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Bridging Classical Pragmatism and Classical Realism

A Critical Evaluation of the Potential for Dialogue between Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Dewey

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Bridging Classical Pragmatism and Classical Realism: A Critical Evaluation of the Potential for Dialogue between Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Dewey.

By Alastair Emmett

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of Philosophy Doctorate in Politics in the Faculty of Social Science and Law,

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Abstract:

This thesis addresses the need to extend the depth and scope of Realism as a normative theory in International Relations by means of a dialogue between the Pragmatism of John Dewey and the tragedian approaches of Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. The research investigates the degree to which John Dewey's understanding of the metra of things offers an alternative perspective of the tragic nature of world politics, i.e. those measures of life which in tragedy is used to illustrate the limitations and insufficiencies of the self. Through the employment of the hermeneutic notion of a "fusion of horizons" our dialogue produces a "tragic Deweyanism" which not only assimilates many metra-driven insights of Morgenthau and Niebuhr but also advances an international political thought that stresses the value of pooling insights through inclusive inquiry on a global scale.

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I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done or in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

Signed… …   Date…

Table of Contents

Introduction:	**6-20**
Section one: pragmatism, realism and tragedy.	**6-10**
Section two: structure of thesis and rationale	**11-12**
Section three: general points	**13-20**
Chapter one: Literature review:	**21-50**
Section one: intro to chapter	**21-22**
Section two: The IPT tradition and realism	**22-27**
Section three: inclusivity, Cochran to tragedy?	**28-32**
Section four: metra-focused tragedy vs IR tragedy	**33-46**
Section five: dialogue between pragmatism and realism	**47-50**
Chapter two: Hermeneutic Methodology	**51-79**
Section one: enriching horizons, fusion of horizons	**51-62**
Section two: tragic horizons	**62-79**
Chapter three: John Dewey and the metra of things	**80-147**
Intro to chapter:	**80-82**
Section one: the metra of the self	**82-120**
Section two: ethical and political imperatives	**120-131**
Section three: application to world politics	**131-145**
Conclusion to chapter three:	**145-147**
Chapter four: Reinhold Niebuhr, tragic irony in IR	**148-202**
Introduction to chapter:	**148-153**
Section one: the metra of the self	**148-167**
Section two: ethical and political imperatives	**168-181**
Section three: application to world politics	**181-201**
Conclusion to chapter four:	**201-202**
Chapter five: Hans J Morgenthau and a tragic sense of life	**203-247**
Introduction to chapter:	**203-204**
Section one: the metra of the self	**204-215**
Section two: ethical and political imperatives	**216-231**
Section three: application to world politics	**231-247**
Conclusion to chapter	**246-247**
Chapter six: Towards an alternative IR tragedy	**248-303**
Introduction to chapter six:	**248-249**
Section one: assimilating realism into Deweyanism	**250-258**
Section two: advantages of metra-focused IR vs hubris	**250-258**
Section three: advantages of tragic Deweyanism	**285-288**
Section four: objections to Deweyan ‘realism’	**289-303**
Conclusion	**304-311**
Section one: introduction to conclusion	**304**
Section two: contribution to field	**305-307**
Section two: how the contribution was achieved	**308-310**
Section three: significance to the field	**310-211**
Bibliography:	**312-311**

Introduction

Section One: Pragmatism, Realism and Tragedy

The thesis posits that integrating the Pragmatism of John Dewey with Classical Realist approaches, also "tragedian", which remain untouched by the contemporary International Relations and tragedy debate, will be useful for extending the depth and scope of realism as a normative theory in International Relations. The thesis offers an original and valuable contribution to knowledge by synthesising the insights obtained from the two positions.

The methodology adopted is *inspired* by the Philosophical Hermeneutics of Hans-George Gadamer. The primary instrument used for advancing the thesis is Gadamer's conception of a "fusion of horizons". The researcher fuses their "horizon", which is deliberately embedded within concepts drawn from tragedy, principally the notion of measures or *metra*, with the "horizons" which arise from scholarly texts analysed in the thesis. This process of "bringing a personal horizon to bear" upon pre-existing text is the mechanism through which interpretations are produced in the research. Essentially the tragic concepts within the researcher's own horizon are applied to the texts in order to fully "grasp" (and attain an understanding of) the texts.

Engaging with the legacy texts and integrating the different layers of interpretation resulted in inductively produced conclusions through a process of shaping and reshaping the researcher's "horizon". The thesis, therefore, develops through the enrichment of several horizons. Essentially, the results of the dialogue between the three principle approaches analysed in the text are established within the researcher's own horizon.

Realism as a normative approach is often considered in existing literature as being an inappropriate addition to the International Political Thought (IPT) literature owing to what can be referred to as an ideological opposition to realism, which casts the approach as amoral and overly concerned with questions of power politics. Recent scholarship on the topic suggests that realism has a profoundly ethical dimension which has not earned the tradition thus far, a position that is up-front and centre in IPT theories. This is unfortunate as significant approaches, such as those advanced by Molloy Cochran, demonstrate that the effective means of pushing beyond impasses in IPT by a refocusing upon epistemological issues suffer from an overly optimistic reading of politics. Cochran demonstrates that Pragmatism can have great potential within IPT, and would benefit greatly if a tragic vision of life were applied to it in order to better capture the insufficiencies and limitations of the self. By integrating into productive dialogue, an approach which embraces pragmatism, inclusivity and dialogue with realist tragedian approaches, this research opens up the possibility of creating an approach which synthesises

insight from both traditions. It also produces an approach which belongs to the IPT tradition specifically, not just International Relations or the realist tradition in general.

The existing debate on tragedy and International Relations is profoundly influenced by liberal ethical priorities which view tragedy as an instrument for advancing the understanding of normative dilemmas in world politics, the hope being that institutional reform such that liberal progress can be advanced. Tragedy, however, does not necessarily suggest a theoretical insight into how particular ethical contingencies can find their realisation in world politics. Tragedy is primarily concerned with an explanation for the impact of the metra of things and the measures of life, which in turn expose humans to both the limits of their intellect and the ability to control their own destinies. Hubris may occur from overshooting our legitimate measures, but there equally exists measures which cannot be overshot even if so desired.

The human knowledge, ethics and lives have profound limitations which render the human race unable to resolve tragic antagonisms or to overcome the limitations of the self's finiteness. Tragedy is *not* an antidote to hubris as many contemporary International Relations scholars maintain. Rather, it offers an explanation and rationalisation for the importance of learning the measures of things and the regrettable but sometimes unavoidable impact of being blind to the importance of the measures of things. To put tragedy to use as an instrument for the advancement of any particular ethical and political priorities is to miss

the point of tragedy, which is to indicate how the self is a limited being that must cope with its insufficiencies and limitations the best way it can in an existence where life's riddles ultimately become impossible to solve.

In order to select realist tragedian approaches, the researcher considered approaches which were unaffected by the contemporary tragedy and International relations debate. Eventually, we selected the realist tragedians of Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr as these approaches are realist and tragedian and have not been impacted by the contemporary debate. They, therefore, do not view tragedy as some sort of means for providing an antidote to hubris or as an instrument of advancing liberal ethical priorities. This is further discussed in the literature review chapter.

The pragmatism selected is that of John Dewey's. This is due to the fact that within Deweyan studies, there have already been arguments made as to Dewey's own relationship with tragedy, notably by Sidney Hook. It was, therefore, a logical choice as it offered hope of there already being some measure of a dialogue between Dewey and tragedy.

The research addressed these gaps in the literature simultaneously as further explained in the literature review. The question as to whether or not Dewey's pragmatism understands the metra of things as the researchers do in their horizon is addressed, and subsequently, the research establishes the degree to which Deweyan pragmatism, in particular Dewey's understanding of the

"metra" of things, offers an alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the "tragic" nature of International Relations.

The rationale for this question is that the research aims to fill gaps in the literature that are being established in the literature review simultaneously. A dialogue between a pragmatism, which is inclusive and dialogical (thereby retaining the advantages of pragmatism to IPT), and realist approaches, which are also largely tragedian (and thereby advancing a needed account of the self as defined by limitations and insufficiency), must naturally avoid the error of the contemporary tragedy and IR debate by focusing on the metra of things.

By demonstrating that Dewey's thought is consistent with the researcher's own horizon's understanding of the metra of things, the research opens up the possibility of synthesising insight from both traditions. Indeed, the research demonstrates that Dewey's thought is consistent with individual understanding of the metra of things in the horizon and, in turn, offers a (tragic) understanding of world politics. However, the research also indicates that there are several similarities between the researcher's reading of Dewey and the Classical Realists of Morgenthau and Niebuhr. Hence, the research maintains that an alternative can only be developed to an extent through this analysis/ interpretation. Nonetheless, by assimilating the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian approaches into Dewey's own dialogical and inclusivist form of inquiry, the research produces an alternative tragedian approach which does indeed synthesise the insights of both traditions by creating a "tragic Deweyanism"

which is at once a tragedian and metra oriented approach, as well as a pragmatist approach which is consistent with both the principle of inclusivity and dialogue.

Section Two: Structure of Thesis and Rationale

The structure of this thesis reflects the hermeneutic methodology employed throughout the thesis. The thesis begins by establishing the gaps in existing literature in chapter one. Chapter one also outlines the rationale for the research question. The chapter discusses how establishing that Dewey's approach does indeed understand the metra of things, positions the research to then ask if such an alternative understanding offers an alternative to the kind of tragedian approaches which are developed by Niebuhr and Morgenthau.

Chapter two develops the methodology of the research, which is inspired, but not a clone of, the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-George Gadamer. The researcher establishes the importance of the concept of the fusion of horizons. It becomes evident that, as consistent with Gadamer's view that realities are constituted in language, the researcher's own horizon as a hermeneutician can be brought to bear upon the texts of the three scholars. Through fusing two horizons, the researcher interprets the meaning of the horizons that are embedded within the text and, thus, provide them with renewed meaning reflected within the researcher's horizon. The rationale here is that the

researcher's horizon becomes increasingly enriched as the research proceeds from a chapter interpreting Dewey, to one interpreting Niebuhr, to one interpreting Morgenthau. The researcher's horizon is, thus, enriched throughout the research process: one interpretation builds upon another in an inductive manner.

Chapter three explores Dewey. The chapter interprets his approach employing three themes (a) the metra of the self (b) ethical and political imperatives and (c) application to world politics. The interpretation of the approach as one consistent with the metra of things (as well as the typical features of pragmatism such as dialogue and inclusivity) and thus the researcher's horizon is enriched by this interpretation.

Chapter four focuses upon Niebuhr and the same themes applied in chapter three are applied here. Methodologically, the research is now in a position to interpret not only Niebuhr's thought, but also to assess it in relation to the prior interpretation of Dewey. This assessment further enriches the researcher in line with the methodology established in chapter two.

Chapter five focuses upon Morgenthau and employs the same themes as in the previous two chapters. In this chapter, the research is not only positioned to interpret Morgenthau by bringing the researcher's horizon to bear upon Morgenthau's texts, it also able to assess Morgenthau's thought in relation to both Dewey and Niebuhr. At this point, the researcher's horizon has become fully enriched through a fusion of horizons between the three scholars.

Essentially, each engagement with the texts per chapter further enriches the researcher's own horizon in line with the fusion of horizons. By the time the study progresses to chapter six, addressing the research question becomes feasible.

Chapter six outlines how the various threads of the three themes across the three chapters have come together to form a new "tragic Deweyanism". It becomes evident how the fusion of horizons has sufficiently enriched the researcher's horizon, and the research is in a position to illustrate what is produced through this dialogue. Tragic Deweyanism is an answer to the questions posed by grasping the metra of things including the self (theme one) the ethical and political imperatives needed in order to manage such metra (theme two) and to put such priorities into practice in world politics (theme three). The research views tragic Deweyanism as being able to assimilate the realist approaches as hypothetical models which play an important role in Dewey's form of inquiry which is at once pragmatic, inclusive and dialogical as well as consistent with the researcher's understandings of the concept of metra.

Section Three: General Points

Our thesis is that the tragic nature of world politics is best understood using the concept of "metra" or measures. This concept relates to the notion of fundamental limitations to human abilities: both practical and intellectual. The

concept is not exclusively tragedian – one that is derived from Classical Tragedy – however; for analytic purposes it helps explain the central role that "the furies" play in tragedy. Metra is a special kind of boundary, one which is impossible for human beings to cross. There is metra in all things which human beings cannot truly master. For example, our measures are insufficient in terms of our capacity to resolve value conflicts which take place within our own ethical space. In the famous example of the two brothers made by Mervyn Frost, he advances a view of tragedy that leaves open the possibility that ethical dilemmas can become undone as a result of changes in the contingencies that give rise to such dilemmas. The intractability of these sorts of dilemmas is well illustrated (Frost, 2012: 35-39). Frost employs metra as a concept implicitly. In our thesis, we focus on metra and make it explicit in our understandings of tragedy.

The understanding of the metra/measures of things, which can be seen as implicit within Frost's position, is to a very great extent both an enormously significant aspect of tragedy and yet also frequently left implicit. Even in Frost, there is an overemphasis on what is "mutable" in tragedy. As such, the role that tragedy can play in the study of International Relations (IR) is explained as a way of deepening our understanding of dilemmas in the hope that such knowledge may help us resolve them once cultural and historical circumstances have changed. New social practices can reorient and transform social meanings and language, dissolving value antagonisms so that they no longer have any

disruptive ethical impact (Frost, 2012: 35-39). Yet Frost's thesis does not adequately explore either the role that metra plays in tragedy or within contemporary IR debates such as those pertaining to non-positivist Classical Realism, or IR and tragedy.

In our view, metra is of great importance in how we theorise the intellectual capacity of the self. The notion of metra roughly translates into English as measures and denotes a sense of proportions. The measures of the self in terms of its intellectual capacity can be “maxed out” before the self has found answers to questions of supreme importance. That is, the intellect of the self has a certain “ceiling” it cannot exceed owing to its animalistic limitations. Implicit in this thesis is the view that the measures of the self, and indeed of things in general, not only expose the ceiling of human intelligence, but also have epistemological and normative implications for how we theorise world politics. Some of the consequences of human metra/measures are found in the manner in which the self is left ignorant of the answers to questions that cannot be answered owing to the ceiling on the capacity of human beings to exercise their intelligence. In our understanding of tragedy, the central figures of tragedies answer riddles that confront them, only for new harder riddles to emerge subsequently. In the end, the questions prove too hard for human beings to answer. As a consequence, humans must learn to cope with their ignorance and the insecurity which arises from being ignorant of these answers. This is what gives tragedy its bite. In the cases of Oedipus and Antigone, neither figure

could cope emotionally with their ignorance of how to live properly in the situations they found themselves in. Consequently, both became self-destructive. In our view, the central lesson of tragedy is to learn the measures of things and to make choices which are consistent with an understanding of these measures. Therefore, in our view, the self, either in its individual or its collective form, must adapt to its "situation" or suffer the consequences.

On the stage of world politics, international actors must find ways to manage the implications of their ignorance of the answers they need to know. They must also ensure that policy is made consistent with the measures/metra of things, including the self.

As we will demonstrate, the standpoint of Hans J. Morgenthau, to whom our understanding of tragedy in IR is deeply indebted, is consistent with our view of tragedy and how it ought to shape our understanding of how to act on the world stage. In our thesis, we establish, through the application of the hermeneutic methodology and in particular the fusion of horizons, that Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Dewey are all very much alert to the metra/measures of things; and we make this explicit. Our horizon is enriched through our dialogue with these texts which, through our interpretation, also come into dialogue with each other. Through the fusion of horizons, we reach a point where the insights of our three scholars can be analysed simultaneously. In our view, all three scholars can be interpreted as tragedian. Applying Dewey's Classical Pragmatism renders all models of politics into hypotheses which form

part of a grand dialogue involving the widest possible demos. We argue that Deweyanism can assimilate the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian approaches. It is through this assimilation that our perspective is formed – a view that we call Tragic Deweyanism.

Tragedy advocates implicitly that there is no vantage point from which life can be cast either in an optimistic or pessimistic light. We are part of the tragedy of things because we are limited beings with a delimited measure of intelligence and thus confront dilemmas for which there can be no answers arrived at dialogically through human means. Riddles rearrange the meanings expressed in language in such a way as to pose a question requiring a measure of intelligence to arrange them back into an answer. However, where the meanings become so extreme and so in contradiction with each other, the self's measure of intelligence is simply insufficient to rearrange them into an answer. Therefore, the answers to many of life’s hard questions are left unanswerable.

The political and ethical implications of this are that we are reduced to managing the consequences of the self’s ignorance for our social world. Understanding the consequences of our metra/measures on our intelligence suggests political and ethical imperatives do not abandon hope of institutional or political reform, but rather suggest that if such reforms are possible then it must be consistent with an understanding of the self’s delimited intelligence.

By drawing attention to the metra of things, the social scientist is in a position to understand the nature of our tragic existence and thus to advocate an understanding which emphasises the measure and limits of human intelligence as well as the consequences of not grasping the consequences of metra. Overstressing the extent of the measures of human intelligence creates an overly optimistic account, whereas under-emphasising generates a false pessimism. All three scholars studied in this thesis took the world that is grasped to be one constituted by historically and culturally contingent fallible knowledge that understood the metra/measures of the self and its concomitant delimited intelligence.

By examining the impact of metra upon the thought of our three scholars, it is possible to understand how their political and ethical approaches were, in one fashion or another, designed to manage the metra of things. The Morgenthau/Niebuhr iterations of non-positivist realism have much to say about how to manage the consequences of metra in world politics, such as by advocating ethical and political imperatives designed to promote normative values of liberal democracy. Our reading of Dewey similarly advances ideas about how best to manage the consequences of the metra of things. Prosaically, Dewey could be said to advocate the notion that many heads are better than one when it comes to solving ethical and political problems in world politics. However, on closer inspection, our methodology exposes in Deweyan thought a deep concern with the metra of things. Dewey understood the consequences of

our delimited intelligence even if he did not overly emphasise its limits. Thus, when it came to inquiry Dewey understood the importance of engaging the widest number of contributors in a dialogue that aimed at addressing the ends-in-view, i.e. pressing practical and concrete problems of the day. This would be of greater value than reliance upon a dialogue of the few. Dewey is inclusive in terms of his approach. He advocates the aggregation of the fruits of experience, through dialogue, that aims to be inclusive of the widest possible community. On the scale of world politics, the global "demos" becomes part of Dewey's epistemological approach and thus aims to address "the problems of mankind" at the level of supranationalism. The same can be said of Morgenthau, for whom the functionalism of David Mitrany is understood to ideal in modern conditions.

The logic of our thesis is to advance a tragic Deweyanism that looks towards establishing the ethical and political imperatives necessary to cope with the consequences of the metra of things and the delimited measures of the self's intelligence. These imperatives are best managed through an inclusive and productive dialogue with the widest possible demos. Although this does not provide an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of international relations, it does provide a complementary approach which bridges the gap between the IR sub-fields of the IPT tradition (emphasising the centrality of inclusivity) and the Realist tradition of IR (stressing the insufficiencies and limitations of human nature).

As such, we extend and deepen the scope of realism as a normative theory of IR by bringing it into dialogue with the Deweyan approach as we interpret it (employing our hermeneutic methodology) in this thesis.

Chapter one Literature Review:

Section One: Introduction

IPT tradition stresses inclusivity, whereas realism, in particular non-positivist classical realism, stresses the insufficiencies and limitations of human nature. These two traditions meet on the terrain of the tragedy. There is an IR debate which focuses both on human nature as defined by tragedy and the ethical and political questions arising out of this nature. This is an excellent place to build an alternative approach to IR which emphasises inclusivity alongside an understanding of the insufficiencies of human nature and the delimited measure of human intelligence.

In our view, contemporary IR tragedian approaches focus too heavily on the concept of hubris. This is particularly true of Lebow. Such approaches are insufficient in their understanding of tragedy, since they omit a central concept within it: the notion of metra/measures and the downstream consequences of such measures. By focusing on metra we reinvigorate the tragedy and IR debate. We also open up dialogues with IPT standpoints which stress inclusivity, such as the work of John Dewey. Dewey takes an unconventional approach in advancing his of human nature, focusing on the epistemological mutability of assertions about the nature of human beings. Can such an understanding of

human nature be reinterpreted as an understanding of the metra/measures of things? And if this is the case, does Dewey's understanding of the metra of things provide us with an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of international relations?

Our reason for employing Dewey in this thesis is because his thought has been invoked in relation to tragedy in scholarship (see Hook, 1974; Rogers, 2009). To my knowledge, this is not the case with other Classical Pragmatists such as James.

Into dialogue with Dewey we place two (non-positivist) realist scholars who engaged seriously with tragedy and for whom human beings are defined by their insufficiencies: Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. Both of these scholars have well developed ethical and political thought, are concerned with human nature, and have engaged seriously with tragedian thinking. No attempt has thus far been made within the tragedy and IR debate to expose the role of metra/measures in the thought of such realist scholars, still less to put them into dialogue with a pragmatist in the hope of extending realism in a more explicitly ethical (IR) direction.

Section Two: The International Political Tradition and Realism

We begin this section with a brief overview of the nature of the IPT tradition. As Jørgensen argues, Normative IR scholars may not be numerous, but they have formed a "critical mass" and thus have become a tradition in their own right (Jørgensen, 2010: 33, 39). As such, this tradition cannot be overlooked; its contribution to the wider discipline is significant:

> "The contours of a theoretical tradition have emerged on the horizon, characterised by most of the characteristics of an intellectual tradition. The emerging research community engages in reconstruction of the tradition, including reflections attempting to span the classical cannon of political theorists and contemporary issues. Leading exponents of the tradition have imported important strands of thought - for example, cosmopolitanism, liberalism, and communitarianism - from political theory, and they have considered their relevance and usefulness for our understanding of international relations. Furthermore, they engage in enquiries of contemporary issues in world politics, ranging from just war doctrine and humanitarian interventions to international order and justice" (Jørgensen, 2010: 39).

Brown's definition of "normative" International Relations Theory (IPT) is sufficiently broad so as not to exclude realist IR contributions from IPT debates (potential or actual):

> "By normative international relations theory is meant that body of work which addresses the moral dimension of international relations and the wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by the discipline. At its most basic it addresses the ethical nature of the relations between communities/states, whether in the context of the old agenda, which focussed on violence and war, or the new(er) agenda, which mixes these traditional concerns with the modern demand for international distributive justice" (Brown, 1992: 3).

Nor does Cochran's definition of IPT exclude realism: IPT research, he argues, often takes place through "moral-philosophical reasoning about right and wrong". This creates "ideal-theoretical" conceptions and reasoning against which we may judge international life (Cochran, 2016: 85). This literature, furthermore, creates a resource to make "a set of systematic reflections on the normative or ethical dimensions that are present in other theoretical traditions" (Jørgensen, 2010: 33).

With this in mind, we can see that IPT is broad enough in terms of the definition of the field to include realism as part of its framework. However, despite this, realism is largely seen as the straw-man against which IPT stands. Indeed, developments in the field of the study of realism and realist ethics have yet to encourage a reconsideration on the part of IPT theorists or its incorporation into the tradition. Thus, the general antipathy towards realism from within the IPT tradition remains.

Such an exclusion is unwarranted. For many non-positivist realists, such as Niebuhr or Morgenthau, there is considerable importance attached to questions of international ethics and normative matters in general. Indeed, realism in general has built thematic equivalents to debates that happen within the field of Political Theory in International Relations (Jørgensen, 2010: 33). The suggestion that realism does not concern itself with ethics is repudiated by the volume of research illustrating how realist scholarship engages with ethical questions (see: Bell, 2009; Cox, 2007; Dienstag, 2009; Frost, 2012; Lebow, 2003; Lebow, 2007; Lebow, 2009; Lebow, 2012; Turner, 2009; Lang, 2007; Little, 2007; Molloy, 2006; Murray, 1997; Neacsu, 2010; Scheuerman, 2009; Scheuerman, 2010; Rengger, 2012; Williams, 2007). Intra-Realist debates frequently reflect themes such as what is just/unjust, good/evil, valid/invalid, right/wrong at the international level (Jørgensen, 2010: 33). Therefore, the sharp distinction often drawn between the realist tradition of International Relations and the International Political Theory tradition is unjustified.

Indeed, the supposed incommensurability between these traditions has broken down in recent years as more research is conducted into Realism's ethical dimension. These boundaries were historically never as sharply defined as they seemed. Historical scholarship maintained a keen interest in world politics long before the development of International Relations as a unique and separate discipline, and it was within this scholarship that discussions pertaining

to the ethics of realism arose (see: Behr, 2010; Boucher, 1998; Keene, 2005). The ethics of realism has a very long history. This reflects the dimension of political thought which takes seriously the intellectual and ethical insufficiencies of human beings, and aims to advocate ethical positions which adequately manage the consequences of these limitations.

However, more jaundiced views as to the relevance of ethics in realism remain very much evident. The long-standing view advances Machiavellian-Hobbesian stereotypes that affirms the priority of power politics over ethics. This branch of scholarship posits profound doubts about the mitigating effect of ethics upon the exercise of power politics (see: Beitz, 1979: 15; Coady, 2008: 54-55; Walker, 1993: 32).

This long-standing view of realism arises in part because of the contributions of certain important International Political Theorists such as Charles Beitz. Indeed, Beitz is typical in his view of realism. Using Hans Morgenthau's realism as a template, Beitz argues that realism represents a cynical and non-normative approach that echoes the amorality of Niccolo Machiavelli (Beitz, 1979: 20-21). Generally speaking, Betiz views realism as intrinsically sceptical of ethics. As a mitigating factor to the exercise of power, ethics is understood to have minimal impact. Morgenthau is presented as an anti-ethical theorist when nothing could be further from the truth (Beitz, 1979: 15).

This long-standing view is further reinforced by the scholarship of Rob Walker, for whom Morgenthau offers little more than "banalities" regarding the nature of world politics. In Walker's view, Morgenthau's thought advances positivistic ideas which likewise aim at the full insulation of politics from ethics (Walker, 1993: 32, 119, 180). Even the highly influential IR ethical theorist Chris Brown juxtaposes the ethical and supposedly "legitimate" Communitarian standpoint against the supposedly amoral realist for whom the outcomes of world politics can be expressed as the consequences of the exercise of might (Brown, 1992: 66-67). Similarly, even the more sympathetic view of Morgenthau advanced by Molly Cochran, which acknowledges Morgenthau's advocacy of an ethic of responsibility, still finds his approach to lie outside the field of International Politics. For Cochran, realism's ethical stance is best understood as a preference for the alignment of national interests between states, something she argues falls short of a genuine ethical theory of International Relations (Cochran, 2016: 92).

Consequently, given the privileged position that the long-standing view of realism holds in International Political Thought, no amount of research into the ethical dimensions of realism has so far been able to challenge the conventional view. It holds, therefore, that if we desire to see IPT find space for some form of realism in IPT ethical debates, then we require a standpoint which extends the depth and scope of realism as a normative approach to IR.

In this thesis, we intend to develop such an approach. And in the following sections, we assess further how a leading IPT theorist, Cochran, who adopts a pragmatist view of international ethics, succeeds in transcending IPT heritage approaches, such as cosmopolitanism, through the development of a dialogical and inclusivist approach to IR. However, notwithstanding its accomplishments, such an approach still does not adequately grasp the implications of human insufficiencies. As such, we argue that a gap opens up in this literature which embraces both a pragmatist view of dialogue and inclusivity (which we take to be an advance upon the heritage IPT approaches) as well as a more "tragic vision" of world politics. This is fruitful to our wider purposes because of the historical engagement of realism with tragedy, such as in the theories of Morgenthau and Niebuhr.

Section Three: The Importance of the Notion of Inclusivity within International Political Theory; from Cochran to Tragedy?

IPT scholars are united by the fact that they are all engaged in a field that strives to create "shared principles for extending moral inclusion and social reconstruction in international practice" (Cochran, 1999: 2). Indeed, as Cochran argues, the goal of IPT in a discreet and principled sense is to strive towards and

defend inclusion as an ethical principle and outcome in international practice (Cochran, 1999: xix). The practical impact of such a definition is that it shapes the conception of the purpose inherent within the IPT tradition. Moreover, IPT theories can be judged as to whether or not they advance this overall goal. Thus, if a theory does not meet this goal it ought not to be considered within the boundaries of the tradition. Were we to develop a realist approach which is more firmly located within this tradition, it would hold that such an approach would foreground the principle of inclusion as well as dialogue in a manner not that dissimilar to Cochran's own position.

Cochran's thesis is perhaps more radical than the mainstream approaches within IPT insofar as she argues from an epistemological perspective that the conceptual frameworks within IPT advance "universalising tendencies" which do harm by restricting dialogue with those who might conceive of ethics differently (Cochran, 1999: xix). Cochran's conception of IPT foregrounds the principle of inclusivity at the epistemological level and in turn exposes the limitations of various standpoints in light of that principle.

The great significance for IPT of Cochran's contribution is the extent to which she grasps the typology of the various standpoints within the field, and in turn shows how these approaches are epistemologically impregnated with "universalising tendencies" which underline their limitations as ethical approaches. In Cochran's view, such tendencies indicate an unwillingness to engage in what we suggest could be called dialogical openness when engaging

with identities grounded in distinctly different socio-historical and cultural worlds; the net effect being that such righteousness creates "possibilities for oppression and moral exclusion" (Cochran, 1999: xix).

Cochran's approach, which she describes as pragmatic, does succeed, however, in stressing how dialogue is central to inclusive international ethics. For Cochran, her "pragmatic" approach puts her in a position to examine her own cultural and historical contingencies as well as to expose how various ethical commitments and positions retain a measure of value even though they are grasped as contingent positions (Cochran, 1999: 273). Understanding the diversity of ethical positions in world politics requires an approach sensitive enough to grasp such diversity but not so sensitive as to undermine any ethical priority on the part of any one agent (Cochran, 1999: 278, 279). The key is to engage openly and in a spirit of acceptance and consolidation of norms so that a shared ethical world becomes possible.

We maintain that Cochran's contribution is very significant in terms of IPT insofar as it departs from the sort of ideal-theorisation found amongst scholars such as Beitz or Frost. It also retains a level of abstraction needed in order to speak coherently about ethics. Cochran's turn towards a more sustained discussion of the epistemology of international ethical views is farsighted and provides a renewed way of thinking about ethical questions that is inherently pragmatic, dialogical and inclusive. By exposing how the sensitivities of diverse ethical and normative standpoints are often excluded from mainstream IPT,

Cochran illustrates how pragmatism contrasts favourably with heritage approaches.

However, in a review of Cochran's work, Hutchings argues that Cochran's approach is contradictory insofar as she stresses the need for inclusivity and respecting the sensitivities of various ethical views while at the same time calling for power political and institutional reform at the level of world politics (Hutchings, 2000: 309). The only way in which such things could occur simultaneously is if an "optimistic reading of history" were to be correct (Hutchings, 2000: 310). We would put this in a different way: Cochran underplays the finiteness and insufficiencies of the self in relation to its capacity to generate shared ethical priorities amongst ethical traditions however diverse they are. There are limits to the extent to which moral imagination or dialogical-engagement can put us in a position to unify around shared normative priorities.

Such an approach lacks a "tragic vision" of life or world politics. Although a form of pragmatism based on dialogue and inclusiveness is desirable in principle owing to the advance that such an approach offers to IPT, it is profoundly lacking in its omission of tragedy from its theorisation.

A "tragic vision" of life, which stresses the need to learn our measures and the implications of our human insufficiencies, includes being able to reconcile differing accounts of what is right or good, (Mayall, 2012: 45; Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). It is completely unwarranted to engage in ethical

theorisation without a keen alertness about such limitations. Tragedy cannot be overlooked – and as Chris Brown argues passionately, IPT scholars such as Beitz entirely overlook the possibility that their normative theorising may involve contradictions within their shared ethical space (Brown, 2012: 82-83):

> "What to me, is important, is that we do not adopt Agamemnon's solution to this dilemma and turn our backs on the tragic element of human existence. Instead, an awareness of tragedy ought to cause us to act modestly, to be aware of our limitations and to be suspicious of grand narratives of salvation which pretend that there are no tragic choices to be made" (Brown 2012: 83).

Although perhaps not grand narratives, scholars like Walker, Beitz and Cochran typically involve themselves in the advancement of ethical and political priorities which do not engage in tragic reflections. The suggested priorities are not qualified by the context of contending values. They also fail to stress the insufficiencies of the self as tragedy does and as would seem to be warranted in a human existence defined by finiteness.

As such, tragedy is a necessary part of ethical reflection. Thus, in order to address the limitations of Cochran's otherwise excellent thesis, tragedy must play a role in the development of a form of pragmatism which is dialogical and inclusive if it is to address what is missing from this approach: i.e. an adequate appreciation of the insufficiencies of the self and the consequences of those

limitations for the realisation of ethics. Only then can its reliance upon an optimistic reading of history be overcome.

Section Four: A Metra-focused Tragic Vision vs IR Tragedy

A significant gap in the IPT literature is found in the absence of a dialogue between approaches which are similar to Cochran's, i.e. pragmatic, dialogical, inclusivist and tragedian approaches to IR such as those advanced by Niebuhr or Morgenthau. In our view, contemporary tragedian approaches, such as those advanced by Richard Ned Lebow, are deficient in a very important aspect. They are either: (a) hubris-centred accounts, or they stress the value conflicts within one's own ethical space, i.e. between good and good, but without adequately making it explicit that human insufficiencies prompt such conflicts; (b) they advance an understanding that tragedy serves an instrumental purpose in enabling the possibility that the consequences of human limitations can be transcended. In both these cases, they stand in contrast to an understanding of tragedy that focuses upon the metra of things and, in particular, the metra of the self. We explain below what we mean by metra. It is sufficient now simply to state that contemporary IR tragedy is lacking a rigorous examination of the role of this very important tragedian concept.

Lebow (2003), has found it advantageous to build a renewed form of Classical Realism upon the terrain of a "tragic vision" of politics. However,

such an approach excessively emphasises the centrality of hubris and omits a discussion of metra/measures even though such a concept is central to many understandings of tragedy.

In this section we discuss the notion of metra in more detail before moving onto explaining how it is that such a concept is missing from contemporary tragedian accounts within IR.

In our understanding, tragedy is tied together with a series of constituent concepts. At the centre of these concepts is the notion of "metra". Metra, for Saxonhouse, represents a certain kind of limitation or boundary that marks out what human beings can or cannot do using the instruments of their own intellectual, and specifically rational, capabilities (Ahrensdorf, 2011: 7; Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272).

A better definition is provided by Raymond Prier, who does not address tragedy directly but does provide an understanding of the linguistic and cultural environment in which the notion of metra existed prior to its incorporation into tragedy. That is, Prier helps us understand the cultural context of tragedy, a context where the notion of metra was well known. Prier argues that the notion arises as early as Homer, Heraclitus and Pindar, and that it describes initially a holistic term that relates to a sense of completion or culmination of something (Prier, 1976: 161). The sense is that there are full measures (metron) of something or a full measure (metra) of things that can be proportioned by the self through their own judgement of what those proportions are (Prier, 1976:

162). In Hesiod, the metra is manifested as measures "of the loud-roaring sea" (Prier, 1976: 164). These measures are not exogenous to the self, but are noetic and exist as a means of managing the phenomena which impact upon life (Prier, 1976: 166-169). Therefore, metron/metra can be conceived of as either a bounded sum or a completed sum, a measure or proportioned thing, and its manifestation is a reflection of the mind's judgement through which such measuring takes place.

To bring this back to tragedy, there is an association of justice or a just measure that takes place between agents as they determine legitimate exchange, such as gifts or punishment (Slatkin, 2003: 43). The measures become just measures, or fair measures that are due to be exchanged or not depending upon what is appropriate (Slatkin, 2003: 44-45). This association of metra and their just observation has considerable impact insofar as there are very serious implications to overstepping them (Prier, 1976: 165). The implication is that we ought to know our measures and, if we do, then we can act wisely (Prier, 1976: 165). Metaphorically, (although the Greeks understood this literally and cosmologically) the vengeful and dark spirits known as the "furies" intervene in order to uphold the just measures of things (metra) – consequently, metra are not things to be "overstepped" (Prier, 1976: 165; Slatkin, 2003: 26). The fate of tragic heroes are linked, furthermore, to the furies and the consequences of metra.

For Saxonhouse, the relationship between tragedy and metra becomes more explicit when the tragic poet Sophocles warns his audience that the furies will enforce the metra of things (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). Reason is particularly prone to overstepping the metra of things if left unchecked and relied upon by political actors striving to radically transform things or arrange them out of their pre-existing patterns, i.e. tyrants in the Greek sense of the term (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272).

This "trailblazing" study of Sophocles' political thought identifies how agents are not in control of their situations even if they believe they have a rational grip upon them (Ahrensdorf, 2011: 6, 7; Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). Metra cannot be escaped from or conquered because it represents concrete boundaries and limitations upon the aspirations of those who strive to put reason to use in transforming the world (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1272). If we assess these two general views of metra, then we can see how they are more similar than different. Although Saxonhouse stresses how limits are overstepped by the tyrant's excessive reliance upon reasoning, this view is congruent with the notion of metra as proportioned just measures. Wisdom in both cases arises from an understanding of the measures of things.

These definitions give us a conception of measures which can be applied to the notion of the self. The self has measures as well. Indeed, the self is defined both in terms of having the potential to act justly, but also by being insufficient in relation to certain aspects of life. The metra of the self is perhaps

the most tragic dimension of life insofar as we learn that we have limitations, both material and intellectual (noetic). Further, not only can we fail to adequately know the metra of things, as in the case of Oedipus, we can also fail to find answers to questions that require them, such as in the case of Antigone.

Hubris is the retrospective realisation that the tragic hero has overstepped the metra of things and thus is struck down by the furies. It is not something which can be avoided, and it arises when the metra of things is not grasped sufficiently. Respecting the metra of things is critical to best coping with the implications of the self's insufficiencies.

To refocus on metra exposes contemporary IR tragedian approaches as having an inadequate grasp of tragedy as a manifestation of the self's insufficiencies. Perhaps the most important scholar to engage with IR and tragedy, as well as to fall into the trap of understanding hubris to be arrogance rather than a retrospective grasping of where measures were transcended, is Richard Ned Lebow. Indeed, Lebow's "tragic vision" of politics has a number of limitations, such as problematically suggesting how to realise "progress" (i.e. Western liberal progress) through the wisdom that tragedy seems to teach. Tragedy does not "teach" so much as illustrate the implications of human insufficiencies. Tragedy provides no lessons, but it does help explain and enable the audience to grasp life and the limits of the self intellectually and materially.

Lebow stresses the role of hubris in tragedy (Lebow, 2012: 64). Lebow conceives of tragedy in such a way that the political actor is taken to be

somehow at fault for his own arrogance and in some way to blame for his own dénouement (Lebow, 2012: 65). Miscalculation/hamartia are exposed by the arrogance of agents buoyed up by their own accomplishments. However, owing to the epistemological complexities of tragedy, it is not the fault of a tragic hero that they suffer, since there was no other way to act given the information available to them in the tragic scenario. Oedipus's hubris is regrettable, but it is not avoidable. That the metra of things were overstepped is not in doubt, but it was not the fault of Oedipus, who could not have known that such a situation had unfolded. Lebow's language implies the language of fault, as if hubris is something that can be avoided so long as certain balances are maintained (Lebow, 2012: 70). However, as Euben argues, it is glory, not humility, which drives Greek customs. As such, it is not a sin to be proud, since it is pride which enlivens the world and brings about great accomplishments such as those of Oedipus (Euben, 2012: 89). Tragedy alerts the audience to the limits of the self and its intellect and the importance of grasping the just measures of things as well as not overstepping them where possible. It is not there to assign fault; this would miss the point of exposing limitations. Arrogance can be overcome but our limitations and insufficiencies cannot be.

Lebow recruits Thucydidies to make his hubris-focused argument. Thucydides is read as a tragedian and as proffering great wisdom which ought to be engaged with today; the hope of world peace may well be advanced by engagement with this ancient scholar (Lebow, 2001: 547-560; Lebow, 2003:

chapters 2, 3; Lebow, 2012: 69). Moreover, Lebow's Thucydides provides an account of the rise and fall of Athens that stresses the arrogance of Athenians and the role of hubris in their tragedy (Lebow, 2003: 116-117; 41, 116, 124-125). Hubris is identified with the Athenian repudiation of pan-Hellenic norms, which might confer some measure of legitimacy upon their imperialism, as well as the naked and arrogant projection of power (Lebow, 2003: 41, 116, 124-125). Therefore, Lebow's account stresses the wisdom of anti-hubris, understood as a need to cloak imperial ambitions within societal norms which establish the legitimacy of the polis in question. An imperial polis such as Athens ought not to miscalculate its position, but arrogance can lead to such miscalculation.

Tragedy, however, exposes the measures of things and the implications of the self's limits. It does not, in our view, suggest that were tragic heroes to cohere their interests with the ethics of a particular society then this would be sufficient to avoid hubris. Oedipus and Antigone are people of conscience and it is this concern for shared ethics and norms which drives their emotional distress and suffering. They were most certainly trying to act within the framework of socially normative ethics of Hellenic society; circumstances, however, did not permit them to act in this manner. Tragedy does not teach that pride cometh before the fall.

A tragic vision that centres upon metra might well discuss the extent to which Athenians overstepped their metra and thus suffered a defeat at the hands

of Sparta. Such a vision would imply that Athens should have more adequately grasped its metra and understood its limitations.

Lebow's vision, in contrast, emphasises how arrogance is the driving force behind what he describes as a "cycle" whereby hubris occasions a sequence of outcomes ending in nemesis or catastrophe (Lebow, 2012: 65). The ethical priority for Lebow is to create an "antidote" to hubris and thus transcend the tragic condition itself (Lebow, 2012: 66). This is, in our view, not consistent with a tragedian understanding of life or human existence. Tragedy is, in these hubris-centred approaches, reduced to an instrument through which liberal notions of international progress are advanced. Our account of metra, by contrast, equips the IR theorist with an understanding of tragedy that is consistent with human insufficiencies. Our question ought to be how best to grasp the metra of things, rather than how to avoid hamartia.

It would be wrong to argue that Lebow's tragic vision is unaware of the metra of things, but such an awareness is advanced as a resource in order to help advance liberal progress in world politics. Moreover, Lebow does not advocate an understanding of the need to grasp and manage "the irremediable, ineluctable, inescapable" parts of life (Nietzsche in: Frei 2001: 187). By contrast, Lebow argues that his tragic vision can provide some kind of 'antidote to hubris' through a process of balancing that he associates with the concept of sophrosunē (Lebow 2012: 70):

> "If thoughtful Greeks could observe our world, and rethink their understanding of the human conditions in light of modern conditions and possibilities, they might conclude that the golden mean – the medan agan, so central to their approach to life – describes a position somewhere between ancient acceptance and modern activism. If so, it would find expression in cautious hopes for progress, tempered by awareness of the dangers of forgetting the inherent limitations of human beings" (Lebow, 2012: 70).

Consequently, progress can employ an "awareness" of the metra of the self as a resource to undermine such limitations. Other checks upon the consequences of human limitations that Lebow provides include the notion of shared social norms. Athenian ascendency, for Lebow, is something contingent upon self-restraint and exercising power in accordance with clearly defined 'social conventions' governing the behaviour and language of the Greeks (Erskine and Lebow, 2012b: 206). Thucydides, for Lebow:

> "finds that nomos – a concept that also encompasses values, norms, expectations and obligations embedded in relationships – shapes identities and channels and restrains the behaviour of individuals or societies" (Lebow, 2003: 117).

A secure and prosperous society depends upon social and ethical conventions that are built up and maintained through reasoning and intelligence (Lebow, 2003: 41). These checks upon the consequences of the metra of the self put the liberal activist in a position to advance progress in world politics. This,

however, misses the point of tragedy which explains that the metra of things cannot be transcended through elaborate checks upon the consequences of such insufficiencies. A metra-centred tragic vision would stress the importance of understanding the measures of things and of the self and aiming to exercise wisdom in light of the possibility that such measures may not be known to the agent.

There are elements of Lebow's thought that we agree with in terms of his account of the implications of human limitations even if Lebow argues that such implications can be checked by things like shared social norms or self-awareness. Lebow is correct to argue that the political agent which views itself as unchecked by limitations eventually comes to believe themselves to have the same eminence as divine beings (Lebow, 2012: 64). The consequences of not grasping the metra of the self for the political agent is thus that political successes, such as those in foreign policy, act to simulate excessive confidence in one's abilities. This leads to over-confidence and hubris (Lebow, 2012: 64):

> "Hubris is manifest as over-confidence in one's own judgement and ability to control events. It encourages leaders and followers to mistake temporary ascendency for a permanent state of affairs" (Lebow 2012: 64).

In this interpretation of Thucydides, Athens makes strategic miscalculations, hamartia, which reveal how the qualities of "cleverness, self-

confidence, forethought, decisiveness, initiative and risk taking" become the very fuel of over-confidence and an unwarranted lust for power (Lebow, 2007: 406):

> "For Pericles, and the citizens of Athens, success stimulates the appetite for further success while blinding them to the attendant risks" (Lebow, 2007: 2034).

For Lebow, Thucydides is seen to provide an account of hubris concomitant with hamartia, i.e. miscalculation arising from the seductive effect, atē, of power (Lebow, 2007: 407). This is consistent with a metra-focused account of tragedy insofar as the agent is revealed to have a certain self-destroying dynamic deriving from an ignorance of the metra of things. This is the case for Oedipus.

The TIR debate, however, goes beyond the work of Lebow. This is a broad outline of the debate between Rengger, Frost and Mayall. Rengger has described the debate between James Mayall and Mervyn Frost as one where Frost is presented as "too progressive, optimistic and teleological" and Mayall as overemphasizing the tragic in international affairs (Rengger, 2005: 321). Mayall defends himself against this by arguing that tragedy has its uses in the moderating of arrogance, hubris, and progressive thought; the obstacles to the progress that Frost desires are greater than he supposes (Rengger, 2005: 321). Rengger argues that although Frost may resist the notion of a tragic reality, he would nonetheless agree with Mayall and Lebow that "the real importance of

tragic vision is that it allows us to understand our situation better and learn from this so that we can make it better still" (Rengger, 2005: 323).

Rengger goes on to argue that Morgenthau may not have viewed tragedy in this way (Rengger, 2005: 323). In Rengger's view, Morgenthau did not think that tragedy could be used for the purposes suggested by Frost, Mayall and Lebow, since Morgenthau's pessimism ran deeper than these thinkers. Lebow, for instance, contends that reflexive awareness of tragedy can create positive feedback and therefore escape its worst excesses (Rengger, 2005: 324).

These IR theorists kept alive the important role that tragedy can play in IR, even inspiring an IR and tragedy debate in recent decades. This debate, which has largely bookended, suggests a kind of progress-enabling and liberal tragic understanding within IR. Rengger argues that the recent IR debate about the notion of tragedy began with Mayall and Frost and mostly concerned the manner in which overly progress-enabling approaches to world politics may not be fully aware of the limitations that exist in regard to the realisation of international progress (Rengger, 2012: 53).

For Rengger, the views of Mayall and Frost on tragedy do not undermine their commitment to the view that there are substantial possibilities for the realisation of a normative and ethical order in the international system/international society to a greater (Frost) or lesser (Mayall) degree (Rengger, 2012: 53). Rengger holds that what unites scholars of tragedy and IR,

such as Mayall, Frost, and Richard Ned Lebow, is their emphasis on how a "tragic vision" serves as an enabler for social learning; the very experience of repeating cycles of tragedy occasions opportunities to enrich our learning and make us better placed to meet future challenges (Rengger, 2012: 57). As Rengger argues, Mayall, Frost and Lebow draw upon tragedy in the hope that the insights that tragedy proffers may enable a greater realisation of liberal progress in world politics than would be possible were we to remain in ignorance of these insights.

Frost argues that tragedy, and in particular the insights generated by the application of the tragic concept of the agon to the ethical questions of international relations, provides insights that help normative theorists to deepen their understanding of ethical problems in international practice (Frost, 2012: 32). The agon is for Frost a defining feature of tragedy: its value is found in the way in which it exposes how the realisation of certain, broadly speaking, "normative" values frequently come at the expense of another privileged value within the identity of the normative actor (Frost, 2012: 28). Indeed, Antigone found herself "part of an agon among fractious and divided systems of signification" (Honig, 2013: 2). Frost argues that normative theorists can employ a deeper understanding of the tragic agon – that is, the inherent contradiction between positive ethical and moral values – in order to better identify value conflicts as well as deepening our understanding of these conflicts (Frost, 2012: 32):

> "It alerts us to the relationships that hold between an actor, the wider society within which he or she is constituted as an actor of a certain kind, ethics and the consequences of his or her acts" (Frost, 2012: 32).

Thus, tragedy brings into focus which 'social formations' constitute value conflicts and thereby, implies Frost, puts modern human beings into a position to transform such formations and hence potentially dissolve the value conflict (Frost, 2012: 41-42). Such qualified optimism is echoed by Mayall insofar as his position accords with Lebow's emphasis upon social learning (Reggner, 2012: 57).

Indeed, Mayall argues that although tragedy may best explain certain parts of international relations, these relations take place within the institutional setting of an international society (Mayall, 2012: 51). Mayall argues that there is an opposition between the idea of progress on the one hand and tragedy (with its attendant value conflicts) on the other. However, his position remains that the hubris of progress can be diagnosed by tragedy and cured by the "antidote" of tragedy (Mayall, 2012: 45). Like Frost, Mayall is arguing that tragedy can be a path towards a form of progress defined by anti-hubris, but a better form of progress nonetheless (Mayall, 2012: 45). These liberal and progress-enabling tragic visions, however, are not metra-focused tragedian. Prosaically, they are liberal constructivists who aim to extract tragic insights from various sources

and employ them instrumentally as a conceptual tool kit designed for modern IR scholars who seek to realise their ethical priorities.

Tragedy does not teach, let alone provide enlightened roadmaps to more progressive liberal ethical outcomes. The modern progress-enabling liberal constructivists, such as Lebow and Frost, miss the point of tragedy entirely from the perspective of a tragic vision that focuses upon the metra of things; some measures of which cannot be transcended. As Morgenthau wrote in his letter to Oakeshott, tragedy is a dimension of life (Rengger, 2012: 59). Ethical and political imperatives and priorities must be consistent with an awareness of the metra of things including the self, not to transcend such limitations but rather to reflect such measures within such normative views.

Section Five: dialogue between a standpoint which is pragmatic, inclusivist, and dialogical and IR realist approaches which engage with tragedy

In this literature review we have identified three gaps in the IR/IPT/realist literatures: (a) that there is in pragmatism great value in terms of an approach which is inclusivist and dialogical, and that the contribution of Cochran to IPT has been significant in introducing pragmatism into IPT. However, pragmatism, as it is understood in Cochran, suffers from an optimistic understanding of history. The application of a tragic vision of politics would address this

shortfall; (b) that the existing tragedian approaches in contemporary IR either focus upon hubris as the central concept of tragedy or in general advance a view of tragedy that conceives of the metra of things as something to be transcended through social learning. There is a need to revive the tragedy and IR debate by focusing it upon the notion of metra/measures which in many cases cannot be overcome; (c) there is, further, a need to address the absence of a more developed realist ethical standpoint within IPT.

We in this thesis therefore aim to address these three lacunae simultaneously through a dialogue between a pragmatist approach, which stresses inclusivity and dialogue, and realist approaches which have engaged seriously with tragedy. These realist approaches must not view the limitations and insufficiencies of things or the self as things which could be overcome. The pragmatist approach must also have some notion of the limits of things.

On the latter point, the thought of John Dewey would serve well insofar as it is heavily dialogical and inclusivist. Indeed, it has been already been noted by two eminent Deweyan scholars that there are "tragic" dimensions to his thought (see Hook, 1974; Rogers, 2009: 187). This would suggest a more fruitful dialogue than using James or Peirce.

As for the realists, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr have been said to have tragedian approaches to world politics (Frost, 2012: 22-23). At the very least these approaches advance an understanding of human limitations and a strong view that such limitations cannot be transcended. These two meet our

requirements because they are considered realists, in particular Classical Realists, and they engage with and produce tragic accounts of world politics.

Our dialogue between these three scholars is therefore manifested as a need to address the three gaps in the literature that we have examined. An alternative understanding of the nature of world politics is needed, an approach which extends the scope and depth of realism as a normative theory of IR (an International Political Theory) through a dialogue with John Dewey's pragmatism. In order to create a dialogue between these three scholars that also meets our need to better address the concept of the metra of things in relation to tragedy, we advance a research question that addresses this need throughout the thesis. Our research question is thus: to what extent can Deweyan pragmatism, in particular Dewey's understanding of the "metra" of things, provide an alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the "tragic" nature of International Relations?

This research question implies that our analysis of John Dewey will examine the extent to which his thought does indeed cohere with our understanding of the metra of things and the metra of the self. Following such an examination, the dialogue with the two scholars will put us in a situation where we are able to establish the extent to which Dewey's approach does indeed provide an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of world politics. As Dewey's approach is pragmatic, inclusive and dialogical, it falls within the boundaries of IPT. If it can be demonstrated that it provides an

account of metra, through which an alternative understanding of the tragic nature of world politics can be constituted, then such an approach would not only bridge the gap between realism and pragmatism, it would also create a realist-type approach which could push deeper within the field of IPT.

Chapter Two: Hermeneutic Methodology

Section One: Advancing a Richer Understanding Through a Fusion of Horizon

In this section, we articulate a number of hermeneutic concepts which will be employed instrumentally to aid interpretation of the standpoints (texts) we critically analyse. The interpretation that we constitute will become increasingly enriched throughout our analysis and thus represents the enrichment of our horizon. In this way we show our workings, so to speak, and put the reader in a position to understand how our enriched horizon is reached as well as to grasp the end product of this process of cultivation. Our thesis is one of enriching our horizons through the interpretation of the texts. Our methodology is inspired by the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-George Gadamer, although our own approach does not map directly onto his thought as we will explain in this chapter.

In our view, hermeneutics is an excellent approach for understanding the relationship between texts (as part of language) and how the interpreter manifests the language practices inherent within life (Palmer, 1969: 205, 207). Language is a central concept within hermeneutics insofar as it conceives of the

world linguistically (Palmer, 1969: 205, 207). Gadamer offers us an alternative methodological view to orthodox empiricist approaches as well as one consistent with our method of an enriching horizon of understanding (Gadamer, 2013: xx):

> "Even from its historical beginnings, the problem of hermeneutics goes beyond the limits of the concept of method as set by modern science, but obviously belongs to human experience of the world in general. The hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of method at all. It is not concerned with a method of understanding by means of which texts are subjected to scientific investigation like all other objects of experience. It is not concerned primarily with amassing verified knowledge, such as would satisfy the methodological ideal of science – yet it too is concerned with knowledge and truth" (Gadamer 2013: xx).

In other words, the hermeneutic approach has an open epistemological view, and conceives of the hermeneutic phenomenon (i.e. understanding itself) as something which can include natural scientific knowledge but does not restrict itself to just this knowledge or truth.

Gadamer's approach to questions of 'truth' and the interpretive method owes much to his long engagement with a variety of philosophical traditions that can make the trajectory of his thought difficult to discern (Wachterhauser, 1999: 1-2; Warnke, 1987: 1-4). Indeed, Gadamer would seem to advance the

general view that the depth of understanding of a particular subject-matter is a measure of the quality of the interpretation (Schmidt, 2006: 95-97). Moreover, Gadamer is skeptical of ahistorical views that ignore how interpretations are situated within historical contingencies (Schmidt, 2006: 98). Nevertheless, in spite of this commitment to the principle that there is no theory-independent knowledge, Gadamer does advance an understanding of truth that leans towards ontological realism (Wachterhauser, 1999: 59)

Gadamer's hermeneutics makes the ontological argument that there are essences which are integrated within the mind with thought and its manifestation of language (Wachterhauser, 1999: 57):

> "For Gadamer, these realities do not change in themselves. In this respect these noetic realities are like Platonic Ideas. But our grasp of them changes as history gives us access to some different, highly variegated side of them. These realities are what they are apart from our apprehension of them but their "look" varies, their appearances in time are widely varied. Nevertheless, a limited, finite grasp of them is possible through interpretation even though that interpretation can never claim to be timeless, eternal, definitive, or exhaustive" (Wachterhauser 1999: 57).

Gadamer, who considered himself to be a Platonist, embraces the notion of "truth of being" occurring in "the ideality of language" (Gadamer, 2013: 118; Wachterhauser, 1999: xi). Indeed, essences occur

not in a domain external to language, but rather in language itself (Wachterhauser, 1999: 59):

> "Gadamer is an 'essentialist' of a nonconventional sort in that he insists that real essences are not to be found outside language but in language. Nevertheless, such essences are not mere language. Hermeneutic, for Gadamer, is not a nominalist enterprise. Despite the emphasis on the Sprachlichkeit der Sachen selbst, these things have an ideality that is not reducible to words. Consistent with his Platonic roots, Gadamer remains a metaphysical realist" (Wachterhauser, 1999: 59).

However, we are not persuaded of the need to embrace an ontologically realist standpoint. The hermeneutic position that Gadamer develops is comprehensively linguistic in its understanding of the world. In this thesis, we aim to remain consistent with this dimension of Gadamer's approach, even if this is a departure from his wider thought. This is why we describe our methodology as being inspired by Gadamerian philosophy rather than being fully representative of it. The "essences" that Gadamer speaks of are thus, in this thesis, understood to be contingent and limited "truth-claims" that indicate our ontological-normative priorities.

Gadamer captures how the interpreter "grasps" (reaches an understanding of) those things with which we come into contact; and for Gadamer this grasping represents a truth-event (Wachterhauser, 1999:

24). In our hermeneutic approach, by contrast, we conceive of grasping as an event of understanding. This event of understanding occurs through a process of interpretation that draws our own horizon into the horizon presented by the texts.

Gadamer views language as a central concept within hermeneutics insofar as it conceives of the world as a linguistic construct. In this view, language is a mechanism for the disclosure of the world (Palmer, 1969: 205, 207). In contrast, we consider language to disclose our interpretation of the world as consistent with our own horizons.

However, there remain many aspects of Gadamer's thought that we continue to draw upon in the development of our methodology. For example, we adopt the Gadamarian notion of the fusion of horizons in order to build our thesis of enriching our understanding of the texts we analyse.

We argue, along with Gadamer and Palmer, that hermeneutics is a "transpersonal" approach which conceives of the notion of the "world" to be "seen as between persons. It is the shared understanding between persons, and the medium of this understanding" (Palmer, 1969: 205-206, 206). Furthermore, this experience is something which "occurs in and through" language (Palmer, 1969: 207).

The difference between our approach and orthodox naturalism is that we do not regard experience as somehow prior to language, but rather as something

that also happens within language itself (Palmer, 1969: 207). It is in language that the self is constituted and it is through the experience of language that the self "grasps" the world. Moreover, it is in the medium of thought that understanding is obtained (Gadamer, 2013: xxi). Much like Thomas Kuhn, for whom there is also no language-independent account of reality, Gadamer understands interpretations of what is real to be rooted in the situations of the interpreter (Warnke, 1987: 77).

Central to our hermeneutic approach is the concept of horizons and the fusion of horizons. Gadamer's reflections on horizons are central to our understanding of the concept in this thesis (Dostal, 2002: 3):

> "The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizons, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth". (Gadamer, 2013: 313).

Gadamer continues:

> "A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, "to have a horizon" means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it. A person who has a horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small" (Gadamer, 2013: 313).

We interpret these quotes to mean that a horizon represents a field of vision containing meanings that we employ in order to make sense of and grasp our world. It is within our horizon that our pre-judgements or prejudices are found, and these are understood in a positive sense to make understanding possible.

Prejudices in hermeneutics are not controversial, rather they are necessary insofar as their absence would make it impossible to make sense of any standpoint or text (Crowe, 2019: 224; Warnke, 1987: 76). These assumptions or prejudices/pre-judgements are part of the present and they come into tension with the (past) texts in such a way that their alterity is productive.

The interpreter's (in this case the author's) personal horizon extends outwards towards the horizon of the heritage of text/standpoint as a dialogue between the two is established (Gadamer, 2013: 313). The interpreter thus comes to understand more than she did before. By necessity, this changes the horizon of the hermeneutician, who cannot escape how her horizon has been "broadened" through the dialogue (Palmer, 1969: 201).

The horizon of the present is in a process of dynamic renewal as our prejudices are constantly tested (Gadamer, 2013: 317). Such testing often arises from the tension between our present horizon and the horizons of the past, including our own heritage (Gadamer, 2013: 317). As we illustrated above, the epistemological posture of hermeneutics is to be open towards embracing accounts of knowledge and truth that go beyond those delimited by naturalistic

philosophy. This openness is also evident in how the fusion of past and present horizons takes place.

Indeed, as a result of the encounter with alternative horizons, the interpreter's horizon can transform its identity as its pre-judgements/prejudices are enriched and transformed through a better understanding of different and past horizons. This is a hermeneutical experience based on an "encounter between heritage in the form of a transmitted text and the horizon of the interpreter" (Palmer, 1969: 207). This "encounter with tradition" is manifested in the form of "questioning and seeking truth" (Gadamer, 2013: 313, 375).

The fusion of horizon takes place within a hermeneutical conversation or dialogue, where the interpreter engages in "re-awakening" the meanings of a historical horizon (found within the historical text):

> "In this the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one's own what the text says" (Gadamer, 2013: 406).

This is how we will apply hermeneutic philosophy in this thesis. We aim to "re-awaken" the meanings of the texts that we will study, and then further to that, we will advance our horizon and thereby make our own interpretation of what the text means. That is, we will enrich our horizon by fusing it with the

other horizons studied in this thesis. This approach mobilises our prior prejudices in order to create a cycle of interpretation which brings about a better understanding of a historical text (Schmidt, 2006: 101; Wachterhauser, 1999: 9). A deeper level of understanding becomes possible, albeit one which "can never claim to be timeless, eternal, definitive, or exhaustive (Wachterhauser, 1999: 57).

Gadamer encourages us to "hear" what a text/standpoint has to say on a particular subject, to give it a fair hearing, and to be open to the possibility that one's own understanding might evolve through this process of hearing and participating through language. As Palmer states:

> "Because through hearing, through language, one gains access to the logos, to the world to which we belong. It is precisely this deeper dimension, this ontological dimension accessible through language, that gives the hermeneutical experience its significance for the present life of the interpreter" (Palmer, 1969: 209).

It is for this reason that, in our view, standpoints and texts are in effect "answers" to historic questions; and to disclose these questions is to grasp the value of the text/standpoint to the interpreter's own understanding of the subject-matter (Palmer, 1969: 199-200). They are attempts to grasp the world to which we belong and the answers that they provide can indeed continue to offer us insights that continue to challenge our prejudices. Indeed, such a feedback

loop inherent within the fusion of horizons could go on indefinitely (Palmer, 1969: 198-200; Wachterhauser, 1999: 51-53).

This dialogue must be situated within the medium of language and can never escape this situation and look down upon it from an external vantage point (Gadamer, 2013: 312). The alterity within this dialogue is thus the dynamic interaction between the consciousness of the interpreter and the heritage (and answers to historical questions) embedded within the text (Gadamer, 2013: 312). When we engage dialogically with Morgenthau, or Dewey or Niebuhr, we look to the answers that these scholars provided to the questions that they considered significant. These answers necessarily have an impact on shaping the vorurteile of the interpreter through a process of broadening (Palmer, 1969: 201).

The dialogue between the interpreter and the texts/standpoints in this thesis does not aim to end conversations pertaining to the subject-matters we research. On the contrary, "the process of fusion" of (present) horizon with (past) horizon is never ending and forever emerging as "something of living value" (Gadamer, 2013: 317).

A new understanding of the text must in principle be unable to claim that this particular understanding is the actual truth of the text. The openness of dialogue also opens up the possibility of an open ended discussion with a new interpreter forever finding new latent meanings within the same text, thus opening up the possibility of a forever evolving debate and the disclosing of

new meanings in the text that are no longer bound to the original meaning of the texts made by their authors. All texts are living texts that can evolve into new meanings through the processes of hermeneutic interpretation and the fusion of horizons. Indeed, such a process of grasping serves to enrich and cultivate the interpreter whose prejudices are strained and compelled to experience “a kind of continual formation and re-formation” (Crowe, 2019: 228).

For the sake of methodological clarity, in this chapter we outline below the various “tragedian” concepts that shape our vorurteile, or what one might call the author’s tragedian bias. Our vorurteile is shaped by our understanding of the metra/metron of things, i.e. “boundaries” in the archaic sense, and our understanding of how metra/metron shapes tragic notions of hubris and the agon. Methodologically, we bring our vorurteile to bear upon the texts/standpoints of Dewey, Morgenthau and Niebuhr. In doing so, we produce an interpretation of the answers they provide to the questions they maintain are significant. However, as this is an open approach, we aim to hear these texts as they are transmitted through the universal linguisticality of worlds in such a way that we are open to permitting this heritage and its horizons to advance our understanding dialogically (Palmer, 1969: 207-209). That is, the world (logos) in some part opens itself up to (discloses itself) to the interpreter and thus moulds and shapes the interpreter’s identity, understandings and vorurteile (Palmer, 1969: 209).

Methodologically, then, we perform a dual task. On one level we aim to interpret – or in our own sense of the term, to "grasp" – the heritage/legacy texts employing our own conceptual (tragedian) understanding. On the other level, we will maintain an openness to the heritage standpoints/texts such that we as hermeneutician "hear" these texts and learn from them the implications for our own understandings and prejudices. In the following section, we illustrate the concepts that are constitutive of our prejudices in this specific methodological sense. These concepts will be used instrumentally throughout the thesis as a means of interpreting the meaning of the heritage/legacy texts/standpoints.

Section Two: The Horizon of the Interpreter (Tragic Horizon)

As part of the methodology, this section explains our own grasp of tragedy as it is understood to the interpreter. It is on this basis that we can speak of having a tragedian horizon through which we will show "our workings". To make this clear, what we are doing in this section is to establish how it is that we understand tragedy. The implications of this are that our horizon has been deliberately embedded with an understanding of tragedy and metra which we will discuss in this section. It is this bias, or prejudice/pre-judgement, that enables the hermeneutician with the means through which an interpretation is possible in the first instance. *In our case, we "grasp" tragedy in a particular way and employ such an understanding instrumentally as part of the*

interpretive practice of bringing my horizon to bear upon the texts of the three principal scholars in this thesis.

We grasp tragedy as illustrating the measures of human life through a process of bringing the audience into the tragic performance, and thus, teaching this audience the implications of not adequately understanding or respecting the metra of things. Our understanding of tragedy is expressible in a manner consistent with an ontology that maintains the role of language in constituting social worlds. Indeed, at the heart of tragedy is the notion of a *riddle* that *cannot be answered due to the intellectual insufficiency of the tragic agent*. In the case of Oedipus, the tragic agent is revealed to have a measure of human intelligence, the consequence of which is a worthy but delimited accomplishment: "Oedipus did save Thebes" and his abilities are indeed worthy of glory (Euben, 2012: 89). However, *crucially*, this is not the end of the story. The resolution of one set of riddles reorients the tragic agent towards asking new questions, so discovering the existence of seemingly new but harder riddles. Indeed, in the case of Oedipus the resolution of the Sphinx's riddle leads him to discover how he acted historically, revealing himself to be the true monster of the tragedy (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1988: 45, 214-216). The resolving of riddles thus ultimately brings him some epistemological clarity and a clear line of sight to the inherent metra/measures of things exposed throughout his accomplishments (Euben, 1990: 57).

Tragedy, indeed, exposes the self to “problems that defy resolution” (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1988: 242). Moreover, it exposes the insufficiencies of the self in terms of finding solutions to value-conflicts which are internal to one’s own ethical space (Aristotle, 1982: 59). But for Oedipus tragedy has a forceful impact as he is left with a question that he is unable to answer: *how to live properly in full knowledge of his past actions*. In our view, tragedy exposes the conditions of existence in which human beings live in exactly this way. We need to know the truth of our reality as well as how to live correctly, but we *cannot find answers owing to our own flaws as limited beings*. The world we constitute through our social and linguistic practices is takes the form that it does in part as a reflection of the limitations and insufficiencies of human beings. The manifestation of the world is formed in a way that reflects our delimited intellect, our measures/metra, and therefore falls short of becoming a world that is truly satisfactory. We consequently find ourselves caught between the longings of our mind to reach satisfaction and the delimited capacity to build a world that could accomplish such a feat. This is our own eminently personal tragedy (Morgenthau, 1946: 221).

Tragedy is bound up with and relies upon the conception of measures which we developed in the literature review. However, we do distinguish in this thesis between an account of metra which can but should not be breached by the self’s choices, and an account of metra where the self is powerless to breach

such limits even if it was so inclined to do owing to its inherent insufficiencies. Our grasping of tragedy builds outwards from the role that we think that metra plays: the downstream consequences of human measures is that tragedy can illustrate the inability of the self to reconcile conceptions of what is good, and consequently is caught within the agony of an tragic agon from which it cannot escape. And tragedy also illustrates how the self often overshoots its legitimate measures and is brought low as a result. This is the notion of tragic hubris. The concepts of metra, and then agon and hubris, combine to form our grasping of tragedy, and thus forms our pre-judgments going into the practice of interpreting the texts of the three scholars.

One has to feel tragedy in order to understand its impact; the essence (as we use the term) of tragedy is knowable in the suffering of Oedipus who in his blindness is left groping for his daughters all the while alert to the agony that his accomplishments, built upon the exercise of reason to solve riddles, are manifestations of the overshooting of legimate metra and are therefore also acts of hubris (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270-1271). The false confidence of Oedipus, bolstered by his successes in using reason to defeat the Sphinx and save Thebes, evaporates in an instant and we are left with a crushed king who is left ruined and in a state of failure.

The audience undergoes the experience of living out tragedy by proxy and, in doing so, acquires an emotional character and a normative identity that

is changed by the experience; the practice of reasoning can usher in the light but also darkness. Metra is embedded in all human accomplishments, including the outcome of ethical practices.

The tragic agōn arises from the metra inherent in identity. Indeed, in tragedy the agent is represented as undermining her own identity (at least in part) as a result of the fact that the implementation of one value must come at the expense of another. That is, the metra of human capacity/intellect, discourses and practices, acts to limit the choices of the agent who must sacrifice some values for the sake of others. Even declining to choose is itself an action that invites normative consequences. The agent is motivated by legitimate and justifiable values but encounters a sort of riddle, in the broadest sense of the term, the confrontation with which reveals the metra embedded within her identity and thus reveals its problematic nature.

Like Oedipus, Antigone's father, who was blind to the choices embedded within his own accomplishments, Antigone's own limits are manifested as a blindness to the possibilities of creativity and the vitality of life which leads her down a path of self-destruction (Saxonhouse, 1986: 409). Antigone's unflinching piousness to the God of death, Hades, and unwillingness to concern herself with matters which might create or renew life, leads her down a path of achieving glory only through her own moment of death (Saxonhouse, 1986: 409). Even Antigone's very name implies the arch of her character: anti-gone meaning against birth and suggesting a denial of the renewing dimensions of

life (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Moreover, Creon's unflinching denial of the practices of funeral and kinship leads him to practice justice in such a way as to cause real consequences for him and for Antigone, whose self-destruction is something that Creon supremely regrets (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). The shock for the audience is that Antigone and Creon are trapped by their metra and unable to think their way out of this riddle. Thus, like a runaway train, they are destined to crash into ruination.

Whereas it is the vitality of creativity and life which raises up Oedipus only to bring him down, for Antigone it is her opposition to the vitality of creativity, something implied by her name anti-gone meaning against birth, which leads her into opposition against Creon's law passed against the bonds of kinship (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Antigone is even willing to hang herself, rather than extend her life inside her tomb, in order to quicken her reunion with her dead father and brothers (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408). Antigone's metra is manifested, thus, as a blindness to the value of life which leads to a denial of its own possibility: that is, the very denial of life that her actions represent are themselves practices that obtain in failure.

When "undergoing" the theatre of tragedy, the audience undergoes an emotional learning curve which results in their perspective being changed and their identity enriched. In IR, tragedy teaches insights by provoking emotional and ethical learning which allows the audience to experience vicariously the consequences of eminence by exposing hubris and its relationship to perceived

eminence (Erskine and Lebow, 2012a: 186-187). Hubris is our third tragic concept and we view it once more as a consequence of human metra and the impact of the furies, and not as a manifestation of selfish pride as portrayed by Ned Lebow.

Hubris is not something that is, in tragedy, associated with pride per se. Indeed, the audience of a tragedy witnesses and experiences how the employment of our rational intellect is something worthy and generates a great measure of authority (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1264). The employment of reason engenders accomplishments, just as Oedipus is able to abstract a wider context from clues – e.g. he reasons that a child or an old priest, a baby or a fool, are all of 'man' manifested in different ways (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267). Oedipus transcends the particularity of his world and thus establishes a measure of confidence in the practice of employing reasoning. In so doing, he becomes convinced that such practices give him a greater measure of freedom than would seem warranted by custom or tradition or even the divines (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267).

Sophocles juxtaposes the "seer" with Oedipus and leaves the audience in no doubt as to the tension between Oedipus's confidence in the power of his reasoning and the religious order to which the audience subscribes (the Ancient Greek religion) (Euben, 1990: 108). The "seer" is not presented as the representative of archaic and dogmatic backwardness but rather as a legitimate and worthy authority (Euben, 1990: 108). Thus, it would seem that it is pride or

overconfidence in the power of reasoning which leads to his nemesis. Yet this is not the case. Instead, the practices and discourses that lead Oedipus to establish his accomplishments can also in turn lead him to learn the distressing answers to the riddles that confront him.

The power of his own reasoning gives him the ability to test his boundaries, first against the Sphinx, which he defeats through reason, and then against the plague, which he also defeats (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1271). Oedipus thus is carried forwards from one riddle to the next, pushing beyond the metra established by the divines – a boundary which should not be crossed – by the power of his own reasoning and his confidence in the use of these powers. However, such accomplishments are soon revealed to be problematic as the power of his own reasoning reveals himself to be the corruption that has infected Thebes (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1271).

Tragedy exposes our eminence to be constrained by metra, thus is simply unable to deliver humanity from being humbled by forces which defy our attempts as a species to explain (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270, 1271-1272). Tragedy brutally reminds us that whatever confidence and joy we may feel, we are still faced with a crushing retrospective realisation that what we had thought was right, just, and good was simply hubris (Euben, 2012: 88). Tragedy prepares us emotionally for the blackest of days, the grimmest of prospects, and we are alerted to the possibility that we have met our metra and that as a result we are defined by our hubris.

In the case of Oedipus The Tyrant, an epistemic dimension embedded in the grimmest moments exposes the relative emptiness of notions such as justice, good, and right (Euben, 1990: 101). The suffering of Oedipus, as he undoes himself by answering the riddles of his own life, enhances the wisdom of the audience by revealing to them how what goes right is the cause of what goes terribly wrong (Euben, 1990: 55-59; Euben, 2012: 86-87). The tragic lesson is not the banal claim that taboo and patricide are bad things to do, but rather that there is an inherent risk in an attitude which assumes that "one has a monopoly of intelligence and foresight" or that "prior success guarantees future ones" or indeed feeling confident that "one can see the origins and consequences of one's actions" (Euben, 2012: 87-88).

In Sophocles Oedipus is presented as stubborn and unable to turn away from learning new information about his own situation – for example, in the way in which he dismisses his wife/mother who attempts to shield him from the truth of himself; or how he is unable to simply leave a riddle unsolved (Euben, 1990: 105, 121). Oedipus learns the truth of his ancestry from a shepherd who to his horror reveals to him that in his ignorance, he had murdered his father and married his mother, thus revealing him to have lost sight of the boundaries, metra, of human knowledge and power (Euben, 1990: 105, 122; Lebow, 2012: 65). This scene exposes the audience to a choice for themselves, a choice to look to their own emotional well-being, to avoid suffering or the grimmest moments of life. In losing sight of metra, Oedipus – an intelligent, eminent man

– is revealed to have been "ignorant of the fundamental facts of his existence, his name, place and birth" and is totally unaware of what "he is doing to himself and others" (Euben, 1990: 102). Here the audience is alerted and called instinctively to examine in their own lives where they have pushed the boundaries of metra and to wonder, at least in terms of their imagination, what they have done which perhaps has gone too far.

The impact is heuristic for the audience and the Social Scientist. Oedipus comes to see how his failures were manifested in the belief that he was totally aware of the truth of his situation and existence only to discover that such a view was itself hubris. Hence, the audience learns the prospect of transcending their own metra: "If a man as talented and perceptive as Oedipus can be so wrong about so much, how can we be sure that we know who we are and what we are doing" (Euben, 1990: 105).

Tragedy exposes the authority of a plurality of practices which build an identity into the self or collective (Euben, 1990: 108; Erskine and Lebow, 2012a: 187). For Euben there are differing accounts of authority from different dimensions of life, such as the epistemic, the religious, the normative, and so on (Euben, 1990: 108). Tragedy is true to "the enigmatic quality" of life and our existence (Euben, 1990: 108). It makes no apology for this unflinching look into life and seeks to leave unexplained that which is only grasped emotionally or intuitively and defies rational abstractions into hypotheses which can be tested quantitatively.

Embracing modesty is not a sufficient emotional response: one cannot moralise one's own way out of tragedy. We learn to perceive, but what we see is not something that can be put into words, although it is true nonetheless (Euben, 2012: 89). As Goldhill argues, a nebulous and paradoxical vision, tragedy associates sight with ignorance (in Euben, 1990: 101).

Per Ahrensdorf, scholars such as Euben and Saxonhouse read Oedipus as providing a critique of theoretical and political rationalism (Ahrensdorf, 2009: 6-7). Indeed, Euben argues Oedipus represents an understanding that the rationalist hope in “epistemological and moral enlightenment” is misguided (Euben, 1990: 26-27). For Euben, the self cannot authenticate for itself its own beliefs: “Sophocles portrays human beings as riddles to themselves and to others, as grasping for certainties that elude and then turn back on the most talented among them” (Euben, 1990: 27). Political thought does not have to be defined by rationalism but rather can be shaped by visions, and in the case of tragedy visions that give due weight to the concept of metra (Euben, 1990: 101, 105). Political visions rely upon reflexively comprehending the self as well as understanding the impact that our identities have upon our normative choices (Euben, 1990: 41).

Tragedy exposes the lesson that the truth is always up for grabs and can be always made anew (Euben, 1990: 101). Tragedy's shock therapy encourages the audience to be aware of paradoxes, and to manage those paradoxes if they are manifested in politics (Euben, 1990: 55-59; Euben, 2012: 86-87). However,

tragedy does not permit the idea that a middle ground somewhere between enlightenment rationalism and a treatise on human limitations is possible in the manner Lebow suggests (Lebow, 2007: 411; Lebow, 2012: 70). Tragedy exposes our paradoxes, hence the view that:

> "reason and reasonableness are as much a part of the problem as they are part of the solution" (Euben, 2012: 87).

What is up is down and what is up is still good even if it leads to down; tragedy enriches the audience's emotional comprehension by teaching a lesson that does not in itself expose lines of rational abstraction. Rather it does the opposite: it aims to communicate the enigmatic quality of life, not to reduce it into rational abstractions.

Tragedy gives us a conceptual toolkit that fuses rational conceptions with emotional human responses. Tragedy in our view centres on metra but leaves the concept vague and as much an emotional threshold as a rational or intellectual one. Hubris is exposed in retrospect and cannot be identified in the moment. Nor can it be eliminated given human insufficiency; rather it must be lamented and accepted emotionally. Agon is a concept which exposes the tensions and emotional agonising which exist between good, just and worthy values in such a way as to accept that authority can come from a variety of practices. These can be as broad and vague as religious practices all the way

down to resolving logical riddles (quantitative reasoning). Katharsis is the acceptance of those things we can change emotionally either as a grief for what we have lost or as sorrow that we cannot realise our dreams. This concept is not a metaphor for the modern notion of catharsis, but rather is an ancient concept that has a direct relationship with tragedy.

Classical theorists have found in Sophocles the instances where agents are exposed to their failings by retrospectively discovering their hubris during a recent past when they had identified themselves as virtuous or eminent. Certainly this is the case for the hubris of “rationalism” (Ahrensdorf, 2009: 6-7). Tragedy exposes the practices which have obtained within the drama and, in doing so, leaves the audience with the normative insight that this practice has led the characters to their ruin. Certainly this is the case with “rationalist” practices, which are frequently exposed by tragedy to lack the power to reshape outcomes themselves (Euben, 1990: 26-27).

Tragedies frequently expose the actor as blind to his true nature and defined by an insufficiency which leads him to be forever “grasping for certainties” even if these are by necessity unattainable (Euben, 1990: 27). Tragedies are thus holistic in the way they conceive of the self as constituted by various and sometimes quite different, or even incommensurable, concretisations coming from differing cultural and historical practices. Just as human sight extends only so far, so also human comprehension and knowledge of what is just or wise never achieves the status of immutable (Euben, 1990: 57,

105). The loss of certainty is not simply something occasioning sorrow in tragedy, it is the loss of a particular confidence in one's own wisdom and sense of justice. The tragic shock is the retrospective and sudden learning that the dramatic complexities of life have been managed by beliefs that suddenly appear false and lamentable (Euben, 1990: 57). Thus, it is in this loss of false certainty that the actor discovers the emotions of regret, sorrow and distress. It is this which gives the drama its emotional weight. This resonates with the identity of the audience, which is shaped by a special kind of normativity that is emotional in nature and not rational or logical. Aristotle describes this as Katharsis; it is a special set of emotions pregnant with a tragic normativity that must be experienced/undergone/suffered in order to be fully understood. One must feel tragedy to understand its impact. Tragedy is knowable in the suffering of Oedipus who in his blindness is left groping for his daughters all the while alert to the agony that he has committed hubris by using reason to resolve riddles (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270-1271). The false confidence of Oedipus, bolstered by his successes in using reason to defeat the Sphinx and save Thebes, evaporates in an instant and we are left with a crushed king who is left ruined and in a state of failure.

The audience undergoes the experience of living out tragedy by proxy and, in doing so, acquires an emotional character and a normative identity that is changed by the experience; the practice of reasoning can usher in the light but also darkness. Everything comes at a cost, even the practice of making

normative choices. Indeed, tragedy identifies the agon as lying at the heart of the moral identity of an individual agent, say Creon, or a collective, say Creon and Antigone and the wider population of Thebes. The audience is thus in a privileged position to spot this agon even before the agents themselves see it. This is another potent emotional shock. The agent is motivated by worthy views, concretisations of legitimate social and historical practices, and can come into conflict with another agent that also embraces equally worthy views.

The audience, and by extension the Social Scientist, is in a position to perceive the tragic agon. This concept refers to the inherent tension which exists within a moral space, such as within the self or an audience/collective:

> "In tragedy the conflict in the agon is not between a protagonist who is taken to be good and an antagonist who is understood to be the ethically unacceptable 'other.' These are not fights between good and evil, between the foreigner and us, or between friends and enemies. What gives tragedy its edge is the way in which the ethical positions in conflict are positions understood and endorsed by both the parties involved and by the audience. Tragedy, one might say, involves a conflict within our own ethical space" (Frost, 2012: 28).

This is found in the positions of Creon and Antigone where both are worthy and good in their convictions, and indeed Antigone is quite right in her avocation of kinship. Like Oedipus, Antigone's father, whose blindness to

human intellectual limitations is what eventually sets the seeds for his own downfall, it is Antigone's blindness to the possibilities of creativity and the vitality of life which leads her down a path of self-destruction (Saxonhouse, 1986: 409). Antigone's unflinching piousness to the God of death, Hades, and unwillingness to concern herself with matters which might create or renew life, leads her down a path of achieving glory only through her own moment of death (Saxonhouse, 1986: 409). Even Antigone's very name implies the arch of her character: anti-gone meaning against birth suggests a denial of the renewing dimensions of life (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Moreover, Creon's unflinching denial of the practices of funeral and kinship leads him to practice justice in a way that creates real consequences for him and for Antigone, whose self-destruction is something that Creon supremely regrets (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). The retrospective shock for the audience is that Antigone and Creon are trapped by their beliefs and like a runaway train are destined to crash into ruination; although this is perhaps best understood after repeat viewings.

It is the vitality of creativity and life which raises up Oedipus only to bring him down; for Antigone, it is her opposition to the vitality of creativity, something implied by her name anti-gone meaning against birth, which leads her into opposition against Creon's law passed against the bonds of kinship (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408-409). Antigone is even willing to hang herself, rather than to extend her life inside her tomb, in order to quicken her reunion with her dead father and brothers (Saxonhouse, 1986: 408). Antigone's blindness to the

value of life leads to a denial of its own possibility: that is, the very denial of life that her actions represent are themselves practices that obtain in failure.

When “undergoing” the theatre of tragedy, the audience undergoes an emotional learning curve which results in their perspective being changed and their identity enriched. In IR, tragedy teaches insights by provoking emotional and ethical learning which allows the audience to experience vicariously the consequences of eminence by exposing hubris and its relationship to perceived eminence (Erskine and Lebow, 2012a: 186-187). As Euben argues, the audience experiences vicariously the drama being played out before them. The good tragedian poet will elicit emotions in the audience through alteration of the narrative being played out. What the audience learns in part is that to employ our rational intellect is indeed something worthy and something that can be a source of authority (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1264). For example, Oedipus is able to abstract from clues how they may belong to some wider commensurate thing, e.g. a child or an old priest, a baby or a fool, they are all of ‘man’ albeit manifested in different ways (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267). Oedipus is able to transcend the boundaries of the particular and has confidence in his rational capacities. Thus, as a new ruler without care for custom and tradition, he measures his freedom not by boundaries set by gods or men but by his power to reason (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1267). The power of his own reasoning gives him the ability to test his boundaries, first against the Sphinx which he defeats through reason, and then against the plague which he also defeats, albeit at the

cost revealing himself to be the very pollution he strives to drive from Thebes (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1271). Oedipus is thus carried forwards across boundaries which should not be crossed. Through his reasoning, he transcends metra and puts himself in a position of vulnerability regarding the possibility that the Gods will punish him and his creativity.

Euben argues tragedy is educative, something of a social institution, which prompts those who learn from it to think through their own circumstances and difficulties (Euben, 1990: 56). One of the lessons learned is in relation to 'the epistemological complexities of the world' whereby wisdom can be derived from different accounts of truth (Euben, 1990: 57). Nevertheless, tragedy impregnates such complexities with an emotional quality that is not easily explained. Metra is revealed through the success of those who solve riddles (Euben, 1990: 56-57). Tragedy exposes our eminence to be constrained by metra, thus is simply unable to deliver humanity from being humbled by forces which defy our attempts as a species to explain (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1270, 1271-1272). Therefore, it is tragedy as theatre which draws our attention to those aspects of life which words alone struggle to explain but which nonetheless have a profound consequence for our lives.

Chapter Three: John Dewey and the Metra of Things

Section One: Introduction to Chapter

In this chapter we will argue that John Dewey's Classical Pragmatism is defined by our broader conception of metra and, thus, advances a tragedian political thought which can be applied to world politics. The advantage of Dewey's political thought is that it advances a form of inquiry which, if applied to world politics, draws in insights within a dialogical epistemic practice that refines our knowledge of how to cope with our broader understanding of the concept of metra.

In subsequent chapters, we will show how it is that Morgenthau and Niebuhr likewise understand "the metra of things" as we conceive of the term. Building on this, we advance the argument that all three legacy scholars share with Dewey much of the same caution towards the scope of human intellectual power as well as the profound anti-dogmatism necessary to continue to adapt to a forever changing situation in world politics.

In their own ways, what unites all three scholars is not just their alertness to "the metra of things", it is also that they share similar political and ethical imperatives: to better manage metra through cultivating institutional structures

that embody those norms which act to generate some degree of adaptation to the situations in which human beings find themselves, above all the metra/tragedy of human life and by extension the tragedy of world politics. The vision of intellectual inquiry, and adaptive actions, advanced by Dewey is not characterised by idealistic notions, but rather by the art of the possible. Dewey seeks to manage metra through the exercise of intellectual forms of inquiry that it is reasonable to expect world political actors to be able to perform in practice. Indeed, Dewey's form of inquiry does not aim to rely upon the altruism or good nature of human beings, but rather upon pooling the insights from the widest possible number of participants within a dialogue designed specifically to meet the needs of all mankind. This pooling of intellectual insights and capabilities is in Dewey a collective enterprise. This is perhaps the defining feature of Dewey's political thought: the manner in which he fuses epistemological dialogue with inclusiveness and collectivism in order to advance policy.

Concerning political matters, realising our norms in practice is fraught with difficulties. Dewey was keenly aware of what goes wrong with attempts in political life to advance the collective interests of mankind (Putnam, 2004: 10-11). Indeed, Dewey understood that while intelligence and reflection do indeed help us to advance collective interests, they only go so far (Dewey, 2002: 278). For Dewey it is entirely possible that a particularly vexing political or social problem cannot currently be solved due to our intellectual and practical insufficiencies (Dewey, 2002: 278). To bring our methodology to bear, we

interpret this to mean that Dewey was alert to the metra inherent in intelligence, and indeed in political and intellectual discourses and actions. Yet he finds his own need to exercise inquiry to be the best way to advance the case for employing the insights of as many qualified voices as possible with a view to discerning the best way to cope with the otherwise unknowing implications of metra that extend outwards from the partially visible structures of limitations and measures that exist beyond our capacity to control.

Section One: The Metra of the Self and the Tragic Conditions of Existence and Dewey.

In The Oxford Hand Book of The Self, Richard Menary argues that much of pragmatism denies that there is any meaningful distinction between "a conscious, knowing, or experiencing, subject and a world experienced" (Menary, 2011: 618). There is "no deep metaphysical discontinuity between the mind and the world" (Menary, 2011: 623). This is problematic insofar as it introduces an abstract distinction that would seem to put human minds and nature into different ontological realms as well as doing very little to advance any particular solutions to the concrete problems a demos might face in adapting to its environment. In the absence of such an unproductive and unnecessary distinction, Dewey develops an extremely useful conception of "body-mind" which captures the consequences of when "a living body is

implicated in situations of discourse, communication and participation" (Dewey, 1958: 285). Human beings "are biological adaptations of organism and environment" where the subject-matter that makes up knowledge occurs in the same world in which the mind has evolved into being (Dewey, 1958: 277). The separation of "life from nature, mind from organic life" only serves to generate abstract problems (Dewey, 1958: 278). Furthermore, abstraction frequently leads to what Santayana describes as "hypostatising the conclusions to which reflections may lead" as well as to engage in debates dogmatically by arguing that these things are "prior realities" (Santayana, 1951: 247).

To interpret then – that is, to bring our horizon to bear – we infer this element of Dewey's thought to indicate that for Dewey there is a direct relationship between the self and its environment. We interpret the question, which Dewey is answering, as to whether or not it is possible to conceive of the self in a manner that situates it within, and co-constitutive, of body-mind and environment, but to do so without hypostatising abstractions to such an extent that they become dogmatic. Such dogmatism, in our interpretation, thus indicates how it is that Dewey's thought captures the importance of the intellectual capacity of the self, its metra/measures, and the need for not overstepping these measures and thereby creating a dogmatism characterised by hubris (as we understand the notion).

Such an understanding of the capacity of the self to be limited by its own measures translates directly into Dewey's conception of knowledge. Knowing

things thus becomes to know within the capacity of the self to know things. Therefore, there is only a limited measure of warrant attached to any knowledge-claim – and, as Dewey claims, such knowledge contains within itself always a "sceptical element" (Dewey, 1998d: 203).

If our knowledge-claims are mutable and plastic then there is no dogmatic barrier regarding the evaluation of the worth of any particular knowledge-claim employing a process of interrogation and inspection (Dewey, 1998d: 203). Dogmatic accounts of what is warranted knowledge, which invariably represents the sum of adaptive knowledge designed to meet the needs of previous situations, is foregrounded in the vision of Deweyan analysis which examines whether or not a particular-knowledge claim continues to be appropriate for the present situation (Dewey, 1998d: 203).

For Dewey, knowledge is, epistemologically, "artefacts of our evidentiary sources" (Margolis, 2002: 112). As such, what we come to know is a mutable, plastic and contingent product of the self's intellectual capacity. Our knowledge thus reflects, at its best, the full measure of human intellect. But such a measure must in principle fall short of the absolute, and any knowledge that is produced therein cannot be more than simply what it is: warranted assertions into what reality might look like.

To bring our horizon to bear, there is a modesty in this epistemological stance insofar as it accepts that knowledge is measured not by its capacity to explain the ontologically external world in the form of an absolute account of

what is true. It rather explains the external world in terms of the use that a particular knowledge-claim has in aiding the self in its adaptation to its environment and in advancing one's best interests.

There is a considerable degree of consistency here in terms of how Dewey sticks to a modest sense of the value of the knowledge that the self can produce given its metra. Indeed, the creation of new knowledge is manifested as a form of intervention into the prior insights that the self has about its existence: and thus as knowledge evolves dialectically, so too will our insights into all things continue to transform and remodel themselves (Dewey, 1958: 286-287; Margolis, 2002: 115-116). Therefore, dogmatism and absolutism are continuously repudiated; so, too, in our interpretation, is the hubris associated with both of these positions.

The world "experienced" by the self is co-constitutive of the self and indeed, our knowledge of that world brings into being a "reality" that is defined by human dialectics (Dewey, 1958: 287; Hook, 1974: 9). Nothing stands still and there is a constant evolution of the situation in which the self discovers itself placed and is required to make sense of by employing the full measure of its intellectual capability. Grasping the nature of the world and its various features is critical to understanding how to act (Hook, 1974: 9).

For Dewey, to grasp the external world – that is to say, to construct knowledge which enables the body-mind to cope with the situation into which it finds itself – requires the employment of meanings which become the building

blocks of an unending dialectical approach. This is distinct from Hegel's telos driven version. For Dewey, the ends-in-view are of primary importance, not the ends of history as it were. This is a modest view in congruence with his awareness of the proportions and metra of things.

Meanings do not "belong" to an ontologically external "nature" but are constituted by the self, in its collective form, and find as its inspiration the natural circumstances and events within which a community is immersed (Dewey, 1958: 287-289). A "sociological" or "community-oriented account of truth" is advanced by Dewey that repudiates "the correspondence theory of truth and representationalist theories of mind and language, where mental states model or represent states of affairs in the natural world" (Baghramian, 2004: 145). In this sense the self has an interpretive role in bringing meaning, through language, to the situation in which it finds itself. The direct interaction between situation and self does not mean that what comes to be grasped is in any way "correct" by virtue of such interaction (Dewey, 1958: 287-289). Knowledge has a direct and instrumental bearing upon the manner of coping with the situation: the ethical objective of mitigating any human suffering, for which the concrete experiential impact serves as a prompt to produce practical knowledge, is the central objective of his pragmatism (Dewey, 1958: 110-111). The yardstick by which knowledge is measured is therefore the utility it serves as a means of coping with situations, not its capacity to create within the self a true representation of an external world.

To bring our horizon to bear, this line of reasoning suggests that a question Dewey is answering, is how can the self use its capacity to constitute knowledge in order to cope or manage a constantly evolving situation?

The self is defined by metra insofar as it simply cannot grasp the actuality of things in terms of creating representations of our external world that are irrefutably true. The self must rely upon knowledge which is useful in some fashion in order to cope with evolving situations. This is a modest understanding of the authority of human truth-claims, and implies that Dewey understood the metra of all human beings, in particular intellectual limitations.

Our interpretation is strengthened by the manner in which Dewey understands the actuality of existence in its absolute sense to be beyond our intellectual capabilities to understand, let alone "control" in the Deweyan sense of the term. Human beings have the means to achieve knowledge which is manifested as something "settled" in terms of debates upon a subject. However, such a settlement remains simply an "assertion" that has been given the status of "warranted" only as a result of the outcome of debates concerning the subject at hand (Dewey, 1998d: 203).

Just as it is that the "metra of things" – the measures and boundaries of things – are within the grasp of the audience to a tragedy to comprehend, so it is that the demos as it is understood within Deweyan thought is in a position to learn the lessons of human experiences. In Deweyan thought the metra is embedded both within "nature," as a construction of human intelligence, and in

the human being who remains defined by his intellectual metra. This differs from the hubris-centred IR tragedy, as discussed in the literature review, which conceives of human beings as having the power to breach metra, such as the norms of international society. Dewey's conception is that while there may be some metra (measures) that human beings can breach, as IR tragedy would expect, there are other metra (boundaries) for which human beings, because of their own metra (intellectual limitations), do not have the power to breach. Dewey therefore advances a form of inquiry which is more than capable of asserting hypotheses as to where the boundaries and measures of things can be found. This offers hope of finding ways to advocate a more valuable adaptive response to the evolving situation of world politics.

What inquiry is possible, then, into human nature itself? The Deweyan position highlights the role of the interaction between the individual and group and the 'surrounding medium,' and in particular the role of the 'social' in constituting the 'desires' manifested within each person (Dewey, 1998b: 305). Dewey rejects the notion that the 'social' is something 'external' to what is 'native' in the human (Dewey, 1998b: 306). As Westbrook argues, the Deweyan position takes human nature to be constituted through 'habits' that are themselves functions not of a particular individual but rather of the mediating social level (Westbrook, 1991: 287-288). The human mind is a downstream variable dependent upon the societal customs and norms. As such, human nature is entirely mouldable, and intuitions – or what Dewey calls impulses –

are organised through the interactions of an individual and the social medium (Westbrook, 1991: 288-289): 'The meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium' (Dewey, in: Westbrook 1991: 288). Dewey argues this leads to tensions between differing internal social norms brought about by the motor of social change (Westbrook, 1991: 290).

The Deweyan position takes there to be no 'intelligent exercise of preferences' without the judgement of moral agents being 'tested' by the circumstances of the contingent environ of which our (moral and natural) knowledge is fallible and constitutive (Dewey, 1998e: 309-310; Dewey, 1958; 51 -52). Indeed, Dewey stresses that wisdom is created in the context of this metaphysical/existential discourse of 'incompleteness and precariousness', complicit in choices and human endeavours, such that what becomes wisdom and morality is not fixed to nature but is bound up with the process of its constitution (Dewey, 1958: 52). Dewey argues that human beings crave the transformation of what is understood to be 'good' from the status of 'unstable' to 'stable' such that human groups can have beliefs they rely upon (Dewey, 1958: 53). What is 'surrendered' is the distinction between 'knowing and doing' (Dewey, 1982b: 291). What is gained is an appreciation for the role of culture in occasioning judgement and valuing (Dewey, 1982b: 304-305). Whatever 'good' comes to be transformed into a 'stable' belief is a manifestation of culturally

informed/constitutive practices which determine the status of the belief and not the 'being' or 'reality' of the thing believed 'to be' in itself. The essence or morality of a subject matter is a metaphor for that which is most prized by a human group for its value: conferring of the status "warranted" is an act of valuing.

Persuasively, Dewey criticises traditional thinkers for emptying their accounts of nature and morality of the incompleteness, precariousness, and instability of existence (Dewey, 1958: 53). That is, the metra of things is most certainly required in order to best grasp the conditions of human life and existence.

Implying that it is in suffering existence that human beings/groups are innervated, Dewey argues that stable, unstable, high and specious accounts of existence do not imply distinct correct or false explanations of nature and ethics but rather are a product of practices which are impacted by the 'precarious and incomplete' character of existence that 'involves us in the necessity of choice and active struggle' (Dewey, 1958: 53). Moreover, for Dewey, in the absence of an immutable lodestar that can guide us towards an account of existence that resolves all debates, it is necessary to view the world as something that is constituted through adding into the manifestation of the world interventions or reconfigurations of older interventions. Through this, owing to the changing nature of the sum of all knowledge, the world can be totally reconfigured (Dewey, 1998b 314; Dewey, 1998c 111). This radical plasticity extends

outwards across all things that Dewey considers natural as well as meta-theoretically into his own theoretical discourse.

This relates to tragedy insofar as Dewey distinguishes between two levels of metra: (a) the metra level concerning those measures that are mutable through interventions or reconfigurations; and (b) the metra level of those measures which we cannot mutate as they extend beyond human power. It is into this deeper level of existence that Dewey delves, albeit he stops before transforming his speculative account of existence into anything more than warranted assertion. Even in his account of existence Dewey retains his grasp upon the metra of all human intellectual capability. Indeed, in Rorty's estimation, Dewey maintains the view that it is entirely possible to have an account of what is or is not warranted, in the sense of having knowledge, without this account needing to be attached a formal epistemology (Rorty, 2009: 318). Moreover, it is from the authority of the collective that the evaluation of the warrant of any claim to knowledge is derived (Rorty, 2009: 174).

However, Rorty argues that Dewey's account of the existential aspects of human life are somewhat fixed and in "slightly bad faith" given Dewey's otherwise strong commitment to the plasticity of all things (Rorty, 2010: 73). Indeed, Rorty argues that Dewey "occasionally came down with the disease he was trying to cure" in advocating seemingly fixed insights into human existence and at the same time trying to eliminate traditional epistemology (Rorty, 2010:

83). However, this argument is debunked by Joseph Margolis, who points to how Dewey's insights into the conditions of human existence are not contrary to his prior commitments but, rather, reflect Dewey's insistence that criticism itself does not have an upward limit or end point! (Margolis, 2002: 115).

To bring our methodology to bear, we can see here how Dewey extends his understanding of the metra of human intellect into the insight that whatever discourse human beings create, there cannot be a point from which any particular man-made "paradigm" ever ends a particular debate and thus becomes a lodestar from which to order some sort of metaphysical order.

Relevant here is how Morgenthau - drawing upon Nietzsche - and Niebuhr - drawing upon Kierkegaard - understood modern man as unable to sustain the metaphysics of traditional Christian Europe. Given that Dewey spent most of his life opposing dogmatism and various forms of rationalism, he would not have had reason to live in fear of Morgenthau's or Niebuhr's critique (Dewey, 2011: 111). Furthermore, Dewey understood normative matters to be somewhat rough and ready, perfection remaining a 'vague conception' and presumably devoid of much value for Dewey (Dewey, 2002: 282). Indeed, as Dewey states:

> "Till men give up the search for a general formula of progress they will not know where to look to find it" (Dewey, 2002: 282).

Dewey rejects a search for formulas which strive towards perfectible progress as embodied in absolute ideals. He favours a view of normativity as a forever changing and dynamic process of moving from one justified belief to the next without ever determining that a particular view is final (Dewey, 2002: 282). Dewey views normative practices to be embodied as a dynamic process of social justification in the absence of general natural laws. Again, Morgenthau's mischaracterisation is illuminated. Morgenthau also misrepresents the overarching vision of Dewey's thought regarding the possibilities inherent in world politics by implying that they are either unsolved or yet to be solved 'rationally and with finality, once the right formula is discovered' (Morgenthau, 1946: 28).

On the contrary, the Deweyan position does not advocate the notion that all that is required is the right formula to solve normative questions. Indeed, Dewey argues that it is often the case that moral agents struggle to find an answer to the question of what is just:

> "he hesitates among ends, all of which are good in some measure, among duties which obligate him for some reason" (Dewey, 1998a: 315).

What we have here is Dewey articulating an ethical agon which in Frost's estimation is the 'heart' of a tragic understanding of morality (Frost, 2012: 27).

Indeed, Dewey recognizes that the social agent is torn between differing moral goods in a manner perfectly consistent with a 'tragic sense of life'. Frost describes this dilemma as ‘a conflict within our own ethical space’ (Frost, 2012: 28). Whereas in Morgenthau’s estimation the Deweyan engineer is little more than a mouthpiece for a decadent rationalism which articulates a failed over-reliance upon 'science' as a liberator from moral distress, Dewey’s position in fact represents a dynamic understanding where ‘each human being has to make the best adjustment he can among forces which are genuinely disparate’ such that all that can be achieved is ‘a juster estimate of the force of each competing factor’ (Dewey, 1998a: 320).

To bring our horizon to bear once more, Dewey is more than aware of the metra of the self and its intellectual limitations, and thus in this case is compelled to adopt the view that there is only a least worst outcome available. To understand such value antagonism implies a keen awareness of the tragic nature of making ethical judgements about one’s own values.

And yet the critical difference is – and what this thesis is drawing towards – is that in Dewey the inclusive inquiring dialogue extends outwards into the global demos and the vast possibilities of collective thought and knowledge production.

Far from Morgenthau’s caricature of the ‘social engineer’ whereby ‘correct’ solutions to social problems are produced as a result of experimentalism (Morgenthau, 1946: 219), Dewey is humble enough to

acknowledge the way experimentalism creates hypothetical possibilities which only become warranted beliefs if they acquire a certain status within a community. As we have shown, such epistemological restraint allows Dewey to evade intellectual hubris, i.e. to overshoot the metra of things.

Far from Morgenthau's "scientific man", Dewey is opposed to rationalism (Dewey, 2011: 111). Indeed, Dewey resisted "vague conceptions of unattainable perfection" in ethics (Dewey, 2002: 282). Dewey maintains that the pursuit of "a general formula" through which 'progress' can be attained is something that must be eschewed so that attention is not diverted away from the concrete problems experienced by social groups (Dewey, 2002: 282). In conceiving of ethical values as something arising out of social practices, Dewey implies opposition to any approach claiming to have ethical values that are situated in an external sphere of non-human truth (Dewey, 2002: 282). Our beliefs are not discovered: they are produced. Objective laws are social constructions which are mutable and change over time and space (Dewey, 2002: 282). In this Dewey acknowledges our very real and concrete human metra.

Like Morgenthau, Dewey accepts that "progress" is a matter of interpretation and in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, he accepts that the truth of human existence will never be arrived at because humans lack the ability to capture knowledge about the truth of actuality (Dewey, 2002: 282). It is in illustrating this that Dewey views normative practices to be embodied as a dynamic process of awarding authority to certain warranted assertions.

Dewey's pragmatism is inherently defined by its reflexivity. Not only is Dewey able to apply his meta-theory to nature and mankind, exposing their character, but also to turn his critical thought inwardly, exposing the plastic nature of his own mutable insights into existence. To support this, Margolis cites a passage within Dewey's famous book entitled Logic which points to how the occasion of new knowledge is itself an intervention into already existing understandings of what might be said to be known (Margolis, 2002: 116). To develop a new insight into existence is to modify our comprehension as a species and thus generate a new representation and hence a new cosmos (Margolis, 2002: 116). Therefore, what comes to be said to be known, and pertaining to all events, are ontological instances of alteration and creation: our insights into existence can themselves be redesigned as a result of this practice.

For Dewey, to settle upon one set of metaphysical insights concerning existence as immutable and endless truths would be to make the same error as classical philosophers in which their "tradition" takes "the proper goal and ideal of true knowledge" to be "realities which even if they are located in empirical things cannot be known by experimental methods" (Dewey, 1998c: 103). Theories of knowledge for which the construction is predicated upon the assumption that the universe is static or unchanging, are problematic (Dewey, 1982a: 275). Philosophy had become "a species of apologetic justification" regarding an "ultimate reality" and as such had tended to support an understanding of the relationship between knowledge and the objects which

populate a reality to be “measured by adhesion to fixed and immutable objects, which therefore are independent of what men do in practical activity” (Dewey, 1998c: 103-104; Dewey, 1982a: 276-277).

To interpret then, Dewey understands the measures of existence, albeit within the limited, mutable and plastic account of things that can never reach the point of a metaphysical lodestar from which to construct a metaphysical order to things. To posit the attainability of such an order would be to make the same mistake as Oedipus in putting his faith in his human intellectual capacity to exercise reason for the good of all. Instead, Dewey echoes the insights of Sophocles that the measures of things, even the scholarship of the social scientist and theorist, must be respected. Overshooting these measures will produce hubris and thus trigger the furies who ruthlessly enforce the metra. In this, Dewey embraces the narrower conception of metra common to IR tragedian approaches.

As we read Dewey, the constituting of a new world or reality is explained by Dewey as the transformation of the “universe of discourse,” namely a horizon of understandings by a collective (Dewey, 2008: 74). As one world intermingles with another, so they interact and interpenetrate: the consequences of these interactions have a bearing upon all social realities and thus generate interventions that in turn reshape another “universe of discourse” (Dewey, 2008: 74):

> "It is a commonplace that a universe of discourse cannot be a term or element within itself. One universe of discourse may, however, be a term of discourse within another universe. The same principle applies in the case of universes of experience" (Dewey, 2008: 74).

In this eloquent passage, Dewey expresses beautifully the manner in which one world has bearing upon another; both belong to a wider existence as they are united into a shared existence. It matters little, then, if a particular social meaning or value is or is not incommensurable between different social worlds, only that we understand that as they intermingle they generate consequences within each other's worlds. What they are united by is the conditions of existence which are plastic all the way down. The interaction between these universes can be grouped together and explained in terms of the consequences of how one impacts the others, something that can be done through the use of the pragmatist maxim.

Dewey's understanding of human beings and their existence identifies their position within the linearity of time as it unfolds and stretches outwards into the undiscovered country of the future. Dewey identifies the self's insufficiency in this regard as the necessary reliance on past circumstances to guide our deliberations concerning any attempt to determine the course of future events (Dewey, 2002: 278-281). In Dewey's idiom, the term "control" represents a hypothesis regarding the downstream consequences implied in

present actions. Our insufficiencies derive from the fact that our vantage point is by necessity located in the present. As a direct result, it is impossible for any human individual to "know" or "control" the true consequences of their choices (Dewey, 2002: 278-281). This sceptical concept, it could be argued, has a normative dimension because it implies that under the conditions of our human existence we ought to exercise some measure of caution as we cannot truly know what the consequences of our actions are going to be in social and political matters. Dewey evokes the epistemological argument that there are limits to "what we can know" thus maintaining a consistency with what he calls the "sceptical element" within his thought. We can have "warranted" knowledge upon which we must depend, yet this knowledge is a "justified belief" and little more (Dewey and Tuft, 1909: 261-262; Dewey, 2002: 278-281). These educated guesses about the future are, of course, subject to revisions: a strength of Dewey's thought is its plasticity, because this allows the potential for a total revision of the sum of human knowledge as a result of any intervention resulting from developments within debates concerning the "warrant" of new truth-claims. This flexibility elevates all participants in dialogue into potentially world transforming actors.

As a result, when we look to the best guesses regarding how to act well or to make a better choice regarding a particular desired outcome, the powerful and the meek are all in the same boat. In the absence of certain control concerning the future, all human beings are necessarily powerless to control

their destiny and thus by implication are totally at the mercy of future events over which they have, in fact, no control (Dewey, 2002: 278-281). All decisions/choices are in fact made blindly, and once a choice is made there is a terrible possibility that hoped for consequences might simply evaporate and the success of these choices become simply a matter of good fortune (Dewey, 2002: 281). While the Enlightenment Rationalist (à la Morgenthau or Niebuhr) can trust in the verisimilitude and trustworthiness of his righteous choices, the Deweyan doubts that any truth-claim can be given the status of immutable and forever true.

For Dewey, there is an indeterminate, precarious and plastic universe which we cannot truly comprehend and in which, as a consequence of the conditions of our human existence, we are compelled to render all truth-claims as little more than justified beliefs. The human mind simply lacks the "foresight" to comprehend how its choices will shape the future:

> "The future situation involved in deliberation is of necessity marked by contingency. What it will be in fact remains dependent upon conditions that escape our foresight and power of regulation" (Dewey, 2002: 208).

Therefore, the conditions of human existence prompt in Dewey a sceptical response to questions concerning the reliability of knowledge and indeed the value of our best guesses. How to reach a decision then becomes a

very dramatic choice and something that must be enriched, so Dewey argues, through the collective pursuit of inquiry through dialogue in order to allow us to make better choices. As West argues, Dewey does not devalue knowledge; he grounds it in human experience (West, 1989: 86).

Implied in this distinction is the sense in which unintended consequences can and do occur, which adds weight to the view implicit in Dewey's thought that it is naïve to suppose we can determine a normative outcome by applying the correct remedy. Human limitations are further implied when Dewey argues that to help increase the chances of a normatively positive outcome, the normative actor must understand his limits:

> "It is only through taking into account subsequent acts consequences of prior acts not intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the fuller significance of his own power and thus of himself. Every builder builds other than he knows, whether better or worse. In no case, can he foresee all consequences of his acts" (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261).

Echoing themes found in Classical Tragedy, where man is revealed to be a riddle unto himself, it is only by learning the consequences of choices that we learn. However, whereas for Aristotle Tragedy occasions Katharisis brought on by the encounter with the limits of human beings, for Dewey it prompts the

view that we can learn and develop a more sophisticated hypothesis/best guess about how to act. A more sophisticated form of inquiry can aid us in this regard.

For Dewey, all 'truth' is a possession and property of the present moment; its truth is subject to the contingencies of that moment and its social situation (Dewey, 2002: 275).

Certainly, this does not mean that a degree of foresight is impossible, only that the social existence of an ethical value takes place in the present situation, and any attempt to conceive of ethics in the undiscovered country of the future can only exist within our imaginations in the present and therefore proves, Dewey implies, unreliable (Dewey, 2002: 274-276). A moral view must be found in the existing concrete contingencies of the social situation, and is sustained by the social habits built into that situation as individuals and groups strive to think intelligently (Dewey, 2002: 271-276).

Moreover, as the situation changes, and the consequences of actions are better understood, intentions are influenced by this growing awareness:

> "This translation of consequences once wholly unforeseeable into consequences which have to be taken in account is at its maximum in the change of impulsive into intelligent action" (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261).

In the context of human limitations, Dewey implies that intelligent action requires a measure of humility in recognising that in order to effect moral

change the ethical actor must be attentive to the lessons already learned from social experience:

> "The great need of the moral agent is thus a character which will make him open, as accessible as possible, to the recognition of the consequences of his behavior" (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 262).

However, this argument seems to imply that a path can be charted out of dilemmas by means of fastidious attention to historical patterns and tendencies. Yet Dewey maintains that judging principles is a matter of reflection as well as determining the effect of the utility of these principles in differing social situations (Dewey, 2002: 239). The path forwards remains as uncertain as our contingent truths.

Judgement can be a matter of reforming principles and their meanings in social situations, which are constantly evolving (Dewey, 2002: 240). To suppose that existing wisdom will retain its on-going adaptive success, as well as to radically abandon the rich legacy of wisdom inherited by society, is in effect to recognise the contingency of social life as well as exposing the excessive pride held in principles that are unwarranted for new circumstances (Dewey, 2002: 239-240). Intelligence is not a silver bullet, and it may prove useless in the attainment of a new equilibrium; nevertheless, it is valuable as a means through which a successful path towards a wise way of living can be

achieved. However, Dewey's path towards a true wisdom is just a path, and we can never in principle arrive at this outcome. Again, we must make good guesses and remember our powerlessness in an existence where our destiny cannot be determined through our own hands.

Dewey's concern is to get to the heart of what constitutes a "wise" choice given human insufficiencies and the conditions of human existence. How can one be wise when there is no infallible certainty that our choices will produce the consequences we desire? Dewey's conception of reasoning, argues West, is largely directed at reflecting upon wisdom, which for Dewey is defended as "conviction" (West, 1989: 86).

Thought serves a purpose: it adds wisdom and value and helps us to cope with the circumstances of the age (West, 1989: 92-93). Wisdom is derived from goal-directed reflections that refuse to bow easily to easy answers conjured up by those fixed to orthodoxy or blind to humility of any kind with regards to the power of human truth (Hook, 1974: 7). The thrust of Dewey's thought is to enable the collective to respond wisely to the circumstances they find themselves in, whatever they may be. This is accomplished by including the widest number of participants in a dialogue, and if necessary challenging those who hold onto dogma at the cost of coping better (Dewey, 2011: 113):

> "Triumphs are dangerous when dwelt upon or lived off from; successes use themselves up. Any achieved equilibrium of adjustment with the

> environment is precarious because we cannot evenly keep pace with changes in the environment. These are so opposed that we must choose. We must take the risk of casting in our lot with one movement or the other. Nothing can eliminate all risk, all adventure; the one thing doomed to failure is to try to keep even with the whole environment at once - that is to say, to maintain the happy moment when all things go our way" (Dewey 2011: 113).

In other words, the ever developing plastic universe compels us to constantly develop and renew our "wisdom" or conviction about what is the right way to act regardless of the normative cost of the values "rejected" along the way. What Dewey has in mind is a constant battle between the inherited knowledge of the past horizons of wisdom and the special kind of suffering that collectives experience as a result of the conditions of their existence (Dewey, 2011: 112-113). This is how Dewey understood experience: as something incorrigible and impossible to change even when the light of Enlightenment Rationalism is cast upon it. "Truth" for Dewey represents the reaction of the collective to their common existence, that is, the interpenetration of nature and human minds as a fused continuous phenomenon (Dewey, 2011: 112-113). The fusion represents the total sum of our experiences, and the "real" is as much a manifestation of our comprehension as vice versa.

The elimination of righteousness is implied in Dewey's assertion that the future is largely out of our control (Dewey, 2002: 271-276). The historical horizon of inherited wisdom is valuable, but can also cause righteousness (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261). The indeterminate nature of the future creates the need for control and implicitly the acceptance that whatever it is, it remains a representation rather than a factual or immutable account of how the future will develop in social affairs (Dewey, 2002: 206). The implicit wisdom in Dewey, then, is to acknowledge the helplessness of mankind as its defining feature; we can overcome indeterminacy only at the cost of believing our own fictions, namely that we know the true nature of things.

In Dewey's view, all knowledge and all truth is fallible and owes its authority to practices of social and linguistic status-giving driven by our social and historical cultural valuations as to what counts as true or false (Dewey, 1998d: 203):

> "The position which I take, namely, that all knowledge, or warranted assertion, depends upon inquiry and that inquiry is, truistically, connected with what is questionable (and questioned) involves a sceptical element, or what Peirce called 'fallibilism,' But it also provides for probability, and for determination of degrees of probability in rejecting all intrinsically dogmatic statements, where 'dogmatic' applies to any statement asserted to possess inherent self-evident truth. That the only alternative to ascribing to some proposition self-sufficient, self-possessed, and self-evident truth is a theory

which finds the test and mark of truth in consequence of some sort is, I hope, an acceptable view" (Dewey 1998d: 203).

Dewey resists labelling his truth-claims as timeless, fixed, and immutable when he writes: 'what is taken to be so fixed and final that man may repose upon it, differs with race, clime, epoch and temperament' (Dewey, 1998f: 347). Moreover, our very human nature, argues Dewey, does not reside in immutable and infallible truths (Dewey, 1998f: 347). Rather, it is a highly plastic thing which evolves or regresses as it moves towards and away from its incentives and circumstances (Dewey, 2002: 89 98, 106, 124). Thus, humanity is of nature (Dewey, 2002: 295-296).

Wisdom requires us to maintain an open mind, to resist dogmatism, and to engage in open dialogue. This goes hand in hand with the humility needed to understand that our own inherited knowledge and horizon is not a true account, but rather one of many – all of which have varying, and culturally determined, levels of value or warrant. Indeed, by combining a "fallibilist" theory of knowledge with a plastic conception of all things, Dewey introduces both sceptical and relativistic dimensions into his approach. His anti-dogmatism is an attack on any approach which fails to keep pace with developments over time, where developments represent the transforming and constantly changing fusion of mind with nature. So, it is possible for Dewey to argue simultaneously that

human beings are “finite” and “subject to conditions imposed by space and time” and at the same time that the consequences of our collective experience of undergoing existence is the sum of “reality” (Dewey, 2002: 287; Dewey, 2011: 112-113). This fusion is never still or fixed, as if on a pedestal. The meaning of mankind is reconstructed continuously as our understanding of both ourselves and nature develops. The modes by which mankind lives and the truth-claims we construct, either fit or do not fit the needs of the situations we find ourselves in at particular times (Dewey, 1998e: 225-229). By implication, bringing these truth-claims into equilibrium is the wisest set of actions mankind can take.

What might be considered wise modes of living in one time – that is to say, the existence of societal habits which occasion a measure of equilibrium between species and environment – may not prove appropriate in a different situation (Dewey, 1998e: 229; Dewey, 2002: chapter 1). As human beings transform their social habits and beliefs in response to changing circumstances, they can remake the world so as to render humanity a good 'fit' at least for a time.

This is in keeping with Dewey's view pertaining to whether or not problems have to be solved or abandoned:

> “It would be difficult to find a single problem during the whole record of reflective thought which has been pursued consistently until some definite result was reached” (Dewey, 1998e: 225).

Indeed, the solution to a problem is reached not by logical justification but because there has been 'a change in men's points of view' (Dewey, 1998e: 225). In effect, there is no final opinion upon the matter of what is, or is not, human; our humanness emerges out of social practices employed by humanity as it strives to make sense of the existence it suffers/undergoes.

As we have shown, Dewey argues that our account of what is beyond our social reality is itself a product of our contingent social, historical and cultural circumstances, and says nothing about what is truly correct in all things in the ultimate sense. Nevertheless, there is a manner in which humanity can constitute a socially factual objective reality which can be put to normative purpose as a way of bringing the lives of individuals and societies into alignment with reality or environment (Dewey, 2002: 54-55).

This aim of creating equilibrium between environment and community involves reality constitution as well as ongoing adaptive practices in light of that constitution. However, such coping is not a guarantee of success (Dewey, 2002: 55). As we have shown, all coping, all truth, and all wisdom for Dewey are understood to have only moderate authority and cannot be expected to deliver in the future anything more than what good luck delivers.

Just as Dewey implies a celebration of how we can as a species develop ways of coping with our limitations, we have shown that in a wider context such coping is limited and ultimately only a blind guess about the future. Dewey

implies, in other words, that we persevere with our dogmas because we must, even as we acknowledge that such hubris exists because we cannot escape our limits and simply see beyond our social and historical contingency into an external reality where truth is what it is and has very little to do with the constitutive practices societies employ in order to constitute their social realities. In other words, we have to go with what we have got, even if we know that such dogma is bound by its time and culture. We must, however, be prepared to drop these assumptions in an instant in order that we may come to learn new lessons as the consequences of previous actions become apparent (as conceived by the pragmatist maxim). But in what direction?

For Gale, the summum bonum in Dewey's thought is the concept of 'growth'. By this Gale means the accomplishment of moral progress arrived at through dialogical engagement with a community which strives for a common outcome serving the interests and desires of the group (Gale, 2010: 72). This does not eliminate the indeterminacy which Dewey returns to in his arguments regarding the conditions of human existence, or the insufficiency of the self and the mind to realise all of our most cherished desires or to crush our least hopeful dreams (Dewey, 2002: 281). Nevertheless, triumphs, accomplishments and successes in a broad range of fields are possible, even if they are manifestations of fallible accounts of truth.

For Dewey, there is no sense in which 'growth' is the instrument whereby such accomplishments must evolve, only that it directs us in principle towards

what may bring about such successes (Dewey, 2002: 283). Indeed, Dewey advocates that the role of experimental inquiry may help us to determine the path by which humanity may move towards greater fruits; however, this is only the case if circumstances permit (Dewey, 2002: 283).

Gale incorrectly claims that Dewey orients towards a view where desires and interests are harmonised, and hence that Dewey is representative of an approach which 'reduces the normative to the factual' (Gale, 2010: 72, 73). Yet Dewey is clear that all truth claims are fallible (Dewey, 1998d: 203). As we have shown, the insufficiency of the self is built into his understanding. By necessity this places the agent in a position where the realisation of one belief or value comes at the cost of another. We argue that Dewey thus precludes the view that the harmonising of society is possible.

Indeed, growth remains very much a manifestation of a forever reconstructing equilibrium which we define as the “wisdom” of a particular place and time. The wisdom of a particular place and time are constantly in a state of retransformation and reconstruction. Although there is a fundamental powerlessness inherent in the human condition, growth gives us directionality by creating the retrospective accomplishment of equilibrium; the possibility, that is, that dogma can be created in the first place.

For Melvin L. Rogers, Dewey conceives of the self as reflective and able to engage in a process of deliberation through which the self is transformed and

made anew by the exercise of choice (Rogers, 2009: 186-189). Moreover, for Rogers:

> "It is the importance of the values within any normal person's self-conception and larger vision of what gives their lives meaning that makes choosing tragic" (Rogers, 2009: 187).

In Rogers' view, "tragic" refers to the rejected beliefs and values discussed above; but Rogers also points out that the self conceives as internal to its identity a number of commitments or cherished beliefs that help bring social meaning to its own self-image (Rogers, 2009: 187). The tensions existing within the self make it difficult to reconcile its identity, and in a globalised world where norms and values are increasingly diverse, such vast commitments generate equally vast tensions (Frost, 2012). This fusion of self and society is a critical dimension of Dewey's thought (Brinkmann, 2013: 88). As Brinkmann argues, Dewey distinguishes between the physical/biological sources of the self when it practices reflection, deed and emotion, from those which find their origin at the social level (Brinkmann, 2013: 88) Indeed, Dewey sees the social level as intervening within the self in such a way as to create shared experiences and understandings and the communication of commensurate social meanings (Dewey, 2008: 52-53).

Dewey is also able to recognise that incommensurable social meanings and the 'universes' they constitute have a bearing upon each other. It is in their interaction and interpenetration that all social realities create consequences for each other. Logically, then, the self is constituted as a concrete social being within one social reality where social meanings are incommensurable. They are, thus, co-constituted within differing social realities where social meanings are indeed commensurable. The self is therefore a site of tensions, straddled at once across and within social realities and constituted by commensurable social meanings as well as some incommensurable ones. It is a social being that harbours ethical values which arise and co-exist as they go into the very makeup and form of the self.

Sydney Hook, a sometime critic and sometime friend to Dewey, acknowledged the implicit tension within Dewey's thought. On the one hand there is the hope and possibility that the promise of intelligence creates the possibility of realising our normative aspirations. On the other hand, there is the recognition that circumstances frequently arise in which certain norms or values must be prioritised over and above others which may be equally passionately held (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22). Hook notes that Dewey understands there is a cost to realising a value and that the limits on the possibility of a moral world come not from the defeat of what is bad, or wrong, or evil, but rather come at the cost of the "rejected" value (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22). This element of Dewey's thought is congruent with Frost's description of a "tragic" choice

whereby social actors are confronted with a choice between cherished beliefs regarding proper conduct (Frost, 2012). Hook likewise uses the term "tragic" to describe this element of Dewey's thought (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22). Although we do not maintain in this thesis that Deweyanism is a "tragedian" approach, we do think that this element of Dewey's thought implies the presence of a tragic "agon" within the deliberative space of the human mind.

Dewey has a vision of what could be described as the relentless "progress" of mankind towards a more liberal and technologically advanced society. Nevertheless, a vision is not "blind faith" – and as Putnam argues, Dewey advances a highly qualified view of "progress" by identifying the need for ever improving understandings in order to have the hope of realising it in practice (Putnam, 2004: 11). Identifying what goes wrong, as it were, is critical for finding a way to make things go right (Putnam, 2004: 11). Understanding what goes wrong can bolster an optimistic approach with richness and seriousness (Putnam, 2004: 11). Although this might seem like a crude or simplistic philosophical argument, Dewey's philosophical purpose was not to engage in ivory tower discussions but rather to "reconstruct" philosophy as a transformative force whereby collectives could use dialogue and practicality to create a better world. The vagueness of notions like "better" and "progress" is perhaps deliberate for Dewey as it might well represent his attempt to acknowledge the contingency and relativity implied by these terms.

Dewey is widely thought to take the view that value conflicts can be transcended. This view has been given weight by thoughtful scholars such as Westbrook, who has made a version of this argument (Rogers, 2009: 183). However, as Rogers argues, Dewey is uncertain about whether or not such conflicts can even be properly understood, still less transcended. Thus, we may discover that there is an 'irreducibility' inherent in these types of conflicts (Rogers, 2009: 185).

This conception of value conflicts is found in Dewey's famous work Ethics, in which he emphasises the need to choose between cherished values (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 209). This even extends to choices between desired ends (Dewey, 2002: 278). When instances of incommensurability arise, the power of the intelligence to generate solutions is exposed as insufficient (Hook, 1974: 10, 13, 22; Rogers, 2009: 183-189).

Dewey expands upon this notion of value conflicts when he argues that there are various "modes" of normative reasoning which pit goods against goods, virtues against virtues, goods against virtues et cetera (Dewey, 1998a: 315-320). Thus, for Dewey, inherent in the process of normative reasoning is an acknowledgement of human insufficiency regarding our inability to overcome these tensions (Dewey, 1998a: 315-320):

> "The worse or evil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil. Until rejected, it is a competing good. After

rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation" (Dewey 2002: 278).

In this quote, Dewey identifies how "the bad" is a manifestation of choices made to "reject" certain values. Thus, in the context of his view that human insufficiencies are responsible for the need to make such a "tragic" choice, Dewey is in effect arguing that the agent, necessarily and inevitably, causes "the bad" of a situation to occur by attempting to make the best out of a difficult situation. To clarify, Dewey, like Morgenthau, perceives negative normative consequences arising from the manifestation of our human insufficiencies.

The self as a concretised social fact is unable to escape the tragic agōn at the heart of its identity. This is not to say that the self is a tragic being, forever agonising and unable to find emotional relief without drowning itself in the sorrow of failure. The self for Dewey is rather a construction that reflects the collective identity as much as the individual. But how to choose? How to deliberate and act wisely?

Dewey implies that the self cannot be fully in charge of its own identity because action itself helps shape the collective identity, which in turn engenders the identity of the self (Dewey, 1998i: 341-442). The self is fused in part with its own deeds and thus changes as the consequences of choices develop (Dewey, 1998i: 343). The self learns alongside the collective through the

development of consequences. The self can thus review its estimation of the value and worth of a particular choice or normative judgment (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 209; Dewey, 1998h: 329). In estimating the value of a choice/judgement by reference to its empirical and concrete consequences, the self in combination with the collective is able to judge not just other agents but also their deeds (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 259-261). As learning progresses, and hence "growth" is accomplished, so the self learns what it is capable of achieving if it is lucky enough to have the fortunate circumstance found in the future (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 261).

The mesh that holds together this process of growth is dialogue, in particular the process of engagement whereby such dialogue engages the widest number of participants possible. This brings the energies and minds of the collective into a focused effort to realise a new equilibrium and thus to restore or demolish the confidence we have in our convictions/wisdom (Dewey, 2012: 160; Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 180-181; Dewey, 1951: 589; Dewey, 2002: 217).

We therefore think that in spite of his implicit awareness of the vast insufficiencies of the self, there is a great degree of hopefulness and optimism in Dewey's thought. Much like Morgenthau and Niebuhr, Dewey understands that the development of theoretical thought offers huge scope for personal and collective growth. Dewey's self may have a tragic dimension, but there is also a hopeful dimension that puts faith in the capacity of human intelligence, through the shared potential of collective energies and dialogue, to generate wise

convictions. We may celebrate what rigorous social scientific empirical inquiry can achieve. To engage in a process of deliberation and experimental discovery is to uncover not only the extent of our insufficiencies but also the potential to limit the impact of these insufficiencies upon our enterprises:

> "Conflict is acute; one impulse carries us one way into one situation, and another impulse takes us another way to a radically different objective result. Deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount. It is an attempt to uncover the conflict in its full scope and bearings. What we want to find out is what differences each impulse and habit imports, to reveal qualitative incompatibilities by detecting the different courses to which they commit us, the different dispositions they form and foster, the different situations into which they plunge us" (Dewey, 2002: 216).

Hence, when Dewey affirms the importance of growth, he is doing so with a clear understanding of the nature of the self as an insufficient being capable of comprehending the internal tensions within itself: a good way to help prioritise which values to favour. In Dewey's view, deliberation requires that we estimate the worthiness of particular judgments by investigating whether choices were or were not made in full awareness of the acute conflict between values (Rogers, 2009: 185).

Dewey, thus, embraces the notion that within the limits of our insufficiencies we are still capable of making value judgments. As such, deliberation and estimation are bound up in the judging of choices to be good or bad (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 3). Indeed, the purpose of normative reflection is to 'give some guidance for the unsolved problems of life which continually present themselves for decision' (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 4). In concrete situations, the suggestion that a choice or value judgement ought to be taken is not a retrospective action – that is, the return to dogma or the assumption that what worked in the past will work again – but rather a prospective act, a deed concerning the future which is done without certainty as to whether or not it is the right thing to do (Dewey, 1998k: 280).

The self is forward looking and concerned to employ its intelligence for the purposes of building a better future. Although this may involve the sacrifice of certain cherished beliefs, ultimately developments drive learning and growth (Dewey, 1998k: 282-283).

In The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, Dewey argues that scholars err in maintaining that the self is independent of events and happenings. On the contrary, we are highly influenced and partly constituted by the social world to which we belong, a manifestation of 'different ways of being in and of the movement of things' (Dewey, 1993a: 4). Ontologically, Dewey conceives of the self/mind as being procured by 'the course of events' as well as 'partaking in the course of events' in such a way that the 'presence' of 'future possibilities' serves

to encourage the self/mind to anticipate future events. Epistemically, it is in this process of anticipating and reflecting upon consequences that the knower comes to know and refine the best guess of wisdom in the manner outlined above (Dewey, 1993a: 4-5).

The knower comes to know herself, as well as the world to which she belongs, not in terms of her 'antecedent fixity' but rather by treating events in a particular way, altering them so that they have meaning to her insofar that becomes better able to understand future situations or what might happen in the future (Dewey, 1993a: 1-4). Dewey very strongly implies that knowledge is value-based and can be evaluated through societal deliberation. Indeed, Dewey employs the notion of deliberation in relation to moral actions insofar as the social actor is shaped by his habits; these are a significant influence on how deliberation occurs (Dewey and Tufts, 1909: 202-203). Habits arise in behaviour that occurred 'in the past' and which influence the present by means of conditioning the social actor (Dewey, 1958: 279). If Dewey argues (a) that social actors deliberate in a manner that is a matter of habits, and (b) that such habits reflect the influences which impact their deliberations, then it is logical to argue that the deliberation enabling value judgments to be made is a manifestation of the habitual norms of a particular group.

Section Two: Political and Ethical Imperatives

Richard Bernstein's examination of Dewey's ethical thought advances the view that democracy is not some other form of associated life but a direct extension of the life of communities (Bernstein, 2010: 72). Moreover, democracy does not bifurcate governors and governed but fuses both within a shared government that incorporates the sum of all the citizenry (Bernstein, 2010: 73). Dewey contends that there is scope for any citizen to cultivate the competence required to govern without the assistance of any aristocratic elite (Bernstein, 2010: 74-75). Indeed, Dewey does not advance a view of any particular member of the demos being called upon to govern at any moment. Rather, it is the case that any member of the demos may become a joint partner in the practice of governance amongst other citizens. As Rogers argues:

> "For Dewey, however, citizens do not merely authorize the use of power and so legitimize political action, but are genuinely authoritative. Among their contributions, citizens contextualize and give purpose to expertise; otherwise such expertise would be meaningless. This view is premised on yet another claim, namely, that in matters of politics there can be no political expertise independent from the wisdom of the public. A democratic understanding of collective problem-solving thus envisions deliberation as emerging from the relationship among experts, political representatives, and the larger public. This ensures, he believes, that justification of one's actions is not uncoupled from being accountable to the public" (Rogers, 2009: 195).

For Dewey, thus, any particular individual within a broadly inclusive dialogical practice of knowledge creation, including those who perform policy and political practices, do indeed engage with expertise. This expertise emerges amongst those who engage dialogically across the demos in the broadest sense of the term.

To bring our hermeneutic method to bear, we interpret this as indicating that Dewey is alert to the metra of the individual and thus the need to pool the insights and standpoints of the widest possible demos in order to constitute the most warranted assertion possible. Allegorically, this is just as the audience to a tragedy is in better a position to understand the position of the tragic heroes than the heroes themselves. The audience has the advantage of knowing a wider amount of information than is available to the bounded characters on stage, often as a result of the chorus directly feeding the audience information of which the heroes are unaware. The audience is thus in a position to understand the ignorance of the hero to the metra of things. Although Dewey's demos cannot be free from metra, it nonetheless evades the hubris of assuming that the individual is capable of greater knowledge, through reason or any other means, than the pooled insights reached through collective dialogue and inquiry.

For Dewey, democracy must rest upon its capacity to replicate itself across the generations: for that, the educative process is critical in the establishment of such norms. Indeed, the process of education is the mechanism

through which the individual is drawn into the culture of the society to which he belongs (Pring, 2017: 346-347). Moreover, Dewey puts a requirement upon the collective to constitute "norms that shape and control behaviour" so as to meet "the expressed needs" of all members (Waks, 2017: 11). In our view, the core of Dewey's ethical and political imperative is that the demos is best served through the creation of the knowledge necessary to reproduce collective norms that underscore democratic life. Insofar as it is amid these collective practices that an individual comes to take on a measure of political agency, this individual will use the educative process to reproduce those features of democratic living most essential to the well-being of the demos.

Therefore, the imperatives within Dewey's thought are linked to his democratic ethics and the need to secure a democratic way of life that supports the well-being of the demos. The nature of democratic life is such that there is an openness to dialogue, a readiness to seek out opinions and alternative values, an openness to engage in critical dialogues and to have access to relevant information (Pring, 2017: 347). Such things are necessary to accomplish to the fullest extent possible the Deweyan style of inquiry that aims to pool the insights of the widest possible demos.

Furthermore, the pooling of insights also highlights the inherent value of every contributor to dialogue, thus indicating the role of equality in determining the quality and ethics of any particular inquiry. As Dewey states, "It means that

every existence deserving the name of existence has something unique and irreplaceable about it" (Dewey, 1998L: 46). This notion of equality is linked to the contribution that any individual can bring to the knowledge-creating dialogue, but it also maps onto the ideal of democracy that Dewey advocates.

Dewey's pooling of insights strives to achieve a number of things. First, to address the specific, concrete and socially applicable, as opposed to ivory tower, problems which command Dewey's attention (Putnam, 2004: 28, 99-100). Second, to disprove the notion that reason (as the product of a scholarly activity) can be divorced from practices (undertaken in order to obtain them) (Dewey, 2008: 64). Third, to isolate rational discourse from 'anything outside itself' is to shut down any debate about how the cultural circumstances may have impacted the manner in which knowledge is produced (Dewey, 2008: 64-65).

To bring our methodology to bear, we can see that for Dewey intellectual metra is manifested in the manner in which intellectuals turn towards rationalistic conceptions and juxtapose them to cultural norms even though such a distinction overlooks how knowledge fuses both as an outcome and as a form of practices. The focus upon practical matters represents an acceptance that the metra of things demands that certain imperatives be taken. There is little value in engaging our intellectual resources into building perfect theories that can resolve any manner of intellectual problem. It is more pressing to address the practical problems that arise and face the demos and engage our intellectual

energies in this manner; the outcome then serves as a way of addressing the needs of the demos.

Dewey's ethical imperatives employ the notion of "ends-in-view" which "denote plans of action or purpose" that draw upon knowledge that is arrived at through inquiry and is manifested as warranted assertions, and is better understood as a "mode of operation that will resolve the doubtful situation" (Dewey, 2008: 169). Dewey's ethical imperatives exercise "genuine moral judgement" which examines the situation in its empirically concrete and social forms and supplies practice-oriented knowledge which may supply the right means of operations through which a resolution to ethical dilemmas might be ascertained (Dewey, 2008: 169-170). Hence we can speak of Dewey's ethical imperatives being situational in the sense that just as the end-in-view may well change given the views of the demos, so it is that empirically informed ethical judgments can likewise change if the circumstances require such adaptations and changes.

To interpret, then, Dewey evades the risk of hubris by acknowledging the mutability and limited authority of knowledge and judgements and even of ethical and political imperatives. Nevertheless, in terms of our wider conception of metra, Dewey maintains a firm commitment to keep limit such imperatives to the status of warranted assertion and never to permit such assertions to be transformed into rationalistic absolute claims.

It is from this stance of respecting the measures of things that Dewey is able to argue that there are no pre-determined responses to particular ethical or political predicaments (Dewey, 2008: 169-170). The exercise of what Dewey calls intelligence, very much requires the individual and the collective to understand the metra of their intellect, their knowledge and their situation and to be prepared at a moment's notice to abandon all pre-existing imperatives and choices if they appear to not meet the need of that situation. The metra of things are always in dynamic change and transformation, so it must be that our ethical and political imperatives must also be in a state of transformation.

The uniqueness of each social, political and ethical predicament requires a unique response as well as the view that whatever problems are encountered must find their resolution not as an expression of applying rational maxims but rather on a case by case basis employing a wider cultural analysis as well as being prepared to adopt new values or to reform these values if it required to do so. Dewey therefore invites dialogue into the examination of the values and knowledge through which the metra of things is managed in both the wide and narrow senses of the term. Moreover, this may require that the democratic culture which underscores such a dynamic and dialogical approach to adaptation also requires that the culture of each individual ethos or imperative be also investigated. A warranted assertion is produced whenever inquiry produces the requisite knowledge necessary for a resolution of a particular problem, in the broadest sense of the term (Dewey, 1951: 559). Nevertheless, owing to the

metra of human intellect, such a "resolution" need not be thought of as adding weight to a particular set of "truths" that ought to have the authority to act as a social and cultural loadstar. Indeed, the mutability of any warranted assertion is certainly necessary in order to evade the hubris of assuming too much of the human intellect: that is to know how to develop maxims capable of addressing a host of political and ethical problems through the exercising of reasoning alone.

To interpret, then, Dewey is alert to the metra of human intellect and understands that such limitations mean that there cannot be discovered the essential nature of things or indeed the absolute truths through which the resolution of all problems might be attained. Such alertness leads Dewey towards embracing the notion of warranted assertions and thus evades the nemesis which could arise if we were to assume that our knowledge represented the true imperatives necessary to make the measures of things irrelevant to human beings insofar as they could manage and thus transcend their impact. The furies would be rendered irrelevant and there would be nothing to stop a particular warranted assertion from taking on the significance of absolute and immutable truth.

Dewey argues that democratic ethos where the end-in-view is to build adaptive knowledge and values, as well as to resist dogmas which restrict our lives as we encounter new opportunities (Dewey, 2002: 100). For Dewey, "the ethos and spirit of a group is the decisive factor in determining the system and meanings in use" (Dewey, 1998g: 82). Thus, because the ethos of democracy is

something special in that it represents more than simply another form of government through which to organise a sovereign state, it evokes political and ethical imperatives which engender a certain type of world. This world is one that is shaped by the notion of "equilibrium."

Indeed, for Dewey, an ethos is a dynamic thing which facilitates or renders effective any temporary equilibrium established between the demos and its situation. The whole notion of equilibrium in Dewey fuses the notion of warranted assertions arrived at by pooling the insights of the widest possible demos alongside the political and ethical imperatives required in order to shift the demos in the direction of an accommodation with their environing circumstances.

To interpret, then, Dewey is alert to the measures of things as they are manifested within the natural circumstances that bear down upon the demos as it strives to make sense of its environment. Such metra is, however, not mastered or transcended, but rather the demos find as its imperatives the need to establish some measure of equilibrium between the societal and the natural, both of which are embedded with metra and are constituted as "real" as a consequence of the production of knowledge into all aspects of our world.

And perhaps at the heart of Dewey's imperatives is to act upon the potential of democracy as an ideal to which the fullest fruition of dialogue and equilibrium become possibilities:

> "Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the ideal of community life itself" (Dewey, 1998h: 295).

Furthermore:

> "Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is insofar a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy" (Dewey, 1998h: 295).

Therefore, the democratic world achieves in its ideal form the fullest fruition of social and communal life that a collective can reach. However, the measure of democracy's place within that world is its capacity to engender some kind of equilibrium.

In order to assess the extent of Dewey's ethical relativism it is helpful to establish an account of what this might look like in a social setting: Baghramian's provides such an understanding in arguing that:

> "Once we accept that there are many such communities, and that their practices tend to vary substantially and even be at conflict with each other, then the sociological account of truth ends up giving us diversity and incompatible conceptions of truth, rationality and objectivity. Historically,

> there have been many occasions when different communities of enquirers have agreed on different - and incompatible - beliefs. To explicate truth in terms of intersubjective agreement is to concede to one of the key points of relativism: that truth is dependent on local and changing norms and conceptions" (Baghramian, 2004: 148).

In light of this we can see that Dewey does indeed have a measure of ethical and political relativism within his thought as it is the case that Dewey's theory of knowledge is designed in such a way as to advance the notion that contingency is central to the determination of the meaning of knowledge-claims. Moreover, as we saw above, Dewey conceives of the world as a product of knowledge practices. Nevertheless, Dewey's notion of equilibrium provides a loadstar against which some measure of the extent to which the demos is adapted to the metra of things does provide an orientation to Dewey's ethical and political standpoints. Even if we cannot know what is good in the absolute sense, we don't really need to know more than a warranted assertion in order to achieve a measure of adaption as well as the development of democracy as a means of coping with the metra of things.

Indeed, Dewey's view of knowledge, which is that it defined by its fallibility, draws upon the notion that insights arising out of and through the demos are sufficient for the purposes of establishing an equilibrium. Although

there is for Dewey no value-free or contingency-free ethics, there are more than enough warranted insights through which to dialogically integrate into warranted knowledge in order to accomplish our ends-in-view. Such an ethical and by extension political imperative is, in our interpretation heavily impacted by the broader definition of metra that we outlined in the literature review. The intellectual metra of the self and indeed of individual self-reliance, such as which follows from the use exclusively of reasoning, is acknowledged and left unchallenged. But that the scope for warranted knowledge, even fallible knowledge still remains. In the next section, we take our interpretation of Dewey and apply it to world politics.

Section Three: Application to World Politics

Generally speaking, Deweyan political thought can be applied to world politics without much difficulty and indeed, as Cochran argues, that Dewey can be considered an "international thinker" (Cochran, 2010: 309).

Just how Dewey conceived of the domestic polity as a composite of differing interdependent stakeholders, so it is that Dewey conceives of the world community as largely defined by a diversity of interests and actors which, in the era of globalisation are industrially interdependent: indeed his writing as early as 1902, as well as during World War One, point to the centrality of webs of

industrial interconnectedness which shape the ideal form that international relationships should take (Cochran, 2010b: 309).

Generally speaking, Dewey conception of world politics is that there are problems, at the level of the domestic polity, and by extension the level of the world polity: “the problems of men” penetrate as deep as the domestic level and as high as the level of the world community; the best management of these interconnected levels of analysis and policy takes, in the Deweyan political agenda a collectivist form and moreover the ethical yardstick by which a state may be evaluated is by the extent to which it constructs collectivist institutions designed to further the interests of what we call the global demos (Cochran, 2010b: 311, 313). Dewey correctly gauged that modern nation-states lack the means to adequately manage the problems that their societies collectively share and thus there is an ethical need to look beyond the boundaries of the nation-state towards any actor which might play a role in advancing solutions to the problems of mankind (Cochran, 2010b: 314-315).

To bring our methodology to bear, Dewey grasps the measures of things in world politics and comes to the realisation that in order to mitigate the impact of the metra of nations, their aggressiveness and their propensity to put the interests of their own states ahead of the interests of addressing the problems of mankind on a collectivist level.

At a policy level Dewey’s support for the USA’s involvement in global conflicts arose in the context of the role that he thought that the USA could play

in developing the kind of global political collectivist institutions necessary for a transformation of circumstances that favoured the individual citizen of the USA (Howlett, 1977: 4-5). However, this policy is in tension with his reluctance to endorse the exercise of the institutions of, and policy of, war-making (Cochran, 2010b: 321-323; Howlett, 1977: 4-5). On balance Dewey acknowledges the metra of not acting and advances a positive case for USA interventionism which it is hoped would bring about an ethical reorganising of world politics. The metra of pacifism informs his agon and thus puts him in a position to answer the question: how can the USA act in such a way as promote the ethical reordering of world politics such that supranational institutions may take on the burden of governance with regards to our common problems.

Collectivism manifests itself as in opposition, in Deweyan thought, to anything which gets in the efficient management of the problems of mankind. That is, the problems of mankind required a collective response from mankind, and the directionality of his political thought extends beyond the measures of the nation-state or the boundary of international sovereignty into the global demos and in doing so juxtaposes the advantages of supranational collectivism over and above ongoing inter-state competitiveness. Dewey advances an ethical view which aims at the advancement of the flourishing of all human beings, not just the citizenry of any particular nation: something which is also true of Morgenthau and Niebuhr.

In our reading, Dewey would have agreed with Putnam's view that questioning and critique should not be limited in scope or target (Putnam in: Rogers, 2009: 52). There is very little that should be spared the inspection of thinking or criticism; our ability to examine our own convictions and cherished beliefs is of extreme significance if the social actor is to avoid the worst excesses of its blindness to the truth of its circumstances. The blindness of the social actor is highlighted in moments when it finds itself no longer walking along the edge of a cliff but has unknowingly walked a long way off the edge and is currently in free fall.

Even our attempts to determine matters of justice are limited by our blindness and anything that we perceive to be objective in such matters is an inference arrived at through an examination of consequences (Dewey, 2012: 51). Dewey conceives of all things as existing in a concrete form; however, their "essence" has no real representational form beyond the meanings we bring to them. The human conditions of existence are a vacuum of emptiness where "events" are random and "an infinite number of meanings" collide and form into configurations that serve to confuse as much as clarify (Dewey, 1958: 318-319). It is the responsibility of the collective to make sense of these random things and to participate in the dialogues and practices through which normatively useful meanings can be organised and tamed so that they can be used in order to effect social change (Dewey, 1958: 318-319). When Dewey writes that the "possibilities of conjunctions are endless, and since the

consequences of any of them may at some time be significant, its potential meanings are endless" (Dewey, 1958: 319), he highlights how possibilities are open and endless: the sky is the limit in terms of creating new worlds. And it is the experience - and choices - of the collective that makes the difference between these worlds as they render meanings upon the existence that they find themselves experiencing.

Dewey takes even metaphysics to be produced by this process of meaning formation within the intersubjective space (Margolis, 2002: 16). The suffering of existence that the collective undergoes is part of the process of meaning formation. Because it is a human activity, so it is a fallible outcome: the world that emerges is one defined by social and historical contingency.

Inquiry begins naturally: the overarching sense is that to practice valuing as a process of giving and exchanging reasons, refining and reinterpreting significations, in a manner in which an account of what is wise proves to be, in retrospect, a valuable way by which human communities can in a practical manner adapt dynamically to the evolving situation.

Dewey shares with Brandom a concern that "we remain answerable to the world of social and natural phenomena and so engage in an objective affair without also making the more dubious claim about corresponding to the real" (Rogers, 2009: 52). Although Brandom is making a point about how to be objective without becoming ontologically realist, he is also highlighting how the collective interacts with and is responsible in the context of the world it

experiences. Dewey understood the collective to be thus so, trapped in a condition in which there is no guidance as to how we should act in order to act wisely - certainly an atheist proposition - but we have natural responsibilities that reflect directly our participation in our world. This has epistemological force: the collective is responsible to the truths to which they have already committed themselves (Brandom, 2011: 30). That is, in the absence of guidance directly from the universe, we must embrace our historically inherited wisdom and act either to transform that knowledge if it no longer works for us or to respect its authority because it serves a normative function. And what is the medium through which such transformation or respect is communicated across the collective? It is the social activity and practice of inquiry - as manifested within dialogue - that constitutes the discursive basis of the collective agent (Brandom, 2011: 30).

As Brandom and Dewey argue - epistemologically - in the asserting of hypothesis/justified beliefs, the inquiring social actor makes commitments to truth-claims which bind downstream inferences that the social actor is entitled to make given prior commitments. On a purely common sense level, to assert that the Earth is both the centre of the solar system and that it orbits the Sun is to render the view discursively incoherent and of no epistemic, ontological, or ethical/normative value. What is implied in this argument, for Dewey and for us, is that what is done in the process of reflection is to produce inferential consequences with regards to the assertion of truth, which occasion in

combination with the ongoing dynamic process of the inquiring practice, an inferential structure - which is called an objective structure by Brandom - compels the responsible inquirer to limit further truth-claims such that they are structured in a manner which imbues these truth-claims with a quality which cannot be achieved by the self, acting on its own epistemic authority (Rogers, 2009: 92).

Such a triumph - the capacity to cope at all - is all the more impressive because it occurs in an existence which provides inherent normative guidance; there are no natural laws upon which the collective can lean back upon. We have only to make sense of this existence through the production of worlds that have their own logic as a result of the human origin of the significations used to make sense of these worlds. And the inquiring practice that this takes place is inherently dialogical.

In this way, we can appreciate the normativity implied in understanding because it is performed through dialogue within a collective in order to take responsibility for our own affairs. Whatever fallibility may exist in our blindness, the accomplishments of the collective nonetheless is the accomplishment of its internal dialogue realised in an existence without naturally occurring guides.

As has already been noted in this chapter, Dewey's norms do not imply a straight forward instrumentality of collective response to chaining situations - the autonomic response of automatons responding deterministically to stimuli -

rather it is the intervention of collective thought and choices into its situations that renders these responses democratic. It also fuses the outcomes of dialogical inquiry with the enriched understandings of the collective: what insights are produced represents the common-sense and practical thinking of the demos/collective as well as incentivising certain social habits over others. That is, the incorporation of the demos into the process of creating wisdom is of paramount importance to Dewey's attempt to achieve growth.

Indeed, in The Public And Its Problems, Dewey argues that individuals come to be connected within a "human association" and in the process of associating internalised norms which are in fact the product of intersubjectively arrived at social habits (Dewey, 2012: 52-53). These social habits - practices of dialogical meaning generating - bring about the social construction of the self and even its awareness of itself (Dewey, 2012: 52-53). Thus, at the basis of many elements of what counts as social affairs, the self, the collective, the notion of usefulness, normativity et cetera, all these arise out of the habitual processes of intersubjective dialogue and knowledge/meaning making.

For Dewey collective life acquires a normative character that mere associated living lacks: the collective creates emotional and intellectual support that enables a more enriched consciousness to be sustained (Dewey, 2012: 123). Both bridge the gap between natural and social phenomena and both are renderings of "collective action" (Dewey, 2012: 123-124). Dewey implies a bias towards collective life insofar as it is the normative character of this grouping

that lends itself to the hope that through collective agency and thought - i.e. inquiring dialogue - a conscious understanding of the unfolding of consequences is possible (Dewey, 2012: 123-124). This is important as for Dewey it is in understanding the unfolding of consequences that we can posit or surmise hypotheses regarding just and wise actions.

We see in this the beginnings of inclusivity and democracy for Dewey. The collective has a certain mode of internal communicating and a dialogical means of inquiry. There is no attempt by Dewey to hold out a portion of the collective for special consideration. All parts of the demos have a part to play.

The collective agent can act most wisely when it embraces the diverse sources of opinion and debates from across its classes and divides. This inclusivity towards the demos is consistent with Dewey's epistemological vision of dialogical inquiry as something that should be unhindered and open. It is more than simply an ethos, it is a rendering of the demos into potentiality, an attempt to focus political and social energies into a force through which we may come to have the best guesses about what is wise, just or true. All of the demos participates in this most inclusive of democratic dialogues (Dewey, 1993a: 4-5). Indeed, Dewey values the inclusivity of the demos, because to employ a dialogue in this way, maximises the possibility of there emerging an equilibrium between the world and the collective which is an ideal version of success for Dewey (Dewey, 1993a: 4-5). Such an inclusive dialogical inquiring practice achieves a certain quality.

Indeed, quality must come from the elimination of dogma and limitations: there must be no limits upon dialogical interaction within the collective and nothing and no one should be excluded from ethical conversations: the liberty of all in the collective to have the right to participate is the best quality outcome to be accomplished. The implication is that elitist inquiry can occasion a measure of wisdom, however, successful adaptation to the world must come from incorporating all the demos into a greater conversation which is in pursuit of a more valuable wisdom.

For Dewey, in viewing democracy to be a matter of good inquiry, and in the productive practices whereby wisdom is refined through dialogical engagement, Dewey identifies demos-inclusivity with epistemic and normative accomplishment. That is, the best guess of wisdom, is best generated by the widest conversation possible.

For Dewey, this association is spelled out in Science and Free Culture, where Dewey argues that in societies where opinion is closed and closely controlled by a governing elite - such as in Soviet Russia - then "a general atmosphere of control of opinion cannot exist without reacting in pretty fundamental ways upon every form of intellectual activity - art too as well as science" (Dewey, 1993b: 49). Dewey implies thus, that to shut down or control and limit the intellectual freedoms of the demos has by necessity a deleterious effect upon the quality of the wisdom obtained through dialogical inquiry. In a discussion concerning the value of the scientific ethos - in this case regarding

the exposing as spurious various forms of propaganda - Dewey develops the opinion that it is possible to educate the demos as a whole as to what is or is not trustworthy forms of information and it is this which is said to avoid the possibility of pseudo-public opinion being created through deception (Dewey, 1993b: 57). The scientific spirit is held up as that which is able to assure the very possibility of a public opinion which is enriched enough - in terms of substantiated, systematic, and competent knowledge - to withstand the impact of deceptive propaganda (Dewey, 1993b: 57). Implied here is an element of faith and hope that the democratic way is not some arbitrary normative position which is the equivalent of some other socio-political system, but rather a qualitative mechanism to get the best out of a collective and for that collective to live up to its own potential in the fullest. Inclusivity is central to that promise.

Such a unity is in prospect about meeting the expectations of the demos. The capacity of the demos to take responsibility for its own well-being is something that must extend outwards to the whole of society and to every part of the demos. Indeed, as Brinkmann argues a 'community' is in Dewey’s understanding is not an arbitrary collection of people but rather it is a manifestation of a group of people whose interests, and wellbeing, is accounted for and a good community has normativity when it coheres around shared interests and understandings; that is, where there is a fair measure of solidarity (Brinkmann, 2013: 136).

Indeed, when Dewey argues that intolerance and hostility directed at a specific quarter of society must deny that minority or group 'all human qualities' (Dewey, 1993c: 227), it is implied that tolerance and inclusivity which confers more upon a community than simply a certain ethical status from which it draws its legitimacy; the community is wiser because it is more inclusive of all of the demos.

It is an effective, indeed wise community, which embraces the widest possible engagement in the pursuit of good adaptation to the situation of the day. Although the scope of solidarity may supply a greater wisdom, the absence of solidarity, however, weakens the fruits of science, runs contrary to the practical notion that a wider debate is a richer and more detailed debate, and increases the probability of maladaptation and the loss of wisdom.

However, while this relative and inclusively produced wisdom generates growth and thus hope of equilibrium between society and environment, this process takes place within the moment of the present and takes place within the constraints of human limitations. Dewey at once affirms the value of the democratic ethos by associating it with adaptive epistemic means to generate growth and the possibility of a better equilibrium, and at the same time affirms that the achievement of wise choices defined by growing knowledge remains fallible, relative to the community and by extension unable to push beyond the limitations of human beings and establish ultimate values. What represents optimism of a positive adaption and equilibrium is exposed to be once again

measured down by its limits and our inability to know the consequences of our actions in the present upon the future course of events. The optimism implied by the inclusive dialogical process is revealed to be, for Dewey, continent fallible and subject to the dangers of ill fortune.

In other words, society only comes into being for Dewey, once its members begin to act in an inferentially objective way; that is to say, to become aware that a greater thirst will accompany drinking the well dry, therefore, it is wiser to let the well replenish itself and to only take what little is needed; assertions about future consequences are held accountable to past truth-claims.

Moreover, Dewey conceives of community life as the same thing as democracy as something of which the ideal realisation is impossible and thus, we argue along with Brinkmann, that for Dewey, community life/democracy is of great normative value (Dewey, 2012: 122; Brinkmann, 2013: 136). To do what is better, what is wiser, is to care about all the component parts of a society in order that the society achieves a greater aggregate than would be achieved without such solidarity:

> "In its just connection with communal experience, fraternity is another name for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in which all share, and which give direction to the conduct of each" (Dewey, 2012: 123).

Therefore, Dewey's position takes the sum of wisdom to be amplified through solidarity within the demos as they employ inferential objectivity in order to better adapt to the situation which is manifested within, and across, social realities.

As Hook argues, intelligence 'tries to make it possible' for individuals and societies to cope with our limitations and the inevitable tensions which arise within ourselves because of the incommensurability of certain 'good and rights and duties' (Hook, 1974: 19). As we have shown, these socially constituted tragic tensions are found in the interweaving of the self and the social levels, thereby embedding within each 'self' a tragic agon that undermines the hope that our judgments will ever be perfectly good. As Dewey acknowledged, judgements made in order to make moral and ethical progress must come at the cost of a 'rejected good' and as Hook and Dewey argue, at the heart of all judgments is found a 'tragic sense of life' (Hook, 1974: 13).

As Dewey argues, the constraining limitations which impact the free hand with which a society acts to promote its interests, incentivise the society to create wisdom and promote positive consequences in the future (Dewey, 1998e: 311). However, such constraining limitations do not remove for society the opportunities to work within these limits in order to create as much progress as possible (Dewey, 1998e: 314).

As Putnam argues, this is the optimism within Dewey, it is a strategic optimism designed to constitute our worlds around in terms of the restrictions

and constraints which bear down upon societies (Putnam, 2004: 11). But then to strive to find any possible way to push back these limitations, and as Dewey writes:

> "The good can never be demonstrated to the senses, nor be proven by calculations of personal profit. It involves a radical venture of the will in the interest of what is unseen and prudentially incalculable. But such optimism of will, such determination of the man that, so far as his choice is concerned, only the good shall be recognized as real, is very different from a sentimental refusal to look at the realities of the situation just as they are. In fact a certain intellectual pessimism, in the sense of a steadfast willingness to uncover sore points, to acknowledge and search for abuses, to note how presumed good often serves as a cloak for actual bad, it a necessary part of the moral optimism which actively devotes itself to making the right prevail. Any other view reduces the aspirations and hope, which are the essence of moral courage, to cheerful animal buoyancy; and, in its failure to see the evil done to others in its thoughtless pursuit of what is called good, is next door to brutality, to a brutality bathed in the atmosphere of sentimentality and flourishing the catchwords of idealism" (Dewey in: Putnam, 2004: 11).

Conclusion to chapter three:

In this chapter we have built our interpretation of Dewey's thought as consistent with the metra of things. Managing the measures of things takes

place through a process of epistemological, dialogical and inclusivist inquiry. At the level of world politics the ethical and political priorities of adaptation to a forever evolving situation are understood to be best managed by pooling the insights of those who can participate in inquiries that address the shared problems of the widest possible self in its collective form.

The manifestation of metra comes from the modest view of knowledge and truth that Dewey holds and knowledge itself can be abandoned if it is no longer useful in some fashion regarding the managing of the problems inherent in a situation. This leads Dewey to advocate a rejection of dogmatism. The alternative that Dewey provides is one that evades the need to ground truth into anything in particular but instead offers the existential insights that there are limits and measures in all things and that such things have consequences for us all at all levels of society. The response to such consequences is a contingent and forever evolving practice of building knowledge through dialogue with the widest possible group of contributors.

There is no guarantee that the optimum policy will be generated through dialogue, and Dewey acknowledges that all we can do is hope that our answers are in some fashion an appropriate response to our collective needs. Dewey's grasp of the metra of things, however, indicates the presence of the wisdom of insecurity that comes from a realisation that limitations are real and that things

constantly change. This in our view is a tragic account in so far as it does not provide an escape from hubris, but rather acknowledges that we simply cannot know if today's knowledge will build tomorrow's solutions. We can only hope that through inclusivity and shared practices of knowledge building we may just be able to achieve some measure of policy and reform needed to meet our collective needs at the level of world politics. Although nothing is guaranteed and thus we are required to forever "return to the drawing boards" if our knowledge of what is good or right proves to be inadequate.

Chapter Four: Reinhold Niebuhr and the "Tragic Irony" of International Relations

Introduction

In our interpretation of Niebuhrian thought, we view his conception of the self to be defined not just by its capacity to overshoot metra, and thus generate "tragic ironies" but also as something defined by metra in the broader sense of the term that we discussed in the literature review and in the introduction to this thesis. In the broader sense of the term, metra conceives of things to have measures which extend beyond those things that human beings can manipulate (for right or wrong). As such, the self is without the requisite means to take control over the process of history and thus determine its own destiny.

For Niebuhr, there are specific circumstances that contextualise the self which are conceived of by a discursive view that integrates both his Christian faith (which he calls either a Biblical faith or a neo-orthodox faith) and his understanding of the modern conditions of existence:

> "It is to be noted that the great Christian existentialists, Pascal, Luther, Kierkegaard, thought in a world in which modern science had not radically

> altered or was just beginning to alter the conception of nature. Modern Barthians blithely disregard the evidences of modern science as if they did not exist" (Niebuhr, 1986d: 233).

Thus, Niebuhr's understanding of the self, as something that acquires identities that arise within the context of the cultural-historical contingencies of a particular time, leads him to grasp the importance of bringing into harmony modern worlds and what he regards as Biblical truths (Rice, 1993: 1219-130, 160). Commentators, however, such as Dewey, point to how Niebuhr is much like Kierkegaard insofar as they both have somewhat lost faith in "traditional statements" concerning Christian faith and yet are striving to contrive "something which supplies to them the gist of Christianity - what they find significant in it and what they approve of in modern thought" (Dewey in: Rice, 1993: 160).

Niebuhr belongs to modern times and thus must find some way to accommodate the modern world which he inhabits with the Biblical truths which his faith requires him to hold. Evidence of his modern way of thinking is illustrated by his biographer June Bingham, who points to how Niebuhr condemns the fanaticism of religious extremists by stating that "bad religion can be worse than no religion" (Niebuhr in: Tjalve, 2008: 63).

To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear, then, we can see that Niebuhr understood the metra of dogma in the sense of holding onto the

traditional statements regarding the Biblical faith in a time when the contingencies of history and culture have evolved through history to produce a modern world where those traditional statements no longer seem to have the warrant that they once had. Niebuhr is conscious of this metra, and thus moves to advance an understanding which recaptures the modern self and introducing into it an identity which can inhabit modern worlds and also maintain the faith in circumstances where it could be washed away by naturalist accounts of history.

Niebuhr thus moves to separate a naturalist account of history, and thereby, we infer, expose the metra of that position, and the human history in which metra is comprehended and the pattern of its impact can be discerned over time. Indeed, for Niebuhr "modern apologetics" must make a "radical" distinction between the natural world as manifested in the passage of history and human history "in which the true God is encountered" (Niebuhr, 1986d: 233-234). That is not however to argue that a rational theory of God's impact can be made through some sort of historical inquiry.

Niebuhr understood the role that faith can play in escaping the closed cage of reason that would otherwise attempt to lock inside itself all things (Niebuhr, 1986d: 236). Niebuhr finds this rationalised account of all things to be restrictive and prohibitive with regards to one of the most significant features of the Biblical conception of the self, that is, its ability to render the seemingly capricious nature of suffering experienced by the self (either individual or

collective) as instances of divine judgement (Niebuhr, 1986d: 236). Viewed in this way, divine judgment is contextualised by the hope of salvation that goes beyond a rationalised conception of all things:

> "This faith in the sovereign of a divine creator, judge, and redeemer is not subject to rational proof, because it stands beyond and above the rational coherences of the world and can therefore not be proved by an analysis of these coherences. But a scientific and philosophical analysis of these coherences is not incapable of revealing where they post beyond themselves to a freedom which is not in them, to contradictions between each other which suggest a profounder mystery and meaning beyond them" (Niebuhr, 1986d: 236).

For Niebuhr, such mysteries are manifested in and through human history and it is his understanding of this history that it is meaningful and that it "passes through the sense of the tragic to a hope and an assurance which is "beyond tragedy" (Niebuhr ,1937: x):

> "This is a wisdom beyond human knowledge, but not contrary to human experience. Once known, the truth of the gospel explains our experiences which remain inexplicable on any other level. Through it we are able to understand life in all of its beauty and its terror, without being beguiled by its beauty or driven to despair by its terror" (Niebuhr, 1986a: 85).

The self, thus, finds itself within a world where there is a means of escape from the tragic circumstances of life so long as it aims to avoid certain pitfalls which will be discussed later in this chapter. Niebuhr advances a view of the self as a finite being that can through the power of The Lord find satisfaction in its transformation into “a new life” consisting of “love, joy and peace” (Niebuhr, 1986d: 236).

Interpreting, then, Niebuhr grasps the metra of things, including the broader definition and defines this as being trapped within a tragic world where the self is subject to endless tragedies. However, owing to his faith, Niebuhr establishes that there is a means to achieve “a new life” and thus push beyond tragedy but only if the metra of things are observed.

This is also a view that is consistent with Niebuhrian thought. Indeed, Niebuhr’s account of the radical freedom of human beings, i.e. as having the capacity to decide for themselves their choices and behaviours, renders the self into an ethical agent. Nevertheless, such an agent is also limited by its intellectual metra, in the broad sense, and its inability to manage the future outcomes that can be said to control the passage of history.

Applied to world politics, Niebuhr identifies the metra of collectives in both senses of the term metra. On the one hand the collective manifested as the nation-state is conceived of as overshooting metra and thus falling prey to its own self-image as eminent, and thus engendering a pretentiousness or false pride in its own accomplishments and power. Owing to the dynamic of hubris

and nemesis in Niebuhrian thought, such pride comes before a fall: the cycle of pathos, and irony manifests itself throughout the history of world politics and human history in general exposing the lack of wisdom or insight on the part of those who do not adequately grasp the metra of things.

We read Niebuhr in this chapter in light of the previous chapter on Dewey in order to advance the dialogue between our three heritage scholars. Just as we did in the case of Dewey, we understand Niebuhrian thought to be an answer to questions embedded within his standpoint. We will in this chapter create an interpretation of what those questions might be. Again, to reiterate, our purpose here is not to construct answers to the question of the truth of Niebuhr's thought, but rather to interpret his work, his texts, in a way that provides new meaning as a result of the fusion of horizon between the horizon of our understanding of the text and our own horizon employing the tragedian concepts we developed in the methodology chapter. This process will be repeated in the next chapter on Morgenthau's approach to world politics.

Section One: The Self and Judgment in Niebuhrian Thought

Just as we began the chapter upon Dewey with an interpretation of the self, and its relationship to the practice of judgement making, so we also have a section in this chapter in this chapter. These themes replicate themselves across

our interpretations of the three scholars in order to facilitate the dialogue within which they are placed in this thesis.

Niebuhr advances a conception of the sort of knowledge that the self, as a finite and intellectually limited being, can produce. Such knowledge is not just limited, it also arises in historically contingent circumstances: Niebuhr understood social meanings to arise only within “the flux of history” and the importance of rejecting accounts of history which claim to have transcended such a flux (Niebuhr, 1986: 234). Moreover, for Niebuhr the content of any interpretation of history must reflect the “governing” beliefs which are prevalent at the time and in the culture of those who construct those beliefs (Niebuhr, 1952: 152). There is thus, in Niebuhr, as in Dewey, a strong sense of the plasticity of our warranted beliefs and an understanding of how such beliefs reflect our historical and cultural contingencies.

Niebuhr conceives of the self as in a position to understand nature and its dynamics up to a point, and to have scope to exercise its freedom in such a way as to shape the process of history (Niebuhr, 1944a: 3). The self is a creator of the historical process as well as something which stands within the “flux” of that process (Niebuhr, 1986d: 234; Rice, 1993: 140). The self is also somewhat free of nature insofar as it has the capacity to register insights into what is eternal under its own power (Rice, 1993: 158). Niebuhr even understands the self to be somewhat mysterious and requires this sense in order to retain a religious outlook (Rice, 1993: 157-158).

To bring our hermeneutic approach to bear, we interpret this dimension of Niebuhr's thought to mean that the self is, in Niebuhr, defined by its metra, in the broader sense of the term. The self is a finite being, and thus even the intellectual and the theorist, can only secure some degree of knowledge concerning all things before the limits of human nature make their presence felt to the thinker or any human being. Niebuhr understands our knowledge of the self to be limited to the status of a warranted assertion, but he goes much further than Dewey, and suggest that there are even more mysteries to the self that even the religious will struggle to understand. Niebuhr is content with such limitations and focuses upon that aspect of human life which can be moulded to fit his ethical approach: the agency of the self as a being with freedom and the capability to make ethical and political judgments.

Such judgments must take place, however, in the context of the conditions of human life. Whereas Dewey envisages human life to be involved in a plastic universe that reflects our limited capacity to grasp the nature of our world as well as to manage such a world, Niebuhr argues that there are consequences for attitudes and actions that run contrary to how it is that Christians ought to behave.

Niebuhr understood good and bad behaviour to be visible in the passage of history itself, and indeed, Niebuhr understood that it is, amongst other things, within the passage of history that God encounters human beings (Niebuhr, 1986d: 234). For Niebuhr:

> "God is encountered in judgements whenever human ideals, values, and historical achievements are discovered to be in contradiction to the divine rather than in simple harmony with the ultimate coherence of things" (Niebuhr, 1986d: 234).

To interpret, then, these contradictions often become instances of where the self oversteps the just metra of things, in the narrow sense, which has been designed by The Lord as measures we ought not cross and then we are punished for its sinfulness through nemesis and thereby fall into patterns of history that Niebuhr claims to be empirically visible throughout history as it unfolds. However, there is also metra in the broader sense insofar as the self is totally at the mercy of divinity, its metra has distinctive limitations that puts it in an extremely vulnerable position to either The Lord or the Greek Gods.

Unlike in tragedy, however, Niebuhr understands The Lord to be a merciful God and judge and thus is fully prepared to forgive any particular human being who strives towards contrition and to put an end to their sins (Niebuhr, 1943: 332; Niebuhr, 2008: 155).

For Niebuhr, insights into how to behave in a way that is consistent with the moral laws found in the Gospels, can be found in the deployment of a Christian lens through which to interpret the sum of human history (Niebuhr, 1937: x-xi). History, to the extent that it can be understood, must be understood through a Christian lens (Niebuhr, 1952: 151-153). In our view, Niebuhr

conceives of history as displaying a certain pattern which, in the context of his Biblical insights, leads him to think that history has a directionality and order to it that will ultimately find its resolution at a specific point (Niebuhr, 1937: x-xi).

Niebuhr thus sets out two layers: (a) the layer of history as it plays out through human agency and consequence and (b) how this somewhat "tragic" process is ultimately dissolved by God: in Beyond Tragedy Niebuhr argues that:

> 'It is the thesis of these essays that the Christian view of history passes through the sense of the tragic to a hope and an assurance which is 'beyond tragedy'. The cross, which stands at the centre of the Christian world view, reveals both the seriousness of human sin and the purpose and power to overcome it. It reveals man violating the will of God in his highest moral and spiritual achievements (in Roman law and in Jewish religion) and God absorbing this evil into Himself in the very moment of its most vivid expression. Christianity's view of history is tragic insofar as it recognises evil as an inevitable concomitant of even the highest spiritual enterprise. It is beyond tragedy insofar as it does not regard evil as inherent in existence itself but as finally under the dominion of a good God' (Niebuhr, 1937: x).

To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear then: the self in Niebuhrian thought can achieve satisfaction in the form of religious piousness and its metra need not be seen as resulting in an outcome to its existence that is limited by that metra in the broader sense of the term. The significance of the

Niebuhrian view is that it provides a means of managing the metra of things and even, to believers at least, a way of transcending metra and pushing beyond the tragedy of human life.

Indeed, for Niebuhr, were the Gospels untrue, it is implied, then existence, life and all of history would be defined by 'pure tragedy' (Niebuhr, 1986a: 84-85). This quote illustrates how Niebuhr distances himself from the kind of tragic vision of the self that we embrace in terms of our own horizon. Furthermore, Niebuhr distances himself from 'pure tragedy' when he writes:

> "The pessimism of Greek tragedy is somewhat different from that of the philosophers and most nearly approaches the Christian interpretation of life. But, unlike Christian thought, it has no answer for the problem it presents. In Aeschylus and Sophocles the capricious jealousy of Zeus against mortal men of Homeric legend had been transmuted into the justified jealousy of the ultimate principle of law and order against the lawlessness of human passion. But unlike the philosophers, the dramatists see human passions as something more than mere impulses of the body. The principle of order and measure, represented by Zeus, is constantly defied by vitalities in human life which are creative as well as destructive. The tragedy of human history consists precisely in the fact that human life cannot be creative without being destructive" (Niebuhr, 1941: 11).

Pure tragedy, for Niebuhr, incorrectly portrays human creativity and vitality as defiance of divine order, that life cannot be "creative without being destructive" (Niebuhr, 1941: 11). Individuals who defy the advice to moderate their creativity come into defiant conflict with or between divine beings, and for Niebuhr this conflict finds no solution or resolution within pure tragic discourse (Niebuhr, 1941: 11-12).

To bring our horizon to bear, then, Niebuhr remains doubtful of the notion that the metra of things, in the broader sense of the term, can be managed by the self either as an individual or as a collective. This, we think puts Niebuhr at odds with Dewey, insofar as Dewey incorporates a spirit of experimentalism into his pragmatism and thus is able to see in practice if a particular metra can be well managed. For Niebuhr, the limitations of human beings give the self an opportunity to behave in line with the metra of things in the narrow sense of the term and thus to alert us to the discipline that we ought to expect for behaving in a sinful way. The most important sin, is the sin of pretentiousness:

> "For the destructiveness in human life is primarily the consequence of exceeding, not the bounds of nature, but much more ultimate limits. The God of the Bible is, like Zeus, "jealous". But His jealousy is aroused not by the achievements of culture and civilisation. Man's dominion over nature is declared to be a rightful one. Divine jealousy is aroused by man's refusal to observe the limits of his freedom. There are such limits, because man is a creature as well as creator. The limits cannot be sharply defined. Therefore,

> distinctions between good and evil cannot be made with absolute precision. But it is clear that the great evils of history are caused by human pretensions which are not inherent in the gift of freedom. They are a corruption of that gift. These pretensions are the source of the ironic contrasts of strength leading to weakness, of wisdom issuing in foolishness" (Niebuhr, 1952: 158).

The Biblical view of the self, as defined by its free will, can act in a manner consistent with The Lord's will, and this brings about the hope and possibility that salvation can be achieved (Niebuhr, 1952: 158; Niebuhr, 1986a: 85). However, for Niebuhr pretensions and a false sense of the self's eminence is ubiquitous throughout human history and thus frequently results in tragic and ironic reversals of fortune. Intervention not from the furies, as the Greeks would expect, but by The Lord for whom "the children of darkness" have come to rule across the historical process.

The inevitability that the self will employ its free will and the gift of freedom to misbehave and attempt to build its own eminence is central to Niebuhr's conception of the self. Indeed, this vision of life is informed by his understanding of how sin, or what could be called misbehaviour, is 'pitiful,' hence a pathos, and happens whenever the self, in its individual or collective forms, adopts an exclusive reliance upon what is revealed through its own mind,

as well as when a hubristic pride becomes manifested because of a false confidence in one's own "eminence" (Niebuhr, 1937: 167-168).

Although Niebuhr acknowledges that it is anxiety which frequently drives the self to sin, often arising from reflections concerning the indeterminacy of their own existence, Niebuhr sees this as no excuse for sinning (Niebuhr, 1941: 266). Although to an extent an understandable response by the anxious self to take self-responsibilty for their own wellbeing and safety in an indeterminate and potentially threatening reality, for Niebuhr this is a sinful deed that reflects a doubt in the will of The Lord to deliver what is just to all peoples (Niebuhr, 1941: 266-267; Niebuhr, 1941: 212, 267-269; Niebuhr, 1963: 15-16).

To bring our own horizon to bear, Niebuhr's conception of the self as sinful for acting in a responsible manner would seem to set the bar for the self very high, and to imply that "the children of light" have to face no tragic agon and the metra of things do not in effect apply so long as the self employs practices which are consistent with the Bible and the Gospels.

Attempts, that is, to assume responsibility for one's own safety, as well as sense of certainty, is the sinful reaction which comes from the absence of humility to divine grace. We thus bring about further sin, i.e. pride in our accomplishments and in overcoming such uncertainties (Niebuhr, 1941: 266).

We interpret the following quote to mean that for Niebuhr, the "defect" in the self is illustrated in how, such as in the case of the Garden of Eden, it may

misbehave and rebel against what The Lord has determined to be its best interests. The self eventually comes to "weep for itself" and thus in doing so creates the right conditions for its eventual repentance and eschewal of excessive pride or hubris (Niebuhr, 1937: 168). Although not a total or "pure" tragedy, as there remains a measure of hope that some belong to the saved citizenry of heaven, as in the Augustinian framework, it nonetheless explains (implicitly) much of history as a pattern of managing, and sometimes escaping, the consequences of overshooting the metra of things:

> "The cross does not reveal life at cross purposes with itself. On the contrary, it declares that what seems to be an inherent defect in life itself is really a contingent defect in the soul of each man, the defect of the sin which he commits in his freedom. If he can realise that fact, if he can weep for himself; if he can repent, he can also be saved. He can be saved by hope and faith. His hope and faith will separate the character of life in its essential reality from life as it is revealed in sinful history" (Niebuhr, 1937: 168).

For Niebuhr, free agents may misbehave and abuse their freedom, and create pretension.

To bring our horizon to bear upon this, we view this line of arguing to be one where it is somewhat restrictive to conceive of nemesis as arising only as a result of a particular set of circumstances. The metra of the self, in our view, and in Dewey's, is such that whenever and for whatever reason, nemesis occurs,

it would be foolish to claim that this is a result of a handful of factors, when in reality each nemesis may be unique to that particular circumstance. We are not in an intellectual position to narrow down the causes of nemesis into a pattern which seemingly brings meaning to the sum of the human historical process. This would seem to overstep the metra, in the narrow sense, of the self/thinker for whom there is no timeless way to determine the causes of nemesis as tightly and as specifically as Niebuhr does in his standpoint.

This is not to say that the Niebuhrian account does not provide a contribution to our understanding of world politics, only that its account of the consequences of metra is somewhat narrow and restricted as a result of his religious commitments.

However, while Niebuhr describes the experiences of modern man as belonging to "the category of pathos," and nemesis arising from divine judgement upon human pretensions, there remains the hope that the self will exercise its freedom in a way consistent with the of the "children of light" (Niebuhr, 1944a: 19; Niebuhr, 2015a: 777):

> "Man is the kind of animal who cannot merely live. If he lives at all he is bound to seek the realization of his true nature; and to his true nature belongs his fulfilment in the lives of others. The will to live is thus transmuted into the will to self-realisation; and self-realisation involves self-giving in relations to others. When this desire for self-realisation is fully explored it becomes apparent that it is subject to the paradox

> that the highest form of self-realisation is the consequence of self-giving, but that it cannot be the intended consequences without being prematurely limited. Thus the will to live is finally transmuted into its opposite in the sense that only in self-giving can the self be fulfilled, for: "He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it"." (Niebuhr, 1944a: 19).

To bring our horizon to bear then, this passage gets to the heart of Niebuhr's answer to the question, how do the children of light live in a way that is consistent with the Gospels. Niebuhr hopes indeed that humanity will find it within their hearts to embrace the notion that there is a paradox of self-realisation that in order to advance self-realisation the self must "loseth his life" through a standpoint of self-giving. However, his political and ethical imperatives answer the question of what if the self does not find it within its heart to embrace such an ethic of giving.

Niebuhr is not naïve, and indeed, is highly attuned to what he refers to as "a contingent defect in the soul of each man, the defect of the which he commits in his freedom" (Niebuhr, 1937: 168). Although Niebuhr conceives of life as "capable of destroying the evil which has been produced in it" his outlook continues to draw attention to how it is that the self frequently gives into its anxieties and attempts to build a measure of security for itself and thus opens up the road to sin (Niebuhr, 1941: 267; Niebuhr, 1952: 158).

These ironies are found in their strongest whenever there is a defiance of divine laws by the idolatrous “pretensions” of individuals and collectives, who make themselves the final “source and ends” of life: something which leads Niebuhr to argue that there is an implicit vanity amongst the pretentious that is manifested as a belief that they themselves are more magnificent than the divine (Niebuhr, 1986b: 24). For Niebuhr, to mistake oneself to be “God-like” is something manifested in history in cases where politics contrives to embolden a nation-state to such an extent that it begins to over-stress and exaggerate its accomplishment or “eminence” (Niebuhr, 1937: 212). The tragic ironies of history play out, thus, within the history of International Relations whenever the eminence of nation-states and “civilisations” is exposed as false by a divine judge: the very source of the presumed “eminence” becomes the very internal vulnerability that occasions divine judgment (Niebuhr, 1937: 212; 1986b: 24-25):

> “Every quality which leads to eminence in human history represents, on one side of it, an extension of a force of nature by which the harmonies of nature and disturbed, the inequalities of nature accentuated, the cruelties of nature aggravated and human history involved in self-destruction. These tragic aspects of human excellence and superiority are usually obscured in history. They become fully apparent only in rare moments when empires and civilisations decay and when it is recognised that they were brought low, not

> by some external foe but by the defect of their own virtues" (Niebuhr, 1937: 212).

Tragic ironies occur for Niebuhr in a manner that exposes the negative impact of employing reason as a tool to quell the self's inner anxieties arising from its own indeterminate situations. A reliance upon knowledge which is revealed exclusively by reason, is singled out by Niebuhr as particularly at risk of vulnerability insofar as it often creates, in particular on the part of collectives, a sense of pride which can all to easily turn into the sin of "pretension" (Niebuhr, 1993: 154-155; Niebuhr, 1960: xxix). This occurs in the context of how the nation-state develops an exaggerated sense of its own entitlement and thus adopts a righteous attitude with regards to what it regards as an infringement upon its national interests (Niebuhr, 1993: 154-155; Niebuhr, 1960: xxix). Thus, for Niebuhr, there is an association between how the self puts into practice the transformation of rational theory into policy, and the sense of entitlement and frustration that rational policy, such as a policy designed to advance the national interests of the collective, encounters opposition.

In the case of the USA, Niebuhr was concerned that the self-idolatry, i.e. excessive pride or superbia, in itself would prove a more fundamental threat to national wellbeing than Soviet Communism (Tjalve, 2008: 76). If it was the case that the USA was a special case of excessive pretension and an excessive

sense of its own eminence, then there would surely be, in Niebuhr's formula, a tragic ironic consequence to this extreme disregard of the notion that it is only through making The Lord the ends of our lives that tragic ironies may be mitigated. Indeed, and drawing upon the standpoint of Augustine, Niebuhr writes:

> "Augustine's conception of evil which threatens the human community on every level is a corollary of his doctrine of selfhood. "Self-love" is the source of evil rather than some residual natural impulse which mind has not yet completely mastered. This excessive love of self, sometimes also defined as pride or superbia, is explained as the consequence of the self's abandonment of God as its true end and of making itself "a kind of end"." (Niebuhr, 1986e: 125).

Moreover, the power of The Lord is not to be doubted for Niebuhr for whom the Old Testament connects the exercise of divine power with the sense of vulnerability that human beings have in the face of such power:

> "God is the ultimate source of that indestructible order in the world against which man's pride and self-will beat in vain. Here Christian faith, drawing its conceptions of divine justice from the teaching of the Old Testament prophets, reveals similarities with the interpretations of the Greek tragedies, in which the power of Zeus is conceived of as the final order and power which ultimately defeats all lesser majesties and forces which are arrayed

> against it. All lesser sources of power, which seek proudly to usurp the position of Zeus, are finally brought low" (Niebuhr, 1986b: 24).

Such lesser forces include the nation, which in a moment of self-idolatry incurs a terrible nemesis:

> "In the Bible, particularly in Hebraic prophetism, there is no question about this point. The nations, judges, and princes of the world are all in partial defiance of the divine creator and judge of the world; and the terrible character of His wrath is a justified judgment upon the various idolatries of history" (Niebuhr, 1986b: 24).

In this Niebuhr is setting out his view that there can be no doubt that self-love or pretension, or hubris, will lead to the terrible intervention of The Lord and thus makes it incumbent upon the self to make judgements which mitigate this ironical and pathetic situation. Niebuhr's thought thus identifies the wisdom of rooting out this pride where possible by "a repentant attitude towards false completions of life" (Niebuhr, 1986d: 235).

Section Two: Ethical and Moral Imperatives

The intellectual scene of the mid-century in the USA was characterised by an optimistic, liberal and positive pragmatic outlook which in no small part was defined by John Dewey. Hans Morgenthau, indeed, as a representative of having had a "European" education discovered his new adopted country of the USA to have a climate of excessive optimism and an overreliance in his view upon ahistorical or pragmatist approaches (Frei, 2001: 184). Morgenthau found that the USA was a society that deeply favoured the notion of the scientific as well as a general acceptance of the notion of "progress" (Frei, 2001: 181, 186). For Morgenthau, US society believed that science would bring under the power of reason the chaos of modern life and thus by a form of alchemy bring about a better society (Frei, 2001: 186).

Morgenthau was not alone in this reaction to the intellectual climate of the time. Indeed, Niebuhr reacted in much the same manner to many idealists for whom the badge of "historical optimism" was added and described this upwards progression of science leading towards the accomplishment of good ends (Frei, 2001: 186). The term is apt insofar as it does indeed reflect how for idealist scholars in mid-century America there was a considerable hope that the progress of reason could be used to benefit mankind as a whole (Niebuhr, 1993: 153-154, 156). For Niebuhr, reasoning does not represent a medicine to treat social problems because it alone cannot persuade other social and political actors to behave differently from what they would otherwise do (Niebuhr, 1993: 155-156). The light of reason alone is not sufficiently powerful interest groups,

such as wealthy capitalists, to act against their material interests (Niebuhr, 1993: 155-156). Indeed, Niebuhr found the whole notion that the social sciences could through the exclusive practice of intellectual activities generate the same kind of transformation of the world that the natural sciences had accomplished in the Victorian era; indeed, the notion that all that is required for the social science is to catch up with the success of the natural sciences, the so called "cultural lag" argument, is something that Niebuhr finds problematic (Niebuhr, 1993: 156-157).

For Niebuhr, historical optimists err in their optimistic beliefs that intellectual enterprises are sufficiently capable of acting as instruments through which the delivery of normative progress in politics and international relations can take place (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). The 'moralist' and the 'educator' are both interchangeable parts of historical optimism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxii). They represent idealistic rationalism which overlooks or poorly understands (Niebuhr, 1959: 116). A critique of moralism is found when Niebuhr writes in 1959 that:

> "The educational enterprise for this nation, in short, must include a thorough re-examination of the problems of political morality, which will help the new generation to understand that any consideration of power and interest in analysing the peace within a nation and among the nations need not be a cynical defiance of the moral order but can well be what responsible statesmanship has always been: an effort to

> coerce competitive and contradictory human aspirations and interests into some kind of tolerable order and justice. Such a task is a highly moral one" (Niebuhr, 1959: 116).

Niebuhr's approach to moralism and the need to redesign the conception of a whole generation such that they will acquire the necessary practices needed in order to continue the furtherance of "order and justice" is central to his understanding of how historical optimism will be transcended and an alternative more resilient approach to ethics and politics might be born. Such an approach must not repeat the mistakes, or pathos of rational man.

Indeed, the pathos of rational man is a manifestation of the tragic ironies that we find within the general patterns of history (Niebuhr, 2008: 154). Niebuhr conceives of rational man as hubristic in attempting to aggregate human achievements as part of a cumulative pattern of development such that the progression of history, as it were, carries the progress of society and ethics (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion and sees in such hubris an implicit "desire" that "would keep man's ends" that is to say his destiny firmly "under his control and in his power" (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). Rational Man aims to "prematurely to complete" the historical process (Niebuhr, 1943: 332). If mankind proceeds down a path of self-reliance then a "false centre" to life is constructed and thus a failure to trust in divine deliverance (Niebuhr, 1941: 267; Niebuhr, 1952: 158):

> "The Biblical view of human nature and destiny moves within the framework of irony with remarkable consistency. Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden of Eden because the first pair allowed "the serpent" to insinuate that, if only they would defy the limits which God had set even for his most unique creature, man, they would be like God. All subsequent human actions are infected with a pretentious denial of human limits" (Niebuhr 2008: 158-159).

Humans exercise in their freedom the capacity to overstate their stature and thus cultivate pride in their eminence; this is how Niebuhr conceives of "original sin" (Tjalve, 2008: 63).

To bring our horizon to bear, we interpret this view to indicate that for Niebuhr, the metra of things, the measures that The Lord sets down, have been overstepped since the time of the mythical Garden of Eden. Indeed, in Niebuhr's Biblical vision, this myth serves to illustrate the origin of original sin and such a notion brings with a clear ethical (and indeed political) imperative: do not be like Eve and be defy the metra that The Lord has established. That is, to observe the boundaries and measures in all things and to act responsibly with the freedom that has been given to all human beings or else face nemesis and the tragic ironies of history.

Niebuhr's polemic battle with historical optimism stems from this opposition to Niebuhr's opposition stems from his own conviction that human

life and history is profoundly shaped by dimensions which are beliefs central to his own faith, and what he calls his 'historic religion' (Niebuhr, 1986c: 13). There is no scholar for whom Reinhold Niebuhr held to be the best example of historical optimism than that of John Dewey and in particular his concept of 'intelligence' (Niebuhr, 1993: 154). Niebuhr argues that the exercise of 'intelligence' in Dewey's Pragmatism is problematic in over-emphasising the extent to which disinterested reason can be used as a tool to achieve social change (Niebuhr, 1993: 154). As we have seen in the preceding chapter Dewey's conception of intelligence is a dialogical approach which draws in the insights from the widest possible number of contributors and is not a rationalistic approach based upon non-contingent a priori.

Niebuhr rightly advances the notion that reasoning can never exist as a neutral or independent force within social interactions, however, he is quite wrong in suggesting that it is Dewey that advocates an unbiased and autonomous conception of reasoning or to have erroneously overstated its possibilities and potential (Niebuhr, 2013: xxix-xxxvi). However, as we have seen, Dewey is alert to the metra of things and it underscores most of his thought.

Nevertheless, this attack upon Dewey exposes the directionality of Niebuhr's ethical and political imperatives insofar as it exposes his forceful anti-idealist stance. For Niebuhr, the application of disinterested reasoning is a useless palliative given the depth of human corruption (Niebuhr, 2013). This is

not surprising given Niebuhr's view that our humanness is highly amenable to corruption, largely pride based, and it is this which frequently characterises our social struggles (Niebuhr, 1941; Niebuhr, 1943; Niebuhr, 2013).

Niebuhr saw it as folly to think that disinterested reasoning can remedy social ills, merely by educating away any ignorance on the part of those who might stand in the way of social progress (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Only through a contest of power can justice be accomplished (Niebuhr 2013: xxx-xxxi). "Social inertia" is caused, argues Niebuhr, by "predatory self-interest" and this is something that the idealist fails to grasp (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx):

> "Pure idealists underestimate the perennial power of particular and parochial loyalties, operating as a counter force against the achievements of the wider community" (Niebuhr, 1944: 176).

For Niebuhr, it is the corruption inherent in human nature that impregnates social relations with challenging roadblocks that resist the accomplishment of political justice, and this is all the more so at the level of international politics (Niebuhr, 2013).

In the preface to Moral Man, is implicitly identified with the "moralist" or the "educator" and is generally criticised as assuming that "the egoism of the individual is being progressively checked" in part by "the development of rationality" and in part by "religiously inspired goodwill" through which "social

harmony between all the human societies and collectives" can be induced (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). "Moralists" Niebuhr argues:

> "disregard the political necessities in the struggle for justice in human society by failing to recognise those elements in man's collective behaviour which belong to the order of nature and can never be completely brought under the dominion of reason or conscience" (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx).

As with "moralists" so it goes with "educators" who Niebuhr criticises for inappropriately employing natural science "experimentalism" in the social sciences as a means of generating knowledge for the purposes of "moral and social pedagogy" (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Chief amongst scholars advocating "experimentalism" for Niebuhr was John Dewey (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi; Niebuhr, 1993: 156; Niebuhr 2008: 80-81). For Niebuhr, Dewey's supposed "abstract and sterile" thought is simply another "rationalism" (Rice, 1993: 23).

Niebuhr took up the polemic against the "educator" and liberal reformists, for whom Dewey was counted amongst their leaders, and discounted them for their failure to understand the importance and centrality of conflict, coercion and violence in the shaping of political outcomes (Craig, 2003: 32-33; Fox, 1985: 136). For Craig, Niebuhr understood John Dewey's political thought

as “hopelessly idealistic in a world of self-interest and conflict” (Craig, 2003: 33).

Williams illustrates how some scholars employ a certain way of arguing whereby he establishes certain “types” which represent various belief-systems and are moulded so as to be what are in effect over-simplifications of what is basic to that tradition (Rice, 1993: 18). Such a style of arguing permits broad brush strokes of grand cultural criticism (Rice, 1993: 18). Niebuhr does indeed employ this style of arguing; as Rice suggests Dewey’s pragmatism is a casualty of these broad strokes (Rice, 1993: 18-19).

In Pathos of Liberalism Niebuhr characterises Dewey’s political ethics as unable to recognise the insufficiency and limitations upon human beings (Niebuhr, 1993: 154). Niebuhr’s Dewey, he implies, drastically overestimates the capacity of “reason” to act as a restraining and moderating force upon the social conflicts that are inherent in politics (Niebuhr, 1993: 154): for Niebuhr, Dewey errs in failing to acknowledge “the subordination of reason to interests” (Niebuhr, 1993: 154). Furthermore, as Westbrook argues, Niebuhr’s Dewey represents no more than ‘a sunny exponent of the inevitable triumph of human intelligence’ (Westbrook, 1991: 525). Such a ‘rosy optimism’ erred for Niebuhr, because it ‘neglected and repudiated politics’ as well as the ‘struggle for power’ (Westbrook, 1991: 523-524).

> "The invariable implication of this assumption is that, with a little more time, a little more adequate moral and social pedagogy and a generally higher development of human intelligence, our social problems will approach solution" (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx).

Niebuhr famously declares: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (Niebuhr in: Bingham, 1972: 17).

Against his own gritty historical overview Niebuhr points to the "gradualism" of Dewey" supposedly "rationalist" alternative (Fox, 1985: 136). In Niebuhr's version of Dewey, the pragmatist takes "reason" to propel the course of history in a progressive direction (Fox, 1985: 136). Niebuhr's Dewey is a rationalist for whom there is an inherent force within history within the historical process itself which advances almost automatically liberal "progress" (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr writes of philosophers who view the sum of the whole historical process and think that there is a 'cumulative' pattern through which human beings reap the rewards of their own accomplishments (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion when he argues implicitly that history itself cannot redeem; such things are, by contrast, the exclusive responsibility of The Lord (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). For Niebuhr, human hubris and error are manifested in history and are "prompted by the desire" that "would keep man's ends under his control and in his power" (Niebuhr, 1943:

331). Indeed, history is “tragic” because there is always an attempt by men to take control of their own destiny, to bring it under their own power and to “prematurely to complete” the historical process (Niebuhr, 1943: 332). This attempt to take control of their destiny arises from an exclusive reliance by the self upon reason alone.

Furthermore, in his famous The Irony of American History, Niebuhr specifies how it is the “pretension” of human beings that is a constant throughout history (Niebuhr, 2008: 155). This represents the pretension of thinking that human destiny can be taken under the control of human beings (Niebuhr, 1943: 331-332). For Niebuhr “the whole drama of human history is under the scrutiny of a divine judge” and it is the pretensions of human beings in taking their destiny under their own control which invites a divine “laughter” (Niebuhr, 2008: 155). This echoes the relationship between hubris and nemesis in tragedy. The pretensions of individuals/collectives incur hubris, i.e. the error of thinking oneself to be godlike or capable of dictating the course of history. This hubris is judged by the gods and they choose to impose their wrath upon humans to punish them for their hubris. However, unlike in tragedy, Niebuhr sees The Lord as a merciful judge who favours human aspiration and who may well forgive those who mitigate their pride and who are contrite in recognising their vain pretensions (Niebuhr, 1943: 332; Niebuhr, 2008: 155).

Echoing his earlier arguments that the self in its collective form can become a conduit for the transmuted desires and selfishness of the self in its

individual form, Niebuhr argues that in devoting itself to the cause of a nation, it can become evil (Ashworth, 2014: 235; Niebuhr, 1944a: 9-10) Whereas "the children of light" strive to bring self-interest "under the discipline of a higher law" (i.e. the law of self-realisation through self-giving) evil "is always the assertion of self-interest without regard to the whole" regardless of whether or not the whole is understood to be "the immediate community" or "the total community of mankind" (Niebuhr, 1944a: 9).

Niebuhr, thus, provides the answer of needing to restrain the destructive potential and indeed evil of the nation-state to his wider question of what to do if the self in its collective form beings to sin. At one level it requires an awareness of the nation-state's capacity to do great evil such as in how it can command the "devotion" of a collective and thus "may become evil" because it ignores the whole in the pursuit of its own self-interest (Niebuhr, 1944a: 9-10).

It can also do great evil as a result of its inherent lack of self-restraint as explained in Moral Man and Immoral Society where Niebuhr's overarching argument can be summarised by Ashworth:

> "To Niebuhr the central problem of human societies was that, while individuals were capable of moral behaviour because they can sacrifice themselves, collectivities and societies of people were not. Rather, groups, including states, are amoral entities whose power can only be checked by another countervailing power" (Ashworth, 2014: 235).

The exercise of self-interested power with no concern for the global demos as a whole will find itself likely “checked” by another nation-state(s) that puts its own interests ahead of the whole. In the international sphere:

> “patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism. Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle of all the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervour that the critical attitude of the individual towards the nation and its enterprises is almost completely destroyed” (Niebuhr, 1960: 91).

To bring our horizon to bear then, there is in both Niebuhr and Dewey a sense in which the position of the global demos, something which represents the whole, must be considered by nation-states when devising their own national priorities and policies.

Niebuhr’s argument echoes Dewey’s view that warranted assertions are ethical if they advance the interests of “mankind” as a whole. Again, however, Dewey provides the ethical and theoretical resources needed to further refine this position and to explain how a community of inquirers can proceed towards a more inclusive account of the diversity of voices within the global demos who may have a differing view upon what are the interests of the whole actually are.

In Niebuhr's view, the whole is best served by transcending the tragic ironies of history by bringing an end (to the extent possible) those forms of pretension (hubris) which frequently bring about nemesis. But this is, in effect, to take one voice, Niebuhr's own, as entitled to determine the interests of the whole. This has the effect of rendering other voices out there in the global demos unheard in the dialogue as to what the interests of the whole ought to look like.

Section Three: Application to World Politics

In relation to policy, Niebuhr advances is a via media position between two poles of "realism" and "idealism." Indeed, in A Protest Against A Dilemma's Two Horns, Niebuhr rejects using the rather confusing terms of international 'idealism' and 'realism' (Niebuhr, 1950: 338-339). Both approaches, he writes, create a rationalisation and abstraction of various patterns of empirical data; patterns which are excessively rational, i.e. it relies upon what is revealed by reason exclusively, and thus represents an inappropriate way to properly grasp 'the tortuous course of human history' (Niebuhr, 1950: 338). Whereas 'idealists' point to the need for supranational governance in order to escape the possibility of war, 'realists' go too far in the opposite direction and accept the principle that that war is 'inevitable.' The realist notion that the USA ought to take military action to defeat the USSR at an opportune time rather

than to wait for an attack is in RN's view deeply problematic (Niebuhr, 1950: 338).

Niebuhr, indeed, sets a very high bar for the international agent to reach, especially for those who aren't able to embrace what is revealed through Biblical faith. Those international actors for whom there is hope individually, or the greater self of society, must acknowledge their sins and repent in order that hope of salvation is restored (Niebuhr, 1937: 168).

World politics is not without hope; Niebuhr sees history as a process that keeps alive the hope of salvation:

> "We do not believe that the human enterprise will have a tragic conclusion; but the ground of our hope lies not in human capacity but in divine power and mercy, in the character of the ultimate reality, which carries the human enterprise" (Niebuhr, 1937: 24).

However, such hope is juxtaposed to the tragic irony of politics and international relations which is found throughout human history.
Niebuhr argues that the language of 'irony' is better than that of 'tragedy' when interpreting politics and by extension international relations (Niebuhr, 1952: 153). Curiously we could regard this ironist approach as a "comic" interpretation of history whereby a measure of humour is generated, albeit a

dark humour, as a result of the patterns of repetition and reoccurrence throughout the drama of history whenever ironic ‘contrasts and incongruities’ are manifested (Niebuhr, 1952: 153). Politics and IR are, like history, defined by ironic repeating patters which for Niebuhr both affirm the significance of understanding tragedy as well as suggest its limitations (Niebuhr, 1937: 24; Niebuhr, 1952: 151-162).

To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear then, we interpret this dimension of Niebuhrian thought to indicate how the metra of international actors is visible in their tendency to overshoot metra and defy the Gods, who eliminate such pretensions through the furies, nemesis and wrath.

As Wohlforth puts it, Niebuhr sought to advance his realism as something that extended beyond international affairs and served “as a general approach to the study of politics” (Wohlforth, 2008: 134). Nevertheless, his reflections on international relations are situated within his religious framework. We have exposed the implications of this framework for his international ethical thought. In our hermeneutic interpretation, the significance of hubris in Niebuhrian thought is central to his understanding of the normative role of the international actor in international relations. This view is also echoed by Tjalve, who makes a similar point that for Niebuhr the danger of actions becoming sin and occasioning ironic reversals arises not from the vitality and creativity of mankind (as Niebuhr identifies in classical tragedy) but rather, first and

foremost, from pride (Tjalve, 2008: 66-67). This view, Niebuhr declares, is driven by his embrace of Augustinian ideas (Niebuhr, 1986e: chapter 10). Similarly to Niebuhrian thought, its Augustinian predecessor locates the source of pride within the radical freedom possessed by human beings (Tjalve, 2008: 66-67). Such pride is exaggerated whenever indeterminate situations are seemingly well managed through the exercise of reason. However, as a sceptic Niebuhr points out that such knowledge is provisional and does not reflect that which is revealed through Biblical faith (Tjalve, 2008: 67). This partial blindness exposes how, like in the case of Augustine, it is not bodily impulses that bring about misbehaviour but rather the attempt to cope with indeterminate situations through self-reliance. This sin is compounded by any pride or superbia that such self-reliance encourages (Tjalve, 2008: 67).

For Niebuhr, the nation-state, especially in its technologically advanced, industrialised and modern manifestation, is particularly likely to believe that its "eminence" arises from its capacity for self-reliance. There is a psychological aspect here insofar as any egoism or greed lying latent within the citizen is transmuted into a socially acceptable collective force which takes its political objective to be the pursuit of the national interest (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). This effect forms into a kind of mesh across the international system where the advance of one state's interests is seen as a loss for another. This force is so powerful both within the state and without that the cultivation of rationality – as a cultural means of softening egoism – and the encouragement of 'religiously

inspired good will' and scientific social engineering, merely represent misplaced hope in the capacity of human beings to overcome their own natural weaknesses (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx).

Niebuhr's international and political thought is to some extent more "pessimistic" than his wider Biblical framework. Whereas the self can reach salvation and accomplish a great measure of hope in that salvation, the Niebuhrian conception of international relations regards conflict between collective groups and individuals as inevitable. Further, power can only be challenged by power (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi; Ashworth, 2014: 235). Niebuhr uses a Marxist example to illustrate that power determines the outcome of political events, in particular the power of privileged elites who, in defence of their own 'predatory self-interests', act with great effort and success to preserve the status-quo, however unjust, in order to preserve their position (Niebuhr, 1960: xxx).

Niebuhr considered international relations to be defined in part by transnational interests of ruling classes who may find in their counterparts of other nation-states a shared interest in maintaining their own positions of power (Niebuhr, 1936: 36). The industrial worker class, Niebuhr argues, will never obtain a greater measure of liberty without obtaining the requisite power needed to achieve concrete changes (Niebuhr, 1960: xxxi).

Niebuhr thus caricatures privileged and powerful elites as furthering their own selfish ends (Niebuhr, 1936: 36). Certain social classes, such as the then ruling elite in the UK, Niebuhr argues, put their own class interests ahead of the

national interest and thus seemingly confirm his pessimistic assumption that political actors, especially powerful actors, will act selfishly and without normative responsibility (Niebuhr, 1936: 36). Niebuhr's political thought therefore begins (at a certain point in his life) with a distinctly class-conscious understanding of politics, although he moves away from this position over time (Tjalve, 2008: 64-66). This dimension of Niebuhr's thought is implied when he argues that the industrial worker will win freedom from privileged classes if, and only if, they acquire real political power to 'contest the power of the strong' (Niebuhr, 1960: xxxi).

Niebuhr's views had grown stronger by the 1940s. The calamity of the Second World War highlighted the tragic ironies he would later discuss in the 1950s. The arrogance of humanity, and in particular the pride/superbia of the preceding century, are identified as root causes for the calamity (Niebuhr, 1944b: 194). Writing towards the end of the war, Niebuhr maintains that politics, including that which takes place within international affairs, acts 'to beguile, deflect, and harness collective egoism' (Niebuhr, 1944b: 195).

Applying our hermeneutic methodology, the international actor in Niebuhrian thought is required to understand how the nation-state is defined by its own self-defeating metra insofar as being part of being one unit amongst egoistically competitive units creates tensions and oppositions that ultimately form themselves into power contests. The best way for the international agent to act from an ethical perspective is to restrain the egoism and pride of his own

nation-state and thus minimize the tragic ironies that are quite frequent in the history of international relations.

Niebuhr argues that the post-World War Two superpower tensions are marked by an uneasy peace generated by the “mutual fear of mutual annihilation” in a potential thermonuclear war (Niebuhr, 1963: 6). Although Niebuhr acknowledges that there is a material and ideological dimension to the power contest between these superpowers, he nonetheless maintains that it is primarily the false pride and greed of collectives which underscores this competition (Niebuhr, 1963: 6). The superpower contest brought the world to the “edge of an abyss”, and Niebuhr feared that both sides were so filled with national pride and hubris that in a moment of supreme national peril, they would perhaps use “the ultimate weapon in a mood of desperation” (Niebuhr, 1962: 155; Niebuhr, 1963: 6). Niebuhr thus understood the peril of power as well as its ethical utility in securing political ends.

For Niebuhr, the end of the Cold War would seem to be an impossible dream when he writes that the USA must be prepared to endure ‘decades’ and even ‘centuries’ of stalemate with an implacable foe (Niebuhr, 1962: 157). For Niebuhr, the material, technological and ideological assets of the superpowers were sufficient foundations upon which the selfish competition could go on indefinitely. For Niebuhr, thus, there would have been no grounds for exiting the Cold War standoff so long as human nature and the material circumstances of the standoff remained unchanged.

Moreover, a heterogeneous supra-nation-state society would struggle to hold together (Niebuhr, 1944a: 164-168):

> "It may be axiomatic that the less a community is held together by cohesive forces in the texture of its life the more must it be held together by power. This fact leads to the dismal conclusion that the international community lacking these inner cohesive forces, must find its first unity through cohesive force to a larger degree than is compatible with the necessities of justice. Order will have to be purchased at the price of justice; though it is quite obvious that if too much justice is sacrificed to the necessities of order, the order will prove too vexatious to last" (Niebuhr, 1944a: 168).

Niebuhr implies in this passage that an increase in international cooperation, order and peace, and the development of more shared normative values, is at odds with the prevailing practice of international relations: the pursuit and exercise of power. Although for Niebuhr the exercise of power is a prerequisite for the possibility of shared arrangements, this arrangement must be predicated upon good values in order to be ethically legitimate. As great nations acquire power over smaller nations, they encounter the gap between the power they exercise and the absence of any normative authority upon which the exercise of this power ought to rest (Niebuhr, 1944a: 171).

The relationship between power and the absence of shared social linkages and normative connections is illustrated by Niebuhr with reference to the end of

British rule in India whereby the removal of a third (imperial) party's exercise of power created a situation in which there could not be a shared constitutional arrangement between Hindus and Muslims (Niebuhr, 1948: 385). The absence of 'social tissue' suggests, to Niebuhr, that any attempt to build legal and constitutional supranational systems would be impossible to sustain (Niebuhr, 1948: 379-380, 383). Even when 'social tissue' is found, such as in the 'self-evident' shared norms of all peoples, it 'does not contain very much specific content' (Niebuhr, 1948: 487).

Indeed, for Niebuhr:

> "While there are halting efforts to create an international mind and conscience, capable of coping with this social situation, modern man has progressed only a little beyond his fathers in extending his ethical attitudes beyond the group to which he is organic and which possesses symbols, vivid enough to excite his social sympathies" (Niebuhr 1960: 49).

In other words, humanity's inability to see beyond our own cultural horizons limits the scope for the interpenetration and merging of global cultural understandings.

Niebuhr's views on international relations are further illustrated in his identification of a link between political actors advancing their self-interest and the way such actors, whether 'patriots' or state officials, become outraged when

the honour of their nation is somehow infringed, however petty the offence (Niebuhr, 1960: 93). Collectively, the offence is felt throughout the nation and the national interest becomes little more than a 'vicarious selfishness' whereby private egoism is concentrated in a collective form and projected upon other nations, thereby creating antagonistic relations (Niebuhr, 1960: 93).

There is a dimension of Niebuhr's thought which holds out the possibility of a road map for international relations to push towards a future less defined by tragic ironies. Hope for international society can be found in the "insecurities and ambiguities of the possible" (Niebuhr, 1948: 388). Indeed, Niebuhr writes:

> "Beyond the national (and in a few cases the imperial) community lies international chaos, slightly qualified by minimal forms of international cooperation" (Niebuhr, 1944a: 153).

To interpret, we have seen how in Niebuhrian thought overshooting the metra of things frequently occasions hubris/nemesis and ironic patterns in the history of international relations. Now we interpret Niebuhrian thought to imply that there is hubris in building hope for even a "thin" international society when there appear to be many good reasons to think that the requisite social tissue is not strong enough to support such cohesion.

In A Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns, Niebuhr resists the suggestion that he has any special 'wisdom' or means of delivering international peace and security (Niebuhr, 1950: 344). This is too modest. If we examine The Children of Light, we see that Niebuhr regards humanity as caught between the necessity of needing an international community with a greater degree of international cooperation than existed in his time, and the difficulty of its creation (Niebuhr, 1944a: 187). Such an understanding illustrates Niebuhr's view that a tension exists between the exercise of power and the possibility of normative realisation. Does this mean that for Niebuhr Christian ethics must fail in the face of power relations within international politics?

In response to Morgenthau's claim that Niebuhr supported a view that it is impossible to hold up Christian ethics and at the same time be a successful politician, Niebuhr argues:

> "Morgenthau is concerned, as I am, to dispel the illusions of all forms of liberalism, which seek to obscure the fact that the political order must concern itself with interest and with power. This concern makes it necessary to call attention to the moral ambiguity of the political order and the consequent impossibility of making a pure ethic relevant in this realm. But if one speaks of the "discrepancy between the commands of Christian teachings and the requirements of political success," one may concede too much to the perfectionist versions of Christianity, some of which make so much of this discrepancy that the Mennonites, for instance specifically

> declare the responsibilities of the magistrate to be incompatible with Christian life" (Niebuhr 1962: 121).

Niebuhr continues:

> "But "Christian teachings" ought to include more than the absolute demands of the Sermon on the Mount. A Christian faith which accurately portrays the selfishness of men, as well as their capacity for justice, is bound to insist not only on the freedom of the conscience of the individual, but also on the right of the community to be guarded against the peril of the individual's greed or lust to power" (Niebuhr, 1962: 121).

This is a critically important point insofar as it creates scope for the Niebuhrian position to go beyond his more straightforward ethical analysis that for the self to do good in practice it must make its behaviour fully consistent with what is revealed in the Gospels. As Niebuhr argued, there must be a place in heaven for political leaders like Abraham Lincoln (Niebuhr, 1962: 112).

But this is not intended to describe Niebuhr as a "balance of power" realist. Indeed, it was his explicitly stated view that the whole notion of balance is precarious:

> "Every centre of power will seek to improve its position: and every such effort will be regarded by the others as an attempt to disturb that equilibrium" (Niebuhr 1944a: 175).

By rejecting what he views as this inherently unstable form of world political order, Niebuhr suggests that the children of light need to "borrow" some aspects of the "wisdom" of the children of darkness (Niebuhr, 1944a: 176). Realism, no more than idealism, fails in its own way; realism is blind, Niebuhr argues, to novel and unique elements in world political situations (Niebuhr, 1944a: 176).

In these lengthy quotes, we see that Niebuhr points to how there is enough freedom for human beings to be conduits for justice as well as injustice. Moreover, we see that Niebuhr's thought is not a simplistic or one-dimensional view of Christian ethics, but rather a sophisticated understanding that acknowledges, albeit implicitly, the limitations of implementing the love commandment in concert with other concerns for justice. This would seem to answer our question in the negative. Niebuhr's Christian Realism is alert to the limits of what is possible whenever the demands of exercising power and realising norms are both required.

Niebuhr argues that arriving at an account of the truth that can be understood as final or ultimate is problematic insofar as there are limits to human knowledge. Indeed, this search for final truth represents a corrupt

ambition to overcome subjectivity through 'raising precisely what is contingent to absolute and unlimited dimensions' (Niebuhr, 1943: 193):

> "[P]ride becomes explicit in the conscious effort to obscure the partiality of the perspective from which the truth is apprehended. The explicit character of this pride is fully revealed in all cases in which the universalistic note in human knowledge becomes the basis of an imperial desire for domination over life which does not conform to it" (Niebuhr 1943: 210-211).

Broadly speaking, the Niebuhrian standpoint is consistent with the view that it is wise to embrace 'a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge and our power' (Niebuhr, 1943: 332):

> "In one of the greatest books of religious poetry, the book of Job, man questions the justice of God in terms of human standards, but is finally overwhelmed by the majesty and mystery of existence, and Job confesses contritely, 'I have uttered that I understand not; things too wonderful for me which I knew not – wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes' " (Niebuhr, 1986c: 14).

For Niebuhr, then, tragedy is a 'view of life' (Niebuhr, 1937: 156). It serves to 'measure life' in a manner which reaches beyond 'some little scheme of prudent rationality' in order to examine more profoundly the 'forces of

human existence' (Niebuhr, 1937: 165). However, in itself it deepens our understanding without providing us with help or hope in the actual process of history. All it accomplishes is a dark insight:

> 'The really tragic hero of warfare is not the soldier who makes the greatest sacrifice but the occasional discerning spirit who plunges into the chaos of war with a full understanding of its dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche and an equal resolution, either to defy these forces or to submit himself as their tool and victim in recognition of his common humanity with those who are unconscious victims' (Niebuhr 1937: 158).

For Niebuhr, a tragic vision brings into focus the terrible dangers of hubris and failing to excise it from oneself (Niebuhr, 1937: 166). Niebuhr implies that we should not respond to tragedy by searching for a better technical solution to evade it in future, but rather ought to turn our critical eye inwardly to make ourselves the critical object of our efforts to root out our own hubris and to discover how that hubris may even be cloaked as something else (Niebuhr, 1941: 274).

> 'It is the consequences of man's self-centredness and egotism by which he destroys the harmony of existence. The fact that he does this is not an occasion for admiration but for pity: "weep for yourselves" remains Christianity's admonition to all who involve themselves in sin and guilt' (Niebuhr 1937: 166).

This may seem poetic; however, Niebuhr is making a moral point concerning the need to look inside ourselves and strive to understand the evil within, and by implication to be saddened and horrified by it (Niebuhr, 1941: 274). Critical examination of oneself may well reveal that we are ignorant of our own hubris:

> 'It is weakness which poses as strength; it is the pride of an inferiority complex. It may create but it destroys more than it creates. It involves Europe in carnage for the sake of a brief hour of glory. Like Agamemnon, it sacrifices its Iphigenia under the illusion that the father who sacrifices a daughter, the nation which sacrifices its sons, for the sake of victory, is proving itself unselfish. It forgets, like Agamemnon, that the pride of the man and not the unselfishness of the father is the dominant motif in the sacrifice' (Niebuhr, 1937: 166-167).

Thus, for Niebuhr even the pretence of selflessness and sacrifice may be little more than hubris in disguise. Indeed, privileged values such as equality, liberty, et cetera, may be understood in tragic terms as tools to be exploited by hubristic and selfish political actors (Niebuhr, 1963: 16; Niebuhr, 1949: 387-388).

In terms of the outcome of these practices, Niebuhr's religious framework integrates his understanding of tragic ironies with his international ethics. Although the city of God citizenry would be saved, there is hope of an

intermediate stage which moderates the impact of tragic ironies in international relations.

Niebuhr's framework reveals how the self-destructive ‘qualities’ which build instances of ‘eminence’ are evident in the moments when social groups ‘decay’ and are ‘brought low’ by ‘the defect of their own virtues’ (Niebuhr, 1937: 212). The history of international relations, Niebuhr implies, is littered with recurring patterns of hubristic eminence followed by civilisational decline, as civilisations find themselves brought down by the very qualities that brought about their eminence in the first place (Niebuhr, 1963: 16; Niebuhr, 1949: 387-388).

International peace, for Niebuhr, must rest upon a bond (or potential bond) between individuals and collectives; and it must come from an acceptance of a common fate and suffering. When commenting upon growing ‘technical interdependency,’ i.e. early globalisation, Niebuhr took it to be very important to create new political institutions to make globalisation something that all of humanity can benefit from rather than breeds global violence. This is quite a hopeful international normative view (Niebuhr, 1943: 325-326).

Norms which aim to create a measure of political unity in world politics may only succeed if pretension is rooted out as much as possible, since:

> “to rely upon hubris is foolish and will surely occasion the decline of any civilisation” (Niebuhr, 1943: 331-332).

Such a position implies the beginnings of a global demos inclusive of technical actors. Niebuhr sought to emphasise radical freedom and the reality of the moral responsibility exercised by the individual, even amid tragic ironies:

> "Even when the historic situation is as tragic as our contemporary one, and when a careful estimate of historical possibilities is bound to lead to more pessimistic than optimistic conclusions, we have no right to speak of 'inevitabilities' in history. Men are always agents, and not merely the stuff, in the historical process. If modern culture has been inclined, at times, to overestimate the power of the human will over historical destiny, there is yet no reason why we should abdicate the responsibility of that will in this tragic hour. It is foolish to substitute the pretensions of omniscience for the pretensions of omnipotence" (Niebuhr, 1950: 339).

Thus, even though we might not all embrace The Lord as the true end of our lives, this does not mean that nothing can be done to mitigate the tragic ironies in things. This via media position helps establish that there remains hope that peace is possible. Here we see Niebuhr foregrounding the pretensions of Machiavellians, for whom there is an abdication of responsibility. Niebuhr implies that (as will all pretension) the cynic's wisdom is no way to create peace. Indeed, it represents a problematic pride that will surely fit neatly into

the historical pattern of tragic irony. Responsibility is possible, as is the possibility of realising normatively desirable goals:

> "Such a course cannot be guaranteed to preserve the peace of the world. No guarantee for any policy can be given in our present predicament. But a policy is possible which saves us from both illusion and despair" (Niebuhr, 1950: 344).

For Niebuhr, the exercise of such responsibility can be done in a way that extends the cope for international peace: there remains hope that peace is possible if normative actors are equipped with the necessary intellectual and normative humility to produce a morally improved outcome:

> "We would, I think have a better chance of success in our struggle against a fanatical foe if we were less sure of our own purity and virtue. The pride and self-righteousness of powerful nations are a greater hazard to the success of statecraft than the machinations of their foes. If we could combine a greater degree of humility with our stubborn resolution, we might not only be more successful in holding the dyke against tyranny, but we might also gradually establish a genuine sense of community with our foe, however small. No matter how stubbornly we resist Russian pressure, we should still have a marginal sense of community with the Soviet Union, derived from our sense of being involved in a common fate of tragic proportions and from a recognition of a common guilt of mutual fear. If

> community in basic terms is established by various organic forces of history, it must finally be preserved by mutual forbearance and forgiveness" (Niebuhr, 1949: 388).

In other words, a normativity of inclusion is established in principle as a good thing, even if it is the most minimal of bonds.

To bring our hermeneutic methodology to bear: the outcome of Niebuhrian thought is the latent conception of a proto-demos – by which we mean the beginnings of a shared normative and cultural global (and international) society – without the theoretical tools needed to transform this society into something "deeper."

To equally bring our interpretive methodology to bear: the Niebuhrian conception of the practices of mitigation, understood as establishing the bare minimum of bonds between those bound up in the tragic ironies of international relations, is desirable. These bonds are, as in the case of the Morgenthauian position, bound up with a broadly "cosmopolitan" IR view that there is no liberation from the tragedy of international relations to be found through particularistic-nationalism; rather, it must be found by approaching the possibilities of supranational associations in a favourable light.

As for "the metra of things", the Niebuhrian position is here interpreted to mean that the self is limited by its metra in such a way that while it does indeed

have the gift of radical freedom, it is limited in terms of its sight and thus must fumble and guess at the truth of things. The predilection of the self to find through its own eminence a sense of "self-reliance" is dangerous because it leads to the false belief that the self has become master over its own destiny and thus can determine the course of its own history and the history of nations. This error leads to pretentiousness and in turn the buffeting of our false eminence as a species. In this case, the 'the metra of things' is enforced not by the furies but by The Lord. Our beliefs in our own eminence are exposed to be 'hubris.' This foregrounds and places into context the preferred ethical values and international practices implied by the Niebuhrian standpoint. They then potentially serve to mitigate the tragic ironies of international relations. As we have argued, the shared bond of knowing that international actors and nation-states are bound up in structures they cannot escape is the first step towards determining the

Misbehaviour or the poor use of the gift of radical freedom given to human beings will drive up the pretension and "self-reliance" of hubristic actors as they overshoot the metra of things and thus undermine the tissue needed to build deeper integration across international and global relations. Nevertheless, a marginal sense of demos is conceived of and allowed for in Niebuhrian thought even for those nations caught in power conflicts.

Conclusion to Chapter four:

In this chapter we have built an interpretation of Niebuhrian thought which emphasises his understanding of the metra of things. Niebuhr frames his understanding of the limitations and insufficiencies and measures of the self (in its individual and collective forms) using his own Biblical vision of life. Nonetheless, such a vision gives him scope to argue that metra is either not well known, or it is overshot owning to excessive pride (or some combination therein). As such there arises those political actors for whom the pursuit of narrow self-interests becomes their primary objectives and these must be challenged by an alternative ethical group which hopes to see the world be reformed in a way consistent with Christian values of trusting in divine deliverance. Niebuhr opposes self-reliance and by implication those sovereign states that presume themselves to be the origin of their own eminence. A tragic irony is advanced that exposes the pathos of such eminent states. Applied to world politics, Niebuhr advocates the need for a balanced approach which neither swings too far away from his values, but which can embrace some of the virtues of those who are far less committed to the realisation of global society defined by shared values, but may have a greater measure of skill than those who are far more committed to such a goal.

Chapter Five: Hans J Morgenthau and the Tragic Sense of Life in World Politics

Introduction

In this chapter, we will continue to bring our horizon to the legacy texts, in this case the thought of Hans J. Morgenthau. We do so in order to develop an account of his thought which fuses our horizons with our interpretation of the horizon of the text, i.e. the horizon which represents answers to implicit questions which both arise as a manifestation of the world of the text.

Our interpretation of Morgenthau's conception of the self is that it is defined by metra primarily in the narrow sense of the term. There is in Morgenthau's thought a sense of the self existing in a state of conflict between its own reaction to the existential conditions of its existence and its frustration in being unable to bond adequately with other minds. This conflicted, tragic self is prone to destructive outwards impulses that serve to further limit it and expose the metra of its own ethical being in the broader sense of the term, i.e. having limits/measures that it is powerless to change.

The more seasoned and mature Morgenthau abandons his earlier nostalgia for the shared norms of aristocratic European societies in favour of a vision of radical participatory democracy that resists the "Jacobinism" of

majoritarian rule. His ethics demonstrate the metra of power politics as well as idealism and the advancement of a form of international association which can extend from a balance of power, if needed, towards a working system of peace, i.e. a functionalist model of supranationalism.

Section One: The Metra of the Self

To bring our horizon to bear upon Morgenthau's conception of the self, we interpret there to be an awareness of the measures of human beings as capable, even political beings rich with ethics and values. However, they are also limited by their animalistic nature, their impulsiveness and the finiteness of their lives (Frei, 2001: 185-189; Morgenthau, 1946: 155). The self for Morgenthau is defined by an inability to become fully satisfied and thus is forever longing to overcome its limitations, its measures, and to take charge of its destiny (Morgenthau, 1946: 221-222). Echoing Niebuhr, Morgenthau points to the insights of tragedy, such as Icarus, for whom the overstepping of his measures is manifested in hubris and melted wings (Morgenthau, 1946: 222).

Just as there are insights which point towards a limited self, Morgenthau explains that there are conceptions of the self as being seemingly unlimited in terms of its capabilities and capacities. In Morgenthau's idiom, the "engineer" is at fault in thinking that the knowledge brought by experimentation can adequately grasp "the knowing insecurity of the wisdom of man" (Morgenthau,

1946: 221-223). Human life “exhausts the possibilities of human existence” (Morgenthau, 1946: 223). Thus, a wisdom which understands the limitations of human potential is, when put into practice, the maximum of what can be done through human potential and possibilities (Morgenthau, 1946: 223). The self is, therefore, an inherently limited being with only a certain measure of abilities.

In our interpretation, there is an evolution of Morgenthau’s vision of the metra of the self in the broader definition of the term. Indeed, in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau grasps that the self has measures that extend only so far in terms of the raw power to overturn the “discord, contradictions and conflicts” of life (Morgenthau, 1946: 206). Reason must be employed in order to exorcise the lesser evil, yet it proves the self to be powerless as a mechanism for the transcending of the metra “inherent in the nature of things” (Morgenthau, 1946: 206).

To bring our horizon to bear, we can see that Morgenthau is alert to the role of language in being the medium within which rational articulations become riddles that the self is powerless to solve. To recap, as we understand tragedy, the metra/measures inherent in things is not only that which can be overstepped by the tragic hero but also that which he encounters through new riddles which cannot be overcome. For Oedipus, it was how to live the life he had once enjoyed having discovered that he was the pollution infecting his city. For Antigone, it was how to solve the riddle of the circumstances that she faced.

In both cases, the central figures in the tragedies commit acts of self-destruction against their own sight and lives.

In our view, Morgenthau's "tragic sense of life" is congruent with our own:

> "Man – and here we have to exclude the rationalist – meets in his intellectual experience the unceasing struggle between his understanding, on the one hand, and the riddles of the world and of his existence in this world, on the other – a struggle which offers with each answer new questions, with each victory a new disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In this labyrinth of unconnected casual connections man discovers many little answers but no answer to the great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction" (Morgenthau, 1946: 207).

Morgenthau argues as we do, that the ends of reasoning ultimately build into questions that the human mind simply has no means of answering; they are beyond us as intellectual beings. Epistemologically, this echoes Dewey's notion that all truth-claims are ultimately limited to fallible warranted beliefs reflecting the circumstances and intelligence of the self in its collective form. Indeed, in the Purpose of American Politics, Morgenthau agrees with Kelsen's view that it is impossible to have an absolutist or unassailable view of truth where one group or individual can claim to have a "monopoly". As such, Morgenthau endorses a fallibilist view of truth-claims (Scheuerman, 2009: 185).

Moreover, the epistemological advantages of democracy over other forms of political system arise out the plurality of knowledge as well as the dynamics of power shifting from minority to majority (at least in a well-functioning democracy) (Scheuerman, 2009: 183-184). As in the case of Dewey, the self in its collective form must incorporate the insights of the widest demos, so it is in Morgenthau that those insights must find their way throughout the state through the regular transformation of minorities into majorities and back again.

Applying our horizon, we can understand how it is that Morgenthau's conception of the self is a tragedian account in our sense of the term. In our horizon, Morgenthau's self is much like Oedipus for whom the resolution of riddles through the application of reason leads him to discover that he has been a riddle to himself and, indeed, that he has answered the riddle of his own identity only to learn the measures and proportions of himself. This is his terrible metra. Unable to emotionally cope with the knowledge of himself, he thus strikes out his eyes in desperation. The lesson of tragedy remains to understand one's metra or measures and not to overshoot them. The self must, therefore, learn its measures (its metra) and act within them. This is exactly what Morgenthau sets out to explain through his political realism.

Morgenthau draws inspiration for this notion of there being a limited self from a number of places. As Frei argues, Morgenthau's debt to Nietzsche is now much better understood in contemporary debates (Frei, 2001: 113). Morgenthau's thought draws inspiration from Nietzsche's "will to power", in

particular how there are dynamics within the self which generate externalised impulses such as a will to "self-assertion", as well as the perennial "self-preservation" (Frei, 2001: 125-127). This, sometimes violent, externalisation of the self's internal dynamics is described as the animus dominandi and is manifested as a "dark force" against which the morality of nations must be marshalled (Molloy, 2006: 93).

The self is not just a knowing being; it is also something that can be known through reasoning. Morgenthau fashions a view of the self as the centre of our world. Indeed, for Morgenthau both factual knowledge and abstract theorisations find their origins in the consciousness of the self as it grasps with its own inner loneliness and desire to unite with others (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629). Without boundless access to the truth of its existence and shaped by its inability to unite with others, perhaps through a shared metaphysics, the self in conditions of modern existence generates its own social meanings and attempts to dominate others through the exercise of power (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629). For Morgenthau, the self is not just defined by its external metra, i.e. its animalistic nature, but also by the metra of the mind and in particular the internal conflicts arising within the mind that give rise to destructive impulses.

There emerges a situation where the individual is confronted with its own existence and discovers it to be absurd and frightening. The individual is then compelled to seek refuge in a reality that lacks the transcendent quality needed to deliver individual spiritual satisfaction. Human desire runs far ahead of what

can be achieved in the context of a changed cultural landscape (Frei, 2001: 187; Neacsu, 2010: 72; Molloy, 2006: 81).

For Morgenthau, the self is unable to cope, i.e. it has a limited emotional capacity to handle and accommodate certain existential possibilities. As such, the metra of the self is profoundly cognitive and emotional. Morgenthau explores this dimension of the self's metra with reference to existential dread and the possibility that life is absurd (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629). There is a strong echo of Nietzsche in this line of thinking: the dilemma faced by the self is to choose to uphold the scared divine metaphysics of The Lord or to "go bust" and lose all social meanings (Schacht, 2012: 118).

None of these arguments suggest a pessimism in Morgenthau; only that if we are to make the best of existence then we must learn the constraints of our limitations well and thereby push those limits as much as possible. It is perhaps ironic, then, that although Morgenthau advocates a view of politics that is called "realism" when his theories conceive of reality to be much like the world, that is, something made sense of and grasped using the limited tools of human intellect. The influence of Nietzsche on Morgenthau can be seen in how he identifies the origin of power as a consequence of the impact of the modern existential circumstances defined by "the death of God"; that is, the impact that the absence of unassailable value claims has upon human beings and in particular their solitariness (Molloy, 2006: 85; Neacsu, 2010: 68-69).

Gripped by the realisation that truth is constructed and not simply discovered in an external reality, the self is filled with a solitude that occasions an angry emotional need to dominate others in the absence of genuine bonds of affection (Molloy, 2006: 85). That is, the emotional and existentially suffering character of human beings creates in the modern world the desire to acquire a position of power. In other words, it is not the factual limitations of human mind and body which crush our human spirit, but the comprehension of how these limitations have prevented us from achieving what we desire as individuals or society (Neacsu, 2010: 94; Frei, 2001: 185-189).

Under the conditions of modern existence where the lodestar of religious conviction and faith no longer drives society towards a shared purpose – in other words, a universe where the Gods have departed – the norms of a particular place and time reflect the exercise of power through the assertion of meaning which has been imposed over human societies (Morgenthau, 1946: 191). Epistemologically, there is an absence of fixed truths concerning the world or human life: the observer helps determine “what can be known and how it is to be understood” and that whatever “partial truth” of politics is uncovered, it must always reflect the observers’ social contingency (Morgenthau, 1962: 36; Morgenthau, 1946: 167).

However, knowledge itself must serve a purpose, and for Morgenthau this purpose is about restoring meaning to an otherwise empty universe (under skies where the Gods have departed), as well as meeting something very

fundamental to our human nature: our emotional need to overcome what might otherwise be an absurdity to our human existence. Morgenthau implies that the emotional and cognitive metra of the self is such that it cannot cope with the vivid reality of the certainty of one's future mortality (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629). The emotionality of the self is manifested forcefully in its reaction to sudden realisations and moments of anxiety. Indeed, we can see this in the self's sharp, inescapable and explosive desire to shake off the possibility that life is meaningless (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629).

This is a philosophically sophisticated attempt by Morgenthau to grapple with the implications of the metra of the self. However, unlike Nietzsche's peculiar optimism regarding the future role of super-men to build an affirmation of life and its enrichment, Morgenthau conceives of the self's necessary escape from the perils of existential dread in a rather tragedian light. Morgenthau, in our interpretation, explores the roadmap away from accepting that life is absurd and meaningless, and casts it as a tragic instance of the self's measures being met by the human mind, which suffers as a result but ultimately must learn to cope with its metra (Morgenthau, 1971: 619-629; Schact, 2012: 118). Maintaining the meaning of things is, thus, central to Morgenthau's conception of the self in tragedy. Without such meanings, the self will find itself cut adrift much like Oedipus, whose actions shredded the conventional meanings of words. This left him exposed and compelled into unnatural acts such as striking out his own eyes.

The metra of the self's intellectual limits has consequences for social scientific knowledge: knowledge of politics is by necessity a reflection of the observers' social contingency (Morgenthau, 1962: 36; Morgenthau, 1946: 167):

> "The truth of the social sciences, then, is truth only under the particular perspective of the observer, yet under this perspective it is truth. And this is the only kind of truth to be had in the social sphere" (Morgenthau, 1946: 167).

Morgenthau understood the self to be comprised of dimensions that are prior to (or are intermingled with) "reasoning faculties," hence his insight that there are intra-self emotional and interest based factors that have downstream consequences in framing what is revealed through reason (Morgenthau, 1946: 155). For Morgenthau, "reality" is a manifestation of an intra-self cognitive practice that takes place in the context of how individuals relate to each other (Neacsu, 2010: 89).

> "Morgenthau subscribes to an individualist ontology in which meaning imposition is less a matter of institutional relations, and more one of individual relations. In Morgenthau's account, power is a relational concept, and one's power needs other's presence and recognition" (Neacsu, 2010: 89).

In other words, it is from within the self that social meaning finds its origin for Morgenthau. Nevertheless, it is also a social matter insofar as the power relations between individuals manifest as social interactions which help translate the imposition of meaning into something concretised as culture and identity, indeed the world itself. Morgenthau's advocacy of human "activism" locates the production and concretisation of instances of power relations as well as an intra-self practice that aims to render the self capable of resisting the dizzying uncertainties produced by the modern condition (Morgenthau, 1971: 622). Truth and power are interlinked but both are manifestations of human encounters with the limits and extreme edges of the measures of human nature.

There is a certain solitariness which arises under empty skies (Molloy, 2006: 85; Neacsu, 2010: 68-69). Such solitude reflects the boundaries between human minds, which prevent the formation of bonds with others and induce such frustration as to prompt a destructive will to dominate others (Molloy, 2006: 85). This destructive impulse aims to recreate by force a bond that has been lost by the death of God.

The emotional and existentially suffering character of human beings is linked in modern circumstances to the origin of the desire to acquire a position of power. This need is found deep within our flawed human character as a direct consequence of our human metra. Moreover, it is not the factual measures of the human mind which crush our human spirit but, tragically, the comprehension of

how these limitations have impacted us by preventing us achieving what we desire as individuals or society (Neacsu, 2010: 94; Frei, 2001: 185-189).

In Thought And Action In Politics, Morgenthau argues that to achieve a certain level of consciousness, human life must live "in the presence of death" and suffer the realisation that all meaning is transitory and has no basis beyond itself ontologically (Morgenthau, 1971: 629-630). There is no essence or reality behind which socially determined meanings draw their existence; what we have accomplished through constituting meaning is the possibility for life within its measures (Morgenthau, 1971: 629-630). However, too much reflection strips us of such vitality (Morgenthau, 1971: 629-630). Endless reflection pushes us deeper into riddles we have no way to answer.

To bring our horizon to bear, we interpret Morgenthau to have a keen awareness of the metra of the self and to grasp how human measures have a defining impact upon human "nature." At the extremities of our measures, the human mind encounters possibilities that it struggles to shake off emotionally. This creates, for Morgenthau, a kind of domino effect that builds from a frustrated individualised desire for power over the other into a fully realised nationalistic universalism. On the stage of world politics such destructive human impulses have come to define international power contests, in turn producing global conflicts and the atomic bomb.

This impulse to construct meaning out of nothing is thus understood as an act of desperation by the self as it grapples with its metra and its need to construct for itself, through the production of its own meanings, its own ethical lodestar. Nietzsche sees the self's escape from the perils of existential dread through the affirmation of life and its enrichment (Schacht, 2012: 118). Morgenthau agrees up to a point: what is revealed through reason can become a wisdom of sorts which emphasises the need for our actions to be consistent with our measures.

Reason, however, remains subordinate to the primacy of "interest and emotions." Interests, and the power relations implied by them, are like emotions: something that shapes the faculties of reasoning rather than the other way around. Thus, what is obtained through such faculties is a corrupted reason that bends to the will of our nature and therefore cannot be relied upon to deliver on its own a transformation of politics along ethical lines:

> "Those interests and emotional preferences are perhaps not a priori in the same sense in which philosophers like to think of the categories of our reasoning as a priori. But they are a priori with respect to the processes of reason which we apply to the social sphere. In other words, those interests and emotions are already determined when we start using our reasoning powers in the social sphere" (Morgenthau 1946: 155).

Section Two: Ethical and Political Imperatives

International power relations have a discursive impact by imposing meaning upon the international system. That is, the same dynamics which occur at the inter-individual level are also the same dynamics occurring at the statesman/inter-national level. Morgenthau's ontological view leads him to identify the reality of actuality as a tabla rasa and any attempt to project a world onto that actuality is an act of (useful) myth making (Neacsu, 2010: 76). Such meaning imposition or myth making requires international actors to craft possibilities for the emergence of common meanings, a "stable ground" upon which norms can be built (Neacsu, 2010: 165). Contingent ethical identities, however, are relativised understandings and Morgenthau initially found it hard to establish his ethical/political directionality:

> "In 1960 as in 1930, Morgenthau is not interested in the specific content of ultimate values, as this content will always depend on the particular circumstances of time and place" (Frei, 2001: 214).

Far from a timeless transcendental reality, we can only ever have a construction of a particular time or place, firmly within the hermeneutical circle and without the possibility of theory-independence (Frei, 2001: 214-215). The setting of the social concrete is, however, not at all like the material used to

build buildings. The stuff of the social can always be re-concretized and transformed into a new configuration.

Just as Nietzsche understood the salience of the tragic aspects of life, i.e. those aspects of life for which there can be no amelioration, so it would seem that Morgenthau understood the limits of human abilities in a similar manner (Frei, 2001: 187). But it was not an uncritical dialogue: against Nietzsche, Morgenthau argues that there are time-bound, socially determined values which ought to be realised (Frei, 2001: 166-167). Morgenthau does not stand "beyond good or evil"; rather he affirms and embraces the cultural/historical and ethical circumstances within which he locates his values.

These values are reference points throughout history that can be used to guide political actors towards an understanding of what is good in Morgenthau's judgement (Frei, 2001: 167). Frei defines these values as "liberal in the classical, European sense of the term" (Frei, 2001: 170). Frei is quite right to argue that Morgenthau's ethics reflect his experience in the Weimar Republic, as excellently and pithily described in this passage:

> "Law and order, a secure existence: the further these goals receded from Morgenthau's grasp, the more he cherished them. Given both his Jewish background and his deep longing for security, he found an almost natural refuge in that specifically Bourgeois and distinctly liberal political tradition of securing the rights of man and his claim to a peaceful life" (Frei, 2001: 172).

To bring our hermeneutic approach to bear – that is, to bring our horizon into an interpretative dialogue with Morgenthau's standpoint – we interpret this "liberal" ethos as being shaped by his experience of witnessing his home country turn away from such guiding values towards the evil of anti-Semitic politics, which were in ascendency at the time in Germany. As a Jew, Morgenthau's ethical view could not have resisted being shaped by the horror of witnessing the trampling of personal freedoms and rights for all of Germany's Jews. Indeed, as Frei argues, Morgenthau came to understand with brutal clarity that the sphere of politics and the subordination of the self by another is in itself an "evil" thing (Frei, 2001: 173).

The ethics of Morgenthau's position thus point to the imperative of advancing liberal values which can be established through dialectic and reason to a certain extent. Such reasoning must, however, understand the measures of the self and take care not to overstep them. Reason can, nonetheless, provide an opportunity to push beyond naturalistic representationalism and put the scholar, and the self, in a position to understand the tragic nature of human life:

> "[T]hat man is a political animal is true forever; the truth of the natural sciences are true only until other truths have supplanted them. The key to those laws of man is not in the facts from whose uniformity the sciences derive their laws. It is in the insights and the wisdom by which more-than-scientific man elevates his experiences into the

> universal laws of human nature. It is he who, by doing so, establishes himself as the representative of true reason, while nothing-but-science man appears as the true dogmatist who universalizes cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them to realms not accessible to them. It is also the former who proves himself to be the true 'realist'; for it is he who does justice to the true nature of things" (Morgenthau, 1946: 220).

Morgenthau's thesis here is that reason has great potential to grasp the "true" nature of things while rejecting the naturalist social scientist's account of things. Reason is a resource to be relied upon in order to establish ethical and political imperatives because reason can grasp the "truth" of the nature of things. It is this faith in the power of reason that defines Morgenthau's ethics as much as his firm conviction that reason must learn its measures otherwise it lends itself to idealism or utopianism and, by extension, hubris.

Whereas Aristotle advances acceptance of the justice of metra, i.e. Katharsis, Morgenthau's use of metra is strategic as it exposes the value of phronesis (Frei, 2001: 185-189).

Morgenthau identifies there to be a certain part of politics which is defined by a will to dominate and establish the power of one person over another (Morgenthau, 1945a: 14). Although this tendency is seen to be particularly amplified in the conditions of the modern nation state, where there is a particular energy to the will to dominate, this impulse for power exists throughout time and history (Morgenthau, 1945a: 15):

> "There is no escape from evil of power regardless of what one does. Whenever we act with reference to our fellowmen, we must sin and we must still sin when we refuse to act; for the refusal to be involved in the evil of action carries with it the breach of the obligations to do one's duty". (Morgenthau, 1945a: 17).

To bring our horizon to bear, Morgenthau here evokes the tragic complexities of the ethical dimension of politics and by implication the incapability of the self to solve the riddle of these complexities. The tragic agon in this passage repudiates the resolution of the riddle of the ethical complexities of politics. Any truth-claim to there being answers to such types of riddles must be provisional as there remains always the proportion of the measures of things, which Nietzsche describes as the "inescapable" aspects of life arising from the "elemental" aspects of human experiences (Morgenthau, 1946: 206; Nietzsche in Frei, 2001: 185, 187). As such, the self is left with only a limited opportunity for ethical success:

> "Neither science nor ethics nor politics can resolve the conflict between politics and ethics into harmony. We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully - that is, according to the rules of the political art - is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgement" (Morgenthau, 1945a: 18).

To bring our horizon to bear once more, the metra of the self comes to be manifested in the inability of the political agent to act in a way that evades the exercise of power – something which Morgenthau considers to be, in part at least, evil. Exposing and revealing the agons throughout political life therefore acts in a way to advance a 'modus vivendi' which may be deployed instrumentally to minimise evil wherever it is found, even if such an enterprise is "uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical" (Morgenthau, 1945a: 18).

In couching his ethical and political imperatives in epistemological terms, Morgenthau grasps the extent to which knowledge revealed through reason carries with it all the possibilities of ethical life, but also generates a plurality of ethical views. There is simply no way to engage in universalising absolute claims without ignoring the diversity and value of ethical contributions and insights. This orients us towards a relativized view whereby the political actor, his own faculty of reason directed by the determinations of social contingency, represents an important dimension to Morgenthau's ethical and political thought.

Indeed, while Morgenthau identifies the role that theoretical reflection has played throughout the ages, such accomplishments – in terms of intellectual contributions – take place in the context of a relativised understanding of their truth (Morgenthau, 1962: 45). Although this might be said to offer truth and wisdom "regardless of time and place," Morgenthau very much embraced the

notion of standortgebunden – and thus theoretical claims are contingent upon the historical, political, and cultural circumstances of a particular time (Behr, 2010: 214-216; Morgenthau, 1962: 45).

Such accomplishments did not lack value, however, and Morgenthau aims to use a process of triangulation to distil the truths that can be extracted from these diverse insights and thinkers (Morgenthau, 1962: 45). The theorist may well identify discernible patterns throughout diverse historical circumstances and so build up a picture or "store" of "general truths" (Morgenthau, 1962: 45). Nevertheless, such a situation never escapes from the "historic-political hermeneutics" of Morgenthau's standpoint. Indeed, it must be recalled that the purpose of theory for Morgenthau is to bring meaning and order to "a mass of phenomena that without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible" (Behr, 2010: 214; Morgenthau, 2006: 3; Morgenthau, 1962: 45). That is, the interpretation of world politics takes place at the societal level and hence can never escape its historical and social contingencies.

Any interpretation of the truths of political or ethical life must be revealed by reason. And reason reveals not only a plurality of values but also the metra/measures of each position arising from the metra /measures of each intellectual tradition.

Morgenthau understood the extent to which the prospects for peace, or at the very least international political order, requires the adoption of a "check" upon the self's more destructive impulses (Molloy, 2006: 93). In our horizon,

Morgenthau understood the ethical need to appropriate the metra of the self and to redeploy such metra between groups. As Morgenthau passionately argues, it is the separating out of the parts of governmental power into different branches or responsibilities that keep each other in check that serves as the best way to protect the interests of all groups from any one of them acquiring ascendency over the other (Morgenthau, 2006: 181-184). In our horizon, Morgenthau grasps that the metra of the self, in its collective form, leads it down the path of potential selfishness. Consequently, creating a form of government where the interests of all groups share responsibility for the exercise of power must be of considerable ethical import for the preservation of a legitimate order at the level of the domestic sphere.

However, Morgenthau, again correctly in our view, grasps how it is that such a balance may be fruitful for international peace if maintained at the level of international politics. Morgenthau's "balance of power" is, to a significant extent, a societal norm designed to preserve the peace between nation-states corrupted by nationalistic universalism (Little, 2007: 119). A profound concern for ethics finds expression, moreover, in the mature Morgenthau's view that a radical participatory democracy is needed in order to prevent the decline of American democracy (Scheuerman, 2009: 173-174). As Scheuerman states, scholars have tended to "neglect" Morgenthau's democratic reflections (Scheuerman, 2009: 179).

Our analysis of Morgenthau's reluctance to incorporate the demos into the decision-making processes is correct only insofar as we examine mid-Morgenthau, i.e. that period where Morgenthau arrives in north America and comes into confrontation with what might be considered "historical optimism." However, as political events unfold, in particular the Indochina conflict, mid-Morgenthau realism evolves into mature-Morgenthau. The mature Morgenthau, starting with the Purpose of American Politics, moves to identify a well-functioning democracy with the notion that political wisdom is not monopolised by political majorities (Scheuerman, 2009: 183). As Scheuerman correctly argues, for Morgenthau the representative democratic system maintains the link between the demos and the government, as well as the conference of authority and legitimacy, but without degenerating into the majoritarian nightmare of Jacobinism whereby the majority is mistaken for the "vox dei" (Scheuerman, 2009: 184):

> "While democracy requires that the will of the people limit the freedom of the government, it also requires that the freedom of the popular will be limited. A popular will not so limited becomes the tyranny of the majority which destroys the freedom of political competition and thus uses the powers of the government to prevent a new majority from forming and to entrench itself permanently in the seat of power." (Morgenthau, 1960b : 249).

To bring our horizon to bear, we interpret this development to mean that Morgenthau came to stress that there is an epistemological metra associated with a majoritarian democracy that comes to see itself as having a great measure of legitimacy when, in fact, from an epistemological point of view, political knowledge remains fallible. Morgenthau well understood this point. Indeed, his grasping of the metra of Jacobin-style majoritarianism maps onto his view that the cause of the nation, to the masses of universalist nationalists, was indeed the advancement of justice within world politics (Morgenthau, 2006: 12).

The values Morgenthau invokes in judging which ethical claims can be considered just are bound to his understanding of what is ethically permissible in world politics. In turn, what is possible ethically must be understood in relation to our conception of human nature (Morgenthau, 1946: 204-208; Frei, 2001: 215). If there are "moral laws which govern the universe," humanity cannot know what they are (Morgenthau, 1960a: 11). Such an epistemological view allows Morgenthau to marshal our limited knowledge as an appeal to embrace the value of insecurity.

What we can know, by contrast, is how to judge ethical truth claims with reference to an enriched and hermeneutically enhanced understanding of human life (Morgenthau, 1946: 204-208). In this passage from Scientific Man we can see what such an understanding would look like:

> “If, however, the world is conceived as the scene of a tragic struggle between good and evil, reason and passion, the mere advice to follow the commands of reason will not measure up to the nature of the problems to be solved. Without recognition of these tragic antinomies of human existence, the counsel of reason becomes the counsel of unreason; the promise of success turns into the certainty of failure; the goodness of the virtuous unmasks itself as the self-righteous egoism of the hypocrite; and education is reduced to the 'objective' communication of facts, unable to distinguish between right and wrong, good and evil, true and false” (Morgenthau, 1946: 209).

The implied presence of our human limitations is evident throughout this quote; we must act as best we can using reason, but we must use reason well and acknowledge the “tragic” dimension of life.

Morgenthau continues this line of reasoning by arguing that the cultural inheritance he draws upon arises from what is true about the conditions of human life (Morgenthau, 1946: 209). Morgenthau implies that normative dilemmas are accounted for by his conception of human beings; if the warrant of a normative view is unknowable, then we must assume that there is a possibility of it being false. Thus, the scholar is forced into a position of doubt where a best guess or approximation as to what is true is the best we can hope for (Morgenthau, 1962: 14-15; Frei, 2001: 215).

Morgenthau conceives of the 'lust for power' as a 'ubiquitous empirical fact' which is 'perennial,' and to deny this fact is to deny 'the very condition of

human existence in this world' (Morgenthau, 1946: 201). Morgenthau points to the impossibility of avoiding evil in Scientific Man. Similarly, in The Decline of Democratic Politics he points to how human beings incur 'sin' simply through acting. If left unrestrained, this becomes a greater evil:

> “Man cannot help sinning when he acts in relation to his fellow man; he may be able to minimize that sinfulness of social action, but he cannot escape it. For no social action can be completely free of the taint of egoism which, as selfishness, pride, or self-deception, seeks for the actor more than is his due” (Morgenthau, 1962: 319).

The international political actor is 'dazzled by the pride of power' such that 'they take truth for error, and vice versa, and make ready with unsuspecting confidence to jump into the abyss as if it were the consummation of their dreams' (Morgenthau, 1962: 326). This is consistent with Morgenthau's earlier view that:

> "There is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does. Whenever we act with reference to our fellow men, we must sin, and we must still sin when we refuse to act; for the refusal to be involved in the evil of action carries with it the breach of the obligation of one's duties. No ivory tower is remote enough to offer protection against the guilt in which the actor and the bystander, the

> oppressor and the oppressed, the murderer and his victim are inextricably enmeshed. Political ethics is indeed the ethics of doing evil" (Morgenthau, 1946: 201-202).

Indeed, Morgenthau then argues that the "last resort" of any individual determined to create a more normative international order must be to opt for actions which incur the 'least evil' (Morgenthau, 1946: 202). The wise international normative agent, Morgenthau implies, is one who is reconciled to the truth that there is an "enduring presence of evil in all political action" (Morgenthau, 1946: 202).

In Scientific Man, Morgenthau argues that it is possible to master the insecurity of mankind, although he doesn't clarify exactly what this means beyond a general sense of epistemological caution (Morgenthau, 1946: 223). A more generous interpretation would be that Morgenthau understood the importance of grasping the measures/metra of things and having the wisdom to act within these measures. That said, Morgenthau appears to imply that it is possible to test the boundaries of such measures to the greatest extent possible when he states that tragic "wisdom" is "the fulfilment of human possibilities" (Morgenthau, 1946: 223). It is clear, however, that central to Morgenthau's thinking is the epistemological relationship between the self, and the fallible knowledge it can create in order to grasp the best way to proceed in unique situations. This, in our horizon, is in a different idiom, congruent with Dewey's

thesis that knowledge must reflect the metra of the self and indeed must be consistent with metra if it is to be useful in an indeterminate reality/situation.

Morgenthau takes Dewey to be naïve enough to think that expert opinion can dissolve all our societal problems (Morgenthau, 1946: 30). As we have shown, however, Dewey makes the end of his inquiries the production of knowledge which favours adaptation to our situations. It is not the means through which we determine the future course of events; there are no means to achieve such a feat as far as Dewey is concerned. Dewey understands the metra/measures of the self as well as Morgenthau and Niebuhr, and maintains that to employ our measures fully and create the best knowledge possible still represents no more than a best guess. The quote that Morgenthau uses in order to explain away the Deweyan position is one where Dewey regrets the orientation of intellectual energy towards developing techniques which cause terrible suffering rather than being put to more productive use (Morgenthau, 1946: 30). This is not Dewey the historical optimist speaking; it is Dewey the regretful. Again, this is hardly something with which Morgenthau or Niebuhr would have disagreed.

Morgenthau's actual target is what could be called Enlightenment Rationalism. For Morgenthau, this has become a fundamental part of Western society, helping to shape the temperament and character of the modern age (Morgenthau, 1946: 1, 30). The notion that all social and political problems can be resolved through the application of reason is for Morgenthau deeply

overstated (Morgenthau, 1946: 1, 30). Expertise in a particular field is not in itself the instrument through which ideal outcomes can be realised in practice (Morgenthau, 1946: 28, 30, 219-223). Social engineering errs in its assumption that the methodology of the natural sciences supply the intellectual instrumentality necessary to realise our normative ideals (Morgenthau, 1946: 1-2, 27-31, 71, 219-220). Hence, the flaw of Scientific Man – Morgenthau's name for the Enlightenment Rationalist/Scientist Rationalist – is his failure to comprehend adequately the limitations of the self in terms of the scope of its intellectual possibilities. Only the capability and willingness to comprehend these limitations, and then act upon this comprehension, can create realistic prospects for the realisation of norms in international practice.

Morgenthau's caricature takes Dewey's position to be hubristic insofar as there is a perceived over-emphasis on the potential of human beings to employ their intellectual resources to resolve moral problems. Yet this is done without considering the wider context of Dewey's thought, thereby leaving the reader with the impression that Dewey naively assumes that a great many moral problems could be solved if intellectual energies were to be redirected (Morgenthau, 1946: 30). And yet Morgenthau also affirms the triumph of intellectual accomplishment, in particular the value of political philosophy.

By categorising Dewey as the engineer, moreover, Morgenthau misrepresents the overarching vision of Dewey's thought regarding the possibilities inherent in world politics by implying that they are either unsolved

or yet to be solved “rationally and with finality, once the right formula is discovered” (Morgenthau, 1946: 28).

Section Three: Application to World Politics

The mid-Morgenthau identifies the intuition of and the perspective of the “statesman,” as the international actor/agent for whom the responsibility falls for advancing the wisdom of tragedy as he understood it, a wisdom of insecurity (Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221). The Statesman, argues Morgenthau, is uniquely placed to comprehend, as well as to undergo, the unique experience of experiencing social life in its contingent dimensions (Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221). By grasping the “common lot of all mankind” and thus establishing a measure of understanding about its complexities and similarities, the Statesman has a finger on the pulse of world politics and moreover can be in a position to “create a new society” (Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221).

For the mid-Morgenthau the Statesman can grasp, by undergoing the experience of international relations, how “the contingencies of the social

world" become concretized in practice and thus become as if "eternal laws" (Morgenthau, 1946: 220-221).

Statesmen, however, remain men insofar as they are as much at risk of overshooting their metra and thus bringing themselves to the mercy of the furies because of an absence of moderation or the blindness of passion; that is, the hubris of an Alexander or a Napoleon can easily turn to nemesis (Morgenthau, 1946: 156). And this is clearly demonstrated in the universalism of nationalistic movements which establish an indefensible association between their own nationalised normativity as the true values of actuality applicable to all nations and all times:

> "The light-hearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the biblical prophets have warned rules and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortions in judgement that, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilisations - in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself" (Morgenthau, 2006: 12-13).

For Morgenthau, the modern nation-state has no moral high ground from which to judge the actions of other states. Indeed, in The Decline of Democratic Politics, Morgenthau argues that whatever moral judgements are made between

nations, to issue moral praise and condemnation with earnestness is "preposterous" (Morgenthau, 1962: 280). Such moral self-righteousness reveals itself as ignorance and a "corruption to which moral judgements on matters political are particularly prone" (Morgenthau, 1962: 281). Moreover, there are only "narrow limits" with which nations "are able to comply with abstract moral standards" (Morgenthau, 1962: 281). Great efforts must be made, implies Morgenthau, to maximise the realisation of normative ideals, and indeed on an empirical level Morgenthau understood that statesmen often took decisions which fell short of a fully expedient foreign policy with few moral limitations (Morgenthau. 1948: 79; Morgenthau. 1960: 234). Morgenthau argued that morality is "vital" in the political sphere because it limits the choice of ends and means available to decision makers as well as "delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether" (Morgenthau, 1962: 325), i.e. took certain choices off the table of viable ethical options. Morgenthau is implying that there is scope for international ethics and that this scope can go a certain way towards building international norms which accept the employment of domineering power and yet work within these international practices in order to minimise evil to as small a level as possible.

Morgenthau has been misunderstood and in part this is because of the extent to which his earlier thought, the mid-Morgenthau, came to dominate how American political science understood realism; rationalist, non-normative, empiricist and essentially consistent with equally understood scholars such as

Machiavelli and Hobbes (Murray, 1996: 84). In Murray's view, the Machiavellian-Hobbesian view is one which identifies sovereign states as in a state of endless competition and where relative power gains are free to be pursued regardless of the amorality that such a policy implies (Murray, 1996: 84-85). Indeed, the Machiavellian or Hobbesian image of Morgenthau had by the end of the twentieth century become "conventional wisdom" (Murray, 1996: 84). Such an image has been repudiated, as we have argued in the literature review.

To bring our horizon to bear, and as we have argued in this chapter, Morgenthau understood the ends of reasoning as constituting metra which we cannot overcome. His understanding, as ours, is one of there being measures that limit the intellectual capability of human beings, this view of metra is marshalled against those approaches, which in Morgenthau's view, sought to build theories without consideration of the intellectual limitations of the self, advanced a thesis of utopianism. Indeed, in The Machiavellian Utopia Morgenthau repudiates the utopianism of both idealists, by which he means "scientific man," as well as Machiavellians which are equally culpable of ignoring the metra of the self and the intellectual:

> "if it is utopian to assume that a rational system of thought by its own inner force can transform the conditions of man, it is no less utopian

> to expect that a stable, peaceful society can be built upon power alone" (Morgenthau, 1945b: 145).

The statesmen, as well as the tragedian, can understand the metra of the self in the broad sense of the term, and can act in a manner which is consistent with that understanding (Morgenthau, 1946: 221). The statesman/tragedian acknowledges that there are limits to what is obtainable given the metra of the self (Morgenthau, 1946: 221). The utopian, either in "the vestments of a scientific age" or those who fetishize power as the means to achieve peace, fail to learn "the knowing insecurity of the wisdom of man" (Morgenthau, 1945b: 145; Morgenthau, 1946: 222-223).

Morgenthau's international ethics are achieved by statesmen who are able to rise above the supreme wickedness of human beings and adopt merely a limited wickedness; a willingness to conduct evil in such a way that the 'moral' agent becomes less 'beast' like (Morgenthau, 1946: 201-203). Indeed, as Good argues, for Morgenthau: "Diplomacy itself becomes a kind of norm" (Good, 1960: 610). Citing Politics Among Nations, Good argues that Morgenthau understood "diplomacy" in light of the national interest to be a process of moderating and accounting for the interests of other nations when attempting to build an international order (Good, 1960: 610). Diplomacy must not advance domestic values but rather must aim to balance interests-defined-as-power within an associational society (Good, 1960: 610).

Raskin describes Morgenthau's position, moreover, as forever attempting to apply prudence to concrete situations, such as interventionism, and in doing so to discover careful duties on the part of statesmen or where abstract formulations had prompted disastrous moral consequences (Raskin, 1984: 88-94). Therefore, we can infer that it is a prudent, careful and dutiful Statesman who is the central normative agent in the international sphere for Morgenthau. In an international relations context, this involves the balancing of national powers in order to secure equilibrium (Little, 2007: 123-124). International peace can be accomplished through statesmanship (Morgenthau, 1946: 219-223). As Little argues, Morgenthau's implied international society is evident in his vision of the balance of power (Little, 2007: 122-124).

There is something strikingly existential about the self in Morgenthau's thought. What we mean by this is that the self is confronted with its own existence and the conditions of its own existence in the context of not being able to grasp its actuality. The illusion of truth of things in an absolute sense is shattered by the sudden absurdity of claiming to have certain meanings when in fact the self, and the nations, have no loadstar to which their lives direct their actions and give it meaning. The more poetic point is that nations meet under an "empty sky from which the Gods have departed"

As we argued in the earlier section in this chapter, the self, externalises the destructive internal frustrations that drive it towards power-conflicts. In the absence of the Gods, the self feels the need to make itself the ends of its own

existence, and in a collective form, the nation emerges as the objective end of political life and its ideology becomes understood as if it was universally correct. Morgenthau lamented this vision of pathos that dominated the landscape of world politics. Indeed, mid-Morgenthau sought to introduce the practice of balancing power between nations which took the form of a check, one upon another. Indeed, as Little persuasively argues, there is a normative and societal dimension to this international practice: sharing their role as international statesmen with the norms of the society to which they belong, nations strive to prevent the annihilation of humanity by means of thermonuclear warfare through an associational balance of power where all have a role in its maintenance (Little, 2007: 122-124). This implies the existence of ethical and political imperatives within mid-Morgenthau's view of world politics that are necessary in order to advance the possibilities for peace.

Falk distinguishes between Morgenthau, for whom the national interest must have normative primacy, and the position of McCone, for whom the national interest may be pursued by whatever expedient means necessary; Morgenthau's ethical position resists making policy accountable to the value of expediency or the pursuit of interests normatively uninhibited by considerations of the means to a particular political end (Falk, 1984: 80). In Scientific Man, Morgenthau repudiates the view that the end always justifies the means by arguing that if this were the case then all means would become legitimate regardless of their excesses (Morgenthau, 1946: 185-186). Moreover, good

intentions are not a sufficient enough reason to excuse blunders as, in this context, a blunder represents a failure to uphold the ethics of responsibility to those people who must suffer the consequences of such mistakes (Morgenthau, 1946: 185-186).

In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau further distances himself such an expedient realpolitik by stressing the desirability of supranational norms which enable the possibilities for peace and justice at the level of world politics (Morgenthau, 1960a: 248). The notion of supranational norms as a means of checking the nation-state's perpetual desire to fulfil its expansive power-over impulses, is inspired by Morgenthau's nostalgia for the existence of such norms in European history.

European history illustrated how supranational norms can come about through societal integration and where:

> "The individual members of this society, therefore, felt themselves to be personally responsible for compliance with those moral rules of conduct; for it was to them as rational human beings, as individuals, that this moral code was addressed" (Morgenthau 1960: 248).

Restraint on the part of nation-states, Morgenthau implies, must rest upon some kind of shared cultural similarity or identity which can, as it did in the past, serve a moral end (Morgenthau, 1960a: 248-255). Although Morgenthau is

keenly aware of the metaphysical contingencies implied by historic norms, and thus in their absence there is little to stop particular nations from assuming that their account of the truth of things is the actuality of things in an absolute sense, there is no reason to think that supranational norms as a concept could not provide some means of advancing Morgenthau's political and ethical imperatives (Graebner, 1984: 76; Morgenthau, 1960a: 259; Molloy, 2006: 93).

However, Morgenthau had put great stock in the notion that the certainties which had existed prior to the advent of modernity, which were defined within the context of European cultural norms, had been totally shattered and could no longer issue the assurance that the hopes and aspirations of the self as it had (Neacsu, 2010: 72). Supranationalism thus would thus have to rest upon something other than historical norms which could not be reinvented.

Morgenthau's answer has a distinctively Deweyan flavour to it: the advent of supranational organisations is driven by the needs of humanity, what we have called the global demos, as well as rising awareness amongst the international community of the inadequacy of the nation-state to deliver upon those needs (Morgenthau in: Mitrany, 1966: 11). Conceiving of a battle between nationalism and functionalism, a battle which will determine in Morgenthau's view "the fate of the word" is all the more essential given the atomic arsenals available to the modern nation-state (Morgenthau in: Mitrany, 1966: 11).

> "According to Professor Mitrany, an international community must grow from the satisfaction of common needs shared by members of different nations. International agencies, serving peoples all over the world regardless of national boundaries, could create by the very fact of their existence and performance a community of interests, valuations, and actions. Ultimately, if such international agencies were numerous enough and served the most important wants of most people of the earth, the loyalties to these institutions and to the international community of which they would be the agencies would supersede the loyalties to the separate national societies and their institutions" (Morgenthau in: Mitrany, 1966: 11).

As Scheuerman argues, Morgenthau describes "with ever-heightened enthusiasm" the functionalist theory of David Mitrany, a theory which Morgenthau took to offer a unique prospect for "international reform" and the re-construction of an international society (Scheuerman, 2010: 263).

Morgenthau endorsed Mitrany's vision that competence over a technical area linked to a specific activity or function could be elevated to a supranational institution and thus could "generate new supranational forms of social practice, shared norms, and complexes of shared interests" and thus lay the "building blocks" of a new form of "global governance" (Scheuerman, 2010: 263).

Morgenthau implies that his interpretation of international politics escapes from the narrow and parochial views and argues that there are political and ethical imperatives in world politics must be to establish normatively infused social institutions which effectively restrains "the conscience of the actors on the international scene" (Morgenthau, 1960a: 258). Such norms must

be supranational and must orient international actors towards wise choices which work to maintain and regulate an associational balance of power in such a way that a "lesser evil" can be accomplished (Little, 2007: 123-124). As Morgenthau argues the aim of the associational balance of power is "to maintain the stability of the system" all the while maintaining "the elements" that go into it (Morgenthau 1960: 169). As Little argues, Morgenthau's view is that "he is effectively identifying the benign future with an associational balance of power and the malign future with an adversarial balance of power" (Little, 2007: 127). Certainly, this societal check on the vice of universal nationalisms is at the heart of Morgenthau's drive to build world peace and indeed to promote a world which facilitates the opportunity for his type of anti-Jacobinist democracy.

Other examples that certain norms which are appropriate for the international sphere are outlined in Politics Among Nations where Morgenthau argues that as a prudent matter it is better for there to be a norm of accepting that a perfect balance of power is implausible because of human imperfectability and the likelihood of mistakes and blunders as well as miscalculations (Morgenthau, 1960a: 210). A further norm then follows, it is better to maximise power to create a space for the possibility of error that might produce a disadvantage (Morgenthau, 1960a: 210).

Against the nationalistic universalism which has transformed the particularity of its own sovereign state into a globally threatening ideology, as was witnessed by Morgenthau in the heights of the Cold War, Morgenthau

sought system transformation (Lebow, 2003: 242-246). Morgenthau sought to promote the organisation of politics which meshed the sovereign state level and the supranational level and is fuelled by the reconceptualisation of the national interest by leaders of vision (Lebow, 2003: 245). In an international relations context, this involves the balancing of national powers in order to secure equilibrium (Little, 2007: 123-124). And indeed, there is much hope that international peace can be accomplished through statesmanship (Morgenthau, 1946: 219-223).

In the context of Morgenthau's view that it is within the self that human activism helps evades metaphysical shock, the enlightened statesman, we infer becomes a representative of the irrational need for activism (Morgenthau, 1971: 622). For Neacsu, Morgenthau highlights the role of the Statesman in creating the possibilities for the emergence of common meanings, hence a "stable ground" upon which norms can be built (Neacsu, 2010: 165). Thus, it is through this activism that the very practice of IR can discursively sooth the need within the self to have a measure of social meaning. That is, the same dynamics which occur at the level of the self are also the same dynamic occurring at the level of world politics.

Indeed, in Scientific Man we can see how Morgenthau interpreted the transformation of international society into one defined by nationalist universalism:

> "National unification and democratic liberation, instead of doing away with the only remaining causes of war, intensified international antagonisms and made the broad masses of the people active participants in them. The unified nations, instead of being deprived of an incentive for war, now had the cohesion and emotional impetus necessary for policies of conquest, colonial and otherwise. International disputes, which formerly had been largely rivalries of princes and an aristocratic pastime, now became controversies between nations, where the interests of the peoples themselves appeared to be at stake and in which the peoples themselves had the opportunity to play a determining part" (Morgenthau, 1946: 67).

However, if we bring our hermeneutic understanding to bear upon Morgenthau thought, we interpret there to be a strong sense of the metra of Jacobian/majoritarian democracies, but also the metra of authoritarian governments. Certainly, Morgenthau explained the calamities of the twentieth century as a long-term consequence of the decline of aristocratic society, but nowhere does he advocate abandoning democracy of excluding the demos from the political process. Nostalgia for European supranational norms does not in itself imply an anti-democratic standpoint (Scheuerman, 2009: 176-177).

It would seem that Morgenthau understood that a poorly-functioning democracy is of limited value in advancing his political and ethical imperatives:

> "First, the recruitment of government and especially foreign policy officials from the entire population mean that foreign affairs was subsequently pursued by practitioners whose values were as heterogeneous as this of society at large. Moral and political pluralism demolished the relatively uniform normative outlook on which much of international society had depended" (Morgenthau in: Scheuerman, 2009: 177).

A well-functioning democracy would embrace the representative dimension of democracy whereby the demos would confer upon persons the power of the state and enable that government to act for the benefit of those whom they represented (Scheurerman, 2009: 184)

In Politics Among Nations, in a section entitled the "Destruction of International Morality" Morgenthau displays an implicit concern by contextualising the historical fact of the replacement of aristocratic foreign policy makers with ones that could be appointed from any class, or by election, with a wider explanation concerning the decline of international morality (Morgenthau, 2006: 256-256). Morgenthau juxtaposes the modern "individual statesman" - for whom there is a measure of restraint in terms of his conscience - with a description of the electorate - or in our terms the demos - as having virtually "no moral convictions of a supranational character at all" (Morgenthau, 2006: 256). Thus, it would seem that Morgenthau's position is anti-democratic. It is not at all. His view is an anti-Jacobin/majoritarian and one that is in support of a system of government that is representative rather than an

elected dictatorship governed through opinion polls, plebiscites and a repudiation of minorities.

Morgenthau analysis of the demos states explicitly that there can be a moral character to a nation's international cultural identity as a result of good leadership (Morgenthau, 2006: 256). The principle here represented is that the demos is not in a position to exercise moral responsibility in terms of international affairs directly and thus a representative system of government is needed so as to (a) avoid Jacobinism and (b) and to give the representative the space to practice her craft:

> "Moral rules operate within the conscience of individual men. Government by clearly identifiable men, who can be held personally accountable for their acts, is therefore the precondition for the existence of an effective system of international ethics. Where responsibility for government is widely distributed among a great number of individuals with different conceptions as to what is morally required in international affairs, or with no such conceptions at all, international morality as an effective system of restraints upon international policy becomes impossible" (Morgenthau, 2006: 257).

This anti-Jacobinism is also anti-nationalism; the answer becomes the need above all else to advance the representative system of government so as to act as a check upon the self's tendency for destruction in modern conditions.

Writing in 1978 Morgenthau acknowledges the impact that modern forms of communications has had an effect upon undermining the ideology which had tried unsuccessfully to justify USA intervention in Indochina (Morgenthau, 1978: 122). Morgenthau implies that incongruence between the ideological identity of the USA and the realities of the Vietnam War helped undermine the justifications for that conflict (Morgenthau, 1978: 123). In this we see how the hubris of militarist intervention supporters could be undermined through democratic participation in the foreign policy sphere.

Conclusion to Chapter:

In this chapter we brought our horizon to bear and built an interpretation of Morgenthau which emphasises the very great extent to which he grasps the metra/measures of things, such as the self, but also the limits upon majoritarian rule. He conceives of ethics and normativity as checks upon the exercise of power, that is to mobilise those ethical aspects of world politics and democracy which limit and constrain the worst impulses of political ambition and lack of

moderation. Morgenthau conceives of the need to build a working system of peace which aims to manage the interests of the global demos through institutional reform and the shifting of power away from the corruptible sovereign-states and towards supranational organisations which hold the potential to put those states into check. Morgenthau offers IR an account of the tragic nature of world politics that echoes our interpretation of Dewey: the importance of a wisdom of insecurity that arises from an awareness of the metra of things and the implications of such measures. In our interpretation Morgenthau conceives of his thought as an answer to the question of how to manage the implications of the self's limitations and metra. He succeeds and thus offers an account of world politics that is tragedian.

Chapter Six: Towards an Alternative Understanding of the Tragic Nature of World Politics

Introduction: Nature of the Dialogue between Niebuhr/Morgenthau and Dewey

The dialogue has taken place within the horizon of the interpreter, and has concerned itself with enriching this horizon through an examination of (a) the metra of the self (b) the political and ethical imperatives of the various approaches and (c) the application of the approach to world politics.

In general, we have interpreted as we have gone along insofar as we have built up an interpretation of each theme by grasping them one at a time in light of the previous interpretation. We did this, in this manner, in order to illustrate how our interpretation came about, we sought instead of contrasting the themes of the thesis against each other we focused upon the scholars in question one at a time. This permitted us to answer the research question directly: Dewey could be interpreted as applying the metra of things to his approach as well as to retain his commitment to inclusivity, dialogue and pragmatism. Niebuhr could be interpreted in light of the previous chapter, and then Morgenthau. The extent to which the Deweyan approach differed (or not) from the Classical Realists became visible as the dialogue unfolded. In this section we will illustrate what

the outcome of that dialogue is. To put that another way, what is the end result of the horizon’s enrichment and in doing so we answer our research question.

Section One: the Deweyan Assimilation of Morgenthau and Niebuhr

It is our thesis that Dewey's understanding of the metra of things does indeed develop an alternative understanding of tragedy up to a certain point. There are lots of overlaps between Morgenthau, Dewey and Niebuhr. For example, all three acknowledge the metra of the self in their own theories. This is a narrow and broad definition of metra/measures in all three standpoints. That being said the scope of the potential for hubris is greater in Niebuhr than in Morgenthau and Dewey. For Niebuhr, pretention and eminence are sufficient to indicate that the metra of things has been breached. For Morgenthau, the breaching of the metra of things is something that indicates the onset of self-mutilation. Whereas for Dewey the overshooting of metra simply requires there to be a reappraisal of the situation so as to avoid negative consequences in the future. In all three of these cases the narrow conception of metra/measures is involved.

In the broader definition all three suggest epistemological and ethical modesty insofar as when confronted by measures that are beyond the self's capacity to manage or master or indeed overshoot, there is a need to recognise the limitations of the self and its intellect. As such all three scholars embrace notions of truth that are consistent with the intellectual metra/measures of the self. In the case of ethical and political imperatives, the positions of all three are to address the metra of things that are embedded within the situations that

confront them. It is incumbent upon the collective self and the individual to act in a manner that acknowledges the metra/measures of things in all its actions and thus make choices which are consistent with these measures. Moreover, all three suggest that where the broader definition of the metra of things applies, the implications of these measures must be managed as best we can.

When it comes to the application of these standpoints to world politics, we find that they differ somewhat in emphasis but not in their understanding of the metra of things. Niebuhr suggests that the standpoint of the children of light is moderated so as to better manage the children of darkness on the stage of world politics. For Morgenthau, it is to put into check the consequences of the metra of the self which is manifested as power-conflicts in all politics either by balancing the power of nations, or by building domestic and international institutions that act as constraints. In the case of Dewey, the exercise of intelligence as conceived of within a global dialogue between those who make up the widest possible demos serves to pool our knowledge and in turn to produce effective means of dynamic adaption to a constantly evolving situation.

In sum, our horizon has become increasingly enriched by this dialogue and as such puts the interpreter in a position to answer the research question. At a certain level, in spite of their vastly different internal logics, all three scholars display a great concern with the metra of things and thus they all can be interpreted, following from our own interpretation of the nature of tragedy, as tragedian understandings. The pre-existing heritage of the tragedian approaches

from the Classical Realists, do neatly assemble into the flexible pragmatism of John Dewey. However, the conceptions of the self which are developed by Morgenthau and Niebuhr become in Dewey hypotheses as to how the mind part of the body-mind might be organised. Dewey pulls back from making general statements regarding the nature of the mind in favour of an understanding which reflects its construction.

Dewey's conception of the self is as we have argued a product of adaptive practices that lead us towards a mutable and contingent socially constitutive mind. Dewey understood the distinction between a mind that can be explained as a constitutive consequence of communal and community socio-historical practices and the internal "rational" nature of a certain type of subjectivist mind which may or may not come into being (Brandom, 2011: 110). In this sense, Dewey is more alert to the metra of the theorist for whom radical contingency is the best way to explain how so many "minds" or "selves" can be constituted across such a diversity in space and time. Concurrently Morgenthau and Niebuhr do something similar in both conceiving of meaning to arise out of the existential crisis that follows from the grasping of our own finite and relative nature. However, Dewey does not develop an account of the disturbance to the self that is caused by our existential awareness or how it has an impact upon our agential judgements or failings. His thesis implies that such disturbances can become part of a dialogue as to their origins and nature.

When it comes to political and ethical imperatives, the situated intelligence of John Dewey can assimilate the concerns and positions of Morgenthau and Niebuhr by putting them into the context of a dialogue concerning how to best adapt to situations which continue to be defined by the metra of things. As there is always an understanding of the consequences of overshooting the metra in all three approaches, Dewey offers a means of integrating a plurality of ethical and political stances into a contingent situated non-dogmatic set of warranted beliefs that can be "tested" against the capacity of the self to adapt to the situation that they are in that time and place suffering/undergoing/experiencing. Sometimes this may require holding to account the tragic ironies of the eminent and proud, sometimes it will mean balancing power or building democratic movements which aim to put a check upon majoritarian (Jacobinist) rule. Deweyanism can take a posture of a situated ethical and political stance all the while stressing that such stances exist within the measures and metra of a tragic existence.

In our view, Dewey's Classical Pragmatism enables the accomplishment of the task of learning the measures of things and in turn to offer a modest conception of knowledge which pools the insights of the widest demos. The insights of Morgenthau and Niebuhr can easily be added to such a dialogue and can even occupy an important place as experts in their fields. In our horizon, all three provide a shared concern with the metra of things and how the self can cope or manage a world that is defined by metra.

This may not be a synthesis of the three positions, it is perhaps an assimilation of the Morgenthau/Niebuhrian tragedian accounts into the Classical Pragmatism of John Dewey. The tragedian alternative that we proffer in this thesis is one that is outwardly our understanding/interpretation of Dewey with the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian positions incorporated into the epistemological and ethical/political dialogues through which the metra of things is managed, in the context of a forever evolving situation, and through the employment of situated intelligence.

The promise of our dialogue has been that such an assimilation is possible and a shared front can be envisaged by a "Tragic Deweyanism" that further bridges the gap between the realist and international political thought traditions.

The outcome of such an approach is not to achieve some rationally arrived at dialectically shaped absolute knowledge, and thus to measure human choices against such a criterion; rather, it is to keep the conversation alive and to create contingent modest knowledge that is flexible and can be easily discarded if it no longer is best able to manage the ongoing evolutions of our situations.

Dewey's theory of knowledge maps onto our own tragedian conception of the self being unable to resolve the riddles of things once those riddles reach a point whereby we lack, because of our metra/measures as human beings, the capacity or ability to resolve such questions. Oedipus cannot answer the riddle

of returning to his normal life having learned the answer to the riddle of his own identity. Antigone is unable to answer the riddle of how to perform both her familial and patriotic duties owing to their contradictions. Some riddles can be answered because we lack the means to answer them.

By drawing together our tragedian horizon with the understanding of metra (and how to manage metra) embedded within the three scholars with whom we have a dialogue, we are in a position to provide IR with a tragic Deweyanism.

Our approach is a "tragic" Deweyanism insofar as it is an interpretation of Dewey's thought as consistent with an understanding of the metra of things, in terms of the self (and its intellectual limitations), our ethical and political imperatives (as in tension and limited) and the application of these imperatives in world politics (as oriented away from individualism towards collectivist epistemological dialogue). This understanding of the metra of things is embedded throughout Dewey's thought. Now we will employ our interpretation of his thought to construct an alternative understanding of the "tragic" nature of world politics that builds from our reading of Morgenthau/Niebuhr.

To recap: our understanding of "tragedy" as an account of how there are measures inherent in all things and that if these measures are overstepped it results in hubris. Moreover, there are certain measures that the self, in both its individual and collectivist forms, lacks the power to overstep even if it wanted to. n Dewey, these measures must be managed in the best way possible and

such an effort can be best achieved by pooling the insights of the widest possible demos through dialogical engagement. Moreover, Dewey also grasps the importance of these measures as they form the bed rock of his understanding of all aspects of his thought: what we call the metra of things.

In this chapter we will develop our tragic Deweyan standpoint: we employ our interpretation of Dewey as a resource to build a tragic understanding of world politics and suggest the instrumental means through which such tragedy can be managed through attentiveness to the impact of the metra of things as part of a broad process of inquiry within and throughout the global demos.

Methodologically, what we do in this chapter is to employ our broadened/more enriched horizon as a result of our dialogue with the heritage texts. Our enlarged horizon has become enriched through a fusion with the meaning of the heritage texts. Following Gadamer we have fused our horizon with our interpretation of the horizon of meanings within the legacy texts. We remind the reader that in order to give greater clarity to how our horizon is shaped, we employ certain tragedian concepts to help us in interpreting the legacy texts.

We set out in the methodology chapter an illustration of this “base” to our horizon established through deliberately privileging certain concepts in our interpretations. Principally amongst these was the narrow and broader definitions of metra.

To further recap: in the chapter on Dewey we made an interpretation of his thought which led us to have the beginnings of an answer to our research question. We made an interpretation of Dewey's thought in which the Deweyan standpoint is understood to be alert to the metra of things in both its narrow and broader senses. In our interpretation, the Deweyan style of inquiry suggests a form of world politics whereby a dialogue which pools diverse insights can be brought together across the global demos in order to address the problems of mankind. In our interpretation such a style of inquiry is consistent with an awareness of the metra of things and thus aims to manage them in a manner consistent with the principle of inclusivity. Because of its consistency with metra, which we put into a tragedian framework, we advance an interpretation of Dewey's approach to world politics that presents it as a tragedian approach.

In the subsequent two chapters we put our understanding of Dewey's thought into a dialogue of horizons with the Niebuhrian and then Morgenthauian standpoints. What this revealed was that in the case of Niebuhr, his understanding of the metra of things is restricted by his religious views that leave him unable to grasp how it is that his own account of the tragic ironies of things is unable to open up dialogues between differing parts of the global demos which may have a different account of the metra of things than his own Christian version. We conclude by arguing that Dewey's style of inquiry offers a means through which those who are self-giving might learn how to comprehend and adapt to the metra of things and thus advance the Niebuhrian

goal of building a world community that overturns the children of darkness and creates a common bond between nation-states which can achieve a shared awareness of their own tragic fate.

In the chapter on Morgenthau, we put Dewey into dialogue with Morgenthau by means of bringing our horizon, which has come to understand Dewey in a certain way, to bear upon Morgenthau's standpoint and thus enabling us to make an interpretation of his thought. In our interpretation Morgenthau does indeed understand the metra of things, and indeed, puts his political realism to the task of managing metra through a mixture of associational balance of power and by advocating a functionalist model of world politics. We agree that these are the best ways to manage the metra of world politics up to a certain extent, however, Dewey is better able to advance a functionalist model of world politics because he provides a form of inquiry that reaches out to all those parts of the global demos which would participate in supranational institutions and thus goes beyond the boundaries of international politics in order to be more inclusive of the insights of those who might stand to benefit from sectorial supra-nationalisation. This also serves to engage in a practice of culture change in order to support and maintain those institutions.

Section Two: Tragic Deweyanism: The Advantages of Metra-focused Theory Relative to Hubris-focused Accounts of Tragedy

As we have demonstrated in our interpretation, Niebuhr captures the extent to which the self is capable of exercising its freedom in a manner which leads it to ignore the just measures inherent things. Our tragic Deweyanism embraces this sense of "tragic pathos" and seizes upon the impact of overstepping our measures and thus put ourselves into terrible suffering. By pathos we mean to express that which is pathetic about human beings in how they fail to exercise self-restraint in order to keep themselves within what they learn to be the measures of things.

The tragic self is forever caught, as Morgenthau argues, within a tension between scholars for whom the measure of accomplishment on the part of human beings is not defined by the measure of the self as a limited being and thus is forever in a position of resistance against such hopefulness (Frei, 2001: 186; Rengger, 2012: 56). The tragic self is in a position to understand its own metra, and thus to understand the metra of others: intellectuals and optimistic scholars regarding the scope of human accomplishment are thus subject to critical scrutiny (Frei, 2001: 184). Moreover, the tragic self is unwilling to accept that the vast accomplishments of the natural sciences in their own fields can be replicated within the social sciences (Frei, 2001: 181, 186). Tragedians

fully acknowledge the ontological differences of the natural and social spheres and thus require different methodological approaches.

Exclusive reliance upon what is revealed by reason alone does not translate into an automatic means of individual or collective salvation from our difficult situations: there is more revealed to us that what reason reveals alone (Morgenthau, 1946: 220). Oedipus in his ignorance oversteps the measures of things, and incurs the wrath of the furies: but his fate is compounded by his false faith in the capacity of reason to deliver salvation to his people and to advance his greatness.

Tragedy encourages is a strong awareness of where the measures of things are, to get a grip upon those measures, and to respect the craft of grasping such measures. As the tragic self engages in a practice of grasping the nature and meaning of these measures in terms of consequences, it also learns the craft of managing such metra. Such a craft is advanced a great deal through pooling the insights of the global demos: metra as a meta-theoretical concept is a universal feature of all worlds as it is an intrinsic element of all objects of perception: for the tragic self, all things have their measures/metra. Cognitively, without the measures of things, there cannot be a world: metra is a part of the very process of world-constituting that the self performs through social-linguistic practices.

In order to best understand the metra of things, and to have the broadest understanding of its manifestation, it is necessary to have an open mind, as well as to be sensitive to all those things which are revealed to the self either through reason or any other source of revelation. Only with the broadest sense of grasping the insights of the widest number of people can the measures/the metra of things be managed.

Following our interpretation of Dewey's self as defined by its measures/metra, and thus only able to produce warranted assertions, or knowledge claims of limited authority we are in a position to claim that this understanding of the self is tragedian insofar as such a self would be in the end only partially understood given the limited scope of understanding or grasping that the self is capable of achieving. In our horizon this can be easily added to a tragedian account of the self as a limited being that is at the mercy of forces that are beyond its capacity to control.

Our tragic Deweyanism, can render both the Morgenthau and Niebuhr accounts of the self into theoretical and hypothetical resources which can be put to use within inquiry into the nature of the self and its choices/actions. The warrant of these hypotheses thus becomes measured by the utility of them to aid in the constitution of a new equilibrium. Indeed, in the context of experimentalism and dialogical engagement/inquiry, the Morgenthau/Niebuhrian views that the self that it is prone to abuse its freedom, or to manifest its own internal tensions as external destructive impulses may

well represent very useful hypotheses in explaining the nature of world politics. However, such hypotheses would also stand as open to revision if they were revealed to no longer be an adequately useful approach for the self's adaption to the metra of things.

Following such insights, the tragic self is in a position to grasp what its situational and dialogically inclusivity-enhanced insights are and thus what his ethical and political imperatives really ought to be in this circumstance. In our iteration, a situational response is the best response as it reflects the plastic and forever changing nature/metra of things. Sometimes a meta-theoretical restraint upon reason will be required (Lebow, 2012: 70), sometimes a dilution of "grandiose and universalist ambitions" (Mayall, 2012: 15). Indeed, tragedy implicitly warns against a one-size-fits-all response and offers a situational ethic that fits the constantly evolving situation.

However, our approach differs from IR approaches to tragedy, such as Lebow's, which can be largely a critique of hubris (Lebow and Erskine, 2012: 8-9). Such hubris is illustrated in how the Athenians in their dialogue with the Melians: the Athenian overstepping of the metra of conventions results in their hubris and eventual downfall (Lebow, 2003: 124, 160, 161). Lebow's thesis, therefore, concerns itself with advancing an ethos, an ethos of prudence, which represents an "antidote" to hubris (Lebow, 2003: 308).

In our view, this orients his thesis away from the centrality of metra to tragedy. Instead of advancing an account of tragedy which establishes the importance of the archaic use of metra, in both its narrow and broader forms, within the tragedian narrative, Lebow is content to understand that which is breached to be convention (nomos) rather than measures (metra). Lebow understands, following Deutsch, that respecting nomos is much like pulling up a red light in an automobile without being made to do so by anything other than convention (Lebow, 2003: 326). In the overstepping of such conventions, Lebow argues a hegemonic nation fills up with hubris (Lebow, 2003: 310). Therefore, when Lebow maintains that "common sense, restraint, self-control, prudence and balanced judgement, and for women chastity" is the antidote to hubris, he appears to be implying that this ethos as a way of bringing a hegemonic nation away from the brink of tragedy (Lebow, 2003: 366).

Applying our horizon, we interpret this to mean that the question, which Lebow is answering as a manifestation of his thought, is to find a means of advocating for those conventions to which a hegemon might benefit in terms of how it manages the system of states. Lebow even states that these could be: the convention of observing constraints established by international law, institutional obligations, norms of consultation and policy by consensus among close allies" as well as the norms of advancing a more democratic world (Lebow, 2003: 310). However, it seems to me that tragedy is performing a different intellectual feat than council hegemonic nations as to how they can

perpetuate conventions that might well advance their interests. Tragedy, in our interpretation, is about illustrating the importance of understanding the measures of things and managing them in the best way possible. It is an affirmation of measures (of metra), and not as Lebow sees it, a critique of the hubris that arises out of the ignoring of useful social and political conventions.

If tragedy does anything it also exposes how the strong, such as Creon, or Oedipus, can be brought low by the furies as easily as anyone else. The lesson of tragedies is directed at the audience, the demos, and not at characters as they endlessly play out the same script over and over again on the stage. There is no social learning of the characters of the play, but the audience can indeed learn from their fates the importance of grasping the measures of things: metra which may include, but does not confine itself exclusively to, nomos.

In our interpretation the demos is expansive, it is in its broadest category truly global and contains within it a vast array of diverse voices and traditions. In the context of globalisation, and when viewed through a tragedian (metra focused) lens, the boundaries of the demos run only as far as the intellectual limits of the self in its global collective manifestation. As in our view, tragedy encourages the audience, which we take to be allegorical to the widest possible demos, i.e. the global demos, to grasp the importance of knowing as best one can the measures (metra) of things. Tragedy also implies a collectivist and dialogical dimension to this exercise insofar as it is in dialogue that the potential for the audience/demos to learn its tragic "lessons" is established. The ethical,

and indeed, political imperatives which arise out of such lessons are naturally questions of instrumentality: how do we implement what we have learned? How do we understand the metra? How do we manage it even though we are limited beings?

Perhaps the most significant difference is the embrace of radicalism on the part of tragic Deweyanism if the situation calls for it. Prudence isn't always the answer in the sea if it turns to storms.

In Thought And Action In Politics, Morgenthau argues that any theoretical postulates demand "confirmation" if they are to avoid to "a dogmatism that equates theoretical propositions with factual knowledge and sticks with the former in the face of factual evidence to the contrary" (Morgenthau, 1971: 617). We interpret this to mean that dogmatism is, as it is with Dewey, of little advantage if it is unable to be supported by the outcome of investigative inquiry. Like Dewey, Morgenthau understood the self to need to belong to a community of inquirers if it is to establish warranted beliefs.

Moral consciousness is consistent with the very nature of the self (Morgenthau, 1962: 366). Normativity is inherent in the self as much as its capacity to formulate social meanings. This fusion of nature and normativity thus puts Morgenthau in a position to associate what are concrete facts with the normative intra-self social meaning constructing process. The self is caught in a tension between the need to serve its own interests - as well as to undermine metaphysical shock - and as well as the wider obligation to act in an "unselfish"

way and to “not sacrifice the interests of others” to one’s own (Morgenthau, 1946: 191). This impulse to protect the best interests of others is something which Morgenthau felt was of great concern and he lamented the failure of sovereign states to live up to their ideals (Lebow, 2003: 253-255). We must act to protect each other from ourselves, to put each other in check, and to acknowledge that the self is the best moral resource through which the self’s destructive behaviour can be managed. Morgenthau’s ethical and political imperatives, therefore, create societal norms that are effective enough to bring about peace even between superpowers.

There is a curious optimism to Morgenthau’s thought whereby the reoccurring “perennially” and “eternal” manifestation of certain patterns of life lead to lessons learned over time (Morgenthau, 1962: 3). Morgenthau is quick to point towards the lesion of tensions between the legacy of historical political ideas and the understanding of the consequences occasioned by common experiences of political life in a certain period of time (Morgenthau, 1962: 3). Moreover, Morgenthau takes 'political philosophy' and by implication his own (international) political thought, to be caught up within the tensions of historical ideas and contemporary manifestations insofar that “awareness” of what is understood to be true in politics, Morgenthau implies, is built upon shifting sands (Morgenthau, 1962: 4). For Morgenthau, the epoch of when timeless truths concerning human existence has ended, we are seemingly forever thrown into the shifting sands of relativized understandings (Frei, 2001: 14-17).

Nevertheless, in spite of these shifting sands, Morgenthau maintains that is possible to peer beyond the “ephemeral” truths of international relations and identify the underlying laws and patterns, in the sense of long term concretized social facts, and thus we are able to learn over time.

For Morgenthau, the “store of objective general truths' is uncovered by the monument of political thought over the ages, and the construction of this thought overtime comes to a greater “awareness” of political truth (Morgenthau, 1962: 45). Nevertheless, even if our awareness is higher than before, untangling the social reality of the present from the theoretical truths of the past is no easier for modern man than it was at any point in the history of thought. The metra of human nature, however, means that any account of truth must be a 'politicised' manifestation of the lust for power; it strives to turn thought into tools of power acquisition that render the very practice of thinking/reflectivity into a corruption or 'sinful' display of human vice (Morgenthau, 1959: 129). These truths, nevertheless, are more than the power relations that arise from our intra-subject, they are also a manifestation of the inter-subject social level of reflectivity and for the Social Scientist the vantage point is the accomplishment of thought at the social level rather than the arbitrariness of individuated standpoint:

> “Either it will be tempted to overcome the limits of its relativistic assumption, whose nihilistic consequences it is unable to face, by taking flight in a subjective dogmatism that identifies the perspective

> and preferences of the observer with objective general truth - thus becoming the ideology of a particular view of society, reflecting particular social interests - or else it will travel the relativistic road to the end and surrender the very concept of objective, general truth, concluding from the subjectivity of its own insights that there is nothing but opinion and that one opinion is as good as another provided society does not object to it" (Morgenthau, 1959: 129).

Therefore, it is the vantage point of the scholar which cuts across the shifting sands of our relativised contingencies and pluralities; the arbitrariness of politics as simply opinionated disagreement is eschewed in lieu of the social level scholarly reflections that are manifested as the accomplishment of the contribution of thought throughout the ages. Nevertheless, this thought has undergone a vast shift as a result of the departure of the "Gods" from the sky and by extension the inability of the self to create unity with others in our current conditions (Morgenthau, 1971: 628-632). As such, the metaphysical dilemma faced by modern man is something that makes incumbent upon the scholar a certain need to make sense of the world that is otherwise "disconnected" and "unintelligible" (Morgenthau, 1962: 45-46).

Just as the monuments to thought have enriched our theoretical understandings, so the process of reinterpretation continues and through the practices of ordering and signifying, a new interpretation of the otherwise "disconnected and unintelligible" is built (Morgenthau, 1962: 45-46). And for

Morgenthau this renewed interpretation is arbitrated and judged solely by the value that any theory is valuable so long as it is useful in deepening our understanding of our study (Morgenthau, 1962: 45-46). Therefore, when Morgenthau argues that the modern impulse to bring about "reality" by bringing into meaningful contact groups of human beings, a move which serves their corrupt needs, he is implicitly arguing that this is a useful interpretation for us because it deepens our understanding and enriches our interpretation (Morgenthau, 1971: 628-632):

> "In history man meets himself, and in his encounter with history he encounters again, magnified into super human proportions the fallibility of his own intellectual understanding and moral judgments that prevents him from completely understanding and adequately judging both history and himself" (Morgenthau 1962: 15).

By turning towards thought, in this case history but also other disciplines, Morgenthau interprets into being a more nuanced understanding, in this case regarding human intellectual limitations, than would have been possible without that monument of scholarly accomplishment. Therefore, the monument of thought is a useful tool to understand international relations because it enriches our interpretations. It allows us to escape our arbitrary opinions but it falls short

of establishing various meanings and simplifications produced at the social level as the reality of an actuality that is theory-independent.

The great advantage of our approach is that it answers these questions and it does so in a way that represents an advance upon hubris-oriented tragedian approaches in the study of world politics. Whereas these approaches, principally Lebow, are concerned to establish benign and indeed ethically warranted forms of hegemony, tragedy in our view is concerned with encouraging the audience/demos to learn the metra of things in their lives and to manage them as best they can.

Moreover, we conceive of tragedy as understanding the social and collective nature of human beings. Our metra may not come from within but indeed it may come from a society where the powerful fail to understand how they are producing metra that binds others and thus leads them into measures from which there is no escape from tragedy.

Tragic Deweyanism is not only better able to grasp a wider conception of the measure of things than pre-existing IR tragedians, it also provides situational ethical and political imperatives which are responsive to the changing circumstances of and the dynamic evolution of our worlds.

Our alternative understanding of the tragic nature of world politics advances a conception of the self, in its collective form, as able to generate an effective adaptation between itself and the external world that it constitutes through attempting to grasp the actuality of things. As Dewey argues, such

grasping is an ethical and normative action insofar as it aims to create useful knowledge which can be put to use as any account of the world would be: to serve the interests of the collective that engages in the production of that world. Morgenthau is wrong to characterise a faith in experimentalism as a form of alchemy which unrealistically channels intellectual energy into societal change (Frei, 2001: 186). Dewey's employment of experimentalism drives the self in the direction of establishing an account of the world as well as mechanisms designed to cope with this world in a scientific manner, but this is simply an attempt to be more precise and nuanced about the measures of things.

In Scientific Man, the 'decay' of the Western world is said thus to be:

> "represented most typically by the belief in the power of science to solve all problems and, more particularly, all political problems which confront man in the modern age" (Morgenthau, 1946: v-vi).

Scientific Man is dogmatic in his insistence that science has the capacity to resolve all political and social matters if only they were put into the idiom of reason and science: "solving" such matters would seem to be possible in a similar way to how problems are solved in disciplines such as Physics or Mathematics (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). The mood and temper of Scientific Man is an attitude of "confidence in the power of reason" (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). Scientific Man sees problems arise out of the "limitations of knowledge" and "insufficiencies of technical achievement" and thus sees the resolutions of these

problems as accomplished by means of "the progressive development of theory and practice" (Morgenthau, 1946: 215). A medicine can be created to treat even the most protracted problems such as the difficulties in realising international peace (Morgenthau, 1946: 216). Scientistic Man reimagines the world by rendering all things into two camps where "reason, goodness, and right" is juxtaposed to "ignorance, evil, and wrong," with the former having the strength to wrestle the course of history away from a pessimistic, towards an optimistic, outcome (Frei, 2001: 186; Morgenthau, 1946: 218).

Scientific Man's ontological assumptions about politics and the nature of man lead himself (with time) into self-mutilation (Morgenthau, 1946: 215-221):

> "An age, in particular, whose powers and vistas have been multiplied by science is liable to forget for a moment this perennial human tragedy and to exalt in the engineer a new man whose powers equal his aspirations and who masters human destiny as he masters a machine" (Morgenthau, 1946: 221).

Morgenthau implies that this self-mutilation represents a nemesis to liberalist faith in Enlightenment Rationalism, and indeed he goes on to point towards how the "old hubris" of Icarus has resurfaced in this age of science and thus creates a pathos which occasions a fall from success and triumph (Morgenthau, 1946: 222). This nemesis for Morgenthau has already arrived, and it has arrived in the

form of a mood or temper of the age to rival scientistic triumphalism: the despair that arises from the repeated failure of science to "solve" political and social problems (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). Moreover, such a temper is nothing new, as for Morgenthau it represents a characteristic of thought throughout history (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). Man's quest, as manifested in his thought, represents a desire to recapture the "innocence" and "security" it has lost as a result of its evolving into something beyond simply an animal (Morgenthau, 1946: 1). Scientific Man simply misconstrues the "nature of politics" as well as that of "political action" and thus exposes its bankruptcy in the very moment of its "triumph in theory and in practice," i.e. in the "political and military catastrophes" of the nineteen thirties and forties (Morgenthau, 1946: 5-6). Self-mutilation indeed.

Niebuhr echoes this vision of the pathos of Scientific Man in his own conception of the manifestation of irony within the general patterns of history (Niebuhr, 2008: 154). At the heart of Niebuhr's conception of the historical process (as will be argued in a subsequent chapter) is a uniquely Niebuhrian conception of metra (Niebuhr, 2008: 154). Niebuhr aims to establish that his analysis of history is more sophisticated than any alternatives which might be available: using the idiom of tragedy and not naturalism exclusively (Niebuhr, 2008: 152).

Methodologically, Niebuhr concedes to interpretivism that a historical analysis can never escape subjectivism into an objective conception of history (Niebuhr, 2008: 152). Niebuhr argues that his interpretation is a better one because it eschews arbitrary judgments, acknowledges and eliminates obvious biases, and illumines rather than diminishes our historical comprehension (Niebuhr, 2008: 152). Niebuhr seems to hold that history can be comprehended in a sophisticated manner only by rejecting the authority of historians who see their accounts as true and correct interpretations. Niebuhr argues that this is to overstate what is possible and to commit the error of thinking that a subjective and limited view can represent a true and correct interpretation. This type of historian, as well as the Enlightenment Rationalist, for Niebuhr, both represent examples of what Morgenthau calls the "old hubris."

What Niebuhr sees when he interprets the overarching stretch of human history are certain patterns which for Niebuhr are congruent with his religiously inspired view that human eminence and hubris occasion an ironic nemesis or downfall (Niebuhr, 2008). In The Irony of American History, Niebuhr specifies how it is the "pretension" of the human being that is a constant throughout history (Niebuhr, 2008: 155). This represents the pretension of thinking that human destiny can be taken under the control of human beings (Niebuhr, 1943: 331-332). For Niebuhr "the whole drama of human history is under the scrutiny of a divine judge" and it is the pretensions of human beings in taking their destiny under their own control which invites a divine "laughter" (Niebuhr,

2008: 155). Niebuhr conceives of Scientific Man as identifying with the "cumulative" pattern of human accomplishment with the unfolding of history itself (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion and sees in such hubris an implicit "desire" that "would keep man's ends" - that is to say, his destiny - firmly "under his control and in his power" (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). Indeed, Scientific Man aims to "prematurely to complete" the historical process (Niebuhr, 1943: 332). If mankind proceeds down a path of self-reliance then a 'false centre' to life is constructed and thus a failure to trust in divine deliverance (Niebuhr, 1941: 267; Niebuhr, 1952: 158).

For Niebuhr, this is an allegory for how history unfolds: there is a divine law and structure to human life which acts to restrain attempts from humans to become self-reliant and thus build a false centre:

> "The nations, judges, and princes of the world are all in partial defiance of the divine creator and judge of the world; and the terrible character of His wrath is a justified judgment upon the various idolatries of history" (Niebuhr, 1986b: 24).

By "idolatries of history" Niebuhr is referring to self-reliance and eminence, something which fosters pride and thus invites the justified judgment (Niebuhr, 1937: 212; 1986b: 24-25):

> "Every quality which leads to eminence in human history represents, on one side of it, an extension of a force of nature by which the harmonies of nature and disturbed, the inequalities of nature accentuated, the cruelties of nature aggravated and human history involved in self-destruction. These tragic aspects of human excellence and superiority are usually obscured in history. They become fully apparent only in rare moments when empires and civilisations decay and when it is recognised that they were brought low, not by some external foe but by the defect of their own virtues" (Niebuhr, 1937: 212).

The connection between eminence and being brought low is for Niebuhr a pattern of ironic reversals throughout human history, and such a pattern is given a Christian form (Niebuhr, 2008: 157):

> "The Biblical view of human nature and destiny moves within the framework of irony with remarkable consistency. Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden of Eden because the first pair allowed "the serpent" to insinuate that, if only they would defy the limits which God had set even for his most unique creature, man, they would be like God. All subsequent human actions are infected with a pretentious denial of human limits" (Niebuhr, 2008: 158-159).

Humans exercise in their freedom the capacity to overstate their stature and thus cultivate pride in their eminence; this is what Niebuhr calls "original sin" (Tjalve, 2008: 63).

One of Niebuhr's polemic battles is with a catch-all notion of modern optimism, that an optimism concerning the upwards progress of history is inevitable and good. Niebuhr's opposition stems from his own conviction that human life and history is profoundly shaped by dimensions which are beliefs central to his own faith, and what he calls his 'historic religion' (Niebuhr, 1986c: 13). Niebuhr sees tragedies arise amidst the presence of sin, something associated with evil (Niebuhr, 1937: x). For Niebuhr, evil is something to be overcome even if it is something that is part of the universe (Niebuhr, 1986c: 15).

Whereas Niebuhr evokes the idiom of sin, evil and tragedy, his historical optimists evoke the possibilities of human eminence and intelligence and skills. For Niebuhr, historical optimists think that there are good grounds to believe that 'egoism' in the individual, as well as egoism amplified enormously through collectives, can be somehow overcome through the power of reason or through growing religious sentiment. For Niebuhr, historical optimists err in their optimistic beliefs that intellectual enterprises are sufficiently capable of acting as instruments through which the delivery of normative progress in politics and international relations can take place (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx).

For Niebuhr, the ‘moralist’ and the ‘educator’ are both interchangeable parts of historical optimism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxii). They represent idealistic rationalism which overlooks the cold realities of IR which are poorly understood (Niebuhr, 1959: 116). A critique of moralism is found when Niebuhr writes in 1959 that:

> “The educational enterprise for this nation, in short, must include a thorough re-examination of the problems of political morality, which will help the new generation to understand that any consideration of power and interest in analysing the peace within a nation and among the nations need not be a cynical defiance of the moral order but can well be what responsible statesmanship has always been: an effort to coerce competitive and contradictory human aspirations and interests into some kind of tolerable order and justice. Such a task is a highly moral one” (Niebuhr, 1959: 116).

That “moral order” for Niebuhr is one that acknowledges the tragic irony inherent in the historical process. Using the idiom of tragedy Niebuhr acknowledges the metra of human beings but also their capacity as moral beings to put the welfare and interests of others ahead of their own (Ashworth, 2014: 235). As such there is the possibility that the self can act in such a way that it can avoid overshooting its metra. By contrast collectives, such as nations, lack that level of self-restraint and thus overshoot metra, commit the sin of hubris and invite the retribution of the highest authority be that Zeus (in tragedy) or

The Lord (in Christianity). As the individual can exercise greater self-restraint than the nation it is thus that individuals are more trustworthy. Such restraint that cannot easily be put upon nations/collectives which can for practical matters, Niebuhr implies, be restrained only by critical loyalty (Niebuhr, 1960: 89). Such criticality is necessary in order that a "moral order" is maintained at the level of International Relations because the consequences of not maintaining it are to unleash the impact of hubristic "patriotism" in the international sphere:

> "patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism. Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle of all the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervour that the critical attitude of the individual towards the nation and its enterprises is almost completely destroyed" (Niebuhr, 1960: 91).

In this, Niebuhr identifies how pride in national accomplishment is pretension and thus a hubris which fits into the historical pattern of "tragic irony" that the Niebuhrian standpoint maintains. The exercise of collective intelligence to further the national interest represents a pretension and creates the conditions of pride within that collective; the nation develops an exaggerated sense of its own entitlement and is righteous in defence of that

interest that results in the overshooting of the metra of things (Niebuhr, 1993: 154-155; Niebuhr, 1960: xxix).

In the case of the USA, Niebuhr was concerned that the self-idolatry, i.e. excessive pride, would prove a more fundamental threat to national wellbeing than Soviet Communism (Tjalve, 2008: 76). Niebuhr's thought thus identifies the wisdom of rooting out hubris where possible by "a repentant attitude towards false completions of life" (Niebuhr, 1986d: 235). That is to respect the metra of things and encourage the collective or nation to do the same. RN's thought employs the idiom of tragedy in such a way to make this very point:

> "God is the ultimate source of that indestructible order in the world against which man's pride and self-will beat in vain. Here Christian faith, drawing its conceptions of divine justice from the teaching of the Old Testament prophets, reveal similarities with the interpretations of the Greek tragedies, in which the power of Zeus is conceived of as the final order and power which ultimately defeats all lesser majesties and forces which are arrayed against it. All lesser sources of power, which seek proudly to usurp the positions of Zeus, are finally brought low" (Niebuhr, 1986: 24).

Such lesser forces include the nation, which in a moment of self-idolatry incurs a terrible nemesis:

> “The nations, judges, and princes of the world are all in partial defiance of the divine creator and judge of the world; and the terrible character of His wrath is a justified judgment upon the various idolatries of history” (Niebuhr, 1986: 24).

The defiance of the divine by the ‘idolatrous pretensions’ of individuals and collectives, who make themselves the final source and ends of life, think of themselves as more magnificent than any divinity (Niebuhr, 1986: 24). For Niebuhr, to mistake oneself as divine, is found when politics contrives to embolden a nation to embrace an exaggerated sense of its own accomplishment or “eminence” (Niebuhr, 1937: 212). The “tragic irony” of history plays out, thus, within the history of IR; the eminence of civilisations, their very strengths become their internal vulnerabilities, and nemesis - and laughter - is occasioned as the divine judges and undermines such pretensions and thus exposes their eminence to be, in truth, hubris (Niebuhr, 1937: 212; 1986: 24-25):

> “Every quality which leads to eminence in human history represents, on one side of it, an extension of a force of nature by which the harmonies of nature and disturbed, the inequalities of nature accentuated, the cruelties of nature aggravated and human history involved in self-destruction. These tragic aspects of human excellence and superiority are usually obscured in history. They become fully apparent only in rare moments when empires and civilisations decay and when it is recognised that they were brought low, not

> by some external foe but by the defect of their own virtues" (Niebuhr, 1937: 212).

Applying our hermeneutic approach, we can make an interpretation based on the dialogue between Niebuhr and Morgenthau here that with the idiom of tragedy that he employs, Niebuhr is able to correctly identify the "tragic irony" in the historical process where the metra of things are frequently overshot and in turn nemesis frequently follows. Niebuhr finds the distress within the self as it is lost within the conditions of its existence and thus must strive to understand life as best that it can: the idiom of reason and science is insufficient in reaching an understanding of human life that can promote its welfare and interests. By contrast such an idiom only serves to create practices that amplify the "tragic irony" of the historical process. The idiom of tragedy by contrast allows us to best understand life and to adequately respect the metra of things and the implication of overshooting them.

Is this what is at fault with Dewey's political thought, namely, that although he is, as Hook argues, deeply committed to a "tragic sense of life" he nonetheless overestimates what can be delivered ethically at the international level through the employment of social intelligence and its commensurate capacity to mitigate the exercise of political power? (Rogers, 2009: 81-82; Hook, 1974: 9-10; Howlett and Cohan, 2016: 132). Dewey affirms the

epistemological implications of metra, but does he fail to grasp the emotional and existential implications?

To bring our horizon to bear, Dewey can well understand the self to be an emotional and intelligent being without needing to make hypothetical statements as to the true nature of the mind. As we suggested above, Dewey can incorporate the Morgenthauian hypothesis and hold this accountable to the value of usefulness from an epistemological and ethical point of view. Morgenthau's expert contribution, such as that as Niebuhr, would thus, become part of the dialogue within the widest possible demos as to the source of human beings more destructive dimensions and could no doubt provide dialectical input on the matter amongst a plurality of understandings.

The implications of this failure to adequately comprehend the implications of metra is seen throughout his thought for example in his reluctance to affirm the need in certain cases for employing the institution of war in international politics as well as his sympathy of pacificism (Howlett and Cohan, 2016: 132). We use the term sympathy because Dewey did indeed support the use of organized violence and supported the allied war efforts in both World War One and World War Two, nevertheless, he would have found it very difficult to endorse the abhorrent (but perhaps necessary) use of a policy of M.A.D in post-World War Two international politics. We assert this because Dewey lacked a grasp of the truly tragic nature of human beings and how the disruption caused by existential shock had propelled by a means of

concretisation the abhorrent totalitarian ideologies of the mid-century into a means of coping with the possibility that there is an absurdity to life. Indeed, in the aftermath of World War One Dewey retreated from an earlier view that war/international organized violence could provide an instrument for the promotion of a more democratic world (Cochran, 2010: 319-320). Dewey's approach does acknowledge that the eschewal of the institution of war from international politics is possible so long as there is the underlying support of the global demos (Cochran, 2010: 332), however it is unable to adequately explain why such support is necessary: surely the argument for the outlawry of war is strong enough to convince everyone in its path?

Section three: Advantages of Tragic Deweyanism

Tragic Deweyanism has a broader understanding of the metra of things it also can assimilate the narrower definition employed by Saxonhouse's use of the term to mean limits (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1262). The Pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus explained how it is that even the Sun must not overstep the limits, what he refers to as metra or "measures", placed upon his movements as to do so would trigger intervention from the furies (Saxonhouse, 1988: 1262).

Tragic Deweyanism finds an echo in ancient Greek culture and provides a significant evolution upon the idea of metra and its relationship with coping with an existence which necessitate learning the measures of things as well as punishes those who cannot. Indeed, in Some Thoughts on the Archaic Use of Metron, Raymond Prier (1976) argues that the Homeric use of the notion of "measures" evolves through Hesiod and Heraclitus to be noetic rather than material as well as to evoke a sense of "completion" (Prier, 1976: 163-165). Prier points to how in the case of Theognis the social actor is described as holding onto "measures" and "the measure of the ability to cope" (Prier, 1976: 165). The term is later employed by Salon to describe how a human being has a measured sense of completion of his life (Prier, 1976: 164). Metra is perceived within the mind as "measures" that cannot be measured using a ruler or stick as some sort of structure embedded within things which is directly experienced

and only partially grasped (Prier, 1976: 164). Referring to Hesiod's metra of "the loud-roaring sea" Prier contends that:

> "there are seaways men know, underlying dynamics and directions they experience. There is, therefore, a strong indication that the experience of these structures, that is, their revelation to man, must be lodged in nous or some other partially defined area of cognition" (Prier, 1976: 164).

Prier maintains, we think correctly, that the nous (mind) perceives metra as something "immediate and experiential" (Prier, 1976: 164). Thus, it is within the mind that the self comes to understand the "measure of all things" (Prier, 1976: 169). The measure/metra of things is not, thus, an exogenously located extant structure which binds human beings, it is rather an instrumental concept that serves to alert the self to the actuality of its own knowledge of things as well as the potential for its own hubris and ignorance.

This is consistent with Tragic Deweyanism which itself establishes the way to cope with the existential limitations of the self and the need to pool talents in a collective manner not just to cope with what are known problems that require solutions, but also the wisdom of insecurity to understand that there are structures that go beyond our metra and that these may well have a profoundly negative effect upon our lives even if they were previously unknown or the risk associated with them was unknown.

The metra is central to tragedian thought as it sits central to the dramatic narrative and the discourse insofar as without metra the remainder of the drama would make little sense. Indeed, Sophocles represents human beings are simply being unable intellectually to discover a discourse that corresponds to the actuality of their reality in some ultimate sense (Euben, 1990: 27). Moreover, this illustrates of the metra of human beings: the ways of speaking and acting that the tragic heroes are represented as having engendered both the eminence and accomplishments of that hero and as well serve to bring that hero into a terrible "nemesis" (Euben, 1990: 30). This does not however result in a demonstration of irony for its own sake, or a pessimistic lament for human intellectual limitations. The metra of things, however, can to a certain extent be managed, as this following passage indicates:

> "Characters in the plays are trapped in webs partially of their own partially of their own inadvertent devising, which also, in the best of circumstances, empower them. Bound by and to their "character" and their history, they are limited in their capacities of perception and reflection, attached to particular blindnesses in which they have no small stake. Yet they (and the audience perhaps more so) are able to see their blindness and so draw upon and extend the modes of discourse and practices that would otherwise simply ensnare them" (Euben, 1990: 30).

What this passage indicates is that alertness to the metra embedded in the outcomes of modes of dialogical interactions and modes of practices embedded

within the identity of tragic hero, engenders the imperative of being open to new and alternative ways of speaking and acting which may well prove to be more justified than those which arise from a partial view of the world. Our Tragic Deweyanism repudiates dogmatism is prepared always to reorganise and embrace new ways of thinking and acting (discourses and policy) to meet an existence which is too vast and complex to control using the methodologies of reasoning and natural science. Our approach acknowledges the vulnerability of assuming that our current horizon or sight is sufficiently advanced that it can adequately mirror nature without fault and in actuality. Our Tragic Deweyanism assumes that our sight is limited and our views provisional. Like the audience to a Sophoclean play, Tragic Deweyanism has learned from tragedy, and has become part of the hermeneutic experience of those plays itself through its embrace of metra.

The metra of things cannot be overcome, however, even if it is well managed. The fate of tragic heroes reflects the limits of discourses and actions to bring about the realisation of human wants/needs. Metra is also found in the very practices and discourses of the tragic hero: they produce both achievement and failure.

Section Three: Possible Objections Regarding the Introduction of Deweyanism into the Realist Tradition

Can Deweyanism be understood as defined by pathos rather than tragedy? Morgenthau and Niebuhr interpreted Dewey's thought as problematic insofar as it was seen to be consistent with what they understood to be a self-mutilating scientific man. The dialogue in this thesis has advanced/enriched our horizon and has added to it the interpretation that Dewey's thought is consistent with our own understanding of tragedy and in particular the metra of things in both the narrow and broad categories. We also build an interpretation of Morgenthau's metra-focused account of the tragedy of world politics which we think provides us with a vision of the tragic nature of world politics which continues to have import for contemporary debates concerning the ethical and normative dialogue between the realist tradition and the tradition of international political thought.

In this chapter, we argue that Dewey's understanding of the metra of things does not in itself result in a tragic vision of world politics. Nevertheless, it ought to provide a rich theoretical and ethical resource that can be complimentary to as well as add to the tragic vision of world politics that modern debates in the discipline of IR has inherited from Morgenthau. In our complementary approach, Dewey deepens and enriches our tragic vision by introducing a form of inquiry which aims to not only grasp in detail the metra of

things but also how to constitute knowledge which can be put to use adaptively towards the tragic situation of world politics.

However, in order to make this argument we must also demonstrate whether it is the case that our Classical Realists were right in their view that, generally speaking, Dewey's thought was defined by an overly rosy optimistic reading of history? If this is the case, then there are no grounds for thinking that a complementary approach would have any import as far as building a more normative realist approach. In this section we reject entirely the notion that adding Deweyan thought to realism would undermine its tragic sense of life.

As we have argued in earlier chapters, Morgenthau and Niebuhr had a sceptical view of the intellectual landscape of the mid-century USA. John Dewey, as a leading Classical Pragmatist, that is, a living representative of a philosophical tradition which found its origins in the New World, stood out to them as a perfect example of the historical optimist for whom the passage of time can be measured with the success of the whole human enterprise. Dewey the voice of US liberalism would have come across to both Morgenthau and Niebuhr as a naturalist for whom the methods of the natural sciences can be employed in order to help advance the progress of the nation in a liberal light. And indeed, this is correct, Dewey was a liberal and a naturalist,

It was not hard for them to attribute to Dewey the label of "historical optimist" as they viewed much of his thought as little more than a scientistic naïve attempt to harness human "intelligence" for liberal and democratic ends.

Dewey seemed to be a perfect example of such naivety, a typical example of the mid-century US “liberal” scholar who put great hope in the idea that human “intelligence” could unlock great improvements to mankind as a whole (Niebuhr, 1993: 153-154, 156).

For Niebuhr “intelligence" does not represent a medicine to treat social problems, far from it, it does not in itself generate the persuasive force needed to create a social and political transformation that Niebuhr felt was needed (Niebuhr, 1993: 155-156). The light of reason alone, that is the product of practices that employed “intelligence,” is not sufficiently powerful a force alone to incite privileged groups to act against their material interests (Niebuhr, 1993: 155-156). Although, as we have argued, Dewey’s use of the notion of intelligence and it is not without its employment of reason, it is also an assessment that the self must make full use of its measures in order to maximise the best adaptation to the situation with which it confronts.

However, Dewey does indeed stress that the employment of the intelligence of the self in its collective form can be harnessed through the state for the sake of social planning and control (Dewey, 1998j: 367). The marshalling of expertise and “all available resources of knowledge” towards the shared goal of social planning represents the instrumentality that modern societies need in order to replicate in human affairs the same kind of success that intelligence could deliver in the natural sciences (Dewey, 1998j: 367).

For Niebuhr, this is a manifestation of the notion that all that is required for social science is to catch up with the success of natural science - the so called “cultural lag” argument - is problematic because it puts far too much faith in what could be called the power of persuasion (Niebuhr, 1993: 156-157). Niebuhr’s argument is that Dewey can only bring about the advancement of the application of intelligence to society if it is able to persuade vested interests to set aside their privileged positions and to willingly agree to participate in some kind of collectivism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi).

Morgenthau agrees, the power of persuasion, including that which employs the “instruments of science,” is not a sufficient force to make big societal and political improvements alone (Morgenthau, 1972: 2). Morgenthau even located the source of this naivety in the Victorian ideal that the spread of the instruments of science throughout scholarship represents a step towards “progress” (Morgenthau, 1972: 46). Dewey was, to both Niebuhr and Morgenthau, an excellent example of this kind of naivety.

Niebuhr saw it as folly to think that disinterested reasoning can remedy social ills and global ethical and normative dilemmas, merely by educating away any ignorance on the part of those who might stand in the way of social progress (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Only through the contest of power can justice be accomplished (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). “Social inertia” is caused, argues Niebuhr, by “our predatory self-interest” that translates into group competitiveness; Dewey’s supposed failure to acknowledge such predatory

forces leads Niebuhr to be highly sceptical of his pragmatism (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx). For Niebuhr, it is the corruption inherent in human nature that impregnates social relations with challenging roadblocks that resist the accomplishment of political justice, and this is all the more so at the level of international politics (Niebuhr, 2013).

Indeed, Dewey's view, in fact, is that "entrenched predatory self-interests" do get in the way of the marshalling of intelligence in the manner in which he wishes (Dewey, 1998j: 367). But such a statement, however, is matched by both Niebuhr and Morgenthau both of whom, as we argued in previous chapters, sought to put in check the selfishness of the self either through embracing the standpoint of a moderated children of light (Niebuhr), or by putting in place the institutions or nations to balance it on the world stage (Morgenthau).

Moreover, the form of inquiry that Dewey advocates is inclusive of the widest possible gathering of participants, the widest possible demos, and thus aims to put into dialogue all those who stand to reach a just outcome. To bandwagon with a part of the global demos is to introduce injustice and thus cannot represent the greatest degree of insights. Leaving out sections of the global demos can only lead to problems that militate against successful adaption to situations. This may require conflict with predators but again this is not a position that creates disagreement between Dewey and Morgenthau or Dewey and Niebuhr.

When Morgenthau writes in Scientific Man a temper of the age is undue faith in science he signals out Dewey as a typical example (Morgenthau, 1946: 1, 30, 219-223). The heart of Morgenthau's criticism of Dewey is that the Pragmatist is representative of "the engineer" for whom the formulation of rational solutions to social problems can be found and realised as a form of social engineering (Morgenthau, 1946: 1-2, 4, 27-31, 71, 219-220). Dewey is accused of rendering politics a residue of a pre-rational era by attempting to substitute politics for applied intelligence armed with the equipment of scientific instruments (Morgenthau, 1946: 28). It is sufficient here to state that for Morgenthau, Dewey is an excellent example of the kind of Enlightenment rationalism that he finds so problematic.

Niebuhr positions his thought in opposition to rationalism, in particular the kind of rationalism which affirms the transformative potential of "impartial and scientific inquiry" which can be put towards grasping and improving upon "the means and ends of social policy" (Niebuhr, 1993: 156). Consider this description in Moral Man and Immoral Society:

> "While this hope of the educators, which in America finds its most telling presentation in the educational philosophy of John Dewey, has some justification, political redemption through education is not as easily achieved as the educators assume" (Niebuhr, 2013: 303).

Echoing Marxism, Niebuhr argues that the "predatory self-interest" of powerful groups will forever work to prevent the establishment of a more equitable distribution of power within a society (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi). Thus, Niebuhr finds it unlikely that the faith that scientific rationalists have in the connection between improving education and skills and the outcome of a steadily improving society can transform any society where self-interested groups have already bedded down (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi).

Social groups, as they exercise their power, as they promote their interests, exist in conflicting relations and thus the notion that, were a scientific diagnosis of social problems to be made, and prescriptions offered up as medicine, would be unconvincing; there is little incentive for dominant groups to take the bitter pill:

> "social injustice cannot be resolved by moral and rational suasion alone, as the educator and the social scientist usually believe. Conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by power. That fact is not recognized by most of the educators, and only very grudgingly admitted by most of the social scientists" (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi).

Niebuhr's Dewey is such an educator that conceives of politics as the scene of dialogue and persuasion, where superior reasoning is the medicine for social ills: i.e. a naive approach that fails to capture the importance of power relations.

Furthermore, as Westbrook argues, Niebuhr's Dewey represents no more than "a sunny exponent of the inevitable triumph of human intelligence" (Westbrook, 1991: 525). Such a "rosy optimism" erred for Niebuhr, because it "neglected and repudiated politics" as well as the "struggle for power" (Westbrook, 1991: 523-524).

Dewey simply does not understand how it is that power relations shape the political and historical outcomes of struggles and is highly naive to think that individuals and groups can be persuaded to act contrary to their best interests. To think that such a solution to questions of social justice is for Niebuhr to think that historical and social matters can be resolved as if they were of the same substance as natural phenomena (Niebuhr, 2008: 80-81). Moreover, this approach obscures a truth about history, namely that human beings are part of the unfolding of history also create it through their agency (Niebuhr, 2008: 156). This is the very agency as the site of sin as well as virtue for Niebuhr. The failure to associate the self with its potential for sin leads, Niebuhr implies, Dewey down a path where it is reasonable to expect rational solutions to problems that are essentially zero-sum material interest conflicts (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi). For Niebuhr:

> "The invariable implication of this assumption is that, with a little more time, a little more adequate moral and social pedagogy and a

> generally higher development of human intelligence, our social problems will approach solution" (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx).

For Niebuhr, this is Dewey's "gradualism" and it very much clashes with his own much more gritty conception of history (Fox, 1985: 136). Niebuhr's Dewey takes reason as exercised in the form of "intelligence" to propel the course of history in a progressive direction (Fox, 1985: 136; Niebuhr, 1993: 153-154; Niebuhr, 1941: 117). Niebuhr's Dewey associates the progress of reason with the progress of history itself (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr writes of philosophers who view the sum of the whole historical process and think that there is a 'cumulative' pattern through which human beings reap the rewards of their own accomplishments (Niebuhr, 1943: 330). Niebuhr is incredulous at this notion; history itself cannot redeem that can only be done by The Lord. For Niebuhr, human error is manifested in history and is "prompted by the desire" that "would keep man's ends under his control and in his power" (Niebuhr, 1943: 331). Niebuhr implies that mankind's attempt to reach a point in history where its destiny is totally under its control is unfortunate and something that will easily be undone as a result of their hubris (Niebuhr, 1943: 332).

Understanding that social justice must involve conflict is something that Niebuhr suggests is right and necessary in his thought and not at all present amongst the so called "educator" (Niebuhr, 2013: xxxi). In the context of broad cultural criticism, Dewey is held out as an archetypal example of "historical

optimism" (Rice, 1993: 23-24). The role of education and of teaching privileged groups to act in a way that is consistent with social justice is vastly overstated for Niebuhr, and this is particularly true of John Dewey (Niebuhr, 2013: xxx-xxxi).

Niebuhr took up the polemic against the "educator" and liberal reformists, for whom Dewey was counted amongst their leaders, and discounted them for their failure to understand the importance and centrality of conflict, coercion and violence in the shaping of political outcomes (Craig, 2003: 32-33; Fox, 1985: 136). For Craig, Niebuhr understood John Dewey's political thought as "hopelessly idealistic in a world of self-interest and conflict" (Craig, 2003: 33).

For Niebuhr, Dewey's Pragmatism has certain fundamental characteristics (Rice, 1993: 18-19). This is not surprising, as Niebuhr's means comprehending thought throughout history was to discover what was at the heart of - and what was basic about - a certain way of thinking (Rice, 1993: 18): Williams illustrates how this way of establishing 'types' of various belief-systems involved foregrounding of what is basic, if necessary involving over-simplifications, in order to permit the possibility of broad and grand cultural criticism (Rice, 1993: 18).

However, in his review of Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, Ernest Nagel writes:

"He makes telling though familiar criticisms of the shallow optimism and the tidy rationalism of what is essentially the philosophy of the Enlightenment; and he scores heavily against those who place a fatuous and sentimental reliance on mere "appeals to reason" for solving the problems of men. But he obtains a crushing victory over "scientism" only by using the debater's trick of so exaggerating the claims of empirical rationalism that even to its proponents the views demolished are legitimate subjects for ridicule" (Nagel, 1947: 907).

Nagel points to Morgenthau's debater's trick of exaggerating an opponent's argument in order to make his own vision, however radical, seem a moderate and sensible position. Indeed, Morgenthau's "scientism" is very broad and perhaps lacks a coherent identity (Morgenthau, 1946: 4). For Nagel, "Scientism" is Morgenthau's name for "the philosophy of modern empirical rationalism" (Nagel, 1947: 906). But from the perspective of the 1940s, a "modern empirical rationalism" is a very general category: Carnap's Logical-Empiricism, Wittgenstein's Tractus, Peirce's "Pragmaticism" etcetera: these distinctions are lost on the Morgenthau of Scientific Man. Morgenthau's perhaps excessive generalisation identifies prima facie similarities with vast swathes of Western thought but in doing so totally sweeps away the differences, nuances and sophistication of these standpoints:

> "Whatever different philosophic, economic, and political beliefs people may hold, they are united in the conviction that science is able, at least potentially, to solve all the problems of man. In this view, the problems of society and nature are essentially identical and the solution of social problems depends upon the quantitative extension of the methods of the natural sciences to the social sphere. This is the common ground on which Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer and John Dewey take their stand" (Morgenthau, 1946: 4).

Our defence of Dewey against Morgenthau is that we must distinguish between Dewey's faith in the collective self's capacity to exercise the full measure/metra of its intelligence, and his faith in the role of science/reason in generating inevitable social change. As we have seen, Dewey understood the metra of any truth-claim, and thus advanced a fallibilist conception whatever reason/intelligence reveals to the collective self. His employment of the instruments of science is only warranted so long as they are held accountable to the principle of usefulness to society. Indeed, as we have argued, this is how Dewey conceives of how we determine the warrant of any truth claim.

Dewey's thought belongs to a different sort of "enlightenment" than the one Morgenthau critiques.

Superficially there is the appearance of "scientism" in Deweyan thought as well as the use of the concepts of "intelligence" and "control" that can seem to be less sophisticated a position than it is at a glance. However, it is a substantial error to leave unacknowledged the nuances in Dewey's thought. Morgenthau advances his line of attack against standpoints such as J. S. Mill, for whom there are epistemological and ethical possibilities that methodological individualism could in any way produce social laws that could be put at use in social problems (Nagel, 1947: 907; Putnam, 2004: 99-100). The serious empirical study of social problems ought to mean nothing more than an attempt to practice situated intelligence, and not as an advocation of some sort of scientism (Putnam, 2004: 10-11, 100).

As we argued in chapter one, Dewey's conception of the self's experience and understanding of the externality of the world is constituted through the collective self's capacity to marshal its intelligence into the production of warranted beliefs. There is a direct interaction between the collective self and its situation that necessitates the dynamic adaptation of the collective self to the situation that it experiences. Such a mutable and contingent and indeed moderate account of the self's measures relative to those measures/metra of thing that cannot be grasped or mastered create a sense of democratic epistemological impulse to combine in dialogue the insights of the widest possible demos (Dewey, 1958; Dewey, 2002; Putnam, 2004: 103-105). Such adaptation does not discriminate between insights but is inclusive of all

who produce them within the dialogues through which the collective self makes sense of and manages its tragic circumstances. To artificially reject knowledge because of its "non-scientific" quality stands in contrast with Dewey's thesis as inclusive to all warranted beliefs and democratically inclusive of all participants in the ethical and epistemological dialogue that constitute them.

Morgenthau's objections to enlightenment "naturalism" simply do not apply to Dewey's naturalism (Morgenthau, 1946: 220). What counts as legitimate knowledge cannot be delimited to those things which cannot be expressed in the idiom of science or reason. What is required - all the while acknowledging the value of natural scientific accomplishments is to celebrate and acknowledge the legitimacy of other understandings about human life that are not accountable to enlightenment naturalist methodological values and normativity (Morgenthau, 1946: 220). This, Niebuhr and Morgenthau would be surprised to learn, is a position they share with Dewey.

Notions of metra/measures cannot be expressed in the idiom of positivism, but as we have demonstrated, they are central to Dewey's reflections as the notion explains, in our interpretation, many aspects of Dewey's overall thought. Because of his vision of knowledge in this inclusive sense is for Dewey the most warranted way to understand the potential usefulness, it is not unsurprising how it is that he conceives of democracy in epistemological terms (Putnam, 2004: 104). Every citizen has a dialogical role to play to bring their unique insights into dialogue with the expert and through the process of

deliberate democracy and the widescale dissemination of critical thinking skills through a reformed education system, every citizen would learn to think for herself as well as to know "when to seek expert knowledge" (Putnam, 2004: 150).

To bring our horizon to bear, Dewey's thought is consistent in it rejection of an optimistic reading of history just as the case with Morgenthau and Niebuhr. The notion that Dewey represents a scientistic approach does not do justice to the nuances of his thought. We see no barrier from an epistemological or ethical standpoint to why our alternative Deweyan approach could not become a compliment to the inherited account of the tragedy of world politics.

Conclusion

Section One: introduction to conclusion

In the literature review we identified three gaps in the IR/IPT/realist literatures and these were that (a) pragmatism as it is understood in IR suffers from an optimistic understanding of history and that the application of a tragic vision of politics would address this shortfall: (b) that the existing tragedian approaches in contemporary IR either focus upon hubris as the central concept of tragedy or in general advance a view of tragedy that conceives of the metra of things as something to be transcended through social learning. We found there to be a need to revive the tragedy and IR debate through a centring upon the notion of metra/measures which in many cases cannot be overcome. (c) And importantly we found there to be a need to develop and deepen a realist ethical standpoint which could be up-front and centred within IPT.

Our dialogue between these three scholars therefore was designed to address these gaps in the literature simultaneously. An alternative understanding of the tragic nature of world politics was developed and this is an approach which both applies tragedy to pragmatism all the while extending the scope and depth of realism as an International Political Theory.

Section Two: Distinctive and Original Contribution to Knowledge

The central problems that we identified in the literature review were that within IPT there is a general view of realism as not at all a normative or ethical approach to world politics. Such a repudiation has taken place amid the development of IPT approaches such as Cochran's Pragmatism which is an approach which advanced notions such as inclusivity and dialogue as well as a tragedy in IR debate. In our view Cochran's pragmatism lacked a tragic sense of life, and contemporary IR theorists who have engaged with tragedy have underplayed the importance of the role that the concept of metra plays in tragedy. We therefore advocated a dialogue between various approaches which supported pragmatism, inclusivity and dialogue on the one hand (Dewey) and realists which engaged seriously with tragedy on the other (Morgenthau and Niebuhr). It was our hope that a dialogue between these three important thinkers would produce an approach which embraced both an understanding of the metra of things as well as the notions of inclusivity, dialogue and pragmatism that have been so important in IPT. Such an approach would thus be within the boundaries of IPT and would also represent a development of realism by drawing upon the insights and understandings of Morgenthau and Niebuhr in a dialogical manner.

Our research question (to what extent can Deweyan pragmatism, in particular Dewey's understanding of the "metra" of things, provide an alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the "tragic" nature of IR?) was designed in order to facilitate the critical analysis underscoring the dialogue between the three scholars. If an alternative could be created through this dialogue then a metra-focused account of tragedy would be in contrast to the tragic understanding of IR found in Classical Realism. If an alternative could not be produced by means of this dialogue then it would suggest that this avenue of advancing and deepening realism as a normative approach would not be fruitful. As it happened, the dialogue did indeed produce, to a certain extent, an understanding of IR which was simultaneously consistent with the metra of things as well as retaining those aspects of pragmatism needed in order for the approach to be considered within the boundaries of IPT: inclusivity and dialogue. The extent to which it does not represent an alternative is as a result of the surprising similarities between Morgenthau and Dewey regarding their use of the metra of things in their approaches.

This Tragic Deweyanism is an original contribution insofar as the confluence of the concept of metra with our dialogue between the three scholars has not been attempted in the literature. It is significant because as an approach it has the potential to engage in IPT debates from within the boundaries of the field all the while retaining the realist grasp of (metra-centred) tragedy that IPT approaches need to avoid overly optimistic readings of history.

Central to our contribution is the dialogue between the three scholars and in particular our employment of the concept of metra to help explain how all three in their own ways apply the concept within their thought and in doing so provide answers to the question of how to manage the metra of things. This shared understanding of the metra of things as well as similar political and ethical imperatives is surprising for those who think of Classical Realism and Classical Pragmatism as quite different approaches within world politics. Our dialogue between these three scholars exposed how similar the contributions of Dewey and Morgenthau are when viewed through the lens of metra.

To the extent that an alternative to Classical Realist understandings of the "tragic" nature of IR was created we found the Deweyan understanding of the metra of things sufficiently elastic and plastic that it was able to assimilate the Morgenthauian and Niebuhrian positions as hypothetical models to be examined within the context of a wider global dialogue amongst the global demos. To an extent this does provide an alternative tragic understanding that is distinctive from Classical Realism's understanding of the tragic nature of International Relations. However, we also found that owing to the similarities between the metra of things as embedded within the thought of John Dewey and the Classical Realists, we are limited in our claim that this alternative represents a sharp departure. It is perhaps better understood as an evolution of the Classical Realist position to become more attuned to the importance of the concept of global dialogical inquiry.

Section Three: How we Achieved this Original and Significant Contribution to Knowledge

In this thesis, we selected three scholars who met our requirements of (a) realists who have engaged with tragedy, who are untouched by the tragedy and IR debate, but also have developed ethical and normative thought and (b) pragmatic theory which advances inclusivity and dialogue. The reason for choosing Dewey over alternative pragmatists was because his approach was mentioned in relation to tragedy in Deweyan studies. It made sense therefore to include him as our pragmatist. We chose Morgenthau and Niebuhr because they were both realists who engaged with tragedy in a time that was untouched by the contemporary tragedy and IR debate. They also had profound ethical and normative contributions for the field of IR.

We took inspiration from Hans-George Gadamer to create a methodology which enabled us to facilitate the dialogue between the three scholars. We maintained a view that is consistent with the dimension of Gadamer's thought which stresses how reality is constituted in and through language. In order to maintain consistency with this position we were forced to reject Gadamer's unorthodox essentialism. Nevertheless, our methodological position remains consistent with hermeneutics that largely reflects Gadamer's philosophy. Our main research instrument throughout the thesis, is the fusion of horizons. This a concept in which an interpreter can bring to bear one's own horizon upon

another in such a way that our own horizon is forever shaped by the interaction. In order to illustrate how our horizon became increasingly enriched over time, we developed a tragedian horizon which stressed the importance of a number of tragedian concepts. During the dialogue we primarily drew upon the concept of metra in order to advance our interpretation (although the other concepts such as hubris and agon were applied infrequently). We distinguished between a narrow and broad understanding of metra in order to illustrate the distinction between measures that could be overstepped and those that could not be.

Our dialogue began with Dewey's thought and we developed an account of Dewey through interpretation that exposed the very great extent to which his thought was shaped by a conception of the metra of things. We stressed the importance of dialogue and inclusivity in this chapter. In the following chapter, we further enriched our horizon by adding Niebuhrian insights and contribution to it and further developing the similarities and tensions between our interpretation of Dewey and that of Niebuhr. In the following chapter, we did the same thing with regards to Morgenthau. In the final chapter, we answered the research question by developing the end result of our horizon's enrichment: a tragic Deweyanism which could assimilate insights from Morgenthau and Niebuhr all the while retaining the aspects of Pragmatism that we consider important if the approach is to be located within the boundaries of IPT. We then followed up this chapter with a few discussions regarding any objections that

might be made towards including Deweyan thought in realism as well as to suggest some of the advantages of tragic Deweyanism in general.

Section Four: Significance for the Field of IR

Our research does offer IR a theoretical means to bridge the gap between realism and pragmatism as well as to illustrate how a tragedian understanding that centres upon a notion of measures can create analytical opportunities to build new approaches and new synthesis. Realism has long been considered to be outside the boundaries of IPT for reasons that we spelled out in the literature review. This ought not to be the case with a Tragic Deweyanism that stresses the measures of things that can be grasped and managed as much as possible and done so in an inclusivist and collectivist manner (inquiry through dialogue) but it also grasps the epistemological complexities which go with such an understanding of measures. We can only be sure of a partial and historically/culturally contingent understanding of such things. Our warranted knowledge, our justified beliefs, they all remain bound to the limitations and insufficiencies of the self which remains locked into an existence which it cannot control and which will eventually overwhelm it in full knowledge of its own personal extinction.

This tragic self is one shaped by its measures and the measures of its contingent situation. Tragic Deweyanism grasps both this tragic dimension of

life as well as to retain its epistemological view that the self in its collective form can pool its intellectual resources through dialogue and in the pursuit of inquiry in order to best manage the metra of things. It seems to me that IPT would benefit greatly from such an approach as its very purpose is to redesign international practices so as to extend inclusion to all groups.

Moreover, for the tradition of realism, engaging with notions of inclusivity and dialogue more fully could help produce a means of further restraining the worst impulses of human beings by creating supranational values and institutions which serve to maximise the measure of constraints upon the worst impulses of nation-states and their leaders/majorities. In assimilating insights from Classical Realism, Tragic Deweyanism retains those insights and can put them to use in the right situations at the right times. This also rejuvenates these insights and puts them to use in debates within IPT in a way that they would otherwise not be welcome. Especially if the approach had realism in the title.

(72492 words)

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