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Discourse, Politics and Hegemony

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Title: Boko Haram and the Discourse of Terrorism in Nigeria: Discourse, Politics and Hegemony

MODUPE IDOWU AKINLEYE

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, University of Bristol, submitted in October 2019

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Abstract

The issue of terrorism has become one of the topmost concerns of US-Nigerian Foreign policy in connection with the Global War on Terror. As a result of the 'shift' of the GWOT into Nigeria, Boko Haram was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in 2013. Extant research on Boko Haram's terrorism in Nigeria and other parts of Africa is however premised on/driven by some essentialist thoughts and thus remains normative. Yet the proscription of Boko Haram reveals both continuities and change in relation to earlier constructs of the Nigerian state and non-state actors since the Cold War. Through the power of discourse, state actors silence complicities and 'fix' the meaning of the violence of others while excluding other possible narratives in order to arrive at discursive constructs which remain self-serving. These continuities in identity constructs therefore highlight the need for a post structural thought in understanding terrorism in Nigeria particularly and Africa generally. In particular, this thesis suggests that the labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation in Nigeria reveals the continuities of Othering of actors through the signification of 'crises' in policy discourse. This is premised on the perception of Africa by the 'West' as a site of ongoing disorder. The thesis uses Homi Bhabha's concept of Otherness as well as Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory to understand the construction of the 'terrorist threat', and the 'United States Self', 'the counter terrorist state', and the 'terrorist other'. As no known study has undertaken to show how the labelling of Boko Haram works through discursive power and politics as well as the function of silence in meta narratives, this research is therefore particularly significant as the focus on policy and its implementers in Nigeria helps to unveil the silence in the discursive construction of the 'strong' state as the state which counters 'evil' terrorists. However, unlike Traditional Terrorism Studies which highlights the state as a possible user of terrorism, the thesis adds to the Critical Terrorism Studies by examining how the production of the discourses within which the labelling of acts and actors of 'terrorism' have evolved and how practices like counter-terrorism enabled by these discourses become justified and normalized.

Dedication and Acknowledgement:

I am grateful to God, family and friends who supported me through this lonely and difficult journey. Particularly I am grateful to my spouse, Mr A. A. Ajibade for his relentless effort in supporting me so far.

My gratitude without fail goes to my supervisors: Dr Adrian Flint and Dr Elspeth Van Veen for their unwavering support throughout the dark times. All I could say is THANK YOU.

I would like to appreciate the examiners of this thesis: Dr Christopher Baker-Beall and Dr Ryerson Christie.

This work is dedicated to **Daniel Adewole Ajibade**, my dear son, who was just a few weeks old when I started this research.

Author's Declaration:

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: DATE: 1st October 2019

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The events of September 2001 justified the 'shift' of the Global War on Terror/ism (henceforth GWOT) into Africa generally and Nigeria particularly. The discursive shift enabled the proscription of Boko Haram¹ (and Ansaru²) by the Nigerian government as a terrorist organisation on June 4, 2013³, followed by the Home Office on July 12, 2013 and the White House on November 13, 2013. As a moment, the shift of the GWOT into Africa highlights some continuities and change in the U.S-Nigeria policy narratives and draws heavily from earlier constructions and/or representations of Africa/Nigeria. The United States is particularly important to this thesis because the GWOT was not just championed by the U.S but the shift also bring to the fore the importance of Africa and particularly Nigeria to the U.S. Thus, the construction Africa/Nigeria shifted from open and/or ungoverned spaces during the Cold War to failed states pre-September 2001 to a site of terror/ism after 9/11. The continuities of earlier colonial discourse in these pre-9/11 representations exist to shape the post-9/11 discursive practices in a way that enables the practices of Othering of the terrorists as well as the production of Nigeria as a counterterrorist state. The Othering of Boko Haram and the production of Nigeria as essentially a counterterrorist state, in this sense did not represent a denial of agency to any of these subjects but to highlight how through discursive continuities of earlier colonial rhetoric, the global order and disorder binary became fixed and assume permanence instead of the ambivalence congruent to the globe. Nigeria for instance is constructed as an economic giant in Africa and an exemplar in West Africa (i.e. order) while in the same breath represented as a site of poverty and degeneracy (i.e. disorder) in the policy

¹ Though the group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad", Boko Haram will be retained throughout this thesis.

² It is unknown whether Ansaru is a splinter group of Boko Haram or an independent entity. The Nigerian army has however claimed that the group has been completely defeated and it's no longer in existence. The group is however largely unknown in Nigeria (Elden 2014).

³ It is worthy to note that the proscription of the group as terrorists by the Nigerian government became inevitable after high level meetings by the U.S and the Nigerian governments with the former exerting some 'pressure' on the latter to proscribe the group locally. This is after Abubakar Shekau had been on U.S international terrorists list for two years (House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014).

documents and official narratives analysed in this thesis. While this is beyond the purview of this thesis, the state of ambivalence in the U.S has also been frequently highlighted by scholars like Noam Chomsky and Roxanne Doty. Therefore, the fixity of a state of disorder as signalled by the terrorism discourse in Nigeria points to the play of hegemony in meaning fixation and the continuation of earlier colonial practices.

Furthermore, as this thesis aims to show that the discursive change occasioned by the GWOT in Africa brought about a “fixity” and “permanence” to this ambivalence inherent to the globe thereby constructing an Other. The U.S foreign policy therefore changed in the wake of the 9/11 from a narrow state-centric policy to an overarching and broad template which involves democracy promotion, health and economic drive linked to the GWOT. While some of these practices were reflected in the Pre-9/11 Clinton’s presidency, they became dominant with the war on terror/ism being the hub of the policy narrative. It is in this light that this thesis argues that the GWOT in Africa/Nigeria is premised on a number of assumptions, rhetoric, myths and beliefs drawn from earlier colonial discourses and practices. The construction of the discourse of terrorism, which according to Zulaika and Douglass (1996) is therefore framed in the “mythology of the Otherness” with no idea of the subjectivity, historical and social background of the so-called ‘terrorist’. As Stampnitzky (2013) argues, by boxing a group into the terrorism myth, their grievances notwithstanding, the rationality or otherwise of their actions are considered an impossibility as their actions are then located in the realms beyond reasoning; because if it becomes reasonable, it is can no longer be referred to as terrorism. Also, the ‘invention’ of ‘terrorism’ poses a moral judgement which among other things delineate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ violence’, ‘justifiable and ‘unjustifiable’ violence. Assigning a priori, a moral and rational judgement on the violence as well as the identity of Boko Haram then highlights the use of discursive power to create political identities through Othering by mobilizing the identity as a fixed construction positioned against a perceived threat. Moreover, the possible role of the Nigerian and U.S governments in the violence are not only silenced, but also the global hegemony of the U.S and the ‘war on terrorism’ doctrine itself become naturalised. Every violence then remains a referent sign open to several interpretations, but which could be understood within its context. Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985: 108) Discourse Theory which this thesis follows, puts it more aptly:

An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independent of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of “natural phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath of God,” depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence

On this basis, this thesis will therefore engage with *meaning structures* through the use of the label ‘terrorist’ to delineate the Boko Haram group both in Nigeria and internationally along the underlying politics and power connected to it. It will also examine how empty signifiers like ‘liberty’, ‘development’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, and ‘order’, all come together in a chain of equivalential identity to construct the U.S self as well as re-imagine the Other.

As a summary, this section has introduced how the shift of the GWOT into Africa reflects both the continuity of earlier colonial discourse and also signals a change in the U.S foreign policy towards Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. The discourse of terrorism therefore becomes a moment around which the United States foreign policy became anchored. To this end, the use of Bhabha’s’ concept of Otherness and Discourse Theory to understand it becomes all the more important as they help to highlight why words matter. It thus matters not to produce the Boko Haram movement as a terrorist group not only because it borders on the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of the terrorism myth and the silencing of the roles as well as naturalising the power and hegemony of the U.S and Nigerian political elites in the Boko Haram uprising but also because the label will among other things, normalise the other violence not categorised as terrorism. Since the discourse of terrorism as a hegemonic political language in Nigeria is yet to receive context specific studies on it, the second section will engage with, build upon and add to strands of relevant literature in terrorism studies, in order to unveil how the social is constituted by discourse. Key to this chapter will be gaps in knowledge that this project aims to fill. This research will address two gaps in the terrorism studies literature. CTS scholars like Zulaika and Douglass (1996) has continued to argue for the increasing need for context in order to understand disparate political violence and this project aims to achieve this by providing context to the Boko Haram movement. Secondly, the delineation of Boko Haram as an international terrorist group was initially premised on

the failed states templates which draws on the metaphor of Africa as “the sick continent” while blurring its history. This project will therefore address these gaps by examining how terrorism as a hegemonic political language in Nigeria is produced through the analysis of U.S government texts (from 1953 to 2017) and interview data from nine Nigerian military officials. The interview text will help to give primary empirical evidence to show how hegemonic language becomes normalized and/or naturalized. The third section will then discuss the methodology: theories, concepts and methods this research will draw on to understand how the use of the terrorism language functions as a hegemonic political language. Much of the conceptual framework of this thesis comes from Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory and Homi K. Bhabha’s concept of Otherness in order to unveil how hegemonic discourses are normalized. The fourth and fifth sections highlight the thesis’ structure and its conclusion.

Foreign Policy: Nigeria and the United States

Literatures on U.S-Nigeria foreign policy are in scant supply and there seems to be no literature examining the discourse of terrorism and Nigeria-U.S foreign relations. Nigeria has traditionally considered itself as a natural leader of Africa and its foreign policy has hitherto reflected this. The country has played very pivotal roles in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). For instance, the country spent an estimated \$ 13 billion on various peace keeping operations across West Africa by 2014 (Ashaver and Teriyima 2014). It has moved from a pan-Africanist policy which focuses on the need to eradicate colonialism and its effects in Africa during the Cold War to a concentric one during the 1990s, with priority given to issues relating to Nigeria, before West Africa, the rest of Africa and then the rest of the world (Osuntokun 2007; Akinterinwa 2004). However, the shift of Nigeria’s foreign policy in 1999, the year it returned to democratic rule, to focus on Nigeria’s economic development by attracting foreign direct investment meant that the international community, of which the U.S is a key component, would define the country’s policy focus (McGann 2019).

While Britain is the official colonizer of Nigeria, the United States and Nigeria has, however developed close ties based on significant economic and political interests particularly from the 1950s during the devolution of power (Ekeh 1990; Adebayo 1983). This is because as the

'illusion of permanence' of British-ordered global political landscape gradually and steadily diminishes (Hutchins 1967), that of the U.S gained significance in the continent following the end of the second World War (Huband 2001; Oye et al 1981). Nigeria became all the more important to the strategic interests of the U.S during and after the Cold War due to the "critical interests" of the U.S in Nigeria's energy infrastructure, hydrocarbon and other natural resources especially after the U.S fallout with the Middle East. Nigeria plays host to the largest amount of hydro carbon in West Africa and ranks from the 3rd to the 5th supplier of oil to the U.S (Robertson 2012). Following this background, socially and politically salient processes in Nigeria also became of importance to the U.S in order for the economic interests of the U.S in the country to remain secured through a universalized order (FRUS, Documents on Africa, 1976). As will be argued by this thesis, it is this concern for order by the U.S in Nigeria that occasioned the crises in the construction of U.S policy towards Africa through which the state failure in Africa and the 'shift' of the GWOT became a matter of policy concern and/or drive. The focus of this thesis on foreign policy as discursive constructions which defines for us the identity of states and their actors as well as practices enabled by these constructions is in the understanding that a state or nation has no objective essence through which its ontological status could be understood. Rather this is made possible through discursive constructions (Nabers 2009; Ashley 1986; Weldes 1999; Ashley 1986; Campbell 1998). According to Campbell (1998:12), "States are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved... states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming". Unlike Butler's theory of Performativity used by Campbell to understand how representational practices, rather than a pre-given subject, could explain the production of state identity and otherness, this thesis considers such effects of identity construct through Bhabha's Otherness. The U.S foreign policy towards Nigeria then as a discursive site helps to understand how both states' identities as well as their actors become fixed following the global order/disorder dyad and how practices enabled by these constructions assume their naturalness. Following scholars like Baker-Beall (2014); Doty (1993), Widmaier (2007) and Nabers (2009: 192), foreign policy will be understood as constructions which represent the "continuous attempt by

governments to assume the role of representative of the nation, thereby creating identity and social order”.

A word of caution about the usage of Nigeria and Africa used alongside throughout the thesis is necessary from the onset. In U.S foreign policy, Africa is sometimes considered in policy terms as a seemingly monolithic whole; except in certain instances like official narratives where regions like West/North Africa are considered distinctly. Hence, throughout the thesis, Africa is considered alongside Nigeria because Nigeria is sometimes implied in U.S policy directives on Africa. A further proof of this is how the proscription of Boko Haram is linked to its similarities with other groups like Al-Shabaab in North Africa. Hence, except where Nigeria or West Africa is explicitly mentioned, the policy on Africa will be quoted as implicitly about Nigeria.

Defining Terrorism

Academic Debates

Extant literature on Terrorism Studies could be considered as polarized basically into Traditional Terrorism Studies (hereafter TTS) and Critical Terrorism Studies (hereafter CTS). Being an emergent field that is interdisciplinary in nature, some scholars have questioned if Terrorism Studies could actually be regarded as a distinct field of its own (Horgan 2006). Terrorism is an “essentially contested” concept (Gallie, 1955-56:168) and lacks a ubiquitous definition. The absence of a consensus among scholars about the definition of terrorism proves problematic in both theoretical and empirical terms. As Silke (2005: 36) and Wardlaw (1986:3) observe, the absence of this “Holy Grail” presents a possible pitfall for the field ‘in terms of production of empirical knowledge’ and conceptual development. Within TTS, however, terrorism is regarded as “‘something out there’ that is open to scientific objective verifiability” (Joseph 2009:93). This underlying assumption which considers terrorism as a phenomenon with essence that is distinct from other types of political violence which is identifiable and independent of the researcher’s value is grounded within the positivist school of thought and has given rise to a litany of projects aimed at defining, analysing and countering terrorism (Primoratz 1990; Teichman 1989; Schmid et. al 1988, Hoffmann 1996 among others). One such project, Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 attempt at synthesizing varied definitions of terrorism among scholars failed to achieve a universal acceptance of the definition of terrorism. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988:28), after completing a synthesis of academic definitions in the field of terrorism studies, provided a wide-ranging broad-spectrum definition which goes beyond the traditional focus on non-state actors. They therefore submit that:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby -in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main

target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought

As has been critiqued by Ramsay (2015:214), the definition, among other things, conflates several elements and regard them as if “they were atomic units rather than subjective, qualitative codes”. The rigour and complexity reflected both in the survey and reaching a seeming consensus in the adoption of a universally acceptable and applicable definition points to the age-long battle of ‘knowing’ what terrorism is. The highly and essentially contested nature of this concept is also highlighted by the inability of states and even the United Nations to evolve a definition that satisfy the interests of all parties represented. In the United States for instance, definitions as well as analytical codes varied according to agencies, while the Army for instance considers the targeting of non-combatants, the Department of State through “the Act” adopts an open-ended definition within which most political violence and even protests could well fit. In Nigeria, the obvious lack of a definition for terrorism until 2011 which was done in compliance to the U.S demand for ‘cooperation’ against ‘terrorism’ also reflects the highly subjective and value-laden nature of the construct. Even after defining ‘terrorism’, through a seemingly endless lists of “acts of terrorism” which has hitherto been captured by the general criminal laws, the lists could have well point to the use of violence by the Nigerian government itself. However, since arguments abound as to whether a state could make use of terrorism as a tactic or become labelled a terrorist state thereby delegitimizing it (Wilkerson 2005; Hoffman 1996), the field of Traditional Terrorism Studies

Bereft of sound theoretical, conceptual and ethical grounding, therefore, TTS has continued to struggle with conceptual issues with implication for the analytical framework and which has produced several definitions from different scholars with divergent voices. What is however considered as ‘terrorism’ is defined within “the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action” (Apter 1997:114). This means that existing power structures determine what category of violence would be interpreted as terrorism. Many critical scholars have argued that the

seminal contribution of Robert Cox (1981) is apt to the field of Traditional Terrorism Studies TTS which has as its “normal science” a positivist and objectivist approach based on Cox’s problem-solving thesis with its normative search for patterns in a fixed or given world and aims to explain and “to correct dysfunctions or specific problems that arise within {the} existing order” (Cox 1995: 31-32). Through this problem-solving approach, TTS scholars has been able to ‘reduce’ the problem of terrorism “to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination” (ibid. pg.129); this has provided for a macro-level understanding and analysis of the phenomenon with its inherent aim at building theory. This background necessitates the “critical turn” of Terrorism Studies by challenging dominant discourses which produce terrorism as a dysfunction in the social order that should be fixed without a critical evaluation of the social order which produces/defines it. This framework obviously works to “maintain existing social order” together with its probable hegemonic stance and oppressive tendencies (Cox 1995:31).

So, in order to challenge dominant narrative of the mainstream scholars, CTS has highlighted how the label is political, pejorative, and subjective and a web of rhetoric (Bryan et. al 2011; Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Jackson 2005). According to Zulaika and Douglass (1996), prior to 1960, political violence was not studied in any distinct category to phenomena like wars and insurgency and the label was only associated with acts of bombing, assassinations and the likes. The concept became relevant in the 1960’s as a result of the Cold War during which Western Powers labelled anti-colonial revolutionary groups as ‘terrorists’ in order to delegitimize them and produce as well as justify counter-terrorism policy (Winker 2006). Hence, the label evolved within the existing power structure as a rhetorical weapon to demonize the challengers. During 1989-1992, a period during which only “thirty-four Americans were killed worldwide” with no single one on the American soil, numerous books were produced under the buzz word ‘terrorism’ (1322 titles) and ‘terrorist’ (121) respectively. Zulaika and Douglass then ask “how, in the absence of a significant number of fatalities, can a discursive machine provide sufficient ammunition to sustain the plethora of texts, expertise, and conferences that will depict the phenomenon as the ultimate threat to civilization?” They concluded by asserting that terrorism is nothing but rhetoric that exists to serve some political ends and often connected to power structures. Positioned as a category that is social and

discursive, terrorism is argued to be a 'social fact' rather than a "brute fact" (Jackson et. al. 2009). As a social fact the definition of terrorism lends itself to the socio-political context, histories, culture, micro-specifics and power differentials involved in a particular political violence to shape its meaning and interpretation.

With the arguments around the "politics of naming" (Bhatia 2005), the CTS approach is predominantly that of rejectionists or reformists. Rejectionists argue that the concept or label terrorism is counterproductive to the spirit of rigour in research as it is too pejorative, contaminated ideologically and takes 'categories of practice for categories of analysis' which leads to reification of terrorism (Stump and Dixit 2011; Waldron 2004; Scheffler 2006). As a rejectionist, Bhatia (2005) questions the veracity of the label by highlighting the inherent fluidity due to the dynamics employed by the parties to a conflict. In other words, Bhatia seems to contend that power does not lie only in the 'super powers' so to speak but it is presented at every level of interaction and this negotiation of the 'politics of naming' should be put into perspectives by critical theorists. He further posits that "Most authors ... are not confident of the ability of any particular label or interpretative lens to adequately encompass the purpose, activities, local relevance or ideology of a given movement" (ibid. pg. 8). In furtherance to this, some critical scholars have contended that rather than engage in seemingly endless efforts at defining or naming, CTS should be more concerned with giving clarity to its methodology and what this means for its truth claim (Stump 2013; Stump and Dixit 2011). Reformists however maintain that the use of the concept remains useful analytically and should be defined (Finlay 2009). It would not be entirely correct to present these approaches in two rigid binaries: Richard Jackson, a prominent CTS scholar has often argued that terrorism has no essence and as such could be regarded as a rejectionist, but he has almost in the same breath proposed a minimal foundationalism definition of terrorism (Jackson 2011). Though this has been critiqued by Stump and Dixit (2011) as a form of ontological cum epistemological imbalance, it remains that the border between both approaches might be fluid rather than rigid. This ontological cum epistemological incoherence is due to what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985:215) refers to as "ontological gerrymandering" between dualism and monism which has implication for conceptual/analytical development as well as the claims to truth. Ontological gerrymandering is used here to mean "the way that

explanations are used in the social constructivist research on social problems” (ibid) which undermines rigorous research by manipulating the boundaries of a particular paradigm to one’s advantage. In spite of the fact that reformists query the seeming gulf of namelessness and wondered how we can relate to a phenomenon if it cannot be named, the rejectionists’ model will inform the approach of this thesis. This is because the history of terrorism and the shift of meaning it has undergone makes obvious how power structures organise and determine what counts as acceptable knowledge and how to interpret this. This thesis therefore follows the Critical Terrorism Framework to contribute to Terrorism Studies by giving attention to how discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is a production of existing power structures prevalent in today’s world order. As the contestation between TTS and CTS continues on whether terrorism is ‘something out there’ or not, this study aims to address this contestation by highlighting the Othering character of the label and its implications in Nigeria through a post-structural research framework.

From both definitions, however, the meaning of ‘terrorism’ is intrinsically connected to identity, because it is constructed to be as broad as possible in order to accommodate as much violent crimes committed by non-state actors. Scholars as well as the media have often highlighted the indiscriminate application of the label in the U.S, like other European countries, where the problem is perceived as “foreign” rather than “domestic” (Baker-Beall 2011; Chomsky 2003). The undergirding idea that the ‘terrorist’ is a ‘foreigner’ or an ‘alien’ that is mobilized against the collective identity of the state is also drawn upon in Nigeria. Chapter 7 examines the Othering of the Boko Haram as a terrorist group based on themes identified in the texts under study. The identification of an enemy of the state to which the terrorism label is susceptible to meshes well with the aim of this research in asking *how* and *why* rather than *what* help to unveil processes and structures within which the discourse of terrorism and its practices are constructed and enabled. As Doty (1993: 299) asserts: “what is explained is not why a particular outcome is obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible”. How-questions enable us to explain the way that “power works to constitute” particular actors, identities, meaningful orientations, relations and modes of conduct/subjectivities (Doty 1996:4). Doty’s distinction between the how- and why-questions

proved useful to the extent to which certain possibilities and modes of being are already presupposed in the why-questions. The explanation of certain causes through the use of the why-questions therefore takes for granted the constitution of power within modes of subjectivities and makes certain outcomes almost predictable. This, according to Doty, makes the why-question “incomplete in an important sense”. However, why this thesis is interested in the how- rather than why-questions, it does so with the understanding that “how things happen is also why they happen” (Tilly 2006:410). What this means is that both types of questions (the why-questions being that of causation and the how-question being that of constitution) are two variants of explanations (Wendt 1998). Doty which this thesis draws heavily from also considers the *how-possible* questions as another form of explanation. This follows that by focusing on how-questions in this thesis, which among other things, highlight the play of power through discourse, the explanation for ‘why’ Boko Haram’s ‘terrorism’ is so constructed become implied. CTS scholars like Richard Jackson (2012) has also argued along this line by positing that both causation (why-questions) and constitution (how-questions) are not essentially separated within CTS scholarship.

A focus on discourse therefore points to what is spoken and what is left unspoken as it is by making political violence ahistorical that its labelling as terrorism became justified. In this light, this research will make an original contribution to knowledge through a critical approach that helps to think through the construction of identity in Critical Terrorism Studies which according to (Jackson 2007c) has not been one of the core commitments of the field. Being ‘critical’ in the sense is to:

Look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly familiar. In this way, new spaces are opened for thinking about the meaning of the past and the present and, therefore, how we construct the future (Fierke 1998:13)

While Fierke’s critical approach which embraces a diverse range of approaches to understanding of security studies generally and terrorism studies particularly, might seemingly dislocate their commitment from the Frankfurt School’s emancipatory aim, the broad critical template adopted by this thesis is still closely connected to an emancipatory vision. According to Stump and Dixit (2013: 45), “CT-inspired knowledge should *always* aim

to change the world because for a “reflexivist, knowing the world and changing the world are inseparable” (Jackson 2011: 160). By adopting a postcolonial approach to understanding the discourse of terrorism, therefore, the possibility of change could be envisioned in Nigeria. While the approach helps us to challenge and think about the normative understanding of Boko Haram, it does not seek to exceptionalize the experience of Boko Haram or that of Nigeria nor reify the category ‘nationalism’ or ‘race’. It rather seeks to adopt a critical interrogation that unveils normative and common sense understanding in the construction of our world. It argues for the complex understanding of our world rather than a simplified binary division with both ontological, epistemological and methodological implications. Unlike a critical realist methodological approach, the reflexivism of the research highlights the interconnectedness of both the researcher and the world as well as the subject and the object. It does this from a point of view that ‘terrorism’ is not “something out there” and therefore does not seek to “identify the deeper, underlying nature of reality” (Joseph 2011:26).

A Discourse Analytic Approach to Terrorism Studies

To begin with, this thesis contends that terrorism is not a materiality. It, therefore, has no essence outside of discursive constructions. It is in this light that a discursive approach to the study of terrorism will offer the space to critically engage with how the construction of terrorism came about and practices enabled by such. With a discursive approach to the study of terrorism, therefore, the space to talk about how possible certain constructions become productive. It is important to clarify the meaning of 'politics', 'hegemony' and 'power' from the onset. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 153), this thesis defines 'politics' as "a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations". This means that the open nature of discourse makes the articulations of several identities possible, however the practice ensures exclusion of alternatives in order to fix particular structures of meanings. The discursive practice through which identities and meanings became fixed does not only involve the exclusion of certain elements but also the process through which these meaning structures became articulated as a structural totality. This is how the social is created. As society does not exist, it is politically instituted. Politics, therefore, provides the ground through which the social became a 'reality' (Critchley and Marchart 2004). It is the means through which certain fixations assume naturalness. It is the fixing of certain elements to the exclusion of others that makes 'hegemony' possible. Hegemonic interventions therefore work by 'congealing' the discursive field which is open-ended and slippery. Through such hegemonic interventions, subjective articulations become positioned as 'objective' 'reality' and thus the social become constituted. Hegemony in Laclau and Mouffe's theory thus helps to ensure that meaning-making is possible in the presence of infinite discursive possibilities.

To this end, power rather than being construed as something possessed and used by certain social actors or entities to oppress and/or repress others, it is posited in this thesis as how certain discourses as mechanisms of 'truth' became used both to foreclose possible alternatives as well as achieve a (total) closure in the fixation of meanings and construction of identities. In the words of Michel Foucault "relations of power cannot in themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation,

circulation and functioning of a discourse” (1976: 93). Power therefore works through the construction of discourses by social agents who becomes the ‘speaking’ subject of such discourses. Power inheres discourses in that the slippery nature of discourse makes it “an undecided terrain” with a continual struggle for integration and closure. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001), the struggle for the integration of a discourse is on a spectrum; at one end of the spectrum is full integration while at the other end is total rupture. Whether a partial or total closure is therefore achieved, the accumulation and functioning of such discourses will constitute varied subjectivities and realities as the effects of discursive power. This thesis will therefore be engaging with how power works through discourse not only to constitute certain identities and modes of subjectivities but also to construct certain social realities like that of “crisis in Africa” prior to 9/11. This, as this thesis attempts to demonstrate throughout its chapters, helps to produce “the field of play” that works for the subject of the discourse. As a result, meanings, identities and varied subjectivities are effects of power rather than being given as ontological categories identifiable outside of the discourse that produced them.

Also, this thesis considers Homi Bhabha’s concept of Otherness most suited for the understanding of the constructions of the Boko Haram group. Examining the problem of terrorism in Nigeria from a post-structural perspective helps to interrogate (dis)continuities of the common constructions of Africa/Nigeria in mainstream literature and how these constructions enabled the shift of the GWOT into Nigeria. No known publication has hitherto employed a discursive approach to the study of Boko Haram within Critical Terrorism Studies and this research attempts to fill this gap in knowledge. The theory of Bhabha’s Otherness as a fixation which negates the agency of the colonial subject through the discursive strategy of stereotyping by the fixity of the ambivalence of “repulsion” and “difference” constructed as “resistance” or “pleasure” and “mimicry” will help to fruitfully engage with the aims of this thesis by examining how Nigeria and Boko Haram became so constructed.

Dominant thinkers and theorists of the concept of Otherness are Bill Ashcroft, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin. The origin of the concept relies on the binary division of the colonizing culture as centre and the colonized as the periphery,

the other. The center relates to the idea of cartography in which differences were mapped such that meaning as well as power is fixed metaphorically and not just geographically. Said, Fanon and Spivak's concept of Othering relates to a binary construction of the imperial centre and the colonial periphery premised on race. For Spivak (1985: 171, 173), Otherness is "a process by which the empire can define itself against those it colonizes, excludes and marginalizes. [...] The business of creating the enemy...in order that the empire might define itself by its geographical and racial others". Several scholars like Stuart Hall and Kobena Mercer have queried the rigid division of the colonizer and colonized as an underwriting of the arguments that there are possibilities of varied subjectivities in discourse. It is this critique that theorists like Bhabha sought to overcome by considering the colonizer/colonized relationship as an ambivalence; for Bhabha the Colonized is both an object of pleasure and repulsion to the Colonized. It is an object of pleasure to the extent to which it reflects or to put it in Bhabha's words "mimic" the Colonizer's exalted values and a source of repulsion to the extent of its "difference" which is often captured as resistance. The Other, therefore is a mode of paradoxical representation that is centred on political, religious, historical or cultural difference as "fixity" which depicts a permanent/rigid state of order as well as disorder and chaos (Bhabha 1997). It is this "fixity" that a totalizing discourse like terrorism represents and which this thesis seeks to deconstruct.

This thesis understands that postcolonial writers and thinkers including Bhabha often accept the use of the label terrorism but only contends for context as Bhabha (2002) submits in his only article on terrorism:

When American foreign and economic policy is conducted in terms of the civilizational divisions of 'them' and 'us', the nation assumes that hawkish, imperialist aspect that provokes a widespread sense of injustice, indignation and fear. The embattled and embalmed narrative of civilizational clash is often deployed to justify the reckless destruction of civilians who are suspected by virtue of their culture (read second nature), of being terrorists or protecting them.

Rather than accept terrorism as a construct identifiable outside of discourse, this research however contends that the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria remains a discursive construct. The research will therefore bridge the gap in knowledge by evaluating the discourse of

terrorism as a form of hegemonic political language by the U.S and Nigerian political elites (especially after September 2001) which has hitherto received no attention in academic debate. As I argue, every violence has a history and Boko Haram's violent activities are no exception. As it were, Nigeria has a history of political violence that is not essentially different from that of Boko Haram and to label Boko Haram this way is not only to justify militarism (and its many abuses of human rights, as is the case in Nigeria) but to also naturalise the discursive practices of neo-colonial hegemony and power that produce this discourse. The thesis therefore explores how the group is produced as terrorist by American and Nigerian terrorism discourses as a threatening 'Other' when examined through the lens of postcolonial thought within a post-structural framework. A great wealth of literature has argued for the implication of European colonialism, imperialism and as well as neo-colonialism in the very "colonializing structure" (Mudimbe 1988:2) observed in today's Africa, and Nigeria, in particular. These structures, as argued by Olaniyan (2005: 270) is a "'structured marginality' by which African 'societies' capacities for self-directed evolution" is shattered and a seeming shifting space, or "interregnum" is created. It is this interregnum that post coloniality seeks to unravel as well as understand. It then becomes important to engage with poststructuralism as a field of theoretical inquiry in order to understand how Boko Haram is represented as an Other by silencing the structures that produce it. By constructing the Other this way, American as well as the Nigerian government's role in the political violence is silenced. As has been argued by several scholars, the use of words or to use Bhabha (2005)'s words: "the politics of naming" is not value-neutral; words are employed for varied reasons with some end in view. Words or labels exist to structure, organise, categorise and give meaning to things, among other things (Chomsky and Edward 1988). The use of words is intrinsically connected to power and works as the instrument to express and enact the prejudices of the one naming (Zulaika and Douglass 1996; George 2001). Through this discursive power, "reality" is created and certain acts become a possibility and normalised. As Crenshaw (1981) and Zulaika and Douglass (1996) argue, the writing of terrorism, like other political discourses, are weapons to define the Other by altering perception through the reification of terrorism as a spectacle. By projecting certain narratives as the dominant and only way of seeing,

people's cognition is altered and as well as structured to accommodate dominant interpretation in order to make certain selfish interests a possibility.

Research Problems, Motivations, Aims and Questions

Research Problems

The binary division of the world into a global order versus disorder premised on the colonizer/colonized divide highlights the focus of official texts and narratives of terrorism on the part of the world constructed as disordered. This is why inherent in the construction of the terrorism discourse is the idea of the 'terrorist' as 'foreign' or 'alien'. However, unlike this binary division, the colonial experience presents an ambivalence through which varied subjectivities and 'realities' could be imagined. It is this understanding that help to interrogate how Nigeria could be both a source of repulsion and resistance to the U.S on the one hand and also be a source of pleasure and a representation of the U.S self on the other hand, as far as the discourse of terrorism is concerned. Nigeria as a state stands in some diplomatic jeopardy if found not "cooperating" with the U.S as it then becomes a "haven" or "sanctuary" for "terrorist". Compliance with the U.S on the labelling of Boko Haram however dates back to the Clinton Presidency when Nigeria was "adopted" as an official partner in its fight against international terrorism. This focus on state explains why an explicit linkage between two hitherto contested concepts, "weak states" and "terrorism", became prevalent immediately after September 2001. However, the focus on the state as a corporate entity only ensures a commitment to fight its enemies, the approach does not provide a leverage for the discourse of terrorism to enable practices which touch down on the everyday lives of the people. This is why it becomes important to also understand terrorism as being linked to democracy and health and economic development in recent times. While all of these constructs are not by any means new, the discourse of terrorism as a nodal point helps to justify their explicit linkage and thereby justify as well as normalise not just the construction but also the normalization of the militarization of the state and democracy.

Motivations

My motivation in researching into how and why Boko Haram became known as a terrorist group was consummated on 14th April 2014. This was not my first time of coming across Boko

Haram's activities and/or engaging in private discussions through which we simply use the label 'terrorist' without actually understanding what that means nor why and how they became so known. The 14th April, 2014 triggered a deep concern in me because I was heavily pregnant and only narrowly escaped a major bombing in Nyanya, Abuja as I was on my way to commuting one of the buses which went off in ground-rocking explosions. The BBC counted at least 70 bodies however other local newspaper like the Nigerian Punch, counted bodies as high as 240. Amidst the confusion and meaninglessness as well as the void of language to articulate what just happened before me, I remembered, the words, 'why' coming through my mouth again and again. This experience motivated me to change my interest in Media studies to the studies of terrorism in order to find out the motivations of Boko Haram as well as the possible solutions to their violence. My first surprise therefore was to find out 'terrorism' is a value-laden and normative discursive construct with no widely acceptable definition. Moreover, the understanding that discursive totalities like terrorism works by the strategy of silencing the role of the structures which produce them further livens my interests to position this research as a challenge to hegemonic constructions like terrorism which does little to understand such violence through an integrated and holistic approach. This is because more often than not, the labelling of terrorism comes with foreclosure which limits viable options in solving such political issues.

Aims and Questions

The aims of this research are to unveil silence by highlighting the connection between knowledge, power and discourse as it relates to the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria. It does this by focusing on the U.S government texts on terrorism and/or political violence in Nigeria particularly and Africa in general and Nigeria's government texts including interview text from nine Nigerian military officials. The growing body of literature on Boko Haram has often been situated within the positivist school of thought which not only understand 'terrorism' as 'something out there' but also has excluded the role of the neo-colonial structures within which the agency of the Boko Haram group is produced and exercised. This thesis therefore attempts to bridge this gap in knowledge by focusing on the discursive constructions within

which Boko Haram's labelling as a terrorist group became constructed, justified and normalized. It is through this neo-colonial structure that the U.S sense of Self became constructed against the Other. The dominant narrative in both governments' texts is constructed to highlight the 'terrorist' as essentially the 'problem' of Nigeria. The construction of Nigeria as the counterterrorist state thus function for the U.S through the continual shifting of Nigeria's subject positions. This is because through a colonial 'mimicry' Nigeria represents the U.S Self to the extent to which it is a source of pleasure and entrench the U.S values. It is however an Other to the extent to which it resists the U.S As has been highlighted by Doty (1996) for instance, the construction of "Third world" countries, enables certain productive practices within which the agency of countries like Kenya is understood. As a result, certain practices like the militarization of democracy in Nigeria became legitimized. To this end, a dominant argument of this thesis remains that the construction of Boko Haram as a terrorist group is not a given; it is a discursive construct positioned within other neo-colonial constructs. It therefore exists to justify as well naturalize neo-colonialism and its practices.

Main research Question: To what extent does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria represent a hegemonic political construction?

Sub Questions:

- I. How does the U.S foreign policy towards Africa, from the 1970s, enable the construction of the threat of terrorism in Africa/Nigeria?
- II. How does the construction of the U.S Self from the 1970s enable and justify U.S colonial tropes in Nigeria?
- III. How does the construction of Nigeria as a counterterrorist state enable and naturalize discourses/practices of counterterrorism in Nigeria?
- IV. How does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria enable and justify the construction of the terrorist as an Other?

The interpretative approach of this thesis is not about individuals or groups who consider themselves as 'terrorist' or are defined as such by policy makers and implementers. The interest of this thesis is to understand how the constructions of a "particular community or set of communities' interpretations of and responses to events or persons deemed terrorist" become possible (Stump and Dixit 2013:93). This means that both the U.S foreign policy texts and Nigeria's texts on Boko Haram represent how policy makers and implementers construct and fix the meaning of terrorism and thus enable certain dominant understanding of counterterrorism and/or practices. The nuances here however, is that in constructing the U.S Self, Africa generally and Nigeria particularly are being negatively constructed in order to create the space for the 'location' of the terrorist Other. This is why subject positions of Nigeria is always in a continual flux in U.S foreign policy texts. This is to ensure that the discourse function effectively for the speaking subject of the discourse.

Thesis Structure

This first chapter as an introduction provides a comprehensive overview of the entire thesis. It gives a background to the Boko Haram group, the motivation for this study, its aims, argument, research questions, data collection and analysis and the discussion of its theory and method. The second chapter, which is the Theory and Method begins by stating the relevance of Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory to the 'linguistic turn' of the post structural field of theoretical enquiry which this thesis considers best suited to understand the construction of the Boko Haram group as a terrorist group. By making a case for Discourse Theory, the chapter offers an insight into why an engagement with representation and its practices helps to bring to the fore why and how totalizing constructions like terrorism became positioned as given and therefore natural. As a theory, it undergirds the proposition that knowledge and truth is not an objective category, they are products of power and are therefore highly subjective. What is known is only known through discourse. It therefore corroborates, one of the central tenets of the 'linguistic turn' in not searching for self-evident objective truth but an engagement with discursive constructions in order to understand how and possibly why certain discourse came to assume their supposed objectivity. The third

section of the chapter then focuses on how the texts used in this thesis are collected. Interview data from nine Nigerian military officials and key U.S policy texts with focus on political violence and/or terrorism in Nigeria or Africa and some key speeches on Nigeria by high U.S officials were identified on the various U.S public domain. The justification for the selection of the interview participants and texts as well as the method of transcription and analysis is covered in greater details in this chapter.

The Third Chapter: Understanding Boko Haram, aims to bring to the fore the dominant constructions and narratives of Boko Haram both in literatures and the media. This is done by examining discourses both in academic literature and the media on the emergence of Boko Haram, Its function in the Nigerian political landscape and how it was proscribed. Chapter Four is the literature review which aims to provide context for the evolution of the violence of Boko Haram. It does this by examining dominant argument on political violence both in Africa and Nigeria before and after the September 2001 attacks. Chapter Five: Constructing the Terrorist Threat, is aimed at showing how through discursive move the discourse of 'crisis' in Africa became articulated in the 1970s and 80s; 'Crisis' of state failure in the 1990s and early 2000s and 'Crisis' of terrorism in post-September 2001. It argues that the threat of the terrorist after September 2001 represents some continuities and change of a long-standing neo-colonial discourse. Dominant arguments on the understanding of political violence from the 1970s, the period of the Cold War, to the period of the Global war on terrorism in Nigeria was engaged with to provide a rich discursive background that enables certain practices like the explicit linkage of state failure to terrorism. The neo-colonial venture, therefore, necessitated the need for construction of 'instability' in the 1970s and 1980s and how this evolved to the state-centric 'crisis' of the 1990s. The state-centric 'crisis' of the 1990s then witnessed the 'adoption' of Nigeria as an official partner of the fight against international terrorism and the linkage of poverty and disease like HIV to threat of terrorism during the Clinton Presidency. It is also this discourse of 'crisis' that warranted the labelling of the Niger Delta militias as 'terrorists' and witnessed the extra-judicial execution of their leader, Ken Saro Wiwa. The shift of the GWOT into Nigeria as with other African countries then, evolve almost seamlessly from this discursive background.

Chapter Six, examined how the U.S Self through some colonial tropes became so constructed. The official colonizer of Nigeria was Britain and not the U.S. The U.S was, however, known for its anti-colonial rhetoric especially during the 1970s. Like Nigeria's colonizer, the U.S' need of Africa generally and Nigeria specifically was initially for their resources; the independence was considered "dangerous" and of "security concern" as it might impact on this supply. Hence, by constructing the identity of the hesitant colonizer, the need for U.S expansionism from the oil-rich southern part of Nigeria to the agrarian northern states which was understood under the state-centric 'crisis' discourse of poverty and disease became justified. As a result, the U.S became constructed as the subject of Nigeria's democracy due to its representation as the exemplar by employing a unity of significations with equivalential identity with that of Nigeria. The argument about Nigeria's agency here is again considered in the light of the U.S' construction of Nigeria's leadership position in Africa in order to use it as a tool for its leadership expansion to other parts of Africa while in the same breath constructing the need for Nigeria to accept the U.S leadership position in Africa. Articulating this impasse therefore demands a shifting of subject positions to service discursive power.

Chapter Seven: Constructing the Counter-Terrorist State examines how the identity of the state became constructed to fix the state as an anti-terrorist while a cross-section of its citizens are positioned as the terrorists. As the linkage of the military to democracy and the economy in Africa has been argued as a dominant feature of postcolonial states, Africom represents a major shift in constructing Nigeria as a counter-terrorist state. However, prior to the launch of Africom, from the 1970s to the 1980s the launch of African Response Initiative (ACRI) later transitioned to Africa Contingency Operations (ACOTA) in the 1990s, among others, to the GWOT has signalled how the military has become an integral part of democracy in Nigeria. By examining on a thematic basis, the construction of Boko Haram's violence by the military officials, it reveals how the discursive shift to the war on terrorism highlights the normalization of violence in Nigeria. The fight against Boko Haram was constructed as 'crisis', 'war' and the absence of terrorism became constructed as 'peace'. The transitioning from one construction to the other almost effortlessly reveal, among other things how political violence is understood and engaged with and how the focus of militarism has not only transitioned to

'war' but also how other categories of political violence not labelled as terrorism might have become synonymous with peace in Nigeria.

Chapter Eight, constructing the Terrorist Other attempts to reveal the essentially Othering character of the terrorism label in Nigeria. Particular modes of subjectivities and representations are enabled through the productive use of discourse. The engagement with representations takes the focus away from the East versus West divide of Said's Orientalism and bring to the fore particular "modes of exclusion" and kinds of subjects which enables the practices examined by Said and others. Considering the neo-colonial template within Nigeria and/or Africa has become constructed as a kind of subject, the Othering of Boko Haram therefore become located within this overarching discourse. Through the power of discourse some things become visible while others is silenced. As an Other, it became important to represent them as 'evil' worthy of elimination in order to achieve the demand of Progress. They became the 'threat' to Nigeria's collective identity, a negation and outsiders while mobilizing the identity of the 'people' as 'insiders'.

Chapter Nine, is the Conclusion of the thesis. In this chapter, discussions on the importance of the thesis, the gap in knowledge it seeks to bridge, the aims of the research and the research questions were highlighted in order to examine the extent to which they were answered as well as how the different parts of the thesis have come together to form a unified whole. The core contributions of the thesis which range from the unveiling of silence in the structure that produce knowledge and truth (of terrorism and counter terrorism for instance) to the politics of naming and exclusion inherent in the discourse of terrorism is extensively discussed. The chapter also draws from texts earlier analysed to bring home the main argument of the thesis that the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is a neo-colonial discourse which evolve from a long background of practices enabled by the U.S neo-colonial discourse and it exists to normalise violence in Nigeria. The chapter concludes by examining the limitations of the study and how these limitations could serve as viable avenues for further research.

Conclusion

This first chapter as an introduction to the thesis has attempted to highlight the structure of the thesis and how its different parts fit together to form a coherent narrative. One of the important elements of this chapter is the review of major contentions in Terrorism Studies and how this thesis will both challenge and build upon Critical Terrorism Studies through a post-structural theoretical lens. It has introduced that the policy 'shift' of the GWOT into Africa/Nigeria is not a product of any materiality of an actual terrorist threat as represented by Boko Haram to the U.S but that of discursive power through a binary division of the world into order versus disorder. The U.S policy shift of the GWOT into Nigeria therefore can thus be understood through the production of the Other and how the discourse of terrorism is posited as a total closure infused with assumptions, myths and certain associations. By critically engaging with the definitional debate in Terrorism Studies, this chapter also brings to the fore one of the fundamental arguments of this thesis: terrorism as a discursive construct and not a brute fact. The contested nature of the concept both in Traditional Terrorism Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies points to the salience of discourse in understanding how policy narratives as instruments of discursive power helps to 'fix' meaning by normalizing and justifying it. This has some significant implications for both the methodological and theoretical commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies and how these commitments are reflected throughout the thesis.

Chapter 2: Theory and Method: Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory

Introduction

The Case for Discourse Theory

This thesis makes use of Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory to study how the discourse of terrorism is a hegemonic political language in Nigeria by focusing on US policy documents and key government texts on terrorism in Nigeria and interview data from nine Nigerian military officials. As has been set out in Chapter One, using a discursive lens to understand representational practices is premised on an anti-foundationalism orientation to the study of terrorism and the assumption that there is no pre-given subject outside discourse. As research aimed at deconstructing a totalising concept like terrorism in Nigeria, I consider Laclau and Mouffe (1985)'s Discourse Theory as the method most suited for the thesis. Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory is particularly useful in examining the discourse of terrorism not only because it affords the space to interrogate how the social is constituted by discourse, but also that it meshes well with the "textual turn" of the post-structural approach adopted by this thesis. As Doty (1993: 297-320) explains,

Texts always refer back to other texts which themselves refer to still other texts. The power that is inherent in language is thus not something that is centralised, emanating from a pre-given subject. Rather, like the discursive practices in which it inheres, power is dispersed and, most important, is productive of subjects and their worlds.

To achieve, hegemony, totalising concepts like terrorism need to be naturalised. Thus, the discourse of terrorism, like every other discourse, is a 'reduction of possibilities' which excludes other possible alternate meaning. As a label, terrorism works by drawing from the linguistic elements already present in a culture to construct an essence for the political violence of the Other thereby denying not only the complicities of the one naming but also its own violence. Moreover, the history of the concept reveals the inherent discontinuities and rupture it has undergone overtime. In order to construct this type of discourse, several numbers of assumptions, myths, justifications and theories needs to be drawn upon and

linked together both to conceal and reveal. Like every other discourse, the discourse of terrorism is fluid and constantly evolving, however, some recurring themes could be highlighted overtime. For instance, during the Cold War, political violence in Nigeria and other parts of Africa was understood through the language of resistance, and approached through policies of development and containment, albeit with the intent of co-opting African states and/or resistant movements to fight the war by proxy, even when it means sponsoring the state against resistance movements or vice versa (Adebajo 2010). The main contention here is that there is nothing essentially terroristic about the violence of Boko Haram and other groups of the likes in Nigeria which is identifiable outside of the discourse that construct it so.

As a method, Discourse Theory works by exploring how linguistic elements which are resources already available within a particular culture (Hall 1985) whose meanings are to be fixed through articulation in order to produce a particular discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). An example here is the word 'jihadists' which has come to command attention recently and could be used to mean 'terrorists', 'freedom fighters', 'extremists' or 'puritans' depending on context. It depends on the power of fixation based on the 'field of discursivity' that is the exclusion of other possible competing discourses to obtain its meaning. A discourse then is a 'reduction of possibilities', 'a fixation of meaning within a particular domain' (Jorgensen and Philips 2002). Concepts central to the analysis of text using Discourse Theory includes but are not limited to Elements, Moments, logics of Equivalence and Difference through the process of Articulation. The use of these concepts in analysing the texts will help to unveil how floating signifiers, for example 'violence', which only derive their meaning when used in association with other elements are transformed through an articulatory process into moments, that is, linguistic resources which have come to occupy a differential position through the fixation of meaning. Also, the use of Discourse Theory as a method offers the space to explore what makes a discourse hegemonic or dominant and how dominant discourse like government texts are produced through the use of 'moments'. The discourse of terrorism or war, for example are discourses produced through the embellishment of "myths" into "nodal point" like 'political violence' to produce "moments". On the other hand, the interview text helps to understand the extent to which the dominant discourse has been naturalized through the seeming objectivity of moments. Through articulation as analytical tool, how moments obtain

their objectivity, which is “sedimented” power and politics or power without a “face” so to speak and become naturalized will be explored. However, to be able to fruitfully engage with the data and bring out the aforementioned, the representational practices as analytical tools need to be explained.

Representation and Representational Practices

Representation refers to the discursive construct which bridges/connects a thing and what it signifies. It is the use of language to constitute an entity/identity, an event, an object and social practices through elements which are present within a culture. It is the product of articulatory practice which forms part of the process of meaning construction through a necessary linkage between 'things' and the concept (or meanings) which are signified. This is because as there is no necessary connection between a thing and its meaning, as well as an identity and the "embodied individual", social actors employ linguistic elements within a language structure to fix the meaning (subject to conventions) of a hitherto arbitrary sign as it relates to a particular group/event (Hall 1996; Shepherd and Hamilton 2016; Doty 1996; Weldes 1999; Mills 1997). In the words of Andersen (2003: 53), representation is achieved through "the sliding of the signifier across the signified [which] forces the signifier to step into, or down onto, the level of the signified". This means that the practice of representation helps to produce discourse and knowledge of ourselves, others and things through the necessary linkage of a particular sign to its constructed meaning. As every discursive formation is contingent, representation therefore as the product of articulation, is relational and always in a state of flux.

In Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory, the dichotomy between a group and its representation does not exist. The discursive representation of a group brings about a whole understanding, assumptions and myths of that constituted group and the social practices enabled by this representation. Every group/individual is a discursive construct and therefore contingent; this background gives it its differential position and its equivalence among other possible elements. In the words of Laclau (1996b:27):

The basic point is this: I cannot assert a differential identity without distinguishing it from a context, and in the process of making the distinction, I am asserting the context at the same time.

So, to be constituted/formed is to be represented at the same time. Since every discursive subject is overdetermined, fragmented and fundamentally split, so as argued by Said (1979:21) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985:119), a "delivered presence" is a fallacy and all we

possibly have is a 're-presence' or representation. This stance thus reasserts the rejection of the polar divide between discourse and non-discursive practices and reaffirms the argument that every material reality is constituted only within discourse. Again, this is not a denial of actual violence of Boko Haram, as is the case in Nigeria, but an assertion that it is only when signifiers like "Islam" and "American" are attached to it that the temporary fixation of its meaning as terrorism could emerge. These signifiers as labels, of course, conceals the problematic of thinking through what is "Islam" and/or "American" and what it's not. It is obvious the shift that will take place if the "real" meaning of the group's violence would be linked with signifiers like "inequality", "elections" and "change". This section aims to explain the representational practices which this thesis will look for in the texts under study to examine the extent to which the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is hegemonic.

Articulation

Articulation is the practice of meaning fixation whereby (linguistic) elements are modified (or transitioned) into moments through the establishment of relations (among these elements) in order to produce a "structured totality" called discourse. Meaning is context-dependent; so, every meaning is derived from the relativeness of elements as they occupy differential positions in a language structure. The relativeness of the elements to each other explains their necessity in the "regularity of a system of structural positions". For instance, in order to create an identity of terrorist, it became necessary to link together signifiers like, uncivilized, irrationality, undemocratic, unjustifiable and hate through the logic of equivalence. The systematic linking together of these signifiers is a necessity as far as the "structured totality" of the identity of a terrorist is concerned. To take this further, *uncivilized* for instance is a signifier which occupies a differential position with an oppositional logic in the construction of identities; it presents to us how the Self is constructed through the Other. Hence, to understand what *uncivilized* means, the oppositional identity *civilized* would need be examined. However, when examined in context, as Doty (1996) did in relation to the US and the Philippines, civilized could mean uncivilized and vice versa. This is because the open-endedness of elements and discourse explains their contingency while highlighting their necessity in a system of structure. The point here is that while meaning is context dependent,

the system of language itself makes certain elements a necessity in order to produce a discourse.

A follow-up argument might then be that if elements are necessary, then articulation and/or re-articulation might be an impossibility as the discursive formation is not contingent and only depends on the principle of repetition. To attend to this argument, it is necessary to mention that the idea of *struggle* in an undecidable terrain is a central principle of discourse. So, just as there is no closure to any discourse, so also elements are open to modification and their transition to moments are never fully complete. Therefore, the contingency of discourse is “because no discursive formation is a sutured totality” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:106). Moreover, as Spurr (1993) points out, the power to construct and fix meaning, which I refer to as hegemony, explains why concepts could be moved around to mean different things in different contexts. The mobility and interchangeability of the elements themselves does not undermine their necessity in the structure but rather highlight the contingency of the discursive formation.

To argue otherwise would mean to deny that “all values are values of opposition and are defined only by their difference”. This is because “if language is something other than a fortuitous conglomeration of erratic notions and sounds uttered at random, it is because necessity is inherent in its structure as in all structure” (Benveniste 1971:47-48). The structurally necessary character of elements explains the non-arbitrariness of language and rejects the notion of discourse as an absolute flux. Thus, “neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:111). It then follows that the very necessary character of the structure in the system of language explains why any modification of the elements/discourse would have a reciprocal effect on one another. Every discursive formation therefore is a construction whose elements are relational, necessary and contingent.

Since the system is only a partial limitation and every elements and discourse remains inherently open, every discourse therefore is a contingent which draws from the “surplus of meaning” refers to as the “field of discursivity”. Based on this, the articulatory practice draws from open elements in the field of discursivity to the exclusion of others through the logic of

equivalence and difference in order to fix meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:105). It makes possible particular contingent discursive constructions which can be contested or re-articulated in different possible ways. This simply means constructions are not natural as alternate representations are always possible for any object or social action. The non-naturalness of discursive constructions stems from two reasons: One, the inherent duality of discourse whereby discourses are both open-ended (impossibility of a sutured totality) and are at the time partially fixed (in meaning creation) reveals how identities are created through partial closure so as to fix meanings which then seems natural. During the colonial era for instance, the meaning of 'violence' as a sign was fixed around the nodal point (i.e. a privileged sign) 'Race'; so, violence which could not be justified in terms of *progress* is constructed as pervasive, uncivilized and barbaric. So instead of delimiting *violence* as an unstable ontological category which could present itself in different forms (thereby revealing the impossibility of a sutured totality of that discourse), it became partially fixed by linking it together with 'Race' through the logic of difference and equivalence and the meaning of the violence of self and the other became fixed through the loading of "myths" into the nodal point "Race". This partial closure also explains the discourse of terrorism, as the sign has not only gained rupture and continuity in meaning overtime, but has linked certain violence to *progress* through the differential position they occupy. So, while the many violence in Africa during the Cold War were constructed as either resistance, insurgency, oppression, intervention etc. as the case maybe depending on the context and the meaning fixed, the post-cold war discourse creates the "realities" of terrorism from the same social action.

Secondly, the non-naturalness of discursive constructions is evident in the sense that language itself is a "signifying practice" through which meaning is produced. As a signifying process, it is "multi-referential" and so different meanings could be created from the same social action or objects. This means that meaning derived from a particular social action is never self-evident or natural; it is the result of articulatory practice. This is however not to mean that articulations are arbitrary rather it is to assert that they could be better understood as conventional and are products of social and historical circumstances. As Williams (1981:330) puts it:

The notion [of arbitrariness] was introduced in opposition to the idea that the sign was an icon, and it is certainly true that there is in general no necessary relation of an abstract kind between word and thing in language. But to describe the sign as arbitrary or unmotivated prejudices the whole theoretical issue. I say it is not arbitrary but conventional, and that the convention is the result of a social process. If it has a history, then it is not arbitrary-it is the specific product of the people who have developed the language in question.

The question of the extent to which the contingency of discourse denies the existence or otherwise of reality has a simple answer. Nothing can be assessed except through discourse; hence discourse itself is material. Just like elements, every social action produces meaning when in their differential positions. So, social actions are articulations themselves. Whether for instance, the violence of Boko Haram means for us “terrorism” or “resistance” or simply “crime” depends on the relationship of that action to other actions. The “politics of representation” is therefore how some of these competing meanings are fixed through the use of nodal points such that discourses which are produced are often positioned as totalities until some discursive dislocation (i.e. crisis) occur (van Dijk 2002; Shapiro 1998).

Nodal Points

Nodal points are crucial analytical tools in the articulatory process which function as anchors in the “chains of significations” through which associated signs in a specific discourse derive their meanings within a complex web of meanings. An instance of this is how meanings of signs like “democracy”, “state”, “equality” and “freedom” are changed when linked to the nodal point “communism” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Žižek 1989; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000). As privileged sign which are fixed and around which other signs are organised, nodal points represent “the word which, as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given field, constitutes its identity” (Žižek, 1989: 95). Through a metaphorical comparison, Philips and Jorgensen (2002), consider nodal points to be like the “knots” in a fishing net which help to anchor the weaving together of the entire net. Before a sign become a privilege and fixed sign, it is transitioned from ‘elements’, which are signs with no fixed meanings, to ‘moments’ where the meaning fixed within discourse and then to ‘nodal points’ thereby occupying a

privileged position. To examine the discourse of terrorism for instance, one of the nodal points-privilege and fixed sign- is 'Progress' through which lens certain violence become justifiable and acceptable while others are not. Throughout this thesis, signs like Africa, 9/11 and American liberal democratic imaginary are teased out as nodal points through which social practices/realities and events in Nigeria particularly and Africa generally became articulated. Nodal Points are however not to be mistaken with the concept of 'crisis' used in this thesis as the discursive dislocation of a particular narrative through a discursive move by social actors (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Nabers 2009; Croft 2006). Crisis in this sense represents a collapsing or disruption to a hitherto dominant narrative/meaning (not necessarily a nodal point) for the emergence of another succeeding narrative/meaning. Crisis as a strategy of articulation, also highlights the "politics of representation" because it enables social actors to effect change(s) in meanings and how entities/events/things are represented. It therefore 'hails' certain discourses while others are collapsed. In the words of Nabers (2009: 193), " it is crises of representation, of meaning, which are at the root of any kind of social or identity change....Crisis is a constant political phenomenon". Hence, while nodal points represent a privilege sign which has become fixed within a specific discourse, crisis represents the articulatory strategy through which discourses emerge or are disrupted.

Equivalence and Difference

The ultimately un-sutured character of discourse poses a concern about how discourse became partially closed or a “structured totality” in the process of meaning fixation through articulation. The partial fixation of meaning or the production of a discourse as a “structured totality” which inherently creates “realities” is achieved through the logics of equivalence and difference (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). The logics of equivalence and difference are derivatives in a system of differential identities. In the process of meaning fixation, the open-endedness of discourse is thus subverted by the system through these logics as the differential nature of identities both assert their difference as well as their equivalence. Laclau (2000a:38) puts it this way:

The identity of each element is constitutively split; on the one hand, each difference expresses itself as difference; on the other hand, each of them cancels itself as such by entering into a relation of equivalence with all the other differences of the system.

Both logics are constitutive split on two planes: one, to create an identity from the ultimately open terrain of discourse requires a necessary linking together of signifiers drawn from the field of discursivity. The unity of these signifiers creates a “totality” considered distinct from others. The distinctiveness of each identity is a differential moment premised on its relativity and contingency. This means that every constituted identity is so because of what that identity is not i.e. its negativity or the Other (Mouffe 1985). As the system of language itself is a system of relations, to assert a differential identity is to acknowledge the presence of “something” which lies beyond. This means that every constituted identity though expressed in positives, based on foundational essences, are inverted negatives i.e. negativity expressed in positive terms. This is because no one knows who a terrorist is until we know who a terrorist is not. The transition period between open signifiers in the field of discursivity to differential moment like ‘terrorist’ in the process of identity construction is thus loaded with myths. Therefore, every constituted identity remains a partial construction. Two, the logic of equivalence implies that the differential positions of each element become equivalent to the others in terms of their common differentiation; thus, the specificity of their

differences become dissolved and each element became open with no intrinsic meaning. It is at this juncture that elements become interchangeable and moveable in the construction of identities (Laclau 1996). To consider the instance of the constituted identities of the terrorist and anti-terrorist as two differential positions. The very presence of an equivalential identity of a 'terrorist' makes this construct to lose its specificity as they both cancel out each other in a chain of endless signification which refers back to each other in polar divides and bring out a "common something". In this instance, these significations could include good/evil; justified/unjustified; legitimate/illegitimate; rational/irrational; love/hate; civilized/uncivilized and so on. The open element 'violence' then becomes the "common something" to both identities and this is what is loaded with myths to create a privileged signifier or a nodal point around which the terrorist/anti-terrorist identity is fixed. To reiterate, all of these signifiers are themselves negatives as they have no foundational essence but became inverted as positives through the loading of myths for representational purposes.

This means that 'good' as represented in the war against terrorism in Nigeria could mean 'evil' as foundational essence(s) of what it means to be good not only become elusive but also the constructed meaning become interchangeable. Good, in this context, could be argued to mean "violence which could be justified by progress". Of course, the idea of progress itself has been challenged and considered a myth by many scholars and philosophers like Karl Popper, Charles Baudouin and the likes. Even if we agree to the idea of Progress as a grounded scientific explanation of social phenomenon, should we then say that the Boko Haram group, like many other groups of this nature in Nigeria, do not consider themselves as fighting for Progress just like the French Revolutionists? The equivalential signifiers of good/evil thus become mobile and interchangeable and reveals the inherent relativeness and contingency of every representation via the logics of equivalence and difference.

Interpellation and Subject Positions

Just as meaning is constructed through the process of articulation, the subject positions occupied by individuals are through the process of interpellation. Interpellation, therefore, refers to the process through which discourse construct identities or subjects for the individual and this make the individual/concrete entity to become the subject. In Althusser's

words “hailing” is another word for interpellation (1971:174). As individuals have no pre-discursive identity, to be ‘hailed’ into positions or identities is to accept the discourse at play and the whole assumptions and understanding that comes with the discourse. So, the individuals become the medium through which the discourse ‘speaks’ based on the identity or subject positions such as ‘hailed’ into (Kvale 1992:36). The double effect of interpellation means that as the discourse ‘speaks’ through the individual, so the power relations in terms of meanings, particular modes of subjectivities and a range of possibilities that particular representation brings about become naturalized.

As discourse is ultimately open so also is subject positions as every position occupied by subjects are discursive constructs. Through this, identities are created and individuals are interpellated depending on the discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 115). As discourses are contingents i.e. there are many possible ways by which a particular object could be articulated but the logic of their articulation is not a necessary progression, so also subject positions that individuals occupy can be multiple. A particular discourse domain makes possible particular subject positions. The subject position is thus a relational construct (Laclau 1990). As a relational construct, it has no pre-discursive character and therefore lacks any “originary and founding totality” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:115). This helps to make room for change in subject positions and extricate it from essentialism or any ‘true’ determinant of positions occupied by individuals beyond/behind the discourse at play. To take the example of the nodal point or master signifier, ‘Africa’, as an instance, it is the linking together of other signifiers like poverty, disease and violence- which are referred to as chains of equivalence- that make possible the image or metaphor of Africa as the problem child and its need for “saving” (Mamdani 1996). This sort of representation against other possible constructions gives Africa its identity and subject position. It therefore makes evident different power relations and what social reality could be made possible. Since subject positions could be overdetermined i.e. there are many possible subject positions depending on the discourse at play, for example a terrorist could be ‘hailed’ into the subject position of a political activist or freedom fighter, it means that subject positions as identity constructs could either be accepted, refused or negotiated. In the instance of it being accepted, it depicts the intervention of hegemony and explicates the naturalness that power and politics have

assumed. The representation of the discourse of terrorism takes it almost as a given that the U.S is both the central subject (i.e. the one with the responsibility to designate others as 'good' or 'evil' and the one to protect) and object (i.e. the one that needs and receives the protection). To this end one can ask to what extent individuals exercise agency since they are constructed into identities through articulation. Since Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory draws heavily from Foucault, I will turn to Foucault for some clarification. According to Foucault (1998:100-101):

Discourses are not once and for all subservient or raised to power up against it...We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart.

This assertion helps to shed some light on the how and why the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria assumes a seeming natural mode. For according to Foucault here, discourse works through people while also acting as structures and thus set the limits for possible actions. Since it is impossible to get behind it, it therefore acts as the structure within which possible actions are negotiated. So, "structure both transcends and explains its [constituents] elements" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:107). As Hall (1980) has also shown in his "encode/decode" theory that individuals are not just passive recipients of narratives but are also actively involved in the interpretation process. The "freedom of action" question is then an uneasy one which is ever open as identities could be negotiated but within discourse.

Otherness

Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory together with the interregnum which postcolonial theory seeks to investigate offers the space to examine and critically engage with the discursive construction of the terrorist as an Other. This thesis follows the thoughts of Homi Bhabha on Otherness to understand why and how Boko Haram's violence became known as terrorism. The discourse of the war on terror could now be said to produce a new kind of subject position which can be referred to as the *Other*. The concept of otherness become altogether important now in understanding dominant and totalizing discourses like terrorism

because Otherness ensure the production of a discourse that dictates not only what can or cannot be said but also how it is said. It proves useful for this thesis only to the extent that the discourse of terrorism through a totalizing and permanent fixation, represents the resistance in the ambivalence of the colonizer/colonized dyad. Central to Bhabha's thought on Otherness is the "fixity" and 'permanence' that have been ascribed to what otherwise could have been an ambivalence. According to Bhabha (1983: 18)

Fixity, as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation: it connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic repetition. Likewise the stereotype, which is its major discursive strategy, is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated... as if the essential duplicity of the Asiatic or the bestial sexual license of the African that needs no proof, can never really, in discourse, be proved.

In other words, the construction of Otherness relies on the deployment of stereotype as a discursive strategy to make sense of and represent the one who seems the same but not quite. The 'fixity' as a sign function by its ability to ensure permanence repetition of an identity so permanent as well as so given to change. Its 'unchanging order' as a site of permanence relates to the meeting point of the 'desire' as well as 'attraction' of the colonizing subject and the colonized and while its 'unchanging disorder' relates to the 'repulsion' and the 'resistance' of the latter and the former respectively. The metaphoric representation explains the ambivalent Nigeria-U.S relations through which Nigeria as a site of order and an object of desire and attraction is represented as a 'leader in West Africa' that is rich in oil and as a site of disorder and object of repulsion and resistance, it is represented as 'traditional', 'unstable' and 'poor'. Otherness as a fixity then negates the play of difference which ambivalence sorts to highlight by simplifying it through stereotyping. The ambivalence which is the constituents of both identities which ideally should function for the U.S as well became a dominant representation of Nigeria because the strategy of stereotyping as an aftermath of colonialism highlights the meeting point of both countries' repulsion and resistance in such a way as it becomes repetition. This is captured better in Bhabha's words:

The stereotype, then, as the primary point of subjectification in colonial discourse, for both coloniser and colonised, is the scene of a similar fantasy and defence-the desire for an originality which is again threatened by the differences of race, colour and culture.... It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that, in denying the play of difference (that the negation through the Other permits), constitutes a problem for the representation of the subject in significations of psychic and social relations (ibid 27).

To this end, the rigid construct of the Self and Other through the strategy of stereotyping works through the power of discourse to produce. It functions through an exclusion, absolute and totalizing representation by silencing possible alternatives. Rather than the rigid construct of Self and Other which, for instance, cannot account for the agency of Nigerian political elites through practices of corruption and oppression, Bhabha's logic of ambivalence describes a complex mix of 'attraction' and 'repulsion', of 'complicity' and 'resistance'. It is this complex and continual fluctuation in discourse as well as practices enabled that helps to understand why Nigeria could be represented both as economically viable and in the same breath as absent. Another instance that points to this ambivalence is how the representation of the U.S as sponsoring violent groups and repressive governments in Africa during the cold war while in the same time constructing the corrupt practices of those countries. Ambivalence is therefore not a simply construct of the colonial subject as either 'resisting' or being 'complicit', it is a liminal space for both where resistance and complicity are both possible. Agbigboa (2010), Onuoha (2012) have often highlighted the 'hypocrisy' of violent groups like Boko Haram while trying to think through their complicity in resisting the corrupt practices of the elites. Boko Haram's hypocrisy is often highlighted through their means of funding which includes robbery, drug trafficking and kidnapping as well as the use of western technological devices used to further their course. These violent groups have also celebrated a utopian democratic representation while also condemning (liberal) democracy with its corrupt practices and corrupting influences. As a result, they have imposed one of the strictest version of Sharia Law in states like Borno, Yobe and Zamfara (Seyeifa 2009). The Nigerian army have however reclaimed most of these states back from them (Premium Times, 2019). What these sorts of ambivalence is highlighting is that a rigid, ultimate and permanent binary division is not a possibility. It remains a flux as it is an ongoing ambivalence through which the self and

other is being re-constructed. The identity of the terrorists as a total permanent fixity highlights the prevalence of discursive power through the Othering process. This explains why the “shifting of subject positions” becomes all the more important in understanding and constructing the Other.

This thesis therefore follows Bhabha that the representation of particular modes of subjectivities and their possibilities as well as limitations is intricately connected to the power of discourse to produce meanings and subject identities and not just in terms of their class differentiation. Though Homi Bhabha has according to him “attempted no general theory” (1990: 170), his thoughts are useful in understanding the liminality of the colonized identity. He maintains that no identity (whether that of the colonial state or the colonized) is “originary” as far as the colonial relationship is concerned. By troubling the traditional delineation of the Self and Other between the colonised and the colonizer, he opens up an “in-between” space or “borderland” or what he later refers to as the “third space”. The liminality of both identities as he argues exist to constitute each other and critiques Said on his presentation of the identity of the colonizer as unitary and powerful. Bhabha asserts that “cultural nationalism” by the Luso-Hispanic scholars and others who aspire to out-rightly discredit Western ontology and episteme might succeed at reversing the structure of binary opposition upon which Western canon of racism is based but not displace it. However, Ahmad (1992) from a Marxist perspective has critiqued Bhabha of minimizing or even undermining the material difference between the colonized and the colonizer and the reality of oppression experienced by the Other. The “third space” Bhabha opens up however helps to understand that identities are not just rigid construct but are rather contingent and the discourse of the “colonial difference” has impacted on both the colonizer and as well as the colonized. Following Bhabha then, there are two sites of fixities of the discourse of terrorism, one is Nigeria, this is because of its resistance, and it has to be understood via its absences (of underdevelopment and state failure). The second location of Otherness is the Boko Haram group by fixing its violence as different to that of the one naming. The construction of Otherness therefore necessitates this negation to drive the project of neo-colonialism. Following Bhabha’s theory of Otherness, therefore, this thesis attempts to understand how

the Other, in this case Nigeria and the terrorist, have been constructed by dominant narratives prior to and after the attack of September 2001.

Selection of Texts and Collection of Data

Selection of Texts: The State Department, Defense Department and the Congress

Nigeria as a nascent state has evolved through a proliferation of political violence in different parts of the country but none has been understood as a terrorist group until Boko Haram was proscribed by the Nigerian government as a terrorist organisation on June 4, 2013, followed by the Home Office on July 12, 2013 and the White House on November 14, 2013 and other governments following suit. Hence, the analysis of US policy documents on terrorism and/or counter-terrorism in Nigeria becomes central to the understanding of and approach to counter terrorism in Nigeria specifically and Africa generally. The US policy documents towards Nigeria particularly is considered scanty because despite the rhetoric about Africa, no concrete country specific strategy has involved. Even on the level of the continent, it was only in 2012 that the first and only “US Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa” was launched by the Obama administration. Also, the first ever US-Africa summit was organized by the same administration in 2014. Even after the September 2001 event, issues about Africa have largely received no significant policy reorientation. In accordance with this line of thought, the Bureau of African Affairs was established in 1958 by President D. Eisenhower in order to “change what had been a traditionally Eurocentric policy view of Africa” (Philip Carter III, 2008). However, the extent to which this vision has been achieved, remains an issue open to debate. As Banjo (2010) argues that this is so primarily because African issues have always been a bipartisan one with a seemingly common and fix perception of the continent. The documents analysed therefore include general policy, congress testimonies/research and security documents where terrorism and/or political violence as relating to Nigeria/Africa is mentioned or highlighted. To delineate what comes in or goes out, the focus would be on key documents relating to political violence/terrorism in Nigeria during the presidency of Gerald Ford (1974-1977) to that of Barack Obama (2009-2017). This timeline is so in order to capture at least the 1970s when Nigeria was recovering from its Civil War (1967-1970) and its economy became prosperous due to the discovery of oil. This period is also the timeline when the U.S attempted to co-opt Nigeria to suppress liberation movements across the continent. Though it has been variously analysed that Africa and of course Nigeria only occupies a

marginal position in US international relations prior to the 1990s (Akinwande 2014; Deroche 2006), the Cold War provides a useful context to understanding the development of the 1990s. It is often argued that US policy towards Africa was largely 'isolationist' as only less than 2 percent of America's foreign aid was apportioned for Africa and even most of this percentage went to North Africa or the "white regimes" (Deroche 2006:107) where US interest in oil is prevalent. On this note Nwaubani (cited in Deroche 2006:107), cautions that there is need for thorough examination and appropriate discernment to understand the difference between US "rhetoric" and "reality" as the "the emerging black states in West Africa got virtually no concrete support from the United States". Also, for instance, according to Clapham (1996:194-198) as late as the mid-1990s only an insignificant fraction of US aid went to Kenya, in East Africa, with all of this given to non-state actors. In commenting on the US relations after the Cold War, during a presidential debate, President Bush (1989-1993) asserted that the US has "no vital interests in Africa" (Oyebade et, al. 2008:22). Thus, while the 'crisis' of the 1990s, as it is being referred to, which relates to state failure like that of Somali and Ivory Coast, signals the beginning of Africa's centrality to the US foreign policies, the context of the Cold War helps to better appreciate this. This was marked by the 1997 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) launched by the Bill Clinton Administration. During this era, development became linked to security and state building is proffered as the solution to the African 'problem'. To put it in the words of Susan Rice, the Assistant Secretary of states for Africans during President Clinton, quoted in Taylor et.al. (2004:33)

There was a time not long ago when Africa was the exclusive domain of the understaffed bureau at Foggy Bottom...but now, virtually every government agency is building the capacity to implement new programmes that support our policy of comprehensive engagement with Africa

This relation, however, takes a significant new turn after the September 2001 event. This significant shift in the US-Africa relations as argued by Akinwande (2014) witnessed the extension of the US foreign policy beyond the domain of development-security to the securitization of environmental, political and economic issues in Africa through the War on Terror strategy. To this end, more texts were produced which engage with the discourse of terrorism in Africa and Nigeria specifically. Hence, this is reflected in the percentage of the texts chosen from Presidents Bush and Obama era. All texts selected are primary documents

that are regarded as official US government's discourse on terrorism in Nigeria and/or Africa. The justification for focusing on the Department of State and the Defense Department, as well as selection of each text will be given in greater details in the proceeding sections and chapter. To engage with the text(s) in order to discover how linguistic practices work within them, the text will be coded to identify key words, terms, phrases and labels contained in each text; the main assumptions contained within each of the texts will be identified; how the main themes or strands of the discourse are constructed will be shown; and the dominant narratives will be contrasted with the less dominant ones to highlight the extent to which contingent articulations have become normalized.

Reasons for Focusing on the State Department, the Defense Department and the Congress

The US Department of State presents itself for a discursive site considered suited for this study majorly because it is the executive branch which has leading and constitutional responsibilities of the US foreign policy. The Defense Department on the other hand is useful to identify key security documents on Africa. It proves more useful in understanding military initiatives like African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) (1997) which was changed to Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) (2004) shortly after the implosion of Ivory Coast argued (by Akinwande 2014) as the resultant effect of ACRI before the launch of AFRICOM in 2007. Also, the state Department and the Pentagon (Department of Defense) have traditionally/historically been the agencies with somewhat engagement with the African continent. For instance, the post of the Bureau of African Affairs was created in 1958 (during the Cold war and decade of African independence) by the State department under the Secretary of State to co-ordinate and supervise activities in the continent. Also, during the administration of President Clinton, the post of the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs was created within the State Department to highlight issues of security, democracy and governance, among other things, with more focus on Africa than other regions of the world. The intervention of the US in Africa and the transformation of its security since the Cold war and particularly during the crisis of the 1990s have severally been justified on humanitarian grounds but have largely been more of military interventions which Frazer (1997:103) has termed "self-interested humanitarianism". This military intervention provides

a justification for the focus on the Department of Defence (as a discursive site) as it is the executive branch saddled that carried out these operations (in league with the Department of State). The Pentagon's engagement with Africa became more pronounced under the Clinton's administration. Though the US has organised and led operations like the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was replaced by the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to Africa, it was during the Clinton's tenure that the first US military initiative to Africa (ACRI) was launched under the Department of Defence. The Defence Department also for the first time during this tenure budgeted for "conflict-resolution operations" in the continent. In the wake of the Global War on Terror and its militarised counter-terrorism approach, the Department of Defence became even more relevant in understanding the discourse of terrorism, especially with the launch of AFRICOM in 2006. As Banjo (2010), Akinwande (2014) and Olsen (2017) have rightly argued that to understand the somewhat ambivalent US-Africa policy, the State Department and Department of Defence are two very useful sites. Another site also considered useful for this research is the Homeland Security Committee. This is because as a standing committee of the House of Representatives on security, it conducts oversight functions and investigations and remains vital in the process of threat construction to the security of the U.S. Other sites like Committee on Foreign Affairs or Council on Foreign Relations could also be considered. For instance, Nigerian presidents like Olusegun Obasanjo testified that "the Council on Foreign Relations has contributed immensely to my formation in whatever my view and ideas are". However, going by the practicability of data management, the research will be limited to these three discursive sites.

Selection of Texts: The National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Office of the Presidency

The discourse of terrorism is emergent in Nigeria, so it is unsurprising not to find many primary documents classed public on it. Unlike the U.S archive, where a proportionate number could be sourced, though not without its own ambivalence, the Nigerian National Assembly only host 3 variants of the same document- The Terrorism Prohibition Act. The first one written in 2011 and the second a memorandum on the Act and the third is the Act (as amended) in 2013. There is a conspicuous absence of any policy document, recommendations or even testimonies of Assembly members on the domain. To augment this, 16 Press releases

relating to Boko Haram hosted by the Office of the Presidency under the National Security and Intelligence were selected. All documents are dated from 2011 to 2017 as no documents relating to the sect's activities could be found prior to this time.

Reasons for Focusing on the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Office of the Presidency

Most of the evolving scholarship on terrorism in Nigeria have either reviewed literature or drawn resources from the media as the basis for their argument. While media narratives themselves are potential source of data for research, scholars like Popoola (2003;2012) and Połońska-Kimunguyi, and Gillespie (2017) have highlighted how the Nigerian press have always been doctored (both locally and internationally) and freedom of reportage elusive which is a continuation of colonial heritage. Another argument to this end is the recent legislation against hate speech in Nigeria where open-ended definition of 'hate speech' is categorised as 'terrorism' (Sahara Reporters Aug. 26, 2017). It could therefore be argued that in nascent states like Nigeria where political violence has been prevalent, it might be necessary to look beyond the media as an institution to organs of government themselves to understand the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria. Apart from a handful of doctoral theses which have undertaken critical study about terrorism and the National assembly of Nigeria, only Sampson and Onuoha (2011) have considered the National Assembly as vital to understanding how the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation came about in Nigeria. Sampson and Onuoha (2011)'s article was an engagement with the complexities surrounding the enactment of the anti-terrorism legislation (ATL), its failures and revival and the dominant influence of the U.S and the U.N in its actualization. However, it fundamentally points to the overall importance of the National Assembly of Nigeria in understanding the politics and power intricate to the construction of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria and therefore the contingent nature of such discourse. Though no identified study has pointed to the relevance of the Office of the Presidency in understanding the construction of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria, it is considered very important to this research because at the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, the Office of the Presidency remains the central point of call for discussions on terrorism in Nigeria. Not too surprising however, considering

the emergent nature of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria, only some scanty texts were identified as relevant in this site. In order to accumulate appropriate quantity of relevant texts, The Office of the Secretary to the Presidency and that of the National Security Adviser of Nigeria could have proved very useful but surprisingly none of these sites have any reports, recommendations or policy documents on terrorism in their archives. Also, there is the stark absence of any policy and/or official recommendations whether comprehensive or otherwise on terrorism in all the sites identified (See Appendix 1 for Table of the selection of texts).

Interview

Researching political violence raises sensitive ethical and practical concerns both to the researcher and research participants. The ethical and practical challenges encountered in the course of this research impacted strongly on the process as well as the final output of the research. This is because the initial focus of this research was to garner data from the 'subaltern', that is, those who have been excluded to the margin of 'society' through the "itinerant of silencing" (Spivak 2004) in order to give 'voice' to them. This focus might make methods such as ethnography, participant observation and/or in-depth/semi-structured interviews more suited to the research agenda (at the initial phase) and in practice present many challenges. One of such, is gaining access to the appropriate community, which in this case is in the North-East Nigeria, where Boko Haram is domiciled. Having lived in this community for a year, between 2009/2010, I had relied on friendships which I have formed to regain access and to obtain reliable data. My friendship network as gatekeepers, as well as research participants, consented to the use of snowball sampling through which their network of friends could also participate in the research. However, prior to my travelling to North-East Nigeria, there were a series of Boko Haram's attacks in North-East, which led to the displacement of many people, including some of my gatekeepers. This development changed the focus of the research from understanding 'subaltern' narratives about terrorism to that of dominant texts like those of policy makers and implementers both in Nigeria and the United States.

Like most research which requires access to policy implementers like the military, gaining access to the participants was also met with some initial resistance. Again, through the

assistance of a friend, who acted as a gate keeper, nine out of about 30 servicemen who were approached consented on the grounds of anonymity and confidentiality. To ensure participants consented after being duly informed, the aims of the research, how participants' data will be used as well as the meaning of anonymity and confidentiality were explained verbally and in writing to each participant and each of the nine participants signed the form to attest to their consent. Anonymity and confidentiality were also guaranteed in writing by the researcher. Of the nine participants, eight are from the Nigerian Army while the remaining one is a navy officer. They are all in Lagos, a south-western state but have all been involved with either Boko Haram or other militant groups in Nigeria. Apart from the difficulty of gaining access, other practical issues like weather conditions, flooding and a times appointment cancellation by some participants prolonged the data collection from July to early October 2014. While Lagos is a state located in the western region of Nigeria, it represents a good mix of Nigerians as a former capital of Nigeria and its home to the highest number of military barracks in the country.

The interview of military officials as the implementers of the GWOT policy in Nigeria become important to this research as it helps to understand how these officials as a "community...makes sense of and responds to events deemed terrorism" (Stump and Dixit 2013: 97). These interviews are particularly useful on three grounds: one, the interviews provide an immensely rich data in understanding how the implementation of the GWOT policy is understood and operationalised by the officials who are saddled with the responsibilities of enactment (Fosher 2009). With the many instances of their vivid descriptions of their engagement in the 'war' against Boko Haram or other violent groups in the interview text, as well as their constructions of the group, it represents how texts refer to each other to legitimise and fix certain meanings (Doty 1993). Secondly, the interview text is positioned as a construction which helps to unveil how military officials define and categorise violence and how this enables certain practices in their management of political violence. The interview data is not however collected in order to affirm or otherwise the 'truth' underlying the practices of the GWOT, it is aimed at understanding how the implementers of the GWOT doctrine use words to justify the morality and rationality of the 'terrorism' construct and the 'war on terrorism'. Thirdly, they serve as a juxtaposition to the official policy texts, because

as workers with possible grievances against both governments, they represent a source of rich data that would contrast the 'official' version of the GWOT in Nigeria. For instance, the personal opinions of participants on corrupt practices by the Nigerian government officials and how some of them think the violence of Boko Haram is caused/motivated by political elites both locally and internationally could not have been represented in the government texts. Some of them particularly demanded that some of their opinions should not be recorded as the nature of their job do not afford them the space to air such views. There was the incidence of a participant who discussed with me extensively only to conclude by saying "please don't quote me, don't use it, I was only expressing a very private opinion".

The physical location where the interviews were recorded did aid the 'loosening up' during most of the interviews. All of the interviews took place either in the participant's compound, a private space in a restaurant or a worship centre like church/mosque. Each interview encounter was face-to-face and was for an average time of twenty-five to thirty minutes, only one interview was about 25 minutes and three of the interviews were above this average. In-depth semi-structured interview questions like 'what is your experience with political violence' were posed to the participants in order to allow them engage with the subject of the research without being 'lead' by the researcher (Fontana and Frey 1998). This might in theory lead to discussions which might not generate any useful data to the research. However, rather than the discussion leading to such, the participants were more concise and apt as some of them granted the interview amidst tight personal and official schedules. Interviews were recorded and encrypted (with the knowledge and consent of every participant) using my mobile phone and were immediately uploaded to the University's drive. To further ensure every data is safe and secure, they were immediately deleted after being uploaded as encrypted files to the University's drive.

The transcription and subsequent analysis of the interviews were done about six months later. This was to allow the participants some time to think about the interview and if necessary change their minds about their data. As part of the written agreement on consent forms, each participant was allowed till the end of October 2016 to contact the researcher by phone/email if they did change their minds. After transcribing the interviews, identifying

features in personal details like names, age, gender, religion and states of origin of participants were overwritten in line with ethics (see Appendix 1).

Data Analysis

Discourses as meaning-making enterprises by the I/we of the 'speaking' subject create the space for how certain 'truths' could be talked about and how certain identities could be constituted by employing some discursive practices as strategies which work for the 'speaking subject' (Croft 2007; Foucault 1972). To critically engage with the representational strategies like elements, floating signifiers, nodal points, moments, logics of equivalence and difference, recurring words and themes were highlighted using Nvivo. Floating signifiers like violence were highlighted to examine how they became embellished and transitioned into nodal points like 9/11. By highlighting the signifier 'crisis' in the construction of the 'threat of the terrorist' as a theme, for instance, it becomes possible to see how certain discourses were ebbed out and others were made dominant and fixed through the strategy of articulation. The transitioning of the signifier 'crisis' works then by the "delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories " (Foucault 1977:199) which are otherwise known as discursive practices.

Another discursive practice examined by this thesis is how identities are constituted. According to Croft (2007:1):

Discourses create and reflect identities, and thus they construct those who are our allies and those who are our enemies. When not in flux, they settle who "we" are, and who "they" are; what "we" stand for, and what "they" mean to us. They construct the space for "our" legitimate activity; and the space for the behaviour we will (and will not) tolerate from "them".

In constituting identities, practices employed are negation, equivalence and difference and articulations to delimit how the self is constructed against the other. For instance, producing the identity of Nigeria as a kind of state which exists to counter terrorism works by recurrent use of words like security/insecurity; peace/war/terrorism; hate/love; and violence/crisis. Articulating the state's identity to mean counterterrorism has already define for us the "field

of discursivity” that is, words that could be employed and practices that would be enabled as a result of this.

Conclusion

This Chapter has engaged with Discourse Theory as the theory and method for this thesis. It has made the case for the suitability of Discourse Theory for this research and also examined how certain discursive practices like articulations and logics of equivalence and difference work as representational practices to delimit and fix “the field of discursivity”. Discourses are not inherently fixed; they are in a state of continual flux and are often unstable. Hence, it takes the “agent of knowledge” to delimit certain discourses and thus make it fixed and stable through the employment of certain discursive practices. Importantly, discursive practices are not self-evident and value-free tools as they are inherently linked to the ‘speaking’ subject of the discourse. Furthermore, the chapter has attempted to shed some light on how these discursive practices would be teased out particularly by highlighting words/phrases which are recurrent and thus make a particular theme dominant.

Also, the chapter has explained how data were collected and analysed and the rationale behind this. Both primary and secondary data from the Nigeria military as policy implementers and U.S and Nigeria policy texts (respectively) were considered appropriate and important for the research. Accessing this community of research participants was difficult as it is against the ethos of their profession to grant such interviews. To ensure access then, snowball sampling was employed through the initial aid of a friend who acted as the gatekeeper. Informed consent of every participant was documented and signed on the grounds of anonymity and confidentiality guaranteed by the researcher. To delineate what comes in and what goes out for the government texts, key words like ‘Africa/Nigeria’, ‘political violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘security’, ‘Boko Haram’ were employed in data selection. Both the interviews and government texts were analysed in the empirical chapters using concepts such as Otherness and discursive practices such as logics of equivalence and difference and difference. Words and themes were highlighted to examine how these discursive practices were employed in the constructions of the texts under study.

Chapter 3: Understanding Boko Haram

“What is most worrying at present is, at least in my view, a clearly stated intent by Boko Haram and by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and synchronize their efforts. I’m not so sure they’re able to do that just yet, but it’s clear to me they have the desire and intent to do that”. (U.S. Army General, Carter F. Ham, Commander of AFRICOM, August 17, 2011)

Introduction

According to the Global Terrorism Database, the first attack of Boko Haram was launched on the 27th July 2009 with an unknown number of fatalities. This is however in contrast to media submission that the group’s first violence was in 2003 (CNN, October 19th, 2018). The inconsistency in the emergence of the group and the history of their violence shows how the shift of the GWOT into Nigeria helps to construct dominant narratives and fix meaning which enables certain productive practices while silencing others. This is because prior to the event of September 2001, the activities of the group have been considered local and thus a reflection of the volatile political terrain of Nigeria. This is thus within the moral boundary of the political violence inherent to the state and hence do not need to be understood any more differently than others. Through the service of power therefore, certain discourses and practices become dominant and visible while others are not. While the ‘irrationality’, ‘hate’ and ‘evil’ of Boko Haram becomes dominant after the shift of the GWOT into Nigeria, the oppressive and exclusionary practices of both the Nigerian political elites and the U.S GWOT become invisible and thus silenced. According to Doty (1993: 298) “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place”. In the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the shift from “Islamic fundamentalist” which serve the interests of political elites to “enemies of the state” before being constructed as ‘terrorists’ reveals how

what could or could not be done provides the space for the range of actions available for social actors.

The 2009 Boko Haram uprising and subsequent lethality had a lot to do with the effects of specific actions and/or inactions of political elites both locally and internationally. It is known that the activities of the group became more violent and lethal during President Goodluck Jonathan's heavily militarized counter-terrorism approach (The Guardian, June 5th, 2014). According to President Goodluck Jonathan on January 8, 2012:

*...During the civil war, we **knew**, and we could even predict where **the enemy** was coming from. You can even know the route they are coming from, you can even know what calibre of weapon they will use and so on....Some continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won't even know the person who will point a gun at you or plant a bomb behind your house (Premium Times 2012)*

This kind of mysterious enemy of the state has already constructs for us the possibilities of the courses of actions to be taken against the group. And in this case due to the narratives of the GWOT, it is the employment of the military to win the war against an enemy 'without a face'. These practices evidently draw from the background understanding of how the identity of the group as 'Islamic fundamentalist' serves the narrative of the GWOT. It however silences the narrative of politicking that explains the violence of groups of this nature in Nigeria. This is captured in the words of former President Olusegun Obasanjo:

I went out in 2011 to Maiduguri. I took great risk to find out what is really happening. Boko Haram, do they have grievances, if they have grievances, what are their grievances and I brought all that to Jonathan. Jonathan didn't believe that Boko Haram was a serious issue. He thought that it was a device by the North to prevent him from continuing as president of Nigeria which was rather unfortunate (Daily Post September 11, 2017)

This background understanding of groups being used to influence the electoral process in Nigeria reveals an important aspect of power to fix and shift meanings and produce varied subjectivities as deemed fit. It is this productive use of discursive power that helps to understand why under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, the group could be useful for electoral purpose and shortly, they are constructed as 'enemies'. It is this important aspect

of power that highlights how policy discourse and official narratives on terrorism helps to shift subject positions and construct identities as total closure.

This chapter provides a background to the proscription of Boko Haram as the first terrorist organisation in Nigeria. It focuses on the construction of the Boko Haram group both in academic literature, media, policy documents and official narratives both locally and internationally. The chapter aims to provide context to the group's violence by highlighting what is known/unknown about the groups' name, origin, structure, objectives, splinter groups, operational dynamics and tactics, religious identity and its international dimension. Providing context for the emergence and operations of the group will help to understand later analyses in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 and shows how the 'fixity' of the terrorists' label serve a neo-colonial divide of a global order versus disorder. This will open up the space for a critical rethink of how the movement is being constructed and how this can offer a possibility of change. There are three sub-headings in this chapter: The first is emergence, structure and narratives of Boko Haram. This section examines the origin of the group and the nature of their activities prior to the time they became knowable through the discourse of terrorism. Three men have so far led the group as we know it (apart from the splinter groups) and the group have to a large extent evolve according to the leadership dynamics. An important node in the violence of the group is the role of the state as represented by its political elites during the group's fallout with them. The second sub-heading: Boko Haram and the Political Landscape in Nigeria highlights the role of political elites in constructing and manipulating identities for their interests. It highlights this background to give a context to why Boko Haram's 2009 uprising was not taken seriously because such practices are possible within Nigeria's political landscape. The third and final sub-heading before the conclusion examines the logic of Boko Haram's proscription. Not so much is known about the U.S-Nigeria meetings which made the later to concede to the proscription of Boko Haram but there seems to be some real hesitancy on the part of Nigeria in labelling the group as a terrorist organisation which signals co-option. This sub-heading has a subsection: Assessment by Juxtaposition and Pre-emption. The subsection examines how the Homeland Security Report (2011) helps to prove the "intent" and "capacity" of Boko Haram to attack the United States simply by

juxtaposing the group with other groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda and their “capacity” by their ability to attack Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city.

The Emergence, Structure and Narratives of Boko Haram



Muhammed Yusuf, Boko Haram's founding leader during his arrest

Source: BBC (2014)

The meaning of the group's name, their structure/strategy, source of funding and religious beliefs are all contested (Samuel 2013; Iro and Oarhe 2012). As it were, nothing substantial is known about the numerical strength of Boko Haram and other demographic profile of its members. The group's name has changed repeatedly to reflect the present agenda and/or leadership of the group. The group's name was changed from *Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad* meaning Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and the Jihad to its present official name which is Islamic State in West Africa or Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWA or ISWAP) to reflect their expression of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in March, 2015 (Global Security, 2015). The word 'Boko Haram' is not a nomenclature by which the group itself self-identify but was appended to the group by northern Nigerians because of the group's narratives (Onuoha 2010). The name is frequently

interpreted to mean “hate or dislike for book or western education or western civilization” or “book or western education/civilization is forbidden” (Agbigboa 2011; Abimbola 2012).

The general theorem in (international) media is that the movement started in 2002 (BBC 2016; Aljazeera 2015). However, in official and academic discourse the actual date of the group’s emergence remains a source of dispute. This dispute is due to the metrics used to determine the possible date of the group’s birth. These range from the possible date of birth of Muhammed Yusuf and when his militant activism began to the date of his death (Onuoha 2010; Forest 2012). According to official narratives, however, Boko Haram’s activities predated Muhammed Yusuf’s leadership and started as a small religious study group sometimes in the mid-1990’s (U.S Homeland Security, 2011; Nigeria Security Defence 2012). Adesoji (2010) has particularly contended that unlike official documents and narratives which stated the group’s emergence as the mid-1990s, he argued that Boko Haram’s strategy, operations and goals modelled an earlier sect of the 1970s/1980s known as the Maitaisine and therefore it is a splinter group of the latter. While there seems to be a unanimous agreement by scholars that both the evolution and narratives of the group is linked to the history of political violence and ‘reality’ of the Nigerian state and also that certain striking similarities between Boko Haram and Maitaisine could be highlighted, there is no established connection of Boko Haram to the Maitaisine group. The study group usually referred to as the Muslim Youth Organisation, also known as Shabab, was said to be teaching and promoting a (Wahhabi) puritans and/or separatist version of Islam which the residents of Damboa, Maiduguri, Borno state were initially against (Olojo 2013; Onyebuchi and Chigozie 2013). Their doctrine was marked by grievances against the corrupting influence of western education as evidenced by the corrupt and immoral practices of elites in the country. Under the leadership of the first leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Lawan, the group was completely non-violent. Though not so much is known about him or the group, what is known is that the group only engages in preaching, crusades and criticism of governmental failings (Onuoha 2013). Abubakar Lawan’s influence was more visible within the University of Maiduguri where, as a faculty representative, he oversaw the study group. However, while no direct correlation was established, many students under his leadership were reported to have dropped out of the university system. It was evidenced that Muhammed Yusuf met with and was inspired by

Lawan during this period. Lawan was believed to have been secretly killed by the state's security agencies (Omotola 2013; Cook 2011).

After the unexplained and suspicious death of Lawan, Mohammed Yusuf, who is believed to be given birth to on 29th January 1970 (again varying dates are given), emerged as a charismatic leader who fine-tuned the group's objectives and made a direct link between the absence of Islamic principles as a way of life and the prevalence of poverty, unemployment, criminal activities and corrupt practices by political elites. Prior to meeting with his predecessor in Nigeria, Yusuf was a (graduate level) scholar of theology from the University of Medina at Saudi Arabia and was later significantly influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Egyptian exiled scholar Shukri Mustafa. With a large following from the Kanuri ethnic group in Borno state, some scholars argued that the group's religious beliefs dates back to pre-colonial days (Campbell 2013; Danjibo 2009). However, some other scholars have submitted that the Salafist version of Islam practised by Boko Haram members are 'imported' from the Middle East. Thereby, Yusuf's beliefs are considered not compatible with the socio-cultural cum religious landscape of northern Nigeria (Samuel 2013; Murtada 2013). By attending to the issues of poverty through giving of food and other basic provisions to the extremely poor like the Almajiris, however, his doctrine began to attract a wide following (Abimbola 2011; Elkaim 2012). Many scholars seem to agree that the group's dogma taps into the longstanding, deep-rooted political, religious and ethnic challenges the country has been facing (Solomon 2015; Elden 2014; Herbst 2004) According to Abimbola (2011) and Onuoha (2010), his call for an Islamic theocratic state made him particularly attractive to northern political elites who consider him to be a useful tool in winning the hearts and the minds of the people for electoral purposes. This new phase led to the pact entered into by Mohammed Yusuf and Ali Modu Sheriff, a politician and gubernatorial candidate in Borno state. The pact was believed to include the payment of monthly salaries to Yusuf's key followers, the conversion of Borno state to an Islamic theocratic state, among other things. After the victory of Ali Modu Sheriff at the polls of 2003, he established the Islamic Affairs commission and employed Mohammed Yusuf as well as his followers. However, both parties fell out of pact due to several undisclosed reasons, leading to Yusuf's resignation and his subsequent polemics against the government of Sheriff. After the event of September 2001, the group

became known as the Nigerian Taliban⁴ or the Yusuffiya sect. It was unclear whether or not violence was employed by the group or the extent to which violence was employed by the Boko Haram group during the early 2000s. The group was however involved in flagrant disregard for the authority of the state and staging crusades with focus on discrediting both national and international governments. In most of his narratives, he skilfully links the grievances and feelings of injustice associated with their immediate environment with international issues focusing mainly on Israel (Jews), the U.S (westerners) and Nigerian political elites and Christians. As he asserts in one of his sermons after some revenge killings of some Muslims in Onitsha by an unnamed armed group:

Once [the infidels] have power, once they have control, they show no mercy, they show no forgiveness. In Onitsha, they killed everyone. In Maiduguri, there have been skirmishes. They burned down houses, but it was nothing compared to what happened in Onitsha. That's why we can't put down our arms ...Can you even think of Muslims being in Guantánamo? In Iraq, people have been humiliated in their homes, in their own country. They built their country, and they were forced to go on their hands and knees. They were stripped and then raped by dogs. Can you imagine? To strip a woman and have her raped by a dog? Can you remain silent before such humiliations? Remain silent, and on Judgment Day, Allah will hold you accountable. (Cited in Apard 2015:46, YouTube videos Mohammed Yusuf sermon, 2006)



Mohammed Yusuf during his sermon

⁴ This was believed as a strategy of gaining recognition beyond the Nigerian border, thereby tapping into the narratives of Al Qaeda (Iro and Qarhe 2012).

Source: You tube (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nYGyYEA1Y8>)

As a result of this, several clashes between the group and the Nigerian police were recorded between January and July 2009. The group's members were imprisoned, maimed, brutalized and killed both by the Nigerian police and Army and by 30th July 2009, the group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf alongside his father-in-law, Baba Mohammed were extra judicially killed in front of the Police Headquarters in Maiduguri.

Further to the killing of Mohammed Yusuf after his fall-out with Ali Modu Sheriff, the then state governor of Borno state, the state witnessed an upsurge in violence, popularly referred to as the Boko Haram 2009 uprising. This uprising was forcefully suppressed by Nigerian soldiers and police through its "Operation Flush" initiative leading to the death of some thousands of people after which a seeming peace returned to the region. The group however resurfaced again in 2010 with more determination to fight having been trained by other groups suspected to be either Al-Qaeda or Al-Shabaab in places as diverse as Niger, Sudan, Egypt and some other unknown caves and mountains (Oarhe 2012; Elden 2014). Scholars like Agbigboa (2010) and Adesoji (2015) have argued that the violence of the group might partly be due to Boko Haram's revenge of the death of Yusuf and partly the aggressive and temperamental nature of its new leader, Abubakar Shekau. Agbigboa (2010; 2013) has also pushed this further by asserting that Shekau's aggressive stance was a result of the death of Yusuf as there was no evidence of any violence carried out by him prior to Yusuf's death. However, the group became increasingly violent and less discriminately in the targets of their attacks from public symbols like the police station to communal market settings where everyday people do business to bus stations, to other Muslim sects who do not support their course, people were killed almost on daily basis especially during the heavily militarized President Goodluck Jonathan era. According to Qaqa, Boko Haram's supposed spokesperson:

Allah has said that we revenge on anyone that attacks us in the measure as we were attacked. So as far as we are concerned, persons like Ali Sheriff, Senator Ndume and Pindar are not in any way different from President Goodluck Jonathan, whom we are targeting to eliminate... (Cited in All Africa November 25th, Qaqa 2011 and BBC 2015)

Prior to their proscription by the United States, Abubakar Shekau became more vocal about the operations of the group by employing social media to broadcast his messages. He reconstructed the goals of the group to mean anything or anyone that is 'western' as being an enemy of Islam. In his words:

Everyone knows that democracy and the constitution is paganism and everyone knows there are some things that Allah has forbidden in the Quran that cannot be counted as western education (Cited from Boko Haram YouTube Videos, Shekau 2012).

The Quran teaches that we must shun democracy, we must shun western education, and we must shun the constitution (Cited from Boko Haram YouTube Videos, Shekau 2013).



Boko Haram's Leader: Abubakar Shekau, alongside his fighters

Source: BBC 2014

The meaning of 'western' in this sense remain contested. As Agbiboa (2012) and Abimbola (2014) have pointed out the hypocrisy of the group in fighting western education and oppressive systems generally. They contended that the use of western technology for their fight and the propagation of their messages at least highlights this hypocrisy. In line with this argument, Walker (2012:7) submits that:

Boko Haram, as a group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world out of hand. The group's use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits them

Another factor which highlights the group's hypocrisy in fighting oppressive systems which they have equated with being 'western' is criminal activities like robberies, kidnapping and the likes which the group have continually engaged in. In the height of the group's violence under Shekau's leadership, the meaning of 'western' and being an 'enemy' became so broad that even his own fighters like Mujtahid Abu Hanifa, Hadhiq Kaka al-Hajj, Mustafa al-Chadiwho and Malim Omar, who thought he was being too extreme by killing other Muslims were killed in 2014 (BBC 2016). The emergence of Abubakar Shekau, the present leader of the group, (It is not clear whether Shekau is dead or still alive as there has been claims and counter claims of his death both by the Nigerian military and the Boko Haram group), thus lead to their proscription as a 'terrorist' group because of their scale of violence. Under the present leadership, the group carried out the first suicide bomb in Nigeria in July 2011 and has since been involved with a high level of destruction of public properties as well as killings, maiming, kidnapping and displacement of thousands of people both in Nigeria and beyond. Overall. There seems to be a continual increase of Boko Haram's violence with the death of each leader.

Scholars are also not unanimous on the sect's "religious methodology" and structure. With respect to their dogma, Furnish (2012), Copeland (2013), Ibrahim (2012) and others have unequivocally described the sect as Salafist, while Sageman (2004) and Wictorowicz (2001) among others suggested that there are "strands of Salafists". Murtada (2013), a Nigerian Islamic scholar, has however contended the view that Boko Haram is Salafist. It is thus not very certain what informs the group's religious dogma, if any. In Murtada's argument, the discourse and practices of Boko Haram, especially under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau stands in stark opposition to the tenets of the sacred texts and the principles of war as enshrined in the Salafist dogma. The differences in the interpretation of who a non-believer really is and whether women and children should be part of the war whether as soldiers or victims, seem to be at the heart of the contention. For Abubakar Shekau, a non-believer

includes Muslims who have become westernized. This background explains why the dynamics of the group changed leading to the breakaway of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the biological son of Mohammed Yusuf, to form a splinter group which pledged allegiance to ISIL in his videos. It is this breakaway of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and subsequent pact with ISIL that made Abubakar Shekau form another pact with ISIL. ISIL has acknowledged both factions at some points but seems to give more credence to Abu Musab al-Barnawi in the newspaper *al-Naba* lately (BBC 2018). Though scholars like Onuoha (2010) and Iro and Qarhe (2012) have argued that the rhetoric might not mean an actual pact as it is part of the strategies of violent groups of this nature to distract the public as well as enjoy cheap publicity, the exchange of correspondence between the parties involved found in their hideouts gave some credence to this pact (BBC, 2017). Also, it remains uncertain how many splinter groups have broken away from Boko Haram as some of its members like Abu Qaqa II has renounced the group and its practices publicly (though he was later killed) (Oftedal 2013). This is important partly because different people have identified as the group's spokesperson at different times leading to arguments about the credibility of the information. Though the group has reported links with Al-Qaeda, there is insufficient evidence to establish this. According to The Jihad and Terrorism Monitor (2010), Al-Qaeda has acknowledged twice the provision of some forms of trainings and support for their "Nigerian brothers". On the part of Boko Haram, BBC (2009, August 14) reported that a supposed spokesperson of Boko Haram, Thani Umar, made a public statement that "the movement had joined up with al-Qaida and thus intends to launch a series of bombings starting in August in both Northern and Southern Nigeria so as to make Nigeria ungovernable". This was not long after the movement's leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed extra-judicially by the Nigerian police. Some have however argued that whether or not Boko Haram's affiliation with ISIS and Al-Qaeda are mere rhetoric focusing on it might decontextualize the understanding of the group (Campbell 2013). It is however not clear if the supposed affiliations became necessary after their proscription as a terrorist group. As Oarhe (2012) has argued that the attempt to link Nigeria's local struggles to a wider one might inadvertently lead to an anti-U.S global allegiance.

Boko Haram and the Political Landscape in Nigeria

The Boko Haram movement has often been argued as a reflection of the political violence that evolved in Nigeria shortly after its independence (Adesoji 2010; Benjamin 2009). However, unlike other forms of political violence akin to the (southern) Nigerian landscape, which highlights grievances relating to equal political representation and/or economic deprivation, Boko Haram's violence has often been associated with their demand for an independent Islamic caliphate which models the early visions of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio prior to the advent of colonialism in Nigeria (Obadare 1999; Falola 1998). It is this utopian vision of an Islamic theocratic political arrangement that both endeared the group to the political elites, especially during the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, and also set them at parallel with the Nigerian government as it is today. Many scholars and journalistic accounts seem to agree with the group's narratives that the Nigerian state as characterized by a culture of impunity, untamed corruption, coercion, poverty and gross abuse of human rights among others. Scholars seem to agree that Nigeria has failed in these indices of governance (Yusuf 2013; Agbiboa 2014; Campbell 2012; Animashaun and Saka 2013). Agbiboa (2014) and others therefore see a correlation between the culture of impunity by political elites and the persistent political violence in the country. Some others contend that Nigeria's history of colonization and Arab invasion is the probable reason for the cultivation of a culture of aggression and violence as a means of resisting undue dominance of the invaders. According to Ayinde (2010), violence and of course terrorism in Africa can be better explained through the lenses of Arabs and Europeans' invasion into Africa. He divided this into three phases: Afro-Oriental phase (Arab invasion and enslavement); Afro-Occidental phase (European invasion and enslavement) and the Afro-global phase (where Africans has to survive through terror tactics). Ayinde's reductionist account however does not account for so-called "primordial wars" prior to the advent of the colonialists as well as the role of political elites in the continued incidence of political violence in Nigeria. Expressing his frustration and inability to find lasting peace, the former President Goodluck Jonathan during his presidency affirmed:

some of them [sponsors of Boko Haram] are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary, legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary (Cited in Oarhe 2012:57)

In spite of this outright implication of officials of his government as being either members of Boko Haram or sponsors of the group's violence, there was neither identification nor arrest of these persons. Also, commenting on the role of the state as represented by its elites, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, in a public lecture in Ibadan, on Corruption and the African Child (2017) asserts:

One of the reasons that members of the extremist group – Boko Haram, gave for their insurrection is that they became disillusioned when they saw how corrupt Western educated leaders were. According to them, if those who occupied government offices by virtue of their Western education would corruptly enrich themselves and deprive others of the basic things of life, then that education is 'haram' which means forbidden...We may not agree with their position, but the disappointment and disillusionment of citizens over the inadequacy or poor performance of their leaders is real.

Furthermore, like the Maitaisine uprising in Nigeria which was linked to political elites, the Boko Haram group is often represented as a major node in the politicization of religion in Nigeria by its political elites (Adesoji 2011; Alao 2013; Hill 2010). The group's religious identity became constructed and mobilized by political elites like Ahmed Yerima, a former governor of Zamfara state and ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo who both promised and endorsed an Islamic theocratic state in the Northern region of Nigeria in exchange for electoral votes (Ayelabola 2013; Perous de Montclos 2014). Boko Haram's narratives as well as its violence therefore received legitimacy among the northerners under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf as a result of their religious identity as constructed by the political elites (Guardian 2014; Cook 2011). As a result, Mohammed Yusuf became prominent during the Sharia implementation programme in the 12 northern states of the federation during this period. According to Professor Akinwande Oluwole Soyinka, an astute political activist, in his interview with Sahara Reporters where he highlighted the instrumental use of religion by Nigerian political elites for personal interests by referencing the promise of the enforcement of Sharia Law by Sani Ahmed Yerima, during his gubernatorial political campaign:

...when he was asked why he decided to turn Zamfara state into a theocratic state in a secular dispensation. He said and I dare him to deny it, that it was the only weapon he had to snatch power. He said that the PDP was so strong that he needed something which would appeal to raw emotions to mobilize and get the governorship... (Soyinka 2012; cited in Sahara Reporters).

This assertion is further corroborated by Alhaji Balaraba Musa, the former governor of Kaduna state in response to the use of Islamic religion as a political tool by political elites:

In the face of the new political programme, the ruling class had no foothold or any solid base for political competition as a block with the rest of the country. In view of this political bankruptcy, it became clear that Islam would offer the only alternative for the protection of their class interest. But even this was not an easy card to play...it was clear that to seek to defend it [Islam] would enhance their position. So, they held on to the issue of sharia...as their only weapon for mobilisation in the north (Musa; Cited in Sampson 2014:335).

While the polemics of the likes of Professor Oluwole Soyinka remain valid to the extent that the use of the Islamic religion as an instrument for the manipulation and mobilization of the electorates to a large extent reflects the history of political violence in the northern part of Nigeria, it remains that difference and antagonism should be envisioned as part of the democratic imaginary in Nigeria. Unlike Samuel Huntington's submission that religion is a vital instrument in the inherent nature of state politics, religion is not monolithic and often is a product of discursive constructions that highlights difference, antagonism and dissent in the democratic experiment. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the acceptance of difference, antagonism and dissent should be part of the radical democratic imaginary, rather than the building of consensus. In this sense, instead of highlighting religion as evidenced by institutionalizing Sharia Law in Zamfara state for instance as the primary cause of political violence, the focus should be about unveiling silence and making oppressive power relations visible. In other words, just like groups like the Oodua Peoples' Congress (OPC) and the Bakkasi Boys in the South-western and South-eastern parts of the country respectively, Boko Haram as a group exists to give voice to the prevalence of oppressive practices enabled by certain discourses of exclusion (Vinson 2017).

Boko Haram's Proscription



Boko Haram displaying their weapons and their readiness for war after news of proscription



Nigerian Soldiers in the North-East of Nigeria at war against Boko Haram

Source: BBC 2013

The proscription of Boko Haram as the first terrorist organisation in Nigeria on June 4, 2013 by the Nigerian government, followed by the Home Office on July 12, 2013 and the White House on November 14, 2013 became justified locally due to their use of violence and internationally due to the possibility of the group attacking the West (Department of State 2013; Terrorist Proscription Order 2013). Prior to the proscription of the group in Nigeria, northern community leaders through several meetings with the federal government of Nigeria, have consistently warned against heavy involvement of the military in combating the group and the many human rights abuses recorded against the Nigerian Army (Benedict 2012). Also, they gave their voice against labelling the group as a terrorist organisation when the pressure from the U.S was getting intense. This is because such measures would be counter-productive and that the heightened military involvement that would follow such proscription would only offer the group more sympathy from some northern Muslims (Aregbe 2012). They advocated instead for an Amnesty Programme similar to that offered to the Niger Delta militants (Oarhe 2012). After one of the bilateral sessions between Nigeria and the U.S on Security and the economy, an official reported:

In making a case against the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist group, the Federal Government took into consideration the fact that it will look like a sanction which will hurt innocent Nigerians. Some people think that the designation will only hurt Boko Haram members without knowing that all of us will bear the brunt.... And once the US does that, the EU countries will follow. The consequence of the designation is that this country will return to the club of pariah nations. This will surely in turn hurt our economy. So, the government pleaded with the US Secretary of State and other top officials against designation (Badejo 2012)

Reflecting on this, Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State, in charge of the African region, also, objected to the designation of the group on the grounds that Nigeria is “adamantly opposed to the designation”, citing that it might have unintended consequences on the country and its people and that the designation might work for Boko Haram rather than against them (CBS News, July 20th 2016). In spite of this, Oarhe (2014) and Oche (2014), argue that it remains unclear however, if Boko Haram’s designation was initially instigated by the Nigerian government itself in order to either galvanise foreign support and/or aids or to

just save face that the violence reflects something more global than a local uprising. This reasoning was based on the rhetoric of the war on terror which former president Goodluck Jonathan was using to describe the group prior to its designation. The designation, however, eventually took place because of Daniel Benjamin, the head of the counter-terrorism Bureau, who “was leaning toward the designation” (CBS News, July 20th, 2016). Since according to the U.S, foreign governments are appraised based on:

a) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the act; and

b) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country;

Nigeria was considered not to be doing enough in fighting groups such as Boko Haram who are “threat” to the “interests” of the United States in Nigeria. In same breath, the U.S acknowledged the several human rights abuses of the Nigerian army in their fight against the group and conclude that such practices would deter the direct involvement of U.S soldiers in the war but offered technical support to the Nigerian government in the prosecution of the war. It nonetheless significantly cut back on aids to the region suffering from the import of Boko Haram and the soldiers’ activities in exchange for regions that are more inclined towards ‘democracy’ and the ‘rule of law’ (Dagne 2011).

Assessment by Juxtaposition and Pre-emption

To successfully, designate a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the U.S. apart from such group’s violent activities, the group must have been assessed to have the “intent” of attacking the U.S and the “capacity” to do such (Department of State, 2013). In the case of Boko Haram, the fact that the uprising was mainly about local issues which was acknowledged in the report makes its ‘intent’ of attacking the U.S difficult to prove. Although, Boko Haram’s rhetoric has been replete of its discontent against western civilization and subjects, there was however no ascertained intent beyond these emotive words. The report also explicitly rules out the possibility of the group’s capacity to launch an attack against the U.S citing the fact that Boko Haram largely depends on locally made explosives and weapons to carry out their

attacks (Homeland Security, 2011). The Homeland Security however reached conclusions and made recommendations contrary to the premises cited in their report citing that the group's violence is "believed" to be against "the interests of America and the West" because Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) all began with rhetoric of hate against the West the same way as Boko Haram. According to the Homeland Security (2011:15):

AFRICOM Commander General Ham warned that while he doubts the ability of Boko Haram, AQIM, and al-Shabaab to carry out attacks against the United States directly at the moment, he does not doubt their intent to do so. General Ham has warned about the potential for a transnational terrorist network to develop in Africa if the rising threat potential of these three groups is left unchecked.

The report devoted most of its content to analysing these other groups highlighting that the similarities are compelling enough to draw the conclusion of Boko Haram's intent. Having established the intent of Boko Haram based on its comparison to other disparate groups, they also prove its capacity to attack the U.S thus:

The use of a suicide VBIED on the Abuja police barracks in June 2011 marked the first time on record a suicide attack was carried out in Nigeria. The bomb used was large enough to destroy 40 other vehicles in the parking lot, and it demonstrated the sect's ability to launch attacks outside of its traditional area of operations in the north, proving that they were now capable of targeting the capital (Homeland Security; 2011: 11)

This is further corroborated by David Cook, a political scientist testifying before the House:

While the attack on the police General Headquarters can be seen as a continuation of Boko Haram's fixation upon the Nigerian police and army, the United Nations attack is much more in line with other [global terrorist] organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August 2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi insurgency (Cook, 2011: 5)

The report thus proved intentionality based on the intent of other groups with motivation of hate against western civilization and through the targeting of western symbols like the U.N building, capacity was proved based on the ability to attack Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. By decontextualizing the violence and linking it to al-Qaeda and others, the rhetoric of

President George W. Bush that “we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them” (National commission on Terrorist attacks 2004: 326) seems to have enabled the practice of this proscription. The logic was simply built on pre-emption. It was not enough that the ‘Iraqi insurgency’ itself as referenced by David Cook was a pre-emptive war based on the idea of a global enemy and a globalist reach and power (Ahmad 2001), the result of such practices which is still being criticized today could still be drawn upon to start yet another war in thousands of miles away. The logic of juxtaposition and pre-emption could show how the linkage of a global war on terrorism became justified in Nigeria and as such enabled normalization of militarism in this region and the rest of the country. This is because prior to the proscription of Boko Haram there was the space to discuss the political solutions available in engaging the group and other violent groups in the country. However, after their labelling as terrorist, the practices of counter-terrorism become the space within which discussions and engagement could take place. The point here is not that militarism has not been a practice in Nigeria prior to the war on terror. At least not until 1999 when the country returned to a democratically-elected government, military coups and regimes have defined the most part of the country’s democratic experiment since independence. However, the return to democracy has meant that most soldiers have returned to their barracks (BBC, August 10, 2000). And the employment of their service by political elites to suppress local uprisings have often been subjected to open and harsh criticisms of the likes of Professor Oluwole Soyinka and Barrister Femi Falana (Vanguard, September 2, 2018; BBC Hard talk, May 10, 2014). The fixing of the label of terrorism has however justified and naturalise the return of the military and their untold human rights abuses (BBC May 24, 2018). By producing a discourse that works for the mission of the GWOT in Nigeria, therefore, Abubakar Shekau became designated as a terrorist on the U.S designated persons’ list after this report. In 2013. Two years after this, a bounty of \$ 7 million was offered for anyone who helps to provide details that can lead to his arrest. The same week of this offer by the U.S, the Nigerian government proscribed the group locally and Boko Haram became designated as a foreign Terrorist organisation some months later.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the understanding of Boko Haram as well as their violence as represented in extant literature and the media. By examining how the group emerged as well as their narratives, the first section of the chapter helps to shed some light on the extent to which Boko Haram's background, operations as well as the meaning of their name is known. Evidently, many of these important details relating to the history and evolving nomenclature of the group remain unknown or open to some serious debate. The second and third sections of the chapter have highlighted how the operation of Boko Haram has been enabled by the same political elites who now labels them as terrorists. The political landscape in Nigeria is such that make use of violence especially for the purposes of elections and Boko Haram is only a reflection of these practice. This is why their proscription as terrorists both locally and internationally does little or nothing to help forestall the spate of violence groups such as Boko Haram engage in. Further, by employing the logic of juxtaposition and pre-emption in the proscription of the group the need for a universal enemy of the U.S rather than the group's specificity is highlighted.

The fixing of discourses exists, therefore, to categorise, organise and label. The GWOT remains at the heart of Boko Haram's proscription and was made possible through the strategies of silence, juxtaposition and pre-emption which in turn enables practices of oppression. The point is does demonizing the group help to understand the history of the violence and possible options of engagement? The fact that Boko Haram is one of many is a tell-tale sign which demands that policy-makers tread cautiously. Hence, the naming of Boko Haram as the first terrorist group in Nigeria (both locally and internationally), has implications which range from what approach is considered appropriate to untold human rights abuses, possible higher tendencies for radicalization and heightened fear between the Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria (Agbibo and Benjamin 2013). Radicalization and gross human rights abuses are already on the increase in the country (Onapajo and Uzodike 2012; BBC June 2, 2017). The construction of the terrorists as irrational beings who are evil and who destroy the good because of hate led to the proscription and works to bring about a new way of thinking about political violence in Nigeria. It goes without saying that the label helps to think about what is normal or abnormal, justified or unjustified political violence in Nigeria. The point is delineating the boundary of morality is thus simple: the political violence that is

considered unacceptable by those who are responsible for it. It therefore highlights how these dominant narratives seem to take as a given the use of the label terrorism, its underlying assumptions and what power (structures) and politics (both in Nigeria and internationally) the use of the label exists to normalise and naturalise.

Chapter 4: Literature Review: The Cold War, Decolonization and Political Violence in Africa

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to engage with relevant literatures within which the discourse of terrorism in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular has emerged. The Chapter argues that political violence like that of Boko Haram is not new in Nigeria and that rather than actual terrorists or terrorism, it is the event of September 2001 that helps to evolve 'terrorism' and thus fix its meaning in Nigeria and beyond. The discourse of terrorism in Nigeria is positioned as a given and often linked to the state failure template. The rationale behind this review is that an attempt at deconstructing the labelling of Boko Haram as terrorists necessitates the engagement with the histories of the violence. While the predominant argument of the thesis is about the shift in policy narratives to construct certain violence and their perpetrators as threats to the 'interest' of the U.S, it becomes important to provide context to the understanding of such violence and identities. The emergence of the terrorism discourse in Nigeria, has often been highlighted as inherently connected to the 'failure' of the state and the institution of governance. This dominant narrative itself, as will be shown in chapter 5 of this thesis, is a product of discursive move. The import of the Cold War while acknowledged in discussions about political violence in Africa prior to September 2001, has often been silenced in the narrative of African state 'failure'. Thus, scholarship has been less focused on understanding how the dynamics of the Cold War and decolonization both significantly influenced divergent movements in the country.

This chapter as a review of relevant literatures will argue that the histories of violence within which the discourse of terrorism has emerged has been blurred to accommodate the 'shift' of the GWOT. It does this by dividing the chapter into four subheadings: The first subheading being Decolonization, Cold War and Political violence in Africa; the second, State Failure and Terrorism in Africa; the third, Political Violence in Nigeria Pre-September 2001 and the fourth, Political Violence in Nigeria Post-September 2001. The first subheading aims to show how

political violence in Africa were understood during the Cold War and the decolonization of Africa. The sharp 'turn' in literature from the import of the Cold War and decolonization to state-centric scholarship especially during the 1990s points to the silencing of complicities. The second subheading thus builds on the first by engaging with the literatures on state failure and terrorism in Africa. It argues that the concept of state failure itself is connected to the Cold War when the U.S was seeking to 'modernize' states so that these states are pro-U.S rather than pro-communist. The third subheading of the chapter, Political violence in Nigeria, narrows the discussion from Africa to Nigeria in order to show how this dominant argument is teased out in understanding political violence in Nigeria. Interestingly, while for understandable reason, Britain, Nigeria's colonizer was often highlighted, the U.S through its cold war activities and subsequent state building initiatives is conspicuously absent from literatures on Nigeria's political violence. By highlighting state failure therefore in post September 2001, the literatures in the fourth subheading positions the emergence of the discourse of terrorism as seemingly natural.

Decolonization, Cold War and Political Violence in Africa

The 1950 and 60s represent the decades of independence for most African states (Okoh 1990). It is also during this period that the Cold War took place. The Cold War represents the period when many states in Africa were considered of strategic importance to the USA and its allies on the one hand and/or the Soviet Union on the other, as they were co-opted to fight the war by proxy by either of the warring factions (Gifford and Louis 1982, 1988; Elkins 2005). The twin events: the struggle for decolonisation and the Cold War witnessed a litany of violent groups noticeable in the continent during and after the end of the Cold War (Marrouchi 2010; Piot 2010). Prior to the end of the Cold War a new 'turn' within the literature referred to more state-centric discourse. However, the understanding of [political] violence (along with concepts like 'conflicts' and 'war' often used interchangeably), in Africa has been represented in dissenting voices among scholars with various degrees of emphasis. However, two dominant schools of thought (though with some similarities) could be identified: the first relating to the inherent incapacity of African states for self-governance and the second mainly because of the comprador nature of the state and its elites. Scholars like Sandbrook (1985),

Linklater (1982), Jackson (1993) and Herbst (1990; 2004; 2006) contend for the lack of capacity of the average state in Africa for governance. Defining work here is considered to be that of Jackson (1993). According to Jackson (1993), the history of state making presents how the logic of war usually determines how the belligerent party claims ownership of the new territory and how conquered territories have to assert their freedom through their prowess at war. Jackson went as far as arguing that were it not for the “new rule’ of sovereignty” African states should not have been granted independence as they are not fit for self-assertion and self-governance. To this group of scholars then, colonization, decolonization and the Cold War cannot explain the unmaking of Africa with respect to incidences of political violence and/or terrorism; instead African states are best referred to as “quasi-states” as they are bereft of the ‘marks and merits of empirical statehood’. ‘Empirical statehood’ here refers to the inherent incapability of African states for self-governance. Colonization and/or decolonization notwithstanding, the modern history of state creation and development comes with political violence justified by the idea of progress and states’ functionaries must deliver on the ‘merits of statehood’ in order to compete favourably in the global landscape. One of the arguments that these critiques fail to engage with, however, is whether Africa really attain independence in the true sense of the word. While the argument for the agency of states’ functionaries often linked with their incapacity for self-governance is central to this school of thought, the extent and nature of sovereignty granted to these states remain open to debate. According to Grovogui (2002) and Hill (2005), the “Westphalia common sense” within which the normative lack and supposed deviancy of states in Africa have evolved did not only position African states as an Other from their European counterparts but it’s also ahistorical given the structures of meaning, assumptions, myths and other associations that have come to define the ‘reality’ of states in International Relations today. For Grovogui (2002: 315-316), drawing from the case of Belgium, Switzerland and Congo, while the first two states are often understood as a sign of “resilience” of European quasi states, the other is constructed as a sign of incapacity of Africa for self-governance. These constructions as regimes of sovereignty not only enables and justifies the ‘failures’ of states in Africa but also “assisted” the “failings” through “modulations of power, interest and identity that continue to favour European entities at the expense of African ones”. Moreover, Linklater (1982),

Jackson (1993) and others does flatten the 'reality' of oppressive practices and violence enabled through the Weberian model of statehood and sovereignty positioned as given and objective as this further elicits the power of discourse.

However, the second major group of scholars identified factors ranging from the role of the political elites, 'poverty', and 'scarce resources', 'the clash of civilizations', globalization, to 'greed' among others, as the 'causes' of political violence in Africa (Usman 1984; Kaplan 1996; Homer-Dixon 1999; Huntington 1997; Stewart 2008; Ballantine and Sherman 2002) The dominant argument here being the 'greed' theory adherents like Collier (2000); Adesoji (2011); Herbst and Mills (2003) and Reno (2000) have continued to underscore the prevalence of corrupt practices and the deliberate weakening of the infrastructure of governance and/or state institutions as the 'root cause' of most if not all the political violence in the continent. Reno's (2000) shadow state theory (as part of the Greed theory) as a concept explicates the deliberate acts of strengthening informal networks or structures over formal state institutions by the ruler (of 'weak' African states) and his allies for economic gains. This is made possible through a supposed state sovereignty subverted by a system of 'personal rule'. As a result, public goods become 'privatized' and the masses are intentionally impoverished and denied basic amenities so as to ensure patronage of the ruler. The creation of this system ensures a continuous spiral of corrupt practices both by the ruler and his allies and the people in general as the framework allows those in power to engage in the siphoning of public wealth for private uses without being checked and as a way of survival the masses have to take to informal networks to court the favour of the ruler and establish affinity on private grounds. For Frances Stewart (2002; 2008), on the other hand, using her Horizontal Inequality theory, has submitted that, ethnic identities determine to a large extent who gets what (resources) in pluralist and poor countries like Uganda, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. The theory explains the prevalence of political violence as due to striking social and economic differences among divergent groups in poor countries as these differences line up with politics as it determines who gets what. Due to the prevalence of poverty and several ethnic groupings, competition for how resources are allocated became connected to the ethnic identities of state functionaries as they are considered as representing their ethnic group and not the wider population. Hence, a system of inequality is perpetuated where certain ethnic groups remain

impoverished because of lack of access to state resources and the emergence of political violence becomes inevitable in such instance. Though Collier (2000) has disputed the validity or usefulness of this theory in understanding the incidence of political violence by arguing against the salience of identity, Keen (2012), Ballantine and Sherman (2003) have reiterated the usefulness of this theory in understanding why violence happens in Africa. Close to this school of thought is Gurr and Harff (1994), Ali and Mathews (1999), Brown (1996; 1998), Carment and James (1998); Lake and Rothchild (1998), Snyder and Jervis (1999) seeming agreement on how elements of group identity and interaction could be used to facilitate political violence. However, even positivist like Weingast (1997), Posner (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) have submitted that the mere fact that a society is pluralistic does not explain the occurrence or otherwise of violence. As Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) argue that 'a greater degree of ethnic or religious identity... by itself 'cannot be 'a major or direct cause' of any violence or conflict. While the Stewart's concept seems to capture most of the factors highlighted as the root causes of political violence in Africa, ranging from identity to economic issues, it nonetheless seems to hold ethnic identities as pre-discursively fixed rather than constructed. In the words of Bhabha (2010:3, 4):

Terms of cultural engagement whether antagonistic or affiliative are produced performatively. The representation of difference must not be hastily read as the representation of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed tablets of tradition

Hence 'the binary logic through which identities of difference' are perceived is a product of some construction and reconstruction and deliberately reinforced rather than pre-given. Interesting in the wake of the GWOT, with the exception of scholars like Jeremy Keenan and Noam Chomsky, the seeming divergent voices became conflated under 'state failure' and its link to 'terrorism' in Africa. The state failure discourse premised on reductionism, hence, does not only make 'terrorism' knowable but also exists to justify and normalize the neo-colonial venture of modernisation of African states from the Cold War period. This thesis contends that in understanding political violence in contemporary Africa, as exemplified by Boko Haram in Nigeria, the articulation of discursive structure as well as the productive practices enabled by these constructs are not in themselves natural but became necessary in order to silent complicity and/or possible other alternatives.

State Failure and Terrorism in Africa

The concept of state failure is not an entirely new one as it is often linked to the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s (Amin 1974; Bayart 1993). The concern for state failure could be traced to the Cold War when nation-building became conflated with state-building (Marrouchi 2010; Piot 2010). The concept of state fragility/weakness becomes dominant to the understanding of world politics because the end of Cold War signals the collapsing of bipolarity and eliminates seeming distance between the United States and the rest of the global regions (Amburn 2009; Devetak 2008; Duffield 2005; Schmidt 2013). The thesis on state failure/weakness is often constructed in literature as the 'crisis' of the 1990s evident by the case of Yugoslavia, USSR, Cambodia, Sudan, Liberia and particularly Somalia. While the conceptualization itself remains problematic amidst scholars and policy makers, it however gained significant importance in U.S Foreign policy as signalled by its inclusion as a matter of concern in the U.S National Security Strategy of 1998 and the policy focus on 'weak states' in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The concept, however, became the core of policy narratives, after the September 2001 event (Amburn 2006; NSS 1998). Though scholars and policy analysts like Jeffrey D. Sachs and Rita Abrahamsen have highlighted how the strategic interests of the United States since the second World War have been based on global inequality and the implicit use of the concept have shaped the U.S foreign policy towards these states, it remains that it is the (re)conceptualization of these events as 'crisis' that occasioned the 'shift' in foreign policy and therefore enables practices such as militarism and/or counterterrorism which has often defined the U.S foreign policy towards Africa. According to Nabers (2009) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896), how certain events are interpreted by agents often serve as the "tipping points" which signals a crisis in foreign policy and therefore justified the 'shift' in narratives and the new direction/drive of foreign policy.

According to Rotberg (2002), today's globalization makes the phenomenon of failed states of graver consequence to the US and the democratic world at large than before. This trend has continued to be a source of deep concern because weak or failed states have been identified as a source of threat to the stability and development of the democratic world. As Rotberg (2002) puts it:

Although the phenomenon of state failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worry than ever before. In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now these states pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbors but also to peoples around the globe.

In the wake of the War on Terror, the proposition that fragile states are the main threats to global security then becomes a dominant argument. With the first appearance of The Failed States Index in 2005, the template is invariably linked to the September 2001 event and has made a successful journey from the 'periphery' to the very 'centre of global politics' since September 2001. Following September 2001, state failure 'was held responsible for just about every threat to international peace and security that existed: civil war, mass migration, ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, drug smuggling, arms trafficking and terrorism' (Gourevitch, 2004; 255). However, prior to September 2001, 'The State Failure Task Force' research project funded by the CIA was initiated in 1994 as an effort to understand the emerging trend of state failure due to the 'crisis' of the early 1990s but synergized efforts were conspicuously absent until the unfortunate event of September 2001. It is in this light that academics like Walt (2002) argue that in spite of the huge challenges failed states pose to "neighbouring countries" which range from "large-scale migration" to "economic chaos" and "mass violence", the perception of this problem has largely been humanitarian and its corresponding response of non-commitment by the US to seriously tackle it. He argues that the phenomenon should rather be viewed as a "major national security problem" and should be tackled accordingly. Citing the inherent danger in the extensive conflicts that are commonplace in failed states, for instance, how terrorists' organisations like al-Qaeda are the offspring of unresolved prolonged conflicts. He finally submits that "helping to settle protracted civil conflicts is not merely good for the world in general; it can also make the United States safer".

While state failure as a matter of policy is not just about Africa, Africa has come to occupy the centre of the state failure scholarship not just because they are states 'that will not disappear, but simply cannot develop' (Herbst 1990:138) but also because of its (particularly the Horn of Africa) supposedly shared similarities with countries like Afghanistan which makes it 'a moral catastrophe' and, 'a security threat' (Williams, 2006; 37) and are considered unable to cope

with globalization with the resulting effects being endemic poverty and disease, massive crime including drug-related ones, privatization of violence, breakdown of law and order leading to a supposed 'global dislocation' (Kaldor 2001:70; Newman 2007). Thus, African 'quasi' states according to Jackson (1987: 526-528) could be best described as:

... more a personal- or primordial-favouring political arrangement than a public-regarding realm. Government is less an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth and power for a small elite who control it... Many governments are incapable of enforcing their writ throughout their territory. In more than a few countries... some regions have escaped from national control... [and the states] are fairly loose patchworks of plural allegiances and identities somewhat reminiscent of medieval Europe.

Moreover, with the exceptions of critical scholarship like Milliken and Krause (2002) and Hill (2007), mainstream scholarship on state failure often consider the validity or otherwise of the label without its historical contingency as a production which became necessary for certain ends. The critical literature notwithstanding there seems to be an obvious gap in literature that draws the state failure-terrorism thesis to a productive end, that is, the state failure-terrorism nexus underscores age-long neo-colonial enterprise. The question is, how does a state so 'authoritarian' so as to be repressive, is also so lacking in 'authority' for effective governance? The answer here seems to lie in the silencing of possible alternatives, the violent history of state-making, and the dogmatic assumption that the question of (Weberian) statehood as appropriate for post-colonial countries cannot be interrogated (Engel and Mehler 2005; Lund 2006; Benjaminsen and Lund 2002; von Benda-Beckmann 2001; Young, 1988; Hyden 1999; Tilly 1985) To put it in Kapferer (2005:286)'s words:" the once broadly accepted Weberian definition of state as that authority with the legitimate monopoly of violence over defined territory seems to be undergoing challenge in many global regions".

Critics have often responded to this proposition as either ignoring historical timeline, issues of context and/or dynamics in modern state formation which makes the comparison an imbalance proposition considering that African states are relatively new in the stage of state formation especially in the international context (Milliken and Krause 2002; Aidan 2007; Brooks 2011 Hill 2005; Newman 2007; Call 2008). Hill (2005) and Newman (2005), for

instance, call for its utter abandonment, whereby emphasizing its othering character and the inherent pathological representation. Central to this argument is how 'failure' should be understood. Beyond the process of conceptualization and its attendant problems, it's the even more serious problem of lack of any serious scholarship on the processes of state failure. According to Milliken and Krause (2003:12): 'one might expect that the case of state collapse would be a prominent object of study for those working on state failure, and/or that scholarship on state failure would deploy a coherent set of concepts and distinctions with which to study the processes of state failure. But ... this is not the case.' Not only has conceptual vagueness and ambiguities proliferated, the normative solution which is state-building does not put history and context into adequate consideration. Hence, two hitherto separate disciplines (i.e. security and development) have to be linked in order to argue the point for state building as the 'cure' for state failure/fragile and terrorism in Africa. Albeit the conceptual jumble (on state failure) which has continued to abound and its attendant policy implications call for a critical introspection into the normative understanding of what makes a state.

However, its linkage to terrorism in Africa is a recent development which could be considered as evolving since the emergence of the World Bank 'good governance' concept and the state failure 'crisis' of the 1990s. Hence, after the September 2001 attack therefore these two hitherto contested concepts became fixed and naturalised. Evolving literatures on the nexus of state failure and terrorism are often considered in three dominant perspectives. Scholars in the first school of thought argues that African state weakness/fragility are 'safe havens' or 'sanctuaries' for terrorists. In other words, the (deliberate) weakening of such states' institutional structures provides an easy hide-out for terrorists and transnational criminals (Andre le Sage 2005; Arseneault and Bacon 2015; Afoaku 2017). Citing reasons why (African) failed states lead to terrorism, Andre le Sage (2005) opines that African states present themselves as sanctuaries to terrorists due to their physical, legal and financial "safe havens". Africa many "ungoverned spaces" call for worry as these physical spaces are so because the respective state governments are either lacking in willingness or capacity to exercise due control over the territories and as such terrorists use them for recruitment and operation purposes. The legal safe havens for terrorists are evident in the many loopholes in their

respective legal frameworks and the sluggishness in the commitment of relevant national governments and stakeholders to accede to the outcome of the UN Security Resolution 2001 and introduce punitive measures into the framework. African's 'ungoverned spaces' therefore do not only serve as 'launching pads' for terrorists but also such states seem to provide some sorts of assistance to terrorists and transnational criminals. Obviously, scholars in this school of thought have refused to engage with arguments about what actually constitute a state failure and what is terrorism and how these contested concepts become fixed and dominant. This might reveal why the process of conceptualization itself is considered problematic as early works like Helman and Ratner's 'Failed States' (1993) and Zartman's 'Collapsed States' (1995) which were obviously addressed to 1990s 'crisis' not only differ in their labels and definitions but also in their applications. While Helman and Ratner sees 'Failed States' as states that are 'Utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community', Zartman sees it as where 'the basic functions of the state are no longer performed' (1993, pp 2-3). Also, from Rotberg's to the annual Failed State Index (FSI)'s definitions and indices of failed state, disparate conditions and categories continue to evolve. For instance, Rotberg's open blanket definition of a failing state being "any state in anarchy" poses the danger of an ever-widening category as it is unclear what is 'anarchy' and how different social and institutional conditions could be so conflated. In 2003, Colombia, Iraq, North Korea, Indonesia and Cote d'Ivoire were considered by Rotberg as failing states. These states not only represented disparate and parallel social and institutional conditions but also the very nature of armed conflicts they experience are obviously different, and so might demand different policy response. To mention Colombia and Iraq as examples, drug related violence could be said to be the bane of the Colombia government's challenge while sectarian violence that of Iraq. Both states are at extreme when it comes to indicators of fragility, weakness or failure. While Iraq has continued to show signs of weakness across board like its economic, political, security and social welfare, Colombia has only shown signs of weakness in particular areas of the state in relation to security.

Furthermore, critics like Newman (2007), Call (2008), Aidan (2007) Campana and Ducoi (20011) and Brooks (2011) have highlighted how it is the so-called strong states, like Saudi Arabia, rather than the weak ones, which are habitats of terrorism, among other things.

According to this group of scholars, often terror networks rely on technological architecture, finances and weapons that poor and weak states do not possess. Newman (2007) for instance argue that conflating state weakness/failure together with terrorism does not only raises serious methodological concerns, it also leads to false conclusions owing to a number of false premises. While agreeing to the fact that terrorists' organisations could benefit from failed states like Somalia, he contended that the history of terrorism reveals that such organisations has thrived in diverse social and political landscape. According to Call (2008) the 'cookie-cutter prescription' of building state institutions particularly the 'core' five institutions, which are highlighted as military, police, civil service, the system of justice and leadership (FSI 2008), clearly reflect a 'concern for order and stability' and exist to serve the self-serving interest of the West without putting into consideration the complex and diverge realities of states. Due to this bias and self-serving agenda, there seems to be a foreclosure of certain 'truth' which do not line-up with western interest. The concern for order and the focus on state building has therefore led to oppressive practices in struggling African states especially through the military. While some scholars in this school of thought concluded by advocating for alternative modes of conceptualization and/or policy response in engaging with the problem of terrorism/political violence in Africa, either of the concepts or both of them are often held as fixed categories which are self-evident outside of discourse.

Political Violence in Nigeria Pre-September 2001

The logic of the Nigerian violence has hitherto been somewhat polarised into two distinct categories: colonial heritage and/or Nigeria as a weak state. Colonial heritage here refers to cultural, economic cum political domination not just by Nigeria's colonizer, Britain, but by a critical mass of foreign (western) countries with economic and political interests in Nigeria. As far back as the 60's to early 2000's scholars like Nkrumah (1965), Leys (1974) and Uche 2008 clearly locate the fragile unity and violent reality of the state since its independence on 1st October, 1960, to its colonial heritage asserting that post colonialism is a myth rather than a reality in Nigeria as the state remains subservient to its colonizers which gives rise to a neo-colonial system where Nigerian political elites now assume the status of 'black colonizers'

who serves the interest of Britain and others in a bid to advance their careers in the nascent state. According to Williams (1998: 289):

Independence had brought not the solace and succour it had promised but deepening misery and misfortune. Internal colonialism had merely replaced external colonialism. Africans, to use the words of local commentators, had only exchanged monkeys for baboons. What made the situation particularly galling was that in most cases, yesterday's celebrated freedom fighter had become today's remarkable tyrant.

This argument was advanced further by scholars who posit that political violence in Nigeria is premised on the 'divide and rule' policy of Britain which ensures a reification of religious and ethnic identities in order to perpetuate dominance. Religious and ethnic identities thus became politicised and this became noticeable immediately after Nigeria's independence in the civil war saga. For Falola (1998), Jibrin (1989); Hunwick (1992), and Isichei (1987), sectarian violence which is premised on religious identities claimed thousands of lives because 'Islamic fundamentalism' or 'political Islam' was on the rise either for 'puritanists' purposes like the Maitaisine uprising (1980-1985) or for competitive purposes as the Muslim elites from 1930 began striving to keep pace with their Christian counterpart who has had a growing influence since 1842. Unsurprisingly, the proliferation of non-state violent groups in the 1960s to 1990s was largely due to agitations around control of resources (Falola and Heaton 2008), the Nigerian civil war, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta in Nigeria (MEND), the Suez war in Egypt, and the Algerian war (which lasted for seven years), among others, remain quintessential examples of political violence motivated by the colonial powers' exploitation of oil in colonial states. It is worth mentioning that beyond the torture, killings and assassinations of nationalist militant groups and leaders, civilian settlements were invaded by the colonial armies (with properties and millions of lives destroyed) as deemed fit by the imperial powers (Louis and Owen 1956; Cradock 2002; Horn 2006). For instance, Pegg (1999) examines how violence has defined the environment where multinational oil companies like the Royal Dutch Company and others have operated and groups like Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) emerged to resist the domination and environmental degradation. This led to the unlawful killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, the leader of the group and an almost endless political violence which the Niger Delta in Nigeria has

continued to experience is largely due to agitations against foreign domination and control of the Nigerian petroleum.

As an astute historian, Toyin Falola through a revisionist template contended that violence in Nigeria is not a 'new phenomena' as earlier (colonial) literature, which highlights conflicts/instability with the solution of narratives of 'accommodation', would want us to believe, but based on religious identity politics. Extant literature on political violence in Nigeria from 1960s seems to be represented along the lines of control for the nation's resources (both nationally and internationally) but expressed primarily through ethno-religious identity, as identity is considered critical to determining allocation of resources (Nnoli 1988; Diamond 1988; Adebani 2004; Kalejaiye and Aliyu 2013). Not surprisingly, the 1970's and 80's which was Nigeria's second republic (also anchored on military rule) witnessed the rise of extreme religious groups like the Maitaisine, the Yan Izala, Dawa Group, the Muslim Brotherhood and many others in the northern part of the country (Adesoji 2010). While other militant groups like the MEND and OPC sprung up in the southern part. To highlight the Maitaisine uprising in the North, for instance, Adesoji (2010) and Tilde (2012) argue that the Boko Haram's ontology could be located in that of the Maitaisine. The Maitaisine uprising, as it is referred to, was a violent uprising that was said to be responsible for the deaths of an un-estimated number of Nigerians and almost like the civil war, in terms of duration, it lasted from 1980 to 1985 with pockets of violent uprising in Kano (1980), Kaduna and Bulumkutu (1982), Yola (1984) and Bauchi (1985) regions. The leader of the movement advanced criticisms of corruption, inequalities and the likes against the Nigerian government, which he posits as capitalist and westernized (Forest 2012). Agbigboa (2010) and others while acknowledging some similarities ranging from religious identity, narratives and geographical locations, have however debunked any explicit link of the Boko Haram group to the Maitaisine's. This is because groups with similar narratives and identity are a common feature of the Nigerian political landscape.

To this end, there are ample study on how identities are constructed and mobilized along ethno-religious fault lines in Nigeria (Brown 2003; Younis, Mcllenan and Yates 1999; Ikelegbe 2005; Coakley 2002 and Blanco-Mancilla 2002). In Blanco-Mancilla (2002:4) seminal study of

Kaduna state, for instance, Nigeria is regarded as the 'most deeply divided state in Africa' due to complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability'. He portends that in Northern Nigeria, religion is the mainstay of identity as it defines how individuals perceive of themselves, others and the world. Boundaries are thus created in social interaction as religion determines whether an individual is part of a social group or not. Furthermore, they assert that religion "acts both as a strong identity and bond to a social group and as a tool to legitimize power". The argument of Blanco-Mancilla like many others, however, seems to underwrite itself by first acknowledging divergent ethno-religious identities in the country and at the same time using one state (Kaduna) to represent the entire country. Also, the fact that both Christianity and Islam practised in the state are not monolithic is not recognised.

Prior to the 1990s, the literature was focused on understanding 'conflicts', 'uprisings', 'revolts', 'civil war', 'crisis', 'instability' and/or 'clashes'. However, the late 1990s heralded a new development in literature and discussions about endemic corruption of the political elites or the apparent lack of capacity of the Nigerian state, as other African states, in matters of administration and governance began to evolve (Ikelegbe 1999; 2001; Abutudu 1995; Olukoshi 1996; Herbst 2004). To push this even further, some scholars in this school have argued that the entity called Nigeria is only a myth of the Whiteman, arguing that the continued fragile polity of the country is as a result of the union of disparate peoples and cultures who have no common heritage or history. Citing the already established different kingdoms of the Hausa-Fulani, Oyo and others, prior to the advent of Britain in the 19th and 20th centuries Kyari (1994) contends that Nigeria is a forceful fusion of disparate peoples and cultures and could never be regarded as an entity. For scholars like Jerven (2009) and Decker (2008: 605) in this school of thought, the neo-colonial system in Nigeria ensures Nigeria remains within its orbit as an economic and political satellite by institutionalizing composite laws that are meant to safeguard the self-interest of Britain, USA, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Holland in Nigeria. According to Decker (2008: 605), the British neo-colonial system in Nigeria 'ensures Nigeria remains within its orbit as an economic and political satellite' by institutionalizing certain laws that are meant to safeguard the self-interest of Britain in Nigeria. For instance, the almost endless political violence which the Niger Delta in

Nigeria has continued to experience has its root in the foreign control of the petroleum reserves. Prior to the independence of Nigeria, the British Petroleum and the Royal Dutch Shell has monopoly of the oil industry and control the production, distribution and marketing of the product (Uche 2008). After independence, though ownership was transferred to Nigeria, not so much changed as only multinational oil companies from countries like Britain, the USA, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Holland were granted exploration rights. Moreover, tax laws that are composite in nature like the Income Tax Act (No 22 of 1961) were put in place to grant fiscal concessions and tax reliefs to these companies (Attah 2013). These forms of control were not limited to the petroleum industry but are observable features of all key sectors of the economy (Jerven 2009).

Political Violence in Nigeria Post-September 2001

In recent scholarship, Nigeria, like most other African states, has been described variously by scholars and policy documents/makers as 'weak', 'fragile' and/or 'failing' and disparate political violence (like Boko Haram, Ansaru and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)) rooted in the history of the state became understood as 'terrorism' (Agbiboa 2009; 2011; Solomon 2015). For scholars like Gaibullov and Sandler (2011), Benjamin, Ayo, Ufo and Hakeem (2012) and Afoaku (2017), terrorism in Nigeria is intrinsically connected to the failed states template. For Ayo, Ufo and Hakeem (2012) and others who obviously have given less consideration to the questions: what is terrorism? Who defines it? Why is Nigeria discussing terrorism now? And what implications, if any, does the terrorism discourse have on the peoples of Nigeria? are rather swift to highlight either the extreme poverty being experienced by the Northern part of Nigeria, lack of basic human rights, corrupt political elite, or the pluralism of the Nigerian society as the cause(s) of the Boko Haram uprising and almost in the same breath offer a rather naïve and simplistic solution to the complex problem. More often than not these group of scholars hypothesize that the acute prevalence of violent groups in the Nigerian state is the result of factors like untamed corruption, poverty, gross abuse of human rights and coercion. Some others have located the violent reality of the state either within the template of the 'greed' of its political elites and/or the overtly dependence of the country on primary commodity like oil thereby giving rise to arguments on 'oil wars' or 'resource curse' (Adebanwi 2011; Agbiboa 2013; Solomon 2015; Adesoji 2011; Freedom 2010); Some others

like Adebayo et. al (2012) and Onapajo and Uzodike (2012) contend that the prevalence of corruption of the political elites (since the independence of the country) which is in sharp contrast to the spirit of democracy explains why 'religion' and 'ethnic' cleavages have become so politicised in such a way that violent groups like Boko Haram were organised for political ends like the winning of elections. According to Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:31) "Nigeria typifies a good example of a failing or weak state that is fast gravitating towards a failed or collapsed state like Somalia and others". They contend that David Rapport's 'four waves' of terrorism proves useful in understanding the emergence of the group. Like many other scholars of this school of thought, the question of why the discourse of failed/fragile states and terrorism is now considered useful in understanding the reality of the Nigerian state considering that political violence has been recurrent since the country's independence is never asked? Moreover, the idea of Islamic revivalism as proposed by David Rapoport has not put into proper perspective the fact that Islam like many other major religions of the world is not monolithic and so subject to varied interpretations. The overriding concern here has been to identify the root causes of Boko Haram and other groups' violence rather than an attempt at understanding the construction that enabled such practices as 'corruption', 'weakness' and/or 'terrorism'.

These strands of literature which obviously evolve after the re-emergence of the 'good governance' concept of the 1990's and became dominant after the September 11, 2001 event reveal the prevalence of politics in the articulation of discursive structure. Interestingly, no known publication has argued against the use of the label 'terrorism' in understanding the violence of Boko Haram (and others). As a discursive construct by deconstructing the discursive structure positioned as objective, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in knowledge. As this thesis argues, this is as a result of hegemonic intervention which explicates the coupling together of two hitherto conceptually contested and analytically invalid terms: 'state failure' and 'terrorism'.

Conclusion

This chapter has engaged literatures relevant to the understanding of political violence in Africa generally and Nigeria specifically. It does so in order to provide a context for the

emergence of the discourse of terrorism in post-September 2001. The Chapter is divided into two broad sections with two subheadings under each section. The first section focused on understanding dominant arguments on political violence in Africa both before and after the emergence of the discourse of terrorism. This effort is undertaken because the dominant logic of political violence in Nigeria as represented in literature often reflect some wider happenings in Africa. The section could therefore serve as a background to understanding the literature on political violence in Nigeria. The second section therefore reviewed literature on political violence in Nigeria both before and after September 2001. Prior to the event of September 2001, the understanding of political violence in Africa has often warranted a state-centric lens which was either about the import of colonial heritage which is somewhat close to Mamdani's argument of 'decentralized nepotism' or the failure/weakness of the state in matters of governance. Reviewing dominant arguments about political violence in Africa/Nigeria this way therefore helps to capture not only the history of certain violence but also how understanding about such violence changed after the September 2001 event.

In this light, the chapter has highlighted the dominant themes in literature on understanding political violence in Africa from the Cold War to the present as inherently linked to the functioning or otherwise of states in the continent. The chapter argues that political violence is not a new phenomenon in the continent as well as Nigeria. However, the representation of the violence has often been linked to the 'weakness' or 'failure' of states from the Cold War to the present. While this is not intended to function as a denial of the role state agents play in the prevalence of violence as is the case in Nigeria, the labelling of terrorists in post-September 2001 works to blur the history of violence by silencing the role of structures through which such violence is produced. The state failure thesis for instance while accounting for the role of local state agents silenced the complicities of the Cold War. Moreover, the emergence of the terrorism discourse in Nigeria particularly points to the need to universalize the GWOT rather than the existence of actual terrorists in Nigeria.

Chapter 5: Constructing the Terrorist Threat: From the Cold War to the Present

“Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress” (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006)

Introduction

This chapter attempts to show how the U.S foreign policy, as a discursive site, enables the constructions of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria. Rather than being a momentous event which rewrites the understanding of political violence in Nigeria, the event of 9/11 only represents a continuity of earlier constructions of Africa, especially from the 1970s. By initiating discursive moves around distant events such that the meaning of ‘crisis’ did not only remain elusive but also posits Africa as a site of permanent disorder and anarchy. The construction of the terrorist threat after September 2001 represents a continuity of earlier constructions of ‘instability’ from the 1970s, the period of the Cold War. These sorts of constructions are not products of self-evident objective realities themselves rather they are often signalled by the subjective interpretation of distant events as ‘crisis’ which warrants a ‘shift’ or change in policy strategies and engagements. The (re)conceptualization of material events as open referents to mean a crisis by agents helps to weaken hitherto dominant discourses and reify other discourses thereby constituting such as ‘focusing events’ (Birkland 2004: 335). By arguing that interpretation of events as crises are not necessarily a product of the material reality of such events but rather that of discursive construction by agents, Widmaier (2007: 779-780), highlighted instances of these in U.S foreign policy as transitioning from an ‘exceptionalist isolationism’ prior to the World war II to an “internationalist” stance during the Cold War. Again the discourse was transitioned to an isolationist views prior to the

War on Terror as exemplified by the case of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo and by September 2001 it became more of an internationalist stance. The interaction of the United States with West Africa and particularly Nigeria is suggested in literature to be dated as far back as the pre-Columbian era (Ate 1987). However, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the colonization of Liberia, a West African nation (in 1822), represent the defining history of the U.S relations with the sub-continent. In the words of Oyebade and Falola (2008:18) 'The shipment of several million Africans, mostly from West Africa, across the Atlantic to the New World represented the largest forced migration in human history...' Most scholars conclude that not long after the abolition of slave trade, US interest in West Africa became particularly isolationist except for their continual dominance of Liberia, their ex-colony (Flint 1976). Apart from the slave trade, the US has a long history of intervention in North Africa (the region that now play host to most of the terrorists' organizations in Africa). This could be dated from the 19th century, 1st and 2nd Barbary Wars to the World Wars. The 2nd World War particularly and the Cold War signals the US military intervention in Africa when wars were fought by proxies with the U.S either maintaining a 'paradoxical policy of espousing self-determination and decolonization while supporting the European colonial powers' during the 2nd world war or funding violent groups against the government or vice versa during the Cold War (Akinwande 2014: 110; Ewoh 2008).

The representation of Nigeria in mainstream literature is that, unlike most other African states, Nigeria won its independence on 1st October 1960, without apparent political violence. While this might prove true to the extent that 'the dynamics of independence' in Nigeria did not warrant any major political violence, it remains however that there were evidences of pockets of riots/resistances (throughout the country) relating to the Cold War and the structure being put in place during decolonisation (Events in Lagos 1976; FRUS 1950; Adebajo 2010; Falola 1999). The discourses of 'danger' (Campbell 1999:171) like AIDS, and terrorism which have come to signal 'general sign of anarchy' became transitioned to state-centric' crises of the 1990s after the Cold War ended. Hence, the shift of the GWOT into Africa has often been represented in mainstream literature as not only necessary but also justified for pragmatic reasons like the 'security' of the U.S. As the end of the Cold War also signals the end of bi-polarity in the U.S Foreign relations, the state failure thesis came to replace the

Cold War bi-polar relations with the rest of the world (Devetak 2008). The construction of 'crisis' of terrorism in Africa was enabled by the state failure policy strategy. The construction works to normalize and naturalize the counter terrorism focus of state agents both locally and internationally. The justification for Africa's integration into the GWOT therefore explains how the 'I/We' versus 'them/theirs' of the terrorism discourse became represented in Nigeria particularly and Africa generally. As Jourde (2006:183) asserts that:

How a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. In sum, the way one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other' delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with the 'other'.

The aim of this chapter is to show how U.S foreign policy towards Africa became constructed to signal, 'anarchy', 'danger', and 'threat' as continuities from the Cold War, especially the 1970s to the present. The change in discourse after September 2001 is however signalled from the 'crisis' in Africa being a marginal issue as the continent and its issues were only discussed alongside other issues prior to 9/11, the 'crisis' of September 2001 in Africa became transitioned to a discursive moment. Thus, this representation changed *how* the continent is being talked about but not what is being said. This will serve as a context for understanding the construction of the counter terrorist state in Chapter 7 and how the Othering process of the terrorists i.e. Boko Haram in the wake of the 9/11 signals a continuity of earlier discourse (in Chapter 8).

The main argument of the chapter is that though scholars have often highlighted the end of the Cold War as being the end of bi-polarity, the inherent nature of the discourse of terrorism in the wake of 9/11 signals a continuation of the binary division of the world into order versus disorder with the U.S positioned as the 'center'. In order to effectively bring home the argument of this chapter, the chapter will be divided into three subheadings: one is Articulating Crisis of Africa: From the 1970s to the 1980s. This section aims to show how the period of the Cold War particularly, from the 1970s to the 1980s, the articulation of 'crisis' through the signification of 'instability' and 'development' became woven around the Southern Question. This creates a space to talk about the narratives of the Cold War by

silencing the role of the United States. The second subheading: Articulating Crisis of State Failure: from the 1990s to the early 2000s examined the continuities and changes of U.S policy towards Africa during this period. It shows that rather being a material 'reality', the dominant theme of 'instability' which helps to justify the concern of the United States' national security was transitioned from earlier years. The third subheading: Articulating Crisis of Terrorism: Post September 2001 examines how the 'crisis' of terrorism become construction and what this means. It highlights how rather than the focus on the Horn of Africa in articulating the 'crisis' of state failure, the articulation of the 'crisis' of terrorism helps to integrate the whole of Africa through an whole-of-government approach.

Articulating Crisis of Africa: From the 1970s to 1980s

The main thrust of the U.S administrations from the 1950s to the 1970s was the need to ensure a pro-U.S or Western-oriented Africa. This was conceived differently by different administrations; from Eisenhower (1950s) to Carter (1970s), for instance, the discourse was about Africa as a periphery region with varying levels of significance to U.S interests in policy terms. One of the early practices enabled by this discourse was the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs within the State Department in 1958 as recommended by the Nixon Administration. Prior to the Eisenhower presidency, the heightened concern over the “psychological warfare” of the Soviet occasioned Truman’s authorization of ‘peacetime covert action operations’ through the new National Security Council and necessitated the development of the U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy in 1962:

*A military interest in assuring that strategic areas and the manpower and natural resources **of developing nations do not fall under communist control**; that these nations remain able to maintain effectively their internal security and **to preserve independence from communist control**.*

The context of the Cold War and the decolonization of Africa therefore serve as background to the normative understanding of Africa by state agents prior to the 1970s. The relevance or otherwise of Africa, and of course, Nigeria, in policy terms are in line with the U.S internationalist stance during the Cold War and the adoption of policy of containment during the Cold War (Gourevitch 1986; Ikenberry 2001). Thus, the linkage of the military to political and economic issues in Africa became warranted since the continent began struggling for its independence from colonialism. However, in the 1970s, especially from the Presidency of Gerald Ford (1974-1977) to that of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), the construction of Africa generally and Nigeria in particular, as a site of danger was signalled through the interpretation of certain domestic events as *crises* through policy instruments. Unlike conventional wisdom, in the materialist school of thought which opines that states interests, and of course, their foreign policy is exogenously given (Krasner 1978; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981), it is the interpretation of such events by certain agents that help to fix the meaning of such events (Weldes 1999; Keynes 1937; Widmaier 2007; Doty 1993). As far as the U.S and

Africa is concerned; the latter is always considered to be at the margin of the former's foreign policy and as such issues about the continent are bipartisan and opened to less debate and rigorous considerations (Schraeder 1995; Olsen 2017). In the words of Skinner (1986: 43), "America's military and strategic interests in Africa would scarcely have merited a paragraph in anything other than an ambitious naval officer's dream book". Often the reduction in budgetary allocation to the continent was highlighted as the referent which signals the diminished interest of the U.S in Africa (Schroeder 1994; Taylor 2004). The relative decline of America's military and economic might during/after the Cold War, however, could explain why funds earlier budgeted for pro-West countries and non-state actors witnessed some significant cutback. It is rather this decline in American strength that help to construct and justify the importance of revolutions in African states to the U.S security especially from the 1970s (Rothchild 1983; Clough 1992). The marginality of Africa then could be argued as based on a fixated stereotyping drawn from earlier colonial discourses. Considering the Cold War context and America's policy of containment, it remains that countries like Nigeria that have adopted a seemingly neutral disposition and policy towards both power blocs have to be kept under some other forms of 'tutelage'. This was stated explicitly as the reasons for aids and other economic relations (FRUS 1960). Of importance here is that the application of the idea of trusteeship analogous to that of the League of Nations where nations are under 'tutelage' and 'modernized' became incompatible with the British principle of self-governance and underscores the reason why the United States, amidst other international actors such as Denmark, Syria, Uruguay and Thailand as the members of the committee of the International Court of Justice, a principal judicial organ of the United Nations, championed the deliberate fusion of the principles of self-government and good governance⁵ which had hitherto been at parallel (Thornton 1999)⁶. Particularly in the 1970s and 80s, this justified the

⁵ Note that this concept has a long colonial history (Hewitt 2009)

⁶ For instance, in the decades prior to independence, the meaning of 'good governance', which initially signals the superiority of Britain ruling class over others especially the colonies and justifies their economic interests and policies, was later transitioned to mean 'westernization' and 'modernization' through a radical social and economic change of the colonies. This change meant a complete fusion of the seemingly parallel concepts of good governance and that of self-governance. This historic feat originated from and was achieved through the U.S as one of the strongest international force (Thornton 1999; Rostow 1990)

U.S support for colonial legacy in the Southern Question i.e. the 'crisis' of Angola, Namibia, and South Africa itself, and the preservation of its economic interests in the Horn of Africa as well as West Africa. The construction of crisis premised on 'conflicts' and 'instability' of the 'third world' necessitated a policy response through which modernization of these countries become the panacea for ensuring peace:

*The Continent **still faces grave problems.** The imbalances of economies and institutions once under full external control are only too evident today. Arbitrary boundaries drawn in European chancelleries left many African countries vulnerable to **tribal strife**; and no-where is the task of **nation-building** more taxing. Not least, Africans face the formidable task of strengthening their sense of identity and preserving **traditional culture as their societies make the transition to modernity.** We have learned that there are no panaceas for **African development...** (Peace Strategy for the 1970's)*

***Africa is the latest, the last, and will be, perhaps, the worst area of instability and conflict** resulting from the end of the European colonial empires, a process which began immediately after World War II and which has seen the withdrawal of the British, French, Dutch, Belgians, and Portuguese from the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece and Cyprus), the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, and South East Asia. These withdrawals involved conflicts between the colonial power and indigenous nationalist groups, between contending indigenous groups, and between **outside powers and forces attempting to fill the vacuum** (FRUS 1977-1980).*

As a discursive move, the articulation of the crisis of development is initiated through the enduring colonial discourse which positions Africa as site of lingering problems. The problems of instability and strife in the continent became implicitly articulated in terms of the lack of capacity of Africans for self-governance as the vacuum left by former colonialists' remains. This background helps to link together the case for nation-building and the Southern Question while effectively silencing the role of the Cold War. The interpretation by state agents of the Southern Question as crisis of the third world in the 1970s and 1980s was at the heart of U.S policy strategies that seek to avoid the unpopularity of its involvement in Vietnam while ensuring a pro-colonial stance in Africa. It thus follows that by highlighting development, re-engineering the architecture of the nation/state to suit the interest of the U.S becomes justified. The

signification of **under/development** as linked to **tribal strife, conflicts and instability** **thus** represents a departure from earlier administration and highlights a discursive move through which the narrative of the 'danger' posed by Africa to the U.S became understood and justified. It however goes without saying that **development** is held as an ideal typical construct through the binary division of the 'periphery' and the 'centre' (Amin 1974; Bayart 1993). The resultant effect of this is giving an "analytical value and universal status" to concepts such as "development", "modern", "industrial" and "capitalist" (Mamdani 1996:9). Rather than as differential values, it constructs the U.S as a rigid 'center' through which the concept could be measured. Through this dichotomizing system, the necessity of 'intervention' became fixed as 'humanitarian' efforts at state/nation⁷ building. This distinction seems to presume as a universal category the theory of state autonomy through deliberate exclusions. However, as Chandler (2006) has already contended that state building is a highly political process. This means that even if taken as truly distinct categories, state building involves relations of subordination which constructs the 'the West' as the subject and seeks to transform other states accordingly. It is thus interesting that through a stereotypical fixation of Africa, the Southern Question is articulated not in terms of U.S-Cuban rivalry in Angola or the control of majority of resources by the minority white settlers in South Africa but in terms of development. The production of (under)development as argued by Abrahamsen (2000:14) is both 'culturally and historically contingent' and highlights the discursive formation of subjects and objects and how the knowledge produced enabled certain practices which help to 'manage' the continent as a unified whole.

Again, not only is the meaning of development elusive but its construction as a crisis by policy makers creates the space for the narrative of state/nation-building. The crisis of

⁷ Of note here is that this is linked to the modernisation theories of 1950's and 1960's where the two principal agents of the Cold War, the US and USSR, employ nation-building as a strategy to broaden their influence and therefore curtail that of their enemy (Dinnen 2006; Hippler 2004; Hewitt 2009). Since nation-building at this time falls within the domain of development, to achieve this feat, nation-building was not only equated with state-building but also development became linked to security (Duffield 2005).

underdevelopment as articulated then hinges on the **vacuum** that the withdrawal of former colonizers brought about and as a result the U.S has one of three options:

The end of the European presence creates vacuums which can be filled in one or more of three ways: (a) by indigenous nationalist forces (as in India under Nehru or Egypt under Nasser); (b) by U.S. influence (Greece in 1947, Iran in 1954); (c) by Soviet influence or communist forces (Indochina; Indonesia in the 1960s) (FRUS 1977-1980).

One apparent presupposition drawn from the eighteenth century Scramble for Africa is the construction of Africa's 'openness' to colonial exploitation (Pratt 1992). In the 1970s and 80s this presupposition however works by co-opting African leaders like "Muhammed and his co-plotter and now deputy, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo" who "are the most militant of Nigerian military leaders on **the Southern African question**" to ensure that a "**Pan African jihad for liberation**" did not evolve (Documents on Africa, 1975). Paradoxically, the 1970s represents the decade of Nigeria's economic prosperity, the U.S increasing need of Nigeria's oil as well as the Nigeria's support for MPLA and other indigenous liberation movements in Africa. The non-alignment policy adopted by Nigeria to either of the power bloc of the Cold War signals a threatening other to the hegemony of the U.S. This was considered 'dangerous', 'retrogressive' and 'destructive' in view of their space as 'open' to Soviet expansion (McKay 1956). The inclusion of Nigeria in the Southern Question therefore helps to ensure that west Africa which has been hitherto left out of the 'crisis' (except for Liberia in the late 1980s) became part of the discourse. On the whole, by the 1980s articulating the crisis of development in the continent as fundamentally linked to the Southern Question necessitated the use of state institutions and/or agents to suppress liberation movements:

*Nigeria's inclusion in the Southern African equation is the only way that some **discipline** can be brought to bear on the liberation movements. Nigeria provides the "cash" for much of the armed struggle (Soviets supply guns) and also has extended loans to Mozambique and Angola...Nigeria is increasingly disturbed about the liberation leaders traveling around the world "playing president" and neglecting their people's needs. Nigeria is interested in the leadership being assumed by Africans not Cubans, Soviets or Chinese. **They want closer U.S. ties** and a joint economic commission similar to those we have with Egypt, Israel and Iran (FRUS 1977)*

Co-opting 'friendly' African leaders for the purposes of containing the spread of communism thus meant that local initiatives and struggles were supported or resisted depending on the reading of their activities as either open to the 'manoeuvre' of the U.S or that of the Communist Bloc. An interesting perspective to this East-West divide is that by the 1980's, the U.S and its allies shifted the meaning of terrorism to be political violence organized by or in support of the Communist; thus counterterrorism became constructed as 'war'. The implication of this involves the suspension of the legal process and even the human rights of those so named. (Stampnitzky 2013; Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Jackson2005). This shift in the meaning of political violence was reflected more in the Horn of Africa, where terrorism was not just applied to nationalist struggles but was also used by opposing factions in the region to refer to each other (Huband 2001).

Moreover, in the 1980's, the Reagan administration reconsidered the policy strategy of earlier administrations towards the "Third World". Thus, the narratives were changed from the insignificance of periphery regions to the global dominance of the U.S (except as viable sources of natural resources) to places of serious source of insecurity due to their revolutions. The Reagan administration shifted the focus to winning the confidence of their friends and allies by its involvement in the "Third World" as "the short war fallacy" narrative (Annual Report 1983:16) has gradually been changed to that of a conventional long war. The policy was therefore focused on the growth of American military and economic strength as the so-called periphery countries became central to American's foreign policy. Hence, it became all the more important to ensure revolutions and nationalist movements in Africa are resisted/contained so that these countries do not become hijacked by America's enemies (Oye 1983). In West Africa, the implementation of this policy strategy was made possible through Liberia for obvious historical reasons. The U.S partnered with Samuel Doe, a military autocrat in Liberia who supported U.S anti-Libyan policies and intervention in Angola and helped to smuggle arms to the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). The support by the U.S for South African military intervention in Angola through UNITA for instance led to the friction in the Nigeria-U.S bilateral relations as Nigeria through its policies and leadership in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) influenced most African countries to support the Movimento Popular da Libertaçã de Angola (MPLA) and condemn the military

involvement of the U.S and South Africa in Angola. According to Adebajo (2004:35), 'In an era of Cold War, America's strategic interests in Liberia appeared more important to Washington than niceties about human rights and democracy. The Reagan administration sank over \$500 million into Liberia in the 1980s'. By the end of the 1980s therefore the narratives of underdevelopment as fundamentally linked to 'instability' and 'conflicts' in Africa became replaced with the 'crisis' of state failure of the 1990s.

Articulating Crisis of State Failure: from the 1990s to early 2000s

The late 1980s and 1990s heralded the 'crisis' of state failure and the struggle for adequate conceptualization. According to Wyler (2008:5):

*Failed states have appeared as a matter of **concern** in U.S National Security Strategy documents since 1998, though the term had long been the topic of significant academic debate and implicitly informed U.S national security policy since at least the end of World War II*

The **concern** for state failure therefore following the Cold War highlights how through the discursive construction of crisis several U.S peace keeping initiatives and/or agencies in Africa like President's Clinton's 1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (the Kampala Document) (CSSDCA) in the 1990s championed by Nigeria's former president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, constructs the need for state-building through focus on police, military and a productive workforce. An important sign that became dominant in the 1990s then was the need for 'stability' in African states which became a function of the Department of Defense and the U.S stabilization efforts became also partly funded by the Department of Defense. As a result of this, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, for instance, ensures that funds of \$100 million were made available through Congress for 'reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country' (CRS, August 28, 2008). A theme which signals continuity in the foreign policy of the U.S towards Africa then from the 1970s to the present is 'instability' and 'conflicts'. As Lawson (2007) argues that while the concern of the U.S has been about security, it is less about the security of Africa and more about the security of the U.S itself. 'Instability' was however articulated based on two developments: One, the weakness of state infrastructure as in Ivory Coast and Liberia or utter collapse as in Somalia.

The second, which is also closely linked to the first was the articulation of the rising trend of 'international terrorism' in the continent as signalled by the killing of 18 U.S soldiers in 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia during peace-keeping operations and the bombing of U.S embassies in Dares Salam and Nairobi both in 1998 which recorded about 200 deaths. By the end of the state failure 'crisis' of the 1990s, the killing of the soldiers signalled a change in the policy directive of the U.S as the U.S withdrew its troop through a policy of disengagement and reconsidered its criteria for financial support to the continent. This is owing to the sharp criticisms which has followed their involvement in the continent. One strong point often highlighted as the reason for the sharp withdrawal of the U.S' support to the continent was its failure in Somalia (Woodward 2013). The heavy criticisms that has followed the operations of the U.S in Somalia after the latter's implosion in the 1990s meant that even during the massive genocide in Rwanda, the U.S has remained largely uninvolved (Frazer 2017). In Nigeria, the effect of this shift in meaning was later reflected by the labelling of the activities of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) as terrorists by the Clinton Administration without an actual proscription (Department of State, 2000). The struggles of the group against soil and water degradation by multinational oil companies especially the Royal Dutch company which has caused untold sufferings of the Ogoni People whose major source of livelihood is the water was therefore clamped down by the federal government of Nigeria in favour of the interests of the foreign investors (Ekeh 1990; Falola 1999).

Articulating the 'crisis' of state failure in Africa from these two stand points as warranting conditions through the dominant sign 'instability' works by a continuity of the narratives of development. According to Christie (2012:55), though with reference to Afghanistan, 'this logic requires the coordination of the range of international actors, with the result that military operations, diplomatic activity, and development programs are now approached as an integrated whole'. This means that articulating development in this sense, especially in the 1990s, produces an envisioning of development based on militarism. Hence, while development as a sign during the 1970s and 1980s was connected to instability and the Southern Question, the narratives of development in the 1990s was explicitly connected to the 'security' of the U.S interests in the continent:

Persistent conflict and continuing political instability in some African countries remain chronic obstacles to Africa's development and to U.S. interests there, including unhampered access to oil and other vital natural resources (National Security Strategy 1998).

While economic interest of the U.S was also at the heart of the Southern Question of the 1970s, as evidenced by the fact that Nigeria was “the largest exporter of oil to the US,” and “has considerable leverage over” the U.S in 1973 (Department of State, 1975), the ‘security’ of the U.S was not constructed as threatened until the 1990s. Hence the ‘crisis’ of the 1970s and 1980s was about the continent’s openness to the manipulations of world powers while that of the 1990s was about its capacity to directly threaten the U.S. One could argue that President’s Bush’s vision of a New World Order where the rule of law, peace and justice triumphs over ‘chaos’ and ‘the law of the jungle’ (Bush 1990) would mean a utopian vision of peace especially in regions like Africa where political violence has been prevalent as he asserts:

Institution-building, economic development, and regional peace are the goals of our policy in Africa. The global trends of democracy must come to Africa too... Africa is a major contributor to the world supply of raw materials and minerals and a region of enormous human potential (National Security strategy 1990).

As a result, in spite of the U.S initial hesitancy in its involvement in places like Somalia for instance, it became the highest donor of financial and human resources to the country through Africa Union Peace-keeping Operations (AMISOM) (Patman 2008). The explicit linkage of development through state-building in Africa to the U.S security was to identify “lower-order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking [which] are menacing the United States, its citizenry, and its interests in **new** ways” (National Security strategy 1991) and “support **friends** and **allies** to improve their self-defence capabilities in order to deter and defend against regional aggressors, and continue to maintain and improve our crisis response capabilities” (National Security Strategy 1993).

Thus the interpretation of state failure as ‘crisis’ which warrants a policy reorientation was not a natural self-evident truth as occasioned by the material events of political violence in these states but a deliberate identification and linkage of these as connected to the security

of the United States. According to Baker-Beall (2014), though in the context of the European Council, such linkage functions not only to collapse the 'local' and 'global' but also to identify 'new' trends of terrorism. Like the European Council's construction of the "fight against terrorism" as argued by Baker-Beall (2009; 2014), the articulation of 'crisis' of the state failure demands the construction of an *'ever more lethal environment' which 'exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones'*. Hence *"forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements"* becomes *"key to confronting these emerging transnational threats"* (National Security Strategy 2002). As the Horn of Africa where these threats to the U.S have been are predominantly Muslim countries, the threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism' becomes constructed as 'the single most worrisome trend for policy makers' (Clough 1992: 2) especially during the Clinton Administration. As a result of this concern, US officials fears were expressed during interviews in January, 1992, that countries like Sudan 'might become a base for exporting Islamic revolution across Africa' (Copson 1995). This explains why a 'retaliatory attack' was carried out by the Clinton Administration against a pharmaceutical company in Khartoum, Sudan which the administration believed to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda. These moves therefore define for the U.S and Africa a **new era** of the crisis of terrorism in the continent.

Articulating Crisis of Terrorism: Post September 2001

The attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 was articulated in the National Security Strategy (2002) as a threat by 'failing' states on the United States as against 'conquering' states which has hitherto threatened the U.S. The reframing of the attacks as 'war' rather criminal acts fuelled by rage and vengeance and focus on state failure rather than individuals who perpetuated the acts helps interpret ongoing local issues in Africa as 'terrorism' as thus a 'crisis' in policy terms. As has been argued by various scholars, the event of September 2001 could have been framed and understood differently other than 'war' (Jackson 2005; Van Veeren 2011). The shift in policy narratives to construct the event as crisis helps to articulate a space where it becomes possible to continue the discourse of 'instability' 'threat' and 'danger' beyond the state to other areas. This is signified by the establishment of Africom in 2007. As asserted by General Bantz Craddock, the Commander of EUCOM, in 2006

that the “the greatest security stability challenge” to EUCOM was posted by Africa and that “a separate command for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement” (Ploch,2014:5). The establishment of Africom as a policy initiative of President George W. Bush on February 6th 2007 signalled the nexus between state failure, democracy, health, economy and terrorism in Africa and the continuation of the discourse of threat and danger after the Cold War.

While the ‘crisis’ of state failure in the 1990s was more focused on the Horn of Africa, the establishment of Africom with its base in ten⁸ African countries, including Nigeria, shifted the focus to the rest of Africa and help to fix as a moment the coupling together of ‘instability’ and the lack of governance and/or democracy. As President Barack Obama asserts in March 2013:

*...because **extremists thrive in chaos**. They thrive in failed states. **They thrive in power vacuums**. They don’t have much to offer when it comes to actually building things, but they’re very good about exploiting **situations that are no longer functioning**. They fill that gap.*

Also this logic was reiterated in the 9/11 Commission Report:

*The United States faces a sudden **crisis** and summons a tremendous exertion of national energy...Terrorists organisations have fled to some of **the least governed, most lawless places in the world**.*

“**Ungoverned spaces**” are identified by the State Department (2006) as “acute risk” to the ‘national security of the U.S’ and defined as “physical or non-physical area(s) where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control”. This means that apart from both possible land mass where government effective control might be lacking, other ‘non-physical’ areas like the lack of effective democracies as signalled by institutional strength could become ‘grounds’ where terrorists ‘breed’. To do this effectively, while there was no significant change in the policy formulation and orientation from Presidents Clinton to Obama, the discourse of development which had been modified before now to accommodate the discipline of democracy in Africa (Abrahamsen 2000; 2004) become fixed such that in the

⁸ These countries are Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, Algeria and Chad

wake of the GWOT, to not only make development synonymous with militarization and/or counterterrorism for ordering purposes but also to natural and normalize it. The seeming appeal to universal democratic values, entrenched in policy documents, in the GWOT in Africa would only serve to captivate but as Rist (2014:1) has asserted that the discourse of development exists 'to charm, to please, to fascinate, to set dreaming, but also to abuse, to turn away from the truth, to deceive'. Moreover, in the wake of the GWOT, not only are the polemics of development bereft of principles and/or social values congruent to the individual context of countries in Africa (Chomsky 2006; Call 2008), according to Boggs (2003:3), the pretext has contributed to the "unparalleled military domination over the world's landmasses, sea lanes, and air spaces, with great aspirations toward colonization of outer space". Whether or not the militarization of democracy in Nigeria and Africa generally exists, through the counterterrorism mission of Africom to serve "America's Imperial Grand Strategy" or not as alluded by Noam Chomsky, it remains that the articulation by the United States of "...principles of democracy and human rights, [to expand] economic opportunity, [and to] support those who seek peace where war and deprivation have plagued communities" (U.S STSSA 2012:3)) exemplifies a seeming need for evolving 'African solutions to African problems' through several security assistance and peace-keeping operations to ensure order.

Thus while the linking of economic issues to a weak state represents some continuities from the Cold War especially the 1990s, the discourse changed through the broadening of agendas under initiatives like AFRICOM and the Global Peace Initiatives to include health and other aspects of democracy. This discursive move to incorporate the whole of Africa highlights the new significance in U.S foreign policy that Africa has now gained. Rather than 'sporadic' and 'reactionary' policy strategies that has hitherto characterized U.S-Africa policy, Africa thus becomes a "high priority" because the U.S "security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies" (National Security Strategy 2006). This shift from a supposed marginality often expressed by U.S officials and agencies like the Department of Defense articulates a new era which legitimates militaristic ventures as 'war' by state agents on their citizens. As Ayittey (2004: 67) argued that African governments "needed their troops to crush

their own people's aspirations for freedom at home". It is established in literature that a seeming 'postcolonial anxiety' (Krishna 1999) makes military a symmetry of the state (Luckham 1994) and more often than not, military gained some legitimacy through the ability to repress resistance movements in postcolonial states (Chenoy 2002). The identification and elimination of terrorists/terrorism therefore become a defining priority both for the U.S and states like Nigeria that have **friends** and **allies** of the U.S. According to Ploch (2014:18), "under this overarching strategy, U.S. programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies". From the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to the (Combined) Joint Task Force, both the military and civilian architectures were funded and trained to effectively fight the 'plague' of terrorism in Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the discursive construction of 'crisis' in Africa through the U.S policy documents. It has attempted to show how rather than the material reality of Africa as a site of 'danger', 'threat' or 'anarchy' to the U.S 'security', it is the subjective interpretation of issues by state agents which serve as warranting conditions for such 'crisis' constructions. Articulating the terrorist threat after September 2001, therefore, works by drawing from earlier discursive constructs of Africa especially from the 1970s. The possibility of such constructions is premised on an enduring 'colonial mind set' which posits Africa as a site 'open' to colonial exploitation and manipulation. The terrorist threat then did not just 'emerge' and thus demand a 'new' way of understanding political violence, it is a product of some continuities and changes through which Africa shifted from supposed marginality to being a matter of "high priority". Prior to September 2001, U.S policy towards Africa has often involved the concern for 'instability' and the lack of development as a sign through which state building become justified. It is this background that help to legitimate the 'crisis' of terrorism in Africa and its subsequent whole-of-government. As a continuity, the stereotypical construction of Africa as a site of 'danger' and 'instability' were not just reinforced through this comprehensive approach, the explicit linkage of empty signifiers like 'instability' and 'development' and 'state failure' helps to shift the discourse as a discursive

moment. The 1970s and 80s for instance articulate 'instability' and lack of 'development' through the Southern Question and therefore silence the narratives of the Cold War. It is this construction of 'crisis' of Africa that shifted to the state failure 'crisis' of the 1990s and early 2000s. Rather, than the states-centric constructions as shown in the 1990s and early 2000s, therefore, the 'crisis' of terrorism shifted to include both 'physical' and 'non-physical spaces'.

Chapter 6: Constructing the U.S Self

“In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity”. (President George W. Bush, 2002 National Security Strategy)

Introduction

The chapter examines how colonized/colonizer dyad (understood here as colonial tropes) has become the nodal points through which the U.S Self is constructed. It argues that through the productive use of power, the U.S justifies and naturalises its colonial subject position through the move from oil issues in the south-south of Nigeria to poverty and health-related issues in the north. To self-assert as the center of this discourse, therefore, it becomes necessary to construct varying kinds of subject positions both for itself and Nigeria as discursive power deems fit. This means that constructing the U.S Self as the ‘center’ is not by itself an easy venture given Nigeria’s agency and therefore requires that the U.S draws from background understanding of Nigeria and Britain, the Official colonizer of Nigeria, as far back as the 1950s/60s. On August 11 and 12, 1954, the Joint Resolution 183 was passed unanimously by the House and Senate concerning Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana), “to encourage efforts toward independence and self-government truly expressive of the desires of the peoples and as they show their capacity to establish and protect free institutions” and the Resolution was signed on August 27 by President Eisenhower. The deliberate conflating here of the principle of self-government and that of good governance- ‘free institutions’ for the first time in history, brought about the re-constructed idea of trusteeship (to ensure subordination) under the auspices of the United Nations. With the new Nigerian constitution which will be effective on

the 1st of October 1954 and subsequent election the following year, the Joint Resolution is to be read by the Speaker of the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives and the Chief Secretary of the Nigerian Government was to move for adoption. This move is particularly important because it will project the U.S in a favourable discursive light before Nigerians as evidenced in the *Lagos Daily Success* of September 2, 1954⁹ (The Secretary of State to Vice President Nixon, October 6, 1954). The Joint Resolution involves among other things that Africa is of strategic importance to the U.S because of resources like aluminium and oil; the continent's strength population-wise and its openness or otherwise to communist USSR and China. It became necessary to ensure that Nigeria is pro-America in both its political and social organisation. This explains why Nigerian students were sponsored to the U.S to "observe its society" and the U.S grievance at the lower British ranks, in Lagos Nigeria, who were 'dragging their feet' at ensuring this (The Vice Consul at Lagos (Ross) to the Department of State Lagos, June 18, 1952). The productive practice enabled by this meant that the prior arrangement of "trusteeship" through the universal application of 'good governance' by Britain which later fed directly to the United Nations Trusteeship Council and the Decolonization exercise (James 1994) would be officially ended on the 1st October 1960, Nigeria's Independence Day. Besides, with Nigeria's non-alignment policy during the Cold War, the country's relationship with the U.S have continued to be surrounded by 'mistrust' because of the obvious disparity between the anti-colonial rhetoric of the U.S. and their actual actions in other African countries like, the South West Africa (now Namibia), the Congo and Angola (as it relates to the Cuban troops). For instance, during what is often referred to as the Congo crisis of the 1960s¹⁰, Nigeria was completely against and condemned the stance of the U.S which supported and funded the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and the (colonial) Belgian troops against national liberation movements.

⁹ Prior to this time (i.e. 1951-1952), anti-American publications in the *West African Pilot* by Editor K.C. Okoro hinged on American's air operations in Tangier has been particularly pressured through its publisher Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, because of the Cold War and the latter's interest in becoming Nigeria's Governor-General in 1960 and later President in 1963.

¹⁰ Note that this crisis signalled a considerable change to U.S-Nigeria relations as the proxy wars of the Cold War fought in Congo meant that in order to prevent Soviet's influence, the U.S. support for a pro-Western government which involves the plans to unseat and assassinate Lumumba if possible, made Nigeria to condemn the U.S hypocritical stance against colonial domination.

Also, during the grand plan for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the inauguration of its new charter in 1963, Nigeria championed a doctrine of neutrality in the interest of Africa (Anglin 1964; Claude 1964). Considering the Cold War context and America's policy of containment, it remains that countries like Nigeria that have adopted a seemingly neutral disposition and policy towards both power blocs have to be kept under some other forms of 'tutelage'. This was stated explicitly as the reasons for aids and other economic relations. Of importance here is that the application of the idea of trusteeship analogous to that of the League of Nations where nations are under 'tutelage' and 'modernized' became incompatible with the British principle of self-governance and underscores the reason why the United States, amidst other international actors such as Denmark, Syria, Uruguay and Thailand as the members of the committee of the International Court of Justice, a principal judicial organ of the United Nations, championed the deliberate fusion of the principles of self-government and good governance which had hitherto been at parallel (Thornton 1999).

To this end, while the official colonization era was ended in Nigeria on 1st October 1960, America's maintenance of 'a firm position alongside the UK in most international questions' meant that the 'colonizing structure' of 'trusteeship' continued through the 'western bond' shared between the United States and Britain. As the Vice Consul at Lagos, Nigeria asserted:

The Chief Secretary to the government, Mr A.E.T. Benson, believed that it was to the benefit of Nigeria to be completely pro-United States even if they developed a strong feeling against the UK in the future. It is his feeling that, in many cases, British institutions are not necessarily the ones which will contribute the things Nigeria needs in the way of training and outlook and that steps should be taken to facilitate orientation of the people here toward the US. As long as he was in a policy-making position, he said, such steps would be encouraged. Benson also said that if the Nigerians developed a serious anti-US attitude he would consider British administration here a complete failure and would "wash his hands" off the Nigerians and the Colonial Service.... On this ground he justified and insisted upon "tutelage" by the British for several years to come (Department of State, May 21, 1952).

It is often argued that with the discourse of terrorism comes the discursive re-construction of the world into the dichotomies of "free" and "civilized" states which trumps terror on the one hand and "fragile" and/or "rogue" states which harbour "evil" and "barbaric" terrorists

on the other hand (Gunning 2007; Gregory 2004). For Nigeria and the rest of Africa, the binary division of colonized versus colonizer has been the overwhelming submission of most critical African scholars (Okoh 1996; Ayinde 2010). While most scholars have often highlighted the literal colonizer of Nigeria, Britain, little has been said about how this colonial trope has not only constructed the U.S self but has also shaped the dynamics of the two countries bilateral relations since Nigeria's independence to post-September 2001. The Obama administration has often been pointed out as changing the rhetoric of the 'war on terror' of the Bush era and not necessarily the practices enabled by the 'war on terror' (McCrisken 2011; Smith 2010). This disparity between rhetoric and practice is not a new development as far as the U.S engagement with Nigeria, and Africa, is concerned. The disparity between the U.S anti-colonial rhetoric and its actual practices during decolonization is highlighted, for instance, by the U.S support for the Belgian troop in Congo. What this disparity points to was the construction that Nigeria lacks the capacity for self-governance and it functions as the dominant signifier for constructing Nigeria's identity as an Other. Furthermore, the disparity reveals why the discourse of U.S expansionism in Nigeria became veiled as a necessity through signifiers like poverty and disease. While the road to expansionism in Nigeria has not been a simple weave, the discursive construct itself within which the necessity for expansionism takes place highlights a denial of agency to Nigeria. Bhabha (1984) refers to 'colonial mimicry' through which an "other" which was a subject of difference that reflects the self but not exactly the same and this other become a total closure i.e. permanent. It is through this construct of "other" that practices like expansionism thus became doable. The necessity of expansionism calls for naturalizing the leadership authority of the U.S so as to justify the construction of a hesitant imperialist. Through the use of strategies like equivalence and articulation, the unity of chains of signification provided the justification for the inevitability of 'assisting' Nigeria. By drawing from earlier colonial constructions together with its complex myths and assumptions, representational strategies were employed to construct the U.S as a kind of subject that is at the centre of Nigeria's democracy. However, because of the need to expand to other West African states by using Nigeria as a political tool, it became necessary to shift subject positions through the exercise of discursive power. These subject position underscores why, after independence, most scholars agree that Nigeria is an 'inherited

colonial state' or a 'neo-colonial' one (Eze 1999). However, by constructing an oppositional discourse, the 'reality' of Nigeria's lack as well as its leadership position was both constructed almost in the same breath. The power that inheres in these representational practices, hence, shift subject positions around to enable the colonial tropes find avenues of expression as the U.S deems fit.

Background: The Uneasy Road of Expansionism: From Oil to Poverty and Health Issues

A great wealth of literature has argued that the war on terror(ism) was about U.S. expansionism, which represents the continuation of the Cold War and highlights a colonial trope that bears resemblance to earlier colonial practises (Van Veeren 2009; 2011; Schmidt 2013). With the exception of scholars like Kenneth Omeje who argues that the war on terror(ism) exists to accentuate the 'postcolonial crisis' in Africa, most scholars like Daniel Agbiboa, Solomon Hussein and Hakeem Onapajo with focus on Nigeria who have engaged with this strand of argument have often highlighted how the oil "resource curse" in Nigeria has engendered massive corrupt practises by Nigerian government functionaries and how the incidences of political violence is corruption 'fighting back'. What these scholars left unsorted however is that corruption is a polyvalent concept with different shades of meaning not only as it depends on what is measured but also as regards who the actors are within the context where it is practised (Underkuffler 2005; Jain 2001). For example, in the words of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) on the distinction between gifts and bribes, he said:

An integral aspect of [the African] culture could be taken as the basis for rationalising otherwise despicable behaviour...In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is in the open, and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and it is returned. If anything, corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of our culture (cited in Pope 2000: 8).

Though this might be critiqued as a simplistic cultural relativistic argument, this assertion seems to confirm the stance of Sardan (1999: 34) that, 'the real borderline between what is corruption and what is not fluctuates, and depends on the context and on the position of the actors involved'. As evidenced by the official documents and interview data garnered for this thesis, the theme of corruption as an important factor in the prevalence of political violence

in Nigeria could not be argued away. However, there remains two latent points which were not accounted for by these scholars: one, the complex mix of local and international dynamics which range from how the practises of the U.S. in relating with the 'strong men' of Africa especially as it relates to their ethnic, religious and political affiliations were used to further personal interests. Secondly, in the Nigerian case, while the use or misuse of the revenues accrued from oil was understandably a predominant factor in the cause of violence and demonstrations in the south-south, this surely cannot explain the incidence of political violence in the northern parts of Nigeria and the rest of the south. It is in this regards that the expansionist drive of the U.S through the war on terror(ism) and its 'shift' into Africa needs to be understood for what it is rather than economic and governance failures in the country.

The United States' relationship with Nigeria is the most strategic relationship on the continent, and its stabilization is essential in meeting U.S. Strategic Objectives. In addition to being America's fifth largest supplier of oil, Nigeria also produces most of the hydrocarbon in West Africa which attracts American investment. The quality of crude oil from Nigeria is easily adapted to U.S. refineries, lessening U.S. dependence on the Middle Eastern supply. Boko Haram could potentially disrupt U.S. access to this new source of oil and cause billions of dollars in damage to the U.S. economy (W.E Robertson, U.S Army, and 2012:4).

A hallmark of the British colonial era was the need for African resources and the need to civilize the African people. In spite of the material end of colonialism, scholars like Noam Chomsky, Rita Abrahamsen, Mark Duffield and others has highlighted how the imperial drive of the U.S in Africa represents a continuity of the mission of ex-colonizers. However, while the colonial tropes of the U.S remain a reality as far as discursive constructions and its enabling practises are concerned, it has not always been an easy road in Nigeria. The US-Nigeria relationship could be captured as passive-aggressive: this is reflected not only in the friction between interpolating the U.S as the subject of the post-colonial era in Nigeria but also the need to "responsibilize" Nigeria for other African countries. The latter is done in order to use the country as a supposed tool in the U.S expansionist drive. For instance, prior to and during the Nigerian military era (1966-1979), the U.S was praised for their policy of non-involvement with the civil war which was demonstrated by not selling weapons of war

to either the Nigerian government or the Biafra secessionists. The U.S, however, oscillated in their supposed 'friendship' with Nigeria depending on whether the military head of state is from the northern or southern part of Nigeria and whether or not the head of state considers U.S's interests as integral to Nigeria :

*The salient question for Nigeria is whether the federal structure can survive in the face of the many internal strains and tensions. The facts of **geography** and **population** assure that under the constitution, the federal government will continue to be dominated by the party representing the tradition-bound Moslems of the North, who are generally contemptuous of the South and unsympathetic to its problems. The southern regions, which are deeply divided along tribal, regional, and party lines, resent northern domination. Some southern leaders cooperate with the North in federal affairs realizing that only thus can they and their interest reap the benefits of participation in government (Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968 Volume XXIV, Africa).*

The leader of the coup against General Yakubu Gowon is an erratic, vainglorious, impetuous, corrupt, vindictive, intelligent, articulate, daring Hausa. Muhammed also inherits - and has contributed to - a tradition of corrupt civilian and military officials, urban problems second only to those of Calcutta, drift and ineptitude in development, insoluble but containable ethnic problems, and a national temperament which combines pride, aggressiveness, arrogance and patriotism into a brand of xenophobia best labelled 'Nigerianism'. Almost six years after the civil war, Muhammed is probably ushering in a period of coups. As a corrupt Hausa, he automatically attracts Ibo and Yoruba enmity, which he knows and has attempted to reduce by early appointments. As a Northerner and a Muslim, he will be expected to consolidate once and for all the leadership role which his fifty million brothers are certain is theirs. Muhammed will agree, of course, but will seem to the Hausas to vacillate as he sings "One Nigeria." (Foreign Relations of the United States, Documents on Africa 1973-1976)

The above excerpts represent how the relations of the U.S with the 'African strong men' more often than not shapes how its foreign policy is driven in Nigeria. While the second excerpt is particularly representative is because of all the Nigerian head of states-only General Yakubu Gowon (August 1966-July 1975) and General Olusegun Obasanjo (February 1976-October 1979) were the only Christians who were from the northern and southern parts of Nigeria

respectively. Suffice it to mention that the southern part of Nigeria is the oil-rich and most economically viable part of Nigeria. Hence, the relations of the U.S, like their colonial counterpart, Britain, has predominantly been with political elites (civilian and military alike) who are either from southern parts of Nigeria or had some strong ties with elites from this region. By profiling General Muritala Muhammed along with his 'Northern' and 'Muslim' 'brothers', the U.S was not only exploring ethno-religious fault lines to their advantage but was also signalling a continuity of earlier discourses which interpolates the colonialist as the subject of the discourse. Being a supposed hinterland and a prize of political and strategic contest, Nigeria particularly and Africa in general should be transitioned in such a manner that suits the modern template of the U.S and should effectively function for the U.S. The concept of 'Nigerianism' or 'one Nigeria' represents a discursive struggle where instead of being the object to be acted upon by the subject, the U.S, Nigeria seeks to be the subject. Thereby challenging or even negating the hegemony of the U.S. It was rather interesting that General Olusegun Obasanjo who took over after the political assassination of General Muritala Muhammed went into a pact with the U.S for an effective transitioning from a British-style parliamentary system of government to a U.S-style presidential system of government (while it is beyond the purview of this thesis, the debate on the inappropriateness of the presidential system to the Nigerian character and the need for restructuring Nigeria as way to end the incessant political violence is still ongoing). The conflict in the passive-aggressive relations between the U.S and Nigeria was signalled by Muhammed's choice of privileging 'Nigeria', as nodal point and subject of his policy rather than 'democracy', the U.S oil-centred economic developmental template or even the U.S-prescribed presidential system of government. Prior to the administration of Muhammed, the First Republic (1963-1966), which was a parliamentary system of government was considered of 'security concerns' to the U.S because of the Cold War and the need for continued access to Nigerian oil after independence (Foreign Relations, 1958-1960 Volume XIV). 'Security' here seems to signal economic security of the U.S which the decentralised system of government in Nigeria could not guarantee in the long run as U.S need for Africa's resources was to 'increase' in the near future and the regions in Nigeria would likely demand for more control of their territory. This forecast became fulfilled in the Nigerian civil war. The

U.S therefore proposes an oil-centred economic development plan alongside a presidential system of government where power would become centralized. However, in sharp contrast to the U.S visions for Nigeria, Muhammed seems to give voice to the visions and hopes of Nigeria prior to independence. Hence, the self-assertive stance of Nigeria signalled through the construction of 'Nigerianism', which means the decision of Nigeria to formulate and drive foreign policy architecture that is focused primarily on Nigeria and Africa. This represents a discursive friction.

The new struggle for Nigeria's autonomy and unity would mean that the continued access to Nigerian oil both during and after the Cold War on terms that privilege the U.K, US and others would no longer be the norm. This new development which the U.S was not favourably disposed to was considered a defining factor in the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) and also the uprising of violent groups like the Maitaisine (Falola 1992). Having successfully taken control of the south and its oil, the use of contrast here between Gowon and Muhammed highlights the challenge faced by the U.S. in its bid for expanding to the northern part of Nigeria (through its elites) which is about constructions of ethno-religious identity. Both in prior documents and those shortly after, the concerns raised about defiant or despotic Nigerian leaders have often been linked to their ethnicity/religion and corruption. The 1990s onward, however, signals a shift in understanding and focuses on state-centric discursive constructions. The linkage of Muhammed's ethno-religious identity to corruption which was empirically inaccurate as Muhammed was about the most accountable military head of state Nigeria has had (Eze 1990; Akindele 1992). This could only be understood in the light of his defiance against the U.S intervention in Nigeria and the U.S undemocratic role in Angola. Also, Muhammed's 'nationalistic impulses' to revive the economy of Nigeria from the ruins of the civil war led to his banning of most importations into Nigeria (mostly from the U.S) and this obviously pitched him and 'his brothers' against the U.S.

Shortly after the assassination of Muhammed on 13th February 1976, it became all the more important to the U.S to ensure 'stability' and 'strengthen economic ties' with Nigeria. This led to the signing of technical agreements and the official visit of President Carter to Nigeria from March 31 to April 3, 1977, and of the official visit of General Obasanjo to the United States in

October the same year. During this time on the international scene, petroleum products which has been the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, and as well as in some other African states, witnessed a dramatic increase in price due to the 1970s recession and sharp increase in oil prices globally (Perron 1988). Hence in the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6 (Documents of Africa, 1976), concerns were expressed thus:

The future development of Nigeria petroleum policies is expected to be shaped by more nationalistic impulses. In this mood of vigorous nationalism and well-heeled self-confidence, Nigeria may be expected to scorn self-serving offers of specific AID projects or financial incentives. Responsible FMG officials have come increasingly to the conviction that financial assistance is too inflexible to be of significant help to a country which expects \$8 billion in governmental oil revenues for the coming year. Even though per capita income in Nigeria remains at about \$100, American foreign aid must be recognized as having only a modest impact in a country blessed by this petroleum windfall.

It was unsurprising then, when instead of a further reduction in the AIDS policy to Nigeria as a result of the ‘petroleum windfall’, it was increased on the basis of poverty as reflected by the citing of Nigeria’s per capital income. As a result, many sub-Saharan African countries, including Nigeria, went into mounting trade deficits that adversely affected the polity (Adebajo 2011). According to Schmidt (2013), and Dia (1994), the incidence of economic mismanagement and corruption in African states during this period contributed greatly to the decline of state institutions. With the logic of the cold war, the rulers of these nascent states took advantage of the external support/pressure to take sides to loot resources and suppress internal insurrections, some of which are due to boundary and resource-related disputes as a result of decolonization. The resultant effect, as is argued, are countries with very high poverty rates, severe decline in per capita real gross national product and a rise in warlord politicking. Furthermore, the result of external factors which accentuate the decline of state institutions meant the subordinate position of Africa in the global political economy together with the cold war politics. In order for struggling African states to survive the economic plummet, they resorted to borrowing from the IMF and World Bank with stringent conditions meant to promote free trade that is global capitalism. The so-called ‘unintended consequence’ to use Reno (1998)’s words, of these reforms such as reduced government spending imposed by the World Bank was renewed upsurge in political instability due to cuts

in jobs, among other things, as imposed by the World Bank. For Nigeria, this move was initially blocked in order to make the country 'assume an international position' in congruence with its finance position, however the move was resisted by the U.S:

*Despite Nigeria's hostile position on Angola, the country remains very important both to **our** overall policy in Africa and to **our** relationship with the developing world; we must not go out of our way to cause additional problems. We should oppose Treasury's attempt to "cut off" Nigeria from the World Bank, but at the same time encourage the country to assume an international financial position more appropriate to its increased wealth. (Documents on Africa, 1976).*

The uprising of political violence both in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria as a result of poverty led to the enlisting of the partnership of Nigeria to fight militants in the Niger Delta who the U.S has just labelled as 'terrorists' while poverty, disease (especially HIV) and mother-child mortality also became linked to the absence of 'democracy' and presence of international terrorism.

*In addition, radical youth gangs in Nigeria abducted and held for ransom more than three dozen foreign oil workers. The gangs held most of the hostages for a few days before releasing them unharmed. **Terrorists** targeted US interests in 169 attacks in 1999, an increase of 52 percent from 1998. The increase was concentrated in four countries: Colombia, Greece, Nigeria, and Yemen. In Nigeria and Yemen, US citizens were among the foreign nationals abducted....Ethnic violence flared in Nigeria during the year as bloody feuds broke out among various indigenous groups battling for access to and control of limited local resources. **Poverty-stricken Nigerians across the nation**, particularly in the oil-producing southern regions, demanded a larger share of the nation's oil wealth (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, U.S Department of State 2000).*

With the nodal point of liberal democracy that enables the discursive constructions of the need for 'economic growth/prosperity' through a 'healthy' workforce, in Africa generally and Nigeria particularly, the U.S colonial tropes moved from its focus on oil in the southern part of Nigeria to poverty and health issues in the northern part of Nigeria. It is during this era that HIV became constructed as a matter of 'international terrorism' and 'a threat to international peace and order' (Elbe 2003). According to Caldas-Coulthard (2003: 272) on discourses of the media, politicians often enlist the use of 'we', 'the West' and 'free democracies' to construct the self and at the time contrast this construction with the 'other', as the other became the

haven of terrorists based on open-ended elements like poverty. Hence, almost in a haste the discourse of (international) terrorism made a sudden shift from the southern region of Nigeria to the northern part during the Clinton presidency. General Sanni Abacha, who has been considered as one of the most despotic and corrupt Nigerian leaders, was at this time sanctioned by the U.S for his non-compliance to international norms but it also was interesting that the U.S economic relationship with Nigeria also got to its peak during this time (Akinwande 2014). The punchline here is that the drive for expansionism together with the need to factor in the interests of the elites enable the construction of 'terrorism' through which the structure which produced the struggles of the Niger Delta as well as the poverty and disease in the northern Nigeria were silenced.

To do this effectively, after the event of September 2001, from President Bush to Obama, not only did Africa's democracy continues to be 'stabilized', trade, education, civil society, health, energy and indeed economy including agriculture and land rights become articulated as fundamentally demanding order. For instance, HIV/AIDS which was a new pandemic in Africa but became understood through "colonial tropes" of race (Flint and Hewitt 2015) was already described as a 'a threat to international peace and security in Africa' (Elbe 2003) during the regime of President Clinton became linked to the promotion of democratic institutions under the guise of global development programmes like the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCM), and the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR). According to Lymann (2009) instead of a global orientation of these programmes as earlier posited, it became synonymous with Africa. The focus on Africa through these programmes is poised as altruistic intervention for struggling African states to move out of poverty and disease which makes them less stable and able to compete internationally and thus open to the exploitation of 'terrorists'. The explicit linkage of democracy and economic issues to the understanding of political violence became well highlighted especially after the September 2001 event. Also, unlike the paltry American aid that went to isolated African states, aids and trade budget became significantly improved more or less as a bait for compliance on bilateral terms of policy and institutional reforms which remain a serious source of worry to many (Dagne 2010; Call 2010). Commenting on The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCM), Linda Thomas-

Greenfield (2006)'s testimonial to the Congress, child health, education, infectious diseases and hunger all become connected to democracy:

*It is strongly in the interest of the United States government and other Western governments to help the young democracies of West Africa prosper economically. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was created with just that purpose in mind, on a global scale, and roughly half of the compacts signed thus far have been with West African democracies, including some of the largest onesis a necessary prerequisite for economic development, for a **healthy** and **educated** workforce is necessary for long-term economic prosperity and for the growth of democratic institution.*

Indeed, it is argued for understandable reasons that increase in aids to combat things like HIV/AIDS or even infant mortality rate should be applauded (Dagne 2010). However, the 17 indicators as preconditions for these aids meant a drastic policy and institutional change that most struggling African countries might be unable to meet. McInne's et, al. (2008) also contended that constructing the pandemic as a security threat (internationally) shows how the groundwork for integrating Africa into the GWOT was being laid and Flint and Hewitt (2015) show why such 'colonial tropes' justifies the need for 'saving' Africa from itself. Moreover, positing the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a security threat and proffering the building of state institutions based on militarized visions of order is another thing altogether. To articulate and justify the integration of Nigeria into the GWOT, it is unsurprising that things like HIV/AIDS, infant mortality rate and even poverty became located within the security imaginary of the U.S. because the Northern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram originated from play host to the highest indicators of poverty and disease in Nigeria (World Bank 2012) and constructing these issues as security threat only serves to accentuate the discourse of 'new' history that demands corresponding measures. To this end, the discourse of failed states and terrorism might seem tenable. A follow-up argument might then be that the fact that the North hosts the poorest explains why Boko Haram is there in the first instance whether they are labelled terrorist or not. This argument could be refuted on three grounds: one, the motivations or causes of political violence have been established as complex and dynamic (Adesoji 2011). This shows why there are several violent groups in the Northern Nigeria agitating for different things and often with contrasting narratives of supposed motivations.

The fact that the not-so-poor regions of Nigeria also houses several violent groups might serve to negate poverty as the primary causal factor. So, the argument for variables or causal factors remain fragile. Secondly and interestingly, from some narratives of violent groups like Boko Haram, it is the political system of Liberal democratic imaginary which the U.S. is trying to stabilize that the violent groups are agitating against (Jordan 2015). As Hugh (2004), political systems like Liberal democracy bring about certain ideals, norms and values that define the identities of members of that system; it constructs boundaries and limits and practices that are acceptable or otherwise. More importantly, political systems also entrench ideologies and interests which might be at parallel with other systems. Examples of this abound, the Cold War is one and some narratives of al Qaeda and even Boko Haram reveal this. Thirdly, while empirical evidences point to the prevalence of poverty and disease in the Northern part of Nigeria when compared with other regions (World Bank 2012), the development points to a history of 'decentralised despotism' that entrenched ethnicity and privilege based on the colonial divide of settlers and natives which political elites have continued to perpetuate (Mamdani 1990) and the politics of aids by the U.S. and other European countries that accentuate corruption either by turning the blind eye on the deliberate misuse of aids or (in)directly enabling/participating in corrupt and questionable practices often for economic reasons (Doty 1996). Most importantly is the fact that suffering regions like the North-East cannot meet eligibility criteria for aids because of the proliferation of political violence and more especially the proscription of Boko Haram. This inadvertently serves as an underwriting of the arguments advanced for constructing security and threat out of people's suffering.

Constructing the U.S as the Subject of Democracy

The defence of 'democracy' and the 'free world' often on the grounds of 'progress' are premises upon which the Cold War were fought (by proxy) in Nigeria and elsewhere. This universalist and totalizing discourse that not only demands that other possible conceptions of democracy and development are excluded and silenced but also through a naturalised binary of the world where the U.S is positioned against its Other becomes the norm (Jackson 2005: 62). In Nigeria, this representation demands that the central image of the U.S. as the subject of democracy and progress becomes the defining feature by which its relations with Nigeria, and indeed the rest of Africa became anchored. As Smith (1994) has poignantly

argued that (American) democracy remains the most important lens, if not the only one, through which its foreign relations could be read and understood. The practices enabled by this discourse not only positioned the U.S as the subject but also ensures the continual manipulations of its border especially its linkage of 'democracy' to economic prosperity/development and 'civic action'. 'Democracy' and 'Progress' who's meaning are hinged on 'economic prosperity' and 'military defense' in order to factor in the interests of the 'free world' and ultimately that of the U.S became constructed. Democracy then could mean any actions undertaken by the U.S to secure its economic and military interests.

*Despite the recent blasts against U.S. policy on Angola by the FMG, the basic relationship is still sound and we would not want to imperil it without compelling reason. The World Bank feels strongly that it should develop a close working relationship with Nigeria, and we support this view. Nigeria is the natural leader of the black African constituency, an important bloc in the Bank. It is in **our** interests to **assist** the Nigerians in constructing a policy framework for development which is generally **Western-oriented** with a large role for market forces, and the World Bank can play a major role in this process. (Documents on Africa, 1973–1976)*

*Nigeria's successful transformation is **key** to anchoring the climate of peace and rapid development that **our** citizens hope to see throughout Africa, and, thus, central to meeting all **our** economic, security, and political objectives in the region (subcommittee on Africa 1999)*

The construction of the U.S as the subject of Nigeria's democracy was drawn from the tropes of colonialism through which the binary divide of colonizer/colonized serves the fruitful use of constructing an Other for the self. As Said (1993) has argued that not enough critical engagement has been done to challenge the discourses which privileges the West and through which practises of entitlement are enabled. Here, political and economic access to Nigeria as the nodal point to significations of entitlement and the denial of agency to Nigeria by the U.S. Through this, the power of U.S (colonial) discourse elicits the capacity of the U.S agency over Nigeria's in making Nigeria function for the U.S both politically and economically. In the 1960s, the thrust of the U.S foreign policy towards Nigeria was to ensure the "friendship" of Nigerian leaders so as not to be perceived as a "nasty imperialist" like Britain but to interpolate itself as the kind of subject that both owns and controls Nigeria's polity and resources without saying so.

The 1970's onward was significant for both Nigeria and the U.S for two reasons: one, it was the period of Nigerian oil boom ("petroleum windfall") which made the country become a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971. The oil boom also signalled the dearth of Nigeria's agro-economy (majorly from the northern part of Nigeria) as well as the rise of significant political violence and corrupt practises in Nigeria (Falola 1994). Secondly, it was also the period of the U.S drive towards 'democratization', 'security' and political order (Okolo 2011) and therefore a probable reason for transitioning Nigeria from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government. It was to this end that the U.S **assisted** African states in ensuring regional development, stability and economic integration through the formation of regional organisations like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Akinwande (2014: 233) has argued that ECOWAS was used by the U.S as a 'security complex' to ensure regional stability, peace and democracy in line with socio-political processes ongoing in Washington. Central to the developments of the 1960s to post-September 2001 was the practice of linking the open signifiers 'assisting' or 'helping' Nigeria/Africa to 'our interests' or 'western interests'. By coupling these two elements together, it became easy to say more by saying less. While the literal meaning of the word 'help' or 'assist' points to making something easier for someone, which in this case should be Nigeria/Africa, it is interesting to see that the supposed assistance was to further the interest of the U.S or 'the west'. Hence, it is not just laudable to promote democracy and economic prosperity, it is also important to construct the U.S as the subject of the discourse of democracy. For instance, the direct import of U.S' actions of inadvertently aiding corruption through its support for Nigeria's borrowing from the IMF and World Bank while also increasing its aids grants to Nigeria as a way to buy back Nigeria's support of the U.S after Nigeria's disapproval of U.S role in the Angolan crisis, was that Nigeria has to pay mounting interests at the expense of basic human needs. This is better captured in the words of President Clinton during his visit to Nigeria:

We face, of course, another obstacle to Nigeria's economic development, the burden of debt that past governments left on your shoulders. The United States has taken the lead in rescheduling Nigeria's debt within the Paris Club, and I believe we should do more. Nigeria shouldn't have to choose between paying interest on debt and meeting basic human needs, especially

in education and health. We are prepared to support a substantial reduction of Nigeria's debts on a multilateral basis, as long as your economic and financial reforms continue to make progress and you ensure that the benefits of debt reduction go to the people.

Critics like Rodney (2018) have often highlighted how through the World Bank, and other transnational bodies, the flow of capital was facilitated from Africa to the U.S and the rest of Europe. This is why the rhetoric of President Clinton and others, which appears laudable at an uncritical level, was actually to further the impoverishment of 'the people'. In the first instance, this discursive construction takes for granted that both countries are supposed to be sovereign and thus interact at a level that reflects their independence at the very least. The rhetoric of President Clinton for instance at an uncritical level appears laudable. On further examination, it however, reveals two important factors in the colonized/colonizer dyad of the timeline under review. One is that Nigeria, like in colonial times remains, Nigeria remains an extension of the 'hesitant' colonizer and secondly that the core commitments and/or construct of 'progress', 'democracy', 'freedom' and the likes which are dominant signifiers associated with the colonizer's values remains the exclusive domain of the colonizer. As it were, the definition as well as the commitments of Progress remains western-oriented and generally elusive. The idea of U.S **assistance** to Nigeria here did not only silence the history of how poverty was produced but also simultaneously construct the U.S as a kind of subject with an altruistic democracy. Both at the regional and state levels, the drive for democratization, security and political order in the 1970s which was also further evidenced by the revival of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (the Kampala Document) (CSSDCA) in the 1990s, signified a necessity for ensuring Nigeria as well as Africa remain within the binary divide of the colonizer versus the colonized.

The material end of colonialism in Nigeria by Britain during the Cold War meant that American democratic imaginary and more importantly, expansionism might experience a setback if the U.S.S.R gets a firm footing in the newly independent state. The idea of a universal political order which could be said to underscore the Cold War and woven around the 'openness' of Nigeria means entrenching the values of 'democracy' which the U.S. represents. As Obi (2010: 183) asserts "the interests of foreign actors are unwittingly prioritized at the cost of

developing the West African region". This reveals why, a 5-year developmental plan tied majorly to democracy and economic development with a proposed \$225 million by a 5-man delegation was formulated in June 1960, shortly before Nigeria's independence in October. And also why R.H Hunt, the U.S. consul general, visited Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the premier of the eastern region of Nigeria, in April 1957 to highlight the dangers of communism and also warn against possible 'contamination' of Nigeria by the Eastern bloc. The visit was later to the then Premier of the western region of Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, in October 1957 to discuss the merits of democracy and the need for the containment of communism in western Nigerian (U.S Foreign Relations 1960). Prior to this visit, the then minister of finance, Festus Okotie-Eboh has answered back at the U.S during a national broadcast that Nigeria is willing and ready to accept aid from any of the western powers who is willing to help. This raised so much concern for the U.S that several high level meetings with Nigerian officials were held in order to ensure the elites did not fall to the U.S.S.R. Hence, by engaging with Nigeria on the need for a liberal democratic imaginary (positioned against communism), politics of aids as an inducement for Nigeria to actively join in the war against communism and as well as strengthen economic ties immediately followed suit (Darwin 1991; Killingray and Rathbone eds. 1986). In the words of Hattori, (2001: 634) aids then is 'a policy tool [...] to influence the political judgments of recipient countries'. However, as the subject of the discourse, the U.S positioned itself in Nigeria as **helping struggling African states and entrenching democratic values** through aids inducements in order to have 'free and democratic institutions' for stability and reduction of (extreme) poverty while actively participating in economically, socially and politically salient processes. Since the representation of the U.S as the arbiter of democracy was the nodal point around which deliberations were fixed, it becomes necessary for the U.S to be represented around its size as a 'a big nation', its strength as 'strong', its humanness as 'peace-loving and peaceful', its resources as 'prosperous', its values as 'freedom loving' its essence as 'civilized' and above all through the assertion of self, the other stand in stark opposition to the 'absences' of Nigeria and their need of the U.S altruistic venture. This discursive representation helps to construct a kind of international identity that equates that of Nigeria's colonizer, Britain, and enables the practises of the "nasty imperialist'.

Constructing the Hesitant Colonialist

The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and trade to every corner of the world (The White House 2002b)

We must use every tool at our disposal to meet this grave global threat, including strengthened non-proliferation regimes and export controls, and moving ahead with missile defense to deny any benefit to those who would try and acquire weapons of mass destruction (Rice, 2002)

*Now, let me say, as we do our part to **support your economic growth and economic growth throughout Africa**, we must also work together and build on African **efforts to end the conflicts** that are **bleeding hope** from too many places. If there's one thing I would want the American people to learn from my trip here it is the true, extraordinary extent of **Nigeria's leadership for peace in West Africa** and around the world...Last year President Obasanjo came to Washington and reminded us that peace is indivisible. I have worked to build a new relationship between America and Africa because our futures are indivisible. It matters to us whether you become an **engine of growth and opportunity** or a place of **unrelieved despair**. It matters whether we push back the **forces of crime, corruption, and disease** together or leave them to divide and conquer us. It matters whether we reach out with Africans to **build peace** or leave millions of God's children to suffer alone (Clinton visits Nigeria, July 21, 2015).*

Nigeria has been freed by the higher prices of the transformed petroleum market from the absolute necessity to exploit to the maximum its growing oil resources (Documents of Africa, 1976).

The 'reality' of "emerging" African nations presents to the U.S complex webs of challenge ranging from the lack of free institutions, economic development, racial inequality and hatred to the concerns for political order (FRUS 1973-1976). Every discourse is a partial fixation or partially closed through which a totality is impossible. The construction of 'reality' is the same: it is a possible construction amidst other possible alternatives. It is a partial closure that creates certain subject positions and identities as well as fixes meanings. The subject positions and identity constructs of the colonizer/colonized upon which the identities of the U.S and Nigeria have become partially fixed was accomplished through the representational practices of articulation and equivalence. The U.S and Nigeria relations have followed the 'natural' template of a world superpower to an 'emerging' nation. According to the U.S, this

is for obvious reasons as 'stability in the small nations is necessary to us. Turmoil in small nations forces the large nations into opposition (Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, October 8, 1960). The text here was the first official meeting between the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa and President Eisenhower, just 7 days after Nigeria's independence at Washington. The equivalential identities of the two countries in the discursive construction was subverted by the specificity of each open element through something that they both considered common to them. One is prominent, stable and safe while the other is emerging, unstable and dangerous. One has mastered self-governance while the other is dependent and unable to be left to themselves. One is modern and the arbiter of democracy while the other is traditional and authoritarian. The positivity and specificity of each equivalential identity pairs are thus subverted through each one's identification with colonialism. While the common something could be argued as the Cold War especially in the light of America's anti-colonial stance. The choice of elements, among other possible elements, which are chain of equivalences articulated through other texts reveal something beyond America's Cold War. The U.S Foreign Policy (1958-1960:47) further highlight these chains of equivalences through the fear that 'African nationalism' could become 'a massive anti-European movement' which heightens the concerns for the 'immature and unsophisticated' Africans who are 'subject to many pressures-Communist, Pan-African, Islamic- all of which made it difficult for those African leaders who were western minded to keep their followers on the right path'. In constructing the identity of the U.S as the hesitant imperialist of the African continent and particularly Nigeria, complex webs of association, assumptions and rhetoric are drawn upon to enable certain production of world representation and as well create the space for the subject position that the 'other' is to assume. The U.S-Nigeria relationship was anchored on colonialism as the dominant signifier and equivalential identity of these chains of significations. This construct evidently plays some vital roles in the evolving relationships of both countries. The shared commitments of both countries to (open-ended) visions of economic prosperity premised on 'free institutions' positioned the U.S as the 'exemplar' or 'arbiter of democracy' and therefore constructs the space for Nigeria's 'emergent' identity construct. Indeed, the U.S democratic identity construct (both in Africa and beyond) has not been a simple weave but has always been

modified to suit certain interests depending on contexts. (Cox et. al. 2013; Doty 1996; Omeje 2008). For instance, scholars like Cox (1995) and Quinn (2010) have highlighted the fact that the U.S unpopular intervention in Iraq during President Bush era was woven around democracy and the idea of freedom (from tyranny). In Nigeria, the western-centric epistemology which informs the dominant discourse of the colonial era as well as the anti-colonialism rhetoric of the U.S bring about the need for the U.S to justify its identification with Nigeria's colonizer. In other words, it is because Nigeria is emerging, unstable and dangerous, among other things that necessitated the corresponding chains of equivalence which resulted in the unity through which America's identity as the hesitant imperialist is created. Thus articulation of Nigeria's identity through the unity of significations across texts point to sudden 'facts' about how 50% of narcotics are ferried through Nigeria to the U.S; how some Nigerians are 'very poor people'; how 'instability' there could 'threaten the peace of the U.S.'; how 'primitive tribes' and 'emerging nations' need transitioning to 'modernity'; and how diseases like HIV is of 'international concern'. While the unity of significations through which the U.S identity became constructed point to 'Nigerian oil' being of 'strategic economic interest' to the U.S; and Nigerian 'leadership in West Africa' of strategic political interest to the U.S and how the U.S is positioned to 'assist struggling African states'.

The representation of self as prominent, stable and safe, among other things simultaneously demand the construction of the other. It reveals the fact that without one the other cannot exist. The U.S became an imperialist, albeit hesitantly, because of Nigeria's identity construct. As seen in President Clinton's words while the U.S identity is woven around its altruism, exemplar character, strength and prosperity that of Nigeria is constructed around conflict, poverty, crimes and a bleak future. The unity of these significations mean that the undemocratic practices of the U.S like its linkage to the assassination of the then Nigerian Head of State, Muritala Muhammed as well as its heavy involvement in the assassination of the acclaimed winner of Nigeria's June 12, 1993 election, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola (Events in Lagos, 1976; 1993), not to mention the funding of repressive governments and structures and programmes like the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that ensure the further movement of capital away from the poor to the rich that were either silenced or downplayed. Due to the contingent nature of all identities, all discourses become unstable

and therefore loses their differences or positives. By subverting these specificities through the identification of either pair with the underlying common element of colonialism, it becomes possible to cancel out the significations of each identity so that one could replace the other.

Articulating the Impasse: Nigeria's Leadership and America's Colonial Trope

The second most powerful country in sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria. Nigeria has the people (in numbers and education), oil, a tradition of reasonably effective political authority, and a lingering British residue, which could make it the Brazil of Africa in the coming decade. The factors that favour the Soviets in Africa are generally weaker in Nigeria than elsewhere in the continent. It should become a principal target of U.S. effort to develop support in Africa (FRUS 1977-1981)

*A democratic Nigeria is **key** to a stable and prosperous West Africa, an invigorated Africa, and to U.S. national and economic security. Nigeria is our second largest trading partner in all of Africa (Jeter, 1999)*

*The U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission is our flagship agreement for bilateral cooperation **on the entire African continent**...Nigeria has also played an important role on global issues through its seat on the UN Security Council and has been **a leader** in helping to improve stability in West Africa...Economic development is key; Nigeria is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with the largest population in Africa and strong trading relationships (Clinton, 2011)*

On political, economic, military and other pragmatic fronts, Nigeria has often been considered as playing the dominant role of the leader in West Africa and probably the rest of the continent (Obi 2010; Ikelegbe 2006). This was also foregrounded explicitly as one of the United States' driving force for building 'friendship' with Nigeria on a level deeper than pre-independence era (U.S Foreign Policy 1960). However, 'the responsibility for world leadership' (NSC 1950: 390) that the U.S has self-assigned to itself makes it a particular kind of subject that heavily relies on colonial trope in Nigeria and the rest of Africa. Evidently, the colonized/colonizer identity binary which represents the nodes upon which the U.S-Nigeria relationships was based directly feeds the assumptions, myths rhetoric and contradictions through which the U.S became constructed as this kind of subject. As has been demonstrated above, the unity of significations related to the identity of the colonizer in Nigeria demand a corresponding identity construct for Nigeria. Nigeria, like the rest of West Africa presents a

different challenge to the U.S as unlike Algeria, Rhodesia, Kenya, South Africa and others in East, North and Southern Africa, it has no resident European communities and remains economically viable. The apparent presence of settled European communities and the need for aids as a political tool was considered of justifiable ground for an alliance with existing European powers 'to achieve similar aims' (Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960; Department of States Central Files 751S.oo/1961). Hence, the absence of these two critical factors mean that Nigeria might challenge instead of passively submit to the necessity of U.S leadership in Africa. To articulate the impasse of Nigeria's leadership and the U.S colonial trope, therefore, an oppositional discourse of Nigeria's absences as against its leadership role in West Africa becomes partially fixed with the supposition of the necessity of U.S leadership role in West Africa and Africa generally. Thus, the articulation reveals the struggle in discourse because while the construction of othering was necessary to maintain Nigeria's subordination, the construction of its leadership also became necessary to use Nigeria as a tool for the furtherance of U.S interest in Africa. This struggle in representation reveals the topsy-turvy that has accompanied US-Nigeria relations since the Cold War to the GWOT era. One of the most fundamental presupposition that gives support to the oppositional discourse of Nigeria's absences as well as its leadership role in Africa was the premise that Africa's need for socio-political order as well as economic development comes naturally.

*The new leaders see this more **aggressive** foreign policy as a logical international counterpart to their ambitious attempt on the domestic front to remedy the management inadequacies of the regime they toppled (Documents on Africa, 1973).*

The Nigerian Government now increasingly sees the US as indifferent or as an impediment to the achievement of objectives which Nigeria considers legitimate. These include economic growth and African political and economic independence. Nigerian foreign policy therefore gives high priority to strengthening ties with fellow-Africans and cooperating with other third-world countries, and lower priority to relations with the US and other developed countries Nigeria wants little from the US and seeks to keep relations with us at a distance. (Documents on Africa, 1976)

These representational texts highlight the discursive struggle to couple the seemingly natural leadership of the U.S with that of Nigeria in Africa generally and West Africa in particular. It highlights the possibility of alternative constructions and the acknowledgment of such.

However, as a representational practice, it sets up the U.S as a kind of subject with a natural authority and power to expand into Africa and to make use of Nigeria for that purpose. What this reveals is that the U.S drive for expansionism in Nigeria and Africa is natural. Nigeria was thus constructed as a kind of subject who should accept this position without challenge. The construction of Nigeria's leadership was therefore dependent on the power of the U.S to define and at the same time to self-assert. To set it in a larger context, these representational strategies assume a natural mode because of the idea of trusteeship the U.S earlier highlighted as a concern which might make their disposition to 'assist' Africans misunderstood. Hence, one of the most important elements in articulating this impasse is the struggle to fix as a total closure the presupposition that America's need of Nigeria's resources and leadership is legitimate. As a result, the need to use Nigeria as a political tool to influence West Africa's policy and make it U.S-oriented or western-oriented forms the larger discursive framework within which other discourse should take place. Hence, the possibility that 'Nigerian foreign policy therefore gives high priority to strengthening ties with fellow-Africans and cooperating with other third-world countries, and lower priority to relations with the U.S' became a site for discursive struggle. It is this site of struggle that Bhabha (1983:31) asserts as "a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power". The shifting of these subject positions from being an 'emerging', 'poor' and 'dangerous' nation to being 'a leader' of Africa are all partial constructs to enable the practice of imperial power depending on present interests.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the construction of the U.S Self is premised on some colonial tropes and based on the colonizer/colonized binary divide. In the words of David Apter, a political scientist, in his testimony, as an authority, before the Senate subcommittee on Africa, "Nigeria is much more of a western country than we [Americans] tend to think it is" (Briefing on Africa, 1960:104). The colonizer/colonized binary was therefore the nodal point around which much of the identity construction of the U.S was centred around, and this was based on the significations of 'democracy' and/or the 'free world'. This is so for obvious reasons as concerns relating to 'free institutions' and 'the free world' was the bane of colonisation and was at the heart of discussions of the decolonization process. As a nodal point, America's

specificities were linked to democracy because it makes possible a particular kind of identity which conjures the images of 'strength', 'wealth' and 'order' which both equates that of Britain in terms of colonialism. While being the 'friend' of Britain was of prime importance apparently because of the 'western bond' they both share, it was more important to construct Nigeria in the same breath, both as a West African leader and a country in need of leadership, in order to justify the necessity for America's subject position of taking up the job of the "nasty imperialist". For instance, in spite of the Joint Resolution of 1954 and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe's pro-American assertion, Nigeria's non-alignment policy to either of the power bloc of the Cold War signals a threatening other to the hegemony of the U.S. This threat was demonstrated by the subsequent hedging of the U.S in the devolution exercise as Nigeria was considered 'dangerous', 'retrogressive' and 'destructive' in view of their space as 'open' to Soviet expansion (Mckay 1956). However, the agency of Nigeria, as with most African countries, could only be exercised within the bounds made possible by the United Nations, which is considered an agency for International Development. Through representational practices like articulations and equivalence, these identity constructs became possible. It therefore became necessary to produce an oppositional discourse which both assert Nigeria's leadership position in Africa and in the same breath deny this so that Nigeria should not be made aware of its importance to America, partly because America's supply of energy from the Arab world became crippled during the Cold War. America's colonial tropes based on this kind of subject position and identity construct .This stems from the U.S. assumption of a neo-colonial stance as the arbiter of democracy and increasing interest in Nigerian oil, the 'mistrust' of Nigeria about the genuineness of U.S in Nigeria and Africa generally. With the US perception of Nigeria's awareness of its own strength and leadership position in Africa and assertive stance usually demonstrated through protests (especially in Lagos) rather than 'public polemics' (U.S Foreign Relations 1973), the subject positions continue to be moved around according to need.

Chapter 7: Constructing Nigeria as a Counter Terrorist State

“U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity.... Although security assistance is not new, what has fundamentally changed is the role that such assistance can play in providing security in today’s environment. Threats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous grey area that is neither fully war nor fully peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot reach alone” (The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010:73.)

Introduction

Chapter 6 has attempted to demonstrate how the construction of the U.S Self functions to fix the U.S as the center and how the discourse continually struggles to integrate Nigeria and fix its positioning as the user of the discourse deems fit. To do this effectively varying subject positions has to be constructed for U.S and Nigeria fixed around the colonized/colonized binary divisions as nodal points. To further add to this, this chapter aims to show how the Nigerian state has become constructed as a certain kind of state- a state that exists essentially to counter terrorist. In this light, the representation is not about the state as a ‘possible user of terrorism’ nor is it about state terrorism. Constructing Nigeria as a counter terrorist, therefore, enables the re-engineering and refocusing of the entire state architecture on terrorism in order to ensure that the ‘menace’ of terrorism and terrorists are effectively tackled. It works by reifying ‘terrorism’ as the main, if not the only, issue confronting the state

and as such the absence of Boko Haram's 'terrorism' becomes equated to peace in Nigeria. Among other things, producing such constructions, work to legitimise and normalize counter terrorism such as militarism.

On 9th February 2016, the Director of the Nigerian Army Public Relations, Sani Usman, issued a public statement ordering that certain public markets in Borno and Yobe have become hideouts for 'the adversaries' of the state as the traders are "sabotaging the successes of the military" and so they should be shut down because these markets "have clandestinely been aiding the terrorists (Boko Haram) with logistics and other supplies through smuggling and other forms of illicit trading, thus sustaining them while the merchants of death make money out of it" (Nigeria Security Tracker, 2016). By producing certain spaces as spaces of terror, among other things, poor people whose lively hood depend on trading are further pushed to the margins. These sorts of practices of representation of social actors and actions as discursive practices have come to define for us not just the identities of the Northerners (who are predominantly Muslim), as accomplices of evil but also that of the Nigerian State, as the peaceful state that counters terrorism. This is particularly interesting because the shift of the GWOT into Nigeria was premised on the U.S policy directives which focuses on 'strengthening' failed/weak states which have become breeding grounds for terrorists.

As Blakely (2007) has shown through her analyses of the history of democracies in the global North that the use of military and/or financial support to oppressive governments, like that of Indonesia against East Timor as supported by Britain, U.S. and Australia, has a long history. She contended through this and many more examples that state complicity in fostering violent activities should be given more attention in Critical Terrorism Studies. While the argument here is not about the state use of terrorism, this chapter draws from works of these sorts in the Critical Terrorism studies to argue that the September 2001 event, with the attendant GWOT brought about the articulation of a discourse that constructs Nigeria as a counter terrorist state through which the normalization of (political) violence is justified. To do this effectively, while there was no significant change in the policy formulation and orientation from Presidents Clinton to Obama, however the war against terrorism necessitated a whole-of-government approach through which all aspects of the democratic

life became envisioned through the identity of Nigeria as a counter terrorist. The seeming appeal to universal democratic values, entrenched in policy documents, in the GWOT in Africa would only serve to captivate but as Sardar and Davies 2002:56 asserted that ‘the questions to which we all need answers since 11 September fall off the agenda in the face of the description ‘evil’. Evil simply demands opposition rather than analysis or understanding’’. Moreover, in the wake of the GWOT, not only are the polemics of counter terrorism bereft of principles and/or social values congruent to the individual context of countries in Africa (Chomsky 2006; Call 2008), according to Boggs (2003:3), the pretext has contributed to the “unparalleled military domination over the world’s landmasses, sea lanes, and air spaces, with great aspirations toward colonization of outer space”.

The chapter is divided into two major parts with five subsections in order to fully capture the how the counter terrorist state is constructed, and the practises enabled by such constructions in Nigeria. While the first part is focused on the construction of the state as a counter terrorist, the second part works by applying this construction to the Boko Haram group. Hence the identity of the counter terrorist’s state functions by ensuring groups like Boko Haram is constructed in certain ways which work for the counter terrorist state. The first part starts with the subsection: Constructing the state as the target of terrorists aims to show how the inherent nature of this discursive construction is to categorise what oppressive practices and/or political violence should or should not be fixed as ‘terrorism’. Hence, the silencing of the history of such violence and its positioning as inherently against the survival of the corporate entity called, Nigeria. The second subheading: Constructing the peaceful state that counters terrorism argues that terrorism/terrorists are represented by this productive practice as the antithesis of peace in ‘society’. Hence, their elimination would ensure the return to a peaceful society. The second part of the chapter starts with the third subheading constructing Boko Haram’s violence as crisis. This section shows how Boko Haram’s violence is constructed as a crisis and as such demands a solution from the norm. The point here is that the construction of a crisis situation enables the justification of extraordinary measures which works nicely for the counter terrorist’s state. The fourth section : constructing Boko Haram’s violence as war aims to show how ‘crisis’ and ‘war’ are used interchangeably as a result of the GWOT doctrine in order to ensure that Nigeria is

secured against its enemies. The last subheading: Constructing Peace as the absence of terrorism highlights the practice enabled by the discursive construction of the counter terrorist's state. Boko Haram is thus the only group whose violence represents the lack of peace in Nigeria. The question is does the presence of other violent groups represents 'peace'?

The State as Counter terrorist State

Constructing the State as the Target of Terrorists

*It must also enhance its liaison relationship with Nigerian security services and help build their **capacity to combat the threat** posed by Boko Haram to **Nigerian and U.S. interests...**[and] may be pursuing interests it shares with AQIM (Boko Haram Emerging Threats to the U.S Homeland, 2011).*

***Terrorism is just an act of violence against the government.** They feel through that they will get what they want. Just an act of violence, killing innocent people. That is it and they have very strong networks. **They link up with other international terrorist organisations.** Anywhere they spring up like in Mali, they still have their financing from the international terrorism group. **They use this to destroy lives** (Interviewee 1)*

*They don't really have any grievance and there is none. They are just hiding under the canopy of religion **and want to take over the government in Nigeria.** That has been their aim. They have not come out publicly or privately to make known their grievances (Interviewee 4).*

In the words of George (1991:1), “the term ‘terrorism’ has been virtually appropriated by mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the West” and through these sorts of constructions, state-centric bias in describing violent activities and formulating [repressive] policies are the norm. As has been argued in previous chapters, one of the primary functions of the discourse of terrorism is to decontextualize acts of violence thereby making it ahistorical. In constructing the identity of the counterterrorist state such discourse function by fixing the state as the primary target of the terrorists. The construction here was not fixed for instance around the history of the violence and the possible grievances Boko Haram might be putting forth. The terrorists’ violence thereby evolves from nowhere and with no apparent reason and only exist to target the state and destabilize its architecture. The ‘threat’ and ‘danger’ posed by the terrorists to the **interests** of Nigeria and the U.S through which their proscription became justified, is positioned as a self-evident truth for the necessity of “tools and security collaboration” for effective counterterrorism measures. On the contrary, rather than Boko Haram being the threat to the effectiveness of the state or to democracy in Nigeria, the militaristic posture of the Nigerian state especially from the state-building policy strategy of the 1990s is the threat to the political stability of Nigeria. For instance, during the 1990s, the autocratic reign of General Sani witnessed several human

rights abuses including assassinations of journalists, women leaders and political activists which led to the official sanctioning of Nigeria from the international scene. However, in spite of the U.S rhetoric against Abacha's oppressive and corrupt regime, their economic ties with Nigeria witnessed an increment during this period. This contributed to Abacha's insistence on the continuation of his regime rather than a return to democracy by arguing that Nigeria's resources make it indispensable to the survival of countries like the U.S (Oye 2000). Shortly, after the death of Abacha and the return to democracy in 1999, rather than a holistic and integrated approach in policy terms, the discourse of instability through the African Crisis Response Initiative became dominant. The signification of instability through the policy strategy of strengthening vulnerable states in the 1990s became transitioned into a moment after 9/11. The signification of instability as a moment therefore help to give legitimacy both nationally and internationally to the oppression of the state through the forceful repression of dissident groups like Boko Haram. The justification of "whole-of-government" approach to countering the terrorists' threat after 9/11 is therefore premised on not just the weakness/fragility of the state but how the presence of non-state actors who seek to give voice to injustice and oppression by the state represents instability. According to Puneet Talwar, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on June 4, 2015:

*We have made substantial progress addressing **instability** in Africa over the last decade. Our African partners are increasingly taking charge of their own security. We welcome these efforts to provide African solutions to African security challenges. However, significant and complex security challenges remain. Conflict persists in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab, **and Boko Haram threaten the regional and international order.***

As has been highlighted in this thesis, the discourse of 'instability' about Nigeria and other African countries emerged during the Cold War when local issues were understood by the U.S as possible grounds for co-opting African countries into the East-West divide. While the usage of the language has changed overtime, the 'solutions' often proffered has been 'partnership' of foreign and local military to address the issues. Prior to and after the GWOT in Africa, the discourse of instability gained new relevance in Nigeria as Nigeria became 'adopted' as

partner to the U.S by the Clinton presidency in addressing security and fighting international terrorism. As a result of this partnership, the discourse of instability witnessed some revival during the Obasanjo presidency (1999-2007) as signified by the establishment of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa through the Kampala Document provided a comprehensive security and Development framework towards the provision of much-needed peace and economic prosperity in Africa. The new relevance gained by the discourse of instability was also signified by the priority given to it by Nigeria's foreign policy (which was why Niger Delta militants became labelled as 'terrorists' in the late 1990s) during the Obasanjo presidency as well. According to scholars like Adoghamhe (2006), Deng and Zartman (1999) and Akinwande (2014: 147), this partnership could be understood as an official acknowledgement of 'the link between security and stability on the one hand, and development and cooperation in Africa' on the other hand. This background is triangulated by Abrahamsen (2018) on how the new form of global militarism in Africa is linked to development/democracy and political order especially the discourse of war. By being constructed as targeting the **interests** of the Nigerian and U.S governments and seeking to "take over the government", Boko Haram thus represents the cause of instability to the socio-political landscape not just in Nigeria but to a global political order. As a result of this, the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria, as highlighted by the Boko Haram proscription, help to construct and normalize the identity of the state as the counterterrorism state.

The second narrative of the discourse of terrorism through which the state is represented as the target of terrorists is the extent of strength and lethality of such groups which in turn demand a 'strong' and 'resilient' state to counter such groups:


*Terrorism is an act of **destroying or planning attack on a group of people** who have actually done nothing so as to achieve a particular goal. It is not like a war setting, they just come together to plan attack. This day we see them **tie bomb to themselves and they just explode anytime and any day.** They do that in public places (Interviewee 5)*

*As President Obama has said, effectively addressing evolving terrorism challenges requires **strong, capable, and diverse partners** who have both*

*the political will and the ability to **disrupt and degrade terrorist networks***
(Thomas-Greenfield, May 10, 2015).

From the Global Terrorism Database to the Council on Foreign Relations, Boko Haram is represented as one of the deadliest terror groups across the globe owing to the number of fatalities recorded since the group became known. Constructing the strength of Boko Haram is often directly linked to their facelessness and invincibility as a result of guerrilla strategy and links to other terror networks in Africa. Boko Haram like most terrorist groups is constructed as being so strong, sophisticated and ruthless that the former president of Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan asserted that due to the strength and sophistication of the group, even his own life is not safe (Oarhe 2012). As regards the group’s fatalities, both Boko Haram and the Nigerian Army have often traded blames on who is responsible for the deaths of victims on certain attacks (BBC 2012, January 26th). Also on statistical terms the number of fatalities according to perpetrators (whether it was state actors i.e. the Nigerian army or Boko Haram) remains unclear. An example of this is highlighted below:

These graphs depict countrywide deaths broken down by perpetrator. These include Boko Haram, state security services, and sectarian groups (excluding Boko Haram). To avoid double counting deaths, the NST distinguishes between incidents in which one perpetrator is involved and in which more than one perpetrator is involved. As a result, deaths of Boko Haram and State Actors are combined for the category "Boko Haram, State Actor," which corresponds to incidents where there was a clash. These five groups represent the majority of deaths documented by the NST. There are additional deaths included in the overall NST count, displayed in graph 1, that are not reflected here.



Notes
 Hover over the graph to view the number of deaths.
 Specific dates can be viewed using the slider above.

Graph 3: Total Deaths by Perpetrator

Source: Nigeria Security Tracker, May 2011-April 2019

Prior to and even after the emergence of Shekau, the present leader of Boko Haram known for his violent and aggressive stance against the state, both the Nigerian police and army have been accused of killing more people than any single non-state actor (Transparency

International, 1999; Ogunoye 2001). Hence, representing the state as the target of terrorists based on lethality of groups helps to fix the assumption that the terrorists' use of violence is needless, **devious** and **ruthless** (Bush, November 2001) while that of the state is necessary and virtuous based on the legitimate use of violence by the Weberian state. One could argue that the oppressive practices of states like Nigeria thus justifies their labelling as weak states which are "axis of evil" according to President Bush. Obviously, the repressive practices of Nigerian cannot explain 'weakness' in terms of authority as the U.S policy instruments would want us believe. It should rather point to its strength as signalled by its military and economic strength and leadership position in Africa. The concern of the U.S in Africa especially as highlighted by the GWOT is premised on the fear of African governments sponsoring terrorist groups against the U.S. Hence for states such as Nigeria to resist being labelled as part of the "axis of evil" against the U.S, what is necessary is becoming a 'friend' of the U.S not in terms of respecting the human rights of the Nigerian people but partnering with the U.S to counter non-state actors who are considered threatening.

Constructing the Peaceful State that Counters Terrorism

Another strong justification for constructing and normalizing the counter terrorist state is that terrorism is a bad kind of political violence which a peaceful state like Nigeria should counter. As one of the primary functions of the state is to protect human lives and properties and defend its territorial integrity against any form of aggression, it behoves any well-meaning state to carry out such functions to fulfil the reasons for its existence. The statement by President Bush on September 11th, 2001 that

*Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a **hostile** regime*

function as a discursive move through which being part of an 'us' group constructed by the U.S as its friends and allies against enemies who are 'axis of evil' meant that the 'differential value' of the U.S as a peace-loving state is fixed in equivalential terms with terrorism. As a result, the move helps to fix the identity of the U.S and its friends in terms of an antiterrorists state as this signals a strong commitment to peace, freedom and democracy. This sort of representation was premised on an earlier analysis that the incidence of September 11 could have been averted if threats from weak/failed states had been treated with less complacency (Woodward 2002; Suskind 2006). By drawing from the virtues of freedom and peace, it becomes all the more important to ensure that 'terrorism' which is the predominant threat to peace is eliminated at all cost. Hence in the National Security Strategy (2002 p.15), the need for pre-emptive strikes became warranted and justified. As the document stated that "the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves...to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries" the U.S would not hesitate to "act pre-emptively". The identity of the counterterrorist state which is a state that is able to *know* the terrorists' intention, capacity and allies necessitated the need for Pentagon, the State Department and the Bureau of African Affairs, the three most important organs on the U.S policy towards Africa, to conclude on the need to re-evaluate the need for U.S military in Africa. This is because since the case of Somalia in 1993 when a number of U.S marines were killed, a policy of disengagement as

regards direct U.S military involvement in Africa became enacted (Patman 2008). However, in the wake of 9/11 this changed through the signification of 9/11 as crisis in policy terms and this enables the need the physical presence of U.S military in Africa in order to train African military so they could become ‘professionals’ at managing and controlling conflicts and instability (Olsen 2017).

*A nation of Nigeria's size and importance, however, **needs a credible and professional military force** that respects civilian control and fulfils its constitutional role of protecting the nation. It is therefore vital for the U.S. government to engage with Nigeria's military as part of an overall effort to consolidate democracy, rebuild institutions, and encourage investment and economic growth in Nigeria (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs January, 2001)*

*The government [of Nigeria] has lent **strong diplomatic support to U.S. Government counter-terrorism efforts** in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Government of Nigeria, in its official statements, **has both condemned the terrorist attacks and supported military action** against the Taliban and Al Qaida. Nigeria also has played **a leading role in forging an anti-terrorism consensus** among states in Sub-Saharan Africa U.S (Bilateral Relations Factsheet, Nigeria February 2008)*

The war against terrorism therefore requires the fixing of Nigeria not just as a major concern of the U.S foreign policy but constructs it as a kind of state: a counter terrorist state. Through this, the Obama government adopted a whole-of government approach which focuses on peace, stability and security in sub-Saharan Africa as “one of the United States’ highest priorities” by the State Department (Blanchard 2015). Through the appeal to the rule of law and the virtues of justice, liberty and freedom therefore, the whole-of-government approach by the Obama Presidency works well to fix the narrative of the peaceful state as the counter terrorist state. This is further evidenced in the following excerpts:

*While **military efforts remain critical**, the success of counterterrorism efforts in Africa increasingly depends upon capable and responsible civilian partners -- police, prosecutors, judges, prison officials, religious and community leaders -- who can help address terrorism through a sustainable framework that advances **rule of law** and **respect for human rights**. In that regard, we seek to increase our capacity-building support for law*

enforcement, judicial, and other criminal justice sector institutions (Thomas-Greenfield 2015).

*Of course, the western country they are **liberal people** because if Nigeria falls, they will want to support Nigeria (Interviewee 4)*

As a partner to the U.S through initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), Nigeria military was trained not just on countering terrorism in the country but also on its prevention. The whole-of-government approach during the Obama administration thus embodies the executive, legislature, police, judiciary, army, health professionals, community and religious leaders and civil society so as to address the “root causes” of terrorism. This approach become inevitable after the factual details of the millions who have become displaced, killed and/or maimed by terrorists’ groups like Boko Haram. The ‘facts’ about the evils of terrorism and that of the terrorist is so self-evident that they speak for themselves. Such ‘facts’ are “so ‘real’ that it requires no frame, so ‘true’ that no interpretation is necessary, so ‘concrete’ that no meaning need be inferred” (Zulaika and Douglass 1996: 5). The ‘facts’ about the evils of terrorism for instance highlights how through (suicide) bombing scores were killed at Abuja and how the U.N building was destroyed; it however, did not discuss how thousands of supposed ‘terrorists’ have been so dehumanised and killed extra judicially with the bodies of some dragged across the cities so as to be completely dismembered (BBC 2012, Nov 1st; Amnesty International, 2013). The corollary to the hostility of terrorism is a peaceful state which is that that is **strong and capable to counter and degrade** Boko Haram terror networks. Terrorism was frequently referred to as “plague” and “crises” which requires all the efforts that any responsible and responsive government could garner. As a result of this, in 2015 the Obama Administration provided \$71 million through the Department of States, \$40 million through the Global Security Contingency Fund program and \$45 million in Presidential Drawdown for its counter-Boko Haram strategy (Thomas-Greenfield 2016). This heavy funding to ensure terrorism is effectively countered is so instructive because for instance in spite of Nigeria’s economic prowess, about 53.5% of its population live in extreme poverty in 2009 (World Bank, 2018), yet such a whole-of-government approach has never been considered appropriate to ensure people are economically empowered.

A considerable amount of constructing the peaceful state which counters the hostility of terrorism positions the military as the solution to the problem of terrorism. Interesting policy documents and official narratives often involve partial acknowledgment of the 'complex' and 'diverse' 'realities' and 'challenges' facing Africa and an explicit assertion that military solutions are inadequate. However, a sharp disparity could be drawn between such and the solutions provided. In 2004, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) through which both military and humanitarian needs of Africa would be addressed (Stimson Centre 2005). In furtherance to this, in 2007, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) became established to be the epicentre of most U.S operations in Africa. Hence, issues as diverse as health and the oil of African states are to be addressed through AFRICOM with the main aim of countering terrorism. In response of this, Theresa Whelan, at a testimony to the congressional subcommittee in 2008, asserted that AFRICOM's establishment is mainly to confront "violent extremism" and not "...solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China". The fixing of the meaning of terrorism and labelling of groups as such works to provide a justifiable ground for the increased militaristic ventures through various initiatives like Africa Peacekeeping and Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) and the 'Flintlock' Exercise.

On the question of the extent of agency exercised by Nigeria, as argued in earlier chapters, the discourse of terrorism is a discourse of advantage to both countries as it works by silencing the roles of the structures which produced it. Hence, constructing the identity of the counter terrorist state is somewhat an easy task for the U.S. to do in Nigeria. This is partly because Nigeria, like most African countries had been under military regimes for longer periods than they are under democratic setting. In Nigeria, for instance, the military toppled the new democratic state in 1966 after the country's independence in 1960 and ruled till 1999, excluding the four-year period between 1979 and 1983 (Bappah 2016). It goes without saying that Nigerians experienced the height of oppression during these times as even the press was gagged, and emerging liberation movements violently contained (Chisom, 1999). The U.S. emphasis on containment through political order during the Cold War which brought about the accusation of the U.S. complicities in the assassinations of General Murtala Muhammed, the military Head of State, in 1976, as well as the acclaimed winner of Nigeria's June 12, 1993

election, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola due to their anti-U.S. stance (Falola 1998), the Nigerian political elites have become somewhat docile in their compliance to the U.S. (Sowale 2013; Events in Lagos, 1976; 1993).

The Transitioning of Boko Haram's Violence as Terrorism

Constructing Boko Haram's Violence as Crisis

This is in line with the 'instability' and 'crisis' envisaged in the 'foreseeable future' of 'developing countries' that were being 'granted independence long before they are able to govern themselves'. The policy document which was a defining document as it aggregates both military and economic strategy of the U.S in managing the democracies and/or development of 'emerging African nations' in line with 'civic action' elicits the history of controlling Africa's economy through a deliberate global militarism. With several high level meetings on what the 'instability' in African countries portend for the U.S., Nigeria became of 'security concern' which necessitated the construction of the U.S as the subject to be secured. The representation of the U.S as being responsible for securing the interests of the 'free world' as well that of the U.S. in 'developing countries' enables the explicit linkage of democracy to the military.

Prior to the launch of AFRICOM in 2007, as a response to the crisis of the 1990s, Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor ACOTA were the initiatives of the Department of Defense between 1996 and 2004. While criticisms and counter-criticisms of imperialistic agenda abound as regards the successes and failures of the involvement of the U.S. in countries like Somalia, Ivory Coast or even their evasiveness in the Rwandan crisis (Frazer 1997), it remains that the tradition of resorting to reactive foreign policy with telling consequences on the African continent reveals, among other things, how Africa is being imagined by the U.S. This tradition could rightly show why in spite of the severe criticisms that followed ACOTA for the implosion of Ivory Coast for instance, immediately after the September 2001 event, ACOTA was immediately subsumed under the Global Peace

Operations Initiative with immerse presence in Africa. Also the hasty manner by which state failure and terrorism become reified to the 'center of global politics' and through which this thesis has shown that Boko Haram became proscribed further buttress this argument. According to a Congressional Research Service statement, 'the Global Peace Operations Initiative was designed as a program with worldwide reach, but its emphasis was always intended to remain on Africa'. The reasons for substituting 'Global' for 'Africa' was not stated explicitly but the tradition of knowing and acting upon Africa through a 'sovereign' discourse could help in understanding the reasons for the focus.

The productive practice of the discourse of the GWOT enabled several peace-keeping operations and 'partnerships' for ordering and stability reasons. An instance of this is further highlighted in another of Linda Thomas-Greenfield's, the assistant secretary bureau of African affairs, testimonial:

*Through our bilateral and regional relationships as well as through our engagement in the UN Security Council, we are focused on enhancing the capabilities of our African partners to prevent and respond to **crises**. ..Through the Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP), a Presidential initiative announced at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit, we will continue to develop a full-spectrum of **crisis** management capabilities and strengthen the capacity of West African states and the African Union to not only improve their response mechanisms once a **crisis** develops, but to also proactively identify and prevent **crises** in a more proactive manner. (June 4, 2015)*

*I believe during president Obasanjo, he was advised that time that the **crisis** would soon break up and from his own experience, he warned the one that took power from him, that he should take the matter of security so seriously....We started having internal **crisis** even until now we are having internal **crisis**. So the time this Boko Haram started manifesting was in 2004... We are talking of Boko Haram. We have been having internal **crisis** with different names and factions but the one of Boko Haram should be 2004 (Interviewee 1).*

*No matter how you are looking at that, any country that you find violence, the **crisis** does not calm down at once, even since that 2006, there is still **crisis** in Liberia but not as it was. Today everywhere will be calm and tomorrow they will come out again. In which troop had to be sent to calm them down (Interviewee 2)*

*... And all these coupled up has led to Islamic **crisis** in Nigeria. Before now, we hardly have **crisis** in this nature. Therefore, with the help of those Islamic countries, that are now sponsoring these things, we have these **crises**. Looking at the number of people that are been killed within a short period, you will know that we have lost a lot of Nigerians to this **crisis** (Interview 3)*

*The government don't really care because the government is for those in government. The average Nigerian feels very little impact of the government and prays the issue of **crisis** be brought under control as soon as possible and can go on with their daily living. (Interview 4)*

*In 2011 the **crisis** subsided in Jos and to my understanding, I believe is the same group that was fighting in Jos that moved down to Maiduguri to now form a kind of base in Maiduguri..... the **crisis** started from church as the Muslims started blocking Christians that were going to churches then the Christians were fighting back (Interviewee 7)*

From the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in the 1997 during the presidency of Clinton to African Contingency Operations (ACOTA) in 2002, the discourse of 'crisis' has become a necessary construction to justify the intervention of both foreign and local military men in issues organic to democracy and every lives of Africans. In the entire interview text, the element 'crisis' was used about 42 times by 7 out of the 9 soldiers who were interviewed. In using this, the violence of Boko Haram was not only constructed as 'crisis' but it was also used in equivalential terms to 'terrorism' and to that of the Niger Deltas, the Maitaisine's and other violent groups in Nigeria. The interchangeable use of 'crisis' and 'terrorism' in the entire text was unsurprising as situations of political violence have often been described as 'crisis' in the military lexicon. The use of 'terrorism' only represents a shift that is silenced in order to naturalize its meaning. However, with the exception of one, all the soldiers consider the crisis situation in Nigeria as asymptomatic of issues of marginalization and corruption. An important highlight of this discursive construction is the salience of the complex interplay of social, economic, political and cultural processes in Nigeria. Understanding Boko Haram's violence as 'crisis' in this sense meant that as an antagonism, it signals the friction between 'westernization' and/or 'modernization' as against the 'traditional' socio-political character of Nigerians prior to and after independence. The project of transitioning Nigeria to be 'modern' or 'western-oriented' as has been highlighted in this thesis involves an economic developmental template as well as the idea of Liberal democracy through which the U.S

became the subject of the discourse. Through this the people of Nigeria become acted upon in such a manner that they are silenced. One of the dominant narratives of Boko Haram, as well as others like the Avengers, is the theme of corruption, westernization and economic deprivation. For instance, Abu Qaqa, Boko Haram's spokesman asserted that:

...Absolutely nothing will stop us against waging war on the Nigerian State and its establishmentsThe sect will not hesitate to eliminate anyone that chooses to prefer the western culture over sharia (Cited in All Africa November 25th, Qaqa 2011).

As Seyeifa (2013) has argued, these grievances acted as 'catalyst' for 'vulnerable' and 'poor' people to engage in political violence. In the word of Danjibo (2013) about Boko Haram's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, he was 'feeding people freely, giving people money to get married, was paying people's rent...that attracted a lot of young people who lacked some economic strengths to join that group'. Hence, rather than constructing the people of Nigeria as the victims of the practises enabled by the discourse of terrorism, (the interests of) the U.S became constructed as the defining feature of Nigeria's democratic experiment. The U.S then became the victim who suffers economic loss (partly because of exploration of mineral resources) and therefore the one who suffers should be understood. An interesting perspective to this, however, was that none of the soldier (except interviewee 6 who made an explicit linkage of the sale of weapons for war to the importation of/exchange for oil) highlighted the role of the U.S in the 'crisis'. This interesting feature, among other things, points to how the role of structures that produce meta-narratives and violent 'reality' like that of Boko Haram is silenced. Silence then highlights the power to produce what we know and the politics of fixing meaning to serve a certain end. To this end, the uprising of violent groups like Boko Haram represents the signification of a challenged hegemony. The 'crisis' did not only show that something is not working but it gives 'voice' to what has been silenced: the possibilities of alternative ways. As an addendum, this was why rather than engaging with and understanding the sufferings and grievances of the Ogoni people in Niger Delta, the presidency of Clinton 'adopted' the Nigerian government in partnership, hence they were considered as 'terrorists' owing to the 'economic loss' suffered by the U.S. Thereby, silencing the message of the 'crisis' situation because why should anyone listen to a terrorist anyway?

Secondly, from the Nigerian civil war to the emergence of 'terrorism' in the 1990s and particularly after September 2001, the presence of 'crisis' relates to the clear cut identity markers : North versus South or Muslims versus Christians respectively. By assigning rigid categories to these identity constructions, the one is positioned against the other in Nigeria through the modern/traditional dyad. The 'society' envisioned is the one which is not only accessible and thus open to the U.S but also that which remains a 'hinterland'. The use of the language of identity to describe, engage with as well as understand political violence here is not natural nor is it new. It is a deliberate design that 'essentializes' and re-enforces the 'us' against 'them'. This is because unlike previous violent groups in Nigeria, the evoking of these identity constructs, in the emergence of the discourse of terrorism, relate to the identification of an enemy rather an attempt at understanding. Hence, it is the coupling together of 'crisis' and the 'them' identity construct that equates 'terrorism'. It was interesting to note the discursive struggle and obvious contradictions by the interviewees to construct a crisis situation on the one hand and the identification of the enemy of the state on the other hand. From the perspective of these military officers, Boko Haram's categorization as an enemy of the state represents 'terrorism' and in the same light, their narratives as highlighting common grievances of corruption, deprivation and marginalization represents 'crisis'. The contradictions then became necessary to justify the militarization of democracy in Nigeria. Otherwise, without the identification of an enemy of the state, how else would the involvement of the Nigerian army be justified?

Constructing Boko Haram's violence as War

Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing (President Bush, Washington, D.C. 2001)

I have been to Liberia twice. I was told before I enter the force that then during the war, if not for that Nigeria soldiers, the war wouldn't have been successfully won, I believe if we follow the same approach with Boko Haram, the war against terrorism can be won like we did in Liberia. We just need to trust our military. No matter how you are looking at that, any country that

you find violence, the crisis does not calm down at once, even since that 2006, there is still crisis in Liberia but not as it was (Interviewee 3)

*... But what I know is that only he cannot do it. You cannot say as a president you will go out and win a **war** alone. (Interviewee 2)*

*This Boko Haram **terrorist** uses unconventional method to fight like mines. The Geneva Convention forbids the use of mines in warfare. In warfare situation, the provision on the convention allows you to kill your enemies and not like say amputate your enemy and leave him half human. There is also an allowance to take your enemy alive if he surrenders. This is basically the method the Boko Haram guys are using. The unconventional method. They make it in a way that it looks like a trap. The mines strategy has been their major style of operation and this has resulted in major casualty (interviewee 4).*

*Sometimes, the **war** itself looks like a propaganda. How this group started. Boko Haram has been on for a long time for instance, what is the meaning of Boko Haram (Interviewee 6)*

*It became a **war** between boko Haram and Christians. They burnt churches 300 to 400 churches in Borno state, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Damaturu and Adamawa. When the Boko haram group escalated further, they said their fellow Muslim are not supporting them but supporting the government of Nigeria. Then it became a fight after the Nigerian nation and no longer religious (Interviewee 8)*

The discursive shift and interchangeability from 'crisis' to 'terrorism' almost in the same breath serves as the basis for the construction of Boko Haram's violence as 'war'. However, unlike the Just War theory, and its theological base, within which Jackson (2005) has argued that the 'war on terrorism' is positioned, the 'war on terrorism' in Nigeria is aptly positioned within a justifiable premise of the nation's 'security'. The obvious need for 'security' of human lives and their properties; for state apparatus and its personnel's, among other things serves as justifiable grounds to defend the people and the state's sovereignty against external aggression. The meaning as well as the genuineness of Boko Haram's violence as 'war' seems to come naturally. It is because the violence is 'terrorism'; it is an escalated 'crisis' and therefore it is beyond what is 'normal' in Nigeria. Hence, neither does 'war' needs defining nor the need to explain or justify why a country goes to war against its own citizens. The seeming naturalness silenced the need to explain why soldiers in their quantum now resume duty on the streets and bus-stops of many cities and suburbs in Nigeria. It is because Nigeria

is at 'war'; only that the war is against itself. The war on terrorism has variously been defined as a war against something vague, a broad idea and a concept (Collins and Glover 2002; Van Veeren 2011). It is simply an endless war and a venture so infinite and undoable. In a similar vein, however with some twists, the war against Boko Haram's terrorism is not just vague, infinite and broad, it is a war that defines for Nigerians the line between 'good' violence and 'bad' violence. The history of political violence in Nigeria usually understood as 'crisis' presents a practical challenge to the Meta narrative of the terrorism construct: how is the terrorists' violence different from others? The implicit response to this as given by some of the interviewees is that Boko Haram make use of 'unconventional' tactics or they have killed more Nigerians than other violent groups. Both responses are not just empirically incorrect but also do not shed light on why some 'terror' is considered moral and legitimate. Unconventional tactics for instance have been employed by non-state actors like the Maitaisine's and the Avengers (Abimbola 2010; Agbiboa 2013), and this approach has been well documented as the major means available to non-state actors in their fight against an organised state army (Lacquer 1977; Crenshaw 1995). Again, the Fulani Herdsmen have killed more people according to several sources including the Global Terrorism Database (2017). Moreover, if the quantity of deaths is the yardstick to measure 'terrorism' how many lives should then be taken before it is considered not 'normal'? By giving the 'crisis' an equivalential identity of terrorism, the violence becomes 'bad' for the country and its peoples. Hence, its elimination was not just justified but also the violence of the state as represented by the military become 'good'. Hence, Boko Haram's violence as 'war' is a representation of a 'bad' violence because it is targeted against the collective identity of the nation. The discourse of terrorism, among other things, therefore articulates a new history where political violence whether by the state or non-state actors are 'good' and therefore 'normal' until they become boxed into moral judgement of 'terrorism'.

Constructing Peace as Absence of Boko Haram's Terrorism

Terrorism is something that needs to be dealt with... Now we don't have plan because we are living with fear of the terrorist. This is very bad for a country...terrorism is causing havoc in a particular place that have peace. Making the place unstable, making the place unbearable for people living in a peaceful place. Terrorism has caused pain in our society.... I can round up by saying that terrorism is what disorganises a society (Interviewee 3)

That is what peace will really mean because the terrorist activity is a real threat to life in the country. The movement does not really have a friend except you are there's. Probably their sponsors. ...I hope with time; the threat will be completely eliminated._Nigeria will know peace again (Interviewee 4)

..... For me, peace is actually a state where the society is working as it is supposed to be. It is absence of terrorism. Where people can go about their normal day to day business. Daily activities without disturbance, without fears, and threat to their lives and properties (Interviewee 5)

Terrorism is an abnormal act why I say it is abnormal is that, it doesn't maintain orderliness but breed destruction and disorganises people and takes life and at the end nothing is achieved (Interviewee 7)

During the military, things were done in a normal way and you don't go out to agitate anyhow even during Obasanjo democratic regime, it started small and wasn't the way it is now (Interviewee 8).

The discourse of terrorism in Nigeria assumes its naturalness through the appeal that a 'bad' violence gives: the need for peace or normalcy. However just like the definition of 'terrorism' remains elusive and evasive so also that of 'peace'. The only way to define peace would then be the absence of terrorism. Otherwise, how else do we know 'peace' until when the 'war' is won? After all the olive branch of dialogue and negotiation has been turned down by the 'terrorists' and there is 'fear everywhere'. And for Nigerians to resume their 'normal business' the 'terrorist threat' of necessity should be eliminated. What 'peace' as the 'absence of terrorism' seems to point to is that the prevalence of political violence both in the southern and northern parts of Nigeria remains asymmetry with the normal state of things. However, the kind of violence that challenges neo-colonial drive as represented by the 'interests' of the U.S and that of Nigeria's political elite is the violence that needs elimination especially militarily. 'Peace' then in this respect does not necessarily mean 'peace' to Nigerians but peace to the subject of the terrorism discourse. It is the elimination of antagonism as represented by Boko Haram's violence in order to evolve a Liberal democratic imaginary devoid of agitations against the state. At the very basic, the realist thought associate peace with the democratic process and this idea of peace relates to the absence of war, especially among nation-states (Kochler 1995). This explains why after the discursive re-construction of Boko Haram's violence as 'war', it not only become somewhat justifiable to engage them

militarily but also it immediately excludes the group from Nigeria's body polity. They became 'alien' to the nation's democratic imagination and therefore a separate entity. However, the subversiveness of the so-called 'western-oriented' democratic experiment is not just exclusionary in political participation but inadvertently encourages an autocracy or totalitarianism. This is why the definition of 'peace' in the narrowest sense of defending the state is upheld in the war against Boko Haram's violence.

Moreover, constructing the absence of terrorism as peace also highlights a deliberate discursive construction through which Nigeria's numerous governance and economic issues became substituted for Boko Haram. Apparently, by using the emotive response that comes along with acts of violence, the history of this 'terrorism' is safely hidden and the need for its elimination become a binding force. Hence, for the first time in Nigeria's history, peace became fixed as unity against a group whose violence has been defined as the centre of all of the issues facing Nigeria. Hence, the discourse is constructed to say that if only 'terrorism' could be eliminated, then all of Nigeria's challenges would be solved and everything would come to 'normal'.

Furthermore, while 'peace' in the 'war on terrorism' is evoked alongside the idea of 'justice', and understandably so because it has to be justified through the Just War theory. Constructing peace as the absence of terrorism in Nigeria comes alongside the justification for the militarization of the democracy process. The rhetoric of the need for Nigerians to 'trust' the military so that peace could be restored was often repeated using different words and discursive frames. It is frequently claimed both implicitly and explicitly that the idea of democracy without the active participation of the military, especially during the Jonathan administration led to the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria. This is substantiated below:

I think then, the political violence was not rampant like from 1999 downward. Although, there were silent killings, you know it was military then. No civilian will protest because the military was just using power. During the military regime, there was nothing like human rights as we have today (Interview 3).

I think terrorism is as old as Nigeria but it has become pronounced with our democratic settings. Probably because our democratic leaders do not have the power to fight it (Interview 5).

It is obvious that the so-called weakness of democracy to 'fight' political violence led to the 'reality' of 'terrorism'. Hence, the very survival of democracy depends on the brute force of the military. Without doubt, during the repressive military era there was little to no political violence. This is because human right activists like Ken Saro Wiwa and Dele Giwa were extra judicially executed. As has been pointed out in this thesis earlier, in spite of the sanctioning of these governments by the international community, Nigeria's trade with the U.S reached its epoch during the most repressive government of General Sani Abacha. Constructing peace as the absence of 'terrorism' exists to justify and normalise the militarization of democracy. As Abrahamsen (2018) has pointed out that this is so because the militarization now upholds the 'bare life' in Africa. For Spivak (2012), how western knowledge has 'commodified' and 'museumized' the problem of terrorism reinforces the representation of the destruction of the world trade center as the destruction of world peace as well as the double bind of politico-military aggression makes terror an object beyond border instead of considering it as an affect. She submits that the representation of terror is based on some disconnect the subaltern who are the marginalized.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the construction of the counter-terrorist state positions it as a kind of state that inherently counters terrorists. The productive practice enabled by this discourse among other things help to read 'terrorism' through the lens of violence which a state disapproves of. The construction of the state as the target of terrorist therefore silences the violence of the state by reading it as something legitimate while making the violence of the terrorists visible. It reinforces the narrative that a state is peaceful only when terrorists are eliminated. Through this discursive construct, the terrorists become the 'menace' and 'threat' to the peaceful co-existence of people. This means that the counter terrorist identity among other things function only to ensure that no 'terrorists' thrive within its domain. By constructing Boko Haram's violence as 'crisis' and 'war', the histories of violence is not only silenced but a shift in the understanding of political violence within the socio-political landscape of Nigeria is produced. The discursive move thus helps to initiate a military solution to a complex political problem. Boko Haram as a terrorist organization thus represents the challenge to the peaceful co-existence of Nigerians.

The discourse of terrorism as a political discourse thus constructs spaces for subjects and/or objects that are knowable and could be acted upon. As a political discourse, it seems to mesh well with the essentialist use of language about African fragile/failed states and the realist logic of the conception of 'state' and 'security' to the exclusion of possible complicities and other alternatives. This is because in much of International Relations and policy debates, it is not uncommon to start the discussion of Africa including the failed state-terrorism nexus (Elden 2009) on a metaphor of 'sickness', through a positivist 'hard science' of governmental 'lack' or 'failings'; the discourse of terrorism premised on state fragility in Africa, therefore draws heavily from the metaphor of 'sickness' or 'lack' to justify its essence. In order to fix and subvert the identity of the 'terrorist' such that the discourse becomes partly closed through the logic of equivalence, a discursive construction of 'failing' states drawn from colonial myth of "primitiveness", "barbaric splendours" or "bestly savages" (Leclerc 1972) became necessary. Whether deliberately or not, the speakers of the discourse have engaged in a productive practice of constructing identities through the power of knowledge. The

essence of this discursive categorization therefore is to ensure an enduring silencing of the structures that produce 'terrorism' as well as the terrorists.

Producing the identity of the Nigerian state as essentially a counter terrorist, therefore helps to define how a state should function and thereby ensure that the (entire) resources/institutions of such state exist for that end. As has variously been highlighted in this thesis, Boko Haram is only one of many violent groups in Nigeria and political violence is increasingly becoming the option that Nigerian politicians employ to gain access to elective positions, it then follows that producing Nigeria as a counter terrorism works to further entrench and normalise as well as legitimise oppressive practices among other things. This argument follows that of Call (1996) which submits that the focus on order as represented by the police, army and others in a state might work for rather than against oppressive practices in certain states where government agents use state institutions for selfish ends. Moreover, if the state exists essentially to counter terrorism, all other possible challenges simply become 'boxed' into the 'normal' category and therefore needs no pragmatic political solutions. The construction inherently positions *how* we can talk about the state, what could be said and the practices which are enabled as a result of this.

Chapter 8: The Terrorist Other

Introduction

The previous chapter has examined how the identity of the counter terrorist state is constructed to produce Nigeria as a certain kind of state which exists essentially to counter terrorism. Through the discursive shift of an implicit binary division of the state as the anti-terrorist and a subsection of its citizens as the terrorists, a whole of government approach became necessitated and justified to counter the country's most important problem, which is 'terrorism'. As a continuation of this argument, this chapter will examine how the identity of the terrorists become fixed as an Other. As articulations made possible through the representative practice of equivalence and difference, the representation of identities of 'terrorists' become positives based on the foundational essence of the counter terrorist state and/or the 'difference' of the terrorists. This thesis understands that discourse plays a central role in the range of possibilities made available to its users and political identities are constructions constituted in and by discourse. Bhabha (1983) clarifies that Otherness is not a rigid construct as it is inherently unstable and contingent and could only be understood within certain historical and discursive conditions.

In producing the discourse of terrorism in Africa and particularly Nigeria, one of the ambiguities is the struggle to highlight root causes of the terrorist violence by reifying systemic failure (which is argued as the continuation of prior colonial discourse) while also (dis)locating the 'terrorist' in a realm/space that is transcendental. The ambiguities of the construction posit among others a tension between dualisms and an embrace of "the universe of differences". The ambiguity remains a contradiction in the logic of representing 'terrorists' in Nigeria and Africa in general. In this light, Hughes (2004:7) argues that identity and interests are intrinsically linked. This means that the I/We as the subject of the discourse of terrorism constructs an Other through a representation of Self. The self here includes perceived values and principles whether they are self-serving or not. This understanding challenges positivist's thought that 'terrorism' and of course, 'terrorists' remain something 'out there', identifiable and knowable outside of the discourse that produce it so. This positioning also necessarily evades the complexity of the surplus of meaning a social action

presents to the logic of fixation made possible through the articulatory practice. As will be analysed in proceeding sections, in order to delineate a differential position for the violence of Boko Haram and its many others in Africa, the open elements have to be infused with myths and assumptions subsumed within a larger colonial discourse. By condemning the political violence of Boko Haram through the terrorism label, therefore, the label works to define other political violence not in the category of terrorism as either 'good' or 'normal' or simply fit for purpose. To put it in the words of Dexter (2012: 123):

This allows for the possibility that our violence is different. By condemning some violence, the category of terrorism also serves to legitimise violence by suggesting that an alternative violence is possible, violence that only targets the guilty, that only produces what is intended, that does not communicate a message (of fear) and that serves a progressive purpose.

This chapter analyses the discourse of terrorism as Othering in a thematic manner and three themes were identified and discussed: The Terrorist as Threat; Terrorism as a Negation; and the Terrorist as an Outsider. To do this effectively, a section was dedicated as a background to the close reading of legal definitions of terrorism both by the U.S and the Nigerian governments. Engaging with the legal definitions of terrorism becomes important in order to understand how the discourse of terrorism is fixed as an Other which is a continuation. As a result, the three themes analysed are only separated analytically but are to be considered as overlapping with the GWOT as an overarching discourse within which the discourse of terrorism as Othering is produced. The first theme, 'The Terrorist as Threat', is possibly the most highlighted feature of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria and elsewhere. This subsection is an attempt at deconstructing the construction of the terrorists as 'threat' by the U.S. through the 'failings' of Africa and by both governments through the construction of anti-terrorism. As it were that Boko Haram is a threat is taken almost as a given in literatures and the texts under analysis. However, more than anything else, the construction of threat is discursive and represents the productive practice of the power of discourse through the logics of equivalence and difference. The second theme, 'Terrorism as a Negation' is another deconstructive attempt at the discourse of terrorism in producing the terrorist as an Other. The discursive construction of the identity of the terrorist as a negation requires the deliberate hailing of the U.S. as the subject of Boko Haram's violence in order to establish a

meaningful connection to the 'threat' of Boko Haram. One of the paramount condition for the presence of antagonism is the construction of identity based on the logics of equivalence and difference. However, to effectively construct a discourse of the Other in this sense, antagonism has to be collectivized and constructed as 'enemies'. The third theme, 'The Terrorists as Outsiders' examines the insider/outsider dichotomies inherent in the discourse of terrorism as based not only on the ambiguous construction of antagonism but also on the account of 'difference' and 'new' kind of political violence in Nigeria.

Background: Legal Definitions

In the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011(SB.335) by the Senate Federal Republic of Nigeria, the judge in Chambers may on an application made by the Attorney General, National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police on the approval of the President declare any entity to become a proscribed terrorist organization and the notice would be published in official gazette. The definitions of a **terrorist** and **terrorism** are as follows:

A person who knowingly— (a) does, attempts or threatens to do an act preparatory to or in furtherance of an act of terrorism; (b) commits to do anything that is reasonably necessary to promote an act of terrorism; or (c) assists or facilitates the activities of persons engaged in an act of terrorism, commits an offence under this Act.

The discursive construction of identity is inherently connected to the discourse of terrorism. Terrorists then are not just those who engage in a kind of political violence considered illegitimate (Butler 2010); terrorism itself becomes the violence of those that are disapproved of (Whitaker 2001; Jackson 2005; Zulaika and Douglass 1996). According to Weldes et al (1999:11), "Thus, there is always a politics of identity and difference through which difference can, but not be transformed into otherness". This means, due to the partial nature of a discursive construct, it is possible to fix the identity of the terrorists as a closure, a 'fixity'; a permanent and total state (of disorder). However, that something is possible does not mean it should be done. It is interesting that the only two publicly available documents on terrorism produced by the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria defined the identity of the terrorist before engaging in the rigour of defining terrorism. Whether this is intentional or not, it thus highlights how fundamental the 'person' who commits the 'act of terrorism' is more

important than defining the 'act of terrorism' itself. The first and the most fundamental challenge here is how to delineate the boundary between which political violence counts as terrorism and which ones did not. The identity of Boko Haram from background knowledge either in terms of their 'Islamic fundamentalism' (Agbiboa 2012) or in terms of their grievances against the state as represented by their political elites (Adebayo 2010; Seyeifa 2014) or a combination of both bring about the possibility of knowing who a terrorist is. More importantly, the practices of the GWOT (with its ubiquitous enemy) in Nigeria necessitated the production of the Terrorism Prevention Act (2011; 2013) in the first place and make the 'terrorist' knowable and the production of their identity a possibility. Apparently before the production of these documents, there have been high level meetings by the U.S and Nigerian government officials on the *difference* of Boko Haram and their violence in Nigeria. The transitioning of the *difference* of Boko Haram and their violence here as terrorists and terrorism respectively therefore precludes that of the practices of the U.S in its counterterrorism practices in places like Iraq for instance; so does it preclude the oppressive practices of the Nigerian state agents. The identity of the terrorist thus transcends its value as a difference but to that of Otherness (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Weldes et al 1999). After the identification of the 'terrorist', the document thus proceeded to define 'terrorism':

*(2) In this section, "act of terrorism" means an act which is **deliberately done with malice, aforethought** and which: (a) may **seriously harm or damage** a country or an international organization;*

The construction of the terrorists' identity in (1) above was connected to intentionality through the adverb '**knowingly**' and this is also fixed as a node in the definition of terrorism itself. The premise of intentionality and causing '**serious harm or damage**' evidently draw from or rather based on criminal law. Without going into the possible long legal debates about serious harm or damage that could be caused by indifference or negligence (West's Encyclopaedia of American Law, 2010), establishing intentionality, would then mean that, among other things, the supposed terrorists are presumed to be rational actors. It follows that if rationality cannot be proven, as in the case of madness for instance, intention to commit such a crime cannot be established (Foucault and Simon 2017). However, if we agree to the rationality of their actions, it would also mean that like every presumed criminal, they

have a right to be heard or tried in a law court. The point here is that while the definition of terrorism as a kind of political violence follows a legal template, the language of the GWOT which enables the discursive construct takes their engagement beyond the purview of the law and therefore give legitimacy to a system of oppression. So, instead of the law court being the resort as in every criminal case, the rhetoric of 'war' then justifies the use of the military by the state to defend its territory.

Building on this, the intended action is constructed as against 'a country or an international organisation'. Terrorism in this sense is an intended injurious act against a corporate entity. It is interesting that usually what scholars like Primoratz (2013) tries to distinguish as terrorism is the targeting of 'innocent' individuals that is those who are non-combatants but terrorism here is posited as harmful acts against the state. The subject of 'international organizations' here as being targets is also interesting given the Nigerian environment. Sprout and Sprout (1965)'s argument about 'environmental possibilism' being the range of practices and actions available to social actors, based on the constraints within their environment helps to make sense of *how* international organisations not the local ones become part of this definition. In this light, non-state actors in Nigeria have often accused the Nigerian government of compromise with international organisations especially the oil firms and aids-donating organisations, for personal economic gains (Ekeh, 2008). So, it is reasonable to these non-state actors to fight the government of Nigeria by fighting/attacking the sources of their economic power. A quintessential example of this is Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria. So 'international organisations' as a referent sign in the definition of terrorism exists not just to protect the economic interests of political elites but also to enlist as one of the 'friends' of the U.S in the GWOT. This is further emphasized:

*(b) is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to—
(i) unduly **compel** a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing **any** act; (ii) seriously **intimidate** a population; (iii) seriously **destabilize or destroy** the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization; or (iv) otherwise **influence** such government or international organization by intimidation or coercion;*

Highlighting intent of the violence as the fundamental principle guiding the categorisation of terrorism from non-terroristic violence follows the definition of terrorism as a communicative tool (Stohl 2008). If this line of reasoning is followed through, it then means that other non-state actors as well as state agents could make use of terror as a tool for certain ends. However, the intent of 'compelling', 'intimidating', 'destroying' and even 'influencing' government as characteristic nature of the terrorists puts them in contrast to the state and other violent groups who are implied as using violence tactically or even legitimately (Hosmer and Crane 2006; Agbese 1986). In constructing the discourse of force and terror as linked to the identity of the terrorists, a moral distinction is being made between the violence perpetuated by state agents or even non-state violent actors. This is so because what seems to give legitimacy to an actor's violence is the state's ability to prove the actor's intent. It therefore leaves the space open for when such intent cannot be proven. This means despite the violence of groups like Odua People's Congress and their well-known activities at compelling and intimidating as well as destroying people's lives and properties, until the intent of their actions are so proven, their violence remains 'good' and/or 'normal' (Dexter 2012). This does little to help our understanding of the violence of several groups both in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria. It is in this light that the application of this definition in the proscription of the Boko Haram group could only make sense through the doctrine of the GWOT. The definition continues thus:

(c) involves or causes, as the case may be— (i)an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; (ii) kidnapping of a person; (iii) destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (iv)the seizure of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and diversion or the use of such means of transportation for any of the purposes in paragraph

(b)(iv) of this subsection ; (v) the manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of biological and chemical weapons without lawful authority ;(vi) the release of dangerous substance or causing of fire, explosions or floods, the effect of which is to endanger human life; (vii) interference with or disruption of the

supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life ; (d) an act or omission in or outside Nigeria which constitutes an offence within the scope of a counter terrorism protocols and conventions duly ratified by Nigeria.

The deployment of the rhetoric of fear based on the limitless capacity of the terrorists to destroy lives, facilities, hijack airplanes as well as use and/or produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons resonates well with the discourse of 'super-terrorism' (Falkenrath 2001) which is drawn upon by the GWOT. While this thesis does not in any way undermine the effect of Boko Haram's violence in Nigeria, the construction of the extremely dangerous terrorists who could potentially destroy thousands or even millions of lives by an attack could be aptly captured for instance by the incidences of the Nigerian Civil War or even the Odi killings. The Odi killings of November 4, 1999, similar to but not exactly like the Nigerian Civil War, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, took sides with multinational oil companies like Shell and Agip against the militants in Odi, Bayelsa state who wants to be in control of their resources and land. The resulting conflict led to the killing of seven policemen by an unnamed armed gang. In retaliation to this, both the state and federal governments ordered the executions of both young and old people in the small community leading to the killings of several thousands, with an unnamed number of girls and women who were raped by the soldiers and their land including buildings burnt down with explosives (Human Rights Watch, 2000). The point here is that, drawing from the context of political violence in Nigeria, all the elements weave together to construct and evoke an ultimate fear through which the supposed terrorist could be identified could aptly described state actors as enabled by their foreign counterparts. As examined by Falola (1999) all the major violence through which, statistically speaking, thousands or even millions have died in Nigeria were motivated by or woven around some considerations for foreign actors in Nigeria. Citing elements as diverse as the hijacking of planes to the use of weapon of mass destruction both of which have not been employed by non-state actors in Nigeria only serve to attribute to non-state actors the scale of violence which state actors are not just capable of but have been accused of in Nigeria and elsewhere.

Another interesting perspective to this kind of definition is that the fear of an extremely dangerous terrorists in the GWOT goes together with that of the failed states in Africa. For instance, President Bush asserted that “The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons” (January 29, 2002). The presumed alliance of dangerous regimes and dangerous terrorists who are simply enemies of the United States and would employ the most lethal weapons against the United States is what helps to construct the image of the kind of catastrophe imagined in this definition. It might then be safe to imagine that for Nigeria to construct the ultimate danger of the terrorists and employ the language of the GWOT which construct the ultimate fear associated with terrorism, it ought to have at least acknowledge or deny the possibility of its own support for such groups. Instead of an explicit acknowledgement or denial of the possible collaboration of the state and the non-state actors against the United States, the document highlighted the commitment of Nigeria to provide all necessary information and assistance to “any foreign state” for the purposes of “mutual assistance” necessary for “investigation”, “extradition”, “prosecution” including the permission to enter and search private properties, collect biometric details, and access documents and the extent to which radioactive/biological/nuclear substances are harmful as such details deemed necessary by both governments. Thus by securing the commitment of Nigeria as a partner in the GWOT, the inherent drive of the GWOT to identify enemies with limitless capacity for danger has been duly transferred from state actors being potential enemies to non-state actors in Nigeria. The last section that will be examined for the purposes of this thesis further corroborate this:

*(3) An act which disrupts a service but is committed in pursuance of a **protest**. However, demonstration or stoppage of work is not a terrorist act within the meaning of this definition provided that the act is not intended to result in any harm referred to in subsection (2) (b)(i), (ii) or (iv) of this section.*

Through the template of the GWOT in Nigeria, the only non-violent means available to non-state actors in Nigeria thus become described as “acts of terrorism”. So the activities of groups like Bring Back Our Girls could also be read as compelling ‘*An act which disrupts a*

service but is committed in pursuance of a protest' and might explain the arrest of its Convener, Dr Oby Ezekwesili on the 28th January 2108 (Daily Post 2018). Rather than the normative argument about the intention to cause terror to people (which itself is problematic), the state agents who produced this document therefore seems to be interested in protecting the institution of government which they represent.

Furthermore, the lack of an agreed upon definition of terrorism both amidst academics and states highlights its highly contested nature and the resort to value judgements in delineating what is and what is not terrorism (Horgan and Boyle 2008). It also points to the understanding among policy makers that 'terrorism' is just not another crime which is covered by general criminal law, but it represents a different kind of threat with essence based on its motivations and intended consequence. It behoves the state to codify their constructed threat into law by drawing from the Hobbesian principle of the ultimate need of ensuring the people's safety. This hitherto value-laden judgement become fixed albeit the dissenting and divergent arguments as to what constitutes the boundary of the construct is not taken into account. From the above definitions, groups as divergent as the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), the Arewa Consultative Council (APC) and the Ohaneze Ndigbo group or Igbo People's Congress (IPC) which later evolve to the Movement for the Actualisation of the sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), to name a few, which have constantly sought to coerce or influence the Nigerian government through different means to listen to their grievances fall under the open-ended definitions. The OPC, for instance, was a nationalist oriented group which was formed to protect and defend the rights of the Yoruba people after the killing of Moshood Kashimawo Abiola, the acclaimed winner of the June 12, 1993 election. The complicity of state agents in Nigeria and from foreign governments like the U.S in the death of Moshood Abiola was employed by the group as a justification for the use of violence including kidnapping, riots and political assassinations. Both the APC and IPC evolved in response to the motivations as well as violence of the OPC and that of the Nigerian government (Akinyele 2001; Olaniyan 2009). As such conducting an investigation into the labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist group through discourse theory helps to bring discursive power to the fore. The question of why and how Boko Haram become so constructed highlights the connection between power,

knowledge and truth. As knowledge remains a product of power, both what is known and unknown as well as what is said and not said is produced as discursive power deems fit.

According to the U.S Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d), (“the Act”), the following definitions are adopted since 1983 for legal, analytical and statistics purposes:

I. The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

II. The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

III. The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

Under the Federal Criminal Code Title 18 of the United States Code, terrorism is defined in Section 2331 of Chapter 113(B), as:

...activities that involve violent... or life-threatening acts... that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and... appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and... (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States...

The template of the Just War Theory which has come to define the deployment of official narratives after September 2001 (Jackson 2005), is not limited to narratives of state agents but policy documents as well. This means that the bi-polar divide of the East versus West of the Cold War through which political violence believed to be organised by or sponsored by the Communist Bloc became constructed as terrorism (Harbeson and Rothchild 2000), justified the invocation of the Just War Theory in defining what is/what is not terrorism. Since the terrorist groups are international actors/agents which involves countries, it is in the National interests of the United States to outlaw their violence and declare war against it. Hence, for both states, the definitions of terrorism are woven around the nodal point ‘National Security’. However, while the identification of an external enemy who is a terrorist is central to U.S policy, that of an internal enemy constitute the preoccupation of Nigeria.

While some dissimilarities do exist between definitions of both states, there are at least one interesting similar perspective to both legal definitions. One, it shows how the definition of terrorism makes meaning in connection with the identity of the perpetrators of violence. As a discursive construct, it helps to organise, delineate and categorise the legitimate use of violence by focusing on 'who' uses violence. In the case of Nigeria, the target was any person who commits "acts of terrorism". Technically, this refers to local individuals who commits terroristic acts but not whole groups like Boko Haram or even the state. The terrorists are individuals who are considered anti-state and/or against international organisations; it is about the enemy within. The terrorists are therefore those who are making the architecture of governance difficult and frustrating diplomatic relations through the kidnapping of foreign persons or the destruction of the U.N building at Abuja. For the U.S, while the definition of what constitute terrorism differ from one government agency to the other, it identifies whole groups as terrorists. Though this definition predated the September 2001 event, the context of the Cold War within which the definition evolved, could explain why 'terrorist groups' are considered international rather than locals.

Self/Other Binaries and the Terrorism Discourse: Dichotomous Logic and Identity Construction

Engagement with the production of discourse is critical to the understanding of relations of power because every discourse remains a narrative with a partial construction of the self and not a necessary relation between a discursive representation and 'reality'. As Cobb (2004) has highlighted that in spite of the actual violence of Al-Qaeda, the group would necessarily construct itself as victims of an oppressive system and therefore acting in line with its own moral values by resisting a system of oppression. The narrative of the US on the other hand is articulated as hinged on the principles of liberty, democracy and justice for human kind. These principles therefore form the lens through which the violence of the US should be read and understood. The perception and construction of self/other then, is not a function of essence as it relates to identity but that of discourse and power (Baker-Beall 2009; Clifford 2004). The logic of binary thinking inherent in the terrorism discourse, unlike Said's Orientalism which positions the Orient against the West, produces subjects and objects which equate naming to knowing and thereby perpetuates a system that normalises violence. For

instance, scholars like Shah (2004) and Baev (2007) have demonstrated how Russia used the war on international terrorism to explain, justify and legitimise its actions against Chechnya, a former Soviet Republic.

The Terrorist as Threat

*Now we don't have plan because we are living with the **fear of the terrorist**. This is very bad for a country (Interviewee 3)*

*So many areas which were under the control of these **terrorist** have been liberated and, I hope with time, the **threat** will be completely eliminated... Nigeria will know peace again ...they will want to support Nigeria by taking people in and these **people** will become a **threat** later to them (interviewee 4).*

One of the outstanding themes of the terrorism discourse both by the US and Nigerian texts is the representation of the identity of the terrorist as 'threats'. Simon Dalby (1997) points out that more than being a linguistic and epistemological act, the art of highlighting difference serves a very political purpose as it positions the subject of the discourse to construct a space where others become knowable and acted upon. In constructing the identity of the 'terrorist' as a threatening other who is ultimately dangerous, the subject of the texts (as represented by the US and Nigerian state agencies and functionaries) transitioned the open element 'threat' into a nodal point, and become a state of being, an ontological positioning rather than a construction amidst other possible constructions. Since the history of the violence represents a 'painful knowledge' and demands a 'deliberate blindness', the meaning constructed from the violence of the other has to be made not only to mean 'threat' but also to inscribe or mark their being as 'threats'.

However, as all values are values of difference, what reveals the instability or openness of the constituted identity is the logic of equivalence which creates a chain of significations that cancels each other until a 'common something' is left. By constituting the identity of the terrorists as positives through the logic of difference, there is a presumption of foundational essence through which difference is established. If terrorism is an identity construction which is a negation in itself, we cannot assert a signification of a 'terrorist' as 'threat' without asserting who a terrorist is not. A chain of equivalences of 'threat' according to the texts are: 'insecurity', 'menace', 'danger', 'risk', 'fear', 'destruction', 'tyranny' while that of the anti-terrorists are: 'security', 'help', 'safety', 'stability', 'confidence', 'protection', and 'freedom'. The systematic assemblage of possibly infinite signifiers is necessary to construct the identity

of the terrorists (in this case Boko Haram) as well as that of the anti-terrorists (the US and Nigerian governments) by referring back to each other in a circle of significations which cancels out each other; hence the positivity of the signs *security* and *insecurity* is subverted by a reference to something common in the differences expressed by help/menace, safety/danger, stability/risk, confidence/fear, protection/destruction, freedom/tyranny. By taking the first pair of signification: *security* and *insecurity*; both are invoked as constituting some positives and considered central to the understanding of terrorism. Hence, to speak 'security' in this sense, is to articulate representations of difference in a way that the sign is reified/modified as a new collective identity. The collective identity 'we' or 'us' is made to mean *security* and *security* also becomes 'we' or 'us'. The discursive constructions of what (in)security means then becomes elusive except when placed within the hegemonic constructions of identity through a dichotomous logic. The common something remains the differentiation between the terrorist and anti-terrorist.

The positivity assumed in the chains of significations represents a hegemonic fixation of meaning/identity. Security or insecurity could be made to mean several things depending on the subject/object of the discourse. In the texts, the identity 'we' or 'us' refers, in some sense to 'Americanness', and in another sense, the state as represented by its functionaries. This constructed identity modified as a new collective identity is made to mean *security* where *security* refers to "unparalleled military strength" and "America's growing economic strength". The articulation of brute force as signified by military and that of capitalism as meaning *security* leave us with several problematics on several grounds. To take the increasing incidence of gun violence in the US, after the September 2001 event, for instance, we could ask if that development means *security* for Americans. Again, does the idea of killing for a cause, whether considered noble or not, automatically makes 'us' secured? And ultimately if unparalleled military strength means *security* why did the event of September 2001 happened? The problematics of making the state the referent object of security is also represented in for instance a state like Nigeria where state institutions/apparatus are used to repress the people. Also, articulating the ideology of capitalism as meaning *security* does not account for the practice of inequality, global poverty and institutional racism, among others,

which is inherent in the discourse of capitalism. To reiterate, the point here is that the assumed positivity of these significations are made possible only in their differential position.

Security could then mean *insecurity* and become mobile and interchangeable depending on context and the enterprise of the speaking subject. The term *security* could prove useful when constructing and mobilizing collective identity based on principles and values like ‘democracy’, ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ but could also be used for the justification of human rights abuse and [pervasive] violence as is the case with Guantanamo Bay, the War in Afghanistan, or the gross abuse of human rights and wanton killings of Nigerians by Nigerian soldiers in the course of fighting Boko Haram. Moreover, the inherent reductionism, essentialism and Othering in the discourse of terrorism represents the silencing of the complicity of ones naming while demonizing the Other (Zulaika and Douglass 1996). The representation of the identity of ‘terrorists’ as ‘threats’ then does not point to an objective ‘reality’ or ‘something out there’ but are made possible through the partial closure of discourse.

Terrorism as a Negation

Prior to and after the proscriptions of Boko Haram [as well as Ansaru and IPOB] as a terrorist organisation in Nigeria, political violence has been prevalent in the country. However, what is new to the country and the continent is the representation and understanding of disparate insurgent movements as terrorism. This representation functions as a Negation. Negation here as a process works through interpellation and antagonism; it therefore denies effective agency to a constituted group/entity. This is evidenced in the following texts:

In a Background briefing on designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist organisations and as a specially designated global terrorists, Karen DeYoung with The Washington Post (2013) asked senior U.S administration officials:

Question: Hi, thank you. Two things: I wonder if-excuse me- could you tell us what – I’m sorry-what the specific links are to AQIM that you are aware of. And also, do either of these groups pose a threat to the U.S. homeland or U.S. persons? Thank you

*In response: **senior administration official two:** Yes, while we **believe** that Boko Haram remains primarily a Nigerian organization with its principle objectives in Nigeria, and that is true also of Ansaru, as I said in my opening remarks that it does-both groups have links to AQIM. Our assessment is that AQIM has helped provide some training to the groups and has provided limited financing.*

***Senior administration official one:** And as far as it's-the relationship to Americas- to U.S. security, there is a very large American population in Nigeria, as you probably are aware, and a lot of U.S. investment-economic investment in Nigeria. So threats to Nigeria automatically impact U.S. economic and American citizens' interest.*

As relational identity constructs, the terrorist/anti-terrorist label is an identity mobilized for political purpose i.e. based on constructed 'threats'. Through interpellation, the US become 'hailed' into the subject position of the violence of Boko Haram in such a manner as to make the violence 'speak' or mean something to them. In other words, given US interest, a connection has to be established. As to the why and how? Firstly, because with the shift of the GWOT into Africa, Nigeria which is the US most strategic economic partner in the region has to be incorporated into the discourse to effectively execute the war. In order to successfully hail themselves into the subject position of Boko Haram's violence, "warranting conditions" which "makes a particular action or belief more 'reasonable', 'justified', or 'appropriate', given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors" (Fay 1975:85 cited in Weldes 1999:13) had to be provided. One of such warranting conditions is the protection of US economic investment in Nigeria which is basically in the oil-rich region of the coastal areas. This is situated in the south-south of Nigeria, while Boko Haram is domiciled in the Northeast of the country. Moreover, the oil-rich Niger Delta where the US (as well as Britain, France and Germany's) economic interest lies already plays host to several militant groups since the discovery of oil in Oloibiri in 1956 due to repression, pervasive neglect and untold human suffering both by the Nigerian state and multinational corporations like Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (Pegg 1999; Oyefusi 2008; 2007; Ibeanu and Lockham 2007). This warranting condition shows why the scramble for oil has been advanced as the reason behind the integration of Africa into the GWOT (Keenan 2010). Whether this is or not the case in other African countries, it remains that in Nigeria, going by the warranting condition cited, groups like The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and The Avengers

should have been proscribed a long while before now. By providing such a warranting condition through a seeming self-evident connection based on 'facts', a discursive construction of threat is established and made justifiable. Secondly, we could argue that the bombing of the UN building in Abuja, also cited in the texts, is another warranting condition which help to make the interpellation of US as the subject a possibility. This might, among other things, mean the bombing of the UN building represents to the US metaphorically (as an unquestioned analogy) the destruction of the US interest in Nigeria. Obviously, prior to this time, the pressure of the US on the Nigerian government to label the Boko Haram group as 'terrorists' has been intense. While the Nigerian government was hedging on the proscription, a heavy-handed military actions were being carried out against the group. So, almost like a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', the violence of the group did not only increase but western symbols like the UN building became part of their rhetoric and practice. As an unquestioned analogy then, the US 'saw' themselves in the destruction of the building and promptly leverage on that warranting condition for more serious deliberations with the Nigerian government, leading to an eventual proscription of the group by both governments. The metaphoric connection of the UN building to the US interest thus made the hailing process do-able. In order to appropriate the hailing process successfully, some discursive substitution was therefore, employed. Through this the UN building became substituted with the World Trade Center and al Qaeda with Boko Haram. As a strategy of articulation, the art of substitution helps in the process of meaning fixation so as to bring about a discursive shift. To reiterate, the strategy of militant's occasionally targeting western interests or persons has been on, especially in the South-South where oil is the main concern. So, the destruction of the UN building by itself remains a social action, until it was made to mean the same thing as that of the World Trade Center by Al Qaeda. The violence as a referent or sign is thus loaded with myths so it could be made to mean something to the US. To be clear, showing why and how the US became the subject of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria does not in any way undermine the actual violence of Boko Haram. Through interpellation then, the subject/object of the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria becomes produced and the construction of the self and other made possible. Hall (1997:44)'s thought on discourse proves useful here:

[It] defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others [emphasis mine].

To further deny effective agency to Boko Haram and their primary target, Nigeria, antagonism, as a strategy of negation was employed. This becomes necessary in the making of a discursive shift that could accommodate the productive practice of constructing Boko Haram as a terrorist group. Since 'society' itself exists only as a discursive construct, antagonism makes obvious the limits of that discursive construct and reveals the impossibility of its full realization. In the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 125) 'it is because a peasant *cannot be* a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land'. Since no pre-discursive identities exist, every identity including social actions and relationships are produced through discourse. What this implies is that the present national and international identities, are produced through discourse as a 'society' which 'never manages to be society' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:127). In this sense, the relationship of the US with Nigeria, like other African countries, lend itself to infinite possibilities through discourse but would only be limited by 'something subverting it' which is within the social. This 'something' becomes an Other because it prevents the identity of US as a global leader from full actualization. This is why the reification of Boko Haram's religious identity became necessary in mainstream literatures on terrorism in Nigeria. For instance, some scholars which could be positioned within Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' template argue that the group are religious fundamentals which implicitly reflects the nature of the Nigerian society and taps into local grievances in order to advance their course (Elden (2014); Agbiboa (2014); Solomon (2015) and Abimbola (2011)). In his words, Abimbola (2011:99-100) asserts that 'Nigerians are a highly religious people, or so it seems...the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 indicated growing Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, apparently in the face of the government's seeming unreadiness to tackle the menace'. So for scholars in this school of thought, not only does culture explain violence but also culture is a discrete category with a seeming pre-discursive identity. This form of essentialism and reductionism evade the complexities that scholars like Okafor (2011) and Nnoli (1988) have already highlighted in understanding political violence and ethno-religious identity in Nigeria. One of which is that

these identities are deliberate but shifting constructions in the service of the political elites. Moreover, the construction of equivalential identities through discourse is the necessary condition for the presence of antagonism.

So, just like discourse, the social never fully constitute itself and its limits not only subverts it but limits the realization of its full presence. Antagonisms present to us the limits of the social and subverts society from fully actualizing itself. It reveals to us how the violence of Boko Haram, which is an objective reality became 'the presence of the Other'. It marks the end of objective relation and reveals the non-being of society. In this sense, the identity of Boko Haram, is a referent that seeks to destroy the ambition of society from constituting a full presence. So Boko Haram's terrorism as an antagonism, an Other, is not by itself an objective reality, but drawn from a metaphorical representation, or 'an 'experience' so to speak. The metaphorical representation or 'experience' (which is the GWOT), not in itself a totality, produces the Other by de-individuating the agency of the factual agents of violence, it becomes constructed as the violence of a collective Other, i.e. Boko Haram.

The non-being of society, i.e. limits of the productive relations between US and Nigeria, especially the GWOT, as a result of antagonism produces the construction of the terrorist identity. The non-being of society as represented by the presence of Boko Haram, the Other, is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevents its being fixed as full positivity' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:124). This suggests that the ethnic/religious/political identity of Boko Haram, their history as well as their violence open up the possibilities for several meanings and bring about the impossibility of essence in understanding. Identities are always almost over-determined, and it is through a negation, that is, an emptying of the productive possibilities of over-determination of identities that a constituted entity is identified with a referent. This reveals that to label Boko Haram, as a terrorist group demands a deliberate identification with a sign or referent through discourse and a re-articulation of their being, which is an Othering and a negation. This Othering is what the discourse of terrorism represents. For instance, the Maitaisine violence of the 1980s, as well as the Izalas, which many scholars believe Boko Haram originated from was often represented as 'uprising', 'riots', 'religious crisis', 'massacre' or 'conflict' (Kukah 1993; Gofwen 2004; Falola 1992). The

Maitaisine uprising, as it is often referred to, was said to be responsible for the deaths of thousands and destruction of an un-estimated amount of properties including western symbols and almost like the Nigerian Civil War, in terms of duration, it lasted from 1980 to 1985 with pockets of violent uprising in Kano (1980), Kaduna and Bulumkutu (1982), Yola (1984) and Bauchi (1985). The leader of the movement, like that of Boko Haram, also advanced criticisms of corruption, inequalities and the likes against the Nigerian government which he posits as capitalist and westernized (Forest 2012; Ndidi 2016). So why the actual violence of Boko Haram, including the destruction of the UN building are positivities to the extent that people were killed and physical properties destroyed, the antagonism is not reducible to them. This becomes necessary as far as their incorporation into a metaphorical or symbolic order (i.e. US global leadership/the global war on terror) is considered a viable project. The structuring of the discourse of terrorism itself makes the reification of a sign or referent while silencing or 'emptying' other signs a necessity which appeals to 'experience' or 'metaphor' in order to arrive at a partial totality.

As a negation, the discourse of terrorism makes use of the logic of equivalence and difference to produce social totalities (identities) since they are not pre-given; they emerge through articulatory practices as "attempts to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112). In this light, the "terrorists" are "enemies" of the "people". According to Aho (1994) the enemy/friends binaries exist to serve the mobilization of one constituted group against another by evoking certain emotions through reconstruction. A reconstruction of their being as an ontological presence that makes society incapable of achieving its ambition means a forcible change into 'friends' of the 'people'. Again, these signs bring about chains of significations like poverty/wealthy; evil/good; barbaric/civilization; and hate/love in a polar divide that cancels out each other and are drawn upon to arrive at a common something. The dominant signifier here seems to be the concept of Liberalism which also reveals the common something as the colonized/colonizer differentiation. The presence of something that subverts or limits the full presence of 'society' might seem to reveal some positivity in the discursive construct of the 'terrorist' as an 'enemy'. To assume a positivity to the identity of the 'enemy' as a limit to the social is to assume or accept something beyond differences; something objective and

positive- 'a new difference' (ibid127). In the texts, two reasons were highlighted as the basis for the designation: one, political violence which directly/indirectly targets the US; two, connection to already designated groups in [North] Africa. Since [political] violence is highlighted as one of the referents through which this identity is constructed, one could argue that [political] violence is an objective reality. Even if we accept that violence is a positivity and the 'fact' that it is politically motivated could be established from the narratives of the insurgents themselves, this still does not show why the violence of other politically motivated groups, who also target western interests/persons in Nigeria has not become constructed as terrorism. The second reason cited might then illuminate the discourse: their connections to other Islamist group(s) in Africa, particularly AQIM and Al Shabab. This could be disentangled on two notes. One, while it is beyond the purview of this thesis to contend the proscription of AQIM and Al Shabab as terrorist organisations, it remains that empirical evidence have continued to point to context-specific local conditions within which their violence could be understood. Dowd and Raleigh (2013) and Farrall (2011), for instance, have pointed to the implosion and fragmentations in Al Qaeda, AQIM and Al Shabab which not only put the strength of their franchise at a question but is also manifested through their own verbal dissonance of their motivations, agenda, ideology, narratives and their relevance in national politicking. Al-Shabaab leadership have also for instance publicly discredited narratives linking their localised struggles to a globalized agenda. This background unveils what Dowd and Raleigh refers to as "the myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel" through which Boko Haram's violence has been linked to that of groups in North Africa. Hence, the linking together of Boko Haram to AQIM and Al-Shabaab amounts to a reductionism which is not just ahistorical but lacking in substance. Two, it is interesting to note that the supposed connection of Boko Haram to these groups were stated explicitly as based on secondary, open sourced documents rather than some (rigorous) intelligence gathering by the U.S. The result of which clauses like, "Boko Haram evolving tactics...**may be** the result of ties between AQIM and Al-Shabaab in Somalia"; [Boko Haram] is focused on local issues, although it **may be** pursuing interests it shares with AQIM" (Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S Homeland 2011:12; Statement for the Record on the World Wide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 2011:18) were employed in justifying the

designation. The resulting decisions of designation is therefore produced based on some 'interests' of the U.S. in the group and therefore mythic rather than factual.

To accept this proposition of some positivity to the construction of 'enemies', will amount to dislocating the limit to the full presence of society as something transcendental and external to its construction. That Boko Haram, like other groups, is not a homogenous entity is evidenced in the nuance in their narratives concerning their ethno-religious identification and its diverse hermeneutics; their different stratum of class identifications and the splinter groups that have evolved from the movement (Ordu 2017). The fixedness of these identities so constructed will among other things mean to evade the possibilities of change and with the interruption of the democratic discourse, the constructed identities become a limbo where the governments can dislocate and thus explain away 'oppression'. To reiterate here, taking away agency from the individual perpetrators of violence and positing some positivity to their construction as 'terrorists' who are 'enemies' reveals the strategy of negation in mobilizing identities against themselves. Moreover, the limit of the social is present within it i.e. internal to the very logic that constitute it and the construction of the 'enemy' of the 'people' only reflects a hegemonic intervention.

To further consider this, the discursive construct of the identity of the 'people' as 'friends' against which that of the 'enemies' were mobilized presents some challenges. One, to construct this identity, again synecdoche had to be employed. This is because what is articulated as the 'people' reveals how component part of an entity i.e. Nigeria is represented as the entire entity. An instance of this logic is represented in the interviews conducted for this research:

Yeah, before we go to the final question, just curious about why you think the army wiping them out will help I mean what does it mean for a country to be going to war against its citizens? (Interviewer)

*The purpose of governance is to create an enabling environment for her **people** to do business and exist. Whatever is necessary to bring about that, I think it is worth it and it is the responsibility of government to do so. The government cannot because of a group has religious bigotry against others and allow them to continue to destroy others in the society. Any responsible government will have to seek for the higher goal. The higher goal is to the*

*good of the larger populace. I think that is it. If the government has to do away with some **people** in order to achieve the higher goal, I think it is worth it (Interview 1).*

The partial closure of this polemic is predicated on two assumptions: firstly, that culture and/or race explains violence that cannot be justified by progress (Mamdani 2003: 130); Secondly, that the Other is deserving of elimination for the good of progress. Firstly, as a negation, by privileging culture (i.e. ethnicity/religion), the discourse draws from European constructions of 'backward tribes', and as Berry (2006) has submitted that in constructing the Self/Other binaries of the discourse of terrorism both parties draw on religion to further their course and perpetuate violence. So even if the violence of Boko Haram is taken as a given that it is motivated by religion, this is not exclusive to the 'terrorists'. For Mamdani then this deliberate 'essentializing' helps us make sense of the violence of the Other. In his words:

Unable to explain it, we turn our back on history. Two such endeavours are worth noting. The first turns to culture, the second to theology. The cultural turn distinguishes modern from pre-modern culture and then offers pre-modern culture as an explanation of political violence. If revolutionary or counter-revolutionary violence arises from market-based identities such as class, then non-revolutionary violence is said to be an outcome of cultural difference. On a world scale, it is called a clash of civilizations. Locally – that is, when it does not cross the boundary between the West and the rest – it is called communal conflict, as in South Asia, or ethnic conflict, as in Africa.

While Mamdani's historicism might be criticized on account of a seeming relativist argument, it remains useful to the extent that the dichotomized logic premised on an imperialized model or logic presents an internal contradiction in a world where the state can no longer be the privileged unit of analysis. This contradiction becomes obvious in the words of the same interviewee and that of others:

...A society that is made up of 250 ethnic groups and then we have 36 states in the federation. Nigeria is a federation and then the issues of violence arises as a result of scarce resources. Each of these 250 ethnic groups tries to be in control and so any one that is in the centre will control these resources and try to allocate it to his clan from my personal experience. So this is one of the things that give birth to political violence. ... The

government in Nigeria is not really for the people but for those who are in government, that is why everyone want to be there because the resources is not only controlled for their clan but for their pocket as well.

I mean the government of the day, there are some group of people sponsoring the people. Using it against other religions and other political believe and ideology. When Goodluck was there as a president, he was a Christian and they do not want him. So let me say the other opponents were using it against him so they could say that, during his tenure in office, there was no peace. Yeah, the name Avengers. You know if somebody has not wrong you, you won't be thinking of vengeance but if otherwise, you want to avenge. This group was formed so as to fight against the government because when Goodluck was there who was from the same region as they i.e. the group, Boko-haram was used to trouble his government (Interview 2).

The internal contradictions inherent in the narratives of the interviewees of asserting on the one hand that the violence is motivated by 'religious bigotry' and on the other hand by 'resource control' reveals the hegemonic intervention through which the discourse of terrorism has become fixed. If the 'failings' of government is also highlighted as the cause of 'terrorism', the reification of culture then exists to manage and produce the Other (Said 1978) among other things. It is interesting that culture remains an implicit discourse in the U.S. and Nigerian government's texts but given voice to in an explicit manner in the interviews. This is because there is an implicit double dealing in the texts: the violence is articulated as global because of the 'threat' of Boko Haram to American/Western interests and thus fits well into the GWOT while at the same breath in all the texts the violence is constructed as targeted at local issues. As pointed out by Mamdani then, culture becomes the touch point when the global dimension is added to violence. The boundary of the local/global divide then becomes both blurred and highlighted through the discourse of terrorism. Like Said (2003) has argued that the production of the culture of the Arabs as backward, anti-democratic and threatening, the same can be said of the production of Boko Haram's violence as terrorism.

Secondly, the identity of the 'people' here is articulated as a homogenous population, whereas Nigeria, remains a "complex web of politically salient identities" which makes Blanco-Mancilla (2002:4, 26)'s seminal study submit that Nigeria is the "most deeply divided state in Africa" with a "...history of chronic and intractable conflicts and instability". Blanco-

Mancilla should just have mentioned that this division and “intractable conflicts” works through the “binary logic through which identities of difference” are produced (Bhabha 2010:4) and mobilized (Nnoli 1988; Adebani 2014). Also, the construction of the ‘people’ here as in the other texts points to an exclusionary representation where the group that is being negated is articulated as not belonging to the ‘people’ of Nigeria. Hence, a part becomes the whole. Laclau (2005:81) sums it up this way: ‘The people’ in that case, is something less than the totality of the members of a community: it is a partial component which nevertheless aspires to be conceived as the only legitimate totality’. The “people” becomes part of the members of the community produced as ‘friends’ against the collective Other who are considered problematic. They are articulated as the legitimate occupiers of a territory for whom governance is due. This discursive construction which directly justifies the negation of a part of the Nigerian population as ‘terrorists’ worthy of elimination based on the “higher goal” of government reveals the inherent inconsistency in what is often conceptualized as *governance* or *security* especially when the postcolonial state is in question. The disruption in the production of the discourse is however further highlighted in the ambiguities in the meaning of the sign ‘people’. Does it refer exclusively to Nigerians who are not terrorists? Or does it include Americans/Westerners both in Nigeria and elsewhere? Since the US has been interpellated as the subject of the discourse through a metaphoric connection, the ‘people’ could be taken as an inverse representation of the US and not that of Nigeria. Evidently, the uneasy history of political violence in Nigeria reveals several nuances in the ethno-religious cleavages as well as the international dimension inherent in the narratives of both the government and the violent groups so constructed (Adibe 2012). So, a necessary elimination of some for the ‘good’ of others cannot be further from a ‘postcolonial anxiety’ (Krishna 1999) where nation-building has become synonymous with militarized state centric security (Parashar 2018). A clear instance of this remains the Nigerian Civil War where millions of Nigerians in the South-East were killed in order to deter secession (Stremlau 1977). Therefore, the idea of *Progress* evoked in the texts continually draws upon the conceptualization of racial/ethnic and/or religious superiority as a fundamental justification for the “extinction of barbarous customs” (article 2 of the Brussels Act of 1892). It is interesting here that in writing the story of Progress, the discourse of terrorism as a negation does not in any way condemn

violence but rather it is not only the violence of the 'inferior' that is articulated as bad for progress but also their being. In this sense, the story of Progress has moralized not only the violence of Others but also marked their bodies in such a manner that they are only worthy of elimination for the 'higher goal' of society to be actualized. In essence, depending on whom the object of the discourse represents i.e. Boko Haram or other Nigerians, they become represented as the "victims of progress" who are meant to "disappear" (Bodley 2008). Therefore, it dislocates the violence of the 'people' from its history and by so doing justifies an oppressive collectivized arrangement that frames the elimination of peoples as a necessary good.

The Terrorists as Outsiders

*It must be a **foreign** organization.*

The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national Defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. (Department of State, 2013)

Following the negation of 'terrorists' is their representation as 'outsiders' not only in the global schematic of things but also in Nigeria. By constructing a Collectivized Other, the representation of two forms of society became possible through politics. As a problem of politics, the "two opposing systems of equivalences" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:151) of the insider/outsider or internal/external dichotomies in the terrorism discourse is articulated through the productive practice of representation. Constructing this totality of an "ambiguous" dichotomy would amount to a kind of 'populism' which is 'a frontier of exclusion [that] divides society into two camps' (Laclau 2005:81 emphasis mine). This is because both Boko Haram and the other groups so constructed, have been de-individuated and represented as a collective Other, i.e. 'Outsiders', so as to construct and mobilize the identity of the 'people' as 'Insiders'. This means that as a moment the insider/outsider dichotomies is only made possible through a "fragile and ambiguous" (ibid.) articulation of antagonism through which society becomes an impossibility. Such Binaries as Othering are not just overly simplified and imperialist (Berry 2006) especially in a country like Nigeria where such divides

are manipulated but reflects the power of discourse to produce 'reality'. This can be further exemplified through the following interview excerpts:

*Terrorism is something that needs to be dealt with. Looking at the number of people that are been killed within a short period, you will know that **we have lost a lot of Nigerians** to this crisis (Interviewee 3)*

*The Boko Haram themselves are they Nigerians? **In part they are Nigerians in part they are not Nigerians** (Interviewee 6)*

This argument meshes well with mainstream body of scholarship on Boko Haram like Solomon (2015) and Amusan and Ejoke (2017) that Boko Haram's specificity/difference lies in the lethality of the group as compared to other violent groups in Nigeria. However, if this is the case how then should we describe the violence of the Nigerian state against the Biafra secessionists of the 1960s? Or the present carnage of the Fulani herdsmen (which has surpassed that of Boko Haram)? (Global Terrorism Database 2017). The articulation of the lethality, 'havoc' or 'fear' of the Boko Haram violence is made possible by the fixation of antagonism in a way that posits it as 'new' or 'different' from what is 'normal' to society. By highlighting the pain and fear of people in society as a result of the presence of the terrorist, this not only means that other prevalent violence has assumed a 'normalness' and thus could be understood as 'peace' but also that of Boko Haram is beyond the boundary of 'normal' or 'insider' violence. The ambiguous delineation of what violence passes as 'bearable' or 'peaceful' reveals the difference of the violence of Boko Haram and thus the warranting of the 'outsider' status. The outsider designation works through the seeming "givenness" of 'new' kind of violence that comes with the discourse of terrorism. Again, the argument *that "Looking at the number of people that have been killed within a short period, you will know that we have lost a lot of Nigerians to this crisis"* shows that the dichotomize logic of the terrorism discourse presupposes that the so-called 'terrorists' are neither Nigerians nor did the loss of their own lives count. This brings about not only a dehumanization of the victims of both sides but also a righteous self and a deliberate construction of one's pains and suffering in the cause of the war as meritorious while that of the Other as due justice (Cronin 2003; Coleman 2004; Zartman 2001). The argument here is simple; it is the power of discourse

that has produced 'terrorism' out of extant political violence which has been prevalent since the supposed independence of Nigeria in the 1960s. Hence, Boko Haram's violence is as 'Nigerian' as its many others. If the difference of Boko Haram is to be taken as given, then the many other violence is being 'banalized'. This argument could be further substantiated in the words of Spivak (2012:94) , 'I am suggesting that if in the imagination we do not make the attempt to figure the other as imaginative actant, political (and military) solutions will not remove the binary which led to the problem in the first place. Hence cultural instruction in the exercise of the imagination'. By this she presents the other not just in the sense of root causes of his violence but in terms of Kant's 'sublime'. Spivak describes suicide bombing as "purposive self-annihilation...the extreme end of auto-eroticism, killing oneself as other, in the process killing others" (2012, p. 383). She posits that in attempting to understand, we often rationalize and this makes the idea of terrorism simply dismissed through categorization. Having critiqued Foucault and Deleuze on two grounds (in can the subaltern Speak?): one, the inherent counter-productiveness of reducing power/desire/interest's heterogeneity to a seeming 'coherent narrative' and two, the argument for the awareness of intellectuals on the 'discourse of society's Other' (ibid. 272). As this thesis follows Bhabha's theory of Otherness, Bhabha suggests that Otherness is the fixation of ambivalence based on some strategy of stereotyping in order to veil the ambivalence inherent in a dyad. In this light, fixing Boko Haram as an Other works not only by their seeming exclusion from the collective identity of 'Nigerians' but also by denoting their violence as essentially different from that of others.

Conclusion

This Chapter has made an attempt at showing how the construction of the terrorist as an Other has come to be produced through the U.S., and Nigeria texts. It has been argued that this construction came about through an implicit binary division of that state as the anti-terrorist and some citizens as the terrorists. This discursive totality therefore works to make the terrorist knowable and to be acted upon. With the Nodal Point of the legal definitions (of terrorism/terrorist) by both governments, being National Security, it becomes possible to construct security/insecurity to mean what the speaking subject deemed fit. To this end, while *security* is unproblematically constructed to mean the state, *insecurity* becomes some

'foreign' entities or some anti-government persons/ movement in the U.S. and Nigeria respectively.

The construction of the terrorist as an Other, therefore, is premised on the articulation of the full possibility of society where antagonism is located beyond 'difference' and becomes transcendental. As such the discursive construction of threat is made possible through politics as 'difference' makes society an impossibility. To construct threat is to construct (in) security which has been argued as articulations pliable to the service of power. The productive power of discourse among other things would mean that security or insecurity becomes whatever the speaking subject defines it as. This means that the prevalence of political violence in Nigeria could mean security while the violence of Boko Haram is articulated as insecurity. The discursive construction of threat is particularly important as it dislocates Nigeria and/or Nigerians from the subject of the discourse and incorporates the U.S as the subject of the violence of Boko Haram. The result of such a discourse is the negation of the 'terrorist' through the articulation of the necessity of Progress to bring about 'Liberty', 'Democracy' and 'Justice'. This invariably means that through negation the terrorists are without help the 'victims' of Progress because they are the 'embittered few' who are not only outsiders to society but are unwanted for the full actualization of society.

It has been argued that articulating Boko Haram as a terrorist group is a possibility but not a necessity because violence as a social action is a referent that is open to several interpretations. The construction is only made possible through the implicit discourse of 'who' uses violence in the texts under study and not through the discovery of an essence that is terroristic. As such while the U.S. points to seeming 'warranting conditions' that justified the proscriptions, the Nigerian texts has no such warranting conditions but gave an endlessly broad definitions of terrorism in order to 'appear' as the speaking subject of their own territory. The discourse of terrorism functions then as a productive space where oppression can be explained away, justified and legitimised. It is then a discourse of advantage to both governments and only serves to normalize other categories of violence not labelled as terrorism in Nigeria.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Introduction

The aim of this thesis has not been to argue against Boko Haram's violence as being of 'real' harm to the people of Nigeria and the region of West Africa. Ironically, it is the harm caused by this political violence that should justify the seriousness of engagement with the group. This is reflexive of the motivation to undertake the research in the first place. It is rather the aim of this thesis to show that Boko Haram's violence is a referent sign with many possible constructions. It is therefore a major argument of this thesis that the history, (or "inventory" to use Said 1979:25's words), of the violence, should serve as context to understanding and engaging with this violence. This thesis has attempted at challenging and/or deconstructing the label 'terrorism' in Nigeria by examining the understanding of political violence in Nigeria prior to and post September 2001 through the discursive constructions of the other and the self as well as the practices enabled by this discourse. Though writers like Akinwande (2014) has pointed out that processes in the U.S usually influence its foreign policy as well as its bilateral relations, in this thesis processes in Washington has largely been ignored in order to focus more on constructions of Nigeria and the terrorist by the U.S. In order to avoid exclusions, which is also an important node of this thesis, interview texts from nine Nigerian military officials were analysed to provide the extent to which representations and practices by the U.S are either accepted or challenged. Hence, the 'voice' of these servicemen serve as that of the state to the extent to which they represent the state by justifying and naturalizing the 'war on terrorism' and as that of the people of Nigeria because of their identification as Nigerians suffering from the import of corruption. To this end, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) affirm that for representational purposes, subject positions are almost always overdetermined. Hence, the military officials in their capacity as servicemen could ably represent the state and as part of the 'public servants', they represent the Nigerian populace. Their identification with the people of Nigeria is reflected by eight out of nine of these soldiers who highlighted corrupt practices by political elites as being complicit in the 'crisis' of Boko Haram. However, as 'managers of violence', they probably did not have the distance of mind

to engage with the dominant narrative of terrorism and how it enables the 'war' they are fighting. The main argument of this thesis is therefore that the discourse of terrorism through Boko Haram's violence is rooted in the neo-colonial structure of Nigeria and exists to normalize violence in Nigeria. The labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist group therefore exists to silence the structure that produce the violence as well as normalize the political violence that are not assigned to that category.

This thesis does this by examining the role of discourse in producing what we know as "truth" and "reality" as it relates to the construction of identity and the productive practices enabled by this. Both the fixing of meaning and the construction of identity are partial closures which are open to other possible constructions. Hence, meanings and identities are not given but are the products of representations. According to Laclau (1988:256), "if difference exists only in the diachronic succession of the syntagmatic pole, equivalence exists only at the paradigmatic pole". This means that history of the evolution of a word as a background would inform how such words could be used and substituted in the immediate. Hence difference eventually equates or means same. The terrorist identity in Nigeria therefore is an identity construct which reflects the history of the neo- colonial discourse in Nigeria and on equivalential grounds, it becomes the same as that of the one who is antiterrorist. This by itself does not deny the existence of 'facts' of violence or corrupt practices as it were but that how we understand and construct these 'facts' does matter. In theory, this might have implications for some infinite discursive constructions based on the same referential sign and therefore represent a seemingly impossible task. However, the argument here against an absolute and totalizing discourse like terrorism does not present itself to some infinite constructions. Rather, it creates the space for a fruitful and critical engagement with political violence to the end that it might be understood rather than being explained away by demonizing the perpetrators of the violence. Both the governments of Nigeria and the U.S, for instance, have little empirical evidence about the group, including details as banal as when the group started, comprehensive profile of its leaders and whether they are actually Nigerians or Nigeriens or drawn from different countries in Africa. This shows that if details that should be commonplace are missing, we cannot ask 'why' the group is engaging in such magnitude of violence and more important to this thesis 'why' is Nigeria talking about

'terrorism' now. While scholars like Solomon (2015) and Ayinde (2010) has attempted to answer this question, with the former situating it within the context of the revival of Islamic fundamentalism while the latter considers it through the lens of the 'invasion' of both the Arabs and the colonialist into Nigeria. However, those in the former group did not account for the fact that Islamic fundamentalism has already been foreshadowed by the U.S during the decade of independence and this has informed to some degree their engagement with Nigeria and other African countries. Islamic fundamentalism itself is also not a given but an identity construction that is open to other possible constructions. Even if we accept Islamic fundamentalism as an organising category, it still remains that it has neither engage with nor answer the question of why Nigeria is talking about 'terrorism' now and the implications that follow these constructions. Also, the latter group that highlighted foreign invasion in Nigeria, especially through violence, has also taken for granted the labelling of Boko Haram as a terrorist group. It only seeks to unveil the history of the violence but nonetheless accept the construction as 'terrorism' as closed and total. It remains that like the U.S Vietnam war and even the Cold war, the war against Boko Haram's 'terrorism' might represent not just an endless war but also another utterly unnecessary waste of human lives.

Through the focus on discourse, this thesis is intended to both challenge and complement other approaches to the research on Boko Haram's violence in Nigeria. As a challenge, one major issue at stake is the conception of power as something used [to oppress] others. Therefore, agents and structures are assigned a priori identity to the exercise of power. This thesis, however, considers power in line with Michel Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe's postulation. According to Foucault (1980b: 93), "there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association". In other words, there would be neither agents nor structure without the exercise of power as both agents and structure are effects of power. The productive use of power produce both knowledge and truth. Hence, both agents and structures have no identity before discourse. What is known can only be known within discourse. Hence, power is inhered in meaning-making and thereby the possibility as well as the production of agency and structures, respectively, are sites of discursive power. To this end, the question about the degree of freedom or the extent to which Nigeria exercise agency is simply that the agency of

Nigeria is always negotiated within the structure of discourse produced. For instance, the representation of certain regions of the world as 'Third world' come along with structures of power like subjugation and domination and defines the extent to which agency could be exercised within such structures (Goldberg 1993; Doty 1996). The production of the "truth" of Nigeria being a "Third world" country already defines for it the structure within which it could operate and the extent of agency it could exercise within such structure of domination and for the Boko Haram group this relates to their limits within the relationships of oppression available to them. The focus on discourse and representation in understanding the violence of Boko Haram, therefore, helps to unveil the inherent connection between power, structure and agency. This thesis, therefore, intends to challenge earlier researches on Boko Haram's 'terrorism' in Nigeria. Building on this the thesis made a unique contribution to bridge this gap in knowledge as no known research has shed light on the construction of terrorism in Nigeria following representational focus. As a complement to earlier research, as no knowledge exist in isolation, this research intends to add to the understanding of U.S Foreign policy on terrorism and/or political violence in Nigeria particularly and Africa in general. It seeks to unveil the politics of naming, silence, exclusion, oppression and domination to the understanding of political violence in Nigeria. Every violence has a history and it is this history that could help us to 'know' why certain discursive constructs enabled practices that now define our "reality". As an attempt at deconstruction, it shows how knowledge and truth of Boko Haram's 'terrorism' is produced and how associated discourses all form a unity to evolve this "reality".

This research is situated within the Critical Terrorism Studies. However, the aim of situating this research within the Critical Terrorism Studies is not to uncritically bifurcate the research into "critical and orthodox ghettos" "where one divide cannot speak to the other" (Smythe et. al. 2008:147). As highlighted earlier, the 'critical' approach of the thesis is to challenge the normative understanding and a seeming essentialized positivist construction through which the Boko Haram's terrorism is positioned as given and fixed. Arguing for an anti-foundationalism ontology helps among other things to do away with an a priori identity label in engaging with the group. It creates the space for both the structures (which produce the totalizing discourse of terrorism) and the agents of the violence to be critically examined. This

will lead to an unveiling of the strategy of silence which is inherent in totalizing discourses like terrorism.

The remaining sections of this chapter will do several things: One, the second section will engage with the research questions of this thesis:

Main research Question: To what extent does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria represent a hegemonic political construction?

Sub Questions:

- I. How does the U.S foreign policy towards Africa, from the 1970s, enable the construction of the threat of terrorism in Africa/Nigeria?
- II. How does the construction of the U.S self from the 1970's enable and justify U.S colonial tropes in Nigeria?
- III. How does the construction of Nigeria as a counterterrorist state enable and naturalize discourses/practices of counterterrorism in Nigeria?
- IV. How does the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria enable and justify the construction of the terrorist as an Other?

The second section therefore will show how Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory will help to answer the main research question of this thesis as it reflects on the central contributions of the thesis. This is done by referring back to elements analysed in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight. As a result, it will show how the threat of the terrorist become constructed and more importantly, how the productive use of power makes possible the colonial tropes within which the identities of the U.S, Nigeria and the terrorist are constructed, and practices of counterterrorism naturalised. The third section of this chapter will discuss the limitations of the research and the recommendations it seeks to offer. The knowledge claim of this thesis

does not allude to any absolute “truth” or any objective scientific endeavour as the conclusions is only one of many possible ‘truths’ there are. Since it is the product of the researcher’s knowledge of “reality”, it therefore opens up other avenues for research that could focus on the U.S securitization of West Africa/Nigeria; the relationship between the U.S’ ‘war on terrorism’ and the E.U’s ‘fight against terrorism’. The chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of the thesis.

The discussions in this second section will attempt to answer the research questions by highlighting Boko Haram’s terrorism as a discursive totality which seeks to fix the meaning of ‘terrorism’ so as to enable and naturalise the discourse of terrorism as well as counterterrorism in Nigeria. The practices enabled by this discourse as well as the “reality” of the terrorist do not exist outside of discourse; they are therefore products of discursive power. This second section will engage with the discussions of the core arguments of this thesis. It is argued that as a result of these constructions, the discourse assumes a natural mode by justifying the constructions through the presupposition of legitimacy that dominant narratives give. This is done by analysing how the texts and the practices enabled are articulated to form a partial closure that justifies the labelling of Boko Haram as terrorists. The section will do more in terms of engagement by highlighting the core arguments of this thesis which also relates to the other research questions of this thesis. The core arguments then will provide answers to the main research question of this thesis from the different perspectives the thesis has engaged with.

Hegemony: Construction of the Threat of Terrorism in Africa/Nigeria

The construction of threat (from Africa) which is against the ‘security’ of the U.S could be better understood within the context of the Cold War. Linguistic elements common to the colonial era were drawn upon and deployed to constitute identities, relationships and events in such a way as to make distant events mean ‘something’ to the U.S. To do this effectively, either new meanings were fixed to understand open elements like ‘development’ through a discursive move that signifies ‘crisis’ or some new narratives were constructed to understand events like the Southern Question. The continuity in the representation of ‘crisis’ in Africa especially from the 1970s to the present is quite interesting as it highlights the prevalence of

hegemony. As a strategy of articulation, 'crisis' in discursive constructions works by initiating a discursive move which disrupts earlier articulations in order to entrench new meanings through the productive practice of discourse. Prior to the 'crisis' of terrorism in Africa, several events in Africa/Nigeria has been represented as 'crisis' which threaten the 'security' of the U.S and the Western world. 'conflicts', 'instability' and 'crisis' of the 1970s and 80s became disrupted and transitioned after the end of the Cold War to the state failure discourse of the 1990s. In the wake of the bombing of the world Trade centre (by Al-Qaida), the event has become another nodal point which now defines how disparate political violence in Africa/Nigeria should be categorised and understood. After, September 2001, the transition in the way political violence of groups like Boko Haram are understood is noteworthy. The discourse of terrorism as a fixity creates the space for the play of hegemony especially after the attack of September 2001. It positions as closed, fixed and permanent the understanding of Boko Haram's violence by linking it to the failure of the state. While it remains unclear whether Boko Haram is an entirely new group or not, few scholars like Adesoji (2010) have linked them to the Maitaisine uprising of the 1980s. All the authors seem to agree unanimously that groups like Boko Haram have a long history rooted in the socio-political cum economic 'reality' of Nigeria but their understanding as terrorists after September 2001 seems to be taken as a given and have assumed a seeming naturalness. Most mainstream scholarship currently hold a supposedly fixed and objective understanding of what terrorism in Africa and particularly Nigeria is. Specific interpretation of terrorism as its considered congruent with that of a dominant world power like the United States is normative. The construction and understanding of what terrorism is in Nigeria today do not only blur the unfortunate violent history of Nigeria but also the historical context of the discourse of terrorism as it relates to its contingency and rupture in meaning over time. Importantly, the historical context of the discourse of terrorism elucidates how through hegemony, partial fixation of dominant meaning to the exclusion of possible silenced alternatives are not only legitimized but naturalized. Moreover, considering the prevalence of several violent groups in Nigeria since its independence, it is unclear what makes Boko Haram's violence labelled 'terrorism'. This background highlights how political violence has become normalized and perhaps justified until when it is boxed into the 'exceptional' myth to which terrorism belongs.

To this end, through analogy whereby 'western' 'strong' and 'stable' states are held as the norm and 'accomplished', the extent of failure or otherwise of their African counterpart could be measured. The scholarship examining the interface of state failure with terrorism seems to be more concerned with the falsity or otherwise of the state failure-terrorism proposition. It goes without saying that 'terrorism' as well as state fragility/weakness is often held as a sutured totality, identifiable outside of discursive construction.

Approaching Boko Haram's terrorism as a discursive construct therefore situates it within the Critical Terrorism Studies. This is because unlike the Traditional Terrorism Studies, the role of discourse in understanding political violence is very critical. Violence, whether political or not, usually evokes emotive response for obvious reasons: people are either harmed, maimed or killed and possibly properties are destroyed. The Boko Haram and Ansaru groups became the first violent groups to be proscribed internationally as terrorist organisations on November 13, 2013 after being proscribed nationally a few months before. Ansaru remains unknown even in Nigeria, so while this justifies the exclusive focus on Boko Haram by this thesis, the international community, the Nigerian government, the media and scholars, it leaves many questions unanswered as to how the U.S arrived at the proscription of Ansaru in the first instance. While the history and profile of the Boko Haram group has been at best sketchy, there is consensus that the group started out non-violent until their pact with the Borno state government became broken and their leader was killed. Evidently, the group's violence increased in accordance with the state's violence against them (Seyeifa 2015). To reiterate, this thesis neither downplays the import of Boko Haram's violence nor attempts to justify it. It is rather submitting that the history of Boko Haram's and other groups' violence in Nigeria demand a more honest, holistic and robust approach than the undefined and unhelpful mission of 'war on terrorism'. The military officials' interview texts analysed in this research highlighted that poverty, youth unemployment, poor governance and state-sponsored violence are nodes that could help to understand Boko Haram's violence. Interestingly, and ironically, the U.S texts suggested that some or all of these significations and practices come together in unity to inform the violence of the group. However, there is silence on the part of the U.S and the Nigerian government to admit their roles in the aforementioned practices. Rather, as the violence of the group increases, so did the rhetoric of both governments in

recasting them as 'enemy' of the state who will be defeated by the military. Labelling the group as a terrorist organisation is thus a hegemonic construction that is politically convenient so as to perpetuate silence and exclusion, among other things, by the structures that produced it. Following this, Nagy (2018), junior Assistant Secretary of States for the Bureau of African Affairs by assessing the U.S Policy in Africa during previous administrations, asserted that:

If you recall, in Nigeria a number of years ago, Boko Haram was a relatively minor organization involved in Islamic education, and it was largely through the brutal reaction of the Nigerian government at the time which turned Boko Haram into a much more radical organization and actually increased Boko Haram's membership

While Nagy's silence on the role of the 'shift' of the U.S war on terrorism into Nigeria is quite instructive, it nonetheless reveals how the labelling of the group as terrorists helps to silence the role of the structures that produce it. This means that the discursive construction of Boko Haram, Nigeria and the United States should reveal both their complicities and their fight against oppressive practices. However, what Otherness in discourse does is to 'fix' certain elements while excluding the others in order to arrive at discursive constructs which are self-serving. Understanding Boko Haram's 'terrorism' as a discursive construct therefore help to unveil representational practices through which their identities became so constructed. The representations are thus practices of power which highlight the phenomenon of neo colonialism in another form. Discussing the phenomenon of neo colonialism, Said (1993: 26), argues that the past is in the present and it remains very doubtful if neo colonialism is a thing of the past. As has been highlighted above, power produces discourse and it inheres in the fixation of meaning. This is particularly evident in one of the key reports through which recommendations were made for Boko Haram to be proscribed:

Do Not Underestimate Boko Haram's Intent and Capability to Attack the U.S. Homeland.—As this report makes clear, the U.S. Intelligence Community has recently underestimated the intent and capability of terrorist groups to strike the homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These underestimations had near-deadly consequences on Christmas Day 2009 over Detroit and in May 2010 in Times Square (Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence

Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, December 2011).

The report therefore draws its strong recommendation based on a juxtaposition of Boko Haram with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The undergirding supposition was based on the committee's 'believe' that Boko Haram is an 'emerging threat' to the U.S homeland and this should be taken with more seriousness to avoid the mistake done with Al Qaeda and others. Several assumptions not only of Boko Haram's capacity to launch an attack against the U.S but also of profiling the group were thus evoked based on 'believe', which is a subjective transcendental experience. While the violence of Boko Haram leaves no one in doubt as to their seriousness, the subjective reality of the group itself has nothing in common with AQAP and TTP. It is only through the intervention of hegemony that such totalizing construct became arrived at. Hegemony according to Laclau (1988:101) "refers not only to the privileged position of a nation-state in a group of nation-states, but more generally to construction of a predominant discursive formation". It is this form of hegemonic constructions that have defined Nigeria and Africa prior to the advent of the war on terrorism. It is also within this constructed truth which privileges neo liberal democracy above all other possible alternatives of political systems that moments like failed states and underdevelopment could evolve. Neo liberalism itself is articulated on an idea of Progress that excludes antagonism i.e. it is a form of articulation that denies its limits and therefore its possibility to accommodate change. The majority of political violence in Nigeria, without the exception of Boko Haram, highlight the need for a change in the democratic imagination and structure of statehood of the country; they contend often explicitly for political representations that are not only accountable but that also reflect the will of the people. While the use of violence by virtually all of them, though at different scales, remains regrettable, Boko Haram like these groups should not just be demonized while the structures which produce the 'reality' remain silent.

Following the Critical Terrorism Studies rejectionists arguments therefore, this thesis submits that the fixing of the discourse of Boko Haram's terrorism as a total closure reflects the construction of the political space where certain kinds of subjects and/or objects became knowable and could be acted upon. It is a discursive construct that highlights the connection

between the power to produce knowledge and truth. By situating the history of Boko Haram within its history and subjective realities, it becomes obvious that its labelling only exists to the interests of the structures that are labelling. This thesis argues that the discourse of terrorism in Nigeria as a hegemonic discourse only represents a moment in the history of U.S-Nigeria relations. As a construction, it not only fixed the meaning of political violence by silencing the role of the structures through which the violence is produced but also would further reinforce dominant (western) constructions of Nigeria/Africa and the policy response it receives. By situating it within the productive use of the post-structural, the project is theoretically and empirically informed through primary data as interviews and secondary data of U.S government texts from 1953-2017.

Representational Practices: Nigeria as a Counterterrorist State

Representing terrorism as a discursive totality which is given, among other things, enables and legitimises certain discourses and practices to the exclusion of others. The discourse of counterterrorism which has come to define the understanding of some political violence in Nigeria fixes a certain kind of *security* imaginary which constructs the state as essentially an entity that exists to counter terrorism/terrorists. What this sort of construction does is that *security* and *insecurity* become interchangeable as one becomes another. Through the policy strategy of a whole-of-government approach towards countering terrorism, the meaning of *security* become fixed as engaging and deploying all the apparatus and architecture of government to destroy those whose violence are disapproved of. Thus, in a country like Nigeria where political violence has been prevalent, it remains unclear how to understand other categories of violence not labelled as terrorism and how to respond to such. Moreover, constructing a secured country as that which is bereft of terrorism legitimises and normalises among other things the militarization of democratic experiment in Nigeria. This is because the discourse of terrorism which before now has not been how political violence in Nigeria is understood has become the dominant signifier that is at the very center of discursive structure and defines for us both the “play” and the limits of understanding political violence in Nigeria. The texts examined attest to the power of representations to form an unconscious boundary in defining whose violence gets visible, talked about and how they are talked about. As it were, political violence in Nigeria after the construction of Boko Haram as terrorist for

instance has largely been normalized as a result of the militarization of democracy through the linkage of the military to the economy, health, education and other aspects of government. Owing to the ascription of legitimacy and monopoly of violence to the state, which this thesis is not by any means contending, the use of violence both by the military and non-state actors as aided by both local and foreign governments especially during periods of elections, become the norm in intimidating and/or influencing voting patterns across Nigeria and Africa (Seyeifa 2015). Thus, the power of representation through the strategy of exclusions works well to silent these sorts of political violence; it makes it invisible and delineate for us what political violence functions for the system. The 'reality' of 'terrorism' then in Nigeria points to the power of discourse to produce 'good' violence and 'bad' violence. Otherwise, how do we understand and deal with other political violence not categorized as terrorism in Nigeria? Through this, the emergence of the discourse of 'terrorism' exists to delineate between the moral character of the violence: while other violence is 'good' for Nigeria, the violence categorised as 'terrorism' is 'bad' and should thus be countered through the linkage of all aspects of democracy to the military.

Power and Politics: Representation of the U.S Self and the Terrorist Other

Power inheres discourse through representational practices. Prior to the fixity of the discourse of terrorism, the U.S imaginaries of colonial troupes provide the space to construct the U.S sense of Self. Articulating this identity plays a critical role in the struggle for a discursive 'center' through which 'emerging' African states and particularly Nigeria could be measured. It, therefore, functions as an exemplar through which, for instance, 'development' could be known. Through the effective deployment of silence therefore instead of the narrative of expansionism into both the northern and southern parts of Nigeria, the U.S sense of Self therefore provides the space not only for what could be said but also how to say these things. The politics of representation according to Michel Foucault come along with the possibilities of several silences: silence therefore is present not just in the binary of what is said or not said but within the strategies employed to represent what is. The dynamics of representations are assumed to construct as well as signify certain subjectivities; through this medium, power relations could become distorted; ironically, representation can function as a strategy of silence through the denial of agency to some kinds of subjects like the terrorists;

representation of absence itself could function as a form of silence; it could also function as a means through which the tensions between oppression and resistance could be sequestered. In the words of Foucault (1987:27)

Silence itself- the thing one declines to say or its forbidden to name- the discretion that is required between different speakers- is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies. There is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized and which form of discretion is required in either case. There is not one but many silences and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.

Silence as one of the predominant contributions of this thesis functions through metanarratives as they became naturalized through dominant structures. The politics of the production of identity employ the use of exclusion and inclusions of elements for the fixation of meaning. To this end the discourse of terrorism is a metanarrative which produces an identity through which the voices of resistance is sequestered from the practices of oppression:

I have been among the peace keeping mission in Somalia, Sierra- Leone, and Sudan. I have been able to experience that things just don't emanate like that but because government have not been up and doing in the area of their assignment. Like the experience I had in Sudan, if you have ever been to Sudan. No communication there except in their state capital, no school, no health centre. The people are just living like animals. No road we only travel through the desert. We use the PS to get our bearing and that is how we move. The people there are suffering.....Also in Somalia the situation is similar. Like what we are experiencing in Nigeria now, the issue of this Boko Haram, Republic of Biafra, Niger Delta militant, is because there is no balancing in the way our government are doing their things. Some tribes are feeling aggrieved while some tribes declare they have been cheated in the area of assigning appointments, some tribes feel they are always left out because they are minority. With all these I feel most of these problems is being caused by the government. The particular issue of the Boko Haram, there are some people who have settled down for long in a particular area...The North east. Because the thing broke out from the North east. Some tribes feel their father settled down in a particular place but when it

got to the time when they are doing all this politics, they count them not to be their own indigene. Some of the people were aggrieved somehow..... To execute their grievances just for the government or the people around to know they are being cheated. So they now group together and spread some propaganda among their colleagues around them. So this thing now escalated they never know this thing will spread like that (Interviewee 1).

Having been part of extensive peacekeeping operations across Africa and a very recent retiree as he retired some couple of months before the interview, Interviewee One was the only participant who contended the labelling of Boko Haram as terrorists. He was very deliberate about not using 'the terrorist' label in understanding Boko Haram. According to him, Boko Haram's violence is a form of resistance against the oppressive system in Nigeria and the group is very much like other resistant groups in Nigeria and across Africa. Their resistance against the state represents the disillusionment not only of Northern Muslims but also that of other citizens of the country. By highlighting the group's resistance against an oppressive system, he makes visible the practices of exclusion that have been silenced in their representation as terrorists. The very logic of the war on terrorism in Nigeria was premised on the group's identification as an enemy of the people of Nigeria; thereby making invisible the oppressive practices of the government. Ironically, however in his struggle against the marking, naming and exclusion of the group and others, he asserts that any violence directed against the government of the state could be regarded as 'terrorism'. The effects of representational texts through which 'terrorism' was produced then works through another strategy of silence: it is the exclusion of moments that helps in the fixation of meaning. The identification of the Niger Delta militants by the U.S as terrorists in the 1990s which led to the extra judicial execution of their leader, Ken Saro Wiwa served as the moment for fixing the meaning of terrorism after September 2001. During the Clinton's administration when the concept of terrorism became introduced in Nigeria, there was no actual definition of the concept nor was there any attempt to define it. What was important was the exclusion of the untold sufferings of the people due to the extraction of oil that led to oil spillage which made majority of the people homeless and jobless. It is interesting that during this time not only was Nigeria 'adopted' as the 'official partner' of the U.S in the fight against 'international terrorism', the focus of the state was 'security' as poverty also became labelled as terrorism. It is also worth noting that in all the texts, while the concept of terrorism remains essentially

contested, with dissenting voices on the meaning of terrorism, 'terrorists' could be identified with less rigour. From the southern to the northern parts of Nigeria, it is those who are disenchanted, poor and struggling and want to give 'voice' to these struggles due to the import of 'western-oriented' policy and development frameworks that have become known as 'terrorists'. The strategy of silencing moments like these, therefore, works as a means of exclusion in fixing meaning and production of identity. The construction of meaning and identity is not value-neutral. It exists for certain end. The strategy of silencing and production of meaning and identity is well reflected in the works of most scholars with works on Nigeria. Categories, meanings and identities are held as fixed and arguments are made based on this. Obi (2010)'s thought on African development and terrorism proves useful here. He contends that the linking of African development "to the on-going international fight against terrorism will not only amount to distorting its development priorities". He further contends that there are fundamental differences between "fight of terrorism in Africa and the civil strife in the region which is a symptom of state-building". This civil strife, according to him, could be termed as "local terrorism" or "political terrorism". He postulates that terrorism in Nigeria as well as other African countries is the result of resentments projected at foreign interests, foreigners and their involvement in Africa. Hence, their resentment is not against Africans and African governments per se. "It is thus arguable that development, with all the associated welfare benefits, even if equitably distributed among a country's population, will not necessarily deter committed terrorists from carrying out their plans". In other words, disenchantment within Africa's Muslim communities is not a sufficient factor to dictate the direction of the "region's development agenda" (Obi 2006; 2010: 183). Like most other scholars, Obi's 'terrorism', 'development' and other associated concepts are self-evident truth. The power of discourse to produce an unchallenged truth as a result of the politics of exclusions and inclusions point to the play of hegemony. However, the play of hegemony works through an effective strategy of silence in the production of discourse.

Limitation of Study and Recommendations for Further Research

This thesis has argued for the understanding of terrorism as a discursive construct and has contributed to Critical Terrorism Studies by examining how the production of the discourses within which the labelling of acts and actors of terrorism have evolved. The thesis has also

examined how the production of Nigeria as a counterterrorist state enables and justifies the discourse of counterterrorism in understanding and responding to some political violence. The thesis has focused on discourse analysis by using both primary and secondary data from nine Nigerian military officers and U.S and Nigeria's policy texts. While the thesis has focused mainly on policy documents which are produced by the U.S State Department, Defense Department and the Congress, other sites that could have been considered but for the practicality of data management include the Homeland Security Committee, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Council on Foreign Relations. Policy documents from these other sites could potentially have enriched the discussions further or challenge some propositions in this thesis or even might yield meaningful data for novel/further research. Also, with the extremely scanty Nigerian government texts, a research focus on discursive frames across various media in Nigeria might yield some interesting results in the understanding of Boko Haram and terrorism generally in Nigeria.

Finally, as was noted in Chapter 2, the initial focus of the thesis was to understand the narratives of the 'subaltern' on terrorism in Nigeria. Rather than its present commitment as a challenge to hegemonic discursive construction, the thesis would have done more by giving 'voice' to the 'voiceless'. The focus of the thesis itself on the examination of metanarratives, as it were, exclude 'voices' of the seemingly voiceless which could have further enriched our understanding of terrorism in Nigeria. This is particularly an avenue for an engaging and enriching research which can build on this thesis because representing the voices of the marginalised might help to challenge practices of exclusion inherent in discursive totalities like terrorism. This choice might prove useful both on the basis of theoretical commitment and that of ethics.

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Appendix 1: Table of Texts Selection

Text 1: The U.S. Public Documents on Political Violence/Terrorism in Africa/Nigeria			
Type	Date	Name	Description
Policy Document	1977-1980 Vol XVII	Foreign Relations of the United States	Department of States, Washington Sub-Saharan Africa
Report	1996 released July 1997	Incidents of political violence against Americans	
Report	April 2000	Patterns of Global terrorism	
Report	January, 2001	Department of State Foreign Policy Objectives: Africa	Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interests, Bureau of Military-Political affairs
Report		The 9/11 Commission Report	
Official Remarks	April 29, 2002	National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, on Terrorism and Foreign Policy	Office of the Press Secretary
Report	June 27, 2002	G8 Africa action Plan	Released by the Group of Eight, Kananaskis, Canada

Policy Document	September 2002	National security strategy of the united states of America	Policy Document
Official Remarks	February 16, 2006	Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice before the House International Relations Committee	
Report	August 28, 2008	Weak and Failing States, evolving Security threats and U.S Policy	Congress Research Service
Report	May 9, 2008	Islam in Africa	Congress Research Service
Report	July 11, 2009	The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress	
Report	July 22, 2011	Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S Military in Africa	Congress Research Service
Report	December 2011	Boko haram: emerging threat to the US Homeland	Submitted to the subcommittee on counterterrorism and intelligence committee on homeland security
Policy document	June 2012	U.S. strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa	

Report	November 14, 2012	U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa and the African Growth and Opportunity Act	Report
Policy Directive	April 03, 2013	US Security Sector Assistance Policy	Policy Directive
Policy document	April 05, 2013	U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy	
Special Briefing	November 13, 2013	U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action Background Briefing on Designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Organizations and as Specially Designated Global Terrorists	Senior Administration Officials via teleconference
Media Note	November 13, 2013	Terrorists Designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru	Office of the Spokesperson, Washington D.C
Fact Sheet	January 10, 2014	Terrorism Designations FAQs	Office of the Spokesperson

Fact Sheet	May 14, 2014	Boko Haram and the U.S Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria	Office of the Spokesperson
Testimony	May 15, 2014	#BringBackOurGirls: Addressing Boko Haram's Growing Threat	Robert P. Jackson Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs Washington, DC
Policy document	2014	Quadrennial Defense Review	Policy document
Testimony	May 21, 2014	Boko Haram: the growing threat to schoolgirls in Nigeria and beyond	Sarah Sewall Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights House Foreign Affairs Committee Washington, DC

Fact Sheet	August 05, 2014	The Doing Business in Africa	Office of the Press secretary
Fact sheet	August 06, 2014	U.S Support for Peace Keeping in Africa	Office of the Press secretary
Fact Sheet	August 06, 2014	Partnering to Counter Terrorism in Africa	Office of the Press Secretary
Fact sheet	August 06, 2014	Security governance initiative	Office of the Press secretary
Testimony	December 2, 2014	Statement for the records for the foreign affairs subcommittee on terrorism, non-proliferation and Trade; and the Middle East and North Africa: Foreign Terrorist Fighters	Ambassador Robert A. Bradtke Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters, Bureau of Counterterrorism Washington, DC
Policy Document	February 2015	National security strategy	Policy Document
Policy Statement	May 2015	Nigeria: Investment Climate Statement	
Testimony	June 2, 2015	Statement by the state Department of Bureau of	

		counterterrorism: Budget, Programs and Policies	Justin Siberell Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non- proliferation, and Trade Washington, DC
Testimony	June 4, 2015	Security Assistance to Africa	Puneet Talwar Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy Washington, DC
Testimony	June 4, 2015	Security Assistance to Africa	Linda Thomas-Greenfield Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs

			Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy Washington, DC
Policy Statement	June 4, 2015	U.S Security Assistance in Africa	Statement of Lauren Ploch Blanchard, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Hearing, Congressional Research Service
Communique	March 30, 2016	U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action The United-States-Nigeria Bi-National Commission Joint Communique	Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington DC

Testimony	May 10, 2016	Addressing instability in sub-Saharan Africa	Linda Thomas-Greenfield Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs Justin Siberell, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC
Fact sheet	September 26, 2016	U.S Relations with Nigeria	Bureau of African Affairs
Text 2: Public Documents on Terrorism by the Nigerian Government			
Act	2011	The Prevention of Terrorism Act	The Senate Federal Republic of Nigeria
Explanatory Memorandum	2011	Terrorism Prevention Act	The Senate Federal Republic of Nigeria

Act	2013	Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act Explanatory Memorandum	
Act	24 th May,2013	Terrorism (Prevention) (Proscription Order) as Amended	

Appendix 2: Government Texts

Jack Straw, 'Failed and failing States, speech given at the European Institute of Research, university of Birmingham, 6 September, 2002 www.eri.bham.ac.uk/events/jstraw060902.pdf accessed September 12, 2018

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVII, and Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa ed. Louise P. Woodroffe (United States Government Publishing Office Washington 2018)

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV, eds Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992) Document 21

Foreign Relations of The United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume li eds Ralph R. Goodwin, N. Stephen Kane and Harriet D. Schwar (United States Government Printing Office Washington 1979) Document 473

Foreign Relations of The United States, 1952–1954, Africa And South Asia, Volume Xi, Part 1 eds Paul Claussen , Joan M. Lee, David W. Mabon, Nina J. Noring, Carl N. Raether, William F. Sanford, Stanley Shaloff, William Z. Slany and Louis J. Smith (United States Government Printing Office Washington 1983) Document 106

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Foreign Relations of the United States–1992, Volume XX, North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa (Being researched or prepared)

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National Security Strategy (September 2002) <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/> accessed on June 20th, 2018 at 5 p.m.

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National Security Strategy for a New Century (1997) <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1997/> accessed on July 20th, 2018 at 2 p.m.

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Appendix 3: Interview Transcriptions

Interview 1

Interviewer - I am Modupe Akinleye researcher from the University of Bristol. I am here to look at how you understand Boko Haram, and how it is being responded to. May I ask about your background? Questions like, your education background, your age and things you would want us to know sir?

..... I am a Warrant officer as you can see,

Interviewer..... Continue sir.

..... Hmmmm, Warrant Officer xxxxx, I am from xxxx State, I am xxx years old and my educational background is an O'level certificate. I am a xxxx, soldier by profession, and I just retired now.

Interviewer.... Thank you sir. Can you tell us about any experience you have had with political violence?

..... Thank you I can recount very well is hmmm. I have been among the peace keeping mission in Somalia, Sierra- Leone, and Sudan. I have been able to experience that things just don't emanate like that but because government have not been up and doing in the area of their assignment. Like the experience I had in Sudan, if you have ever been to Sudan. No communication there except in their state capital, no school, no health centre. The people are just living like animals. No road we only travel through the desert. We use the PS to get our bearing and that is how we move. The people there are suffering. The way we understand the war in Sudan is, that there are those who claim to be the owner of the land. We call them, hmmm, Janjanwei, we have those blacks who when going to the Mecca and they normally trek along the paths and were not able to make it back home and settle on those paths while to nomadic dwellers that is called the Janjanwei claims the people are strangers and they don't want them on their land. They the Janjanwei invade the villages and kill everybody. The crisis has been on for a while and a lot of soul have perished there. Also, in Somalia the

situation is similar. Only one particular individual that is General Addis Farah Didi was their commander in chief when the war broke. He went and hid all their weapons in a place called Bakara. The European when they came, they tried to locate where he hid those weapons because he has bombs, they couldn't because he has a strong security network. We have one issue, October 3, 1993 where seven America Rangers were killed. The America soldiers went in search for more than three days we could not sleep. The war in Sierra-Leone, similar like this. The people in power were so greedy and about five faction's broke-up that they don't want that government, we appease to the different faction and they all said no. in fact there should be checks and balance in the way the government operate so that at least all these grievances among the citizens wouldn't be so open. Like what we are experiencing in Nigeria now, the issue of this Boko-Haram, Republic of Biafra, Niger Delta militant, is because there is no balancing in the way our government are doing their things. Some tribes are feeling aggrieved while some tribes declare they have been cheated in the area of assigning appointments, some tribes feel they are always left out because they are minority. With all these I feel most of these problems is been cause by the government. The particular issue of the boko-haram, there some people who have settled down for long in a particular area,

Interviewer..... Some tribe?

..... Some tribes, The North East. Because the thing broke out from the North East. Some tribes feel their father settled down in a particular place but when it got to the time when they are doing all this politics, they count them not to be their own indigene. Some the people were aggrieved somehow.

Interviewer..... Is that they took their land from them?

..... No. You know the land owners, when they know their territory then, when strangers come to stay within their area, they know that the people are not part of their tribe then some people feel cheated at least and when it results to political appointment, they are supposed to get somethings allocated to them. They feel cheated and now come under the disguise of religion.

Interviewer.... Ok

..... To execute their grievances just for the government or the people around to know they are being cheated. So, they now group together and spread some propaganda among their colleagues around them. So this thing now escalated them never know this thing will spread like that. They have their first training in Sudan and later in Libya as I was told

Interviewer so... sorry who are they?

..... I mean those aggrieved

Interviewer..... Ok Boko Haram guys?

.....yeah. They are now coming out in the name of religion to fight back.

Me..... Hmmmm

..... I believe during president Obasanjo, he was advised that time to that the crisis would soon break up and from his own experience, he warned the one that took power from him, that he should take the matter of security so seriously. So, the thing started like a child play until it now spread like a wide fire. Because in their operation when they are coming, they may be around five and as they are moving anyone they come across their way and refuse to join them is killed.

Interviewer- hmhhh

..... So that is how they operate. It is not all of them that carry weapon. Some just carry cutlass

Me... Thank you sir, just to buttress on the point you made now, why do you think Boko Haram spread like a wide fire?

..... Because the issue was not addressed on time

Interviewer-hmhhh

..... The government of President Jonathan thought it won't escalate to that extent so the area of security was not taken care of as it should.

Interviewer- But boko haram started before President Jonathan

..... I know. They were calling themselves different names that time but before the real name Boko Haram, came into being, it was during the time was late president Yar'auda either in 2004. We started having internal crisis even until now we are having internal crisis. So, the time this Boko haram started manifesting was in 2004.

Interviewer- So sir, you think terrorism started in 2004 in Nigeria?

..... We are talking of boko haram. We have been having internal crisis with different names and fraction but the one of boko haram should be 2004. To the best of my knowledge

Interviewer- thank you sir. In your opinion because we are particular about terrorism and why you think terrorism started in 2004 since we know that Nigeria has been having political violence for so long and so. Why do think terrorism started in Nigeria with boko haram?

..... Boko haram that is the name of their fraction. The issue of internal crisis. The major tribe in Nigeria is Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. The other tribe who feel marginalise in the area of political appointment, which is the cause of the crisis, the government is supposed to find a way to make the amendment by accommodating them into the polity.

Interviewer-Thank you very much sir.... The next question here says what terrorism means to you as security personnel

..... It is an act of violence against government. Terrorism is just an act of violence against the government. They feel through that, they will get what they want. Just an act of violence, killing innocent people. That is, it and they have very strong network. They link up with other international terrorist organisations. Anywhere they spring up like in Mali, they still have their financing from the international terrorism group. They use this to destroy lives

Interviewer- I don't know if you have any personal experience with boko haram as a security officer?

..... I have not had any experience with them, shortly when I came back from Sudan that was when I retired. When the issue of boko haram became intense. They deplored some of my unit there and I was not with them.

Interviewer- Thank you sir.... The other question is what does peace in Nigeria mean to you. If we say peace in Nigeria, what does it mean to you?

..... Peace is when government do the right thing. Let everybody feel the impact of good government, I think that is when there will be absolute peace. You get what I am saying?

Interviewer- Yes sir. The right thing, you think boko haram is fighting for things they are entitle to so if the government do the right thing by giving them what they want, there will be peace?

..... I am not particular about boko haram. Like what is happening in Niger Delta for instance, president Obasanjo made a comment during his regime. He said the goose that is laying a golden egg, is it taken care of? All our natural resources and source of revenue is from that side of the country. The Niger delta, those people are suffering, if you been to that area, you find petroleum pipe spilling on their water way, their rivers. They don't have good water to drink. Their crops are dying and people have been crying come to our aid, the government refuse to listen to them. look at Igbo as another example, they don't allow them to become president, they don't allow them to hold some position in the country and they are crying where is the one Nigeria, see you people are cheating us like this and where is the one Nigeria? And this result in all these grievances. For peace to reign let the government do the right thing so that everyone will be please. Like the National conference which they all contributed their own view and billions of funds was used for the conference in 2014, till now, it has not been implemented.

Interviewer- Hmmmmm

..... The present government now don't want to hear anything about that. Without taking a look at its recommendation. Our government should look at the area where they can make amendment to this.

Me- Thank you sir... This directly link us to the next question. What do you think of Nigeria as a country?

..... Nigeria is a blessed land. We have enough natural resources but in the hand of very few. Look at the price of petroleum has fallen in the international market yet we buy at a high price in Nigeria also the price of kerosene now per litre is almost two hundred naira now. The average Nigerian in the street, uses kerosene to cook and now it is so expensive, go to the hospital, it is so expensive and go the school, school is so expensive now. Nigeria is a country where we have bad leaders, they are just mismanaging the funds. Instead for them to invest their money in the country, they steal this money and run away to other countries to invest it. Like in former president Jonathan, we heard he has refinery in Malaysia.

Interviewer Hmmmmm

..... yes. All our crude oil, they are selling it to his refinery. So that is the issue. For peace to reign, we should do the right thing.

Interviewer- In comparison to other places I remember you mentioned Somalia, Sudan, what do you think of the level of violence in Nigeria when you compare it with other places. Whether in Africa or other places?

..... Our own is a bit better because what is happening in those country, even in thirty years' time, they cannot recover from the war situation.

Interviewer- You mean Sudan and Somalia?

..... All the area I visited, Somalia, Sierra-Leon and Sudan. They are so many problem for the government to solve. We don't pray to be in such situation. If you look at the vegetation ours is better. There is nothing we plant that will not geminate. Somalia and Sudan there is nothing you plant that will geminate because it is desert. They have a very harsh weather there. So in

our own country, we are blessed. Over there all their things are imported. All their things are imported. They don't have any industry there. So many government houses have been burnt. Sea port has been vandalised. We don't pray such for Nigeria.

Me- We are almost there

..... Let us go

Interviewer-laughing.....Just two more questions. Sir what do you think about Nigeria government, I know you have been talking about them. What do you think about Nigeria government and the way they have been responding to issues?

..... That is what I have been saying

Interviewer-hmmmmm

..... The government is in the hand of very few. What is meant to be spent as our budget in a year, you discover that somebody runs away with trillion of naira not billion. We hear report from the EFCC that so amount has been given to someone who will just convert it to his own personal account. After some time we heard he has spent so out of it

Interviewer- Those account are not found in Nigeria?

..... Those account are not found in Nigeria. You know where they hide it

Interviewer- No

..... The problem we have in Nigeria, money that is meant to purchase weapons for soldiers to go and fight Boko Haram, you now convert it to run campaign for Jonathan. You can see the kind of country we are. So that is the problem. That is just the problem. The government, they know where the problem is so let them do the right thing.

Interviewer- The next question is, what is your assessment of how the government is fighting boko haram?

..... We are winning the battle

Interviewer- why do you think so?

..... Because initially we hear of bombing here and there over the news how they go to market places and detonate bombs and casualty are reported in the news but since President Buhari enters now and with the new set up of security network they have subdued those people. We don't hear about those bombing again

Interviewer- But boko haram seems to strike once in a while?

.... They still strike once in a while, it is true but it is not as before.

Interviewer- Not as frequent as before

.... Yeah, not as frequent as before

Interviewer- So the battle is being won?

..... Yeah they subdue them seriously. They have.

Interviewer- This should be about the last question. What do you think is the way forward for Nigeria? We have so many movement coming up here and there. Now we have Avengers and all of them. What do you think is the way forward?

..... Why not call all this people to a round table discussion. You don't use violence to resolve violence. This constitutional conference and told you about, why not bring all this people to a round table. those aggrieve parties and find the way forward for all this things to be controlled and that is the only way we can be able to rectify it and let all the aggrieve tribes have a hand in government. If not the problem will still continue and more fraction may still come up again. If we should say Igbo should go, Niger delta should go, there all other aggrieve party, they just waiting they too will follow suit

Interviewer-So the way forward is dialogue?

..... Yeah dialogue. Let them all come to the round table and discuss the best way to solve this issue. To the best of my knowledge.

Interviewer-Thank you very much sir. Thank you for giving me your time

..... You are welcome

Interview 2

Modupe- Good afternoon ma. I am Modupe Akinleye a PhD student from the University of Bristol. I am here to understand Boko-Haram and how it is been responded to, political violence generally in Nigeria. If you please want us to know about your background; age, gender and educational qualification and nature of job?

.....Is this relevant?

Interviewer- yes ma. So we can know who we are talking to.

.....Educational background. HND holder, profession, military personnel, we are not allowed to participate in political events whether during election or anything about politics, we are not allow as a military personnel.

Interviewer-political violence in this respect that we are interested in is in things like people fighting for a course or for one reason or the other like we have the Niger Delta Avengers in Nigeria, Boko-haram. If you have had any experience with them?

.....I don't think I have had any experience with them at all but I know that they do exist in Nigeria. We have those in the North that call themselves Boko-haram and then the Biafra but really I don't have any experience with them.

Interviewer-How about outside the country any?

.....I wouldn't want to discuss that.

Interviewer-What do you think about Boko-haram?

.....To me no one can really say, I don't think anyone in Nigeria can give a particular thing about themselves. What people use to say is that they are fighting because of religion while some say because of other reason although I heard they said they want to make Nigeria of

one religion But I don't believe so but what I know is that this people we don't really know what they want and no one can really say what in particular they are all about. We just see them in Nigeria and that is it.

Interviewer-Thank you. .okay

Interviewer- How long do you think they have in Nigeria? Is it before we got independence or after independence?

.....No not before Nigeria got independence but after Nigeria Independence and not quite long let say in 2006 I.e. about 10years or more and it all started in the North.

Interviewer-ok thank you

Interviewer-In your opinion, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

.....Actually I cannot say the particular time but what I can say is that if you look at the Niger Delta crisis, that has been on for a while and after it was calmed down we are now face with Boko-haram but the particular time Boko-Haram started or what did you call it, I mean the question? HmMMM terrorism in Nigeria, hmMMM, I don't have a particular time for it.

Interviewer-Ok, What do you think terrorism mean, if we talk about terrorism what does it mean to you?

.....Terrorism. What it means to me, you know if there is such in a country, people may not be able to have free movement hope you get me?

Interviewer- yeah

.....Because you will be thinking that they will be here or there. People we be afraid of going out or doing things that they ought to do because they don't know the time they will strike. Hope you get me?

Interviewer-Yeah

Interviewer-It is not like a technical definition we are looking for actually just how we know that this act of violence is terrorism and this one is not terrorism.

.....Because you know, when you just see normally in a country something is going out of hand a tribe is fighting against the other tribe but when you see the one generated from like those Boko Haram people and you are thinking it will end but now spreading to other state of the federations. I believe Boko Haram movement is not something of just ehn people fighting against themselves within the country but seems to have people backing them up from outside the country. I believe it should have die down.

Interviewer-within and outside the country?

.....We cannot say, nobody can say. We can have insider and people sponsoring them from outside Nigeria.

Interviewer- You have told us that you do not have any particular experience with Boko-haram and you do not want to tell us your experience with insurgent movement but we are not looking for like I told you, any particular security report but just to draw from your experiences with any peace keeping operation and things like that so we can understand how Boko-haram can be tackled. That just the essence.

.....My experience with peacekeeping operations?

Me-Yes please

..... Hmmm I have been to Liberia twice. I was told before I enter the force that then during the war, if not for that Nigeria soldiers, the war wouldn't have been successfully won. I believe we follow the same approach with Boko-Haram, the war against terrorism can be won like we did in Liberia. We just need to trust our military. No matter how you are looking at that, any country that you find violence, the crisis does not calm down at once, even since that 2006, there is still crisis in Liberia but not as it was. Today everywhere will be calm and tomorrow they will come out again. In which troop had to be sent to calm them down. But I believe no matter how it is, if all of us can work hand in hand I believe things will be better.

Interviewer-Thank you ma.

Interviewer- So what do you think peace means to us in Nigeria?

.....I believe and I pray that God will be with us to bring total peace in Nigeria. You see when we are talking of peace, there will not be no war, no tribalism, people will not be talking about I am a Christian, I am a Muslim and all of us will be one and we will believe in what we believe. You are a Muslim, you continue serving your god and Christian as well so that two of us and all Nigeria will be able to stay together, do everything in common when there is peace, everywhere and people from outside when they come to Nigeria they will be able to say in that country, there is peace. To me I believe when there is peace, everyone will be happy. Our prayers every day is that God should send peace to Nigeria like now, you see in North what happen during the Chibok girls that we are talking about even until now that we have not seen them. Some people said they saw some of them while some people said they have not seen anyone of them. I have not been there to witness things myself but we are hearing from the news media but what I know is that if there is peace in Nigeria, we will not be thinking about Boko-haram anymore. Hope you understand?

Interviewer-hmmmm

.....we will not have Niger delta movement as all these would have been tackled.

Interviewer- Ok. Thank you ma.

Interviewer-So in your opinion you think that Terrorism is when political violence is spreading like that of Boko-haram.

..... I don't know if Boko-haram is political violence or not. I don't really know it is only God that know but for me I don't know. If we say because of political problems we have Boko-haram because some people said if Hausa people reign again, there will be no problem and Boko-haram issue will be something of the past. But since the new president has emerged, is he not a Hausa man? But we are still having the same issue. So you can see, if people are saying because of politics, I don't believe that.

Interviewer- hmmm but some people think he is winning the war against Boko-Haram, that Buhari and the present government is winning the war against Boko-haram.

..... Yes I will believe so by the grace of God that Nigeria will be normal again. That's what we think now. We pray that it will so in Jesus name. But what I know is that only he cannot do it. You cannot say as a president you will go out and win a war alone. You need to assign some people to do it but it is now left for those assign to do that particular work to do it right. You know when you are going out with your troops they need the necessary artillery to work, like food, cloths etc. If you can provide all the things needed at that particular time, what do you think will happen? Even if they are about to win the war and all the logistics needed is not available, it can cause so many problems.

Interviewer-Thank you

Me- That will just take us to the next round of question but we are almost done as you can see. What do you think of Nigeria as a country?

.....Hmmm Nigeria they say my father land. You know no matter how it is, one Yoruba adage says ' Ile abo Simi oko' meaning the home is once resting place after a journey. No matter where you are, no matter how your home is, no matter what you are in life, surely you must think about your home and one day you will thinking of coming back. You can't compare Nigeria with another country, it is our home and I believe that Nigeria is the best because we all can't migrate to another country. It is not possible, who will take us, nobody. I know no country is like Nigeria, no matter what and I believe that by the grace of God, Nigeria will be better. You cannot compare other country with Nigeria. We are okay and God will help us.

Interviewer-Thank you

Interviewer-In comparison with other places, what do you think of the level of violence in Nigeria?

.....Nigeria situation is still better we can still give God the glory. Nobody is thinking about war and nobody we say because some part is having problem we are okay. We know we are

not really okay let say 99% okay which we are praying for. But our own is better compare to so many countries over there. When you think of countries like Congo, Somalia and so many others we are still okay and I believe that God will help us. When you think about Sudan, it is only in the North that we really have this problem and I believe that with God all things are possible.

Interviewer-What is your thought about Nigeria government?

..... You know, what can I say, any house maybe during the war, let me use Liberia as an example, from 2006 till date when I visited Liberia, they have been talking about peace until now but you cannot compare Liberia of then and now. If I get your question right

Interviewer-What do you think of Nigeria government?

.....When things have gone wrong, for you to bring that thing back to normal is really difficult because it will go through processes, so Nigeria government presently is okay and I believe if there is any lapses from the previous government, for this government to put them in order, at least they will go through some processes and I believe that what they are doing and for the first year of this new administration I believe they are okay and I believe if they continue with what they have been doing for the past one year, Nigeria will be better.

Interviewer- Ok Thank you

Interviewer- What is your assessment on how the government is fighting Boko-haram?

.....You know there is nothing they can do more than what they have been doing because when you look out so many soldiers that have lost their lives. In serving their father's land, just to see that peace reigns in Nigeria. The government have been trying, I believe that if there is any insider that is backing them up or maybe sponsoring them, the Boko-haram before you know it you will not hear anything about Boko-haram again because the government they are trying and those people deployed over there they are trying their best. Nobody will leave his house and say I am going out and will not come back and you see they are so many of the soldiers like that and some of them are wounded and some of them cannot

do anything even in the job they are no more useful. I believe that Nigeria will be better again. The government they are trying.

Interviewer-and what do you think is the way forward for Nigeria now?

..... The way forward is that first, we should pray to God, if there is anything we have done maybe sin against God one way or the other, and we should come together and ask God for forgiveness because I know, if God is for us nobody can be against us. So we should pray to God for forgiveness after that, we can come together as one and I believe that there is no war that cannot be won. Because they say, a stick of broom cannot do anything but if it is a bunch of broom, it can clean up whatsoever dirt that is on the floor. So all of us as Nigerian need to work together, as a team and nothing will be impossible to us. This will lead to peace that's my belief.

Interviewer- How do we come together since we are made up of different tribes, religious and ethnic backgrounds?

..... I have said earlier for us to work together, we have to remove tribalism, thinking if been a Muslim or Christian. Because if you are thinking I am a Christian, Muslim, Yoruba, Hausa or Igbo that means things will not go on sweet. It will not go on as planned but if we can all remove those things and believe we are one and that we are brothers and sisters as long as we are Nigeria and all of us are the same, I believe things will go on fine.

Interviewer- Thank you very much, I really appreciate you giving me your time. Thank you and I don't know if you have any question for me?

..... No.

Interview 3

Interviewer: Good afternoon sir. As I had introduced myself earlier, I am Modupe Akinleye PhD student from the University of Bristol and I am taking a research about political violence in Nigeria. May I know your background sir? I mean about you, educational background, age, gender and all of those things if you don't mind?

..... My name is xxxxx I am from xxxx state. Serving in the Nigeria army for about 14 years now. I am xxxx years, a xxxx and HND holder. I think the information is okay.

Interviewer- Alright sir. Ok if you can just tell us your level

..... On the job?

Interviewer- hmmm, so that we know if you are a senior officer

..... I am a corporal brigade

Interviewer- Thank you very much sir. Can you let us know your experience, any experience you have had with political violence whether in Nigeria or outside Nigeria?

..... You know, political violence is something that happens within an environment every day and you know it has been a custom to us that once those things comes to be we don't care about them again, because, we know that those are things that must come and they must go. So political violence is what we have live with for years now. I think in Nigeria, in 1999 ever since the civilian took over from the military, we have been experiencing the violence.

Interviewer- Do you have any personal experience along the line say as a security officer?

..... My first experience was in 2007 when there was crisis in River State Nigeria. I am talking about the militant. I went there 2007 I think in October. I spent 3 years there as a captain. We experienced a lot of hard times there. We lost some of our colleagues. The experience was very painful for one to loss his colleague because of political violence.

Interviewer- Okay thanks

Interviewer- What do you think about Boko-Haram?

..... Boko Haram how will put it, Boko-haram was arranged by the same politicians and there was a purpose they trained this group. There is a saying that goes like this: `man proposes and God disposes` If your plan and God's plan is different, it is either your evil prevail of God's. Since 1999 those boys have been in training. They send them abroad to train them.

Interviewer- The Boko Haram guys?

..... Yes, they send them abroad to train them for several years but the Boko-Haram their activity was partially in operations in 1999 at the Northeast region and not as it is today. Today we experience bomb blast every now and then. People are no longer afraid of their attack anymore as after a bomb is detonated, and there is casualty, shortly after this, people go on with their daily life. However, the purpose they were trained took another dimension for these politicians. I know it was during the period of handing over to civilian government that those boys came out. That was 1999. Since then the country has been in such mess. These days everywhere you go there is no trust. The activity of Boko-Haram has really cause deep pain in the lives of Nigerian. They may feel the effect of their activity either directly or indirectly so the effect of their operations is felt daily. Look at now the Niger Delta Avengers, they are doing their own now because of the political crisis is been fuelled by those who wish to run the government down. Like the other government, Goodluck regime according to them, they said because Goodluck was from south-south, the activity of Boko-Haram was premeditated to run down Goodluck regime so, the Niger Delta Avengers will love to do the same with this present government. I heard a prominent person said I will make this government unbearable. Such a person is walking freely today.

Interviewer- Was that directed to former president Goodluck Jonathan?

..... Jonathan. Look at the Niger Delta Avengers and other groups coming up. They will be thinking that because we were peaceful now the northern region is ruling. They will want to make sure they Avenge. When statements are being made, there are many interpretations to statements made. You know if a word is being said to different people, they will come out with different meaning. So the fight in Nigeria is just tussle of power. The North will say, we are the leader of the country, trying to silence other people. I pray that God will end this Boko-Haram and Niger Delta crisis so we can move on as a nation.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- So do you think that, it is more like politics. They use groups like Boko-Haram and Avengers and other groups. This has something to do with politics and politicians?

..... Yeah, first deal with Nigeria politics. If you check the background of all these people, who are the sponsor of these groups, it is the same politicians.

Interviewer- So they are being sponsored?

..... They are being sponsored by the same politicians who embezzle money for their own selfish interest. Despite I am not a northern, I love what president Buhari is doing, because, he is trying to create awareness that at this time you cannot steal from the government. You maybe stealing before, now you cannot steal anymore. He is doing a good one by also retrieving money stolen in the past. This is very important because if we continue like this, I think our generation and generations to come will suffer the consequences. So the country will be in total mess. But I love what Buhari is doing now. Because I know it is something that will give our children the future they deserve. We have graduate going into the society to be employed, you we be thinking of how much you will earn and not the knowledge you will impact to your generation. That is one thing that kills us as Nigerians. We don't think about what we can impact on the society. We always think of what to receive. Because your father or mother or some fraction has sponsored us to school, we want to make money and pay them back and likewise make name for ourselves. Unlike in the western world, you think of what to offer to the society and not what to gain from it. Having that mind-set make one focus on what to contribute to societal building. For example, if you compare our councillors (a political position in Nigeria) with a councillor position in the western world, you see a difference in their discharge of duty. The Nigeria councillor, some of them owe billions of naira in their account. You might disagree with me. How much is their income? So those are the issue. Just to govern a particular locality and councillor will be making money out of the same people he is governing. What are we saying, because of selfish interest and the rest? We have to go back to the drawing board. If I have opportunity to be in government, I would love to create impact on the society and not gain from it. If we all can think towards this direction, and leave selfish interest, we will make headway and this crisis will be minimal.

Interviewer- So why do you think they keep sponsoring the groups, violent group like Boko-Haram, I mean the politicians?

..... You know, in a society, we have the rich that have power. As a rich person, you will want to have boys working for you. Among these boys working for you, you will have the good and the bad. In a society when you look at a rich man, if the man belongs to one group that has made him wealthy, he may begin to harbour the fear that this money will start to cause envy and feeling of threat That he may be attacked and killed. Therefore, such fears will make them train up boys. Those boys just like agent will want to look after the interest of their principal. They buy them equipment to do their job such as guns, knives etc. That is the way violence starts. The fear of the unknown. The poor man that has nothing is thinking of what he will eat tomorrow, so he doesn't have any fear. So the rich men want to protect themselves by using these boys. The problem with our society is that the society is very poorly organized. When you see a boy who has graduated, having nothing to do and walking on the streets and looking for what to eat, you can easily recruit them. Give them some money and give them everything they need, they become your boys and any errand you send them, they will gladly do it. These boys sees the rich men as their saviour.

Interviewer- just before we move on from that point, you talked about power tussle. You know the Niger delta Avengers and the rest of the groups are agitating base on the fact we are a pluralize society? Hope you remember that point

..... I do

Interviewer- Boko-Haram was been sponsored by northern politicians to destabilise the then government because the president was from the south. And now the Niger Delta Avengers are also coming up and some many other factions. Do you think that is the actual cause?

..... I don't think so. You know politics is a dirty game as we always say in the military that everyone is a suspect

Interviewer- until proven otherwise

..... Yes. Until you are cleared by the law court. So I can say that despite the crisis, they still have synergy to work together. If you look at the crisis in River State, Rotimi Ameachi the former governor of the state and his brother, Wike the present governor were from the same village but different political parties. They were at loggerheads and this led to killings and the rest. The crisis resulted because the then governor wanted to impose a successor and Wike wanted the position who was a serving minister at that time. I do not buy into Rotimi Ideology of imposing someone to take over from him.

Interviewer- hmmm

..... You understand

Interviewer- yeah

..... The present governor who was from the same village as His predecessor were fighting seriously which resulted in loss of lives and properties. Now tell me why they are fighting if they are from the same village. This politicians, I don't know but I don't blame them. I blame the masses that voted them in and they make use of this same masses to propagate their selfish agenda. Because if an individual will say what we I gain if I sell my conscience, how much I am paid for destabilising the country. You know to build is very difficult but to destroy is very easy. If you listen to the news media, River State is a place everyone is afraid to go now.

Interviewer- Are you from Rivers?

..... No I am from Bayelsa state.

Interviewer- Okay

..... It is also happening in Bayelsa state to same way as in River State. It is all about power tussle.

Interviewer-hmmmm

..... I don't know, God will help us

Interviewer-Amen

Interviewer- In your opinion when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

..... Like I said earlier, terrorism began in 1999, although by then it was just hidden. I know they kill silently

Interviewer- They, who are they?

.....Then they weren't called Boko-haram. They were just silent. Their names were unknown. They will say religious crisis. Flagging it with religion. There was terror activity going on then, like bombings, loss of life and properties as a result.

Interviewer- But why did you think it began in 1999, with religious movement in the North. Since we know that they have political violence in Nigeria before then.

..... I think then, the political violence was not rampant like from 1999 downward. Although, there were silent killing, you know it was military then. No civilian will protest because the military was just using power. During the military regime, there was nothing like human right as we have today. But today when you think of human right as a military officer, it mean you are bounded by two laws. The civil and military laws.

Interviewer-Ok

..... As a result, even the society is bounded by both laws. If you commit an offence and the civil law did not catch up with you, the military will. Furthermore after the military handed over power in 1999, to a civilian government, this various groups are springing up across the nation. It was Nigerian that were sponsoring the Boko-haram group like ISIS. This religious movement did not start from Nigeria as they say, it started from all these Islamic nations and one thing with Islamic movement according to Islamic cleric is that whenever you fight for Jihad, when you die, you have reward in heaven. You know this philosophy motivates them to kill. This ideology is brought into Nigeria. And all these coupled up has led to Islamic crisis in Nigeria. Before now, we hardly have crisis in this nature. Therefore with the help of those Islamic countries, that are now sponsoring this things, we have these crisis. The problem is

that we don't know the culprits I mean the sponsors. When the America troop came into Nigeria, concerning this Boko-haram. They came over, got some information but did not let it out to the open because as they said, if they let it out, it will lead to more trouble.

Interviewer- Can you explain what you think terrorism mean?

..... Terrorism is causing havoc in a particular place that have peace. Making the place unstable, making the place unbearable for people living in a peaceful place. Whenever there is bomb blast in a particular place, people will be unable to live in peace as they will be afraid to go about their daily business. Whenever people start living with fear, the next thing is death. Once you live with fear, you won't have a stable mind to think. Terrorism is something that needs to be dealt with. Looking at the number of people that are been killed within a short period, you will know that we have lost a lot of Nigerian to this crisis. If you go to the barracks now, we have widows. Young woman having one, two kids and she is a widow all because of terrorist. Terrorism has caused pain in our society. I can round up by saying that terrorism is what disorganises a society. Now we don't have plan because we are living with fear of the terrorist. This is very bad for a country.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- Have you ever had any experience with Boko-haram as a group, probably as relating to your duty or peace keeping whatever. Counter terrorism.

..... Thank God I have not have encounter with Boko-haram. I only had encounter with Niger Delta militants which was 2007 to 2010. I was there for three years plus. With that I think I can relate about crisis situations. I have colleagues, friends, mates that have come back from the Northeast tell us what is happening there. This is too hard to relate because is scary. When you look at a soldier trained by the Nigeria army, you should know it cost so much to train him or her. In America, if the live of one soldier is lost, the whole country will come to a standstill. Because they know the cost of training one soldier and they value it. In our country people only want to make money. They care about human lives and that is why the crisis is still on going. The money released to procure arms to fight these terrorist was embezzled by

the politicians and they send this soldiers with bare hands to fight Boko-haram. It is something that is annoying. We don't know what the country is turning to. This is something we need to deal with having serious minded people to handle it. If we continue on how to use human lives to make money and not think about our future will lead to a sad end.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- Considering the situation we have in Nigeria now. I mean that, Nigeria is multi-ethnic, multi- cultural and multi- religious and all of that, what do you think peace will mean to us Nigerians. What will peace mean to us? Will it be a situation where we will never have any violence or what?

..... Peace is what everybody want to see

Interviewer-hmmmm

..... Peace is a thing of joy to every individual but you know violence is as a result of selfish desire but peace is what everybody is praying for and before we can have peace, we need godly men. It is only God that can give peace. If you can know God and know the commandment of God and live according to the scriptures, it means we will have a peaceful place to live.

Interviewer- That sound more like religious believe. Are we not doing that already?

..... If you look at the world now, at least, in religious adherence, we can say we are 1-5 countries but religion only make us to know what. But if you are a Christian, what is the bible telling you? And if you are a Muslim, what is the Koran telling you? What is your ideology? What are the people learning from the various religious backgrounds? Are you teaching this people on how to create violence? How can you tell me in the Koran if you kill, you will go to heaven. Is that not fallacious? You know, we have to know the truth individually, we need to take it upon ourselves, that as a Christian, what are my duties. I call myself Christian and I don't know the bible and the basis. For instance, the bible say thou shall not kill and I killed someone the question is am I a Christian? No because am not been obedient to what the bible

says. The bible says love your neighbour as yourself. If the love is there, peace will come. If I love my neighbour, I cannot think evil concerning my neighbour. There cannot be envy towards my neighbours. So I know that with that law been obeyed, peace will reign. We don't need to pray for peace, we need to just act. If you believe, you will have no negative feeling about your neighbour. It is only God that can help us. The fight against Boko-haram is not ordinary, it is not physical the with the way we are looking at it. Someone told me that, do I know that Boko-haram is stated in the scripture? In the book of revelations that 'difficult times we come' that is what we are into now. Let me deviate a bit. Look at our world today, it is looking like Sodom and Gomorrah with this gay stuff around. What is behind this ideology, do you think it is ordinary? It is not ordinary. Therefore Boko-haram is not ordinary. The bible has said the time is coming were son will rise against the father and father against son. A village will rise against each other and likewise countries against one another. So let's look beyond the physical. When you are tackling issues, you need to look beyond the physical. How can someone kill his fellow and be happy about it?

Interviewer Sir you understand that not all Nigerians are Christians, some are Muslims and others traditionalist. I know you are a Christian from the way you are talking and you are responding from your own religious belief.

..... Perspective

Interviewer- Yeah, what will peace mean to us with our different religious beliefs and ethnic identity and so on?

..... We need to identify the core of your Faith. Like bible say people perish for lack of knowledge. We allow people to read and tell us what is not supposed to be. We have to learn and find our ourselves. We have to think deeply if what we are learning is good for me. How does this affect my relationship with the society where I live and others around me? Does it contradict the norms of the society I live? Because if your belief contradict the value system and norms of the society which you live in, you will be punished. I also said earlier on this thing is not ordinary because how can you give me money and says I should go and bomb a

place that will also result in my death? It shows they are not operating with their natural mind and something is driving them beyond physical. Because everyone is afraid to die.

Interviewer- Sorry to interrupt you

Interviewer- you mentioned earlier that, the group is been sponsored for political reason and things like that, how will you think of Nigeria as a country? What do you think of Nigeria as a country from our past, to present and the future? What does the hold for us from all that is happening?

..... You know in Nigeria, we are dynamic, we have so many culture and so many things that is happening but I think because of our population, the North want to say we are the head. They say we are born to rule, the south-south we say the same thing. But if we can understand each other, we have thirty-six state of the federation excluding Abuja I.e. thirty-seven and we have one of the largest population in Africa. If we can come together and understand ourselves

Interviewer- Some people are saying that Nigeria should divide

..... Hmmm, the Biafra agitation has been since the 1960's Biafra is supposed to be independent on their own but you know creating another country from Nigeria cannot solve the problem. I said earlier, if we deal with ourselves. Now if the Biafra separate from Nigeria, How many state will make up Biafra country? And this will not evade crisis from coming. Any problem unsolved is unsolved. If the separation happens, the Igbo group will say we singlehandedly fought for this independence and we will be the one ruling and the south—south group will disagree. And another crisis again will erupt. The crisis we face now cannot be solved by separation. It just like having a problem with your husband in the house and you do not deem it fit to settle it, the problem will continue to degenerate and will be waiting for both of you to address it. We have to know that, as a country, we have to be one. Forget about tribal differences. If we can come together and say, this is our country, and let think of the way forward as a people, Nigeria will be great again. When there is power tussle, so many things result. So the only thing we need in this country is just prayers. The crisis we are facing

now, boko-haram, Niger Delta militants, the Avengers, Biafra and so on if it dies down today, another fraction will rise up. To tell you the truth, people are working against the peace of this country and it is not ordinary but the work of the devil. That is why I said this crisis we are facing will not come to an end of a sudden because there are individuals fuelling it. I don't know what someone can achieve by putting the other to grieve.

Interviewer- Thank you very much

Interviewer- In comparison to other places, what do you think about the level of violence in Nigeria?

..... I can still say in comparison to other country, we are still okay. Like if you go to other countries of the world like Iraq, you can sleep. Nigeria is still better than Iraq, Afghanistan and the likes. We know that we can still close our eyes in so part of the country and sleep notwithstanding, crisis is not good we need peace. We need absolute peace to make sure that at least foreigners can come into our country and improve our resources. We need peace. Nigeria is still okay compare to other countries of the world to be realistic, Nigeria is a good country. We live together as one no matter your skin colour and belief.

Interviewer- Thank you so much sir. What is your assessment of Nigeria government and your opinion about them?

..... Nigeria government! You know it is individual that make up government. They are trying to recover funds stolen by public servants and public office holder. I think that is a good job. Government is elected in by the masses and when this present government came in, they promised they are going to give jobs to those young people, the graduates and they have to keep up with their promise. The government is trying but what i ask people is what are you doing for the government? You are waiting for the government to pay you. We have come to that aspect of life. You don't need to receive but you have to give out also. Most of our problems is let's wait on government. Though the government is doing their best and we still want them to do more. I love this government because the rich cannot continue to exploit

the poor to garner more wealth and poor goes on getting poor. The government is doing its best.

Interviewer- And the fight against Boko-haram?

..... The fight against Boko-haram has reduced somehow, the government gave ultimatum that the fight should end in previous two month before now. But this is not achieved. However things are not as it used to be. At least people are now moving about their normal businesses. Those that left their villages are coming back to start life again. Then if you listen to radio service station's news, you hear of bomb blast and number of casualty recorded but now this has reduced. So this is a plus to the president.

Interviewer- What do you think should be the way forward for Nigeria?

..... We should start thinking as Nigerians

Interviewer- How do we do that?

..... There are so many ways we can do these. By using the media to unite the nation

Interviewer- Are you saying on the part of the government?

..... It should be top down. It is the government that will initiate that and try to bring everyone under one umbrella. Do you know why?

Interviewer- No

..... An average American will fight for America, why because they know who they ar. See let me tell you this will shock you. America bans their flag in other country of the world

Interviewer- Hmmm

..... Yes, I cannot trample on America flag. An average American can never do that but Nigeria we are not patriotic enough as other countries like America. Maybe because we do not have access to our basic right as citizens

Interviewer- Hmmm

..... As a citizen you pay less tax and if you don't have, the government will give to you and make you comfortable. Unlike in Nigeria. I heard in the US, a man was trying to commit suicide by jumping down a storey building and was asked why he wanted to commit suicide, he said he needed \$100,000 maybe to clear off a debt and the police in the country brought the money to him. In Nigeria we can do that. We need to give people their right and make them know their right and I hope you know the cause? Poverty. As a father of five children and I don't have money to train them, those children, might end up been a robbers and thief to survive and this is what is causing the crisis. So therefore , we have a lot of bad people in the society and people are using their money to employ these kids who cannot taken care of by their parents and the government is not coming in to savage the situation. There is need for everyone to put his or her effort, the government including to educate these young mind so as to get them off the streets and make society a better place. Government should also provide the basic amenities, people in the society will be reasonable and there won't be violence anymore. We need to go back to the drawing board.

Interviewer- you know issue of various ethnic group living together like the three major ethnic group in the country, the Igbos, Hausas and Yorubas. We can trace it back to the civil war. I do not know if you know anything about the civil war?

.....hmmmmm Ojukwu

Interviewer- Yeah and some of the Northern Generals. Don't you think it is grievances that is still the issue in Nigeria?

..... It is power tussle. I told you earlier on any problem that is not solved even if it is half solve, it is not solved at all. Everyone have something in mind. Ojukwu was there as an Igbo man and people did not want him. It is just power tussle and everyone just want to be there for self-interest. It is just selfish ambition. We have to go back to the drawing board. I think it is not this generation.

Interviewer- Thank you very much. I do appreciate your time. I think that will take us to the end of the interview.

Interview 4

Interviewer- Thank you so much sir for your time. Like I have explained earlier, my name is modupe Akinleye a PhD student from the university of Bristol and would like to know about your understanding on political violence in Nigeria, particularly Boko-haram movement and how it is been responded to in Nigeria. Can I know your background?

..... Ok hmmm. I am warrant officer xxxxx. A soldier of the Nigeria army, xxxxx years of age, xxxxx and in have a first degree in French and xxxxx. I have been in the Nigeria army for 32 years. So the issues of political violence in Nigeria is a very complex one because Nigeria is a plural society. A society that is made up of 250 ethnic groups and then we have 36 states in the federation. Nigeria is a federation and then the issues of violence arises as a result of scarce resources. Each of these 250 ethnic groups tries to be in control and so any one that is in the centre will control these resources and try to allocate it to his clan from my personal experience. So this is one of the things that give birth to political violence. Basically the violence as we have known usually used to be from the Northern part of the country because, the Northern part of the country is predominantly Islam and then the south are predominantly Christians and we know from experience that Islam is usually associated with violence and I do not owe anyone apology for that. In addition, to that they also like to be in control and that is the cardinal principle of Islam. They just want to be the one leading and they don't like to be led by others. So what also give birth to political violence as at present in Nigeria is because we are going through turbulent times. The Boko-Haram movement initially was an Islamic movement. The man that brought the movement in Borno state Nigeria, though I can recall his names. He was an Islamic teacher and he brought this movement which was a bit different from existing Islamic teachings. It is a radical type of Islamic movement which is quite different from what the Nigerian Muslims are used to. So it is a kind of idea that radicalises the youth and emphasis the fact that western education is a sin. So because the

Northern part of the country is backward educationally, if anyone comes up with the idea that western education is really against their religion, the youth in that part of the country will buy the idea. That is how Boko-Haram started. Initially the fight was between them and the police force but over time, the Boko-Haram movement has now transformed to something else. Today, it is no longer a religious movement because, their aim as we have seen in the Nigeria situation is not just to Islamitize the entire Northern part of the country but also take over control of the nation. They took over some local government in Borno state Nigeria and in those local government, they raised their flags which means it is not just a religious movement but political with a purpose to set up their own form of government which is against the laws of Nigeria. So that is the background of the Boko-Haram movement in Nigeria.

Interviewer- In your opinion when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

..... Well I will not say it is quite a while but like I said before, this violence i.e. at the root of the violence is this desire to control the limited resources of the country. That is the bottom line of any political movement. This desire to control the resources of the country which is situated at southern part of the country. So but in the late 80's, there was the movement of the Maitaisine which was also from the North as it is in the North that this type of movement comes from. The government of Nigeria which usually comprises of the Muslim north, as the movement usually start as a religious movement, they usually, that is the government overlook it till it goes out of hand. So that has been the trend but at the moment, in think Maitaisine It happened the same as it did today and after a long while, the military were able to nip it in the board. I cannot pinpoint the exact time but I think Maitaisine in the late 80's was the first violence that the country actually encountered. In terms of religion and political violence. I will say the late 80's with all modesty because as a country, we have not witness so much of this violence. Nigeria could be noted for other things but violence, is a recent development in our nationhood.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- With regards to saying that violence is a recent thing, what about the issue of the civil war and all of that, that happened shortly after our independence?

..... Okay, well the civil war hmmm. Why I said violence is a recent development, the civil war like we in the military and the world all over know it to be. The war is, although certain incidence led to the war but the civil war was a combination of a political like I said at the centre of the crisis is the desire to control the resources and then what actually happened in the case of the civil war was the first military coup that Nigeria had which was carried out by late Maj. Kaduna Nzeogwu. The man at the centre of the coup in fairness to him was a patriot. That is my own personal opinion and I stand to be corrected. Because what motivated the coup was because of the level of corruption on the part of the post independent government and the military officer was a comrade. He saw the way the political leaders were living which was at variance with the living standards of the masses. So he saw the need to topple the government and introduce a workable system that will enable the masses to live at standard. A regime that will be people oriented in nature but unfortunately, the idea could not materialise because some of those who planned the coup together with him, betrayed him. The first coup resulted in the first prime minister of the nation late. Tafawa Balewa was killed and the sultan of Sokoto. The two key leader from the North. So this resulted in the civil war. The officers in the North saw it as a blow as the initial plan was they should execute all political leaders in all regions of the nation. Ojukwu was tasked for this assignment and fulfilled his own part but those in the east and west did not follow suit as planned. This is available in the public domain as several books have been written on the civil war. So the officers in the North felt betrayed that this was a calculated attempt to destroy their own political leaders while those of the east, west were not touched so, they had to come up with a counter coup. What happened then, the leader of the Nigeria army then Maj. Gen Aguyi Ironsi who took over the Nzeogwu coup led to disarray in the political arena. He late. Maj Gen Aguyi Ironsi took over government then but unfortunately, he could not manage the situation because he did not as a military tradition, try the coup plotters. So the officers did not get tried. So they the Northern officers saw it as an attempt by the Igbos because Ojukwu was from Igbo like Aguyi Ironsi, to seize power and destroy their political leaders. Therefore, the Northern officer's stage a counter coup and Ironsi was disgracefully killed so, the civil war erupted but violence is not as it is now. In the military, we look at war as a full flesh war and not a violence that something gives rise to. That is, the country went through a period of 30-month war (civil). It

was Gen. Gowon who was the leader at that time. He gave no Victor nor vanquish verdict for the war. So Nigeria got back to normal life and since then, Nigeria has not had these issue of violence as it is today.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- I can see you are trying to distinguish between the concept of war and violence

..... Yeah violence

Interviewer- That would have brought us to the next question. What does terrorism mean? In your own opinion

..... Well terrorism in military concept, we see the act of terrorism as an attempt by a group of people imposes themselves on people in a community through intimidation and violence. Who forces people to accept their ideology, beliefs and concept? So that is terrorism and at the centre of it, is the use of intimidation and violence. Terrorism is what build-up to all full flesh war because, if it is not well managed, it can lead to a full flesh war. Terrorism basically involves a group having an idea and wanting to impose that idea. In An ideal situation, you are expected to sell the idea and allow people make a choice on what they want. But in the case of terrorism, they do not want people to make a choice but will want to force people to accept it through violence means. By using intimidation, like we see in our country, people killing people even those who are not involved normally. The masses are always at the receiving end. The political leaders are well secured and their places of abode is well guarded but it is the masses they target so as to give the impression that the government is in effective and the government is weak and so, that people are open to any kind of attack. So by doing that, they want the people to lose confidence in that government and forced to accept their ideology.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- Can you just tell us your experiences with political violence or even Boko-haram movement?

..... hmmm, well as a soldier, the issue of Boko-haram in Nigeria, the Nigeria army have really bear much of the brunt because, so many of my colleagues who participated in the war at one time or the other and of course the thing is still on-going and nobody know when is turn will come next and unfortunately or fortunately I was out of the country from 2012 to 2015. So, I was out of the country for three years probably that is why I am not drafted in earlier. I have heard from eye witness, from colleagues and those we live in the same block who went. In fact there was one of my colleagues, we did course together in the army that was drafted to the battlefield. While I was outside the country we use to chat through the net and suddenly, I didn't hear from him anymore. I try to call his number but it didn't go through. Only for me to see a post by his son on social media that he was killed by the Boko-Haram terrorist and I called my other colleagues to confirm this. Sadly I was told this is true. There are other cases too and other colleagues we were victims as well. So the Nigeria army has actually bear so much of the brunt because Nigeria army is at the centre of the fight against Boko-Haram. The other arms of the military service are just supporting, like the air force. The Nigeria army is on ground to fight. The air force come to give support service in air surveillance and bombings on the air but the Nigeria army are always on ground. This Boko-Haram terrorist uses unconventional method to fight like mines. The Geneva Convention forbids the use of mines in warfare. In warfare situation, the provision on the convention allows you to kill your enemies and not like say amputate your enemy and leave him half human. There is also an allowance to take your enemy alive if he surrenders. This is basically the method the Boko-Haram guys are using. The unconventional method. They make it in a way that it looks like a trap. The mines strategy has been their major style of operation and this has resulted in major casualty.

Interviewer- If we can just build on that. As an officer, do you have an understanding of what this group are agitating for or fighting for? Are they aggrieved over anything?

Interviewee: Unfortunately, the so called Boko-Haram have not come out even the government, the past and present tried to make some effort to negotiate to ask for their grievances like I said, the truth is that this terrorist aim is to take over government. They are not really aggrieved. Like I said earlier they say they are against western education. When you

say Boko-Haram, it means western education is a sin. That is their doctrine, that western education is a sin. Now, what we have expected them to do is to discourage people from accepting western education but of course, come to think of it, the idea of planting bombs, the idea of manufacturing bomb, the idea of planting mines are all traceable to western education because the Islamic education is not based on science. So when we come to look at it, it is all hypocrisy on their part. They are just trying to deceive some sections that western education is a sin and yet they pose messages on internet, if western education is a sin how come you have access to internet. Islamic education has never introduced something like that to the world. The scientific discovery and whatever components the world is enjoying today, is attributed to western education. They don't really have any grievance and there is none. They are just hiding under the canopy of religion and want to take over the government in Nigeria. That has been their aim. They have not come out publicly or privately to make known their grievances. But unlike the Niger Delta Avengers, their grievances is on the control of resources but everyone knows that the North is the Savannah area in country with no much resources. They don't have any grievance. They just want to take over the government of Nigeria and to be able to control the resource. That is the hidden motive.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer what would you say that peace would mean to us

..... Peace will mean a lot. Peace will mean that the average Nigeria will be able to move to other part of the region to do business without fear, hindrance and doing his normal business. That is what peace will really mean because the terrorist activity is a real threat to life in the country. At the beginning of their activity, they were sparing Muslims but today, they don't spare anyone, whether you are a Muslim or non-Muslim, everyone is a source of their target except if you are their member. The movement does not really have a friend except you are there's. Probably their sponsors. Peace will bring a feeling of togetherness and been accepted. It is our hope that this will materialize and that God will intervene so that the average Nigerian go back to their normal life.

Interviewer- Thank you sir

Interviewer- Can you tell us of your thought on Nigeria as a country. You mentioned earlier on that Nigeria is a plural society and all of that. What do you think of Nigeria as a country?

.... Well, Nigeria is a country, I will say first and foremost as a Christian, my thought for Nigeria is rooted directly on my Faith. I believe God has brought Nigeria together. Though it is often said that God did not create Nigeria but that Nigeria was created by a lord Luggard. Overtime, I think that Nigeria have come to accept that we have no other country than this. Nigerian and all over the world knows that Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world and when Nigeria squeezes, Africa catches a flu. Nigeria is a country that God has destined for greatness. Except for the act of terrorism we are witnessing. Even with the political turmoil. This are all stages countries go through. Nigeria that is my own opinion, I see that if this threat caused by the act of terrorism is not curtail, our unity as a nation is under threat. As so many other movement or groups are beginning to come up. Like the Biafra who are agitating for separation and also the south-south states that is those that have this crude oil are also agitating on their own for separation. My opinion, from the trend and the way things are going, I will say that if God does not help us and if our leaders do not manage the situation very well, Nigeria may break-up in the near future. The political leaders have to emphasize the need of togetherness and drop their ethnic alignment. That has been the position and the result of these agitation today. The south-south are agitating against the way the resources of the country is been shared and most of the present administration seats in government are people from the president's region and religion. If this trend continue, there is a limit to human endurance. With the development, this country may likely break-up as we have seen in other countries. Because other countries never experienced what we are experiencing today and they broke up. I remember when we were in operation in former Yugoslavia that is peace keeping mission, those people were telling us that we came to keep peace in their country and that very soon they we come to keep peace in ours. I pray the situation we not degenerate to that level.

Interviewer-- What do you think about the level of political violence in Nigeria in comparison with other places and other countries of the world?

..... Let me say that, what I know about other countries of the world basically is from the social and mass media but when we are talking about violence in Nigeria, I think I have a first-hand knowledge. So I cannot say much about what is happening in other countries. However, in the case of Nigeria, the situation is still manageable because ours have not degenerated to that level and the reason is simply, the average Nigerian does not like violence. The average Nigerian are interested in earning their living and be okay. The average Nigerian does not believe in violence because violence causes dislocation. Violence causes disorganization and as a result plans cannot be made and result in sudden death and all that. The average Nigerian want to live in peace and earn their living. These reasons is what makes the situation manageable unlike in other countries like Libya were the government was sort of a socialist regime were people get everything almost freely and government was taking care of them, which makes them to be easily bought over but the average Nigerian will have to fend for themselves. The government don't really care because the government is for those in government. The average Nigerian feels very little impact of the government and prays the issue of crisis be brought under control as soon as possible and can go on with their daily living.

Interviewer-- Thank you sir

Interviewer-- You mentioned that the government of Nigeria is for those in government, and that will lead us to the next question. What is your thought about the Nigerian government?

..... Well my thought is personal and I stand to be corrected. My thought concerning Nigeria government, not just Nigeria government only but the government in Africa is that they should change the trends, I attribute this to the British that handed over government in Nigeria because Nigeria got independence on a platter of gold. The British just left the scene and Nigeria set in though, during the colonial era, the British were the lord so the Nigeria political elites who stepped into their shoes, like I said the British were the lords and the average Nigerian were regarded as nobody even in the Nigeria army, during the colonial era, the British were the officers, then Nigerian were the other ranks. So, when the British step out because, Nigeria did not fight for independence, the political elite stepped in and they now put themselves in the position of the colonial masters. Also, the average Nigerian is now

looked down on. That is why you see the violence and whatever movement. It is as a result of control of resources because, it is he who control resources that can dish out to anybody. The government in Nigeria is not a government that cares for the people. They pay lip service to democracy especially during political campaign. Even the present regime in Nigeria who promised change, they assume power and went back on their words. They are now turning back to say, they never promise somethings on their manifesto. The government in Nigeria is not really for the people but for those who are in government, that is why everyone want to be there because the resources is not only controlled for their clan but for their pocket as well. That why we are bearing a lot about corruption. Those past government, borrowed so much money and embezzle them. The government took \$2million loan from the World Bank which they said was to prosecute the Boko-haram war. Unfortunately this money was shared as we know today by the political job here. The money was not use to procure weapons for the Boko-haram fight. So that is the Nigeria government. The Nigeria government is all about sharing. The political elite share the limited resources among themselves. The average Nigeria is left at the ebb of these leaders

Interviewer-Thank you sir

Interviewer-- hmmm at the moment, the fight against Boko-haram is still on going, we can see some commitment from the present government as well. What do your assessment of the fight against Boko-haram?

.... Well the fight is still on going, and the present government with all due respect have tried. Because for now most of the area, which the terrorist took over has been liberated and normal lives has been restored in quite a number of area but not in the entire North-east. Otherwise, the issue of the IDP will not be in existence. We still have IDP everywhere, even in Lagos you can see them

Interviewer- What do you mean by IDP sir?

.... It mean Internally Displaced People. Those people who are in the theatre of the war and most of them from Northeast. So we see them everywhere. That is to show that the situation

has not been brought under total control but to a large extent, so many areas which were under the control of these terrorists have been liberated and, I hope with time, the threat will be completely eliminated. Nigeria will know peace again.

Interviewer-- Thank you sir

Interviewer-- What do you think is the way forward for Nigeria? We are aware that apart from Boko-haram, there are so many other movements and groups that are springing up as a pattern

..... Like I have said before. The way forward is for the government of Nigeria to realise that whoever is in the government should realise that Nigeria belongs to everyone and all parts of the country. They should run an all-inclusive government where the North, South, East and West are the components of Nigeria and so that, every part of the country must be an active participant in government. In addition to that, the government must realise too that government exists for the welfare of the people. The government of Nigeria is detached from the people. I don't owe anyone an apology on that. The government of Nigeria is detached from the people. The government takes decisions which are at variance from the people. You see a government making laws that are anti-masses. For instance, a man retrenched from his job and tries to find a source of income for himself and family, buys a motorcycle for transport business and the government will wake up and ban motorcycle operation in his state. The government is supposed to understand the plight of the masses. So one who is just retrenched from work and finds a source of livelihood and you ban the business he is doing, how he keeps body and soul together. So the government should realise that they exist to care for the welfare of the masses and not for those who are in government alone

Interviewer-- Thank you sir

Interviewer- Any last word you would want to say as a summary?

..... I will like to say that Boko-haram in Nigeria is a challenge because their method of operations is a novel one because in the past, we had such similar things and the government rose to the occasion and were able to nip it in the bud but for these movements of Boko-haram, it is a movement that is religious / political and in addition, I think the government in the middle-

east should support Nigeria as Boko-haram pledges allegiance to ISIS. Like they did in Iran where the whole world stood against such movement with sanctions. If we can fight against the external support I mean the world because it is this external support that is making them more difficult to deal with. Because of the support the world need to raise and come to Nigeria aid because, by and large, the truth must be told, if Nigeria as a country in Africa falls, Africa has fallen. If Nigeria falls, there is a problem. The whole world will feel it. Because Nigeria will move to everywhere. I think that is why the world need to come to our help. If not the Islamic radicals will take over the whole country. Of course the western country they are liberal people because if Nigeria falls, they will want to support Nigeria by taking people in and these people will become a threat latter to them. The world should deal with the source because Boko-haram pays allegiance to ISIS. ISIS gives support to Boko Haram like materials, weapons and so on. This is an area I think the world need to come to the aid of Nigeria. Especially the West. Because the long term effect of the disintegration of Nigeria will have an impact not just on African but on the world at large.

Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir, so grateful for your time. That is the end of the interview

Interview 5

Interviewer-- Thank you very much sir for availing me the opportunity to have this interview with you. As I mentioned earlier, my name is modupe Akinleye a student of the University of Bristol and I am completing my PhD on political violence with emphasis on Boko-haram movement is been understood and responded to in Nigeria. Please sir, can we know your background?

..... I am xxxx xxxxx, a military officer of the Nigeria army, precisely from the xxxxx

Interviewer-- Your educational background?

..... I am a HND holder

Interviewer-- And your rank in the Nigeria army

..... Okay. A corporal

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Have you had any experience with political violence in Nigeria?

..... Of course, of recent over past few years there have been political violence around which mostly caused by terrorist. As a soldier, we are trying to see how we can ensure peace and try to ensure that the environment is safe to live

Interviewer-- Thank you sir, any personal experience like the ones you experienced personally

..... The one I experienced personally was the one that happened in Kaduna state Nigeria, close to the army barrack

Interviewer- When was that?

..... Last year, they almost entered the military barrack but we were able to push them out.

Interviewer-- Which group was that?

..... It was Boko-haram

Interviewer-- The same Boko-haram?

..... Yes

Interviewer-- What do you think about the group itself?

..... I think the group is politically motivated not only that they are motivated by some religious group. I mean not only political motivation given to them but religious motivation. They feel that power should be theirs and the whole country should come under one religion. I think that is their motivation.

..... Why do you think this is motivated by religious group?

Interviewer-- If you follow the events, the attack first started by attacking churches and religious places. You discover that, this is religious issue

Interviewer-- But we do know that, from unfolding events, they kill both Christians and Muslims. And there are official records that says that more Muslims are dying from the attack than Christians because from the region where they are attacking, there are more Muslims than Christians.

..... If you say so, our perspective of saying that is more religious incline. For instance, if a Boko-haram kills a military personnel and runs into a group of Muslim sitting, instead of them identifying him, they will tell you nobody enter the house. So what do you think of that? Protecting their own. By my understanding of what is happening, it is political but there is a religious element in it. That is my take.

Interviewer-- hmmm. Thank you very much. In your opinion, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

..... I think terrorism is as old as Nigeria but it has become pronounced with our democratic settings. Probably because our democratic leaders do not have the power to fight it.

Interviewer-- You said it is as old as Nigeria, what do you mean by that?

..... Yeah, it is as old as Nigeria. There was a time of the Maitaisine group. The group was clamped down but they evolve over the years and what we are having today is what is called Boko-haram. The same group. So it is as old as Nigeria.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Can you give us your opinion on terrorism, what it means to you?

..... To me terrorism is an act of destroying or planning attack on a group of people who have actually done nothing so as to achieve a particular goal. It is not like a war settings, they just come together to plan attack. This day we see them tie bomb to themselves and they just explode anytime and any day. They do that in public places.

Interviewer--Thank you very much. Just to press on that a bit. You think terrorism is all about planning attack on a group in order to achieve certain goals. Other political violence we have in Nigeria, also result in that.

..... That's true. Political violence in Nigeria has not been as destructive as what we have now. Though we have been having political issue and I think the most challenging is this issue of Boko-haram that has really claim a lot of lives. I tell you every day, recently in Abuja, we heard of a Christian who was murdered while she was preaching the gospel. All of these have become pronounce within this political era.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Do you by any mean have experience with the Boko-haram group? Probably on duty or any peace keeping mission?

..... I have not had direct contact with them. However in term of providing security. Maybe when there is a security alert that there is an attack going on, we are deployed to make sure it does not spread to other places.

Interviewer-- You went to the North to do that?

.... I think I mentioned Kaduna earlier on

Interviewer-- Okay you were on duty there?

..... Yeah

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Can you just tell us what peace means to us?

..... For me, peace is actually a state where the society is working as it is supposed to be. It is absent of terrorism. Where people can go about their normal day to day business. Daily activities without disturbance, without fears, and threat to their lives and properties.

Interviewer-- Do you think they can be a society that is absent of violence?

..... Honestly, there is no society that is absent of violence. There will always be one or two issues. The government can be focus with their will power to ensure an average peace. So people can do business and go on with their daily lives.

Interviewer-- Thank you. We are talking about political violence and Boko-haram in the first part and that will lead us to your assessment of Nigeria as a country and I also understand

some factions are already agitating that they want to secede and all of that. With what we got on ground, what do you think about Nigeria as a country?

..... I think Nigeria would have been a better place. If the nation is devoid of ethnicity, religion. They will see themselves as one. Like you said, the region are trying to go away and be on their own. Simply because, they do not have a sense of belonging to the country and so for them been on their own is a dream and they are walking towards that to see that the dream is actualized.

Interviewer-- What you are trying to say is that we are better off together

..... Can I say we are better off together. When issues like our strength is in our diversity. Is that true? Are we really making the necessary progress? How do the average Nigeria feel if he is not from the North east? How is he treated? Do we really see ourselves as one? These are questions I must ask

Interviewer-- Do we see ourselves as one?

..... I don't think we do. To be honest i do not think we do

Interviewer-- Why do you think so?

..... Maybe the problem was from inception

Interviewer-- What do you mean by inception

..... I mean inception. When the amalgamation the thing came about. I think it was not properly done in the sense that, they did not consider a lot of factors. This idea was not put in place as it should have been. Maybe our colonel masters felt this will be to their advantage. If the right indexes was put in place maybe we should have been better off apart.

Interviewer-- Would you support secession?

..... I support it for now?

Interviewer-- Yes or no

..... Wouldn't want to say yes or no but I would want to see a country where everybody is seen as one. I had a bad experience when I joined the army. We were on a particular assignment and it was going to bring some financial reward. I heard someone saying the person responsible for giving this financial rewards after the assignment, discriminating us in the line of regional affinity and religion. I wouldn't want to use the actual language the person used. This are the issues we face daily.

Interviewer-- When was that?

..... As early as 2001

Interviewer-- Okay

..... I just came into the system. You can only imagine how I would feel then. If we can see ourselves as one, if you are a Nigerian, you should not be discriminated against in the country no matter your beliefs and regional affinity.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. What do you think about the level of political violence in Nigeria in comparison to other countries of the world?

..... I think we are better off compare to other part of the world. I think we are better. The violence in Nigeria is synonymous with some part of Nigeria and not the whole country. So we are still better off.

Interviewer-- Like which country in comparison.

..... You said other part of the world and I am looking at it holistically

Interviewer-- Yeah, just like highlight some countries

..... Ok. Let me look at it with countries like Iran, Afghanistan. If you compare our system to that, I think we are better.

Interviewer-- What about countries like America, do you think we are better?

..... America is seen as the world power. This mean they have a lot of responsible off their shoulders and it also mean that a lot of people has a lot of expectation from them. I am sure that, relatively they are better off than us because of technology.

Interviewer-- There are so many variables

..... Of course they are so many variables. If you look at the trend of violence there, they always come up with those who are the culprits in time because of technology. If we can increase our technological arsenals in term of security, maybe in the nearest future, we could start to compete with them.

Interviewer-- Thank you. You're thought about the Nigeria government?

..... For me, I think we are headway. Before now we were ruled by military but now democracy. And it is getting better in the sense that, we now have people who could criticize the government constructively and put them under pressure to perform. There is freedom of speech with democracy. Though we have some setback but in the nearest future, I think we will have a good system in place

Interviewer-- So, you think that Nigeria is doing fairly well?

..... Yes they are doing fairly well.

Interviewer-- Not just the present government?

..... Yes they are doing fairly well

Interviewer-- Thank you. What is your assessment of the fight against Boko-haram?

..... Like I said initially, the fight against Boko-haram is both political and religious. And in such situation, it will only take a government with a strong will power irrespective of your religious inclinations to calm the situation. Presently I can assure you the Nigeria government is on top of the situation.

Interviewer-- On top of the situation?

...., yeah, the fight have been progressive and the result is getting obvious and we hope in the near future, it will be a thing of the past.

Interviewer-- And, don't you think it will be a thing like the Maitaisine's. Like they seem to have been wiped out but they never really go?

.... That is where religious issues come in. The Maitaisine was a religious ideology and even the one that is currently going on. It is my personal opinion. The government is going to do well to make sure this people are wiped out I think for now. From revelation, we think there is a collaboration between this group and foreign groups and if the government can put the necessary machinery in place, we can defeat this group I.e. Boko-haram for now but then, there must be a lasting solution. We must go back to the drawing board. Taught religious leaders. They need to be licensed properly. Nobody should just pick up the bible or the Koran as preachers. They must be made to go through the necessary accreditations, so that people that should speak, should be those who are well trained. Not those who we just take their time to read the bible or Koran and psyche the people base on their personal interest or ideology.

Interviewer-- Yeah, before we go to the final question, just curious about why you think the army wiping them out will help because what does it mean for a country to be going to war against her citizens?

.... The purpose of governance is to create an enabling environment for her people to do business and exist. Whatever is necessary to bring about that, I think it is worth it and it is the responsibility of government to do so. The government cannot because of a group has religious bigotry against others and allow them to continue to destroy others in the society. Any responsible government we have to seek for the higher goal. The higher goal is to the good of the larger populace. I think that is it. If the government has to do away with some people in order to achieve the higher goal, I think it is worth it.

Interviewer-- Do you think this will not lead to growth of more splinter groups? Like what we are experiencing in the Niger delta. There have been a lot of military power to suppress the

activities of the militant but they seem to be multiplying. Don't you think that is what we will continue to experience?

..... The simple reason is that, the basics are not been handled

Interviewer-- What are the basics?

.....The basics for instance, we have a situation were the past government came up with the amnesty program for those who choose to lay down their arms, I mean the militant group. You will agree with me that it became political because the whole group was not captured. The government should make sure there is an orientation. What I meant by orientation, if you been to that part of the country before, you discover that they are been neglected. The government should allocate resources towards that end to give more support. They must empower them in terms of skill acquisition and help them start-up businesses of their own. The last time I went there, it was not a good experience. The education system over there is poor. I think there is a lot of things the government can do to ensure that those who accept the amnesty offer are properly integrated back into the society by providing skilled jobs and empower them.

Interviewer-- What do you see as the way forward for a Nigeria?

..... As regard to?

Interviewer-- As regards to political issues, religious issues and all of that

..... Whatever I say is my personal opinion. I think the government should allow every zone to manage her natural resources and give some percentages to the centre. I think it will help to reduce this violence.

Interviewer-- More like confederacy, is that what you mean?

..... Yeah, so that the centre will not be too powerful. They should do it in a way state should be allowed to manage its resources. Then federal government will not have the whole power to be deciding the course of our nationhood.

..... Thank you. So you think the whole issue that is spreading religious violence, is not all about religion but also resource control?

..... Yeah. Looking at the issue of the south of Nigeria, you see agitation there is all about the way the government have used their resources to develop other part of the region why they are suffering.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Mr. Festus

..... You are welcome.

Interview 6

Interviewer--Thank you so much sir for availing me the opportunity to interview you. My names are Modupe Akinleye a PhD student from the University of Bristol and I am carrying out a research on political violence especially the boko-haram movement and how it is been responded to so far. Can we meet you by giving us your names, education qualification, occupation religion stand and so on?

.... I am xxxxx a staff of the Nigeria Army. We have been hearing of the Boko haram, the battle with them has been on and it is only God that has given us power to overcome them thus far because it has not been as it used to. Peradventure you still hear they bomb so places, I will like to make you understand that an enemy cannot just be able to have power in a country without an intruder. I don't know whether you understand. Hmmm so times, the war itself looks like a propaganda. How this group stated. Boko haram has been on for a long time for instance, what is the meaning of boko haram. It say book is a sin that is book has become a taboo. If you look at it that way, it is not the Islamic way as the Muslims will tell that, if you write Arabic way, it is book also likewise Christians therefore they

Of Boko Haram...no one can say education is a sin... we are trying to condemn them but we find it difficult..... the former NSA to Jonathan he made a comment that majority of them are found in the PDP...automatically the government remove him from the post....and he later died in the plane crash...there's no way to contain them...we are holding a GPNG while the

Boko Haram are holding a brandy when the new president came, he furnish the Army with sophisticated weapons.....

..... this problem of Boko Haram has been long, before 2012 but it has not been like that..., if you want me to tell you more. Before this Boko Haram of a thing in the time of Babangida they wanted to form a national guide. These northerners you see they know what they are doing, they wanted to form a national guide and they build some place which were not completed, just like, you know say when we are talking of the Sambisa you know like underground when the Boko Haram are was not meant for them before Babangida wanted to make that place a national guide

What does a national guide mean?

Babangida wanted to make that place to supersede military, army.

Most of the areas designed for the national guide are left vacant so the Boko Haram are underground in the Sambisa forest...until we have to use extra mine destruction you know there are bombs that you are able to destroy the ground

The Boko Haram themselves are they Nigerians? in part they are Nigerians in part they are not Nigerians the Boko haram themselves are very smelly, if you see them now immediately you see them now they are very easy to identify, they have a very big odour they don't bath they have long finger nails they don't eat much, you understand me and if you kill them now they have little blood. Their blood is not much. I think you understand what I mean now. So if boko haram is within us here now we will know him, we know them. If you have any other thing you can ask me

Interviewer-When do you think terrorism started in Nigeria

...I will first of all tell you that like the Boko Haram of a thing is a sabotage because if I mean ask of the Boko Haram of a thing that what are they demanding for? For me and you to understand they say book is a sin...in fact the cause of their fighting I will call it that they are

ungodly, they are antichrist, they are the people that the bible have already prophecy against that nation will rise against nations

When I was in Sudan 2009 it started but was contained.....

The government also will carry money and give to the communities in the Nigeria Delta na done man will eat it.....there's problem within ourselves when a child is hungry is hungry what do you think he will do....take for instance this country Libya, you see Libya was doing well by their Muammar Gaddafi because he ruled for 42 years I'm giving you instances now for how many years that Gaddafi ruled, all these things, the peace.. this American of a thing, you know there are some countries now that doesn't have oil at all they have their own power in weapon and I'm selling oil I will like you to come and make trouble so that I will sell my arms its very common in the world. Another point I have to let you know you see USSR their power see this country see... America...USSR... that on they are very good in manufacturing strong weapons and they don't have oil...where do you think they will make up for their economy if they did not make crash landed other countries to fight with one another so that they will be able to say okay you take this gun and give me your oil

Interviewer-So there seems to be some external...

Yes

Take for instance Libya was doing well ...until other countries came and set up a rebel, only God knew how they set up a rebel in that country... even here in Nigeria... it is a propaganda...until today Libya is not having peace

Interviewer don't you think boko haram might have some grievances

Interview 7

Interviewer- Thank you for availing me the opportunity to conduct this interview. I am Modupe Akinleye I am completing my PhD studies on political violence and how it is being responded to thus far. Can we meet you? Your name and other information.

..... I am corporal xxxxx. I am from xxxxx State Nigeria, I am xxxx years old of age xxxxx. That is all for now

Interviewer-- Your educational background?

..... My Educational background, I am an HND holder. That is all for now

Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir. Do you have any experience with political violence before now?

..... First and foremost my encounter is that of the militant in Warri that is in 2003 then I later join the army and posted down to that place where we encountered the militant and the issue was resolved in 2009. Before the Boko-haram came up. The Boko Haram group stated earlier in 2003 and the whole thing was in a cool way later on in 2009, religious fight came up between the Christian and Muslim then after the fight in 2009, in that same year in December, the Muslim group now came up with the issue of Boko Haram. In 2011 the crisis subsided in Jos and to my understanding, I believe is the same group that was fighting in Jos that moved down to Maiduguri to now form a kind of base in Maiduguri. This has really took lives of Nigerian in their base in Maiduguri.

Interviewer-- Thank you sir Hmmmmm when we talking about Jos, where you there in Jos or do you have anybody there as a civilian or a military person?

..... Ok I was there in Jos as a military person

Interviewer-- Ok what were you doing there?

..... I was posted there that same 2009 on the 5th of January that very day I was posted to Jos, the crisis stated from church as the Muslim stated blocking Christian that were going to church then the Christian were fighting back. I think that is how the thing stated there. They state chasing me as a soldier because I was driving on my vehicle on my military uniform

Interviewer-- Who were chasing you?

..... The civilians. They were chasing anyone with gun

Interviewer-- Do you know the particular group?

..... I don't know the particular group. I just saw people chasing me so that I will not get through any access road. I was able to run away from them before I encounter soldiers on the way. They protected me and led me to the barracks.

Interviewer- ok

..... I never knew Jos before, that was the first day I entered Jos.

Interviewer- You got into the middle of the crisis

..... Yeah. I was asked to sign in and secure the barracks

Interviewer-- thank you sir. From your experience and as a military officer what do you think of the Boko-haram movement or group, what do you think they are fighting for?

..... my experience from this Boko Haram group is that it started with religious fight which gravitated to what it is today. They are not body of individuals who are touts I think they are supported by prominent Nigerians because first, we caught some of them with sophisticated weapons which we cannot find in Nigeria but we see them handling this weapons. How did this weapons get into Nigeria? I believe Nigeria is a secured country but most of our military men out there are been intimidated by the so called rich men and high personality in Nigeria. So if you are in a check point, you are asked not to check a particular vehicle and if you check it, your commanding officer may lock you up or mess you up or jailed or they dismiss you from the job. We in the Military are trained to obey every order whether good or bad as the subordinate, you are trained to obey your superior. If you're superior ask you to allow the vehicle to move, you cannot disobey that order. So that is how these weapons come into Nigeria. With what it is now, I believe Boko Haram is supported by senior personality in the country.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much for that incite and to you understanding why do you think prominent Nigeria would want to sponsor violent groups in Nigeria?

..... I think maybe they are fighting for political positions like what is going on in the cabinet, the labour congress, different party fighting the other, I think that because they want to jeopardise their opponent government. Such things can cause the other party to be against the other one. What I am seeing in Nigeria is a fight between two individual that the common man cannot go in between them

Interviewer-- thank you very much, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

..... When terrorism began in Nigeria... hmmm, not in 2000. The only one I really experienced is in 2003

Interviewer-- When it began?

..... I have not really gone into history to know when terrorism began in Nigeria the only knowledge I have is the experience of 2003

Interviewer-- Do you think it might have begun before then?

..... Yes I believe it might have begun before then. I think Nigeria has been a tough country in terms of power tussle. When this issue of power comes in, the opponent will be planning strategy on how to bring down your own power and I think that may lead to terrorism

Interviewer--What do you think terrorism mean?

..... Terrorism is an abnormal act why I say it tis abnormal is that, it doesn't maintain orderliness but breed destruction and disorganises people and takes life and at the end nothing is achieved.

Interviewer-- So it mean mass destruction, is that what you are saying?

..... Terrorism can lead to mass destruction

Interviewer-- it can lead to it but how do we identify a terror act or say this is terrorism?

..... Terrorism does not want to see anything good because when you are into terrorism, you are fighting against others and one thing that can lead one into terrorism is when a person

has not gotten what he or she want he becomes selfish. Terrorism is selfishness. That is how me I look at terrorism.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. You have given us your experience with boko-haram and others. What do you think peace will mean in Nigeria?

..... One thing about Nigeria is, if we want to bring peace in Nigeria, it has to start from various religious head. They have to dish out the truth and let the people know the truth from the scripture because the scripture is supposed to be God's business but now it is becoming an individual business. Somebody will just come and start turning the scripture upside down. Like this issue of Boko-haram, I think the meaning of that word Boko-haram if translated to English means western education is prohibited then if you prohibit western education and a preacher tells is followers that western education is prohibited and kill everyone with western ideology, what do you expect and the followers believe in their head and whatsoever he tells them is what they will obey. Just like in the military, when your superior gives you order, you follow. If I will advise, I will advise the government to focus on every leader in every religious organisation

Interviewer-- In Nigeria

..... In Nigeria. Then, the village heads should be told to caution their people. On the part of the government, the various parties should support each other's in governance and let their followers know they are not fighting and wrestling power with each other in a violent way. They should contest for positions in a peaceful way. That will make Nigeria a peaceful place.

Interviewer-- Thank you so much on your thought on that. And what will you say about Nigeria as a country seeing we have different regions and ethnicity?

..... Nigeria is a great country and would have been a very peaceful country if there was no terror acts. Nigeria are friendly and we are very hospitable people no matter where you are coming from and you can come in and go out freely until this insurgency came in.

Interviewer- _ Thank you. Some people have been calling for national conference and some people have been agitating for division like the Biafra. They started agitating, they want to secede from Nigeria as early as 1960 shortly after Nigeria independence and up till now they are still fighting for it and some other sections are beginning to ask for that and some are saying Nigeria should divide while others are saying in the near future that will happen. What do you think about that?

..... You know Nigeria is a big country, the issue of dividing Nigeria is political. It is a political issue. It has nothing to do with the common Nigeria. It is those politicians are the one empowering the common Nigerian to go into this issues of dividing Nigeria. They have their own aim of why they want to divide Nigeria but Nigerian do not want to be divided.

Interviewer-- Nigerians

..... Nigerians

Interviewer-- If I may ask, How you will identify yourself, is it as a common Nigeria or....

..... Yeah, I am a common Nigeria. The reason why I say I am a common Nigeria is that I am not in the political field and I hold no position that is highly recognise and I don't have anyone I am contending with because if you have someone you are contending with, it means you will be in position probably aiming a higher position and you don't want others to get to that position hence you start contention. I am not of that stuff.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. In comparison with other countries of the world, what we you say about the level of violence in Nigeria when you compare it?

..... For real I will say many other countries are worse than Nigeria in the issue of terrorism. Nigeria terrorism lately and they are still behind us.

Interviewer-- Like which country are you looking at?

..... Like countries like Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan and many others

Interviewer-- Thank you so much. So you think that Nigeria level of violence is still minimal

..... Yeah it is still minimal

Interviewer-- compare to other places and you're thought on the Nigeria government?

..... I think I have spoken a bit about the Nigeria government. What I see about the Nigeria government is that will need to reshape our government especially our top leaders. We still need to reshape that aspect because it was from them that eminent from. There is this saying, if the head is corrupt, all the whole body will be corrupt. If our leaders play a good role on that seat, we the followers will concur to that standard. Our leaders really need to change their lifestyle and look into their attitude.

Interviewer-- Do you think the Nigeria government is doing well with the fight against Boko-haram?

..... They are trying, the present government I think they are trying. That of president Buhari I think they are trying

Interviewer-- Why do you think they are trying?

..... Why I think so is that a year plus that he has been on sit, the issue of bombing and killing in Maiduguri has really subsided. I believe he is trying

Interviewer-- Through the help of the military is it?

..... Yeah Through the help of the military

Interviewer-- What do you see as the lasting solution for Nigeria. What do you see as the solution for Nigeria in this crisis situation? I mean the way forward.

..... By the grace of God, Nigeria, we are aiming there. The present president is putting on effort to fight against corruption and I believe if corruption is taken away, then terrorism will die. We will be able to handle terrorism and crush it in Nigeria. That's my take.

Interviewer-- So corruption is the direct cause of terrorism in Nigeria?

..... Yeah corruption is the cause of terrorism in Nigeria

Interviewer-- is there any final word or thought?

..... I will suggest the main parties that is political parties should resolve their differences and run their political parties in a peaceful way and Nigeria will be a better place for everybody if they don't, the issue of terrorism, we may find it very tough because if their no agreement between the main two political parties, there is tendency that the opposition party will encourage terrorism to destroy the party in power. It is always good to be in peace to achieve our goal.

Interviewer-- Thank you so very much for taking your time

..... Thank you

Interview 8

Interviewer-- I am Modupe Akinleye from the University of Bristol and I am doing research on political violence and Boko Haram movement and how it is being responded to. Can we get some background information about you like your name, education background, religion, occupation and things like that?

..... I am xxxx an ex-military officer from the Nigeria navy. I served the navy and left the navy as a DVC

Interviewer-- When was that?

.....xxxxx this is almost 22 years. And I have been residing in Lagos. Lagos is like our mother station, because every vessel come through Lagos. Since then I have been in Lagos and I know Lagos very well

Interviewer--You are from what part of the country?

..... I am from Xxxxx State

Interviewer-- Thank you very much. Can you talk about your educational background?

..... I finished my secondary school in xxxx state and that was when I joined the navy. When I joined the navy, I did my basic navy training and after the training I graduated and served the navy for 14 years and went for other training like underground weaponry training and at the moment I am doing have a training certificate on security and I am working as a security officer. The certificate on security is undertaken by those who are about to leave the arm forces though not compulsory. The training was done in NAFRC

Interviewer-- What is the full meaning of NAFRC sir?

..... Nigeria Arm forces Resettlement Centre that is NAFRC. You are free to read any course there as there are Engineering courses, Mechanical Courses and so on. I studied security management and got employed by continental shipyard. I worked there for 8years and 5 months. I was a security officer and trained security personnel there on security and criminology and after some time during the Obasanjo regime, a policy was enacted that ex-military men should no longer work because they are earning pension from the state. I voluntary resigned from that place and since then, I have not be fully engaged in employment but I only work part time.

Interviewer-- As a consultant?

..... No, not as a consultant. At times, when NPA (Nigeria Port Authority) buys some boat, from Holland and brings it to the yard, they engage my service to be in charge of the boat and take care of it. Like the other year 2013, for three or four month and last year from February 2nd to August 7th I took care of their boat. But since then I have not have such engagement by them.

Interviewer-- Thank you sir. What do you know about the boko-haram movement or think about them?

..... The boko-haram

Interviewer--hmhhh

..... I am born and brought up from the north. When you say Boko in Hausa language, mean western civilization and haram mean forbidden in the Arabic language.

Interviewer- The meaning of the name but what do you think about the group, their grievances or what they wanted?

..... When they started initially, some of them believed it is written in the Quran that anyone who did not practice the Islamic faith can be killed under violence and nothing is wrong and nothing should be done to prosecute the murderer and in their kingdom whether that of Mohammed, the person will go to paradise and there will be a reward for the victim of the Jihad war that fought for the course of their religion. This I believe is as a result of illiteracy especially in the northern part of Nigeria. But in the south, it is not so among the Muslim. They are more literate and believe they shouldn't make their religion a problem to others. The Boko Haram movement like I said earlier on, they are against western education and believe everyone should study Arabic language and that is the only acceptable language and form of study in Nigeria.

Interviewer-- Sir why do you think that they want everyone to shun western civilization considering that even they using western technology to fight. Why do they want that?

..... During colonization of Nigeria by the western nation, they gave Nigeria western education but when the jihadist of Usman Dan Fodio came into Nigeria they force the people to deny their faith as Islam came with force and Christianity was their choice. The Boko Haram when they came up, came with that ideology because I was born in North and stay awhile in Katsina where president Buhari came from. They claim that everyone in the country is supposed to be a Muslim and our people who were Christian already were assumed to be kafari

Interviewer-- What is the meaning of Kafari?

..... Kafari is seen as an unbeliever. My father was a teacher. He said when they started that was the Jihadist before Boko Haram, they were fighting against the Christians. They burnt many of our churches because I use to listen to the news media daily and kill a lot of people. The fellow Muslim at some point said it is good I mean from the south and said it was in their

Quran and said if a Muslim kills a Christian is like a person killed a hen before their Allah and that there is no sin there. After sometime the boko-haram group came up and started with Christian in 2011. It became a war between boko haram and Christians. They burnt churches 300 to 400 churches in Borno state, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Damaturu and Adamawa. When the Boko haram group escalated further, they said their fellow Muslim are not supporting them but supporting the government of Nigeria. Then it became a fight after the Nigeria nation and no longer religious. An eyewitness account from the troop that went to restore order in that region said when they capture anyone, they ask whether they are Muslim or not, I am speaking as a military officer that is if the Boko haram capture you, they ask if you are Muslim or a Christian and if you say you are a Muslim, they will ask why did you join the military to fight against them and not join them in the course. They say they are fighting for Allah and that they are a mission. And as we are been taught in the bible, nobody can fight for God and that God is the creator of all things. But hey once they capture any Christian or Muslim in the Army fighting for the state, they will tie their hands backward and their feet and ask them to kneel and they begin to shout Allah Bakkar. And cut off his or her head. They say this ones are kafari. There was a friend of ours who had a friend in Damaturu, who is a Muslim said their citation of Allah Bakkar is taken from the Quran and is as if a hen is killed according to their Quran. We spoke with that Muslim friend and ask you that is been lenient because he went to the university but didn't graduate. That why will you talk that way with your educational exposure. He said it is written in the Quran. You know the Quran is a book is written in Arab language and they never make it into other translation unlike the bible. They the Muslim only listen to the interpretation of the Quran by their Imam who is their spiritual leader and due to their level of illiteracy, they what he says without raising question.

Interviewer-- When do you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

..... It began in Nigeria long time ago. We have the Niger Delta Militant and it was during the time of Obasanjo. They were agitating that they were draining their crude oil which made their land non -productive and then they form the militant group sponsored by some rich Nigerians from that place who bought weapon for them. Their strategy was that they hide in the sea and kill people they also break petroleum pipelines and extract the oil into some

tanker and sell them to ships who sell this oil abroad. No one could stand them hence today in the oil creek, today you will see arm forces units their fully arm. The creek is just like a house inside the sea. It is like an up stair. They drain this oil from pipeline or other sources I don't know and put them into the ship. That is where they sell to foreign buyer. After the militant come the NASO. It is the Igbo people they want to secede from Nigeria and declare themselves a Biafra Republic. Even on the 29th this year, they blocked Asaba Bridge to Onitsha and said that is where Biafra Stated from

Interviewer-- I think you are talking about the civil war?

..... The civil war was an argument between the East and the North and that was not a terrorism stuff like that

Interviewer-- So when Major Ojukwu wanted Biafra, he wanted secession because of control

..... Ojukwu said he was the most educated military officer at that time and why should Gen. Gowon be the head of state and that he went to university while Gen. Gowon went to military academy like NDA (Nigeria Defence Academy) When Britain was leaving Nigeria they handed over a lot of things to the Northern and that time I was a very small boy that was around 1966 when we were talking of Arava. The Nigeria military agreed to kill all the top politicians for the four region at that time. According to the arrangement, they killed the top politicians from the North and the southern military officer did not kill top politician from the south like Awolowo, Azikwe but the Northern officer I think killed their top politician like the sultan of Sokoto was killed on a Friday as they don't carry charm on a Friday and other important politician like Tafawa Balewa and in 1967 the Northern Military officer saw that they were tricked to killing their people and they stated killing the Igbo from the North.

Interviewer-- So sir. Why do you think terrorism really began during Obasanjo regime and not before then?

..... Obasanjo is one of the people that spoiled this country

Interviewer-- Sir. I just need a bit of clarity, is that Obasanjo regime as a military man or as a civilian president?

..... Yeah as a democratic person

Interviewer-- In 1999?

..... Yeah in 1999. During that time, the militant from the Niger Delta said they have not being taking care of them and their land is not productive and as they dredge crude oil their land can no longer yield agricultural produce. Though government have been giving their leaders money but this money ends up in their pocket and not been use for the community hence the youth started agitating and resolved to fight the government to my understanding

Interviewer-- Why, do you think the political violence happening that time is not terrorism until the democratic regime with president Obasanjo. What is the Difference?

..... During the military era

Interviewer-- yes sir the military and the civilian government

..... During the military, things were done in a normal way and you don't go out to agitate anyhow even during Obasanjo democratic regime, it started small and wasn't the way it is now. There was a fight in Benue state where the Tiv people had problem with Jukon people in Taraba State, and it was found out that the ex-service chief during Obasanjo rein as military head of state gave them i.e. people of his tribe weapon to fight the Tiv people. Most of the crisis today, are been supported by serving and ex- military personnel.

Interviewer- Why are they supporting or sponsoring the violence?

..... They are supporting it because they like to cause problem. They say if two elephant fight, it is the grass that will suffer.

Interviewer-- What will be their benefit of causing this problems?

..... they want Nigeria to split into the various region. They do not believe in the Nigeria project.

Interviewer-- So they want Nigeria to go back to what it was before the amalgamation?

..... 1914 was the amalgamation period

Interviewer- yeah

..... I read history in school. They want Nigeria to separate. They say there was written agreement that when Nigeria is not happy together after a determined period of time, they should all go their separate ways or we should go back to the regional government as it was those days that is into four region and during the civil war, the Igbo and the Yoruba said the North were dominating them and they want to separate from the North but when the Igbo now started to process of the separation, the Yoruba did not support them again and they withdrew from them though there was a sabotage by one Adekunle in the Nigeria military during the civil war. He goes to get the Nigeria troop into the hands of the fighting Biafra we then in return gave him monetary reward

Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir. You mentioned you studied security management earlier on. Do you think there a particular definition you will want to adopt about terrorism or what does terrorism mean to you?

..... Terrorism is an act where people terrorise innocent people and kill them for no reason. It started from the Arab nations and so say they are the sponsors of this terror act in the whole world because all those that have been caught in the terror act are always identified as Islamic militant. It started right from the bible.

Interviewer-- How do you mean?

..... The root of this religious started when Abraham in the bible could not bear a son with his wife and took to himself Hagar his wife maiden and raised a son through her. That is when it started. Isaac and Ishmael. The separating of Ismael and Isaac was with a fight between both mothers and till then the fight has continue throughout ages and Ishmael is the father of the

Arabs. Isaac is the father of the Israelite and the fight is still ongoing till today and it will be till the end of the world.

Interviewer-- Is it why they distinguish between militant and Islamic militant in Nigeria?

..... The militant says their land has been wasted as they have been dredging crude oil in their land which make it difficult for them to use their land and that is why they are fighting for their right, saying their leader gets money from the government and they embezzle it without it getting to the masses. There militancy started among them but in the area religion, we have not heard of Christian militant only Islamic militancy and the boko-haram is the worse militant in the whole world because they killed 1.6 million people that is the one they counted even the one of Iraq did not kill people like that of the Nigeria Boko-haram. Why we are blaming our Nigeria government is that they have never pinpoint those sponsoring them. Because they are been sponsored by rich people. You will hear that have war tank. You wonder we gave them and where did they get it from. How did they get their weapon? They got machine guns when the Nigeria military are using AK47 and with that sophisticated weapon, it is difficult to combat them. Also President Jonathan was very slack. He gave money to the military to get weapons to combat this insurgency but he didn't supervise the use of the money. And the money was embezzled and use for other purpose. There was no check and balance in his govt. However the government have not come up to tell us who is sponsoring them. Some rumoured it was the former governor of Borno state but he wasn't tried nor convicted nor tried. He was even made the chairman of the opposition party at some point.

Interviewer- Have you by any means have any experience with political violence and boko haram as a group?

..... I use to listen to news daily but I left the military 24 years now but while I was in the military the issue at that time was this Bakassi people which is in Cameroun. It was about land dispute because there was an oil creek in that region. It was a fight between the Nigeria army and the Cameroun army. Though later Obasanjo handed over to Cameroun but this present administration says they will go to the world court to review the judgement that gave over that land to Cameroun. I went for the operation at that time and will stayed there for 5year

Interviewer-- Thank you so much sir. What do you say that peace will mean to you?

..... Peace. When we unite and come together and there is employment for the youth and there is all round development, there will be peace in Nigeria. Nigeria will not want to experience another civil war

Interviewer- Thank you sir. We are almost done. Just you're thought of Nigeria as a country?

..... What I think about Nigeria is if we can have employment and a moving economy. The people of Nigeria are really going through hard times. If you go the North you will see. In Nigeria, we have different class of citizenry. We first class citizens, second class citizens and third class citizen.

Interviewer-- so what class do you belong to?

..... Me? From the third-class citizen, which is the poorest of the poor. Unlike in the developed world where at certain age you are given certain privileges and job to start building your life. All of our Nigeria politician are liars including president Buhari himself. He promised that when he get into power, he will give our graduates #5000 every month but when he became the leader of the nation, but he went to another country after he became president, he said that he doesn't know the number of graduate in the country. Can you imagine that? Just last week they say they are going to recruit graduate into teaching line and they said they needed 18,000 teachers but after a while they said they have not gotten the quota they needed. After that they will keep quiet about it as if they weren't the one that made such promise. People suffering in Nigeria and they cannot avoid to get food now.

Interviewer-- do you think that all of this situation is what contributed to political violence in Nigeria?

..... It contribute to it. When everyone gets what he want, who will go and fight?

Interviewer-- and considering the point you made about politicians and rich men sponsoring groups for their own interest and so that Nigeria can return to the four regions we got before

..... When I said, I don't want it to break into four region

Interviewer-- yeah.

..... But this are the people pushing it underground so that one day Nigeria will break.

Interviewer-- You just said the way the Nigeria government is treating his citizens contributed to the uprising of groups in the country

..... Yeah

Interviewer-- and they are also part of those who are sponsoring the crisis

..... Yeah, because they have never held anyone responsible for the terror of this groups even to those who are obvious to us? Babangida the former head of state said he was among those sponsoring the group and the government have never challenge he till today. It is only when they are dead like the case of late Gen. Sani Abacha. When I was in the military, Gen. Babangida embezzled all the crude oil money bought from Nigeria during the cold war. They said he owns swatch Watch Company or a major shareholder there and a refinery outside the country. But he is alive and no one even queried him or accuse him but Late Gen. Abacha is been talked about every time. Obasanjo spoiled Nigeria. He sold National shipping line, Nigeria airway was sold by him and as he is alive, no one dear challenge him.

Interviewer-- This should be the last question. How then do you think that Nigeria can actually move forward in term of the upsurge of political violence as at the moment they are still fighting Boko Haram and the Niger delta militant. Considering that as you said the government are implicated, how can we move forward considering all this problems?

..... When there is job for the youth, and the economy of this country is moving and all party satisfied. With what we get from the sale of crude oil, only in that, we are ranked sixth richest country in the world on the other hand, Nigeria citizens are the poorest in the world. Even Liberia during their civil war, they are still enjoying more than Nigerian. Over there in Liberia, they distribute food to her citizen every month so that they could have what to eat. There is a lot of intimidation and oppression in the land I mean Nigeria. However, the Nigeria politician

go home with fat salary for example a senator take home pay in Nigeria at the end of the month is #30 million including sitting allowance. Nigeria is supposed to be like America. When we were born in those day, Naira is higher than dollars but now, as at yesterday, a dollar to a naira is #434. Because of corruption. Our people are highly corrupt

Interviewer-- Thank you very much sir for avail me your time

..... You are welcome

Interview 9

Interviewer-- Thank you so much. As I mentioned earlier, my name is Modupe Akinleye, I am a student of the University of Bristol. I am completing my PhD on Boko Haram movement and how it is been responded to. Ma, can you tell us about your background. Everything you think we can know about you?

..... I am a military officer. I am also a student of Nigeria army school of nursing and administration. I just completed my HND. I am xxxx.

Interviewer-- What about your rank or level in the army.

..... I am a corporal

Interviewer-- Thank you very much

Interviewer-- Do you have any experience with political violence?

..... Not really

Interviewer-- Maybe personal experience or an eyewitness testimony of somebody you know. Base on the job?

..... Well some experience I had, based on my job is not direct contact with such but some colleagues of mine who have been to places of war, related some of their experience to us and with that I think I can make a little input. Some of our colleagues that were deployed to fight the insurgency were killed, some died as a result of hunger, some fear of the obvious.

They get trapped as they are trying to escape. All these experience was related to me. I also heard from an eyewitness, who was among those at the theatre of the war. These are my experience on the fight against Boko-haram

Interviewer-- Alright, thank you very much

Interviewer-- What do you think about the Boko Haram movement?

..... They are group of people, agitating for their own self-interest. They are agitating for their own personal interest and not the interest of the public. The movement is so organized that it is not easy to defeat them. It is something they planned for years even before they started carrying out their actions: The kind of terror they unleash on people, how they move from one state to the other and how to recruit others to join them. The government of the day has not be able to overcome them for now.

Interviewer- Thank you

Interviewer- You don't think that they might be some reason why they are agitating or fighting?

..... I just believe that

Interviewer-- In your own opinion, when did you think terrorism began in Nigeria?

..... It started for long but what I can specifically say is that, it began in 2010 during the former regime. The reason why i can say this is because, we started hearing of their activity that time.

Interviewer-- Ok

Interviewer-- What do you think terrorism mean?

..... Terrorism means a deliberate act of a group of people, agitating for a specific thing and causing violence as a result. This violence is targeted at innocent ones. When we talk of terrorism, it does only relate to the killing of people but its act also involve, kidnapping and other social havoc. I think that is what I can say about terrorism.

Interviewer-- Ok do you think terrorism is different from other form of violence we experience in Nigeria?

..... Yes of course. Because Nigeria have had incidences of violence in the past. For instance, in 1993, I can say much about the violence that erupted after the annulment of the June 12, election that year. That is political violence. They destroyed properties and some people died in the process. Even I was part of it myself as I nearly escape death. Wasn't a military officer then as I was still young then? The tear gas fired into our neighbourhood almost choked me to death. All these is also part of violence but terrorism is different from violence. Violence is more focus. Its agitation is more focus but terrorism is targeted at everyone and anyone can be affected. It can be at any place. When we are the wrong place, at the wrong time, one can be affected. So that is what I understand by terrorism and how it is different from violence or political violence. Violence may not lead to death but terrorism may cause a lot of death. A lot of property is destroyed through terrorism.

Interviewer-- Thank you very much ma

Interviewer-- What about your experience with boko-haram, have you ever had any?

....., well I have not come in personal contact with them

Interviewer-- Base on your work or any peace keeping operation?

..... But in 2011, I was supposed to go on a mission to Sudan but unfortunately, I got admission into the school. Before then, I was about rounding off my HND. So I have not been to any operations but internal and external. I have not had personal contact with Boko-haram.

Interviewer-- Thank you

Interviewer-- What will peace mean to Nigeria?

..... Peace at this crucial time will mean so much to us. Peace means when there is no war. A time where security of lives and properties are no longer an issue. So, in our country today, we are not experiencing total peace, especially in some areas. There are so area like Jos, part

of Maiduguri and so on. If you must go out, you go out with care. According to someone's account, they tell their neighbours, as I am going out, if you do not see me again, know that I am gone. In such area, I don't think there is anything we call peace.

Interviewer- So peace in Nigeria, is it a possibility?

..... Yeah it is possible, we have experienced peace before and I believe we can still have it back

Interviewer- Thank you very much

Interviewer-- What do you think about Nigeria as a country?

..... Nigeria as a country in my opinion, I believe that good days are ahead. I am an optimist. I believe good things and days are coming and this whole issue of terrorism and violence will be wiped out.

Interviewer-And the level of violence in Nigeria compare to others, what can you say?

..... When we talk about other Africa countries, Nigeria is a peaceful country. If not for this period that we are experiencing this things, there are some other countries in Africa, Nigeria is a peaceful country. If not for this period that we are experiencing this things, there are some other countries in Africa that have experienced more violence and terror act in Africa. Example is like the case of Angola where there was civil war between the two main tribes of the region. The war lasted for a while but ended in 1994. Nigeria crisis has not gotten to that level. In Sudan, they have been fighting this war and yet Nigeria military and other contingents are still going there to try to bring peace to that nation. To God be praised at least, no foreigner is in this country to maintain peace. So also Liberia. In the case of Nigeria, we have not gotten to that extent. So, I believe we are going to come of the Boko-haram movement soonest. I remember the Maitatsine movement. Though I cannot give account of their activity then but I heard from those that were part of the crisis then and I also read about them, and today they are no more.

Interviewer-- Don't you think Maitatsine might have something to do with Boko-haram?

..... Of course I believe they are still there and they are working hand in hand. Let me say, it is only a change of nomenclature because they are agitating for the same thing. Religious fight. They may not have direct alliance but it is still part of the foundation they the Maitaisine

Interviewer--Thank you

Interviewer-- The fight against Boko-haram, how would you assess it?

..... Well, the fight against Boko-haram, I will say that the fight has a political undertone in it. The fight of Boko-haram in Nigeria is a fight of religion though they did not come directly to say is a religious fight. If not for the political involvement, I believe Boko-haram should have ended. But because of politics, the weapon they are using, my annual salary may not be able to buy one.

Interviewer-- What do you mean by politics?

..... I mean the government of the day, there are some group of people sponsoring the people. Using it against other religion and other political believe and ideology. When Goodluck was there as a president, he was a Christian and they do not want him. So let me say the other opponents were using it against him so they could say that, during his tenure in office, there was no peace.

Interviewer-- So you are trying to say that, it has something to do with politician's base on region and the likes

.....Yeah

Interviewer-- Do you think this also explain the Niger Delta Avengers also coming up now that Buhari who is from the North now the president?

..... Yeah, the name Avengers. You know if somebody has not wrong you, you won't be think of vengeance but if otherwise, you want to avenge. This group was form so as to fight against the government because when Goodluck was there who the group, Boko-haram was from the same region as they I.e. was used to trouble his government.

Interviewer-- And the Nigeria government, what do you think about the Nigeria government?

..... In what way

Interviewer-- You just made mention that Boko-haram movement and political violence in Nigeria has something to do with region base politics and politician's base on the situation we are having in Nigeria and how they are running the country base on how it has to do with political violence and how they are managing it

..... Well the government for now I cannot really say much about them.

Interviewer-- Not just Buhari government but Nigeria government as a whole. Your perception

..... Well what I perceive about the government of the day is that, they are not fighting for the ordinary citizens. They are fighting for themselves. They are after themselves. After a lot of manifestos, that I will do this and that, immediately they get powered or get into office, they begin to serve themselves and their pocket. How they can acquire money to the extent that their 5th generation cannot finish spending it. They are after their pick stand not the masses.

Interviewer-- Why do you think this is so?

..... The reason is because, the level of poverty in this country and the standard of living is very high and unfortunately it is on a continuous rise and the government does not have a plan set out to help the masses.

Interviewer-- Why do you think the government of the day takes to corruption and do not care about her citizens.

..... The wealth we have in this country is enough to care for the ordinary citizen. Whether you are working or not. You should be able to live an average life. But today people are dying of hunger. No job, insecurity. All we hear is that someone has embezzled some amount of billions. This why i believe they are working for themselves and not the citizens.

Interviewer--Thank you very much ma

Interviewer-- As a final question, what do you see as the way forward?

..... The way forward for Nigeria is that, we should pray for good leaders, if we have a good leader i.e. if the head is not corrupt, the whole body will be whole. We know that corruption is in every society, at least a little level of corruption. If we have a good leader, that will be able to stand steadfastly against corruption, we be able to rise to the level we feel that we belong to a good country. Where someone that is not working we be able to eat and live an average life.

Interviewer-- So you think corruption can be tackled in Nigeria. You think political violence could be resolved?

..... Hmm. I don't believe that corruption is the cause of political violence. It is not as a result of corruption. Corruption is another thing while political violence is another thing entirely. Political violence can start as a result of power tussle while corruption is occupying a public office and diverting the funds met to other purpose for personal use. Therefore I don't agree political violence has anything to do with corruption. The reason for corruption and political violence are different except if violence erupt as a result of agitation on public embezzlement by politicians. That one is understandable.

Interviewer-- Any final word you may want to say?

..... You made mentioned of whether we can have peace in Nigeria? I just believe the current crisis of insecurity and violence will end soon and peace will be possible. There is no total peace anywhere. The place I believe there will be total peace is in heaven. Peace itself varies, we have societal peace, mental peace whereby you have rest of mind. No worries and fear of terror. Peace in the society is possible and it is what the government should pursue to achieve.

Interviewer-- You're thought on the Christians Muslim relationship in the country

..... The relationship between Christians and Muslims in this country is hypocritical in nature. Whatever brings Christians and Muslims together breed pretence and both claiming we are

serving the same God but we are not. So the relationship between Christians and Muslims is not so cordial. The way I see it, even in public office, you are discriminated according to your religious belief.

Interviewer- Thank you very much for your time

..... You are welcome.

Appendix 4: Table of Interviews

Serial No	Name	Mobile Number	Date	Location
1.	Warrant Officer xxxx	+234703xxxxxx	31/07/16	Lagos
2.	Warrant Officer xxxx	+234803xxxxxx	30/07/16	Lagos
3.	Corporal xxxx	+234818xxxxxx	01/10/16	Lagos
4.	Warrant Officer xxxx	+2345xxxxxx	30/07/16	Lagos
5.	Corporal xxxxx	+2348xxxxxx	09/09/16	Lagos
6.	Corporal xxxxx	+2347xxxxxx	30/08/16	Lagos
7.	Officer xxxxx	+2348xxxxxx	03/10/16	Lagos
8.	Officer xxxxx	+2348xxxxxx	30/07/16	Lagos
9.	Corporal xxxxx	+2347xxxxxx	01/08/16	Lagos

