

**THE DIALOGICS OF SATIRE: FOCI AND FAULTLINES IN
GEORGE ORWELL'S *ANIMAL FARM* AND *NINETEEN EIGHTY-
FOUR***

by
RALPH GOODMAN

Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Literature at the
University of Stellenbosch



Supervisor: Prof M.W. Heyns

December 2000

Abstract

The Dialogics of Sallust: Fact and Falsities in *Contra Iugurthinum*
Alfreden Eijgher Tuit

This thesis uses Michel Foucault's theory of power and postmodernism, to open up questions of truth and various perceptions and take the author's dialogic and postmodernist perspective into account.

Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any other university for a degree.

Signature:

Date:

Abstract

The Dialogics of Satire: Foci and Faultlines in Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

This thesis uses Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, as well as postmodernism, to open up faultlines in satire, and to explore and challenge various perceptions and discourses surrounding and related to it. Both dialogism and postmodernism are used to suggest fresh approaches to satire, by repositioning it in relation to other discourses and reframing it as a complex dynamic, rather than a closed and inflexible system. Chapter 1 of the thesis opens with an historical survey of the beginnings and subsequent development of satire. It also contains a general discussion of the nature of satiric strategies and opens the door for the incorporation of postmodern perspectives into the argument. Chapter 2 contrasts the issues of morality and re-presentation in satire, arguing that satirists do not simply invite their audience to condemn, but offer them an opportunity to discover alternative worlds. The affinity between satire and postmodernism is emphasised by the postmodern predilection for modes highly favoured by satire: allegory, parody and fantasy. In Chapter 3 the issue of language and its referents is explored, starting with Saussure's theory of how the signifier and the signified function. It is argued that satire has never respected this fixed relationship, and that it is in this respect similar to deconstruction. The last part of the chapter is devoted to examining four key socio-political discourses - psychoanalysis, ideology, propaganda and political myth - in relation to satire. These four discourses are, like satire, intent on influencing the perceptions which people have of the world. The intention in juxtaposing these discourses is to create a dialogic process which will throw a fresh light on all of them, including satire itself. The four socio-political discourses named above play an important part in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, and are relevant to the subsequent discussion of these novels. Chapter 4 consists of a detailed discussion of *Animal Farm*, in which the various layers comprising the work are examined. The satirical aspects of the novel are closely related to the fabular and fairy tale elements which are an important part of its constitution. These elements

or levels are juxtaposed with the historical details alluded to continuously in *Animal Farm* and indicate its close concern with the world outside the novel. Chapter 5 consists of a detailed exploration of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which is illuminated by a process of dialogism between the modernist ideology from which the novel springs and the postmodern perspective introduced into the thesis, as well as the four socio-political discourses mentioned earlier. The main postmodern theories used in this chapter are those of Foucault. The last section of the thesis demonstrates how Orwell's personal experience drives his satire, and relates this specifically to a discussion of utopia / dystopia in satire.

Opsomming

Die Dialogiek van Satire: Fokuspunte en Breuke in Orwell se *Animal Farm* en *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

Hierdie proefskrif maak gebruik van Mikhail Bakhtin se teorie van dialogisme, sowel as die postmodernisme, om die breuke in satire bloot te lê, en om die verskillende persepsies en diskoerse wat verband hou met die satire te ondersoek en te bevraagteken. Beide die dialogisme en die postmodernisme word gebruik om nuwe perspektiewe op satire te open, deur dit te herposisioneer in verhouding tot ander diskoerse en dit voor te stel in terme van 'n komplekse dinamika eerder as 'n geslote en onbuigsame sisteem. Die eerste hoofstuk van die proefskrif begin met 'n historiese oorsig van die oorsprong en daaropvolgende ontwikkeling van satire. Dit omvat ook 'n algemene bespreking van die aard van satiriese strategieë en open die moontlikheid om postmodernistiese perspektiewe in die argument te integreer. Hoofstuk 2 kontrasteer die kwessies van moraliteit en representasie in satire met mekaar; daar word geargumenteer dat satirici nie net hulle gehore uitnooi om te veroordeel nie, maar hulle die geleentheid gee om alternatiewe wêreldes te ontdek. Die verwantskap tussen satire en postmodernisme word benadruk deur die postmodernisme se voorliefde vir die modi waaraan die satire so dikwels voorkeur gee: allegorie, parodie en fantasie. In hoofstuk 3 word die kwessie van taal en referensialiteit

ondersoek, beginnende by Saussure se teorie oor die funksionering van die betekenaar en die betekende. Daar word geargumenteer dat satire nog nooit die vaste verhouding tussen betekenaar en betekende eerbiedig het nie, en dat dit in hierdie opsig verwant is aan die dekonstruksie. Die laaste gedeelte van die hoofstuk word gewy aan 'n ondersoek van vier sentrale sosio-politiese diskoerse - psigoanalise, ideologie, propaganda en politieke mitologie - in verhouding met satire. Hierdie vier diskoerse is, soos satire, daarop ingestel om mense se persepsies/opvattinge van die wêreld te verander. Die doelstelling met die jukstaposisie van hierdie diskoerse is die skep van 'n dialogiese proses wat al vier hierdie diskoerse, insluitende satire, in 'n nuwe lig sal stel. Die genoemde sosio-politiese diskoerse speel 'n belangrike rol in *Animal Farm* en *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, en is relevant vir die daaropvolgende bespreking van die romans. Hoofstuk 4 bestaan uit 'n gedetailleerde bespreking van *Animal Farm*, waarin daar ondersoek ingestel word na die verskillende lae waaruit die roman bestaan. Die satiriese aspekte van die roman word in noue verband gebring met die fabulêre en die feëverhaal-elemente wat so 'n belangrike deel uitmaak van die roman se samestelling. Hierdie elemente of vlakke word gejukstaponeer met die historiese detail waarna daar deurlopend in *Animal Farm* verwys word en wat die noue bemoëienis met die wêreld buite die roman aandui. Hoofstuk 5 bestaan uit 'n intensiewe ondersoek van *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, wat belig word deur 'n proses van dialogisme tussen die modernistiese ideologie waaruit die roman spruit en die postmodernistiese perspektiewe wat in die proefskrif ingevoer word. Die belangrikste postmodernistiese teorieë wat in hierdie hoofstuk gebruik word, is dié van Foucault. Die laaste afdeling van die proefskrif demonstreer hoedat Orwell se persoonlike ervaring bepalend is vir sy satire en bring dit spesifiek in verband met 'n bespreking van utopie/distopie in satire.

In fact, the spiritual climate surrounding the modernist artist is ambivalent: it is above all exhilarating and exalting, because of the momentum that mankind seemed to be gaining and because of the endless prospects that seemed to open up, but at the same time it is also frustrating, frightening and alienating, because of the discrepancy which is more and more acutely felt to exist between (spiritual) man and (technological) civilization.

Walter Goppers ("Modernism, Modernity and the Avant-Garde: A Bilingual Introduction," 9)

But a book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer. The more new, possible or unexpected uses there are, the happier I shall be. All my books...are, if you like, like little tool-boxes. If people want to open them, to use this sentence or that idea as a screwdriver or spanner to short-circuit, discredit or smash systems of power, including eventually those from which my books have emerged...so much the better!

Michel Foucault (*Power, Truth, Strategy*, 115)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to my supervisor, Michiel Heyns, for his challenging and perceptive responses to my work. I owe much to my wife, Rosalind, for her support while I worked on this thesis.

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| Chapter 2 | 121 |
| Chapter 3 | 151 |
| Chapter 4 | 177 |
| Chapter 5 | 205 |
| Conclusion | 245 |
| Bibliography | 295 |

Introduction

This thesis uses Bakhtin's theory of dialogism and heteroglossia, postmodernist, to open up faultlines in satire and parody and to interrogate various discourses related to satire. Postmodernist and poststructuralist are used to suggest new views on satire. Lyotard's theory of the postmodern is used to describe the satirical text as a complex system of discourses and to describe the flexible system. Satire's function is to interrogate and to deconstruct the discourses associated with femininity and masculinity.

Table of Contents

Introduction..... 1

Chapter 1..... 15

Chapter 2.....37

Chapter 3.....58

Chapter 4.....122

Chapter 5.....189

Conclusion.....285

Bibliography.....296

¹ Randolph Quirk, "Natural Language and Creative Intervention," *The English Language Today*, ed. Sidney Greenblatt (Oxford: Pergamon, 1995) 48.

Introduction

This thesis uses Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, in conjunction with postmodernism, to open up faultlines in satire, and to explore and challenge various discourses related to satire. Both dialogism and postmodernism are used to suggest new views on satire, by repositioning it in relation to other discourses and reframing it as a complex dynamic, rather than a closed and inflexible system. Satirists themselves emerge as ambiguous figures, associated with liminality and the alienation of audiences from the familiar in life. At times, the thesis subjects the reputation and art of Orwell to deconstruction as well, in the spirit of Randolph Quirk's warning about "the undue reverence in which [Orwell] is held as a serious thinker on social and linguistic matters."¹

The thesis makes implicit and explicit use of Bakhtin's notions of heteroglossia and dialogism, and embraces his views on language. Like Bakhtin, it also stresses the importance of flexibility in the way the world is envisaged, since this reflects the principles and practice of both satire and postmodernism (which is associated with satire in this thesis). Bakhtin has a high regard for the role of traditional "parodic-travesty forms," satire among them, since such forms are sites of heteroglossia, which creates dialogism. He attributes particularly dynamic dialogic powers to these forms from their inception:

They liberated the object from the power of language in which it had become entangled as if in a net; they destroyed the homogenizing power of the direct word, destroyed the thick walls that had imprisoned consciousness within its own discourse....Language is transformed from the absolute dogma it had been within the narrow framework of a sealed-off and impermeable monoglossia into a working hypothesis for

¹ Randolph Quirk, "Natural Language and Orwellian Intervention," *The English Language Today*, ed. Sidney Greenbaum (Oxford: Pergamon, 1985) 48.

comprehending and expressing reality.²

For Bakhtin, maverick forms such as satire and parody are part of what he calls "the carnivalesque" - powerful creators of heteroglossia, having a catalytic force which involves formerly embedded discourses (monoglossia) in a process of creative dialogue. The effect of both heteroglossia and satire is to create shifts in language, dissolve rigid categories and boundaries, and establish alternative worlds, which interact in a dialogic way with the audience's own internal worlds. This thesis exploits the dialogism created by satire and postmodernism, as well as that created between them, but also sets out to create a pattern of dialogism involving certain other discourses such as propaganda, psychiatry, ideology and political myth - the intention being to engage them with satire in a process of mutual exploration. Bakhtin himself acknowledges the power of heteroglot forms in relation to various socio-political discourses, citing the role of such forms in the death of the "unitary and totalizing" Greek national myth,³ and bemoaning the "[monoglot] propagandizing impulse [which] sometimes leads to a narrowing-down of heteroglot social consciousness [and] a radical concretization of dialogization (almost always undertaken in the service of a polemic)."⁴ Orwell, in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, subjects such socio-political discourse to the heteroglot power of satire, so that, in Bakhtin's words, these "socio-ideological belief systems...are unmasked and destroyed as something false, hypocritical, greedy, limited, narrowly rationalistic, inadequate to reality."⁵

The chapters on *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* discuss these novels by means of a technique of dialogism, in this case constructing heteroglot forms by juxtaposing the text of the novels with other "voices," such as historical parallels, aspects of Orwell's biography, psychological viewpoints, postmodern theory and socio-political discourses. Throughout the thesis, there is a continuous attempt to open up new views on satire, by exploring,

² M.M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: U of Texas P, 1981) 60, 61.

³ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 65

⁴ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 283.

⁵ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 311-12.

reframing and redefining it, by means of the dynamics of postmodernism and the dialogical method. This includes a continuous process of dialogism between satire and the society within which it operates, and even between satirists and the texts they create. As Bogel (one of the few critics on satire who take a fully provisional stance) says, "Reading satire is not so much about finding a position we can plug ourselves into as about exploring the complexity of what it means to take a position."⁶ Griffin, too, sees satire as an exploratory form which aims "to question, to challenge orthodoxy, to induce reflection, to awaken awareness, to enable us to see contradictions, and to discover human limits."⁷

This thesis views the satirist always as a socially-concerned but highly marginal figure, who exploits that marginality in order to gain distance from society and comment on it, while relatively unfettered by a fixed place in it. Bakhtin speaks in similar terms of such figures as the rogue, the clown and the fool - the bearers and mediators of parodic-travesty heteroglot forms who have access to particular privileges:

[They have] the right to be 'other' in this world, the right not to make common cause with any single one of the existing categories that life makes available; none of these categories quite suits them, they see the underside and the falseness of every situation.⁸

The satirist is often a clown or a "fool" (or both) - and is (from society's point of view) always suspected of being a rogue. The suspicion that satirists live under derives from their being the ideological and emotional equivalent of homeless vagabonds, who are always seen as a threat to the peace and contentment of an established society. As argued later in this thesis, the

⁶ Frederic V. Bogel, "The Difference Satire Makes: Reading Swift's Poems," *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*, eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 52.

⁷ Dustin Griffin, "Satire as an Exploratory Form," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 265 (1989): 1246.

⁸ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 159.

desire to be "other" and to evade categories is a basic quality of the satirist.⁹ These are surely some of the qualities that have led a critic such as Rai to say that with writing "so subtly ingratiating as Orwell's, criticism must become an act of violence, delicate or brutal as the need arises, but determined anyway to seize that which the work itself is reluctant to yield...."¹⁰ Satire, in its approach to other texts or to socio-political issues, is anything but domesticated, particularly the polemical kind of satire which Orwell produced.

This thesis views satire itself as a primarily interrogative form which habitually generates dialogue with society, opening up to question the apparently solid and certain texture of social and political life, in a way which is not prescriptive, though also not entirely free of agendas. It is argued that postmodernism and satire have certain similarities, in their tendency to initiate sceptical and interrogatory processes, and postmodernism is thus seen here as allied to satire. Yet postmodernism is also used to question certain aspects of Orwell's ideology, since, particularly in the last chapters, one facet of the methodology of the thesis is to expound Orwell's views, but set them side by side with other views on the same issues, encouraging a greater degree of the interrogatory and dialogic than Orwell seems to have anticipated. This process consciously utilises the postmodern ethos, with its subversive stance and insistence on the indeterminacy and pluralist nature of truth, to suggest various views on issues such as history, language and power which challenge Orwell's implicit modernist assumptions and conclusions. Points made in this way encourage the dialogic mode, since postmodern terms are not finite: they are themselves shifting and "problematized" (i.e. rendered problematic), always open to challenge (though themselves always challenging), as opposed to the modernist certainty which sees language, science, history and truth as fixed, and views progress as a teleological process.¹¹ Nowotny

⁹ See 102 below.

¹⁰ Alok Rai, *Orwell and the Politics of Despair: A Critical Study of the Writings of George Orwell* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988) 9.

¹¹ According to Kate Soper in "Feminism, Humanism, Postmodernism," *Feminisms*, eds. Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), "Postmodernist argument...has issued a number of challenges: to the idea that we can continue to think, write and speak of our culture as representing a continuous development and progress; to the idea that humanity is proceeding towards a telos of 'emancipation' and 'self-realization'...." (286)

believes that "modern science...was quickly transformed into a rational as well as a utopian vehicle, charged to bring about a social world constructed in its image."¹² Part of the difference between modernism and postmodernism is that the latter usually espouses negotiable and interrogatory views, whereas the former is more attracted to absolute definitions. This thesis also uses both postmodernism and dialogism to highlight the disjunction between the modernist ideology of Orwell and his more radical satiric practice. This is a creative disjunction, though, since it emphasises that Orwell was not smug in his modernism: he was a dissatisfied and fragmented figure who used satire to objectify and confront aspects of his personal fragmentation - the latter a particularly modernist issue.

Modernist literature, in general, saw the entire world as fragmented, but concentrated on meticulously rendering this fragmented world and attempting to give it some kind of coherence.¹³ The non-literary manifestation of modernism was conservative (particularly in comparison to postmodernism), with a great deal of faith in technology,¹⁴ a lack of genuine political democracy¹⁵ and a belief (which postmodernists generally trace back to the period of the Enlightenment) that social and scientific progress would inevitably bring improvements to human life.¹⁶ Postmodernism, with its more radical approach, questions these utopian ideals, is suspicious of stasis and encourages fragmentation - delights in it, even - embracing the fragments

¹² Helga Nowotny, "Science and Utopia: On the Social Ordering of the Future," *Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science Between Utopia and Dystopia*, eds. Everett Mendelsohn and Helga Nowotny (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984) 7.

¹³ See, for example, Linda Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1989) 108.

¹⁴ Barry Smart, *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies* (London: Routledge, 1992) says that "What seems to distinguish the modern age is the strong conviction that a progressive growth of scientific knowledge will uncover the natural order of things, making possible the construction of technologies through which control might be exercised over the course of the development of events." (62)

¹⁵ Both Stalinism and Nazism are systems associated with modernism. David Daiches, "Politics and the Literary Imagination," *Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities and Revolution*, ed. Ihab Hassan (Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1971) speaks of modernism's "reactionary political vision of an ideal order." (110)

¹⁶ Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity - An Incomplete Project," *Postmodernism: A Reader*, ed. Thomas Docherty (New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993) speaks approvingly of the "project of modernity formulated...by the philosophers of the Enlightenment [who believed that] the arts and science would promote...moral progress, the justice of institutions and even the happiness of human beings. The twentieth century has shattered this optimism." (103)

without seeking fixed meaning in them, while allowing them to form a continuously changing picture. Postmodernism is characterised by cultural subversion - the revelation and questioning of (fixed) hegemonic discourses;¹⁷ it is also concerned with ontology (ways of being in the world), as opposed to modernism's primary concern with epistemology (ways of knowing the world).¹⁸ There are, of course, various versions of postmodernism and normally, when this thesis refers to postmodernism, it has in mind the core of elements which most postmodernisms have in common, despite their differences. There are also various alternative views of modernism (for example that of Bloom), which give a much more positive view of it. However, it should be noted that this thesis does not claim to be exhaustive in such matters, and that it defines modernism over and against postmodernism. It takes its cue from satire itself, and focuses on being polemical and dialogic - in the questioning and even aggressive way posited by Bakhtin. For him, dialogism itself was an aggressive manifestation, since he saw heteroglossia as not just a mixture of languages: it is a dialogue of languages, which develops an energy of its own:

[In certain areas of heteroglossia,] the collision and interaction of languages is especially powerful....In this intense struggle, boundaries are drawn with new sharpness and simultaneously erased with new ease; it is sometimes impossible to establish where they have been erased or where certain of the warring parties have already crossed over into alien territory.¹⁹

Orwell is the primary satirist dealt with in this thesis, though in the pages that follow he is occasionally paired with Swift for purposes of discussion. Orwell

¹⁷ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, foreword Fredric Jameson, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1979) defines postmodernism as "incredulity towards metanarratives." (xxiv)

¹⁸ According to Peter Brooker, ed., *Modernism / Postmodernism* (London: Longman, 1992), the "shift from questions of epistemology (ways of knowing) to ontology (ways of being and acting in the world) becomes then an expression of what some see as fundamental in the very transition to postmodernism." (20-1)

¹⁹ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 418.

without seeking fixed meaning in them, while allowing them to form a continuously changing picture. Postmodernism is characterised by cultural subversion - the revelation and questioning of (fixed) hegemonic discourses;¹⁷ it is also concerned with ontology (ways of being in the world), as opposed to modernism's primary concern with epistemology (ways of knowing the world).¹⁸ There are, of course, various versions of postmodernism and normally, when this thesis refers to postmodernism, it has in mind the core of elements which most postmodernisms have in common, despite their differences. There are also various alternative views of modernism (for example that of Bloom), which give a much more positive view of it. However, it should be noted that this thesis does not claim to be exhaustive in such matters, and that it defines modernism over and against postmodernism. It takes its cue from satire itself, and focuses on being polemical and dialogic - in the questioning and even aggressive way posited by Bakhtin. For him, dialogism itself was an aggressive manifestation, since he saw heteroglossia as not just a mixture of languages: it is a dialogue of languages, which develops an energy of its own:

[In certain areas of heteroglossia,] the collision and interaction of languages is especially powerful....In this intense struggle, boundaries are drawn with new sharpness and simultaneously erased with new ease; it is sometimes impossible to establish where they have been erased or where certain of the warring parties have already crossed over into alien territory.¹⁹

Orwell is the primary satirist dealt with in this thesis, though in the pages that follow he is occasionally paired with Swift for purposes of discussion. Orwell

¹⁷ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, foreword Fredric Jameson, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1979) defines postmodernism as "incredulity towards metanarratives." (xxiv)

¹⁸ According to Peter Brooker, ed., *Modernism / Postmodernism* (London: Longman, 1992), the "shift from questions of epistemology (ways of knowing) to ontology (ways of being and acting in the world) becomes then an expression of what some see as fundamental in the very transition to postmodernism." (20-1)

¹⁹ Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 418.

and Swift have a demonstrable affinity, which can be seen in Orwell's essay on Swift, in which he declares his debt to him, as well as the example of *Animal Farm*, which clearly owes much of its inspiration to the fourth book of *Gulliver's Travels*. In addition, both writers were journalists and polemicists, deeply involved in political issues, and for both language was a matter of the deepest importance. Both Swift and Orwell were (to use Orwell's phrase) "Tory anarchists," that is they had a conservative and a radical side, equally marked, and they shared a passionate commitment to reason and fair-dealing. In fact, some critics regard a strong conservative streak as part of the make-up of many satirists.²⁰ Finally, Orwell lived a life of self-imposed emotional exile (in the end it was literal exile) from his society,²¹ which is akin to the situation of Swift, who was in exile in Ireland for much of his life. This kind of congruence is stressed by Koestler, who believes that "future historians of literature will regard Orwell as a kind of missing link between Kafka and Swift."²²

The first three chapters of this thesis are devoted to the introduction and discussion of the issues, approaches and terminology to be utilised in the last two chapters, which deal with two novels by George Orwell: *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Postmodernism is one of the implicit forces that drive this thesis, frequently providing approaches for interrogating discourses in a questing and questioning spirit. Postmodern theories, like satire, create new worlds for their audience and they both also make creative use of allegory and parody. The differences between satire and postmodernism are equally important, and the dialectic between them will provide creative energy as the thesis progresses. Chapter 1 opens with a detailed historical perspective on the beginnings and subsequent development of satire. It also contains a general discussion of the nature of the satirist, as well as satiric strategies and

²⁰ See, for example, Edward W. Rosenheim Jr., *Swift and the Satirist's Art* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1963) 185 and Robert C. Elliott, *The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual and Art* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996) 266-74.

²¹ Raymond Williams, "George Orwell," *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (New York: Columbia UP, 1958) 289-91.

²² Arthur Koestler, "A Rebel's Progress: To George Orwell's Death," *The Trail of the Dinosaur and Other Essays* (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 104.

aims, and opens the door for the later incorporation of postmodern issues and practice into the argument. The focus is on exploring satire rather than attempting to define it in absolute terms, since satirical forms are marked by a multifariousness that eludes absolute definition.

Chapter 2 takes the discussion much further, in detailing the interaction between the satirist and society. It contrasts the issues of morality and representation in satire, arguing that satirists offer their audience an opportunity to discover alternative worlds or versions of "reality," though satire also has a certain didactic element to it. The affinity between satire and postmodernism is again emphasised by pointing to the interrogative stance that the two share, as well as the common ground created by the postmodern predilection for modes highly favoured by satire: allegory, parody and fantasy.

In Chapter 3 the issue of language and its referents is explored, starting with Saussure's theory of how the signifier and the signified function. It is argued that satire has never respected this fixed relationship, and that it is in this respect similar to deconstruction - an essential strategy of postmodernism. The theories of the Russian formalists are examined, and it is shown how what they preach is very much what satire practises, including especially the element of aggression which is so apparent in so much satire. In fact, aggression is present in deconstruction, even if it is there not as openly menacing as it is in satire, manifesting itself instead as a mischievous intention to manufacture creative confusion. The last part of this chapter is devoted to examining four key socio-political discourses - psychoanalysis, ideology, propaganda and political myth - in relation to satire. The term "socio-political" here is not intended to suggest that satire is, by contrast, free from a concern with either society in general or politics in particular, but rather that satire is primarily a literary discourse - which the others are not. Satire's being set in this thesis among such non-literary discourses as psychoanalysis, ideology, propaganda and political myth signals a refusal to separate, in practice, discourses which are literary from those which are not. Psychoanalysis is named as a socio-political discourse on the grounds that it

has been used for political purposes ("insanity" has long been used as grounds for the incarceration of certain kinds of marginalised people, most notably, but by no means only, by the former Soviet Union), as well as the postmodern argument that it is not innocent of either social or political agendas.²³ These four discourses are, like satire, intimately concerned with language, as well as intent on working with the perceptions of the world which people have and, perhaps, changing them. The intention in juxtaposing all these discourses is to create a dialogic process which will allow the deconstructive energy typically generated by dialogism to cast a fresh light on them all, not least on satire itself. The four socio-political discourses named above play an important part in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, and will be relevant to the subsequent discussion of these novels.

Chapter 4 consists of a detailed exploration of *Animal Farm*, in which the various layers comprising the work are examined. The satirical aspects of the novel are closely related to the fabular and fairy tale elements which are an important part of its constitution. These elements or levels are juxtaposed with the historical details which are alluded to continuously in *Animal Farm* and indicate its close concern with the world outside the novel. The juxtaposition of various levels in a text, resulting in a dialogue between them, is central to any allegory. The allegorical nature of *Animal Farm* provides a framework for the contrasting levels of both meaning and emotion with which Orwell is working. For example, the amusing in *Animal Farm* is, in fact, never very far from the horrifying, though the reader is also made aware of the banality which exists side-by-side with the many appalling examples of evil in the novel. The degree of dialogism achieved here is high.

Chapter 5 consists of a detailed exploration of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which is strongly illuminated by the process of dialogism between the modernist ideology from which the novel springs and the postmodernist outlook introduced into the thesis, as well as the four socio-political discourses discussed earlier. Chief among the postmodern theories used in this chapter

²³ See 72-3 below.

are those of Foucault. The issues of power and language are examined from a psychological, a philosophical and a political point of view. The issue of connivance is examined in relation to whether the people of Oceania have passively accepted the oppression represented by Big Brother, or whether they are making a willed effort to conform to the system of Ingsoc, wholly or partly out of fear. This chapter ends by emphasising how the personal views of the satirist pervade his / her satire, and relates this specifically to a discussion of utopia / dystopia in Orwell's satire. As Orwell said of W.B. Yeats, "a writer's personal beliefs are not excrescences to be laughed away, but something that will leave their mark even on the smallest detail of his work."²⁴

While it cannot be denied that much of literature has points of reference in the world outside the text, this thesis treats satire as primarily a literary (though sometimes a performed) discourse which is grounded in that world in a particularly marked and unique way. This is because satire is almost always a comment on contemporary people and events, and this diminishes the usual distance between the text and the concrete, historical world to which it refers. This point is strengthened by the close connection between satire and utopia, which habitually forms one of the unspoken bases of satire and which shares satire's particular connection with an historical world:

Utopian and anti-utopian works are, by convention in practice (textually and discursively), centrifugal; their focus, the locus of their argument, is outside the text. They function with the readers' own society as the figure implied in the text and as their integrating feature; that is, their coherence is not internal, but a function of their constant dialectical movement between the figure (the dystopian society) constructed in the text and the figure of the writer's and contemporary reader's own society

²⁴ Orwell, George, "W.B. Yeats," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 276.

implied in the text.²⁵

It is for this reason that in Chapters 4 and 5 history becomes an issue, since the two satirical novels being discussed have a factual basis. The contemporary nature of satire, together with its involvement in the well-being of society, gives it an interest which is broadly political, in that it is concerned with the functioning of the polis - hence Rosenheim's suggestion that satire breaks down the boundaries between literary criticism and historical scholarship.²⁶ In addition, there is the importance of Orwell's personal history, elements of which figure in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Specifically, Orwell's avowed antagonism to Stalinist communism, precipitated by his experiences in the Spanish Civil War, is a crucial aspect of *Animal Farm*. As for *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the discussion of this novel focuses towards the end of Chapter 5 on the significance of Orwell's religious views, as well as some other key autobiographical elements. The conscious and unconscious use of personal material - often exaggerated or even fabricated - can be found in the work of satirists as different as Woody Allen, Mark Banks, Jonathan Swift and Robert Kirby. The inclusion of all these various elements in this thesis highlights the elusiveness (and allusiveness) of satire - its refusal to become a genre, with definable elements and limits. Because satire is so diverse and can include, inter alia, both written and performed forms as well as works of art, reference is often made in this thesis to the audience, rather than the readers, of satire.

Satire has an idiosyncratic quality which gives it a liminal and marginal status, associated with a radical disrespect for both legitimate and (especially) illegitimate forms of power. In fact, satire revels in what Bakhtin calls the carnivalesque - informal forms which threaten stable structures by means of dialogism and mock duly constituted authority. This is a marked tendency of postmodernism and is one indication of how the postmodern outlook is part of the fabric of this thesis - an outlook which rejects modernist notions of

²⁵ Anne Cranny-Francis, "Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984 in 1989: Raymond Williams and George Orwell," *Southern Review* 22.2 (1989): 155.

²⁶ Rosenheim, 32-33.

epistemology, as well as the utopian myths of science, technology, progress and information. Orwell attacked these, though this thesis proposes that his reason was disappointment at their failure, rather than a rejection of these ideals themselves. The Enlightenment / modernist view had more than its share of utopian thinking, as suggested by Kumar when speaking of modern anti-utopian writers: "They believed, often passionately, in equality, science and reason. This is as plain in the early anti-utopian Wells as in Huxley and Wells. Not the principles of progress themselves, but their use and practice, was what dismayed and outraged them."²⁷ As mentioned earlier, there is a significant disjunction between Orwell's ideological stance and his satirical praxis, the former being often conservative, and the latter much more radical.

Satire is seen in this thesis as having a greater freedom and individuality than overtly political discourses, but as paying for this freedom by having less real power than those discourses. The discussion of propaganda, ideology and political myth takes its cue from Orwell, as well as various theorists in these fields, and presents these discourses as harmful but, in each case, it also presents other important views of them as potentially beneficent or at least so endemic to society that a *modus vivendi* rather than attack may be called for. In the same way, while a strong case is built up for the value of satire, a certain amount of scepticism is also expressed towards it, since the postmodern bias of the thesis precludes it from proclaiming the complete innocence of any discourse.

On the subject of ideology, this thesis has followed the practice of writers on the subject such as Manning and Corbett, and used the term "ideologist" to denote someone who is actively involved in the theory, manufacture and dissemination of ideology, as opposed to the term "ideologue," which suggests the less active role of one who espouses ideology in a conscious way (one may live according to an ideology without being conscious of its nature) but is not actively involved in its dissemination.

²⁷ Krishan Kumar, *Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) 110.

As regards "psychoanalysis," that is a term used in this thesis to refer to both the discipline and the practice of the therapeutic method originated by Freud, but important aspects of the discussion will eventually centre on the practice of psychotherapy, which is a much wider term, embracing all the multifold schools relating to the treatment of emotional or personality disorders which have developed since the advent of Freud's methods, many of them having moved far from their roots. The model of psychotherapy engaged with in Chapter 3 is that espoused by the Dulwich Centre in Australia, where both theory and treatment are highly influenced by postmodernist thought, particularly that of Foucault.

Finally, when this thesis uses the term "discourse" it is assumed to have a very broad application. Belsey defines a discourse as "a domain of language-use, a particular way of talking (and writing and thinking)." ²⁸ She also says that for Foucault a "discourse (or discursive formation) is a domain of language-use subject to rules of formation and transformation." ²⁹ In using the term "discourse" as it does, this thesis takes its chief cue from deconstruction within which, as Culler says, "Context is just more text, just as much in need of interpretation and in fact constituted by the same sort of inimical forces that produce the possible ambiguities it is being called on to resolve. The appeal to context only displaces into a larger arena the problems at issue....This leads to a second point about context...:while meaning is context-bound, context is boundless." ³⁰ In other words, there is nothing outside the text, so that "discourse" may describe language as well as practice in terms of that language, and Foucault can refer to "the formation of a discursive practice and a body of...knowledge that are expressed in behaviour and strategies." ³¹ Edward Said, speaking of Derrida and Foucault, says:

²⁸ Catherine Belsey, *Critical Practice* (London: Methuen, 1980) 5.

²⁹ Belsey 160.

³⁰ Jonathan Culler, *Framing the Sign: Criticism and its Institutions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) 147-8.

³¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972) 195.

It helps to remember that cultural analyses like theirs began to proliferate and to take a great deal of influence away from traditional humanistic work because many people in the Sixties recognized that traditional humanistic modes and techniques - like the ethos of humanism itself - had really come to the end of their road.³²

³² John Lukacs, Edward Said and Gerald Graff (participants), "The Legacy of Orwell: A Discussion," *Salmagundi* 71-2 (1986): 124.

Chapter 1 An Historical and Theoretical Overview

Satire has some of its most significant origins in magic, as well as formal cursing, both of which have ritualistic elements requiring verbal fluency and accuracy for effective results. The intention to do ill, in one way or another, is also apparent - always in the case of cursing and often in the case of magic. Those who had such power over words were seen in several early societies, including ancient Finnish and Icelandic culture, as able to inflict real harm on their victims. These qualities have left their mark on satire, a generally critical stance expressed with unusual articulateness being one of the keynotes of the satirical mode. The first satirist known by name was a Greek called Archilocus (7th century B.C.) and he is remembered for the force and malice of his condemnation of his promised bride and her father, both of whom refused to honour her contract to marry Archilocus and both of whom are supposed to have committed suicide as a result of this satirist's invective.¹ But this is a primitive manifestation of satire, and Greek satire found its literary form only at the hands of Menippus (3rd century B.C.) and Aristophanes (5th century B.C.).

Satire also existed in a primitive form in ancient Arabia and ancient Ireland where satirists were, in effect, sorcerers to be appeased or punished as what Robinson terms "dangerous persons."² The malediction of Irish satirists is reputed to have caused illness or even death to its victims. In ancient Arabia (and almost certainly in some other societies) satirists rode out to war at the head of the army to publicly satirise the enemy. A mark of the seriousness with which Irish society viewed its satirists is the amount of legislation existing in those times to regulate and contain the activities of this feared group of people. The law distinguished no fewer than seven different kinds of satire for the purposes of punishment, though a distinction was made between lawful and unlawful satire. In general the laws discriminated against satirists:

¹ John Burke Shipley, "Satire," *Dictionary of World Literary Terms*, 1970.

² Fred Norris Robinson, "Satirists and Enchanters in Early Irish Literature," *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 4. All the information about Irish satirists in this paragraph is taken from this source, unless otherwise indicated.

they forbade anyone to stand surety for a satirist, and the child of a woman satirist was ineligible for the chieftainship. On the other hand, satirists sometimes served the state by helping to collect taxes, and they were accorded special privileges to speak in public.³ But satirists were often dangerous and troublesome in Ireland - and the reported activities of one satirist, Airthirne the Importunate, show him to have been a brigand and an extortioner.⁴ In the end Irish satirists were permitted to remain within that society in considerably reduced numbers and only after they and the kings of Ireland had entered into a pact.

This discussion of the beginnings of satire reflects some key elements that have remained constant in the uneasy relationship between satirists and their societies, particularly the lack of mutual trust. As has been shown, there was some respect for satirists, but they were also feared. Since those times attitudes to satirists have softened somewhat and, unless they live under an authoritarian or totalitarian government, the law has certainly ceased to single them out for such harsh treatment. Yet we are caught up in the same matrix as the ancient Irish when it comes to satire. We too allow satire, but the acceptability of satire is now governed not primarily by law but by more indefinite things, such as the degree to which our collective unconscious fears and taboos, masquerading as reason, will allow us to countenance the attacking and ridiculing of authority figures and of deeply-rooted customs and beliefs. Satirists have remained in an equivocal position vis-à-vis society, while the degree of mistrust shown towards them has varied, often depending on the stability or otherwise of the state and the degree of security of its rulers. The relatively stable and tolerant nature of Augustan England may be one reason why satire was well tolerated there (though not always approved of by its rulers) - and why it is so poorly tolerated in modern authoritarian and totalitarian states.

³ Robert C. Elliott, "The Satirist and Society," *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 208.

⁴ Elliott, *The Power of Satire* 29.

During the Roman period satire, like the epic, the elegy and other genres, became formalised, though this did not result in its becoming an entirely tame or predictable form, as the writing of Juvenal shows. According to Elliott, Quintilian, the Roman teacher of rhetoric, uses the phrase "*satura tota nostra est*," apparently "claiming satire as a wholly Roman phenomenon, although he had read Aristophanes, and was familiar with a number of Greek forms that we would call satiric. The point is that by *satura* (which meant originally something like 'medley' and from which comes our *satire*) he intended to specify that kind of poem 'invented' by Lucilius, written in hexameters on certain appropriate themes, and dominated by a Lucilian-Horatian tone. *Satura* referred, in short, to a poetic *form*, established and fixed by Roman practice."⁵ This definition, which chooses to ignore the Greek Menippean tradition, perhaps for misguidedly patriotic reasons, is patently an attempt on the part of a single society to fix its relations with satire once and for all - an attempt which the very nature of satire is bound to defeat. Griffin's addition to this discussion makes an important point: "In any case, [Quintilian's] claim...simplifies a complicated history by focusing on one element - here the tradition and progressive refinement of formal verse satire from Lucilius through Horace, Persius, and Juvenal - to the exclusion of...what might be called the unruly spirit of satyr."⁶ Classen confirms the complexity of the genre by showing that from Roman times until at least the Middle Ages the term "satire" was regarded as too general to be used in an unqualified way because there were so many varieties of satire. It was seen as necessary to give the name of the author, thus indicating the particular style of satire under discussion.⁷

It may be that Quintilian, unable to deal with some of the wild qualities of satire, chose to ignore them. It must, however, be conceded that the process of formalisation may have led to a greater acceptance of satire by society. No society tolerates unruly or unpredictable elements with ease, especially when

⁵ Robert C. Elliott, "The Definition of Satire: A Note on Method," *Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature* No. 11 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1962) 19.

⁶ Dustin Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction* (Lexington: U of Kentucky P, 1994) 9.

⁷ Carl Joachim Classen, "Satire - The Elusive Genre," *Symbolae Osloenses* 63 (1988):103, 109.

those elements are fairly sophisticated and have the potential to be highly influential - though some societies have a greater tolerance of such phenomena than others. As will be demonstrated in the course of this thesis, the satirist is by definition a rogue element in society, to a greater or lesser degree. For Roman society, the definition and formalisation of satire must have been comforting, bringing an (apparent, at any rate) element of predictability and order.

The degree to which satire finds acceptance is also dependent on the degree to which satirists are willing to work within the basic norms of their society, pointing out weaknesses but not questioning the very foundations of that society. It seems that more radical satire would find itself addressing a smaller group than, say, the gentlemanly musings of a Horace - a satirist who enjoyed the kind of entente cordiale with Augustus Caesar which is very likely to blunt the cutting edge of satire. Horace is a good example of the Roman satirist who attempted to speak to what Braund terms "all right-thinking men" - or "to those who can be persuaded into becoming for a time like-minded:"

[So,] in his poems he may surround himself with friends whose opinions validate his own. This validation comes not just from their numbers...but from their position in Roman society. Society is, on the one hand, the object of satire, but, on the other, a high-ranking portion of it sets the standard of behaviour and guarantees the satirist's moral outlook as sound.⁸

While Roman satire often ensured itself an audience by adopting the norms of its society - or, as Braund says, the norms of an important group within that society - it is also true that the practice of different Roman satirists in this respect varied widely. Juvenal, who lived in the time of Domitian, attacks so many different groups in his satire that he can be said to be attacking the very fabric of his society, rather than tamely relying on the unfailing support of a group of like-minded people. In fact, so successful an irritant did Juvenal

⁸ Susan H, Braund, ed., *Satire and Society in Ancient Rome* (Exeter: U of Exeter P, 1989) 5.

make of himself that he was sent into exile by Domitian. Thus, despite Horace's example, there were Roman satirists who were individualists.

What this discussion suggests about Roman satire is that, even at times when much of satire adopts the norms of the prevailing elite, there will still be satirists who preserve the uneasy relationship with society which has marked satire from its inception - and, significantly, it was Augustus who instituted what was, in effect, the first libel law. There had been a general law in Rome (the *Lex Iuliae Majestatis*) against those who insulted the Roman government, its institutions or its people. Hitherto, according to Tacitus, this law had been invoked only against insulting actions, but Augustus specifically extended the law to cover literature as well, including defamatory lampoons and satires.⁹ To what degree this law made the entente between Augustus and Horace purely a matter of professional survival for the poet is not clear. McKnight says of Horace that he was "naturally servile and lived at court."¹⁰ Dryden says that "Horace, as he was a courtier, complied with the interest of his master, and avoiding the lashing of greater crimes, confined himself to the ridiculing of petty vices, and common follies...."¹¹ Raphael, commenting on this entente, remarks that "one cannot be a state pensioner and a true satirist, for satire is, at the least, the expression of a temperamental dissidence rather than of the indulgent complaisance which Horace did not bother to disguise."¹²

It is not coincidental that the rapport between Augustus and Horace occurred during a time of great peace and prosperity in Roman history. The tolerance of governments, and of society in general, for satire increases during periods of social stability - though it seems that Horace did not tax Augustus's tolerance very heavily. The eighteenth century in England provides the other great source of formal satire and this was indeed an England that was

⁹ Edward P. Nathan, "The Bench and the Pulpit: Conflicting Elements in the Augustan Apology for Satire," *ELH* 52.2 (1985): 381-2.

¹⁰ Philip S. McKnight, "Sudden Glory: Some Preliminary Notes on the Assailant, the Victim and the Collaborator in 'Type J' Satire," *Colloquia Germanica* 18.3 (1985): 193.

¹¹ John Dryden, "Discourse on Satire," *John Dryden: Selected Criticism*, eds. James Kinsley and George Parfitt (London: Oxford UP, 1970) 261.

¹² Frederic Raphael, "What the Romans laughed at," *The Listener* 16 June 1977: 781.

relatively stable. No doubt the political turmoil which marked seventeenth-century England was still fresh enough in people's minds to make them greatly value peace and order, the latter being prime values of the Augustan age. It is thus not surprising that satire was an accepted feature of English eighteenth-century life - and that much of it was formal.

The links between the Roman and the English Augustan ages were the result of a conscious adoption of a classical frame of reference during the latter period. This stance, embodying strong elements of the current literary and social establishment, was adopted by satirists such as Pope, who used classical verse forms as far as English would accommodate them. Mack speaks of Pope and his fellow-satirists writing against the "Roman background...a kind of universal Augustan metaphor or 'myth' " embodying the implied " standard of a mighty and civilized tradition in arts, morals and government." ¹³ Brouwer describes Pope's tone as "the tone of Roman civilization - more refined and truly Horatian, less downright and less pompous than Dryden..." ¹⁴ It was much more than the Roman tone which eighteenth-century satire adopted: the neo-classical influence penetrated to the warp and weft of the poetry of the time and influenced some of its verse forms. The dominant form of satire during the Augustan age in England was the closed (heroic) couplet, though this form originated in the Middle Ages as a form used only for comedy. It was developed further by Elizabethan and Jacobean poets such as Marlowe, Waller, Jonson and Donne, in an attempt to convey in English the effects of the Latin elegiac distich (a couplet consisting of a dactylic hexameter followed by a pentameter) of Ovid's *Amores* and Martial's *Epigrams*. Part of the English Augustan project, beginning with Dryden and culminating in the work of Pope was, according to Piper, to refine the form and establish a particular tone for the heroic couplet, based on the Horatian style: "sensible and quiet talk, easy without being careless, terse without being crabbed" ¹⁵ - and then to combine rhetoric and

¹³ Maynard Mack, " 'Wit and Poetry and Pope': Some Observations on his Imagery," *Pope and his Contemporaries: Essays Presented to George Sherburn*, eds. James L. Clifford and Louis A. Landa (London: Oxford UP, 1949) 34.

¹⁴ Rueben Brower, *Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1959) 13.

¹⁵ W.B. Piper, *The Heroic Couplet* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve UP, 1969) 56.

metre into that mutually supportive role which the neoclassical age called "correctness." To Piper this "suggests the ease, the graceful associative quality of polite talk....Thus the closed couplet, with its close-grained system of pauses, allows the poet to suggest a persistent responsiveness to his society, a persistent readiness to change course in order to accommodate his interlocutor's questions and doubts." ¹⁶

As can be seen, the watchword at this time was reasonableness, in both thought and style. Yet, if it is accepted that the task of satirists is to establish an adversarial relationship with their society and to question, rather than accept, the dominant myths and ideologies of their time, the Augustan period in England was one in which satire was in danger of sacrificing its integrity. It is significant that it was the Horatian style that the Augustan heroic couplet aimed at, and Raphael's point about this Roman satirist stands as a general truth: a "temperamental dissidence" is the hallmark of satire, and satirists who compound with their society or act as the bearer of its values to any great degree may be seen as weakening their satirical thrust. As suggested earlier, satirists occupy an equivocal position: ¹⁷ they are involved with their society, yet they are also detached enough to be aware of and able to criticise its shortcomings. However, the balance between these two contrasting stances is not always easy to maintain, and what seems to have happened in both the Roman and the English Augustan ages is that there were important satirists who became heavily enmeshed in the norms of their society and thus struck a highly conservative note. Adding weight to this tendency in England was the fact that, as Nokes says, many eighteenth-century English satirists shared an ideology usually described as "'Augustan humanism', of which the defining characteristics were a veneration for the past allied to and predicated upon a fundamental belief in the historical uniformity of common humanity." ¹⁸

¹⁶ Piper 141.

¹⁷ See 16 above.

¹⁸ David Nokes, *Raillery and Rage: A Study of Eighteenth Century Satire* (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1987) 77.

The mainly conservative forms of eighteenth-century English satire were reflected by its aim, which was to reform by a combination of ridicule and persuasion, on the assumption that most people were reasonable. Nicolson suggests that this was reinforced by the philosophical ethos of the time - the Age of Reason - when, influenced by Newton, Locke, Voltaire and the *Encyclopédistes*, people turned from theology "to what they called 'natural philosophy', namely the faith in individual reason rather than in divine revelation....." ¹⁹ Eighteenth-century intellectuals stood for "good sense, balance, moderation, order, taste, intellectual truthfulness and tolerance." ²⁰ They also espoused humanitarian values, being against war and greatly in favour of liberalism and egalitarianism. There was in addition in England a stress on social awareness and responsibility, which was also one of the underpinnings of satire in this period. An additional factor, mentioned by Probyn, would have been that eighteenth-century writers in general were under great pressure to use their texts as "vehicles for popular instruction,"²¹ and such overt didacticism tends to the absolute rather than the provisional. It is significant that the Enlightenment in France undermined traditional ways of thought sufficiently to usher in the Revolution, but the ideas of the *idéologues* of the time were so radical that Napoleon soon suppressed them.²² In England even the most biting satire of the Enlightenment has a containment and underlying respect for norms which reflects the unlikelihood of revolution there at that time. And, if Quintilian is seen as a spokesperson for his times, the exclusion of the wilder aspects of satire from his definitions could be seen as one sign among many that revolution was equally unlikely in Augustan Rome. It seems clear that satire in England during the Enlightenment - and at other times - could be relatively tame. Yet this thesis insists that one of the creative functions of satire is not to resolve and reconcile issues, but rather to create, multiply and exploit tensions within society. These qualities are, in fact, often found in satire but many factors, including social and historical circumstances, may attenuate them. In the case of the English

¹⁹ Harold Nicolson, *The Age of Reason (1700-1789)* (London: Panther, 1968) 20.

²⁰ Nicolson 13-14.

²¹ Clive T. Probyn, *English Fiction of the Eighteenth Century 1700-1789* (London: Longman, 1987) 22.

²² See 87 below.

Enlightenment, other aspects making for a less radical kind of satire could have been the formality and, in the case of verse satire, relatively limited structures of satire, which may, arguably, have blunted the thrust of satire.

This was the first and last time that English satire was so formalised - and, significantly, never again has English satire been so in tune with the society in which it has been produced. It has to be added though that, even at the height of the Augustan age, there were English satirists whose voices often had a distinctly informal, if not anarchic, ring - and of these Jonathan Swift is a prime example (though even Pope could produce fairly scurrilous satire). Rogers suggests that Swift's apparent espousal of orthodox views hides a scepticism towards authority. "Anarchy is always round the corner," she says;²³ but something that is only around the corner is not something that operates in a direct way. The following archly witty comment by Pope has a great deal of truth to it, since it stresses both Swift's respectable position and his satiric tendency to be subversive of the very morality a clergyman is supposed to be safeguarding, with the implication that as much as Swift was against the establishment, he was also part of it:

The person I mean is Dr. Swift, a dignified clergyman, but one who by his own confession, has composed more libels than sermons. If it be true, what I have heard often affirmed by innocent people, "that too much wit is dangerous to salvation," this unfortunate gentleman must certainly be damned to all eternity.²⁴

A maverick though he may have been (and his becoming something of an Irish nationalist only demonstrates this quality), Swift also embraced the common set of ideals that formed the basis of Augustan satire. Those ideals were also those of society - and it is in this respect that satire has changed since then. As sense and sensibility waged their struggle during the last part

²³ Pat Rogers, "Swift and the Idea of Authority," *The World of Jonathan Swift: Essays for the Tercentenary*, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968) 33.

²⁴ Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life* (New York: Norton; New Haven: Yale UP, 1985) 337.

of the eighteenth century and Romantic ideals finally asserted themselves, English society (and satire) lost its special sense of social cohesiveness (the discussion in Chapter 3 on the role of myth as a binding force in society is relevant here), and the individual consciousness grew in importance. Satire was deprived of a strong ideological link with society, with a resulting decrease in idealism. As a result of this process modern satire has often felt freer to attack the very structures of society in a deeply radical way, though it frequently retains at least some element of its conservative side, as can be seen in a satirist such as Orwell.

Although eighteenth-century English satire was not without its detractors, with the passing of that century its defenders seem to have become even fewer. In *Sense and Sensibility* (published in 1811) Lady Middleton dislikes Elinor and Marianne Dashwood and, "because they were fond of reading, she fancied them satirical: perhaps without exactly knowing what it was to be satirical; but that did not signify. It was censure in common use, and easily given."²⁵ By mid-century, Thackeray was able to comment on satire as follows:

We cannot afford to lose Satyr with his pipe and dances and gambols. But we have washed, combed, clothed and taught the rogue good manners: or rather let us say he has learned them himself; for he is of nature soft and kindly, and he has put aside his mad pranks and tipsy habits; and, frolicsome always, has become gentle and harmless, smitten into shame by the pure presence of our women and the sweet confiding smiles of our children.²⁶

The suggestion here is that satire has lost its bite entirely. Yet, it is clear that Thackeray is using a narrow definition of satire as, prior to this, he has been

²⁵ Jane Austen, *Sense and Sensibility*, ed. R.W. Chapman, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford UP, 1933) 246.

²⁶ Elliott, *The Power of Satire* 269-70.

"deploring the savagery of the caricaturists Gilray and Rowlandson."²⁷ The refusal to acknowledge caricature as a form of satire, together with the attempt to limit satire in one area and encourage ferocity in another, constitutes yet another strategy to control and contain satire. The lively tradition of English caricature so firmly established in the eighteenth century by Hogarth, Rowlandson and Dighton was continued in the nineteenth by the "brilliant cruelty" of Gillray²⁸ and the unsparing mockery of Cruikshank. Thackeray has chosen to chide the most potent manifestation of satire of his time, while (rather unconvincingly) encouraging the least dangerous aspect to become more assertive. Judging by Thackeray's views, society seems to have been as uneasy and ambivalent about satire in the nineteenth century as it was in ancient Ireland.

Trends and patterns in satire become increasingly difficult to chart as the nature of satire becomes even more diverse during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and satirists have widely differing agendas and strategies. To illustrate the new range and diversity of satire, it might be mentioned that at the beginning of this period Wilde and Shaw were writing satirical plays, Campbell and Auden were writing satirical poems, and in 1922 T.S. Eliot produced his masterpiece of satirical pastiche and allusion, *The Waste Land*. Waugh produced satirical novels and, later this century, so did Orwell and Huxley. Cummings wrote his brand of satirical poetry, and later still there were the satirical novels of Lodge and Kingsley Amis. More currently, we have Monty Python and *Spitting Image*, the British television show which uses grotesque puppets of well-known figures in order to ridicule them - and the vitriolic pen of Steadman, the cartoonist. All this certainly suggests that satire, as a form, has become irrevocably fragmented, with no possibility now of formal satire of any standing.

As a result of this fragmentation, working with satire presents certain problems, and these are exacerbated by the fact that satire is a semi-covert

²⁷ Elliott, *The Power of Satire* 269.

²⁸ Richard Cork, "Gillray's Legacy: A New Spirit of Satire," *The Listener* 114.2919 (1985):14.

form, often with a hidden agenda. What presents even greater problems, however, is providing a watertight and generally applicable definition of satire. As Real says, "To this very day, satire has withstood all conceptual and classificatory efforts claiming general validity."²⁹ The elusiveness of satire as a form springs from the fact that it is not a genre, in the conventional sense of having a fixed structure and style; but satire is often a mode, in the sense of having a prevailing manner in which it expresses itself,³⁰ or, to use a much wider term, satire is a discourse, as defined earlier.³¹ Worcester's term "protean"³² is a useful description of satire, considering that it is found in such widely divergent forms as poetry, plays, jokes, novels and cartoons, inter alia. Not only the style in which satire expresses itself in these forms, but also the way in which satire manifests itself in the same form will differ, depending on the stance of the satirist and when the satire was written. It is precisely because of the restlessness of satire's nature and the elusiveness of the satirist that this thesis aims to explore, rather than absolutely define, the nature of satire.

This lack of clear definition is not an aspect only of the outward form of satire. It is apparent at a much deeper level as well, where it appears as a refusal on the part of satire to present a formal outline of its basic principles or intentions, despite the fact that it is usually intent on some form of personal and social change. In fact, the satirist is most at home in discourses which question absolutes and which carry with them a deep scepticism towards fixed positions. There is about satire a destabilising self-reflexiveness and a cultural subversion which, despite the venerable lineage of satire, make it a very contemporary phenomenon. Satire, among all the literary forms, has a particular commitment to the revelation and questioning of hegemonic

²⁹ Hermann Josef Real, "An Introduction to Satire," *Teaching Satire: Dryden to Pope*, ed. Hermann Josef Real (Heidelberg: Real, 1992) 9.

³⁰ For confirmation of the difficulty in defining satire see Leonard Feinberg, *The Satirist: His Temperament, Motivation, and Influence* (Ames: Iowa State UP, 1963) 6-7, James Sutherland, *English Satire* (London: Cambridge UP, 1962) 1-2 and Matthew Hodgart, *Satire* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969) 8.

³¹ See 10, 13-14 above.

³² David Worcester, *The Art of Satire* (1940; New York: Norton, 1969) 3.

discourses, which suggests that it has a great deal in common with postmodernism, and may be seen as one of the key discourses in the postmodern world. More specifically, postmodernism has been described by Brooker as having a "dominant tone of parody and pastiche..., penned between textualism and reference, licensed play and subversion. " ³³ In certain types of satire, such as that of Swift and, in particular, Orwell, the element of parody has become bitter and the quality of play transformed into a dark kind of fantasy, though the subversively interrogative element is retained.

The affinities that exist between postmodernism and satire are inescapable, though, because satire is a marginal form (a major contention of this thesis), it is unusual for it to be so comfortable with an important element of the *Weltanschauung* of its time. This represents a change from the traditional relationship between satire and the societies within which it has operated. As will be argued at length elsewhere, satire tends not to prosper for long in an uncontroversial and unambiguous way in any society. This is so because of the generally disturbing subversiveness of most satire and, perhaps, because as mentioned earlier, satire is not really a genre at all. This would have been a significant factor in times when genre was a matter of importance, since satire (formal satire excepted) has usually resisted the rigorous classification to which other literary forms are more amenable. In ancient Greece, for example, no attempt was made to isolate the satiric from the comic elements in the works of Aristophanes ³⁴ and, certainly, in Aristotle's *Poetics*, there is no mention of satire as a distinct form. The Romans had no unified theory of satire (formal satire excepted, to some degree), and satiric theory then seems to have been of interest mainly to satirists, each usually incorporating some discussion of satire into his satirical work. ³⁵ Yet the typical lack of a warm and close relationship between satirists and their society is not due simply to the indifference or antagonism of society: many satirists do claim, implicitly or

³³ Brooker 19.

³⁴ Robert C. Elliott, "Satire," *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, eds. Alex Preminger, Frank J. Warnke and O.B. Hardison, Jr., enlarged ed. (London: Macmillan, 1974) 739.

³⁵ Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction* 6-9.

explicitly, a superiority which can be alienating and, as Zietsman notes, Roman satirists were no exception to this:

Persius...dissociates himself not only from the famous Greek poets and from the early Roman poets like Ennius who imitated Greek models...but also from his contemporaries who are inspired by the Muses and who are slavishly continuing with this imitation of traditional epic and tragedy....Horace believes that the poet is set apart from the rest of mankind...and that he has authority...to point to evils that need righting....³⁶

Such aloofness is common among satirists and, logically enough, most societies have not responded with unmitigated pleasure towards satire. Sherbert speaks of "satire's traditionally low standing among the genres,"³⁷ and Elliott confirms that satire is "a form unremittingly aware of its low estate in the hierarchy of genres."³⁸ Eighteenth-century critical writing makes it clear that satire is not among the most important of literary forms,³⁹ the discomfort about satire which accompanied the fashion for it in that century being evidenced by the need for frequent apologies for it in this, the greatest age of English satire.⁴⁰ Why the need for so much justification of satire if, in fact, satire is considered a normal member of the literary family? That satire was indeed a marginalised form is further suggested by the hostility it aroused at the time, which is described by Elkin:

In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries satirists were constantly being called to account. They could expect every satire they published to arouse a storm of protest: attacks on their characters, questionings

³⁶ Johan Christoff Zietsman, "A Commentary on Persius: Satire 5: Themes and Structures," diss., U of Pretoria, 1987, 31-2, 37.

³⁷ Gary Sherbert, *Menippean Satire and the Poetics of Wit: Ideologies of Self-Consciousness in Dunton, D'Urfey, and Sterne* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996) xvii.

³⁸ Elliott, "Satire" 738.

³⁹ For a comment on the generally marginal position of satire in literary theory see George Test, *Satire: Spirit and Art* (Tampa: U of Southern Florida P, 1991) 12.

⁴⁰ Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction* 24-25.

of their motives, and aspersions on their literary capabilities.⁴¹

Test, pointing to the generally unlovable nature and point of view of satire, finds it logical that "satirists have been the most persecuted of artists - exiled, silenced, sued, physically attacked."⁴²

In subsequent times, when genre had become less of an issue, satire remained a suspect form, partly because of its frequently anarchic basis and vituperative tone, and partly because the traditional prejudice against satire still survived, though usually in an attenuated and only half-conscious form. Elkin speaks of the matter as follows:

In the nineteenth century satire was not considered worthy of theoretical consideration in its own right, but was treated merely as a facet of comedy. Until recent years, indeed, general, or theoretical, criticism of satire was incidental, haphazard, defensive and partial. It was undertaken principally by the satirists themselves in defence of their own professional practice and of their reputations.⁴³

Falck's recent comments suggest that the prejudice against satire is still a reality in this part of the twentieth century:

At their best, our actual 'postmodernist' fictions are overwhelmingly ironic in their mode, and the most literarily valuable results of this widespread cultural condition of inability to know what it is that we feel have been some brilliant satires...but we cannot keep the plumber on as the cook.⁴⁴

⁴¹ P.K. Elkin, *The Augustan Defence of Satire* (London: Oxford UP, 1973) 1.

⁴² Test 1.

⁴³ P.K. Elkin, "Recent Changes in Satiric Theory," *Kunstgriffe: Auskünfte zur Reichweite von Literaturtheorie und Literaturkritik*, Festschrift für Herbert Mainusch, Herausgegeben von Ulrich Horstmann und Wolfgang Zach (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1989) 51.

⁴⁴ Colin Falck, *Myth, Truth and Literature: Towards a True Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) 166.

The fact that Falck's sweeping dismissal embraces both postmodernism and satire is an acknowledgement of the affinities between the two, as suggested earlier in this thesis. It also confirms that literary snobbery, centred around the issue of genre, is by no means dead. By contrast, in postmodernist theory, the notion of genre has lost most of its hold on art, and satire, with its innate contradictions and penchant for parody and fantasy, has, perhaps for the first time ever, found itself at one with the main literary theory and practice of its time. (Kantra believes that much "modern literary theory...has the appearance of unintentional satire...")⁴⁵ This is the world in which satire finds itself today - and for the satirist, it seems, it is both brave and new.

But, given that satire and postmodernism also show marked differences, particularly when it comes to the satire of Orwell, and considering the mercurial qualities of both satire and postmodernism, their convergence is not any guarantee of stability, especially as the satirist's natural place is on the fringes of society and satire itself is a form which thrives on the liminal, thus giving both satire and satirist a rootless, shifting quality. As for satirists themselves, this thesis will argue that they differ markedly from other artists in many ways - so much so that (misguided) attempts have even been made to isolate and define the satirist as a psychological type.⁴⁶ In fact, there are much more germane criteria that make satirists a special case among literary writers, such as the strategies they employ, among which are their strongly didactic thrust and the fact that they are as much concerned with influencing views of "reality" as the psychotherapist, the ideologist, the propagandist and the purveyor of political myths. Much of the distinction between the satirist and these other figures hinges on their different strategies and their different relationship with their societies. It is these relationships which constitute some of the most serious concerns of this thesis.

⁴⁵ Robert A. Kantra, "Practical Wisdom and Satiric Humor in Philosophic Fictions," *Mosaic* 22.3 (1989): 89.

⁴⁶ Feinberg, *The Satirist* 119-20.

Barthes says that "a mode of writing is...the relationship between creation and society,"⁴⁷ but he goes further, to say that writing "unquestionably arises from a confrontation of the writer with the society of his time."⁴⁸ This thesis will deal at length with these aspects, maintaining that they are especially germane to satire. Satirists address particular conditions in a particular society, yet they are by no means totally at one with that society. Yet if they are to be heeded (and it is of the utmost importance to satirists that they be heard) they must have a fairly close relationship with their society and use at least some elements of its discourse, or they will be disregarded. On the other hand, they need to have a measure of detachment from the society that they are satirising, both so that they can see more clearly and so that they will have the dispassion, if not the ruthlessness, which their job usually entails. Dryden speaks admiringly of the "fineness of a [satirical] stroke that separates the head from the body, and leaves it standing in its place."⁴⁹ Satirists need skill and space to swing the axe, but they also need some measure of consent - at least initially - from their audience, since satirists work within a context at least of tolerance, if not always agreement. The fact that this context often contains more mistrust than tolerance is well illustrated by a cartoon in *The Listener* depicting an old-style prison cell, bare and dingy, with unplastered brick walls and the usual single barred window high above the floor. One of the occupants of the cell, who is writing something, is saying to his companion, "The difference between COMEDY and SATIRE? Oh, about a five-year prison sentence...."⁵⁰ There is - and there always has been - an uncomfortable relationship between the satirist and society.

Satirists can be seen as marginal people, grudgingly accepting the need for some link with their society while at the same time habitually adopting an adversarial stance towards it. This does not imply that satirists are simply malcontents, nor does it imply that their stance as marginal people is either safe or comfortable. Bogdanor has said of the twentieth-century novel that "it

⁴⁷ Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, trans. Anette Lavers and Colin Smith (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967) 20.

⁴⁸ Barthes 22.

⁴⁹ Dryden 263.

⁵⁰ R. Lowry, cartoon, *The Listener* 30 June 1983: 15.

has been dominated by the outsider and his sense of the artificiality of settled social forms. When the foundations of one's house are being undermined, the inhabitants are usually the last to know what is happening. Only someone who has felt within himself the fragility of all social arrangements will be in a good position to interpret it to others."⁵¹ This formulation is extremely appropriate if applied to satirists. They, after all, have always been more or less outsiders and have always fought against the smugness and placidity that settled social forms bring with them. They are usually among the first to become aware of the rottenness of a society's foundations and to try to convey this to the inhabitants. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, George Orwell's novels *Animal Farm* and, especially, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, are good examples of such satire, since they probe the illnesses of the body politic most endemic to the age, take the temperature of the times, urge humankind to examine its own nature and warn of tendencies which could become endemic if not checked. This is the more serious side of satire, lacking in laughter and heavy with prophetic foreboding. Every satirist, to a greater or lesser degree, feels "within himself the fragility of all social arrangements," because such an awareness is an inevitable part of being a marginal person. By choosing marginality the satirist retains that awareness of the precarious and provisional nature of life which others who embrace the dominant discourses of society soon lose. For them ideology and political myth take care of their existential anxieties, while for the satirist there are no simple solutions and (as will be shown) ideology is anathema.

In their willingness to take risks and their position on the fringes of society, satirists have a great deal in common with the prophet, in the biblical sense. Both are dissatisfied with the status quo and, as a result, both will remain marginal people, their position in relation to their society weakened by their equal lack of formal authority. As a result they will not always be listened to (satirists, as well as prophets, are often without honour in their own country), but the fact that they can have informal influence is thoroughly disquieting to society, which does not easily endure the presence of "rogue authority" in its

⁵¹ Vernon Bogdanor, "In or Out?," *The Listener* 115.2956 (1986): 28.

midst. Thus the power of both satirist and prophet is weakened: they are not part of any formal power structure and the existing political structures are wary of them and will not make any great effort to welcome them. Another important aspect which the satirist and the prophet have in common is that both habitually see things from a dark perspective, though satirists do use strategies such as humour and irony to ease the pain of the "truths" they utter. Roelofs sees Orwell as a prophet in the biblical tradition:

In this tradition, a prophet is not a seer, fortuneteller (sic), or clairvoyant. He is, first, a messenger - and Orwell was a bearer of tidings. The prophet is, second, an extraordinary person who confronts us in some specially dramatic way - and Orwell with his horror story [*Nineteen Eighty-Four*] does just that. Third, what a prophet confronts us with is the choice that illuminates our moment, our existential predicament...
Orwell presses upon his readers a choice: which way will we go, the way of love and equality and peace, or the way of power and hierarchy and war? ⁵²

The common notion of a prophet these days is based on the model of a stern-faced, denunciatory Jeremiah rather than a gentle Micah, no doubt because the former has a much more striking message and a more obvious power. That anger is part of the role of both prophet and satirist is suggested by the following remarks of Orwell's, quoted by Ingle: "This age makes me so sick that I sometimes am almost impelled to stop at a corner and start calling down curses from Heaven like Jeremiah or Ezra or something." ⁵³ Prophets like Jeremiah have never bothered with things such as humour and irony and, unlike fortune tellers (their debased modern equivalent), they speak what they see as the unvarnished "truth," not feeling called upon to offer either comfort or hope to their audience. Although prophets speak with divine authority, they are often not accepted, nor is their message always taken seriously

⁵² H. Mark Roelofs, "George Orwell's Obscured Utopia," *Religion and Literature* 19.2 (1987): 29-30

⁵³ Stephen Ingle, *George Orwell: A Political Life* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993) viii.

(mythology offers a classic case in Cassandra), a fate often faced also by satirists. The prophet has as venerable a lineage as the satirist, though prophets have, for a long time, been out of fashion. The contemporary bearer of the prophetic legacy is the satirist, who is as necessary to an ungrateful society as the prophet ever was. For both, the society of their time is in decay or in imminent danger of being so: that is all they see, that is their point of view. Yet behind the warnings of the prophet lies a vision of an ideal state of affairs and, until fairly recently satirists, too, often spoke with an implicit sense of the perfectibility of the world around them. This duality in satirists - their gloomy view of their surroundings working together with their strong covert utopian idealism - is perhaps the dialectic from which springs their satirical energy. Hazlitt says that "Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps, for he is the only animal that is struck with the difference between what things are, and what they ought to be."⁵⁴ People are also the only creatures that are satirical - and it may be that they are satirical for the same reason as, according to Hazlitt, they laugh and cry.

Given the didactic strand in satire, as well as the implicitly utopian (or anti-utopian) view that usually underpins it, the kind of response made by people to what is an imperfect world is a crucial issue for satire. The point frequently made by writers on satire is that this form of writing is connected to the world outside the text in a particularly direct way. As Pfaff and Gibbs put it, "in satire, the author mostly hopes that readers will recover the absurdity of the created text, which hopefully will prompt the readers to consider issues beyond the text."⁵⁵ This is another way of saying that satire is primarily a political mode, in that it is very aware of and concerned with the situation in the polis, in the broadest sense. As mentioned above, most satire has until recently been underpinned by some utopian ideal - some implied hope that the world can indeed become a better place, and that satire has a role to play in this process. However, the early part of this century saw the publication of

⁵⁴ William Hazlitt, "On Wit and Humour," *Selected Essays of William Hazlitt: 1778 - 1830*, ed. Geoffrey Keynes (London: Nonesuch P, 1930) 410.

⁵⁵ Kerry L. Pfaff and Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., "Authorial Intention in Understanding Satirical Texts," *Poetics* 25.1 (1997): 46.

major satirical dystopian novels such as Wells's *When the Sleeper Wakes* (1899), Zamyatin's *We* (1920), Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), and Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949). Now there were satirical texts which, if they were idealistic, showed this only as a form of cynicism or disappointed idealism, as well as a deep concern for the way things were. So deep was Orwell's concern that his two dystopian novels are almost devoid of humour.

The development of dystopian fiction was related to then current philosophies and events, particularly the threatened creation or advent of totalitarian regimes and the tendency to increase control of populations. An example is the case of late nineteenth-century socialism, which was *the* utopian ideal of the nineteenth century, but which by the 1930s and 1940s had grown to become Stalinist communism and hence a ready target for dystopian fiction. Kumar sees early twentieth-century dystopian writing as designed expressly to combat socialism and the forms that evolved from it which became, as Kumar says, "the fullest and most sophisticated expression of the modern worship of science, technology and organisation."⁵⁶ These aspects attained a mythical status in the modern age, becoming a particular target of the satire then current. They were a central tenet of Nazi philosophy, and the threat posed by these forces was regarded as highly dangerous by satirists such as Huxley and Orwell. There can be no doubt that fascism, too, worshipped science and technology, associating them with power rather than the creation of a better world. Herf's formulation sums up the issues: "For Hitler, the decisive element remained the ideology of the will to power. If life and politics were essentially a struggle in which the strongest won, then in politics among nations the technologically weak would deserve to be defeated."⁵⁷

It is in these areas - the evils of ideology, as well as the abuse of power and technology, coupled with an increasingly impersonal form of government - that the enemy lies for Orwell, and these are his main targets in *Animal Farm* and, particularly in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It is for these that he reserves his

⁵⁶ Kumar 49.

⁵⁷ Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984) 194.

Chapter 2 Anatomizing Satire

Historically, satirists have often presented themselves as concerned with morality. Their self-appointed function, and that often allotted them by critics, (Dryden says that "Satire is of the nature of moral philosophy; as being instructive..."¹) has been to pin-point the failings of humankind and endeavour to correct them by rebuking or mocking people into becoming more sensible or more honest. This view limits both satirist and satire, running the risk of painting the satirist as merely a moralist or a kind of preacher. Such a holier-than-thou attitude is not, however, entirely convincing, nor is it conducive to the relational way in which this thesis presents the whole process of satire.

A shift from the realm of morality to one of relationship would stress the engagement of satirists with their society and their times and, as a consequence of this level of engagement (together with the equally important aspect of detachment mentioned earlier), the satirist could then be seen as one who is pre-eminently concerned with the way things are (as opposed to the way they are seen to be), rather than someone who is intent on behaving like some kind of moral policeman. This rather modernist view of satire is only a starting-point - and this thesis does not propose that there is only one way of seeing the world. However, it is not simply that, as Knight says, "the satirist is the man who shouts 'Shadows' in a crowded cave."² Satirists are, from this point of view, a kind of enlightened truth-teller - people who are committed to seeing things in a very clear way, as far as that is possible - but (and this is where morality alone becomes irrelevant) they also, by means of various strategies, are intent on freeing others from conformity, while not condemning them to another form of ontological bondage. Thus the satirist as seen here represents an amalgam of qualities: the ability to see life with unusual clarity, and the awareness that there is more than one way of re-presenting the world, but also a sense (greater or lesser) that people should not be forced

¹ Dryden 250.

² Charles A. Knight, "Satire, Speech, and Genre," *Comparative Literature* 44.1 (1992): 28.

into a mould. Satirists do not simply invite their audience to condemn the satirical target, but offer them an opportunity to discover alternative worlds. The satirist's urge to mediate fresh insights has to be tempered by a respect for people's individuality and, although satire has a didactic urge which varies in strength among satirists and can be overpoweringly strong in some, this is still very different from a simple desire to humiliate people and show them up as foolish and venal, not to mention plain wicked.

Of course the issue of morality will never be entirely absent from most kinds of satire, and it is not the intention of this thesis to deny its presence, but to shift the critical focus into a different area. This thesis will claim a privileged status for the satirist's way of re-presenting the world, arguing that it provides more impetus for change than the norm because of satire's particular strategies, as well as its marginal stance. However, alongside these notions there co-exist many others which cut across the image of the satirist set out here, and these will be discussed in due course. It needs to be added that a privileged view is not to be seen either as infallible or as the only possible view. Satirists may indeed be concerned with authenticity, but the trickster element is very strong in them, so that their re-presentation of the world is often heavily flavoured with exaggeration, whimsy, fantasy and other kinds of distortion.

This thesis will argue that both Orwell and Swift exemplify the qualities of satire set out above. The deep involvement of both men in overtly political writing as well as satire emphasises their dual stance: they were both passionate political polemicists, as well as very serious satirists. That all satirists are concerned with conditions in the polis (even if they do not write for specifically political ends) has already been argued: the overt part played in politics by Orwell and Swift serves to highlight this general statement. Satire takes the world as presented through the dominant narrative of any particular society and deliberately distorts that narrative - and this raises questions about the nature of the strategy pursued by satire.

Bruner discusses the way different views of the world are constructed, drawing on the work of the philosopher Nelson Goodman, who speaks of complementary or competing versions of "truth," which lead to the existence of "different worlds." Goodman also maintains that each of these various worlds is not independent of any other "linguistic versions of worlds," and that one affects the other.³ Bruner concludes that Goodman "has made clearer a concept of mind to be specified not in terms of properties but rather as an instrument for producing worlds."⁴ This thesis holds that satire is adept at producing what Bruner calls "multiple perspectives or stances and at entertaining the results as, so to speak, alternative possible worlds."⁵ Satire understands this way of thinking and works within a similar kind of dynamic framework. Satirists offer a version of what might pass for "reality," though it clearly is not so since they have distorted it in some obvious ways. Yet they imply that this version has some important relationship with the world, both as it is and as it might be - and they invite us to grapple with these different worlds and emerge with a new perspective on the reality which we, in turn, have created for ourselves to live in from day to day. Satire is happiest in this kind of liminal space, and its tendency to use provisional strategies such as fantasy, irony and exaggeration facilitates its fabrication of these alternative worlds. Swift's Lilliput and Orwell's Oceania are good examples of satirists' penchant for producing worlds and then encouraging their audience to engage in the challenging project of occupying these worlds for a while.

Feinberg maintains that "instead of emphasizing what is real, satire emphasizes what seems to be real but is not."⁶ This is offered by Feinberg as a comment on the nature of satire, but it can equally be seen as a statement (an incomplete statement) of the tactics used by the satirist to undermine readers' views of "reality" and offer them the opportunity to engage with another view of the world. Feinberg's statement seems fair enough, but it is misleading precisely because of its incompleteness. Satirists do indeed take

³ Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1986) 98-100.

⁴ Bruner 104.

⁵ Bruner 109.

⁶ Leonard Feinberg, *Introduction to Satire* (Ames: Iowa State UP, 1968) 3.

liberties with "reality" - they often exaggerate and distort facts or present us with a fictional account which is patently "unreal" or lacking in naturalism - but they do so with the intention of indicating that there are other versions of the world available.

In *Gulliver's Travels*, for example, Swift offers us a tale that is compounded of irony, burlesque, the grotesque - and a great deal that (as Kristeva says of postmodernist literature) "writes itself with the more or less conscious intention of expanding the signifiable and thus human realm...."⁷ Swift has deliberately confronted us with much that we will be unable to accept as "real," no matter how hard we try. In doing this he has deprived us, as far as he can, of clear links between his fictional world and the world which we see as reality. He has done this not merely in a spirit of anarchy (though satire is by no means lacking in anarchy), but so that we, frustrated with the attempt to relate *Gulliver's Travels* to what we see and think about our immediate surroundings, will capitulate and begin to be aware that reality is not as much a "given" as we have always believed it to be. In this state of betwixt-and-between, readers are more malleable than usual, and Swift would also be hoping to strike home with a didactic point wanting us, as we search for meaning within the text, to take to heart the lessons about human fallibility, folly and pride that underlie this strange text. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the satirical enterprise is rather an uncertain one, largely because of the refusal or inability of satire to dragoon its audience into obedience and its need for their co-operation - aspects which will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. Kernan's view of satire is that it "is not a force that produces social and political consequences, but an elaborate civilized means for letting off steam,"⁸ though that seems rather oversimplified. Swift himself did seem to have reservations about the efficacy of his work, saying in the preface to *A Tale of a Tub* that satirists "might very well spare their Reproof and Correction: For there is not, through all Nature, another so callous and insensible a Member as the *World's Posteriors*,

⁷ Julia Kristeva, "Postmodernism?", *Modernism / Postmodernism*, ed. Peter Brooker (London: Longman, 1992) 199.

⁸ Dustin Griffin, "Venting Spleen," *Essays in Criticism* 40.2 (1990): 130.

whether you apply to it the *Toe* or the *Birch*." ⁹ This has the ring of bitter conviction, though a necessary scepticism demands that nothing satirists say should be taken completely at face value, not least when they are talking about satire.

Orwell, too, in *Animal Farm*, presents us with a world which is far from ours, on one level at least. This is an allegorical world, in which animals represent certain types or even particular human beings but, beneath the fantastic surface of this tale about thinking donkeys and talking pigs lies the nightmare world of a totalitarian state in which people are made into things and ideology comes before human considerations. In many cases the satirist has to make use of obliquity in order to draw the reader into the text, and allegory is only one of the strategies that satirists use for this purpose. Swift, in *Gulliver's Travels*, is addressing a multitude of human faults, both political and personal, but he does so very much as a satirist, rather than, say, a preacher or even the writer of a medieval "complaint." He provides entertainment for the reader in order to sugar the pill of rebuke, and he does this by framing his book as a series of travel stories which are filled with humour and fantasy. Orwell, too, could not afford to be too direct: an important section of the people he was targeting by writing *Animal Farm* was the British Left, whose eyes he wished to open to the mythical nature of Soviet dogma. ¹⁰ It has been said that Orwell was "the conscience of the British Left." ¹¹ He tried to get under the guard of his readers, at least initially, by presenting them with a world cast in the frame of a fairy-tale (as the subtitle to *Animal Farm* announces). Of course, the satirical aspects become obvious very soon - but one of the strongest resources of satire is the power of the story on the mind, and good stories grip one and draw one in, even against one's will. To return to the earlier discussion of Feinberg's remarks: Orwell is indeed not emphasising "reality," but he is presenting us with an alternative world in an effective way, engaging

⁹ Jonathan Swift, *A Tale of a Tub and Other Satires*, ed. and introd. Kathleen Williams (London: Dent, 1975) 29.

¹⁰ George Orwell, Author's Preface to the Ukrainian Edition of *Animal Farm*, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 405.

¹¹ Robert L. Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo, eds., "Extending the Orwellian Moment: An Introduction," *The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World* (Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989) 4.

us by means of the story, but simultaneously immersing us in this bizarre version of totalitarianism - which he has constructed in typical satirical fashion by taking some recognisable facts and people and creating around them an exaggerated (and appalling) political system.

Feinberg makes some general points about the reasons for the satirist's distortion of "reality." He says that satirists aim their writing at an audience that is often either indifferent or hostile to satire. A related point is that every society has institutions which have a vested interest in maintaining their façade of respectability and efficiency, even if venial faults are admitted. Such institutions embody what Bakhtin would call "authoritative discourse" - which is the privileged language which "approaches us from without; it is distanced, taboo, and permits no play within its framing context."¹² Feinberg concludes that there is a "formidable opposition" of "teachers, officials, and writers who insist that unpleasant truths...do not exist" that forces the satirist to exaggerate - to be "unfair."¹³

Even though this view of satire presents it as a counterbalance to existing forms of mental tyranny, it also grants a licence to satirists which may constitute a grave danger to society, for how can one be certain that satirists will not abuse such powers? Satirists need licence, since that is one of their rightful privileges, yet there may be a case for individuals to be protected from such licence when it becomes excessive - though there will never be universal agreement on what exactly constitutes excess in such matters. It has already been shown how satirists distort the world of experience or appearances for their own ends and there is nothing to compel satirists to be responsible when doing this; in other words, there is nothing to prevent satirists from fabricating facts about people and events. Two contemporary satirical publications - the British magazine *Private Eye* and its South African equivalent, *noseWeek* - embody different views of the role of satire. *Private Eye* regularly receives letters from people or organisations named in its columns alleging distortions,

¹² Mikhail Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 424.

¹³ Feinberg, *Introduction to Satire* 13-14.

wrongful and malicious insinuations or blatant untruths on the part of the magazine. It also receives a steady stream of letters from lawyers, claiming that their clients have been insulted and libelled, and threatening legal action unless redress is made. All these are printed by *Private Eye*, each under an arch or whimsical caption, in a spirit of gleeful mockery and devil-may-care nose-thumbing. Some complaints do, in fact, come to court: in 1977 libel suits cost *Private Eye* £85,000 "and readers' donations of £40,000 were essential to keep the paper going," while in 1981 the cost of such suits amounted to £100,000....The annual libel provision had to be doubled."¹⁴ Occasionally an apology will appear in the magazine and the following examples illustrate the type of statements to which some of *Private Eye's* victims have objected. In March 1980 the magazine's apology to a complainant began as follows: "In our issue of 18 February 1980 we published a scurrilous and, indeed, vicious, piece about Rev. Canon David Burgess." ¹⁵ Another retraction apologises "to Ms Booth for any 'distasteful personal reference' to her in our issue of 28 Jan last which she claims was both distressing and insulting. We withdraw unconditionally."¹⁶ Finally, after legal proceedings for libel against *Private Eye* by Sir James Goldsmith, the magazine, in a full-page advertisement in the *London Evening Standard*, "now recognises that any suggestion in the issue of December 12, 1975, that Sir James [Goldsmith] had taken part in a criminal conspiracy was particularly serious and wishes to make it known publicly once and for all that there was not a shred of truth in it." ¹⁷ This, rather than signifying any remorse, is evidence of the persistence and deviousness of satire. Such an apology, by offering an opportunity for the repetition of the original insults while denying them, simply serves to broadcast the allegations even more widely, in this case in another publication whose readership would be different from that of *Private Eye*.

¹⁴ Patrick Marnham, *The Private Eye Story: The First 21 Years* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982) 111.

¹⁵ Marnham 219.

¹⁶ Editorial statement. *Private Eye* 25 March 1983: 11.

¹⁷ Apology. *The Evening Standard* 10 May 1977: 4.

It is useful to compare this with the case of the satirical South African magazine *noseWeek*, which also concerns itself with social and political issues and which has a long record of publishing little-known information about public figures, often to their discomfiture. Recently *noseWeek* was sued by a Dr Robert Hall for defamation, but a supreme court judge found in favour of *noseWeek*. Its editor, Martin Weltz, commented as follows:

When a small, cash-strapped publication like noseWEEK wins against a bold and brazen millionaire, that's cause for celebration.

.....
A man, who noseWEEK...found occasion to merely report and comment on - with some humour, I might add - has now been damned by court order as a preposterous liar who not only created a fake status for himself in politics and society but, as a tax dodger and currency fraudster, stole from the public purse.

.....
Judge Conradie has...found that, by actively promoting himself as a high-profile, highly principled man; by publicly supporting political campaigns and by claiming a quasi-political role as 'unofficial ambassador' for South Africa...Dr Hall had 'thrown away the shield of privacy to the same extent as a public figure and politician'.¹⁸

These two legal battles involving two different satirical magazines raise various issues about satire. A case against satire might be argued from the *Private Eye* matter and a case for satire from the *noseWeek* affair. In fact, it is not that simple, for the two magazines represent two sides of the same coin. If satire is to function properly it has to be given enough freedom to do so. The judgement in the Hall case gives satire considerable licence when it comes to public figures and, indeed, this thesis argues that it is primarily people of influence and power who have their heads above the parapet, as

¹⁸ Martin Weltz, "Dr Hall gets his nose rubbed in press victory," *The Independent on Sunday* 28/29 September 1996: "Sunday Insight" 3.

far as satire is concerned - and that is the way it should be. There will be cases of satirists behaving outrageously, but these (it is argued) will have to be endured by the victim or redressed by the courts. The implication of this is that those who are not tough-minded or rich enough to take legal action will suffer, though even if one wins one remains satirised, as the case of Sir James Goldsmith demonstrates. The degree of acquiescence to this rather harsh situation by any society will depend on how much value that society places on the somewhat equivocal - but arguably very valuable - services of satire.

Private Eye is an extreme case, and this thesis will not argue that satirists are habitually as careless with facts as *Private Eye* sometimes seems to be. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, satirists do distort "reality," for their own purposes. One crude but effective way of distorting "reality" is by over-simplifying it. This can be useful, provided it is seen as only part of the dynamic of satire. When satire over-simplifies issues by abstracting them from their context, it enables them to be viewed in isolation. This may help to focus the audience's attention on such issues, particularly if the issues are of the kind that an audience would gladly skim over if allowed to do so. But, ideally, the audience is part of such a process and, after such issues have been viewed in isolation, the audience is enabled to view them again, this time in the midst of the other factors which operate in conjunction with them. This helps prevent satire from becoming as prescriptive as some of the other discourses discussed in Chapter 3. In other words, to adapt Goffman's terminology, the satirist "reframes" the issues in several ways, as part of the satirical process, and such reframing gives both distance and perspective to issues.¹⁹

This does not always happen, which is one among many reasons why the satirist should not be seen as a legislator, even in a subtle sense, despite the

¹⁹ Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Analysis of Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1974) 10ff.

fact that satire sometimes tries, implicitly, to assume such a role. An example of this is the wistful statement by the satirical cabaret artist, Tom Lehrer, that "If, after hearing my songs, just one person is inspired to say something nasty to a friend, or strike a loved one, it will all have been worth the while [sic]."²⁰ This is very amusing and it could be argued that it is entirely tongue-in-cheek, but there is a sense in which it anarchistically attempts to challenge basic relationships within society, simply for the sake of doing so. Such satire is an essential part of the spectrum of satiric art to which society is exposed, but it could also be seen as evidence that satirists should not be allowed to have the last word. They are not fully-fledged secular prophets, nor are they the only would-be truth-tellers operating in a social context. They are important figures but, in a healthy society, satire will be only one of the factors acting to influence people, within a system of mutual checks and balances. That such a well-balanced system of power relations is only a utopian ideal in any society is one of the important general points made by the dystopian scenario set out in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

There is a tension between the function of satire as a mediator for changed perceptions, on the one hand, and the more egocentric and morally prescriptive stance of many satirists on the other, though such a stance is not always overt. A publication such as *Private Eye* has chosen to adopt a heavily moral stance (not always credibly), particularly towards the behaviour of politicians and powerful industrialists and businessmen, and this is one of the qualities which have gained it a great deal of attention. However, it is arguable that *Private Eye*, by doing this, has gained so much respect that it has sacrificed that aspect of satire which can open its readers' eyes to the possibility of new worlds without influencing them in a directive manner. At its best, satire has always been a healthy alternative voice to the established moral voices of the time, but the satirist does not flourish if given too much attention and respect. In fact more than a minimal amount of acceptance of satirists may impair their marginal status - and if, as sometimes happens, they

²⁰ Ethel Robinson, "Setting sharp satire to a snappy beat," *Weekend Argus* 13 May 1989: Weekender Supplement: 4.

are embraced by society (possibly as a ploy to render them harmless), that is to be seen as the kiss of death for satire. We should view satirists as satirists, not purely as media-people, teachers or psychotherapists - though satirists may indeed adopt aspects of all these roles at times. Swift and Orwell need to be viewed with a certain amount of scepticism and not weighed down with any high degree of social responsibility. If the true mission of satirists is not recognised, they may come to appear as rather cranky (if intelligent) moralisers or philosophers who present us with valid but limited ways of engaging with life. We give satirists a more creative kind of acceptability if we retain for ourselves the right to exercise on their ideas the very freedom to judge, choose and criticise which they claim for themselves. Such a process is not simple because of the evasive quality of satire, which makes it no easy task to decide exactly what satirists are doing or why they are doing it.

What satirists are doing will depend a lot on what they see as their task and on what ethical or moral base (if any) underpins their text. However, satirists are generally unwilling to be pinned down, so whatever they themselves say about their craft or beliefs (on the rare occasions when they reveal the latter) must be viewed with a great deal of scepticism, since such statements may be intended more to sow confusion than to bring any enlightenment. Rosenheim says that "The obliquity or invention which we call satiric fiction is certainly not hospitable to the development of firmly stated principles."²¹ As suggested earlier, a study of satire can focus on its mediatory aspects or on its moralistic qualities (this excludes, for the moment, satire which is written entirely for malicious reasons). But whether we see satirists as ontological movers and shakers or as figures with a certain amount of moral authority, to what degree is it desirable to put ourselves into their hands? It is true that the satirist seems to have a deeply-felt commitment to society but, given the evasive temperament of the satirist, the nature of that commitment cannot easily be measured. In fact satire does not lend itself to easy conclusions, but one way of gaining some degree of clarity on these issues (resolution is not

²¹ Rosenheim 188.

something one can hope for) may be by examining the way satire is seen today, operating within a contemporary environment.

In Chapter 1 of this thesis contemporary satire is described as fragmented,²² though this conclusion is intended to be factual rather than pessimistic. Bearing in mind the way that satire (especially contemporary satire) and postmodernism are portrayed as partners in this thesis, and given the toughness and interrogative quality of both forms, fragmentation is likely to be only the beginning of a journey to a different kind of configuration - and, in the true provisional style which contemporary satire has found in postmodernism, any degree of wholeness reached would again become vulnerable to a process of deconstruction and reconstruction.

Hutcheon asserts that in our time satire has lost its direction and, reflecting the lack of fixed social values in the world in which it finds itself, has collapsed into anarchy and rudderless nastiness:

Satire tends to defend norms; it ridicules in order to bring deviation into line - or it used to. 'Black humor,' today's most common form of satire, seems to many to be a defensive humor of shock, a humor of lost norms, of disorientation, of lost confidence.²³

This, despite being the opinion of a postmodern theorist, is a traditional (and common) view of satire. It regards satire as incorrigibly conservative and irretrievably tied to a fixed set of norms. It sees the demise of moral certainties as marking the end of any meaningful satiric statement. This thesis is certainly more optimistic and, as indicated above, sees this part of the twentieth century as marking the renewal of satire in reworked forms, demonstrating the flexibility and ability to survive that satire has always had. In fact, it is very much a phoenix rather than the dead duck portrayed above.

²² See 25 above.

²³ Linda Hutcheon, *A Theory of Parody: The Teaching of Twentieth-Century Art Forms* (New York: Methuen, 1985) 79.

What can be said about contemporary times is that far fewer texts which can be called purely satirical are currently being produced. Postmodernism has vigorously interrogated every textual form, including satire, and has made the boundaries of genre highly permeable within texts and between texts. Jameson puts it as follows:

It would now seem that, far from becoming extinct, the older genres, released like viruses from their traditional ecosystem, have now spread out and colonized reality itself, which we divide up and file away according to typological schemes which are no longer those of subject matter but for which the alternative topic of style seems somehow inadequate.²⁴

Satire has always shown flexibility as a genre and an amenability to incorporation into a wide range of other genres and forms, and this phenomenon has accelerated during this part of the twentieth century. The influence of postmodernism, sharing as it does many of satire's qualities, has helped it to shake off many aspects of genre which it might have retained from the past. Now, freed from its shackles, though with its questioning and questing spirit preserved, satire is rather close in temper to its ally postmodernism which, being a particularly energetic manifestation of our *Zeitgeist*, has given satire a renewed relevance and credibility.

Satire and postmodernism share an adversarial stance towards the world as it is depicted by "official" discourse, and both tend to react by foregrounding those discourses which "official" culture wishes to ignore or denigrate by marginalising them. Bakhtin has written about the importance of "carnival practices," which have always played a key role in breaking down the fixed positions of "high" and "low" aspects of society by subjecting them to the force of playfulness (with which both postmodernism and satire are often

²⁴ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke UP, 1991) 371.

associated).²⁵ At least one postmodern theorist, McHale, sees Menippean satire, "which initially developed in direct contact with popular carnival...as the dialectical response to the consolidation of 'official' monological literary genres....'Carnivalized' genres such as Menippean satire are in this sense official literature's...parodic double. Postmodernist fiction is the heir of Menippean satire and its most recent historical avatar."²⁶ This reflects the postmodern tendency to mistrust absolute boundaries since, if satire in general is a highly protean mode, Menippean satire is particularly so, with its "motley nature and the variety of its exemplars."²⁷ Though the extended debates sometimes contained in Menippean satire can have the boisterous setting of a banquet or party, Frye regards this as a "species or rather sub-species of the form..."²⁸ In fact, there is also a "purely moral type" of Menippean satire which "is a serious vision of society as a single intellectual pattern, in other words a Utopia,"²⁹ and for Frye a text such as Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* is among the greatest Menippean satires in English. This is Menippean satire as defined by Sherbert as "a kind of intellectual prose satire." He also says that Menippean satire examines utopian ideas critically, aware that such social programmes easily lead to "a tyranny similar to Socrates' *Republic* and Orwell's *1984*."³⁰ According to Bakhtin, the Menippean satirist challenges orthodox philosophical ideas, with satire here undermining accepted discourses.³¹ The views of both Frye and Bakhtin, as well as the notions of utopia and dystopia generally, are relevant to the later chapters of this thesis, where *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are discussed in detail.

Postmodernism and satire also have common concerns in the areas of parody, allegory and the fantastic (all non-linear strategies), though they often differ widely in their definition and use of these forms. McHale sees parody as

²⁵ M.M. Bakhtin, introduction, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Helene Iswolsky (1965; Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984) 20-1.

²⁶ McHale, *Postmodernist Fiction* (New York: Methuen, 1987) 164, 172.

²⁷ Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction* 32.

²⁸ Frye 311.

²⁹ Frye 310.

³⁰ Sherbert, 1, 13.

³¹ Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction* 32.

something healthily antiseptic that any text can employ as "a form of self-reflection and self-critique, a genre's way of thinking critically about itself."³² But Baudrillard suggests that we now have unintentional parody,³³ which seems to regard parody as lacking in animus and perhaps rather decadent, while Jameson refuses to allow that parody can be valid in a postmodern setting, maintaining that pastiche - a "neutral practice of...mimicry, without parody's ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter" - has taken the place of parody. He argues that the effect of parody is "to cast ridicule on...[particular] stylistic mannerisms and their...eccentricity with respect to the way people normally speak or write." Literary parody thus assumes that there is a linguistic norm against which the deficiencies of other kinds of discourse will be evident. And what is happening now, according to Jameson, is that belief in the existence of "normal language, or speech" is waning. There is an immense process of "fragmentation and privatization of modern literature," with different groups and professions each speaking their own variety of discourse, each of which has come to be seen as valid and acceptable. In such a case there is no linguistic norm for parody to use.³⁴ While Jameson sees parody as limited to literary texts (a rather un-postmodern stance), satire, ever unwilling to be confined (and not ever an exclusively literary form), practises other kinds of parody as well, in which social and individual norms, philosophies and practices are grist to its mill - this kind of parody approaching burlesque. For example, in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Orwell parodies the actions and philosophy of dictatorships, as well as the concept of utopia (and he may well be parodying the utopian novels of the past, too). In *Animal Farm* he also parodies the fairy-tale, though there is little attempt to ridicule it. The fact that the humour in these novels is indeed black does not preclude parody. There is a certain amount of dark - even grisly - humour in a Punch and Judy show, in which everyday life is parodied.

³² McHale 145.

³³ Margaret A. Rose, *The Postmodern and the Post-Industrial* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 70.

³⁴ Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," *Modernism / Postmodernism*, ed. Peter Brooker (London: Longman, 1992) 166.

The truth is that, despite Jameson's contention, reports of parody's death are greatly exaggerated. His rather utopian (he would say dystopian) reasoning presumes that postmodernism has caused every group of people to accept with equanimity individual languages and private discourses which differ from their own. In reality, human weakness will ensure that parody survives, since there will always be people who are willing to laugh at the "otherness" of discourses different from their own, because of certain social, cultural or political values such discourses carry or simply because one's neighbour, if at all different, is usually a handy target. It is ironic that satire in general (of which parody can be an invaluable ingredient) thus relies for its existence on the fallen nature of the human race, while at the same time often claiming to want to remedy that fallenness by reforming people.

Hutcheon firmly claims parody as an important aspect of postmodernism, choosing to foreground an aspect of parody which is not new, but which has become the most practised in postmodernist art of all kinds:

The function of parody was often to be the malicious, denigrating vehicle of satire, a role it continues to play to this day in some forms of parody...[But] the kind of parody upon which I wish to focus is an integrated structural modelling process of revising, replaying, inverting, and 'trans-contextualizing' previous works of art. Perhaps the archetypal manifestation of this process is what is now called Postmodern architecture.³⁵

What Hutcheon is doing is both acknowledging the traditional close co-operation between satire and parody, and then going on to say that parody, when it abandons satire for something like irony, can achieve very different objectives on its own: "It can be a serious criticism, not necessarily of the parodied text; it can be a playful, genial mockery of codifiable forms. Its range

³⁵ Hutcheon, *Parody* 11.

of intent is from respectful admiration to biting ridicule." ³⁶ Parody is thus potentially either challenging and radical, or a more conservative force which recontextualises and reinforces norms by imitating and juxtaposing them. To some degree, it can be both at the same time.

Finally, Hutcheon distinguishes between the targets of parody and satire: parody's target is "intramural," while satire's is "extramural." ³⁷ In other words, (literary) parody finds its targets in the world of already existing texts and its frame of reference is limited by the texts it chooses to parody, so that it is, in one sense, a parasitic form. Satire, on the other hand, is a form which is closely in touch with the "world" outside the text, since it sets out to address specific historical and cultural (or even personal) issues and works them into the text for examination and comment. This is an aspect which will become crucial in later chapters which demonstrate the impact that political ideologies and historical events have in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

A second element in which both postmodernism and satire have a stake is allegory, though postmodern forms of it are often looser. It is of the essence of this form that it operates on at least two levels, which readers either hold in their minds simultaneously or between which they move. Both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* can be seen as allegories, the first an animal allegory and the latter an allegory which sets the present against another world which is a projection into the future. Leyburn sees the movement between the levels of an allegory as more of a moment of recognition within a kind of "time-lag" - the "brief interval in which the reader makes the adjustment between the apparent meaning and the real one...." ³⁸ The postmodern notion of allegory is more dynamic though, stressing continuous movement rather than a single transition from one level to another. This makes available a greater flexibility in the use of allegory, giving writers the freedom to use more varied approaches when employing this literary form.

³⁶ Hutcheon, *Parody* 15-16.

³⁷ Hutcheon, *Parody* 54.

³⁸ Ellen Douglass Leyburn, *Satiric Allegory: Mirror of Man* (Westport: Greenwood P, 1978) 10.

McHale, who maintains that postmodernist writing has revived allegory, shows how the nature of allegory springs directly from its roots in metaphor:

Postmodernist writing seeks to foreground the ontological *duality* of metaphor, its participation in two frames of reference with different ontological statuses....All metaphor *hesitates* between a literal function (in a secondary frame of reference) and a metaphorical function (in a 'real' frame of reference). Postmodernist texts often *prolong* this hesitation as a means of foregrounding ontological structure.³⁹

This approximates to Leyburn's "brief interval of adjustment." However, in postmodernist allegory the writer consciously manipulates this interval in order to prevent the easy, straightforward access to meaning and lack of anxiety offered by the structuralist model of signifier and signified (there will be more detailed discussion of this issue in the next chapter). The mechanism of allegory then, is simply that of metaphor writ large. Allegory occurs when the metaphorical trope is inflated to what McHale calls the "limits of the text."

The result is a text-long trope which preserves the two-level ontological structure of metaphor (literal frame of reference, metaphorical frame of reference), but in which...the two-level structure...[is] disseminated throughout the text.⁴⁰

An example of this might be the way Orwell in his parodic novel *Animal Farm* directs readers simultaneously to both Britain and the Soviet Union throughout, not allowing them to settle at either level for any length of time. But, according to McHale's arguments, Orwell's use of allegory here would be seen as conventional rather than postmodern because Orwell does not prolong the natural hesitation between levels which is found in all types of allegory.

³⁹ McHale 134.

⁴⁰ McHale 140.

Some postmodernist writers do use conventional allegory, but others, as McHale shows, offer texts which seem to contain allegorical meaning, while the allegory remains elusive and unresolved:

[N]othing is actually an allegory; the trope seems to lack a specific literal level or frame of reference....Every expression belongs simultaneously to several frames of reference, none of them identifiable as the basic world of the text, relative to which other frames are metaphorical; instead, there is a perpetual jostling and jockeying for position among a plurality of simultaneously present...worlds.⁴¹

This strongly resembles Nelson Goodman's notion of complementary or competing versions of "truth," leading to the existence of "different worlds."⁴²

The dynamic and playful quality of McHale's view of allegory is typical of postmodernism, offering as it does an open-endedness of both process and viewpoint:

[I]f there are *several* distinguishable allegorical meanings, then the literal level circulates among them, so to speak, never coming to rest. In short, indeterminate allegory is a means of inducing an ontological oscillation, the same hesitation or 'slow flicker' that characterizes other types of tropological world.⁴³

What is clear from the above discussion is that both previous and postmodern views of allegory see two distinct levels involved in the process of allegory, with a hesitation or pause occurring as the reader comes to terms with the message of the trope. But the traditional view regards the process as something that is predictable and happens once and for all, while for

⁴¹ McHale 141.

⁴² See 39 above.

⁴³ McHale 142.

postmodernism the process of the two levels coming together occurs continuously, with different elements combining, breaking up and then re-combining with other elements to make yet other patterns of meaning. The allegorical elements in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are not postmodern in nature, but postmodernist allegorical practice serves to interrogate them and gauge their effectiveness - and show them, by contrast, to be representative of their own time. In general Orwell's use of allegory is, by postmodernist standards, closed and unstimulating, yet these qualities sit well with the oppressed state of society that Orwell is portraying.

The final topic to be dealt with in this chapter is fantasy which, in the broad sense, is an important ingredient of satire. McHale makes the point that "Postmodernist fiction has close affinities with the genre of the fantastic" ⁴⁴ since the postmodern in literature is characterised by what Kristeva calls "its fantasies or language-defying style." ⁴⁵ This discussion is not concerned with the fantasy romances of writers such as C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien, which avoid the difficulties of confrontation that more radical fantasies face up to. Their worlds are closed, avoiding the creative risks which come when a fantasy writer acknowledges and confronts a world outside that of the text. There is thus - to draw on the earlier discussion of parody - no "ontological flicker" in their texts. The opposite kind of fantasy, which is flexible and creative, is described by Jackson as follows:

[M]any fantasies from the late eighteenth century onwards attempt to undermine dominant philosophical and epistemological orders. They subvert and interrogate nominal unities of time, space and character, as well as questioning the possibility, or honesty, of fictional representation of these unities. Like the grotesque, with which it overlaps, the fantastic can be seen as an art of estrangement, resisting closure, opening structures which categorize experience in the name of a 'human reality'. ⁴⁶

⁴⁴ McHale 74.

⁴⁵ Kristeva 202.

⁴⁶ Rosemary Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (London: Methuen, 1981) 175.

There can be no doubt that satire often shares this subversive - aggressive, even - stance with both fantasy and postmodernism. But the element of fantasy is also present in satire in a more complex way, involving the fabrication by satirists of a false or fantasy world which they then induce their audience to inhabit, for the duration of the satire - a strategy which can plainly be seen in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. This involves a kind of game of which the audience is completely conscious and to which it willingly submits, agreeing to suspend its disbelief and, for a fixed period, accept the world of the satire as at least a conceivable one. This is a procedure which raises all kinds of questions about the integrity of the satirist and the nature of what is seen as "reality," as well as the relationship between language and cultural constructs and beliefs. These are some of the issues which constitute the core of the next chapter, in which various cultural discourses, some of them very powerful, will also be examined, in relation to satire. In particular, there will be an engagement with the poststructuralist debate surrounding language and meaning, with satire being viewed in this context.

Chapter 3 Satire and the Contemporary World: Ways of Seeing and Being

This thesis has discussed the issue of re-presentation in relation to the satirist - and has referred to the way satirists offer their audiences alternative viewpoints by metaphorically inserting a crowbar into their fixed view of the world, thus causing a shift to a more provisional stance. These worlds are not necessarily offered as new ontological homes for the audience to occupy as much as new places to stand which may alter the way it sees its own world. These alternative worlds are constructed by the manipulation of language, and the audience accepts their fictional quality, while at the same time giving itself to the experience offered by satire. This chapter aims to deepen this discussion, using the theoretical framework set up by Saussure, and then tracing its development via the contributions of the deconstructionists. Many of the theoretical views of the latter also form part of the personality of satire: the urge to be playful and dismantle structures, with the intention to "defamiliarise" the known world, as Russian formalism has it. Finally, satire will be put into a dialogic relationship with some important socio-political discourses which function alongside it to influence the way people view their world: psychoanalysis, ideology, political myth and propaganda. These are discourses which have come into their own during this century, and which have a particularly close bearing on the two Orwell novels which serve as key texts in this thesis.

The structuralist view is that language takes the form of deep, largely unconscious structures and, since language is embedded in society, the latter is also structured in an identical way. The structure of language is self-contained and, therefore, so is the way in which members of that language group view society or the reality around them, since reality is apprehended by means of language. Thus, from the structuralist point of view, one can say that all members of the same society or language group view reality in the same way.

Satirists, working through and with words, manipulate them and the reader, at the same time managing to disrupt the particular view of reality that that society has. Disruption at such a deep level implies an intimate knowledge of the way that society functions and a thorough awareness of its beliefs and taboos, expressed and (especially) unexpressed. The satirist, then, works from within society: satire is an "inside job." This suggests that it cannot be written by an outsider - or that an outsider must become an "honorary insider" in order to write satire. Yet, at the same time, the satirist is essentially an outsider or "fringe" person. The point discussed earlier needs constantly to be borne in mind: satirists must know the society they are satirising but, simultaneously, they must be able to stand outside it, in order to see it clearly enough to attack it (and to launch such an attack in a spirit of glee rather than guilt). This kind of equivocal stance gives the satirist greater freedom and manoeuvrability - and attacks from one who has an intimate knowledge of a society, but whose status is to some degree that of an outsider, are particularly disturbing. That satire wishes to disturb (to say the least) is obvious, whether it is simply ruffling the smooth surface of accepted patterns of behaviour by creating laughter at their expense or causing society to react with pain and indignation by planting a barb in one of its most sensitive parts.

It has already been noted that satirists are usually feared and mistrusted. They are feared for the power of ridicule that they wield, and also because many people, aware that they too secretly practise the vice that is being attacked, feel threatened by the satire. But satirists are at their most threatening when they disrupt the average person's view of reality to a marked degree. The reason why satire so often evokes anger in particular is that disruption of one's view of reality is intensely disturbing - and this leads to anger, as well as various defensive ploys on the part of society. These could include censorship and / or imprisonment, or even cruder moves to detract from the credibility of the satirist. For example, Swift was referred to by certain critics in both the eighteenth and nineteenth century as mad;¹ while the Soviet

¹ Donald M. Berwick, *The Reputation of Jonathan Swift 1781-1882* (New York: Haskell House, 1941) 4,7,121.

authorities detained dissidents (among whom there were certainly satirists) in mental institutions as "insane." Zimbardo relates how, twenty-five years after *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was published, a Soviet dissident, Viktor Feinberg, forcibly committed to a mental hospital, was told, "Your release depends on your behavior....Your illness consists of dissenting opinions. As soon as you renounce them and adopt a correct point of view, we will let you go."² The ultimate form of rejection, perhaps, is to call people mad because one is frightened of what they think or say - and this is what happens to Winston in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Finally, society can combat satire by stressing ways of looking at life that are inimical to satire (e.g. sentimentality, blind patriotism) or it can absorb the satirical viewpoint into itself by embracing it, thus robbing satire of its "outsider" status (e.g. Dr. Piet Koornhof agreeing to appear as himself in one of Pieter-Dirk Uys's early satirical films). The Australian satirist, Max Gillies, says that "to be embraced by his satiric target is an occupational hazard for the satirist."³ Schechter says that Lyndon B. Johnson "knew how to dry up the pens of satirists: ask them for autographed cartoons [of Johnson]."⁴ Schechter also notes how Robert Walpole applauded verses against himself in *The Beggar's Opera* - and even led the cries for an encore.

Satirists are acutely aware of the way language structures reality, and they are expert at exposing the tenuous quality of apparently fixed meaning. In the structuralist model set up by Saussure he stresses that language is a convention, a "social bond," existing outside the individual and "only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by its members."⁵ This social contract, whereby each word in a language refers to a particular element of reality, ensures that each member of that society visualises the same version of reality whenever any word is spoken or read. Saussure is very aware that language is far more

² Philip G. Zimbardo, "Mind Control: Political Fiction and Psychological Reality," *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*, ed. Peter Stansky (New York: Freeman, 1983) 209.

³ Max Gillies, "Satire," interview with Helen Thomson, *Meanjin* 45.2 (1986): 220.

⁴ Joel Schechter, "The Theater of Satire, or Politicians and the Arts," *Before his Eyes: Essays in Honor of Stanley Kauffmann*, ed. Bert Cardullo (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986) 123.

⁵ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin, eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger (1915; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966) 14.

than simply a "name-giving system" ⁶ since it gives meaning to the world around us, and that is crucial to our sense of ontological certainty. Saussure notes how, in the case of "primitive" people, "each nation believes in the superiority of its idiom and is quick to regard the man who uses a different language as incapable of speaking." ⁷ As noted earlier, this is one of the ways of thinking which satire exploits - and it certainly does not apply only to "primitive" people. ⁸ In other words, Saussure is saying that one's language defines one's world and, for each individual, his or her language is *the* world. As Wittgenstein has it, "The world is *my* world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of [my] *language*...mean the limits of *my* world."⁹ Thus when satirists disrupt a society's view of its world they are also violating this structuralist social contract linking society's view of the world to its language.

The way in which Saussure sets out his theory throws some light on how satirists, by working with language, are able to affect not simply the perceptions but also the unconscious structures of their audience and (if the satirical effects are efficacious) those of their society as well. Saussure sees each word of a language (linguistic "sign") as consisting of "a concept and a sound-image," which he refers to as the "signified" and the "signifier" respectively. "The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our sense." We can, after all, talk to ourselves without movement of lips or tongue. "The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity....The two elements [of signifier and signified] are intimately united, and each recalls the other. Whether we try to find the meaning of the Latin word 'arbor' or the word that Latin uses to designate the concept 'tree', it is clear that only the associations sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality, and we disregard whatever others might be imagined." ¹⁰ Saussure goes on to insist on the arbitrariness of the bond between signifier and signified, the

⁶ Saussure, 16.

⁷ Saussure 191.

⁸ See 51-2 above.

⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (1921; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961) 115.

¹⁰ Saussure 66 - 7.

connection between them being based on convention or collective behaviour within the society.

This thesis will argue that the satirist (among others) does not feel bound to honour this arbitrary bond between language and reality - though the language worlds set up by satire are hardly less arbitrary. However, in an age where doubt is endemic, this is no drawback: in fact, some decades ago literary texts were acknowledged to have lacunae or "spots of indeterminacy"¹¹ which the reader's involvement is required to make whole, such a process indicating that texts are not available, initially at least, in a neatly finished-off form. This spirit of provisionality is related to the issue of liminality, which will figure in later discussion - both strongly marked qualities of post-structuralist theories of language. It is to some of these theories - those representing deconstruction and postmodernism - that we shall soon turn, as these are ideas which are extremely useful in discussing the strategies of the satirist and the psychotherapist, as well as the propagandist, the ideologist and the political myth-maker. The latter three, interested as they all are in altering the way other people view reality, are foremost among those who have, so to speak, exploited the weakness of Saussure's model, for their own ends.

Saussure was very much of his time. There is a strong affinity between Saussure, Durkheim (the father of modern sociology) and Freud (the father of modern psychology), in that all three offer what Culler calls a "structural rather than a causal explanation"¹² for the way the world works. For these men, society is not the result of individual behaviour; rather, "behaviour is made possible by collective systems which individuals have assimilated...."¹³ though they are not conscious of these systems. Culler concludes as follows:

¹¹ Roman Ingarden: *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*, trans. and introd. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973) 246-54.

¹² Jonathan Culler, *Ferdinand de Saussure*, Penguin Modern Masters Ser. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976) 77.

¹³ Culler, *Ferdinand de Saussure* 75.

By internalizing origins, removing them from temporal history [as Saussure, Durkheim and Freud, all did] one creates a new space of explanation which has come to be called the unconscious. It is not so much that the unconscious replaces the historical series; rather it becomes the space where any antecedents which have an explanatory function are located. Structural explanation relates actions to a system of norms - the rules of a language, the collective representations of a society, the mechanisms of a psychological economy - the concept of the unconscious is a way of explaining how these systems have explanatory force. It is a way of explaining how they can be simultaneously unknown yet effectively present.¹⁴

Both the satirist and the psychotherapist are concerned, in their very different ways, with aspects of the unconscious, and their avowed aim is creative change. Psychotherapists use their awareness of unconscious structures to help people understand themselves better, while satirists use it to provoke and / or cajole people into an altered view of the world which will, satirists hope, lead to altered beliefs and behaviour (though this is something also aimed at by many psychotherapists).

What satirists do is to disrupt society's view of the world by distorting or upsetting the linguistic (and therefore cultural) codes which form part of the internal structure of that society. What they do, in Saussure's terminology (though not at all on his terms), is to shift or disturb the settled and smoothly functioning relationship between the signifier and the signified, inducing a pause and / or a change in the linkage between words and the ideas or things to which they refer. This results in uneasiness and uncertainty in the audience, making it easier for the satirist either to provoke them by redefining the relationship on his or her own terms or use some other strategy which will make the audience aware of the arbitrariness and vulnerability of such a relationship and force them to re-examine it themselves. These two

¹⁴ Culler, *Ferdinand de Saussure* 80.

passages, from the beginning and the middle respectively of Swift's *A Modest Proposal*, can be used to illustrate the point:

I think it is agreed by all Parties, that this prodigious Number of Children in the Arms, or on the Backs, or at the *Heels* of their *Mothers*...is in the present deplorable State of the Kingdom, a very great additional Grievance; and therefore, whoever could find out a fair, cheap, and easy Method of making these Children sound and useful Members of the Commonwealth, would deserve so well of the Publick, as to have his Statue set up for a preserver of the Nation. ¹⁵

In this passage Swift casts his net particularly wide and only the most cynical or sour of his audience would not find themselves giving a large measure of assent to what is being said here by the satiric persona. The average reader is drawn into what seems to be a highly rational and praiseworthy statement of concern marked, apparently, by a sympathy which must gain the audience's respect and attention.

The second passage, however, has very different implications and results:

I have been assured by a very knowing *American* of my acquaintance that a young healthy Child, well nursed, is, at a Year old, a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome Food; whether *Stewed, Roasted, Baked, or Boiled*; and I make no doubt, that it will equally serve in a *Fricasie* or *Ragoust*. ¹⁶

On encountering this second passage readers are suddenly put under enormous pressure to revise their assessment of the satiric persona - and that is entirely because of certain signifiers in the first passage which have, in

¹⁵ Swift, *Tale* 255.

¹⁶ Swift, *Tale* 257.

the light of the second passage, been completely wrenched from their sockets, so to speak. There is an unexpected though miniscule hesitation as the readers realise that there has been a shift, and then they have to adjust to the fact that these signifiers now point to a series of completely different signifieds. The signifiers "fair," "preserver," "deplorable," "sound" and "useful," which in the earlier passage signified an attitude of caring and concern, have here in retrospect been made to signify a callous and distantiated stance which regards the poor as no more than a public nuisance. Similarly, the many signifiers in the second passage which normally have as their signifieds various pleasant aspects relating to cooking and eating, point instead to a proposal of cannibalism as a means of reducing the numbers of indigent people, replacing the reader's pleasure with horror. It is not merely that certain signifiers now have different signifieds, but that these shifts have collectively created a new and markedly uncomfortable world with which the reader must now cope. By no mental or verbal juggling are readers able to re-establish the status quo: they must either accept Swift's new world at face value (and most readers would find this very difficult) or they must accept the challenge this new world offers to explore the assumptions and conditions prevailing in their own everyday world. The readers have been winkled out of their snug ontological corner and may well feel angry and betrayed, as though some unfair trick had been played on them, and they would be right. But it is the kind of trick that might just lead the reader to grapple, for a while, with the problem of language and meaning, and examine some of the moral bases of society, both in Swift's time and in the present.

Yet anger is by no means the only reaction evoked by satire and, often, the satirist's audience will be torn between anger and laughter, as well as several other emotions. On the other hand, in some cases, as with the dystopian novels of Orwell, laughter will be absent, though the effect of the satire on the audience may be devastating. Examples of this in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are the name of the secret police torture centre ("The Ministry of Love"), and, even less subtly, various slogans used by the state, such as "War is Peace" and "Freedom is Slavery." It is certainly fair to say that the satirist's brand of

linguistic disruption has some marked effect on the readers: it catches them somewhere, often either on the raw or on the funny-bone, or both. There is, though, a marked difference between an audience's reaction to a satirist and its reaction to a humorist. The difference arises mainly from the divergent intentions of the humorist and the satirist, as well as their differing perceptions of their respective arts. Humour admits, by implication, its social and political impotence, but satire, partly by its stance and partly by its choice of target, behaves (whether justified or not) as though it has a greater effect on its audience than simply to amuse them. Humour is one of the weapons or strategies of satirists, but it is not their end, and the satirist is both more hostile and more in earnest than the humorist. Satirists wish to involve their audience in a dialogic process and they try to bring various attitudes and preconceptions of their auditors to consciousness, in this case in order to broaden awareness, but also to criticise them and exercise the satirist's didactic function upon them. Above all, satirists try to force the audience to react - to rob the audience of their ability to be neutral when confronted by satire. In the face of satire, members of an audience (short of walking out of the auditorium or closing the book) must either undergo an inner struggle to defend their accustomed position or give in to satire's pressure for more openness.

Satirists are emerging from the pages of this thesis as aggressive people and that is not inaccurate, though such aggression is committed with a particular aim in mind: to make people examine both the hidden assumptions and the everyday events of their society and, perhaps, become aware of the faultlines in that society. Russian formalism has evolved some theories about art in general which have relevance to satire and aggression in particular. These theories, according to Jameson, are "based on the opposition between habituation and perception, between mechanical and thoughtless performance and a sudden awareness of the very textures of the world and language [which art can bring about]." ¹⁷Viktor Shklovsky, one of the founders

¹⁷ Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton: Prince UP, 1972) 50.

of Russian formalism, defined art as "a defamiliarization, a making strange...of objects, a renewal of perception...Art is in this context a way of restoring conscious experience, of breaking through deadening and mechanical habits of conduct...and allowing us to be reborn to the world in its existential freshness and horror." ¹⁸ The concept of defamiliarization is particularly relevant to satire since - whether one looks at *A Modest Proposal* or *Animal Farm* - an important part of satiric strategy is to disrupt the unthinking world of the average person, precisely in order to "make strange" this world. Also significant is Shklovsky's point about "restoring conscious experience," which is very much the kind of process desired by satire, in some ways akin to the psychotherapist's aim of reintegrating repressed memory into the fabric of consciousness.

Russian formalism, as described by Hawkes, proposes very ungentle ways of furthering the defamiliarizing or alienating purpose of art "to shock us out of the anaesthetic grip our language maintains on our perceptions." Hawkes, still speaking of the formalist standpoint, reminds us of Saussure's view "that native speakers tend to assume a necessary 'fitness', an unquestionable 'identity' between signifier and signified, between the 'sound image' made by the word 'tree', and the concept of an actual tree. This assumption is the basis of language's anaesthetic function." ¹⁹ Roman Jakobson, a formalist himself, argues that the poet's task "requires him to refuse to permit that anaesthetic to operate." According to him, "The function of poetry is to point out that the sign is not identical with its referent." The "poet's attitude to language... 'wakes up' the reader, and makes him see the structure of his language, and so that of his 'world', anew." ²⁰ Foulkes, commenting on Maynard Solomon's notion that " 'art is itself...a strategy of demystification, a withdrawal...into a different order of reality....' ", says, "A demystifying art...is by its nature a subversive and questioning art. It challenges habits and modes of perception, and produces new ways of seeing and interpreting processes and relationships. To do this successfully, it must be unpredictable, surprising, even

¹⁸ Jameson, *Prison-House* 50 -1.

¹⁹ Terence Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics* (London: Methuen, 1978) 70.

²⁰ Hawkes 70.

shocking...." ²¹ Finally, in a formulation which is of crucial importance to this discussion of satire, Jakobson sees poetry as "a deliberate 'deformation' of ordinary language: it is 'organized violence committed on ordinary speech'."²²

As can be seen, Russian formalism encourages an attacking stance on the part of art in general, and poetry in particular - and it envisages such an attack as being conducted in precisely the way this thesis has proposed that satire functions: by undermining the link between the signifier and the signified, and in this way pulling the carpet out from underneath language itself. As a plan of action for art in general this may, in practice, often be somewhat far-fetched and liable to remain a theoretical concept - but it could function very comfortably as a manifesto for the practice of satire, since it is satire that most obviously has the requisite qualities to put such a plan into action. This thesis claims a special standing for satire, since it is satire that is consistently aggressive in a particularly ferocious and concentrated way, largely because it is not motivated by aesthetic considerations, but by the satirical animus. Satire functions unimpeded by any serious considerations of genre, conventional plot, style or desire to entertain its audience (except as part of its strategy of war), so that it can concentrate its energies on attacking the factitious, the corrupt and the ridiculous. If, as Jakobson says, poetry in general is "organized violence committed on ordinary speech," then satirists are the Genghis Khans of literary art, in their deliberate and conscious attitude of Schadenfreude towards both language and commonly-held views.

The attacking nature of satire has already been discussed in relation to ancient Irish satirists. ²³ Randolph says that the Celtic satirist often "meant to destroy his victim, flesh, bone, nerve, and sinew," as well as the victim's possessions and relations. What was intended was "word-death." Alternatively, the intention was often "to mutilate the victim's face so shamefully that, if he were a man, he could hold no high tribal office; and if it were a woman, she should be repulsive to those who might love her....Few

²¹ A.P. Foulkes, *Literature and Propaganda* (London: Methuen, 1983) 56.

²² Hawkes 71.

²³ See 15 above.

[early Irish] satires...preserved to us fail to include the idea of physical mutilation or destruction, an idea which the early Irish terms for satire and satirists persistently stress."²⁴ Even when this ceased to be literally the case, the idea of causing some kind of harm to one's victim remained an integral part of satire. Renaissance theory on satire almost invariably involved words such as scourge, whip, surgeon's scalpel, cauterizing iron, flay, cut, purge, culprit, victim, whipper and executioner.²⁵ William Rankin, in 1598, wrote, "I am a Satyre...savage is my sport."²⁶ Randolph asserts that satire lost its savagery towards the end of the seventeenth century, when there was more concentration on "Reason...Will, the workings of his mind, and [people's] place in and in relation to society...." Satire then became more philosophical and psychological in the eyes of both critics and practitioners.²⁷ But this thesis regards Randolph's view as over-simplified, true only on the surface - and the real inner nature of satire remains one of redness in tooth and claw, despite the polished veneer of most Augustan satire. In any case, Swift speaks of satirists kicking or beating the world's posteriors²⁸ - and if one turns to modern satire, Nigel Dempster, a writer for *Private Eye*, is on record as saying that people who "put themselves in the public eye must be aware that they may be chastised."²⁹ More recently, Real has suggested that satire's aims can be seen as those of "'demolition experts', of geniuses for 'intellectual slum-clearance'...."³⁰

As it is clear that satire sets out, with some degree of force, to attack the foundations of structuralism, one can safely say that it belongs among the "demolition experts" and that its allegiance lies with those who are the "intellectual slum-clearers" of our time. In fact, as suggested earlier in this thesis, satire has strong familial associations with post-structuralism,

²⁴ Mary Claire Randolph, "The Medieval Concept in English Renaissance Satiric Theory," *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 137- 8.

²⁵ Randolph 135.

²⁶ O.J. Campbell, "The Elizabethan Satyr-Satirist and his Satire," *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 89.

²⁷ Randolph 135.

²⁸ See 40-1 above.

²⁹ Richard Ingrams (ed. *Private Eye*), interview, *Tonight*, BBC 1, London, 27 October 1976.

³⁰ Real 9.

specifically postmodernism, with its significant component of deconstruction. Norris puts it as follows: "Deconstruction is avowedly 'post-structuralist' in its refusal to accept the idea of structure as in any sense given or objectively 'there' in a text. Above all, it questions the assumption...that structures of meaning correspond to some deep-laid mental 'set' or pattern of mind which determines the limits of intelligibility."³¹

It has been shown how satire operates in terms of Saussure's signifier and signified, shifting or disturbing the link between these two, giving the audience pause (in both senses) and inducing a change in the linkage between words and the objects or ideas to which they refer. What deconstruction does is similar, though more radical than this. It also challenges the fixed nature of the sign but, after it has disturbed the link between the signifier and the signified, it suspends the usual process of communication of meaning and sets in motion what Norris calls "the disconcerting 'free play' of signs"³² - the "giddy motion of pure *differance*,"³³ which may have no end. The genesis of this latter term is attributed to Derrida, the father of deconstruction, who has taken the Saussurean notion that it is the binary "difference" between terms that allows them to exist and coined the term "différance," which subsumes the French meanings of both differing and deferring - two aspects which, for Derrida, are what always mark the sign and make for the inherent quality of delay in the full communication of meaning. In other words, there was already a gap (or delay) between the signifier and the signified, ready to be deconstructed. What Derrida does is to drive a large wedge into this gap, and make it into an ontological abyss. In fact, he has exploited the possibilities offered by Saussure's notion of the sign by deconstructing it, uncovering the faultline between signifier and signified which was not expressed by Saussure but always existed. In short, as Atkins puts it, "[d]econstructionists wish to avoid the interpretive mastery of closure that imports *into* texts and the world meaning as transcendent truth or

³¹ Christopher Norris, *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice* (London: Methuen, 1982) 3.

³² Norris 59.

³³ Norris 60.

significance, outside the play of difference." ³⁴ Satire is not willing to go quite as far as deconstruction in rejecting closure entirely, yet it does have a reluctance to accept easy and ready closure of the sign, since this would suggest a conservative and inflexible view of the world. In addition, both satire and deconstruction are concerned with the matter of "play," in both senses of the word: they both import a quality of flexibility into the fixity of the structuralist paradigm, and they also insist that, within the pause or deferred state of the link between the signifier and the signified, there should be an opportunity for play, in the most childlike sense of the word. They are temperamentally opposed to the po-faced rigidity of epistemology (indeed, they assume that we cannot "know," in that self-satisfied way) and wish to encourage a provisional and ontological approach towards language and meaning, in which there is room for the childlike quality mentioned above.

It is a major contention of this thesis that satire is not, in essence, prescriptive, but dialogic. Among the foremost discourses which share this dialogic quality is psychoanalysis. In chapter 5 there will be further examination of this issue in the light of the relationship between O'Brien and Winston (in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*), which is on one level a parody of the traditional relationship between psychoanalyst and patient. The arguments about the use and abuse of psychoanalysis and psychiatry are very wide-ranging, encompassing a whole spectrum ranging from the determined professionalism of the majority of contemporary practitioners ³⁵ to the wilful betrayal of their calling by some psychologists in the former Soviet Union (for example) who countenanced the transformation of mental hospitals into places of torture for political dissidents:

What Lenin was prescribing, and what he began to put into effect, was...a process of purification....The place for those classed as undesirables was in concentration camps or, for political

³⁴ Douglas G. Atkins, *Reading Deconstruction, Deconstructive Reading* (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1983) 29.

³⁵ See, for example, Nikolas Rose, "Psychiatry as a Political Science: Advanced Liberalism and the Administration of Risk" *History of the Human Sciences* 9:2 (1996): 2-23.

opponents, in lunatic asylums. Such camps and asylums were already operating by 1918 [a year after the revolution].³⁶

It is not the intention of this thesis to cover all the arguments on this issue. However, the dialogic relationship established above between satire and the psychological approach is intended to explore whether either discourse offers a real degree of free thought and action to those it addresses. In the case of psychology, this can only be so if this discourse is engaged in a constant process of re-evaluation and self-examination, and of dialogism within itself, of which the writings of David Epston and Michael White, under the influence of postmodern thinking, show interesting signs:

If we accept [as Foucault has it] that power and knowledge are inseparable...and if we accept that we are simultaneously undergoing the effects of power and exercising power over others, then we will be unable to take a benign view of our own practices....We would work to identify the context of ideas in which our practices are situated....This would enable us to more readily identify the effects, dangers, and limitations of these ideas and of our own practices....And instead of believing that therapy has nothing to do with social control, we would assume that this was always a strong possibility....[We] would also accept that we are inevitably engaged in a political activity. This is not a political activity that involves the proposal of an ideology, but one that challenges the techniques that subjugate persons to a dominant ideology.³⁷

This quotation embodies many issues which are central to this thesis. It strikes the keynote for the rest of this chapter, which will discuss and compare the nature and role of various socio-political discourses which are relevant to

³⁶ Dominique Colas, "Civil Society: From Utopia to Management, from Marxism to Anti-Marxism," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 94.4 (1995): 1021.

³⁷ Michael White and David Epston, *Literate Means to Therapeutic Ends* (Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications, 1989) 32-3.

an examination of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. The final sentences of the quotation suggest that no social discourse can consider itself to be apolitical, the implication being that psychology, even when it challenges dominant ideologies, cannot entirely avoid having an ideology itself. This is an expression of the postmodernist view which holds that all discourses have an ideology (including postmodernism itself), and that mere hostility towards dominant discourses does not, in itself, free any discourse from the grip of ideology. The passage as a whole points to important links between power, knowledge and language, which will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. White and Epston's stand is clearly very honest, open and courageous, yet its very honesty may lead us to ask whether the good intentions of individuals are enough, if social, professional and political structures do not reinforce laudable desires to be free of ideology, and to encourage heteroglossia instead.

Like satire, psychotherapy offers structures which encourage change in people, though perhaps not unlimited freedom. Yet there are undoubtedly elements of power involved in the relationship between psychotherapist and patient, and the dynamic of therapy makes equality and mutuality difficult. Some therapists, like White and Epston, are opting out of the traditional power patterns of therapy and replacing them with frameworks in which patients also have power, specifically to ask questions and assess the process, rather than delivering themselves entirely into the therapist's hands. These therapists will demythologise the process by inviting patients to bring other people to sessions, where their presence and verbal witness may be helpful to the patient by forming links between the world of psychotherapy and the more familiar world "out there," thus sharpening the dialogic quality of the therapeutic process.

The collaborative nature of this process is paralleled by the essentially dialogic nature of satire. In a satirical text or show the level of participation of the audience is so intense that it can be called collusion, since it involves the acceptance of some recognisably unnatural and fabricated features. Kreuz

and Roberts discuss this aspect in terms of pretence and irony: the ironist (who is often also a satirist) "pretends to be ignorant and injudicious, but the listener...correctly interprets the ironist's [or satirist's] utterance and, together, the ironist and the listener constitute an 'inner circle' that is aware of the pretense of the utterance." ³⁸ There is also collusion involved in the acceptance of the satirist's fantastical world as (temporarily) accurate and "real," in the acceptance of the artistic, linguistic and moral authority of the satirist and in the singling out and ridiculing of certain characters or ways of thought. Goffman speaks of the willing suspension of disbelief which ordinary theatregoers tacitly agree to make:

We willingly sought out the circumstances in which we could be temporarily deceived or at least kept in the dark, in brief, transformed into collaborators in unreality. And we actively collaborate in sustaining this playful unknowingness.... It might be said that a stage production was some sort of voluntarily supported benign fabrication.³⁹

However, a satirical show goes further than this. Goffman says that the "spatial boundaries of the stage [in an ordinary play] sharply and arbitrarily cut off the depicted world from what lies beyond the stage line," ⁴⁰ but this is the diametrical opposite of the satirist's aim, which is to put the audience in touch with the world beyond the stage line, paradoxically by drawing them into a world which is itself not realistically credible. Satirists consistently violate the theatrical frame by indulging in dialogism with individual members of the audience, as well as revealing various aspects of their own selves (as opposed to their satiric personae). In this the satirist behaves in the same way as those psychotherapists who are willing to step outside the therapeutic frame in the interests of the freedom of the patient. A further step - the

³⁸ Roger J. Kreuz and Richard M. Roberts, "On Satire and Parody: The Importance of Being Ironic," *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 8.2 (1993): 100.

³⁹ Goffman 136, 138.

⁴⁰ Goffman 139.

enabling of the patient to become more independent and more in control of what is happening - is commented on here by White and Epston:

This, along with invitations for persons to engage in activities that generate an awareness of a process in which they are simultaneously a performer and an audience to their own performance...provides for a context of reflexivity. This context brings forth new choices for persons regarding the authoring of themselves, others, and their relationships.⁴¹

This encouragement of reflexivity is shared by both satire and psychotherapy, but not so by the other socio-political discourses to be dealt with in this chapter. Nevertheless, one needs to heed Linda Hutcheon's caveat that "being made to feel that we are actively participating in the generation of meaning is no guarantee of freedom; manipulators who make us feel in control are no less present for all their careful concealment."⁴² Thus, without being too cynical, we need to be circumspect about accepting the bona fides of even the most convincing psychotherapist - and we definitely need to be on our guard when evaluating as slippery a customer as the satirist.

Certainly, when it comes to continually examining one's motives and practices in order to avoid potential dangers and limitations, the chances are that psychotherapy will be more dutiful and rigorous than satire. After all, psychology has governing bodies, rigorous training, professional ethics and official accreditation to at least make it more likely that it will strive to be responsible. Satirists, on the other hand, are answerable to no one except, perhaps, themselves. They may proceed in a very blind and unexamined way, if they choose. They are, in any case, expert at coming at topics and people from eccentric and unexpected directions, and are very adept at covering their tracks. They are masters of the double bind and enjoy keeping their audience guessing for a lot of the time. They make a practice of speaking and behaving

⁴¹ White and Epston 24.

⁴² Hutcheon 92.

in an opaque way, unless they wish to do otherwise for strategic purposes. They are accustomed to using - or sometimes abusing - whatever ideas or systems of thought come to hand, for all is grist to their mill. Their approach is usually compounded of a strange mixture of facts, exaggeration, bias, malevolence, impishness and / or general animus. For satirists to examine themselves and their ideas as suggested above in the case of the therapist might well lead to the collapse of the slender structure upon which satire is built. In fact, it is likely that one of the props of that structure is a certain ability in satirists to fool themselves as well - a certain tendency to become so wrapped up in their particular combination of play and power that they are, to some degree, sucked into the satiric world they create for their audience. This is a step further than the collusion discussed earlier, since here the manipulators are unable to step back from their own machinations, and are caught in the same web as their audience. It is true that satirists maintain their fringe status by having one foot outside the society they are addressing, but even that may not preserve their balance. In any case, such an attempt to maintain a distance from their targets is made in order to facilitate the proceedings of satirists, rather than to encourage critical examination of themselves and their practices. As Karl Kraus, a Viennese satirist of the *fin de siècle*, put it, "I don't like to meddle in my private affairs."⁴³ The satiric impulse does not find self-examination highly attractive and, even if only by default rather than intent, the distance under discussion comes very close to being a means of control, a concept which would normally be associated with a prime target of the satirist: the abuse of power. Thus, it seems, like blue cheese which is given its flavour by microbes which we would normally eschew, satire, in order to have its full potency, needs a degree of just that kind of contamination which is its enemy. It is possible that part of the cultivated ambiguity of the satirists' stance may also lie in a subtly equivocal attitude to their audiences. The divide between psychotherapy and satire in matters of responsibility and accountability is made clear if one asks oneself whether a serious and responsible person would ever be any kind of success

⁴³ Adam Philips, "How to be Viennese." Rev. of *Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist*, by Edward Timms and *Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths: Selected Aphorisms of Karl Kraus*, ed. and trans. Harry Zohn. *London Review of Books* 9.5 (1987): 17.

as a satirist, whose stock-in-trade is usually precisely of the opposite kind. "Rational and benevolent reform is satire's social alibi, but is often maintained on only the shakiest ground. Posing as the upstanding custodian of social and cultural correction, satire often stumbles...." ⁴⁴

This contrast is also apparent when it comes to the exercise of power, where it seems that satire may have more in common with postmodernism than psychoanalysis, as the two former discourses are not able to have as great a degree of influence on their audience as psychoanalysis. In practice, psychoanalysts and psychotherapists are able to penetrate much more deeply into the psyches of their patients than either postmodernism or satire could ever achieve in relation to their target audiences. The limitations of satire in the South African context are spelled out by Ian Glenn, who says that "[Pieter-Dirk] Uys seems to lay down his art as helpless before extremism or as unable to deal with political crisis as manifested in black-on-black violence." ⁴⁵ However, given the violent reaction that satire sometimes arouses, one should perhaps credit it with more influence than postmodernism and place it firmly between postmodernism and psychoanalysis, particularly in view of what it does share with the latter. Despite satire's lack of formal social or political influence, this thesis is insistent that satire has a different kind of power which can, given the right conditions, have a significant influence on society. Perhaps one could conclude (tentatively) that satire embodies a great deal of the playfulness and deconstructive nature of postmodernism (as well as its ontological ruthlessness), while also sharing some of the serious and open intention to change people that psychoanalysis has.

As it concerns psychotherapy (admittedly of the avant garde kind chosen for discussion here), this process of change is set out by Epston and White in terms of van Genneep's work on the "rite of passage," which he sees as

⁴⁴ Erin Mackie, "The Culture Market, the Marriage Market, and the Exchange of Language: Swift and the Progress of Desire," *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*, eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 173.

⁴⁵ Ian Glenn, "South African Satire Now," *New Contrast* 77 (1992): 83.

occurring in three stages: separation, transition and incorporation,⁴⁶ though Epston and White (among others) refer to the middle phase as the "liminal phase"⁴⁷ - an amendment of which the importance will become clear. The idea is that psychotherapy operates very much along these lines, with the first step being separation, in which people are detached from their familiar roles, ideas, preconceptions and stock notions. People are encouraged by the psychotherapist to "distinguish themselves from their problems by engaging in [new and liberating] externalizing discourses in relation to these problems....This dislodges persons from certain familiar and taken-for-granted notions about problems and from the dominant externalizing discourses that guide their lives. This initiates the experience of liminality," the second stage of the process.⁴⁸ In this unfamiliar space of the liminal many of these thoughtlessly sustained ways of living are suspended. Liminality "is 'betwixt and between' known worlds, and is characterized by experiences of disorganization and confusion, by a spirit of exploration, and by a heightened sense of possibility."⁴⁹ One might add that the liminal space is an area with potential for movement and change of many kinds - and that laughter and play are both important agents of liminality, Bakhtinian issues which will be relevant when satiric liminality is discussed. When Russian formalism speaks of people and worlds being "made strange" it is, in fact, describing one of the effects of liminality. Finally, there is the third stage, incorporation, in which people are enabled to re-enter their familiar world, but at a different point and in a different way. Their world may still be the familiar one, but in this final stage people see both themselves and the world with new eyes, and (if the psychotherapy is effective) are more open to engagement with change.

The process of satire can be seen as following the same pattern. Satirists first proceed to dislodge people from their fossilised ways of thought and behaviour, which they accomplish by various means. Satire is a freeing

⁴⁶ Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, trans. Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee, introd. Solon T. Kimball (London: Routledge, 1960) 10-11.

⁴⁷ David Epston and Michael White, *Experience, Contradiction, Narrative & Imagination: Selected Papers of David Epston and Michael White, 1989 - 1991* (Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications, 1992) 15.

⁴⁸ Epston and White 13.

⁴⁹ Epston and White 15.

externalising discourse par excellence, in that it separates people from their familiar world as well as their habitual ways of thinking and reacting. It urges them to take a step back from their everyday world, so that they may view it more clearly. The gap created by this separation is a liminal space (the word itself is derived from the Latin for "threshold") which is characterised by provisionality and - as both psychotherapists and satirists know - once people are persuaded or enticed into a liminal or threshold space there is the potential for much movement, since provisionality generates its own dynamic. As mentioned earlier, the laughter and the invitation to play which is the hallmark of much satire, are themselves productive of liminality, and thus further the process. As will become clear from the later discussion of Orwell's novels, fairy tales and nightmares are also elements which encourage liminality. In addition, looking back at the earlier discussion, one could say that what postmodernism and deconstruction do to the sign is to induce an element of liminality into it, either by suspending the link between the signifier and the signified or by creating a situation in which the reader's attention oscillates between the signifiers of different worlds. In all these cases, the creative potential of liminality is exploited to the full and the power of the threshold is demonstrated. Turner also delivers a warning: "Liminality is both more creative and more destructive than the structural norm."⁵⁰ The implication here is that liminality's lack of containment makes it potentially dangerous as well as offering challenges and opportunities. This is recognised by the existence of structures and rites which help people to pass safely through transitional experiences, whether they be tribal initiation, religious conversion or the process of psychotherapy. In these cases there is a tacit recognition that it is irresponsible and even potentially disastrous to set people off on liminal quests without ensuring that there are sufficient constraints to prevent those on the journey from losing their way entirely, and thus being unable to return to the everyday world when they need to. It is obvious that these are concerns which should exercise the mind of psychotherapists, but when it comes to satire there are no such constraints

⁵⁰ Victor Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982) 47.

because satire is in a rather different position. What the satirist does is, on the face of it at any rate, not as serious and, certainly, satirists do not have the depth of influence that psychotherapists, potentially, have over their patients: the relationship between satirists and their audience is not as intimate as that between psychotherapists and their patients, and it is always much easier and less complicated for the satirist's audience to sever their relationship.

Given the three stages of van Gennep's framework, the satirist's aims and methods are both similar to and different from those of psychotherapy. Satirists precipitate and mediate shifts in people's views, initially using laughter, irony, malice and fantasy to jolt them out of their old ways and draw them into the liminal world created by satire. It should be noted, in passing, that the popularity of horror films and the still widespread admiration for *Nineteen Eighty-Four* indicates that terror can be as powerful as anything else when it comes to drawing an audience into an alternative world. If the audience, in response to the satirist's combination of blandishments and goading, identify with his or her liminal world, they emerge as different people, occupying a slightly different ontological place as a result of the satirist's manoeuvrings. This process may be repeated many times in the course of a satirical show or other text, since the satirist may offer access to a succession of liminal worlds, return the audience to their original world, and then repeat the process several times, the effect of these repeated little shocks or shifts being to change the audience's relationship with their original world. They may well emerge with a different standpoint, though how long such a standpoint lasts and how deep it goes are debatable. It may well be argued that the pull of a long-established view of reality is a very powerful one, but the question which both satire and psychoanalysis ask is whether many people really do engage, in the full sense of the word, with the concrete world around them. Satirists and psychoanalysts would both like to see people being less evasive when they relate to their surroundings and more honest in their dealings with both themselves and others.

It also needs to be recognised that satiric alternative worlds have their own powerful attractions, particularly if, while audiences are under their spell, satirists manage to infect them with something of their own fringe status. The effect of satire can be particularly marked during and after a live performance, as it is a shared communal experience during which people strengthen and legitimate one another's new stance - though, in some cases, previously existing ways of seeing the world will also be confirmed. Certainly there seems to be an experience of bonding among the audience, both during and after the performance, almost as though all have been through some process of initiation at the hands of the satirist who, in this sense, may have something of the shaman about him or her. This notion becomes even more attractive when it is recalled that van Gennep's notion of the rite of passage is, essentially, the framework within which this discussion is proceeding, and that initiation always involves an element of danger to the initiate. It takes a certain kind of courage to read a deeply satirical book or go to a satirical show, particularly given the propensity of satirists in live performance to pounce unexpectedly on members of their audience. People who want a quiet life, with no growth or change, do not willingly place themselves in contact with satire. However, it is conceivable that some members of such an audience may, in reaction to the satirist, suddenly find themselves in the position, posited by McKnight, of people who don't "really want to know what is going on [and] would prefer to maintain illusions, including those perpetrated by the current political and social status quo...." ⁵¹

It is reasonable to suppose that most people desiring psychotherapy are also taking the risk of change and unpredictable growth, whatever school of psychology their psychotherapist espouses, though this thesis does make the very broad distinction between the traditional modes of psychotherapeutical praxis and the contemporary mode of psychotherapy chosen, because it is most similar to satire and makes use of postmodern thought. Freud, speaking of the disadvantages of becoming a psychoanalyst, expresses the following opinion:

⁵¹ McKnight 197.

As things stand at present, such a choice of profession would ruin any chance he might have of success at a University, and... he would find himself in a society which did not understand his efforts, which regarded him with distrust and hostility, and unleashed upon him all the evil spirits lurking within it.⁵²

This suggests that there are also ties between the satirist and traditional psychoanalysis, specifically relating to the suspicion with which both have been (and, in many ways, still are) viewed by society. The mention of the evil spirits lurking within society evokes the shamanistic aspects of satirists, seen most clearly in their identification with sorcery in ancient times, their marginalised status and their being a kind of emotional witch-doctor. A summation by Coon of the relevant characteristics of shamans reveals their similarities to satirists immediately:

In the anthropological literature, shamans have often been categorized as natural neurotics who would have been social misfits in a society like our own - the craziest hunters of all. Actually, they were exceptionally intelligent and well-disciplined men....⁵³

Certainly satirists are also often misfits - and it is not difficult to make out a case for many of them being neurotic. They are also generally both highly intelligent, as well as "the craziest hunters of all," pursuing the follies and the malignancies of society with a blend of off-beat reasoning and deadly seriousness. Who but one of the tribe of crazy hunters, the American satirist Bill Hicks, could have transfixed his prey with such deadly accuracy by referring to the human race as "viruses with shoes"?⁵⁴ This view of humanity has some connection with Freud's "evil spirits" of society and, whether they are defined as people's own unexpressed hates and fears that trap and

⁵² Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, trans. James Strachey, eds. James Strachey and Angela Richards, The Penguin Freud Library vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1991) 40.

⁵³ Carleton S. Coon, *The Hunting People* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) 390.

⁵⁴ *Meridian*, Narr. Brian Sibley, BBC World Service, London, 1 Mar. 1997.

harass them or the outward manifestation of such destructive emotions in the bestial behaviour of a Stalin or a Hitler, these "evil spirits of society" are among the concerns and the banes of both psychoanalysis and satire. However, psychoanalysis tends to be much more dispassionate than satire about its work, as one can see by comparing the stance and tone of Hicks's remark with that of the following by Freud:

The thesis that symptoms disappear when we have made their unconscious predeterminants conscious has been confirmed by all subsequent research, although we meet with the strangest and most unexpected complications when we attempt to carry it through in practice. Our therapy works by transforming what is unconscious into what is conscious, and it works only in so far as it is in a position to effect that transformation.⁵⁵

The processes of satire are not amenable to the kind of research Freud mentions, nor do satirists have his calm certainty, which suggests a kind of power or control in the hands of the psychoanalyst. There is no saving doubt in Freud here, and it is this certainty that Epston and White's views and practices are intended to counteract. Yet (fortunately) Freud is not always so sure of himself and, in general, it is fair to say that psychoanalysis and satire share a sense that much of what they do is not completely explicable. Both discourses work with the unconscious, though satirists do so in a much more covert way. Certainly, as will be shown, Orwell's satire in *Animal Farm* and, especially, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, is deeply concerned with both individual and collective devils, whether they be psychic and invisible or only too visible human beings wielding machines of torture, whether they manifest themselves as individual "viruses with shoes" or as whole societies which operate in a psychologically toxic environment.

However, psychology does not have the satirist's lack of commitment to formal frameworks and inventive ways with language, qualities which bring to

⁵⁵ Freud 321.

mind not the solemn doctor of the soul, but the trickster - the marginalised shaman-like figure about whom people feel both unease and fascination. ("I and my public understand each other very well," [Karl Kraus] noted: "it does not want to hear what I say, and I don't say what it wants to hear.")⁵⁶ Kern provides the origin of the term "trickster" which, originally, "was the name given to a clownish figure of mercurial unpredictability and changeability, a mythical hero of North American Indians...."⁵⁷ Tricksters are shifty, roguish, ambiguous and cunning - though they can also be Lords of Misrule who turn the world upside down in acts of creative chaos from which can spring new knowledge and awareness for others. In Greek mythology it is Hermes, the messenger of the gods, who is regarded as the archetypal trickster figure - and he is renowned for both his puckishly thieving nature and his capacity to cause the liberating laughter which can threaten whole edifices of rule-bound structures with destruction by ridicule.⁵⁸ Kern says that "Tricksters are the instigators of carnivalesque activities, whether...jesters, clowns, devils, or saintly prophets of the nature of Nietzsche's Zarathustra."⁵⁹ As we have seen, Bakhtin values the carnivalesque highly for its destabilising effects.⁶⁰ Tricksters are also associated with the creation of liminal states, which they induce in a similar way to the satirist, by means of the farcical, the ridiculous and the fantastic. Literature abounds in trickster figures, among them Tartuffe, Moll Flanders, Falstaff and Chaucer's Nicolas - though tricksters are often also the scapegoats of society which, while being entertained by their winning ways, may turn on them and exact revenge for their unconventionality and association with the liminal.

This constitutes a severe limitation on tricksters, and suggests that if they do have power it is never licence. In this tricksters partake more of the comic than the satiric, since it is the comic that has an unwritten contract with society not to exceed its levels of tolerance. The trickster is absolutely dependent on the goodwill of society, while satirists reserve the right to

⁵⁶ Philips 16.

⁵⁷ Edith Kern, *The Absolute Comic* (New York: Columbia UP, 1980) 117.

⁵⁸ Murray Stein, *In Midlife: A Jungian Perspective* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1983) 3-5.

⁵⁹ Kern 117.

⁶⁰ See 1-2 above.

antagonise society when they wish, and avoid coming to terms with those who constitute their potential targets. This leaves satirists in a much more isolated and vulnerable position, yet it is essential for the work of the satirist. To be a loner is traditionally the fate of any artist, but the loneliness of the satirist is a particularly impenetrable and intense one and, one could say, the success of the satire depends on it. Company could be dangerous to satire, since company could easily become society, intruding into the particular kind of critical and creative space that the satirist needs and associating satire with a group of people, rather than a single one. Satirical collaboration has never been common, with perhaps the best known example of such collaboration having occurred (significantly, in the eighteenth century) between the members of the Scriblerus Club, which included Swift, Pope and Gay, though even that was short-lived. In general, satirists are not egalitarian and their loyalty - their approval even - is not easily given. One could call the satirist an elitist or, to put a different slant on it, something of a hermit, at least by temperament: if the examples of satirists such as Swift, Pope and Orwell, are anything to go by, it is important to satirists that they at least see themselves as isolated (and, perhaps, beleaguered in some sense) even though they may, in fact, have a reasonably happy, if limited, social life, as seems to have been the case with the three satirists mentioned. Certainly, for satirists to be part of a cause or a member of a political party could blunt their edge and dilute their venom. Adders and vipers are at their most irritable and dangerous when confined, and satirists have to find ways of preserving and concentrating their spleen. It could be argued that most artists need creative space in order to be successful, but satirists also need to feel that they stand alone in a world which is both foolish and threatening.

The degree of detachment from society that the satirist thrives on is very different from the mass influence and contact which some more obviously political discourses seek and foster. Discourses which emanate from individuals rather than the state operate on a very different basis, since the latter have the whole machinery of government to call upon. Such considerations are important because they govern the amount of control that

these respective discourses are able to exercise on their audiences. Satire may be seen by some of its individual victims as offensive and by some of its political targets as dangerous. Nevertheless, the potential harm inflicted by satire is limited by its lack of a power base of any kind, since it operates from the fringes of society and is unable to call on any kind of organisational help to achieve its aims. "For the world of power in a kind such as satire, which is often about things political, is remarkably lacking in efficacy..."⁶¹ Perhaps satire, by its nature, does not require such help and, in any case, the lack of access to power is surely the only sure safeguard against its abuse. The other discourses to be considered in this chapter - ideology, propaganda and political myth - do not have such safeguards in relation to power, since they are often part of massive systems of control.

For satire, didacticism (a comparatively mild form of power) is one of its greatest potential pitfalls: it may want to achieve certain aims too badly. There is sometimes a sense in which, while encouraging their audience to explore alternative worlds, satirists are not entirely disinterested as to the results of their art. Satirists have their thumb on the scale to a certain extent, and they do not always approach their task or communicate with their audience in an entirely detached way. The way in which they interpose the lens of their work between their audience and the world outside the text can be liberating, but they may also wish subtly to direct the audience towards specific new insights about the world.

Satire can also be distinguished from other literary discourses in that it is grounded in the world in a unique way, since it is a mode that consistently refers to historical and contemporary events and ideas in the world outside itself for its foundations - even for its very right to exist and be taken seriously. Hence satire's literary relevance is often reliant on the importance of its contemporary social referents: if they are not sufficiently memorable then the

⁶¹ John Snyder, *Prospects of Power: Tragedy, Satire, the Essay, and the Theory of Genre* (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1991) 25.

satirical work in question may be neglected by later generations. There is an inherent need for satire to be grounded in contemporary issues, which also have some universality, in order to be understood and effective in both its own time and beyond it. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the satirist also needs a degree of detachment from the concerns of the society being satirised. What this amounts to is a restatement of the paradoxical situation of both satire and satirist which has been insisted on from the beginning of this thesis.

This rather complex picture of how satirists are embedded in their society raises important issues about the nature of satire, particularly its relationship to the socio-political discourses against which it is to be measured, the first of which is ideology. The concept of ideology has modulated over time, so that modern views of it will differ widely from those held after the French revolution, when the term first surfaced in a politically meaningful way. At that time, it was the so-called "*idéologues*" who set the philosophical seal on the revolution, though they were later discarded by Napoleon, who could not tolerate the radicalism of their ideas⁶² - which does suggest something about the vulnerability of ideology, despite the fact that it wears an air of great assurance while it is accepted. This may explain the tendency in totalitarian states to safeguard and promote ideology by means of propaganda, terror and political myth. Contemporary social scientists tend to shy away from the stigmatisation of ideology which has been - and still is - very common, and to suggest that ideology can serve other, less questionable, purposes. Clifford Geertz, for example, acknowledges that it is one of the tasks of the social sciences "to criticize [ideologies], to force them to come to terms with (but not necessarily surrender to) reality."⁶³ This is a very even-handed approach, which is painstaking in its attempts to avoid absolute judgements about ideology, so much so that it implicitly accepts that a kind of armed neutrality rather than a wholehearted commitment to "reality" is in order, even in a discourse which wields so much power over people. Nevertheless, the notion

⁶² George Lichtheim, *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays* (New York: Vintage, 1967) 4-5.

⁶³ Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (London: Hutchinson, 1975) 232.

of ideology as a force to be regarded with suspicion remains strong and, as will become clear, a stance such as that of Geertz would have been unacceptable to Orwell as well, both as a satirist and as a democratic socialist (his own description of his political stance).⁶⁴ Geertz's case for a relativistic view of ideology is summed up as follows:

Whatever else ideologies may be - projections of unacknowledged fears, disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity - they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience. Whether, in any particular case, the map is accurate or the conscience credible is a separate question to which one can hardly give the same answer for Nazism and Zionism, for the nationalisms of McCarthy and of Churchill, for the defenders of segregation and its opponents.⁶⁵

Geertz here, by implication, acknowledges that ideology can be the bearer of feelings and motives which have been either deliberately or unconsciously evaded and repressed by whole groups or societies, though he makes no comment on the poor mental hygiene which such habits represent. He also suggests that ideology can be a kind of social glue, uniting people and providing an ordered framework within which societies may be contained, though what he does not ask is when the price of unity becomes too high and containment becomes claustrophobia, nor does he consider a situation in which unity may be attained at the cost of individual freedoms. His boldest assertion is that ideologies can provide "maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience." These assertions are delivered from the viewpoint of one who describes and dissects social phenomena, rather than judging them or even commenting on them. Geertz speaks as a social scientist, but the satirist's stance is a very different one

⁶⁴ George Orwell, "Why I Write," *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell* [hereafter referred to as CEJL], eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. I (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 5.

⁶⁵ Geertz 220.

and it is at this point that satire and social science definitively part company. Satire's natural scepticism makes it unable to be as detached and accepting as this and it would certainly never claim to be a science, though it is quite capable of satirising (no doubt unfairly) the claims of sociologists to be scientists.

The emotional charge carried by the term "ideology" will differ according to people's political beliefs and even that is not a sure guide. Marxism, for example, has a bad name among many writers on ideology, yet Marxist views are not that predictable, as the case of Orwell shows. Traditional Marxists (of whom Orwell certainly was not one) view the term "ideology" as a criticism to be applied to systems of thought (not acceptable to Marxism) which favour the interests of a particular group, while for many of their more modern counterparts it is a more neutral term. Marx himself frequently referred to ideology as "false consciousness":

By false consciousness Marx appears to have meant a set of mistaken beliefs about matters important to them shared by a whole group of persons or even a whole community. [False consciousness] consists of a number of closely related illusions common to all or nearly all persons whose situations or roles in society are the same.⁶⁶

Both Marx and Engels adopted a privileged stance in this matter, since they did not regard their own theory as ideology, even though it is a theory which does favour the interests of a particular class - the proletariat. Their theory was not, in their view, an ideology (and thus false consciousness) because of the nature of the proletariat who, they believed, have an unconscious understanding of the historical processes of history and act upon them with a kind of instinctive sureness by revolting against oppressive political and social structures. There is, for Marxism, a kind of inherent human and political virtue

⁶⁶ John Plamenatz, *Ideology* (London: Pall Mall P, 1970) 24.

in the proletariat which elevates them above other classes in this respect (a view which Winston clings to in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*). Such thinking encourages the use of the term "ideology" as an easy way of negating any political philosophy which differs from one's own. It turns what might be a neutral term into one of abuse, except when an ideology of one's own (which is then not identified as an ideology) is concerned. These views represent a dangerous temptation for Marxists unjustifiably to occupy the moral and political high ground and are also an example of the phenomenon of "doublethink" which flourishes in the totalitarian state of Oceania depicted in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. The French intellectual Raymond Aron does not even bother to refute directly the Marxist claim that it is not an ideology, but simply speaks of the Soviet state as one in which ideology reigns supreme:

So much does the [Soviet] Communist regime call upon ideology... that it has often been called an ideocracy. It is always necessary to contrast ideology and reality, a distinction which is often difficult to draw. But it is particularly relevant in the case of a regime which is more directly based on ideology than any other.... To believe in a false idea is sometimes enough to make it true.⁶⁷

However, Orwell wrote in the days of the worst excesses of Stalinist communism and since then there have been some changes, as Plamenatz indicates:

Marxists today do not speak of ideology always as though it were a form of false consciousness. They even use such expressions as 'the communist ideology'...: expressions which older Marxists avoid. Perhaps when they call even Marxism an ideology they think of it as serving to hold a party or class together and to guide their actions. When they think of it primarily as explaining the course of social change,

⁶⁷ Raymond Aron, *Democracy and Ideology*, trans. Valence Ionescu (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968) 162.

they call it a theory....This theory or ideology is, they think, essentially true, though sometimes misapplied by those who accept it.⁶⁸

So, in some important circumstances Marxists will refer to their beliefs as a theory and, in all cases, they will maintain that this remains true, though theory may go awry through misapplication. But what has remained constant among Marxists (as well as many other groups) is the absolute, almost religious, faith which ideology (which most groups do not call by that name) habitually arouses in its adherents, stemming perhaps from the need that people have for a framework of ideas that makes sense of the world for them and, if possible, also offers them hope for the future. This thesis does not dispute the common humanity of such a need, but it does recognise the distinction between apparently benign systems of meaning (ideologies) which provide comfort and unity to a society, and those which are labelled ideologies because they are seen by one or other group as harmful. However, as the foregoing discussion indicates, this distinction is not a clear-cut one, depending heavily on the stance and intention of those who wield the ideology and the perceptions of those who feel threatened by it.

Ideology, as discussed in this thesis, is political ideology as it manifests itself in the modern world. The phenomenon of ideology is not new, but what is new is the conscious and systematic application of ideology by sophisticated means within modern societies with the express purpose of controlling large groups of people, without sufficient concern for their political or human rights. It is this, still generally unpopular, manifestation of ideology which was Orwell's satirical target in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, becoming embedded in the minds of millions as summed up by Geertz: "I have a social philosophy; you have political opinions; he has an ideology."⁶⁹ Irrespective of the efforts of some social scientists to diminish its threatening aspect in favour of a more detached view, the former is the manifestation of

⁶⁸ Plamenatz 80.

⁶⁹ Geertz 194.

ideology with which Orwell is concerned - and it is on this view of ideology that the thesis will focus, though not without drawing attention to the limitations of such a view. It has been said that Orwell himself had certain personal "ideological propositions, to which he was fiercely committed [and which remained] unacknowledged."⁷⁰ Without attempting to lessen the accusation, it may be said that this is a general truth about human nature; though in the case of Orwell, such a charge must be weighed, in a spirit of dialogism, against earlier assertions about the clarity of thought with which satirists are endowed. However, what Orwell depicts in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, is not simply personal idiosyncrasy, but a manifestation of political ideology which has caused, and continues to cause, grave physical and mental harm to untold numbers of people.

It was mentioned earlier that satire seems to be less open-minded than literature in general, since it has a certain didactic thrust which may not leave its audience entirely free. Thus, on the face of it, satire has certain affinities with ideology, but the differences between satire and ideology begin to emerge when one puts them into a dialogic relationship. It then becomes apparent that, in comparison to the ideologist, the satirist is a model of reasonableness. If satirists sometimes combine their efforts to free their audience with a slight nudge in the direction of a particular view of reality, they do not try to imprison them in it unconditionally, which is the aim of the ideologist. Both satire and ideology are very down to earth, in that both build on the situation of society as they find it, yet they do it in very different ways. Satirists, as has been shown earlier, have a range of strategies through which they try to persuade people to change because their present behaviour is foolish, inconsistent, anti-social or immoral - but, above all, unthinking. Ideologists, being concerned more with ends than means, are preoccupied mainly with issues of power, even if they may also profess some concern about the moral or emotional welfare of the body politic and, since ideology does not spring out of thin air and is most powerful when it is based on the

⁷⁰ Daphne Patai, *The Orwell Mystique: A Study in Male Ideology* (Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1984) 266.

familiar, ideologists will take as their raw material whatever strong beliefs, likes and dislikes they find already extant in a society and elaborate on those that will further their cause. Geertz's views on Nazi ideology illuminate the above point:

Hitler was not distorting the German conscience when he rendered his countrymen's demonic self-hatred in the tropological figure of the magically corrupting Jew; he was merely objectifying it - transforming a prevalent neurosis into a powerful force.⁷¹

The power of ideologists to do harm both to those whom they are targeting as scapegoats and to those upon whom they are practising ideology is well illustrated here. As so often, ideologists in this instance recognised the need for the German people to have a collective scapegoat - a group of people who could be saddled with all that the German people disliked about themselves. In psychological terms, they needed to project their own perceived inferiority onto relatively powerless outsiders, who could be made to carry that burden for them and allow them to feel superior. This distrust of Jews may already have been present in the collective unconscious of the German people (as a fear of "the Other" may be present, unconsciously, in most people), but it took a master of both ideology and propaganda - Joseph Goebbels - to foster distrust into a burning hatred and use it as an instrument of state policy, making it a cornerstone of the ideological fabric of the Third Reich. Geertz's use of the term "magically" points to the hidden way in which ideology often operates, working as it usually does through deep-seated needs and drives of which the majority of the population is not consciously aware. It is obvious that if one is not aware of one's deepest needs and drives one is going to find it very difficult to defend oneself against being manipulated and exploited through them. The issues of the "magical" aspect of ideology, as well as the matter of political scapegoating, are well illustrated

⁷¹ Geertz 232.

by the role of Snowball in *Animal Farm* and Goldstein in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

As is becoming clear, ideology is much more in earnest than satire, partly because satire's habitual stance is an ironic one, which can involve attitudes such as diffidence, self-mockery and doubt, and its habitual mode is a humorous one, even if the humour is often of a ferocious kind. The stance of ideology is always an absolute one, without self-doubt or compromise, and it does not deal in humour unless it is of a scarifying kind directed at the enemy. Its aim is not merely to force the whole of its audience to believe in the version of reality which it offers, but also to make them believe that every other way of looking at life is worthless. Ideology seeks to polarise issues, and to present those who are opposed to it as so irrational, naïve or even evil that compromise or co-existence with them is impossible. To this end, the ideologist will provide signifiers which can be used to distance "unbelievers" and to render them as alien - even inhuman - as possible. These signifiers may, under other circumstances or in other communities, be neutral or carry other connotations, but in this particular context they have become so loaded because of their connection with the particular ideology that they carry an enormous charge of repulsion which works exactly as the ancient taboos did - by engendering a sense of rejection and hatred at a very primitive level which modern people seldom experience in a conscious way. Hence, the word "Jew," in other contexts merely a descriptive term, aroused deep communal loathing and an unbearable sense of the "otherness" of the person in the average German during the Nazi period; so it is not by chance that Orwell named his scapegoat figure "Goldstein." Similarly, in former days in Communist Russia, the term "capitalist"⁷² was sufficient to evoke the same reaction. There is a network of ideological beliefs and prejudices underlying such reactions, but its nature and its mechanisms are seldom clear to many people within any society.

⁷² J.A.C. Brown, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) 119.

Gouldner highlights the ambitiousness and all-embracing tendencies of ideology when he says:

[N]ow that the whole self has been reorganised in terms that hinge on the ideology, the latter cannot be lightly opened up for examination; it cannot be kept perpetually open to continual, critical examination or challenge. Known with an inward conviction, there seems to be nothing more, or at least nothing more of comparable importance, for the ideologue to know.⁷³

The rigidity of outlook in ideology is matched by the narrowness and exclusivity of the language in which it is formulated - a language which consists of invented terms or those taken from everyday speech, but in either case purged of any associations or reverberations beyond those that will serve ideology in the most obvious and direct way. The whole structure of Newspeak, the emasculated form of language devised by the rulers of Oceania, demonstrates how ideology controls and disempowers people, limiting their ability to think by curtailing the range of signification of their language. According to Arendt, the ideologue believes we have "the right to retreat into our own worlds of meaning, and demand[s] only that each of us remain consistent within his own private terminology."⁷⁴ Satirists, by implication, deny such a right: their appeal is to all people, their attempt is not to establish philosophical and linguistic insularity and their kind of reality is a social or communal manifestation, in the broadest sense of the term. Satirists may indeed play games with language worlds, as has been demonstrated, but their ironic and / or humorous stance warns the audience that all may not be what it seems: the satirical world may, at times, approximate to the perceived world of its audience and, at other times, it may try to pull the carpet out from beneath it, but it is very clear that it does not try to pass itself off as anything but a fantastic or fictitious world which has no kind of enduring quality. As has been shown, satirists have unwritten contracts with their audiences, whereby

⁷³ Gouldner 47.

⁷⁴ Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (London: Faber, 1961) 96.

both parties know what is happening and the audience willingly give themselves to the process. But ideologists have no such contract with their communities though, like satire, they manipulate language worlds; but they offer their audience no signals as to what they are doing, and their discourse uses language to offer people a coherent system of meaning that is to be taken entirely at face value.

According to Gouldner, "Ideology...is...the effort to 'normalize' relations between...power and goodness, making that which is good, powerful and that which is powerful, good."⁷⁵ This raises many questions about the definition of the good and the powerful, not to mention the thorny question of what is meant by "normalize," and the later discussion of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* will certainly throw further light on this particular formulation. For the moment, suffice it to say that ideology is beginning to look like satire wearing jackboots since, unlike satire, it has access to the full might of the state in terms of guns, laws and printing presses to help it apply pressure to society so that its ideals may be realised.

This argument is germane to the matter of Swift and Orwell's functioning as political writers as well as satirists. Both were extremely interested in politics and much of their satire has a high political content. The fact that they both produced serious political material and did not confine themselves to satire may well suggest a longing for more substantial (i.e. overtly political) power, rather than simply the ability only to point, however forcefully, to what may be amiss and to direct laughter and scorn in its direction, while coaxing their audience to experiment with new ways of seeing the world. Given different circumstances, either or both of them might have become ideologists - and it is impossible to deny that both of them, at various points in their careers, produced what can only be called propaganda.

Satirists may have to take care lest they become too committed to one particular party, and thus imprisoned in an ideology which turns them into little

⁷⁵ Gouldner 85.

more than political hacks. Todorov insists that, for the writer, "Recognizing the political dimension of life does not mean allowing oneself to be enlisted by a party in the service of some dogma."⁷⁶ Orwell himself said, "In sentiment I am definitely 'left', but I believe that a writer can only remain honest if he keeps free of party labels."⁷⁷ The only political party⁷⁸ that Orwell joined was the Independent Party (in 1938), though within 18 months he was at loggerheads with it.⁷⁹ The result of this, in practice, is that "both Swift and Orwell have been seen as traitors to their own parties [to which they were not fully committed], advocates for the wrong side."⁸⁰ Some satirists have overtly served the cause of specific political parties, though one does not have to be a paid-up member of a party to do that. The eighteenth-century cartoonist, Gillray, was undeniably a propagandist (though that did not stop him from being a very effective satirist) because of his biting attacks on King George III and his family - and, as Jowett and O'Donnell relate, "after Gillray's conversion to conservatism as a result of his dismay at the French Revolution, he launched a long series of political attacks ridiculing Napoleon and the French, while glorifying John Bull and the common Englishman."⁸¹

By remaining at least relatively free of cast-iron political loyalties the majority of satirists sacrifice the chances of a certain kind of power, but they retain a greater objectivity and the ability to operate in relative freedom from ideology. Such a lack of overt commitment is useful to satirists, since it makes it more difficult for their victims to pin them down in order to make a counter-attack on them. Satire is very much a free spirit when compared with the dour purposefulness of ideology, and it is clear that the two discourses are, in fact, natural enemies.

⁷⁶ Tzvetan Todorov, "Politics, Morality, and the Writer's Life: Notes on George Orwell," *Stanford French Review* 16.1 (1992): 139.

⁷⁷ George Orwell, Autobiographical Note, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 23-4.

⁷⁸ John Rodden, "The Politics of Literary Reputation: George Woodcock and the Anarchists' Orwell," *Queen's Quarterly* 95.2 (1988): 334.

⁷⁹ Michael Sheldon, *Orwell: The Authorised Biography* (London: Heinemann, 1991) 327-8.

⁸⁰ J.J. Peereboom, "Swift and Orwell: Utopia as Nightmare," *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*, ed. D. Baker-Smith and C.C. Barfoot (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1987) 97.

⁸¹ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1986) 51.

If ideology is set in a dialogic relation with postmodernism, on the other hand, a very different result is obtained. Postmodernism acknowledges the existence of ideology, but, as Hutcheon indicates, it regards ideology more as a common condition of existence than a problem to be grappled with and eradicated:

What postmodern theory and practice has taught is less that 'truth' is illusory than that it is institutional, for we always act and use language in the context of politico-discursive conditions.... Ideology both constructs and is constructed by the way we live our role in the social totality...and the way we represent that process in art. Its fate, however, is to appear as natural, common sense. Our consciousness of ourselves is usually, therefore, uncriticized because it is familiar, obvious.⁸²

The provisional and uncommitted nature of postmodernism has worried some commentators but here, as elsewhere, these qualities result in a fresh approach to stock issues. Hutcheon's statement about truth circumvents many of the traditional ways of discussing both "truth" and language by focusing on what constitute both the roots and the framework of both "truth" and language: the political institutions of society. In this way, postmodernism takes the discussion away from the purely aesthetic or linguistic and into the realm of the political. It is in the social and political realm that matters such as "truth," language and ideology are both formed and used as the unexamined basis for everyday life. Thus, calmly disentangling itself from the toils of liberal humanist⁸³ and modernist belief, postmodernism sets out one of the conditions of existence which it believes has to be accepted: our helplessness

⁸² Linda Hutcheon, *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction* (London: Routledge, 1988) 178.

⁸³ Modernism is generally associated with humanism. For example, see Daniel Stern, "The Mysterious New Novel," *Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities in Revolution*, ed. Ihab Hassan (Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1971) 26. For a discussion of Orwell's liberal tendencies, see Rai: "Orwell is a liberal who endorses and owes allegiance to the socialist critique of liberalism and capitalism; and his career is, in its particular form, a working through of that contradiction." (1) Arthur Eckstein, in "1984 and George Orwell's Other View of Capitalism" *Modern Age* 29.1 (1985), also explores the nature of Orwell's liberalism (18).

in the face of forces which can perhaps be made conscious but can neither be fitted into some neat and logical framework nor eradicated. The message is that the force of ideology is a complex and all-pervasive thing, and if we really want to eradicate it we may have to eradicate society first.

What seemed to escape Orwell was that one could not avoid having an ideology simply by avoiding formal commitment to any official party or organisation - and that to approach life (or literature) with one's hands surgically clean of all ideology was not possible. For Orwell things were much more clear-cut, and he tended to sound the alarm bells and man the gun turrets when he saw an obvious example of ideology approaching. His consistently liberal view of the political writer was that he or she should (and could) address the issues of the day without embracing any political ideology - a stance he continued to hold even when anxiety about what he saw as a future "political and cultural apocalypse"⁸⁴ drove him to write such committed political novels as *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.⁸⁵

But the advent of postmodern thought has, as Jameson says, brought about "the eclipse of all the affect (depth, anxiety, terror, the emotions of the monumental) that marked high modernism and its replacement with what Coleridge would have called fancy and Schiller aesthetic play...."⁸⁶ Specifically, postmodernism is less adversarial about the subject of ideology, perhaps because postmodernist art and theory in general acknowledge that postmodernism itself has ideological longings of a kind, as Hutcheon indicates:

[Postmodern] writers have an ideological impulse: the desire to challenge the institutional structures of bourgeois society (usually seen as being reinforced by realism) by awakening

⁸⁴ David M. Zehr, "George Orwell: The Novelist Displaced," *Bucknell Review* 27.1 (1982): 29.

⁸⁵ Zehr, "George Orwell" 23, 30.

⁸⁶ Fredric Jameson, foreword, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, by Jean-François Lyotard, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1979) xviii.

readers to the political implications of accepted literary practices.⁸⁷

Postmodernism has tried to reunite the political and the aesthetic, believing that they have important things to say to each other. Instead of simply vilifying and rejecting ideology, postmodernism has learned to live with it, examine it, deconstruct it and incorporate it into the patchwork of creative and dynamic contradictions that postmodernism represents. In fact, the very insistence by postmodernism that process is more valuable than conclusions, as well as its tendency to nurture contradictions rather than resolve them, is a denial of the monolithic and controlling structures of ideology. Insisting as it does on its provisionality and its refusal to countenance closure, postmodernism contrives to dance as well as take issue with its antagonists, so that the term "antagonist" loses its meaning. Using a form of ontological jujitsu instead of encouraging a head-on encounter, postmodernist art, as Hutcheon says, "asserts and then deliberately undermines such principles as value, order, meaning, control, and identity...that have been the basic premises of bourgeois [liberal ideology]." ⁸⁸

The difference between Orwell's views and those of postmodernism is partly a matter of different experience and different historical times: the terrors of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes (as well as the Soviet invasion of Hungary) have ceased to be realities, in the intellectual sense, to a new generation, and the ideologies which these regimes were able to impose so powerfully have lost their hold both on their previously captive populations and the imaginations of subsequent thinkers. However, Orwell's ideas about ideology were not always predictable. On the one hand, he had the satirist's habit of exaggerating, and for his tendency to depict such issues through the distorting lens of satire we need look no further than his nightmarish and surreal depiction of totalitarian rule in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. However, when he was speaking as a political commentator who was not attempting to be satirical, he could take a very different line, a result no doubt of the fact that the attempt to be fair-minded in

⁸⁷ Hutcheon, *Poetics* 141-2.

⁸⁸ Hutcheon *Poetics* 13.

the classic English way underpinned his thought and writing, as well as his life. His fairness is highlighted by some rough notes he made in the last year of his life, when he wrote "Gross unfairness & misleadingness of much criticism of both USA & USSR, because of failure to allow for the size of these countries."⁸⁹ This piece of even-handedness comes from the pen of a long-time vigorous crusader against the Soviet Union, at which both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* were, in large part, aimed.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that Orwell's personal views were not devoid of ideology, since he never abandoned his allegiance to socialism though he would, no doubt, have considered this to be a benign example of ideology, if in fact he allowed it to be ideology at all. Perhaps a sign that Orwell was in his own idiosyncratic way indeed not an ideologue is that he made no single and obvious statement about his political beliefs, leading various people who knew him to offer widely differing comments on the subject. Frederic Warburg, one of Orwell's publishers, denies that Orwell "was ever a socialist, though he would have described himself as a socialist"⁹⁰ and A.J. Ayer says that Orwell's socialism "owed nothing to Marxist theory and much to the tradition of English Nonconformity. He saw it primarily as an instrument of justice."⁹¹ The writer Paul Potts refers to Orwell as "by temperament a Tory radical,"⁹² but Stephen Spender says that "Orwell really was a socialist who wanted people...to live socialist lives in a kind of socialist, anarchist society."⁹³ Orwell himself says that there were publications of the right which "have tried to use *1984* as propaganda against the Labour Party, but I have published a sort of démenti which I hope will be printed."⁹⁴ Symons sees Orwell as "handy for radicals who view him as a renegade partly responsible for the failures and defeats of the Left, and equally for right-wingers as a stick with which to beat

⁸⁹ George Orwell, Extracts from a Manuscript Note-book, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 514.

⁹⁰ Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick, eds., *Orwell Remembered* (London: Ariel, 1984) 194.

⁹¹ Coppard and Crick 211.

⁹² Coppard and Crick 254.

⁹³ Coppard and Crick 266.

⁹⁴ George Orwell, letter to Vernon Richards, 22 June 1949, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 504.

left-wing parties and movements." ⁹⁵ Orwell emerges from these comments as having the classic qualities of the satirist implicit in this thesis: elusiveness and independence of mind, together with a profound radicalism, a suspicion of the status quo and a consequent desire for people to change. All this suggests that Orwell was true to the stance he recommended to writers: of avoiding commitment to a party political line ⁹⁶ - a stance suggested by this thesis as offering the most integrity and creativity for satirists. Ingle sees Orwell's individualism as an inherent part of him, believing that "Orwell was temperamentally unsuited to being a regular soldier in anybody's army; he was an irregular fighting in his own way under his own command." ⁹⁷ Commenting on Orwell's temperament, Bernard Crick says that he "was expert in the art of rubbing his own cat's fur backwards and he enjoyed doing just that." ⁹⁸

Orwell himself does not discuss the concept of ideology in any detail, but it is clear that he would have been at home with the notion that it is when ideology becomes palpably toxic (a highly debatable and subjective issue, until concentration camps or planned starvation begin to occur in a country) that it needs to be fought. That is very different from the postmodern notion that ideology is everywhere and innocence is dead - but this thesis proposes to continue the dialogue already begun in earlier chapters between satire and postmodernism. It is a dialogue which implicitly asserts the value of provisionality, difference and contradiction as opposed to clear-cut moral and political judgements, and thus promises also to become a dialogue between postmodernism and modernism, insofar as Orwell was a modernist. Specifically, the notion of ideology will again become a major issue when *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are discussed in detail.

⁹⁵ Julian Symons, "Orwellspeak," rev. of *The Politics of Literary Reputation: The Making and Claiming of 'St George' Orwell*, by John Rodden, *London Review of Books* 11.21 (1989): 20.

⁹⁶ See 96-7 above.

⁹⁷ Ingle, *A Political Life* 23.

⁹⁸ Bernard Crick, introd., *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, by George Orwell (1949. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984) 4.

Closely related to the subject of ideology is that of propaganda, and what now follows is a discussion of the nature of propaganda in dialogic relation to satire (and, more specifically, Orwell's statements on propaganda). Jowett and O'Donnell offer the following definition of propaganda, which may serve here as a working definition:

Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.... Further, propaganda seeks to contain information in a specific area, and responses to propaganda are manipulated in an attempt to keep them in the contained area. The recipient of the propaganda message is discouraged from asking about anything outside the contained area.⁹⁹

Propaganda is closely linked to ideology and, in fact, propaganda can be seen as ideology in action, though when ideology is forceful enough, there may be no distinction between it and propaganda. Orwell did not really discuss ideology at any length, but he had a passionate interest in propaganda, possibly because ideology smacks of theory, of which he was always suspicious, whereas propaganda has an eminently practical quality to it. There are some key statements about the relationship between propaganda and writing in a piece Orwell wrote in 1946:

Once again, no book is genuinely free from political bias. The opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.... Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, *against* totalitarianism and *for* democratic Socialism, as I understand it.... Anyone who cares to examine my work will see that even

⁹⁹ Jowett and O'Donnell 16.

when it is downright propaganda it contains much that a full-time politician would consider irrelevant.¹⁰⁰

The first statement about art and politics recognises the pervasive quality of politics in human life, even if it does not call such an influence "ideology." Orwell also suggests that his serious writing has been committed to a particular political purpose - a stance which it would be difficult now not to call propaganda. However, one also needs to examine Orwell's democratic socialist ideals, which are similar to those of the Marxist critic Terry Eagleton, who speaks contemptuously of "bourgeois criticism's smug assumption that art is one thing and propaganda another."¹⁰¹ Orwell's final statement implicitly differentiates between political writing and propaganda and, significantly, implies that even when writers produce "downright propaganda" they have not necessarily become propagandists (in the wholly pejorative sense of the word), since a politician would still consider much of what Orwell wrote as "irrelevant." A few years earlier Orwell had written the following:

It is fashionable to say that in verse only the words count and the "meaning" is irrelevant, but in fact every poem contains a prose meaning, and when the poem is any good it is a meaning which the poet urgently wishes to express. All art is to some extent propaganda.¹⁰²

These views help to clarify Orwell's views about propaganda which, in relation to art at any rate, seem to be very broad, since he seems to feel that any deeply felt views, successfully conveyed so as to influence an audience, constitute propaganda. As indicated earlier, Orwell had little respect for theoretical considerations and here, as elsewhere, he is exercising his right not to commit himself to a rigid statement of his views on propaganda. While he has a right to such flexibility - he is not, after all, setting himself up as a

¹⁰⁰ Orwell, "Why I Write" 4,5,6.

¹⁰¹ Terry Eagleton, *Marxism and Literary Criticism* (London: Methuen, 1976) 57.

¹⁰² George Orwell, rev. of *Burnt Norton, East Coker, The Dry Salvages*, by T.S. Eliot, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 239-40.

political philosopher - his two best-known novels are much exercised with the practice and the effects of propaganda, and his raw material for these novels is drawn from historical events, relating his text to a world outside the literary work in the distinctive way common to satire. Yet, as has been suggested in earlier discussion, satirists are "truth-tellers" in only a limited sense and their aim is to influence their audience towards some kind of shift in thought and action. So what is Orwell's agenda in these two highly political novels of his, and what kind of credence are we to give to their stand on the issue of propaganda, even after we have made allowance for the fact that he is writing satire? Are these novels themselves propagandistic and if so how are we to assess them? In short, there is a need to evaluate both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in terms of whether they actually partake of precisely the culture of propaganda of which Orwell is so critical in these novels. This need is increased by the fact that from 1941 to 1943 Orwell worked for the BBC producing, and sometimes taking part in, talks and programmes which clearly fell within the broad category of propaganda, though they clearly did not constitute what is known as "black" propaganda.¹⁰³ In a letter to Woodcock Orwell hedges on this matter, first saying that "it is chiefly a question of whether one considers it more important to down the Nazis first" and then claiming that he has "kept our propaganda slightly less disgusting than it might otherwise have been."¹⁰⁴ However, when he left the BBC he "spoke of feeling like an orange that has been trodden on by a very dirty boot"¹⁰⁵ and at a later point he refers to "all the bilge" he wrote for the BBC.¹⁰⁶ Finally, to reiterate an earlier point, it is not unknown for a satirist to fill the role of a party political hack, and write out-and-out propaganda for that particular

¹⁰³ Jowett and O'Donnell (18) speak of white, grey and black propaganda, the latter entailing successful falsification at many levels. The citizens of Oceania, for example, live in an atmosphere of constant black propaganda.

¹⁰⁴ George Orwell, letter to George Woodcock, 2 December 1942, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 268.

¹⁰⁵ W.J. West, *The Larger Evils: Nineteen Eighty-Four* (Edinburgh: Canongate P, 1992) 65.

¹⁰⁶ George Orwell, letter to Stafford Cottman, 25 April 1946, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 149.

party: Jonathan Swift did this for the Tories, particularly between 1710 and 1711, as Michael Foot shows.¹⁰⁷

One view of propaganda is that, like the view of ideology discussed earlier, it is - and always has been - all-pervasive, and thus inescapable. The corollary to this view is that propaganda is a legitimate aspect of any society and that its bad reputation is undeserved. Thomson says that "[in] reality, it is hard to find any piece of communication which is devoid of propaganda content or intention."¹⁰⁸ This seems to confirm Orwell's above-quoted views about propaganda, though Thomson's reasoning is rather different:

[It] is easy to become alarmist and to condemn all forms of propaganda, without appreciating 'the myriad small rites' which help societies to function.... There is a need to find some guidelines for a balanced judgement on the use of media and communication techniques for achieving acceptable levels of social indoctrination in a democratic society.... [There] may be some standard by which techniques of social control... can be justified on the grounds of... eliminating war, reducing population growth, encouraging hygiene....¹⁰⁹

Thomson is not alone in his thinking about the nature of propaganda. In the same way as some people suggest that there can be ideology which is both acceptable and useful, so there is an argument that certain uses of propaganda can serve society well. Doob airs the commonly-held view¹¹⁰ that propaganda acquired its reputation for slyness and manipulation largely from the large-scale abuse of it during World War I. He adds that "'propaganda' is disliked in a democratic society because people feel naïvely that their decisions should be made by themselves and not by someone else. The

¹⁰⁷ Michael Foot, *The Pen and the Sword : A Year in the Life of Jonathan Swift* (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1966) 140, 255, 291ff, 317, 356-9. Swift's later political writing, on the Irish situation, was a separate matter.

¹⁰⁸ Oliver Thomson, *Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques* (Edinburgh: Paul Harris, 1977) 4.

¹⁰⁹ Thomson 6.

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Brown 11.

feeling is naïve because decisions result from past experiences, many of which are usually culturally determined...." ¹¹¹

Despite these assertions Thomson, Doob and others do also point out that propaganda has extensive and alarming possibilities for abuse. In fact, those writers who begin by arguing for a more balanced view of propaganda almost always go on to devote much more attention to its questionable side. While accepting that propaganda can sometimes be socially useful, this thesis deals mainly with the widely held view that this discourse is a force for evil rather than good and, certainly, Orwell showed in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* that modern propaganda can lead to untold harm. Doob, rather controversially, suggests that contemporary American society is more saturated with propaganda than Nazi Germany ever was, and adverts to the multifarious sources of propaganda in North America - "political parties, trade unions, churches, business houses, newspaper owners...societies, clubs, professional associations." His main point is that propaganda is really harmful only in a totalitarian society, where there is only one source of propaganda (the state) and citizens are robbed of the right of choice. ¹¹² It does seem crucial to know how oppressive (or not) the structures of a state are and how effectively propaganda is propagated and applied.

Several commentators agree that propaganda is not anything new, but what is new is the twentieth-century use of technology to establish propaganda as a permanent feature of political life which manipulates the thoughts, choices and actions of large numbers of people in a premeditated and co-ordinated way. So, propaganda is, among other things, a device for narrowing people's worlds rather than expanding them - and the propagandist has a range of strategies by which to accomplish this: the ideology animating the propaganda will nearly always contain and limit thought and the language used to express the propaganda can itself also serve this function (Newspeak, the language spoken in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, is a good

¹¹¹ Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Holt, 1948) 242.

¹¹² Doob 121-22.

example), while various social measures, always embracing a culture of conformity and possibly including terror, will reinforce this narrowness. As with ideology, propaganda also has its own vocabulary, which is often used to deify what is approved of and demonise what is not, as Qualter indicates in the case of Soviet propaganda:

In its actual operation Russian propaganda has been characterized by a distinctive use of language described, with fair accuracy, as 'semantic warfare'....Soviet propaganda policy does not allow for subtle shades of friendship. The world is divided into two mutually exclusive camps where those who are not unquestionably loyal are mortal enemies. Neutrals and 'deviationists' are left in a difficult position. ¹¹³

Propaganda shares with ideology its pervasive and devious qualities, since all these strategies reach very deep into society but are imposed on people, without their conscious knowledge and co-operation.

Adolf Hitler's views on propaganda display a contemptuous view of human nature as weak, irrational and completely malleable:

The receptive ability of the masses is very limited, their understanding small; on the other hand, they have a great power of forgetting. This being so, all effective propaganda must be confined to a few points, which must be brought out in the form of slogans....An immense majority of the people are so feminine [sic] in nature and point of view, that their thoughts and actions are governed more by feeling and sentiment.... ¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Terence H. Qualter, *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare* (1962; Pretoria: Unisa P, 1965) 107.

¹¹⁴ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, The Paternoster Library (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1933) 81-2, 83.

Hitler's attitudes and methods of making propaganda were faithfully aped by Joseph Goebbels, the Reichsminister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. His title's frank mention of propaganda conveys well the unabashed quality of Goebbels's deceptions, and the term "Popular Enlightenment" is worthy in its cynicism of the Party in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* which calls its propaganda arm "The Ministry of Truth." Goebbels, reporting on a conversation he had with Hitler, says, "I emphasized that I insist upon totalitarianism in carrying out the propaganda and news policies of the Reich. He agreed with me absolutely...."¹¹⁵ Lochner says that Goebbels was interested in the sheer exercise of power, having "an almost psychopathic lust for power,"¹¹⁶ and this is reflected in the painstaking nature of his propaganda activities:

[T]he machinery that controlled Nazi propaganda activities was carefully concealed from public view.... On one occasion, Goebbels had a fit of blinding fury because an illustrated magazine had published a picture of a man putting on a record of a triumphal bell chime after a special announcement....¹¹⁷

Propaganda does, in fact, have a strong covert streak, and this is related to the need for flexibility, since an open and fixed programme of thought and action makes short-term changes more difficult to justify. Propaganda can change its methods and its current of thought without missing a beat, as can be seen from the Hitler-Stalin pact announced in 1939, which overnight reversed the hitherto (officially) antagonistic relations between these two countries, the announcement being accompanied by press releases concerning the long-standing friendship between the countries - a propaganda somersault which is parodied by Orwell in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Joseph Paul Goebbels, *The Goebbels Diaries*, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948) 385.

¹¹⁶ Goebbels xxiv.

¹¹⁷ Goebbels 39.

¹¹⁸ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954) 148-49.

Since propaganda works on an emotional and irrational level, exploiting unconscious needs, no organisation or government (with the exception of Marxism) will admit to using it, though all do. Satire is more open in its approach:¹¹⁹ as demonstrated earlier, it too is aware that the mind contains unconscious structures, but satirists overtly try to break these down or at least to stimulate (or irritate) their audience by attacking such structures. It is propagandists who, as stealthily as possible, make use of such structures for covert ends or attempt to replace them with structures which are by no means always announced, but which will ensure the greatest support for whatever it is the propagandist wishes to accomplish.

The best known type of propaganda is that commonly known as "agitation propaganda," which, according to Foulkes, "is usually subversive and oppositional. It may seek to overthrow a government or established order, but may equally be used by governments, for example in times of war, when they wish to break down" ¹²⁰ what Ellul calls "the psychological barriers of habit, belief, and judgment." ¹²¹ Such is the kind of propaganda described by Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Information in Britain during World War I, as "the munitions of the mind."¹²² This is propaganda which may be noisy and obvious on the surface, though its precise intentions and long-term goals are kept hidden.

A covert kind of propaganda, referred to by Ellul as "integration propaganda," is very similar to ideology, functioning essentially as a tranquilliser, arguing away any contradictions or conflicts and reassuring people that everything is under control. As Szanto says, integration propaganda tries to make its audience "accept unquestioningly and uncomplainingly the social conundrums of the present and not challenge the authority of those who perpetuate the dominant and ongoing social institutions." ¹²³ It is "so

¹¹⁹ See 73-5 above.

¹²⁰ Foulkes 11.

¹²¹ Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner, introd. Konrad Kellen (New York: Vintage, 1973) 72.

¹²² Philip Waller, "A Small Triumph," rev. of *British Propaganda During the First World War 1914-18*, by Michael Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, *The Literary Review*, June 1983: 1.

¹²³ George H. Szanto, *Theater and Propaganda* (Austin: U of Texas P, 1978) 9.

pervasive, its effect is so permeating, that one becomes aware of its existence only with great difficulty. Integration propaganda suggests that...one should accept one's society and participate passively within it....Integration propaganda's purpose is preventative: to avoid unplanned change." ¹²⁴

From the above it seems that there are certain limited similarities between agitation propaganda and satire, in that both are subversive, in one sense or another. However, as was seen earlier when ideology and satire were presented in a dialogic relationship, satire lacks the element of totalitarianism which underlies propaganda: satire is not motivated by a lust for power, nor does it have the strong ambition to impose conformity which both agitation and integration propaganda have. Again, propaganda shares, to some degree, the indirect approach of the satirist (it is not fruitful to attack unconscious structures directly, since most people are very protective of such structures) but, in comparison to propaganda, satire is not very indirect and the satirist's audience is not long unaware of what is being done to them. The intentions - and often the very existence - of propaganda can remain hidden for a very long time. This is particularly so in the case of integration propaganda, which is intended to "avoid unplanned change." Satire, on the contrary, is an invitational mode which challenges its audience to take risks and explore alternative worlds - not an easy option, since the avoidance of unplanned change, although it is very poor emotional hygiene and causes personal and political stultification, is a more attractive prospect to most people.

Propaganda's battle against unplanned change is related to its intention to fix the recipient's view of reality, as well as bring about planned changes in the actual circumstances of reality, using the recipient as its tool. The former intention has much in common with ideology, which also tries to provide a final way of interpreting society though, as has been indicated, propaganda has more flexibility than ideology. The attempt to fix people's view of reality is

¹²⁴ Szanto 24.

very far-reaching, since it involves a kind of social engineering which can have extremely sinister implications. Though propaganda may begin by serving and promoting an ideology, in the end it may modify or even supersede that ideology (as in the case of the Hitler-Stalin pact).¹²⁵ Ellul is categorical on this point: "The same holds for ideology as for doctrine; when propaganda uses it, it destroys it...All that is believed, known, and accepted is what propaganda has promulgated."¹²⁶ It seems that propaganda is too cynical and pragmatic to allow itself to be yoked to any fixed ideology for long. It soon takes on a life of its own, doing whatever it must in order to continue to keep a particular government or group in power. The ideas, means and doctrines used will be those that best serve this purpose, whether they be the Communist notion of the inevitability of history or the seventeenth-century belief that women have no souls, Rome's bread and circuses or Hitler's Nuremburg rallies.

The cynicism with which propaganda sets to work can also be seen in the way it uses information and, in particular, statistics, as Ellul makes clear:

[M]uch of the information disseminated nowadays - research findings, facts, statistics, explanations, analyses - *eliminate* [sic] personal judgement and the capacity to form one's own opinion.... A surfeit of data, far from permitting people to make judgements and form opinions, prevents them from doing so and actually paralyzes them. They are caught in a web of facts and must remain at the level of the facts they have been given.... Thus the mechanisms of modern information induce a sort of hypnosis in the individual, who cannot get out of the field that has been laid out for him by the information.¹²⁷

The above-quoted passage is concerned with the abuse of information, which is a key issue in this chapter, and in this thesis as a whole. Satirists are

¹²⁵ See 109 above.

¹²⁶ Ellul 202.

¹²⁷ Ellul 87.

concerned not with information but, rather with process, offering an audience a space in which it can reassess its view of reality, as opposed to the confining quality of discourses such as ideology and propaganda. Satire has more detachment, in certain respects, than many other discourses, and it certainly has a greater seriousness (which sounds ironic in view of its liberal use of humour). This seriousness consists of a kind of integrity which is not available to propagandists, since they are representatives of ideologies and / or institutions and therefore lack the moral and teleological freedom which satirists, as artists and outsiders, have. Satirists are deeply concerned with the problems of both individual people and society, rather than the narrower issues of power and manipulation which are the lifeblood of both the ideologist and the propagandist. It is not simply, as Francis Bacon said, that "knowledge itself is power."¹²⁸ It is that people naturally, even without the interference of ideologists or propagandists, use the knowledge and information that they are given to construct inner worlds for themselves in which they will feel powerful and safe. But what propaganda and ideology do is to encourage, interfere with, direct and control this process of construction, not in an attempt to make people freer or more powerful, but with entirely contrary intentions. The role of ideology is to inform propaganda and underpin it in this process: ideology is what inspires the propagandist deliberately to set about distorting the creative urges of people to construct a reality for themselves, but it is satire which encourages people to question this reality - to ask whether it has been created in a spontaneous way or at the instance of more invasive discourses which seek to become dominant (or are already so).

A discourse which is related to both ideology and propaganda, but is arguably more durable than both, is political myth. The terms "myth" and "ideology" are occasionally used as approximate synonyms, but it is more accurate to say that myths are often used to support ideology or, as Waardenburg has it, they may even be assimilated into ideology.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, it is both possible

¹²⁸ Francis Bacon, "Meditationes Sacrae: Of Heresies," *The Works of Francis Bacon*, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, vol. VII (London: Longman, 1859) 253.

¹²⁹ Jacques Waardenburg, "Symbolic Aspects of Myth," *Myth, Symbol and Reality*, ed. Alan M. Olson (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1980) 55.

and useful to distinguish between political myth and ideology, since they do not always operate in precisely the same way. Ideology offers a structure of ideas on which people can base a view of themselves and the world around them, but myth (whether political or otherwise) offers a structure of symbols which people can mentally inhabit and in which they can find a solid network of meaning. Ellul speaks of myth as follows:

Finally, myth has to be global...It furnishes both the explanation and the synthesis, the future and the requirements. The totality of myth is what counts, not this or that fugitive aspect which might be discounted tomorrow without too much damage. Again, it is global because there is no part of the individual to which it is indifferent. Its control is complete....Nothing subsists outside its sphere. There is no point which could serve as a fulcrum for criticism. It supplies the entire man with a satisfying image. It is a design which permits...no decisive divergence...among those who harbour the same myth.¹³⁰

This view of myth is a bleak one. It sees myth as nothing more than a trap which offers a coherent and certain view of the world and exacts in return a complete loss of the power to discriminate or see clearly. As with ideology and propaganda, some of the power of myth comes from its uncritical acceptance by people as "normality" rather than as an imposed construct. If propaganda is seen as the sheepdog which tirelessly drives the sheep in a certain direction, then political myth can be seen as the corral (or laager) into which the sheep are driven. However, political myth is something that many people find very attractive - and the more threatening the socio-political situation the greater the temptation to seek refuge in myth of one kind or another. The myths surrounding the Nazi regime (e.g. the myth of the Aryan race) are a good example of this.

¹³⁰ Jacques Ellul, *The New Demons* (London: Mowbrays, 1975) 95-96.

But Ellul's views on myth are directed solely at political myth. He is not concerned with the kind of myth which is peopled by gods or has a specific link with ritual, unless they are the gods and the ritual of the modern secular state, which he abhors as psychologically and politically emasculating. Myth has, of course, a much broader reach than that and need not be political, in the strict sense of the word. This is indicated by Mark Schorer's definition:

Myths are the instruments by which we continually struggle to make our experience intelligible to ourselves. A myth is a large, controlling image that gives philosophical meaning to the facts of ordinary life; that is, which has organizing value for experience....¹³¹

The creative value of myth is here apparent, with myth being portrayed as a tool for finding oneself, as well as giving reality a pattern which helps one to negotiate the maze of life. The negative aspect of this is that it is a fixed pattern and offers a single view of reality. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that myth has particular value for communities in ensuring that the past is not forgotten and offering a path forward based on what that particular community has already achieved. Myth gives coherence to current human experience, often by reaching back into the past and interpreting present events in terms of the actions of ancient gods, for example, or in terms of historical or (more commonly) quasi-historical events, such events being themselves shaped and pointed in order to make them more significant. Myth also helps to bind communities together by means of the rituals which often accompany it, thus providing a way for people to overcome their sense of separateness. However, there is another view, represented by Sorel, which sees myths as more active and less conservative:

Their function is not to stabilize, but to direct energies and inspire action. They do this by embodying a dynamic vision

¹³¹ Mark Schorer, "The Necessity of Myth," *Myth and Mythmaking*, ed. Henry A. Murray (New York: Braziller, 1960) 355.

of the movement of life, the more potent because not rational...¹³²

Myth can also have an explanatory role, offering narratives which speak of the origins and the current practices of the group or society concerned, though such explanations are not offered in a rational or scientific mode. This is both a strength and a weakness of myth, since irrational ways of communicating may penetrate into areas of the human mind not accessible to logos (the realm of cold, detached ratiocination), as opposed to mythos. On the other hand, myth is often viewed suspiciously by an age in which linear ways of thinking are still regarded as superior to non-linear, mainly because science is associated with the former - not to mention the general view that often equates the very word "myth" with falsehood.

Kolakowski sums up the arguments for and against myth, acknowledging its value but delivering a warning as to how easily myth can be abused:

What we know for certain is that in maintaining any kind of human fellowship we need a faith in ready-made and arbitrary values, and that at the same time it is dangerous to believe that these values are at any time fixed and completed, that they can relieve one of situational interpretations and a situational responsibility for them. A mythology can be socially fruitful only when it is unceasingly subject to vigilance which would frustrate its natural tendency to turn into a narcotic.¹³³

What this clear-sighted and humane, though hard-headed, statement indicates is that people need stable communal values, but that such values will become destructive if they are not accompanied by responsible attitudes on the part of the community. At its best, myth is an organic part of society, expressing ideals and desires which dwell in the collective unconscious of

¹³² Quoted by William Righter, *Myth and Literature* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) 9.

¹³³ Leszek Kolakowski, *The Presence of Myth*, trans. Adam Czerniawski (1972; Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989) 105.

that society, helping to direct it and to reconcile contradictions which might otherwise cripple it.

Malinowski emphasizes that in primitive societies myth "expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards morality....It is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom."¹³⁴ It is significant that this highly optimistic view of myth is limited to so-called primitive society, since by far the worst abuses of myth have occurred in so-called advanced civilizations, in the guise of what we would call social or political myth. At its worst, myth is the conscious and cynical use of a society's ideals and desires to keep a particular group or party in power, and to legitimize its past, present and future actions. It is in this guise that myth can be used to abuse whole societies by the "engineers of the soul" (a description, intended to be laudatory, attributed to Stalin by Gorky).¹³⁵ As Cassirer says, "The power of mythical thought...is perhaps the most important and the most alarming feature...of modern political thought."¹³⁶

It is this particular manifestation of myth, highlighted so starkly in *Animal Farm* and especially in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which satirists seek to expose and weaken. As has been shown, satire finds itself at odds with both ideology and propaganda - but it is a particular enemy of political myth, perhaps because of the latter's comprehensiveness and attractiveness. Political myth is unique in that it encourages in people an abandonment of self, in conjunction with blind belief and participation at the level of ritual and taboo otherwise associated only with religion. Satire, on the other hand, is a force that works for freedom of thought, encouraging clear and subtle views of the world, while stressing its provisional quality. As will be seen in the final chapter, the world of a novel such as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is saturated in political myth, with clear elements of ritual and taboo emerging in the daily "Two Minutes Hate" sessions in which all citizens must participate and which draw on the most primitive levels of belief and action.

¹³⁴ Leonard Thompson, *The Political Mythology of Apartheid* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1985) 7.

¹³⁵ Maxim Gorky, address, Writers' Congress, 26 Oct. 1934.

¹³⁶ Ernst Cassirer *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1946) 3.

Marina Warner makes the point that there are "hopeful myths which imagine a different world, which hold out a promise of happiness - and transformation."¹³⁷ Myth in general can indeed have a transforming power, and perhaps what is most alien to satire in purely political myths is that they foster a dreary conformity, especially in the case of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* so clearly shows. Satire, on the other hand, is a radical force for unplanned change which tries to jolt people out of their habitual ways of thinking, while exercising the minimum amount of control and, in contrast to political myth, fostering the critical awareness of the individuals it is addressing.

The standard Marxist approach to myth is the same as its view of ideology: both are suspect because they represent forms of false consciousness. Roland Barthes, for example, is scathing about myth. Defining myth "in a bourgeois society," Barthes says that "*myth is depoliticized speech*. One must naturally understand *political in its deeper* meaning, as describing the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the world...."¹³⁸ This is a very telling criticism of myth, since it accuses it of debasing the very language ("*depoliticized speech*") that people use in order to rob them of the right to participate in the political process. More than that, because of the formulation Barthes uses to define the political, myth stands accused of depriving people of the opportunity to shape the society in which they live. As can be seen from the previous paragraph, the implicit view of satire on the issue of political myth does not contradict that of Barthes, particularly as his definition of the political reflects the kind of broad involvement in politics practised by satirists.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Marina Warner, *Managing Monsters: Six Myths of our Time*, The 1994 Reith Lectures (London: Vintage, 1994) 25.

¹³⁸ Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, selected and trans. Annette Lavers (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) 143.

¹³⁹ See 34, 38 above.

Finally, a dialogic juxtaposition of myth and postmodernism suggests that, as with its attitude to other discourses, postmodernism is very relaxed about myth. Hutcheon states the case as follows:

Postmodernist discourses...need the very myths and conventions they contest and reduce...; they do not necessarily come to terms with either order or disorder...but question both in terms of each other. The myths and conventions exist for a reason, and postmodernism investigates that reason. The postmodern impulse is not to seek any total vision. It merely questions. If it *finds* such a vision, it questions how, in fact, it *made* it.¹⁴⁰

As elsewhere in this thesis, the postmodern outlook provides a touchstone, a counterpoint and an alternative stance against which to assess the necessarily serious and committed stance of Orwell's novels. The stance of postmodernism is one of open and interested intellectual curiosity which refuses to adopt any ideology or fixed set of beliefs. It is, as so often, the refusal of postmodernism to cement itself into a particular position that gives it its attractiveness and liveliness. The fact that Orwell sometimes committed himself to fixed positions does not lessen the value of his work, but it does lead one to examine whether he, in his need to have defined beliefs, did not to some degree fall into the trap of rigid ideology, propaganda and myth which he sought so hard to fend off and render harmless - an issue which will be taken up in later chapters. The lightness of touch that postmodernism has towards socio-political discourses was just not possible in Orwell's time, but it is important to juxtapose the different approaches, very much in the spirit of postmodernism, and initiate a dialogic process between them. As can be seen, postmodernism practises a remarkable kind of economy, finding a use for what it questions rather than consigning it to perdition, as a more rigid approach might do. This process of defining and redefining is part of the life-blood of postmodernism, which remains in a creative and provisional stance, always dynamic and never judgmental. In Jungian terms, it refuses to disown

¹⁴⁰ Hutcheon, *Poetics* 48.

its shadow - the implicit and unrealised but powerful and "unacceptable" side which one is tempted to reject for fear that it will take control - but chooses rather to make fertile use of it. Satire, not being as self-aware as postmodernism, is not as ready to acknowledge that shadow side.

Perhaps it is unrealistic to ask a discourse like satire, which thrives on estrangement and deviousness, to become more integrated in this way, especially since satire has a large shadow side which is useful in its unexpressed form. The success of satire may depend on the satirist being, to a certain degree, dis-integrated. But the danger in these matters is that a shadow side has such energy that if rejected it may surface unexpectedly and claim its right to life ¹⁴¹ - as, arguably, the discourses demonised by Orwell arise to haunt the very texts in which he attempts to exorcise them. In fact, one way of seeing satire is to characterise it as entirely a shadow form: "Satire is the stranger that lives in the basement" ¹⁴² - and this suggests that satire represents something both uncomfortable and familiar: a stranger, yet living in the heart (the "home") of society, in the basement which, metaphorically speaking, is where the shadow side resides.

One of the topics to be discussed in Chapter 5 is precisely the dark or shadow sides of Orwell which he fails to acknowledge. Is his case against totalitarianism in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* so univocal (in Bakhtin's terms, monoglot) that aspects of what he is condemning are incorporated, willy-nilly, as the discourse of his shadow side - a return of the repressed carnivalesque - in both his writing and his general stance? For example, there is his linguistic rigidity discussed later in this thesis, ¹⁴³ as well as the issue of sadism. ¹⁴⁴ Satirists may in fact sometimes be too rigid and narrow, and not interrogative and unruly enough, particularly towards themselves. In this thesis, such aspects are revealed when Orwell's modernist attempts to

¹⁴¹ C.G. Jung, *Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice*, The Tavistock Lectures (1968; London: Routledge, 1986) 21-25.

¹⁴² Test 6.

¹⁴³ See 128-30 below.

¹⁴⁴ See 237-8, 273-4 below.

systematise ways of seeing the world are brought into a dialogic relationship with postmodernism, which emphasises play and différance.

In the last part of this chapter, three different but related ways of manipulating the world have been explored, in dialogic relationship with satire: ideology, propaganda and political myth. In their most unlovely manifestations, at any rate, all share an absolute intolerance of any world-view other than the one they propagate, and label any deviation from or questioning of their viewpoint as a form of heresy. The Stalinist belief in a communist utopia, the Nazi idea of the Aryan race and related Western notions of the infallibility of science and progress are all myths, nurtured and fixed in people's minds by a combination of ideology and propaganda. Central to these three discourses is an obsessive concern with language, which is controlled and manipulated in a conscious attempt to create a world in which a small group of people has a great deal of power over many others. The intimate link between language and power is one that Orwell is bent on exposing - and it will be one of the main concerns of Chapters 4 and 5, which will consist of a discussion of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* respectively.

Chapter 4 *Animal Farm*: Language, Terror, History and Utopia

Earlier chapters of this thesis have highlighted the aggressive nature of satire, as well as its mischievous side, while ideology, propaganda and political myth were also shown to have an aggressive side, giving them the ability to inflict mischief of a much more serious kind. The negative views of ideology, propaganda and political myth are part of the modernist view espoused by Orwell, and they were juxtaposed with postmodern views to create a dialogic process. The integrity of satire is not harmed by such dialogism, even though the lightness of touch of postmodernism is sometimes in conflict with the underlying basis of Orwell's satire. In these last chapters the dialogism is sharpened as these theoretical considerations are for the first time brought to bear on literary texts, and the faultlines between Orwell's modernist ideological stand and his radical satiric praxis also become more apparent. The solidarity between satire and postmodernism described earlier still stands, though, primarily because both work with provisionality, even if postmodernism is more open and shifting.

In *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Orwell shows how ideology, propaganda and political myth can strike at the root of public and personal well-being. Such discourses may inflict wounds on the psyche of society that are intended to destroy democratic structures, operating within the context of power rather than the invitational and provisional mode which marks satire. One of the most specific markers which separate satire from these other discourses is its attitude to and use of language. Both Swift and Orwell wrote essays on language which show their concern with it, and their longer works, in which language is seen in action within a society, show their involvement even more clearly. It is Sartre who, borrowing Brice-Parrain's phrase, maintains that words are "loaded pistols," concluding that "If [a person] speaks he fires. He may be silent, but since he has chosen to fire, he must do it like a man, by aiming at targets, and not like a child, at random...."¹ The implication here is that language is dangerous and its use demands

¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *What is Literature?*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950) 14.

responsibility on the part of the mature speaker or writer. The aggression and the frequently playful nature of satire might suggest that it is both dangerous and immature but, as this thesis argues, the issue is more complex than that: the "danger" satire presents is only to thoughtlessly entrenched habits of thought and its playfulness is an invitation to openness and growth.

There can be no doubt that readers of works such as *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *Gulliver's Travels* or *A Modest Proposal* do frequently feel that they are human targets for the satirist's marksmanship. But satirists aim with care, their goals are defined and limited and (unless one speaks of ancient satirical practice)² they intend to inflict only a certain amount of damage, which will not result in death of the mind or spirit. Ideologists, propagandists and political myth-makers, on the other hand, have very different attitudes towards language and use it for ends which are essentially manipulative. They are intent on wrenching language from its moorings (as opposed to invoking *différance*) in both the collective and the individual psyche, with the intention of changing and moulding thought (and therefore action) in a very specific direction. The aim of the socio-political discourses discussed in this thesis is to limit the *Weltanschauung* of whole groups or nations by means of language, and to control that *Weltanschauung* for the foreseeable future. The argument here is not that satire is entirely neutral in the matter of wishing to influence public opinion, but satire is engendered by feelings such as concern, anger and irritation, while ideology, propaganda and political myth stem from a much colder desire to imprison the human spirit. Robert Graves warns that "There's a cool web of language winds us in,"³ suggesting that the very structure of ordinary language has a deceptively comfortable quality which can limit people's ability to experience and feel. This quality is exploited by some very influential discourses, which use language in ways that confirm and encourage the limitations of language, to increase the influence of these discourses. By contrast, Russian formalists, psychoanalysts, satirists,

² See 15 above.

³ Robert Graves, "The Cool Web," *Robert Graves: Poems Selected by Himself* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) 43.

postmodernists and poststructuralists engage in a struggle to liberate language, and to keep it flexible and open.

Swift and Orwell, being political polemicists as well as satirists, pointed out the dangers posed to society by those who abuse and distort language. Both of these writers were also very aware of how the fate of language is directly linked to political developments within any society. Orwell's concern about these matters is much more overt, but Swift's involvement in them is nevertheless unmistakable. Among his writings on the subject is his *A Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue* [hereafter referred to as the *Proposa*], in which, speaking to the Earl of Oxford, he says, "And I take it to be your Lordship's duty, as *prime Minister*, to give Order for inspecting our Language..."⁴ Swift makes a related point about the connection between language and politics when he attributes the corruption of Latin to the Roman government's tyranny, "which ruined the Study of Eloquence; there being no further Use or Encouragement for popular Orators."⁵ He also complains that the Roman Senate and people had become "slavish" in disposition, and thus "the Wit and Eloquence of the Age were wholly turned into Panegyrick, the most barren of all subjects."⁶ Finally, the Roman language was adversely affected by "The great Corruption of Manners, and Introduction of foreign Luxury, with foreign Terms to express it."⁷

Swift's arguments stress the close links between language, politics and the moral health of society. A tyrannical government can harm the language of the land because it curtails freedom of speech, thus setting an arbitrary limit to the critical use of language. When a people becomes servile ("slavish") there is not only a loss of political freedom, but also a loss to language: "Wit and Eloquence" now reflect this servility by abandoning their integrity and failing to nurture the cogent and trenchant use of language, lending

⁴ Swift, *A Proposal* 17.

⁵ Swift, *A Proposal* 8.

⁶ Swift, *A Proposal* 8.

⁷ Swift, *A Proposal* 8.

themselves instead to fawning and flattery. The way in which language shapes both thought and action is stressed by Swift's last point (about "foreign Luxury"), which reflects how the nature of society can be adversely affected not only by foreign decadent habits but also by the very terms which are introduced to mediate that decadence. For Swift, the health of the body politic and the existence of a lean and muscular system of language are interdependent.

Swift maintains that the English Civil War ("the great Rebellion") initiated a period in which the "corruptions" of English at least equalled its "refinements," and he continues in similar vein:

During the Usurpation [the Cromwellian period], such an Infusion of Enthusiastick Jargon prevailed in every Writing, as was not shaken off in many Years after. To this succeeded that Licentiousness which entered with the *Restoration*; and from infecting our Religion and Morals, fell to corrupt our Language.⁸

For Swift, as for Orwell, language was not a peripheral issue. He saw that words have the power both to shape the inner worlds that people inhabit and to determine the way events occur in the public domain. His passionate engagement with the inter-linked issues of politics and language can also be seen in the fourth book of *Gulliver's Travels*, where the nature of the Houyhnhnms' language is decisive in defining and reflecting the quality of their society: for example, the suffix "yahoo" is attached to signifiers in order to give them negative connotations, thus helping to entrench the lower status of the Yahoos, and there is no word for telling a lie in the Houyhnhnm language - which encourages the Houyhnhnms' smugness and narrow view of life.

⁸ Swift, *A Proposal* 10.

Orwell's views on these issues are expressed with even more directness. In the opening lines of his essay "Politics and the English Language" he states that "the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes."⁹ Orwell lists several ways in which language can be used to mislead readers and prevent them from seeing situations clearly - a "catalogue of swindles and perversions" he calls this.¹⁰ He attacks such debasements of language as "dying metaphors," "pretentious diction" and "meaningless words," but it is clear that his objections are not simply to linguistic pretentiousness and poor style. Orwell is concerned about the propagation of a fuzzy, false and ultimately dangerous view of the world - dangerous because it is an evasion of "reality" and therefore a very poor basis upon which to act. Psychology and satire could easily make common cause here: both are intent on questioning views of the world which are not dynamic enough to aid individuals or groups along whatever road will allow them to develop their full potential. The precise road is not laid down, since each individual or group will have a unique path to find and follow, but the road may be obstructed or obfuscated, either by internal psychic factors or by discourses inimical to personal or political freedom. It is to the latter that Orwell directs his hostility, here unmasking the ways in which propaganda uses language to offer a view of the world which can blind people to the horror of events in times of war and political oppression:

In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the

⁹ George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 127.

¹⁰ Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" 133.

countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called *pacification*. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called *transfer of population* or *rectification of frontiers*. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called *elimination of unreliable elements*.¹¹

The use of language to inoculate people against a knowledge of actual events is something particularly abhorrent to Orwell, since he was both a satirist and a journalist. Specifically, he was the kind of journalist who went to live among the poor before he wrote about them in *The Road to Wigan Pier*, and based his account of the Spanish civil war in *Homage to Catalonia* on his experience of having fought there. In his preface to the Ukrainian edition of the novel, Orwell makes it clear that the satiric alternative world which *Animal Farm* constitutes is based primarily on autobiographical foundations - Orwell's experiences and his consequent desire to accomplish "the destruction of the Soviet Union."¹² This use of personal experience seems to be common among satirists, as Frye suggests: "Insofar as the satirist has a 'position' of his own, it is the preference of practice to theory, experience to metaphysics."¹³ Orwell certainly put a premium on experience, and this made his thinking heavily empirical - an approach which Joseph and Taylor regard as helpful in avoiding "the covert influence of ideology."¹⁴

Whether Orwell's particular brand of empiricism did in fact allow him to avoid ideology is highly debatable, particularly when earlier arguments about the near impossibility of avoiding ideology under any circumstances are borne in mind. While Orwell admits to the pervasiveness of propaganda in art¹⁵ he is

¹¹ Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" 136.

¹² Orwell, Author's Preface 405.

¹³ Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957) 230.

¹⁴ John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor, "Ideology, Science and Language," *Ideologies of Language*, eds. Joseph and Taylor (London: Routledge, 1990) 2.

¹⁵ See 104 above.

not similarly open on the subject of ideology. As the quotation from "Politics and the English Language" shows, Orwell's views on language, although presented as something commonsensically obvious, are far from detached. Orwell's plain style here (and elsewhere) is that of the good journalist and able polemicist, but such clarity also involves a certain sacrifice of nuance and complexity: he mistrusted intellectuals¹⁶ and what they stood for (ironically, so did the Nazis),¹⁷ and this sometimes led to a rigidity and lack of breadth in his thought. Proudly asserting his Englishness, he says that "the English are not intellectual. They have a horror of abstract thought, they feel no need for any philosophy or systematic 'world-view.'"¹⁸ His mistrust of theoretical speculation - his empiricism - as well as his unwillingness to take philosophical risks may have kept him from the worst excesses of ideological thinking, but did not equip him to detect and counter ideological tendencies in himself. Carl Freedman finds *Nineteen Eighty-Four* flawed because Winston Smith makes his stand against the Party purely on the basis of common sense (for example, 2+2 must make 4). Freedman regards Orwell's "long attachment to empiricist common-sense reason [as] prevent[ing] him...from considering more complex...more dialectical forms of reason."¹⁹

Orwell's views on language, imbued as they are with liberal humanism, are prescriptive rather than discursive, and purport to relate to certain fixed values and truths. Quirk, speaking of "Politics and the English Language," suggests that Orwell is neither adventurous nor unconventional here, and speaks of his "sociolinguistic naivety."²⁰ These qualities are reminiscent of the attitudes towards language of the authorities in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which are also prescriptive, only significantly more so, and Orwell's

¹⁶ George Orwell, letter to Victor Gollancz, 8 January 1940, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. I (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 409-10, letter to H.J. Willmetts, 18 May 1944, *CEJL*, vol. III, 150, "Inside the Whale," *CEJL*, vol. I, 515 and "James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution," *CEJL*, vol. IV, 179.

¹⁷ John Wesley Young, *Totalitarian Language: Orwell's Newspeak and its Nazi and Communist Antecedents* (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1991) 70-3.

¹⁸ George Orwell, "The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 58.

¹⁹ Carl Freedman, in "Antinomies of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*," *Modern Fiction Studies* 30.4 (1984): 614.

²⁰ Randolph Quirk, "'1984' and '1984'," *London Review of Books* 6.3 (1984):10.

attempt to assert certain fixed linguistic norms, while filled with genuine care for humanity, is not ideologically innocent. Taylor warns against the dangers of normative theories of language, concluding as follows: "If, in language, our situation is one in which there is no escape from the mechanisms of power, then it is better that we be aware of our situation."²¹ Orwell states that "The great enemy of clear language is insincerity," but his conception of the relationship between language and its referents is highly debatable. As Flammia puts it, Orwell "makes the error of believing that thought predates language and fails to see that people are enmeshed in their language system."²² Patai makes the point more fully:

Orwell...assumes a predetermined meaning standing in opposition to preexisting (sic) words. Totalitarianism, which to Orwell is a deviation from a normal reality 'out there', must therefore try to control language and ultimately thought, to the point where 'clear' meanings in the outside world will no longer be available. But [Orwell]...does not see that his thoughts, his language, made public, also help maintain a certain reality in place.²³

George Trail attempts to defend "Politics and the English Language," but seems to have been able to find only critical articles about it. He begins by describing the various strictures of other writers on it, including Hugh Rank who, in examining the essay, accuses Orwell of "'weak analogies, massive overgeneralizations, a pleading for our sympathetic understanding...and an awkward paste-and-scissors listing of examples of bad writing.'"²⁴ The unstinting praise given to this essay by some other writers suggests that

²¹ Talbot J. Taylor, "Which is to be Master?: The Institutionalizing of Authority in the Science of Language," *Ideologies of Language*, eds. John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor (London: Routledge, 1990) 25.

²² Madelyn Flammia, "Beyond Orwell: Clarity and the English Language," *George Orwell*, eds. Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky (New York: Greenwood P, 1987) 28.

²³ Patai 267.

²⁴ George Y. Trail, "Teaching Argument and the Rhetoric of Orwell's 'Politics and the English Language'," *College English* 57.5 (1995): 570-1.

Orwell's widespread reputation for having a plain style may have mesmerised some readers into glossing over his faults.

The application of current critical criteria to Orwell's work makes him emerge as less aware and more complex than the idealised figure depicted by earlier criticism. Gill, in a general theoretical statement which is applicable to both Orwell's essays and his fictional writing, says that postmodern critical approaches "tend to distrust exclusive moral or philosophical stances, especially those feigning embattled and lonely disinterestedness and objectivity."²⁵ This sounds harsh and cynical, particularly the word "feigning," but this thesis does not regard Orwell as a hypocrite, and accepts that his particular "embattled and lonely disinterestedness" was genuinely felt, even though it may not stand up to examination today. However, a degree of scepticism, even hostility, is inevitable when what Ricoeur calls "the hermeneutics of suspicion"²⁶ are applied to earlier structures of thought and belief. As Gill says, postmodern readings offer "alternative models of reading by challenging their predecessors' cultural hegemony"²⁷ - a process which calls into question not just previous ways of reading and writing, but the very assumptions which made them possible. In the light of post-structuralist thought it is difficult to accept Orwell's implicit belief that language is a simple matter; but this belief needs to be seen in the context of the time, which was one of desperation in which the fate of the world seemed to hang in the balance. In such a world simplicity was a valuable asset - and Orwell's views are an example of how history and culture condition the way language is used and regarded. This thesis seeks to make a truce (even if not complete peace) with Orwell's views, with the aim of showing that his novels still have value, both in themselves and as a measure of how far ontology has come since his time. In any case, postmodernism itself accepts that there are no final positions and that the way language is viewed depends entirely on the framework of the viewer.

²⁵ James E. Gill, ed., *Cutting Edges: Postmodern Critical Essays on Eighteenth-Century Satire* (Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1995) ix.

²⁶ Richard Kearney, "Between Tradition and Utopia: The Hermeneutical Problem of Myth," *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1991) 66.

²⁷ Gill x.

Any discussion of *Animal Farm* (or *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) tends to return repeatedly to the issue of language, despite the fact that, as Chilton says, "There is no denying that Orwell knew no linguistic theory, or that his obiter dicta on language are capricious and sometimes snobbish." Chilton does add, however, "But so were and are the pronouncements of many language commentators, and that alone cannot explain the persistent interest of what he had to say."²⁸ That Orwell's views on linguistic obfuscation still have some relevance is apparent from an examination of the way businessmen, stockbrokers, academics and military officials, among others, use language today. Troops can be described as "advisors," bombing as "air support," jammed telephone lines as "a slow-talk situation," a drop in share prices as a "technical correction," and the jail in Madison, Wisconsin as a "total incarceration facility."²⁹ Hannah Arendt, though writing in a different mode, shares Orwell's concern about language in relation to public affairs:

Power is actualized [in a positive way] only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy, but to establish relations and create new realities.³⁰

Orwell shares Arendt's perception that power and language are intimately connected - and his sense of how "word and deed have...parted company" seems to underlie most of his general statements about power. Orwell's concern about totalitarianism is wider than Arendt's, sometimes addressing the abuse of power in the world as a whole, as in these views written in 1944:

I believe, or fear, that taking the world as a whole these things [totalitarianism, leader worship] are on the increase. Hitler, no doubt, will soon disappear, but only at the expense of

²⁸ Paul Chilton, rev. of *The Language of 1984: Orwell's English and Ours*, by W.F. Bolton, *The Modern Language Review* 82 (1987): 723.

²⁹ Dwight Bolinger, *Language - The Loaded Weapon* (London: Longman, 1980) 130-2.

³⁰ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1958) 200.

strengthening (a) Stalin, (b) the Anglo-American millionaires and (c) all sorts of petty fuehrers of the type of De Gaulle. All the national movements everywhere... seem to take non-democratic forms... Everywhere the world movement seems to be in the direction of centralised economies which can be made to "work" in an economic sense but which are not democratically organised and which tend to establish a caste system.³¹

This is the kind of pessimistic thinking that pervades *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and seems to see the merging of capitalism, fascism and Stalinist communism. But Orwell was not alone in having such a vision, as Jameson's comments on Adorno, Horkheimer (contemporaries of Orwell) and "late capitalism" suggest:

[Late capitalism is] found commonly in both Adorno and Horkheimer, stressing two essential features: (1) a tendential web of bureaucratic control (in its more nightmarish forms, a Foucault-like grid...), and (2) the interpenetration of government and big business ("state capitalism") such that Nazism and the New Deal are related systems (and some form of socialism, benign or Stalinist, also seems to be on the agenda).³²

The point here (with the mention of Adorno and Horkheimer) is that a version of the world view found particularly in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was current, at least in certain circles, during Orwell's lifetime. This is not to suggest that he was part of such circles, but that he was both speaking for his time and adopting the kind of prophetic role sometimes taken by satirists.

Jameson continues his account as follows:

³¹ Orwell, letter to H.J. Willmetts 148-50.

³² Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, xviii.

As widely used today, the term *late capitalism* has very different overtones....No one particularly notices the expansion of the state sector and bureaucratization any longer; it seems a...natural fact of life....[This] whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror.³³

This thesis has argued that postmodernism and satire can often be seen as making common cause, and this is yet another instance of it: Jameson, a Marxist and postmodern theorist, in many respects confirms the vision Orwell had of the future, indicating that centralised control and ruthlessly undemocratic forms of government are the rule today. Where Jameson differs from Orwell is in his reaction to these circumstances, since he believes that in a time of postmodern culture "the luxury of old-fashioned ideological critique, the indignant moral denunciation of the other, becomes unavailable." He urges, instead, that "we make at least some effort to think of the cultural evolution of capitalism dialectically, as catastrophe and progress together."³⁴ As elsewhere in this thesis, the stance of postmodernism differs from that of Orwell in that it is more relaxed and exercises that peculiarly postmodern tendency to come to terms with rather than demonise cultural phenomena which do not directly reflect its own tendencies.

In *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen-Four* Orwell explores the key role played by language in societies ruled by a combination of manipulation, control and violence. Building on the historical facts of life in both Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, he shows how state interference with language and the right to free expression warp and pervert the network of private and public relationships that constitute society. The subject of language and society is

³³ Jameson, *Postmodernism* 5.

³⁴ Jameson, *Postmodernism* 46,47.

also the theme of an essay by George Steiner, who charts the process of linguistic dislocation in Germany, starting from the period between 1870 and the First World War, and relating it to more recent events:

[University], officialdom, army and court combined to drill into the German language habits no less dangerous than those they drilled into the German people: a terrible weakness for slogans and pompous clichés (*Lebensraum*, "the yellow peril," "the Nordic virtues"); an automatic reverence before the long word or the loud voice; a fatal taste for saccharine pathos (*Gemütlichkeit*) beneath which to conceal any amount of rawness or deception....A Hitler would have found reservoirs of venom and moral illiteracy in any language. But by virtue of recent history, they were nowhere else so ready and so near the very surface of common speech. A language in which one can write a "Horst Wessel Lied" is ready to give hell a native tongue. (How should the word "*spritzen*" recover a sane meaning after having signified to millions the "spurting" of Jewish blood from knife points?)³⁵

Steiner's approach here, like that of Orwell, is also largely empirical, but his use of a specific historical framework for his critique of the German language demonstrates that such analysis has its place, *pace* the postmodern penchant for theory which transcends history. This stands even if the use of history does lend itself to selectivity - an issue which will be dealt with in more detail later. Postmodern critical theory as a whole arguably lends itself to selectivity too (though in a different sense), since it embodies various approaches of which not all can be fully employed at any one time.

Steiner's views on the German language are shared by Karl Kraus, the Austrian satirist, who died in 1936. Kraus (who did not live to see the more brutal Nazi atrocities) bitterly remarked that "he could forgive Hitler everything

³⁵ George Steiner, *Language and Silence* (New York: Atheneum, 1967) 97, 99.

except what he had done to the German language." ³⁶ Kraus, Swift, Orwell and Steiner share a common concern with the vulnerability of language and an awareness of how its strength and credibility can be damaged by its political and cultural context. It is noteworthy, though, that Steiner published his views on the German language long after the defeat of Hitler and that both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, in which Orwell exposes the linguistic and moral bankruptcy in totalitarianism of both the Right and the Left, were written in the spacious freedom of democratic Britain. It seems that distance is needed to write tellingly of the effects of linguistic degeneration, since a degree of clarity is most easily found outside the context of the language and society concerned. This is so because no language is entirely free of phenomena such as propaganda, ideology and political myth, which limit people's ability to think and perceive with any kind of objectivity, rendering them unable to look beyond the "prison-house of language"³⁷ (to use Nietzsche's phrase) in which they find themselves. Since language is never a perfectly "clean" means of mediating and interpreting experience, and is always misleading, to some degree, there is no way of ever escaping the prison-house entirely, only of ameliorating the conditions of one's incarceration. The issue is one of degree, as well as intention, since the darkest prison-houses are created when language is distorted in a radical and intentional way.

Swift and Orwell were both engaged in a continuous struggle to preserve language as a means of perception and direct communication. The fact that they would never entirely reach their goal may not have occurred to them, but if it did it is unlikely to have deterred them. They were concerned to resist the blunting of language which, inter alia, could make it conceal or glamorize the world, instead of opening it up for exploration. This can be seen in their attacks against modish and meaningless words, and in the quality of their own writing. Test speaks of the concern for language of another satirist, and goes on to suggest that the "satiric dictionaries of Ambrose Bierce, Gustav

³⁶ Bernard Crick, introd., *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, by George Orwell (1949; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984) 75.

³⁷ Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language*, title-page.

Flaubert, Voltaire, Kingsley Amis, and William Safire are further indications that many satirists are extra-sensitive to the misuse, corruption, and violations of their language."³⁸ This thesis maintains that the motives of satirists are not always apparent and would like to suggest that their concern about language is not only a concern for the general good but also a desire to safeguard jealously one of satire's primary tools for the manufacture of alternative worlds.

However, Wordsworth, by no means a satirist, also feels the need for vigilance when using language, since he sees its effects as highly variable:

Language, if it do not uphold, and feed, and leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe, is a counterspirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work, to subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve.³⁹

Ironically, the kind of language disparaged by Wordsworth is the kind of language valued by both satire and postmodernism. They find language that "is a counterspirit" creative and interesting, precisely because it does not "leave in quiet," but rather tends to "subvert...and to dissolve" things that are no longer alive and useful. Satire stresses the existence of stupidity, hypocrisy and evil, offering resistance when language is used to sanitise these aspects of existence. The strategy of satire is to be on the alert for the unpleasant realities in life and to rub people's noses in them. Franz Kafka, whose dark satire shows certain affinities with that of Orwell, wrote a letter containing the following passage:

If the book we are reading does not wake us, as with a fist hammering on our skull, why then do we read it? So that it shall make us happy? Good God, we would also be happy if we had no books, and such books as make us happy we

³⁸ Test 145-46.

³⁹ William Wordsworth, "Upon Epitaphs (III)," *Prose Works of William Wordsworth*, ed. William Knight, vol. II (London: Macmillan, 1896).

could, if need be, write ourselves. But what we must have are those books which come upon us like ill-fortune, and distress us deeply, like the death of one we love better than ourselves, like suicide. A book must be an ice-axe to break the frozen sea inside us.⁴⁰

Satirists wield particularly large and sharp ice-axes and, as has been argued in different terms elsewhere in this thesis, they are also the writers who most consciously and directly try to break the frozen sea inside us. Orwell does this in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* by drawing us into the alternative world of totalitarianism and making us experience the helplessness of ordinary citizens in such a system.

In *Animal Farm* Orwell invites us into the alternative world of a farm which has been taken over by animals after the ejection of the human who originally owned it. This satiric world bristles with parody, directed at various targets: totalitarian forms of government, the notion of utopia, the credibility of the masses - and the fairy tale form itself which Orwell has chosen to carry his narrative. In depicting this world he has drawn on the events of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath, coloured perhaps by his own experience of disillusionment with revolution in Spain, as set out in his *Homage to Catalonia*, of which Mairet says that "It shows us the heart of innocence that lies in revolution; also the miasma of lying that, far more than cruelty, takes the heart out of it."⁴¹ The pre-revolutionary rhetoric on the farm has promised the animals a paradisaical future, but this dream of perfection is undermined by the new rulers of the farm - the pigs - who turn out to be as oppressive and self-serving as the human being had been, if not more so. The reader, too, is drawn into the heady post-revolutionary liminal world in which all things seem possible, only to experience the systematic and inexorable destruction of all that utopian promise offers. "The Gospel according to Marx...teaches the true believer that Utopia will inevitably dawn: the mechanics of History guarantee

⁴⁰ Quoted by Steiner 67.

⁴¹ David Pryce-Jones, "Orwell's Reputation," *The World of George Orwell*, ed. Miriam Gross (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 144.

it." ⁴² Satire's implicit involvement with the notion of utopia is nowhere as clear as when utopias turn sour and become dystopias instead. Orwell offers us some kind of utopian hope when, with deceptive lightness and heavy irony, he subtitles his novel "A Fairy Story," but it turns out instead to be a heart-rending account of what Trotsky called his book on the Russian Revolution: "The Revolution Betrayed." ⁴³

In *Animal Farm* the satirist is hard at work on our frozen hearts with his ice-axe, depicting through the animals his view of the devastating innocence of the masses who participated in the Russian Revolution, as well as the cynical and duplicitous nature of their leaders. It is crucial that we preserve a sense that this is only one alternative world into which we are being invited - a version of the truth - so that we keep our critical faculties about us as we respond to it, even as we give ourselves to the experience of the novel. There is no single version of the truth - and certainly not of history. Orwell, like other writers, has his own agenda, but that does not negate the value of what he says. It simply demands that the reader interrogate the text in various ways, and also be aware of the ideology espoused by Orwell: in other words, the reader has to be aware of the nature of dialogism that is initiated by satirical texts. Such issues are not made simpler by the elusiveness of most satirists when it comes to declaring their beliefs, or committing themselves to specific parties or ideologies - and Orwell was no exception to this. It is thus not surprising that T.S. Eliot said of *Animal Farm* that "it was clear whom Orwell was attacking... [but] not so clear from which side." Eliot believed that "it was necessary to have a constituency - and Orwell had none." ⁴⁴ Satire does often contain a didactic element which may involve a specific constituency, but the broad mechanics of satire function to free its audience by presenting them with alternative worlds in which truth is shown as unstructured and not unitary, very much in postmodern vein.

⁴² Young 159.

⁴³ Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?*, trans. Max Eastman, 5th ed. (New York: Pathfinder P, 1972)

⁴⁴ Ingle, *A Political Life* 64.

The notion that there is no simple version of the truth is encouraged by the allegorical nature of *Animal Farm*, which functions as a non-linear and rather elusive form of discourse. Leyburn comments on the success of Orwell's use of allegory as follows:

It is because the imaginative scheme of the animal allegory is sustained that the revelation of the ease with which well-meaning citizens can be duped into serving the masters of a totalitarian state achieves its power. Orwell's keeping the point of view consistently that of the helpless animals and letting us make only the discoveries that they make forces us to interpret for ourselves not just the misfortunes of the renamed Manor Farm, but also those of our own world. We are compelled to participate imaginatively. *Animal Farm* is successful social satire because it is successful allegory.⁴⁵

Here Leyburn speaks of the mechanism of allegory as one initially of restraint, confining readers to a single level until the unfolding events of the tale give them access to the other levels. But this thesis offers a more dynamic interpretation of the process, suggesting that allegory allows readers to move constantly back and forth between the level of animals and that of human beings, the levels of Britain and Soviet Russia, the levels of capitalism and Marxism, the levels of conscious and unconscious behaviour and the levels of the text and the concrete world, among others. This means that readers are not simply moving back and forth between two levels, but rather that there are several different levels between which readers move, some readers dwelling longer on particular levels than others, some aware of more levels than others. The primary movement of readers between the level of the animals and that of human beings is set up by the structure of the allegory, encouraging the "discoveries" mentioned by Leyburn, but that structure serves to set off the other movements between other levels mentioned above. The result is an unpredictable and unstable process of dialogism within the

⁴⁵ Leyburn 69-70.

text between the various levels which serves the purposes of satire well, since in practice it encourages liminality, keeps the reader off balance, and may offer different alternative worlds to particular readers at different times, or even a different array of alternative worlds to particular readers each time they re-read the novel. Although it must be acknowledged that conventional allegory has its limitations, ideally this array of alternative worlds would have a dialogic force, preventing readers from settling into a single comfortable view of *Animal Farm*, and encouraging them to continue thinking about the issues it raises. In fact, it is far more likely that such a result would be accomplished by the postmodern form of allegory, which induces a more radical and continuous oscillation of meaning, one that comes from the freeing of the signifier from the signified - or, better still, from the existence of various alternating and competing signifieds which themselves form a pattern in the complete absence of a signifier. This would give rise to a highly provisional quality, involving many different issues simultaneously, which the mere movement and variety of conventional allegory cannot match.⁴⁶

The following excerpt from *Animal Farm* contains many such issues, and occurs at a point in the novel where the realities of life in a totalitarian environment are starting to penetrate the idealistic haze in which the animals have been living. In this chapter the phrase "the animals" generally refers to the mass of animals on the farm, as opposed to the pigs and their dogs. The Rebellion against the oppressor, man, has taken place, but, for some reason, the animals are worse off than before:

Meanwhile life was hard. The winter was as cold as the last one had been, and food was even shorter. Once again all rations were reduced, except those of the pigs and dogs. A too rigid equality in rations, Squealer explained, would have been contrary to the principles of Animalism. In any case he had no difficulty in proving to the other animals that they were *not* in reality short of food, whatever the appearances might be. For the time being, certainly,

⁴⁶ See 53-6 above for a full discussion of this.

it had been found necessary to make a readjustment of rations... but in comparison with the days of Jones, the improvement was enormous. Reading out the figures in a shrill, rapid voice, he proved to them in detail that they had more oats, more hay, more turnips than they had had in Jones's day, that they worked shorter hours, that their drinking water was of better quality, that they lived longer, that a larger proportion of their young ones survived infancy, and that they...suffered less from fleas. The animals believed every word of it. Truth to tell, Jones and all he stood for had almost faded out of their memories. They knew that life nowadays was harsh and bare, they were often hungry and often cold, and that they were usually working when they were not asleep. But doubtless it had been worse in the old days. They were glad to believe so. Besides, in those days they had been slaves and now they were free, and that made all the difference, as Squealer did not fail to point out.⁴⁷

An integral part of freedom consists of access to public information presented in a meaningful way, and Squealer's rapid and cursory reading out of figures apparently proving how well the animals are living is a satirical gibe at the abuse of information by propagandists. The figures quoted are, in general, unverifiable and represent an evasiveness masquerading as transparent government. Much of the "information" presented by Squealer here refers to the past, which is a blank to the animals, (except perhaps to Benjamin, the donkey) and Squealer's rapid delivery of it is a further safeguard against the animals absorbing the information or asking any awkward questions about it.

The whole passage is an attack by Orwell on Soviet communism, which he calls "Animalism," perhaps implying that it is distinctly beastly, rather than human or humane - and, throughout *Animal Farm*, the reader is made to ponder on the difference (if any) between human beings and animals, by the

⁴⁷ George Orwell, *Animal Farm: A Fairy Story* (1945; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951) 95-6.

force of the allegorical movement between these two levels. If, as has been argued, the satirist creates alternative worlds for his readers, so does Squealer in this passage, by persuading the animals to disregard the hard evidence of their senses and accept his interpretation of both their experience and the events they have lived through. The difference between the satirist's alternative worlds and those of the ideologue or propagandist is that, in the latter cases the alternative world is intended to block off entirely the audience's own sense of the world (monoglossia) - while the satirist introduces a heteroglot flavour, intent on initiating a process of dialogism between the various worlds. Squealer refers to their hunger pangs as "appearances" and has "no difficulty in proving" that the shortage of food does not, "in reality," exist. In terms of Orwell's satire, Squealer represents the propagandist who deliberately forces the signification of words - for example "appearances" and "reality" - into a specific mould, in the cause of a particular political ideology. The tone of sweet reasonableness which is part of the integration propagandist's ⁴⁸ stock-in-trade can be heard in the sentence beginning "For the time being, certainly, it has been found necessary...." As for the victims of ideology and the other discourses related to it, throughout this novel Orwell seems to both satirise and pity them. Here the narrator tells us that the animals are "glad to believe" Squealer, leaving the reader to speculate that the animals need and want to believe him because they have so much emotional capital invested in doing so: they have participated in the Rebellion, given up their former view of the world, and accepted the ideology of Animalism and the myth of the Rebellion as their guiding principles - and they need these principles to be reliable. Orwell is commenting on human behaviour here, suggesting that people cannot happily absorb too much change: they need some kind of fixed framework and, he may be suggesting, in order to secure this stability they will connive at their own enslavement by giving away their right to have lives of their own. Bettelheim formulates what he calls the appeal of tyranny as follows:

The more absolute the tyranny, the more debilitated the subject,

⁴⁸ See 110-11 above.

the more tempting to him to "regain" strength by becoming part of the tyranny and thus enjoy its power. In accepting all this one can attain, or retain, some inner integration through conformity. But the price one must pay is to identify with the tyranny without reservation; in brief, to give up autonomy.⁴⁹

The notion that many people are drawn to give up their freedom and want to be told how to live their lives is confirmed by the views of Erich Fromm:

Another common illusion, perhaps the most dangerous of all, was that men like Hitler had gained power over the vast apparatus of the state through nothing but cunning and trickery, that they and their satellites ruled merely by sheer force; that the whole population was only the will-less object of betrayal and terror....We have been compelled to recognize that millions in Germany were as eager to surrender their freedom as their fathers were to fight for it; that other millions were indifferent and did not believe the defence of freedom to be worth fighting and dying for.⁵⁰

If Fromm's views on human behaviour are taken into account it is not possible to have an unambiguous and sentimentalised response to the message of *Animal Farm*. Another reason why one should be wary of seeing the animals merely as victims is that such a view ignores the tendency of satire to present audiences with distorted scenarios, not intended to be interpreted in a realist spirit, and seldom encouraging interpretative closure: for example, groups of people are never in fact as uniformly stupid as the animals in Orwell's novel are depicted. Other possible interpretations of *Animal Farm* would insist that people (or animals, here) are responsible for the way they live their lives, even in the face of an oppressive regime. Some of these alternative views are available mainly through deconstructive techniques, rather than the reactions

⁴⁹ Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart* (1960; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) 294.

⁵⁰ Erich Fromm: *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt, 1941) 4-5.

of the ordinary reader - which might suggest that the didactic element in this text is so strong that it tends to overpower the liminal force of satire. However, as Bogel says, "If we are to find our way here, we must be able to lose it, and that means allowing the satirist to fail and ourselves to be uncertain whether the satirist has failed or not. Really uncertain."⁵¹ The implication of this is that audiences of satire may be prevented from taking comfortable and oversimplified stances in relation to it, but rather compelled to remain in what this thesis calls the liminal spaces offered by satire - spaces that offer satire's audiences not comfort, but the opportunity to change and grow.

In Orwell's totalitarian worlds uncontrolled change is stifled, inter alia, by the limitation of communication, both public and private. In *Animal Farm* the majority of the animals is depicted as illiterate and the pigs are seen as using language to disempower the other animals, while in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* a new and deliberately impoverished language is imposed on the populace, with the same intention. Texts of any kind are seen in both novels as an arena of struggle, with the "Seven Commandments" being the prime example in *Animal Farm*. The commandments, far from being irrevocably graven in stone like their namesakes, are subjected to surreptitious changes by the pigs, in their own favour. The final change, which comes towards the end of the novel, sees the commandments reduced to one, which reads as follows:

ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL
BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE
EQUAL THAN OTHERS⁵²

The first line shows the original ideal, which is shaken by the "BUT" at the beginning of the second, though the word "MORE" offers hope to at least some animals, and may be seen as ameliorating matters somewhat. However, the last line's revelation that such hopes lie in the destruction of a cornerstone of Animalism belies the constant use of the term "comrade" by

⁵¹ Bogel 52.

⁵² Orwell, *Animal Farm* 114.

the pigs (especially Squealer) when addressing the other animals, and abolishes any real sense of comradeship on the farm. Orwell's satiric intent here is apparently to show how tyrannical the pigs (representing the communist Party elite) are, in that they manipulate the masses and exploit their naiveté. The point of the satire is that the dignity, independence and freedom which the pigs held out to the other animals have been short-lived, since the pigs have been unable to resist the seductiveness of power, privilege and luxury. For Patai, "It is not power that corrupts the pigs; power simply provides them with the means to realize their 'nature'."⁵³ By parodying the effect of power on pigs, Orwell is pointing to the piggishness of human beings, in the field of politics at any rate, providing some pungent satire.

However, postmodernism, with its different view of power and politics, might well insist on opening up the issues more by focusing instead on the provisionality of all texts, and asking what new ideology was being imposed in place of the old. Orwell's modernist seriousness and certainty present difficulties today, since at least some of his satiric effects depend on his readers sharing his assumptions in an equally serious way. For example, freedom is a suspect utopian ideal in postmodern thinking, but Orwell takes it very seriously, believing it to be attainable, or at least worth struggling towards. (That the issue of utopianism is a crucial one for satirists as well as utopians will be demonstrated later in this chapter.) Brooker, speaking of the postmodern writers Derrida and Hassan, says that both "share 'a profound sense of *ontological uncertainty*' but...confirm this radical uncertainty in an attitude of play and reconciliation, outdating the modernist's struggle for wholeness and autonomy."⁵⁴ The struggle for wholeness and autonomy has little point in a post-structuralist world which thrives on fragmentation, though this struggle is a key factor in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and, taken on its own terms, gives point to these novels which they would not otherwise have.

⁵³ Patai 214.

⁵⁴ Brooker 14.

Much of the discussion so far has centred on language and its provisionality or otherwise, depending on whether one takes a postmodernist or a modernist view. Orwell's satirical stance towards (Marxist) propaganda and ideology in *Animal Farm* repeatedly leads him to question the pigs' use of language and to pillory these discourses as dishonest and misleading. One of the ways he does this is through attacking the use of slogans, of which the best known in the novel, the parodic "Four legs good, two legs bad," arises because of the high illiteracy rate among the animals, which (on the face of it) causes Snowball to reduce the Seven Commandments to this single, unwritten maxim. The birds on the farm object to this formulation because they, having two legs, are now classed as "bad," but Snowball "proved" (Orwell's ironical word) to them that they were in error:

'A bird's wing, comrades, ' he said, 'is an organ of propulsion and not of manipulation. It should therefore be regarded as a leg. The distinguishing mark of Man is the *hand*, the instrument with which he does all his mischief. ' ⁵⁵

In other words, when is a wing a leg? When an ideologue says so. To use the language of Marxist dialectics, the wing is "objectively" a leg. This use of the word "objectively" is an example of how ideology can appropriate to itself certain signifiers with positive connotations and apply them only to its adherents or their point of view. Orwell's quarrel in this case seems to be that the Marxist point of view is ideological, since it is offered as an objective point of view (the only one) and all other points of view are, by implication, not objective. Significantly, it is the sheep, traditionally representative of an inability to think independently, who really take to this slogan, and they "bleat" it "for hours on end, never growing tired of it." ⁵⁶ The primacy of language in any discussion of *Animal Farm* is confirmed by Elbarbary:

I suggest that the deliberate derangement of language, and

⁵⁵ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 31.

⁵⁶ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 31.

linguistic exclusiveness which sustain the usurpation of power, stand out as one of the novel's central thematic concerns. In a sense, the revolution on the farm is a language-focused enterprise, a product of specifically aggressive linguistic energy, and language, which can effectively control reality, is at the root of the tragic experience rather than merely mirroring it.⁵⁷

Speaking of life in Soviet satellite states, Fraser says that "the perpetual nagging of Communist propaganda slogans involves a soul-destroying boredom which only the stoutest and most patient spirit can withstand."⁵⁸ Slogans are recommended by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*,⁵⁹ and Ozhegov's *Dictionary of the Russian Language* assumes that slogans are an essential part of political education.⁶⁰ Orwell's suspicion of slogans can be seen from the way he uses them in *Animal Farm*, as well as his account of the telegraphese language Newspeak in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Since it draws on the animals' experience of the oppressiveness of human beings, "Four legs good two legs bad" is a highly effective slogan, and it operates not simply at an intellectual level, but is also deeply felt (as with all propaganda). It forms part of the agitation propaganda⁶¹ against humans to which the animals are habitually subjected. They have been encouraged to see all humans as evil creatures who seek to dominate and exploit animals, and a deep fear of humankind has been inculcated into them. They have come to see people's habitual stance - on two legs - as an inherent part of their threatening nature, and Squealer depicts the human hand in the same way. These features are seen by the animals as unnatural or "other," signifying the absolute difference between the animals and their implacable enemy.

Such is the ability of propaganda to manipulate, though, that it can swiftly overcome the resistance generated even by such a taboo-like rejection of the

⁵⁷ Samir Elbarbary, "Language as Theme in *Animal Farm*," *International Fiction Review* 19.1 (1992): 31.

⁵⁸ Brown 125.

⁵⁹ See 108 above.

⁶⁰ Brown 21.

⁶¹ See 110 above.

"other," undermining the animals' dislike of these key features of human beings and even making them accept what before was anathema. This happens when, one day, their leader Napoleon (who represents Stalin) appears walking on his hind legs and clutching a whip in his trotter. The latter is a particularly savage stroke on Orwell's part since, immediately after the rebellion against farmer Jones (representing Tsar Nicholas II), the animals destroy all his nose-rings, halters, blinkers, whips and the like as symbols of oppression. Now the animals are stunned into silence ("It was as though the world had been turned upside down")⁶² and make no protest, though it is clear that Napoleon has taken on the authority of Jones and intends to wield power in the same way. The clearly pre-arranged response to this is a new slogan chanted by the sheep, which confirms Napoleon in the role he has taken on, and continues for five minutes, without intermission: "Four legs good, two legs *better!* Four legs good, two legs *better!*" Like all effective slogans, the new one becomes one of the secular prayers of the group, incontrovertible because it has such force to bind people together and to silence any alternative ideas. In this case, the new slogan has successfully altered one of the founding myths of Animalism as expressed by the old slogan, allowing the pigs to take on the worst qualities of the enemy without opposition from the animals. Furthermore, what was previously seen as a mark of irretrievable evil in humans is now seen as valuable and prestigious, setting Napoleon up as superior to the animals.

Slogans, together with other political discourses, define the inner world which the adherents of a specific ideology inhabit, in this case Animalism. But implicit in Orwell's satire is the outline of another world, with different values and assumptions, which is in a dialogic relationship with the world set out by Animalism and its propagandists. In the allegory of *Animal Farm*, the implicit dialogue is between the view that the prosperity of the state is all that counts (with the pigs as the all-powerful directors of the state) and the alternative view that it is, above all, personal values and individuality that count. The former view is strengthened by ideology, political myth and propaganda

⁶² Orwell, *Animal Farm* 113.

(including slogans), while the latter view does not get much of a direct hearing, but functions as a powerfully implicit counterpoint to much that happens in the novel. Support for the first view is shown after Boxer has killed a stable-lad in the Battle of the Cowshed when Snowball produces the following slogan: "The only good human being is a dead one." But Boxer's immediate reply (which suggests the second view) is " 'I have no wish to take life, not even human life'...and his eyes were full of tears." ⁶³ Boxer at this stage rejects the slogan but, as the novel progresses, he is drawn so far into the world of the pigs that he loses his sense of the value and dignity even of his own life and uniqueness so that, at the memorial banquet held in Boxer's honour after his death, Napoleon can truthfully sum up Boxer's life by quoting his "two favourite maxims, 'I will work harder' and 'Comrade Napoleon is always right' - maxims, he said, which every animal would do well to adopt as his own." ⁶⁴ In Boxer Orwell is satirising the Stakhanovites of Stalinist Russia, people modelling themselves on a miner called Stakhanov who raised production by means of more efficient methods. However, another comment of the time on the same issue brings a different reality into play: "But most workers live[d] by the motto, 'As long as the bosses pretend they are paying us a decent wage we will pretend that we are working'...." ⁶⁵ This latter rather different light on what happened under Stalin serves as a reminder that satirists do not simply manufacture their alternative worlds in a spirit of realism; they may also have very specific agendas of their own which lead them to distort and exaggerate issues. At any rate, the parodic version offered us by Orwell in this novel shows one side of the picture by depicting Boxer as noble, if naïve, from the start and, as the novel progresses - especially as it becomes clear that the pigs are cynically exploiting his blind loyalty to their regime - it seems that Orwell is using Boxer to arouse our pity and anger.

Such feelings are also evident in the writing of the French writer, Gallais, who a year after the French Revolution expressed his doubts about it:

⁶³ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 39.

⁶⁴ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 107.

⁶⁵ *The People's Chronology*, Microsoft Bookshelf '95, CD-ROM (Redmond: Microsoft, 1995).

Almost everywhere the popular masses, the instruments of revolution, served the ambitions of demagogues, and were poor, ignorant...and restless. It is not difficult to incite to a revolution wretches who are always willing and ready to sell themselves and to change masters.⁶⁶

But it is also necessary to look beyond both Gallais's points to the issue raised earlier in this discussion - in effect, to adopt a dialogic stance - and take into account that the advent of tyranny is not always unavoidable and its victims often connive at its growth.⁶⁷ The mental prison of political myth can be very attractive to people because it offers them escape from the troublesome and contradictory world which they normally inhabit - and the same could be said of propaganda and ideology. Particularly when times are bad, the temptation to abdicate responsibility for one's own life can be strong - and people may be willing to sacrifice a great deal of their freedom in order to be relieved of important decisions.

The nineteenth-century historian Burckhardt prophesied that "dreadful simplifiers" would take over the world.⁶⁸ In this century his prophecy has been realised with a thoroughness which might have surprised even him, and a plethora of totalitarian regimes has sprung up. Their intention is to exert control over populations, with language as a prime means of persuading people to accept a simplified view of the world. The more efficient of these regimes have such a degree of control that they are able to decide for people what "the truth" is. Raymond Carr, commenting on Orwell's differences with his fellow members of the Left, says that ordinary Communist party members saw truth itself as "class conditioned," and believed that conventional notions of truth should be "superseded by historically correct proletarian truth."⁶⁹ It is

⁶⁶ Pieter Desmet, Johan Rooryck and Pierre Swiggers, "What are Words Worth? Language and Ideology in French Dictionaries of the Revolutionary Period," *Ideologies of Language*, eds. John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor (London: Routledge, 1990) 175.

⁶⁷ See 142-3 above.

⁶⁸ Henry Hatfield, "The Myth of Nazism," *Myth and Mythmaking*, ed. Henry A. Murray (New York: Braziller, 1960) 217.

⁶⁹ Raymond Carr, "Orwell and the Spanish Civil War," *The World of George Orwell*, ed. Miriam Gross (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 65.

often easier to alter the past than the present, and the regimes of both Stalin and Hitler made quite sophisticated attempts to alter people's perceptions of both history and truth by changing them to suit the present regime's needs. In *Animal Farm* the standard views of the Left on history and truth in Orwell's time are put under pressure by the establishment of a dialogic process between them and the liberal humanist values which the novel is implicitly advocating.

An example of the manipulation of both history and "truth" in *Animal Farm* occurs when Napoleon suddenly announces that Animal Farm would thenceforth engage in trade with the neighbouring farms. The animals are bemused and uneasy, because they recall that immediately after the Rebellion against Jones resolutions were passed by them forbidding animals to deal with human beings, to engage in trade or make use of money. But Squealer "settles" the matter in his own way:

Afterwards Squealer made a round of the farm and set the animals' minds at rest. He assured them that the resolution against engaging in trade and using money had never been passed, or even suggested. It was pure imagination, probably traceable in the beginning to lies circulated by Snowball. A few animals still felt faintly doubtful, but Squealer asked them shrewdly, 'Are you certain that this is not something that you have dreamed, comrades? Have you any record of such a resolution? Is it written down anywhere?' And since it was certainly true that nothing of the kind existed in writing, the animals were satisfied that they had been mistaken.⁷⁰

The phrase "set the animals' minds at rest" is ironic here, since Squealer's actual intention is to make the animals mistrust their recollection of events and accept that of the authorities instead (as happens in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*). Squealer invokes the name of a pig called Snowball (representing

⁷⁰ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 57-8.

Trotsky) who has been demonised by the other pigs. Just like Trotsky, who opposed Stalin, left Russia and continued his opposition outside the country, Snowball serves as a scapegoat for any occasion and, being absent and thus unable to defend himself, he can be used to bolster the pigs' version of history. The spurious defensive unity thus created against this invisible external enemy takes the minds of the animals off the reality of conditions on the farm. Squealer cynically exploits the animals' illiteracy, as well as the lack of written records, brushing aside the common memory of the animals and citing the lack of records as evidence that resolutions were not taken. He has recreated a new view of past events and has thus successfully rewritten history.

A similar revision of the past occurs when, after opposing Snowball's plans to build a windmill, Napoleon suddenly drives him off the farm and then announces that the windmill will be built after all:

That evening Squealer explained privately to the other animals that Napoleon had never in reality been opposed to the windmill. On the contrary, it was he who had advocated it in the beginning....The windmill was, in fact, Napoleon's own creation....He had *seemed* to oppose the windmill, simply as a manoeuvre to get rid of Snowball, who was a dangerous character....This, said Squealer, was something called tactics. He repeated a number of times, 'Tactics, comrades, tactics!' skipping round and whisking his tail with a merry laugh.⁷¹

Squealer embodies the cynicism and smugness traditionally attributed to many propagandists, among them Hitler and Goebbels,⁷² and seen here in the self-congratulatory jig danced by Squealer at the end of the passage. The word "privately" in the first sentence is calculated to mislead, suggesting that

⁷¹ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 52.

⁷² See 108-9 above.

Squealer is taking the animals into his confidence by giving them privileged information, when in fact he is giving them what is now called "disinformation." It is apparent from the whole of *Animal Farm* that he is not merely a common liar or manipulator, nor just a party stooge. In terms of the discussion of propaganda in Chapter 3, Squealer is a propagandist by virtue of his cynicism, his deviousness and his readiness to defend and rationalise anything that the ruling group does, marking his intense commitment to the pigs' cause, which consists of the intensification and perpetuation of their hold on power. He seems conscienceless, always ready to undermine the certainty of the animals in order to reshape history or simply to keep them unsettled so as to make them more malleable.

The history presented to any society has always been a product of selection, bias and manipulation, but the propagandist shapes history more consciously than most historians. Arendt sees the Greek historian Herodotus as highly idealistic, one who aimed "to save human deeds from the futility that comes from oblivion...." ⁷³ But, she goes on to say, all history translates "action and speech...into that kind of fabrication which eventually becomes the written word." ⁷⁴ Orwell's attitude towards history is illustrated by his comments on the history of the Spanish Civil War, which he fought in and thus knew at first hand. He says, "I saw, in fact, history being written not in terms of what happened but of what ought to have happened according to various 'party lines'." ⁷⁵ That he is by no means entirely naïve on this issue is confirmed by his going on to say:

I am willing to believe that history is for the most part inaccurate and biased, but what is peculiar to our own age is the abandonment of the idea that history *could* be truthfully written. In the past people deliberately lied, or they unconsciously coloured what they wrote, or they

⁷³ Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (London: Faber, 1961) 41.

⁷⁴ Arendt, *Between Past and Future* 45.

⁷⁵ George Orwell, "Looking Back on the Spanish War," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol.II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 257.

struggled after the truth, well knowing that they must make many mistakes; but in each case they believed that "the facts" existed and were more or less discoverable.⁷⁶

Orwell makes a stout effort to come to terms with the elusiveness of history, though he can't bring himself to quite let go of the notion that truth may always, in some way, be accessible. He believes that "as long as some parts of the earth remain unconquered, the liberal tradition can be kept alive [and truth will survive]" - and that "the truth goes on existing."⁷⁷ In another article he does admit that "History is written by the winners....In the last analysis our only claim to victory is that if we win the war we shall tell less lies about it than our adversaries." Yet, he goes on to say "There is some hope...that the liberal habit of mind, which thinks of truth as something to be discovered, and not as something you can make up as you go along, will survive."⁷⁸ Orwell expresses scepticism about the absolute quality of history, yet his liberalism prevents him from acknowledging the provisionality of history without reservation. In this he shows himself to be a modernist, rather than a postmodern writer, since it is only a short step from this reserved position about history to the notion that there is a single version of it, which one owns, and another short step thence to exactly what Orwell deplored in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: the conscious manufacture and mystification of history found in totalitarian states. As Tismaneanu says, "Communism, as formulated by Marx and Lenin, had sacralized history, turning it into a myth in the name of which all sacrifices were justified."⁷⁹ Orwell's view is that it is only totalitarian states that "demand" the manipulation and falsification of history⁸⁰ - yet there is good reason to believe that such practices are much more widespread and that history habitually diverges from simple fact. It is possible that Orwell's views on history arose from his writing very much as a journalist,

⁷⁶ Orwell, "Looking Back on the Spanish War" 258.

⁷⁷ Orwell, "Looking Back on the Spanish War" 259.

⁷⁸ George Orwell, "As I Please," 4 February 1944, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 88.

⁷⁹ Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Resurrecting Utopia: The Search for Myth Under Post-Communism," *Partisan Review* 64 (1997): 387.

⁸⁰ George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 63-4.

rather than a historian. Journalists have to believe that the truth is both recoverable and transmissible, while historians (of today, at any rate) do not have such certainties. Meyer suggests that "the practice that seems to horrify [Orwell] the most, the control of the past by falsifying records and rewriting history, is, of course, as old as historiography itself." ⁸¹

Speaking of history, the narrator in Samuel Butler's nineteenth-century satire, *Erewhon Revisited*, remarks: "It has been said that though God cannot alter the past, historians can; it is perhaps because they can be useful to Him in this respect that He tolerates their existence." ⁸² It is this kind of scepticism that is closer to contemporary views on history than Orwell's attempts to shore up the already permeable boundaries of "truth" against uncertainty. Samuel and Thompson express their scepticism as follows:

Historians themselves, however rationalistic in their method, are by no means insulated from the appeal of myth, as can be seen from symbolic categories we employ (like 'the nation', or 'the common people'), the grand theories we subscribe to and, not least, our own fetishistic faith in the facts.... Most fundamentally of all... many of us weigh evidence with an instinctive naïvety which rests on our failure to recognize rationalistic realism as the special myth of our own Western culture.... Yet if we turn to almost any historical field, this persistent blindness to myth robs us of much of our power to understand and interpret the past. ⁸³

Samuel and Thompson see myth as omnipresent and unavoidable, but historians' blindness to myth's role is seen as a barrier to understanding the past. Significantly, Samuel and Thompson urge a kind of dialogism: not the eradication of myth, but its acceptance as a source of energy and flexibility of

⁸¹ Meyer, 127.

⁸² Samuel Butler, *Erewhon and Erewhon Revisited* (London: Dent, 1932) 293.

⁸³ Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson, *The Myths We Live By*, eds. Samuel and Thompson (London: Routledge, 1990) 4-5.

approach, which will "open up a history which refuses to be safely boxed away...which instead pivots on the active relationship between past and present, subjective and objective, poetic and political." ⁸⁴ This kind of openness to ontological uncertainties is a distinctive quality of postmodernism, which has the courage to wait for patterns to emerge, as well as the confidence not to regard such patterns as definitive, while keeping faith in the value of continuous process - as Hutcheon's comments on history demonstrate:

Among the consequences of the postmodern desire to denaturalise history is a new self-consciousness about the distinction between the brute events of the past and the historical events we construct out of them. Facts are events to which we have given meaning. ⁸⁵

History as seen by Orwell is not "denaturalised": it has for him a purity and clarity which give rise to a single, indisputable account of the past. Hence the extent of his outrage when the version of history espoused by him is tampered with, since he fails to see that the way history is commonly viewed is coloured by a set of assumptions, an ideology, a political myth or some other fixed way of interpreting events: "Facts are events to which we have given meaning." In *Animal Farm* (and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) Orwell's assumption that he views history objectively is a place for him to stand while he swings his satiric axe, and it gives energy to his angry polemic against those who manipulate history. Postmodernism, however, regards history as an artefact, as merely another text, with the unreliability and provisionality common to all texts: from this perspective history cannot be seen as synonymous with "truth."

In this regard, we are reminded by Jameson of the following:

⁸⁴ Samuel and Thompson 5.

⁸⁵ Linda Hutcheon, "Telling Stories: Fiction and History," *Modernism / Postmodernism*, ed. Peter Brooker (London: Longman, 1992) 238.

[There is] a lesson we are supposed to have learned by now, namely, that even...in the present context even the plainest unreflective history - the sheerest, most 'mindless' enumeration of facts of an annals or a chronicle - implies a whole metaphysic and constitutes through its mere enunciation a whole philosophy of history in its own right.⁸⁶

In *Animal Farm* Orwell is only too well aware of the theoretical baggage implicit in the historical events he allegorises, but tends to dodge the full consequences of his own commitment to socialism insofar as he reserves the right to view it in an unorthodox way, in this case by denying that "the USSR was progressing towards anything that one could truly call Socialism."⁸⁷ This kind of evasiveness with regard to the principles and beliefs held by the satirist is endemic to satire,⁸⁸ but it does throw light on Orwell's particular brand of socialism, especially given the uncertainty of his contemporaries (as well as more recent commentators) as to his true political colours.⁸⁹ In addition, there is an innate conservatism in Orwell which conflicts with both his socialist values and his satirical stance. Both socialism and satire stand for movement and change, but both also have a powerful utopian foundation, making Orwell doubly prone implicitly to explain events against the backdrop of utopia. However, utopia is, by definition, a place or condition of stasis, rather than dynamism, leading writers like Elliott to accuse utopian writers of attempting "to freeze history."⁹⁰ Both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* embody a howl of protest, not merely because people are unjust to others, but because they have deviated so far from the utopian view of the world which satirists in general, and Orwell in particular, covertly cherish.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Fredric Jameson, *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986*, vol. 1: Situations of Theory (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988) 154.

⁸⁷ Orwell, Author's Preface 404.

⁸⁸ See 47 above.

⁸⁹ See 101-2 above.

⁹⁰ Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1970) 10.

⁹¹ See 175-7, 288-9 below.

The totally pessimistic interpretation of *Animal Farm* adopted by this thesis is not universally accepted, though. Letemendia, for example, believes that the lack of self-confidence and political wisdom shown by the animals does not necessarily indicate that the masses will always be enslaved. He sees the novel, instead, as Orwell's challenge to socialism as a movement:

The crude proletarian spirit of the common animals necessarily provides the essential ingredient for a revolution towards a free and equal society, but it needs careful honing and polishing if it is not to fall victim to its own inherent decency and modesty.⁹²

Letemendia's view is attractive, though the question is how to establish a society which is prepared to actively nurture these qualities of decency and modesty. Michael Peters regards a pessimistic view of *Animal Farm* as "anti-Communist propaganda":

Whilst Orwell was happy to see [*Animal Farm*] used to attack the Soviet myth, he did become increasingly worried about the way it was being used by the Right as a means of demonstrating that all revolutionary change was bound to fail. Picking out as central the moment when the pigs keep the apples and milk for themselves, he makes the point that if 'the other animals had had the sense to put their foot down then it would have been all right'. Major's dream could have been realised.⁹³

Considering the inexorability of *Animal Farm* it is unconvincingly idealistic to suggest that good sense alone can defeat tyranny. Revolutions often begin precisely because under-educated and powerless masses of people are not capable of intervening and asserting their rights.⁹⁴ It almost smacks of self-

⁹² V.C. Letemendia, "Revolution on *Animal Farm*: Orwell's Neglected Commentary," *Journal of Modern Literature* 18.1 (1992):129.

⁹³ Michael Peters, "'*Animal Farm*' Fifty Years On," *Contemporary Review* 267.1555 (1995): 91.

⁹⁴ See 214-6 below for a discussion of Orwell's attitudes towards the masses in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

deception, therefore, for Orwell to speak of the assertion of such rights *before* a revolution, organised by those few who *do* know how to assert their rights, has begun to empower the many who do not. Is this a case of "trust the tale, not the teller"?

The first part of this chapter has charted the movement in *Animal Farm* from utopia to dystopia in terms of how both ideology and language can be abused to gain political power. However, part of the lesson of *Animal Farm* (and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) is that a totalitarian regime does not gain and keep power over people's lives and thoughts by words alone, no matter how cleverly it is done: the force of terror has to be added in order to complete and maintain the supremacy of tyrannical rule.⁹⁵ In both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* it is the manipulativeness of propaganda, the blinkered quality of ideology and the coerciveness of terror that together provide the means for total control of a population. This requires a police force which has the savagery necessary to reduce a society to submission and which is free from the restraints of the law. In *Animal Farm* such a force emerges in the form of the dogs, which have been nurtured since puppyhood in such seclusion that, as we are told, the other animals forget about their existence⁹⁶ - as does the reader. Orwell stages a dramatic reappearance of the dogs at the climax of the disagreement between Snowball and Napoleon over the matter of the windmill. The re-emergence of the dogs marks the end of the "fairy story" for the animals, but announces a fresh attempt on Orwell's part to "make strange" (in the Russian formalist sense) the familiar:

But just at this moment Napoleon stood up and...uttered a high-pitched whimper....At this there was a terrible baying sound outside, and nine enormous dogs wearing brass-studded collars came bounding into the barn. They dashed straight for Snowball, who only sprang from his place just in time to escape their snapping jaws. In a moment he was out of the

⁹⁵ Aron 185.

⁹⁶ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 32.

door and they were after him. Too amazed and frightened to speak, all the animals crowded through the door to watch.... Snowball...was running as only a pig can run, but the dogs were close on his heels....Then he put on an extra spurt and, with a few extra inches to spare, slipped through a hole in the hedge and was seen no more....Silent and terrified, the animals crept back into the barn. In a moment the dogs came bounding back....Though not yet full-grown, they were huge dogs, and as fierce-looking as wolves....Napoleon, with the dogs following him, now mounted on to the raised portion of the floor....He announced that from now on the Sunday morning Meetings would come to an end....In future all questions relating to the working of the farm would be settled by a special committee of pigs....These would meet in privateThe animals would still assemble on Sunday mornings to... receive their orders for the week; but there would be no more debates.⁹⁷

This quotation is crucial to Orwell's purpose in *Animal Farm* since, from a political point of view, it represents the climax of the novel. Here Napoleon asserts his personal power over the farm and tightens the grip of the pigs over the animals by means of the dogs, which symbolize the G.P.U., the ruthless and feared secret police employed by Stalin. The passage opens with Napoleon whistling to his dogs in an unmistakably human sound denoting ownership and control over the animals. The scene as a whole combines a *monde renversé* quality with an animal ferocity, depicting a pig setting his dogs, which unquestioningly obey him, on to his political rival, another pig. This alternative world is one in which Orwell deliberately blurs the boundaries between human and animal behaviour - a device which exceeds the bounds of mere allegory, compelling readers into a surrealist framework which forces them to re-examine conventional ideas about both human and animal behaviour. In political terms, Napoleon has betrayed the

⁹⁷ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 47-9.

most important principles of the Rebellion: that all animals should be free and equal, and that all the ways of man should be eschewed. It is significant that the dogs are wearing collars, which are the mark of man, the oppressor, because their appearance constitutes a dramatic announcement of the fact that henceforth there will be no semblance of democracy and justice on Animal Farm. The dogs produced by Napoleon are "as fierce as wolves," which carries a particularly sinister quality of threat, since most of the citizens of this society are, literally, sheep.

Having reduced the animals to a state of terror, Napoleon proceeds to formally entrench himself as chief ruler of Animal Farm. He stands in the same place where Major (representing Marx), the great idealist and preacher of freedom, had once stood and thrilled the animals with his words, but Napoleon has a very different message, and he has the dogs with him in case of disagreement. Orwell is here satirising the blatant abuse of power, in which, at a stroke, the animals are deprived of all their political rights by a cynical leader. He clearly intended this to reflect the actual outcome of the Russian Revolution, which is contrasted with the theories of Marx, here summarised by Bendix:

In [Marx's] view, the workers will provide the political momentum for the great historical change to come; they will cause a revolutionary upheaval against the material and psychological inhumanities to which they have been subjected, but they do not possess the intellectual tools to direct that upheaval. This direction will be provided by bourgeois ideologists who respond to the dissolution of their own class, the miseries of the proletariat, and the historical opportunities that arise....⁹⁸

But *Animal Farm* portrays the proletariat as having been misled, abused and

⁹⁸ Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (Glencoe: The Free P, 1964) 309.

freshly enslaved by the bourgeoisie who, if they ever had any idealism, abandon it entirely after the Rebellion. Orwell declared that "*Animal Farm* was the first book in which I tried, with full consciousness of what I was doing, to fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole."⁹⁹ In his Preface to the Ukrainian edition of *Animal Farm* he says:

[It] was of the utmost importance to me that people in western Europe should see the Soviet régime for what it really was.... And so for the past ten years I have been convinced that the destruction of the Soviet myth was essential if we wanted a revival of the Socialist movement.¹⁰⁰

Orwell is here using the term "myth" in Ellul's pejorative sense rather than, for example, Schorer's view which sees myth as something which gives meaning to experience and helps people give it shape and form.¹⁰¹ The Marxist view offers itself as something akin to the latter, though it does not refer to itself as a myth, but Orwell's aim in *Animal Farm* is to expose that view as myth in the most destructive sense of the word. Speaking of the genesis of *Animal Farm*, Zwerdling points to the growth of two disturbing aspects in that time, the worship of power and the seductiveness of political myth:

These two forces were in fact connected, for the myths were necessary to protect committed people from the knowledge that the universal hunger for power threatened every political system.... The myths of the perfect society, of the inevitability of human improvement, and of the possibility of achieving genuine equality were all necessary to hide the new facts of tyranny...and the rigidification of social privilege.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Orwell, "Why I Write" 7.

¹⁰⁰ Orwell, Author's Preface 404-5.

¹⁰¹ See 115 above.

¹⁰² Alex Zwerdling, "Orwell and the Techniques of Didactic Fantasy," *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984*, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 90-1.

Zwerdling suggests that all "these myths came together for [gullible] Westerners in the myth of the Soviet Union - the ideal socialist commonwealth" and that Orwell decided to provide a counter-myth by way of *Animal Farm*.¹⁰³ Yet this counter-myth - this alternative world - which Orwell's satire offers his audience cannot be seen as ideologically neutral, and *Animal Farm* comes very close to being as much political myth as the myth of the Soviet Union - an affinity between satire and its adversaries that has been noted elsewhere in this thesis.¹⁰⁴ It needs to be stressed again that satire is not always as innocent as it claims to be: no discourse could be so consistently on the side of the angels.

As has been shown, Orwell's avowed intention in writing *Animal Farm* was political, and this, combined with its shortness, gives it something of the polemical nature of a pamphlet. The polemic mode is well suited to satire, since both have a tendency to exaggerate and distort, and aim to make a point rather than be fair to all sides. Orwell admired the simplicity and power of the pamphlet form at its best, so it is not surprising that he decided to produce a novel in something resembling that form. He liked and collected pamphlets, bemoaning the poor quality of contemporary ones, and insisted that pamphlets should, ideally, occupy a central place in the political life of the time:

The reason why the badness of contemporary pamphlets is somewhat surprising is that the pamphlet ought to be *the* literary form of an age like our own. We live in a time when political passions run high, channels of free expression are dwindling, and organised lying exists on a scale never before known. For plugging the holes in history the pamphlet is the ideal form.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Zwerdling, "Didactic Fantasy" 91.

¹⁰⁴ See 76, 122-3 above.

¹⁰⁵ George Orwell, "Pamphlet Literature," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 284-5.

It is clear from what Orwell says about his motivation for writing *Animal Farm* that he was intent on plugging what he saw as a particularly large hole in history. In fact, it appears that *Animal Farm* came very close to being published as a fully-fledged pamphlet. It was difficult to find a publisher for this novel, since in 1944 it was considered outrageous to attack Britain's Soviet allies as Orwell does in *Animal Farm*.¹⁰⁶ In a letter to Leonard Moore an irate Orwell threatens to "...publish it myself as a pamphlet at 2/-. I have already half-arranged to do so & have got the necessary financial backing."¹⁰⁷ It may well be that the pamphlet-like form of *Animal Farm* is also responsible for the novel's occasional oversimplifications.

Rosenheim insists that "All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack upon *discernible, historically authentic particulars...*"¹⁰⁸ and, certainly, the parallels between conditions and events in Orwell's novel and those in Stalinist Russia are precise down to the smallest detail. Meyers says that "the political allegory of *Animal Farm*, whether specific or general, detailed or allusive, is pervasive, thorough and accurate, and the brilliance of the book becomes much clearer when the satiric allegory is compared to the political actuality."¹⁰⁹ For example, the characterisation of Napoleon as Stalin and Snowball as Trotsky is extremely true to life, Napoleon being depicted as the quiet, dogged and pathologically cruel and deceitful leader that Stalin was, and Snowball possessing Trotsky's oratorical brilliance and intellectual flair, as well as the assurance that led him to underestimate fatally Stalin's shrewdness and gift for political manipulation. A great deal of Stalin's quality comes across in the following words of his, quoted by Tucker and Cohen: "To choose one's victim, to prepare one's plans minutely, to slake an implacable vengeance, and then to go to bed...there is nothing sweeter in the world."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ T.R. Fyvel, *George Orwell: A Personal Memoir* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) 131-32.

¹⁰⁷ George Orwell, letter to Leonard Moore, 18 July 1944, *CEJL*, eds. Sonya Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 187.

¹⁰⁸ Rosenheim 25.

¹⁰⁹ Jeffrey Meyers, *A Reader's Guide to George Orwell* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975) 143.

¹¹⁰ Robert Tucker and Stephen Cohen, eds., introd. Tucker, *The Great Purge Trials* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) xviii.

Orwell's bitter disappointment at the realities of communist oppression springs partly from his naïve belief that political ideals can be successfully translated into practice without the adaptation and corruption of those ideals. Colas says of Marxism that "The state in Marx's system was destined to disappear eventually, after the real, proletarian revolution, which would give birth to the dictatorship of the proletariat."¹¹¹ The satirical scenario in *Animal Farm* is entirely the opposite, with the proletariat showing no signs of becoming dictators but rather suffering great oppression. Orwell's satire is aimed, inter alia, at Stalin's totalitarian stance; yet, as Colas indicates (and *Animal Farm* confirms), the deviation from Marx's theories began directly after the revolution staged in the name of those theories, and years before Stalin came to power:

After the revolution of October 1917, the main mission of [the Bolshevik Party] became the destruction of all the debris of the former society, particularly the parasitic peasantry, the kulaks, whom Lenin compared to insects, lice, and whom he planned to eradicate. Mass terror, targeting selected groups of people, would be one of the key aims and methods of such a totalitarian regime.¹¹²

Power did not come into the hands of the proletariat after the revolution, the planned bloodshed described above was not of their doing and they did not particularly benefit by it.

The most dramatic moments of oppression in *Animal Farm* occur during the mass confessions and punishment of animals which are Orwell's satirical version of Stalin's show trials, showing how connivance and sado-masochism function as part of the apparatus of terror:

Four days later...Napoleon ordered all the animals to assemble

¹¹¹ Colas 1019.

¹¹² Colas 1020 - 21.

in the yard. When they were all gathered together, [he] emerged ...wearing both his medals (for he had recently awarded himself 'Animal Hero, First Class', and 'Animal Hero, Second Class'), with his nine huge dogs...uttering growls that sent shivers down all the animals' spines. They all covered silently....Napoleon stood sternly surveying his audience; then he uttered a high-pitched whimper. Immediately the dogs bounded forward, seized four of the pigs by the ear and dragged them, squealing with pain and terror, to Napoleon's feet....[He]now called upon them to confess their crimes. They were the same four pigs as had protested when Napoleon abolished the Sunday Meetings....[T]hey confessed that they had been secretly in touch with Snowball...that they had collaborated with him in destroying the windmill, and that they had entered into an agreement...to hand over Animal Farm to Mr Frederick....When they had finished their confession, the dogs promptly tore their throats out, and in a terrible voice Napoleon demanded whether any other animal had anything to confess.... The three hens who had been the ringleaders in the attempted rebellion over the eggs now came forward and stated that Snowball had appeared to them in a dream and incited them to disobey Napoleon's orders. They, too, were slaughtered. Then a goose came forward and confessed to having secreted six ears of corn during the last years' harvest....Then a sheep confessed to having urinated in the drinking pool.... and two other sheep confessed to having murdered an old ram...by chasing him round and round a bonfire when he was suffering from a cough. They were all slain on the spot. And so the tale of confessions and executions went on, until there was a pile of corpses lying before Napoleon's feet and the air was heavy with the smell of blood, which had been unknown there since the expulsion of Jones.¹¹³

¹¹³ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 72-4.

Napoleon now no longer calls meetings, but orders the animals to assemble. His rather stagy appearance, wearing his self-awarded medals, suggests the archetypal dictator, vain and revelling in power - a Stroessner or an Idi Amin, as much as a Stalin. The interplay between Napoleon and the animals is telling. The flood of confessions that is elicited from the animals shows no sense of self-preservation, since this flood does not abate, even when it is clear that no-one is getting a fair trial, no distinction is being made between trivial and serious offences and all executions are being summarily carried out.

There is a sado-masochistic relationship between Napoleon and the animals, with him showing a dramatic relish as he plays the vindictive and punitive role, while the animals offer themselves up to death, goaded by their great sense of guilt and gripped by their fatalistic sense that what is happening must be right. The last sentence of the passage strongly suggests a scene in an abattoir, and the mention of Jones reinforces this. No doubt Jones had killed animals in order to eat or sell them, but even animals in an abattoir do not always submit meekly to death, sometimes struggling and expressing terror when they smell the blood and hear the cries of the other animals. Here, though, the animals' sense of Napoleon's power, coupled with their low sense of self-worth, results in confessions - some ridiculous - followed by a meek acceptance of death. The force of satiric distortion presents us with a surrealist world in which animals express guilt and pigs indulge in mass killing. By twisting the formerly orderly strands of the allegory back and forth in this way Orwell is tampering with the traditional links between the signifiers and the signifieds of words in order to make people concentrate less on the comfort of epistemology and more on the ontological significance of the events he is describing. When Orwell makes pigs into butchers he strips away the mask of civilisation adopted by human beings, shocking and shaming people into an awareness of what their race is capable of, since even in the pig, for which people usually have contempt anyway, such behaviour is unnatural and horrific. When he shows the animals, which here represent humans, going meekly to the slaughter, Orwell exposes our psychic

vulnerability, demonstrating how fragile the supposed mastery of the human race really is. Either way the satire is savage, showing how totalitarianism robs individuals both of their self-respect and the ability to act with freedom and dignity. This is satire in its function of performing "a kind of border work," here by repeatedly "invoking an antithesis between the social and the animal." ¹¹⁴

A parallel can be drawn between the way the animals relate to Napoleon and the operation of various charismatic movements, both political and religious. Lindholm says that "there is a deep human desire to escape from the limits of the self" ¹¹⁵ and this would involve handing over one's freedom to a leader or guru, as suggested earlier by Fromm. ¹¹⁶ Hitler, Charles Manson and the Reverend Jim Jones are all examples of leaders who drew people to themselves, inspiring uncritical love and obedience in their followers, as well as calm acceptance of their death. Crowd psychologists speak of groups who in the presence of such leaders become mesmerised so that, as Lindholm says, they "give up all volition, even though paradoxically they believe themselves to be acting spontaneously." ¹¹⁷ Such an experience reduces the group to the emotional state of a child who is utterly dependent on a parent figure. Freud is even more specific, suggesting that under these circumstances "the leader is the embodiment of the... 'dreaded primal father'... who is believed to be superhuman, full of sexual energy, and endowed with absolute power." ¹¹⁸ In a similar strategy of asserting dominance, Hitler's rhetoric was aimed at eroding his audience's sense of its own individuality, something both Manson and Jones also aimed to do. According to Lindholm, Manson's followers were made to "become nothing, undergo a psychological and spiritual death that burned out any independent personality," ¹¹⁹ and of the Reverend Jones, Lindholm says that the

¹¹⁴ Richard Nash, "Satyrs and Satire in Augustan England," *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*, eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 98.

¹¹⁵ Charles Lindholm, *Charisma* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990) 175.

¹¹⁶ See 143 above.

¹¹⁷ Lindholm 41.

¹¹⁸ Lindholm 54.

¹¹⁹ Lindholm 126.

charismatic tends to "create environments where he would be in complete control, and where he could act out fantasies of omnipotence and violence as the regulator of life and death."¹²⁰ Whether it is the Reverend Jones inducing hundreds of people to drink juice containing cyanide or Napoleon prompting scores of animals to go to their deaths by confessing to crimes which are either largely fantasy or so minor as to be risible, the leader is a god-like figure with hypnotic power over his followers,

The historical basis for the scenes of confession and execution in *Animal Farm* is clearly the Moscow Trials of Stalin (part of what is known as the Great Purge) which took place between 1936 and 1939. The allegory is particularly telling here, the details being central to a full understanding of the novel. Napoleon and Stalin have many characteristics in common, among them being arrogance, coldness and paranoia. The way in which the Great Purge was organized - indeed, the fact that it occurred at all - was directly due to these personal qualities of Stalin, who masterminded the purges. It is estimated that some nine million people were arrested during the Great Purges, most of whom were either executed, imprisoned or sent to the labour camps in Siberia. Stalin personally approved the arrest of thousands upon thousands of people, and it was he who made all the decisions about the arrest of high party leaders, sometimes without the knowledge of the State Prosecutor. Fischer provides further details:

[This period saw] the death, without trial, of countless top-rank, second-rank, third-rank and fourth-rank officials. Of the twenty-seven...outstanding Bolsheviks who drafted the 1936 Constitution, fifteen had been shot by 1938. Eleven...ambassadors were shot...Universities saw...entire faculties vanish. Many hundreds of foreign Communists who had found asylum in Russia were executed. Hundreds of journalists, novelists, poets, playwrights, theatre managers, actors, sculptors, and painters were purged. Pages and pages could

¹²⁰ Lindholm 141.

be filled with the mere surnames of nationally famous Communists who were killed....With each prominent party member went at least a score of his associates and friends. Many cabinet members in the federal governments and in the smaller regional republics were purged; their staffs, often numbering hundreds, were purged with them.¹²¹

In the army some 35,000 officers suffered the same fate, including four hundred of the seven hundred generals and the entire high command.

In all this Stalin was the prime mover. The Moscow Trials were, according to Tucker and Cohen, "basically one-man shows of which Stalin himself was organizer, chief producer, and stage manager as well as an appreciative spectator from a darkened room at the rear of the Hall of Columns, where the trials were held."¹²² A feature of the Trials was that the defendants all confessed to whatever they had been charged with and, in reflecting this in *Animal Farm*, Orwell is presenting an important aspect of Stalin's psychological makeup: it was essential to him that those whom he decided were guilty of conspiracy, sabotage or plotting to overthrow the regime should publicly confirm their guilt. Deutscher says that Stalin pressed his enemies and critics, real or imagined, to "commit moral suicide. He demanded that they should recant...[and] denounce their own mistakes."¹²³ Like many dictators, it seems that Stalin needed to create the illusion that he was in the right - hence his habit of clothing his paranoid suspicions in a series of legal fictions in which the dice were loaded against the accused. No doubt such show trials reinforced Stalin's wishful view of himself as both perfect and omnipotent.

That Stalin continued to exercise power - and terror - to the end of his life is clear from the so-called "Doctor's Plot," in response to which, Deutscher says, Stalin appears to have intended "a new Witches' Sabbath, with mass

¹²¹ Louis Fischer, *The Life and Death of Stalin* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953) 155.

¹²² Tucker and Cohen xiv-xv.

¹²³ Isaac Deutscher, *The Great Purges* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 52.

accusations, mass confessions and mass executions."¹²⁴ This affair, of which the full carrying through was averted only by Stalin's death in 1953, was sparked off by a doctor who wrote to him alleging that doctors at the Kremlin were not treating their patients properly. This was sufficient to persuade Stalin that there was a plot against the regime and he promptly ordered the arrest of a whole group of eminent medical specialists. He supervised the matter very closely, and was explicit in his instructions as to how the magistrate was to behave during the initial private examination required by law: "Beat them, beat them, and then beat them again!" he said, as Deutscher tells us.¹²⁵ There is thus heavy irony in the myth current during the Moscow Trials that Stalin was not responsible for the suffering of his countrymen, that he in fact knew nothing about it and that his officials were perpetrating these deeds without his knowledge.

Given the now widely accepted fact that the vast majority of Stalin's victims were innocent, the question arises as to why they confessed to crimes they had not in fact committed. Deutscher quotes a speech in which Nikita Khrushchev states that "Stalin employed mass terror....Thousands upon thousands of innocent and honest communists died as a result of monstrous falsifications....They were forced to bring false charges against both themselves and others. These slanderous confessions were extorted from them."¹²⁶

The trial sequence in *Animal Farm* graphically illustrates the way in which people can be tortured and terrorized into confession. There four pigs confess to the same trumped-up charges which key figures in the Moscow Trials had faced: sabotage and conspiracy with Nazi Germany to overthrow the government, depicted specifically in the *Animal Farm* trials as the wrecking of the windmill (though in fact this was an act of nature), and seditious collusion with Mr Frederick, who represents Hitler here. Historically, some of the charges were more bizarre than this, including the deliberate infection of pigs

¹²⁴ Deutscher, *Great Purges* 154.

¹²⁵ Deutscher, *Great Purges* 160.

¹²⁶ Deutscher, *Great Purges* 8.

with the plague and the mixing of nails and glass into butter. Apart from the defendants' confessions, the prosecution was able to produce no evidence to substantiate the charges. For both Stalin and Napoleon such confessions would have been a way of distracting attention from the deficiencies of their regimes, and, given the superhuman image of Stalin, it is likely that some defendants willingly colluded to save the reputation of the Soviet state and its leaders. The details from some of the trials, supplied by Fischer, show that Orwell did not misrepresent the ineptness of the regime he was parodying, and indeed, it is of the essence of parodic attack that the malicious mimicry occurring in the satiric world be based on recognisable figures or events in the primary world:

There had been hundreds of train wrecks in Siberia. An accused official confessed that he had staged them deliberately. The peasants in collective farms complained that they were underpaid. Former Commissar of Finance Grinka confessed that he, on instructions from Prime Minister Rykov, another defendant, purposely underpaid the peasants in order to sow discontent. In White-Russia, the number of livestock had been disastrously reduced. Defendants at one Moscow trial confessed that it was done on orders from the Polish Intelligence Service. Thirty thousand horses had died of anaemia in White-Russia in 1936. "My work," accused Sharangovich testified. ¹²⁷

Such details are the basis for the wild and wonderful confessions in *Animal Farm*, culminating in the confession of two sheep to having murdered an old ram by "chasing him round and round a bonfire when he was suffering from a cough." Meyers has traced the source of this to one of the Great Purge trials, in which "Gorky's secretary Kryuchkov confessed, 'I arranged long walks for

¹²⁷ Fischer, *Stalin* 38.

Alexei Maximovich [Gorky], I was always arranging bonfires. The smoke of the bonfire naturally affected Gorky's weak lungs." ¹²⁸

Tamara Deutscher graphically encapsulates all the elements of the Moscow Trials:

What made the Moscow spectacle so exceptionally hallucinatory in its sadism and masochism was the depth of self-humiliation into which...[Stalin] hurled his broken adversaries, denying them all possibility to defend their honour and their dignity....The drama rose to its bizarre climax with Vyshinsky, the Prosecutor General, bellowing his fantastic indictment, and the defendants - all heroic revolutionaries - making their blood-chilling "confessions" and declaring themselves guilty of monstrous crimes they could not have committed. ¹²⁹

The word "hallucinatory" describes equally well the trial and execution scene in *Animal Farm*, the horribly theatrical nature of the proceedings permeating both accounts, which have the ring of some appalling nightmare which cannot be halted, but has to be lived out to the end. It is clear from the accounts of the time that it was into such a general world of waking nightmare that the entire Russian people were plunged by Stalin's Great Purges, and it is no exaggeration to say that the level of oppression after the Revolution at least equalled that in Russia during the time of the Tsars. The notion that the wheel of history tends to come full circle is one of Orwell's main points in *Animal Farm*.

Underlying *Animal Farm* is Orwell's continuous awareness of and certainty about historical events and their significance. Earlier in this thesis the influence of myth on interpretations of history was discussed and the point was made that the myths and ideologies used to interpret the past are often

¹²⁸ David Wykes, *A Preface to Orwell* (New York: Longman, 1987) 129.

¹²⁹ Deutscher 6-7.

covert and unconscious. It is not the accuracy of Orwell's historical facts, but his way of selecting facts and the philosophy according to which he manipulates and interprets these facts, that are at issue. Jameson, speaking about a novel by Balzac, suggests a different (postmodern, here) strategy of dealing with history:

[The novel] inscribes the irrevocable brute facts of empirical history...[but] it does so in order the more surely to 'manage' those facts and to open up a space in which they are no longer quite so irreparable, no longer quite so definitive.¹³⁰

Orwell had various axes to grind in his satiric presentation of history in *Animal Farm*, among them being to refute the Marxist maxim concerning the inevitability of history. Orwell tries to show that the history of a society does not proceed in a sequential way from capitalism through revolution with the aid of the bourgeoisie and then on to the triumph of the proletariat in a classless society, as Marx believed. Orwell, on the contrary, sees history as much less predictable and, because some people are gullible and others are dishonest and power-hungry, the Marxist utopia will never become a reality. He "proves" this by depicting the Russian leaders as entirely evil and self-seeking, and the masses as naïve victims of those leaders. His account of this history omits any sense of lasting idealism on the part of the leaders and any deep sense of gain and happiness on the part of the people. This is perhaps a weakness directly attributable to the novel being a fable, since it is a form that leaves little room for nuance. Nelson speaks of the creation of a "mythos of totalitarianism" by writers such as Hannah Arendt and George Orwell who, because they were confronting such appalling realities, "depicted totalitarianism as the starkest and most absolute evil known to humanity: an irrational threat to the very soul of every living person and to the merest memory of every moment past."¹³¹ Nelson believes that this "mystification of

¹³⁰ Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (London: Methuen, 1981) 164.

¹³¹ John S. Nelson, "Orwell's Political Myths and Ours," *The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World*, eds. Robert L. Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo (Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989) 23

power" achieves the opposite of its intention: it impedes the struggle against totalitarian regimes because it clouds the issue.¹³²

Orwell seems to have no sense of what Jameson, quoting Lyotard, refers to as "the desire called Marx," which Jameson sees as something that can reconcile and give meaning to the separate dimensions of individual life on the one hand, and history on the other:

The "desire called Marx," then, is not the will to reduce one of these dimensions to the other...but rather the effort to develop organs of perception capable of enabling us fitfully to position ourselves in that other temporality, that other story, over which we also hope - but now as groups and collectives, rather than as individuals - to assert some influence and control.¹³³

From this point of view, Marxism becomes a desire to re-story creatively the relationship between history and individual destiny, so as to empower individuals by repositioning them in relation to history. That Stalinist communism does not fully fit this description is not in question, but what is in question is how fully the doleful and hopeless narrative of *Animal Farm* deals with Stalinist communism, even given that satire is not intended to be taken literally and that the fable form has built-in limitations which may prevent it from conveying subtleties. This thesis argues that Orwell's unacknowledged but disappointed longing for utopia, which he shares with satirists in general, is in this case so bitter that it has lessened the universality of his novel and made it more difficult for contemporary readers to engage fully with it. A further difficulty is created by Orwell's implicit insistence that life can be fully represented by facts which are easily apprehensible because they lie on the surface. Trilling praises Orwell for this quality:

[Orwell] liberates us. He tells us that we can understand our

¹³² Nelson 27.

¹³³ Jameson, *Ideologies of Theory* xxviii.

political and social life merely by looking around us; he frees us from the need for the inside dope. He implies that our job is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this fashion or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our lights - he restores the old sense of the democracy of the mind, releasing us from the belief that the mind can work only in a technical, professional way....He has the effect of making us believe that we may become full members of the society of thinking men. ¹³⁴

Yet these arguments are based on naive liberal humanist conceptions of the equality of man ¹³⁵ and confirm Orwell's empiricism and mistrust of the philosophical. They also identify with Orwell's implicit yearning for a utopian state, though Trilling takes this even further ("restores the old sense of a democracy of the mind") and, unlike Orwell, seems to believe that such a utopia is within our grasp. In a postmodern age these ideas have far less credibility than they had in Orwell's day. His disappointed utopianism and the static quality of utopia ¹³⁶ have already been alluded to, but for a writer of dystopian novels like *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the future holds no hope and utopia is something not even partially attainable, to be found only in the past. The conservative tendency to long for the past, paradoxically co-existing with his desire for radical change, may be what Orwell recognised in himself when in 1930 he spoke of himself as a "Tory anarchist." ¹³⁷

Beneath the surface of most satire there lies a vision (often dim and unacknowledged) of the Golden Age, the Garden of Eden or some such utopian state - the paradisaical state from which people have been cast out, the loss of which, on one level, satire bewails and to which it desires people at least to begin to return. Perhaps the bitterness of satire such as Orwell's

¹³⁴ Lionel Trilling, "George Orwell and the Politics of Truth," *The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in Criticism by Lionel Trilling* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1955) 158.

¹³⁵ As Kumar says, "The general liberal belief in material and moral advance had proved to be a cruel delusion. Beliefs and practices such as slavery and genocide...had reappeared with a vengeance." (299)

¹³⁶ See 157 above.

¹³⁷ Bernard Crick, *George Orwell: A Life* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980) 174.

springs precisely from a recognition that this is not possible: one cannot "go back home," since the gates of Eden are forever guarded by an angel with a fiery sword. As indicated earlier, this issue is complicated by Orwell's allegiance to socialism, which carries its own version of utopia.¹³⁸

In political circles, elaborate utopian ideals flourish within extreme ideologies, as Tismaneanu indicates:

The total ideologies of Communism and Fascism held in common a belief in the plasticity of human nature and in the possibility of transforming it in accordance with some utopian blueprint. Both Marxism and Fascism have inspired unflinching loyalties, a fascination with the figure of the perfect society and romantic immersions in collective movements promising the advent of the millennium.¹³⁹

Many of the attitudes mentioned above are satirised in *Animal Farm*, particularly the utopian aspect, combined with the unflinching loyalties, while the mention of the millennium brings to mind the utterly unquestioning faith of the animals in their leaders and the creed they espouse. It is his view of the shattering of the Marxist utopian dream that Orwell so bitterly depicts in the massacre scene of *Animal Farm*, and all the subsequent events in the novel are filled with the deep sadness of disappointed ideals. This is exacerbated by the animals' unwillingness to speak openly about their sense of loss, since they still have so much invested in their beliefs that it is preferable to suffer in silence rather than articulate their ontological emptiness. It is this sense of emptiness and pain that is evident immediately after the killings, when the animals move off in shock and disbelief, ending up on a knoll overlooking the farm, huddled together around Clover, the mare - an embodiment of caring and common sense:

¹³⁸ See 157 above.

¹³⁹ Tismaneanu 385.

The knoll where they were lying gave them a wide prospect across the countryside...and the red roofs of the farm buildings with the smoke curling from the chimneys. It was a clear spring evening....Never had the farm...appeared to the animals so desirable a place. As Clover looked down the hillside her eyes filled with tears. If she could have spoken her thoughts, it would have been to say that this was not what they had aimed at when they had set themselves years ago to work for the overthrow of the human race. These scenes of terror...were not what they had looked forward to....[Her own picture of the future] had been of a society of animals set free from hunger and the whip, all equal, each working according to his capacity, the strong protecting the weak....There was no thought of rebellion and disobedience in her mind....Such were her thoughts, though she lacked the words to express them. ¹⁴⁰

From a distance, the farm presents a picture of order and prosperity, a seemingly idyllic scene which contrasts with the bloody executions which have just occurred. It also contrasts the pre-revolutionary ideals and ideological rhetoric with the injustice and violence which have been perpetrated on the animals in the name of the Rebellion. However, the farm does not belong to the animals, but to a relatively small ruling clique, with the rest of the animals reduced to servants. The "red roofs of the farm buildings" seem charming, but these buildings house the pigs in thoroughly unegalitarian splendour, while the lives of the animals are as hard as ever. That this allegorical point reflects at least a part of post-revolutionary Soviet reality is indicated by one of Trotsky's descriptions:

As for the members of collective farms, they live as formerly in the old huts with their calves and cockroaches. On the other hand, the Soviet dignitaries complain in the Press that not all the houses newly constructed for them possess 'rooms for

¹⁴⁰ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 75-6.

house-workers' - that is, for domestic servants.¹⁴¹

This chimes well with Orwell's picture of revolutionary inequality, though it has to be borne in mind that both Orwell and Trotsky speak from within a framework of ideology and that both have axes to grind. The picture presented by Trotsky underlines Orwell's point about how people can be oppressed while being told that they have been liberated, and how disempowering such a deception can be. Clover feels betrayed, but cannot say so because she is inarticulate, and one of the ways in which the Rebellion has betrayed her is in not helping her to clearer ways of seeing and thinking about the world around her. Orwell's depiction of her as a warm, loving being, a member of the working class with a great capacity for nurturing others, reminds us that Marx "saw in the working class the hopes of humanity in the face of a self-destructive capitalistic system"¹⁴² and Winston, in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, sees the "proles" as the only hope for the future.

Yet, Orwell's attitudes towards the working class in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are controversial, showing the passivity of the workers as unavoidable, perhaps even desirable. Zehr comments on this as follows:

[In Orwell] we begin to witness a problematic retreat into a virtually mythic idealization of the working class. Increasingly, he looked to the past as a time of stability and permanence utterly unlike the present, and while this period of growing pessimism led to his fatalistic portrait of the revolutionary and intellectual impotence of the working class in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, he seems to have found a kind of consolation in the slumbering innocence of the animals and the proles.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Trotsky 116.

¹⁴² Steven Seidman, *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994) 186.

¹⁴³ David Morgan Zehr, "Orwell and the Proles: Revolutionary or Middle-Class Voyeur?," *Centennial Review*, 27.1 (1983): 34

The connection between satire and utopia is particularly clear here, though the waters are considerably muddied by Orwell's struggle to cast off his middle-class background ¹⁴⁴ and his lingering nostalgia for the past which constitutes a sentimental kind of utopianism. These views are puzzling, even in an avowedly deviant socialist, since empowerment of the people, at least through family solidarity and affection, is what Orwell solidly endorses, both in his essays and, implicitly, in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Trotsky, with his "revisionist" stance, saw socialism as having moved away from such relational values, under the false pretence of having already attained them:

Socialism, if it is worthy of the name, means human relations without greed, friendship without envy and intrigue, love without base calculation. The official doctrine declares these ideal norms already realized - and with more insistence the louder the reality protests against such declarations. ¹⁴⁵

Trotsky's voice is of course a voice speaking from an opposition point of view, which is both isolated and powerless - a stance which notoriously encourages highly idealistic positions that are always difficult to translate into reality in the everyday administration of power. Essentially, his objection is to the Soviet state proclaiming a reality which the facts do not support, and it is an analogous disjunction between what the pigs proclaim and what the animals feel that lies at the root of Clover's sadness.

Clover is shown as desperately unhappy, yet she chooses to accept the situation. We are told she "knew" that things were better now than under Jones, but the reader is aware that what the animals "know" is merely what they have been persuaded to believe by means of propaganda. "Whatever

¹⁴⁴ Zehr, "Orwell and the Proles" 31.

¹⁴⁵ Trotsky 155.

happened she would remain faithful, work hard, carry out the orders given to her, and accept the leadership of Napoleon." ¹⁴⁶ There is a passivity and resignation about these words which suggest that she is unable or unwilling to act on her real feelings because she has been programmed to have other feelings. Deutscher's account of Soviet society after the great Purge is directly relevant to this:

During the remaining fifteen years of Stalin's rule no group was left in Soviet society, not even in the prisons and camps, that was capable of challenging him. No centre of independent political thinking had been allowed to survive. A tremendous gap had been torn in the nation's consciousness; its collective memory was shattered; the continuity of its revolutionary traditions was broken; and its capacity to form and crystallize any nonconformist notions was destroyed. The Soviet Union was finally left, not merely in its practical politics, but even in its hidden mental processes, with no alternative to Stalinism. ¹⁴⁷

Just as the Soviet people were left with no alternative but Stalinism, so the animals are left with no alternative but Animalism. However, Animalism is an ideology embodying a set of myths about the world which are couched in the language of freedom but in fact act as a stultifying force. Since this ideology has a need for mythical external enemies (Snowball, Frederick and Jones) who are never overcome and who help to unite the animals, they always feel under threat, and the utopian ideal of peace and freedom continues to recede.

One movement within the myths which comprise the animals' world does occur when their former human "enemies" are suddenly presented to the animals as allies, "rehabilitated" and devoid of their former stigma as

¹⁴⁶ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 76.

¹⁴⁷ Deutscher, *Great Purges* 121.

oppressors, who meet for an evening of celebration with the pigs in the manor house of the farm. If, as we have seen, Clover has some unspoken doubts as to whether the animals really are living in freedom, there is no doubt whatsoever in the minds of their former oppressors. When Mr. Pilkington rises to propose a toast to the farm, he does so as follows:

Today he and his friends had visited Animal Farm and inspected every inch of it with their own eyes, and what did they find? Not only the most up-to-date methods, but a discipline and an orderliness which should be an example to all farmers everywhere. He believed that he was right in saying that the lower animals on Animal Farm did more work and received less food than any animals in the county. Indeed, he and his fellow-visitors today had observed many features which they intended to introduce on their own farms immediately. ¹⁴⁸

It takes an oppressor to properly recognise the degree to which the "lower animals," as he calls them, are now more cruelly oppressed by their own kind than they were by Jones. The "discipline" and "orderliness" that he praises are spoken of as oppression when administered by Jones, and his comments about the animals' rations speak for themselves. So far has the utopian ideal of freedom degenerated that, as the last sentence of the passage indicates, the former oppressors have been able to take lessons in oppression from a society in which, officially, liberty reigns everywhere. *Animal Farm* depicts history as a kind of vicious circle, in which the masses will always be doomed to slavery. It is thus puzzling that Orwell should, in 1946, so trenchantly attack James Burnham, whose arguments Orwell sums up as follows: "So that history consists of a series of swindles, in which the masses are first lured into revolt by the promise of Utopia, and then, when they have done their job, enslaved over again by new masters." ¹⁴⁹ Orwell's intention here is parodic, yet he is, in fact, describing precisely what seems to happen in *Animal Farm*

¹⁴⁸ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 117.

¹⁴⁹ George Orwell, "James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 177.

(completed in 1944). A partial explanation of this inconsistency may be found in Crick's outline of how Orwell, over the years, was both critical of and fascinated by Burnham's views.¹⁵⁰

In *Animal Farm* Orwell has given new life to the phrase which Hannah Arendt used to entitle her book: "the banality of evil,"¹⁵¹ since he shows that the abuse of power results not only in misery and lack of freedom, but also an empty quality to life which is just as destructive to the human spirit. In this view, life under a totalitarian regime has a repetitious and limiting nature, which may easily infect the perpetrators of evil as well, rendering their own lives trivial and preventing them from being creative in any real sense. It is from this point of view that evil is truly banal.

Yet the satiric dynamic of *Animal Farm* is far from banal, if Freud's concept of the *unheimlich* or uncanny is used to examine it, breaking the illusion that history is fact, by making readers see the text as one in which the ordinary is made to seem uncanny or estranged from everyday experience. This is closely related to the notion that satire creates liminality in order to challenge our certainty about our particular view of the world and move us into an alternative one in order to foster change.¹⁵² Freud stresses that the word *unheimlich* is the opposite of *heimlich*, which connotes intimacy and friendliness,¹⁵³ yet he notes that *heimlich* can also connote the hidden, the magical and the secret, which makes it similar to *unheimlich*.¹⁵⁴ Thus, Freud concludes, "*heimlich* is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite."¹⁵⁵ There is a dynamic ambiguity here involving the familiar and the uncanny - a Janus-like two-facedness which is never at rest - that is of the essence of satire. The

¹⁵⁰ Bernard Crick, introd., *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, by George Orwell (1949; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984) 57-8, 84-92, 121-2.

¹⁵¹ Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Faber, 1963)

¹⁵² See 80-1 above.

¹⁵³ Sigmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny'," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, eds. and trans. James Strachey and Anna Freud, vol. XVII (London: Hogarth P, 1955) 222.

¹⁵⁴ Freud, "The 'Uncanny'" 223-4.

¹⁵⁵ Freud, "The 'Uncanny'" 226.

satirical thrust of *Animal Farm* can be seen as juxtaposing the familiar or purportedly historical with the uncanny, to create a dialogic process which interrogates the former and makes it strange (in the Russian formalist sense), in effect jostling the signification of the familiar so that it appears very like its opposite. The existence of the totalitarian world of Stalinism seems to be confirmed by the historical details used as a backdrop to the novel, but the satirical and fabular mode of *Animal Farm* serves to alienate, make strange and question the existential reality of that historical world. Readers find themselves in a Kafkaesque world in which the energy of the liminal¹⁵⁶ integrates the historical aspects within the creative processes of dystopian satire, which makes the text seem larger than life, compelling our attention by infusing a dramatic tension into the bare bones of what purports to be history, and drawing us into a powerful experience. This dissolves our sense of our own world in a way which, at this point in the discussion, has perhaps more in common with the effect of a fairy tale than that of satire. Among the most effective creators of liminality are new externalising discourses,¹⁵⁷ of which satire and fairy tales are examples. Orwell can be seen here as exploiting, in a non-ironic way, the fairy tale element (a concept which he uses scathingly in his subtitle) which, by infusing the text with liminality, creates the potential for movement and play illustrated above.

However, the "fairy tale" of *Animal Farm* ends "*Not with a bang but a whimper.*"¹⁵⁸ It looks as though Orwell's satirical strategy in thus titling his novel was to lull his readers into complacency, the better to shock them at a later stage by the savagery of his parody. In fact, this is a tale of brutality and cynicism, at the end of which the animals will live unhappily ever after. Fairy tales may indeed contain frightening elements, but they are also about change, often in the end change for the better. Here, instead of Sleeping Beauty waking up or the frog changing into a handsome prince, we have pigs which, while retaining their traditionally worst characteristics as pigs, steadily

¹⁵⁶ See 78ff above.

¹⁵⁷ See 78-9 above.

¹⁵⁸ T.S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men," *The Complete Poems and Plays of T.S. Eliot* (London: Faber, 1969) 86.

take on many of the worst characteristics of people until, as the last sentence of *Animal Farm* has it, "The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which."¹⁵⁹ An alternative (though rather utopian) view to the generally pessimistic reading of this ending is provided by Letemendia, who says that "The final scene of the book...reveals the disillusionment of the working beasts with their porcine leaders, an essential step in the process of creating a new revolution."¹⁶⁰ More convincingly, Letemendia, arguing from a letter written by Orwell to Dwight Macdonald in 1946, says that Orwell "was calling not for the end of revolutionary hopes, but for the beginning of a new kind of personal responsibility on the part of revolutionaries."¹⁶¹ Elbarbary suggests that the animals' hopes of liberation (however slim) depend on their being "raised up into language and provided with semantic space...to engage [the pigs] on their own ground with a counter discourse and gestures of their own."¹⁶²

By depicting events in *Animal Farm* which parallel those in Stalinist Russia Orwell has written a novel which is not simply an attack on totalitarianism: Orwell's primary message in *Animal Farm* is that the Marxist utopian ideal (the fairy tale of his subtitle) is both unworkable and pernicious, as it was applied in Soviet Russia. Yet, as mentioned earlier, satire has its own (covert) utopian ideals and didactic intent, and it is not surprising, considering *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, that Orwell's allegiance to socialism has been questioned by some of his contemporaries. Kolakowski, a Polish supporter of Lech Walesa, has some relevant ideas on the subject of utopias:

As long as utopia is simply a vision of a perfect world...without suffering...struggle and conflict, such a vision is a harmless literary exercise. A utopia becomes sinister once we persuade ourselves that we have a kind of technique to bring about our

¹⁵⁹ Orwell, *Animal Farm* 120.

¹⁶⁰ Letemendia 129.

¹⁶¹ Letemendia 136-7.

¹⁶² Elbarbary 37.

fantasies; that we acquire a technique of apocalypse, a device by which we can implement our dreams....Utopia implies an ultimate goal...and absolutely all methods are good if we believe that they will bring about this goal. To the rulers of the communist countries this utopian fantasy gives a very convenient conceptual framework within which everything is allowed....Only in this sense does utopia become malignant, because [then] utopia is a device in the service of tyranny. ¹⁶³

Kolakowski distinguishes between literary and political utopias, though it is surely possible for them to become indistinguishable when literature is used in the service of politics. However, he is careful to label as harmful only those political structures which are put into place with the unrealisable aim of making a utopian ideal into a reality. For him, it seems, it is this Faustian element of arrogance and presumption which renders utopia dangerous, since the search for a chimera can never end and it has such power over people's minds that they will disregard any principle of democracy or morality in the name of such a goal.

Heller and Fehér declare that "the postmodern political condition is tremendously ill at ease with Utopianism." ¹⁶⁴ Smart writes in favour of a new restructured notion of utopia, stating that "Utopian thought has had a bad press, particularly within the critical tradition of inquiry developed by Marx" and that "elements of utopian thinking are consistently present in Marx's work." ¹⁶⁵ Jameson too, from a Marxist perspective, wishes for a new view of utopia, since he complains that, in the recent past, the word "utopia" has been "a code word that simply meant 'socialism' or any revolutionary attempt to create a radically different society...[and] identified almost exclusively with Stalin and Soviet communism." ¹⁶⁶ In fact, there is common ground between

¹⁶³ Enrique Krauze, "An Interview with Leszek Kolakowski," *Partisan Review* 52 (1985): 211-12.

¹⁶⁴ Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér, *The Postmodern Political Condition* (Cambridge: Polity P, 1988) 4.

¹⁶⁵ Smart 64, 65.

¹⁶⁶ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* 159.

the self-proclaimed democratic socialism of Orwell and the Marxism of Jameson, since both writers preserve some connection with Marxist ideology while being flexible and critical, though both end up with quite different and individualistic political philosophies. In addition, both want to demythologise the political systems current in their time, though Jameson's stance is a much more sophisticated and knowing one.

Animal Farm is a satirical dystopian novel which, using aspects of history as its raw material, dissects the claims of a utopian creed to show that utopia is here nothing but a myth, in the most pejorative sense of the term. On its own terms, the novel succeeds in showing that such a myth can lead to dishonesty and, in turn, to habits of manipulation and an insatiable desire for power. Yet, as Ricoeur shows, there are alternative ways of disempowering harmful myths, which allow for the retention and nurturing of the positive side of myth. Specifically, Ricoeur is concerned to retain the idealistic aspect of utopian myth, since it provides a valuable way into the future: "Without the forward look [of myth a society] is deprived of its dreams."¹⁶⁷ However, he does also recognise the danger that this kind of myth "can be perverted, usually by monopolistic elites, into a mystificatory discourse which serves to uncritically vindicate the established political powers."¹⁶⁸ This thesis has already spoken of Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of suspicion," which has a demystifying function¹⁶⁹ but, after that, according to Ricoeur, there is the need for a more positive process:

Myth is an ideological function. But it is also more than that. Once a hermeneutics of suspicion has unmasked the alienating role of myth as an agency of ideological conformism, there remains the task of a positive interpretation. Hermeneutics, as Ricoeur insists, has a double duty: to 'suspect' and to 'listen'. Having demythologized the ideologies of false consciousness it labours to disclose the utopian symbols of liberating

¹⁶⁷ Kearney 64.

¹⁶⁸ Kearney 65.

¹⁶⁹ See 130 above.

consciousness.¹⁷⁰

This approach, like the earlier discussion of myth,¹⁷¹ distinguishes between the myth which offers a misleading view and that which instead liberates. It deals summarily with ideology, but has a great deal of sensitivity about preserving aspects of utopian myth which can serve as a form of ontological map, giving pattern and life to the future. Although Orwell's views on ideology and political myth are less subtle, in the end it is not necessary to judge him harshly for his particular way of dealing with utopian myth by presenting it as dystopia. Different times have different needs, and besides, Orwell was a satirist, with all that implies of the assumed right to be curmudgeonly and unreasonable, to remain on the fringes of society and never make terms with the enemy. In *Animal Farm* Orwell is being true to a calling which, as the opening pages of this thesis show, has a long and honourable lineage.

¹⁷⁰ Kearney 67.

¹⁷¹ See 113-19 above.

Chapter 5 *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: Apocalypse Later or The Future Shape of Power

As has become clear from the previous chapter, *Animal Farm* has little of the playfulness and light-heartedness that mark much of satire. This applies even more to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which is pervaded by a spirit of despair and prophetic gloom. Yet these qualities are not foreign to satire, along with the elements of parody, exaggeration, fantasy and dystopia to be found in both novels. Humour is a common weapon of the satirist but it is not an essential element of satire - and some satire may make its audience wince more often than laugh, as can be seen in Kafka's writing, as well as texts such as Swift's *A Modest Proposal* and *Gulliver's Travels*. These works, like *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, can be seen as examples of the "purely moral type" of Menippean satire,¹ which strikes a more serious note than other kinds of satire, and makes the connection between satire and utopianism / dystopianism much more overt. Bakhtin, in particular, associates utopian elements with Menippean satire and, for him, this kind of satire uses fantasy "to put to the test and to expose ideas and ideologues."² Palmeri distinguishes between verse satire and narrative satire: the former he sees as conservative, the latter (Menippean satire in particular) he finds "'dialogical' in [that] different voices or points of view enter into unresolved dialogue."³ He concludes that "[a]lthough many critics associate satire with comedy, satire in narrative more closely resembles tragedy in its unresolved ambivalence."⁴ Finally, Snyder speaks about satire in general, and Menippean satire in particular, describing it as a highly unstable genre which, by its nature, shifts into other genres, which he names as tragedy and the novel.⁵ These views of Menippean satire clearly have relevance to a discussion of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, as has Frye's assertion that Menippean satire has "a special function of breaking up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all the other things that

¹ See 49-50 above.

² Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 26.

³ Frank Palmeri, *Satire in Narrative: Petronius, Swift, Gibbon, Melville, and Pynchon* (Austin: U of Texas P, 1990) 12.

⁴ Palmeri 4.

⁵ Snyder 96, 101, 121, 139.

impede the free movement...of society."⁶ Howe sees *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as "mostly Menippean satire and conventional novel...."⁷ Since this thesis speaks of Orwell's humanism, it is interesting that, according to Lerner, one of the models of Menippean satire "was developed in humanist circles to criticize social and moral conditions of society...."⁸ Finally, both the novels dealt with in this thesis can be seen as examples of what Halász calls modern or black satire, which speaks for a human condition which is on the verge of disaster. Such satire is "an escape from mental pain, a protective mask and an outlet for desperation, and, in relation to the readers, the proper vehicle for shocking modern civilization into the realization of its own frustration and chaos."⁹

Nineteen Eighty-Four, completed in 1948, three years after Orwell wrote *Animal Farm*, is his last novel and, in many ways, it is *Animal Farm* writ large and more terrible. The fable form of *Animal Farm* provides some sort of emotional buffer for the reader, since the process of allegory leads the reader to human considerations through the alternative world of the animals, but in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* we are made to feel with great directness that both the victims and the perpetrators are human beings, and the alternative world presented so relentlessly in this case leads the readers themselves to feel under attack. While Orwell subtitled *Animal Farm* "A Fairy Tale," he insisted that *Nineteen Eighty-Four* be subtitled "A Novel"¹⁰ - which serves to highlight his more serious literary intentions, especially as the text suggests a nightmare rather than a fairy tale. His satiric and polemical intentions are also more serious in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, since Orwell's canvas here is the world, and the abuse of power portrayed is more systematic and inexorable than in *Animal Farm*.

⁶ Frye 233.

⁷ Irving Howe, "1984: Enigmas of Power," *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 8.

⁸ Lía Schwartz Lerner, "Golden Age Satire: Transformations of Genre," *MLN* 105.2 (1990): 271.

⁹ Ann Mary Halász, "The Metamorphoses of Satire," *Acta Litteraria Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29.1-2 (1987): 6.

¹⁰ J.R. Hammond, *A George Orwell Companion: A Guide to the Novels, Documentaries and Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1982) 181.

As in *Animal Farm*, issues of ideology, propaganda and myth are highly relevant to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, functioning within the satirical structures of the texts. In the former novel the animals are in the grip of a highly oppressive and dictatorial regime; the latter novel gives us the same kind of society, but with several excruciating turns of the screw which strengthen the ideological underpinnings of the society. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* the state of Oceania has harnessed sophisticated sociological, psychological and technological techniques in order to control the sex lives of people, to institute a continuous system of surveillance of most of its citizens, both in public and in the heart of the family, and finally to monitor and punish by means of the cruellest humiliation, torture and ultimately death, any deviation, in thought, word or deed from the norms prescribed by the state. These punishments involve not just the deprivation of the victims' human dignity, but the invasion of their minds by highly developed electronic equipment which permanently damages certain areas of the brain, thus opening it up to a series of "learning" experiences which "encourage" the victims, by means of electric shocks - a grotesque parody of classic behaviourist methods of conditioning - to alter their entire view of the world, irrevocably and to the satisfaction of the state. As Winston Smith, the hero of the novel, is told by his chief inquisitor, O'Brien, "We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves."¹¹ This is the fate of everyone who is brought to the Ministry of Love accused of what is called "thoughtcrime" and, after that, at some point, all are killed. The entire system is aimed at dehumanising people, suggested particularly by the use of electric shocks, which are a version of the methods used by behavioural psychologists in experiments with animals. The brutally satirical implication here is that the state recognises no difference between human beings and animals, and this follows directly from what animals themselves, in a different context, observe at the end of *Animal Farm*: that it was impossible to tell animal from human being. The name "Ministry of Love" when applied to the headquarters and torture facility of the Thought Police, is reminiscent in its grim perversity of Himmler's insistence that the main gates of Dachau bear

¹¹ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel* (1949; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954) 206.

the legend "Arbeit Macht Frei" (Work Liberates).¹² This thesis has already commented on the tendency of satire to distort or even sever the link between signifier and signified,¹³ and the names of the various ministries in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are some of the numerous examples of this in the novel. In fact, the whole system of Newspeak represents such a process of linguistic engineering, which Orwell uses to highlight the dystopian nature of Oceania. As Nisbet comments, the use of language as a means of obfuscation is a factor common to many modern totalitarian states: "The changes which Lenin and Trotsky, Mussolini, Hitler and Goebbels, Mao, and so many others have rung on the words 'freedom', 'justice', 'democracy', and the like are of course notorious."¹⁴

Both novels deal with the abuse of power but, as the degree of abuse in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* differs from that in *Animal Farm*, so do the motive and philosophy in each case. Napoleon, in *Animal Farm*, is a cunning, bullying pig (figuratively as well as literally) who uses power and terror largely in order to receive adulation and live a very luxurious life, rather like one of the more decadent Roman emperors. The rulers of Oceania are different, and very intimidating in their political puritanism, having more in common with Savonarola than Nero. As O'Brien confirms, they are not interested in the fruits of power as much as the dynamics of having and keeping it: "The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power."¹⁵

Orwell depicts Oceania as an all-powerful totalitarian state, with a massively centralised system which administers power from the top in a way that ensures total control of all its citizens. For the backdrop to this novel Orwell drew on life as he knew it in wartime Britain - the seediness of the buildings, the shortages of basic consumer goods and the atmosphere of repression (as he saw it) at the BBC where he worked. In addition to these autobiographical

¹² Peter Padfield, *Himmler: Reichsführer-SS* (London: Macmillan, 1991) 134.

¹³ See 68 above.

¹⁴ Robert Nisbet, "1984 and the Conservative Imagination," *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 202.

¹⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 212.

aspects, he was also extrapolating from the recent historical examples of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, and exercising the satirist's prophetic role, viewing these states as a model for the future, but also practising the satirist's art of exaggeration by presenting us with a parody of a totalitarian state. He speaks of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in the following terms:

I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily *will* arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it *could* arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. The scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else and totalitarianism, *if not fought against*, could triumph anywhere.¹⁶

Rose's comment that "Orwell's intention was to avert rather than predict a nightmare"¹⁷ is not entirely accurate, since there is an element of prediction in Orwell's statement above, though he does not insist that his prediction will necessarily be realised. *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is prophetic insofar as Orwell was convinced that without vigilance and action the world would become a kind of totalitarian nightmare. Hodgart says that "Prophecy was a subject that Orwell could not leave alone"¹⁸ and Ehrenfeld regards him as one of the prominent prophets of this century.¹⁹ McCarthy regards Orwell as one of the "two authentic, certifiable, prophets...of and for this century...."²⁰ But Bernard

¹⁶ George Orwell, letter to Francis A. Henson (extract), 16 June 1949, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 502.

¹⁷ Jonathan Rose, ed., *The Revised Orwell* (East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991) 1.

¹⁸ Matthew Hodgart, "From *Animal Farm* to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*," *The World of George Orwell*, ed. Miriam Gross (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 139.

¹⁹ David Ehrenfeld, "The Roots of Prophecy: Orwell and Nature," *Hudson Review* 38.2 (1985): 193.

²⁰ Eugene J. McCarthy, "George Orwell: A Prophet Honored Just after His Time," *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*, ed. Ejner J. Jensen (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984) 137.

Crick seems to prefer the term "warning" to the word "prophecy," when describing what Orwell does in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.²¹

However, since totalitarianism was alive and well in Orwell's time, it is also necessary to examine totalitarianism as a political manifestation and not only as a product of Orwell's prophetic sensibility. Schapiro speaks of the "five contours from which the map reader in the political wilderness will recognize 'the totalitarian regime': the Leader; the subjugation of the legal order; control over private morality; continuous mobilization; and legitimacy based on mass support."²² These represent important aspects of totalitarianism which either have been or will be addressed in this thesis, but they are only a framework, albeit a useful one. Malinowski, less dispassionate and more penetrating, fills out the picture with this description of totalitarianism:

The...transformation of nationhood and all its resources into a lethal 'technocratic' government instrument of violence. This becomes a means justified by the end....Thus the end of totalitarianism, in so far as it saps all the resources of culture and destroys its structure, is diametrically opposed and completely incompatible with the constitution of human societies for the normal, peaceful business of producing, maintaining, and transmitting wealth, solidarity, reason, and conscience, all of which are the real indices of civilization.²³

This suggests how destructive totalitarianism is to society, and to the values which Western democracy holds most dear. The destruction is felt in the fabric of society as a whole but, as demonstrated in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, it is experienced most keenly by the ordinary individuals who constitute that society. Orwell, no mere theorist when it came to politics, would not allow his readers to lose sight of this obvious truth by taking refuge in generalizations

²¹ Bernard Crick, "Nineteen Eighty-Four: Satire or Prophecy?," *Dutch Quarterly Review of Anglo-American Letters* 13.2 (1983): 90 - 92.

²² Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (London: Pall Mall P, 1972) 20.

²³ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1948) 303.

or other distancing devices. Zuckert's views on totalitarianism embrace many of the concerns and discourses foregrounded by this thesis. He quotes Kirkpatrick's dictum that "totalitarianism is utopianism come to power," and stresses that totalitarian states claim "a monopoly, not only of political power, but over the means of communication.... Propaganda of all sorts is required." He concludes that "Totalitarian rule...refuses to recognize limits, in principle or practice, to its sway, accepting neither legalism as a boundary nor a delimited sphere of legitimate application."²⁴

At the heart of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* lies a form of government which lacks any regard for morality and has an attitude of complete contempt towards those who are ruled. Perhaps the best known formulations of this particular view were made by Machiavelli (whose thoughts, Orwell believed, had influenced the contemporary "British intelligentsia"²⁵):

So, a prince is forced to know how to act like a beast, he must learn from the fox and the lion.... So it follows that a prudent ruler cannot, and must not, honour his word when it places him at a disadvantage.... If all men were good this precept would not be good; but because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you, you need not keep your word to them.... But one must know how to colour one's actions and to be a great liar and deceiver. Men are so simple, and so much creatures of circumstance, that the deceiver will always find someone ready to be deceived.²⁶

There is much cynicism, as well as political expediency, in this view. Nevertheless, there is an attempt to justify the opinions expressed, or at least

²⁴ Michael P. Zuckert, "Orwell's Hopes, Orwell's Fears: 1984 as a Theory of Totalitarianism," *The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World*, eds. Robert L. Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo (Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989) 48.

²⁵ George Orwell, "The English People," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 7-8.

²⁶ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. and introd. George Bull (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975) 99-100.

a tacit acknowledgement that conventional morality is being flouted. *The Prince's* advice on how to gain power and hold on to it clearly contains the seeds of totalitarianism, despite the note of regret which tinges Machiavelli's description of people as unreliable and easily manipulable. In fact, at least one critic regards *The Prince* as a dystopian text and sees many conscious and unconscious echoes of it in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.²⁷

Machiavelli is describing a form of authoritarianism which differs from the more modern aspects of despotism which totalitarianism represents. Authoritarianism lacks some of the ability to gain total power over a people, and its harshness and oppression do not extend to every single aspect of a nation's life. As Perlmutter says,

When one speaks of 'totalitarianism', one means an institutionalized authoritarian regime sustained by a combination of organization and ideology. Institutionalized authoritarian regimes have an ideological orientation; noninstitutionalized authoritarian regimes are basically nonideological.²⁸

As has been demonstrated, the more generous, or even neutral, view of ideology is one that Orwell ignores, in favour of the view that ideology is a dangerous phenomenon. Apter speaks more positively when he says that revolutionaries use ideology as "a way of stipulating the moral superiority of new ideas." He adds that in modern times ideology is devoid of the "utopian element"²⁹ which his first statement implies. It is clear that the two dystopias of Orwell's with which this thesis is concerned associate ideology with the opposite of "moral superiority" and see the presence of ideology as one of the signs of the death of utopia.

²⁷ Kumar 101.

²⁸ Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1981) 175.

²⁹ David E. Apter, "Ideology and Discontent," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (Glencoe: The Free P, 1964) 17.

The slight ambivalence shown earlier towards the issue of human manipulability by Machiavelli is not to be found in the views of a later political philosopher, Hegel:

Hegel...rejected all 'humanitarian' ideals. He declared the 'universal love of mankind' to be nothing more than an 'insipid invention'....Hegel is not interested in the beauty of the state but in its 'truth'. And, according to him this truth is not a moral one; it is rather 'the truth which lies in power'. 'Men are as foolish as to forget...in their enthusiasm for liberty of conscience and political freedom, the truth which lies in power.'³⁰

Totalitarianism is a peculiarly modern manifestation (the word took root in the English language between 1930 and 1940),³¹ but the attitude of Hegel, writing in the nineteenth century, contains the seeds of totalitarianism. It is of the essence of totalitarianism to reject ideas because they are not obviously utilitarian ("beauty," "humanitarian ideals," "universal love of mankind"), a tendency which can be liberally illustrated from *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. It is also typical of totalitarianism to reject the notion of morality ("this truth is not a moral one"), preferring to assert its will either by brute force or by reference to some principle or myth such as the law of Nature (in the case of Nazism) or the law of History (in the case of Communism). In Oceania - with a typical Orwellian turn of the screw - the principle which justifies all actions by the state is simply that of power.

In his essay entitled "The Prevention of Literature" Orwell says the following of totalitarianism:

Totalitarianism demands, in fact, the continuous alteration of the past, and in the long run probably demands a disbelief in the very existence of objective truth....A society becomes

³⁰ Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1946) 226, 227.

³¹ Schapiro 14.

totalitarian when its structures become flagrantly artificial: that is, when its ruling class has lost its function but succeeds in clinging to power by force or fraud. Such a society, no matter how long it persists, can never afford to become either tolerant or intellectually stable. It can never permit either the truthful recording of facts, or the emotional sincerity, that literary creation demands.³²

What emerges here is the rigidity of the rulers of a totalitarian state: such a society is kept busy altering history lest its lies be discovered, it lacks a democratically strong core in that its rulers lack legitimacy and it cannot permit any emotional integrity in its citizens. In fact, such rulers are also disadvantaged by their own system, since those who subject others to tyranny become the prisoners of their own tyranny, because of the onerousness and waste of energy involved in maintaining such a system. But there is little point in pointing out that such rulers live in a cultural and moral hell if they are themselves impervious to the barrenness of their situation and are unable to escape the boundaries of their own ideology and myth. In a state such as Oceania there can be no question of "disbelief in the very existence of objective truth" because there can be no possibility of widespread scepticism when objective truth is universally accepted as what the Party declares it to be. As for the few who rebel, there is a strong likelihood that this is part of the Party's plan: the machinery of terror has to be fed and it is possible that the provision of victims is not left to chance. In the case of Oceania, the Party's striving towards omnipotence is so blatant, that to speak of it "clinging to power" seems an absurd understatement, as O'Brien's thoughts suggest:

But in the future there will be no wives and no friends. Children will be taken from their mothers at birth, as one takes eggs from a chicken. The sex instinct will be eradicated. Procreation will be an annual formality like the renewal of a ration card. We shall

³² George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 63-4, 67.

abolish the orgasm. Our neurologists are at work upon it now. There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love except the love of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy. There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we are omnipotent we shall have no more need of science. There will be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed.³³

Much of the satirical force of this passage lies in its being both appalling and absurd. O'Brien's confidence in the imminent abolition of both the orgasm and laughter (the former surely a hit at the Catholic Church, of which more later) seems risible until one remembers that Winston is in the hands of a merciless fanatic who will, in the end, succeed in abolishing him as a person. The predicted end of art, literature and science sounds ridiculous until one recalls that successive totalitarian regimes have exercised very real control over these areas, either completely removing certain aspects of art from the public domain or robbing scientists of their intellectual freedom to such a degree that they have become unworthy of that name. The idea of a world in which there is so little trust and affection that friends do not exist may well be ludicrous, but the Russian writer Isaac Babel said, "Today a man can only talk freely with his wife - at night, with the blankets pulled over his head," though this did not prevent him from being arrested and executed on trumped up charges.³⁴

It may well be part of Orwell's purpose to both appal and amuse his readers at the same time. This would be part of the satirist's calculatedly mercurial quality, which aims to put us off our guard while confronting us with some aspect of reality which has been made grotesque. In this novel readers are introduced into an alternative world which is frighteningly surrealist. O'Brien's

³³ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 215.

³⁴ Robert Conquest, "Totalterror," *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*, ed. Peter Stansky (New York: Freeman, 1983) 184.

statements about sex, art and science mark one of the climaxes of such surrealism, in which Orwell may be trying to confuse us into clearer thought by making us laugh and cry, so to speak, at the same time. This bears out what has been said in earlier chapters about the wily and unpredictable methods used by satirists to make their points.

The programme for change set out by O'Brien is, one suspects, partly a satirical thrust on the part of Orwell at the political myth of progress which has often been espoused by totalitarian states. Five-Year Plans for economic or industrial advancement (often unfulfilled) were common in Stalinist Russia, as were the false announcements of success in these areas which Orwell parodies:

'Comrades!' cried an eager youthful voice. 'Attention, comrades! We have glorious news for you. We have won the battle for production! Returns now completed of the output of all classes of consumption goods show that the standard of living has risen by no less than 20 per cent over the past year.'³⁵

The materially drab lives of the people of Oceania (members of the Inner Party excepted) give the lie to this statement, yet it is generally accepted by most people, Winston's secret scepticism marking him as an outsider. Similarly, what seems to the reader an outrageous and impossible plan of the kind put forward by O'Brien would have been acceptable to the Party faithful because the foundation for any tyrannical system of government had been firmly laid - what Arendt refers to as "the banishment of the citizens from the public realm and the insistence that they mind their private business while only 'the ruler should attend to public affairs'." ³⁶ In a totalitarian state people are isolated from the mechanics of government, but they are also isolated from one another, by mutual suspicion and fear. In addition, because it is in the nature of totalitarianism to create a self-contained and closed world for

³⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 50.

³⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1958) 221.

itself, the ordinary members are cut off from the criteria by which they might normally judge the words and actions of their government. In other words, they are imprisoned in a specific version of reality created by the state, a reality which conditions their emotional and their intellectual lives. This is precisely the kind of situation which tempts satirists to move in and construct the alternative, liminal worlds which will shake the massive certainty of the totalitarian vision. In Oceania - Orwell's brutal parody of a totalitarian state - he has created a target worthy of the satire he vents upon it.

In an argument reminiscent of Orwell's thinking, Arendt concludes that the existence of totalitarianism hinges on the confusion of certain binary opposites:

The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction...and the distinction between true and false...no longer exist.³⁷

Like Shakespeare in *Macbeth*, Arendt associates the inability to make these distinctions with the flowering of evil in a state. Thus the words of the witches in *Macbeth* - "fair is foul and foul is fair"³⁸ - are a way of defining totalitarian politics, since to be trapped in the inhuman world created by the Party and see it as "true" and desirable opens the way for cruel and inhuman acts. O'Brien can torture Winston as he does only because he inhabits the mental world of the Party, in which Winston's suffering is tolerable - even good - because it is necessary for the reinforcement of that world. Similar artificially fixed views of the world, tailored for power, paved the way for Stalin's acts of murder against the kulaks and those of the Nazis against the inmates of concentration camps. Thus fairness becomes polluted by foulness, and this leads in turn to a world in which foulness flourishes unchecked.

³⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1950; New York: World Publishing Company, 1958) 474.

³⁸ William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, ed. G.K. Hunter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 1.1.9.

The basis for this kind of confusion lies in the ability of rulers to cut their people off from alternative views of reality and - from the point of view of this dystopian novel - the primary means of doing that is ideology. As we have already seen, one way of defining ideology is as "the effort to 'normalize' relations between...power and goodness, making that which is good, powerful and that which is powerful, good." ³⁹ This is directly analogous to the witches' words in that it implies not just the meeting of virtue and political power but their becoming interchangeable or even identical. In any political dispensation such a naïve belief would endanger the integrity of the body politic; in a totalitarian setting, where this belief is engineered into being by the rulers of the state, the stage is set for limitless abuse of power. Orwell himself has commented on "the impossibility of combining power with righteousness," ⁴⁰ and that is one of the most striking points made by *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

In the previous ten pages power - as a constituent of totalitarianism - has been discussed from a modernist point of view, with no flexibility in the definition and treatment of hegemonic discourses and hierarchies: Malinowski speaks uncompromisingly of completely incompatible elements, Hegel believes in a single view of "truth," O'Brien is seen as evil partly because he gleefully predicts the demise of science and Arendt insists on the importance of certain binary opposites, such as fact and fiction. In addition, Orwell speaks of the existence of objective truth - a belief which Peter Goodall describes as the "most important manifestation of Orwell's realism," ⁴¹ summed up in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* by Winston's insistence that $2+2=4$.

Postmodernism, on the other hand, has less faith in science and technology. In addition, postmodernism insists on the indeterminacy and pluralist nature of truth, thus undermining the notion of mere binary opposition and advocating an all-embracing view which could include elements thought to be incompatible from a modernist point of view. As Hutcheon says,

³⁹ See 96 above.

⁴⁰ George Orwell, "Arthur Koestler," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 238.

⁴¹ Peter Goodall, " 'Was the So-Called Melon Actually a Pumpkin'? : Orwell and the Problems of Realism," *AUMLA* 75 (1991): 12.

postmodernism indulges in a "general questioning of any totalizing or homogenizing system" and "interrogate[s] the modernist totalizing ideal of progress through rationality...." ⁴² Yet the issue for Orwell is not a straightforward one: as demonstrated more than once in this thesis, he has a modernist view of the world yet, at the same time he is a satirist and, by means of parody, exaggeration and the grotesque, he is attacking certain manifestations of modernism, because they have failed to live up to their promise, thus causing utopia to degenerate into dystopia (its fragmented form), in a way not unrelated to the postmodern mode. The strategy of the satire here is to exaggerate the enclosed and unself-reflexive nature of modernist discourses of power in order (to use postmodern terminology) to expose their totalizing quality. The word "totalizing" here refers to a discourse which, according to Hawthorn, "seeks to occupy all the available ground" and denies any standing to the discourses which it opposes. ⁴³

The word "totalizing" denotes, as Hutcheon says, unification "with an eye to power and control" ⁴⁴, and is generally used by postmodern theorists in a pejorative way. Michel Foucault is the postmodernist who has written most tellingly on the issue of power, yet Jameson is antagonistic to Foucault's notions of power and speaks of "the rather antediluvian fantasy representations [of totalizing structure] that accompanied the 'domination' models from 1984...all the way to Foucault - narratives rather comical for the new postmodern age...." ⁴⁵ This is a rather over-simplified view of Foucault, whose postmodernism differs from that of Jameson, though his views of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* would probably have chimed with Jameson's opinion of it. Hutcheon stresses the postmodern tendency to accommodate rather than abolish opposites. She makes the point that while postmodernism does seek to challenge totalizing forces, it does not deny them:

But it does seek to assert difference, not homogeneous identity.

⁴² Hutcheon, *A Poetics of Postmodernism* 12, 25.

⁴³ Jenny Hawthorn, *A Concise Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory*, 2nd ed. (London: Arnold, 1994) 217.

⁴⁴ Hutcheon, *A Poetics of Postmodernism* xi.

⁴⁵ Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* 272.

Of course, the very concept of difference could be said to entail a typically postmodern contradiction: 'difference', unlike 'otherness', has no exact opposite against which to define itself.⁴⁶

In pursuit of such "difference", and in contrast to Orwell and other modernists, Foucault sees power as diffuse and localised, having a quality which makes it more difficult to point a finger at a single overarching source of control:

But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.⁴⁷

Part of this definition is applicable to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, since in that novel the powers of the state certainly do reach "into the very grain of individuals" and "touch their bodies," in a particularly invasive way in the case of dissidents. But, as has been shown, Orwell sees state power primarily as a heavily centralised manifestation which imposes itself with crude directness on the populace below, while Foucault, with his notion of capillary forms, is intent on problematizing this conception of power, that is, making this issue a debatable one and generating discourses around it. This, *pace* Jameson, is entirely faithful to mainstream postmodern ways of thought, since it seeks to break down monolithic ways of viewing the world. The following statement by Foucault during an interview sets out his view:

Power in the substantive sense, '*le*' *pouvoir*, does not exist. What I mean is this: the idea that there is located at - or emanating from - a given point something which is a 'power' seems to me to be based on a misguided analysis....In reality power means relations,

⁴⁶ Hutcheon, *A Poetics of Postmodernism* 20, 6.

⁴⁷ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980) 39.

a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations.⁴⁸

His interviewer (Grosrichard), playing the same game as Foucault, attempts to deconstruct this view:

Then you think this representation of power as exercised from above, and in a negative or repressive way, is an illusion? Isn't it a necessary illusion, one engendered by itself? At all events, the illusion is a very persistent one, and after all it's against just this kind of power that people have struggled in the hope of being able to change things... One always needs to have someone smaller than oneself.⁴⁹

Grosrichard's point is a shrewd one, setting up Foucault's theory against what is perceived as reality by those oppressed by power. He challenges Foucault's notion of power, but then implies that it does not matter if Foucault is right and the general view of power is an illusion, even if it is induced by power itself, since this illusion has always provided a focal point for resistance to power. His final statement about smallness is penetrating and highly relevant to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, since it goes to the very heart of oppression, whether it be the bully in the playground or the tyrant in his bunker. It brings the practice of oppression down to a very human scale: in big or small things it is the rule rather than the exception for human beings to enjoy superiority.

Foucault's reply to this is typically postmodern, masterly or maddening depending on one's view of postmodernism: "Agreed, but what I meant to say was that in order for there to be a movement from above to below there has to be a capillary from below to above at the same time."⁵⁰ Foucault's notion of power is in terms of two-way flow, rather than straightforward imposition

⁴⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 198.

⁴⁹ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 201.

⁵⁰ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 201.

from above. He is not put out by the notion that the opposite view may be an illusion engendered by power itself - a useful and necessary illusion at that. Foucault is here being true to the spirit of postmodernism: he is not trying to demolish an opposing point of view, but is happy to accommodate it within his understanding of power. Such an accommodating spirit has been noted elsewhere in this thesis and, although it may sometimes seem like a secular form of Zen Buddhism in its ability to embrace rather than reject outright, it has value in discouraging both quick judgements and the drawing up of inflexible intellectual boundaries, such as are implicit in both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Apter comments that "ideology helps to support an elite and to justify the exercise of power." He elaborates on this by drawing on the views of Lenin: "Superior wisdom is equated with ideological authority by means of which the public is converted to the political line. Indeed, ideology becomes the rock against which waves of deviationism must be dashed unless they submerge the promontories of revolution."⁵¹ This rock-like image of ideology is one that Orwell found threatening rather than the comfort which, in this context, it is meant to be - a difference of perspective which highlights the fact that ideology can be seen as either a unifying or an ominous force in the hands of a government.

Grosrichard's more neutral statement that "One always needs to have someone smaller than oneself" gives the exercise of power a very human, though hardly more attractive, dimension. In *Animal Farm* the pig called Napoleon has dictatorial powers, thus invoking a double layer of significance: there is the notion that human beings act like pigs, and there is also the fact that this pig is named after an historical figure who was highly autocratic, the two ideas mutually reinforcing Orwell's point that democracy is a highly vulnerable system. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, however, all power is embodied in the person of Big Brother, who is depicted as larger than life and, true to Grosrichard's dictum, the main quality about him is a negative one: the

⁵¹ Apter, "Ideology" 18, 19.

posters depicting his face are overpoweringly large and omnipresent, a symbol of the universal bullying which passes for government in Oceania. Significantly, the novel never reveals whether or not he is a real person, which has the advantage for the Party that it enables him to be presented as the timeless and immortal figure that he is claimed to be. O'Brien tells Winston that Big Brother will never die,⁵² to which Pittcock, who sees *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as a depiction of hell, responds that "the reign of the Antichrist is forever, not as a preliminary to the New Jerusalem. There are no angels; only devils."⁵³ If this is so Big Brother's horns and forked tail are cloaked by a veneer of amiability - a form of mystification which can be compared to that practised by Stalin, particularly during the Moscow trials.⁵⁴

The people of Oceania know Big Brother primarily through the massive, identical and omnipresent portraits of him in public places, as well his appearances in propaganda films, where he is represented as "black-haired, black-moustachio'd, full of power and mysterious calm, and so vast that [he] almost filled up the screen."⁵⁵ Under each poster of Big Brother are the capitalised words "BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU" which, despite the use of the word "brother," exude menace rather than comfort. Readers in this part of the twentieth century would recognise these huge posters of a leader, with their Pinteresque quality of violence lurking beneath a bland smile, as the mark of a dictator, whether he be Ze-Dong or Saddam Hussein. There can be no doubt, though, that the specific model for Orwell's Big Brother was Stalin: the physical resemblance between the two is marked, and when Winston, in the course of his duties, has to write an article using Big Brother's style, the prose is "at once military and pedantic"⁵⁶, resembling that of Stalin, according to Fischer, who also indicates other more striking resemblances:

One of the secrets of Stalin's personality seems to be a desire to substitute an unreal Stalin for the real one....The outstanding

⁵² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 209.

⁵³ Malcolm Pittcock, "The Hell of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*," *Essays in Criticism* 47.2 (1997): 147.

⁵⁴ See 169-70 above.

⁵⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 16.

⁵⁶ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 41.

feature of Stalin's self-portraiture in Soviet propaganda is flight from reality. This starts with the radical retouching of his photographs and ends by attributing almost godlike qualities to him.⁵⁷

Big Brother, too, is seen by us, and by the citizens of Oceania, as an unreal figure, godlike in many ways, and it is the symbolic force of Big Brother, rather than any vestigial human qualities he may seem to have, which makes him so important to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. His name is an unusual choice for an authority figure, and the question is, "Why not a parent figure, as in 'Big Father' or 'Big Mother'?" In fact, as Mellor suggests, the term "Big Brother" best fits Orwell's concept of the totalitarian ruler:

Orwell's masculine Big Brother draws our attention to a specific aspect of totalitarian ideology: its inability to respond affectionately to an individual.... Big Brother is totally without love, without concern for the health and mental welfare of the individual. He is a logical abstraction, not a person.... Assigning the role of political leader to a Big Father would arouse the expectation that the father would grow old, weaken, and eventually turn over his authority to his younger, stronger male heir. By elevating the oldest brother to the position of ultimate strength, Oceania effectively claims that there is no possibility of changing the status quo. Your older brother will live as long as you will, especially since he has always been bigger and stronger than you.... What Orwell has portrayed in Oceania is the complete triumph of a patriarchal culture, a fascist society in which the man with the most machismo, the older and stronger brother, reigns forever.⁵⁸

The work of Adler seems to confirm the psychological accuracy of the above analysis. He says of the oldest children in a family:

⁵⁷ Fischer, *Stalin* 214.

⁵⁸ Anne Mellor, "You're Only a Rebel from the Waist Downwards: Orwell's View of Women," *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*, ed. Peter Stansky (New York: Freeman, 1983) 116.

[They] have once tasted power and they remain worshippers of power....The oldest children usually have some authority over their brothers and sisters, and thus learn the advantages of power. This develops their interest in authority and law, and they see to it that authority is maintained. They themselves yield to paternal authority.⁵⁹

It is therefore not surprising that in Oceania, where power is not yielded to paternal authority, the result is tyranny. Big Brother has a stranglehold on power because there is no father to whom he can yield authority. By the same token, the citizens of Oceania are permanently in the situation of children - all younger children at that - who have no hope of liberation because they are not ruled by a father, but by a relatively youthful big brother.

Oceania is essentially a society in which the state has constructed new values and structures, in place of the traditional ones which have been neutralised and discredited. In parodying family relationships in this way, Orwell may be alluding satirically to the totalitarian "Volksgemeinschaft and Brudersband of the Nazis, [with] their false fraternity and contempt for individual liberty."⁶⁰ In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* solid networks of relationship, particularly within the family, are undermined, and Big Brother furthers this process since, despite his name, he is neither protective nor caring, entirely lacking the comradely qualities ideally shown by an elder brother towards his siblings. He is much more like an autocratic and unloving father than a brother of any kind, but whether one sees him as a brother or a father one is left with the image of a relative who does not relate to any of the other family members, but seems instead to be a perfectly empty shell. Big Brother is portrayed as mythical in the most pejorative sense of the term: he is a political myth created to help a dominant group retain and exercise power. The kind of myth he represents is not "a way of binding the individual and the social together. For such myths to be useful, Sorel argues, they must be in tune with the worthier moral

⁵⁹ Hertha Orgler, *Alfred Adler: The Man and his Work: Triumph Over the Inferiority Complex* (1939; London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1963) 24.

⁶⁰ Crick, "Satire or Prophecy" 93.

tendencies. It is on a moral basis that ideologies must be evaluated rather than on vague belief in dialectical progress." ⁶¹ This may seem to endorse Orwell's implication that values are fixed and given, though what may be "worthier moral tendencies" for, say, a Soviet Marxist may not be so for Orwell.

In the case of Oceania, for example, the kind of relationship the state finds most desirable between its citizens and Big Brother is one in which they are nothing and he is everything. The reader is therefore prepared for the worst when O'Brien and Winston have the following conversation in the Ministry of Love:

'Tell me, Winston - and remember, no lies: you know that I am always able to detect a lie - tell me, what are your true feelings towards Big Brother?'

'I hate him.'

'You hate him. Good. Then the time has come for you to take the last step. You must love Big Brother. It is not enough to obey him: you must love him.'

He released Winston with a little push towards the guards.

'Room 101,' he said. ⁶²

Ironically, Room 101 is the most feared place among the prisoners in the Ministry of Love, yet it is here that Winston will learn to "love" Big Brother. In this room tailor-made torture is inflicted, since it is where each prisoner is confronted with precisely whatever it is that he or she most fears. Thus the Thought Police are able to reduce individuals to a state of helpless terror in which their inner defences are completely breached and in which they will give their deepest intellectual and emotional consent to whatever is put to them. "The worst thing in the world is whatever unmakes the self, dispersing it

⁶¹ Quoted by Apter, "Ideology" 19.

⁶² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 227.

or devouring it." ⁶³ In Winston's case it is a cage containing rats, strapped to his face, which leads him to "betray" his love for Julia - a love which both of them were certain would last forever - as he shouts out, " 'Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! Not me! Julia! I don't care what you do to her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones. Not me! Julia! Not me!' " ⁶⁴

It is in this distinctly "horror comic" context that Symons's comment about the "schoolboyish sensationalism" of Orwell's approach becomes relevant: for Symons "the idea of Room 101 and the rats will always remain comic rather than horrific." ⁶⁵ Orwell subsequently wrote to Symons about this, saying "You are of course right about the vulgarity of the 'Room 101' business. I was aware of this while writing it, but I did not know another way of getting somewhere the effect I wanted." ⁶⁶ Significant here too is Fowler's contention that two major aspects of Orwell's style are "[n]egativism and hyperbole."⁶⁷ Certainly it is debatable whether Winston's words really constitute betrayal and whether any blame can reasonably be attached to anyone acting or speaking under such circumstances of agonising and dehumanising duress. Orwell himself says in an article (about Gandhi) published after the completion of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*:

The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection...and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human beings. ⁶⁸

It is on this issue that Parrinder quotes Burgess to the effect that "a man with

⁶³ Judith Wilt, "Behind the Door of 1984: The Worst Thing in the World," *Modernism Reconsidered*, eds. Robert Kiely and John Hildebidle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1983) 248.

⁶⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 230-31.

⁶⁵ Julian Symons, rev. of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *Burmese Days* and *Coming Up for Air*, *Times Literary Supplement* 10 June 1949 : 380.

⁶⁶ Jenni Calder, "Orwell's Post-War Prophecy," *George Orwell: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974) 150.

⁶⁷ Roger Fowler, *The Language of George Orwell* (London: Macmillan, 1995) 54.

⁶⁸ George Orwell, "Reflections on Gandhi," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 467.

a more robust conscience would have been able to discount his enforced betrayal of Julia in Room 101." ⁶⁹ However, in the context of the liminal world of the novel into which the reader has entered, what matters is that both Winston and Julia believe that they have betrayed each other in Room 101. The aim of the Thought Police is deception and control, and this they have achieved.

Thus it appears that Winston has been made to renounce his love for Julia in order that he can do what is demanded of every inhabitant of Oceania: devote all his physical and emotional energy to the state. The last two sentences of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* proclaim this in their bitter way: "He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother." ⁷⁰ In fact the process by which Winston has come to "love" Big Brother belies this conclusion since, on one level, Winston's "love" for Big Brother is as factitious as his "betrayal" of Julia. Both are the product of coercion, violence and terror, and thus neither has any substance beyond the world of Oceania. Neither Winston's betrayal nor his love for Big Brother is a free act, and yet Winston cannot see that he has become enslaved, thus exemplifying the Party slogan that "freedom is slavery." Winston sincerely believes that, now that he loves Big Brother, he is free for the first time in his life. The real triumph of O'Brien is not simply that he has made Winston see his present pathetic and sterile state as love of any kind, but rather that he has persuaded Winston that Big Brother is human and real enough to be loved. In other words, Winston has come to accept the version of reality offered by the Party - a reality which consists largely of a web of political myth, with Big Brother at the centre.

The force and symbolism of Big Brother are both political and personal: he is a visible sign of the omnipotence of the state but, at the same time, he penetrates into the heart of all human relationships, implicitly or explicitly forbidding intimacy, and jealously diverting feelings of family loyalty or sexual passion out of their natural course and towards himself in parodic imitation of

⁶⁹ Patrick Parrinder, "Updating Orwell? Burgess's Future Fictions," *Encounter* 56.1 (1981): 48.

⁷⁰ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 240.

the Old Testamentary God. Thus his power is enormous, particularly at the subconscious level, where his example conditions people in their expectations of both fatherhood and brotherhood, and serves as a template for human relations in general. His influence thus works from below as much as above to form the framework of society, in this way linking the political to the personal, and pointing to Foucault's way of seeing power as all-pervasive and inherent in the very fabric of society, not emanating in a simple way from the government, whether despotic or otherwise.

The history of totalitarian rule in Oceania set out, putatively, by Emmanuel Goldstein in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, makes a similar point about government not simply by politicians but also by a "new aristocracy [of] bureaucrats, scientists, technicians, trade-union organizers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, journalists...."⁷¹ Foucault also views the network of service-orientated professional people in society as constituting a major part of the power structure at the personal level. We are, he says, "in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based...."⁷² In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the figure of O'Brien embodies the norms of the society on a personal level, though his persona contains elements of all the above-mentioned roles, and he is also father-confessor to Winston, with an intimacy very like that of a family member.

The link between the power of the state on the one hand and that of the family on the other is stressed by Fischer in his comments on "the power of the father-image" and "patriarchal hypocrisy....It begins with this dictum of all rulers, that without them there is no world-father, no home for little ones, never mind if the home is a bunker and the world a hell...."⁷³ This bitter comment on the abuse of power may refer to the bunker in which Hitler died, but clearly has relevance to Stalin as well, since both these totalitarian rulers

⁷¹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 166.

⁷² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977) 304.

⁷³ Ernst Fischer, *Art Against Ideology*, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Penguin, 1969) 11.

created a dystopia for their people, while promising them a utopia. The same conditions apply in Oceania, where people are coerced into believing - or pretending to believe - that their miserable existence is in fact an enjoyable one. Fischer's use of the terms "world-father" and "little ones" points to the way in which totalitarian rulers reduce their citizens to the state of helpless children, deprived of the nurturing influence of a mother and at the mercy of a father who is depicted as a distant and superhuman being. Attempts were made to depict Hitler as an "Übermensch" (superman), Stalin was at pains to be seen as invulnerable, almost immortal (the very name Stalin, meaning "man of iron," was an assumed one) and Big Brother's stance is one of godlike omniscience. This largely explains the sense of powerlessness and fatalism which pervades the lives of nearly all the characters in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Even when Winston rebels against Big Brother and the state he does so without any real hope of success, as his thoughts reveal: "Nobody ever escaped detection, and nobody ever failed to confess. When once you had succumbed to thoughtcrime it was certain that by a given date you would be dead."⁷⁴

For Winston, if there is any hope it lies in the proles, as he writes in his diary. He has faith in their innate strength and sees them as the unselfconscious (and unconscious) bearers of dignity and freedom: "They needed only to rise up and shake themselves like a horse shaking off flies. If they chose they could blow the party to pieces to-morrow morning."⁷⁵ Yet later he comments on the diary entry as follows: "The words kept coming back to him, statement of a mystical truth and a palpable absurdity."⁷⁶ However, he clings to this hope, despite palpable proof of the helplessness of the proles and, moments before his arrest, he admires the prole woman singing as she hangs up washing and describes proles as "people who had never learned to think but who were storing up in their hearts and bellies and muscles the power that would one day overturn the world. The future belonged to the proles."⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 86.

⁷⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 59.

⁷⁶ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 69.

⁷⁷ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 176-7.

Huntington's view of this is that "Orwell [here] suggests, not a revolutionary hope, but a level of being that...by its unconscious co-optation of the culture-producers' co-optation, transcends the totalitarian state."⁷⁸ However, this suggests a political passivity, very alien to the classic Marxist ideology which Orwell never entirely abandoned, though he claimed to represent a more commonsensical (and genuine) brand of socialism. He remained a committed (though maverick) socialist, and the matter of the working class was one on which he held strong - even somewhat idealistic - views, as his *Down and Out in Paris and London*, and especially *The Road to Wigan Pier*, show. Goodall says that "the concept of the 'common people' is important in Orwell's work from first to last,"⁷⁹ while Gregory takes up Winston's thought that belief in the proles required "an act of faith" and applies it to Orwell:

Orwell's 'act of faith' required him to believe that it was possible to have an absolute standard of values to base his democratic socialism on while at the same time realizing that there was nothing to base that standard of values on except the inherent value of a class that had little possibility of gaining any sort of influence.⁸⁰

In "The English People" Orwell says (somewhat wistfully) that "England can only fulfil its mission if the ordinary English in the street can somehow get their hands on power."⁸¹ Crick suggests that this view of the proles is prompted by Orwell's conservatism:

Quite simply, Orwell did not believe that poverty and class oppression...had dehumanized people completely. Rather these forces had created a genuine fellowship and fraternity in the common people that the middle classes

⁷⁸ John Huntington, "Utopia and Anti-Utopian Logic," *Science Fiction Studies* 9.2 (1982): 135.

⁷⁹ Peter Goodall, "Common Decency and the Common People in the Writing of George Orwell," *Durham University Journal* 52.1 (1991): 75.

⁸⁰ Mark W. Gregory, "'An Act of Faith': George Orwell's Socialist Thought and 1984," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 84.4 (1985): 378.

⁸¹ Orwell, "The English People" 37.

lacked.⁸²

Elsewhere, Crick insists that "[*Nineteen Eight-Four*] is perfectly unclear and deliberately ambiguous as to whether we are to believe in an inevitable victory of the common people."⁸³ However, Sharrock believes that "Orwell escapes from pessimism and paranoia through his idealization of the proles."⁸⁴ Zehr argues the point even more strongly:

[Orwell's] views of the working class remained rooted within a pre-World War I nostalgia and a middle-class sensibility, and this nostalgia for his cultural childhood was accentuated by his growing personal fears during the forties. He believed that it was the ordinary, non-intellectual Englishman who conveyed the cultural vitality, native resiliency (sic), and traditional moral sense that he identified with England's heritage and peculiar cultural sensibility. At the same time he believed that they had as yet no developed, articulated consciousness, and possessed only limited mental resources.⁸⁵

In his depiction of the proles in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell seems to have been trapped between his longing for the past and his need for a future that held some hope, his state of mind presumably exacerbated by the totalitarian nightmare which took shape in his mind and his writing, as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* followed *Animal Farm*. Whatever the role Orwell intended for the proles, the sometimes ambiguous idealism expressed by Winston towards them has no apparent relevance to their fate, since they are simply brushed aside by the state in its all-pervasive assertion of power.

⁸² Crick, "Satire or Prophecy?" 94.

⁸³ Crick, "Reading Nineteen Eighty-Four as Satire," *Reflections on America, 1984: An Orwell Symposium*, ed. Robert Mulvihill (Athens, Georgia: U of Georgia P, 1986) 25.

⁸⁴ Roger Sharrock, "1984 and the Rupture of Desire," *Essays in Criticism* 34.4 (1984): 327.

⁸⁵ Zehr, David Morgan, "Orwell and the Proles: Revolutionary or Middle-Class Voyeur?" *Centennial Review* 27.1 (1983): 39-40.

The situation of Outer Party members is hardly better: Winston and Julia, for example, have virtually no private life, so that private and public life come very close to merging. It is a sign of their rebellion that, for a short while, they do have something of a private life, and a sign of the omniscience of the state that they are detected almost as soon as they do rebel. The degree of surveillance to which their society is routinely subjected is echoed in Foucault's writings on Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, a structure which was intended to ensure continuous surveillance of those within it. For Foucault the most important effect of the Panopticon was as follows:

[T]o induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action... that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.⁸⁶

The society of Oceania is very much a mechanism of surveillance of this kind, with its telescreens indoors, its microphones in the countryside and its Thought Police. This system ensures the functioning of power and, although surveillance by means of the telescreens may not be continuous, because the citizens have no way of knowing when they are in fact being observed, the surveillance is permanent in its effects. Finally, the members of the Outer Party do indeed become the enforcers of the power exercised over them, since they inform on one another and oil the wheels of repression by enthusiastically taking part in various activities which only reinforce the Party's hold over them. According to Foucault, "The Panopticon...must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power

⁸⁶ Foucault, *Discipline* 201.

relations in terms of the everyday life of men." ⁸⁷ It certainly proves to be an effective way of defining the power relations existing in Oceania.

It is significant (bearing in mind the dystopian nature of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) that for Foucault the philosophy of the Panopticon was appropriated by the French revolution for utopian reasons, ostensibly to further the cause of openness and transparency:

A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of darkened spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men and truths. [The revolution] sought to break up the patches of darkness that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of society, demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of ignorance were fomented. ⁸⁸

Insofar as these ideals went awry there was a shift from an avowedly utopian society to an actually dystopian one, very much like the scenario in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where the Party depicts life before the revolution which brought it to power as having been intolerably oppressive, in contrast to what it presents as its own benign policies.

As shown in Chapter 3, ideology plays a crucial role in the administration of power. ⁸⁹ From the way Orwell portrays the role of ideology in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* it is clear that he regards ideology as a sinister force. Virtually all the habits of mind which rob people of freedom and dignity in Oceania are grounded in ideology: the worship of Big Brother, the hatred of Goldstein, the blind faith in the Party's pronouncements. The attraction of ideology for many people lies in its provision of simple responses which exclude thought and reduce life to a neat, consistent and predictable form. One of the Nazi

⁸⁷ Foucault, *Discipline* 205.

⁸⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 154.

⁸⁹ See 87ff above.

slogans, for example, warned that "Wer denkt, zweifelt schon: 'He who thinks has already doubted.' " ⁹⁰ - and Newspeak openly declares itself to be the enemy of thought. Ideology offers a sense of historical comprehensiveness, as well as persuading its devotees that they have a privileged knowledge of the world:

First, ideologies...explain...all historical happenings..., [promising] the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the future. Secondly...ideological thinking...insists on a "truer" reality concealed behind all perceptible things...requiring a sixth sense that enables us to become aware of it. The sixth sense is provided by precisely the ideology...which is taught by the educational institutions, established exclusively for this purpose, to train the "political soldiers" in the *Ordensburg* of the Nazis or the schools of the Comintern and the Cominform. ⁹¹

Ideology can be a mental prison into which totalitarian states drive people by means of both propaganda and terror, but people can also come to embrace an ideology, consciously or unconsciously, because they find it comfortable, or have a need to surrender their personal freedom to a metaphorical or literal Big Brother. In other words, one may be battered into accepting an ideology or one may collude in the process. Cassirer speaks of freedom and totalitarianism as follows:

Freedom is not a natural inheritance of man. In order to possess it we have to create it. If man were simply to follow his natural instincts he would not strive for freedom; he would rather choose dependence. Obviously it is much easier to depend upon others than to think, to judge, and to decide for himself...[and] under extremely difficult conditions man tries to cast off this burden. Here the

⁹⁰ Young 70.

⁹¹ Arendt, *Totalitarianism* 470-1.

totalitarian state and the political myths step in.⁹²

This may sound elitist, cynical or condescending. Certainly it contradicts the modernist myth of political progress⁹³ which assumes, inter alia, that people are ready, willing and able to accept freedom and use it creatively. This myth is not part of postmodern thinking, though one of the underlying messages of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is that the myth has been betrayed rather than become irrelevant in any way. A writer such as Arendt is aware of the vulnerability of such humanistic legacies:

The Greeks, whose city-state was the most individualistic and least conformable body politic known to us, were quite aware of the fact that the *polis*, with its emphasis on action and speech, could survive only if the number of citizens remained restricted. Large numbers of people, crowded together, develop an almost irresistible inclination toward despotism....⁹⁴

Modern totalitarian states stress conformity at the expense of the self-respect and personal independence which are implied in the ancient Greek emphasis on untrammelled action and speech. There may be a vicious circle here, in that people's inability to exercise their individuality in what Bettelheim calls the "mass state"⁹⁵ encourages the state to step in and control them. Eventually, the citizens' ability to be independent is so weakened that they come to rely on outside guidance in virtually every matter. It would seem that, in many cases, the victims of totalitarianism must take some degree of responsibility for their plight.

⁹² Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* 288.

⁹³ As Jean-François Lyotard, "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-' ," *Postmodernism: A Reader*, ed. Thomas Docherty (New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993) says, "It is no longer possible to call development progress." (49)

⁹⁴ Arendt, *Human Condition* 43.

⁹⁵ Bruno Bettelheim, in his *The Informed Heart* (1960; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), uses this term to describe large modern states.

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* these issues are particularly problematic because Orwell has presented us with a totalitarian state in which ideology, propaganda and terror control the citizens so absolutely that, in general, the issue of collusion becomes a marginal one. Collusion argues at least some freedom to think and feel as an individual, to speak and act from motives which are one's own, even if the actions themselves are completely conformist, but in Oceania thinking and feeling differently are labelled "thoughtcrime" or "ownlife" - offences for which the Thought Police are constantly on the alert. The reader is thus faced with a society in which people are careful to reveal - and try actually to feel - only what is allowable in thought, word and deed. In this novel the surface texture of the characters' words, deeds and personalities is so opaque that it is seldom possible to distinguish those who are genuinely enthusiastic followers of Big Brother from those who are miserably going through the motions. The constant perspiring of Parsons almost certainly indicates a degree of conflict with the ruling ideology, yet it is impossible to ascertain whether his enthusiastic commitment to community activities is motivated by fear or by a kind of collusion in which his childishness has found an enjoyable outlet in the mindless activities organized by the Party. In the case of Syme, his enthusiasm for the work he is doing on the latest edition of the Newspeak dictionary is clearly genuine and suggests a degree of collusion, in that he has found a comfortable niche in which he can exercise his linguistic skills in the service of Ingsoc, apparently without any scruples. Yet ironically, the position of even such a person is unsafe, and Winston's thoughts about Syme are an indication of how hostile the Party is towards any manifestation of individuality:

One of these days, thought Winston with sudden deep conviction, Syme will be vaporised. He is too intelligent. He sees too clearly and speaks too plainly. The Party does not like such people. One day he will disappear. It is written in his face.... And yet it was a fact that if Syme grasped, even for three seconds, the nature of his, Winston's, secret opinions, he would betray him instantly to the Thought Police. So would anybody else, for that matter: but

Syme more than most.⁹⁶

Through the eyes of Winston we see Syme as an intelligent, articulate and able man whose loyalty to the Party is absolute. Yet, because Winston is also intelligent and articulate, but not loyal to the Party, he can perceive that it is these very qualities that doom Syme. Ironically, Winston is himself doomed by having these qualities, and he too colludes with the system by relishing his work, though he does not parade this as Syme does. Apter says that, under certain circumstances, "Ideology becomes a protection for people alienated from their society - a protection against the final alienation."⁹⁷ In other words, such people are unable to face up to the very hard existential realities prevalent under totalitarianism and accept the kind of comfort that the state does offer, even though it means the loss of their birthright to be independent human beings.

Yet, if the majority of the Outer Party falls prey to these temptations, Winston avails himself only marginally of such false comfort, and instead persists with his plans to rebel. The extent of Winston's disloyalty is early made clear by his keeping a diary (itself punishable by death) of which the contents certainly constitute thoughtcrime, and thereafter "he recognized himself as a dead man."⁹⁸ Yet, ironically, the loyalty of a person such as Syme will not enable him to escape the same fate eventually suffered by Winston, a man who had repeatedly written in his diary the words "DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER."⁹⁹ As Miller says:

Nor does the Party thus superannuate only its opponents. In its relentless onward thrust, sooner or later it simultaneously bypasses and exterminates everyone above ground level, whether they hate the Party, zealously applaud it, or vacuously go about their business: Syme is vaporized, despite his exemplary

⁹⁶ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 47, 48.

⁹⁷ Apter, "Ideology" 37.

⁹⁸ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 26.

⁹⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 18.

commitment to...linguistics...but then Parsons too is vaporized -
for "thoughtcrime," although he seems to have no thoughts.¹⁰⁰

Winston's awareness of and ensuing outrage at how the Party controls life in Oceania are heightened by the work he does at the Ministry of Truth which entails his systematically altering or fabricating material in various journals, documents and speeches. The aim of this is to destroy or alter evidence pertaining to certain past events, statements or even the existence of certain people, in order that the past should conform with the reality which the Party wishes to establish. As Hunter puts it, "Winston's job is to do the very thing he fears the most, to make history a 'palimpsest', to aid the Party in control of information..."¹⁰¹ Yet we are told that he is good at it and that his "greatest pleasure in life was his work,"¹⁰² though this statement occurs before his involvement with Julia. Winston's attitude may be an example of what Anna Freud calls "identification with the aggressor" - a form of ego defence which occurs in people under intolerable stress, who collude with or imitate the thoughts or person oppressing them, but repress the negative associations of such thoughts or actions.¹⁰³ Whatever the reason, Winston's enjoyment of his work is one indicator of how deeply he is embedded in the system he hates - and his inability to prevent himself from joining in the Two Minute Hate sessions¹⁰⁴ shows that he is enmeshed in the system at a subconscious level. Nevertheless, he maintains his integrity and independence insofar as that is humanly possible in Oceania. Those who appear actively to embrace the system suffer a different fate: they lead robot-like and fearful lives, empty of real meaning and leading to a kind of mental death.

Those like Winston and Julia who make gestures of defiance bring on themselves the most appalling consequences, made more telling because the reader's hopes for some kind of positive outcome are pinned on these two

¹⁰⁰ Mark Crispin Miller, "Big Brother Is You, Watching," *The Georgia Review*, 38 (1984): 706.

¹⁰¹ Lynette Hunter, *George Orwell: The Search for a Voice* (Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1984) 197.

¹⁰² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 38.

¹⁰³ Anna Freud, "Identification with the Aggressor," *Selected Writings by Anna Freud*, ed. and introd. Richard Elkins and Ruth Freeman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998) 13-22.

¹⁰⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 15.

characters, particularly Winston. After all, he has a great deal of insight and objectivity about what is happening around him, and he seems to have particular advantages (e.g. a strong awareness that the past differs from the version of it offered by the Party) in his struggle to retain his own sense of reality. Yet despite this both he and Julia seem to be doomed from the start. The novel dispassionately examines the two possible ways of living under Big Brother - obedience and rebellion - and shows them to be equally harrowing. This refusal by Orwell to leave the inhabitants of Airstrip One with any hope (Winston's hope in the proles is unconvincing) or any way of avoiding being crushed by the machinery of the party is what gives *Nineteen Eighty-Four* its aura of claustrophobia and helplessness. The novel is the story of Winston's struggle to free himself from the web of ideology, propaganda and myth in which he finds himself, but in the end he finds that he cannot do it.

Julia, too, is not willing to give up her individuality, and she presents to the world the appearance of someone unreservedly immersed in the world created by the ruling ideology of Ingsoc. She consciously operates on two different levels - a very different process from that of "doublethink," which is intended to allow logical inconsistencies to co-exist happily in the interests of maintaining complete conformity to Party ideology.

Despite her disloyalty she, too, bears the scars of a life lived in the shadow of Big Brother, which show themselves primarily in her inability to relate closely to her lovers - until, that is, she meets Winston. Her contempt for the system and the emptiness of her lip-service to it have not stopped it from damaging her ability to function in a fully human way. Yet it is significant that, among the heteroglot texts which create dialogism within *Nineteen Eighty-Four* - for example, Winston's creations at work, his diary, Goldstein's seditious book (if it was his work) - it is the very small text produced by Julia, the one that says "I love you," which has the most powerful deconstructive force in the novel. The fact that this in the end comes to nothing indicates how Menippean satire can shift into the genre of tragedy.¹⁰⁵ Wilt speaks of "their doomed struggle to

¹⁰⁵ See 189 above.

add a spark of life to their death by making love." ¹⁰⁶ Oceania does not offer an accepting community within which people can develop their personal relationships, since it aims to drive individuals into conformity by devaluing personhood, and thus making it difficult for people to see themselves as adult, independent beings.

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Orwell protests vehemently against such a development, bitterly asserting the primacy of individual consciousness - a modernist view since postmodernism is sceptical about the very possibility of a single, unified consciousness. Orwell repeatedly shows us what the effects of totalitarian power are on individuals, and he does this through that most intimate of connections between human beings: love. At first glance it seems curious that the massive state machinery of Oceania should be concerned with aspects of love, yet Big Brother shares with one of his historical counterparts, Stalin, a deep concern with precisely this matter. Fischer informs us that a theme of Soviet propaganda was that "Stalin loves all Soviet men, women and children; everything he does is for their welfare...." ¹⁰⁷ It was presumably to inspire a genuinely reciprocal response in the hearts of Russian citizens that his propaganda machine turned out many songs and poems like the following "Hymn to J.V. Stalin":

The world has no person
Dearer, closer,
With him, happiness is happier,
And the sun is brighter. ¹⁰⁸

The love that Big Brother demands (or rather that the Thought Police demand for him) is a grimmer affair. The menace involved is spelt out when O'Brien says of the alleged traitors, Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford:

I took part in their interrogation myself. I saw them gradually

¹⁰⁶ Wilt 251.

¹⁰⁷ Fischer, *Stalin* 80.

¹⁰⁸ Fischer, *Stalin* 32.

worn down, whimpering, grovelling, weeping - and in the end it was not with pain or fear, only with penitence. By the time we had finished with them they were only shells of men. There was nothing left in them except sorrow for what they had done, and love of Big Brother. It was touching to see how they loved him. They begged to be shot quickly, so they could die while their minds were still clean.¹⁰⁹

O'Brien here establishes a clear link between people being broken and emptied of their humanity and their coming to love Big Brother. This passage is one of several parodies of religion to be found in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, here alluding to the Catholic practice of confession and reflecting on the way Catholicism saw God. Orwell was, in fact, sceptical about some aspects of Christianity in general and unflattering, sometimes scathing, about Catholicism in particular, as several commentators have noted.¹¹⁰

Foucault takes the matter of confession much further. He alludes to the way confession has been practised since the Middle Ages - "one of the main rituals we rely on for the production of truth"¹¹¹ in both the Church and other institutions. Orwell's vision of confession in the future is sinister, but Foucault's view of it in the present is just as disturbing:

We have since [the Middle Ages] become a singularly confessing society. The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one's crimes, one's sins, one's thoughts and desires, one's illnesses and troubles.... One confesses in public and in private, to one's parents, one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves....

¹⁰⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 205.

¹¹⁰ See for example, Crick, *George Orwell* 226-9.

¹¹¹ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. I (London: Penguin, 1981) 58.

When it is not...dictated by some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body. Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied it like a shadow, and supported it when it could go no further: the dark twins. The most defenceless tenderness and the bloodiest of powers have a similar need of confession.¹¹²

For both Foucault and Orwell the ritualistic nature of confession is an important element, whether it be in the systematic uncovering of crime in the courtroom or the torture chamber or (for Foucault in particular) the structured invasiveness of the social worker or the doctor. But Foucault goes further:

There was undoubtedly an...extension of the domain controlled; but also a sensualization of power and a gain of pleasure...that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the pleasure that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it...[t]he power that lets itself be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and opposite it, power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off....¹¹³

This can be used to throw light on the last part of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in which O'Brien variously and evasively adopts the roles of teacher, confessor, friend, adversary, psychotherapist and torturer. Orwell must have been familiar with the techniques of psychotherapy since his first wife, Eileen, was a senior psychology student and lay psychotherapist when he met her.¹¹⁴ The long torture scenes played out between Winston and O'Brien can be viewed as a perversion of the kind of psychotherapy practised by Epston and

¹¹² Foucault, *Sexuality* 59.

¹¹³ Foucault, *Sexuality* 44-5.

¹¹⁴ Laurence M. Porter, "Psychomachia versus Socialism in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: A Psychoanalytic View," *The Revised Orwell*, ed. Jonathan Rose (East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991) 64.

White,¹¹⁵ since in both scenarios there is an interaction between two people with the intention of bringing about change, though that is where the similarity ends. The latter process empowers patients by helping them to restore their lives in a healing way, while in the former there is a kind of sado-masochistic ritual from which both O'Brien and Winston gain some kind of pleasure - not necessarily conscious. Michael Orange discusses the encounter between Winston, Julia and O'Brien in the latter's flat, as well as the later torture scenes, and notes the presence there of "a dark complicity in sado-masochistic fantasy."¹¹⁶ O'Brien's discourse of power moves from measured talk to passionate denunciation, and the cumulative effect of his words and actions is to deny the value of non-controlling relationship, yet at times he displays a caressing quality towards Winston which has strong sexual overtones. Patai says that "the romance between Julia and Winston is far less important in the novel, and occupies less space, than the 'romance', between Winston and O'Brien."¹¹⁷

O'Brien is clearly a sadist, though he presents this in the guise of a Victorian fatherliness which believes it is only hurting a child for his/her own good. According to Staub, in reality the activities of torturers such as O'Brien feed off themselves and the activities of such perpetrators come to feel omnipotent. Drawing on tendencies in Cambodia and Argentina as well as Nazi Germany, Staub says the following of state-designated torturers:

Learning by doing stifled the torturers' feelings of empathy and concern. They had come to see themselves as absolute rulers over the victims' well-being and life, not subject to normal human constraints. They often talked to the victims about this absolute godlike power and the victims' total dependence on them; as they did this, they strengthened their own belief in it.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ See 72-3 above.

¹¹⁶ Michael Orange, "Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Spirit of Schweik," *George Orwell*, eds. Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky (New York: Greenwood P, 1987) 53.

¹¹⁷ Patai 239.

¹¹⁸ Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) 226.

O'Brien's behaviour follows this pattern very closely. The concern he expresses for Winston is obviously suspect, since it involves an assumption that if only Winston were to understand the world as the Party does, he would immediately see it as the truth:

O'Brien silenced him by a movement of his hand. 'We control matter because we control the mind. Reality is inside the skull. You will learn by degrees, Winston. There is nothing that we could not do. Invisibility, levitation - anything. I could float off this floor like a soap bubble if I wish to. I do not wish to, because the Party does not wish it.... We make the laws of nature.'¹¹⁹

O'Brien's stance is one of omniscience and omnipotence, with a ponderous smugness to his discourse. His remarks about levitation make him sound like some religious fanatic who also has a touch of psychosis - an element which is at variance with his apparently logical way of arguing, and adds to the nightmare quality of the novel.

Yet if we view O'Brien primarily as a parodic representation - the mad or deluded philosopher figure who is an important part of Menippean satire - we gain a more light-hearted view of him as he argues against common sense with such "quixotic conviction" and "narcissistic neglect of the facts."¹²⁰ As Sherbert says, "The self-referentiality of the mad philosopher's own digressive [discourse]...marks his lack of control over both language and himself."¹²¹ To see O'Brien not as a psychotic but as a mad philosopher (or a satire on totalitarianism) would change the reader's feelings about him - a reminder of the different kinds of alternative worlds that satire can offer us.

Foucault returns us to more serious views on the power relations existing between interrogator and prisoner, and he speaks of "a game that combined

¹¹⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 213.

¹²⁰ Sherbert 76, 87.

¹²¹ Sherbert 30.

pleasure with compulsion, and consent with inquisition, [and] made it tell the truth about itself and others as well." ¹²² In other words, power often involves an element of sado-masochism, and the question is to what degree Winston gives himself to a ritual in which he enjoys the pleasures of being dominated - or at least has an unconscious need to be dominated. Good detects in Winston "hints, in his emotions mostly, that his rash defiance is simply a way to hasten the punishment and forgiveness he subconsciously desires." ¹²³ Whatever the case, it is clear that at no point does Winston hate O'Brien. On the contrary, even after months of humiliation and torture Winston can still admire and revere him:

The peculiar reverence for O'Brien, which nothing seemed able to destroy, flooded Winston's heart again. How intelligent, he thought, how intelligent! Never did O'Brien fail to understand what was said to him. ¹²⁴

Bouson maintains that "Winston's attraction to O'Brien stems from an archaic need for merger with an omnipotent, idealized figure." ¹²⁵ Bouson sees Big Brother and O'Brien as representations of the same "all-powerful, protective/destructive parental imago" ¹²⁶ and relates this to Winston's frustrated need to merge with his mother. The notion of O'Brien and Big Brother as ambiguous - both protective and destructive - is a key to the novel, since both O'Brien and Big Brother entice people into a false haven which is actually a kind of death so that, finally, destruction is the only reality.

Bettelheim speaks of such false havens in different terms since, for him, the great trap of submitting to what he calls "the total state " is that "it leads to a disintegration of what seemed a well integrated personality, plus a return to

¹²² Foucault, *Sexuality* 77.

¹²³ Graham Good, " 'Ingsoc in Relation to Chess': Reversible Opposites in Orwell's *1984*," *Novel* 18.1 (1984): 54.

¹²⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 220.

¹²⁵ J. Brooks Bouson, "The 'Hidden Agenda' of Winston Smith: Pathological Narcissism and *1984*," *University of Hartford Studies in Literature* 18.1 (1986): 14.

¹²⁶ Bouson 16.

many infantile attitudes." ¹²⁷ It is for this reason that he launches a scathing attack on Anne Frank and her family, accusing them of refusing to take proper measures to save themselves and to accept the fact of human evil ¹²⁸. In the same way, Winston equivocates with his intuitive awareness of exactly what O'Brien represents because he needs someone to believe in, writing in his diary that it does not matter whether O'Brien is a friend or an enemy. ¹²⁹

However, the elements of both ambiguity and "splitting" (the oversimplified view that things are either completely good or completely bad) in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* have even deeper ramifications. In the course of earlier discussion, warnings were sounded about the contamination of satire by the very aspects it sets out to attack ¹³⁰ and, more specifically, the question was posed as to whether Orwell, through a lack of provisionality in his stance, was showing a desire to control people and oversimplify issues by defining social and linguistic strategies so rigidly, even as he points out the dangers of doing such things. ¹³¹ The passion to expose and prevent the evils of ideology and propaganda may have led Orwell to write a novel which is itself highly propagandistic in setting up alternative forms of ideology. Such an argument would spring from a postmodern rather than the modernist outlook which Orwell espoused: from the former point of view no text is innocent. Bouson addresses this point by implicating Orwell directly: "The omnipotent party-parent and the split figure of the persecutor/savior are clandestine representations of the author-manipulator."¹³² In other words, there are manipulative agendas in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* which Orwell does not declare to his readers - and perhaps not even to himself - and this is a situation that satire's audience has to live with.

This thesis has insisted repeatedly that satirists are an essential but flawed part of society, since they are often evasive and aggressive, pursuing their

¹²⁷ Bettelheim, *Informed Heart* 255.

¹²⁸ Bettelheim, *Informed Heart* 253-54.

¹²⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 208.

¹³⁰ See 76 above.

¹³¹ See 128-9 above.

¹³² Bouson 17.

own agendas in a way which puts them on the margins of society. Nevertheless, satirists habitually exploit their very marginality in a creative way that competes strongly with more conventional voices for attention: in a family the children often find the disreputable uncle or aunt more attractive, thus giving them a greater influence than the mother or father ever could have. It is in this role of disreputable relative - both familiar and unconventional - that the satirist exaggerates and distorts issues, ignoring conventional notions of fairness and pulling the rug out from other people's feet, while exercising a fair amount of aggression towards the values and the institutions of society.

As argued earlier, satirists exaggerate in order, paradoxically, to bring their audience closer to a different truth.¹³³ It is the apparent unwillingness to acknowledge that parody and exaggeration are stock satiric strategies that leads critics such as Young to leap to Orwell's defence against those who accuse him of parody in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.¹³⁴ But if the novel is viewed as satire then it is not surprising that, for example, in depicting Big Brother, Orwell has taken the historical figure of Stalin and parodied his qualities in order to make a point about the nature of totalitarian rule. Similarly, the powers of mind control and general surveillance attributed to the Thought Police in Oceania are exaggerated versions of the way both the Soviet and Nazi secret police operated. But the important thing is that the basic themes of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* lay readily to hand in the personalities, views and actions of people like Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. Orwell took these already distorted styles of government and distorted them even further, deepening the qualities of evil and oppression that they embodied and exaggerating their power and influence until, in his novel, they become universal. Orwell's general view of current civilisation was decidedly bleak, and in 1937 he wrote: "We are living in a world in which nobody is free, in which hardly anybody is secure, in which it is almost impossible to be honest and remain alive."¹³⁵ Elsewhere in his writings his message to the "free world," as it called itself,

¹³³ See 38-9 above.

¹³⁴ Young 5-6.

¹³⁵ George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962) 149.

was that those freedoms that it had would in the future be in grave danger from power-hungry politicians and capitalists.¹³⁶ The fact that the outlines of the totalitarian world Orwell has created are recognisably historical in nature makes it difficult for readers to objectify Orwell's text as merely a dire warning about what the future holds for the world, though that is part of its message. Yet readers are likely to be ambivalent in their response, since to most people a world in which no thought or action is free is a monstrous one, both frightening and inconceivable.

The modern painter Francis Bacon, not strictly speaking a satirist, is an example of an artist who makes use of the most grotesque distortions in his work, and in the following interview he sets out his thoughts on this issue:

SR *In many of your portraits, despite the distortion, one can still see a likeness. It's not all distortion.*

BACON No, it isn't all distortion. But then, you see, I always hope to distort into reality.

SR *To distort into reality?*

BACON And not distort away from it.¹³⁷

By saying that he "distorts into reality" Bacon implies that there is more than one kind of distortion and is claiming a privileged status for his kind of distortion on the grounds that it points towards "reality." It is obvious that he is not speaking of a reality that lies on the surface, since in order to find the reality presented by Bacon the viewer has to make an effort to enter into the liminal world of distortion presented by Bacon's portraits. As always, liminality invites participation in a newly-created externalising discourse which initiates changed views in the participants. In this case the externalising discourse deepens the viewer's awareness of the qualities portrayed in Bacon's

¹³⁶ See, for example, George Orwell, "You and the Atom Bomb," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 9, War-time Diary: 28 May 1940 - 28 August 1941, *CEJL*, vol. II, 354 and "Inside the Whale," *CEJL*, vol. I, 525.

¹³⁷ Francis Bacon, interview with Joshua Gilden, "I Think About Death Every Day," *Saturday Review*, September 1981 : 39.

paintings, particularly the vulnerability of the people depicted in them. But the paintings are also an assault on the viewers, which makes them in turn more aware of their own vulnerability.

It has been said of Bacon that "there is nothing gratuitous or wilful about the distortions which he imposes upon the sitter's features,"¹³⁸ and that his problem was "how to ally the strongest possible dose of verifiable reality to the strongest dose of inspired risk."¹³⁹ Similarly, one has to recognise the craft in what Orwell has done in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. As with Bacon, Orwell had to provide his audience with a certain amount of verifiable reality to avoid alienating them entirely, while going as far as he dared in the direction of the grotesqueness and horror that lie at the heart of the novel. Contemporary literary critics describe the mode of a certain kind of novel as "magic realism," indicating that the novel embodies elements of both fantasy and realism. On an analogy with that, one could categorise *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as "nightmare realism" - though that would be far from a comprehensive description of the novel.

As with Bacon's paintings, Orwell's novel presents a powerful invitation into an alternative world. Being a form of externalising discourse, satire constantly offers its audience liminal experiences, and in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* that experience is of a particularly traumatic kind as readers are drawn into the liminal world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and made to feel on the pulse what the state can do to the human spirit. Orwell would have had no difficulty in answering Ernst Fischer's question: "What do you say about reality when the screams from the cellar grow louder than the singer's voice?"¹⁴⁰ Orwell had no doubt that his art was not to be a singer, but rather to make his readers unavoidably aware of what he heard coming from the cellar. Those screams had to be magnified, even distorted, until the reader was forced to empathize with the suffering of humanity. That is as important a part of Orwell's purpose as it is of Bacon's *Study after Velasquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X*. As far

¹³⁸ John Russell, *Francis Bacon* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979) 124.

¹³⁹ Russell 107.

¹⁴⁰ Fischer, *Art Against Ideology* 130.

as Orwell was concerned, unless great care was taken, the future would be as O'Brien defines it: "a boot stamping on a human face - for ever."¹⁴¹ This demonisation of the relations between politics and power has been challenged by Raymond Williams, who believes it should be resisted because "it would then be pointless to try and distinguish between social systems, or to inquire, discriminatingly, where this or that system went good or went bad."¹⁴² It is true that pointing to the violence - in word and deed - of the politics portrayed in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* does not clarify the issue of how such a text succeeds in drawing its readers into the alternative or liminal world it offers. Bacon has said that people do not buy his paintings because they like them, and it is likewise reasonable to suppose that people do not read *Nineteen Eighty-Four* because they enjoy it. Bouson and others suggest that some apparently paradoxical processes are at work here:

1984 exerts a strange power over its readers....The terror and rage that erupt from the subsurfaces of the text assault the reader who, like Winston Smith, becomes a passive victim. Georges Poulet's description of the reading process as involving the 'annexation' of the reader's consciousness...is analogous to the description [of] Winston's takeover by O'Brien and Orwell's manipulation of the reader....Similarly, Norman Holland links the reading process - the commonly described experience of being absorbed, engrossed, carried away by a text - to the primitive fear of merger....Winston's core fantasy - desire for and fear of merger - is, in effect, replicated in the reader, who becomes engrossed in what seems at first a familiar fictional world but which is transformed into an unrelieved nightmare.¹⁴³

Orwell lulls us into a false sense of security by presenting us in the very first lines of his novel with "a familiar fictional" world - in this case a typical seedy, run-down city which becomes even more familiar as we recognise that this is

¹⁴¹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 215.

¹⁴² Raymond Williams, *Orwell* (London: Fontana, 1984) 124-5.

¹⁴³ Bouson 8.

post-war London, despite the strangeness of the clocks "striking thirteen" in the second line.¹⁴⁴ "Satire straddles the historical world of experience and the contrived world of created literature, and it insists on the necessity of both."¹⁴⁵ The dialogic relationship between the satirist and society, between the liminal world created by satire and the actual, tangible world within which satire is received, is a crucial aspect of satire:

Reference to things outside of a fictional context does not by itself distinguish satire from other literary forms, but the reader's perception of extrafictional reference is perhaps more important in the case of satire than it is for other genres: it is the reader's relating of 'satirical' descriptions to a context outside of the fiction that determines their satirical significance....¹⁴⁶

The society depicted in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is both familiar and unfamiliar to the reader, and the satirist capitalises on both of these aspects. On the one hand, the political strategies of the Party often reflect the current - or recent - history of Orwell's time and the dreary social conditions of post-war Britain. However, the contemporary reader can identify with certain aspects of the novel because they are accurate reflections of life today. There is the increase in surveillance, based on sophisticated technology, the growing sense of loneliness and helplessness that individuals are experiencing in most societies, and the totalitarian systems which, even in these days of *glasnost*, have not yet disappeared. All these considerations reinforce the impact of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, forcing the reader to regard it as more than a work of fiction.

The aggressive aspect of satire emerges as "the terror and rage that erupt from the subsurfaces of the text assault the reader"; but one would have to add that much of the strength of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* lies precisely in the

¹⁴⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 5.

¹⁴⁵ Knight 35.

¹⁴⁶ Terence Harpold, "The Anatomy of Satire: Aggressivity and Satirical Physick in Gulliver's Travels, *Literature and Psychology* 36.3 (1990): 34.

ability of the text to appal. It is this unreal world of horror - this distortion and exaggeration of evil so that it becomes almost a parody of itself - which repels readers, but also holds a kind of terrible fascination for them. However, the reader of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is not merely a passive victim of Orwell's verbal violence, and the matter is a more complex one than the theories alluded to by Bouson suggest. It may rather be the very grotesqueness of the suffering depicted in the novel that moves readers and keeps them so involved in the text, whether because of some deep atavistic need to witness suffering or out of the kind of helpless pity which can do nothing but stand by the sufferer, but is driven to do just that anyway. It would be odd to suggest that Orwell is here intent on feeding atavistic impulses, but he may wish to make people aware of such impulses, so that they can be exposed to the civilising influence of consciousness.

The issue of aggression in satire is examined in detail by Bentley, who discusses how satirical aggression can be devoid of noble motives and thus tend towards sadism:

Reduction to flesh is the rhetoric of sadism...[and s]atire employs the same central maneuver. Even a casual glance at the history of this genre will show that scatological reductionism is its most frequent technique.¹⁴⁷

Bentley argues that such reductiveness is a result of both satire and sadism concentrating on the body, so that the mind of the victim is excluded. He does not accuse the satirist of being consciously sadistic, but concludes that "on the unrationalized level, both in action and in method, satire is sadistic."¹⁴⁸ Foucault has a different view of sadism: "The precise object of 'sadism' is not the other, nor his body, nor his sovereignty: it is everything that might have been said."¹⁴⁹ Foucault has redefined the site of sadism, problematizing the

¹⁴⁷ Joseph Bentley, "Satire and the Rhetoric of Sadism," *Centennial Review* 11 (1967): 394.

¹⁴⁸ Bentley 404.

¹⁴⁹ Michel Foucault, "Language to Infinity," *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) 62.

concept and retrieving it from the realm of closed and centred signification. Foucault's view, applied to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, invites the reader to view the character of O'Brien from a postmodern stance, which implies less certainty about the interaction between O'Brien and Winston.

Some writers have depicted Orwell as having had a sadistic streak. Sharrock speaks of "the Orwell whom a friend on Jura saw methodically chopping up a living adder with his jack-knife."¹⁵⁰ Rayner Heppenstall, another friend, tells of being attacked by Orwell during a domestic quarrel and describes Orwell's expression as "a curious blend of fear and sadistic exaltation" as he raised a metal shooting-stick to strike Heppenstall.¹⁵¹ Crick's comment is that "There was this sadistic streak in Orwell's character - which usually he mastered."¹⁵² Richard Sanderson mentions two critics who "have each pointed out strong resemblances between O'Brien's manipulation of Winston and Orwell's manipulation of the reader."¹⁵³ It has already been suggested that there is a sado-masochistic relationship between Winston and O'Brien¹⁵⁴ and there is no doubt that *Nineteen Eighty-Four* contains a great deal of sadism. If Orwell took even an unconscious pleasure in this it is likely to have been in his role of satirist, with the satirical animus here being tinged with the sadism of which Bentley speaks. Yet this is precisely what Pritchett exults in, calling the Orwell of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* "the most devastating pamphleteer alive because he is the plainest and most individual...and because, with steady misanthropy, he knows exactly where on the new Jesuitism to apply the Protestant whip."¹⁵⁵ Rai believes that readers of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* experience a "sadistic element in the pleasure which the novel gives."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁰ Sharrock 332.

¹⁵¹ Coppard 113.

¹⁵² Crick, *George Orwell* 525.

¹⁵³ Richard K. Sanderson, "The Two Narrators and Happy Ending of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*," *Modern Fiction Studies* 34.4 (1988) 593.

¹⁵⁴ See 228-30 above.

¹⁵⁵ E.V. Pritchett. rev. of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *New Statesman and Nation* 18 June 1949 : 646.

¹⁵⁶ Rai 137.

It is clear that the level of aggression in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* - directed at both the satiric target and the readers of the novel - exceeds that normally encountered in satirical works. Orwell is here fiercely attacking both those who perpetrate the evils he is exposing and those who read about them, a dual process which has more than one end. It seeks to break down the imperviousness to suffering which many people have and it reminds them that, because they are all members of the human race, they too are potentially guilty of the faults which can be seen in the rulers of Oceania. The distortion practised by satirists also constitutes a form of violence directed against the version of reality accepted by most people. Neither form of violence can be seen as gratuitous, since they are both an essential part of the mechanics of satire, and the degree of violence employed is a finely judged thing.

Because Orwell's approach differs from that of the conventional novelist of his time, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* has been criticised on the grounds, among other things, that it has "no credible or 'three-dimensional' characters,"¹⁵⁷ that Big Brother "resembles the bogieman of a rather inartistic nursery tale"¹⁵⁸ and that an oligarchy such as rules Oceania could not, realistically speaking, last for any length of time without divisions developing among its members, so that cracks began to show in its apparently invulnerable façade. As Hollis asks:

Why should such a man as O'Brien have fanatically given himself to the service of the Party, where it was obviously only too probable that one day before long the masters of the Party, in their insatiable sadistic appetite, would seize him and torture him in his turn?¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Irving Howe, "1984: History as Nightmare," *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984*, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 43.

¹⁵⁸ Isaac Deutscher, "'1984' - The Mysticism of Cruelty," *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984*, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 30.

¹⁵⁹ Christopher Hollis, *A Study of George Orwell: The Man and His Works* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1956) 197.

Such aspects cannot be ignored, but to focus on them is to discount the contemporary fluidity of the novel as a genre, and to detract from the fact that *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is an extremely powerful work of art. These objections become serious only if they are allowed to outweigh other considerations, particularly the fact that this novel is primarily a satirical work in which serious political issues are made to come alive for the reader with compelling force. In any case, even in Orwell's own time, a critic such as Symons was able to distinguish between writers who are primarily interested in ideas and those for whom the major focus is on the characters.¹⁶⁰ One could add to this Howe's statement that "The last thing Orwell cared about when he wrote *1984*, the last thing he should have cared about, was literature."¹⁶¹ An aspect which strengthens *Nineteen Eighty-Four's* right to unorthodox literary strategies is that it is not only a satirical text, but also a typical dystopian one, so that its "major textual/discursive strategy...is an external referentiality which is inimical to any kind of realist aesthetic."¹⁶² In fact, many of the objections to the style and characterisation of this novel stem from an adherence to rigid norms of realism and ignore the fact that distortion and exaggeration are the satirist's stock-in-trade. Judged from the former point of view, Julia may indeed seem weak as a character, O'Brien unreal and the whole world of the novel unconvincing. Yet in fact, as Crick points out, the characterizations of Winston and Julia appear increasingly skilful "the more one begins to perceive that they are meant to be studies in 'one-dimensional man': the regime has dehumanized people...."¹⁶³ Elsbree sees the fractured, episodic quality of the novel, with its use of flashbacks, dreams and distortions of time as the successful creation of a literal "nightmare, a frightening dreamlike state in which the individual is helpless before an involuntary succession of symbols and ideas."¹⁶⁴ This is related to the critical observation that, in important ways, satire habitually resists closure,¹⁶⁵ discussed by Seidel in

¹⁶⁰ Symons, rev. of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 380.

¹⁶¹ Howe, "History" 42-3.

¹⁶² Cranny-Francis 156.

¹⁶³ Bernard Crick, introd., *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, by George Orwell (1949; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984) 6.

¹⁶⁴ Langdon Elsbree, "The Structured Nightmare of *1984*," *Twentieth Century Literature* 5.3 (1959) 135.

¹⁶⁵ Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction* 95-114.

terms of satire's "sustained, unresolved state of crisis....Satire, in a sense, has no licence to end satisfactorily....Insofar as satire can be said to have an ideology at all, its tents are located in absurd, skeptical, despairing, or even subversive assessments of human capacity where the powers necessary to resolve life's crises are absent or concealed."¹⁶⁶

Cope says that "Satire is the only literary genre which is enthusiastically philosophical...[since] only satire openly esteems truth more than art. Only the satirist claims to declare truth without worrying about beauty."¹⁶⁷ Traditional aesthetic and literary concerns have seldom been paramount for satire, since its main focus is not on providing credible and realistic narratives - and this is particularly true of Menippean satire. Satire concentrates instead on presenting challenging structures which will create liminal spaces and give life to certain ideas, often neglecting issues such as characterization and realism in favour of these other goals. Gulliver is an example of a successful satirical character who is not fully rounded, as is Pieter Dirk-Uys's Evita Bezuidenhout. In fact, characters such as these have become masks - a favourite distancing device of the satirist, in which a disguised stance or voice is adopted. Although satire does have close connections with the everyday world, its aim is not to present an alternative world which is verifiable and convincing, but rather a distorted one, marked by elusiveness on the part of the satirist.

Yet, as in the case of *Animal Farm*, the level of allusion to documented historical facts and practices in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is high - a practice which doubtless owes much to Orwell's being a journalist to the marrow, but also reflects the unique dialogic relationship between the satirist and historical events. Howard Wolf speaks of the "difficult struggle in Orwell between the claims of non-fiction and its relationship to history and the inescapable presence of the author, between the claims of creative or constructed writing

¹⁶⁶ Michael Seidel, "Crisis Rhetoric and Satiric Power," *New Literary History* 20.1 (1988): 165-7.

¹⁶⁷ Kevin L. Cope, "Satire: The Conquest of Philosophy," *Literature as Philosophy / Philosophy as Literature*, ed. Donald G. Marshall (Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987) 175.

and what we called confidently journalism from about 1660 to 1960...." ¹⁶⁸ Orwell himself viewed his novel as "a show-up of the perversions to which a centralised economy is liable and which have already been partly realised in Communism and Fascism." ¹⁶⁹ He wrote this novel just after the death of Hitler and during the lifetime of Stalin - which is reflected in the novel's atmosphere and much of its detail. The killing of twenty million people under Stalin and the gassing of many millions in Hitler's concentration camps stand at the centre of these regimes' totalitarian nature.

There were, however, other significant, if less major, contemporary manifestations as well, which are closely reflected in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. The attempts to control the sex-life of the populace in Oceania are comparable to those in Nazi Germany, even if the Nazi ideal was primarily to breed an Aryan master-race: Germans were forbidden to have sex with Jews, ¹⁷⁰ homosexuals were persecuted, ¹⁷¹ and special "superior" types of women, so-called "Chosen Women," were to be trained in Himmler's Women's Academy, the "products" to be "awarded" to Party and SS leaders. Himmler said that "The Führer had placed him in charge of the [latter] project and final decisions on marriage rested with him." ¹⁷² The way in which children are indoctrinated in Airstrip One offers close parallels with the situation in both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia where, as in the novel, children were pressurized into joining youth organisations at an early age in order to facilitate indoctrination. Life under these regimes was heavily totalitarian: hundreds of Germans were sent to concentration camps merely for listening to foreign radio broadcasts ¹⁷³ and, during the German occupation of Holland, there were guards in the cinemas to apprehend

¹⁶⁸ Howard Wolf, "George Orwell and the Problematics of Non-Fiction," *Critical Quarterly* 27.2 (1985): 25.

¹⁶⁹ Orwell, letter to Henson 502.

¹⁷⁰ Padfield 199.

¹⁷¹ Padfield 367.

¹⁷² Padfield 319.

¹⁷³ Bettelheim, *Informed Heart* 277.

anyone who laughed, or even coughed, during the showing of Nazi propaganda films.¹⁷⁴

As far as family life is concerned, the parallels between fiction and reality are again close. In Nazi Germany parents whose religious and political convictions did not agree with those laid down by the state had their children taken away from them and put in a "local Youth hostel (referred to as a 'politically reliable home')." ¹⁷⁵ Much closer to the world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was what went on when children were not taken away from their parents. Winston, after a visit to the Parsons family, comments on the role of children:

With those children, he thought, that wretched woman must lead a life of terror. Another year, two years, and they would be watching her day and night for symptoms of unorthodoxy. Nearly all children nowadays were horrible....It was almost normal for people over thirty to be frightened of their own children. And with good reason, for hardly a week passed in which *The Times* did not carry a paragraph describing how some eavesdropping little sneak - 'child hero' was the phrase generally used - had overheard some compromising remark and denounced its parents to the Thought Police.¹⁷⁶

The case of the Parsons family could have been taken unaltered out of the daily life of a German or Russian family under Hitler or Stalin, where political denunciations by children of their parents were encouraged, and those responsible publicly praised. Bettelheim has the following to say about the effects of such events on German parents:

This fear gripped most parents, and by weakening their security

¹⁷⁴ Gerhard Hirschfeld, "Nazi Propaganda in Occupied Western Europe: The Case of the Netherlands," *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations*, ed. David Welch (London: Croom Helm, 1983) 151.

¹⁷⁵ David Welch, "Educational Film Propaganda and the Nazi Youth," *Nazi Propaganda* 72.

¹⁷⁶ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 23-4.

within the home, dried up a main source that could still have fed their self-respect, given them a sense of worth and thus of inner autonomy. The fear, more than the fact of betrayal by children or mates, made it impossible to lower one's defenses even within one's own four walls. Unquestioned trust, which is the greatest value of an intimate relation, became a danger instead of the relief it should have been. It turned family life into an experience of continuous caution, of strain, of being on guard if not openly distrustful; it became a weakening experience when it should have given greatest security.¹⁷⁷

Thus parents were mistrustful of their children and children were mistrustful of their parents. By using children in this fashion the Nazis could assert the supremacy of the state over the family with virtually no remission. As Orwell makes clear in his novel, the common thoughtlessness and cruelty of children of a certain age would have ensured that many parents experienced not just the sense of being spied on, but a fair degree of real fear as well. From the state's point of view, one might call this a highly economical system of terror.

The same system was followed by the Soviet authorities, as Conquest indicates:

Orwell would certainly have known of the case of Pavlik Morozov, a fourteen-year-old Pioneer [member of the Communist youth movement] who denounced his father for 'hoarding' grain, and was himself killed by villagers. He became...a Soviet hero - the Palace of Culture of the Red Pioneers in Moscow was named after him, and even in the Khrushchev period *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, official organ of the Party youth, told of 'the sacred and dear' Pavlik Morozov Museum in his own village: 'In this timbered house was

¹⁷⁷ Bettelheim, *Informed Heart* 273.

held the court at which Pavlik unmasked his father.'... In his speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the secret police, Mikoyan went out of his way to praise two other children who turned in their relations, and these were representative of tens of thousands enrolled to report on the peasantry.¹⁷⁸

Nineteen Eighty-Four contains many other examples of totalitarian practices which actually occurred. Among these are the practice known in Airstrip One as "blackwhite" and the ability of the state to switch the focus of the populace from one enemy to another at short notice. In the novel the term "blackwhite" as a quality of a Party member "means a loyal willingness to say that black is white when party discipline demands this. But it means also the ability to *believe* that black is white, and more, to *know* that black is white, and to forget that one has ever believed the contrary."¹⁷⁹ In Russia as early as 1929 Pyatkov (later to be an important victim of Stalin's trials) proclaimed his loyalty as follows:

He "would be ready to believe that black was white, and white was black, if the Party required it. In order to become one with his great Party, he would fuse with it, abandon his own personality, so that there was no particle left inside him which was not as one with the Party."¹⁸⁰

Pyatkov is willing to abandon his personality in pursuit of this aim. Winston Smith is one of those who has his personality taken away from him so that he will be able to achieve the same end as Pyatkov.

On another issue, David Gurevich, a Russian who grew up under the Soviet system, speaks of life there in the 1960s. He says the following about *Nineteen Eighty-Four*:

¹⁷⁸ Conquest 182-83.

¹⁷⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 171.

¹⁸⁰ Conquest 184.

The opening scene in "Nineteen Eighty-four," where Winston is bullied into reaching his toes, left me stunned. Morning exercise on the radio is a staple of Soviet life, and the announcer's voice, now sugary, now stern, had always made me feel I was being watched. How did Orwell know that? ¹⁸¹

Orwell himself speaks of his concern with the concrete details of life, and his reporter's nose served him well in this respect:

So long as I remain alive and well I shall continue to feel strongly about prose style, to love the surface of the earth, and to take pleasure in solid objects and scraps of useless information. ¹⁸²

His empiricism is strongly evident here, and he combined that with the ability to incorporate this information into a novel such as *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and to use it to convey the atmosphere of a totalitarian state with great realism, paradoxically, despite the exaggerated quality of the description.

A final point here concerns the transfer of enmity which occurs in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* during a highly organized Hate Week against Oceania's current enemy, Eurasia. There have been processions, films, waxworks, firing of heavy guns and military parades - in fact all the elements of dramatic enactment which are one of the marks of a propaganda campaign. However, "after six days of this, when the great orgasm was quivering to its climax and the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into...a delirium" ¹⁸³ it becomes known that it is now Eastasia that is the enemy, while Eurasia is now an ally. The change is made public by a speaker at a mass rally who has been delivering a vituperative denunciation of Eurasia for twenty minutes when the message is handed to him:

¹⁸¹ David Gurevich, "Moscow Days: Liberated by Harold Robbins," *New York Times Book Review* 11 Mar. 1990 : 26.

¹⁸² Orwell, "Why I Write" 6.

¹⁸³ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 147.

He unrolled it and read it without pausing in his speech. Nothing altered in his voice or manner, or in the content of what he was saying, but suddenly the names were different. Without words said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd. Oceania was at war with Eastasia! The next moment there was a tremendous commotion. The banners and posters with which the square was decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had the wrong faces on them. It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein had been at work. ¹⁸⁴

This example of how the mechanism of propaganda, once established, can very flexibly be used to support or undermine any social or political development, is undoubtedly a satirical account of the suddenly announced Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. The news that their former German enemies were now allies took some Russian newspapers so much by surprise that day that some of them "accused the Germans of warmongering in the afternoon, and celebrated them as friends in the evening." ¹⁸⁵

This incident indicates how highly propagandized - and hence manipulable - societies can become. Totalitarian states invariably manufacture external enemies for their citizens, to divert attention from the political situation at home and to provide people with an outlet for their aggression. Oceania presents a classic case of this by offering the populace external enemies which change from time to time, so that people will not become habituated to the same target. But the Party also focuses people daily on the figure of Emmanuel Goldstein by means of the Two Minutes Hate - a ritualised venting of hatred on the traditionally marginalised Jew (specifically, a Trotsky-Bronstein figure here) who is clearly chosen for this role by Orwell as a comment on the way societies need scapegoats. Goldstein, as the chief scapegoat of this society, is also an important element of the mythology of Ingsoc, which is continuously reinforced by propaganda. He is a shadowy

¹⁸⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 148.

¹⁸⁵ Conquest 184.

figure, seen only in propaganda films made by the Party, and therefore open to constant re-creation and manipulation by the various socio-political discourses. The daily Hate sessions capitalise on the powerful, irrational and non-linear mode of myth, showing how it engenders blind belief, using the mechanisms of ritual and taboo.

In his satirical description of Hate Week the distortion and exaggeration are so strong that they merge into the grotesque, in the description of the two thousand "war criminals" waiting to be hanged, the blind savagery of the crowd and the inflammatory speech of the speaker. The grotesque has a "disorienting and generally overwhelming effect," producing "a confusion of reaction." The writer of the grotesque excites both "derisive laughter" and "a sense of the gross evil which arouses anger...simultaneously and with equal force."¹⁸⁶ Hence, in the description mentioned above, readers are overwhelmed because they feel both revolted and amused - a mixed reaction which is useful to the satirist because it helps to disorientate readers, thus assisting satire in its initial purpose of defamiliarising the environment and creating liminal texts.

Postmodernism in general is enthusiastic about creating and remaining within liminal spaces. However, Foucault leaves less space for play than usual in his theoretical structures when he writes about power, perhaps because he sees power as being applied and influenced entirely through the structures of society, with no sense that individuals can influence that power. But Orwell, though in his novel he sees power as more monolithic than Foucault does, still chooses to create an alternative (and liminal) world in which personal relationship is set against these political structures in a struggle which author, reader and characters must realise is doomed from the start. Winston's notion is that "from the moment of declaring war on the Party it was better to think of yourself as a corpse....'We are the dead,' he said."¹⁸⁷ Later, while pretending to recruit Winston and Julia to the Brotherhood, O'Brien repeats this

¹⁸⁶ Philip Thomson, *The Grotesque* (London: Methuen, 1972) 42.

¹⁸⁷ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 112.

sentence.¹⁸⁸ Finally, just before he and Julia are arrested Winston says it again - and this time it is echoed, first by Julia and then by "an iron voice behind them."¹⁸⁹ Orwell's narrative is thus framed by this absolute acknowledgement of hopelessness and defeat.

There is, however, less rigidity in Foucault's notion of power, since he regards rebellion as an integral part of the mechanism of power. Orwell insists on the dreary inevitability of punishment for any offence against the regime, while Foucault sees resistance (and, presumably, punishment) as part of the mechanism of power. He believes in the "strictly relational character of power relationships" - that their "existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations." ¹⁹⁰ Thus, for Foucault, there is an interaction and interdependence - a dialogic relationship, in fact - between power and resistance which gives the latter more overt importance than in Orwell's scheme. For example, it is Foucault's way of seeing power that might lead us to speculate that in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* the Party actually creates and orchestrates resistance to itself, perhaps by means of mind control which has the power to determine the path of people's lives from a very early age. According to this highly deterministic view, Julia's note to Winston would not be a chance thing and Winston's dreams and fantasies about the Golden Country and the light place beyond the dark wall would form part of a predetermined pattern which would culminate in his arrest. Parrinder, for example, believes it highly possible that Winston's premonitions about Julia and the Golden Country have been programmed into him and that Julia is "a spy, or at best a decoy (this is not to deny that she grows genuinely fond of Winston)."¹⁹¹ This kind of process would ensure that there were always people who rebelled, enabling the Party to demonstrate and exercise its power, not simply declare it. Foucault's view suggests that systems of political power do not function in a vacuum, detached from those over whom they

¹⁸⁸ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 144.

¹⁸⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 177.

¹⁹⁰ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 95.

¹⁹¹ Parrinder 47-8.

exercise power. Rather, the functioning of such systems is dependent on a symbiotic relationship with those who resist power. As Casement says of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: "Without dissidence, dominance would become mechanical and the thrill would be lost." ¹⁹²

Foucault maintains that "The relationship between rationalization and the excesses of political power is evident. We should not need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such relations." ¹⁹³ Foucault is concerned with a more sophisticated manifestation of power than Orwell, not surprisingly since the world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* represents a parodic - and hence simplified - version of the way power operates. In addition, Foucault sees "the political form of a central and centralizing power" as different from what he calls "the pastoral mode of power," by which he means "power techniques oriented towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way." ¹⁹⁴

While power in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is as intrusive as "pastoral power," it is administered with the full impersonality of a totalitarian (or what is currently referred to as a totalized) state. Expressing one's individuality is dangerous in Oceania, and in Newspeak is called "ownlife," "meaning individualism and eccentricity." ¹⁹⁵ The Party claims control over every waking moment, starting with the communal calisthenics in which all Party members have to participate early every morning in front of the all-seeing and all-hearing telescreen. These aspects of life are intended to force individuals to define themselves only in relation to the entire society. What is created is what Ellul calls a "mass society" in which the individual "becomes an abstraction and is in effect reduced to a cipher." ¹⁹⁶ Ellul regards many modern developed nations as consisting of mass (or totalized) societies.

¹⁹² William Casement, "Another Perspective on Orwellian Pessimism," *International Fiction Review* 15.1 (1988): 49.

¹⁹³ Michel Foucault, "Critical Theory/Intellectual History," interview with Gérard Raulet, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. and introd. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1990) 59.

¹⁹⁴ Foucault, "Critical Theory" 60.

¹⁹⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 69.

¹⁹⁶ Ellul, *Propaganda* 90.

Basic to the elimination of individuality and intimacy is the Party's view of marriage. It is clear that the Party would like to eliminate sex and marriage altogether but this is impossible, even for such a totalitarian state. In any case, as implied by Foucault's view mentioned earlier, such complete control would deny the state the large numbers it needs to work for it and to die for it, as well as to satisfy its desire to dominate through the infliction - and not just the administration - of power. Therefore sex (though preferably without pleasure) is allowed, but only within marriage, and the whole institution of marriage is strictly controlled.¹⁹⁷ The Junior Anti-Sex League, of which Julia is an apparently militant member, advocates celibacy for both sexes, and chastity is deeply ingrained in women.¹⁹⁸ As Chandler points out, "The denial of the normal sex urge also induces hysteria, a very valuable emotion which the Party can transform into war fever and leader worship."¹⁹⁹ The same principle operated in the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s, with a dissident reporting that the principle of "Stalinist Virtue" regarded love for its own sake as an act of treason, since it would " 'detract from the sole purpose of human existence: service to the state.' " ²⁰⁰

In the world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the "sexual act, successfully performed, was rebellion. Desire was thoughtcrime."²⁰¹ The Party fully understands that for Winston and Julia their rebellion against authority is incarnated in their physical relationship with each other. Ironically, the only other relationship in the novel which is physically and emotionally close is that between Winston and O'Brien in the Ministry of Love. It is as though the ultimate price of any real human contact in Oceania is emotional and even physical death, and such contact is experienced only by those who have made themselves into "unpersons." Those who are considered orthodox and normal are also

¹⁹⁷ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 56.

¹⁹⁸ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 58.

¹⁹⁹ Ellen Chandler, "George Orwell's Anti-Utopia: A Study of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Their Evolvement from Orwell's Earlier Writings," diss., U of South Africa, 1974, 238.

²⁰⁰ John Rodden, "Soviet Literary Policy, 1945-1989: The Case of George Orwell," *Modern Age* 32.2 (1988): 134.

²⁰¹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 58.

considered sane by the state and, as a mark of their sanity, they never experience intimacy.

Shortly before he is arrested Winston has the following reflection: "Being in a minority, even a minority of one, did not make you mad. There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth against the whole world, you were not mad."²⁰² In the Ministry of Love O'Brien, as so often, divines what Winston is or has been thinking, and tells him that he "preferred to be a lunatic, a minority of one." O'Brien is calmly certain of Winston's insanity, adding that "You must be humble before you can become sane" and "It is not easy to become sane."²⁰³ The earlier remarks on the practices of Soviet psychiatrists are relevant here,²⁰⁴ as are the comments of Foucault on this issue, where he maintains that society has become increasingly policed:

The policing process fosters a mentality that requires ever more explicit definitions of what is appropriate to human behavior.... The notion of sanity, Foucault argues, is a historical definition, imposed by a process ever more relentless in its demands for behavioral conformity.... Only as such behavior becomes subject to public scrutiny does it become necessary to define the boundaries of its legitimacy.²⁰⁵

Thus surveillance multiplies upon itself, making increasing demands on those it is policing and becoming more detailed and complex as it subjects more areas to scrutiny and control. That in turn leads to increased and narrower definitions of what is acceptable and what is not. Hence O'Brien, as the representative of a highly intrusive system of surveillance and control, can lay down very narrow parameters as to what constitutes sanity for his particular

²⁰² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 174.

²⁰³ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 200, 201.

²⁰⁴ See 60 above.

²⁰⁵ Patrick H. Hutton, "Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self," *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, eds. Luther H. Martin, Hank Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (London: Tavistock, 1988) 126.

society. He can also co-opt Winston into the process of making himself "sane" again, in the way articulated by Foucault:

Foucault shows how the inmates being policed are enticed into participating in, and hence confirming the validity of, the policing process. The madman is encouraged to rid himself of his infirmity by actively seeking a cure....The prisoner is admonished to undertake his own rehabilitation.²⁰⁶

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Winston is in his society's eyes both an imprisoned criminal and a madman. He is exhorted to connive at his own "cure," which amounts to his sincerely adopting all the beliefs that define sanity and non-criminality in that society. O'Brien says to Winston:

You are mentally deranged. You suffer from a defective memory. You are unable to remember real events and you persuade yourself that you remember other events which never happened. Fortunately it is curable. You have never cured yourself of it, because you did not choose to. There was a small effort of the will that you were not ready to make. Even now, I am well aware, you are clinging to your disease under the impression that it is a virtue.²⁰⁷

O'Brien's discourse here parodies psychiatry (though, as pointed out earlier, too much certainty *is* a possible danger in psychiatry).²⁰⁸ He believes that other people's view of reality is flawed, and that he himself is infinitely wise and perceptive. This is fertile ground for satire, particularly Menippean satire, which "attacks learned discourse more than any other target. When the mouthpiece of the learned discourse is self-conscious, the satirist can bring in an element of self-parody by emphasizing an inner division or sense of

²⁰⁶ Hutton 127.

²⁰⁷ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 197.

²⁰⁸ See 83 above.

alienation." ²⁰⁹ Thus the satirist here deals with his victim by showing him to the audience as psychologically fragmented, while the victim believes himself to be mentally more healthy than other people.

The other side of that coin is that O'Brien has induced psychological fragmentation in the mind of Winston. Yet O'Brien suggests that he is not interrogating and torturing Winston: instead he is giving meaning to Winston's situation by first destroying his putatively useless belief system and then replacing it with another. His activity is thus a hermeneutic one, though he is initially applying what has been called, in a different context, "the hermeneutics of suspicion." ²¹⁰

The entire society is pervaded by this particular hermeneutic, since everyone has to operate within a general atmosphere of suspicion and fear. It has already been shown how the Party poisons children against their own parents, thus ensuring that family life in Oceania will be saturated with the hermeneutics of suspicion. ²¹¹ The result of this is demonstrated by Winston's encounter in the Ministry of Love with Tom Parsons, the indefatigable frequenter of Community Centres, whose daughter has denounced him. Parsons, mindful that the telescreen in the room constitutes yet another source of surveillance, is pathetically eager to say - and appear to think - the right thing:

'It was my little daughter,' said Parsons with a sort of doleful pride. 'She listened at the keyhole. Heard what I was saying, and nipped off to the patrols the very next day. Pretty smart for a nipper of seven, eh? I don't bear her any grudge for it. In fact I'm proud of her. It shows I brought her up in the right spirit, anyway.' ²¹²

Parsons has tried for many years to do exactly what the Party wants, but he is

²⁰⁹ Sherbert 17.

²¹⁰ See 130, 187 above.

²¹¹ See 243-5 above.

²¹² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 187-88.

reported by his daughter for saying "Down with Big Brother!" in his sleep. On the one hand, the situation is so grotesque as to be risible. On the other hand, there is a deep pathos in this simple man's double betrayal, first by his subconscious, which has expressed his true feelings about Big Brother and, secondly, by a close family member who has had no compunction about betraying him to the authorities. " 'Of course I'm guilty!' cried Parsons with a servile glance at the telescreen. 'You don't think the Party would arrest an innocent man, do you?' " ²¹³ His attempts to accept blame for his words and to approve of his daughter's action only serve to highlight the way the Party damages people, forcing them to behave in ways that are bizarre.

This grotesque, nightmare quality constitutes the frame within which much of the novel unfolds, the satire distorting attitudes and perspectives, and making conventional assessments impossible. For example, despite the fact that Winston starts out with some of the conventional attributes of a hero and, at first, proclaims a "liberal-humanist belief in the impregnability of the spirit of man," ²¹⁴ the structure of the liminal world of Oceania progressively places major difficulties in the path of a reader wishing to regard him as such. After all, Winston is reduced to a snivelling wreck who believes that two and two are five, begs that his torture be inflicted instead on his beloved and finally, awash with self-pity and sentimentality, tearfully acknowledges that he loves Big Brother. Orwell denies the reader the relief of a conventional hero whose humanity and dignity remain intact and whose beliefs and courage give meaning to his suffering.

Throughout his many ordeals Winston has never thought of himself as any kind of hero. His actions have proceeded from a concern for truth and freedom which is totally free from any kind of self-consciousness or self-congratulation. Yet, ironically, after his defeat he has strong feelings of conscious virtue based on what he sees as a victory over himself. At the heart of the equivocal issue of Winston's heroism lies the difference between the

²¹³ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 187.

²¹⁴ Sharrock 321.

covert hero, which is all Winston is allowed to be in a state which allows its dissidents no publicity, and the more conventional hero who displays his qualities openly, through his engagement with the world. The latter sense has a long tradition, here evoked by Arendt:

The...word 'hero' originally, that is, in Homer, was no more than a name given each free man who participated in the Trojan enterprise and about whom a story could be told. The connotation of courage, which we now feel to be an indispensable quality of the hero, is in fact already present in a willingness to act and speak at all, to insert one's self into the world and begin a story of one's own....The extent of this original courage, without which action and speech and therefore, according to the Greeks, freedom, would not be possible at all, is not less great and may even be greater if the 'hero' happens to be a coward.²¹⁵

Winston is unable to become this kind of public hero because in Oceania speaking and acting, "inserting oneself into the world" as a unique human being, are tantamount to suicide. By winning "the battle over himself" Winston has become a kind of hero, but on the Party's terms, which deny him any opportunity to appear in public as a hero, just as he is denied any opportunity to appear as a martyr because of his rebellion. In the same way, by denying them the right to exercise their love in public, the Party succeeds in devaluing and annulling the feelings that Winston and Julia have for each other.

It seems that there is tragedy, rather than heroism, to be found in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, but Rae questions Winston's (and implicitly, Orwell's) stance towards both these qualities:

Winston suffers from the blindness Raymond Williams later identified as endemic to modern criticism: so committed is he to a 'traditional,' liberal humanist conception of tragedy, with

²¹⁵ Arendt, *Human Condition* 186-87.

its focus on the individual and its precise specifications about the decorum of tragic suffering, that he fails to valorize the new form of tragedy happening all around him and exemplified by his own fate: a 'social' tragedy, in which the noble tragic 'hero' is replaced by a less noble tragic 'victim.' Winston's conviction that tragedy belongs to an 'ancient time' reflects a hypostatization of the term *tragedy* that is profoundly ideological, devaluing contemporary forms of loss.²¹⁶

Nineteen Eighty-Four presents loss in dramatic forms: in a state such as Oceania, as often in Nazi Germany, people who are arrested for a crime against the state are not merely punished: they disappear, and the official attitude is that they never existed. When Syme is vaporised nothing is said, either by the authorities or his associates: he simply stops appearing at work and the membership list of the Chess Committee, to which Syme had belonged, "looked almost exactly as it had looked before - nothing had been crossed out - but it was one name shorter."²¹⁷ For Arendt this is one of the marks of any totalitarian state:

In totalitarian countries all places of detention ruled by the police are made to be veritable holes of oblivion into which people stumble by accident and without leaving behind them such ordinary traces of former existence as a body and a grave. Compared with this newest invention for doing away with people, the old-fashioned method of murder, political or criminal, is inefficient indeed. The murderer leaves behind him a corpse, and although he tries to efface the traces of his own identity, he has no power to erase the identity of his victim from the memory of the surviving world. The operation of the secret police, on the contrary, miraculously sees to it that the victim never existed at all.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Patricia Rae, "Mr. Charrington's Junk Shop: T.S. Eliot and Modernist Poetics in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*", *Twentieth Century Literature* 43.2 (1997): 211-12.

²¹⁷ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 121.

²¹⁸ Arendt, *Totalitarianism* 434-35.

At the Ministry of Truth there are numerous slits in the walls, in every room and at frequent intervals along the corridors. These apertures lead directly to huge furnaces and are intended for the destruction of any document which does not reflect the version of reality currently espoused by the Party, and they are called "memory holes." In the same way as dissidents are made to seem as though they never existed, so the evidence of any event or utterance which conflicts with the Party's views must be destroyed, and forgotten.

The oblivion into which offenders vanish is typical of totalitarian states, but in Oceania it is accompanied by a legal system characterised by deliberate vagueness. The aim of the Party is to keep people in a constant state of anxious uncertainty in which the structures within which they live are not fixed - a lack of containment which makes the society much more susceptible to discourses such as propaganda, ideology and political myth. The point is made early in the novel in relation to Winston's diary:

The thing that he was about to do was to open a diary. This was not illegal (nothing was illegal, since there were no longer any laws), but if detected it was reasonably certain that it would be punished by death, or at least by twenty-five years in a forced-labour camp.²¹⁹

Later, when Winston buys a paperweight, he again senses that it is something compromising: "Anything old, or for that matter anything beautiful, was always vaguely suspect."²²⁰ Ampleforth, arrested and placed in the same cell as Winston, tells him that there is only one crime (he means thoughtcrime) and, when Winston asks him if he has committed it, all he can say is, "Apparently I have."²²¹

Totalitarian states often cynically regard the law as only one among many means to be used to keep their hold on power. In Oceania the lack of a formal

²¹⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 9.

²²⁰ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 80.

²²¹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 185.

legal system allows the Party to decide arbitrarily what constitutes an offence, so that people live in constant fear of being arrested for something they may have done in good faith. This point is made in *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*:

[A Party member] has no freedom of choice in any direction whatever. On the other hand his actions are not regulated by law or by any clearly formulated code of behaviour. In Oceania there is no law. Thoughts and actions which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally forbidden, and the endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments and vaporizations are not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed, but are merely the wiping-out of persons who might perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future. A Party member is required to have not only the right opinions, but the right instincts. Many of the beliefs and attitudes demanded of him are never plainly stated, and could not be stated without laying bare the contradictions inherent in Ingsoc.²²²

This final statement indicates that Party members are deprived of definite information in respect not only of the misdeeds they might commit but also of the desirable thoughts and qualities they are called upon to have. Given that Goldstein's book, whether written by him or the Party, is in itself a piece of propaganda, one needs to maintain a certain distance from it. However, Goldstein's assertion has an authentic ring to it - a view which is confirmed by the discussion about crimethink (the verb from thoughtcrime) in Orwell's appendix entitled "The Principles of Newspeak":

What was required in a party member was an outlook similar to that of the ancient Hebrew who knew, without knowing much else, that all nations other than his own worshipped 'false gods'. He did not need to know that these gods were called Baal, Osiris,

²²² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 170.

Moloch, Ashtaroth, and the like: probably the less he knew about them the better for his orthodoxy. He knew Jehovah and the commandments of Jehovah: he knew, therefore, that all gods with other names or other attributes were false gods. In somewhat the same way, the Party member knew what constituted right conduct, and in exceedingly vague, generalized terms he knew what kinds of departure from it were possible.²²³

As Syme says, "Orthodoxy means not thinking - not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness."²²⁴ It is perhaps more accurate to say that orthodoxy requires Party members to allow themselves to be steered through life in a kind of obedient, misty haze in which their only faculty is an unreflecting, half-conscious awareness of the wishes of the Party.

The quotation above is significant in its use of religious terms to denote the relationship between the Party faithful and the state. A blind faith in a single, fairly narrow way of life is suggested and, given the connotations of the Old Testamentary Jehovah, any kind of deviation would not be advisable. - despite the fact that religion is supposed to offer hope and comfort, as Ingsoc is supposed to benefit the people of Oceania. This accurately reflects the strong element of dystopian satire which marks Orwell's thinking, not only in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, but elsewhere in his writings as well. In the course of earlier discussion, links were established between utopia / dystopia and satire, in relation to the two novels by Orwell dealt with in this thesis. One of the most striking uses of utopianism and its opposite in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* centres around Winston's recurring dream of a non-existent utopian landscape he calls the Golden Country:

Suddenly he was standing on short springy turf, on a summer evening when the slanting rays of the sun gilded the ground.... Somewhere near at hand, though out of sight, there was a

²²³ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 246.

²²⁴ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 46.

clear, slow-moving stream where dace were swimming in the pools under the willow trees.²²⁵

Into this idyllic dream landscape comes a beautiful girl who tears off her clothes and makes love with Winston. Their love-making is primarily a political gesture, since Winston's dream experience is that her grace seems to annihilate the whole paraphernalia of oppression of Oceania. Yet the dream becomes reality when Winston and Julia first meet in the countryside to make love, since the setting is that of Winston's Golden Country - and Julia's sexual behaviour is that of the girl in Winston's dream.²²⁶ This utopian dream of love and freedom eventually turn into a dystopian nightmare - which is the story of the rest of the novel, though the seeds of that process are evident even here in Winston's fear that their love-making may be detected by some "small beetle-like man" listening to them by means of a microphone concealed in this paradisaical setting. The description of the Golden Country mirrors Orwell's nostalgic and idealised view of the English countryside and, arguably, the fact that from the start there is a serpent in Winston's Garden of Eden reflects the fears Orwell had that his own private utopia was under threat from the forces of change, both political and social. Adding to the reader's sense of dystopia is the strong possibility that the dream of the Golden Country has been inserted into Winston's mind by the Thought Police - and that Julia is herself their agent. Orwell's veneration for certain aspects of the past cut across his socialist utopian ideals²²⁷ and, in *The Lion and the Unicorn*, fairly radical proposals for what he calls "the English Revolution" exist side-by-side with an assertion that such a revolution "will show a power of assimilating the past which will shock foreign observers and sometimes make them doubt whether any revolution has happened."²²⁸ Rae groups Orwell with T.S. Eliot "in their profound sense of disaffection from contemporary life and of longing for the past,"²²⁹ and Greer says that Orwell's "writing suggests a harking

²²⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 28.

²²⁶ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 101-4.

²²⁷ See 176, 180 above on this point.

²²⁸ Orwell, *Lion and Unicorn* 102.

²²⁹ Rae 198.

back to Edwardian middle-class socialism...." ²³⁰ Crick, in his biography of Orwell, calls him "a revolutionary in love with the past." ²³¹

The subject of Orwell's internalised and idealised notions of the past is relevant to the last section of this chapter, which will deal with notions of utopia / dystopia (which often embody an implicit longing for the past) evident in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and reflected in some of Orwell's shorter writings, specifically those about the Catholic Church and Stalinism, his early experiences in Burma and as a tramp and, above all, his days at St. Cyprian's school - all autobiographical issues which, as stressed earlier, are an important aspect of satire. ²³²

These issues are also important insofar as this thesis puts them into dialogic relationship with *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as part of a strategy for reframing the novel. The Catholic Church and Stalinism offer strongly utopian goals to believers, and British imperialism had its own brand of utopian thinking - all of which are presented by Orwell in a dystopian way. Schooldays are often thought about in an idealised and utopian way, though Orwell's essay on his is decidedly dystopian and, finally, Orwell's tramping experience was motivated, in part, by a desire to share the lot of the working-class, reflecting a utopian view of this class which *Nineteen Eighty-Four* seems to share. As can be seen, the relevance of Orwell's personal beliefs (both conscious and unconscious) and their effect on his work are deeply interwoven with issues of utopia / dystopia, not least so in the case of religion.

Several critics relate issues in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* to religion, though it is the New Testamentary brand, specifically Roman Catholicism, which Orwell believed to be dangerously dogmatic and monolithic - a Christian equivalent of the old Hebraic religion. That this particular equation was not far from Orwell's thoughts can be seen from his reference in an article to "the Hebrew-

²³⁰ Herb Greer, "Orwell in Perspective," *Commentary* 75.3 (1983): 51.

²³¹ Crick, *George Orwell* 408.

²³² See 11 above.

like pride and exclusiveness of the genuine Catholic mind." ²³³ The (largely uncomplimentary) use made by Orwell of Catholic belief and practice in the novel is so extensive ²³⁴ that it is necessary to convey something of the tenor of his mind on the subject.

His animus is clear in remarks such as "One cannot really be a Catholic & grown-up" ²³⁵ and in his classing Catholics among the "enemies of intellectual liberty":

The Catholic and the Communist are alike in assuming that an opponent cannot be both honest and intelligent. Each of them tacitly claims that "the truth" has already been revealed, and that the heretic, if he is not simply a fool, is secretly aware of "the truth" and merely resists it out of selfish motives.... Orthodox Catholicism... seems to have a crushing effect upon certain literary forms, especially the novel.... No one ever wrote a good book in praise of the Inquisition. ²³⁶

Orwell is right to question the claims of both Catholicism and Communism to absolute truth, both of which are often cited as good examples of the exercise of ideology. On the other hand, he himself sometimes believes his version of truth to be unquestionable, ²³⁷ and his treatment of facts is not uninfluenced by his ideology, as well as his intentions as a satirist and political writer.

Foucault attempts here to give some perspective to the issue of truth:

'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements.... 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation

²³³ George Orwell, rev. of *The Spirit of Catholicism*, by Karl Adam, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. I (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 80.

²³⁴ Freedman says that "Verbal and incidental references to Catholic Christianity abound in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*" (610).

²³⁵ Orwell, "Extracts from a Manuscript Note-book" 513.

²³⁶ Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature" 61, 68.

²³⁷ See, for example, 154-6, 173-5 above.

with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it....It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.²³⁸

Unlike Foucault, Orwell does not always recognise the social, economic and cultural forces which shape the truths which he regards as obvious and axiomatic.²³⁹ As a satirist, Orwell's focus is necessarily a narrower one when he examines the issue of truth in relation to both Catholicism and Ingsoc, as well as the attitudes of both towards heretics. The similarity between these two systems of belief is heightened by the Church's monolithic quality in Orwell's day, as well as its tendency to negate the role of the individual conscience in favour of adherence to a single set of beliefs and rituals set out by the papacy in Rome.

Orwell's view of the Church as dangerous was fostered by the fact that the "literary Catholics whom he read about were generally conservative, sneerers at democracy..."²⁴⁰ and further inflamed by his experience in the Spanish Civil War, which made him see the Catholic Church as the powerful and conservative upholder of privilege. The degree to which Orwell saw Catholicism as a threat to liberty is stressed by his reference above to the Inquisition - a byword for dogmatism and torture - and it is perhaps no coincidence that O'Brien is an Irish name.

Orwell was more tolerant towards Protestantism, which has always stood for the primacy of the individual conscience, and he took some of the basic tenets of Christianity seriously, though his interest in it was primarily as a social force which was now spent, leaving a worrying gap in the ontological fabric of modern society:

²³⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 133.

²³⁹ See 156 above.

²⁴⁰ Hollis 89.

[B]elief in survival after death...is enormously less widespread than it was....There is little doubt that the modern cult of power worship is bound up with the modern man's feeling that life here and now is the only life there is. If death ends everything, it becomes much harder to believe that you can be in the right even if you are defeated....I do not want the belief in life after death to return....What I do point out is that its disappearance has left a big hole....Reared for thousands of years on the notion that the individual survives, man has got to make a considerable psychological effort to get used to the notion that the individual perishes.²⁴¹

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Winston Smith, who has formerly had an unshakeable belief in the importance of the individual, perishes without a trace. Orwell implicitly links this quality of meaninglessness to totalitarianism when he speaks of the influence of "the modern cult of power worship" and, in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* for example, it is the state which ensures that the memory of Winston will not survive. Sealing this sense of utter alienation are O'Brien's words to him: "Do you understand that you are *alone*? You are outside history, you are non-existent" confirming O'Brien's repeated jibe that Winston is "the last man."²⁴² This notion is reflected in Orwell's working title for the novel - *The Last Man in Europe*²⁴³ - which stresses that not just Winston, but the humanist philosophy which sustains him (and, to some degree, Orwell himself) is irrelevant because it is impotent. Winston Smith, whose name ironically contains an allusion to the British prime minister who led the country to victory, becomes a symbol of modern man struggling with the meaningless of modern life and being defeated by it. As R.D. Laing has it,

²⁴¹ George Orwell, "As I Please," 3 March 1944, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 102, 103.

²⁴² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 217.

²⁴³ Jonathan Rose, "The Invisible Sources of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*," *The Revised Orwell*, ed. Jonathan Rose (East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991) 131.

" 'There is nothing to be afraid of.' The ultimate reassurance and the ultimate terror." ²⁴⁴

Such terror arises from the sinister quality of the "comfort" offered, leading to a sense that life is persecutory and that there is nowhere to hide from all-powerful controlling forces. These feelings are not found only between the covers of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: they also coloured Orwell's own emotional life, as reflected in his attitudes towards the Catholic Church and the bitterness of his childhood memories as a young schoolboy (at St. Cyprian's school) depicted in the essay entitled "Such, Such Were the Joys." The thread which unites Orwell's views on Catholicism with the misery depicted in "Such, Such Were the Joys" is that of disappointed utopianism. In both cases the vehemence of Orwell's attack is directly related to the fact that, in very different ways, both one's childhood and the Catholic Church are supposed to offer forms of utopianism and, in Orwell's eyes, both failed to do so. Instead of offering an example of the radical message of Jesus, the Church took the side of Franco in Spain, and was generally reactionary in its politics. And, as far as St. Cyprian's is concerned, Orwell's attack on it clearly suggests that it failed to soothe his tender sensibilities and offer him the opportunities for freedom and growth necessary for a young boy. It is for this reason that Orwell's accounts of both the Church and his early schooldays take on a dystopian flavour - the preferred mode of a disappointed utopian.

It has already been suggested that in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Orwell draws the reader into an alternative world which is a mixture of actual totalitarian practices and a strong element of fantasy and exaggeration. He does something similar in relation to the Catholic Church, taking the rigidity, intolerance and dogmatism of the Church as it was then and demonizing it, making its claim to authority appear to be one of absolute power by means of his satire. The allusions to the Church in Orwell's novel are calculated to evoke it as it was at the height of the Inquisition (which Orwell equates

²⁴⁴ R.D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* and *The Bird of Paradise* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 33.

elsewhere with Catholicism), particularly in his use of terms such as "orthodoxy" and "heresy," as well as the inquisitorial and confessional thrust of O'Brien's treatment of Winston.

Confession - a cornerstone of the Catholic Church - is a central issue in the novel, Orwell stressing this aspect no doubt because he saw it as an invasion of people's privacy and because it may seem to lead to the weakening of individual conscience. At any rate, he shows Julia and Winston making no fewer than three confessions to O'Brien, each different in nature and all intended to pillory the practice of confession. The first occurs upon their arrival at O'Brien's flat, when Winston makes a confession that is unnecessarily self-abasing and distinctly masochistic:

We believe that there is some kind of conspiracy, some kind of secret organization working against the Party, and that you are involved in it. We want to join it and work for it. We are enemies of the Party. We disbelieve in the principles of Ingsoc. We are thought-criminals. We are also adulterers. I tell you this because we want to put ourselves at your mercy. If you want us to incriminate ourselves in any other way, we are ready.²⁴⁵

O'Brien then proceeds to play with them like a cat with a pair of mice, subjecting them to a set of questions which, in fact, elicit their second confession:

He began asking his questions in a low, expressionless voice, as though this were a routine, a sort of catechism, most of whose answers were known to him already.

'You are prepared to give your lives?'

'Yes.'

'You are prepared to commit murder?'

'Yes.'

²⁴⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 139-40.

'To commit acts of sabotage which may cause the death of hundreds of innocent people?'

'Yes.'

'To betray your country to foreign powers?'

'Yes.'

'You are prepared to cheat, to forge, to blackmail, to corrupt the minds of children, to distribute habit-forming drugs, to encourage prostitution, to disseminate venereal diseases - to do anything which is likely to cause demoralization and weaken the power of the Party?'

'Yes.'

'If, for example, it would somehow serve our interests to throw sulphuric acid in a child's face - are you prepared to do that?'

'Yes'²⁴⁶

According to Crick, "one critic, at least, sees this scene as central to the book and to Orwell's concerns. The whole book is thus about the state replacing God, and Orwell's agonized despair at believing in neither."²⁴⁷ Significantly, in this passage most of the desperate or appalling actions to which Winston and Julia are asked to give their assent are in fact practised by the Party itself and thus legitimated by its own ideology. Certainly the party commits murder, often upon innocent people, both in the Ministry of Love and, if Julia's earlier surmise is correct, by bombing London. Cheating and forging are major occupations of the Ministry of Truth, and drugs are abused by the Thought Police in the process of brainwashing people. Finally, by distorting children's relationships with their parents and turning them into political commissars, the Party is abusing them. The philosophy behind this programme accords very much with the spirit of the Party, particularly as expressed by O'Brien during his sessions with Winston in the Ministry of Love: any means are justified in the attainment and preservation of power. Yet, ironically, the programme is purportedly that of the Brotherhood - a fact which clearly suggests that

²⁴⁶ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 141-2.

²⁴⁷ Crick, *Reading Nineteen Eighty-Four* 32.

opponents of the Party have to become as evil as the Party in order to defeat it, or even threaten it. Patai concludes that, from this point on, "Winston is an active participant in the game [in the serious sense of the term] the two men are playing....Winston is [now] O'Brien's accomplice; he is thereby implicated in his own downfall...." ²⁴⁸ The issue of sado-masochism, discussed later in this chapter, is relevant here too.

The third confession occurs in the Ministry of Love where, at times during his torture sessions with Winston, O'Brien uses the language of the Catholic Church, speaking of heresy, confession, penitence, conversion, martyrdom and the Inquisition. He says, "We are the priests of power" and claims that if anyone "can merge himself in the Party...then he is all-powerful and immortal." ²⁴⁹ Thus the Party promises its faithful omnipotence (ironic in view of the context of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) as well as the traditional Christian gift of eternal life ("immortal"). To Winston, O'Brien has the air "even [of] a priest"²⁵⁰ and Winston's attitude to him is often that of a penitent and humble pupil or even sinner before a priest-teacher figure: well into his process of "conversion," he feels a "peculiar reverence for O'Brien which nothing seemed able to destroy." ²⁵¹ At the end of the novel Winston, sitting in the Chestnut Café listening to the telescreen relate the details of a great victory over Eurasia, experiences the inner "victory":

Winston, sitting in a blissful dream...was back in the Ministry of Love, with everything forgiven, his soul as white as snow. He was in the public dock, confessing everything, implicating everybody. He was walking down the white-tiled corridor, with the feeling of walking in sunlight, and an armed guard at his back. The long-hoped-for bullet was entering his brain. ²⁵²

²⁴⁸ Patai 231.

²⁴⁹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 212.

²⁵⁰ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 197.

²⁵¹ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 220.

²⁵² Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 239.

There are strong elements of religion and masochism here, with bliss being associated with the complete betrayal "of everybody" and then - the ultimate masochistic gesture - a feeling of joyous welcome towards the bullet which will take one's life. It is this parody of a soul in bliss that ends with the words "He loved Big Brother," an experience strongly recalling the spirit in which the followers of Jim Jones committed mass suicide in an ecstasy of self-abasement.²⁵³ Freedman regards Winston's tragic end as reflecting Orwell's fixation on modernist "autonomous, centered subjectivity of bourgeois thought and feeling....He can conceive of the *destruction* of individual autonomy, but he cannot really imagine its *transcendence*."²⁵⁴ Winston's subjectivity, systematically undermined by the process of interrogation and confession at the hands of O'Brien, is now irretrievably fragmented, his will totally surrendered to that of the Party:

He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.

THE END ²⁵⁵

Foucault comments on confession as follows:

The confession is...a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship...[to one who is] the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual...which...produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it

²⁵³ See 169 above.

²⁵⁴ Freedman 615.

²⁵⁵ Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* 239-40.

unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation.²⁵⁶

This description of confession is surely intended by Foucault to be sinister in its import, yet it is an accurate description of the interaction between Winston and O'Brien in the Ministry of Love.

Orwell's marked use of religious discourse within a totalitarian and dystopian context may well be intended to parody the Nazi practice of adopting such discourse, as described by Young:

Goebbels called the Nazi party 'a political church,' its members 'the political pastors of our people,' its mass meetings 'the divine services of our political work'; its dogmas were a 'Gospel' and a 'teaching of eternal life.'²⁵⁷

There is, in general, much in common between the concerns of Orwell and those of Foucault in this area, but where they part company is in their different stance towards, and divergent ways of dealing with these issues. Orwell's view of Catholicism as totalitarian in its dogmatism and invasiveness led him to equate it with Stalinist Communism,²⁵⁸ as what Sandison has called "confessional totalitarianism":

At first his linking together of the Communist Party and the Roman Catholic Church seems little more than an analogical convenience: the Communist Party in its heresy-trials and inquisitorial methods recalling the Church in its absolute hey-day. Even then it is often the Roman Catholics who bear the full brunt of his ferocious attacks.... Comparisons between them are so insistent and distinctions so often blurred that, morally, the Communist Party begins to look like the Catholic Church in

²⁵⁶ Foucault, *Sexuality* 61-2.

²⁵⁷ Young 79.

²⁵⁸ See, for example, 263 above.

mufti and the Catholic Church - to adapt a well-known adage - like the Communist Party on its knees. The explanation is, of course, that it is not simply totalitarianism but a confessional totalitarianism which poses the greatest threat to Orwell's fluctuating confidence in the idea of the personal self; and the greatest attraction.²⁵⁹

The presence of sado-masochism in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* has already been argued from Foucault's model of power,²⁶⁰ and Bouson suggests the involvement of "the author-manipulator" in these matters.²⁶¹ Sandison's last sentence suggests that Orwell was himself torn between a strong antipathy to totalitarianism and an equally strong attraction to the prospect of surrendering in confession to an apparently all-powerful person or system. This would imply a degree of masochism in Orwell himself - a notion which though provocative is not new, as Porter suggests:

In Winston's masochism, which appears excessive and overdetermined, biographically oriented critics have found their most convincing avenue for extrapolating from the protagonist to the historical author. The most thorough psychoanalytic study of the novel to date²⁶² speculates that five years of "traumatic overstimulation" at St. Cyprian's [Orwell's first school, about which he wrote a scathing critique] provoked in Eric Blair a rage that had no outlet, and that led in turn to fears of retaliation....The adult Orwell would have perpetuated his scapegoat role by identifying with workers and derelicts subject to economic victimization and helplessness.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Alan Sandison, *The Last Man in Europe: An Essay on George Orwell* (London: Macmillan, 1974) 117-18.

²⁶⁰ See 229-30 above.

²⁶¹ See 231 above.

²⁶² An unpublished paper by Martin D. Capell entitled "George Orwell: The Child-Scapegoat" delivered in April 1986.

²⁶³ Porter 74.

Zwerdling is another critic who identifies Orwell with his main character:

Orwell has transformed the genre [of fantasy] into a semi-confessional mode which expressed his own deepest conflicts and fears....He allowed himself to use even idiosyncratic personal fantasies in imagining the world of Oceania and the mind of Winston Smith. ²⁶⁴

Marcus supports this, but also comments on the positive use to which Orwell put such personal material, stressing how Orwell "was able to enlist his deepest conflicts and to at least some degree momentarily transcend them, as he largely does in *Animal Farm* and *1984*," this involving a "quasi-conscious creative use of his neurosis." ²⁶⁵

Chief among Orwell's conflicts and neuroses would be the sadism and masochism already discussed. Sadism, although a common ingredient of satire, is particularly prominent in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and, by some accounts at least, formed part of Orwell's make-up. ²⁶⁶ Meyer maintains that "the driving force of politics in Oceania is sadism." ²⁶⁷ Masochism is a strongly marked characteristic of many of Orwell's characters, but especially so in the case of Winston Smith and, as with sadism, aspects of masochism have been found in Orwell himself. ²⁶⁸ Williams believes that "what is being recorded, in Orwell, is the experience of a victim...." ²⁶⁹ and in fact *Nineteen Eighty-Four* encourages the reader to associate totalitarianism with the presence of sado-masochism.

The simultaneous presence of these two aspects is predictable:

²⁶⁴ Zwerdling, "Techniques of Didactic Fantasy" 94-95.

²⁶⁵ Steven Marcus, "George Orwell: Biography as Literature," *Partisan Review* 60:1 (1993): 47.

²⁶⁶ See 238 above.

²⁶⁷ Meyer 126.

²⁶⁸ Rai asserts that "Orwell can only allow his self-undermining 'masochism' free rein under cover...of [his] fiction (44).

²⁶⁹ Williams 292.

Neither sadism nor masochism exists without the other, at least unconsciously. The sadist gains vicarious pleasure from hurting the object and vicarious masochistic pleasure from simultaneously identifying with the object... Both sadism and masochism are blends of pleasure and pain, of erotic and aggressive drive elements.²⁷⁰

Neither sadism nor masochism is necessarily to be seen as a sign of grave mental illness, since these manifestations exist along a broad continuum, in some cases forming a virtually unnoticeable part of people's personality, in others having very obvious effects which may turn people into virtual social outcasts. In Orwell's case, his (imputed) sadism does not seem to have crippled him and, if Bentley's arguments are accepted, sadism is something that one would expect to find in the satirist. Certainly, this thesis has repeatedly stressed the high level of aggression to be found in satire - and, by extension, the satirist. As for the elements of masochism found in Orwell, they too seem to have been an important part of the creative process for him - in tandem with his sadistic aspects, if Rai's theory about Orwell has credence. Rai's notion is that Orwell's mind was always "splitting reality into 'adversarial' forms - 'victims' and 'victimisers', bourgeois proletarians and proletarian bourgeois, St George and the dragons...."²⁷¹

Marcus speaks of Orwell's "neurotic choices and behaviors" in living as a vagrant and a tramp, inter alia:

He undertook these "adventures" both as a form of self-laceration and penitence and as a means of appropriating material to write about. He consorted with the homeless, painfully disabling his hands by picking hops... [In Paris he] more or less voluntarily chose to starve for days at a time, and slaved at the lowest and most self-punishing labor he could find. [In his last days he chose] isolation and virtual self-mortification on the primitive island of Jura in the

²⁷⁰ Burness E. Moore and Bernard D. Fine, eds., *Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts* (New York: The American Psychoanalytic Association; New Haven: Yale UP, 1990) 171.

²⁷¹ Rai 73-4.

Hebrides.²⁷²

Leys compares Orwell with Simone Weil, believing that "they both burned with the same passion for justice, they both cultivated poverty and asceticism to a degree which bordered on self-punishment."²⁷³

Orwell's experiences when relatively young seem to have contributed directly to this kind of behaviour. One influence was his spell in Burma as a member of the Imperial Indian Police from which he resigned at the age of twenty-four after five years of service. A passage about this period in *The Road to Wigan Pier* is full of raw feeling:

I was not going back to be a part of that evil despotism. But I wanted much more than merely to escape from my job. For five years I had been part of an oppressive system, and it had left me with a bad conscience. Innumerable remembered faces - faces of prisoners in the dock, of men waiting in the condemned cells, of subordinates I had bullied and aged peasants I had snubbed, of servants and coolies I had hit with my fist in moments of rage...haunted me intolerably. I was conscious of an immense weight of guilt that I had got to expiate. I suppose that sounds exaggerated...I felt that I had got to escape not merely from imperialism but from every form of man's dominion over man.... And...I had carried my hatred of oppression to extraordinary lengths....Every suspicion of self-advancement, even to 'succeed' in life to the extent of making a few hundreds a year, seemed to me spiritually ugly, a species of bullying.²⁷⁴

Ingle believes that this experience gave Orwell a touchstone - "the imperial metaphor"²⁷⁵ - which he applied to a wide range of other moral and political

²⁷² Marcus 47.

²⁷³ Simon Leys, "Orwell: The Horror of Politics," *Quadrant* 28.12 (1983): 11.

²⁷⁴ Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* 129-30.

²⁷⁵ Stephen Ingle, "The Anti-Imperialism of George Orwell," *Literature and the Political Imagination*, eds. John Horton and Andrea T. Baumeister (London: Routledge, 1996) 224.

situations. According to this "imperialist model," one was "either exploiter or exploited and as he said...the exploited were always right and the exploiters always wrong."²⁷⁶ The point is not simply that all of Orwell's novels reflect this experience and these feelings, but that all are concerned, some to a small degree, many in a concentrated way, with the issues of human dignity and freedom (or their opposites) in the personal and political sense. As Marcus indicates,²⁷⁷ Orwell's biography shows that he carried these influences with him to the grave. He says that the feelings quoted above are "exaggerated," but the evidence suggests that they came from very deep within himself, and his last two novels indicate that these concerns became more intense, rather than diminishing, as he grew older. Calder says that "Crudely put, Orwell's message had always been 'keep humanity human,' and he spent his life in trying to show how Conservative values involved a denial of the right of fulfilment to a large section of humanity."²⁷⁸

The other strong emotional influence on Orwell's writing - particularly when it comes to the issue of sado-masochism - is particularly relevant to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, though it comes from even earlier in his life: his years at a preparatory school, St. Cyprian's, which he describes in detail in his dystopian essay "Such, Such Were the Joys." Orwell does caution readers of this essay against too sympathetic a view of the young protagonist, saying that "No one can look back on his schooldays and say with truth that they were altogether unhappy" and "Whoever writes about his childhood must beware of exaggeration and self-pity."²⁷⁹ Yet, despite this, Orwell still proceeded to write a tale which reflects the helplessness of the child in an adult world with such power and accuracy that it is less an indictment of the school in question than a voice which speaks for the wounded part of every reader except some lucky few. The centrality of this essay to the interpretation of *Nineteen Eighty-*

²⁷⁶ Ingle, "Anti-Imperialism" 228.

²⁷⁷ See 274 above.

²⁷⁸ Calder, "Orwell's Post-War Prophecy" 152.

²⁷⁹ George Orwell, "Such, Such Were the Joys," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 344, 347.

than I had imagined." ²⁸² In terms of the reaction of his psyche, infinite wickedness would have been seen as worthy of infinite punishment. In fact, later in the essay, speaking more generally about his boyhood, he indicates that he felt profoundly "that I was no good, that I was wasting my time, wrecking my talents...and all this, it seemed, was inescapable, because I lived among laws which were...not possible for me to keep." ²⁸³ The fantasy and nightmare aspects of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are clearly prefigured here: the normal laws of cause and effect do not apply because one inhabits a world which has no predictable framework or boundaries within which one can safely operate.

An important restatement of these ideas in "Such, Such Were the Joys" occurs when Orwell links them to his childhood notions of religion:

The Prayer Book told you, for example, to love God and fear him: but how could you love someone whom you feared?.... It was equally clear that one ought to love one's father, but I knew very well that I merely disliked my own father, whom I had barely seen before I was eight and who appeared to me as a gruff-voiced elderly man forever saying "Don't." It was not that one did not want to possess the right qualities or feel the correct emotions, but that one could not. The good and the possible never seemed to coincide. ²⁸⁴

These are the thoughts of a young person who has not yet learned to value or really understand the depth and complexity of interaction that occurs between people. His problem at this point - which is precisely that of Outer Party members in his novel - is not how to relate to others, but how to gain a sense of being right with his world by feeling and doing the correct thing so that he will be accepted and not punished. There is a deep sense of pathos here since he finds himself rudderless, in this case apparently because he lacked

²⁸² Orwell, "Such" 334.

²⁸³ Orwell, "Such" 343-44.

²⁸⁴ Orwell, "Such" 360.

the love and guidance of an involved and concerned father. Orwell's childhood experience of father-figures, whether his actual father or the fatherly God of Judaeo-Christian belief, can be directly linked to the way he presents that protitutor of fatherly qualities, Big Brother.

Towards the end of "Such, Such Were the Joys," Orwell homes in on his main point :

The weakness of the child is that it starts with a blank sheet. It neither understands nor questions the society in which it lives, and because of its credulity other people can work upon it, infecting it with the sense of inferiority and the dread of offending against mysterious, terrible laws.²⁸⁵

There is, perhaps, a parallel with the case of Franz Kafka here, of whom it has been said, "To the end of his life, Kafka persisted in denouncing school as a 'conspiracy of the grown-ups', the lapidary half-truth still charged with the despair of the six-year-old."²⁸⁶

Other accounts of Orwell's childhood, by his sister and by a friend of his, seem to cast doubt on the reliability of "Such, Such Were the Joys." Orwell's sister, Avril Dunn, has the following to say about this period of Orwell's life:

It has been said that Eric had an unhappy childhood. I don't think this was in the least true, although he did give out that impression himself when he was grown-up....Every summer we used to go down to Cornwall. My mother and father used to take a house or furnished rooms perhaps, and really we used to have a lovely time down there - bathing....He [Orwell] always

²⁸⁵ Orwell, "Such" 368.

²⁸⁶ Ernst Pawel, *The Nightmare of Reason: A Life of Franz Kafka* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984) 26.

seemed perfectly happy.²⁸⁷

Jacintha Buddicom, a close friend of Orwell's in his youth, "wrote a book about their childhood in which she claimed that 'he was a specially happy child'. She cast shrewd doubts on the literal accuracy of the great polemic against prep schools."²⁸⁸ Finally, it should be mentioned that Orwell's account of life at St. Cyprian's has also been challenged by one or two of the pupils who were there with him²⁸⁹ - and an article by Pearce systematically and comprehensively undermines the literal credibility of "Such, Such Were the Joys."²⁹⁰

However Michael Shelden, Orwell's authorised biographer, gives a different perspective on the matter:

Old men can claim that their memories of St. Cyprian's are warm and golden, but Orwell is not writing a version to satisfy them. His account of his childhood terrors is so compelling not because every word of it is literally true, but because - from beginning to end - it strives to be true to the one thing which matters most to its author: the impressions and feelings of his boyhood, a time when he lacked the articulate voice to speak up for himself. Throughout his work, Orwell uses his power over words to provide an eloquent voice for others whose voices have been silenced or ignored - political prisoners in Spain, tramps in London, miners in Wigan. In 'Such, Such Were the Joys' he is an impassioned advocate for himself, for the boy he once was.²⁹¹

²⁸⁷ Avril Dunn, "My Brother, George Orwell," *Orwell Remembered*, eds. Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick (London: Ariel, 1984) 27.

²⁸⁸ Crick, *George Orwell* 80.

²⁸⁹ See, for example, Henry Longhurst, "A Sportsman Defends the Old Prep School," *Orwell Remembered*, eds. Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick (London: Ariel, 1984) 35.

²⁹⁰ Robert Pearce, "Truth and Falsehood: George Orwell's Prep School Woes," *Review of English Studies* 43:171 (1992): 367-86.

²⁹¹ Michael Shelden, *The Authorised Biography* (London: Heinemann, 1991) 35.

The point is that Orwell never was - and never claimed to be - a merely objective recorder of what he saw around him. He was a man who felt passionately, who wanted to make a difference to the world by what he wrote, and who shaped and pointed his thoughts and experience to that end. He was also a polemicist (of the best kind), as well as a satirist. He was keenly aware of how his own experience was also that of many others and he was outraged that any child should be subjected to such treatment, as he was outraged to think that any people should be subjected to authoritarian or totalitarian government, or that any group should be repressed by the Catholic Church. His early experiences determined the kind of issues that aroused his passion, and by exaggerating and distorting both the events concerned and his feelings about them into a new kind of emotional reality,²⁹² he produced a satirical novel of the power of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Shelden concludes:

Endless theories have been put forward to explain [*Nineteen Eighty-Four's*] vision of the future, but not many critics have been willing to see how firmly rooted it is in Orwell's past.

Almost every aspect of Orwell's life is in some way represented in the book.²⁹³

Jasbir Jain believes that "The significance of 'Such, Such Were the Joys' does not lie in its autobiographical element; it lies in the expression of Orwell's opinions about the relationship of the individual to the outer reality."²⁹⁴ This essay is, among other things, a piece of satire in which Orwell is inviting his readers into an alternative world where children are powerless. Satirists do not simply attempt to reflect reality in a precise way, but rather react to specific events or ideas, distorting them in order to highlight aspects of them. The source and nature of such distortion are worth examining, since satirists are among the least disinterested of artists. Satirists have axes to grind - and also to swing. It is thus of interest to the recipients of satire, who are usually

²⁹² See 233-4 above for a discussion of Francis Bacon and "distorting into reality".

²⁹³ Shelden 470-1.

²⁹⁴ Jasbir Jain, "Orwell: From Clerisy to Intelligentsia," *George Orwell*, eds. Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky (New York: Greenwood P, 1987) 44.

its direct or indirect victims, to know something about the size, the origins and the relative keenness of the satirical axe. It is also important to know something about the nature and the fulcrum of the swing, which can come at the audience impelled by a large measure of controlled intellectual contempt or be launched at the reader straight from the depths of the satirist's subconscious mind, weighted with deadly quantities of long-simmering pain and outrage. It is in this context that this thesis views "Such, Such were the Joys" as a serious piece of evidence about Orwell's feelings and his motivations for writing, even though it may not be a faithful historical account of what happened. Orwell himself makes the same point about writing in general:

I give all this background information because I do not think one can assess a writer's motives without knowing something of his early development. [B]efore he ever begins to write he will have acquired an emotional attitude from which he will never completely escape...but if he escapes from his earlier influences altogether, he will have killed his impulse to write.²⁹⁵

The fact that he forwarded "Such, Such Were the Joys" to his publisher in 1947 (even though he worked on it earlier)²⁹⁶ suggests that Orwell was thinking about this essay during the writing of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which occurred between 1946 and 1948.²⁹⁷ The influence of current events on *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is stressed by Zwerdling, who points out that the novel was taking shape in Orwell's mind at just about the time when the first detailed reports about the Nazi concentration camps were being published in Britain.²⁹⁸ At the core of this chapter lies Orwell's view of totalitarian government as a system which, by means of persecution and victimisation,

²⁹⁵ Orwell, "Why I Write" 3.

²⁹⁶ George Orwell, letter to F.J. Warburg, 31 May 1947, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 330.

²⁹⁷ Hammond 68.

²⁹⁸ Alex Zwerdling, "Orwell's Psychopolitics," *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*, ed. Ejner J. Jensen (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984) 91-2.

induces a state of regression in those under its sway (in the same way as regression is shown to be induced and perpetuated in "Such, Such Were the Joys"). People are forced, in subtle and unsubtle ways, to surrender their deepest selves to the state and are prevented, in both the public and private spheres, from realising their potential as human beings: they are not allowed to grow up and relate to the world in a healthy way.

The traditional psychological view of the father is, *inter alia*, that he functions as a bridge between the developing child and the outside world: he is the parent who is primarily responsible for the child's healthy integration into the wider community. Big Brother does come across as fatherly, but as a false father - one who is presented as caring and gentle yet in fact stands for a system of bewilderingly vague and capricious rules, accompanied by wholesale bullying and violence, both physical and emotional, which are the binary opposite of the nurturing function and the just use of power typical of true fatherhood. In Oceania this betrayal of fatherliness, referred to in this thesis as punitive fatherhood, functions not only on a public level but also in the private sphere, where it invades and disrupts relationships within families, as well as between co-workers, friends and lovers. This, for Orwell, is the link between the world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and such seemingly disparate areas as Nazism, St. Cyprian's school, Catholicism and Stalinist Communism. In all of these Orwell saw the dystopian exercise of punitive fatherhood: a thin veneer of beneficence offering freedom behind which lurks the killing power of ideology, deliberately blocking off the paths to a multifaceted view of reality and denying access to authentic experience and growth.

The disjunction between utopia and dystopia, though often covert, is ever-present in satire and this contributes to the dynamic tension within which satire operates. One of the fascinations that satirists exercise for people is that they are the carriers of the myth of utopia, as well as its living refutation: they are the bearers of the deepest hopes and disappointments of society. They tease out the implications of utopian myth and show its bearing on the society of the time, using dystopian methods to demonstrate how far short it

falls of the ideal. They help society to take its failure seriously, but they often introduce a light-hearted note to offset such failure - even if the humour is decidedly black, as in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Another dualistic quality revealed in satire is its combination of radicalism and conservatism: the mythical aspect of satire may suggest a conservatism, as may the utopian view it takes, if these involve looking back on the past as a lost source of perfection. However, myth which looks forwards to the future or dystopian satire which has lost its faith in the future is often radical in nature.

This thesis has stressed that while satire is very much part of society, there are many ways in which it operates on the fringes of society - its allegiances dubious, its commitment ambiguous, its stance hovering between playfulness, seriousness and anarchy. The thesis concludes that satire and postmodernism share some common ground, while acknowledging that they also have distinct differences. The unfixed aspect of satire constitutes a kind of "deferral" which is related to, though not identical with, the Derridean sense of the word - an avoidance of absolutes and closure that is a key factor linking satire and postmodernism, and contributing to the penetrating and restless quality of both these discourses.

Conclusion

This thesis began by examining the relationship between the satirist and society, showing the satirist as occupying an equivocal position in society, with the citizenry treading a fine line between interest or amusement on the one hand, and fear of the satirist on the other. The state is often equally ambivalent towards satire, frequently walking an uneasy path between grudging acceptance and harsh suppression of satire. It has also been argued that satirists at work are complex and equivocal, but unique: satire makes use of irony, parody, the grotesque, allegory and other forms of distortion - all indirect and oblique discourses which allow the satirist to retain an uncommitted stance. Yet, it seems, this lack of commitment may hide a deeper, if unconventional, commitment in the satirist. Orwell was certainly committed to an ideology (though not a party) he called "democratic socialism" and, on a personal level, Crick sees him as highly committed:

Blair came to adopt the Orwell part of himself as an ideal image to be lived up to: an image of integrity, honesty, simplicity, egalitarian conviction, plain living, plain writing and plain speaking, in all a man with an almost reckless commitment to speaking out unwelcome truths.¹

In the case of Orwell, the habitual complexity of satirists overlay both his ideals and his very name. Crick's comments above sum up Orwell's life, describing in a nutshell the man who began as the rather ordinary middle-class Eric Blair, but who gradually gained the stature of his alter ego, George Orwell ("The Orwell was a river he knew and liked, the whole name had a manly, English, indeed country-sounding, ring to it...").² Orwell's life was essentially about process, not stasis, involving the creative but unpredictable state of liminality which this thesis sees as part of the mechanics of satire. It is significant that liminality is evident in the fabric of Orwell's life as well as in his art.

¹ Crick, *George Orwell* 28.

² Crick, *George Orwell* 234.

The thesis has looked at how satire uses liminality to sever its audiences from their connection with the linguistic worlds they unthinkingly occupy. More specifically, satire uses the oblique discourses mentioned above to create alternative worlds which, by means of various strategies, it invites its audience to inhabit for a while, with the aim of creating movement and play in the way its audience views its own worlds.

The thesis has drawn on Bakhtin's notion of dialogism, which views the textual juxtaposition of several "voices" (heteroglossia) as a subversive force. For Bakhtin satire is a discourse which is particularly effective in creating dialogism - and his views on the strategies of satire are similar to those of this thesis. Both value satire for the same reason: it attacks the fixed patterns of language and thought which are responsible for inflexible ways of seeing the world. The thesis has introduced a further note of subversion in the form of postmodernism, with its playfulness and its disrespect for master narratives and its tendency, too, to foster dialogism by accepting multiple views of the world.

The thesis has provided a backdrop against which various discourses operate, both independently and in relation to other discourses. Satire, dialogism and postmodernism have been used to open up faultlines, and to explore and challenge various perceptions and discourses, within the polis. Postmodernism has been used to suggest new views on satire, by reframing and redefining it as a complex dynamic, rather than a closed and predictable system, creating a process of dialogism between satire and the society within which it operates. Dialogic relationships have been also created between satire and certain other discourses operating within society, which have revealed both the strengths and the weaknesses of satire. On the one hand, there is the value of an independent voice, with no formal political power, the importance of the satirist's prophetic role and the healthiness of a discourse which relentlessly exposes the hypocrisy and corruption of society. On the other hand, satire has been seen to have a tendency to didacticism and lack of fairness, while there is a large element of subjectivity in the satirist's choice

of target and mode of attack. However, this dialogic process has opened up more serious flaws in some of the socio-political discourses which co-exist with satire in many societies, showing them to be more far-reaching, more powerful and less gentle, despite the ferocious rhetoric of satire. Above all, these discourses have been shown as more covert than satire, and liable to embed people in rigid alternative worlds from which they cannot easily escape. In the course of further dialogic process, the disapprobatory view of these discourses has been engaged with more positive views of them, often by invoking postmodernism - and it is this kind of dialogism which has drawn the thesis closer to an examination of the specific faultlines in Orwell's satirical writing.

Other issues pertaining specifically to Orwell have arisen when the thesis has initiated dialogic processes which highlight his conservative modernist ideology in contrast to the postmodern stance, raised issues of power and sado-masochism, and shown the disjunction between Orwell's ideology and his more radical satiric praxis. The thesis has wrestled with the notions of fixedness and epistemology, as expressed by Orwell politically and as a satirist, exploring Orwell's modernist approach to issues such as language, ideology, propaganda and myth. It has used dialogism and postmodernism to challenge Orwell's views, suggesting that he is sometimes as guilty as his satiric targets in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* of authoritarianism, closed thinking, prescription, one-sided views of the world, unimaginativeness and intolerance. Satire in general has been shown to fall short of postmodernism as a way of exploring new worlds in an open way, and the limitations of Orwell may well be typical of those of the satirist in general. These limitations have a great deal to do with the conservatism and didactic bias which are an inherent part of satire, emerging to different degrees in the work of different satirists, and accompanying its radical thrust. These contrasting but limited qualities may help to give satire its particular focused quality, but also lead to a sacrifice of breadth and inclusiveness. In the case of Orwell, he focuses particularly narrowly on his own experience, both

political and personal - and the times he lived in also weigh heavily in the message of his two last novels.

More specifically, in *Animal Farm* the necessarily narrow focus of satire is compounded by Orwell's single-minded view of historical events, while the alarmist notions about discourses such as propaganda and ideology found in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* serve, to some degree, to limit the novel's viewpoint to a particular historical time. This has served to highlight the relationship between society and satire, as well as the other social discourses examined in the thesis. Orwell challenged many of the trends of his time, but he also confirmed some of its most deep-seated ideologies and myths. He stood for a liberal humanism which had its roots so entangled in the past that it had become defensive and lost some of its energy. The postmodern (specifically deconstructive) focus in this thesis has revealed how in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* he could parody a prescriptive system of language, while still displaying in his essays on language a linguistic and philosophical conservatism which is akin to that of prescriptiveness - and yet not be conscious of the disjunction.

It is this specific disjunction - between Orwell's modernist stance and that of postmodernism - which has been exploited by this thesis. The dialogic process between these two modes has suggested that Orwell's modernist cast of mind makes him less flexible towards alternative discourses. His espousal of socialism is a related factor which increases this disjunction, since socialism embodies a utopian dream, and postmodernism is suspicious of utopian thinking, unless the issue concerns heterotopias.³ This has also created dialogism between postmodernism and discourses such as ideology, propaganda and myth, since all of these contain a utopian element, implying that they will open the way to a better world, or even a perfect one. Satirical, overtly political texts like *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* find such

³ This term is taken from the introduction by Tobin Seebers, ed., *Heterotopia: Postmodern Utopia and the Body Politic* (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994) 20.

offers of utopia highly suspect, and portray them as dystopic instead yet, paradoxically, satire is itself not devoid of utopian thinking. As Steinhoff comments, "Orwell had a lifelong interest in this genre [of utopian literature] and its typical themes; he was absorbed by the relation of rulers to ruled, the satirical portrayal of utopias...and what the future was going to be like."⁴ Yet Orwell's sensibility was as much rooted in the past: Wolf sees Orwell's writing as a contrast between "the humanism of character" and "pastoral associations" of "the pre-1914 period" on the one hand, and "the technologies and technological fantasies of totalitarianisms in the modern period" on the other.⁵

It is through his satire that Orwell is most heavily engaged in the dialogics that occur between utopianism and dystopianism, the latter being a soured version of the former. This thesis has maintained that satirists are covert idealists or utopians: they patently want conditions in society to improve, yet what drives them is clearly stronger than a mere wish for improvement. But they are utopians who, because of their aggressively demythologising enterprises, are acutely aware of the unattainability of the paradise or other mythological utopian past which we have all lost, whether it is felt through the collective unconscious of a society or the personal nostalgia for a childhood which now seems paradisaic. Rabkin refers to utopian writing as "a consolation for today cast in the forms of tomorrow but borrowed for us from our own personal past."⁶ Dystopian writing - the shadow side of utopian writing - offers the opposite of comfort, but Rabkin's remarks about the future and "our own personal past" remain highly pertinent.

In the case of the dystopian writing of Orwell, it has been suggested that the promise of modernism, in terms of culture, politics and technology, failed him - it disappointed his utopian longings and, for Rezler, utopianism is

⁴ William Steinhoff, "Utopia Reconsidered: Comments on 1984," *No Place Else: Explorations in Utopian and Dystopian Fiction*, eds. Eric S. Rabkin, Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983) 152.

⁵ Wolf 26-7.

⁶ Eric S. Rabkin, "Atavism and Utopia," *No Place Else: Explorations in Utopian and Dystopian Fiction*, eds. Eric S. Rabkin, Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983) 10.

"essentially reactionary,"⁷ despite its traditional association with ideas of progress. The focus of Orwell's satire is against what modernism has become, rather than what it should be - a view which reinforces the point made elsewhere that elements of Orwell's ideology are very conservative, and have a certain nostalgia for things as they were, or as they might have been:

Orwell was very attached to the past, both to the Edwardian years of his childhood, and to the longer past preserved in history and literature. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* he makes a horrified but fascinated exploration of the possibility that the past could be abolished by the power of the state.⁸

In this particular sense, Orwell was not at one with the tenor of his times - an ironic aspect in one who so strongly proclaimed his belief in the value and power of lived experience and everyday reality. But, whether by his disappointed utopianism, his refusal to accept the stock brand of English socialism and his necessarily marginalised position as a satirist, or by virtue of his lack of close personal relationships, his self-imposed geographical and social exile, first in London and Paris and, finally, on the lonely island of Jura, Orwell lived the life of an expatriate, even when he was geographically in Britain. Expatriates, whether they be exiles in a geographical sense or of the mind, often cherish an idealised notion of the mental or physical homeland they have left behind. The conservatism of exiles in this respect seems to arise primarily from the nostalgically utopian view they have of the longed-for place, with the implicit sense that it will not - or should not - change, and will thus provide a kind of mental stability. Utopia is essentially a condition of stasis: once the perfect place exists, no changes can be permitted, since one cannot improve on perfection:

⁷ André Rezler, "Man as Nostalgia: The Image of the Last Man in Twentieth-Century Postutopian Fiction," *Visions of Apocalypse: End or Rebirth?*, eds. Saul Friedländer, Gerald Holton, Leo Marx and Eugene Skolnikoff (New York: Holmes and Neier, 1985) 197.

⁸ Bernard Bergonzi, "*Nineteen Eighty-Four* and the Literary Imagination," *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*, eds. D. Baker-Smith and C.C. Barfoot (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987) 221.

The attempt of utopian writers to freeze history - the fight of utopia against history - has prompted severe criticism of the whole enterprise; but the attempt has been merely one way in which man has tried to arrive imaginatively at the condition of paradise on earth.⁹

However, there is an alternative to such stasis in the depiction of utopia, though it is not always open to the modernist writer. This involves the displacement of the sign "utopia," with its fixed binarism of familiar world / utopia, and its replacement with the postmodern conception of heterotopias: a series of alternative worlds which offers different views of utopia, rather than a single utopia which becomes a (limiting) master narrative. In this respect, Roland Barthes has more affinity with satire than conventional utopianism when he advocates "speaking...out of context...by describing utopias of language - places where neither speaker's intention nor society's ideology holds sway."¹⁰ Moylan takes this even further with his discussion of "critical utopias," which are seditious and self-aware rather than prescriptive, as well as encouraging exploration rather than the adoption of a fixed position:

To be part of the emancipatory project, therefore, [critical] utopian writing breaks with the limits of the traditional genre and becomes a self-critical and disturbingly open form that articulates the deep tensions within the political unconscious at the present moment. The imposed totality of the single utopian text gives way to the contradictory and diverse multiplicity of a broad utopian dialogue.¹¹

At this point satire and utopia part company: this sophisticated and liberatory mode of utopian writing makes demands which satire, even with its liking for

⁹ Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1970) 10.

¹⁰ Mary Bittner Wiseman, "Rewriting the Self: Barthes and the Utopias of Language," *Literature and the Question of Philosophy*, ed. Anthony J. Cascardi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987) 312.

¹¹ Tom Moylan, *Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination* (New York: Methuen, 1986) 210.

liminality, cannot meet. Satire, for all its advantages and usefulness to society, is ultimately more conservative and narrow in its aims and, certainly, critical utopianism is very far from both ordinary utopianism and dystopias such as *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

These two novels have demonstrated clearly how dystopia, the parodic version of utopia, nevertheless offers the same quality of stasis: though the motivation is the opposite of idealism, as the dystopian world is constructed by the writer in disillusion and outrage, dystopia strives for the same degree of perfect unchangeability as in the case of a utopian world. Ironically, though, in the stifling world of the dystopian novel (particularly in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*) it is ordinary life which becomes the protagonists' longed-for utopian vision.¹² Certainly, *Nineteen-Eighty Four* offers Winston a depressing future, while the past, which was for Orwell the present, is treated with wistful yearning: the meagre advantages of post-war Britain, such as the availability of a certain number of books, as well as objects with only aesthetic value, in addition to many individual freedoms, including those of thought and speech, are for Winston things for which he can only long.¹³ It is common cause that Orwell stood for these latter freedoms, yet in this novel he, an avowed socialist, seems to represent such freedoms as a function of the capitalist society in which he lived. However, Orwell was not oblivious to such contradictions, as this piece he wrote in 1944 shows:

Indeed, if one thinks of the artist as an...autonomous individual who owes nothing to society, then the golden age of the artist was the age of capitalism. He had then escaped from the patron and not yet been captured by the bureaucrat....Yet it remains true that capitalism, which in many ways was kind to the artist and the intellectual generally, is doomed and is not worth saving anyway. So you arrive at these two antithetical facts: (1) Society

¹² Elaine Hoffman Baruch, "The Golden Country": Sex and Love in 1984," *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 48.

¹³ Arthur Eckstein, in "1984 and George Orwell's Other View of Capitalism," *Modern Age* 29.1 (1985), makes this point very fully (11-12).

cannot be arranged for the benefit of artists; (2) without artists civilization perishes. I have never yet seen this dilemma solved (there must be a solution), and it is not often that it is honestly discussed.¹⁴

At the very least, one can say that Orwell was torn between his nostalgic longings and artistic values on the one hand, and his socialist ideals on the other¹⁵ - in effect, two conflicting utopian notions, one based in the past and the other in the future. Yet the view of this thesis has been that, in satire, conflicting views are neither undesirable nor confusing, since they may impel an audience into the desirable state of liminality. Cope, arguing in a different context, provides a formulation which sums up the point here: "Satire never sparks a simple argument between defective experience and unreachable ideals, but sews them together on an infinitesimal seam, where they may touch but never intersect."¹⁶ This reflects the open-ended nature of satire, as well as its combination of seriousness and playfulness: the fallen state of humankind is pointed out and the utopian ideal implicitly invoked, but the two are not inextricably yoked together, and the game of the satirist is to evoke a liminal state within which the language world of the audience may become more fluid.

Side-by-side with personal and public utopias and dystopias, issues of control are crucial to both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. One of the chief concerns of this thesis has been power and its many failures: *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* show how power can dehumanise both the wielders and the victims of power. Power has been shown to be very ambivalent: there is always the risk that power will damage the ability of governing structures to stay flexible and responsive - and yet, at the same time, power is hugely attractive to most people. Foucault demonstrates the insidious seductiveness of power, and Orwell himself seems to have fought a

¹⁴ George Orwell, "As I Please," 8 September 1944, *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 229-30.

¹⁵ Bergonzi (221) makes a similar point.

¹⁶ Cope 178.

battle against this aspect of power - hence his abrupt rejection of his career in the Burmese police and his adventures as a tramp, both arguably an attempt to flee from what he found attractive, but also hated. The occasional sadistic incidents, related by his friends, may suggest that the dark side of his nature could arise unbidden. Orwell's description of the torture scenes in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* suggests that the line between enjoying and being repelled by the exercise of power is a very thin one: certainly O'Brien enjoys it, but the question arises as to whether both Orwell and Winston have mixed feelings about it. The quality of Orwell's fury with institutions such as the Catholic Church and St Cyprian's is so energetically overstated that it strongly suggests a subconscious need to keep his own unacknowledged feelings about power at bay.

It is interesting, therefore, that satire is the discourse he used for his most effective fictional writing, since satire has a violent streak, though, as noted earlier, it has no political teeth. Yet satire is also more open and flexible than most other discourses, as it attempts to "make strange" existing views of the world and encourage new ways of understanding it. It is a discourse which instinctively mistrusts power and attempts to distance itself from it, often by means of playfulness. Orwell's great seriousness of temperament and sense of social responsibility ensured that he would not become a satirist whose work exploded with jokes and puns. Nevertheless, in a more important sense, he was faithful to the tradition of satire, having the courage to remain a maverick despite his conservative political views, not committing himself entirely to any one party or philosophy, but instead, in *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in particular, devoting himself to creating satirical texts which encourage people to re-examine the bases of their own thinking and question the actions of their institutions. This is the demystifying role of satire, exercised by one who steadfastly remained on the fringes of society, inviting his readers to participate in liminal and dialogic processes, writing as he said

one should, "as an individual, an outsider, at the most an unwelcome guerrilla."¹⁷

Adams, R.M. "The Sin of Veilings." *Alvin T. S. and the World*. Ed. J.K. P. Clifford Green. New York: Norton, 1971. 203-14.

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Towards an Investigation)." *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review, 1971. 127-54.

Apology. *The Evening Standard*, 30 May 1977. 1.

Apter, David E., ed. *Ideology and Discontent*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1965.

— "Ideology and Discontent." *Ideology and Discontent*. Ed. David E. Apter. Glencoe: The Free P., 1965. 15-46.

Arendt, Hannah. *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought*. London: Faber, 1961.

— *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. London: Faber, 1963.

— *The Human Condition*. Chicago: U of Chicago P., 1959.

— *The Origins of Totalitarianism: 1950*. New York: Vintage Publishing Company, 1958.

Amalring, Juan. *Animal Farm by George Orwell*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1977.

Alton, Raymond. *Democracy and Totalitarianism: Three Views from the Left*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

Atkins, Douglas G. *Reading Deconstruction: Geographical Perspectives*. Lexington, UP of Kentucky, 1983.

Austen, Jane. *Sense and Sensibility*. Ed. R.W. Chapman. London: Oxford UP, 1933.

Bacon, Francis. Interview with Joshua Gliden. "I Think About Death Every Day." *Saturday Review*, September 1991: 30-9.

Bacon, Francis. "Meditationes Sacrae: On Heresies." *The Works of Francis Bacon*. Eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Parker Heath. Vol. VII. London: Longman, 1898. 231-4.

Baker-Smith, D. and C.C. Barfoot, eds. *Between Death and Justice: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997.

¹⁷ George Orwell, "Writers and Leviathan," *CEJL*, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 413.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, R.M. "The Sense of Verification." *Myth, Symbol, and Culture*. Ed. Clifford Geertz. New York: Norton, 1971. 203 -14.
- Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)." *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review P, 1971. 127 - 86.
- Apology. *The Evening Standard* 10 May 1977: 4.
- Apter, David E., ed. *Ideology and Discontent*. Glencoe: The Free P, 1964.
- . "Ideology and Discontent." *Ideology and Discontent*. Ed. David E. Apter. Glencoe: The Free P, 1964. 15-46.
- Arendt, Hannah. *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought*. London: Faber, 1961.
- . *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. London: Faber, 1963.
- . *The Human Condition*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1958.
- . *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. 1950. New York: World Publishing Company, 1958.
- Armstrong, Jean. *Animal Farm by George Orwell*. London: Macmillan, 1985.
- Aron, Raymond. *Democracy and Totalitarianism*. Trans. Valence Ionescu. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.
- Atkins, Douglas G. *Reading Deconstruction, Deconstructive Reading*. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1983.
- Austen, Jane. *Sense and Sensibility*. Ed. R.W. Chapman. London: Oxford UP, 1933.
- Bacon, Francis. Interview with Joshua Gilden. "I Think About Death Every Day." *Saturday Review* September 1981: 36-9.
- Bacon, Francis. "Meditationes Sacrae: On Heresies." *The Works of Francis Bacon*. Eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath. Vol. VII. London: Longman, 1859. 252-4.
- Baker-Smith, D. and C.C. Barfoot, eds. *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Trans. Caryl

- Emerson and Michael Holquist. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.
- . Introduction. *Rabelais and his World*. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. 1965; Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984
- Bannet, Eve Tavor. *Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent: Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.
- Barrell, John. *Poetry, Language and Politics*. Cultural Politics Series. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1988.
- Bartlett, F.C. *Political Propaganda*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1940.
- Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. Selected and trans. Anette Lavers. London: Jonathan Cape, 1972.
- . *Writing Degree Zero*. Trans. Anette Lavers and Colin Smith. London: Jonathan Cape, 1967.
- Baruch, Elaine Hoffman. "'The Golden Country': Sex and Love in 1984." *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*. Ed. Irving Howe. New York: Harper & Row, 1983. 47-56.
- Baudrillard, Jean et al. *Art and Philosophy*. No ed. Milan: Giancarlo Politi Editore, 1991.
- Beauchamp, Gorman. "From Bingo to Big Brother: Orwell on Power and Sadism." *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Ejner J. Jensen. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984. 65-85.
- Bell, Daniel. *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. Glencoe: The Free P, 1960.
- Belsey, Catherine. *Critical Practice*. London: Methuen, 1980.
- Bendix, Reinhard. "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing." *Ideology and Discontent*. Ed. David E. Apter. Glencoe: The Free P., 1964. 294-327.
- X Bentley, Joseph. "Satire and the Rhetoric of Sadism." *Centennial Review* 11 (1967): 387-404.
- Berg, Christian, Frank Durieux and Geert Lernout, eds. *The Turn of the Century / Le tournant du siècle: Modernism and Modernity in the Arts / Le modernisme et la modernité dans la littérature et les arts*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995.
- Bergonzi, Bernard. "Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Literary Imagination." *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*. Eds. D.

Baker-Smith and C.C. Barfoot. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987 211-28.

Berwick, Donald M. *The Reputation of Jonathan Swift 1781-1882*. New York: Haskell House, 1941.

Bettelheim, Bruno. *The Informed Heart*. 1960. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986.

---. *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1976.

X Bloom, Edward and Lillian D. Bloom. *Satire's Persuasive Voice*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979.

Bogardus, Emory S. *The Making of Public Opinion*. New York: Association P, 1951.

Bogel, Frederic V. "The Difference Satire Makes: Reading Swift's Poems." *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*. Eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 43-53.

Bogdanor, Vernon. "In or Out?." *The Listener* 115.2956 (1986): 28-9.

Bolinger, Dwight. *Language - The Loaded Weapon*. London: Longman, 1980.

Booth, Wayne C. *The Rhetoric of Irony*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1974.

Bouchard, Donald F., ed. *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977.

Boulson, J. Brooks. "The 'Hidden Agenda' of Winston Smith: Pathological Narcissism and 1984." *University of Hartford Studies in Literature*. 18.1 (1986): 8-20.

Bouson, J. Brooks. "The 'Hidden Agenda' of Winston Smith: Pathological Narcissism and 1984." *University of Hartford Studies in Literature* 18.1 (1986): 8-20.

Bowra, C.M. *Poetry and Politics*. London: Cambridge UP, 1966.

Braund, Susan. *Satire and Society in Ancient Rome*. Exeter Studies in History 23. Exeter: U of Exeter P, 1989.

Brombert, Victor. *The Intellectual Hero: Studies in the French Novel 1880-1955*. London: Faber, 1960.

Brooker, Peter. *Modernism / Postmodernism*. London: Longman, 1992.

Brower, Reuben. *Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion*. Oxford: Oxford

- UP, 1959.
- Brown, J.A.C. *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963.
- Bruner, Jerome. *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1986.
- Buddicom, Jacintha. *Eric and Us: A Remembrance of George Orwell*. London: Leslie Frewin, 1974.
- Burke, Peter. *History and Social Theory*. Cambridge: Polity P, 1992.
- Burnham, James. *The Managerial Revolution or What is Happening in the World Now*. 1941. London: Putnam, 1942.
- Butler, Samuel. *Erewhon and Erewhon Revisited*. London: Dent, 1932.
- Calder, Jenni. *Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Open University Guides to Literature. Milton Keynes: Open University P, 1987.
- . "Orwell's Post-War Prophecy." *George Orwell: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Ed. Raymond Williams. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974. 133-55.
- Campbell, O.J. "The Elizabethan Satyr-Satirist and his Satire." *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*. Ed. Ronald Paulson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 80-112.
- Cardullo, Bert, ed. *Before his Eyes: Essays in Honor of Stanley Kauffmann*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1986.
- Carlsnaes, Walter. *The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination of its Usage by Marx, Lenin, and Mannheim*. Contributions in Philosophy 17. Westport: Greenwood P, 1981.
- Carlson, Leland and Ronald Paulson. *English Satire: Papers Read at a Clark Library Seminar, January 15, 1972*. Los Angeles: William Clark Memorial Library, 1972.
- Carotenuto, Aldo. *Eros and Pathos: Shades of Love and Suffering*. Trans. Charles Nopar. Toronto: Inner City Books, 1989.
- Carr, Raymond. "Orwell and the Spanish Civil War." *The World of George Orwell*. Ed. Miriam Gross. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. 63-73.
- Carretta, Vincent. *The Snarling Muse: Verbal and Visual Political Satire from Pope to Churchill*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1983.

- Cascardi, Anthony J., ed. *Literature and the Question of Philosophy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987.
- Casement, William. "Another Perspective on Orwellian Pessimism." *International Fiction Review* 15.1 (1988): 48-50.
- Cassirer, Ernst. *Language and Myth*. Trans. Susanne K. Langer. New York: Dover, 1953.
- . *The Myth of the State*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1946.
- Caudwell, Christopher. *Illusion and Reality: A Study of the Sources of Poetry*. Chapter 2: "The Death of Mythology." London: Macmillan, 1937.
- Chakotin, Serge. *The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda*. Trans. E.W. Dickes. London: Routledge, 1940.
- Chandler, Ann Ellen. "George Orwell's Anti-Utopia: A Study of *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and their Evolvement from Orwell's Earlier Writings." Diss. U of South Africa, 1974.
- Chilton, Paul. Rev. of *The Language of 1984: Orwell's English and Ours*, by W.F. Bolton. *The Modern Language Review* 82 (1987): 723-5.
- Chilton, Paul and Crispin Aubrey, eds. *Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984: Autonomy, Control and Communication*. Comedia Series 17. London: Comedia, 1983.
- Classen, Carl Joachim. "Satire - The Elusive Genre." *Symbolae Osloenses* 63 (1988): 95 - 121.
- Clifford, James L. and Louis A. Landa, eds. *Pope and his Contemporaries: Essays Presented to George Sherburn*. London: Oxford UP, 1949.
- Colas, Dominique. "Civil Society: From Utopia to Management, from Marxism to Anti-Marxism." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 94.4 (1995):1009 -1023.
- Connery, Brian A. and Kirk Combe, eds. *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Conquest, Robert. "Totaliterror." *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Peter Stansky. New York: Freeman, 1983. 177-87.
- Coon, Carleton S. *The Hunting People*. Boston: Little Brown, 1971.
- Cope, Kevin L. "Satire: The Conquest of Philosophy." *Literature as Philosophy / Philosophy as Literature*. Ed. Donald G. Marshall. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987. 175-84.
- Coppard, Audrey and Bernard Crick, eds. *Orwell Remembered*. London:

- Ariel, 1984.
- Corbett, Patrick. *Ideologies*. London: Hutchinson, 1970.
- Cork, Richard. "Gillray's Legacy: A New Spirit of Satire." *The Listener* 114.2919 (1985): 13-14.
- Corner, John, ed. *Popular Television in Britain: Studies in Cultural History*. London: BFI Publications, 1991.
- Cranny-Francis, Anne. "Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984 in 1989: Raymond Williams and George Orwell." *Southern Review* 22.2 (1989): 152-62.
- Crick, Bernard. *George Orwell: A Life*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980.
- . Introd. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. By George Orwell. 1949. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984. 1-136.
- . "Nineteen Eighty-Four: Satire or Prophecy?" *Dutch Quarterly Review of Anglo-American Letters* 13.2 (1983): 90 - 102.
- . "Reading *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as Satire." *Reflections on America, 1984: An Orwell Symposium*. Ed. Robert Mulvihill. Athens, Georgia: U of Georgia P, 1986. 15 - 45.
- Crisell, Andrew. "Filth, Sediton and Blasphemy: The Rise and Fall of Satire." *Popular Television in Britain: Studies in Cultural History*. Ed. John Corner. London: BFI Publications, 1991. 145-58.
- Culler, Jonathan. *Ferdinand de Saussure*. Penguin Modern Masters Ser. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.
- . *Framing the Sign: Criticism and its Institutions*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.
- Cunningham, Adrian, ed. *The Theory of Myth: Six Studies*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1973.
- Cuthbertson, Gilbert Morris. *Political Myth and Epic*. Michigan: Michigan State UP, 1975.
- Daiches, David . "Politics and the Literary Imagination." *Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities and Revolution*. Ed. Ihab Hassan. Middleton, Connecticut : Wesleyan UP, 1971. 103-19.
- Dallin, Alexander. "Big Brother is Watching You." *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Peter Stansky. New York: Freeman, 1983. 188-96.
- Dalziel, Margaret, ed. *Myth and the Modern Imagination*. Dunedin: U of Otago P, 1967.

- Dandeker, Christopher. *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day*. Cambridge: Polity P, 1990.
- Dane, Joseph A. "Parody and Satire: A Theoretical Model." *Genre* 13.2 (1980): 145-59.
- Davison, Peter, Rolf Meyersohn and Edward Shils, eds. *The Writer and Politics*. Literary Taste, Culture and Mass Communication Vol. 11. Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1978.
- DeFleur, Melvin L. and Sandra Ball-Rokeach. *Theories of Mass Communication*. 5th ed. New York: Longman, 1989.
- De Lange, Adriaan M. *The Influence of Political Bias in Selected Essays of George Orwell*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen P, 1992.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Writing and Difference*. Chapter 2: "Cogito and the History of Madness." London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
- Desmet, Pieter, Johan Rooryck and Pierre Swiggers. "What are Words Worth? Language and Ideology in French Dictionaries of the Revolutionary Period." *Ideologies of Language*. Eds. John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor. London: Routledge, 1990. 162-88.
- Deutscher, Isaac. "'1984' - The Mysticism of Cruelty." *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984*. Ed. Samuel Hynes. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 29-40.
- . *The Great Purges*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
- Docherty, Thomas, ed. *Postmodernism: A Reader*. New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993.
- Doob, Leonard W. *Public Opinion and Propaganda*. New York: Holt, 1948.
- Douglas, Mary. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. Rev. 2nd impression. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
- Dowling, Tessa. "Satirical Strategies in Xhosa under Apartheid." *South African Journal of African Languages* 17.2 (1997): 35-49.
- Driver, Tom F. *The Magic of Ritual: Our Need for Liberating Rites that Transform our Lives and our Communities*. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991.
- Dryden, John. "Discourse on Satire." *John Dryden: Selected Criticism*. Eds. James Kinsley and George Parfitt. London: Oxford UP, 1970. 208-78.
- Dunham, Barrows. *Man Against Myth*. London: Frederick Muller, 1948.

- Dunn, Avril. "My Brother, George Orwell." *Orwell Remembered*. Eds. Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick. London: Ariel, 1984. 25-32.
- Eagleton, Terry. *Marxism and Literary Criticism*. London: Methuen, 1976.
- Ebewo, Patrick. "Reflections on Dramatic Satire as Agent of Change." *English Studies in Africa*. 40:1 (1997): 31-41.
- Eckstein, Arthur. "1984 and George Orwell's Other View of Capitalism." *Modern Age* 29.1 (1985): 11-19.
- Eden, Rick. "Master Tropes in Satire." *Style* 21.4 (1987): 589-606.
- Editorial statement. *Private Eye* 25 March 1983: 11.
- Ehrenfeld, David. "The Roots of Prophecy: Orwell and Nature." *Hudson Review* 38.2 (1985): 193-213.
- Elbarbary, Samir. "Language as Theme in *Animal Farm*." *International Fiction Review* 19.1 (1992): 31-8.
- Eliade, Mircea. *Myth and Reality*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.
- Eliot, T.S. *The Complete Poems and Plays of T.S. Eliot*. London: Faber, 1969.
- Elkin, P. K. *The Augustan Defence of Satire*. London: Oxford UP, 1973.
- . "Recent Changes in Satiric Theory." *Kunstgriffe: Auskünfte zur Reichweite von Literaturtheorie und Literaturkritik*. Festschrift für Herbert Mainusch. Herausgegeben von Ulrich Horstmann und Wolfgang Zach. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1989. 51-56.
- Elkins, Richard and Ruth Freeman, eds. and introd. *Selected Writings by Anna Freud*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998.
- Elliott, Robert C. "The Definition of Satire: A Note on Method." *Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature* No. 11. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1962. 19 - 23.
- . *The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual and Art*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1966.
- . "Satire." *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, eds. Alex Preminger, Frank J. Warnke and O.B. Hardison, jr. Enlarged ed. London: Macmillan, 1974.
- . "The Satirist and Society." *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*. Ed. Ronald Paulson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 205 - 16.
- . *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre*. Chicago: Chicago UP,

1970.

- Ellul, Jacques. *The New Demons*. London: Mowbrays, 1975.
- . *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. Trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. Introd. Konrad Kellen. New York: Vintage, 1973.
- Elsbree, Langdon. "The Structured Nightmare of 1984." *Twentieth Century Literature* 5.3 (1959): 135-41.
- Epston, David and Michael White. *Experience, Contradiction, Narrative & Imagination: Selected Papers of David Epston and Michael White, 1989 - 1991*. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications, 1992.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Language and Power*. London: Longman, 1989.
- Falck, Colin. *Myth, Truth and Literature: Towards a True Post-Modernism*. Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1989.
- Feder, Lillian. "Selfhood, Language, and Reality: George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four." *Georgia Review* 37.2 (1983): 392-409.
- Feinberg, Leonard. *Introduction to Satire*. Ames: Iowa State UP, 1968.
- . *The Satirist: His Temperament, Motivation, and Influence*. Ames: Iowa State UP, 1963.
- Fischer, Ernst. *Art Against Ideology*. Trans. Anna Bostock. London: Penguin, 1969.
- Fischer, Louis. *The Life and Death of Stalin*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1953.
- Flammia, Madelyn. "Beyond Orwell: Clarity and the English Language." *George Orwell*. Eds. Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky. New York: Greenwood P, 1987. 27-33.
- Fontenrose, Joseph. *The Ritual Theory of Myth*. Folklore Studies 18. Berkeley: U of California P, 1971.
- Foot, Michael. *The Pen and the Sword: A Year in the Life of Jonathan Swift*. London: McGibbon and Kee, 1966.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, 1972.
- . "Critical Theory/Intellectual History." Interview with Gérard Raulet. *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings*. Ed. and introd. Lawrence D. Kritzman. New York: Routledge, 1990. 17-46.
- . *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Trans. Alan Sheridan.

New York: Pantheon, 1977.

---. *The History of Sexuality*. Trans. Robert Hurley. Vol. 1. London: Penguin, 1981.

---. "Language to Infinity." *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977. 53-67.

---. *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings*. Ed. and introd. Lawrence D. Kritzman. New York: Routledge, 1990.

---. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Ed. Colin Gordon. Brighton: Harvester, 1980.

---. *Power, Truth, Strategy*. Eds. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton. Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979.

Foulkes, A.P. *Literature and Propaganda*. London: Methuen, 1983.

Fowler, Roger. *The Language of George Orwell*. London: Macmillan, 1995.

Frankl, Viktor E. *The Doctor and the Soul: From Psychology to Logotherapy*. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1966. Rpt. of *Artzliche Seelsorge*. 1946.

Freedman, Carl. "Antinomies of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*." *Modern Fiction Studies* 30.4 (1984): 601-20.

Freud, Anna. "Identification with the Aggressor." *Selected Writings by Anna Freud*. Ed. and introd. Richard Elkins and Ruth Freeman. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998. 13-22.

Freud, Sigmund. *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Trans. James Strachey. Eds. James Strachey and Angela Richards. The Penguin Freud Library Vol. 1. London: Penguin, 1991.

---. "The 'Uncanny' ." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*. Trans. and eds. James Strachey and Anna Freud. Vol. XVII. London: Hogarth P, 1955. 219-56.

Friedländer, Saul, Gerald Holton, Leo Marx and Eugene Skolnikoff, eds. *Visions of Apocalypse: End or Rebirth?* New York: Holmes and Neier, 1985.

Fromm, Erich. *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Holt, 1941.

Frye, Northrop. *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957.

- Fyvel, T.R. *George Orwell: A Personal Memoir*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982.
- Geertz, Clifford. "Ideology as a Cultural System." *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz*. London: Hutchinson, 1975. 193-233.
- Gill, James E., ed. *Cutting Edges: Postmodern Critical Essays on Eighteenth-Century Satire*. Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1995.
- Gillies, Max. "Satire." Interview with Helen Thomson. *Meanjin* 45.2 (1986): 213-22.
- Glenn, Ian. "South African Satire Now." *New Contrast* 77 (1992): 80-90.
- Gobbers, Walter. "Modernism, Modernity, Avant-Garde: A Bilingual Introduction." *The Turn of the Century / Le tournant du siècle: Modernism and Modernity in the Arts / Le modernisme et la modernité dans la littérature et les arts*. Eds. Christian Berg, Frank Durieux and Geert Lernout. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1995. 3-16.
- Goebbels, Joseph Paul. *The Goebbels Diaries*. Trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948.
- Goffman, Erving. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Analysis of Experience*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1974.
- Good, Graham. "'Ingsoc in Relation to Chess': Reversible Opposites in Orwell's 1984." *Novel* 18.1 (1984): 50-63.
- Goodall, Peter. "Common Decency and the Common People in the Writing of George Orwell." *Durham University Journal* 52.1 (1991): 75-83.
- . "'Was the So-Called Melon Actually a Pumpkin?': Orwell and the Problems of Realism." *AUMLA* 75 (1991): 3 - 20.
- Gorky, Maxim. Address. Writers' Congress. 26 Oct. 1934.
- Gorman, Frank H. *The Ideology of Ritual: Space, Time and Status in the Priestly Theology*. Chapter 1: "Ritual: A Methodological Framework." Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology*. Critical Social Studies. London: Macmillan, 1976.
- Graves, Robert. *Robert Graves: Poems Selected by Himself*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966.
- Greenbaum, Sidney. *The English Language Today*. Oxford: Pergamon,

1985.

Greenland, Colin. "Images of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: Fiction and Prediction." *Storm Warnings: Science Fiction Confronts the Future*. Eds. George E. Slusser, Colin Greenland and Eric S. Rabkin. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987. 124-34.

Greer, Herb. "Orwell in Perspective." *Commentary* 75.3 (1983): 50-4.

Gregory, Mark W. "'An Act of Faith': George Orwell's Socialist Thought and 1984." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 84.4 (1985): 368-78.

Griffin, Dustin. *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction*. Lexington: U of Kentucky P, 1994.

---. "Satire as an Exploratory Form," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 265 (1989): 1245 - 1246.

---. "Venting Spleen." *Essays in Criticism* 40.2 (1990): 124-35.

Gross, Miriam, ed. *The World of George Orwell*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

Guilhamet, Leon. *Satire and the Transformation of Genre*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1987.

Gurevich, David. "Moscow Days: Liberated by Harold Robbins." *New York Times Book Review* 11 Mar. 1990: 1; 26-7.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity - An Incomplete Project." *Postmodernism: A Reader*. Ed. Thomas Docherty. New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993. 98-109.

Halász, Ann Mary. "The Metamorphoses of Satire." *Acta Litteraria Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29.1-2 (1987): 3-8.

Hall, Peter, adapt. *George Orwell's Animal Farm*. Lyrics Adrian Mitchell. Music Richard Peaslee. London: Methuen, 1985.

Hammond, J.R. *A George Orwell Companion: A Guide to the Novels, Documentaries and Essays*. London: Macmillan, 1982.

Harpold, Harold. "The Anatomy of Satire: Aggressivity and Satirical Physick in Gulliver's Travels." *Literature and Psychology* 36.3 (1990): 32-43.

Harris, Nigel. *Beliefs in Society*. London: Watts, 1968.

Hassan, Ihab, ed. *Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities and Revolution*. Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1971.

- Hatfield, Henry. "The Myth of Nazism." *Myth and Mythmaking*. Ed. Henry A. Murray. New York: Braziller, 1960. 199-220.
- Hawkes, Terence. *Structuralism and Semiotics*. London: Methuen, 1978.
- Hawthorn, Jenny. *A Concise Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory*. 2nd ed. London: Arnold, 1994.
- Hazlitt, William. "On Wit and Humour." *Selected Essays of William Hazlitt: 1778 - 1830*. Ed. Geoffrey Keynes. London: Nonesuch P, 1930. 410 - 46.
- Heller, Agnes and Ferenc Fehér. *The Postmodern Political Condition*. Cambridge: Polity P., 1988.
- Herf, Jeffrey. *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984.
- Hirschfeld, Gerhard. "Nazi Propaganda in Occupied Western Europe: The Case of the Netherlands." *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations*. Ed. David Welch. London: Croom Helm, 1983. 143-60.
- Hitler, Adolf. *Mein Kampf*. The Paternoster Library. London: Hurst & Blackett, 1933.
- Hodgart, Matthew. "From *Animal Farm* to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*." *The World of George Orwell*. Ed. Miriam Gross. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. 135-42.
- . *Satire*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
- Hodge, Robert and Günther Kress. *Language as Ideology*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1993.
- Hollis, Christopher. *A Study of George Orwell: The Man and His Works*. London: Hollis and Carter, 1956.
- Horn, David Bayne. *Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Oxford UP, 1967.
- Horton, John and Andrea T. Baumeister, eds. *Literature and the Political Imagination*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Howe, Irving. "1984: Enigmas of Power." *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*. Ed. Irving Howe. New York: Harper & Row, 1983. 3-18.
- . "1984: History as Nightmare." *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984*. Ed. Samuel Hynes. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 41-53.
- , ed. *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*. New York: Harper &

- Row, 1983.
- , ed. *Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four: Text, Sources, Criticism*. 2nd ed. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1982.
- Hunter, Lynette. *George Orwell: The Search for a Voice*. Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1984.
- Huntington, John. "Utopia and Anti-Utopian Logic." *Science Fiction Studies* 9.2 (1982): 122-46.
- Hutcheon, Linda. *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction*. London: Routledge, 1988.
- . *The Politics of Postmodernism*. London: Routledge, 1989.
- . "Telling Stories: Fiction and History." *Modernism / Postmodernism*. Ed. Peter Brooker. London: Longman, 1992. 229-42.
- . *A Theory of Parody: The Teaching of Twentieth-Century Art Forms*. New York: Methuen, 1985.
- Hutton, Patrick H. "Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self." *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Eds. Luther H. Martin, Hank Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton. London: Tavistock, 1988. 121-44.
- Hynes, Samuel, ed. *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Ingarden, Roman. *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*. Trans. and introd. George G. Grabowicz. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973.
- Ingle, Stephen. "The Anti-Imperialism of George Orwell." *Literature and the Political Imagination*. Eds. John Horton and Andrea T. Baumeister. London: Routledge, 1996. 218-37.
- . *George Orwell: A Political Life*. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993.
- Ingrams, Richard (ed. *Private Eye*). Interview. *Tonight*. BBC 1, London. 27 October 1976.
- Jack, Ian. *The Poet and his Audience*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984.
- Jackson, Rosemary. *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*. London: Methuen, 1981.
- Jakobson, Roman. "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics." *Style in*

- Language*. Ed. Thomas Sebeok. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960. 350-77.
- Jameson, Frederic. *The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986*. Vol. 1: Situations of Theory. Minneapolis: U of Minneapolis P, 1988.
- . *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. London: Methuen, 1981.
- . *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
- . "Postmodernism and Consumer Society." *Modernism / Postmodernism*. Ed. Peter Brooker. London: Longman, 1992. 163 - 79.
- . *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972
- Jensen, Ejner J., ed. *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P., 1984.
- Jensen, H. James and Malvin R. Zirker, eds. *The Satirist's Art*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1972.
- Joseph, John E. and Talbot J. Taylor, eds. *Ideologies of Language*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O'Donnell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1986.
- Jung, C.G. *Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice*. The Tavistock Lectures. 1968. London: Routledge, 1986.
- Kantra, Robert A. "Practical Wisdom and Satiric Humor in Philosophic Fictions." *Mosaic* 22.3 (1989): 85-100.
- Kearney, Richard. "Between Tradition and Utopia: The Hermeneutical Problem of Myth." *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*. Ed. David Wood. London: Routledge, 1991. 55-73.
- Kemp, Sandra and Judith Squires, eds. *Feminisms*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997.
- Kenner, Hugh. *Mazes: Essays by Hugh Kenner*. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1989.
- Kermode, Frank. "Cockaigne." Rev. of *Orwell: The Authorised Biography*, by Michael Shelden. *London Review of Books* 13.20 (1991): 8-9.
- Kern, Edith. *The Absolute Comic*. New York: Columbia UP, 1980.

- Kiely Robert and John Hildebidle, eds. *Modernism Reconsidered*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1983.
- Kierkegaard, Soren. *The Concept of Irony*. Trans. and introd. Lee M. Capel. London: Collins, 1966.
- Kirk, G.S. *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures*. London: Cambridge UP; Berkeley: U of California P, 1970.
- Knight, Charles A. "Satire, Speech, and Genre." *Comparative Literature* 44.1 (1992): 22-41.
- Koestler, Arthur. "A Rebel's Progress: To George Orwell's Death." *The Trail of the Dinosaur and Other Essays*. New York: Macmillan, 1947. 102-5.
- Kolakowski, Leszek. *The Presence of Myth*. 1972. Trans. Adam Czerniawski. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989.
- Kraus, Karl. *Half-Truths & One-and-a-Half Truths: Selected Aphorisms*. Ed. and trans. Harry Zohn. Manchester: Carcanet P, 1986.
- Krauze, Enrique. An Interview with Leszek Kolakowski. *Partisan Review* 52 (1985): 210-21.
- Kreuz, Roger J. and Richard M. Roberts. "On Satire and Parody: The Importance of Being Ironic." *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 8.2 (1993): 100.
- Kristeva, Julia. "Postmodernism?." *Modernism/Postmodernism*. Ed. Peter Brooker. London: Longman, 1992. 197 - 203.
- Kritzman, Lawrence D., ed. and introd. Interview with Gérard Raulet. *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings*. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- Kubal, David L. *Outside the Whale: George Orwell's Art and Politics*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1972.
- Kumar, Krishan. *Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
- Kurzweil, Edith and William Phillips, eds. *Writers and Politics: A Partisan Review Reader*. Boston: Routledge, 1983.
- Laing, R.D. *The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967.
- Lawson, E. Thomas and Robert N. McCauley. *Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1990.

- Lea, Henry Charles. *The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organization and Operation*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963.
- Lerner, Lia Schwartz. "Golden Age Satire: Transformations of Genre." *MLN* 105.2 (1990): 260-82.
- Letemendia, V.C. "Revolution on Animal Farm: Orwell's Neglected Commentary." *Journal of Modern Literature* 18.1 (1992): 127 - 37.
- Levin, Bernard. *A World Elsewhere*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *Myth and Meaning*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
- Leyburn, Ellen Douglass. *Satiric Allegory: Mirror of Man*. 1956. Westport: Greenwood P, 1978.
- Leys, Simon. "Orwell: The Horror of Politics." *Quadrant* 28.12 (1983): 9-21.
- Lichtheim, George. *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays*. New York: Vintage, 1967.
- Lief, Ruth Ann. *Homage to Oceania: The Prophetic Vision of George Orwell*. Ohio: Ohio State UP, 1969.
- Lindholm, Charles. *Charisma*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990.
- London, Jack. *The Iron Heel*. 1907. London: Journeyman P, 1974.
- Longhurst, Henry. "A Sportsman Defends the Old Prep School." *Orwell Remembered*. Eds. Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick. London: Ariel, 1984. 35 - 6.
- Lowry, R. Cartoon. *The Listener* 30 June 1983: 15.
- Lukacs, John, Edward Said and Gerald Graff (participants). "The Legacy of Orwell: A Discussion." *Salmagundi* (1986): 121-8.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-' ." *Postmodernism: A Reader*. Ed. Thomas Docherty. New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993. 47-50.
- . *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Foreword Frederic Jameson. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1979.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. *The Prince*. Trans. and introd. George Bull. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975.
- Mack, Maynard. *Alexander Pope: A Life*. New York: Norton; New Haven:

- Yale UP, 1985.
- . " 'Wit and Poetry and Pope': Some Observations on his Imagery." *Pope and his Contemporaries: Essays Presented to George Sherburn*. Eds. James L. Clifford and Louis A. Landa. London: Oxford UP, 1949. 20 - 40.
- Mackie, Erin, "The Culture Market, the Marriage Market, and the Exchange of Language: Swift and the Progress of Desire." *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*. Eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 173 - 92.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1948.
- Manning, D.J. *The Form of Ideology*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1980.
- Manvell, Roger and Heinrich Fraenkel. *Doctor Goebbels: His Life and Death*. London: Heinemann, 1960.
- Maranda, Pierre. *Mythology*. Penguin Education Series. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.
- Marcus, Steven. "George Orwell: Biography as Literature." *Partisan Review* 60.1 (1993): 42-50.
- Marnham, Patrick. *The Private Eye Story: The First 21 Years*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1982.
- Marshall, Donald G., ed. *Literature as Philosophy / Philosophy as Literature*. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 1987.
- Martin, Luther H., Hank Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, eds. *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. London: Tavistock, 1988.
- Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. Introd. A. J. P. Taylor. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967.
- McCarthy, Eugene J. "George Orwell: A Prophet Honored Just after His Time." *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Ejner J. Jensen. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984. 137-150.
- McHale, Brian. *Postmodernist Fiction*. New York: Methuen, 1987.
- McKnight, Philip S. "Sudden Glory: Some Preliminary Notes on the Assailant, the Victim and the Collaborator in 'Type J' Satire." *Colloquia Germanica* 18.3 (1985): 193-201.
- McPhail, Clark. *The Myth of the Maddening Crowd*. New York: De Gruyter, 1991.

- Mellor, Anne. "You're Only a Rebel from the Waist Downwards: Orwell's View of Women." *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Peter Stansky. New York: Freeman, 1983. 115-25.
- Mendelsohn, Everett and Helga Nowotny, eds. *Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science Between Utopia and Dystopia*. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984.
- Meridian*, Narr. Brian Sibley, BBC World Service, London, 1 Mar. 1997.
- Merton, Robert K. "Mass Persuasion: The Moral Dimension." *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*. Ed. Wilbur Schramm. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1965. 424 - 27.
- Meyer, Alfred G. "The Political Theory of Pessimism: George Orwell and Herbert Marcuse." *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Ejner J. Jensen. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984. 121-35.
- Meyers, Jeffrey. *George Orwell: The Critical Heritage*. London: Routledge, 1975.
- . ed. *A Reader's Guide to George Orwell*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1975.
- Miller, Mark Crispin. "Big Brother Is You, Watching." *The Georgia Review* 38 (1984): 695-719.
- Moore, Burness E. and Bernard D. Fine, eds. *Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts*. New York: The American Psychoanalytic Association; New Haven: Yale UP, 1990.
- Moylan, Tom. *Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination*. New York: Methuen, 1986.
- Mulvihill, Robert, ed. *Reflections on America, 1984: An Orwell Symposium*. Athens, Georgia: U of Georgia P, 1986.
- Murray, Henry A., ed. *Myth and Mythmaking*. New York: Braziller, 1960.
- Nash, Richard. "Satyrs and Satire in Augustan England." *Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism*. Eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 95-105.
- Nathan, Edward P. "The Bench and the Pulpit: Conflicting Elements in the Augustan Apology for Satire." *ELH* 52.2 (1985): 375-96.
- Nelson, John S. "Orwell's Political Myths and Ours." *The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World*. Eds. Robert L. Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo. Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989. 11-39.

- Nichols, James W. *Insinuation: The Tactics of English Satire*. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.
- Nicolson, Harold. *The Age of Reason (1700-1789)*. London: Panther, 1968.
- Nisbet, Robert. "1984 and the Conservative Imagination." *1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in our Century*. Ed. Irving Howe. New York: Harper & Row, 1983. 180-206.
- Nokes, David. *Jonathan Swift: A Hypocrite Reversed*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987.
- . *Raillery and Rage: A Study of Eighteenth Century Satire*. Brighton: Harvester, 1987.
- Norris, Christopher. *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice*. London: Methuen, 1982.
- Nowotny, Helga. "Science and Utopia: On the Social Ordering of the Future." *Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science Between Utopia and Dystopia*. Eds. Everett Mendelsohn and Helga Nowotny. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984. 3-18.
- Olson, Alan M., ed. *Myth, Symbol, and Reality*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1980.
- Orange, Michael. "Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Spirit of Schweik." *George Orwell*. Eds. Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky. New York: Greenwood P, 1987. 51-7.
- Orgler, Hertha. *Alfred Adler, the Man and his Work: Triumph over the Inferiority Complex*. 1939. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1963.
- Orwell, George. *Animal Farm: A Fairy Story*. 1945. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951.
- . *Animal Farm: A Fairy Story*. Large print ed. Bath: Lythway P, 1945.
- . "Arthur Koestler." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 234-44.
- . "As I Please." 4 February 1944. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 87-9
- . "As I Please." 3 March 1944. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 101-4.
- . "As I Please." 8 September 1944. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and*

- Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 228-31.
- . Author's Preface to the Ukrainian Edition of *Animal Farm*. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 402-6.
- . Autobiographical Note. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 23-4.
- . "The English People." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 1-38.
- . Extracts from a Manuscript Note-book. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 509-15.
- . "Inside the Whale." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. I. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 493-527.
- . "James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 160-81.
- . Letter to Stafford Cottman. 25 April 1946. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 148-49.
- . Letter to Victor Gollancz. 8 January 1940. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. I. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 409-10.
- . Letter to Francis A. Henson (extract). 16 June 1949. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 502.
- . Letter to Leonard Moore. 18 July 1944. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 186-87.
- . Letter to Vernon Richards. 22 June 1949. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 503-4.
- . Letter to F.J. Warburg. 31 May 1947. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 329-30.

- . Letter to H.J. Willmet. 18 May 1944. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. III. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 148-50.
- . Letter to George Woodcock. 2 December 1942. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 267-68.
- . "The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 56-109.
- . "Looking Back on the Spanish War." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 249-67.
- . *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. and introd. Bernard Crick. 1949. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984.
- . *Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel*. 1949. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954.
- . *Nineteen Eighty-Four: The Facsimile of the Extant Manuscript*. Ed. Peter Davison. London: Secker and Warburg, 1984.
- . "Pamphlet Literature." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 283-5.
- . "Politics and the English Language." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 127-40.
- . "The Prevention of Literature." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 59-72.
- . "Reflections on Gandhi." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 463-70.
- . Rev. of *Burnt Norton, East Coker, The Dry Salvages*, by T.S. Eliot. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 236-42.
- . Rev. of *The Spirit of Catholicism*, by Karl Adam. *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. I. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 79-81.

- . *The Road to Wigan Pier*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.
- . "Such, Such Were the Joys." *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 330-69.
- . War-time Diary: 28 May 1940 - 28 August 1941. *The Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 339-409.
- . "W.B. Yeats," *The Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. II. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 271-6.
- . "Why I Write." *The Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. I. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 1-7.
- . "Writers and Leviathan." *The Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 407-14.
- . "You and the Atom Bomb." *The Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism of George Orwell*. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. Vol. IV. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 6-10.
- Padfield, Peter. *Himmler: Reichsfuhrer-SS*. London: Macmillan, 1991.
- Palmeri, Frank. *Satire in Narrative: Petronius, Swift, Gibbon, Melville, and Pynchon*. Austin: U of Texas P, 1990.
- Parker, Meg. *Socrates and Athens*. London: Macmillan, 1973.
- Parrinder, Patrick. "Updating Orwell? Burgess's Future Fictions." *Encounter* 56.1 (1981): 45-53.
- Patai, Daphne. *The Orwell Mystique: A Study in Male Ideology*. Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1984.
- Paulson, Ronald, ed. *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*. Prentice-Hall Literature Series. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Pawel, Ernst. *The Nightmare of Reason: A Life of Franz Kafka*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984.
- Pearce, Robert. "Truth and Falsehood: George Orwell's Prep School Woes." *Review of English Studies* 43:171 (1992): 367-86.
- Peereboom, J.J. "Swift and Orwell: Utopia as Nightmare." *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia*. Ed. D. Baker-Smith and C.C.

Barfoot. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1987. 91-210.

The People's Chronology. Microsoft Bookshelf '95. CD-ROM. Redmond: Microsoft, 1995.

Perlmutter, Amos. *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1981.

Peters, Michael. "'Animal Farm' Fifty Years On." *Contemporary Review* 267.1555 (1995): 90-1.

Pfaff, Kerry and Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. "Authorial Intentions in Understanding Satirical Texts." *Poetics* 25.1 (1997): 45-70.

Philips, Adam. "How to be Viennese." Rev. of *Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist*, by Edward Timms and *Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths: Selected Aphorisms of Karl Kraus*. Ed. and trans. Harry Zohn. *London Review of Books* 9.5 (1987): 16-17.

Piper, W.B.. *The Heroic Couplet*. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve UP, 1969.

Pittock, Malcolm. "The Hell of Nineteen Eighty-Four." *Essays in Criticism*. 47.2 (1997): 143-64.

Plamenatz, John. *Ideology*. London: Pall Mall P, 1970.

Pollard, A. *Satire*. London: Methuen, 1970.

Porter, Laurence M. "Psychomachia versus Socialism in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: A Psychoanalytic View." *The Revised Orwell*. Ed. Jonathan Rose. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991. 61-74.

Price-Jones, David. "Orwell's Reputation." *The World of George Orwell*. Ed. Miriam Gross. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971. 144-52.

Pritchett, E.V. Rev. of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. *New Statesman and Nation*. 18 June 1949: 646-48.

Probyn, Clive T. *English Fiction of the Eighteenth Century 1700 -1789*. London: Longman, 1987.

Qualter, Terence H. *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare*. New York: Random House, 1962. Pretoria: Unisa P, 1965.

Quintana, Ricardo. *The Mind and Art of Jonathan Swift*. Gloucester: Oxford UP and Peter Smith, 1965.

Quirk, Randolph. "1984 and '1984' ." *London Review of Books* 6.3 (1984): 10-11.

- . "Natural Language and Orwellian Intervention." *The English Language Today*. Ed. Sidney Greenbaum. Oxford: Pergamon, 1985. 48-54.
- Rabkin, Eric S. "Atavism and Utopia." *No Place Else: Explorations in Utopian and Dystopian Fiction*. Eds. Eric S. Rabkin, Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983. 1-10.
- , Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander, eds. *No Place Else: Explorations in Utopian and Dystopian Fiction*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983.
- Rae, Patricia. "Mr. Charrington's Junk Shop: T.S. Eliot and Modernist Poetics in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*". *Twentieth Century Literature* 43.2 (1997): 196-220.
- Rai, Alok. *Orwell and the Politics of Despair: A Critical Study of the Writings of George Orwell*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988.
- Randolph, Mary Claire. "The Medieval Concept in English Renaissance Satiric Theory." *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*. Ed. Ronald Paulson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 135-70.
- Raphael, Frederic. "What the Romans laughed at." *The Listener* 16 June 1977: 779 - 81.
- Rasmussen, David M. *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology: A Constructive Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
- Real, Hermann Josef, ed. *Teaching Satire: Dryden to Pope*. Heidelberg: Winter, 1992.
- Rezler, André. "Man as Nostalgia: The Image of the Last Man in Twentieth-Century Postutopian Fiction." *Visions of Apocalypse: End or Rebirth?* Eds. Saul Friedländer, Gerald Holton, Leo Marx and Eugene Skolnikoff. New York: Holmes and Neier, 1985. 196-215.
- Righter, William. *Myth and Literature*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
- Robertson, P.J.M. "Criticism and Creativity VI: George Orwell and Northrop Frye." *Queen's Quarterly* 92.1 (1985): 374-84.
- Robinson, Ethel. "Setting sharp satire to a snappy beat." *Weekend Argus* 13 May 1989, "Weekender Supplement": 4.
- Robinson, Fred Norris. "Satirists and Enchanters in Early Irish Literature." *Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism*. Ed. Ronald Paulson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 1 - 36.

- Rockwell, Joan. *Fact in Fiction: The Use of Literature in the Systematic Study of Society*. London: Routledge, 1974.
- Rodden, John. "The Politics of Literary Reputation: George Woodcock and the Anarchists' Orwell." *Queen's Quarterly* 95.2 (1988): 330-49.
- . "Soviet Literary Policy, 1945-1989: The Case of George Orwell." *Modern Age* 32.2 (1988): 131-39.
- Roelofs, H. Mark. "George Orwell's Obscured Utopia." *Religion and Literature* 19.2 (1987): 11-33.
- Rogers, Pat. *Literature and Popular Culture in Eighteenth Century England*. Sussex: Harvester, 1985.
- . "Swift and the Idea of Authority." *The World of Jonathan Swift: Essays for the Tercentenary*. Ed. Brian Vickers. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968. 25 -37.
- Rose, Jonathan, "The Invisible Sources of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*." *The Revised Orwell*. Ed. Jonathan Rose. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991. 131-47.
- , ed. *The Revised Orwell*. East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991.
- Rose, Margaret A. *The Post-Modern and the Post-Industrial*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.
- Rose, Nikolas. "Psychiatry as a Political Science: Advanced Liberalism and the Administration of Risk." *History of the Human Sciences* 9:2 (1996): 2-23.
- Rosenfeld, Isaac. "Decency and Death." *Partisan Review* 17 (1950): 514 - 18.
- Rosenheim, Edward W., Jr. *Swift and the Satirist's Art*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1963.
- Russell, John. *Francis Bacon*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1979.
- Ruthven, K.K. *Myth*. The Critical Idiom Series. London: Methuen, 1976.
- Samuel, Raphael and Paul Thompson, eds. *The Myths We Live By*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Sanderson, Richard K. "The Two Narrators and Happy Ending of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*." *Modern Fiction Studies* 34.4 (1988): 587-95.
- Sandison, Alan. *The Last Man in Europe; An Essay on George Orwell*. London: Macmillan, 1974.

- Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Politics and Literature*. Trans. Calder and Boyars Ltd. London: Calder and Boyars, 1973.
- . *What is Literature?* Trans. Bernard Frechtman. London: Methuen, 1950.
- Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. 1915. Trans. Wade Baskin. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Savage Robert L., James Combs and Dan Nimmo, eds. "Extending the Orwellian Moment: An Introduction." *The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World*. Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989. 1-9.
- Schapiro, Leonard. *Totalitarianism*. London: Pall Mall P, 1972.
- Schechter, Joel. "The Theater of Satire, or Politicians and the Arts." *Before his Eyes: Essays in Honor of Stanley Kauffmann*. Ed. Bert Cardullo. Lanham: University Press of America, 1986. 123-7.
- Schorer, Mark. "The Necessity of Myth." *Myth and Mythmaking*. Ed. Henry A. Murray. New York: Braziller, 1960. 354-59.
- Schramm, Wilbur, ed. *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1965.
- Sebeok, Thomas A. *Myth: A Symposium*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1974.
- Seebers, Tobin, ed. *Heterotopia: Postmodern Utopia and the Body Politic*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994.
- Seidel, Michael. "Crisis Rhetoric and Satiric Power." *New Literary History* 20.1 (1988): 165-86.
- Seidman, Steven. *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era*. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994.
- Shakespeare, William. *Macbeth*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967.
- Sharrock, Roger. "1984 and the Rupture of Desire." *Essays in Criticism* 34.4 (1984): 319 - 38.
- Shelden, Michael. *Orwell: The Authorised Biography*. London: Heinemann, 1991.
- Sherbert, Gary. *Menippean Satire and the Poetics of Wit: Ideologies of Self-Consciousness in Dunton, D'Urfey, and Sterne*. New York: Peter Lang, 1996.
- Shipley, Joseph T., ed. *Dictionary of World Literary Terms*. London: Allen

- and Unwin, 1970.
- Sitter, John. *Arguments of Augustan Wit*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.
- Slusser, George E., Colin Greenland and Eric S. Rabkin, eds. *Storm Warnings: Science Fiction Confronts the Future*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987.
- Smart, Barry. *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Smith, Barbara Herrnstein. *On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978.
- Smith, Bruce L. "Propaganda." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968.
- Snyder, John. *Prospects of Power: Tragedy, Satire, the Essay, and the Theory of Genre*. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1991.
- Soper, Kate. "Feminism, Humanism, Postmodernism." *Feminisms*. Eds. Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997. 286-92.
- Spender, Stephen. *The Creative Element: A Study of Vision, Despair and Orthodoxy among some Modern Writers*. London: Hamilton, 1953.
- . *The Thirties and After: Poetry, Politics, People (1933 - 75)*. Glasgow: Fontana, 1978.
- Stallybrass, Oliver and Allan White. *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986.
- Stansky, Peter, ed. *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*. New York: Freeman, 1983.
- Staub, Ervin. *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.
- Stein, Murray. *In Midlife: A Jungian Perspective*. Dallas: Spring Publications, 1983.
- Steiner, George. *Language and Silence*. New York: Atheneum, 1967.
- Steinhoff, William, "Utopia Reconsidered: Comments on 1984." *No Place Else: Explorations in Utopian and Dystopian Fiction*. Eds. Eric S. Rabkin, Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983. 147-161.
- Stern, Daniel. "The Mysterious New Novel." *Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities in Revolution*. Ed. Ihab Hassan. Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1971. 22-37.

- Stivers, Richard. *Evil in Modern Myth and Ritual*. Athens: U of Georgia P, 1982.
- Sutherland, James. *English Satire*. London: Cambridge UP, 1962.
- Swift, Jonathan. *A Proposal for Correcting the ENGLISH TONGUE, Polite Conversation, Etc.* Eds. Herbert Davis and Louis Landa. Oxford: Blackwell, 1964.
- . *A Tale of a Tub and Other Satires*. Ed. and introd. Kathleen Williams. London: Dent, 1975.
- Symons, Julian. "Orwellspeak." Rev. of *The Politics of Literary Reputation: The Making and Claiming of 'St George' Orwell*, by John Rodden. *London Review of Books* 11.21 (1989): 20-1.
- . Rev. of *Nineteen Eighty-Four, Burmese Days and Coming Up for Air*. *Times Literary Supplement* 10 June 1949: 380.
- Szanto, George H. *Theater and Propaganda*. Austin: U of Texas P, 1978.
- Taylor, J. Talbot. "Which is to be Master?: The Institutionalizing of Authority in the Science of Language." *Ideologies of Language*. Eds. John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor. London: Routledge, 1990. 9-26.
- Test, George A. *Satire: Spirit and Art*. Tampa: U of South Florida P, 1991.
- Thompson, Dennis F. *Political Ethics and Public Office*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1987.
- Thompson, Leonard. *The Political Mythology of Apartheid*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1985.
- Thomson, Oliver. *Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques*. Edinburgh: Paul Harris, 1977.
- Thomson, Philip. *The Grotesque*. London: Methuen, 1972.
- Timms, Edward. *Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1986.
- Tismaneanu, Vladimir. "Resurrecting Utopia: The Search for Myth Under Post-Communism." *Partisan Review* 64 (1997): 384-94.
- Todorov, Tzvetan. "Politics, Morality, and the Writer's Life: Notes on George Orwell." *Stanford French Review* 16.1 (1992): 136-42.
- Trail, George Y. "Teaching Argument and the Rhetoric of Orwell's 'Politics and the English Language' ." *College English* 57.5 (1995): 570-83.

- Trilling, Lionel. "George Orwell and the Politics of Truth." *The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in Criticism*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1955. 151-72.
- . "Orwell on the Future." Rev. of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. *New Yorker* 18 June 1949: 74-7.
- Trotsky, Leon. *The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?* Trans. Max Eastman. 5th ed. New York: Pathfinder P, 1972.
- Tucker, Robert C. and Stephen F. Cohen, eds. *The Great Purge Trial*. Introd. Robert C. Tucker. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965.
- Tudor, Henry. *Political Myth*. London: Pall Mall P, 1972.
- Turner, Victor. *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1974.
- . *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play*. New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982.
- Van Gennep, Arnold. *The Rites of Passage*. Trans. Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee. Introd. Solon T. Kimball. London: Routledge, 1960.
- Vickers, Brian, ed. *The World of Jonathan Swift: Essays for the Tercentenary*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.
- Waardenburg, Jacques. "Symbolic Aspects of Myth." *Myth, Symbol and Reality*. Ed. Alan M. Olson. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1980. 41-68.
- Waller, Philip. "A Small Triumph." Rev. of *British Propaganda During the First World War 1914-18*, by Michael Sanders and Philip M. Taylor. *The Literary Review* June 1983: 1-3.
- Warburg, Frederic. "Publisher's Report." *George Orwell: The Critical Heritage*. Ed. Geoffrey Meyers. London: Routledge, 1975. 247-50.
- Warner, Marina. *Managing Monsters: Six Myths of our Time*. The 1994 Reith Lectures. London: Vintage, 1994.
- Weinbrot, Howard D. *Alexander Pope and the Traditions of Formal Verse Satire*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982.
- . *Eighteenth-Century Satire: Essays on Text and Context from Dryden to Peter Pindar*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988.
- Welch, David, ed. *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations*. London: Croom Helm, 1983.

- . "Educational Film Propaganda and the Nazi Youth." *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations*. Ed. David Welch. London: Croom Helm, 1983. 65-87.
- Weltz, Martin. "Dr Hall gets his nose rubbed in press victory." *The Sunday Independent* 28/29 September 1996: "Sunday Insight" 3.
- Wemyss, Courtney T. and Alexej Ugrinsky, eds. *George Orwell*. New York: Greenwood P, 1987.
- West, W.J. *The Larger Evils: Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Edinburgh: Canongate P, 1992.
- White, Michael. "Deconstruction and Therapy." *Dulwich Centre Newsletter*. 1 (1991): 21-40.
- White, Michael and David Epston. *Literate Means to Therapeutic Ends*. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications, 1989.
- Williams, Raymond, ed. *George Orwell: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
- . "George Orwell." *Culture and Society 1780-1950*. New York: Columbia UP, 1958. 285-94.
- . *Orwell*. London: Fontana, 1984.
- Wilt, Judith. "Behind the Door of 1984: The Worst Thing in the World." *Modernism Reconsidered*. Eds. Robert Kiely and John Hildebidle. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1983. 247-62.
- Wimsatt, W.K. *Hateful Contraries: Studies in Literature and Criticism*. Kentucky: U of Kentucky P, 1965.
- Winnifrith, Tom and William V. Whitehead. *1984 and All's Well?* London: Macmillan, 1984.
- Wiseman, Mary Bittner. "Rewriting the Self: Barthes and the Utopias of Language." *Literature and the Question of Philosophy*. Ed. Anthony J. Cascardi. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987. 295-313.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. 1921. Trans. D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
- Wolf, Howard. "George Orwell and the Problematics of Non-Fiction." *Critical Quarterly* 27.2 (1985): 23-30.
- Wood, David, ed. *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*. London: Routledge, 1991.

- Woodcock, George. *The Crystal Spirit: A Study of George Orwell*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- Worcester, David. *The Art of Satire*. 1940; New York: Norton, 1969.
- Wordsworth, William. "Upon Epitaphs (III)." *Prose Works of William Wordsworth*. Ed. William Knight. Vol. II. London: Macmillan, 1896.
- Wykes, David. *A Preface to Orwell*. New York: Longman, 1987.
- Young, John Wesley. *Totalitarian Language: Orwell's Newspeak and its Nazi and Communist Antecedents*. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1991.
- Zamyatin, Yevgeny. *We*. 1924. Trans. Bernard Guilbert Guerney. Introd. Michael Glenny. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972.
- Zeman, Z.A.B. *Nazi Propaganda*. 2nd ed. London: Oxford UP, 1973.
- Zehr, David Morgan. "George Orwell: The Novelist Displaced." *Bucknell Review* 27.1 (1982): 17-31.
- . "Orwell and the Proles: Revolutionary or Middle-Class Voyeur?." *Centennial Review* 27.1 (1983): 30-40.
- Zietsman, Johan Christoff. "A Commentary on Persius: Satire 5: Themes and Structures." Diss., U of Pretoria, 1987.
- Zimbardo, Philip G. "Mind Control: Political Fiction and Psychological Reality." *On Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Peter Stansky. New York: Freeman, 1983. 197-215.
- Zipes, Jack. *Fairy Tales and the Art of Subversion: The Classical Genre for Children and the Process of Civilization*. London: Heinemann, 1983.
- Zuckert, Michael P. "Orwell's Hopes, Orwell's Fears: 1984 as a Theory of Totalitarianism." *The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World*. Eds. Robert L. Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo. Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989. 45-67
- Zwerdling, Alex. "Orwell and the Techniques of Didactic Fantasy." *Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984*. Ed. Samuel Hynes. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 88-101.
- . "Orwell's Psychopolitics." *The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Ed. Ejner J. Jensen. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984. 87-110.