

# **THE FAILURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND STRUCTURES FOR CONFLICT**

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I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part, submitted it at any university for a degree.

## **ABSTRACT**

This study focuses on the role of political elites in addressing the problem of why a durable peace has eluded Israel/ Palestine.

A theoretical background study was made on the articulation of identity within a civilization. This established identity formation as a political process. To see how the manipulation of the structure within which identity formation processes take place, six critical indicators were identified. These are: Manufacturing conditions of underdevelopment; Un-integrated social and political systems, and distributive injustice; Fostering cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism; Placing issues under the 'sign of security'; The production of insecurity through the manipulation of identity formation processes; and Monopolising the conflict resolution process.

Political elite creation and perpetuation of structures for conflict shows an inherent inability to bring about a lasting peace in a protracted social conflict for conflict has become the source, rather than the outcome of policy formation. As a result this thesis calls for a more inclusive approach to conflict resolution, one that goes beyond the processes of arbitration, mediation, negotiation and facilitation, to include conciliation at grass roots level between civilizations, sincerely exploring the underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust.

## **OPSOMMING**

Hierdie studie fokus op die rol gespeel deur politieke elites in die voortslepende vraagstuk rondom vrede in Israel /Palestina.

'n Teoretiese agtergrondstudie is onderneem om die uitdrukking van 'n samelewings-oftewel volksidentiteit te ondersoek. Die studie het laat blyk dat identiteitsformulering 'n politieke proses is. Om waar te neem hoe die manipulasie van die struktuur waarbinne identiteitsformulering plaasvind, is ses kritiese indikatore geïdentifiseer, te wete: die skepping van toestande vir onderontwikkeling; ongeïntegreerde sosiale en politieke sisteme en ongelyke verdeling van welvaart; doelbewuste voortsetting van etniese verskille, stereotipering en politieke simbolisme; plasing van kwessies onder die vaandel van "sekuriteit"; die produksie van "onsekerheid" deur die manipulasie van identiteitsformulering prosesse; en die manipulasie van konflik resolusie prosedures.

Skepping en doelbewuste voortsetting van strukture vir konflik deur politieke elites dui op 'n onvermoë om langdurige vrede in 'n 'uitgerekte sosiale konflik' te bewerkstellig. Konflik het die oorsprong, eerder as die uitkoms van beleid geword. As gevolg van hierdie feite doen die tesis 'n beroep dat konflik resolusie as dissipline 'n meer inklusiewe benadering volg. Die resolusie prosesse van mediasie, arbitrasie, fasilitering en onderhandeling is opsigself nie genoeg nie en behoort vergesel te word deur die proses van konsiliasie op grondvlak tussen samelewings. Hierdie proses moet deel vorm van 'n opregtheid om mense se vrese, haat, seer en wantroue met ootmoed aan te hoor.

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The difference between freedom-fighters and terrorists is that the freedom-fighters are on my side and the terrorists are on the other side.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CIA:</b>	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
<b>DOP:</b>	Declaration of Principles
<b>FMEP:</b>	Foundation for Middle East Peace
<b>GDP:</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>IDF:</b>	Israeli Defence Force
<b>JEC:</b>	Joint Economic Committee
<b>JMCC:</b>	Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre
<b>MEMRI:</b>	Middle East Media Research Institute
<b>MERIA:</b>	Middle East Review of International Affairs
<b>MFA:</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Israel)
<b>PA:</b>	Palestinian Authority
<b>PASSIA:</b>	Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
<b>PEDCAR:</b>	Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Construction
<b>PLO:</b>	Palestine Liberation Organisation
<b>PSC:</b>	Protracted Social Conflict
<b>TAU:</b>	Tel Aviv University
<b>UN:</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCTAD:</b>	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
<b>UNISPAL:</b>	United Nations Information Systems on the Question of Palestine
<b>UNRWA:</b>	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
<b>USA:</b>	United States of America
<b>VAT:</b>	Value Added Tax

### Map 1: Israel



(CIA World Factbook, 2001)

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The chapter will begin by contextualising the study. This will be followed by an explanation of how the preliminary reading of the literature led me to a refinement and focusing of my initial ideas. Next is a statement of the overall goals of the study as they crystallized during the preliminary reading. This brings us to a rough indication of the design and mode of reasoning followed in addressing the research problem.

### **1.1: DEVELOPING THE IDEA FOR THE THESIS AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY**

The study of International Relations is the study of how authority and/or power is used to govern transborder interactions/ relations between actors and how this contributes to the establishment/ maintenance/ transformation of order in a global system. As a student of International Relations, conflict and the processes involved in its resolution provide the scholar with a unique opportunity to view the inner workings of relations between actors in the global system. The Middle East conflict shows up anomalies in conventional approaches to define conflict and processes used in its resolution. The researcher is presented with a case of a peace process which reached dramatic heights, only to return to a stalemate and violence. Many of the theoretical contributions encountered contribute to the theoretical debate around conflict without ever questioning the structure within which conflict takes place. The dynamic nature of this conflict led me to believe that there is indeed scope and opportunity to add to the theoretical debate and influence opinion within which policy is made by taking a step back and focusing on structure.

The main reasons that led me to decide on this topic can be divided into three categories: theoretical, empirical and practical. Theory cannot be untied from practice, but has to take on its rightful purpose as critique that reveals true conditions. Not only does it help

people to see the way to a better world, but it also creates and maintains the climate of opinion within which policy is made. For the critical social scientist, contributions to the scientific community are not enough; he or she can become the true organic intellectual and help transform the social order by supplying people with the information needed to do so.

The second reason that led me to decide on this topic is empirical in nature. Do we really know so little about the causes of violence and terrorism that we have to blame it on the 'violent nature of man' or the 'machinations of a madman'? I think not. Recurring patterns are empirically observable through the course of history. Social reality always changes and this change is rooted in the tensions, conflicts or contradictions of social relations, meanings, processes, structures or institutions. By focusing on intractable or protracted conflicts such as the Middle East, recurring patterns can be tracked over time.

The final reason for choosing this topic is practical in nature. The Middle-East conflict resolution process is an ongoing one. It is therefore still possible to influence the course of events. In the words of Noam Chomsky: "Intellectuals... are in a position to expose lies of governments, to analyse actions in terms of their causes and motives and often hidden intentions.... As for those who stood by in silence.... on what page of history do we find our proper place?" (Vasquez, 1990:59) The critical social scientist can still unmask ideology and the lies of governments; herein lays his/her vocation.

## **1.2: DERIVING THE RESEARCH TOPIC FROM THE PRELIMINARY READING**

Hermann & Newman in their article "A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Making" (Darby & MacGinty, 2000:107) maintained that in order to understand why the Middle-East peace process had taken such a backward turn, it was necessary to deal with the deeper roots of the conflict in general, and in particular the way in which each side perceived the intentions and deeply rooted beliefs of the other side. They made the distinction of the perceptions of the public at large, as

opposed to those of political elites and negotiators who were responsible for the management of the peace process. Central to their argument was the fact that for a legal peace treaty to be translated into a reality of mutual accommodation, the nation's leaders and political elites who were responsible for promoting such a political reorientation, had to ensure that it attained 'cognitive legitimacy' at the grass roots level. Regarding their contribution as problem solving theory, its value lies firstly in their distinction between political elites and the public at large as role-players in the conflict resolution process, secondly in their focus on the deeper roots of the conflict seen in the beliefs and attitudes of the opposing sides, and finally, the centrality of 'cognitive legitimacy' as measured in opinion polls.

Their focus on actions and beliefs however, failed to address the structure of the social reality within which the conflict resolution process took place. In trying to present their work as objective as possible, they fell into the trap of naturalizing the social reality (replete with political symbolism), thereby exhibiting a conservative bias towards it. For example: "Technical solutions to conflict resolution are simply not sufficient if they are unable to be translated into genuine resolution of the conflict which includes the changing of attitudes as part of a long term culture of change." (Hermann & Newman, 2000:109) This central theorem is made to iron out problems and smooth the functioning of the whole (or structure). It focuses on action without questioning the fact whether it is indeed desirable for political elites to manipulate attitudes. To put it differently, it focuses on process and action without taking into account the structure or arena within which action takes place. Further theoretical contributions fall into the same trap. (Albin, 2000; Heraclides, 1989; Peretz, 1990) The preliminary reading of the literature led me to ask the question of how structure influences the researcher and serves as a framework in which conceptualisation of the conflict, its resolution, and its processes takes place. Are researchers not perhaps blinded by their framework of thinking, which might serve to be part of the problem?

### **1.3: IDENTIFYING AND ARTICULATING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM**

The initial aim of my research proposal was to explore societal feelings of insecurity and its relation to conflict resolution in Israel/Palestine. However, as the process of deriving a research topic from the preliminary readings unfolded, it soon became apparent that societal feelings of insecurity are not a natural state of being. Civilizations as media through which people come to organise themselves materially and mentally to cope with their material context and imagine a collective future, by its very nature, aim to provide a secure sense of belonging. The continual process of identity formation is inherently relational in that it constitutes conceptions of the self and of others based on collective knowledge about expectations and intersubjective meanings. Meanings, in terms of which actions are organised, arise out of interaction. Expectations and intersubjective meanings are then the result of interaction. Societal feelings of insecurity are thus the result of tensions, conflicts and contradictions of identity formation processes. By focusing on these tensions, conflicts and contradictions in Israel, it became apparent that the articulation of identity could be established as a political process. The aim of this thesis is to see if this is in fact so.

The problem statement of this thesis asks the following questions: “Why has durable peace eluded Israel/Palestine?” More specifically, the research question deals with the role of political elites in the collapse of the peace initiatives seen during the 1990’s and beyond. The research question deals specifically with the role of political elites in this process and asks the question: “What has the role of political elites been in preventing cognitive legitimacy of the peace process?” This allows me to explore the structure (including the rules, procedures, roles, hierarchy, norms and regulations) within which action takes place. Structure encompasses the framework within which research, discourses on security, production of insecurity, identity formation processes, distributive injustice, conflict and, conflict resolution processes takes place.

The key research proposition reads as follow: **“Political elites have helped create and**

**perpetuate a structure for conflict.”** In order to show the validity of this proposition, it is not any single event that is of interest, but rather the flow and the sequence of events, or the historical context of any single event. Attention will be given to the claim that political elites are unable to bring about lasting peace within a protracted social conflict for they rely on processes that help to manage the conflict and ‘normalise’ the situation alone, instead of fostering additional mechanisms aimed at conciliation between the opposing collectivities. Peace treaties would then be based on economic and political enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations, without being accompanied by sincere exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust; and without addressing the deep rooted causes of the conflict. This argument does not mean to say that political elites do not negotiate in good will or good faith, but that they alone cannot bring about a lasting peace.

The research objective would be to show whether political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict by identifying critical indicators that shed light on the actions of political elites. Six of these have initially been identified:

1. Manufacturing conditions of underdevelopment;
2. Un-integrated social and political systems, and distributive injustice;
3. Fostering cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism;
4. Placing issues under the ‘sign of security’;
5. The production of insecurity through the manipulation of identity formation processes;
6. Monopolising the conflict resolution process.

If these critical indicators are validated, it will enable us to see that in a protracted social conflict, such as is the case in the Middle East, conflict has become a source, rather than the outcome of policy. A validated central proposition would underline the need for a more inclusive approach to conflict resolution, one involving conciliation at grass roots level between civilizations.



## **1.4: GENERAL INDICATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

This thesis is a descriptive historical study, allowing the researcher to reconstruct the past by taking the chronology of events into account. A critical, narrative analysis will be used to illuminate the historically informed structure of social reality. The narrative analysis will try to reconstruct a particular configuration of forces applying pressures and constraints to civilization. Use will be made of retroductive reasoning- using inferences from observations or data in order to construct or infer an explanation of such observations. Historical data will be used to illustrate and test the validity of the central proposition. The interaction of data and theory means that a researcher goes beyond the surface examination of the evidence to develop new concepts by critically evaluating the evidence based on theory. The main task when conducting a comparative historical study lies not in revealing new data about particular aspects of large time periods, but rather in establishing the interest and prima facie validity of an overall argument about causal regularities across various historical events. Central to this task is the identification of critical indicators and supporting evidence for themes and explanations. Data will mostly be gathered from three sources:

- primary sources- newspapers, declarations, accords, speeches and official government websites;
- secondary sources- bibliographic work including scholarly articles, surveys, historical records and textbooks;
- running records such as the peace index, crisis magnitude index, international crisis behaviour and government records.

The Research Design focuses on the testing of the central proposition: “Political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict.” The structure of conflict serves as dependent or effect variable for it is purported to be the outcome of different types of action taken by political elites. Actions taken or not taken by political elites serve as the independent variable. The six ‘critical indicators’ as set out in the research

objectives are necessary for inferring a specific causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Indicators confirm a theoretical inference and occur when many details suggest a clear interpretation. These critical indicators will be supported by 'supporting evidence' that builds the overall background or context.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **2.1: DEMARCATING THE LITERATURE COVERED**

As pointed out, the initial development of the idea for this thesis stemmed from the fruitful collaboration of Hermann & Newman (2001:107). From this followed an elaborate literature study to derive a topic and problem statement. The literature was also studied to find out what has previously been said about the topic. This process took the shape of interrelated steps:

#### **STEP 1**

Literature was sought to provide a satisfactory methodological placing of the role of theory and practice. Theory is revealed as always for someone and for some purpose, thereby exposing the power relation of theory do the dominant power matrix. This does not imply a lapse into a relativist position where anything goes, the need for a methodological approach to theory construction remains important. However, recognition should be given to the fact that theory is biased. Making this fact explicit allows the reader to avoid being constrained by dogma. Writers consulted include Nel, (1999); Neuman, (2000); Waltz, (1979); Cox, (1981); Weldes et al, (1999); Azar & Burton, (1986).

#### **STEP 2**

This step involved finding more literature on the process of Conflict Resolution in International Relations. Special emphasis was placed on authors who have been involved in actual problem solving and resolution workshops such as Burton (1990), Kriesberg (1973), Mitchell (1981), Doob (1990) and Miall, Woodhouse & Ramsbotham (1999). The aim was to gather a plethora of concepts and evaluate different approaches to conflict resolution.

### **STEP 3**

The third step sought to expand the traditional concepts such as 'people at large', nation and ethnic group into 'civilizations'. The compatibility of the concept 'civilizations' with other concepts such as collective security, collective peace and bottom-up processes led to the next step.

### **STEP 4**

The final step sought to unite problem solving theories of conflict resolution with critical social science. Conflict needed to be studied over time, relating it to man's processes of identity formation in social reality. Here, Azar's (1986) model of 'protracted social conflicts' was developed with the help of Agnew (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson, 1989) to suit the arguments used in this thesis.

## **2.2: PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS DEFINED**

Any process of concept formation in comparative-historical study which is based on the way society presents itself will be inadequate, misleading and ideological. Only after interaction with the evidence gathered could we formulate new concepts to re-examine the evidence.

### **CIVILIZATION**

The first concept is 'civilization'. For Cox (1996(b):2), the material, technological, economically organized and class structured entity called civilization was unified in the realm of consciousness by religion. Religion enabled people encompassed within civilization to develop a shared consciousness and symbols through which they could communicate meaningfully. Myth, religion and language were coterminous until language became secularised and rationalized. The material world provided a common ground for experience, religion a common realm for thought. Religion should here be understood in the wider sense as to include superstition, evil and a general belief structure as enacted in ritual. Civilization then is defined by Cox as a fit between material conditions and intersubjective meanings.

A further distinction is made between culture and civilization, this is the distinction between the synchronic and the diachronic. Culture is seen as the synchronic moment concerned with how the manifold behavioural patterns in a social system interact in maintaining the whole. Civilization is the diachronic dimension of culture. Its concern is with origin, encounters and transformations of civilizations. The focus is on development and responses to internal and external challenges, as opposed to stability and equilibrium. Civilizations has for Cox (1996:3) become the media through which people have come to organize themselves materially and mentally to cope with their material context and imagine a collective future. Civilizations as realms of intersubjectivity are not irrevocably territorially based, it is rather a community of thought so that two or more civilizations may co-exist within a geographical confine, even within a single individual.

For the purpose of this thesis, Cox's description of civilization holds a threefold importance. Firstly, the concept embraces all the factors of man's identity formation processes in his social world, i.e. material conditions and intersubjective meanings of ideas, norms, values and institutions. This allows for an avoidance of reductionism to any given attribute. Secondly, its shifting boundaries and overlapping allows it to be flexible enough to manoeuvre within historical structural confines as to embrace or discard ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, technological and class discrepancies that occur when referring to a 'people at large'. Finally, the introduction of the diachronic or temporal aspect allows for a tracking of societal change over time, thus following the evolution of collective existence.

## **SECURITY**

The second concept is security. There is no general agreement on a definition for this concept but Buzan (1991:17) lists some definitions given by others:

- Lawrence Martin: Security is the assurance of future well being.
- John E. Mroz: Security is the relative freedom from harmful threats.
- Arnold Wolfers: Security, in any objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.

Buzan refrains from venturing a definition but describes security as the ability of states and societies to maintain their individual identity and their functional integrity. "In seeking security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes opposed.... Security is primarily about the fate of human collectives, and only secondary about the personal security of individual human beings.... In the contemporary international system, the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial state... but since nations and states do not fit neatly together in many places, non state collectives, particularly nations are also important units of analysis" (1991:19). Buzan's description is useful in that it separates the state and society and argues that their security interests can sometimes be in disharmony. State sanctioned violence can and often is used against those it is supposed to protect.

Miall (Booth, 1991:309) points out the emergence of "new thinking" which posits security as a broader concept, thereby separating state security from "citizen's security." This type of security includes physical and economic well being, civil and political liberties, a sustainable environment and social justice. His argument correspondingly includes the enlargement of threats such as unjust and unequal relationships between rich and poor countries, poverty and starvation, environmental threats etc. It calls for an awareness of what is being defended, thereby shifting conventional security discourses to a systemic level. This implies a refocusing of what is to be secured- collective society, and how it is to be secured- social justice and poverty alleviation.

Security for our purposes can now be defined as the ability of civilizations to maintain and contribute to their individual identity and functional integrity, in relative freedom. Collective security then, concerns the fate of specified human collectives. The collective forms the main focus of analysis in ascertaining security needs and participation. The sovereign territorial state, whose interests might oppose that of the collective, is regarded as separate to the collective.

### **PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS**

The third concept is protracted social conflicts. This is a type of ongoing, seemingly

irresolvable conflict with certain key characteristics that are deep-rooted and provide an infrastructure for seemingly intractable conflict (Azar, 1986:28). This concept will be discussed in greater detail below (Chapter 2.3.4).

### **CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

The next concept is conflict resolution. Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999:21) define conflict resolution as the addressing of deep-rooted sources of conflict. This implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes no longer hostile and the structure of the conflict has changed. Although the state remains an important actor in the conflict resolution process, other actors play an equally important role in its implementation. Political elites play the main roles in four of the five processes of conflict resolution: arbitration, mediation, negotiation and facilitation. These four processes all have to do with the management of the conflict resolution process. The fifth process is conciliation. For the purposes of this thesis conciliation can be defined as bottom-up process of continued dialogue and interaction on grass roots level by the two main opposing civilizations. Conflict resolution at civilizational level is a process separate, yet in tandem with conflict resolution between political elites, a bottom-up conciliatory process of continued dialogue and interaction on grass roots level. This does not mean that there is no conciliation, confidence building or showing of good will between political elites, it does however exclude conciliation as defined above, as an active ingredient found in the peace processes engaged in by political elites.

### **POLITICAL ELITES**

This concept includes the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Stepan defines the state within a Weberian perspective as follow: "The state must be considered as more than the 'government'. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relations between civil society and public authority in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well" (quoted in Skocpol, 1985:7). Political elites include powerful individuals connected to the state/authority, granting their voice prima facie validity. It is these leaders who make policy statements, important decisions that affect collectivities,

speeches and deliver commentary on events. Such leaders would also include individuals connected to the terrorist organisations who actively influence the direction of negotiations. An example would be members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad issuing statements.

## **2.3: DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE READ**

The literature covered will now be discussed, based on the steps outlined in the demarcation of the literature covered above.

- 2.3.1 Methodological Placing
- 2.3.2 Towards a clearer understanding of conflict resolution
- 2.3.3 Expanding collectivity
- 2.3.4 An underlying model: Protracted social conflicts

### **2.3.1: METHODOLOGICAL PLACING**

Nel (1999:50) defines theory as a mental picture of how a specific segment of reality hangs together or are connected. Neuman (2000:40) is more cautious with his approach to reality and thus defines theory as a system of interconnected abstractions or ideas that condenses and organizes 'knowledge' about the social world. Waltz (1979:6) states that "Laws are facts of observation, theories are speculative processes introduced to explain them." Paracelsus would have it that speculation is when man speculates and imagines within himself and thereby his imagination is united with heaven, and heaven operates so within him that more is discovered than would seem possible by merely human methods. This would equate to Newton's 'Eureka' or Rosenau's "exhilaration or exquisiteness to be enjoyed in the theoretical enterprise that virtually defies description" (free translation, 1993:34).

All three the above definitions of Nel, Waltz and Neuman are in accord that theory provides the researcher with a predisposition or a way of thinking. Nel explicitly and Waltz by implication points out that theory is a way of thinking about reality. Neuman



would rather have it that theory is a take on 'knowledge', gleaned from reality, therefore subjectivity is implied. It is this very debate between objective observance of reality and subjective gleaning of knowledge, taken from reality, that has occupied a large body of rhetoric in the social sciences.

Scientific theory frames how we look and think about a topic. It contains a set of assumptions or a starting point, then tries to explain what the social world is like and why it changes. It offers a system of concepts or ideas, looks at relationships amongst concepts and seeks the causes that provides an interconnected system of ideas. Simply put, without it, researchers would find themselves adrift in a sea of knowledge.

Banks (Azar & Burton, 1986:6) provides us with a modern agreement between theory and practice. Both the positions of 'practice dominates theory' (the positivist/ objectivist as archivist) and 'theory dominates practice' (the idealist/ subjectivist as participant) should be treated as ideologies. Both these positions are extreme and it is necessary to take a compromise position. We cannot be wholehearted positivists for there are well known problems with that position (Vasquez, 1990:108). On the other hand we cannot be wholehearted subjectivists either because then we are in danger of treating people's ideas as more important than actual conditions and focus on localized, micro-level, short term settings while ignoring the broader, long-term context. For Banks, this fact sets the context for an activist approach to work in conflict resolution:

"There is indeed an international relations system out there, and its institutions and organizations are real enough. But the real world is also made up of habits and practices and theories of how it all works. The theories are, to some degree self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling. They help to create the reality that we have to deal with. We do need to recognize that the existing system is shaped and conditioned by ideas. As writers and teachers, we may not be responsible for the making of policy, but we are most certainly responsible for creating and maintaining the climate of opinion within which policy is made" (Azar & Burton, 1986:8).

The implication of looking at the theory/ reality relationship is the realization that the real

world is not unchangeable. If it was made by people, it can in principle be remade by people.

### **2.3.2: TOWARDS A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

Conflict between tribes and nations has its roots at the dawn of time and has remained a concern of societies and civilizations ever since. The creation of conflict resolution as an academic discipline in Western civilization had its origins only in the 1950's, and grew out of different practices.

Abu-Nimer (1996:35) identifies five such movements:

The industrial labour management work of Shepard & Mouton which emerged from organizational relations in the 1960's (Abu-Nimer, 1996); The problem solving workshops and mediation which was introduced into International Relations by Burton (1969), Kelman (1976), Doob (1971), and Mitchell (1981); Religious figures redirecting their work in peace related endeavours to an emphasis on "peace making" [Scimecca (1987) Abu- Nimer, 1996]; Lawyers and the court system in mainly the U.S.A. were criticized by the general public which resulted in what is known today as alternative dispute resolution, and; The interpersonal and family dispute practices derived from human relations practices as led by Walton, (1971); Haynes, (1981); Coogler; (1978).

Out of these approaches several intervention approaches have been developed and applied at different levels of conflict. The main processes of conflict resolution being facilitation, negotiation, arbitration, mediation and conciliation.

This study also concentrates on the problem solving workshops as mentioned by Abu-Nimer above. These workshops are examples of how academics and/or political elites have gone about trying to resolve conflicts in the past.

De Reuck (Burton, 1990:183) argued that the essence of problem solving procedure involves a meeting with representatives from opposing parties in the presence of a small

panel of disinterested, professional and qualified social scientists. This should be done in order to analyse and possibly resolve conflicts in complete confidentiality. Parties should be enabled by the panel to negotiate through collaboration, in order to reach solutions of their joint predicament, by discovering accommodations affording net advantages to all concerned. The joint predicament is a problem to be solved. With a few minor exceptions, this captures the essence of all the different problem solving workshops.

Workshops covered include:

- Burton's "Controlled Communication Workshops" (Sandole & Sandole-Staroste, 1987:251; Burton,1990);
- Doob's "Fermeda Workshop" (Azar, 1990:24);
- Azar's "Problem Solving Forums" at the University of Maryland (Azar, 1990:29);
- Groom's "George Mason University Project" (Sandole & Sandole-Staroste, 1987:275).

Apart from certain techniques developed in the management of problem solving workshops, (i.e. confidentiality, joint collaboration etc.), important aspects to emerge from the workshops can be listed as follows. Burton noted the importance of a conceptualisation change through perception changes in parties. Azar added to this conducive environments and the exploration of shared needs and values such as security, identity, equality, participation and control, freedoms etc. Groom noted the problem of vantage points being determined by hierarchies. Finally, Doob pointed out the 're-entry' problem in trying to influence constituencies back home. This is echoed by Fisher and Wedge (Sandole & Sandole-Staroste, 1987: 203 & 208 respectively). Fisher calls this the multi-party problem and articulates it along the same lines as Putnam in "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games" (1988: 431)

Three other contributions to the field of Conflict Resolution outside the problem solving workshops also have to be mentioned. Firstly, Kelman (Burton, 1990:200) introduces social-psychological analysis and suggests a broader vision of goals to which negotiation should be directed. Conflict is seen as a phenomenon occurring between societies and not necessarily states. Negotiations then have to go beyond the achievement of political

agreement to a resolution of the conflict, a process conducive to structural and attitudinal change and eventually to reconciliation between parties, thus transforming the relationship. This process requires measures capable of de-escalatory dynamics. Kelman's importance lies in his vision of an enlargement of the scope of conflict resolution to incorporate societies, both as agents in conflict and in its resolution.

The second contribution is from Van der Merwe et al. (Burton, 1990:216) He states that in a situation where gross injustices are built into the major social structures, such as in South Africa pre 1990's, conflict cannot be accommodated constructively and social justice and peace cannot be achieved without fundamental structural change. It is this structural change that is of central concern to the thesis.

The third contribution comes from Kriesberg (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson, 1989:109). He argues that every particular conflict is interlocked with many others and that whichever we decide to focus on will be found to be embedded in others over time and space. Many different parties are involved in each fight and the conflict may be intractable for some but not for others. Conflict is regarded as more or less intractable with resolution involving the transformation of intractability. The idea of the interconnectedness of conflicts can be extended in all directions, not just to other conflicts but to the configuration of forces that interact within each structure. Intractability within a particular conflict such as the Middle East can differ depending on position in time and space, implying that actors are dynamic and diverse.

### **2.3.3: EXPANDING COLLECTIVITY**

In defining civilizations as a fit between material conditions of existence and intersubjective meanings, we infuse the concept with quite a large amount of flexibility indeed. As argued above, it is a community of thought so that two or more civilizations may co-exist within a particular geographical confine, even within a single individual. The introduction of the term civilization for Cox (1996: 2) is seen as synonymous with

culture, the synchronic aspect of civilization. The term culture has a large number of connotations attached to it, especially as it regards nation and the nation-state. A “collective” however, is a group of people who share some pattern of normative behaviour and who form part of a larger population interacting within a common social system. For the purposes of this thesis, collective is used to denote the synchronic moment of civilization. A ‘collective’ is used as opposed to ethnic, cultural or national groupings, these concepts restricting an individual’s classification to the colour of his skin or any other kind of cultural trait. Collective is any and all of these classifications as governed by the identity formation processes within a certain moment in history and as specified by the researcher or social group.

Intersubjective meanings within a collective in the form of traditions, are never static and constantly being reinterpreted or even re-invented by succeeding generations (Hobsbawn & Ranger as quoted by Agnew, 1989:42). The symbols people use to identify themselves are objects, acts, events, relationships and linguistic forms that stand ambiguously, for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions and impel men to action. Cohen argues that they usually occur in stylised patterns of activities such as ritual, ceremonies, gift exchange, prescribed patterns of joking, taking an oath, eating and drinking together, acts of etiquette and various other cultural traits that constitute the ‘style of life’ of a group (Agnew, 1989:42). There is a danger in accepting long run claims of continuity at face value, the meanings and symbols central to a particular collective identity may well have been fundamentally transformed. As intersubjective meanings within a collective are reinterpreted and new ones invented, one can speak of civilizations evolving.

#### **2.3.4: AN UNDERLYING MODEL – PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS**

A critical approach notes that social change and conflict are not always apparent or observable. The social world is full of illusion, myth and distortion. Initial observations of the world are only partial and often misleading because the human senses are limited

and so is our knowledge. The appearances in surface reality do not have to be based on conscious deception. The immediately perceived characteristics of objects, events or social relations rarely reveal everything. (Neuman, 2000:77)

Social reality has multiple layers and evolves over time. Behind the immediately observable surface reality lie deep structures or unobservable mechanisms. Constant change is rooted in tensions, conflict and contradictions of social relations and institutions. By researching tension, conflict and contradictions over time, it is possible to observe these deep structures and unobservable mechanisms that influence behaviour. As Azar points out: "War and poverty, which are dramatically obvious to the observer and the main cause of human physical suffering are but symptoms of underlying structural conditions. The notion of protracted social conflicts provide a deeper insight into the issues of conflict-motivations; authority roles; political and social structures; behaviour patterns, needs and interests; and other aspects. It draws our attention away from the obvious and superficial towards the underlying conditions that create conflict situations. It directs our attention finally, to the means of resolution." (1999:15). The utility of protracted social conflict in the overall study of conflict is that it places 'conflict-process' as central in the tension between states or other types of actors such as collectivities at sub-state level. As Starr argues (1999:5): "In protracted conflict and rival analysis, it is not any single event that is of interest, but rather the flow of events, the sequence of events, or the historical context of a single event."

By establishing the Middle-East as a case of 'Protracted Social Conflict', we are able to: 1) track the conflict in its proper historical context, 2) analyse the conflict in a way that cuts across levels of analysis to incorporate other actors, and 3) see how conflict itself could become the source, rather than the outcome of policy. This thesis does not restrict itself to pure structural reasons for behaviour but nonetheless find underlying structural conditions useful in tracking conflict and specifically, elite actions in that conflict over time.

Azar (1986:28) puts forward ten propositions on protracted social conflicts (PSC's) that

can be summarized as follow:

1. PSC's have endearing features such as economic and technological underdevelopment, unintegrated social and political systems and distributive injustice. These features provide an infrastructure for intractable conflict.
2. The re-emergence of conflict in the same situation, a particular characteristic of PSC's, suggest to any one monitoring events over a long period of time, that the real source of conflict – as distinct from features – are deep-rooted in the ontological being of those concerned. The source of PSC's are the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation.
3. Ethnic and communal cleavages and political structures associated with them are conspicuous. (It is the denial of human needs, of which ethnic identity is merely one, that emerges as the source of conflict.)
4. PSC's are not unique but have certain behavioural and structural characteristics in common. They are predictable for this reason. PSC's universally are situations which arise out of attempts to combat conditions of perceived victimization stemming from: A- the denial of separate identity of parties involved in the process; B- an absence of security of culture and valued relationships; and C- an absence of effective political participation through which victimization can be remedied.
5. Tracking conflict negotiations, temporary settlements and the outbreak of further conflicts draws attention to the reality that human needs and longstanding cultural values will not be traded, exchanged or bargained over. Agreements that came out of negotiations that may give certain advantages to elites, but do not touch upon the underlying issues in the conflict, do not last.
6. Conflict and cooperative events flow together even in the most severe of intense conflicts. Cooperative events are not sufficient to abate PSC's. Tension reduction measures may make the conflict more bearable in the short term, but conflict resolution involves a far more complex process than mere conflict management.

7. The most useful unit of analysis in PSC's is the identity group: racial, religious, ethnic, cultural, poor and others. The reason is that power finally rests with the identity group, not the nation-state.
8. Internal and external relations between states and nations are included to satisfy basic needs. Groups as actors in PSC's initiate plans, actions, reactions and strategies in order to accomplish the goal of satisfying societal needs or of reducing and eliminating need deficiencies. For these purposes the domestic and the international are only arenas. In whatever arena the actors behave, they do so to satisfy their needs. The motivations for actions are internal, not systemic or international.
9. PSC's in multi-ethnic societies are not ameliorated peacefully by centralized structures. For conflicts to be enduringly resolved, appropriate decentralized structures are needed. These structures are designed to serve the psychological, economic and relational needs of groups and individuals within nation-states. Highly centralized political structures are sources of conflict. They reduce the opportunity of a sense of community among groups, increase alienation and they tend to deny to groups the means to accomplish their needs.
10. Researchers have failed to perceive the continuity over time of what appear to be discrete conflicts. There is a strong tendency in international relations theory to regard conflict actions as discrete, delineated by time and space, and differentiated in terms of the actors, targets and issues involved. Conflict is perceived as a phenomenon found in the natural unity of action, events which can be empirically isolated, formalized and studied. Each situation is seen as a unique one. No patterns or common features are related to common causes. It is important to emphasize that the set of events, taken as conflictual, are always preceded and followed by a stream of events. Because conflicts fluctuate in intensity over time, researchers tend to make assertions about starting and end points which may be of limited utility for the understanding of inertia embedded in some conflict situations. (Azar & Burton, 1986:28-39)

Agnew (Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989:45) adds some important insights into



PSC's with the introduction of spatial and temporal sources of intractability. These two factors make conflicts more intractable, thereby viewing intractability as a process, rather than a zero-sum condition of conflicts. Spatial sources are those that reflect the territory, theatre or actual places of many (ethnic) conflicts, for instance competing territorial claims, ritualisation of symbolic places, competition for control over spatial-economic policy, etc. As conflicts occur, competing claims to territory and allocational authority are seen increasingly in mutually exclusive terms. Conflicts as a consequence often become more intractable. Temporal sources are those that reflect the cumulative-temporal nature of (ethnic) conflict, for example the material stakes produced by conflict, the new symbolic issues, the new naturalized "in-group war talk" and the conversion of competing interests through 'sacrifice' to competing principles. The longer (ethnic) conflicts last, the more intractable they often become.

Azar and Agnew add to our understanding by introducing some novel and unique ways of viewing conflicts. Firstly the temporal aspect allows us to track conflict over time. Conflicts are only perceived as such and studied if they are overt and violent. Covert, latent or non-violent conflicts are not perceived as conflicts. The researcher then falls into the trap of viewing each manifestation of conflict as unique. The conflict in the Middle-East has shown four distinct phases: the colonial phase, 1917-48; the period of interstate conflict with the four Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-73; the transnational conflict phase, 1973-89 (Heraclides, 89:197); and the intranational phase, fighting the PLO, Hamas and other organizations within Israeli occupied territory, 1989- present. By identifying patterns and infrastructure within social reality related to these four phases, information could be gleaned on the nature of deep structures and unobservable mechanisms. The second important aspect to emerge from PSC's is that the re-emergence of conflict suggests deep-rooted sources in the lives and therefore in the identity formation processes of those collectives concerned increasingly forming the basis of interest formulation. State sponsored denial of access to this process result in violence directed against that entity or those it purports to represent.

The third aspect to emerge is that by tracking conflict and the processes of resolution,

attention is drawn to the fact that human needs and longstanding values will not be bargained over. Agreements struck by political elites that do not take this fact into account, will not last. By placing agreements struck by political elites in a larger, historical, macro-level context, their exploitative nature can be unveiled for it is possible to see who's interests they represent.

The fourth aspect is Azar's identification of the 'identity group' as unit of analysis in problem solving theory. The identity group could be equated to collectives and civilizations in that it has no fixed connotations to start off with and it can evolve over time. Identity groups for Azar can be based on racial, religious, ethnic and other common factors. This notion can be extended by adding political, material, technological and class dimensions as possible variants. Keeping in mind that individuals can belong to more than one 'fit' among civilizations, this could account for often contradictory behaviour within individuals and collectives.

This fact leads us to the fifth aspect. Azar's proposition that the drive to satisfy basic needs is the main motivation for action between states, nations and identity groups in the internal and external arenas, is limited. 'Satisfying individual societal needs' and 'eliminating need deficiencies' are two pursuits, governed by utility, that are a primal drive in any collective. Utility is not the sole factor to compel collectivities to act, but supplemented by intersubjective meanings of norms, of eternal reason, of institutions and of social practices. Motivation for action cannot be limited to material forces alone but by a configuration of forces that includes the existence of norms, rules, eternal reason, institutions and practices.

The sixth aspect is that PSC's in multi-ethnic societies are not ameliorated peacefully by centralized structures. Azar calls for decentralized structures to increase a sense of community and provide collectives with a means to accomplish their needs. Movement from centralized to decentralized forms of government is merely a reform of the current system. There is conflicting evidence at best, to suggest that decentralized forms of government will resolve deep-rooted cleavages between civilizations as illustrated by

instances where partition or secession has been the only viable option. It is thus in Azar's vision for the future where this thesis will differ more radically.

## **2.4: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS**

Structure is the arena within which process takes place or actors act. In this arena the likelihood for conflict or cooperation to emerge can be viewed on a continuum and is equally possible. Competition, self-help and the security dilemma are not natural phenomena within an anarchic world order but just as likely as cooperation and peace.

This basic premise allows us to formulate the central research proposition: "Political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict." The validation of this proposition as set out by the research objectives, and taking into account Azar's 10 propositions on protracted social conflicts, should point us in the direction that conflict has become a source, rather than an outcome of policy. This would establish the four processes of conflict resolution (mediation, arbitration, negotiation and facilitation) as inadequate for attaining lasting peace in situations of protracted social conflict. If conflict is the source of policy formulation, de-escalation as a purely political elite implemented process, would be extremely difficult to achieve in PSC's. A necessary ingredient would be grass roots conciliation, the fifth process in conflict resolution.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **RESULTS PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION**

Before we can begin the research on the critical indicators, it would be prudent to provide some background on attempts at conflict resolution and events over the last decade in Israel.

#### **3.1: BACKGROUND-: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS**

Following World War II, the British government withdrew their mandate over Palestine and the UN partitioned the area into Arab and Jewish states, an arrangement rejected by the Arabs. Since the declaration of independence on May 14<sup>th</sup>, 1948, Israel had been involved in five wars and had been the target of countless acts of terrorism and violence. Israel defeated the Arabs in a series of wars without ending the deep tensions between the opposing sides. The territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war are still under disputation, being the Golan Heights (Syria), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestinian). On April 25<sup>th</sup>, 1982, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in pursuit of the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Outstanding territorial disputes were resolved with Jordan in the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace treaty. The First Intifada or uprising broke out in December 1987 signalling a new era of internal warfare. It was named Intifada, for it was an uprising within the Palestinian community directed from the territories inside Israeli borders without foreign help or intervention. It has been attributed to many factors of which the most salient are the stalemate characterizing the mid-1980's combined with relentless expansion of Israeli settlements linked with the expropriation of land. (Moodley-Moore, 1998:46) This Intifada was characterized by terrorist attacks, suicide bombings and mass protests mainly confined to the Gaza Strip and West bank areas but occasionally spilling over into Israel itself. Israel was ill prepared for this kind of war as previous wars were fought mainly across borders with neighbouring states. The main

achievement was bringing to the fore the plight of the Palestinians, especially within the mass media and the United Nations. As Moodley-Moore (1998:460) points out, the Intifada did not defeat Israel militarily or cripple its economy, but it spurred Israeli leaders onto new directions. An unexpected window of opportunity with the advent of the Gulf War spurred the USA to nudge Israeli and Palestinian leaders closer to the negotiation table. This event resulted in the Madrid International Conference.

### **THE MADRID FRAMEWORK (1991)**

The Madrid International Conference was designed to serve as an opening forum for future regional peace dialogue, having no power to impose solutions or veto agreements. Yet the protagonists to the Middle East conflict, Israel and the Arab states, were all disinclined (be it for different reasons) to take part in it and agreed only at the insistence of the George Bush Sr. administration (Hermann & Newman, 2000:112). The Palestinian delegation was not yet formally recognised as a legitimate, independent negotiation partner by Israel and hence forced to take its place at the conference table as part of the Jordanian delegation. The Madrid conference resulted in the commencement of two separate yet parallel negotiation tracks- the bilateral and the multilateral tracks. The bilateral negotiations were meant to resolve the conflicts of the past. The multilateral negotiations in contrast, were intended to construct a Middle East for the future, whilst building confidence amongst parties.

### **THE OSLO A AGREEMENT (1993)**

The Oslo A Agreement was a major groundbreaking agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Agreement was drawn up in a round of secret talks between Israeli and Palestinian diplomats and academics in Norway during 1993. On September 9th, 1993, Chairman Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Rabin in which he stated unequivocally that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO):

- recognises the right of Israel to exist in peace and security;
- accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 & 338;
- commits itself to peaceful resolution of the conflict;
- renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence;

- assumes responsibility over all PLO elements to ensure their compliance, prevent violations, and discipline violators;
- affirms that those articles in the PLO Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist are now inoperative and no longer valid;
- undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes to the Covenant.

In reply, Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in the peace negotiations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001:1).

On September 13th, 1993, a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP), based on the agreement worked out in Oslo, was signed by the two parties in Washington D.C., outlining the proposed interim self-government arrangements, as envisioned and agreed upon by both sides. The arrangements contained in the DOP included immediate Palestinian self rule in Gaza and Jericho, early empowerment for the Palestinians in the West Bank, an agreement on self-government and an election of a Palestinian council. Additionally, extensive economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians played an important role in the DOP.

#### **THE OSLO B INTERIM AGREEMENT (1995)**

On September 28th, 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip was signed in Washington D.C. While still perceived by both sides as being no more than a transitional agreement on the path to full autonomy and/or statehood, this agreement was more far reaching than the Oslo A Agreement, both in terms of the nature of autonomy and the amount of territory included.

The main object of the Interim Agreement was to broaden Palestinian self-government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority- the Palestinian Council- for an interim period not to exceed five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (i.e. no later than May 1999). It allowed the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a new era of cooperation and co-existence based on common interest, dignity and mutual

respect. At the same time, it protected Israel's vital interests, and in particular its security interests both with regards to external security as well as the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001:3).

This agreement effectively resulted in the transfer of over 90% of the Palestinian population to Palestinian autonomy, but on an area covering less than 30% of the West Bank. The agreement was implemented in a series of rapid Israeli withdrawals from the Palestinian towns (Hermann & Newman, 2000:115). However, the town of Hebron had not been evacuated by the time of the 1996 elections in which the Labour Party failed to get re-elected. The new Netanyahu administration insisted on renegotiating the Hebron redeployment but was honour bound to implement the agreements of the previous government.

#### **THE WYE RIVER AGREEMENT (1998)**

Following ten days of intensive direct negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, the Wye River Memorandum was signed at the White House, Washington D.C. Hosted by Bill Clinton at the Wye plantation in Maryland, Israel's demands for Palestinian action on security issues were aired. This was embodied in a specific timetable of actions that was supposed to imprison wanted terrorists in Palestinian Authority (PA) jails, reduce the amount of PA police from 40 000 to the Oslo authorised 30 000, act against Hamas infrastructure, collect unauthorised weapons, and take other measures specified in a secret U.S. brokered security plan. The Israelis would also have a public spectacle of a mass Palestinian gathering to renounce the Palestinian Charter's anti-Israeli provisions (Hermann & Newman, 2000:116).

Immediately after the signing of the agreement, it was clear that both parties interpreted the implementation of the Wye River Agreement differently, and that it was unclear whether the timetable would be adhered to.

#### **THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM (1999)**

On September 4th, 1999, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed by

representatives of Israel and the PLO. Restating their commitment to full implementation of all agreements reached since September 1993, the memorandum set out to resolve outstanding issues of the interim status, in particular those set out in the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998. The parties also restated their commitment to the Interim Agreement's prohibition regarding initiating or taking any action that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to the conclusion of the permanent status agreement.

At the urging of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, U.S. president Bill Clinton announced an invitation to Barak and PA Chairman Arafat to go to Camp David and continue negotiations on the Middle East peace process. On July 12th, the Camp David 2000 Summit convened. It ended 13 days later without an agreement being reached. At its conclusion, a trilateral statement was issued defining agreed principles for future negotiations.

#### **THE INTIFADA RESUMES (2000)**

A highly controversial visit to the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif by Likud leader Ariel Sharon on September 28th, 2000, provoked the worst violence between Palestinians and Israeli forces for years, signalling what was effectively the end of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Ironically, in an interview that same day, Ehud Barak had for the first time publicly indicated his willingness to cede sovereignty of parts of East Jerusalem, although not the Temple Mount, in order to establish a 'twin' Israel-Palestine capital.

This culminated in the eventual ousting of the Labour Government led by Ehud Barak, to be replaced by Ariel Sharon. In what was the largest margin of victory ever, Sharon took up office on the March 7th, 2001. A policy statement was issued by the new Israeli government stating that it is determined in its aspiration to achieve peace with its Palestinian neighbour, but that the conduct of peace negotiations calls for tranquillity. More than 600 people have died in related violence since, in what is commonly referred to as the al-Aqsa intifada. (Al-Aqsa because it was commonly believed to have started at



the Temple Mount, the site of the Al-Aqsa mosque.)

### **3.2: CRITICAL INDICATORS**

The six critical indicators are:

1. Manufacturing conditions of underdevelopment;
2. Un-integrated social and political systems, and distributive injustice;
3. Fostering cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism;
4. Placing issues under the 'sign of security';
5. The production of insecurity through the manipulation of identity formation processes;
6. Monopolising the conflict resolution process.

### **THEORY THAT INFORMS CRITICAL INDICATORS 1-2**

Azar's (1986:28) first proposition on protracted social conflicts mentions enduring features such as economic and technological underdevelopment, un-integrated social and political systems and distributive injustice. Theory that informs us on these, essentially utilitarian aspects of conflict, where human behaviour is orientated towards the satisfaction of human needs, is put forward by Burton (1987:225) – the human needs approach to conflict and its resolution; and Gurr (1970:319)- relative deprivation as determinant of the magnitude of political violence.

The point of departure of the human needs approach is the inevitable tension between a society that aims at integration and individuals who want to maintain their uniqueness. A basic assumption is the concept of 'social contract', establishing the primacy of societal interests as opposed to that of individuals and consequently, the obligation of the authorities to impose the rules and norms of the whole on the deviants (Peleg, 1999:109). Human beings possess individual needs that have to be satisfied. These needs are uncontrollable and cannot be co-opted by governmental benefits or harnessed to societal expectations. If they are not satisfied, tension will arise for people prefer to gratify their

needs and forego societal norms.

Bay (Peleg, 1999:111) defines a human need as “any requirement for a person’s survival, health, or basic liberties; basic meaning that, to the extent that they are inadequately met, mental or physical health is impaired. Thus ‘need’ refers to necessities for not only biological survival but also for the health and development (physical and mental growth) of persons as human beings.” These needs always exist and are universal in that they transcend culture.

Unfulfilled human needs is then a powerful independent variable to political behaviour. Need satisfaction is viewed as a driver of social change. Tessororf (1993:19) points out that proponents of needs theory agree unanimously on the social psychological consequences which are associated with a failure to satisfy human needs. Behavioural traits manifested in individual and group behaviour include the development of frustration and alienation; the use of aggression as a defence mechanism against perceived threats; rank disequilibrium; rising expectations; and perceptions of relative deprivation.

Gurr went beyond human needs and focused on human values. He argued that the primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicisation of that discontent and finally, its actualisation in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participants in political violence (1970:12). Relative deprivation is defined as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing the capabilities increase the intensity of discontent” (1970:13).

Unfulfilled human needs and relative deprivation inform us 'why men rebel'. If unfulfilled human needs and relative deprivation are the result of structural victimization as imposed by political elites in a territory where there is violence, it corroborates this thesis' central proposition. These indicators contend that the creation of absolute deprivation as shown below through the examples of land, water, labour, closure and settlements, leads to relative deprivation as experienced by the Palestinian society. Relative deprivation is reflected in data that reflect how Palestinians and then Israelis experience inequalities. This is elaborated upon below in the fifth indicator where opinion polls were used to reflect attitude.

### **3.2.1: FIRST INDICATOR: CONDITIONS FOR UNDERDEVELOPMENT**

The first indicator reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict through the creation of conditions of underdevelopment. In order to validate this statement, it was necessary to find out more about the economic reality as experienced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS). Immediately apparent was the lack of accurate data, with even the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau making use of 'estimates' for the WBGS areas. The lack of any published budget and population figures for the occupied territories in a period from 1967 up to 1991 is a result of Israeli Military rule and testament to the complete lack of formal governance in the West bank and Gaza strip.

#### **A- ISRAELI POLITICAL ELITES: POLICIES OF DEPRIVATION**

Economic reality for Palestinian society was characterised by "de-development" (Roy, 1999:1). Twenty five years of Israeli military occupation resulted in the creation of a Palestinian economy dependent on Israel. Salient features of the Palestinian economy as found up to 1993 would be:

- a mainly inward production focus for domestic products with a heavy reliance on agricultural goods;
- Israeli control of the factors of production within the WBGS such as land, water,

labour and capital;


- external and internal border control as maintained by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) through multiple checkpoints (See Maps 2 & 3);
- dispossession of land for the construction of settlements and roads;
- legal and economic restrictions on production, water use, aid and labour rights;
- severe export restrictions (Roy, 1999:1).


## LAND

Land dispossession for the use of Jewish settlements and the building of roads has been a distinguishing feature of this period (maps 4 & 5). Depriving Palestinians of their land meant less water wells, less agricultural land and less wilderness area for grazing of livestock and recreational areas. The World Bank, in a draft of its September 1993 study, "Developing the Occupied Territories- An Investment in Peace," notes:

"Confiscation of Palestinian land has enabled Israel to proceed with the construction of settlements and related structures in various areas of the West Bank that were traditionally considered to be wilderness zones. Most important among these are the eastern slopes and the central part of the West Bank which once housed a variety of wildlife and provided a winter grazing ground for livestock and recreation for the local population. . . . Similarly, building agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley has gradually deprived the Palestinian inhabitants of these areas of their richest soils and water wells. A similar situation has developed in the Gaza Strip where settlements have encroached upon fertile inland and coastal areas. The Israeli settlement program was not accompanied by adequate and proper environmental considerations. None of the settlements have developed sewage treatment plants. Sewage is often allowed to run into valleys even if a neighbouring [Palestinian] village is threatened. The sewage system of the settlements on the eastern hills and slopes north of Jerusalem has contaminated fresh water supplies for drinking and irrigation of Palestinian areas up to Jericho" (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1998:1).

## MAP 2: ISRAELI CHECK POINTS - WEST BANK

المجلس الاقتصادي الفلسطيني للتنمية والإعمار (بكدار) PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION (PECTAR)   
خريطة الحواجز الاسرائيلية في الضفة الغربية  
Israeli Check Points in West Bank





(Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction: Feb. 2002)

## **LABOUR**

Labour was and still is controlled through the issuing of work permits or the 'right' to enter Israeli territory and work therein. These permits are seldom issued for any lengthy period of time with workers having to constantly reapply for permits. Every month, since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada (29 September 2000), Israel has issued a limited number of entry permits (a few thousand) for Palestinians employed within the Green Line (Israel's 1967 borders), (B'Tselem, 2001:1). In addition, a small number of workers, most of them from the West Bank, succeed in entering Israel and getting to their jobs without having permits. These workers run the risk of being caught, detained and their employers severely fined in regular round-ups by the Israeli Defence Force. Because of the closure, the vast majority of Palestinians employed in Israel prior to the intifada lost their jobs.

## **WATER**

Water is one of the scarcest resources in the Middle Eastern region and therefore a much valued commodity. The chief surface water resource is the Jordan river and can be divided into the Upper-Jordan drainage basin and the Lower-Jordan drainage basin. (Isaac, 1992:4) The Upper-Jordan system is fed by water from southern Lebanon, the southern and western slopes of Mount Hermon and the rest of the Golan Heights. Water drains into Lake Tiberias, also known as the Sea of Galilee. The Lower-Jordan section is mainly fed by springs and runoff water from the West Bank, Syrian and Jordanian regions. Only about 30% of water is surface water, the rest is ground water. Ground water in the West Bank originates from the "West Bank aquifer system", discharging through springs in the area. Israeli control of these water resources in the form of canals, pumping systems and allocation of quotas have had severe effects on the mainly agricultural economy of the Palestinian areas. West Bank groundwater accounts for 25% of Israel's total supply. Israeli settlers in the West Bank use about four times more water than their Palestinian neighbours and pay about a third as much per cubic meter (Postal, WorldWatch Institute, 2001). The 'Coastal aquifer system' supplying the Gaza Strip has been depleted beyond replenishable levels with severe salination setting in. The Israeli

government's response to accusations that it is responsible for the salination of the Gaza aquifer system points out that the large number of private wells in the Gaza area makes it almost impossible to control the level of pumping from the two underground aquifers which supply the region. Such excess pumping accounts for a 33 percent water deficit in the aquifers, an improvement over 1967 when the deficit stood at approximately 50 percent. This reduction in the deficit was made possible through the introduction of advanced irrigation techniques and other efficiency improvement measures. A reverse osmosis desalination plant was set up in Dir-el-Balah, water networks were installed and new water lines were laid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993) (Tables 1&2).

**Table 1: Distribution of the Annual Water Amounts from The Basins in the West Bank Between the Palestinians and the Israelis According to the Oslo Agreement.**

Aquifer Name	Amount of Water Allocated for the Israelis	Amount of Water Allocated for Palestinians from Springs	Amount of Water Allocated for Palestinians from Wells	Total Estimated Capacity
Western aquifer	340	2	20	362
North Eastern aquifer	103	17	25	145
Eastern aquifer	40	30	24	172
<b>Total</b>	<b>483</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>679</b>

Source: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)

(Palestinian National Bureau of Statistics- [www.pna.org](http://www.pna.org), Oct. 2001)

**Table 2: Water Purchased from Israeli Water Company (Mekorot) for Domestic Use in the Palestinian Territory by Region and Month, 1998.\***

1000 m<sup>3</sup>

Governate	Month												Total
	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	
Jenin	216.1	192.5	193.1	227.1	248.9	260.0	262.9	254.0	197.5	316.8	241.1	208.5	<b>2818.5</b>
Tubas	171.9	114.3	222.2	234.1	479.7	351.9	127.5	360.3	483.7	589.9	501.3	468.9	<b>4105.7</b>
Tulkarem	9.1	6.9	10.8	14.0	16.1	18.6	19.4	21.9	15.1	20.2	15.3	13.3	<b>180.7</b>
Nablus	80.1	78.5	92.1	82.7	122.8	187.9	131.3	168.6	130.3	158.4	128.3	118.8	<b>1479.8</b>
Qalqiliya	6.7	6.7	7.9	8.7	11.3	12.8	15.7	13.6	15.1	15.1	9.0	11.7	<b>134.3</b>
Salfit	41.9	40.4	37.4	63.5	66.6	90.5	72.2	111.9	82.8	104.2	88.4	90.3	<b>890.1</b>
Ramallah&Al-Bireh	479.0	454.3	499.5	497.2	633.3	716.4	825.9	793.1	758.2	811.3	638.0	679.2	<b>7785.4</b>
Jerusalem	131.4	119.2	131.9	157.3	153.3	173.7	156.7	156.3	135.6	150.1	147.2	145.6	<b>1758.3</b>



Jericho	37.5	36.9	45.8	83.1	70.5	79.6	76.6	42.5	42.8	35.1	40.2	51.3	641.9
Bethlehem	358.4	330.0	428.7	420.5	446.3	484.8	437.8	436.3	419.4	529.8	435.0	437.3	5164.3
Hebron	486.4	498.6	576.3	612.1	684.9	729.7	652.9	633.6	582.5	784.6	686.1	685.7	7613.4
West Bank	2018.5	1878.3	2245.7	2400.3	2933.7	3105.9	2778.9	2992.1	2863.0	3515.5	2929.9	2910.6	32572.4
Gaza strip	308.6	340.1	362.0	414.1	392.0	549.1	479.6	515.8	494.0	522.7	491.7	500.5	5370.2
Total	2327.1	2218.4	2607.7	2814.4	3325.7	3655.0	3258.5	3507.9	3357.0	4038.2	3421.6	3411.1	37942.6

\* Includes the pumped water from the wells which are located in the Palestinian Territory and controlled by Mekorot.

\*\* For domestic and agricultural use.

Source: Palestinian Water Authority

(Palestinian National Bureau of Statistics- [www.pna.org](http://www.pna.org), Oct. 2001)

### 1993 ONWARDS

Since the Oslo A Agreement (1993), noting the specific clauses and subsequent agreements for economic cooperation, we find the introduction of new structures for underdevelopment such as the policy of closures and accelerated land settlement. The policy of closure consists of 'general' closure, 'total' closure, 'internal' closure, 'external' closure and curfews.

- General closure refers to the overall restrictions placed on the movement of labour, goods and the factors of production between the West Bank and Gaza and between these territories and Israel, and is usually accompanied by delays and searches at border crossings (Roy, 2001:6). Searches are carried out manually by the Israeli Defence Force. There is also no 'sealed container system' in operation, meaning that all goods have to be searched.
- Total closure is where the West Bank and Gaza Strip is sealed off completely, usually in the wake of a severe terrorist attack or in anticipation of one. Movement is not only confined to either the West Bank or Gaza Strip, but also within these areas, having the effect of sealing towns into giant prisons.
- Internal closure is the restriction of movement to either the West Bank or the Gaza strip, with multiple checkpoints in between different towns (maps 2 & 3). This was facilitated by the Oslo B Agreement which effectively turned the West Bank into a series of cantons separated from each other by areas of Israeli control (Roy, 2001:5). The report of the United Nations Human Rights Inquiry

Commission states that during the 123-day period from 1 October 2000 to 31 January 2001, the Israeli-Palestinian border was closed for labour and trade flows for 93 days. Internal movement restrictions and internal closures were in place 100% of the time in the West Bank and 89% of the time in Gaza (2001:1).

- External closures include the closure of borders with the neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Jordan. This means that the Gaza port and airfields are closed as well. External closure also includes the restrictions on imports by the Israeli Defence Force. The UN Human Rights Inquiry Commission (2001:1) found that the construction and building sector in the Palestinian territories has been practically suspended due to products like cement, steel and timber being denied entry through the control at border checkpoints.
- Curfews have been implemented in certain regions to restrict movement at night. In sectors such as those close to Hebron, curfews are imposed on the Palestinian population to allow Jewish settler movement at night.

The UN commissioned, Second Quarterly Report on Economic and Social Conditions (April, 1997:1) states that the Israeli closure policy is estimated to have reduced the number of normal working days in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by about 20% during 1993-1996 and 30% of such days during 1996. The resulting losses in income-generating opportunities during 1993-1996 are estimated at US\$ 4.4 million per day and over US\$ 5 million in 1996.


## **SETTLEMENTS**

As pointed out above, the Israeli policy of moving settlers into the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas has been done at the direct expense of the Palestinians. The Mitchell Report, issued 30th April 2001 by the Sharm el-Sheikh fact-finding committee headed by U.S. Senator George Mitchell, found that Palestinians are genuinely angry at the growth of settlements and at their daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's presence in their territories (Mitchell, 2001:1). Settlement expansion has markedly increased during the 1990's to a settler population of over 200 000 by September 2000 (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2001:1). The Mitchell Report also

found that cessation of violence would be particularly hard to sustain unless settlement construction was stopped and pointed out the usefulness of strategic settlements as bargaining chips in future negotiations.

The Commission on Human Rights found that by October 2000, there were 190 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, inhabited by approximately 380,000 settlers, of whom some 180,000 live in the East Jerusalem area.


**Graph 1: Settler Population in the WBGs, 1972-1998**



**(Foundation for Middle East Peace, Oct. 2001: [www.fmep.org](http://www.fmep.org))**

## Map 4: Settlements and Land Confiscation in the West Bank

### West Bank Hilltop Settlements and Land Confiscations - June 1999



([www.fimep.org/images/maps/map9907\\_1.jpg](http://www.fimep.org/images/maps/map9907_1.jpg) \\*, Sep. 2001)

**Map 5: Gaza strip.**



(CIA World factbook, Sept. 2001)

## **B) PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: A DIFFICULT TRANSITION FROM TERRORIST ORGANISATION TO GOVERNMENT**

The Palestinian Authority, upon its official taking up of 'government' over the Palestinian territories, appointed many of the "Tunisians" (the Palestine Liberation Organisation was stationed in Tunisia during its years of exile), or PLO members that served in Tunisia, to key positions, much to the chagrin of local Palestinians. This led to what Baskin (2000:2) referred to as the ceasing of political 'party life', or the severe curtailment of dialogue within the Palestinian political community, as illustrated by the demise of a host of political parties. Ideology made way in the face of short term private gains as illustrated by the political cronyism and heavy handed rule of the Palestinian Authority in the economy. Roy (2001:6) argues that the adoption of economic policies that was protectionist, corrupt through its lack of accountability and transparency, and the fostering of monopolies in the commodity sector, frightened many potential investors. "The Palestinian Authority's heavy-handed presence in the market, most keenly felt through state-dominated monopolies, personally controlled by individuals high in the Palestinian Authority bureaucracy working in collaboration with Israeli suppliers, also had a stifling effect on the economy" (Roy, 2001:6). Foreign investment is also tightly controlled by Arafat and a handful of individuals, in alliance with specific private sector interests and external actors including former Israeli military and security officials.

Many Israeli Palestinian leaders and intellectuals interviewed by Muhammad Amara expressed similar disappointment with the PA: "Lutfi Mash'ur, editor of al-Sinara, a leading Arab newspaper, said he wishes to see more democracy and believes that the current PA governing style is such a catastrophe that the Israeli occupation is preferable in some cases. He is very pessimistic as to the PA's factionalism, tribalism, and lack of respect for democracy and freedom. Walid Sadik, a Knesset member, agrees with Mash'ur and adds that 'everything is based on tribalism rather than achievements, and the achievements of the Intifada are lost'" (Amara, 2000:2).

Corruption and cronyism amongst political elites serve to perpetuate conditions of

underdevelopment. US and Israeli tacit sanctioning of this lack of democracy has compounded the problem.

### 3.2.2: SECOND INDICATOR: UNINTEGRATED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE

The second indicator reads: “political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict through the creation of unintegrated social and political systems and distributive injustice”. The West Bank and Gaza Strip areas are regarded as occupied territories and consequently the status of Palestinians in these areas are that of a stateless society, subject to interim agreement. They neither have the right to vote in Israel nor are they allowed to enter without express Israeli permission. They do not carry Palestinian passports and as pointed out above, their movements are severely restricted by the Israeli Defence Force. Palestinians in neighbouring countries with the exception of Jordan (mostly Lebanon and Syria), have only refugee status, primarily in anticipation of their eventual return to Palestine. No citizen rights have been granted them which include the right to vote and partake in political activity in the country of domicile.

**Table 3: UNRWA Registered Refugees**

#### UNRWA REGISTERED REFUGEES (JUNE 2000)

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	Total
Registered Refugees	583,009	824,622	1,570,192	383,199	376,472	3,737,494
Increase over 1999	2.3%	3.3%	3.8%	2.3%	1.7%	3.1%
% of total population	29.7	78	32.2	2.5	11.1	30.7
% of total RRs	16	22	42	10	10	100
No. of refugee camps	19	8	10**	10	12	59
RR living in camps (in % of RR)	157,676 (27)	451,186 (54.7)	280,191 (17.8)	111,712 (29.2)	210,715 (56)	1,211,480 (32.4)
RR outside camps	425,333	373,436	1,290,001	271,487	165,757	2,526,014
<b>Facilities:</b>						
Schools	96	168	192	110	74	640
Training Centers	3	1	2	1	1	8
Primary Health Care	34	18	23	23	25	122

UNRWA. (Source: *UNRWA in Figures*, UNRWA Headquarters, June 2000.)

(United Nations Relief and Works Agency: 2001)

For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas, the confiscation of land and the destruction of property serve as a key point in their alienation from the Israelis. Since 1967, Israel has expropriated approximately 79% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) report states that during the period, January to November 1999, over 7140 fruit and olive trees were uprooted and 50 708 dunums of land confiscated. Furthermore, Israeli authorities have partially or wholly demolished over 6000 houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas and 2500 houses in East Jerusalem. Houses are demolished as a punitive measure or under the pretext of a lack of building permits. Palestinians are also prohibited from building in 60% of the West Bank and 87% of East Jerusalem (PASSIA, 2001:1). These figures are however contradicted by alternative sources.

Repeated claims for compensation have thus far been summarily ignored by the Israeli government, serving to deny Palestinians effective recompense for victimization suffered at the hand of the Israeli “bulldozers” and to further the social distance between Palestinians and Israelis.

Social integration is stifled as well. Scham (2000) conducted a study of 195 research cooperation projects run jointly by Israeli scholars with Arab counterparts from the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. He found that difficulties encountered in developing such research cooperation stemmed from a resistance in the Arab world to “normalisation” of relations with Israelis.

The notable absence of democracy within the Palestinian Authority points to a lack of political integration. Chairman Arafat’s declaration that he could not sign “Palestinian Basic Law” is indicative of the fact that a separation of authority to impose checks and balances between executive and legislative branches, would not only stifle PA control, but could also be counterproductive when dealing with the Israelis. This is enhanced through a lack of objections from the USA and Israel as main actors in the peace process.



As Baskin points out: "... various governments of Israel viewed Arafat's ability to take actions against anti-peace forces in Palestine as overriding any need for Palestinian democracy. This was summarized by Rabin's famous sentence – "bli bagatz u'bli btzelem" – without the Supreme Court and without Bethlehem – meaning that Arafat could arrest, detain, and even execute anyone, without any real due process of law" (MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2000).

### **DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE**

Distributive injustice is illustrated by the 'creation of conditions of underdevelopment' and 'unintegrated political and social structures' above. A total lack of any adequate institutions to redistribute welfare benefits and mechanisms aimed at political integration in the democratic sense, underlines conditions of distributive injustice. Perhaps overshadowed by conditions within the occupied territories, is the plight of Israeli Arabs (Palestinians living within Israeli borders) whose communities have also been racked by violence. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found in her report on her visit to Israel and the occupied territories that Israeli Arabs are the subject of repeated discrimination and neglect. Point 77 of her report states that: "most of the Arab Israelis whom the High Commissioner met described their situation as one of exclusion, prejudice, official hostility and routine humiliation" (2000:3).

Laws reinforce privilege and discriminated against the Palestinians by excluding them from civic participation. Moodley-Moore (1998:39) points out three fundamental laws that defined the Israeli state's preference for Jews over Arabs. These are the:

1. Law of Return, enacted in 1950, which grants all Jews the inalienable right to immigrate to Israel and officially excludes the Palestinians in exile.
2. Law of Nationality of 1952 which gave all persons who are accorded 'Jewish Nationality' under the Law of Return the right to claim Israeli nationality by return without any formal procedures.
3. World Zionist Organisation/ Jewish Agency (Status) Law of 1952 implicitly imposed legal, economic, social and political discrimination against Arabs by directing a wide range of functions to exclusively Zionist institutions.

## **THEORY THAT INFORMS CRITICAL INDICATORS 3-5: STRUCTURAL DISCOURSE**

Material elements are important, but a protracted social conflict cannot be reduced to the competing interests among pre-existing politically motivated entities alone. Azar's (1986:28) second proposition therefore states that the real source of conflict is deep rooted in the being of those concerned. A source of PSC's is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation in these processes.

Actors participating in this process of identity formation acquire identities by giving meaning to objects and other actors. 'Actors' consist of individuals or aggregations of individuals called collectivities or civilizations. It is collective meanings given to objects and other actors that constitute structure. Structure mirrors the process of the formation of collective identity. As Weldes (1999:17) argue: "Constructions of reality and the codes of intelligibility out of which they are produced provide both conditions of possibility and the limits on possibility; that is, they make it possible to act in the world while simultaneously defining the 'horizon of the taken-for-granted' that marks the boundaries of common sense and accepted knowledge."

Identity is inherently relational in that it constitutes conceptions of the self and others, based on collective knowledge about expectations and intersubjective meanings. It enables an actor to determine "who I am/ we are" in a situation, in order to position itself in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations (Wendt, 1996:51). This interdependence can be expressed as a binary relationship, the existence of the one supposes the existence of the other. This notion could also be seen as an interdependence between many actors, not just binary. Furthermore, identities can also differ within an actor based on these different role-specific understandings: "The commitment to, and salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and

one another, and which constitute the structure of the social world” (Wendt, 1992:397). Cox’s position on civilizations as realms of intersubjectively constituted identities that cannot be seen as irrevocably territorially based is not entirely dissimilar to this position. Identities are furthermore the basis of interest (Wendt, 1992:398). Actors’ interest are defined in relation to their specific identity roles in different situations. Interests also change over time with identity as different situations emerge requiring different roles.

“An institution is a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors’ socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works” (Wendt, 1992:399). Structure is thus equated to institutions in that it is constructed as collective knowledge but experienced as having an existence over and above the individuals who happen to embody them at the moment. Structures or then institutions, serve to constrain or coerce behaviour, imposing pressures and constraints. (Cox, 1996:33) As such, identities and institutions do not exist apart from each other but are as Giddens points out “mutually constitutive” (Wendt, 1992:399).

Institutions as constricting social entities influence the behaviour of societies, but because socialization is a cognitive process, one cannot take for granted conflicts, threats and security as natural processes in the formation of state identity. The state as institution is not a natural phenomenon relating objectively to the external world. States are rather collectivities of individuals that through their practices constitute the institution of the state as an ‘actor’, and furthermore, as an ‘actor’ in the international arena define other ‘actors’ (states) in terms of their own interests, fears etc. It is this position that allows Wendt to argue: “Because states do not have conceptions of self and other, and thus security interests apart from or prior to interaction, we assume too much about the state of nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy, international political systems like economic markets are formed by the co-action of self regarding units” (Wendt, 1992:401).

It is here where constructivism as critical approach fundamentally differs from existing neo-realist thinking. As Krause and Williams point out: "The basic claims of the critical and constructivist approaches are that 'security' is not an objective condition, that threats to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and that the object of security is not stable or unchanging. Instead, questions about how the object to be secured (nation, state or group) is constituted and how particular issues are placed under a 'sign of security' become central. Security is understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared understandings" (1996:242).

These historical discourses and practices on security are manifested in three interrelated processes. The first is the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism in order to solidify cohesion and fortify identity. Threats are constructed to denigrate the rival and legitimise action taken against the perceived threat. The second is state sponsored placing of issues under the sign of security. These issues are then subsumed within concepts and institutions of state security (military jargon and responses against a particular target). The third process is the production of insecurity over those whom the political elite governs. The processes of constructing a meaningful discourse of threats, the fostering of cleavages, and placing issues under the sign of security, are not politically neutral. These two processes have a direct influence on identity formation processes within a civilization and serves as a source of insecurity.

### **3.2.3: THIRD INDICATOR: FOSTERING CLEAVAGES, STEREOTYPICAL IMAGES AND POLITICAL SYMBOLISM**

This proposition reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict through the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism. As pointed out above, institutions such as the state serves to constrain or coerce behaviour, imposing pressures and constraints. One such a mechanism at the disposal of institutions is the monopolization of discourses and practices through the construction of

threats. Campbell (Weldes, 1992:152) argues that the construction of a threat entails the differentiation of a community from a threatening “other”, thereby producing a boundary between the community inside and the threat outside. The construction of threats serves to solidify group cohesion and fortify identity. For the group to crystallise, foes are required. Animosity and hostility is tacitly sanctioned if not encouraged. As Peleg (1999:118) points out: “Loyalty is contrived by dehumanising and demonising the rival and consolidating an ‘us-versus-them perspective’. Group identity is forged and encouraged by denying rights and needs of the other by underscoring the exclusiveness and pre-eminence of the self, the ‘chosen people syndrome’”. In practice, this is achieved through the fostering of cleavages and stereotypical images, and/or by politicising or ‘charging’ ethnic, religious or strategic issues, events and territory with symbolic content. Symbolic content is usually ascribed to collective and indivisible goods like the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount. Contentions over these areas lack objective criteria for calm and negotiated compromise.

The state of Israel has had to absorb the influx of a large amount of Jews from all over the world, Ashkenazi from the European countries, Sephardim (the Spaniards) from mainly Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Ethiopia) and other Middle Eastern countries (Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon etc.), even from countries as far afield as Ethiopia and India. Most recently, Israel received a large influx of Russian émigrés. This means that the Jewish nation is not homogeneous but extremely diverse, requiring active nation building efforts from the Israeli government. Likewise, the Palestinian people are deeply divided between refugees from different countries and factions supporting different parties. Israeli efforts at nation building include the mandatory study of Hebrew as official language and compulsory military service.

In order to find instances of the fostering of cleavages, the making of stereotypical images and political symbolism, this study has tried to find references to separation of the two civilizations in rhetoric used by key figures or leaders within society, official policy documents and statements by official spokespersons.

**ISRAEL:**

**POLITICAL SYMBOLISM:** The following is Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's address to the Knesset delivered on May 29, 1995, on Jerusalem Day: *"There was one moment in the Six Day War which symbolized the great victory: that was the moment in which the first paratroopers under Gur's command reached the stones of the Western Wall, feeling the emotion of the place; there never was, and never will be, another moment like it. Nobody staged that moment. Nobody planned it in advance. Nobody prepared it and nobody was prepared for it; it was as if Providence had directed the whole thing: the paratroopers weeping loudly and in pain over their comrades who had fallen along the way, the words of the Kaddish prayer heard by Western Wall's stones after 19 years of silence, tears of mourning, shouts of joy, and the singing of "Hatikvah"*" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).

The second example on the politicisation of symbolic places comes from Ariel Sharon's inaugural speech to the Knesset (2001-03-07): *"Jerusalem is the great dream, for which the Jews yearned for and prayed for in every generation. If we turn our back to it - to its symbols and our sacred places - we will put a question mark on our very future and destiny. The late Yigal Allon, the commander of the Palmach and one of the most brilliant commanders of the War of Independence, said: "A people that does not respect its past has a barren present and its future is shrouded in uncertainty." Jerusalem was and will be the eternal capital of the Jewish people. Israeli Prime Ministers have always reiterated this commitment in their inauguration speeches, including the late Yitzhak Rabin. So, too, in the words of the vow: "If I forget thee of Jerusalem, let my right hand lose its cunning..."*" (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).

In an address by Prime Minister of the time, Ehud Barak (November 8, 2000) on the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Barak made Israel's position on Jerusalem clear: *"I suspect that I don't have to explain Jerusalem's standing in the Jewish and Israeli consciousness. The city's unification in 1967 and our return to the holy places, under Jewish sovereignty after 2,000 years, were a kind of "big bang" that reverberated on the deepest of Jewish heartstrings. The unity of Jerusalem, the eternal*

*capital of the State of Israel, became the keystone of our national consensus. The Jewish holy places in East Jerusalem are the pivot of Jewish history, identity, and faith. Jews have been turning to the Temple Mount in prayer three times a day for thousands of years.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).*

Inside the city of Jerusalem is the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif. This is the most holy site for Jews and the third most holy site for Arabs the world over. Ariel Sharon’s visit to it late in September 2000, is alleged to have sparked renewed violence and is commemorated as the start of the current al-Aqsa intifada. This site has frequently been a flashpoint for the eruption of violence and has had to be closed off on various occasions. A contentious issue is excavation behind the wailing wall which is underneath the al-Aqsa mosque. Palestinians believe that excavations underneath the site constitute a desecration of the religious site.

In a statement issued by an Israeli Defence Force spokesperson, full responsibility for the desecration of Joseph’s tomb is charged at the Palestinian Authority: *“The security of a number of holy sites is mentioned in the Interim Agreements as being the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority. The agreements ensure that the Palestinian Authority will be responsible for the security of these sites, and that Jewish worshippers will be allowed unhindered access to them. The Palestinians have not upheld this written agreement, have not enabled Jewish worshippers to visit the sites and have allowed mobs to destroy Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus and to burn the “Peace for Israel” synagogue in Jericho. In violating the agreements, the Palestinians have proven that they cannot be trusted to protect holy site” (IDF: 2001).*

**FOSTERING CLEAVAGES:** One example is an address by Foreign Minister Levy (of the Netanyahu government) to the Knesset on motions to the agenda on the Peace Process: *“There is yet another area of activity, of which we are aware, which poses a serious danger. The Palestinian Authority is now co-opting to its discussions, organizations which only yesterday it itself pointed to as a dangerous opposition seeking to undermine the peace process. They are now partners in the talks. There is today also*

*encouragement to begin to foment unrest - not yet violence, against which we admonish, but unrest which is liable to deteriorate into violence, to which HAMAS is a party. Yes, HAMAS is involved in this too. And if it is given a green light, it will destroy this process with its own hands.*" (1997-03-12)

Many high ranking Israeli officials blame Chairman Arafat or the Palestinian Authority personally for the perpetuation of violence, which serves to demonise the other side. The first example is from a press conference with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on his Return from the Wye Plantation Summit at Ben-Gurion Airport, Israel on October 25, 1998: *"Gone are the days when Israel gave and gave with no return except for words and promises, or more precisely, false promises. They received territory and we got terror. The terrorist monster of HAMAS grew as the territory under Palestinian control increased, because the Palestinian Authority did not fulfill its obligations to combat the terrorist infrastructure, and other obligations."* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001)

In a briefing given by Foreign Ministry Director-General Alon Liel to the Foreign Press on February 14, 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attack in Jerusalem, Liel responded to a question on whether he sees Arafat personally responsible for the violence as follows: *"I see him responsible for the fact that the incitement is going on, all the time, and that the intifada is going on. Arafat had hundreds of opportunities - in public appearance, he is interviewed on television all the time - to call on his people to stop this violence, and he didn't do it. We know, and we wrote in the report to the Mitchell Committee, that the Palestinian Authority was behind this wave of violence, thought it could benefit from this wave of violence, thought it could prove its bargaining position through the violence. So we see him responsible for the violence, and we see him responsible for what he calls the 'al-Aqsa intifada'"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).

**STEREOTYPICAL IMAGES:** Israeli's in general view the Palestinians as untrustworthy, violent and dishonest. This is reflected in a joint project of the Palestinian-Israeli People to People Program, conducted by the Jerusalem Media and



Communication Centre (JMCC) and the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research (Tel Aviv University) [See Indicator 3.2.5 below]. Popular rhetoric used at governmental level when referring to the Palestinian Authority's unwillingness or inability to implement decisions reached in negotiation, enforces these attitudes towards Palestinians. The Israeli government blames the Palestinian Authority and Chairman Arafat personally for the current al-Aqsa intifada as shown in an official policy statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *"The violent events recently witnessed in our region are the result of a clear Palestinian decision to pursue violence as a political tool. Israel seeks to resolve its differences with the Palestinians at the negotiating table, while Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have chosen the path of ongoing confrontation"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).

This was also clearly echoed in a statement by Prime Minister of the time Ehud Barak on the November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2000, in response to the violence connected to the al-Aqsa intifada: *"Today we suffered a very grave attack, carried out by the Fatah Tanzim. The Palestinian Authority is, in our view, directly responsible for this attack. We have therefore once again today taken forceful action against targets of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip... We attacked targets of the Fatah, Tanzim and Force 17 - offices, buildings, training camps. We also attacked a naval vantage point and a television relay station from which incitement is broadcast to the Gaza Strip... The Palestinian Authority is systematically violating all agreements and understandings which it signed. Thus, by its own doing, is it accountable for our victims... We will continue to take vigorous action to bring about an end to the violence. We will act with all force necessary, without restraint. The Palestinian Authority must understand that it will achieve nothing through violence..."* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).

#### **PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY:**

**FOSTERING CLEAVAGES:** Ruhi Fatuh, Secretary General of the Palestinian Legislative Council and member of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah, Yasser Arafat's mainstream faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization said the return to armed

struggle should take place if a Palestinian state is not established by May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1999, when the Israel-PLO accords expire: *"The failed attempt to achieve peace made us realize that the only way to solve the Palestinian problem in a just and comprehensive manner is to implement the PLO's covenant... meaning a return to the armed struggle, which is the only language the Israelis understand..."* (Memri, 2001).

**STEREOTYPICAL IMAGES:** On October 13<sup>th</sup>, 2000, the official Palestinian Authority television station broadcast live a Friday sermon in the Zayed bin Sultan Aal Nahyan mosque in Gaza. Below are excerpts from the sermon, as transcribed by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). The speaker is Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, Member of the Palestinian Authority-appointed "Fatwa Council" and former acting Rector of the Islamic University in Gaza: *"O brother believers, the criminals, the terrorists - are the Jews, who have butchered our children, orphaned them, widowed our women and desecrated our holy places and sacred sites. They are the terrorists. They are the ones who must be butchered and killed, as Allah the Almighty said: 'Fight them: Allah will torture them at your hands, and will humiliate them and will help you to overcome them, and will relieve the minds of the believers..."* (Memri, 2001). The Joint Project of the Palestinian- Israeli People to People Program found that 87,5% of Palestinians thought of Israelis as violent and 70,9% thought of Israelis as dishonest.

**POLITICAL SYMBOLISM:** The following are excerpts from an address given by Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat at the headquarters of the Palestinian Workers' Association in Gaza City, October 27<sup>th</sup>, 2001: *"...The tanks, planes, and missiles will never subjugate our people, because it is at the forefront [of the battle], until Judgment Day... Oh mountain, the wind cannot move you; thus it is with our people, no one can move it... We are now at a crossroads, but I say that the Palestinian caravan is on its way to the first direction of prayer [i.e. Jerusalem], to the third holiest place [Jerusalem], to the place from which the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven [Jerusalem, according to Koranic tradition], and the cradle of Jesus' birth [sic]. To noble Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Palestine, whether anyone agrees or not [i.e. Israel]..."* (Memri: 2001).

The Palestinian National Authority's Ministry of Information views Jerusalem as follows: *"Israel's concepts, policies, and practices in Jerusalem can be summarized in one sentence:- The Judaization of the Holy City, its land, its population, its history, and its culture. This Judaization began with the emergence of the State of Israel in 1948, intensified in the wake of the 1967 war and has continued ever since."* (Jerusalem Crying out for Justice) *"Among its arbitrary measures, Israel sent its archaeological teams to excavate around and below Al-Aqsa Mosque which has caused great damage to the historic buildings. The Israeli government has desecrated the Islamic holy places, attacked Muslim worshippers several times, and set on fire Al-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August 1968. The burning of the Mosque and the Israeli attempt to blow it up in 1980 were not the last in its disgraceful acts, but it has also desecrated the holy tombs inside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and looted many churches"* ('Jerusalem, Capital of Palestine') [Ministry of Information, Palestine. 2001].

#### **3.2.4: FOURTH INDICATOR: PLACING ISSUES UNDER THE 'SIGN OF SECURITY', SECURITY DISCOURSES**

This proposition would read: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict by placing issues under the 'sign of security'. By placing issues under the 'sign of security' it is meant that peacetime issues that fall under government responsibility such as agriculture, environmental affairs, media and communication, water affairs, labour etc. take on a military or security significance. These issues are subsumed within the concepts and institutions of state security and elicit military responses to military targets. It also provides justification for what might otherwise be construed as questionable behaviour such as censure of the media and infringements of human rights issues.

To understand this indicator better it is perhaps prudent to start with Israeli security discourse. The importance of security to the Israeli government and indeed to its people, is summarized by Ariel Sharon in his inaugural speech to the Knesset (2001-03-07): *"The supreme mission of the new Government is bolstering Israel's security, and*

*acquiring personal security for the citizens of Israel while conducting the struggle against violence and terror, and striving to achieve stability.*” Israel views violence as ‘forced’ upon it and not a preferred course of action. The image of Israel awash in a sea of Arab countries is frequently invoked, as is apparent in a statement by then Prime Minister Barak: *“Whoever believes that ‘peace is security’, so that there is no need for special security arrangements in peacetime, has no idea of where he’s living. The State of Israel stands, with its back to the sea, facing on a region that is volatile, armed, and awash with advanced weaponry - a region with a history of instability that is seething with treacherous currents. Suffice it to mention the unforeseen revolution in Iran, Saddam Hussein’s sudden descent upon his sister state of Kuwait, the calls heard even at the recent Arab summit for a ‘holy war’ against Israel, and the Palestinian Authority’s abrupt volte-face from negotiation and near-agreement to violent confrontation”* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov 8, 2000).

Two distinct levels of security discourse can be identified: firstly, national security, relating Israel to regional and global power structures; and secondly, domestic security, relating Israel to the Palestinians. This is embodied in the Israeli Defence Force mission statement:

TO DEFEND THE EXISTENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF ISRAEL AND TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM WHICH THREATEN THE DAILY LIFE (Israeli Defence Force, 2001).

**National security:** Hermann & Newman state that the Israeli national security outlook is based on the deep conviction that it operates under a permanent existential threat and that this threat is not going to disappear in the foreseeable future, even if all peace treaties with its neighbours are signed (2000:122). Israel’s security doctrine is set out by the Israeli Defence Force in six basic points:

- Israel cannot afford to lose a single war
- Defensive on the strategic level, no territorial ambitions.
- Desire to avoid war by political means and a credible deterrent posture.

- Preventing escalation.
- Determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively.
- Combating terrorism. (IDF, 2001).

Israel's military capability is based on superior technology, nuclear deterrence and a highly effective early warning capability based on (amongst other factors), a superior intelligence network. Transferring the battle to the enemy's territory and a quick conclusion of the war is viewed as imperative and served as the primary reasoning behind a policy of 'Defensive Strategy- Offensive Tactics', as seen in Israel's first strike in the Six Day War (1967). Despite the fact that Israel maintains superior military capabilities, this did not enable it to effectively quell terrorist attacks inflicted upon it in the first intifada during the late 1980's and into the early 1990's.

**Domestic security:** The Israeli military response to domestic violence was characterised by a strategy of containment. Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas was devised to seal off the inflow of weapons into these areas, and limit the outflow of violence. This was embodied in a policy of territorial separation where, as pointed out above, work permits were issued to Palestinians for short periods at a time and revoked whenever a certain level of closure was reached. A series of suicide and car bombings of buses, public and military targets served only to intensify the Israeli Military operation. A policy of expansion and consolidation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas forms part of Israeli strategic security planning. Settlements encircle Jerusalem to its eastern side, effectively cutting off Arab villages in the West Bank from Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. This serves to create Arab 'ghettos' in East Jerusalem, cut off territorially from the proposed Arab state.

Israeli security discourse has identified certain territories to be of strategic importance to the long term security of Israel. This includes (previously) the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Jordan valley along the Jordanian border and strategic hilltops in and around the West Bank. Israeli national security doctrine has steadily moved in the direction of exchanging territory for formal peace treaties (e.g., with Egypt and Jordan) or informal

understandings (e.g., with Lebanon) that are accompanied by acceptable security guarantees, including international monitoring, demilitarised zones, early warning stations and bilateral security coordination (Rodman, 2001:1).

Issues that conflict with or are deemed of importance to these strategic security objectives on national and domestic level, are subsumed within the concepts and institutions of state security, resulting in military responses to military targets. Environmental, agricultural and economic issues serve as an example. Water is a scarce resource and deemed as of strategic importance to Israel. The West Bank aquifer system provides an abundance of water to the Palestinian areas, however, Israeli control of water supplies through the construction of canals, pumping systems and the rationing of water to the Palestinian areas, have had a severe impact on its mainly agricultural economy. The Israeli company Mekarot pumps water from wells situated in the Palestinian territories and then sells it to the Palestinians at a higher price than to the Israelis in settlements. Water has taken on a security significance for Israel and is therefore subsumed within security discourse. Furthermore, Israeli military searches and its denial of certain products to enter the Palestinian territories, such as cement, timber and other construction materials, have placed trade under the security rubric. The exploitation of non-unionised cheap Palestinian labour is rationalised as of strategic importance to the Israeli economy. Environmental and health concerns over untreated sewage flowing from settlements into Palestinian towns, are ignored for the same reasons.

Palestinian security discourse resembles that of a liberation movement and not a government. For example, the Palestinian Charter states:

- Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not a tactic. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding determination to pursue the armed struggle and to march forward towards the armed popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and restore its right to a natural life, and to exercise its right of self-determination and national sovereignty.
- Article 10: Fedayeen's (freedom fighters) action forms the nucleus of the

popular Palestinian war of liberation. This requires its promotion, extension and protection, and the mobilization of all the Arab and Palestinian masses and scientific capacities of the Palestinians, their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution to ensure the continuation of the revolution, its advancement and victory.

- Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically related to the world imperialism and is hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatic movement in its formation, aggressive, expansionist, and colonialist in its aims, fascist and nazi in its means. Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and is a human and geographic base for world imperialism. It is a concentration and a way for imperialism to the heart of the Arab homeland, to strike at the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress (Ministry of Information, Palestine, 2001).

Although the charter has been amended, security doctrine has not evolved into that of a state having to defend its territory and protect its sovereignty.

The Palestinian Authority does not have an army and therefore does not play a role in regional power equations. However, its domestic security discourse centres around two main issues: firstly, settler activity and Israeli control of Palestinian national resources; and secondly, the limitation of internal opposition within the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. The Palestinian Authority also has two forces at its disposal. Firstly, the Palestinian Police force, numbering around 40 000. This force was created as a result of the Oslo B Agreement and play an active role in managing security affairs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. The second force is the TANZIM (“organisation” in English). The Palestinian Authority financially supports day-to-day activities of the TANZIM, and Chairman Arafat is personally involved in the selection of senior leaders in the organization. The Israeli Defence Force states that the TANZIM is part of the Fatah organisation working towards the expansion of its membership to be the largest and leading Palestinian faction in the Palestinian Authority. It also operates as an armed militia for enforcing order and serves as a personal instrument of Chairman Arafat (Israeli Defence Force, 2001). As armed militia, it is often in confrontation with other

Palestinian splinter groups and terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The TANZIM has also been responsible for attacks on Israel and have been targeted by former prime minister Barak: *"Today we suffered a very grave attack, carried out by the Fatah Tanzim. The Palestinian Authority is, in our view, directly responsible for this attack. We have therefore once again today taken forceful action against targets of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip..."* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

Democratic principles such as freedom of speech, dialogue and multiple parties have thus been placed under the 'sign of security' by the Palestinian Authority (more specifically, Fatah) in order to consolidate its own power position and limit the influence of opposition.

### **3.2.5: FIFTH INDICATOR: THE PRODUCTION OF INSECURITY AND THE MANIPULATION OF IDENTITY FORMATION PROCESSES**

The next critical indicator is the production of insecurity over those whom the political elite governs. This proposition reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict through the production of insecurity. The processes of constructing discourses of threats, the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images, political symbolism, and placing issues under the sign of security are not politically neutral. These processes have a direct influence on identity formation processes within a civilization and serves as a source of insecurity. This does not preclude actual acts of violence perpetrated by political elites or spoilers as a source of insecurity. To explain: As pointed out above in the theory, identity is inherently a social definition of an actor or individual, grounded in the views or perceptions which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another. Distinctive identity, social recognition of that identity and effective participation in the processes shaping that identity is a deep rooted need in all. Frustration of these needs, or attempts at politicising and co-optation of these processes by political elites causes tension within civilizations as human needs and critical theory points out (Tessendorf, 1993:19). Behavioural traits manifested in individuals and



groups whose needs have been deprived, include the development of frustration and alienation; the use of aggression as a defence mechanism against perceived threats; rank disequilibrium; rising expectations; and perceptions of relative deprivation. Therefore we can argue that the by-product of political processes which are by definition not politically neutral, is the production of insecurity. Insecurity is manifested in societal attitudes toward the 'opposite' society, opposite state/authority, toward the peace process/peace in general, toward the violence/intifada, toward their own society and toward their own state/authority. This is reflected in various opinion polls and in voter patterns.

To measure these attitudes, this thesis has referred to:

- the Peace Index (Tel Aviv University and the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research, May & October 2001) [TAU, 2001],
- the Joint Project of the Palestinian-Israeli People to People Program (TAU and Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre -JMCC, December 2000) [TAU/JMCC, 2001],
- the JMCC Palestinian Opinion Polls (Palestinians only, September 2001) [JMCC, 2001].

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OPPOSITE SOCIETY:**

While 49% of Israeli Jews regarded Palestinians as violent in June 2000 (before the start of the al-Aqsa intifada), this figure went up to 69% by December 2000. The same trend holds true for the Palestinians, while 75% of them regarded Israeli Jews as violent in June 2000, this went up to 94% by December 2000. 51,5% of Israeli Jews regarded Palestinians as dishonest, whilst 81,8% Palestinians regarded Israeli Jews as dishonest (in December 2000). Only 33% of Israeli Jews regarded Palestinians as strong while 59,1% of Palestinians regarded Israeli Jews as strong (TAU/JMCC, 2000). When asked if Palestinians in general are willing to negotiate with Israelis, only 11,9% said yes while 61,2% replied in the negative. Satisfaction levels of solidarity from Palestinians living inside Israel showed that 59,6% of Palestinians were satisfied with Israeli Arabs' solidarity while 37,9% were dissatisfied (JMCC, 2001).

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OPPOSITE STATE/ AUTHORITY:**

When asked who is more responsible for the recent deterioration in Palestinian and Israeli relations (i.e. the al-Aqsa intifada), 61% of Israeli Jews blamed the Palestinian side, while 75,9% Palestinians blamed the Israeli side (TAU/JMCC, 2000). In the JMCC Palestinian Opinion Poll, 82,6% of Palestinians blamed the Israeli government for the failure of the Camp David negotiations and 58,3% see Jerusalem as the main issue for the failure (JMCC, 2001). The Oslo (Peace) Index of May 2001 indicated a prevalent negative attitude vis-à-vis the Palestinian side with 70% of the Jewish public estimating that Chairman Arafat personally lacks the desire, or the capability, to sign an agreement to end the conflict with Israel, even if Israel agrees to all his demands and that he will make additional demands to foil the agreement. Only 12% of the Jewish public believed that the Palestinian side would honour an agreement while 80% thought they would not (TAU, 2001).

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD OWN STATE:**

In response to a question on whether the Palestinian president is in control of the Palestinian situation, 21,6% Palestinians thought Chairman Arafat to be in complete control, 45,7% thought he was in control up to a degree while 29,1% believed he had less or no control of the situation. When asked to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian National Authority, 62% rated it from good to very good while 33,6% rated it from bad to very bad. Interestingly, only 29,2% of Palestinians support Fatah, 20,7% support Hamas and 22,7% don't trust anyone (JMCC, 2001). The Oslo (Peace) Index of May 2001 showed that 82% of Jewish respondents thought that the State of Israel's national security and the personal security of its citizens was worse than it was before the Oslo Process started (TAU, 2001).

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD OWN SOCIETY:**

In response to the question, 'How satisfied are you with Arab solidarity with the Intifada?', only 16,2% of Palestinians expressed their satisfaction compared to 83% who were dissatisfied (59,5% were totally dissatisfied) (JMCC, 2001). In response to the question, 'If the present state of violence persist over time, which of the two societies,

Israeli or Palestinian, will in your opinion hold out longer where its national strength is concerned?', 62% of Israeli Jews felt that they will hold out longer and only 12% feel that the Palestinian society has a greater inner strength and will therefore be better able to hold out in a lengthy violent confrontation (TAU, 2001).

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD PEACE/ PEACE PROCESS:**

Asked whether the Palestinians support or oppose the peace process in general, 46,9% supported it while 49% opposed it. Only 29,7% still supported the Oslo agreement whilst 62,9% opposed the agreement (JMCC, 2001). This finding shows consistency with the JMCC/TAU People to People Program for December 2000, where only 28,7% Palestinians believed the Oslo Agreement would bring about peace while 67,6% did not believe so (TAU/JMCC, 2000). Only 13,9% of Israeli Jews believe that the Oslo Agreement will bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years while 68,3% did not think so. The General Peace Index shows that only 20,9% of Israeli Jews believe there will be peace between Israel and the Arabs (in general) in the future, while 66,3% do not believe it is possible (TAU, 2001).

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE/ INTIFADA:**


Asked whether the Israeli population (IL Jews and IL Arabs combined) support or oppose continuing the policy of targeted killings in the territories by Israel's security forces, 77% of Jewish respondents replied in the affirmative, against 15% who were opposed; (8% did not know). 68% of the Jewish public support the Israeli Defence Force's entering Palestinian towns, while only 27% oppose it (the remaining 5% have no opinion) (TAU, 2001). Of the Palestinians asked whether they support the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets, 86,4% supported the resumption while 9,9% thought it to be harmful to Palestinian interests (JMCC, 2001).

Hermann & Newman (2000:125) point out an additional source of insecurity, the acts of 'spoilers' in the peace process, such as settler militias and groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the PFLP. They argue that fundamentalist religious ideologies which negate all forms of compromise over those elements which, to their own way of thinking are pure,

cannot be invalidated. These groups act according to a “divine plan”, enacting their god’s wishes as a sacred duty, and are essentially locked in a zero-sum battle where one’s gain is at the direct expense of the other. These types of groups have claimed responsibility for numerous acts of violence including the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin (Yigal Amir, settler, Nov, 95), car-bomb attacks on many targets, a suicide bomb attack on No. 5 Bus on Dizengoff Street, Tel Aviv, and countless more incidents.

**Graph 2: IDF, 2001.**

Monthly Breakdown of Terror Attacks (Shootings, Bombings, Grenades, Assaults, Stabbing, Hit and Run) During "Ebb and Flow" (Since 29.09.00): Updated 12.11.01



(Israeli Defence Force, Sept. 2001)

**3.2.6: SIXTH INDICATOR: MONOPOLIZATION OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS**

The final proposition reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict through the monopolization of the conflict resolution process. As pointed out

above in the theory (Chapter 2.3.2), this thesis makes the distinction between the conflict resolution processes of facilitation, negotiation, arbitration and mediation –being processes mainly employed by political elites to manage conflict; and conciliation –seen as a bottom-up process of continued dialogue and interaction on grass roots level between collectivities. What is meant by the term ‘monopolization of conflict resolution processes’, is that political elites conduct the processes of facilitation, mediation, negotiation and arbitration as processes to manage the conflict, without employing active mechanisms to foster conciliation between collectivities. This indicator then makes the claim that political elites are unable to bring about lasting peace within a protracted social conflict for they rely on processes that help to manage the conflict and ‘normalise’ the situation alone, instead of fostering additional mechanisms aimed at conciliation between the opposing collectivities. Peace treaties would then be based on economic and political enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations, without being accompanied by sincere exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust; and without addressing the deep rooted causes of the conflict.

The Madrid Conference of 1991 resulted in the commencement of two separate yet parallel negotiation tracks- the bilateral and the multilateral tracks. The bilateral tracks were designed to resolve conflicts of the past between different countries while the multilateral negotiations in contrast, were intended to construct a Middle East for the future, whilst building confidence amongst parties. Peters points out that the multilaterals (multilateral working parties on different issue areas) were designed to allow the parties to raise issues without much publicity. Multilaterals could best be described as an exercise in diplomacy by stealth. “Thus, little thought was given to means of including civil society in the proceedings. The lack of public awareness ultimately ran contrary to one of the aims of the multilateral track, namely the creation of a series of confidence-building measures between the peoples of the region. Since knowledge of the multilaterals’ activities was limited to the diplomats and elites involved, no confidence-building among the peoples ever took place.” (Meria, 1991:1).

As pointed out above in the background, the Oslo A Agreement between Israel and the

Palestinians was drawn up in a round of secret talks between Israeli and Palestinian diplomats and academics in Norway during 1993. This agreement included the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and was followed shortly afterwards by three further agreements dealing with more practical matters such as the implementation of the agreement:

- 1) The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations- this Protocol included, in addition to the Preamble and Principles, rulings on the Importation and Import Taxes, Labour, Monetary and Financial Policy, Direct Taxation, Indirect Taxation, Agriculture, Industry, Energy, Tourism, and Insurance. Areas in which no agreement was reached or new questions for which answers could not be determined under the Protocols were negotiated by a permanent Joint Economic Committee (JEC) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
- 2) The Gaza-Jericho First Agreement signed in Cairo on the May 4th, 1994- the key point of the agreement was the assumption of authority over most civilian affairs in Gaza and Jericho by a 24-member Palestinian Authority chaired by Arafat. Its authority would cover 62 square kilometres in Jericho and some 350 square kilometres of Gaza, except for Israeli settlements and Israeli Defence Force installations. Ground covered include the scheduled Israeli Defence Force military withdrawal, transfer of authority, structure and composition of the Palestinian Authority, jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority, legislative powers of the Palestinian Authority, arrangements on public security and order, the Palestinian directorate of police force, safe passages and Israel-Palestinian cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
- 3) The Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (August, 24<sup>th</sup>, 1994)- this preliminary agreement set out the scope for the transfer from Israeli military and Civil Authority to Palestinian control in the West Bank, the areas of health, education, social affairs, taxation, tourism and Value Added Tax (VAT) on local production.

The Oslo B agreement signed on September 28<sup>th</sup>, 1995 was designed to broaden Palestinian self-rule and covered the following areas:

- THE COUNCIL -Transfer of Authority, Elections, Structure of the Palestinian Council, Size of the Council, The Executive Authority of the Council, Open Government, Judicial Review, Powers and Responsibilities of the Council;
- REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS- Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces, Land, Arrangements for Security and Public Order, Security, the Palestinian police, Prevention of Hostile Acts, Confidence Building Measures;
- LEGAL AFFAIRS- jurisdiction, Legislative Powers of the Council, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Rights, Liabilities and Obligations, Settlement of Differences and Disputes;
- COOPERATION- Relations between Israel and the Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).

*None of these agreements between political elites, nor any of the other ones signed, made any attempts at the exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust. Political elites conducted the processes of facilitation, mediation, negotiation and arbitration as processes to manage the conflict, without employing active mechanisms to foster conciliation between collectivities.*

## CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

This thesis set out six critical indicators to establish a link between structure for conflict and the actions taken by political elites. The overall effects of political elite action in every field identified by the critical indicators have been far reaching.

To begin with, there exists a link between the actions taken by both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority and conditions of underdevelopment. A multitude of figures are given by differing reports of the United Nations and non-governmental organisations, stating various levels of 'de-development', unemployment and growing impoverishment as a direct result of policies such as closure on the Israeli side and the Palestinian Authority's heavy-handed presence in the market, seen in state-dominated monopolies and questionable investments.

The internal closure has severely disrupted life within the territories. Workers are unable to reach their places of work and produce from farms cannot reach markets. Shops and commercial offices are for most of the time, unable to open. Numerous limitations have been placed on passage between the north and the south of the Gaza Strip and movement between Gaza City and the cities of Khan Yunis and Rafah was prevented almost entirely. Movement within the West Bank has become nearly impossible. Hundreds of IDF checkpoints have been erected throughout the West Bank and entry to and exit from towns requires passing through them. As Roy (1999:2) points out: "...by severely restricting Palestinian access to Jerusalem, the closure divided the West Bank's northern and southern regions, whose key road connections pass through Jerusalem. In recent years, less than 4 percent of all Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza had permission to enter Jerusalem. Since East Jerusalem had always been the commercial heart of the West Bank, the closure devastated the city's Arab economy as well." The main issue that has emerged from the policy of internal closure is the large scale unemployment resulting in a loss of income to Palestinian families and a rise in child labour. Many Palestinians call Israel's actions a 'state of siege'. Furthermore, external closure of international borders with Jordan, Egypt and the Gaza port to the rest of the



world, have restricted the flow of goods and resulted in the closing of factories dependent on materials from outside Palestine for their production. This has also had severe effects on the Palestinian agriculture, being unable to export its produce either abroad or into Israel. The report of the Human Rights Enquiry Commission (9 October, 2000) found that direct economic losses arising from movement restrictions were estimated at 50 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the four-month period of the second intifada and 75 per cent of wage income earned by Palestinian workers in Israel. The UNCTAD Report of 4 October 2001 has published the latest usable figures on the Palestinian economy: "Direct losses in national income assumed an accelerating trend, estimated at over \$2 billion in the six-month period from October 1999 to March 2000 alone, according to different sources. In addition, indirect losses are estimated at least at \$200 million for the same period. With domestic output cut by almost half in the last quarter of the year, per capita GNI is estimated to have declined by at least 20 per cent in 2000. Unemployment grew sharply, with over a third of the labour force (some 300,000 Palestinians) reported jobless in 2001. More than 1 million Palestinians are now living under the poverty line of \$2.10 a day and the income of around 64% of Palestinian households has fallen below \$400 a month." (UNCTAD, 2001).

Settlements: James A. Baker III commented on May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1991- "*Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs--Arab governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories--whose situation is really quite desperate--the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.*" (Mitchell Report, 2001). The continued Israeli policy of settlement expansion, whether due to 'natural growth' or some other reason has been a prime stumbling block in all negotiations. It has aggravated ordinary Palestinians on ground level who have lost their houses, had their farmland confiscated or had their olive and other fruit trees demolished and has contributed to a growing sense of insecurity and frustration.

The Palestinian Authority contributed to the creation of conditions of underdevelopment by adopting a system of economic management that was both protectionist and corrupt. Large PA-sponsored monopolies frightened off potential investors and had a stifling effect on the economy. Corruption arose due to a lack of accountability, transparency and legal recourse should wrongdoing have occurred. The cumulative effect of these structures for underdevelopment is manifold. Poverty, deprivation and desperation served as a breeding ground for attitudes to ferment and opportunists to exploit and politicise daily suffering.

The second indicator identified unintegrated social and political systems and distributive injustice as actions taken by political elites to create and perpetuate a structure for conflict. The extremely limited democratic practice within the Palestinian Authority has exacerbated the growing problem of spoilers in the peace process. An unintegrated political system has stifled dialogue and not given voice to the many factions within Palestinian society. US and Israeli silence over the matter meant that the Palestine Liberation Organisation could bargain over and implement systems that served its purposes at the expense of the society as a whole, such as its failure to separate the Rule of Law from Executive power. This did not serve to temper the resolve of many marginalized groups to spoil the peace process, becoming ever more radicalised in the process in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the disenfranchised.

Events in Israel (Nov. 2001) to strip a member of the Knesset of his parliamentary immunity in order to stand trial for utterances that were deemed politically inflammatory can only be construed as a step backwards towards even more unintegrated political systems. Ha'aretz, an Israeli daily newspaper, reported that the Knesset's action was taken against MK Azmi Bishara (Balad-National Democratic Alliance) so that he could stand trial for 'incitement against Israel' having urged Arabs to 'take the path of resistance' and support Palestinian struggle against Israel (Ha'aretz, 2001). Bishara also faces a separate trial over having arranged for Israeli Arabs to visit Syria, an offence under Israeli law as Damascus is still in a state of formal war with Jerusalem. In a separate, but not unrelated action, the parliament passed a preliminary version of a bill

that would in future bar from Knesset candidacy any person deemed to have made statements supporting terrorism or Israel's enemies. Even Prime Minister Ariel Sharon commented: "*Removing Bishara's immunity is a great achievement, which will increase our security. Democracy has to protect itself.*" (Jerusalem Post, 2001). This action can only serve to incite Israeli Palestinian groups already operating outside the Israeli political systems as Ori Nir commentates: "*The more you portray the Knesset as a place in which Arabs have no influence, or have no ability to stand as equals, you bolster those who argue that there's no point in playing by the rules of Israeli democracy.*" (Ha'aretz, 2001).

The third indicator sought out utterances and policy documents to illustrate the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism. Rhetoric used by political leaders in statements and speeches, and published official doctrine, covenants and charters, have a prima facie validity in the eyes of both collectivities. All this serves to compound historical discourses of security, setting the horizon for the taken for granted that marks the boundaries of common sense and accepted knowledge as Wendt points out (1999,17). Threats are constructed to denigrate the rival and legitimise action taken against the perceived threat. This forms part of a political process to solidify 'societal' cohesion and fortify 'societal' identity. The inevitable tension that arises from this process is indicative of the main proposition, that political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict.

Furthermore, the politicisation of indivisible goods such as the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount or Jerusalem for that matter, makes negotiated compromise on these places or issues extremely difficult. By adding symbolic value to venues shared for religious reasons or even venues in close proximity to each other, objective criteria for compromise are negated and locks parties into a winner takes all situation. In the JMCC public opinion poll, 42,6% of Palestinian respondents viewed the best and final solution on the Jerusalem issue as a unified (East and West) Jerusalem, capital of Palestine. Add to this the 28,2% who viewed it as the capital of Muslims only, we are left with 70,8% Palestinians who do not want to share the city. 82,6% viewed Jerusalem as important for

religious reasons.

The fourth indicator proposed that political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict through the placing of issues under the sign of security. Peacetime issues such as government functions (agriculture, infrastructure, water procurement etc.) , and peacetime values (democratic principles and human rights) are subsumed within the concepts and institutions of state security at national and domestic level eliciting military responses to military targets. It also provides justification for what might otherwise be construed as questionable behaviour such as censure of the media and curtailment of human rights issues. Both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority have placed a wide range of issues under the sign of security. Israel, being a functioning democracy, has tended to provide legal justification for Israeli Defence Force actions by making and changing laws to suit military actions and needs. Examples would include detention without trial, testimony extraction, prison conditions and human rights suspension. Other actions would include the creation of the Civil Administration over the occupied territories which effectively resulted in military rule. Permission is given to the Israeli Defence Force by the Civil Administration to demolish houses and farmland under the rubric of illegal building permits etc. Justification for these actions is derived from the security discourse. Similarly, the Palestinian placing of issues under the sign of security corresponds with Palestinian Authority security discourse. The democratic deficit and heavy-handed rule in the Palestinian economy stem from a need to fortify the Fatah power base and finance these questionable actions.

The fifth indicator is the production of insecurity and the manipulation of identity formation processes. As pointed out above, the processes of constructing discourses of threats, the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images, political symbolism, and the placing of issues under the sign of security are not politically neutral. These processes have a direct influence on identity formation processes within a civilization and serves as a source of insecurity. Insecurity is manifested in societal attitudes toward the 'opposite' society, opposite state/authority, toward the peace process/peace in general, toward the violence/intifada, toward their own society and toward their own state/authority. This is

reflected in various opinion polls and in voter patterns. The opinion polls consulted reveal a deep mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians. This is manifested towards the opposite society, the opposite authority/state and towards the peace process in general.

In the analysis of opinion polls toward the opposite society, mistrust was reflected in the fact that each regards the other as violent and dishonest. Interestingly, the Palestinians do not regard the Israelis as weak, possibly reflecting the disproportionate power structure of the region. Feelings towards the opposite state/authority reveal that both sides hold each other responsible for the breakdown of the peace process and resultant violence and that the Jewish collectivity do not believe that the Palestinian Authority would honour any future agreements. Attitudes toward the peace process reflect relative consistency over long periods of time in all three the Peace indices (Syrian-, Oslo- and General Peace Index). Belief in the Oslo Agreements' ability to bring about peace has decreased steadily since January 2000 reaching an all time low in September 2001 with only 29,8 points. This trend was also reflected by the other two indices, the Syrian Index hitting 30,6% and the General Index dropping to 47,1%, the lowest figures ever recorded. It must also be taken into account that this survey was conducted between 23-25 September, 2001, after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in the U.S.A.

The final indicator on the monopolisation of the conflict resolution process found no evidence of widespread public involvement in the processes of negotiation, facilitation, arbitration and mediation, neither did it find any mechanisms put in place by political elites to foster confidence building at civilizational level. Peace treaties were based on economic and political enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations, without addressing the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. *None of the agreements between political elites, nor any of the other ones signed, made any attempts at the sincere exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust.* Unlike the South African case, there were no mechanisms put in place for the creation of bodies such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Land Claims Commission. Years of extensive mobilisation of both these collectivities in accepting the conflict as a normative reality and opposition within both the Israeli right wing and the

Palestinian opposition groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, were not conducive to the creation of these conciliatory mechanisms. Yet successive governments in Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, after legitimately taking up governance over the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas, did nothing to initiate such institutions. Instead, the Israeli government changed from Labour to the more conservative Likud, and the PA exhibited a marked decrease in and severe curtailment of dialogue within the Palestinian political community. This illustrates the inability of negotiators to convince political elites of the necessity of conciliation as a grass roots mechanism for conflict resolution, *and serves to affirm the key research proposition that political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict.* Economic promises, political independence and security deferment to the Palestinian Authority did not translate into better living conditions, more integrated social and political structures and recognition of identity for the Palestinian civilization. The exclusion of civil society from any forms of reconciliation merely contributed to the feeling of alienation and mistrust between the opposing collectivities. Consequently, political elite action such as the gaining of 'cognitive legitimacy' and the 'mustering of support' for the peace process has fallen short. Yitzhak Rabin's 'price to be paid for peace' was too high due to the inability of political elites to create a feeling that each member of society has an active stake in a peaceful solution to the conflict.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This thesis has set out to establish an interest and prima facie validity between the actions of political elites and the existence of a structure for conflict. By focusing on the conflicts, tensions and contradictions in Israel and the Occupied Territories, six elements were identified that form part of a configuration of forces constraining actions. These six elements acted as critical indicators in order to validate the central proposition. We are now able to draw the conclusion that in a protracted social conflict, such as the Middle East, political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict. Over a protracted period of time, conflict has become the source, rather than the outcome of policy.

What are the implications of this for the question asked in the problem statement? (Is it desirable for political elites to manipulate societal attitudes in a conflict resolution process?) Political elites engaged in a peace process are responsible for the promotion of a political reorientation to ensure that the peace process gains cognitive legitimacy. This mustering of support is made difficult by the fact that a peace process follows years of extensive mobilisation of the civilization to accept continuous and intense conflict as constituting the normative condition (Hermann & Newman, 2000:108). If political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict and this conflict has then become the source of policy making, their capacity to successfully negotiate a lasting peace settlement is severely constrained. Given the narrow scope political elites utilise in their definition of security and conflict resolution (security seen as the ability of states and societies to maintain their individual identity and functional integrity; conflict resolution seen as the processes of facilitation, mediation, arbitration and negotiation confined to political elites only), it is not desirable for them to manipulate societal attitudes in a conflict resolution process as it stands now, for conflict resolution is aimed at management and normalization of an untenable structure of conditions, perpetuated by political elites.

Kelman's social psychological analysis that sees conflict as a phenomenon that occurs

between societies and not exclusively between states, informs us that negotiations aimed at achieving lasting peace have to go beyond the achievement of political agreements to include processes that are conducive to structural and attitudinal change and eventually to reconciliation between parties, thus transforming the relationship. In order for lasting peace to be achieved, conflict resolution in a protracted social conflict has to go beyond the management of the conflict, towards a genuine involvement of collectivities in its resolution through the creation of mechanisms, including confidence building and cooperation measures, that foster conciliation at grass roots level. This widening of the scope of conflict resolution necessitates the inclusion of a multitude of actors functioning at different levels. Similarly, Miall's 'new thinking' (p10 above) posits security as a broader concept involving physical and economic well being, civil and political liberties, a sustainable environment and social justice. It also calls for an awareness of what is being defended, thereby shifting conventional security discourse to a systemic level. By pointing out that political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict, this thesis has hoped to refocus attitude towards what is being secured- collective society; how it is to be secured- social justice and poverty alleviation; and how de-escalation in a protracted social conflict can be achieved- introducing mechanisms fostering conciliation at grass roots level between civilizations. Middle East peace making have focused on economic and political enticements, coercion and strategic considerations without addressing the deep rooted causes of the conflict or the emotional legacies left by more than a generation's worth of violence. The achievement of lasting peace calls for a widening of the scope of conflict resolution to include grass roots conciliation and a new thinking over security.



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