarian enforcement.

The fourth and fifth approaches according to Machin (2013) are *green deliberative-democratic* and *radical-democratic.* Similar to the green-republican approach (in its democratic form), both approaches see the solution as based on more active citizenship and the politicisation of climate politics. These two approaches criticise our current representative democratic model and aspire to greater citizen engagement in the political process, but it differs in how they perceive the necessary political change. This difference originates from the alternative political and philosophical perspectives on 'what is the purpose of political processes', as discussed in detail in this part (2): the deliberative-democratic and the agonistic-democratic perspectives. These perspectives hold contrasting positions on the use and meaning of political *consensus*. This discussion is important to my analysis process, which examine the discursive political process around hydro-polices to address the droughts. While deliberative democracy sees consensus building as the purpose of the political process (and as an inclusive mechanism) the agonistic democracy sees consensus as something that cannot be achieved (and as an exclusory mechanism). The first suggests a variety of political mechanisms to be able to include more people in the decision-making process (such as public participation, referendums and direct democracy) to achieve consensus on how to become more sustainable. By contrast, the second suggests

acknowledging that disagreement is constitutive of human existence, and that certain mechanisms will turn climate politics from an antagonistic process of winners and losers into an agonistic process of constant deliberation and reflection.

Machin's (2013) typology of approaches helps to differentiate between the political meanings of different climate policies. However, some environmental policies are offering solutions that are fitting into more than one approach. Kenis and Lievens (2016) explore such an example by looking at green-economy projects. They define these projects as having four threads. The first thread offers a transition towards sustainability via the market by "getting the right price", "addressing market failures" and "creating new markets" (Kenis and Lievens 2016:3); the second thread creates new technologies as a tool to address the crisis (such as the use of electric cars or solar energy to reduce emissions, biotechnology to address food needs or desalination for water). These techno-economic innovations are used to deepen the capitalistic marketisation of the environment. The third thread is the involvement of the private sector in the entrepreneurship of such solutions, either by leaving the invention and distributing the technology to the market or by collaborations of governments and the private sector. For example, this can be seen with carbon trading, instead of placing regulations on emissions. The last thread refers to conscious consumerism, which is used to encourage companies to offer such services (or adopt environmental responsibility) and reduce unsustainable consumption, with promotions such as "save water by remembering to close the tap" (Kenis and Lievens 2016:4). If adopting Machin's (2013) view, green growth constitutes a combination of the first and second approaches. Kenis and Lievens (2015) also argue that the discursive ways in which a green-economy is being promoted by companies, international agencies and governments is by building a new green-consensus that maintains the principles of the current capitalistic and neoliberal consensus.

Kenis and Lievens (2014, 2016) based part of their analysis of the green-economy discourse on Swyngedouw's (2010) work on post-political populism. Insights from this work are specifically relevant to the analysis in this thesis as it explains how environmental risk, built on a discourse of apocalyptic fear and homogenising threat, is used to promote specific kinds of technologic solutions. Swyngedouw uses the example of climate change and claims that it presents as a universal and heterogeneous threat of which "we are all potential victims. 'THE' Environment and 'THE' People" (2010:221, emphasis in the original). The threat is described as a discourse of fear, using apocalyptic rhetoric and imagery of global catastrophe, sustained by a particular scientific discourse. A consensus

on the need to address the problem is created. Hence, it produces a social homogenisation of the risk even though people are not heterogeneous political subjects; therefore, it conceals those who are under greater threat. The universality of risk also works in another way. Even though it has an anthropogenic origin, it reinforces the human-nature dichotomy; that is once a natural material (in this case CO_2) creates a threat, it becomes the enemy. The externalisation and objectification of this enemy diverts attention from "the system" who created it (Swyngedouw 2010:222) and calls for technology to fight it. These technologies produce a "*social-ecological fix* making sure that nothing really changes" (ibid, italics added) and do not solve the problem, but instead they move it elsewhere. As discussed earlier in the literature review, these are all classified as identifiers of risk society, and here is where Swyngedouw (2010) connects his theory with Beck's (1992) in that this dynamic is being radicalised by stakeholders that operate beyond the state and thus undermine its power. Swyngedouw adds that what contrasts populism with risk society is that the public addresses the call for action to an elite. By directing such demands on the elite, the public ensures that the solution will not force a change in their behaviour. At the same time, the elite uses the public pressure to promote solutions that will benefit them by choosing centralised technologies and specific eco-managerial mechanisms. As an example of post-politics, Swyngedouw emphasises that this process is achieved under an unnamed political paradigm (unlike socialism or communism), making it harder to understand not only who benefits from this populism, but also what our future will look like. Swyngedouw claims that what differentiates this present-day, eco-apocalyptic discourse from previous apocalyptic imaginers, as with the biblical, is the lack of promise of redemption (2010:218).

Following Swyngedouw's (2010) notion of the use of fear and the homogenising of dangers in a post-political risk society, I claim that such a discursive atmosphere invites a counter discourse, which offers a redemption and a new form of hope. In the years since Swyngedouw (2010) published his environmental-populism theory, a new discourse has arisen around climate change, which is the discourse of *resilience*, offering an opportunity to overcome and resist the risk. In the next part of the literature review (1.3) on *Acting: Resilience*, I present this discourse, its origin, some critique on its political meanings, and my intentions for using it to study the depoliticisation of climate policies. Before moving to resilience, the next section explore the connections between water and the political and Swyngedouw's (2013a, 2015; Swyngedouw and Williams 2016) arguments on desalination as an example of eco-populism and depoliticisation.

1.2.4. Hydro-Policies: Water and the Political

Hydro- (WATER): prefix 'connected with or using the power of water'

(Anon 2020b)

This thesis focuses on hydro-polities as manifestation of climate change politics in the context of risk communication, post-political discourse in the news. Mainly, this analysis looks closely at the discourse on the implementation of seawater desalination (SD) in Israel, as a response to the drought risk induced by climate change. This part explores the academic literature on the connections between water, power and the political to further explain why this thesis' studies the processes of depoliticisation.

A key premise for this research is that every environmental project is a political project (Harvey 1996) and vice versa (Swyngedouw 2015). That is to say, every realisation of an environmental project has political implications and motivations, regardless of whether it has an industrial or ecological incentive. According to Bakker (2012), water is political in a conventional sense as it is embedded in conflicting relationships of authority and power. The political aspects of water can be explored by looking at who or what has the right to water, and examining how this right is understood. This can be expressed by a matter of distribution, technology or pricing, but more importantly, by how these technicalities are symbolically and discursively rationalised; this is because, the rationale behind organising access to nature (water) reflects social power, conflict and ideology (Swyngedouw 2015). In other words, changes to the water supply intertwine "elements of discourse, power, conflict and ecology" (Hannigan 2006:57). With this emphasis on power, politics and their manifestation in policies, it is possible to situate this thesis in the field of hydropolitics. This term will be used sparingly, however, as it is mostly used to refer to the geopolitics of water, that is in the realm of international relations and not as part of political relations within a state (Julien 2012). Instead, I will use the concept of *hydro-policies* which, according to Swyngedouw, is one of the manifestations of the *hydro-social cycle*, which is "the socially embedded techno-institutional organization of the material flows of water" (2015:19).

In his writings on SD in Spain, Swyngedouw (2013a, 2015) explains how this technology "bears all the hallmarks of a post-political techno-managerial project" (Swyngedouw and Williams 2016:69). Firstly, it offers a socio-ecological *fix*, in both senses

of the word, of the conditions that lead to the problem (Swyngedouw 2013). Secondly, the decision to choose this technology is based on a consensus built around a specific hydro-modernist vision (Swyngedouw and Williams 2016:60). Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) claim that SD offers two different kinds of 'fixes' to the water problem in Spain: the *scalar fix* and the *scarcity fix*. These combined fixes maintain the perception that the country, and specially its arid areas, will always demand more water than it has due to the growing population, agricultural and tourism industry needs and due to climate change; and that this solution should be based on a grand-scale operation, and not on a combination of small interventions. As such, it represents an understanding that there is a problem of supply, and that SD is "consistent with a particular modernizing political–ecological development approach with a broadly neoliberalizing logic". Swyngedouw and Williams also identify contradictions in SD that have the potential to re-politicise the hydro-policies discourse in Spain: the energy and climate contradiction, the environmental contradiction, the governance contradiction, the growth contradiction, the cost contradiction and the ownership contradiction (ibid). I discuss these contradictions in more detail in the Chapter 2 when presenting the implications of desalination in the Israeli case. Building on these findings, this thesis asks questions about the discursive process that took place in Israel, the depoliticisation of desalination and the role of the media in consensus building around these hydro-policies. This thesis is the first to use a media analysis to study the depoliticisation of hydro-policies and desalination.

1.3.   Part 3 - Acting: Resilience

This thesis uses the concept of *resilience* to study a set of discourses related to environmental risk (droughts and hydro-policies in Israel) and to analyse its depoliticisation in the media. Based on the previous discussion, I argue in this part of the literature review that in a risk society, when society and individuals are surrounded by danger, a discourse of resilience can seem appealing since it is understood as the ability to resist and overcome these risks. When the traditional and ideological political system is perceived as incapable of addressing these problems, solutions perceived as non-ideological can appeal to the public and the political elite (Beck 1995). This is especially true for solutions that offer a risk reduction or risk transfer without undermining the current hegemonic perceptions and practices (Swyngedouw 2010), which could be the need for a change in lifestyle. As explained in this part of the literature review, resilience thinking and the discourse and policies arising from it, such as desalination, provide exactly this type of post-political solution.

In this part, I present the cross-disciplinary journey of resilience from the natural to the social sciences, which initiated a body of work criticising resilience and its use inside and outside of academia. A review of the current social science critiques of resilience, mainly from development studies, geography and policy, identifying issues of power and the politics of resilience, inform any future use of this concept in this thesis. The final section of this part (1.3.4) explores how the use of resilience ties together issues and concepts previously discussed in the *Meaning Making* and *Politics* parts, that is, what are the possible contributions of resilience to EC and media research on climate risks and depoliticisation.

1.3.1.   Resilience: Origin, Definition and Explanations for its Popularity

Originating from ecology and biophysical sciences in the early 1970s (McGreavy 2016), resilience is a way to conceptualise and analyse systems' and communities' reaction to external shocks and disturbances (Adger 2000). Literally meaning 'springing-back' or the ability to return to a previous good condition after a problem (Anon 2020b), resilience is referred to as the ability to cope, recover and reduce vulnerability (Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007). In an environmental context, this umbrella term is used for promoting readiness for specific risks (such as hurricanes and floods) while learning from experience (as through academic research). Put simply, research using resilience asks: how does a

system or community cope with environmental stress; and how does this process cause change (Adger 2000). Resilience is a popular concept in academic studies (including ecology, psychology, disaster studies, economic geography and environmental planning; Davoudi, 2012) and has widely spread to practitioners, activists, governmental and non-governmental organisations and institutions (Bahadur, Ibrahim, and Tanner 2010; McGreavy 2016; Turner 2014). For instance, a special issue of *Water Security* (Richter and Boltz 2020) coming out later during 2020 is dedicated to examining the connection between water resilience and climate-resilience. Another example, mentioned in the thesis introduction, refers to the Israel Office of Environmental Protection who claimed that the country achieved "national resilience [of the] water supply" (Netanyahu 2017). According to Chmutina and colleagues (2016), a great deal of attention is given in the academic debate to defining resilience, yet in practice, governments and other institutions have adopted this term, using it in policy papers and strategic plans, without a communally accepted definition.

Even though resilience has developed across several disciplines, as noted by writers who describe the development of the concept and its cross-disciplinary journey (Adler et al. 2015; Bahadur et al. 2010; Brown 2014; Cretney 2014; McGreavy 2016), it is important to recognise its theoretical foundation in studies of social-ecological systems (SES), and with the work of the ecologist S.C Holling who is often regarded as the founder of ecological-resilience thought (Cretney 2014; McGreavy 2016).

The following definition of ecological-resilience from the Resilience Alliance[i] is considered representative by Cannon and Müller-Mahn (2010) and McGreavy (2016):

> *A resilient ecosystem can withstand shocks and rebuild itself when necessary. Resilience in social systems has the added capacity of humans to anticipate and plan for the future. Humans are part of the natural world. We depend on ecological systems for our survival and we continuously impact the ecosystems in which we live, from the local to global scale. Resilience is a property of these linked social-ecological systems (Resilience Alliance n.d.).[j]*

[i] The Resilience Alliance (est. 1999) is an international, multidisciplinary research and practice organisation that explores the dynamics of social-ecological systems.

[j] This version of the definition is no longer on its website. The currant definition is much longer and has some changes to its meaning.

This definition acknowledges the origins of resilience in natural and life science disciplines where research focuses primarily on ecosystems, and which later evolved to SES and human-nature interactions (McGreavy 2016). Mainly, this definition represents a point of view that is about human and nature connectivity, influence and dependence, with a perspective that simultaneously looks at local and global aspects, and which expects society to prepare for future risks. Chmutina et al. (2016) list attributes of resilience that are rhetorically similar in most of the approaches trying to define it. These are, an assumed ability to "[a]nticipate an event and its effects; [p]roactively react; [m]anage risks; [c]ooperate; [r]espond after the event to mitigate effects; [t]ransform and/or adapt" (Chmutina et al. 2016:70). *Climate-resilience* is a term in use in academic discourse and public policy to signal the use of resilience in the context of climate change (Adler et al. 2015; Bahadur et al. 2010; Denton et al. 2014; Moser 2017). It should be emphasised that there is not one agreed definition of socio-ecological resilience (SER) or climate-resilience, for reasons that will be discussed next. As this thesis examines discourses of resilience through media communication, I will not go into definitions of resilience from other fields such as engineering or psychology as they are less relevant for this study.

The lack of an agreed definition of resilience (and for SER and climate-resilience) within and across disciplines and practices is used for explaining its academic and non-academic popularity. One leading explanation connects its popularity to its "open meaning" and flexibility: as a term, resilience is "highly complex and dynamic" (Chmutina et al. 2016). Some see it as a perspective for understanding process of change (Folke 2006) and others only as a metaphor for describing a condition (Turner 2014). Matyas and Pelling argue that resilience is "[r]iddled with competing meanings and diverse policy implications, […] it is a concept caught between the abstract and operational" (2014:S2). Sometimes, it is regarded as a cohesive theory (Olsson et al. 2015) or ideology (Cretney 2014), and at other times, as an organised framework for analysis (Nelson et al. 2007), or even as an operational concept (Bahadur et al. 2010). More recently, some scholars started referring to resilience as a discourse (Chmutina et al. 2016; Cretney 2014; Gilllard 2014; McGreavy 2016; Moser 2017); my thesis takes a similar approach. This conceptual fluidity and its application to policy is considered as one of the advantages (Benson and Craig 2014). It has a pragmatic advantage and an intuitive meaning (as the capacity to absorb shocks) which makes it an inclusive discourse that helps integrate different institutions under its umbrella. It helps build communication bridges and platforms between communities, disciplines and practices (Bristow 2010 in Shaw 2012).

Another explanation for the growing popularity of SER in and outside academia could be that it replaces *sustainability* as an approach to conceptualise human-nature interactions. *Time Magazine* suggested that the change in terms is connected to a shift in understanding climate change from a future risk to a current issue (Walsh 2013). If sustainability aims at "preventing the storm" (or minimising it) then resilience aims at "surviving it" (Walsh, 2013). A recurrent claim in the resilience discourse is that climate change is here (Turner 2014), so there is a need to move from "hunting for the Sustainable Grail" (Davidson 2010:1136) to an operational approach for achieving climate-resilience (Bahadur et al. 2010). Sustainability is criticised in the resilience literature as a wish to achieve and maintain an equilibrium between society and nature (even if it is limited to a specific system) (Benson and Craig 2014; Davidson 2010) while resilience suggests that systems are in constant transformation and reject the possibly of maintaining such balance (see below in the discussion on the Panarchy model in Step 2) (Davidson 2010; Folke 2006). Another difference between sustainability and resilience lies in their time orientation; sustainability represents a complex understanding about how present action affects the future climate (Doyle, 2011); this is in contrast to resilience, which refers to the reaction to current events with the ability to plan for the future.

Benson and Craig (2014) strongly contend that we must replace sustainability with resilience as the older concept has failed to achieve its goals regarding climate change and environmental governance because of the desire for a continued, long-term engagement in activities (as with the use of a resource). They claim that:

> *Shifting the governance focus from sustainability to resilience is not admitting defeat. Instead, a resilience approach would reorient current research and policy efforts toward coping with change instead of increasingly futile efforts to maintain existing states of being (Benson and Craig 2014:708).*

Alternatively, McGreavy (2013:4) argues that resilience is not replacing sustainability but that they are "fundamentally complementary", and that "resilience is the dynamic responsiveness that makes sustainability go". Even though they disagree about the differences between sustainability and resilience, what Benson and Craig (2014) and McGreavy (2013) have in common is their attention to the changes in behaviour or policy promoted by using these two terms. Moser (2017:3) gives similar explanation, but suggests that climate-resilience is used by decision makers in the same meaning as climate adaptation, and replaces it "to make the abstract notion of 'adaptation' meaningful [and] practical, politically and socially acceptable". The differences and complementary aspects

of sustainability and resilience as a form of adaptation discussed further in Section 1.3.3, as part of an examination of different ways of becoming resilient and the side effects of resilience. Prior to this, in the next section, I will explore the cross-disciplinary journey of resilience to social science, and its uses as a research tool.

1.3.2. Resilience in Social Science Research

This thesis joins an academic debate on "if" and "how to adapt" resilience theory from ecology to fit social science (among them: Adger 2000; Davidson 2010; Folke 2006; Olsson et al. 2015; Turner 2014). This debate raises important epistemological questions on the boundaries of resilience (Bahadur et al. 2010) and on disciplinary tensions between the social and natural sciences (Olsson et al. 2015). Rigorous research has identified specific concepts, theoretical tensions and methodological barriers of SER that clash with notions of contemporary social science (Davidson 2010; Davoudi 2012; Olsson et al. 2015).[k] Central to this debate is the importance of *human agency* and the complex understanding of *power* within social science, which make it challenging to transfer concepts made to describe physical processes from ecology to social science (Davidson 2010). Moreover, Cretney (2014) in her review of the emergence of critical SER thinking in geography, claims: "strong ties with ecology have led to the assumption that natural and social systems are essentiality similar and operate on similar principles".

Acknowledging this tendency, Davoudi (2012) listed critical guidelines for translating resilience from the natural world to the social world for case study design.[l] She advises, firstly, to recognise intentional human action and intervention, such as the engagement of social networks and institutions or the application of technology. Secondly, she suggest assessing what is desirable because "in the social context defining what is desirable is always tied to normative judgments" (Davoudi 2012:305). Thirdly, She propose paying attention to defining a case study's boundaries to avoid social exclusion. Her last guideline is to address power and politics and the conflict over the desired

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[k] These disciplinary tensions are also used for explaining the popularity of resilience in certain fields, such as disaster risk reduction and development studies (Bahadur et al. 2010) and the absence from others, such as political science, sociology and economics (Olsson et al. 2015)

[l] In 2008, in a symposium at Sussex University entitled *Reframing Resilience*, speakers pointed to the epistemological challenges of using resilience thinking when trying to reduce human vulnerability and promoting social justice. The conclusions of the symposium report (Leach 2008) are very similar to Davoudi's (2012) guidelines and conclusions.

outcome. Ecological-resilience (even when analysing SES), Davoudi concludes, "is almost power blind and a-political" (2012:306). However, in society, there are always people who gain or lose from decision-making: "[r]esilience for some people or places may lead to the loss of resilience for others" (ibid).

As can be seen in Davoudi's (2012) conclusion, the concerns around the lack of attention to human agency and power have led SER critical scholars to address the political aspects of resilience and attend interrelated questions of culture, discourse and politics (Chmutina et al. 2016; Leach 2008; McGreavy 2016). In other words, not only studying resilience *from/to what,* but also *by whom* and *for whom*? (Cretney 2014). These are important questions about: who has the power to frame the debate? Who has access to decision-making? And, who benefits from the entire process? As Cretney (2014) points out, the former absence of these topics from the research led to criticism of resilience as a new form of the "manifestation of power" (p.632). In her words: "discussions of resilience mask the ways in which resilience discourse reinforce and create hegemonic political and ideological discourses" (ibid). Similarly, McGreavy (2016:105), who conducted a Foucauldian archaeology of resilience as a discourse, states that "a primary problem with resilience is that it ignores its own discursivity, which constrains how we might come to know and do resilience differently". Biermann and colleagues conclude their analysis of the 'critical turn' in resilience thinking, discussed in this section of the literature review, with this quote about the practical meaning of this turn:

> *Ultimately, critically informed resilience thinking can offer a chance to assure the promotion of social and social–ecological systems that are not simply sustainable and robust, but are also just and equitable – in other words, systems that are worth making and keeping resilient (Biermann et al. 2016:74).*

By revealing the apolitical façade of the resilience discourse, these critics were able to 'reframe resilience' (Brown, 2012; Leach, 2008; McGreavy, 2015; Shaw, 2012). They turned resilience from a power-blind analytic tool into its opposite, from a depoliticised discourse to a re-politicising one. Inspired by this notion, this thesis uses resilience to understand changes in the Israeli hydro-policies discourse and to reveal the political-ideological aspects of its press coverage.

Another repeated and related critique of resilience, from writers analysing the frames, policies and discourses of resilience, is that it reinforces neoliberal ideology (Biermann et al. 2016; Cretney 2014). In the field of international policy, Joseph (2013), argues that the enthusiasm for the concept of resilience in policy literature fits with

neoliberal discourse, and rejects "claims that resilience is part of a post-liberal shift" (p.38). He points out that resilience is not necessarily neoliberal: "but it fits neatly with what [neoliberalism] is trying to say and do" (Joseph 2013:38). Joseph explicitly refers to the Anglo-Saxon understanding of resilience that fits with neoliberalism in its emphasis on individual adaptability, self-awareness, reflexivity and responsibility, and which encourages "active citizenship" (2013:42) and reduces state responsibility. This suggests that within other cultures and local variations of neoliberalism, this might not be the case. Others share Joseph's (2013) stance, such as Chmutina et al. (2016) who also refer to Evans and Reid (2014) and their view of resilience as a neoliberal project used by powerful institutions to manipulate and dominate vulnerable societal sectors. Chmutina et al. (2016:78) analyse resilience policy discourse on security risks in the UK and conclude that resilience is a political construct with "winners and losers": "[i]t is important to identify them and make sure that it is not the most vulnerable individuals or social groups who carry the burden of resilience policy". In other fields, Aldunce et al. (2014) examine the framing of environmental disaster resilience and highlight the similarities to neoliberal discourse; for example, this includes the appeal for community based solutions and self-reliance as opposed to a dependence on governments or technologies. Contrary to Joseph (2013), Biermann et al. (2016) argue that the critical evaluation of resilience that comes from the "premise [it] has been used to advance neoliberal agendas, also moves the discussion forward by examining the potential of resilience to support *radical social change* (in a Leftist sense)*"* (Biermann et al. 2015:6, emphasis in the original). Put another way, Biermann et al. (2015) do not claim that resilience has not been used to support neoliberal policies, but that the critical turn described above made it possible to use it as an opposition. My research sits close to this idea; it sets out to explore where resilience works in favour of neoliberalism, with an intention to indicate where it could have been contested. The following sections focus on elements of research on SES to introduce how they can be used for studying resilience as discourse.

1.3.3.   Four-Step Process: Researching Social-Ecological Resilience

This thesis regards resilience as a discourse and as a research perspective; the next subsections are dedicated to explaining the latter. I am using a resilience perspective for analysing the media coverage of an environmental risk and its related (de)politicised policy discourse. This section investigates how ecological-resilience (and SES) is commonly used in case-study research such as this thesis. Research on SER usually involves several

key elements: (1) examining a case study when a system or a community has to adapt to specific environmental disturbances or risk (such as wildfires or droughts); (2) looking at nature and the extent of the system/community reaction to it; (3) identifying and evaluating the source of resilience (i.e. the *factors* and *actors* that lead to a specific reaction; and (4) describing the side effects of the whole process (Matyas and Pelling 2014; Nelson et al. 2007). This section explains these stages one by one, highlighting concepts and questions relevant to the analysis in this thesis. In order to make this discussion more concrete, occasionally I give examples for the use of such a concept or question by using climate-related environmental risks, mostly water scarcity, which is the risk examined in this research.

Step 1: Examination of a Case Study on Risk

The first stage out of this four-stage research process requires the shortest explanation and focuses on the case study definition and its mode of examination. The definition of 'a system', was an issue of debate as part of the trans-disciplinary journey of resilience to social science, mentioned in the last section (1.3.2). Even after the development of SES studies, there remained a wide debate on 'what is a system?' It should be mentioned that this research is not an analysis of a system (i.e. system-analysis), rather it is a discourse analysis taking place in two public arenas of a chosen SES – the news-media reporting on Israel's hydro-policies and the PCCs. One main insight that should be taken from this debate is the importance of defining the case study, such that it questions what is included within the body of analysis. This decision might affect the evaluation in the next steps and understanding of the reactions to the risk. As mentioned by Olsson et al. (2015:4) in their exploration of system ontology and system boundary, "[n]either in nature nor in society are boundaries fixed unless we first decide on the phenomenon to be described or explained". That is, every SES is conceptually constructed as part of the process of trying to explain a social-environmental interaction. Therefore, this is an example of the issues raised at the beginning of this literature review, on the role of institutionalised knowledge in risk society. This debate on the boundaries and scope of the case analysed were taken into consideration when presenting my case study (Chapter 2) and in the data collection process (Chapter 3).

Step 2: Reaction to the Risk

Subsequent to choosing the case study, the second stage of analysing resilience is evaluating the social-environmental reactions to the environmental risk and the change that it introduced to the system. There is an abundance of writing on this stage as this is

the core aspect of the question "what does it means to be resilient?" Due to its origins in ecology and natural sciences, an understanding of resilience as 'bouncing back' (that is having the capacity to return to an original state) was prominent in the initial stages of the use of this concept. For example, bouncing back from a drought could be the ability to restore water reservoirs to their pre-disturbance levels. However, this is no longer a desired attribute in some fields using resilience. Davoudi (2012:300) distinguishes between engineering and ecological-resilience: the first relates to the notion of "the faster the system bounces back, the more resilient it is"; and the later focuses on the ability to persist and adapt. Accordingly, in this case, the ecological-resilience focus could be looking for the ability to prepare for a water shortage and to reduce water demands. Based on Holling's (1986 in Davoudi 2012) developments in his ecological-resilience research, this field advanced from looking at systems as having a fixed equilibrium,[m] which the system can return to after displacement, to an understanding of resilience as the ability to absorb disturbances, including the capacity to adapt, learn, change and develop necessarily (Adler et al. 2015). This notion included the development of the *panarchy model* of the adaptive cycle[n] (Gunderson and Holling 2003 in Davoudi 2012). Shaw (2012) simply renamed this module as 'bouncing forward', that is understanding resilience as a positive process of development caused by adapting to risk. For this thesis, the bouncing forward type of resilience in the case of droughts can lower society's water demands to a level at which it can survive even a permanent drought by disconnecting the water use from the dependence on the weather, by recycling and desalination. Does desalination represent a positive or negative or neutral process of development? This can be explored by looking more closely on the ways to become resilient, which is explained in the next section.

Discussion of Step 2: Ways of Becoming Resilient: Resistance, Adjustments or Transformation

Before moving to the third step, it is important to dedicate more attention to Step 2 by using concepts that indicates the direction and intensity of change created by the reaction

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[m] Equilibrium is a state in which opposing forces or influences are balanced.

[n] The Panarchy model is a multi-stage model explaining the dynamics of change introduced to systems by adapting to outside disturbances and resisting risk; it suggests that this adaptation has transformative potential when at a certain point, the system is no longer the same as it was before the process began.

to the risk. Between understanding the reaction to the risk as bouncing backwards (due to the capacity to resist it) or forwards (due to changing and adapting), there is a spectrum of possible reactions to the disturbances. Many writers use different terminology and concepts to differentiate between types of reaction. ° Each suggestion for terminology represents a different understanding and value judgment on the change induced in the system. In my analysis I chose to use Matyas and Pelling's (2014) terms of *resistance*, *incremental adjustments* and *transformation*, which I explain below. Nelson, Adger and Brown (2007) explain why we should consider distinctions between such concepts, even though there is no clear break-off point between the terms. They claim that this is where resilience (as an analytic tool) provides space for agency. That is, in their words:

> *The conceptual implications of this difference are that societies, in addition to responding to current or perceived disturbances, also have the capability of defining and working to achieve a desired system state (Nelson et al. 2007:412).*

This difference between each outcome, I argue, relates to the outcome of a dual process of meaning making and acting to achieve the desired state of resilience. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the responses to a disturbance (and study it) as a discursive process with a materialised socio-ecological outcome.

My choice to use the terms of *resistance*, *incremental adjustments* and *transformation*, (Matyas and Pelling 2014), out of the options in footnote o, is partly as they offer a clearer distinction between categories and help to avoid confusion with other related concepts (such as adaptation). On one side of this tripartite scale, *resilience-by-resistance* refers to the refining of actions to improve performance without changing the guiding assumptions or questioning the established routines. These mitigating actions of risk reduction can be, using Matyas and Pelling's (2014:510) examples, build a sea wall to stop floods, reinforce the built environment to minimise distruction by an earthquake, or in the case of droughts, cope by using pre-drought water saving. The second term, *resilience-by-adjustments*, can be understood as a process of reorganising assets, capacities and capabilities to return to balance (Matyas and Pelling 2014). Alternatively, as Nelson and colleagues (2007:400)

° There is a variation in definitions which is connected to the variations in defining resilience in distinct disciplines (as discussed above). Here are some examples: resilience, adaptation and transformation (Davidson 2010); persistence, adaptability and transformability (Davoudi 2012); resilience, transition and transformation (Pelling 2012); prevent, react, transform and adapt (Chmutia et al 2016); resistance, coping and bouncing back (McGreavy 2016).

describe, the adjustments "are undertaken in order to reduce risk and improve the level of adaptedness". This stage includes reflection on the community's goals, and how problems are framed, and which aims can be achieved (Matyas and Pelling 2014). Matyas and Pelling (2014) suggest that such adjustments, in the case of drought risk, can implement changes to the irrigated agricultural system, according to redefined social goals. The last term on the scale is transformative change, which is defined as an irreversible regime change, built on a paradigmatic change and deep social reform (Pelling 2012). This is a fundamental restructuring of the system and community due to expected and experienced risk, which is "pushing the system towards a different status quo" (Matyas and Pelling 2014:S8). This transformation can be seen as bouncing forward by changing into a new system. *Resilience-by-transformation* requires deliberate reflection on the preferred options over competing (resource) demands (ibid), based on reflective modes of governance (Nelson et al. 2007) and representing normative judgements (Davoudi 2012). Matyas and Pelling (2015) discuss the importance of transparency, accountability and democratising critical thinking as part of this reflective learning process. All these values are (ideally) connected to a news-mediated public debate.

Table 1: Ways of Becoming Resilient (Based on: Matyas and Pelling 2015)

	Resistence	Adjustments	Transformation
	Improving performance, and protecting the status quo from risk without addressing its couse.	Reorgnisation of assets, capabilities and capacities, risk management for changes in behaviour to minimise degragation.	Reorganisation, paradigmatic change, deep-rooted change in systems, actions, values or behaviours to transfer the risk to eliminate its effect on society.
Flood threats in residential areas	Building sea walls or dams	Flood planes	Relocation of the population
A decrease in the fish population in the sea (fishers' livelihood)	Business as usual: supply decrease will push some fishers to stop fishing	Sustainble fishing and creation of a no fishing zone	Inland fish-farming or veganism
Droughts (farmers' livelihood)	Water efficiency	Changing crops	Desalination

Table 1 summarises the different terms by using examples of possible climate-change related risks and possible reactions. It is based on examples taken form Matyas and Pelling (2015), Nelson et al. (2007) and Pelling (2012). As can be seen, each of the three directions of change, discussed above, has advantages and disadvantages, and each term represents a different competing pathway for a possible future for a certain community (Matyas and Pelling 2014). The factors that lead to the selected pathway are to be examined in the next step.

To illustrate Stage 2 'the reaction to the risk', I will use the example of energy resources. Achieving climate resilience by minimising greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved in many ways. Energy efficiency, such as by switching to more efficient utilities, represents resilience as a form of *resistance*. It maintains society's lifestyle and daily practices, without addressing the question of how this electricity is produced. Once a public understanding of the need to reduce consumption has been achieved, in a way that questions the priorities and implications of energy consumption, this stage can be considered to be moving towards *adjustments*. A more distinct presentation of the adjustments are with the energy supply, by changing the use of fossil fuels to ones that are less pollutant, from coal to natural gas, and even incorporating some renewable power sources. *Transformative* change will only be achieved once renewables constitute the majority of the energy supply. However, which kind of transformative change is it? Is it still based on the capitalist belief of ever-increasing profit and consumerism? Is it based on large manufacturers, or is it a solution based on the decentralised greed of small and home-based energy production? An off-shore, large-scale wind farm has different environmental effects to roof-top home-owned turbines or solar panels. In other words, is it green populist solution with maintain the old systematic problems or does it offers an alternative future (Kenis and Lievens 2016; Swyngedouw 2010)? Who are the actors (persons or institutions) that benefit from each of these resilience opportunities? What were the socio-political conditions that led to a specific kind of solution, and what kind of ideological viewpoint does it represent? The next steps (3-4), are designed to answer these questions.

Steps 3 and 4: Identifying and Evaluating the Source of Resilience: Factors, Actors and Side Effects

After (1) choosing the case study and (2) evaluating the social-environmental reaction to a risk, comes the third step of evaluating the *actors* and *factors* (henceforth referred to as *f/actors*) that led to a particular outcome (Nelson et al. 2007). The fourth and final stage,

according to Nelson et al. (2007) involve the *side effects*, that is what were the social, ecological, economic or other prices that had to paid to achieve the new resilient status. It is important to return here to Davoudi's (2012) list of critical guidelines for translating resilience into the social realm. The exclusion of f/actors can happen when defining the case study, and also when defining the desired outcomes of the resilience process. This exclusion represents winners and losers that can be better understood by looking at the side effects. Therefore, Step Four can also contribute to the evaluation of the f/actors of Step Three as it indicates their gains and losses. Also, it looks at which f/actors did not participate or contribute (or were mentioned or considered) in the process. According to the panarchy model (Folke 2006), side effects that have not been considered in the process open the door for different outcomes the next time the risk occurs. By contrast, as we learned from Beck (1992), these side effects can turn into a new risk that endangers the system and starts a new resilience process. Further to this, a resilience perspective (and panarchy) emphasises nonlinear dynamics, uncertainties and surprises, and how different periods of change interplay and the ways that such variables interact (Folke 2006). Step Three examines these kinds of factors that influenced the process, such as political or environmental events. The combination of these two stages connect topics discussed earlier in this literature review and can be referred to as: *resilience by/for whom?* This is where the risk conflict, as defined by Maeseele (2015b), unravels in resilience. This means that from a politicised approach, Stage Three includes looking at the claims, values and interests of each actor. While Step Four better reveals the social, environmental and political implications. This does not necessarily mean conducting Stages Three and Four together; it suggests that repeating stages in the analysis will deepen the understanding of each one. The panarchy model represents an understanding that resilience is not a linear process, and thus using resilience as a research tool shows how it can conform to a nonlinear analysis. Additionally, Step Four can also inform Step Two by helping to evaluate the direction of the whole process (i.e. resistance, adjustments or transformation).

Step Four raises the question on the conceptual differences between resilience and sustainability. As previously discussed (in Section 1.3.1), there are voices that contest replacing sustainability (Benson and Craig 2014) while others regard resilience and sustainability as completing concepts (McGreavy 2013). My interim conclusion to this debate is that both sides pay attention to the immediate and future changes in behaviour and policy promoted by using these two concepts. However, the differences between

resilience and sustainability become clearer on examining the kinds of change that resilience offers to the system (Step 2) and examining its side effects (Step 4). Resilience as resistance might not be sustainable in the long run, and even transformation can introduce new side effects that can be considered to be unsustainable. In some cases, resilience might be seen as un-environmental to f/actors that were not initially considered part of the system. To phrase it differently, social resilience might be anti-ecological when expanding our scope to social-environmental aspects of the same process. Therefore, I agree with McGreavy (2013:4) that resilience and sustainability are "fundamentally complementary". Whether desalination represent a sustainable form of resilience is explored in Chapter 2, together with an introduction for the f/actors that influenced the implementation of this policy in Israel. The discursive development of this specific resilience process, whether it incorporated sustainable considerations or not and for what reasons, are part of the analysis. Now, that the steps taken from resilience in the social-studies research are clear, in the next subsection, I argue if and how it should be used in EC research.

1.3.4. Communication and Resilience

The academic literature that approaches and analyses resilience as a discourse (see Section 1.3.2) raises the following questions: is climate resilience a promising concept for communication studies? What are the opportunities and limitations of using resilience in communications studies? Put simply, research using resilience asks: how does a system and community cope with environmental stress, and how does this process cause change? I suggest that we need to ask: how is this process mediated? Alternatively, what is the media's role in shaping the debates and discourses about resilience and adaptation? According to my examination, SER is almost non-existent in communication research even though elements like 'inner-system-communications', 'learning', 'imagination' and 'memory' are considered important for becoming resilient (Davidson, 2010).

Olsson et al. (2015) reviewed the ten highest-ranking journals (ISI) in five social-science disciplines, including ecology and environmental studies, to evaluate the popularity of resilience and SER between the years of 2001 and 2013. They found that outside ecology, the vast majority of articles were published in the field of environmental studies. Most were concentrated in two journals: *Ecology and Society* and *Global Environmental Change*, publishing together hundreds of articles (ibid). Using the same methods and

search words, in May 2017, I conducted a similar bibliometric analysis of 12 journals in communication studies and EC, the 10 highest-ranked (ISI) plus *Science Communication* and *Environmental Communications,* for the years between 2001 and 2016. Only 61 articles were found mentioning 'resilience' and 'system' in their abstract; most of them were published in *Public Understanding of Science* and *Health Communication*. Only 16 articles out of the 61 referred to ecological-resilience, 13 of them referred to SER. Only one article was published in *Environmental Communications* (McGreavy 2016).

This article by McGreavy (2016), mentioned above and presented earlier in this literature review, used a discourse analysis of resilience from an EC perspective, showing how collective responses to environmental change, that is SER, are discursively shaped and constrained. In her conclusions, McGreavy askes "how might resilience become different?" (2016:116), and how is it possible to add and change elements in this discourse or perspective while understanding its boundaries and possibilities, "for more effective and ecological modes of becoming resilient" (2016:104). She suggests introducing other communication tools, such as poetry, to our ways of discursively producing and understanding resilience. With that, McGreavy (2016) opens the door for studying SER discourse in other arenas of EC. In the discussion on *meaning making* (Part 1) and more specifically in the discussions on news, environment and risk communication, I presented arguments for looking at the media and the news as active *actors* shaping the debate on environmental issues and as *arenas* of contestation between actors. Accordingly, and building on McGreavy (2016) this thesis not just looks at how "resilience" is explicitly communicated, but on how the process of achieving resilience is mediated. I use resilience as a perspective for understanding the process of change and discourses about climate risks and policies.[p] Furthermore, Folke's (2006) emphasis on nonlinear dynamics influenced by events and changes over time helps communication research ask new questions on risk discourses. In this sense, the resilience perspective suggests not simply searching for consistent frames or narratives, promoted by different actors, but exploring ever-changing discourse(s) and power relations of risks, uncertainties, events and their social-political implementations. In the chapter 2, I present in more detail my adaptation of the four-step process of researching social-ecological resilience in communication

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[p] By *communicating resilience* I mean the explicit representation or use of the term resilience during a debate on a risk and the possible reaction to it, while by *mediating resilience* I mean looking at the role of the media in this discursive process (with or without explicit or implicit use of the term).

studies. Before this, two minor subjects remain to be reviewed, environmental discourse in Israel (Part 4) and studies on PCCs (Part 5).

1.4.   Part 4 - Environmental Discourse in Israel

This part offers additional research on EC and environmental discourse in Israel which has not yet been mentioned in the literature review. The academic research in Israeli environmental communications is minimal, sporadic and relatively new (for a review of the field, see Katz-Kimchi 2013). The local environmental movement is subject to flourishing research (Ben-gal and Shmueli 2004; de-Shalit 2001; Rabinowitz and Vardi 2009; Schwartz 2001; Shmueli 2008; Tal 2006), and the discursive aspects of environmental campaigning, policies and risks have also been rigorously explored (Fischhendler, Boymel, and Boykoff 2016; Gutkowski, Grosglik and Shani 2017; Lipman Servi 2012). However, these studies lack analyses of the discursive role of the media and the news. Only two studies deal with environmental risk communication in Israeli news. One study, which has little relevance to this thesis, is about the news coverage of cancer cases linked to a polluted river (Meyers and Rozen 2014). The second study, more relevant to this research, is about reporting apparent 'uncertainties' over the Dead Sea Read Sea Water Canal. This hydro-policy project was envisioned 150 years ago, and its modern version includes large-scale SD and a hydroelectric power plant in Jordan.[q] A study, on the reporting of this project in Haaretz (during 1974-2007), found that over time, environmental uncertainties outvoiced the political and economic ones (Fischhendler et al. 2013). News reporting on this project was exempt from my data collection (see Section 3.3).

To my knowledge, only two studies examine climate change, reporting on Israeli newspapers. Nossek (2010) compared the reporting of the 2007 Bali Climate Summit with the summit in Copenhagen two years later, in the two newspapers: Yedioth Ahronoth (YA) and Haaretz. Recently, Nossek (2019) also compared the same newspapers in their reports on the 2016 Paris Climate Summit. This thesis compares and contrasts these newspapers; hence, Nossek's (2019) findings are important to this analysis. He claims that climate change is not an important issue in Israeli newspapers despite the fact that according to climatologists, its facing climate change induced risks of desertification and sea-level rises. The coverage of all three summits focussed on the politics and negotiation aspects (its drama and conflict) and less on the causes of climate change or the ways to

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[q] Since Israel and Jordan signed the peace treaty, the plans for this infrastructure project changed from crossing over Israeli territory and into Jordan's.

adapt or mitigate it (Nossek 2019). In general, Nossek summarises the reporting as "[t]he problem of climate change was seen more as a problem for the 'world' and not so much for Israel" (2010:236). When comparing these newspapers, Nossek (2019) found that YA had a tendency towards national framing and Haaretz to an international one. In terms of the scope of coverage, Haaretz had more articles than YA on each summit; their items were also longer and located more often in the front page. The amount of items changed between summits (Bali n=10, Copenhagen n=85 and Paris n=25). Nossek (2019) hypothesises that this change indicates one of the following: (i) a diplomatic conflict in each summit; (ii) the context: the local and international expectations from each summit; or (iii) the newspaper agenda which reflects less interest in environmental issues (i.e. giving more space to day-to-day topics). In both papers and all three summits, the environmental reporters contributed most of the items (Nossek 2019). Haaretz was the only newspaper publishing an editorial on climate change during the summits. Further findings relevant to this thesis were that scientists, activists and NGO voices from the summits were marginalised compared to the politicians attending, and that any protests taking place during the summits were presented in pictures, without giving voice to the protestors and without explaining their aims (Nossek 2019).

In the context of the depoliticisation of environmental discourse in Israel, some studies are relevant to this thesis even though none of them build on post-political literature and critiques. Rabinowitz and Vardi (2009) claim that the failure of the campaign against the construction of Highway 6 in Israel during the 1990s was due to the inability of the environmental activists to change the consensual dominant framing of the road as the only solution to national traffic problems. Similarly, Sadeh (2010) in her study on why the environmental movement did not oppose the construction of the West Bank Barrier, claims that the public consensus on the barrier as the best solution to a national security risk silenced the environmental NGOs that felt there was no public legitimacy to act against it, nor even to minimise its environmental impact. Sadeh (2010), similar to Rabinowitz and Vardi (2009), based her thesis on interviewing key figures in the environmental movement at the time without analysing the role of the media. One of my hypotheses is that the mediation of desalination had similar characteristics in constructing a public consensus that depoliticised the debate in a way that silenced the environmental voices and precluded the display of alternatives.

Lipman-Servi (2012) analysed the same anti-highway campaign as Rabinowitz and Vardi (2009), as part of her study on the evolution of the Israeli environmental-justice

discourse (connecting environmental issues to other social-economic issues) in environmental campaigns between 1990 and 2005. Lipman-Servi (2012) claims that the more the environmental campaigners focused on scientific evidence and ecological predictions in their communications with officials, the pubic and the media, the more their ability to express other arguments (social-economic and egalitarian) in favour of their position diminished. According to this research, this was first due to the fact that scientific arguments and numbers were contested by experts on the other side. Second, the failure was based on the inability of the environmental campaigners to build discourse-coalitions with organisations (such as worker unions and social NGOs) and populations (as with marginalised communities) representing the wider context of the contested issue. In this sense, the campaigners' reliance on scientific and ecological arguments actively depoliticised the discourse and prevented it from connecting to other ideological or political issues relevant to their campaign. Although using a some newspaper analysis, Lipman-Servi's (2012) work (similar to Rabinowitz and Vardi (2009) and Sadeh (2010)) did not examine the role of the media in the process of (de)politicisation.

My master's dissertation, a study on the newspaper reporting of the campaign to save Palmachim Beach, presents how the local grassroots activist group successfully politicised the mediated debate (Kassirer 2012). In this study, the discursive strategy of *juridification* was found to contribute to processes of depoliticisation. I use the term juridification to mean discursively constructing an issue in the sense of the legal obligations. For example, it looks at whether a policy is legally possible, and if a governmental body acted within its jurisdiction or not, and it focuses on the legislation process, rather than on the ideology behind the legal obligation. As a discursive strategy, *juridification* works in similar ways to Pepermans' (2015) explanation on economisation (see Section 3.2.2). In accordance to the literature reviewed in this chapter (Maeseele 2015b), strategies of *rationalization* have also been found to delegitimise activists. However, in contrast to Maeseele's (2015b) claim, in the reporting on Palmachim's *moralisation* (that is presenting something as immoral and as such claiming it has illegitimate authority) has contributed to the politicisation of the debate in the long term. Initially *moralisation* was used by the activists to depoliticise the debate and to delegitimise the entrepreneurs promoting the housing development on the beach (Kassirer 2012). However, in the long term, this opened the reporting to consider the campaign as one that was dealing with competing moralities, as a conflict between two legitimate ideological perspectives on nature and economic development. Therefore, legitimising the activist groups as

presenting a consistent legitimate ideological stand and supporting their demands to the politicians (that is the city councils, parliament and government) and affected the final decision over the beach (ibid). In the Methodology and Methods Chapter, I present discursive strategies that are analysed, and among these, I also look for expressions of juridification.

1.5.   Part 5 - Public Communication Campaigns: Definitions and Insights

This final part of this chapter reviews the literature about televised Public Communication Campaigns (PCCs) as a form of risk communication. PCCs are a form of social marketing. According to Andreasen (1994 in Takahashi 2009), social marketing applies commercial marketing tools to influence a target population's voluntary behaviour to improve their personal wellbeing and of the societies in which they belong. Rice and Atkin (2013:3) define PCCs as:

> *Persuasive attempt to inform or influence behaviours in large audiences within a specific time period using organized set of communication activities and featuring an array of mediated messages in multiple channels generally to produce non-commercial benefits to individuals and society.*

These two authors claim, thus, that environmental PCCs share similarities to advertising and commercial campaigns. In her research on road safety campaigns, Guttman (2014) uses the terms persuasive communication campaigns or initiatives and gives a very similar definition to the one above. She adds that these campaigns are "often complemented by interpersonal support and/or other supportive activities as enforcement, education, legislation, commitment, rewards, etc." (Vaa et al. 2008 in Guttman 2014:46).[1] All these definitions apply to the IWA campaigns examined for the purposes of this thesis. They are non-commercial, made to inform and influence the wider Israeli public behaviour, and each was broadcast for a defined and short period of time, and some were complemented by supportive activities.

There is more than a half-century of experience studying PCCs, drawing on multiple communication theories, mainly from social marketing, also including the agenda setting and message frames (Rice and Atkin 2013). In this thesis, as explained in the Methodology chapter, I am interested in the *discursive* aspects of the media texts I analyse, as in the case of newspapers and videos. Guttman emphasises that despite the high visibility of televised PCCs they:

> *may not necessarily influence individual behaviour, but instead can have an impact by raising issues to the public agenda, or have an cumulative effect […] as explained by communication theories of agenda setting, framing and cultivation theory (Guttman 2014:46).*

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[1] It should be noted that these definitions above are not part of the community-based social marketing approach, which places more emphasis on personal communication and persuasion methods.

In other words, evaluating and analysing PCCs must "take into consideration the complexity of media effects as represented in […] media studies" (Guttman 2014:272), rather than assuming an immediate direct effect on behaviour. Similarly, Rice and Atkin (2013) claim that although PCCs are usually measured by their direct effect on focal audience segments, they have other unmeasurable indirect effects on interpersonal influence, on policy makers and even on the media coverage of the topic. Although the language used by Rice and Atkin (2013) to describe these indirect effects greatly draws on agenda-setting and framing theories; to my understanding, they clearly describe the discursive effects of such campaigns among the public, policy makers and the media. Likewise, they claim that PCCs "often build on existing values" and "tend to reinforce the predispositions" of the target audience by using "loss frames" to "shape the debate" (Rice and Atkin 2013:9). Building on this claim, I argue that PCCs are about reinforcing and shaping existing discourses. Rice and Atkin (2013) list the methods for quantitative research on campaigns, such as focus groups and surveys; however, they do not address discourse analysis, and generally the studies they review are more interested in behavioural change, than in the cultural and discursive elements of PCCs.

My thesis neither constitutes what an effective campaign is, nor is it interested in evaluating IWA's PCCs beyond their discursive contraction of risks, causes and reactions to it. Nonetheless, some insights from studies on such campaigns are relevant to this study. Salmon and Murray-Johnson (2013) suggest a critical distinction between *effectiveness* and *effects* when researching PCCs. Due to the broad range of possible outcomes of PCCs, they suggest different conceptualisations of effectiveness to move beyond measuring impact. In the first level, they suggest that campaigns have *definitional effectiveness* as they show that a certain condition has been accepted as being socially wrong; and that some claim makers or institutions have been able to prioritise this issue over others, as being worthy of political and financial capital. In the second level, PCCs have *ideological effectiveness* and can be "perceived as ideologically neutral in contrast to systemic solutions, which are often labelled as partisan or political" (Salmon and Murray-Johnson 2013:102). Salmon and Murray-Johnson (2013) claim that PCCs are political as with any other approach to social change, but unlike systemic solutions, their hidden assumptions and politics are not debated to the same level. Moreover, they argue that:

> *In most cases, campaigns are designed to modify personal knowledge, attitudes, intentions, and behaviours rather than to modify the political and economic environments in which those attitudes, intentions and behaviours occur (Salmon and Murray-Johnson 2013:102).*

That is, campaigns tend to depoliticise issues due to their perceived non-ideological content and their tendency to address the individual and not the political systemic causes of the issue. In this sense, the contribute to an *ethical-individual* depoliticisation (Machin 2013). On the third effectiveness level, Salmon and Murray-Johnson (2013) look at *political effectiveness*. They regard PCCs as symbolic politics, which demonstrate that a government cares about a specific issue. This is a public gesture to signal an issue, which can give researchers insight into the governmental perception of it, on its political agenda or preferred policies. In other words, campaigns provide insight into the way the dominant discourses define the problem, what the related policies are and the ideological and political assumptions that influenced its production by the government. Salmon and Murray-Johnson (2013) also suggest further levels of effectiveness, which are less relevant to this research, such as contextual, cost and programmatic ones.

Generally, campaigns seek to influence conduct by promoting positive behaviour (such as installing Watersavers)[s] or preventing negative behaviour (seen in excessive water use). In that respect, Rice and Atkin (2013) argue that prevention campaigns usually use *fear* to focus attention on negative consequences of harmful practice, rather than promoting the positive alternative. Yzer et al. (2013) claim that fear is a popular strategy in PCCs, based on the assumption that it can motivate action. They contest the effectiveness of it and note that there is evidence for the effectiveness of fear when targeting *specific* groups and particular risky behaviours. In the case of the IWA's PCCs, the campaigns aim at heterogeneous audiences, and do not target at a specific crowd. In terms of other discursive strategies in the case of traffic safety campaigns, Guttman (2016) shows that studies (including those from Israel) have identified several main types of approaches used in their message design and discursive strategies. These approaches include the following: informative, rational, positive and negative emotional appeals, fear, hard-hitting, shocking, and funny. Even though Guttman (2016) uses primarily quantitative methods, some of her insights and findings have informed the multimodal critical discourse analysis in this thesis, which is described in the methods chapter.

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[s] See Chapter 7 and Note 5 in Appendix on Translations.

1.5.1. Water and Environmental PCCs

In the field of environmental communication, there is extensive research on environmental advocacy campaigns (Cox 2010), which are predominately a public or environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGO) led campaigns aiming to influence governmental policies, rather than the opposite. In view of environmental PCCs, Takahashi (2009) reviewed studies from social marketing on environmental topics between the years of 1971 and 2006 and only found 148 cases across multiple disciplines. The leading topics for PCCs studied found in this period were: general environmental campaigns (24%), recycling (18%) and only three studies (2%) were on water conservation campaigns. According to Rice and Robinson (2013) more contemporary studies on environmental PCCs focus on the fields of science communication and environmental education. They give typologies of dialogic (two-way and participatory) and monologic (one-way) modes of environmental PCCs. The IWA campaigns fit the first group of a liner transmission of information, which includes according to Rice and Robinson (2013), *advocacy* campaigns, *greenwashing* contra-campaigns, *science advocacy* and *entertainment education* (such as documentaries and environmental television programmes). Specifically in this typology, the IWA campaigns fit the *awareness, information and persuasion* type of campaigns. Rice and Atkin (2013) use different wording: awareness, instruction and persuasive, according to the main types of message in these campaigns.

In her book Water Communications, Herve-Bazin (2014) explores a few examples of PCCs that address issues of water consumption; however, her book which was published by the International Water Association targets professional communicators and utilities companies; therefore, it lacks a critical angle, such as the one taken in this research. These campaigns range from focusing on drinking water quality, pollution, legislation, infrastructure and water management by the suppliers. Herve-Bazin (2014) argues that they often focus on attitudes, behaviours and perceptions at the level of the household. This is particularly the case in arid countries or regions with underdeveloped infrastructure, and where campaigns tend to promote a reduction in consumption and more sustainable water usage (Herve-Bazin 2014). Katz et al. (2016) discuss the increasing popularity of water conservation campaigns in times of shortage or crisis. They claim that PCCs attract less public resistance (compared to direct regulations), and they can be deployed quickly, cheaply and may create longer and deeper change due to their educational nature. Despite the popularity of such campaigns around the world, according to this review on the existing literature, there is currently no research that analyses water

campaign videos or that adopts the approach of a critical discourse analysis. Similar to road safety, studies tend to use quantitative analysis to evaluate the short-term impact on consumption, and which come from the perspective of marketing. Such is the case with Katz et al. (2016) who analysed the effects of printed water PCCs in Israel. Arbel and Ben-Yehuda (2010) have compared the impact on consumption of the IWA's 2008 to 2009 PCCs to the Drought Levy tool of that year (without analysing the content of the videos, just their distribution and impact).[t] Thus, it is necessary to examine the various messages and the discursive aspects of water PCCs.

Despite the absence of a critical discourse analysis of water PCCs, some studies reviewed by Herve-Bazin (2014) provide (limited) information about the discourses used in these campaigns. Researchers have shown that a wide range of cultural representations of water are deployed in such campaigns. Herve-Bazin (2014) lists categories of symbolic values related to water: (1) life, fertility and seed growth; (2) medical and health; (3) purifying and ritualistic; and (4) civilisation and human usage. She suggests that these categories can help to analyse the symbolic and social representations of water. Herve-Bazin (2014) claims that, nowadays, water is largely symbolically connected to risks and concerns about: quantity (drought, floods and scarcity); quality (contamination and health); and management and governance (failed infrastructure, raising prices and public versus private). In that sense, she argues that water PCCs "are concurring to create the 'factory of risk' identified by Beck" (Herve-Bazin 2014:29). When these risks are addressed by water PCCs, it is expected that the values listed above will play a discursive role in mobilising the audience to adopt a certain position or action. Besides risk, Herve-Bazin (2014) suggests that in PCC campaigns, locality and territory play a discursive role for considering the special relationship between society and any nearby water (rivers and lakes). As such, some research has shown that water PCCs encourage protection of resources, and they influence people's capacity to interpret other related environmental issues (Herve-Bazin 2014).

Although these studies reviewed above discuss the topics and media relevant to this analysis, the lack of audio-visual research of governmental PCCs emphasise the importance of this thesis.

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[t] These two campaigns are analysed in this thesis. For the Drought Levy see Section 5.3.3.2.

Conclusion

In this literature review, I highlighted some of the complex connections between different elements of climate change and risks: the way we communicate these risks; the political aspect of climate change in a post-political era; and its connection to specific kinds of actions, policies and technologies for building resilience to these risks. Resilience thinking relates to the phenomenon in which climate change transforms from a future risk into a current issue. The way we act and the way we study this action needs to change. Critical resilience writing invites researchers to politicise the questions they ask about processes of resilience building. This thesis places these arguments into communication studies. More specifically, in this literature review, I have argued for using resilience as a perspective that can be adopted in the field of environmental communication studies. This perspective can provide new insights into the discursive evolution of a climatic risk and the reactions to it within a defined community.

In his book *Climate Change and Post-Political Communications*, Philip Hammond (2018) also suggests examining the role of media representation and framing in (de)politicisation of climate change. His book looks at historical and contemporary depoliticisation of the climate and the environment, using many of the theorists and researchers named in the Meaning Making and Politics parts of this literature review. Hammond also analyses attempts to politicise environmental discourse and its mediation and he discusses how this has changed over the years. He concludes by saying that: "[sometimes] what presents itself as 'critical' perspective instead turns out to be close to the dominant, mainstream outlook" (Hammond 2018:135). Hammond here points to the danger faced by alternative discourses when they try to reach the mainstream (i.e. become consensual); and to what Maeseele (2015a:391) called the "post-political trap" of EC research. This trap, which Hammond (2018:59) also recognises, is that the normative goal of EC to facilitate "transformation of scientific consensus into policy via the media" or "to achieve social consensus" actively contributes to depoliticisation. In light of this, the resilience perspective presented above, and the methodological ways to use it (in the next chapter), does not offer insight on how to better communicate environmental issues, but rather insights on how to better understand the complex relations of environmental risk, the media and the political.

This thesis further examines these theories by looking at drought risks in Israel, and the changes it introduced to the country's hydro-regime. It attempt to answer, how

do Israeli newspapers and PCCs communicate drought and hydro-policies between 2001 and 2018? What forms of resilience was constructed through these mediations, and how might these contribute to the (de)politicization of droughts, hydro-policies and desalination and in Israel? The next chapter introduces the case study and its context in more detail; it also provides information on the transformations in the national hydro-policies in Israel, and on the discourse-coalitions shaping these transformations.

Chapter 2 - Case Study Context

This chapter provides a general context for the case study. Firstly, as a contextual background for this research, in Section 2.1, I give a brief introduction to Israel's water sources and the increasing pressures it suffers. Next, Section 2.2 introduce the concept of policy paradigm which is used to explain certain differences between the distinct periods of hydro-policies in Israel, and the concept of discourse-coalition which promote paradigmatic change. After this explanation I present a historical review of Israel's hydro-policies, its transition from a hydro-regime based on water transfer to its current regime of desalination and sewage recycling. This thesis analyses the hydro-policies discourse from 2001 to 2018. In view of the time periods presented below, this analysis looks at the transition to the current era of Desalination and Marketisation. Ending this chapter with (2.3) an introduction to the implications and contradiction of seawater desalination (SD) technology.

2.1. Israel's Water Sources

Israel is an arid country with eight dry months a year and a desert covering 60% of the land (Teschner and Negev 2013). The country's main natural renewable freshwater sources are: (i) the Jordan River Basin that includes the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret); (ii) the Mountain Aquifer and (iii) Coastal Aquifers, annually supplying together 1,300 to 1,400 million cubic metres (MCM) (Becker 2013). Two of the above water sources are shared with neighbouring countries: the Jordan River Basin with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (PA)[a] and the Mountain Aquifer with PA (Feitelson 2013). Israel's water shortage is comprised of a deficiency between the available freshwater and consumption (Becker 2013). This deficiency increased from 108% in 1990 to 150% in 2010 (the actual consumption is about 2,100 MCM), and it is expected to rise by 2030 to more than 230% (the predicted demands are 3,000 MCM). The increasing gap in supply is influenced by a combination of factors, primarily population growth (which increases demand) and climate change (which affects rainfall and evaporation) (Teschner and Negev 2013). The latter has already reduced the annual freshwater supply from the 1980s'

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[a] Israel is the sole user of Lake Kinneret; however, the lake is dependent on water flowing down from Lebanon and Syria.

level of 1,550 MCM (ibid), and which carried into effect a series of droughts in the rain-years[b] of 1989-1991, 1999-2001, 2004-2011 and 2014-2017 (IWA 2020). According to NASA's research on climate change, during 1998-2012, the Eastern Mediterranean region suffered the longest and driest drought of the past 900 years (Cook et al. 2016). Beyond its threat to human consumption, this scarcity also affects the natural environment. Aquatic ecosystems and water streams are under threat of drying up as a result of decreasing rainfall, evaporation and "drought induced water pumping" (Teschner and Negev 2013:17). The connection between climate change and water scarcity in Israel was officially recognised by the Israeli Government in 2009 (State of Israel Prime Minister Office 2009), and by the Ministry of Environment before 2008 (Golan-Angeleco and Baror 2008; Ministry of Environmental Protection 2017).

The increasing frequency of the droughts and the expected severe water shortage brought Israel to develop two new water sources. One relates to the sewage reclamation operation, which has been gradually built since the mid-1990s. Since 2011, 75% of domestic effluent is reused for irrigation, industrial or recreational purposes (Teschner and Negev 2013).[c] The second water source is Israel's large-scale seawater desalination (SD) operation, which is the subject of this research. In 2015, desalination supplied 42% of the national water consumption, which stands for around 80% of urban and household use (Netanyahu, 2017). The Israeli water companies (Mekorot, Tahal and IDE) started experimenting with desalination technology in the 1960s, based on technology created by the Israeli engineer Alexander Zarchin (Teschner and Negev 2013). In 1965, Zarchin funded a government-owned desalination company, Israel Desalination Engineering (IDE) which was privatised in 1996 and became the international company of IDE Technologies (it currently owns most of the SD facilities in Israel). Until the reduction in costs of the reverse osmosis technology in the late 1990s and the early 2000s in Israel, desalination facilities were built only to supply remote and dry areas, such as the city of Eilat (ibid). By 2003, reverse osmosis prices dropped drastically, making this technology feasible for large-scale production (Becker, Lavee and Katz 2010). In 2005, the first large-

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[b] A rain-year is defined by the Israeli Methodological Services as the period between 1 August and the following 31 July, for calculating the annual rainfall. The rain season in Israel usually starts in October and ends during May.

[c] In 2011, Israel's reuse figures were globally the highest, compared to other water-stressed countries such as Spain (40%) or Australia (27.8%) (Teschner et al. 2012).

scale reverse osmosis SD facility began operating on the Mediterranean coast near the city of Ashkelon, producing 120 MCM/year (Teschner and Negev 2013). Other SD facilities became operational: in 2007 Palmachim, in 2010 Hadera, in 2013 Soreq and in 2015 Ashdud, together supplying 660 MCM/year. National plans aimed for 1.5 billion MCM/year by 2040 (IWA, 2011).

2.2. Periodisation of Hydro-Policies, Policy Paradigms and Discourse-Coalitions

When examining the development of Israel's hydro-policies, geographers tend to divide them into several different periods (Feitelson 2013; Menahem 2001; Menahem and Gilad 2013). Each period represents, according to Feitelson (2013:17), a shift in "the main concerns that drove policies, the main actors that affected those policies, and the main issue that arose, and ultimately led to the next transformation."[d] Moreover, Feitelson (2002:296) claims that "the water discourse in Israel is shifting faster than policies." This means that changes in the discourse are not simultaneous with policy changes but they are more likely to foresee or precede it.[e] This section introduces the different time periods starting from 1948, with a focus on the later eras and follows Feitelson (2013) by not having a specific years to mark the transition between periods. The periods are: (1) 1948-1960s Hydraulic Expansion and Institutionalisation, (2) 1960s-1990s Water Management, (3) 1990s-2000s Policy Deliberations or the Transition Era, and (4) from mid-2000s Desalination and Marketisation (See Table 2) (Feitelson 2013; Menahem 2001; Tal 2006a). My thesis analyses the discourse of the third period of Policy Deliberations and the transition to the fourth.

An essential characteristic of each period is the idea of a *policy paradigm* and the way it is manifested into hydro-polices (Menahem 2001). Policy paradigms influence the

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[d] This description resembles the Panarchy model of constant transformation derived by the need to maintain resilience and triggered by changes to risks and events, and which is led by new actors and new perspectives on the problems and solutions.

[e] From this perspective, Feitelson's (2013) periodisation has overlapping years as a rise of new actors, issues or goals in hydro-policies starts in one era before its gains mainstream attention or shifts the hydro regime into a new period.

definition of 'the cause of the problem', and hence the policy solutions suggested for it. Menahem explains that:

> *Policy paradigms refer to the system of ideas and standards that specify the goals of the policy, the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, and the very nature of the problem they are meant to address (Menahem 2001:22).*

Menachem (2001) and Menahem and Gilad (2013) identified these hydro-policies paradigms over the years: state-supported expansion, the priority of agriculture, peace, environment, marketisation and privatisation (see Appendix 3 for further information). Policy paradigms are based on ideology, and they uphold a set of beliefs. Menahem (2001) explains that *policy problem definition* is a discursive process where policy makers and other actors contest the definition of a condition according to their ideological standpoint (Menahem 2001). That is, defining an issue as a subject for policy making based on paradigmatic and ideological standpoint. For example, defining a water crisis as deriving from over consumption (stemming from an economic paradigm) will lead to a different solution as opposed to defining it as a sign of a long-term change in the regional weather (based on an environmental paradigm) (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012). This conceptualisation is similar to Maeseele's (2015a) idea of *risk conflict* presented in Chapter 1.

Policy problem definition is promoted by *policy networks* (Menahem 2001), which can also be referred to as *discourse-coalitions* (Carvalho 2008, see the Chapter 3 for further discussion). Menahem and Gilad (2013, 2016)[f] investigate the policy coalitions, paradigms and goals in the Israeli water sector in the years from 1980 to 2000 and identified three discourse-coalitions: *agro-zionist*, *economist* and *environmentalist*. (Table 14 in Appendix 3 summarises their work). They claim that to better understand changes in policy (and moreover policy contestation), one should examine the narratives and stories used by each coalition to promote their policies. Menahem and Gilad ask how changes to the stories can bring alterations to the policies (2016, see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion). Menahem and Gilad (2016) mention journalists as members of these coalitions; however, they do not explain what the institutional role of the media is in these disputes between the coalitions in view of the policy problem definition. This thesis aims to address this gap in knowledge.

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[f] Menahem and Gilad (2013, 2016) use the term *Advocacy Coalitions*.

The next table (2) present my suggestion for periodization of Israel's hydro-polices based on the works of Feitelson (2013), Menahem (2001), Tal (2007), Siegel (2015) and others:

Table 2: Hydro-Policies Periods

Period	Name	Characteristics and policies	Coalitions
1 1948-1960s	**Hydraulic Expansion and Institutionalisation**	Socialist and Zionist ideologies directing state supported expansion of agriculture and water resources. Institutionalisation by the 1959 Water Law. Construction of the National Water Carrier.	Agro-Zionist
2 1960s-1990s	**Water Management**	System based on water transfers, national social-tariff, subsidies and priority of agriculture expansion over conservation. Technological improvements for water efficiency in agriculture.	Agro-Zionist
3 1990s-2000s	**Policy Deliberations or the Transition Era**	Time of policy stagnation and struggle for paradigm shift: emergence of Peace, Privatisation and Environmental paradigms.	Agro-Zionist Economic Environmental
4 From Mid-2000s	**Desalination and Marketisation**	New principles of water management, cost based tariffs, desalination and sewage reclamation.	Economic Environmental Agro-Zionist

2.2.1. Israel's Hydro-Policies until 1990s (Periods One and Two)

The first period of Israel's hydro-policies is identified in the literature as time of Hydraulic Expansion and Institutionalisation while the second is identified as period of state led Water Management which maintain the principles of its former (Feitelson 2013). Historically, since the establishment of the state and moreover after the Water Act of 1959 and the construction of the National Water Carrier in the early 1960s (which mark the beginning of the second period), Israel's hydro-policies were characterised by Zionist[g] and socialist ideologies directing anticipatory decision-making (Feitelson 2013). During these years, this perception manifested into policies of state-supported expansion of

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[g] Zionism (Zion = Jerusalem) is the national movement of the Jewish people that established the State of Israel, and since 1948, it is a political positioning of patriotism that sees Israel as a Jewish nation state.

agriculture and water resources as a means for nation building and population dispersal (Teschner and Negev 2013). The hegemonic coalition of the first two periods was named by Menahem (2001) as the Agro-Zionist discourse-coalition (AZDC). In these periods, water shortages were not perceived in terms of an absence of resources but as a problem of accessibility that could be solved by better infrastructure, by discovering more resources (such as aquifers) or by technological innovation (such as water-efficient crops) (Menahem 2001).

According to the government's socialist ideology, Israel's early hydro-policies were characterised by the need to nationalise water sources and establish institutions for creating hydro-polices. This need manifested in the Water Law of 1959, which was enacted to regulate all production and allocation of water. According to Feitelson and Fischhendler (2009), the law constitutes Israel's modern centralised water management system. Its main principles are:

1. Nationalisation of all water sources in Israel which were declared to be public goods: "springs, lakes, rivers and any stream and water source" (from Section 2).
2. Responsibility of the state for developing water sources to supply the needs of its citizens and for the development of the country.
3. No private ownership of water: cancelling a landlord's right to water sources originating in their property or passing through and making it illegal to collect and store rainfall.
4. Establishing the structure and function of a centralised national water authority by: the Minister of Agriculture, Water Commissioner, Water Council (IWC), a parliamentary committee of water and a Water Tribunal to deal with claims against the commissioner's decisions.
5. Determining a system of water allocation and production: Mekorot[h] as the national utility operator and Tahal as the national water planning company, and municipalities as providing the services to the end-users (Teschner and Negev 2013).

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[h] The national water utility company, Mekorot, was founded in 1937 by the General Organisation of Workers in the Land of Israel to supply water for the new Socialist-Zionist workers' villages (the Kibbutz). It was co-owned by the Jewish Agency for Israel and the Jewish National Fund until its nationalisation in 1959.

Feitelson (2013) argues that water stress during the second period (1960s-1990s) lessened due to several technological innovations, the most significant of them is the development of drip irrigation in the early 1960s. As mentioned above Israel had started to use SD at the same time. These technological innovations can be seen as a realisation of Beck's risk society (1992), reinforcing an understanding that technological innovation is the way to avoid the water scarcity risk.

2.2.2. The Policy Deliberations of the 1990s-2000s (Period Three)

Past studies on Israel's hydro-policies are united in describing the years between the 1990's and 2000's as a crisis period of increasing water demands[i] and a need to change the old hydro-policies (Becker 2013). This time of policy deadlock (Teschner, Garb, and Paavola 2013) is characterised as an "era of reflective deliberation" (Feitelson 2013:23) or a "paradigm shift" (Menahem 2001). This transition era is described as a time of a paradigmatic and discursive conflict between different discourse-coalitions (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012; Menahem and Gilad 2013, 2016; Teschner et al. 2013). This is due to the rise in the economic discourse-coalition (EcDC), which had gained power since the successful economic liberal reform of 1985. During the 1990s, two discourse-coalitions, the AZDC and the EcDC, balanced each other and prevented any necessary reform. The 2000s are considered to be the decade where the EcDC turned from a contra-hegemonic force that delayed reform into a hegemonic power that promoted and enabled it (Menahem and Gilad 2016). The third coalition acting in the period, according to Menahem (2001), is the environmental discourse-coalition (EnDC). However, Menachem and Gilad (2016) see this coalition as less significant in its power over policy change due to the weakness of the Ministry of Environmental Protection,[j] and having the majority of its members coming from the non-governmental sector and the academia. Feitelson (2001) and Techner et al. (2013) agree with this analysis; nonetheless, they see the EnDC as a tiebreaker on some issues: the increasing attention to water quality and recycling, and

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[i] It resulted from: insufficient and unsustainable management of water sources, a series of drought years, changes in the characteristics of the rainy period due to climate change, a dramatic increase in population (including mass immigration from the former USSR countries which increased Israel's population by 20%) and the need to supply water to Jordan and the Palestinian Territories (Feitelson 2013; Menahem and Gilad 2016).

[j] This ministry was established in 1988 as the Ministry for Environmental Quality, which was changed to Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2009.

later by arguing in favour of desalination and water allocation to nature (see Table 14 in Appendix 3 for a summary of the coalltion belief systems).

Three different committees were appointed to resolve the policy deadlock: the Arlosoroff Committee (1995-1997), a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee (PIC) (2001-2002) and a National Inquiry Committee (NIC) (2008-2010). The PIC and NIC constitute the first two critical discourse period analysed in this thesis. In 2001 the Water and Sewage Corporation Act transformed the municipal water services and was the first time marketisation principles were introduced to the water system. The work achieved by these committees constitutes critical discursive periods, where the discourse-coalitions contested hydro-policies problem definitions.[k]

2.2.3. Israel's Current Main Hydro-Policies (Period Four)

Feitelson (2013) argues that the operation of the first large-scale SD facility (Ashkelon 2005) marks the beginning of a new era in Israel's hydro-policies which I name as Desalination and Marketisation.[l] In 2006, the 1959 water law was amended, changing the institutional structure of the water sector: the IWC was cancelled and replaced by the Israel Water Authority (IWA), which became an independent governmental body,[m] no longer a part of the Ministry of Agriculture (as it was until 1997) or the Ministry of Infrastructures (1997-2002). This era is characterised by SD technological dominance and economic considerations leading policy making. That is, it included patterns of marketisation to the water sector, such as: a new pricing system (cost-based tariffs) which better reflected the costs of extraction, production and allocation; corporatisation and partial privatisation of municipal water services; and private ownership of desalination

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[k] Arlosoroff Committee's work was shelved in 1997. The Arlosoroff Committee (1994-1997) was a possible starting point for this thesis, however, due to data collection problems and issues related to the scope of the research, was excluded after close consideration.

[l] Feitelson (2013) named this period as Desalination and Privatisation.

[m] In Israel an independent governmental body, usually called "authority", operates **outside** of a specific ministry in a similar way to Non Ministerial Departments in the United Kingdom (such as the Water Services Regulation Authority or the Food Standards Agency). The UK Cabinet Office defines Non Ministerial Departments as: "[they] operate similarly to normal government Departments in the functions they perform (though usually they are more specialised and not as wide ranging in the policy areas they cover). **They generally cover matters for which direct political oversight is judged unnecessary or inappropriate**. They are usually headed by a senior civil servant as Chief Executive, with an independent Chair and non-executive directors for the board" (Cabinet Office n.d.:15, emphasis added).

facilities (Tevet 2015). This represented a transition from a hydro-regime based on water transfer, state ownership and subsidies (mainly for agriculture) to a regime based on water production by desalination and sewage recycling with economic principles guiding decision-making over pricing, management and development of infrastructure (such as most of the desalination facilities are privately owned) (Feitelson 2013). These aspects are discussed in detail in the next chapters.

2.3. The Implications of Seawater Desalination

The transition to SD can be seen as an attempt to disconnect the water sources from relying on the weather and to minimise the effect of climate change (Feitelson 2013:26). As mentioned in Section 2.2 in recent years, SD technology had become the main solution for dealing with the increasing water demands. Besides promising a steady water supply, the SD project has long-term implications:

1. **Environmental impact:** this is due to a very high use of fossil-fuel based electricity (Becker et al. 2010), pollution caused by returning the concentrated minerals to the sea and seafront land use (Drami et al. 2011), pollution related to the manufacturing and waste of the membranes (Netanyahu 2017) and some (positive) effects due to minimising groundwater use (Dreizin et al. 2008).

2. **Economic implications:** SD is among the least cost efficient of all the alternatives considered by the IWA (Becker 2010). SD facilities are privately owned, and its implementation involves marketisation of (parts of) the supply system (Tevet 2015), which includes a significant increase in prices for the domestic consumer (Milrad 2014).

3. **Political and geopolitical implications**: as mentioned in this literature review, desalination has multiple geopolitical (international)[n] and political (intra-national) implications, which will be dissected in length in this analysis. To mention a few:

   - Increases in the amount of water available to share with neighbouring countries (Feitelson 2002); changing the relationship with these countries

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[n] The geopolitical (international hydropolitical) implication of SD in Israel are not in the scope of this thesis as explained in Section 1.2.4.

from a competition over resource capture into a commodity trading market (Aviram, Katz and Shmueli 2014);

- Perceived by the EcDC as a means to reduce the power of the labour unions by reducing Mekorot's monopoly over the water sector (i.e. outsourcing the SD operation) (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012);

- Being used to transfer political disagreements from within the hydro-polices institutions (the water committee and Agriculture Office) onto other political bodies (IWA, Ministry of Finance) (Teschner et al. 2013).

4. **Health implications:** consumption of mineral-free desalinated water is associated with cardiac morbidity and mortality due to a lack of magnesium (Bas Spector 2012; Koren et al. 2017).

The Chief Scientist of Israel's Office of Nature Protection published a paper in 2017 entitled "Seawater Desalination – Resilience, Challenges and Risks" (Netanyahu 2017), which claims that by using SD, Israel achieved water resilience. Netanyahu (2017) lists most of the environmental and health risks that are created by SD, and also names the risks that endanger the use of SD, such as sea contamination, sea-level rise and security threats.

As presented in Section 1.2.4, Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) identified a list of contradictions in the implementation of SD in Spain. The recognition of these contradictions by the public/political actors, according to them, have the potential to re-politicise the hydro-debate. The implication of SD in Israel listed above, relates to the energy, climate, environmental, governance, ownership and cost contradictions. The health implication of SD and the risk imposed on it (Netanyahu 2017) are not recognised by Swyngedouw and Williams (2016). Nonetheless, I argue that these implications can also potentially (discursively) challenge the way in which SD was implemented in Israel. This thesis ask questions on the discursive process that took place in Israel, and whether these implication and contradictions were represented in the media (newspapers and PCCs) and had a role in the (de)politicisation of SD.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced this thesis' case study of Israel hydro-policies, the policy coalitions contesting these policies and their changes over time. It identified a gap in knowledge regarding the role of the media (and more specifically newspapers and journalists) in the contestation of policies and their transformation according to changing paradigms and ideologies. This chapter also presented the environmental, economic, political and health implication of SD in Israel as a context to the analysis. The next chapter introduces the methodology and methods used in this thesis. It explains the methodological approach and the methods I use to analyse the discursive transition from the third to the fourth period.

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Chapter 3 - Methodology and Methods

Introduction

This thesis applies a resilience perspective to investigate the historical development of the policy discourse on droughts and desalination in Israel. It analyses how, over an eighteen-year period (2001-2018), Israeli newspapers discursively represented the national water deficiencies and the hydro-policies promoted to solve them. By drawing upon diverse literature, it critically evaluates the role of Israeli newspapers as contributing to the (de)politicisation of the hydro-policy debate, and especially the debate on seawater desalination (SD) as the preferred resilience policy. The main methodology is the analysis of articles from two Israeli daily newspapers (in Hebrew): *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Aharonoth* and their economic sub-papers *TheMarker* and *Calcalist*. The focus is on three time periods, (2001-2002), (2008-2010) and (2018), which have been identified as critical discourse periods (Carvalho 2008) as these are periods of formal governmental inquiry into hydro-policies at times of droughts. During the course of this research, it became clear that in order to understand the construction of the hydro-policy discourse in Israeli media, it is necessary to analyse the governmental public communication campaigns (PCCs) produced by the Israel Water Authority from 2008 to 2018, in the format of video advertisements.

The methodological approach taken in this thesis is qualitative, with a focus on 'discourse' as the methodological framework. Discourse is a theoretical approach to examine the connections between language, social practice, power and ideology. The methodological standpoint of this thesis draws on the work of Michel Foucault (1984 [1970]) and is based upon several texts by Norman Fairclough, whose work on developing critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2010) and its uses in media studies and news analysis (Fairclough 1995) is seminal. Kress' (2012) interpretations of Foucault and discourse also inform the methodology as his multimodal approach (2010) is employed within the videos analysis. This chapter firstly explains the methodological framework of the thesis through a discussion of the relationships between discourse, texts and historical analysis. Section 3.2 specifies the methods chosen for the critical discourse analysis (CDA) and multimodal discourse analysis (MDA). Section 3.3 explains the data collection process, divided into two separate processes for the newspapers and videos. The final section (3.4) of this chapter presents the limitations of the chosen methods and data.

3.1.   Methodology: Discourse, Text and Historical Analysis

Discourse theory is the main conceptual framework that guides this research and its chosen methods. `Discourse', as noted by Fairclough (1995), is a *theory of power* stemming from both social theory and philosophy (especially in the work of Michel Foucault) and linguistics (such as Teun van Dijk). Foucault considers discourse to play a central role in the production and reproduction of power. He sees power as a systematic and constitutive component of society, and one which is expressed with intention (Fairclough 1995). Discourse as defined by Foucault is a theory of power and knowledge, dealing with how language produces meaning (knowledge) through particular power relations (Hall 2001). Hall (2001) explains that Foucault took the term discourse away from its linguistic use and gave it a different meaning: as a social process of producing knowledge through language, a practice of applying meaning that shapes and influences conduct. Kress (2012:35) clarifies that Foucault sees discourse as produced knowledge (usually institutionally), and therefore as a social category, rather than a linguistic one. Accordingly, Fairclough argues that referring to processes of meaning making as discourse (e.g. news and environmental discourse) is "signalling a wish to investigate it in a way that is informed by the social theory insights […] as a form of social practice" (Fairclough, 1995:54). Discourse should be regarded as a socially and historically situated mode of action, which is socially shaped, and which shapes the social order. Discourse analysis then is more of a social science practice than a linguistic one (I return to its historical aspect at the end of this section). Foucault argues that discourse constructs a topic (rather than providing a neutral description of it), and it is the connection "between what one *says* (language) to what one *does* (practice)" (Hall 2001:72). Similarly, Richardson (2007:220) defines discourse as "language in use", as an activity and a practice.

As this thesis examines a hegemonic, post-political discourse of a social-environmental issue, it is important to consider the connection between hegemony and discourse, and how discourses are incorporated or reproduced from one topic into another. According to Foucault, "[d]iscourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations" (Foucault 1981 in Fairclough 2010:66). In other words, discourse is a productive form of power, and people reproduce power relations through the use of discursive strategies (such as word choices or constructions of who is a legitimate carrier of knowledge). Foucault suggests that there are correlations between discursive strategies and hegemonic political strategies for constructing and maintaining alliances (Fairclough, 2010). Moreover, discursive practices can have ideological effects

by producing and reproducing power relations according to an ideology (Wodak and Meyer 2009). Ideology is a formulated and systematic set of ideals and theories for understanding and organising society, which are shared by social groups (Van Dijk, 2003).[a] This is unlike discourse which is a fluid way of manifesting and communicating ideology through language and action. Therefore, the use of a discourse, which constructs meaning in alignment with an ideology, can be understood as a representation of this ideology in a particular situation. Put another way, discourse is used to construct and communicate ideologies (that is more than one). In fact, Foucault was critical of the notion of ideology and arguably introduced discourse as an alternative category (Foucault and Rabinow 1986). By contrast, Fairclough understands ideology as "meaning in the service of power" and as another way of representing an aspect of the world which may be operational (Thompson 1984 in Fairclough 2010:8). Drawing on Gramsci, Fairclough (2010) argues that ideology can be observed in the language people use when sharing views on how the world works (e.g. reflecting 'common sense'). For Fairclough (2010:67), "the relationship between discourse and hegemony is a matter of the latter limiting the potential of the former". That is, hegemonic beliefs, practices and ideologies prevent the contestation of privilege by foreclosing alternative discourses, thus limiting possibilities to describe and understand things differently.

Furthermore, discourse has the ability to transfer meaning onto new subjects. Discourses that originated in a specific context, field or institution can be "recontextualised" in other places (Fairclough 2012:12). Fairclough understands this phenomenon as an appropriation and incorporation of "external" discourses into new spheres or subjects, which represents the strategic "colonisation" of one field by another, which is promoted by particular agents (Fairclough 2012:12). In other words, recontextualisation of one discourse into a new domain is part of a social process of reconstructing this domain according to the particular social perspective (or ideology) of the original discursive site. This is a process of expanding the influence of a dominant discourse (e.g. neoliberalism or resilience), made by identifiable agents (such as economists) using language and practices associated with the original domain (in the case

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[a] I share Raeijmaekers and Maeseele's (2017) understanding of ideology "as inherent to making sense of the world and to the construction of social identities", which is used by dominant and subordinate social groups, and I add following from van Djik (2003) that social groups share (ideological) beliefs, knowledge and attitudes as part of a cognitive and cultural process of formulating social practices and control.

of business management), and can be seen as an appropriation of their perspective (or ideology) to affect the character of a new sphere (e.g. national water management).

Before moving on to explain my chosen method of CDA, another methodological consideration should be explained, that is to say, the need for a historical perspective when critiquing society. In the introduction, I chose to describe this thesis as "historical" not only for its longitudinal methods, but also (and especially) for its emphasis on the direct connection between a historical perspective and the idea of *critique* as it is understood by Foucault (1984). In the concluding section of his essay "What is Enlightenment?", Foucault defines critique as follows:

> *[Critique] has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the* **historical analysis** *of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them (Foucault 1984:50, emphasis added).*

According to Foucault, critique is an attitude. Critique is not a theory, method or belief, but a state of mind, a way of thinking, or rather it is the relation of a person to the text while they critique a societal situation (with the intention of changing it) (Cornelissen 2018). According to Foucault, society is the outcome of historical process. The way we, as a society, explains and understands that the world is shaped by cultural-historical processes (Hall 2001). Therefore, critiquing society includes a "historical analysis". Foucault's idea of historical analysis goes beyond acknowledging the historical nature of the societal situation; it is an activity that reveals the processes that construct experience (Cornelissen 2019). Its aim is to expose "the limits that are imposed on us" while presenting the possibility of an alternative. In this sense, critique is a political action (*praxis*) as it is the attempt to reject those limits. Placing this definition in the context of what was discussed in the literature review (see the Section 1.2), critique can become, or be seen as, an act of politicisation. The analysis in the discourse on hydro-policies and its depoliticisation (that is through the limitations of the debate by the imposition of a techno-managerial discourse) as part of the process of achieving resilience cannot ignore the historical context. In this thesis, my critique is applied to certain discourses to reveal the historical discursive processes (their limits and marginalised alternatives) that lead to the current hydro-social situation.

3.1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

In the field of climate change news reporting, many studies use quantitative methods that aim to identify the frequency of topics (McComas and Shanahan 1999) by using predefined categories such as frames (Nisbet 2009) or examining who participates in the climate debate (Takahashi and Meisner 2013). Following this tendency, the two studies on newspaper climate change communication in Israel also use a quantitative analysis on the frames and actors involved (Nossek 2010, 2019). Similar to this is the case of studying hydro-polices reporting in Israel (Fischhendler et al. 2015, see Section 1.4). However, Pepermans (2015) argues that only qualitative discourse analysis can fulfil the goal of studying processes of depoliticisation (see below). Drawing on Fairclough, Richardson (2006) suggests several methods for studying newspaper *discourse,* all deriving from a rejection of the analysis of *content.* Content analysis (which is usually quantitative) relies on three assumptions: (i) that connections between content and effect can be established (or can be identified within elements of the reporting); (ii) that content (not the interpretation) reflects meaning; and (iii) that the frequency of various characteristics has significance (Richardson 2007). Discourse theories[b] reject these assumptions as they require understanding the context, and they rely on its interpretation (ibid).

CDA is a qualitative method for exploring which features of the coverage have been used to accomplish particular communication aims (Hansen and Machin 2013a), and is one of many methods used in discourse studies. CDA examines texts as sites of social processes and investigates their mediation and constitution through language. Stamou and Paraskevopoulos (2004:107 in Peeples 2015:44) argue that linguistic studies of discourse have "failed to account for its social nature" while social discourse analysis "neglected the role of language". CDA combines both systematically, showing exactly how language choices are being used to accomplish particular social aims (Hansen and Machin 2013a). CDA is not one method, but a transdisciplinary range of methods for analysing texts, discourses and their relations with other elements which are 'outside' (or 'beyond') the text in order to understand their socially constructive and constitutive effects (Fairclough 2010). Carvalho describes it as "looking beyond texts and taking into account institutional and sociocultural context" (2008:161). Thinking of the context of the text while analysing it demands applying insight and knowledge gained from past research and even from

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[b] In the past three decades, various theories and methods have revolved around discourse studies (for a typology of the main theorists, see Wodak and Meyer (2009:20).

other disciplines. The transdisciplinary aspect of CDA derives from its dialectical relations with theory; it bases its analysis on and contributes insights to theory from various disciplines. By using frameworks, concepts and categories from different theories (social, political and linguistic), CDA improves them and their use (Fairclough 2010, 2012). Wodak and Meyer (2009) explain this process as 'translating' or 'mediating' theoretical claims (that apply to society as a whole) into methods of analysing texts and social interactions. The 'critique' in CDA suggests an element of a normative evaluation of the discourse: "it focuses on what is wrong with a society […] from a particular normative standpoint" (Wodak and Meyer 2009:7). The aim of CDA is to produce an interpretation of social life, identifying wrongs and creating knowledge about them. Wodak and Meyer (2009) define CDA goals as "aim[ing] to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use". CDA addresses the ideological aspects of discourse while being ideological in itself (Fairclough 2012). It is a method that shows the relationship between ideology and language and how ideologies use specific signs (words, sounds and images) while the use of CDA for interpretation and explanation can itself be seen as an ideological practice. For this reason, Fairclough (2010) reminds researchers that CDA is also a discursive practice and its analysis should be based on (and provide) strong evidence for its claims.

There is a long tradition of studying media and news discourse, from the works of van Dijk (1988), Fairclough (1995) and Wodak (1996). According to Carvalho (2008:162), CDA is the "single most authoritative line of research" for studying media and news discourse. Within the school of CDA, there is a diversity of methods and strands for media and news analysis, which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Several reasons have led to my choice of this method; this section briefly explains them. One reason is an appeal by Wodak and Meyer (2009). In their summary of the main research agenda and of the challenges to the interest in CDA, they call for a detailed investigation into depoliticisation (in the media) to explain complex historical processes and local developments. This call fits with the aims of this research. Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017) argue that the concept of depoliticisation is still used only sporadically in media studies and even less by researchers regarding it as a discursive strategy.

Discourse analysis was also chosen because it has long contributed to the study of environmental communication. Peeples (2015) presents the advantages of discourse and rhetoric analysis for environmental communication research. She shows how these

approaches are productive for uncovering the meaning of media content about the environment, and she concludes that:

They both explore the use of symbols and explain how those symbols function within the particular context, often illustrated through a case study. They reveal how the language used within that context influences, and is influenced, by larger cultural, political, economic, and/or social systems in play. Because they are not restricted by the need to limit variables and replicate findings, these methods are well suited to investigate and reveal the complex relationship between the symbolic and the material environment (Peeples 2015:46).

More specifically, CDA was chosen due to its proven advantage for examining news representations of climate change. Seminal in this line of research is Carvalho's study on climate change discourse in UK newspapers (2007, 2008). More recently, Pepermans (2015) compared CDA to other methods of examining media representations of climate change (mainly quantitative methods and popular methods of frames analysis). He claims that CDA has an advantage over these because the latter: "fail[s] to reveal processes of power and ideology in the construction of meaning" (Pepermans 2015:51). Building on Olausson (2009), Pepermans argues for a deep context-sensitive exploration of meaning construction to reveal connections between media discourse and the depoliticisation of ideological hegemony. For his study on citizens and newspaper discourses of climate change in Belgium, Pepermans (2015) built on Carvalho's methodological framework (2007, 2008; 2005). Moreover, Pepermans (2015) was concerned with the depoliticisation of climate change, and Carvalho's (2008) framework has also been successfully applied to empirical studies of (de)politicisation from the risk conflict perspective (Maeseele 2015b; Maeseele et al. 2017; Pepermans and Maeseele 2014). Adding to this collection of works from the risk perspective and on the work by Pepermans (2015) and Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017), Raeijmaekers (2018) suggests a framework for the study of depoliticisation and agonistic pluralism in the media. My methods draw elements from all of these sources (Carvalho 2008; Pepermans 2015; Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017), as discussed in further depth in my procedure of analysis.

3.1.2. Multimodal Discourse Analysis of Videos

When analysing discourse, 'texts' should be understood in a generalising and inclusive sense, as any representation of signs and symbols. It includes not only written, but also visual, verbal (in conversations and interviews), and "multi-modal" media, which includes mixing language, non-verbal and visual signs (Fairclough 2012:12). Kress (2012) bases his definition of discourse on the works by Fairclough and Foucault. Therefore, his methodological approach for a study of discourse lies on the same assumptions in the ideology and texts discussed at length above. Kress' (2012) multimodal approach expands the definition of *text* to multidimensional semiotic entities, which includes gesture, speech, image (still or moving) writing and music. Multimodality attributes meaning making to all these dimensions as a change in one can influence the meaning in another (for example, replacing the music of a video-clip can turn a sad scene into a comedy and vice-versa, or how gestures can add irony or sarcasm to a speech). By this, Kress (2012) offers the methods and tools with which to analyse discourse that goes beyond the explicit meaning of language (both textual and speech). Moreover, "multimodality, first and foremost, refuses the idea of the 'priority' of the linguistic modes; it regards them as partial means of making meaning" (Kress 2012:46). These dimensions of the text are all a result of *design* and *production* made by its creator to achieve a discursive *cohesion*. Thus, like any other discourse, this cohesion is open to interpretation, which is culturally dependent (ibid). By expanding the scope of the text to include these elements, Kress' (2012) multimodal discourse analysis (MDA) can be used to analyse audio-visual texts such as videos, digital multimedia and websites.

3.2.   Procedure of Analysis

My procedure of newspaper analysis builds on the works and methods of Raeijmaekers (2018) and Raeijmaekers and Maeseele (2017) for the study of agonistic journalism and Pepermans (2015) for the study of depoliticisation, which are all based on the seminal work of Carvalho (2008). I draw on elements from thier methods, with nessasery adaptations, additions and changes, and also incorporating aspects of the four-step process for the study of resilience that I reviewed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.3). As such, the methods presented below synthesise concepts and questions presented in the literature review into a framework for a critical and politisicied discourse analysis of hydro-policies for climate resilience. The second set of data, on the PCC videos, requires a separate MDA procedure, which as mentioned above is mainly based on the work of Kress (2012). The CDA and MDA procedures are detailed below, in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, respectively; first however, it is necessary to explain the decision for a longitudinal analysis.

3.2.1.   Longitudinal Analysis

In the literature review, I mentioned calls for further studies in risk communications and EC that encourage using longitudinal methods to better understand the process of change over time in reporting and discourse (Anderson 2015; Bakir 2010; Hansen 2015c). Longitudinal research can be defined as one in which: (a) data is collected for each item or variable for two or more distinct periods; (b) the subjects or cases analysed are the same, or at least comparable, from one period to the next; and (c) the analysis involves some comparison of data between or among periods[c] (Menard 1991). In support of longitudinal research, Carvalho states that "most studies of media discourse are like snapshots examining some news items in detail but covering a short time span" (2008:164). Her framework offers a time sensitive discourse analysis, examining the "life" of an issue, "from conditions of emergence in the public arena to their constitution into political problem, formulation of answers, adoption of measures implementation and evolution" (ibid). This aim fits with the objectives of this study to examine the emergence and evolution of the discourse about desalination as a resilience issue. This thesis includes

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[c] As longitudinal analysis is composed by comparing two or more distinct time periods, there is no obligation to collect data between these periods (Menard 1991).

two longitudinal studies, CDA and MDA; the first compares separate periods of newspaper reporting while the second compares governmental video campaigns.

3.2.2. Levels of CDA Newspapers Analysis

In the following explanation of the analysis process, I use the term *levels* instead of the common term steps.[d] This terminology is partly to reduce confusion between the methods and the *steps* of researching resilience (presented at Section 1.3.3). Naming the process of this analysis as levels derives from the fact that CDA has never had a strict procedure as some of these elements are analysed, evaluated and coded simultaneously, and reading and coding is often repeated for the same text. Maeseele and Raeijmaekers make the following important comment in their footnotes:

> *This rather detailed introduction to the analysis of agonistic media pluralism must not be seen as a 'step-by-step' directory. To begin with, it does not concern a strict linear process: to develop a full understanding of each level, steps forward and jumps backwards are essential. Thus, the four steps must be seen as accumulative to each other. Neither does it operate as a strict 'check-the-box' manual. It has been developed to help determine the 'validity' - that is, 'coherence' and 'fruitfulness' - and 'transparency' (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002) of future analyses on agonistic media pluralism (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017:2).*

For this reason, I am avoiding the terminology of steps, and emphasising that even though Figure 1 suggests a strict order of analysis, it is not the case. To put it another way, resilience and risk society theories both argue for a nonlinear understanding of the processes of change. Therefore, a resilience perspective should also offer a nonlinear reading of media texts.

The chosen four levels of analysis are: contextual analysis, textual analysis, media-contextual analysis and cross-periods discussion. These are largely based (despite the different titles)[e] on Maeseele and Raeijmaekers' (2017) agonistic-pluralism framework of

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[d] In Carvalho's (2008) framework, for each period, the analysis is divided into two defined stages: item by item and by comparing them. Carvalho's (2008) calls them "textual" (of each item) and "contextual" (when comparing items). Carvalho (2008) uses the term contextual here in the meaning of the media landscape context, that is what is reported in other news items from other times or news outlets. In order to be clearer and to differentiate this meaning from contextual in the sense of being outside the media landscape, I use media-contextual for naming her second stage.

[e] Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017) levels are: (1) studying the ideological conflict of a social issue, (2) analysing the *scope* and *form* of media reporting, (3) evaluating the ideological culture of each media outlet

the four levels of analysis. Each level, mainly the textual and media-contextual levels (i.e. the second and third levels), examines several discursive elements in each newspaper item. There is no 'order' to examine these elements, and for the sake of a providing a clear explanation, they are grouped by type. Figure 1 summarises the levels of analysis and their composing elements as I use them in this thesis.

Figure 1: Levels of CDA

Level 1. Contextual

Based on the literature review: identifying possible critical discourse periods, policy paradigms and discourse-coalitions.

Level 2. Textual

Examining elements of each item of reporting:

a. Type, section, headlines and first paragraph
b. Objects of reporting
c. Actors and discourse-coalitions
d. Language and rhetoric
e. Discursive strategies
f. Ideological standpoint

Level 3. Media-Contextual

For each CDP:

Examination:

Comparative-synchronic layer (same time in different newspapers)

Historical-diachronic layer (same newspaper chronologically)

Evaluation:

a. Ideological culture of the period
b. Scope
c. Form

Level 4. Cross-Period Discussion: Media Landscape

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and (4) of the media landscape. My secound and third levels use the titles of Carvalho's (2008) *Textual* and *Media-Contextual* Axes.

Level 1: Contextual Analysis, Identification of Critical Discourse Periods and Discourse-Coalitions

Fairclough (1995) argues that every CDA should start with an identification of a social problem and with a deep understanding of it, such as by selecting a case study and contextualising it. This level of contextualising is complex and draws on the previous knowledge of the researcher, largely based on the literature review and on supporting texts outside of media analysis (e.g. the NIC report), and which requires interpretative work. This work also contributes to certain choices described later in this chapter, such as the selection of a timeframe and news outlets and identification of f/actors. Most of the findings in this level are presented in Chapter 2, which was also informed by the four-step process of resilience studies.

In her longitudinal research, Carvalho (2007, 2008; 2005) focuses on analysing selected months that she identifies as critical discourse moments (CDM), according to peaks in the number of reports. Carvalho defines a CDM as "a period which may challenge the 'established' discursive positions" (2008:166); these can be 'natural events', times of political or scientific activity, such as summits or report publications (Carvalho and Burgess 2005). Carvalho and Burgess explain that:

> *These critical moments entail a potential for transformation in the understanding of an issue and constitute a test for 'established' discursive positions. Therefore, it is important to examine whether and how representations changed or remained static in these moments (Carvalho and Burgess 2005:1461–62).*

In Carvalho's work, the identification of these peaks is based on the frequency of analysis of the entire timeframe of the digitally collected articles. Her detailed analysis was conducted only for the articles within the CDMs. Pepermans (2015), in his longitudinal research, suggested an adaptation to this method. He refers to the analysed years and months as critical discourse periods (CDP) while he uses the term CDM only for shorter time periods where he identifies a change in the discourse, or an important event that might have triggered such a change. I will use Pepermans' (2015) terminology. The changes in and between each CDP can be seen as an evolution in the discourse in an analogous way to the Panarchy model (see Section 1.3.3). These periods of transformation in a discourse also correspond to the Panarchy model; if we consider each CDP as a stage in the discursive development of the SES, analysing their CDMs helps to identify the f/actors which influence its development. Therefore, at every CDP, I examine "what does it mean to be resilient at this time?"

As discussed in the literature review, critical resilience studies identify "by/for whom?" the resilient discourse is promoted and serves (see Step 3, Section 1.3.3). A political debate stretching over 18 years will probably include an extensive list of participating (or marginalised) actors and stakeholders. In order to simplify the analysis, the actors were grouped into *discourse-coalitions* based on their ideological paradigms that influence their policy suggestions. According to Maeseele, ideological fault lines (or rather paradigms) represent how ideological struggles between alternatives is "about what constitutes progress with regards to particular politico-ideological categories" (Maeseele et al. 2017:17). Identifying the ideological paradigms of a social issue, that is the competing viewpoints over hydro-policies in Israel, helps, in a later stage, to understand how broad or limited the media discourse of the issue was, and whether it accurately represented all the possible socio-environmental and political views. This does not mean a representation in the media of each and every individual actor relevant to the issue as they are part of a discourse-coalition (Carvalho 2008). Hajer (2000 in Aldunce et al. 2014) defines discourse-coalitions as a group of actors who believe that their interests and positions are represented in a specific storyline. Menachem uses a similar term of 'policy networks' (Menahem 2001) or 'advocacy coalitions' (Menahem and Gilad 2013), which refer to: people, institutions and forums of interactions between governmental and non-governmental players who share a set of values or beliefs. These networks "provide the formation of definition" (2001: 22) and a social context for the relevant issues. Chapter 2 presents the Israeli hydro discourse-coalitions I use in this reaserch; as identified by Menahem and Gilad (2016), the three discourse-coalitions are: *agro-zionist*, *economist* and *environmentalist*.

Level 2: Textual Analysis for Each Period

After the contextual analysis (accompanied by the data collection described in Section 3.3) begins a detailed CDA for each period. This level and the following ones constitute the procedure for my close examination on 'how do Israeli newspapers communicate drought and hydro-policies?' and to explore the process of the changing discourses and the f/actors which influenced and shaped it. For each period, the following questions were asked: how did the media define the risk problem and its causes (i.e. resilience from what)? Who defined the problem (i.e. resilience by whom)? Which kinds of policy solutions were presented (i.e. resilience by what)? What were the discourses that led to a specific kind of solution, and what kind of (and whose) ideological viewpoint does it represent? Which discursive strategies were used to justify one option over the other? What kind of language

was used? How was the dispute framed? Was it an agonistic or antagonistic, political or depoliticised representation of the debate?

Due to the surplus of news items collected for each period, not all of them were analysed in the same depth. For each CDP, all the news items were organised in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet containing the formal data[f] and a frequency table was made for each period by newspaper to identify the months with a more intense coverage (presented at the beginning of each empirical chapter). Subsequent to this, the news items were read chronologically for each newspaper while keeping notes to identify the major points of contention in each era, prime and rare discourses, main events, the leading actors and so forth.[g] News items that were marked for further analysis were uploaded to the NVivo software and coded in a second read.[h] The second round of analysis (while coding) chronologically by paper focused on the following elements.

Textual Analysis, Item by Item

This level of textual analysis is of individual items, i.e. news articles, editorials or opposite the editorial (op-ed), focused on specific types of information and elements (which are coded with equivalent nodes in NVivo). It is not a quantitative accumulation of nodes as articles vary in size and are dependent on the context; thus, it is a systematic way of understanding how each item produces meaning; NVivo is later used to also identify how certain f/actors interact. The layout elements were not considered in this analysis, due to the type of archival data.[i]

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[f] File name, date, paper, writer(s), section and type.

[g] Some items have been excluded in this stage of the analysis during this read as they did not fit the collection criteria; see Section 3.3.3.

[h] In the endeavour to not make a random or subjective selection, which will affect or disrupt the findings, I have tried to be systematic. I have included, therefore: all items from peak months and the first and last months; all items directly mentioning the PIC, NIC or the SCR; items presenting new or marginalised discourses, actors or policies; items mentioning climate change; and all interviews, op-eds and commentaries. For the last CDP, all the items were coded.

[i] Like many other CDA methods, Carvalho's framework pays attention to the layout of the items within the newspaper (that is the page number, size, location and visual elements) as these provide information on the editorial evaluation of the issue (2008:167). Most of these elements cannot be evaluated in this research due to the kind of output provided by the specific archives (see below on Data Collection).

a) **Type of item:**

According to Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017), researchers can learn more about the papers' ideological standpoint by examining the editorials and news articles while interviews and op-eds contribute to a sense of pluralism and the diversity of the news outlet, and which teaches us more about the ideological standpoint of the writer or interviewee (see further in Level 3). The section of paper, headlines and first paragraph are given particular attention as they are considered to reveal the editor's framing and greater influence on for how the issue is perceived.

b) **Objects of reporting:**

Objects are the events, topics, issues and themes that are linked to hydro-policies described in the text, presented from a certain angles or frames. This layer identifies key concepts and their relationship to wider issues. For this thesis, these can be droughts, policies, legislation, inquiry committee hearings and implications of desalination. Climate change (and its connection to the droughts, hydro-policies or desalination) is another example of an object of analysis. Objects are constituted by discourse, rather than referred to as being part of a uniform reality (Carvalho 2008). Importantly, "objects of discourse are not always obvious, and clearly identifying them is an important step towards deconstructing and understanding the role of discourses" (Carvalho 2008:167). Objects are coded by nodes, which are then thematically grouped.[j]

c) **Actors, coalitions and their presentation:**

This layer is about the perceived influence of the actors on the discourse in shaping the meaning and position of the debate (Pepermans 2015). This refers to individuals and institutions that are mentioned or quoted in the news items, including the journalists (Carvalho 2008). Texts play a role in constructing the image and identities of the social actors (Fairclough 1995), their legitimacy to take part in the debate (Maeseele et al. 2017), their presentation and on how the journalist evaluates them (Pepermans 2015). This stage examines the framing power of the actors. That is, according to Carvalho, "the capacity of one actor to convey his/her views and positions through the media" (2008:167). As

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[j] To illustrate this, hydro-policies node groups include: the tariff changes, fines, desalination (with sub-nodes for different desalination technologies), drilling, public campaigns, quotas and more; reasons for the crisis group include: droughts, climate change, contamination, wrong allocations, over consumption amongst others.

mentioned in the contextual level, they can have individual positions or represent a discourse coalition (ibid). Actors are coded by their institutional affiliations, their issue-specific standpoints and their discourse coalition alignments.

d) **Language and rhetoric:**

This stage looks at writing styles, vocabulary choices, metaphors and other persuasive devices, used for presenting a certain reality (Carvalho 2008),[k] and the way in which they connect to wider paradigms and discourses (e.g. economic and Zionist). Pepermans (2015) suggests paying close attention to which language uses open the space for agency or to which ones reduce the potential for intervention by searching for words that 'lock' a certain future, policy or viewpoint as being inevitable. I also look for wording that is associated to resilience, such as 'readiness' or 'prevention'.

e) **Discursive strategies:**

As part of the search for persuasive devices, a review of studies on depoliticisation has placed a focus on revealing discursive strategies. These can be described as "manipulations of reality by social actors […] to achieve a certain effect or goal" (Carvalho 2008:168), "which can either be employed consciously or unconsciously" (Pepermans 2015:54). Manipulations should be understood as a discursive intervention, not as an illegitimate alteration of reality (Carvalho 2008). Interventions can be achieved by choosing a specific angle to frame an issue, inclusion and exclusions of facts, value judgments and their arrangement in the production of meaning. The difference between framing analysis and the framework of CDA is the emphasis on *how* it is being used, not the mere appearance of a specific frame in a text (ibid). Pepermans (2015) reminds us that "journalists can choose to either endorse, challenge, balance or ignore" frames and facts given to him/her by certain actors. Therefore, discursive strategies (such as frames) are both manipulated by the newspaper and by the non-editorial actors.

Carvalho (2008) highlights three discursive strategies: *positioning* (constructing actors into a certain relationship with others), *(de)legitimation* (justifying or sanctioning an action, such as being (ir)responsible) and *(de)politicisation*. Maeseele (2015b) and Maeseele

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[k] Carvalho's (2008) framework differs from other CDA frameworks by moving the focus from a linguistic analysis of a text, and its close attention to grammar, semantics and syntax (Hansen and Machin 2013a). Instead, it focuses more on the connection between lingual persuasive devices to wider contextual discourses and strategies (see the next layer).

and Raeijmaekers (2017) suggest that this is in light of agonistic writing, which searches for the depoliticising discursive strategies of *rationalisation*, *moralisation* and *naturalisation* (as in completely rejecting disagreement or imposing a consensus of something as 'natural'). Also, within these depoliticisation discursive strategies, Pepermans' (2015) findings add the strategies of *economisation* and *scientisation*, which both support techno-managerial perspective, such as contributing to this notion of *rationalisation*. As for the discursive strategies of politicisation, Pepermans suggests the following:

> *Politicization can be observed through the reoccurring identification of the following discursive strategies in news coverage: (i) the deconstruction of particular discourses by revealing competing sets of rationality claims, values and interests underlying competing responses to uncertainty; (ii) relating these to underlying alternative visions and (iii) by giving voice to alternative actors and ideological standpoints, which are recognized as such (Pepermans 2015:55).*

Based on my previous findings on the news reporting of an environmental conflict in Israel (Kassirer, 2012) in addition to the strategies mentioned above, I am exploring the discursive strategy of *juridification*, that is presenting an issue as a matter of following the law, and which regards regulation as a technical and ideologically neutral aspect of policy-making. This could be in the form of a call to take the disputed issue to court (where the sides of the debate will act as antagonists), instead of contesting the notion that the law and regulations are manifestations of an ideology that should be resolved in a democratic way (e.g. in parliament).

f) **Writer/newspaper ideological standpoint:**

Finally, for each news item, the following questions are posed: what is the dominant viewpoint in this text? Which understanding of the issue is this specific news item representing? This layer draws on the contextual analysis and requires interpretative work. According to Carvalho (2008:171), "ideological standpoints are possibly the most fundamental shaping influence of a text". Ideological standpoints of a journalist or newspaper are usually not explicit in the text, in light of the journalistic ethos of "appearing neutral" (Carvalho 2008:170; see also Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017) Carvalho shows how these standpoints are manifest in the editorial selection of the actors, interpretations of the causes and consequences of an environmental risk and the evaluations of the suggested policies (Carvalho 2008).

Level 3: Media-Contextual Analysis

This level is for analysing the wider media context, going beyond the individual news items to understand the evolution of the discourse for each period. In this level, for each

period, the newspapers are examined and evaluated in view of the idea that they form one metatextual debate. Each CDP is considered one at a time, and within it, the news items are read chronologecly to understand the key narratives, the evolution of the debate and to compare the newspapers. Here, the texts are challenged in comparison to the discourse(s) presented in other texts, from other times or other news outlets.[l] The media-contextual examination is done in two ways: *comparative-synchronic* and *historical-diachronic*. The first, comparative-synchronic, examines the simultaneous coverage of the same subject (e.g. hydro-policies) in different outlets (i.e. in *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*) (Carvalho 2008). The second, historical-diachronic, means looking at the evolution of a discourse over time in a single news outlet (ibid).[m] Each text and news outlet is challenged by the others by using cross-referencing and contextual analysis of the non-media sources of information (ibid).

The historical media-contextual level reveals how the media has contributed to the development of a discourse on a specific hydro-policy and of the evolution of the perception of resilience. This level includes the actual writing of the empirical chapters as the discourse analysis continues during the writing. The media-contextual analysis helps to evaluate the ideological culture of the period, the ideological standpoint of each newspaper and journalist, which might be different from the standpoint of a specific item (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017). Moreover, at the end of the analysis of each period, the role of each newspaper (in the evolution of the discourse) is evaluated by using two lenses: *scope* and *form* (ibid). The scope lens examines the presence, prominence and absence of particular objects, coalitions, viewpoints and preferences. For *scope*, we ask: has this paper opened or closed (limited or broadened) the debate? In the words of Maeseele and Raeijmaekers:

> *[T]o be able to say something about the scope of media debates […], researchers must distinguish whether media texts introduce the same (established) or allow for alternative (marginal) actors and demands. Debates are found to be closed, when media texts privilege particular (established) actors and preferences (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017:9).*

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[l] Carvalho (2005) asks us to examine the texts produced by these actors outside the media, such as reports, press releases, speeches and certain websites, and to pay attention to direct quotes in the media.

[m] In the NVivo software, this can be done by presenting all the news items from the same newspaper, which is coded as including a specific subject (or node).

The *form* lens analyses the discursive ways in which these objects, actors and policies are presented (ibid). It further asks whether a particular newspaper inhibits or facilitates the debate. It questions whether it cultivates a specific argument or viewpoint with 'objective' criteria or by introducing alternatives while "acknowledging the role of ideological assumptions and preferences" (ibid). Close attention is given in this level of analysis to the implications of the scope, form and ideological standpoint of each newspaper to resilience in general and the desalination technology more specifically. Is the scope of the coverage open to alternative resilience scenarios (resistance, adjustments and transformation)? Has the form of the coverage of the hydro-policy debate contributed to specific standpoints and ideologies? Has there been a change between time periods and newspapers?

Level 4: Cross-Period Discussion: Media Landscape

While Carvalho's (2008) framework leaves no specific instructions for the conclusion, the final level of the analysis, according to Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017), involves comparing the ideological cultures of different news outlets to understand the level of agonistic pluralism of the *media landscape*. It further questions whether the selected outlets are promoting the same established ideology, do they present a uniformity in their coverage and reproduce hegemony? This level involves returning to the research questions of: what forms of resilince are constucted by the newspoapers, and, how might these contribute to the (de)politicisation of droughts, hydro-policis and desalintion? This level is the main component of the final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8), drawing on the findings of each period. Chapter 8 also incorporates the findings from the MDA of the videos; the longitudinal methods for this part of the study are presented in the next section.

3.2.3. Levels of Multimodal Discourse Analysis of the Videos

Looking for examples on how audio-visual elements create meaning, I decided to learn from visual research, mainly from advertisements and environmental communication. Some of the insights from this field that inform my analysis are mentioned Section 1.1.1 (Hansen and Machin 2013b; Lester and Cottle 2009). Hansen and Machin (2013b) argue that the possible multiple interpretations of environmental images are dependent on the accompanying texts, which guide how they are read. Multimodal analyses include both elements (text and image), and thus it offers further insight into the message design. In

terms of the longitudinal aspects of this research, Hansen and Machin (2013b) draw from longitudinal studies on advertisements, television documentaries and the news. These authors argue that visualisation is often a response to and an engagement with criticism of previous dominant images and discourses, creating a historical intertextuality. Therefore, longitudinal analyses help to better understand representation (and its interpretation) and can be seen as a tool to identify historically cultural moments when new discourse emerge and change.

Based on Kress's (2010, 2012) multimodal approach, with additional elements from Rose's (2016) visual critical discourse analysis and insights from PCCs and visual-EC studies presented in the literature review; the following communication elements within the videos are analysed as each of these elements creates meaning and contributes to the discursive construction of climate resilience within the topic of drought risks.

- **Image** (still): motionless sections or motionless items, such as colours and objects. The use of symbolic, iconic and spectacular signs (Lester and Cottle 2009) or informative images (such as tables and charts).

- **Moving image** (video): in relation to the editing choices, such as the digital animation (Medeiros and Gomes 2018) and changes in viewpoint. How do composition, perspective and certain angles contribute to the narrative?

- **Gesture:** such as body language, smiles or talking directly to the camera (Kress 2012).

- **Written text**: language (discourse and slogans) and graphics (the use of font, size, colour and whether it is bold).

- **Music and Soundtrack:** how sound effects contribute to the construction of meaning (Kress 2010, 2012)

- **Speech**: textual (discourse and framing) and diction (emphasis, tone and rhythm).

- **Location and set:** how does the location choice contribute to the message?

- **Presenters and actors**: presenters are speaking performers and actors are non-speaking characters. Rice and Atkin (2013) list examples of commonly used presenters in PCCs: celebrities, public officials, professional performers (actors or models), ordinary people, special experience individuals (victims and patients) and animated or costumed characters. Each of these options constructs the discourse of the message

differently and can be interoperated by the viewer in another way. Do they deliver information (facts), demonstrate behaviour (advice) or provide testimonials (personal experience)?

- **Symbols and icons**: identifying audio-visual elements which hold a representative meaning, such as representation of water as taps or rain; or referring to specific objects that hold greater cultural meaning, such as mentioning Lake Kinneret (Lester and Cottle 2009).

- **Format and structure:** do the videos document reality (such as with images from the news) or use imagery that was produced especially for the videos (as with television sets, using digital images and actors)? Do they try to imitate other televised genres (that is in advertisements, news and gameshows)?

- **Discursive strategies:** informative, rational, positive or negative emotional appeals, fear, shock or comedy (Guttman 2014).

3.3.   Data Collection:

3.3.1.   Selection of the Newspapers Longitudinal Timeframes and Critical Discourse Periods

The larger empiric part of this thesis is of the newspaper articles about droughts, hydro-policies and SD, published between 2001 and 2018. According to the periodisation of Israel's hydro-policies reviewed in Chapter 2, the long transition from the Policy Deliberation Period to the current Desalination and Marketisation occurred during the 2000s (Feitelson 2013; Menahem 2001; Menahem and Gilad 2013). Menahem and Gilad (2013:45) suggest that "external events" (among them the drought of 1999-2001) triggered a series of policy decisions after the turn of the century (2000-2002), which began a "trend" towards SD. Therefore, the drought of 1999-2001 was originally chosen as a loose starting point for the longitudinal timeframe. The first tender for a construction of a large-scale SD facility near Ashkelon was published in 2001, and the facility became operational in 2005 (NIC 2010). Other facilities became operational in 2007 (in Palmachim), 2010 (in Hadera), 2013 (in Soreq) and 2015 (in Ashdud). Beginning the analysis in 2001 (and not earlier) was decided only after the CDPs were identified. The year 2018 was chosen as the final year for the data analysis for three reasons: to conclude this thesis with the most current reporting available; because the rain-year of 2017-18 was the fifth consecutive arid year in Israel; and included a State Comptroller investigation on hydro-policies.

To pre-identify the CDPs during the chosen timeframes, a chronology of the hydro-policy making and events of SD during these years was formed, based on official reporting such as in the enquiry committee and in academic publications discussing the hydro-policies in this era (Feitelson 2013; Menahem 2001; Menahem and Gilad 2016). This work (see in Chapter 2 and Appendix 3) suggests that significant policy making took place during times of official public investigation: during the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee for the Water System[n] (2001–2002), the National Inquiry Committee (2008-2010) and the State Comptroller investigation (2017-2018). These investigations correlate with the 1999-2001, 2004-2011 and 2014-2017 droughts. These natural and political events fit with recommendations in the literature for CDPs (Carvalho 2008) which have the potential to attract news coverage of the hydro-policies. Therefore, the chosen CDPs

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[n] A full explanation in the name of this committee see Notes 1 and 2 at the Appendix on Translations.

were selected to represent these investigation periods; each period starts a few months before the beginning of the investigation and ends after the report was published. A detailed explanation for choosing the exact beginning and end date for each CDP and its key events are given at the start of each empirical chapter.

3.3.2. Selection of News Outlets

For the analysis of news coverage, two daily Hebrew newspapers were selected: *Yedioth Ahronoth* and *Haaretz,* including their economic supplements, *Calcalist* and *TheMarker.* The newspapers were selected for several reasons. Firstly, these newspapers comprise two of the three newspapers that are defined by Israel's Ministry of Interior's official list as the 'most widely circulated newspapers'[o] for most of the selected timeframe.[p] Secondly, both newspapers have different ideological roots, address different target audiences (popular and elite) and are printed in different formats (tabloid and broadsheet), which together reflect the Israeli media landscape. Thirdly, a comparison between these two newspapers has also been made in past research on climate change in Israel (Nossek 2010, 2019). Nossek (2019) highlights that both newspapers employ professional journalists that specialise in reporting on environmental issues and climate change. Lastly, these newspapers were selected due to the availability of the archives for the full period of study. Digital news services (e.g. radio, television and websites) are not analysed due to dramatic changes in the field since 2000 and the lack of available archives.

<u>The Selected Newspapers:</u>

Yedioth Ahronoth (YA) (which means the 'latest news', established in 1939) is the largest newspaper in Israel in terms of sales and its circulation (it sells 300k on weekdays and 400k on weekends); it is a 'popular' paper in a tabloid format with a centre political orientation. Due to its dominance in the newspaper market during the 1990s and 2000s, it was regarded and regulated as a monopoly, but in 2013, it lost its lead in the weekday

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[o] An official list published according to a law from 1965, rating the newspapers in Israel according to their distribution. This law obliges the government to publish some of its decisions in the three most widely circulated newspapers by buying advertising space.

[p] Between the years 2001-2012 *Maarive* (mid-range in tabloid format) was in the second and third places of this list, from 2013 *Israel Hayom* is at the top of the list.

circulation to the right-wing free daily newspaper *Israel-Hayom*.[q] It is published by the Yedioth Media Group and owned by the Moses family (85% of shares).

Calcalist (which means 'economist', established in 2008) is an economic newspaper in a tabloid format, also published by the Yedioth Media Group. For its first year of circulation, it was given free to YA buyers and subscribers and sold separately. During 2008, the YA readers received de-facto two daily economic sections: the old Mamon (which means finance) and the new Calcalist. Therefore, this newspaper was added to the data collection from CDP2 (2008-2010) onwards.

Haaretz (which means 'the land', established in 1919) is a broadsheet (in a Berliner format) elite newspaper with a liberal-left political orientation. Despite its lower circulation (70k on weekdays and 100k on weekends), for many years, it has been described as Israel's most influential daily newspaper and is considered as a newspaper of record. It is the only broadsheet newspaper that was printed all through the selected timeframe.[r] It is published by the Shoken Group, and until 2010, it was owned exclusively by the Shoken family who founded the paper and now hold 60% of the shares.

TheMarker (established in 1999) was originally an economic-news website published by the Shoken Group. Since 2005, the printed version (in a tabloid format) replaced Haaretz' financial section, and from 2008, it can be bought separately as a daily economic newspaper.[s] Therefore, TheMarker was collected as part of the data collection on the Haaretz.

Hereafter, when not mentioned separately YA refers to Yedioth Ahronoth and Calcalist as one entity, and Haaretz includes TheMarker as one united entity.

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[q] Israel-Hayom (literally means Israel Today) was established in 2007, and thus it is not included in the research.

[r] Makor-Rishon (literally means First Source) is a right-wing broadsheet elite newspaper, established in 1997, and which only started printing weekday editions in 2007. Other broadsheet newspapers are no longer in print or address a specific ethnography (such as the Hasidic-Jews newspapers or ones written in Arabic, English or Russian).

[s] De-facto means that the readers of TheMarker are divided (unequally) into three: those who read it as an independent newspaper, those who read it as the supplement to the broadsheet Haaretz and those who read it online. Due to the popularity of TheMarker, some of Haaretz' reporters write in both newspapers, and the newspapers often cross reference each other.

3.3.3. Collection of Newspaper Data

The data collection protocol was different for each newspaper due to a lack of unified databases or archive catalogues. Yedioth Group has a digital archive only accessible from registered computers of (paying) libraries in Israel, and as such, any data collection for YA was limited to archive visits. Haaretz has a pay-by-article online archive dating from 1994 until today, with free access to its key search engine. Both newspapers have a microfilm archive that covers all the collected years, which is only catalogued by date and not by article. A sample data collection at Tel-Aviv University Library was made in April 2016, for establishing the data collection protocol. Data collection for the first two CDPs was made in August and September, 2017 at the newspaper archives of Tel-Aviv University and Bait Ariella Library, Tel-Aviv, Israel. Additional data collection was completed online for Haaretz and in Tel-Aviv for YA in September, 2018. Data collection for CDP3 conducted in April, 2019 at Bait Ariella Library.

Collection protocol:

- Haaretz: prior to the archive visit, a list of potential items for data collection was compiled by running searches on Haaretz online archives.[t] Haaretz' microfilms were only searched for the dates listed in the list, plus one day before and after each one. For these dates, the full issue of the day was searched, for data collection of any item which fits the collection criteria (marked on the list as found or added to it)[u]. For the third period, collection was made directly from Haaretz and TheMarker websites.

- YA: the digital archive was searched for both the YA and Calcalist by using the search words within the defined timeframe, month by month. A list of the dates of the collected items was composed and compared to Haaretz.

- For every date that an item was found only in YA or Haaretz, the second newspaper was reviewed a second time for missed items.

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[t] This is in the format of an Excel file, containing the information: date, writers, section, headlines and filename.

[u] Finding more than one article in the same day by different writers or by the same writer was very common (see relevant dissection at Chapter 4). Also, I found articles that did not appear in the online archive search. By contrast, it was rare for articles to appear in the online search, but not in the microfilm.

Either digitally or from microfilm, articles must have been saved (downloaded or photocopied) one by one. As a result, this has been a 'collection by selection' process, which includes a skim read of each item to determine its relevance. Some of the 'excluded' subjects were: water contaminations or quality (usually of specific geographical areas); international news on droughts or hydro-policies (e.g. droughts in Australia); the Dead-Sea Read-Sea Canal; labour union disputes, sanctions and strikes within the water sector; drought effects on food prices; Israeli desalination companies' business in other countries (e.g. building and operating SD facilities in Cyprus); and daily weather forecasts (even when mentioning the droughts or Lake Kinneret sea-level). The appearance of these articles where noted as additional information for the media-textual analysis. Following Carvalho (2008), readers' letters and advertisements were excluded from the data collection and analysis.

Search words:

Table 3 shows the search words for all the CDPs and Table 4 presents the amount of item collected for each period. Due to a common use of the Hebrew word water (מים), it cannot be used as a search word by itself. Similarly, the Hebrew word for drought (בצורת) has an identical spelling to the word for "in the shape of", so it had to be used with other search words. The Hebrew terms for climate change, including its parallels of global warming or climate crisis, were not used as search words.[v] For each time period, a final search was made for 'search by reporter' by using their name plus the word "water"; this was done for the two most recurrent reports of each newspaper in each time period.[w]

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[v] Adding climate change as a search term would have created a surplus of data as it too broad. The decision was to narrow down the coverage of drought and water and within these items I looked for climate change references as part of the analysis (see Level 2). Items about climate change which have mentioned droughts and water came up without the specific use of this term and were included in the collection.

[w] The names of each time period's most current reporters are given in the findings section of each chapter.

Table 3: Collection Word Search

Search word→ Order ↓	Original Hebrew Search Words[x]	English Translation[y]
1	"מחסור במים" או "משבר המים"	"water crisis" OR "water shortage"
2	"מים" וגם "בצורת"	"drought" AND "water"
3	"שנת בצורת" או "היטל בצורת"	"drought year" OR "drought tax/fee"
4	כנרת או "מפלס הכנרת"	Kinneret OR "Kinneret sea-level"
5	התפלה או "התפלת מים" או "התפלת מי ים" או "מתקן התפלה"	desalination OR "seawater desalination" OR "water desalination" OR "desalination facility"
6	מים וגם ועדת חקירה	Enquiry committee AND water

Table 4: Items per Period

	Haaretz	Yedioth Ahronoth	Total
CDP1 2001-2002	324	108	432
CDP2 2008-2010*	197	183	377
CDP4 2018*	66	61	127
Total	584	325	936
*including TheMarker and Calcalist			

3.3.4. Video Data Collection

In April 2017, a list of campaigns aiming to reduce water consumption over the past decade was identified and collected with the help of an IWA spokesperson.[z] Seven campaigns have been identified (from the years 2008-2012, the 2017 PCC was under production at the time). The later PCCs were collected during 2018. Table 5 shows a summary of the collected data. One campaign (marked in X) from the summer of 2009

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[x] Within the limit of the search engine of each archive (not a Boolean search), all the words/terms were searched with and without the definiteness determine (i.e. "ה").

[y] The direct translation can be different from the one presented, which has the closest meaning.

[z] The IWA was established in 2007 to replace the Israeli Water Commission and despite my efforts, older campaigns produced by the Water Commission were unavailable for data collection.

was unavailable for data collection.[aa] Some of the campaigns had complementary radio and printed versions, which are not included in the analysis. Some campaigns also had versions in Arabic or/and Russian, either with dubbing or subtitles. Only the Hebrew versions of the videos were analysed.

All the videos were downloaded from YouTube. The campaigns of 2008-2011 were uploaded to YouTube by private accounts.[bb] The campaigns 2012-2018 were uploaded to YouTube by IWA's official account and are also available on its website (IWA 2020).[cc] Full transcriptions, translated into English, with web links can be found in Appendix 2.

Table 5: Campaigns Produced by IWA

	Broadcasting Period	Slogan	Slogans or Name in Printed Advertising	Items
1	Spring-Summer 2008	**No Water to Waste**	*Israel is Drying*	1
2	Spring 2009	**Must Save the Kinneret**		1
X	Summer 2009	**Israel is Moving From Red to Black**		Not collected
3	Spring 2010	**Israel is Still Drying**		1
4	Summer 2010	**Water-Savers on Every Tap**	*National Watersavers Distribution Campaign*	1
5	Winter 2011	**Israel is Drying**		9
6	Summer 2012	**Israel Continues to Save Water**		5
7	Summer 2017	**Water is Life**		3
8	Summer 2018	**We Don't Have Water to Waste**	*Israel is Drying, Again*; *I'm Back, Despite Desalination*	8
9	Winter 2018	**We Don't Have Water to Waste**	*Despite the Winter*	6

[aa] Evidence of the existence of this campaign has been found in the newspapers. The title refers to the Kinneret Red and Black water level lines. This campaign is not available on YouTube, and attempts to collect it has failed (including approaching the IWA).

[bb] The 2008-2011 videos that were uploaded to YouTube by various users; their uploading dates do not indicate the exact dates of being broadcast on the television.

[cc] As such, their uploading dates to YouTube indicate their release dates: 15/8/2012, 20/7/2017, 23/5/2018 and 11/11/2018, respectively.

3.4. Limitations

Before moving on to the empirical chapters, a short discussion on the limitations of this research is needed, starting with a critique of CDA. First and foremost, discourse is interpretative and thus open to alternative and subjective explanations, and as Carvalho mentions "probably not replicable" (2000 in Raeijmaekers 2018:76). Attached to these notions are scientific ideals of the 'objective' and 'neutral' researcher (Kenis 2015), which clash with discourse theory understanding of the position of the researcher (their subjectivity and in accordance with their specific discipline epistemology). Kenis (2015) and Raeijmaekers (2018) argue against the perception of objectivty and neutrality as they represent hegemonic ideas, pardigms and discourses of particular times and places. Furthermore, I agree with them that presenting research as objective goes against the fundamental ideas of CDA and political research that criticises the post-political condition. Secondly, as Hansen and Machin (2013a) highlight, Widdowson (1998) critiques CDA as being inconsistent, lax and unrigorous. According to these authors, Widdowson (1998) claims that researchers often apply concepts to justify their observations, instead of "reveal[ing] what is buried in the text" and even disregarding elements in the text that are inconsistent with their argument (Hansen and Machin 2013a:149). Every answer to these limitations and critiques of CDA should start with van Dijk's (1990) recommendation (as Hansen and Machin (2013a) mention, van Dijk predicted this critique) to be explicit, systematic and based on methods and theories. More recent recommendations addressing this kind of critique are from Jørgensen and Phillips' (2002). They, first, call researchers to explicitly address their normative beliefs and assumptions. Second, they claim that the validity of CDA can be determined by coherence, clear arguments and richness of the analysis. Third, they suggest that it is necessary to be transparent in displaying results to enable the reader to make their own judgements of the research interpretations.

More specific limitations in this research are derived from some of the choices described in this chapter, that is the choice of discourse methodology: CDA and MDA.[dd] Firstly, the limitations are connected to the basic choice of only analysing newspapers and PCCs as clearly discourse and policy disputes also occur in other media outlets, such as in television, on the radio and in other newspapers. I acknowledge that choosing different

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[dd] I have already argued above why I chose CDA over quantitative methods (see Section 3.1.1).

news outlets could lead to different findings, and I return to this possibility in my Thesis Conclusion. However, my choice to combine a textual analysis of newspapers and an audio-visual analysis of PCCs is in response to one of the main critiques of discourse analysis as being anachronistic in its prominence on written texts and newspapers. Secondly, a longer timeframe (i.e. with more CDPs) or more specific CDM choices might reveal other trends in the coverage and discourse. Nonetheless, the amount of data collected even after excluding some topics, excelled my expectations; therefore, it is most likely to accurately present the scope of the hydro-policy debate in the newspapers during the selected years.

The third limitation is about the translations from Hebrew, which is strongly connected to the notions of interpretation and transparency. To avoid any bias, all the translations presented here (that is the quotations from the news items) have been translated by another person in addition to myself, and I have taken advice from editors (proficient in English and Hebrew) on some of the specific words and concepts I present. As the final decision about translations were mine, there is the possibility that an occasional translation was chosen as it fit the argument (as Widdowson (1998) states). To offer transparency, I offer alternative translations in the footnotes or in the Appendix on Translations as well the references to the item itself. Finally, the last limitation relates to my personal position and expectations. As a former environmental activist embedded in the Israeli environmental movement and ENGOs for many years (and who personally knows some of the names mentioned in this research), I came with some predetermined ideas which I had to be aware of while analysing.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the methodological approach of this research, explained the two longitudinal discourse analysis methods that were used to analyse resilience and hydro-policies in Israel and the process of data collection. The next four chapters are dedicated to presenting the empirical results. They are organised chronologically and according to their method: one chapter for each critical discourse period (Chapters 4 to 6) and one for the analysis of the public communication campaigns (7). The results begin with CDP1, the coverage of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee in 2001-2002, which is the next chapter.

Chapter 4 - First Critical Discourse Period: the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee for the Water System (January 2001 – July 2002)

This chapter analyses the first critical discourse period (CDP1) of the newspaper coverage between January 2001 and June 2002. In June 2001, after a second drought year, the Knesset's (the Israeli parliament) House Committee had unanimously decided to establish a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee (PIC) into the Water System (known as the Magen Committee).[a] Prior to the Magen Committee, the Knesset had only ever employed the PIC tool on eight issues.[b] Establishing a PIC signals that an issue is of national importance that goes beyond the ongoing work of the permanent parliamentary committees and bodies, and which is in need of comprehensive policy reform. Hence, Goldberg (2011) argues that a PIC "reinforces the democratic principle of the public's right to know" since they do not have judicial or legislative powers.[c] This type of inquiry invites a debate on the human agency that leads to a crisis. This not only includes which governmental bodies are liable for a problem and which policies could end it, but also what kinds of behaviours and lifestyles lead to this situation. As such, the appointment of a PIC (and its newspaper coverage) has the potential of producing a critical hydro-discourse, either creating a new discourse or basing it on existing marginalised/dominant alternatives.

This chapter examines the representations and the construction of the hydro-policies in two newspapers, Haaretz and Yedioth Aharonoth (YA). More specifically, it looks at how seawater desalination (SD) was presented and debated before and during the work of the PIC on the water system, and how during this period, this policy had been positioned as the best solution to the so called "water crisis" at the time. Firstly, however, it is necessary to provide the context of this CDP (4.1) and to describe some of the general findings from the data (4.2).

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[a] The name of the committee can be translated to English in several ways; see Note 1 in the Appendix on Translation.

[b] Between the years 1948-2018, the Knesset appointed 25 PICs on issues such as traffic accidents (1987) and domestic violence (1995). Unlike its predecessors and successors who used the PIC moderately, the Fifteenth Knesset (1999-2003) used the PIC tool nine times during its service; the Magen Committee was its sixth.

[c] Policy recommendations made by PICs are not binding unless they have opted for legislative proposals; these should also go through the usual legislative process. PICs have the power to summon a testimony and investigate the actions of state employees, government companies, corporations established by the law and the local authorities. It can invite specialists and other civilians to express their opinion and recommend policies. PIC meetings are public, and as such can open journalist reporting.

4.1. Context for the Period and Key Events

This section describes further relevant context, identifying key events in the period related to hydro-policies, and providing the start and end dates of the period. The rain-year 2000-2001 was the second consecutive season with a below average rainfall, officially defined as droughts. On 6/2/2001, elections were held in Israel as a result of Prime Minister Ehud Barak's (Labour Party) resignation.[d] Ariel Sharon (Likud Party) was elected as Prime Minister (PM) and formed a national unity government[e] with the Labour Party, based on a large coalition of two thirds of the Knesset. As Minister of Agriculture, Sharon appointed Shalom Simhon (Labour), who was, until that point, the head of the largest farmers' organisation.[f] During April 2001, the new cabinet decided on some immediate and long-term actions to mitigate the effect of the drought: to reduce agricultural water quotas and to build an SD facility in Ashdod. On 27/6/2001, the Knesset's House Committee established a PIC to investigate the water system. Member of the Knesset (MK) David Magen (Centre Party) was chosen to head the committee,[g] which had eight more members from across the house. The PIC published its final report in May 2002. During this time, the Israel Water Commission (IWC) issued a public campaign to reduce water consumption (in August 2001),[h] and they published a draft for a new hydro-masterplan (in January 2002). Also during the committee's work, the Knesset approved a new water tariffs and the Water and Sewage Services Corporation Act [2001], transferring the responsibility for urban water services from the municipalities to local corporations (meaning companies owned by the municipalities).

The data collected for this period begins in January 2001, a month before the elections, and ends in July 2002, a month after the committee published its report. Article subjects that were excluded from the data collection (in addition to subjects listed in

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[d] It was the third and last direct prime ministerial election (the only one in Israel's history which was not held alongside simultaneous Knesset elections).

[e] The Israeli term for Grand Coalition or National Government: a government based on a collation of parties from the opposite sides of the house and based on the two major parties (Likud and Labour).

[f] Simhon headed the *HaMerkaz HaHakla'iI* (the Agricultural Centre) which in 2001 changed its name to the Israel Farmers' Federation.

[g] Official papers, such as the National Inquiry Committee report, refer to the PIC as the Magen Committee (National Enquiry Committee for Water System 2010).

[h] This specific campaign is not part of the campaigns analysed in Chapter 7. The reason for this is explained in Section 3.2.7

Section 3.3 on Data Collection) are on: the water dispute with Lebanon (March 2001); the water contamination in the Tel-Aviv district (July 2001); and the negotiations between the Finance Ministry and Mekorot and its union over a "structural reform" (all through the period).

4.2.   General Findings

Table 6: Data Collection by Newspaper CDP1 (January 2001 - July 2002)

	Haaretz	**Yedioth Ahronoth**
Total: 432 items[i,j]	**324**	**108**
Average items per month	18	6
Economy section	**233 (71%)**	**42 (38%)**
Economic news items	209	35
Commentary columns	17	6
Interviews	4	1
Opinions	3	n.a
➢ By external writers	➢ 3	n.a
News section	**50 (15%)**	**42 (38%)**
News items	49	40
Commentary columns	1	2
Interviews	0	0
Opinion pieces	**33 (10%)**	**5 (4%)**
Editorials	7	0
➢ By external writers	➢ 8	➢ 2
Magazine supplements	**9 (0.2%)**	**19 (17.5%)**
Interviews	0	1

Table 6 shows that the newspaper *Haaretz* has exactly triple the amount of publications to YA. An examination of each section indicates opposing trends in their news coverage: in Haaretz, more than thirds of the items are in the economic section; in YA, the items are divided almost equally between the news and economic sections. In Haaretz 10% of the items are opinion pieces, with 12 op-ed by external writers (including those in the economic section) which might suggest according to Raeijmaekers (2018) high level of (political) disagreement.

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[i] The collection had n:433 items, and n:46 were excluded during the analysis.

[j] The percentage in brackets are approximate (rounded) so the total is not a hundred percent.

	Title	Name	Total items	% of coverage in this newspaper	Special Items
Haaretz	Infrastructure Reporters	Amiram Cohen	196	60%	5 Commentary columns
	Science & Environment Reporter	Zafrir Rinat	37	11%	4 Op-eds
	Economic Reporter	Anat Georgie	10	~3%	n.a
YA	Shopping & Consumption Reporter	Nurit Arad	46	42%	1 Op-ed; 1 Commentary columns
	Parliamentary Reporter	Gabi Baron	10	9%	n.a
	Economic Reporter & Commentator	Gidion Eshet	8	7%	4 Op-ed; 3 Commentary columns

Table 7 presents the recurrent writers and their share of coverage in each newspaper. As can be seen, Haaretz' infrastructure reporter is responsible for the majority of this newspaper's coverage, followed by the science and environment reporter and then the economic one. In Haaretz, they predominantly frame the water issue as a technical one whereas in YA, it was reported more as a subject of consumption, and then as a parliamentary-political issue.

Tables 6 and 7 also point toward a structural element of fragmentation in the coverage of hydro-policies which is identified in the findings. That is, on the same day, in the same newspapers there may be multiple items about hydro-policies representing different angels or specific issues, not necessarily next to each other or even in the same section. These sometimes involved several news-items by the same writer on the same day spread around the newspaper, or cases where news items were accompanied by a commentary column and/or an op-ed (either by the same writer or by multiple contributors) without the newspaper actively highlighting the connections between the items. This structural element of the coverage makes it harder for the reader to contextualize an issue. Nonetheless, in the cases of a column and a news item being placed next to each other, the commentary is contextualized as reflecting the opinion of the

writer while the news item is contextualized as non-bias and balanced. The selective process of representation by the writers in the news items is thus masked, and can be identified by looking at their frames, priming and discursive choices. Having multiple reporters covering hydro-policies from many angles also reflects the complexity of reporting of environmental problems (Hannigan 2006; Lester 2010). In Appendix 4 there are two figures, one from each newspaper, to present examples were several items were given next to each other.

Figure 2: Frequency per Month CDP1

Figure 2 presents the number of articles in each newspaper per month. The first two peaks in coverage are in May 2001 (marked i) and July 2001 (ii), which are the months before and after the establishment of the PIC in June 2001. The peak in January 2001 (iii) correlates to the publication of the draft masterplan. As can be seen, the month of the PIC's final report had below average reporting in both newspapers (iv).

4.3. Analysis

The newspaper coverage during CDP1 is characterised by a general consensus, shared by the newspapers, governmental bodies and non-governmental actors, all of whom frame the water situation as being in a state of 'crisis'. The analysis offered in this chapter starts by (4.3.1) presenting the formation of this 'crisis' frame, its scientific definition and dominant interpretations about its meaning. Part 4.3.2 presents three manifestations of human responsibility, and how they became prominent after the appointment of the PIC. This part is divided into three sections: (4.3.2.1) the governmental failure-to-act discourse; (4.3.2.2) the responsibility of the agricultural sector; and (4.3.2.3) the failed attempt to reduce urban consumption. These sections deal with the two prominent discourse-coalitions presented in the press during this period: the Agro-Zionist (AZDC) and the economic (EcDC). The analysis focuses on how the mediated debate between them contributed to depoliticisation of hydro-policies in general. More specifically, the debate around the agricultural sector centres on contesting two policies – reduction in the agriculture water quotas and their tariffs. Part 4.3.3 discusses the debate around long-term polices to increase water supply, which is associated with 'alternative water sources': desalination, sewage treatment and importation. This part shows how SD transformed during this period from being *one of* these alternatives to the preferred one. It begins (4.3.3.1) by showing how the first SD tender was used by the treasury in the dispute against the AZDC about the agricultural tariffs and the EcDC's call to set a "real" price for water. The discourse on each of the alternative polices in relation to SD constitutes Sections 4.3.3.1 to 4.3.3.4. Then, the analysis provides a short discussion on the marginalised environmental discourse (4.3.4) by looking at how the droughts were connected to climate change, and the minimal role of the environmental discourse-coalition (EnDC). Finally, (4.3.5) the analysis concludes with the news coverage of the PIC report.

4.3.1. Pre-Investigation Period: Constructing a "Crisis" Consensus and its Scientific Definition

In the first months of CDP1, the newspapers formed the consensus that Israel was having a "water crisis". In December,[k] Haaretz reported that the Barak government was promoting an "emergency plan" to resolve the "water crisis";[l,1] during the month of March and after the appointment of the new government, some articles raised the drought[2] and the "crisis" as urgent issues for the new ministers to deal with.[3] The "crisis" terminology is repeated in both newspapers: in the headlines or in the quotes given by key officials such as the commissioner or the Mekorot's chief executive officer (CEO). Here are some examples of the prominence of this terminology:

1. YA, sub-headline: *Mekorot warns: If the second half of winter will be similar to the first, an unprecedented crisis is expected in the water system.*[4]
2. Haaretz: *"The reason for the water crisis is simple: Israel is withdrawing from the national water bank (reservoirs) more than nature deposit, and the overdraft is growing annually".*[5]
3. YA: *"The water crisis' terrible failure to act is entirely behind the doors of the treasury".*[6]
4. Haaretz: [The Commissioner:] *"The emergency crisis of the water system demands taking definite steps."*[7]

As can be seen in the last quote (example 4), this term situates a sense of emergency and invites action. Other articles, in both papers, claim that there is an "worsening water distress",[8] a possibility of a "catastrophe",[9,10,11] a "danger",[12] calling to "save the reservoir"[13] and to take "emergency steps"[14] to prevent a "disaster".[15,16] The quotes above suggests that the "water crisis" has been framed in different ways: as a hydrological situation affected by low precipitation (example 1); that can be explained in economic terms (example 2);[17,18] or as a result of the governmental failure to act (example 3). The most frequent explanations (reasons for the crisis) at the time were "drought" and "governmental failure-to-act"[m] (see Section 4.3.2). The commissioner is repeatedly quoted in YA as warning that *"if the situation continues, there will be no drinking water in the taps",*[19] which is repeated in both newspapers.[20,21,22,23] The "water crisis" frame remains

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[k] This relates to the month before the beginning of CDP1.

[l] In Chapters 4 to 6 references to newspaper articles are given as numbered endnotes (for each chapter separately). Sometimes reference is given to an exact article after a quotation, sometimes it is given to illustrate the finding as an example chosen in random. When multipole endnotes are presented together (e.g. [20,21,22,23]) it represents that this example is more frequent, but it does not represent all possible occurrences and should be considered as "see for example". Item titles are translated to English.

[m] *Failure-to-act* can be translated into English in several ways; see Note 3 in the Appendix on Translation.

prominent throughout this CDP. This is the first stage in the resilience process, that is acknowledging the risk; its identification in this case is scientific, but its definition sometimes employs an economic language. The hydro-policies that receive newspaper attention in the beginning of CDP1 are (in order of their prominence): desalination, importing water from Turkey, cuts in agricultural water quotas and changes to the water tariffs. During the spring, there was an increasing debate on the advantages of each policy. An analysis of the news coverage of each policy follows.

One prominent aspect of the "crisis" frame is its scientisation by both newspapers (though more frequently in Haaretz) by presenting hydrological data and quotations from hydrologists, scientists and academics. Experts form the Israeli Hydrological Service (a unit within the IWC) or Mekorot are often quoted giving data and figures about: water shortages in the aquifers (in the million cubic metres (MCM) of water); the volumetric flow rate of streams spilling (in litres per hour) into Lake Kinneret; and Lake Kinneret's sea level (in metres) referred to as "red-line".[24,25,26] The red-line plays an important part of this discourse marking it as a signal of danger. The water level is described "below" or "above" this line, with estimations and predictions as to when this line will be crossed.[n] The next quote from YA is an example of a typical explanation as to what all these numbers mean:

> *The Water Commissioner, Shimon Tal, warned that the levels of the mountain and costal aquifers are below the red-line and that over pumping from them may* **cause irreversible damage**. *Additionally, Tal warned about* **biological changes** *in the Kinneret due to the decline in water level, and he said that in the long term, there's a danger* **of losing the lake as a water source** *[emphasis added].* [27]

In this quote, Commissioner Tal (a water engineer) refers to the red-lines as a scientific sign of danger from ecological deterioration and loss of resources. Despite the high frequency of this signifier, through CDP1, the occasional article contested this scientific discourse. The contestation is based on the fact that, historically, Lake Kinneret's red-line was set at the level of the pumping pipes of Mekorot, and it was not based on scientific research. Moreover, in previous years, as some articles indicate,[28,29] the red-line changed once these pipes were extended. This means that repeating statements such as "once the Kinneret reaches 215.20m, its supply capacity will be greatly reduced"[30] actually describe

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[n] Items on rain events also reference the red-lines and the storms positive effect on them. For example: Cohen, A. (2001, January 22) The Rains Didn't Help the Kinneret Sea-Level: Missing 740 MCM. Haaretz.

a technical difficulty and not an ecological one. In YA, the commissioner explains the following:

> *The red-lines lost their actual meanings [... they] exist only because the law requires us to set a level, and the level of the Kinneret is a symbol; it has symbolic value to the people [...] Today, what limits our ability to pump from the lake is the pumps utility below a certain line.* [31]

The possibility of the commissioner to lower the line is used in YA to reinforce the crisis and the failure-to-act frame (see below), and thus limits the discursive power of the scientific alerts about the lake.

Haaretz uses the scientisation of the crisis to depoliticise any reaction to it. That is to say, it emphasises how scientific expertise (about the dangers of pumping over the red-lines) should determine hydro-policy action. For example, the following op-ed by Rinat states that:

> *The experts tracking the Kinneret are usually not among the panic-sowers and the apocalyptic prophets, but lately they too have expressed great warnings when they realized that their recommendation for a line which cannot be crossed are ignored.*[32]

Rinat is an environmental correspondent, and in this op-ed, he express the position of the EnDC. During the first stages of this period, the EnDC uses the red-line risk dispute to promote depoliticisation within the decision-making through the process of scientisation and juridification.[33] For example, in September, the Society for the Preservation of Nature in Israel (SPNI) submitted a petition to the Supreme Court against a new definition of the red-line. An item in YA presents the petition's arguments as having a scientific and ecological stance, and "heavy fears that the decision [to change the red-line level] is an outcome of impositions and political pressures".[34] However, despite their contribution to the depoliticisation of the discourse, the EnDC play a marginal role during this stage. In fact, the EnDC actors are rarely mentioned at the beginning of the period in comparison to the AZDC and EcDC players, as shown in the next section.

4.3.2. Beginning of the Investigation into Human Responsibility: The Rise of the Governmental Failure-to-Act Frame

An op-ed in Haaretz by Yoash Tzidon° was the first to raise the idea that the reasons for the crisis should be investigated by a National Inquiry Committee (NIC) to determine why the governmental plans in the 1990s for desalination and importing water were never implemented.[35] There is no indication in the newspapers that there is any move in the Knesset towards initiating a formal investigation until after its establishment. On 27/6/2001, both papers reported that the Knesset's House Committee unanimously accepted establishing a PIC into the water system. The letter of appointment for the Magen Committee was reported in Haaretz that same day:

> *According to the letter of appointment by the House Committee, the Inquiry Committee will investigate the reasons for the* **severe crisis** *in the water system, and decide* **who are responsible** *for this situation. Also, the committee will recommend* **urgent actions** *and* **emergency steps***, and perhaps publish a midterm report about these steps. The committee will also examine desalination facilities and sewage treatment plans and will check the water services pricing* **policies** *[emphasis added].[36]*

The letter of appointment sets the scope of the discourse for the rest of the CDP. Firstly, it frames the hydrological situation as a "crisis" and establishes it as a human-made situation (as it seeks to answer "who is responsible"), not as an act of nature. Secondly, it differentiates between short-term "actions" or "steps", on the one hand, and long-term "policies", on the other. Thirdly, the leading and preferred long-term policies are desalination, sewage treatment and pricing changes. The option of importing water is absent from the above quote and from the rest of the item.

The papers use the appointment of the PIC to reaffirm their frame of a crisis: both use quotes from the commissioner and Mekorot CEO during one of the Knesset's House Committee session. Haaretz' headlines tells the reader that the "parliamentary committee will investigate the status of the Israeli water system", and accordingly it gives quotes about the Kinneret's red-line and the predicted pumping problems. Thus, it maintains its scientific framing of the crisis. YA headline states: "the Knesset establishes an inquiry committee for the 'water failure-to-act'",[37] and it uses only quotes that support

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° He was a member of the Twelfth Knesset (1988-1992) and the head of a task-force assigned by the Minister of Agriculture in 1990 to come up with a new national strategic plan for agriculture. The task-force's recommendations were never implemented including its hydro-policies.

a "*governmental failure-to-act*"[p] framing. The commissioner is quoted as saying that there was a "management failure" while the CEO explained that "bureaucracy" intentionally delays the desalination tenders. The commissioner is also quoted in Haaretz as praising the recent governmental move towards "producing water by building desalination facilities".[38] In view of this, both papers signal desalination as the more prominent policy of the options mentioned in the PIC letter of appointment. The meaning of 'water failure-to-act' is given in a quote in YA from Professor Avner Adin, a water engineer and recent founder of the Israeli Water Association[q,39]: "[they] ruined the coastal aquifer by over-pumping, neglected the water quality and also let politics take over the water".[40] The accused remain anonymous. The quotes in YA represent a position dictating the way in which politics should be detached from decision-making over water (that is depoliticisation), and that effective hydro-policies are measured by techno-managerial categories, such as by an aquifer's water levels and "water quality" standards. Moreover, YA represents a position where the politicisation of policy making combined with governmental bureaucracy leads to an incapability to manage the water system.

This governmental failure-to-act frame appeared in both papers before and after the inquiry initiation. They published frequent statements directing the blame for the crisis on the government (rather than on the water user or the climate), which was given by various actors from all three discourse-coalitions.[r] These statements, supported by establishing the PIC, represent a consensus around this frame. However, there is not a consensus about its implications. As seen above, YA uses this frame to depoliticise hydro-policies by delegitimising the government and offering an economisation of the decision-making. This discourse is promoted mainly by the economic writers of the newspaper.[s] Which are according to Menahem (2001) are active members of the EcDC. For example,

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[p] See Note 3 in the Appendix on Translation.

[q] In an interview to mark the establishment of the Israeli Water Association, Adin explained his aims and motivation for the organisation. In the article, he explained that "politicians never had the will to plan for longer than one term", and that the organisation will: "*be the first to gather all the best minds and senior scientists and professionals to save Israel from the water crisis. We found a non-political organisation, which will be the professional centre on water issues for the Israeli public, and which will promote legislation and execution of water issues in the country*".[38] Adin's preferred policies to resolve the crisis are desalination (seawater and underground) and the cancellation of agricultural subsidies. Adin or his organisation were only mentioned in three items.

[r] Such as columnists, the head of the Federation of Local Councils in Israel and the Society for the Preservation of Nature in Israel.

[s] According to Menahem (2001) these reporters are members of the EcDC.

in March, Sever Plocker, YA Chief-Economic Editor explained in his column that "there's no water crisis in Israel; there's a crisis of water policies. Even this statement is inaccurate; there's no policy crisis as there's no water policy in Israel".[41] After situating the meaning of the term failure-to-act as an inability of the political system for making decisions (or rather its "impotence"),[42] Plocker calls for economic forces and technological innovations to fill the gap left by the government. His policy suggestions include tariff changes and private investment in the research and development of desalination. In May 2001, he writes:

> *Two simple governmental decisions could have quickly solved the water problem in Israel. First is the introduction of a unified price for all water use, with compensation for the farmer (and others) for the loss in governmental subsidies […] Second, is giving the absolute freedom for every investor and entrepreneur – public or private, local or foreign – to install a water desalination facility, as long as it complies with environmental and planning rules. The Israeli government will only commit to buying the water from the cheapest and the highest quality desalinator.[43]*

Plocker promotes full marketisation of water, a radical transition from the historical hydro-regime of governmental ownership and management of the water system. Further discussion about the connection between the price, the farmers and desalination in the next section (4.3.2.2). Gideon Eshet, YA Economic Commentator, agrees with Plocker on the governmental failure-to-act (which he calls "idleness" and "irresponsible"),[44] and he suggests the same solutions. However, Eshet sees the new government as an opportunity to amend it: "there is nothing like a unity government, as taught by political-scientists, for making hard decisions".[45] In this column, in contrast to Plocker, Eshet calls for the government to take more action, and not to transfer the responsibility onto private actors.[46]

Two Haaretz editorials use the failure-to-act argument: one came after the cabinet meeting in April 2001 dedicated to hydro-policies;[47] and the second in July 2001 in response to IWC policy suggestions.[48] In contrast to YA, Haaretz uses this discourse to politicise the coverage of the crisis instead of delegitimising public service. The editorials call to adopt "the radical solutions" promoted by the Minister of National Infrastructures and the Minister of Finance, and explain that "in the current situation and taking into consideration the political status, such a move cannot be done".[49] The editorials refer to the same polices as Plocker and Eshet (pricing and desalination), yet they do not regard them as techno-managerial solutions that can replace politics, but rather attributes them to a political and ideological disagreement around the roles of the government and agriculture. In contrast to Plocker and more in line with Eshet, the editorials refer to such

solutions as coming **from** the political, not as economic or technological solutions with authority **outside** of politics. Despite the opposite stance on (de)politicisation in these examples, both newspapers agree on desalination, tariffs on agricultural water use and the government's failure-to-act on both these issues, as presented in following section.

4.3.2.1. Agricultural Sector Responsibility: Delegitimising the Farmers to Promote Changes to Their Water Quotas and Tariffs

A prominent aspect of the coverage in this period directed the blame for the crisis on the agricultural sector and its political leaders, that is the AZDC. This sector was blamed for the following three reasons; the quantity of water it uses (quotas); their water tariffs; and for their political power in hydro-policy making. The third reason (i.e. farmers' political representation in the IWC, Knesset and other bodies) was criticised by the EcDC as enabling the first two. As their criticism the EcDC used the discursive strategies of delegitimisation (of the farmers) and (de)rationalisation arguments for the economisation of these hydro-policies. This was a prominent discourse throughout this period; it is presented in this section mostly by way of examples given from the months surrounding the initiation of the investigation, which were critical of its formation, followed by examples of the AZCD's response to it.

After the decision to conduct an inquiry, the appointment of Knesset Members to the committee drew some attention in Haaretz (YA did not report on it). One party's suggested representative, MK Avshalom Vilan, was also the head of the Knesset's Agriculture Lobby.[t,u] His nomination was opposed by other parties who expressed concerns that the committee's work would be influenced by having a member representing the farmers' interests. An article reporting the dispute (in Haaretz, 29/6/2001) quotes one MK claiming that the committee members should be "clean of any vested interest". The clean/dirty metaphor delegitimises having a political-ideological stance on hydro-policies whilst also establishing a counter position in which the speaker is ideologically free, which is impossible. That is, trying to depoliticise the scope of the committee's work. Vilan's appointment was later criticised by Haaretz' economic

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[t] Knesset Lobby (in Hebrew: *shdula* שדולה): a semi-official and cross-partisan group of Knesset Members committed to promote a certain issue or represent a defined sector. Despite the similarity in English terminology, this is not a group of lobbyists (in Hebrew: *lobbyist*) who are employed by NGOs and private companies to promote specific issues to the MKs; but rather a group formed by MKs.

[u] Since 2010 Vilan is the head of the Israel Framer's Federation.

commentator, Nehemia Shtrasler, in a column dealing with the negotiations between the ministries of agriculture and finance over agricultural water tariffs and the compensation for allocation cuts. In this article, Shtrasler delegitimises any involvement by farmer representatives in hydro-policies making: he opposes the PM's (Ariel Sharon) involvement in the negotiations as he is "a farmer himself" and adds that "it's an absurdity bordering on corruption". Shtrasler describes the farmers' representation in the IWC as "let[ting] the cat guard the cream."[v],[50] and he blames the farmers for causing the water crisis:

> *For years, the farmers' institutions gave [water] quotas to kibbutzim, moshavim[w] and farmers[x]; according to political considerations, the farmers received the allocations in subsidised prices, significantly lower than the water production price, which caused great waste, export water to Norway (via the export of oranges for example) and [caused] the current water crisis.* [51]

Shtrasler starts his argument by claiming that farmers' institutions were in charge of quota allocation while actual allocations were decided and regulated by the Water Commission, and he associates politically motivated subsidies with "waste". He also accuses the farmers of:

> *Using their cheap water for* **pleasure.** *Some dare to use the cheap water to irrigate their lawns or to fill their* **private** *pools, and some just hold their quotas without using it [emphasis added].[52]*

This argument contains an internal contradiction: the farmers are simultaneously wasting water by using their allocations and by not using them. It uses status symbols from the middle and upper classes of lawns and private pools to claim that the farmers are getting rich at the expense of the rest of society. This argument sits on the premise that water is a public good in Israel. The accusation of using agricultural water for personal need is a discursive strategy for delegitimising the farmers. It is repeated in several other articles of

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[v] A play on the Hebrew version of the idiom "you can't trust the cat to guard the cream" which means acting irresponsibly, letting a person of interest a role they will abuse to their benefits.

[w] Moshavim and Kibbutzim are forms of settlement of a collective community, based on socialism and Zionism ideologies, was traditionally based its livelihood on agriculture. The names Shtrasler specifically identifies as the benefactors of the subsidies are the left-wing farmer's movements, moshavim and kibbutzim, and he doesn't mention the right-wing Settlement movement.

[x] There are two Hebrew words to mean farmers: *icarim* (איכרים) who practice non-irrigated farming (based on rainfall only) and *haklayim* (חקלאים) who uses irrigation techniques and grow crops who demand regular hydration. Ironically, Shtrasler mistakenly calls the recipients of water allocations as icarim.

this period,[53] and it is even used by the Minister of Infrastructure,[54] always in the context of the need to reduce farming allocations.

The presentation of agricultural export to Europe, mentioned by Strasler above,[55] is a repeating argument in this period about the *irrational* use of water by farmers.[56] A repeated statement in both newspapers is that "there is no need for us to export water to Europe in the shape of bananas and tomatoes".[57] That is a multi-layered explanation: the cheap agricultural water tariffs lead to exporting goods, which are based on intense irrigation, and that this is a market failure, which does not represent the real water demands during the crisis. [58] The discussion on the irrigation tariff is another form of economisation of hydro-policies and their discourse. This was achieved by the use of several arguments: (1) evaluating the agricultural contribution to the national economy, its low share in the economy compared to its high share in water use; in order to blame the farmers for spending national resources disproportionately;[59] (2) having irrigation water rates set lower than the urban tariffs is presented as a way to subsidise agriculture; (3) hence supporters of raising the tariffs called for "full",[60] "real"[61,62] or "economic"[63] rates, and for the "rationalization"[64] of prices and "efficiency"[65,66] of water use; and (4) by presenting the current system as "artificial",[67] "illogical",[68] with "distortion[s]"[69] or simply "uneconomic".[70] For example, the Minister of Infrastructures suggests that the government "cancel water subsidies to agriculture".[71] He provides the following reasons:

> *Since the 60s, agriculture enjoys fresh water quotas at subsidised prices, 35% lower than the household and industry tariff. […] this system created a situation that contradicts any logic and economic approach, when an essential and product in demand and in severe shortage like water – is subsidised.[72]*

In August 2001, the ministers of agriculture and finance negotiated a tariff reform in agriculture. Simhon is quoted in Haaretz as saying: "the price of water for agriculture will reflect the real cost of supplying freshwater"; however, the item emphasises that "Shimhon did not clarify what he meant by 'real cost'".[73] This is not the only time where the economic discourse expanded into the arguments given by the AZDC.

The delegitimisation of the farmers meant to exclude them from decision-making on hydro-policies, and appeared in both papers, but instances of it are much less frequent in YA. In YA, Eshet calls the bodies representing farmers, "the agriculture clique headed by [PM] Sharon" and a "farming mafia",[74] and he claims that they block any reforms that

could reduce consumption.[y] A few weeks later, he stated that "most of their interest is to leech on public property – whether its land, money or water".[75] Agricultural quotas and their cuts receive little attention in YA and are only ever in the form of a sporadic line or two, either supporting further cuts or claiming that the quota system (which was set up in 1989) is disconnected from the real consumption figures.[76,77] While in YA, delegitimisation generally refers to the framer's political power, in Haaretz, it focuses mainly on their influence on water tariffs, which is presented as leading to an "irrational" use of water (as seen in Strasler's quotes above).

In an op-ed written by the Deputy Director of Budgets published in August and entitled "the sweet price of expensive water",[z,78] the discursive strategies of economisation combined with the delegitimisation of the farmers continues. The farmers are accused of having an "ideology", and they are referred to as *askanim*[aa] and blamed for stealing from the public: "in the past three decades, Israel experienced the biggest water robbery of its history."[79] This refers to the policy of reduced agricultural water tariffs, which led to an over-consumption of water. The writer claims that the political system is "incapable" and "too weak to guard the public interest" from the pressures exerted by these interest groups. The writer claims that any political decision-making over these subjects is an "economic distortion". This op-ed compares the budget and water, and it emphasises the discursive connection between the two. It uses idioms such as "holding the schieber" (or "with the hand on the tap") which usually means in Hebrew 'controlling the budget'; "flow"; "withdrawal"; and that the budget and the reservoirs are "drained", "empty" and in "overdraft".[80]

As a response to their delegitimisation, the AZDC used three main strategies. First, it used Zionistic arguments, based on the traditional self-perception of agriculture as a means of national protection, such as "blooming the desert", feeding the country and supplying produce for industry. Secondly, it argued for economic reasons to the lower

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[y] Another example of de-legitimization portraying the farmers as benefiting on the expanse of the public, Eshet also connects the water quotas to real-estate aspirations, writing that farmers are only using their quotas to maintain their right for holding on public-land, until they can benefit from rezoning it.

[z] Can also be translated" "the sweet price of the cherished water"

[aa] עסקנים - Party hacks or party-workers, usually referred to group of people who combine business with political activity like lobbing for commercial interests, or people whose livelihood or profession is political activity. This term has a diminishing and negative meaning, can also suggest criminal and immoral intent or practices by those people.

price: urban water has higher quality standards than irrigation, and as such it costs more to supply, meaning it is not a subsidy. Second strategy argued that Israeli agriculture is "efficient" in its water use compared to the past (due to changes in crops and technology);[81] and agricultural products support local industry and create a landscape with economic benefits (which are important for the tourism industry). Third, it adopts environmental arguments for the benefits of supporting agriculture: by blocking the urban spread; maintaining open spaces and "green-lungs"; for improved air, groundwater seepage and temperature regulation; and for recycling organic waste. For instance, in Haaretz, it stated that:

> *According to Simhon, the farmers are the ones who keep the land of the nation from being seized by hostile elements, that is, the Arabs. This land is the last barrier against urban insanity and the green lungs of the country.[82]*

By using economic and environmental arguments, the AZDC signals that its traditional Zionist discourse lost the hegemonic political position it enjoyed in the past. The AZDC also use environmental and economic arguments against reducing their water quotes. They warn that quota cuts will force farmers to uproot their plantations and will lead to unemployment. By comparing this uprooting to the recent forest fires (also an outcome of the drought), the farmers present the environmental and ecological benefits of their occupation. When the AZDC use arguments from the paradigms of other discourse-coalitions, it is a sign of the weakening discursive power of their old socialist and Zionist arguments.

Evidence in the newspapers suggests that the debate around reducing agricultural water to mitigate the drought started before the timeframe of CDP1.[bb] Already in January, Haaretz reported on the farmers' campaign against the suggested cuts in the quotas of 50%.[83] Five different farmers representing different NGOs and sub-sectors (including an Arab farmers' representative) are quoted in this article. In this article, MK Shimchon[cc] claims that the crisis is not due to the lack of rainfall, but as "a result of failed policies of all the governments that refrained from making the necessary investments in water

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[bb] As agriculture at that year was the biggest user of freshwater, and because this consumption is regulated by a quota system, one of the quickest ways to mitigate the drought is by allocation reduction. Quota cuts and compensation for agriculture during droughts due to "natural disaster" has a long history in Israel.

[cc] Who become the Agriculture Minister two months later, and at the time was also head of the Agricultural Centre (an NGO also known as Israel Farmers' Federation).

infrastructure". This item is an example of the AZDC's interpretation of the failure-to-act frame; they claim that cutting quotas is a way for the government to "cover-up" its failures, and that the action needed is investment in SD (and they anticipate environmental objections to this policy).

During this period, the AZDC repeatedly quoted promoting desalination as an alternative to cut allocations;[84] they suggest that desalination will be directed for household consumption (releasing freshwater for irrigation) and funded by the urban sector.[85, 86] During CDP1, the issue of agriculture had been presented in the press less and less frequently by the farmers' leadership and more and more by the Minister of Agriculture, as the last remaining spokesperson of the AZDC which had not been affected by the delegitimisation promoted by the EcDC.

4.3.2.2.   Urban Sector Responsibility and the Gardening Ban

Two initiatives were promoted by the Ministry of Infrastructures (MoI) during the summer of 2001 to address urban consumption: the first, a temporary ban on urban-garden irrigations, public and private (hereafter 'gardening ban');[87] and the second raised household tariffs for gardening. Despite the short length of the debate about these policies,[dd] their coverage is relevant for the development of relating polices in CDP1 and CDP2. At the beginning of this period, both newspapers presented the possibility of a gardening ban as an indicator of the magnitude of the crisis.[88,89] In July 2001, the papers used the contestation of these polices to reaffirm their position on agricultural consumption. Both newspapers presented a clear stance against the promotion of the ban, giving more coverage to voices rejecting it. They suggested prioritising cuts to agricultural quotas and rises in agriculture tariffs over any policy that target urban users. They emphasise that urban initiatives will lead to a minimal reduction in consumption (compared to the large reduction potential in agriculture), and that unlike the farmers who pay "artificial" tariffs, the urban sector already pays the "full" or "real" cost of water. Other arguments against the ban were also economic: the councils' financial inability to enforce it; the possible harm to the gardening sector; and mainly a loss to investment. For example, YA once gave a voice to a celebrity stating - "I've invested hundreds of thousands of shekels in my garden, and now they want me to dry it"; and once to a mayor

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[dd] The gardening ban was only debated for one month, and didn't receive the Knesset's approval just days before its intended start, and the tariff change was raised at the last month of this CDP.

who stated that "[it will] cause the destruction and loss of hundreds of millions of shekels invested over the years in public gardening". As can be seen by these quotes, the newspapers' debate about this ban did not differentiate between private and public gardening (except in one op-ed, but this changes in CDP2). Some MKs are quoted as suggesting the idea of replacing the gardening ban with tariff rises. However, YA claims that "increasing water prices for households is not worthwhile", based on an economic study by the Israeli Consumer Council. [90] At the end of the period, the MoI promotes raising tariffs on urban garden irrigation; this initiative was just a footnote in the coverage of the PIC recommendations.

Both newspaper emphasise that the biggest benefit of the unsuccessful gardening ban is that it raised the public awareness and interest in the water crisis: in YA such a statement is given in a quote from the minister of infrastructures; and in a Haaretz an editorial titled "Before Drying-Out Gardens",[ee] explains:

> *So far, the water shortage was the subject of debate between specialists, politicians with vested interests and farmers; this is the first time that the debate broke into the wider public sphere, to the level of private garden owners, and the awareness to the severity of the problem increased.[91]*

On top of the arguments given above against the ban, the editorial argues for expanding the use of sewage treatment for irrigation and to consider a consumption reduction as temporary and as an interim policy until desalination and importation are in operation. This quote indicates what Beck (1995:5) described as how "the alarms go off" when the risk reaches the "influential middle class", which leads to governmental action and opportunities for industrial expansion (see Section 1.1.2). It is unclear why the newspapers view public awareness as important as all through this period, they do not give voice to lay people to be able to participate in the debate. The newspapers use the attention given to the gardening ban to reaffirm the discourses blaming the agricultural sector and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) (for delaying desalination), and by that they enforced a position that depoliticisation of water is beneficial for the wider public.

In CDP1, the idea of reducing consumption as a way for achieving resilience is contested, and it is supported mainly by those who wish to reduce it in agriculture as a means of increasing the supply to the urban sector. While the more prominent debate in

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[ee] As for the phrase "drying out" please see note 4 in the Appendix on Translations.

CDP1 is about finding ways to increase water availability, which is the topic of the next part of the analysis.

4.3.3. Policies to Increase Water Supply through "Alternative Water Sources"

At the beginning of CDP1 several items in both newspapers remind the readers that past Israeli governments decided to import water, and to use desalination and recycled sewage.[92,93,94] Thus, in these items, the governmental failure is indicated by their inaction on these policies. Sometimes as seen above, it is presented more specifically as being due to the treasury's objection to approving the budgets to implement these policies.[95] The discourse around these three policies at the beginning of CDP1 attributes them the same likelihood of realisation (while mentioning that each has its own time-scale between decision-making to implementation, and each entails a separate set of considerations). One phrase is repeated during this period to represent all three polices: *alternative water sources*. For instance, PM Sharon explains that his commitment to "fasten projects to develop alternative water sources: 'the solution for the crisis is producing new water – not drying-out gardens or farming land".[96] As this quote indicates, "alternatives" can also be considered as "new", "produced" and "developed", the opposite of the old and unproduced water cycle. These policies present "creative and advanced solutions to the shortage",[97] and represent a general attitude which shows that this water crisis (unlike past droughts) demands transforming the current water system through the use of certain technologies. Haaretz' editorial entitled "Water Policy Change" explains: "in 2001 water shortages should no longer be considered as a natural blow".[98] The 'alternative water sources' phrase presents an identical discourse to that which Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) presented in the 'scarcity fix' argument. They represented a technological vision, which focused on the water supply (not managing demands), which is consistent with political-ecological, Malthusian modern development logic, and relates to neoliberal ideals. This discourse also adopts the scientific term of "freshwater" to differentiate the old water sources form the new. According to this approach, the way towards water resilience was through the use of technologies to increase supply. Each of the next four sections is presenting each of these alternatives.

4.3.3.1. Seawater Desalination: The First SD Tenders and the Privatisation Question

The CEO of Mekorot claims in YA in March 2001 that "the only solution to the severe water crisis is seawater desalination"; He further argues that even after this drought ends and due to the continual national rise in consumption "there is no way to rely on the regular water sources".[99] This section focus on the reporting of the SD tenders, and how their coverage contributes to the growing consensus on SD, that SD is the "only" solution.

As seen in Section 4.3.2.1, during the debate on agricultural water pricing and quotas in Haaretz, the EcDC used a variety of arguments to promote a depoliticised position of the marketisation of the tariffs, such as cancelling political subsidies. However, in YA, these ideas about tariffs were mentioned in proximity to the idea of creating a market of private water producers, mainly through desalination. This section, on the coverage of the desalination tenders, begins by showing how the government decision to promote SD was used by the treasury to give meaning to what the "real cost" of water is.[ff] An interview by Meirav Arlosoroff, the economic editor of Haaretz, with the MoF Director of Budgets (DoB), is a good example of presenting the ministry position on pricing and its connection to desalination. In this interview, the DoB admits that the MoF was wrong to reject desalination. According to the article, the MoF's position for the rationalisation of water pricing implied that it should be identical to all consumers regardless of its use (e.g. irrigation, industry or household), and that past attempts to raise the price for agriculture have failed. The DoB explained that because there is no water market in Israel, there is no way to calculate and evaluate the water prices, based on supply and demand, only by the cost of its allocation. The DoB is quoted as saying the following:

> *The great importance of desalination in my eyes is that for the first time, we can determine the price of water in Israel. Therefore, the treasury made a mistake when it objected to desalination for all these years, and even in small amounts. The transition to desalination helps us prove that the price that the farmers pay is too low. Today, we can say that its illogical to produce water for 70 cents and to sell it to the farmers for 20 cents, the farmers also understand this.[100]*

This new way to evaluate the price of water can be found three weeks later in a column in YA:

[ff] As can be seen in the quote the DoB says "we can determine", when "we" equals the MoF. Legally the Water Council has the jurisdiction to set the water price, hence the DoB not only argue for the rationalization of the tariff but also for the MoF achieving control over the process.

Water has a price. And, surprisingly, it is not zero. It is the opposite, it is known and familiar to [the Ministry of Agriculture] and to everyone who is interested in this question. It is the price of desalinating seawater, which is abundant.[101]

In her commentary column, published under this interview, Arlosoroff explains that in the debate on a possible solution to the water crisis:

[…] only one side was right, the Ministry of Finance, but neither sides were smart. The persistence of the treasury to rationalise water pricing in Israel, meaning the abolition of subsidises for agricultural water, was economically right but politically impossible.[102]

Arlosoroff's opinion, similar to Shtrasler's above, provides support for the economisation of hydro-policies, and which claims that political justification for water pricing is one of the causes of the crisis. However, while Shtrasler delegitimises the farmers, Arlosoroff legitimises the ministry. She describes the treasury as "the only right side", "rational" and that its actions are motivated by "admirable determination".[103]

Reporting the issues relating to the water tenders is a main part of the newspaper coverage in CDP1. For instance, 50 items in Haaretz (15% of items) and 9 in YA (8%) include the word 'tender' in their headlines (most but not all of these are desalination tenders). It is clear by the quotes from the ministers in these items that the government uses the tenders as a means to give a sense of action and as a response to the failure-to-act discourse. Haaretz' political commentator writes in April 2001 that:

[PM] Sharon wishes that the new water desalination project will be credited to him, as the one who saved Israel from dehydration, but the big catastrophe of the water services is credited to his days as Minister .[104]

Certain key actors across this period suggest that the need to use SD in Israel is 'inevitable'. For example, this is seen in the following quotes: "the only solution to the water crisis is seawater desalination"[105] or "the solution is by desalination" (BD and SD).[106,107] Alongside framing desalination as 'saving' Israel from the crisis, when reporting on the SD tenders, they are framed as serving a broader economic purpose.[gg] As seen by the statement from the MoI after signing the construction agreement for the first SD facility, "this policy will accelerate economic growth and create more jobs, especially in the unemployed-stricken Ashkelon".[108] Importantly, as this news item emphasises by the use of "this policy", the

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[gg] It is important in the context that the Israeli economy at the time suffered a recession, due to the 2000 Dot-com Bubble financial crisis and The Second Palestinian Intifada.

minister refers not only to SD, but also to its implementation by using a "public-private partnership" (PPP).[hh] Three SD tenders are promoted in this period, and one of the most prominent aspects of their coverage in Haaretz is the different economic variations of this partnership.[ii]

Tevet (2015) acknowledges PPP as part of the slow privatisation of infrastructure. However, the newspapers at the time do not use any language to critique privatisation, nor do they give voice to the actors that do. Only two do, and one is in a short indirect quote from Mekorot union; the other is in an item about the UN Water summit opposing water privatisation (including PPP projects).[109] Both newspapers present a position that supports privatisation, without using the word privatisation, possibly because it is often used describe selling governmental companies and not for building something new. Besides these PPPs, the newspapers use the language of "private investment in infrastructure", "private entrepreneurship",[110,111] and "private franchise".[112] The ideological reasons for moving from public investment to private is never presented. The newspapers mask it with short statements about historical governmental decisions not to expand "governmental monopolies". For example: "governmental companies are not allowed to participate in desalination projects. According to a governmental decision, this market is meant for the private sector".[113] The IWC position on this debate is never presented. YA economic commentator, Eshet, suggests that some costal municipalities will build SD facilities, and hence that desalination can be publicly owned.[114]

Masking the economic transition, which is embedded within desalination (i.e. privatisation), as a managerial decision, is a discursive strategy used by the EnDC. Officials from the treasury called the decision, made by the PM to allow Mekorot to own (and not to build or operate) the facility in Ashdod,[jj] as: "inefficient",[115] a "conflict of interest"[116] and "unreasonable",[117] and which "will cause serious, profound and lasting harm to the public good".[118] More than once, these officials also use the discursive strategy of juridification, arguing that not complying with this governmental decision is illegal, and

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[hh] Public-private partnerships involve collaboration between a government agency and a private-sector company that can be used to finance, build, and operate projects.

[ii] Whether it's Build-Operate-Transfer in Ashkelon, Build-Operate-Own in Hadera or Turn-Key in Ashdod.

[jj] on a land where it had in old small scale SD facility

could bring private SD companies to sue the state or Mekorot.[119,120,121] The newspapers reflect this discourse in many ways: first (as mentioned above) by not presenting the voices contesting the privatisation of water, and when they are presented, they are predominantly coming from governmental companies arguing to be part of the new "SD market", thus shown as a management or union interest to expand.[122,kk] By this the newspapers limit the scope of the debate over the question of whether to allow governmental companies to participate in the tenders (and thus to compete against private companies), and by not opening the debate up to the option of SD being governmentally owned. These governmental companies (Mekorot, Bazan, the Israeli Electric Company and others) all have past experience in SD,[ll] and/or the energy production necessary for it and have available seashore territory next to power plants. These advantages of these companies (over the private sector) are also reduced to the question of cost, as seen in the following quote:

> *Against the principle by which the government shouldn't produce[mm] seawater desalination through governmental companies, stands the consideration that these available locations have some advantages for the cost of desalination. […] whereas any reduction in production and construction costs is a net gain for the entire economy.* [123]

This quote frames the debate as being between "principle" and "consideration", that is two uneven sides, and more importantly, not as an ideological disagreement, which must comply with the economic discourse logic. The advantages of using industrial land instead of developing coastal areas, and the ability to reuse access water and energy from the nearby power plants, are only presented as economic not as environmental benefits.

The contestation between Mekorot and the MoI against the treasury over the construction of the Ashdod facility is described in Haaretz as a "dispute" over "who will control the facility – Mekorot's workers or the private sector […] This dispute has deviated from the debate to a personal confrontation between Mekorot's CEO [and the Accountant General[nn]]".[124] The newspaper presents this contestation, which is brought

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[kk] This debate is within the context of the negotiation between MoF to Mekorot and its union over a "structural reform", which used the "water crisis" discourse to introduce neo-liberal management principles to Mekorot. This subject was excluded from the data collection.

[ll] Mekorot had an old SD facility in Ashdod since the 1970 which was unused do to its high-energy consumption.

[mm] The word in Hebrew is לעסוק which can also be translated into: participate, engage, or do business.

[nn] High level rank in the Ministry of Finance.

before the PM for a decision, as an antagonistic (and personal) disagreement between a "belligerent union"[125] and an administration that protects the public interest (i.e. depoliticised); and not as an outcome of two legitimate opposite ideological perspectives about privatisation (i.e. politicalised).

4.3.3.2. Sewage Treatment as a Precedent for the Depoliticisation of the Hydro-Discourse

Recycling sewage water for agricultural irrigation is one of the most frequently mentioned policies in this period, and the first of the 'alternative' polices to be implemented.[oo] Analysing this policy discourse is not in the scope of this research; however, it is important for the development of the desalination discourse on several reasons. Conceptually and perhaps discursively, sewage treatment can be seen as a precedent to desalination. Firstly, as the promotion of sewage treatment was part of the transition of water issues from the political to the techno-managerial. Secondly, it contributes to a framing of the crisis as a question of supply and demand, which can be resolved by technological solutions. Unlike the other policies analysed in this section, sewage treatment is not contested, and it enjoys support from the AZDC, EnDC and partially by the EcDC, each with their own reason.[pp] Therefore, it acts as an example of what Teschner et al. (2013: abstract) describe as how technology "induced new ideas about water abundance and engendered policy change". Sewage treatment offers the contesting coalitions an opportunity to unite around a technology which displaces their political deadlock and ideological disagreements. This policy shows how water allocations are not a zero-sum game between urban and agriculture uses since it allows the growth in domestic consumption to continue without the reduction in agriculture, and thus turns sewage from an ecological problem to an economic resource. Plocker, the YA economic commentator, states that "freshwater flows into agriculture, sewage water is discharged into the sea"[126] when arguing for investment into sewage treatment. This policy is presented as positive, not only because

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[oo] Taking into conciderations that the data collection excluded stories about water contamination, that were almost always related to untreated sewage, which means that this policy was even more prominent in this period.

[pp] The EnDC as it solves problems of water contamination and argues for the use of reclaimed sewage for streams restoration. The AZDC as substitute for freshwater, and the EcDC as a way to reform both municipal water and sewage services and to base the agriculture tariff on the cost of water. The EcDC promotes it as a means to implement "cost-based tariff" on agriculture, the EnDC describe it as a way to minimize water contamination.

it solves the argument about agricultural allocations, but also because of its cost: "desalinated (or imported) water costs three times as much as reclaiming sewage".[127] Finally, similar to SD, this policy presents a risk-society circularity in that "over time irrigation by reclaimed water causes damage to soil texture, reducing crops and impairing their quality".[128] This is the only item that presents the potential future risks of this policy, indicating that the consensus around the policy shows how the media has minimised its disadvantages (in a similar way to the discursive development of SD, as presented in Chapter 6). At the end of this period, the PIC recommended a complete transformation of Israeli agriculture to be based on reclaimed water irrigation (see Chapter 2), except for specific crops which could be influenced by this risk. In some ways, the marginalisation of the ecological implications of this technology act as a precedent to the marginalisation of the ecological implications of desalination, and thereby contributes to the presentation of these technologies as non-political.

4.3.3.3. Importing Water

The news coverage of water imports initiatives, the third "alternative" policy for increasing supply, sheds light on how economic arguments became more powerful than (geo)political ones, and this change benefited the promotion of SD. The first and last items of this CDP in Haaretz are dedicated to water importation, and through the period, almost every item about water import compared it to desalination. Mostly compared their price per MCM and/or how quickly they can become available. In May 2001, the government published a tender for importing water from Turkey.[129] Supporters of import present it (mostly in Haaretz) as an Israeli geo-strategic interest and opportunity for tightening connections with Turkey.[130,131,132,133] In one time, in YA, this aspect was considered to be a disadvantage by "creating dependency on another country."[134] The import was presented as having a direct implication on other aspects of the Turkey-Israel relationship, mainly on issues of arms trades ("Water for Tanks",[135] as commented in one supporting op-ed in Haaretz). Between November 2001 and March 2002, the treasury delayed and later cancelled the import tender on technical grounds (the PM instructed them to reissue it) while offering the commissioner to double plans for SD production due to his support for waiving the import. Haaretz clarified the reason: "the treasury is unenthusiastic in approving the import because of its price which is expected to be 50% more than desalination".[136] This period ends with the treasury's plea to the PM to cancel any initiatives relating to water imports on the grounds that it is more expensive than SD (with a financial compensation for Turkey and the companies involved).[137]

The eradication of the import possibility despite its advantages on the grounds of its price is significant for the following reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the hegemony of economic arguments over other discourses and considerations, and it indicates the power of the treasury (and the EnDC) in decision-making. Particularly, it emphasises the importance of the price per MCM over other "costs", including economic ones (i.e. the compensation). Similarly, as the treasury agreed to desalination as a means to reform the tariff, they evaluated the competing policies mostly in terms of their price and not any other aspects. Secondly, by presenting SD as the benchmark for any alternative, it reaffirms the growing consensus around desalination as the leading hydro-policy. Finally, in May 2002, in a news item covering the PIC report, YA writes that "the committee decided not to engage with the issue of the import from Turkey because these are not just considerations of water, but also of a political dimension."[138] The quoted PIC member remains anonymous, and what they meant by political remains unexplained. The PIC decision not to engage with the policy, which was presented as equal to desalination at the beginning of the period, marks it as irrelevant in comparison. More importantly, the PIC is comprised by *politicians* not specialists and its decision not to engage with the *political* aspects of water, reveal the self-perception of their role as being post-political.

4.3.3.4. Coverage of Additional Desalination Technologies

For the final discussion on 'alternative' policies, it is important to notice that there is more than one desalination technology that is reported in this period. Brackish desalination (BD)[qq] is the second most frequently mentioned desalination option in CDP1 after SD, and other desalination options only appear in the newspapers a few times. Unless they explicitly mention one of the options, the newspapers use "desalination" as a general term to cover all desalination technologies. Consequently, statements such as "the government of Israel has finally decided to enter the era of desalination"[139] and "the desire to delay as much as possible the transition to the era of desalination will no longer be realised"[140] (in items that do not specify which) should be read as supporting *all* the desalination possibilities. On many occasions, SD and BD are mentioned during the period as being equal options: "we can solve this problem, amongst others, by seawater and brackish desalination"[141] or that a "revolutionary new technology developed in Israel […] can

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[qq] Brackish water are having more salinity than freshwater, but not as much as seawater. In Israel brackish water most commonly refers to underground brackish water sources.

lessen the price of the desalination of seawater and brackish water by 50 percent".[142] Writers, however, distinguish between these technologies mainly when specifically reporting on a development or debate about one of them.[rr] In terms of the water import and sewage, the difference in the coverage of BD over SD helps shed light on the discourses that come later.

The particular coverage of BD is more frequent in Haaretz, and it is primarily scientific, but sometimes economic. At the beginning of the period, the Ministry of Agriculture promoted BD for agricultural use.[143] BD gained more attention during the summer of 2001 due to a proposal to utilise a saline underground reservoir in the Negev. Much of the coverage of this technology concentrates on the scientific disagreements between the current commissioner (who opposed using this aquifer) and the former one (Ben-Meir, who was hired by entrepreneurs to lobby for BD).[144] Plans for BD in several Negev locations are scientifically criticised in Haaretz based on the risks that pumping saline water imposes on nearby freshwater aquifers. Nonetheless, the option of using BD near Lake Kinneret and the Mountain Aquifer is presented positively as a technology for their protection.[145] One of the items in YA that presented Ben-Meir's plans for BD called it "radical", the explanation reflect a risk society cycle:

> *The principle of this plan is to continue over-pumping from the costal aquifers for a period of 10-20 years, a period when the aquifer will get completely destroyed, and its water will salinate. And then to continue pumping the saline water and desalinate them at a lower rate. This period will allow Israel to build enough seawater-desalination facilities and develop cheap desalination technologies; thereafter, the water system will be on its feet, and ready to say goodbye forever to the aquifer.[146]*

That is, the aim is to continue the creation of a risk until a new technology that can solve it becomes available, which is replaced by a more advanced technology, disconnecting it from nature. This plan positions BD as a transitional stage towards the radical disconnection from nature offered by SD. Other scientists are quoted in response, referring to this plan as "silly", "absurd", "unsustainable", "un-ecological" and "deceptive".[147] Having Ben-Meir as the main promoter of BD in this period and by delegitimising his policy-suggestions, thus discursively works against it. In comparison,

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[rr] Sever Plocker differentiate between SD and BD by calling the first desalination (התפלה) and the second sweetening (המתקה), he is the only writer using this term.

during this period, the predicted ecological and scientific (dis)advantages of SD never received such in-depth reporting.

When presented positively, BD is often reduced to its economic advantages. For example, the title of a commentary box next to a scientific item on BD in Haaretz states that: "increasing the water balance at no extra cost"[148] explains how the full price of BD in the Negev is cheaper than the current cost of transferring water from the north to this area. In YA, Eshet asks whether:

> *Seawater desalination is an expensive story. Alternatively, under the Negev, there is about 1 billion cubic metres of water; their desalination costs half the price of seawater. What did the economic rabbis decide? That they prefer expensive seawater over cheap water from the Negev. Why?[149]*

That is, as in the case of the imports, BD is presented in comparison to SD, but only in its economic value. Unlike the imports, the economic advantage of BD over SD, coupled with this policy's ecological and environmental advantages,[ss] are never presented by either the economic or the environmental discourse-coalitions as a reason for preferring the former over the latter. Even the issue of privatising BD is not debated in the newspapers whereas the privatisation of SD is. One item in Haaretz on the approval of a BD facility in the north opens with: "for the first time, private entrepreneurs will sell desalinated water to the country".[150] The use of "desalination" and (not BD) in the headline and in the opening paragraph suggests that BD is presented as a pilot for the general implementation of desalination by private companies. This is similar to Ben-Meir's vision, as the first step of the transition. At the end of the period, the PIC report recommendations for implementing BD by Mekorot (that is not being privatised) are reported in Haaretz without any clarifications about the decision. YA never mentioned BD in its coverage of the report, but it explicitly mentions "seawater desalination".[151] This silences frame BD as being less important than SD, similar to the option of importing; thus, these once equally relevant alternatives are no longer in the same position.

[ss] BD is promoted by the IWC as a mean to protect the aquifers and the Kinneret from salination and require about half the electricity of SD.

4.3.4. Marginalised Environmental Discourse: Climate Change and the Environmental Discourse Coalition

This part of the analysis centres on the alternative discourses on the reason for the crisis, which are derived from an environmental perspective, and their marginalised presentation in the press. Climate change (or global warming) was only mentioned eight times during this period (less than 1.8% of the items), six times are by Rinat the environmental reporter in Haaretz. The discourse about climate change in this period is scientific and taken from scientists. In CDP1, climate change is reported with some uncertainty, using words such as "may be connected",[152] "according to the hypothesis"[153] and with uncertainty about its possible effect on the regional weather, as can be seen in the quote below, from an op-ed in Haaretz by Professor Hillel:[tt]

> *We are uncertain about the future climate. Despite the concerns that global warming will cause [unclear word, maybe desertification] in our country, there is the opposite possibility also. Anyway, it is likely that in warmer climates, every phenomenon will intensify – the storm periods will get stronger and the drought periods will get harder.[154]*

This op-ed argues in favour of agricultural subsidies due to its contribution to CO_2 absorption, water seepage and temperature regulation. That is, even if it presents uncertainty about the future climate, it presents local agriculture as being part of the solution towards climate-resilience, and not as part of the problem. At least three times, climate change was mentioned next to other hypotheses for the causes of regional changes in precipitation patterns.[155,156]

In YA, uncertainty also exists around the anthropogenic origins of climate change. A magazine item talking about the effect of "global warming" on Lake Kinneret suggests that solar storms caused it, and not greenhouse gas emissions. The title of this article is "Desalination to Save the Kinneret",[157] and this is one of the three times in CDP1[158,159] where desalination is clearly presented as a climate adaptation technology. These articles emphasise that climate change is not only about a decrease in precipitation, but also an increase in evaporation. In YA, Doctor Seter from the Hydrological Services is quoted with a prediction that "in the near future, the National Water Carrier will reverse: instead of supplying water from Lake Kinneret into the country, it will transport desalinated water

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[tt] Daniel Hillel is an agronomy professor at the Hebrew University.

from the coastline to the lake".[160] In 2018 (CDP3), this speculation turns into a policy (see Chapter 6).

Only occasionally, ENGO members are mentioned or quoted during this period. At the beginning of the period in a news item about the farmers' campaign against cuts in allocations, one of the farmer union leaders is quoted as being in favour of SD and predicts that "the greens" will be against this solution.[161] Only one news item presents an objection to SD by an environmental organisation; however, this is not an objection to the use of the technology, only to locating facilities in the Hifa bay area due to a risk of contaminated seawater in this area. The item quoted a representative from the Israel Union for Environmental Defence (IUED), arguing that SD facilities in the contaminated area "will not be able to desalinate water at the same price achieved in the first tender for Ashkelon".[162] Moreover, the representative complained that the Ministry for Environment was not consulted about the preparations of the SD tenders, and they warned that the IUED would make an appeal to the court against any placement of SD facilities in that area. This rare objection to SD is framed by the IUED as a scientific issue with economic implications, suggesting a judicial resolution, rather than a political one.

Another representation from the EnDC during this period showed their support for the depoliticisation of the hydro-policies in general, which does not necessarily directly connect to SD. An op-ed by a Tel-Aviv city council member from the Green Party, entitled "Bring the Water Back to the Professionals",[163] argues against pumping water from the aquifers below the red-lines, and further claims that an alternative to over-pumping is "increasing private awareness to water saving". The op-ed, thus, argues in favour of the depoliticisation of hydro-polices and for an expert-driven decision-making. The writer uses the crisis frame (calling it a "water disaster") and the governmental failure-to-act language to argue that:

> *The policy makers expropriated from the experts the authority to create effective policy for the water system and transfer it into the hands of the politicians, and even worse, into the hands of the lobbyists.* [164]

Furthermore, the writer argues for the benefits of declaring a 'state of emergency' to allow "appropriate action" and to expand the power of the IWC.

Except for op-eds written by the environmental reporter Rinat, in Haaretz, this is the only op-ed in this period written by a member of the EnDC. Despite the fact that Rinat is responsible for 11% of the newspaper publications, the environmental position

is marginalised during CDP1. One of the signs of this marginalization and the lack of access to participate in the debate in CDP1, is that the head of the SPNI[uu] once expressed his opinion at the Letters to the Editor section of YA, and not by an interview, nor was he quoted in a news item or published an op-ed. This will change in the next period.

4.3.5.   Magen Committee Report to Reaffirm the Debate Outcomes

As shown above, at the beginning of the period, both newspapers used the setting up of the PIC to reaffirm the failure-to-act frame, and they presented its role as "investigating" the governmental failure.[165] Haaretz' editorial argues this after the PIC had been established that:

> **Parliamentary committees consisting of politicians are not the best instrument for exploring these public problems,** *but once appointed, one can only hope that its findings and recommendations will assist finding a solution [emphasis added].[166]*

The day of the report publication, another editorial in Haaretz starts with exactly the same sentence marked in bold. This time claiming that "the committee's main contribution is by raising again the important issue back onto the agenda".[167] That is, Haaretz suggests the PIC has greater power to change the discourse than it does over changing the legislation. Haaretz further addresses the PIC work during this period in several ways: as a means to argue against the AZDC and their pro-depoliticisation of hydro-policies; and when reporting on the PIC hearings, Haaretz emphasises the testimonies in favour of making the IWC more professional and being independent from politician influence.[168] YA hardly engages with the hearings: only five news items mention it, including the reporting on the PIC being established and its conclusions. The items when YA report from the hearings are all very short and provide sensational and alarming quotes from the hearings about the crisis. For instance, a headline stated that "we will not be able to supply water every day".[169]

On 2/6/2002, the headline in YA on the PIC final report is in red font, stating "The Water Failure-to-Act";[170] by contrast, Haaretz' front-page headline states "The Enquiry Committee for the Water System: 'Ongoing Failure of Israeli Governments'".[171] Both newspapers start their coverage of the report with the PIC recommendations for

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[uu] The biggest and oldest ENGO in Israel.

declaring a state of emergency (SoE), transferring all water regulations and legislation to the PM for a three-year period. Both newspapers emphasise the PIC recommendations to make the IWC (and the commissioner) into an independent, professional, non-political body with more regulatory powers, which will narrow or cancel the (governmental) political ability to influence policies. During the SoE period and until the IWC reform was complete, the PM had the power of decision-making, according to the commissioner's recommendations. From these headlines highlighting the SoE and IWC reform, these newspapers reaffirm their argument that the "crisis" was caused by the failure-to-act, and that the water system requires a specialist management, and not political decision-making, a position which is now supported by the PIC report. Moreover, the committee's decision not to name individuals as responsible, but the historical and current hydro-policies management system as a whole, supports this position. Suggesting that this is not a failure of a specific government, but of the political.

The PIC report and its coverage answer the questions whether the treasury and/or the agricultural sector are responsible for the crisis. Both newspapers quote the same section from the report on the MoF, stating that it was "wrong" in its "attitude to reject flexibility and openness to new ideas which caused a big delay to desalination plans", and for "blocking Mekorot [...] and preventing its professional contribution". YA added a critique on the "over-involvement of the treasury" and its years-long consistent policy of cutting development budgets.[172] Haaretz, however, places the critique of the treasury at the end of the news item, without mentioning the PIC position on the power of the treasury and it budgetary cuts.[173] That is, YA parliamentary reporter presents the critique of the PIC on the treasury's neoliberal policies while Haaretz marginalises this part of the report. The PIC criticised the treasury's ideologically based decision-making as contributing to the crisis, both in delaying desalination and sewage treatment and in resisting that Mekorot implement them. In view of this, the report holds the potential of becoming a CDM about these polices, which YA highlights and Haaretz deemphasises.

The newspapers also vary on how they present the PIC findings about the agricultural water use. In YA, the farmers are "exempt [by the committee] from the collective blame" for the crisis, but "imposes the responsibility on 'some of the sector's leaders'" for preventing tariff reforms during these years.[174] The infrastructure reporter of Haaretz wrote that:

The committee disproves the claim that 'wasteful agriculture' caused the development of the crisis, and that it could have been solved by a drastic reduction in irrigated farming. The committee determined that agriculture has 'national-strategic-Zionist value' beyond its economic contribution, which should be maintained.[175]

Next to this news item, a commentary column by the same writer, maintains Haaretz' past position on the farmers, arguing that the "strategic-ideological decision […] to base the Israeli agriculture on irrigation [...] turned out to be disastrous".[176] Haaretz presents the ideological legitimisation by the committee in full while at the same time disagreeing with it. In contrast, despite the PIC stance against the delegitimisation discourse, YA chose to continue to direct the blame on the farmers' leadership and to overlook the ideological legitimization in the report. A few days later, Strasler, the most prominent promoter of the delegitimisation of the AZDC, published an op-ed against the PIC recommendations about the farmers.[177]

Regarding polices mentioned in the report, Haaretz wrote more than once that the SoE was set for two years to give time "for the SD facilities to start supplying drinking water and for the recycling facilities to provide big quantities of purified sewage water for irrigation".[178] YA repeated the need to "develop the water system", but without stating by which policy. For the remainder of the period (June-July 2002), there is no more reporting in YA on any hydro-policy. In the following days, a Haaretz news items criticises the PIC decision not to name responsible persons, comments on changes to the tariffs and the treasury's cancellation of the import tender.

The analysis of Haaretz and YA hydro-policies news coverage during the work of Magen Committee revealed important differences and similarities between and within the newspapers. To summarise this chapter, in both newspapers, the discourse in this period showed similarities to the post-political contestation identified in the literature review. This was achieved by presenting the drought and hydro-policies as techno-managerial issues through the use of scientific and economic discourses, and by presenting ideological oppositions as illegitimate and irrational actors.

An ideological pluralism (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017) *between* the newspapers had not been identified in this period despite the differences in focus in some issues. Mostly the differences between the newspapers relate to their format. As a popular newspaper, YA gave more space to alarming and sensational statements and less to the policy making process and the disagreements around it. The news items in YA were much shorter in length, presented less voices and focused more on dramatising the crisis, its risk and solutions (rather than analysing policy suggestions). Haaretz, by contrast, presented more issues from the policy debate and more voices; however, the fragmentation of coverage in this newspaper masks the context and connections between policies and arguments. Haaretz presented an ideological pluralism *within* the newspaper, which can be seen in the differences between the economic writers' position on pro-neoliberal economic solutions while the science and environmental writer emphasised the ecological ones (such as sewage treatment, domestic water reuse and nature preservation). Nonetheless, this pluralism was not equal and was limited in relation to the consensus formed around specific solutions and positions. Despite it having triple the amount of items, Haaretz' predominant coverage of hydro-policies in the economic section minimised the scope of the debate to a techno-managerial problem and not an ideological-political question. Scientific disagreements, such as in the case of BD, were presented in Haaretz by the science and environmental reporter, which also contributed to the process of depoliticisation. For the most part, YA echoed the post-political discourse and arguments, but Haaretz had wider coverage of this discourse. Mainly, this was by delegitimising the farmers and prioritising the (neoliberal) economic discourse and arguments over others (i.e. social, Zionist and environmental). Moreover, YA silenced or ignored the subjects of contestation which appeared in Haaretz, such as by not presenting the AZDC position, the supporters of the importing or in the case of BD, by minimising the debate around this policy to dismiss the "radical" Ben-Meir's plan. As such, YA

contributed to the presentation of SD and agricultural consumption reduction as prime and uncontested solutions to the crisis.

The hydro-policies reporting during CDP1 is further characterised by a general consensus about the existence of a water crisis, shared by the newspapers, governmental bodies and non-governmental actors. The crisis is explained in several ways: as an outcome of the drought (but not of climate change), as a supply and demand imbalance, but mostly as a result of a governmental failure-to-act. Both newspapers use scientific experts to situate the crisis as a risk, but not for suggesting solutions since that should be governmental responsibility. The analysis above has shown that the crisis discourse is in line with Beck's (1992) risk society theory: it was identified by scientists (hydrologists) and was suggested to be addressed by technologies (i.e. 'alternative water sources'). It also works in a similar way to Swyngedouw's (2010:221, see Section 1.2.3) critique on the use of an apocalyptic environmental discourse which heterogeneously risk "'THE' people and 'THE' environment" (mainly for Lake Kinneret), and which creates a perceived consensus around the ways to address it. Furthermore, in line with Swyngedouw (2010), even though the crisis is anthropogenic in origin (due to climate change and human consumption), the crisis discourse diverts attention from "the system" which created it to the solutions (which maintains the same growth logic). Nonetheless, this diversion was not absolute as the failure-to-act discourse and the investigation by the PIC directed the attention of the newspapers to the possibility that it was down to human responsibility.

Out of the technological solutions presented in this period, which as Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) suggested served the rationale of securing a constant water supply (the 'scarcity fix'), SD stood out as the leading one. Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) argue that SD has internal 'contradictions', which could lead to a politicisation of the hydro-policy discourse; I argue based on the analysis above, that in this period, some of these contradictions were considered as advantages to SD, and thus contributed at this point to the depoliticisation. The 'contradictions' presented by the newspapers as virtues in this period are: cost, ownership and growth. The cost of SD per MCM was the main reason behind the EcDC supporting this policy, in combination with their support of the private ownership of water infrastructure via PPP, and with the ability to contribute to economic growth. The 'contradictions', presented as the potential to politicise the debate in CDP1, were the energy contradictions, which was seen as a reason for state-owned desalination while the environmental contradiction was discussed as a possible opposition to this policy by the "greens" which was never fully voices in the papers. These two

'contradictions' in desalination were highly marginalised in CDP1, and they only appear in Haaretz. That is, the post-political and techno-managerial aspects of SD were presented as advantages over all the other policies suggested in this period.

The second consensus shared by these newspapers and the discourse-coalitions, which was reaffirmed by the initiation of an investigation, was around the governmental failure-to-act as leading to the crisis, but without a consensus about its implications (that is, the policies needed to address it). Both newspapers used the failure-to-act frame to depoliticise the debate in general (i.e. valuing expert knowledge over political considerations), or specific elements of it (e.g. supporting economic arguments) or specific actors in it (such as the agricultural sector). Predominantly, the newspapers actively imposed a post-political discourse on these hydro-policies by presenting the economic tools and the EcDC as non-ideological, and by priming (neoliberal) economic arguments over the AZDC and EnDC's ideological ones. In both newspapers, the economic editors depoliticised the debate in their commentary columns. In Haaretz, Strasler delegitimised the farmers while Arlosoroff positioned the treasury as the only rational actor. Similarly, in YA, Plocker and Eshet called to impose an economic marketisation logic on policy making (such as a free water market for desalination). They all strongly argued for a rationalisation of the water tariff by raising the agricultural tariffs and cancelling the water subsidies. A significant difference in the use of the failure-to-act discourse had been found in Haaretz editorials and Eshet's writing in YA when they argued that the policies are derived from the political, not from an economic solution, which has authority outside of politics. Other op-eds by external writers also used the failure-to-act discourse to politicise the debate. However, the occasions when the debate was presented as an agonistic and political-ideological contestation were significantly rare.

For the majority of CDP1, accusing the agricultural sector and its political leaders for creating the crisis was the prominent discourse. More predominantly in Haaretz, and less so in YA, blaming the farmers (for their quotas, tariffs and political power) was articulated by using the discursive strategies of economisation, delegitimisation and rationalisation to exclude them from the decision-making. YA almost never gave voice to the AZDC beyond of the Minister of Agriculture. The AZDC tried to respond to this discourse of delegitimisation by presenting ideological arguments in favour of supporting agriculture, and by using economic language or adopting environmental arguments. This attempt (shown exclusively in Haaretz) to use the language and arguments of other discourse-coalitions, coupled with the reduction in their media appearances, shows a

decrease in the power of the AZDC throughout this period. The economic tools presented to address agricultural consumption contributed to a further economisation of the hydro-policies discourse and the presentation of water as a techno-managerial issue.

To conclude this chapter from the resilience perspective, CDP1 presented the first stages in the resilience process, that is the identification of the risk by the 'crisis' discourse. In this period, the newspapers limited the scope of the risk definition to drought, which eliminated any possibility of it being due to climate change. This period presented two ways to react to the drought: the consumption management of one sector and technological solutions to increase supply. The first is meant either as *resilience-as-resistance* or *resilience-as-adjustments*. That is, resistance by cutting allocations in the short term or adjusting the tariffs, which was speculated as being a way to reduce and change the consumption patterns of farmers (such as changing the crops). The newspapers presented these policy tools as contributing to achieving a drought resilience for **everyone**, while it also being at the expense of the agricultural sector was justified by their delegitimisation. The idea of *resilience-as-transformation* (to 'alternative sources') was promoted as the most appealing for the government and as the necessary consensual development. At this stage, the implications of these future transformations have yet to be presented by the newspapers.

[1] Arad, Y. (2001, January 3) The Water Crisis: Agriculture Minister Ordered Mekorot to Publish a Tender for Constructing a Desalination Facility in Ashdod. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[2] Cohen, A. (2001, March 8) Will Work for Quick Importation of Water. *Haaretz*

[3] Cohen A. (2001, March 2) The Water Commission and the Treasury Work on a Plan to Raise Water Tariffs by 20%. *Haaretz*

[4] Arad, N. and I. Glickman (2001, February 22) In Spite the Storm: the Kinneret Sea-Level Only Rose by 3 cm, *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[5] Cohen, A. (2001, February 7) Water Gardens at Night, Uproot Water-Hungry Plants. *Haaretz*

[6] Ganhovski, D. (2001, March 6) Beige's Crocodile Tears. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[7] Cohen, A. (2001, March 9) The Commissioner Suggest to Make a Third of Household Water Costly by 175%. *Haaretz*

[8] Bassok, M. (2001, March 25) The Tender to Import 50-25 MCM of Water from Turkey will be Published Soon. *Haaretz*

[9] Ronen, M. (2001, May 2) Water Guard. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[10] Plocker, S. (2001, March 15) There is Water, There is No Policy. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[11] Herzog, I. (2001, December 20) The Clerks and the Water. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[12] Baron, G. and ITIM (2001, March 14) Water Commissioner: "If the Situation Continues, No Drinking Water will Remain in the Taps". *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[13] (Cohen 2001, March 9)

[14] Editorial (2001, April 20) Past Failures Price. *Haaretz*

[15] Cohen, A. (2001, May 21) Water Commission Operations Committee Warns of "Disaster". *Haaretz*

[16] Shachnai, H. (2001, June 25) Return the Water to the Experts. *Haaretz*

[17] (Arad and Glickman 2001, February 22)

[18] Rinat, Z. (2001, January 31) The Kinneret Sea-Level will Fall a Metre Below the Red-Line. *Haaretz*

[19] (Baron and ITIM 2001, March 14)

[20] Bior, H. (2001, March 21) Mekorot Union: Will Disrupt Water Supply if Company's Reconstruction Approved. *Haaretz*

[21] Baron, G. (2001, June 27) The Knesset Establish an Inquiry Committee for the 'Water Failure-to-Act', *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[22] Shibi, H. (2001, September 25) Lieberman: "We Cannot Supply Water Everyday". *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[23] Editorial (2001, March 3) Water Policy Change. *Haaretz*

[24] Arad, N. and Baron G. (2001, July 7) Cabinet Approved: to Immediately Build a Desalination Facility. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[25] Arad, N. (2001, July 10) The Water Reservoirs are on the Way to the Red-Lines. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[26] Rinat, Z. (2001, November 27) Experts: Over-Pumping Endangers the Costal Aquifer. *Haaretz*

[27] (Arad and Baron 2001, July 7)

[28] Bar-Yossef, I and Adato E, (2001, September 14) Appeal Against the Commissioner Decision to Lower the Kinneret Red-Line. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[29] Shaked, R. (2001, October 12) Grinding Water. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[30] Arad, N. (2001, July 24) Saving: a Drop in the Ocean. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[31] (Shaked 2001, October 12)

[32] Rinat, Z. (2001, August 28) The Abandonment of the Kinneret. *Haaretz*

[33] Ben-Bezalel, G. (2001, May 3) Oh My, My Kinneret. *Haaretz*

[34] (Bar-Yossef and Adato 2001, September 14)

[35] Tzidon, Y. (2001, March 18) Impotent Decision Making. *Haaretz*

[36] Rinat, Z. (2001, June 27) Parliamentary Committee to Investigate the Status of the Israeli Water System. *Haaretz*

[37] (Baron 2001, June 27)

[38] (Rinat, 2001, June 27)

[39] (Ronen, May 2)

[40] (Baron 2001, June 27)

[41] (Plocker 2001, March 15)

[42] Plocker, S. (2001, May 3) Watershed. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[43] (Plocker 2001, May 3)

[44] Eshet, G. (2001, April 29) Is this a New Government, *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[45] (Eshet 2001, April 29)

[46] Eshet, G. (2001, May 8) The Seven Water Sins. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[47] (Editorial 2001, April 20)

[48] Editorial (2001, July 26) Before Drying-Out Gardens. *Haaretz*

[49] (Editorial 2001, April 20)

[50] Strasler, N. (2001, July 3) The Shame Went Away. *Haaretz*

[51] (Strasler 2001, July 3)

[52] (Strasler 2001, July 3)

[53] Isser, A. (2001, July 9) A Proposal for the Despondent Farmer. *Haaretz*

[54] Georgie, A. (2001, July 27) Minister of Infrastructure: Abolish the Water Quotas for Agriculture. *Haaretz*

[55] (Strasler 2001, July 3)

[56] Eshet, G. (2001, March 7) Waster Prohibition Law. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[57] (Adin quoted at Shaked 2001, October 12)

[58] Strasler, N. (2001, March 20) Fake Shortage. *Haaretz*

[59] (Editorial 2001, April 20)

[60] (Plocker 2001, March 15)

[61] (Georgie 2001, July 27)

[62] Eshet, G. (2001, August 13) The Real Price of Water. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[63] (Plocker 2001, March 15)

[64] Tal, A. (2001, August 3) Do Not Dry the Land. *Haaretz*

[65] Cohen, A. (2001, March 2) Ministry of Agriculture funds 120 Million Shekel for Water Efficiency. *Haaretz*

[66] Cohen, A. (2002, March 10) The Treasury: the Country Have No Budget to Buy Water from the Farmers. *Haaretz*

[67] (Editorial 2001, July 26)

[68] Arlosoroff, M. (2001, July 24a) "We Should Have Agreed to Desalination Earlier". *Haaretz*

[69] Boaz, D. (2001, August 15) The Sweet Price of Expensive Water. *Haaretz*

[70] (Arlosoroff 2001, July 24a)

[71] (Georgie 2001, July 27)

[72] Cohen (2001, April 16) Lieberman Suggests to Cancel Water Subsidies to Agriculture, *Haaretz*

[73] Cohen, A. (2001, August 3) Simhon: Agriculture Water Price May Reach the Urban Price 1.43 Shekel. *Haaretz*

[74] Eshet, G. (2002, March 12) That's it, No More Water. What to do? *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[75] Eshet, G. (2001, April 3) Cottages Instead of Oranges. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[76] (Eshet 2002, March 12)

[77] (Eshet 2001, May 8)

[78] (Boaz 2001, August 15)

[79] (Boaz 2001, August 15)

[80] (Boaz 2001, August 15)

[81] (Cohen 2002, March 10)

[82] Cohen, A. (2001, August 13) The Framers Turn to the Ecologic Argument. *Haaretz*

[83] Cohen, A. (2001, January 11) Farmers Organizations Started a Campaign Against 50% Cuts in Water Quotas, *Haaretz*

[84] Cohen, A. (2001, October 11) The Farmers Centre: Compare the Price of Water to the Cost of Production. *Haaretz*

[85] (Cohen 2001, October 11)

[86] (Cohen 2001, August 13)

[87] Baron, G., Yeoshua, Y., Palter, N. and N. Arad (2001, July 25) The Fate of the Lawns will be Decided Today. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[88] (Baron and ITIM 2001, March 14)

[89] (Cohen, 2001, February 7)

[90] Arad, N. (2001, July 10) No Garden Irrigation in August and September. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[91] (Editorial 2001, July 26)

[92] (Cohen, 2001, February 7)

[93] (Tzidon, 2001, March 18)

[94] (Eshet 2001, April 29)

[95] (Ganhovski 2001, March 6)

[96] Cohen, A. (2001, April 11) Prime Minister: the Quotas Cuts for Agriculture are Too High. *Haaretz*

[97] Editorial (2001, March 16) Water Policy Change. *Haaretz*

[98] (Editorial 2001, March 16)

[99] (Baron and ITIM 2001, March 14)

[100] (Arlosoroff 2001, July 24a)

[101] (Eshet, 2001, August 13)

[102] Arlosoroff, M. (2001, July 24b) The Enemy of the Good is the Best. *Haaretz*

[103] (Arlosoroff 2001, July 24b)

[104] Kim, H. (2001, April 4) Starts to Zigzag. *Haaretz*

[105] (Baron and ITIM 2001, March 14)

[106] (Ronen 2001, May 2)

[107] (Plocker 2001, March 15)

[108] Bassok, M. (2001, November 26) First Franchises Signed. *Haaretz*

[109] Cohen, A. (2001, December 6) International Water Summit: Objecting Water Privatisation. *Haaretz*

[110] Cohen, A. (2001, November 12) Kibbutz Ma'agn Michael will Sell 10 MCM Desalinated Water to Mekorot for 35 Cent/CM. *Haaretz*

[111] (Plocker 2001, May 3)

[112] Arad, N. (2001, January 24) Shtrum to the Treasury and Infrastructures: Mekorot Shouldn't be allowed to Conduct the Desalination Tenders. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[113] Cohen, A. (2001, May 29) Bazan's Problem. *Haaretz*

[114] (Eshet, 2002, March 12)

[115] Palter, N. (2002, March 20) The Ministry of Infrastructures Against the Treasury: Let Mekorot Operate the Desalination Facility in Ashdod. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[116] Cohen, A. (2001, January 23) Shtrum: Giving Mekorot to Prepare the Desalination Tender – "Unreasonable". *Haaretz*

[117] (Cohen 2001, January 23)

[118] Cohen, A. (2002, February 19) The General Accountant Closes Mekorot's Tap. *Haaretz*

[119] Cohen, A. (2002, February 3) The General Accountant Demands to Freeze the Ashdod Desalination Tender. *Haaretz*.

[120] (Cohen 2001, January 23)

[121] (Cohen 2002, February 19)

[122] Cohen, A. (2001, May 3) The Ministry of Infrastructures Asks the Electricity Company to Allocate its Land for a Desalination Facility in Hadera. *Haaretz*

[123] (Cohen 2001, May 29)

[124] (Cohen 2002, February 19)

[125] (Cohen 2002, February 19)

[126] (Plocker 2001, May 3)

[127] (Eshet, 2001, April 3)

[128] Cohen. A (2002, June 7) The Inquiry Committee for the Water Crisis: Compensate the Farmers for Giving Freshwater to the State. *Haaretz*

[129] Arad, N. And G. Lior (2001, May 22) The Water Crisis: the Government Published a Tender for Water Import from Turkey. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[130] Cohen, A. (2001, November 28) The Water Importation Tender from Turkey is Cancelled. *Haaretz*

[131] Cohen, A. (2002, February 10) The Turkish Ambassador: We Do Not Support the Plan for a Water Pipeline to Israel. *Haaretz*

[132] Cohen, A. (2002, February 22) The Economic Cabinet is Expected to Approve Tender Exemption for Water Importation from Turkey. *Haaretz*

[133] Amit, A. And I. Eicher (2002, May 2) Turkey Suggests: Water to Israel via Underwater Pipeline. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[134] (Shaked 2001, October 12)

[135] Barzili, A. (2002, February 6) Water for Tanks. *Haaretz*

[136] Cohen, A. (2002, March 11) Grinding Water. *Haaretz*

[137] Cohen, A. (2002, May 25) The Ministry of Finance: to Cancel Water Importation for Turkey and to Compensate it. *Haaretz*

[138] Baron, G. (2002, May 29) The Inquiry Committee to the Water System: the Crisis will Continue. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[139] Rinat, Z. (2001, April 23) Cutting Water Use is Necessary. *Haaretz*

[140] Cohen, A. (2002, March 20) Mekorot: Ashdod Facility will Precede the Private Desalination Facilities. *Haaretz*

[141] (Ronen 2001, May 2)

[142] Cohen, A. (2002, May 14) Israeli Technology Can Reduce Desalination Price by 50%. *Haaretz*

[143] (Cohen, 2001, March 2)

[144] Gabizon, Y. (2001, July 9) The Second Carrier of Ben-Meir. *Haaretz*

[145] Rinat, Z. (2001, June 10) There's Life Under the Red-Line. *Haaretz*

[146] (Shaked 2001, October 12)

[147] (Shaked 2001, October 12)

[148] Cohen, A. (2001, May 11) Increasing the Water Balance at No Extra Cost. *Haaretz*

[149] (Eshet 2001, May 8)

[150] (Cohen 2001, November 12)

[151] Baron, G. (2002, June 3) The Sea-Level Dropped by 8cm in 3 Weeks. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[152] (Tzidon, 2001, March 18)

[153] Rinat, Z. (2002, January 9) The Recent Rains Didn't Affect the Kinneret Sea-Level. *Haaretz*

[154] Hillel, D. (2001, August 14) Minimize, Not Abolish. *Haaretz*

[155] Rinat, Z. (2002, January 17) The Water Flow to the Kinneret Shrinks Every Year. *Haaretz*

[156] This item presents several explanations for climate-change (as anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic): Gatnio, I. (2001, October 1) Desalinated Water to Save the Kinneret. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[157] (Gatnio, 2001, October 1)

[158] Rinat, Z. (2001, December 13) Despite the Floods. *Haaretz*

[159] (Rinat 2002, January 17)

[160] (Gatnio, 2001, October 1)

[161] (Cohen 2001, January 11)

[162] Cohen, A. (2001, October 8) Adam Teva: 9 Approved Desalination Locations in Hifa Bay are Contaminated. *Haaretz*

[163] (Shachnai, 2001, June 25)

[164] (Shachnai, 2001, June 25)

[165] (Editorial 2001, July 26)

[166] Editorial (2001, July 9) Towards a Water Scarcity. *Haaretz*

[167] Editorial (2002, June 4) The Threatening Water Crisis. *Haaretz*

[168] 6/9/2001 Haaretz

[169] (Shibi, 2001, September 25)

[170] Baron, G. (2002, June 2) The Water Failure-to-Act. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[171] Cohen, A. (2002, June 2b) The Crisis – An Outcome of 30 Years of Over-Pumping, *Haaretz*

[172] (Baron 2002, June 2)

[173] (Cohen, 2002, June 2b)

[174] (Baron 2002, June 2)

[175] Cohen, A. (2002, June 2a) The enquiry committee for the water system: the system should operate under state of emergency regulations. *Haaretz*

[176] Cohen, 2002, June 2b)

[177] Strasler, N. (2002, June 7) Water, Water with Joy. *Haaretz*.

[178] Cohen, A. (2002, June 2c) The enquiry committee for the water system: "Ongoing Failure of Israeli Governments". *Haaretz*.

Chapter 5 - Second Critical Discourse Period: The National Inquiry Committee for the Water System (March 2008 to April 2010)

This second chapter starts seven years after the end of the first critical discourse period (CDP1) and analyses the CDP of the National Inquiry Committee (NIC) to investigate the water system.[a] This period was chosen as it holds the potential to become a CDP regarding Israel's hydro-policies. This is based on the assumption that establishing the NIC to investigate past and current policies would attract media attention and potentially bring changes to the discourse. My hypothesis is that even the existence of such an inquiry has a discursive effect and increases the amount of news reports for the following reasons: (i) the committee's investigative power to call for witnesses can publicise and release information about governmental decision-making processes that were unknown to the public; (ii) its appointment to make hydro-policy recommendations, and the committee's request from the public to bring such suggestions, may encourage actors and interest groups to influence these recommendations in media and bring attention to marginalised voices; (iii) its ability to name past actions, institutions or people as responsible for the creation of the crisis may encourage some to publicly defend their positions and action in the press; and that (iv) governmental bodies and other interest groups may wish to use the time before the publication of the committee's reports to change their de-facto status, and prior to this, to implement policies that might not be supported by the committee or which appear to generate positive actions.

This chapter is structured in a similar way to Chapter 4 by presenting: (5.1) the context for the period, (5.2) an overview of the data, (5.3) an analysis divided into themes and (5.4) a summary. The next section contextualises the setting up of the committee and further presents key political events, the reasons for the start and end date of CDP2 and any key changes to the format of the newspapers in this period.

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[a] A judicial committee, under the Supreme Court. As for the committee's name please see note 1 in the Appendix on Translations.

5.1. Context for the Period and Key Events

Several developments in the Israel hydro-regime had been promoted between CDP1 and this period, which affected the discourse (see Chapter 2) about: the operation of the two large-scale SD facilities in Ashkelon (2005) and Palmachim (2007); the corporatisation of municipal water and sewage services (see Section 5.3.1.4.1); and the implementation of local sewage treatment facilities supplying water for agricultural irrigation (see Section 5.3.1.4.2). On account of the rain-years, from 2004-2005 to 2010-2011, Israel experienced its longest drought on record. Following the recommendations from the PIC from 2002, the Israeli Water Commission (IWC) was disassembled in January 2007, and a new Israeli Water and Sewerage Authority (IWA) was established, headed by Professor Uri Shani, a water and soil scientist from the Hebrew University.[a] The IWA is an independent governmental body (a specialist and not political),[b] which received responsibilities that were previously scattered between different governmental offices, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Water Council, responsible for water pricing, also changed its representative structure, from a body with an automatic majority of farmer representatives to a majority from governmental offices, plus two public representatives, and which was chaired by Shani, representing the IWA.

Data collection for CDP2 begins in March 2008. In April 2008, the IWA released its first national water saving campaign, which was the first since the IWC's campaign in 2001. It released two more public communication campaigns (PCCs) during this period (analysed in Chapter 7). In June 2008, the government approved an "1b₪ Water Emergency Plan"[1] and appealed to the SD franchisees with a proposal to increase the output of the facilities to above that which was required by their contract.[2,3] At the end of July 2008, the Knesset's State Control Committee voted to establish an NIC to investigate the water system.[4,5] The President of the Supreme Court appointed the committee members in August 2008,[6] headed by: a former Judge, Professor Dan Bayan, also former President of the Haifa District Court and the Water Tribunal; Professor Emeritus Yoram Avinimelech, former Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP); and Professor Emeritus Yoav Kislev, an agricultural and water economist. The NIC held its public hearings from November 2008 at the Haifa District Court. It published an

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[a] The IWA Director is the equivalent of the cancelled title of Commissioner of the IWC. Many newspaper items during CDP2 refer to Shani as the Commissioner and not by his official title of IWA Director.

[b] For more information on the IWA see comment m in Chapter 2.

interim report in December 2009 and a final report at the end of March 2010 (National Enquiry Committee for Water System 2010). The data collection ended in April 2010 (Figure 3).

During the work of the NIC and in light of the continuing drought, different governmental bodies and NGOs promoted several different hydro-policies, including reforms in the water pricing, new desalination facilities, emergency regulations and over-consumption fines. This policy activity was delayed due to other political events at the time: the PM Olmert's resignation (September 2008) and the collapse of the Kadima-Labour government, the Gaza War (December 2008 to January 2009) and the following Knesset elections, which brought Netanyahu (Likud Party) back to the prime ministerial office in February 2009 (with a fraction of the Labour Party sitting in his coalition). Therefore, all the relevant offices for this study had new ministers appointed during CDP2, except the Minister of Agriculture, Shalom Simhon (Labour Party)[c].

Changes to the Newspapers Structure

In 2005, Haaretz incorporated the financial-news website *TheMarker* as its daily economic section while maintaining its independent entity. From 2008, *TheMarker* was also available to be purchased separately as a daily financial newspaper. Yedioth Group launched in February 2008 had its own daily financial newspaper called *Calaclist*, and during this year, the YA readers received two daily economic sections. Data from both *Calcalist* and *TheMarker* were collected for CDP2 and CDP3. In order not to confuse the readers of this research, and due to the design of the data collection, in this period, both *Calaclist* and *TheMarker* are counted as an inseparable part of their hosting newspapers, and not as separate ones (for further details, see Section 3.2.6).

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[c] Simhon didn't serve in this role in succession since CDP1, he was the minister in 2001-2002 under PM Sharon, and in 2006-2011 under PM Olmert and PM Netanyahu.

5.2. General Findings

Table 8: Data Collected by Newspaper CDP2 (March 2008 – April 2010)

	Haaretz	Yedioth Ahronoth
Total: 377 Items[d,e]	**197**	**183**
Average Items per Month	7.88	7.32
Economy Section	**127 (64%)**	**82 (44%)**
Economic News Items	84	64
Commentary Columns	18	11
Interviews	8	4
Opinions	17	3
➢ By External Writers	➢ 16	➢ 3
News Section	**59 (29%)**	**73 (39%)**
News Items	55	69
Commentary Columns	3	4
Interviews	1	0
Opinion Pieces	**9 (4%)**	**20 (10%)**
Editorials	0	0
➢ By External Writer	➢ 1	➢ 6
Magazine Supplements	**6 (3%)**	**13 (7%)**
Interviews	1	0

Table 8 shows that in CDP2 the average items per month is similar in both outlets, in contrast to CDP1. This is due to a drop in coverage in Haaretz (from 18 items per month in CDP1 to ~7), and not because of an increase in coverage in YA (from 6 to ~7 per month). Looking at items per section, Haaretz' economic section contributes most of the items (with a small percentage decrease compared to CDP1) while in YA, there was a small increase in coverage in the economic section (from 38% to 44%), but the balance between the news and economy sections remains similar to CDP1. As *Calcalist's* coverage is included in YA's count, it could probably explain this increase. Both *Calcalist* and *TheMarker* have op-ed sections, which are counted as part of the economic section, both which use this platform to primarily give voice to external writers.

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[d] Collection had n:433 items, n:46 were excluded during the analysis.

[e] The percentage in brackets are approximate (rounded) so the total is not a hundred percent.

Figure 3 shows the frequency of coverage per month by outlet. The peaks in newspaper coverage represent some of the events and policy actions mentioned in the context to the period: the first (marked i), July-August 2008, represents the establishment of the NIC. Between April and August 2009, there is a fluctuation in the reports between the newspapers; this is the dispute period over the gardening regulations and the Drought Levy, which are discussed in Section 5.3.3.2. Once the 2009-2010 winter continued the same dry pattern of the previous year, between November and December 2009, the reporting reached a new peak (ii). In these months, the debate on the gardening regulation returned, and was emphasised by a dispute over a new tariff, and coverage peaked due to a special State Comptroller Report and the NIC Interim Report, both published in December 2009 (see Section 5.3.3.5.2). The last reporting peak (iii) covered the NIC Final Report and when it was published in the last week of March 2010 (see Section 5.3.3). The newspapers interest in the report died quickly; in the following month, the reporting on hydro-policies is almost entirely absent. The last items for this period covered PM Netanyahu's involvement in the negotiations between Mekorot and the treasury over the SD facility in Ashdod.

	Title	Name	Total items	% of coverage in this newspaper	Special Items
Haaretz	Economic Reporter	Avi Bar-Eli	70	35%	11 Commentary columns
	Science & Environment Reporter	Zafrir Rinat	41	20%	1 Commentary columns, 1 Op-ed
	Infrastructure Reporter	Amiram Cohen	15	7%	1 Op-ed
YA	Environmental Reporter (YA)	Amir Ben-David	75	40%	2 Commentary columns, 2 Op-eds
	Infrastructure Reporter (Calcalist)	Galit Shafir	24	13%	0
	Economic Reporter (Calcalist)	Revital Hovel	8	4%	0

Table 9 presents the three most recurrent writers in each news outlet. In Haaretz, the most active writer is the economic reporter. In CDP1, the most recurrent reporter was the infrastructure reporter with 60% of the coverage, which dropped to only 7% in CDP2. This reflects a change in the perception of the hydro-policies in this newspaper to a general economic issue, and not as a special infrastructure topic. Rinat, the science and environment reporter maintains the second place although he doubles his share from 10% (in CDP1) to 20%. In YA, the hydro-policies coverage shifted from (in CDP1) the responsibility of shopping and consumption and the parliamentary reporters to (in CDP2) being in the hands of the environmental or the infrastructure reporters. As presented below, Ben-David's large share does not always include the prominence of an environmental discourse.

5.3. Analysis

Similar to CDP1, the analysis of CDP2 does not cover all the hydro-policies issues covered by the newspapers due to the high number of news items collected. Thus, it focuses on the new and principal trends in the discourses during this period in relation to the past. The subjects and discourses continuing from the previous chapter and their reconstruction during this period are presented in the first part of the analysis: (in Section 5.3.1) the 'crisis', its investigation and suggested causes. This part returns to the themes of: (Section 5.3.1.1) the 'crisis', (Section 5.3.1.2) its contestation as 'fake' and (Section 5.3.1.3) the formation of the investigation as part of a governmental failure-to-act discourse. Section 5.3.1.4 ends with the media explanation for the causes of the crisis, which is divided into three parts: (5.3.1.4.1) the agricultural sector water use, (5.3.1.4.2) the Ministry of Finance delaying policy implementation and (5.3.1.4.3) climate change. These sections build the foundation for the most prominent shift in discourse in CDP2, that is, discussing urban consumption. This shift was partly due to the implementation of sewage treatment facilities, which drastically reduced the share of the agricultural sector's use of freshwater.

The next two parts of the chapter address the two aspects of the supply and demand balance, with a specific focus of urban and household consumption. The first (Section 5.3.2) deals with policies for increasing supply, such as (5.3.2.1) importing water, and (5.3.2.2) other short-term polices, and (Sections 5.3.2.3 and 5.3.2.4) it presents the hegemony of seawater desalination (SD) over its alternatives. The second part (Section 5.3.3) discusses the debate around polices to reduce household consumption. Consequently, the discursive shift to urban consumption brought the rise of a new discourse addressing the social aspects of water, mainly advocated by municipal politicians, which I name as the social-municipal discourse-coalition (SMDC).

5.3.1. The Crisis: Investigation and Causes
5.3.1.1. Situating a "Crisis"

Similar to the CDP1, this period starts with articles marking the end of the winter (2007-2008) with predictions of a 'water crisis' expected the following spring and summer (once the rainy season ends).[7,8,9,10] The discursive pattern of CDP1 which establishes a state of emergency crisis, which is affected by the drought, but not solely by it, and which needs to be addressed by policies before the summer is repeated. Throughout CDP2, the

expression of a "water crisis" is constantly repeated, sometimes with added adjectives such as: severe,[11,12,13] catastrophic,[14] sharp[15,16,17,18] and unprecedented;[19,20] in the second year of the period (in 2009), it is described: as the worst,[21] the worst in history,[22] "the worst in the history of the country",[23] and the worst ever[24] or "in the last 80 years".[25,26,27]

CDP2 first news items were published in 11/3/2008, when both newspapers dedicated a full spread to the issue, comprised of one long item in YA[28] and four in Haaretz (which was over two pages and on the front page.[29,30,31,32] These articles follow a similar structure seen in the last period: (i) an alarming headline and sub-heading indicating an emerging water scarcity; (ii) an opening using Lake Kinneret's red and black lines[f] as main signifiers of the problem. This is followed by a scientific explanation, including quotes from hydrologists, meteorologists, IWA or Mekorot personnel that supply data on the magnitude of the drought, freshwater shortages and risks to the natural reservoirs (see Section 5.3.1.4.3); (iii) presenting reasons for the crisis; and (iv) reporting on short- and long-term possible solutions and governmental actions. Haaretz' front page article headline was: "Israel is on its Way to the Worst Water Crisis in a Decade", and the subheading states: "Reservoirs declining, there's not enough rain and household consumption grows. IWA plans saving measures, but water quality is in danger".[33] "Dry Hit" is the YA headline, with the subheading:

> *Kinneret on its way to the red-line, the wells are contaminated, and the aquifers are dry […] the meaning: cutting agriculture quotas and dramatic rises in water pricing. But experts have good news: "in 2013, Israel's desalination capacity will double and the country's water problem will resolve".*[34]

The apocalyptic subheading ends with an optimistic desalinated future, explicitly setting the tone for the rest of the period (see Section 5.3.2).

Throughout this article, YA uses more dramatic language to convey the crisis than Haaretz: "it is the 85th minute",[g] "water-ruptcy"[h] and "stated in despair". In both newspapers, describing the conditions that led to this crisis draws from economic language: deficit,[8] overdraft,[8] saving,[8] efficacy,[7] supply[7] and consumption.[7,8] This economic framing of the crisis had already appeared in CDP1, but this time, it is the

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[f] Due to the contestation of the red line in CDP1, a new Black-Line was introduced, presented as the lowest level for pumping which cannot be passed for a risks of salination and contamination.

[g] Referring to the common football idiom of the 90th minute, representing the urgency towards the end of game.

[h] A wordplay on bankruptcy, in Hebrew: פשיטת מים.

dominant explanation that even comes from hydrologists. These economic metaphors explain the crisis through an idea of supply and demand, and it shows water as a resource in low supply and high demand. Therefore, according to economic theory, such a resource should be dealt with by either increasing the supply or raising the price, with an expectation that this will affect demand. The framing of the crisis in economic terms, and the supply and demand perception, will lead the main policy suggestions in CDP2, especially in the Governmental Emergency Plans, which reinforce the notion of a "crisis" and its economisation (see Section 5.3.3). The discourse of the different reasons for the crisis and its possible policy solutions also continue patterns from the CDP1, and are discussed below separately (see Section 5.3.1.4).

5.3.1.2. Fake Crisis

The discursive consensus around the existence of a crisis is not hermetic, and the voices which negate its existence are presented in the press during this period. More than one headline rejects the crisis frame, such as: "There is no Water Problem in Israel";[35] "There is no Water Crisis in Israel"[36] and "Drying? Not really".[37] Rejecting the crisis consensus is a discursive strategy used for either rejecting the consensus building around a specific solution or for reaffirming it. In CDP1, claims about the artificiality of the crisis were mostly connected to claims around the excessive use in the agricultural sector; this discourse has not completely disappeared in this period (see Section 5.3.1.4.1). In other words, rejections of the crisis consensus are still used to reaffirm past contested solutions of cutting quotas and price rises for agriculture.[38,39,40] In this period, rejecting the crisis consensus is also done to support or reject consensus building around desalination. I would like to focus on two prime examples for rejecting the notion of a water crisis, thus opposing desalination deriving from two different perspectives: *environmental* and *political-economic*.

A weekend magazine article in YA by Tzur Shizaf[i] in March 2008, with environmental arguments, rejects SD. For over two pages, Shizaf rejects the public attention to Lake Kinneret's red-line as an indicator of a water shortage, and directs the

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[i] During CDP2 Tzur Shizaf also made a television documentary for the Israeli Broadcasting Authority apposing desalination while arguing that harvesting rain, minimizing consumption and recycling water are more sustainable ways of dealing with the country's water needs.

focus to the aquifers, which according to him have enough water to support Israel until 2020. The second part of the article suggests a list of solutions that either supports the refilling of reservoirs or encourages household rainfall harvesting and reuse, which together will enable to sustainably meet the needs of the population until 2050. Shizaf concludes by saying: "we don't need to build desalination facilities of not so good water, consumers of energy and space, heaters of the atmosphere, instead of take care of the existing water."[41] The only person named and quoted in this article is Professor Sinai from the Israel Institute of Technology (who discusses environmental urban-planning to boost aquifer refiling), and one environmental organisation (the JNF) is mentioned as supporting these policies.

The political-economic perspective example to reject desalination by claiming that the crisis is fake is an interview in *TheMarker* with Dr Dar Peretz. Peretz has been positioned and legitimized as "an expert", senior consultant and one of the writers of the National Water Saving Master Plan in 2000. The interview dedicated a lot of space to presenting the implications of desalination: health, sea contamination, energy demands and CO_2 emissions, and it called for the IWA to be integrated into the Ministry of Environmental Protection. But mostly, the interview focused on the economic meaning of desalination, and the headline quoted Peretz as saying that: "the government created panic in the water sector to benefit the capitalist".[42] Peretz' main claim is that with long-term water saving and reduction of consumption, Israel could make desalination redundant. This article includes the most radical claims about the motivations behind desalination:

> *Capital always seek catastrophes, and even tries to generate it – as an opportunity to economically benefit from the pressure on the system. Thus, in 2000 instead of deciding on past proven saving steps, in two weeks the government decided on building four desalination facilities. It is enough to look at the map of ownership of these facilities, to understand who this decision served. Everywhere in the world where they led a saving plan, it brought 15% reduction in consumption. Israel didn't have a body to direct the water authority to recommend saving, because Tahal (Israel Water Plaining) was privatised in 1996. We are witnessing the Ministry of Finance taking control of all the system from the belief that the benefit of the state and the benefit of the market goes together. The goal is to direct more and more national resources into private hands.[43]*

The Ministry of Health replies to Peretz' claims, and the IWA Director (Shani) is quoted as saying that "desalination in recent years gained momentum throughout the world, and there is no longer any need for proof of its worthiness" [44] (that is *naturalisation* of SD). The article states that the MoF decided not to comment. Peretz published an op-ed in Haaretz

in 2010, advocating a reduction to domestic consumption over desalination and repeating his claims on the "fabrication" of the crisis.[45]

Nevertheless, these two examples represent more of what is usually silenced by the press, and which does not appear in the recurrent discourses. A more common use is the strategy of rejecting the notion of a crisis made in support of SD.[46,47] This discursive strategy of naturalization can be seen in Shani's response to YA's chief economic correspondent, Plocker, in July 2009: "a seashore country shouldn't have a water problem".[48] Plocker had commented the following exactly one year earlier:

> *Israel is on the seashore and therefore has an unlimited water supply. [You] only have to desalinate it. Massive seawater desalination is the only available solution (but not a full one) to water scarcity in Israel, and those who suggest otherwise hide their true intentions.[49]*

In another column, after repeating the "plenty of water in the sea" argument, Plocker sets a visionary future where a "free water market" in Israel enables investors to build SD facilities and even turn the country into a water exporter.[50] Claiming that there is an opportunity for unlimited desalination and a saturated future, which is delayed by governmental regulation (but without claiming the crisis is artificial) is presented in Section 5.3.1.4.2. The "plenty of water in the sea" also relates to a discourse around the need to disconnect from nature, which is discussed in Section 5.3.2.4.

5.3.1.3.   Founding the NIC and the Governmental Failure-to-Act Frame

The establishment of the NIC lead to an increase in news coverage (marked i in Figure 3). Only one news item forecasts that an NIC will be established to investigate the water crisis: on the morning of the Knesset's State Control Committee meeting about this issue (28/7/2008), YA reports that the Minister of Infrastructure supports this initiative raised by several MKs.[51] Haaretz wrote nothing about it until the morning after the Knesset decision was made; it briefly explained the mission statement in that:

> *To examine the failures that led to non-execution of recommendations by many expert committees and the ignoring of government decisions on the subject. Also, the committee will be required to form short- and long-term recommendations to ensure regular water supply to the country's citizens.[52]*

According to this quote, the mission focus is around the "failures", "non-execution" and "ignoring" of "expert" recommendations and decisions, and which suggests new ones. Therefore, the investigation is not into the long-term social-environmental processes that led to the problem or into the patterns of the hydro-social regime in Israel, but only into

governmental execution. By this, discursively, the NIC is assigned to reaffirm the governmental failure-to-act discourse seen in the last period. The emphasis on past recommendation plays a key role in the days to come, with reporters questioning the need for such an investigation.[53] In YA, the mission statement of the NIC is not explained to the reader; the item only starts by stating: "an inquiry committee will examine the crisis in the water system in Israel".[54,55] Adding the word crisis to the name of the committee affirms the existence of "the crisis" and builds on it. Other versions of naming it, "committee to investigate the water crisis", instead of using its formal name, are repeated in other articles in both newspapers.[56,57,58,59,60]

Both newspapers' framing of the NIC mission, with the emphasis on past investigations and decisions, creates a new version of the governmental failure-to-act discourse, which will repeat and reaffirm itself until the end of the period. The original failure-to-act discourse of CDP1 (see Chapter 4) not only claimed that the water crisis is due to governmental neglect of the issue, but it also stated that there is a "systematic failure"[61] in the Israeli government, which led to the inability to execute decisions or to have a consistent long-term policy vision. Therefore, in the past, this discourse was used to depoliticise decision-making and justified transferring it onto experts (i.e. the construction of the IWA). Likewise, the original discourse was key in the legitimisation of privatisation as it suggests that nationally owned companies are less capable than privately owned ones (see Section 4.3.3.1). In CDP2, this new version of failure-to-act starts by questioning the need for another investigation since everything had been investigated and recommended before. Then, it selectively picks one or two examples from the PIC recommendations, which had not been enforced, as proof of the government's incapability, and it concludes that if only these two were implemented on time, this current crisis could have been avoided.[62,63] This discursive strategy is similar to the fake crisis strategy. Through the selective use of examples, writers use the inaction discourse to support or reject any of the many policies that were suggested in the past, and to selectively point a finger at the reason for their non-implementation as the real reason for the crisis. It can be the farmers with their demand for water, the MoF's past refusal to invest in the water system or the Ministry of Health with its rejection of household greywater recycling. In YA's 28 and 29 July news reports (after the decision for NIC) it is obvious which of the past policy recommendations is favoured by this newspaper; in both articles, the PIC recommendations for desalination are mentioned and their non-execution. Presenting the PIC report a biding (and not as recommendations) act as

juridification for their implementation. More on this discourse and desalination can be found below (see Section 5.3.2.4).

Failure-to-act arguments were not only used to delegitimise a specific actor or to generate support for transferring the decision-making onto experts (i.e. to depoliticise), but also in an opposite way. An op-ed in Haaretz on the day after establishing the NIC politicises the failure-to-act argument. The writer, presented as an "expert of the Israeli water system",[64] claims that "systematic [governmental] failure" is centred on "the lack of consistent policy", which should be based on "strategy, vision and direction", "leadership and a wide public coalition for change", and that "this solution is in the hands of public leaders". [65] In other words, this writer calls for an ideological and political leadership which generates public support behind a coherent hydro-social vision that will direct short and long policy visions. Once cohesion and support are established, it is easier to execute the vision. This writer is not using the inaction discourse to reject or support specific policies, a governmental body or an interest group. He uses this argument to claim that this process "means revolution and deep structural change that can hurt", yet if it happens, it will help to avoid "total environmental distraction" and to balance conflicting goals (such as insuring water supply and sharing it with neighbouring countries). Here, the writer calls for a transformative process of achieving resilience from water scarcity, which is both political and environmental.

Only a few articles covered the NIC hearings by reporting the testimonies,[66,67,68,69,70,71,72] this time without the sensational characters of the PIC hearings' coverage (in CDP1). As suggested by Plocker in one of his columns,[73] maybe it was due to its location in Haifa, away from the newspaper's headquarters in Tel Aviv; perhaps, it was because of the bureaucratic, legalistic and managerial tendencies of such hearings, or for other editorial reasons. It might also be an outcome of discourse questioning the need for investigation; if its outcome is known, it is uninteresting to follow the investigation. However, the committee is mentioned often in articles during this period, and there is a build-up over time of expectations for its rulings and report.[74,75,76,77,78,79,80] Nonetheless, despite this trend of coverage, the establishment of the NIC acted as a critical discourse moment (CDM), similar to the NIP in CDP1.

5.3.1.4. Media Exploration of the Causes for the Crisis

The following sections present the main causes for the crisis, as they appeared in the press, beyond the governmental failure-to-act. The three reasons presented next do not cover all the explanations given by the press in this period. The most prominent one in CDP2 is the accusation of the urban sector of over-consumption, which is presented at length in the third part of the analysis (see Section 5.3.3). The next section starts with the accusation of the farmers, which played a central role in CDP1.

5.3.1.4.1. Agricultural Sector Water Use

In contrast to the contestation over the agricultural sector as a major contributor to the water shortage during CDP1, in this period, articles rarely accuse the farmers for causing the crisis. This can partly be explained by their recent loss of power within the IWA and the Water Committee, but mainly by the policies implemented since the PIC, transitioning agriculture from using freshwater to retreated sewage. Some writers and speakers still argue that freshwater quotas for this sector needed to be reduced, and that tariff should have been raised; most of them are members of the EcDC,[81] describing the current situation as crazy,[82] irrational,[83] irresponsible[84] or illogical.[85] The EcDC also repeats arguments from the last period, mainly against the export of intensively irrigated crops and water subsidies[86] and also against the political power of the farmers.[87,88] A new argument repeats the need to change crop types to more water-efficient ones and to sustainable agriculture.[89] The potential for saving water (or funds) in agriculture is compared to SD. For instance, an op-ed in Haaretz by the former treasury's Director of Budget (DoB) states that:

> *Israel has no water crisis. There is a waste of water resulting from the irresponsible price of water for farmers. This waste leads to another waste of huge investments in desalination facilities.[90]*

In YA, Professor of Environmental Health Emeritus, Hillel Shoval, claimed that: "it is cheaper for the state to compensate the farmers than to invest in desalination".[91] This affirmation of the past discourse serves two uses. The first is to maintain and strengthen the decision to depoliticise the IWA. The second is to justify the treasury's past priority to focus on reducing agricultural water use over investment in desalination (see the next section). Thus, it reinforces the positioning of SD as the main policy alternative, and economic reasoning as the main consideration. Arguments in support of agriculture almost disappear from the reporting in CDP2, together with the actors promoting the

AZDC position, such as the Minister of Agriculture or the farmers' organisations that were barely quoted. One who is exceptional is the Farmers Union spokesperson who publishes two op-eds at the beginning of the period, criticising the establishment of an NIC as a "witch hunt" against the farmers.[92,93] This small debate about the role of the agricultural sector takes place only in the op-ed section, which is a sign of its minor importance, according to the newspapers. Otherwise, it would have been covered by the reporters as it was in CDP1.

5.3.1.4.2. Ministry of Finance's Control of Policy Implementation

Stemming from the governmental failure-to-act discourse, before the establishment of the investigation and furthermore afterword, this period also experienced different arms of the government point to the guilty of specific bodies. What is new about this period is the positioning of the MoF, from the primary accuser (of Mekorot, the farmers and the municipalities) to the accused and being responsible for the crisis.

The first and the most prominent speaker to accuse the treasury is the Infrastructure Minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer (Labour). He blamed "a handful of clerks"[j] in the MoF for blocking the implementation of governmental plans for desalination, which caused the current water shortage.[94] With time, his language changes from the neutral terms of "officials" (and the semi-neutral "clerks") to the delegitimising term "treasury boys".[k] The use of this term is a discursive strategy of antagonistic depoliticisation by delegitimisation, instead of explaining the ideological disagreement (privatisation versus big-government). It is used as a critic of the power of the treasury by controlling all the other ministries' budgets, and the growing power of its Referents[l] in every office, and as a critic of their inexperience and (what can be seen as a childish behaviour and thinking) and limited economisation of problem solving. As can be seen

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[j] The word קומץ could also be translated to a 'pinch' or 'wisp'. Using the term 'handful' (קומץ) on people in Hebrew usually means a small number in a negative and disrespectful sense, such as 'a handful of demonstrators' or a 'handful of rioters'.

[k] The term "treasury boys" gained popularity in the first decade of the 21st century by Israeli circles critiquing neo-liberal policies which were promoted by the MoF, with a reference to the term Chicago Boys. It symbolise the ministry as ideologically motivated to projects such as privatisation, minimizing the power of the government and labour-unions and reducing social-care.

[l] Refernats are employees of MoF who sits at a governmental unit and responsible for approval of every item in the budget of that unit.

in this quote from Ben-Eliezer, "I need to stand in front of a 25 year old referent from the treasury, who thinks he knows better than a whole ministry with decades of knowledge and experience".[95] This term is used by reporterd in both newspapers, at the beginning and the end of the period:

- YA: *The Ministry of Infrastructure claims that in all the years the treasury boys blocked seawater desalination plans, the boys, for their part, insist that the problem is mismanagement.*[96]
- Haaretz: *Delays in the establishment of the biggest and most important desalination facility in the country stemmed from the opposition of the treasury boys to Mekorot as a governmental company.*[97]

The former Water Commissioner is also quoted as presenting this same position.[98] Sometimes, the delegitimisation includes pointing out the 'revolving-door' of retired treasury officials working for private water desalination companies as a sign of their interest in blocking governmental investment.[99] Even without the discursive strategy of delegitimising, what is dominant throughout the period is that the MoF is accused mostly for delaying desalination, and it's another aspect of the consensus building around this policy. By using a discourse that was originally anti-neoliberal, criticising a past rejection of SD by the MoF, it contributes to a neoliberalism as there is almost no debate about the fact that desalination is primarily promoted by privatisation (see Section 5.3.2.4). Interestingly, besides SD, in this period, the MoF is simultaneously praised for investing in sewage treatment and blamed for blocking Mekorot from expanding this project in favour of privatisation.[100] As mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.3.2), sewage treatment acts discursively as a precedent to the SD transition.

The first two explanations for the causes of the crisis were dedicated to human responsibility and presented an element of the antagonistic depoliticisation of the hydro-policy debate. The third section deals with how climate change was presented in this period and its linkage to the droughts.

5.3.1.4.3.   Climate Change

The link between climate change, the droughts and the water crisis is still silenced in this period. Only 13 items in CDP2 mention climate change (3.4%), a minor increase compared to the 1.8% of CDP1, and despite my expectation for a more frequent link to the subject in this period. Some writers' mentions of climate change appear casually within the news items, such as:

- Haaretz: "*That's how it is when the world is warming, and prayers of rain don't work*".[101]

- YA: *"The water crisis in Israel is a known fact for 30 years. Not only because of global warming and climatic changes"*.[102]

Climate change is absent even within the scientific discourse situating the crisis at the beginning of the period (see Section 5.3.1.1). More prominent among these scientists is a general comment connecting the drought to changes in the "rain patterns", which are "less uniform than before" and "below in the multi-annual average range".[103] In the first item of CDP2 in YA mentioned above (on Section 5.3.1.1), the Head of the Climate Department at Israel's Metrological Service was asked about climate change and the droughts; his answer was a long explanation on historical rainfall data that ended with: "our conclusion is that there are rainy years and dry years, but for the long term, there are no serious changes in the amount of precipitation in Israel."[104] In Haaretz, during the summer of 2008, the IWA gave an opposite statement: "data presented yesterday by the Water Authority shows that one of the reasons for the severe water crisis is climatic; the area is undergoing a process of dehydration".[105] The IWA Director in an interview to YA a month later named climate change as part of the long-term causes that "reduce supply".[106]

The EnDC speakers who appear in this period are also not quoted talking about climate change (except for one occurrence) despite the fact that the MEP officially makes this connection.[107] Just a few days after the Knesset decision for the NIC, the MEP published a report on Israel's preparations for climate change (Golan-Angeleco and Baror 2008) one item in each newspaper follows it.[108,109] Despite water being only one of the issues presented by the report, the environmental journalists in both newspapers dedicated their coverage of it to the climate change induced water scarcity in Israel. Similar to his tendency when situating the water crisis in YA, Ben-David focused more on the effect on Lake Kinneret: the headline calls it "Salt Lake", the subheading states that:

> *The biggest freshwater reservoir in Israel is no longer sweet: salination levels in the Kinneret do not allow for irrigation of some of the agricultural crops. Experts warn: in 20-30 years the water will be unsuitable for drinking.*[110]

The lake's salination is expected to increase due to a decrease in precipitation and an increase in evaporation (induced by pumping); however, YA only discusses the lakes' water intake. Desalination mentioned by YA twice in this news item, first as an option to desalinate the lake's water and second when discussing the rise in the Mediterranean Sea water levels, which threaten the functioning of seashore infrastructures, such as ports, SD facilities and power plants. This item includes direct quotes from the writers of the report

and a warning by the minister about the state's lack of preparation for climate change. In addition, it quotes the Chairman of the Green Party and the CEO of IUED as both calling for a national action plan to mitigate climate change. Haaretz does not mention Lake Kinneret and dedicates its attention to the expected decrease in precipitation nationally, and with predictions that: "by the end of the next decade, Israel will find it difficult to meet the water needs of the population".[111] The report's writers are quoted as recommending an: "increase [in the] production of water by seawater desalination". This is the only mention of SD in this item. Haaretz indicates that climate change is not only about less precipitation, but also about heat, which brings higher demands for irrigation. Neither newspaper mentions the connection between SD and greenhouse gas emissions, which shows that the 'fix' embedded in SD (as Swyngedouw (2013) called it) is not yet acknowledged in this period. Haaretz does not present comments from environmentalists, only a one-line quote from the minister about the government putting climate change low on the agenda. This report holds the potential for a greater link between climate change and the larger hydro-policy debate; however, it does not affect the reporting for the rest of CDP2, and importantly it also serves the arguments that are pro-SD.

5.3.2. Policies for Increasing Supply and the Hegemony of Seawater Desalination

The analysis above explored the premise of a crisis, the initiation of its investigation and some of its causing factors. As mentioned above, one of the aspects of the economisation of the crisis discourse frames it as a problem of supply and demand. That is, the drought reduces the natural supply, which should be dealt with either by reducing demand or by an alternative supply. This part of the analysis (Section 5.3.2) is dedicated to the notion of increasing supply while the next (Section 5.3.3) focuses on the demands. Firstly, I briefly explore the discourse around importing water, which during CDP1 was a leading solution by the government. Then, I present the different aspects of the discourses around desalination as a short- and long-term policy to increase supply, and the hegemony of SD over other desalination options and other hydro-policies.

5.3.2.1. Importing Water

According to the newspapers, importing from Turkey is no longer a valid option in this period. It is sometimes briefly mentioned as a past policy that was never been

realised,[112,113,114] and which repeats the argument that the treasury finds desalination cheaper than import (see Section 4.3.3.3).[115,116] Two articles claim that it is still a valid option: one in Haaretz only mentions it as a policy option that will be presented by Shani to the NIC. The second, in YA, reports on the negotiations between the IWA (via the Foreign Office) and Turkish companies over an importing contract. The subheading of this article states that: "Israel didn't build desalination facilities and now it considers importing water from Turkey"; while the opening paragraph claims "that's how it is when you aren't sensible enough to build desalination facilities".[117] This report also claims that Turkey currently has no interest in exporting water to Israel. By this, YA reaffirms the discursive consensus around desalination as the favourite hydro-policy. Both newspapers never follow up on any reporting on the import option.

5.3.2.2.   Short-term Polices for Increasing Supply:
5.3.2.2.1.   Inducing Pumping and Nature's Water Needs

In CDP1, an increase in water pumping from the aquifers to mitigate the shortage was the only valid option to maintain supply, and it was challenged by those who called for alternative water sources (see Section 4.3.3). In this period, new drillings are mentioned less than ten times, usually only in one sentence,[118,119,120] sometimes calling it "emergency drilling"[121] (as in CDP1) and other times "drought drilling".[122,123] Indications for the problematic aspects of this hydro-policy are given in Haaretz, but are very limited in comparison to the CDP1. Haaretz' infrastructure reporter once briefly explained that: "emergency drilling in the Kinneret area means pumping water at the expense of the future".[124] One article by Haaretz' environmental reporter is dedicated to an official request by the SPNI to cancel such drilling near a specific nature reserve while explaining that the SPNI "do not object to drought drilling in places that do not cause significant damage to nature".[125] An earlier news item in Haaretz describes the SPNI as "concerned" by the drilling near nature conservation areas.[126]

This contestation about the drilling connects to a new discourse raised in this period by the EnDC: Nature's Water Needs. This discourse is concerned with non-human water needs, and the effect of the droughts (and pumping) on aspects such as bio-diversity, specific aquatic ecosystem degradation and similar ecological issues. Even though these issues have been mentioned in CDP1, as part of items describing the impact of the droughts (and to situate the crisis discourse), in CDP2, there is a new voice calling

for policies to consider more than just human needs, and especially the issue of drying water streams. For example, an SPNI employee is quoted in Haaretz as describing the drilling near the Kziv Stream as if it were about "to hit the victim once more", and concludes with his objection to this policy by saying: "we, as a society, should be ashamed of what we did to our water sources".[127] An op-ed in YA in May 2008 by SPNI's CEO is dedicated to nature's water needs and blames society for "a triable injustice we infected on Israel's streams".[128] This op-ed presents a historical process where Israel built pioneering waterworks to support human needs while neglecting its effect on nature, and it refers to the current water crisis as an opportunity to correct these past mistakes. Later that year in October 2008, a report by the Samuel Neaman Institute for National Policy is described in Haaretz as recommending "supplying water to nature", and it warns about the environmental effects of some of the hydro-polices promoted at the time.[129] These are rare occasions where the media gives voice to the EnDC claims for expanding decision-making to include environmental considerations, and not just for supplying water for human consumption.

5.3.2.2.2.   Portable Seawater Desalination Facilities

The second short-term policy is small-scale portable SD units (P-SD); in January 2009, both newspapers suggested that this technology could be used temporarily,[130,131] and seven other articles reported this option up to the end of the period. The newspapers hold opposite views on this policy as can be seen by the headlines during February and March 2009: *Calaclist* presents a favourable position: "Emergency Solution for the Water Crisis: portable desalination facilities", with the sub-heading: "the safety net of the Israeli water system".[132] By contrast, *TheMarker*, a week later, presents a negative perspective in that: "portable desalination units are shortcuts that lead to failure".[133] This headline quotes the MoF Accountant General, from his testimony to the NIC, where he also called P-SD "problematic" and "unsatisfying".[134] The Accountant General's criticism of P-SD is mostly economic, about the difficulties in funding due to the global financial crisis. He also suggests that P-SD is "a complex story that will take a few years" to implement. In four other articles, Haaretz reports that P-SD is expected to be more expensive than SD by "twice or threefold",[135] "fourfold",[136] or that it is "significantly expensive"[137] and "very expensive".[138] P-SD requiring excessive seashore space is also mentioned as a disadvantage by Haaretz.[139] In October 2009 in a report on Shani's testimony to the NIC, Haaretz, rejects P-SD and imports as:

Very expensive solutions [...that] will not lead to any significant quantitative support. Additionally, due to the high cost of portable units, it was decided to examine the feasibility of their operation only in March 2010, after it becomes clear whether the current winter is arid.[140]

P-SD and importing water are never implemented; they are not immediate enough to act as a short-term mitigation, and they are too expensive as a long-term one in comparison to (large-scale) SD, which became, in CDP1, the (economic) benchmark for all other policies. Similar to other desalination technologies, explored in the next sub-section, the P-SD option and its rejection only reinforce the hegemony of desalination over other hydro-policies.

5.3.2.3. Representation of Desalination Technologies - Desalination equates to SD

As presented in the Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.3.4), desalination technologies are not exclusive to seawater. In CDP1, I showed how the general term "desalination" was used to cover both options: SD and BD. In this period, a third desalination technology is presented by the press, desalinating sewage (as part of its treatment, and referred to as SDT). Another technology, mentioned in this period, is the option of Purifying Contaminated Groundwater (PCG). A few articles mention the option of BD and SDT, but only as part of a list of possible policies,[141,142] and together with PCG.[143,144,145,146]

Right at the first item of CDP2 in YA, alternative desalination technologies are presented by Mekorot's CEO which labels PCG as the first tool to resolve the crisis: "it's a relatively simple solution, relatively easy and relatively cheap. It can be done fast".[147] Even articles that dedicate more space to these three options usually gave it no more than a paragraph,[m] with the exceptions of one article on a BD plan to "save the costal aquifer" from salination and contamination.[148] The news item ends with a paragraph dedicated to SD, claiming that the expansion of SD will also protect the aquifer as it will allow a reduction in the pumping and create less saline sewage water (that is later used for irrigation).[149] The option of SDT for human consumption is rejected by Mekorot's CEO:

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[m] It is important nothing here that articles dealing with incidents of contaminated groundwater were not collected for this thesis, a few incidents of contamination during this period included a discussion on this policy.

I heard the idea of converting sewage water for drinking [...], but perhaps there is only one place in the world where it is customary. This will not necessarily be a satisfactory solution because of public aversion.[150]

In contrast to CDP1, in this period, the term desalination does not cover all the desalination options, but it means only SD (i.e. when referring to other desalination technologies, the writer now uses their full name). For instance, The CEO of the Israel Union for Environmental Defence (IUED) is the most prominent promoter of PCG and SDT during this CDP, writing two opinion pieces to support these policies.[151,152] She wrote an op-ed to present the benefits of these policies over SD; however, even for her, while arguing against it, "desalination" is used to mean SD:

Desalination is not only more expensive then treating contaminated wells, it involves environmental costs: greenhouse gas emissions, wasting land resources and harming the marine environment. [...] upgrading sewage treatment facilities will cost half the price of desalination and consume a third of the energy desalination consumes.[153]

Consequently, the text contributes to the hegemonic discourse of SD by referring to it as the primary desalination option even when arguing for more environmentally friendly policies.[n] For other environmental arguments opposing SD, also using the general term desalination, see Section 5.3.1.2 on the fake crisis. If in CDP1 desalination had become the leading policy represented in the press while also meaning BD and SDT, the exclusion of these two meanings in this period from its umbrella term makes large-scale SD the only preferred policy when talking about a desalinated future.

Another example of preferring SD over other technologies can be seen in the repeated claim that "Mekorot lacks experience in desalination",[154] which ignores the vast experience it has in BD and Mekorot's SD[o] facility in Eilat, has been operating since the 1970s. This claim is also used to favour privatisation in general and SD specifically. In another interview, in Haaretz, the CEO mentions that Mekorot operates 30 BD facilities, but it is not authorised to expand the use of this technology (and that the company is blocked from expanding sewage treatment):

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[n] This op-ed is also raising the dangers of treated sewage used in agriculture as contributor to salination of farming grounds and underground water, and suggesting SDT to prevent this risk (this issue will become important in the next period)

[o] As mentioned in Chapter 2 the small-scale SD facility in Eilat was built in the 1970's based on Zarchin technology and in 1997 was switched to Reverse Osmosis technology similar to the new large-scale SD facilities.

> *Because the policy was to transfer it into private hands. I don't have a problem that the private sector will do it – but nothing is executed. Maybe it is not economic enough, maybe it is complicated – but execution must increase.[155]*

On other occasions, Mekorot's officials argue in favour of the company to build new BD facilities.[156] Unlike in CDP1, Mekorot does not emphasise its opposition to the privatisation of SD and focuses more on promoting BD. The marginalisation of BD in this period makes SD the preferred option.

5.3.2.4.   Normalisation and Economisation of SD: Privatisation and Energy Demands

This is the last section about supply policies which presents the prominent position of SD in this period as an economic subject. 40 items in YA and 44 in Haaretz (about 20% of this period) **only** cover SD: reporting its tenders (40 items across the newspapers), governmental plans, privatisation and stock exchange sales.[p] 72 of these items (85%) were published in the economy sections. The frequency of these subjects and the prominence of private SD companies in these items strengthen the perception of: (1) the normalisation of the use of SD; (2) SD as an economic issue; (3) the normalisation of its privatisation; and (4) prioritising SD over other policies. The normalisation of SD, as a commonly used technology (in Israel and around the world), is an attribute of this period, in comparison to the futuristic language of the 'alternative water sources' of CDP1. One aspect of this normalisation is the repeated adjectives praising the size of the Israeli SD project and projections for its future expansion. For example, an op-ed by the MoF Deputy Accountant General begins with: "Israel already operates three of the biggest desalination facilities in the world", under the headline: "In Four Years, Most of the Tap Water Will Be Desalinated".[157] Moreover, these items present SD in a positive way, as being good for the market in times of a financial crisis.[158] On several occasions, such as during the debate on the "fake" crisis, speculations by the EcDC that investors are just waiting to build SD in Israel are repeated.[q],[159] These claims are reaffirmed in interviews with SD company

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[p] More items were published during CDP2 on implementation by Israeli companies in other countries they were excluded for the analysis.

[q] Although it should be stated, that due to the global financial crisis, some EcDC writer changed their argument: claiming that the state should invest in private desalination as the companies have difficulties to get banks guarantees.

managers and owners.[160] Not a single item in this period was dedicated to the (negative) environmental implications of desalination even though they were briefly mentioned in some items (as presented above).

The economic implications of SD debated during CDP2 are similar to the first period: the connection between SD and the tariff, which are presented within the debate for reducing consumption (see Section 5.3.3) and privatisation. In December 2009, after IDE won the Soreq tender, *TheMarker* starts criticising the creation of a private monopoly of SD suppliers as IDE will own 75% of SD production.[161] That is, the newspaper did not oppose privatisation, just IDE's growing share. A few weeks afterwards, *Calaclist* dedicates a spread to private investment in water technologies (SD, PCG and sewage treatment).[162] These investments by the "tycoons" are described as a "success", "change for the best" and where privatisation is presented as "inevitable". IDE's new monopolistic potential goes almost unmentioned, only in a comment by Shani that "some companies win all the SD tenders", which does not fit the "rationale that incorporating the private sector will bring competition".[163] That is, *Calcalist* unlike *TheMarker* marginalises the fact that privatisation does not create competition, but a new type of ownership. In contrast to the silence about the creation of a private monopoly in SD, in *Calcalist,* Mekorot's monopoly over the transfer and delivery of water is repeatedly mentioned. In the same item, Uri Yogev, former DoB and currently the owner of a water technologies company,[r] is quoted as supporting Mekorot being fully privatised as "an inevitable process",[164] which occurs "everywhere in the world". That is he uses the discursive strategy of naturalisation to reject possible objections to privatisation. Moreover, Mekorot is presented as the only voice which opposes privatisation, and the company's position is framed as caring for its "monopoly and status",[165] which delegitimize this position. Shani is quoted in this item estimating that privatisation of the municipal corporation is the next step (for further details, see Section 5.3.3.2). *Calcalist's* position towards privatisation is emphasised in another spread later that month entitled "Mekorot's Desalination Failure".[166] This item tells the story of Ashdod SD facility as an example of the company's "lack of necessary experience", and it reproduces the discourse to support privatisation presented in CDP1 (see Section 4.3.3.1). Several other items in this period, in both newspapers, describe the

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[r] *Calcalist*, unlike its hosting newspaper, YA, does not criticize the "revolving door" of former treasury officials in water companies (see 5.3.1.4.2).

delays in the operation of the Ashdod facility as one of the failures that led to the crisis[167] while supporting further privatisation of water.[168,169]

In CDP1, SD energy needs served as an argument against privatisation (see Section 4.3.3.1). In this period, the SD energy needs are raised a few times by the EnDC (via IUED) as an argument against SD. [170,171] Sometimes, this issue is mentioned by the EcDC as a downside of SD, which should be taken into consideration (but not as an argument against it),[172,173] including its effect on the water price.[174] At the beginning of 2009, four significant natural gas reserves were found in Israel's territorial waters. These discoveries are mentioned in relation to SD. For instance, Mekorot CEO explains that: "water is energy and energy is water. Once you transition to desalination, water becomes a high energy consumer […] in this context, the gas discoveries are significant". [175] After IDE won the tender for the Soreq facility, a commentary column in *TheMarker* about its monopoly status claimed that is was "due to its ability to influence, allegedly, the price of electricity necessary for operating the biggest desalination plant in Israel" because IDE is part of the Delek conglomerate, which owns one of the biggest natural gas fields.[176] The column continues to discuss how the new gas discoveries might affect SD: by lowering the price of desalination, and by creating new monopolies (gas and water) that endanger economic competition.[177] At the end of the period, in 2010, another column[178] in *TheMarker* and a news spread the next day[179] describe how one businessmen, Teshuva, creates a vertical monopoly of electricity, gas and water in Israel. The strong editorial line in *TheMarker* against the creation of a private monopoly is not a critique of privatisation, but a call for regulations over the cross-ownership of "the tycoon". *TheMarker* uses this word in a negative way while in *Calaclist,* it is used positively. YA does not discuss the gas discoveries' connection to SD.

To conclude, voices criticising privatisation of SD (and not aspects of it), as in Peretz' op-ed presented above (Section 5.3.1.2) are rare in CDP2 compared to the first. Anti-privatisation calls in this period are raised by a new discourse-coalition, which is presented in the next part (5.3.3). But privatisation of SD is not a central issue raised by this coalition. This part of the analysis about supply increase policies presented how SD has been shown in this period as a consensual policy in contrast to other ways to increase supply (i.e. importing water and pumping) and other desalination options (i.e. P-SD or BD). Generally, in CDP2 has ample reports presenting the expansion of SD as an inevitable consensus: "we have no solution other than desalination"[180] says Mekorot CEO in Haaretz; further to this, "there is hardly anyone in the country who doesn't know - or

disagree - that the solution must come from desalination"[181] writes YA senior commentator (and future Finance Minister), and that "the expert have no doubt that this is the best way to overcome the drought".[182] These statements indicate the central use of the discursive strategy of naturalisation to generate the consensus around SD. The next part of this chapter presents the debate about the policies to reduce consumption.

5.3.3. Reducing Household Consumption and the Rise of the Social-Municipal Discourse-Coalition

A dominant shift in the discourse in this period is the debate around the need to reduce urban consumption (i.e. household, municipal and industry). Three policies for reducing urban consumption were prominent in the newspapers: (1) regulations over public and private garden irrigation, (2) a temporary surcharge on domestic high-consumption (the Drought Levy) and (3) tariff changes. Three more received less attention: (4) municipal quotas, (5) watersavers distribution and (6) public communication campaigns (PCCs). The six policies listed above were promoted almost simultaneously, and they were sometimes considered in the media as complementing each other, and at other times as alternatives.[183,184] The IWA promoted all these policies while the EcDC argued in favour of financial tools, and the EnDC for PCCs and watersavers.[s]

These policies are part of the crisis discourse on account of being presented as part of the "emergency plan(s)".[185,186] This new direction for dealing with household consumption is explained by the rise in the urban sector's total water consumption, which is now considered as a new "reason for the crisis".[187] The shift from discussing agricultural to urban uses also includes new actors (mainly MKs and mayors), who contest these policies and raise new ideological considerations. I argue that these actors form a new discourse-coalition, which I refer to as the social-municipal discourse-coalition (SMDC). As seen above, the crisis investigation generated either a politicised (agonistic) discourse demanding an understanding about "who is responsible", and how this perceived responsibility can be implemented into policy; or alternatively, it generated a depoliticised (antagonistic) version to accuse certain actors of causing the crisis. Subsequently, this

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[s] For the meaning of Watersavers, please see Note 5 in Appendix on Translations. In 2010 the IWA distributed for free over a million Watersavers for domestic use. The EnDC have argued for such action and for a law that would require the installation of water-saving measures in public buildings and private homes all though CDP2 and already in CDP1. More on this campaign in Chapter 7.

includes a delegitimisation of certain blamed actors – the farmers in the past and now the mayors (in charge of municipal water services) who oppose some of these new policies.

Most of the policies discussed in the next two sections come from the same discursive origins. As seen above, the framing of the crisis by the economic discourse into a question of supply and demand guides policies during CDP2, and while waiting for SD to increase supply, there is a need to reduce consumption. Moreover, most of these policies further contribute to the economisation of the discourse as they are based on economic tools to regulate consumption. More specifically, it is a new version of the economic discourse from CDP1 of the rationalisation of the water tariff, which included the EcDC demands for the "full-price" of water. In the past, rational tariff arguments mainly supported raising prices for agriculture, claiming that the old pricing system was too cheap, had no economic logic and was based on politically motivated subsidies. As shown in the last chapter, progress in desalination played a key role in the process of discursively (and economically) establishing a "real water price". In this CDP, the rational pricing discourse is diverted by the EcDC to deal with household consumption.

The most prominent speakers in this period on the social or class issues of hydro-policies are the SMDC. Similar to other discourse-coalitions, this term refers to actors raising similar arguments and discourses that represent a similar ideological conceptualisation of an issue, and which support policies that build on their shared values. City mayors and their organisations such as Fourom-15[t] and the Federation of Local Authorities (FLA) contested hydro-policies between CDP1 and CDP2, mostly in the context of the municipal water services. Municipally owned water and sewage corporations are another outcome of policies promoted during and after the PIC, based on legislation from 2001 and 2004, which obliged municipalities to turn their water and sewage services into external corporations (public ownership). This act also is based on a neoliberal economisation and marketisation of hydro-policies, regarding water as a product and not as a social service, with users as consumers, rather than citizens. The Water and Sewage Corporations Act 2001 disconnected the water system (and budget) from the elected local council, turning it into a business operation. The PIC final report supported the municipal corporation:

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[t] An association of Israel's fifteen self-government cities, whose municipalities are fiscally autonomous and not dependent on national balancing or development grants.

Because the local authorities use the funds they collect from citizens not only for the purpose of improving the water and sewer system, they have no incentive to encourage water savings, but vice versa (Parliamentary Committee Inquiry on the Israeli Water Sector 2002).

Some items in CDP2 echo this claim, arguing that ill-maintenance of the system is a reason for the crisis,[188, 189] but this argument is not as prominent as I expected. For example, YA praised arguments in favour of this act, and claimed that, in the name of 'efficacy' of payment collection and infrastructure investments (such as reducing leaks), that less citizens will receive politically motivated reductions, and that these funds will be disconnected from the general municipal budget (which is democratically decided by the councils).[190] Opposition to this act is regarded as a stage towards the privatisation of the water services.[191] The corporatisation process took years to complete due to strong political objections by the municipalities, mayors and FLA. At the beginning of CDP2, only about half (and not all) the country's population received services from the new corporations. Articles dealing with the corporatisation of the water services were not collected for this thesis unless specifically dealing with desalination. As such, the items collected referring to this debate might not reflect all the complexities of the SMDC and its newspaper presentation.

5.3.3.1. Drying-Out Gardens

A few mechanisms for reducing water consumption in the urban sector were aimed at the irrigation of gardens and parks: (a) a prohibition on irrigation in new green public spaces or new gardening in existing parks (hereafter, the New-Parks Ban); (b) limitations on irrigation by the municipalities (hereafter, Municipal Quotas); (c) raising tariff for urban (public and private) irrigation;[u] and (d) a prohibition on private and household irrigation (hereafter, the Gardening Ban). Even though these are four distinguished policies, they were often wrapped by the media into the same term of 'drying-out gardens'.[v,192,193] This makes it hard for the reader to understand which of the policies an item, writer or a spokesperson is referring to. These initiatives rely mostly on self-enforcement,[w,194] and they are commonly compared to drought policies in other countries. The PCCs addressed

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[u] Only applied to gardens with separate meters.

[v] For an explanation on the term "drying-out" see Note 4 in the Appendix on Translations.

[w] Even when official fines were introduced, only a few inspectors were certified to enforce these policies across the whole country.

the need for self-enforcement (see Chapter 7). Similar to the Gardening Ban suggestion in CDP1, the IWA suggests that these policies are a deliberate act to change the public perception of the crisis (see Section 5.3.3.3).[195] In an article about the second emergency plan, Ben-David claims that:

> *Above all these restrictions and measures it seems like the action with the most moral effect on the public is the absolute ban on watering garden lawns and seasonal flowers all year long.[196]*

The public awareness for the appeal to personal behaviour change, which Ben David calls a "moral effect", is translated into media attention. More than 50 of the items in this period mention or cover the Gardening Ban, and 48 articles' main subject is the Drought Levy. More on this effect is discussed together with the PCCs below (see Section 5.3.3.3).

During the first month of the period, March 2008, the option of "administrative restrictions"[197] to gardening is mentioned as a future possibility, as is the option of "raising the gardening tariff and enforcing regulation".[x,198] That is, it proposes only to "reduce"[199] or "minimise"[200] irrigation, not as a total prohibition on urban gardening. A quote in Haaretz referring to an IWA official explains that: "the aim is not to dry-out gardens, but for efficient use of water".[201] The day after "drying-out gardens" is labelled in YA as a "disgrace" and "absurd", and the newspaper suggests instead to force agriculture to be more water efficient.[202] In the following month, Haaretz calls it "an extreme step".[203] Regrading the Gardening Ban as an 'extreme' policy-tool to delegitimize it also appears later in the period,[204] sometimes without explaining why it is considered as such. After the approval of the 2008 Emergency Plan, which included a New-Park Ban and raising the prices for urban irrigation by 90%, the press presented voices calling for drying-out **private** gardens before **public** ones. Eshet, YA's economic commentator, in an op-ed entitled "The rich are invited to the public gardens", argues that:

> *This is a classic example of how much the authorities and the whole public internalised the "values" of private property and the disrespect for public property. […] Because the private garden is holy while the public property – the public garden – must be exploited, damaged and neglected.[205]*

Eshet argues that the option favoured by the government constitutes a class issue, insofar as the latter seems to prefer not to harm the high-income population, who are more likely to own private gardens. Also, he claims that it is much easier to enforce regulations on

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[x] Suggestion such as: restrictions on watering during the winter months (November-April), allowing only night-time irrigation during the summer, restricting irrigations of lawns or quotas for municipal parks.

public spaces while private garden owners only received a price increase. Eshet is not the only one raising this argument in the press: the Israeli Organisation for Gardening and Landscape claims that "[…it] will cause serious damage to quality of life, mainly of disadvantaged classes, because public lawns are one of the only options available to them for family pastimes", and that "the real saving potential is in household consumption".[206]

The first statement from the FLA on regulating public gardening is in an op-ed in Haaretz by its new chairman, Mayor of Ma'alot-Tarshiha, Shlomo Bohbot. Bohbot refers to "drying-out public gardens" and to "municipal water quotas"[y] as "the easy solution", "unreasonable", "populist", coming from a "conceptual fixation" and "narrow thinking" (i.e. uses delegitimization strategy).[207] In his op-ed, Bohbot mostly draws upon Zionist discourse of "creativity" and "foresight" for making Israel into "a good place to live in", and he connects the public parks to the Zionist ideal of blooming the desert (without literally mentioning this phrase). Social and economic arguments against drying-out gardens, and environmental arguments in favour of other mechanisms for reducing water (such as less water-intensive vegetation or recycling sewage), are less prominent in this op-ed. They are used to support the Zionist narrative, to include the cities in the "national project" of water users, and to position the municipal political system as acting efficiently and responsibly. By using this narrative, Bohbot try to legitimize the SMDC opposition to these policies as ideological not of interested party (i.e. to politicise).[208] This can also be seen as another aspect of the AZDC losing the lead of the Zionist discourse.

Fourom-15 and FLA manage to negotiate with the IWA a cancellation of the public Gardening Ban and the New-Park Ban and replaced it with Municipal Quotas for public irrigation and other regulations on hydration patterns. Haaretz, in a news item on the 2009 Emergency Plan, laconically mentioned the negotiation, praising the idea of Municipal Quotas in that: "until now, this sector was not required to optimise its consumption, as opposed to, for example, the agricultural sector". Three weeks later, YA dedicates an item to this "policy change";[209] the headline frames it as permitting public irrigation, and the opening sentence places it as an alternative to private gardens.

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[y] The sentence says הקצאת המים לרשויות which can also be translated into "the municipal water allocations".

5.3.3.2. Debate on Household Tariffs and the Drought Levy

This section explores the SMDC objection to the tariff changes. As mentioned above, the marketization of the tariff which was promoted by the EcDC focuses in CDP2 on household consumption. At the beginning of this period, Haaretz introduces a new concept "encourage-saving tariff"[210,211,z] meaning that water prices should be used as a tool in reducing consumption. This represents an argument in favour of price rises which was added to the more frequent arguments that the tariff should reflect the cost of water production and distribution, which grew due to the use of SD and should also fund SD expansion.[212] This concept has the potential to politicise the debate as it highlights that tariffs reflect social-environmental political goals. In line with their support for the use of **any** means to reduce consumption (such as PCCs), the EnDC argued in favour of the encourage-saving tariff,[213] but this coalition was marginalized in newspaper items which specifically covered the tariff changes.

Two main tariff increase policies were promoted in CDP2: a temporary surcharge for excessive consumption, named by the government as a Drought Levy; and a permanent tariff reform that proposed Differential Tariffs. In September 2008 the Water Committee presented its differential tariff reforms for public consultation. The committee proposed: cancelling the national social-tariff,[aa] dividing household consumption into two new categories of Basic and Surplus (per-capita)[bb] and introducing differential prices for each municipality.[cc] Haaretz presented it thus:

> *The suggested water tariff reform is meant to deal with the severe water crisis by reflecting as much as possible the real costs of supplying water to the different consumers, setting reasonable consumption "quotas" per capita, that once exceeded will be charged by relatively higher fee. [...] the scheme includes more differential pricing, on a municipal basis, according to the corporation costs.[214]*

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[z] What is new in here is not the idea to use the tariff as a consumption regulator, but its branding in an easy to understand phrase. In Hebrew: תעריפים מעודדי חיסכון

[aa] As explained in Chapter 2, historically, in Israel by the 1959 Water Act, water was considered as "public good", managed by the state (via Mekorot and municipalities) to benefit its citizens. Discursively water tariff set on socialist economic ideas, and the tariffs reflected it by having a national rate for all home consumers.

[bb] It also cancelled the old system of A, B, C rates calculated per household.

[cc] Variation in prices are by location, geographical categories (shore, mountain etc.), quality municipal infrastructure (system loss) and excreta.

The change to differential tariffs is justified by reference to the "water crisis", and by continuing the economization discourse of "real costs" from CDP1. The Basic-Surplus option is framed as "reasonable" and the municipal differences presented without an adjective. The laconic economization language in this item hides the radical political implications of the differential tariff which annihilates 60 years of national equal rates. One month earlier, a spread on the second and third pages[dd] of YA presented the IWA differential proposal, focusing on the divergence between municipalities. In this article Ben-David calls the new tariff a "decree" (גזירה), a word with a negative connotation in Jewish history (this word is repeated in other items in YA[215] and occurs once in Haaretz). But this does not mean that YA supported the advocates of the old social-tariff, as it repeatedly quoted speakers from the MoF citing claims about the "real cost" of water and about mismanagement by councils leading to waste.[216,217] The subheading and the spread in YA repeats a claim that the differential tariff is a step towards a future where full rationalization of the prices: "intends to eventually bring reduction of waste and to lower water prices".[218]

According to the IWA, the Drought Levy was an alternative to the private garden irrigation regulations.[219] There is great divergence in coverage of this policy between the papers: first, most of the contestation over the levy was in YA, in which 20 items addressed it as their main topic, including articles of one- or two-pages length, while in Haaretz this protest received minimal coverage (only 4 short items). Secondly, Haaretz used the governmental term levy, whereas YA called it a Drought Tax.[ee,220,221,222] Calling it a tax emphasizes that the revenues raised fund the general state budget and are not dedicated to water management. The purpose of the fund is central to the FLA's rejection of it. The FLA claims that any extra charge should be invested directly in the water system. Adversaries of the levy repeat claims that it's an "anti-social" tax meant to punish the public for governmental failures.[223] The mayor of Ashdod, in a commentary column supporting the SMDC campaign says: "The public is being called upon again to pay for the colossal failure of all Israel's governments dealing with the water crisis".[224] Some mayors also refer to it as a "fine",[225] and the FLA suggests that this is how the levy will be named on utility bills.[226] Moreover, they argue that investment in SD should not be funded

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[dd] Probably with a headline and reference on the front page.

[ee] In Hebrew: היטל בצורת or מס בצורת

though the tariff but directly from the state's budget, and also criticise the MoF for preventing such direct investment (and thereby strengthening the consensus around SD).[227,228]

After the elections of 2009 which brought a change in government, and increasingly during the summer and autumn of that year, YA gives wide coverage to SMDC attempts to cancel or minimize[ff] these economic changes. In these items YA uses juridification and delegitimization strategies to portray the SMDC's actions. Some of these actions, and mainly threats that councils will not collect the levy, were framed by YA with words such as a "rebellion"[229,230,231,232,233] or the "the water rebellion"[234,235] and statements that the mayors "must obey the law".[236] Using terms such as "revolt"[237,238] to describe the FLA's contestation and calls for civil-disobedience (instead of campaign or protest) frames it as illegal in order to delegitimize it. Haaretz gives these issues mush less attention than YA, describing it as "public campaign" or a "struggle"[239] against the levy. In Haaretz, a column by Bar-Eli calls the contestation about the levy and the tariffs a "sad circus" and calls the SMDC "populist".[240] Other items in both papers until the end of the period repeat accusations of the SMDC as "populist"[241,242,243,244,245,246] instead of presenting it as a legitimate political position. The EcDC strengthens the juridification discourse through an appeal from the MoF to the Attorney General to examine the legality of the FLA's campaign. This appeal is reported twice in YA.[247,248] A booklet made by MK Ronit Tirosh (Kadima, opposition), which explained to citizens how to delay their levy payments to give the Knesset time to cancel it, receive wide coverage in YA, which publishes a two-page spread and a one page interview with Tirosh a few days later.[249,250] Seven times during this interview the writer suggests that the booklet constitutes a recommendation to break the law, three times it is called a rebellion, and three times it is suggested that such actions are "danger to democracy".[251] Similar claims of "anarchy, sabotage of the rule of law and democracy", made by the Finance Minister and published in Haaretz, delegalizing the SMDC's actions referring to them as "incitement against MoF".[gg,252]

From the end of October 2009 until February 2010 there is a peak in coverage (marked ii in Figure 3), starting with a call by the new Minister of Infrastructures to cancel

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[ff] Either by increasing how much water is defined as Basic and/or by lowering the price of the Surplus charge.

[gg] Since the assassination of PM Rabin in 1995, in Israel, claiming that someone is committing incitement (הסתה), is understood as a claim that that person is committing (or calling for) a violent act against democracy. Tirosh's actions are also delegitimized in YA by referencing Rabin's assassination.

the municipal differentiation and to delay the levy to the next summer.[253] This is a critical discourse moment around these policies which includes an interim report of the NIC in support of these economic tools and a special report by the State Comptroller criticising them. The comptroller argues that "part of the basic commitment of the state is to provide each citizen's water needs at a fair price", that water is an "essential, basic and existential service" and that the new tariffs will harm lower-income families and municipalities.[254] Calcalist's headline quotes the comptroller that "The State Should Pay the Price Increase, Not the Public."[255] The comptroller also suggests that the political level and not the administration (i.e. IWA or MoF) should have the authority to decide the price of water as: "setting policies is within the jurisdiction of the government." [256] The comptroller's arguments both support claims by the SMDC about the harm done by the new tariff to lower classes and, moreover, politicises the discourse. Other, similar kinds of politicising arguments are given by MKs in YA.[257] Only once does such politicisation of the dispute originate with the EcDC. Moshe Zanber, a former MoF DoB argues in an op-ed in favour of the new tariff. He politicises his arguments, discusses the socialist ideology of past hydro-policies, and explains to the reader why he thinks market tools are better than regulation of water use: "Some regimes solve such a problem by administrative means, while democratic regimes prefer to avoid waste of resources through the system of prices and market forces."[258] Zanber limits the debate into the boundaries of capitalistic democracy, rejecting the option of non-market tools as non-democratic.[259]

The NIC interim report published on 15/12/2009 is legitimized by the newspapers as the "expert" and "rational" position,[260] while the comptroller's report is delegitimized as an ideological position and hence as outside his jurisdiction. In Haaretz Strasler calls the comptroller "Robin Hood", "populist" and "naïve", and calls his report "perfunctory", "superficial" and a "manifesto".[261] In YA, Plocker also calls the comptroller "naïve" and praises the "revolution" embodied in the economization of the tariff. Plocker interviews Prof. Kislev whom he positions as "a member of the NIC and the leading water economist in Israel and one of the most prominent in the world".[262] Kislev is asked: "is it desirable for the Knesset to determine the price of water and not the IWA?", and answers:

> *It is not desirable. Elected representatives should determine guidance and principals for the structure of the water tariff, and leave it for the professionals and experts to translate those into the language of exact numbers. This is the only way to prevent politicisation of the tariff, which is a disgraceful phenomenon".* [263]

The item suggests delaying further tariff changes until the NIC publishes its final report, which is the subject of Section 5.3.4. In January 2010, with the support of the Minister of Infrastructures and the PM, the Basic-Surplus changes to the tariff are implemented by the IWA while the Drought Levy is delayed to the next year (and never implemented) and the municipal differentiation is cancelled.[264] The headline in Calcalist is "populism wins".[265] An item in Haaretz claims that this is thanks to the support of the comptroller in the SMDC's attempts to block (future) full-privatisation of water in Israel. [266] In this item the MoF Water Referent[hh] argues that the price rise was not aimed at reducing consumption, but at financing infrastructure investment, building SD facilities and "adjusting the price of water to reflect its real cost". The item concludes with his statement that "municipal negligence" created the "water shortage."[267]

5.3.3.3.   IWA's Public Awareness Campaigns

Five columns in the magazine and the opinion sections of both newspapers address the writers' personal feelings on the drying–out gardens' policy, the accompanying PCCs and their implications as diverting the responsibility from the government to the individual. All five writers criticise the "guilt" sentiment imposed by the campaigns on the domestic user. These news items used these policies to reaffirm the government failure-to-act discourse, such as:

- *"I failed, the country tells you, and you need to pay for it" (Shaked, YA, August 2008)[268]*
- *"[The campaign is] drawing on a repeated pattern where the state is rolling vast parts of its responsibility onto its citizens" (Amir, YA, November 2008)[269]*
- *"The real water offenders, I tell my pomegranate tree while watering it […] are the leaders of the state. Not me. Defiantly not you." (Golan, Haaretz, July 2009)[270]*

Shaked and Amir repeat similar claims about how supplying water is part of the basic social contract between the state and its people. In their columns, Shaked, Amir and Golan are all directly raising the issue of the non-implementation of desalination, suggesting it could have obviated the need for the campaigns and domestic irrigation regulations. Golan in Haaretz (and Ringel-Hufman in YA)[271] uses nostalgic discursive strategies, reminiscing on historical water stress or a greener glorious past, to suggest that the previous state responsibility ideals are gone. Both writers call to continue watering the gardens while personally taking other domestic water-saving efforts.

[hh] See comment l in this chapter.

More articles[272,273,274] mention or refer to the campaigns during this period, usually using them to reinforce "the crisis", and for emphasising the central discursive trend in this period for reducing household consumption. YA mentions the campaigns (or just by wordplay in their slogans) in articles suggesting appliances and products for reducing household consumption: artificial lawns,[275] smart taps and flush toilets[276] and domestic greywater recycling.[277] A repeated argument in Haaretz throughout this period is about the potential for reducing domestic consumption in comparison to SD, which is, as claimed above, the benchmark for cost and quantity. Mainly, this is achieved by quantifying and comparing real-time figures or potential savings to investment in SD,[278,279] such that:

> *According to the Water Authority this year, 30 MCM of water have already been spared thanks to public-relation activities, equivalent to the capacity of a medium desalination plant.[280]*

The EnDC is repeatedly quoted in support of the IWA campaigns and of other means to reduce consumption during this period (such as domestic greywater recycling).[281] Many times ENGOs speakers are quoted arguing for governmental distribution of watersavers and for legislation compiling its installation in public and office buildings.[282,283,284] This policy is implemented as part of the second campaign of 2010 which is released just after the end of this period (see Chapter 7). On the last month of CDP2 (March 2010), a coalition of ENGOs released an environmental an economic report suggesting policies to reduce national water consumption in order to "decrease the extent of desalination". Only one item covers this report, in Haaretz, it ends with quotations from two ENGOs arguing for having more public representation in the IWA and the Water Council: "one of the reasons for the crisis was the lack of civil society representation".[285] This attempt to politicise decision making, to minimise dependency on SD by long-term plans to reduce consumption had no impact on the following week's reporting of the NIC final report; which is the subject of the next section.

5.3.4. The National Inquiry Committee Report

On 25/3/2010 the newspapers cover the publication of the final report of the NIC. The reporting centres on just a few statements out of the 333 pages of the report. Five items in Haaretz and three in YA cover the publication of the report, mainly focusing on attribution of responsibility for the crisis and on a few policy recommendations. Like the parliamentary inquiry report in 2002, the NIC names governmental departments as

responsible and not specific persons. The headline in Haaretz states: "The governments of Israel failed in managing the water crisis",[286] and explains that because it's a "structural failure which spans over a long period"[ii] the committee decided not to attribute personal responsibility. *Calcalist* also presents the same explanation and quotation.[287] The majority of the coverage of the NIC report in both papers concentrates on this issue, and not on the policy recommendations. In this way, both papers use the report to reaffirm the governmental failure-to-act discourse, as also occurred in the framing of the report in CDP1. A commentary column in *TheMarker* by Bar-Eli states that he is "disappointed" by the NIC decision to repeat the mistake of the PIC not to name those responsible, and suggests that this will encourage the next governmental failure-to-act. He criticizes the committee's decision not to use all of its legal jurisdiction. He quotes the head of the NIC from the press conference in which the report was released:

> *"The power of the committee is only in the media" said Bayan naively […] "Where is [the report's] power? In the news. This is why we address the media, and ask for your help, because we are toothless. Our teeth are the newspapers."*[288]

Bar-Eli asks in return how can democracy's watchdog "bite those who are protected by the committee?" This statement by Bayan, although criticized by Bar-Eli, echoes Haaretz's editorials from CDP1 which suggested that the PIC have only discursive power to change public and governmental awareness about the urgency of the issue and not to change policies (see section 3.4.1). It suggests that despite statements from the NIC about the need to depoliticise hydro-policy decision making, power lies at the political level.

The headline in *Calcalist* covering the NIP report is "the inquiry committee for the water crisis: the treasury is responsible for delaying the SD project".[289] Hence YA also uses the report to reaffirm SD as the main solution to the water crisis, similar to the framing of the report in CDP1. Already with the publication of the interim, *Calcalist* pointed at the similarity between the upcoming NIC findings to the PIC report from 2002.[290] Calcalist use this resemblance to repeat the arguments from the beginning of CDP2 on the needlessness of the PIC (see section 5.3.1.3), to reaffirm the failure-to-act discourse and to argue for expansion of desalination. In the news section of YA Ben-David writes that "political influence" leads to non-execution of decisions about desalination. In Haaretz, SD is mentioned only in one sentence: "the committee decided to continue with the desalination policy, but not to overdo its expansion, as these facilities

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[ii] In plural, as in not the current government but every government since the PIC report.

have a negative environmental impact".[291] An interview the following day with the IWA Director by Rinat in Haaretz, begins with the director describing the increase in desalination as his biggest achievement. Rinat, the environmental reporter, does not repeat to the reader the committee's environmental concerns about SD.

5.4. Summary

This chapter has presented the newspaper discourse on hydro-policies in Israel during the second critical discourse period (CDP2) before and during the work of an NIC, from March 2008 to April 2010. This period continued in the same direction as CDP1: expanding the hegemony of the economic discourse over other conceptualisations of water (i.e. political or ecologic); contributing to the depoliticisation of these hydro-policies by using the failure-to-act frame, marginalisation and delegitimisation of the discourse-coalitions and positioning SD as the prime reaction to the droughts (disconnecting it from climate change).

As with the former period, CDP2 began with both newspapers describing the drought as a 'water crisis'. This time, they mainly explained the crisis through the use of economic language and via the supply and demand frame, even from scientists. This perception of the crisis as a supply and demand imbalance led to the main policy suggestions in CDP2 addressing the two sides of this equation. The policies in favour of demand management were highly contested while on the supply side throughout this period, the newspapers presented a consensus around the need to expand SD. Unlike in CDP1, the newspapers presented voices rejecting the crisis consensus. This was a discursive strategy used for either rejecting the consensus building around a specific solution or for supporting it. Voices rejecting the crisis also reaffirmed its existence as the logic of their arguments could be summed up as: if the government would have done X, as recommended by experts, then there would not be a crisis. This argument also reaffirms the perception of the crisis as a governmental failure-to-act, which continues from the last period. Both newspapers framed the NIC mission by emphasising the non-exaction of past 'expert committee' recommendations (often arguing that there is no need for investigation, in a similar logic to the no crisis argument). As such, more than in CDP1, the crisis investigation was used for a post-political depoliticisation, supporting expert and non-political decision-making and policy execution (i.e. by the private sector and not by the government). The depoliticisation of hydro-policies in CDP1 was about certain policies or actors. This trend expanded in CDP2 by claiming that *all governments* are responsible for the crisis, and to poison all the hydro-policies as techno-managerial issues, which should be managed by experts (or by the market).

An important feature of news coverage during CDP2 is the ways that both newspapers generated a consensus around SD as the best way to address the crisis. This

was due to: (1) claiming that the delays in SD implementation caused the crisis; (2) by presenting SD potential as unlimited; (3) by marginalising voices contesting any expansion and delegitimising those who objected it in the past (mainly the treasury); (4) by comparing other supply increasing policies as inferior to SD (such as importing and drilling), mainly on the aspects of time, capacity and price; (5) by presenting the possible effects of demand management tools as equivalent to the annual water production of SD facilities; and by (6) marginalising the known negative effects of SD, mainly the health and environmental ones. Under this consensus construction, desalination was presented as inevitable and able to provide an unlimited abundance of water in the future.[292] This was achieved by claiming that "[with SD] a seashore country shouldn't have a water problem",[293] and that there were no disagreements among experts that "the solution [for the crisis] must come from desalination."[294] The frequent coverage of SD as an economic subject, and the presentation of the disputes over every policy except SD contributed to the normalisation of SD in general, and to the normalisation of its implementation by privatisation specifically. In this respect, major differences in the coverage of SD between the newspapers had not been identified. This is aside from the minor differences between *TheMarker* and *Calcalist* about privatisation where the first criticised the possibility of the creation of a private monopoly, and the latter disputed further privatisation of the water infrastructure. YA, and more prominently *Calcalist,* discursively constricted the privatisation of the water infrastructure, and presented SD as positive and inevitable.

More significant differences between the newspapers have been identified in their coverage of the policies for reducing urban consumption. I argue that the voices contesting these policies can be considered as a new discourse-coalition, which was not identified in the literature (Menahem 2001; Menahem and Gilad 2016). According to their arguments and quotes presented in the newspapers in this period, I have identified that this coalition's water paradigms are conservatives in its wishes to maintain the paradigmatic principals of the 1959 Water Law. To some degree, this coalition formed in reaction to the works of the EcDC (i.e. against neoliberalisation and marketisation). The SMDC argued against the differential tariffs, against corporations and the privatisation of the water services in favour of private gardening regulations over public ones. They also presented water as a social issue and water as a public good, arguing against further economisation of the water. Not mentioned above, is that Forume-15 cities also tried to promote construction of SD facilities that will be directly owned by municipalities, as an alternative to privatisation of SD.[295,296]

One of the significant differences between the newspapers was the delegitimisation of this coalition and the juridification of its actions in YA. More than once, YA referred to the SMDC protest as an act of rebellion against the state, and it framed its actions as illegal and illegitimate. The political presentation of this coalition, formed mostly by MKs and mayors, was presented as acting from self-interest, populist and contributing to the creation of the water crisis. By contrast, YA often connected the tariff price increases to general increases in the cost of living (such as housing or the consumer price index). This framing could be seen as supporting the SMDC's social arguments; however, it reaffirmed the economic discourse regarding water as a product, and by that it contributed to the depoliticisation of the tariff. Even though Haaretz has not delegitimised the SMDC, it marginalised it and did not cover much of its contestation it was part of. When the State Comptroller published his critique of the new urban tariff, his arguments (which were based on the Water Law and supported the SMDC) were depoliticised by using the discursive strategy of juridification. As this coalition was formed mainly against the corporation of the municipal services, a subject which was excluded from the data collection (and because this coalition was marginalized, delegitimized and silenced) the water paradigms of this coalition presented in this chapter are limited and should be the subject of further study.

One significant difference between CDP1 and CPD2 is in the role of the science and environmental reporters in each newspaper. Firstly, this difference refers to the share of these reporters, which increased in CDP2 to 40% of the reporting in YA and 20% in Haaretz. In comparison to CDP1, this increase has brought more exposure to EnDC arguments and spokespersons, and it raised the connection to climate change more so than in the first period. Nonetheless, this increase is still marginal, and the scope of the coverage of climate change and the environmental or ecological aspects of the hydro-polices remains very small. Moreover, environmental arguments were mostly limited in both newspapers to presenting the drought impact on nature or calling for adopting water-saving measures, and with no references to the environmental implications of SD. As such, the environmental reports were 'bearing witness'[297] to nature as part of the construction of the 'crisis' discourse more than influencing the discourse of hydro-polices to be more sustainable and ecological. The environmental reports echoed the EnDC's call to 'listen to experts',[298] and by this call (even though they increased the *scope* of the debate), their *form* of coverage contributed to depoliticisation. Both of these reporters contested in op-eds and commentary columns as a means of reducing consumption. Ben-David

argued in favour of economic tools and against the SMDC's political lobby. He called the Drought Levy "A Necessary Evil" and "Unpleasant, But Essential" (in the headlines for these two op-eds), and he referred to the SMDC opposition to the levy as populist, which goes against expert opinion (and against the PIC work).

Also, more than in Haaretz, YA coverage in this period (similar to CDP1) focused on how the drought and hydro-policies affected the individual consumer. This included explaining how the tariff reforms affected households, such as by giving voice to private garden and small-business owners (such as restauranteurs) complaining about the large costs of water. Alternatively, it provided advices on saving water and water-saving appliances. Taking an ethical-individual depoliticisation position (Machin 2013) on how to address the crisis. YA also frequently published small items (usually with photos) about cases of public water wastage, such as excessive irrigation, or about local initiatives for water saving, such as closing public beach showers[299] or greywater reuse.[300] In Haaretz, Rinat argued (more but not only) for non-economic means such as the PCCs and reuse of greywater at home and in public buildings. Rinat concluded in one of his op-eds that:

> *If Israel would have entered a saving regime, which includes, among other things, widespread use of water-saving devices, appropriate urban and agriculture tariffs, reuse, and irrigation regulation – the accumulated water deficit would have been smaller. The Kinneret wouldn't dry so fast and the dependency of the high-energy desalination facilities would reduce. […] "What many societies need today is a new water management paradigm not a new water resource".[301]*

Despite the closing sentence, not a single item in this period was dedicated to the meaning of the high-energy demands of SD (i.e. on the climate), and the option of household greywater recycling, which was promoted in the Knesset by the EnDC MKs and ENGOs; it only mentioned several times in this period.[302,303,304] This op-ed is an example of the unfulfilled potential in CDP2 of the environmental reporters to challenge the hegemonic discourse and to offer new understanding on ways to achieve resilience (further discussion in Chapter 8).

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[232] Brut, Z. (2009, October 29) Drought Levy Revolt. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[233] Daum, H. (2009, August 7) Against the Revolt: This is Not for Us. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[234] (Ben-David and Wise 2009, September 23)

[235] (Zimuki and Ben-David 2009, August 27)

[236] (Zimuki and Ben-David 2009, August 27)

[237] (Zimuki and Ben-David 2009, August 27)

[238] (Daum 2009, August 7)

[239] Zerahia, Z. (2009, August 31) The Next Struggle of Miri Regev: Water Pricing, *Haaretz*

[240] Zerahia, Z. (2009, October 30) Probably: The Knesset will Delay the Water Tariff Rise to January. *Haaretz*

[241] Shtrasler, N. (2009, November 3) Shulman Can Pay. *Haaretz*

[242] (Katz 2009, November 16)

[243] Rinat, Z. (2009, December 16) The Inquiry Committee: Severe Management Deficiencies in Israel's Water System. *Haaretz*

[244] Hovel, R. (2009, December 16) Populism Wins. *Calcalist*

[245] Zerahia, Z. (2009, December 31) The Knesset Initiates a Bill to Abolish Tomorrow's 25% Tariffs Rise. *Haaretz*

[246] Bar-Eli, A. (2009, November 10) Sad Circus. *Haaretz*

[247] (Zimuki and Ben-David 2009, August 27)

[248] (Wise 2009, August 7)

[249] (Brut 2009, October 29)

[250] (Ronen 2009, November 1)

[251] (Brut 2009, October 29)

[252] Bar-Eli, A. (2009, August 26), Steinitz: "The drought levy is essential, incitement against the treasury should stop", Haaretz

[253] (Brut 2009, October 29)

[254] Ben-David, A., Regev, D. and Z. Zinger (2009, December 31) The State Comptroller Attacked, The Government Ignored. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[255] Hovel, R. (2009, December 31) "The State Should Pay the Price Increase, Not the Public." *Calcalist*

[256] (Ben-David, Regev, and Zinger 2009, December 31)

[257] Ben-David, A. and Z. Brut (2009, August 12) "The Change Discriminates". *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[258] Zanber, M. (2010, January 12) Israel Raised Water Prices in the Past and Needs to Raise Them Again Today. *Haaretz*

[259] (Zanber 2010, January 12)

[260] (Hovel 2009, December 30)

[261] Shtrasler, N. (2009, December 31) Lucky There's Robin Hood. *Haaretz*

[262] Plocker, S. (2010, January 1) We Were Dreamers. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[263] (Plocker 2010, January 1)

[264] (Bar-Eli 2010, January 2)

[265] (Hovel 2009, December 16)

[266] Sade, S. (2010, January 8) The Tariff Battles: Saving Water or Funding Restructuring? *Haaretz*

[267] (Sade 2010, January 8)

[268] Shaked, R. (2008, August 22) The Water is the Limit. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[269] Amir, G. (2008, November 25) All the People as a Drop. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[270] Golan, A. (2009, July 15) Water Offenders. *Haaretz*

[271] Ringel-Huffman, A. (2009, August, 27) Drying-Out the Country. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[272] Geffen, M. (2009, May 19) Drying? Not Really. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[273] Rinat, Z. (2010, January 10) The Campaign and the Levy Work: Decrease in Household Water in Israel Consumption. *Haaretz*

[274] (Ginsburg 2009, April 27)

[275] Yahav. J. (2009, May 7) Please do Not Water the Lawn. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[276] Yahav, J. (2008, July 30) Go With the Flow. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[277] Yahav, J. (2009, December 13) Green Eyes. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[278] (Bar-Eli 2008, June 3)

[279] Rinat, Z. (2009, May 9) Water Affair. *Haaretz*

[280] Rinat, Z. (2008, November 17) Infrastructures Minister: If Needed, We will Limit Domestic Water Consumption. *Haaretz*

[281] Rinat, Z. (2009, November 13) Greywater. *Haaretz*

[282] (Ben-David 2009, January 30)

[283] (Rinat 2009, November 13)

[284] (Ben-David 2008, March 24)

[285] Rinat, Z. (2010, March 17) Environmental Organisations Report: Prioritise Savings over Desalination. *Haaretz*

[286] Rinat, Z. (2010, March 25) The Inquiry Committee: The governments of Israel Failed in Managing the Water Crisis. *Haaretz*

[287] Hovel, R. (2010, March 25) The Treasury is Responsible for the Water Crisis". *Calcalist*

[288] Bar-Eli, A. (2010, March 24) With Guilt - There is no Blame. *Haaretz*

[289] (Hovel 2010, March 25)

[290] (Hovel 2009, December 30)

[291] (Rinat 2010, March 25)

[292] (Cohen 2009, January 26)

[293] (Plocker 2009, July 17)

[294] (Ginsburg 2009, April 27)

[295] Rinat, Z. and A. Cohen (2008, April 13) Proposal: Large Costal Cities will Desalinate Water. *Haaretz*

[296] Shafir, G. (2008, August 3) Tel-Aviv to Build a Desalination Facility for 6 Million Shekel. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[297] (Peleg 2008, May 19)

[298] (Rinat 2009, May 19)

[299] Avni, I. and A. Ben-David (2009, February 5) Closing the Beach Showers. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[300] Torgeman, M. and I. Glikman (2008, March 14) In Tel-Aviv City will Connect the Air-Con to the Toilets. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[301] (Rinat 2009, May 19)

[302] (Shaked 2001, October 12)

[303] Yahav, J. (2009, December 13) The Grey is Very Green Today. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[304] (Rinat 2009, November 13)

Chapter 6 - Third Critical Discourse Period: A Contemporary Perspective: the State Comptroller Report (2018)

In the last two chapters, I presented the hydro-policy discourses from Israel at the time of public inquiry investigations of a so-called "water crisis". They presented: the decline in importance of the Agro-Zionist discourse-coalition (AZDC); the growing domination of the economic discourse-coalition (EcDC); the marginalisation of the environmental discourse-coalition (EnDC); and the rise of the new social-municipal discourse-coalition (SMDC). At times, these coalitions challenged the hydro-policies discourse (i.e. they politicised), and at other times, they contributed to the hegemonic post-political zeitgeist of discursively addressing water as a techno-managerial and mainly economic subject (i.e. depoliticised). Simultaneous with the economic discourse of hydro-policies becoming prominent, seawater desalination (SD) moved from a discursive position of one of many 'alternatives' to the leading one, even in relation to other desalination technologies. As shown in Chapter 5, the National Inquiry Committee's (NIC's) final report strengthened the consensual discourse presenting SD as the main policy for Israel's growing water needs.

This critical discourse period (CDP3) differs from the first two on several issues: it is much shorter in length; even though it covers the State Comptroller investigation, its existence has been largely ignored by the press; the discourse-coalitions play a marginalised role compared to the previous periods; and more importantly, SD in this period supplies 80% of the urban water consumption (see Chapter 2).

Chapter Six explores the dynamics of the hydro-polices discourse during a time of drought when the water supply seems to be disconnected from the natural water cycle. It presents how the repeated droughts lead to arguments for further disconnection from nature by expanding SD while also raising questions about some of the implications of desalination. As presented below, climate change and its connection to the droughts and desalination is no longer ignored. Firstly, similar to the previous chapters, this time period is contextualised below.

6.1.   Context for the Period and Key Events

According to the Israel Meteorological Services, after four continuous drought years, beginning with the rain-year of 2013-2014, the rain-year of 2017-2018 "has ended within the norm" and is not a drought year, partly thanks to "unusual and multiple rains" in June 2018 (Porat 2018). Despite this rain-year was statistically within the norm, the Kinneret Basin had only 70%-80% of its normal precipitation, and furthermore:

> *It should be noted that in the north of the country and especially in the north east [the Kinneret Basin], a rare rainfall deficit has accumulated over the past five years, after the previous two rainy seasons and in the 2013-2014 there was a significant low rainfall. (Porat 2018)*

Therefore, for some areas and mainly for the purposes of financially compensating the agricultural sector, the rain-year 2017-2018 was officially defined by the government as a drought year.[1] In January 2018, the IWA began working on a national strategic plan for the water system, which five months later was the base for the "Governmental Decision [#3866, 10/6/2018]: Strategic plan for dealing with drought periods in the water system in the years 2018-2030" (Office 2018). The plan includes immediate tenders to increase SD by 300 MCM/year (that is by having two new facilities, operational by 2024). In February 2018, it became public that the State Comptroller was investigating the IWA's policy execution, its actions to mitigate the drought and how it implemented the NIC's recommendations. The State Comptroller Report (SCR) entitled Planning and Managing the Water System was published in October (State Comptroller 2018). During this year, the IWA published two public communication campaigns (PCCs) in May and November, asking the public to reduce consumption "in spite of desalination" (see Chapter 7). In April 2018, the government published a preliminary tender for the sixth desalination facility to be built in Soreq (next to an existing facility, in operation since 2013); the full tender was published and open to proposals in October. In August 2018, the Competition Authority (CA) regulation actions regarding IDE's monopoly in SD obliged the company to sell its holdings in one or two facilities, as a prerequisite for its participation in the coming tenders (Israel Competition Authority 2018). October to December 2018 were the rainiest months since the rain-year 1994-1995 (according to the national average), and the rain-year 2018-2019 was the wettest since 2002-2003 (Porat 2019).

The Ministry of Infrastructure during this period was renamed as the Ministry of Energy (MoE) and Yuval Steinitz, was the minister, (who was the Finance Minister during CDP2). Uri Ariel (Jewish Home Party) was the Minister of Agriculture, Moshe Kahlon (Kulanu Party), the Finance Minister and Benyamin Netanyahu (from the Likud Party)

was serving as the Prime Minister (since 2009). Giora Shaham (a water engineer) was the IWA Director from 2017. Since the NIC had published its report, two new SD facilities began operation: Ashdud (2015) and Soreq (2013), and the facilities in Palmachim and Hadera increased their capacity, together completing the transformation of urban supply, which is described in Chapter 2.

6.2. General Findings

Table 10: Data Collection by Newspaper CDP3 (2018)

	Haaretz (including *TheMarker*)	Yedioth Ahronoth (including *Calcalist)*
Total: 127 items	**66**	**61**
Average items per month	5.5	5.08
Economy section	**39 (59%)**	**46 (75%)**
Economic news items	32	36
Commentary columns	2	8
Interviews	1	1
Opinions	2	1
➢ By external writers	➢ 2	➢ 0
News section	**19 (28%)**	**7 (~11%)**
News items	19	7
Commentary columns	0	0
Interviews	0	0
Opinion pieces	**2 (3%)**	**3 (4.9%)**
Editorials	0	0
➢ By external writer	➢ 1	➢ 2
Magazine supplements	**6 (9%)**	**5 (8.1%)**
Interviews	0	1

Table 10 shows the number of items analysed in CDP3. Compared to the previous CDPs, the total number has dropped to 127 mostly since this period is only 12 months long (CDP1 was 18 months and CDP2 was 25 months). Comparing the averages per month, there is a small decrease in the news coverage (~5) compared to CDP2 (~7), and similar to CDP2, it is almost equal between Haaretz and YA. A comparison of the different sections indicates that in YA, the economic section had almost doubled its share of coverage to two thirds of the total (38% in CDP1 and 44% in CDP2). One explanation for this is the growth in *Calcalist,* which contributed half of the items in YA. Importantly, this change reflects the increasing use of the framing of the hydro-policies as an economic issue in this news outlet. In contrast, Haaretz shows an opposite trend of a reduction in the share of the economic section to 59%, continuing the trend from CDP2 while still retaining a majority in the coverage. Notably, both newspapers reduced their share of op-eds and commentary columns (more in Haaretz than YA). In CDP2, as suggested by Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017), op-eds is the space where clear ideological standpoints can be made which contribute to the diversity in the debate in each newspaper. Therefore, the reduction in the number of op-eds suggests that the hydro-policies have not been ideologically contested as much in CDP3.

Figure 4: Frequency per Month CDP3

Figure 4 shows the frequency of items by month across the two newspapers. This frequency was influenced by the following events: in February, *Calaclist* published "exclusively"[2] that the State Comptroller is writing his report on hydro-policies, neither newspaper follows up on this until the report's publication in October 2018. The first coverage peak shared by both newspapers is in May (marked i) due to the IWA's PCC release. Haaretz' peak in coverage in August (marked ii) mainly covers the Competition Authority decision about the IDE. Both newspapers' peak in October (marked iii) is at the beginning of the month because of the tender for the Soreq SD facility, and at the end when it covered the SCR.

	Title	Name	Total items	% of coverage in this newspaper	Special Items
Haaretz	Industry and Energy Reporter (*TheMarker*)	Ora Koren	28	42%	1 Commentary column
	Nature & Environment Reporter[a]	Zafrir Rinat	20	30%	1 Op-ed
	Economic Reporter	Yoram Gabizon	3	4%	0
YA	Infrastructure Reporter and Editor (*Calaclist*)	Lior Gutman	18	29%	4 Commentary columns
	Infrastructure Reporter (*Calaclist*)	Gabi Baron	9	14%	1 Commentary column
	Chief-Economic Commentator and Economic Editor	Gidion Eshet	5	8%	4 Commentary columns, 1 op-ed
	Environmental Reporter	Amir Ben-David	5	8%	0

Similar to CDP1, in Haaretz, two writers are responsible for more than 70% of the news items, that is Ora Koern from the economic section and Zafrir Rinat from the news section. However, this time, there seems to be more of a balance between the two perspectives presented. The environmental reporter, Rinat, continues his trend of expanding his share of the reporting to 30% while his equivalent in YA, Ben-David, presents the opposite trend of dropping from 40% in CDP2 to 8% in this period.

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[a] In CDP1 and CDP1 Rinat was titled the Science and Environment Reporter.

6.3.   Analysis

The Analysis in this chapter is divided into three main parts: one is chronological and the other two are thematic. The first (Section 6.3.1) follows the construction of a "crisis" discourse in three chronological stages. Section 6.3.1.1 presents the beginning of the period, followed by two points, which correlate with peaks in the news coverage during this period: Section 6.3.1.2 relates to the release of a new governmental strategic plan and a PCC in May and Section 6.3.2.3 refers to the release of the SCR towards the end of the period. The SCR reinvigorates the failure-to-act discourse from the previous CDPs. The second part of this chapter (6.3.2) specifically looks at two alternative explanations to the failure-to-act discourse: (Section 6.3.2.1) climate change and (Section 6.3.2.2) household consumption. The third part (6.3.3) explores new themes in the news coverage about SD in this period: (Section 6.3.3.1) a new perspective on privatisation, (Section 6.3.3.2) transferring SD water to Lake Kinneret and (Section 6.3.3.3) the health implications. Finally, (in Section 6.3.4) the analysis focuses on the discourse-coalitions, and how they are presented during this time period.

6.3.1.   The Construction of the "Crisis" discourse in CDP3

6.3.1.1.   January to March: It's not a Manmade "Crisis", but a "Rare Natural Event"

This CDP starts in the middle of the winter (similar to CDP1). At the beginning, the newspapers and the quoted officials speak about the possibility of another drought year and the potential risks. In contrast to CDP1 and CDP2, during 2018, the newspapers generally avoid describing the drought and its hydrological implications as a *water crisis*. Only eight news items use this phrase (5.5% of the total) during 2018. Haaretz uses it the least, only once[3], whereas *Calcalist* uses the crisis framing the most (it appear in January in a headline[4] and in two other headlines later on).[5,6] Nonetheless, the newspapers do not ignore the five-year drought, and similar to the past they still frame the situation as risky and problematic, only without the crisis frame. They call it an "extreme situation",[7,8,9,10,11] "rare"[12] or "severe".[13] The longevity of the drought (since 2013) is described as an unusual "natural event"[14] or as being statistically unusual weather.[15,16] Unlike the previous time periods, climate change is part of the debate (see below in Section 6.3.2.1). However, this framing of rarity and as a natural phenomenon mark the risk as unexpected and beyond human responsibility; therefore, the hydro-policies could not be predictive, only *reactive* to

it. For example, in January, *Calaclist* writes that the new strategic plan drafted by the MoE aimed at "addressing the sad condition of the water system, **an outcome of a rare natural event**, in the form of five consecutive drought years (emphasis added)".[17] The IWA Director, Shaham, and the Energy Minister are the most prominent promoters of this *reacting to nature* perspective, which they use as means to make the IWA and the government exempt from liability.[18] At the same time, their position of the drought being due to infrequent natural phenomena presents a new perspective about the limitations of resilience: one could not and should not prepare for every possibility. This is shown in the interview below in Haaretz:

> *The water authority manager explains the lack of **preparation** for the situation, because it is an **extreme** scenario [...] such scenarios are not being **prepared** to because of the large investments involved and their environmental impact. 'A five-year drought is so **rare** that its probability is only 2%', says Shaham. 'There have been only two such cases in the last 100 years [...] and we are on the verge of the third time. A water system cannot be **prepared** for such low probabilities. The consequences will be unbearable [emphasis added].[19]*

As a reaction to this situation, Shaham suggests the same policies seen in the past: short-term "drought drilling", a reduction in household consumption (by the PCCs) and agriculture. His reluctance to expand SD for economic and environmental reasons seen in this quote is repeated in the interview and is discussed later (see Section 6.3.2.1).

Unlike CDP1 and CDP2, there are fewer scientific definitions of the problem in terms of using hydrological data (the rainfall figures), and there is an increased usage of short descriptions about the state of the natural sources, mostly streams and springs in the northern parts of the country and in the Kinneret basin. The next example from the first news item of CDP3 is relevant for explaining this change in how the problem is described with less scientisation. This item describes the Dan River[b] as having "the lowest flow intensity ever measured at this time of year", and Mekorot is quoted as stating that "in the Western Galilee, there is simply no way to supply more water to homes".[20] Firstly, it might represent a development in ability of lay people to see the risk effects without the need for scientific knowledge (Beck 1992). For instance, YA often mentions the drying northern rivers[c] and the "growing island in the Kinneret"[21] (which are now visible), and

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[b] Dan is one of the three main tributaries coming together to form the Jordan River before it flows into Lake Kinneret.

[c] An outbreaks of Leptospirosis in some northern stream happened in summers of 2018 and 2017, and is associated with the drought. Similar to other water contamination stories in past periods, the reporting

it uses them to dramatise the description of the drought. Secondly, the use of a visible landscape or part of nature, which situates this as a naturalised event, thus possibly places an emphasis on the responsibility of an externalised nature (i.e. the drought), as suggested by the IWA. Thirdly, this language change to 'natural sources' and the focus on the northern parts of Israel is also connected to SD. It differentiates between the "natural" water to desalinated water, and from areas which rely on SD to the ones which are not connected to it, such as Western Galilee. The power of SD to detach the water supply from *nature*, which was raised in the previous time periods (see 4.3.3), plays a role in a new project brought to the forefront in September 2018 (see below). Likewise, the discursive role of the red-lines hadn't changed from CDP1 and CDP2. They are mentioned in more than 10% of the news items of CDP3; hence, the red-lines still play a role in dramatising the drought. However, in 2018, this dramatization comes without any description of the risks stemming from the low water levels, and without any warning of the problems in supply to household, which was typical in the past CDPs, probably because in CDP3 80% of the urban water is from SD.

6.3.1.2.   May to June: the New Governmental Strategic Plan and the PCCs: a Critical Discourse Moment?

The first change in CDP3 in the way the newspapers presented the effect of the drought was in May. The news stories on SD dominated the coverage in April 2018 across six items, only one of them presented a different hydro-policy.[d] By contrast, the reporting in May was dominated by the governmental strategic plan and the PCC, and only one had no relation to the plan or campaigns.[e] The intensive coverage of the strategic plan included an escalation in the language used to describe the sense of the situation. Haaretz[22] and YA[23] call the situation an "emergency" and with "severe water shortages"; and *Calaclist* escalates its language to a "hard water crisis".[24] There is a substantial difference in how each newspaper covers the strategic plan and the PCC. The YA reports in May are **only** about the PCC, and in June, it **only** reports on the SD parts of the strategic plan. However, *Calaclist* centres its attention on supporting issues which **are not** part of the plan, and which are promoted by the MoE: cutting agricultural allocation[25] and privatisation of

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about the outbreaks were excluded from the data, expect some articles that specifically dealt with desalination.

[d] The farmer's request for financial compensation in the case of allocations cuts.

[e] About termination of governmental investments in water technologies start-ups via Mekorot.

water drilling.[26,27] In contrast, all the items from May to June in Haaretz and TheMarker are about the governmental strategic plan **and** the PCC.

The period from May to June also includes a significant change in the explanation of the reasons for this water shortage; a new critical explanation emerges about the possible "euphoria"[28] or "illusions"[29] around SD, which led to a consumption increase. This new explanation corresponds with the messages in the PCC released in proximity, which justify renewed efforts for household savings. In doing so, SD and the promises made by this technology are not criticised, but rather responsibility is placed on the consumers. Before the launch of the PCC, Rinat writes the following:

> *According to the Ministry of Energy, the current rise in consumption cannot be explained only by the rapid Israeli population growth; it stems, among other things,* **from a reduction in the population's strictness to save on usage; partly because of the erroneous assumption that water desalination obviates the need for savings** *[emphasis added].[30]*

The day after this report, Rinat continues with: "the desalination facilities construction created a sense of complacency, and last decades' saving achievements […] wore out".[31] In August 2018, *Calcalist* explains that prices decreased "due to improvements in desalination technologies", leading to an increase in consumption, and which explains that "these two elements made us all relax, take our feet off the brake and consume beyond what is really needed"[32] (for more detail on the connection between desalination and tariff, see Section 4.3.3). As predicted by Swyngedouw (2013a), SD is able to 'fix' the problem of the water demands while creating further demands.

Six news items during May and June reflect the campaign message that "desalination is not enough" (which is quoted in two items).[33,34] After the release of the campaign, two op-eds in YA and Haaretz criticise previous descriptions of desalination as a "magical solution"[35] and "dreamy illusion",[36] respectively. Both op-eds suggest that the problematic economic, health and environmental effects of SD are only revealed now. YA only briefly mentions these implications of desalination in an op-ed on the PCC while in Haaretz, SD and its health and environmental implications are described as "drastic", "significant" and "irreversible". Two additional op-eds in Haaretz in June criticise SD by raising these implications. Nonetheless, both writers do not politicise SD, but rather they question the use of SD while contributing to further depoliticisation. The first op-ed, written by an environmental and economic consultant and a board member of the Israel Planners Association, continues the de-political discourse of the expert-based decision-making and delegitimisation of its opponents. It delegitimises the desalination owners as

"tycoons";[f] it criticises the government for not listening to the "warning calls and alerts from experts and professionals" and it refers to the previous emphasis on SD as a "stupidity", which is "irresponsible". The second op-ed, by the water scientist of IUED, writes about the "disadvantages" of "produced water" in comparison to "natural water". The discourse strategy of scientisation is used by the writer to promote a "rehabilitation" of the natural resources (the aquifers) for their "environmental, health, economic and strategic advantages" over SD (see Section 6.3.3.3 for further details).[37]

Despite the increase in criticisms on the hegemony of desalination, the consensus around SD as the best long-term solution is reaffirmed in the strategic plan. That is, the governmental strategic plan ignores this critiques and promotes an increase in the production of the existing SD facilities and two new facilities, one for the Galilee area on the northern coast, and one to be located next to the SD facility in Soreq operating since 2013 (named by the press as Soreq 2) (Office 2018). Nothing was new about this strategy as the preliminary tender for Soreq 2 was published in April;[38] in January, Haaretz reported that the Galilee facility had been approved by the IWA.[39] Therefore, despite the emphasis during May on reducing consumption, SD maintains its hegemony as the long-term fix. Shaham is quoted in Haaretz saying "how to solve the problem? First thing is desalination";[40] *Calcalist* blames the MoE for "not doing enough to increase SD production".[41]

In Haaretz, reducing household consumption and SD are presented as supplementary policies. As can be seen in the following quotes: "the campaign occurs in parallel to the strategic plan";[42] and "beyond the campaign, the IWA takes additional steps, such as continuing to desalinate water".[43] YA and *Calaclist* emphasise the temporality of this supplementary aspect, and similar to the past CDPs, reducing consumption is presented as a short-term effect until the expansion of SD.[44,45,46] Plocker, YA economic commentator, writes two commentary columns and one op-ed in June to argue for the expansion of desalination (before and after the plan's approval). In his writings, Plocker maintains and reaffirms past discourses such as the governmental failure-to-act, which leads to a "fake crisis",[47] arguing for a full economisation of the water market, and using

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[f] The term tycoon changed its meaning in Israel after the 2011 social protest, in CDP2 this word was used positively by *Calcalist* and negatively by *TheMarker*, here it is used as a negative adjective.

the "plenty of water in the sea" arguments. Plocker supports his arguments through an interview with Dr Shinen, who is presented to the reader as: "a practical economist with good practical plans - which the Israeli governments adopt only after trying having done wrong and failed".[g],[48] Shinen's promotes neoliberal economy, and it includes statements such as:

> *The public call to return to the days of water discipline contradicts the principles of economics and reduces the welfare of citizens [… later in the item] decision makers in the country should internalise the fact that thanks to desalination technology we have plenty of water, and at a reasonable cost.[49]*

In terms of cost, Shinen only refers to economics, ignoring all the other implications. The fact that the governmental strategic plan includes two new desalination facilities which were approved without objection, Plocker considers as proof that there is a consensus for using SD:

> *Both the [energy] minister and the economist [Shinen] sees the solution to Israel's water stress through a massive increase of the desalinated water supply and not by (unnecessary) restraint of private fresh water demands.[50]*

6.3.1.3.   October to November: the State Comptroller Report (SCR)

The final step in the escalation of the crisis discourse came after the SCR publication, which emphasised the governmental responsibility for its creation. The SCR was published on 22/10/2018, and in the introduction, State Comptroller Shapira quotes the NIC definition of a 'water crisis' and writes: "eight years after the Bayan Committee[h] recommendations […] again the water system is at crisis" (State Comptroller 2018:2) (this definition is discussed further in Chapter 8). The newspapers adopt the comptroller's crisis framing. Both *Calaclist* and YA use a direct quote from the comptroller blaming the IWA for "creating a crisis" as their headlines for the items covering the report. *TheMarker* uses a similar quote in the opening paragraph of the item. However, in Haaretz, Rinat is the only one not using this term. As such, the return of the crisis frame also brings back a frame which was almost absent in this period: the governmental failure-to-act, including its discursive strategy of asking 'who is responsible'. The newspapers consensually adopt

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[g] Shinen argue that the state allow IDE to increase SD production without a tender, which might indicate his interest, while the government insist on a competitive tender process.

[h] i.e. the NIC for the water system headed by Former Judge Professor Dan Bayan.

the comptroller's position of the IWA responsibility, the administrative level, and not the political level or a political position or paradigm. The SCR lists six "main deficiencies"[i] of planning and managing the water system (State Comptroller 2018), all of which are techno-managerial. As a result, the newspapers report on these techno-managerial deficiencies without expanding the scope beyond the administrative aspects to question the paradigms behind it. The articles covering the report all reflect the same depoliticised chain of events: the non-implementation of certain actions which led to "the gap between supply and demand",[51] and when induced by a drought ended with a crisis. Even when the commentary columns in *Calcalist* re-direct the blame from the IWA onto the political level, the critique is about the minister's management skills, and not on his ideological position (or on his marginalisation of the effects of climate change).

The SCR has a discursive effect similar to the NIC and the PIC reports as reaffirming policy decisions made during the investigation period, which strengthen the depoliticised "expertise".[j] This discourse can be identified in the reactions and commentaries to the report. The IWA's reaction to the SCR has two levels. Firstly, it built on the discourse it constructed from the beginning of this period about the notion of "rarity" (which prevented any pre-planning due to costs) to suggest that there was no failure in their actions. Secondly, it reminded the reader about the strategic plan which was proposed in June, and used the SCR to reaffirm the policies in the plan. This is the response quoted in Haaretz and *TheMarker*:

> *A rare five-year drought that strikes the State of Israel cannot receive an early planning response, because such a response requires huge investments affecting* **the consumer tariff***. […] The planning and management of the Israeli water system is one of the most successful and advanced in the world,* **and it sets an example to other countries on how to cope and adjust the water system to climate change***. A programme that addresses the rare situation [has been approved] and is being implemented [emphasis added].[52]*

YA[53] and *Calcalist*[54] give this quote (seen in full Haaretz and *TheMarker*) without the text I marked in "[…]" and without the parts in bold. These omissions from the quote indicate the newspaper positions on the tariff and climate change, which is discussed below. A week later Shaham is quoted in Haaretz as stating that "the SRC created unfounded

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[i] (a) Not-promoting work programmes, (b) Non-implementation of sufficient programmes to reduce demands, (c) Not-conserving natural water sources, (d) Lack of development and protection of drilling, (e) Lack of planning and preparation for construction of desalination facilities and (f) Non-treatment of sewage at the required quality (State Comptroller 2018)

[j] This in contrast to the SCR on the water tariff during CDP2 which re-politicised the debate (see 5.3.3.3).

headlines" because the strategic plan addressed all the deficiencies, including new SD projects. While the IWA and the MoE reaction framed the SCR as referring to issues already solved (by the strategic plan), the commentary columns in YA and *Calcalist* use the SCR to suggest policies for further depoliticisation of hydro-policies. *Calcalist* argues for making the IWA more independent (i.e. more professional and less political) and for more privately-owned SD. Similarly, in YA, Plocker continues his fake-crisis and governmental failure-to-act arguments, claiming that the situation could have been avoided by a quicker implementation of desalination in that "contrary to the State Comptroller's opinion, my opinion as an economist is: there is no water crisis; there's a planning and execution crisis". The newspapers prioritise institutional and governmental voices in the coverage of the SCR; only one item provides space to a speaker from outside the IWA or the MoE. In Haaretz, the chairman of the Water Lobby,[k] MK Cohen-Pharan,[l] is quoted as saying that:

> *The bottom line is that the drought is not the problem, but that the government has had a resounding failure in managing the water system […] This neglect has led to the depletion of the natural water reservoirs, a lack of preparation to increase desalination, and the lack of consumer demand management policies.[55]*

The environmentalist parliamentarian presents a position which reaffirms the hegemonic discourse: the techno-managerial failure and the need to increase the disconnection from nature by SD while using economic language about consumption.

This chronological part of the chapter has presented the escalation in the description of the hydrologic situation in CDP3, which moved from a "rare natural event" to a "crisis", which is derived from governmental inaction. The next part of the chapter looks more closely into some of the explanations to the water problem, which were mentioned above.

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[k] See comment t at page 124 bout what is a Knesset Lobby. This is the first time this lobby is ever mentioned in the press.

[l] MK Cohen-Pharan is the first member of the Green Movement Party in the Israeli parliament, which was elected as part of the Zionist Union, an alliance with Labour and Hatnua Party. The item neglect to mention the party in which she is a member, and only mention the water lobby and the alliance name.

6.3.2. Reasons for the "Crisis" from the Press

The next sections present the main themes that were raised in the press as contributing to this period's water situation (i.e. the crisis). The two main reasons given in the press, alongside the drought and before the publication of the SCR, are household consumption and climate change. The next two sub-sections present these subjects. These two issues together unfold different sides of a discursive triangle formed during this period, which connects climate change, consumption and desalination, and where each side of the triangle has the potential to affect the other ones. This discursive triangle implies an alternative understanding of climate resilience, which is discussed at the end of this chapter.

6.3.2.1. Drought, Climate Change and their Implications

The description of the droughts by the IWA Director as a natural phenomenon maintains the previous CDPs marginalisations of climate change. This period presents more prominent (but still not hegemonic) connection between the droughts and climate change. In this period, 16% of the items mention climate change as one of the reasons for the drought frequency, or as an issue which will increase water scarcity in Israel. Haaretz references climate change three times the amount in YA, Koren (the industry and energy reporter), and Rinat (the environmental reporter) wrote half the items. This means that climate change is more prominent in Haaretz, but that in this newspaper, it is no longer limited to the environmental section and reporter. This implies that climate change is becoming more mainstream, and that its meaning has expanded beyond science and environment into other realms, which is an acknowledgment of its impact on the economy. The last news item in CDP3 mentioning climate change calls it "the climate crisis" in its headline, which might indicate a future change in Haaretz' terminology, similar to other broadsheets around the world.[56] Both newspapers use definite language connecting the droughts and climate change: "we cannot and should not bury our heads in the sand: the climate is changing"[57] writes Ben-David in YA in February; and that "the Kinneret area is a victim of climate changes"[58] from Rinat in Haaretz in October (in an item dedicated to the IPCC report).

Ambiguous phrases seen in previous CDPs such as "changes in the patterns of rain" (see Chapter 5) are now replaced by more firm statements about climate change even when it is being contested. For example, in December, Rinat writes about scientific research analysing the Dead Sea water levels, which found that the lack of rain in Israel in this century is typical (or average) to the historical climate of the past 4,500 years, which

went through several periods of relative decreases and increases in rainfall. However, three times the item mention that: "the decrease in rainfall is expected to escalate due to climate change impact, connected to human activity".[59] Most items connecting the droughts to climate change, however, neglect to mention the human responsibility aspect (the three items quoted in this paragraph are the only ones doing so. Thus, they limit the scope of the climate discourse to adaptation over mitigation. Of equal importance is that the rise in prominence does not mean that this discourse has become hegemonic because most items in CDP3 neglect to mention climate change, and they present the hydro-policies as a suggested adaptation to the drought, not the climate.

Two dominant policies are mentioned in proximity to climate change as means of adaptation:[m] SD and consumption reduction. The more dominant of the two is SD, which also reflects that climate discourse has yet to become hegemonic. That is, adaptation through SD is presented with some uncertainty about climate change impact on the droughts (which are "probably related"[60] and "most likely"[61] related), but with a certainty that it will mean an increase in SD production. For example, when discussing the "rarity" of the drought at the beginning of the period, the IWA Director says:

> *Global climate research about the earth's warming shows that we are in the process of dehydration. If this is the trend, not a rare event, we will be in a different world of massive reinforcement of desalination facilities – way beyond modular plans according to population increase.*[62]

This quote's premise is that Israeli desalination production plans are meant to meet raises in urban consumption, based on a constant population growth. Accordingly, climate change means both a decrease in rainfall and an increase in water demands, as in the next quote. In January, Haaretz quotes an unnamed official stating that "the water consumption in Israel rises because of population growth, and it became clear that [Israel] probably drinks more due to the continuous warming of the weather".[63] In October, in a report about the Soreq 2 tender, Shaham claims that the IWA development plan for desalination takes into consideration both the "constant population growth" and climate change.[64]

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[m] It should be said that there is no explicit mentioning of 'climate mitigation' or 'climate adaptation'.

The second most dominant climate adaptation practice is reducing consumption. The next declaration by the Minister of Energy when the PCC was released is a prime example of how consumption reduction is reported as climate adaptation:

> *We concluded that the drought is a result of climate change. Fresh water stress is a problem that will stay with us for a long time, and so that the state of emergency does not harm the citizens and minimises the damage to natural resources – all [people] must start to save water.*[65]

This discourse does not question climate change or go into much detail about its effect on water demands. Furthermore, unlike past periods where alternative ways of consumption reduction had been thoroughly deliberated in the media (e.g. via agriculture), 'saving water' in CDP3, as in the above quote, commonly refers to household consumption. This discourse gained prominence after the PCC release and is an important part of the CDM, which occurred in May, during this discourse (see Section 6.3.1.2 above and Chapter 7). Despite the change in discourse in the news section during these months, the op-eds and television critique columns reacting to the PCC resonate the message of "because of the drought".[66] They thereby present the PCC as promoting a drought resilience, not any climate resilience action (further discussion in Chapter 8). One magazine article in YA suggests reducing consumption as part of climate *mitigation* and *resilience*, and it gives advice from academics and ENGOs on how to do so. To reduce consumption, they suggest: changes to agriculture (as the need for irrigation will increase), economic and technological tools to reduce household consumption, water-stream conservation and even voluntary birth reduction.[67,n]

This climate mitigation item presents and advice on the "20 most pressing environmental issues", and under the advice of being able to "acknowledge the limits of water", the YA environmental reporter writes that:

> *Drinking water supply has a technical solution in the form of the essential and important desalination facilities, but they have a heavy environmental price: they're large energy consumers and the water production process causes greenhouse gas emissions and contamination.*[68]

Earlier in this item, Ben-David also claims that climate change, induced sea-level rise endanger the functioning of SD facilities. This unusual comment is a perfect example of

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[n] The need to reduce the Israeli high birth rate for environmental reasons is in a way a discursive response to the consensual assumption that population will increase forever, which is addressed by a constant increase in SD, see further bellow. Interestingly, household greywater recycling solutions which were suggested by the press and ENGOs during CDP2 are absent in CDP3.

the circularity of a risk society to which desalination, seen as "essential and important" in adapting to climate change **and** contributes to it. This is the least mentioned risk and effect stemming from the expansion of desalination mentioned in CDP3 (see Section 6.3.3). Another effect of the technological developments in desalination, which create the problem it came to solve, is presented in the next section.

6.3.2.2. Household Consumption and Water Tariffs

At the beginning of the period and moreover following the PCC, several items suggest that an increase in household consumption is one of the reasons for the water shortage (that is an increase per capita and in total).[69,70,71,72,73] The two main reasons presented to explain this rise are SD euphoria and the water tariff. In contrast to past CDPs where the water tariff (both urban and agricultural) played a central role in the hydro-policy debate, in CDP3, this policy attracts little contestation, and the economic tools to reduce consumption are almost never recommended. I suggest it is uncontested because the discourse of the marketisation of water has reached a hegemonic status during and since CDP2. Since 2011, the consumer water tariff is by design at cost price, meaning it is derived from the cost of water production, infrastructure, distribution and overhead expenses (hereafter: cost-based tariffs). Furthermore, the water system is economically closed, so each investment (private or governmental) is enclosed in the consumer tariff. The transformation of the water system to a closed economic market, which no longer includes subsidies or governmental budget, is an outcome of the neoliberalisation of the water system, which had started before the scope of this research, and which is an outcome of changes in the law made in 2010. Moreover, in previous CDPs, I identified the discourses which promoted this transformation of the tariff: the *rationalisation* of the tariff and *real* prices (see Chapter 4). Water in these discourses are no longer a public good or an existential need, but a mercantile product like any other; that is they are depoliticised by economisation. In the CDP1 and CDP2, economization discourse promoted cost-based tariffs with the promise that they will optimise the prices, raise them and reduce consumption. A version of this discourse which promotes raising the tariff to reduce consumption, beyond its allocation costs, is because the 'real' price should be high as water is a product in short supply (an encourage-saving tariffs; see Section 5.3.3.2). The EcDC led the rationalisation discourse, and the central voices contesting it the past came from the AZDC and the SMDC. The contesting coalitions politicised the tariffs discourse by arguing that it should reflect values such as equality, support certain populations (in need) and industries (including agriculture), and politically block the differential tariffs.

The hegemony of the economisation of the tariff in CDP3 has several indicators. The first indicator is that (also) in this CDP, the tariff is regarded as a consumption regulator. That is, low water price leads to extensive consumption. This discourse is much less prominent than previously, and in 2018, the cost-based tariff is described as having an opposite effect than it had in 2010 because it is presented as raising consumption. An item in Haaretz entitled "the price of the drought" presents this economic rationale as one of the reasons for the crisis:

> *Citizens' private water consumption is significant to the crisis […]* **According to Israeli law***, the water and sewage tariff should reflect their production and delivery costs. However, this* **strategy** *harmed the consumers' motivation to save water, as their price dropped in recent years to 40% - thus supporting the increase in demand [emphasis added].[74]*

While still using economic language in this quote, it reveals that this is a "strategy", and 'according to a law', not an economic truism but a juridification strategy; therefore, it can be replaced by an alternative strategy or law. Other items in Haaretz[75,76] and *Calcalist*[77] connect the price drop to the creation of the "crisis" or the "emergency", respectively. These explanations for the rise in consumption are not followed by voices calling for a encourage-saving tariff or price rises (despite the experience from CDP2). This item in *Calcalist* claims that the prices decreased in 2017 because of an agreement between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior, and that the IWA "really dreads" rising prices, but that they are not sufficiently independent to demand an "emergency budget" from the government. In other words, *Calcalist* claims that the cost-based tariff is still political and not fully enclosed.[78] A similar claim in the same item by the Head of the Israel Farmer's Federation suggests that the IWA is "really afraid" to raise prices or to "demand money from the treasury" to purchase more desalinated water.[79] Moreover, these two claims suggest that within the enclosure of the cost-based tariff, the tariff is less affected by costs, but rather the political ambition to keep it low prevents budgets for new projects.

These last two examples also show the second indicator for the hegemony of the cost-based tariff rational: investments into the water infrastructure in CDP3 are always presented as affecting the price,[80,81] and that the previous CDPs alternatives investment options (by the government) are no longer imaginable. In these cases, the cost-based tariff and its enclosure is presented as an axiom, which is not contested (i.e. naturalization of this tariff). Under the economic logic of water as a product, price rises are considered bad for the costumer. Therefore, costly infrastructure investments are sometimes presented as bad news for the consumer, as in the headline quoted above. Likewise, when Haaretz

reported on the initiative to stream SD water to the Kinneret, the sub-heading was: "downsize: the tunnel will raise the water tariff" (see further Section 6.3.3.2).[82] Towards the end of CDP3, *Calcalist* was the main promoter for a low tariff being better for the consumer, and that it should be kept low in the name of economic efficiency.[83,84,85]

As shown in this section, the issues in consumption, climate change and SD are presented as interconnected in this period. Climate change leads to an increase in water demands and to the adaptation measure of expanding SD. While further implementation of SD, based on the assumption that the water supply has been 'disconnected from nature' and coupled with its effect on reducing the tariff, has led to increases in consumption. This section presented how SD's negative implications on climate change are still in the periphery of the newspaper coverage (i.e. its emissions), and that climate change poses some risks to the SD project. However, SD and household consumption reduction policies are framed as ways to achieve resilience to the drought, and not to climate resilience; therefore, the newspapers are marginalising the contradictions in this policy. The next part shows opportunities to challenge these contradictions.

6.3.3. New Emerging Desalination Discourses

As shown above, in this period, desalination is reinforced as the main solution to ever increasing water needs in Israel. At the same time, as can be seen during May and June, the implications of desalination also play a part in the hydro-policies discourse, such as the "illusion" that SD eliminates the need for careful household consumption, about desalination's environmental impact and energy needs. This section presents new discourses about desalination emerging during CDP3 (6.3.3.1) on privatisation, (6.3.3.2) about a new project on streaming desalinated water into Lake Kinneret and (6.3.3.3) the health impacts of SD.

6.3.3.1. Issues on the Privatisation of SD and their Split Coverage

From June and more prominently during August to October issues about privatisation of SD are deliberated in the press. None of the newspapers object to further privatisation of SD, but like in CDP2 they do present some interesting differences in how they cover the issue. The fact that desalination via privatisation is uncontested in this period is another indicator of the hegemony of depoliticisation of desalination as according to Mouffe (2005), the hegemony of neoliberalism is achieved when it is perceived as the only possibility for the social-economic structure (see Section 1.2.2). This section presents the

newspaper's stance about the Soreq 2 tender and the governmental decision to sell Mekorot's SD facility in Ashdod, as an example of their spilt coverage, which presents disagreements within the hegemony without a presentation of alternatives.

TheMarker uses the Soreq 2 tender to contest IDE's share of the desalination market.[o] Koren dedicates three items to criticising the possibility of IDE owning more facilities while discussing the social-economic dangers of a private monopoly. The critique is mostly in economic language: IDE is a "monopoly"; and that this is a case of "market concentration", which should be addressed by the Competition Authority (CA), and not politically.[86,p] Koren clearly supports reducing IDE's share of the SD market, and she calls the situation "problematic", describing "fears from strengthening the monopolistic power of IDE", and gives a "blatant example of the implications of market concentration", which harms the public interest. Koren asks at the beginning of one of her commentary columns "will the government fold again in front of Teshuva?"[q,87] After IDE and CA reached an agreement, she writes that:

> *The Competition Authority had carefully engineered an arrangement that will allow the Delek group, controlled by Isaac Teshuva, to participate in the tender they are expected to win. This, instead of utilising desalination tenders as a means to weaken Delek's monopoly, reduces Teshuva's holdings of desalinated water – and the entire economy.[88]*

The decision is presented as a missed opportunity to change the power balance in the Israeli economy, but the critique is confined to a free-market discourse. SD private ownership is uncontested, and the possibility for nationalisation or a publicly owned SD facility go unmentioned. The reporting about Delek's ownership of IDE is also an opportunity to raise the desalination electricity needs as Bar-Eli asks in *TheMarker* "why does the gas monopoly sell the resource to its own power stations, which sell cheap electricity to the desalination facilities they own?"[89] As can be seen, Bar-Eli's critique also focuses on the economic implications, not the political or environmental. Despite Swyngedouw and Williams' (2016) claims, this aspect, which combines both the energy-

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[o] IDE fully or partly owns Soreq 1, Hadera and Ashkelon facilities.

[p] Market concentration is a function of the number of firms and their respective shares of the total production, capacity or reserves in a market. TheMarker uses this term for many years to describe the financial ties between different companies in Israel's economy, and to criticize creations of monopolistic situations.

[q] The owner of Delek.

water nexus and the ownership paradox of desalination, does not evolve into a depoliticisation of desalination, neither on the possibility of a sustainable energy source or non-private ownership.

TheMarker's interest in the Soreq 2 tender leads to a peak in coverage in August (marked ii in Figure 4), which is the only time both newspapers did not peak simultaneously. YA never reports on the IDE and CA agreement, nor on most of the SD stock exchange that happened that summer (and which were contextualised in Haaretz as relating to the negotiations); in only one small item cover the tender, listing the participating corporations. This silence in YA about the formation of a private monopoly should come as evidence that it supports this situation. Furthermore, in June, Plocker suggests that IDE will get Soreq 2 **without** a tender due to its "experience", and as this option is "better for the economy and better for the citizens".[90] *Calcalist* reports on the SD stock exchange of IDE during that month, but without contextualising it to the tender.[91] Two days after it reports on Delek selling its shares of the power stations supplying electricity to IDE's facilities, as part of the agreement with CA;[92] the fact that Teshuva sells it to himself, and his monopoly status, are not mentioned. Moreover, *Calcalist* presents a strong pro-privatisation position in other cases during this period. In September,[93] it reports that the government examined the option of transferring other "critical projects" from Mekorot to private companies. *Calcalist* writes that it should be done to benefit the "competition", and which will lead to a reduction in the tariffs. YA promotes "competition" when it is against Mekorot's monopoly, but not when it is against IDE's one. *Calcalist* binds together the governmental plans for water project privatisation[r] as "stemming from Mekorot's Ashdod failure".[94]

Opposite to their attitudes about Soreq 2, the newspapers are united in their support of the governmental decision to privatise the only SD facility it owns. Haaretz' strong position against the formation of a private monopoly does not include support for the governmentally owned desalination. On the contrary, it uses the problems in Ashdod to argue against it. In August, Koren writes about the facility in Ashdod, as being the only one which is owned by the government via Mekorot. Koren describes the stages in the facility's establishment as: "odd", "borderline", with "unfulfilled promises",

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[r] On the privatisation of drilling, the decision about the start-ups investments halt, and even water transfer projects.

"performance weaknesses", "catastrophic", suffering from "many deficiencies", "material weaknesses" and as a "massive business failure".[95] *TheMarker* describes the origin if its financial problems below:

> *The sad story of the [Ashdod] facility was a foretold failure: Mekorot got to build this facility without a tender, as a compensation to its union for supporting the company's structural reform in 2007. The controversial procedure led to the treasury […] dictating to Mekorot a water price identical to the private sector. However, the governmental company had no chance to afford this low price.[96]*

TheMarker blames both the union, its governmental management and ownership for "the high price [of this failure] funded by public money".[97] YA shares *TheMarker's* stance on Mekorot's problems in Ashdod. Items in *Calcalist* and YA on this facility use a similar language describing it as a: "failure",[98] "bitter failure", with "poor performance" and being a "fiasco".[99] The newspapers rule out any possibility that Mekorot will expand its share in desalination, "not soon nor in the future".[100] In one item, *Calcalist* states that "the conclusion is that the facility must be sold immediately". As seen above, *Calaclist* is using the case of Ashdod to promote the privatisation of other aspects of Mekorot's work; one of these projects is discussed in the next section.

Despite the different positions of the newspapers over the Soreq 2 tender, they present a consensus of pro-privatisation of SD. This consensus, which views SD only as an economic issue, conceals aspects of SD such as its energy needs (and its connection to climate change) and subjugates these to the logic of private ownership; the SD owners' interest is to ensure growth in production (and consumption) over more sustainable hydro-policies.

6.3.3.2.   Transferring Desalinated Water to Fill Lake Kinneret

This section presents a new SD project promoted in CDP3, which strengthens the perception of this technology as a climate-adaptation policy. Section Six of the governmental strategic plan entitled "Reinforcing the Kinneret Basin" states that by July 2020, Lake Kinneret will receive an annual water supply (Office 2018).[s] In practice, this means that SD water will be transferred by underground pipes across the country into the lake. 17 items mention this policy in 2018, which are 13% of this period's total. This radical project ("strategic",[101] "revolutionary" and "ambitious"[102]) is mentioned in 2018

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[s] Of 30 MCM from July 2020 and 100 MCM from 2022.

before the plan's approval with several reasons presented in the press: "to support agriculture, to prevent the lake's sea-level decrease and to ensure the water quotas [Israel is] committed to supply Jordan", which was quoted from Shaham in May. [103] In June, Shaham states that through this project, "I estimate we can keep the promise to save the Kinneret". Shaham's quote discursively places this project within the historical Zionist perception of the Kinneret as maintaining the livelihood (water and food) and the sea level as its barometer. Likewise, six items call this project a "reverse carrier",[104] and explain that this policy is "reversing the National Water Carrier",[105,106,107,108,109] and through this, it discursively connects this new project to the historical techno-hydrological AZDC achievement of the carrier. Both newspapers write reports about this project on 3 September 2018, adding other reasons for it. Their list of justifications draw on other discourses: ecological (balancing the Lake Kinneret's ecology, rehabilitation of the Jordan River and streaming water to the Dead Sea), economic (supporting agriculture and tourism) and security (to increase supply to the Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestinians).[110,111] The last justification is interesting as securitisation[t] of hydro-policies is not a common discourse in this period, and it is usually promoted by the IWA Director.[112] In Haaretz in September[113] and YA in June,[114] he explained that Israel wants to increase the supply given to Jordan, who is "under pressure and unstable" due to two million Syrian refugees[u]. Shaham is quoted about the increase in YA:

> *Because I believe it is better to pay for desalinating an extra few million cubes of water, rather than for armed helicopter rotors or tanks caterpillars. Water can be grounds for war, but water is a factor in maintaining good neighbours.[115]*

It should be noted that the discourse connecting SD with peace building between Israel and Jordan is common in regard to the Red Sea Dead Sea Canal (Fischhendler et al. 2015).[v]

The reverse carrier is not a new idea, already in CDP1 the press suggested it as a form of speculation about future climate adaptation project (see Section 4.3.4). At the end of 2018, in a news item about the IPCC report (see Section 6.3.1.1), a Hebrew University

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[t] Securitization according to Fischhendler (2015) is a discourse presenting water as a security issue between states, prioritizing this aspect in policy making over political, technical, environmental and economic issues.

[u] This is a local example on how discourses of climate migration are connected to discourses of environmental/climate securitization.

[v] Items about the canal were excluded from this research, however these only appeared during CDP1 and CDP2 and not during CDP3.

climatologist uses this project as an example of Israel's dehydration and its ability to adapt to the changing climate: "the national carrier was built to stream water from Lake Kinneret to the dry south; today we see a reverse situation where it is necessary to stream water to the Kinneret".[116] The reverse carrier expands the imaginary aspects of the hydro-social cycle (Swyngedouw 2015) beyond human needs, and the techno-scientific solution to a natural conservation project. In 2002, the possibility of using SD to fill Lake Kinneret was predicted as an outcome of climate change in CDP1; by the end of 2018, it became a reality.

Both newspapers explain that a "desalination surplus"[117,118] will be made in the near future due to the new SD facilities and the expansion of the old under the new strategic plan.[119] They do not explain why there is a surplus beyond consumption needs (i.e. why they are producing water which is not used). *Calaclist* uses a quote from a "senior official in the water system" which critiques this project as "delusional", and which "will not be implemented" because it is "expensive and complicated". This unnamed person claims that it means "taking good water and streaming it to a reservoir to get dirty"; instead, this unnamed official suggests that we "restore excess water to the aquifer". Even this criticiser does not challenge the existence of a desalinated surplus. This is the only objection to this project presented in the press thus far, besides certain reservations about the economic costs (as in the example given above).[120,121]

This section presented how the rationale for expanding SD to 'save' Lake Kinneret, which in the previous CDPs meant reducing pumping water from the lake, had developed into streaming desalinated water into it. This policy is presented to the public without any examination of the possible environmental implications. The next section presents the news coverage of one implication of desalination in this period.

6.3.3.3.   Health Implications of Desalination

One negative implication of desalination, which was almost entirely absent in the past CDPs, is presented in this period only in Haaretz despite the governmental and scientific consensus on its importance. The SCR recommendations suggest that it is wise "to hasten" adding magnesium to the water "without delay, to avoid serious damage to the public health" (State Comptroller 2018). It is mentioned in one sentence in Haaretz' new coverage of the report[122] whereas in YA, it goes unmentioned. Five news items (3%) across this period, all in Haaretz, mention that one of the "disadvantages" of desalination is its magnesium "deficiency", which has "public health implications".[123,124] The

magnesium deficiency health risk was not mentioned in the past period, and it was officially acknowledged by the Knesset in 2011 (Bas Spector 2012; Levy 2011). This is another example of how SD fits Beck's risk society (1992), as the solution for the risk of a water scarcity (SD), creating a new risk, which takes time to scientifically identify and now needs a new technological intervention. In the 2018 news items, it seems that the existence of this risk is uncontested based on scientific findings (and discourse), and that a consensus had already formed around a solution (of artificially adding minerals to the drinking water after desalination). A contestation of this issue (and its news coverage), if it ever occurred, might have been between CDP3 and the former one.

In March, Haaretz reports on a new scientific finding on the lack of magnesium and nitrogen in fruits and vegetables grown in Israel irrigated by the reclaimed sewage water (originating in the SD facilities). The minerals absence from the irrigated water and the resulting agricultural products has been attributed in the news articles to SD, which has two aspects:

> *While the decrease in nitrogen is positive, because high consistency of salt is not recommended for health and causes damage to crop development and soil structure. In contrast, magnesium deficiency […] is problematic.*[125]

Magnesium is described as important for building nerves and muscles, and its deficiency is connected to heart failure. The items presenting the magnesium deficiency emphasise the disadvantages over the advantages, and also report on a governmental pilot project to reintroduce magnesium post-desalination. Both the op-eds from June in Haaretz criticising SD (mentioned in Section 6.3.1.2) use the lack of minerals and its effect on human health as an argument against expanding SD.

The health risk of SD, presented in this section, is an example of how certain implications of desalination present a discursive opportunity to contest the expansion of SD. However, this subject is at the periphery of the news coverage, and the consensus around the solution to this risk (which rests on the risk society rationale) foreclose the option of using it to contest this policy as a whole.

6.3.4. Voices form the Discourse-Coalitions in CDP3

One dramatic change between the previous CDPs and CDP3 is the almost complete absence of the discourse-coalitions from the reporting. As previously mentioned, the main actors during this period are the IWA and the MoE. The position of other actors

(institutional and non-institutional) and their respective discourses have been marginalised in the reporting. Even the hegemonic economic and marketisation discourse is maintained mainly by the reporters (or the Energy Minister and IWA) when they justify governmental action, rarely directly by the treasury or economists like in CDP1 and CDP2. Occasionally, the newspapers give evidence that the discourse-coalitions still exist and try to influence hydro-policies in other areas, but in comparison to CDP1 and CDP2, their contestation is absent from the coverage. This section briefly presents the issues raised by the discourse-coalitions, which despite their marginalisation has made it into the reporting.

Besides climate change and the health risks of SD which I presented above, the EnDC in this period focuses on stream and spring preservation. The Ministry of Environmental Protection, ENGOs, activists and environmental scientists are rarely quoted; unlike the previous time periods, their media role of bearing witness or being policy commentators is drastically minimised. Only five news items (3%) use direct quotes from EnDC spokespersons. However, the environmental considerations raised by this coalition in previous CDPs appear in the news, either from the reporters commenting about them (as with the case of climate change) or by the IWA justifying its policies. For example, the governmental strategic plan allocates water and funds for nature preservation (a hydro-policy raised by ENGOs in CDP2). One of the interviews mentions that in the past, IWA Director, Shaham, wrote a policy paper for the environmental movement entitled "Nature's Right to Water", and the 2018 emergency plan adopts some of his old recommendations. In one news item, an IWA department manager explains that in the past:

> *Streams dried up, but there was no alternative; we couldn't supply drinking water. But today there's a choice, due to Mediterranean seawater desalination […] the state decided to return the water to the streams.* [126]

Despite the discourse of allocating water to nature now being adopted by the government, its adoption is by and large thanks to SD, as seen in the case of the reverse carrier, and it reaffirms the consensus around its implementation and constant expansion.

Representatives of the AZDC sporadically appear during CDP3. They resonate issues and discourses raised by this coalition in the past, mainly around allocation cuts and demands for financial compensation due to the drought.[127,128,129] Hence, when agriculture is mentioned in this the period, it is mostly discussed in economic language. The farmers are no longer delegitimised in the press for their water needs or demands for drought compensation or subsidies; however, they lost their central position in the hydro-policies

debate, and these issues are marginalised. The AZDC is no longer presented as a strong political player, and agricultural water needs are usually expressed in the press by others, such as the IWA Director. One item discursively reminded its readers about the ability of this coalition to politicise these hydro-policies. In May, a day after the PCC was released, the Agricultural Union[w] called for the creation of a new inquiry committee.[130] The Agricultural Union contested that, for a few years and during this period, the political body of the Water Council had been inactive and positions on the council were not filled.[131] Their spokesperson politicised the need for a water council to represent the citizens and water users and to supervise the IWA's work. The dysfunctionality of the Water Council, which is against the water law, had the potential to re-politicise the coverage, but this fact is never repeated in the press. By not raising this issue again, the newspapers contribute to depoliticisation.

The SMDC is virtually completely absent from the reporting in this period despite developments in the issues it contested in the past: the municipal corporations for water services. Two times during this period, IWA Director suggests that water issues are politically charged in a year of municipal elections (which took place in October).[132,133] The second time it is mentioned is in reference to the need to reduce the number of corporations (by merging small ones) in the name of economic efficiency. A new bill on the matter passed its first legislative stage in December, and it is reported in Haaretz and YA. Both newspapers emphasise the economic efficiency aspect of it, and that its succession will lead to a tariff reduction. Even though this bill includes social aspects raised in the past by the SMDC[x], comments from municipal representatives are not presented. Haaretz finishes its items with a quote by the bill promoter, MK David Bitan (Likud), the first and only representative of the SMDC quoted in this period. Bitan claims that this bill will "fix a social injustice" and warns all the corporations that the Knesset will continue legislation if they do not improve their services. By this, Bitan and Shaham reveal the potential of the SMDC to re-politicise the hydro-polices discourse.

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[w] A political non-governmental organization formed by and for farming villages.

[x] Such as debt collection, improve customer services and mechanisms for infrastructure improvement in lower income population regions.

6.4.   Summary

This chapter has presented an analysis of the hydro-policy discourse during the year 2018, which ended with the publication of the SCR report on hydro-policies. The coverage in this critical discourse period (CDP3) had some significant differences to the past CDPs: the ongoing drought was not framed as a crisis until the end of the period; climate change was mentioned more frequently, but its relevance to the hydro-policies was not consensual, and the connection to SD was not prominent; the IWA Director and the Energy Minister were the hegemonic voices in this period while all the other discourse-coalition voices were almost completely silenced. Importantly, this period presented some of the environmental, health and economic aspects of SD, such as the interconnections between SD, consumption and climate change. Nonetheless, the discourse about SD maintained its consensual, hegemonic and non-political aspects observed in CDP2. This analysis has shown that similar to the end of CDP2, in 2018, SD still enjoys a consensual coverage in all the newspapers criticising the government for not doing enough to expand its use. Despite the rise in coverage of the implications of desalination, this consensus still frames SD as the main reaction to the drought (and not a climate) while the means to reduce consumption are presented as a short-term way to mitigate its impact.

Despite the large similarities, small but important differences can be found in the news outlets' analysis of the implications of SD and the connection to climate change. Climate change is more prominent in Haaretz, and the coverage of it extended to the economic reporters as an issue which should be taken into consideration. While in YA, it was still confined to the writings of the environmental reporter, whose share of coverage also decreased to only 5% of the items. Primarily, climate change is presented as leading to more water demands. Most items connecting the droughts to climate change neglect to mention the human responsibility aspect. Thus, they limit the scope of the climate discourse to adaptation over mitigation. The SD effect on climate change is raised in both newspapers (i.e. in the context of emissions and energy); this effect is only laconically mentioned, without any direct explanation that by its energy use, SD induces climate change. Therefore, it confines the 'energy contradiction' (Swyngedouw and Williams 2016) to challenging the post-political consensus around SD. YA is the only newspaper to address the risks that sea-level rises impose on SD.

The first implication of SD raised in this period is health. Only Haaretz discusses (and not just mentions) it and also the governmental delay in addressing this risk. Despite

the SCR critique on this subject at the end of the period, it remains in the periphery of the coverage in this CDP.

The second and main implication of SD raised in this period is the "euphoria" and its impact on increasing consumption. In Haaretz' coverage of the PCC and the discussion on the "illusion" of SD connects to its health and environmental implications which are described (in op-eds) as "drastic" and "irreversible". In YA and moreover in *Calcalist,* SD's euphoria is mainly mentioned in relation to its effect on the price, and from that on consumption. Hence, the PCC release is a CDM, which in Haaretz opens the scope of the debate beyond its economic aspects. However, this widening of the scope by the EnDC in Haaretz is identified by the discursive strategies of depoliticisation (by scientisation and delegitimisation). This coverage of the PCC contradicts Swyngedouw and Williams' (2016) prediction of politicisation by presenting the SD and consumption contradiction. As such, both newspapers do not use the discourse of the SD euphoria to challenge the governmental plans to expand SD, which are presented at the same time as the PCC. Furthermore, both newspapers indicate that IWA is reluctant to raise the tariff because of public opinion; this also does not lead to politicisation, and towards the end of the period, the newspapers do not challenge the low-price economic ideal.

The third issue where the newspapers differ in their presentation of the implications of SD is in relation to economics, especially privatisation. Similar to CDP2, both newspapers support privatisation while *TheMarker* continues its critique on IDE's share of the market as a monopoly. This aspect of the Soreq 2 tender leads to a peak in coverage in Haaretz in which changes to the SD franchises are contextualised as relating to this tender. Despite mentioning the energy-water nexus in SD in general and in the context of Delek specifically, *TheMarker's* strong arguments do not extend to a challenge of the privatisation consensus, nor the SD dependency on fossil fuels. At the same time, YA and *Calcalist* silence the creation of a private monopoly while *Calcalist* calls for even more privatisation of water, in the name of efficiency and with the promise of a lower tariff. Both newspapers describe investment in infrastructure (such as the SD facility and the reverse carrier) as having an impact on the tariffs while YA and *Calcalist* present it as bad news for private consumers. In this sense, the discussion of the SD euphoria did not change YA's perspective on the tariff in the long term.

A significant change in CDP3 from CDP2 is the narrowing of the scope of coverage (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017) to relay almost entirely governmental and

official voices. This is a sign of the further depoliticisation of the droughts, hydro-policies and desalination in this period as privileging particular voices and paradigms. The most prominent speakers in this period are the Energy Minister and the IWA Director. The only speaker represented from the SMDC is MK Bitan, the Coalition Whip at the time. Importantly in this context, both the minister and the IWA Director draw from economic and sometimes even environmental discourses (mainly when interviewed). Furthermore, similar to the past, and according to Menahem and Gilad (2016), some reporters, such as Rinat, and economic commentators represent the environmental and economic coalitions position. That is to say, the two discourses which are further silenced in CDP3 are those of the coalitions which were delegitimised in CDP1 and CDP2 as being political; and the two more prominent discourses are those which can be framed as techno-managerial: the economic and environmental ones.

Chapter 8 will return to this position of the coalitions from a longitudinal perspective. The next chapter (7) is about the IWA's PCCs from 2007 to 2018.

[1] Koren, O. (2018, July 25) Fifth Drought-Year? Not When Farming Compensation is Needed. *Haaretz*

[2] Filut, A. (2018, February 1) The State Comptroller Checks the Water Authority Preparation for the Drought. *Calcalist*

[3] Koren, O. (2018, October 22) A Time When it will Not be Possible to Shower: This is How the Water System Collapses – and How Much it Costs. *Haaretz*

[4] Guttman, L. and A. Filut. (2018, January 18) The Water Crisis: the Water Authority and Energy Ministry Woke Up Late. *Calcalist*

[5] Guttman, L. and A. Gazit. (2018, May 23) The Farmers will Pay the Price of the Hard Water Crisis. *Calcalist*

[6] Gazit, A. (2018, October 23a) "Failed Management of the Water Authority Created a Crisis", *Calcalist*

[7] Koren, O. (2018, January 17) When the Water in our Taps Stops Flowing. *Haaretz*

[8] Koren, O. (2018, April 9) Two New Desalination Facilities to be Built in the West Galilee. *Haaretz*

[9] Amit, H. (2018, January 21) The Cost of the Drought, *Haaretz*

[10] Kane, H. (2018, May 23) The Farmers Demands an Enquiry Committee to Investigate the IWA Action. *Haaretz*

[11] Ringel Hoffman, A. (2018, June 22) "I Commit that the Kinneret will Get Full". *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[12] Kane, H. (2018, May 22) The Water Authority Calls the Public: Make Your Shower Shorter by 2 Minutes. *Haaretz*

[13] Rinat, Z. (2018, August 26) Due to the Drought, the IWA Build a System to Stream Water to the Kinneret from the Lower Galilee. *Haaretz*

[14] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)

[15] (Amit 2018, January 21)

[16] Koren. O. (2018, January 27) Good News – It is no Longer Certain that There will be a Drought. *Haaretz*

[17] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)

[18] (Ringel Hoffman 2018, June 22)

[19] (Koren 2018, January 17)

[20] Rinat, Z. Spiegel, N. Ben-Zachri, A. and I. Lior (2018, January 4) The Storm is Coming. *Haaretz*

[21] Moshkovitz, I. (2018, October 17) An Island of Despair. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[22] (Kane 2018, May 22)

[23] Yaniv, Y. (2018, May 23) The Desalinated Principle. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[24] (Guttman and Gazit 2018, May 23)

[25] Kuriel, I. (2018, May 23) Watershed. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[26] Gazit, A. (2018, May 30) First Time: the Water Authority will Allow Drilling by International Companies. *Calcalist*

[27] Gazit, A. (2018, May 31) The Water Drilling Privatisation will Lead to a Labour Dispute. *Calcalist*

[28] (Amit 2018, January 21)

[29] (Kuriel 2018, May 23)

[30] Rinat, Z. (2018, May 1) The Return of the Watersavers: Due to Consumption Increase, the Government Promotes a Water Saving Plan. *Haaretz*

[31] Rinat, Z. (2018, May 2) Israel Avoided a Shortage, So Far. *Haaretz*

[32] Guttman, L. (2018, August 16) Despite the Renewed Campaign, Water Consumption Raise. *Calcalist*

[33] Alfer, R. (2018, May 25) Renana Raz is Back, Like the Polish Giving Tree from Hell. *Haaretz*

[34] Shizaf, E. (2018, May 24) Doesn't Hold Water. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[35] (Shizaf 2018, May 24)

[36] Morgenstern, D. (2018, June 10) Israel is Drying – and Wastes Water. *Haaretz*

[37] Caspi Oron, S. (2018, June 18) The Things They Don't Tell Us About Desalination. *Haaretz*

[38] Lior, G. (2018, April 29) Tender: Sixth Desalination Facility. *Haaretz*

[39] (Amit 2018, January 21)

[40] (Kane 2018, May 22)

[41] (Guttman and Gazit 2018, May 23)

[42] Rinat, Z. (2018, May 22) The Water Authority Calls the Public Shorten Your Showers by 2 Minutes. *Haaretz*

[43] (Kane 2018, May 22)

[44] Plocker, S. (2018, June 8) Two More Shower Minutes. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[45] (Guttman and Gazit 2018, May 23)

[46] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[47] Plocker, S. (2018, June 11) Israel Dries While Waiting for Tenders. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[48] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[49] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[50] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[51] Gazit, A. (2018, October 23b) "The Water Authority brought the Water System to a Crisis". *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[52] (Koren 2018, October 22)

[53] (Gazit 2018, October 23b)

[54] (Gazit 2018, October 23a)

[55] Rinat, Z. (2018, October 22) State Comptroller Report: The IWA Failure-to-Act Endangered the Kinneret and Aquafers. *Haaretz*

[56] Yalin, O. (2018, December 26) The Guide for the End of the World: What did we Learn in 2018 on the Climate Crisis and How to Prevent It. *Haaretz*

[57] Ben-David. A (2018, February 9) Slimy Introspection. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[58] Rinat, Z. (2018, October 10) Half-Degree Higher. *Haaretz*

[59] Rinat, Z. (2018, December 23) Research: the Low Rainfall of Recent years is Typical for Israel's Historical Climate. *Haaretz*

[60] (Rinat 2018, May 2)

[61] (Ben-David 2018, February 9)

[62] (Koren 2018, January 17)

[63] Koren, O. (2018, January 1) "In 20 Years the Kinneret will be a Muddy Lake". *Haaretz*

[64] Koren, O. (2018 October 7) Seven Firms Participate in the Tender for Soreq 2. *Haaretz*

[65] (Kane 2018, May 22) and in (Rinat 2018, May 22)

[66] (Shizaf 2018, May 24)

[67] (Yalin 2018, December 26)

[68] (Yalin 2018, December 26)

[69] (Koren 2018, January 17)

[70] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)

[71] (Amit 2018, January 21)

[72] (Rinat 2018, May 1)

[73] (Kuriel 2018, May 23)

[74] (Amit 2018, January 21)

[75] Koren, O. (2018, June 10) IDE will Not be Able to Build More Desalination Facilities in Israel. *Haaretz*

[76] (Rinat 2018, May 1)

[77] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)

[78] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)

[79] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)

[80] Koren, O. (2018, August 26) The Drought Demands Billion-Shekel Projects and the Water will Get Expensive. *Haaretz*

[81] Koren, O. (2018, September 3) Energy Ministry Exanimate: a Tunnel to Stream Water to the Kinneret. *Haaretz*

[82] (Koren 2018, August 26)

[83] Guttmann, L. and O. Milman (2018, December 17) From Council Tax to Water: Why Everything Costs More. *Calcalist*

[84] Lior, G. (2018 December 13) 30 Water Corporations: How Would it Affect Our Pockets. *Calcalist*

[85] Guttman, L. (2018, October 24) Mekorot Redirects: Subsidiaries will be Sold, 100 Employees will Get Redundant. *Calcalist*

[86] (Koren 2018, June 10)

[87] Koren, O. (2018, August 13) Will the Government Fold Again in Front of Teshuva? *Haaretz*

[88] Koren, O. (2018, August 22) Helping the Monopoly to Stay a Monopoly. *Haaretz*

[89] Bar-Eli, A. (2018, August 26) Miracle or Not: What's the Story of the Gas Reservoirs? *Haaretz*

[90] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[91] Hazani, G. (2018, August 21) Teshuva Sales 30% of IDE to Portisimo for 124M$. *Calcalist*

[92] Guttman, L. (2018, August 23) Teshuva will Sell Desalination Facilities Power Stations to Comply with the Concentration Committee Regulations. *Calcalist*

[93] Guttman, L. (2018, September 27) The Government Doesn't Trust Mekorot. *Calcalist*

[94] (Guttman 2018, September 27)

[95] Koren, O. (2018 August 23) A Year Too Late: The Government will Investigate How Mekorot Lost 400₪ in Ashdod. *Haaretz*

[96] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[97] (Plocker 2018, June 8)

[98] Hazani, G. (2018, June 26) Bank Hapoalim Objects the Sale of Ashdod Facility Before it's repaired. *Calcalist*

[99] (Guttman 2018, September 27)

[100] (Guttman 2018, September 27)

[101] (Koren 2018, August 26)
[102] (Gazit 2018, September 3)
[103] (Rinat 2018, May 22)
[104] (Koren 2018, September 3)
[105] Rinat, Z. (2018, November 30) The Kinneret and Abdullah Awaits: The National Carrier is Reversing, to Save Jordan. *Haaretz*
[106] (Rinat 2018, August 26)
[107] Gabizon, Y. (2018, June 10) Reversing: The Ministers will Approve Streaming Water to the Kinneret. *Haaretz*
[108] (Ringel Hoffman 2018, June 22)
[109] (Yalin 2018, December 26)
[110] (Koren 2018, September 3)
[111] (Gazit 2018, September 3)
[112] (Ringel Hoffman 2018, June 22)
[113] (Koren 2018, September 3)
[114] (Ringel Hoffman 2018, June 22)
[115] (Ringel Hoffman 2018, June 22)
[116] (Yalin 2018, December 26)
[117] (Rinat 2018, August 26)
[118] (Gazit 2018, September 3)
[119] (Koren 2018, September 3)
[120] (Koren 2018, September 3)
[121] (Gazit 2018, September 3)
[122] (Koren 2018, October 22)
[123] Rinat, Z. (2018, July 22) Because of the Drought and Cattle Herds: Dozens of Springs Remain Dry. *Haaretz*
[124] (Caspi Oron 2018, June 18)
[125] Rinat Z. (2018, March 29) Because of the Use of Desalinated Water in Agriculture: 30% Decrease in Magnesium in Fruits and Vegetables. *Haaretz*
[126] Ohana, L. (2018, August 28) Water for the Soul. *Yedioth Ahronoth*
[127] (Koren 2018, July 25)
[128] (Gazit 2018, October 23a)
[129] (Guttman and Filut 2018, January 18)
[130] (Kane 2018, May 23)
[131] (Kane 2018, May 23)
[132] (Koren 2018, January 17)
[133] (Rinat 2018, August 26)

Chapter 7 - IWA's Public Communication Campaigns: a Multimodal Discourse Analysis

Less than a year after its establishment, the Israel Water Authority (IWA) published its first public communication campaign (PCC) on television (TV), radio and in print. From spring 2008 to winter 2018, ten PCCs targeting urban consumption reduction were broadcast on Israeli TV and radio. During this period, Israel experienced two long droughts in the years 2004-2011 and 2014-2017. As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, the newspapers at the time referenced these PCCs. They used them to reaffirm the existence of a 'water crisis' and the viewpoint of the governmental failure-to-act that caused it. The PCCs were, continuously, presented in the press as having the potential to "save" sufficient amounts of water, equal to a seawater desalination (SD) facility or as necessary interim stage until more facilities were built. This chapter compares 35 videos from 9 separate campaigns. A multimodal discourse analysis (MDA) (using audio-visual and textual media, see Chapter 3 Sections 3.1.2. and 3.2.3) has been used to identify the main messages from each campaign and the discursive strategies that were used to communicate resilient urban consumption. This chapter explores how the discourse of resilience has been audio-visually constructed and changed between each campaign. And, what kind of environmental futures were envisioned in them? Moreover, this chapter, as with the main focus of the newspaper analysis, asks how the PCCs presented SD to the Israeli public. Did these PCCs reinforced and reaffirmed the (hegemonic) newspapers discourse or did they shaped and represent a different perspective on the droughts, hydro-policies and desalination?

This chapter begins with a detailed description and analysis of the first video ever produced by IWA, S08, as it became an iconic point of reference for the later campaigns. The video set the aesthetics and tone for the videos which followed: with a presenter, location, digital effects and music. Its opening sentence, "Israel is drying", became a catchphrase and a reference to future campaign slogans. Informed by the S08 analysis, the second stage of the chapter (7.2) presents general findings across all the campaigns, in order to identify categories which later inform the chronological analysis. The third stage of the analysis (7.3) moves from the second campaign to the last, year by year, describing and analysing changes in the discourse and messages of the campaigns. The longitudinal discussion (7.4) focuses on two main subjects, the definitional, political and

ideological effectiveness of the campaigns (Salmon and Murray-Johnson 2013) and the types of resilience offered by them. The PCCs and individual videos in the chapter are named and referred according to the explanation given in the next table.

Table 12: IWA Campaigns (Table 5 with Referencing)

	Broadcasting Period	Slogan	Slogans or Name in Printed Advertising	Items	Hereafter Referenced As*
1	Spring-Summer 2008	**No Water to Waste**	*Israel is Drying*	1	S08
2	Spring 2009	**Must Save the Kinneret**		1	S09
3	Spring 2010	**Israel is Still Drying**		1	S10A
4	Summer 2010	**Water-Savers on Every Tap**	*National Watersavers Distribution Campaign*	1	S10B
5	Winter 2011	**Israel is Drying**		9	W11**; W11A to W11I***
6	Summer 2012	**Israel Continues to Save Water**		5	S12**; S12A to S12E***
7	Summer 2017	**Water is Life**		3	S17**; S17A to S17C***
8	Summer 2018	**We Don't Have Water to Waste**	*Israel is Drying, Again; I'm Back, Despite Desalination*	8	S18**; S18A to S18H***
9	Winter 2018	**We Don't Have Water to Waste**	*Despite the Winter*	6	W18**; W18A to W18I***

* S=summer, W=winter.
** Refers to the campaign as a whole.
*** Refers to each individual video.

7.1. First Campaign - Summer 2008: No Water to Waste

The first video of this analysis starts with a close-up of a white female presenter, with no make-up, wearing a sleeveless pale, grey-blue dress that matches the white-grey background of what looks like a home. The video takes place in different parts of the house: a living room, kitchen (with no tap in the sink) and next to a dining table, all maintaining the grey-blue and white colour scheme, with shades of brown (mostly of wooden furniture); there are no plants in the house. A bright white light is coming through the windows, indicating that it is summer. The presenter's first sentence is "Israel is drying, and not just Israel". In the background, a piano is playing a slow and dramatic tune, which adds an element of drama and horror to the text. The most prominent element in this video starts to appear by the end of the first sentence – a sound of cracking

that gets louder and louder until the end of the advertisement. The sound complements a visible crack that spreads down from the top of her forehead down to her body and arms. During the video, the cracks, shaped like dry land, are taking over the house, furniture and walls, which are also cracking and peeling. This is an audio-visual symbol of how the drought affects the personal domain. The lack of water is also symbolised by the lack of any visual mention of the use of water: no kitchen tap, water-using utensils such as a kettle and no images of a bathroom. The end close-up on her face shows a dramatic change from her clean beautiful face of the opening shot; now, she is covered in cracks, she is dehydrated and her skin is injured and peeling. Her last sentence is "we have no water to waste", which corresponds with the slogan that appears in bold red letters over a black background: "no water to waste".[S08]

Figure 5: S08 Opening Sentence and Close-up

Figure 6: S08 End Close-up

The presenter talks about the lack of water in Israel as part of a global phenomenon: "the world is drying"; she does not talk about the region and only names rich, western countries and states: Australia, Spain and California. The explicit

Original in Colour

terminology of climate change or global warming is not mentioned, but the text can be understood as identifying the local water crisis with this global problem. The main claim in the text is that it is not a temporal status, but rather a new status with an accumulated effect that will continue into the future: "it is not only a drought year, even a rainy winter will not be enough". No other reasons for the water scarcity are given. As with its visual absence, neither water uses, infrastructure nor sources are mentioned in the text, and there is no informative advice on how to save water. There is no economic, health or religious reasoning about not wasting water, but only a generalised encouragement to reduce consumption. Audio-visually and textually, this campaign describes a dangerous present and apocalyptic drying future, and its main discourse strategy is about mobilising (motivation) through fear.

From a resilience perspective, this campaign identifies the risk and the need to overcome it, but it does not indicate the exact way of doing it. This video does not give any advice on how to reduce water consumption. The text is calling for a reduction in consumption by saying not to "waste"; this is a discourse of *resilience-by-adapting* to a change that has already happened, not through a *resilience-by-resistance* approach, which would have used the language of "saving water" (see the Chapter 1, and the discussion below). This campaign depoliticises and privatises the responsibility of addressing the crisis, taking an *ethical-individual* approach (Machin 2013). The word 'we' is repeated three times, creating an identification between "Israel" and the viewers. Even though the presenter uses the 'we' mode of address, because the call is coming from a lay person sitting in their home, and not from an official public figure, the "we" is equal to the consumer, the citizen, the public, the family and not the country as an institution. It is the viewer's responsibility and not the state's, which could adopt a comprehensive policy to solve the crisis. From a resilience perspective, this is an example of transferring the replicability from structural solutions (such as water recycling) to personal responsibility, a privatisation of the realm of the state to the individual citizen.

7.2. Categories of Findings from across all Campaigns

This section identifies common features from all the PCCs. These findings are thematically divided into categories and concepts which are used in the following sections of (7.3) Analysis Year by Year and the (7.4) Longitudinal Discussion.

7.2.1. Format, Structure and Written Text

All the PCCs videos resemble TV commercials in their format, structure and length, and they have production qualities identifiable with this genre, that is not a documentation of reality as with the news or live broadcasts. The longest items are one minute in length (2 items from the summer 2018 campaign) and the shortest, from the winter 2018 campaign, is only 10 seconds; 8 videos are around half a minute long, and 23 are 13 to 16 seconds long. Every video starts with the initials of the Governmental Press Office (לפמ) written in white, in the bottom left-hand corner of the screen. This indicates to the viewer that the video is a PCC and not commercial advertising. All items end with a still image presenting the official campaign slogan, the IWA logo or the full name and internet address. The end slogans are usually identical to the slogans used in the associated printed advertisements (billboards and newspapers). Alternatively, the printed slogans in the first and eighth campaigns used the opening line of the video, "Israel is Drying"[S08] and "I'm back in spite of desalination", [S18A,a] respectively. The S08 printed slogan later became the slogan for W11, which was paraphrased in the S10 slogan and the printed one in S18 (see [Table 12](#)). This repetition is an indication that "Israel is Drying" had quickly become an iconic catchphrase in Israel.[b] The printed material always kept the same graphics and aesthetics of the videos as they appeared in the last slide. These elements and repetitions link the different campaigns by intertextuality and reference, creating a sense of continuity across the different media and across time, which were also maintained by other elements.

The closing image of the videos can be divided into two categories, which correspond with the main discourse strategy of the campaign: *fear* or *hope*. The text is not punctuated, except during 2018 when it ends with an exclamation mark.[S18, W18] the fonts

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[a] This was only the opening sentence of the first video from that year (S18A).

[b] This slogan had been imitated and used along the years in parodies such as in TV satire shows, in online memes, and even is commercial advertising for Huggies diapers.

have a reflection effect (as if the text is set on water) at the bottom in all the campaigns, except for S17, S18 and W18. The fear group includes six campaigns[c] (see the example in Figure 7): S08, S09, S10A, W11, S18 and W18. This group's slides used red and white text on a black background, except S09 which included a cracking effect on the slogan. This group usually did not use the blue IWA logo, and instead wrote IWA in white.

Figure 7: Example of the Fear Group Final Slide - S10A

Figure 8: Example of the Hope Group Final Slide - S10B

Hope is the minority category for the closing images; it includes three campaigns (see the example in Figure 8): S10B, S12 and S17. These three used optimistic and encouraging messages with a hopeful discourse in the videos. All the slides in this category used the blue IWA logo, and the dominant colours are shades of blue and white; in S17, plenty of green was also added.

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[c] The campaign "Israel is moving from red to black" of 2009 (not collected) is also a member of this group. It used white text on black and red writing, representing that the "red-line" of the Kinneret water level has been crossed and reaching the "black-line" beneath pumping from the lake is no longer possible.

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<u>Additional written text:</u>

- Some videos giving water-saving advices used a written text to emphasise some of the spoken text, giving figures and information by writing keywords and numbers. The 2018 advisory videos also used animated icons above the text of the items mentioned verbally (see the example in Figure 9).

- Written information was used in the S18 informative videos (see 2018)

- The 2017 campaign used only written text and no speech (see 2017).

Figure 9: W18F

7.2.2. Presenters and Actors (Human)

The presenters in all the videos are looking and talking directly into the camera, addressing the viewers. Except in two items, [S10B, S12E] there is never more than one person on the screen at the same time, and even in those two exceptions, the people do not converse. Hereafter, *presenter* refers to the person speaking and *actors* as the non-speaking characters. Across the years, the majority of the actors and presenters have been white with a European appearance, representing Ashkenazi Jews, except in S09 which presents a more diverse look and ethnicity (see 2009). The presenters' talking tone is usually slow and soft, but assertive. The tone and text are inclusive and motivational, not authoritative, the tone of a friendly person who tries to convince, rather than command. The urgency of the issue is presented by what has been said and enhanced by other multimodal means (that is through certain sounds and emphasis on specific words and visuals). In every campaign except one, [S17] and hence in the majority of items (27 out of 35), the same person acts as the presenter: Reanna Raz. Raz was a television actress in 2008, but she only became a

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household name and a celebrity after the first campaign.[d] Therefore, the use of her celebrity status as a discursive strategy only emerged after the first campaign; the S09 campaign is the only one that significantly relied on the strategy of using celebrities as role models (Rice and Atkin 2013). Another irregular campaign is S12 where four out of five videos[S12B-E] have only non-speaking actors on screen, with no presenter, and instead these videos use a male signifying voiceover (see 2012).

Besides keeping Raz as the presenter, the visual intertextuality has also been sustained through her garments in which a similar silhouette and style has been maintained across the years (in later PCCs with her elbows covered according to the Jewish tradition). In the fear-based videos, she wears grey, brown and white, only using the bright colours of pink and purple in the hope-based videos.[S10B,S12A] From S09 onwards, a gradual evolution in the number of items inside the house, and the use of minimal and modest jewellery, suggests the appearance of a middle-class person represented by Raz.

7.2.3. Locations and Sets: Houses, Neutral, Newsroom and Outdoors

Sets can be divided into two main categories: *houses* and *neutral*, with two sets as exceptions to this rule. The first three campaigns took place on a very similar set of a house interior[S08, S09, S10A] (see Figure 10), and the S12 videos were located in a family home. Locating the campaigns in houses is a discursive strategy, which seems to claim that this is where most of the water is consumed; it limits the scope of the campaigns and the problem. They also conceal all other non-domestic (schools and workplaces), urban (industry and parks) and non-urban (agriculture and nature) water demands from the campaigns. Locating the presenter in her imagined home makes it easier for the audience to identify with her; her dehydration is also 'ours'. Neutral sets refer to campaigns where the presenter is filmed in an empty space while she interacts with digitally-animated objects and effects (see Figure 12). This type of set was first used in the summer of 2010,[S10B] and it continued to be used in all the W11 items and in S12A, which is the only video using both set categories. All the 2018 items starring Raz present a hyper-modernist concrete set, which could be a combination of the houses and neutral aesthetics, or it could signify a new type of set (see

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[d] Since 2011 Raz has no longer played in television shows, she works as a dance choreographer and art curator.

Figure 9 and Figure 14). The two exceptions used neither of these categories: three videos from 2018 were located in a *newsroom* with Danny Rup[e] as the presenter[S18G, S18G, W18B] and the S17 campaign, which was shot outside and categorised as *outdoors*.

7.2.4. Types: Motivational, Advisory and Informative

"Israel is drying, again. And we already know what we need to do" says Raz in one of the latest videos.[S18F] However, in spite of this catch phrase, most of the campaigns did not extend their message beyond giving general advice about not wasting water. I refer to this type of video as *motivational*, some using hope or fear (as in S08) as the main motivations. The direct request to "save water" only appears in S12; the first three years of campaigns only implied this by saying "we have no water to waste"[S08] and by mentioning Lake Kinneret,[S09] the reservoirs,[W11D] the droughts[S08,S09] and the "water crisis in Israel".[S,10] The second type of video is *advisory*: four campaigns out of nine (or only 13 out of 35 items)[S10B,S12,S18,W18] give specific advice on how to conserve water through individual behavioural change. They all suggest how to change behaviour in the household: reducing the shower length,[S12C,S18C,W18D] closing taps,[S12D,S12E,S18E,W18C] dual flush toilets system,[S18F] reducing garden irrigation[S12B,S18D] and maintenance of piping.[W18F] Only one video in the advisory category[S10B] shifts the responsibility from the individual to the state when referring to the door-to-door distribution of watersavers (see 2010). The last and smallest type is *informative*, containing three videos using newsroom set.[S18G,S18G,W18B]

7.2.5. Symbolism of Water and Nature

Images and sounds symbolising water and its absence are widely used. This is primarily through the use of an animated cracking effect to symbolise dehydration. Water absence is also visualised by the lack of taps (and other kitchen utensils) in the first video, and by half-empty water vessels in W11 and S18. These symbols mostly identify the fear-based videos and campaigns. Some videos take an opposite visual approach, which mostly correlate to the hope strategy and/or giving direct advices. These items present the

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[e] Rup was the first Israeli to present a television weather forecast from 1989 on Israel Broadcasting Authority, and still works as the weatherman of Channel 13, along the years he presented the weather and game shows in all the Hebrew speaking broadcast television channels. Rup also was one of the celebrities in the S09 video.

saturation of water, and different ways of using it: in taps, fountains, full glasses and bottles, kitchens overflowing with dishes, sprinklers and images of toilets. Textually, a direct mention of the use of water is predominately given in the advisory and informative videos. Sounds of dripping and flowing water only dominate the S12 and S17 videos, presenting water as a scarcity.

Nature is also absent from most of the campaigns, which take place in urban and modern-looking sets. The house in S08 has no plants; some flowers appear in S08, S90, S10A and S18; however, an effect is used to make the flowers wilt and die quickly. Animals appear only three: a goldfish,[S18A] a bird[S17B] or just a tweeting sound[S10A]. The informative videos use some images of nature, such as a man hiking in the desert and a bird's eye view of Lake Kinneret's declining water levels.

7.3. Analysis Year by Year

By using the categories identified in the previse section, this chronological part of the analysis explores year by year the changes and similarities in the discourse of the risk and the responses to it which was established by the first campaign of 2008.

2009: Must Save the Kinneret

The second campaign keeps the main elements of the first: the house set, music and cracking effects. However, instead of one presenter, it features nine celebrities (a model, musicians, a basketball player and various TV stars) sitting in different rooms of the house, with never more than one person on set at a time. They give more ethnically diverse representations of Israeli society (black, Mizrachi, male and female), but with no Arab participants. Having nine celebrities (including Raz) in the video signifies that the message is more important than last year, and there is some repetition in the text which reinforces this. We see the speakers one by one, not together; they complete each other's sentences as if it is one person talking. It is a collective strategy. The word "we" is frequently mentioned, and the strategy in this campaign is less about addressing individual action, but collective action. The accumulative effect claim from last year is repeated here: "after 5 years of drought and a particularly dry winter, the water crisis is reaching its peak".[f] The drought is now called "the water crisis" as in the press (See Chapters 4 and 5).

Despite the similar set, aesthetics and opening sentence from S08, the narrative of this campaign has changed. The S09 focus is more nationalistic: the slogan is "we must save the Kinneret", and the global water problem is not mentioned. As shown in the newspaper analysis, the state of Lake Kinneret is used as an identifier of the crisis. Lake Kinneret is both a symbol of the Zionist movement, as the source of life for the nation, and it is perceived by the majority of the public as the main (if not only) water source of the country (Siegel 2015). Saving the lake historically symbolises saving the nation. This is also a place of religious importance for the Christian population. A famous Christian basketball player says the slogan in the middle of the video. His tone of voice sounds as if he is begging for help; his hand gestures are emblematic of the Jewish prayer (in contrast to his Christian identity).

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[f] Said by Danny Rup, who present three motivational videos during 2018.

Two different campaigns were released during 2010 (S10A and S10B), both representing a shift in the discourse, and both suggesting a technological solution to the crisis while each one takes it in a different direction.

Figure 10: S10A Opening Shot

S10A employs the same house set as before, and it uses the same presenter (alone again), music and effects to continue the same dehydration storyline. As in S09, the house (and the presenter) appear in the first shot with cracking and peeling skin and paint, but the opening point is much worse than before (see Figure 10). Raz's opening sentence is "once again Israel is drying"; she uses a tone of dissatisfaction in the statement, which could also be understood as a rhetorical question. It might have been used to suggest that this is a temporal situation, contradicting S08 which presented an apocalyptic discourse of an escalating nature. Behind her, books are peeling, framing the drought as a risk to culture and civilisation (Herve-Bazin 2014). She continues with the following:

> *It can be different; it does not have to continue forever; if we continue to save as we have saved until now in 3 years, the water crisis of Israel… [pause] will end!*[S10A]

Raz snaps her fingers during the pause towards the end of the above sentence, and suddenly all the cracks disappear, the furniture is fixed and the tree outside becomes green. There are birds heard tweeting in the background, and her skin is once again clear as she smiles to the camera (see Figure 11). She explains that "it will happen because the desalination plants will reach full capacity, but it will happen… [pause] only in 3 years".[S10A] The end of this sentence is located in the kitchen, which is cluttered with cooking utensils and dishes, a reflection of the wealth associated with an abundance of water, thus

associating desalination with modern life and technological achievement. The pause in this sentence is also accompanied with a finger snap, which returns everything to its ruined state, followed by a plea to "continue to save". This snap emphasises the temporality of the situation and shifts the responsibility back to the viewer.

Similar to the desalination prediction of S10A, the second campaign of this year[S10B] also presents an optimism in the ability to radically change the future by implementing a new technology. S10B introduces a new set (neutral) and aesthetics, which also represent a new means of addressing the water crisis and a different way for the public to participate (i.e. to reduce their water consumption). Similar to S08, the video starts with a facial close-up; this time Raz is looking through a metal pipe. This pipe is a watersaver device[g], and the presenter explains how much water one device in the shower can conserve in a given timeframe (day, week or month). For each timeframe, piles of water bottles appear around her, visualising what could had been saved (see Figure 12). The set is an empty space, light-blue in colour, and when she walks, ripples appear around her feet, and her image is reflected on the floor as if she walks on water (see Figure 12). This video explains the governmental campaign to deliver free watersavers for each home[h] through door-to-door canvasing of stewards who install it and give water-saving advice. This is the first campaign to give practical advice on how to save, but it transfers the

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[g] Raz only claim to hold a Watersaver, in practice it is impossible to see through a watersaver as its small holes are designed to slow the water flow. For its name, see note 5 in Appendix on translations.

[h] For two million homes nationwide, up-to three Watersavers per household.

agency from the viewer to the man sent by the government to the house.[i] This video replaces the discursive strategy of fear used up until now with an optimistic approach, which is emphasised by the design. In contrast to the preceding items, this campaign's iconicity relates to water saturation, rather than a shortage, and rehydration as the answer to the dehydration of the past two years.

Figure 12: S10B Walking on Water

Together, the 2010 campaigns shift the responsibility for resilience building to the government while still limiting the scope of the campaigns to the household.[j] They reflect the major trends in the newspaper discourse at the time (see Chapter 5): (1) increasing supply through desalination and (2) reducing urban consumption. A comparison reveals two different approaches taken by the IWA to achieve water resilience that year. The first is about building resilience as a form of *transformation* by detaching from nature and using desalination; the second promotes *resilience-by-adjustments* by modifying the taps in order to use less water without the need to shorten the length of its use. Even though the watersavers are distributed by the state, the two strategies are also differentiated in their reference to the scale of intervention necessary for achieving resilience. One promotes a large-scale, top-down, centralised change by an infrastructure solution (SD); the other promotes an accumulative effect achieved by multiple accounts of micro-scale, bottom-up interventions at the local level. Both campaigns reflect a desire for an unrestrained consumption achieved through the means of technology. The first is the long-term

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[i] Raz's explanation of the distribution process includes her opening a door which appears in the empty space and a man wearing a shirt with the campaign logo on it is standing on the other side.

[j] A new legislation made watersavers compulsory on all taps in public buildings in 2010 and not mentioned in the campaign.

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approach of desalination, which when implemented, will allow a return to the pre-crisis consumption patterns. The second is an understanding that consumption should be reduced, but by a technological change, and not a behavioural one. While during 2008-2009, the public was motivated to be active in its efforts, the S10B campaign invites passivity. Adding to the message of S10A that the crisis will end soon, these campaigns might have been counterproductive, encouraging a "back to normal" pattern of consumption and a disclaimer for the public. For the next eight years, maybe due to the environmental and public criticism of it (see Chapter 8), none of the PCCs after S10A mention desalination, until 2018.

2011: "Even During the Winter"

The 2011 campaign was the first campaign to be released during the winter. Returning to the neutral set of S10B, this time the presenter, however, does not walk on a wet surface, but on a dry and cracked one (see Figure 13). W11 was a series of eight videos; in seven of them, there is a large presentation of a date looking like a vessel filled with water (see Figure 13), representing the amount of rainfall which had accumulated up to that day. Each video starts with a statement referring to the date and the amount of rainfall, followed by one of these three statements about the crisis:

- "Because Israel is going through another dry winter";[W11B,W11E]
- "The state of Israel's water supply is critical";[W11C] and
- "Because the water reservoirs remain empty".[W11D,W11F,W11G]

Only one video that year aired for more than a single day. In this video, Raz explains that: 2003 has been the last year that had a more than average rainfall; since then, Israel has undergone seven consecutive dry years.[W11A] As she talks, the number of years are rapidly changing, and the water level in them is declining. The main message of this year is that this drought situation is becoming permanent, that this decade is far below the "average", and the accumulative effect is worsening. Although the closing slide says 'Israel is drying', the main message is "even during the winter, we must continue saving".[W11A] This campaign gives no explanation for the crisis, just the weather, and the lack of rain. Similar to the previous years, there is no connection to long-term processes and patterns of consumption, and no explanation as to how to save. Also, this is a return to the pre-2010 depoliticised discourse of ethical-individual responsibility. From a

resilience perspective, this campaign can be configured as returning to *resilience by resistance* as unlike in 2010, it offers no alternative future to the current situation.

Figure 13: W11C Cracking Floor

2012: Continue to Save

The 2012 campaign is the first PCC to provide any advices for daily behaviour on how to save water, with four videos providing advice[S12B-E] and one motivational video. By offering specific advice on how to change behaviour, as in S10B, this campaign offers *resilience-by-adaptation*. The four advices include a voiceover with a masculine voice and a slogan: "Israel continue to save water".[S12] The actors in the videos represent a family in a house set: a man (showering), a girl (walking next to a sprinkler), and a woman (in the kitchen). The action represents the responsibility of everyone in the family, when at home (in the shower or kitchen) and in public places (in a park or swimming pool). The fifth motivational video is a compilation of images from the advisory ones,[S12B-E] plus a scene with children playing in a swimming pool, which ends with a scene with Raz.[S12A] She is in a neutral setting again; her hair is loose, and she has purple lipstick on. She looks happy and healthy. Raz and the use of the house and neural sets provide a continuity with the previous campaigns while the masculine voice over sets an authoritative tone. The neutral set is dark, and everywhere around Raz, water drops float still in the air. She points a finger as if trying to touch one of them and says: "nothing can stop water, only us. Israel continue to save water". All the other clips taken from the advisory videos also present water floating and being still in the air, and with people looking on it in awe.

There is a substantial change from the positive attitude of the advisory videos of this PCC (which comes across in the music, sound and text) to the semi-negative tone of Raz that contradicts her smile. This mix of positive and negative attitudes suggests an

ambivalent future, which is dependent on the behaviour of the viewer. This campaign was released while two of the large-scale SD facilities were already operational, and close to the opening the third. In contrast to the earlier PCCs, in S12, water plays a dominant motif and can be seen in every image. However, the soundtrack is not of flowing or dripping water as the water is presented as being still. The water looks like crystal, and the people's reaction to its motionless state is of respect and wonder. It possibly suggests that water is a luxury, and that its regular flow should not be taken for granted.

2017: Water is Life

The S17 PCC is irregular in all its aspects, such as the design (the set, aesthetics and use of actors) and the messages, which represent a drastic shift in discourse. There is a five-year gap between the S12 campaign and this one; during this time, the SD operations have reached full capacity. Nonetheless, past campaigns (2008-2012) were all released as reaction to the long drought of 2004-2011, S17 is the first PCC reacting to the drought of 2014-2017. Officially, SD provides most of Israel's urban and household consumption, and thus mitigated the effect of this drought, and the governmental contracts oblige Mekorot to purchase a fixed amount per year (Teschner and Negev 2013). Therefore, the conservation of water by reducing consumption relieves the pressures of using natural sources (mostly from Lake Kinneret) and to delay the expansion of SD. Possibly, for this reason, the S17 campaign is the only one to use a biocentric discourse. This campaign represents the possibility for a more diverse framing of water uses (including nature), but still within the confines of a necessary change in behaviour due to the drought, and not as part of a call for a permanent change in patterns of consumption.

S17 is composed of three motivational videos on an outdoors set, all of which are 12 seconds long, with identical text and different audio-visuals. There is no spoken text narrating the videos just written:

> **Water is life. And, life is not for wasting**. *After four years of drought, also this summer, water should be used wisely.*[S17]

The slogan is the section I marked in bold as it appears on the screen in two parts. For the first time, "life" includes non-humans: one video pictures a young girl drinking from a park fountain,[S17A] the second a bird from a natural stream[S17B] and the third a hand watering a small green sprout in the soil.[S17C] Green is the main colour; water sounds dominate the soundtrack (plus birds tweeting[S17B] and children playing[S17A]). The end image

represents the hope category; this time adding green to the blue theme typical of this group.

2018: Transformation of the Discourse

The summer of 2018 also presents several changes in the discourse: on desalination and climate change; and it diverts from the discourse temporality that identified most of the past campaigns. However, unlike S17 which used a new visual language to introduce new ideas, the 2018 campaigns return to the language that was developed between the S08 and the S12 PCCs. S18 was launched through a large press conference headed by the Minister of Energy, and which enjoyed a wide distribution in print and radio advertising. It is the biggest campaign so far, with eight videos released in three stages: the first two motivational videos frame the main messages;[S18A, S18B] the second stage has four advisory videos (with similar advice as given in the past); and the third stage has two long informative videos explaining the shift in the discourse[S18G, S18H] (see below). W18 continues the same discourse and design from the summer 2018 campaign, with one motivational video,[W18A] one informative video[W18B] (a shorter edition of S18G) and four advisory videos. W18 can be considered to be another phase added to S18, and thus this analysis combines both.

The 2018 PCCs reintroduce Raz as the presenter, taking place on a set which is a combination of the house and neutral sets, and its first video even uses the cracking effect.[S18A] The first, a motivational video,[S18A] starts with an image of a woman drinking water with a straw from a glass. The water level in the glass does not decrease from the drinking; instead, the content empties from below upwards (see Figure 14, the top right-hand image). The next shot shows that this is Raz, and she says that: "I'm back, because of the drought".[S,18A] As indicated by this text, during the decade passed since her first campaign, Raz has become the national icon for water saving, an established symbol of droughts.

"I'm back in spite of desalination" was the slogan of the printed campaign on billboards, written next to an image of Raz's face. The first part of this slogan situates Raz as a symbol, and the intertextuality of the text and design with the former campaigns are sufficient for the viewer to understand that this is a call for water conservation. The second part of the slogan represents the discursive shift towards desalination. In S10A, desalination was presented as a promise to end water scarcity forever, and as seen in the

newspaper analysis (Chapters 5 and 6), a growing consensus was generated around it as **the** prime solution to the droughts. In the S18A video, standing on a cracked floor, Raz explains that "after five years of drought, we pumped everything we could. There's no water in the streams. There's no water in the aquifers. There's no water in the Kinneret".[S18A] Images of half-empty below upwards water vessels accompanies this text (see Figure 14). It is the main visual-metaphor of 2018: that desalination gives an illusion of optimism (i.e. a full glass for a full reservoir); it is the illusion that there is plenty of water for everyone while in reality, desalination is unable to fix the accumulated long-term shortage (this is further explained in the informative videos). The second motivational video (S18B) is more explicit about this change; Raz holds the glass with the floating water and says: "but, let's look at the glass' empty half: desalination is not enough, and it doesn't matter how much water we desalinate; we don't have water to waste!".[S18B]

Figure 14: Four Images from S18A

To bridge this change in discourse, S18 introduces a new type of video: a long informative clip, placed in a newsroom type of set and with a new presenter, Rup, Israel's first weatherman.[k] These were the longest ever videos, one minute each, where Rup stands

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[k] See comment e in this chapter. Rup also was one of the celebrities in the S09 video.

in a studio; behind him are big screens similar to a newsroom. These are the only items using a scientific discourse, with data and figures in the text and images behind Rup. Rup's text directly addresses the public dissonance between having five large-scale desalination facilities and the need to conserve water:

> *A lot of people ask me: "Danny, really, how can that be? But we have desalination" Right. We have desalination, but there is also* **global warming**. *[…] True, we have water in the faucets thanks to the desalination plants, but* **desalination is not enough**. *It's only part of the solution to the problem. Let's remember,* **desalination has an economic and environmental price** *[emphasis added].* [S18G]

This is the first time that desalination's economic and environmental implications are presented to the public as a reason to reduce consumption. It is an official statement that there is no technological solution to the problem (in contrast to both of the 2010 campaigns), but that adaptation to climate change includes permanent changes to the water consumption patterns. Rup's informative videos all started with Raz's "I'm back" greeting; one is more dedicated to explaining that desalination is not the full solution,[S18G] the second refers to the magnitude of the current crisis and the state of the natural water resources[S18H] (and the third in the winter, W18B, is a shorter edit of them). Rup speaks to the audience as in a weather forecast, asking and answering questions. While he speaks, images behind him complement and interpret his statements (floods, Kinneret's coastline, desalination facilities, chimneys that emit smoke).

The second main shift in the discourse of 2018 is that the water shortage and the need to conserve is no longer a temporal situation; as suggested in Rup's quote above, the reason is connected to climate change. In S18H, Rup addresses the misconception that floods and unusual rains during May 2018 were a sign of water abundance, and that actually the natural reservoirs are empty.[S18H] Rup explains that, thanks to desalination, water pumping from Lake Kinneret has almost completely ceased, yet it is still approaching the black-line. Therefore, "always"[S18H] save water. This is moving from resilience as *resistance* to *adjustments*. Similar to W11, the 2018 campaigns ask to maintain the pattern of reducing consumption regardless of rainfall. But this time, the emphasis is on the fact that this is not temporally connected to a drought. Rup claims that the next winter might also experience a drought.[S18H] Raz repeats this attitude that "even if it is a rainy winter, we will continue to reduce our water consumption to a minimum".[W18A] The introductions for the W18 advisory videos include statements which reinforce the need for a permanent change, saying either: "it's raining; it's not raining"[W18C,W18F] or that "there

will be a drought; there will be no drought".[W18B, W18E] Her tone and body language indicate that it does not matter which option happens; in any case, the advice that follows should be taken. This year, the plea is not to save or conserve, but to "reduce to a minimum",[W18A] with "minimised"[S18C,S18D] consumption and that "we must minimise our water consumption".[S18C,W18A]

7.4.   Longitudinal Discussion

To summarise, this chapter's objectives were to investigate the PCCs produced during 2008 and 2018 by the IWA, which aimed at a water-use reduction in Israel, in order to be able to compare the discourses to those communicated in the newspapers. This analysis investigated the audio-visual discursive construction, and its development over the years. Most campaigns used the discursive appeal of *fear*; some used *hopeful* messages or a combination of both (Rice and Atkin 2013; Yzer et al. 2013); only the informative videos used *informative* and *rational* messages and appeals (Guttman 2015). It has been shown that in order to convey their messages, the campaigns created a defined audio-visual and textual (spoken and written) language. Elements were reused over the years to create continuity, intertextuality and to reinforce and reshape messages by reusing and adapting two defined sets (that is houses and neutral ones), graphics (the end images and fonts), visual metaphors (the cracks and empty vessels), sound effects and slogans. In the earlier PCCs,[S08-S10A] a *visual metaphor* (Medeiros and Gomes 2018) of dehydration constructed the presenter as symbolising both Israel as a whole and the viewers as individuals, who were affected by the drought. Later videos, from 2011 onwards, kept reaffirming the discourse constructed by the visual metaphor of dehydration, but which no longer had to place this metaphor at the centre of the videos, and only needed to briefly reference it (as with the short visual of the cracked floor). Most of the campaigns used the same presenter; S10B was the first that built on her status as a sign of domestic water conservation, and which drew elements from the previous campaigns to reconstruct a new visual metaphor of a saturated future. In 2018, five years after her last PCC, Raz's "I'm back" statement was enough to signal the need to save water, completing her transformation from a *professional presenter* (Rice and Atkin 2013) to a *symbol* (Lester and Cottle 2009).

Most campaigns took one direction or the other in the symbolic and iconic audio-visualisation of water, either emphasised by its absence or its existence. Water absence was visualised by the lack of taps,[S08] empty vessels[W11,S18,W18] and mostly by the repeated use of the animated dehydration and cracked effects. All these symbols connected only to the categories of *life, human utilisation* and *civilisation* (Herve-Bazin 2014), and the dehydration cracks presented the risk imposed by the drought on all these three categories. Some videos took an opposite audio-visual approach, presenting the saturation of water, and the different ways of using it: in taps, fountains, full glasses and bottles, kitchens overflowing with dishes and utensils, sprinklers and images of toilets. Sounds of dripping and flowing water only dominated these videos. In a spoken text, a direct mention of

water *uses* was predominately given in the informative videos. By contrast, the *motivational* videos mentioned water sources: the Kinneret,[S09,S18A] reservoirs,[W11D,S12D+F] streams[S18A+G+H] and desalination.[S10A,S18A+B+D+H,W18B] This is in line with Herve-Bazin (2014) suggestion that PCCs are able to encourage the protection of natural sources. Primarily, water was presented in most of the campaigns as a resource, and not as part of nature. Hence, in line with the newspaper discourse, in the videos, natural sources were mentioned to signal the magnitude of the drought and desalination as the technological alternative source.

Public statements by the IWA (see Chapter 5 and 6) reveals the *definitional effectiveness* (Salmon and Murray-Johnson 2013) of the PCCs as a domestic issue, which is in line with most water PCCs globally (Herve-Bazin 2014). Accordingly, none of the videos mentioned public uses, nor large private consumers, such as businesses, industry or the agricultural sectors, and not even day-to-day consumption in the workplace or schools. The analysis has shown several other characteristics of the definitional effectiveness of the campaigns. Firstly, for most of the years analysed, the PCCs reaffirmed the newspapers' risk definition of the droughts as a "crisis". Secondly, they defined it as a techno-managerial problem affected by the droughts. Thirdly, they silenced the human agency of the causes of this crisis such as climate change. Finally, it marginalised the non-human, environmental and ecological aspects.

In terms of their ideological effectiveness (Salmon and Murray-Johnson 2013), most of the campaigns maintained the same set of discourses: the de-political, individual action, national mobilisation and the anthropocentric perception of the problem. That is, using the ethical-individual depoliticised approach (Machin 2013). Ideologically, it could be said that one of the main discursive contradictions presented about the drought was the narrative that it was anthropocentric, seeing as it views humans as the only users of water. It also marginalised the environmental reasoning for water saving and the non-human need for water. The opposite perspective of an eco-centric discourse, which includes non-human use of water and eliminates the human-nature dichotomy, only appeared in S17. Having been irregular in many aspects, I suggest that S17's campaign was a critical discourse moment, offering new ways to conceptualise the droughts, water needs and the human-nature relationship.

As suggested by the newspapers (see Section 5.3.3.3), the *political effectiveness* might not have signalled to the viewers that the government 'care' about the issue, but rather that it admits its own 'failure' in managing the crisis. Furthermore, the campaigns

contributed to depoliticisation by ethical-individual responsibility to conserve water. As expected from the PCCs, they focused on building long-term resilience by recruiting the public into the effort. Moreover, these campaigns used a generalised "we", as a means for such a mobilisation of the public. As described above, this recruitment was at an individual level; while some campaigns used nationalistic and patriotic reasons to save water, the responsibility in the campaigns was predominantly targeted at the individual or family level. The literature has described the Israeli society as a mobilised society (Peled and Ophir 2001), and as such, it has a long history of public campaigns for water conservation and the public understanding of the need to conserve water (Siegel 2015). In line with this tradition, most campaigns analysed here usually did not explain how to conserve water, and as a result, they relied on an assumed common knowledge on how to do so. This follows Salmon and Murray-Johnson's (2013) arguments about depoliticisation by using the ideological and political effectiveness of the PCCs. Nonetheless, at the same time, it reaffirmed discourses of Zionist citizen mobilisation (through individual action) over the option of systemic changes. Alternative strategies for mobilisation, such as economic (saving water = saving money) or environmental (conserving water = nature conservation) were absent or marginalised in contrast to the dominance of the economic discourse in the newspapers.

There are only three governmental policies that were mentioned in the videos. The first in S09 is only by implication when the text mentions that: "this summer we cannot irrigate gardens" and by referring to the drying-out garden regulations at that time (see Section 5.3.3.1). Only during 2010, the responsibility of the solution was in the hands of the state, either by delivering the watersavers or by desalination; in that sense, 2010 was a critical discourse year. Thus, the potential for politicisation was a just temporary shift and later campaigns maintained these de-political ethical-individual patterns. It concealed the possibility of addressing the risk at the policy level looking at the systemic causes of the problem.

7.4.1. PCCs and Resilience

Examining the PCCs from the resilience perspective reveals where the PCCs reaffirmed the hegemonic discourse of the newspapers and where they offered a different way to address the risk. The campaigns are means to achieve resilience, but they also reflect the resilience perception of their producers (the IWA and Government Advertising Agency) at

the time of production and in terms of the changes over time. Predominantly, most campaigns confined their messages to promote a mitigation of the so-called "water crisis"[S09] by mobilising a consumption reduction. By contrast, the newspapers argued for reducing consumption through the use of economic tools, and more prominently they argued for increasing supply. In other words, the PCCs offered different ways to become more water resilient to the droughts. Nevertheless, the resilience offered was confined to the risk of a water scarcity and the droughts, and not to climate change, similar to the newspapers it promoted drought resilience and not a climate-resilience.

A longitudinal examination of the formation of the national water resilience supports the panarchy model. This model, as explained in the Literature Review (see Section 1.3.3), concerns resilience as a process of change where repeating environmental stress leads to a re-evaluation of the ways to address it; this creates an evolution in the understanding of the problem and its possible solutions while the implementation of solutions reshapes the system and redefines the problem. The first campaigns, 2008 to 2009, offered *resilience-by-resistance*, that is, minimal changes to consumption while waiting to return to a business-as-usual scenario. As the droughts continued, resistance was not enough, and 2010 offered two directions with which to achieve resilience: either by implementing minor *adjustments* in the form of watersavers or a *transformation* of the water sources through desalination. These alternative futures were constructed in the videos in different ways. Despite its transformative ability, desalination was presented first as a bouncing-back technology (Davoudi 2012), magically eliminating the problem and returning society to its pre-crisis state. Conversely, the watersavers were presented as bouncing forwards (Shaw 2012), enabling a new saturated future. Nevertheless, despite their differences (such as scale, direction of change and modes of implementation), both technologies reinforced the discourse of techno-managerialism, and both offered a future where old patterns of water consumption (which led to the crisis) could be maintained. Furthermore, the attempt to achieve resilience shifted from active participation to a passive one as the state and the stewards are the ones supplying and installing the watersavers, and desalination was implemented by an unmentioned entity. This passivity holds the potential (in the case of the continuing droughts) to return to a scarcity situation.

While the process of transformation began in accordance with the SD promise in 2010, the 2011 campaign called for more changes to behaviour. This campaign moved away from the discourse of temporality, which identified the previous years' aim to construct a new status quo of "even during the winter". This marks a development to

resilience-by-adjustments. In the following year, 2012, these messages of adaptation offered specific advices about consumption, which only suggested minor adjustments to behaviour (still individual and in the household). Audio-visually, S12A maintained the promise of a saturated future, even without explicitly referring to the promises of 2010. From 2013, the year when according to S10A "the crisis…will end", until 2017, there were no campaigns, a drastic frequency drop[1] despite the continuation of the droughts. By not releasing new campaigns in spite of the continuation of the droughts, the IWA might have signalled to the public that the promise from 2010 of achieving resilience by desalination had been fulfilled. By that, the IWA contributed to the situation which was criticised by the papers in Chapter 6 as the 'desalination euphoria'. In a way, the campaign of 2017, which broadened the scope of the PCCs and as being beyond just humans, also reinforced this perception – the privilege of addressing nature's needs was enabled by some relief in the stress due to desalination. Despite the expectations set in 2010, and in line with the panarchy model, the continuation of the drought brought a re-evaluation of the transformation offered by desalination. Therefore, S18 offered a critical discourse moment in regard to desalination, calling for water saving, and W18 reaffirmed the discourse of adaptation and the new status quo. This was a shift from the 2010 promises of a saturated future and the potential solutions; therefore, in order to explain this shift, there was a need to publicly announce that "desalination is not enough" with the *informative* videos, which opened the scope of the debate. The informative videos explained that desalination is not a climate resilience policy, and that drought resilience should also address aspects of climate resilience.

As mentioned above, this was a de-political version of resilience. The findings have shown that the campaigns contributed to a depoliticisation of the Israeli hydro-political discourse through using a variety of tools. First and foremost, it homogenised the drought as threatening and affecting everyone in the same way, thereby building a consensual discourse which ignored those who were more affected by the water shortage: farmers, residents of the desert areas, poor people (who cannot afford the changes in the tariffs and fines), Bedouin villages not connected to the national water system and the Palestinians. In line with Swyngedouw's (2010) arguments, an apocalyptic description of the environmental crisis and a homogenisation of its outcome led to a technological solution (desalination), which is presented as the answer to the problem, without

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[1] Until 2012 for 5 years there where 1-2 campaigns each year.

addressing the complex causes (i.e. climate change, population growth and a constant increase in consumption). This perception of desalination has changed recently, as can be seen by the 2018 summer campaign findings. The 2018 campaign represents an understanding that desalination is not a complete solution, and that it should be combined with long-term efforts to change consumption patterns. Also, in this video dedicated to desalination, the IWA mentions the environmental and economic prices of this technology. This informative video was the first time the IWA gave a comprehensive explanation to the public on the nation's water situation, which could open the scope of the discourses around these issues to address the implications of desalination.

As suggested by Swyngedouw and Williams (2016), large-scale seawater desalination has embedded contradictions which bare the potential to transform and re-politicise the discourse. The economic cost, the environmental impact and the growth contradictions all play a role in the 2018 campaign and have the (still unfulfilled) potential to develop into a public debate about them in other public spheres. The growth contradiction of desalination is particularly interesting in the context of the 2010 campaigns where S10B offers an alternative to the future presented in S10A. The S10A campaign presents this promise, suggesting that once desalination facilities have been built, continued growth is guaranteed. S10A offers a future of unlimited water supply, similar to the newspaper discourse (see Chapters 4 and 5). The long-term discursive and educational effect of the PCCs (Guttman 2014; Herve-Bazin 2014) and especially the campaigns of 2018, coupled with the unique local cultural sensitivity to the issue (Siegal 2017), challenges the growth promise. The S18 campaign also presents a realisation and understating of the prices of promised growth. The homogenisation of the threat led to a consensus that more water was necessary. This consensus depoliticised the growth paradigm, which comes from a specific capitalistic ideology. S18 is yet to re-politicise this paradigm, but by questioning it, it holds the potential to develop into a political perspective of it.

To conclude, the results indicate that a variety of opposite and competing discursive strategies were used by the IWA: fear/hope, nostalgic/futuristic, nationalistic/individualistic and bio-centric/anthropocentric. The earlier PCCs (2008-2010) developed a defined audio-visual symbolic language, visioning an apocalyptic future, which was later modified by intertextuality, references and repetition, to communicate more complex messages, and to suggest an opposite saturated future. A longitudinal comparison reveals how the discourse of water resilience has evolved and

changed over the years from a *resilience-by-resistance* to a *resilience-by-transformation* and finally a *resilience-by-adaptation*. This chapter shows how by only addressing the domestic individual water consumption the campaigns constructed a depolitical water-discourse, which directs the responsibility for achieving resilience to ethical-individual behaviour and ignores governmental responsibility and the systemic social-environmental causes of the problem, including climate change. It also found how the newspapers reaffirmed the discourse of a crisis (and its depoliticisation) which was constructed by the newspapers. The next chapter expand more on these findings.

Chapter 8 – Longitudinal Findings and Discussion: Depoliticisation, Desalination and Resilience

This chapter draws together the findings of the previous chapters and provides theoretical reflection in relation to the literature. It returns to the main questions of this research, how do Israeli news media and PCCs communicate drought and hydro-policies between 2001 and 2018? What forms of resilience are constructed through these mediations, and how might these contribute to the (de)politicisation of droughts, hydro-policies and desalination in Israel?

In the 1990s, as presented in the Chapter 2, Israel's hydro-regime was based on water transfers from natural resources (Lake Kinneret and the aquifers), social tariffs and agricultural subsidies managed by the Water Commission which had political representation. Currently, the hydro-regime is managed by the (independent and expert-based) Water Authority, using cost-based tariffs. Urban consumption is now based on privately-owned seawater desalination (SD) and agricultural irrigation on reclaimed sewage. This thesis has examined the discursive aspects of these transformations of the hydro-regime for archiving resilience by using two longitudinal studies, analysing newspaper and public communication campaign videos and by focusing mainly on one hydro-policy – SD. The main objective of this thesis was to understand and evaluate the discursive role of the newspapers Haaretz and Yedioth Ahronoth (YA) and their economic sub-papers *TheMarker* and *Calcalist* in their reporting on the hydro-policies and droughts during three predefined critical discourse periods (CDPs) from 2001 to 2018. The second objective relates to the examination of the discourse on public communication campaigns (PCCs) produced by the Israel Water Authority (IWA). This chapter brings together insights from both these objectives. It should be noted that many of the findings presented below are built one on top of the other, thus reinforcing each other; therefore, they are not ordered chronologicaly or by their appearance in the analytical chapters.

This discussion chapter proceeds as described in the following outline. The first part (8.1) starts with a longitudinal review summarising the general findings from the newspaper critical discourse analysis (CDA). Section 8.1.1 presents the key findings,

making distinctions between the newspapers; and follows with a theoretical discussion based on Maeseele and Raeijmaekers' (2017) analytical tools of scope and form to evaluate the *media landscape* in its influence on (de)politicising the issue of water. Then, (in Section 8.1.2) it presents the findings connected to the "crisis" frame as depoliticisating the hydro-policy discourse, which includes insights from the PCCs. The next section (8.1.3) looks more closely at the depoliticisation of SD and the silence around its implications. The secound part (8.2) examines these key findings from the perspective of climate resilience by using certain directive questions offered by critical refection on resilience (Cretney 2014) in terms of (in Section 8.2.1) the notion from/to what? and (in Section 8.2.2) how and by/for whom? The third section (8.2.3) theoretically disscusses the use of the resilience prespective for environmental and risk communication studies.

8.1. Longitudinal Review of the Newspaper Discourse

The longitudinal findings of the newspapers analysis revealed that in all three critical discourse periods (CDPs), the hydro-policies discourse followed a similar dynamic: (a) identification and definition of the problem; followed by (b) the initiation of a governmental investigation; with a simultaneous influx of (c) policy debate, which can be divided into short-term (such as the quota cuts and the Gardening Ban) and long-term measures (as with SD and the tariff changes), and which alternate between reducing consumption and increasing supply; and ending with (d) the publication of an investigation report, which was used to reaffirm the prominent position on the policies and plans promoted during the period. Furthermore, the longitudinal findings reveal the expansion of the discourses, and how they became hegemonic in the newspapers over time: (i) techno-managerial expert-driven depoliticisation mainly in the form of (ii) economisation, which promotes (iii) neoliberal reforms (e.g. the marketisation of tariffs, corporation of services and privatisation) and (iv) the continual expansion of a privatised SD.

When looking at the changes between the different time periods, the details of the expansion of this post-political discourse are revealed. In CDP1, the aim for reducing consumption was centred on the agricultural sector, which included a delegitimisation of their political leadership. Simultaneously, desalination was one of the many options for increasing supply. In CDP2, the attention was diverted to urban consumption, which included delegitimising the political leadership that objected the neoliberalisation of the household tariffs. Moreover in this period, SD reached a hegemonic consensual position as the prime hydro-policy. CDP3 presents some issues that challenged the hegemonic discourse, but which had not re-politicised it: the cost-based tariff leading to an increase in consumption (despite the opposite claims in CDP2); the return of the crisis despite the promise (reaffirmed by the PCCs in 2010) that desalination will "end" the water problem; desalination imposing health risks; and the connections between climate change and desalination.

8.1.1. Identifying the Newspaper Media Landscape

This section presents the key findings on the newspaper discourse (2001-2018) as a basis for evaluating the media's (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017) role in the (de)politicisation of the hydro-policies during these years.

The first finding is that within this research timeframe, the newspapers mainly presented the droughts and the hydro-policies as a techno-managerial issue (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014), and predominantly economic discourse became hegemonic over time (or *techno-economic* as Machin (2013) named it). In doing so, newspapers contributed to shifting the focus of attention from what is essentially a problem of politics or political will to a problem that could only be handled by depoliticised – that is to say, neutral – experts, who are supposedly outside of or beyond politics. Secondly, one prominent aspect of the economisation of these hydro-policies is the frequency of items printed in the economic sections and written by the economic reporters or those covering the economic sectors (such as shopping, infrastructure or energy). The next table (13) aggregates findings presented in Tables 6-11. As seen in Table 13, from the first CDP to the last, YA had a trend of expanding the frequency of the news items published in the economic sections. Haaretz showed an opposite trend of decreasing this number. Moreover, in all three CDPs, most of Haaretz' items were printed in the economic sections. Except in the case of YA in CDP2; in every time period in both newspapers, the reporters offering an economic perspective were the main contributors of the news articles.

Table 13: Recurrent Reporters and Key Findings 2001-2018

		Yedioth Ahronoth including *Calcalist*	*Haaretz* including *TheMarker*
CDP1 2001-2002	Items	108	324
	Per month	18	6
	Economy sections	38%	71%
	Most frequent writer	Shopping & Consumption Reporter	Infrastructure Reporter
CDP2 2008-2010	Items	183	197
	Per month	7.88	7.32
	Economy sections	44%	64%
	Most frequent writer	Environmental reporter	Economic reporter
CDP3 2018	Items	61	66
	Per month	5.08	5.5
	Economy sections	75%	59%
	Most frequent writer	Infrastructure Reporter	Industry & Energy Reporter

Thirdly, even though both newspapers predominantly reported the hydro-policies as an economic issue, their main economic framing of this issue was different, namely as economic market and sector in Haaretz and as a consumption product in YA. In all three CDPs, YA emphasised how hydro-policies would affect the private consumer. Certain

aspects of this emphasis can be seen in the newspaper's: (1) coverage by the shopping and consumption reporter in CDP1; (2) the limited coverage of hydro-policies related to agriculture and industry; (3) the wide coverage of the policies to reduce urban consumption; (4) the emphasis on changes to household tariffs; and (5) repeating items relating to ways to reduce household consumption (with advices and technological devices for home use). In all three periods, Haaretz had more frequent items covering SD as an economic market, reporting on: (1) developments in the SD tenders; (2) stock exchange and ownership; (3) SD by Israeli companies abroad; (4) interviews with water-companies managements and items connecting the SD industry to other economic sectors (such as energy and gas). These different trends in the economisation of hydro-policies can be explained more by the type of newspaper, and not by their ideological viewpoint. YA as a popular tabloid addresses the crisis for the eyes of the (imagined) common reader, interested in its effect on everyday life; Haaretz as an elitist broadsheet newspaper presents to its (upper and upper-middle class) readership the development in desalination as a business and financial investment. Another indication of this is the difference between *Calcalist* and *TheMarker*, both economic sub-papers, in their promotion of the economisation of these hydro-policies, supported privatisation and used delegitimisation of Mekorot and its union. These are all indications of a neoliberal ideology. However, while Calcalist reports argue for privatisation as a means to reduce the tariff, TheMarker reporters argue about the dangers of a private monopoly that might impose on the free market.

Fourthly, all three discourse-coalitions identified by Menahem and Gilad (2013) were represented in the newspapers: the Agro-Zionist (AZDC), economic (EcDC) and environmental (EnDC). I identified (from CDP2) the representation of a fourth discourse-coalition: the social-municipal discourse-coalition (SMDC), promoting social policy represented by mayors and MKs. The four coalitions and their ideological paradigms received an uneven representation in the newspapers and were positioned differently between the distinct news outlets, writers and periods. Importantly, the diversity in representation of the actors from these coalitions dropped dramatically in CDP3 when the most prominent speakers were governmental figures, mainly the IWA Director and the Minister of Energy. Also, Menahem and Gilad (2013) present the discourse-coalitions as consistent in their position on policies, based on their ideological viewpoint. My findings show how the discourses of one coalition colonised (see Fairclough (2012) , Chapter 3) the others. For example, this is evidenced when the AZDC

used economic or environmental arguments to justify the subsidies in CDP1. More frequently, it can be seen when the environmental writers used economic arguments and supported economic tools for water-demand management as serving an environmental purpose. This is a sign of the growing hegemony of the economic discourse from the first period to the last as an increasing number of voices and discourse-coalitions were adapting it over time (the AZDC in CDP1 and scientists and members of the EnDC in CDP2 and CDP3).

Fifthly, the initiation of an investigation at the start of each period (mainly in CDP1 and CDP2) and the investigation reports at their end were used by the newspapers to reaffirm the governmental failure-to-act frame and the notion of depoliticisation via expert-based decision-making. Even though the emphasis on governmental responsibility in every report could have led to re-politicisation. Also, each newspaper chose to cherry-pick statements and recommendations from the reports, which supported their position on certain policies that were debated during the period. Hence, this marginalised the parts of the reports that challenged the writers' and newspapers' policy preferences, and prevented these reports' potential to alter the discourse.

Sixthly, the connection between the droughts and climate change was silenced and marginalised in the first two periods (1.8% in CDP1 and 3.4% in CDP2). This changed in CDP3 (16%) where it gained more prominence; however, the correlation between the droughts and climate change was still questioned in statements from the IWA Director, thus marginalising climatic considerations in policy making. In all three periods, climate change was mentioned more often in Haaretz, and its connection to the droughts was less questioned in this newspaper.

Finally, the use of water in the industry was almost completely absent from the coverage in both newspapers in all periods. Aside from the reporting in rare items laconically mentioning tariff changes[1] and allocation cuts[2] for the industry, the debate on reducing consumption focussed on agriculture, households and municipalities (e.g. gardening) and silenced the option of reductions in the industry sector.

Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017) suggest the analytical aspects of *scope* and *form* to identify the ways in which each newspapers (and combined as a media landscape*)* has constructed the discourse as agonistic or antagonistic and political or post-political (Maeseele 2015a; Mouffe 2005, see Section 1.2.1). Analysing the *scope* of the coverage thus examines the presence, prominence and absence of particular objects and issues, actors

and viewpoints; by contrast, the *form* is about the discursive positioning of these elements. Based on the findings presented in Chapters 4 to 6, and the summary above, I claim that that the *scope* of the coverage of the hydro-policies during 2001-2018 privileged particular voices, perspectives and demands. One important finding in this context is the discursive tool of marginalisation and the silencing of the perceived opposition or alternative voices, perspectives and demands by not covering them. This is evidenced by the case of the AZDC in YA during CDP1 and the marginalisation of the SMDC in Haaretz in CDP2 since these coalition arguments and spokespeople where excluded from one newspaper or the other. Further examples are seen in: the marginalisation of the connection between climate change and the droughts and of policies such as reducing household consumption by greywater reuse; the exclusion of industrial water consumption; and the silence around the implications of desalination. These silences reoccur in all three CDPs and in both newspapers. Alternatively, in the language of post-politics, the misrepresentation of voices contesting the hegemonic discourse led to a presentation and reconstruction of a perceived consensus around specific policies mainly supporting SD. The next section returns to this consensus and silence.

The differences between the newspapers' scope of the coverage were identified by their position towards specific issues and developments, as in the case of privatisation. Both newspapers argued in favour of privatisation and marketisation of water, with minor changes. In the first period, YA did not cover the governmental companies' contestation of the prohibition of their participation in the tender; in later CDPs, YA did not address the growing share of IDE in the SD market. In contrast, Haaretz presented, although marginalising it, the governmental companies' dispute over SD privatisation. It also addressed IDE's monopoly in CDP2 and CDP3, but almost completely ignored the SMDC contestation of the Drought Levy and the differential tariffs. However, these differences in scope do not reflect strong ideological differences between the newspapers as they both remain within the margins of the techno-managerial, economic, and depoliticised discourse.

Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017) further claim that an open debate or politicised coverage occurs when newspapers identify the privileged actors and positions and introduce alternative voices and demands (as an agonistic alternative). I argue that the newspapers **opened** the scope of the debate by having multiple reporters covering the policy debates simultaneously (such as on days when both an environmental reporter and an economic correspondent covered the same event) and having many external writers

contribute to the op-eds. Nonetheless, this diversity **within** the newspapers cannot be identified as agonistic pluralism. This is because even if it broadened and occasionally challenged the debate, it did not change the unified hegemonic post-political techno-managerial perspective, or how the contra-hegemonic discourses were marginalised. By that, both publications in a sense avoided meaningful political engagement. As explained in the next section, the newspapers gradually minimised the scope of the debate to one in which there is no long-term alternative to the constant expansion of privatised desalination. The following examination of the *form* of coverage also supports this claim about diversity.

The *form* of the reporting during the analysed CDPs also contributed to the depoliticisation of the hydro-policies debate (and which antagonised the contesting voices). Predominantly from CDP1 to CD2, an economisation of the crisis became the hegemonic discourse for understanding the risk and for directing the decision-making on hydro-policies. The analysis presented the use of a variety of discursive strategies from those identified in the literature (Carvalho 2008; Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017; Pepermans 2015) which were used in both newspapers to depoliticise the debate. The majority of the differences between the newspapers were identified in terms of their particular use of these discursive strategies on certain occasions and around specific topics. Despite these differences, the findings illustrate a long-term discursive formation that foreclosed any opportunities to politicise the mediated hydro-policy debate. The most prominent discursive strategies are: the *positioning* of economic arguments as rational and political arguments as irrational (mainly around the tariffs); the *delegitimisation* of the discourse-coalitions and their political and ideological stances (mainly the AZDC in Haaretz in CDP1 and the SMDC in YA in CDP2); the *scientisation* and *economisation* of the reasons for 'the crisis' (more in the next section); and the *naturalisation* of desalination as the prime solution and of its privatisation. The analysis also identified the (less prominent) use of the discursive strategies of: *juridification*, such as repeating arguments that the NIC, PIC or State Comptroller recommendations are obligatory, the dispute over the Drought Levy and the governmental companies' participation in the tenders. Lastly, there were occasions when the notion of *securitisation* in the discourse had been identified as in the cases of importing water from Turkey (in CDP1) and the reverse carrier to ensure a water supply to Jordan (in CDP3). However, the discourse around securitisation as a form of

depoliticisation (i.e. using national security and geopolitical arguments to silence the ideological ones) was very rare.[a]

This analysis has also identified a new discursive strategy for depoliticisation – *divinisation* (which wasn't mentioned earlier in this thesis). That is, it addresses the divine god as having agency over resolving the problem, instead of political (and human) agency. On several occasions, one in CDP2[3,4] one in CDP3,[5] several ministers suggested the use of the religious practices of prayers to solve the crisis, and thus to redirect the reasons and blame for the crisis from the political onto the divine.[b] This was also a discursive strategy encouraging a suspension of action and decision-making, based on the genuine assumption that time, god or nature will resolve the crisis. Interestingly, this was used by the newspapers to present these ministers as *irrational*, and the government as inadequate. Accordingly, it strengthened the discourse around the failure of the political. The connection between divinisation and rationalisation in these two examples is linked to the fact that both newspapers address a generally secular audience. An examination of the religious newspapers from Israel might present an opposing use of the divinisation discursive strategy as depoliticising while legitimising these ministers' suggestions.

The literature on (de)politicisation aims to draw clear-cut differences between the discursive strategies of depoliticisation and politicisation. However, in my findings (as suggested by Schallhart 2017), the distinctions between the strategies do not lead to a clear differentiation between the actors as antagonistic and agonistic or depoliticiser and re-politiciser. My findings showed that sometimes the same actor can use both strategies, at different times (or even in the same item), in distinct contexts and with different motivations. Thus, the example from the infrastructure minister in CDP2 (see Section 5.3.1.4.2) shows him arguing against the hegemony of the economic discourse and the need to be allowed to promote policies according to his ideology (i.e. politicising) while delegitimising the "treasury boys" (i.e. depoliticising). By contrast, the op-eds in CDP3 expanded the scope of the debate to the environmental aspects, presenting the economic arguments as ideological (i.e. politicising) while delegitimising the EcDC as serving the

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[a] This is most likely due to the data collection design, see Section 3.3.

[b] Twice it came from two different Ministers of Agriculture. In January 2009, Minister of Agriculture Shalom Shimchon suggested replacing the Mezuzahs in the IWA offices for the return of the rain. (Eichner 2009, December 26). In December 2017, a month before the beginning of CDP3, the Minister of Agriculture Uri Ariel organised a mass prayer for rain in the Jerusalem, the minister speech at this prayer is quoted a month later in Haaretz (Amit 2018, January 21).

interests of the "tycoons". These findings also suggest that depoliticisation, and also delegitimisation, is not only a top-down strategy of the hegemonic actors, but that it is also used by the contra-hegemonic powers as a way to achieve legitimacy (by positioning the other actors as illegitimate). To put it differently, delegitimisation is not necessarily directed only by the powerful actors towards the contra-hegemonic ones, but also the opposite can occur. These findings suggest more about the post-political situation than about the actors themselves. Once the de-politicised discourse becomes hegemonic and the political discourse becomes antagonistic (friend/enemy), the discursive strategies of politicisation still exist without the intention of their user to transform the debate into an agnostic (we/they) one, especially when the actors are contra-hegemonic.

To conclude this part of the discussion, despite the different perspectives reflected within a newspaper or shared between the newspapers on specific issues, the general long-term media landscape offers the reader some *media diversity* within the margins of the post-political situation, but not as an open, agonistic, political media landscape (which Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017) defined as *media pluralism)*. Maeseele and Raeijmaekers (2017) define *media uniformity* as a landscape where media outlets construct the same consensual scope and form a similar depoliticised discourse. The next section explores the findings suggesting that the newspapers and the PCCs presented a media uniformity in their discourse on the droughts and the hydro-policies.

8.1.2. Consensual Crisis Frame and Depoliticisation of Hydro-Policies

This section presents and discusses the findings related to the discursive construction of a consensual 'water crisis', its causes and solutions, and how it contributed to the depoliticisation of the hydro-policies. All the following findings listed below were common among the newspapers (in contrast to the findings in the previous section), and which were strengthened by the PCCs. As these findings are interconnected discourses that reaffirm each other in a circular way, I first list them more broadly, and then I expand on each one, concluding with a theoretical discussion.

Firstly, I found that in the first two periods (2001-2002 and 2008-2010), the newspapers constructed the outcome of the drought (i.e. the risk) as a "water crisis". The definition of the risk as a crisis returned at the end of CDP3 after the publication of the State Comptroller Report in October 2018. Secondly, the crisis was explained by using two main frames: scientific and economic. In line with risk-society theory (Beck 1992),

scientists, mainly hydrologists and water engineers working in governmental institutions, identified the risk (as a natural-hydrological event) and its side effects (on reservoirs), and they made it visible by providing data and interpreting it as a threat to water quality and supply. By using economic language and metaphors, the reporters and institutional experts constructed the crisis as a problem of a water supply and demand imbalance. Thirdly, the journalists and the discourse-coalitions also explained the crisis as an outcome of a 'governmental failure-to-act', a prominent frame in CDP1 and CDP2, which also returned during CDP3. Fourthly, the PCCs produced by the IWA built and reaffirmed the crisis discourse, the supply and demand explanation and the governmental failure-to-act frame.

The governmental failure-to-act frame was used in the newspapers to depoliticise the debate by supporting several arguments and actions. The first refers to how the political rationale in decision-making should be replaced by expert rationales: scientific, economic or legal (such as formal investigation committees). The second supports minimising the governmental and political control over water by applying specific policies, mainly coming from a neoliberal market logic. Despite their differences, the varying discourse-coalitions also strengthened the failure-to-act frame, which they interpreted according to their ideological paradigms and desired outcomes. Also, the EnDC and EcDC explicitly supported employing expert (non-political) knowledge over political. The consensus around this frame supports the claim that this is not a failure of specific government, but a systemic failure of any possible government, that is a failure of *the political* (Mouffe 2005). The use of this argument grew within CDP2 as "the crisis" returned. This argument was used to support multiple policies such as: reducing consumption by household self-regulation (via PCCs or pricing) instead of governmental regulations (via the Gardening Ban or Drought Levy); reducing governmental ownership of infrastructure by not allowing governmental companies (mainly Mekorot) to build SD facilities; and as contributing to two reforms that were not included in the data: replacing the IWC by the IWA and the corporatisation of the municipal services. Some writers (representing the EcDC) used this argument to offer a future vision of a free-water-market where water production, pricing and allocation is regulated by a market composed of SD producers and private consumers, with minimum governmental and political intervention. The substitution of *homo politicus* by *homo economicus* is a classic neoliberal move (Brown 2015:87), as presents that crises caused by political systems and political

actors can only be solved by experts who are of course themselves deeply political even when they are presented as 'apolitical'.

The frame explaining the crisis as a supply and demand imbalance was used in the press to depoliticise the hydro-polices in four main ways: (1) by using an economic concept as a metaphor for identifying the problem, it primed the economic discourse and rationale over other alternatives. Generally, while a variety of policies to reduce consumption were presented as being strongly contested by the coalitions, the newspapers presented "alternative water sources" to increase supply as the means to overcome the political disagreements; in other words, reducing consumption was presented (2) as a political problem while (3) technological solutions to increase supply were presented as politically neutral or consensual and thus better; also (4) the supply and demand imbalance frame was used to delegitimise certain sectors as having caused the crisis. In CDP1, it was used to delegitimise the farmers and the AZDC whilst in the second period, it was used to delegitimise the SMDC (as supporting excessive consumption) and the treasury and EcDC (as delaying investment in infrastructure). In a circular way, the economic language and the positioning of the policies to increase supply as being easier to implement also primed the economic elements over other considerations (e.g. environmental ones). Thus, decision-making between these technological alternatives was minimised to their economic aspects. Consequently, priming SD was due to the economic benefits, which relate to the scale of promising large quantities, the price per MCM, determining the water price and implementation through privatisation.

The scientific explanation for the crisis as being caused by natural-hydrological phenomena, such as the drought or climate change, also contributed to a depoliticisation of the discourse. The first contribution is how it positioned scientific expertise over other voices, using hydrologists and water engineers to provide data and descriptions of the drought effects on natural ecosystems to signify the magnitude of the crisis. This excluded alternative ways of explaining the drought effect on nature. The newspapers marginalised such voices, mostly coming from the EnDC and AZDC, who presented alternative ways to bear witness and to describe human and nature relationship. Moreover, having mainly scientific data provided by experts working at IWA or Mekorot, marginalised alternative scientific perspectives which might promote policies that were not supported by the government. The second contribution is in line with Swyngedouw's (2010) theory about the use of fear from environmental degradation; this scientific consensus homogenised

the crisis of harming both nature and humans, concealing the power relations between the two where human access to water was maintained at the expense of nature's rights to water. Even when 'nature's right to water' in the form of allocating water for the preservation of nature was implemented into policies during CDP3, the newspapers still marginalised it. The third contribution to the depoliticisation of this frame is in the connection between the droughts and climate change by reducing the scope of the risks of climate change to increasing water demands, and thus more desalination. This connection is further discussed in the Section 8.2 of this chapter.

It should be noted that in spite of the centrality of the technological solutions, scientists played a small role in the mediated debate. According to risk society theory (Beck 1992), they are the primary definers of risk/crisis, but the findings indicate that in the media, they did not play a central role in suggesting solutions or in deciding between policies (except in the case of the drought drillings and brackish water (see Section 4.3.3.4). The crisis debate followed the circular dynamics of risk society: every period began with the risk being identified by certain experts, and how this was then addressed through particular technologies. Over time, the side effects of these technologies (economic, ecologic and health) had to be identified, explained and re-evaluated by other experts. The next section also explores the findings on the new risks imposed by desalination.

The crisis frame presenting the drought as a homogenous danger was also used in the PCCs. Most of the campaigns using the fear strategy resonated with this discourse even though the "water crisis" phrase was not explicitly mentioned in most of the videos. The PCCs contributed to the depoliticisation of the crisis by presenting it as a problem that should be addressed by a personal behavioural change in consumption, and not as a structural or political problem to be addressed by the state. By presenting it as a question of consumption, the PCCs reaffirmed the supply/demand frame of the newspapers. Nonetheless, the PCCs challenged the newspaper discourse, which favoured market-based tools to reduce consumption. As they used fear and a national discourse (not an economic one) to mobilise water savings. Thus, this different rationale of ethical-individual behavioural change (Machin 2013) stayed within the realm of the post-political perspective of the crisis, marginalising the need for governmental action, the drought effect on nature and climate change. Furthermore, the newspapers used the release of each campaign to reaffirm the crisis frame (especially in YA during CDP2) and as a sign of its importance. In both newspapers, some columnists argued that the governmental

public appeal for self-regulation (i.e. to save water) was another sign of the governmental failure-to-act, and hence of the political.

At the end of each period, the newspapers used the inquiry reports to reaffirm the hegemonic discourse, described above, the existence of the crisis and to criticise the governmental failure-to-act and to promote expert-based decision-making. In 2010, the NIC report provided a definition of the term *water crisis*, and in 2018, the State Comptroller quoted it in his report, referring to it as a legal definition. The legal institutions' (NIC and the State Comptroller) need to define this term, which was coined by the newspapers, is an example of the dynamics of relations of definition of risk (Beck 1992) that exist between institutions. The definition below represents some of the media discourse (beyond the simple adoption of the term crisis):

> *A situation where there is a high level of a risk of loss of control over the necessary balance between the current water consumption for all the needs defined by the Water Law and the ability to supply the required amount in the quality necessary for each use, without harming the natural sources, with consideration of environmental quality and at a reasonable cost. (NIC for the Water System at State Comptroller 2018:6)*

According to this definition,[c] a crisis is the danger of an uncontrolled imbalance between supply and demand, which causes damage to the natural water sources. Hence, not only did the NIC adopt the crisis terminology of the risk, but also its supply and demand interpretation. Importantly, this definition positions the necessity to meet demands (that is "current consumption" and "needs") over managing them (i.e. regulating consumption), which is also in line with the dominant newspaper discourse. Nevertheless, it offers two exemptions: environmental and economic. That is, to avoid environmental risks and unreasonable costs, the government needs to change its direction from matching demands to regulating consumption. The legal definition indicates that despite the newspapers' marginalisation of environmental considerations, outside the media, they are as important as economic considerations. As shown above, the newspapers primed the policies to increase supply, and their evaluations according to economic cost. The quotation above suggests that the NIC and the State Comptroller did not entirely adopt the newspapers' economisation of the crisis discourse and emphasis on supply. Moreover, this legal definition positions environmental considerations before economic ones while the newspapers marginalised this aspect. As such, the NIC and the State Comptroller

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[c] This definition is in line with the Water Law which position managing the water sources as a governmental responsibility, executed by the IWA.

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offer an alternative crisis definition, which has the potential to politicise the hydro-discourse by positioning environmental considerations as equal or prior to economic ones; and with the potential to politicise by reaffirming the responsibility of the government (and not the market) to regulate the system. The CDP2 and CDP3 findings indicate that this potential was not reflected in the newspapers in 2010 or in 2018.

To conclude, the crisis frame worked in Israel during the years 2001 and 2018 as the basis for the construction of what was defined in the literature as post-political populism (Kenis and Lievens 2016; Swyngedouw 2010), and which followed a similar dynamic. That is, it represents a process where a discourse of apocalyptic fear, sustained by a particular scientific and expert discourse, creates a social homogenising of the risk (by concealing social differences) and generates a consensus on the need to address it. Consequently, this consensus around the risk forecloses political disagreements, and it constructs another consensus around a specific (hydro) modernist vision of a "political-ecological development approach with a broadly neoliberal logic" and the use of technological solutions (Swyngedouw and Williams 2016:60). The next section further explores the depoliticisation of the chosen technology – seawater desalination.

8.1.3. Depoliticisation of the Desalination Discourse and Silencing the Implications

As mentioned above, a prominent aspect of the depoliticisation of hydro-policies is the discursive construction of SD as a consensual techno-managerial solution. This section further explores this argument by returning to the key literature and examples from the analysis to highlight the significant contribution to knowledge in terms of the desalination discourses made in this research. This also lays the groundwork for the final discussion about resilience in the next section.

Teschner et al. (2013) argue that desalination displaced tensions between the actors in the hydro-policy debate, and presented an opportunity to move beyond the deadlock which defined the policy debate of the past (i.e. from the 1990s until the implementation of SD, from 2005 onwards). My findings from the newspaper coverage support their argument by revealing the mediated dynamics. Firstly, my findings show how the four discourse-coalitions argued in favour of desalination in the newspapers. The EcDC supported SD as a means to reform the tariff into a cost-based one, to exclude political intervention and to create economic competition with Mekorot (i.e. privatisation). The EnDC did not object to SD as a way to increase domestic supply,

easing the pressure from natural sources, and they supported other desalination technologies as means to protect the aquifers. Hence, the rhetorical use of the term "desalination" without identification to a particular technology, as seen in CDP1 and CDP2, was a discursive tool that also generated the consensus. The AZDC argued in favour of SD to increase governmental investment in water infrastructure and as an alternative to the repeated allocation cuts. The SMDC supported an expansion of SD as an alternative to household tariff increases, and as an alternative to privatisation it promoted city-owned desalination facilities.[d] That is, regardless of each coalition's particular reason to support this policy, the newspapers emphasised that to overcome the crisis, "no one doubts that the end solution is desalination".[6]

Secondly, my findings suggest that the newspapers' role in resolving the policy deadlock was as a result of their emphasis on the disagreements about every hydro-policy, except SD. Accordingly, while the newspapers presented disputes about the policies to reduce demand, for both the urban and agricultural sectors, they concealed the contradictions in the implementation of desalination (mainly environmental), which could have instigated one or more of these coalitions to object to it (or the newspaper silenced such objections). Thirdly, Teschner et al. (2013:98) argue that SD "allowed the appearance of 'water abundance' to emerge as […] replacing the old paradigm of 'water scarcity' and repetitive crises". Thus, the consensus built around SD was based on its discursive construction as unlimited. My findings also support this claim, revealing that it was an argument that was continually repeated in the newspapers. The 'abundance by desalination' promise was reaffirmed by the PCCs in 2010 (see Chapter 7). As presented in Chapters 6 and 7, the 'water abundance' promise of desalination began to be challenged in 2018 by the 'desalination euphoria' discourse presenting desalination as raising consumption, in the newspapers and in the 2018 PCC.

The water abundance promise of desalination was conceptualised by Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) as one of the main elements that contributed to the depoliticisation of desalination, which they called the 'scarcity fix' in decision-making. That is, it maintains a constant Malthusian growth in water consumption by technological innovation. As discussed in the analysis chapters, the newspaper discourse around

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[d] During CDP2 several items reported on initiatives by coastal cities such as Tel-Aviv, Netanya and Rishon Le'Tziyon to build city-owned SD or BD facilities. Some municipally owned BD facilities operates today in Israel but not SD.

alternative water sources reflects evidence which supports their theory. In Chapters 4 and 5, I showed how the newspapers emphasised technological solutions as consensual, and the elements which positioned SD as the primary policy option. Swyngedouw and Williams (2016) also listed the contradictions of SD that could lead to its re-politicisation: energy and climate, environment, governance, cost and ownership. I found that during 2018, most of these contradictions are still silenced within the newspaper coverage as part of the consensual position of SD. Furthermore, some of these contradictions were presented by the newspapers as being **advantages** of this technology, thus, having an opposite discursive effect than that predicted by Swyngedouw and Williams (2016). At the end of the first chapter, I argued how the aspects of economic cost, ownership (privatisation) and growth were used by the newspapers to depoliticise SD; alternatively, the energy and environmental contradictions were raised by some writers as reasons to object it, but without further politicising the issues. The findings from CDP3 demonstrated how the 'scalar fix' combined with the cost contradiction led to euphoria, which raised consumption, and which were used in 2018 to challenge some of the premises of SD. This small critical discourse moment (CDM) which supports Swyngedouw and Williams' (2016) theory was strengthened by the summer of 2018 PCC which mentions "the environmental and economic cost of desalination". Also, in CDP3, the ownership contradiction had also sporadically contributed to a politicisation of SD, mainly in Haaretz when it contested the creation of a private monopoly. On the other hand, the environmental contradictions of climate, energy and environment had so far, as my analysis has shown, remained in a marginal position, which prevents a re-politicisation of the discourse in the newspapers in their reporting on the PCCs, thus refuting Swyngedouw and Williams' (2016) claims.

On several occasions during the CDPs, attempts by the EnDC to raise the environmental implications of desalination have been identified in the newspapers. For example, in 2010, just before the NIC report publication, a coalition of ENGOs presented a policy paper calling to drastically minimise future SD plans (see Section 5.3.3.3). Another example is from July 2010 (four months after the end of the analysed CDP), the IUED's water policy advisors published an op-ed in Haaretz as a response to the PCC of summer 2010 (the PCC which stated that by 2013, desalination will end Israel's water problems, see Chapter 7). They predicted that this campaign could have a counter-productive effect that would erase years of continuous efforts to educate citizens on a water-aware lifestyle. It is a prediction that became a reality, as presented in Chapter 6 (i.e. the 'desalination

euphoria'). Most of this op-ed describes "the unpleasant desalination facts": its effect on tariff, private monopoly ownership, energy demands, climate change, marine ecosystems, and the implications around seafront land use and health dangers. They call to re-evaluate the use of SD based on comparing its external environmental costs to more sustainable policy alternatives. However, the writers reaffirm the consensus around desalination by stating that: "no one disputes the need to use desalination facilities as one of the means of managing the water system".[7] These two examples reveal that already in 2010, the EnDC objected to the priming of SD over other hydro-policies; however, this position was silenced in the newspapers that primed the consensual aspects of the discourse over the disagreements. The IUED repeated these claims in an op-ed in 2018, this time with stronger position against expansion of SD.[8] These examples also show how the EnDC offered a wider scope to the question of drought resilience by desalination. Another example of an attempt by the EnDC to challenge the discourse, coming from the Ministry of Environment, is given in the next section, which looks at the evolution of understanding resilience underpinned by the longitudinal aspects of this research.

8.2. Evolution of Resilience: from/to What, How and by/for Whom?

The longitudinal aspect of my research aimed to answer questions around the transformation of the discourse over time. This section looks at these transformations from the perspective of resilience to conclude this chapter, which also discusses the evolution of the resilience process as presented in the newspapers and PCCs. The following discussion returns to Matyas and Pelling's (2014) concept of *resistance*, *adjustments* and *transformation*. Previously, I used some of the questions suggested by critical resilience studies (Cretney 2014) to offer further insight into the role of the media in the risk definition and reaction process. Resilience studies offer a set of questions to examine a case study: (a) resilience from/to what? (b) how (by which policies)? and (c) by/for whom? (Cretney 2014). The newspapers and the PCCs presented different answers to these questions, and the answers changed over time, as shown below. I start with the first question: from/to what?

8.2.1. Resilience from/to What? Droughts or Climate Change?

> *[Minister:] No one predicted, neither in the country or in the world, the global warming and its negative effect on the Middle East water balance (on the amount of rainfall), which is probably what caused the five-year drought.*
>
> **[Interviewer:] Nobody predicted it?**
>
> *[Minister:] No. It's a complete surprise.*
>
> *(Channel 2 News, 22/5/2018)*

This quotation is from a TV interview with the Israel Energy Minister when he promoted the 2018 PCC and the new governmental hydro-policy masterplan. The minister's answer in this interview reveals his office's prior lack of attention to climate change and to the implications it has for the hydro-policies. It indicates that for the ministry, the process of building resilience by using SD and through the PCCs (up to 2018) did not take climate change into account. This disconnection between climate change, the droughts and hydro-policies was also identified in the newspaper coverage and the PCCs. Chapters 4 and 5 presented how marginalised climate change was (or global warming as it was then called in 2001) in the newspaper coverage of the hydro-policy debate until 2010. Less than 1.8% of the items in CDP1 suggested that there might be a connection between climate change and the droughts, and only 3.4% in CDP2. In these periods, in the rare times climate change was mentioned, it was presented by the environmental reporters, usually

with some uncertainty about its existence and connection to the drought. Chapter 6 showed that even during CDP3, while climate change appeared in 16% of items, the newspapers sometimes quoted the IWA Director questioning the connections between climate change and the droughts. In all the periods, I have shown that the newspapers used climate change as predicting a dryer future, and thus as an argument in favour of desalination. Chapter 4 demonstrated how until 2018, the PCCs also silenced this issue.

Based on the overall marginalisation of climate change seen in both longitudinal studies (the newspapers and PCCs), I claim that the answer to 'resilience from/to what?' is droughts, not climate change. Or more explicitly, I contend that the hydro-policies discourse in Israel between 2001-2018, as presented in the newspapers (Haaretz and YA) and by the governmental campaigns, aimed to address the drought risks while minimising their connection to climate change. Incidents in the reporting in all CDPs which did made the connection between climate change and the droughts, like after the release of the governmental preparations for climate change report (2008, see Section 5.3.1.4.3), present the missed opportunity in Israel to discursively use the droughts to communicate the need for climate action and vice versa. A climate-resilience aim of hydro-policies **could** suggest: (i) basing SD on renewable energy to reduce CO_2 emissions; (ii) placing the facilities further away from the seashore to reduce the dangers of sea-level rises; (iii) preferring BD over SD as the former requires less energy and contributes to reduce risks imposed on the aquifers in terms of the sea-level rises; and (iv) prioritising long-term means of reducing water consumption and its reuse.

A contextual analysis of policy papers by environmental organisations (Rosenthal and Erez 2010; Tagar, Becker, and Bromberg 2004), by the Ministry for Environmental Protection (Golan-Angeleco and Baror 2008; Ministry of Environmental Protection 2017) and even the NIC report (National Enquiry Committee for Water System 2010) all suggest taking climate change into consideration, and how this means SD should be used moderately. Haaretz published this opposition, but not during the timeframe of the CDPs analysed in this thesis. YA gave some representation of it in the op-eds by the head of the IUED (Chapter 5). For example, the reporting in Haaretz on the ENGOs policy paper suggesting alternatives to SD (during CDP2) does not mention climate change even though it was part of the policy paper (see Chapter 5). In February 2012, Haaretz presented the Governmental Commission for Climate Change Preparation (which is a part of the MEP's) position on SD. Rinat wrote the following:

> *Desalination is not a part of the ministry's plans for climate adaptation [...] even though it produces large quantities of water, its advantages are not equal to its environmental disadvantages.*[9]

The ministry repeated these claims in 2017 (Netanyahu 2017) prior to the 2018 recognition of these issues by the IWA and the Ministry of Energy.

Importantly, what this contextual evidence suggests is that these voices of opposition were silenced in the newspapers during the CDPs. Thus, the marginalisation of the EnDC prevented them from influencing the debate to consider more sustainable hydro-policies. From this silence, the newspaper role in the hydro-policy discourse could be seen as supporting desalination and positioning the advantages as being greater than the environmental disadvantages. The post-political consensus identifying the droughts as a 'crisis', as a result of a temporary drought induced by governmental mismanagement and overconsumption, limited the scope of the debate and excluded the voices raising climatic considerations. Therefore, it limited the direction of the resilience process to address the narrow aim of achieving only drought resilience, and not climate resilience. Put simply, the droughts were not presented as an outcome of climate change, and so the policy recommendations to address the crisis did not take climate change into account. This conclusion supports the claims made about risk society (Beck 1992) and social-ecological resilience (Cretney 2014) in terms of the importance of the risk definition process. The definition of the risk as the drought limited the scope of the debate to fully be able to present the meaning and implications of the chosen solution, SD, and primarily its climatic and environmental context. Thus, this discussion highlights the importance of the discursive role of the newspapers and the PCCs in the resilience process. As highlighted in the literature review, unlike Beck (1992) and the risk studies which follow his theory, resilience studies marginalised, until recently, the importance of discursive and communication processes in this field (McGreavy 2016).

As presented in Chapters 6 and 7, the PCC of 2018, which the minister promoted in the interview above, included changes to the official discourse of the Ministry of Energy about the droughts. In May 2018, the IWA in the PCC (and the newspapers) publicly addressed the connections between the droughts and climate change, claiming that "desalination is not enough" to achieve climate resilience, and encouraged reducing consumption. The 2018 informative videos explained to the public (without using these actual words) that the droughts and the climate are interconnected, and that SD offers drought resilience, but not climate resilience. In this sense, the 2018 campaign represented

a critical discourse moment (CDM) that challenged the established discourse and with the potential to transform it in the long run (Carvalho and Burgess 2005). This CDM had yet to impact policy making, as presented in Chapter 6. Thus, this CDM and the 2018 PCCs still positioned SD as the main resilience policy; it only changed its position as a comprehensive solution.

8.2.2. How Resilience Was Achieved, by Whom and for Whom?

The section above partly answered the next set of questions offered by Cretney (2014) on how and by/for whom? It did so by answering the last question of 'by whom' through the negative by pointing at the exclusion of the EnDC. This section provides more detailed answers to these questions based on the longitudinal findings. Unlike the answers to 'from what' (the drought), for these questions, the newspapers and the PCCs presented different answers. In the PCCs, the answers to the questions were: by reducing consumption, by individual/household consumers and for the Israeli society. Apart for the summer of 2017, the PCCs excluded non-Israeli and non-human entities (i.e. nature, flora and fauna). The campaigns of 2010 added the option of resilience by using desalination or watersavers, without articulating who was responsible for these policies and for whom they would benefit. As argued in the discussion of Chapter 7, the PCCs might also have produced a signal to the public that the answer to 'by whom' is the government and the public, but which had the opposite effect and was understood as removing any responsibility from the government.

The newspapers presented more complex answers to these questions, which changed over time. In all three CDPs, the newspapers presented multiple policy options, each offering a variation of the answers to these questions. Therefore, I focus only on the key policies mentioned in Chapters 4 to 6 and mainly on desalination. Similar to the PCCs, in CDP1 and CDP2, the newspapers limited the answer of 'for whom' to the Israeli society.[e] Only in CDP3, the arguments in favour of the reverse-carrier included the justifications of "saving the Kinneret" and supplying water to the Kingdom of Jordan. Also, in CDP3, the growing use of SD and sewage treatment was one of the justifications to implementing policies under the title of "nature's right to water". However, in all three

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[e] Although this might been affected by the data collection. For example of such exclusion form the data, the Red Sea – Dead Sea water canal project which includes SD is an Israeli-Jordanian.

periods, calls by the EnDC to expand the scope of resilience beyond humans to streams and nature were marginalised, which was also the case for similar recommendations made by the PIC, NIC and the State Comptroller reports.

In the first two periods, reducing consumption was one of the central answers promoted by the newspapers to "how" to achieve resilience. In CDP1, reductions were to be achieved by the farmers to ensure supply to the urban sector. In CDP2, similar to the PCCs, reductions were to be made by the urban sector for the Israeli society. More specifically, in both periods, the EnDC promoted the idea that reduction could be achieved by economic tools, rather than voluntary self-regulation (as in the PCCs) or governmental regulation (the quotas). That is, the EnDC and the newspapers advocated a form of resilience by the market, not by the government. The AZDC and the SMDC attempts to present these economic tools promoted by the EcDC as harmful for low-income farmers or households were delegitimised in the newspapers as political or populist.

The discursive promotion of resilience through desalination also reveals how the media communicated one option as beneficial 'to Israel' while concealing the winners and losers. The newspaper analysis revealed that SD was promoted by the government and the IWA, based on the consensual support of all the coalitions participating in the debate. The EcDC was the most prominent advocate for the privatisation of SD even though in the past, parts of this coalition objected to desalination. Moreover, it promoted resilience by the market, and not by the government. This finding is also supports arguments about the connection between resilience and neoliberalism (e.g Evans and Reid 2014). The main beneficiaries of this kind of resilience by SD were the companies who received the franchise; among the losers were: Mekorot who lost their monopoly;[f] the state who no longer owned parts of the water; the public whose health was in danger; and even the environment and the climate. All these aspects of SD, the external economic, environmental and health costs of desalination were marginalised or ignored for most of this timeframe.

Matyas and Pelling's (2014) proposal for evaluating resilience helps to identify the main trends in the discourse and the changes between one period and another (a similar

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[f] And by that harmed the political power of Mekorot Worker Union, and unionized work in general as the SD companies employees are not unionized.

discussion on the PCCs is at the end of Chapter 7). In CDP1, the newspapers constructed a sense of urgency for achieving resilience for the drought through short-term *resistance* while arguing for long-term *adjustments*. Specifically, resistance to the drought and not the climate was advocated through the use of immediate cuts to agricultural quotas and the long-term process of reducing consumption via tariff changes. Some writers argued that this process will lead to more efficient agricultural water use by the farmers, which would include changing crops. This could lead to a more sustainable agriculture, which also means *resilience-by-adjustments*. During CDP2, the newspapers emphasised expanding the adjustments to the urban sector. In the first period, there were voices arguing to achieve *resilience-by-transformation* via desalination and other technologies. As argued above, this transformation reflected the 'fix' promised by these technologies as protecting the rationale of constant growth. This understanding of resilience from the droughts as transformation by using SD and the market became hegemonic during CDP2, and it remained so until the end of CDP3.

At the end of every period, the newspapers reaffirmed this hegemonic conceptualisation of drought resilience by using the inquiry reports (from the PIC, NIC and State Comptroller). While doing so, it also marginalised how all three reports suggested a more complex understanding of risk and the hydro-policies that could address it. All three reports proposed combining several hydro-policies to attain climate resilience through transformation and adjustments (via SD, sewage treatment and a long-term reduction of consumption). The newspapers did not represent these complex transformation suggestions, and they minimised the scope over the consumption adjustments and transformation by SD. At the end of Chapter 6, I argued how the rationale of the continuous expansion of SD remained prominent, regardless of the critical voices opposing it.

8.2.3. Climate-Resilience for Environmental Communications

Resilience is a concept used in the academic and non-academic literature and discourses as a way to describe, understand and examine reactions to external disturbances. It is further used in environmental contexts to evaluate reactions to environmental risks such as droughts and climate change (McGreavy 2016; Moser 2017). My research employed this concept to study environmental discourses taking place in Israel. In the literature review, following the insights gained from critical studies on resilience (Brown 2014;

Cretney 2014; Davoudi 2012; Leach 2008; McGreavy 2016; Shaw 2012), I suggested how using this concept could help to articulate new questions and arguments about environmental communication processes. In this chapter, I presented how the resilience perspective assisted in the evaluation of the discursive construction of the risk (as a crisis) as an outcome of human behaviour (i.e. a governmental failure-to-act or household over-consumption) induced by a natural phenomenon (i.e. a drought). Additionally, the panarchy model assisted in explaining the changes to the discourse as a constant changing dynamic, which is constantly influenced by key actors (such as the discourse-coalitions) and factors (such as the weather and political events). It also helped to understand the changes between each period since they revaluated (rejected or reaffirmed) the premises, concepts and arguments of the previous one, and they created a new discursive trajectory, as predicted by this model. As shown and in line with the literature (Evans and Reid 2014), in a post-political setting, building resilience is interconnected with processes of marketisation and a neoliberal discourse. The differentiation in the outcome of the process as drought-resilience and climate-resilience relates to the debate about the connections between resilience and sustainability (Chapter 1 Part 3). The ways in which SD was implemented in Israel and the discursive construction of this specific hydro-policy support statements that resilience can be unsustainable (Benson and Craig 2014); therefore, integrating environmental and sustainable considerations into the resilience process, as described by this research, could lead to a different outcome, as suggested by McGreevy (2016). For future research, it would be interesting to study the use of the term (water) resilience in Israeli governmental bodies and the ENGOs to compare it to the findings from this study.

[1] For example: Koren, O. (2001, August 15) Manufacturers Agree to Reduce Water Consumption in 10% by 2004, In Exchange for Cancelling the Price Increase. *Haaretz*

[2] For example: Shafir, G. (2009, January 27) Closing the Tap: Cutting Industry Water Allocations. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[3] Eichner, I. (2009, January 26) The Mezuzahs to Rise the Kinneret Sea-Level. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[4] Ben-David, A. and I. Eichner (2008, November 17) "Restrict Prisoners' Showers". *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[5] Amit, H. (2018, January 21) The Cost of the Drought. *Haaretz*

[6] Lapid, Y. (2009, April 28) I Have Another Dream. *Yedioth Ahronoth*

[7] Elad, N. and S. Caspi-Oron (2010, July 27) The Facts the IWA is Hiding from You. *Haaretz*

[8] Caspi-Oron, S. (2018, July 27) What the Water Saving Plan Doesn't Say. *Haaretz*

[9] Rinat, Z. (2012, February 23) Disagreements about Desalination Between the Water Authority and The Ministry of Environmental Protection, *Haaretz*

Conclusion

This thesis used a resilience perspective to analyse hydro-policies discourse during droughts in Israel. It asked: how did Israeli newspapers and public communication campaigns (PCCs) communicate drought and hydro-policies between 2001 and 2018? What forms of resilience were constructed through these mediations, and how might these contribute to the (de)politicisation of droughts, hydro-policies and desalination in Israel? To answer these questions, two longitudinal methods were applied. The first, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) on three pre-identified critical discourse periods (CDPs) of newspaper reporting in times of drought and governmental hydro-policies investigations: CDP1 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee 2001-2002 (n=432), CDP2 National Inquiry Committee 2008-2010 (n=377), and CDP3 State Comptroller Investigation 2018 (n=127). Data included the elite broadsheet *Haaretz*, the popular daily *Yedioth Aharonoth* (YA), and from CDP2, their economic sub-papers *TheMarker* and *Calcalist*. The second method was multimodal discourse analysis (MDA) of 35 videos from nine PCCs produced by the Israel Water Authority from 2008 to 2018.

This thesis found that Israeli newspapers communicated the droughts as 'water crises', more a result of a 'governmental failure-to-act' than a lack of precipitation. This risk definition had three main discursive implications: (1) it limited the scope of the resilience building process to droughts rather than climate change, (2) it framed it as a failure of *the political* (i.e. depoliticised) and thus (3) prioritised expert-based techno-managerial hydro-policy making. The PCCs reaffirmed the crisis definition and the failure-to-act frame. They offered a different version of depoliticised drought resilience building: ethical-individual reduction in household consumption. The newspaper analysis showed how in each period the newspaper coverage followed a similar dynamic: risk problem definition as a crisis, initiation of governmental investigation, depoliticised policy debate (divided into short/long-term or supply/demands) and publication of the report. This thesis found that this was a process of achieving short-term *resilience by resistance* (reducing consumption) and a long-term *resilience by transformation* of the water system via desalination (increasing supply) and marketisation. Thus, the process of achieving resilience was intertwined with the depoliticisation of the hydro-policies debate.

This thesis found that both mediums contributed to depoliticisation of the droughts, hydro-policies and desalination in different ways. As mentioned above, the PCCs constructed an ethical-individual form of post-political (Machin 2013) resilience. In

addition to what is mentioned above, the newspapers also depoliticised the debate by offering a limited *media diversity* (Maeseele and Raeijmaekers 2017) within the margins of the post-political debate. This primarily included: framing the crisis as a failure of the political; by constructing techno-managerial discourse mainly through economisation and promotion of marketisation tools; by reporting the contestation between the discourse-coalitions as antagonistic (Mouffe 2005); and by generating a consensus around seawater desalination (SD) as the prime resilience policy. More specifically, within this post-political reporting, SD was depoliticised through priming the vision of technological solution for *water abundance* (Teschner et al. 2013). With this vision, the newspapers (and the PCC of summer 2010) primed the advantages of this technology and marginalised its economic, political, environmental and health implication. The consensus built around SD was presented in the newspapers as an advantage in compression to all other policies, which were contested by the discourse-coalitions. Findings suggest that in 2018, both the newspapers and the PCCs started to challenge the water abundance vision by presenting some of the implications of desalination and its connection to climate change.

As such, this thesis built on the theoretical work of Beck's (1992) *risk society* and on writers on *the post-political* condition (Maeseele 2015a; Mouffe 2005; Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014) to explore how *resilience* (McGreavy 2016) can be a useful theoretical tool for environmental risk communications (Cottle 1998; Hansen and Cox 2015). More specifically, this thesis built on Swyngedouw's (2015) work on depoliticisation of hydro-policies and seawater desalination (SD), by investigating the media's role in this discursive process. Methodologically, this thesis answered calls for conducting longitudinal studies in environmental communication to study the historical development of risk discourse (Anderson 2015; Bakir 2010; Hansen 2015c) and its visualisation (Hansen and Machin 2013b). The CDA methods built on longitudinal studies of climate change reporting and depoliticisation (Carvalho 2008; Pepermans 2015; Raeijmaekers 2018) with adaptations according to questions asked by critical resilience (Cretney 2014). The MDA methods built on Kress (2012) on studies of PCCs (Rice and Atkin 2013) and on visual environmental communication (Hansen and Machin 2013b). This thesis' audio-visual methods were innovative in threefold: by their approach to studying the audio-visual discursive aspects of PCCs rather than their behavioural affect; by offering longitudinal comparison between campaigns; and by integrating the resilience perspective into these methods.

Building on previous knowledge about discursive strategies of depoliticisation in newspapers, this thesis found that the following strategies identified in the literature were also used by the Israeli newspapers: *positioning, scientisation, economisation, rationalisation, delegitimisation, naturalisation* (Carvalho 2008; Pepermans 2015; Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2017) and *juridification* (Kassirer 2012). Importantly, despite their important role at the beginning of each period in identifying the 'crisis', scientists were not prominent actors and thus scientisation was not a discourse strategy which was commonly used to silence adversaries but rather to legitimise certain policies. For economisation, both newspapers predominantly reported the hydro-policies as an economic issue while each paper had a different main economic framing: Haaretz presented water (and mainly SD) as an economic market, while YA was more concerned with policies directed at household consumption. The use of the strategy of *securitisation* (Fischhendler 2015) was rare, and as mentioned this could be a result of the data sample which excluded items relating to Israel international relations. As such, further research on newspapers coverage of Israel's hydro-policies in the context of international politics and depoliticisation is needed. The strategy of *moralisation* (Kassirer 2012; Maeseele 2015b) did not appear in the hydro-policy debate. Lastly, this thesis found cases using the strategy of *divinisation*, transferring the agency from the political to god, which was presented by the writers as connected to rationalisation and delegitimisation. Further research of the use of this strategy is also recommended.

Building on the works of Menahem and Gilad (2013, 2016) about the contesting discourse-coalitions in the hydro-policy debate, and works claiming that the policy deadlock of the third period (1990s-2000s) was an outcome of a power balance between these coalitions which ended due to the repeating droughts and the price-drop of SD (Feitelson 2013; Teschner et al. 2013), Chapters Four to Six presented the role of the newspapers in resolving this deadlock in the transition to the period of Desalination and Marketisation. Furthermore, in addition to the three discourse-coalitions identified by the literature (Economic, Environmental and Agro-Zionist), Chapter Four identified the Social-Municipal discourse-coalition (SMDC) as a fourth contesting coalition, composed mainly of Members of Knesset and mayors. The four coalitions and their paradigms/ideologies received an uneven representation by the newspapers, and were positioned differently over the years, between news outlets and writers. These chapters also presented the decline in importance of the AZDC; the growing domination of the EcDC; the marginalisation of the EnDC; and the rise of the new SMDC. As the AZDC

formed mainly against the corporation of the municipal services, a subject which was excluded from the data collection, the ideological position of this coalition presented in this thesis was limited and should be the subject of further study.

Incorporating the PCCs analysis, this thesis showed the discursive relationship between the newspapers and other hydro-discourses of the time. Chapters Five and Six presented how the PCCs and their messages were discussed in the newspapers. Chapter Seven was dedicated to the Multimodal Discourse Analysis (MDA) of the PCCs. The MDA chapter presented how along the years the IWA campaigns used variety of opposite and competing strategies: fear /hope, nostalgic/futuristic, nationalistic/individualistic and bio-centric/anthropocentric. Nonetheless, all these strategies served the same central discourse focused on an ethical-individual (Machin 2013) voluntary reduction of consumption as a way to achieve drought resilience. As such, the PCCs offered a different version of depoliticisation than the newspapers discourse of the time, which did not centre on economic tools to reduce consumption or on increasing supply. Chapter Six (CDP3) and Chapter Seven (PCCs) showed how it was not until 2018 that the newspapers and the PCCs began to address the interconnection between the droughts, climate change and desalination. The way in which PCCs and news media interact, strengthen and challenge discourses, on other risks and in other countries should be further explored.

This thesis also contributes to limited knowledge of environmental discourse in Israel. Studies had shown examples when the Israeli environmental discourse-coalition (EnDC) failed to challenge hegemonic discourses about large-scale infrastructures projects (Lipman Servi 2012; Rabinowitz and Vardi 2009; Sadeh 2010). One hypothesis of this thesis was that that SD presents such an example, however, findings revealed how in the hydro-policies debate the EnDC reaffirmed the hegemonic discourse of a crisis and expert-based decision making and thereby SD. In this context, this thesis adds to our knowledge on the role of the newspapers in constructing this hegemonic discourse and the marginalisation of the environmental arguments about climate change, 'nature water rights' and desalination environmental impact, and it showed that this coalition didn't publicly object to SD, but merely argued to minimise its implementation.

This thesis ends with some reflections on using longitudinal critical discourse analysis. The decision for a longitudinal analysis was justified by complying with calls in the field of environmental and risk communications (Anderson 2015; Bakir 2010; Hansen 2015c), and according to the resilience perspective which seeks knowledge on the *process*

of change. After completion of my analysis, I still argue that this method generated insights that could not be revealed by a short frame (snapshot) analysis. Despite this, I suggest for further studies to closely consider ways to minimise the amount of data analysed. During the data collection it quickly became clear that the droughts and hydro-policies enjoyed wide coverage by the press. Perhaps random selection of items (as sometime used in quantitative methods) or a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods for analysing only selected months might have been more time efficient. This of course has the potential to manipulate the findings or bring different conclusions than presented here. Perhaps shorter timeframes for each CDP would have benefited the analysis, as CDA is a method that demands deep engagement with each text and does not offer clear methodological solutions to analyse large numbers of items. To mitigate this problem, after data collection I reduced the timeframe of the research to start at 2001, and not with the State Comptroller Report of 1991 and the works of the 1996 Arlosoroff Committee as originally planned which would have added two more CDPs. I also chose not to analysis another newspaper (*Marrive*) which in past research on environmental contestation (Kassirer 2012) was the paper had a reporter which politicised the environmental contestation. The inclusion of *Marrive* might have presented an alternative to the depoliticised consensus between *Haaretz* and *YA*. However, including these CDPs and paper would have made this research project too wide to complete in the timeframe of a single doctoral research project.

To conclude, this thesis offered an example for the use of resilience in environmental communication, using the case study of Israel's adaptation to increasing drought risks. Since resilience is a relatively new way to conceptualise environmental reactions to risks and climate change, this thesis did not include analysis of explicit use of this concept in the media (as such, resilience was not a search word). The way in which resilience is explicitly communicated in Israel in the media or in governmental policy-papers may be a subject of a future research. As mentioned in Chapter Eight, in recent-years the Israeli government had started to use this term to describe its hydro-policies as offering "water resilience" (Netanyahu 2017). By using the resilience perspective this thesis offered new questions and concepts for analysing the development of the hydro-discourse over time. I hope that this kind of use of resilience will open the door to future critical studies using this concept in environmental communication aiming to aid social-environmental change.

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Appendix on Translations

Note 1 – Water System: משק המים

Water *Meshek* (משק המים) which I choose to translate into "water system", is a comprehensive term for the natural and human-made production, transfer and storage systems of water and related institutions in a defined area. The word *Meshek* (משק) can also be translated as sector, services or economy. I choose to use system because the Hebrew word *meshek* has a similar meaning to the Greek word *oikos* (household) which is the origin of economy and ecology. In Hebrew, in different word combinations or contexts *meshek* can mean economy, a farm, a household or a system. Hereafter in translations of quotes, I use water system wherever water *meshek* was written, and it should be understood in its broad meaning and not as refereeing only to physical infrastructure. Especially as the English word system is translated to מערכת in Hebrew.

Note 2 - The name of Parliamentary Inquiry Committee headed by MK David Magen (2002-2001): ועדת החקירה למשק המים

It should be noted that according to the Knesset English website, the Magen Committee is called the "Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on **the Issue of Water**" (Knesset 2019), and on the English version of its final report it is called "the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Israeli **Water Sector**" (2002). But neither of the phrases marked in bold are a direct translation of the term used in Hebrew: (Water *Meshek)* משק המים. Subject to the explanation given in Note no.1, I choose to translate the committee's name as Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on the Water System. Which is also referenced in the literature and governmental sources as the Magen committee (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012).

Note 3 - Failure-to-act: מחדל

Failure to act is my chosen translation of the word: *mechdal* (מחדל), which is the non-performance of an action necessary to perform, by virtue of the law or by virtue of the responsibility imposed on a person. In everyday Hebrew it also means 'careless functioning with negative results' (Anon 2020a). Moreover this is also a legal term, according to the Israeli Criminal Code Section 18(b) (1977). Other translation options are: inaction, neglect, default (legal), omission. I choose to translate it into failure-to-act in order to convey the full meaning of inaction with negative implications when action was obligatory.

Note 4 – Drying Out Gardens: ייבוש גינות

The newspapers called the regulations for non-irrigation by using conjugations of the Hebrew verb *To Dry* (לייבש). As Israel has no rain during the summer stopping irrigation means active and intentional drying. As such, the newspapers used the active conjugation of *drying* (לייבש) and not the passive version of *dries* (להתייבש). As English as no differentiation between passive and active versions of this verb, I chose to use drying-out as my translation to emphasis the newspapers meaning intentional and active discourse.

Note 5 – Watersaver: חסכם

Watersaver is a faucet aerator and pressure regulator device which is meant to conserve water by reducing water pressure. Its Hebrew name *Chasham* (חסכם) is a word fusion of save and water, in a way that also means smart-saver, suggesting that its use is also connected to "smart" behaviour.

Appendix 2 - Videos Translations

This appendix provides the translations of the public communication campaigns produced by the IWA and broadcasted on Israeli television in 2008-2018, including YouTube web links. The next table it a reprint of Table 12 from Chapter 7.

	Broadcasting Period	Slogan	Slogans or name on Printed Advertising	Items	Hereafter Referenced As*
1	Spring-Summer 2008	*No Water to Waste*	*Israel is Drying*	1	S08
2	Spring 2009	*Must Save the Kinneret*		1	S09
3	Spring 2010	*Israel is Still Drying*		1	S10A
4	Summer 2010	*Water-Savers on Every Tap*	*National Watersavers Distribution Campaign*	1	S10B
5	Winter 2011	*Israel is Drying*		9	W11**; W11A to W11I***
6	Summer 2012	*Israel Continues to Save Water*		5	S12**; S12A to S12E***
7	Summer 2017	*Water is Life*		3	S17**; S17A to S17C***
8	Summer 2018	*We Don't Have Water to Waste*	*Israel is Drying, Again; I'm Back, Despite Desalination*	8	S181**; S18A to S18H***
9	Winter 2018	*We Don't Have Water to Waste*	*Despite the Winter*	6	W181**; W18A to W18I***

* S=summer, W=winter.
** Refers to the campaign as a whole.
*** Refers to each individual video.

1. S08 April 2008: **No Water to Waste**
(One item. Length: 00:00:29, link: https://youtu.be/hYlaYwP51Bo)

> Israel is drying…
> and not just Israel.
> It also happens in Australia and Spain,
> it also happens in California.
> It happens everywhere:
> the world is drying.
> We are drying!
> And it is not "only a drought year",
> even a rainy winter will not be enough.
> No, we just don't have any water to waste.
> **We Have No Water to Waste**

2. S09A April 2009: **Must Save the Kinneret**
(One item. Length: 00:00:31, link: https://youtu.be/GMse6JW1zj0)

> Israel is drying.
> After 5 years of drought and a particularly dry winter,
> the water crisis is reaching its peak.
> Israel's water sources are at an unprecedented low,
> and the Kinneret is in danger of drying.
> We must save the Kinneret,

and therefore this summer we cannot irrigate gardens.
And we have to minimize the consumption of water at home,
in any way possible,
because we have no water,
we have no choice.
We must to save the Kinneret
We Must Save the Kinneret

3.　　 S10A April 2010: **Israel is Still Drying**
(One item Length: 00:00:35, link: https://youtu.be/hKZjZq8zDrU)

Once again Israel is drying(?)
It can be different, it does not have to continue forever,
if we continue to save as we have saved until now,
in 3 years the water crisis of Israel…
will end!
It will happen because the desalination plants will reach full capacity,
but it will happen…
only in 3 years
Until then, continue to save,
Because Israel is still drying up.
Israel is Still Drying

4.　　 S10B summer 2010: **Water-savers**
(One item Length: 00:00:36, link: https://youtu.be/_L7y3lnZ-MY)

One of these in the shower.
This is how much it saves in one day…
…in a week
…in a year
And this is only one!
Now, multiply by one million!
Currently, the Water Authority is providing 2 million houses in Israel water-savers as part of a campaign to install one on every tap. Stewards will come to your house and install saver on your taps for free [written text: up to 3 per household, while stock last].
Continue to save, because Israel is still drying up.

5.　　 Campaign W11 January-February 2011: **Israel is Drying**
(Nine items)

A. **[image: 2003]** (Length: 00:00:15, link: https://youtu.be/4RnKfE8eN54)
2003 has been the last year that had a more than average rainfall,
since then Israel has undergone seven consecutive dry years.
Even during the winter we must continue to save.
Israel is drying.

B. **[image: 5.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:12, link: https://youtu.be/-3LZkBjW6tM)
Until today, 5.11, only about a quarter of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save.
Because Israel is going through another dry winter.
Israel is drying.

C. **[image: 6.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/jf2aXZDJ3Ds)
Until today, 6.1, only about a quarter of the average rainfall has fallen.
The state of Israel's water supply is critical.

We don't have water to waste.
Israel is drying.

D. **[image: 8.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/gUJzr8Thlk4)
Until today, 8.1, only about a quarter of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save,
because the water reservoirs remain empty.
Israel is drying.

E. **[image: 9.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/tLt2Tdqh38U)
Until today, Sunday, only about a quarter of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save,
because Israel is going through another dry winter.
Israel is drying.

F. **[image: 13.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:15, link: https://youtu.be/APt0frkC6Y8)
Even today it didn't rain and the umbrellas remained closed.
Until today only about 25% of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save,
because the water reservoirs remain empty.
Israel is drying.

G. **[image: 15.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:12, link: https://youtu.be/8pqipV4vlQs)
To this day, Saturday night, less than one-third of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save,
because the water reserves remain empty.
Israel is drying.

H. **[image: 31.1.2011]** (Length: 00:00:13, link: https://youtu.be/YDJh1Sw8Gz8)
Thank God, today is rainy!
However until today only about a third of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save, even when it raining.
Israel is drying.

I. **[image: 2.2.2011]** (Length: 00:00:16, link: https://youtu.be/4gX8RX07JLk)
It seems to rain much, it just seems.
Until today only 40% of the average rainfall has fallen.
We must continue to save,
because Israel is going through another dry winter.
Israel is drying.

6.   S12 Summer 2012: **Israel continue to save water**
(Five items)

A. (Length: 00:00:40, link: https://youtu.be/oJKeqzg4Vn0)
Nothing can stop the water, just us.
Israel continues to save water,
Israel continue to save water.

B. **[Advice: Sprinklers]**(Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/_UrKEWZMGtA)
In the hot summer our water evaporates quickly.
What to do?
Watering with sprinklers is permitted only from 5 PM until 10 AM.
It is recommended to water twice a week for up to 20 minutes.
Israel continues to save water.

C. **[Advice: Shower]** (Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/Hxz9vwfd76M)
In the hot summer our water evaporates quickly.
What to do?
Shortening the shower time by 2 minutes, and can save about 40 litters of water.
Israel continues to save water.

D. **[Advice: Brushing]** (Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/vCmHx16h_0M)
In the hot summer our water evaporates quickly.
Wat to do?
Closing the faucet while brushing, shaving and washing dishes,
and can save about 15 litters per minute.
Israel continues to save water.

E. **[Advice: Dripping Faucet]** (Length: 00:00:14, link: https://youtu.be/_Uqor_cd1AY)
In the hot summer our water evaporates quickly.
What to do?
Closing tightly a dripping faucet, can save about 60 litters a day.
Israel continues to save water.

7. S17 Summer 2017: ***Water is Life***
(Three items, same text for all, Length: 00:00:13 each, links: https://youtu.be/zTY89kt5zBc,
https://youtu.be/5-lGldb1L68 and https://youtu.be/C-oy_ewJRNk)

Water is life
And life is not for wasting
After four years of drought
This summer too, water is used wisely

8. S18 Summer 2018: ***Israel is Drying, Again***
(Eight items)

A. (Length: 00:00:42, link: https://youtu.be/l8Ml_ha5Qzs)
I'm back
because of the drought
Yes, we have desalination facilities
But let's look at the glass half empty:
The desalination is not enough.
After five years of drought
We drew everything we could.
There's no water in the streams
There's no water in the aquifers
There's no water in the Kinneret
And it doesn't matter how much water we desalinate
Israel is drying, again
No, we don't have water to waste.
We have no water to waste!

B. (Length: 00:00:20, link: https://youtu.be/-48qx85Zj74)
I'm back!
Because of the drought
yes, we have desalination facilities
But let's look on the glass' empty half
Desalination is not enough
And it doesn't matter how much water we desalinate,
We have no water to waste!

C. **[Advice: Shower]** (Length: 00:00:11, link: https://youtu.be/ArKNz6PVv0s)
We have no choice
We must minimize our water consumption
Shower two minutes less
And save 40 litre water [image: average per day]
Because no
We have no water to waste!

D. **[Advice: Garden]** (Length: 00:00:15, link: https://youtu.be/8K9cOFPtneQ)
There's no water in the streams
No water in the Kinneret
We must minimize irrigation amount
Irrigation water quantities must be minimized
Watering the garden 5 minutes less
And save 200 litre water [image: for a 250m² garden]
Because no
We have no water to waste!

E. **[Advice: Taps]** (Length: 00:00:13, YouTube link: https://youtu.be/n_OQvYEUkW0)
We have desalination facilities
But it will never be enough
Always closing a dripping tap
And save 60 litre water per day [image: average per day]
Because no
We have no water to waste!

F. **[Advice: Toilets]** (Length: 00:00:14, YouTube link: https://youtu.be/lBvYepu7es0)
Israel is drying, again
And we already know what we need to do
Pressing the small handle in the toilets, when possible
And save 18 litre per day [image: average per day]
Because no
We have no water to waste!

G. **[Set: newsroom]** (Length: 00:01:00, YouTube link: https://youtu.be/vqQhv0d71yI)
We just don't have water to waste
A lot of people ask me: "Danny, really, how can that be? But we have desalination"
Right. We have desalination, but there is also global warming.
Look, at the other end of the planet, in Cape Town, South Africa, after only three
years of drought, they limited the amount of water in the faucets!
Counter to Cape Town, Israel has built five desalination facilities in the last ten years.
True, we have water in the faucets thanks to the desalination plants,
but desalination is not enough.
It is only part of the solution to the problem.
Let's remember, desalination has an economic and environmental price.
So that the green around us will remain green and not turn into brown and yellow,
and in order to save the streams and natural reservoirs,
we must save in every possible way.
Because always ...
We have no water to waste!

H. **[Set: newsroom]** (Length: 00:01:01, YouTube link: https://youtu.be/pc7hlL2-lnc)
I'm back because of the drought.
Renana returned because we do not have water to waste
People ask me all the time: "drought?"

But there were floods and we had rain in May too.
So, one or two floods, are not enough.
Defiantly now, after five years of drought
and who knows if there will not be a sixth year.
The drought has severely damaged Israel's water resources,
they lack about two and a half billion cubic meters of water.
The streams do not flow
and the levels of groundwater reservoirs fell below the red lines.
Who remembers how the Kinneret looks like full?
And now look..
For the past three years we've hardly pumped water from the Kinneret to the National Carrier.
Even though, its level is approaching the black line.
Each of us can and should save water,
Always
In the bathroom, in the shower, in the garden, in any way possible way
Both because of the drought and because -
We have no water to waste!

9. <u>W18 winter 2018:</u> **We have no water to waste!**
    (Six items)

    A. (Length: 00:00:16, link: https://youtu.be/gAbqZZROnDc)
    I'm back, this time because of the rain.
    Even if it will be a rainy winter,
    We all continue to reduce our water consumption to a minimum
    Because also in the winter
    We have no water to waste!

    B. **[Set: newsroom]** (Length: 00:00:30, link: https://youtu.be/enULx7aJboE)
    We just don't have water to waste
    A lot of people ask me: "Danny, really, how can that be? But we have desalination"
    Right. We have desalination.
    In Israel, in the past ten years five desalination facilities were built.
    True, we have water in the faucets thanks to the desalination plants,
    but desalination is not enough.
    It is only part of the solution to the problem.
    Let's remember, desalination has an economic and environmental price.
    we must save water in every possible way.
    Because always ...
    We have no water to waste!

    C. **[Advice: Taps]** (Length: 00:00:12, link: https://youtu.be/GMKs_48s0Eg)
    Would it be a drought, would not
    Closing a dripping tap – Always!
    And save 60 litre water per day [image: average per day]
    Because no
    We have no water to waste!

    D. **[Advice: Shower]** (Length: 00:00:10, link: https://youtu.be/FxhBDmfUEXk)
    Its' raining, it doesn't
    Shower two minutes less
    And save 40 litre water [image: average per day]
    Because no
    We have no water to waste!

E. **[Advice: Toilets]** (Length: 00:00:12, link: https://youtu.be/uIzw_12wbTs)
Its' raining, it doesn't
Pressing the small handle in the toilets, when possible
And save 18 litre per day [image: average per day]
Because no
We have no water to waste!

F. **[Advice: pipes]** (Length: 00:00:12, link: https://youtu.be/UPxdAocusT0)
Would it be a drought, would not
Cheeking the water meter,
To make sure there's no leaks,
And preventing a great waste of water. [image: fix leaks, prevent waste]
Because no
We have no water to waste!

Appendix 3 - Tables form Literature

Table 14: Discourse-Coalitions (based on Menahem and Gilad 2013:3.1)

	Argo-Zionist Coalition	Economic Coalition	Environmentalists Coalition
Deep Core Beliefs			
Ideology	Zionist, (some) social-democracy	Liberal and neoliberal	Environmental
Values	National security, sovereignty, land settlement	National economic growth, market economy, personal liberty, efficiency	Sustainability, equity
Scope of government/private sector role	Large-scale government involvement, public funds, centralist approach for planning, development and management	Minimal government intervention, privatisation, market system guarantees individual freedom of choice and support democracy	Large-scale government role and large-scale citizen participation
National resources perceived as	Strategic national assets	Economic commodity	Public goods
Approach to development	Proactive	Economic criteria, cost/benefit analysis	Cautions and regulated sustainable development
Nature/human	Humans as a group use nature	Humans as individuals use nature	Humans are part of nature
Enforcement mechanism	Regulatory instruments	Economic incentives	Regulatory and judicial precedents
Policy Core Beliefs			
water perceived as	Strategic asset, ensuring autonomous supply	Economic commodity, resource	Public good
Cause of problem defined as	Shortage of natural resources & government resistance to financial development	Quota-based allocation system and subsidies leading to irrational use, central administrative management system failure	Abuse, disregard and exploitation of nature and resources
Solution	Proactive development of resources: conventional and nonconventional	Adopt (optimal) economic allocation pricing scheme, water development limited by cost-benefit confederations	Conservation, long-term planning, sustainable development based on ecological impact confederations
Management boundaries	Political, nation state	International market	Regional, natural – defined by water basin
Achieving a water balance	Expand supply	Manage demands	Modify supply and manage demands
Role of agriculture	Primary	Should be treated like any other sector	Favourable

	Argo-Zionist Coalition	**Economic Coalition**	**Environmentalists Coalition**
Instrumental Beliefs			
Need for institutional reform	Reduce power of Finance Ministry	Reduce power of Agriculture Lobby	Enhance stakeholders power, mainly the public
Immediate policy steps	Create/find new resource of water: desalination, import water, household conservation	Reduce quota for agriculture, in particular in high water consumption sectors for exports, reduce household consumption as an immediate interim solution	Increase recycling, household conservation, rainwater harvest

	Argo-Zionist Coalition	**Economic Coalition**	**Environmentalists Coalition**

Appendix 4 - Figures of Fragmented Reporting

Figure 15: Haaretz 19.2.2002

Figure 15 present an example of the split coverage in Haaretz from 19.2.2002 (CDP1). Three items on the same page all by Amiram Cohen. Item A in on a tender for brackish desalination, item B on the Director of Budget in the Ministry of Finance suggestion for reform in Mekorot, item C on the tender for seawater desalination in Ashkelon. There are no cross reference between the items, and the items on the tenders (A and C) do not contextualize the tenders as part of the struggle between the ministry and Mekorot over privatisation. An item on the next page, also by Cohen, reports resignation of managers at the Water Commission.

Original in Colour

Figure 16: Yedioth Ahronoth 23.10.2018

Figure 16 is a page in Yedioth Ahronoth reporting on the State Comptroller Report on 23.10.2018. The main item (C, by Amity Gazit) covers the report, accompanied by a commentary column by Sever Plocker (B), a report on water contamination by Ofer Petersburg (A) and at the top an image of the island in the Kinneret (which only appears when the lake water level is low).