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**Assembling the 'Post-Conflict' State in United Nations Public Discourse**

*Kosovo and the Contemporary Geopolitics of Peace*

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Assembling the ‘Post-Conflict’ State in  
United Nations Public Discourse  
Kosovo and the Contemporary Geopolitics of  
Peace



Harry Bregazzi

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Science and Law.

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## Abstract

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Contemporary United Nations (UN) peace operations are characterised by multilateral interventions in ‘failed states’. Often assuming responsibility for part, or all, of the state’s administration, they undertake tasks as diverse as conducting elections, providing a police force, and managing the return of displaced people. Contextualising these operations within geopolitical transformations after the Cold War, this thesis examines the relationship between the UN and the state, and considers what their interaction reveals about the possibilities for peace in today’s globalised politics.

Through a systematic examination of resolutions, policy documents, and mission reports, I identify how the UN conceptualises peace as an ideal, and the role it attributes to the state in the pursuit of peace. I then consider how this geopolitical vision was manifest in the UN’s efforts to develop autonomy and self-government in post-war Kosovo. The analysis is informed by a combination of assemblage theory and the political philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. These theories offer a useful explanatory framework for apprehending the complex interplay and co-constitution of ‘local’, ‘national’, and ‘international’ actors that shape the possibilities for peace in any given context.

The thesis therefore responds to a conceptual tension present in existing geographical literature on peace – the tension between understanding peace as a localised ‘bottom-up’ process, and peace as maintained by transnational authorities and state institutions. In my analysis of the UN intervention in Kosovo, I aim to demonstrate a productive way of including states, institutions, and international organisations in the geographical study of peace, but without losing the critical sensibility of the existing literature, nor a recognition of the importance of local productions of peace.



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## Author's declaration

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I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: ..... DATE: .....





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## Abbreviations

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DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IGO	Intergovernmental organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P-5	The Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council
R2P	The Responsibility to Protect
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization



## Note on referencing

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This thesis follows the Harvard system of referencing, except in the following cases:

### Works by Spinoza

*E* = *Ethics*

*TP* = *Political Treatise*

*TTP* = *Theological-Political Treatise*

References to the *Political Treatise* (*TP*) and *Theological-Political Treatise* (*TTP*) indicate the chapter and the paragraph number. For example, *TP* 3/6 refers to the *Political Treatise*, chapter 3, paragraph 6.

References to the *Ethics* (*E*) follow the standard practice of using abbreviations to denote specific sections within the text:

Roman numeral = part

ax = axiom

app = appendix

c = corollary

def = definition

def aff = definition of the affects

d = demonstration

ex = explanation

L = lemma

p = proposition

post = postulate

pref = preface

s = scholium

For example, *E* IV p37s2 refers to part 4 of the *Ethics*, proposition 37, 2<sup>nd</sup> scholium.

### United Nations Resolutions and Mission Reports

References to United Nations documents follow the Harvard system except when referring to mission reports, or to resolutions from the Security Council and General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> These are most usefully referred to by their unique document symbol. For example, the Security Council resolution which formally mandated the UN Mission in Kosovo is S/RES/1244 (1999). The full texts are easily found by entering their symbol in the UN's online Official Document System: <https://documents.un.org>

Additionally, direct quotations from UN documents are usually referenced with paragraph numbers (§) rather than page numbers.

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<sup>1</sup> In doing so, I follow the practice of Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams in *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (2010), Cambridge: Polity Press





# 1 Introduction: Geopolitical transformations and peace

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## 1.1 Peace after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War in 1989 is often understood as a geopolitical turning point. The characteristics and extent of geopolitical change in the years since are a source of rich debate. These range from Fukuyama's (1989) famous assertion of the 'End of History', to considerations of how the end of the Cold War influenced national culture and identity (Sharp, 1998), to discussions regarding new sources of international tension and how they relate to the 'old' Cold War geopolitics (Buzan, 2006; Ciută and Klinke, 2010). Nevertheless, it seems to be broadly accepted that the post-Cold War era has seen changes in the character and patterns of violent conflicts (Human Security Centre, 2005; Yilmaz, 2007). The threat of nuclear war between antagonist superpowers has lessened. Indeed, wars between states, featuring battles fought by two or more national armies, have become an exception,<sup>2</sup> meaning almost all ongoing conflicts today are intrastate (Pettersson *et al.*, 2019). These include, however, an increasing number of 'internationalized intrastate' conflicts, in which 'external states contributed troops to one or both sides in the conflict' (Allansson *et al.*, 2017: 576). The locations of violence and war seem also to have changed. Logics of security are rendering cities increasingly militarised (Graham, 2011; Sassen, 2010), and the response of governments to contemporary threats has blurred and broadened the spaces in which war is fought (Gregory, 2011a; Thrift, 2007). The influence of new technologies must also be acknowledged, with their capacity to alter the methods and time-space of what Gregory (2011b) calls 'late modern war' – a term which he uses to designate the highly specialised, technologized methods of contemporary warfare, such as the use of drones (see also Gregory, 2018). As Gregory's term implies, some scholars suggest that these changes are such that they represent 'New Wars' (Kaldor, 2012; Münkler, 2005). While this assertion is contested (see Henderson and Singer, 2002; Newman, 2004), Kaldor (2013) argues that 'New War' remains a useful conceptual tool for getting past traditional assumptions about war, and so for developing research agendas that can account for how globalisation and new technologies are influencing current violent conflicts.

Related to the changing geopolitics of violence, the end of the Cold War has also seen a proliferation of peace activities implemented by organisations of varying size and influence. Perhaps most notable among these activities has been 'the widespread practice of external intervention undertaken with the express aim of building "sustainable peace" within societies ravaged by war and violent conflict' (Berdal, 2009: 11). This, too, is a trend associated with globalisation - the convergence of political norms and integration into a world market (Ben-Porat, 2006). The principal organisation to undertake such peace operations is the United Nations (UN). While its initial peacekeeping mission was in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the majority of UN peace operations have occurred since the Cold War ended.<sup>3</sup> Not only did the number of operations increase in the 1990s, but so too did the scope of the tasks they undertook. During the Cold War, UN peace

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<sup>2</sup> The most recent data from the Upsala Conflict Data Program record two interstate conflicts – between India and Pakistan, and between Iran and Israel. The further 50 ongoing state-based conflicts are all intrastate (Pettersson *et al.*, 2019).

<sup>3</sup> Between 1945 and 1988, the UN mandated 15 peace missions. From 1989 to the time of writing, there have been a further 56 missions (for a full list, see United Nations, 2018).

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missions were, in the main, mandated to observe ceasefires and maintain the separation of forces, usually national armies. By contrast, the 1990s saw the development of the 'multi-dimensional' peace operation. Much broader in the scope of their activities, multi-dimensional operations combine a traditional security presence with tasks including the delivery of aid, the development of institutions, and the promotion of human rights (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010; UN DPKO, 2003). Despite the proliferation of new missions deployed in the 1990s, that period of peacekeeping is also notable for its failures, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. The failures resulted in part from the fact that these conflicts, characterised by ethnic-civil violence and the internal breakdown of national governments, were 'simply not covered in the [UN] Charter at all' (Kennedy, 2007: 67). As conflict patterns changed, therefore, the UN's peace institutions had to respond by developing new policies and approaches as they struggled to deal with crisis after crisis.

In addition to the UN, there are many other organisations involved in contemporary peace activities. These include other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), both global (e.g. the World Bank) and regional (e.g. the European Union, the African Union); state-based institutions (e.g. the US Institute for Peace, the UK's Department for International Development etc.); and numerous charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), some international in their operations, some smaller and more localised. Today's multi-dimensional peace processes are therefore 'institutionalized in the work of the UN and international agencies, international financial institutions, NGOs, and the many actors engaged in conflict environments' (Richmond, 2004: 87-88).

The international character of organisations involved in peace processes, and particularly the UN, raises questions regarding the role of the traditional political organisation, the nation state. This is not because they render the state less relevant – indeed, as shall be seen, the UN emphasises the reconstruction of liberal democratic states as a primary goal of its peace operations – but rather because the intervention of external organisations represents an alternative and unprecedented form of political agency shaping the possibilities for peace. A UN peacekeeping mission is authorised by the UN Security Council, a deliberative body of representatives from 15 national governments. The personnel who make up a peace operation are voluntarily contributed by the UN Member States (UN DPKO, 2008). A UN peace operation is therefore an inherently international, multilateral, geopolitical agent. Although a peacekeeping mission is 'deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict' (UN DPKO, 2008: 31), it is a distinct geopolitical force, acting outside of the authority of the host country.

A further reason to consider the role of the state in contemporary peace operations is the prevalence of so-called 'state failure'. State-failure is sometimes argued to be a key reason behind the aforementioned 'new wars' that characterise the post-Cold War period (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Helman and Ratner, 1992). From the perspective of state failure, civil and ethnic violence is viewed as resulting from the collapse of state functions, and so a peace operation attempts to provide the security and stability which the host government has failed to maintain. Hence, the UN's approach to peacekeeping has involved taking on more administrative and governance roles in host countries (Richmond, 2004; Zanotti, 2006).

While this form of international authority represents an unprecedented development in international politics, ‘the State’, as an ideal and as a practical political reality, remains deeply relevant to contemporary peace processes. Richmond (2004: 91) maintains that ‘contemporary peace operations have aimed at the reconstitution of liberal states’, and that ‘states underpin the key organizations through which peace operations occur’. Mahapatra (2016), too, emphasises the relevance of individual state politics in UN decision making, particularly that of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5).<sup>4</sup> Even if interventions are fundamentally an international political process, the end goal of a ‘sustainable peace’ seems to rely on the reconstruction of a liberal democratic state.

Peace, then, is geopolitical. If changing patterns of geopolitics after the Cold War have shaped the characteristics on contemporary conflict, then it is reasonable to assume that the same geopolitical patterns determine the possibilities for peace. The starting point for this thesis is therefore to concur with Simon Dalby (2014: 30) that these geopolitical transformations ‘need to be incorporated into new thinking within geography about war, peace, [and] violence’. Peace processes occur within, shape, and are shaped by, the context of these changing spatial and territorial patterns (Dalby, 2014). Peace is also geopolitical in the discursive sense of the term denoted by proponents of critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). That is, the actors involved in the pursuit of peace adhere to certain presuppositions, narratives, and representations about the world and the nature of politics. Their policies, and perhaps the extent to which their responses have the potential to contribute to peace, will therefore differ according to their respective geopolitical visions.

Investigations into such geopolitical visions, as they relate to *peace*, are rare within political geography (Megoran, 2010b). Indeed, attending to peace from any perspective at all was rare in geography until a series of articles kickstarted ‘geographies of peace’ as a research agenda (Inwood and Tyner, 2011; McConnell *et al.*, 2014; Megoran, 2011; Williams and McConnell, 2011). Subsequent geographical work on peace has explored a range of conceptual and empirical approaches, engaging with the meaning of peace, its spatiality, and its complex entanglements with violence. In general, however, this literature has not addressed the kinds of geopolitical trends just outlined, or the associated political actors (Megoran and Dalby, 2018). It has tended instead to emphasise an understanding of peace as an everyday, localised process – embodied, emotional, and varying across different contexts (for example Brickell, 2015; Daley, 2014; Williams, 2013). Where an organisation like the UN is discussed, it is usually to critique it as a key proponent of the inadequate ‘liberal model’ of peace; that is, peace as guaranteed by the universal statist norms of democracy, rule of law, and market-led development (Joas, 2003; Richmond, 2006). As Megoran (2013: 190) notes, ‘for liberalism, international institutions and organisations representing universal norms make peace achievable’. The UN is certainly associated with such a liberal model of peace, as indeed are many NGOs, which Richmond (2004: 90) claims ‘operate solely in the context of a Western development discourse’ (see also Jeffrey, 2013). For this reason, the liberal model has been criticised as an imposition of western values parading as universal, and one that has frequently failed in its declared purpose (Daley, 2014; Vogel, 2018). Some even argue that

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<sup>4</sup> China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

## Chapter 1

the liberal model of peace paradoxically justifies further violence, as dominant states and powerful organisations enforce conformity to their liberal norms (Dillon and Reid, 2009; Joas, 2003).

Perhaps the UN and the state have been peripheral in the peace geographies literature because to focus on them would seem to remain within this paradigm of the liberal peace, rather than pushing at its boundaries and promoting or imagining alternatives. The emphasis on the local as the site of peace's production would seem to fit a recent tendency within political geography to 'avoid the topic of the state' (Dittmer, 2017: 5). Indeed, a traditional view of 'the State', as a unified political actor, with a coherent identity and identifiable 'state interests', has frequently been dismissed in political geography. To understand states in these terms is to fall into the 'territorial trap' (Agnew, 1994), to perpetuate 'methodological nationalism' (Kuus, 2019: 165) and the myth of natural state boundaries (Fall, 2010). It has therefore been a central task of critical geopolitics to critique and denaturalise what statist discourse presents as natural 'truths' about states and their interaction (Dalby, 1991; Dodds, 2001).

To take the state as a central concept in this thesis, therefore, it is necessary to do so in a careful way; one that is mindful of critiques of statist explanation, and which avoids returning to a so-called 'realist' (Wohlforth, 2009) understanding of states and international relations. This is necessary, furthermore, because of the geopolitical transformations that have just been outlined. International organisations, transnational political agency, and cross-border flows of people and ideas, all question the primacy of the state as the category through which to adequately explain contemporary politics. They challenge assumptions about 'the centrality of states to world politics, and the primacy of fixed national identities in political psychology' (Agnew, 2003: 2). This implies the need not only to maintain an awareness of 'the local' in political explanation, but also for explanatory concepts that attend to categories cutting across the nation-state (see also Kearns, 2008).

Rather than taking UN peace operations as the model against which to justify studying alternative, localised, more radical productions of peace, this thesis makes them the central focus through which to explore transnational political agency and the state. This is not so much to disagree with the critiques of the liberal peace, or with the need to understand local productions of peace, than it is to recognise that contemporary geopolitics and transnational networks of authority unavoidably shape the possibilities for peace in local contexts (Megoran and Dalby, 2018). As such, there is a need for them to be included in the geographical study of peace. The first question that this thesis therefore seeks to develop an answer for is: how might this be done? How can we develop a conceptual framework that can account for the unavoidable influence of states, institutions and IGOs like the UN, but which maintains, first, an appreciation for 'the local' in the production of peace, and second, the critical sensibility of the literature, particularly regarding criticism of the liberal peace? Such a question requires consideration of the nature of states and the UN themselves, of political agency, and of their relation to the local. This thesis argues that a *relational ontology* can provide productive ways of addressing these factors, and of responding to the tension between thinking about peace as shaped by local level relationships, and peace as shaped by state institutions and international organisations. A relational ontology blurs the boundaries between scales in political enquiry – that is,

between state and non-state, or local/national/international – and instead draws our attention to their co-constitution.

## 1.2 A relational ontological approach: Assemblage theory and Spinoza

In considering the place of the state in political explanation, I am following Jason Dittmer's (2017: 6) desire 'to rehabilitate the state within political geography'. Recognising the tensions between a statist politics and an everyday politics, Dittmer disrupts the boundaries between the two by utilising assemblage theory. Originating in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), assemblage theory has more recently been developed by Manuel DeLanda (2006, 2016). Ontologically, assemblage theory asserts that things are always a product of relations. Nothing exists as a self-caused unified entity, they are always an arrangement of 'different entities linked together to form a new whole' (Müller, 2015: 28).

An assemblage, therefore, is an arrangement and ordering of various constituent parts, both human and non-human, whose orientation and interaction are such that they realise capacities that the parts by themselves would be unable to achieve. This definition applies to the state, as well as to any other assemblage – a university, a government, a football team, the human body. From these examples, it can be seen that 'Assemblages can become component parts of larger assemblages' (DeLanda, 2016: 20). Thus the UK Foreign Office (to use one of Dittmer's examples) is an assemblage; which in turn is a constituent part of the UK *government* assemblage; which is in turn a constituent part of the UK *state* assemblage.<sup>5</sup> The functioning of assemblages – the process by which their capacities are made manifest – is a product of everyday chains of interaction between the people, materials, and ideas of which they consist. By understanding the state as an assemblage, rather than a 'transcendental subject', Dittmer attends to states as an *effect* of these processes of interaction – a process by which the state assemblage emerges and maintains its identity (see also Mitchell, 1991; Painter, 2006). An assemblage's cohesion over time is not taken for granted, therefore, but is continually produced through everyday interactions between parts. By conceptualising the state as an assemblage, Dittmer (2017) joins state theory to a consideration of the everyday, and argues that using assemblage theory allows the researcher greater understanding of how the state is itself an everyday production.

This understanding therefore makes no ontological distinctions between different levels or scales. It does not consider the local relationship and the state institution as separate political spheres. They differ in their capacities, but not in their nature. As Dittmer (2017: 11) writes, 'the state is not special; it is simply one body politic among many'. Furthermore, the assemblage process is both bottom-up and top-down (DeLanda, 2016) The identity and agency of an assemblage is *emergent* from the continuous interaction between its components, 'but once an assemblage is in place it immediately starts acting as a source of limitations and opportunities for its components (downward causality)' (DeLanda, 2016: 21). The nature of social existence is therefore bottom-up and top-down, simultaneously. If there is a conceptual tension between peace as produced in localised everyday relationships, and peace as produced in state institutions and international actors, then the utility of assemblage theory is that it is not beholden to a logic of either/or. It allows for

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<sup>5</sup> See DeLanda (2016: 46), on the distinction between government and state.

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including the agency of states and international organisations in the study of peace, but does not reify them as unified actors with rational intent. For the purposes of this thesis, then, the state is understood as an assemblage, and so too is the UN. In a case of UN intervention, the UN mission can no more be understood as a unified actor than we can say the state is a unified actor. Through the deployment of people, technology, and a set of ideals and aims, a UN mission becomes part of the assemblage process in the region in which it intervenes – part of the interaction of elements that determine the capacities, limitations, and potentiality of the assemblage.

The next question, and one which this thesis aims to respond to, is how this relational ontology can help us think about the meaning of peace, and the kinds of processes that are productive of more peaceful assemblages. I argue that productive answers to this question can be found in the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza (1632-77). Spinoza, too, adheres to a relational ontology, which he set out in detail in his *Ethics* (1996 [1677]). Like assemblage theory, Spinoza conceptualises the state as an effect of a relational process whereby the combined powers of individuals realise a greater capacity to survive and thrive.<sup>6</sup> In his *Political Treatise* (2000 [1677]) and *Theological-Political Treatise* (2007 [1670]), Spinoza applies his relational understanding of reality to the question of the governance of states. Written at a period in European history that had seen prolonged warfare, religious fragmentation, and subsequent attempts to establish a more stable political system (i.e. The Peace of Westphalia), Spinoza's political works are deeply concerned with the possibility of 'peaceful diversity' (Frank and Waller, 2016: 9). Indeed, the purpose of the state, says Spinoza, is 'peace and security of life' (*TP* 5/2), and his political works consider how this purpose is to be achieved in consideration of the relational processes that determine society.

Spinoza, then, can offer concepts and measures by which to describe the relational process of state-building, and to assess the extent to which the process is productive of what he calls 'harmony' (*TP* 5/2, 5/5).<sup>7</sup> The question of whether and how a state can contribute to social harmony remains equally relevant to understanding the problems of conflict and division that exist today. In addition, this thesis considers how international organisations might contribute to social harmony as well. While Spinoza's political philosophy only briefly raises the question of a sphere 'above' the level of states, his relational ontology provides the analytic tools by which to address such transnational agency, as well as the influence of regional blocs and the development of international law (Altwickler, 2019; Sharp, 2005). It is for this reason that the present thesis utilises Spinoza's political philosophy, in combination with assemblage theory, to address the relationship between the UN, states, and the possibilities for peace.

Before turning to the objectives and structure of the thesis, I want to raise again the issue of 'liberal peace' and its critiques. The UN is rightly associated with the liberal model of peace. My purpose in adopting a relational ontology as the means to analyse UN peace operations is not to defend the UN from these critiques. But neither do I rule out from the beginning the possibility that institutions, states, and

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<sup>6</sup> Note, this combining is not a conscious rational decision – Spinoza views it as a natural process determined by every being's striving to persevere. See chapter 4 for more detail.

<sup>7</sup> The original Latin term used by Spinoza is *concordia*. Both Samuel Shirley's and Edwin Curley's translations of the *Political Treatise* render it as 'harmony'. Further discussion of Spinoza's meaning of the term is provided in chapter 4.

organisations contribute to the possibilities for peace. Therefore, while some will always reject the notion that a state or governmental institution might contribute to peace (see, for example, the anarchist geography of Springer, 2012, 2017), I want to note here how adopting a relational ontology might in fact aid critiques of, and political opposition to, liberal operations of peace. As a relational approach views states, institutions, and organisations not as unified actors but as processes, it draws our attention to the *actual workings* of policies understood to represent the liberal peace. ‘[M]ak[ing] this assemblage visible’ - as Jason Dittmer (2017: 22) puts it – reveals the concrete arrangements, orderings, actions and interactions, against which to direct critique. Thus the liberal peace can be examined in its actuality, and not as what DeLanda (2016: 48) calls a ‘reified generality’. It is in this that these authors see the political potential of assemblage thinking. Gaining insight into the relational process of a peace operation in today’s globalised politics can therefore contribute to ‘careful analysis of how the world is being changed, so that useful advocacy is possible’ (Dalby, 2014: 41).

### 1.3 Objectives and structure

#### 1.3.1 Aim of the research

The UN is representative of an unprecedented geopolitical trend that occurred over the 20<sup>th</sup> century – the attempt to develop multilateral systems of governmental collaboration in order to collectively pursue common goals; in this case, in order to prevent war and so maintain peace (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018; Kennedy, 2007). As noted above, however, nation states remain the standard form of political organisation. This thesis therefore preserves a focus on ‘the State’ as a political ideal and a political reality. The question is not whether peace is a product of internationalism, state sovereignty, or the local level. It is rather about their interaction and co-constitution, and what this can reveal about the geopolitics of peace today.

Taking all of the above into account, the thesis can be summarised as an investigation into the relationship between the UN, ‘the State’, and peace. It investigates this relationship in relation to changing conflict patterns following the Cold War, and the accompanying development of new forms of international authority and intervention. As such, the thesis seeks to contribute towards efforts to account for contemporary geopolitical transformations, including transnational political agency, cross-border flows of people and ideas, and the influence of international organisations (for overviews, see Kuus, 2018, 2019). It does so by drawing on political theory that disputes any clear distinctions between state and non-state, or local and national, in political explanation. Spinoza’s philosophy asserts the relationality of all beings - how they affect others and the world, and how they are affected by others and the world. While Spinoza’s political theory only briefly addresses a sphere of politics ‘above’ the state (*TP* 3/11-18), his relational account of reality make his work particularly applicable to considering transboundary networks of communication and influence (Sharp, 2005). Assemblage theory similarly disputes a state/non-state binary, and is therefore useful for thinking about those contemporary geopolitical phenomena that seem to question the primacy of the state (Dittmer, 2017). Both Spinoza’s philosophy and assemblage theory have in common a relational ontology.



## Chapter 1

The overarching objective of this thesis, therefore, is to apply a relational ontology to the geopolitics of peace, and to consider the implications of such an approach. I explore the implications along three themes. First, the meaning of peace, as a political and ethical category, and how it relates to the agencies that shape it in contemporary geopolitics. Second, the attempts by the UN to secure peace via the development of state institutions. Third, the issue of communal difference as it relates to both conflict, independence movements, and peace, and how UN peace operations have sought to manage these issues. The discussion of these themes is illustrated by a focus on United Nations peace operations in general, and the Interim Administration in Kosovo in particular. The UN is an organisation that particularly represents multilateral peace interventions in the post-Cold War era. The mission in Kosovo is a relevant case for considering the role of the state because of the extent of the UN's sovereignty over the region, Kosovo's subsequent unilateral declaration of independence, and the fact of Kosovo's still unresolved independent status. Kosovo is therefore a suitable case through which to explore the interaction between the UN, the state as a model of political organisation, and peace. In exploring these themes, the thesis aims 'to illustrate, support or challenge pre-existing theoretical assumptions' (Muvingi and Duckworth, 2014: 96) regarding the meaning of peace and the role of the state.

### 1.3.2 Research questions

Conceptually, the thesis therefore responds to two questions:

- How can states and international organisations be included in the geographical study of peace, whilst maintaining an appreciation of 'the local'?
- How does adopting a relational ontology help us think about the meaning of peace, and the political processes that are productive of peace?

These conceptual questions are addressed predominantly in chapters 3 and 4. Thereafter, the thesis turns to the analysis of the United Nations policy documents. To this end, it addresses two further questions:

- What is the UN's geopolitical vision regarding peace and the state in its contemporary peace operations?
- To what effect has this vision been manifest in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo?

### 1.3.3 Thesis structure

Chapter 2 provides an overview of UN peace operations, in order to further justify their inclusion in the geographical study of peace, and also to provide the necessary context and background information for the later analysis. This chapter particularly emphasises that a tension between the global aspirations of the UN and the primacy of the sovereign state has been present in the organisation from its beginning. This chapter also introduces the chosen case study of the UN Mission in Kosovo, providing an overview of the conflict and subsequent UN intervention that emphasises how the geopolitical trends of the post-Cold War era are manifest there. I argue that Kosovo's situation within the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and its unresolved independent status, make it a particularly suitable case for investigating the role of the state in the

contemporary geopolitics of peace. There are a number of other cases which could have served as the chosen example through which to investigate these themes. During my document analysis, in addition to Kosovo, I also examined the UN peace operations in South Sudan and Timor-Leste. In all three of these cases, the UN facilitated autonomy, self-government, and in the case of South Sudan and Timor-Leste, full legal independence. Each of these three interventions can therefore contribute to understanding how the UN pursues peace through the development of state institutions. The reason for choosing to focus specifically on Kosovo, however, is because the question of its independence remains unresolved. In Timor-Leste and South Sudan, the UN organised and monitored independence referendums, and subsequently aided the countries in their transfer to independence. In Kosovo, however, the UN mandate was not to assist a move to independence, but to promote ‘substantial autonomy and self-government’ while formally the region would remain a part of Serbia (S/RES/1244[1999]: § 11a). In 2008, however, against the authority of the UN, the Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Today, Kosovo’s independence is recognised by 115 states (Seymour, 2017), but it has not been granted membership of the United Nations.<sup>8</sup> Since the outbreak of war in 1998, therefore, the region of Kosovo has been under UN administration, has been subject to an internationally mediated peace process, and has emerged as a *de facto* state without official independent status. It has been determined by the agencies of ‘international society’, and yet cannot fully participate in international society. It is therefore the very fact of Kosovo’s unsettled status – and thus its unsettled *stateness* – that means it can shed light on the geopolitics of peace and the state. Regarding another anomalous expression of statehood, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, McConnell (2016: 5) writes that ‘polities such as dependencies, stateless nations and de facto states can provide a valuable window on the nature of international politics’. This thesis argues that Kosovo can serve such a function for thinking about the relationship between the UN and the state in the contemporary geopolitics of peace. The question of peace in Kosovo, and the question of Kosovo’s stateness, are deeply connected. Analysing the peace process in Kosovo over the past two decades therefore requires questioning assumptions about what a ‘state’ *is*, and how states interact with the relatively new forms of international political organisation like the UN. The analysis of these themes in relation to Kosovo might furthermore serve to inform research into other cases of peace/conflict that involve matters of international intervention, statehood, and territory, such as Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, Kashmir, and so on.

The overview of the UN and its mission in Kosovo is followed by the literature review, chapter 3, which places the thesis at the intersection of geographical research on peace, organisations, and new understandings of the state. By focussing on the UN and its state-building policies, this thesis is to an extent turning away from what have emerged as the central tenets of the peace geographies literature, in particular, understanding peace as a localised everyday process, and criticisms of the liberal model of peace. The literature review therefore carefully draws out the tension between peace as a local process and peace as the responsibility of state institutions and international organisations. Looking for a productive route through

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<sup>8</sup> All five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as two-thirds of the General Assembly (i.e. the organ consisting of representatives of all 193 Member States), must agree before a new country can be admitted to the UN as a Member State (see United Nations, 1945: Articles 4 and 18). Of the P-5 members, Russia and China both continue to reject Kosovo’s independence. Neither would Kosovo meet the two-thirds threshold in the General Assembly at its current number of recognitions.

## Chapter 1

this tension, the chapter then introduces Spinoza's relational ontology as a way of blurring distinctions between state and non-state, and so to develop alternative explanatory frameworks of political agency. It finishes by considering how the Spinozan approach relates to existing literature on the study of international organisations and their influence on states.

Building upon the themes and conceptual debates presented in the literature review, the fourth chapter presents the conceptual framework advanced by the thesis. Drawing from assemblage theory and Spinoza's political philosophy, this chapter offers an exposition of the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace. The need for such a theoretical chapter is to ensure that none of these three things – the three central topics of this thesis – are taken for granted. This chapter therefore develops a line of thought which questions the nature of the state as a political organisation, and of its interactions with international forms of political agency represented by the UN. It also develops an argument regarding how these are involved in the production of peace. The merits of a relational ontology in this regard is that it views the influence of the state and the UN as both inevitable and unavoidable, even while it disrupts any understanding of them as unified political actors. Accepting that causality is both top-down and bottom-up (DeLanda, 2016), a relational ontology leads us to consider how the local and the relational are already constitutive of institutional and state systems, and that, in turn, institutions and the patterns of social life they engender can shape the affects and passions of the population. The question, therefore, is how a state assemblage contributes to social/political life, and how might it contribute towards peace? The tendency towards peace and cooperation or towards division and violence is dependent on the kinds of affects and passions that circulate through a population (Armstrong, 2009; Sharp, 2005).

Having established the theoretical argument, the thesis then turns to textual analysis. This begins with chapter 5, the methodology, which explains my approach to the UN documents and how I use them to inform the discussion of the main themes of the thesis. After first considering organisations as objects of study more generally, the chapter turns to discourse analysis as it has been utilised in political geography. I argue that the relational ontology which underlies this thesis has implications for the method of discourse analysis. Drawing especially on Hasana Sharp's (2011) 'renaturalized' understanding of ideas, the analysis of the UN documents becomes an 'an engagement with the "life force" of ideas' (Sharp, 2011: 57), and the task is to identify how successfully the UN has mobilised the power of its ideas and what the consequences have been. I then describe the process by which I chose and analysed the UN documents.

Following the methodology are two chapters presenting an analysis of the UN documents in relation to the principle themes of the thesis. The first of these, chapter 6, concerns the UN's attempts to institutionalise peace. The term 'institution' here has a broad meaning, following Merje Kuus's (2018: 2) definition: 'more or less stable patterns in, and mechanisms for, organizing social and political life'. Where these patterns have reflected division and violence, the UN seeks to alter them towards more peaceful relations, ultimately with the aim that the society can achieve a self-sustaining peace. This chapter therefore addresses the UN peace policy and documentation in the UN's attempts to institutionalise peace in the regions in which it intervenes, and particularly how this has played out in the Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The chapter therefore presents the findings from the UN documentation regarding how peace is conceptualised by the

UN, including its vision of the role of the state. While the UN places considerable emphasis on the role of the state for securing a lasting peace, it is apparent that this statist vision sits in tension with the organisation's universal ideals, as well as with the need for multilateralism. To consider the implications of this vision, and geopolitical tension, in Kosovo, I consider how the UN participated in the 'Kosovo assemblage'. The mission in Kosovo was deployed in 1999 and is still in operation at the time of writing. The length of deployment, combined with the breadth of the mission, means that it is not possible to address all aspects of UNMIK throughout its 20 years of existence. I therefore focus on two key events from the history of UNMIK, those which are particularly indicative of the geopolitical tensions that are manifest in Kosovo, and how these tensions have shaped the possibilities for peace there. The first of these two is the unilateral declaration of independence by the government of Kosovo, which was a direct challenge and to the UN's authority in the region, and an assertion of statehood. The second key event is the resistance to the production of the state assemblage by Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo – the so-called 'North Kosovo crisis'

Chapter 7 deals with the problem of difference as it relates to both conflict and peace. Conflicts are often manifest along lines of communal difference – national, ethnic, religious, and so on. In cases of independence movements, a political movement claiming to represent a defined social group campaigns to achieve the demarcation of their own territory as distinct from the larger state within which they used to be formally included. In Kosovo, (and also in other cases, including Timor-Leste and South Sudan), the UN has facilitated this demarcation with the intention that it would be conducive of peace. Drawing on a further contemporary reading of Spinoza, this chapter characterises independence movements as a 'rejection of parthood' (Lord, 2017: 64). One of the fundamental tenets of Spinoza's ontology is the inability to make absolute distinctions between bodies. Bodies are both constituted and determined by other bodies, ultimately making up a single substance, 'God or Nature' (Spinoza, *E IV pref*; also *IV p4d*). This section therefore elaborates upon differentiation and relationality. I argue that such an understanding does not deny the existence of differences, nor that these differences are implicated in violence. But these differences are not seen as pre-given. Rather difference is viewed as produced by processes of *differentiation*, and this is a relational and affective process. Not only that, but the process is always ongoing, and so is potentially open to change. The passions and relations that are productive of group identity, and of conflict between groups, are not fixed. They can be subject to new affects, which can alter the patterns by which groups have organised themselves. Investigating difference and peace processes from this position is therefore about examining a 'network of passionate relationships' (Sharp, 2005: 607). Difference need not necessarily be a cause of conflict – whether it is or not is dependent on the types of affects circulating among people. I investigate how the UN's management of ethnic difference has played out in Kosovo by focusing on the conduct of elections in the region.

## 2 United Nations peace operations and the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

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### 2.1 Introduction

Searching in the journals *Political Geography* and *Geopolitics* reveals few articles about the United Nations. There are fewer still specifically about peace operations.<sup>9</sup> Despite a call, 25 years ago, for a ‘political geography of UN peacekeeping’ (Grundy-Warr, 1994), such a field of study has largely failed to develop. *Political Geography* published a special issue on the UN in 1996, in which only one article was about peacekeeping (Chopra, 1996). A handful of articles can be found in other journals on aspects of UN peace operations (for example Korson, 2015; Lemay-Hébert, 2018; Mahapatra, 2016; Mason, 2014).<sup>10</sup> Yet peace operations connect to, and raise questions about, themes of globalisation, transnational political agency, sovereignty, governmentality, territory, and the nature of states themselves. There is therefore broad potential for political geographies of the UN. This chapter provides an overview of UN peace operations and introduces the case mission on which the thesis focuses: the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Throughout, I show how the geopolitical transformations discussed in the introduction are implicated in, and demonstrated by, the evolution of UN peace operations.

I open this chapter by summarising peace operations between the UN’s formation in 1945 and the end of the Cold War, to demonstrate the unprecedented nature of peace missions as a geopolitical phenomenon. The discussion of the UN’s attempts to pursue peace raises a tension that has pervaded the UN throughout its history, and which remains significant today – the tension between the international scope of the organisation, and the principle of state sovereignty in international law. Given that this thesis deals with the UN’s facilitation of autonomy and self-government in the pursuit of peace – a perhaps paradoxical undertaking – this geopolitical tension remains an underlying concern when analysing the mission in Kosovo.

Having established the broader context, the second section turns to peace operations after the Cold War, a period of ‘expansion, failure, and reform’ (Sharland, 2018: 8). During this period, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established and several new missions were deployed in rapid succession. This development and expansion immediately following the Cold War is attributed to improved relations amongst Security Council members (notably between the USA and Russia), as well as to an increased demand for intervention as outbreaks of internal armed conflict increased (Koops *et al.*, 2015b). The defining events of the UN peace operations in the 1990s, however, are the failures to prevent the

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<sup>9</sup> I use ‘peace operations’ as the broadest term to capture the UN’s involvement in peace processes. As will be seen, the UN makes distinctions in how it defines its peace activities (peacekeeping, peacebuilding, etc.), but in practice they all happen simultaneously in any given intervention.

<sup>10</sup> I am here referring only to geographical journals. There are hundreds of articles on UN peace operations in journals outside of geography. I do not mean to say that if a paper does not appear in a nominally geographical journal it cannot contribute to a political geography of the UN. I make the distinction here only to demonstrate the dearth of research on the UN that is explicitly situated within political geography, an observation made also by McConnell (2019) and Megoran and Dalby (2018).

Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. The re-assessment of peacekeeping practices and policy recommendations that followed these failures have therefore shaped the policy and practice of UN peace operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Two of the most important reform agendas are represented by the ‘Brahimi Report’ (UN General Assembly, 2000) and the *Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO, 2008). I summarise the definitions of peace activities that can be found in these two documents, to demonstrate how the UN itself defines its role in 21<sup>st</sup> century peace processes. I end this section by focussing on the most comprehensive form of peace operation – so-called ‘transitional administrations’. In a transitional administration, the UN assumes sovereignty over the region in which it intervenes and, subsequently, takes on the responsibility of state administration. A transitional administration is therefore an excellent example of a trend by which states are today more and more subject to the influence of international organisations imposing governmental norms (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010). A UN transitional administration is a prime example of how a peace process is shaped in the interaction between a state and new forms of international political agency.

This leads to the third section, which introduces the UN’s facilitation of autonomy in Kosovo. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is representative of a modern ‘multi-dimensional’ peace operation. Multi-dimensional operations developed in the ‘transformation of the international environment’ following the end of the Cold War (UN DPKO, 2008: 22). A trend towards civil conflicts in ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states meant that UN interventions more often engaged in matters of internal governance. Multi-dimensional missions therefore differ from ‘traditional’ peacekeeping in their broader and more active participation in the political and social processes of the country in which they are deployed. In addition to the traditional role of observing ceasefires and maintaining the separation of forces, a multi-dimensional mission also includes supporting policing and rule of law, developing institutions of governance, conducting elections, protecting civilians, and promoting dialogue and reconciliation (UN DPKO, 2003, 2008). As a transitional administration, UNMIK took the multi-dimensional approach to an unprecedented extent. It was, at the time, the broadest and most comprehensive mandate that the UN had ever undertaken. Established in 1999, and still present in Kosovo today, UNMIK has been in operation alongside some major policy initiatives in UN peacekeeping/building, not least those following the failures of the UN peace missions in Bosnia and Rwanda. Kosovo is therefore particularly suitable for examining UN peace policies as they have developed in the aftermath of the 1990s failures. Its status as one of the first, and the longest running, multi-dimensional transitional administrations makes it a landmark case through which to consider the relationships between states, internationalism, and peace.

## 2.2 A brief overview of the United Nations and its peace operations, 1945-1989

The UN was established in 1945. Initiated during WWII, and organised principally by the ‘Great Powers’ of the USA, the USSR, and the UK (Morris, 2018), the UN Charter was eventually signed in San Francisco by the governments of 50 countries (United Nations, 1945). At the time of writing there are 193 Member States. The UN is part of an unprecedented trend in the 20<sup>th</sup> century towards inter-state cooperation on matters of war and peace, development, and international law (Kennedy, 2007). Hathaway and Shapiro (2018) designate this the emergence of a ‘New World Order’. For centuries, war, conquest, aggression, and

## Chapter 2

coercion had been both legal and accepted in relations between states (the ‘Old World Order’). By contrast, the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the development of new laws and principles for international order; conquest and aggression were outlawed, and cooperation became, in principle at least, the only legitimate way to pursue state interests (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018). The UN is a key organisation in this ‘New World Order’, founded on the assumption that security and prosperity for all states is to be pursued cooperatively.

The immediate predecessor of the UN was the League of Nations (1920-1946). One of the first ever intergovernmental organisations, the League had been established after World War I as a means of peacefully settling disputes between states (see Housden, 2014; Northedge, 1986). Although it represents a significant part in the development of international law and human rights (Redman, 1994), the League ultimately failed in its purpose to prevent war. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 is considered the first major test, and failure, of the League of Nations (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018; Kennedy, 2007). This was precisely the kind of aggressive action by one state upon another that the League was designed to resolve. And yet, according to the League’s Covenant, there was no obligation on member states to take military or economic action against an aggressor (Kennedy, 2007). Furthermore, because the USA and the USSR were not members of the League at the time of the Manchurian occupation, a counter to Japan’s aggression would have had to rely on Britain and France, neither of whose governments committed to action. Instead, the League commissioned an investigation into the incident, the Lytton Commission, which concluded that the Japanese invasion was not legitimate (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018). In response, the Japanese simply withdrew their membership from the League of Nations. No further measures were taken by the League. By the time Adolf Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain decided to negotiate with Hitler directly, rather than rely on the League of Nations. In demonstrating that the British government no longer had faith in it, Chamberlain’s decision was ‘a deathblow to the League’ (Kennedy, 2007: 21).

The Charter of the United Nations, therefore, is in part influenced by the failure of the League; that is, the founders tried to organise the UN such that it would avoid the same problems that made the League ineffectual (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010; Kennedy, 2007). For example, it was imperative that both the USA and the USSR would be members. The USA had never joined the League of Nations, despite President Woodrow Wilson’s pioneering role in its formation (Knock, 1995). The US Senate voted against joining, for fear that doing so would legally oblige the USA to enter future conflicts (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2018). The USSR was only admitted to the League in 1934, and was expelled again in 1939 when it invaded Finland (Gross, 1945). In order to ensure the participation of the USA and USSR in the United Nations, it was agreed that permanent Security Council membership, and veto-power, would be granted to the ‘Permanent Five’ (P-5) countries – the USA, USSR, UK, China, and France (Morris, 2018; United Nations, 1945: Article 23; Article 27). With power of veto, these countries’ governments could ensure that they would not be obliged to obey the authority of the organisation; they could prevent any decisions being made that they deemed to be against their interest.

Regarding peace, the UN inherited the League of Nations’ principle of inter-governmental cooperation in the prevention of war. Indeed, the first declared purpose of UN is ‘To maintain international peace and

security' (United Nations, 1945: Article 1). The first UN peace operation was established in 1948. It was called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and it was mandated to monitor a ceasefire in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (S/RES/50[1948]).<sup>11</sup> The peace missions deployed during the Cold War are generally referred to as 'traditional peacekeeping'. It should be noted, however, that there are still some 'traditional' operations ongoing today, for example the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, which was established in 1964 (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010). Traditional operations are deployed to monitor the implementation of peace agreements, with tasks including observing ceasefires and maintaining the separation of forces. The majority of these operations in the Cold War intervened in conflicts *between* states, and were deployed with the consent of the parties to the conflict. The limits of a principal of consent are apparent. For example, before the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, Egypt simply withdrew consent and told the UN peace operation to leave.<sup>12</sup>

The need for consent from a host government was not the only way in which the ideals of the UN Charter have proved difficult to realise in practice. No peace operation can be mandated without the agreement of the P-5, even if all other Member States are in support. Kennedy (2007) cites this as the reason that there were no UN interventions in Algeria (because of French interests) or in Vietnam (because of US interests). During the Cold War, the P-5 were seldom in consensus, limiting the Security Council's capacity to make decisions and authorise action. No peace operations were mandated between 1974 and 1987, for example. Disagreement among the P-5 also meant that a proposed UN standing army, which could have increased the speed of response to crises, was never implemented (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010).

The difficulties presented by the P-5 veto, and by the need for consent from the parties to a conflict, reflect a tension that remains at the heart of the UN as an organisation – the tension between a global organisation with universal ideals, and the principle of state sovereignty (Kennedy, 2007; Weiss and Daws, 2018). While state sovereignty is itself a universal ideal, and one that the UN promotes, the tension arises when a sovereign state acts contrarily to the other ideals adhered to by the UN, such as peace, democracy, or human rights. The principle of state sovereignty is written into the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945: Article 2), even while the Security Council is supposed to constitute an authority which Member States agree to obey (*ibid.*, Articles 24-25; Article 49). As Weiss and Daws (2018: 7-8) put it, 'the UN has been responsible for both the triumph and the erosion of state sovereignty'.

This tension is present also in the concept of multilateralism. Organising collective responses to problems that transcend borders requires that individual state governments participate in, and are accountable to, the decision making of a broader coalition of states. Multilateralism is central to the functioning of international organisations like the UN, and by definition it involves a reduction in absolute sovereignty on the part of individual governments. Governments are not always willing to make such concessions, and so multilateral action can become stalled and ineffectual. In the case of the P-5 countries, the problem is exacerbated yet further. If a P-5 government wants to protect its own interests against a multilateral decision or programme, not only can it refuse to cooperate, it can also use its veto to prevent the other members of the Security

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<sup>11</sup> UNTSO remains in operation at the time of writing.

<sup>12</sup> The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) had been deployed to Egypt in response to the Suez Crisis in 1956.



Council from implementing the decision. Hence the ‘everlasting dilemma: how to reconcile national interests [...] with international aspirations’ (Hanhimäki, 2015: 27). As the next section will discuss, the end of the Cold War saw a rapid expansion in the UN’s multilateral peace operations, as well as innovations in peacekeeping policy and practice. The apparently fundamental tension between internationalism and sovereignty has not gone away, however, and it remains a factor in the politics of intervention.

### 2.3 Peacekeeping after the Cold War: ‘expansion, failure, and reform’

The evolution of peacekeeping following the end of the Cold War is a recurrent theme in the literature on modern peace activities (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010; Berdal, 2009; Koops *et al.*, 2015c). The early 1990s saw a significant expansion of UN peacekeeping efforts. No longer constrained by the politics of competing superpowers in the Security Council, there was a rapid deployment of new peace missions. Twenty new operations were mandated between 1988 and 1993, in contrast to just 13 operations in the 40 years before 1988. In 1992, the newly appointed Secretary-General established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and published his vision for the future of UN peace operations, the *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The *Agenda* laid out a more interventionist approach to UN peace operations. It even questioned the assumption of inviolable state sovereignty (Peou, 2002), stating that ‘[t]he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty[...] has passed’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: § 17). The *Agenda* was therefore a distinct development in the UN’s conceptualisation of peace. It expanded the responsibilities of UN peace missions to include institution building following civil war, as well as to ‘address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: § 15). The role of the UN envisioned by Boutros-Ghali thus far surpassed that of ‘traditional’ peace operations.

The initial optimism and expansion were soon dampened, however, by the failure of UN peacekeepers to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. A ‘period of introspection’ began (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010: 75), alongside a steep reduction in the numbers of personnel deployed across all missions, from over 70,000 in 1994, to fewer than 15,000 in 1998 (International Peace Institute, n.d.). The 1990s were, therefore, a transformational period of ‘expansion, failure, and reform’ (Sharland, 2018: 8) in international peacekeeping.

In subsequent years, the UN developed new doctrines and policies in response to its failures, and began once again to expand its operations (Koops *et al.*, 2015a). The start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw the release and partial implementation of the ‘Brahimi report’ (UN General Assembly, 2000), which supplied a full review of UN peace activities, including recommendations, as a direct response to peacekeeping failures. In 2008, new *Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO, 2008) were established, providing a coherent overview of peacekeeping doctrine intended to guide ‘planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations’ (p. 8). The numbers of personnel deployed also returned to, and surpassed, those of the 1990s, with 2010 seeing over 100,000 peacekeepers in the field (Koops *et al.*, 2015a).

This research focuses on this recent period in peacekeeping history, because of the sustained effort to develop new and more effective policies. The peace operations that are ongoing today have been shaped by the policies and practices introduced as the UN struggled to learn from its failures in the 1990s. An

understanding and analysis of these policies and practices is therefore necessary in order to develop broader arguments about the contemporary geopolitics of peace.

### 2.3.1 Defining UN peace activities

Two of the most important policy initiatives for the reform and improvement of UN peace operations are the ‘Brahimi Report’ and the *Principles and Guidelines* (Koops *et al.*, 2015a). The ‘Brahimi Report’ – or the ‘Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’, to use its official title – was commissioned in light of the UN’s failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre (UN General Assembly, 2000). The *Principles and Guidelines* – also called the Capstone Doctrine – is the UN’s guide to the normative framework of its peace operations (UN DPKO, 2008). Its publication was the first time that the DPKO had produced a single text setting out ‘the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United Nations peacekeeping’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 9). Both of these documents offer definitions of the main activities undertaken in UN peace operations. The Brahimi report names three: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and peacebuilding (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 10). The *Principles and Guidelines* separates conflict prevention and peacemaking into distinct elements, and adds a further concept, peace enforcement, to total five overarching activities that the UN carries out in the pursuit of ‘international peace and security’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 17).

Conflict prevention and peacemaking are defined as the diplomatic efforts to prevent the escalation of violent conflict, and to ‘bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 17). As stated, while the Brahimi report presents these as one category, the *Principles* distinguishes between them. According to the *Principles*, conflict prevention is an intervention in a dispute *before* it has escalated to direct violence. Peacemaking is the diplomatic action taken once a conflict has already become violent, to try and negotiate a cease-fire and formal peace agreement. Peace enforcement is the use of ‘coercive measures’ to counter ‘a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). It can include the use of military force. These three activities are therefore presented as taking place before and during a violent conflict.

Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is defined as the effort to maintain security in the immediate *aftermath* of a violent conflict, once the hostile parties have signed a peace agreement. The documents recognise the




Figure 1 - 'The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' (UN DPKO, 2008: 23)

distinction between ‘traditional’ peacekeeping during the Cold War period, and broader ‘multi-dimensional’ peace operations that have been mandated since the 1990s. Traditional peacekeeping is defined as a principally military operation, observing ceasefires and maintaining the separation of hostile forces. While some traditional missions are still ongoing, the majority of contemporary peace operations are multi-dimensional, combining a traditional military presence with police and civilian personnel, and engaging with politics, governance, and social issues (Figure 1). The scope of such operations means that peacekeepers work in collaboration with various partners, including The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, NGOs, and humanitarian agencies. The *Principles* acknowledge that UN peacekeeping has limitations. It is ‘neither designed nor equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 28), and must be ‘deployed as one part of a much broader international effort’ (ibid., 22).

The limits of peacekeeping therefore lead to peacebuilding. Originally conceptualised in *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), peacebuilding measures aim to produce ‘something that is more than just the absence of war’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). According to the *Principles and Guidelines*, peacebuilding is part of the development work of the UN Country Team (UNCT),<sup>13</sup> a distinct part of the organisation from the DPKO. Peacebuilding encompasses a broad range of ideas and activities. As the Brahimi report states:

[P]eace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13).




Figure 2 - UN peace activities. Note the overlapping 'grey areas', indicating the lack of strict separation between them (UN DPKO, 2008: 19)

<sup>13</sup> Country teams are part of the UN Development Group. Their purpose is to coordinate, and take overall responsibility for, the various distinct UN agencies involved in the development of a specific country.

The *Principles and Guidelines* state: ‘Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect [*sic*] the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). These definitions therefore associate peacebuilding with state functions such as law and order, with social measures such as reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as with international concepts such as universal human rights. They demonstrate the broad understanding of the responsibilities of UN peace operations that Boutros-Ghali championed in *An Agenda for Peace*. The definitions confirm, once again, that the UN’s vision for contemporary peace operations goes far beyond that of ‘traditional’ missions to include social, legal, and political measures.

The documents acknowledge, however, that there is not a strict separation between peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping (Figure 2). The linear conceptualization of distinct activities before, during, and after, a conflict is not necessarily how peace operations unfold in practice. Furthermore, peacekeeping, and to an extent peacemaking and enforcement, are seen as constituent parts of the overall peacebuilding efforts (Figure 2). The Brahimi report says, ‘peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners’ (§ 28), while the *Principles and Guidelines* confirms that the boundaries between the various concepts are blurred, such that ‘Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity’ (p. 18). This is particularly so since the end of the Cold War, as evidenced by the development of the multi-dimensional approach to peace operations.

The broad understanding of peacebuilding was further re-emphasised, and indeed broadened further, in 2016, when the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted a new concept: ‘sustaining peace’ (UN Secretary-General, 2016: § 60). The term was proposed in a ‘Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture’ that was commissioned by the presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council (A/69/968-S/2015/490). The concept ‘sustaining peace’ aims to develop the definition of peacebuilding as a strategy across all the other peace activities, including before tensions and divisions become violent. Indeed, the review suggested that the ‘post-conflict’ prefix should be removed from ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, to emphasise the all-encompassing understanding of peacebuilding (A/69/968-S/2015/420: § 26). Furthermore, the review emphasised that ‘sustaining peace’ is inextricable from the other ‘pillars’ of the UN – namely, development and human rights (ibid., see section ‘D’). ‘Sustaining peace’ would therefore require the above figure 2 to be adjusted, to show that the measures for a sustainable peace should be supported *before* the outbreak of conflict. The introduction of yet another adjustment to the definition of its peace activities demonstrates the ongoing endeavour for the UN to improve its approach to peace, in response to both experience and changing circumstances.

The above definitions demonstrate just how broad the approach to peace has become, and that it continues to broaden. Indeed, a UN peace operation is not even exclusive to the UN, but involves collaboration with other international, regional, and non-governmental organisations. When the UN deploys a mission, therefore, the local context becomes subject to the influence of a global network of actors, whose policies and practices shape the possibilities for peace, for both better and worse. The broadest and most comprehensive form of peace intervention is a ‘transitional administration’.

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### 2.3.2 Transitional administrations

A characteristic of 21<sup>st</sup> century peace operations, therefore, is their increasingly complex and multi-dimensional nature (Berdal, 2009; Zanotti, 2006). New peacekeeping missions have tended ‘towards broad and complex mandates’ (Koops *et al.*, 2015a: 613). They entail ‘supervising and conducting elections’, ‘strengthening the rule of law’, and ‘promoting respect for human rights’ (UN DPKO, 2003: 2). Such aims necessitate the use of more police and civilian personnel, in addition to the traditional military presence, as missions increasingly take on ‘the functions of state administration’ (Zanotti, 2006: 151; see also Richmond, 2004). Since the mid-1990s, four peace operations have provided so-called ‘transitional administrations’ – in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Bosnia. These missions were distinct in the extent of the authority that they were granted over the territory in which they intervened (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010; Caplan, 2004). They ‘assumed a sovereign-like responsibility’ for the governance of their respective regions (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010: 256).

Writing in 1996, Chopra (1996: 339) reflected on the necessity of UN peace operations to establish ‘jurisdiction over the entire territory, and ought to deploy throughout if it can’. In countries where state authority has failed, Chopra argues, and where there is factionalism and conflict between different groups, then a partial deployment of the UN merely makes the peacekeepers into one of the groups competing for power (Chopra, 1996). Although Chopra expresses doubt at the capacity of the UN to establish the kind of authority he advocates, this is in fact what the organisation would go on to attempt in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. In these cases, both established in 1999, the UN took on responsibility for the administration of the regions, including making and enforcing the law, conducting elections, delivering humanitarian aid, and maintaining the provision of public services such as water and electricity.

Transitional administrations are therefore the type of peace mission which represent the fullest extent of the changes in peace processes that have developed since the end of the Cold War. While each one occurs in a specific context with its own unique history, culture, and politics, the fact that these operations are led by the UN means that they also involve networks of transnational political agency, the imposition of ‘universal’ political and legal norms, and integration into regional organisations. This thesis therefore agrees with Dalby (2014: 30) that changes in the ‘geopolitical scene’ ought to be incorporated into geographies of peace, and suggests that examining UN transitional administrations is a way in which to do so. Transitional administrations are particularly suitable for examining the transnational character of today’s peace processes, and what they reveal about political agency and the responsibility for peace. While any of the states mentioned here would be a suitable focus, for the purposes of this thesis I have chosen to use Kosovo as the main case in which to explore these themes. The next section outlines how post-Cold War transformations in geopolitics are manifest in the case of the UN’s intervention in the Kosovo War.

## 2.4 The UN Interim Administration in Kosovo

The remainder of this chapter introduces Kosovo as an important case through which to investigate the UN, the state, and peace. The account of the conflict given here is necessarily simplified, its purpose being to contextualise the analysis later in the thesis, rather than to provide a sufficient historical explanation. As

such, the summary focuses mainly on the contemporary violent events that prompted the deployment of a UN peace mission. Yet, the modern conflict did not occur in a vacuum. The history of Kosovo includes the history of the Ottoman empire in Europe, the Kingdom of Serbia, Austria-Hungary, the creation of Yugoslavia, the first and second world wars, and other factors besides. When tracing the ‘geopolitical becoming’ (Dittmer, 2014a: 395) of a state assemblage, there is no point at which a formal origin can be established in the chains of causation that determine the present. This is not only an academic point. The Battle of Kosovo, fought in 1389 between Serbian forces and the invading Ottoman Empire, still holds significance for contemporary Serbian identity. A narrative of the battle is mobilised in Serbian nationalism, which is implicated in the war that led to UN intervention (see Bieber, 2002; Erjavec and Volčič, 2007). With this caveat in mind, I turn to the Kosovo War.

#### 2.4.1 The conflict

The Kosovo War (Feb 1998 – June 1999) was fought in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), of which Kosovo was a constituent region. It was one of several conflicts that occurred during the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Cohen, 1995; Denitch, 1994), and can more broadly be situated in the history of ethnic, religious, and nationalist conflicts in the Balkans (Glenny, 1999). In the 1990s, the FRY consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, which were the two remaining republics following the secession of the other Yugoslav constituent countries.<sup>14</sup> Kosovo was formally a part of Serbia, but it had long been the focus of competing national territorial claims – Serbian on the one hand, and Albanian on the other (see Daskalovski, 2005). It was part of Serbia, then, but within the Kosovo region the population was majority ethnic Albanian (Brunborg, 2002). It was this national/ethnic division along which the war in 1998 was fought.

Kosovo had a certain amount of autonomy under Josip Broz Tito’s rule in socialist Yugoslavia.<sup>15</sup> This was particularly so after a new Yugoslav constitution, in 1974, made Kosovo an ‘autonomous province’, with its own assembly, judiciary, and veto power in the Serbian government (Daskalovski, 2005; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Such freedoms did not prevent an Albanian nationalist movement, however, which favoured Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, and in some cases also wanted integration into Albania (Arhsien and Howells, 1981). When Tito died in 1980, Albanian separatist sentiment increased, as did incidents of ethnic based violence against Serbs in Kosovo (Daskalovski, 2005). At the end of the Cold War, however, Kosovo remained a part of Serbia.

In 1990, the newly elected President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, began a series of discriminatory policies against Albanians in Kosovo. These included dissolving the Kosovo Assembly, changing street names from Albanian to Serbian, and firing Albanian teachers who refused to adopt a new Serbian curriculum (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Albanian resistance to Serbian authority over Kosovo was initially peaceful, exemplified by a boycott of Serbian schools and establishing in their place a parallel Albanian education system (Daskalovski, 2005). By the mid-90s, however, more radical separatist groups began to carry out acts of armed resistance, under the name of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

<sup>14</sup> The six constituent republics of Yugoslavia were: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

<sup>15</sup> Tito was Prime Minister of Yugoslavia 1944-1963; he was President of Yugoslavia from 1953 until his death in 1980.

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(Judah, 2000). The eventual outbreak of war at the beginning of 1998 is considered to have been sparked when Serbian anti-terrorist police killed a KLA leader and almost 60 further Kosovo Albanians in the village of Prekaz (Judah, 2000; Özerdem, 2003). The KLA reacted with more widespread mobilisation, and Serbian forces responded in kind. The ensuing violence included ethnically motivated killing of civilians (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000).

The Serbian forces were more numerous and better organised than the Albanian militias, and they advanced rapidly through the regions of Kosovo where the KLA operated, sometimes burning villages and carrying out executions (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). Judah (2000) suggests that this excessive use of force prompted international sympathy for the Kosovo Albanians, sympathy that eventually led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to launch a bombing campaign against the Serbs in March 1999. By June of the same year, Milošević accepted an agreement to remove all Serbian forces from Kosovo (NATO, 1999), and agreed to an international presence in Kosovo, to be led by the UN. On 10 June 1999, therefore, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244 [1999]) to establish the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

### 2.4.2 The UN intervention

While the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia was not mandated by the UN, the intervention following it was a collaboration between the two organisations. The Security Council resolution authorised an ‘international security presence’ and an ‘international civil presence’, with distinct responsibilities designated to each. The security presence, Kosovo Force (KFOR), is led by NATO, while the civil presence is led by the UN, in partnership with the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The security presence was mandated to ensure the withdrawal of military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, to demilitarize the KLA, and to monitor the border. The intention was to maintain a secure territory within which the civil presence could carry out their responsibilities, and so that ‘other international organizations’ could move freely and safely within the region (S/RES/1244[1999]: § 9).

The borders of Kosovo were established based on the Serbian districts of Kosovo and Metohija. These districts had been defined as part of the Constitution of Serbia. When the war ended with the signing of the Military Technical Agreement, Serbian forces agreed to withdraw beyond these boundaries (NATO, 1999). The UN’s ‘operational boundary’ therefore conforms to what were the existing district boundaries. The UN documentation, in adherence to its official neutrality on the question of Kosovo’s independence, always notes that its maps of the operational boundary ‘do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations’ (see for example S/2004/348: p. 19).

The first responsibility that the civil presence was given in the mandate was to promote ‘substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo’ (S/RES/1244[1999]: § 11a). This was to be achieved through the establishment of ‘provisional institutions’ of government and the gradual transfer of powers to them. The mission established the Assembly of Kosovo and organised the elections by which members of the Assembly were selected. The civil side of the mission was also instructed to facilitate negotiations on the

final status of Kosovo in relation to Serbia, a matter which has yet to be resolved at the time of writing. The resolution also mandates UNMIK to maintain law and order using an international police force. In addition to these institutional measures, the mandate also includes measures directed at the needs and rights of the citizens, notably the provision of humanitarian aid (in cooperation with aid organizations), the protection of human rights, and the safe return of ‘refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo’ (ibid., § 11).

The mission in Kosovo therefore had the broadest mandate that had ever been given to a UN peace operation (Caplan, 2015). Along with the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) established later in the same year, Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that they were ‘charged with nothing less than helping to rebuild shattered societies almost from scratch’ (UN Secretary-General, 2000: § 5). The model of state-building by which UNMIK set out to achieve this task can be observed in two key documents: the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (UNMIK, 2001), and the Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004). The Constitutional Framework provided the constitution by which Kosovo was to be governed, including the organisation of the Assembly of Kosovo and the judicial system. It also laid out which powers were to be transferred to the Assembly, and which were to be reserved by UNMIK’s Special Representative to the Secretary-General. The reserved powers included the right to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly should it act in contradiction to the Security Council mandate (UNMIK, 2001: § 8.1), demonstrating that ultimate authority was vested in UNMIK rather than the Assembly. Meanwhile, the Standards for Kosovo lay out a series of benchmarks that the UN Security Council deemed necessary to have been achieved before the independent status of Kosovo would be considered – the so-called ‘standards before status’ policy (see S/PRST/2004/13). The Standards cover a broad range of aspects, including criteria for the functioning of democratic institutions, freedom of movement of all citizens, management of the economy, and dialogue between the Kosovo and Serbian governments (UNMIK, 2004).

While the Constitutional Framework and the Standards for Kosovo indicate the unprecedented extent of the authority that the UN took over Kosovo, UNMIK’s authority was directly challenged in 2008, when the Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. The Assembly then started a process of assuming the powers that, until then, had been reserved by UNMIK, and adopted a new constitution ‘that does not envisage a real role for UNMIK’ (S/2008/458: § 2). The USA, the UK, and France immediately recognised Kosovo’s independence. Russia and China, however, did not. Such disparity among the P-5 meant that the Security Council could provide no guidance as to how UNMIK should respond, thus leaving it up to the Secretary-General alone to manage (ibid., § 3). The outcome was a loss of authority for UNMIK, and ultimately a significant downsizing of the mission. Shortly following the declaration of independence, UNMIK recommended that the European Union take on a greater role in Kosovo (S/2008/354: § 13). For example, responsibility for ‘policing, justice and customs’ (S/2008/692: § 23) was handed over to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Equipment, vehicles, and office space were transferred from UNMIK to EULEX (ibid.).

It can be seen that, in the case of Kosovo, the principal of the consent of the parties was not respected as it was in the previously mentioned example of Egypt and Israel. Serbia did agree to the deployment of the



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UN mission, but coming as it did in the aftermath of NATO's bombing campaign, the consent of the Serbian government could not have been withdrawn as it was in Egypt. This point recalls the previously mentioned tension regarding state sovereignty and the aspirations of the UN as responsible for maintaining peace and adherence to human rights. In the case of Kosovo, NATO and the UN forced Serbia to relinquish sovereignty over Kosovo as a way of stopping the war. The UN mission in Kosovo can therefore be understood, in its initial years at least, as representative of the changing attitude to sovereignty that was presented in *An Agenda for Peace*. The sovereign right of the Serbian government was subordinated to the need to stop the war. When Kosovo itself had sufficiently developed its governmental institutions, however, it was the Kosovo government that in effect withdrew consent to be under UN authority. The support for independence from three members of the P-5 has effectively allowed the Assembly of Kosovo to take authority away from UNMIK, even while, formally, Resolution 1244 is still in place. As of September 2019, UNMIK consists of only 347 personnel.<sup>16</sup>

### 2.4.3 The geopolitics of peace in Kosovo

The preamble of the Security Council mandate for UNMIK affirms the UN's commitment to the 'sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', but supports 'substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo' (S/RES/1244[1999]: p. 2). These two commitments, appearing one after the other, summarise the geopolitical tension into which the United Nations deployed. Kosovo is today a *de facto* independent state, but is only partially recognised. The governments of Serbia and Kosovo have engaged in EU facilitated dialogue, but the fundamental question of Kosovo's independence remains unresolved (Bieber, 2015). Within Kosovo itself, four Serb-majority municipalities in the north of the region do not recognise the independence of Kosovo, and look instead to the Serbian government as legitimate (see later chapters for more on northern Kosovo).<sup>17</sup> Kosovo Serbs in these municipalities have been allowed to vote in Serbia's elections, even after Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (see S/2012/603: §§ 4-5). In the more recent past there have even been discussions of a potential 'land swap', whereby portions of Kosovo would be ceded to Serbia and vice-versa (Capussela, 2018). These are some of the contradictions and tensions that UNMIK operates within, which have shaped the possibilities for peace in Kosovo over the past two decades, and will continue to do so.

Kosovo is therefore an exceptional case through which to consider the interaction between international organisations and the state, and how geopolitics can shape possibilities for peace. Nationalism and the assertion of statehood were central to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and its corresponding wars (Denitch, 1994). In Kosovo, the UN assisted in 'autonomy and self-government' as a means towards establishing a lasting peace. The question of the state is central to the case of Kosovo. A consideration of the politics of 'stateness' (Painter, 2006) is required for explanations of both the war, and the attempts to build peace. This thesis examines the ambiguities and paradoxes that are implicated in the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo as a way of shedding light on the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace.

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<sup>16</sup> Figure taken from the official UNMIK webpage. See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmik>

<sup>17</sup> The four municipalities are: North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of United Nations peace operations and has sought to demonstrate their potential as a topic through which to explore the geopolitics of peace. In particular, I have noted the changing character and methods of UN peace missions following the Cold War. The chapter has also introduced the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and emphasised the geopolitical factors that shape the possibilities for peace in Kosovo.

The UN is a prominent actor in what has been termed ‘international society’ (Gorman, 2012; Mayall, 1990) – the organisations, networks, and ideas, that form and operate across national boundaries. As such, it has from its beginnings involved tensions between its multilateral methods in the pursuit of universal norms, and the assertion of sovereign interests on the part of national governments. The interaction between the UN and its individual Member States therefore shapes the capacities of the organisation. Cooperation among states across the world means that the UN has the potential to orchestrate ambitious multilateral action on global issues. And yet, as the example of the P-5 veto demonstrates, multilateralism has often been stalled by the disagreement of individual governments.

This is just one of the ways in which the UN’s pursuit of peace is a geopolitical matter. As relations among the P-5 improved after the Cold War, there was a burst of activity in the UN’s efforts for peace. Not only was there a rapid increase in the number of missions deployed, but the mandates and methods of the operations began to change dramatically as well. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* laid out a vision for UN peace operations that was more interventionist and broader in scope. This, too, was shaped by geopolitics. The end of the Cold War saw a trend towards the dissolution of some states, not least the break-up of the USSR in 1991. Central governments in some states found their authority challenged by separatist movements, sometimes breaking down along ethnic lines (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995). This process resulted in ‘the dissolution of multiethnic empires and states, and the emergence of new states with contested boundaries’ (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010: 416). The problem of state break-up and civil war, combined with a more interventionist vision for peace, meant that UN peace operations began to engage far more with matters of internal governance. In particular, the development of transitional administrations saw the most comprehensive peace operations that had yet been mandated in the UN’s history. As conflicts have changed, therefore, so have the methods of the UN’s attempts to maintain peace.

All of these factors come together in the case of Kosovo. The Kosovo War occurred in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which resulted in a series of ethno-nationalist conflicts. Kosovo was the last of these Yugoslav wars, as the ethnic-Albanian majority in the region sought to achieve independence from Serbia. The UN’s response was to launch its most comprehensive transitional administration operation. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is therefore an example of the capacity of international society to shape the politics of war and peace in a region, with UNMIK actually assuming sovereignty over Kosovo. While UNMIK might in part be placed among the ‘proliferation of nation-building’ (McConnell, 2016: 20) that occurred after the Cold War, it is significant that the transfer to independence is stalled; Kosovo has not achieved formal legal independence from Serbia, and is only partially recognised by other

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states. The post-conflict efforts towards peace in Kosovo are therefore intimately connected to the question of its 'stateness'. It is a case in which the international networks of authority that intervened have both enabled and disabled Kosovo's transfer to independence. The UN mission in Kosovo developed Kosovo's governmental institutions, monitored its borders, dismissed Serbian sovereignty over the region, and so greatly aided its autonomy and its capacity to function as a state. And yet, at the same time, the UN never committed to Kosovo's independence and has not recognised its status since the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared independence in 2008.

All of the above factors make UNMIK an especially useful example through which to explore the geopolitics of a contemporary peace process and the influence of international organisations on the possibilities for peace. Patterns of the contemporary political world 'cannot be neatly summarized in terms of nation-based categories' (Kuus, 2018: 6), and this is certainly true of the politics of peace in Kosovo. Investigating the UN's approach to peace in Kosovo can therefore contribute to efforts in political geography, as a discipline, to develop analyses of the transnational character of political agency, and how this agency interacts with the more traditional politics of the nation state (Bachmann, 2013; Dittmer, 2014a, 2017; Jeffrey, 2013; Kuus, 2018, 2019). Having now introduced the main research topics, the next chapter aims to demonstrate how this thesis contributes to the broader geographical literature on peace, states, and international organisations.

### 3 Literature review: Geographies of peace, the ‘local turn’, and international organisations

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#### 3.1 Introduction

The origins of this thesis can be traced to a module on geopolitics I undertook in my final year as an undergraduate. Writing an assignment on external intervention in the Israel-Palestine conflict, I came across Nick Megoran’s (2011) call for the study of peace within geography. His assertion was straightforward - geographers and geography are ‘better at studying war than peace’ (p. 178). If they want to more effectively respond to today’s global problems, geographers must examine the meaning of peace, as well as commit to ‘building cultures of peace’ (p. 187). In subsequent years, several geographers have critically responded to, supported, and broadened the literature on peace (for example Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018; Brickell, 2015; Courtheyn, 2018; Koopman, 2011b; Loyd, 2012; Ross, 2011; Springer, 2014; Williams and McConnell, 2011; Woon, 2014, 2015). An edited volume dedicated specifically to peace as a geographical topic of study has also been published (McConnell *et al.*, 2014). This chapter begins by identifying the key themes in this literature regarding how peace can be understood as a concept, and specifically as a *geographical* concept. Peace is not easily defined, and the literature embraces this complexity rather than seeking to be definitive about the meaning of peace. How peace is understood varies not only over time and in different places, but also according to the frames of reference used to discuss it. To this complexity I apply Simon Dalby’s basic definition of critical geopolitical analysis: to ‘explicate the implicit or explicit political implications of knowing the world in particular ways’ (Dalby, 2003, in Megoran, 2010b: 385). The present thesis therefore becomes an investigation into how the UN knows the world – its ideals of peace – and the implications of these ideals when they are pursued in the policies and practice of a peace operation.

A particularly prominent theme across the peace geographies literature is an attention to ‘the local’ as the site of peace’s production, and so of its study. The meaning of ‘the local’ in this literature broadly consists of two main elements. The first element regards the meaning of peace itself – that is, it seeks to foreground how peace is understood in a specific local context, by the people who live there. Such local understandings, it is suggested, are marginalised by a hegemonic, western, ‘liberal’ understanding of peace, which presumes to be universally applicable (Daley, 2014). The second element of ‘the local’ regards the forms of political agency that are involved in producing peace. Rather than looking at the role of powerful actors such as governments, statesmen, and elites, a local approach attends to the everyday forms of interaction and agency among ordinary people (Williams, 2014). Foregrounding the local and the everyday in this way is sometimes referred to as a ‘bottom-up’ account of peace. Focus on the local is not limited to geographers; there has also been a ‘local turn’ in peace studies and peacebuilding literature more broadly (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013).

In examining the United Nations and its state-building practices, this thesis is in some ways moving away from a focus on ‘the local’. Indeed, the UN represents precisely the kind of universal, ‘top-down’ version of peace that the local-turn wants to disrupt and resist. The second section of this chapter therefore identifies

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the key arguments regarding this tension between peace as a local process, and peace as guaranteed by international organisations and state institutions which the UN would seem to represent. In particular, I discuss critiques of the so-called 'liberal model of peace', as this is a model with which the UN is especially associated (Richmond, 2004). Arguments for peace as a localised process are often framed in opposition to the liberal peace. Engaging with these arguments, I justify attending to international organisations like the UN, while also maintaining that the critical sensibility of the literature ought not to be lost. A research agenda to understand the geopolitics of UN peace operations does not amount to a desire to defend them from criticism; but to only dismiss the UN as inadequate risks ignoring what is in fact a key political agent shaping peace as a spatial and territorial process in a globalised world.

As a means of thinking through the tension between 'the local' and the 'liberal peace', therefore, I turn to Spinoza's relational account of human agency. A Spinozan approach views political agency as a continual process of interactions and relations between ideas, people, and the material environment. As such, the distinctions between state and non-state in political explanation become blurred, as agency from this perspective is considered as a dispersed network of *affects*, rather than as the rational intent of a unified actor. I argue that this is a particularly useful framework through which to study UN peace missions. Each mission unfolds within a specific place, but is enabled and constrained by an international network of relations.

The final section reflects further on the relationship between international organisations and their influence on the governance of states. While the literature has critiqued the imposition of dominant models of statehood by such organisations, this thesis will develop a line of argument which does not dismiss their capacity to positively contribute towards peace.

### 3.2 Peace as a geographical concept

It is difficult to pick a point at which to start a discussion of the meaning of peace. The concept has a long history in both western and eastern philosophies, various religions give it prominence in their scriptures, and it is deployed politically in numerous and contradictory ways. For the present, however, I begin with two distinctions in the understanding of peace, the first made by a pioneering peace campaigner, Jane Addams, and the second by the founder of modern peace studies, Johan Galtung. Each demonstrates that peace is not a neatly contained category.

Jane Addams was a pioneering activist for peace, who founded the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in 1919. She also established Hull House in Chicago in 1889 as part of the broader 'Settlement Movement' to alleviate poverty. In her work and activism, Addams collaborated with the philosopher John Dewey, with civil rights activist W. E. B. Du Bois, and with lawyer Salmon Levinson, who drafted the Kellogg-Briand Pact.<sup>18</sup> Her ideas and activism were thus formed in relation to a breadth of political spheres, from formal attempts to proscribe war in international law, to radical grassroots movements for peace, social reform, and civil rights. In her text, *Newer Ideals of Peace*, Addams (2008 [1906]) distinguishes between different ideals of peace, identifying what she calls the old ideals and the newer ideals. The older ideals, she

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<sup>18</sup> The Kellogg-Briand Pact was an international treaty ratified in 1928. Representatives of 63 states became signatories to the pact, pledging to renounce war as a means of settling disputes (see Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017).

argues, have taken two forms: an appeal to morality (e.g. the command to cease from evil), or an appeal to prudence (e.g. demonstrating the material cost of war). She recognises the value of such appeals, but argues that they are dogmatic, ‘soft and literary’, and articulated in ‘unreal and high-sounding phrases’ (Addams, 2008 [1906]: 14). These are contrasted with the newer ideals, which Addams sees as manifest in the mixed immigrant communities of cosmopolitan US cities. She contends that the mix of different people produces an ‘opportunity and necessity for breaking through the tribal bond’ (p. 6), which erases the group morality of us vs. them and ‘soak[s] up the notion of nationalism’ (p. 9). It is these newer ideals that Addams suggests can provide the principles and foundations for peace as a political force (Mueller, 2011). From this proposition comes the central aim of her text: ‘to uncover these newer ideals as we may daily experience them in the modern city’ (Addams, 2008 [1906]: 14). Although Addams can be criticised for a certain degree of romanticising, even essentialising, poor urban communities (see Brown, 2008), she nevertheless anticipates a concern for ‘the local’ in contemporary understandings of peace. Her newer ideals situate the meaning and production of peace in an embodied politics of everyday life, with a particular emphasis on interaction between different nationalities.

Johan Galtung (1969) made prominent the distinction between negative and positive peace. Negative peace, by Galtung’s definition, is the absence of direct personal violence. Negative peace does not account for ‘structural’ violence, however. Galtung calls structural violence that which cannot be attributed to an acting subject, which may not be readily perceived, and yet which still negatively impacts people’s lives. Examples of structural violence include social injustice, forms of inequality, and the ‘unequal life chances’ that follow from them (Galtung, 1969: 171; 1990). *Positive* peace, therefore, is not only the absence of direct violence, but also the presence of social justice, which in Galtung’s terms involves ‘egalitarian distribution of power and resources’ (Galtung, 1969: 183). This designation of different types of peace begins to destabilize a conception of war and peace as being binary opposites. Galtung’s analysis suggests degrees of peace and violence, rather than fixed unitary definitions.

These two distinctions regarding how peace can be conceptualised begin to demonstrate its complexity, and indicate the theoretical and methodological breadth that might be brought to bear on questions of peace. The literature that specifically examines the *geographies* of peace maintains an appreciation for this complexity. It also seeks ‘to demonstrate the utility of geographical analysis to an interdisciplinary community of scholars who study peace’ (Williams *et al.*, 2014: 2). This means approaching peace as a spatial concept: ‘peace is inherently spatial: that is to say, it is always shaped by the spaces through which it is produced and reproduced’ (Williams *et al.*, 2014: 19). A consequence of a spatial approach is to acknowledge that peace has different meanings in different places and times. Indeed, this is a reason why it can be said that peace has a geography, and why geographers are in a position to contribute to broader scholarship about peace.

The study of the spatiality of peace also involves considering how space is shaped by peace and violence, and how the possibilities for peace and violence are shaped by space. The segregation of communities along the lines of their group identity in cities such as Belfast (Harrowell, 2018) or Mitrovica (Gusic, 2019) is a key

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example of the spatiality of peace/conflict.<sup>19</sup> Such spatiality is, as Gusic (2019: 53) notes, ‘constantly produced’, through everyday patterns of behaviour. While both Northern Ireland and Kosovo are more peaceful today than when they were experiencing direct violence, the legacy of their respective conflicts is manifest in these spatial divisions of the population. If the maintenance of security perhaps relies on such segregation, a more radical, positive vision of peace would hope to see these patterns begin to change, lessening the degree of separation. Williams and McConnell (2011: 930) therefore speak of a ‘spectrum of violence and non-violence’, a conceptualization that accounts for the complex mix of factors that are involved in peace as an *ongoing process*. Varying across different contexts, peace can involve ‘processes of negotiation, co-existence and friendship, as well as tension and hostility’ (ibid., 930). It can have setbacks, it needs to be negotiated and renewed, and requires commitment in the face of adversity.

Laliberte (2014) demonstrates the sometimes paradoxical connections between peace and conflict empirically. Her example is a voluntary human rights organisation in Uganda, run by women, who organise and facilitate the provision of services and resources for communities impacted by the war in the 2000s. Laliberte notes that, whilst this organisation enacts peaceful practices in a context of war, it was precisely the ‘social upheaval’ of the war that allowed a group of women to ‘participate in realms of life formerly deemed masculine’ (ibid., 50). Williams (2007, 2013, 2014) similarly reveals such contradictory elements in her account of Hindu-Muslim relations in northern India. Focusing particularly on Hindu-Muslim collaboration in the silk industry, Williams observes that whilst this has led to cooperation, friendship, and a prevalent discourse of ‘Hindu-Muslim brotherhood’, it also maintains the Muslim populations’ subordinate status in the city. Cooperation, stability, tension, conflict, peaceful practices and violent practices thus occur simultaneously, and can be inter-connected in paradoxical ways. It is important that the study of peace acknowledges and investigates such intricacies in order to pursue a greater understanding of the elements at play in any context of conflict resolution or peace process. Failure to take these factors into account risks portraying peace ‘as a mythical singular [...] so abstract as to be unobtainable’ (Koopman, 2011b: 194). Like Jane Addams’ newer ideals, the incentive is to study peace as something which is experienced, amongst people, in places. There is thus an incentive for research in multiple contexts, thereby adding to our understanding of the ‘highly differentiated landscape’ (Williams and McConnell, 2011: 930) of peace.

Taking into account the complexity of peace just outlined, it is clear that there is broad scope for different understandings of peace. As is implied by Jane Addams’s distinction between old and newer ideals, the different ways that peace is understood will have differing political implications. Addams promoted her newer ideals because she felt they would provide greater political utility than the old ideals – that is, she felt the pursuit of peace would be more successful if it was informed by the newer ideals of peace which she derived from her experience among poor immigrant communities of US cities. This thesis is likewise

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<sup>19</sup> In parts of Belfast, Northern Ireland, Protestants and Catholics reside in distinct neighbourhoods, often distinguishable by the flags and murals displayed in each area. Some of these neighbourhoods are separated by high barriers – so-called ‘peace-walls’ – intended to maintain the security of residents. Mitrovica, in Kosovo, is characterised by the near total segregation of ethnic Serbs from ethnic Albanians. The Ibar river, which flows through the city, forms the demarcation line, with Serbs resident in the northern part of the city, and Albanians resident in the southern part.

concerned with the ideas that shape the pursuit of peace, but focuses on a quite different political actor: the United Nations. While a contemporary UN peace mission is a radically different context to that in which Addams worked, it is nevertheless the case that the UN, too, operates according to its own ideals of peace. This thesis therefore seeks to identify the UN's peaceful ideals, and to investigate how they have been put into practice in Kosovo. In this way, I see the thesis as following Simon Dalby's definition of critical geopolitics, to 'explicate the implicit or explicit political implications of knowing the world in particular ways' (Dalby, 2003, in Megoran, 2010b: 385). How the UN 'knows the world' – in this case, how it conceptualises peace and the causes of peace – has shaped the possibilities for peace in Kosovo over the last two decades.

As well as being applied in a different context, the UN's ideals are a product of a very different environment to those that Addams promoted. The UN Charter was developed by the leaders of the 'Great Powers' during WWII; peace operations are directed from the UN HQ in New York, by Secretaries-General who are elite statesmen; and policy reviews are carried out by panels of expert diplomats (for more on the UN's policy making process, see Sharland, 2018). While I therefore see this thesis as contributing to the peace geographies literature, it must be acknowledged that a focus on UN peace policy would appear to disregard those accounts which advocate a focus on the local in our understanding of peace. Indeed, the hegemonic, 'top-down' nature of the UN's approach to peace has been explicitly critiqued within the peace geographies literature (Daley, 2014; Vogel, 2018). The following section therefore takes up this challenge, to consider the question of political scale and where the production of peace is located.

### 3.3 The 'local turn' and the 'liberal peace': who is responsible for peace?

One of the claims Megoran (2011) makes, in his call for geographies of peace, is that geographers have studied warfare and violence in greater depth than they have peace or nonviolence. Geopolitics, as a sub-discipline within geography, has been particularly associated with issues of violence, conflict, and warfare. In its original 'classical' form, geopolitics was concerned with empires and 'Great Powers' (Dittmer, 2014b; Ó Tuathail, 2006). It was a branch of geographical inquiry that related to imperialist strategy and competition over territories, notable examples being the work of Halford Mackinder (e.g., 1904) and Friedrich Ratzel (e.g., 2018 [1901]). After falling into disrepute post-World War II,<sup>20</sup> the present day engagement with geopolitics is from a critical perspective, seeking to deconstruct the logics and power relations that were present in classical geopolitical scripts, and those that continue today (Dalby, 1991; Megoran, 2010a; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). A critical approach argues that the politics of space, identity, and competition - which classical geopolitics treats as natural facts - are in fact constructed through geopolitical discourse and are imbued with relations of power.

Much of critical geopolitics has maintained a focus on nation states and the powerful actors involved in governing them (Gilmartin and Kofman, 2004; J.P. Sharp, 2000). In response, feminist geographers have expressed the need to understand the manifestation of geopolitics at other scales, particularly the ways in which global processes and discourses are experienced in different local contexts, that is, as reflected in

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<sup>20</sup> Although see Klinke (2018) for an investigation into the continuation of classical German geopolitics after the War.



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*embodied* practices and relations (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001). An important part of this shift towards embodied understandings is its project of political alternatives. This, too, is seen as being absent from the critical approach to geopolitics. As Hyndman (2004: 309) puts it, ‘feminist geopolitics is distinguished from critical geopolitics by adding a potentially reconstructive political dimension to the crucial but at times unsatisfactory deconstructionist political impulses’. For Koopman (2011a), this means engaging with geopolitics ‘as it is being done by bodies “in the streets”’ (p. 277).

Related, and building upon the outlined feminist critique, are those who advocate attention to the emotional elements that influence social processes and subjective experiences of space and place (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Pain, 2009). ‘Emotions are an intensely political issue’ (Anderson and Smith, 2001: 2), and they play a role in structuring people’s lives. Take, for example, an analysis of women’s fear of violence and their use of public space (Valentine, 1989; see also Pain and Smith, 2008). Similarly, Shuttleworth and Anderson (2002) examine fear as a factor in the structuring of the Northern Irish labour market. This latter example corroborates the above point that broader geopolitical processes (in this case the history of British-Irish political relations) have practical and spatial implications in people’s everyday lives. Woon (2014) has also demonstrated the value of a focus on emotion, specifically in the study of nonviolence. He argues that recognizing nonviolence only as a logically planned strategy ignores the way emotions can be ‘motivating factors for nonviolent actions’ (p. 663). Attending to emotion is part of his project to understand the *actual workings* of nonviolence – to understand the ways in which nonviolence comes to be chosen as an alternative to violence in the face of provocation. From this perspective, to ignore emotion leaves a void in our knowledge about the world and how to intervene in it.

These differing approaches to the study of geopolitics raise a key question to explore in the examination of contemporary peace activities. The question is one of political scale, and at which level peace is best understood. That peace is achieved through the agreement of political power-holders is a prominent view, derived from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and present still in the ‘liberal’ model of peace that organisations such as the UN represent today. The liberal understanding of peace, as discussed in chapter 1, sees peace as guaranteed by democracy, rule of law, and market-led development. Yet the feminist and emotional approaches just outlined would urge attention to how a politics of peace is embodied and experienced amongst individuals and communities. This latter understanding is particularly convincing in consideration of conflicts between different self-identifying ‘communities’ who live in the same place, such as Loyalists and Republicans in the Northern Irish Troubles, or in Williams’ example of Muslims and Hindus in Varanasi. In these cases, peace is not just a matter of legal agreement and stable governance, it is also about transforming the relationships between people whose everyday lives are shaped by social division and fear.

This concern for peace as a ‘bottom-up’ local process is not limited to human geography – there has similarly been a ‘local turn’ in peace studies more broadly (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Advocates of the local approach justify it in similar ways to those in political geography, including as part of a critique and response to the liberal peace. They see it as a way of including marginalised voices,

and marginalised *agency*, that have been ignored by mainstream peacebuilding discourse, leading to insensitive and ineffective interventions (Berents, 2015).

Laliberté (2016: 28), however, criticises what she calls the ‘downscaling of responsibility to the site of the individual’ in discourses of peace. Her evidence is drawn from Uganda, and the various governmental and NGO discourses regarding the peace process following civil war. Laliberté shows that there are a series of othering narratives within this context, which locate the problem of violence in northern Uganda, more specifically among the Acholi people, and more specifically still, *rural Acholi men*. She shows that this is where peacebuilding NGOs have focused their efforts, addressing domestic violence and local disputes in rural areas, instituting training programmes for non-violent dispute resolution, and thus treating ‘the “bellicose” nature of Acholi masculinity’ (p. 29, quotation from an interviewee). The history of conflict in Uganda, Laliberté argues, comprises a complex mix of international, national, and regional factors. Yet when the problem of violence is discursively situated at the level of the individual, the task for peacebuilders becomes to change individuals’ behaviour, rather than engage the broader structural/political factors. She writes that, ‘By isolating the causes of violence in the bodies of rural Acholi men, professional peacebuilders are able to simultaneously establish a site of violence and identify the behaviour that needs modification (Laliberté, 2016: 29). Therefore, as a neat antithesis to critiques of peace in state and legal structures, Laliberté observes that making peace the duty of localised individuals is not without its own problems and exclusions. Namely, that it ‘obscures the causes and implications of war’ (p. 31), and essentialises certain people and places as violent, thus ignoring the roles of international and national actors who can ‘perpetuate the idea that they are outside the systems of violence’ (p. 30).

Laliberté’s critique warns the researcher to be alert to the discursive framings of space in programmes of development and peacebuilding. The construction of such narratives shapes the practice of the organisations and justifies their actions. Laliberté here argues that the orientalism she identifies functions across the various actors involved in peace activities:

their ability to agree upon a site of intervention – in the case of northern Uganda this is the rural home of the prominent ethnic group, the Acholi – says less about the centrality of this site to the creation of peace than it does about the centrality of this site in maintaining the networks of mutual legitimization between peacebuilding partners (Laliberté, 2016: 25).

The critique also cautions against an understanding of peace that focuses on localised issues to the extent that the broader forces shaping contexts of conflict and peace are ignored. It seems, then, that what is required is to take seriously both the critiques of the liberal peace justifying the attention on local articulations of peace, *and* the inevitable influence of states, institutions, and organisations. Indeed, there is a danger of creating a binary here – the liberal peace vs. the local peace. This tendency has been noticed by other scholars reflecting on the ‘local turn’ in peace studies (Behr, 2018; Heathershaw, 2013). Furthermore, as Macaspac (2019) points out, the local should not be romanticised. There is an immediate problem in the very assumption that there are more ‘authentic’ peaceful agencies manifest locally, as opposed to the ‘inauthentic’ liberal peace. By what measure is it decided what is authentic and what is not? In this regard,

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Randazzo (2016: 1357) observes an ‘unwillingness to engage with the local turn’s own normative aspirations’. That is, while these studies choose to focus on local agencies as an alternative to the liberal peace, there is normative judgement in what they choose to foreground. It is quite possible for forms of local agency to resist the liberal norms of peacebuilding, and yet at the same time these agencies might themselves be violent, or ethno-nationalist. If these complexities are not sufficiently included in analyses of ‘the local’, there is a risk that this kind of research ‘seeks to access these more “authentic” expressions of agency while “outlawing” other “unbecoming” actors and behaviours’ (Randazzo, 2016: 1357).

I want my analysis of the UN in this thesis to remain cognizant of the critiques of the liberal peace. I also want to avoid reproducing any false binary between local peace and liberal peace. While a conceptual distinction between the two can usefully inform analysis of the different agencies shaping peace, it is possible to think of the international and the local not as distinct spheres but as co-constituted in any context of intervention and peacebuilding. As Heathershaw (2013: 280) writes regarding Kosovo: ‘The more interesting question is not the degree of internationalisation [...] but how it combines with certain forms of localisation, licit or illicit, to produce more or less stable outcomes’. A more nuanced account of the relationship between ‘global’ and ‘local’ is exemplified by Björkdahl and Gusic (2015), who discuss the ways in which local political actors in Kosovo engage with, co-opt, and resist the norms of the international peace operation.

It is in light of this that I want to now turn to an aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy – his account of the external determination of human agency. I suggest that adopting Spinoza’s perspective on agency leads to understanding the politics of peace as something that emerges through inter-subjective relationships between people, but which nevertheless is shaped by larger institutions, by material environments, and by history, all of which are implicated in the present order of things. I argue that Spinoza’s philosophy provides a way of articulating the co-constitution of ‘bottom-up’ agency and ‘top-down’ agency, and so can avoid producing a binary between liberal and local peace. A Spinozan framework also provides a set of concepts and measures by which to assess the ways that institutions, states, and organisations contribute to the production of positive peace, notably through his account of *affects*. The consequences of this for analysing the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace are indicated in the following section, but are explored in greater detail in chapter 4.

### 3.3.1 Spinoza, affect, and agency

In his text, *Ethics*, Spinoza (1996 [1677]) offers an account of the nature of existence, which he conceptualises as constituting one connected whole (God, or Nature). This claim provides the foundation for all of his further philosophy, including his politics. From this starting point, Spinoza argues that human agency cannot be otherwise than a product of relations between the human and non-human bodies that constitute reality. This necessary relation to external causes means that humans are constantly subject to *affects*, modifications of our bodies and minds, which can be positive or negative for us (*E* III def3). If the change is positive, i.e. it increases the body’s power of acting, this is named *joy* (def aff II). If the change is negative, i.e. it decreases the body’s power of acting, this is named *sadness* (def aff III). By ‘power of acting’, Spinoza means an individual’s capacities to be an adequate cause of things – joy and sadness are simply the

passage to a greater or lesser power of acting, a greater or lesser ability to bring about certain effects' (Della Rocca, 2008: 156). Our power of acting is therefore constantly subject to modification by the things we encounter, and changes throughout our lives. A new-born baby, for example, has a relatively low power of acting – it has not yet developed the capacities to bring about effects that it will have as it gets older. Its capacities thus increase as it grows – but, crucially, the sources of these capacities are in large part *external* to it. Its capacities to act do not originate within itself, they are rather a product of its relations to external things. Our power of acting therefore relies on a great many things external to us which assist our capacity to persevere in our existence and to pursue our interests. These external things include the air we breathe, the food and drink that sustains us, our networks of friends and neighbours, the tools and appliances that allow us to achieve what we could not do with our bare hands – the list could go on and on. The point is that our capacities to think and act in the world are reliant on a whole host of things external to us. We are constantly enabled and disabled by the things in our environment.

Elsewhere (Bregazzi, 2016), I have written about how the affects connect to explanations of conflict:

These instances, by which we undergo changes that we neither control nor understand, Spinoza calls *passions*. So long as people are led by passions, they can be contrary to one another (*E IV p34*), as they are affected differently and have different desires. Such disparity of desire is the source of conflict, hatred, fear and so on. Importantly, the passions do not have to be based in truth – it is enough that we imagine or associate something with a positive or negative impact on us, and are thereby affected by it 'accidentally' (*III p15*) (see also Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018).

A relational account of agency can therefore avoid a 'neoliberal individualization of responsibility' (Laliberté, 2016: 28), because affect theory explicitly rejects the notion of a self-determined individual subject. Spinoza's relational ontology posits the determination of external causes. It attends to the influences that are in the material environment, and the various elements, human and non-human, material and discursive, that shape any given context, or *assemblage* (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; Dittmer, 2014a). If people are contrary to each other, as in violent and divided societies, the source of the conflict does not originate in the individual human, but is a result of networks of causation that have shaped them – the *passions* that they have been subject to whereby they perceive the other to affect them negatively.<sup>21</sup> It is this same attention to networks of causation that enables affect theory to avoid Laliberté's charge of ignoring factors that are outside of the immediate context of peace or conflict, but which nevertheless have played a role in shaping it.

Not only must a relational account attend to the influence of events in other places, it must also acknowledge the influence of history, which is always implicated in the current state of things. Feigenbaum *et al.* (2013) have demonstrated this in an examination of the micropolitics of affect in a Canadian Occupy protest camp. Their fieldwork found that the historic debates and tensions around use of the French or English language in Canada caused some upset in the protest camp. This tension was heightened at 'General Assemblies' in

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<sup>21</sup> It is useful to note that the Latin *passio*, from which 'passion' derives, has shared etymological roots with 'passive' (*passivus*). That is, it refers to something that is undergone, or done to us, rather than something we do. In Spinoza's account, it is impossible for an individual to avoid being determined by passions. This becomes a crucial aspect of his political theory, discussed further in chapter 4 of this thesis.

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a way that it was not in the everyday life of the camp, demonstrating how different spaces can provoke different affective responses; whether to speak in English or French became contentious in the assemblies, where outside of the formal meetings it was not (Feigenbaum *et al.* 2013). Similarly, Fregonese (2012) incorporates an analysis of how the Ottoman rule and French Colonial history of Lebanon is implicated in the contemporary social divisions and violence in Beirut. Ash Amin (2010), examining racism, has referred to such influences as ‘debris from the past’ (p.9) that remains present in the everyday affective ‘doings’ of racial difference. Furthermore, he uses the concept to explicitly critique any naturalized discourse of difference, and so supports Laliberté’s argument against the designation of a specific place or people as being inherently violent. What has been essentialised as a social given (e.g., Acholi men are violent) is revealed to be a product of history.

The above examples focus on micropolitics in specific contexts, but also acknowledge the historical lines that shape the reality of the present, or the influence of events happening in other places. Such elements form part of the understanding of the present assemblage, and so thinking in terms of affect is compatible with, and arguably requires, this attention to broader historical and material factors – ‘what composes a human world may be anything but proximate to it, let alone human’ (Povinelli, 2011: 8).

When developing political explanations, then, a relational understanding of agency blurs any distinctions between scales. Instead, relationality thinks in terms of networks of affect, whereby lines of causation incorporate bodies that are both local and further afield. An encounter between two people, for example, might produce an unexpected change in subjectivity and relation, through ‘challeng[ing] assumptions, normalised modes of perception and ways of thinking and acting’ (Wilson and Darling, 2016: 8). But from the perspective of Spinoza’s relational ontology, larger groups and institutions are still part of the complex of affects. It no longer makes sense to think of the local relationship and the state institution as separate political spheres, because all of reality is constituted through relations between things, and this is as true for a human body as it is for a nation state (*E II L7s*). Institutions also affect and are affected; the state, which is equally a product of a network of relations determining events, ‘can bring about the liberation of its citizens[...] by helping to reorient their emotions or affective dispositions’ (Steinberg, 2009: 47).

Chapter 4 of this thesis will explore in more detail how a relational understanding of agency provides concepts and measures by which to assess the influence of institutions, states, and organisations on the possibilities for peace. The point that I want to emphasise, for now, is that a relational ontology, and its accompanying understanding of agency, can usefully guide an enquiry into how international organisations like the UN might contribute to peace. Indeed, as globalisation has increased, societies are increasingly subject to international determinants, both formal governmental institutions, and less formal networks of communication and organisation. A Spinozan account could even characterise globalisation as a process by which people’s power of acting becomes subject to the affects of ever broader networks, as a global economy, communication technology, and networks of transnational organisations mean that people are ‘more immediately and easily affected by others’ (Sharp, 2005: 597). A further point to emphasise, therefore, is that these networks of affect spread across state boundaries, such that an explanation of events, e.g. outbreaks of war or movements towards peace, cannot be neatly contained within the domestic politics of

a state. The next section of this chapter elaborates further upon the relationship between international organisations and states, and how they have been understood as contributing to peace.

### 3.4 International organisations and the nation state

- [T]he state does not exist as such, but is an emergent effect of a range of practices occurring at a range of sites (Dittmer, 2017: 5).

Peace, as a concept and ideal, has a long association with sovereign nation states. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is a key reference point in literature on peace, international relations, and the nation state as understood in its modern form. Ending the Thirty Years War in Europe, the treaties Westphalia treaties included various territorial settlements among the major European powers (Croxton, 2013; Gross, 1948). The treaties therefore gave rise to, or at least have given a name to, the ‘Westphalian system’ of sovereign nation states. There is, in fact, disagreement among historians as to how far the Peace of Westphalia can be seen as establishing state sovereignty as it is understood today (Croxton, 1999; Osiander, 2001). For the purposes of this thesis, however, such debates are secondary to what the treaties have come to represent for understanding peace as a concept. The ‘Westphalian system’ represents a certain ideal of peace as something that is maintained through formal agreement between sovereign states.

Kant’s (2009 [1795]) essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’, for example, maintains the necessity of legal agreement, specifically between ‘republics’, which Kant views as the legitimate form of government with which treaties can be established. It is the legacy of such ideas that exists in what contemporary scholars call the ‘liberal’ model of peace (Doyle, 2005), a model with which the UN is associated (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2006). Indeed, Gross (1948) interprets the UN Charter as part of a legacy of international law beginning with Westphalia. A key theme of this research, therefore, is a concern with the role of the state in relation to the geopolitics of peace. The tendency of peacekeeping mandates to increasingly contain elements of building state-capacity, juxtaposed alongside the transnational character of the UN and other peace organisations, raises lines of enquiry regarding political agency and responsibility for peace, and the ways in which geographies of peace relate to ‘statization’ (see Painter, 2006).

What, therefore, is the state? The theoretical grounding of this research is in a relational ontology, derived from Spinoza (1996 [1677]) and contemporary applications of his philosophy (Armstrong, 2009; Lord, 2017; Sharp, 2011, 2017; Steinberg, 2009). Following the above outlined relational ontology, the state cannot be conceptualised as an ontologically distinct entity. As with everything else in Nature, a state is constituted out of relations between things, or ‘modes’, to use Spinoza’s term. While Spinoza might argue that a ‘civil state’ is an advantageous way of organising ourselves (*E IV p37s2; TP 3/6*), it remains an ‘individual’ made up of individuals, affecting and affected (Balibar, 2008; Sharp, 2017). This understanding of the state corresponds with others who have sought to avoid reifying ‘The State’ as a unified agent, and yet who nevertheless recognise that state effects should not simply be dismissed from political analyses (Dittmer, 2017; Mitchell, 1991). While critics of a statist approach to political explanation rightly reject any metaphysical status of the state, ‘[s]uch criticisms ignore the fact that this is how the state very often appears *in practice*’ (Mitchell, 1991: 91, emphasis added). As Painter (2006: 771) puts it, ‘*stateness* is not an illusion, but

is actualized in countless mundane social and material practices within and outside the institutions conventionally referred to as the state apparatus’.

This notion of the state as an effect of a process, rather than a pre-given unified actor in itself, is shared by assemblage theory. In assemblage theory, there are no ‘ontological distinctions between levels of existence’ (DeLanda, 2016: 13). Dittmer (2017) utilises assemblage theory to get past a binary between state and non-state, or between formal political institutions and everyday life, in his studies of diplomacy and foreign policy. He expresses a desire ‘to rehabilitate the state within political geography’ (p. 6), arguing that assemblage theory allows for this whilst remaining attentive to the everyday. The reason assemblage theory allows for this is because of its focus on the relational nature of reality. Things that may well be perceived as coherent unified agents, such as a state, an institution, an individual human, are assemblages of relations between elements that constitute them and sustain their continued existence. These elements are material and discursive, human and non-human, living and non-living. From different arrangements of bodies, materials and ideas, emerge different capacities (Dittmer, 2014a). While assemblage theory is applicable to all of nature, political geography is most concerned with human society, and so Dittmer uses the term ‘body politic’ to designate ‘any assemblage in which human bodies participate[...]and which shape the political cognition of those participating in them’ (Dittmer, 2017: 11). This conceptualisation applies to ‘the state’ as much as to any other assemblage, small or large – ‘the state is not special; it is simply one body politic among many’ (Dittmer, 2017: 11). What we call ‘the state’ is itself a complex and continually becoming assemblage of bodies, materials, and ideas, organised in such a way as to produce all of its various capacities. Its capacities may be much greater than that of smaller bodies politic, but it is not distinct in nature. Formal boundaries cannot be placed around an assemblage, because they are constantly interacting with other assemblages, and their own internal constituents are constantly changing too, altering their capacities to affect and be affected (Dittmer, 2014a, 2017).

A relational understanding of agency can therefore help fulfil Heathershaw’s (2013) entreaty that we investigate the co-constitution of the liberal peace and the local peace in cases of peace interventions. A UN mission does not deploy into a vacuum. It functions within the patterns, practices, institutions, and habits that constitute the local context in which it intervenes. An appreciation for both top-down and bottom-up factors in shaping the capacities of any assemblage is better placed to pursue understandings of this interaction. As Heathershaw puts it: ‘By essentialising the nature of the state or the international intervention, or by drawing a binary between internal and external actors, the analyst is blind to how the formal is intertwined with the informal, the international with the local and the liberal reform with the security imperative’ (p. 282). Adopting an assemblage approach avoids such binaries and essentialisations.

In turning attention to international organisations involved in peace, therefore, the question of the state here is one of the ‘range of practices’ and ‘sites’ (Dittmer, 2017: 5) that are involved in the emergence of a ‘peaceful’ state. Indeed, peacebuilding as a concept, is closely associated with state-building. ‘State failure’ is seen as a cause of civil war and violence (Ghani and Lockhart, 2009; Helman and Ratner, 1992), for which the international response is the restoration of state functions. The previous chapter demonstrated the extent to which the UN takes on governance and administration roles in its efforts to establish institutions,

build security, and ultimately (in theory) establish the conditions for a sustainable peace (Richmond, 2004; Zanotti, 2006). As stated, the UN transitional administrations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste went so far as to assume sovereignty over the regions in which they intervened (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010: see chapter 11). The UN attempted to establish lasting peace in these regions, in large part through the development of state institutions. While the aim in both cases was ultimately to transfer authority over to local administrators, it remains an unprecedented geopolitical phenomenon for an external organisation to take sovereignty over the domestic administration of a state. Most UN peace operations are not granted this much power over the country in which they are deployed. A transitional administration is, however, the most comprehensive form of a type of transnational governmental power that has developed along with ‘international society’ over the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. Individual state governments increasingly participate in, and are subject to the influence of, the governmental power of international organisations.

### 3.4.1 Governmental power of organisations

The agency of international organisations within a globalised political system has been examined by Andrijasevic and Walters (2010), addressing the example of ‘border management’ by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The IOM is characterised as ‘a major source of intelligence, assessment, advice, and technical assistance in connection with national and regional border policies and practices’ (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 979). This description points towards the nature of the relationship between the organisation and the nation state. Organisations involved in ‘global governance’, Andrijasevic and Walters (2010: 980) suggest, should not be seen as:

an entirely new regime of power operating on a global level somewhere “above” the world of states and much more as a complex of schemes which govern through the elicitation of state agency and the regulated enhancement and deployment of state capacity (p. 980).

It appears, then, that while the means are international in their reach, the intended outcome is ‘a *particular model* of statehood’ (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 983, emphasis added). The authors are therefore concerned with the social technologies involved in this interaction between an international organisation and the state apparatuses involved in managing a border. Handbooks, training seminars, study visits, lunch meetings and so on, are recognised as crucial factors in this governmental process. Organisations, therefore, as influential and significant geopolitical agents, are important objects of study for critical geopolitics (Bachmann, 2013; Jeffrey, 2013).

In their analysis, Andrijasevic and Walters remain attentive to the political struggles that accompany border management. They note that the technical and seemingly apolitical world of border management masks the fact that ‘borders continue to produce hierarchies of access to citizenship and conceals the (political) struggles that accompany acts of rebordering’ (p. 996). This attention to the struggle, even violence, concealed behind seemingly dull institutional practices is not surprising given the authors adoption of a Foucauldian perspective on power, discipline, and governmentality. Foucault’s theoretical framework, and his objects of study, are particularly concerned with control, subjugation, and violence, such that his work, and work that is inspired by him, is often a project of revealing struggle and violence in society, state



## Chapter 3

apparatuses, and institutions (Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018). This critical approach can be, and is, applied to peace, particularly in critiques of the liberal model of peace (Daley, 2014; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008; Polat, 2010; Ross, 2011; Shinko, 2008). Zanotti (2006), for example, characterises UN peacekeeping as an example of Foucauldian discipline and governmentality (see also Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005). She argues that, after the Cold War, the disciplinary and governmental apparatuses that Foucault identifies within the modern state were expanded into the international arena. International organisations have ‘mechanisms to know, monitor and regulate’ (Zanotti, 2006: 152) state governments, and are thus important political agents acting across and beyond states. I acknowledge the essential importance of critical accounts, and yet, as has been argued elsewhere (Bignall, 2014; Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018), it is necessary to also research peace in such a way that the analysis does not exclusively reveal conflict and violence going on behind the scenes.

In adopting a Spinozan conceptual framework, I hope to develop a more positive understanding of how international organisations and states might contribute to peace. The intention is not simply to distinguish between an idealised version of peace according to Spinoza’s *Ethics* and the reality that can be observed ‘on the ground’. Rather, Spinoza’s relational account of agency can be used to discern that which might otherwise *not* be identified, particularly from the perspective of more dominant political theory, such as the realism of international relations, or poststructuralist approaches (e.g. Foucauldian) which disproportionately focus analytical attention on violence.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has situated the present thesis within current discussions of peace, geopolitics, and the governmental power of international organisations in political geography. In conclusion, I want to re-emphasise three key areas to which I see this thesis contributing, based on the foregoing discussions.

The first is an attention to ideals of peace, and how differing ideals have differing political implications. This thesis focuses on the peaceful ideals that can be identified in the UN’s peace policies – that is, how the UN ‘knows the world’ – and investigates how these ideals have played out in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. This concern constitutes the main subject matter of chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.

The second area regards political agency, and where the production of peace is best understood to be situated. The peace geographies literature has tended towards a focus on ‘the local’ in its accounts of peaceful agencies. These accounts are often framed in opposition to the ‘liberal peace’, which is viewed as an hegemonic imposition onto local cultures. Since the UN is considered a key proponent of the liberal peace, it was necessary that I address these arguments. I argued that a relational ontology, derived from Spinoza’s *Ethics*, provides an account of agency which can think beyond a binary between the local and the liberal. Regarding discussions of agency within political geography, Kuus (2019: 168) states that ‘the question[...] is what specifically is revealed and obscured by any specific conception of agency and action’. I hope that the relational understanding of agency adhered to in this thesis can reveal new perspectives on how the UN influences possibilities for peace. The implications of such a relational ontology on how to assess the UN’s contribution to peace are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4 of this thesis. There, I draw from Spinoza’s

*Political Treatise* (2000 [1677]), which considers how best a state can be organised towards the production of freedom and peace. Given that this is precisely the endeavour undertaken by the UN mission in Kosovo, Spinoza can be utilised in an innovative way to consider the role of both the UN and the state in the contemporary geopolitics of peace.

This leads to the third area to which this thesis contributes, which is the influence of international organisations in today's globalised politics. International organisations represent 'geopolitical agency in a global political space not exclusively determined by territoriality' (Bachmann, 2013: 410). Examining their role in contemporary geopolitics can contribute to efforts to think beyond the nation state, avoiding the 'territorial trap' (Agnew, 1994) of thinking in terms of discreet states, and instead attend to the flows and processes of modern politics (Bachmann, 2013). The United Nations Security Council, which provides the mandate for all UN peace operations, has been called 'the apex international organisation' (Mahapatra, 2016: 45). For this reason, focusing on UN peacekeeping also entails thinking beyond state-centric accounts of geopolitics, a conceptual move that Dittmer (2015) argues is necessary in order to understand the role of transnational assemblages in shaping global politics. A relational account of agency does not only provide a conceptual language with which to describe such networks. It also has implications for understanding the causes of war and peace. Who is responsible for peace if agency is dispersed across networks of causation that are not easily influenced and frequently inadequately understood? This is a question that permeates all of the chapters of this thesis.

Chapters 2 and 3 have set out the topics of this thesis and identified the relevant areas to which I see it contributing. I have also indicated the themes that are explored in the remainder of the thesis. The next chapter takes up the themes that have so far been indicated, and develops a coherent conceptual framework for the approach to the UN, the state, and peace that this thesis advocates.

## 4 Peaceful geopolitics: relational ontology and the state

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### 4.1 Introduction

In its *Principles and Guidelines* on peace operations, the UN frequently refers to developing the capacity of the state as part of how it defines the aims of a peace mission. To quote one example:

Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect [*sic*] the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions (UN DPKO, 2008: 18).

In certain peace missions, an association between the ‘core functions’ of the state and the definition of peacebuilding is even more apparent. In Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan, the UN facilitated transfer to autonomy, or full independence, for a defined territory. The pursuit of peace and the production of ‘stateness’ are in these cases deeply connected, such that the two cannot be considered separate political processes. This chapter is a conceptual investigation into the three principal topics of this thesis - the UN, states, and peace. The nature and meaning of these three should not be taken for granted. In order to consider questions such as how the state contributes to peace, and whether the transnational agency of the UN is changing the role of the state, it is necessary to develop an understanding of what is being referred to by the terms ‘the state’, ‘transnational agency’, and ‘peace’. Having so far argued for the inclusion of international organisations and states in the geographical study of peace, this chapter develops with more detail a conceptual account of how peace itself can be understood in relation to the structures of organisations and states.

The first section considers the position of an idealised category like peace in the complex and messy reality of politics. What is the relationship between the political reality of states and organisations, and an ideal that in a certain sense can never be realised? I begin by examining the discord between peace and justice – the fact that positive understandings of peace are seemingly undermined by critical attention to continuing forms of injustice. This tension recalls Jacques Derrida’s sense of justice as *aporetic* – a radically ethical concept, the demand for which is never satisfied in the present. The need to be ever vigilant for operations of violence and injustice going on within supposed peace seems to hold a similar sense of peace as an *aporia*. Given the influence of Derrida and deconstruction within critical human geography, it is not surprising to find advocates of such vigilant critique (Darling, 2014; Kirsch and Flint, 2011b; Ross, 2011). To articulate an understanding of the position of states and organisations relative to an ideal of peace, therefore, I utilise Derrida’s analysis of justice and law to try and establish what potential there is for a positive conceptualisation of peace from the highly critical perspective of deconstruction. I argue that the need for critique remains necessary, but that the very purpose of deconstruction relies on the possibility that there can be improvements in the current state of things. Once this is accepted, the next task is to articulate criteria by which such improvements might be recognised and assessed.

Having argued that there is a relationship between peace and institutional systems – that it is reasonable to ask what kinds of institutional patterns could contribute peace – the second section argues for relational ontology as a means by which this relationship can be articulated. Drawing again from Spinoza’s philosophy, I argue that a relational account of agency collapses the distinction between peace as structural and institutional, and peace as localised and embodied. This section argues that Spinoza’s theory is not beholden to a logic of either/or, but leads us to consider how the local and the relational are already constitutive of institutional and state systems, and that, in turn, institutions and the patterns of social life they engender can shape the affects and passions of the population. The tendency towards peace and cooperation or towards division and violence is dependent on the kinds of affects and passions that circulate through a population. From this perspective, a UN peace mission cannot be understood as a unified actor any more than a state is. Rather, through the deployment of people, technology, and a set of ideals and aims, the missions become part of the relational process. This theoretical articulation of the relationship between state institutions and the extent of social harmony among its citizens provides the criteria and measures with which a state or organisation’s contribution to peace might be identified.

## 4.2 Utopian ideals in politics: peace and justice

The peace geographies literature conceptualises war and peace as existing on a spectrum (Koopman, 2011b; Williams and McConnell, 2011). It does not treat them as static binary opposites, but instead shows how ‘violence and peace are intertwined and entangled in complex ways’ (Williams *et al.*, 2014: 6). Yet this understanding does not eliminate a sense of peace as a utopian ideal. Indeed, it even seems to confirm it. In being vigilant to the ways that peace is always entangled with violence, there is a sense in which every expression of peace that can be observed is *not quite* peace. There are always limits to actual expressions of peace, always something that can be pointed to that fails to live up to the name peace. A utopian sense of peace remains, therefore, even if it is left unarticulated; it is that which has not yet been realised.

There is a potential paralysis in this view that I want to avoid. In noting a utopian sense of peace, my aim is not to frame war and peace as ‘all-or-nothing opposites’, as Sara Koopman puts it, and so ‘give up on ever achieving peace’ (Koopman, 2011b: 193). The reason for raising this point is rather to acknowledge the difficulties of trying to develop a position on the relationship between an ideal like peace and the messy reality of politics, and then to develop a productive line of inquiry that takes these difficulties into account. If the best that can be said about expressions of peace is that they are ‘less-than-violent’ (Darling, 2014), what does one look for when studying peace in relation to an organisation like the UN and its state-building policies? To begin answering this question, I now turn to a key example of a limiting factor on peace - its tension with the concept of justice.

### 4.2.1 ‘No justice, no peace?’

Peace is closely associated with the concept of justice. Martin Luther King Jr. (2003: 181) wrote that positive peace is ‘the presence of justice’, an idea similarly advocated by the founder of peace studies, Johan Galtung (1969). Williams and McConnell (2011) name justice in their list of ‘peaceful concepts’, and Woon (2014: 657) states that the intent of nonviolence ‘is to confront injustice in order to increase social justice’. These

ideas are echoed in the chants of ‘no justice, no peace!’ at recent protests against police violence in both the UK and the USA.<sup>22</sup>

Yet critical examinations of peace in geographical literature observe a tension between the concepts of peace and justice. Straightforward accounts of what peace means and consists of are destabilized by the continuation of injustices such as inequality, poverty, social marginalisation, and so on. This is demonstrated by the previously mentioned study of Hindu-Muslim relations in Varanasi, India (Williams, 2007, 2014). After two terrorist attacks in the city, a Hindu priest and a Muslim cleric made public appearances together and appealed for peace, drawing on a narrative of Hindu-Muslim brotherhood in the city. Williams reports that local citizens felt this community-level moral guidance was significant in maintaining calm after the violent attacks. Yet, she observes that this particular operation of peace was not manifest as ‘a romantic condition in which equality and justice are realized by all’ (Williams, 2014: 205). Muslims in Varanasi remain marginalised economically, as well as in education and politics. The maintenance of peaceful relations between Hindus and Muslims in this example therefore includes the maintenance of structural inequality.

To acknowledge this discord, Darling (2014) has used the term ‘less-than-violent’, rather than peaceful, when referring to acts of friendship or care across social divides - acts that do not in themselves alter underlying structures of injustice. He does so, first, to avoid a simple opposition between violent and non-violent as discreet opposites, and, second, so as not to conceal the violence that is pervasive throughout society. Darling bases this argument on Slavoj Žižek’s (2009) distinction between subjective and objective violence. Subjective violence is that which has an identifiable subject responsible for the violent act. Objective violence, however, is that which is involved in maintaining the current political and economic reality - it is the violence inherent within the “‘normal” state of things’ (Žižek, 2009: 2). While it is not possible to identify a subject responsible for this violence, its effects (inequality, marginalisation, poverty, and so on) cannot be denied (see also Galtung, 1969).

Darling’s empirical case is asylum seekers’ experiences of life in Sheffield, UK. The objective violence in this case includes the varying symbolic representations of asylum seekers (as victims; as scroungers; as a threat, etc.), and the systemic violence of containment, categorisation, and marginalisation (Darling, 2014). Hence ‘less-than-violent’ acts. The positive and welcoming encounters between asylum seekers and citizens of Sheffield nevertheless occur within structural forms of violence and injustice, which the caring act in itself does not address. Indeed, Darling argues that objective violence is present precisely in the ‘modes of dominance that arrange some individuals as capable of acts of compassion and hospitality’ (2014: 238).

There is, within these accounts and others like them, a warning that we should not lose sight of violence and injustice, even as we turn our attention to peace. Indeed, for Ross (2011), the primary critical task is to expose the violence *within* narratives of peace. Outside of geography, Polat (2010) develops an argument doing precisely that. Moving ultimately towards a conclusion that ‘peace is war’, Polat critiques a series of understandings of peace, arguing that beneath them all is violence and injustice. International, national,

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<sup>22</sup> A series of police killings of black people in the USA has led to the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement. This chant is often used at their protests. Similarly, in the UK, the chant was used in protest after a public inquest ruled that the 2011 police killing of Mark Duggan was lawful.

governmental, non-governmental, top-down liberal, bottom-up emancipatory - all modes of peace are presented as masking violence, as Polat posits conflict and war as an ontological condition. Ignoring this constitutive conflict in ideas of peace 'is in effect only a privileged manifestation of power, hegemonic and violent' (Polat, 2010: 339).

What do such critiques mean for studying peace, particularly if aiming for a positive understanding of the concept? The arguments for uncovering violence and injustice within 'putative peace' (Ross, 2011) can be placed within a legacy of deconstruction in critical geography and particularly critical geopolitics. Through deconstructive critique, scholars have remained attentive to power and violence within what are ordinarily considered peaceful norms. Darling's claim that the very act of hospitality holds within it a mode of dominance, for example, has a particularly deconstructive flavour to it (see Derrida, 2000). Derrida himself, the originator of deconstruction, treated the concept of justice most notably in his essay 'Force of Law' (1992). In a later essay, he explored the theme of 'living together', and the question of how to live together well (Derrida, 2013). Drawing upon his arguments regarding justice, law, and deconstructive critique, parallels can here be made with the concept of peace. It supports the argument that we can never be naïve or romantic in theorising peace, and that a critical eye is always necessary; yet I argue that this should not lead us to giving up on the term peace altogether, as Darling chooses to do. Even within a highly critical deconstructive approach, Derrida's formulation allows that there can be change, progress, and improvement within the systems and structures that are the target of critique. As well as revealing systemic violence, therefore, there is an additional imperative to conceptualise and research the processes by which such progress is made.

#### 4.2.2 'Deconstruction is justice...'

In the essay 'Force of Law', Derrida makes a distinction between justice and law. Although they are not necessarily opposed, justice is never synonymous with the law. The law is always constructed, and thus is 'essentially deconstructible' (Derrida, 1992: 14). This is unlike justice, which Derrida argues is *not* deconstructible. Justice, however, is not here an existing reality – it is the unforeseeable prospect that drives the deconstruction of the law (see also Caputo, 1997: chapter 5). The motivation to deconstruct is a desire for that which will never come; but the concept of justice remains essential, even if in Derrida's conceptualisation it can never be said that justice has been achieved. This is clarified by Derrida elsewhere:

You can improve law, you can replace one law by another one. There are constitutions and institutions. This is a history, and a history, as such, can be deconstructed. Each time you replace one legal system by another one, one law by another one, or you improve the law, that is a kind of deconstruction, a critique and deconstruction. So, the law as such can be deconstructed and has to be deconstructed. That is the condition of historicity, revolution, morals, ethics, and progress. But justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law. That is why I said that the condition of possibility of deconstruction is a call for justice (Derrida, 1997: 16).

## Chapter 4

A similar logical structure can also be applied to peace. Peace can be placed in the same position as justice, an unforeseeable and un-deconstructible ideal, and the present reality can always be critiqued to show where injustice and objective violence continue. But if the law is deconstructed in the name of justice, what is deconstructed in the name of peace? What is peace's limitation in the present?

Multiple social structures and institutions could be candidates, including, indeed, the law. An example of this is offered by critiques of the role of US law as a tactical aid to the 'war on terror', (Gregory, 2007; Morrissey, 2011). Here, the law is revealed as failing to live up to the standards of peace. *Security* is another broad category that can be critiqued in the name of peace. Security is defined as 'the state or condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger' (*OED*). There are various national and international processes and institutions that together ensure the basic security of (some) people's lives. But, to echo Derrida, security is not synonymous with peace (see also Dalby, 2014; Ukai, 2009). There will always be people excluded from the safety that security measures provide. The security of some will rely on the insecurity of others, and violence can be (and is) justified as necessary for continued security (Graham, 2006; Ingram and Dodds, 2009). Peace, if it is understood in Derrida's aporetic sense of justice, is not satisfied by the reality of security.

In 'Avowing – the Impossible', Derrida does appear to treat peace in a similar way to his understanding of justice. He writes that 'the peace of "living together"... exceeds the juridical, even the political, at any rate, the political as determined by the state' (Derrida, 2013: 26).<sup>23</sup> Rather, living together well 'supposes an accord beyond any statutory condition, not necessarily in contradiction with it, but beyond and across the normality of a legal, political, and state-controlled bond' (*ibid.*, 26). As with justice, then, Derridean critique cannot allow that the peace of living together well is guaranteed by legal, political, and state systems.

To claim that the meaning of peace is not sufficiently captured by a legal or political agreement does not, in itself, particularly move the academic discussion of peace in a new or productive direction. At this point it is just to assert that Derrida's logic - that certain concepts, like peace, justice, hospitality, and even democracy (see Derrida, 2005) always demand more than the present political reality - seems to capture reliably the various calls to remain attentive to how peace is entangled with violence and injustice, as well as the criticisms of the liberal model of peace as being inadequate (discussed in the literature review). I said above that I wanted to avoid becoming paralysed by such a logic. Koopman (2011b: 193) warns against an understanding that would lead us 'to give up on ever achieving peace', but that seems to be exactly what a deconstructive critique tells us – peace is impossible. Yet, even from this hyper-critical perspective, this is not the last word on peace. There are two productive avenues that suggest themselves.

Firstly, in the above long quotation about justice and law, Derrida twice mentions that the law can be improved. The critique of institutions and constitutions does not rule out that they can be better or worse when judged against the standards of peace. Derrida's logic allows that there could be movement towards

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<sup>23</sup> It is useful to note that the term *vivre-ensemble* ('living together') is used in France to denote what in the UK we call 'multiculturalism' – namely, harmonious cohabitation between different communities (*Larousse Dictionnaire de Français*). This definition gives further credibility to reading Derrida's essay on 'living together' as contributing to an understanding of peace.

peace, and towards justice. Indeed, *deconstruction relies on this possibility*. There would be no sense in deconstructing the political present if there was no possibility of change. The fact that current systems of governance, maintaining the normal state of things, can be deconstructed, means that they can be improved. For example, since the end of WWII, European countries have developed political and economic systems in the pursuit of greater integration, with the aims of reducing nationalism and improving stability and security (Gilbert, 2003; McCormick, 2011). A deconstructive analysis may expose injustice, violence, and democratic deficit in the political narratives and structures of what is now the European Union; but it does not follow that changes in Europe since WWII have not also been meaningful in terms of people's well-being and safety. Derrida (2013: 26) makes it clear that under his logic, justice and the law are distinguished, but not necessarily opposed. The same can be said for peace and security. If systems of government, security, and law can be flexible, and can change to account for new circumstances and new understandings, it might be that they can be more or less enabling of peace-likeness. The criteria by which this might be assessed are the subject of the next section of this chapter.

Secondly, the discussion so far has spoken principally of systems of governance. Without making a strict distinction between a 'formal' sphere of governance and an 'informal' sphere of everyday life (discussed further below), it is nevertheless true that political and ethical meaning is also manifest at the level of people's thoughts, feelings, and relationships. There are certain peaceful qualities that are realised here, for example trust, friendship, compassion, or forgiveness. Such 'language of the heart', as Derrida (2013: 25) calls it, cannot be simply produced through the implementation of a rule, a contract, or a policy. It is instead a question of ethical relationality – that is, peace and justice as a relation to the other (Bregazzi, 2019; Derrida, 1997). When Derrida (2013: 27) says that the peace of living together is not contained in a 'juridico-political contract', and that its meaning exceeds the systems of law and state, it is perhaps only here at the level of the affective relationships that make intersubjectivity possible where such criteria could begin to be met. For deeply divided societies to move towards peace requires new and transformative relationships between people who have a history of violence. Disabling affects like hatred, fear, and resentment must be transformed by more powerful enabling affects in order for new understandings between people to emerge (Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018; Sharp, 2005). Ethnographic research that focuses on localised everyday peace is well placed to uncover and understand the affective and emotional elements involved in peace processes.

While Darling is therefore right that an act of friendship in Sheffield does not alter the systemic othering of the asylum seekers, it is important not to underplay the potential of the everyday, even in the face of intractable conflict and/or injustice. In reference to the injustice of systemic racism in the USA, Caputo (1997: 130) writes that 'Before Rosa Parks decided to visit the undeconstructibility of justice upon Montgomery, Alabama, [...] it was legal, legitimate, and authorized to force African-Americans to the back of the bus'. Systems of laws and governance can be disrupted, questioned, and ultimately transformed, by acts and relations that exceed the 'juridico-political contract'. Such everyday acts can put into question the conditions that have maintained social division, and so become part of what can improve those systems. They are themselves a form of deconstruction, an opening up and questioning of the status quo.



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The above discussion suggests a basic analytic framework for peace with three distinguished but related elements:

1. Peace as a utopian ideal – an undeconstructable and unforeseeable future that provides the drive and the impulse to deconstruct the current state of things.
2. Peace in state and legal systems and institutions. These may never be free from objective forms of violence, but they are amendable and can be improved. Deconstructive critique of these systems is therefore necessary. It interrogates the limits of our conceptions of peace and insists on recognising where improvements are needed.
3. Peace in the thoughts, feelings and actions of people and their relationships, where narratives and representations might be put into question, and new associations might be created. Such acts and relations can contribute to the improvement of the structures of security and law.

Keeping in mind these distinctions maintains an appreciation for the complexity of peace as discussed in the literature review. They maintain the importance of ‘the local’ as a site of peace’s production, while not discounting that political structures such as state institutions and the law can contribute to greater or lesser ‘peace-likeness’ among citizens.

The question of how a state might contribute to peace is of central importance to an analysis of the United Nations peace project. UN peace operations explicitly aim to restore ‘the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 25). Critique and deconstruction of the institutional patterns that UN peace operations support is therefore a continual necessity, as one way through which those structures might improve. This is a task that academic researchers are well placed to carry out, but it should not be forgotten that the UN itself engages in self-critique. Following the Srebrenica massacre and the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s, both of which occurred in spite of a UN peacekeeping presence, the Secretary-General commissioned investigations into each tragedy, as well as the Brahimi report which provided a comprehensive critique of the UN’s approach to peace (UN General Assembly, 2000).<sup>24</sup> The organisation continues to commission reviews of its peace operations. The most recent ‘Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture’ was published in 2015, and there is another review due in 2020 (Lebada, 2019). Similarly, in 2018, Secretary-General António Guterres launched the ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ agenda (Guterres, 2018). Supported by a Security Council resolution, Action for Peacekeeping is directed at ‘the need to enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations peacekeeping’ (S/RES/2436[2018]: 2). The content of these reports and resolutions, as well as others besides, is analysed in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. For now, the point is simply that, as per the above conceptualisation of peace as a radical ideal, there will never come a time when the UN cannot be critiqued in the name of peace.

United Nations peace operations do not only have to be approached through the second level of the above framework, however. They might also be analysed in relation to the third level, the thoughts, feelings, and actions of people in the post-conflict environment. Doubtless it is difficult to ascertain how institutional

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<sup>24</sup>The individual report for Srebrenica can be accessed with document code A/54/549. The report for Rwanda is document code S/1999/1257.

patterns and organisations might shape the possibilities for peaceful criteria at this level. A policy to conduct an election or to establish a secure border is one matter, and it is comparatively easy to judge whether the outcome of such a policy was successful or otherwise. But how would a policy produce a change in peoples' subjectivity, and in their relationship to the other? In consideration of matters of subjectivity and ethical relationships across difference, the philosopher Luce Irigaray has written about the need for 'an appropriate background and milieu' to aid people's 'cultural or spiritual becoming' (Irigaray, 2019: xvi). For the purposes of the present discussion, 'spiritual becoming' can be equated to the development among people of peaceful qualities such as forgiveness, trust, and compassion. While the policies of a UN transitional administration might not be able to direct people's thoughts and feelings in any straightforward way, they might realistically shape a more or less 'appropriate background' for the kinds of personal changes that a positive understanding of peace requires.

The question of how a causal relationship between institutions and citizens' subjectivity might be possible is discussed in the following section. It builds upon the framework just outlined, with the aim of conceptualising what exactly it means to say that a state, an institution, or an organisation can be understood as contributing to peace, and how a researcher might identify such causation. While the above outlined framework already suggests interaction between the second and third levels, the next section goes further in blurring the distinction between the two, such that, in the final analysis, no formal line can be drawn between the state and its constituents. Developing the political implications of such a perspective from Spinoza's political philosophy and contemporary assemblage theory provides a set of concepts, criteria, and measures by which to analyse the potential of states, institutions, and international organisations like the UN to contribute to positive peace within a population.

### 4.3 State institutions and the production of social harmony

In a United Nations transitional administration, like that which deployed in Kosovo, the UN assumes responsibility for administrative and legislative institutions. In Kosovo, UNMIK's mandated responsibilities were broad, including establishing an assembly, conducting elections, providing a police force, controlling the region's borders, re-settling displaced people, and managing provision of utilities. In the pursuit of peace and stability, then, the UN's methods are often directed at the institutions of the state. While the specific vision of the state in UN policies is discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7, the remainder of this chapter will lay out a conceptual framework by which the UN's attempts to pursue peace through institutions might be both understood and assessed. The first half of this chapter has argued that it is reasonable to ask how a state might contribute to peace. Such a claim makes the assumption that there is causality between state institutions and peace, that is, that states can be more or less enabling of peace-likeness. The rest of this chapter conceptualises the process through which such causality might occur. This is necessary, as it will form the conceptual basis from which the UN policies can be analysed and assessed in the following chapters. Such conceptualisation can also contribute to more general discussions within political geography on interactions between states and forms of international agency (Kuus, 2019).

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Spinoza's (2000 [1677]) *Political Treatise* was written at a period in European history that had seen prolonged warfare, religious fragmentation, and subsequent attempts to establish a more stable political system (i.e. The Peace of Westphalia). As such, Spinoza's political works are deeply concerned with the possibility of 'peaceful diversity' (Frank and Waller, 2016: 9). Spinoza places particular emphasis on the organisation of the state to this end, writing that the purpose of the state is 'peace and security of life' (*TP* 5/2).

My reason for turning to Spinoza's politics to elucidate an analysis of UN peace operations is therefore the following. In a transitional administration, the UN attempts to establish a stable state in the pursuit of a sustainable peace. Spinoza's *Political Treatise* provides an account of the process by which states form, as well as the logic by which to understand how a state can contribute to peace among its citizens. When Spinoza discusses the best way to organise a state to this end, however, he bases his claims on the relational understanding of agency that he set out in the *Ethics*. As discussed in the literature review, a relational account of agency leads us to focus on how people's thoughts, feelings, and actions are determined in the most part by things external to them. Through his relational ontology, therefore, Spinoza sought to produce a political theory that was founded on an understanding of 'human nature as it really is' (*TP* 1/4) – that is, subject to the external determinants - passions - that so often make people contrary to one another, and which are the causes of conflict and hatred (*E* IV p34).

The significance of this is that Spinoza explicitly acknowledges the weakness of peaceful ideals in the face of the messy and passionate reality of society. While religion, for example, 'teaches that each should love his neighbour as himself [...] this conviction is of little avail against the passions' (*TP* 1/5). Spinoza's starting point, then, is to acknowledge the influence of passions, and to insist that they are taken into account when developing a political programme for peace. The central question that Spinoza sets out to answer is: what organisation of the state will determine people to act in each other's mutual interest, given that we know they are led by passion more often than reason? If people could reliably be trusted to act from reason, there would be no need to pose such a question. But 'human nature is far otherwise constituted', and so 'the state must necessarily be so established that all men, both rulers and ruled, whether they will or no, will do what is in the interests of their common welfare' (*TP* 6/3).

The *Political Treatise* therefore provides a framework by which to think carefully and thoroughly about the role of state institutions and how they affect their constituent populations, both positively and negatively. Spinoza's 'political philosophy is about channelling the passions into social benefits by institutional means' (Altwicker, 2017: 188). The concepts and measures that Spinoza provides are therefore applicable to a wide range of contemporary political issues. For the present argument, they are applied to United Nations peace operation like UNMIK, which developed state institutions in Kosovo with the aim of producing a variety of 'social benefits', not least an end to violence and ethnic discrimination.

The concepts to be foregrounded in the remainder of this chapter are derived from Spinoza's account of the foundations of the state. I will therefore first give an overview of the relational foundation of the state in Spinoza, before turning to the most significant implications for the present thesis. The implications are: First, the state can be conceptualised as an 'individual' in so far as the relations between its constituents

produce the effect of a certain level of coherence. The capacities of this ‘individual’ act back upon its constituents, and therefore it remains possible to refer to the agency of the state. From this position, the efforts of a UN peace operation to facilitate autonomy or independence is conceptualised as an attempt to develop the coherence and stability of a new ‘individual’. Second, the affects of the state’s institutions upon its citizens can be a cause of harmony (*concordia*) or disagreement (*discordia*). These terms, and an understanding of the processes that lead to greater or lesser harmony, provide the conceptual measure by which to assess the UN’s peace building policies.

#### 4.3.1 The relational foundation of the state: Spinoza’s commonwealth

In the *Political Treatise*, Spinoza applies his relational ontology (as laid out in the *Ethics*) to the foundations of the state itself. He writes that ‘one should not look for the causes and natural foundations of the state in the teachings of reason, but deduce them from the nature and condition of men in general’ (*TP* 1/7). The ‘nature and condition of men in general’ is that they are necessarily in relation to, and determined by, external causes – no one can avoid be influenced by passions (*E* IV p4c). The foundation of the state is, from this perspective, a natural relational process (Armstrong, 2009). The process begins with the fact that in a ‘state of nature’ – that is, outside of a civil state – an individual’s rights are only equal to their own power (*TP* 2/15; *TTP* 16/2). With no agreement or laws established, people have the right to do anything that they are able to do according to their desires. It is important to note that this is not a normative argument. It is not ‘right’ in the sense of being morally correct, just, or good. It is rather a formal claim based on Spinoza’s ontology (see *TP* 2/4). Thus, ‘when one sees the term “right” in Spinoza, one should generally think descriptively, in terms of actual power relations, and not normatively, in terms of obligations one owes to others or others to oneself’ (Den Uyl, 2000: xi).

To live in such a condition is, however, extremely difficult, and a cause of constant fear. A state of nature, far from being a radical freedom, is a state of bondage. Mutual assistance is therefore required, such that people can more easily ‘support life and cultivate their minds’ (*TP* 2/15). Everyone strives to persevere in their existence, and they are greatly assisted in this striving when they collaborate – i.e. when they organise and coordinate their activities such that all benefit. We have far greater potential for survival, growth, and cultivation if we are part of a collaborative and organised group, rather than reliant solely on our own devices. It is this joining of forces that is the foundation of a ‘civil order’ (*TP* 1/7).<sup>25</sup> The consequence is, however, that the right of the individual must submit to that of the group, the communal right, in order to sustain the advantages of being in a civil state. This communal right, ‘defined by the power of a people, is usually called sovereignty’ (*TP* 2/17). It is in each person’s interest to follow the command of the sovereign – that is, it is in their interest to obey the laws – because it is this subjection to communal right that allows for their greater safety, security and power of acting.

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<sup>25</sup> Spinoza’s definition of ‘civil state’ thus accepts a wide variety of forms of government. As he puts it, ‘all men everywhere, whether barbarian or civilised, enter into relationships with one another and set up some kind of civil order’ (*TP* 1/7). As such, humans are almost never in a state of nature – indeed, we are simply born into ‘some kind of civil order’.

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This is why Spinoza refers to the ‘natural foundations of the state’ (*TP* 1/7). The transfer to living in a civil state is not a product of reason, worked out in advance. Rather, it is a product of every beings’ natural striving to persevere, something which they are better able to do when they join their powers and submit to the collective power of the *multitude*. Crucially for the purposes of this thesis, Spinoza’s understanding means that it no longer makes sense to think of ‘the State’ as a political agent distinct from society. The source of the state’s power is the combination of its constituents. As Armstrong points out:

[F]or Spinoza, the political problem does not reduce, as it does in Hobbes, to two terms – individuals and the state – and the relations between them. Rather, Spinoza considers individuals and the state as abstractions, which can only be adequately apprehended when related through the multitude which includes them both (Armstrong, 2009: 284).

The result is that Spinoza’s political theory collapses any division between the state and its citizens. The state is not a substantial entity, and it cannot be distinguished from the things of which it is constituted. It is a product of relations between people, and its coherence over time depends on maintaining certain levels of consent from the population – indeed, from this perspective, ‘the state’s existence depends simply on the agreement among its citizens’ (Della Rocca, 2008: 213). Again, consent or agreement is not here necessarily rational, but affective – people submit to the multitude because they perceive it positively affects their power of acting.

Does it still make sense, then, to refer to the agency of states and institutions in political explanation? It does, but in a carefully qualified way. Even while the state is not a substantial ontological entity, a state’s power to affect people’s lives cannot be denied. The relational process that produces the effects of the state means that ‘institutions and social forces can be sufficiently unified in their existence and action so as to constitute individuals’ (Sharp, 2017: 834; see also Field, 2015). This definition of individuality does not, however, entail ‘seamlessly unified and perfectly coordinated’ entities (Sharp, 2017: 841). Rather, it is sufficient that a number of elements relate to each other in such a way that reach ‘a minimal threshold of incorporation to produce effects that depend on the synergy produced by their concatenation’ (*ibid.*, 842). The relational process realises capacities that the constituent parts by themselves would not be able to realise. These capacities, then, can rightly be seen as state agency, shaping the lives of citizens and events in the world more generally – it is just that this agency is not the rational intent of a unified actor, but an effect of the continual relational process between constituents.

The ‘individuality’ of the state is therefore a product of an ongoing process, and, crucially, it is a matter of degree. It is not a case of a binary between a perfectly coherent civil state or a state of nature. Rather, all forms of political organisation exist somewhere on a spectrum between the two – that is, they have a greater or lesser degree of *harmony* among their constituents. The concept of harmony as it relates to politics and states warrants some further discussion, to establish a precise meaning of the term for the present argument.

### 4.3.1.1 *What is social harmony?*

Both Edwin Curley and Samuel Shirley translate Spinoza’s Latin term *concordia* as ‘harmony’. In the *Political Treatise*, Spinoza names harmony as the aim of civil order, writing that ‘the best state is one where men live

together in harmony' (*TP* 5/2). The term is also used in part IV of the *Ethics*, wherein Spinoza more briefly considers the role of the state for moderating inevitable contrary affects amongst a population (see IV p37s2). He writes that: 'Things which [...] bring it about that men live harmoniously [*concorditer*], are useful; those, on the other hand, are evil which bring discord [*discordiam*] to the state' (*E* IV p40). It can be seen, then, that in both the *Political Treatise* and the *Ethics*, the notion of harmony is central to assessing the success of a civil order. The concord-discord spectrum is furthermore the key conceptual tool for articulating the relationship between the state and peace. Spinoza even defines peace as 'consist[ing] not in the absence of war but in the union or *harmony* of minds' (*TP* 6/4, emphasis added).

The previous section noted that a civil order is in existence when people agree to give up their individual rights to the rights of the group. This is of enormous benefit for enhancing their capacities to continue living and thriving. It is this agreement on a common good, and the resultant mutual benefit, that forms the basis for 'harmony' in Spinoza's political philosophy. If the foundation of a civil state is the mutual benefit derived from an agreement to combine powers, then the *best* state would be that which is *most* mutually beneficial. A perfectly harmonious society, therefore, would be one in which 'all, together, should seek for themselves the common advantage of all' (*E* IV p18s). While the desire for this level of harmony is the formal conclusion of Spinoza's philosophy, he readily acknowledges that it is not possible to achieve it in reality. Since everyone is subject to passions, they necessarily have different desires, they have disagreements, and they act in ways that are contrary to each other's well-being (*TP* 1/5; *TTP* 5/8; *E* IV p34). Such disagreement and discord are politically destabilising, while agreement and harmony provide stability for the civil order. The furthest extent of disagreement and discord would be such that the civil order can no longer be maintained. A civil war is in fact a particularly appropriate example of such state-breakdown, whereby a section of the population rejects even the minimum level of agreement necessary to define a civil order – they no longer agree to submit to the authority of the sovereign on any matter whatsoever.

If perfectly achieved mutual benefit and total disintegration represent the two extremes of the harmony/discord spectrum, then there is enormous scope for variation in-between. There are countless issues on which the citizens of a state might agree and disagree, and all civil orders will experience periods of greater and lesser harmony. While the complexity and specificity of the issues varies contextually, the fundamental criterion for assessing civil order in Spinoza's political philosophy remains the extent to which it promotes harmony. The further along the spectrum towards harmony, the better the state is achieving its purpose:

The best way to organise a state is easily discovered by considering the purpose of civil order, which is nothing other than peace and security of life. Therefore the best state is one where men live together in harmony and where the laws are preserved unbroken (*TP* 5/2).

It is necessary at this point to acknowledge a certain ambiguity of a term like harmony when it is to be used as a political aim in this way. No doubt there are authoritarian policies and states that successfully maintain 'harmony' by means of punishment, fearmongering, and surveillance. There are numerous examples, both contemporary and historical, whereby citizens have agreed to submit to the laws of the state not because

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they value the state's contribution to their well-being, but because they fear the consequences of doing otherwise. The Chinese government, for example, has in recent decades used a rhetoric of 'Harmonious Society' to underly its various suppressions of protest and political dissent (Choukroune, 2012; Choukroune and Garapon, 2007; Shin, 2012).

Spinoza explicitly acknowledges this ambiguity, stating in the *Ethics* that 'harmony is also commonly born of fear' (*E IV appXVI*). He elaborates further in the *Political Treatise*:

[E]xperience seems to teach us that peace and harmony are best served if all power is conferred on one man. For no state has stood so long without notable change as that of the Turks, and, conversely, none have proved so short-lived as popular or democratic states, nor have any been so liable to frequent rebellion. But if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, there can be nothing more wretched for mankind than peace (*TP 6/4*).<sup>26</sup>

A further distinction is therefore required, between agreement based on appreciation for the mutual benefits of civil order, and agreement based on the fear of expressing dissent. Such a distinction can be made in a similar way to the previously discussed definitions of positive and negative peace (Galtung, 1969; King Jr., 2003). Justin Steinberg, in a paper discussing Spinoza's state theory, does precisely that when he says that '[o]ver and above stability, the state ought to promote a *positive* harmony (Steinberg, 2009: 48, emphasis added). Just as the absence of direct violence is not synonymous with positive peace, so the absence of civil strife is not synonymous with positive social harmony. While both fear of punishment and appreciation of benefit may achieve obedience to the law, the difference is in the underlying *motivation* for the fact of obedience (Blom, 1995: cited in Steinberg, 2009 [see footnote 59]). Considering the question of motivation returns us to the affects, and how a person's power of acting is enabled or disabled by various external influences. As the next section will seek to explore, it is this affective register that provides the conceptual basis for assessing social harmony.

Before moving on to the next section, it is worth adding one note further, to ask if 'harmony' and 'peace' are to be read as synonymous concepts. It is evident how closely related are Spinoza's understandings of the terms. When discussing the role of the state it is indeed the case that they can be used largely interchangeably, as Spinoza seems to do in the above quotation from *TP 5/2*. There are, however, two ways in which we can distinguish between harmony and peace. The first is implied by the distinction between positive and negative understandings of harmony just mentioned. Harmony achieved through authoritarianism may produce stability in the civil order; but to qualify as *peaceful*, the degree of social harmony ought to be motivated more by hope for mutual reward than by threat of punishment. Peace might then be defined as: a high degree of social harmony, motivated by the experience of mutual benefit and reward derived from participating in the civil order. In this sense, peace is not exactly synonymous with harmony, but it is a certain *type* of social harmony.

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<sup>26</sup> The state of 'the Turks' is a reference to the Ottoman Empire. At the time when Spinoza was writing his political works (1660s-70s), the Ottoman Empire was near the height of its territorial control and power. It was ruled by an absolute monarch, the Sultan.

The second distinction between harmony and peace comes from Spinoza's understanding that there are certain aspects of our subjectivity which the state is not able to determine. While harmony in the civil order is a product of reward or threat, Spinoza qualifies this by adding that 'such things as no one can be induced to do by reward or threats do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth' (*TP* 3/8; see also *TTP* 20/3-4). Spinoza specifically names the 'faculty of judgement' as that which the law cannot order. For example, the law cannot make us love someone who we hate, or hate someone who we love (*TP* 3/8). We might *pretend* to do so to avoid punishment, but the actual affect of love/hate will not have been induced in us. And if ever one does come to love someone who they previously hated – if enemies are to become friends, for example - it can only be due to a change in the affective relationship between those people (see *E* IIIp43-44). This suggests a level of subjectivity where peace might be manifest, beyond the stability and security that is provided by social harmony. As with Derrida's reflections on 'living together' discussed above, there therefore remains a sense of peace that exceeds what is achievable by the production of social harmony in the civil order. To repeat what I wrote regarding that excess, however, a state or civil order might still provide a more or less suitable background for the development of such positive affects.

#### 4.3.2 Power of acting as the immanent measure of social harmony

Social harmony within a state therefore relies on the consent of the constituents to continue to participate within it and submit to the collective sovereignty. This consent, however, is not a rational decision, but a product of the affects that the citizens feel in relation to the state. To the extent that people are enabled in their endeavour to persevere – that is, that they feel their power of acting to be increased by being part of the multitude – then they will agree to continue submitting to the sovereign power of the multitude. Part of the measure of social harmony, then, is how far the organisation of the state affects the citizens such that they are determined to continue to agree to be a constituent part (Lord, 2017).

If the institutions and laws of the state give people reason enough to fear it and conspire against it, then the right of the commonwealth is diminished: 'the power of the commonwealth and its right is to that extent diminished, as it affords reasons for many citizens to join in a conspiracy' (*TP* 3/9). As Walther (2003: 661) puts it – the 'right to direct others[...] is] weakened in the measure that those directives diminish this willingness to obey the laws'. Thus 'a commonwealth does wrong when it does, or suffers to be done, things that can cause its own downfall; [...] a commonwealth does wrong when it does something *contrary to the dictates of reason*. For it is when a commonwealth acts from the dictates of reason that it is most fully in control of its own right' (*TP* 4/4, emphasis added). The normative measure of institutions and laws given here is *rationality*. Institutions and laws must be reasonable, or the commonwealth puts its own existence at risk. But how is rationality defined?

The first thing to say is that the normativity of rationality cannot be based on a transcendent measure. Spinoza rejects 'the claim that there exists an *external and transcendent* moral standard to which human behavior [*sic*] and human society must conform' (Frank and Waller, 2016: 14, original emphasis). He rejects such a transcendent morality 'because such a law would apply only to parts of the natural world in violation of Spinoza's principled naturalism' (Frank and Waller, 2016: 27). It would be to treat humans as an



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ontologically distinct part of nature, a ‘dominion within a dominion’, which Spinoza’s ontology of a single substance (God or Nature) explicitly does not do (*E III pref*). A transcendent law could only apply to humans – it could not apply to non-human animals, for how can an animal be judged ‘wrong’ for doing something that it is determined to do by its nature? A transcendent measure of morality which humans are supposed to obey presupposes that humans are in control of their own actions. But Spinoza’s ontology challenges us to accept that humans are just as much part of Nature and subject to the laws of determinism. We only believe ourselves to be acting from freewill because we remain ignorant of the causes of our determination (*E III p2s*). Therefore, to apply a transcendent morality to humans introduces a division into reality, which violates Spinoza’s naturalism (Della Rocca, 2008).

How, then, can Spinoza assert a normative measure by which to judge institutions – rationality – and at the same time have it that this is an *immanent* measure and not transcendent? Rationality can be an immanent measure if it is based on power of acting. Recall that power of acting refers to an individual’s *capacities* – to think, to feel, and to be the cause of effects. It is the desire to increase power of acting that is the foundation of the commonwealth. Any increase in power of acting is a joy, any decrease is a sadness. A state’s institutions and laws are therefore rational when they increase the power of acting of the multitude, and are irrational if they decrease it. The state participates directly in the wellbeing of citizens, because, even while all citizens are subject to passions and therefore liable to be contrary to one another, the institutions and laws can determine them to act *as if they were rational*, that is, to act for the good of the common welfare – ‘laws are correctives that check or harness the passionate, myopic, grasping nature of most people and replace would-be destructive behaviour with power-promoting behaviour’ (Steinberg, 2009: 46). On the contrary, if a state’s laws are such that they oppress the civilians and produce division, the state is reducing its own power of acting – and so such laws are irrational. As Armstrong (2009: 294) states:

For Spinoza, a state which relies on mere force acts contrarily to reason, but only in the sense that reason dictates the avoidance of actions that lead to the weakening or destruction of a body’s power.

Now, an immediate counter to this comes to mind, and it is present in Arendt’s (2017) *Origins of Totalitarianism*. Arendt critiques the idea ‘that right is the equivalent to being good or useful for the whole in distinction of its parts’ (p. 391). She associates such a view with a justification for violations of human rights; indeed, she sees such a view as being consistent with Adolf Hitler’s motto: ‘Right is what is good for the German people’. Thus Arendt quotes Plato – ‘Not man, but a god, must be the measure of all things’ (Arendt, 2017: 391).

Spinoza’s doctrine of immanence is the precise opposite of this – there is no transcendent morality, thus the measure for what is good is based on what ‘yields best results for the agent’ (Frank and Waller, 2016: 27). Spinoza’s immanent measure of what is good for a population, however, is *not* an equivalent to Hitler’s declaration that what is right is what is good for the German people. What is good for the German people, for Spinoza, is objectively measurable based on the citizen’s collective power of acting. Hitler’s opinion on what is good for the German people did not measure up to this objective rule – his laws and institutions were irrational, because they brought about the destruction of the state. So, ‘what is good for’, in Spinoza’s

political philosophy, is not a matter of opinion - it is not even a matter of democratic decision making – it is based on the objectivity of increases and decreases in power of acting.

Spinoza's politics therefore still provides a position from which to critique laws and institutions which perpetuate injustice and division. The difference is that they are not critiqued via an appeal to transcendent ideals, but via the immanent measure of power of acting. The laws of apartheid in South Africa, for example, were irrational, aiding and continuing division and hatred among the population. It can therefore be asserted that while it is often better to obey a law that we know to be irrational (*TP 3/5*), that does not mean that the commonwealth is right to force us to do it. If the state continues to demand adherence to irrational laws, it gives more people cause for indignation – pushed far enough indignation turns 'the civil order into a condition of war' (*TP 4/4*). Certain conditions maintain the fear of, or respect for, the commonwealth by its citizens, and so maintain adherence to its laws (see also *TP 3/3*) – a commonwealth ceases to be if these conditions are not maintained. If even the minimum amount of harmony cannot be maintained, then Spinoza claims that the state 'has not attained the full right of a commonwealth' (*TP 5/2*). Such a failure to promote harmony describes what might today be called a 'failed state'. Spinoza writes that:

a civil order that has not removed the causes of rebellion and where the threat of war is never absent and the laws are frequently broken is little different from a state of Nature, where every man lives as he pleases with his life at risk (*TP 2/5*).

The 'individuality' of a state is brought about by the concurrence among its citizens (Della Rocca, 2008), but the coherence achieved is not fixed, but changeable – 'its coherence [...] admits of a wide range of degrees' (Sharp, 2017: 841). When the bare minimum cannot be maintained, however, it can no longer be said to be functioning as a civil state.

#### 4.3.3 Assessing the UN's intervention in 'failed states'

The above understanding of the state and how it affects the harmony or division among its constituents completes the analytic framework for assessing the United Nation's pursuit of peace through state institution. The relative coherence of the state as an 'individual' is, from a Spinozan perspective, the product of an ongoing process whereby citizen's power of acting is sufficiently positively affected such that they are determined to continue submitting to the collective sovereignty of the multitude. The dissolution of a state like Yugoslavia is indicative of how this coherence cannot be taken for granted. If the institutions of the state, its government and its laws, are disabling for the citizens power of acting, then they are more likely to be productive of division rather than harmony. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević's oppressive measures against Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s can therefore be characterised as irrational according to Spinoza's political philosophy. They were productive of disabling affects, and so increased division, eventually leading to the outbreak of war.

When the UN intervened, therefore, it began to engage in the relational process in Kosovo. The measure for assessing UNMIK's contribution to peace is based on how far their ideals and practices were productive of harmony – positive affects by which the 'citizens view the interests of the state, or the aim of the laws, as consonant with their own private interests' (Steinberg, 2009: 51). Spinoza's term for this sense that the

## Chapter 4

state is serving one's interests is *securitas*. While a perfect harmony among all citizens is an impossibility, 'a state that is able to promote *securitas* or hope will approximate "peace" to a considerable degree' (ibid., 53).

The remainder of this thesis turn to the UN policy documents themselves, and considers them in light of the above outlined understanding of how institutions can contribute to social harmony. Chapter 5 presents the methodological approach to the document analysis. Chapter 6, examines the ways that the UN conceptualises the role of the state, and how it has implemented its ideals in Kosovo. I consider its success in contributing to a coherent 'individual' in Kosovo, but also examine how the ideas and coherence of this individual were resisted, particularly in northern Kosovo. The final chapter, chapter 7, takes up the question of social harmony in relation to the social *difference* that characterises the conflict in Kosovo; namely, the division between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians. I examine how UNMIK's ideals and policies have sought to manage this difference, and consider whether there are indicators of movement towards more harmony. In this regard, I particularly pay attention to elections, as an indication of the extent to which citizens are prepared to participate in the Kosovo institutions, and so agree to be a part of the Kosovo 'individual'.

### 4.4 Conclusion

Security and the law can be critiqued in the name of peace – they can be deconstructed. But if the motivation for critique and deconstruction is the hope that there can be improvement in structures of security and law, which Derrida seemingly confirms to be the case, then it is reasonable to ask of what such improvement would consist. I have argued that considering the political implications of a relational ontology can provide some productive avenues for articulating the criteria for such improvements.

In this chapter, I have sought to provide a productive conceptual framework for the inclusion of states, institutions, and international organizations in the geographical study of peace, but to do so without losing the critical sensibility of the existing literature, nor a recognition of the importance of local forms of agency in the production of peace. I based this framework on Spinoza's relational account of reality, which offers a relational understanding of the foundations of the state and its capacities. This understanding makes no ontological distinction between different levels or scales, because every 'individual' thing is a product of relations between constituent parts. Viewing the state's coherence as a product of ongoing relational processes has implications for how we can understand the way a state, through its government, institutions, and laws, can contribute to greater or lesser social harmony among its constituents. If constituents have the perception that their interests are served by the state, then they are affected positively towards it and agree to submit to the collective right of the multitude. The greater and more widespread the sense of *securitas*, among the population, the more social harmony is produced. This account therefore provides terms and measures by which to analyse the UN's state-building endeavours in the pursuit of peace.

Even while the peace geographies literature acknowledges peace's complexity, and refrains from positing any single definition of the concept, there remains a sense in which peace is utopian. Attending to the ways in which peace and violence are always interconnected means that there is always a sense in which reality falls short of a peaceful ideal. Even while we seek to articulate more positive accounts of peace, we are

warned to maintain critical attention to ongoing forms of injustice and structural violence going on within the supposed peace (Brickell, 2015; Ross, 2011). From a Spinozan perspective, there remains a sense of a perfect peace that can never be achieved. Harmony and division are matter of degree – perfect harmony however, whereby every citizen would act in the interests of all, is an impossibility. But states can certainly be better or worse in this regard. Some institutions, governments, and laws are more productive of harmony, or peace-likeness, than others. Chapters 6 and 7 apply the conceptual framework developed here to the UN’s vision of the state, and their implementation of that vision in Kosovo. Before that, however, it is necessary to present my approach to the documents under analysis. The next chapter, therefore, lays out my methodology and gives an account of how I carried out the document analysis on which chapters 6 and 7 are based.

## 5 Methodology and method: Applying discourse analysis to United Nations policy documents

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UN secretaries-general have, with varying degrees of success, attempted to advance the debate on doctrine for UN peacekeeping. Their proposals, even though not constituting a comprehensive doctrine for peacekeeping, in toto, have decidedly influenced the mandate and means most recently assigned to the latest generation of peacekeeping operations.

- Ahmed *et al.* (2007: 21)

### 5.1 Introduction

To develop an understanding of how peace is conceptualised in the policy and practice of UN peace operations requires a careful examination of relevant documents, resolutions, and reports. The UN, and indeed any organisation, is guided by numerous ideas by which it rationalises its policies and practices. In any peace operation, it is not only personnel and materials that are deployed, but ideas too. These ideas guide the activities that are supposed to be productive of a more peaceful and stable society. In order to analyse the UN's role within the contemporary geopolitics of peace, it is necessary to identify the political rationality of its peace activities. Such rationality includes how it articulates problems and solutions, and so justifies its actions (Dittmer, 2010; Lees, 2004; Merlingen, 2003).

Within human geography, and especially in critical geopolitics, discourse analysis has been a key method by which scholars have examined texts and their relationship to political or social practices (Dittmer, 2010; Hoggart *et al.*, 2002; Waitt, 2010).<sup>27</sup> Critical geopolitics has investigated texts in order to identify the particular geopolitical vision that is being advocated, and then to demonstrate the political implications of such a vision. Underlying this approach to analysing texts is an understanding that actions within politics and society are shaped according to different understandings of how the world is and what is possible within it. As Megoran (2010b: 385) points out, however, such investigations have 'largely sought to expose geopolitical visions as constitutive of violence or of the economic, social, imaginative or political structures that support violence'. A 'pacific geopolitics', by contrast, would adopt similar methods, but would explore 'the ways in which spatialising and ordering the world in imaginative geographies can contribute towards more harmonious relations between states and other human groupings' (Megoran, 2010b: 385). This chapter therefore presents how I utilise and build upon the legacy of discourse analysis for the purposes of identifying the ideas of peace supported by UN documentation, and for considering their implications in peace interventions.

As this research is concerned with the UN as a key actor in the development of transnational agency after the Cold War, the first section introduces organisations as objects of study within political geography, particularly organisations that are international in scope. Identifying the policies and practices of

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<sup>27</sup> 'Text' here assumes a broad meaning: policies, speeches, science, journalism, television broadcasts, literature, films, etc. have all been subject to discourse analyses within geography and beyond.

international governmental organisations (IGOs), using both text-based approaches and also increasingly ‘institutional ethnography’ (Billo and Mountz, 2016; Kuus, 2019), is a way in which political geographers can better understand the cross-border nature of governance in a globalised world, and the relationships between such governance and the traditional role of states. If politics and civil society is more and more subject to international influences in a globalised world, then attempting to understand this process requires thinking beyond ‘nation-based categories’ (Kuus, 2018: 6). Studying the UN can contribute to such attempts. Not only does the UN represent a form of political agency operating ‘above’ the level of states, but its purpose is to deal with the kinds of problems which are neither caused, nor resolved, by any individual state. Poverty, climate change, illegal trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs, terrorism, the regionalisation of conflict, the displacement of people and subsequent refugee crises – all of these examples require multilateral responses, and the UN is one of, if not *the*, primary organisation through which such a response is provided. To research such themes necessarily puts the primacy of states into question and requires the development of alternative explanatory concepts.

The second section turns to the main types of discourse analysis within critical geopolitics. Reflecting on the difference between broadly structuralist and poststructuralist approaches, this section demonstrates that discourse can be, and is, understood differently, and that the method and purpose of analysis differs according to its theoretical underpinnings. While this thesis is certainly working within the legacy of discourse analysis in critical geopolitics, it does not fully subscribe to either structuralist or poststructuralist theoretical foundations. It is therefore necessary to identify where the present thesis differs, and how this difference changes the understanding of the texts and how they are to be analysed – this is communicated in the third section.

Remaining committed to the relational ontology underpinning the thesis, the third section considers the nature of ideas themselves, and how a relational, ‘renaturalized’ (Sharp, 2011), understanding of ideas alters the method of discourse analysis. Drawing especially on Sharp’s (2011) contemporary reading of Spinoza, I consider the ways in which text-based research can serve the study of peace. Like the structuralist and poststructuralist approaches, a Spinozan understanding of discourse recognises that ideas have power and force within the world. Applying Sharp’s renaturalized conception, however, means that critical analysis is not only a matter of identifying damaging ideas or exposing them as contingent products of history. A renaturalized account views the world of ideas as an ‘ecology’ wherein the ideas that thrive are those that have the most support from multiple ‘thinking powers’ (Sharp, 2011). When considering peace, therefore, the question becomes that of how far ideas promoting more peaceful relationships spread within the ecology of ideas in any given context. How far have peaceful ideas received the support of more thinking powers, and so provided alternatives to the kinds of ideas that have shaped damaging patterns of conflict and division? Analysing the UN peace operation documents is therefore about identifying the ideas of peace they support and assessing how successful the organisation has been in mobilising the power of its ideas. Importantly, ideas also come up against resistance from counter-ideas. When examining a UN peace operation, it also therefore necessary to look at how far the UN’s ideas are resisted in the local context in which they are deployed, and the effects of such resistance.

Having established the methodological framework for the research, the final section describes the actual process and rationale by which UN documents were selected and analysed. I describe the filters I used to choose the documents, how I organised them, and the process of analysing each set of texts to identify key themes.

## 5.2 Organisations as objects of study

Organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, are recognised as important objects of study for critical geopolitics (Bachmann, 2013; Jeffrey, 2013). Emerging from ‘a broad dissatisfaction with an assumption that the state constitutes the primary locus of political power’ (Jeffrey, 2013: 388), studying organisations contributes towards developing more nuanced understandings of geopolitics today. Doing so has certain scalar and spatial implications. International governmental organisations are transnational; money and ideas flow between them, and thus ‘the established scalar hierarchies or organisational boundaries are challenged by a new institutional politics’ (Jeffrey, 2013: 391; see also Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Dittmer, 2015). The study of organisational discourse is necessary to understand ‘the mutually constitutive relationship of language and practice, the complex interweaving of representation and intervention. Examining organisations that act across state boundaries allows researchers to explore international governance as a discursive project and a set of material practices’ (Merlingen, 2003: 371).

This thesis aims to analyse the political rationalities of contemporary UN peace operations through an examination of policy documents, mission reports, and Security Council resolutions. Engaging with UN documents, and adopting discourse analysis as a method, broadly follows Merlingen’s approach to studying organisations. He writes that political rationalities:

can be studied by investigating IGO [intergovernmental organisation] documents (e.g. decisions, policy papers, programmes), pronouncements by national delegations to IGOs and IGO staff, proposals of IGO-affiliated international non-governmental organizations and so forth. The focus in this analysis is, among other things, on the problems to be acted upon by IGOs, the arguments that are put forward to justify interventions, the strategies for tackling the problems, and the agencies that are assigned operational functions (Merlingen, 2003: 367).

Merlingen draws upon Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and governmentality (Foucault, 1991a, 1998, 2002). This is reflected in his recognition of the power of discourse to ‘make up reality’ (Merlingen, 2003: 368). Thus, Merlingen talks about the ‘imagined’ status of the eastern states in Europe after the Cold War – ‘the *imagined* similarity between East and West gave way to *imagined* structural dissimilarity that needed to be tackled by a major international project of improvement’ (p. 372, emphasis added).

While my own thesis is likewise focussed on the productive power of imagination and ideas, the underlying conceptual framework utilised here differs somewhat from a Foucauldian understanding of discourse. Foucault’s approach, and the literature that follows his approach, seeks to *de*-naturalize epistemology; that is, it seeks to demonstrate that knowledge is not a reflection of natural ‘truths’ about society. The Spinozan framework that I here adopt from Sharp (2011) however, *re*-naturalizes epistemology. This distinction is

discussed in greater detail below. For now, I will emphasise that a renaturalized account of ideas alters how the rationality of an organisation is understood. The analysis is not just to show that the ideas promoted by an organisation are productive of certain imaginaries and subjectivities, as a Foucauldian approach does. It is also to understand how the very possibility of such imaginaries is a product of an underlying relational ontology of ideas as a natural attribute of existence. Before elaborating a renaturalized understanding, the next section first considers in more detail the theoretical underpinnings that have shaped the use of discourse analysis as a method in critical geopolitics.

### 5.3 Discourse analysis and critical geopolitics

Discourse analysis is not a neatly isolated method for analysing texts. Committed to the importance of language for ‘enabling virtually all social activities’ (Dittmer, 2010: 274), discourse analysis shares similar concerns and objects of analysis with hermeneutics, deconstruction, and semiotic analysis (Hoggart *et al.*, 2002). Although firmly established in human geography, there is no single agreed-upon definition of discourse analysis, and methods of application vary accordingly. The kinds of questions to be asked of a text, and the analysis of what is found, differ according to the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology. The following therefore sets out the theoretical perspective of the methodology for this thesis and demonstrates how the theory justifies the questions asked of the documents.

In human geography there are two broad strands to discourse analysis, which differ along the lines of structuralist and poststructuralist social theory (Dittmer, 2010; Lees, 2004). The structuralist understanding, drawing from Gramsci and Marx, ‘presupposes a subject that is ontologically prior to the effect of the discourse of the subject’ (Dittmer, 2010: 276). Characteristic for this kind of work is the designation of different classes. Citizens belong to an identifiable class, and discourse is the ideology by which capitalist values are instilled in society and revolution is prevented. The analysis of texts from this perspective therefore focuses on demonstrating the ways that prevalent discourses (or ideologies) are complicit in the oppression of the working class (or women, people of colour etc.). This approach aims at liberation from such ideologies.

The poststructuralist understanding of discourse, associated principally with Michel Foucault, does not adhere to a Marxist understanding of pre-given subject positions, but rather argues that subjectivity itself is a product of discourse (Dittmer, 2010; Wylie, 2006). Subject positions, individual as well as groups, are not presupposed to have a fixed reality, but are considered the result of historical and ongoing operations of power and knowledge. A key difference with the structuralist view is that power is not understood as held and exercised by a ruling class, but rather is viewed as something that functions through numerous relations between individuals. As Foucault (2004: 29) himself states:

Do not regard power as a phenomenon of mass and homogenous domination – the domination of one individual over others, of one group over others, or of one class over others [...] Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a chain.



## Chapter 5

Analysing texts from this perspective involves tracing the conflation of power and knowledge in the historical formation of the 'regime of truth' (Foucault, 1977: 13) that is under scrutiny. It concerns the ways in which the ideas and concepts in a text 'become embodied and enacted' (Dittmer, 2010: 275) in the reality of everyday life. Foucault, following Nietzsche, called his approach 'genealogy' (Foucault, 1991b), and notably applied it in his analyses of the human sciences (Foucault, 1991a, 1998).

The two approaches are not necessarily discrete, and there is a 'blurring of theoretical boundaries during many discourse analyses' (Dittmer, 2010: 279). Within critical geopolitics, however, poststructuralist theory has been particularly influential, and discourse analysis in the Foucauldian tradition is a principle tool (Agnew, 2013; Müller, 2008; Ó Tuathail, 1996). It is used to show that geographical knowledge about the world is imbued with political power, that taken-for-granted 'truths' about space, place, and identity are discursively produced, and that these constructions are frequently implicated in instances of violence and war (Agnew, 2013). If geographers are to develop a greater understanding of peace and nonviolence, as Megoran (2010b, 2011) argues they should, then the question remains of how discourse analysis can serve the study of peace.

### 5.4 Ideology critique and the nature of ideas

In the structuralist view, ideology oppresses certain social groups and prevents material change in society. The poststructuralist perspective is concerned with how knowledge constructs subjectivities and shapes the possibilities of social life. Both understandings imply that discourses - the texts, ideas and concepts they consist of - have significance and *force* within the reality of people's lives. The continual attention paid to representations (textual and otherwise) within human geography is part of 'a concerted effort to understand the force of representations as they make, remake and unmake the world' (Anderson, 2019: 1120). What does it mean to say that ideas have force, and how does such a claim relate to questions of war and peace?

The force of ideas is considered in some depth by the philosopher Hasana Sharp (2011), whose arguments regarding the nature of ideas, and their significance for political analysis, derive from the ontology set out in Spinoza's *Ethics* (1996 [1677]). Spinoza's account of reality focuses on its relational nature. The being of any single 'thing' - to the extent that it is possible to talk about discrete 'things' - cannot be isolated from its relationship to everything around it, how it affects and is affected by the things it encounters. This is as much true of humans as it is of plants and animals, and indeed of non-living objects, although their capacity to affect and be affected is less than that of living beings. This is why Sharp names her project one of *re-naturalization*. Following Spinoza, she argues that humans, and their social and political realities, cannot be considered as being outside of the system of relations that constitute Nature.

The key point for the purposes of this methodology is that the relationality between beings is true not only of bodies but also of minds. Spinoza challenges us to consider that the content of our minds, our thoughts and ideas, cannot be said to originate in ourselves. As Sharp (2011: 67) puts it:

Individuals imagine themselves to be the origin of their ideas, when, in actuality, they do not think independently of myriad other beings, especially those of their immediate surroundings, social milieu and political environment.

This acknowledges the fact that our minds consist in large part of the numerous ideas inherited from the social world into which we are born - the commonly accepted knowledge which is perpetuated down generations. In Sharp's account, the strength of an idea is dependent on it occupying many minds and being supported by other ideas within those minds. Through encounters and interactions with other beings we are exposed to new ideas, which may strengthen or weaken ideas already present in our minds. For new ideas to develop and begin to gain strength requires that more people are exposed to them, and that they 'take root' in many minds, something which can be difficult when new ideas come up against the resistance of numerous thinking powers, who might reject the new idea if it is not compatible with their current ideas (Sharp, 2011).

Some ideas that we inherit from our social environment are useful for us and contribute to our well-being. Examples could include knowing how to read and write, how to cook, or moral instruction to treat others well. Others can be damaging to our well-being, for example dominant standards of physical beauty which can cause low self-esteem.<sup>28</sup> These examples demonstrate the point that ideas can be enabling or disabling, but it is necessary not to be simplistic. People can be affected differently by the same idea – i.e. what one perceives as good, another perceives as bad. This disparity is the result of each person having a unique history of the ideas and affects they have been exposed to, which has formed their desires, disposition, and the content of their mind (Sharp, 2017). Such disparity may in many cases be of no great consequence, differing tastes in music, for example. In other cases, disparity can drive social divisions and hatred, whereby people find themselves in irreconcilable groups regarding a particular issue. This division and enmity can to a large extent shape social and political life because it involves strong ideas which occupy a great many minds on both sides of a debate.

Individuals themselves are also affected by contrary ideas. An addiction, for example, could be conceptualised under Spinoza's ontology as a particularly strong affect that drives a person to repeat a specific behaviour. Knowing that the behaviour is damaging them is often not sufficient to make them cease, because such knowledge is overwhelmed by the strength of the opposite idea, which in the case of an addiction is the desire for alcohol, drugs, or whatever it may be. Hence Spinoza's declaration that 'often we see the better and follow the worse (viz. when we are torn by contrary affects)' (*E III p2s*).

Ideas, then, just like everything else in Nature, require support to thrive and persevere. In turning to Spinoza and developing a renaturalized understanding of ideology, the study of discourse becomes a study of 'the life of ideas' (Sharp, 2011: 61). Hence Sharp's call to 'ascertain the affective power of ideas' (p. 78). A politically engaged analysis should not just be about identifying damaging or disabling ideas. It also:

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<sup>28</sup> see Sharp, 2011: 79-80, for a discussion of affects in relation to beauty standards, plastic surgery, and self-esteem.

requires an ongoing practice of sustenance and attention to new insights, promising ideas, and counterhypotheses, seeking amenable ambient forces that might allow them to take root and become adequate for increasingly many thinking powers. Spinoza's portrait of ideal existence encourages us to consider which practices, associations, and relationships might strengthen and care for emerging, fragile, and challenging ideas that will not immediately find fertile soil (Sharp, 2011: 74).

Taking Spinoza's ontology into account suggests a revised understanding of discourse or ideology. It includes elements of both the structuralist and poststructuralist approaches outlined above, but a renaturalized conception of ideas adds an additional dimension to critical analysis. Like the structuralist approach, Sharp's model for ideology critique involves the identification of damaging ideas, ideas that can reasonably be shown to be reducing people's well-being. But, like the Foucauldian critique, Sharp does not accept that the power of an idea is held by a ruling class. She writes that:

Ideology is not best understood as something that is produced by the powers that be and imposed upon the malleable crowd. Rather, regardless of where they come from, ideas are powerful insofar as they occupy and flow from many minds (Sharp, 2011: 78-79).

Sharp's conceptualisation of ideas also shares the poststructural understanding that subjectivities are shaped by the constellation of ideas in which we unavoidably exist. But, for Sharp, pointing out that certain taken-for-granted ideals or categories are in fact contingent products of history is not in itself sufficient to fulfil a critical analytical investigation of ideas. Her call to 'ascertain the affective power of ideas' (Sharp, 2011: 78) focuses a stage earlier in the existence of a discourse. If, for Foucault, the 'way things are' is the outcome of historical struggles out of which 'truth' is produced (Foucault, 1991b; Oksala, 2012), then Sharp's understanding of ideas attempts to grasp the ontological nature of that struggle – the relationality of thought and the 'ecosystem of ideas' (Sharp, 2011: 56) in which all thought participates. In arguing for a renaturalized understanding of ideology/discourse, Sharp is not saying that traditionally accepted categories are natural after all; rather she argues that *ideas themselves are natural, whether they are true or not*. Hence why '[t]he renaturalization of ideology is not exclusively a question of truth but is most importantly a question of power' (Sharp, 2011: 77).

How does this understanding of ideas relate to matters of war and peace? Regarding peace, for Sharp it would not be enough to point out the ideas that cause and perpetuate division and violence, e.g. the perception of an a priori enemy in an ideology of difference (see Said, 1985), inflexible orthodoxies that justify violence, dehumanising a specific community, and so on. Neither is it sufficient to demonstrate that these ideas are contingent products of history, rather than essential truths. It is necessary to also try to understand and promote how ideas that counter such damage spread and become adequate – what are the 'practices, associations, and relationships [that] might strengthen' the idea that *we can live together*, and so on? Such ideas, if they became strong enough, change the nature of the relationships between people, from damaging and destructive to enabling and productive, and thus allow for the possibility of peace, and give peace content. It is this more productive element that is often missing from analyses in critical geopolitics

that have focused predominantly on violence and war (Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018). Thinking about peace this way responds also to Megoran's (2010b) argument that critical geopolitics should not only examine how discourse contributes to violence and warfare, but how it can contribute to peace.

Studying the policies of an organisation from this perspective is therefore a study of the ideas that are advocated and supported by that institution and what they do. Certain ideas flourish and become established ideals, while others seem to have momentary consideration before being largely forgotten. Some ideas are hotly contested and debated. Others are so widely accepted that they may not even be explicitly acknowledged – they rather form a foundation of presuppositions that are not brought into question or critical scrutiny. Sharp's conceptualisation of an 'ecosystem of ideas' draws our attention to these ongoing relational processes. It is no doubt an incredibly complex process. An organisation like the UN involves a plethora of meetings, panels of experts, different governments with different priorities, and debates over every conceivable issue of international governance. An informal conversation between staff members and a Security Council resolution are both contributions to the life of ideas in this assemblage, albeit with disparate force and influence. In focusing on policy documents and reports on peace operations, this thesis is addressing only one aspect of the complex assemblage of UN ideas. It is therefore necessary now to examine more specifically the role of documents and reports within the ecosystem of ideas in an organisation like the UN.

## 5.5 Coding the ecosystem of ideas in UN public discourse

Alongside the networks of relations between politicians, diplomats, civil servants, and military personnel, 'international intervention also fuels, and is fuelled by, a knowledge and report writing industry' (Doucet, 2016: 126). This thesis analyses publicly available UN reports on matters of peace policy in general, and the intervention in Kosovo in particular. The documents selected for analysis include regular reports on the mission in Kosovo, as well as those stand-alone documents that are considered doctrinal within UN peace policy (see below section 5.6 for specific detail on documents analysed). To a large extent, the documents under examination here represent a specific 'genre' of UN policy writing. That is, they share a highly formal written style, consisting of a series of numbered paragraphs and/or articles, each paragraph presenting one key point (Figure 3). The documents also frequently refer to the existing organisational code or decision in accordance with which they are produced. For example, every Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Kosovo begins by stating: 'The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)'. To a large degree, then, the documents correspond to the style and formatting practices of international law. The UN Charter and Security Council resolutions in fact *are* international legal treaties, so such stylistic correspondence is unsurprising in their case; but their formal genre is emulated also in the Secretary-General's reports, and in other documents which do not hold the same legal authority as Security Council resolutions.

What are the methodological consequences of conceptualising these formal texts, and the ideas they contain, as component parts of an assemblage? Given the foregoing account of the nature of ideas, and the complexity of the assemblage of ideas in the UN, a first point to acknowledge is that these documents are

only a partial window into the ecosystem of ideas on UN peace operations. Similarly, it is important to remain aware of the fact that the presentation of an idea or policy in a publicly available document might belie disagreement and arguments going on ‘behind-the-scenes’ in the organisation. Inter-agency competition and resistance to coordination efforts, for example, are not uncommon in the UN (Ahmed *et al.*, 2007; Weiss, 2011). Likewise, the appearance of a policy recommendation in a document does not guarantee that it will be implemented in full. To take one example, the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) was published in 2015, but the Security Council ‘did not initiate an implementation process triggered by a formal resolution’ (Novosseloff, 2019: 4), and the report’s recommended reforms have only ‘been implemented in a piecemeal manner’ (Sharland, 2018: 9).

While texts, and the ideas they contain, do not provide access to the whole assemblage, then, they are nevertheless important component parts. There are several reasons why a focus on the UN’s public discourse remains relevant to researching the geopolitics of peace, even while accepting the previous paragraph’s caveats. ‘UN ideas have set past and present international agendas’, writes Thomas Weiss (2011: 45). They have attempted to provide a ‘guiding vision’ for contemporary peace processes (Ahmed *et al.*, 2007: 16). Using the language of assemblage theory, the agenda-setting and vision-guiding function of formal documents can be identified as a capacity to *code* the components of the assemblage. ‘Coding’ is defined as ‘the role played by special expressive components in an assemblage in fixing the identity of a whole’ (DeLanda, 2016: 22). In an assemblage like the UN, or a state, the coding function is provided by ‘written rules, standard procedures, and most importantly, a constitution defining the organisation’s rights and obligation’ (*ibid.*, 22). The UN Charter is an excellent example of a text that demonstrates a capacity to code the UN’s ideas and policies. As a foundational and legally binding treaty, all the procedures and policies of the organisation are expected to conform to the Charter. A Security Council resolution, such as that mandating the mission in Kosovo, likewise demonstrates a coding function, providing the legal framework

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

Figure 3 – Extract from Security Council Resolution 1244, demonstrating the formal legal style of most UN documents

within which UNMIK is expected to carry out its mandated responsibilities. Thus, while UNMIK's policies are expected to conform to the code of Security Council Resolution 1244, Resolution 1244 is expected to conform to the code of the UN Charter. Texts with a substantial coding capacity are therefore important to examine, because they establish the *parameter* within which the organisation's policies are bounded.

Paying attention to the coding function of the documents is therefore one of the methodological consequences of conceptualising texts as component parts of an assemblage. Nevertheless, the majority of the documents analysed in this thesis are reports of the Secretary-General, which do not have the legal authority of Security Council resolutions or the UN Charter. What is their role within the assemblage? While texts that code the assemblage provide its parameter, the majority of texts are *variables* within the limits of that code.<sup>29</sup> The distinction between parameter and variable as different 'levels' of linguistic entity within an assemblage is analytically useful, but in reality the ideas they contain constantly interact and influence each other (DeLanda, 2016: 52). This means that, although the Secretary-General's reports do not have the same coding capacity as resolutions or Security Council approved doctrine, they are still active components of the assemblage of ideas. Additionally, ideas that originate within the plethora of variables, if they receive sufficient nurturing and support, may end up as part of future codes. Hence the relevance of the Secretary-General's reports, in which the researcher can identify which ideas are being promoted and nurtured over time. If they are expressed in a way that seems to emulate international law, then that is perhaps a way to strengthen support for ideas, seeking legitimacy by echoing the authoritative framework of legal documents.

Ahmed *et al.* (2007: 21) observe that the Secretary-General's reports, 'though not constituting a comprehensive doctrine for peacekeeping, *in toto*, have decidedly influenced the mandate and means most recently assigned to the latest generation of peacekeeping operations'. The ideas present in these variable texts can therefore gain in prominence and influence, even though they do not always receive unanimous Security Council or General Assembly endorsement. As texts '*accumulate* in an archive that [can] be accessed by policy makers' (Dittmer, 2017: 32, original emphasis), they come to form an institutional memory – an enduring record of the ecosystem of ideas out of which policy is constructed. Even if certain policies or ideas are disputed, the point is that the dispute is over *this* particular policy and not over some other unarticulated one. By focusing on the UN's public discourse, then, the researcher is able to identify the content of its institutional memory - which ideas change, which remain constant, which end up being reflected as later parameters/codes, and so on.

Although an examination of discourse lacks the immediate experience of social processes as they unfold in context, then, the importance of policy and doctrine in its capacity to guide practices should not be dismissed. The large body of knowledge contained in UN reports promotes a 'particular way of making visible and problematizing violent conflict[...] and it summons particular forms of knowledge and remedial actions in response' (Doucet, 2016: 126). Examining the UN's policies and reports provides a way of understanding, at least in part, the transnational governmentality of a contemporary peace process. It allows

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<sup>29</sup> The terms 'parameter' and 'variable' are both from DeLanda (2016: 51).

for an analysis of how peace becomes imagined as possible in different contexts and at different times – how it is conceptualised, and how it is operationalised.

## 5.6 Account of the document analysis

In a review of the UN peacekeeping policy making process, Sharland (2018: 4) notes that '[t]he formulation of policy on UN peacekeeping over the last seventy years has largely been evolutionary and ad hoc'. Indeed, before the development of the *Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO, 2008), there was no single document defining and elaborating the UN's peacekeeping doctrine (see Ahmed *et al.*, 2007). Rather, various policies and guides were introduced at different points, often in response to perceived failures, particularly in the 1990s, as well as when interventions were prematurely declared successes before reverting to violence (Ahmed *et al.*, 2007).

For the purposes of this research, UN documents were selected for analysis according to the conceptual framework and filter of my study, as presented in previous chapters. This thesis is concerned with the UNs conceptualisation of peace, its policies in the Mission in Kosovo, and what they reveal about the state in the geopolitics of peace. It was necessary, therefore, to examine both the overarching principles and doctrine of UN peace operations, and documents specific to Kosovo. Documents were thus chosen with the aim of establishing how peace is both conceptualised in an abstract statement of ideals, and operationalised in the policy decisions in Kosovo.

The documents were chosen with the support of an understanding of how peacekeeping policy gets made, which came principally from Sharland (2018). While the Secretariat formulates much of the peace policy and training materials, the Security Council retains overall authority over peace operation mandates and so 'continues to set the terms and limits of how UN peacekeeping is defined' (Sharland, 2018: 19). While the majority of the documents selected would therefore be sourced from the Secretariat (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretary-General's reports, etc.), it was also important to establish the legal mandates of the case mission as presented in Security Council resolutions.

The selection process was further informed by Koops *et al.*'s (2015a) introduction to peacekeeping in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They note the importance of the Brahimi report (UN General Assembly, 2000), the Capstone doctrine (UN DPKO, 2008), and the New Horizon process (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009), as being three key conceptual developments in peacekeeping in the new millennium. Selection was aided also by the UNs own research guide on peacekeeping.<sup>30</sup> This guide directs the researcher towards the relevant documents from the General Assembly, the Security Council, as well as the relevant specific departments and committees involved in the management of peace operations.

Based on the above, I established three broad categories by which to filter the available documents, from the conceptual to the operational, and selected relevant documents applicable to each category. The categories are: principles and doctrine (6 documents); annual reports on peace (21 documents); mission specific reports and resolutions on Kosovo (78 documents). In total, 105 documents were selected for

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<sup>30</sup> Guide available at: <http://research.un.org/en/docs/peacekeeping/intro>

analysis. All of the documents were accessed through the UN's online archive, which stores electronic copies of every publicly available UN document from throughout the history of the organisation. The majority of the documents have a unique document symbol. The full texts can be found by entering the document symbol in the Official Document System at <https://documents.un.org>. The next three sub-sections detail the specifics of the chosen documents. This is followed by a note on the authorship of the documents, then an account of how the analysis was conducted.

### 5.6.1 Principles and doctrine

#### **Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000)**

The 'Brahimi Report' was commissioned in light of the UN's failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre. It provides a 'thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities' and makes recommendations for improvements in UN peace operations. The Capstone Doctrine (see below) explicitly states that it draws on the analysis provided in the Brahimi Report (UN DPKO, 2008: 10).

#### **United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008)**

The so-called 'Capstone Doctrine', this text is the UN's guide to the normative framework of their peacekeeping operations. It is aimed at 'planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations' (UN DPKO, 2008: 8).

#### **A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009)**

Unlike the Brahimi report and the *Principles and Guidelines*, the New Partnership Agenda is *not* a declaration of official UN policy. It was produced by the DPKO and the DFS, but as a 'consultation document' to promote discussion about the future of UN peacekeeping. It explicitly cites both the Brahimi report and the Capstone doctrine.

#### **An Agenda for Peace (1992)**

The *Agenda for Peace* ushered in the transformative post-Cold War approach to peace operations in the UN. It introduced the term 'post-conflict peacebuilding', a concept that would extend the role of peace missions beyond security measures to include aspects of social, economic, and political development.

#### **Charter of the United Nations (1945)**

The founding document of the UN, the Charter provides the legal and organisational framework to which Member States, in principle, agree to adhere. While peace operations have transformed significantly in the decades since the Charter was signed, all Security Council mandates make reference to the section of the Charter under which they are acting when they authorise an intervention. The chapters most directly relevant to peace operations are chapters VI and VII, regarding, respectively, 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'.

#### **Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (2015)**



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Jointly commissioned by the General Assembly and the Security Council (see A/69/674–S/2014/911), the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture initiated the ‘sustaining peace’ agenda in the UN. ‘Sustaining peace’ is the most recent program for improvement and development of the organisation’s approach to peace operations (see section 2.3.1 of this thesis).

### 5.6.2 Annual reports on peace

#### **Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization**

These reports are an annual review of the full breadth of UN activities. They always contain a section on peace and security. Their UN document symbol is A/[session]/1. I reviewed every annual report, from 1999 to 2019, attending particularly to the sections on peace and security, as well as to the introductory sections which outlined the main themes of that year’s activities, and often summarised the Secretary-General’s thoughts on where work and improvement was required.

### 5.6.3 Mission specific resolutions and reports

#### **Security Council mandates and resolutions**

The Security Council holds the overall authority to deploy a peace mission, to set and renew its mandate, and also to pass any resolutions regarding the mission as it develops. Thus, while other bodies within the UN are involved in policy discussions and consultations, the Security Council ‘continues to set the terms and limits of how UN peacekeeping is defined’ (Sharland, 2018: 19). The most important Security Council resolution for the purposes of this thesis was that which provided the mandate for the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/RES/1244[1999]).

#### **Reports of the Secretary-General on the Interim Administration in Kosovo**

The Secretary-General compiles a report for each peacekeeping mission roughly every 90 days, addressed to the Security-Council. I was therefore able to compile the UN mission reports for Kosovo from its establishment in 1999 through to the present day, a total of 72 reports. They give an account of the mission’s activities for the given period, and recommendations for further action.

#### **A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (2001)**

The Constitutional Framework (UNMIK, 2001) was the legal regulation by which UNMIK established and managed the ‘provisional institutions’ in Kosovo, including the Provisional Assembly, the judicial system, the protection of human rights, and other factors besides. This document was therefore a particularly useful source for investigating how UNMIK sought to pursue peace through the institutions of government.

#### **The Standards for Kosovo (2004)**

The Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004) lay out a series of benchmarks that the UN Security Council deemed necessary to have been achieved before the independent status of Kosovo would be considered – the so-called ‘standards before status’ policy (see S/PRST/2004/13). The Standards cover a broad range of aspects, including criteria for the functioning of democratic institutions, freedom of movement of all

citizens, management of the economy, and dialogue between the Kosovo and Serbian governments. This document therefore provided a particularly good insight into the overall vision of peace that UNMIK was aspiring to in Kosovo – ‘A Kosovo where all – regardless of ethnic background, race or religion – are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for everyone’ (p. 1). The document was therefore a rich source of the ideas that UNMIK sought to promote, although there was less detail here on precisely *how* these standards would be achieved.

### **Reports on the future status of Kosovo**

Two reports were selected for their significance in relation to the status of Kosovo, and the efforts to establish an official UN position on the question of whether Kosovo should be independent or not. These are: ‘A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo’ (S/2005/635); and the ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’ (S/2007/168). The first of these was an assessment of the progress that had been made in Kosovo up to that point, with a view to deciding if it was possible to begin the process of determining Kosovo’s future status. The report concluded that ‘the time has come to commence this process’ (§ 62). The second report therefore detailed the outcome of the future status process initiated by the first report. It recommended that Kosovo should indeed begin its transfer to full legal independence from Serbia. This recommendation was not passed by the Security Council, however, due to the Russian government rejecting it. Six months later, the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared independence, violating the conditions of the UNMIK mandate.

### **First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations (2013)**

More commonly called the ‘Brussels Agreement’, this treaty was the outcome of European Union facilitated negotiations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo. It is considered to have brought to an end the ‘North Kosovo Crisis’, a period of increased tension and violence related to the Kosovo government’s exercise of authority over Serbian communities in the region (see chapter 6). The agreement proposed the creation of an Association/Community of Kosovo Serb Municipalities, a policy that would give the Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo a certain amount of governmental autonomy. At the time of writing, however, the Association/Community has yet to be formally established.

#### 5.6.4 A note on authorship and institutional context

A characteristic of many of the documents just listed is that they are not attributed to an author. Security Council resolutions, and doctrinal texts like the *Principles and Guidelines* are presented as the disembodied voice of the organisation – or at least of the specific department that has produced the text. This is one of the ways in which the public-facing discourse of the UN might be said to belie fragmentation and disagreement. The reader is presented with, for example, the supposedly coherent view of the Security Council – we are not given details of arguments between Member States, or what compromises had to be made to placate the P-5.

The Reports of the Secretary-General are a little different in this regard, however, in so far as they do not claim to speak for the UN as a whole, but are presented as the Secretary-General’s own analysis of the

activities of the Secretariat. They are even written in the first-person, albeit while maintaining a highly formal style. Different Secretaries-General have different ideas and agendas. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (served 1992-96), who wrote the *Agenda for Peace*, evidently championed an interventionist agenda, successfully advocating for the expansion of the UN's peace activities. More recently, it has been suggested that the current Secretary-General, António Guterres, 'is not a fan of multidimensional peace operation' (Novosseloff, 2019: 1). The Mission in Kosovo has been conducted under the service of three Secretaries-General,<sup>31</sup> and it is therefore relevant to pay attention to what is consistent and what changes in the priorities of the Secretariat as they are presented by the Secretary-General.

This distinction – between the disembodied codes of doctrine/resolution and the slightly more subjective Secretary-General's reports – roughly follows the above-discussed distinction between texts as parameter and texts as variable. Indeed, as the term 'variable' already implies, there can be latitude for different ideas within the parameters of the larger code. It might be expected, then, that the researcher is likely to find more variability of ideas within the Secretary-General's reports than in the more highly coded documents. Such distinction might in part be an outcome of the different institutional contexts in which the texts are produced. The Security Council consists of 15 representatives of national governments – the five permanent members, plus the remaining ten members who rotate after two years of participation. While the changing of the non-permanent members may bring new perspectives into consideration, or increase/diminish the potential for effective collaboration, the history of the Council demonstrates that veto, stalling, and inaction are common. Commenting on the 'unhelpfulness' of the Security Council in addressing contemporary conflicts, Novosseloff (2019: 5) observes:

Fewer member states are willing to deviate from agreed-upon language and concepts, even if proposed changes are minimal. There is great reluctance to advance new ideas; there is also a lack of flexibility, a lack of inventiveness, and a lack of audacity.

By contrast, the Secretary-General, and the Secretariat he administers, is not so beholden to the demands and red lines of national governments. Indeed, the UN Charter describes the Secretary-General's responsibilities as 'exclusively international', and orders that Member States shall not 'seek to influence [the Secretary-General] in the discharge of their responsibilities' (United Nations, 1945: Article 100). Perhaps this is why a reader is more likely to find new ideas and agendas being promoted and discussed in Secretariat documents rather than being advanced by Security Council resolutions. National governments are unlikely to question the inviolability of state sovereignty for example – but that is exactly what Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was able to do in his *Agenda for Peace*.

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General's reports still try 'to demonstrate a consistent organizational stance' (Sharland, 2018: 21) which is not necessarily representative of inter-departmental rivalry, disagreement, and inconsistent practice or procedure. To acknowledge that there is disagreement over ideas within the organisation, however, does not render the public documents irrelevant, a somehow passive façade that masks the 'real' UN. On the contrary, they are important and influential components of the UN assemblage.

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<sup>31</sup> Kofi Annan (1997-2006), Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016), António Guterres (2017-present).

Without a certain degree of coherence around key ideas – provided by the circulation of reports and doctrine – the organisation would not be able to function. Such coherence can never be achieved absolutely. That is, the assemblage can never become so highly coded that there is no latitude whatsoever for divergent views, disagreement, or inconsistency. But it can be achieved to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the issue being addressed. From this perspective, the role of the public discourse of the UN is to pursue this coherence – to try and establish consistent understandings of, for example, the ideals of democracy and human rights, the organisation of state institutions in the pursuit of peace, or a definition of sovereignty. The institutional or departmental authorship of these documents – as opposed to naming the actual person/people who write them – can therefore be seen as part of this strategy to pursue coherence.

### 5.6.5 Conducting the document analysis

The analysis was conducted using NVivo, a computer programme designed to aid qualitative textual research. It allows the researcher to highlight and organise material that relates to chosen themes and sub-themes in the documents. The text can be annotated to keep track of the analytical process. Not only do these features make the process systematic and efficient, they also support the transparency of the research, as it makes it straightforward to identify the supporting evidence for claims.

I sifted through the documents, or relevant sub-sections, coding the text according to the themes discussed below, as well as new themes that became apparent as I read. I was then able to review the coded content, examine its context within the document as a whole, and then write up the findings for each theme with reference to the content.

#### 5.6.5.1 *Principles and doctrine*

The analysis began with the principles and doctrine, in order to first establish an understanding of the organisation's own conceptualisation of peace which would then productively inform the analysis of the annual reports and the mission-specific reports, to identify any discrepancies, for example, or to search in the mission specific reports for any key terms identified in the doctrinal texts. Based on the conceptual framework of the research, I began with six themes to draw out from the documents. They were:

- Ideals of peace
  - Anything that indicates the conceptual understanding of what peace is. This would include any 'theology' of peace, any references to universal themes such as justice and equality.
- Geographical/spatial
  - Any references to space and place in the understanding of peace and how to achieve it. It could be specific sites of action, policies that involve spatial separation of peoples (safe zones etc.), or any comments that refer to the geography of a place as part of their diagnosis of the problems and suggested solutions.
- State governance
  - References to the state and the functions of state, as part of the development of peace. This might include mandates to carry out civil administration and/or institution building. It could include practices that aim to extend the spatial reach of government authority. It might be part

of the conceptual understanding of peace, placing responsibility on the government or the law for example.

- Local level
  - A counterpoint to the 'state governance' node, local level means any references to reconciliation in communities and local relationships. This might include community meetings, local reconciliation measures, the role of trade/religion/sport/music and so on. Namely, policies and practices that are aimed not at state institutions and authority, but on people and their relationships in a context of post-conflict society.
- Criteria for measuring outcome
  - By what criteria is a policy, practice, or mission, deemed a success or failure? Any mention of what worked or what didn't work will come under this.
- Responses to perceived problems
  - How has the organisation responded to perceived problems? I.e., if they recognise an issue that is compromising peace, what do they do to remedy it?

While these six formed a starting framework for my examination of the texts, I remained open to identifying other relevant themes might become apparent as I read the documents.

#### *5.6.5.2 Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*

Reading the annual Reports of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization was a little different to reading the declarations of principles and fundamental doctrine. I read the introduction of each report, wherein the Secretary-General summarises the main issues of the year and the actions that the UN has taken in relation to them. I also read the section in each report that is dedicated specifically to peace and security. The overarching themes that I was looking for stayed the same, and I was interested to see if there were continuities and differences between the detached 'Ideals of Peace' in the doctrine, and the more engaged process of making decisions and responding to problems that the reports summarise for a given year. I looked for geopolitical and spatial themes. I also looked for details of Kosovo, and how these cases were connected to the policy decisions made in that particular year. This way I was able to track changes across the 20-year period, changes in concepts, in organisational elements, and of events in Kosovo (elections, renewal of violence, etc.).

Once I had been through all the reports, I reviewed the coded material and the annotations, in order to summarise the findings relating to the key themes of the project. I noted all the points that were annotated, and then tried to draw out themes that were repeated across the different points. I came up with nine themes – each point I'd annotated seemed to be related to at least one of the following themes. One of the themes was simply 'geopolitical', but this was too broad – and at least 5 of the other themes could be considered geopolitical. Thus, those things I'd called simply 'geopolitical', I considered again and tried to recognise their more specific theme, and how they related to the other eight themes, which were as follows:

- Globalization and the limits of the nation state
- Cross-border flows

- International sphere of operating
- National/domestic sphere of operating
- State sovereignty vs the need to protect human rights
- Struggles and operational hindrances
- Institutions
- Ideals

In addition, reviewing these reports I established a timeline of the mission in Kosovo by bringing together the content of each report regarding UNMIK (as a general rule, each report had one or two paragraphs dealing with every ongoing peace operation). Doing this not only provided a summary of the UN's engagement in Kosovo over the 20-year period, but I was able to pay attention to what the Secretary-General saw fit to report in each case. I was able to identify changes in events and policy, for example the extension of mandates, elections, Security Council resolutions, and so on.

Having written up the summaries of these findings, I reviewed them and identified what related to the overarching theme of geopolitics and the role of the state, as well as to the chapter themes of institutionalising peace and managing difference. This gave me a sense of how to direct my reading after this stage – i.e., if I picked up on a key finding to do with managing difference, I could work out what I would have to look for to further develop an understanding of that point. For example, one of the findings regarding Kosovo was that the peace mission tried to encourage the participation of ethnic Serbs in elections. This prompted further inquiry into election turnout, how the mission sought to promote Serbian participation, and so on. This kind of further information was generally found in the mission specific reports.

#### 5.6.5.3 *Reports on the Interim Administration in Kosovo*

For the documentation specific to Kosovo, the starting point was the Security Council mandate. Resolution 1244 specifies the mission's aim and indicate the main components of the strategy for peacekeeping/building in the distinct context of the mission. All actions and decisions taken by the mission leadership is supposed to adhere to the scope and aims of the mandate, which is what gives authority to the intervention.

I then moved onto the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Interim Administration in Kosovo, which are requested by the Security Council in its initial mandate. The reports present a summary of the conditions on the ground (organised along key themes such as security situation, humanitarian situation, etc.), as well as documenting the mission's activities. The reports are produced frequently (usually four a year), and thus make up a substantial body of material. To help guide my examination of this large body of material, I referred to the summary that I derived from the broader Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. These summaries indicated key events from the history of the mission which I could then look at in further detail in the mission specific reports. For example, in Kosovo, a key event mentioned in the broader reports was the election of the Provisional Assembly in 2001, and the subsequent transfer of some administrative powers to the Assembly. I could therefore go to the mission specific reports from 2001

## Chapter 5

to find greater detail of UNMIK's involvement in this process, to find out which powers were transferred, which were retained by the UN, and so on.

Of particular use for a systematic approach to the document analysis was the concluding section of each report, sub-titled 'Observations'. These sections, generally 1-2 pages, communicated the Secretary-General's main points regarding the work of the mission for that reporting period. Thus, a good overview of the work of the mission in any given period could be derived from reading the relevant 'Observations' sections for the reports in that period. The more specific detail of relevant information could then be found in the relevant sections elsewhere in the report.

In addition, my enquiries were guided by my research questions and the theoretical framework of the thesis. I was interested in anything that related to the key themes of managing difference and institutionalising peace. Regarding managing difference, I was interested in how UNMIK responded to further outbreaks of violence; how elections were organised, particularly whether broad participation of the electorate was achieved; measures directed at improving civic participation and representation. For institutionalising peace, I was interested in the development of new constitutions; the role of law in the peace process; the networks of infrastructure that allow administration of the region, how the mission negotiated opposition in the local context, and so on. Geopolitically, and thinking about the assemblage of a new state, I was interested in elements such as border management, infrastructure, extension of state authority, and internal and external agencies and inputs (e.g. Kosovo relying on Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, for the production of electricity following the war [see S/1999/779]).

### 5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has set out the methodological framework which underlies the research carried out for this thesis, and also gave an account of how I carried out my document analysis. The following two chapters present the findings and analysis of this process, identifying the ideas found in the documents, and how these ideas were put into practice in Kosovo.

## 6 Institutionalised peace: Assembling the ‘post-conflict’ state

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The different powers that contribute to the existence and action of a commonwealth can be sufficiently coherent and unified to account for its endurance over time, its ability to preserve itself in the face of hostile forces (internal and external), its ability to organize constituents to act according to certain norms and laws, etc.

- Hasana Sharp (2017: 840)

The best way to organise a state is easily discovered by considering the purpose of civil order, which is nothing other than peace and security of life.

- Spinoza (2000 [1677]) *Political Treatise*, 5/2

[P]eacebuilding is first and foremost a national process.

- Ban Ki-moon (UN Secretary-General, 2009: § 58)

### 6.1 Introduction

In an overview of research on institutions in political geography, Merje Kuus defines institutions as ‘more or less stable patterns in, and mechanisms for, organizing social and political life’ (Kuus, 2018: 2). This definition includes a formal understanding of the term (national government, the law, financial institutions etc.), as well as the less formalised arrangements and customs of what is sometimes called ‘civil society’. If there is to be change in politics and society, even if the driver of change is a grassroots movement, it must eventually be institutionalised (Kuus, 2018); it must become part of the ‘more or less stable patterns’ that shape people’s lives.

United Nations peace operations can be characterised as attempting to institute such changes in the societies where they intervene. Where conflict and violence dominate, the UN tries to institutionalise patterns of practice and custom that are conducive to long-term peace rather than war. How has the UN sought to do this, and how have such attempts played out in context? The UN mission in Kosovo is a particularly appropriate case in which to investigate this question. In 1999, peacebuilding had only recently developed as a concept to guide UN policy and practice, and the new types of tasks being put into practice were considerably broader than those of ‘traditional’ peacekeeping (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). The Security Council’s mandates for the UN missions in Kosovo (S/RES/1244) and East Timor (S/RES/1272) were unprecedented in the extent to which they took responsibility for the administration of the regions in which they were deployed (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010: chapter 11). In addition, these missions, and the more recently mandated mission in South Sudan, assisted in establishing autonomy and independence in the regions in which they deployed. This has involved the production of constitutions, laws, infrastructure, and so on, for the development of the new countries. These productions can be understood as ‘place-making’ – the process whereby abstract notions (in this case, the idea of the new nation state) become manifest materially and socially (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 25-26).



## Chapter 6

This chapter examines the UN's vision of the role of the state in relation to peace, and how the UN has attempted to build peace through the development and management of state institutions in Kosovo.

The chapter begins with a review of the UN's statements of principle and doctrine on peace, to establish how the organisation pursues peace through the role of the state. Surveying these documents, it is clear that the UN places great emphasis on the development of a stable, democratic, legitimate state, for establishing more peaceful societies. In addition, however, the documents also display an awareness of the limits of the state to deal with problems that are cross-border in nature, for example the regionalization of conflict. Furthermore, when it comes to promoting human rights, the UN has sought a more multilateral and interventionist approach, whereby the sovereignty of a state government is considered secondary to the protection of citizens. In the case of Kosovo, it is perhaps the case that Serbia's sovereign and legal right over the region was subordinated to the need stop the violence – and yet, the UNMIK mandate was also committed to the 'territorial integrity' of Serbia. The tension between the UN's commitment to state sovereignty and its method of multilateral intervention in the pursuit of universal norms has therefore played out in Kosovo, with various political implications.

The latter half of the chapter therefore examines the UN mission in Kosovo, and the effect of the UN developing Kosovo's state institutions without formally supporting its independence. I focus, first, on the Kosovo Assembly's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. I argue that, although the UN was neutral on the matter of Kosovo's independence, by developing its state institutions and territorializing its division from Serbia, UNMIK in effect had produced an independent state 'individual' even if, on paper, it was not committed to such an end. The coherence of the new state was not evenly distributed, however. The second key event I focus on is the resistance to the Kosovo assemblage in the so-called 'North Kosovo crisis' (2011-13), wherein four Serb-majority municipalities in the north of the region resisted the central authority of the Kosovo government. While the crisis was supposedly resolved in EU-facilitated negotiations between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, northern Kosovo remains highly segregated from the rest of the region. The North Kosovo crisis is an example of how events in one location are determined by interactions between international, state, and local agencies.

### 6.2 The UN's geopolitical vision for peace

Given that peace is often ill-defined (Megoran, 2011), what can be learned from the UN's doctrine about the meaning of peace supported by the organisation? Chapter 2 highlighted the different definitions by which the UN describes its various peace activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Although in practice there is not strict separation of these activities, it is peacekeeping and peacebuilding that most concern this thesis. These are the activities that the UN defines as occurring in the post-conflict environment, where, in theory at least, a peace agreement or ceasefire has been agreed between the parties to the conflict (see chapter 2, figure 2). It is these activities, and especially peacebuilding, that aim at creating 'sustainable peace' (UN DPKO, 2008: 18). The findings presented in this section are derived from the three key documents identified by Koops *et al.* (2015a) as most significantly

shaping 21<sup>st</sup> century peace policy,<sup>32</sup> as well as from the annual Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. Probably the most important document, at least for establishing the overarching ideals of peace, is the *Principles and Guidelines*, the so-called ‘Capstone Doctrine’ (UN DPKO, 2008). The *Principles* are intended to guide the conduct of all peacekeeping activities. Here is how it describes its doctrinal status:

[This document] sits at the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United Nations peacekeeping. Any subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform to the principles and concepts referred to in this guidance document (UN DPKO, 2008: 9).

Recalling the discussion of texts as constituent parts of an assemblage, laid out in chapter 5, the preceding quotation makes apparent the Capstone Doctrine’s status as a *coding* document. It is described as the ‘highest-level’ creed on peacekeeping; it sets the limits and parameters to which all further ‘directives, guidelines[...] procedures, manuals and training materials’ are expected to conform. It therefore readily achieves DeLanda’s (2016: 22) definition of coding: ‘the role played by an expressive component of an assemblage in fixing the identity of a whole’. In this case, the ‘whole’ being coded is the entire UN peacekeeping assemblage. Wherever in the world a peace mission is deployed, the content of this document is intended to guide its principles, policy, and conduct. When trying to discern the ideals to which the Department of Peacekeeping seeks conformity – its attempt to produce a coherent and widely adopted understanding of peace, the role of the state, and the role of the UN – the *Principles and Guidelines* are the most suitable first port-of-call.

The definitions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding quoted in chapter 2 already indicate certain factors in how peace is understood within the UN. There is acknowledgment that the aim is to sustain a positive version of peace, ‘something that is more than just the absence of war’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13); but what are the qualities of this positive peace in the documents’ conceptualisation? The *Principles and Guidelines* list key attributes of the ‘sustainable peace’ envisioned in a contemporary multi-dimensional peace operation. There is continuity across the definitions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding emphasising ‘the State’s ability to provide security’, the rule of law, and the need for ‘legitimate’ political/governmental institutions (Table 1). These criteria provide a summary of what can be found consistently throughout the UN’s documentation. Surveying the principles and doctrine on peace operations, the same group of ideals are continually referenced as being crucial to peace. They are: Security; rule of law; human rights; protection of civilians; political process and elections; state institutions; dialogue and reconciliation; social recovery; economic recovery.

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<sup>32</sup> The three are: the ‘Brahimi Report’ (UN General Assembly, 2000), the *Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO, 2008), and the *New Partnership Agenda* (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009).

Table 1- UN criteria for a sustainable peace

<b>Defining peacekeeping</b>	<b>Defining peacebuilding</b>
<p>[T]he core functions of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation are to:</p> <p>a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;</p> <p>b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;</p> <p>c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.</p> <p><i>Principles and Guidelines</i> (UN DPKO, 2008: 23)</p>	<p>[E]xperience has shown that the achievement of a sustainable peace requires progress in at least four critical areas:</p> <p>a) Restoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order;</p> <p>b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;</p> <p>c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;</p> <p>d) Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict.</p> <p><i>Principles and Guidelines</i> (UN DPKO, 2008: 25)</p>

### 6.2.1 What role for the state is presented in the documents?

As the above criteria for peace demonstrate, the role of 'the State' is emphasised in the UN's conceptualisation of peace. A sustainable peace requires 'restoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order' (UN DPKO, 2008: 25). Examining the documents for further mention of the state reveals more detail as to what is regarded as necessary at the state and institutional level in order to maintain a sustainable peace. The criteria referred to are, in part, similar to those peaceful criteria mentioned above – security and public order; rule of law; democracy and political representation; social and economic recovery; and reconciliation. While the UN is frequently involved in these functions, particularly when providing an interim administration, ultimately the objective is that the state should become responsible for their provision. Both the *Partnership Agenda* and the *Principles and Guidelines* state that an 'exit strategy' for a UN peace operation depends upon the host country 'providing for their own security' (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 5).

Three further terms that are used in the UN documents to define the role of the state are *capacity*, *authority*, and *legitimacy*.

*State capacity*: At no point do the documents offer an explicit definition of what is meant by state or national capacity, but it is implicit in reading the documents that it refers to the ability of the state to provide those criteria mentioned above – also referred to as 'core functions'.

A lack of, or weak, state capacity is recognised as a problem in need of redress. For example, regarding intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War era, the *Principles* say, ‘Many of these conflicts take place in the world’s poorest countries where state capacity may be weak’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 21). In response, ‘[t]he activities of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation must be informed by the need to support and, where necessary, build national capacity’ (ibid., 40). This view is confirmed in the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, which further notes that ‘weak states’ are ‘fertile breeding grounds for terrorism’ (UN Secretary-General, 2002: § 2), and are furthermore unable to prevent the spread of violence.

*State authority*: Related is the term ‘state authority’. The *Principles* list ‘Restoration and extension of State authority’ as a core peacebuilding activity (UN DPKO, 2008: 27-28):

The aim must always be to restore, as soon as possible, the ability of national actors and institutions to assume their responsibilities and to exercise their full authority, with due respect for internationally accepted norms and standards (UN DPKO, 2008: 40).

Similarly, the annual Secretary-General’s Reports on the Work of the Organization refer to need to *consolidate* (2004 § 46; 2005: § 45), *restore* (2006 § 72), *extend* (2009 § 46; 2013 § 34), and *re-establish* (2012 § 50) state authority.

*State legitimacy*: Finally, the term *legitimate* is used in the *Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO, 2008) to describe the ‘transition to legitimate government’ (p. 22), the ‘establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance’ (p. 23), and the ‘formation of legitimate political institutions’ (p.89). There is little detail given on what precisely defines legitimate institutions from non-legitimate ones, but it is explicitly connected with ‘free and fair elections’ (pp. 28; 89). This suggests that the UN understands the legitimacy of a government and its institutions to be derived from it being democratically elected.

Overall, it appears that state capacity and authority refer to the extent to which the state can provide the further peaceful criteria, including security and public order, rule of law, political representation of all groups, and so on. Progress on these criteria seems to go hand in hand with achieving legitimacy according to the measures in the documents, particularly the holding of democratic elections.

## 6.2.2 What is the vision of peace outside of the institutions of the state?

In addition to emphasising the role of the state, some of the peaceful criteria are qualities manifest in communities rather than governmental institutions. These criteria emphasise social recovery. They include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, the resettlement of citizens displaced by the conflict, and the safety of civilians from any further violence. These social criteria cannot be divorced from the institutional criteria because they are related. For example, a criterion for sustainable peace at the institutional level is economic recovery, something which necessarily requires the development of organisations and infrastructure. The social or community level counterpart to this institutional development would be the provision of sustainable employment for demobilized former combatants. Discussion of social measures in the documents also includes factors which are about the relationship

## Chapter 6

between the UN peace mission and citizens. The factors are communication, understanding local culture, and perceptions of the mission among local people.

### *Communication*

Communication regards the UN's 'public information strategies' (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 15), and the need to 'ensure that the mandate and objectives of the mission are fully understood by the host population and other key actors' (UN DPKO, 2008: 83). An effective public information strategy is required 'to counter disinformation and to secure the cooperation of local populations' (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 146), as well as to 'manage expectations[...] among the local population' (UN DPKO, 2008: 82).

### *Understanding local culture*

Understanding the local culture is intended to minimise the potential for tensions and misunderstandings between UN personnel and the communities with which they interact. It includes factors such as understanding the diversity of views regarding the peace process among local people, to ensure that 'ownership and participation [is] not limited to small elite groups' (UN DPKO, 2008: 39). The *Principles* also state the need to manage cultural differences between the UN and the host population, in order to minimise the potential for 'friction and discontent' (UN DPKO, 2008: 82). The examples given include, 'employment of women in non-traditional gender roles, mixing and socialization amongst genders, drinking, gambling, inappropriate behaviour, etc.' (p. 82).

### *Local perception of the UN*

Both communication and respect for local culture are intended to contribute to a positive *perception* of the mission among the host population. The effectiveness of a peace operation is deemed to require local support: 'The experiences of the past 15 years have shown that in order to succeed, United Nations peacekeeping operations must also be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population' (UN DPKO, 2008: 36).

The local level criteria for peace can therefore be divided into those that are directly about building peace (safety, employment, reconciliation, DDR), and those which are about management of the UN mission's relation to the local population. These latter factors indirectly contribute to peace in so far as they contribute to the mission's chances of success.

### 6.2.3 Positive peace as a stable nation state

Considering the definitions of peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, of most significance for the present research project are peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Whereas peacemaking and enforcement are directed towards stopping an ongoing violent conflict, peacekeeping and peacebuilding encompass the range of activities intended to maintain peace and develop sustainably peaceful societies. In principal, these activities require 'a peace to keep' (UN DPKO, 2008: 49), that is, the hostile parties must have at the least agreed to a cease-fire and consented to a peace process. In practice, however, there is often not a clean temporal distinction between peacemaking and peacekeeping/building, between measures to

stop violence and measures to sustain peace. Indeed, the *Principles* document notes that the different activities undertaken in the pursuit of peace do not occur sequentially, and that it is through a combination of them all that a comprehensive peace process functions (UN DPKO, 2008: 20). It is worth maintaining a *conceptual* distinction, however, not only because the documents themselves do so, but to aid the overall analysis.

In terms of the difference between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the distinction broadly fits the conceptual distinction between negative and positive peace (Galtung, 1969). Peacekeeping aims to maintain ‘security’, which can be understood as the absence of violence. To this end, it requires that the hostile parties agree to a political process, so the disagreement and conflict can be addressed through negotiation and diplomacy rather than through direct violence. From this foundation of non-violence, in theory at least, the more fundamental structural issues can be addressed and a more positive version of peace, underpinned by the rule of law and human rights, can be built. The Brahimi report states, ‘peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: viii, see also § 28). The positive vision for long-term peace is acknowledged to be the more difficult to achieve. As the authors of the *New Partnership Agenda* write, ‘Several [missions] have made good progress in providing security and stability but face obstacles in designing and implementing peacebuilding strategies that can facilitate responsible transition and exit’ (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: ii).

The latter quotation raises the point of transition and exit, which is when a peace mission is judged to have completed its mandate and can withdraw, handing responsibility for further engagement with the country to other UN and non-UN organisations (see UN DPKO, 2008: 86-90). This is an important problem, because a decision to withdraw a peace mission indicates that a certain understanding of peace has been achieved, and the Security Council has decided that the host country no longer requires a peacekeeping presence. The mission in Kosovo was established in 1999, and is still ongoing today, albeit with a relatively small number of personnel. The *Principles* note that ‘There is no standard “check-list” of benchmarks applicable to all situations. The specific benchmarks used will differ from situation to situation, depending on the underlying causes of the conflict and the dynamics at play’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 88).

Despite this acknowledgement that there is no ‘check-list’ applicable in all contexts, the consistency of the concepts across the documents indicates that there are a set of broader standards which the organisation presents as normative. Indeed, the intention behind the *Principles and Doctrine* is precisely to provide a unified doctrine to which ‘subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform’ (UN DPKO, 2008: 9). This is further evidenced by statements about universal, or ‘international’ standards. The *Principles* says that one of the aims of a multi-dimensional operation is for national institutions to ‘exercise their full authority, with due respect for internationally accepted norms and standards’ (ibid., 40). The Brahimi report says that the UN should only commit to implementing a peace agreement if it is ‘consistent with prevailing international human rights standards and humanitarian law’ (§ 58), and also mentions the need to train local police forces ‘according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights’ (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 39). Elsewhere, Secretary-General Kofi Annan laments the ‘growing contempt for international norms (UN

Secretary-General, 1999: § 93), and in the case of the ‘Standards for Kosovo’, a series of governmental norms were supposed to be achieved before any consideration of settling Kosovo’s independent status (UNMIK, 2004). Phrases like these make explicit what is implicit in the whole concept of international intervention, namely that a UN peace operation is intended to help a country meet certain standards which it has failed to achieve or maintain – standards of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and so on. It is for this reason that Zanotti (2006) has characterised peacekeeping as a project of ‘normalization’. The doctrinal texts evidently play a role in this normalization, displaying a consistent set of ideals by which *all* peace missions are intended to operate, no matter the differing contexts in which they are deployed. Examining the UN Mission in Kosovo therefore offers an opportunity to examine how this process of normalization – this attempt to institutionalise consistent standards - has been manifest in practice, and to reflect on its implications for how the geopolitics of contemporary peace processes can be understood.

The findings just outlined, then, can be understood as setting the parameters within which further policies of the UN peace operation assemblage must conform. They demonstrate the UN’s emphasis on state building, accompanied by an understanding that social measures such as DDR are also necessary. As Ban Ki-moon states, ‘peacebuilding is first and foremost a national process’ (UN Secretary-General, 2009: § 58). So far, this highly-coded geopolitical vision would seem to correspond with the liberal model of peace – the end goal is a stable state which operates in accordance with ‘international norms’ (Richmond, 2004). Reading further through the Secretary-General’s Reports on the Work of the Organization, however, reveals that these doctrinal standards are by no means the beginning and end of the UN’s ecosystem of ideas in relation to peace and the state. Indeed, the Secretary-General’s reports at times display an awareness of the limits of the state, question the inviolability of state sovereignty, and consider how to better respond to the cross-border and regional nature of conflict.

#### 6.2.4 Beyond the state: Cross-border flows and ‘regionalization’

As the previous section’s findings demonstrate, the ideals of peace presented in the doctrinal texts are echoed also in some of the Reports of the Secretary-General. The declared importance of restoring ‘state authority’, for example, was present in the *Principles and Guidelines* and in several of the Secretary-General’s reports. Likewise, the necessity of ‘international norms’. As was discussed in the methodology, however, the Secretary-General’s reports do not have the same coding function as do the doctrinal texts which have just been discussed. They do not set the mandate of peace missions, and neither do they ‘define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations’, as do the *Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO, 2008: 8). Rather than a *parameter* of the peacekeeping assemblage, then, the ideas in the Secretary-General’s reports are better characterised as *variables* within that parameter. The presentation of an annual report on the Work of the Organization is ordered by the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945: Article 98). While they are therefore produced in accordance with the larger code, and derive their legitimacy from that code, the reports also display a greater latitude and variance in the ideas they present, as will become apparent in the presentation of the following findings. They do not only echo the doctrinal texts, but also advance and promote some of the more contentious ideas that have not achieved doctrinal status. The methodology of this thesis characterised the ‘life of ideas’ as a natural ‘ecosystem’ within which some

ideas flourish and are supported, while others either fade away, or perhaps are never even articulated (Sharp, 2011: 61). The doctrinal texts discussed above can be said to contain ideas that have flourished and received wide support within the UN assemblage. The Reports of the Secretary-General, by contrast, offer an insight into some of the less ‘successful’ ideas – those which are more rigorously contested or questioned, and regarding which consensus has yet to be achieved.

A repeated theme across the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization is the transboundary nature of contemporary problems, and the need for international cooperation to be able to deal with them. These statements were generally made in the introductions of the reports, and thus were being made in relation not just to peace, but to the broader range of issue that come under the so-called ‘three pillars’ of the UN – peace and security, development, and human rights (UN Secretary-General, 2012: § 1; 2016: § 3). The statements made regarding this highlight the limits of the nation state as being capable of solving problems of violence, poverty, and human rights abuses. This is implicit in stating that global problems require international cooperation, but the reports also state it explicitly. ‘[N]o single country has the capacity to cope with the political, economic, environmental and technological challenges of an interconnected world’, writes Kofi Annan in the 2002 report (UN Secretary-General, 2002: § 4). Ban Ki-moon echoes this in 2008 – ‘Challenges like climate change and global health know no borders and cannot be addressed by a single State or groups of States’ (UN Secretary-General, 2008: § 5). António Guterres likewise writes in 2017 – ‘The interconnected nature of today’s global trends unequivocally demonstrates that countries cannot manage these risks alone’ (UN Secretary-General, 2017: § 12).

In the report for 2006, Kofi Annan offers a relatively extended reflection on the place of the nation state (UN Secretary-General, 2006: §§ 4-13). Here he writes that the current globalized world represents ‘an era in which international relations are no longer almost exclusively about relations between nation-States’, and notes the various ‘self-constituted groups across national boundaries’ that make up ‘new global constituencies’ (ibid., § 4). He also notes that wars and violence ‘most often begin within States, yet swiftly develop into threats to the peace of a whole region, if not the whole world’ (UN Secretary-General, 2006: § 9). This point is similarly emphasised by António Guterres, who writes that ‘[t]he regionalization of conflict is one of the most challenging trends we face today’ (UN Secretary-General, 2018: § 67). The specific example given in the 2018 report is the Middle East and its series of related conflicts, but the same phenomenon is addressed in a broader sense elsewhere (2003: § 12; 2004: § 11). In the report for 2003, for example, Kofi Annan notes the threat posed by civil wars to ‘international peace and security’ (§ 12). He refers to ‘zones of impunity’, and the ‘transboundary networks of finance and trade’ which facilitate trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people, and destabilize ‘entire regions’ (§ 12). A notable other example occurred in Africa in the 1990s. The violence of the Rwandan civil war and genocide spread across Rwanda’s border into Zaire,<sup>33</sup> leading to further strife, the collapse of Zaire’s government, and two Congolese wars involving seven further countries (Williams, 2011).

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<sup>33</sup> Zaire was then the name of what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



6.2.5 Multilateralism before state sovereignty?

The tension between the primacy of nation states and the need for multilateral responses based on international norms is reflected in Kofi Annan's assertion that state sovereignty should not protect governments that violate human rights. Referring to a disagreement in the Security Council over intervention in Kosovo, he observes that 'Defenders of the traditional interpretations of international law stressed the inviolability of State sovereignty; others stressed the moral imperative to act forcefully in the face of gross violations of human rights' (UN Secretary-General, 1999: § 66). He raises the point again in 2000, where he asks the following:

if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? (UN Secretary-General, 2000: § 37).

This question was responded to in a report produced by an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The report was called *The Responsibility to Protect* (R2P), a principle that is defined as follows:

the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe — from mass murder and rape, from starvation — but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (ICISS, 2001: viii).

The UN General Assembly adopted this principle in 2005, and a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect was appointed in 2008. While the UN charter notes that state sovereignty is inviolable, therefore, the ICISS sought to sidestep this by presenting a new understanding of sovereignty — namely that it is not the government that is sovereign, but the *citizens* of the state (Oman, 2010). This idea is in fact present in one of Kofi Annan's reports, where he refers to 'the sovereignty of the *people*' as a 'universal ideal' (UN Secretary-General, 2001: § 5, emphasis added). These developments around the definition of sovereignty indicate that the discord between multilateral action in the interests of universal ideals and state sovereignty remains relevant to the organisation's contemporary actions. As with Boutros-Ghali's (1992) more interventionist vision in *An Agenda for Peace*, the *Responsibility to Protect* (ICISS, 2001) initiative shows that the UN is still trying to develop ways through this discord.

This debate and disagreement over state sovereignty furthermore demonstrates the often fragmented and incoherent character of the UN. While the doctrinal texts seek to produce a coherent and unified set of ideals, it is apparent that such unity and coherence is not always possible. What is worth emphasising, however, is that the appeals from Kofi Annan to place qualifiers on the inviolable status of sovereignty clearly had some success. This is particularly evident in the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda. Thomas Weiss (2011: 225) observes that, 'no idea has moved faster or further in the international normative arena than the "responsibility to protect"'. While the Secretary-General's reports do not function as doctrinal parameters, then, the example of R2P demonstrates their potential to nurture and promote certain ideas such that they gain in prominence and influence in the broader ecosystem of ideas.

The fact that the principle of R2P was adopted by the General Assembly shows the interaction and influence between the different ‘levels’ of linguistic entity (DeLanda, 2016) in the UN assemblage. Ideas that originate among the variable non-doctrinal texts can end up forming part of future doctrine if they receive sufficient support.

The above concerns of the Secretaries-General illustrate some of the main geopolitical tensions within which the UN tries to operate. While both an international sphere and a domestic sphere of operating are noted as important, the tension between the two is evident when regarding issues such as globalisation and the limits of the state, cross-border flows and regionalization, and state sovereignty vs. the ‘responsibility to protect’ citizens from human rights violations. This tension is further demonstrated by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s ‘Human Rights Up Front’ initiative, which foregrounded the responsibility of the organization to protect civilians. (UN Secretary-General, 2014: § 57). The initiative was intentionally implemented at a level that did not require Member State approval – ‘UN officials were concerned that too much public attention surrounding the action plan could provoke a serious backlash from states wary of an intrusive and activist organization, and the possible erosion of sovereignty’ (Rhoads, 2019: 289). While this implies an opposition between national sovereignty and the protection of human rights, António Guterres says that ‘human rights and national sovereignty should not be seen as competing ideas’ (UN Secretary-General, 2018: § 18). Such a statement is somewhat undermined by the need to introduce Rights Up Front without Member State approval, demonstrating again the contested nature of UN ideas. The UN has a multilateral vision for responding to problems that are transboundary in nature, but it has to pursue this vision through the nation-state system. Kofi Annan affirms that ‘while nation-States are no longer the sole players in international relations, they are still the most important’ (§ 6), and he ultimately finishes his reflections by emphasising states’ responsibility and capacity to maintain security and protect human rights.

The first half of this chapter has identified the geopolitical vision of the UN in relation to its peace operations. A peace mission can be said to operate between the need for multilateralism and universal norms, on the one hand, and the sovereignty of nation states on the other. The doctrinal texts clearly affirm a vision of the institutions of state as vital for securing peace – they direct the efforts of peace missions towards establishing state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy. The tension, however, is in the fact that these state-based aims are articulated according to universal norms, such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law. The UN therefore wants to re-establish a stable state through its interventions, but demands that this state must conform to the UN’s universal norms.

The second half of this chapter turns to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to examine how the geopolitical vision for peace laid-out in the principles and doctrine of the UN has played out in practice. Kosovo demonstrates the complexity of operating between state-based goals and universal norms. As chapter 2 described, Kosovo was placed under international authority, which developed its governmental institutions, and yet it was not granted formal statehood by the international authorities. The comprehensive extent of UNMIK, and its 20 year history, means that it is not possible to analyse the full extent of the mission. I have therefore chosen two key events that represent the geopolitical complexities, paradoxes, and tensions in Kosovo. They are, first, the question of Kosovo’s status and the unilateral

declaration of independence in 2008; and second, the resistance to Kosovo's government in the north of the region and the so-called North Kosovo Crisis during 2011-13.

### 6.3 Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence

Chapter 2 overviewed the extent of UNMIK's authority in Kosovo when it was deployed in 1999. The mission assumed near total sovereignty over the region. It secured the borders, provided a police force, managed the judicial system, and organised the election of the first Provisional Assembly. It provided the constitution for the new government, and transferred some authority over to the Assembly, but UNMIK also maintained a series of 'reserved powers' which were not transferred (UNMIK, 2001). The mission therefore had the authority to implement a broad strategy in pursuit of its peaceful ideals in Kosovo, and began the process of institutionalising the universal norms adhered to by the UN. In the terms of the relational account of agency discussed in chapter 4, it could be said that through the deployment of people, technologies, and ideals, UNMIK was organising the constituents of Kosovo such that it was becoming more coherent, and new capacities were being realised. The mission's activities therefore contributed to Kosovo's *territorialization*, not least by securing and monitoring the borders.

'Territorialization' is the assemblage theory term for 'the determination of the spatial boundaries of a whole – as in the territory of a community, city, or nation-state' (DeLanda, 2016: 22). As with the cohesion of a Spinozan state 'individual' (see chapter 4), the territorialization of a state assemblage is a matter of degree, rather than binary. When considering the matter of Kosovo's independence, it is apparent how the concept of territorialization becomes relevant. Securing the borders of the region, for example, is a textbook instance of increasing the degree of territorialization. The physical apparatus on the border, defended by police and/or military personnel, delineates between the space of the 'new' country and that of the country from which it has become independent. A highly territorialized state might have very strict rules on movement of people and goods across the border. A less highly territorialized state might allow for greater freedom of movement (as, for example, exists between member states of the European Union). As shall be seen, however, while UNMIK contributed to Kosovo's territorialization, it was formally neutral on the question of independence. While some policies are territorializing, such as border monitoring, other policies are deterritorializing, such as remaining neutral on Kosovo's status. De/territorialization is therefore a particularly useful concept for understanding the implications of the UN's geopolitical vision for peace and the state as it was made manifest in Kosovo.

Whilst under UNMIK administration, the question of Kosovo's final status remained unaddressed. The Security Council resolution which mandated UNMIK – the key *coding* text of the mission - was committed to both autonomy for Kosovo *and* the territorial integrity of Serbia (S/RES/1244 [1999]). The question of the status of Kosovo was, furthermore, supposedly to be postponed until the Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004) had been achieved – the 'standards before status' policy (S/PRST/2004/13). For the first years of the mission, then, UNMIK operated within the tension of its mandate, developing autonomy and territorialization within Kosovo but without committing to a process for independence.

The status problem would eventually have to be addressed, however. In 2005, therefore, the Secretary-General commissioned ‘A comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo’ (S/2005/635), the purpose of which was to assess ‘whether the conditions are now in place for initiating and conducting the future status process’ (S/2005/635: 2). The review identified progress in several key areas, including the development of central and local government, a functioning civil service, and some economic progress. Despite noting the need for continued implementation of the Standards for Kosovo, the review recommended that the process to determine Kosovo’s final status should begin. The process took the form of a negotiation between the Serbian and Kosovan leadership, mediated by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, Martti Ahtisaari. By 2007, Ahtisaari had prepared his report (S/2007/168). He recommended ‘independence with international supervision’ as the only possible future status for Kosovo, given the totally irreconcilable positions of the Serbian and Kosovan governments. The recommendation was presented to the Security Council, who, had they agreed to it, would have provided the legal mandate for Kosovo’s transfer to independence. Russia, however, a member of the Security Council P-5, refused to accept the recommendation, meaning a resolution could not be passed; the question of the UN’s formal position on Kosovo’s future status was left unresolved.

Shortly after Russia had blocked the independence process, the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Having failed to achieve independence through the formal UN process, they went against the authority of the UN and declared independence via an ‘unofficial’ method. The declaration was passed by 109 of 120 Assembly members – the 10 Serb representatives did not attend the vote (S/2008/354: § 3). As part of this move, the Assembly also acted to remove UNMIK’s authority over the region – they did so by introducing a new constitution, which came into force 15 June 2008. The new constitution claimed responsibility for what had been the UNMIK Special Representative’s reserved powers (S/2008/458: § 2). The Assembly furthermore began a concerted effort to assert its statehood, including the following measures:

- established a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and set up diplomatic mission
  - applied for membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
  - conducted a census
  - established the Ministry for Security Forces
  - appointed a Central Election Commission
  - passed legislation ‘without reference to the powers of [the] Special Representative’
- see S/2008/692: § 2

The declaration of independence, and the new constitution, represented a fundamental challenge to UNMIK and its role in Kosovo. The Secretary-General’s report at the time talks of the need to adjust the ‘operational role’ of UNMIK in light of these new circumstances (S/2008/354: §§ 10-11). Furthermore, the Security Council was divided on the issue – the USA, the UK, and France, all immediately recognised Kosovo’s independent status (on 18 February 2008). Russia and China did not. This deadlock among the P-5 meant the Security Council was ‘unable to provide guidance’ as the Secretary-General’s report put it

(S/2008/458: § 3). UNMIK was therefore restructured according to the Secretary-General's plans, without Security Council backing. This involved a downscaling of UNMIK, loss of the Special Representative's authority, and the transferral of many of its responsibilities to EULEX, notably in the area of 'policing, justice and customs' (S/2008/692: §§ 21-25). At the time, the Special Representative to the Secretary-General still held 'reserved powers', including the right to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly should it act in contradiction to the Security Council mandate (UNMIK, 2001). While the unilateral declaration of independence is in violation of the Security Council's resolution, the Special Representative did not exercise his rights to assert UNMIK authority against the Kosovo Assembly.

In unilaterally declaring independence, the Kosovo assemblage to which the UN mission had been contributing sought to enhance its autonomy yet further by breaking away from the UN's authority. This demonstrates that agency does not equal intention. UNMIK was indeed an important agent in Kosovo. But as Kosovo territorialized, there would come a point at which the territorialization came into conflict with the *de*-territorializing elements of the UN mission. This seems to indicate a paradox that Kofi Annan himself recognises regarding transitional administrations. Regarding the then newly deployed operations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, he refers to the 'sometimes contradictory tasks of governing those territories, supporting the emergence of local institutions and maintaining law and order' (UN Secretary-General, 2000: § 68). The tasks are contradictory in the sense that an international authority is trying to establish regional autonomy, autonomy that is undermined by the fact the UN mission retains executive authority, including the authority to dissolve the government (UNMIK, 2001: § 8.1). Indeed, some political activist groups, opposed to international intervention in Kosovo, utilise this kind of contradiction to frame their opposition (Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015). While UNMIK and the other international organisations in Kosovo are committed to norms of democracy and rule of law, the activist opposition point out that the international presence is itself undemocratic, and places itself 'above the law which they are here to implement' (Vetëvendosje!, quoted in Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015: 279). The territorializing factors in the Kosovo assemblage (self-government, border control, 'independence', ethno-nationalism) are in discord with the deterritorializing factors (coalition of international organisations, neutrality on independent status, principle of multiethnicity).

To further demonstrate the role of territorialization and coherence of the state 'individual' with regards to independence, it is worth noting that 2008 was not the first time that the Kosovo government had declared independence. In 1990, the Kosovo Assembly had similarly declared Kosovo to be an independent state, and re-asserted this claim again in 1991, following an unofficial referendum on the question (Daskalovski, 2005). Some alternative public institutions were developed, but these first declarations of independence had little meaning beyond the symbolic. Albania was the only country to recognise Kosovo as independent, and Serbia continued to exercise authority in the region – indeed, Serbian President Milošević was actively reducing the autonomy that Kosovo had been granted under Tito's Yugoslavia.

In 2008, however, the ideal and material circumstances were considerably different. Serbian authorities - governmental, military and police - had withdrawn from Kosovo under NATO's watch (NATO, 1999). The border between Kosovo and Serbia was monitored by KFOR personnel, and customs gates were in operation. The Kosovo Assembly had been established and several official elections had been conducted to

select its members. In short, the Kosovo state assemblage had developed a level of territorialization that it had not had in the 1990s. UNMIK's official neutrality on the status of Kosovo was therefore secondary to the fact that Kosovo had already become a more consistent and territorialized assemblage through UN intervention. When considering the state as an assemblage, or a Spinozan 'individual', it can be said that UNMIK had already facilitated Kosovo's becoming a state, even while the UN discursively resisted such a status by being formally neutral on the matter. UNMIK's intention, on the question of independence, was undermined by its action. Again, agency and influence was not the same as rational intention. Although UNMIK substantially influenced the development of institutions in Kosovo and was granted extensive authority, it can never be said that an agent is totally in control of the processes in which they participate.

When independence was declared in 2008, therefore, it had a good deal more meaning than in the 1990s. The capacities of the assemblage had been developed such that the Kosovo Assembly was able to implement further territorializing measures, such as conducting a census and establishing new ministries, thus asserting their 'stateness'. Furthermore, the USA, the UK, and France immediately recognised Kosovo's independence, giving further weight to the coding of Kosovo as a state. The discursive designation of Kosovo as a state does, therefore, contribute to the coding of the assemblage. But it is not the only, or even the most important, aspect.

#### 6.4 Resisting the state assemblage: the 'North Kosovo Crisis'

The question of Kosovo's status cannot be separated from the ethnic division that characterised the war in the 1990s. While the majority of ethnic-Albanians are in favour of independence, the minority ethnic-Serbs want Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia. The region remains highly segregated along ethnic lines, with many Kosovo Serbs living in mono-ethnic 'enclaves', which swelled after the NATO military intervention had forced out Serbian authority (Higate and Henry, 2009). In particular, the segregation of Kosovo Serbs in four northern municipalities of the region has been an enduring factor contributing to the geopolitical tensions at play in Kosovo (Figure 4). The institutional processes developed by UNMIK continually struggled to integrate northern Kosovo into the governance of the region (Gusic, 2019). Indeed, the Serbian government maintained influence in the northern municipalities, managing 'parallel structures' that operated separately from the Kosovo institutions (OSCE, 2007). The parallel structures included courts, education, and healthcare (OSCE, 2007). The 'problem' of the ethnic enclaves made headlines again in 2018, when the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo discussed a potential 'land swap' that would transfer northern Kosovo into Serbia in return for a majority-Albanian area of Serbia being ceded to Kosovo (Capussela, 2018).

While UNMIK may have had a comprehensive set of ideals, and a broad mandate with which to implement them, the process by which they are put into practice was neither straightforward nor evenly applied across the region. Institutional and governmental processes come up against obstacles and resistance whereby they are weakened, or disabled altogether (DeLanda, 2016). While this is the case in any system of government, in divided societies, where state legitimacy is in question, resistance to the central government is often more trenchant and exacerbated (van der Haar and Heijke, 2013).



*Figure 4 - Map highlighting the four Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo. (Original map by WhiteWriter, distributed under CC BY-SA 3.0 license. Additional text added by author.)*

Following the unilateral declaration of independence, then, there was immediate protest and reaction from Kosovo Serbs in the northern municipalities, including some violent clashes, the seizure of a courthouse, and the destruction of customs service points (S/2008/354: §§ 5-6). The Serbian parallel structures in northern Kosovo ‘widened and deepened’ (S/2008/458:§ 2), with the support of the Serbian government in Belgrade (S/2008/458: § 5). Serbia held its own elections in northern Kosovo on 11 May 2008, which UNMIK declared to be invalid (*ibid.*, § 6). Furthermore, on the basis of these elections, Serbia established the Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, as an alternative to the Kosovo Assembly. While UNMIK’s institution building can therefore be characterised as territorializing the Kosovo assemblage, it is apparent that this process was resisted in northern Kosovo. If the unilateral declaration of independence was an assertion of Kosovo’s stateness, the response in northern Kosovo was to emphasise rejection of the Kosovo government’s authority, further entrenching the parallel structures.

A period that particularly captures the geopolitics of Kosovo’s stateness and Serbian resistance is the so-called ‘North Kosovo Crisis’, from 2011-2013. Beginning in July 2011 with an attempt by Kosovo police to exercise authority in the northern municipalities, the crisis supposedly ended with the ‘Brussels Agreement’,

an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo facilitated by the EU. The crisis was triggered by a dispute over customs, and the policing of customs gates. An incidence of international dispute and diplomacy between Kosovo and Serbia was manifest locally at customs gates 1 and 31, on the northern Kosovo border with Serbia.

#### 6.4.1 Customs gates 1 and 31

In the UN documents, rising tension in northern Kosovo is attributed to the Kosovo government's attempt to exercise its authority in the region. For example, Regional Operational Support Units (part of the Kosovo Police) began to patrol in northern municipalities (S/2011/514: § 21). The 'triggering' event was when the Kosovo government placed an embargo on Serbian goods, and deployed police officers to the customs check points in northern Kosovo in order to enforce it (S/2011/675: § 3). The embargo itself was a response to Serbia's refusal to recognise goods with a Kosovo Customs stamp (*ibid.*, § 3).

This assertion of Kosovo's central authority was met with roadblocks from Kosovo Serbs, on the roads leading to the customs gates, blocking the approach of the Kosovo police. KFOR intervened to remove Kosovo police, but violence broke out and a Kosovo Police officer was killed. KFOR took control of the customs gates, and through mediation between Belgrade and Pristina it was agreed that KFOR should remain in control of them 'until the resumption of the European Union-facilitated dialogue and with a deadline of 15 September' (S/2011/ 675: § 4). Most (but not all) protestors' roadblocks were removed following this mediation.

Tensions would soon rise again, however. Following further discussions between Belgrade and Pristina in Brussels, an agreement was reached such that Serbia would recognise Kosovo's customs stamps (the initial issue over which the trade embargo was imposed), and so trade could begin again. It was agreed that EULEX would take over authority at the customs gates from KFOR, but that one Kosovo Customs officer and two Kosovo border police would also be present at each gate (S/2011/ 675: § 5). Kosovo Serb protestors were not satisfied with this arrangement, and so 'reinforced their roadblocks at Gates 1 and 31 and erected additional roadblocks along other routes in order to protest the deployment of Kosovo Customs officers at the gates' (*ibid.*, § 6).

The supposed end of the 'crisis' was the signing of the 'First agreement on principles governing the normalization of relations' – also called the Brussels Agreement - by the Serbian and Kosovo governments (S/2013/254: § 4). The headline policy of the agreement was the creation of an Association/Community of Kosovo Serb Municipalities, a policy that would give the northern Kosovo municipalities a certain amount of governmental autonomy. Furthermore, during the negotiations, Serbia was granted EU candidacy (S/2012/275). Establishing the Brussels Agreement was a prerequisite for Serbian accession negotiations to begin. Despite the supposed settlement of the disagreement over authority in northern Kosovo at the formal governmental level, protestors in the northern municipalities were not necessarily satisfied. The Secretary-General notes that 'many Kosovo Serbs continued to voice their opposition to the agreement' (S/2013/444: § 16). At the time of writing, the Association of Kosovo Serb Municipalities has still yet to be established (see S/2018/407: §§ 23-4).



6.4.2 International, national, and local agencies in northern Kosovo

The situation in northern Kosovo, both during the crisis and still to this day, is shaped by the interaction between the local actors, the authorities of Kosovo and Serbia, and the international agencies of both the UN and the EU. It serves as an example of the multiple forms of agency, across and within borders, that shape the politics of a particular location. Northern Kosovo is not unique in this regard. In today's globalised politics, almost all human societies are more subject to influence and determining factors from further and further afield, as people organise and collaborate internationally, and communication technologies allow for wider spread of affects (Sharp, 2005). The North Kosovo crisis is an example of how these agencies and affects interact and influence matters of war and peace. The dispute over customs and the subsequent unrest and violence demonstrates the everyday consequences of international diplomacy. Talks between the Serbian and Kosovar governments were being facilitated by the EU, but a breakdown in negotiations led to the trade embargo. The 'reality' of this embargo was played out in northern Kosovo, with the deployment of police to the border in order to enforce it. Thus the local and the everyday reality of life in northern Kosovo is implicated in both national policy and international diplomacy. Customs gates 1 and 31 became flashpoints for the manifestation of geopolitical issues, including relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the authority of NATO, and Serbia's potential membership of the EU. Megoran and Dalby (2018: 263) note that the EU wasted an opportunity to shape peace in Cyprus when it allowed the island to become an EU member 'without making accession conditional on negotiated reunification, thus removing a major incentive to real progress'. It remains to be seen whether Serbia's EU candidacy will more positively affect the geopolitical dispute in north Kosovo.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the supposed settlement of the north Kosovo crisis following the Brussels Agreement, northern Kosovo remains highly segregated along ethnic lines. Indeed, the Brussels Agreement even confirmed the distinctness of northern Kosovo by granting the region some governmental autonomy. In terms of whether the intervention of a regional block (the EU) or an international organisation (the UN) contributed towards a greater sense of *securitas* among Kosovo Serbs regarding Kosovo, it is difficult to be optimistic. The more recent discussions of a potential land swap, whereby northern Kosovo would be ceded to Serbia (Capussela, 2018), demonstrate that the matter of the Serb-majority municipalities is far from resolved. Is it still worth considering the contribution of international and regional agencies to peace, therefore? They seem to have only secured a fragile negative peace in northern Kosovo, dependent on continued segregation of the population. The failure of these political organisations to produce a more positive peace is one of the strongest arguments justifying focus on alternative, radical, localised manifestations of peace instead of 'liberal peace'. And yet, precisely because these agencies are implicated in shaping events in a case like the North Kosovo crisis, we should still seek to understand them, even if it is only to more pointedly direct critique against them. The point is not that the influence of these forms of political agency are more likely than local agencies to guarantee peace. Indeed, if we accept an account of political agency as relational and

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<sup>34</sup> At the time of writing, neither Serbia nor Kosovo are members of the European Union. Serbia is a 'candidate country', while Kosovo is a 'potential candidate' (see European Commission webpage: <https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm>).

dispersed, the responsibility for peace can never be placed solely on a government, an institution, or an organisation (Sharp, 2005). But if there is to be movement towards more peace-likeness in northern Kosovo, it will not happen in isolation of the influence of the UN, the EU, the Kosovo government, and the Serbian government. It is therefore worth maintaining an understanding of how they have shaped events in the past, and how they might shape them in the future.

## 6.5 How the UN knows the world: A changing vision?

This chapter has explored the role of the state in UN peace operations, examining both the vision of the state in principle, and how this vision has been manifest in the mission in Kosovo. I want to finish this chapter by returning once again to the way that the UN sees the state in relation to peace.

Dalby (2014: 43) observes that ‘dominant mappings of politics continue to specify the world in terms of territorial domains of rule in rivalry with one another, and with military force as the ultimate arbiter’. Such a view would correspond with the so-called ‘realist’ understanding of international relations (Wohlforth, 2009). But Dalby goes on to suggest that the United Nations might represent a ‘pacification’ of international relations, and links such a process to the possibility of what Megoran (2010b) calls *pacific geopolitics*, defined as ‘the study of how ways of thinking geographically about world politics can promote peaceful and mutually enriching human coexistence’ (Megoran, 2010b: 383).

The origins of the UN can be read as more aligned with a realist view, emphasising the primacy of sovereign states and the need to regulate competition between them. This is understandable given the ineffectuality of the League of Nations to de-escalate the conflicts that eventually led to WWII. Hence the need for the P-5 members of the Security Council. It was essential that any new ‘global organisation’ would include the USA and the USSR, and that both governments could be re-assured that this organisation could not force their hand or undermine their sovereignty. The early ‘traditional’ peace operations similarly reveal a more realist view of the world, designed to diminish inter-state war, by monitoring ceasefire and the separation of forces with the consent of the parties to the conflict (Bellamy *et al.*, 2010).

In the 75 years since the UN has existed, however, both geopolitical patterns and the UN’s approach to conflict resolution have changed. The geopolitical vision presented in the policy documents has by no means neglected the primacy of states, but it has become more nuanced, as indicated by Kofi Annan’s reflections on the role of the state (see above, section 6.2.4). The annual reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization continually assert the transboundary nature of contemporary problems and the necessity of multilateral responses to them. They note the regionalization of conflict, as local violence spills into neighbouring countries, as well as the cross-border flows of weapons in ‘zones of impunity’ (UN Secretary-General, 2003: § 12). As discussed above, the Secretary-General’s advocacy for more progressive ideas does not guarantee they will become doctrine. Division and disagreement among member states is inevitable when it comes to multilateral coordination, a process which necessarily brings absolute sovereignty into question. As the example of the rise of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ agenda demonstrates, though, ideas in the UN are never totally static. New geopolitical visions develop, often in the reports and documents of the Secretariat, which can go on to have a real influence on doctrine.

## Chapter 6

It is with this in mind that I want to highlight a line from the 2015 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490). Much of the review confirms what has been identified above. For example, it notes that failures and flaws in governance and state institutions contribute towards conflicts (§ 12), that religious and ethnic identities are exploited in civil conflicts (§ 13), and that local disputes can quickly become regional (§§ 19-20). The point of interest, however, is in paragraph 21, which questions the prioritisation of central state authority in peacebuilding. Indeed, it goes so far as to suggest that in contexts of fragmentation (often along sectarian and/or ethnic lines), then strengthening of central state authority might even exacerbate violence. The Review states:

Independent, sovereign nation States are the building blocks of the international order and of the United Nations in particular. Member States are therefore naturally inclined towards a predominant international paradigm of recreating a strong central authority. In a context of fragmentation, however, it is possible that an attempt to rebuild or extend a central authority could lead not to peace, but to deepening conflict. In such cases, there is a need to find new approaches that understand peacebuilding, at least in its early phases, as having more to do with strengthening local domains of governance than with endeavouring to re-establish a strong central authority (A/69/968-S/2015/490: § 21).

As an alternative view of governance and sovereignty in relation to peace, if this view was to take hold within UN peacebuilding doctrine, it would represent a move away from the earlier emphasis on ‘enhancing state capacity’ as the primary task for a peace mission.

Being published in 2015 means that this review is of course too late to influence the UN’s mission in Kosovo. UNMIK no longer has the authority in Kosovo that it did when it was deployed. Furthermore, the central governance of the Kosovo Assembly is now firmly established, as is its resistance in northern Kosovo. Given the foregoing discussion of the north Kosovo crisis, however, it might be said, just as the Review states, that the strengthening of central authority in Kosovo exacerbated the division and conflict with the northern municipalities, rather than easing them. Perhaps an approach that began by developing more localised governance would have met with less resistance than did the institutionalisation of a central state government.

This is necessarily a speculative point, and I certainly do not want to claim in hindsight that UNMIK would have successfully managed the integration of Serbs and Albanians if only it had eschewed developing the centralised Kosovo Assembly. What can be said, however, is that the resistance to the state assemblage in northern Kosovo would appear to exemplify the problems for peace that can arise when asserting a centralised state authority onto a minority group that rejects it. While it is too early to say if the Review’s alternative vision will gain prominence in UN peace policy – if it will eventually come to form part of the guiding parameters/code - it could be the beginning of a significant development. An approach to peacebuilding that began by focussing on the reconciliation of local relations might in turn ‘add up’ to a more effective state, with these relations contributing to a state assemblage that is not so intractably divided. That is to say, if we accept that causality within an assemblage is both bottom-up and top-down at once

(DeLanda, 2016), then the quality of the affects and interactions at a local level will in part determine the characteristics and capacities of the assemblage as a whole. Whether the recommendation of the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture is to become more prominent and influential will depend on its continuing to be nurtured within the larger ecosystem of UN ideas.

## 6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the geopolitical vision of the United Nations, and the implications of this vision as they have played out in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. Drawing on doctrinal texts, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General, I identified the most prominent ideals of peace present in the UN public discourse. These include ideals of security, rule of law, democracy, the extension of state authority, and the commitment to ‘international norms’ on human rights. While there is continuity between the doctrine and the Secretary-General’s reports on these themes, the chapter also identified where the Secretary-General has questioned doctrinal assumptions, and advocated ideas that are more contested than those which have made it into doctrine. The chapter therefore also demonstrates the ongoing interaction between ideas at the different ‘levels’ of the organisation, and showed how the *variable* texts of the Secretary-General can influence the *parameter* texts of the doctrinal codes.

Regarding Kosovo, I have argued that, although UNMIK was neutral on the question of Kosovo’s independence, the mission in fact facilitated Kosovo’s territorialization as a state assemblage, even before it declared its independence unilaterally. While mainstream discourse still tends to reify nation states as self-evident coherent units of geopolitics, the case of Kosovo exemplifies the continual process by which ‘stateness’ is produced (Mitchell, 1991; Painter, 2006). Demonstrating that agency and intention are not synonymous, UNMIK contributed to the stateness of Kosovo while its mandate was formally committed to the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Serbia (S/RES/1244: 2).

The process by which the coherence of the Kosovo state ‘individual’ developed was not, however, evenly distributed across the region. It came up against resistance, most notably in the Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo. I therefore explored the North Kosovo crisis as an example of the interaction of international, national, and local forms of agency as they shaped the possibilities for peace in the northern municipalities. Although a formal agreement was established between Serbia and Kosovo, the issue of ethnic segregation in Kosovo is far from resolved. Progress in terms of functioning institutions has therefore not been sufficient to resolve the issue of status and ethnic divide. The Kosovo assemblage itself may be achieving greater coherence and realising greater capacities of governance, but the ethnic divide remains. The next chapter therefore considers the issue of segregation and integration in more detail, by examining the ways that UNMIK sought to manage the ‘problem’ of social difference in Kosovo.

## 7 Difference and relationality in peacebuilding

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One can, however, declare oneself *for* difference (as opposed to sameness or homogenization) without at the same time being for the rigidly enforced and policed separation of populations into different groups.

- Edward Said (1985: 40)

If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation.

- Spinoza (1996 [1677]) *Ethics*, III p46

### 7.1 Introduction

Hostility and conflict are often manifest in a supposed incompatibility between groups. Whether it involves nationality, ethnicity, religion, political allegiance - at various scales and locations there is ongoing violence along lines of communal *difference*. When considering the meaning of peace, therefore, the question of difference must be accounted for. How should a geography of peace, or a 'pacific geopolitics' (Megoran, 2010b), address this apparent tendency towards division into identity-based factions who cannot live together? With its society segregated along ethno-nationalist lines, Kosovo is a prime example of the 'problem' of difference for peacebuilding (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018). This chapter therefore explores the issue of difference as it contributes to both conflict and peace, and investigates how UNMIK has attempted to manage communal difference in Kosovo.

The chapter begins with an overview of the question of 'managing difference' as I am applying it to UN peace operations. Continuing the theme of the state in relation to peace, I note the relevance of ethnic/nationalist/religious conflicts that are accompanied by secessionist movements. While in Kosovo the UN has facilitated self-government and autonomy, the question of reconciliation across seemingly intractable differences certainly does not end with the partition of the population or assisting independence.

Having set the scene on the problem of difference in Kosovo, the chapter develops an understanding of what difference is, and its place in the politics of both war and peace. I examine how difference has been conceptualised as a social construct, and more particularly how this is regarded as a spatial process in critical geopolitics. Such work has focused on how the difference between groups is produced in discourse, and how it is expressed spatially through representations of 'our' place, and 'their' place. Spatial expressions of difference are present in Kosovo, and the UN facilitated this separation. Understanding difference as being fundamentally a problem for peace, however, and advocating spatial separation as its remedy, does little to satisfy a more positive understanding of what peace can be. The second section considers the potential for a positive understanding of difference and peace. As is firmly established at this point, this thesis is approaching peace processes from the perspective of a relational ontology. One of the fundamental tenets

of such an ontology is the inability to make absolute distinctions between bodies. Bodies are both constituted and determined by other bodies, ultimately making up a single substance, ‘God or Nature’ (Spinoza, *E IV* pref; also *IV p4d*). This section therefore elaborates upon differentiation and relationality. I argue that such an understanding does not deny the existence of differences, nor that these differences are implicated in violence. But these differences are not seen as pre-given. Rather difference is viewed as produced by processes of *differentiation*, and this is a relational and affective process. Not only that, but the process is always ongoing, and so is potentially open to change. The passions and relations that are productive of group identity, and of conflict between groups, are not fixed. They can be subject to new affects, which can alter the patterns by which groups have organised themselves. Investigating difference and peace processes from this position is therefore about examining a ‘network of passionate relationships’ (Sharp, 2005: 607). Difference need not necessarily be a cause of conflict – whether it is or not is dependent on the types of affects circulating among people. And as previous chapters have sought to demonstrate, institutions and organisations contribute to the network of relations, both positively and negatively. Managing the ‘problem’ of difference (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018) must therefore necessarily involve the passions of a society, even if an organisation like the UN does not frame its activities in those terms.

Having established a theoretical understanding of difference in relation to peace and conflict, and some criteria by which to assess the movement towards peace, the chapter turns again to the UN and to the Interim Administration in Kosovo. While the UN is in principal against ‘all forms of racial discrimination’ (see A/RES/1904[XVIII]), in facilitating the transfers to independence following conflicts that have involved division along ethnic lines, it could also be said to be facilitating a formal ‘separation of populations into different groups’ as Edward Said (1985: 40) puts it in the opening quotation above. As an indicator of potential improvement in relations between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo government, I examine a series of elections that were conducted in Kosovo, managed and organised by UNMIK. Ultimately, however, I conclude that elections in Kosovo reflect the divisions of the society rather than reduce them.

## 7.2 UN peace operations and managing difference: Setting the scene

This section sets the scene for the analysis of difference by establishing the basic parameters of the ‘problem’ of difference (Bargués-Pedreny and Mathieu, 2018) and how it relates to understanding United Nations peace operations.

While all conflicts involve some form of difference, a difference of opinion on a political matter for example, in cases of ethnic/religious/nationalist violence, the problem of difference becomes seemingly intractable. More than a difference in opinion, these conflicts involve a difference in identity, and a history of violence between the different identities. When intervening in such a conflict, a UN peace mission comes up against the problem of difference and tries to manage it. In the UN documents examined for this thesis, there was explicit acknowledgement of the issue of violent conflict manifesting along lines of ethnic, religious, and nationalist identities. Secretary-General Kofi Annan writes that ‘The upsurge of “ethnic cleansing” in the 1990s provides stark evidence of the appalling human costs that this vicious exploitation of identity politics

can generate' (UN Secretary-General, 1999: § 19). In a later report he notes the continued problem of 'violent internal conflicts' that 'exploit ethnic and religious differences' (UN Secretary-General, 2004: § 11). While the reports do not themselves use the term 'managing difference', this is the term I have chosen to designate the attempts by UN peace operations to resolve the kinds of conflicts to which Kofi Annan's quotations refer.<sup>35</sup>

As this thesis is concerned with the role of the state in relation to peace, of particular relevance are civil conflicts along identity lines that are accompanied by a political independence movement – a desire on the part of one faction to secede from the country and assert their right to a new independent state. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the UN has facilitated self-determination as part of a resolution to three nationalist civil wars: in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. The UN mandates for these peace missions, in one sense, already accepted the difference between the two demographics (broadly defined) and accepted the right of the seceding group to self-government. This is one way of managing difference in the pursuit of peace, if not a particularly inspiring one. While the UN formally condemns racial or ethnic discrimination as 'a violation of human rights' (A/RES/1904[XVIII]: Article 1), facilitating transfer to independence seemingly confirms that the groups in question cannot live together in peace, and formalises their spatial and governmental separation.

As a way of managing difference in the pursuit of peace, the limitations of assisting group self-determination are apparent. Separating ethnic, national, or religious groups in the name of security does not meet positive understandings of peace that would include criteria such as justice and reconciliation, even if it does achieve a cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and South Sudan have all experienced further violence within their own borders since achieving self-government. For example, in South Sudan, within three years of having achieved independence, the country descended into a further civil war in 2013, this time among factions within its own population (de Waal, 2014). Similarly, in the newly independent Timor-Leste, a schism within the East Timorese military sparked an outbreak of more widespread violence in 2006-7 (Scambray, 2009). The populations of these countries both overwhelmingly voted for their independence (99% in South Sudan, 79% in East Timor). Yet, in both cases, the resolution of civil conflict through democratic transfer to independence did not mark the beginning of long-term peace.

As with South Sudan and Timor-Leste, Kosovo is a political conflict that is manifest in an ethnic/national divide. There is also a religious aspect to the division, as Serbs are associated with Orthodox Christianity and Albanians are associated with Islam. While the Kosovo War is not considered a religious war, religion functions as an 'identity marker', and 'religious myths' are mobilised in Serbian nationalist rhetoric (Johnston, 2005: 184). The war in 1998-9 was a result of competing nationalist claims over the region, and segregation between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs has continued to characterise Kosovo since the UN intervention (Baldwin, 2006; Dahlman and Williams, 2010). The segregation is expressed spatially, in Kosovo Serb 'enclaves', but it is also expressed institutionally, notably in the Serbian-run 'parallel structures'

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<sup>35</sup> The notion of difference as 'an obstacle that ha[s] to be manged' in peacebuilding is discussed by Bargués-Pedreney and Mathieu (2018). It is from their article that I have drawn the term 'managing difference' as the theme for this chapter.

in northern Kosovo (OSCE, 2007). Education and healthcare ‘remain almost completely segregated’ (Krasniqi, 2015: 212), with the Serbian government providing these services for the Kosovo Serbs *within* Kosovo, while the Kosovo government manages the services for the majority Kosovo Albanians (Kostovicova, 2005; Krasniqi, 2015).

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the UN’s peacebuilding policies in Kosovo frequently emphasise the objective of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. From the beginning of the intervention, the institution-building component of UNMIK aimed to ‘establish the foundations of a free, pluralist and multi-ethnic society’ (S/1999/779: § 79). Similarly, the Standards for Kosovo (UNMIK, 2004: 3) aspired to ‘a multi-ethnic society where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement and equal access to justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background’. The difficulty lies in assessing just what kind of policies and actions might be productive of movement towards such ideals. The previous quotation gives some indication as to the kind of measures through which UNMIK hoped to resolve the division and segregation, including representation of all communities in the democratic institutions, secure freedom of movement for all ethnicities throughout the region, and equality within the justice system. And yet, as assemblage theory reminds us, agency does not equal intention, and there are also reasons to show that UNMIK’s intervention inadvertently consolidated segregation in Kosovo (Gusic, 2019; Jenne, 2009). At the same time, the fact that the conflict involves an ethnic division, and that there was ethnically motivated violence carried out by both sides during the war, means that there are some who argue that the resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts must involve partition as part of a realistic solution (Downes, 2006; Kaufmann, 1996). While such an argument certainly would not satisfy radical understandings of positive peace, it must still be acknowledged as part of the discussion of difference in peace processes, not least because the UN’s facilitation of self-determination would seem to facilitate such partition.

In the *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1992: § 17) wrote that ‘if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve’. This quotation seems to show an awareness of the potential problem for peace of logics of self-determinism as a resolution to conflict between different groups. Two principles of UN doctrine are therefore in tension – the principle of democracy, and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of ethnicity or religion. In short, the democratic will of Kosovo’s population is for independence from Serbia. But because it is an ethno-nationalist conflict, then supporting the right to statehood is in effect facilitating the partition of ethnic groups, thus violating the principle of non-discrimination and multi-ethnic societies. The mandate for the UN mission in Kosovo tried to operate between the two – it supported autonomy and self-government for Kosovo, while supposedly maintaining the ‘territorial integrity’ of Serbia (S/RES/1244[1999]: p. 2). The remainder of this chapter explores how the attempts to manage the problem of difference in Kosovo have played out, and considers what this can tell us about peace.



### 7.3 Difference as social and spatial

Social theory has dealt with the constructed nature of difference. Of significance in this regard is the work of Michel Foucault, who analysed the construction of categories in the human sciences. To cite just one example, Foucault asserts that ‘the Homosexual’, as a category of person (rather than just the practices/relationships with which it is associated), came into being in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Foucault, 1998). The categories ‘heterosexual’ and ‘homosexual’ are not, in Foucault’s analysis, a taken-for-granted truth, but a product of scientific and psychological discourses on sexuality in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This raises two of Foucault’s famous ideas about power: its relation to knowledge, and its productive capacity. By conjoining power/knowledge, Foucault aimed to show that the knowledge produced about people cannot be separated from operations of power. Knowledge is not a detached description of its object. Rather, it acts on its object, it passes judgement by measuring deviations from norms that knowledge itself produces, and then power is operationalised to correct these deviations (Foucault, 1991a). Hence why power is not understood by Foucault as only repressive. It is also productive, of categories, identities, behaviours, and modes of conduct.

Within critical geopolitics, the Foucauldian account of knowledge/power has been adopted and applied to matters of political geography. In Ó Tuathail’s foundational text, *Critical Geopolitics*, he states that ‘geography is not a natural given but a power-knowledge relationship’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 10). He introduced the term *geo-power* to designate ‘the functioning of geographical knowledge not as an innocent body of knowledge and learning but as an ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the governmental production and management of territorial space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 7). The question of difference in critical geopolitics is investigated by analysing the construction of difference in place and space, and how such constructions are inseparable from the politics of states, territory, and war. ‘[T]he essential moment of geopolitical discourse’, says Dalby, ‘is the division of space into “our” place and “their” place’ (Dalby, 1991: 274).

An understanding of the territorial construction of difference can be applied to analysing the identity politics of Kosovo. Chapter 2 of this thesis mentioned the significance of the Battle of Kosovo (fought in 1389) in contemporary Serbian cultural identity. The supposed connection between ethnic Serbs and the geographical region of Kosovo therefore draws upon centuries of history and mythology. When Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was promoting Serbian nationalism and introducing discriminatory measures against Kosovo Albanians, he referred to Kosovo as ‘the heart of Serbia’ (quoted in Daskalovski, 2005: 12). Kosovo Albanians equally justify their claim to the region by drawing upon a long history and mythology. The Albanian account asserts continuity from the ancient Illyrians to present day Albanians, and thus the Serb settlements in Kosovo from the seventh century are viewed as an occupation of Albanian land (Daskalovski, 2005). These competing ‘truths’ over the history and geography of Kosovo exemplify Ó Tuathail’s notion of geo-power. The knowledge produced about Kosovo is not a neutral communication of facts, but is productive of contemporary identities in relation to Kosovo, and is implicated in the continuing political divide in the region. These discourses were mobilised during Milošević’s suppression of Kosovo’s autonomy, and are likewise used in support of Kosovo’s right to sovereign independence.

A demonstration of the connection between historical knowledge and state identity in Kosovo is identified by Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) in the example of Mother Teresa Boulevard in Kosovo's capital city, Pristina. In the 1990s, when Serbia was asserting authority over Kosovo, this street was called Vidovdanska Street. Vidovdan is Saint Vitus' Day in Serbia, a commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo. Mother Teresa, on the other hand, is symbolic of 'Albanianness' in Kosovo. In addition to renaming the street Mother Theresa Boulevard, a statue of Mother Teresa replaced a statue of the Serbian symbol the 'Kosovo Maiden' (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 58). The Serbian symbolism of Vidovdan has therefore been replaced, with the street's new name and statute instead contributing to the 'discursive construction of a predominantly Albanian identity of Kosovo' (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 58). Interestingly, the authors also note that the street was once called Marshall Tito Street, after Yugoslavia's President Tito. The same street has therefore had three different names, each one symbolically asserting a specific form of identity and statehood – first Yugoslavian, then Serbian, then Kosovan. This is one demonstration of how geopolitical changes of the last 70 years of Kosovo's history become manifest in specific places. Björkdahl and Kappler call this process 'place-making' – the way that an abstract idea, such as the idea that Kosovo is Albanian, becomes 'visible in material terms' (p. 66). In the language of assemblage theory discussed in chapter 4, we could say that symbolic place names and statues contribute to the coding of the Kosovo assemblage. Coding refers to 'the role played by special expressive components in an assemblage in fixing the identity of the whole' (DeLanda, 2016: 22). As with territorialization, coding is a matter of degree rather than a binary of coded vs. decoded. Re-naming the street and changing the political symbolism of the statues increases the coding of the Kosovo assemblage as having Albanian identity.

If the construction of difference between people and places is often implicated in conflict, violence, and war, it seems that an understanding of peace ought to grapple with the question of what difference is, how it contributes to violence, and how a politics of peace could respond for it. Must peace appeal to sameness as a response to the problem of difference, for example? Hannah Arendt (2017) argues that 'developed political communities, such as the ancient city-states or modern nation-states' (p. 394), have sought to 'eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and differentiations which by themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust, and discrimination' (p. 395). She claims that the fact of naturally given differences – 'the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds' (p. 394) – represents a threat to the 'law of equality' on which the 'public sphere' of a polity is founded.<sup>36</sup> Difference, on this understanding, is a problem that has been suppressed, but which cannot be denied.

An appeal to sameness, perhaps to the universal humanity and value of each and every person, may have merit, but is it sufficient to inform the politics of peace in the face of histories of conflict along ethno-nationalist lines? Regarding his critique of how the difference between East and West was constructed, Edward Said (2003: 352) has said that he aimed 'not so much to dissipate difference itself – for who can

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<sup>36</sup> Arendt is not suggesting that equality is necessarily achieved in such polities. She is making this point in the context of a discussion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), a French Revolution document that still forms part of the French constitution, and which asserts the principle of equal rights for all humans. Similar political principles are included the US Declaration of Independence. The UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a descendant of such ideas (Kennedy, 2007: see chapter 6).

deny the constitutive role of national as well as cultural differences in the relations between human beings – but to challenge the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of opposed essences, and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of those things’. If peace does not necessarily require the eradication of differences that Arendt identifies in modern state politics, then what are the qualities of the relations across difference that could be called peaceful? The next section considers how a Spinozan relational account of politics would respond to this question.

#### 7.4 Difference and relationality

The theoretical framework set out in chapter 4 explored an understanding of political agency and peace based on a relational ontology. The foundational claim of Spinoza’s relational philosophy is, as stated, that there is only one substance – God, or Nature – which incorporates the whole of reality. All the constituent parts of this reality are therefore products of relationality. Bodies are both constituted and determined by other bodies (Spinoza, E IV pref; also IV p4d). Given this unavoidable relationality, how does such a perspective account for the kind of entrenched differences and segregation that characterise ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts?

The first point to make is that the assertion of a single substance does not deny the existence of these kinds of difference, or their implication in violent conflict. It does, however, deny that they are essential. They are rather a product of relational processes that make up reality. In this regard, then, a relational ontology would concur with the above outlined Foucauldian view that differences in identity are a product of social construction. But from the perspective of a Spinozan relational ontology, the process that produces the entrenched difference is not only a matter of discursive construction. It is also *affective* – it is a product of how people have been determined to feel towards others that they perceive as different, based on how they are affected by them.

The process of differentiation does not just operate along ethnic, national, or religious lines. We are all differentiated and individualized through our interactions, as we develop a unique history of affects which shape our disposition and the content of our minds (Sharp, 2017). The fact of people’s differentiation, then, is not, in itself, the source of the problem of difference – it is rather the perception of negative affects between differentiated people. As Spinoza writes:

‘If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation’ (E III p46).

Importantly, the idea of the cause of sadness does not have to be true; it is enough that we imagine ourselves to have been affected by them (E III p15). It can be seen, therefore, how this affective process accounts for the seemingly intractable conflicts among different ‘communities’, each side perceiving the other as a cause of their reduced power of acting. It is this affective process that can be said to be the ‘problem’ of difference for peace.

#### 7.4.1 The Kosovo peace process as a double-rejection of parthood

Chapter 4 noted that a state could be understood as contributing towards social harmony in so far as it affects the population with a sense of *securitas* – the reasonable expectation that their interests will be served by the commonwealth (Steinberg, 2009). If people are not affected positively in this way, but are instead fearful of the state, they are determined to reject their place within the broader community. As the Spinozist scholar Beth Lord puts it: ‘[i]n so far as we agree, we consider ourselves parts of a community whole; in so far as we disagree, we reject our political parthood and consider ourselves wholes in our own right’ (Lord, 2017: 74). According to this explanation, the problem of ethnic difference in Kosovo can be considered a double ‘rejection of parthood’. First, the population of Kosovo Albanians rejected their parthood as constituents of Serbia, and instead asserted their own ‘wholeness’ – or stateness. Second, the Kosovo Serbs remaining in northern Kosovo rejected their parthood as constituents of Kosovo.

It is difficult to assess the level of hope felt within a population in a text-based study. For the purposes of this chapter, I investigate this through the conduct and participation in elections in Kosovo. Steinberg (2009: 56) defines *securitas* as being demonstrated by ‘broad civic participation’ (p. 56), and claims that such participation would result in a reduction of factionalism. For this reason, I have chosen to focus on elections, as an indication of civic participation in Kosovo.

#### 7.5 The management of difference through democratic elections

In his 1999 Report on the Work of the Organization, Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted a development in the role attributed to democratic elections in the UN’s peacebuilding strategy. He writes:

Elections that have in the past served predominantly as an exit strategy out of conflict situations are now seen as providing an opportunity for institution-building and the introduction of programmes for good governance (UN Secretary-General, 1999: 109).

This view of elections is consistent with the definition of peacebuilding presented in the Brahimi report a year later, which lists ‘assistance for democratic development’ and ‘electoral assistance’ among the peacebuilding activities (UN General Assembly, 2000: § 13). Similarly, the *Principles and Guidelines* associates ‘free and fair elections’ with the development of legitimate institutions of government (UN DPKO, 2008: 28; 89). Elections remain a major part of UN peacebuilding, with 2019 seeing the organisation provide direct assistance in 18 elections around the world (UN Secretary-General, 2019: § 76). Kofi Annan’s above quotation was published in the same year that the UN Interim Administration was deployed in Kosovo. Two years later, UNMIK conducted the first national election in Kosovo, to select the members of the Provisional Assembly.

How might elections relate to the management of difference in societies that are highly segregated, and with a history of violence between factions? In principle at least, elections are meant to initiate ‘the institutionalization of a *multi-party* democratic system that provides for *inclusive*, transparent and accountable governance’ (UN Secretary-General, 2007: § 59, emphasis added). The first point to make with regards to how elections can contribute to the management of difference within a state, therefore, is that an election

should provide for the inclusion of the different communities – inclusion in the sense that they participate in the election by casting their votes, and inclusion in the sense that representatives from different communities get the chance to be elected. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon furthermore asserted that elections are a way to help states ‘demonstrate that the legitimacy of an elected government is derived not solely from the ballot box but rather from its ability to provide impartial security and deliver basic social services to all’ (UN Secretary-General, 2007: § 59). The idea that legitimacy comes from impartial security and the delivery of services to all would correspond with Spinoza’s term *securitas* (*E III def aff XIV*; Steinberg, 2009: 52). *Securitas* must apply as widely as possible within the population; for if portions of the population do not feel that it is in their interests to participate in civic life – or if they have reason to fear the state, then they have greater reason to reject their parthood and to assert their own sovereign wholeness (Lord, 2017). Thus, one way in which the institutions of a state can contribute to peace among the population, is if they instil *securitas* widely among citizens.

If it is the case that elections can contribute towards the peaceful management of difference within a divided population, it must be noted that this is not *necessarily* the case. While there can be no doubt that the UN peace policies foreground the importance of elections, they also display an awareness that ‘elections can have a polarizing effect and heighten political tensions’ (UN Secretary-General, 2004: § 64). As opposed to lessening the sense of division in a state, an ‘ill-timed or poorly designed’ election can exacerbate tensions and ‘result in support for extremists or encourage patterns of voting that reflect wartime allegiances’ (UN Secretary-General, 2005: § 74). The following section explores the relationship between elections and the management of difference in Kosovo.

### 7.5.1 UNMIK’s administration of elections in Kosovo

In Kosovo, the Constitutional Framework by which UNMIK established the provisional institutions made it a requirement for the Assembly to reserve 20 of the 120 seats for ‘non-Albanian Kosovo Communities’ (UNMIK, 2001: § 9.1.3). Of that 20, half are designated for representatives of Kosovo Serbs, and the other half is made up of representatives for ‘other communities’ (*ibid.*).<sup>37</sup> It might be observed that this reservation of Assembly seats is not in fact democratic – it allows for the election of political representatives that would not otherwise receive a high enough proportion of votes to secure a seat. In the unique circumstances of Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of civil war, however, it is apparent why UNMIK justified such a choice in the Constitution. Recall that UNMIK aimed to ‘establish the foundations of a free, pluralist and multi-ethnic society’ in Kosovo (S/1999/779: § 79). In pursuit of this objective, ‘The Mission’s aim is to show Kosovo’s minority communities that they can derive tangible benefits from engaging in public life’ (S/2001/926: § 35). In designating 20 seats to ethnic minorities the Constitutional Framework can be seen as coding the idea of multi-ethnic representation into the foundational text of the polity. Interestingly, even after the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared independence in 2008, they maintained the 20-seat reservation for minorities when they introduced their new constitution. This continuity shows that, even

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<sup>37</sup> ‘Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to other Communities as follows: the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities four (4), the Bosniak Community three (3), the Turkish Community two (2) and the Gorani Community one (1)’ (UNMIK, 2001: § 9.1.3).

while the government was asserting its autonomy and rejection of UNMIK's authority, the ideas that UNMIK promoted have still shaped the code of the Kosovo assemblage.

It would be difficult to achieve *securitas*, a hopeful citizenry, and an acceptance of parthood, if there was no realistic chance of being represented in the government. It might be said, however, that reserving the seats for representatives maintains a logic of two distinct groups without shared interests. It seems to make the assumption that Albanian and Serbian citizens would never be voting for the same parties. It is therefore continuing the stasis of the divide, even while it is supposed to institutionalise peace. There is thus a fine line between adopting measures for the inclusion of minority groups and avoiding entrenching a logic of fundamental difference between communities. As shall be seen in the following sections, UNMIK was not always successful in staying on the right side of this line.

### 7.5.2 Electing the first Provisional Assembly

A principal step in the development of 'provisional institutions' in Kosovo was the election of the first Assembly, held on 17 November 2001. It was organised by the 'institution-building' pillar of UNMIK, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). While the election was reported a success (S/2002/62: § 3), the issues that UNMIK had to attempt to resolve during and after the election are representative of the tensions and paradoxes of Kosovo's geopolitics.

As the Secretary-General's reports state, a primary focus during preparation for the vote was the participation of non-Albanian communities, most importantly that of ethnic Serbs. In an earlier election, the municipal elections held in October 2000, Kosovo Serbs had not participated in the vote. In fact, the UNMIK Special Representative had to personally appoint members of the municipal assemblies in Serb majority municipalities because the turnout was so low that the results were not certified (S/2000/1196). Thus, for the election of the Provisional Assembly, UNMIK was determined to achieve Serb participation. The report from the period immediately before the election says that participation of the minority groups in Kosovo is 'critical to the legitimacy of the elections and the Mission's goal of an all-inclusive provisional self-government' (S/2001/926: § 2). Recall that 'legitimacy' is one of the ideals emphasised by the doctrinal texts on peace operations (see section 6.2.1.). So here, legitimacy is being defined in part by extent to which ethnic minorities participate in elections and are represented in the institutions of government. In pursuit of this doctrinal ideal, UNMIK conducted a 'civil registration operation'. The emphasis was to register those who had not participated in the municipal elections of the previous year, as well as newly returned citizens, and those eligible to vote who were outside of Kosovo (e.g. people displaced by the conflict who had not yet returned to Kosovo) (see S/2001/926: §§ 28-31). To this end, UNMIK set up voter service centres and mobile registration units, and conducted a public information campaign (*ibid.*).

One reason for the difficulty in achieving Kosovo Serb participation is because Serbs looked to the government of Serbia (then still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for direction (S/2001/926: § 5). It was therefore a significant boost to the registration campaign when both the President of F.R. Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of Serbia called upon Kosovo Serbs to register. The report notes that, following this endorsement, numbers of Kosovo Serb registrations increased to between 3 - 4,000 a day. In response,

UNMIK decided to extend the registration period by two weeks, in order to accommodate this increase (S/2001/926: § 31). Again, the actions of the mission were being guided by the principle of multi-ethnicity.

Thus, though the effort to achieve Kosovo Serb participation was successful, it was aided in great part by the endorsement of the leaders of Yugoslavia and Serbia, demonstrating that the Kosovo Serb population still looked to Serbian leadership for consent to participate. This indicates a theme that remains significant for Kosovo; namely, the adherence of Kosovo Serbs to Serbian authority rather than either UNMIK or the Kosovo Assembly. As the previous chapter discussed, the influence of Serbian authority is especially significant in northern Kosovo. The next section therefore deals explicitly with the impact of elections in the Serb-majority northern municipalities.

### 7.5.3 Official and unofficial elections in northern Kosovo

Elections seem to characterise the paradoxes and tensions in northern Kosovo, especially during the so-called north Kosovo crisis in 2011-13. There were three elections during the north Kosovo crisis: northern Kosovo's unofficial referendum (14-15 February 2012); Serbia's parliamentary, presidential, and local elections (6 and 20 May 2012); and Kosovo's municipal and mayoral elections (3 November 2013).

#### 7.5.3.1 *The unofficial referendum*

On 14-15 February 2012, Northern Kosovo municipal authorities held a referendum on accepting the authority of Kosovo. The question on the ballot was: "Do you accept the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo?". This vote was opposed by the Serbian Government, and the report also notes that some Kosovo Serbs living in other parts of Kosovo were also against the referendum (S/2012/72: § 12). 'The organizers claimed a turnout of 75.29 per cent, and that some 99.74 per cent of participants responded negatively to the question posed' (S/2012/275: § 8). But 'UNMIK and other international presences stressed that it had no legal consequence' (S/2012/275: § 8). In this case, the unofficial election was not an instrument for greater integration, but an indicator of Kosovo Serb rejection of Kosovo authority.

#### 7.5.3.2 *Serbia's presidential, parliamentary, and local elections*

While progress was being made in the EU-facilitated talks between Serbia and Kosovo, tension was once again observed in northern Kosovo as the Serbian elections approached (S/2012/275: §§ 3-4). The reports note that a key cause of this was the question of whether there would be voting in Kosovo for the Serbian elections – 'a lightning rod for unresolved issues and tensions' (S/2012/275: § 59). UNMIK mediated between the relevant stakeholders and advised the Serbian Government not to conduct local elections in Kosovo, to which the Serbians agreed (S/2012/275: § 5; § 59). The Kosovo authorities had said 'they would use all available means to prevent' such a vote, so this was a useful measure for removing a potential cause of violence. As with the unofficial referendum, the report here notes that some Kosovo Serbs opposed the holding of Serbian local elections in Kosovo – 'Kosovo Serbs who participate in the Kosovo institutions dismissed the need to hold local elections in Kosovo' (S/2012/275: § 5). It is therefore apparent that Kosovo Serbs should not be treated as a homogenous group who all share the same opinion and vote in the same way. There are some Kosovo Serbs who do participate in the Kosovo institutions. There is a spatial pattern to participation however, with Serb-majority municipalities located south of the river Ibar more

likely to participate, and those in the north more likely to reject Kosovo's institutions (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). Those Serbs outside of northern Kosovo perhaps have a greater sense of *securitas* in Kosovo than those in the north of the region – their participation would seem to indicate an acceptance of parthood within Kosovo.

The Kosovo government did agree, however, to allow for the Serbian presidential and parliamentary votes to include eligible voters in Kosovo. It was agreed that the OSCE would facilitate the Kosovo vote, setting-up the polling stations and then delivering the ballots to the Serbian Election Commission (S/2012/603: §§ 4-5). The Secretary-General reports that the vote in Kosovo was successfully carried out, 'in an orderly and peaceful fashion' (ibid., § 5). This election was thus considered a success.

### 7.5.3.3 *Kosovo's municipal and mayoral elections*

Kosovo intended to include northern Kosovo in the 2013 municipal elections (S/2013/444: § 8). As with the Serbian vote in the previous year, it was agreed between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina that the OSCE would facilitate the ballots in northern Kosovo (S/2013/631: § 4). 'Serbian leadership has committed its strong support for participation by Kosovo Serbs in the upcoming elections' (ibid., § 5). However, continuing the theme of dissent among Kosovo Serbs against the Serbian government, there were 'public campaigns against participation' in the election (ibid., § 12). The unofficial 'Provisional Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija' also called for a boycott (ibid., § 14). With all this tension, the Secretary-General placed particular emphasis on the importance achieving a successful election (ibid., § 48). This was the first election held following the implementation of the Brussels Agreement (19 April 2013). The Secretary-General made it clear that success in this election was crucial to the continued implementation of that agreement and the 'consolidation of peace and stability' (ibid., § 48).

The elections were carried out 'by and large peacefully throughout Kosovo' (S/2014/68: § 5). In the run-up to the vote there were two attacks against candidates in northern Kosovo. On the day of voting, 'two OSCE and one EULEX vehicles were stoned by a crowd in Zvečan/Zvečan' (S/2014/68: § 16). Repeat votes had to be held at three polling stations in North Mitrovica municipality, which had been disrupted in the initial vote. The re-vote proceeded 'peacefully and without further incident' (S/2014/68: § 16). Despite the relatively peaceful conduct of the elections, turnout in northern Kosovo was low, averaging about 25% (see S/2014/68: § 17).

The divergence of opinion among Kosovo Serbs regarding the unofficial referendum and the holding of Serbian local elections in Kosovo demonstrates a point that it is worth keeping in mind. That, although the conflict in Kosovo is evidently in large part ethnic, neither side should be considered a unified homogenous political group. This is evidenced here by the fact that some participate in the Kosovo institutions while others boycott them; by the fact that they had different opinions on the votes; and by the fact that when the Serbian President called for the removal of roadblocks in northern Kosovo, 'Although this message was disregarded by some municipal leaders in the north — notably those belonging to Serbian opposition parties — it was heeded by others, and contributed to the removal of roadblocks in Leposaviq/Leposavić municipality' (S/2012/72: § 7).



#### 7.5.4 Election of the Assembly, 2019

The most recent election in Kosovo, at the time of writing, was held on 6 October 2019. The current Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNMIK, Zahir Tanin, reported to the Security Council that this election ‘has brought forth the most significant change in the political landscape of Kosovo in twelve years’ (Tanin, 2019: 1). The election saw the highest voter turnout since 2010, amongst both the population as a whole (44.56 % turnout), and also specifically in Kosovo-Serb majority areas (48.6% turnout) (S/2020/255: § 4). Tanin sees the turnout of Kosovo Serbs as ‘confirming a trend of active participation by this community in Kosovo elections’ (ibid., 2), but also notes that there were some instances of voter intimidation recorded in Kosovo Serb areas.

According to the conceptual framework set out in chapter 4, the increase in participation, particularly in the Kosovo Serb areas, can be understood as a positive outcome, in so far as ‘broad civic participation’ (Steinberg, 2009: 56) can be read as indicating movement towards peace and security, an acceptance of ‘parthood’ (Lord, 2017). If parthood is a matter of degree, as suggested in chapter 4, then participation among Kosovo Serbs can be understood as a move towards a sense of parthood rather than total rejection of parthood. In the 2004 election, by comparison, fewer than 1% of Kosovo Serb’s participated in the vote (S/2004/907: § 7), and again in 2007, Serbian authorities called for a boycott of the election and so no votes were cast in Serb-majority northern Kosovo (S/2007/768: § 3).

It is important not to overstate the case, however. While negotiations over forming a coalition are ongoing, the party with the highest proportion of votes was Vetëvendosje, an explicitly Albanian nationalist party which has, in the past, been associated with the cause of Kosovan unification with Albania (Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015). As for the representation of Kosovo Serbs, according to Tanin’s (2019) report the Serbian List are likely to take all ten of the seats that are reserved for Kosovo Serb representatives. There is a history of animosity between the two parties, and it remains to be seen whether Serbian List would agree to participate in an Assembly headed by Vetëvendosje (Stojanovic, 2019). There is a precedent of Serbian representatives refusing to take their seats in the Kosovo Assembly (S/2007/134: § 7), and the Serbian List is one of the parties that has boycotted the Assembly in the past (S/2005/88: § 11).

Thus, while higher participation in the election might be welcomed, it could be that, with a government led by Vetëvendosje and the Kosovo Serbs represented exclusively by the Serbian List, the result of the election simply reflects the division of the state. As such, it is difficult to assert too positive an interpretation of the election result as a reduction in factionalism, beyond the basic assertion that it is better for there to be Serb participation in the Assembly than not. The Serb List participated in Kosovo’s coalition government following the 2017 election (S/2017/911: § 5) – so if they refuse to work with Vetëvendosje, it would be a step backwards rather than forwards.

The struggle to promote the idea of a multi-ethnic Kosovo continues, as indeed does the struggle to develop the idea among Kosovo Serbs that their interests are served by the institutions of Kosovo – a sense of *securitas*. ‘In order for objects that once prompted fear to come to mean something totally different, however, a whole network of passionate relationships must be transformed’ (Sharp, 2005: 607). Elections in the future

may continue to be looked at as an indicator of *securitas* among the population – but more so if the results reflected the development of political movements and parties that were not representative of exclusively Serb or Albanian identity. At present, such a development seems unlikely.

## 7.6 Conclusion

The Secretary-General states UNMIK's aim is 'to show Kosovo's minority communities that they can derive tangible benefits from engaging in public life' (S/2001/926: § 35). They want to instil in them a sense that the institutions of government will be good for them. This chapter has investigated the role of elections in influencing the level of *securitas* in the population. Elections in Kosovo would appear, in many ways, to reflect the ethno-nationalist divisions of the country rather than lessen them. The impact of elections in northern Kosovo particularly seems to be an example of 'rejection of parthood' (Lord, 2017). Based on reviewing the internationally mediated elections reported on in the UN documents, it is difficult to say that elections are evidence of *securitas* or acceptance of parthood. For elections to become reflective of greater integration and participation, the source of the change would likely come from elsewhere. That is, the elections themselves would not so much produce greater integration than we would see greater integration reflected in the elections, should greater integration begin to be achieved.

I wish to end this chapter with a speculative point, derived from the theoretical accounts of relationality and 'parts' and 'wholes'. Raymond Williams observes that:

however dominant a social system may be, the very meaning of its domination involves a limitation or selection of the activities it covers, so that by definition it cannot exhaust all social experience, which therefore always potentially contains space for alternative acts and alternative intentions which are not yet articulated as a social institution or even project (Raymond Williams, quoted in Said, 1985: 46)

The point here is that the 'whole' that is asserted by groups that reject their part in broader society, or insist on their incompatibility with the other, is in reality never completed. This is not to deny their power, their capacity to 'enforce local norms' (DeLanda, 2016: 11); but total homogeneity of ideas and action is never achieved. In short, difference is never as straightforward as its representation. Even while some political actors rely on an 'ideology of difference' to justify their actions, such ideological systems can never be 'completely effective' (Said, 1985: 46). This serves as a reminder that there is always the *potential* for change – for a lessening of segregation – even if it can seem totally intractable.

Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) indicate a possible area in which such change might be observed in Kosovo - the protection of cultural heritage sites. In a context of extreme segregation between the majority ethnic Albanians and the minority ethnic Serbs, these legally protected sites include monuments of significance to both groups (as well as others besides). Notably, the protected sites include several Serbian Orthodox churches, which have in the past been subject to demolition and vandalism. Local populations are consulted in decision making over how the sites are to be used. They are spaces for education, for local participation, and they emphasise the shared cultural heritage of Kosovo over the centuries (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017).

## Chapter 7

The authors do not present such initiatives as a straightforward remedy to Kosovo's problems. But if change in politics and society is to be sustained, it must ultimately become part of the institutional patterns organising social life. While these patterns might still overwhelmingly reflect division and segregation, that does not rule-out exploring and understanding alternatives. Initiatives aimed at how people understand their history, their identity, and their relationships with others, could form an important part of a broader set of peace policies; they could help provide a more appropriate background, or catalyst, for the development of more enabling and positive affects within the population.

## 8 Conclusion

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The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

- UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali – *An Agenda for Peace* (1992: § 17).

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When I began the research for this thesis, I was working on Spinoza's *Ethics* and trying to develop an understanding of peace based on the relational ontology that Spinoza presents. This understanding posited peace as something emergent in mutually enabling relations between people; it was explicitly not an understanding of peace as something instituted by states, governments, and legal agreements (see Bregazzi and Jackson, 2018). It was only later that I learnt that Spinoza says more or less the opposite in his *Political Treatise*, wherein he emphasises the responsibility of the state for ensuring 'peace and security of life' (TP 5/2), and uses the same relational ontology to justify his claims.

This tension regarding the responsibility for peace, and where it is located, exists also in the literature on geographies of peace. Much of this literature has attended to peace as an everyday, localised process, embodied and emotional. And yet Megoran and Dalby (2018) have recently asserted that this focus has ignored geopolitics. They write:

geographies of peace must attend to geopolitics: not instead of the fine-grained, local, thick descriptions of peace in specific places, but as well as this (p. 263).

Their call is therefore to include more traditional geopolitical actors into the study of peace: nation states, regional blocks, global organisations, and so on. One such geopolitical actor is the United Nations, and it is UN peace operations that have provided the focus for this thesis. The UN is one of those geopolitical actors that has not received much attention in the geographies of peace literature. Where it is discussed, it is usually critiqued as a key proponent of the inadequate liberal peace - an imposition of western values parading as universal, and one that has frequently failed in its purpose. Yet UN peace operations both contribute to, and are shaped by, matters of geopolitics. This thesis has particularly been concerned with the way the UN has facilitated autonomy and self-government in Kosovo. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was one of the most comprehensive operations the UN has ever undertaken. The production of state institutions in the pursuit of peace, in part facilitated by an external organisation, is a phenomenon that connects to questions of territory, sovereignty, transnational political agency, and the nature of states themselves. Political geographers therefore are well placed to examine these aspects of UN peace operations, and so contribute to understandings of peace as a spatial and geopolitical process.

To conclude, I wish to summarise the main arguments and findings of the thesis in relation to these broad themes of the state, the international political agency of the UN, and peace in Kosovo. This is followed by a consideration of the limits of the present thesis, and some avenues for further research.

## 8.1 Key arguments, findings, and contributions of the research

### 8.1.1 Spinoza, assemblage theory, and peace

The theoretical argument in this thesis, laid out predominantly in chapter 4, has been in part an attempt to resolve the above-mentioned tension between understanding peace as manifest in local relationships and peace as guaranteed by the state. The case I have made is that the two are not mutually exclusive, but rather co-constitutive. This claim is based on an understanding of the state as a production of relational processes between people, materials, and ideas. A state's reality is nothing more than the capacities realised in the relations between its constituent parts. This view is therefore aligned with contemporary assemblage theory, and particularly with applications of assemblage theory to questions of geopolitics and international relations (e.g. Dittmer, 2017, 2020; Doucet, 2016; McConnell and Dittmer, 2017). The relevance of an assemblage approach to the geographical study of peace, I have argued, is that it opens up productive avenues for the inclusion of states and international institutions in the geographical study of peace, while maintaining the importance of local forms of peaceful agency as well. Indeed, assemblage theory makes no ontological distinctions between 'local', 'national', 'international' etc. To speak of different 'scales' of politics 'should refer only to *relative scale*, that is, to scale relative to the part-to-whole relation' (DeLanda, 2016: 16, original emphasis). The influence of geopolitical actors like states and international organisations is therefore the object of analysis in this thesis – but their agency is accounted for not as the rational intent of a unified actor, but as the capacities realised in a continual process of interaction and relationality between constituent parts. This approach responds to Megoran and Dalby's call for inclusion of 'traditional' geopolitical actors, but does so in a way that is sensitive to the interaction and co-constitution of the local, the state, and the international.

This thesis contributes to and extends the literature on assemblage in political geography by considering how the ontological commitments of assemblage theory change or enhance an understanding of peace as a (geo)political category. To this end, I have drawn particularly from the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, whose works provide a rich resource for exploring the political implications of relational ontology. In short, the thesis combines Spinoza's political philosophy with assemblage theory, and proposes a theory of peace based on this combination. This 'Spinoza-assemblage → peace' formula is developed in two distinct ways.

First, chapter 4 considers how a state might be understood as contributing towards peace once we accept the account of state agency that assemblage theory entails. As a historically produced and contingent entity, a state assemblage has no transcendent unitary status; but it does exert '*downward causal influence*' (DeLanda, 2016: 18, original emphasis). Chapter 4 derives from Spinoza an understanding of how such 'downward' causality of states and international organisations might contribute to peace, arguing that the Spinozan concept of 'harmony' provides the means to articulating a relationship between the state and peace. Based on Spinoza's account of the natural foundations and purpose of the state, I argue that harmony becomes the normative measure by which any 'civil order' can be assessed. The thesis therefore concurs with Doucet (2016) about the utility of assemblage for investigating peacekeeping interventions, particularly those which attempt to institute state-building measures. Chapter 4 adds to this a consideration of what peace itself

means in relation to states and international organisations, once they are conceptualised as assemblages. There is some further discussion of this below, in the reflections on the role of the state.

The second use of the Spinoza-assemblage combination in this thesis is methodological. Discussed in chapter 5, this line of thought regards the place of ideas and texts within an assemblage, and how textual/discourse analysis might be altered when texts, and the ideas they contain, are considered as component parts of an assemblage. Texts have been the dominant object of analysis in critical geopolitics. Indeed, the tendency to focus on deconstructing texts has been critiqued as ignoring the manifestation of geopolitics in embodied practices and relations, notably by feminist geographers (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001; McDowell, 1999; Pain, 2009). Advocates of ethnographic methods in political geography likewise want to ‘re-people’ the discipline (Megoran, 2006: 625; for a critical overview, see Kuus, 2013). In foregrounding relationality, and extending agency to materiality and the non-human, assemblage theory in fact provides a productive route away from solely analysing texts (Dittmer, 2014a; Müller, 2015). But texts, and language/ideas more generally, remain component parts of assemblages, and contribute towards the properties and capacities that can be realised within an assemblage.

In chapter 5, I situated my approach to the texts within Hasana Sharp’s ‘renaturalized’ understanding of ideas. Based on Spinoza’s *Ethics*, Sharp treats ideas themselves as natural entities that require support and nurturing in order to thrive and spread. Just as Spinoza’s ontology foregrounds relationality between bodies, so too are minds relational, interacting in an ‘ecosystem of ideas’ (Sharp, 2011: 56). I combined this renaturalized account of ideas with an assemblage theory understanding of ‘linguistic entities’ (DeLanda, 2016: 51), claiming that the UN’s public discourse can be understood as *coding* the ecosystem of ideas within the organisation. In the complex ecosystem, the role of doctrinal and policy texts is to try and establish coherent understandings of the principles and ideals by which the organisation can function. I therefore characterised certain UN documents as providing the *parameter* of this assemblage of ideas, whilst others were characterised as *variables* within the larger code (DeLanda, 2016). This provided a methodological framework with which to analyse the documents, with a clearly articulated understanding of their role within an assemblage.

Overall, the methodological formulation presented in this thesis allows the researcher to take seriously the agenda-setting and vision-guiding role of texts and ideas to produce certain outcomes in society, whilst at the same time acknowledging that they are only one part of the larger assemblage. A further benefit of conceptualising texts as a component part of a broader assemblage is that it may allow connections between text-based studies and ethnographic studies to more readily be made— whereby the different methods are conceived as focusing on different components of the same assemblage.

## 8.1.2 The United Nations, the state, and the intervention in Kosovo

### 8.1.2.1 *The power of ideas*

The methodology of this thesis therefore attests to the power of ideas, claiming that, given sufficient support, they have a capacity to ‘make, remake and unmake the world’ (Anderson, 2019: 1120). As a text-based study, the main object of analysis has been the ideas contained and promoted in UN public discourse

on matters of peace policy. The contributions of this thesis to existing research on the UN as an institution are therefore concentrated on understanding UN ideas – what they are and what they do. By characterising the UN’s public discourse on peace as a constituent part on an assemblage, the thesis makes a case for the continuing importance of UN doctrine. It concurs that UN ideas can and do ‘change the world’ (Weiss, 2011: see chapter 2), as active agents contributing to the capacities and properties of the assemblages in which they exist. The unique role of doctrinal texts in this regard, as stated above, is in their capacity to code the ecosystem of ideas. The non-doctrinal texts are also important, as a record of the institutional memory from which policy is constructed, showing which ideas change, which remain constant, and which end up being reflected as later parameters/codes. A benefit of an assemblage understanding is that the active role of texts can be acknowledged and explored, whilst remaining aware of the often-fragmented nature of the organisation. Coding is a matter of degree. The consistency of ideals and practice across peace missions that the UN seeks to produce in its doctrine on peace operations will never be achieved absolutely; but it can be achieved to a greater or lesser degree, and the capacities of the organisation to implement effective programmes and agendas will always be in part dependent on the quality of the ideas guiding them.

Further confirmation of the continuing relevance of, and need to analyse, policy texts in peace research can be found in the problems that are caused when there is *not* sufficiently clear doctrine or guidance for peace missions. This was the case, for example, during the rapid increase of state break-down and civil war in the 1990s, when the UN was trying to respond to forms of conflict that were not accounted for in its Charter (Kennedy, 2007). Similarly, Ahmed *et al.* (2007) argue that many problems faced by peacekeepers have arisen precisely because of a lack of coherent policy to guide them. Regarding the difficulty of implementing the expanded and multi-dimensional UN mandates in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, they note that ‘it became all too clear that there was no guiding vision for these efforts beyond that being fashioned on the ground as reactions to daily events’ (Ahmed *et al.*, 2007: 16). More recently, it has been suggested that ‘the current portfolio of missions is stretching [the UN’s] core principles to their limit’, and that it may be time for a ‘Capstone 2.0’ in response (Hunt, 2019). The ideas, policies, and norms promoted by an institution like the UN go a long way in setting the agendas that will ultimately be manifest in success and failure in the field. There is therefore a continuing necessity for research into where these ideas come from, the effects they have, and the prospects for their improvement.

#### 8.1.2.2 *Peace and the State: Sovereignty, de facto statehood, and the transitional administration in Kosovo*

The aspect of UN discourse that has particularly concerned this thesis is how the relationship between peace and the state has been conceived, and how these ideas have been made manifest in the peace- and state-building policies in Kosovo. The state, as an idea and in practice, has always involved matters of war and peace. The very origins of the modern state form are located in a series of peace treaties, the Peace of Westphalia. Since then, the ‘sovereign state’ has proved enduring as an ideal form of political organisation. And yet, ‘the modern nation-state has never been the absolute, bounded container of politics that some realist scholars have portrayed it to be’ (McConnell, 2016: 17-18). The case of Kosovo has provided a fascinating and important example through which this thesis has addressed the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace.

In chapters 1 and 2, I contextualised these themes within geopolitical transformations that occurred following the end of the Cold War. New patterns of conflict emerged, and the UN responded by developing new ideas and policies regarding the extent of its role in maintaining peace. The original signatories of the UN Charter, who pledged their support to the maintenance of ‘international peace and security’ (United Nations, 1945: Article 1), would likely not have foreseen that future ‘threats to peace would often be due less to external acts of aggression than to internal disintegration and civil wars’ (Kennedy, 2007: 46). The increase in instances of just such state disintegration after the Cold War therefore saw the UN struggle to develop policy on matters of war and peace that were not accounted for in the Charter. The result was the development of ‘multidimensional peace operations’, and an interventionist *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) that questioned the inviolability of state sovereignty and dramatically expanded the responsibilities of UN peace operations. The greatest extent of these interventionist policies was manifest in ‘transitional administrations’, wherein a UN peace mission was mandated to assume sovereign-like authority over the region in which it intervened. The mission in Kosovo was one such transitional administration. Considering the post-Cold War geopolitics of peace, both in general and specifically as manifest in Kosovo, therefore raises matters of sovereignty and *de facto* statehood, the agency and authority of international organisations, and the relationship between peacebuilding and state-building.

Chapter 4 of this thesis was dedicated to exploring the relationship between peace and the state in depth, and did so by articulating an understanding of the nature and foundations of ‘the state’ itself. Drawing on both contemporary assemblage theory and the political philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, the chapter considered the relational process by which a state can be considered as contributing to peace. The argument laid out there, most notably that a state can contribute to ‘social harmony’, is derived from an understanding of the state as a product of relationality between constituent parts. The state can be conceptualised as an ‘individual’ in so far as the relations between its constituents produce the effect of a certain level of coherence. The capacities of this ‘individual’ act back upon its constituents, and therefore it remains possible to refer to the agency of the state without attributing to it a false transcendent unity. This thesis therefore agrees that ‘*stateness* is not an illusion’ (2006: 771), which is to say that the influence and agency of state institutions and governments cannot be denied.

As a conceptual measure, the coherence of a state ‘individual’ is similar to what assemblage theory calls ‘territorialization’ – that is, the degree of delineation from other state assemblages, as well as ‘the degree to which an assemblage homogenises its own components’ (DeLanda, 2016: 22). The understanding of state independence adhered to by this thesis therefore concurs with the view that statehood and sovereignty are matters of degree, rather than binary categories that can either be achieved in full or not at all (Berg and Kuusk, 2010; Caspersen, 2015a). Literature within political geography and beyond has drawn attention to the various ways in which partially- or non-recognised states are still able to develop sovereignty (Caspersen, 2012; Fawn and Richmond, 2009; Pegg, 1998; Visoka, 2019) and legitimacy (Caspersen, 2015a, 2015b; Ker-Lindsay, 2015; McConnell *et al.*, 2012). Indeed, one of the points made in chapter 6 was that the UN’s intervention in Kosovo effectively created a newly independent state ‘individual’, even while, at the formal level, Kosovo’s independence is not recognised. As discussed in chapter 6, when the Kosovo Assembly



declared independence in 1990, it had very little meaning beyond the symbolic, because the region was not sufficiently delineated from Serbia. In 2008, however - with the NATO intervention having forced out all Serbian authorities, with the Kosovo borders secured and monitored, and with the development of state institutions operating distinctly from Serbia – the unilateral declaration of independence had far more meaning. Kosovo has achieved a level of *empirical* sovereignty, even though it has not achieved *legal* sovereignty (Berg and Kuusk, 2010). UNMIK therefore contributed to Kosovo's functioning as a state assemblage, even while it did not formally recognise it as independent. As Fawn and Richmond (2009: 207) put it, '[i]nternational custodians have both denied *de jure* sovereignty while also contributing to the conditions for *de facto* sovereignty'.

The agency and authority of UNMIK can therefore be seen as significantly contributing to the development of the Kosovo assemblage while under UN administration. The fact that the Assembly unilaterally declared independence, however, in violation of the Constitutional Framework (UNMIK, 2001), demonstrates that the agency of UNMIK is not synonymous with its rational intention. UNMIK may have had a set of declared aims based on the authority of a Security Council mandate – but it could not control all aspects of the Kosovo assemblage. Furthermore, the contradictory aspects of the UN's stance on Kosovo – that it wanted to develop autonomy in the region whilst at the same time respecting Serbian sovereignty – created a geopolitical tension that could only be sustained for so long. Ker-Lindsay even suggests that the UN intervention would never have been able to prevent Kosovo's increased separation and *de facto* independence from Serbia. He states that: 'the UN was in fact powerless to act to bring about an alternative status solution. Once international intervention had occurred, independence became the only feasible option' (Ker-Lindsay, 2012: 393).

Ker-Lindsay's point reminds us that agency within an assemblage is simultaneously top-down and bottom-up (DeLanda, 2016). While international organisations like the UN represent new forms of political agency and authority, their capacities are still constrained by the existing geopolitical conditions at the state and local levels. This is further demonstrated by the obstacles and resistance experienced by UNMIK in Kosovo, whereby its policies and practices were weakened or disabled altogether. One of the most significant sites of resistance highlighted by this thesis is in the north of Kosovo, in the four municipalities with Kosovo Serb majorities. Many members of the population in this area reject the authority of the Kosovo Assembly, and perceive Serbia to be the legitimate authority. This resistance has been implicated in matters of democracy in the region. When electing the first Provisional Assembly, for example, voter registration among Kosovo Serbs was very low. Only when the Prime Minister of Serbia called upon Kosovo Serbs to register to vote did the numbers begin to increase. This raises the further point that, while a political assemblage may become more territorialized and delineated, total delineation is an impossibility. What happens 'on the ground' in the Kosovo peace process cannot be fully separated from what happens in Serbia. A further example of this dispersed agency would be the network that the UN mission itself is connected to. The UN headquarters are in New York; personnel are contributed by a variety of countries from around the world; and a mission receives its legal mandate from the Security Council, itself consisting of representatives from 15 states. While this complex network in large part enables UNMIK (and other

missions) to operate, it can also constrain their actions. This is demonstrated by Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. While the USA, the UK, and France immediately recognised Kosovo's independent status, Russia and China did not. Disagreement among the P-5 members of the Security Council meant that the Council could provide no guidance as to how UNMIK should respond, thus leaving it to the Secretary-General alone. The outcome was a loss of authority for UNMIK, and ultimately a significant downsizing of the mission.

While so much of the UN doctrine asserts the complimentary relationship between developing state functions and peace, the Kosovo case demonstrates that there is no straightforward relationship between enhancing state capacity and supporting peace. It even seems to exacerbate the division in some cases, as in the North Kosovo Crisis (discussed in chapter 6). This tension between state-building and peacebuilding in Kosovo has been highlighted by Visoka (2017: 7) who suggests that '[p]rogress in one policy area meant stagnation and resistance on the other'. While state-building policies, that extended both the Kosovo Assembly's authority and the region's autonomy, placated Kosovo Albanian leadership, peacebuilding policies sought to accommodate 'the rights and interests of the Serbian community through decentralisation of power, special political status and reserved seats in the parliament and government' (Visoka, 2017: 6). In their assessment of the UN's mission in Kosovo, then, Franks and Richmond (2008: 100) conclude that:

liberal peace-building should be discursively decoupled from the concept of state-building, removing an important motivation for local cooption to lead to statehood in such cases, and reverting to the former focus of peace-building, which was on dealing with the issues of everyday life for individuals from the bottom-up in the context of a liberal social contract with meaningful institutions.

Based on the findings in this thesis, such a 'discursive decoupling' of peacebuilding and state-building in UN peace policy and doctrine would represent a radical change. As the discussion of doctrinal documents in chapter 6 demonstrates (see Table 1), the UN's understanding of peacebuilding is very much coupled with '[r]estoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order' (UN DPKO, 2008: 25). In Kosovo, this coupling of state-building and peacebuilding was taken to an unprecedented extent, with the UN mission going so far as to provide the constitution by which the region would be governed, as well as securing its borders and running its elections.

It is in this context that the findings in the 2015 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490) become relevant. As discussed at the end of chapter 6, the Review suggests that, in contexts of severe sectarian fragmentation, facilitating the development and extension of state authority can deepen the conflict rather than ease it. It therefore recommends that 'there is a need to find new approaches that understand peacebuilding[...] as having more to do with strengthening local domains of governance than with endeavouring to re-establish a strong central authority' (§ 21). This development in understanding of peacebuilding – if it was to gain strength within the ecosystem of ideas constituting UN peace policy – would represent precisely the kind of 'discursive decoupling' that Franks and Richmond advocate. As stated in chapter 6, such a development would come too late to have any impact on the situation in Kosovo. But

it does serve to highlight an awareness of the problem, and advocates beginning a process by which doctrine in relation to peace and the state might change and become more effective.

Overall, as politics has become more globalised, the influence of organisations like the UN is unavoidable. As Boutros-Ghali said, the theory of absolute sovereignty was ‘never matched by reality’. Adopting an assemblage understanding of political organisations would go even further: it is not only absolute sovereignty that was never matched by reality, but the transcendent ideal of ‘the State’ itself. Yet recent years have seen a growing distrust of multilateralism, and trends towards nationalist politics in many countries around the world – a re-assertion of ‘the State’ as an idealised category. It is therefore imperative that political advocacy for peace be informed by detailed and realistic analysis of multilateralism’s strengths and weaknesses, rather than wishful-thinking or naivety. Through both theoretical and empirical investigations, research must continue to explore alternative explanatory frameworks for better apprehending the processes contributing to peace and cooperation in today’s globalised politics.

## 8.2 Study limits, unanswered questions, and avenues for further research

### 8.2.1 Limits of a text-based study

A limitation of the research presented here is that, as a text-based study, it does not provide the insights into people’s thoughts and feelings about peace and conflict in Kosovo that a field-based ethnographic study would have allowed. Given that the theoretical framework presented here emphasises relationality and affect in its understanding of the state and peace, there would be much to gain from ethnographic fieldwork. It is difficult, for example, to assess how far citizens experience a sense of *securitas* in Kosovo’s institutions without support from interviews with citizens themselves. I instead had to look to indirect indicators - participation in elections - in order to inform my analysis of whether Kosovo’s institutions are productive of a sense of hope or security in the population. This necessarily changes the kinds of claims I have been able to make, and I have been cautious in what I have been willing to assert on these matters. My hope, however, is that this thesis provides a useful theoretical framework, and demonstrates its utility for the analysis of states and institutions, that could usefully inform further study, including ethnographic studies, in Kosovo and elsewhere. Just as I have drawn on micropolitical ethnographic research (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017; Gusic, 2019) to inform my text-based analysis of institutionalised peace and the management of difference in Kosovo, the work presented in this thesis might also be of use for those peace geographers who are conducting local-level research to connect their findings to broader geopolitical themes. This connecting between ‘traditional’ geopolitical actors and local forms of agency is what Dalby (2014) called for, and this thesis has attempted to show how these connections can be analysed in productive ways, such that peace geographies can consider the role of states and transnational organisations as co-constituted along with local forms of agency.

### 8.2.2 Potential for comparative analysis

A further avenue for research in this area would be to investigate similar questions, but using a comparative politics methodology (Özerdem and Mac Ginty, 2019). In addition to Kosovo, UN peace operations have

facilitated independence in Timor-Leste and South Sudan. A comparative analysis of these three cases could shed further light on the themes discussed in this thesis. The missions in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste were both deployed in 1999. While UNMIK is still present in Kosovo, the last UN peace operation withdrew from Timor-Leste in 2012. A comparative study could investigate the reasons why the UN felt it could withdraw from Timor-Leste but not from Kosovo. For example, what conditions and criteria were achieved in Timor-Leste that were not achieved in Kosovo? The missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste were both transitional administrations – that is, they assumed sovereignty over the region and took responsibility for administration and governance. The mission in South Sudan, although facilitating independence, is not a transitional administration. A comparative study could therefore consider the differences involved in the UN developing a state with complete authority, vs. developing a state in partnership with a host government. Are the challenges the same? Must the same challenges be dealt with in different ways? Investigating such questions would give further insights into the interaction between international organisations and state institutions.

### 8.2.3 Eurocentrism

Having focused solely on Kosovo, however, the parameters of the present thesis remain within a European context. Furthermore, with Spinoza providing the underlying ontological commitments of the study, its theoretical arguments are also grounded in European thought. With a European case study and a conceptual framework derived from European philosophy, it is necessary to raise the question of Eurocentrism when considering the limitations of this thesis. Eurocentrism is defined in *The Dictionary of Human Geography* as ‘A world-view that places “Europe” at the centre of human history, social analysis and political practice’ (Gregory, 2009: 220). Politically, it is ‘the assumption that [Europe’s] cultural and political systems act as the bearers of a universal Reason that maps out the ideal course of all human history’ (ibid., 220).

The latter quotation is especially relevant to the question of Eurocentrism in this thesis, as it arguably describes the liberal model of peace with which the UN is associated. If that is indeed the case, then this thesis has taken as its object the texts and ideas of a Eurocentric perspective. The idea that peace is guaranteed by democratic nation states, whose interactions are governed by legal agreements, is a central strand in European political thinking, notably deriving from Kant’s (2009 [1795]) essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’. The current ideals of UN peace policy, discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis, are remarkably similar. This is why critics of the liberal peace criticise the UN as trying to make universal a ‘Western elites’ concept of peace’ (Daley, 2014: 69). Not only has such a model failed to realise its promise of peace, it has also justified further violence (Kirsch and Flint, 2011a; Simpson, 2008). Political philosopher James Tully has no reservations about calling modern constitutional democracy ‘imperialist’, and explicitly cites the UN Security Council as part of ‘a new phase of western imperialism’ (Tully, 2008: 487).

While this thesis therefore examines what is arguably a Eurocentric worldview, it has not been my aim to advocate such a view, or to accept uncritically the liberal model of peace. I have argued for adopting a Spinozan understanding of civil order and the relational foundations of the state, but the definition of ‘civil order’ derived from Spinoza admits of enormous variety. As discussed in section 4.3.1 of this thesis, a civil

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order is in place wherever people submit to the communal right that is established by joining together to organise and coordinate the group for mutual benefit (*TP* 2/13-17). The concept is by no means limited to the modern understanding of a nation state; there is endless variety in the forms by which people might organise and coordinate. Regarding Eurocentrism, the point is that the political philosophy of peace and the state advocated in this thesis does *not* present an ideal model and claim it to be applicable to all societies. Such a universal model may indeed be how the UN presents its understanding of a liberal democratic state - but this thesis has been an investigation of these ideas and their implication in contemporary geopolitics, rather than a justification or advocacy of them.

Nevertheless, the conceptual framework of the thesis is not without its normative aspects. As discussed in chapter 4, a civil order is fulfilling its purpose in so far as its laws and institutions promote harmony (*concordia*) among its constituents. Where there is discord and disagreement, the civil order is failing in its purpose. But again, this normative measure does not present the 'liberal European' state as an ideal, or as somehow foundational to defining, understanding, and assessing civil orders. If the search for, and promotion of, 'de-imperialized' (Tully, 2008: 488) forms of constitutionalism can inform new ways of organising societies that are less violent and more productive of human flourishing, then that is entirely compatible with the Spinozan political normativity foregrounded in this thesis. The caveat is that alternatives to 'European', 'Western', or 'liberal' ideals would not be advocated for their own sake, but in so far as they promote harmony. Their value is not in the fact of their alterity, but in the quality of the affects that they foster among their constituents.

It is my hope, therefore, that the ideas presented here regarding the relationship between the UN, the state, and peace, could still usefully inform studies into non-European peace processes, as well as work that seeks to de-centre Eurocentric/liberal models of peace. If existing and future studies' findings indicate the failure of the liberal peace and/or the UN, then the ideas in thesis might even provide concepts and measures by which such critique can be articulated in new ways. In turn, understanding the meaning of peace and its relation to states and international organisations will only be further enhanced and refined when informed by the proliferation of studies into peace processes in all contexts.

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