The HKU Scholars Hub The University of Hong Kong 香港大學學術庫



Title	The Enforcement of Mainland Awards before and after the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 2000	
Author(s)	Leung, HF	
Citation	Hong Kong Lawyer, 2002, May, p. 52-58	
Issued Date	2002	
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/10722/48406	
Rights	Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License	

The Enforcement of Mainland Awards before and after the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 2000

In a recent case, the Court of First Instance held that for awards made on the Mainland before 1997, enforcement should have been refused for lack of jurisdiction if the application for leave to enforce the award was made after the change of sovereignty but before the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 2000 came into effect. Leung Hing-fung discusses

Introduction

The Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341) (the Ordinance) was amended in 2000 to include new provisions for the enforcement of Mainland awards. The amendment was introduced as a result of the problems created by Hong Kong's return to China in 1997, after which it lost its position as an independent member vis-a-vis China under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, convened in New York in 1958 (the New York Convention). Because of China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, awards made on the Mainland, which used to be enforceable in Hong Kong under the New York Convention. ceased to be enforceable under the Convention after 1997. The effect of the amendment to the Ordinance is to reintroduce the enforcement mechanisms for such awards.

However, from 1 July 1997 to the time when the amendment took effect (the Relevant Period), there are situations in which a party to an arbitration held on the Mainland may intend to enforce, or has in fact applied for the enforcement of, the award. The question then arises: Where an award was made on the Mainland before the change of sovereignty and enforcement was allowed or refused in the Relevant Period, what is its legal position after the amendment of the Ordinance in 2000?

The recent case of Shandong Textile Import and Export Corp v Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals Co Ltd, IICCT 80/1997 (date of judgment 6 March 2002) may shed some light on this question.

The Shandong Case

In Shandong, the plaintiff was a Mainland company which entered into a contract with the defendant for the purchase of a quantity of US raw cotton. A dispute arose regarding the quality of the cotton and the plaintiff claimed for damages, interest and costs. The dispute was brought before the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) in Beijing. Hearings took place in September 1995 and March 1996. CIETAC made an award on 6 June 1996 and a supplementary award on 5 July 1996, both in favour of the plaintiff (the Awards).

It must be noted that the Awards were made before the change of sovereignty. In August 1997, the plaintiff sought leave *ex parte* from the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong to enforce the Awards on the basis that they were Convention awards within the definition in the Ordinance. By an order dated 21 August 1997, Yam J gave leave to enforce the Awards (the Order).

The defendant took out a summons dated 3 October 1997 to apply for setting aside the Order. The application was heard on 28 and 29 January 2002. During the hearing, the plaintiff applied for abridgement of service and was allowed to serve a new summons under s 2GG and Part IIIA of the Ordinance for leave to enforce the Awards. The plaintiff also applied for an order that judgment be entered in

Lilligation Practice 新設

terms of the Awards on the basis that
they were Mainland awards within the
definition of s 2 of the Ordinance.

- The relevant definition in s 2 and Part IIIA were introduced in the amendment to the Ordinance in 2000.
- Background of

the Relevant Law

t

ï

After the change of sovereignty, Hong Kong ceased to be an independent member vis-à-vis China under the New York Convention. Without any special provision for awards made on the Mainland, there would have been difficulties in enforcing such awards C in Hong Kong. An amendment was therefore made to the Ordinance in C 2000. Part IIIA was introduced and new provisions were included for a C new category of awards; namely, Mainland awards.

A definition of 'Mainland award' was added to s 2 of the Ordinance:

Mainland award' means an arbitral award made on the
 Mainland by a recognised Mainland arbitral authority

in accordance with the Arbitration Law of the People's
 Republic of China.

There are also provisions for
Convention awards which fall within the definition of 'Mainland award'
and for which enforcement had been refused before the amendment came
into effect. Section 40A states:

(1) Subject to subsection (2),
 this Part shall have effect with respect to the enforcement of Mainland awards.

(2) Where -

6

 (a) a Mainland award was at any time before 1 July 1997 a Convention award within the meaning of Part IV as then in force; and (b) the enforcement of that award had been refused at any time before the commencement of section 5 of the Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance 2000 (2 of 2000) under section 44 as then in force.

then sections 40B to 40E shall have no effect with respect to the enforcement of that award.


The major question in *Shandong* was: What is the legal position of an award made on the Mainland before 1997 the enforcement of which has been sought in the Relevant Period? A special point in that case is that leave of enforcement was actually granted at that time. Section 40A(2)(b) therefore becomes relevant.

Arguments of the Defendant in *Shundonş*

In attempting to set aside the Order, the defendant relied on the following arguments:

- (i) The arbitration agreement between the parties was not valid under the law where the awards were made, ie under PRC Mainland law (s 44(2)(b) of the Ordinanee).
- (ii) The defendant, as the respondent in the arbitration proceedings, was not able to present its case (s 44(2)(c) of the Ordinance).
- (iii) It was contrary to public policy to enforce the awards (s 44(3) of the Ordinance).

Ma J in his judgment rejected arguments (i) and (ii). Therefore, only point (iii) will be discussed.



It is clear that only if the defendant had succeeded in setting aside the Order would the summons taken out by the plaintiff have then come into play. The plaintiff would then have to rely on the new summons taken out at the hearing. The next questions to ask would be:

- (i) Are the Awards within the meaning of 'Mainland award' in Part IIIA of the Ordinanee?
- (ii) If so, can they be enforced under s 40A of the Ordinance?

The Ground of Public Policy

The defendant sought to rely on public policy to argue that, as at the time when the application for the Order was heard (ie August 1997). Hong Kong had ceased to be an independent member of the New York Convention with respect to China and that it would therefore be contrary to public policy to uphold the enforcement of any arbitral award made by CIETAC before 1997 based on the Convention. On this point, the defendant relied on the definition of 'Convention award' in the Ordinanee as at the time of the Order, as follows:

'Convention award' ... means an award to which Part IV applies, namely, an award made in pursuance of an arbitration agreement in a State or territory, other than Hong Kong, which is a party to the New York Convention

Counsel for the defendant further submitted that it would be contrary to the Basic Law to regard Hong Kong as a separate territory from the PRC. He argued that the granting of the Order was contrary to public policy, thus invoking s 40A(2)(b).

Whether the Order should be Set Aside

Two eases, both of which were heard in the Relevant Period, were referred to. In Ng Fung Hong v ABC [1998] 1 HKG 213, the court considered the granting of leave to enforce a Mainland award made before 1 July 1997. It was conceded that the award was not a Convention award. It was held that a Mainland award eannot be enforced under s 2GG of the Ordinance and that the section only applied to awards made pursuant to arbitrations held in Hong Kong.

In Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] I HKC 192, Justice Chan CJHC, as he then was, raised a proposition in *obiter* that such awards were not Convention awards. He further raised the question whether the second sentence in art I(1) of the New York Convention could be used to apply to awards made on the Mainland so that such awards, even after 1 July 1997, would still be regarded as Convention awards (at 197D-II). Apparently his lordship was of the view that the matter was not free from doubt but suggested that the relevant authorities should consider appropriate amendments to the Ordinance.

On the above obiter, Ma J in Shandong had this to say:

As for the obiter dieta of Mr Justice Chan CJHC regarding the second sentence of Article I(1) of the New York Convention, I have considerable doubts whether this could justify a conclusion that Mainland Awards after 1 July 1997 could still be regarded as Convention Awards. I say this for two reasons. First, the second sentence does not

form part of the statutory definition of Convention Awards in the Ordinance. Its application must therefore be in some doubt anyway. Secondly, in any event. there was no material before the eourt in Hebei Import & Export Corporation (and none before us) to suggest that a Mainland award could not be considered as a domestie award (in the State of 'the PRC') where its enforcement was sought. It is to be noted that Hong Kong is not an independent state, but a territory within the PRG (para 49).

Ma J therefore went on to hold that Yam J had no jurisdiction to give leave to enforce the Awards on the basis of their being Convention awards and that the Order should be set aside.

Whether the Awards could be Enforced as Mainland Awards even though the Order was Set Aside

The relevant section here is s 44, in particular subsections (1) and (3) of the Ordinance, which state-

(1) Enforcement of a Convention award shall not be refused except in the eases mentioned in this section

(3) Enforcement of a Convention award may also be \mathbb{C}^{2} refused if the award is in respect of a matter which is not eapable of settlement by 0 arbitration, or if it would be contrary to public policy to $\langle \cdot \rangle$ enforce the award.

Counsel for the defendant 6.10 submitted that, even though Yam J did not actually refuse to enforce 0 the Awards, the words 'the

்

 \odot

¢

0

<u>___</u>

5

Ø

 \odot

ø

്

 \bigcirc

 \odot

O

00

 \odot

6

23

6.3

 \square

enforcement of that award had
 been refused in s 40A(2)(b) must
 be sensibly construed so as to apply
 to situations where the enforcement
 should have been refused.

1

C

 \mathbf{C}

 \mathbf{C}

⇐ With this submission Ma J agreed. He said in his judgment:

It could not have been intended that where a court had wrongly given leave to enforce, a party then escapes the prohibition in section 40A(2) even though if the Court had acted correctly, leave to enforce would have been refused under section 44 (para 59).

Counsel for the defendant went on to submit that Yam J should have C refused leave to enforce the Awards on the ground that it was contrary to C. public policy to do so. Since sovereignty over Hong Kong was C resumed by the Mainland on 1 July 1997, there was no question of Hong G Kong being treated as a state or territory separate from the PRC from € that date, as this did not accord with constitutional or political reality. Therefore, as a matter of publie policy, the Awards could not and ē S should not be enforced as Convention awards. It therefore followed that Yam C J should have refused to enforce the Awards on public policy grounds. **6**3

This submission was rejected by Ma J:

 \mathbf{c}

0

63

63

œ

C

First, the grounds on which the enforcement of a Convention award may be refused under section 44 all presuppose that the relevant award is a Convention award in the first place. Note here the words in section 44(2) Enforcement of a Convention award may be refused if the person against whom it is invoked proves ...' (author's emphasis). The ground on which the defendant has succeeded in setting aside Yam J's order was on the basis that the learned judge had no jurisdiction to make the order since the two arbitration Awards were not Convention awards. Accordingly, section 44 was not relevant at all.

Secondly, even if section 44 was somehow relevant as being the basis for the setting aside of Yam J's order. I eannot see how section 40A(2)could render the awards unenforceable when the whole point of Part IIIA of the Ordinance was to deal with the problem of 'mischief' of Mainland awards not being enforceable by reason of the resumption of sovereightv over Hong Kong. Thus, as a matter of construction, it could not have been intended that section 40B would render unenforceable those types of awards in respect of which Part IIIA eame into existence in the first place. To decide otherwise would itself be contrary to public policy and indeed a reading of the preamble of the Arrangement would confirm this (paras 71 and 72)

Ma J was thus of the view that the enforcement of the Awards should have been refused based on the court's lack of jurisdiction, but not on any public policy ground as submitted. Leave for enforcement of the Awards was therefore 're-granted' based on the new provisions introduced in the amendment to the Ordinance in 2000 even though the Order had been set aside.

Conclusion

The sole ground upon which the court in *Shandong* allowed the Order to be enforced again was that enforcement should have been refused in the Relevant Period when the application for enforcement was heard, based on the court's having no jurisdiction at that time (instead of on any of the grounds under s 44 of the Ordinanee).

The Shandong judgement now makes it clear that awards made on the Mainland before the change of sovereignty could not be enforced during the Relevant Period. The amendment to the Ordinance in 2000 provides these awards with new mechanisms by which they can be enforced after the Relevant Period, unless enforcement has been refused on any of the grounds under the new s 44.

Shandong has elarified the court's position that in the Relevant Period the court did not have jurisdiction to enforce awards made on the Mainland before 1997. Therefore, it may reasonably be suggested that for these awards, even if enforcement has been refused, and provided that the refusal was not expressly based on any of the grounds set out under s 44, enforcement will be allowed again after the amendment to the Ordinance in 2000.

> Leung Hing-fung Deputy Head and Associate Professor (Law) Department of Real Estate and Construction The University of Hong Kong Barrister-at-Law

HONG KONG LAWYER 青進律師 05+2002

《2000年仲裁(修訂) 條例》與內地仲裁裁決的 強制執行問題

有一宗近期案例中,原訟法庭裁定,就香港主權回歸中國以前在中國大陸作出的仲裁裁決而言,假 如強制執行裁決的申請於回歸後但於《2000年仲裁(修訂)條例》生效前提出,則法院理應以缺 *乏司法管轄權為理由而拒絕批准該申請。梁慶豐加以剖析*

羽音

香港於主權回歸中國(以下簡稱「香 港回歸」)以前,是 1958年《承認 及執行外國仲裁裁決公約》(下稱 《紐約公約》)下的成員。不過,隨 著香港回歸,香港已失去相對中國 的獨立成員身分;而向來可根據《紐 約公約》在香港強制執行的中國內地 仲裁裁决(以下簡稱「內地裁 決一),亦隨著香港回歸而不能再根 據《紐約公約》予以強制執行。為求 解決這個問題,香港政府於 2000 年 通過《2000年仲裁(修訂)條例》 (2000年第2號)(以下簡稱《修 訂條例》),修訂《仲裁條例》(第 341章)和加入條文,以重新設立內 地裁決的強制執行機制。

縱然如此,一個可能出現的情況 是,從1997年7月1日(即香港回 **歸之日)** 直至《修訂條例》生效的 一段時間(以下簡稱「有關期 **問上)**,國內伸裁的其中一方打算 (
甚或已正式申請) 強制執行仲裁 裁決。這種情況產生了以下問題: 假如内地裁決於香港回歸前作出, 而该裁决的强制執行於有關期間會 獲批准或遭到拒絕,則《修訂條 例》生效後,該裁決的法律地位如 何?

一宗近期案例 Shandong Textile Import and Export Corp v Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals Co Ltd (高院 建築及仲裁訴訟 1997 年第 80 號) (判決日期為本年3月6日),對 上述問題提供了一些開釋。

Shandong 一案的案情

Shandong 一案中的原告人是一家内 地公司,它與被告人簽訂合約,購 冒一批美國原棉。雙方就該批原棉 的質量發生爭拗,原告人更向被告 人申索損害賠償、利息和訟費。該 爭拗交由北京中國國際經貿仲裁委 員會(以下簡稱「北京委員會」) 審理。經過了分別於 1995 年 9 月及 1996年3月進行的聆訊後,北京委 員會裁定原告人勝訴,並於 1996 年 6月6日及7月5日分别作出了伸 战裁決及補充裁決(以下統稱「涉 案裁決」)。必須注意,涉案裁決 是於香港回歸前作出的。

到了 1997 年 8 月,原告人單方 面向原訟法庭申請許可在香港強制 執行涉案裁決,理由是涉案裁決屬 於《仲裁條例》所指的「公約裁 決上。負責審理該申請的原訟法庭 法官任懿君,於1997年8月21日 下令准許原告人在香港強制執行涉

56

案 裁 決 (以下 簡 稱 「 涉 案 命 今 |) 。

被告人於 1997 年 10 月 3 日左右 發出傳票,申請撤銷涉案命令。該 申請的聆訊於本年1月28及29日 進行,聆訊期間,原告人申請送達 \odot 傳票,以按照《仲裁條例》第 2GG 條及第 IIIA 部申請准許強制執行涉 C 案裁決,並獲准省略該傳票的送達 程序。原告人亦要求法院下令按涉 \mathbf{O} 案裁決面登錄判決,理由是涉案裁 決關於《仲裁條例》第 2 條所指的 ത 內地裁決。上述第 IIIA 部及第 2 條 下關於「內地裁決」的條文,均是 ോ 透過《修訂條例》而引入的。

有關法律規定

€ 相對於中國,回歸後的香港已不再 是《紐約公約》下的獨立成員。在 \bigcirc 欠缺專為內地裁決面設的條文下, 在香港尋求強制執行該等裁決的人 \mathbf{O} 遇上了不少困難。有見及此,香港 政府於 2000 年通過了《修訂條 63 例》,特別為內地裁決制定條文, \bigcirc 包括第 IIIA 部。

《修訂條例》將以下定義加入 《仲裁條例》第2條:

「『內地裁決』【…】指由認 可內地仲裁當局按照《中華人 -

ು

 \odot

€Э

€`>

e 3

5

0

: 3

 \bigcirc

 \mathbf{C}

0

Ø

	e -		····
C			
		Litigation Practice 訴訟	
C			
C	民共和國仲裁法》在內地作出的仲裁裁決」	二、被告人身為仲裁程序中的答辩 人,未能提出其案(見《仲裁	涉案命令有違公共政策,因此《仲 裁條例》第 40A(2)(b) 條適用。
C	對於落在上述定義的範圍、而其	條例》第 44(2)(c) 條) 。	
	强制执行於《修訂條例》生效前曾	三、强制執行涉案裁決將違反公	涉案命令應否予以撤銷?
C	遭拒絕的公約裁決,《修訂條例》	共政策 (見《仲裁條例》第	Shandong 一案曾提述兩宗於有關期
e	亦制定了條文。新增的第 40A 條規	44(3)條) 。	問審理的案例。第一宗是 Ng Fung
	定:	負責審理 Shandong 一案的原設	Hong v ABC [1998] 1 HKC 213 > 案 山社際空空電気なける顔を進めまた相称
G	「(1) 除第 (2) 款另有規定 外,【《仲裁條例》第	法庭法官馬道立, 在判詞中已拒絕 接納上述第一及第二項論據, 因此	中法院需要決定是否頒令准許強制執 行於 1997 年 7 月 1 目前所作的内地
G	开,【《甲砜尿两》第 [1]A 部】的規定,對於	按約1.22第二次第二項調源,內此 下文將只討論第三項論據。	表決。申請許可的一方同意該裁決不
~	內地裁決的強制執行具	下又用六时画句二項画述。 清楚的是,只有當被告人成功申	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6	有效力。	請撤銷涉案命令之時,原告人所發	決不能根據《仲裁條例》第 2GG 條
	(2) 凡 —	出的傳票才會起作用,致使原告人	而予以強制執行,理由是該條文只適
C	(a) 某內地裁決在 1997	须在聆讯时倚杖该传票。接著需要	用於依據本地仲裁而作出的裁决。
С	年7月1日前的任	考慮的問題包括:	第二宗案例是 Hebei Import &
	何時候屬當時有效	一、涉案裁決是否屬於《仲裁條	Export Corp v Polytek Engineering
C	的第二\V部所指的公	例》第 HIA 部所指的「内地裁	Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] 1 HKC 192 ,
	約裁決;及	決」?	該案由當時的高等法院首席法官陳
C	(b) 該裁決曾在【《修	二、假如涉案裁決屬於「內地裁	兆愷聯同另外兩位法官審理。陳法
C	訂條例》】第 5 條	決」,它們可否根據《仲裁條	官在判詞中曾發表附帶意見,指該 然仇也也上了層位,2.約40,100,000
	生效前的任何時候	例》第 40A 條予以強制執行?	等仲裁裁決不屬於公約裁決,並質 疑《紐約公約》第1條第1段第二
C	根據當時有效的第 44 條遭拒絕強制執	公共政策的理據	<u>新新公</u> 納/第二條第二段第二 何可否被運用到內地裁決之上,從
	行,	被告人所提出的公共政策論據是:	而令該等裁決於 1997 年 7 月 1 日後
C	則第 40B 至 40E 條並不對該	法院聆訊涉案命令的申請之時(即	仍會被視為公約裁決(見彙報第
e	裁決的強制執行具有效力。」	1997 年 8 月) ,香港相對於中國已	197 頁第 D 至 II 段)。陳法官看來
	Shandong 一案所牽涉的主要問	不再是《紐約公約》下的獨立成	認為上述問題有待清楚明確的答
C	題是:於 1997 年以前在中國大陸作	員,因此,根據《紐約公約》面容	案,並建議有關當局考慮對《仲裁
G	出、並曾於有關期間尋求予以強制	許或支持強制執行任何由北京委員	條例》作出適當的修訂。
-	執行的伸裁裁決,其法律地位如	會所作的仲裁裁決,均會違反公共	對於土述附帶意見, 審理
•	何?案中的特點是,法院確曾於有	政策。就此而言,被告人倚賴涉案	Shandong 一案的馬道立法官這樣說:
	關期間下令准許原告人強制執行涉	命令作出之時有效的「公約裁決」	「至於高等法院首席法官陳兆 地方。4990-098-05
6	案裁決,因此,上述第 40A(2)(b)條	法定定義: 「『公約裁決』【…】指第 IV	愷在《紐約公約》第 1 條第 1 政策二句左面的距響登1 - 並
C	便成為了與案有關的考慮因素。	部適用的裁決,即依據仲裁協	段第二句方面的附帶意見,我 頗為懷疑這是否能支持指
	被告人的論據	^{市巡出} 时被次,今年很勝 議在某一國家或領土 (香港除	1997年7月1日後的内地裁
G	在 Shandong 一案中,尋求撤銷涉	政止来 · 四家或領土 (自把际 外) 所作出的裁決, 而該國家	決仍可被視為公約 截決的結
	案命令的被告人,提出了下列論	或領土乃【《維約公約》】的	論。促使我這樣說的理由有兩
Q	據:	<i>缔约方</i> 」(見《仲裁條例》第	個。首先,上述第二句並不是
e	一、根據作出涉案裁決的國家(即	2(1)條)	【《仲裁條例》】下『公約裁
	「「「「「「」」」」、「「」」、「「」」、「「」」、「「」」、「」、「」、「」、	うゆ ガ・オームル 伊えばに しょうね 心に あくたれ ソレートロ	Mr. 11 J. J. M. M. Mar M. Data M.

中國)的法律,與訟雙方的伸
 截協議不屬有效(見《仲裁條例》第44(2)(b)條)。

被告人的代表大律師亦認為,把 香港視作獨立於中國的領土,將違 反《基本法》。被告人辯稱,頒發

⋟

決』的定義的一部分。因此,

該第二句的適用性怎也必會有

值得商榷之處。第二,不管如

何,在Hebei Import & Export Corporation 一案以及在本案 中,均沒有任何證據顯示內地 哉決不能在尋求予以強制執行 之地被視為(中華人民共和國 的)本土裁決。要注意,香港 不是獨立的國家,而是中華人 民共和國的領土」(見判詞第 49 段)

馬法官接面裁定,任懿君法官没 有司法管轄權以涉案裁決屬於公約裁 決為理由面下令准許強制執行涉案裁 決,因此涉案命令應予以撤銷。

第二4 條及第 IIIA 部的影響

《仲裁條例》第 44 條包含以下規 定:

- 「(1) 除非屬本條所述的情 形,否則不得拒絕強制 執行公約裁決。
- […]
- (3) 如公約截決關乎的事 項,是不能藉伸截解決 的,或強制執行該裁決 是會違反公共政策的, 則亦可拒絕強制執行該 裁決。」

在 Shandong 一案中,被告入的 代表大律師認為,即使任懲君法官 未有確實拒絕准許強制執行涉案裁 決,《仲裁條例》第 40A(2)(b) 條下 的「該裁決曾 … 遭拒絕強制執行」

一句必須予以明智的解釋,以令該 條文適用於強制執行理應遭到拒絕 的情況。

馬道立法官同意土述辯握,並且 指出:

「【有關條文的】宗旨不可能 是,假如法院曾錯誤地給予強 制執行的許可,則即使正確行 事的法院理應會根據第 44 條 面拒絕給予強制執行的許可, 有 關 的 與 訟 方 將 能 免 受 第 40A(2)條的禁制」(見判詞第 59段)

案中被告人的代表大律師又認為,任懿君法官理應以強制執行涉 案裁決會違反公共政策為理由而拒 絕給予強制執行許可。隨著香港回 歸,憲制和政治現實俱不容許將香 港當作獨立於中國的國家或區域看 待。因此,在公共政策的層面上, 涉案裁決既不能亦不應作為公約裁 決予以強制執行。這也是說,任懿 君法官理應根據公共政策理由而拒 絕准許強制執行涉案裁決。

但上述辯據不獲馬法官接納。他 指出:

「首先,第44條所指明的可拒 絕強制執行公約裁決的理由, 一律預先假定了有關裁決從一 開始便已是公約裁決。這裡我 們要注意,第44(2)條的字眼 為『如受<u>公約裁決</u>針對強制執 行的人證明有以下情形,則可 拒絕強制執行<u>公約裁決</u> …』 (下劃線為筆者所加)。本案 被告人成功申請撤銷任懿君法 官所頒下的命令,理由是涉案 的兩項仲裁裁決不屬於公約裁 決,故此任法官沒有司法管轄 權頒發該命令。據此,第44條

第二,既然【《仲裁條 例》】第 IIIA 部的宗旨不外是 處理內地裁決因香港主權回歸 中國而不能予以強制執行的 『禍忠』,則即使第 44 條確 是撤銷任法官的命令的基礎, 從面與本案稍有關連,我亦看 不見第 40A(2) 條如何能令涉 案仲裁裁決不能予以強制執 行。因此,在法例詮釋的層面 上,就第 IIIA 部原本為之面實 施的一類仲裁裁決面言,第 40B 條的目的不可能是令該類

根本與本案無關。

裁決不能予以強制執行。與此 相反的結論,本身將有違公共 政策;事實上,只要閱讀有關 安排的介言,便可確認這一 點」(見判詞第71及72段) 9

Ф

 \Diamond

ø

5

0

ు

1

因此,馬法官認為,拒絕准許強 制執行涉案裁決的依據,應是法官 缺乏相關的司法管轄權,而不是辯 方大律師所提出的公共政策理由。 據此,即使涉案裁決已被撤銷,法 官仍根據《修訂條例》所引入的新 條文,「重新給予」強制執行涉案 裁決的許可。

綺麗

在 Shandong 案中,法官重新批 准強制執行涉案命令的唯一理由是 法院理應拒絕准許強制執行,而這 是基於法院於有關期間(包括審理 致制執行申請之時)缺乏相關的司 法管轄權,而不是基於《仲裁條 例》第 44 條所列明的任何理由。

Shandong 一案的判決表明,於 香港回歸前作出的內地裁決,於有 關期間不能予以強制執行。《修訂 條例》提供了機制,使該等裁決於 有關期間過後得以強制執行,但該 機制受制於第 44 條所列的拒絕強制 執行的理據。

法院在 Shandong 一案中已開 明,於有關期間,法院沒有司法管轄 權下令強制執行 1997 年 7 月 1 日以 前所作出的內地裁決。因此,我們可 合理地提出,即使這類裁決的強制執 行曾遭到拒絕,只要該拒絕並非明確 地建基於第 44 條所列明的任何理 由,上述的強制執行仍可隨著《修訂 條例》的生效而重獲批准。

> 梁慶豐 香港大學房地產及建設學系 副系主任暨副教授(法律) ↔ 大律師

HONE KONG FAMYER 背書律師 05・2002