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New Mexico Historical Review

Volume 88
Number 1 *Vol 88, No 1 (Winter 2013)*

Article 1

1-1-2013

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The Flipside of Discovery

PLANNED PUEBLO INDIAN RESPONSE TO THE APPROACH OF THE CORONADO EXPEDITION

Richard Flint

Sixteenth-century European-led expeditions of reconnaissance and conquest in the New World involved the reciprocal discovery of Natives by "explorers" and of "explorers" by Natives.[1] European "explorers" accumulated intelligence and devised stratagems for contact with Natives; and they recorded these endeavors in their own accounts. The records left by those same "explorers" also reveal parallel planning by Native Americans for their encounters with the Europeans. One such instance of Natives discovering "explorers" took place in the American Southwest, or New Spain's far north, in the early 1540s. The "explorers" were the members of the Coronado Expedition, and the Natives were the Pueblo Indians of what are today Arizona and New Mexico.

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A week or so past the summer solstice of 1540, a large heterogeneous cavalcade of people and animals, the advance guard of the Coronado Expedition, crossed what we now know as the Gila River in southwestern New Mexico. The expeditionaries' records give no indication that they knew they had also crossed a territorial boundary or were being watched. In fact, the members of the Coronado Expedition labeled the territory they were now entering a *despoblado*, an unsettled land without evidence of permanent human presence. They had, however, just entered the territory of the Ashiwi, known today as the Zuni Indians.[2]

Unbeknownst to the thousand or so Europeans of various nationalities, black African slaves and servants, and Indian allies from at least a dozen tribal homelands in Mexico who made up the advance guard of the expedition, the Ashiwi monitored their every move. The Ashiwi reported the Europeans activities up and down the Native trade trail that the expedition was being guided along. The expedition stimulated intense interest by local populations because it was a very large group with a dangerous reputation.[3]

The members of the Coronado Expedition assumed that they were alone and unnoticed as they crossed the relatively rough terrain of river drainages and adjacent wooded foothills that stretch for 150 miles or so between the Gila and Zuni rivers.[4] But lookouts from Shíwana were secretly surveying their movements. The lookouts apparently operated in relays, one group returning to Shíwana with reports after being replaced by another.

Two weeks later, upon reaching the Zuni River, the expeditionaries finally spied two of the lookouts racing in the direction of their home pueblo. Four other men, probably the replacements of the previous group of lookouts, openly approached the expedition and said "they were there because they had been sent to that unsettled place to tell us we were welcome."[5] Soon thereafter, two more Ashiwi contacted the advance guard, who gave them and the four earlier representatives from Shíwana trade goods and told them to tell their people to stay in their homes without fear. The expeditionaries, though, were extremely wary of the Ashiwi. As one of the expeditionaries, Pedro de Ledesma, later put it, "The Indians wandered about looking over the army like men who had come to see what people were in the camp and how they were organized."[6] They acted like spies, and indeed, none of the Ashiwi returned to the expedition's camp, suggesting that their mission had been reconnaissance rather than a social visit.

The lookouts carried each batch of news back to Shíwana and shared it with the seven pueblos, especially among the governing councils that regulated life in each town. Each council conferred among its own members about each new bit of intelligence in light of what they already knew about the

foreigners. Then the councils consulted with each other to set a coordinated response to the approaching menace.[7]

What the Ashiwi knew about the Coronado Expedition was considerable, even before it arrived on their doorstep. For years the Ashiwi had been hearing about Spanish activities far to their south. As the expedition's captain general, Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, later recorded, the Ashiwi "assert that it was said among them more than fifty years ago that a people like us must come, from the direction we have come, and that they would subjugate this whole land."[8] Extensive indigenous trade, travel, and information networks had stitched together Native America for thousands of years and were fully functional in 1540. Even over distances of many hundreds of miles, those networks were capable of transmitting information and eyewitness accounts, sometimes even eyewitnesses themselves, with remarkable speed.[9] To give an indication of both the reach and velocity of indigenous information networks, here is a case that relates directly to the Coronado Expedition.

About two months after the arrival of the advance guard at the Zuni River, the seaborne unit of the expedition under Hernando de Alarcón was making slow, towed progress up the lower reaches of the Gila River just above its junction with the Colorado River. Alarcón and his men were nearly 350 miles as the crow flies from Cíbola and much farther away by any feasible land route. Nevertheless, Alarcón met and interviewed a local Gila River Native who had talked with others recently returned from Shíwana. The men who had been to Shíwana recounted the arrival of the advance guard of the expedition, which they had witnessed. Thus, less than two months after the expedition's arrival at Shíwana/Cíbola, news of the event was common knowledge among Indians along the lower Gila River, hundreds of miles away.[10]

The Ashiwi had for centuries been hearing stories of the Mexica, Purépecha, and other Indians of Mesoamerica, who were known far and wide because of their fearsome practice of ritualized warfare and sacrifice of prisoners.[11] By a similar means of long distance communication, they may have heard about the cataclysmic events of the conquest of Tenochtitlan under Hernando Cortés in 1521. Almost certainly they had heard about Spaniards crossing to the Pacific coast of Mexico in 1523 and their bloody northward thrust as far as Culiacán between 1529 and 1531. By the middle 1530s, Spanish slaving raids had reached southern Sonora in modern Mexico. The Ashiwi undoubtedly heard about the raids from regular visitors who traveled from Sonora to Shíwana at least once a year. People in central Sonora had told fray Marcos de Niza in 1539, the year before the Coronado Expedition's advance guard passed through, that they "were accustomed to travel to the ciudad of Cíbola in thirty days of travel" to work in the fields there every year.[12]

In 1539 the Ashiwi had their first direct contact with an Old World native, the Moorish slave named Esteban. He arrived at the pueblo of Hawikku, one of the seven ciudades of Shíwana, known to the expeditionaries as Cíbola, in the company of about three hundred Indians from Sonora and southeastern Arizona. In response to questions from leaders at Shíwana, Esteban told them that "behind [him] were coming two white men." The white men sounded like some of the conquistadores and slavers the Ashiwi had heard about for years from their Sonoran friends. They concluded that Esteban was a "spy or guide for some people who were trying to conquer them"—not far from the truth—so they killed him.[13]

After Esteban's death, the Ashiwi sent word south to the Natives of southeastern Arizona that "if Christians came, they were to consider them of no importance and were to kill them, since they were mortal . . . [and] if *they* did not dare to kill [the Spaniards], they were to send [a messenger] to tell [the people of Shíwana], because they would come to do it right."[14] Sending such a message to their neighbors indicates that deliberation within the governing councils at Shíwana in 1539 had already reached a consensus about the nature of the Europeans slowly but relentlessly approaching them from the south. It also indicates that the Ashiwi had already resolved to oppose them.

By the time the Coronado Expedition's advance guard reached the Zuni River, little more than a year later, the Ashiwi had already been thinking about, discussing, and planning for the arrival of a group like them for years. That planning was based on specific detailed information that came in part from a Sonoran Indian named Bartolomé, a companion of Esteban who had remained in Shíwana after the Moor's death. The expedition's captain general later wrote: "[The people of Shíwana] took [Bartolomé] prisoner and have held him closely guarded up till now. When I tried to get him back, they refused to give him up for two or three days, saying that he was dead. And other times [they said] that the Indians of Acucu had led him away. But finally, when I told them I would become extremely angry, if they did not give him to me, they turned him over to me."[15]

Because of reports Bartolomé gave, supplementing news from their southern neighbors and recent reports from their own lookouts, the Ashiwi knew about horses, guns, and the Mexican Indian allies who accompanied the expedition. Some had actually seen expeditionaries, but everyone in Shíwana had at least heard detailed descriptions of them. Thus, the size, speed, and effectiveness of horses as vehicles of war were no surprise to the Ashiwi. The same was true of guns, crossbows, metal armor, bugles, drums, banners, and other European accoutrements of war. Indians had already received pictures of such items, both drawn and verbal. As anthropologist

Michael Wilcox has recently written, "Pueblos had formulated (through communication networks) a collective portrait of how the Spaniards could be expected to behave."[16]

The Ashiwi, like many other contemporary Native Americans, saw the Spaniards' horses as their most potent threat. Ashiwi tactics, both offensive and defensive, revolved around hurting horses to minimize their effectiveness. This focus was particularly apparent on the night of 16 July 1540. Following the advance guard's arrival at the Zuni River earlier that day, the expedition's maestre de campo scouted ahead upstream, toward the towns of Shíwana, perhaps forewarned by Sonoran or Arizonan Indians with the advance guard. The scouts soon returned to the main camp to report the existence of a "dangerous pass," a narrow canyon formed by the Zuni River as it cut through a sandstone mesa.[17] In light of that news, Vázquez de Coronado directed García López de Cárdenas and twenty or thirty horsemen to occupy that pass and guard it during the night. They did so, taking up positions among boulders in the canyon.

As Vázquez de Coronado later reported, "When a quarter of the second watch was over, Indians struck and shot some horses with arrows." None of the men-at-arms were wounded, only horses, suggesting that horses were, in fact, the target of the attack. The Ashiwi also set up a howl, unnerving both men and horses. Mounts reared and some riders threw their saddles on backward. When the expeditionaries roused and got themselves mounted, the Ashiwi warriors melted into the night, dark after moonset.[18] Their attack at the dangerous pass clearly reveals the Ashiwi's concern over horses, based on years of alarm expressed by neighbors and two weeks of direct observation by their own lookouts.

In the wake of the nighttime raid, the whole advance guard of the expedition came together at the pass the next morning. With drums and trumpets sounding and banners waving, they proceeded upstream toward Hawikku, the most southwesterly of the Cíbola/Shíwana pueblos. Vázquez de Coronado wrote afterward that as the advance guard moved toward Hawikku, "From time to time the Indians sent up their smoke clouds, which were answered from a distance with as much coordination as we would have known how to do ourselves. Thus, they were notified that we were traveling and where we had reached."[19] As a consequence, as many as two hundred warriors were arrayed to meet them in front of the pueblo. They were armed and in full regalia.

Vázquez de Coronado "sent *maestre de campo* don García López, fray Daniel, fray Luis, and Fernando Bermejo[, a scribe,] some distance ahead with some horsemen, so that the Indians might see them. [He ordered them] to tell

[the Indians] that [the purpose of their] coming was not to do them injury, but to protect them in the name of the emperor."[20] In response, the Ashiwi shot an arrow into the skirts of fray Luis's cassock. As the rest of the advance guard took up positions alongside the friars, more arrows were unleashed, and the warriors moved closer to the foreigners, clearly testing their reaction. Finally, Vázquez de Coronado gave the word to attack, and mounted lancers raced forward, overtaking and killing several Natives before the rest could scale the outer walls of the stone pueblo, using ladders they had left there for that purpose.

The Ashiwi warriors pulled up all but one of the ladders behind them, setting a trap for anyone who followed. Vázquez de Coronado took the bait. As the captain general later wrote, "The people who were on the roof defending themselves had no difficulty at all inflicting the injury on us that they had power [to do]." Immediately leading an assault on the pueblo, Vázquez de Coronado, one of the few men who wore a suit of armor, rushed to the single remaining ladder and began to climb. Ashiwi warriors promptly appeared at the head of the ladder and bombarded the captain general with stones, including a heavy grinding stone that dented his helmet and knocked him unconscious to the ground. He was saved from certain death by two of his captains who shielded him with their bodies and then carried him, still unconscious, out of the fray.[21]

The Ashiwi watched this withdrawal and may have expected that the apparent death of the most prominent man from the expedition might end the assault. Instead, it resumed under the leadership of López de Cárdenas. The Ashiwi warriors now engaged the expeditionaries only from the cover of massive pueblo walls and the elevation of its flat roofs. After an hour or so, the pueblo grew quiet and it became obvious to the expeditionaries that it now was empty. The Ashiwi defenders had let themselves down the back wall and withdrawn surreptitiously to Dowa Yalanne, a steep-walled mesa about fifteen miles away.[22]

Upon entering the deserted pueblo, the expeditionaries realized that the Ashiwi had carefully planned and orchestrated the battle. The Ashiwi had been testing and studying the foreigners' tactics and martial skill. Prior to the beginning of hostilities, probably several days before, the pueblo "had been cleared of men older than sixty years and younger than twenty [years] and of women and children. All that remained were fighting men."[23] The Ashiwi had also transferred nearly all of the pueblo's moveable goods and furnishings to a defensive site on Dowa Yalanne. Shortly after the battle, Vázquez de Coronado wrote, "I think they have turquoise in quantity. By the time I arrived, this had disappeared, along with the rest of their possessions, except

the corn."[24] Given their hunger, the expeditionaries ravenously consumed a portion of the corn.

The recounted events from 15 to 17 July 1540 are best conceived as a series of probing encounters on both the Ashiwi and expeditionary sides. Each party had adhered to an overarching strategy.[25] The Ashiwi strategy was to observe and test firsthand the strength and skill of the foreigners. The brief skirmishes confirmed for the Ashiwi that the expedition's mounted lancers and large cohort of Mexican Indian allies were extremely potent forces. The Ashiwi had faith that in one-on-one combat—the kind that the Mexican Indians preferred—Ashiwi warriors could best their Mexican adversaries. Equestrian advantage could be neutralized by choosing locations of confrontation that were steep and rugged. Thus, in advance of the first battle, they had established their fall-back defense on the high and vertical-walled mesa of Dowa Yalanne. This strategy of defensive withdrawal was nothing new. It was a common prehistoric reaction to outside encroachment, now pursued in response to new threats.[26]

Once they decided to defend themselves from the height of Dowa Yalanne, the Ashiwi successfully stuck with that strategy. They kept "their wives and children and all the goods they have in their fortified places."[27] Throughout the nearly two years the Coronado Expedition remained in Tierra Nueva (the American Southwest), the Ashiwi of Hawikku never returned en masse to their valley pueblo. Word of this strategy's success spread to other Pueblo people of the region: the Tiwa, Tewa, Tano, Towa, Keres, and Hopi. With only one exception a few days after the battle at Hawikku, none of the Pueblos challenged the Coronado Expedition on flat, open terrain again. Instead, they removed themselves to strongly fortified buildings, almost always on commanding elevations. This minimized the number of violent assaults and casualties suffered by the Pueblos during the residence of the Coronado Expedition. Even so, historians have estimated the death rate from violence among the Tiwas, the most affected Pueblo group during residence of the Coronado Expedition, at more than ten percent.[28]

The Pueblos repeatedly used this strategy of defensive withdrawal from valley pueblos in favor of elevated locations during the Coronado Expedition and subsequent expeditions of the sixteenth century, as well as during the Pueblo-Spanish War of 1692–1696.[29] Castañeda de Nájera referred to this tactic when he reported on a sortie north along the Rio Grande late in the summer of 1541. He explained that when an expeditionary company under Francisco Barrionuevo reached the Tewa pueblos near the junction of the Rio Grande and Rio Chama, the company found that the people of "Yuque Yunque [had] abandoned two very beautiful pueblos, between which was

the river, and went to the mountain chain where they had four very strong pueblos in rugged land."[30]

The Pueblos elaborated that strategy with several complementary measures. First, the Pueblos, to the extent they could, strictly limited contact with the expedition to specialists whose customary responsibility was external relations. Within days of the abandonment and occupation of Hawikku, for example, a group of Pueblo emissaries arrived there from Cicuique (Pecos Pueblo), two hundred miles to the east. They had heard about the arrival of foreigners through word spread along the communication grid. With all the studied speech and gestures of seasoned diplomats, they made a show of marveling at the troop of foreigners and offered their services as guides to the expeditionaries. They would be pleased, they said, to conduct them through the Rio Grande pueblos, "making sure that the Indians of those pueblos came out in peace with clothing and provisions and welcomed [the Spaniards] very well."[31] The expeditionaries accepted the arrangement, and the leader of the Pueblo delegation, a man the Spaniards called Bigotes, traveled in advance of an expeditionary detachment to the Rio Grande. Although the Pueblos' reception of the foreigners there was not without incident, on the whole the Europeans were pleased with how smoothly things went.[32]

Second, the embassy from Cicuique, with the acquiescence of the members of the Coronado Expedition, dictated the itinerary and pace by which the expeditionaries saw Tierra Nueva. The Native guides orchestrated ceremonial welcomes and controlled the information upon which the expedition's travel plans were based. Bigotes supplied another guide, called El Turco by the Spaniards, who told tales of "very large settlements and also gold, silver, and painted pictures" at a place known as Quivira.[33]

The expedition then spent the summer months the following year chasing Quivira, El Turco's quimera. But both before and after that long and fruitless journey, the Pueblos maintained their defensive distance from the expedition and "never consented to peace."[34] The expedition and the Indians had minimal contact and, though sporadic, the violence was bloody. The most protracted fighting occurred at a strong and elevated fortified pueblo called Moho, a location fully consistent with the Pueblos' strategy of defensive withdrawal.[35]

In the spring of 1542, the expeditionaries, faced with recalcitrant and distant Pueblo neighbors, a climate of hot and cold extremes, severely disappointed expectations, and a mammoth uprising behind them in Mexico, elected to abandon the long shot in Tierra Nueva, cut their losses, and return south. Two major factors in this decision were persistent Pueblo self-segregation and noncooperation. Pueblo strategies, it must be said, were sometimes

facilitated by vacillation of the expeditionaries between outbursts of violence and attempts at "peaceful occupation."[36]

European Discoveries and Pueblo Knowledge

The Pueblo strategies of defensive withdrawal from the Coronado Expedition into rugged terrain and restriction of contact with the expedition to formal interchange by outside chiefs were highly successful. Those two strategies severely limited what the European-led force saw and where it traveled while in Tierra Nueva. Further, combined with two extremely cold winters in a row and the disappointing lack of high-value goods among the Pueblos, defensive disengagement and limited diplomatic contact ensured that the expedition would make no settlement in Tierra Nueva. Withdrawal deprived the expedition of cooperative guides, and those guides were key to where the expeditionaries went and what they saw. The European members of the expedition were not explorers in the strictest sense of the word. While they traveled to where none of their compatriots had ever been before, they were not blazers of trails across utterly virgin lands. Instead, they relied on local residents to lead them to population centers, traveling by established roads and trails to places known far and wide among the Native populations.

When guides were absent or led grudgingly, the expeditionaries frequently found themselves frustrated. When in August 1540, for example, an expeditionary detachment was led to the Grand Canyon, its Hopi guides feigned ignorance of how to reach the Colorado River at the bottom of the canyon. The expeditionaries tried randomly and fruitlessly to climb down to the river. Earlier, from Shíwana/Cíbola, Vázquez de Coronado wrote to the Spanish viceroy in Mexico City that he could not provide a description of Pueblo women's clothing because "the Indians keep [the women] so carefully guarded [at their refuge on Dowa Yalanne] that until now I have seen no more than two elderly women."[37]

Furthermore, when guides chose to ignore, bypass, or conceal communities or features, the expeditionaries never suspected they existed. For instance, none of the surviving contemporaneous documents indicates that the expedition visited or even heard about most of the Tompiro/Salinas pueblos that were then flourishing in the Estancia and northern Tularosa basins, east of the Rio Grande and southeast of Tiguex. That ignorance meant that the expeditionaries were also unaware of the series of salt lakes in the Estancia Basin, which had been exploited for centuries by the Pueblos and were later recognized as a major resource once a Spanish colony was successfully established in New Mexico in the 1590s.

Given frequent attention paid to turquoise in documents of the expedition, it is surprising that the expeditionaries had no knowledge of the major turquoise mines that were then being worked by the Pueblos in the Cerrillos Hills east of the Rio Grande at the northern edge of the Galisteo Basin. That was true despite repeated traffic by expeditionaries with Pueblo guides back and forth across the basin almost within eyesight of the mines. Likewise, the newcomers were kept in the dark about the locations of sources of lead from which the Pueblos extracted material used in glazing ceramics. This pattern of ignorance of mineral resources by the expedition suggests a concerted, coordinated, and successful effort by Pueblo people of various linguistic and political affiliations to keep such information to themselves.

Fray Marcos de Niza pointedly mentioned having been told by Indians in 1539 about two large and prosperous Native polities called Totonteac and Marata. When they arrived in Tierra Nueva the following year, members of the expedition asked various Native people about those places, but apparently made no attempt to physically verify their existence after their guides told them that neither place matched the friar's report. The Spanish response suggests that either the Pueblos were very insistent and convincing in their denial of knowledge or the expeditionaries were undemanding in their inquiry.

The hostility, including the passive hostility that characterized most extended relations between the expedition and Pueblo communities, further reduced contact between the expedition and the Pueblos and other indigenous peoples of Tierra Nueva. What contact they did have was either very violent or occurred in carefully controlled exchanges with messengers and emissaries. Therefore, central aspects of Pueblo life, such as religious ceremonies and trade with neighbors and distant partners, were unwitnessed and utterly unknown to the newcomers. Not a single description from the Coronado Expedition's surviving documentary record reports the Pueblos' busy annual cycle of masked dances or of the conspicuous, elaborately costumed dancers themselves. Evidently, members of the expedition did not see them. Nor is there any mention of foreign traders, either singly or in parties, making what are known to have been routine visits to the pueblos of the Rio Grande region, where the expedition was in residence for more than twelve full months.

In short, members of the expedition had only a narrow and restricted view of the land of Tierra Nueva and, more importantly, the people who inhabited it, the king's potential vassals. Expeditionaries' attitudes toward and decisions about the people of the region were circumscribed by the physical limits of what they saw and by what they were permitted to see by their guides and other members of the Native communities, which was determined in large measure by the defensive strategies of the region's Native people.

Such tunnel vision is, of course, part of the human condition and not a disability peculiar to sixteenth-century Europeans. The indigenous people of Tierra Nueva had a similarly truncated vision. The Coronado Expedition presented to them an anomalous, artificially unbalanced society made up predominantly of young men. To all appearances, it was a community almost devoid of elders, women, and young children, especially girls, and thus incapable of reproducing itself. As a consequence, the expedition seemed to be without any but the most rudimentary domesticity. It looked to be a group incapable of feeding itself, except with meat, bent on forcing its way across the continent for alien reasons.

The more constructive aspects of Old World cultures were almost completely hidden from the Indians of Tierra Nueva in what they saw of the Coronado Expedition. Even the Franciscan priests and friars accompanying the expedition made little impression on the Native population, having limited opportunity for contact with indigenous people other than as auxiliary support to the armed majority of the expedition. Certainly, there was next to no opportunity for religious indoctrination or proselytization.[38] The expedition seemed like a malevolent force to be hidden from, chased away, and, if one dared, enlisted briefly for one's own cause.

One effect of such a view was that Pueblo and other Native groups rejected and destroyed elements of expeditionary culture and material, even when they might have been of potential use and value in the Indian world. Horses, for example, were killed rather than employed as transportation or pack animals. Likewise, there is no evidence in written, archaeological, or oral Native accounts that at this time Indians took advantage of the docility and manageability of sheep, goats, or cattle. Such animals were simply slaughtered immediately for food or destroyed as enemy possessions.

Partial knowledge on all sides of the constellation of Old World natives and natives of Tierra Nueva made for a signal case of what historian James Lockhart has rightly called "double mistaken identity."[39] Probably no other outcome was realistically possible. Because of information received earlier, the parties were polarized, with little reason to exchange extensive information about each other or to allow each other to acquire such knowledge independently. In the absence of extended peaceful contact, both sides were doomed to remain a mystery to each other.

The Pueblos' initial strategies of defensive withdrawal and minimal intercourse had short-term operational success and staved off colonial occupation for sixty years. But, ultimately, a modified strategy—one of sustained, if still limited, contact with Europeans, resulting in increasing familiarity—ensured eventual coexistence of the two groups.

Notes

1. Sixteenth-century Spanish-led expeditions in the New World routinely penetrated regions previously unknown to them and could therefore be considered to have been exploring, in the broadest sense of the word. They were not, however, operating out of benign motivations of satisfying scientific curiosity, such as are attributed to exploring Mars. The principal goal of the expeditions was openly to take control of non-European, non-Christian polities.
2. "Pedro de Castañeda de Nájera's Narrative, 1560s," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition, 1539–1542: "They Were Not Familiar with His Majesty nor Did They Wish to Be His Subjects,"* eds. and trans. Richard Flint and Shirley Cushing Flint (Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 2005), 392–93. For information on the approximate area of Zuni historical land and resource use and control, see T. J. Ferguson and E. Richard Hart, *A Zuni Atlas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 42–55.
3. Richard Flint, *No Settlement, No Conquest: A History of the Coronado Entrada* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008), 49–64.
4. "Juan Jaramillo's Narrative, 1560s," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 513.
5. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter to the Viceroy, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 256.
6. Richard Flint, *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported: The 1544 Investigation of the Coronado Expedition* (Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 2002), 235.
7. The council of elders as the form of government at Cíbola was noted by expeditionary Pedro de Castañeda de Nájera. "Castañeda de Nájera's Narrative, 1560s," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 397. Edmund Ladd has elaborated extensively on the system reported briefly by Castañeda de Nájera. See Alfonso Ortiz, vol. ed., *Southwest*, vol. 9 of *Handbook of North American Indians*, ed. William C. Strutevant (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1979–83), s.v. "Zuni Social and Political Organization."
8. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 261.
9. Some of the richest thinking about protohistoric trade and communication in the Southwest, including the Zuni pueblos, is done by Carroll Riley. See Carroll L. Riley, *The Frontier People: The Greater Southwest in the Protohistoric Period* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 311–27, esp. 324.
10. "Narrative of Alarcón's Voyage, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 201.
11. Carroll L. Riley, "The Road to Hawikuh: Trade and Trade Routes to Cíbola-Zuni during Late Prehistoric and Early Historic Times," *Kiva* 41 (winter 1975): 137–59.
12. "Narrative Account by fray Marcos de Niza, August 26, 1539," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 70.
13. "Castañeda de Nájera's Narrative, 1560s," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 388.
14. "The Viceroy's Letter to the King, April 17, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 238.

15. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 262.
16. Michael V. Wilcox, *The Pueblo Revolt and the Mythology of Conquest: An Indigenous Archaeology of Contact* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 105.
17. This topographical feature is almost certainly the narrows of the Zuni River just west of the modern Arizona-New Mexico state line.
18. "Testimony of Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, 1544," in *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported*, Flint, 280.
19. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 257.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. "Traslado de las Nuevas, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 292–93. A photo showing Dowa Yalanne appears on page 292.
23. Ibid., 292.
24. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 259.
25. For information on Spanish martial tactics commonly employed by expeditions of the sixteenth century, see Captain Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, *The Indian Militia and Description of the Indies*, eds. and trans. Kris Lane and Timothy F. Johnson (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008; originally published in Spanish in 1599).
26. For a recent penetrating discussion of abandonment as a long-lived defensive strategy among the Pueblos, see Wilcox, *The Pueblo Revolt and the Mythology of Conquest*, 95–148. Native American groups throughout the hemisphere pursued various strategies for dealing with attempted European conquest. Some, such as people of the mound-building cultures in the modern U.S. Southeast, defended themselves by remaining in already fortified settlements. Others, such as the Caxcanes and their neighbors in what are now Jalisco and Zacatecas, withdrew to isolated rugged terrain, much as the Pueblos commonly did. Yet others, for instance the Araucanians of southern Chile, adopted extreme mobility to defend very large territories from foreign encroachment. See Charles Hudson, *Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando de Soto and the South's Ancient Chiefdoms* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 88–379; Ida Altman, *The War for Mexico's West: Indians and Spaniards in New Galicia, 1524–1550* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010), 121–51; and David J. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 54–61.
27. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 261, 268.
28. Flint, *No Settlement, No Conquest*, 201.
29. During testimony taken regarding the Pueblo of Acoma in December 1598, colonist Juan de León remarked that "this [peñol of Acoma] is the place where the natives take refuge when they wage war on other nations. If not destroyed, the pueblo will serve as a shelter for the Indians who rebel." See "Testimony of Juan de León," in *Don Juan de Oñate, Colonizer of New Mexico, 1595–1628*, eds. and trans. George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1953), 445. Many instances of employment of the strategy of defensive withdrawal—for example by the people of San Felipe, Cochití, and San Ildefonso pueblos—are recounted in

the campaign journals of Diego de Vargas. See especially translations of the journals for 1692–1697 in *To the Royal Crown Restored: The Journals of don Diego de Vargas, New Mexico, 1692–1694*, eds. and trans. John L. Kessell, Rick Hendricks, and Meredith D. Dodge (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 380–84, 608–9; and John L. Kessell, Rick Hendricks, and Meredith D. Dodge, eds. and trans., *Blood on the Boulders: The Journals of don Diego de Vargas, New Mexico, 1694–1697*, 2 vols. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 1:81, 378–90.

30. "Castañeda de Nájera's Narrative," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 412, 468.
31. "Testimony of Melchior Pérez, 1544," in *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported*, Flint, 211.
32. "Hernando de Alvarado's Narrative," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 305–6.
33. "Testimony of Juan Troyano, 1544," in *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported*, Flint, 169.
34. Ibid., 171.
35. See, for example, "Testimony of Rodrigo de Frías, 1544," in *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported*, Flint, 195–96.
36. Clearly, the leaders of the expedition, especially perhaps Vázquez de Coronado, attempted from time to time to hold his force to a standard of less violence than had been typical of other entradas. For instance, he issued regulations prohibiting abuse of Natives and occasionally threatened punishment of those who defied those regulations. See, for example, "Testimony of Juan Troyano, 1544," in *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported*, Flint, 94.
37. "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 262.
38. It is telling that in his book on the friars who accompanied the Coronado Expedition, fray Angélico Chávez could write only that "The friars and the *donados*, we can be sure, went about trying to explain the Faith to the native Tiwa of Tiguex." Fray Angélico Chávez, *Coronado's Friars* (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1968), 53–54. Chávez's statement is unsupported by the documentary record and is an improbable assumption in view of the prompt withdrawal of all the Tiwa people (except captives) from the vicinity of the expedition. On the contrary, what is shown by the surviving documentary record is, for instance, that fray Juan de Padilla (the leader of the missionary cadre after the departure of fray Marcos de Niza) assisted in the questioning of Bigotes, the cacique, and El Turco under torture, while fray Daniel and fray Luis were repeatedly the deliverers of the *requerimiento* (demand for submission) to Pueblo people. None of these acts could have been viewed as benign by Pueblos. See, for example, "Vázquez de Coronado's Letter, August 3, 1540," in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, Flint and Flint, 257; and "Sworn Statement of the Governor, Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, 1544," in *Great Cruelties Have Been Reported*, Flint, 284.
39. James Lockhart, "The Post-Conquest Period of Mexican History," in "A Scholarly Debate: The Origins of Modern Mexico—Indigenistas vs. Hispanistas," *The Americas* 48 (January 1992): 327.