

*Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands 1739-1815: the Political, Social and
Economic Context.*

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the origins, development and impact of British army recruiting in the Scottish Highlands in the period from 1739-1815. It examines the interaction of government, landlords and tenantry using estate papers, notably the Macleod of Dunvegan and Gordon Castle Muniments, the Forfeited Estates papers and Campbell of Breadalbane collection. Recruiting is analysed within the context of rapid socio-economic change. The emphasis is on tenant reactions to recruiting, and the study concludes that the upward pressure released by this process was a vital factor in bringing about change in the tenurial structure in the region. Both the decline of the tacksman and the emergence of crofting are linked to the process of regiment raising. Military recruiting involved a clear recognition on the part of Highland landlords and tenantry that the empire and the 'fiscal military state' offered alternative sources of revenue. Both groups 'colonised' various levels of the state's military machine. As a result of this close *involvement*, the government remained a vital influence in the area well after 1745, and a major player in the region's economy. Recruiting was not merely a residue of clanship, rather it was a form of commercial activity, analogous to kelping.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.D.A. :- Argyll and Bute District Archive

A.U.L. :- Aberdeen University Library

B.A.M. :- Blair Atholl Muniments

B.L. :- British Library

C.D.T.L. :- Clan Donald Trust Library

D.C.M. :- Dunvegan Castle Muniments

D.H. :- Dumfries House

E.C.L. :- Edinburgh Central library

G.U.L. :- Glasgow University Library

H.R.A. :- Highland Regional Archive

J.R.L. :- John Rylands Library

M.L. :- Mitchell Library

N.L.S. :- National Library of Scotland

P.R.O. :- Public Record Office

S.R.O. :- Scottish Record Office

W.R.H. :- West Register House (S.R.O.)

B.I.H.R. :- Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research

B.J.R.L. :- Bulletin of the John Rylands Library

Econ.H.R. :- Economic History Review

E.H.R. :- English Historical Review

H.J. :- Historical Journal

H.T. :- History Today

H.M.C. :- Historical Manuscript Commission

J.S.A.H.R. :- Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research

N.S. :- Northern Scotland

S.G.M. :- Scottish Geographic Magazine

S.H.R. :- Scottish History Review

S.J.P.E. :- Scottish Journal of Political Economy

S.S. :- Scottish Studies

T.G.S.I. :- Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness

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Military Recruiting and Highland Historiography

The role and consequence of military recruiting in the 1739-1815 period, has been described by a prominent commentator in the following terms; " the issue was perhaps the most explosive single element in the entire history of the Highland clearances. " ¹

Despite the importance attributed in that instance to such military activity, there has been curiously little in depth analysis or detailed study on the motive for, and impact of, regiment raising in the region. In attempting to explain why there as been such little academic study of this subject, the present image of these regiments is important. They constitute in many respects one of Scotland's most potent cultural icons, and are for that reason a matter of considerable controversy. To many they represent a distorted, indeed, jingoistic hangover from Scotland's imperial past. As a result they appear of little relevance to the wider processes which shaped modern Scotland, be it demographic, industrial or agricultural change. Added to this logical prioritising of subject matter, is the fact that these regiments are surrounded by a whole corpus of material, from both this century and the last, which can generally be described as regimental histories. This literature has romanticised such levies; it emphasises their direct Highland connections and traditions, and ensures that the whole topic is largely represented from the military establishment's viewpoint. Often written by army officers, such regimental histories continue to reinforce a perception that many would describe as at best historically inaccurate and, at worst, as conveying a false and twee image of the Highlands and Scotland as a whole. ²

The historiography of military recruiting reveals how regiments raised for Britain's imperial army are, nevertheless, linked directly to the culture and attitudes of pre 1745 clanship. This is profoundly ironic given that army recruiting as a large scale phenomenon occurred simultaneously with the rapid decline of clanship as the dominant social arrangement. This trend whereby British military service was seen in terms of clanship was, in fact, already evident from very early on in the emergence of this new British-Highland military. During the Jacobite uprising, Adam Ferguson, as chaplain to the 42nd Highland regiment, preached in Gaelic to the battalion. The sermon is best remembered as an exhortation for the soldiers to " play the men for our people. " Thus the troops were to be the cutting edge of Highland reconciliation with the wider British union. Yet more subtle still, is the impression given by Ferguson's sermon. It suggested that these men were representative of Highland clan society, and that as regular soldiers of the crown they were, nevertheless, involved in an activity that was both a privileged yet natural function of the militarised north. ³

At the beginning of the emergence of the British-Highland military, therefore, the indistinguishable nature of clanship and army service was already being suggested. Yet this is a fundamental mistake, and one that has continued to emerge in the literature on the subject. Both logic and the actual evidence calls into question the bellicose nature of Highland society as suggested by service in the professional army. It has been noted that even in the eighteenth century there were " large numbers of clansmen, many of whom knew little else but making war. " This modern quote reveals the prevalency of the perception of clanship as a mere military mechanism. Yet the last internal clan battle was fought in August 1688 at Mulroy in Lochaber, and only took place because one side - the Macintoshes, had government troops amongst its ranks. The military aspects of clanship, while wholly dominating perceptions both in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, had, in fact, been in long term decay since before the end of the seventeenth century. This suggests that the high profile Highland presence in Britain's imperial military should not be seen as in any way inevitable. ⁴

Vast tracts of the Highlands had, for instance, experienced no pitched battles between 1715 and 1745. Thus to speak of armies of clansmen as experienced soldiery is inaccurate. That is not to underestimate the military capabilities of the region. Many clansmen had, in fact, received training on the continent in the armies of France and the Dutch Republic; nevertheless, this thesis suggests that the over concentration on the military capabilities of clanship needs to be addressed and acknowledged. ⁵

Too often the debate on the martial character of the region has been conducted in generalised and vague terms. There has been a failure to distinguish between the various forms of military service. There is evidence to suggest that clanship was not structurally designed for constant large scale war. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the Macleods of Dunvegan and Macdonalds of Sleat engaged in a protracted feud which, given their close proximity, forced the constant retention of military manpower to secure their agricultural sectors from raiding. These powerful clans found that within three years, their struggle could not be sustained due to the needs of the labour intensive arable sector. The devastation that national campaigning in the Scottish civil war had inflicted upon clans like the McLeans of Duart meant that, even after a generation, almost 25% of its arable resources could not be cultivated due to a lack of manpower. This was also the case for the Macleods of Dunvegan, whose hundreds of casualties at the Battle of Worcester induced a legacy of military caution that survived as a voluntarily strategy for the rest of the era of militarised clanship. Only the prospect of massive army occupation in 1745 forced this unmilitary-like clan to fully mobilise for the crown. Even where the military characteristics

of clanship were retained in a permanent way, as in the case of the Camerons of Locheil, it was often in order to protect the more vital agricultural resources of the estate. ⁶

Military activity by clans was designed primarily to complement the agricultural sector and succeed in one or two campaigning seasons. The development and influence of continental techniques and logistics certainly allowed clans to retain themselves in the field as a potent armed force for increasing periods of time. Yet the psychology of clan war becomes obvious when, after Prestonpans in 1745, desertions began to occur in the Jacobite army. This was by no means a demoralised force; yet to many the campaign had been won, while the harvest cycle was by then well advanced. This cultural mind set explains the actions of ordinary clansmen. Only the advance into England, where physical distance removed the option of returning to their farms, saw desertion fall away amongst the Highland levies. ⁷

This social context to military service suggests that commentators cannot merely point to the martial nature of the Highlands. Such military activity at which clanship proved particularly adept, does not necessarily mean that they were the ideal soldiery for the wars that imperial Britain increasingly fought in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. With its fiscal ability enhanced and buttressed by a developing economy, Britain, in common with its enemies, found itself routinely capable of maintaining an army of over 100 000 men for the best part of a decade, and in theatres as diverse as North America and Bengal. The nature of such military activity was completely different from the campaigning which characterised clanship. In one of the most important commentaries on the whole subject of Highland military recruiting, this fundamental incompatibility has been recognised, and explains a paradox whereby the supposedly martial Highlander seemed to despise and mutiny against particular forms of military service. ⁸

Despite what seem to be obvious differences between clan and imperial military service, the historiography on this particular subject has largely failed to highlight these large distinctions. Just as Ferguson had seen the Black Watch soldiers as actually representative of wider Highland society, so the literature has tended to see the continuance of military service, even in a new and radically different form, as evidence of old clan values and attitudes. One of the most important books in this regard is David Stewart of Garth's *Sketches of the Character, Manners and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland*. In his book, Stewart explicitly linked recruitment in the 1750-1810 period to clanship. He argued that the unique characteristics of these regiments were a product of a completely different social arrangement and that their existence was linked to its influence. Stewart constructed a social-cultural world that explained to his readership what the French wars had largely confirmed for them, namely the innate bellicosity of the Highlander. He stated:

In forming his military character the Highlander was no more favoured by nature, but by the social system under which he lived. ⁹

The many regimental histories of Highland battalions served to consolidate the sense that British military service represented a natural and unbroken continuity from the era of clanship. These books obviously concentrated on the active service of their respective regiments and devoted only a few pages in the opening chapter to the actual raising process. The impression given was that regiment raising in the 1739-1810 period was completed by the same methods as those used by a clan chief to levy men. Thus in 1800, the 93rd Sutherland regiment was raised by "clan attachments and through this instinct." The Reay Fencibles were raised when the government "made appeals to their noblemen to arm their clansmen," with the result that "the Mackays came cheerfully forward at the call of their chieftains." ¹⁰

One such deeply influential book, *Gloomy Memories* by Donald Macleod, helped to both maintain the perception of continuity and to make military service an increasingly unique element in the developing nineteenth century debate on Highland landlordism and clearance. In what can arguably be suggested as the single most emotive image of the consequences of the landlords' actions, Macleod noted that;

The children and nearest relations of those who sustained the honour of the British name in many a bloody field - the heroes of Egypt, Corunna, Tolouse, Salamanca and Waterloo - were ruined, trampled upon, dispersed, and compelled to seek an asylum across the Atlantic. ¹¹

He added that military service demonstrated that the population had retained its loyalty to its hereditary chieftains. This made the clearance of such people doubly reprehensible. Indeed, from the original publication of both Stewart of Garth's and Donald Macleod's books, the consolidation of the military element in the whole of the Highland debate was assured. The image was of a betrayed race, which in a supposedly mutual contract, had carried out its side of the bargain only to find the landlord renege on the deal. It intensified the nature of the debate and insured that sense of betrayal, not so readily evident in the rest of Scotland, came to characterise much of the discussion on the region. This recruiting context helps to explain a well recognised aspect of the Sutherland Clearances. That particular case has been highlighted as unusual, in that large amounts of capital allowed a degree of experimentation not possible elsewhere. Yet it is not merely the scale of the Sutherland clearances that explain the unusually intense passions aroused by it. The Sutherlands were, in fact, the last landlord family to raise a proprietary regiment for the

British army, and that fact goes a long way towards explaining the particularly bitter folk memories. In Alexander Mackenzie's immensely popular book *The History of the Highland Clearances*, first published in 1883, significant weight was given to the irony of military service and patriotism being rewarded with eviction. Mackenzie's book gave detailed accounts of the lack of Highland men for the Crimean War. He directly contrasted this poor response to the large levies that late Victorian society firmly believed had been produced under the clanship recruiting of the 1790-1800 period.¹²

This military element is vital in the development of popular perceptions of the region in the last half of the nineteenth century. Land in return for sons appeared to be a simple arrangement, and more significantly, recruiting allowed Highland depopulation to be addressed as a national British issue. The betrayal of the nation's finest soldiers moved the debate on to a different level, away from property and legal rights, and into moral and even patriotic grounds. It undoubtedly put the landlords on the defensive by the period of the 1880s. In a serious charge, it was noted of Highland landlords;

Alas, for the blush that would cover their faces if they would allow themselves to reflect that, in their names, the fathers, mothers, brothers, wives, of the invincible " 78th " had been remorselessly driven from their native soil. But we tell Highland proprietors that were Britain some twenty years hence to have the misfortune to be plunged into such a crisis as the present, there will be few such men as the Highlanders of the 78th to fight her battles [and] if another policy towards the Highlanders is not adopted, that sheep and deer, ptarmigan and grouse, can do but little to save it in such a calamity.¹³

In essence, the landlords were being accused of acting against the nation's best interest. This was in fact a substantial distortion of the real military situation within the Britain of the 1880s. By this period, and ever since the poor response at the time of the Crimean war, Highlanders had not constituted a vital element in Britain's recruiting strategy. Contrary to popular perceptions in both the nineteenth and twentieth century, Highlanders and Scots in general did not make up a strong element within the British army after the 1840s. They were, for example, proportionally outnumbered by the Irish, who constituted the best recruiting ground relative to population.¹⁴ However, so powerful was the perception of Highland regiments, that recruiting retained its position as an important factor. This can be demonstrated by the fact that it formed an element in justifying government intervention in the Highlands during the run up to the establishment of crofting legislation.

Military service, especially the large scale efforts of the late eighteenth century, had, in fact, given a moral respectability to the claims of the Highland population for some time. That this moral aspect had been largely unsuccessful until the 1880s, should not detract from its continuing appearance in the whole question of land and population in the region. Thus it was that, in February and March 1813, in one last attempt to avoid removal, the population of Kildonan deployed the military card. They stated " that they were *loyal* men, whose brothers and sons were now fighting Bonaparte and they would allow no sheep to come into the country. " Even more telling was the fact that when the population organised a petition to the Countess, they deliberately chose William Macdonald, a pensioner from the 93rd regiment. By choosing an ex-soldier, the population were attempting to engender a context where the reality of their economic redundancy was clouded, and the obligations to them suddenly remembered. ¹⁵

The influence of the military dimension in broadening the scope of the land question can thus be traced to within the period of first phase clearance itself. However, it was during the Napier Commission that the true legacy of the whole historiographical treatment of the recruiting issue can be seen at its most important. During the inquiry into conditions in the Highlands, the liberal character of the government must have produced ideological anxieties over what amounted to intervention in the property rights of landlords. It became necessary, therefore, to construct aspects to Highland society that allowed this intervention. This is where recruiting became important.

The inquiry especially sought to clarify the issue of land security, and in Assynt was informed of the classic betrayal of this right which had been won through military service.

In Assynt the great majority joined the army on the distinct understanding that the parents would be kept in their holdings; but upon the return of the survivors, they found their parents huddled together on the seashore and their former holdings converted into so many sheep walks. I have seen some of the soldiers when they came home going to the stances where their fathers lived and shedding tears and saying they would go and pull down Dunrobin castle. ¹⁶

This tradition, the committee noted, had been cited in Lewis and Skye. On the latter Island, the question was directly asked as to why government should intervene in the area. It was replied that favourable government protection for the Gael could bring about the potential return of the large scale recruiting that had been evident during the 1750-1810 period. The Commissioners noted that the whole bargain of sons for land was an " extremely interesting one. " - betraying, perhaps, their desire to find a legitimate excuse for their involvement.

That recruiting played a part in justifying intervention can be proved from the comments of the *Highlander* newspaper ten years after the commission had sat. In May 1893, the paper published original judicial papers from a 1790 case on the Macleod estates in Skye. It regarded the contested eviction of soldiers who had enlisted for Lieutenant Colonel Norman Macleod of Dunvegan during the American War of Independence. The case of these soldiers, the paper argued;

Provide what Lord Napier and Ettrick was so anxious to find proof of, namely, that the land in the Highlands was largely held for military service rendered by the people to their chiefs. ¹⁷

The historiography of the military experience of the Highlands thus remained a powerful influence on the region long after it had ceased as a reality. The army recruiting of the 1746-1815 era, was firmly attached to the supposedly mutual contract of clanship. In fact, regarding the contentious issue of promises, estate records demonstrate that the authorities often constructed very specific terms of time as a reward for giving sons. Thus, on the estate of Lochbuie, any family who recruited gained their possession for a limited time period of five years. On the most infamous estate, that of Sutherland, the stipulations were made quite clear, and were understood by the tenantry because they list them in their petitions. Any family whose son had been in the third Sutherland Fencibles gained a lease of five years. Those whose sons had joined the 93rd, got a seven year lease. This explains why large scale eviction did not commence in Sutherland until 1807, because it was seven years after the regiment had been raised. Likewise, on Lord Macdonald's estate, very specific terms were made out for the families of recruits. Due to government policy, the original terms of the regiment's service was changed to include Ireland. Those that entered the levy, but did not extend their service to Ireland, gained three years of possession. Those who extended their services got five years. ¹⁸

Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that to portray the landlords as betraying those who recruited is a distortion of the strict legal obligations that landlords agreed to, and in many cases kept. However, there is also evidence that landlords broke express promises to retain the families of recruits. In 1778, Lord Macdonald raised the 76th regiment. He gave express written orders, dated to the period when he was recruiting, to retain recruits or their families for life on the possessions that they then held. Only a failure to pay rent was to deprive such persons of their holdings. In this case, these promises are significant because they were not remembered later, when either memory or bitter experience was likely to cloud the issue, but were, instead, a concrete set of promises in writing. They gave assurances of " preference always to the lands which he [the soldier] now possesses. "

Nevertheless, Macdonald broke these promises, and while he never evicted such people from the estate, he did remove them from land for which they had specifically given men.¹⁹ Such instances of recruiting demonstrate how folk memory (understandably perhaps) could be both a distortion of events, and have some basis in fact.

However, the issue of land promises is merely one aspect amongst the many consequences of recruiting. In one respect, the lack of such large scale study in this subject is made more significant by developments in the wider fields of British and Scottish history. The role of the army in Highland history has traditionally been emphasised as inducing integration. This was especially true for elite families who supposedly used their clan loyalties and connections to raise men for the Hanoverian establishment, and thus erase the poor political choices of their Jacobite predecessors.²⁰

Recent analysis on the emergence, or otherwise, of British identity in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, has placed even greater emphasis on the empire, and more especially the successive military conflicts to secure it. In a seminal study on this subject, war, and especially imperial war, has been given a central and all important role in stimulating a wider sense of British identity in Scotland during this period. Within this context, Highland regiments must be viewed as a significant factor in the whole course of the region's development, and worthy of study as an aspect of the ongoing debate on Britishness.²¹

Any examination of Highland recruiting is helped immeasurably by the excellent state of health in which academic study of the region finds itself. As controversial as always, examination of the Highlands, and especially of the Clearances, has broadened out beyond mere polemical writings on the brutality of the landlord, or the laziness of the Highlander, into studies of the region's increasing connections and integration into a wider British economy. An important development in this change was the recognition of variety within the Highlands, with the south and east developing a different local economy and agrarian arrangement from the crofting north west. Within this new historiography, the clearances are to an extent understood as symptomatic of a whole range of forces, from commercial subordination to demographic determinism. These arguments focus less on the landlords than on structural differences and connections with stronger central and industrialising economies.²²

This broader examination of the Highlands, while not necessarily attributing sole importance to the role of the landlord, has not in any way deflected the on going examination of the proprietary class. Debate over their role and impact remains one of the most important elements within Highland historiography, and while the role of the wider economic background has been acknowledged, the significance attached to estate management practices and elite strategies has not diminished, but rather complemented the wider framework of market forces and socio-economic change.²³

However, within this new framework, government, excepting for the rush of involvement both during and immediately after the 1745 uprising, has been viewed as of minimal importance in the region during the 1739-1815 period. This has especially been the case in the sphere of economic development and estate management.²⁴

This overview of the recruiting issue, has attempted to highlight the inherent contradictions in the portrayal of the military use of Highlanders in the period 1739-1815. If military service was a continuity of clanship, then how were more men produced in the 1790s, when its influence was appreciably less, than in 1745 ? More aware of clanship's severe decline from the 1760s, modern scholars link patterns of military levying to this knowledge. If it is seen as residue clanship, then the assumption would be that it would quickly follow the fate of the mechanism that allowed it to occur. The thesis will attempt to avoid such narrow parameters, and will instead examine the process from the wider political, economic and social perspective, and study the contemporary factors that maintained and, indeed, expanded the military experience of the Highlands.

An immediate consequence of this approach is the question of non-Highland factors. A deliberate objective of the thesis, and a natural consequence of the study of military recruiting, is the examination of government. Recruiting represented the single largest government policy for the region, and was until the beginning of the nineteenth century, one of the most successful activities to be practised there. Therefore, one of the main objectives of this thesis will be to assess the impact of government policy. It will endeavour to explain why, after a serious attempt to extinguish the military aspects of clanship, London then performed a *volte-face* of significant dimensions. The government's attitude towards the interaction of recruiting and economic development needs to be assessed in terms of which was given priority, and whether the possibility of disruption to the latter was recognised by London.

This approach needs to be extended into an examination of the recruiting methods used, and the impact of this activity on the various social groups upon Highland estates. This, in turn, involves the motives of the landlord. The thesis will attempt to examine recruiting, less as a traditional activity, and more as a strategy that mirrored the revenue and profit making uses to which estates and their populations were increasingly put. Further down the social scale its impact will be highlighted within the context of inter tenantry relations as opposed to the more traditional landlord tenant connections.

The final area of examination within the sphere of Highland estates is that of economic development. This thesis, by avoiding interpretations that exclusively link recruiting in the Highlands to clanship, will examine the activity as an alternative form of commercial and economic exercise. After all, recruiting ran both parallel to and impacted directly upon the evolution of Highland estates in this period. The military in the Highlands was a successful commercial concern for over fifty years, and its impact on other forms of commercial development needs to be assessed from the standpoint of direct competition.

More generally beyond estate conditions, the maintenance of recruiting highlights the issue raised in the review of historiography. What was the role, if any, of clanship? Recent writing on the subject correctly highlights its decline and extinction as a social and economic arrangement. Yet the thesis will largely avoid this perspective, and attempt to define its role in the maintenance and buttressing of military recruitment within the region. Above all, rather than re-examine the Highland landlord's move away from traditionalist thinking, the perception of clanship within the institutions and personnel of government will be focused upon. As powerful as government was, that does not necessarily mean that it was well informed, or even aware of the complicated decline and transformation of clanship into the new form of commercialised landlords and tenantry. What government knew to be a concrete reality was the military capabilities of the region. This had been convincingly demonstrated in 1745, and this thesis will attempt to reassess the impact of the last Jacobite campaign from that perspective, rather than its lack of influence on the course and scale of economic change.

In summary, this introduction has suggested that the large scale recruiting that occurred between 1739-1810, needs to be treated as a contemporary phenomenon. It is not intended to divorce military levying from the decay of clanship or the established order in the region. Rather to suggest that, instead of exclusively linking the end of successful large scale recruiting to the extinction of clanship, it should be viewed as an activity that, in itself, helped to significantly shape the Highlands of the 1739-1815 period.

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23). For authors who attach a vital role to the proprietary class, if not from the same viewpoint, see: T.M. Devine, 'Landlordism and Highland Emigration' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society* (Edinburgh, 1992); A.I. Macinnes, 'Land ownership, Land Use and Elite Enterprise in Scottish Gaeldom; from Clanship to Clearance in Argyllshire, 1688-1858' in T.M. Devine, *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994); J. Hunter, *The Making of the Crofting Community* (Edinburgh, 1976).

24). A.I. Macinnes, 'Scottish Gaeldom: The First Phase of Clearance' in T.M. Devine & R. Mitchison (eds.), *People and Society in Scotland 1760-1830*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1988), 82; T.M. Devine, 'Social Responses of Agrarian "Improvement": The Highland and Lowland Clearances in Scotland' in R.A. Houston & I.D. Whyte (eds.), *Scottish Society 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1989), 150-51.

Chapter One

Public and Military Policy in the Scottish Highlands 1739 - 1761

The emergence of a British-Highland military in the period from the 1730s to 1750s represents one of the most high profile and important aspects of the region's continuing integration into the now dominant British state. However, the historiography of this development has failed to place this new Highland military within the framework of Edinburgh and Westminster politics - all the more surprising, given that contemporaries recognised the use of Highland manpower as very much a symptom of Scottish, British and even imperial politics. This chapter attempts to illustrate and examine Scottish politics within this context and how the military experience of the Highlands, as well as that of Scotland and the wider empire, in turn affected the on-going political situation.

Regarding the years prior to 1745, there has been a relative lack of analysis on the comprehensive use of Britain's growing military in the attempted generation of political loyalties - a policy more usually ascribed to the period of the Seven Years War. An examination of this first post Culloden conflict also requires a more sophisticated breakdown. The chapter points to the irony that while military service has been viewed as inducing conspicuous loyalty, especially to the wider concept of empire, the Scottish political scene was, nevertheless, enhanced rather than weakened as a distinctive element within the United Kingdom by the military policies practised in the period 1754 - 1760. ¹

On a broader theme, the extent of government involvement both immediately prior to, but more especially after the 1745 uprising will be examined within the larger political arena of the 'First British Empire'. Linked to this, the chapter argues that there have been insufficient attempts to explain why the overall military experience of the region increased, rather than decreased in the twenty years after Culloden - the supposed beginning of Highland demilitarisation. While commentators correctly underplay the role of 1745 in the economic development of the Highlands, over concentration on this one aspect fails to highlight the seminal impact of the rebellion on British military policy. ² In truth, the military dimension to the Scottish Highlands was the single largest concern that British government held regarding the region in the period 1746-1800. From this perspective, the direct result of 1745 was the highlighting and resuscitation of the region's military potential at a crucial period of British military and imperial expansion. As a result, the last Jacobite attempt distorted British recruiting policy and ensured that the Highlands embarked upon a period of militarisation that was still evident in the first decade of the nineteenth century.

The British Military in the Highlands 1739 - 1746.

The use of military commissions to coax potential Jacobite chiefs like Simon Fraser of Lovat and Sir James Grant of Grant into co-operation with the Hanoverian regime, has been highlighted as one of the few instances where an otherwise splintered British government attempted to influence conditions in the area. Regimentation of independent companies from the region into the army's first regular Highland battalion in October 1739, and its subsequent withdrawal from the area in May 1743, has, in turn, been represented as part of Westminster's wider failure to adjust its policies of patronage to realities in the Highlands. The late 1720s, which from the view of executive government, did seem to augur more settled and secure conditions, was the period when these companies gave good intelligence and above all, acted as a high profile military counterpoise to the still armed and disaffected clans. Their actual ability should not be over estimated (regular troops had been sufficiently competent to quickly smother the Spanish backed rising of 1719 without any independent company help), while their effectiveness as a police force is examined in the chapter on law and order. They were seen by contemporaries, and have been viewed by modern commentators, as inextricably linked to the wider problem of disaffection. The withdrawal of military commissions from Lovat (whose rank of captain gave him a potential additional income of over £ 1000), as well as the financially crippling orders he received in 1734 to quarter his company in famine stricken Badenoch, have been cited as factors in turning that significant local interest towards the political solution of Jacobitism.³

In the autumn of 1738, Duncan Forbes of Culloden, the newly appointed Lord President of the Court of Session, approached Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, to moot an extension in the concept of independent companies. Forbes did not merely envisage the retention of such units within the Highlands, but also a broadening of the region's involvement in the wider British military. The motive behind the Lord President's proposed extension of military service, was to bind disaffected elements by an build up of common interest through patronage. Forbes, who along with Milton was one of the leading judicial figures in Scotland, was well aware of the perceived prevalency of foreign and more specifically French recruitment in the Highlands. In 1736, one year before Forbes became Lord President, parliament passed an act which had forbidden, on pain of treason, British nationals from either recruiting for or enlisting in the service of a foreign power. The exception to this was the Scots-Dutch Brigade, which retained its recruiting privileges. The three regiments in the brigade represented a quasi-Scottish contribution to the defence of the Dutch republic against France, and were thus part of the Hanoverians overall strategy for maintaining the balance of power in Europe. It was for this reason that men for these regiments could still be legally recruited from Scotland. The whole phenomenon of foreign

service seems to have largely been an economic one. The winter of 1739-40, for example, was intensely cold; this caused economic hardship and forced many to join the military. ⁴ On 22 July 1745, Norman Macleod of Macleod informed John, fourth Earl of Loudon, that the recruiting potential of his estate was much reduced, as there were " shoals of Skye men in service, [in Scots-Dutch] for lack of bread. " ⁵ This loss of manpower, especially to French battalions, was never on a large scale; nevertheless, it served to rationalise the hostile political attitudes towards the region, and hardened perceptions regarding the real and imaginary disaffection of the Highlands.

Concerning the problem of foreign service, Duncan Forbes, in May and August 1743, while remonstrating about the loss of the Highland Regiment, could cite to John Hay, second Marquis of Tweeddale and Secretary of State for Scotland, cases like that of Robert Cameron who was charged at the Court of Justiciary in January 1743 with recruiting ten men for the French service. On 19 September in the same year, an Alexander Gordon was also reported as recruiting for the Prussian service. In 1744, when war commenced with France, its recruiting officers were evident in the Highlands, but received little encouragement; while in early June 1745, Forbes interviewed Coll Macdonnell of Barrisdale concerning his and the younger Macdonnell of Glengarry's alleged recruiting for Lord John Drummond's French regiment. ⁶

The idea behind enlisting Highlanders into British army regiments was to offer them a financial alternative to French service. It was also an attempt to integrate a substantial section of the last elements in the Highlands not yet accommodated by the British state. Within Scotland, the political situation has been highlighted as preventing this development. The rupture between John, second Duke of Argyll and Forbes on the one hand and the administration of Walpole on the other, had witnessed the consolidation of Argyll's brother, Archibald, Earl of Ilay, as the government's representative within Scotland. Forbes and Ilay had developed an increasingly hostile relationship, and while using Milton as an intermediary, the Lord President hoped to maintain his position and influence in Highland affairs. Upon the accession of Ilay as the third Duke of Argyll in October 1743, Forbes again attempted to generate consensus by suggesting a new policy for the region which, he hoped, could stabilise the situation for the government. Argyll cautiously suggested that the scheme might be carefully considered, but pointed to his own opposition status within Scotland as a reason why his involvement was pointless. ⁷

Political friction undoubtedly played a part in the weak government position in the Highlands. Yet that did not preclude initiatives in the region. In the wider political scene, the idea of establishing regiments of Highlanders seems to have appealed to Walpole's

desire for cost saving exercises within a military machine, which, as he saw it, was detrimental to the fiscal health of the nation. However, due to the likely parliamentary outcry, the policy was not possible until 23 October 1739, when war was declared between Britain and Spain. On 25 October, the independent companies were re-established as the 43rd Regiment. The creation of the Black Watch was thus influenced from the start by non-Highland events, and was symptomatic of foreign policy concerns. This immediate decision to alter the essentially policing nature of the companies into that of a regular army battalion, illustrates that the ability to order them abroad, which did not occur until the spring of 1743, was, nevertheless, considered an option from the start. In early February 1742, with the fall of Sir Robert Walpole, the *Squadron* returned to political prominence within Scotland. The power vacuum this caused has already been described as important within the context of the 1745 uprising, yet it also witnessed a shift in foreign policy at the national level towards the developing continental war. ⁸

From 1739 until the end of 1741, the war with Spain had been largely maritime and colonial. Defeats at Cartagena in central America and in the West Indies, saw the parliamentary opposition increase its attacks on the weakened administration. The Duke of Newcastle, as Walpole's foreign policy adviser, had begun to alter government priorities with more regard to the continent, where, since 1740, upon the death of the Holy Roman Emperor, war had commenced between France and the Hapsburgs. The Secretary of the Northern Department, and eventual successor to Walpole in 1742, John Granville, first Earl of Carteret, espoused a more radical involvement in this war, and a direct linking of Britain's primary interest with the survival of the recognised balance of power between France and Austria. A British army of 16 000 was sent to Flanders to demonstrate the new administration's commitment to the Austrians and the wavering Dutch. This more radical anti-French policy inevitably meant a future war. By 1743, at Dettingen, British troops were actively engaging the French, and it is at this point that the Highland Regiment was ordered to Flanders to stiffen the British contribution to Carteret's policy. Thus the sphere of national foreign policy impacted directly upon the Highlands. Not only was the Carteret administration denuding the region of government men, but it was also engaged in a policy which meant future hostilities with France (this became a reality on 15 March 1744). This, in turn, meant the increased likelihood of French assistance to Scottish Jacobites, who considered the developing foreign policy situation as containing the necessary elements for a successful uprising. ⁹

This represents the international situation which made Forbes pleased at regimentation, but highly critical of the orders concerning foreign service. The plan he advocated had never entailed the removal of the original companies - merely the creation of new regular levies. Thus in reality, the Lord President's plan was only half implemented, and done in such a way as to weaken the government presence in the Highlands. Forbes complained in March and again in August 1743, to both General Jasper Clayton, the Commander in Chief in Scotland, and more especially to Tweeddale concerning the implications such a decision could have on government policy in the north. The Lord President's appeals to the Secretary of State are even more significant given his earlier reluctance to co-operate with the new regime when asked for assistance in drafting new measures for the security of the Highlands.¹⁰

The contrasting attitudes of local and central government to the situation in the Highlands can be illustrated by the fact that Forbes, representing local concerns, complained of the lack of government troops, as did Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Sheriff Substitute of Argyll. In March 1744, the latter informed Lord Milton that the men of Lord Sempill's regiment (the Highland Regiment), would be ideal for domestic Highland security in the present circumstances of hostilities with France. The push for additional levies to act as home defence in late 1743 and again throughout 1744, originated from within Scotland, and while undoubtedly hampered by political concerns, was less inhibited or delayed. This stands in contrast to other government policies, especially disarming, which were attempted in the area. This is an important point. The problem was not lack of government, but differing agendas between local and central government. The four companies which were mooted in April 1744, three of which became a reality in February 1745, did, indeed, represent the only significant central government response implemented in the area. Here again, however, it is instructive that the only recognised government action in the Highlands was never definitely understood to represent a defence mechanism, and was constantly linked to the wider concerns of foreign policy. It has been noted that the three companies were raised for internal security. It is true that, in April 1744, the idea of re-establishing the companies was seen by commentators as a response to the problem of internal security. Almost immediately, however, the rumour spread that they would be difficult to raise if their conditions of service involved overseas destinations. This suggests that contemporaries believed they were, in fact, more regular army levies. On 30 July 1744, John, Lord Glenorchy, petitioned Lord Hardwicke asking that two dependants - Lieutenant James Campbell and John Campbell be given the rank of captain and ensign respectively within the company assigned to protect Perthshire. However, by 26 August, Glenorchy informed Hardwicke that if the companies were going abroad, he did not care if Lieutenant James Campbell was not accommodated - as long as John Campbell received the ensigncy.¹¹

Throughout 1744, confusion reigned as to the nature of the intended companies. This explains why, within the region, and within Scotland, there was a recognition that the mechanisms of clanship were still necessary for law and order requirements. When considering new companies, Robert Dundas observed that as long as government held out their potential use for foreign service, they would fail to deal effectively with Highland crime. Lord Advocate Robert Graigie noted the possibilities inherent in domestic or extended service, and stated that;

It occurred in the first place that if it is proposed that the additional companies are to go abroad it will merit a very different consideration from the case that they are to be employed at home for preserving the peace of the country. In the first case they will fall to be disposed of as other military employments for promoting the power and influence of the administration; only it were to be wished they were Highlanders. But if they are employed in the Highlands they must be people of interest in the several countries they are to be stationed. ¹²

In February 1745 three additional companies were ordered. Along with the subsequent Loudon regiment, they were specifically designed to draw men from the alternative of French service, and thus represent a development in the governmental as much as in the military aspects of the Highlands. Captain Adam Drummond of Megginch, the successful candidate of the Graigie family, was specifically chosen in order to counter-act the French recruiting of Lord John Drummond. Also, in June 1745, when the companies were stationed, it was in order to prevent continued foreign recruiting - not to prevent property crime. From their inception, government figures like Graigie saw the three additional companies' main duty to act as a recruiting nursery for the main battalion in Flanders. In early 1745, it was assumed that with the aid of the Press Act, men could be raised quickly, ordered abroad, and the companies refilled in time for the season of most thieving. In early June 1745, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Munro ordered all officers of the Highland Regiment, including the additional companies, to Flanders. This was reversed only when it was decided that foreign recruiting had not been sufficiently dealt with, and the companies were ordered to remain in the region to gain intelligence on Lord John Drummond. ¹³

The three companies illustrate that large scale military recruitment was, in fact, a pre-1745 reality, and represented with the earlier levies the largest government initiative in the region. Their role also illustrates the extent to which the region was already integrated into the larger concerns of British foreign and military policy. The creation, in May 1745, of a second Highland regiment, to be commanded by John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudon, was a direct response to military defeat at Fontenoy, and should in no way be seen as an

internal security measure. This analysis is supported by the fact that in May, when Milton and Argyll discussed commissions for the new regiment, Lord Ross requested a place for his son in order to get him out of Flanders. Argyll informed Milton that if the reason for the application was to get the son back into Britain, then it was best refused as he knew that the regiment would be on the continent within the year. From the outset, it was to be a regiment of the British army not, as Forbes had hoped, an internal police force. In a letter of 9 August 1745, Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell of Mamore noted how slow the recruiting went because of the foreign nature of the intended service. By early August, as a result of the inability to complete the battalion, Loudon and Mamore asked Argyll to appear personally and exact recruiting promises from the county gentlemen. Indeed, it is ironic that it was the overseas nature of the regiment which slowed its recruitment, so that beyond the 210 men of the additional companies, there was actually a Hanoverian levy in existence in the region, just as Forbes had hoped. However, the presence of government Highlanders within the area was the result of foreign policy, and had the uprising occurred later, even fewer Highland levies would have been available for *immediate service in the region*. Instead, given time to fully mobilise, Highland manpower would have been deployed against France in Flanders.¹⁴

Loudon's Highlanders represent the consolidation of the emerging central government policy of heavy military recruitment in the Highland area for non domestic purposes. The picture of government paralysis in the region as a result of whig political division in the years prior to the uprising is thus to an extent incorrect, and should be contrasted with the fact that a definite course was being followed which had as its motive national foreign policy, rather than the local government recognition of a separate Highland problem. The third Duke of Argyll's failure in November 1743 to co-operate with Tweeddale in re-constituting a coherent policy for the area was, indeed, born of political division, as was Tweeddale's reluctance to sanction additional patronage opportunities for his rival. However, consistent military policies within the sphere of foreign affairs suggest that the government's role and its failure in terms of control through patronage must be re-assessed.

The years 1739-1745, should be seen as a period of unofficial competition between the ducal families of Atholl and Argyll for the control of patronage and this developing British-Highland military. In the lull between the regimenting of the independent companies in 1739 and Loudon's Highlanders in 1745, the Argylls' political position was essentially one of opposition to government. In March 1741, Lord George Murray wrote to his brother James, second Duke of Atholl, informing him that, of the premier Highland families, only the Atholls could benefit from a build up in recruitment. By generating political connections with the families of Macleod and Glengarry, the future ability of their family to raise men

would be significantly advanced. Lord George astutely noted that international conditions could worsen and the war intensify, upon which, the Atholl family could confidently raise a regiment and add to its political weight within a Scottish and British context. Between them, Atholl and Argyll appointed two of the three additional companies in February 1745, and gained complete control of the distribution of commissions for the lower ranks in Loudon's levy. Leading Highland magnates thus fulfilled an important element in the patronage equation in that they helped represent local leaders, and were prepared to push for army commissions. Nevertheless, this struggle for political control is an important feature which does explain some of the failures of the early British recruiting drive. Alexander Macdonald of Sleat, as an opponent of Argyll, refused to get involved in British recruiting attempts and hoped that General John Dalrymple, second Earl of Stair, would act as an alternative to Argyll. There is evidence to suggest that Stair did try to act this part. It is known that in 1743, he asked the cabinet for the Highland Regiment to be removed from the region for very specific, if unknown reasons. Perhaps this was to ensure that, once in Flanders, where he commanded the army, it would act as a patronage resource outwith the control of domestic Scottish politics and politicians. His failure was noted sadly by supporters; while enemies of Argyll, like Sleat, who had negotiated with Stair on matters of military service, noted in January 1745, that the army was now unlikely to offer him a form of employment which would be secure from what he described as the " caprice of those in power. " ¹⁵

By May 1745, Argyll was in the ascendancy. In the face of severe opposition, he managed to obtain the important post of lieutenant-colonel for his cousin John Campbell of Mamore. At the lower level, political machination was also evident. The Duke decided that supporters in Argyll were to be rewarded, and Sheriff Substitute Archibald Campbell of Stonefield was consulted concerning likely candidates. Campbell of Kilberry and other gentry were awarded commissions, and much of the intention was merely to strengthen existing political connections. Graigie noted that, by the nomination of military officers, Argyll had done very well and " rivetts a dependency that will not be easily pulled up in this country. " ¹⁶

From fostering kin and elite political connections in the persons of Mamore and Kilberry, the process was continued within lower social circles. The son of MacLean of Kingerloch in Morvern gained a lieutenancy as:

His father has an undoubted vote which was the motive that prevailed with his Grace to grant the lieutenancy. ¹⁷

Beyond strengthening his political power base, several instances illustrate that Argyll also attempted to bring in elements which were of doubtful loyalty. In the case of MacLean of Kingerloch both motives are evident. With his local interest in Morvern, MacLean was also an element in the on-going attempt by the Argyll Campbells to secure their property in that region, while military commissions to such persons could, it was hoped, improve the government position in the area.

In order to appraise this policy of patronage, several points must be noted. Firstly, government had begun to link Highland manpower to the problems of European war, rather than to the purely domestic issue of criminal violence. This trend meant that opportunities for levies would be more numerous, and were thus confidently predicted. Confidence that requests for places would eventually be met was a vital component in the patronage equation. The letter of Lord George Murray illustrates that the growth of the British Highland military was widely anticipated. In May 1745, in a letter to Macleod of Macleod regarding commissions in Loudon's regiment, Argyll noted that due to his being officially outwith government, and to all intents and purposes in opposition, he had been forced to see to his own supporters as a matter of priority. However, he told Macleod to raise men quickly, which would give a good impression of the region and could lead to more commission opportunities.¹⁸

Allied to this, was the fact that the whole background to the early years of the 1740s was a trend of more generalised and high profile involvement of Scots within the British military. In 1736, James Oglethorpe, Governor of British Georgia, secured Highlanders for the frontier war against the Spanish. The scheme contained all the elements that have been highlighted by historians as furthering Highland integration. Oglethorpe's scheme involved emigration and overseas settlement in return for military service - correspondingly evident against the Spanish at St. Augustine in 1740. Moreover, the S.S.P.C.K. ensured a minister anchored the religious loyalties of the Highland population along Protestant lines. Population movement to the colonies and military service had, in fact, become such a recognised option, it is unsurprising that it was quickly suggested after 1746.¹⁹

Further evidence of this general trend of expanding military service is the officer profile of the expedition to the West Indies and Spanish America led by Charles Cathcart, eighth Lord Cathcart. It serves as a useful example of how patronage was becoming disproportionately British in character. As Commander-in-Chief, Cathcart's choice of the expedition's thirty lieutenants is most interesting. General James St. Clair informed Lord President Forbes that " these lieutenants are mostly Scots lads out of the Holland service. " This trend is important in that it represents the rising dominance of British patronage. The decline of

recruitment into French and Prussian armies can be contrasted with the continuing presence within Scotland of Scots-Dutch recruiting officers who, as continental allies of the British, gained noticeable co-operation from the administration of Carteret. Dutch service in this context equated to de facto British service, at least from the Westminster viewpoint. Scots in the continental service entering the British army were merely replaced by other Scots, especially those recommended by Tweeddale, who used the continental connections of his political faction to buttress his domestic power, and act in some measure to counter the military patronage of his opponents.²⁰ In 1742, three companies were added to the three original Scots-Dutch regiments - a total of 528 men. In 1745, twenty four more companies were levied with the result that the Brigade numbered over 5 000 men.²¹

Against this backdrop of increasing patronage were the 1744-45 Impress Acts. They reflect a general trend whereby central government increased its control of military employment and activity. While ineffective in producing men, the Impress Acts put pressure on the localities. In an effort to pre-empt the 1744 Act, and its more vigorous successor which was passed in 1745, known Jacobite sympathisers like Fraser of Lovat, in order to appear as loyal followers of the government, would supply the sons of prominent government figures with men. In late March 1745, with another Impress Act passed, Lovat, who was aware that Henry Fletcher, second son of Lord Milton, was attempting to gain promotion in the army, offered to supply him with some of his own men. More interestingly, Major-General Joshua Guest, Commander-in-Chief in the North of Scotland, who had demonstrated the government's ability to quarter men on Lovat's estate, requested that the Fraser chief give men to the Scots-Dutch. It is worthy of note that Lovat felt obliged to bother with even that symbolic effort, and it is testimony to the increasing military activity and coercive policies of the government. It is against this background that the appeal of the alternative - voluntary and profitable military involvement ought to be placed.²²

More specifically for patronage policy in the Highlands, the second Duke of Argyll had already, in 1740, attempted to gain a commission in the Highland Regiment for Stewart of Appin. Duncan Forbes of Culloden had done the same for William Macintosh, chief of a clan whose position in central Inverness-shire was of vital geographical importance. Both Argyll and Forbes stressed how commissions would tie the recipients to the government. This concessionary policy was continued elsewhere outwith the realm of military commissions. In January 1745, Campbell of Stonefield and Lord Milton described how the estates of Appin and Locheil had been returned to the original possessors in order " to make them grateful and serviceable to your Grace and the government. " ²³

A similar strategy was followed with the estate of Strowan, which John Mackenzie of Delvine informed Macdonald of Sleat had been placed upon a surer legal footing by the influence of the Lord President and James Murray, second Duke of Atholl. This was in order to win over Duncan Robertson of Drumachuine, estranged heir to the now ancient Alexander Robertson of Strowan. Indeed, in a letter dated 11 January 1745 to the Laird of Macleod, Macdonald confirmed Argyll's personal involvement, adding that as it was an argathelian ploy, he intended opposing the measure. The involvement of such leading political figures like Forbes, demonstrates that active wooing of potential Jacobites cannot be characterised as merely the personal policy of the third Duke of Argyll. It appears that on top of this concession concerning their estate, the Robertson family believed that the Hanoverian government, through the raising of Loudon's regiment, had " formed a scheme of hooking all the Highland chieftains into their military service. " ²⁴

Given that Strowan and his heir were prominent Jacobites in 1745, then the argument that the policy of patronage in the Highlands could not work seems to have more weight. However, on 12 March 1744, against a backdrop of rumoured Highland mobilisation, Argyll and Milton corresponded on the fact that Strowan's heir had offered military service to the crown in order to ensure the estate was not irredeemably lost. By June 1745, when Argyll apologised to Duncan Robertson for not offering a captaincy, the estate was already safe, and a junior military commission not such a vital concern nor so pleasing a prize. Confusion had also broken out in May and June over commissions in the regiment, with mistakes in London and Edinburgh being compounded by the blank nature of many of the commission forms, allowing for the substitution of originally intended names. ²⁵

The examples of Locheil (whose concessions from the Argyll camp ought not to be considered overly generous), Stewart of Appin, and to an extent Robertson of Strowan, can be held up as illustrative of the shortcomings of patronage policies in the Highlands. Nevertheless, there existed a well understood strategy that disaffected elements were to be targeted. In March 1744, in an effort to restart his patronage policy which had been derailed by continental developments, Forbes called for a vigorous use of Highlanders within the military. He described Jacobitism as a dying force, yet cautioned government by informing them that, with regard to the pro Hanoverian Cosmo, third Duke of Gordon; " neither is he enabled, by any encouragement given him to invite other people who are generally guided by expectation to follow his example. " Forbes suggested he be given a Highland regiment. This explains the captaincy for Lord Charles Gordon, whose levying of men from amongst his brother's tenantry removed some which were recognised by Argyll as difficult to control in " so far as they are Popish. " ²⁶

Another excellent example of this is the case of Sir Hector MacLean of Torloisk. In late May 1745, MacLean had been apprehended in Edinburgh on suspicion of recruiting for the French service. On 10 July he arrived in London, and was interrogated at Westminster. By 22 July, despite the widely held belief that he was probably guilty, many believed Argyll had indicated to MacLean that he might receive a commission in the new Highland regiment. Torloisk added that if he gained such a rank, his family would be obliged to the government and would supply its quota of men. Argyll held out the example of Ewan Macpherson of Cluny and the Laird of Macintosh, both of whom had received military commissions as a result of demonstrating a willingness to co-operate.²⁷

The case of Ewan Macpherson of Cluny demonstrates how the policy could work. The Badenoch laird had been co-operating with government figures in Edinburgh on the issue of law and order. Contrary to the established argument amongst historians that government was totally against the clans as an organisational form, it had, in fact, in the 1743-45 period encouraged clans like the Macphersons to adopt measures to combat Highland disorder. However, there was a deeper motive involved. While discussing some of the developments arising from local clan arrangements, Robert Dundas stated that:

Tho' the immediate business be to prevent stealing, to be sure such a number of those who are or have the name of being employed ought to be at the call of the government upon any inland service.²⁸

This concept of an extension in military service meant, in reality, the direct use of clanship within the broader framework of the British army. By domestic government service, clans could release regular units for continental service. The context could be even more direct. Given his successful use of Macpherson clan resources for policing, it is hardly surprising that, in May 1745, Cluny was named as one of the captains of Loudon's regiment. His suitability for government service had been highlighted by his co-operative deployment of clan power. This was quite clearly a direct linking of clanship and military service as advocated by Robert Dundas. But the greatest successes for the government lay in the islands of western Inverness-shire. The loyalty of Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat and Norman Macleod of Dunvegan denied the Jacobites any real security in the North, and the use of perhaps as many as 800 additional troops. The two main Skye clans do seem to have acted in unison throughout the entire affair. The influences of Duncan Forbes, and the traditional caution evident within the Macleod and Macdonald clan elites, were probably as important as commissions in securing loyalty. By 1 August, just prior to the outbreak of the uprising, Macleod had enlisted over eighty men on Skye for Loudon's regiment. This was a large inducement to avoid neutrality, strengthened by the fact that, unlike Cluny, Macleod

was not surrounded by hostile Jacobites. The reward of a captaincy in Loudon's to John Macleod, son to the somewhat cynical Norman, represented a significant concession to a powerful Skye family who felt they had previously been neglected by government. Also, by their inclusion of James Fraser of Foyers as an ensign within their company, the Macleods also deprived the Frasers of both men and a high profile *duine uaisle*.²⁹

These examples demonstrate that in the years prior to the uprising, the government was far from inactive in the Highlands. It merely tried to kill two birds with one stone by removing disaffected elements to fight in the more important region of Flanders. The overall policy was undoubtedly embryonic, as witnessed by its failures. It was overwhelmed in that it coincided with the 1745 uprising, the timing of which took even some of its leading participants by surprise. Had the uprising taken place several months later, large sections of Macpherson, MacLean and Macintosh manpower would have been denied to the Jacobites. The government of the Highlands in the period immediately prior to 1745, was undoubtedly characterised by incompetency and politically induced apathy. However, within the sphere of military policy and military patronage, this analysis is incorrect. Military commissions - while still dominated by political considerations, were, without doubt, being increasingly used, by Argyll in particular, as a vital element in an anti - Jacobite policy. Linked to this, and of increasing significance, is the fact that military policies in the Highlands now took place within a largely British context, which illustrates the surprising extent to which even the pre 1745 Highlands were an integrated part of the British state.

The British - Highland Military 1746 - 49

The intention of this section is not to re-examine the 1745 uprising which has had sufficient, indeed, comprehensive analysis from innumerable heavyweight historians. By the end of the uprising, eighteen independent companies (approx. 1800 men excluding the militia of Argyll and the Earl of Loudon's partially completed regiment) were under the command of the Duke of Cumberland. This meant, paradoxically, that at the period of most intense military activity against the region, Highland involvement within the mechanism of coercion had reached unprecedented levels. Within the North, short term optimism, not to say naivety, was evident amongst the Hanoverian Highlanders over the financial benefits they expected from their military service on the winning side. The arguments over how much was owed to the recruiters, officers, rank and file, caused major problems for Forbes and War Office officials. Staggered completion and commission dates made payment amounts difficult to verify, as did their uncertain retention and use after Culloden. The issue of pre-commissioned pay, which the Treasury said was not applicable to the Highlands due to the dependency of the tenantry, particularly annoyed the Lord President.³⁰ This attitude over

pay highlights one of the core elements of government perception regarding the British Highland military. Westminster believed that clan loyalty meant the usual monetary inducements offered to British soldiers was not required for Highland soldiery, a viewpoint which explains why the British crown later sanctioned such large scale recruiting, instead of avoiding the continued military use of Highland manpower.

As the uprising drew to a close and the presence of Cumberland made itself felt within policy and attitudes to Scotland, the role and behaviour of loyal Highlanders became of great importance to the Scottish political elite. It was hoped that they would act as a high profile foil to what many of the Scottish political nation now slowly recognised as the deep antipathy felt towards large sections of their ranks. The independent companies were, even as the uprising continued, seen as vital in attempting the rehabilitation of the region, or more hopefully, to ensure that by their conduct, rehabilitation would be unnecessary for the majority. The Duke of Argyll was obsessed with highlighting the role, however minor, of the Argyll and Loudon levies. After the skirmish and government defeat at Falkirk in January 1746, John Maule, the Duke's secretary, informed Milton that in order to deflect mounting criticism, Argyll wanted information on how the Hanoverian Highlanders had performed. When, after the battle, government Highlanders were ordered to disperse by their own commanders and quarter themselves amongst the villages in the area, Argyll was horrified. In November 1745, Lord Milton (at no small political risk) had advised the military high command that it should adopt a very cautious quartering policy, as it caused deep discontent within an otherwise loyal population. The dispersal of Argyllshire levies into these villages, would it was now feared in the Campbell camp, cause even more generalised hatred of Highlanders, no matter which side they represented. The feeling that this had been done deliberately may simply have been political paranoia on the part of Argyll, yet it illustrates perfectly, the political climate within factions supposedly allied on the same side. Following the government defeat at Falkirk, Argyll expressed the desire that if Highland troops were to be used in this way it would be better for all that they returned home immediately.³¹

The use of these Hanoverian Highlanders indicate how the military elite perceived their particular usefulness, as well as the conditions under which more or future levies could be raised by the crown. The first point to note is that Highlanders were not considered as *bon fide* soldiers. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl of Chesterfield, informed the Duke of Newcastle that the campaign against the rebels was better conducted without any Highland involvement on the government side. The Highland Regiment was sent to English coastal ports for garrison duty. Cumberland essentially agreed with this policy but, under pressure to retain the Scottish levies, put them to distinctive use. He deployed them as

irregular troops whose duty was simply to find the enemy and let regular troops engage them. Thus Highlanders were first to cross the Forth and scout for the main Highland army outside Perth. Cumberland did not wish to trust the levies, and prior to Culloden ordered the Earl of Loudon not to join his main army at Inverness, which he expected to reach without engaging the main Jacobite army. In the latter stages of the campaign there was a widespread (and given later developments) significant belief that with an imminent naval expedition to reinforce Cape Breton, the independent companies were to be withdrawn from Scotland and effectively transported.³²

The final defeat and suppression of the uprising left substantial problems unresolved. It is ironic that it was Cumberland's flawed tactical leadership at Fontenoy which had in part precipitated the Jacobite attempt and, in turn, drawn fifteen battalions away from the continental theatre. By the middle of 1745, the French had made impressive gains, with substantial military inroads into Holland on top of the complete occupation of the Austrian Netherlands. The dismal continental situation was the single largest concern of the British high command. Much of Cumberland's recognised brutality stemmed from a desire to stamp out a small scale military diversion (partly generated by him), and return to what was the strategic imperative of undiluted continental campaigning. It was at this point that the Hanoverian Highlanders quickly began to lose their initial optimism. By late May the inactivity of the companies was reckoned a sign of their imminent disbandment. Rumours that the Earl of Sutherland and the Seaforth family had been rewarded with regiments proved false, and the potential patronage opportunities seemed lost. In August, the Argyll militia was disbanded, but significantly its men were recruited into the ten additional companies which were now being used to form a reconstituted regiment for the Earl of Loudon. In May 1747, with a successful continental war still the main foreign policy objective, Loudon's regiment, as originally intended was ordered to Flanders.³³

As it was, the war of the Austrian Succession proved several significant points to the British. The 1739-48 war and the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, had witnessed the continuance of Britain's central policy of being pro-Austrian and anti-French. However, it also demonstrated the futility of continental conflict, and in the succeeding war rationalised the British switch (in late 1756) towards aggressive colonial acquisition. Henry Pelham, due to his position in the Treasury, and thus concerned with costs and profitability, had disagreed to an extent over the nature of British interests on the continent. On the one side, the Dukes of Newcastle and Cumberland wished to prosecute the war more vigorously, while Pelham pushed for a more cautious and peaceful policy. Cumberland was bitterly disappointed when, in early November 1747, he received orders that five English battalions were to be ordered home. He failed or refused to understand that this strategy was based on financial

expediency and, exhibiting a growing political trend, used Scotland as a scapegoat. He pretended that the lost battalions were obviously being returned home to counter a threat from Scotland. He added that there was no need to withdraw troops as the Highlands were in no condition to rebel. He noted;

I know the number of Highlanders has been much thinned, as well by what they lost in the rebellion, as by the number of men drawn out of the country for the King's and the States General's service. ³⁴

This statement reveals an important aspect to government policy. It illustrates that Culloden did not represent the end of military activity in the Highlands, but merely confirmed the pre-1745 trends of heavy recruitment for overseas purposes. In early 1748, Highland landlords like John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, became interested in the new Scots-Dutch battalions. Lord Drumlanrig had been given permission, in late 1747, to levy two battalions which increased the establishment to 7 000 men. On 29 February 1748, Lord Glenorchy wrote to Lord Hardwicke that large numbers of Highlanders were entering the Scots-Dutch, and even Prussian service. He considered it outrageous that these men were not being used by the British service (a transparent attempt to increase patronage opportunities). The policy of excessive recruitment was simply not possible with a mere two Highland levies. Other avenues included conscript military service in the American colonies for any non payment of fines due under the Disarming Act. By August 1747, two English garrison regiments moved out of their quarters in the Highlands and marched to Portsmouth. It was known that both regiments withdrew with a large number of prisoners. In December 1747, Henry Pelham reminded a Scottish opponent of Argyll who had accused the Duke of acting against the King's interest, that when the government memorandum concerning the removal of Highlanders from the North was circulated, Argyll had agreed and supported the action - this was a cannon fodder policy which no prominent political figure attempted to disguise. ³⁵

By October 1748, the peace negotiations, which had been protracted and complicated by the domestic divisions within Westminster, slowly drew to a close. It is at this point that any complete demilitarisation of the Highlands was likely to have occurred. It was believed that Loudon's and the Black Watch regiment were to be disbanded. Cumberland resigned himself to peace, and aware of the above cannon fodder policy for the Highlands, consulted with the Duke of Bedford concerning the future of Lord Loudon's regiment. The royal Duke hoped to continue the policy initiated after Culloden, which was simply to enlist men from a broken regiment into one which would continue to serve, and by this means ensure Highlanders did not return home. The plan was to offer Loudon's men favourable conditions of colonial military service in order to get them to settle eventually in Nova Scotia, where

the French inhabitants outnumbered the nationals from the new ruling state. Given the necessity of this, Cumberland added that:

The sooner any resolution of that sort may be taken it will certainly be the better and as it is much to be wished that these people may be disposed of in such a manner as to be of service to the government, instead of a detriment to it. ³⁶

This attitude is significant beyond the emotive espousal of cannon fodder policies for the region. The immediate demilitarisation of the post Culloden Highlands is well recognised and acknowledged. However, such a stance is only useful if the nature of the intended demilitarisation is understood. As in the case of the Scots-Dutch, it is important to highlight that the government only intended to ensure that Highland militarism was not evident in the region itself. By December 1747, in the face of repeated requests for levies to combat disorder, it was proposed to send at least five Highland companies into Skye, Moidart, Knoydart, Lochaber, the Small Isles, Mull and Morvern. Lord Findlater wrote to Newcastle regarding such plans. He noted; " it would prove a most pernicious scheme for it would effectively spread and keep up the warlike spirit there and frustrate all measures for rooting it out. " ³⁷ In contrast to this, the proactive schemes of Bedford and Cumberland, demonstrate that at no time, even during the height of scotophobia induced by 1745, did government espouse demilitarisation to the point of excluding army service. It is ironic that the opposite was the case - 1745 stimulated Highland involvement in the British military.

In order to pacify the region, military recruitment was to be encouraged. In a pamphlet dated 1748, it was noted that the Highlanders ought to have their tradition of arms maintained so that they could then defend British liberty. The same general thinking, but for radically different reasons, was evident during a parliamentary speech by William Wildman, Lord Barrington, who spoke on proposals for limiting army service to a certain number of years. Barrington opposed the measure, and wished instead to see enlistment for life. This, he argued, would ensure no militarised Highlanders returned home. He stated that:

I am for having always in our army as many Scottish soldiers as possible and of all Scottish soldiers I should choose to have and keep in our army as many Highlanders as possible. ³⁸

It was this type of thinking that motivated Bedford. As Secretary of State for the Southern Department he had, in February 1748, espoused a large military effort in the colonies. He was thus in favour of any policy which forwarded that approach. However, national politics operated against this particular use of Highland troops. Pelham continued to disagree with both Cumberland and his brother over the nature of continuing hostilities. He informed his brother on 4 October 1748, that all additional companies were " to be reduced immediately and the rest might follow after the treaty is signed or at the furthest when it is ratified. There shall be not an hours delay in execution. " ³⁹

On 26 October 1748, Bedford informed Cumberland that Pelham, as steward of the nation's finances, was demanding the immediate reduction of as many British battalions as possible. On 12 November, Cumberland conceded to Bedford that any plan which involved the retention of over 1000 men on such favourable terms was impossible, " unless opinions should alter at home. " ⁴⁰ What is significant concerning this outcome was that a re-settlement scheme couched in such anti-Highland sentiments was opposed, not in principle, but simply because of financial expediency.

Scottish Politics and Westminster Dominance 1747 - 55

The climate of scotophobia evident at Westminster produced a political consensus for fundamental alterations in the methods of government in Scotland. It was perceived by most Westminster politicians that Scottish government was characterised by an excessive degree of autonomy, and that the ruling elite had failed to control itself properly. Political divisions sprang up outwith the legitimate remit of Westminster politics, and in order to win support both parties had courted the Jacobite interest in Scotland. Such notions were fed to English politicians by Scottish opponents of Argyll, who portrayed government in Scotland as structurally weakening Britain as a whole. Regarding Scottish administration, memorials pointed to its autocratic nature, where factions were self interested rather than concerned with the wider interests of the crown. The second Duke of Argyll's alliance in 1741 with the Jacobite party, which undermined government in Scotland prior to the uprising, was highlighted as such an example. Administration was seen as excessively politicised and characterised by favouritism. Above all, it was perceived as not accountable to Westminster. The third Duke of Argyll, as the premier political interest in Scotland, came in for particular attack. Simply put - the basis of his power within Scotland was considered the most covertly treasonous. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke illustrates this when stating he considered Argyll's closest ally (Lord Milton), as nothing but " a rogue. " When discussing the inherent Jacobite interest in the Highlands, and the planned Heritable Jurisdiction Bill, it

was commented that " there may be a prospect of gradually destroying that interest which the Duke of Argyll does and always supported. " ⁴¹

The Duke of Newcastle stated simply that;

He [Argyll] always retained that principle which obliged him to have recourse to and depend in some measure upon great Highland families who have been declared enemies of the government. ⁴²

Argyll's own county was essentially Highland, therefore, his political power was seen to originate from Highland sources. Given this, there was little doubt that he was in a vulnerable and awkward situation after 1746. By 1750, it was widely acknowledged that the King's attitude to the duke was one of deep hatred, more intensely held than to any other British subject. Indeed, Argyll himself was fully aware of the impact of the uprising on his position. On 19 August 1745, Argyll wrote a letter to Norman Macleod of Macleod prophesying exactly this reaction. The letter is significant because, at the time of writing, the nature of the trouble in the region was not clear. Argyll wrote the letter before the Jacobites had seriously challenged the position of the Hanoverian establishment. The rumours from the Highlands suggested mere localised violence, and Argyll had no perception of a large scale uprising that would first threaten the entire British political structure, and as a consequence create a substantial adverse reaction. The Campbell duke was writing without the benefit of hindsight, and that makes what he said more significant. He told Macleod;

I wish it (rumours of Charles Edward Stuart's landing), may not turn to the prejudice of us all by producing severities that the most moderate amongst us may not be able to prevent. What will they not say to us in England, who have all along endeavoured to give the English a better notion of the Highlanders than they had, and it will particularly fall upon me who have relieved all those who were in my power, from the distresses that the last affair brought upon them. ⁴³

Beneath a certain element of hyperbole designed to ensure Macleod stayed loyal, the letter was a remarkable recognition of the national implications for Scotland, even of a wholly Highland uprising. The reference to 1715 in particular, meant Argyll correctly understood that in English eyes a recurrence of Highland rebellion would, through Scotland's earlier legalistic cover-up, link the Lowlands implicitly to the wider Jacobite problem. The accuracy of these Westminster perceptions regarding Scotland and Argyll are largely irrelevant in that a widespread consensus believed them and demanded political action on that basis. In the most recent summary of Scottish history, the uprising is described as

" a Highland affair from its beginning to its end. " While accurate if levels of support are considered, the assessment fails to capture the mood of the wider British political nation. Unlike many contemporary and later commentators who have emphasised the limited and Highland nature of the 1745 uprising, Argyll accurately foresaw its national implications. ⁴⁴

As Argyll predicted, Scotland was soon being vilified in the English press. The emergence of the Pelham administration in Westminster saw the establishment of a policy of tighter control of Scottish affairs through direct Treasury patronage. With the departure of Tweeddale as Secretary of State of Scotland without a successor in 1746, the policy of more Westminster control was effectively commenced. Cumberland was allied to the Duke of Newcastle by the fact that they distrusted Argyll to an even greater extent than Henry Pelham. On 31 October 1747, Cumberland conceded to Newcastle;

That affairs in Scotland never would go right in the manner they then were and still are administered and tho' I think it of great importance to keep the Duke of Argyll and the Campbells in good humour and even so far as to put the Duke of Argyll at the head of His Majesty's affairs, yet I can never think it advisable to have him sole and absolute disposer of all the king's favours in that kingdom. ⁴⁵

What is worthy of note is that this was their policy during the war of the Austrian Succession, when both Cumberland and Newcastle, as exponents of vigorous continental involvement, were increasingly disadvantaged within a peace-oriented administration. As a result, they were unable to completely alienate Argyll, attached as he was to Henry Pelham's rising political star.

In the period 1748 to early 1754, Pelham, as Secretary of the Treasury, had emerged as the leading figure of the incumbent administration. Unlike his brother the Duke of Newcastle, while determined to exert overall dominance, he was prepared to allow Argyll's undoubted pre-eminence to survive - as the Scottish Duke would then ally with him as he sought to establish overall control of the ministry. The first real test of this was the Heritable Jurisdictions Bill, debated in parliament between April and June 1747. Argyll faced serious opposition from the Earl of Marchmont and Hume-Campbell, the M.P. for Berwickshire, who associated with Robert Dundas and the Earl of Chesterfield in order to undermine and weaken him. In March and April 1747, a section of Scottish M.P.s associated with Argyll queried and then voted against the bill. This lack of political management angered Pelham, who courted opponents of the Campbell duke. The government eventually paid out over £ 152 000 for the jurisdictions. Many portrayed this whole affair as Argyll's price for supporting the bill, however meekly, and above all, as a sign of how difficult the

management of Scottish affairs would be with him in opposition. The case of the jurisdictions did see the Marchmont faction rise in importance and interest. However, Pelham continued to negotiate with Argyll and Lord Milton, and he ordered the Marchmonts to co-operate with those he described as the 'Kings Friends' within Scotland. Argyll's relative willingness to co-operate, and the dogmatic approach of his Scottish political opponents meant that, by July, Pelham informed Hume-Campbell;

My regard for the Duke of Argyll is well known and cannot be contradicted but it never was nor will be to a degree of submission, this His Grace knows and I must do him the justice to say I have never found him desirous that it should. ⁴⁶

This concessionary arrangement favoured by Pelham is best demonstrated by the high judicial appointments made on the death of the Lord President Duncan Forbes of Culloden in early December 1747. Pelham had initially supported Charles Erskine, the Argyll candidate, whom the King was reluctantly resigned to accept. Newcastle hoped for either Lord Elchies or Robert Dundas as Lord President, and pushed the point as the least the administration should attempt in reducing Argyll's political clout. Newcastle was successful, and Robert Dundas was appointed Lord President. However, significant concessions were awarded to the Argyll camp to sweeten what was generally recognised by Cumberland and Newcastle as a development which "cannot be agreeable" [To Argyll]. Milton, as he desired, retired as Lord Justice Clerk and received the Scottish Signet for life. His son was given a prominent Exchequer sinecure, and Charles Erskine given the position of Lord Justice Clerk. ⁴⁷

The climate of heightened Treasury control saw co-operation between Pelham and Argyll, as well as the latter's Scottish political opponents continue through the late 1740s and early 1750s. Compromise was evident in the negotiations over the length of tenure and personnel profile of the Scottish county sheriffs. The new lists of Sheriff Deputes, drawn up in 1748 by opponents of Argyll like the new Lord President Robert Dundas and the aptly named Lieutenant General Humphrey Bland (new Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Scotland) ensured a broadening of interests. Indeed, Bland intervened in July 1754 upon the death of Lord Elchies and suggested the anti-Argyll candidate Robert Dundas be made Lord Advocate. Bland openly admitted that, as a military officer, he had no legitimate right to suggest any person within the civilian judicial system (military intervention in civilian government being one of the propaganda tools used against the Jacobites). However, Argyll and Milton ensured that supporters like Dalrymple of Drumore and the family of Charles Erskine were represented, while the Duke retained the right to select the Argyll sheriffs. Milton was also appointed by Newcastle to a prominent role in the establishment of lists of

J.P.s., a position he used to reinforce political connections, as in the case of the Duke of Atholl. Milton allowed the Perthshire Duke (long considered in London a political ally of Argyll) to construct the Perthshire J.P. list. Indeed, it was considered so partisan that Hardwicke suggested more independent sources be utilised. ⁴⁸

Evidence that Pelham solidly supported Argyll could, in turn, make Scottish policies prisoner to Westminster factionalism. This is a very important point, Scottish politics did not operate in a vacuum, its participants could find their position weak or strong depending on the state of Westminster politics. In March 1752, in order to embarrass Argyll and Pelham, John Russell, fourth Duke of Bedford, attacked the proposed bill for annexing forfeited estates as a "Scotch jobb," and stated that Jacobites held prominent government positions within Scotland. The attack was a classic example of how Scottish politics was susceptible to hijacking by a purely internal Westminster agenda. Even more significant is the role of Henry Pelham as perceived by Argyll, who informed Milton on 26 March 1752 that: "Mr Pelham has acted a very fair and ready part and if he had not I should have thought fit to retire." ⁴⁹

The political attacks on Argyll had a long term significance that went well beyond their failure to discredit him. The rhetoric of opponents like Lord Findlater routinely emphasised the continuing influence of clanship. These polemics against the Highlands reinforced the distinct impressions of the region held in London. Legislation was justified in the Commons in terms of combating continuing Highland disaffection and clannishness. As in the age of Walpole, the years from 1750 up until the war of 1756 saw "a common practice of late years for any man that hates another to call him a Jacobite." ⁵⁰

More significantly, as in Walpole's age, many believed their own propaganda. Plots like the 1752 Elibank affair, which involved a clique of die-hard Highland Jacobites plotting the assassination of King George II, merely confirmed to many what they already knew - that Jacobitism (and thus clanship) was still very much alive. When war came, this state of affairs was to assume a deep significance for the Highlands.

In March 1754, Henry Pelham died. Henry Fox, a political ally of Argyll, refused to take the initiative; Newcastle succeeded to the leadership of the administration, with the result that government in Scotland was again to experience a Westminster attempt at increased anglicisation. Newcastle had a relatively stronger knowledge of Scottish affairs than his recently deceased brother. In April 1755, upon the resignation of John, first Duke of Roxburghe as Secretary of State for Scotland, Newcastle, as Secretary of the Northern Department whose remit involved Scottish affairs, gained overall management of that

sphere of business. Newcastle demanded more exacting supervision of the administration that passed through his office, and that Scottish patronage candidates be given closer Westminster review. The senior Pelham brother thus had a history of attempted control of Scottish political management. The aftermath of the 1754 election saw Newcastle establish what Argyll perceived to be " the new Scotch ministry. " ⁵¹

The establishment of the younger Robert Dundas as Lord Advocate, and the promotion of the ex-Argyll supporter William Grant to the Court of Justiciary and Session, saw the continuance of the policy of spreading judicial appointments. Newcastle's intention was to retain the influence of Argyll within his administration, but to enhance London's power in Scotland by increasing its political clients in the North. In London, Newcastle developed a balancing act where he awarded posts in order to demonstrate his supremacy. Yet he astutely allowed Argyll supporters to be appointed to various positions - as in the case of the Sheriff Depute of Banffshire in early 1755. This stance by Newcastle explains why Argyll was never driven into opposition. The need to ensure that Scotland remained on the side of the ministry was stimulated by the controversial conduct of the war of 1756-1763. As his own position was increasingly attacked in Westminster, Newcastle had additional reasons to fear the Scottish Duke going into opposition. War marginalised the issue of how Scotland stood in relation to power at the centre. These ambivalent attitudes to Scotland are readily evident. In 1754, Argyll was given £ 1000 from government finances for electoral purposes, yet a list of Scottish M.P.s drawn up after the results show how the unsettled situation in Westminster was reflected in Scotland. Newcastle believed that he commanded the support of nineteen Scottish M.P.s. With the continuance of Argyll in power, this rose to twenty eight. Out of power (a situation Newcastle obviously considered a possibility), Argyll could command only four M.P.s, with another sixteen whom the government would need to negotiate with. What is certain is that throughout 1754 and until September 1755, Argyll was to varying degrees, at odds with the administration. 1754 witnessed Argyll making concessions within the electoral sphere, as in the Elgin Burgh elections, where he put pressure on his preferred candidate to step down so as to bring to a successful conclusion his policy of keeping peace among the main political interests in Scotland. ⁵² However, Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, a conspicuous Treasury ally, made patronage recommendations which angered Argyll. By February 1755, the anglicisation of the Scottish customs led him to comment to Milton that:

One would think their heads are turned and that they want to try to what degree of ill humour they can bring the people of Scotland to. ⁵³

Argyll's attitude to the English army interest in Scotland, his own innate caution and feelings of insecurity for his own position, are evidenced in a letter written to James Murray, second Duke of Atholl in the autumn of 1753;

I have not writ anything upon this whole subject [the appointment of the Sheriff of Mid-Lothian] to the military and indeed hardly ever enter into political details of such matters by letters when I am in Scotland. ⁵⁴

By early 1755, the decline in relations between the main political player in Scotland and the incumbent administration witnessed Argyll nurture his political connections with Henry Fox, then in parliamentary opposition to Newcastle. Indeed, Newcastle sincerely believed by July 1755, that Argyll was prepared to break with him. The Fox connection has been underestimated partly because of its transparently expedient nature, and by the failure to highlight the link of Fox with Cumberland and the scotophobic army faction. In December 1754, Andrew Fletcher informed his father Lord Milton that the occasion of Fox calling upon Argyll caused great speculation. The latter never broke with the ministry, but used the potential of an alliance to make Newcastle more appreciative of his continuing support. What made Argyll aware that Newcastle needed his strong political management skills was the developing foreign policy situation. ⁵⁵

Colonial Conflict and Argathelian Recovery

By October 1754, the military situation in the American colonies was being highlighted by opposition groups as a means to weaken the government. Thus it was that imperial politics offered new opportunities to Scottish politicians. Tensions over the delineation of French and British settlements in America had resulted in undeclared war. In January 1754, Newcastle had attempted to reinforce Nova Scotia without antagonising the French. By September, the government had approved the commissioning of half pay officers for service in America. By 21 September, Newcastle had approached Cumberland with a plan to augment the 42nd Highland Regiment and raise independent companies of Highlanders. The plan fell foul of the King's refusal to sanction new Highland levies, while Cumberland's distrust of Highlanders resulted in the 42nd being rejected in favour of Irish regiments. In all, the whole issue of military planning remained very much a political football - yet it is significant that at the first major cabinet level discussion on military schemes for the colonies, Highland levies were at once suggested as part of the solution. Argyll was undoubtedly aware of these developments. In January 1755, Lord Halifax, the President of the Board of Trade, reported on the military and strategic situation across the Atlantic. His report highlighted divisions over military affairs, and the decline in support for the colonial

regime within British America. Again, Scotland figured in a proposed solution to the problems diagnosed in the colonies. The report continued:

" The army should consist of 10 000 men, more if they are to be had and the regulars should be 6 000 if they can be had. " It concluded by querying " whether a battalion or two might not be raised in Scotland. " ⁵⁶

The expedient nature of the American debate, as well as the ordering of two battalions from the Irish establishment witnessed its subsequent lowering in profile, ensuring, in turn, that the request for Scottish troops was never implemented. Interestingly, Newcastle's involvement in Scottish affairs, best characterised by a cool relationship with its premier politician, did not preclude his suggestion for Highland troops. Given that such levies would fall under Argyll's management, it can be seen how colonial war favoured the prospects of the argathelians. The lowering in importance of the American debate was halted abruptly by the defeat of Lieutenant-General Braddock's expedition while campaigning on the Ohio frontier in July 1755. This again opened up a parliamentary debate on foreign policy along Blue and Grey water lines. The Blue/Grey water strategies were essentially bound up in the debate on whether continental and Hanoverian interests were to be the dominant influence in the direction of British foreign policy. Pitt and his parliamentary allies were consistent promoters of a Blue water policy which stressed the defence and acquisition of colonies, as opposed to heavy British involvement on the European continent. This had the result of making Pitt extremely unpopular with the Hanoverian royal family. The government came under sustained attack for failing to implement a Blue water strategy, and was criticised for subsidising continental powers like Austria and Holland. Blue water, as a result of its emphasis on British colonial interests, also involved a relative reluctance to rely too much on Hanoverian mercenaries. By 28 June 1756, 15 149 Hanoverians and Hessians were on the British army pay-roll - approximately 25% of the total. Criticism of non domestic sources of military manpower merely highlighted Scotland's military potential - an argument reinforced by the fact that Argyll himself, while a member of the government, nevertheless, held hostile attitudes towards German levies. ⁵⁷

When the news concerning the Braddock expedition became known in Britain, a meeting was called on 25 August 1755 which was designed to make recommendations to Cumberland, Newcastle and the King. Anson represented the navy, Sir John Ligonier the army, and Sir Thomas Robinson, executive manager of the Commons, the government. The meeting stressed the need to rapidly and significantly reinforce America. Two battalions were again ordered from the Irish establishment to replace the shattered regiments which were to return to Nova Scotia. In a blatant attempt to utilise Pitt the Elder's patriotic

sentiment, and thus blunt his attacks, the government considered raising a Glasgow regiment. Pitt, in 1745, had been closely associated with Scottish attempts, including that of Glasgow, to ensure that the government allowed them to raise volunteer regiments instead of deploying Hanoverians in Scotland. On 2 September 1755, Glasgow was stressed by various government figures as a potential nursery for a battalion of as many as 1000 men. It was to be commanded by William, eighth Earl of Home, who had commanded the 600 men raised in 1745. In terms of the recovery of Argyll's political position, it is significant that Home was a strong political ally.⁵⁸

These examples demonstrate how imperial conflict raised the potential political power of Argyll at the expense of those who wished to ensure his interest in Scotland was lessened. More generally, the manner of the British defeat had been such that the feasibility of deploying conventional troops became an issue. A report on Braddock's defeat stressed that "it is much to be feared from what has happened that regular troops from hence, will not be depended upon there." This is where the nature of Cumberland's use of Hanoverian Highland levies in 1746 is important. Their use as fast moving irregular soldiers has already been noted. James Wolfe, who had experience of military service in the Highlands, stressed the potential use of Highland manpower in frontier campaigning. What had developed in the period 1746-54 was a deep seated orthodoxy amongst the military elite that Highland manpower was, in theory at least, suitable for colonial conflicts as light infantry.⁵⁹

In late September 1755, with the parliamentary outcry over the situation in America still prominent, the ministry decided to secure itself further by dividing the opposition. Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Robinson, was replaced as leader of the House of Commons by Henry Fox. This was important for the Argyll faction in that it now had a high placed political interest. By 4 October 1755, Argyll wrote to Newcastle from Inveraray saying that he had been surprised to receive a cordial letter from Fox concerning this new arrangement. Fox had asked Argyll on behalf of the government to secure the political management of as many Scottish M.P.s as he could. The Duke responded by recalling from Ireland Colonel John Campbell, M.P. for Dumbarton. Argyll ordered him to muster the government vote more effectively. Indeed, the administration saw Argyll's natural political power as so influential that by November it was noted Fox was "very pressing" in inquiries as to when the Scottish Duke was expected back in London.⁶⁰

It is at this point that the Argyll - Fox - Cumberland axis, noted earlier, reveals its significance. Within a month of Fox's letter, Argyll was using the new Secretary of State as a channel of communication to Cumberland. The position of Captain General of the army, held by the royal Duke, made him second only to the King in terms of military patronage.

Lord Milton received instructions that he was to commence recommending political allies for commissions in the marines, which were to be extensively augmented as part of the administration's attempt to win over parliament. This demonstrates that access to patronage had again been given to Argyll. While the significance of the above developments must be noted, Newcastle's earlier antipathy to Argyll did not extend to denying him all access to military patronage. From March until June 1755, Argyll had been presented with opportunities. For instance, Campbell of Airds had received an offer for his son, but it was refused on the grounds that he not completed his education. Nevertheless, the situation in October had now altered positively for Argyll and his supporters. ⁶¹

Nothing illustrates the importance and significance of Argyll's perceived recruiting ability, and the related upturn in his fortunes more than the fact that within three weeks of his letter to Newcastle concerning Fox, he was apparently given patronage to raise a new Highland regiment. By 31 October 1755, Campbell of Airds had procured for Argyll two lists containing suitable candidates for commissions. The lower Campbell gentry of the county were represented in the persons of: James Campbell of Inverawe (who was to be colonel), the son of Campbell of Airds, Duncan Campbell of Jura, Colin Campbell - son of Campbell of Scamaddie, Neil Campbell, heir to Duntroon, and Donald Campbell of St. Catherine's. The buttressing of Argyll's interest within his own county was the obvious intention. However, what is significant is that Argyll is shown broadening his political net by including Sutherlands and Gunns. The political significance of the Munro and Ross interest, which had supported Argyll in Ross-shire in the 1754 election, was acknowledged by their inclusion as possible candidates for commissions. ⁶²

However, by 18 December it had become clear that the regiment proposed for James Campbell of Inverawe would not be raised because of continuing political distrust of Argyll, and because of preferred methods of recruiting strategy and military etiquette. On 28 September, Cumberland and the King discussed an augmentation of the army. They eventually agreed that old regiments were to expand rather than any new battalions raised. The King hoped this method would secure orderly promotion and largely preserve the established seniority structure. On 25 October, however, a push was made for a change in strategy; the King was asked to sanction new levies and "augment the troops in any way." It was decided that new levies were unavoidable, and by the end of the year ten battalions were ordered onto the British army establishment. ⁶³

By December 1755, Highland recruiting had become a serious political issue. At this point, Newcastle, under severe parliamentary pressure to secure the American colonies, now believed that a new Highland regiment was a necessary evil - a thesis borne out by the fact

that in October he had not instantly dismissed the notion. However, the final decision on which method to deploy saw the approval of an earlier plan that involved Swiss and German Protestants forming four battalions of 1000 men. The scheme was the suggestion of Colonel Augustine Prevost and later became the 60th Royal Americans. Prevost's scheme had been in direct competition with the proposed Campbell regiment, and its adoption by the high command illustrates the continuing distrust of Highlanders. Given that the adoption of Prevost's scheme had prevented Highland recruiting, Argyll should have naturally been displeased with it. Yet on 13 December 1755, in response to a demand from the military that he not oppose the plan for foreign battalions, Argyll informed Cumberland that he would in no way object to the Prevost plan.⁶⁴

This last incident is very instructive. In the period October 1754 to December 1755, there had been a slow recovery in Argyll's political position in Scotland, which had accelerated after October 1755. The thesis proposed here, that it was Argyll's recruiting potential which led to this recovery, may seem flawed by the fact that he had not recruited substantially. However, the lack of direct military patronage needs to be put in context. The wish to avoid arming the region was strong, as it was widely understood that Highland regiments ought to be manned only by those with strong local interests and connections. Another element that slowed the introduction to Highland recruiting was the fact that few disputed Argyll's right to have the lion's share of appointments. The anti-Argyll figures like Hardwicke and Newcastle understood that if they approved of Highland regiments, it would undo much of their own preferred strategy of limiting argathelian power.

The third Duke's leading position in the Highlands which, in the past, had brought him political problems, now ensured nobody would question his position as the manager of the British-Highland military should expansion occur. From the middle of June 1754, with the mention of the Highland Regiment and colonial service, a constant stream of suggestions involving Scottish and Highland regiments had been mooted. The fact that Newcastle had been convinced of the necessity of arming Highlanders, yet found the King opposed, made Argyll's acquiescence in the Prevost affair important, and won him substantial political credit. Nothing demonstrates this better than the fact that Argyll's alternative to Prevost - James Campbell of Inverawe, was, on 1 January 1756, two weeks after failure to acquire a regiment, promoted to the rank of major in the Highland Regiment.⁶⁵

Despite failing to gain approval for a Campbell regiment, the situation for Argyll by late 1755 was one of optimism. Within the framework of Westminster, the Scottish duke now understood the relative weakness of the wartime administration. Given the perception of Westminster politicians on the nature of Argyll's political power, the fact that troops from

the Highlands had been mentioned as an option was significant. It illustrated to Argyll that he could be potentially indispensable to a government which wanted the rapid recruitment and deployment of troops. Argyll's confidence in his strengthening position can be illustrated by his change in attitude towards his political enemies in Scotland.

Throughout late 1754 and most of 1755, the Treasury interest in Scotland had opposed Argyll over appointments for vacancies in Sheriff and Sheriff Depute posts. The case of Banffshire has already been noted. Argyll had adopted a conciliatory stance within this field. On 1 April 1755, Lord Deskford, Commissioner of the Customs, and the main opponent of Argyll, broadened his campaign to ensure that George Douglas was maintained as Sheriff - Substitute of Inverness-shire. General Humphrey Bland backed him up, yet on 4 October 1755, Argyll bluntly and successfully told Newcastle he wanted Douglas removed from his post. By November, it was clear that Newcastle was withdrawing his support from Deskford, who was left isolated at the Customs. The increasing supremacy of the Argyll faction cannot be better illustrated when, on 23 November 1755, Deskford was removed from his position as Commissioner of Customs. Even those who were not necessarily enemies of Argyll could, if they appeared to assist his opponents, experience hostility from the increasingly confident Duke. In early January 1756, Argyll refused to countenance Macleod of Macleod's suggestion that Deskford be given his post as M.P. for Inverness-shire, while in return Macleod himself got a sinecure through Argyll's political interest.⁶⁶

It was not merely Argyll's new aggressiveness towards his political opponents that is evidence of changing attitudes towards the Highlands in general. The alteration in perceptions can be understood from a letter dated 18 January 1756, addressed to Newcastle from Baron Edle, an English appointee to the Scottish Court of Exchequer. It concerned the uncertain future of the Annexed Estates Commission, yet was in reality a description of an on-going seachange in Scottish political opinion concerning the northern region. Edle stated;

I know the bent of the country is not to promote it. [Annexed Estates] Even those who wish not well to the Pretender, secretly wish well for the Highlands. They [the Edinburgh legal profession] consider that they [Highlanders] are an awe upon England and make them respectable there. They cannot forbear bragging that they are the best militia in Europe and the only militia in the Island, and reflect with pleasure on what Lord Lovat used to say, that King William was a wise King and he never thought of breaking the Highlands.⁶⁷

This letter suggests that by the mid 1750s, opinion in Scotland had begun to understand Simon Fraser of Lovat's deeply ironic statements regarding King William and the Highlands. The thrust of Lovat's argument was that while William had dealt severely with region, he had preserved clanship because he wished to utilise the military potential of the area.⁶⁸ Edle's comments suggest that this pragmatic attitude had re-emerged, and that some private Scottish political opinion believed that the traditional military perceptions of the region could be useful in giving Scots political weight within wider British and imperial politics. This change, whereby the region began to be viewed positively within the framework of Scotland was, ironically, a consequence of the 1745 uprising. In the scotophobic aftermath of 1745, the English had comprehensively failed to discriminate between Lowland and Highland Scotland. While Scots had a reasonable understanding of the political and cultural differences between the regions, post 1745 English attitudes made it easier, especially for the Scottish political nation, to see the Highlands as simply part of Scotland - if only because Scots as a whole had been discriminated against as a result of actions emanating from the North. If the Highlands had been used to tar Scotland as a whole, it made it easier in turn to see the region within a broader framework.

Other factors also stimulated this trend whereby the Highlands were increasingly seen as somehow beneficial within a wider Scottish framework. In contrast to the consensus on Highland underdevelopment and its concomitant militarism, the unprecedented efforts of the 1756 war saw Lowland Scots question the implications of the changes in their society. Debates were held in Edinburgh in 1759 on whether a martial and commercial society could co-exist. This was a question that vexed those who saw trade and the empire as truly indivisible, yet also understood the need to defend that empire. During these debates, which found expression in the militia controversy, the position of the Highlands seemed to stand in contrast to the situation in the South. The Highlands stood out as a recent example of militarism which Lowland society could not match. Adam Ferguson described the northern population as " a people regardless of commercial arts, " a naive position that was, nevertheless, given practical expression through Argyll's carefully managed Highland recruiting. In essence, the disproportionate number of Highland regiments demonstrated the accuracy of Ferguson's argument. The thrust of Ferguson's case was these Highland battalions were only possible because, unlike the Lowlands, the Highlands did not have a large commercial sector. Intellectually, therefore, Highland recruiting was linked to the wider perception of the unimproved nature of the area. It is of little relevance that, with hindsight, these arguments can be shown to be based on both a misunderstanding of the Lowlands and the Highlands. To contemporaries and observers in the 1750s, a clear division existed between commerce and military activity. Indeed, this viewpoint was considered viable until the 1790s and beyond. Evidence for this can be seen when

government ministers refused requests for a Scottish militia. They noted that they were actually encouraging manufactures and fisheries by recruiting men disproportionately in a non-commercialised region, and so avoiding a drain of men from the Lowland labour pool. It was widely acknowledged that recruiting should avoid situations whereby " the labourer must be taken from his plough and the manufacturer from his loom. " ⁶⁹

In these circumstances, the entrenched and accepted perception of the idle and unimproved Highlander meant that their recruitment brought no real damage to Scotland's wider economy. In a powerful example of how the Highlands fitted into developing Scottish society, it was argued that the nation's martial tradition, the decline of which offended so many Edinburgh literati, could and indeed was being maintained by the new spate of Highland regiments - a situation which some by the late 1750s believed was only right and proper. In essence, economic growth in the Lowlands, allied to the example of 1745, helped to confirm the potential of the region as a military reservation that would complement the wider needs of society. This contentious conclusion is, nevertheless, strengthened by the subsequent enthusiasm for the demobilisation of soldiers in the Highlands upon terms designed to secure further military service from them or their families. ⁷⁰

There existed, therefore, a strong Scottish intellectual framework that rationalised heavy recruitment in the Highlands. Added to this, was the fact that the unofficial war in 1755 ensured the manpower potential of the Highlands remained significant within the sphere of military options. More importantly, Lord Advocate Dundas had dramatically highlighted the military aspects of the region by sponsoring a population census - simply put, the Highlands contained 20.8% of Scotland's total fighting manpower. (See appendix eight). ⁷¹

Ironically, as the tenth anniversary of the uprising approached, the Highlands were still predominantly seen in terms of their military capacity. Meanwhile steady mobilisation continued. On 7 January 1756, Newcastle noted that while ten new battalions, including the Prevost regiment, might defuse criticism at home, it was recognised that; " the Americans will be dangerously discontented by sending over foreign officers and some dislike the arming of those settlers. " ⁷² In an effort to avoid this, as well as the politically dangerous issue of foreign mercenaries, Cumberland agreed on 20 January, that more regular troops would be sent to America. Simultaneously, in an effort to illustrate its commitment to the American colonies, the government appointed John Campbell, Earl of Loudon as the new Commander in Chief for British North America. It was at this point that Lord Milton received a letter dated 5 February which informed him that;

As the Highland Regiment (42nd Regiment), is to be augmented to a thousand men and there are ten additional officers appointed, His Grace has recommended four, viz. Archibald Campbell, Sheriff substitute , James Campbell son to Commissary James Campbell, Archibald Lamont and Duncan Campbell, nephew to Stonefield. It will be much for the credit of our friends, if they are diligent and alive in raising their proportion of men. But I am afraid it will not be easy as that regiment is ordered to America. ⁷³

The emphasis on speed was to demonstrate to Westminster another core perception which enhanced the real value of a perceived excess of manpower in the Highlands. This was speed of mobilisation. More realistically, the inclusion of prominent Campbells shows the victory of Argyll in terms of patronage, and contrasts with the limited ability of political opponents to gain similar opportunities. In late December 1755, Robert Dundas, the Lord President, had been at pains to cultivate Barrington, the Secretary at War, in order to receive an ensign's commission for a relation - the contrast is one of scale and lack of competition to Argyll's choices for Highland levies. Indeed, the dominance of the Campbell camp in this field did not stop their continuing inclusion in other non-Highland corps. ⁷⁴ Recruiting for the augmented 42nd regiment did prove difficult. By early March, only 239 men had enlisted. With the imposition of a Press Act in the same month, enlistment was assisted and in June 1756, 700 recruits sailed to New York as reinforcements for the Highland Regiment which had departed in April. ⁷⁵

The Seven Years War: Argathelian Dominance & the Rehabilitation of Highland Interest

Throughout early 1756, despite the reinforcement of the American colonies, the debate on foreign policy continued. In early February through until May, parliamentary objections to foreign troops on the British military establishment were again evident. However, while the benefits to Argyll from increased domestic patronage might have resulted in him supporting Pitt against the Hanoverian battalions, the reality was that foreign levies represented a prominent government measure, and Argyll was not prepared to break with an administration which was already offering substantial support. On 30 March, it was contended that a system of domestic recruiting (militia) should be imposed; " to establish a constitutional system of defence for the future which will put us out of the necessity of having a recourse to foreigners. " ⁷⁶ All that this political debate did, however, was to point towards the likelihood of any additional troops coming largely from domestic sources.

In the early autumn of 1756, Pitt highlighted Argyll as capable of raising additional Highland levies. The wisdom of the latter's caution over backing a policy which would have brought immediate patronage benefits, if at the cost of government displeasure, can be highlighted by just how suspicious the administration remained over the nature of Highland manpower and political interest. In February 1756, with a general atmosphere of pessimism concerning war with France, invasion scares became prominent. It was believed that the Scottish regiments in French pay would invade the Highlands on the occasion of Franco - British hostilities. The lack of internal defence was stressed in a petition from the factors on the Annexed Estates, and was forwarded to London by Charles Erskine, the Lord Justice Clerk. The petition concerned a scheme involving two independent companies of a hundred men stationed on the estates of Lovat and Perth, with companies of fifty men in Locheil and Strowan. Erskine stated to Hardwicke that he understood arming 300 Highlanders would be unpopular, but added that he considered the scheme necessary. ⁷⁷

Evidence that Argyll still distrusted elements within Westminster can be illustrated by his comments regarding Lieutenant-General Bland. It was noted that had the English soldier sent in the scheme, it would doubtless have been successful. So paranoid was Argyll concerning political judgements on his Highland interest, that he ordered Andrew Fletcher to inform his father that he had;

Received yours of the 17, [February] with a plan about the factors upon the forfeited estates, which he read over and desires me to acquaint you that however it may be good for the service yet the tide runs so high that it would be in vain at present to propose it. ⁷⁸

This incident illustrates how fragile relations between Argyll and the incumbent administration were in reality, and that the colonial war was not yet serious enough for him to broach the distrust of the Highlands at Westminster.

On 18 May 1756, war was officially declared between France and Britain. The loss of Minorca in late June was as serious a blow as Braddock's defeat had been in the previous year. Such was the panic that Pitt felt it would be gratuitous and unsound opposition tactics to attack the government. He supported financial estimates for Hanoverian levies in the short term, but attacked the administration's perceived desire for a continental war. This lack of specific parliamentary opposition meant that a plan for domestic augmentation involving two battalions of 1000 Highlanders was again turned down. The government, meanwhile, attempted to divide the parliamentary opposition and any prospect of a Pitt - Fox alliance. As it was, Henry Fox resigned from the administration on 13 October 1756,

and was followed by Newcastle on the 26th. The Pitt-Devonshire administration which emerged as a result, made its intentions clear when, on 12 November 1756, in one of its opening speeches it highlighted its policies as anti-continental and hostile to any war which had Hanoverian interests as its primary objective.⁷⁹

The political situation was developing where the likelihood of Highland regiments was increased. Argyll, always the cautious politician, was aware of the new potential opportunities in a heightened war in the colonies, yet waited on Newcastle when he returned from Scotland in November.⁸⁰ Pitt's demand that America be reinforced quickly, allied to his political opposition to foreign troops meant that he had to return to domestic resources. It was intended that two under strength English battalions return home from America for immediate disbandment. In return, fifteen new battalions were to be raised to replace the twelve which were to be transferred to the American colonies. In the short term this could only involve a reduction in the number of British regiments in Flanders, where the Duke of Cumberland wished to see a large British military presence. This was where the constant emphasising of the North of Scotland's ability to recruit quickly became important, in that it would appeal to both Pitt and the opposition army faction led by the royal duke.

It was generally understood that, given Argyll's connection with Fox, he would be out of favour with the new administration. However, on 10 December 1756, John Calcraft a prominent regimental agent informed the Earl of Loudon: " don't let the changes in court dispirit you. His Royal Highness still keeps his weight, the Duke of Argyll has more than ever. " ⁸¹ The prospect of losing battalions from his favoured theatre of war meant that Highland levies now appealed to Cumberland, and it was the Royal Duke who highlighted the May 1756 plan which had been rejected earlier. By 18 December, Argyll was snowed under with business concerning a new Highland regiment. It soon became clear that Pitt was planning a large scale mobilisation of manpower from the region. He intended to raise four Highland battalions to be officered by those who could recruit the quickest, as opposed to only those with previous military service. However, at the end of the month it was obvious that political problems had arisen. Newcastle opposed the measure simply to deny Pitt a policy victory. Calcraft, in turn, informed Loudon that the proposal was unlikely to be put into practice, but that Argyll had emerged as the chief manager of the entire affair.⁸²

Finally, a compromise solution of two Highland regiments was agreed upon. Cumberland, while prepared to sanction Highland recruiting was, nevertheless, deeply unhappy at the choice of Simon Fraser as one of the colonels. Hardwicke noted that;

I find the measures of raising 2000 Highlanders alarm many of the best affected; particularly the making councillor Fraser a colonel of one of the battalions. I owe I am surprised to see that given way to. The event will certainly be the raising [of] the Jacobite clan Fraser under this young Lovat ... nothing will more effectively break in upon the plan which has been pursued for that country ever since the rebellion. ⁸³

This condemnation of Highland recruiting illustrates how attacks within Scottish and British politics in the 1746-55 period, couched as they had been in the language of clanship, now assumed a vital significance. While he disagreed that Fraser ought to be colonel, nowhere does Hardwicke argue that Fraser would not be able to raise the men. Indeed, the opposite is entirely evident in the letter. The Lord Chancellor saw it as a return to the old evil of clan interest, and that " wherein ploughshares were turned again into broadswords. " ⁸⁴

Paradoxically, it was such attitudes which explain why Lovat got the command. So prevalent had the use of clanship been as a political weapon, that few now questioned its role as a still important aspect of Highland society. Argyll was able to manipulate that feeling to vault Lovat to a very high military position. It is deeply ironic that, within barely a decade of the battle which largely confirmed the real and on-going demise of clanship, perceptions of that social arrangement were, nevertheless, stimulating and accelerating Highland colonisation of the very modern British fiscal-military state.

Imperial policy was also moving in a direction that heightened the likelihood of large scale Highland recruitment. Pitt's stated policy was for 8 000 men to reinforce America. This fact finally witnessed generalised if reluctant agreement to new Highland regiments. On the day the levies were agreed, Newcastle informed Hardwicke that Pitt had offered £ 300 000 to a despairing Cumberland for a German campaign, since;

The Duke [Cumberland] will not part with more than four regiments from hence. The new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, [Duke of Bedford] will spare only 1000 men from thence and the Old governor of Scotland cannot muster up above 2000 of his Highland friends which all together will not amount to much above 6000. ⁸⁵

It was agreed that Simon Fraser and Archibald Montgomery, brother to the Earl of Eglington, would both be colonels. Macdonald of Sleat, Mackenzie of Seaforth and Sir Ludovick Grant were to help Montgomery, who was not a Highland proprietor. Argyll was to co-ordinate the choice of officers, which given the various interests involved, took all his

political skill. The choice of Archibald Montgomery to raise a Highland corp represented an attempt to broaden, beyond Argyll, the political interests which would most benefit within Scotland by extensive military patronage. The Eglington family maintained a powerful electoral interest in the Ayr district, and had been noticeable opponents of Argyll within the electorally independent Ayr burghs. However, even here it should be noted that Argyll emerged as the largest beneficiary through his connection with John Campbell, Earl of Loudon, who directly supervised appointments favourable to Argyll's ally, John Duke of Atholl. This included commissions in the 42nd regiment, commanded by a political opponent of Argyll, Lord John Murray.⁸⁶

Newcastle was surprised that Cumberland had agreed to the appointment of Simon Fraser, and recognised the dominant influence of Argyll. The emergence of recruiting in the Highlands in this period has seen a concentration by historians on the aspect of Highland elite rehabilitation. Yet parallel to this was the fact that the events of January 1757 buttressed Argyll's position nationally within Scotland - a fact Newcastle recognised. Hardwicke stated;

The Duke I hear disapproves and submits - it is wholly the Duke of Argyll. The appointment of Councillor Fraser is as ridiculous as it is dangerous.⁸⁷

Moreover, rehabilitation had pre-dated January 1757, and was comprehensive in that the military had already been accepting personnel from notorious Jacobite areas. Established Highland officers like Captain Aeneas Macintosh of the 42nd regiment, recommend relations like Lachlan Macintosh of the Scots-Dutch for commissions in the Royal Americans. By late 1755, it was decided that any military officers entering the British service from the Scots-Dutch must do so at ensign level, so as not to affront the sensibilities of long serving British officers. That such a regulation was established illustrates the extent to which officers from that service were entering the British army. In early December 1755, James Fraser a friend of Simon Fraser, a pensioned officer from the Scots-Dutch, petitioned Loudon on his namesakes behalf for a British commission, stating, " you well know how groundless the general odium at our name is. "⁸⁸

This fact aside, Lovat was undoubtedly Argyll's appointee, and as a policy the deployment of high profile ex-Jacobites was a great success. Within three weeks of the regiments forming, General James St. Clair noted to John Mackenzie of Delvine; " I think the Duke of Argyll stands unrivalled as to Scotland. "⁸⁹ By 12 March 1757, Andrew Fletcher noted the smug political glee evident in the Campbell camp in London.

The extraordinary success with which the two Highland corps have been recruited gives great satisfaction to all concerned, some of the John Bulls [A term for the English] cannot believe that such a body of men could be raised in so short a space. ⁹⁰

This quote reveals the extent to which the argathelian faction saw recruiting as a means to secure itself from hostile English opinion. The swift embarkation of both regiments and their performance in the colonies further vindicated Argyll's position. While the career of Fraser as an individual has been emphasised, the events of January to March 1757, should also be seen as a triumph for Argyll's political faction. Moreover, the true significance of these levies has been largely over looked. Such rapid levying of men could only have reinforced and deepened the changing attitudes within sections of Lowland opinion concerning the northern region. In their eyes it was a substantial display of the ability of clanship to produce soldiery. The concrete reality of over 2000 men so rapidly mobilised, clouded the more complex reality that clanship was already a dying force within the region.

Nationally, the Pitt-Devonshire ministry remained susceptible to opposition alternatives, especially given the King's willingness to sanction alliances against the incumbent administration. In March 1757, Fox sought to secure Argyll in an administration of which he himself was the leading light. It is a measure of the acceptance that Argyll's power had strengthened, that he was to be officially recognised as minister for Scotland, and retain a semi-independent position within the new ministry. This was the antithesis of the trend in Scottish politics for the last decade. The development did not occur as Fox failed to develop wider support for his intended administration. Nevertheless, Argyll, largely through his domination of the British-Highland military, came close to revitalising, in an official way, the semi-autonomous status of Scottish political management. In all events, proceedings moved against him. By June, Pitt and Newcastle had allied together, and Argyll's perceived connections with Fox, as well as the need to reward the extended membership of any coalition government, now meant that he was politically unacceptable. Pitt, by 14 June, wished to see Argyll removed from government involvement, and it does appear that Newcastle prepared a list showing ten Scottish M.P.s as pro - Argyll, demonstrating that his removal and its consequences on voting strength was being seriously considered. ⁹¹

As it was, Argyll's now proven ability in procuring troops was vital in ensuring his political survival and subsequent re-asserted pre-eminence in Scotland. This vital point can be illustrated by the fact that within a month of Pitt wishing to force Argyll out, his government sanctioned three companies to be added to each of the three Highland battalions - 900 men in all. Argyll was given the management of the levies, as had been the

case since 1745. The extent of Argyll's domination can be illustrated by the fact that a list of officers commissioned before 1 August 1758 (when the Highland regiments were again augmented) reveal that of the nineteen listed, fourteen were nominated by his deputy Milton, or supporters like George Ross.⁹²

Moreover, Argyll's power went deeper than that. In November 1759, Lord George Beauclerk, despite being Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, was forced to write to the Secretary of War noting that he had not been informed of the officers recruiting in areas under his jurisdiction. This was due to Argyll's control of their appointment, which the Secretary had largely left to him. This illustrates the extent to which matters had changed since the days when the Treasury had used the army high command in Scotland as a buttress to Argyll's political enemies. The unquestioning dominance of the Scottish Duke within this field can be illustrated by Lord Lindores request to the War Office in late November 1758. Lindores stated that he " understood these companies was to be nominated by the Duke of Argyll. " He had gained a commission from the Duke but wished to ensure his candidate was made the senior lieutenant. The leeway given to Argyll is demonstrated by Secretary of War Barrington's reply.

The Duke of Argyll has fix't the dates, [date of commission decided seniority] and I can make no alterations but by his Grace's desire.⁹³

That a British Secretary of War should demur to such an extent, and to a political figure who, a decade earlier, had seemed in London to stand in the way of Scottish accountability to Westminster is remarkable. Such political power is difficult to put in context and cannot be underestimated. There are, however, figures which allow Argyll's control to be demonstrated. In 1755, the entire Salt and Customs establishment in Scotland totalled 501 places. Candidates of the House of Argyll totalled forty two. However, by 1761, out of a possible 401, the third Duke had either directly or indirectly, appointed one hundred and fifty eight military officers whose total annual pay equalled £ 8650.10.0. Argyll and his interest gained 8.38% of the customs places. In contrast, they gained 39.4% of places in the British-Highland military.⁹⁴

It was not merely that the Duke was able to give commissions to his own supporters, he was able to utilise all sections of Highland society, political ally or foe, to buttress his own power. Appendix one illustrates a recruiting scheme drawn up and reviewed by Milton in 1757. It involved estimating the military populations still free in the Highlands after the completion of the 77th & 78th regiments. Listed were political opponents like the Mackenzies, the Macdonald of Sleat family, and the Campbells of Breadalbane, whose

populations, while subsequently used to aggrandise their political power, also promoted Argyll's position. By the end of the war, ten Highland battalions had been levied from the region. Argyll commanded such a dominant position that when, in July 1760, a military officer petitioned his political opponents in Scotland, he was, nevertheless, told to apply to the Campbell duke. In August 1760, six independent companies of Highlanders were ordered, every commission within the remit of Argyll.⁹⁵

The war undoubtedly saw a seachange in attitudes to the Highlands. By 1760, so confident were Argyll's supporters in their ability to control the region, that it was possible to successfully suggest to the government that it allow Macdonald of Keppoch to use his estate population, which he had deliberately withheld from enlisting, to secure the pardon of Macdonald of Barrisdale. A mere five years earlier, the deliberate withholding of men from the army by the likes of the Keppoch family would have been viewed as outright treason. As this example demonstrates, what was even more significant than the strengthening of the Argyll faction was the entrenchment, at the centre of the British empire, of attitudes which equated the Scottish Highlands to disproportionate military recruitment. Here again, Argyll was deeply significant. He controlled so much military patronage on the basis of Westminster's acceptance of his real and imagined interest in the region, that any large scale recruiting outside it could not so easily have been justified as within his remit. It is perhaps this situation which explains the fate of an offer made in March 1760 to Lord Loudon. It involved a regiment to be raised to the strength of 500 men, by mobilising " the people of the Borders, formerly active and warlike. " ⁹⁶

The offer of a Border regiment, and the subsequent failure of the proposal, do raise some interesting questions regarding the pattern of British army recruiting in Scotland. It is an imponderable of Scottish history as to why the border region of Scotland did not experience anywhere near the same level of imperial militarisation as the Highlands - nor why Westminster had not promoted it. The region had, after all, many similarities; economy, climate and above all, a proven historical record of quasi-military activity. Yet, as noted, the 1760 offer never materialised. Given that the scheme was sent to Argyll for approval, his knowledge that it could only benefit political enemies like the Marchmont family was doubtless vital. More fundamentally, however, the Scottish Borders lacked what the Highlands did not - clear and recent evidence of militarism in the form of the 1745 uprising. It is this fundamental difference, along with the historical (and deeply misunderstood) concept of clanship which goes in large part towards explaining the profoundly differing experience between the Highlands and other areas of Lowland Scotland.

Conclusion

In April 1761, Archibald, third Duke of Argyll died having retained and strengthened his position as the premier political player in Scotland. In February, just before his death it was noted;

It is universally allowed that the Duke of Argyll is more the minister for Scotland just now than ever he was in his life. ⁹⁷

This chapter argues this powerful position needs to be contrasted with the hostile attitudes Argyll faced from as early as 1746. What radically changed his position was his control and subsequent deployment of Highland manpower. The management and smooth operation of this recruiting drive justified his retention as premier political manager. This legacy meant that there was little attempt to institute a new Treasury drive for increased accountability from Scotland; indeed Stewart-Mackenzie initially became responsible for Scottish affairs in much the same manner as Argyll had been. The devolved structure of the argathelian management system, which emphasised a *Scottish political interest and described as "semi-independent"* eventually ended in 1765. ⁹⁸ Given the failure of Westminster to impose centralist policies upon Scotland in the period 1746 - 1765, and the role international conflict and military recruitment played in this, several points have to be noted. Firstly, the survival of Argyll was not due to military recruitment alone. The adversarial nature of Westminster politics was a substantial factor, as was the relative insignificance of Scotland within that system. However, there is no doubt that Argyll used his uncontested position as head of the emerging British-Highland military to reinforce his position within Westminster. Given that the development of a centralised British military in the seventeenth century has already been described as a "state building" mechanism, then it is ironic that in the narrow sphere of mid-eighteenth century Scottish politics that role is reversed. Given the fate of Argyll in the 1750s, it can be argued that rather than the army and imperial conflict acting as unifying forces they did, in fact, act as the opposite, and served to continue some distinctively Scottish political scene.

Linked to this is the fact that, during the Seven Years War, the Scottish political nation united to an unprecedented degree. Paradoxically, they did so because of the 1745 uprising which, while Highland, unquestionably had national implications. Comprehensive hostility towards Scotland as a whole stimulated an overtly patriotic response in 1756. More ironic yet, is that as well as evidence of Scottish investment in Hanoverian Britain, the 1756-63 war involved a strengthening of the perceived differences between Lowland and Highland society in that, to contemporaries, clanship had again produced significant amounts of men

and strikingly re-asserted the militarised nature of the Northern region. The seminal Highland response during the 1756-63 war was a direct result of 1745. As such, it set the precedent and context for government policy during the American War of Independence, demonstrating that the last Jacobite attempt did, in fact, profoundly influence conditions in the Highlands long after its seemingly final end at Culloden.

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- 1). It is not intended to criticise the theory of the army as a unifying force, merely to suggest that the role of the British military in stimulating political unification was not always a constant. It undoubtedly played a role in the Union of 1707, yet the exercise here is to illustrate its political role in the period 1739-61. For theories on the army in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: Keith M. Brown, 'From Scottish Lords to British Officers: State Building, Elite Integration and the Army in the Seventeenth Century' in N. Macdougall (ed.), *Scotland & War AD 79-1918* (Edinburgh, 1991), 152. For the eighteenth century: B. Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen* (London, 1984) 178 & 186; A. Murdoch, *The People Above' : Politics and Administration in Mid Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 124-5; L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, 1992), 120, 126-7 & 129.
 - 2). A.I. Macinnes, 'Scottish Gaeldom: The First Phase of Clearance' in T.M. Devine & R. Mitchison (eds.), *People and Society in Scotland*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1988), 72; T.M. Devine, *Clanship to Crofters' War: the Social Transformation of the Scottish Highlands* (Manchester, 1993), 30-31.
 - 3). For details on the fractured nature of Whig government within Scotland which led, in turn, to an inability or reluctance on the part of the Scottish political elite to impose government policies in the Highlands - as well as the political and financial use and misuse of military commissions: R. Mitchison, 'The Government in the Highlands, 1707-1745' in N.T. Philipson & R. Mitchison (eds.), *Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1970), 33-36; B. Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen* (London, 1984), 96-100, 113; D. Warrand (ed.), *More Culloden Papers*, vol. 5 (Inverness, 1930), 169.
 - 4). For more details on the formation and development of the Scots-Dutch: J. Ferguson, (ed.), *The Scots Dutch Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782*, (Edinburgh, 1899), introduction. R. Mitchison, loc. cit., 38; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1740), 42; vol. 3 (Edinburgh, 1741), 49; G.U.L., David Murray Collection, *Caledonian Mercury* - MU 60 - f 15, no 3083.
 - 5). D.H., Loudon Papers, A/1001, f. 21.
 - 6). D. Warrand (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, 25; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16593, f. 61; Ms 16596, f. 60; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 3 (Edinburgh, 1741), 49.
 - 7). G. Menary, *The Life and Letters of Duncan Forbes of Culloden* (London, 1936), 73, 91-92, 260, n. 1; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16591, ff. 61, 94.
 - 8). R. Mitchison, loc. cit., 30.
 - 9). For summaries on the development of British foreign policy in the period 1739-45: J. Black, 'Foreign Policy and the British State 1742-1793' in J. Black (ed.), *British Politics and Society from Walpole to Pitt 1742-1789* (London, 1990), 147-148; R. Browning, *The Duke of Newcastle* (London, 1975), 101-115; J. Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Cambridge, 1992), 40 & 44.
 - 10). The disintegration of government military policy after the relatively coherent regime of Wade has been highlighted by Mitchison in her article, which does connect the political turmoil of the early 1740s with weak government in the Highlands. Yet the stress on the disunited, indeed, opposing whig political factions within Scotland and Westminster, while entirely valid, fails to show the extent to which the military high command in Flanders and the exigencies of foreign policy meant that the region was being treated more as an

integrated part of the United Kingdom: G. Menary, loc. cit., 188-92; D. Warrand (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 150-152, 184-85.

11). R. Mitchison, loc. cit., 42-43; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7061, f. 22; B. L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, ff. 20-23; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 7 (Edinburgh, 1745), 98.

12). N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7056, f. 122; Ms 7062, ff. 39, 97; Ms 7063, ff. 40 & 42; Ms 7063, f. 68.

13). N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7063, f. 130; Ms 7064, f. 54; Ms 7065, f. 86; Ms 7066, ff. 113, 145, 147, 169; S.R.O., Mitchell Collection, RH. 2/5/12, p. 57.

14). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16597, ff. 17, 20; Ms 16604, f. 187; Ms 16610, f. 57; Ms 16605, ff. 33, 48, 50, 54, 169.

15). L. Leneman, *Living in Atholl - a Social History of the Estate 1685 - 1785* (Edinburgh, 1986), 144; N.L.S., Culloden Papers, Ms 2968, f. 217; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7058, f. 28; D.C.M., 4/120 & 123.

16). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16604, f. 181, 190; Ms 16605, ff. 33, 41; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7066, f. 89.

17). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16605, f. 27.

18). D.C.M., 4/159.

19). B. Lenman, loc. cit., 199. For the scheme involving the removal of Highland populations to the colonies see footnote 36, p. 29.

20). For details on the role of impress acts see chapter two and appendix nine. N.L.S., Culloden Papers, Ms 2968, f. 137; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7045, f. 119.

21). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35509, f. 309.

22). For the quartering of troops on Lovat's estate see chapter two, footnote 8, p. 65-6. Laing Manuscript, vol. 2, *H.M.C.* (London, 1925), f. 44, p. 302; S.R.O., R.H. 15/13/52; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16513, f. 68.

23). R. Mitchison, loc. cit., 28-29; N.L.S., Culloden Papers, Ms 2968, f. 28; N.L.S. Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16604, f. 165.

24). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1136, f. 103; D.C.M., 4/124; J. Browne, *History of the Highlands & of the Highland Clans* vols. 3 & 4 (Glasgow, 1838), 112, 239 - 240.

25). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16596, f. 60; D.C.M., 4/120; S.R.O., Campbells of Barcaldine, GD170/942/2. Later, Duncan, after having lost the estate, claimed to a Jacobite colleague in a letter dated September 1753 that he had refused a commission outright. Yet the Argyll offer suggests that there had been some form of communication and co-operation, and Duncan's definite refusal of a lieutenancy, stands in contrast with his ambiguity while the possibility of higher rank remained: J. Browne, loc. cit., 239 - 240.

26). For the targeting of disaffected areas and opinions on perceived Catholicism within certain clans: S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield Papers, GD 14/18; N.L.S., Ms 16605, ff. 33,

50; Ms 16604, f. 187; Ms 16596, f. 127. Note also that Loudon's drew men from obvious and subsequent Jacobite areas like Cromartie estate, Glengarrie, Glenlivet, Glenroy, Lochaber, Strathspey and Glencoe. See: D.H., Loudon Papers, A/1000, f. 3, (List of Deserters Lord Loudon's Highland Regiment).

27). The MacIntoshs and MacLeans were militarily divided by the patronage policy. The example of Macpherson of Cluny, while suggestive of failure would, had the regiment been raised quicker and got to Flanders, actually have been something of a coup for the government: *Scots Magazine*, vol. 7 (Edinburgh, 1745), 246, 296, 345; G.U.L., David Murray Collection, MU. 60 - f54; *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, no 7653; D. Warrand (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, (Inverness, 1930), 15; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16609, ff. 257, 267; Ms 16692, f. 209.

28). See chapter two, footnote 18, p. 70; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7054, f. 38.

29). D. Warrand (ed.), vol. 5, 70, 30; D.H., Loudon Papers, A/1001, ff. 9, 18. Another interesting example of the linking of local clan activity and wider military service, is that of Mackenzie of Fairburn. Fairburn had been actively involved in cattle watching for the Seaforth and Mackenzie interests in Kintail. This had involved co-operation with elements of the 42nd Highland regiment. Not unsurprisingly, when additional companies were rumoured in early 1745, Mackenzie felt that he had demonstrated both the local power and inclination to serve the government which, in turn, warranted a British army commission. From his perspective, his local clan power logically suggested he move into wider military service. See: N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine, Ms 1327, f. 10.

30). D. Warrand (ed.), loc. cit., 83, 87, 89-91, 111, 115 - 119.

31). For apologia of Scotophobia amongst the English political elite: W. A. Speck, *The Butcher - The Duke of Cumberland & the Suppression of the '45* (Oxford, 1981), 186 - 201. For its extent: B. P. Lenman, 'Scotland & Ireland 1742 - 1789' in J. Black (ed.), *British Politics & Society from Walpole to Pitt, 1742 - 1789* (London, 1990), 87-89; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16630, ff. 68, 26, 36; Ms 16609, f. 168; Ms 16615, f. 85.

32). B. P. Lenman, 'Scotland & Ireland 1742 - 1789' in J. Black (ed.), *British Politics & Society from Walpole to Pitt, 1742 - 1789* (London, 1990), 86 - 87; G.U.L., David Murray Collection, MU 60 - c. 13; *The Glasgow Courant*, February 3rd- 10th, no. 17; D. Warrand, loc. cit., vol. 5, 35 - 36; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 8 (Edinburgh, 1746), 137; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16630, f. 110.

33). J. Black, 'Foreign Policy and the British State, 1742 - 93' in J. Black (ed.), *British Politics & Society from Walpole to Pitt, 1742 - 89* (London, 1990), 147 - 148; D. Warrand (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, 84, 70, 180, 184; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1327, f. 97; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 8 (Edinburgh, 1746), 394; R. Browning, loc. cit., 139-140, 143-144.

34). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32713, ff. 283, 335; Add Ms 32714, f. 466.

35). G.U.L., David Murray Collection, MU. 60 - C. 13; *The Glasgow Courant*, August 11th - 18th, no 45; MU. 60 - f 54, *The Caledonian Mercury*, no 4192; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35451, ff. 66, 74 - 75; Add Ms 35509, f. 309; H. Paton, (ed.), *Polwarth Manuscripts 1725-80*, vol. 5, *H.M.C.* (London, 1961), f. 344, p. 262.

36). Lord J. Russell (ed.), *Correspondence of John 4th Duke of Bedford*, vol. 1 (London, 1842), 563-64.

- 37). S.R.O., Mitchell Collection, RH. 2/5/12, p. 63; B.L. Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32715, f. 323.
- 38). N.L.S., Blk. 47, *A Second letter to a Noble Lord containing a Plan for effectually uniting and sincerely attaching the Highlanders to the British Constitution and Revolutionary Settlement* (London, 1748), 29; *Parliamentary History of England from the earliest period to the year 1803*, vol. 14 (London, 1813) 723-25 & 743-52. There has been a mixture of ambiguity and misunderstanding regarding British policy as intended at Westminster in this period. For evidence of the former, as well as an inaccurate summary of eighteenth century Highland recruiting: D. Henderson, *Highland Soldier: A Social Study of the Highland Regiments 1820-1920* (Edinburgh, 1989), 4-5. For an example of misinterpretation of the cannon fodder element in recruiting policy and in Barrington's speech: L. Colley, loc. cit., 120.
- 39). For a revisionist discussion on British colonial policy in this period: T.R. Clayton, 'The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax and the American origins of the Seven Years War' in *H. J.*, vol. 24 (1981), 574; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32717, ff. 23, 35.
- 40). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32717, ff. 8, 23, 35, 90, 201; Lord J. Russell (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 1, 578.
- 41). S.R.O., Cunningham/Graham Muniments, GD 22/1/391; H. Paton (ed.), loc. cit., ff. 307 - 308, p. 203 - 205; f. 310, p. 212.
- 42). Many of the political developments in this period are well detailed in the work of Dr. Alexander Murdoch from his discussion on politics and administration in Scotland from 1745 -1765. Murdoch has explained that no analysis of military recruitment within the political framework was attempted within his otherwise comprehensive work: A. Murdoch, *The People Above': Politics & Administration in Mid Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 40; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32707, ff. 13, 87; G. Menary, loc. cit., 258 - 259; D. Warrand (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, 36 - 37.
- 43). J.W. Hayes, *The Social & Professional Background of the officers of the British army 1714-1763* (unpublished M.A. Thesis, London 1956), 142; D.C.M., 4/160.
- 44). M. Lynch, *Scotland: a New History* (London, 1992), 334.
- 45). It should be noted that in March 1747, Cumberland had expressed a desire to get Argyll out of administration in Scotland: H. Paton (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, f. 291, p. 188; f. 296, p. 192; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32713, f. 283.
- 46). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16631, f. 5; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 33 - 35; H. Paton (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, f. 336, p. 251, f. 313; p. 221, f. 314, p. 225; f. 320, p. 235.
- 47). H. Paton (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, f. 343, p. 259; f. 345, p. 264; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32715, f. 68; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 35 - 36.
- 48). A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 34; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32714, f. 436; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, f. 120; Add Ms 35450, f. 179; Add Ms 35447, ff. 19, 27, 123.
- 49). For details on political opinions concerning the annexing legislation see chapter five. N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16677, ff. 119-121; H. Paton (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 5, f. 344, p. 262.

50). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms, 1461, ff. 151 & 156; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, ff. 30 & 5.

51). Newcastle told Lieutenant General Bland that he would readily accept comments and suggestions concerning Scottish posts and general administration. He conspicuously communicated with the Earl of Hopetoun and appointed the vehemently anti-argathelian Lord Deskford as a Commissioner of Customs in Scotland. The customs, which had from 1707 been direct Treasury patrimony, was the most anglicised organ of Scottish administration, and had already experienced Cumberland's and Bland's intervention: R. Browning, loc. cit., 45 - 46; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 41; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, f. 75; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32737, ff. 483, 507; Add Ms, 33049, ff. 285 - 90; Add Ms 32733, f. 483; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, ff. 120, 178, 230.

52). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, ff. 224, 230; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32736, ff. 271, 451, 531; Add Ms 32995, ff. 63, 190, 193, 211, 383; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, f. 44.

53). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16690, f. 78.

54). B.A.M., Box 47/5/121.

55). Despite his decision to join the opposition, Fox was the Secretary at War and thus in constant communication with Cumberland, maintaining close political connections with the royal Duke. Within Scottish politics he allied with Argyll, and in the winter of 1754 this had been strengthened by Fox supporting the opposition's pro - Scottish linen lobby led by prominent argathelians. Fox was later informed by the Scottish Duke that his stance had made him surprisingly popular in Scotland - an allusion to his known connections with Cumberland. For a detailed analysis of high politics (though exclusively within the English sphere): J.C.D. Clark, *The Dynamics of Change: The Crisis of the 1750s & English party systems*, (Cambridge, 1982), 67, 99, 179, 205; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16517, f. 80; B.L., Add Ms 32857, f. 87; B.L., Holland House Papers, Add Ms 51429, f. 9.

56). J.C.D. Clark, loc. cit., 99 -105; R. Browning, loc. cit., 177-78; O.A. Sherrard, *Lord Chatham: Pitt and The Seven Years War* (London, 1955), 50; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32996, f. 3.

57). J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688-1783* (London, 1989), 169-170; J. Black, *Pitt the Elder* (Cambridge, 1992), 76, 108; R. Middleton, 'The Recruitment of the British Army 1755 - 1762' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 67 (1989), 226; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32996, f. 281; B.L., Holland House Papers, Add Ms 51375, f. 47; Add Ms 51378, f. 164; J.C.D. Clark, loc. cit., 210-211, 214; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16518, ff. 32, 53 & 57.

58). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32996, ff. 208, 218, O.A. Sherrard, *Lord Chatham - A War Minister in the Making* (London, 1952), 139-41; H. Paton (ed.), loc. cit., f. 345, p. 264.

59). For previous reference to Cumberland's use of Highland levies see footnote 32, p. 27. B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32996, f. 208; J. Prebble, loc. cit., 94; E. M. Lloyd, 'The Raising of the Highland Regiments in 1757' in *E.H.R.*, vol. 17 (1902), 466. A useful article which represents an early attempt to illustrate Highland recruitment as part of a wider political process.

60). R. Browning, loc. cit., 225- 226; J.C.D. Clark, loc. cit., 179, 181, 192; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32859, f. 396; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, f. 240.

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- 61). R. Browning, loc. cit. 141; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, ff. 182, 210, 211; Ms 16690, f. 207.
- 62). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16690, ff. 207, 209; Ms 16517, f. 240; Mss 17505 f. 32. For a description on the political actions of the Ross and Munro interest in Ross-shire, see: L. Namier & J. Brooke (eds.), *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1754-1790*, vol. 3 (London, 1964), 88.
- 63). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, ff. 217, 222, 240; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32859, f. 25; Add Ms 32996, ff. 208, 248, 257. For a revisionist treatment of Newcastle's wartime administration and its recruiting policies: R. Middleton, loc. cit., 228-29. It would also appear that in late 1755 the King was personally opposed to suggestions concerning Highland levies. S. Ayling, *The Elder Pitt: Earl of Chatham* (London, 1976), 192.
- 64). E.M. Lloyd, loc. cit., 466-68; B.L., Holland House Papers, Add Ms 51375, f. 127; N.L.S., Minto Papers, Ms 11001, f. 16; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32861, f. 417.
- 65). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16518, f. 3. Further evidence of Argyll's credit is the case of the successor to John Clerk, Baron of the Court of Exchequer, who died in early October 1755. Dundas informed Newcastle he hoped the new Baron would be someone of his [Newcastle's] or the Lord Chancellor's choosing. On 17 October, Newcastle informed Argyll that Mr Grant (supported by the latter) had gained the Chair. He added that he hoped this would silence the reports concerning their mutual political hostility: B.L., Add Ms 32859, f. 394; Add Ms 32860, f. 78. As early as May 1745, Lord Milton informed his son Henry that concerning his request for a commission in the Earl of Loudon's: "As to the Highland regiment I never asked it because I knew it a fixed rule that none but those who had a Highland family interest would be named - as you see is the case." N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16513, f. 77.
- 66). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 33049, f. 295; Add Ms 32854, f. 15; Add Ms 32859, ff. 396, 417; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, f. 209; Ms 16518, f. 25; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35449, f. 29.
- 67). The context of this particular quote must be noted. Attempts were being made by Edle and his supporters to acquire Treasury money in order to pay off the debts on the Annexed Estates. Edle was highlighting Scottish opinions in as disturbing a manner as he could, in order to justify annexation and secure the money. Nevertheless, it reveals how Scottish contemporaries could view the region in a manner not usually ascribed to mid-eighteenth century Edinburgh. B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35449, f. 2.
- 68). J. Prebble, loc. cit., 21.
- 69). It is not necessary here to argue that the whole debate was based upon a wrong assumption, a fact that Adam Smith suggested when he argued that a strong commercial economy provided capital for a professional full-time army - the scenario that had in any case been evident during the 1745. A.J. Youngson, *After the '45* (Edinburgh, 1973), 10-14; L. Colley, loc. cit., 64-65; J. Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue* (Edinburgh, 1985), 73-6, 81-2, 86; A. Allardyce, *Scotland and Scotsman in the Eighteenth Century* vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1888), 335. Such attitudes to recruiting and the economy were also evident during the later period. It was reported to the fourth Duke of Atholl in May 1776 that when an attempt to get a Scottish militia failed, Scottish manufacturers were in fact highly pleased: B.A.M. Box 65/2/57.

70). Robertson, loc. cit., 114-116. For the settlement of soldiers with a view to further military service see chapter four, footnote 84, p. 172.

71). J.G. Kyd, *Scottish Population Statistics including an Analysis of Webster's Census* (Edinburgh, 1978), p. 8: Regarding the work, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke a zealous proponent of Highland demilitarisation, stated that " in this light it certainly may be applied to many uses of great benefit to the public. " Further evidence that Dundas was aware of the military potential of the region, can be seen when in June 1755, he informed Hardwicke that while on his trip into the Highlands he agreed to a request from Rannoch outlaws for judicial immunity in return for military enlistment. Dundas agreed and ended by stating that " the example will I hope encourage their companions and neighbours to follow their course by entering into the service. " See, B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35449, ff. 88, 90; Add Ms 35448, f. 272.

72). The Prevost regiment was to involve Swiss and German Protestants who would serve the British Crown in return for land in the colonies. B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32862, f. 46.

73). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32996, f. 355; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16518, ff. 15, 21, 32.

74). For example in early January 1756, Macdonald of Knock received a captaincy in one of the new ten battalions just established in late 1755: N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16518, f. 7; P.R.O., WO. 1/972, f. 39.

75). For details on Press Acts see chapter on law and order. P.R.O., WO. 1/972, f. 305, D.H., Loudon Papers, A/972, ff. 1, 18; A/782, f. 35; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 16518, f. 63; J. Browne, loc. cit., 154.

76). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16518, ff. 32, 53, 57; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32864, f. 408.

77). R. Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier* (Oxford, 1958), 215; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35449, ff. 15, 17, 29; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17505, f. 34.

78). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16518, ff. 32, 38.

79). J.C.D. Clark, loc. cit., 231, 235, 251, 275; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32997, f. 22; Add Mss 32996, f. 281.

80). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16694, f. 109; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 48 - 49.

81). B.L., Letter Book of John Calcraft, Add Ms 17493, f. 22.

82). E.M. Lloyd, loc. cit., 466-68; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16518, f. 147; Ms 16694, f. 115; B.L., Letter Book of John Calcraft, Add Ms 17493, f. 24.

83). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms, 32870, f. 58.

84). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35447, f. 303.

85). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32870, ff. 21, 25.

86). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16519, f. 24, 25, 107; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 86-87; D.H., Loudon Papers, A/972, f. 21. For evidence on Lord John Murray's political

position see chapter on Breadalbane estate and, L. Namier & J. Brooke (eds.), vol. 3, 186-7.

87). B.L. Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32870, f. 58, 72; P.C. Yorke (ed.), *The Life & Correspondence of Philip Yorke Lord Chancellor Hardwicke*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1913), 29.

88). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16693, f. 127, D. H., Loudon Papers, A/972, f. 6; A/966, unnumbered folio dated 11 December 1755.

89). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1461, f. 201.

90). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16519, f. 71.

91). J.C.D. Clark, loc. cit., 336-338, 419, 423 - 426; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32997, f. 148, 113.

92). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16519, f. 40; Ms 17505, f. 151.

93). P.R.O., W.O. 1/978, f. 71; WO. 1/977, f. 98.

94). S.R.O., R.H. 2/8/102. The number of officers is conservative, and based on those listed in the Army list within certain corps until early 1761. The numbers are based on the documented fact that Argyll controlled appointments to the 77th, 78th and 88th regiments. He was also responsible for appointing the later, though not necessarily the earlier pre 1760, officers for Murray Keith's 87th. Until the autumn 1759, the original officers had been intended as additional for the 42nd, before they were constituted into a regiment under Argyll's patronage. Thus he was able to appoint pensioned officers like James Campbell brother of Archibald Campbell Ardkinglass in the 87th. It does not include any officers appointed to the 42nd, which Argyll certainly was able to do as in the case of Alexander Grant of Dalrechnie's son in April 1756; N.L.S., Ms 16696, f. 22. Total pay based on number of differing ranks and their official pay as illustrated in Army List. See, M.L., Annual British Army List 1740-1784; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16519, f. 27; Ms 16696, f. 22; Ms 16708, f. 201; Ms 16714, f. 81; Ms 16717, f. 51.

95). For detailed evidence on the use of John, third Earl of Breadalbane in argathelian recruiting see chapter six. N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16713, f. 18; Ms 16714, f. 81; Ms 16717, f. 51; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 33047, f. 285; D.H., Loudon Papers, A/993, f. 2.

96). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16717, f. 36; D.H., Loudon Papers, A/966, unnumbered folio, dated 29 March 1760 (offer of Keppoch's); A/992, f. 2. To illustrate the case of relative ease with which Highland regiments were raised compared to Lowland: D.H., Loudon Papers, A/993, ff. 8, 9 & 16.

97) B.A.M., Box 47/1346.

98). A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 124-5.

Chapter Two

Recruiting , Social Control and the Issue of Law & Order 1739 - 85

Perceptions of the Scottish Highlands as an area characterised by social disorder were a constant feature of attitudes within early modern Scottish and post union governments. Recent studies of the later seventeenth century have highlighted the trend whereby these perceptions of disorder were manipulated and consciously fostered by successive administrations more concerned with the intricacies of national politics than any objective reality on the ground. ¹ This theme is just as relevant in the eighteenth century, when the political packaging of real and perceived disorder in the Highlands was used as a pretext by government to impose military policies on the region. As in the seventeenth century these military developments were related to the exigencies of national policy rather than the realities of law and order.

The use of the issue of disorder to raise units of Highlanders in the years prior to 1745, is best examined against a backdrop of government policies which did not recognise Highland law and order as of vital importance. This was due to the wider situation in Scotland whereby all military activity was increasingly inserted into a British framework, with a corresponding decline in traditional military outlets such as service in the Swedish, Prussian, and above all the French army. Only the Scots-Dutch brigade, a force acceptable to the authorities because it represented an anti-French institution continued to recruit in a meaningful way within Scotland. In place of the old outlets arose an embryonic strategy of reconciling disaffected elements within the Highlands by opening up the patronage of the British army. This suggests that instead of focusing on problems supposedly unique to the area, central government was a key element in the quickening integration of the Highlands. While recruiting could be de facto policing in that it began a process of removing those whom government perceived as trouble-makers, it is significant in another respect. The plans for mobilising Highland manpower for foreign service did, in fact, originate from within Scotland, and its adoption would seem to illustrate co-operation at both the locality and the centre. However, the new recruiting structure was not implemented in a way that was acceptable to local government or, indeed, based on the proposals originally suggested. Instead, the creation of a British-Highland military represents the clearest division between initiatives from central government and its simultaneous failure to attempt implementation of local government proposals on law and order. ²

This chapter will suggest that in the post Culloden Highlands, the continuing use of law and order rhetoric contrasted with the reality of successive government policies like the Impress Acts which actually created social disorder and crime. The implementation of such legislation was the responsibility of the local landed gentry. After Culloden, the assumption is that with the extinction of Jacobitism as a seriously divisive element in Scottish politics, this landed elite united with central government through the bond of common interests. Their enthusiastic promotion of such military measures being seen as highly symptomatic of their new relationship with Westminster. While this scenario is generally correct, more notice should be given to the realities of legislative and regimental recruiting, which could benefit landlords in the main, but also put strain upon the local community, and conflict with the best interests of the elite. These inherent contradictions within crown policy, whereby the Scottish gentry were requested to implement policies not necessarily to their economic advantage, demonstrate the extent to which government retained surprising influence and weight in light of the national embarrassment of 1745.

The Highlands and Pre-Culloden disorder

The characteristics of Highland disorder are well enough documented, and are in little need of expansion. However, beneath the generalisations there did appear to be a genuine problem. The armed and group nature of Highland crime was the major perceived difference with the Lowlands, and once allied in the mind of government to the reality of political disaffection, the problem was altered from that of simply group felony, to a matter of national security.

That is not to say that the Highlands were alone in producing severe and destabilising disorder. The Porteous riot of 1736 in Edinburgh demonstrated a more infamous example of Lowland mobbing which had serious political implications for the country as a whole. Social disorder could vary in geography, scope and intensity. In 1734, Stirling experienced a full scale riot during which the incumbent M.P., Sir James Campbell of Ardkinglass was badly wounded, while in another case, industrial relations and employers' attempts to keep wages artificially low, provided the catalyst for rioting of weavers in Leith in 1742. More specifically with regard to the presence of the military, evidence suggests that they were often an exacerbating rather than a calming influence. In early March 1743, while a crowd attacked a customs house in Banff, soldiers opened fire without judicial consent, killing one man and producing in turn a clamour for the removal of the military. In early March 1742, army officers arresting an alleged deserter in Stirling sparked a full scale riot - evidence that soldiers could cause disorder rather than halt it.³

As to the Highlands, the debate in Edinburgh from the 1720s until the Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1747, focused on the nature of justice in the area. With the discourse dominated by the legal elite, the whole argument centred on devolved and ad hoc judicial procedures which were heavily criticised, as was the general concept of the substitution of clan instead of crown government. The emphasis which legal circles created, was on the comprehensive and regular use of crown justice through its representatives the Sheriffs, rather than on private, and thus biased justice. Indeed, prior to 1747, before self-interest and national politics promoted the opposite view, Archibald Campbell, Earl of Ilay, and subsequently third Duke of Argyll, argued that it was lack of access to impartial state justice which was responsible for conditions in the region. He noted;

The Highlands can never be civilised so long as any person is tolerated in the giving public defiance to the courts of law, and the difficulties that attends the execution of the processes of the law in the Highlands seems to be the very essence of their barbarity. ⁴

The debate over Highland disorder in the 1720s and 1730s was not merely the result of the lawyer elite in Edinburgh wishing to ensure their extended control of legal transactions in the north. From the point of view of Highland gentry, the continuing growth and profitability of the black cattle trade made law and order a vital issue - even more so when prices were sure to rise in wartime to feed an enlarged navy. Law and order was thus more important in the region in time of hostilities, than in time of peace. However, against this backdrop was the reality that much of the perception of Highland disorder was promoted by rival local interests who used the rhetoric and concerns regarding the region to buttress their position in Edinburgh. A fine example of this is a series of incidents in Ross-shire in June to September 1739. The county as a whole was characterised by conflicting political blocs of Mackenzies on the one hand, and an alliance of Rosses and Munros on the other.

In the early summer of 1739, Alexander Mackenzie of Coul seized cattle belonging to Ross of Balnagown which had allegedly strayed onto Mackenzie land in Glenduchrae. Ross of Pitcalnie as Sheriff-Depute of the county, together with Captain George Munro of Culcairn, issued warrants for the arrest of several Mackenzies as a result. ⁵ An armed party of fifty Rosses entered Coul's estate, arrested two men and recovered thirty cattle - reportedly stolen. Mackenzie attempted legal restitution by obtaining the arrest of Balnagown's factor. However, the partiality of the Sheriff-Deputes in the Ross and Munro interest meant that getting a warrant had proven difficult. Eventually Mackenzie of Davochmaluch gave the required notice, and an armed party of Mackenzies entered the Strathconan estates of Balnagown to search for both the cattle and the alleged thieves. The result was an appeal to

Edinburgh by the Ross interest which couched the incident in terms more likely to get a positive response from the legal establishment in the south. Alexander Mackenzie of Coull was accused of sedition, and convening 200-300 men armed with Spanish weapons and intent on acting against the national interest. That the charge was accepted, and Mackenzie and several others arraigned at the Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh, demonstrates how conceptions of law and order problems in the Highlands could be used and manipulated for political ends. That the Mackenzie's were acting outside the law is undoubtedly correct, that they were acting as the spearhead of an invasion was fanciful given that Spain had not entered into hostilities with Britain. The episode, however distorted, was important because it served merely to reinforce perceptions at the centre of social and political disorder in the region. ⁶

As a result of similar reports in the 1720s, six, then ten independent companies had been established to police the Highlands, which they did from the mid 1720s until March 1743. These companies, while flexible and able to target certain areas, were, in reality, curative rather than preventative. James Murray, second Duke of Atholl discovered that lengthy legal applications had to be made before they could be moved into any area to arrest thieves. In May 1742, his commissioner, Thomas Bisset, informed him that troops would, under no circumstances, move into Rannoch to arrest the Macgregors that Atholl had accused of cattle thieving. Bisset informed his employer that the only solution was to apply to Lieutenant-General Jasper Clayton, Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Scotland. Even more disturbing than this time consuming inconvenience, was the rumour that the soldiers and officers of the company of Colquhoun Grant were, in fact, biased towards the Rannoch Macgregors due to traditional kin association. To this problem was added the fact that troops could be stationed in places certain proprietors found more useful than others. A detachment under Lieutenant James Campbell stationed at Bridge of Tay for instance, was of more use to John Campbell, second Earl of Breadalbane than to the second Duke of Atholl. ⁷

While still within the Highlands, the companies' duties were never wholly based on a law and order remit, though their existence had been justified officially on this point. Political policing was just as important. In early January 1741, Lieutenant General Joshua Guest, ordered that sections of the Grant company be billeted on the estate of Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, and the area well protected. This was to illustrate to the Fraser chief that, despite the loss of his company, the government did not wish to alienate him completely. It also had the added benefit of maintaining the armed presence of the crown within the property of a potential enemy, acting as either a threat or a high profile advert for the potential benefits of remaining loyal to the Hanoverians. Indeed, it was within the field of patronage that the real

importance of the companies lay, and chapter one argues that they should be viewed as part of a general plan for creating common interests between Highland landlords and government.⁸

However, as a police and military force they were simply too small to guard the Highlands effectively. The presence of British military troops, as in Stirling, simply did not result in an automatic improvement in local disorder. In late July 1742, after sustaining repeated losses of cattle, Kintail tenantry appealed to Ross-shire J.P.s for military assistance. The tenantry involved armed themselves, and with the sanctioned support of a detachment of six company soldiers, entered the Locharkaig lands of Cameron of Glendessary, where they suspected the cattle had been driven. However, with only six soldiers present, the Camerons easily beat up and severely wounded civilian members of the party. Without official military support, the aggrieved Kintail tenantry would not have considered such a bold policy. However, the number of soldiers was simply too small to influence conditions on the ground. The incident merely served to heighten local feelings, and as a further result of the expedition by the Kintail men, a servant appointed to guard Mackenzie of Fairburn's cattle was murdered in a revenge raid. In truth, military intervention, even on such a small scale, merely exacerbated local attitudes, and the whole affair illustrates how disruptive the presence of external military forces could be on traditional local relationships.⁹

A further example of this trend is the biased use of crown soldiers in the political contest within Ross-shire. The 1740 election for Provost of Dingwall was between the Mackenzie and Munro interest. Sir Robert Munro was Lieutenant-Colonel of the now regimented companies, and Munro of Culcairn a captain. In October 1740, the Munros used the legitimacy of warrants issued by three allied J.P.'s, as well as the physical presence of their soldiers, to arrest Mackenzie members of the town council. The result of this electoral violence, involving soldiers of the crown, was a fight with armed Mackenzies and the death of two people.¹⁰ While the independent companies have been cited as an example of government concern for the problems of Highland disorder, as well as evidence of the crown's increasing dislike of using clanship as its local agent, these army units also helped to institutionalise, and in certain cases, legitimise continuing violence.¹¹

The weakness of these crown levies has tended to be ignored or understated. The reality was that disorder continued while they were still in the region. Much of their reputation was created when, in the early autumn of 1742, rumours spread that they were to be withdrawn south. On 12 August 1742, John Hay, Marquis of Tweeddale, the Secretary of State for Scotland, reported to Robert Graigie, the Lord Advocate, that he had been besieged by memorials concerning depredations in the Highlands. He had earlier ordered Lieutenant

General Clayton to meet with interested parties and discuss alternative schemes to control and police the region. This is what produced the spate of memorials, as in the case of Alexander Mackenzie of Coul who, on 1 September 1742, portrayed to Tweeddale a particularly vivid picture of armed "loose men" terrorising the countryside, even when the military was present. Alexander Mackenzie's report is interesting in that he had developed a reputation in government circles as a whig, and was probably hoping that by highlighting the situation he would be awarded with some domestic military commission to combat the Ross - Munro interest. (As a realistic whig alternative to the Ross/Munro pact in Ross-shire, this could explain why the latter faction had already tried in 1739 to damage Mackenzie of Coul's political reputation). All that these reports achieved was an artificial feeling of heightened levels of violence. Thus it can be argued that the reputation for uniquely high levels of violence which characterised the immediate pre-Culloden Highlands, was, in fact, partly sustained by the more practical concerns to both retain and expand patronage opportunities in the Hanoverian military.¹²

Lieutenant-General Clayton was more reasoned in his conclusions concerning the companies. While informing the Lord Advocate in late August 1742 of the decision to keep the men in the Highlands, Clayton stated that until new parliamentary legislation effectively banning weapons was brought in, soldiers of the crown, Highland or non-Highland, would make very little impact. The subsequent failure to implement legislation for reform in the Highlands was the direct result of a wider political paralysis within Scotland. The inability to construct disarming laws contrasts with the emergence of new companies in 1745, and more especially of the second Highland regiment in May of that year, demonstrating the contradictions between government rhetoric and inaction on the issue of disorder.¹³

The apathetic approach of central government to the question of law and order highlights its different agenda from that of local government. It is important here to sharply divide the differing realms of military as opposed to law and order policies. Within the former, central government's approach was neither inhibited nor dilatory. An illustrative example of this attitude is the case of Lieutenant Robert Cameron who, in July 1742, was arrested on suspicion of recruiting for the French army. In a later letter, Tweeddale informed Lord Advocate Graigie that despite being informed of worries over disorder in the Highlands, the King had been more anxious to see progress in the prosecution of Lieutenant Cameron. This prioritising of military affairs was likewise evident in the case of Sergeant Alexander Gordon, brother to Gordon of Buckie, who had recruited for the Prussian army. Meanwhile, in October 1743, Lord President Duncan Forbes, who hoped to realign himself with the new third Duke of Argyll, refused to co-operate with the *Squadron* appointed Lord Advocate Robert Graigie. Thus from issues ranging from heightening duty on tea (to

stimulate beer consumption and strengthen the revenue from the brewing tax), to the Highlands, there continued to be little progress on important government objectives. Conversely, the King demanded, and achieved, immediate legal procedures against Sergeant Gordon. In May 1743, Clayton re-deployed his few troops within Scotland to prevent Highland disorder becoming acute as a result of the Highland regiment's withdrawal from Scotland. When the battalion mutinied and over 100 armed deserters headed towards Scotland, the troops were re-deployed again to cut the erstwhile soldiers off from the region. While Tweeddale suggested that stopping the men would ensure no adverse consequences for law and order in the region, it also prevented efficient policing. It was thus, on the whole, the purely military aspects of the region which worried the highest levels of government in Britain, rather than the peripheral problems of law and order.¹⁴

The war against Spain and then France added to this demarcation in priorities. The hostile footing of the country allowed a greater atmosphere of coercion to operate in the Highlands and, indeed, within Britain as a whole. As early as January 1741, rumours spread of "a press for soldiers to follow the like has not happened since creation." In March 1744, an Impress Act was passed by parliament. Commissioners of Supply, local heritors and J.P.'s were ordered to meet and appoint out of their number commissioners to enforce the Act. The meetings for North of the Tay were to take place on 10 April 1744, with the first parish search to be completed by the 24th of the same month. In reality, it was not expected to gain many men. Within Scotland from 10 April until 26 May, only 92 men were conscripted. (See Appendix nine). Moreover, military officers, unsure of their legal status and position, were wary of uplifting men under the stipulations of the Act - a sentiment reinforced when, in late June 1744, the case of a pressed recruit from Stirling-shire witnessed the commissioners of that county having to defend themselves in the Court of Justiciary. The returns for the 1744 Act show that a mere ten men were recruited for the Highland regiment. Ineffectual searches were attempted in Elgin, Inverness and Perth, with large counties such as Perthshire being untouched due to J.P. antipathy (See Appendix nine). However, the 1744 and 1745 Acts did demonstrate the government's increasingly comprehensive attempts at conscription policies, and should be viewed as part of the more general policy of utilising all Scottish sources of manpower.¹⁵

The traditional view of the failure by government within the Highlands must, therefore, be qualified with the military initiatives taken by central government in the period 1739-1745. The upshot of these military priorities was the opposite scenario from what has been suggested by some commentators regarding Hanoverian policy for the Highlands. The established argument is that, in the years prior to 1745, establishment circles increasingly demonstrated a theoretical dislike of using the clans as devices of government. Divisions

are indeed evident as to how far the state would, or would not, sanction a maintenance of clan methods. As a form of internal military defence, commentators are correct in arguing that central government exhibited no enthusiasm for clanship. Nevertheless, this theoretical stand-point has to be placed against the wider military policies of the government. In February 1744, an invasion scare witnessed the contradictions in the crown's national and local policies come home to roost. Lieutenant-General Joshua Guest received orders to halt the drafts of newly raised men from Scotland to Flanders. Meanwhile, the government, faced with a military as opposed to a law and order threat in the Highlands, seriously debated methods to police and garrison the region. Lord President Forbes returned to his old scheme of a permanently established Highland regiment as the best possible solution. Forbes went as far as to suggest that, in the short term, to combat the strategic military threat, the mobilising power of local association and tacksmen was the best alternative - but only on the express understanding of clan mobilisation as a temporary expedient. Dundas pointed out to Tweeddale; " I know not whether you have any thoughts of arming any men in the Highlands, but I do not think the President's scheme bad. " ¹⁶

Thus, the traditional picture of absolute hostility between the Hanoverians and the local power of clanship should be qualified. The prospect of arming the clans for law and order purposes was, in fact, seriously debated within Scottish government in early 1744. However, the Carteret/Pelham administration remained true to the principles of putting foreign policy first. Rather than arm trusted clans, it was hoped that military defeat for Spain and France would result in the Highlands remaining passive by default - a decision which insured that the British-Highland military rather than clanship became the preferred policy. Nevertheless, while local associations and kin interest continued to be disliked theoretically, government did not actively discourage their use within certain areas. London understood that its military and law and order policies for the Highlands were incompatible in certain respects. To compensate for the damage Westminster suspected it would inflict on the drive to prevent crime in the Highlands, government, in the years immediately prior to Culloden, allowed a return to the use of clans to prevent criminal disorder, while it developed its policies by creating a British-Highland military.

This trend of retaining clanship can be illustrated by Tweeddale's response to Lord Advocate Graigie's anxieties concerning the certain loss of the Highland regiment in August 1742. The Scottish Secretary stated that, given the withdrawal of the armed presence of the crown from the Highlands, legislation on disarming was worthless in its present form. He continued;

It is confidently asserted here that they, [disaffected clans], are now better armed than ever and I know there was a new Bill prepared and intended to have been brought in last session of Parliament for disarming the Highlands, which I, with some difficulty prevented. I must acknowledge I have not observed any good effects from the previous two bills for disarming that country. ¹⁷

The fact that central government figures had been actively involved in preventing disarming legislation again reveals how the relationship between pre-Culloden London administrations and clanship has been over simplified. In the face of overriding foreign policy concerns, the desire to break the local power of clanship was qualified in order that its influence could be used to sustain some Hanoverian influence in the region. Thus Tweeddale believed another disarming bill would be attempted, and urged Graigie to turn his thoughts to alternatives. Thus central British government retained and even encouraged the most reprehensible aspects of clanship. This was in preference to the greater evil of losing masses of manpower in an attempt to enforce efficient, comprehensive disarming.

This background explains the attitudes of leading government figures when, in October 1743, they were informed of the rumour that 500 stand of arms had entered the Island of Skye. The Solicitor-General for Scotland, Robert Dundas of Arniston was not upset, merely stating that the arms were for local use; " I do not believe with any intention against the government, but really to defend themselves. " Earlier in March 1743, Dundas had corresponded with Tweeddale on the administration's response to the loss of the Highland Regiment. As in August of the preceding year, earlier methods of using chiefs as agents of the government were discussed. In May and June, both Graigie and Dundas stated that the offers of service to prevent thieving could be taken up as long as it was insured that commissions went to small lairds who would make it their business to commit a reasonable amount of time and effort to the affair. Secondly, Dundas stated that such lairds, upon a small payment from government, needed to find security to repay those who lost property under their protection. He added that such a system had been implemented in the region by the *Squadron* administration of the first Duke of Roxburghe prior to 1725. ¹⁸

The government alternatives to disarming, therefore, relied upon previous ad-hoc clan methods. In 1742, Lieutenant-General Clayton encouraged James Murray, second Duke of Atholl, to adopt methods of preventing depredations. In February 1744, Tweeddale thanked Cosmo Gordon, third Duke of Gordon for his protestations of loyalty, and asked that he use his interest to ensure the peace of the area. The renewal of local interest and association as a means to control the Highlands was not confined to the fringes of the region, or to vague notions of magnate authority. Locally, more determined efforts were naturally apparent.

Colin Campbell of Glenure was informed by a relation that the third Duke of Argyll would be foolish not to join with Campbell tenantry in Glenshira and Glenorchy in forming companies of their own. The estate alterations by John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll, had dented the status of his tacksmen, and the renewal of traditional roles would have made this idea popular by appeasing the middle elite who had probably been lack-lustre in their defence of Argyll's property.¹⁹

However, it can be argued that the unusual nature of events within the Argyll estate made it different from general conditions in the Highlands. There is, however, evidence that this was not the case. In May 1742, John Campbell, second Earl of Breadalbane had in fact eschewed the deployment of a private watch as a result of the proximity of government troops. Instead, Breadalbane intended to levy a cess of one shilling or one shilling six pence per merkland to create a fund for financing prosecutions made possible by the apprehension of thieves by troops. This shows there could, indeed, be a move towards the justice of the crown as opposed to traditional methods. However, by July 1744, circumstances had changed. John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, informed Lord Chancellor Hardwicke that the area of Breadalbane desperately needed an independent company. Rather than any positive response, he was forced to deploy his own men who seemed, in turn, to be implicated in cattle thieving against local Macintyre gentry.²⁰

The failure of the crown within the sphere of law enforcement was also evident in Atholl. Throughout 1741, due to the lack of troops, the second Duke of Atholl employed Donald Robertson of Blairpheatie as manager of a private watch. Blairpheatie's watch was expensive - one crown per merkland. For financial and political reasons the Robertson lairds of Fascally and Strowan refused to join. By October 1741, they had nominated Aeneas Macdonnell, laird of Lochgarry, who promised a cheaper rate than Blairpheatie. Lochgarrie was duly given permission to deploy a watch. However, by June 1743, Duncan Robertson of Strowan had complained to Atholl that despite organising an efficient watch, Lochgarrie had lost command. Robert Graham of Fintry informed Strowan that the Duke had not intended to humiliate either Macdonnell or him. Graham continued by pointing out that few of the lairds believed the watch had been successful. The eventual deployment of a detachment of Lord Sempill's regiment into Rannoch had convinced the Duke of Atholl that as the crown now policed the region, there was no need for any private watch. With the subsequent deployment of the regiment in Flanders, Fintry informed Strowan that the Duke now needed a watch re-established in Atholl, and hoped for co-operation from all local lairds and interests. The case scenario of Atholl was also evident in Inverness-shire, where the western fringes of Sir James Grant's estate had, in the period from 1742-1744, lost 100 cows, 70 horses and 300 sheep. Earlier, in January 1743, Coll Macdonnell of Barrisdale had

asked for money to deploy men in a Watch. In response, an estate officer observed this potential arrangement as; "..... no small hardship that we should be obliged to pay any man such a sum for keeping his thieves at home when you can get 30 or 40 of Lord Sempill's men for the asking. " This clearly demonstrates the alternative between the presence of the crown or clan methods.²¹ Perthshire, Inverness-shire and Argyll were not the only areas to see renewed clan methods for maintaining law and order. In May 1745, the Commissioners of Supply for the county of Sutherland raised £ 180 from heritors to pay a private watch to guard the passes of Corriecainloch, the east end of Lochshin and the Kyle of Sutherland. Simultaneously, John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudon, was raising 1100 men for service in Flanders. These two incidents clearly illustrate the divergence between the progress of central government's military policies, and the failure of crown sponsored law and order structures.²²

Even more ambitious than the efforts of the Sutherland commissioners, was that of Ewan Macpherson of Cluny. By May 1744, Macpherson was aware that many proprietors believed his estate lay on the route used by thieves driving stolen cattle to the markets at Elgin and Keith. Cluny offered to commence a private watch of seven men to guard against thieving, and to repay persons who suffered losses while under his protection. Despite an obvious scenario of blackmail, contracts were drawn up with the tenants and landlords of the estates of Airlie, Invercauld and Culloden. In May 1745, a similar plan seemed doomed to failure in Moray and Elgin due to the withdrawal of subscriptions by certain lairds who viewed the additional companies being raised for the Highland Regiment as an alternative. Robert Gordon of Gordonstoun wrote to James Grant of Rothiemurchus, stating that Cluny should be approached and heritors like Rose of Kilvoriack and Campbell of Calder persuaded to join the plan. Gordonstoun wrote that, " I cannot help that the government do not interpose in such a manner as I could wish. " As a result, he was gratified that Cluny's watch had been successful. This essentially private clan arrangement was so welcome locally, that even given the rumours of three additional companies, Norman Macleod of Dunvegan informed Cluny that a request to government to subsidise his watch was not altogether out of the question. Indeed, given the earlier discussions between Dundas, Graigie and Tweeddale on that subject, the notion was hardly fanciful. Macleod added cautiously that government would want a watch scheme systematically erected for the whole area and regulated by legislation, suggesting that some lairds believed methods of clanship could be entrenched by new laws.²³

The Indian summer in traditional clan methods for keeping the peace had thus become generalised across the Highlands - from Sutherland, through western and eastern Inverness-shire, to Atholl and Argyll. It is a measure of the contradictions within crown policy in the

Highlands, that while foreign service in the British army helped to generate common interests and integrate the region into the United Kingdom, this policy also generated a revival in the clan based security measures that were so disliked in London and Edinburgh.

The Post Culloden Highlands

Problems of law and order in the period immediately following Culloden ought not to have seemed overly important. The area was flooded with thousands of troops, and given the climate induced by the Duke of Cumberland's short stay within Scotland, it is reasonable to suppose that criminals would not have constituted much of a problem. The reality was that public policy at both central and local level was still at odds. The war with Spain and France was still the overwhelming priority, and troops in the region were quickly ordered abroad. As part of this strategy, and to drain manpower from the region, the independent companies and Argyll militia were disbanded, and the men encouraged to join the re-established Highland battalion of the Earl of Loudon. This strategy was not welcomed by local gentry. In Ross-shire, the local Mackenzie lairds of Belmaduthie and Redcastle actively suggested the re-arming of tenantry as the only response to heightened levels of thieving. By August 1749, Redcastle had lost twenty three cows in one week - enough to make even the Lowland based lawyer John Mackenzie of Delvine considered the re-arming option. Likewise, in early August 1746, Campbell of Duntroon complained to General John Campbell of Mamore concerning the massive cost to him of maintaining his military company. However, both Mamore and Archibald Campbell of Stonefield agreed that efforts had to be made to keep some form of local police. It was felt that given the prominent role of the county of Argyll and Campbell gentry in particular in supporting the Hanoverians, revenge thieving by rebels would be severe. Thus, those like Duntroon would, once the thieving started, be glad of the retention of four companies of militia which Mamore and Stonefield intended petitioning for. A majority of Campbell gentry signed the subsequent request, which, not surprisingly in the post Culloden climate, failed to achieve its aim.²⁴

The period from 1747-1760, is characterised by increasing government involvement in the region, and attempts to rectify the structural problems inherent in Highland justice. Beyond the high profile legislation passed in the aftermath of the Forty Five, attempts were made to enforce the rule of crown appointed sheriffs in even the most inaccessible districts, and to insure that the new personnel of the judiciary co-operated with the military. Efforts were also made to ensure that the personnel profile of the Justices of the Peace was depoliticised, while discussions commenced on the introduction of regular fees to encourage active membership. Certainly in 1754, the government promised large sums for payment to judicial personnel engaged in the active prosecution of thieves in the Highlands.²⁵

It is important to note the symbiotic relationship between the military and the judiciary. Indeed, Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, governor of Edinburgh castle, and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Scotland in the mid 1750s, was noted for his efforts in this area. From 1752 onwards, Bland highlighted the non-existent nature of justice within the Long Island. In the summer of 1752, it was a party of 150 soldiers who reported to the authorities the complete lack of courts within the Island, and the partiality of the one and only Sheriff-Substitute. In Harris, the position of Donald Macleod, the judicial representative, was considered a reproach to regular justice. The result was the dismissal of Macleod and the appointment of George Mackenzie in a new judicial post in Lewis. Bland believed that a permanent garrison needed to be established on the Islands of Lewis and Harris, and that for the crown's justice to succeed, the newly appointed personnel needed the presence of the military to assist them. As it was, the army insured that the Long Island experienced an annual visit from detachments who stayed as long as possible before returning in the winter with men convicted, or suspected, of law-breaking.²⁶

The spread of the military into localities was facilitated by the often precarious fiscal position of the Scottish Commissioners of Supply. The Highland counties were conspicuous in their incidents of military quartering, sustaining 37.1% of all such orders for the period 1730 - 1750. In the years running up to the beginning of the Seven Years War from 1750-1755, the Highland counties received 30.2% of orders for military quartering. The shires had suffered a build up of arrears partly due to the disruption of 1745, and they were undoubtedly slow to recover their arrears of cess. This in turn allowed the government greater lee way in quartering military detachments. This can be illustrated in the petition of Pyrse Campbell, M.P. for Inverness-shire. In November 1756, he complained that sections of Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther's regiment, then domiciled in Badenoch, were, in fact, imposed upon the county illegally. Lieutenant-General George Beauclerk the new Commander-in-Chief freely admitted this was the case. The imposition of troops was, in fact, an effort to broaden the recruiting basin of regiments within Scotland - a policy confirmed by Beauclerk's request to Lord William Barrington, the Secretary of War, asking him to write to Campbell for his acquiescence in the affair.²⁷

As the military extended its presence into almost every locality, abuses were bound to occur. It should be noted that the initiative in this period lay with central government. Despite obvious benefits to local proprietors in the form of protection, troops were posted at the behest of government, not at the request of landlords. An atmosphere of subtle coercion existed whereby troops were ordered onto estates and landlords asked to insure they were accommodated. In August 1752, Lieutenant-General George Churchill informed agents for the Duke of Gordon that troops were moving onto the Duke's estate in

Lochaber, and that fitting accommodation was to be prepared. He concluded the letter by stating that his aim was " to shew the thieves and their abettors, that it is not government alone [that] is keen in putting an end to a vice so highly detrimental. " ²⁸

Even the Duke of Argyll came under pressure. On 23 September 1754, Lieutenant-General Bland, a hostile political opponent, wrote to the Duke informing him that thieving on Mull was all but an indigenous industry. He added that as two thirds of the Island belonged to the Duke, the matter of thieving ought to involve him. He noted in a condescending sentence; " I am persuaded that your Grace has hitherto been unacquainted with the real situation of this part of your estate. " He offered to wait and hear Argyll's response before telling the Duke of Cumberland. Given the Campbell Duke's political position, this was an ominous threat, and illustrates the on going political use of Highland disorder, real or otherwise. ²⁹

Again in 1754, government in both Edinburgh and London became concerned at the education of James Macdonald, son of the deceased Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat. It was feared that the education he would receive in Scotland from his mother, Lady Margaret Macdonald, would make him politically suspect. In reply to continual requests for her son to be educated in England, Lady Margaret complained that the debts on the estate would not allow her the expense of an English education. The impasse was broken by Lieutenant-General Bland who ordered fifty troops onto Macdonald's estate on Skye to search for weapons. Bland told Lady Margaret that anybody found with weapons would be subjected to full judicial punishment - conveniently for the military this would involve the convicted being ordered into military service. However, if she agreed to Sir James being educated in England, he would ensure all charges against her Skye tenantry would be waived, and the troops removed. Such blatant blackmail, which Bland openly admitted, represents the use to which the large British military presence in the Highlands was put to. ³⁰

Against this backdrop of an encroaching army presence, was an almost constant call from the locality for armed companies of Highland troops. On 3 July 1749 (probably in response to pressure from middle Campbell gentry such as Colin Campbell of Glenure) John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, wrote to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke criticising the use of regular troops in the Highlands. He stated that native soldiers would have apprehended the Jacobite fugitive Ewan Macpherson of Cluny, and reduced the extensive thieving prevalent in the region - something regular troops seemed unable to do. ³¹ There is evidence to suggest that regular troops were generally believed to be ineffective in their attempts to stamp out thieving. On 26 March 1754, Lieutenant-General Bland wrote to Archibald Campbell of Stonefield, Sheriff-Depute of Argyll. Bland informed him that magistrates were

not to expect military officers to play a prominent role in detecting thieves. This was as a result of their being both ignorant of the region and judicial procedure in Scotland.³²

Recruiting Strategies: Conscription and Local Interest 1755-1785

It has been noted when examining the administration of Scotland in the mid eighteenth century, that the Seven Years War represented a watershed in Scottish politics. The gentry united behind a war effort which was truly British in character. The desire to atone for high profile tendencies towards disloyalty, and to destroy negative English perceptions of Scotland, made the country's gentry surpass themselves in order to complement the British military effort. The period of the American Revolutionary War has likewise been portrayed as an alliance of gentry with central government in the sphere of military recruiting. Given the conflict was a rebellion against the position of King and Parliament, there is little doubt that it had a significant and loaded impact on a society consciously aware of its track record in that particular activity. During the 1775-83 war effort, the relative lack of direct central government coercion, which had been evident in the earlier conflict of 1755-63, is worthy of notice. Conscription acts, while attempted in both wars, were significantly lacking in both scope and apparent success in the late 1770s. Allied to this structural difference, is the argument that some of the consequences arising from these respective war efforts conflicted with or undermined existing law and order policies. That aspects of these international wars, and more specifically military recruiting, proved detrimental to the locality was, undoubtedly, an unintended and regretted by-product of government policy. Moreover, the absence, or relatively muted nature of opposition to military activity is testimony to the extent of Highland integration, as well as the apparent lack of a viable alternative to heavy recruiting strategies. Above all, it demonstrates the continuing ability of the government to co-operate with and influence the gentry of the region.³³

In October 1755, as a result of the international situation, the British war machine expanded with ten battalions being added to the army. From as early as March 1755, the British government had embarked upon a policy of pressing for men to increase the size of its existing armed forces. In that month, twenty men per company were added to the army establishment. The result was that central government influence in Highland localities dramatically increased. In April 1755, Mungo Campbell, factor on the forfeited estates of Callert and Locheil, informed Lord Milton that George Douglas, Sheriff-Substitute in Fort William had received orders to press suitable men into the garrison regiment. Fort William was chosen because military officers were already present to receive the men. On 9 March 1756, a conscription act was passed in parliament. It was revised in late 1756, and implemented comprehensively across Scotland for three successive years. It involved co-

operation with civilian commissioners chosen from local gentry, who, after due legal process, passed men to military officers for conscription into designated battalions. ³⁴

As early as the 1720s and the era of General Wade, it had been noted with alarm in some circles that any increase in the physical size of the army in the Highlands would result in government finding it easier to force men into the military. The spread of a permanent or semi-permanent British army presence into isolated areas like the Western Isles, Morar and Knoydart for judicial reasons in the late 1740s-1750s, now represented an important development within the purely military field. As public policy now moved towards recruiting by conscription, the local government framework was in place within the Highlands to complement the military agenda of Westminster. ³⁵

In March 1756, when the first national recruiting drive was ordered, Lieutenant-General Bland wrote to Lord Barrington asking that he, in turn, write to all Scottish M.P.s requesting them to recommend the Impress Act to their major constituents. Bland added;

I may venture to assure you that the success of it, will in great measure depend on the countenance it meets with from the people of distinction in this country. ³⁶

The situation is thus characterised by co-operation through a belief in shared and common interests, rather than in any form of overt coercion. In April 1756, Captain Aeneas Macintosh of the 42nd Highland Regiment, wrote to his commanding officer, John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudon, new Commander-in-Chief of all British forces in North America. He informed his superior that at a meeting with gentlemen of the county of Inverness at Corrieborough in the Urquhart area, he had been surprised at how eager they were to give assistance and efficiently execute the Act. Indeed, so zealous were the gentry and burgh of Inverness-shire, that they had levied for an additional bounty over and above the normal levy money. This demonstration of additional patriotism became generalised across Scotland. In an effort to implement the Act there is no doubt that legality was, if not ignored, then certainly stretched. By July 1756, it was evident that approximately 100 soldiers had, without correct legal sanction, pressed 45 people from the town of Perth. The failure of civilian magistrates to deal effectively with the ensuing outcry produced a somewhat bemused and smug reaction amongst English politicians, and merely confirmed their perceptions that the state of justice within Scotland was as dismal as ever. ³⁷

The failure of the spring Impress Act was noted when, in response to foreign policy changes brought about by the administration of William Pitt the Elder, a new Act was levied for Scotland in November 1756. Another fifteen battalions were ordered to be raised, with

Scotland being responsible for three - or 1830 men. It was hoped by Lord George Beauclerk, the new Commander-in-Chief for Scotland that second battalions could be added to the 19th, 31st and 32nd regiments. Beauclerk had sufficient reason to be optimistic, as Scotland was now in an advantageous position to levy a national muster by conscription. In 1755, the Lord Advocate Robert Dundas had sponsored the Rev. Alexander Webster to complete a national census which, Chancellor Hardwicke believed, would " in this light certainly be applied to many uses of great benefit to the public. " What may be construed from that remark is evident from the fact that the census included a list of fighting men with parish, county and national totals. The overall population was reckoned at approximately 1,265,380. The ratio of fighting men was calculated from a general belief that 20% of the total population was capable of bearing arms. Thus, in 1755, Scotland held in crude terms 235,076 effective men. The Webster census gave an approximation only, and it is not within the remit of this chapter to evaluate its inaccuracies. Within the framework of recruiting by conscription, its importance lay in demonstrating perceived man-power levels. According to the estimates, however general, the impression the authorities received was that the Highlands constituted 20.8% of the nation's entire fighting men. (see appendix eight).³⁸ It is worthy of note that Webster's census, often cited as a concrete example of Scotland's drive for improvement and social enlightenment, was, in fact, first used in a conscription context. By this means, enlightening thinking partly fulfilled the profoundly unenlightened military policies of Cumberland.

In early December 1756, Beauclerk informed Lord Barrington that the Scottish Sheriffs had devised a plan to ensure the Impress Act was comprehensively implemented across the country. This was to be accomplished by deploying the " Minto formula. " (See appendix ten). This regulation was an attempt to halt the disruption caused by conscripting, and to rationalise the whole process. From the formula, and the population of each parish within Scotland, a total for each county was constructed. (See appendix eleven). By 8 March 1757, Beauclerk sent Barrington a list of " The number of men sent by the Commissioners of the Impress Act in North Britain " (See appendix eleven). The returns show that no area escaped a levy, and that within the Highlands the Act had been a resounding success. Nearly three battalions had been conscripted in just over two months. Indeed, the second battalion of Lieutenant-Colonel Leighton's 32nd regiment, quartered at Fort George in Inverness-shire had been completed within a month. By late February 1757, it was evident that excess men, over and above the national quota, would soon collect in Scotland. Beauclerk thought it extreme to order a fourth battalion, adding that it would be best if the Duke of Cumberland were to write to the Scottish commissioners and request them to move men south to fill English quotas. By 16 April, this was accomplished when an initial draft of 220 men was ordered to York to fill the depleted regiment of Major-General Bockland. During

the same period another 125 men were likewise sent to London for the regiment of Lord Robert Bertie.³⁹

The 1757 recruiting drive represented the apogee of co-operation between central government and land owners over the matter of conscription. Its success entirely validated Scottish local government in the form of crown appointed sheriffs. More generally, as the first major military mobilisation for the Hanoverians since the end of the 1745 uprising, Scotland's loyalty, tainted during that incident, had been spectacularly demonstrated. Even in the Highlands, the recruiting returns brought huge political credibility to the faction led by the Duke of Argyll, widely perceived to dominate the northern counties.⁴⁰

The Acts passed during the Seven Years War were similar in structure and intent to the Impress Act passed during the American War of Independence, and levied in Scotland during July 1778 and early 1779. All Acts operated by giving commissioners statutory powers to appoint special constables, who were to target males with no regular employment. In the rural counties, the constables were drawn in large numbers from the tenant farmer class. Thus in 1778, four of the five constables of the parishes of Inch and Croy in Inverness-shire were tenant farmers. In Ross-shire, the five parishes of Lochbroom, Alness, Kiltarn, Dingwall and Fodderty, appointed fifty eight constables - thirty eight or 65.5% were agricultural tenants. In the large rural parish of Lochbroom, seven out of eight were tenants, with the other being a Chelsea pensioner. Once commissioners had drained the pool of unemployed males, they could, as in Northern Perthshire, allow constables to conscript men in employment. The Acts were, however, a potential burden on the vital tenant group. Persons who were elected as constables and failed to act as such, were fined £ 5. Within the Long Island constables had lost money during the vain search for men in early 1758. Their farms had correspondingly suffered from a lack of managerial control as they reacted to Barrington's insistence that recruiting continue until the quota was completed. Perhaps understandably, constables were faced with violence and assault in the course of their duty, as on the estate of Moray. Nevertheless, it was intended that local knowledge be brought to bear to insure comprehensive levying. Thus, Thomas Garden, Sheriff-Depute in Kincardineshire, informed Lord Milton in late December 1756 that commissioners would order substantial creditable tenants to appear before them as;

They must necessarily know best the character and circumstances of the lower sort in their several parishes who by this act are intended to be enlisted.⁴¹

As it was, contemporary social thinking equated laziness, enforced or voluntary, with criminal tendencies - thus it was understood that;

The execution of this Act affords an opportunity of making proper examples and ridding the country of such persons as by the force of discipline may become good soldiers, but are by their manners and behaviour bad members of the civil society. ⁴²

Thus, in theoretical terms, the Acts were designed to complement the economy. On 8 July 1778, the Lorne district of the Commissioners for the Impress Act met to discuss methods of levying men. As early as March of the same year, in order to target them for enlistment in the Argyll fencible regiment, a list of various beggars and disorderly persons had been drawn up. The Impress Acts of the mid 1750s and 1770s, should thus be seen as not merely complementing the economy, but also an established judicial policy undertaken not just in the Highlands, but throughout all of Scotland from as early as the 1740s. This involved offering convicted criminals the alternative of military service to judicial punishment. Throughout the 1750s, Sheriff-Substitute George Douglas in Fort William had used the proximity of garrison battalions to implement a policy whereby " all those suspected, [or convicted] of theft were once engaged in his Majesty's service " - a decision continued by his successor Duncan Macvicar. In June 1755, Lord Advocate Robert Dundas informed Lord Chancellor Hardwicke that he had agreed to a request from Rannoch outlaws for judicial immunity in return for military enlistment, adding optimistically that he hoped the example would encourage a drift of criminals into more useful military employment. ⁴³

On the Annexed Estates, where a law and order remit was a high priority, the Commissioners used the Act to conscript a Donald McColl and his accomplices after their conviction for stealing cows from the barony of Lix on the estate of Perth. Furthermore, it was ordered to enlist them in the American service, which, in effect, meant military transportation. The returns of persons conscripted by the Act reveal that Commissioners removed non-natives and vagrants who were perceived as thieves or a financial burden on the parochial welfare. In 1757, two of the four men levied from the Parish of Kenmore in Perthshire were specifically chosen as they had recently been declared bankrupt. By as early as 7 August 1756, the parish of Blair Atholl had noted the large numbers of non-native beggars within its confines. There can be little doubt that these people would have been targeted as a matter of priority. The ten man quota for the county of Bute included three born out with the shire, and involved conscripts from as far away as Yorkshire and Ireland. In 1758, three men out of the nine conscripted from the county were again born elsewhere. ⁴⁴

There is no doubt that those committing any misdemeanour were the first to be selected. In Lewis, by the end of 1778, after the Island had sent large amounts of its suspected thieves into the Earl of Seaforth's regiment, the factor expressed surprise that petty thieving had, nevertheless, continued. In the most ironic example, the factor on the Duke of Gordon's Lochaber lands cited a man called McCarter; " a notorious thief, and I connived at affording him protection against the Hamilton officers in case we might find other uses for him. " ⁴⁵

The deliberate retention of thieves was amongst the more unusual consequences of recruiting. Another result was that conscription, or levying carried out in that style, could extend and significantly augment local gentry influence. It is no coincidence that while the Ross-shire Commissioners of Supply met to enforce the Act in 1778, they also listed the accepted stipulated wages of the county for agricultural day and half yearly servants. The county attempted to ensure the conscripted personnel consisted of;

All persons who are disorderly, or have no evident trade or employment whereby they can subsist themselves, and who refuse to accept of service from the tenantry or farmers, who may offer them the usual stipulate hire of the county, but insist on extravagant and unusual wages and also against all those who make a practice of leaving their county during the summer and harvest seasons for the sake of higher wages and return again in winter. ⁴⁶

This is significant because, as suggested in chapter seven, excessive levying of men induced substantial wage increases. ⁴⁷ It also removed, in greater numbers, the social group of agricultural labourers. This undoubtedly explains why, on 18 August 1761, after four years of heavy recruiting, the Commissioners of Supply in Argyll met for the " consideration of regulating servants wages. " In Lewis, by July 1778, it was noted that those servants and day labourers who refused the normal wages and attempted to take advantage of the dearth of labour to negotiate a higher level were to be targeted. Ironically, the Impress Acts actually constituted an attempt to use the threat of conscription to counteract the wider economic and social consequences of military recruiting. ⁴⁸

At the very least, the Acts attempted in conceptual terms to minimalise damage to the local economy, and by this means secure the co-operation of landlords. The Acts were also a form of social control, and attempted to integrate with existing and widely understood policies regarding wage control in the localities, especially with regard to the day labourer class. In all, the Impress Acts demonstrate how central and local policy could operate with a surprising level of coherency. It is this compatibility which was doubtless responsible for

much of their initial popularity, beyond the opportunity it offered Scots gentry to demonstrate their political loyalty.

The assistance that central government legislation offered to the local problem of law and order must, however, be considered as a well crafted by-product. The aim was first and foremost to promote the increase of central government's military machine. The 1 800 men raised in 1757, was succeeded in 1758 by a lesser amount of 1 400. However, these direct levies were not the sum product of the legislation. Given the widespread hatred army conscription generated within lower social groups, and the constitutional unease it produced in elite circles, the main objective of the legislation was actually to encourage voluntary enlistment by threatening the alternative of conscription.

Where the prospect of voluntary army service seemed relatively mild, the threat of conscription could substantially increase enlistment levels. In the summer of 1755, the 31st regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes arrived in Fort William to act as the local garrison force, while simultaneously, the civilian magistrate implemented a press. It was noted by the authorities that many locals voluntarily enlisted in an attempt to avoid the Act, and, more interestingly, to remain within the country as part of a local garrison regiment.⁴⁹

Just how effective this carrot and stick policy was, can be illustrated by the experience of Captain Aeneas Macintosh, who recruited in Inverness-shire for the additional companies of the Highland Regiment in the early months of 1756. In April, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of British North America, John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudon, informed officers recruiting under his command that under no circumstances were men destined for the conscription battalions to end up in the Highland Regiment. It appears that this order, especially in isolated areas, was largely ignored, forcing Lieutenant-General Bland to ensure that at least half the impressed men of Inverness-shire were removed from the recruiting officers of the 42nd.⁵⁰ This mis-appropriation of levies, while explaining why the quota of men for several Highland counties was deficient (See appendix eleven) was, nevertheless, insignificant against the numbers raised by fear of conscription. In May 1756, Macintosh met with the Commissioners for the Lochaber area and stated to Loudon that;

" As there is such numbers of idlers in Lochaber, I am to tell them [the commissioners] if they do not fall upon proper means to secure those idlers to complete our regiment as soon as possible, that I shall take care to let it be known I have proclaimed at all the parish churches that for a fortnight after the Act takes place I will give two guineas and a crown to any that will come willing to me. " This was to combat the fact that; " The common people here have taken it in their head that the press was for the Highland Regiment which makes a good many handsome fellows go to the Cameronians as they think they are to stay in the country. " ⁵¹

This method was very successful, and by 6 May Macintosh had recruited 92 men, concluding that; " If the Press Act had continued longer I believe we would have got a regiment. " ⁵²

The concurrent imposition of conscription and voluntary recruiting was also employed by Mungo Campbell on the forfeited estate of Locheil. He impressed eight men under the Act, yet gained 41 supposed volunteers. This strategy allowed for the development of severe coercion and competition. This atmosphere proved particularly useful in light of the comprehensive hatred of compulsive methods. Much has been written on the objections of Highlanders to military service. However, as was probably true across Britain, some forms were undoubtedly more disliked than others, and the Impress Acts were deliberately designed to play upon the differences. In the Old Statistical Account it was noted that the inhabitants of Duirinish in Skye were " averse to the naval and military services, and are extremely disgusted with the idea of being pressed. " The difference in intensity is clear. Perhaps to be conscripted meant severe social stigmatisation, while even the appearance of voluntary enlistment meant some cultural kudos within small communities where status remained an important pre-occupation. The hatred of pressing could be extreme enough to affect those that carried it out. In early January 1760, Alexander Campbell, the son of Campbell of Glenure conscripted a man from the family estate, and found it an intensely objectionable experience. Having imprisoned the man in question he wrote to his father;

The prisoner is crying like a child and says you was the last man on earth that he imagined would use him ill. For heaven's sake dear Sir if you can any how avoid it, give no more men to the fencibles, this is certainly the damnest work that ever man took in hand. If I see but little more of this work for Peace's sake I will list in the fencibles myself. ⁵³

The element of compulsion is what seems to have produced these extreme responses. The result was perhaps predictable. Rather than face what was seen as a shameful imposition, many Highlanders deliberately enlisted before compulsion could be brought to bear. Therefore, in 1757, Hugh Rose, laird of Kilravock noted how he had gained several recruits from a neighbouring estate where the landlord simply adopted methods similar to a conscription act. In an interesting demonstration of disgust and protest, two tradesmen came to Rose and stated that they had no wish to be in the military, but as their own landlord offered no terms, they came voluntarily to him on certain limited conditions. This attitude was evident in Sutherland in September 1778, when, in response to conscription style recruiting by a lieutenant in Seaforth's regiment, the factor noted that; " you may depend upon it that the people will enlist rather than be dragged from their beds under silence of the night." ⁵⁴

The Impress Acts played upon the population's cultural attitudes, and brought in seemingly voluntary men simply by threatening them. The general consensus amongst the recruiting gentry concerning the Acts was evident when, in July 1757, additional companies of 100 men were added to the three Highland battalions.

The recruiting those nine companies will be a matter of difficulty at this time, unless the Press Act is enforced, for though it may not be used, yet to say the truth, the terror of it was a main cause of that recruiting going on so successfully for the Highland battalions. ⁵⁵

The examples of Captain Macintosh, Hugh Rose and the Sutherland estate, cast into serious doubt much of the basic assumptions regarding the Highlander's proclivity for military service. The Acts themselves produced a reasonable amount of soldiers, but these men were in fact only the tip of a more subtle conscription iceberg.

Moreover, these military and political successes were gained at the price of substantial social dislocation, which increased from as early as April 1755. In that month, due to conscription, it was reported that any male capable of bearing arms within a ten mile radius of Fort William had fled the area, and refused to sleep in or near their own homes. The consequences of an Impress Act on the locality were described to Lord Milton prior to its reinstatement in December 1756, and are worthy of lengthy quotation.

Of all things men dislike to be forced to enlist; especially where they are not used to arms. An alarm is taken which gives occasion to the greatest confusion. The work people, particularly those engaged in agriculture, desert their habitations and their work, and fly to the hills and hiding places. This is an evident loss to the country. The evil is rendered the greater, that when perhaps only at a rate of one man per parish is wanted to make up the complement; yet this not being known, the whole work people think they are to be impressed. They are in terror and fly. Whereas were it known, that only one was wanted, they would stay peaceable at home. ⁵⁶

The description of conditions on and around the Atholl estates in early 1778 reinforce this observation. On 9 January, the daughter of the Perthshire laird, Robertson of Lude reported that " there are terrible things going on here. " By 15 March, as the fourth Duke of Atholl strove to complete his regiment, she added; " sad work is expected amongst his people, you never saw such a time, grief and terror painted in every face, they all ran here, poor things, and nobody can help them. " These sentiments were mirrored by the Duke of Atholl's chamberlain, Thomas Bissett, who noted; " No news of this country but the raising of men, recruiting parties in every corner, the people in motion and severals on the alarm especially those under suspicion of crimes or trespasses. " ⁵⁷

Due to the predominant position of agriculture in the wider economy of the Highlands, the majority of labour in the region was of a cyclical and seasonal nature. This resulted in periods of underemployment for large sections of the Highland work force, and as the Acts were often levied in the early months of the year, this left Highland males vulnerable to the clause regarding those with no reliable employment. Thus agricultural labourers constituted 67% of men conscripted from the Northern district of Perthshire in 1757-58. This targeting of a specific social group through military and public policy is significant in a larger respect. Given the role Impress Acts played in persuading men to join voluntarily, agricultural labourers, as the group perceiving itself under most threat, constituted the largest single section of Highland military manpower. ⁵⁸

It is impossible to evaluate or quantify the amount of men lost due to conscription recruiting from 1755 through until the winter of 1756-57. The social dislocation and spasmodic movement of agricultural labourers evident in Fort William from as early as the spring of 1755 was severe enough to be noted with alarm within elite circles. Lord George Beauclerk, after meeting with the Scottish legal elite, stated that the new plans suggested and encouraged by local Sheriffs could ensure that, upon news of an Impress Act, the usual general panic and removal of workers could be avoided. The extent to which dislocation worried local gentry can be guessed from the fact that it was the Sheriffs who had first proposed conscription be comprehensively implemented across Scottish counties. What was an undoubted symptom of Scottish loyalty to the British state was also, however, evidence that even the temporary removal of agricultural labour was disliked, and that seemingly wider patriotism was actually grounded in local or county concerns. By ordering conscription across Scotland, the rationale behind fleeing to another area was nullified. That people did remove themselves is illustrated by the fact that in several counties, as in Kircardineshire and Perthshire, notices were arranged on kirk doors to inform the population that any person absconding from the area to avoid conscription would be automatically pressed, regardless of his position and employment. In 1758, in the Fort William area, the local Sheriff ordered constant searches for those who came within the description of the Press Act and had fled or deserted their homes - an obvious consequence from early 1755. In Ross-shire, by early January 1779, even ineffectual conscripting for the American conflict had witnessed sufficient movement of men into Cromarty and vice-versa, that alternative warrants of arrest in both counties became necessary. This had the benefit of specifically targeting those who had fled, and who had therefore forfeited the right to an appeal.⁵⁹

The use of tenantry to "recommend" particular persons for impressment could also have disruptive tendencies. In early May 1757, Roderick Macleod, tenant on the farm of Rive in the barony of Coigach on the Annexed Estate of Cromarty, related to the Board of Commissioners that neighbouring tenants had apprehended his two sons and ensured their impressment. This was despite the fact that Lochbroom had already completed the necessary quota. As had been intended, Macleod now had all four sons in the military, and was incapable of continuing to farm his possession. Likewise in Sutherland, in February 1757, a rather embittered Robert Gray, noted that "France cannot exceed the arbitrary powers used in this country for recruiting." Robert's brother, Alexander, was tacksman of Lairg, and was in London negotiating with William, seventeenth Earl of Sutherland for a continuation of his whole possession. Munro of Achannie, as a Commissioner for the Act, had pressed three tenants of Gray's into the company of a local Munro captain. Alexander stated this was entirely indicative of the atmosphere of coercion on the estate, where even the economically important sub-tenant group, who held land directly from the tacksmen

were, nevertheless, still threatened and abused. The tacksman opined that such recruiting policies were directly detrimental to the interests of the estate. Gray further informed the Earl's uncle, General James St. Clair, that Dugald Gilchrist, the factor, had sanctioned this removal of Lairg tenantry in order to ensure that he was, in turn, removed as tacksman. In Perthshire, the same incidents of self interest were noted on the estate of Lord Kinnaird; this brought angry responses from the factor, who accused the military of arrogance in removing the only labour available to a widow who held three acres in tack. The targeting of tenantry and labour on specific farms in order to weaken claims on possession could only heighten the atmosphere of uncertainty and caution in investment terms. In 1778 this trend was obviously widespread enough for the Commissioners of Bute-shire to order any person informing on another with a view to gaining their impressment to be examined for any private motive or reason. ⁶⁰

Even the estate of the Duke of Argyll was not exempt from conscription tactics. On 9 March 1759, a company of soldiers had commenced a naval press in and around the garrison castle of Duart. The result was the removal of ten tenants of Argyll. Eight turned out to have legal possessions, while the other two were labourers. The latter were sent into the navy and the others released. The incident brought an abrupt halt to the droving trade on Mull, as those that ferried cattle across to the mainland refused to show evidence of seamanship unless they gained protection from the Press Act. On 1 May, a petition was sent to the Commissioners of Supply who, in turn, ensured that Captain Dougal Campbell, the M.P. for Argyll, petitioned the War Office on 11 June. Yet even here, the full weight of the Campbell establishment could not prevent the disruption of the vital droving trade for over three months. ⁶¹

These examples illustrate how conscription could undermine and work against the already underdeveloped economy of the Highland region. In one respect, the above consequences of conscription produced an unusual result. So worried were managers at the prospect of disruption to the estate, that protection measures were often introduced. It is ironic that conscription was probably an element in the spread of formal agreements (if not leases) between landlords and Highland tenantry. The latter were usually loathed to make even a verbal contract regarding land, because it undermined their traditional perceptions that they had an absolute right to long term occupancy. Yet in two ways, conscription or comprehensive recruiting in general, could stimulate such agreements. In 1757, Alexander Campbell, son of Campbell of Glenure, found he had great difficulty in getting tenantry to accept holdings upon the estate. Regarding a particular tenant it was suggested as a strategy; " If you fright[en] him with the story of the Press which I find is a prevailing argument. " Alexander later added; " I have given him some hints of the Press Act if he did

not (take land). I am hopeful tenants will be easier got this year than for several years past. " As the statement regarding it being a " prevailing argument " suggests, this use of the Press was obviously a common practice, and illustrates that, as with the control of thieves, conscription proved under certain circumstances to be a useful tool for social control. ⁶²

This situation, where the landlord could threaten tenants into taking lands at terms advantageous to the former, is probably one of the Press Act's few positive by products for the proprietary class. In contrast to this, the value placed on tenantry meant the landlord was often forced to secure them. On 27 January 1779, the Glenure family again considered the prospects of conscription. It was noted; " there is for certain a Press Act to take place and it will be dangerous not to strengthen the tenants against the attacks of others. " ⁶³

The impact of such levying was obviously multi faceted. In purely financial terms, the Acts could also disrupt local government finance. In early December 1756, Beauclerk informed Barrington that the Impress Act could not be comprehensively employed across the west Highlands, as only Skye and Mull had any local government endowed with enough finances to actually recruit. The Act was, nevertheless, implemented in the Northern and Western Isles. Alexander Macleod of Ullinish, Sheriff-Substitute in Skye, was responsible for the fifteen men due from the Inverness-shire part of the Outer Hebrides. The expense of the Act in the Spring of 1757 had resulted in Macleod borrowing money from mainland creditors. In late 1757, when another Press was implemented, Macleod denounced the legislation and stated that the gentry of Skye would not act vigorously. He added that the military had been partly responsible for this attitude when they had earlier refused to pay the expense of ferrying men at the relatively high cost of £ 3. The costs of subsistence and transport did result in men from the West Highlands and Northern Isles being recruited at an expensive rate - a fact admitted by Beauclerk. The financial experience of the 1756-58 Acts on local government personnel must be included as one of the factors in inducing apathy in the 1770s. At a meeting at Dingwall in July 1778, the Commissioners of Supply noted that recruiting acts failed to compensate the local commissioners, which was entirely true in the case of Alexander Macleod who, by 1758, was in severe debt. ⁶⁴

Such financial impositions, beyond higher levels of wartime taxation, go some way to explaining the increase in the arrears of cess for the Scottish counties. From total arrears in 1746 of £ 43 000 - or one entire annual Scottish quota, the total, by 1780, was two and half years. This dismal financial position ensured that, in turn, quartering for arrears continued. While considered as a blunted fiscal weapon, quartering was useful in recruiting terms as it dispersed military parties into the countryside, ensuring a comprehensive tapping

of resources. Thus fiscal and military policies could dovetail, and to some extent reinforce each other. ⁶⁵

A trend which reinforces the analysis that recruiting was harming local economies, was the changing attitudes to conscription by the end of 1757. In the autumn, and after a summer of sustained rumours, recruiting was again ordered to be vigorously enforced in an attempt to complete the eight infantry battalions stationed in Scotland. On 13 October, Beauclerk replied to the Secretary of War's proposal to re-deploy the Impress Act. He noted that he was apprehensive of success, but would write to the gentry of the counties and to Scotland's political leaders. By November, Beauclerk cautiously informed Barrington that, across the entire country, Scots gentry feared the return of recruiting by compulsive methods. Their reasoning for this was that it would impact upon the ability of their tenant farmers to find labour. Beauclerk also related that in the vital agricultural border counties of Berwickshire and Roxburghshire, the fear of recruiting had been replaced with outright discontent, with land owners relating that labourers had fled across the border into Northumbria, where the farmers benefited from a surplus of labour. ⁶⁶

This phenomenon of mobility was also evident throughout the Highlands during the American War of Independence. In Lewis, at the end of January 1778, it was noted that a large amount of men from the Island had returned from Macdonald's lands in Uist. While the letter does not specify why, it noted that the men complained of the treatment they had received in the Southern Isles. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that Macdonald had commenced recruiting for his 76th regiment at the beginning of January 1778. As non-natives, the Lewis men would have been the first targets. These men, however, returned to an estate which itself was about to experience a recruiting drive. The best example of this trend of labour removal is upon the estates of Atholl and Gordon. The chapter has already noted the comments of the Robertson of Lude family with regard to the population's reaction to recruiting in Highland Perthshire. It noted that many men from the Atholl estate had bolted when levying commenced. In the correspondence of the factors on the Duke of Gordon's Badenoch estate, these men reappear. On 2 May 1778, while commenting on the lack of labour induced on the estate by excessive recruiting, Gordon's factor added; " If it had not been for Atholl's refugees we should hardly have got our work done this spring. " However, as with the men from Lewis, these Atholl labourers had merely gone from one district that was recruiting to another. On 11 July 1778, it was again noted that when these incomers had heard that the Duke of Gordon was to raise a regiment, they had fled the area, deepening the labour crisis in Badenoch. ⁶⁷

There is little doubt that military recruiting, and conscription in particular, produced severe social dislocation. It also seems to have been a common occurrence for any area where levying was about to occur to quickly lose male labour, especially casual day labourers.

During the Seven Years War this consequence of recruiting began to generate discontent. In turn, this was replaced with outright opposition in the autumn of 1758. Towards the end of that year the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland was informed that central government planned another conscription levy for the country. Given that 1050 men were ordered to be added to the 42nd Highland battalion, and 100 men for each of the other Highland levies, Beauclerk informed Barrington that he did not believe the Scottish landed elite would agree to raise men by conscription. While unable to officially oppose the imposition of conscription upon the country, local gentry were only prepared to act within the law and not exert themselves. Beauclerk added that the gentry were now pointing at the differences in military policy, especially conscription, between England and Scotland. After meeting Scotland's highest judicial figures, Beauclerk related the mood of the political nation;

It was universally believed here that few or no men had been levied in England by the Press Act, the people in general seemed resolved to pursue no other plan in the execution of it in time coming, than what the law directed. ⁶⁸

By 25 November 1758, despite the obvious hostility of sections of Scottish society, agreement had been reached that, if an Act was passed in England, then it should be implemented in Scotland. It was further decided to avoid a definite announcement regarding a new levy, and instead influence the lower social orders by leaving the threat of conscription as a constant possibility. The reality was that England did, indeed, compare favourably with Scotland in this respect. Barrington, exhibiting the unease that recruiting by conscription engendered, stated that south of the border the Acts had produced only trouble and instances of arbitrary behaviour. In return, they had produced the sum total of 400 men in England for the years 1756-57, which given the differences in population, compares badly with Scotland's total of 3 200. ⁶⁹

Given such feelings, the government redefined its recruiting strategy in 1758. The change in policy witnessed the harnessing of local interests in a more direct way. Here it is important to define differences in recruiting methods. Recruiting by conscription was primarily designed to augment battalions already on the military establishment and largely complete with their officer cadre. The result of this was that from March 1757, until the autumn of 1759, no new battalions were ordered for Scotland. The shift in recruiting at the end of 1758 was designed to motivate Scottish proprietors into using their local connections. This

was to be accomplished by allowing them the patronage of new regiments and commissions. As a policy change, it was merely a shift in the means rather than in the end result, with little or no diminution in the loss of men to the army. Enlisting continued in Scotland by promoting " those most likely by interest and connection to assist the raising [of] the said corps. " As a result, the regiments of Argyll, Sutherland, Staat Morris (Gordon), as well as the later levies of Lieutenant Commandant Murray Keith, Campbell, Johnstone, Maclean and Graham were all raised. ⁷⁰

The changes in recruiting policy ensured that Scotland continued to contribute men up until the peace of 1763. How this continued to impact upon the Highlands is evident from the petitions that the War Office received upon the declaration of the Treaty of Paris. Alarmed by a policy which sought to demobilise British battalions in the newly conquered colonies of North America, the " Nobility, Gentry and Freeholders of the Northern and Highland Counties of Scotland, " requested that the men of the 77th and 78th Highland regiments be returned to Scotland as had been stipulated upon the terms of their mobilisation. The petition stressed the constant and unremitting nature of recent military recruiting. Added to this, was the fact that the petitioners perceived that losses in the levies had been so high that perhaps only 10% could return. (See appendix fourteen) Recruiting had drained the north to such an extent that the memorialists, while thinking;

It their duty to give up their own private convenience for the sake of the public thereby [they had] been put to great distress for want of hands to labour the ground, all the young men being thus on service. ⁷¹

That recruiting had hurt the landed interest is easily inferred from the petition. However, the very nature of military activity carried huge patriotic overtones, and to criticise the process overtly was, if not politically damaging, then certainly unusual in elite circles. How far Sir James Carnegie, M.P. for Kincardineshire in 1760, represented the true feelings of Scottish county opinion is impossible to say. However, several points are worthy of note upon analysis of his arguments. Carnegie, while not a high profile supporter of the third Duke of Argyll was, nevertheless, sufficiently connected to the Campbell interest to have been perfectly aware of the political benefits Highland recruitment had brought Scotland's leading political faction. While a supporter of the peace in 1763, Carnegie had, until 1755, also been an army officer and was thus in a position to comment on its general impact. On 26 February 1760, Carnegie wrote to Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, expressing disgust at leading English political figures who had adopted an anti-Scottish militia stance. Carnegie stated that despite being privately attacked, the English militia avoided open criticism. This situation, whereby recruiting policy was hard

to question or debate, was entirely evident throughout the United Kingdom. As a result of this Carnegie said that Scottish M.P.s openly commented that;

There are some who imagine Scotland is looked upon and must be reserved as the fund for recruiting the army. This is thought justified by the various proposals that have been given in for raising regiments, battalions and companies in that Kingdom, as well as those that have been accepted of and are now actually raising to the depopulation of the country and the ruin of both farmer and manufacturer. ⁷²

This feeling that Scotland and the Highlands were being deliberately over recruited was a criticism that was to appear again at the end of the American war. ⁷³ Such fundamental objections to basic military policy demonstrate that while they acquiesced with recruiting, the Scottish political and social elite were aware that it could harm their interests in the vital civilian sector of the employment market.

It was against this experience that the imposition of conscription in July 1778 and January 1779 again took place in Scotland. Not surprisingly, the Acts were never as comprehensive, nor as seemingly effective. Partly, this was due to the successful use of local gentry as a substitute for direct central government involvement. Secondly, unlike 1756-57, the conscription drives were never designed to complete whole battalions, simply to provide an additional method of persuasion, and to ensure that recruiting officers were displaced into even the most isolated areas. The Acts of 1778-79, were instituted after two and half years of heavy recruitment, and did not bring in many men because the bounty offered was far too low to compete in the recruiting market. Men initially marked for impressment simply volunteered for service in the nearest regular regiment, as was the case in Inverness-shire and Cromarty in August and October 1778. In turn, landlord recruiters found themselves under pressure from government to implement conscription if they failed to raise sufficient numbers. By early July 1778, Alexander, fourth Duke of Gordon, found himself pressurised by Lieutenant-General Sir James Oughton, Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, to execute the Press Act to quicken the completion of his regiment. ⁷⁴

In February 1779, Oughton informed Charles Jenkinson, the Secretary at War, that discussions with the Scottish Sheriffs concerning a cess of three recruits per parish yielding 2 700 men, had revealed that the gentry felt they had contributed enough. They added that they would do no more than the letter of the Act required, and would not act with vigour. In Lochaber it was noted of local gentry; " they seem to have been sick of recruiting. " The

Act was instituted on a reduced scale and still met with passive opposition - notably in the Lowlands. ⁷⁵

This discontent with recruiting, which stands in contrast to the usual picture of Scottish belligerence during the American War, finally reached its climax in late July 1779. It was reported on 2 August to Sir James Grant of Grant that;

The raising [of] any more Highland regiments was laid aside in consequence of an application from the Duke of Argyll to Lord Amherst, as tending to depopulate Scotland. ⁷⁶

That the family with the most high profile reputation, both in terms of recruiting and patriotic endeavour, nevertheless felt it necessary to approach the head of the army to request a halt to levies, reveals both the extent and intensity of battalion raising during the American War. It also reveals the degree to which it had begun to hurt the economic standing of the landlord class. The fate of conscription, and of recruiting in general during 1778-79, seemingly demonstrates the ability of local interest to alter central government policies. However, the flexibility of recruiting strategies whereby a reversion to local interest was possible, insured that central government achieved its ultimate aim in the longer term.

Beyond the important aspect of economic damage, recruiting also had a significant impact upon the issue of Highland law and order. It is worthy of note that where ever a garrison existed, desertion was bound to occur. Added to this, was the fact that once outside military law - and in effect outlaws, army deserters had little incentive to remain within the confines of honest behaviour. From as early as the 1740s, deserters had a reputation for generating crime. In June 1743, after it became clear the mutineers from the Highland Regiment would be unable to escape to Scotland, General Guest, while relieved, informed Lord Advocate Graigie that the twenty or so men who had deserted from the regiment while it marched through Scotland, had associated together and formed a band of thieves in the Highlands. While Graigie was unconvinced, it is certain that one particular deserter from the regiment returned to his own area and threatened to murder James Russell, factor to the Earl of Moray, who had removed the deserter's family from their possession. Such perceptions of deserters survived well beyond Culloden. James Small, factor on the Annexed Estate of Strowan, while reflecting on the perception of high levels of thieving in the Rannoch region, highlighted several interesting points. Rannoch was an area readily identified by contemporaries as symptomatic of Highland lawlessness. Yet Small noted that non native garrison soldiers who had deserted often found it impossible to live amongst the

natives and so took to dishonest means to maintain themselves. It is ironic that the Fort William garrison, partly in existence to combat Lochaber crime, was also to a significant extent responsible for it. ⁷⁷

Given the dubious reputation of deserters, then the figures for desertion rates in this period are significant. In the period 1755-59, Scottish desertion rates rose by over 145% when compared to the preceding five years. During the war with the American colonies, desertion rates rose by 125% from their peacetime levels. (See appendix twelve). The figures for desertion by regions show that as a percentage of this enlarged national total, deserters from the Highlands constituted a minority. Significantly, however, that percentage continued to grow during the 1759-79 period. (See appendix thirteen). Given that government policy had from the pre-Culloden era paid at least lip service to the issue of Highland disorder, the reality in the post-Culloden era was that the consequences of its military recruiting represented a contradiction of significant proportions.

From as early as August 1756, Sheriff-Substitute Duncan Macvicar at Fort William noted that as a result of the garrison regiment drafting men abroad, it had lost many of its local recruits, who now formed gangs in the isolated countryside of the Lochaber hinterland. The experience of Macvicar is illustrative of the contradictions in law and order policies and recruiting practices. As was his statutory duty, Macvicar, by April 1757, had pressed eight men for the district's annual quota, and gained forty one by voluntary recruitment - a clear example of the success of the carrot and stick policy. By June 1757, such was the rate of desertion that Macvicar asked Lord Justice Clerk Tinwald if he could deploy the army to arrest the fugitives. By December 1758, Lieutenant-Colonel Lambert of the local regiment had, in accordance with the policy of moving the military into isolated areas, organised an armed expedition into the Morar region to allow Macvicar to prosecute and arrest those persons harbouring deserters. Given the climate of officially sponsored rumours concerning the Press Act agreed in November, allied to Macvicar's policy of forcing convicted persons into the army, the character of the nominally judicial expedition was that of a recruiting one, and as such would have simply compounded the desertion problem. ⁷⁸

The extent of the adverse conditions that excessive recruitment could induce, can be understood from the response of the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland to the imminent completion of the 77th and 78th Highland battalions. The new recruits to Fraser's regiment were ordered, on 12 February 1757, to be moved out of Inverness as quickly as possible. The ever present fear which the government retained for armed Highlanders insured that these men were moved south in small detachments to lessen their strength in the event of mutiny. The other reason, and of more immediate significance, was

that famine conditions made the march hard, and desertion more likely. This potentially volatile situation was made all the more acute by the tendency of both battalions to over recruit. Since their commissions depended on sufficient quotas, it is hardly surprising the officers got over zealous, a fact illustrated when, on 6 May 1757, Fraser revealed that he had eighty superfluous men. Beauclerk, in an open and candid report to his superior at the War Office, told Barrington that 300 men enlisted for the Highland regiments, and not fit for service, were now destitute and could hardly be expected to lead honest lives. Despite being illegally over their quotas, Beauclerk thought it unwise to add to the forty or fifty deserters already thieving in the Highland region. Many deserters had previously been thieves, and had gained arms by joining the army, so enhancing their ability to cause problems in the future. Indeed, so bad had the situation become that Beauclerk thought it wise to send extra military detachments into the area. The whole cycle of recruitment and lawlessness had become self reinforcing. The levying of Montgomery's and Fraser's battalions had faced serious political opposition. They had finally received reluctant approval partly by emphasising the policy's ability to demilitarise and remove potential law and order problems in the form of idle men. Yet the reality was that, by May 1757, the army faced a serious law and order problem of its own making - recruiting policy had merely achieved the exact conditions it sought to prevent.⁷⁹

Unsurprisingly, the law and order problem generated by intense recruiting in the Seven Years War, was also evident during the 1775-1783 period. This can be illustrated by the problems faced by Henry Butter, factor on the annexed estate of Locheil. From August 1778 until 1785, Butter, having assumed possession of the farm of Laggan on the Lochgarry estate, found himself aware of high levels of deserters living locally. In particular, he found his possession plagued by a band of approximately twelve deserters. Having formed a sheep walk from the farm (once occupied by the families of deserters), the factor discovered that by March 1779 they had stolen over 200 head of cattle in connivance with the tenantry of the estate. The laird of Lochgarry, according to Butter, had "so little weight with his people" and was so unable to influence them into surrendering the men, that when shepherds had their arms stolen it became a matter of priority to get troops quartered on the estate. In an interesting example of the Highlanders opposition to sheep farming, it was widely understood that the severe losses of sheep to the thieves had ensured the gang would not be given up by the population of the area. The eviction by Lochgarry of those believed to have harboured the deserters, nevertheless, failed to achieve the surrender of all the gang, and the situation continued with periodic thieving of stock and military raids by the army. The situation was finally resolved seven years later in 1785, when faced with the constant presence of troops from Fort William, the last of the band surrendered to the authorities.⁸⁰

Conclusion

Any examination of the law and order issue in the Highlands in the period 1739-85, and the treatment it received at the hands of central government, reveals more continuity than change after 1746. The reality was that in the 1757-1780 period levels of disorder on the Lochgarry estate, and in Lochaber generally, were little different to what they had been in 1740. Despite the more systematic legal framework of the sheriff courts, a contrast is necessary with the extinction of local and paternal authority, which despite contrary perceptions, had once been wielded effectively. More significantly, the conclusion that government generated a substantial section of this continuing violence is hard to avoid. The differing methods and fate of law and order apparatus in the pre-Culloden era demonstrate that central government, due to an agenda it perceived as more important, was prepared to allow the continuing use of clanship. This is an important point when it is considered that, in local government circles, even the theoretical use of clans had few or no defenders. The reality of their continuing use and, indeed, small scale revival in the years 1743-45, should reinforce the fact that international war made clanship a useful agent for government in the Highlands - a fact that should not be over shadowed by the future debacle of 1746.

This leads to the second conclusion, which is that it is often useful to demarcate between local and central government and their respective agendas. It would be wrong to see the two camps as mutually exclusive, the relationship was more often than not characterised by common interests and mutual aims. Nevertheless, even in the extraordinary years of 1756-1758, when the Scottish gentry united with government, they did so to rehabilitate themselves. Once they felt this had largely been achieved, yet saw government continue on its agenda for even more men, then strains and eventual cracks appeared. When this occurred government merely altered its strategies and continued to access military manpower by allying the local gentry more closely with the recruiting process. This was a significant development. Conscription had demonstrated to gentry, both in the Highlands and the Lowlands, that intense military recruiting damaged local economies for no immediate gain to the landlord personally. By switching recruiting methods from compulsive levying to creating new regiments the government performed a profoundly important operation. It diverted the natural economic leaders of Highland society into an activity which their own experiences had taught them disrupted and occasionally halted economic enterprise. That government had the financial means to achieve this suggests that the period after Culloden, up to and including the American Revolutionary War, must be reassessed in terms of government influence in the region.

The final conclusion regards the nature of Highland military service. The Highland regiments raised in the 1756-1783 period have been noted as a vital element in securing the change in cultural attitudes towards the region's population after 1745, and more interestingly, these levies are also cited as evidence of the voluntary investment by Highlanders into the new ideal of Britishness.⁸¹ It is already well understood that landlords used their own personal authority to compel men into their levies. Yet this chapter also demonstrates that the state applied a significant level of coercion in the region. While used nationally, the Impress Acts were always designed to work in conjunction with voluntary regiments. Thus they impacted harder in the Highlands because of the policy of excessive regiment raising for the region. Many Highlanders undoubtedly entered freely, yet the conscription acts of the 1750s and 1770s bring an entirely new level of compulsion to the old recruiting equation in the north. This suggests that any argument that views the majority of the soldiers in these regiments as voluntary, needs to be seriously challenged. In conclusion, it is ironic that in the two wars where it is argued that the Highlander first demonstrates his Britishness through conspicuous military service, it was in fact the disgust at new British compulsive Impress Acts which prompted a significant amount of Highlanders into army regiments.

- 1). A.I. Macinnes, 'Repression and Conciliation: The Highland Dimension 1660-1688' in *S.H.R.*, vol. 65 (1986), 167-68, 173-74, 178.
- 2). See chapter one, footnotes 14 & 27, p. 19 & 24.
- 3). N.L.S., Culloden Papers, Ms 2968, f. 5; S.R.O., Robert Graigie of Glendoick Papers, GD 1/609/38; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7045, ff. 126, 128, 83; Ms 7054, f. 22. Indeed, by March 1742, Robert Dundas informed the Marquis of Tweeddale that the Lowlands was in general of a very disorderly disposition.
- 4). A.J. Youngson, *After the Forty Five: The Economic Impact on the Scottish Highlands* (Edinburgh, 1973), 19; R. Mitchison, 'The Government of the Highlands 1707-1745' in N.T. Philipson, R. Mitchison (eds.), *Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1970), 26 - 27, 35.
- 5). Sheriff-Deputes were the appointees that completed the routine work which the hereditary or full sheriffs, who were normally large landlords, had little time to complete.
- 6). R. Mitchison, loc. cit., 40-41; S.R.O., Mackenzie of Coul Papers, GD1/1149/19(1 - 2).
- 7). B.A.M., Box 46/15/41, 47, 48.
- 8). S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/171/3/83, 81 & 85. See chapter one, footnote 24, p. 23.
- 9). S.R.O., Robert Graigie of Glendoick Papers, GD1/609/2/37b.
- 10). *Scots Magazine*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1740), 484 - 485.
- 11). R. Mitchison, loc. cit., 27.
- 12). S.R.O., GD1/609/2/27, 33, 37a; S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield Papers, GD14/18.
- 13). S.R.O., Robert Graigie of Glendoick Papers, GD1/609/2/33.
- 14). S.R.O., GD1/609/2/14, 27; GD1/609/3/14, 5. See chapter one, footnote 6. p. 15.
- 15). S.R.O., GD1/609/2/14, 27; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD170/939/2; GD170/939/8/1, *Scots Magazine*, vol. 6, (Edinburgh, 1744), 122-23; vol. 7, (Edinburgh, 1745), 144; N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7061, f. 124; Ms 7062, f. 145; S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin GD 113/183; P.R.O., W.O. 25/3196, List of Impressed Men 10 April- 26 May 1744; W.O. 25/3197, Miscellaneous of Press Act 1744. For details on increasing use of Scottish manpower see chapter one. footnote 19-20. p. 21-22.
- 16). N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7060, ff. 50, 55; Ms 7061, ff. 22 & 53.
- 17). S.R.O., Robert Graigie of Glendoick Papers, GD1/609/2/27.
- 18). S.R.O., GD1/609/2/27; N.L.S., Ms 7055, f. 85; Ms 7056, f. 122; Ms 7058, f. 147.
- 19). S.R.O., GD1/609/2/33; N.L.S., Culloden Papers, Ms 2968, f. 250; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD170/939/6; GD170/940/5-6.
- 20). B.A.M., Box 46/15/48; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, f. 20.

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- 21). B.A.M., Box 46/16/58, 60 & 65; S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD248/172/1/27, 59.
- 22). H.R.A., S.C./1: 1/1, p. 38-39. For similar efforts by Commissioner's of Supply in other areas: G.U.L., David Murray Collection, Mu60 - C.6/107.
- 23) S.R.O., Macpherson of Cluny, GD 80/631/1, 2, 3, 4, 15, 20 & 17; footnotes 16-18, p. 69-70.
- 24). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1327, f. 135, 162-7; S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield Papers, GD14/106-110. Chapter one, footnote 32, p. 27.
- 25). B.L., Add Ms 35447, f. 27; B.L., Egerton Mss, Ms 3433, ff. 1, 109; S.R.O., GD14/142. Chapter one, footnote 48, p. 34.
- 26). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35447, ff. 27, 123; Add Ms 35448, ff. 49, 57, 110; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms, 32737, f. 375. The Long Island was not alone in experiencing visits from military parties. Barra, the Uists, and even the Small Isles received visits. S.R.O., GD1/388/6. It was not just in the Long Island that the military buttressed civil authority. In Rannoch, on the forfeited estate of Strowan, estate authorities regularly called upon the military to intervene in the judicial process, with the result that the estate routinely experienced the physical presence of the army. S.R.O., F.E.P., E783/9/1.
- 27). S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin GD 113/175-6. The figures for Highland counties are calculated from: Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, Cromarty, Inverness-shire and Argyll. No Scottish Burghs or the Highland districts of Elgin, Nairn, Banff, Aberdeen-shire or Perth can be calculated independently of the county total. A. E. Whetsone, *Scottish County Government in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Edinburgh, 1981), 77 - 79; N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, Ms 13497, 10-11.
- 28). S.R.O., Abercromby of Forglen & Birenbog, GD 185/6/2/23.
- 29). N.L.S., Letter Book of Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, Ms 305, p. 8. For a summary on the position of the Duke of Argyll see chapter one.
- 30). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, ff. 110, 142 & 150; G.U.L., David Murray Collection, MU60 - C.13/45.
- 31). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, ff. 183, 189; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD170/942/9. Chapter one, footnote 35, p. 28.
- 32). S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield, GD 14/142.
- 33). A. Murdoch, *The People Above': Politics & Administration in Mid Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 132. The picture of Scottish enthusiasm for the conflict with the Americans is less evident in A. Hook's study of Scottish-American cultural relations, which stresses the probable apathetic response of many Scots to the developing problems with the colonies. Hook points out that, initially at least, Edinburgh and Glasgow were against any hostile policy towards the Americans. However, when the situation appeared dangerous from 1777 onwards these burghs became more supportive of the government's policy. Alternatively, B. Lenman in a study of Inverness-shire clans, stresses that within the Highlands support for the war was evident from its commencement: A. Hook *Scotland & America: A Study of Cultural Relations 1750- 1835* (Glasgow, 1975), 64-65; B. Lenman, *Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen 1650 - 1784* (London, 1984), 206-207.

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- 34). R. Middleton, 'The Recruitment of the British Army 1755 - 1762' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 68 (1989), 228-29; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16517, f. 141; P.R.O., W.O. 1/972, f. 305; W.O. 5/43, p. 179.
- 35). S.R.O., GD1/616/71. Memorial to General Wade. A highly polemical document printed in 1724 as a propaganda piece by the Jacobite interest. However, its arguments on the negative impact of an increased military presence in the locality did in fact commence - if 20 years later.
- 36). P.R.O., W.O. 1/972, f. 305.
- 37). D.H., Loudon Papers, A/973, f. 6; A/972, f. 18; N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, Ms 13497, p. 19; H.R.A., Inverness Burgh Records: 1/1/11, p. 235; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17505, f. 36; Ms 16518, f. 106; Ms 16713, f. 151.
- 38). N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, Ms 13497, f. 19; J.G. Kyd, *Scottish Population Statistics including an Analysis of Webster's Census* (Edinburgh, 1978), 8; M. Flinn, *Scottish Population History: From the 17th Century to the 1930s* (Cambridge, 1977), 252. For the political context: p.43, footnote 70-71.
- 39). H.R.A., Commissioners of Supply Caithness, C.C. 1:1/1; N.L.S., Ms 13497, p. 19, 30, 35-37 40, 43 & 54; N.L.S., Ms 16518, f. 144; P.R.O., W.O. 4/53, p. 30, 175.
- 40). S.R.O., Scrymgeour/Wedderburn Muniments, GD 137/3384; P.R.O., W.O. 4/53, p. 175. Chapter one, footnote 41 & 45, p.31-32.
- 41). S.R.O., GD 137/3390; H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Inverness-shire, 1:1/1/2, p. 51- 53; Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Ross-shire, 1:1/1/1; A.B.D.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Bute-shire, C0 6/2/2/1, p. 48(a) - 49(a); C 05/1/1/1, p. 269; S.R.O., GD 137/3390; B.A.M., Box 50/3/4/1; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1153, f. 131; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17505, f. 103.
- 42). For theories and attitudes on social and commercial development see chapter on four. N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16714, f. 123; Mss 17505, f. 103.
- 43). S.R.O., GD 170/405; A.B.D.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Buteshire, C. 05/1/1/1, p. 265-66; H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Caithness, June 1778. N.L.S., Murray Erskine Papers, Ms 5079, ff. 26, 62; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, f. 272. In February 1740 at Forfar Sheriff court, a convicted thief was ordered into the navy, while in Edinburgh in 1742, three convicted counterfeiters were allowed to enlist as soldiers rather than face capital punishment. G.U.L., David Murray Collection, MU 60 - f 15 no 3098; S.R.O., Robert Graigie of Glendoick Papers, GD1/609/2/36.
- 44). S.R.O., F.E.P., E721/2, p. 2; B.A.M., Box 47/8/124; Box 50/3/4/11; A.B.D.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Buteshire, C 05/1/1/1, p. 49(a) - 57(a).
- 45). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/217/16; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/2/75/1.
- 46). H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Ross-shire, 1:1/1/1, Meeting 29 July 1778; Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Cromarty Meeting 31 July 1778. For similar attempt at control of wages by recruiting in Moray: A. E. Whetsone, *Scottish County Government in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Edinburgh, 1981), 49.
- 47). See chapter seven, footnotes 85 & 86, p. 331-332.

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- 48). A.B.D.A., Minute Book of Commissioners of Supply in Argyllshire, p. 164; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/296/1.
- 49). N.L.S., Murray Erskine Papers, Ms 5079, f. 60.
- 50). D.H., Loudon Papers, A/972, ff. 16 & 18.
- 51). D.H., Loudon Papers, A/972, ff. 8, 18, 22 & 25.
- 52). Ibid., For definite evidence that pressed men ended up in Highland battalions: P.R.O., W.O. 1/615, f. 595.
- 53). N.L.S., Murray Erskine Papers, Ms 5079, f. 125; D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds), *The Statistical Account of Scotland*, vol. 20 (Wakefield, 1983) 165; S.R.O., GD 170/1061/10.
- 54). S.R.O., Rose of Kilravock Papers, GD125/22/2/5; S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/180/66.
- 55). N.L.S., Ms 13497, p. 90; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16698, f. 50.
- 56). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16691, f. 80; Mss 17505, f. 78.
- 57). S.R.O., Robertson of Lude, GD 132/764/23a, 25, 27; N.L.S., Ms 1238, f. 265.
- 58). A.J. Youngson, *After the Forty Five: The Economic Impact on the Scottish Highlands* (Edinburgh, 1973), 36; L. Leneman, *Living in Atholl: a Social History of the Estate 1685 - 1785* (Edinburgh, 1986), 136-37; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/2221/3.
- 59). N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, Ms 13497, p. 12, 19; B.A.M., Box 50/4/1; N.L.S., Ms 17505, f. 103; N.L.S., Murray Erskine Papers, Ms 5080, f. 9; H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Ross-shire, 1:1/1/1, Meeting 29 July 1778, Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Cromarty Meeting 31 July - 20 October 1778. In the October meeting in Cromarty two men were conscripted for deserting their employment.
- 60). S.R.O., F.E.P. E 721/2, p. 67; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1149, f. 56; Ms 1482, f. 207; A.B.D.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Bute-shire, C 05/1/1/1, p. 266.
- 61). A.B.D.A., Minute Book of Commissioners of Supply Argyllshire, 149; P.R.O., W.O. 4/58, p. 56.
- 62). For attitudes on leases: E.R. Cregeen, 'The Tacksman and their Successors: a Study of Tenorial Reorganisation in Mull, Morvern and Tiree in the Early Eighteenth Century' in S.S., vol. 13 (1969), 99 n. 5; S.R.O., GD 170/1061/1/2; GD 170/1061/3/1.
- 63). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1090/25.
- 64). N.L.S., Ms 13497, p. 19, 56; S.R.O., Scrymgeour/Wedderburn Muniments, GD 137/3383, 3387, 3388, 3390, 3384; H.R.A.: - Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Ross-shire, 1:1/1/1, Meeting 29 July 1778.
- 65). For importance of a scattered military as part of recruiting policy see footnote 59 . W.R. Ward, 'The Land Tax in Scotland 1707-98', *B.J.R.L.*, vol. 37 (1955), 294 - 95; H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Caithness, 1:1/1, Meeting 5 and 13 April

1776, 27 December 1780, 19 February 1781, 16 September 1782, Minutes of Commissioner of Supply Sutherland, 1:1/1, p. 9.

66). N.L.S., Ms 13497, p. 99, 108. The implications and effect of military recruiting on substantial farmers is dealt with in greater detail in the chapter on estate recruiting.

67). S.R.O., GD 427/302/11; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/2/54-55; GD 44/43/204/24.

68). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16520 ff. 59, 61, 63; N.L.S., Ms 13497, p. 151, 153, 160, 167.

69). T. Hayter (ed.), *An Eighteenth Century Secretary at War: The papers of William Viscount Barrington* (London, 1988), 54.

70). P.R.O., W.O. 4/59, p. 55, 147; W.O. 1/979, Argyll-Barrington, 30 July, 14 & 18 October 1759; W.O. 1/614, f. 343; W.O. 4/62, p. 231; W.O. 4/66, p. 179 & 227. T. Hayter, loc. cit., 54.

71). Ibid., 37. For further details on de-mobilisation policy in an imperial and national context see chapter five, footnote 78, p. 218; S.R.O., Mackay of Bighouse GD 87/1/95.

72). Sir L. Namier & J. Brooke (eds.), *The History of Parliament: House of Commons 1754-1790*, vol. 2, (London, 1964), 195; N.L.S., Ms 16714, f. 123.

73). Chapter three, footnote 59, p. 126.

74). P.R.O., W.O. 25/3200; W.O. 1/995, f. 869; W.O. 1/998, Oughton-Barrington 15 June, 10 July & 19 August 1778; S.R.A., Commissioners of Supply Bute-shire, C 05/1/1/1, p. 265-66; H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Inverness-shire, 1:1/1/2, p. 51; Minutes of Commissioners of Supply Cromarty, 1:1/3/2, 20 October 1778; P.R.O., W.O. 1/997, f. 259.

75). P.R.O., W.O. 1/1005, ff. 557, 573, 605; H.R.A., Minutes of Commissioner of Supply Ross-shire, Meeting 2 April 1779; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/5/1/41.

76). S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/56/4/57.

77). N.L.S., Yester Papers, Ms 7054, f. 103; Ms, 7056, ff. 11, 19; S.R.O., Robert Graigie of Glendoick Papers, GD1/609/3/5; N.L.S., Ms 1143, f. 368, A.M. Smith, *Jacobite Estates of the Forty Five* (Edinburgh, 1982), 14. See footnote 14, p. 68.

78). N.L.S., Murray Erskine Papers, Ms 5079, ff. 86, 169; Mss 5080, ff. 33, 79.

79). N.L.S., Ms 13497, p. 36-52, 61, 69, 72, 74; N.L.S., Ms 16519, f. 105.

80). S.R.O., F.E.P. E767/31/1(2), 6, 16, 34, 43, 44. The movement of troops onto estates was not confined to Lochgarry. In February 1776 a party of recently enlisted soldiers was ordered into Sunart to arrest a deserter. The underlying motive was to recruit using their presence and orders to coerce the area. Again indicative of the self-reinforcing nature of recruitment and desertion: S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1051/2.

81). D.M. Henderson, *Highland Soldier: A Social Study of the Highland Regiment 1820-1920* (Edinburgh, 1989), 5-6; L Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, 1992), 120, 294.

Chapter Three

Recruiting Policy in the Highlands 1763-1815

The era from the mid 1760s through until the war against revolutionary France represented, in many ways, the maturing of the British-Highland military as formalised in 1739 and subsequently enlarged by the Seven Years War. The use of Highlanders in the successive conflicts against the American colonies and France has, in turn, been viewed as the continuation of a "natural" relationship between the crown and proprietors. More recent analysis has broadened this link by suggesting an exceptional role for military service in rehabilitating certain sections of the Highland elite involved in the Jacobite uprisings of the earlier eighteenth century. This, in effect, added an extra layer of compatibility and urgency to these military links.¹

However, while useful, this analysis fails in several respects. Recruiting undoubtedly rehabilitated certain families, yet the majority of the Highland elite had never been Jacobite, and most families by 1775-93 had no immediate need to justify themselves to this extent. Concentration on the theory of rehabilitation has resulted in a lack of analysis on other aspects of the government's policy. This is a significant omission, as the aims of government, most commentators agree, seemed to place disproportionate emphasis on the region and its military capabilities. More detailed examination is necessary to explain why the state constructed and implemented a strategy which entailed hundreds of thousands of pounds being expended on what many contemporaries saw as excessive patronage. This cannot be explained simply in terms of a vague "natural" partnership, or the generic determinant of "the strong military tradition."² The Scottish and Welsh Borders had a strong martial tradition, but it could hardly be argued that their military experience in 1763-1805 was similar to that of the Scottish Highlands. Attempts must be made to clarify the practical reasons for the government's recruiting strategy. This involves re-assessing the impact of 1745 upon the wider perceptions of central government, as much as on individual ex-Jacobite families. Further, the military policies constructed for the Highlands need to be placed alongside the parallel development of on going commercial change in the region. This context suggests that recruiting policy should be analysed as part of a wider military strategy which acknowledged and protected economic growth in the rest of the United Kingdom.

The Development of State Recruiting 1765-1805

Given the importance of the military to the development of the Highlands in the last half of the eighteenth century, it is surprising how little analysis there has been on trends within the army in this period. Any survey of this subject must first acknowledge the influence of the Hanoverians. From this perspective, the Highlands were part of the military resources of a monarchy steeped in Germanic concepts of militarism. One result of this was the infusion of ideas from the continent, and from Prussia in particular. Within such states it was common practice to grade the various groups within the realm into those who were by disposition, or otherwise, more inclined to martial activity. Thus Frederick the Great ranked his populations and nobility in terms of their propensity for military service. The largely rural Pomeranians were considered hardy and uncomplicated, and their proclivity for military service considered the most deep rooted and natural. In contrast, the populations around the heavily urbanised area of Berlin and the Rhine were ranked last and the least valuable in terms of defending the realm. This merely reflected contemporary ideas that rural populations were more martial. More significantly, peoples living in mountainous areas were, within European thought, considered ideal - the populations of Switzerland and Austrian Lombardy being fine examples. While the infusion of Germanic concepts, unrealistic as they appear, may seem irrelevant to Highland conditions it should be noted that within the military elite they played a part in rationalising the disproportionate emphasis government began to put on the region. ³

Another consequence of this continental link was the fact that many attitudes towards the army merely reflected the situation within German states whereby the sovereign tended to perceive the military as very much his own personal responsibility, especially in a managerial sense. At a more fundamental level, the eighteenth century saw the completion, evident throughout the whole of western Europe, of a process whereby states came to establish firm control of their respective military machines. This involved the promotion of certain forms of recruitment above others. The trend within the British army was the development, in theory at least, of an extremely loyal and professionalised military officer class - paid and maintained by the revenue of the state. This new military elite developed slowly; the whole process was inconsistently enforced, and often met with serious set-backs and difficulties. Nevertheless, to encourage this new professionalism a coherent promotion structure was preferred amongst most executives. By this means loyalty and long service brought the prospect of regulated and imminent promotion. ⁴

This trend in the structure of the army had important implications for the Highlands. The emphasis was on the development and protection of officers already established within its ranks. The objective was to build up expertise in long established regiments, with the officers and experienced men recruiting new soldiers when this became necessary. In contrast to this method lay the option of new battalions, which tended to involve the use of local connections and interest to raise men. This was the practice that appeared to be the most successful in the Highlands. Mobilised in the north of Scotland by the large landlords, and in the Lowlands and England by urban co-operatives, these new regiments could raise men quicker than old established units. The operation was accomplished by tapping reservoirs of manpower that professional officers, through their lack of an immediate legal or economic lever, could not influence. This meant the appointment of junior or new officers into higher rank by their recruiting for commissions. Such officers were appointed as a result of their ability to gain men, not on the basis of their military record. Thus, in 1778, when discussing the officer choice of the Edinburgh regiment, its supporters stated that local power and influence was as much a prerequisite as an established career in the army. Within the military high command, it was perceived that such appointments distorted the promotion flow and discouraged the established officer cadre - a situation the military authorities tried hard to avoid. ⁵

The first point to note concerning the relationship between landlords and government was that far from being a preferable option, the dominant form of Highland recruiting ran against trends that were evident throughout most military machines in western Europe. On 26 August 1775, King George III, a strong proponent of professionalism, noted regarding pressure to institute new regiments. " I shall never agree to disobliging the whole army by giving them (new battalions) to every young man that pretends he can soon complete them. " ⁶ Despite the various commentaries on the nature of levying in the region, the fact that Highland recruiting took a form that displeased the military elite has never been highlighted sufficiently. This conflict over recruiting methods has important implications for when and under what conditions Highland levying would take place. If recruiting by landlords was a strategy disliked by the crown, it was a matter of course that they would not grant such regiments instantly. Indeed, the chapter will demonstrate that because of the reluctance to allow recruiting for promotion, most Highland regiments in the American War were only established after professional officers had enlisted all the men they could gain by the means at their disposal. A vital consequence of these differing methods was that when the crown finally asked landlords to raise regiments, it invariably did so when the national recruiting situation was poor. The result of this was that landlords were forced to a greater degree to utilise their own population resources. This trend is discussed more fully in the chapter on estate recruiting, but it should be noted that the crown's position could

compromise the Highland landlords' natural wish to avoid excessive recruitment from his or her own estate. ⁷

As well as a dislike of new regiments, the relationship between the state and Highland proprietors was complicated in other ways. The Highland military establishment, for instance, varied in size and thus in importance. An obvious qualifying point for any steady link between the landlords and the state, was the fact that the latter was often forced to cut and disband units with little or no warning. The underlying reason was the sheer cost, in financial and political terms, of maintaining regular battalions on a long-standing basis. The Seven Years War, for instance, sent the national debt from £ 74 million to £ 133 million. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Peace of Paris in 1763 saw the British army drop from 120 battalions to 70, lowering the level of men from 170 000 to 30 000. Appendix four, which illustrates the level of half pay officers in this period, demonstrates the same demobilisation occurred again in 1783. ⁸ The period 1765-75 was dominated by the concepts of professionalism, and thus saw a distinctive recruiting pattern re-emerge within the United Kingdom. This involved the deliberate eschewing of the practices by which recruiting in the Highlands had largely been accomplished. Rather than a " natural relationship ", recruiting was now within a state sponsored framework which lowered the necessity for proprietorial involvement. Indeed, table 3:1 demonstrates the stagnation of the British-Highland military in the period 1765-74.

Table 3:1. Officers of Highland Regiments within British Army 1740-1784
(Source, *Annual Army Lists*) ⁹

Year	Total Army Officers	Total Officers Highland Regiments	%
1740	2080	27	1.2
1762	4449	401	9.0
1765	2773	26	0.9
1770	2326	28	1.2
1774	2912	26	0.8
1780	4765	444	9.3
1784	3336	97	2.9

These figures demonstrate that, during 1765-74, the army as a whole only increased slowly, but more so in the last four years before the revolt in America - a period when economic conditions in the Highlands were in a state of increasing change. Unlike the army as a whole, growth in Highland levies was conspicuously lacking in the period leading up to the conflict with the colonies. Analysis of this peacetime pattern demonstrates that while a constant call for additional troops was evident, the "natural relationship" was never deployed in peacetime. This poses questions as to the nature of the crown proprietary relationship. Rather than a constant feature of Highland society, large scale military recruiting by the landlord was, in fact, an episodic phenomenon, and suggests that the links between the state and Highland proprietors were ad hoc, less deeply rooted than has been suggested, and characterised by a certain level of ambiguity.

However, the emergence within the army of more permanent and regulated regiments did not necessarily diminish the role that the military played in the Highlands. It was a characteristic of Highland officers and landlords from the 1760s until the mid 1790s to retain an optimistic attitude towards their potential role in the wider British military. From as early as January 1763, Mungo Campbell of Glenure believed that a series of American regiments were to be raised, and that his reduction to half pay would not be necessary. In the spring of 1762, seven British regiments were sent to Portugal as part of a pact against Spain. Simon Fraser, erstwhile of Lovat, was given a brigadier's commission in this service, as well as being allowed his half pay. This gave him £ 6000 a year, and later enabled him in the late 1760s to purchase Morar from the Glengarry family. This represented the professionalisation of elements in the Highland elite, which, in turn, engendered a certain bullishness concerning their prospects in the military. By early 1763, Captain William Grant of Ballindalloch had already negotiated the purchase of a major's commission in the hope of eventually gaining command of a regiment. The £ 1025 this latter transaction would cost, represented a large capital investment, and it was completed against the advice of his lawyer, John Mackenzie of Delvine. However, Grant noted;

I am sensible it is laying out a great deal of money, full as much as I can well afford, if not more.... the army is my plan, and the command of a battalion at my time of life is another very considerable advantage. My fortune as a private gentleman is but a very moderate one, the army is no doubt in some respects a lottery [by] which addition I hope will enable me to live entirely upon the King's bounty. ¹⁰

These positive attitudes were enhanced by developments elsewhere in the empire. By March 1763, half pay ensigns and lieutenants, at the request of the East India Company, were

allowed by the crown to serve in India without loss of future army rank or half pay. This policy delayed, by as much as twelve years, the return of such officers to the Highlands. Lieutenant Lewis Grant of the 42nd Highland Regiment returned to Urquhart in 1775 from service with the Company, while Alexander Macdonald of Balranald in North Uist, who also saw service in Bengal, later re-settled on his home farm with his half pay.¹¹ India continued as a political and military problem when, in 1770-71, parliament debated the East India recruiting Bill. While again demonstrating the trend of attempted regulation of the military, the legislation intended allowing 1 600 men per annum to be recruited for service with the Company. As part of this defence policy, on 5 July 1769, Scottish proprietors were informed that in an effort to cut costs in India, the government had agreed with the Company that it could recruit throughout the United Kingdom for its military wing. A decision that by late 1770, had already yielded results in the Highlands.¹² These new imperial opportunities demonstrated to the Highland elite that Britain's expanding military machine represented an almost unlimited arena for investment and economic security.

These developments explain why, throughout 1768-70, Lord John Murray, colonel of the 42nd Highland Regiment, pushed hard for a second battalion. On 13 November 1769, despite constant political networking, Murray was reminded of official policy by the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, under whose civilian jurisdiction his regiment then lay. He was ordered to stop requesting new levies and remember that such decisions were the crown's concern. The Falkland incident, which had involved a Spanish occupation of the islands, saw new army augmentations ordered on 11 February 1770. However, for financial reasons they occurred on the Irish establishment in the form of a new battalion staffed by half pay officers from the Irish list. This development seemingly precluded any hope of new levies for Highland officers.¹³

The maintenance of the military as an option for the Highland elite was also fostered by the constant rumours regarding recruiting in the region. In 1765, a serious native revolt challenged the colonial settlement within North America. As a result, officers and men of the Highland Regiment were delayed in their return to the region. The poor situation in the colonies encouraged Highland landlords to speculate on the likelihood of additional levies. By October 1765, William, Earl of Sutherland, informed John Mackenzie of Delvine that six new regiments were to be raised, and that he was to inform the estate authorities in the north. By 1768, it was reported in the press that two new Highland regiments were to be raised for duty in America. Likewise, in September 1768, it was reported that two new battalions from the catholic population in the region were to be recruited for service on the continent. This particular development suggests that the orthodox chronology ascribed to the military element in relief for Roman Catholics should be revised backwards, and that the

precedent of events in 1778 should be questioned. On top of these conjectured regiments, was the likelihood of a Scottish militia, now deemed necessary by some in light of the drain of regular battalions to colonial destinations by early 1769. Again, in August 1772, it was rumoured that two regiments of Highlanders were to be raised for colonial service. The rumours of levies continued right up until the outbreak of the war in America. On 17 February 1775, Lieutenant-Colonel Allan McLean offered to raise a levy. Likewise, in an interesting demonstration of perceptions, it was reported in June 1775, that Thomas Gage, the Commander-in-Chief in North America, had personally asked for Highland levies to the extent of five thousand men. ¹⁴

The phenomenon whereby regiments were constantly expected in the Highlands was also evident in the later period of the French wars. In 1790, the fourth Duke of Gordon and the fourth Earl of Breadalbane, as well as the trustees of the Countess of Sutherland, believed they would raise men. Perhaps the most optimistic example is Allan Cameron of Erracht who offered to raise men in the Highlands in 1787, 1788, 1790 and 1791. ¹⁵ As a result of the establishment's preference for a professional military, none of these levies, either in the 1760s or early 1790s came into existence. Regardless of this, the importance of these rumours and developments should not be overlooked. Firstly, it was the perception of a constant possibility, indeed, the inevitability of Highland levies, that should be emphasised. Even on the occasions when Britain was at peace from 1763-1793, the longest length of time when a regiment was not rumoured for the region was still only three years. Thus, even during years of peace, the military opportunities open to Highland proprietors and half pay officers was, in their eyes at least, a development that was neither dim nor distant. As such, when considering the various avenues open to them, military levies or commissions remained an extra option for landlords in the region. The growth in the ideas of professionalism, whereby long serving officers gained the majority of new commissions, could have reduced the level of ongoing militarisation in the Highlands. However, even professionalism kept the potential military use of the region to the forefront through the existence of large numbers of half pay officers in and from the Highlands. This social group, and that of the Chelsea pensioner, constituted an important capitalised section in Highland society, and any policy regarding them is worthy of notice. ¹⁶

Appendix four illustrates the annual costs voted by parliament for pensions (half pay) given to officers forcibly reduced at the end of the major conflicts of 1756-63 and 1775-83. By March 1763, as the figures illustrate, the peace had dramatically increased the numbers of half pay officers. In an attempt to lower these costs, and ensure that officers with valuable experience were returned to active duty, the crown reiterated a regulation passed in April 1729 which stipulated that vacancies were to be filled by returning half pay officers to active

service. This policy, coupled with the death of older pensioned officers, explains why the amount was slowly reduced during the years of peace by an average of just over £ 3 000 per annum. In certain cases, the experience of such officers was so valued that the government adopted a proactive policy of reinstatement. In September 1765, sixty three commissioned officers from established regiments were returned to the army at an annual cost of £ 7 300. By the reduction in pensions the officers only cost, in real terms, £ 3 650 - illustrating the cost effective use that these annuitant officers could be put to. The drive by government to re-deploy this latent officer corps can be illustrated by comparing the successively lower half pay costs and the relatively constant costs of the Chelsea out-pensions establishment in appendix four.¹⁷

More significantly, the crown made further provision in this department by allowing the exchange of an annuitant with another officer of the same rank within the army. By paying up the difference in the value of their half pay (reckoned at ten years purchase) and the regulated price of a commission, an officer could return to full service at the rank at which he had been disbanded. (See appendix seven).¹⁸ This exchange regulation was significant in that it dramatically cut the cost of returning to full time military service. While the prices for commissions were officially regulated, the lack of places during peacetime saw officers able to sell at much higher prices. By 1773, Alexander Campbell, a brother of John Campbell of Barcaldine in Argyllshire, assured another relation that upon promotion to lieutenant colonel, he would in turn be able to sell it for £ 5 000 - 30% above the regulation price. (See appendix seven). Half pay exchanges were, however, closely regulated, with payments being returned to the War Office. As a result, such large differences between official and actual prices were difficult to achieve, and so half pay officers were protected from inflated prices. In real market terms, being a pensioned officer more than halved the cost of commissions. Such a system was of real worth to the Highland elite, whose chronic indebtedness is clearly understood. By 1775, the debts on the Barcaldine estate ran at £ 15 000. Alexander Campbell, as a half pay lieutenant colonel was able to gain full rank and save £ 1 948 from credit resources - equivalent to 13% of the entire family debt.¹⁹

The half pay policy was thus useful within the context of an encumbered elite increasingly involved in the utilisation of credit; indeed, the half pay regulation merely represented free credit from the crown to the pensioned officer for half the price of his commission. Allied to this financial advantage that encouraged the return of such officers into the military, was the fact that standing units such as the Highland Regiment, with twenty six half pay officers, became the focus for battalion raising schemes. Lord John Murray used the known fact of so many half pay officers, and the crown's official desire to see them returned to duty, as a selling point for his second battalion. By late October 1769, he noted that rather than it

being an expense, a second Highland levy would lower the overall costs of the half pay. (This would have amounted to approximately £1 899 per annum). Likewise, half pay personnel, once they had gained approval from the crown, could advertise and exchange with other officers regardless of their respective regiments. Thus Captain William Macintosh of Dunachton in central Inverness-shire, who had been demobilised in 1763 from the 89th Highland regiment, later transferred into the 69th.²⁰

In these respects the exchange policy was significantly appropriate in the circumstances of the mid and late eighteenth century Highlands. Table 3:2 demonstrates the extent to which the region was represented disproportionately within the British half pay structure. It should be noted that these figures undoubtedly under-estimate total Highland personnel. Only those from Highland regiments are listed, with the non-Highland officers in these levies removed. Moreover, it is known that other battalions within the army contained both ordinary soldiers and officers from the region. The exchange policy was thus more significant within the north because of this Highland over representation. As a proportion of the entire British whole, the Highland half pay fell from 12.2% to 11.2%, during the period 1765-1774. Alternatively, in the same period the British half pay fell by 20.7%; the Highland by 27.3%. By the end of the peace in August 1775, Highland officers constituted a lesser percentage of the half pay because they were exchanging at a higher rate back into the main military.

Table 3:2. British-Highland Half Pay Officers.
(Source:- *Annual Army Lists*)

Year	British Half Pay	Highland Half Pay	%
1762	300 #	26	8.6
1765	2453 *	300 *	12.2
1770	2164	256	11.8
1774	1945	218	11.2
1780	1491	145	9.7
1784	2626	278	10.5

- The figure of 300 for 1762, does not include the Irish half pay establishment, which in that year stood at approximately 100. That would have made the Highland half pay in 1762,

6.25%. Thereafter, when described as British half pay, the Irish establishment is included. (The Irish establishment was the military force paid for by the assembly in Dublin and therefore not officially part of Britain's army, though in reality the Irish establishment constituted a reserve).

* - The official figure for the half pay of 1765 was actually 2419, with a corresponding Highland half pay of 274. This would have given a percentage of 11.3%. However, Colonel Staat-Morris's 89th Highland regiment, which had been serving in India, was actually reduced in late 1765, but not registered in the official figures for that year. As a result twenty six additional Highland officers were in reality demobilised out of the regiment's thirty four officers.²¹

Table 3:2, however, represents the entire half pay, and includes officers from the earlier conflicts of the Spanish and Austrian Succession. By 1765, these older officers, who had already been given the chance to re-enter service, numbered 374. Highland officers correspondingly totalled, twenty six. Such men like Captain John Campbell of Strachur, tended to buy or exchange back into the military in the period after 1748, or during the mobilisations prior to the Seven Years War. Thus, for instance, the commissions for the augmentation of the 42nd in 1756 were specifically reserved for Highland officers who had served in the Earl of Loudon's regiment or the Independent Companies of Highlanders during the 1739-1748 conflict.²²

With this in mind, it is highly probable that in the post 1765 period, it was only those officers who had been demobilised in 1763 who were, in reality, likely to exchange back onto full pay. Table 3:3 illustrates this more focused group. By highlighting those most likely to return to military service, the pattern evident within Highland officers is even more marked. This can be illustrated by the background of officers appointed from half pay back into the army in December 1770 during an augmentation of the standing army. In that month, a total of sixty pensioned officers on the British/Irish establishment were re-appointed. Officers from Highland regiments totalled seven - or 11.6% of the entire re-appointees. Again, this is disproportionate and reflects almost exactly the large imbalance of Highland officers within the pension structure. Moreover, the augmentation of late 1770 was an unusually large affair. Half pay officers usually returned to service merely as the places became available.²³

Table 3.3. British & Highland Half Pay officers reduced in 1763.
(Source:- *Annual Army Lists*)

Year	British Half Pay	% Decrease	Highland Half Pay	% Decrease
1765	2079	-	274	-
1770	1896	8.8	236	13.8
1774	1735	8.4	201	14.8

The pattern evident in table 3:3, suggests that in the four years prior to the American War of Independence, officers from Highland backgrounds were, by inclination, and through the sanction of official policy, almost twice as likely to return to full military service. ²⁴

In summary, the ideals of professionalism remained at work upon one of the most important sections of tenantry in the Highlands. In essence, government policy throughout 1763-1775, had been to encourage the remilitarisation of the half pay officer class. With the coming of the American War, their position was again highlighted with regard to the possibilities of a return to service. Whether such officers ought to return to army service was, in fact, a matter of legal ambiguity - a situation that was evident throughout most of the 1739-1815 period. As early as March 1749, Henry Pelham had attempted to ensure that this particular group were legally held to be under the Mutiny Act. This would have left them open to abrupt and mandatory orders to re-join the military. Opposition groups felt that this was an attempt to increase electoral influence within the counties and shires, where it was generally comprehended that half pay officers generally resided. During the 1749 debates, it was pointed out that there was no need to force such officers back into the army, rather that the opposite was true, most had in fact tried to return to the military, but had failed to find places. Nevertheless, by focusing on the actions or potential actions of the officers, the debate clarified their cultural position and expected behaviour. Henry, second Lord Bathurst, stated that any officer who was physically capable of returning to military service, ought, especially in wartime, to be plainly informed his expected actions. All members of parliament agreed that any officer drawing a pension and deemed capable of service, was socially reprehensible if he failed in his duty. Finally, it was agreed that in return for not putting them under military law, the government kept " a power to strike them off the half pay if they refuse to serve. " ²⁵

There can be little doubt that in terms of cultural stigma, these pensioned officers were sensitive of their position. At the beginning of the American War in August 1775, Lieutenant Adam Stewart of Blackhills in Elginshire, noted to Colonel James Murray, uncle to the Duke of Atholl, that;

Owing to the rebellion in America I suppose many of the half pay officers may be called upon. As the situation would not allow of my serving again I should be glad to know if you, think that by application to the Secretary of War I could still retain my half pay. ²⁶

Stewart was allowed to keep his pension on the recommendation of Barrington. Nevertheless, there remained no institutional framework whereby the position of these officers was determined. Official policy, therefore, induced uncertainty. This engendered a situation that was diametrically opposite to the precepts of agricultural improvement which stressed, above all else, that security to invest was vital. ²⁷ This has important implications for the Highlands. The chapter on estate recruiting suggests that such officers were recognised as useful and substantial tenants, yet government policy did not encourage them in that position. This uncertain situation for pensioned personnel had, in fact, been evident from the beginning of 1775. On 20 February, naval officers, already required by law to return to full time service if required, were told by the War Office to prepare for notice. By 28 October 1775, the Admiralty required that all naval officers inform them as to their place of residence. Lieutenant David Kinloch from the Perthshire parish of Clunie on the Highland line, later stated " My being a lieutenant of the navy on half pay, subjects me to be called out at present to serve in that capacity. " ²⁸

Likewise, in February 1775, the authorities alerted Chelsea out-pensioners to the fact that they were to report for an assessment of their fitness for further duty. The pensioners in the northern counties of Scotland were given until late March to report to certain burghs or else lose their pension. As it was, these particular annuitants were indicative of the role of ex-military personnel in perpetuating militarisation. Firstly, table 7:6 reveals the increase in the numbers of these pensioners. The Highlands from the 1760s onwards, was well endowed with a latent recruiting resource of some magnitude. Attempts were successfully made to ensure that pensioners of the 42nd acted as an informed recruiting interest in the nearest town or market to where they resided. In 1775, as a result of the move to re-deploy the pensioners, the Chelsea out pension fell nationally by over £ 14 700. (See appendix four) ²⁹ As with pensioned officers, the use of such men often represented the removal of a useful social group from within the Highlands, while their use as recruiting agents is indicative of the role of government policy in maintaining militarism within the region.

Throughout 1775, this uncertainty over mobilisation continued. By July, it had been decided to augment the 42nd Highland Regiment to 1 000 men. Likewise, on 5 August, after deciding that 2-3 000 men were to be raised in Ireland, the War Office announced that any officers " who desire to be again employed in their present rank are directed to signify the same to the Secretary of War. " In that month, seven half pay officers from Highland regiments returned to military duty. In October, Barrington informed Lord John Murray that, rather than promoting certain ensigns, the crown wished to ensure that any lieutenants from earlier Highland regiments would be given preferment - again illustrating how proactive government policy was in returning Highland officers to service. Again, in October, six Highland half pay recipients returned to duty, while it was noted by the civilian elite in the region that, " The half pay officers are all getting on full pay and recruiting is going on. " ³⁰

The confusion this caused is evident when, on 10 October 1775, Lieutenant Norman Macleod near Dunvegan in Skye was re-appointed to the Highland Regiment. However, the letter ended up with another Lieutenant Norman Macleod on the farm of Grealin on Macdonald of Sleat's estate in Kilmuir parish, Skye. This officer took fright and wrote to the Secretary asking to be continued on half pay. This problem occurred again in the case of Captain John Forbes of New from the disbanded 114th Highland regiment. He had also received a letter from Barrington who, on Lord John's advice, had restored him to full time military service. Forbes wrote he did not wish to return and asked whether the rumour that all officers were to be re-appointed was true, or whether the King had decided that officers wishing to remain outside the service could do so. Barrington informed Lord John Murray that the latter decision was now official policy. Murray apologised, adding that he had not actually discussed military service with Forbes but had been informed he was a good candidate. On 21 February 1776, Murray again apologised for having recommended Lieutenant Charles Cameron, another half pay officer who had no wish to return to the army. ³¹ For almost another three years, Murray campaigned hard for a second battalion for the Highland Regiment. Indeed, by the time he received permission to raise on 29 July 1779, Murray had asked the War Office or individuals within the high command on no less than five occasions. In early 1776, after contacting army agents who dealt with annuitant officers, it was calculated that Lord John could go to the War Office with the information that, at a bare minimum, there were still 105 Highland half pay officers fit for service - enough to staff three entire regiments. Murray later made it clear that several pensioned officers had refused commissions in the hope that a second battalion would be raised. The end result of these schemes was the constant reinforcement in government's mind of the military potential in the area. ³²

Official policy remained that any half pay officer returning to service could almost certainly do so, but would not be forced to return to the army. Nevertheless, pressure remained on this group to return to military service. On 30 July 1778, the War Office informed every major on half pay who had received that rank prior to December 1771, that any who had; " Not applied for employment [and] propose to be comprehended in a promotion intended to be made by His Majesty, they were to return to actual service, and make application to the Secretary. " ³³

When, in the spring of 1778, fencibles were ordered for Scotland, Barrington had attempted to ensure that colonels like Lord Frederick Campbell informed any half pay officers that they would not lose their pension upon subsequent demobilisation. It was an obvious attempt to make the return to fencible service appealing to such men. In the case of the Argyll Fencibles this was partly successful, with two out of the seven captains coming from half pay, and a third having already served in the fencibles of 1759-63. In such circumstances uncertainty continued, as illustrated by the responses, in May 1778, of Highland half pay officers to an advertisement from the War Office. The advert ordered that all pensioned officers, regardless of rank, were to report for military service or be removed from the half pay list. Sir Allan McLean in Mull, believing that the government was targeting those that had refused to assist recruiting, wrote stating that any rumours regarding his prevention and disruption of levying on the Island were untrue, and that he hoped the advertisement was incorrect. McLean's paranoid response demonstrates the cultural and social pressure recruiting exerted on this military elite. In more practical terms, the advert was a shock to the pensioned community in the north. Lieutenant John Martin residing on the farm of Flodigarrie in Staffin, Skye, expressed alarm at the prospect of losing his pension, and hoped to be excused. The half pay officers were assured that the advertisement had been set by persons attempting to stir discord between elements of the officer elite and the government, and were informed that half pay was seen by the administration as a reward for past services, not a retaining fee. ³⁴

Appendix five illustrates the number of pensioned officers returning to regiments raised later in the war. There is little discernible pattern beyond demonstrating that, as a percentage of entire regiments, half pay personnel constituted a small element. This is partly explained by the already successful drain of such officers back into the army during the peace. However, it also demonstrates a developing irony with regard to the crown's favoured policy of professional recruiting. As the war progressed and the need for men became more intense, the additional levers of delegatory and proprietary recruiting grew more attractive, while the preferred policy of state recruiting became less tenable. By allowing those who held no rank to recruit for it, Government began to break the concepts of professionalism. Half pay

personnel found that the regulation which forced them to return at the same rank, now meant others could by-pass them and become their superior officers. Certainly there is evidence that the War Office, and Barrington in particular, attempted to ensure that regular notions of military appointments were kept. Nevertheless, contradictions appeared that discriminated against personnel that had already been in the military. In November 1775, Norman Macleod of Macleod, having never held rank in the army before was, nevertheless, given a captaincy in Fraser's regiment. Meanwhile, because it broke regulations, half pay Lieutenant Dugald Campbell in the parish of Craignish in Argyll, was refused approval to raise men for a captaincy.³⁵

It was obvious that this system whereby the half pay officer was bound to re-enter the army at the same rank, could discourage such officers. This included men like Lieutenant Alexander Grant from Tullochgorum in Duthil and Rothiemurchus parish, Inverness-shire. As a pensioned officer who was appointed into Fraser's, Grant was informed by the War Office that "where the officers are recommended by the Secretary at War, they are never promoted from the half pay." As Lord John Murray noted;

That officers, or others who get a step by their commissions will give any money besides what is allowed [government bounties] to secure it, which cannot be expected from officers from half pay returned to the same rank, or officers of a regiment who have no advantage by it.³⁶

So extreme did the need for men become in early 1778, that the crown accepted that those with half pay could get one step up if they recruited in a new battalion. The War Office reiterated that the King would never promote such officers by choice, but that he sometimes "consented to their promotion when recommended by those undertaking to raise new corps." This illustrates that while the state was increasingly relying on the power of delegatory recruiting, pensioned officers remained the preferred personnel. The move to allow pensioned officers one step of promotion was to be formalised in late 1778 by the new Secretary of War, Charles Jenkinson, a policy welcomed by such officers as Lieutenant Dugald Campbell, who wrote on 2 January 1779 to immediately re-propose the offer he had made regarding raising men for a captaincy. Again, the consequence of government policy was to stimulate the move of such officers out of localities. Between 1774 and 1780, the national half pay fell by 23%; more interestingly, the Highland equivalent of half pay fell by 33%, though the prominent role of fencibles in the region partly explains the difference. (See table 3:2).³⁷

The whole issue of half pay officers in the region is instructive, as it demonstrates that military activity in the region was not the work of residue clanship. Government policy was an active element in generating the high profile involvement of this militarised Highland elite in the army. It also illustrates that, under certain conditions, not all military activity in the region was characterised by the simple equation of a relationship between government and landlords.

The British-Highland Military and the American War of Independence 1775-1783

From the Highland perspective, this trend of returning military personnel represents the background against which the events of the American War can be placed. Those connected with the army had already returned in such significant numbers that the conflict allowed for other personnel to fill the new regiments. The war of 1775-83 was thus not merely an opportunity for the expression of traditional militarism; rather it offered the chance for imperial re-militarisation, and was, in effect, a deepening process whereby more Highlanders became involved in state service. With regard to recruitment in the 1775-1780 period, commentators have already suggested continuity from the Seven Years War, where political rehabilitation had been a large, if not exclusive factor. Continuity is certainly evident, but the recruiting strategies determined at Westminster for the region reveal that the real significance lies in the impact of clanship upon government perceptions. In the eyes of London politicians, the subsequent performance of Highland landlords in raising men represented a massive and deep rooted vindication of the supposed attributes of clanship.³⁸

With regard to Scotland's role in the coming mobilisation, notice must be taken of the wider context within Europe and the Three Kingdoms. Recent analysis of Britain's diplomatic position by the mid 1770s has suggested that, while isolated, there was nothing inevitable concerning her inability to gain a continental ally for the coming colonial war. However, in 1775, Britain, unlike previous occasions, lacked a strong continental pact to cover her interests and slow French involvement with the Americans. Anglo-Russian relations were cool, as were those with Prussia. This was to have immediate recruiting consequences for Scotland. In the autumn of 1775, it had been planned by the British to send 20 000 Russian troops to deal with the Americans. Diplomatic uncertainty and misunderstanding, indicative of Britain's cool relations with Catherine the Great, ensured that the troops failed to materialise. As a result, Fraser's 71st regiment was raised. Within the German states, where Britain had traditionally recruited much of its required military, there was initial success. Over 17 000 German mercenaries were contracted for America in the first years of the war. Such troops, while expensive, did mean that Britain (as intended) was not burdened with a larger half pay. However, in 1777, Frederick of Prussia denied such troops the right to

march through his territory, having already raised the cost of such levies by taxing them for the right to transverse Prussia. Allied to this, was the deteriorating situation within the German states generally. George III, as Elector of Hanover, ended Hanoverian levies for British purposes when it became obvious that if war broke out in the continent (it did in Bavaria in 1778), his German territories would be under defended. Due to the same concerns over Bavaria, the Emperor Joseph II, banned British use of mercenaries from his territories. Thus from 1777 onwards, traditional British sources of men were drying up, and it is no coincidence that 1778 proved to be the year of heaviest Highland recruiting during the colonial conflict.³⁹

Within the domestic scene, there were also factors which promoted Scottish involvement in the army. This was due to the political lessons learnt by various Westminster administrations concerning Ireland during, but more especially after the end of the Seven Years War. The Irish parliament, while hardly independent, had, nevertheless, increasingly perceived its role as promoting the Island's economic performance. As a result, it maintained a critical eye on the nature and extent of the military establishment in Ireland, as with the unfavourable February 1768 report on the cost of the army. Caution is necessary in that the critical attitude of the Dublin assembly should not be over emphasised. Its actions were not that of an independent body, but more often that of a political lobby or pressure group. There is little doubt that recruiting was a sensitive issue. In January 1758, the Irish Commons requested that the Lord Lieutenant negotiate to ensure that British establishment regiments did not over recruit in Ireland. In 1761, such was the perceived opposition to British augmentation through recruitment in Ireland, that it was suggested a rumour of a French invasion be deliberately circulated in order to frighten Dublin into agreement. As evidenced in other parts of the empire, Ireland was increasingly viewed from Westminster as a useful resource in terms of wider integrated defence needs. In 1763 and 1765, an army augmentation failed when London refused to ensure that the additional troops would not leave Ireland. This set the context for the failure, in May 1768, of George, fourth Viscount Townshend to secure an enlargement of the army in Ireland from 12 000 to 15 000. From 1769, the *Hibernian Chronicle* noted that additional troops would be sent " to enslave the Americans. " While in November 1775, the *Friends of Ireland* and opposition M.P.s in Dublin like Thomas Connely, deeply criticised the departure of Irish troops for the colonies. For Westminster, the whole period from 1761-1775 demonstrated the sensitivity of recruiting on a large scale in Ireland, and that a cautious approach was necessary.⁴⁰

This background explains why, in March 1775, North made it clear that if additional recruiting was to occur, they were to be raised in equal proportion in England and Scotland.

North did not wish to leave himself open to charges of using Roman Catholic troops against Protestant colonists, nor did he wish to antagonise the Protestant interest in the North of Ireland through the withdrawal of so many levies. The sensitive nature of military recruiting in Ireland can be highlighted by the direct contrast that has been made between the interaction of religious interests and recruiting in both Ireland and Scotland. Significantly, it has been noted that with a hidden government agenda in 1777-1778 of military service in return for religious liberties, it was, nevertheless, considered possible by the crown to make clear in Scotland the military agenda - something that was not considered possible for Ireland. This reflects the added dimension of political volatility inherent in recruiting on a large scale in Ireland, and that in blunt terms Scotland was an easier political option. In reality, however, the crown had little choice but to utilise Irish population resources. By August 1775, despite the King placing a large emphasis on the island's manpower, Barrington informed the cabinet that it was failing as a source of quick recruits. By mid October, the situation was complicated by the deterioration of economic conditions in Ireland. Linen exports to the colonies had fallen, and in order to sustain its domestic market, the parliament in Dublin massively rejected the crown's offer of Hessians to reinforce the island in light of the drains to America. This again merely reiterated the political problems inherent in the use of Irish recruits outside Ireland itself. Thus it can be argued that past experiences with the nature of the Anglo-Irish settlement, worked to facilitate recruitment in the Highlands.⁴¹

The continuing political problems with the military uses of Ireland's population was evident again during the middle of the war. By August 1778, regiments and officers on the British establishment in Ireland had over recruited, resulting in substantially raised bounty levels. This simply encouraged desertion and entry into a different regiment in order to gain another high bounty. Thus the whole Irish military establishment was weakened. As a result, by 19 October 1779, again within the context of wider Irish political pressure for free trade with the rest of the empire, the War Office forbade most British officers from recruiting in Ireland. Added to this was the fact that, in January 1778, the King ordered that Scottish regiments were to recruit in Scotland only. The Glasgow regiment, Seaforth's, Macdonald's, Gordon of Fyvie's and Atholl's were all ordered out of England, and their English recruits handed over to a southern regiment. This policy, however badly enforced, was to have obvious consequences within Scotland by increasing the need to comprehensively utilise all local populations.⁴²

Thus while Ireland remained a disproportionate source for men, it nevertheless retained a dimension of political risk not as obvious in Scotland. Therefore, both within the Highlands in the form of a militarised elite, and in the wider British context, there were factors that had

nothing to do with the supposedly warlike Highlander that, nevertheless, positively precipitated recruiting in the area. This being the case, it can be argued that the move towards Highland recruiting was not indicative of the need for rehabilitation, but more symptomatic of largely completed integration and specialisation within Britain's relatively new imperial military.

The Military Perception of the Highlander: The Unimproved Soldier 1775-1783

This constitutes the backdrop to the recommencement of large scale recruiting in the mid 1770s. Yet there is still a lack of understanding which explains why the government focused on the region to the extent it did. The first reason is that the Seven Years War had in itself profoundly militarised the Highlands. In searching for an avenue to replace the limited recruiting abilities of the professional officer, as well as lost Russian and German troops, the 1756-63 conflict acted as a substantial advert for the potential of the region.

On 23 June 1775, a paper was presented to the War Office entitled *Some Thoughts upon raising a body of Highlanders for the American Service*. As a policy document it deployed the rhetoric of the 1750s with regard to the region. It stressed the speed with which the battalion's of Montgomery and Fraser had been levied, as well as the natural military discipline of Highland manpower. Continuity was again evident, with their suitability for colonial warfare as light infantry also being pin-pointed. The proposal was given additional credibility in terms of military economics, by resurrecting the cannon fodder argument used in the 1750s. The paper highlighted the "wasting" normally suffered by standard troops in the irregular conflicts in the colonies - troops, who from the crown's point of view represented a substantial investment in terms of money and time. This loss could be prevented by the deployment of Highlanders more used to that particular form of fighting.⁴³ The influence of the earlier war was apparent when, on 4 February 1778, Lord Barrington justified regiment raising in Scotland, as opposed to more populous areas. He drew attention to the speed with which Highland troops had been raised in the 1757-63 conflict, and told the Commons that he;

Was satisfied that our armies could never have been recruited, nor our successes been so great or decisive, if it had not been for the great resources drawn from that country.⁴⁴

This speech illustrates the profound impact of the 1756-63 conflict. Nevertheless, even these perceptions would not have been as formative as they subsequently proved to be, had it not been for the fact that the Seven Years War had also profoundly militarised large

sections of the land owning Highland elite. This has already been illustrated in the case of the pensioned officers. The obvious re-entrenched of cultural perceptions in the minds of people like Barrington were undoubtedly vital. Yet in practical terms, the earlier war ensured that with the re-emergence of large scale recruiting, the Highlands had a high profile precedent which acted to self perpetuate and then extend the region's level of militarisation. An example of this was the numerous offers of regiment raising from men like Colonel James Murray who, in January 1776, offered to raise 1 000 men. Similar offers came from Alexander Campbell, Allan McLean of Duart, Captain Ranald Macdonnell of Keppoch, Major Duncan Macpherson of Cluny and Captain Allan Macdonald of Knock. These men would correctly fall into the description noted at the beginning of the war, and quoted as evidence of the region's innate bellicosity. " The present ardour of Highland gentlemen is so great to be employed for His Majesty's service that many of them made offers to raise their proportion of men. " ⁴⁵ Yet there has been a lack of attention given to the fact that most of the offers that came to the War Office throughout the American conflict were not from the aristocratic elite, but from serving or pensioned military officers. As such, these offers did not represent the residue of clanship, rather they provide evidence of militarisation induced by former imperial service.

The 1778 memorial of Alexander Robertson of Straloch demonstrates how the earlier conflict helped to perpetuate Highland involvement in the army. He noted that:

At the late peace [1763] twenty new levied battalions were reduced. Their officers half pay amounted to above £ 50 000. The officers of the reduced regiments are mostly young and still fit for service. If His Majesty. would be pleased to call upon them and establish a new regiment, at a peace they would return to their former half pay and create no additional expense. ⁴⁶

These memorials had an important characteristic which followed a trend evident in the earlier war. They tended to mention the recruiting ability of larger landlords without authorisation or clarification from them. John, fourth Lord of Dunmore, mentioned the lands of the Duke of Gordon and various Macdonald lairds. In March 1777, Lord John Murray had told the King that he could gain substantial numbers of men from the Atholl area, as well as Inverness-shire and Argyll. He explicitly informed the administration of the manpower on the Atholl and Gordon estates, which left London with the impression that these proprietors were ready and willing to raise men. Clarification with the landlords of these properties had, in fact, been minimal, and many estate administrators felt that Murray had taken advantage of the Atholl family. In all, these various offers and schemes put large

proprietors into the mind of government, a fact that was to become evident in late 1777 and early 1778.⁴⁷

By the actions of figures like Straloch and Lord John Murray, the Highlands continued to be reinforced and advertised as a sure recruiting option. Yet, as noted earlier, the policy of government at the beginning of the war had involved continuing the preference for professional recruiting. On 15 February 1775, Barrington commenced British mobilisation by bringing before parliament an augmentation of the navy by 2 000 and the army by 4 388. Given the small amount, it is perhaps surprising that he ran into vehement opposition. The whole topic of the army was heavily politicised, but by releasing troops for use in the colonies, an additional element of controversy was added. On financial grounds the augmentation was attacked for generating additional officers and expense. Barrington countered this by restating official preferences for professionalism and loyalty to the established officer corps, as well as asserting that any new officers would only go to regiments in actual service. This support for professional recruiting was reinforced by opposition figures like Thomas Townshend, M.P. for Whitechurch, who stated that half pay officers ought to be brought into the army, as well as any of the 16 000 Chelsea pensioners who might be fit for military service.⁴⁸

This policy found expression in the north of Scotland when, on 1 July 1775, Barrington informed John, fourth Duke of Atholl, that any Highland pensioned lieutenant could return into service with the additional companies that were to be raised for the Highland Regiment.⁴⁹ By this time, however, the pressure on the professional structure had become extreme. In answer to requests from America, where the army was chronically undermanned, the King replied, on 26 July 1775, that the only reinforcements were Highlanders and marines. It is also a significant point that within the context of the entire empire, the British military establishment, even before the outbreak of the American War, had put a completely disproportionate, not to say wholly unrealistic emphasis on the martial qualities of Highland society. As the summer of 1775 wore on, the profile of the Highland recruiting option heightened. It was noted on 1 August 1775, that Highlanders along with Canadians, Indians and Roman-Catholics were to be employed in the military. Finally, by late August, Lord North, over the objections of Barrington, had decided that it was necessary to seriously consider new regiments. Simon Fraser of Lovat had, interestingly, already put proposals to the administration. The King retained his commitment to military professionalism, and was extremely reluctant to sanction a new regiment. By mid October, as the 2-3 000 men from Ireland failed to materialise quickly, and the Russian option looked increasingly doubtful, the king was forced to concede to North's demands. Fraser's two battalions was accordingly commissioned on 25 October 1775. It is a measure of the extent

to which Britain was desperate for men, that George III agreed to the levy. The King stated that it was against his better judgement, and requested guarantees from North and Barrington that no more applications for new regiments would be considered. In the end, he was probably convinced by Adjutant-General Edward Harvey who held similar views but, nevertheless, stated that the battalions would not be unduly reprehensible to the long serving officers of the army. The reason he gave for this is significant. Harvey explained that Fraser was acceptable because he already held high rank, a fact that supports the argument that the earlier conflict of 1756-63 was instrumental in defining the nature of the Highland's ongoing military experience.⁵⁰

The debates on the army estimates reveal the underlying reasoning behind the government's recruiting strategy, and are a powerful indicator of attitudes towards the region. That the British military establishment felt the region singularly and innately useful in its predicament became obvious when, in November 1775, the House of Commons sat as a finance committee to discuss the £ 47 400.12.0 needed to raise and finance 2 000 Highlanders. The first point of note is that Fraser's was the first new regiment for the army in the American War; this automatically reveals that the government believed the Highlands was more suited to rapid military recruitment than any other area on the British mainland. It was argued simply that the recruitment of Highlanders was the only eligible option. On 8 November 1775, Barrington informed the Commons of the recruiting situation nationally. He rejected claims that the army could not be built up because no one wished to fight fellow Protestants. As noted previously, it has been suggested that Roman Catholic relief was dramatically opposed in 1778, when the military agenda became known. Yet during his November speech, Barrington made it clear to the Commons that recruiting Roman Catholics was neither inadvisable nor illegal. At this point it should be noted how military issues tended to see eighteenth century governments prepared to contemplate surprising initiatives, and broach subjects which, in times of peace, were considered politically dangerous. Barrington's speech made it clear that what made the option of recruiting such minority groups as Highlanders necessary was, firstly, the changed scale of the army itself. He pointed out that in 1755-6, when Britain had last been in a comparable situation of trying to recruit quickly, the army had stood at 40 000 men. The Secretary of War noted that, as he spoke, the army stood at 60 000, with an addition of 27 000 militia in England. Thus, the military was already 47 000 more than it had been when it had last tried to augment quickly. More interestingly, he passed comment on the social and economic reasons for poor army recruitment. Barrington noted the commercialised and full employment nature of Britain itself. Living standards had risen, as well as wealth generating opportunities in the form of an expanding manufacturing and commercial economy. This, in effect, made the army a poor option for most of the population.⁵¹ Within Lowland

Scotland, with its developing economy, wages for even the relatively poorly paid day labourers was 9 d per day in 1773, while by the harvest of 1778, labourers were getting 1/- per day. Both levels contrast favourably with the 6 d per day for soldiers.⁵²

The nature of Barrington's speech again suggests that any examination of the reasons why Highlanders were recruited in such numbers should not focus wholly on the innate bellicosity (real or supposed) of the region. Highland military recruiting was also evidence of the commercialised nature of the rest of the United Kingdom. For contemporaries, the need to protect the wealth generating sectors of the economy threw into sharper focus the military contribution of the Highlands. Sustained economic development outside the region, when allied to the imperial need for troops, enhanced the likelihood of recruiting actually occurring in the North. Within the context of his speech, Barrington, by espousing the raising of Highlanders, was actually explicitly highlighting the commercially unimproved nature of the area.⁵³

Therefore, as well as the political imperatives evident in the 1770s, there was also a definite economic rationale to heavy army recruitment in the Highland region. This attitude can be highlighted by examining contemporary thinking on Highland recruits. It was an accepted fact that such men were inherently cheap. In 1759, when Lord John Murray requested that the King's bounty for the officers of the 42nd be raised from £ 3 to £ 4 it was refused, despite his highlighting the excessive over recruiting which his officers faced. The War Office noted; " that [£3] had been generally allowed by the government for raising a regiment of foot in England, and therefore supposed sufficient for recruiting one in the North of Scotland. " ⁵⁴

Simon Fraser of Lovat, in a defence of his regiment in November 1775 demonstrated these specific economic and fiscal aspects. As regarded a justification for Highland recruiting, he stated;

This mode of raising men, would be a public saving of two fifths of the levy money; for the two battalions would not be more than £ 3 or 3 guineas a man, while that of the other regiments is £ 5 or 5 guineas a man.⁵⁵

In reality, the opposite was the case. In 1769, 3 000 additional men from Ireland had cost £36 000 - £12 a man. In 1775, Fraser's 2 000 men cost £ 47 000 - £ 23.10.0 a man. An examination of the cost of Highland regiments raised in 1778 demonstrate that they were, in reality, no less or no more expensive than regiments from other areas. Analysis of bounties given to soldiers recruited by non-proprietorial methods reveal no discernible pattern to

suggest that any particular Highland counties supplied inherently cheap recruits. (See appendix six). The cheap recruits were gained by a landlord who recruited directly from his own resources and who, in turn, would claim the maximum bounty from government. Indeed, given that recent historiography has emphasised the labour intensive nature of the developing economy in the Highland region, it is not surprising that Highland recruits were just as expensive as any other. Another aspect which facilitated large bounties in the Highlands was the fact that government, due to the course and nature of the war, tended to order levies in groups. Thus in the spring of 1778, seven line regiments were raising in the region; such competition was unprecedented and could only have contributed to bounty inflation.⁵⁶

Regardless of the reality that recruiting economics in the Highlands were not as beneficial to the state as might first appear, early January 1778 saw the rejection of proposals for battalion raising from amongst the gentry of Wales, England and more surprisingly from the nobility of Ireland. It was pointed out in the press that the Welsh retained a significant role in the economy of the United Kingdom, as was later demonstrated when labourers from the Principality, due to the fear of pressing, refused to enter neighbouring Shropshire to help the tenant farmers of the county. In contrast, Captain Allan Macdonald of Knock's memorial on Highland recruiting specifically mentioned it, as not "hurting agriculture or grazings."⁵⁷ Thinking which stressed the unimproved nature of the Highlands was prevalent in higher circles, and can be demonstrated by what was probably the single most illustrative comment on the perceived attraction of the Highlands for the British state in the period 1739-1815. Barrington, in February 1778, told the Commons that the Highlands had a minimal economic part to play and that "the women are more fruitful than the soil."⁵⁸ Such military figures as Barrington, while perhaps aware of the economic potential and development of the region, still only saw it, ultimately, as a recruiting reservation. This attitude could have been unimportant but for the fact that the government had the fiscal power to implement such a policy. The American War demonstrates that, for government at least, men were the primary export of the region. John Knox, one of the most influential commentators on conditions in the Highlands, noted what he considered to be the sum of the state's military concerns.

It seems to be a political maxim with many persons, that the Highlands of Scotland are to be considered merely as a nursery for soldiers and seamen; that the inhabitants formed admirably by nature for the fatigues of the campaign and the ocean, are to be employed in these capacities alone as the occasions of the state may require; and that to facilitate the business of recruiting, it is expedient to keep them low.⁵⁹

Despite the fact that Knox seemed to suggest that recruiting was responsible for the prevention of improvement in the region, such a radical idea was not in fact new. The belief that Scotland as a whole had been utilised by the army to the extent of disrupting its commercial development had been evident during the Seven Years War. Likewise, in September 1775 Henry Dundas had described a policy of using the region as a nursery for the army.⁶⁰

In all, these debates illustrate a facet of the recruiting drive in the region that has too often been overlooked. Contemporaries genuinely believed that the relatively underdeveloped and uncommercialised nature of the region's population made the army more of an option. Thus, paradoxically, lack of commerce made for a good commercial case for Highland recruiting. The relative longevity of official sanction for Highland levying, even in the face of the region's rapid socio-economic change, is explained by the fact that many of the arguments used to justify recruiting policy were, in fact, characterised by economic rationalism and modernity.

From the crown's point of view the lack of developed agriculture and excess of population did, under certain circumstances, make for positive advantage to the state. It was the depth to which these perceptions were held that explains the course of Highland recruitment. In this context, the extent to which the conscious rehabilitation of the Highland elite was on central government's agenda, should be questioned. This can be illustrated by the case of John, fourth Lord Dunmore. He had personally been page-in-waiting to Charles Stuart in 1745, while his father had been attainted for his active part in the uprising. He was, therefore, the representative of a family whose doubtful political past made them ideal candidates for such rehabilitation. Despite a vigorous proposal to raise 4 000 men, the King dismissed the scheme on more contemporary concerns such as Dunmore's lowly rank. Instead, the crown turned to Argyll, Gordon, Breadalbane, Macdonald of Sleat and Mackenzie of Seaforth. The rehabilitation of most of these families was not required. Indeed, the whole concept only tended to be mentioned within the context of defending the contemporary policy of disproportionate recruiting from the region, as with General John Burgoyne's parliamentary defence of Scots in the army on 5 April 1780.⁶¹

Political economy, as opposed to political rehabilitation, lay at the core of Highland recruiting, and while this acted as a powerful stimulus, there was still the problem of the army's dislike of proprietorial levies. Barrington made it clear during the debate in late November 1775, that he was against Simon Fraser's levy as a recruiting scheme. He stated; " He did not like the measure, though it was thought right by those in office, that were better judges and better informed than he was. " ⁶²

Such a statement by a British Secretary of War is remarkable in that it illustrates the lack of reasoned opposition or perceived alternatives to Highland militarisation. Allied to this, is the fact that the parliamentary opposition also deployed a particular terminology regarding recruiting in the region. Opposition figures like the Lord Mayor of London, John Sawbridge, attacked the commonalty of Scotland as despotic by inclination and ready to cut the throats of the colonists. Not inaccurately, John Wilkes blamed a Scottish autocratic interest, and focused on Henry Dundas as a leading proponent of vigorous Scottish involvement in Britain's expanding military. To these attacks were added more generalised comments in relation to Scotland's Jacobite past. Such blatantly scotophobic attacks meant that they were easily countered by government supporters, who pointed out that such remarks merely heightened national differences. In essence, this moved the debate back onto the Union - an arrangement few wished to change or criticise comprehensively. Opposition to Highland recruiting was fundamentally flawed by the fact that most opposition figures understood and agreed with the economic rationality behind it. Highland regiments were opposed merely for being symptomatic of wider contentious imperial policies. As a result, the potentially adverse economic impact on the region was not attacked as a reason to lower levels of recruitment. It is ironic that, by failing to highlight the economic consequences of such strategies, opposition figures also contributed to the hardening of military perceptions concerning the region.⁶³

More reasoned argument came from opposition M.P.s like Sir John Wrottesely. An army officer, he severely criticised the lack of half pay personnel in Fraser's regiment. Barrington, aware that it was widely understood Fraser's levy was only to exist while the war lasted, demurred publicly to Lovat on the question of the nature of his officers. In reality, the field officers (those above captain) were forced to pay for their commissions. Captaincies to Charles Cameron of Locheil and Norman Macleod of Macleod signified the return of proprietary recruiting - undoubtedly offending army sensibilities in the process. Fraser, in his first recorded speech to the House of Commons answered the charges of favouritism. Being rather economical with the truth, he stated that there were not enough Highland half pay officers to staff two battalions. He continued;

He had himself recommended an officer who was a young man of fortune and great abilities. [Macleod] He thought all the officers ought to be of North Britain.⁶⁴

This particular speech on Highland levies, demonstrates how attempts were made to manipulate perceptions of clanship (making Macleod the only man who could gain the men) and to facilitate Highland colonisation of the British fiscal-military state. Clanship was

directly responsible for a substantially different policy for the Highlands. Barrington noted with regard to battalions for the American theatre;

That from old habits in Scotland, corps may be the best method in that part of the Kingdom, that does not in the least hold true for Ireland. Nobody in Ireland has any clan or following, the reasons given for raising Highlanders in corps does not in the least degree apply. ⁶⁵

This willingness to concede entire battalions to Highland recruiters, stands in contrast to decisions regarding recruiting methods elsewhere. On 15 January 1778, the King informed Lord North that he wanted no more offers for levies;

They instead of being a utility only complex and total annihilate all chance of completing the regular forces; particularly in England, the raising of corps would be a total destruction to the army. ⁶⁶

Thus, while largely dead as a social form within the region, clanship was, nevertheless, still deeply influential within the highest government circles. The result of this was that Highland recruiting took a specific form. It enabled landlords from the region to gain battalions as opposed to independent companies, which did not ensure prolonged service, even for the period of any given conflict. By ensuring recruiting took this specific form, government perceptions of clanship constitute one of the most significant factors in the emergence and expansion of the British Highland military. This emphasis also explains why it was large Highland landowners like Argyll, Gordon and Seaforth that were specifically targeted by the state. Moreover, aware that government thinking was characterised in such terms, Highland grandees used notions of clanship to facilitate the involvement of other Highland lairds in their regiments. In essence, it became a tool to disrupt, on an unprecedented scale, the regulated promotion of army officers in order that Highland lairds could get preferential treatment. This is evident in the statements of the Earl of Seaforth. He perpetuated notions of clanship when he observed that 4 000 men that would have been lost to the army had, in fact, been procured by his own personal intervention. In an instructive letter, Mackenzie of Cromartie informed Lord North in early January 1778, that given the feelings of local loyalty, and the scale of recruiting in the region, it was vital that the populations of the estates of the Chisholm and Macleod family be utilised in the form of higher commissions for Captain Duncan Chisholm and Norman Macleod of the 71st. The King refused, stating that it was against regulations and that he would not sanction every Scottish officer recommended by Highland lairds. Interestingly, the crown did not disagree with the

reasoning, but considered such rapid promotion too exceptional for the army. The King noted;

I shall say nothing in regard to complaints that may arise from the English officers as to the great promotion among the Scotch occasioned by the new Highland levies. By promoting those already in Britain, this is wounding those serving in America. ⁶⁷

Yet such was the belief that these lairds could rapidly raise men that Macleod did, in fact, gain the major's commission in Cromartie's second battalion. The very real and concrete material benefits derived from the government's attitudes towards clanship can be seen from the case of Macleod. By July 1779, a mere four years after entering the army, he gained the commission of lieutenant colonel. It is ironic that given the demise of clanship in this period, its rhetoric and perception, as in the 1750s, stimulated the entrance of the Highland elite into another form of military activity. Further, by placing clanship at the centre of the recruiting relationship, the crown, however wrong in its initial assumptions, automatically defined certain aspects of the form that recruiting took. As in the Seven Years War, one result was that Lowland recruiting in battalion form was not encouraged on anywhere near the same scale in proportion to the respective populations. Unlike the earlier period, where the third Duke of Argyll had avoided giving patronage to political enemies in the Lowlands, the Scottish landed classes were not as divided. Nevertheless, only the ducal houses of Hamilton and Buccleugh were given regiments. In contrast to the relatively lowly Highland family of the Macdonalds of Sleat who were directly approached by the government, both Hugh, third Earl of Marchmont and Charles, third Duke of Queensbury, were refused regiments which they offered in late December 1777. ⁶⁸

The prevalence of notions regarding clanship also answered another specific concern of the government, a concern that was born of a particular set of imperial and diplomatic circumstances. This can be illustrated by the events of late 1777. Defeat at Saratoga in October of that year transformed the colonial situation into the immediate prospect of great power war. Against this backdrop, North and his administration formulated a policy which placed less emphasis on the actual military reduction of the colonies, as on the avoidance of war with France. Rather than appear weakened or disunited, it was hoped that a strong and immediate show of renewed military determination would deter France, instil caution in the Americans and buttress the political moral of the shaken British elite. As North pointed out in early 1778, " If the Kingdom can be informed in a few days that 10 000 are raising, it must be of service. " ⁶⁹

Beyond its inherent propaganda value, the fundamental point was speed - to get as many troops raised and on the establishment, demonstrating internationally that Britain would continue the conflict. With this in mind, the winter of 1777-78 saw Lord North's administration order the immediate recruitment of 12 000 men to replace completely all the previous losses. Of the eleven regiments raised, six were Highland, with another two regiments representing urban Scotland in the form of the Glasgow and Edinburgh regiments. Several points need to be emphasised. The legacy of the Seven Years War was evident in that Highlanders were seen as troops that could be raised quickly. It also demonstrates that, having tried professional recruiting, the government now instituted proprietary recruiting under very unfavourable conditions to the raisers. So many new levies produced massive competition. The international context and defeat in America made soldiers more difficult to obtain, and provided the pro-American section in parliament with a particular stick with which they could beat the government. Indeed, so common did anti-Scottish sentiments appear over their role in the army, that even Henry Dundas was able to use it as an excuse for not supporting the Edinburgh regiment, which he believed was the creation of his political opponent Sir Lawrence Dundas. In February 1778, English counties petitioned against excessive use of the army against the colonists, as well as commenting on the over use of Scottish Highlanders. As a result, a parliamentary outcry ensued.⁷⁰

This meant that by 24 January 1778, it was widely understood in Scotland that the Commons would vigorously examine all aspects of the new levies. Understandably, this political situation witnessed the government stress its wider support in society. North noted that subscriptions and offers of levies were, beyond their obvious military importance, vital in a domestic and colonial sense in that they gave " the appearance of the public acquiescence in the conduct of administration. " Barrington, in order to avoid accusations of a discernible tendency in government towards despotism, stated during the debate on the army on 4 February 1778, that the government had not asked respectable gentlemen to raise men for them.⁷¹

This need to appear constitutionally minded, has resulted in the portrayal of Highland landlords as the initiators of the whole recruiting business. This is a significant point in that the situation of direct or indirect government pressure has not been attributed to the reasons why recruiting occurred in the region. The letters of service authorising regiments did stress that the King approved of the proprietor's offer to raise. Yet the situation was rather more complex than these formal documents suggest. Recent research has illustrated that, when formulating sensitive policy, government ministers tended to discuss matters personally amongst themselves in a very roundabout indirect way. This would explain the lack of

evidence for government pressure on landlords. Nevertheless, such evidence exists. Lord Alexander Macdonald of Sleat received a letter on 19 December 1777, stating that;

I was asked whether you would exert yourself in person to raise a regiment among the subordinate chieftains of your name and from your own strength..... accept of the *carte blanche* which Lord Barrington gave me. I have ventured to use your name as ready to go in person. ⁷²

This shows continuity from the kind of pressure put on landlords in 1759. ⁷³ Too often commentators have focused on the irony of landlords using clan sentiment while inducing emigration. Yet as the experience of Macdonald illustrates, government itself had definite policies and agendas of its own constructed around the concept of clanship. That Macdonald had not volunteered the regiment can again be illustrated by his letter to Alexander Macdonald of Vallay, a prominent North Uist tacksman. He offered Vallay a captaincy, while pointing out that he had, in fact, been offered a regiment without soliciting for it. In another example, John, fourth Duke of Atholl, was informed by his bankers, Drummonds of Charing Cross, as to the offer of a regiment in mid December 1777. To further illustrate that landlords were often forced to react rather than to initiate, it was widely understood that when Atholl received the offer from government, he was in Scotland and sped south through Edinburgh to London to negotiate in person. Even those who did not recruit as the colonel of the regiment could, nevertheless, find that government had certain set ideas. While discussing options on 19 December 1777, North noted that;

Lord Breadalbane has a very populous neighbourhood and may assist both the Duke of Argyll and the Duke of Atholl's levies, if he is willing, which I hope he is. ⁷⁴

This quote demonstrates the importance of the earlier memorials by army officers in maintaining the image of untapped military potential on various Highland estates. The result was that the crown was interested in targeting specific landlords. Once recruiting had commenced, such proprietors tended to draw up lists of lairds to facilitate the procurement of men. (See appendix two). These plans, reminiscent of Argyll's tactics during the Seven Years War, simply put such lairds under pressure, and by retaining the language of clan and chief, perpetuated notions of the region's militarism in London. Another example of government pressure was that of George Mackenzie, Lord Macleod from the Cromartie family. In what should be stressed as an important distinction, the Lord Advocate Henry Dundas does appear to have moved in this case with a rehabilitation agenda. Yet even here the role of government figures and institutions is instructive. In a letter to Secretary of War

Charles Jenkinson, Dundas recalled how he had taken the initiative in late December 1777, and simply offered a regiment to the crown on Mackenzie's behalf. Then he had appointed its officers to their respective commissions while Mackenzie was still in Sweden and his brother still in America. Allied to this, was the fact that it was the directors of the East Indian Company, not Mackenzie himself, who requested a second battalion to the regiment - again illustrating the entrenchment of perceptions regarding the region within a wider imperial context. ⁷⁵

The result of the American War was massive militarisation. By 1783, there were thirteen official battalions of Scottish Highlanders. While never wholly Highland in personnel, they were undoubtedly so in terms of official perception, and there can be little doubt that the government's *military policy in the region had been an unqualified success. In contrast to the undoubted but uneven development of improvement, the government had proven itself proactive and sure of what it wanted.* No Highland landlord could afford the £ 47 400.0.0 that was required to raise Fraser's regiment, as well as the similar annual payments to maintain it. With the additional regiments raised in 1777-78, government spending on such levies reached unprecedented proportions. The augmentations presented to Parliament on 24 December 1778, estimated the cost of the Highland regiments raised in that year at £ 124 149.4.0. With the cost of Fraser's, this amounted to £ 171 549.4.0 annually to institute and maintain the British-Highland military. ⁷⁶

Thus, in terms of instituting policy, the fiscal-military state could deploy sums that no private individual could hope to match if attempting to initiate alternative strategies like agricultural improvement. As a result of the American War, unlike the 1756-63 conflict, the British Highland military became an institutionalised part of the standing army. As tables 3:1 and 3:2 illustrate, Highland personnel constituted almost 3% of Britain's standing peacetime officer corp. This figure does not include Highland officers in other regiments. Significantly, the level of half pay officers, despite this heightened level of permanent involvement had, by 1784, returned to almost the same levels as 1763. In all spheres, the American War had intensified the militarisation process.

Public Policy in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Period.

The legacy for the Highlands of the American defeat was the consolidation of the belief in government circles that the region had a specific imperial and military role. There was a genuine impression amongst Highland landlords that this state service offered a viable means of economic development. There was even evidence that the state intended making this scenario possible. In 1787, in response to the on-going war against Tipu Sahib in

India, the government allowed the East India Company to raise four regiments and enter them on the British army establishment. In light of the Highland recruiting successes of the 1775-1783 period, it is unsurprising that two were officially designated Highland. Just as indicative of this imperial specialisation, was the involvement of the directors of the East India Company in the affairs of the Highland Society. In the same year that the two regiments were levied for India, the Company assisted a subscription of £ 6 000 for the Society. The trade-off in regiments for external supplies of capital illustrate how even the premier improving agency then operating in the Highlands, nevertheless, understood the powerful influence that the military dimensions of the region had on wider British society. The involvement of the East India Company confirms the institutionalisation of a public policy deliberately designed to sustain and, if possible, heighten Highland militarisation.⁷⁷

The wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France present both the apogee and end of the recruiting order that had developed in the region. The beginning of the war saw many elements of continuity. The characteristic over concentration on Highland levies was evident within the profile of Scotland's fencible forces in 1793. That clanship was seen by government as still a valid force is evident from the appointment of the commanders to these regiments. The highest commissions went to men whose families had been considered powerful clans. Allied to this continuity, was the fact that, as in the case of Fraser's battalion in 1775, the first regular regiment of the war was also a Highland levy - the Earl of Seaforth's 78th Regiment.⁷⁸

The discussions on the raising of the Seaforth regiment also reveal another element of continuity. As in the earlier conflict, landlords found themselves under pressure from government. On 30 January 1793, Seaforth received a letter from Alexander Brodie M.P. for Elgin. It read; " Mr. Dundas asked me if I thought you would be disposed to raise a regiment.... he is very desirous of your aid. " Seaforth agreed to raise a fencible regiment, but wanted his brother-in-law made a major. This was declared possible only if it were a regular battalion. On 15 February, Dundas wrote saying that he had got Seaforth the lieutenant colonel's position. Government again put pressure on the Mackenzie earl by raising the amount of men he needed from 600 to 1000. Regarding the use of Seaforth's position, it was added; " My motives for proposing Seaforth as the commandant were first that his being in that situation would be popular with the clan. " ⁷⁹ This demonstrates that clanship was still favourably distorting the promotion pattern in favour of Highland landlords.

This pressure to raise was evident elsewhere. On 24 January 1794, Lord Jeffrey Amherst the Commander-in-Chief wrote to Alexander, fourth Duke of Gordon in the following way. " I beg the favour to know if it will be agreeable to your Grace to raise a regiment of 1000 men. " On 2 February, Gordon replied that he considered " it my duty to comply with His Majesty's pleasure. " ⁸⁰ For the remainder of the decade, government figures like Dundas made complacent, even blasé requests for military levies from landlords. These reveal the extent to which government saw the region only as a military nursery, with the economic possibilities sidelined if not ignored. Thus in 1798, Dundas asked the Lord Advocate Robert Dundas to request Cameron of Locheil, " or any other real Highland chieftain (to) produce a stout regiment of fencibles speedily. " ⁸¹

A new element that increased pressure on Highland landlords was, ironically, the cultural and intellectual arguments that justified the process of improvement. It has been argued that by highlighting improvement as " patriotism, " the elite weakened any protest at the social effects of dislocated populations. In contrast, it is ironic that in the Highlands this cultural rhetoric stimulated recruitment. In war, patriotism could be best expressed by regiment raising; indeed, it was its ultimate manifestation. In 1803, the Roman Catholic hierarchy noted that by raising a regiment, its Highland community " cannot in the present circumstances of the country give more substantial proofs of their firm attachment. " In light of this, landlords like Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster who utilised patriotism to justify their ideas on social and economic change, were vulnerable to recruiting requests. In 1794, Sinclair found his rhetoric had come home to roost in the form of a prime-ministerial request for a regiment from his estates. Sinclair was taken aback and declared that he was no soldier, yet in the circumstances, it was all but impossible for him to refuse. ⁸²

It says much about military policy in the 1790s that an analysis of recruiting can find so much continuity with the earlier reasoning behind the drives of the 1750s and the 1770s. This continuity stands in direct contrast to the extreme changes in the socio-economic profile of the region. There was on the face of it, much that suggested the recruiting structure in the region was intact. During the 1793-1801 war, thirty separate military levies were raised under the denomination of Highland units. Many were Highland in name only, but the impression given was that the region remained an important element in the military and national defence structure. The proof of this was the 1797 Dundas plan that, in effect, attempted the resurrection of clanship as a viable military force. The plan was drawn to the attention of Dundas by Frederick, Duke of York. In its basic shape it involved raising 16 523 men under the demarcation of their clans, and intended for service within the United Kingdom or Ireland. The plan has avoided serious consideration from historians as a result of the landlord reaction to it. Land owners like Gordon, Cluny and Atholl all discussed its

possibilities, but made it clear that its whole underlying motive was flawed. A correspondent to the Duke of Atholl wrote;

I am afraid that is too weak a motive at the present day to draw forth a great body of men could they be found in the country. But such difficulties have lately been found in completing fencible and other corps, as prove the impracticability of the other.⁸³

The scheme was in fact presented as an alternative to the introduction of a Scottish militia, which suggests that the concerns of economic damage to Scotland's booming economy had again emerged. The government's continuing premise for excessive Highland levying emerged clearly in the introduction to the scheme.

From the ordinary avocations of the Highlanders in general, it is obvious that no equal number of men in any one district of the Kingdom, can be employed with as little injury to agriculture and manufactures.⁸⁴

The 1797 plan is remarkable for demonstrating the lack of development and change in government perceptions of the Highlands. As late as 1797 the state still saw the region as largely unimproved. Above all, the plan re-emphasised the national context for Highland recruiting, in that it was a strategy to protect the commercial sectors of the rest of the country as much as a positive recognition of the martial traditions of the northern region. Despite its naive and blatantly uninformed nature it should not be dismissed instantly as a wholly unrealistic ploy. It is in fact worthy of examination in several respects. Firstly, by highlighting the government's ignorance on Highland affairs, it reveals that for over forty years Westminster had, upon a premise that was increasingly at odds with the situation on the ground, nevertheless, intervened in the region on a massive scale. Secondly, the fact that it was not implemented represented the first high profile failure of the Highlands in the recruiting sphere. This in itself is significant when the reasoning behind the landlords' rejection is known. The plan, in contrast to government perceptions of commercial underdevelopment, was, in fact, discarded because of economic and commercial considerations. It would have undermined the agricultural sector in the Highlands to the serious detriment of the landlord class. The plan helped to highlight the inherent contradictions between recruiting and commerce in the Highlands, and dealt a serious blow to proprietary recruiting in the region.

What is remarkable about government attitudes is the consistency with which these perceptions were held. Table 3:4 illustrates a plan devised in mid June 1803 for raising

20 000 men in clan regiments for service any where in Europe. Probably based on the 1797 plan, it illustrates how long it took the military establishment to see the limitations of the region, and, indeed, to grasp the point that clanship no longer existed in a meaningful way. Despite all the evidence of commercial activity in the region, the government continued in the first few years of the nineteenth century to believe that the region's only real contribution could be in the form of men.

Table 3:4. Plan to Raise Twenty Thousand Man from Scottish Highlands 1803

(Source, S.R.O. RH 1/2/521)

Western Isles	2040
Caithness & Sutherland	2340
E. Central Inverness-shire	1500
W.S. Inverness - shire	2520
Argyll	2520
Perthshire	2280
Aberdeen & Angus	1320
Stirling & Dumbarton	1440

The failure of these plans merely helped to confirm larger more fundamental trends. Developments in the army increasingly meant that the old recruiting structure under which Highland landlords had been able to achieve such rapid promotion was, in fact, obsolete. During the war, the strains between the rival forms of professional and proprietary recruiting re-emerged. The motivation to raise men was increasingly undermined by army regulations that forced the positions to be given to officers, as opposed to those that the landlord wished. Seaforth was informed in 1793 that only men from the half pay list could be taken for his regiment - otherwise it would be considered a " job. " Seaforth was deeply unhappy at this rule, noting that there was little incentive to recruit as they could only get the same rank. These rules also applied in the case of Major Allan Cameron, who was denied the rank of lieutenant-colonel. ⁸⁵

As is the American conflict, the French wars also saw half pay officers increasingly utilised in the various forms of military levies. As evidenced by Seaforth's regiment, they were encouraged to return to full military duty. In 1793-94, John, fourth Earl of Breadalbane, raised three battalions of fencibles. The total number of officers was 79; the number of half pay annuitants totalled 20 or 25.3% of the entire corp. Their uncertain position was highlighted in July 1803, when their deployment was considered for the Army of Reserve,

which was part of the growing attempt to supply the military by legislative sanction.⁸⁶ In 1804, the last regiment in the French wars was raised on the principle of men for rank. Unsurprisingly perhaps, it was a Highland levy, yet all its officers, excepting the ensigns, came from within the army, and it was in no way an estate levy. The long process of professionalisation had finally won through, though recruiting for rank was to be resurrected later in the century. More fundamentally, the French wars were simply of a different dimension and scale for the old system to survive. Recent studies have emphasised the fundamental changes this forced in British recruiting strategy. By 1814 over quarter of a million men were in the regular army, with another half a million in the home defence and volunteer units.⁸⁷

This scale of recruiting naturally exposed the limited population resources of the region. In April 1809, six Highland regiments had their status changed as there were simply not enough men from the region to fill them. Just as destructive of the old recruiting order in the region, was the fact that the war forced the government to increasingly rationalise the use of the army. This started in Scotland in 1794, when the Scottish fencibles were asked to extend their service so that army units in Ireland could be deployed elsewhere. Those regiments that refused were continued until 1799 and then arbitrarily reduced. This offended many landlords and shook the Highland elite's perception of its secure position within the British military. The fifth Duke of Argyll noted that many officers were left distressed and idle by this policy. For John, fourth Earl of Breadalbane, it represented a particular reverse. From as early as 1796 he had attempted to secure the position of fencible officers by obtaining pensions for such personnel (those that served in fencible levies did not receive half pay). The alienation of this prominent Highland recruiter is made clear from his reaction to the crown's suggestion in 1799 that he raise a line regiment from his recently disbanded fencible men. Breadalbane declared himself "disgusted" at the policies of the government, and added regarding the new offer; "All this is very fine, but still it cannot remove the indignity offered us all ... I am so completely in the dumps at the late orders."⁸⁸

This illustrates how important it was, even for prominent Highland landlords, to retain a position within Britain's military machine. This suggests that a certain level of economic or social dependency characterised the role of the region's elite in relation to the army. Certainly, such officers like Captain John Macleod of Caboll who were disbanded, made vigorous efforts to get reinstated. The significance of the military is further underlined by the fact that, in 1803, after Henry Addington's administration had disbanded the last of the fencibles, its reputation in the Highlands suffered considerably. Instead of the multiplicity of home defence units that had emerged during the 1790s, the government moved towards a simplified militia and line regiment system. The new scale of warfare had simply forced a

switch to modes of legislative compulsion. It has been pointed out that this new element of compulsion removed the need to reward land, and so a major element in the Highland recruiting equation was removed. Increasingly, the army was supplied by militia regiments which conscripted the men and then transferred them to the regular regiments. In 1804 and 1807, acts were passed which allowed set proportions of the militia to go annually into the army, while the parishes were forced by a fining system to replace such men. In 1811 this was formalised by putting a set amount of militia men annually into the army. In the Highland counties, such strategies were not appreciated by landlords who valued a large local militia for the income it brought to their estates. In 1805, the loss of men by the Defence Act had caused organisational problems for estate authorities, while the Duke of Atholl, as chairman of the Highland Society, requested government not to lower the pay of local levies. This dislike of government policies was summarised on 21 July 1809, when the Marchioness of Sutherland noted regarding the lowering of the militia establishment; " I think it a pity it is not a regular body of militia, as in the present system they are always persuading the men to go into the line. " ⁸⁹

Perhaps the most important local units in the context of the Highlands were the volunteers. These levies have increasingly attracted attention as useful examples both of the changing attitudes in the new urban elites, and of the development of a sense of Britishness. With regard to the element of class motives, the volunteers have traditionally been viewed as an attempt by the propertied classes in Britain to construct a bulwark against what they saw as the increasingly politicised masses. More recent analysis has questioned this, and has pointed to the English model of volunteering. It has been suggested that as an activity volunteering was preferred in the relatively urbanised areas because it gave expression to the new social groups in the industrial and commercial sector. In contrast to this, it has been argued for Scotland that when landlords were deprived of the organisational aspects of the volunteers, the level of involvement dropped, and returns for Scottish counties fell. ⁹⁰

In both these respects there is evidence to suggest that the experience of the Highlands was different. In Scotland, the power of the landlord to force tenantry into levies has been emphasised. Yet unlike the dread of regular regiments, the volunteering system seems to have been relatively appealing to the mass of Highlanders. In Skye, John Macleod of Talisker noted that his tenantry had little objections to volunteer service except for the pay conditions. These, he argued, were insufficient compensation for the loss that could be sustained to their agricultural holdings. Likewise, in Sconsor, the problem was not service in the volunteers, but the low cost of pay. In Sutherland the true compatibility of these localised forces was demonstrated when, in late 1812, the local militia (the replacement of volunteer corps), was set up as part of the rationalising process for the entire army. The

establishment was lowered to only 400 men, with the result that many families lost the military income that had paid sections of their rent. It was noted by Lord Francis Gower; " I am sorry that we are restricted to 400, as many fine lads offering their services were reluctantly rejected. " ⁹¹

This calls into question the assertion that landlords had lost interest in local levies once government had taken stronger control over their administration in 1803. It also calls into question the role of government policy which, by altering the basis of recruiting in the Highlands from proprietary to compulsive, was responsible for the decline of that activity in the region. The reality of excessive numbers of men offering their service for a local levy in Sutherland, represents a sharp alternative to much of the historiography of oppressive recruiting in the Highlands. For levies that were designed to remain in the county, or only leave it intermittently, the Highland population showed no significant reluctance. The scale of volunteering in the region has been hidden by the more high profile nature of the regular regiments from the area. The numbers in the former service were substantial, and represent the largest single area of Highland involvement in the military. In Skye by 1806, there were 1090 volunteers, and in Sutherland over 1200. National figures for volunteer levels from 1806 reveal that, in proportion to their respective populations, these local units were more popular in the north than elsewhere. In 1801 the census shows that Scotland constituted 15.3% of Britain's population. In 1806 the number of volunteers in Scotland totalled 52 337 - 15.9% of the United Kingdom's whole force. Within Scotland, the counties of Argyll, Inverness, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and Caithness had a population of 255 993 - 15.9% of Scotland's total population. Yet the same counties had 11 336 volunteers - 19.1% of the Scottish total. The Highlands, therefore, had a larger percentage of volunteers than their proportion of the population would suggest. This was due to the undoubted benefits that such levies could bring to estate populations. ⁹² Responses to the decline in volunteer units, and the forced change into local militia in Ross-shire, illustrate that it was the localism of these levies that attracted Highlanders. On 5 October 1808, when an act of parliament was passed for allowing this change, the Earl of Seaforth found that all his Kintail, Lewis and Glensheal tenantry objected. In the Black Isle, the men refused to enrol, while the three Ross-shire units complained at the level of long distance marching that could be involved. Even the distance of twenty four miles proved problematic for Seaforth, and a month later the lack of progress had severely embarrassed the Earl who had confidently assured the London authorities of two battalions of the new militia. ⁹³

In contrast to the relatively high figures for volunteering, returns of the men enlisted under the legislative recruiting acts of the first years of the nineteenth century call into question many assumptions regarding both Scotland's, but more especially the Highland's

automatic proclivity for military service. Under the Army of Reserve Act passed on 6 July 1803, each of the kingdoms were assigned a particular quota of men. The intention was to get men accustomed to military service in a militia form, so that they would then volunteer for the regular army. England raised 93.7% of its quota; 29% having volunteered to extend their services into the main army. In Ireland 81.9% of the quota had been reached, with a respective volunteering total of 21.9%. In Scotland 92.2% had been raised, but only 17.5% had volunteered. More specifically in relation to the Highlands, county totals for the Additional Act passed on 29 June 1804, and repealed in June 1806, survive for the region and the rest of the country. The returns show the number of men recruited from 29 June 1804 to 13 December 1805. As with most new legislation regarding the compulsory militia, this Act also allowed such men to transfer into the regular army, and it is thus a good litmus test of attitudes towards local or extended military service.

Table 3:5. Men Raised in England, Ireland and Scotland Under Additional Act and Volunteering For General Service, June 1804-December 1805
(Source, S.R.O., RH 4/158/1/237, ff. 256-8)

Area	Total Recruited	Volunteered for General Service	%
England	4979	1864	37.4
Ireland	3562	926	25.9
Scotland	989	247	24.9
Highlands *	194	23	8.2

* = Counties of Caithness, Sutherland, Ross-shire, Cromarty, Inverness and Argyll

These figures seriously call into question the reality of the Highlands as a bellicose society. They suggest that more attention needs to be given to the *type* of military service before issuing vague and generalised statements regarding the warlike Highlander. These poor figures for wider British service can be contrasted with the relatively high numbers involved in the local volunteer levies. This suggests that concepts of Britishness were, in fact, only minimally evident within the Highlands, and that patterns of military service demonstrate the continuing existence of a pervasive and dominant sense of localism within the region.⁹⁴

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to outline the wider reasons why government maintained a high level of recruiting within the Scottish Highlands. It argues that outside factors were as important as any internal characteristics in persuading the military authorities that the region constituted an obvious source of men. These external influences included the political structure within the United Kingdom. In Ireland, where the army was, nevertheless, highly successful in gaining men, the process was complicated by concerns of internal security, while Irish recruiting remained political sensitivity within the United Kingdom. When the government came to recruit in the Highlands it looked to a few dominant landlords, or chieftain's depending on the perspective, and left the rest to their proprietary influence. It was a simpler process than in other areas. More significant still, was the commercialised nature of the English and Lowland Scottish economies which effectively competed against the army for men. In light of this, the underdeveloped nature of the Highlands proved doubly useful. It employed poverty stricken men and lessened the military burden on the wealth generating population, which the mercantilist theories of the time placed so much importance on. An important consequence of this was that military recruiting excessively highlighted the commercial underdevelopment of the region, and but for the accolades that the regiments themselves achieved through their service, can be said to have reinforced negative perceptions of the region. If such a high profile policy was both rationalised by, and promoted the perception of commercial underdevelopment, then the whole influence of the army on the rehabilitation of the Highlander's image needs to be questioned.

Yet paradoxically, this recruiting occurred despite the very same commercialising forces being evident within the Highlands. This raises another point with regard to the policies of the government. If considered from the standpoint of Westminster, recruiting constituted after the rent raising policies of the landlords, the most successful single policy implemented in the region. Compared to the attempts to prevent emigration in the 1770s, build up fishing in the 1780s, and in general diversify the economic base of the region, recruiting successfully gained most of its objectives. From 1756-1802, thousands of men were successfully levied by the government. This was possible due to the inordinate amounts of money that government brought to bear upon the recruiting policy for the region.

However, the nature and scope of Highland recruiting was not inevitable, and the chapter suggests that caution should be practised when considering the nature of the whole phenomenon. The recruiting structure in the Highlands took a very specific form, and the underlying trends and strains in the differing methods played a part in the relatively quick demise of the landlord and government relationship from 1794-1802. This illustrates that

the whole recruiting episode from 1756-1800 was not, in fact, continuity from the days of clanship, but rather a specific structure sustained by the government itself and quickly abandoned when large scale war signified that it could no longer serve its function. Traditionally, the end of recruiting has been attributed to landlord commercialising policies. However, this chapter would suggest that, in all respects, the government from the start was a reluctant partner in the whole activity, and that as a result, it was not merely the landlord that ensured the days of large scale Highland recruiting would be short-lived.

- 1). J. Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), 93; B. Lenman, *Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen* (London, 1984) 204-5.
- 2). L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London, 1992), 295.
- 3). C. Duffy, *The Army of Frederick the Great* (London, 1974) 54; A. Allardyce, *Scotland & Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1888), 335.
- 4). For French examples of the centralising and increasingly state controlled military: C. Jones, 'The Military Revolution and the Professionalisation of the French army under the Ancien Regime' in M. Duffy (ed.), *The Military Revolution and the State* (London, 1980), 37-45. For concepts of the social connections and mutual obligations of the state and a professional officer class in Prussia: C. Duffy, loc. cit., 21, 24-35. For British trends: J.W. Hayes, *The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763* (unpublished M.A. Thesis University of London 1956), 158-60, 203-4; J. Shy, *Towards Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton, 1965), 364-69.
- 5). J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688-1783* (London 1989), 55-58; A.N. Gilbert, 'Military Recruitment and Career Advancement in the Eighteenth Century' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 57 (1979), 39-40; P. Stigger, 'Recruiting for Rank in 1764, 1804 & 1857' in *J.S.A.H.R.* vol. 70 (1992), 239; N.L.S., Ry. 1.4.96, *The History of the Rise, Opposition to, and Establishment of the Edinburgh Regiment* (Edinburgh, 1778), 16. While the dominant method for raising new regiments in the Scottish Lowlands, urban co-operatives were not the exclusive form. Thus both Buccleugh and Hamilton raised levies during the American war. For earlier evidence of how disliked new regiments were within the circles of the military establishment. See chapter one, footnote 61.
- 6). W.B. Donne (ed.), *The Correspondence of King George III with Lord North from 1768-1783*, vol. 1 (London, 1867), 265.
- 7). For further discussion on this development see chapter seven, footnote 62, p. 322.
- 8). Brewer, loc. cit., 114; B. Lenman, loc. cit., 194.
- 9). The figures in this table should not be taken as absolutely accurate. They merely demonstrate in a general manner the nature and pattern of Highland levies within the British army. They also represent the extent to which officers from official Highland regiments constitute a percentage of the entire officer cadre. They do not include officers from Highland areas in non-Highland regiments. It should be noted that, in 1762, the number of non-Highland officers in battalions from the north, was circa 50. The 1780 figure of 444 officers, has had the known non-Highland officers in the levies removed, and does not represent the full percentage of the official officer cadre from Highland levies.
- 10). N. L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16723, ff. 127 & 131; Ms 16727, f. 106; J. Prebble, loc. cit., 104; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1284, ff. 48, 50.
- 11). S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/52/6; J. Macinnes, *Brave Sons of Skye* (Edinburgh, 1899), 13; H.V. Bowen, 'The East India Company & Military Recruitment in Britain 1763-1771', in *B.I.H.R.* vol. 59 (1986), 81-86. For other specific examples of entry into Indian service. Captain Archibald Campbell of Inverneil from half pay to Company service 1768, Lieutenant George Campbell Islay, half pay to Company service 1770. D. Campbell, *Records of Clan Campbell in the military service of the Honourable East India Company* (London, 1925), 27 & 126.

- 12). N.L.S., *Caledonian Mercury*, 3 Sept. 1768, no 7199, p. 3; 5 July 1769, no 7326, p. 2; no 8364, p. 2; *Parliamentary History*, vol. 17 (London, 1813), 171-72; N.L.S., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, vol. 11, March 1769, p. 165; vol. 14, 6 November 1770, p. 290.
- 13). J. R.L., Bagshawe Muniments, B. 5/1, pp 100; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD 170/1140/2/1.
- 14). P.R.O., W.O. 1/995, f. 813; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/715/5; J. Redington (ed.), *Calendar of Home Office Papers 1760-65* (London, 1878), p. 269, ff. 832 & 35, p. 298, p. 420, f. 1355; N.L.S., *Caledonian Mercury*, 3 Sept. 1768, no 7196, p. 3; no 7198, p. 2; no 7256 23 Jan 1769, p. 2; R. K. Donovan, 'The military origins of the Roman Catholic relief programme of 1778' in *H. J.*, vol. 28 (1985), 85, 95-6; J. Fortescue, (ed.), *The Correspondence of King George III*, vol. 3 (London, 1928), 175-6. [I am grateful to Dr. R. Clyde for these Caledonian Mercury references].
- 15). S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/180/33; L. McLean, *The Raising of the 79th Highlanders* (Inverness, 1980), 5.
- 16). For details on the influence of pensioned officers see chapter seven, footnotes 70 & 71. p. 326
- 17). J. Shy, loc. cit., 79; P.R.O. W.O. 123/113, p. 100; T. Hayter (ed.), loc. cit., 152 & 293; A. Bruce, *The Purchase System in the British Army* (London, 1980), 22-26, 33-35. The crown was only able to promote half pay personnel back into service under restricted conditions. Death while holding full rank in the army, or a promotion induced vacancy in a non-purchased commission, were the only circumstances by which the crown could promote these officers. Another reason for the Chelsea list retaining its high cost relative to the half pay was that it constantly admitted retired soldiers. When a half pay officer died, he was not replaced by another.
- 18). J. Fortescue, (ed.), loc. cit., 524.
- 19). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1643/20; GD 170/3155, 3461. For extent and nature of Highland indebtedness see chapter seven, footnote 42, p. 314.
- 20). J.R.L., Bagshawe Muniments, B. 5/1, pp 38; P.R.O, W. O. 1/997; M.L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, 21 February 1775, pp. 113; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 34 (Edinburgh, 1772) 54; P.R.O., W.O. 1/997, letter 5 January 1778. For a further six instances of Highland half pay officers returning to full duty in the period 1767-1770: D. Campbell, *The Clan Campbell*, 2nd Series, vol. 4 (Edinburgh, 1916), 87-93. The saving of £ 1899 is calculated on the fact that a battalion was usually of a set number of officers in differing proportions. Lieutenant-Colonel = 1; Major = 2; Captains = 7; Lieutenants = 14; Ensigns = 7.
- 21). It should be stressed that the figures merely represent Highland personnel, not the number of half pay officers definitely living in the region. Official War Office papers such as the annual army list do not supply place of residence. The figures involved are taken from this source, and represent only the numbers from Britain and Ireland's standard army establishment and do not include colonial levies, marine forces, invalids, N.C.O.s, chaplains, quartermasters or adjutants. For evidence on late arrival of 89th regiment: J.M. Bulloch, *Territorial Soldiering in the North East of Scotland during 1759-1814* (Aberdeen 1914) 21.
- 22). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1284, f. 4; G.U.L., *The Glasgow Journal*, Mu 60. - c. 7, no 757, 2-9 Feb. 1756; D. H., Loudon Papers, A/973, f. 5. For further evidence of Highland half pay officers returning to service: *The Scots Magazine*, vol. 28 (Edinburgh, 1756), 150-151.

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- 23). *Scots Magazine*, vol. 32 (Edinburgh, 1770), 686.
- 24). For greater discussion on the reasons for half pay officers returning to duty see chapter on emigration.
- 25). *Parliamentary History* vol. 14 (London, 1813), 462-3.
- 26). B.A.M., Box 65/1/129.
- 27). For theories of improvement and the vital role ascribed to security of tenure see chapter four, footnote four, p. 152 .
- 28) N.L.S., *London Gazette*, no, 11537, 18 February 1775; no 11608, 24 October 1775; B.A.M., Box 65/3/100.
- 29). M.L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, p. 116, 161, 174. For evidence pensioners as recruiting sergeants in 1770s-1790s: S.R.O. Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/12/42; GD 44/47/4/10; J.R.L., Bagshawe Muniments, B. 5/1, p. 137; J.G. Fyfe (ed.), *Memoirs of Sergeant Donald Macleod* (Glasgow, 1933), 71.
- 30). B.A.M., Box 65/1/207; N.L.S., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, vol. 24, no 1219, p. 83; *London Gazette*, no 11584, 1 August 1775; P.R.O., W.O. 4/94, pp. 146-50, 218. It should also be noted that War Office papers occasionally listed the place of residence of half pay personnel. They include men like Captain John Maclachlan of the 110th regiment who resided in the parish of Kilbride in Argyllshire yet had never been in a Highland regiment. [W.O. 4/94, p. 471].
- 31). P.R.O., W.O. 1/993, unnumbered letters dated 10 October 1775 & 30 January 1776; W.O. 1/996, unnumbered letter dated 5 February 1776; W.O. 1/993, letter dated 21 Feb. 1776. For further evidence of apprehensive officers who did not wish to return to service: P.R.O., W.O. 1/993, unnumbered letter 13 Feb. 1776.
- 32). The separate occasions were: 11 January 1776, 31 March & 23 December 1777, 27 April 1778 and 21 June 1779: J.R.L., Bagshawe Muniments, B. 5/1, p. 119, 141, 149, 172, 184, 197, 265 & 275, J. Fortescue, loc. cit., vol. 4, 9.
- 33). M.L., *Glasgow Mercury*, 30 July 1778, p. 233.
- 34). M.L., *ibid.*, p. 124; 14 May p. 150; P.R.O., W.O. 4/103, pp. 63, 124, 444 & 489; W.O. 1/998, unnumbered letter, dated Mull 12 May 1778 & Flodigarrie 10 May 1778. For evidence of disruption of recruiting on Mull: E. R. Cregeen (ed.), *Argyll Estate Instructions: Mull, Morvern and Tiree 1771-1805*, (Edinburgh, 1964) 22-3.
- 35). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/391/1(b); P.R.O. W.O. 1/997, f. 6; W.O. 1/1002, letter dated 2 January 1779.
- 36). P.R.O., W.O. 1/991, f. 304; W.O. 1/996, letter dated 19 November 1776; W.O. 1/933, letter dated 21 February 1776. For another example: W.O. 1/995, f. 829.
- 37). P.R.O. W.O. 1/997, f. 6; W.O. 1/1002, letter dated 2 January 1779.
- 38). Lenman, loc. cit., 205-8.
- 39). H.M. Scott, *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (Oxford 1990), 217-18, 266 (Footnote 64); I. Adams & M. Somerville, *Cargoes of Despair and*

Hope: Scottish Emigration to North America 1603-1803 (Edinburgh, 1993), 141; J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 407; W.B. Donne, (ed.) *The Correspondence of King George III with Lord North from 1768-83*, vol. 2 (London, 1867), 99-100.

40). N.L.S., *Caledonian Mercury*, 12 June 1775, no 8364, p. 2; 6 Sept. 1775, no 8401, p. 2; N.L.S., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, no 1211, 8 Aug. 1775, p. 83; R.B. Macdowell, 'Colonial Nationalism & the Winning of Parliamentary Independence 1760-82' in J.W. Moody & W.E. Vaughan, (eds.) *A New History of Ireland: Eighteenth-Century Ireland 1691-1800*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1986), 199-200, 204-7; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 20 (Edinburgh, 1758) 40; J. O' Donovan, 'The Militia in Munster 1715-78' in G. O'Brien, (ed.), *Parliament, Politics & People: Essays in Eighteenth Century Irish History* (Dublin, 1989) 40; T. Beckett, 'The Augmentation of the Army in Ireland 1767-69' in *E.H.R.* vol. 96 (1981), 541-2, 550 & 558. This last article also argues a prominent role for the augmentation debate in bringing a constitutional realignment between Westminster and Irish government in the form of a lowered role for the Irish 'Undertakers.'

41). For a useful analysis on Irish recruiting in relation to Scotland: R.K. Donovan, loc. cit., 83-85, 94-5; J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit. vol. 3, 185; W.B. Donne (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 1, 265, 274, 274; T. Hayter (ed.), loc. cit., 97, 161-3; P.R.O., W.O. 4/103, p. 408; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1140/2/1.

42). P.R.O., W.O. 4/101, p. 396; W.O. 4/102, p. 8; S.R.O., GD 170/1090/33, 36, 38, 42; GD 170/1380/2; GD 170/1067/11. As with the regulation forbidding recruitment in Ireland, the attempt to stop recruiting in England failed. Nevertheless, it made officers more cautious, as with the Glenure family. It forced such recruiters to prematurely end levying in London and Newcastle (where there was deep opposition to Scottish recruiting), at a time when Scotland was experiencing heavy recruitment. GD 170/1048/1; GD 170/1062/57. The subsequent crowding of traditional recruiting areas like Glasgow and Edinburgh meant that Colin Campbell, a son of Glenure was forced to abandon plans for a higher commission in Macdonald's 76th. Interestingly, when he received a commission later in 1779, he appeared to have taken his lesson to heart. He avoided such areas and headed to the Western Isles. GD 170/1062/57 & 61.

43). B. L., Liverpool Papers, Add. Ms 38342, f. 99. For evidence on earlier perceptions of Highlanders see chapter one, footnote 59, p. 38.

44). *Parliamentary History* vol. 19 (London, 1814), 687-90.

45). P.R.O., W.O. 1/995, f. 567; W.O. 1/997, letters dated December 1777, 30 November 1777 & 5 Jan 1778; W.O. 1/993, letter dated 20 January 1776; Prebble, loc. cit., 103.

46). Lenman, loc. cit., 208; S.R.O., Robertson of Straloch Papers, GD 1/90/8, 12a, 16.

47). John Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 515; B.A.M., Box 65/1/147, 161-2; Box 65/2/1-2; J.R.L., Bagshawe Muniments, B. 5/1. p. 119. Other landlords who found the military actively seek their involvement were Sir Robert Menzies in Perthshire in 1776 (B.A.M., Box 65/2/2). In 1780 the tutors of ClanRanald were unhappy that Lord John Murray put pressure on them to allow the army access to what was widely understood as a very populous estate. They refused to co-operate with Murray whose ideas could, nevertheless, only have demonstrated that the army remained as a distinct option for proprietors endowed with such populations: J.R.L., B. 5/1. p. 389.

48). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1407, f. 55; L. Namier & J. Brooke, (eds.), *The House of Commons 1754-90*, vol. 3 (London, 1964), 554, J. Almon, (ed.), *The Parliamentary Register or History of the Proceedings & Debates of the House of Commons*, vol. 1 (London, 1775), 188-91. Numbers on Chelsea list (those waiting to

receive a pension), totalled 40 000 by 1778. This represented a huge latent resource for the military: *Scots Magazine*, vol. 40 (Edinburgh, 1778), 628.

49). B.A.M., Box 65/1/108.

50). T. Hayter (ed.), loc. cit., 37; W.B. Donne (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 1, 258; J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 235, 249, 268-70, 297. For the reasons why Fraser put in an early offer see chapter seven, footnote 43, p. 315.

51). J. Almon, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3 (London 1776), 130; R.K. Donovan, loc. cit., 95-6.

52). W.R.H., C.S. 96/1401, Farm Journal Book of Rosehall Farm.

53). For earlier evidence of this line of thinking see chapter one, footnote 69, p. 43.

54). P.R.O., W.O. 1/614. f. 25.

55). J. Almon, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 206-7.

56). For parliamentary costs on Highland as well as non-Highland regiments: J. Almon (ed.), vol. 8, 177-78. In 1775 a company of Fraser's Highlanders was recruited with the assistance of the Ducal House of Gordon. The average level of bounties is in appendix 6. Beyond the case of Sutherland which is not useful given only two bounties are registered, what is interesting is that the relatively underdeveloped counties of Ross and Inverness retained high bounties even when compared to economically more advanced counties like Banff and Aberdeen. For analysis on employment structure and opportunities in Highlands see: A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 79 & R.A. Dodgshon, 'Strategies of Farming in the Western Highlands and Islands prior to crofting and the Clearances', *Econ.H.R.*, vol. 46 (1993), 688-90, 699-700.

57). J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., vols. 4 & 2; M.L., *Glasgow Mercury* 12 February 1778, 45; J. Prebble, loc. cit., 103.

58). *Parliamentary History*, vol. 19 (London, 1814), 687.

59). J. Knox, *A View of the British Empire more especially Scotland: with some proposals for the Improvement of that Country and the Extension of its Fisheries and the Relief of the People* (London, 1785), 132-33. For evidence from Seven Years War see chapter two footnote 71-72 & 75.

60). See chapter on emigration footnote 97, p. 185-6; I. Adams and M. Sommerville, loc. cit., 137-38.

61). J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 515; *Parliamentary History*, vol. 22 (London, 1814), 331.

62). J. Almon (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 206-9.

63). J. Almon (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 428; vol. 8, 13.

64). J. Almon (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 206-7; L. Namier & J. Brooke (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 665-6; vol. 2, 472. For a discussion on the role delegatory recruiting played in rapid landlord advancement see the case of Macleod in chapter in estate economics.

65). *Parliamentary History*, vol. 19, 634; J. Fortescue, (ed.), vol. 4, 9, 34-5.

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- 66). J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 4, 2, 18.
- 67). E. Robson, 'The Raising of a Regiment in the American War of Independence' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 27 (1949), 107-109; R.K. Donovan, loc. cit., 91; J. Fortescue, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 523-4; vol. 4, 11-12.
- 68). For evidence on Argyll's lack of action on Lowland offers for regiments during the Seven Years War: chapter one, footnote 96, p. 51; J. Fortescue, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 531.
- 69). J. Fortescue, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 516.
- 70). The regiments raised were numbered from 72nd - 83rd; M.L., *Glasgow Mercury*, 12 Feb. 1778, p. 45; *Parliamentary History*, vol. 19 (London, 1814), 759-762; J. Almon, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 8, 269-73; N.L.S., Ry. 1.4.96, *The History of the Rise, Opposition to, and Establishment of the Edinburgh Regiment* (Edinburgh, 1778), 5, 8-10.
- 71). P.R.O., W.O. 4/101, p. 340; *Parliamentary History* vol. 19 (London, 1814), 615, 687.
- 72). For an example where the enthusiasm of the proprietary class is portrayed as the origin of recruiting in the Highlands, as well as a letter of service which, at face value, would suggest initiation by the landlord: J. Prebble, loc. cit., 20, 493-5; C.D.T.L., GD 221/5516/1.
- 73). For evidence of earlier government pressure on specific landlords see chapter six.
- 74). Unsurprisingly, Breadalbane did agree to levying on his estate by early 1778: S.R.O., Macgregor Collection, GD 50/11/1/77; S.W. Jackson, 'Notes & Queries' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 55 (1977), 183; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1239, f. 264; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/43/94/16; J. Fortescue, (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 3, 516.
- 75). B.L., Liverpool Papers, Add Ms 38192, f. 15; P.R.O., W.O. 4/104, p. 85. With regard to Dundas, it appears that he had discussed returning Major Duncan Macpherson of Cluny's estates by October 1776. Nevertheless, in what is indicative of the secondary nature of rehabilitation, it was not until the government in mid December 1777 made it clear it was sanctioning new Highland levies, that an offer from the Macpherson camp was made: N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 4, f. 4; P.R.O., W.O. 1/997, latter dated 19 December 1777.
- 76). J. Almon (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 8, 177-78.
- 77). J. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. 3 (London, 1902), 516-17; J. Dunlop, *The British Fisheries Society 1786-1893* (Edinburgh, 1978), 25.
- 78). *Scots Magazine*, vol. 60 (Edinburgh, 1793), 152; J. Fortescue, loc. cit., vol. 4, 83.
- 79). S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/6/25/2, 4 & 6.
- 80). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/13/2-3.
- 81). Laing Manuscripts, vol. 2, *H.M.C.* (London, 1925), 657.
- 82). T.C. Smout, 'Problems of Nationalism, Identity and Improvement in later Eighteenth Century Scotland' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Improvement and Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1989), 15-18; S.R.O., RH 2/4/88, f. 283; I.H. Scobie, 'The Caithness Fencibles and a Recruiting Card of 1799' in *J.S.A.H.R.* vol. 6 (1927), 6, 97.

83). Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (London, 1877), 620; J.M. Bulloch, *Territorial Soldiering in the North East of Scotland during 1759-1814* (Aberdeen, 1914); S.R.O., Macpherson of Cluny, GD 80/938/3; B.A.M., Box 59/4/18, 98.

84). N.L.S., Miscellaneous Melville Papers, Ms 14838, f. 182. For concerns of recruiting's impact on the economy see, N.L.S. Melville Papers, Ms 6, f. 157; Ms 1048, f. 3; B.A.M., Bundle 353, unnumbered manuscript on 1797 plan.

85). S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/6/25/6; M. McLean, loc. cit., 6-7.

86). Marchioness of Tullibardine, *A Military History of Perthshire* (Perth, 1908), 151-166; S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 50/18/3; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1480/14.

87). P. Stigger, loc. cit., 240-41; L. Colley, loc. cit., 287.

88). N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 6, f. 139; Ms 1048, ff. 64, 96, 118 & 189; S.R.O., Campbell of Balliveolin Papers, GD 13/292 & 4.

89). For a summary of these developments: D. Henderson, *Highland Soldier: A Social Study of the Highland Regiments 1820-1920* (Edinburgh, 1989), 21; Marchioness of Tullibardine, loc. cit., 126-127; J. Fortescue, *The County Lieutenancies and the Army* (London 1909), 4, 30, 145; N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 1048, ff. 120 & 184; Ms 19578, f. 35; S.R.O., Campbell of Balliveolin Papers, GD 13/339b, 380; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/764/26; Dep 313/754/8.

90). J.E. Cookson, 'The English Volunteer Movement of the French Wars 1793-1815: Some Contexts' in *H. J.* vol. 32 (1989), 840, 868, 878-9.

91). S.R.O., Seaford Muniments, GD 248/99/1/7; GD 248/192/1/11; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/3290/4.

92). Marquis of Cambridge, 'The Volunteer Army of Great Britain 1806' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 13 (1931), 114-72. For population figures: J. Gray (ed.), *Scottish Population Statistics* (Edinburgh, 1952), 23, 82-83.

93). S.R.O., Seaford Muniments, GD 46/17/16, unnumbered letters dated 5, 15, 21, 25 October 1808 and 1 November 1808.

94). For earlier evidence in the 1750s on the localism of Highlanders, where voluntary military enlistment was not indicative of Britishness but rather the opposite: chapter two, footnotes 49 & 51, p. 82-83.

Chapter Four

The Annexed Estates: Improvement, Recruitment and Re-settlement 1746 - 1784

The Board of Annexed Estates in the era 1755-1784, while never operating alone, still represents the most obvious and high profile government agency at work within the Scottish Highlands. The whole experiment of annexation has been described as limited in its impact, and failing absolutely in its role as an improving body. In a more recent analysis, the Board was highlighted as;

An absentee landlord which failed to delegate to agents on the spot, the Board lost touch both with its estates and reality. By the time it was dissolved in 1784, it had left little permanent mark on the Highland economy. ¹

Beyond a reputation for popularising planned villages in the Highlands, and acting as a reward panel for military service, the Board has frequently been viewed as yet another government agency failure within the region. ²

This chapter will attempt to examine how the Board reconciled the various duties it was called upon to perform, and whether these public policies exhibited consistency or contradiction. Given its reputation for failure, it is perhaps more appropriate to examine how the Annexed Estate Commission acted as both the premier improving agency for the government, while pursuing military policies which whig and improvement theory highlighted as maintaining Highland backwardness and under-development. Re-assessment of the Board in view of these military policies suggests that it is within this field that important questions arise that go beyond its failure to successfully impose improvement policies. By viewing the Annexed Estates as an early post Culloden example of the contradiction between classic improvement and military policies, it moves the focus outside the traditional debates over landlordism and improvement. By highlighting the role of central government and its military priorities through its premier improving agency, its influence can be illustrated as, at best ambiguous, or indeed openly inconsistent.

The Post Culloden Highlands: Theories of Improvement and Westminster Politics.

The most detailed study of the Board of Annexed Estates has highlighted the important point concerning the widespread consensus evident over perceived social and economic conditions in the Highlands. The 1745 uprising did, indeed, produce a surprising level of agreement amongst the whig political nation north and south of the border; it was understood that to control and secure the Highlands involved destroying the distinctive

economic and social structures existing in the area. In short, to " reduce the clans and abolish their habits. " ³

Examination of cultural perceptions of the region has stressed the crucial implications of universal acceptance within post Culloden Scotland of crude whig propaganda which equated clanship with perpetually non-industrious and disorderly behaviour. Indeed, hostile opinions of the agricultural and economic structure within the Highlands were already evident prior to the 1745 uprising. Most government and enlightened thinkers believed that the clan arrangement in the north represented a mere mechanism for military mobilisation and, as such, was a poor method for securing tenurial efficiency and its concomitant material wealth. As a result of clanship's rationale, the tacksman was understood to be the only secure possessor of land; this insecurity for the rest produced a willingness amongst them to live under excessive and uncertain labour services. It was perceived that under this backward system, poverty, and the resulting strains over limited resources like cattle had, in turn, produced a bellicose society which stressed its ability to defend its limited resources rather than invest in efficient agriculture and commerce. Thus prior to 1745, conceptions of the Highlands emphasised the military role of clanship and largely ignored its wider social and economic characteristics. This militarised community was perceived as incompatible with a civilised and improved one - at least according to contemporary whig theory. ⁴

It is not within the remit of this chapter to examine the accuracy of these beliefs, sufficient to say they were the widely held and respected views of most of the political and social elite of the time. These perceptions, which narrowed the multi-faceted role of clanship into a one dimensional mechanism, resulted in a belief that Lowland improving policies could easily be initiated in the Highlands. Further, Highland improvement would, as in the Lowlands, be through the same medium of rationalised and more tenurially structured estate management. The salient features of improvement as formulated (and increasingly practised) in the first half of the eighteenth century, involved the issuing of leases to ensure security of tenure, better organised husbandry, and single tenant farms of sufficient size to allow profit for both investment and wages for a totally landless labour force. Multiple tenancies, in particular, seem to have been in decline prior to the second half of the eighteenth century in the Lowlands. In reality, the progress of improved agriculture along set defined models should be treated with caution, as no real definitive model seems to have emerged or been comprehensively implemented. ⁵

It is important to highlight the lack of universal acceptance as to what improvement actually entailed in practical terms. More specifically to the forfeited estates, in 1747, Sir John Clerk of Penicuik wrote that the small nature of Highland agricultural possessions, linked to insecurity of tenure, was the principal cause of Highland poverty, and that the future managers of the estates should not be allowed to issue leases under a certain rent or length of time. Conversely, Sir Archibald Grant of Monymusk, another notable improver, stated that holdings in Scotland averaged out at 221 acres, which meant that they were too large and ill apportioned in terms of investment capacity. Interestingly, Grant's expertise was grounded in the North East, where a tenurial pattern of smaller crofting holdings emerged alongside the more theoretically conventional large units. In his theories, Grant, as with Clerk, also specified single tenancies, criticising, above all, the lack of leases. These core precepts of single tenancy and leases, formed the basis of Lowland improvement, and represent the most optimistic and theoretical approach. As such, these ideas were adopted by the new Commissioners of the Annexed Estates. However, the imposition of this proposed improvement took place against wider economic, social and military policies which represent the backdrop to the growth of estate management under the Westminster Treasury and its Scottish agents. ⁶

While a general consensus may have been reached amongst the political nation as to the nature of the Highland problem and its prime causes, posturing by elements in Westminster brought about disunity over which methods were to be employed. The victor at Culloden, William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, held the opinion that a legislative continuation of the punitive military policies he had instituted during his campaign was the most appropriate option which would succeed in the long term. Indeed, such was his belief that examples should be made, that he became displeased with Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, the Scottish Lord Justice Clerk whose clemency with suspected rebels merely reinforced Cumberland's view that Scotland as a whole was not to be trusted. The opposite view was that of Scotland's leading political player and Milton's patron, Archibald, third Duke of Argyll. Argyll took the stance that repression was counter-productive; on the debate over Heritable Jurisdictions he argued that, while it was certainly desirable to remove them, government supporters would lose a defence mechanism and political face just when it was needed most. Underlying this cautious policy was an attempt to persuade the Pelham regime that substantial compensation would be necessary to secure widespread support in Scotland. This parliamentary reluctance did insure that the paranoid government paid out £152 000 which, in turn, further embittered men like the ex-Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Chesterfield, who played upon a more generalised atmosphere of Scotophobia. ⁷ On a less cynical note, however, Argyll was more obviously aware of the political climate in

Scotland, and his less aggressive policies should be seen as attempting to warn the government against the backlash to its own anti-Scottish position.⁸

This conflict over how best to deal with the Highlands is the background to the passing of the Act of Annexation in March 1752. The widespread consensus apparent after Culloden meant that, unlike 1715 owners of Jacobite estates, it was intended that 1745 Jacobites would not be allowed to re-gain their landed property. This meant that annexation was a much voiced option from the start. By 17 May 1746, a mere month after Culloden, Argyll and Milton had privately discussed investing the crown with the estates of Jacobite families. The Lord President Duncan Forbes suggested breaking up the estates amongst politically reliable favourites. Lord Reay wrote to the Sutherland M.P. George Mackay (an anti-argathelian) stating that the best way to secure the Highlands was complete and unalienable annexation.⁹ There is evidence that Argyll, on 3 July 1746, attempted to circumvent the discussion over the nature of crown control of forfeited property. He informed Milton that he was to meet with Lords Tinwald and Elchies, decide on the first definite proposals, and thus be at an advantage. Argyll was also acutely aware of the sensitive position he and his followers were in. He insisted on editing any proposals before they were sent to London. Milton wished to see the most comprehensive government involvement in the region, and advocated the buying up of Highland estates to add to those already forfeited. This would, in fact, have appealed to Argyll, in that " a tract of lands from the east to the west sea, " could bring to his faction " the great power that naturally attends property. " ¹⁰

In the middle of November 1746, Milton informed the Duke of Newcastle of Macdonnell of Glengarry's offer to sell his estate for a reasonable price. He added that it was an interesting opportunity in that the crown would then be able to alter the whole social and economic experience of large sections of the disaffected Highland populace. Milton was, however, keen to point out that Glengarry would either have to be convicted of treason or pardoned. It does appear at this early stage that it was not necessarily believed that the estates were to be annexed. In October 1746, Argyll expressed the hope that the estate of Stewart of Appin would be sold to a stranger, rather than to a person of Highland interest or connection. By late August 1747, perhaps in order to appear enthusiastic after the Jurisdictions affair, Argyll told Newcastle that annexation was the best policy, while as late as 1749 he retained some hope of controlling the estate of Stewart of Ardsheal.¹¹

However, given attitudes amongst the English political elite towards Argyll, it is not surprising that Lord Chancellor Hardwicke opposed his dominance on policy formation for the Highlands. Anti-argathelian figures like Robert Dundas and the Earl of Findlater were also allowed to deliberate and contribute.¹² However, problems quickly arose over the

exact conditions under which annexation was to take place. Lord Advocate William Grant informed Hardwicke on 6 January 1750, that doubts had occurred over whether legal claims on estates could be paid after annexation, or whether they would have to be made good before annexation was possible. The slow nature of defining and legitimising claims of debt also saw political mud slinging. Dundas believed that the pro-Argyll judges in the Court of Session treated the claims easily in order to delay Treasury payment. However, the argathelian Lord Chief Justice, Charles Erskine, stated that while Lord Advocate Grant was apparently enthusiastic for the measure and went to London with copies of the scheme, he, nevertheless, also dealt slowly with claims.¹³

The parliamentary campaign to pass the Annexation Bill also saw the continuing politicisation of Highland improvement. During the passage of the bill, concerted opposition was evident from Cumberland and John fourth Duke of Bedford. The latter had recently resigned from the administration and wished, with Cumberland's covert support, to mount serious parliamentary opposition to the Pelham incumbency. Bedford argued that;

We all know the nature of public undertakings: we all know how apt they are to be made a jobb of by those that are employed in the execution; and the project to be established by this bill looks as like job, and is, in my opinion, more liable to be made a job of than any public undertaking I ever heard of. This is not an age to expect that men will give themselves any trouble without some expectation of profit or power, those as have great estates in the neighbourhood would be commissioners and be active because it would increase their power in the country and tho' they are well affected this could change.¹⁴

The direct attack on the Scottish promoters of the legislation was backed by Cumberland and the army faction to the extent that Argyll, as the perceived representative of Highland interests, felt that;

Our enemies make it a very doubtful point with me, whether I can with prudence advise the scheme.... I was actually afraid if I had launched out too far that I might have engaged in an altercation with one too much above me.¹⁵

Argyll was, of course, referring to Cumberland. However, the weakness in Bedford's immediate parliamentary attack is demonstrated by his suggested alternative.

I am convinced, that it would [be] more to the improvement of that country, and the increase of our trade, to sell those estates at an under value to gentlemen or merchants who were not natives of the country, than to vest them inalienably in the crown. ¹⁶

In 1715, exactly the same policy had been tried, and the failures were so comprehensive that one has to question Bedford's reason for initial opposition along these lines. The post 1745 agreement and consensus over the Highlands which has been highlighted, was, in fact, always subordinated to the wider vagaries of Westminster politics. It would be unfair to accuse the Cumberland-Bedford faction and, indeed, Scots politicians generally, of using the rhetoric of improvement without genuine regard. Yet if the legislation which gave rise to the Annexed Estates was subject to higher pressures in government, then that is worthy of note when examining the importance of other public policies like recruitment when compared to the declared aims of the Board.

In March 1752 the Annexing Act was passed; the legal and political wrangling over debts did, however, continue. Lord Desford, a member of the Scottish political interest which identified with Newcastle and Hardwicke, tried to insure that the scheme came under the management of the Commissioners of Police, which as a Treasury controlled organ of Scottish government, would be relatively free of Argyll's manipulation. Cumberland's dislike of the legislation can be sensed from Argyll's statement concerning the debate, and from the fact that after the Act was passed, the royal Duke sent a list of suspected Jacobites within Scottish government to the King. Pelham was forced to investigate the claims and this inquiry delayed the setting up of a commission to actually manage the estates. The cautious, indeed, straitened nature of Henry Pelham's fiscal regime between 1752 - 54 also slowed proceedings down. In early February 1753, William Tod, London agent of the British Linen Company informed Milton that nothing had been mentioned in the capital concerning the Highland Commission, and that " the fixing [of] the public supplies has prevented Mr Pelham from noticing other applications. " ¹⁷

It was in the sphere of the payment of claims that Lord Advocate Grant felt that the Treasury was somewhat indifferent. In mid August 1754, he informed Hardwicke that soon after the bill became law, he had asked for a commission in order that, by the terms of the Act, negotiations and settlements of claims could be concluded. He informed the Chancellor that, as yet, he had received no such commission. Likewise, prior to the Act, Baron Idle, an Englishman in the Scottish Court of Exchequer, had complained that the Treasury had constantly objected to allowances for factors administering crown land in the Highlands. ¹⁸

There were also problems over the political makeup and affiliation of commission and administration personnel. Westminster was determined that the estates and crown money would not be "made subservient towards [the] promoting of any parliamentary interest of one great family preferable to another." Commissioners were to be selected in order to insure that the Highland interest was in a minority, and that the Lords of Justiciary and Session, described as "flaming Scots patriots" were also proscribed.¹⁹ What is certain is that, in 1749, the Earl of Breadalbane did attempt to increase his family's patronage connections by petitioning both the Duke of Argyll and Gordon to install Colin Campbell of Glenure in the factor's post in either Ardsheal or Locheil. In the same year, he tried to purchase the wadsett of Fernan on the estate of Robertson of Strowan in order, he informed Hardwicke, that the Duke of Atholl in alliance with Argyll could not gain ownership. In early October 1754, Hardwicke refused to sell the whole estate to the Campbell earl, stating in private that it penetrated to the heart of Breadalbane's estate and would act as a curb on any future earl turning rebel. Perhaps because of cases like this, Argyll believed that the new commission would be managed by a majority of Englishmen.²⁰

The contest over the commission's secretary also showed how divided the whole affair was. The Treasury choice, Stamp Brookbank, was appointed in order that he act impartially, and not as the tool and informant of one side. The policy was taken to a socially higher level when the Duke of Atholl and the Earl of Breadalbane (not surprisingly) were excluded from the commission. The overall result of this delay and indifference was that the Commissioners were not appointed until June 1755.²¹

The fate of the government drive to commence improvement in the Highlands is indicative of how quickly the general consensus, apparent after Culloden, nevertheless, disintegrated into political infighting. This resulted in a nine year gap from the end of the uprising until the actual process began. This demonstrates that within the realm of government at least, the victory of improvement after Culloden was not universal or sudden, and that the whole process could rank low in Westminster's priorities, even during a period of peace.

War & The Annexed Estates Improvement Policies

On the ground the Annexed Estates represented a broad spectrum of varying Highland properties. The largest, Perth, was centred in the south east Highlands and was relatively fertile and developed. Barrisdale, in Glenelg, along with Coigach, part of the estate of Cromarty, were in the far north west, examples of areas almost totally dependent on black cattle, but with a recognised potential for fishing. All in all, the Annexed Estates were

typical of the diverse geographical areas of the Highlands, and, as such, encompassed all the problems and possibilities of the area.

Concerning the policies that were brought to bear upon these estates, the previously noted improving remit of the Commission did, in fact, underlie the specific aim of the Act. This was;

The promoting amongst them the Protestant religion, good government, industry and manufactures, and the principal of duty and loyalty to His Majesty. ²²

In the post '45 climate of the late 1740s and the early 1750s, the security and continuing pacification of the area was still considered vital by the government. In 1752, when details of the Elibank Plot were uncovered, this policy of continuing pacification was consolidated. The underlying theme of law and order is important in what was, after all, a government agency, especially when linked to the attempted implementation of improvement policies. The belief that the loyalty of the inhabitants would be won by ensuring their general happiness could result in the alteration of original policies. This emphasis on social control can be illustrated by the comment of Sir Gilbert Elliot, M.P. for the county of Selkirk, and a noted improver appointed to the commission. Elliot informed an associate on 28 June 1755 that;

We have opened the commission for the Forfeited Estates and flatter ourselves that under our protection a loyal well policed colony will soon flourish. ²³

The lack of improvement rhetoric is not evidence of its unimportance, but it does illustrate that in the early days of the commission, improvement was not the sole aim of the Board. The impact this could have on the structure of tenurial improvement can be illustrated by the comments of Lieutenant-General Humphrey Bland, British army Commander in Chief in Scotland. On 20 December 1753, Bland wrote to Chancellor Hardwicke giving his opinions on the future policies of the Annexed Estates Commission. He stated that in order to make the poor people happy and independent, farms on the estates should be made very small, not exceeding £ 5 or £ 6 a year in rent and leased only to subtenants. Bland continued;

Besides, should the farms be made larger, numbers of poor families who now live upon little farms of 50/- or £3 a year would be destitute of the means of subsisting as they can't become subtenants to the others which would of course depopulate the country and fill it with thieves and rogues. ²⁴

Bland's suggestion for a tenurial model was, in fact, that of crofting, and it is significant that the military suggested it as an alternative to contemporary ideas for improvement. More generally, this reveals that the social cost of change remained an important factor in strategy development for the Highlands, and that assertions that the government did not intervene to alter the process of improvement should be questioned. This thesis argues that the minimisation of subtenant removal on the Annexed Estates conformed more to a European model of agricultural improvement than to the situation in the Scottish Lowlands, where such social concerns were alleviated by a generally buoyant economy. This marks a significant difference in approach between the two regions.²⁵

The confused thinking on the reality of improvement was complicated further when, at the very commencement of its attempts to put into practice the clauses of the Act, the Commissioners, and the country as a whole, faced the prospect of military conflict and imminent attempts at raising additional military forces. Indeed, in the thirty two year existence of the Annexed Estates, Britain was at war for fourteen, and initiated large scale recruitment for sixteen - half of its life span.

The impact these unforeseen circumstances had on shaping or completely altering policies was undoubtedly both considerable and complex. Argument has arisen over the effect of the war upon the operations of the Annexed Commissioners. It has been noted that the complete failure of the Commissioners in the period 1755 - 60 was due to the international situation and the pressures of war time financial stringency. Conversely, it has been argued that the war had little effect on the workings of the Board, and that Cumberland simply blocked all serious attempts at reform.²⁶

Both arguments fail to consider the official remit of the Board as an essentially civilian attempt at promoting both loyalty and improvement. Cumberland, for strategic reasons, was eventually prepared to sanction the large-scale use of Highland troops, but this significant concession to a perceived Highland interest meant that a positive stance towards any other initiative in the region was highly unlikely. This argument can be countered by the fact that, in 1757, Cumberland was disgraced, while the power of Argyll and his Highland interest waxed strongly. This would seem to set the context for sustained levels of fundamental improvement upon the estates. Yet there is also the reality of Argyll's promotion of recruitment in the Highlands, and the recognition by his political enemies that the area could contribute to his over all interest. His lack of positive action in this field had less to do with his ineffectuality, as has been argued, and more to do with alternative uses for the estates. Their military potential and the overwhelming priority of policies designed to maximise the use of population, lowered the profile of any attempt at sustained and

radical change in the Highlands. It was widely perceived that improvement dislocated populations; as such, it " did not obviously match the best interests of the realm during the Seven Years War. " ²⁷

The Board was, in essence, effected by the changing priorities of outside influences. The Commission had been characterised by uncertainty since its inception, and this was hardly the context in which sustained improvement could be implemented. By 2 January 1757, the change in attitudes to the Highlands brought on by this new wartime agenda was noted by a prominent treasury supporter in Scotland;

There has lately been broached a notion of a most pernicious nature, that they intend to move this winter for a repeal of the Annexing Act and that the Highland estates may be sold as the Lowlands have been, for the payment of their debts.... I am not sure the whole country will not favour this [and] that England should stand in awe, they think it [the Highlands] makes Scotland more respectable and gives weight to all their demands. ²⁸

This significant element of doubt concerning state sponsored improvement was specifically brought on by the military use of the estates. One result of this was that uncertainty stretched into management of the properties. In March 1757, John Maule, a Baron of the Exchequer, informed John Campbell, factor on the estate of Perth that " the Commissioners will not incline to give feu's or even long leases until they have deliberated upon it. " Partly, this was merely sensible management, yet it also reflected uncertainty - a state of affairs noted by the Commissioners themselves as uncondusive to agricultural improvement. Nevertheless, while Argyll was prepared to use the property of attainted families in a positive way through recruiting, there can be little doubt that as a cautious politician he would have distanced himself from any suggestion that he was attempting, not merely the rehabilitation of younger scions, but the re-establishment of their powerbase. As a result, in 1758, Argyll assisted in getting £ 69 910 for the debts of Perth estate. ²⁹

Before the impact of wartime policies in a specific area is assessed, it is worth examining some of the personnel involved in the management of the Annexed Estates. The careers and aspirations of estate officials is instructive, and illustrates how civilian and military responsibilities overlapped. For example, James Small, factor on Strowan, had attained the rank of ensign during the War of the Austrian Succession, while Forbes of New, his equivalent in Lovat and Cromarty, had held a captaincy. Indeed, such was their predilection for military service of some kind that, in February 1756, John Campbell of Barcaldine,

factor on Perth estate, along with his colleagues in Locheil, Strowan and Lovat/Cromarty wrote to Milton concerning the need to revive independent companies.

It is to be apprehended that in the event of a war with France, the Highlands of Scotland would of new become disorderly; and that if France was to take any steps in favour of the Pretender by either sending him or some of his adherents into the Highlands, there would be a great many infatuated people found there to join him. ³⁰

The factors wished to have a company of one hundred men on Lovat and Perth estates. Locheil and Strowan were to receive two lieutenants, two ensigns and fifty men each. Since the Annexing Act was for demilitarising the Highlands, arming even well affected tenantry was against both the theory and legal articles of annexation. Yet the request is symptomatic of estate managers with military backgrounds. As it was, the plan was never put into operation, yet when Milton alerted Argyll to the prospect of using the estates in this way, the Duke informed him that he had approved of the idea but that " the tide ran so high that it would be in vain to propose it at present. ³¹

This incident demonstrated several points. Firstly, that hostility to any recruiting attempts on the estates only existed initially in England; secondly, that at various levels of management within the machinery of the Annexed Estates, personnel were obviously prepared to divide their statutory duties, and benefit from the local patronage military activity could bring.

The best example of this military overlap into civilian management is the Campbell of Glenure and Barcaldine family. In February 1757, through the interest of Breadalbane, Alexander Campbell gained a major's commission in the 77th Highland regiment. Barcaldine, Alexander's brother, used his position as factor on Perth estate to recruit for the regiment. Indeed, it was rumoured that Barcaldine had over reacted in terms of recruiting and behaved in an oppressive manner, though most Annexed Commissioners supported him. Again, this is evidence that the military, as well as the commercial use of the estates had found general acceptance. In May 1757, while ensuring the proper use of the woods upon the estate of Strowan, several subtenants had been removed. It was noted that while removal was unfortunate, such dislocated tenantry made willing recruits. ³²

Mungo Campbell, another member of the Barcaldine/Glenure family, was factor on the annexed estate of Barrisdale and forfeited estate of Locheil. In 1757, he asked Milton to recommend him for a position in one of the additional companies intended for the recently

raised Montgomery and Fraser battalions. Mungo failed to secure a position in that year, but in late 1758, he received from Lord Milton a commission in Colonel Archibald Montgomery's levy. Milton, in turn, represents, at the very highest level in Scotland, the tendency of positions within the civilian sphere of improvement to be held simultaneously with those of a recruiting and military nature. His position as both a prominent Commissioner and accumulator of recruiting data should be viewed in this light. He was heavily involved in the Press Act passed in Scotland in 1756 and 1757; in Lothian he was a commissioner for the Haddington area, and as Argyll's agent in Scotland he was heavily involved in the military patronage network constructed by the Campbell Duke. These examples demonstrate that at all levels the personnel of the Commission were faced with a possible divergence of duties.³³

When, in June 1755, the Commission met to finally implement the remit of the Act, it favoured the policy of issuing "profitable leases to continue for a certain limited term in room of the dependent and precarious possessions which normally prevailed." A limit of £20 was set on the leases, while subletting was forbidden. Factors on both the Annexed and Forfeited Estates advocated a policy of clear division of farms, and an increase in the average size in order to ensure agricultural and commercial viability. The emphasis on security of tenure and farm size illustrate how, initially at least, the Commission followed the standard estate policies and orthodoxy of classic Lowland improvement. These strategies stood in direct contrast to the ideas put forward in 1753 by Lieutenant-General Bland. His concern had been for the continuing role that landed resources ought to have in anchoring large estate populations.³⁴

The approach that mirrored Lowland trends was soon being implemented. The factor on Perth estate recommended that the farm of Dundurn be leased to Colin Campbell because "there was a necessity of putting the farm into better hands." This policy was continued on Cromarty, where the farms of Corrie and Dalvaird were put under single lease to Murdoch Mackenzie of Auchility, with the multiple tenants being described as "poor and possessed but small portions of land."³⁵ In summary, the policies meant;

That in order to accommodate anyone capable of making such improvements, it was necessary to remove the former tenants and here they, [the Commissioners] were to countenance what amounted to the whole-scale removal of tenants from a number of farms.³⁶

Recruiting on Lovat: Case Study.

The problems of conflicting interpretation and implementation of agricultural improvement are best illustrated at the estate level. The case of Lovat, for example, demonstrates how policy worked or failed on the ground. For varying political reasons, on 4 January 1757, Simon Fraser, eldest son of the executed Lord Lovat, gained a lieutenant-colonel's commission to raise a battalion of Highlanders.³⁷ The new Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser wrote to the Board on 7 February 1757, asking that "the factors and other officers on the Annexed Estates may have directions from the Commissioners for managing the said estates, for each of them to give their utmost aid and assistance to the military officers who shall be employed in raising the said troops."³⁸ The Board ordered that all the factors were to give their utmost aid and assistance to the recruiting officers of Fraser's corp. This stance appears to contradict the official de-militarisation line, as well as the whig theories which explained the relatively backward economic conditions in the area.³⁹ Between 9 February and the middle of March, the factors of Perth, Strowan, Lovat and Cromarty all acknowledged this order. Fraser obviously intended to recruit from as large a catchment area as possible. His officers were under severe pressure, indeed, their commissions depended on quick success, and the ability to recruit beyond Inverness-shire was, doubtless, gratefully received. This particular regiment has attracted much of the extravagant romanticism attached to such battalions; the lack of proprietary power, and the extensive use of the name Fraser in its commissioned officers, have given it the allure of a post Culloden clan levy. Yet the existence of the Impress Act, as well as the coercive powers of the estate factors, represented a substitute for Fraser's lack of landlord leverage.⁴⁰

Moreover, as Fraser recruited well beyond the territory associated with his family, the above allusion to a clan levy hardly stands. In late 1755, barely a year before recruitment began upon it, the Annexed Estate of Lovat had, at the best estimate, 769 males over the age of 17.⁴¹ The enlistment of men for the Press Act occurred simultaneously with that of Frasers; indeed, the Commissioners, while eager to help Fraser were not prepared to allow men that were destined for conscription to be drafted into the new regiment.⁴²

The figure of 800 men raised by Fraser's personal interest, came not just from the Lovat estate but through his extensive interests beyond the former family property. On 1 March 1757, Simon informed the War Office that this interest had resulted in 582 men by the time he reached Inverness. In three days the estate of Lovat and the numerous smaller Fraser properties surrounding it, had yielded 306 men, demonstrating that, despite the effort to spread the burden, the estate must have experienced intense recruiting activity. The figure

personally raised by Fraser is thus exaggerated, and while never a "clan regiment," a substantial section of its personnel were obviously from the erst-while family lands.⁴³

The raising of the battalion occurred in two ways; Fraser intended to recruit on the family's ex-estates, and on the rest of the area under the Commissioners' control. On 4 January, barely days after securing his new regiment, Simon wrote to the Fraser of Foyers family. The letter demonstrates how the process was essentially one of influence, bribery and delegation. In the letter the emphasis was on the need for haste, and the importance to Fraser of his friends. He continued;

I am satisfied I may depend on you in what so nearly concerns me. As I have not time tonight to write to every one whose assistance I expect, I must beg you will communicate this to such gentlemen as you think proper. I shall endeavour to procure commissions for some gentlemen of the name, but these particulars must be subject of another letter. I thought it necessary to give you and the other friends this early notice that you may make vigour on my behalf.⁴⁴

Simon's appeal to Foyers was backed up by the fact that the latter had suffered financial difficulties, and the former had, in turn, assisted him. Despite the problems it brought, the importance of Fraser connections in recruiting the battalion can be illustrated by the fact that, excluding Simon himself, fifteen Frasers appeared on the officers list.⁴⁵ During the first two months of recruiting, this large Fraser interest put additional pressure on the Annexed Estate itself. Probably due to Simon Fraser's earlier attempts at intervention in local politics, which had Fraser gentry support, the M.P. for the county of Inverness, Pryse Campbell, a relation of Campbell of Calder, refused to sanction any Fraser recruitment upon his estate, believing regiment raising was merely another effort to buttress his opponent's political interest. It was not until March that Fraser was successful in securing access to the Calder estate. The situation within the Fraser interest did not help. Lady Elizabeth Rose of Kilravock stated: "His [Simon Fraser's] own Frasers are not the least of his plague," adding, "well do I know what it is to oblige clannish humours. Sometimes if you take a man of the name you offend at another time."⁴⁶

Beyond local problems, the predominance of one interest did cause patronage difficulties. Milton was given to understand that with regard to the early 1757 regiments, Argyll had found "the making up of these lists and adjusting differences amongst the northern potentates a tedious, troublesome job."⁴⁷ There is evidence that this was understating the case. In July 1757, with the prospect of additional companies looming, Hector McLean of Torloisk wrote that while he was pleased Argyll had asked for his recommendations; "the

Clan McLean were much offended at being left out when the two Highland regiments were raised." ⁴⁸ The disappointment of Hector McLean aside, West Highland gentry were well represented. The Macdonells of Glengarry and Macdonalds of Clanranald and Morar gained eight commissions, the Camerons five, and even the isolated MacNeils of the Western Isles secured a position in Fraser's battalion. ⁴⁹ This method of broadening the geographical area of recruitment was a tremendous success. By 6 May 1757, Montgomery and Fraser had both raised 1100 men - an impressive recruiting feat. ⁵⁰

In London, the early success in recruiting brought joy to the Argyll camp, which used the incident to entrench politically. The rapid creation of the two new regiments underlines the efficiency of the recruiting system as practised in the Highland counties. However, a study of the process with particular reference to the Annexed Estates, and the Lovat estate in particular, demonstrates that success was gained at the price of substantial disruption and subversion of the drive to improve. The first point to note is that in the spring of 1757, the Highlands were experiencing conditions akin to famine. Tenants on Lovat wrote to the Board on 3 January, a day before Fraser secured his regimental commission, stating that they were;

Much distressed by reason of the last severe spring and harvest, the spring was such that it destroyed a great part of the peas in the ground especially the bear part thereof. This with the great fall in the price of the black cattle will beggar a great many of your petitioners. ⁵¹

The later recruiting parties of Fraser's regiment were quartered in Inverness, Fort Augustas, Statherrick and Strathglass. The original parties with responsibilities in Lovat were probably similarly distributed, moreover, such parties universally induced hardships on the communities where they were situated. ⁵² These desperate conditions in the Highlands without doubt helped to quicken the recruiting process. Captain Forbes, while explaining the loss of £ 7.3.9d in meal repayments, stated that the money was due from tenants who had become bankrupt and entered the military. ⁵³

On 7 February 1757, Simon Fraser personally visited the offices of the Board in Edinburgh, to impress and extol the need for rapid recruitment. ⁵⁴ The role of the factor in this process was vital, and John Forbes of New in Lovat and Cromarty was ideal in several respects. Firstly, as a military man, he would be aware of the type of men required. Further, since he had been active in assisting the Commissioners for the Press Act, he already had an extensive knowledge of persons on the estate fit and suitable for military service. ⁵⁵

The choice of the officers for the Fraser battalion illustrates how this previous experience was further utilised. Lieutenant Alexander Fraser was the second son of Thomas Fraser, tacksman of the farm of Garthmore in the Barony of Stratherrick. Since the male population of that farm aged over seventeen was only nine persons, this could hardly have secured the commission.⁵⁶ The fact that his father was a Commissioner for the Press Act, with powers to forcibly enlist men into the statutory levy, could only have boosted Alexander's chance of raising men for Fraser's.⁵⁷ John Forbes influenced the tenantry on the estate by a mixture of blatant threats and promises of security. In 1758, the Board were informed that Forbes used eviction as the "usual way of threatening tenants."⁵⁸ This method of coercion is evident from the fact that, on 15 June 1757, seven soldiers from the battalion surrendered at Fort William, claiming that they had been forced into service "without any shew of legal authority."⁵⁹ The petition of Elizabeth Fraser, whose husband had entered the military, stated that the Board would receive "more supplicants from among the tenants on this estate if they were not restrained by fear of the factor and that punctilious obsequiousness which the captain demanded or expected from all the tenants under his factory."⁶⁰ The fact that the petitioner had been removed from the family farm probably jaded her opinion of Forbes, but in light of the bitter complaints received concerning the factor's later settlement of deserters, the petition doubtless reflected opinion on the estate. By July 1757, just as Fraser's battalion sailed for the colonies, Forbes himself stated that "at present they do all live very quietly and give no sort of offence and conform to the laws in every respect."⁶¹ This state of affairs cannot be attributed to recruiting alone, the famine had resulted in substantial arrears and this obviously cowed the population. Forbes freely admitted that so many owed rent he could not single out any particular offender. However, the tendency to target the financially insecure as potential recruits, again ensured that tenants gave no extra reason to warrant the factor's attention.⁶²

The other method deployed to gain men was security of landed possession. The concept of land in return for military service was well understood by the population, and was employed by Forbes. In February, when Fraser visited the Board in Edinburgh, he secured an intimation from the Commissioners "that the parents of such of the tenants sons as were fit for service, and would enter voluntarily, would be continued in their possessions, and that the young men upon returning home, when the service of their King and country was over, would meet with proper encouragement."⁶³ This policy was in direct contrast with the official remit of the Commission, which was to alter the tenurial structure in the Highlands within an improvement framework. The sum effect of these military policies was simply the bypassing of this agenda.

The Impact of Recruitment on the Estate of Lovat.

The success of the recruiting operation on the Annexed estates is evident by a 1761 report to the Treasury, which stated that " the factors have exerted themselves with equal zeal and success at this time when there are many officers employed by his Majesty's orders in recruiting through Scotland. " The Board also stated that it had ordered continued assistance to the military. Aware, perhaps, that this could involve substantial coercion, they added that factors were to take " care at the same time that no irregularities be committed upon the estates upon which they are factors. " ⁶⁴ The consequences of this intensive recruitment was a profound impact on the Lovat property, all social classes from tacksman through to labourers were affected, as was the smooth running of the estate.

The first result of recruiting activities on Lovat was the disruption of the general policy of the Board to grant single lease farms. Recruiting had resulted in fluctuations of personnel and the removal of several prominent tacksmen. Indeed, Forbes informed the Board that this weakness in traditional local influence represented an ideal opportunity to institute a policy of internal colonisation. When, in early 1757, the farm of Groam lost one of its tenants, a half pay officer Lieutenant William Baillie to the military, the factor recommended that " when a farm becomes vacant, it would be very expedient to introduce low country farmers, or where that is not cast up, to mix strangers in the neighbourhood among the prevailing name. " It was obviously intended that the loss of such personnel could be used to stimulate the creation of single tenant farms. However, this was not always possible as tacksmen or substantial single tenants entered the army in significant numbers. ⁶⁵

These tacksmen were able to use their local knowledge to increase their recruiting potential. When James Fraser, possessor of the farm of Lettoch in Beaully gained his lieutenancy, he, as a single tenant, had no sub-tenants on his farm. He was therefore forced to raise 40 men by an agreement with Forbes, who allowed him to retain profits from his farm until 1758, and then to " verbally renounce " the possession. In return, the factor helped him to such an extent that the lieutenant " owed him great obligations. " ⁶⁶ Nothing more clearly demonstrates the impact recruitment could have upon the very class of farmer the Annexed Estates was attempting to encourage.

These departures resulted in a partial vacuum in the possession of various farms. The lands of Lettoch, Mains of Lovat, Knocknairay, Milns of Kimoraick, Mickle Portclair, Barnyards and Moniack all lost their established single tenants, while the farms of Inchberry, Knockchoilim and little Garth lost their tacksmen. In terms of generating new single

tenants, the loss of even these more traditional tacksmen was significant. Endowed with the expertise and capital, it was usually this class who removed their sub-tenantry and became single leaseholders.⁶⁷ The decision by Forbes to impose single tenants on the vacant farms was seen by many of the inhabitants as the factor merely wishing to hand farms to his friends. The vacant tack of the Milns of Kilmoraick and Teauchruick went to Forbes's assistant, William Grant, baron baillie on the estate; the farm of Glendoemor, left by the tacksman Alexander Fraser when he joined the army, was given to Sweton Grant and then Alexander Grant, successive barrack-masters at Fort Augustas. When Fraser later tried to regain the farm he failed, and when another application was refused due to the residence of Grant Wilcox, he wrote bitterly to the Board that he " had the misfortune in the applications he had made to be opposed by these gentlemen from the country of Strathspey, who are generally reputed to stick to one another under the notion of clanship as much as any set of people in Scotland." Fraser continued that, since Grant Wilcox was the factor of Sir Ludovick Grant's Urquhart properties, he believed he had lost the farm as it lay between Strathspey and Urquhart. This, he added, was a

grievance that strangers of whatever clan or country should by dint of solicitation have it in their power to disappoint the natural inhabitants, who have endeavoured equally to exert themselves for their King and country.⁶⁸

The disappointment of Lieutenant Alexander Fraser is perhaps forgivable; however, his situation was a result of his own preference for a military career. This trend in personnel change is mirrored elsewhere, both on Lovat and other Annexed Estates.⁶⁹ The enthusiastic drain of the substantial single tenant and tacksman class into the military sprang from a belief that the army, as opposed to agriculture, offered a better mechanism for securing a livelihood - an understandable choice given the altering social position of tacksmen in particular.⁷⁰ Evidence does exist which suggests that certain members of the class were suffering financially, a fact that may explain the military option. When one such tacksman enlisted his property was " in a ruinous condition "; his equivalent on the farm of Tomavait had " fallen so low in his circumstances and allowed the farm to become in a great measure waste without house barn or kailyard. " ⁷¹ However, the process of joining the army tended, if anything, to cause further financial embarrassment. Hugh Fraser purchased a company in a new battalion, " but at such an expense as put him very considerably in debt. " Another officer found that after he had paid for his military equipment, his family could not afford the rent and were forced to sell their stock. The family of Lieutenant Alexander Fraser spent £30 on his farm, and after he had enlisted, restocked the property. This financial outlay represented a serious attempt at social advancement, yet the farm, as

already noted, was later taken out of the family's hands, a direct result of Alexander's entry into the army.⁷²

The departure of so many gentry also resulted in altered conditions for the lower social orders. The immediate introduction of new tack holders has already been noted, and for the sub-tenantry this was often disastrous. The protection and influence which a tacksman offered could be reduced dramatically, as in the case of Lieutenant McTavish of Little Garth, who found it impossible from America to protect his farm from water damage which threatened to ruin his tenantry. For other tenants the change was even quicker. The new possessor of the farm of Glendoemor, Alexander Grant, did attempt to implement the policy of single tenancy by removing his subtenants onto a mere third of the farm. The sub-tenants on the possession gained by Grant Wilcox were quickly removed, for, as the Board agreed, the land was only improvable if farmed by a single tenant.⁷³ Another consequence, particularly for single tenants, was the social profile of the vast majority of Highland recruits. Overwhelmingly, those entering the army were from the landless day labourer class. The result of this was a scarcity of labour which, in turn, raised wage levels. Hired help was not a problem for tacksmen, as they simply used the labour resources of their subtenantry and cottars. Waged labour was, largely, a single tenant problem. The single tenant farmers on the Stratherrick farms of Dalittiack and Wester Borlum stated that such was the scarcity of servants " on account of the war " that they had been forced to hire servants from beyond the Highlands at wage levels so exorbitant, as to threaten the continued viability of their single tenure.⁷⁴ The sub-tenants, however, could also benefit from the change in circumstances; upon joining the military, John Fraser had sub-let his farm to his tenants, and due to the fact that non-residency made his possession void, he was informed that the " Honourable Board intended to make the subtenants independent of the principal tacksmen and not removable by him."⁷⁵ In this regard recruitment could actually benefit the aims of the Board by ending the dominance of tacksmen and subtenure. In essence, military service hastened the creation of multiple tenant farms. Indeed, this unstable period in estate conditions witnesses the social expectations and attitudes of the lower orders change; in August 1760, while their tacksmen served in the colonies, sub-tenants petitioned the Board concerning " proposals made in the name of the tenants, " to drain Lochgarth, a major decision prompted from an increasingly confident social group.⁷⁶

Comparison of rentals before and after the Seven Years War demonstrates that, in 1755, 59% of the estate's farms were held by leases to a single person (the majority being tacksmen). The disruption meant that while tacksmen farms had decreased in number, the largest growth in farm holding type had been in multiple tenant as opposed to single tenant farms. In 1755, multiple tenant farms constituted 41% of all agricultural units, while by

1770 they constituted 50%.⁷⁷ More specifically, actual reversion of policy occurred as the single tenant farms of Barnyards, Monaick and Relic became multiple tenant farms. Between 1757-1770, recruitment and demobilisation was responsible for a turnover in tacksmen on 24% of holdings, which, in 1755, had sustained 25% of the estate's population. There can be little doubt that military activity influenced a great many people, and played a significant role in the emergence of these new multiple tenant structures.⁷⁸ These changes demonstrate that land management suffered as a result of recruiting, and that the estate was dominated by confused policies, with no definite or sustained strategy emerging in this period.

The Annexed Estates & Military Demobilisation.

Examples of both the benefits and losses sustained by the gentry and lower tenantry due to recruitment should be treated with caution in view of the changing tenurial structures appearing on the Annexed Estates. With regard to the general development of improvement policies during this time, it has been argued that, between 1755 and 1762, the tendency to grant leases which forbade subletting resulted in the Board sanctioning the loss of a large section of the subtenant class. There is evidence to support this scenario; in 1758, Forbes removed the subtenants on the farm of Dunballoch in Easter Lovat, while the example of Glendoemore in Stratherrick has already been cited.⁷⁹

However, the order for the parents of enlisted volunteers to be maintained demonstrates that this neat version of events is perhaps too simplistic. The conflict of interests between the establishment of single tenant farms, as against the desire to retain population, was heavily influenced by the recruiting drive. The level of military activity on Lovat largely explains why this estate is an early example of the inability of post Culloden improvers to institute a consistent and balanced land use policy of both agriculturally feasible units and an employable population level. Any study involving the impact of the military on the Annexed Estates, falls rather conveniently into two separate spheres. Between the years 1756 and 1762, six highland battalions, either regular or fencible were raised in the relevant counties. After late 1762, the emphasis naturally switched to the problem of demobbing Britain's vastly enlarged military establishment. Since the Annexed Estates belonged to the crown, demobilisation became, in turn, an unusually prevalent feature of estate and tenurial management.

Demobilisation from the military of substantial tacksmen and single tenants, who, earlier, had so enthusiastically entered the army, now presented special problems to the Commissioners. Often keen to return to the estates which they had left, these people

represented the personnel most capable of implementing improvement. However, as a result of subtenant removals in the period 1755 - 60, reaction to the losses in population had set in. The Board, in March 1764, stated that no subtenants paying regular rent were to be removed for substantial tenants, as this affected their happiness and was thus contrary to the aims of the Annexing Act. This represents the victory of General Bland's ideas with regard to social protection. Thus, John Fraser, tacksman of the farm of Knockcoilom found that the Commissioners refused to reinstate him, as this involved the removal of former subtenants. Likewise, other half pay officers, ideal for single tenancies, were informed they would simply have to wait.⁸⁰ However, such was the demand for places that certain farms did witness the removal of small tenantry to make way for substantial tenants. In January 1769, after six years of unsettled estate conditions as a result of continued requests for land, Forbes stated that if small tenants were to be removed then they should, in turn, be resettled with " tenants who have large farms to provide of these poor people. " This could involve the formation of farms with tenantry of sufficient means, but who remained burdened with lesser possessors.⁸¹

Against this backdrop of confusion and compromise, international events lead to the Commissioners adopting policies that generated a large resettlement scheme which not only affected Lovat, but all of the Annexed estates. As reflected in broader colonial policy, the perceived inevitability of further hostilities after 1763 changed the treatment given to ex-military personnel. In the recently secured American colonies, sections of Montgomery's and Fraser's Regiment accepted the government's offer of land in Quebec province. The administration viewed Highlanders as the ideal cutting edge of British colonisation in recently won territories - though the settlement of any ex-military personnel was also common.⁸² The general international situation led to a domestic trend which attempted to ensure the demobbed soldier and sailor were securely and rationally re-settled. This was to ensure their rapid future recruitment when war recommenced. In parliament, legislation was passed which enabled military personnel to exercise trades. Traditional hostility towards the military was changing, and this was highlighted by articles in the press voicing concerns over the loss of potential military personnel through hasty demobbing and subsequent emigration. This trend was also reflected in the actions of prominent improvers like Lord Deskford, Sir Ludovick Grant of Grant and Grant of Monymusk. Deskford instituted a policy of resettling sailors and soldiers on his properties of Portsoy and Whitehalls; Sir Ludovick Grant offered five acres to ex-military personnel on his Moray and Banffshire estates, while at Monymusk, twenty nine Chelsea pensioners were resettled.⁸³

At this juncture a qualifying point should be noted. The resettlement policy attracted improvers like Deskford and the Board of the Annexed Estates because, as well as future military strength, it was believed the plan would bring economic development and progress, an aim more in line with the remit of the Board. Contemporary economic theory required a strong army to conquer and defend markets; a strong navy was to do likewise, as well as provide trained merchant seamen for trade and fishing. Thus the British military machine and economy were, in fact, inextricably linked, and perceived as mutually supportive. The actions of Lord Deskford merely represented one private effort by a Commissioner of the Annexed Estates to broach the problem of maintaining trade and military capability. In November 1762, Milton received a memo illustrating the drop in the number of fishing boats around the Scottish coast, with particular reference to the Kincardine area. The wholesale impressment of fishermen had seen a decline in the profitability of the trade, and it is not surprising that, on 20 January 1763, the policy of settling sailors on the Annexed Estates was suggested by Milton, and couched in terms of profit both to future military capacity and the private purse.⁸⁴ The Board submitted a plan for Treasury approval which included two separate schemes involving soldiers as well as sailors. Approval was given in March 1763, and the full attentions of the personnel of the Annexed Estates, from Commissioners to factors, became concentrated on the resettlement programme.

Sailors and Fishermen.

The plan for the settlement of 1000 sailors involved expenditure of £ 6610. Each man was to be given 3 acres and a rent free house for three years (if married). Each sailor that settled on the Annexed Estates received a £ 2 bounty, or £ 3 if settled on private property. The speedy implementation of the plan was due to the fact that the navy had been demobilising since mid 1762; ex-sailors, it was believed, were already scattered and contemplating emigration.⁸⁵ As a result of the necessity for speed, when asked to name sites for fishing villages, the factors automatically suggested the places which had earlier been chosen as sites for urban development. While the response suggests consistency and integration in urban and economic planning, the completely automatic response also suggests haste, and a failure to explore the differing geographical needs of a manufacturing village and a fishing village.⁸⁶ This inflexibility was compounded by a flaw in personnel choice. Since the plan was to ensure that a " number of gallant men will be employed in most useful labour in time of peace, and will always be ready for the service of their country in any further danger, " it was obviously taken for granted that naval sailors would make good fishermen. The reality was rather different. Lord Deskford who received some sailors found them to " have not the least skill in the business, " as did the men who arrived at the property of Alexander Garden.⁸⁷

Throughout the spring of 1763, the Board sent a number of applicants to Campbeltown, New Taret on Cromarty estate, Inveruie on Barrisdale estate, the Isle of Lewis, and the Lochbroom area. In the haste of planning, aspects of the fishing industry like the price of boats and barrels had been miscalculated, and costs rose substantially. The failure of the Board to seriously challenge the basic problems created by the salt law (salt, which was vital for fish preservation, could only be stored at custom houses, few of which existed in the West Highlands), and the lack of steady employment and specialisation in fishing meant the plan was all but still-born. This lack of foresight was due to the fact that, from the start, the whole plan was based on the progress of naval demobilisation, not reasoned economic criteria. The immediate result of including areas outwith the Annexed Estates was a failure to invest in underdeveloped Highland districts. The men preferred the prospect of settling in areas with a previous fishing heritage, thus the object of the Annexing Act to introduce trade into new areas was fundamentally compromised. Peter Stewart, Provost of Campbeltown, complained that he had no great demand for non-native sailors, as impressed men from the district had returned home to re-start fishing of their own accord. This had resulted in a surplus of labour and a lowering of wages.⁸⁸

Allied to this was the fact that fishing remained unprofitable as a profession all year round, with overhead costs simply remaining too high. Stewart's answer to the problem was to propose a plan to the Commissioners to develop fishing in Skye and the Western Isles. As the Board had already decided that areas outside the Annexed estates could be used, Stewart believed the aim of the Act would be better implemented if Skye and Lewis received more attention. The plan of the Campbeltown Provost, and the experiences of Dr Alexander Mackenzie, organiser of development plans in Lewis, demonstrate that the re-settlement plan brought tenurial innovation well outside the Annexed Estates. Concerning the potential of Skye, Stewart stated that the coastal situation of the population ought to be encouraged, and traditional activities like summer transhumance to sheilings halted or only completed by old men and boys. In Lewis, Mackenzie informed the Board in June 1763 that " a good number of sailors and soldiers natives here, returning upon the reduction, are willing to settle as fishers. " It is worthy of note that, at the time, Mackenzie stated only one Lewisman was prepared to settle without any land at all. The Board eventually ordered sailors from the overcrowded New Taret station to Lewis, with the result that, by 13 August 1764, 33 ex-service men were settled. The settlers in Lewis represented an exercise in internal colonisation, with Orcadians and non Highland men constituting about 50% of the total.⁸⁹

The real significance of the 1763 resettlement plan was that Peter Stewart's advice was, in fact, followed. Traditional activities and land holding systems were altered to encourage fishing, rather than agricultural activity. The Board was further influenced by the fact that, in April 1763, Alexander Garden had given the same advice, stating that three acres would " probably induce them to become farmers rather than fishers. " This policy of lowering the amount of land given to settlers was adopted when, on 17 November 1763, Dr Mackenzie in Lewis informed the Board " that giving acres of land to the fishers is inexpedient as it would divert them from their proper business and that a kail yard and a potato croft is sufficient. " This was subsequently carried out at Holm near Stornoway. In Lochbroom, " feus with small quantities of ground for mere subsistence " were ordered, with the noted benefit that more substantial tenants did not lose much land. As a result, the settled fishermen of Lochbroom got only two acres.⁹⁰

The importance of these developments has not been fully recognised. As the Board developed its policy of rationalised and increasingly enclosed single tenant farms, so the surplus population became, in terms of tenure at least, increasingly redundant. The Board of the Annexed Estates through this plan pioneered and popularised the crofting system of land holding. Alongside reduced acreage, the introduction of diverse employment opportunities allowed for both agricultural improvement and the retention of population. Evidence of this thinking can be seen at Coigach on Cromartie estate, where the factor specifically stated it was the lesser tenantry, with such reduced acreage, that needed to supplement their income by fishing and weaving. An important point to note is the element of social protection intended by this policy - it was a clear attempt to retain the sub-tenant group in the Highlands. This is mirrored on Barrisdale in the mid 1760s. As returning military officers displaced impoverished tenantry, this latter group were, in turn, moved to the coast. As noted earlier, the Board co-operated with private proprietors like Mackenzie of Seaforth and the third Earl of Breadalbane. Mackenzie stated that Seaforth had contributed at least £150 to the development of reduced holdings at Holm (on the East coast of Lewis). This resulted in the Board donating another £ 300 to Mackenzie by November 1763. It is difficult to quantify the consequences of this, but Seaforth had, by 1765, certainly begun to formalise the process of possession division on the West coast of Lewis in order to benefit more fully from kelp production. While division of holdings was not as acute as at Holm, Seaforth's willingness to experiment with new tenurial structures should be seen in the context of his recent co-operation with the Annexed estates.⁹¹

The Board also financially assisted the third Earl of Breadalbane who had, in 1757, helped with the recruitment of Fraser's and Montgomery's regiments. Again, this tended to result in an emergence of smaller holdings. In his petition to the Board, the Earl stated that of the 30 soldiers who had returned to his Argyllshire estate, the most wealthy had been given farms as they had the resources to stock a possession with cattle. The poorer sort, he hoped, could be settled on the coast, supplied with boats and tackle by the Board, while he would supply houses and kail yards at a reduced rent. The Board agreed to this proposal as long as the Earl ensured the re-settled men acted purely as fishermen. The case of the Nether-Lorne soldiers does, in itself, contain important implications for the origins of crofting. Lorne was, by Highland standards, a reasonably well developed commercial area. While certainly underdeveloped, fishing was, nevertheless, practised in the area in the 1750s. Further, the Bunawe furnace and Easdale slate works meant that large sections of the populace would have been settled on very little land - thus providing a useful tenurial model for more generalised implementation. It is ironic that, in this case, it may well have been extractive industry that provided a local model for the crofting structure Breadalbane was attempting to construct for his demobilised soldiers. These Lewis and Argyll examples demonstrate that the resettlement plan encouraged the wider adoption of holdings which were deliberately designed to complement larger commercial activity - characteristics of the crofting structure.⁹²

The 1763 re-settlement plan, which was formulated against wider imperial anxieties, thus had a large impact on the development of Highland tenurial change. Yet the plan itself was a complete failure; by 1764, 154 bounty fishermen had deserted, and the Board reported to the Treasury that it had "not succeeded according to expectation." This should not detract from the fact that the Board of Annexed Estates influenced and promoted the development of crofting across widely separated parts of the West Highlands. The short life span of the Board from 1755-1784, belies the survival of these earlier crofting communities; their creation in 1763, suggests that the evolutionary nature of the emerging crofting system as advocated by historians, did, in fact, have a more purposeful and planned beginning. As regards the genesis of crofting, while historians have been prepared to accept "similar models" existed in the 1760s, they have emphasised their "ephemeral" nature, and focused instead on the system's supposed emergence in Argyll in the late eighteenth, early nineteenth centuries. The work of the Board suggests that this analysis fails, at least within a chronological framework.⁹³

Soldiers and Crofters

The Board of Annexed Estates is credited with highlighting urbanisation as a policy for economic and social change in the Highlands. A plan for demobilising soldiers in March 1763 did involve settling them in agricultural villages, where, it was hoped, growth could be sustained by the creation of a small manufacturing centre serving the surrounding countryside.⁹⁴ However, the strength of this argument can be tested, and the purpose of this section is to suggest that the Board did not in reality promote urbanisation, but did, in fact, produce tenurial innovations which created a rationalised system of small-holdings. A defining characteristic of these holdings was a much reduced agricultural capacity. In sum, by 1763, crofting as a theoretical and physical reality was created.

By October 1761, the general employment situation and lack of reliable labour on the Annexed Estates resulted in the Board deciding that;

There remains a considerable class of inhabitants namely cottars, tradesman, to whom the leases are no security, on the contrary, the tacksman or leasees by force of these leases might depopulate the Annexed Estates of the cottars and tradesmen unless there is provision made to the contrary in the leases now being granted.⁹⁵

Brought on in many respects by the Board's earlier policies, the result of this situation was the King's Cottager scheme. In 1760 a memo entitled *Hints Towards a Plan for Managing the Forfeited Estates*, was circulated to prominent commissioners. This document reveals that the King's Cottager scheme, which attempted to broach the de-population problem, was, in fact, partly brought about by the needs of the military (It should be remembered that by 1760 the consensus was that the Highlands was effectively drained of its male population). The memo stated that the duties of the Board were two fold. The first was to civilise the population; the second was " the propagation of a hardy and industrious race, fit for serving the public in war. " The author argued that to encourage population, the large Highland farms should be;

Divided into small enclosures of one or two acres, and be perfectly dry. That these small enclosures be cropped with potatoes, turnip and sown-grass alternatively. And it ought to be a rule to cultivate them with the spade instead of the plough. In the next place, this method will afford work and bread to the men who at present are in great measure idle, and will consequently will render them hardy and fit to be soldiers.⁹⁶

As with the innovations for the sailors, the model is closer to Humphrey Bland's earlier suggestions with regard to the fate of the numerous subtenant class. In October 1761, Lord Milton suggested that, at the cost of £ 500, one eighth part be removed from large leases, and day labourers and artificers settled on this separated land. This was accepted in March 1762; each of the new class of tenant was to pay rent direct to the crown, and in return there was to be " allotted to each of them, a few acres for raising garden stuff, the ground to be enclosed by the Commissioners. " The cottars' land was, under no circumstances, to be ploughed, but turned instead by spade. This is exactly the suggestion in the 1760 memo. The memorial involved small individual plots of land, with agricultural activity playing a complementary rather than a wholly predominant role. Thiscrofting system had its genesis not just in the de-population trend, but in the desire to maintain the Highlands as a nursery for the army.⁹⁷ As it was, the scheme evolved and found more substantial financial backing and rigorous implementation when, in March 1763, the £500 was added to the costs of the much larger soldier resettlement plan.

The 1763 demobilising plan for soldiers represented the single largest failure of the Board of the Annexed Estates. The resettlement of sailors and soldiers cost the Board, by May 1765, £ 13,115.11.4.⁹⁸ The lack of capital which plagued the commission has been noted by more than one historian. Thus, the above amount is all the more indicative of the extent to which the Board can be accurately described as a mere reward panel for imperial military service. As early as 1760, the factor on the Perth estate was ordered by the Board to find a farm to settle disbanded soldiers. The farm of Morrel was duly honoured; however, it was not a success due to lack of advertising. The result was that not a single soldier settled there.⁹⁹ However, the Board continued to cater to the winding down of Britain's military machine, and, on 13 December 1760, proposed to settle soldiers on the farm of Lintibert.

As it was, events overtook this limited scheme, and in conjunction with the plan for the sailors, the ambitious project to settle 500 soldiers was agreed to. It involved settling the men on the estate of Lovat, Cromarty, Strowan, Monaltry and Perth. The planned expenditure was £ 3000, with 300 married men to receive a house, three arable and six pastoral acres rent free for three years, as well as a bounty of £ 3. The 200 unmarried men were to receive 20/- a year, and if married within a certain time to get the same benefits as their wedded counterparts. A fundamental aspect of this plan was to create foci for future recruitment. The subsequent small villages such as Borelandbog and Strelitz which resulted from this scheme were, indeed, targeted in the 1770's, especially by the Atholl and Argyleshire Regiments.¹⁰⁰

The idea, as already noted, undoubtedly contained military imperatives. The aspect of internal colonialism and the perception of the Highlands as a mere province is demonstrated by the fact that contemporaries directly related the scheme back to the ancient Roman colonial towns set up on the frontier to pacify the native populations and act as recruiting pools for the defence of the empire. ¹⁰¹ Given that this is true, then the scheme for demobilising the soldiers into villages seems to follow the remit of the Annexing Act - the prime aim of which was the maintenance and development of loyalty to the Hanoverian and Protestant Succession. The use of settled soldiers had been a common suggestion as soon as the Board was formed. The aim was for increased social control and the introduction of industry into the area by the settlement of non-Highlanders. ¹⁰²

If the objective of the exercise was to graft manufacturing skills onto the native population by introducing foreigners, then analysis of the background and former professions of the settled soldiers reveal that, from the start, it was a failure and was nothing more than a simple exercise in demobbing. (See appendix three). In the spring of 1763, Major Commandant John Murray of the 89th Highland Regiment sent a list of soldiers recommended for resettlement to the Commissioners of the Annexed Estates. Soldiers from Highland counties constituted 76.6% of all those recommended. Further, as regarded skills, 95% of them were agricultural labourers. ¹⁰³

From these figures, as well as the pattern evident in appendix three, it is obvious that, apart from Perth estate, already the most Lowland in character, the majority of soldiers settled were Highlanders, and thus part of the perceived problem which colonisation was supposed to cure. The vast majority were agricultural day labourers and had little manufacturing or artisan skills, so it is difficult to see how industry was to develop. In all, these figures demonstrate the profound difference between the declared improvement rhetoric of the Board and the reality of its military priorities.

Aside from these observations, the creation of the settlements meant that the factors were required to find 1500 arable acres and 3000 grazing acres. This represented an estate management problem of some magnitude, and almost immediately doubts were voiced as to the feasibility of the whole project. Forbes, on Lovat and Cromarty, stated that to construct settlements he would be forced to use sites " where the present tenants may be hurt by grounds taken off them. " In Strowan, Henry Small stated that he could not make up lots without dispossessing some of the native tenantry of some acreage. In Monaltry, the tenantry refused to co-operate, resulting, in November 1763, in a list of tenants to be removed being drawn up. ¹⁰⁴ The settlement plan did lead to the destruction of traditional farm size and tenure. On Monaltry, 42 acres for 14 soldiers had to be found. The 22 tenants

on the estate all possessed less than one oxgate; indeed, most held under three quarters of that amount. To dispossess them of the required land would threaten the viability of their holdings. The result was that socially vulnerable sub-tenants were cleared to ensure the main tenants could sustain their farms.¹⁰⁵ As a result of this squeeze on land, the soldiers were partially settled on improvable muir land as on Lovat estate, and on Borelandbog park on Perth estate. This decision was also a factor in the failure of the scheme. The poor quality of the land soon resulted in a flood of petitions to the Board for extra subsistence.¹⁰⁶ The sustained use of subsistence money was not just a response to the chronic poverty evident in the settlements, but an attempt to continue the reduction in wage levels. Indeed, wage levels after the war dropped so low that even the soldiers were forced to seasonally migrate to find profitable work.¹⁰⁷

A further unfortunate consequence of subsistence wages was that the soldiers, already used to a regular military pay, developed into "subsidy junkies," a scenario predicted in a memo to Lord Milton. The author stated that *lending* was better in order to discourage soldiers from asking for assistance, except in real extremes.¹⁰⁸ The development of this dependency culture partly explains why the plan grew to be so expensive. By March 1766, failure was already recognised, and the factors ordered "to condescend more particularly to the other articles of improvement and manufactures," an implicit admission perhaps, that the wider aims of the Board had been neglected.¹⁰⁹

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to re-assess the role of the Board of Annexed Estates in Highland development in the mid eighteenth century. The Board has been cited as an early example of philanthropy towards the Highlands, as illustrated by the desire to create villages and bring new skills and better livelihoods to the area. This chapter has, however, sought to demonstrate that the Board was never a free agent, and that it was inextricably linked to the increasingly powerful British military. This relationship is reflected in the figure of Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, both a prominent Board member, and a powerful agent in the argathelian camp which controlled Highland recruiting.

The recruiting activities evident on the Annexed Estates, and illustrated on Lovat, produced insecurities both in the tenorial structure and in the vital land management class of the tacksman. This state of affairs contrasts with the view of the Board that improvement could only be implemented where there was security for all groupings involved in tenorial arrangements. The experience of the Lovat estate also demonstrates that the drive to achieve agriculturally feasible, rational and profitable farm units was, in fact, compromised

by promises to maintain the sub-tenants. The massive military reductions of 1763 institutionalised the confused state of policies regarding farm structure and size. Yet the pressures of demobbing also secured tenurial innovations which were designed to counter the growing dislocation problem brought on by non-subletting leases.

In conclusion, it should be noted that, historically, the Board of Annexed Estates has gained a reputation for popularising planned villages and more generalised improvement in the Highlands. In reality, the Commission demonstrates how Lowland style improvement was rapidly compromised and subverted in the Highlands. Evidence shows that by pursuing the sailor and soldier resettlement plan, the Board was, in reality, promoting the development of the historically important crofting system. By promoted such settlement patterns outside the Annexed Estates, as in the Isle of Lewis and the Lorne properties of the Breadalbane family, the Board ensured that these early crofting arrangements survived its relatively short life. The era of government involvement thus saw the consolidation of the belief that tenurial and land practices ought to be geared to population retention rather than efficient agriculture. This is exemplified by the Board's creation in 1763 of croft holdings. This suggests that the Board of Annexed Estates true significance lies in the fact that government was responsible, to a degree not previously acknowledged, for the slide into crofting and excessive subdivision.

- 1). M. Lynch. *Scotland: A New History* (London, 1992), 363.
- 2). T.C. Smout, 'The Landowner & the Planned Village in Scotland 1730-1830' in N.T. Philipson & R. Mitchison (eds.), *Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1970), 79, 89-91; A.I. Macinnes. 'Scottish Gaeldom: The First Phase of Clearance' in T.M. Devine & R. Mitchison (eds.), *People & Society in Scotland, 1760 - 1830*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1988). 74; A.M. Smith, *Jacobite Estates of the Forty-Five* (Edinburgh, 1982), 229 - 231.
- 3). A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 19-21, 31; Laing Mss, vol. 2, *H.M.C.* (London, 1925), 381; B.L., Newcastle Collection, Add Ms 32707, f. 184.
- 4). R.D. Clyde, *The Rehabilitation of the Highlander, 1745-1830: Changing Visions of Gaeldom* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1990), 20-30; R.A. Dodgshon, *Land & Society in Early Scotland* (Oxford, 1981), 281-283; A.J. Youngson, *After the Forty Five* (Edinburgh, 1972), 14-15.
- 5). T.M. Devine, *The Transformation of Rural Scotland; Social Change and the Agrarian Economy 1660-1815* (Manchester, 1994), 22-29; T.M. Devine, 'The Making of a farming Elite? Lowland Scotland 1750-1850' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), 62-7, 70-72; A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 42, 67-70. For an example where Lowland thinking on leases was applied to the Highlands, see: N.L.S., L.C. 1688, *Political Observations Occasioned by the State of Agriculture in the North of Scotland* (n.p. 1756), 4-5, 10-11.
- 6). J.M. Gray (ed.), *Sir John Clerk of Penicuik* (Edinburgh, 1892), 259; N.L.S., A. Grant, *A Dissertation on the Chief Obstacles to the Improvement of Land & Introducing Better Methods of Agriculture throughout Scotland* (Aberdeen, 1760), 48-55, 58 & 80. For discussion on how such Lowland concepts (however confused) were linked to the Highlands see: R.A. Dodgshon, loc. cit., 253-254, 274; A.J. Youngson, loc. cit., 27, 31. Part of the failure of the Annexed Estates Commissioners, despite their control as de facto landlords, was the centralised accountability of Edinburgh to Westminster, the latter tending to ignore estate initiatives from the former. This elongated administrative problem it should be stressed, was not necessarily a feature of private landlords, who, in turn, developed similar policies to the Commissioners. See, A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 42-50; A. Murdoch, *The People Above: Politics & Administration in Mid Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 21.
- 7). For details on the political background prior to the 1752 Annexing act see chapter one.
- 8). A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 37-9.
- 9). Laing Mss, vol. 2, *H.M.C.* (London, 1925), 381-2; A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 19; R.D. Clyde, loc. cit., 22-23; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16615, f. 112.
- 10). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16631, f. 5; J.S. Shaw, *The Management of Scottish Society 1707-1764* (Edinburgh, 1983), 172-76.
- 11). N.L.S. Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16626, f. 137; Ms 16615, f. 151; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32712, f. 452; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD170/942/9.
- 12). For a summary of Argyll's vulnerable position see chapter one, footnote 43, p. 31; A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 20; B.L. Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35447, ff. 35, 39; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 37 -39.

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- 13). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35447, ff. 45, 54, 58, 74, 110.
 - 14). *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803*, vol. 13 (London, 1813) 1240-41.
 - 15). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16677, ff. 119-121. Prior to the passing of the Bill in June 1752, Argyll had noted that the army intensely disliked the idea. When referring to the army, the Scottish Duke undoubtedly meant Cumberland personally. See: N.L.S., Ms 16677, f. 116.
 - 16). *The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803*, vol. 13 (London, 1813), 1244.
 - 17). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16677, f. 133; Ms 17563, f. 8; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35447, ff. 233, 309. For the 1752 report on supposed Jacobites in Scottish government see, B.L., Egerton Mss, Ms 3433, ff. 1-5.
 - 18). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, f. 130; Add Ms 35447, f. 102.
 - 19). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35448, f. 51.
 - 20). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16677, f. 114; S.R.O., GD170/942/9; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, f. 179; Add Ms 35448, ff. 57, 162, 206, 210.
 - 21). A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 74 - 75; A.M. Smith, 'State Aid to Industry- An Eighteenth Century Example' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Lairds & Improvement in the Scotland of the Enlightenment* (Glasgow, 1978), 47.
 - 22). *Statutes at large from the Twentieth Year of the Reign of George II to the Thirtieth Year of King George II* (London, 1769), 25 Geo. 2 C. 41., 455.
 - 23). N.L.S., Minto Papers, Ms 11009, f. 30.
 - 24). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35447, f. 53.
 - 25). T.M. Devine, 'Social responses to agrarian "Improvement": The Highland & Lowland Clearances in Scotland' in R.A. Houston & I.D. Whyte (eds.), *Scottish Society 1500-1800* (Cambridge 1989), 151.
 - 26). A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 43; A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 74-76.
 - 27). J.S. Shaw, loc. cit., 178-81. For examples on the changing nature of the Highlands within the Scottish political system see chapter one.
 - 28). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35449, f. 74.
 - 29). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/282/3; Shaw, loc. cit. 181.
 - 30). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17505, f. 34.
 - 31). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16518, f. 43.
 - 32). S.R.O., Mackay of Bighouse GD 87/1/72, 74 & 77; S.R.O., GD 170/282/3.
 - 33). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17505, ff. 120 & 186.

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- 34). N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 129; A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 65-7, 58-59; S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/2 p. 56 & 66.
- 35). For the implications of the development of single tenant farms through the issuing of leases, see: S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/6 p. 35, 38, 47, N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 129; S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/2 p.56 & 66, 119. This is evident on the estate of Lovat where the new single tenant of a farm in Glenmoriston said he had reduced his subtenants to simple servants. S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/79/55(2).
- 36). V. Wills, 'The Gentleman Farmer and the Annexed Estates: agrarian change in the Highlands in the second half of the Eighteenth Century' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Lairds & Improvement in the Scotland of the Enlightenment* (Glasgow, 1978), 39.
- 37). See chapter one, footnote 87, p. 48.
- 38). S.R.O. F.E.P. E721/2, 11.
- 39). See footnote 3 & 4.
- 40). J. Browne, *History of the Highlands & the Highland Clans* (Glasgow, 1838), vol. 3, 248. For recruiting act see chapter two.
- 41). N.L.S., Minto Papers, Ms 11035. f. 13.
- 42). S.R.O. F.E.P. E721/2., 11. The fact that the Press Act overlapped with Fraser's own recruiting helped his efforts. On 27 July 1757, while additional companies were raised for the Regiment, Milton was informed that it would be difficult to complete them unless the Press Act was in force. The dread of compulsory service, it was understood, helped to draw men into volunteer units like Fraser's. N.L.S., Ms 16698, f. 50.
- 43). N.L.S., Ms 16519, f. 24; P.R.O., W.O. 1/974, General Correspondence (In) 1757, f. 365; J. Browne, loc. cit., 248.
- 40). C.F. Mackintosh, 'The Frasers of Foyers' in *T.G.S.I.*, vol. 18 (1892), 17-32.
- 45). J. Browne, loc. cit., 248.
- 46). S.R.O. Rose of Kilravock Papers, GD125/22/2/9, 11(1 & 2).
- 47). N.L.S., Ms 16519, f. 27.
- 48). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17505, f. 116.
- 49). J. Browne, loc. cit., 248.
- 42). N.L.S., Letter Book of Lord George Beauclerk, Ms 13497.
- 51). S.R.O. F.E.P. E769/91/3.
- 52). N.L.S., Ms 17505, f. 185. Concerning recruiting parties: see Monaltry tenantry complaints, A.H. Millar (ed.), *Scottish Forfeited Estate Papers* (Edinburgh, 1909), 157.
- 53). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17589, f. 40. This economic dynamic to recruiting was evident even when large scale war was absent. In 1773, a Strathspey tenant of Sir James Grant of Grant informed his landlord that due to poor harvests and low cattle prices he had little option but to abandon his possession and enter the army. S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/458/3/2.

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- 54). S.R.O. F.E.P. E 725/1.
- 55). S.R.O. F.E.P. E 769/79/28. Further evidence that the imposition of the Press Act, far from retarding recruitment facilitated the wider effort beyond the nominal quotas.
- 56). V. Wills (ed.), *Statistics of the Annexed Estates 1755-56* (Edinburgh, 1973), 15.
- 57). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17588, f. 57.
- 58). N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 15.
- 59). N.L.S., Letter Book Lord George Beauclerk, Mss 13497.
- 60). S.R.O., F.E.P. E 769/91/2.
- 61). E.H. Millar, (ed.), *Scottish Forfeited Estate Papers* (Edinburgh, 1909), 79.
- 62). N.L.S., Ms 17505, f. 103.
- 63). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/163(1).
- 64). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/6.
- 65). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/79/1.
- 66). S.R.O., F.E.P. E 769/91/24(2); N.L.S., Ms 17588, f. 170.
- 67). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/2, 11, 24, 70, 80, 94, 203, 233; A. M. Smith, loc. cit., 65.
- 68). S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/2; E769/91/145(2) & 146.
- 69). S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/6; E 769/79/55(3).
- 70). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/136 & 139.
- 71). S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/2; E769/91/85.
- 72). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/2, 93 & 20.
- 73). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/37(1), 94(1), 152(2).
- 74). For social profiles see tables on personnel settled in the 1763 villages see appendix three.
- 75). *Statutes at large from the Twentieth Year of the Reign of George the II to the Thirtieth Year of King George II* (London, 1769), p. 455; S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/70.
- 76). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/79/34(2).
- 77). V. Wills, loc. cit., 14-27; S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/71; E769/72/3; E721/7, p. 74.
- 78). These figures do not represent the impact on lower social orders which, doubtless, witnessed even higher levels of involvement in the recruiting process. S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/2-11; E769/79/1-108; E769/91/2-323; E787/28/1.

79). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/94(1); E769/91/26; E769/91/153, V. Wills, loc. cit., 39; A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 65. See footnote 73.

80). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/79/55(1); E769/91/80; E769/91/143; E769/91/151/(1); E769/91/54(2); E769/91/35; E769/91/234.

81). S.R.O., F.E.P. E769/91/221(2); E769/91/292.

82). For evidence on the role of colonial policy see chapter five, footnote 78. p. 218.

83). *The Scots Magazine*, vol. 25 (Edinburgh, 1763), 175, 246-7, 257; S.R.O., Grant of Monymusk, GD 345/796/25.

84). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17590, f. 63; S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/7; E723/2. For a general description of the impact of the war on the Scottish fishing industry, see: W.R.H., N.G. 1/1/113, p. 79 & 148.

85). A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 157; S.R.O., F.E.P., E730/29/1; N.L.S., Ms 17590, f. 68.

86). In 1755, in response to the Board's request for sites to be developed as urban centres for linen production and general manufactures, the factor on the estates of Barrisdale suggested Inveruie; while on Cromarty the site suggested was Ullapool. Both sites, despite a different objective in mind, were again preferred. Obviously sites on the Annexed Estates were limited, but little flexibility is evident. V. Wills. loc. cit., 52 & 41; S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/7/27.

87). S.R.O., F.E.P. E723/2; E727/50/4(1); E727/50/9.

88). N.L.S., Ms 17590, f. 68. For example while Campbeltown can be said to represent a Highland area, the properties of Lord Deskford, Farquhar of Seatraw and Francis Garden were situated on the East coast plain which already exhibited improved agriculture and fishing. S.R.O., F.E.P. E727/50/4(1); E727/50/6 & 7; E727/50/3 & 5.

89). S.R.O., F.E.P. E727/50/37; E727/50/21; E727/14; E732/15/1.

90). S.R.O., F.E.P. E727/14; E721/7; E746/186/1; N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 143. This policy was also carried out on the estate of Barrisdale; on the 12th March 1764 six houses with kailyards were recommended. This trend was helped on Barrisdale by returning army officers like Lt. Archibald Macdonnell, who requested that some tenants from the farms of Carnochroy and Achagleen be removed as cottagers to coastal areas. S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/7; N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 181.

91). A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 162; S.R.O., F.E.P. E732/15/6; E721/7; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield, GD 427/33.

92). A.H. Miller, loc. cit., 301; W.R.H., Court of Sessions Productions C.S. 96/3108: Log Book of Campbeltown Registered Vessel *The Peggy*, 31-32, 66. I am grateful to Prof. A.I. Macinnes for his suggestion that the relatively advanced industrial sites of Bunawe and Easdale probably provided an additional local model of reduced agricultural holdings.

93). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/9/3/3/14. Neterlorn rentals of the 1780s reveal the continued existence of settled soldiers on £ 3 plots. Allan I Macinnes, loc. cit., 83-85; J.B. Caird, 'The Creation of Crofts and new Settlement Patterns in the Highlands & Islands of Scotland', *S.G.M.*, vol. 103 (1987) 67-79.

94). T.C. Smout, loc. cit., 79, 89-91.

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- 95). N.L.S., Minto Papers, Ms 11015, f. 69; N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun papers, Ms 17589, f. 126.
- 96). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17506, f. 28; N.L.S., Minto Papers, Ms 11035, f. 53.
- 97). S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/6 p.127-8; N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 126.
- 98). S.R.O., F.E.P. E723/2.
- 99). S.R.O., F.E.P. E721/7. p. 9.
- 100). S.R.O., F.E.P. E777/188/70; E777/191/32 & 34. Further evidence of the Board's desire to encourage further recruitment to the unpopular overseas regiments, was the order to prefer soldiers from units which had actually seen action. S.R.O., F.E.P. E727/14. p.7.
- 101). N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 17564, f. 73.
- 102). A.M. Smith, loc. cit., 31 & 58. As early as 1756, a printed pamphlet sought to address the lack of improvement in the region. It advocated settling Chelsea Pensioners and non-Highland soldiers on estates in the area. N.L.S., L.C. 1688, *Political Observations Occasioned by the State of Agriculture in the North of Scotland* (n.p., 1756). The element of control is illustrated by the observations of the factor on Lovat and Cromarty that overseers appointed by the board should get the best land choice, and strongly recommended mixing strangers with the locals. S.R.O. F.E.P. E721/7 p. 123. However, soldiers were not the only persons it was assumed could be controlled by this plan. The policy of single leases with no subletting had resulted in the loss of farm labourers, as a result, wages had increased. By broadening the labour pool, wages, it was hoped, would be reduced in the countryside, and costs for improved farming and industry controlled. N.L.S., Ms 17589, f. 109.
- 103). S.R.O. F.E.P. E727/48/1(2.)
- 104). S.R.O. F.E.P. E727/14, p. 9-11.
- 105). S.R.O. F.E.P. E773/32/2(10). The factor believed that the smallest crofters were to live by their labour alone. The excess land was to be rationally divided into the structured holding of characteristic of the crofting system. This example shows again the Board promoting a reduced landing holding structure.
- 106). S.R.O. F.E.P. E773/51/9; E746/135/1; E769/97/5.
- 107). S.R.O. F.E.P. E773/51/8; N.L.S., Ms 17590, f. 109.
- 108). N.L.S., Ms 17590, f. 242.
- 109). S.R.O. F.E.P. E721/9. As early as 28 December 1762, Milton had expressed worries over finance but was reassured " that there is sufficient funds for it out of the produce of the Annexed Estates without encroaching upon what may be necessary for executing other plans which have been proposed as proper for improving the Highlands ". N.L.S., Ms 17590, f. 68.

Chapter Five

The Military Element in Highland Emigration 1763-1815

Even within the subject of eighteenth century Highland history, which in itself is relatively well documented and analysed, emigration has received substantial recognition and examination. Analysis of this topic for the period 1763-1815 has largely focused on the anti-emigration stance of the Highland landlord. This fact alone was of seminal importance to the development of the region in the period, and thereby explains the concentration on this particular aspect. The differing arguments over the causes and scale of emigration from the Scottish Highlands have resulted in a relative understanding of the issue perhaps unmatched with regard to any other area in the British Isles, excepting Ireland. The debate is multifaceted and defies generalisation; nevertheless, two distinct strands of thought are evident. One stresses the large and impersonal forces of severe demographic change. Allied to this is the area's shift from a subsistence economy dominated by a supposedly paternalistic elite, into specialised regional economies, dominated locally by commercial landlords, and structurally by the needs of the wider and stronger British economy. Within this context, landlords and their policies were merely exacerbating factors in the wider symptoms of economic integration. ¹

Against this stance are the various arguments that while conceding demographic strain and economic subservience, nevertheless, stress the importance of the landlord, who through estate policy, actively influenced conditions in the region. It is suggested that landlords removed populations as a result of distinct management and revenue strategies. Likewise, through the policy of farm division, they retained population for much the same reasons, making the proprietary class a deeply influential factor in the development of demographic strain and subsequent emigration from the region. ²

Yet in one respect, these various lines of argument have a common theme, that is the role of the landlord. Even scholars who highlight large impersonal forces, often do so to illustrate that, as a class, the proprietors are not to be held as ultimately responsible for the perceived and real tragedies involved in Highland emigration. This stand-point is understandable, Highland history, both by tradition and logic, has been centred on the general position of the land-owning class. Within this context, the role of the government has been seen more as an adjunct to the actions of the property owners. There is, however, in the period 1763-1815 one major area where all commentators agree that central government had an equal interest in the region - that being the issue of military manpower. ³

This chapter will attempt to illustrate and define the role that government, through its military concerns, played in the whole complex issue of emigration from the north of Scotland. The deliberate emphasis is necessarily upon the interaction of the landlord and government agendas, which were undoubtedly linked and seen by contemporaries as buttressing each other. However, in terms of policy, it can be suggested that generalisations which portray the government as constantly supportive of the landlord stance need to be treated with caution. Just as the compatibility of their respective agendas are correctly highlighted, so the differences in policy and intention should likewise be noted.

Firstly, due recognition needs to be given to the affects of military service. It is intended to demonstrate that the primary policy of Westminster in the region, that of military recruiting, was, in fact, a depopulating influence in that recruits deliberately used Britain's military machine as a vehicle to remove themselves - this being especially true of the tacksman class. Secondly, and most importantly, the chapter will argue that the state needs to be recognised as an important element in the whole issue of emigration, because its agenda of defence and military manpower was vital in forming readily acceptable dimensions to anti-emigration theory, especially as propounded for the Highlands. This military dimension enabled Highland landlords to appeal to much wider interests, and allowed them to securely link their private estate and pro-population concerns to that of the wider national interest. A further result of this concern for Highland recruiting was a level of government intervention in the region that was more akin to continental approaches to the social consequences of improvement, again suggesting that the role of the central authorities was more complex and influential than has been suggested. ⁴

The Socio-economic Background to Emigration and Recruitment 1765-1775

It is ironic that, given its reputation for underdevelopment and general backwardness, the late eighteenth century Highland economy is, nevertheless, relatively well understood. It was in this period that estate management increasingly switched land and its resources onto a commercial and market orientated footing. As a result, traditional social hierarchies and functions were broken or severely strained in this period. The overall picture was dominated by the reality and perception of increasing rent levels. Southern demand for Highland produce - namely cattle, when allied to the use of competitive bidding, allowed rents to commence a sharper upward trend. From 1754-74, the Perthshire estate of the Breadalbane family rose from £ 2118 to £ 4599. Likewise, on the Mackenzie of Seaforth property of Lewis, the rent had risen from £ 936.3.0 to £ 2535 in the period 1754-80. More significantly, commentators have noted that these new levels were merely a prelude to much sharper rises in the 1790-1810 period. ⁵

Such rent increases meant that farms like Barrs, held by Duncan Campbell of Glenure on the third Earl of Breadalbane's Argyllshire estate for a rent of £ 6.9.5 in the late 1750s, cost £ 12.0.0. by 1775. In 1754, the Glenure family rented seven holdings in Argyll at £ 56.9.3. By 1775, just two cost £ 52.0.0. This backdrop of increasing commercialisation explains why, in 1768, John, third Earl of Breadalbane introduced a policy of no subtenure, which allowed a maximising of revenue from that particular group. Allied to this, he attempted to more clearly define and utilise grazing areas for the buoyant droving trade. As well as driving up rents, Breadalbane removed traditional tacksmen like John Campbell of Barcaldine from certain farms in the Braes of Glenorchy and at Lochceran in Benderloch, western-mid Argyll. An additional stimulus to structural reappraisal like this was the embryonic growth of sheep farming in the 1760s, especially in the southern and eastern Highlands. Families like the Campbells of Glenure and Barcaldine often had a multi-faceted approach to such change. Firstly, they were themselves proprietors and often simply abandoned farms that had increased in rent, as with the Lochtayside farm of Borland. However, due to their substantial interests in droving, they could still resent losing arable and sections of grazing to joint tenants because it represented a narrowing of their real and perceived economic base. There can be little doubt that tacksmen in general did feel their position to be increasingly vulnerable. Even those who had weathered out the recession of the early 1770s, realised their position had changed. Ranald Macdonald, who held land in the Arisaig area from Colin Macdonald of Boisdale, and was a brother of Captain John Macdonald of Glenallandale who had already emigrated, noted in February 1775; " Boisdale looks to us again at a distance, but however we will endeavour to keep our ground a little. " ⁶

It was not, in fact, heightened levels of rent that alone induced emigration. While cattle prices remained high, payments of rent continued. However, the years 1770-74, both within the Highlands and Scotland generally, were characterised by bad harvests, crop deficiency, increased expenditure on meal and, above all, a short term failure in the cattle trade. In 1770 rent arrears on Macleod of Dunvegan's estate in Glenelg stood at £ 21.7.3, or 3% of the rental. By 1773 they totalled £ 170 - 28.8% of the entire rental. In Assynt in 1772, the factor, Alexander Mackenzie of Ardloch, was forced to write off only 8% of the rental in arrears. However, remittances the next year had fallen by £ 152.15.0, or 21.7% of the rental. On the estate of Sutherland as a whole, arrears stood at £ 2500 in 1770, by 1774 they totalled £ 4000. Even in more favoured areas like Argyll, conditions were still poor. On the Mull estate of Maclaine of Lochbuie, arrears by 1775 still stood at £ 81.1.3 - nearly 10% of the rental. ⁷

It should thus be pointed out that military recruiting within the Highlands during the last few years of peace, and at the beginning of the American War did, in fact, occur during a time of debt containment, attempted recovery, and overall economic frailty. Commentators have highlighted geographic and chronological discrepancies that suggest the role of sheep farming in bringing about emigration was probably minimal in the 1760-1770s period. Further, the reality of cattle and crop failure was not necessarily uncommon. However, the inflated rent levels did, without doubt, represent a new element that intensified old problems. On the whole, landlords, though never absolutely, exhibited a marked disinclination to lower rents, even during times of recession. In order to pay the new levels, many tacksmen had undoubtedly put pressure on their subtenants. Unlike their immediate superiors, this social group lacked relative capital reserves, and often simply refused to take farms or countenance a sustained loss of their limited resources.⁸ On the properties of Kenneth Mackenzie of Seaforth, the origins of much of the "oppression" suffered by subtenantry lay in the fact that, as a result of falling cattle prices, tacksmen were forced to maximise all forms of revenue. Conversely, proprietors like Seaforth did not allow any removal of subtenancy without prior approval. This angered tacksmen like Alexander Matheson of Attadale who found himself unable to fully use his possession. This was also the case with Roderick Maclellan on the farm of Garrabost, who was forced to seek permission from Seaforth in order to remove subtenants so that he could consolidate his farm and attempt a rational reconstruction of his economic position. In cases where they were unable to remove such subtenantry, it can be assumed with certainty that tacksmen forced as much revenue from the lower orders as possible. The middle elite are usually seen as the victims of commercial change, however, they as much as anyone needed to gain revenue to pay the increasing rents. This forced tacksmen to strain the traditional relationship they held with their subtenantry, and which usually afforded such excellent security to the latter.⁹

The reality of strained inter-tenantry relations can be illustrated by the fact that the social profile of emigrating families reveal that joint tenantry were an active element in population removal. A rental of Macleod's Glenelg lands taken after the emigrations in 1771-74, reveal that seven out of fifteen farms had been affected by the emigration of heads of family. Tacksmen represented two families, the rest were joint tenantry whose average rent totalled only £ 5.9.0. Such losses meant that, in turn, tacksmen had their profit margins which were already weakened through their prominent role in the cattle trade, lowered even further through the loss of subtenant income. On Lewis, in an attempt to stop the drain of the middle orders from his farm, the tacksmen on the west coast farm of Hachlete, reduced the burden on them by £5 - equivalent to 25% of the estate rental for that farm. Again in Lewis, Angus Smith, tacksmen on the farm of Timsgarry in the parish of Uig, attempted in vain to

secure elements of his tenants from emigrating. Despite the historiographic portrayal of crowded Highland farms, such conditions, when allied to recession meant that landlords like the Duke of Atholl and the Sutherland estate authorities discovered that, by the spring of 1773, they faced the prospect of farms without substantial tenantry. This was not as a result of removal, but because possessors had correctly diagnosed the general economic and estate climate. Despite the high profile given to tacksman emigration, the reality was that the economic situation was more complex than a simple landlord verses tacksman context. In many ways, as the structure of the Glenelg rental demonstrates, the 1770s period saw the tacksman and tenant class face the same problems and, ultimately, emigrating together. The apprehension of landlords regarding emigration concerned the lower joint tenantry as much as the tacksman, and was evident on the Lochaber estate of the fourth Duke of Gordon. In the early 1770s, Archibald Macdonald of Corrachonlie emigrated to America, and attempted to broaden out the numbers involved. He had tried before he left to get other tacksman in the area to accept his as yet unfinished lease. When they refused, the son of the estate bailie gave Macdonald £ 20, and accepted a demission on the terms of the lease. This was done in order to counteract Corrachonlie's line of persuading subtenants to emigrate with him. He had argued that if he had been badly treated, they, as joint tenantry could expect no better. By giving Macdonald good terms on the breaking of the lease, his argument was undoubtedly weakened, and so lesser numbers actually went with him. That the estate had been forced into this action illustrates that in many ways subtenantry and tacksman removed because they recognised that they both faced, " downward social mobility and depression of their living standards. " ¹⁰

While the extent of tacksman demoralisation was increasingly evident, the coherency of landlord planning must not be over emphasised. The emigrations from the estates of Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat in 1771, are a perfect example of this. In March of that year, as over ten Macdonald tacksman subscribed to raise over £ 2000 to emigrate, Alexander Macleod of Glendale, son of the laird of Macleod, noted how the tack holders had been deeply offended by Macdonald's remarks stating that any body going to America would have his farms offered to small tenants. Far from being an intended improving strategy, Glendale stated that Macdonald was flattering himself, and that he would easily lose up to £ 15 000 in specie. He noted that Macdonald would discover that joint tenantry had a lowered investment, stock, and repayment capacity. Indeed, by June 1771, Macdonald himself had written to Macleod stating that his small tenantry were poor and not able to retain large holdings, and that he had only given them leases because he had failed to retain his original possessors. Small tenantry were so active with the tacksman in contemplating emigration that it is hardly surprising Macdonald offered land. The reality was that he had been forced to turn to smaller tenants, not as a matter of design, but in order to regain

control and stem the haemorrhage from his estate. Tacksmen emigrated because of Macdonald's refusal to lower rents, a conclusion brought home by the fact that Macleod, who, in 1769, massively increased his rental from £ 2595 to £ 4316 had originally refused to lower rents because of slipping cattle prices. Nevertheless, he and his successor were finally persuaded by Glendale and John Macleod of Talisker, who had returned from military service in the Scots-Dutch, to concede rent to the extent of £ 904 by 1774 - a 20% reduction in the entire rental. Indeed, Talisker was generally credited within Scottish landlord circles as having ensured that emigration on Macleod's estate had not reached alarming proportions. ¹¹

The whole confused situation and subsequent emigrations from Skye in 1771 and 1772 were repeated elsewhere. The debate over the nature of estate tenantry continued. From as early as 1754, it was argued with regard to the interests of the Sutherland family that; " In my opinion [it] is better secured by this method [small tenants] than by giving the whole to a tacksman, and it brings in a more immediate gain to the family. " Against this stance, other estate authorities wished to have the tacks " in substantial people's hands though they should have more than they can labour. " ¹² This strategy was again evident in 1776, when despite the difficulty in obtaining substantial tenants, it was suggested concerning farms on the estates of Sir James Grant that " In my opinion it is proper to give your gentlemen any lands they want preferable to tenants upon equal terms for many reasons; " this was to be the case even if joint tenants offered 10 shillings more. The many reasons included the ability to pay rent regularly and improve at the same time. Likewise, on the Gordon estates in 1783, the subsistence crisis engendered a hostile reaction to tenants with low capital reserves. Concerning the farms of Drumbeg and Bonaughton in Urquhart, the factor noted that while they would easily rent at £ 81, Gordon was accepting £ 61, a sign that good tenants were increasingly unavailable. ¹³

The planned nature of the assault on tacksmen must, therefore, be seen as counterbalanced by fears amongst estate authorities that small tenantry lacked the security or capital in depth to maintain steady payments. This was pointed out to Sutherland's agent in 1756, and was confirmed in January 1758. In an ominous precedent to the situation in the early 1770s, it was noted that due to heightened rents and a failure in cattle prices, small tenantry had abandoned their possessions and returned to full time labouring service with larger possessors. The result was an increase in the level of farms lying waste. It was argued that this demonstrated tenants needed to have sufficient capital to ensure steady payments. This fact was reinforced when, in 1759 and 1760, the estate authorities faced the reality of a lack of substantial possessors. Partly as a result, a section of the large tack of Torobull was leased to multiple tenants. As early as January 1763, therefore, experimentation had begun

upon the Sutherland estate, with the tacksman class having their traditional authority challenged against a backdrop of ongoing rent increases. In Assynt it was raised from £ 566.18.9 in the late 1750s, to £ 667.10.3 in 1763. The estate authorities remained keen on retaining the substantial tacksman, but large holders like Macleod of Geanies had already dropped part of their possessions which were, in turn, offered to small tenantry. By the end of the Seven Years War it was reported that tacksmen were threatening to drop their leases should rent increases recommence, a situation that illustrates both the slow development of small tenantry holding directly from the landlord, as well as the relatively early alienation of the tacksman class.¹⁴

Both the examples of the Macdonald and Sutherland estates confirm the declining position of the tacksman, though suggestions that the landlord attack upon them as a class was comprehensive and consistent should be treated with caution. If anything, emigration of subtenantry hastened the more radical imposition of anti-tacksman policies. This was true on Macdonald's estate, while the correspondence of the authorities in Assynt became more stridently anti-tacksman as a result of subtenant emigration. This, in turn, ensured that in 1775 a set of leases deliberately designed around joint tenantry was constructed.¹⁵

It is against this general malaise and increasing uncertainty within the ranks of Highland tenantry, particularly within that of the substantial tenant class, that the opportunities offered by the army should be seen. Within this context the military had a complex economic role to play. As part of the crown's policy, the East India Company and regular army had continued to recruit throughout Scotland, including the Highlands, during the years of peace from 1763-1775. The effect of this recruiting was to further strain relationships between the complex social groups evident on Highland estates. In an attempt to broaden his political and credit interests, Norman Macleod of Dunvegan had agreed in 1771 in response to army augmentations, to allow a relative, Captain Fotheringham of Powrie in Angus, to recruit upon his estate in Skye. Upon Fotheringham's failure, inquiries revealed just how destructive the military process could be. In response to the fact that Macleod had been deeply angered at his tacksmen's antipathy to Powrie's recruiting, Alexander Macleod of Glendale stated that the tacksmen on the Skye estate had, in fact, deliberately hindered the recruiting operation. While Powrie was a stranger on the estate, it was not merely from insular clannishness that he had been opposed. Glendale warned Macleod that Fotheringham, by further undermining tacksmen and tenantry confidence, had added to the climate on the estate that encouraged emigration. As was evident in Lewis and Lochaber, tacksmen were aware that subtenantry were also prone to remove when conditions deteriorated. This situation explains why Macleod was warned that he should not force the recruiting issue. Were he to do so, Glendale implied, he would face the same

situation as Lord Alexander Macdonald was facing upon his property. He added that some of Macleod's small tenantry had already emigrated, and care was needed to ensure no slights were committed against the estate population, especially against his larger possessors. ¹⁶

The reason that tacksmen opposed recruiting in a period of economic hardship was well explained by Sir James Grant of Grant in February 1773. He noted concerning East India Company levying;

If the country is to be drained not only in time of war but by every other method in time of peace, how is the ground to be laboured, manufactures to be carried on or the poor farmers to live ? ¹⁷

What Grant meant by the " poor farmers " was, of course, the tacksmen and the tenant farmer. It was this aspect, whereby recruiting heightened labour concerns for an already strained tacksmen class, that explains why the Macleod lease holders reacted the way they did. Given this, it was unfortunate that these recession years witnessed rumours of regiment raising, as in August 1772, when it was rumoured that two regiments would be levied in the Highlands. This potential hostility to recruiting that some tacksmen displayed, was evident in a statement by Ranald Macdonald in West Inverness-shire who noted that the coming war in the colonies meant " great troubles both at home and abroad. " The reasoning behind troubles abroad is obvious, but from the perspective of a Highland tacksmen, war meant the almost certain reality of regiment raising, which with its concomitant recruiting would disrupt estate conditions for those remaining in the civilian sector. ¹⁸

Partly as a result of the disruptive actions of peacetime recruiting, but more fundamentally, because of the slow but steady development of attacks on the tacksmen class, there developed a rather ironic pattern of a re-militarising tacksmen/officer class. This pattern became distinctly evident during the years prior to the American War, and was symptomatic of the commercial changes in the region. ¹⁹ The link between the general economic situation in the Highlands and the army option could be quite direct. Macleod, in response to the failure of Powrie's recruiting suggested that Glendale, as a half pay officer, join the army instead. Likewise, the actions of the Campbells of Glenure and Barcaldine demonstrate how service within the imperial military was nothing less than a response and alternative to economic change. As a result of the lowering of their landed resources, they turned to military outlets to counterbalance the commercialising policies of proprietors like Breadalbane. In December 1770, Major Allan Campbell, brother and half brother to Barcaldine and Glenure respectively, returned to full time military service in the 36th regiment. In the first instance, this lowered any income drain on the financially straitened

Barcaldine family, but in a positive sense it also allowed Allan to act as a facilitator of younger kin into the army - a role he subsequently played for his nephew Colin. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Campbell, another brother, having returned from half pay solicited the fifth Duke of Argyll in 1773 in order to get the colonelcy of the 57th regiment so that he could live entirely on army revenue. Likewise, while initially unsuccessful, he also acted as an interest within the army for his younger relations.²⁰

More pertinently in terms of the impact at the estate level, in 1774, a year marred by electoral politics, Barcaldine secured from Breadalbane the short term continuation of his brother Major Mungo Campbell on the farm of Ardteatle at the north east end of Loch Awe. The arrangement was, nevertheless, explicitly short term, and increased the likelihood of Mungo remaining in the army, especially when opportunities to consolidate his career availed themselves during the American War. When the Glenure and Barcaldine family voted *en masse* for an anti-Breadalbane candidate in the county of Perth election, this was done in order to secure the interest of the fifth Duke of Argyll for military patronage. The defection of Glenure, a long-time supporter of Breadalbane surprised commentators, but was, in fact, evidence of his attempts to increase military opportunities in a climate that lowered the value of his position as a prominent tacksman in Western Argyll. As the fifth Duke was still considered the vital leading interest in gaining military commissions for the middle Highland elite, voting for his candidate was a metaphor for the growing preference in the Glenure family for military service over agricultural holdings. As a result, Mungo and the family lost more farms over and above the losses already induced by Breadalbane's estate management. As a result, Glenure further consolidated the family policy of military service by spending £ 800 on securing ensigncies for his sons James and Colin in the 42nd and 36th regiments respectively. Another son, Alexander, who had been employed in Edinburgh, joined the army in April 1774. This familial militarisation was completed by 22 August 1775, when Hugh, Glenure's youngest son was appointed ensign in the 35th regiment.²¹

In many respects, however, the most useful example of the interaction of estate conditions and military service is that of Glenure's son, Patrick Campbell, half pay lieutenant since 1763. In 1767, his father gave him the farm of Glenduror on the forfeited estate of Ardsheill. However, from as early as January 1771, through until the spring of 1774 (the period characterised by poor or unstable economic conditions) Glenure applied to both Breadalbane and Argyll for their interest in getting Patrick back into the army. Argyll's first attempt failed in September 1771, when it became obvious that any additional officers would be taken from the Irish establishment. Nevertheless, both Argyll and Breadalbane petitioned hard for Patrick's return into the military in 1773, but failed to persuade Viscount

Barrington, the Secretary of War, to alter the regulations or give him preferment. Glenure's subsequent voting power in the 1774 election, again put him in a strong position with Argyll and Breadalbane. On 2 June 1774, the Campbell earl wrote to Glenure stating that he had failed again to get Patrick a commission. He added that he understood Glenure had been at a considerable expense in buying commissions for two of his younger sons. If, for that reason, he did not wish to pay up another £ 150 to get Patrick put back into the rank of full lieutenant, Breadalbane agreed he would settle him on a farm in Argyll. However, he later refused to give him possession of the farm of Soccoth in Glenorchy. What is significant within that context is that Breadalbane earnestly suggested to Glenure that the best option was the military commission - even offering the £ 150 interest free. In light of his earlier military expenditure, Glenure refused and commenced negotiations for a tack; Breadalbane's Perthshire factor adding, " As the military plan has not taken place for your son, I think you are well entitled not only to expect but to insist for a convenient farm for him. " ²²

Breadalbane's attitude is deeply instructive. As a proprietor he obviously considered the army as a preferable outlet for traditional tacksman families. The Earl's reluctant attitude to Patrick's farm settlement explains why Glenure asked Argyll for his interest. On 2 July 1774, Glenure asked the Duke to settle his son on a farm, or more significantly still, to try again and get him full military pay. When it became obvious this would not occur, Argyll informed the Duke of Atholl that Glenure's demands were rather exorbitant " and augmented considerably of late with regard to farms. " ²³ Patrick later agreed with Argyll for the farms of Glencripesdale and Bealach in north west Morvern, as well as several farms in the Duart peninsula of eastern Mull for the grazing of " flying stock. " Patrick entered into possession in May 1775; in all, the five farms cost £100 in annual rent, of which his military pension alone was capable of paying 45.5%. The extent and geographical spread of these farms demonstrated a specialised function within the droving trade, and in 1776 they brought in £ 680.5.0 profit between Patrick and his overseer Archibald Macpherson. ²⁴

This outcome may suggest an argument that the use of the military by such families was, in fact, limited. The small cost (£ 150) that Glenure needed to pay in order to get Patrick his commission, when allied to the reality that the half pay officer did, in fact, become a Morvern drover, might suggest that military service was not an automatically attractive alternative to more traditional options like land holding.

Several qualifying points to this scenario are, however, necessary. The fact that the War Office regulation did not allow for any half pay officer to re-enter the army in a promoted position did, undoubtedly, lessen the appeal of the army. Lieutenant George Mackenzie on half pay in Gairloch, like Patrick, attempted to return to service in the 42nd Highland Regiment. While he finally accepted in 1773, he had done so reluctantly, being disappointed that under the conditions of his exchange, his rank was actually lowered to ensign. That he was prepared to accept such a situation is less indicative of a zeal for military service, as symptomatic of conditions in the Wester Ross region in the immediate aftermath of the temporary collapse of the cattle trade in 1772.²⁵

This was very much the situation the Glenure family faced. As with Mackenzie, the option of military service was a genuine alternative. Added to this, was the fact that as a half pay officer Patrick already had rank and income. Thus any military expenditure went on securing a footing for those members of the family as yet unprovided for. Perhaps most importantly of all, Glenure was increasingly aware in this period that his half-brother, John Campbell of Barcaldine, would be unable to retain his own estate. Rather than see it lost, Glenure spent most of 1774 trying to raise enough capital for a purchase. The financial failure of Barcaldine convinced family members of the need to secure additional access to patronage. Meanwhile, by December 1774, Glenure had managed to raise the £ 24 000 he needed, and on 23rd January 1775 the sale of the estate was completed. The transaction was well publicised, and was seen by many as indicative of the extent to which Highland land prices had risen due to improvement. Under such circumstances of massive debt, which induced Glenure to order that " every other thing be turned to the best advantage possible for cash and rent, " it is perhaps not surprising that he had earlier put as many of his sons into the army as possible, and refused to pay for a pensioned officer when the crown's official policy was known to be that of returning them free of charge.²⁶

Just how attractive the military was to such tacksmen as Patrick, is made clear when the larger context is taken into account. Again, from February 1775, rumours arose as to the likelihood of Highland levies. Imminent mobilisation, when coupled to Glenure's secured patronage access to the Duke of Argyll, would have left him with an impression that no additional expenditure was necessary for Patrick. In economic terms, this political networking proved an astute policy. In November 1775, after six months as a tacksman in Morvern, Patrick, in return for his quota of men, was returned without charge to full military service at the higher rank of captain in Colonel Simon Fraser's 71st regiment. The relatively easy wartime method whereby half pay officers were returned to duty proved useful. In all, Glenure saved £ 1100 - the price of returning to full time military service (£ 150), and the price of a company (£ 950). This example demonstrates the cogency of the

economic rationale in military service, while in more immediate terms, the saving represented 91.6% of the annual interest on the loan to secure the Barcaldine estate.²⁷

While post recession profits from the Morvern farms remained high, the reality of Patrick's position was soon evident. By late November 1775, the family grew increasingly concerned for Patrick's holdings from Argyll. Glenure sought to verify that, despite now being in the army, his son could still retain possession. It was finally agreed that Glenure himself would hold the farms in lieu of Patrick. In 1778, Campbell of Airds brought pressure to bear on all arrears in the northern part of the Argyll estate; Glenure, in turn, disagreed with estate estimates for the rent levels of crofts in Glencripesdale, while Macpherson, in light of Patrick's military service, moved to secure the Morvern possessions for himself. Finally, in late 1780, Dugald Gregorson, a rival drover, offered £ 90 for Glencripesdale and Beaich alone, a bid which ended Patrick's involvement in that region.²⁸

The role of military service in comparison to the conditions a tacksman could expect in the Highlands were noted by Patrick once back in the army;

The footing of Highland farmers is such that a man that has no property has only a toleration to stay in his master's will or at best for a term under 20 years..... I will be very unfit to become a Morvern tenant and very imprudent in me it would be to change my way of life upon so slender a footing as the tack of a farm for the term of 10 or 12 years.... all the perquisites etc. makes a field officer's situation in this country a very envious one. God knows I think it a line of life far more respectable and I am sure profitable one than being a Morvern drover or tenant.²⁹

Such sentiments show how military service was, in fact, a reaction to estate change. Moreover, this thinking was not merely evident within the Glenure family, who were tacksmen under a landlord particularly well known for his "improving" zeal. On 17 July 1779, Captain Archibald Maclaine of Lochbuie was informed of the military prospects of Hugh McLean, the son of a local tacksman.

I am sure he will have a better chance than Donald will have by staying about his own country, where God knows there is little chance for young men making money in any manner of way.³⁰

Such sentiments mirror those of Patrick Campbell exactly, and illustrate that the army represented not only an additional option, but it also tended to remove those with enough capital to ensure the army was a viable route. The permanency of the military avenue was stimulated by official policy. Half pay officers like Patrick who returned to full service were forbidden from selling their commissions at their full market value, this simply encouraged them to remain within the army for longer periods. This increasingly distant relationship with tack holding was also evident in the attitude of Colin, Patrick's younger brother, who, in August 1779, asked his father to retain the farm of Leitterwalton on the family estate for his own purposes. The choice of farm was because, as an army officer, he (Colin) knew little of farming and thus only wanted a small concern. He further noted:

I will almost certainly retire and such a place as it would keep me from being entirely idle. My views are at present to remain in the army until there is a peace, and then retire on half pay. I would then have between £4-500 and my half pay by this way I would have £ 60 and upward per year and have it in my power to get a company in some future war. ³¹

Here the link with the speculative and rumour ridden atmosphere of the 1763-75 period can again be noted. Many military officers holding farms in the region saw their existence within an increasingly hostile agrarian sector as secondary, or, in the case of Colin Campbell, as a mere interlude between positive opportunities within the British military. This suggests that the interaction of military service and the tacksman should be reconsidered. Analysis has traditionally focused on the demise of the tacksman at the hands of commercial landlordism as, in turn, ending the traditional means whereby large scale military recruiting was practised in the region. This argument suggests a neutral or insignificant role for British military activity in the decline of the tacksman, and leaves all the onus on the activities of the Highland landlord. Yet this chapter argues that the relatively easy option of militarisation hastened the withdrawal and decline of tacksmen from landed Highland society. It also directly contradicts the argument that Highland regiments were responsible for the retention of the tacksman, either as an individual, or as a landholding group. ³²

Moreover, as is too often the case, it can be assumed that it was the traditional martial ethos which prompted such a response, and that military service represented continuity for the *duine uaisle*. This is true only to an extent. Culturally, as the attitudes of Patrick Campbell demonstrate, military service allowed them to retain much of their value systems and sense of place. However, as a reaction to the new economic situation, continuity must be seen as limited largely to this cultural sphere. Allied to this, is the attention that needs to be given to the proactive role of government policies - particularly half pay exchange. The case

study of the Barcaldine and Glenure family, when linked to the wider pattern of Highland half pay officers shown in table 3:3, demonstrates that military service for the old elite represented, in many ways, economic re-entrenchment and re-structuring. Given the general fate of such families under large landlords like Breadalbane, the move towards military service was in reality extremely rational economics. It was their new situation within the region which explains why, within a larger British context, Highland half pay officers were returning in such disproportionate numbers. The pattern of military service was linked to the increasing economic discomfiture of the old clan elite from which such annuitant officers were substantially drawn, and suggests that military service was in practical terms an alternative to, or parallel form of emigration.

The theoretical & cultural background to Highland emigration 1763-1810

While it has been suggested that military recruiting complicated estate conditions, added to the alienation of large tack holders, and that military service amounted to a form of emigration, they were, nevertheless, factors that government could not avoid. Rather than emphasising competition between the military and the landlord, it should be noted that throughout the period 1763-1815, both landlords and government held roughly common ground with regard to the loss of populations. This resulted from the dominance of the prevailing economic concept that is rather generically entitled, mercantilism. While hardly a cohesive theory, it is, nevertheless, the vital background to both government and proprietary responses, and no study of Highland emigration in this period would be complete without noting several of its aspects. It is acknowledged that to describe mercantilism as a system, is undoubtedly dangerous. Considerable revision on the whole coherency and consistency of this subject has been largely completed. Nevertheless, even revisionists have accepted several underlying aspects of prevailing thought, whether labelled mercantilist or not. Amongst these was the importance of populations. In economic terms they acted as a captive market for national produce, and, above all, supplied the cheap labour which allowed national exports, through lower production costs, to intrude into the markets of other states. As such, it was noted by the seventeenth century mercantilist Gregory King, in his tract *Natural and Political Observations and Conclusions*, that " a nation may be said to be rich when it abounds with men and money over and above the proportions of its neighbouring government. " ³³

More obviously, war heightened these demographic aspects of mercantilism. While as a whole, the theory emphasised large populations for economic reasons, military conflict gave this stance an obvious and immediate clarity, as well as a vital practical rationale. A nation, it was argued, could be rich in terms of capital and wealth, but if it lacked the population to

provide soldiers and sailors, it was fundamentally weak. Perhaps not surprisingly, in 1802, with war looming against Napoleonic France, Gregory King's pro-population work was republished. It was pointed out by contemporary commentators that emigration lessened military power, and that this had occurred to the former great powers of the Dutch Republic and Spain. War made people aware of the demographic state of the country. The national census, for instance, was directly related to the war effort. This vital link between military conflict and population concerns, can be illustrated convincingly in a Scottish context. In 1779, when faced with the prospect of continuing a heavy recruiting strategy for the American War, Lord North requested a copy of Doctor Alexander Webster's census of Scotland, which he received with a note highlighting Lowland, but more especially Highland depopulation.³⁴

Directly linked to this, is the significant fact that mercantilism, as a recognised system or incoherent clutch of notions, clearly conceded a regulatory and interventionist role for government. This intervention was allowed within the sphere of national defence. Within this context, war was seen by contemporaries such as John Knox as endemic, with the state forced to adjust to this reality. In his influential book *A View of the British Empire*, published in 1783, and again in 1785, Knox painted a bleak picture for the recently defeated British, who had already in the thirty four years since 1739, spent sixteen at war in a vain attempt to expand and defend their Atlantic empire. He stated;

Our wars therefore in the future are to be considered, not as wars of choice, but of unavoidable necessity..... there remains no alternative between a total relinquishment of our transmarine possessions or a continued, expensive preparation for defensive war, we must at the same time devise new sources of men and revenue.... considering our situation therefore in every point of view, *national improvements* and the *increase of population*, seem not only matters of expediency, but of *positive necessity* ".³⁵

The late eighteenth century was thus understood to be characterised by heightened government involvement due to the pressing demands of war or war preparedness. Against this certainty and rationale for intervention, was the emergence of Adam Smith's ideas on the supreme role of the market. However, commentators have pointed out how Adam Smith's ideas were, in fact, only slowly accepted, and in general used in a highly selective way by contemporary commentators in the 1775-1800 period. Even at the turn of the nineteenth century, qualifications to his theories were still evident. This attitude was present in reports on Highland emigration. Highlighting the situation in Skye, and demanding government intervention, a commentator noted that the theories of Adam Smith (non-

intervention) did not and should not apply to the question of population loss. More significantly, in terms of theoretical justification for state involvement, Smith himself acknowledged that military affairs were the first responsibility of government, and that intervention on such an agenda was both necessary and desirable. With regard to national defence, therefore, contemporary society throughout the 1760-1815 period understood and expected that government would and could intervene. Even modern commentators who question the entire mercantilist concept, concede this aspect. As a modern sceptic on the coherency of mercantilism noted regarding military affairs. Nobody " would have denied that if necessity should arise for choosing, all other things would have to give way to considerations of the national safety. " ³⁶

This may seem rather obvious, but it is worth reiterating within the context of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Highland emigration. Given that military concerns allowed intervention by government, then the preponderant contribution of the northern region in this sector assumes a vital importance. It suggests that, with regard to the Highlands, government had the theoretical framework and high profile practical evidence to justify and precipitate intervention in the area. Nothing demonstrates this better than the nature of the emigration debates in the last half of the eighteenth century.

As with the whole of Scotland generally, the economic future of the Highlands came under intense focus in the period after 1763. However, while it can be argued that certain elements were held in common with the rest of Scotland (such as concern for population), the military dimension weighted the discourse on the Highlands to an extent that was not evident elsewhere. All the major commentators on the region, like the Reverend John Walker, James Anderson, and John Knox, justified the retention of Highland population firstly because of their proven utility to the state as a martial race. In his section on the Lowlands in *A View of the British Empire*, Knox failed to highlight any military dimension to the population, noting, instead, their frugal and industrious character. In contrast to this, in his introduction to his account of the Hebrides and West Highlands, James Anderson stated that he was justified in highlighting the area because, " he begs that everyone will for a moment reflect on the means she [Britain] now possesses of manning a navy on a sudden emergency and thus preserving her independence at sea. " In an even better illustration of the military agenda within the Highland emigration debate, and in contrast to his stance on the Lowlands, Knox noted in 1783 that;

"A train of events [the American War of Independence], the most unexpected and humiliating, contributed to exhibit, more than ever, the value of the Highlander. " He added "..... the revolt of some colonies, the conquest of others, and the apparent danger of losing the remainder, gave those neglected wilds additional consequence. " ³⁷

To even the most informed commentators, war brought added significance to the region. The accuracy of such statements regarding either the militarised Highlands or non-militarised Lowlands is irrelevant; it was the perception that they built up or maintained that is important. Moreover, they highlight how much the debate on the region was grounded fully in mercantilist, military and imperial anxieties, and how vital they were as the underlying context within which the debate on emigration took place. It is ironic that while modern historians have stressed how Highland emigration was symptomatic of the old problems of estate underdevelopment, what was of equal importance to contemporaries, was the fact that population loss threatened the Highland's new imperial role. Under an anonymous author described as " A Highlander ", a tract entitled ' *The present conduct of the Chieftains and Proprietors of lands in the Highlands of Scotland towards their clans and people considered impartially* ', appeared in its second addition dedicated to Colonel Sir James Adolphus Oughton. By 1773, to talk of chieftains and clans was obviously anachronistic, yet despite this, several points can be made about the pamphlet beyond its immediate analysis of the emigration problem. Firstly, by dedicating it to Oughton, who was second in command to John, fifth Duke of Argyll, and thus in reality acting Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Scotland, the author was making it clear that these imperial and military consequences were the most important facet of population loss. The pamphlet listed the reasons why Highland emigration should stop. First and foremost, it injured the state through the loss of fighting men. Only then were the economic benefits of a large tenantry addressed within the pamphlet, it being noted that landlords who removed their tenantry acted against their own interest. Finally, it stated the moral and religious reasons against such a policy. As with many of the comments on emigration, especially after 1770, when British-colonial relations deteriorated sharply, it argued that the Highlander's high profile tendency to emigrate out of the home country, when allied to his military capabilities, made his removal particularly unfavourable to the British state. It was suggested that, once in the colonies, people had to be warlike, or in the case of the Highlander - remain warlike. Regarding emigrants from the North of Scotland, it was supposed; " They will make excellent partisans for the first enterprising genius that shall aspire to form an independent establishment in America. " ³⁸ Nothing demonstrates this attitude better than the fact that, in June 1775, government officials removed the arms of emigrants preparing to set sail from Greenock. ³⁹

This broader context to the debate on the Highlands cannot be emphasised enough. Moreover, subtle aspects beyond the practical demonstrations of Highland militarism also tended to highlight this whole manpower issue. Contemporary anti-emigration writers tended to reinforce each other by focusing on the lack of commerce in the region. This, in turn, generated consensus on that point. Such an argument was, in fact, a distortion. Modern historiography has convincingly demonstrated that the region was characterised by new and expanding commercial opportunities in the form of kelp, fishing, distilling and the strengthening Lowland economy. Nevertheless, emigration was seen in terms of the failure to provide an alternative to the agrarian sector. This is evident in tracts by Walker and Knox, as well as in the speeches of public figures.⁴⁰ With no industry in the Highlands to highlight as contributing to the state revenue and general levels of national wealth, it is unsurprising that such anti-emigration writers focused instead on the Highland's military contribution. One of the most important aspects of Highland emigration was that, through the writings of its opponents, it had the cultural consequence of heightening perceptions of the region's military capacity.

It should thus be pointed out that a dovetailing of factors, from successive wars to emigration itself, acted to ensure that the theoretical aspects to the debate on the Highlands emphasised its military contribution first, and its economic potential second. This was the foundation for the deeply held consensus that large populations represented the best option for the region. This, in turn, was the automatic premise from which all economic development in the Highlands was to commence. When discussing plans for the area, and in an interesting and revealing set of priorities, the Reverend John Walker noted;

The number of people in such a nation as ours, is the only permanent wealth. The word capital, is bandied about for everything; but without the sinews of men's arms, it is neither the sinews of war nor of agriculture.⁴¹

Even commentators like David Loch, a prominent Leith merchant, who was pro-sheep farming, agreed that large populations were necessary for the good of the state. In a useful 1778 description of the fifth Duke of Argyll's woollen mill at Inveraray, he approved of it, yet under emphasised its distance from a large and stable market. Conversely, he adding that it proved that;

It is in the interest of the landed gentlemen to promote manufactures; for manufactures cause a brisk circulation of money; money enables the manufacturer to marry; marriage augments the population; population increases consumption which eventually, in the end brings riches and strength to the nation.⁴²

Several modern writers have highlighted the importance of this comprehensive espousal of mercantilist theory and its concomitant promotion of population. It has been pointed out that the economic role and future of the region was continually seen within that of a mercantilist British empire. The dominance of population retention within the late eighteenth century approach to the Highlands has been highlighted by the emergence, even within the writing of bitterly opposed theorists such as Knox and Anderson, of common economic responses to commercial change.⁴³ Thus while they disagreed violently, both men saw urbanisation as the means to prevent population loss. This attitude was evident when, in 1775, Sir James Grant called on government to halt emigration. He added that the ban needed to be implemented quickly; "When this is done proper.... effectual steps should be taken for encouraging and employing this valuable set of people when required." This stance, whereby population was the basic concern, and the economic development to keep them there almost an afterthought, was again described in 1810, just as it was being questioned;

All the speculations which have been offered to the public, on the practicability of retaining the superfluous population in the Highlands, inform us that, in the first instance we must keep the people; and the authors leave them the very distant prospect of finding employment for themselves.⁴⁴

Within the Highlands new commercial ventures and industries were planned to service an already entrenched population policy, rather than constructed around the merits of realistic investment levels or market openings. This thesis argues that this concern for population retention was one of the main reasons behind the failure of economic planning in the period. This assertion suggests that the region's real and imagined martial prowess, which formed such a vital component in the general wish to keep the people in the area, was, in fact, fundamentally damaging to the region in that it stimulated the development of industries on a limited premise.

More recent historiography has dwelt upon the interesting contrast between Lowland and Highland population movement in this period. There are undoubtedly several complicating points regarding this contrast, but again this chapter argues that the military dimension raised the profile of the emigrant Highlander more than that of his similarly inclined Lowland counterpart. There were undoubtedly facets of Highland emigration which explain the high level attention it received. It has been estimated, for example, that Highlanders made up 60% of total Scottish emigrants in the period 1763-75. Therefore, in terms of sheer numbers, the Highlands was conspicuous within a Scottish context. Not only was Highland emigration on a larger scale, but official reports, such as that sent to Lord Suffolk,

the Secretary for the Northern Department by Lord Justice Clerk Thomas Miller in April 1774, highlighted that the removal of people had commenced in the Highlands and was spreading into the social groupings of the better manufacturers in the Lowlands. The report suggested that 730 had left Sutherland alone, 433 from Lewis and 1825 from Argyll. The significant point was that Scotland's first major post 1763 emigration movement was seen to have started in the North. ⁴⁵

However, recent studies have demonstrated that the Highlands were not alone in the period of the 1760s-1780s in witnessing the agrarian restructuring which prompted such movement. This entailed an increase in Lowland evictions as estates moved to rationalise both farm size and tenant numbers. It also involved consolidation of farms, though not necessarily at the expense of wholesale obliteration of small tenantry. It did, however, see cottar and subtenant removal on a substantial scale, while direct comparisons with sheep and the removal of people, as in the Highland scenario, have been drawn for the Scottish Borders. However, it has been pointed out that the speed of change was probably slower in the south, while in addition, it can be argued that the structure of Lowland society partially masked the role of the proprietor, reducing both criticism and cultural pressure on that particular group. Firstly, rural eviction in the Lowlands saw a concomitant mini urbanisation in the surrounding area, thus maintaining the labour pool - if in a different physical environment. Progressively, as these proletarianized workers followed the wage market, so they removed more completely into the urban context before subsequent trans-Atlantic emigration. This continuous but gradual drain, whereby Lowland and, indeed, eastern Highland populations were removed, resulted in a different perception of what, nevertheless, represented as much of a reaction to landlord strategies as anything practised by more northerly populations. This vital difference was noted by Selkirk. " If people are dismissed in a gradual and continued progress one after another... the circumstance does not excite so much public attention, but the effects on the state of the country are the same. " ⁴⁶

While accepting that Highlanders made up a large proportion of emigrants, the fact that removal was occurring in the Lowlands as well, suggests that it is the inherent structure of Highland emigration that made it so conspicuous. While it is clear many Lowland emigrants were undoubtedly farmers, who, like Highlanders complained of high rents, the additional economic sectors of the Lowlands could put the problems of commercial recession at the fore front of comments concerning their motives for leaving. This left relatively unnoticed, or understated, the fact that Lowland lairds had encouraged movement into the market economy in the first place. Thus, while emigration societies like the Scots American Company of Farmers had large farming elements in them, and mentioned rack renting as responsible for their formation, the contemporaneous debate on the state of the Irish linen

industry demonstrates that the connection between emigration and recession was both well understood and concentrated on amongst the elites. The decline in the British mainland's linen industry likewise dominated much of the debates on instances of Lowland emigration in the 1770s. Thus, in February 1774, when a group of five hundred, consisting mostly of weavers left from Paisley, there was no connection made with landlords or estate policies.⁴⁷

In contrast to this, Highland emigration appeared both abrupt and total. John Knox noted an important aspect of the Highlander's cultural response when quoting emigrants as stating, " we are strangers in the Lowlands. " He went on to relate that the only option they considered was trans-Atlantic passage, and that more than any other people in Scotland they were inclined to emigrate. This facet of Highlander behaviour was particularly disquieting. The link with the military was directly made. In 1772, with emigration occurring in Sutherland, it was noted that none of those leaving could be persuaded to join the army. Their preference for overseas destinations was seen in blunt terms as a loss to Britain's military machine. The Lanarkshire factory owner David Dale's attempts to settle Highland emigrants in the Lowlands and allow them the benefits of Scotland's industrial expansion also failed - further suggesting that overseas destinations would remain the first option for Highland emigrants.⁴⁸

With no commercial sector of any significance to suffer a recession, contemporaries assumed that Highland emigrants moved as a result of estate management, either because of new agricultural practices, or crop and stock failure and unpaid levels of rent arrears. Which ever way, it showed the landlord as either inhumane, or even worse, incapable of helping his tenantry. This very localised construction for understanding emigration, which highlighted the good, bad or indifferent role of the landlord, was understood to be the framework in which Highland emigration occurred. In a masterfully tactful commentary, it was noted by a Highland minister in the early 1790s, that permanent internal emigration to the Lowlands was not practised, and that Highland emigration was, in fact, cyclical, in that it occurred when large amounts of leases finished upon Highland estates. He noted that;

Without entering into a disagreeable detail of the various circumstances in the conduct of proprietors, which serve to produce this periodical depopulation when a tenant is dispossessed in consequence of the proprietors demanding more rent, he has no resource left him but to emigrate out of the kingdom. It happens in fact, that the era at which leases expire upon one of these great estates, (if indeed there be leases granted upon it), proves almost invariably an era of emigration.⁴⁹

More so than in the Lowlands, commentators understood that it was estate management conditions that determined Highland emigration. Again, such a stand-point was evident in the early 1800s. As part of the political lobbying campaign to produce the Passenger Act of 1803, a detailed report to Henry Dundas, Lord Melville, noted that the years 1801-2 had seen the ending of entire estate setts in the north west Highlands. This had resulted in the loss of 5000 people by trans-Atlantic emigration. The report highlighted the conditions of various estates and districts, and detailed the length left on current estate setts. It concluded that with so many large estates about to go out of lease, the Highland race was in danger of extirpation. While characterised by the hyperbole that was evident in the campaign to halt emigration by legislation, the report, nevertheless, accurately foresaw that with a large sett to finish on most of the Sutherland estate in 1805, émigration from that county would intensify. It also noted the actions of various landlords. The fifth Duke of Argyll still kept his people at their end of lease, as did Campbell of Lochnell, Mackenzie of Gairloch and Macleod of Harris. The Gordon family also did so - though not as sure in their actions. Mackenzie of Seaforth, Fraser of Lovat, and the Skye proprietors of Macleod of Dunvegan and Macdonald of Sleat had " failed " to retain their populations. Likewise, in January 1802, a Highland Society committee report noted the same radical response to estate changes from the Highland population. It stressed that the Society needed to think of ways whereby they could break what was described as the, " cycle, " which seemed to banish the Highlander if he had no farm of reasonable size.⁵⁰

On the theme of real and perceived differences between Lowland and Highland emigration, it can be argued that along with the rapidly strengthening and urban characteristics of the Lowland economy, the structure of landholding in the south of Scotland did, in fact, lower the profile of estate removals as an explanatory factor in emigration from that region. In a useful breakdown on the nature and size of landlord holdings, it has been pointed out that compared to the Highlands, only the Scottish Borders had a higher percentage of large landlords controlling vast tracts of individual counties. After the Borders, came the counties of Sutherland and Inverness-shire, which were conspicuous in producing emigrants throughout this period. In contrast, research has highlighted areas like Stirlingshire where proprietors were numerous and often described as " Bonnet Lairds. " This difference in structure meant that when emigrants left Lewis, Kintail, Assynt or Skye, the families of Seaforth, Sutherland, Macdonald and Macleod were immediately noticeable to their fellow elites. The same was not true in the Lowlands, except in the area of the Borders. That even this region did not attract the same level of debate or intervention as the Highlands, suggests that the factors of relative urbanisation and geographic proximity to urban centres lowered the levels of mercantilist anxiety regarding Border emigration. Secondly, it suggests that as the issue of military concern for the state was also missing (at least

relatively) from the debate on the Borders, then that aspect must be recognised as an important factor in shaping the nature of the emigration debate on any given area. ⁵¹

In summary, with little or no other economic sectors to detract attention from the landed estate component, a characteristic of the early debates on Highland emigration was a comparatively high concentration and profiling of landlord estate policy. Allied to this, was the fact that the response of the Highlander to estate changes offended mercantilist thinking to a greater extent than that of the Lowlander, in that his emigration was more likely to involve actual loss to the state's domestic population. This calls into question assertions regarding attitudes to the proprietors in the 1760-1803 period. It has been suggested that criticisms were characterised by a failure to condemn landlords to the same extent as was evident later. Given the condemnation that landlords received in the mid-nineteenth century, this is undoubtedly true. Yet attitudes to landlords must be judged by contemporary standards, and commentary on the actions of mid to late eighteenth century Highland landlords with regard to emigration represented an unprecedented level of criticism. Not since Culloden had the actions of proprietors been so discussed and openly debated. The attitudes of Highland landlords themselves reveal that the debate did concentrate on their role in the entire affair, and that heavy emigration put them under considerable social and cultural pressure. ⁵²

As its rather long winded title suggests, the pamphlet *The present conduct of the Chieftains and Proprietors of lands in the Highlands of Scotland towards their clans and people considered impartially*, illustrates that there was considerable focus upon proprietary policies and how they benefited the state and private individuals. The author accepted that in terms of landholding it was erroneous for common Highlanders to " look upon themselves as having a kind of hereditary right to possess it. " As such, the author avoided an extreme viewpoint in relation to proprietary rights, giving his remaining argument additional weight in terms of acceptability. By re-emphasising accepted elite rights, the author was also putting the onus back onto the landlord to remember accepted social responsibilities. ⁵³

This was more deferential request than hostile commentary, but criticism of landlords was evident in many areas. Knox stated quite unequivocally that " upon the whole, the Highlands of Scotland, some few estates excepted, are feats of oppression, poverty, famine anguish and wild despair. " He listed the estates of Argyll, Atholl and Breadalbane with a few others, as patriotically organised. The *Scots Magazine* noted that " the loss of so many people will probably be missed by the landholders; but let them learn to treat their fellow creatures with more humanity. " ⁵⁴

Ironically, developments that were indicative of the Highland landlords' changing commercial position and of their power as a class, could, nevertheless, illustrate their direct responsibility for emigration. In February 1775, when reporting on the introduction of woollen manufacture into Inveraray by the fifth Duke of Argyll, both the *Caledonian Mercury* and *Edinburgh Advertiser* noted that " It were to be wished that the nobility and gentlemen of Scotland would follow the example of the patriotic Duke above mentioned, and spend their money in encouraging industry and agriculture in their native country. " Likewise, in 1772, descriptions of the Harris estate of Norman Macleod of Dunvegan, circulated to increase public interest and thus the final price of a sale, acknowledged that the policy of high rents attempted on the estate since 1769, had not only failed but directly produced heavy emigration. ⁵⁵

The publication, in early February 1775, of Doctor Samuel Johnson's book on the Highlands, only served to keep the issue in the mind of elite circles. The peer pressure that landlords could feel can be illustrated when, in March 1774, a tacksman on Mackenzie of Seaforth's estate noted that despite relaxing rent levels, emigration had continued. This, the tacksman admitted, would scandalise Seaforth in wider society. In the context of influencing elite opinion, the feelings of the actual emigrants were not important. It was conceded by substantial tenantry on the fourth Duke of Gordon's estate in Lochaber that rather than the development of anti-tacksman sentiments, the feelings had been of disgust and clamour at the landlord himself. Yet the overtly anti-landlord feeling as expressed by Macdonald of Glenalladale, that " emigrations are like to demolish the Highland lairds, and very deservedly, " was simply too radical and suggestive of impingement on rights of property to gain any real acceptance in wider society. Evidence that the debate had, nevertheless, questioned the actions of the landlords, can be seen from the fact that, in 1772, the Duke of Atholl made it clear in correspondence with other Highland lairds that he believed they had a certain responsibility to maintain realistic levels of long term rent. Likewise, by 30 November 1773, the tutors of the Countess of Sutherland reported that it was publicly noted that the " avarice " of landlords in the county had prompted emigration. *Even more* alarming it was felt " that as the Countess of Sutherland was possessed of the largest estate in that county, it might be inferred that the tutors by racking her rents had given cause to the emigrations. " ⁵⁶

What this chapter argues is that the first phase of large scale Highland emigration was sufficiently different, both in matters of scale and intensity, to result in a separate debate emerging with regard to both the causes and the consequences of the phenomenon. The level of direct state and military concern in Highland emigration is what distinguishes it. Thus the Duke of Argyll and Atholl were described as ' patriotic, ' in that they were not

merely serving themselves but also the wider nation. In the case of Argyll, his patriotism was well known beyond a simple generic title. It involved the specific description of estate policy on his Mull lands. Argyll was credited with never removing small tenants, and creating small possessions for their benefit. The result of these pro-population tendencies was a high level of recruitment from Argyll's lands. Alexander Macleod of Harris was likewise noted in the *Statistical Account* for having been 'patriotic' in retaining his people. Telford's parliamentary report of 1803 highlighted John, fourth Earl of Breadalbane, as a particularly prominent example of a patriotic Highland landlord, who balanced the landed resources of his estate to include sheep, black cattle and humans. In 1806, with tenants emigrating to America, it was noted by the estate authorities on Maclaine of Lochbuie's estate that it was an unfortunate reality that rearrangements of farms dispossessed the poorer tenants. Thus it was argued that for reasons of "humanity" and "patriotism," crofting ought to be consolidated as a policy on the estate. The idea that Highland landlords had a national duty in the form of retaining men, is evident in several memorials on estate policy, and in prominent articles on emigration. Thus the Reverend John Walker noted that;

Any proprietor who converts his hills into sheep pasture, with advantage to himself, must communicate advantage to the public, provided the population of his estate does not suffer. ⁵⁷

That this attitude was evident throughout all of this period can be seen from the *Old Statistical Account*. In seven parish summaries, the direct interest of the state was mentioned in the context of sheepfarming. Alongside Argyll, Seaforth was noted in Glensheal as having turned down triple rents in order to retain his tenantry. In Laggan parish in Badenoch, the Duke of Gordon was noted in having "not as yet shewn any great disposition to let his lands to shepherds, that nobleman is attached to his people." Contradictions regarding the welfare of the state and private interest were noted in the bluntest terms with regard to the Argyll parish of Strachur;

A military spirit prevails much among the gentlemen of the country; they would wish to keep the men, but their lands give so much more rent by stocking them with sheep, that they cannot withstand the gain the sheep have banished the men. ⁵⁸

In a memorial written to the custodians of the Sutherland estate in the 1780s, it was noted that sheep farming was merely a mechanism for "stretching and increasing rents," while its consequence of depopulation was a disgrace to the landlord involved. Sheep farming was described with the interesting viewpoint that it was nothing more than "inhuman

speculation, chargeable with the want of philanthropy and state policy. " It finished by noting that; " The preservation of the state at large is surely involved in the mischief that may arise from this kind of speculation. " In the most comprehensive analysis of Highland emigration in the 1763-1815 period, even the author, who favoured Highland population movement, conceded that " the prejudices which many persons entertain on this subject arise from the most patriotic, though mistaken motives. " ⁵⁹

Patriotism is thus a vital ingredient in the formation of attitudes to Highland emigration. It has been argued convincingly that, in eighteenth century Scotland, the rhetoric of patriotism was used by agrarian and commercial improvers to link the pursuit of material wealth with the best interests of the state. In essence, to legitimise the process of improvement beyond narrow revenue extraction, by demonstrating that it benefited the nation as a whole. Further, it has been pointed out that this stand-point was not attacked or challenged in any real way. ⁶⁰ Yet, in the Highlands, the paradox over the patriotism of improvement and the patriotism of supplying a disproportionate level of the nation's soldiery was probably at its most intense and obvious. Could a Highland landlord be patriotic if by his actions he removed overseas a proven element in Britain's defensive and imperial war machine? Commentators have highlighted the fact that the Highlands produced the earliest evidence of the conflict of patriotisms. This in itself demonstrates the influence of the military dimension on the region. It also suggests that this conflict over differing forms of patriotism was an important factor in forming attitudes to ongoing regional development.

A note of caution is necessary at this point. The patriotic pressures that landlords felt constrained to acknowledge, must not allow the reality of their actions to be forgotten. Certain landlords like Duncan Macdonnell of Glengarry were conspicuous in that they rapidly switched over to undiluted commercialism, and exhibited little regard for their estate tenantry. In 1782, Macdonnell sett the whole of Glenquoich in the western part of Glengarry under sheep. This entailed the removal of over 500 people, and the outright emigration of 200. In 1786, as a result of heavy sheep planting in Knoydart, 520 people emigrated - a quarter of the entire estate's population in that district. ⁶¹ The high profile and rapid nature of estate management change in the case of the Glengarry family, did leave a feeling amongst other landlords that the Macdonnell lairds would find it difficult to recruit. It was noted in late November 1794 by Ewan Cameron of Fassifern, a close relation of the Camerons of Locheil whose estate bordered Glengarry's, that " strange to tell, Glengarry got twenty one men in four days in the village of Fort William which is more than the Duke [of Gordon] or Locheil got there. " This statement was the surprised reflection of a person who believed that, because of their different estate strategies, the Duke should have been able to raise men easier. ⁶²

Besides the example of a laird like Glengarry, who was not unduly influenced by notions of pro-population, there were definite factors outwith the remit of patriotism whereby large populations could, nevertheless, directly benefit the proprietor. Kelping landlords, for example, expressed disquiet over falling population levels. ClanRanald's agent Robert Brown was especially active in opposing the pro-emigration stance of Selkirk, and it has been well illustrated and established that landlords like Macdonald of Sleat pushed hard to ensure emigration was halted through legislation. Even in the Eastern Highlands, where the obvious factor of kelping was missing, there still existed reasons for landlords to oppose population removal. It has been pointed out that in counties like Inverness-shire, a real difference in population patterns had emerged. Stimulated by the developing kelp industry, the Outer Hebrides and Skye had, between 1755 and 1801, experienced between 59% and 42% growth in population. Conversely, on mainland and eastern Inverness-shire, out of nineteen parishes, only seven had experienced any growth, while interior parishes like Cromdale, Moy, Kingussie and Daviot experienced decline from between 19% and 31% in the same period. Such population loss, even where sheep farming was introduced, appears to have given at least some grounds to the fears of landlords like Sir James Grant, who held substantial lands in some of the parishes effected, that his estates would suffer from excessive depopulation. ⁶³

Added to this was the fact that potato cultivation allowed for waste land to be utilised, especially in a crofting structure. Moreover, in terms of revenue, many of the larger creditors for the region expressed hostility to the reality of population loss. There is evidence that the important class of commercial drovers who supplied a vast amount of the credit that paid rents in the region, did not approve of the actions of landlords. Men like Matthew Culley saw the link between population and the maintenance of the black cattle trade. Before they themselves shifted over to sheep, such drovers may have felt threatened and lowered their capital investments, at least in the short term. A good example of this was reported to Alexander, fourth Duke of Gordon on 19 May 1775. It was stressed that a Mr. Wedlove, a cattle drover, had not been pleased at the evidence he had found of emigration in the Highlands. It was pointed out that he spent £ 30 000 annually in the Highlands and that his proven record of credit dealings ought not to be threatened by what he obviously considered as asset loss from the estate. ⁶⁴

Therefore, in any discussion on why landlords retained such a pro-population standpoint, it should first be noted that, increasingly, certain proprietors simply failed to practice policies which did, in fact, retain population. Conversely, kelping landlords felt that rather than any social pressure on them to keep population, society was not doing enough to retain the people. These differing agendas reveal the opaque nature of any exercise which

attempts to quantify the impact of patriotic thinking. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that, alongside their revenue needs, most landlords understood that other cultural concerns necessarily needed to be taken into account. This explains why, regarding Highland landowners in the first decade of the nineteenth century, it was noted that they suffered from; " unfavourable impressions, as to the tendency of their conduct, which the public have been led to believe. " It was added that;

Any proprietor... resolved to enjoy the full value of his estate [found] that his conduct was deemed oppressive and unjust. When a populous valley was converted into sheep walks, the author of the change was held up as an enemy of the public, who, for a sordid interest, promoted the desolation of his country. ⁶⁵

As noted previously, reports on emigration increasingly highlighted the districts and estates that emigrants had left from, or were preparing to leave. In September 1803, authorities in Edinburgh attempted to ensure that those emigrating were traced to their parishes, thus allowing the source and cause of movement to be revealed. Both contemporary attitudes to large populations, and the particular national use that Highland manpower was intended for, meant that their emigration was not just a matter of localised labour shortages; ultimately, it also involved acute social embarrassment for the Highland proprietor. Thomas Douglas, fifth Earl of Selkirk, and controversial promoter of Highland emigration noted the odd consequences of hostile attitudes to landlord policies;

The gentlemen of the Highlands might have repelled these aspersions by appealing to the general right of landed proprietors to manage their property to the best advantage: but this argument was too much at variance with the established prejudices of their neighbours to be well received. Conscious therefore of the unpopularity of their conduct this may account for a singular contradiction that has been frequently observed. Many of these gentlemen, who in their cooler moments have expressed their regret, at the loss they sustained from the excessive population of their estates, have nevertheless been warmed, even to indignation, when any of their own tenantry showed a disposition to emigrate. ⁶⁶

This is not a situation normally ascribed to the landlord class in this period, yet it certainly existed. In his letter to the Lord Advocate of April 1775 which highlighted the increase in emigration, Sir James Grant was, nevertheless, quick to point out that his estate had been largely unaffected. Grant's entire attitude to emigration from his property was characterised by secrecy and circumspection. On 30 March 1775, John Grant of Tullochgruban, Grant's Strathspey factor, was told to construct a detailed report on those leaving his estate.

Interestingly, he was informed that under no circumstances was he to reveal to anybody that the landlord had earnestly requested such a report. Doubtless, this was partly to avoid alarming tenantry, yet Grant was also afraid that even the mere commissioning of a report on the subject, could be read as evidence that emigration from his estate was both real and sustained. The apprehension over public perception was evident elsewhere. On 31 March 1798, James Kennedy, factor on the Earl of Breadalbane's Perthshire estate, wrote to the Earl informing him of emigration from his lands. In all, 88 people had left, carrying a large amount of specie and lessening the pool of young servants. The sentiments expressed by Selkirk, whereby a rather contradictory attitude to large populations was evident, is exactly revealed when Kennedy noted; " However much we may endeavour to undervalue these circumstances in public [and] in the country, I do not see the propriety of disguising them in private correspondence. " ⁶⁷

This circumspective stance was mirrored throughout the region. A few weeks after the Passenger Act became law, John Campbell, a factor to Lord Macdonald, noted; " I am really at a loss how to manage the great population. " Such an attitude was also obvious when no less than John, fifth Duke of Argyll noted on 6 November 1802, that distillers were to be evicted from farms on Tiree and given £ 2 to remove in the full understanding they would emigrate to America. It was noted in estate memorials in 1802 and 1803, that;

" So many evils spring from the overstock of population on the Island and must year after year grow more and more, till the burden must become insupportable owing to the emigration act perhaps no relief can be expected. " It was finally noted by Argyll in October 1803, that ; " The difficulty of emigration since the late Act of Parliament makes it necessary to relax and even change my plans for settling the people of Tiree. " ⁶⁸

This statement concerning the " evils " of large populations, by one of the leading lights of the Passenger Act campaign, proves that the discrepancy highlighted by Selkirk in the public proclamations and private opinions of landlords was, indeed, a reality. By 1810, the contradictory aspect of the debate on Highland population was openly acknowledged. ⁶⁹

If this scenario arose because of the overtly patriotic aspects of population retention, it can be argued that the intellectual and cultural context used to justify improvement within Scotland generally, left Highland landlords, by contrast, with a sharp series of contradictions when attempting the actual adoption of improvement. It is within this context of conflicting patriotic and revenue concerns, that the role of government assumes a real importance.

Emigration & Government Policy 1763-1803

Before noting the role that government played in solving the problems of revenue and population retention faced by landlords, the actual effects of military policy must be examined. It has been suggested that with regard to Highland emigration, government was, " on the whole inclined to support Scottish and especially Highland hostility to the loss of its population. " ⁷⁰ In most respects this statement is entirely correct. However, if the actual policies of government are examined beyond the well documented examples such as the banning of emigration in 1775 and the Passenger Act of 1803, then such constant government support is less readily obvious.

As described in the chapter on public policy, the thrust of the crown's military objectives in the period 1763-75 was the maintenance, especially on the north American continent, of a large professional officer corp and an instantly available pool of men. This attempt at maintaining some form of professional army, both in terms of men and officers, was correctly viewed from a Scottish perspective as a depopulating influence. An example of this tendency can be seen when, in 1762, Lieutenant John Suttie of Colonel William Pepperell's colonial regiment, asked the War Office for permission to raise one hundred Highlanders for policing purposes in the province of Nova Scotia. In light of the fact that Suttie was a provincial officer, the request demonstrates how entrenched perceptions of Highlanders had become - even in the colonies. More interestingly, Suttie's proposal predated the idea of the Canadian Fencible regiment by forty years. He stated that not only would the regiment take the men, but also their wives, children and dependants. Even more than representing military policy, the plan was deliberately structured as all inclusive familial emigration - making the proposal far more of a depopulating influence beyond the loss of one hundred men. It also catered to the Highlanders' preferred strategy of emigrating in closely related kin groups. Suttie's plan was declined, not because of any dislike of emigration on the part of military officialdom, but, as with similar plans in 1748, because financial stringency dominated the political agenda. ⁷¹

Chapter two demonstrates that in wartime, the loss of large amounts of men was not necessarily new. Local interests and government had been increasingly at odds over official conscription policy during the later years of the Seven Years War. Moreover, the rearing of a latent army on the North American continent in peacetime, when placed against the boom in both the Lowland and Highland economies, would obviously be disliked. Added to this, was the fact that, even after the war had ended, the crown continued to allow Scots-Dutch recruitment in Scotland. In April 1764, the Annual Committee of the Convention of Royal Burghs petitioned for the removal of such recruiting. They stated that;

Scotland has never yet recovered the great loss it sustained by furnishing recruits for the army and navy during the last war, the numbers of which, in proportion to its inhabitants was very great. The want of hands is more sensibly felt than ever, when such numbers are daily going over to the new settlements in America. ⁷²

The last sentence demonstrates that the crown's policy of land settlement in the colonies for military personnel was particularly disliked. In making its priorities known, even for a non-urgent military branch like the Scots-Dutch Brigade, the government replied that it was "sensible of the detriment which would result to the agriculture and manufactures of Great Britain, particularly to that part of it which furnished such large supplies of men during the late war." However, it was felt that Scots-Dutch recruiting ought to continue and the Convention's request was refused. Added to this, was the fact that levying for the East India Company continued throughout this period, with the years 1770-72 highlighting the usual relationship between poor economic conditions and successful recruiting. ⁷³

In light of larger colonial concerns, it is perhaps unsurprising that conditions in Scotland were often considered of secondary importance. Given the historiography that has emerged concerning the role of the Seven Years War in mending poor Scottish-English relations, it is ironic that continuity of government policy from 1746 is, in fact, still evident in 1763. The late 1740s directive concerning the removal of Highlanders took place - the method now being voluntary rather than compulsive. Within Scotland, in the immediate period of the Peace of Paris, rumours as to the plans of government abounded. Remarking on feelings at the time, it was noted;

At the end of the last war Montgomery's and Fraser's its thought, should not have been reduced, but kept in America with additional companies in Scotland for keeping them complete. They are not only the best troops for that country, but they can be easiest spared from Britain and they would also save many a life almost needlessly thrown away by the routine of the troops. ⁷⁴

Indeed, when raised in 1757, it was understood that the two battalions were destined to stay in America. This explains why it was widely believed the third Duke of Argyll had not allowed substantial recruitment upon his estate. While trying to transfer out of one of the Highland regiments, an officer noted;

These battalions are best looked on as irregulars and destined to remain in America even when the war is at an end, besides there are other circumstances I must not name attending the Highland corp which increase my objections to continue amongst them. ⁷⁵

Such sentiments regarding the intended cannon fodder nature of their service are well documented and explicit enough to render little argument on the subject. ⁷⁶ Less well highlighted is the fact that, as these contemporary statements illustrate, their effective transportation was widely understood, and, if nothing else, soldiery must have been aware of the rumours surrounding the nature of their service. Against this, it should be noted that social change had begun in the region, especially upon the Annexed Estates where subtenantry regulations had, as in Rannoch, resulted in large scale evictions. Large numbers of the men had been raised from such areas upon the explicit understanding of evicted subtenantry making willing recruits. ⁷⁷ In turn, the positive response of such soldiery in 1763 to offers of land, suggests that they were aware in 1757 of the positive opportunity military service allowed them to utilise. This point can be over-emphasised, and it cannot be suggested that even a large minority went willingly into such levies. Yet neither can complete ignorance of the opportunity to effectively use the army as a ticket to land in the colonies be discounted.

In light of post war cost cutting the regiments were not, in fact, maintained. The sentiments stated above, albeit in a different form were, nevertheless, implemented. By 1760 an effective and independent French presence throughout most of the North American continent had been largely extinguished. Even before the war had ended, thoughts turned to the maintenance of British rule in areas dominated by French colonists. It was decided that the answer to " problems of internal and external security was, peopling the conquered territories with Britons and Anglo- Americans " - hence the demobbing of Highlanders and British soldiers in general on advantageous terms. Captains got 3000 acres, subaltern officers 2000 acres and ordinary soldiers 50 acres. Even as late as May 1768, when attitudes in Scotland were increasingly hardening against emigration, men from Fraser's regiment were still embarking for St John's Island, where they and their officers had received lots. The time difference between demobilisation in 1763, and their departure in 1768 also suggests that they may have attempted to re-settle in Scotland but found conditions unsuitable. This example is also important as it came only three years before the serious economic hardships of the early 1770s. As such, it represented a high profile and more recent example of the potential benefits of America. ⁷⁸

Military and colonial policy illustrate that assumptions regarding the supportive nature of government towards Highland landlords must be questioned and reassessed. Government strategies were never consciously anti-landlord, it was a matter of priorities, with the pressing reality of colonial defence naturally more important. Government agendas need to be clearly demarcated. Thus, in October 1773, Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Desbrisay advertised for emigrants to St John's Island. Likewise, in 1790, the province of Quebec ordered an inquiry into emigration. It followed the official line in that it concluded emigration ought to be discouraged, yet the provincial authorities showed no real opposition to the arrival of wealthy personnel. Further, by continuing to settle even poor emigrants, Quebec's provincial government was merely continuing the pull factors operating on Highland districts. While colonial regimes often displayed a pragmatic approach to the reality of emigrants, central government also operated policies which encouraged the removal of people. The settlement of soldiers after 1763 is a perfect example of this. They have correctly been viewed by both contemporaries and later commentators as vital in forming a substantial "pull" element in the later emigrations from the region.⁷⁹ There is a tendency to concentrate on these 1763 settlements and forget that the crown, in an obvious contradiction to its stated anti-emigration stance, repeated this settlement offer in 1783. This policy was seen by contemporaries as aiding depopulation, which;

Was facilitated by an event not foreseen [by the landlords]. The Highlanders, who served in the American war, being by royal proclamation, entitled to settlements in that country, were desirous that their kindred and friends should partake of their good fortune.⁸⁰

These settlements also gave leverage to ex-military personnel. Aware that landlords were sensitive to emigration, such people used the fact that they were to be offered land as a bargaining chip to gain better settlement conditions at home. In February 1763, for example, soldiers from Assynt wrote to Alexander Mackenzie of Ardloch offering to take tacks at a 5% annual increase until the rents on each farm were 25% their original level. It was hoped the tacks would last for forty to fifty years. This offer is unusual in many respects. It demonstrates that military service gave the Highlanders an ability to negotiate which has perhaps been underestimated. The soldiers were also writing from America, from where they stated their kin could hold the farms until they returned. The consequence of military service in putting the landlord under pressure to agree to land settlement, was again evident on the Perthshire estates of the Campbells of Breadalbane. In 1785, it was noted regarding soldiers that were being targeted for re-enlistment in that year, that in 1783 the son of Campbell of Achalader had "with much ado persuaded [them] to return with him home to this country". This had only been possible because Achalader "was authorised to

give them hopes, on their return, everything also being equal, of preference to others. " In 1785, they were offered a particular farm on the estate which they refused. In a stance very rarely attributed to Highland tenantry, the ex-soldiers stated that to take any one farm would be to limit themselves in terms of choice. Given this, they planned to emigrate to Nova Scotia, where as soldiers they would receive fifty acres from the crown. This illustrates an adroit use of both the army and imperial re-settlement, and reveals a culture of rising social expectations. Evidence that estate populations understood this alternative, meant that even those who were not in the army could use the threat of military service to gain land. In 1779, with emigration banned outright, Duncan Carmicheal, nevertheless, threatened to emigrate to America. To do so he would have had to join the military. Breadalbane ensured that did not occur by offering Carmicheal a one cow holding on the Glendochart farm of Brae of Lix - which he accepted. ⁸¹

It is certain that Alexander Macdonald from Sleat, a soldier from Macdonald's 76th regiment, raised in 1778, was also successful at this tactic. On 17 October 1783, Lord Alexander Macdonald wrote;

In consequence of the said Alexander having left the country to serve His Majesty at an advanced period of life, and of his having preferred the alternative of returning to settle at home to that of being established abroad, I recommend it to the factor to endeavour as soon as convenient to give him and his son one allotment of a penny. ⁸²

If nothing else, the option of land in the New world ensured that in this case Macdonald's original promises were fulfilled. Indeed, the soldier's son had already been given land on the Sleat farm of Kilmore, which, with a penny rating, put him in the elite of multiple tenant possessors, who mostly held two to three farthings of land. Such settled families were so prevalent across the estate, that even in 1801, almost twenty years later, they remained a complicating element in the estate sett. ⁸³

The settlement of soldiers on government land undoubtedly stimulated emigration. It could be argued that for the likes of Carmicheal in Perthshire and Macdonald in Skye to either join the army, or to threaten to do so, was an extreme course of action that many were unlikely to take. This is a valid point; however, the American War saw aspects of army recruiting policy change which, in fact, increased the chances that people would use the military in precisely this manner. In November 1775, for example, the nature of Colonel Simon Fraser's new Highland regiment was debated in the House of Commons. The levy was bitterly opposed because it was seen to increase the numbers of officers entitled to half pay upon

demobilisation. Government officials did not deny this reality, which demonstrates that as a levy it was conceived as a war time regiment only - as proved to be the case. At the end of 1775, Colonel Alexander Campbell of Barcaldine told his nephew James Campbell that it was not worth going for a post in the regiment because it would be disbanded at the end of the war. This fact had important implications, in that men would have understood that they were not expected to serve for life. Given that land had been available in 1763 upon demobilisation, the sure knowledge that they would not be continued as soldiers after the war, allied to the likelihood of land (Fraser's was always understood to be intended for the American theatre), must have boosted the incentive for entry into the new regiment. Allied to this, was the fact that from 16 December 1775, soldiers were only enlisted for three years, or as long as the war lasted. Thus, in late 1782, the Atholl Highlander's mutinied on a large scale to ensure discharge. In March 1783, despite the continuing war on the Indian sub-continent, the Royal Scots lost 500 of their 700 men to demobilisation, while attempts to retain the Northern Fencibles failed as a result of the watertight legality of the regulation. This recruiting development gave the assurance of demobilisation, and thus increased the chances that those seeking land would use the army as a short term method whereby this could be obtained. ⁸⁴

Higher up the social scale, several commentators have highlighted the significant role that half pay officers played in promoting emigration between 1763-1775. Give that the crown's policy was to deliberately reward loyalty and ensure that military officers were there in sufficient numbers to act as the backbone of British control, then pensioned officers in the Highlands were aware that their treatment would be preferential. This attitude, whereby officers understood that the crown would reward military service, is reflected in the high percentage of pensioned officers commissioned for Lieutenant-Colonel Allan McLean's emigrant regiment. (See appendix five) This suggests that the argument that government did not ban emigration in 1774 because people would not willingly enter a war zone, ought to be questioned. The lure of land explains why the threat of hostilities from 1774 did not seem to slow emigration. Despite the conflict in American already being five months old, September 1775 (the month emigration was banned) still proved to be the month of heaviest departures for Scottish emigrants. Evidence that conflict could be seen as an opportunity for some can be illustrated by the following example of Highland emigrant thinking;

They advance for their conduct in emigrating in these troublesome times, that it is better to confront an enemy in the wildest desert in that country [the colonies], than have to be beggars in their native land. ⁸⁵

The coming of hostilities, it could be argued, brought the more immediate and definite prospect, that with actual military service, land would be made available. As early as 17 February 1775, Lieutenant-Colonel Allan McLean, son of the Mull laird of Torloisk, petitioned Lord North to raise a Highland regiment. By 4 April, the King and North discussed McLean's offer of service. Because of their mutually held concepts regarding the professional nature of the army, they disliked McLean's attempts to ensure land settlements prior to any military service. They did, however, agree that assurances of land upon disbandment were to be guaranteed, and that the men recruited in the Highlands should be treated as normal emigrants. In that month, colonial officials in New York and North Carolina adopted an even more favourable land settlement policy for Highland families on the basis of immediate or future military service. The direct link with emigration and the army was widely comprehended. In April 1778, when asked to explain Badenoch's poor recruiting performance in that year, Robert Macpherson, a local tacksman, noted that in 1776, Macpherson of Cluny, recruiting for Fraser's regiment, had been able to pick up those who normally emigrated seasonally into the Lowlands. Macpherson was, in fact, suggesting that their actions in joining the levy constituted an alternative to that particular form of migration. Given that Fraser's regiment was widely known to be bound for America, this contemporary comment illustrates that Highlanders used military service to emigrate outright. This aspect of recruiting was acknowledged by the estate authorities on the Duke of Gordon's estate. In 1778, under intense pressure generated by recruiting promises, it was feared that a local Badenoch farm would need to be cleared of its possessors to accommodate those, such as subtenant Malcom MacIntyre, who had been involved in levying. However, as MacIntyre had assisted a Captain Macpherson who was to serve in America, it was widely understood that he would follow him to the colonies and get land there - removing the need to dispossess tenants locally.⁸⁶

This attitude was clearly evident in a letter from a piper called William Mackenzie from the Campbell of Glenure estate, who served in the company of Captain Patrick Campbell, the son of the laird, whose career has already been highlighted. The letter is important because it demonstrates the attitudes of the lower soldiery, which is largely an unknown element. It was an extremely confident letter, in which Mackenzie declared that, but for the war, the colonies constituted the best land in the world. He described how he would make his fortune within two years and was entitled to 200 acres of free ground. This demonstrates that Mackenzie had used army service to emigrate in the expectation of social advancement. Even more interestingly, the soldier mentions other men from Glenure's Argyllshire farms, and highlights his continuing contact with them. What the letter suggests is that the army constituted an efficient advert and information channel for emigration. Even more explicit is the example of the regiment raised by Kenneth Mackenzie, Earl of Seaforth. Several

comments by estate authorities reveal a sophisticated understanding amongst his tenantry, both of the opportunities that military service offered them, and of the reality concerning British land settlement policies within the thirteen colonies. On 12 January 1778, it was reported that the rumours regarding General John Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga in October 1777, had significantly lessened the enthusiasm of Seaforth's Kintail tenantry to enter military service. The reality that the war against the Americans was now likely to be a long and bloody affair undoubtedly explained part of this reaction, though the effects of the 1756-63 conflict would have been well enough remembered to suggest that naivety was probably not commonly evident. What was significant from the point of view of Highland tenantry, was that the defeat, for the first time, threw into doubt Britain's ability to retain the landed possessions which so attracted elements in Kintail. The defeat fundamentally called into question the viability, and even the long term legality of any land claim held as a result of military service to the British crown. That Seaforth's tenantry had been thinking along those lines can be illustrated perfectly, when it was noted that with regard to where the regiment was destined to serve; " I suppose, that many of the Lewis lads would rather go to America, than anywhere else. " ⁸⁷

The depopulating affects of the government's military policy was so pronounced during the American War, that the fifth Duke of Argyll asked the government to cease levying battalions in the region. ⁸⁸ Thus, while Sir James Grant was writing concerning the need for government intervention to halt emigration, the military authorities, especially in the colonies and at the start of the war, were formulating a recruiting policy that was unlikely to lower expectations of America. In all, war and military service heightened perceptions amongst the tenantry of positive economic benefits. This, in turn, led to the social consequences of emigration so disliked by landlords, albeit in the disguised form of military service.

Even at the end of the American War, government policies set precedents which encouraged emigrants in the Highlands to take final decision to actually remove. In 1784, Lieutenant Angus Macdonnell returned home to Knoydart from service in the 71st regiment. He emigrated two years later, confident in the knowledge that land awaited him - surely a significant factor in prompting such an abrupt change of mind. In addition to this, the relatively sympathetic treatment of loyalist families, both in terms of land grants and food, meant that when military officers like Macdonnell emigrated, those who went with him expected similar treatment. While the official government line merely stated objection to emigration in principle, the understandable treatment given to those who had suffered in the revolution acted, in fact, as a positive influence for Highland emigrants in the period 1784-1793. ⁸⁹

Against these government policies which stimulated emigration from the Highlands, is the fact that attitudes towards the colonies did, without doubt, change as the political situation deteriorated. From as early as 1765, it was noted that a large population in the colonies could exert political independence through sheer numbers. By 1768, as taxation legislation and the subsequent adverse reaction was noted, so attitudes hardened. This government viewpoint was based almost totally on imperial and military anxieties. In 1774, much attention in Scotland was focused on the House of Commons as it sat as a committee to consider the state of the linen trade within the British mainland and Ireland. On 17 May 1774, it was noted that, within Ireland, it was the more commercialised northern and Protestant sections of the country which were leaving. It has understood that 30 000 weavers had emigrated in consequence of the decline in the linen trade. In military terms this was doubly dangerous. Within Ireland, the buttressing role of a strong Protestant population, dependant on British support, was pivotal in Westminster's plans for maintaining control of the Island as a whole. Within the colonial context, the overtly Protestant and Presbyterian nature of the opposition to centralist Westminster policies, especially those of a fiscal nature, had been noted. That government thought along those lines can be illustrated by the implicit military agenda behind the 1774 Quebec Act. While debated within the House of Commons, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham stated that " the bill established a despotic government in that country. " [Canada] It was generally recognised by many that the Act was a political move against the American colonies, and an attempt to generate cohesive and unified provinces on the basis of political loyalty. The Act was not seen by contemporaries as anti-emigration, it was designed to encourage populations to move into areas where the legal structure and general populace, had both the inclination and incentive to back the British crown. ⁹⁰

It has been argued that the Quebec Act did, in fact, represent the end of government encouragement of emigration as constituted in 1763, thus representing de-facto support for the anti-emigration stance of landlords. However, with loyalty the byword in the new attitudes evident behind the Act, half pay officers, and those with proven military records, would have seen no reason to analyse it as anything other than a confirmation that alongside land, government in London was now legislatively supporting the areas that had demonstrated loyalty. From the perspective of a pensioned officer contemplating emigration, the Quebec Act was a positive sign. In summary, it revealed to military personnel their own importance within the government's new attempts to retain and stabilise the American empire. Indeed, when faced with such problems, the executive exhibited a tendency to move quickly and often with controversial legislation. In contrast to this, the administration's cautious and at times relatively dismissive response to the Highland emigration problem is thrown into sharper relief.

Government & Landlords - The Patriotic Partnership 1775-1815

The actual impact of government policy should not, this chapter argues, be seen as necessarily benefiting the landlords. The policies of land settlement and excessive Highland recruitment suggest that greater care is needed in defining the relationship between landlords and the government. Moreover, in some commentaries on this period, the relationship between the two has been oversimplified. With regard to the eventual banning of emigration in September 1775, it has been noted;

Highland proprietors, led by Sir James Grant, clamoured for Dundas to do something. In response he forbade the Scottish Board of Customs to clear from its ports, while hostilities lasted, any more ships carrying emigrants.⁹¹

Firstly, it should be noted that the formal involvement by government figures had been prompted from within Scotland after several years of sustained emigration from 1769. In October 1773, under his own initiative, Lord Chief Justice Thomas Miller, sent Lord Suffolk, the Secretary of the Northern Department, a report highlighting the issue. In November, Suffolk ordered Miller to monitor the nature and scale of the problem. The subsequent report in March 1774, emphasised that emigration had commenced in the Highlands and had spread to the Lowlands. London was obviously aware of the problem and its response is indicative of the relationship between it and landlords. Partly because of the evidence of interest at Westminster, Highland lairds began to assume that emigration would be legislated against. From November 1773, the authorities for the Sutherland family began to operate estate surveys in light of government involvement in the issue.⁹²

Indeed, as 1774 progressed, it appeared that in Sutherland emigration levels were dropping. By February it had become the general feeling of the estate authorities that parliament ought to intervene with legislation. This was apparently a comprehensive attitude within Highland elite circles by the spring. However, as attention was focused on the linen industry debates, it was feared that Westminster would support the important Irish industries but not concern itself with Scotland. There were instances to support this view. In April, Kenneth Mackenzie, Lord Fortrose, was informed by George Gillanders of Highfield, his factor on Lewis, that the legal mechanism of commitment was necessary in order to re-establish control over sections of the estate population. This involved the fining and poinding of goods by the creditors of tenantry to ensure that those breaking leases paid their local debts. By forcing a sale of goods, Gillanders hoped to initiate a rethink amongst the tenantry as to the economic consequences and subsequent viability of emigration. Seaforth decided that to

ask for government assistance in terms of troops physically preventing emigrations would have been merely counter-productive. In May 1774, the tacksman of South Bragar in the parish of Barvas on the West coast of Lewis emigrated. He had leased the seventh highest rented farm out of the ninety three on the estate, and, as such, represented an undoubted loss to Seaforth.⁹³ The Earl noted that as a landlord in this particular situation, there was little he could do. The hope expressed by his estate managers was " that government would at last look to them. " In a sign of their failure through estate management to stem completely all the emigrations, an effort was again made to gain administration support. In May, Mackenzie asked in London for opinions, probably from the Lord Advocate, as to legal methods for stopping emigrants. More interestingly, in a measure of his concern, he rethought his decision of a month earlier and asked for military support. This was, in many ways, a litmus test of the strength of government feeling on the subject. Suffolk noted that; " A forcible check to emigration might in their effect have the opposite remedy, " and more significantly, in an important statement which reveals thinking in London and Edinburgh, Seaforth was told the opinion of the government as to the best method to prevent emigration. " Fair words and mild usage is much recommended to be used to those who are thought to point at migrating. " ⁹⁴

It is not suggested here that government was in any way anti-landlord. However, automatic support should not be suggested either. The above example demonstrates that London felt Highland proprietors had certain responsibilities; above all, when asked to intervene directly on their behalf, government would not assist them - sensing that it was never a realistic solution. What was suggested to Seaforth was that he was powerful enough in terms of estate management to stem emigration himself.

Contrary to simple statements that government automatically backed the landlord line, by 1775, land owners had become aware that Westminster's assistance was by no means inevitable. The laird's relationship with the central authorities illustrates the anxiety evident in elite circles. Sir James Grant, prior to the letter of September 1775, had, in fact, already sent on 19 April, an appeal to Henry Dundas which decried the government for failing to regulate emigration to America. It stressed the military, as opposed to the economic capability of the Northern population, and suggested that if government did not demonstrate its concern for Highlanders they would emigrate in larger numbers, lowering the military manpower pool. As a letter, it appealed at all times to the military concerns of government, and illustrates that landlords manipulated perceptions in London for their own agenda. It was, above all, couched in terms of patriotism. Adoption of the patriotic argument against emigration was a direct result of the specific anxieties of landlords regarding lukewarm government support. Captain John Forbes of New reported to Grant

that the originators of the letter of appeal, Fraser of Belladrum and Grant of Rothiemurchus had been unwilling to draw up the letter, and that the county heritors of Inverness felt they could only petition government once parliament had begun a debate on whether America lay within a state of rebellion. This sense of uncertainty could not have improved, given that the letter was not acted upon until five months later. Finally, on 23 August 1775, parliament declared America in open arms against the crown. On 4 September, Dundas banned Scottish emigration. In an important point and qualification, Dundas stated that the regulation concerning emigration was a war time enactment only, and that upon the peace, just as Seaforth had been informed, it was up to the landlord to ensure that populations were persuaded to remain.⁹⁵

The banning of emigration in 1775 was an unprecedented act of state intervention. Even a eulogy on the career of Henry Dundas, while highlighting his tenure as liberal in character, nevertheless, conceded that his actions in this regard were undoubtedly illiberal.⁹⁶ The reasons given by Dundas to treasury officials in a long letter of 5 September 1775, represent the most important declaration of the relationship between government and the Highland landlord in the era of first phase clearance, and deserve lengthy quotation.

You seem to suppose that the severity of gentlemen proprietors in Scotland to those under them has been the cause of the decay of that love of country which has drove the Highlanders to seek asylum in America. And you are so far in the right, for I do believe that the severity of some great proprietors in the north by a precipitant and injudicious rise of rents was the immediate cause of emigration..... It ought to be the object of every wise ruler in this country, to cherish and make the proper use of the Highlands of Scotland. For it is impossible that it can now have any other object than what must tend to answer very salutary and beneficial purposes to government. If you ask me what these purposes are, I readily answer that the Highlanders were born to be soldiers and the Highlands ought to be considered as a nursery of strength and security to the kingdom. Upon this principle I say it ought to be the object of government to view with the most favourable eyes those proprietors in the north who value themselves upon possessing an extensive influence amongst their people, and who consequently bestow the most attention to acquire that influence. By such a connection they are at all times ready to call forth into vigorous exertion a set of hardy and brave men. In so far as it falls within my province to inspire the gentlemen of this country with the importance of being kind and beneficent to those who live under them, my endeavours shall not be wanting, but government must likewise do its part. [Disannexation] In return for this they and the other proprietors of the north

would give their most vigorous assistance to aid government in levying that force from the North, which it will be able to supply, and which government will most unquestionably stand in need of. Even if the present American conditions did not subsist, I should think it a wise measure in government to keep at all times a military establishment in Scotland to be recruited from the north. As the men will be supplied from the superfluities of that part of the country, it will be the very best militia without any of its disadvantages..... this and this only is the radical cure of emigration. ⁹⁷

This lengthy letter set out the government's policy for the Highlands for the next thirty years. It illustrates several important points. Firstly, that military service was the fundamental function that underlay relations between government and proprietors. Secondly, that in order to combat emigration, a partnership was envisaged between landlords and London. In return for favourable estate policy in terms of population retention, government would guarantee financial backing in the form of regiments. This partnership explains why the language of patriotism was both a vital and practical option for Highland lairds; and, indeed, why the debate on emigration was so often couched in those terms. To retain population for the good of the state was to expect Highland landlords to act outwith the normal revenue concerns of their class and actively temper their estate management. Yet with the promise of government backing and support, population retention became a realistic, not to say attractive proposal.

This backing by government was evident in the American War when it bestowed upon Highland proprietors a completely disproportional amount of military patronage. The policy of Dundas reveals that, far from a symptom of political rehabilitation for old misdemeanours, military recruitment was a specific policy designed around the emerging social and economic problems of the region. A central plank of the government's co-operation with landlords was disannexation of the estates forfeited in 1746. This was fulfilled in 1784, yet even prior to that, government had demonstrated that it planned to ensure the Highlands retained its population. As famine hit the region, a report to the Commons on 28 May 1784 highlighted that the area required expenditure on food equal to £74 679. Westminster spent £17 700 - equivalent to nearly 25% of the region's entire needs. This does not include the deliberate retention of Highland fencible regiments in order to lessen the impact of hundreds of demobilised men returning to stricken areas. It was later noted that the relief had been intended primarily to prevent death, and then to prevent emigration. In all, it was a powerful indication of the government's commitment to the region, and of the capital resources that Highland landlords, through the medium of military service, could ensure were brought to bear on their estate and regional problems. ⁹⁸

In assessing the development of the Highlands in the first phase of clearance, this culture of anticipated intervention by government should not be underestimated. Even as late as March 1817, proprietors in the north west Highlands explicitly called upon the government to meet the obligations brought upon it by the military service of their tenantry. In calling for assistance to feed their populations, Outer Hebridean landlords, noted that;

" The claim on government is much strengthened by the fact that a considerable part of the population never contributed anything to the advantage of the proprietors though furnished a great number of excellent seamen and soldiers to government. " It was added that; " it is to be kept in view that there is not only a great surplus population in these islands, but a very large proportion of it are totally unconnected with the landholders, that is to say chiefly the individuals returning from public service. " 99

Despite the general tendency to believe that large scale emigration would continue after the American War had ended, this scenario did not occur. Indeed, research suggests that it fell by as much as a third. Nevertheless, in a letter of January 1781, it was noted to Seaforth that " no doubt on a peace all Highlanders will renew the craze they have for leaving their native soil. This cannot be prevented but by government, if they choose to interfere. " It was a measure of the continuing insecurity and uncertainty regarding the executive's position that the last sentence regarding Westminster was struck out. Murdoch MacLaine on Mull, given that he did not see sheep farming as a viable option, expressed relief at the intervention of government during the famine. As a result of this, connections with the state were largely formalised in the years after the defeat in America. Throughout the mid 1780s landlords did, in fact, find that government remained involved in the problems of the area. In 1785 it was widely understood that Dundas had attempted, even going as far as the cabinet, to ensure the permanent banning of emigration from the British Isles. The foundation of the British Fisheries Society and the 1785 Parliamentary Report on that industry were all designed to demonstrate that the government intended giving active backing to the pro-population stance of the landlord. Above all, the formation of the Highland Society in early 1784 should be seen as the creation of the formal body which would represent the landlord side of the patriotic partnership with government. Its role can be understood from the sentiments of a pamphlet written after its establishment; " After all, aid from government should not be despaired of. The influence of the Highland Society is great. " 100

The Society was, therefore, designed to make the marriage of government and landlords more than a war time expediency. When conflict again broke out in 1793, Highland landlords found that government was keen to give a rationale to their large populations. Yet as the war dragged on, the mid 1790s saw changes in recruiting policy which mirrored the larger, more comprehensive needs that characterised Britain's military effort against the *levee en masse* and *Grande Armee* of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. As new methods of compulsory and legislatively organised recruiting were implemented by government, the patriotic partnership came under strain.

Nevertheless, as the new century arrived and emigration again appeared in the region, there was evidence that the underlying military rationale behind government involvement in the region was still a potent factor. The attempt by Highland landlords, from as early as 1801, to get emigration banned is usually seen in terms of the power of kelping proprietors to influence the pre-reformed legislature of Great Britain.¹⁰¹ However, the campaign of 1801-3 was, in many ways, the apogee of the Highland landlord's use of the idea of patriotism. Above all, the nature of their attempts to persuade government to intervene demonstrate the vital role that the reality of large scale military recruitment played in the region. From as early as 29 June 1801, the Highland Society had begun to question how emigration might be tackled. On 3 July a committee was formed, and its opening statements on why the issue needed to be addressed illustrate how patriotism was vital in legitimising the actions of landlords. It proposed that, in light of the military service of the Highlander, applications be made for support from Frederick, Duke of York, the Commander-in-Chief of the army. By this means it hoped to ally their cause with an important national figure. On 21 January 1802, the Society voted to send its first report to the administration of Henry Addington. Immediately after voting to do so, and in order to reinforce the patriotism of its motives, the meeting ordered that the next vote be a motion to thank the 42nd Highland Regiment for its disproportionate role in the Egyptian campaign, the outcome of which, many believed, had been vital in bringing Napoleon to the peace preliminaries. When action on the part of the government seemed to have stalled, Macdonnell of Glengarry re-emphasised why Westminster needed to be involved. In March 1802, he wrote to Lord Pelham, the Secretary for Home Affairs, stating that his estate faced massive emigration and that;

If the government or legislature do not speedily and directly interpose, the Highlands will be depopulated The value of the population in the Highlands in a military point of view alone may be estimated from this circumstance, that besides regulars, there are no less than ten fencible regiments composed principally of Highlanders.¹⁰²

Interestingly, and reminiscent of the trepidation evident amongst the heritors of Inverness-shire in 1775, the Society had earlier decided not to publish its first report until it had consulted privately with government figures. By February, initial contact seemed to bode well, yet Glengarry's letter reveals the deep seated fears amongst proprietors that government would fail to respond sufficiently. This explains several aspects of the anti-emigration campaign. Firstly, it was considered that the report needed " to be touched with gentle hands, " polite phraseology for avoiding the impression of a deliberate banning of emigration. In this context, the issue of extreme trans-Atlantic shipping conditions, and military recruitment played the same role - that of diverting attention from the kelping agenda. Secondly, the prominent Highland lairds on the Society's committee on emigration were Sir James Grant, Fraser of Farrline and Grant of Rothiemurchus. The low profile of the large kelping landlords in the official campaign reveal a sensitivity concerning the promotion of private gain at the expense of legal rights. This sensitivity was warranted. The peace of Amiens was signed in March 1802, yet at the end of the same month Pelham replied to Glengarry informing him that government, while considering legislation desirable, did not think it legally possible. In light of this attitude, the military dimension was made all the more important. ¹⁰³

This is evident in the second Society report sent to London on 9 July 1802. Even more than the first, its terminology was that of empire and the state. Its aim, the report noted, was not the accumulation of private property and wealth, " but the extension of productiveness and enlargement of the population of the Highlands which would be a boom to the wealth and efficient strength which constitute the greatness of the British empire. " It stressed the revenue benefits that would accrue, as well as the contribution " in a still greater degree than at present to its [the empire's] naval and military force. " ¹⁰⁴ The tendency to put concern for population as the primary point reveals the extent to which demography, not economic development, dominated the Highland debate. As it was, the government was still not persuaded to act. Indeed, in mid November 1802, it refused to add additional tariffs onto foreign kelp. This was despite the fact that, as early as September 1801, landlords such as Macdonald of Sleat had noted that if the industry lost its profitability, populations would need to emigrate. In all, the campaign of 1801-2 demonstrated the limitations of government action. In May 1803, the war broke out again, and in a useful illustration of the interconnection between the army and emigration, the Passenger Act was passed in June 1803. War, as already noted, allowed for increased government intervention on the issue of national defence. The whole context of the emigration debate was thus altered with the recommencement of hostilities. Just as in 1775, there was a questioning of the consequences of undiluted commercialism. Selkirk highlighted this when he noted that;

In a period of great and imminent national danger, the reflection may occur, as it has in fact, occurred to men whose opinions deserve the highest respect that any exclusive attention to commercial improvement may lead to pernicious consequences. ¹⁰⁵

The final push for the legislation had been articulated in a third report by the Society and by the conclusions of Thomas Telford in November 1802. This report continued the tendency to emphasise the patriotic dimension over that of private concerns. It listed in terms of priorities why the government needed to act. The army and navy were the most important reasons, then agricultural improvement, then fishing and finally kelp. Indeed, it stressed that kelp was not that important. Allied to this was the fact that the nature of the war was on the campaign's side. The early years of the Napoleonic conflict were, from the British point of view, defensive. In terms of contemporary theory, defensive war required more men in order to fully man the whole coastline. Indeed, in the legislation passed for the first national census, it stressed how defensive war naturally required more men. Again, the Highland Society deliberately manufactured perceptions of the region's martial abilities to link in with larger national concerns. Defensive war in Britain meant, first and foremost, naval war. To back up this particular agenda, the Society stressed how, under the leadership of the fifth Duke of Argyll, a fund commencing at £ 1000 was designed to train West Highland gentlemen for the navy. By this means the seafaring populations of Gaeldom could be drawn more fully into Britain's most vital military sector. This tactic was fully evident for the army also. On 24 June 1803, as the Passenger Act was worked through parliament, the Society's whole meeting centred upon efforts to stimulate recruitment. The meeting opened a subscription " for encouraging a certain description of young men then preparing for emigrating to America to enter regiments of the line or the navy. " ¹⁰⁶

The language of the anti-emigration lobby was designed to heighten fears of intense social destabilisation. Concerns that military policy could not be implemented were highlighted by Ranald Macdonald of Ulva, who stated that emigration raised dangerous political awareness through the rhetoric of the agents who stressed no taxes, no militia, and even no King. It was widely believed in elite circles that emigrants were often finally convinced to move when they realised that the landlord did not wish it. This bloody mindedness was entirely evident on the estate of Macdonald of Sleat. In the parish of Snizort, on the farm of South Cuil, the tenant had enthusiastically co-operated in a roup, deliberately forcing up the rent in the full knowledge that he was going to emigrate and leave the farm empty. The resultant rent of £ 30 was considered exorbitant, and Macdonald was forced to lower the sum to around twenty guineas. The loss of authority that these actions entailed was more imagined than real, yet the elite undoubtedly felt under pressure. It was believed that the loss of

tenantry would have " general political effects, " in that gentry would lose the source of their power and that a decline in the number of country gentlemen would shift the nature of political power in parliament. ¹⁰⁷

Allied to these deliberately exaggerated fears, was the tendency to see emigration as retarding military effectiveness by competing for males. On 21 March 1801, Sir James Grant noted that " I cannot think but that government should take notice of a man enticing artificers and volunteers to leave the Kingdom at this period. " Thus emigration agents were described as " recruiters " and " crimps. " It was reported that they;

Make considerable use at this moment of the Militia Act as an argument for the men who are subject to it leaving the country. The termination of the war rendering the volunteer companies, numbers of which had been embodied in those districts, unnecessary, they were disbanded, and consequently the members of these associations lost the pay (about £5 per annum to each volunteer) which they were in use to receive from government..... In place of those companies came the institution of the militia, which taking away a certain emolument and imposing a certain burden, operated to create discontents. ¹⁰⁸

In the first meeting after the Passenger Act became law, these uncertainties were deliberately contrasted by Henry Dundas, Lord Melville, chairman of the meeting. He stressed that the martial ability of the Highlander was not some anachronistic feature, but a living and continuing tradition, adding; " I wish this circumstance impressed, not only on this part of the country [but] in the whole British Empire. " Questionable accuracy aside, the statement by such a heavyweight British politician suggests that, in terms of legitimising the Passenger Act, historians need to give more weight to the recruiting and defence issue than to the concerns of humanitarianism, which have tended to be seen as the primary smoke screen that commercially motivated landlords used to divert attention from their real concerns. In all, a prominent commentator on the emigration debate has highlighted the fact that, " the Society's agitation was substantially instrumental in creating the case for the first Passenger Act of 1803. " ¹⁰⁹ With this an indisputable fact, it should be noted that the Society's case had, first and foremost, rested largely on the well known military characteristic's of the northern region, and on the wider sense of military insecurity palpably evident throughout the United Kingdom.

An interesting aspect to the campaign to halt emigration was the continuance of the widespread sense that government was obliged to intervene in the affairs of the Highlands. It was widely accepted that if emigration was legislatively halted, then; " It is impossible to

deny that the legislature by making enactments, of which the tendency is to check emigration will view an obligation to increase subsistence and comfort to the inhabitants whom such restrictions keep at home. " The period immediately prior to and after the passing of the Passenger Act witnessed a high level of interest in the way the government would construct alternatives to mass emigration. The general feeling that the state ought to do more was evidence that some proprietors and commentators still saw a place for the patriotic partnership. Even as late as 1811, it was suggested that Westminster ought to come to some form of agreement whereby the landlords retained men in return for guaranteed state service. It was felt that if government demonstrated enough awareness of the emigration issue, then proprietors would consider their populations valuable enough to retain them voluntarily through mild estate management. Likewise, it was widely rumoured that the executive might tax sheep at 6d each " for turning out such noble fellows as our Highlanders, the sources of a 42nd or 92nd. " It was understood that much inference would be taken as a result of " Royal or Parliamentary recommendations to proprietors of land - and distinctions to those who cherish the people. " ¹¹⁰

Speculation on the actions of the government reveal that what was needed was the reconstruction of a *raison d'être* for the large population in the region. Many landlords felt that the state needed to be involved, for while their estate policies were, undoubtedly, an exacerbating factor, the choice of the tenants to leave leases and emigrate was a deeply worrying aspect. It was felt that, by reconfirming a traditional role for populations, government would act to quell social unrest that expressed itself in the form of emigration. In an interesting series of memorials to Melville, Macdonald of Ulva wrote that local military service, in his experience, clarified the respective position of tenantry and landlord. Essentially, Ulva believed volunteering would demonstrate to the tenantry that they still had a useful and practical role to play. This reassertion of old duties and obligations would, he believed, induce a feeling of security and lower the tensions on estates that inevitably led to population movement. Volunteering, in essence, would anchor the unsettled social structure on Highland estates. Exhibiting this line of thinking, the Lord Advocate attempted, on 6 August 1803, to get fencible regiments restored as the primary defence force in the Highlands. Running in parallel, therefore, with the efforts to get public work schemes set up in the Highlands, was a similar concern to construct a recruiting policy that married the official needs for a realistic defence force to official desires to quell emigration. Another report of 1803 added that rather than the militia legislation causing discontent it had, in fact, given a sense of security to populations and stopped certain areas from being completely depopulated. The use of local levies as a form of social anaesthetic (as advocated by Ulva) was noted by a tacksman on North Uist, who, on 24 June 1803, stated that volunteering would " reconcile the emigrants to their native country. " It was added;

It is unnecessary to add to the effect which such a measure would have in a political view in bringing back the attachment of the people to their king and country.¹¹¹

Thus a certain bullishness emerged regarding the social role that military recruitment could play in the region. Exactly how localised forms of military service induced calmer estate conditions was made clear by the most sophisticated contemporary analysis of the role of military recruiting in the region. Thomas Douglas, fifth Earl of Selkirk, noted that tenantry, by the turn of the century, were well aware that their position of general usefulness was declining. Outside kelping, only recruiting remained in persuading the landlord that large populations were still useful. He noted " The only opportunity they had of rendering him any important obligation was when he undertook to raise men for the army. " ¹¹²

Thus it was felt that if a landlord was rumoured to be raising a regiment, then his populations would feel that their redundancy was lessened. It is this connection which explains why, on 1 March 1801, a year dominated by the return of large scale emigration, Maclaine of Lochbuie noted that it was a misguided policy on the part of government officials not to quickly approve of his offer to raise a volunteer levy. ¹¹³

This is not to suggest that Highlanders welcomed the prospect of military service, yet they did not remain ignorant of its effects in persuading landlords to retain them. Well before the end of the eighteenth century, landlords had begun to address the population question. By 1803, even the Duke of Argyll had understood the strains that over population caused. The Sutherland family are perhaps the best example of landlords becoming aware of populations as a developing problem, and of the role recruiting could play within that context. The Sutherlands have retained a reputation for exhibiting the over confidence in demographic strategy that characterised the Highland landlords of the period. Yet this does not mean that they were blithely unaware. As early as 1787, an estate memorial noted that for standards of living to be raised, over 2 600 people would need to be removed from the estate. In 1792, it was recommended that Assynt be given over in its entirety to sheep. The factor, John Fraser, openly admitted that this involved the wholesale removal of tenantry. That was a socially unacceptable prospect for the managers of a family interest deeply imbued with a sense of the traditional role and obligation attached to its position. Moreover, it reveals that with regard to populations, landlords made conscious choices. Just how recruiting fitted into this framework can be illustrated when, in July 1799, Elizabeth, Countess of Sutherland, wrote concerning the lack of recruits for the new family levy. Her opinions show clearly the fundamental role that military recruiting played in the cultural perceptions of the elite with regard to their numerous tenantry.

If Colonel Wemyss sees a possibility of giving up the plan [The 93rd Sutherland Regiment] I would have him do it if they do not come in a certain time, as they are really unworthy of his attention, and need no longer be considered as a credit to Sutherland, or any advantage over sheep or any useful animal. I am quite disgusted and out of patience with them. ¹¹⁴

In another revealing comment, the role of military service in lessening the increasing redundancy of Highland tenantry was noted. On 27 June 1809, in a very early example of the sea-change in landlord attitudes, the Marchioness noted regarding emigration from the estate;

I am glad to hear, that about sixty have emigrated, as they would not come into the plans laid down to be cottars at home, it is much better they do so. The fact is they will not repay us for the ground as they used to do by enlisting when they were called upon, but are here ready to go with others if they are not bribed by us. ¹¹⁵

So important was the issue of this military service, especially in generating reluctance to lose populations, that Selkirk in his critique of attitudes to the emigration phenomenon chose to examine it in a level of detail that illustrates how damaging it was to his pro-emigration cause. He conceded bluntly that, " among the effects of emigration, there has been none that has been more lamented than the loss of that valuable supply of soldiers, which the public service has hitherto derived from the Highlands. " Selkirk conceded that as a result of the landlords' conscious desire to raise men, estate policy had been altered, sheep farming and even emigration retarded. Nevertheless, he stated that the phenomenon of recruiting in the Highlands was totally undermined, and that it was absurd to expect the commercialised Highland landowner to take his tenantry into the field. He accurately pointed out that tenants did not enter the army, and that it was, in fact, the lower strata of cottars who did so. Conversely, it was the former who emigrated, while the latter tended as a result of poverty to remain behind. Thus emigration patterns did not effect the numbers of recruits. So significant did Selkirk see the issue of Britain's military with regard to Highland emigration, that in 1808 he wrote a book which espoused a recruiting system which mobilised equally across the country, producing an enormous militia of 400 000. Under such circumstances the contribution of the northern region would be meaningless. By accurately demonstrating the region's demographic insignificance, and that the Highlander was but a small part of a much larger national effort, Selkirk undermined the serious accusation that espousal of Highland emigration, " militate[d] against the best interests of [the] country. " By removing such a serious charge from any policy that resulted in

population loss, Selkirk, even more immediately than Malthus, was vital in generating the context whereby the Highland elite changed its stance on emigration. This trend to lessen the military dimension in Highland populations commenced in the first decade of the nineteenth century. It was stated, even by authors that supported pro-population policies for military reasons, that with the continuing loss of Highland manpower and the lack of recruits that would result, government ought to intervene as Selkirk suggested, and regulate recruiting on a national basis.

The coercive power of the state ought to apply equally to every part of the Kingdom; and as the arable are capable of maintaining more men than the grazing districts, the operation of such a law ought to bear upon them in proportion. ¹¹⁶

Here was the recognition that the region simply did not have the demographic resources to sustain the patriotic partnership. Moreover, the localised dynamic of Highland landlord coercion, which had produced such significant amounts of men, was being replicated by the state throughout the United Kingdom on a correspondingly larger scale. By this new method of national conscription, the military question within the debate on Highland population levels was rendered obsolete. Indeed, the inconsistencies of an arrangement that sought excessive levels of men from one district were highlighted succinctly in the agricultural survey for the county of Ross, published in 1810. It clearly illustrates the contradictions inherent in the patriotic partnership.

The arguments which have been raised on the supposition that the people must be kept to supply the army and navy, are worse than absurd. Supposing that a good-hearted (I must suppose ignorant) landholder should retain a numerous population on his estate, is it a proper return to make to him for yielding to such pretensions, to send a parcel of recruiting officers to deprive him of those people he was taught to cherish, and to consider the most valuable part of his possessions? The Highlands are trumpeted forth as our only resource for soldiers, while it is notorious that the inhabitants have a strong aversion to a military life. Notwithstanding its being inconsistent with the liberty enjoyed by Britons, with common justice, with sound policy, that the Highland proprietors alone, of all others in the empire should be deprived of the benefit of an improved system of rural economy, and condemned to poverty in order to provide recruits for the army; yet this is the sum and substance of all the outcry against emigration. ¹¹⁷

In essence, the issue of military man power in the region had been, " the sum and substance of all the outcry against emigration. " By the early 1810s the war was no longer defensive,

and in 1812 with Napoleon's defeat in Russia, the element of military apprehensiveness was removed. Just as rapidly as Highland landlords, government began to exhibit no disquiet in deliberately targeting Highlanders for emigration through a new fencible regiment suggested in the spring of 1813. The reasons why it never went ahead included the fact that the War Office had, from as early as 1794, disliked regiments that would only serve in a limited area. It also refused promotion to those that had not previously served in the army. Most importantly from the point of view of the Highlander, it would not pay for families to travel under government expense - a regulation that had seemingly interested 1300 people in Sutherland. Selkirk had, in fact, met with officials of the Sutherland estate to discuss co-operation in enlisting as many married men as possible, so that when the war in America ended, even more people could be removed from the estate to British North America by family and kin ties. It is testimony to the ingrained cultural perceptions of population loss that Lord Gower, while privately keen on the scheme, considered it unwise for the family to be associated with it. Just as significant were the actions of the government in 1813. Ignoring the principle of population retention within the United Kingdom did, in fact, spring from larger colonial concerns. However, it was also a powerful signal to an obviously hesitant elite in the Highlands that Westminster would not object to population removal on the grounds of national interest. ¹¹⁸

Conclusion

This chapter has not attempted to explain why Highlanders emigrated, but why there was so much opposition to their removal from the confines of the United Kingdom. It suggests that at the heart of this opposition was the issue of military manpower. The emergence of this military dimension ensured that the British state became actively interested and involved in the whole topic of Highland emigration. However, this chapter also argues that central government and landlords should not be viewed as indivisible in their motives and actions. Basically, proprietors wished to keep their tenantry for estate use, as well as for recruiting purposes. Government, however, wished landlords to retain their tenants in order that they could then be removed as soldiers, either permanently or for a certain period of time. At no time did Westminster prevent the emigration out of Scotland of its soldiers - indeed, in the 1763-1784 period it positively encouraged them.

Above all, this chapter has attempted to delineate the cultural context of the debate on emigration during the period of first phase clearance. It suggests that while the Lowlands experienced similar developments and even resultant emigration, proprietors in that region were not pressurised to anywhere near the same extent as their Highland counterparts by the possibility that their actions could be construed as unpatriotic. Added to this, was the

fact that the structure and nature both of Highland emigration and Lowland society disguised, in comparative terms, the actions and policies of landlords in the latter region. It has been pointed out that it is bad history to criticise Highland landlords on the assumption that they should be divorced from their position as a fully integrated part of the wider British elite, and then judged as a different species of proprietor.¹¹⁹ This is undoubtedly true, but must not hide the fact that Highland landlords themselves, along with government and informed sections of wider society, believed that through military recruiting they had a specific role that could be accomplished by them to a level other proprietors could not match. This was not evidence of their lack of integration, it was rather evidence of their new specialised role within the British empire. This integration can be illustrated by the partnership explicitly constituted in 1775. Highland landlords, burdened with chronically undercapitalised tenants and poor land, were offered a partnership whereby they reaped the benefits of military and colonial office in return for men. They were, moreover, fulfilling what was seen as a vital, almost paramount duty for the social leaders of the time. Backed by the certainty of revenue from the fiscal-military state, this radically different form of cultural integration, nevertheless, allowed Highland landlords to mirror their wider British counterparts and acquire both capital and material wealth. It is thus argued that contemporaries and, indeed, Highland landlords themselves, saw their responsibilities as different, but ultimately harmonious with the rest of the British elite. While there was undoubtedly an element of cultural hangover whereby the older emphasis on large tenantry could be continued, this should not be stressed. Rather, the desire to retain population sprang from the prospect of a partnership with government, and was in fact a modern, sensible and rational approach.

More generally, a study of the nature of the emigration debate in the region suggests that militarism continued to dominate many aspects of attitudes to the problem. A mentality of concern for estate populations based on the national military interest, ensured a distorted and interventionist approach to the question of Highland demography. Both government and landlords exhibited this mentality, which, in turn, ensured the unbalanced retention of population, and, later, their subsequent removal on an equally unbalanced scale. The military dimension made the emigration experience of the Highlands more extreme. This mentality also engendered both the expectation and reality of government intervention on a surprisingly scale. These concerns prompted Westminster to divert a disproportionate slice of its military resources into the Highlands, and to intervene on a scale which contradicts suggestions that because its directly sponsored schemes to prevent population loss were notable failures, that its influence in the phenomenon of Highland emigration was best characterised as minimal in the period 1763-1815.

- 1). See: E. Richards, *A History of the Highland Clearances*, vol. 2 (London, 1985), 223, 499-500; M. W. Flinn, 'Malthus, Emigration and Potatoes in the Scottish North West 1770-1870' in L.M. Cullen & T.M. Devine (eds.), *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History 1600-1900* (Edinburgh, 1977), 54-60; M. Gray, *The Highland Economy 1750-1850* (Edinburgh, 1957), 58.
- 2). A.I. Macinnes, 'Scottish Gaeldom: The First Phase of Clearance' in T.M. Devine & Rosalind Mitchison (eds.), *People & Society in Scotland, 1760 - 1830*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1988), 79, 86; T.M. Devine, 'Landlordism and Highland Emigration' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society* (Edinburgh, 1992), 84-5, 100.
- 3). J.M. Bumsted, *The People's Clearance: Highland Emigration to British North America 1770-1815* (Edinburgh, 1982), introduction 12-13; A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 86; E. Richards, loc. cit., 207; T.M. Devine, loc. cit., 88.
- 4). T.M. Devine, 'Social Responses to Agrarian "Improvement": The Highland and Lowland Clearances in Scotland' in R.A. Houston & I.D. Whyte (eds.) *Scottish Society 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1989), 150-152.
- 5). A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 78-9. For further details on rents levels, see: S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/9/49, 53; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield, GD 427/49; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Acc 10225/Joass/10/7, Sett of Lewis 1752. For evidence on rent increases. See: M. Gray, *The Highland Economy 1750-1850* (Edinburgh, 1957), 146-47; M. McLean, *The People of Glengarry: Highlanders in Transition, 1745-1820* (London, 1991), 72-73; T.M. Devine, 'Clanship to Crofters' War': *The Social Transformation of the Scottish Highlands* (Manchester, 1994), 32-33.
- 6). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine, GD 170/1135/22; GD 170/1139/2, 4, 21. For evidence of farms held by the Glenure family from Breadalbane and rent raising, see: GD 170/419/2; GD 170/420/1/32; GD 170/1135/22; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/9/49, Rental Barony of Glenlochry 1754; I. Mackay, 'Clanranald's Tacksmen of the late Eighteenth Century' in *T.G.S.I.*, vol. 44 (1966), 71.
- 7). T.M. Devine, *The Transformation of Rural Scotland: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy, 1660-1815* (Edinburgh, 1994), 74-5; D.C.M., 3/64/1/10-14; R.J. Adam (ed.), *John Home's Survey of Assynt* (Edinburgh 1960), 91, xxix; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/1/1/30-1; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie, GD 174/784/5; GD 174/789/2, For evidence of both increased meal ordering to cover recession, see: S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/207/2, 8.
- 8). Disagreement is evident amongst historians concerning the role of sheep farming in the period 1760s - 1815. Adams & Bumsted see sheep in a marginal role for this period. Macinnes, McLean & Devine attach a more significant role, if not to commercialised sheep rearing, then to the deliberate coercive policies of landlords. See Macinnes, loc. cit., 86 & 76. For financial position of tenantry, see: M. McLean, loc. cit., 79, 4-5; T.M. Devine, 'Landlordism and Highland Emigration' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration & Scottish Society* (Edinburgh, 1992), 92-93; J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 62, 68-70; M.I. Adam, 'The Highland Emigration of 1770' in *S.H.R.*, vol. 16 (1919), 281-4.
- 9). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/208/4; GD 427/209/25; A. McKerral, 'The Tacksman and his holding in the South West Highlands' in *S.H.R.*, vol. 26 (1926), 21.
- 10). D.C.M. 2/105/1&2; S.R.O., GD 427/207/9-10; GD 427/11/7; B.A.M., Box 45/4/4, 45; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/25/7/42; A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 86.
- 11). D.C.M., 4/113 & 114; D.C.M., 2/488/21/1; D.C.M., 3/104/15; I. Adams & Meredyth Somerville, *Cargoes of Despair and Hope: Scottish Emigration to North America 1603-*

1803 (Edinburgh, 1993), 93; R.C. Macleod, (ed.), *The Book of Dunvegan*, vol. 2 (Aberdeen, 1939), 96; B.A.M., Box 54/4/48; N.L.S., Lee Papers, Ms 3431, f. 180; T.M. Devine, loc. cit., 92-93.

12). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1149, f. 154; Ms 1483, f. 9.

13). S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/52/3/107; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/43/287/51.

14). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1483, ff. 135-6, 200, 300; Ms 1484, f. 15; Ms 1319, ff. 2, 19, 39-40.

15). R.J. Adam (ed.), loc. cit., xxx-xxxv.

16). D.C.M. 4/113-4.

17). N.L.S., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, vol. 18, p. 99, 14 Aug. 1772; S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/226/2/88.

18). For detail on the constant rumours of regiment raising see chapter three, footnote 14, p. 108-9. I. Mackay, loc. cit., 71.

19). See chapter on public policy, table 3:3, p. 113.

20). D.C.M., 4/113-114. For Major Allan Campbell's return to the army in 1770, see D. Stewart, *Sketches of the Character, Manners and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1822); appendix 3; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 32 (Edinburgh, 1770), 399; B.A.M., Box 45/4/73; Box 54/4/127, 173, 204; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1067/4; 170/1090/21/1; GD 170/1090/34; GD 170/3155; GD 170/1666/7, 8/1.

21). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine, Ms. 1407, f. 18; S.R.O., GD 170/1078/1/1; B.A.M., Box 54/4/173, 198; Box 65/1/196; S.R.O., GD 170/1135/22; GD 170/1138/8; GD 170/1354/32; GD 170/1666/5; GD 170/1379/6/1; GD 170/1139/6; P.R.O., W.O. 1/991, f. 76.

22). S.R.O., GD 170/1643/6; GD 170/1140/2/1; GD 170/1135/26; GD 170/1078/1/2; GD 170 1139/6, 13; T. Hayter (ed.), *An Eighteenth-Century Secretary at War: The Papers of William Viscount Barrington* (London, 1988), 301.

23). S.R.O., GD 170/1140/3; GD 170/1146/9; B.A.M. 54/5/193.

24). S.R.O., GD 170/1682/1; GD 170/391/1(a) & (c).

25). P.R.O., W.O. 1/996: Unnumbered letter, dated 15 January & 1st November 1776.

26). B.A.M., Box 54/5/162; N.L.S., *Caledonian Mercury*, 25 January 1775, no. 8305, p. 2; M.L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, 24 January 1775, p. 52; S.R.O. GD 170/1643/16, 17/1.

27). N.L.S. *Caledonian Mercury*, 12 June 1775, no 8364, p. 2; S.R.O., GD 170/1062/47-8; GD 170/1643/22; GD 170/391/1 (b); S.G. Checkland, *Scottish Banking: A History 1695-1973* (Glasgow, 1975), 47.

28). S.R.O., GD 170/1151/6; GD 170/1151/4; GD 170/1062/48; GD 170/1354/50; GD 170/1135/32; E. Cregeen, (ed.), *Argyll Estate Instructions: Mull, Morvern and Tiree, 1771-1805* (Edinburgh, 1964), 112, 116.

- 29). I. Adams & Meredyth Somerville, loc. cit., 152.
- 30). S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1307/3; GD 174/1329/3.
- 31). For evidence of official prohibition on sales of half pay commissions for full price. See: P.R.O., W.O. 4/94, p. 150; W.O. 4/95, p. 14; S.R.O., GD 170/1090/33.
- 32). S.D.M. Carpenter, *Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army 1756-1815* (unpublished M.Litt Thesis St. Andrew's University 1977), 52, 90-122; D.M. Henderson, *Highland Soldier: A social study of the Highland Regiments 1820-1920* (Edinburgh, 1989), 17; M.I. Adams, loc. cit., 290.
- 33). For a proponent of mercantilism as a reasonably coherent theory with definite precepts and maxims. See: E.F. Heckscher, 'Mercantilism' in D.C. Coleman (ed.), *Revisions in Mercantilism* (London, 1969), 25. For an opposite view, where the common assumptions are revised, with contemporary concerns for wealth being highlighted as just as important and, indeed, complementary to national power. See: J. Viner, 'Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' in D.C. Coleman (ed.), loc. cit., 63-5; D.C. Coleman, 'Mercantilism Revisited' in *H. J.* vol. 23, (1980), 787.
- 34). D.C. Coleman 'Mercantilism Revisited', loc. cit., 787-790; A.J. Youngson, loc. cit., 50; J. Anderson, *An Account of the Present State of the Hebrides and Western Coasts of Scotland* (Dublin, 1786), lxxv. For a connection between population lists and militia see: L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (London 1992), 289, G.S. Mackenzie, *A General Survey of the Counties of Ross and Cromarty* (London 1810), 291, which states "In consequence of the extreme inaccuracy of the population lists, there are many parishes in the North most unfairly oppressed, by the number of militiamen they have to furnish." It was further noted that the population of the Western Isles had a "notion that lists of population were chiefly with a view to military arrangements or fiscal taxation." J. Macdonald, *A General View of the Agriculture of the Hebrides or Western Isles of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1811), 543, Laing Manuscript vol. 2, H.M.C., (London, 1925), 522.
- 35). J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688-1783* (London, 1989), 167; J. Knox, *A View of the British Empire more especially Scotland: with some proposals for the improvement of the country and the extension of its fisheries and the relief of the people* (London, 1785), 26-7. Knox's view, however depressing, was not unusual. In an influential pamphlet on Britain's international situation after the American defeat, the writer James Anderson, who also commentated on Highland affairs, noted that: "Extent of empire in very case, affords it numberless temptations to engage in war and an empire extended like the British empire in America, is peculiarly liable to this defect." See: N.L.S., Mc. 1(4), J. Anderson, *The Interest of Great Britain with regard to her American colonies considered* (London, 1784), p. 105.
- 36). E. Richards, loc. cit., vol. 2, 208-209; A. Smith, *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*, (eds.) R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner (Oxford, 1976), vol. 2, 689, 705-6. For an argument regarding the Highlands and criticisms of Smith's theories on fishing bounties, see: N.L.S., Ry 1.4.151, P. White, *Observations upon the present state of the Scotch fisheries and the improvement of the interior parts of the Highlands* (Edinburgh, 1791), p. 60; A.V. Judges, 'The Idea of a Mercantile State' in D.C. Coleman (ed.), loc. cit., 41; J. Viner, loc. cit., 78-9.
- 37). J. Anderson, loc. cit., xvii. Anderson's account on the potential of the Highlands in terms of Britain's naval defence is also important in another sense. Anderson argued that, with America now independent and Ireland legislatively independent, supplies of men would be impossible from the former and exceedingly difficult from the latter. Thus the Highlands were to act as a substitute. This demonstrates that motives for continuing or extending militarisation in the Highlands did not remain with just the obvious example of 1745, but

that the military dimension was firmly grounded in more modern, changing and relevant imperial concerns. J. Knox, loc. cit., iv-v.

38). N.L.S., *The Present conduct of the Chieftains and Proprietors of lands in the Highlands of Scotland towards their clans and people considered impartially* (Edinburgh, 1773), 6-7; J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 2-3. For other contemporary arguments which follow the wider question of imperial security, see: I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 126-127.

39). E.C. L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, vol. 23, 9 June 1775, no 1051, 52. I am grateful to Dr. Rob Clyde for this reference.

40). T.M. Devine, loc. cit., 90-91. For attitudes which show how common this perception was of no industry, and the subsequent highlighting of the region's military attributes, see chapter one footnote 69, p. 43. Also chapter three, footnote 57-58, p. 126.

41). J. Walker, *An economical history of the Hebrides & Highlands of Scotland*, vol. 2, (Edinburgh, 1808), 410. While published in 1808, the ideas in Walker's book were, in fact, indicative of his thinking in the 1763-1790s period. The book was published posthumously after Walker died in the 1790s.

42). D. Loch, *Essays on the trade, commerce, manufactures and fisheries of Scotland*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1778), 5, 147-48.

43). J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 45; A.J. Youngson, *After the '45* (Edinburgh, 1973), loc. cit., 87.

44). A.J. Youngson, loc. cit., 54; S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/244/4/2; G.S. Mackenzie, loc. cit., 297.

45). M. McLean, loc. cit., 79; E.J. Cowan 'From the Southern Uplands to Southern Ontario: Nineteenth-Century Emigration from the Scottish Borders' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration & Scottish Society*, (Edinburgh, 1992), 63-65; S.R.O., R.H. 1/2/933/4-12.

46). For a debate on the nature and scope of agrarian change in the Lowlands, see: T.C. Smout, 'Scottish landowners & Economic Growth 1650-1850' in *S.J.P.E.*, vol. 11 (1964), 232; R.H. Campbell, 'The Scottish Improvers and the course of agrarian change in the eighteenth century' in L.C. Cullen & T.C. Smout (eds.), *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History*, (Edinburgh, 1977), 204-5; T.M. Devine, *The Transformation of Rural Scotland: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy, 1660-1815* (Edinburgh, 1994), 140-153, 37; T.M. Devine, 'The Making of an Farming Elite?: Lowland Scotland 1750-1850' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), 67-71; T. Douglas (Selkirk), *Observations on the Present State of the Highlands with a view of the causes and probable consequences of emigration* (Edinburgh, 1806), 48-9.

47). J. Almon (ed.), *The Debates and Proceedings of the British House of Commons*, vol. 33 (London, 1775), 39, 155, 162 & 282; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 36, (Edinburgh, 1774), 221, 345; I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 34, 118.

48). J. Knox, loc. cit., 129 & 136; I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 78; J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 78; D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), *The Statistical Account of Scotland*, vol. 20, (Wakefield 1983), 140n-141n.

49). D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20 (Wakefield, 1983), 71n-72n.

50). S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/52/5; S.R.O., R.H. 4/188/2, p. 487.

- 51). L. Timperley, 'The Pattern of Landholding in Eighteenth-Century Scotland' in M.L. Parry & T.R. Slater (eds.), *The Making of the Scottish Countryside* (London, 1980), 145-50.
- 52). T.M. Devine, 'Social Responses of Agrarian 'Improvement': The Highland & Lowland Clearances in Scotland' in R.A. Houston & I.D. Whyte (eds.), *Scottish Society 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1989), 162-3.
- 53). N.L.S., *The Present conduct of the Chieftains and Proprietors of lands in the Highlands of Scotland towards their clans and people considered impartially*, 2nd edition (Edinburgh, 1773), 3-8.
- 54). J. Knox, loc. cit., 127; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 36 (Edinburgh, 1774), 346. Other explicit criticisms of the estate policy of Highland landlords see: N.L.S., RB.m. 262 (14), *A Letter to the Lord Advocate of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1777).
- 55). N.L.S., *Caledonian Mercury*, no 8296, 4 Jan 1775, p. 3; M. L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, 3 Jan 1775, p. 4; N.L.S., Lee Papers, Ms 3431, f. 180.
- 56). E.C.L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, vol. 23, 10 February 1775, 1; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/207/9; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/25/7/42; J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 6, 57-58; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/725: Minute Book of Tutors to Countess of Sutherland. Meeting 30 November 1773.
- 57). D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20 (Wakefield, 1983), 72, 300 n, & 321-22; vol. 8, 147; N.L.S., Ms 20758, Minutes of Tutors for Maclaime of Lochbuie, p. 13; J. Walker, loc. cit., vol. 2, 412.
- 58). D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 17, 153, 225, 408, 421-22, 551, 563; vol. 8, 66, 417-418.
- 59). N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/979/4; T. Douglas, loc. cit., 130.
- 60). T.C. Smout, 'Problems of Nationalism, Identity & Improvement in later Eighteenth Century Scotland' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Improvement and Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1989), 15-18.
- 61). For a description on the estate policies of the Glengarry family, see: M. McLean, loc. cit., 68, 103-108.
- 62). S.R.O., Cameron of Fassifern Papers, GD 1/736/8.
- 63) J. Hunter, *The Making of the Crofting Community* (Edinburgh, 1976), 24-25; D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20, xxxix; vol. 17, lii.
- 64). For evidence on crofting allowing higher augmentations, see chapter on Breadalbane estate, table 6:7. E. Richards, loc. cit., 188. For letter on Wedlove, see; S.R.O. Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/43/140/13.
- 65). T. Douglas, loc. cit., 132.
- 66) N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 1053, f. 104; T Douglas, loc. cit., 133-34.
- 67). S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/244/4/2; GD 248/462/1/34; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/16/4/3/19.
- 68). C.D.T.L., GD 221/816/1; E.R. Cregeen (ed.), loc. cit., 63, 66, 72-72.

69). G.S. Mackenzie, loc. cit., 295.

70). J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., xiii-xiv.

71). For contemporary recognition on the role of the army as a remover of people, see: A. Grant, *A Dissertation on the Chief Obstacles to the Improvement of Land and Introducing Better Methods of Agriculture throughout Scotland* (Aberdeen, 1760), 38-9; S.R.O., Townshend Papers, RH. 4/98/1; I. Adams & M. Somerville, 40-41, 49-50. For 1748 plans see, chapter one, footnote 36, p. 28-29.

72). See chapter two footnotes 68-72, p.90-92; R.A. Roberts (ed.), *Calendar of Home Office Papers 1770-1772* (London, 1881), p. 3, f. 13; D. Wimberley ' Selections from the papers of the Mackay's of Bighouse ' in *T.G.S.I.*, vol. 24 (1899-1901), 54; J. R. L., Bagshawe Muniments, B. 5/1, pp. 60, 100.

73). S.R.O., RH 2/4/218, Home Office Scotland: Domestic Entry Books 1763-95, vol. 1, f. 4. For evidence on how common the depopulation complaint was, as well as its use politically, see H.V. Bowen, ' The East India Company & Military Recruitment in Britain 1763- 1771 ' in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* vol. 59 (1986), 85; J. Redington, (ed.), *Calendar of Home Office Papers 1760-1765* (London, 1878), f. 1291, p. 404. In the fifteen month period from November 1770-February 1771 the 3rd Regiment recruited 110 men within the U.K. 58, or 52% came from Scotland. See, D, H, Loudon Papers, A/965.

74). B.A.M., Box 65/2/2.

75). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1461, f. 199; P.R.O., W.O. 1/973, f. 955.

76). See chapter one, footnote 36, p. 29. Also see Pitt's statement regarding Highland military recruitment; " It will be a drain and not many would return. " S. Ayling, *The Elder Pitt - Earl of Chatham* (London, 1976), 192. Even given the fact that Pitt was merely making his policy more acceptable by couching it in the language of the Cumberland faction, such sentiments are, nevertheless, embarrassing for Highland regiment enthusiasts who hold up Pitt with his speech of 1766 as an example of the positive forces behind excessive military recruitment in the region.

77). S.R.O., Mackay of Bighouse, GD 87/1/77.

78). See chapter four , footnote 82, p. 171, For earlier evidence on such military/colonising attempts see chapter one, footnote 36, p. 29; J. Redington, (ed.), loc. cit., f. 993, p. 304; I. Adams & M. Somerville, 57 & 144.

79). S.R.O., R.H. 1/2/933/8; M.I. Adams, loc. cit., 282; E. Richards, loc. cit., 38; R.A. Roberts (ed.), loc. cit., 95, f. 331; J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit. 70-71; M. McLean, loc. cit., 118-20; T.M. Devine, loc. cit., 88, 90.

80). John Knox, loc. cit., 127.

81). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1319, f. 41; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/16/4/1/3; GD 112/11/1/4/57. Another fine example of the effect of these military settlements was evident on the Urquhart estate of the Grant family on Loch Ness in 1773. The factor noted that a tenant was emigrating because he had had family in America since the end of the Seven Years War. See, S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/349/3/8.

82). C. D.T.L., GD 221/4249/1.

- 83). C.D.T. L., GD 221/5790. For settled soldiers from 1783, see GD 221/676/4; GD 221/701; GD 221/694/4; GD 221/718/1.
- 84). J. Almon (ed.), *Parliamentary Register*, vol. 3 (London, 1776), 208-209; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1666/7; J. Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), 252-53, 493-95; J. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. 3 (London 1902), 499; S.R.O., GD 44/43/283/7.
- 85). M. McLean, loc. cit., 100-102, 108; J. M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 23; M.L., *Edinburgh Advertiser*, p 188; B. Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: Emigration from Britain to America on the Eve of the Revolution* (London, 1986), 99; I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 90.
- 86). J. Fortescue, (ed.), *The Correspondence of King George III*, vol. 3 (London, 1928), 175-6, 197; I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 145; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/2/75(2); GD 44/27/12/5; GD 44/27/5/17/1.
- 87). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/3158; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/302/6; GD 427/304/4.
- 88). See chapter two, footnote 76, p. 93.
- 89). For the example of Angus Macdonnell, see: M. McLean, loc. cit., 108 & 115. It should be noted that Macdonnell was not the only officer with land in America that returned to the United Kingdom after 1783. In 1785 Lieutenant-Colonel John Small of the 84th Emigrant Regiment noted that several of his officers were in the United Kingdom but were to return to their lands in Nova Scotia. S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/2177/10.
- 90). J. Almon, (ed.), *The Debates & Proceedings of the British House of Commons 1774* (London 1775), 39, 155-162, 282; B.A.M., Box 54/5/39; *Scots Magazine*, vol. 36 (Edinburgh, 1774), 304-5; R.K. Donovan, loc. cit., 83; P.D. Brown, *William Pitt, Earl of Chatham:- The Great Commoner* (London, 1978), 374.
- 91). M. Fry, *The Dundas Despotism* (Edinburgh, 1992), 67.
- 92). S.R.O., R.H. 1/2/933/4; R.J. Adam, loc. cit., xxxii & cix n.
- 93). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Paper, Ms 1487, f. 160; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, D 427/207/11, 15-16; GD 427/11/7.
- 94). B.A.M., Box 54/5/39 - 40; S.R.O., GD 427/207/18-19; R.A. Roberts (ed.), *Calendar of Home Office Papers 1773-1775* (London, 1899), p. 219, f. 637.
- 95). S.R.O., GD 248/244/4/2, 12, 14; I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 136.
- 96). M. Fry, loc. cit., 65.
- 97). I. Adams & M. Somerville, loc. cit., 137-38.
- 98). Parliamentary Papers, 1846, XXVII, *Documents Relative to the Distress in Scotland 1783*, 501, 509-10; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/3499; A.U.L., Ms 2284/35.
- 99). A.U.L., Ms 2015, Ms 2023.
- 100). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/3066; A.U.L.. Ms 960; Ms 962; N.L.S., Adv. Ms 20.5.5., Manuscript on Improvement of N.W. Highlands, p 2; S.R.O.,

Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1329/28; M. McLean, loc. cit., 98; J.M. Bumsted, loc. cit., 73; J. Dunlop, *The British Fisheries Society 1786-1893* (Edinburgh, 1978), 20 & 23; S.R.O., RH4/188/1, 38-41; P. White, loc. cit., 189.

101). E. Richards, loc. cit., 207; J. Hunter, loc. cit., 23-25.

102). S.R.O., RH 4/188/2, Sederunt Book May 1795-June 1803, p. 44, 443, 498-505 & 523; S.R.O., RH 2/4/218, f. 151.

103). S.R.O., RH 1/188/2, p. 443; RH 1/188/4, f. 38; RH. 2/4/222, f. 167.

104). S.R.O., RH 1/188/2, p. 531.

105). C.D.T.L., GD 221/4180/15; T. Douglas, loc. cit., 76.

106). L. Colley, loc. cit., 289; S.R.O., RH 1/188/2, 546, 643, Sederunt Book June 1803-1808, 16 & 27.

107). S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/52/4,7; C.D.T. L., GD 221/4433/1; GD 221/771/2.

108) S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/3410/10/11; S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/52/4.

109). S.R.O., RH 1/188/2, Sederunt Book June 1803-1808, 46; E. Richards, loc. cit., 213.

110). S.R.O., RH 1/188/2, p. 487; J. Macdonald, loc. cit., 552-54; S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/52/5.

111). S.R.O., RH 2/4/88, f. 243; C.D.T.L., GD 221/815; S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/1/986; GD 51/52/5, 6,7.

112). T. Douglas, loc. cit., 64.

113). S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1426/60.

114). N.L.S. Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/979/4; Dep 313/1114/14; Dep 313/1115/57.

115). N.L.S. Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/754/3.

116). T. Douglas, loc. cit., 63-78, 131; T. Douglas, *On the Necessity of a More Effectual System of National Defence and the Means of Establishing the Permanent Security of the Kingdom* (London, 1808), 17-25; J. Robertson, *A General View of the Agriculture in the County of Inverness* (London, 1808), 331-332n.

117). G.S. Mackenzie, loc. cit. (London 1810), 297-299.

118). Laing Manuscript vol. 2, *H. M. C.* (London, 1925), 730-732 & 740; S.R.O., Loch Muniments, GD 268/216/17, For the change in colonial circumstance, see: M.E. Vance, 'The Politics of Emigration: Scotland and Assisted Emigration to Upper Canada, 1815-26' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration & Scottish Society*, (Edinburgh, 1992), 38.

119). T.M. Devine, 'The Emergence of the New Elite in the Western Highlands & Islands 1800-60' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Improvement and Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1989), 117.

Chapter Six

The Campbells of Breadalbane, Recruitment and Highland Estate Management 1755 - 1802

The historiography concerning the authority and control which Highland landlords exerted over their estates and tenantry is well established, and in no need of reinforcement. However, the ability of eighteenth century proprietors to wholly dominate the nature and extent of improvement and commercialisation has, nevertheless, been a matter of speculation and debate. Despite accepted evidence which demonstrates their unrivalled position in society, as well as the fact that, as a class, landlords exhibited almost " catholic " approval for commercial change, some historians have highlighted their role as often passive, or deeply influenced by other concerns such as awareness of social consequences and damage to their prestige. More recent research has reopened aspects of this argument. The legal and social power of the Scottish landlord has been highlighted as the most absolute in Britain. The lack of tenurial safeguards has also demonstrated that Scottish law was designed to protect and enhance private property rights, rather than supporting traditional (read non-legally defined) peasant rights. Within Scotland as a whole, the vital leading role played by the landlord class within the process of improvement has been increasingly stressed; it being noted that, " to a considerable extent this was a revolution from above, with landlord power a principal influence. " ¹

However, explicit in both schools of thought is that while endowed with the same power - if not more, Highland landlords nevertheless failed to implement similar standards of improvement in comparison to their Lowland counterparts. This chapter will attempt to question the role that military recruitment played in limiting, to a greater extent than other Scottish proprietors, the options open to Highland landlords in the management and utilisation of their landed resources. It is not contended that the legal rights of landlords were ever seriously contested, but this case study nevertheless seeks to demonstrate the sophisticated, complex and essentially concessionary nature of the relationship between the proprietorial recruiter and his tenantry. A detailed examination of the origin and extent of recruiting activity upon the estates of the Campbells of Breadalbane is useful both in terms of geography and chronology. Moreover, it is necessary to chart the process of recruiting from its political origins, down to its impact on the various social orders and groupings evident upon Highland estates. Charting recruitment through all its phases allows an examination not only of landlord and tenant relations, but also of inter-tenantry links, as well as the influence and role of government and politics, both of which have been understated in charting the development of late eighteenth and early nineteenth Highland society. ²

The Political Dimension to Recruiting - Case Study of the Argyll & Perthshire Fencibles of 1759.

While commentators are correct to highlight the vital eighteenth process whereby Highland landlords moved into a phase of "aggressive apostatising of commercial over customary relationships," a study of the politics whereby particular landlords became involved in recruiting for the British army demonstrates that more attention needs to be focused on factors, often outside a landlord's immediate control, which, nevertheless, forced and modified estate conditions to the detriment of agricultural improvement.³

The political backdrop to events on the Breadalbane estate in the middle of the eighteenth century was that of hostility between its proprietors and the ducal House of Argyll. While Archibald Campbell, the third Duke, suffered a relative decline in political fortunes, especially in the years 1747-1755, the Breadalbane family were unable to capitalise in any meaningful way. Partly, this is explained by the same forces which dented the standing of the leading Campbell family. Argyll, while never losing his standing as premier political player in Scotland, did suffer at Westminster due to his perceived and real Highland connections. For that reason other Highland families like the Glenorchy Campbells failed to gain substantially in terms of political power. Thus it was that in 1749, after Argyll had failed to secure the wadset of Fernan in north west Perthshire for the Breadalbane family, relations between the Campbells cooled even further. Just as Argyll was mistrusted at Westminster, so John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, was, in turn, refused the wadset for the very same reasons. Relations between the Campbell families were extenuated by the political friendship between the Ducal Houses of Atholl and Argyll. In 1751 Glenorchy feared their alliance would ensure the county of Perth would become wholly dominated by their interest. This was confirmed when Argyll and Atholl attempted to get their candidate, John Swinton, installed as Sheriff Depute of Perthshire. By the time Glenorchy succeeded as third Earl in 1752, he deeply distrusted Argyll, believing he had attempted to ensure that he was not elected as one of the sixteen Representative Peers of Scotland.⁴ It is within this framework of mutual political hostility and suspicion that the recruiting events of 1759 need to be placed. By the middle of the Seven Years War, Argyll was able to use the same factor that had earlier diminished his political credit - the perception of his dominance and control of affairs in the Highlands, to weaken political enemies like John, third Earl of Breadalbane.

How such external political concerns resulted in appreciable estate consequences can be seen in the recruiting drives of late 1759-early 1760. By late June 1759, Britain and France had been at war for three years. In response to a deliberate strategy on the part of the British which involved bogging France down in continental struggles while capturing her under defended colonies, the French Crown decided in the spring of that year to plan and execute an invasion of the British Isles to divert resources back into the United Kingdom. On 30 June 1759, Philip Yorke, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, wrote to the third Earl of Breadalbane telling him that it was widely believed Scotland had been designated as a suitable place for the French invasion. As a result, the King had ordered its defences strengthened. Hardwicke continued;

For this purpose the Duke of Argyll has been spoke to, and I did indeed not fail to mention your Lordship as one whose zeal and whose weight and influence in your country could enable you to be of government service on such an occasion. Nothing is yet settled, for the thing is only very lately mentioned..... I determined to write to your lordship, and the Duke of Argyll called upon me yesterday to desire that I would do so. I therefore beg you would inform me without delay what number of men you think may be got together and in what time. ⁵

Hardwicke asked that he and Argyll co-operate on the levies, which were to be of the same type as raised in 1746. This opening letter, and the subsequent political infighting over what eventually became the fencible regiments of Argyll and Sutherland, reveal several important aspects. Firstly, it illustrates the centralised nature of Highland recruiting in the 1750s. Argyll was seen by the government as the natural manager of the whole business. Secondly, it highlights the fact that government tended to name and have in mind certain landlords from the northern region. Finally, it clearly demonstrates that the initiative lay with government, not the proprietor. This last point alone suggests that any analysis of developing conditions in the Highlands must involve the nature and extent of government perceptions and continuing influence. Breadalbane was chosen partly because he was seen as a natural counterpoise to Argyll. More significant, however, was the fact that he had already raised men for the government in 1746. In stark terms, Hardwicke's letter demonstrates that the 1745 uprising was continuing to be a significant factor in both policy formation for the region and on proprietorial families - ironically on large prominent families with perhaps the best ability to improve. By initiating such requests, government was contradicting its own demilitarising policy for the region, and seemed to believe, quite literally, that Highland society had not developed from its supposedly overly militarised status of the 1740s. It also suggests that the relationship between government and landlords should be revised to include the recognition that, as well as the traditional picture of

landlord pressure on government for regiments, there was also explicit pressure from the highest sectors of government on Highland landlords. ⁶

Breadalbane's rather panicked reply illustrates how contemporaries considered military recruiting and the general process of improvement as somewhat incompatible. The third Earl was a noted improver, he was steeped in the theories and practices whereby any given estate (Lowland and Highland) was to rationalise and commercialise. He noted;

It is impossible for me to answer your Lordship's questions, what men I can raise and in what time, for I have for many years taken great pains in that part of the country where my interest lies, to bring peoples minds from the thought of arms to that of industry and improvement.... for several years [I] pursued a wrong plan, thinking it for the service of the government and for my own advantage, by removing all idle people out of my estate into the army and navy. I feel the loss of them upon this occasion, and I wish I had followed the Duke of Argyll's example, who always hindered as much as he could enlisting men in his country. ⁷

Beneath the final political smear against Argyll, the letter demonstrates how difficult a position Highland landlords could find themselves in when asked by the government for men. Indeed, in many respects both Argyll and Breadalbane were in a similar situation. They were to an extent hostages to their own high profile investment in the Hanoverian state; a state which now, paradoxically, sought the very power that, as landlords, both had commenced eroding through improvement. From the start, both Argyll and Breadalbane were reacting to events outside their control. These events could be far removed from influences traditionally associated with the development of the region. For example, the Perthshire and Inverness-shire estates of the Atholl and Gordon families did not experience fencible recruiting because a Prussian victory in central Europe ended the likelihood of a French invasion. ⁸ Within the more immediate Scottish context, Argyll saw Breadalbane's population as a resource that could limit the adverse consequences of excessive recruiting on his own estate. This explains the unsolicited pressure the latter proprietor came to experience. Interestingly, neither landlord refused to raise the men, despite the obvious problems involved. It is not intended here to suggest that Highland gentry regretted or even disliked overt displays of patriotism; indeed, the Scottish performance during the Seven Years War has correctly attracted comment on the high profile nature of its loyalty. However, there has been little acknowledgement of the fact that gentry were anxious to control the form that recruiting took, and that as a class they were not unaware of the detrimental effects of military levying. In reality, recruiting generated multi-faceted problems for landlords, from that of political reputation to the organisation of their estates.

The lack of enthusiasm for a Scottish militia within the circles of the military establishment explains why figures like Hardwicke and George II turned so explicitly to Highland recruiting at the end of June 1759. Having been asked to raise men, the Duke of Argyll exhibited a strong political agenda in his actions. On 17 and 30 July 1759, he wrote to Barrington asking for commissions and naming field officers. Simultaneously, Breadalbane, who was supposedly involved became aware that he was being left out of the patronage opportunities. The Earl wrote to Harwicke stating that he believed Argyll did not want him to gain any more political interest in Argyllshire, and that he had not heard any information regarding the regiment. He added sarcastically; " but [I] probably shall receive a letter from him at Edinburgh after everything is settled ." ⁹ As a result of these delays, and aware that he was being used by Argyll, Breadalbane offered instead to raise 500 men from his own Perthshire estate. He added that to indemnify him for what would be the loss of a year's rent in Perthshire - £ 2162, he wanted control over all the commissions. Breadalbane envisaged twenty positions which through their pay and value would be worth £ 2309. ¹⁰

With regard to Breadalbane's offer, it was widely understood that Atholl would not allow him to gain the Lord-Lieutenancy of Perthshire. As expected, Argyll offered only two commissions to Breadalbane in the Argyllshire levy, which confirmed the latter's thinking. In a letter to Hardwicke, who had previously admitted that Argyll had attempted to keep the commissions for his own interest, Breadalbane stated;

In Perthshire the Duke of Atholl is his [Argyll's] favourite and therefore he uses all methods to raise his family and interest above mine in this county. As to my offer of raising a battalion of 500 men in Perthshire, I made it because I foresaw the scheme the Duke of Argyll mentioned and I thought this might possible prevent it I agree with your Lordship that the Duke of Argyll may attempt to engraft his Atholl plan upon mine or frustrate the latter. ¹¹

This example demonstrates how recruiting needs to be seen at different levels. Firstly, in order to retain political credibility, Breadalbane had been forced, against his better judgement, to offer men. However, this necessity aside, the relative values of the lost rent and intended commissions demonstrate that he had not abandoned attempts to utilise his estate as a profitable concern. Military entrepreneurship, whether forced on Highland landlords through social and political pressure or not, still represented estate commercialism - if in an alternative form. Therefore, despite Breadalbane's assertions that recruiting was incompatible with estate improvement, his own calculations illustrate that, in terms of profit, and, above all, political prestige, recruiting represented a rational approach as well as a

tapping into the relatively modern phenomenon of substantial revenue derived from the fiscal-military state.

As a result of the political machinations whereby Argyll deprived Breadalbane of commissions, the gentry under the latter's interest refused to raise men for what was described as a " private corp. " Lairds in Lorne like John Stewart of Ivernahyle refused to get involved, adding that a lack of half pay was also deeply discouraging. Duncan Campbell of Glenure made it clear that if Breadalbane gained a Perthshire levy, he would raise for it rather than Argyll's. Archibald Campbell of Stonefield correspondingly wrote to the third Duke stating that the gentry of the county were refusing commissions, and that they were unfavourably contrasting the lack of half pay with the numerous military pensions held by their kinsmen in the regular army. ¹²

By 23 August 1759, large sections of the Highland county with the best reputation for conspicuous loyalty to the Hanoverians, were, nevertheless, exhibiting distinct reluctance to recruit. As a result of this, the government increased the pressure on proprietors. Hardwicke wrote to Breadalbane;

I do not wonder that your lordship and such of [your] friends in Argyllshire that have been left quite out of concert, should be offended. But the great question is what conduct it is right for you to hold in respect of your own character and abilities. I presume that if your lordship should sit still and not exert yourself to furnish any men to this regiment that will be misrepresented here, and there are persons in another camp at court who I suspect would take that up. The neglect would be called a backwardness to serve the government in this exigency; and some impartial persons might be drawn to say ' Tis from..... a personal disobligation, but that is not reason not to exert to serve the King and his government. ' There is nothing more difficult than to set such things right at court; and this weighs so strongly in my mind that I think it my duty out of regard to your Lordship and your friends to contribute your assistance in procuring men. ¹³

This letter was, in essence, an instruction to Breadalbane from the Lord Chancellor of England to raise men or face political oblivion. It demonstrates the complex political background to recruiting, and shows that raising a regiment was more symptomatic of the adoption of new British cultural values which, paradoxically, also left landlords like Breadalbane open to pressure that demanded conformity to pre-conceived ideas held at the centre. Under the circumstances, it would have broken the conventions of the day to have refused. Breadalbane had, in truth, very little choice. Given this, it is not surprising he

agreed to Argyll's proposal for 200 men from his estate for overseas service. Argyll's ally, Atholl, also received no consultation or discussion. On 29 August 1759, Milton wrote; " The Duke of Argyll bids me to acquaint your Grace of the government's resolve to send a regiment of Highlanders to Germany and that it would be very acceptable to His Majesty if your Grace could raise two companies of 100 men each. " ¹⁴ This was an entirely different proposal from what both Breadalbane and Atholl had intended. Nevertheless, given that the political climate demanded displays of patriotism, government had presented to both landlords what amounted to a *fait accompli*. The men raised were later added to the regiment of Murray-Keith - a levy controlled by Argyll. Contemporary commentators described Murray-Keith's as having received assistance from the Duke of Argyll. Simply put, this meant that the Campbell Duke had worked it so that political opponents like Breadalbane did the actual recruiting while he gained the political capital. This example demonstrates that it was not merely enough to raise men, the best option for any Highland family was, in fact, to raise an entire regiment. That this analysis holds true can be seen from comments written to the Duke of Atholl when he and his advisers considered the return of Highland recruiting in the early winter of 1760.

They are talking of raising three more regiments and though you should not have one raised by way of a battalion in Atholl, you may lay your account, there will be recruiting there if there are men amongst you to be got..... but what weighs most with me is it would be a fine puff for your Grace to raise a battalion at this period and though you have had great merit all along in raising companies in different corp, that is less known above, than if you had the nomination of a battalion that will be known by your name. ¹⁵

This commentary clearly highlights the political pressure that landlords of the improvement era were under. Recruiting had become such a comprehensive practice across the region that landlords felt compelled to raise their own levies, and thus derive the maximum benefit from a process that was likely to occur on their property regardless. Failure to recruit entailed the loss of estate men for no real political or material gain. It was noted that in the three years of the war, the whole of the Duke of Atholl's lands had already lost 700-1000 men. In terms of political prestige and financial reward, this represented a huge loss to the Atholl family. Quite literally, these men were seen in terms of a lost harvest. Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the family considered it vital to get a recruiting offer to the government before that of Sir Henry Munro's was accepted. This pressure then passed down the social scale onto lesser Highland landlords like Macleod of Macleod, who was well aware that Argyll backed the recruiting drive of the Atholl family. Macleod, in turn, also knew that the Campbell Duke hardly considered him as a reliable political ally. So

when asked to raise men for Fotheringham of Powrie, an ally of the Atholls, the pressure came from Argyll himself. Macleod was put under further social coercion because his estate was widely acknowledged as nowhere near as drained of men as landed estates in Perthshire. Even Atholl's enemies consolidated the picture of spare men on Macleod's estates to no less a person than the Lord Chancellor of England. Breadalbane noted regarding the actions of Atholl, that; " by agreeing with Mr. Macleod to name three of his nephews to be officers of it, provided Macleod would raise the company, which he may do in the Isle of Skye by methods I neither can nor would use in Breadalbane. " In a cautionary note regarding attitudes to requests for recruits, while pressure was undoubtedly evident in the search for men, it should be noted that Macleod responded positively and saw it as a useful political opportunity. The result was that he secured the rights of his own family to hold the subaltern commissions under Powrie's son. ¹⁶

The comments of Breadalbane were, nevertheless, important in that they entrenched conceptions of clanship within the mind of politically important people, who correspondingly acted on that basis. Underlying the pressure to recruit was the recognition that such commissions influenced substantially, and in the case of Perthshire, decisively, the political balance of power in the Scottish counties. Within this context, Argyll's use of military commissions, and his acknowledged connections with the government explain how pro-Argyll candidates won in both Perthshire and Sutherland in the 1761 elections. In Perth, the M.P. was Lord John Murray, Colonel of the 42nd Highland Regiment, who already resented Argyll's use of his regimental commissions in rewarding supporters. Both Argyll and Atholl supported John Murray of Strowan, who, in turn, found that gentry like Fotheringham of Powrie, rather unsurprisingly, came down heavily on his side. Breadalbane, who opposed Strowan, found that most electors by February 1761 were not prepared to oppose Argyll. Even some whose votes were created by the earl backed Strowan, as did normal supporters like Major Robert Campbell of Finab. In the end, even when Lord John gained Breadalbane's support in an attempt to unite the opposition, the Earl conceded that " Mr. Murray's success will be owing to the apprehension several of the gentlemen of that country were under of his Grace's resentment. " On 16 May, after the election had been won and Argyll had died, Breadalbane noted; " If he [Argyll] had not made use of the influence his public station gave him, Mr. Murray would not have been chose for Perthshire. " ¹⁷

What Breadalbane meant by " influence, " was the direct application of pressure on those that held public positions and commissions. Such people were vulnerable to government retribution if they failed to hold the administration's line. In May 1773, during another election in Perthshire it was noted by a supporter of the Atholl interest;

Were those who have power in their hands (after the contest is over) to censure the baseness of any one who hold such pensions or places or offices when those who eat of the bread of dependence are at freedom to oppose their benefactors measures and to cross his or their inclinations, the footing of opposition may have the best chance of success. ¹⁸

With electoral tactics like that, it is unsurprising that military officers like Campbell of Finab backed Argyll. The Campbell Duke also had the structure of the Highland electorate on his side. While the totals are from 1788, table 6:1, nevertheless, illustrates the extent to which the Highland electorate was significant more militarised than the rest of the Scottish voting population. In summary, 14.5% of the Lowland electorate was connected to the military, 17.9% in the Highland line counties, and 25.8% within the main Highland counties. In themselves, these figures highlight how much more important the military was within the northern counties in general. If such similar figures existed in the early 1760s, then the structure of the electorate in the Highlands was one of the factors that maintained and heightened Argyll's political power.

Table 6:1. Military Officers and their Relations in Scottish Counties 1788

(Source, C.E. Adam (ed.), *View of the Political State of Scotland in the Last Century* (Edinburgh, 1887)) ¹⁹

County Type	Electorate	Military officers & %	Half pay officers & %	Relations of voters in military & %
Lowland	1548	120 (7.7)	44 (2.8)	61 (3.9)
Highland Line	820	106 (12.9)	24 (2.9)	17 (2)
Highland	294	60 (20.4)	10 (3.4)	6 (2)

Likewise, in Sutherland, the incumbent M.P. George Mackay was known as a supporter of Newcastle against the interest of Argyll. The third Duke, in order to remove him, allied with William, seventeenth Earl of Sutherland. Argyll persuaded Sutherland that the best method of getting rid of Mackay was not a direct challenge, but by winning over elements of his support. This was done at the expense of allowing Mackay's brother, Alexander, as a compromise candidate. Argyll gained Sutherland's support for this solution by ensuring that

he was the only other Scottish peer to receive a fencible regiment. As in Perthshire, Argyll's electoral success was linked to his control of the British-Highland military. ²⁰

Such concerns go in large part towards explaining why particular estates, especially those of the politically active elite, experienced proprietary levies. Thus it is possible to argue that much recruiting activity came about through pressure upon Highland landlords and that they, in turn, could transfer that pressure onto smaller gentry like Macleod. Thus recruiting never remained a characteristic only of the politically active elite. This process of downward pressure was also evident during the raising of the Argyll Fencibles. One reason for this shifting of responsibility was that the levy was not originally intended to receive bounty money. However, in the real market, bounties for recruits were increasing substantially; in 1752, men could be recruited for one guinea, but after three years of war the bounty was higher than six guineas. ²¹

The matter of expenses soon became prominent for involved gentry - even Argyll noted privately to Andrew Fletcher that he hoped the whole exercise of the Argyll Fencibles would not be as expensive as the 1746 levy. In late August 1759, the War Office had made it clear that no levy money was to be made available. Lord Milton informed several concerned supporters that they were not to approach Argyll concerning the matter, as his mentioning the subject of bounties to the crown would harm his reputation for efficient and economic management of Highland recruiting. In mid September, Breadalbane questioned Lord Milton and the Lord Chancellor on why the regiment did not appear to be getting levy money, and that without it he was at a loss as how to go about getting men. Almost immediately, Breadalbane regretted having asked. He wrote to Hardwicke and John Campbell of Carwhin, the cashier of the Royal Bank of Scotland, stating that he felt Argyll would use his seeming inability to raise men without money to politically weaken him. In the end, despite getting a nominal bounty of one guinea, Argyll was forced to consider methods by which the county of Argyll as a whole could supply the men. He forbade gentry with regular commissions from recruiting within the confines of Argyllshire unless they were officers of Lieutenant -Colonel John Campbell's regiment. This was a levy he had given his personal interest to, and in order to protect his reputation Argyll shielded populations for its use. When still faced with a shortage of fencible men after the end of the harvest in November 1759, Argyll appointed twenty gentry to consider a county wide solution. By this means he hoped to end the elite's reluctance to accept commissions. ²²

It was eventually agreed to get the gentry to raise men in proportion to their part of the shire's total rental. Given that Argyll was by far and away the largest receiver of rent, the pressure remained on his estate. This partly explains why lesser gentry, in contrast to their

earlier reluctance, now promoted the scheme with vigour at the local level, aware that it offered at least a rational division of responsibility. Nevertheless, it still meant that they faced substantial problems. The method of equating men to rent was for every £ 10 to represent one recruit. Thus Duncan Campbell of Glenure was expected to find seven men for his rental of £ 77.17.4 in Lismore and Appin parish. In 1760, Breadalbane's Argyllshire rental totalled £ 1558, resulting in a quota of 155 men. Given that market bounties were at four to six guineas (as opposed to the government bounty of one guinea) this represented a possible expenditure level of £ 22.1.0 - £ 37.9.0 for Glenure, to £ 488.5.0 - £ 813.15.0. for the Earl. Recruiting for Argyll's regiment thus represented for Glenure 28.5 - 48% of his real rental in Lismore and Appin. For Breadalbane it was 31 - 52% of his Argyll rental. ²³

This represented a substantial outlay for the proprietary class, who correspondingly put pressure on the lesser gentry and tacksman. Glenure sought men from neighbouring tacksmen like the Stewarts of Achnacone, and, as with other smaller gentry like the Campbells of Dunstaffnage and Balliveolin, insisted that his own tenantry become financially involved in the supplying of men. Indeed, this appears to have been normal throughout the shire. The military census drawn up for part of Breadalbane's Argyllshire estates noted for the farms of Barravourich and Blaravan that certain named tenants were responsible for getting a set number of men. In the lower Kintyre area, so extreme had the need for men become that the Duke of Argyll's tenantry were forced to pool their financial resources to pay the bounties of their required recruits. In return, failure to supply the men to designated fencible officers meant that tenantry were to pay a £ 5 fine, the payment of which, it was hoped, would ease the distress which David Campbell, the Chamberlain of Kintyre frankly admitted the tenantry were suffering. ²⁴ Thus the process of pressure reached down through various echelons until it impacted directly at the estate level. Indeed, recruiting should be viewed here as a second rent taken from Highland tenantry, and while still representing military entrepreneurialism on the part of the elite, it also signified a substantial drain on a tenantry widely understood by both contemporaries and later commentators as lacking capital reserves. ²⁵

The Recruiting Background to 1793: Perthshire 1745 - 1783.

The properties of the Breadalbane family covered a substantial belt of Western Central Perthshire, as well as a large section of the coastal district of Lorne in Argyllshire. As such the estates encompassed significantly differing geographical areas, with local farming and economic structures in Lorne differing from those in the interior areas of Glenorchy and Lochtayside. The estates were divided in terms of the method of agriculture practised; Argyll was dominated to a greater extent than Perthshire by pastoral activity, with large

mountainous farms suitable for black cattle, as well as large sheep farms which were well established in Glenorchy by the early 1780s. This partly explains the retention of higher levels of tacksmen in Argyll when compared to Perthshire; the greater credit facilities, organisational, and entrepreneurial skills necessary to continue the trade meant that they still held significant economic power. In Argyll by 1788 36% of farms were still held by tacksmen or single tenants, while in Perthshire the level of tacksman farms by 1793 was only 9.9%. (See tables 6:5 and 6:6).²⁶ The prominent role of tacksmen in Argyll was highlighted by Robertson's 1796 report, which stated that " the hills in Netherlorne are occupied by black cattle and mostly along the whole coast of Argyll even in the Braes of Lorne where gentlemen farmers have pretty good slices of hill farms where they prefer black cattle. " The Perth estate was geared more to arable, with lower levels of black cattle than Argyll, and a higher ratio of multiple tenant farms within the estate structure - 62% of all holdings compared to only 29% in Argyll. The eastern estate had also experienced the development of several large single tenant sheep walks such as Kirktown of Strathfillan and the three farms of Reinmor, Corriecherloch and Invervonichill. The stress upon agricultural holdings that this lessening of the arable base caused, when allied to recruiting demands and population growth (the Loch Tayside parishes of Killin, Kenmore and Weem had increased in the period 1755 - 90 by an average of 12.6%) explains why, in 1795, the fourth Earl actively considered the removal of sheep and black cattle from Lochtayside - a policy not seriously advocated for Argyll.²⁷

The chronology of recruitment upon the Breadalbane property reveals that in every conflict from the 1745 rising, through until the French Revolutionary War, the family maintained a constant policy of encouraging substantial recruitment and demobilisation upon the estate. Study of the early recruiting drives for the British army reveals, from the very outset, that the traditional clan characteristic of land in return for military service remained an important feature - so any analysis of recruiting needs to be seen within the context of wider estate management. This interaction of recruiting and the management of landed resources can be illustrated as early as the 1745 uprising.

In 1745, due to his high profile within the ranks of Highland proprietors, John Campbell, second Earl of Breadalbane, found his family under severe political and military pressure to raise men for both sides engaged in the conflict. For several reasons he found it impossible to raise men upon the Perthshire section of his estate. On 22 August 1745, Sir John Cope the British Commander in Chief in Scotland, requested that Breadalbane raise his Lochtayside tenantry to join the Earl of Loudon's Highland regiment. In turn, the Lord Advocate informed Breadalbane that as no Lord Lieutenant held legal warrant for Perthshire, this order was technically illegal.²⁸ When the third Duke of Argyll received

confirmation of his position as Lord Lieutenant of Argyll, and was thus able to raise the militia within that county, Breadalbane, as the next largest proprietor was also expected to contribute. In 1793 the male population of Breadalbane's Argyllshire farms amounted to 1726: thus the companies of 400 men raised in 1745, levied from a seemingly smaller population, represents a significant if not intense level of recruitment.²⁹

The attempts to muster Lochtayside levies in 1745 highlights the crucial role that the basic units of estate management played in military recruiting. In September of the same year, the Jacobite High Command ordered that the men of the estate districts of Lochtayside, Deshoir and Glenloch enter their service under a levy rated at one recruit per merkland in these areas. Given the merk rating of farms in these districts, this would still have given the Jacobite army an extra 310 men.³⁰ The connection between agricultural units, military recruiting and the general efficiency of farming is further highlighted by events on the Perthshire section. In a letter to Hardwicke of September 1745, Lord Glenorchy pointed out that Lochaber was desolate due to the excessive drain of men from disaffected areas into the Jacobite army, and a corresponding lack of labour for agriculture. Fear of crop loss explains the severe reluctance to enlist evident amongst men on both sides, as well as the desertion evident amongst Highland armies of the time.³¹

Aware of this, Glenorchy explained that his own Perthshire tenantry were not prepared to enlist unless enough were left behind on the estate to ensure agricultural activity was continued. As it was, the levy did not occur and this eventuality never arose in Perthshire. However, on the Duke of Argyll's property, the loss of men reduced the rent paying ability of the population; while on Breadalbane's Argyllshire estate, the drain of tenants into the militia meant that a substantial number of experienced managerial personnel were missing from the estate through the autumn, winter and spring of 1745-6. This induced a collapse in agricultural productivity which, in turn, forced Breadalbane to give an abatement of one year's rent. In 1751 the valued rental of Breadalbane's Argyll property was £569. Recent research has emphasised how valued rentals in the county in this period often tended to be only two fifths to a twelfth of actual rents. Thus 1745 represented a huge loss to the Campbell earl, emphasising how military activity which utilised estate resources was, in fact, incompatible with both efficient agriculture and revenue extraction.³²

The massive military effort exerted by Scotland during the period of the Seven Years War resulted in new recruiting efforts being brought to bear upon the Breadalbane estates. The 42nd regiment of Lord John Murray, the 77th and 78th of Montgomery and Fraser, all drew men from the estate. The largest drains went into the regiments of Murray-Keith and the Argyllshire Fencibles - a set of levies which, as already noted, were brought to bear upon

Breadalbane's property as a result of political concerns rather than any estate management agenda. Breadalbane eventually raised 300 men, having informed the government on 24 July 1759, that this number could be spared from his farms without ruining their productivity. In an interesting contrast, it should be noted that this was nearly the same number as the Jacobites intended levying in 1745. If nothing else, it illustrates the extent to which military activity in the supposedly de-militarised Highlands had, in fact, remained comparable to the levels of recruiting under clanship. The earlier levies of the war had seen Breadalbane use recruiting as a social purgative. He encouraged (or forced) certain groups of men into these regiments, adding " I have carefully glean'd this country of useless mouths who fed upon the industrious, by getting them to engage in the army or navy. " ³³ It should be stressed how this practical example of social control illustrates that recruitment could, in fact, be seen to aid and complement the process of improvement. This policy of targeting the under-employed lower social orders continued in 1759 and can be shown to have been a clearly defined strategy.

In response to the 1759 recruiting drive, Breadalbane ordered a military census of his Argyllshire farms in order to gain men from his own population. The census involved fifty one farms, mostly in the Glenorchy and Glenlochry area, but, in all, stretched from Achalader at the north east end of Glenorchy to the farm of Barrs on the west side of Loch Etive in Lorne. The male population was listed as 265; 42 men were marked for service - 15.8% of available male numbers. In all, this recruiting affected exactly 50% of the farms listed.

Table 6:2. Social & Tenorial Origins of Military Recruits Glenorchy Estate 1759
(Source, S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/17/1-6)

Tenorial Group	Total & % of Estate	Total & % of Recruits	Background Unmarried Men	Total & % of Revised Recruits
Tenants*	116 (43.7)	2 (4.7)	17 (51.5)	19 (45.2)
Married men & Cottars	44 (16.6)	7 (16.6)	3 (9)	10 (23.8)
Unmarried Men	105 (39.6)	33 (78.5)	13 (39.3)	13 (30.9)
	265	42	33	42

* = Tenant denotes not merely those holding directly from Breadalbane himself, but also the subtenants of large tacksmen like Campbell of Achalader or Glenure.

Table 6:2 illustrates quite clearly that Breadalbane continued to focus on both the landless and those least involved within the formal tenurial arrangements on his estate. In practical terms this made perfect sense. The men needed to be young in order to fulfil military needs; yet within an estate context, their departure also represented a minimal impact both in terms of lost agricultural expertise and proven rent paying ability. This explains the lack of tenants within the recruit profile. Young non-tenant personnel brought the best hope of profit from recruiting as well as continued profit from the estate itself - in summary, a maximising of the landlord's inherent resources. Given the large preponderance of the thirty three young unmarried recruits, their origins within the tenurial structure of the estate is important.

The revised set of figures which add the background of unmarried men into the origin of the recruits illustrate a vital point concerning recruiting in the Highlands during the 1739-1815 period. The figure for tenant recruits reflect closely their influence within the estate structure. This, in turn, largely explains the motive behind tenant recruiting. It has already been noted that when faced with quotas for men, landlords directed their pressure quite specifically onto the tenant group. The vast majority of recruits from tenant backgrounds were, in fact, representatives - often sons or near relations. Their presence in the levy was the result of their relations seeking another farm or simply defending their original possession. Such families logically contributed the amount of men that would reaffirm and entrench their status as tenants. In contrast to this, analysis of the married and cottar class reveal that they contributed substantially over and above their representation within the estate. The reasons for this have in part already been discussed. Such people were unburdened by large holdings, steelbow commitments to tacksmen, and heavy investment obligations like house and byre building. The unmarried men not linked to the farms from which they were recruited were, nevertheless, mostly from the region, and could in turn represent their parents. The important point is that estate authorities and economic conditions promoted a certain form of recruiting which was deliberately designed not to reflect the rent paying structure of the estate.

While an obvious strategy to minimise disruption in the short term, in the long term this policy put pressure on those with a tenurial involvement in the estate, if only by threatening security and inducing uncertainty. In May 1760, Colin Campbell of Carwhin was deeply criticised for allowing recruiters to induce disorder in Glenorchy, and for using his position as factor to assist recruiting parties in picking men indiscriminately. More interestingly, the drive for men had also involved a series of removals amongst the tenantry that had failed to

give in their sons. Breadalbane himself had ordered these evictions to ensure that recruiting was completed. It was noted that one Archibald MacDiarmid, a tenant in Glenlochry had been removed. This was a matter of regret to the estate authorities as MacDiarmid had been a honest possessor of his farm for the last forty years, and had good stock and resources. Allied to this example was the situation on the eastern estate where farm holdings were separated off for soldiers. The possession of half a plough was, in certain cases, the amount of land given to favoured personnel. This was a usual tenant holding, and illustrates that established tenantry were again losing lands as a result of recruitment. In even greater contrast to the dispossession of well stocked tenantry, was the circumstances whereby, in July 1763, in order to fulfil recruiting promises made in this period, Breadalbane was forced to create crofts for certain soldiers because they lacked the stock and capital to possess the normal size of farm.³⁴

The need to create farms for those with a reduced capacity for stocking was a legacy of the policy whereby the lower social orders of cottar and landless labourers were brought disproportionately into the army. Recruiting was thus profoundly anti-improvement at two differing levels. The removal of personnel like MacDiarmid went against theories which encouraged those who were able to bring capital resources to bear upon the development of land. Likewise, the planting of under capitalised personnel on reduced holdings meant that the cultivation of agricultural surpluses intended for market and profit was increasingly untenable. Recruiting, in summary, removed elements of the established tenantry and replaced them with personnel who had not previously been tenants, and who had gained their possessions for a non-commercial reason. It is at this point that the political pressure upon the third Earl from external sources should be recalled. It was such outside influences that in large part explain why a supposedly " progressive " landlord like Breadalbane, nevertheless, instituted such management policies.

In 1775, upon the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War, Archibald Campbell of Glenlyon gained a captaincy in the 71st Fraser Highlanders, and being a near relation of Breadalbane's, was allowed to recruit upon the estate. In 1778, Alexander Campbell, third son of Archibald Campbell of Achalader, gained a captaincy in the 74th Argyll battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell of Barbreck.³⁵ The latter commission is perhaps of more significance to this study since Campbell of Achalader was factor on the Perthshire estate, and so was in a position to give it his particularly active assistance. The methods used to secure men for his son seemed to bring particular resentment upon Achalader for the supposedly arbitrary personnel and tenurial alterations made by him. In 1786, removed tenants from the Lochtayside farm of Klytirie complained of how Achalader had pursued his policies, describing them as hardly " recruiting but an oppressive press of

men. " The allusion to conscription may not be as exaggerated as the disgruntled tenants made out. In the spring of 1778, military officers had utilised the Impress Act at Perth and Killin for the Atholl and Aberdeenshire battalions, and the factor could have used its presence to implement a similar policy upon the estate. ³⁶

In 1776, when a near relation gained a major's commission in Fraser's 71st battalion, Sir Robert Menzies of Weem deployed the recruiting strategy that had been evident in Glenorchy in 1759. He targeted those who had no possessions, such as cottars and artisans. ³⁷ Since the Breadalbane family had consciously attempted to settle artisans upon the estate, Achalader was forced to continue this policy in a modified way. The scheme " planned out by him for levying the men was that certain tenants within the estate behaved to furnish one or more as required. " ³⁸ Again the trend of downward pressure exerted by recruiting is evident, and correspondingly was applied to the tenurially vulnerable subtenants and crofters. Thus the crofting family in Aldvine on the South side of Lochtay found themselves ejected in favour of another landless family who had contributed a son. The response of such socially inferior groups meant that tenants who did not contribute men were dispossessed and reduced in status, as in the case of Finlay Campbell on the farm of Tommachrocher on north Lochtayside. In terms of the development of separate holdings, Campbell complained that, as a tenant, he had held two crofts as part of his larger possession. His eviction, meanwhile, had formalised the separation of these crofts from the original tenant holding. ³⁹

However, the development of crofts upon the estate was not just the result of punishment removals. In Glenquaich, on the farm of Ceilvellich, six crofts and two cottars were imposed directly by Achalader upon the original tenants, with over half actually being persons who gave recruits. This meant that recruiting was increasing the number of tenants and separate agricultural units. The farm of Baillemore on the south side of Lochtay, " owing to a scarcity of places and the vast number of people to serve " was quartered in 1776, with five tenants and three crofters added on. The generation of additional tenant holdings for those who had complied with the request for men was a policy adopted alongside that of crofting. However, the increased numbers of tenants on the same amount of land meant that townships like Baillemore, described as tenant farms, should in reality be considered as emerging crofting communities, appearing through the piecemeal division of holdings. ⁴⁰

The impact of recruiting for Alexander Campbell's company of 100 men was that at least 8% of all farms on the Breadalbane estate had either more crofters added, or new crofts made out. More importantly, these crofts were created on farms already possessed by three or more tenants; 30% of such farms had crofts created or added to them during or immediately after the American War. It was thus upon multiple tenant farms that crofting was concentrated. As well as Baillemore, the farms of Blarmore, Bliarliargan and Klytirie had crofters added to them. These farms were already amongst the largest on the estate, and had twenty seven tenants and three crofters between them. There is further evidence on how the estate authorities attempted to reduce the generalised impact of recruiting promises, and settle soldiers on specific farms. In 1785, while attempting to recruit for an army commission in peace time, the Perthshire factor related how, two years earlier, upon demobilisation of the 74th Highland regiment, his son had tried with great difficulty to persuade returning soldiers to settle on one particular farm. In 1785, the factor noted how the presence of these ex-soldiers was beneficial in that they constituted a ready and valuable recruiting source of veterans. This example highlights how resettlement was deliberately practised by the estate authorities as part of a long term policy to ensure the military potential of the estate was not damaged for future recruiting drives. (Given the near permanent state of war in which eighteenth century Britain found itself, this was, in fact, quite logical).⁴¹

While the impact was not universal or significant over the entire estate, some large and specific farms became crofted to a significant extent in this period. Throughout late 1782 and early 1783, famine was prevalent across the region, and the returning soldiers represented a prominent factor in the already complex sphere of estate management. The rise of subtenant personnel is also apparent in Argyll. As in Perthshire, tenantry tended to lose ground to soldiers by the process of formalising croft separation. In 1782, the tenants of the Glenorchy farm of Gualachullian lost the farm croft to a soldier. Inveriananmor was described as " now let to Peter Sinclair subtenant from Lower Fernoch, father to Sinclair a fencible soldier "; another possessor had lost a quarter of his holdings due to the settlement of a dispossessed tenant who had lost his farm to a soldier. ⁴²

In the summer of 1783, the Argyllshire factor, John Campbell of Lochend, was ordered to inquire into the state of all farms under his jurisdiction, and in particular to note the desire expressed by Breadalbane to see more substantial tenants. However, recruiting pressures evident on the estate helped to induce confusion within this intended estate strategy which, by June 1783, had turned less towards a policy of farm enlargement than towards one which laid emphasis on population settlement. Commercial concerns were met by keeping the mountainous farms in large holdings to maximise productivity for the cattle market.

However, with regard to arable areas, it was suggested that any farms " that are found proper for raising corns, be divided as much as may be. " The factor submitted his final report on 3 September 1783. It stressed the policy of division amongst the more able tenants, creating separate individual farms for them and by this method reducing the actual amount of tenants to one per farm division - in essence single tenancy. ⁴³

The result was a convenient estate re-organisation at a time of intense pressure for possessions. However, on the newly constructed farms on the island of Luing, land was lost as one or two crofts per farm were divided off. The farms of Ardnammer, Ballachuain and Leckbuie, for example, lost tenant lands for four new crofts. Ex-soldiers began to feature prominently in the dash for places, with two of these crofts receiving ex-military personnel. This squeeze on crofts was paralleled by a more direct process whereby the more substantial soldiers pushed for tenant possessions. Sergeant Livingston was given a holding on the farm of Ardnasaul, which was highlighted four years later as in need of further division due to the number of tenants. ⁴⁴

While a feasible plan had been constructed to promote the growth of separate cohesive possessions, this was mirrored by a corresponding pressure on these holdings and the subsequent promotion of crofting. In Argyll, the demands on land brought about by ex-military personnel seems to have been particularly intense, so Campbell of Lochend targeted the Glenorchy farm of Stronmellicheann near Dalmally, and " proposed (it) be divided into crofts for the accommodation of soldiers and others. " It was expected that there would be 30-40 people claiming land. An important proviso to note is that not all would have been soldiers. As in Perthshire, a knock-on effect was evident, with some having been civilian tenantry removed from their farms to make way for favoured military personnel. This occurred to the holder of the Croft of Guallachullin in Glenorchy, and to Archibald Macintyre tenant on the Nether Lorne farm of Achnamaddy. As a result of such removals, and the general economic climate, this crofting policy was continued elsewhere. The farm of Ballavicar on the Island of Seil was broken up into fourteen crofts to provide land for soldiers and the tenants dispossessed by Lochend's plan, while the meadow of Coiash in Glenorchy was set out for twenty cottars incapable of stocking a croft. ⁴⁵

Estate petitions reveal that at least 23 % of all Glenorchy and mainland Netherlorne farms experienced recruiting due to the American war. In turn, seventy six crofts were created by the 1783 report, although some were not divided off and given to their intended possessors until 1784. Interestingly, the report was constructed by Campbell of Lochend; he had been the factor responsible, under the auspices of the Annexed Estate Board, for settling soldiers on crofts in 1763. The earlier settlement policy had obviously deeply influenced Lochend,

who then decided to implement the same strategy again in 1783. Thus the chronology relating to the genesis of the crofting community should in reality be dated forty years earlier than has been suggested by some historians.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the crofting which occurred (while admittedly 100% on only 3 farms in Argyllshire) was still sufficiently widespread on other possessions to suggest that the model of crofting emerging as a product of the transformation of traditional multiple tenant farms into single tenant farms must be revised, both in the perception of gradual development and to a lesser extent in chronology.⁴⁷

Crofting was a conscious policy induced to a significant degree by the specific demands for land generated by both soldiers and the tenantry they displaced. The famine also represented a significant dynamic as it entailed a general loss of capital reserves and a trend in downward social mobility for tenants. This group, already under pressure from ex-soldiers, often found themselves unable to pay rent. As a result, the factor suggested they allow crofts to be made out on their possessions and thus receive income from crofter rent. This strategy allowed estate officials to avoid the creation of separated units, but it also helped to entrench informal subletting and overcrowding. Given the confused and scanty information on military personnel in Lorne in the 1780s, the true extent and role that military demobilisation played in the institution of crofting cannot be accurately assessed. Fluctuating social groupings due to bankruptcy was the main factor in the 1783 plan, but the role played by ex-soldiers was undoubtedly of crucial importance in deciding that a few select farms were rapidly converted into crofts.⁴⁸

The Breadalbane Estate and the raising of the 1793 Fencibles

In March 1793, the War Office announced that seven Fencible Regiments had been ordered for Scotland, five of which were to be sponsored by Highland landlords. As early as July 1790, Breadalbane, in response to a rumour that two battalions of Highlanders were to be raised, had offered between 1200-2000 men. The scheme was refused, as was a similar request from Alexander, fourth Duke of Gordon. Given that Britain's international position was peaceful, except in India, these requests hardly equate with the theory of government pressure upon landlords. Yet the offer of men by Breadalbane and Gordon reflect the continuing importance and concern that they attached to their political position. The likelihood of war in 1790 was considered high, and perhaps more immediately important was the fact that it was an election year. These offers again demonstrate that estates were viewed as political resources and were to be put to uses beyond the practices of revenue extraction by agricultural means.⁴⁹

When war with revolutionary France became imminent in the early months of 1793, Breadalbane entered into negotiations with Henry Dundas to raise 544 men. As a result, in February the government approved the raising of two battalions of 500 men. Nevertheless, Breadalbane quickly came to the conclusion that the crown had allowed so many levies in the area that he needed to reduce the size of the battalion in order to be sure of completing within the three month time scale. The King even wished to refuse the title " Fencible " as it would give an unfair advantage over regiments recruiting for abroad. ⁵⁰

The intensity of recruiting meant that Breadalbane had to emphasise his ability to recruit upon his own estates and not fill his regiment from areas where other levies were operating. Thus the Earl turned to his estate and commenced his primary levy in Argyll and Perthshire - just as he had informed Dundas he would do. ⁵¹ As soon as the War Office confirmation came through, the fourth Earl informed his various Perthshire ground officers that they were to order all those capable of giving sons to repair either to Taymouth or Killin. From the outset there was confusion as to what the Earl intended, and local gentry were approached to clarify the situation. Captain David Campbell of Glenlyon was approached by one of the crofters on the farm of Baillemeanoch asking if the rumour that crofters beneath one cow holding were exempt from giving sons. Glenlyon informed the estate population that, regardless of social status, only those with sons were expected to give in men. This was later extended to include brother in laws, brothers and " near relations. " ⁵²

This first estate levy saw people who could demonstrate they had no children being exempted from involvement in recruiting. The brother of an Argyll soldier was told by Breadalbane that he need not enlist as his family had no other visible means of support. The estate authorities passed over at least thirteen people who had no sons, or whose son was the only bread winner. The names of those who were too small in terms of physical height were noted and told that, should the Earl need more men, he would return for certain numbers. ⁵³ Sons who had left the estate were told to return home so that tenantry under pressure to give in men did not need to pay the extreme bounties required for purchased recruits. Indeed, tenants were encouraged by the estate authorities to order sons back from service with local lairds like Robert Stewart of Cloichfoldich, from the Western Isles, Badenoch, Edinburgh and the Lowlands in general. Those who had migrated from Breadalbane could use their earnings to purchase recruits in an attempt to re-enter the structure of the estate. To minimise labour shortages, only those unwilling to work at home were readily sent by the tenants who, by virtue of their greater agricultural holdings, were more concerned with the consequence of recruiting upon labour levels. These practices clearly show how estate populations utilised the phenomenon of large Highland families to

the maximum, and that even seasonally migrating populations in the Scottish lowlands could still represent a large resource that significantly influenced estate conditions. ⁵⁴

Throughout the rest of March, the Earl levied men in the Perthshire estate only, and in early April moved into Argyll to promote recruitment there. ⁵⁵ As in Perthshire, the tenantry and lower social orders appear to have questioned representatives of the regiment as to what benefits they were entitled to ask from the Earl. Breadalbane was, in fact, represented in Argyll by Archibald Campbell of Easdale and Campbell of Lochend the factor, whose son John gained a captaincy in the regiment. Nevertheless, when Breadalbane arrived at Dalmally, he found that the Glenorchy tenantry had ignored local representatives and congregated to negotiate directly with himself. Such actions illustrate, in a powerful way, how recruiting unleashed latent social expectation and how much estate populations sought to take the initiative. ⁵⁶ Recruiting proceeded rapidly, and on 20 April, George Younge the Secretary at War was pleased to acknowledge the Earl's letter informing him that both his battalions were complete. ⁵⁷

However, the situation was complicated by changing government demands as well as the changing direction of the war. Firstly, contrary to his intimation of April 1793, Breadalbane found that his first battalion was still in need of men. In April 1794, Lord Amherst, the army Commander-in-Chief in Britain, referred Breadalbane's appeal to allow drafting from his stronger second battalion. Lord Adam Gordon, Amherst's opposite number in Scotland, refused this request and stated that the 1st battalion was to be completed by recruiting its own men. This forced Breadalbane back into a recruiting market made deeply inauspicious by the general thrust of crown policy. 1793-5 represented a period when Britain was on the military offensive within Europe. As a result, unprecedented numbers of line regiments were in the process of completing themselves, making recruits significantly more difficult to procure. Allied to this, was the important fact that while the government considered fencible regiments useful, it nevertheless understood that they diverted needed manpower away from the line regiments. The result of this thinking was renewed pressure on landlords to raise new fencibles that would serve in Ireland, so allowing troops from there to be re-deployed directly against the French. By February 1794, such plans were drawn up for the Scottish fencibles. In October 1794, these new style fencibles, as well as the regular regiments, were allowed to recruit from existing levies like Breadalbane's. In the event, over 600 volunteered from the Earl's first and second battalions. While Breadalbane had initially supported the transfer of numbers of his men, by October he had voiced concerns to Henry Dundas regarding what he saw as a serious loss of domestic resources. The government remained largely inflexible and pushed the Earl to extend his regiment's service to Ireland. When the majority of troops failed to comply with this request, the first and second battalions had

their establishments lowered again to 500 men (in March 1793 they had been raised to 1000 each). Moreover, despite the drain of men into the new fencible regiments, the War Office demanded that both be kept up to the regulated strength. In order to benefit from his own recruits, the Earl was allowed in early December 1794 to raise a third battalion which was liable for extended service in Ireland. The levy was denied government money to subsist its recruits until the full number had been raised. This, in turn, put extreme financial pressure on the Earl. Much depended on the success of this third levy. His first battalion had mutinied resulting in Robert Dundas, the Lord Advocate, demanding the break-up of the whole regiment. It was noted to Henry Dundas; "disband both the Breadalbane and Grant fencibles - or at least the offending companies; or it would have been better a fencible regiment had never been seen in Scotland." ⁵⁸

As a direct result of such external factors, pressure remained upon the estate throughout the whole period from March 1793 until the spring of 1795. The rather optimistic announcement by Breadalbane that both battalions were completed did, in fact, mask the anxious nature of affairs left upon the estate. As a result of two years continuous recruiting pressure, it is not surprising that the nature of land promises began to be hotly debated. In May 1793, Sergeant Kennedy and Robert Dewar, both of whom had helped during the recruiting process, felt they ought to get land on the farm of Mains of Moness. To create a rule of precedent in order to control the numerous claims which would follow, Kennedy, the Perthshire estate factor, suggested to the Earl that he give out land under the strictest instructions and "at an adequate fixed rent and not by measurement or appresentation, if otherwise, considering their expectations, their petitions and requests will be endless and men and services purchased at a high ransom." Kennedy noted that future estate policy should involve all requests being referred, and matters left as they stood until the regiment was completed, and the "hurry is over." ⁵⁹

The social expectations released by recruiting is evident from the factor's sentiments. Kennedy's policy was to ensure that the rush for places did not complicate or hinder the practices whereby estate revenue was realised. In December 1793, those turned down as recruits in the spring were ordered to assist in the completion of the first battalion. Tenants on East Kylvirrie were told to recruit regardless of whether they had sons or not. A tenant on Edramuckie farm was removed despite her not having sons to give. This put pressure on those with possessions, as with the tenants of Kingalline, who became anxious about "whatever should be done when ordered again to appear." Recruiting lists illustrate that as a result of the high competitive recruiting market within Scotland, Breadalbane's renewed levying brought in an additional forty nine estate recruits by 18 January 1794. ⁶⁰

In February 1795, Breadalbane announced that those who had contributed would now be considered for possessions. Until that date he had attempted to maintain control and flexibility by stalling the applications for land. Thus, for example, Colin Campbell, son of a deceased tenant in Ardeonaig complained that he had received no answer to his request for a particular holding on his father's old farm. Breadalbane replied that he was, "surprised the petitioner can represent any promise being made to him beyond that of a general nature, on the contrary he avoided at the time he raised his regiment to involve himself in particular promises." Breadalbane was not, in reality, refuting the right to land, merely attempting to slow the process and continue the policy instituted in March 1793. He informed one tenant in 1795 that while he would get a larger possession as promised, it was to be wished that he would demonstrate a little patience. It is interesting to note that in 1799, when the pressure of demobilised soldiers was at its height, Campbell of Easdale stated that; "there are many promises alleged to be given by your Lordship to the men that enlisted with you in this country, which to my knowledge was not the case." This statement demonstrates how estate officials felt frustrated at what they saw as the damaging consequences of sustained and uncontrolled applications for land. ⁶¹

Yet it does appear that tenants, crofters and cottars had been given very specific promises. Within the estate petitions, references show Breadalbane had mentioned not merely certain farms, but also certain portions and possessions. The Earl could not honour all these promises simply because the threatened holders also recruited and gained a perceived right to continue. ⁶² Further, relations of the Earl in the military like Campbell of Glenlyon and Campbell of Carwhin could force Breadalbane into conflicting situations. On 27 November 1794, Kennedy the factor referred the case of a croft on the Lochtayside farm of Edramuckie. Glenlyon wished for a particular person to get the croft. However, as the factor pointed out to Breadalbane, Glenlyon had already promised another person the croft on the farm of Ardvoil which was the only realistic possession the dispossessed Edramuckie crofter could get. This forced Breadalbane to remove the Edramuckie crofter to a farm he had not wished to use for the purpose of resettling dispossessed persons. ⁶³

The Social and Tenorial consequences of Recruitment on the Perthshire and Argyllshire estates 1793 - 1802

In all, the events of 1793-95 demonstrate the methods whereby the actual recruits were procured. Between these dates, 453 men can be traced as raised directly from within the estate population, or from their domestic resources. The Perthshire estate was responsible for 368, the Argyll lands for 85. This affected 63% of the entire farm structure within

Perthshire, and 42% in Argyll. Overall, in terms of the entire estate this means that, at a conservative estimate, even a property as large as that of the Breadalbane family experienced a level of recruitment which approached three farms out of every five. These figures alone suggest that the third Earl had extensively and systematically utilised the demographic and monied resources of his tenantry to a significant degree. ⁶⁴

The cost of such levying was variable and complex. As a result of the need for men, the rental was reduced as a concession to the estate population. In 1788, the entire rental of the Argyllshire estate was £ 5044, by 1794 it had been reduced by £ 566 - equivalent to 11.2% of the entire rental. When considering why the estate was used to such an extent, it is necessary to highlight other causes beyond the influence of government policies and a desire on the part of Highland landlords to remain politically powerful. Recruiting, as has already been highlighted, did, in fact, represent a new and modern use of estate resources. Rather than proving symptomatic of Highland underdevelopment, it actually demonstrates that the estate was responsive to the heightened demand for men that characterised the Scottish and British recruiting markets.

To explain how the estate mirrored and interrelated with this market is crucial to any understanding of why Highland landlords continued to recruit. As with the other fencible regiments raising at the same time, the government allowed Breadalbane three guineas per recruit. Due to various market conditions, including the strength of the Lowland economy and the purchasing power of the British crown, the real cost of recruits was substantially higher. However, if a man cost Breadalbane £ 15 in the open market, the government would still only forward three guineas, leaving the other £ 11.17.0 to be made up by the landlord. Conversely, if Breadalbane gained a man for free, he was still entitled to the three guineas. By offering the manpower on his estate proxy bounty money in the form of land, Breadalbane increased his chances of gaining free or very cheap men, while reducing the extent to which he needed to enter the wider and substantially inflated recruiting market. In this context, estate recruiting made perfect economic sense. From lists of recruits and estate petitions it appears that Breadalbane gained sixty recruits completely free of charge, a clear profit to the Earl of £189. In reality, the level of free recruits was much higher than sixty. That figure is only for those clearly described as 'Free Gratis'. However, widow MacEwan on the farm of Callelachen in the Taymouth district is described on the general lists as having given in a recruit gratis. Yet she is described in her own petition of 1796 as having purchased a recruit to present to Breadalbane. This logically suggests that any person on the estate who is described as having 'purchased' did, in fact, give in a free recruit. ⁶⁵

Table 6:3. Percentage of Recruits by Purchase or Family, Perthshire Estate 1795
(Source:- GD 112/525/23 & GD 112/11/3-7 - Estate Petitions)

Social Group	Recruits Purchased & %	Family Recruits & %	Volunteers & %
Tacksman	8 (80)	2 (20)	-
Single Tenant	4.5 (47.3)	4 (42.1)	1 (10.5)
Tenant	99.5 (53.3)	83 (44.5)	4 (2.1)
Crofter	37 (35.2)	59 (56.1)	9 (8.5)
Cottar	9 (20.9)	21 (48.8)	13 (30.2)
Villager	1 (7.1)	7 (50)	6 (42.8)
	159	176	33

Table 6:3 illustrates that 159 recruits were purchased by the estate population, giving the earl a profit of £ 500.17.0. Against this, is the more complicated reality of negotiation and compromise evident within transactions between Breadalbane and his tenantry. For instance, some soldiers given in by the tenantry did not require a bounty from the earl, but the families gained pecks of meal on a regular basis. On average, this cost the Earl £ 2.12.0 per soldier - or 82.5% of the government bounty for such recruits. In other instances he negotiated with his tenantry various cash deals. Men that took the three guineas from Breadalbane were, in turn, promised by the tenantry that they would pay up extra money to make a more realistic bounty. Tenants would ask the Earl to agree to pay the standard government bounty which they would then match, or at least add to. On 9 February 1795, in the face of intense pressure from the Earl to complete his third battalion, his entire Glenorchy tenantry offered an additional bounty to any Highland recruits. In essence, to gain a realistic market bounty for recruits that did not entail the financial crippling of their landlord, Breadalbane's estate population had agreed to supply the additional cash and credit. ⁶⁶

In the lists that illustrate the bargains agreed between the various parties, the level of recruits that came with conditions attached, as opposed to completely free, totalled 50%. If taken as illustrative of conditions generally, this means that Breadalbane gained 79 free men - £ 248 as opposed to a £ 500 profit on government bounties. The nature of payouts given to those that asked for some form of assisted bounty from Breadalbane is not clear, but their partial cost to the Earl has to be placed against their true market value. Table 6:4 illustrates known market values paid by tenantry in the area to army recruits. If these bounties are averaged, then the cost of recruits paid by Breadalbane tenantry on the open market totalled £ 8.18.1. By recruiting on his Perthshire estate and gaining 368 low cost recruits, either free or at government bounty price, Breadalbane saved, at a conservative estimate, £ 2365.5.8 - or half his entire rental for his Argyllshire estate.⁶⁷ This market perspective, and the significant role that tenantry played in allowing relative profits to the landlord from government money, represents a vital influence which rationalised large estate populations, even in areas like Lochtayside and Netherlorne where economic factors like kelping were largely or completely missing.

Several other important points are need to be emphasised. The economic rationale behind recruiting from domestic resources meant that promises made by the landlord carried with them a strong financial imperative. This, in turn, brought commercial self interest into considerations of the extent to which landlords fulfilled promises. It was not necessarily the maintenance of old and traditional obligations that prompted landlords like Breadalbane to ensure the fulfilment of land promises. While these cultural concerns doubtless acted as a mutual framework, the recruiting relationship was also grounded on a monetary and cash nexus. For these reasons Breadalbane felt it necessary to complete the arrangements he had contracted with his tenantry. This explains why, in April 1799, he was determined to ensure that the men of his first and second battalions received regular discharges, especially those from his own estate.⁶⁸ To the wider population, concepts of *dutchus* and the cultural hangover of military service as a facet of clanship were undoubtedly vital and useful in rationalising what was a profoundly disturbing experience for the majority of the population. Nevertheless, estate levying reflected the adverse recruiting conditions outside the Highlands as much as any innate bellicosity on the part of the estate tenantry. Underlying its rationale for the proprietor were concerns of capital and profit, and, as such, the raising of men by late eighteenth century Highland landlords was as much a matter of revenue as the large capitalised black cattle farms, and was as modern an estate practice as sheep farming.

Table 6:4. Relative Cost of Rent and Hired Recruits Breadalbane Estates 1793-5
(Source:- S.R.O., GD 112/11/3-7 - Estate Petitions)

Farm	Status of Buyer	Annual Rent	Cost of Recruit	Recruit as % of Rent
Rouckvie	Tenant	£ 1.14.3	£ 9.0.0	525
West Tombreck	Tenant	£ 3.4.6	£ 3.3.0	97.6
West Tombreck	Tenant	£ 3.4.6	£ 8.0.0	248
Croftvellich	Tenant	£ 5.11.3	£ 8.0.0	143.8
Balnahannade	Crofter	£ 3.12.7 #	£ 2.0.0	55.1
Tomchrocher	Tenant	£ 3.14.9	£ 3.0.0	80.2
West Turrerich	Tenant	£ 3.10.1	£ 12.12.0	359.5
Achnafaundich*	Tenant	£ 10.10.0	£ 19.8.0	184.7

* = An Argyllshire Farm, with its rent level dated from 1788.

= As the rental in Perthshire does give the level of payment due from crofters on farms held by multiple tenant (as in this case) the average rent of £ 3.12.7 is used.

However, more detailed analysis is necessary to explain the social implications and the effect of recruiting on the estate in general. Table 6:5 illustrates the contrast between the farm structure and the origins of recruits from the Perthshire lands. However, eighteenth century rentals tend to hide as much as they reveal. The figures are drawn from the year 1793 - when the fencibles were raised. The rental, in fact, seriously distorts the apparent balance of groups present on the estate in favour of the elite and middle tenant classes.⁶⁹ In reality, what table 6:5 illustrates is the various groups which paid money directly to the proprietor, or were recognised as having a distinct possession. It is within the groups of crofters and cottars that evidence is least. In July 1787, in a letter by Stewart of Ardvorlich, factor on the Perthshire estate, it was noted that there existed two distinct types of crofter. Those who held from the Earl, had possessions set aside for them, and were

entered onto the rental alongside the tenants. Besides this group, there was a second layer who were placed on land by the tenant, paid rent to him as subtenants and were, in truth, not the immediate concern of the proprietor. Thus, while the tenant level on the rental is accurate, the levels of crofters and cottars merely show the numbers in these social groups officially recognised by the Earl himself. The crofters and cottars shown on the rental, while admittedly hardly secure, could not be removed by the tenants who were required to go to Breadalbane to get permission. A croft, once created out of a tenant holding, tended to become consolidated as a separate unit, a trend significantly enhanced by Achalader during and at the end of the American War.⁷⁰

Table 6:5. Tenorial Structure of Perthshire Estate 1793 and Social Origins of Estate Recruits 1793-5

(Source:- GD 112/525/23 & GD 112/11/3-7 - Estate Petitions)

Farm Type	Total & % of Estate Farms	Average Rent	Total Possessors & %	Total Recruits & %
Tacksman	26 (9.9)	£ 60.7.4	26 (2.3)	10 (2.7)
Single Tenant	34 (13)	£ 17.8.9	34 (3)	9.5 (2.5)
Multip' Tenant	162 (62)	£ 7.5.10	578 (51.9)	186.5 (50.6)
Crofts	29 (11.1)	£ 3.12.8	312 (28)	105 (28.5)
Village	7 (2.6)	£ 1.12.2	122 (10.9)	14 (3.8)
Cottar	3 (1.1)	£ 0.11.3	41 (3.6)	43 (11.6)
	261		1113	368

Tables 6:2, 6:5 and 6:6 suggest that those recognised on the official rental tended to recruit roughly in proportion to their presence within the estate as a whole. In both Perthshire and Argyllshire it was the cottars who appear to have responded in larger numbers relative to their officially recognised position on the estate. Recruiting, in fact, is one of the ways in which the real numerical strength of this particular social group can be gauged. Likewise care is needed with the Argyll figures shown in table 6:6. The total of seven subtenants only represents the number in the 1788 rental who held farms that were out of tack. Most, if not all the tacksmen, and even some multiple tenant farms would have had elements of this group evident upon them. Therefore, in relation to their official status it is not surprising that Argyll subtenantry made a significant impact in recruiting terms. This difference

between their official position on the rental and their recruiting strength strained tacksman and subtenant relations. John Campbell, the tacksman of the Glenorchy farm of Ardtettle had been a half pay officer at the rank of lieutenant. In March 1793, he tried to get the son of one of his subtenants to enlist in his new company; the son refused and waited instead at Dalmally so as to consolidate his chances of reward from the proprietor himself. The family were removed by Lieutenant Campbell, with the result that the Argyll factor and Campbell of Lochend ordered a croft for them in Glenorchy.⁷¹ This example demonstrates how recruiting corroded the established tenurial structure, and how confident it could make the lower social orders. In this case, it was the subtenant family themselves, not landlord strategy, that was responsible for their move onto a crofting possession.

Table 6:6. Tenurial Structure of Argyllshire Estate 1787 and Social Origins of Estate Recruits 1793-5

(Source:- GD 112/11/3-7 - Estate Petitions)

Farm Type	Total & % of Estate	Total Possessors & %	Total Recruits & %
Tacksman	27 (21.7)	27 (9.5)	2 (2.3)
Single Tenant	18 (14.5)	18 (6.3)	1 (1.1)
Multiple Tenant	36 (29)	126 (44.6)	29 (34.1)
Subtenant	4 (3.2)	7 (2.4)	17 (20)
Croft	37 (29.8)	80 (28.3)	22 (24.7)
Cottar	2 (1.6)	24 (8.5)	15 (17.6)
Total	124	282	85

Strain between social groups is evident in Perthshire also. Between 1793 and 1795, as the estate authorities began to order mass removals, there were at least 104 specific attempts on the Perthshire estate by tenants, crofters, and cottars to gain the possession of an established incumbent. This affected 27.2 % of the entire farm structure, and had consequences for hundreds of people. Requests for tenant holdings represented 66.3 % of the total. Therefore, even without a change in structure, recruiting induced substantial pressure on the personnel that made up the tenant ranks on the estate. Within that percentage, estate crofters and cottars made up 46.3% of all requests for tenant possessions. Conversely, tenants made only eleven requests for the repossession of crofter and cottar land back into their larger holdings - equivalent to only 10.5 % of the total. What

recruiting induced, therefore, was two types of pressure; upward pressure on tenants and their holdings as opposed to downward movement against the smaller possessions of the lower social classes. More importantly, however, it also produced lateral pressure whereby most removals were brought on by moving one tenant or crofter onto a different holding that, nevertheless, did not represent a change in social status. The effect of this is reflected in the series of removals that occurred in 1795. As a result, twenty three tenants, fourteen crofters and eight cottars were relocated. By 1796, the last year before the major restructuring of the estate, the rental shows that removals had occurred on 20% of all farms, affecting fifty tenants and thirty two crofters. Crofters suffered the largest turnover in the 1793-5 period in that removals equalled 10.2 % of all personnel compared to only 8.6% of tenant personnel. By the end of the year, however, the push for crofting places had generated another eleven holdings out of multiple tenant farms - testimony to the upward pressure from the lower social orders. This chapter argues that such strains should make historians reflect on the reputation of military recruiting. So often it has been viewed as merely another iniquity of the Highland landlords upon their victimised tenantry. While that argument has undoubted weight, it needs to be balanced by the recognition that recruiting was also the vehicle whereby social ambition was expressed by the tenantry. ⁷²

A consequence of the policy whereby the lower social orders emerged as a relatively high percentage of recruits, was the development of an atmosphere of uncertainty as to security of possession. Within the context of improvement in the Highlands, uncertain tenure had been constantly highlighted as severely detrimental and indicative of farm holding under clanship. However, there is no doubt that recruitment stimulated tenurial uncertainty. In 1799, the factor listed seven Argyll farms that were to receive disbanded soldiers and noted " there are various rumours which creates much anxiety amongst the tenantry. " Even more directly, Robertson, in his 1796 report on Netherlorne, noted the distress that Argyll tenantry had suffered as a result of the frequent removals on the estate. He noted, " some of them merely to make room for people that had no title to land. My Lord Breadalbane might in part be the cause of this confusion. " ⁷³

Parallel to the negative impact of a substantial turnover in personnel, was the consequences of the expense of recruiting. As table 6:4 illustrates, the cost of recruits represented a huge drain on the monied resources of the tenantry. The examples shown represent, on average, over two years rent. As a result of such expense there is a clear pattern to the purchasers of such recruits. Table 6:3 demonstrates that it was the relatively rich and well resourced tenanted class that gave in such men. Conversely, the lower orders tended to draw on their kin resources in relatively larger numbers, which had the obvious value of keeping down the cost of the entire business. The result of such recruiting patterns was the continued

exacerbation of inter-tenantry relations. Rather than uniting the estate population through feelings of injustice and oppression, recruiting provided the catalyst whereby acute land hunger found expression. Those who gave in their immediate family felt that they had a superior claim. There is evidence that lower groups like the crofters and cottars played on the trend of tenantry buying their recruits. In an extremely aggressive petition to Breadalbane, three crofters and one cottar from Crannich and Carwhin targeted the entire tenantry of the district, giving detailed information on the relative failure of them to send in their sons. Out of a total of forty seven tenants, only five had contributed sons. Another eight had given in sons between them, which meant only four additional recruits, while a total of seven tenants had purchased recruits from elsewhere. Conversely, the petitioners, who stressed their recruiting from kin sources, were all promised possessions by the earl. ⁷⁴

The cost of recruiting is also important in that the financial implications did not end with the hired recruit. A tenant in Rynchulaig was forced to take on a servant at high wages to make up for the loss of familial labour. Likewise, on the farm of Licknie a crofter was forced to give up the holding due to an inability to maintain the usual agricultural practices. Others undoubtedly found it increasingly difficult to plough their land. The cost of labour was an obvious economic factor that would affect local conditions. Even prior to 1793, there is evidence that recruiting had brought about deficiencies in labour supply. In 1780-81, the estate authorities attempted to ensure the strict enforcement of servant regulations which favoured the employer by forcing longer periods of contracted labour. It is no coincidence that these years represent the apogee of military recruiting in the Highlands for the American War. By 1795, Katherine Clark was removed from her crofter's holding and given a cottar possession because it was believed that single women were more useful as flexible landless labour. By 1797, the factor on the Argyllshire estate advised the removal of all female tenants who were widowed and without family to manage the farm - evidence both of the demand for places and the scarcity of labour. ⁷⁵ Military recruiting can, in fact, be tied directly to the concerns of labour on the Argyllshire estate. One of the various concessions given to the tenantry in 1793, the year the fencibles were first raised, was the conversion of labour dues totalling £ 25. Given the inflated cattle market, it was easier for tenants to pay the converted rate than to seek substitutes for estate labour demands in a market drained by seasonal emigration and military recruiting. ⁷⁶

Allied to these strains on the estate economy was the direct conflict between the expense of agricultural improvement and recruiting. The amount spent on improvement on the Argyll estate in 1793 totalled £ 33.15.0. In the same year, abatements of rent because of recruiting cost £ 140.2.1. - four times that spent on improvement. Further, that was merely the cost to the landlord, and the relatively substantial sums already noted for recruits must have

dented the tenantry's ability to expend cash on investment.⁷⁷ The unfavourable contrast of expenditure levels was doubtless only a short term phenomenon. However, serious longer term damage could result from recruiting. This was in the matter of personnel. Donald MacNaughtan crofter on the farm of Rynchulaig highlighted the problem in his petition of 1797. MacNaughtan, fearful of losing his possession, argued that he could not recruit as he had expended so much capital on improvement. In the climate of inter-tenantry rivalry, improving tenants pointed out that their progress attracted the attention of those who could expect favours. In sixteen cases where the possessor tried to keep their holding from aggressive targeting, or have smaller holdings returned to allow for continuing improvement, only three succeeded. Even model tenants who had spent large sums were, nevertheless, removed in order to satisfy the demand for places, as in the case of Alexander Thomson, tenant on the farm of East Tullocheann who had spent £ 13 improving. Not unsurprisingly, Thomson bitterly remarked that it was " a new transaction contrary to any that took place in the country. " ⁷⁸ The removal of able tenants was also conspicuous in Argyll. Despite Breadalbane reasserting the belief that substantial tenants ought to hold the farms, the entire tenantry of the farm of Oban in Lorne were removed to make way for the families of soldiers; while the farm of Duachy lost " two substantial decent tenants who were deprived to accommodate Sergeant Hugh MacCowan. " ⁷⁹ Such a poor record with regard to preserving tenants in the possessions they had invested in, represents a serious breach of improvement theory and practice, illustrating the extent to which recruitment adversely affected the process as a whole.

Estate Management and Resettlement policies

The fact that in proportion to their recognised numbers, the tenurially insecure were by virtue of recruiting promises improving their claim to the land, meant that between the years 1795 and 1799 estate reorganisation was prevalent across Breadalbane. As stated already, 1795 saw a series of removals which replaced those who had been refractory in 1793. These vacant possessions could be divided, as in the farms of Alekick and Wester Glenlawers, or experience a change in personnel, with the ex-tenant crofted upon his or her old land. The subdivision and piecemeal loss of holdings could occur in more complex ways. On the farm of Wester Tombreck, the tenant had given his son-in-law a croft out of his own possession (i.e. subletting). The son-in-law had joined the army and received a tenant's holding on another farm. The dispossessed tenant was, in turn, settled on the croft at Wester Tombreck where the recruit's father-in-law could not, as before, remove him at will. Exactly the same scenario occurred on the farm of Edravonnich, where the crofter who paid direct to Breadalbane had sublet, and was therefore removed. The tenant on the farm, who had recruited in the expectation of getting the vacant croft back, found instead that

Breadalbane ordered a "deserving person" to be installed. In Easter Glenlawers the three incumbent tenants found the farm quartered for another tenant and crofter in late 1794. On the farm of East Tullochcheann the new tenant who gained the possession by recruitment, nevertheless, found his holding reduced by the imposition of a new crofter who had also assisted the earl.⁸⁰

These examples demonstrate how complex the re-settlement trends in Breadalbane actually were. It is important to note that it was less the impact of favoured personnel from the military that caused the problem, it was more the matter of the dispossessed and their re-settlement. As 1795 progressed, the estate authorities were generally recognised as being "very much troubled by many of the same petitions" for land. The earl was forced to concede to a disgruntled tenant that he would attempt to ensure no more crofts were made out in the area, and he apologised for the ones that had already been created. This scenario contrasts sharply with the earlier policy of Breadalbane, who had shown a distinct reluctance to make out crofts for the cottar or landless class.⁸¹

Breadalbane sought to reduce this demand by concessions and benefits other than land. The supply of meal to aged parents or families was the most obvious alternative. Thus Duncan Mackercher a crofter on the farm of Tommachrocher in Breadalbane gained no extra land, but was appeased with two pecks of meal a week. The estate authorities agreed to requests for free ploughing, and in Easdale guaranteed work at the slate quarries which, in turn, helped secure the possessors of reduced holdings. However, even this policy was often not enough to secure compliance. The example of Gilbert Livingston on the Island of Seil in Netherlorne illustrates how difficult it was for landlords to control settlement on estates during times of acute demand for men. On 6 May 1793, Livingston, now a soldier in the regiment, stated that the offer of two bolls per annum to his cottar family was not enough. He added that he had been specifically promised a croft for himself, as well as the possibility of one for his brother who had been turned down as a soldier. Livingston represented himself several times by petition, and Breadalbane was eventually to allow the soldier a croft in Netherlorne.⁸²

The general strain on estate resources was undoubtedly heightened by Breadalbane's continued introduction of sheep walks. In order to construct a new sheep farm, the tenants of the farms of Claggan were told to remove, while the tenants of Callechan and Tullichglass lost their sheiling grazing. The case of Callechan is worthy of notice; having lost its grazing, the farm could not be sustained in its traditional form and was broken up into lots to resettle the lower social groupings. By this method both the demands for land and for higher rents from sheep were made possible. It is profoundly ironic to note that

recruitment could, within a broad estate sense, also promote the development of sheep walks. As the demand from the lower social orders for plots intensified, so arable and infield became increasingly subdivided. The increasing numbers of land holders meant traditional souming levels of black cattle were impossible, and so the grazing was removed for sheep and the arable part of the township turned to intensive cultivation.⁸³

By 1794-95, it was being readily accepted that it was necessary to tackle the problem of estate settlement. In both Perthshire and Argyll, the ensuing debates illustrate how significant recruitment had become within the wider issue of estate management. In November 1794, John Campbell of Lochend informed Breadalbane of the state of his Netherlorne property. The report illustrates how management of the estate tended to vacillate from concerns of farm size and feasibility, to strategies dominated by the creation of new holdings. Lochend informed the earl that the 1783 plan had not been fully implemented, and that his preferred strategy of large farm divisions had not occurred. While crofts had been created, the farms had still retained too many tenants on each division. At the root of the problem was population, and in an interesting set of priorities, Lochend noted why it would be difficult to dispense with them.

At the same time [I] acknowledge that in the present case there are many objections, many things against granting leases of any duration upon this estate. The present times, as well with respect to public affairs, as to markets, which very much depend upon them... but then some of these such as the over stock of people, which is looked upon as the great bar and difficulty, cannot at present be got the better of.⁸⁴

Such comment illustrates the extent of outside influences on the decision making process on Highland estates. Lochend's report accepted that, in the circumstances, it was difficult to rid the property of its population. The uncertainty of what course of action to follow was likewise evident in Perthshire. Breadalbane mooted the idea of banning sheep from Lochtayside, or at least reduce the overall level to free pasture for black cattle and their concomitant support for arable farming. Lochend stated that he believed the opposite was true, and that population and black cattle levels were the real barriers to improvement. By December 1795, major decisions were being formulated. Lochend noted " I have always contended that the number of people on your estate of Breadalbane was well as in this country (Netherlorne) was a barr to improvements and a loss to the proprietor. " Again, however, the suggested solution to this demographic problem involved acceptance of large populations rather than sustained eviction.⁸⁵

Campbell did, in fact, give practical expression to this odd stance whereby a near consensus had been reached regarding the anti-improvement consequences of over population, yet where practical solutions constantly involved the recognition and settlement of that very same population. He stressed that in light of the inability of soldiers to stock and then farm their holdings, arable divisions needed to have several tenants which would, in turn, ease the problem of supernumerary people removed from other farms.

In 1796 and 1797, the fourth Earl ordered a general survey to be conducted into the state of both his Argyll and Perthshire properties. The surveyor Robert Robertson conducted an intensive inquiry, and was then ordered to divide the land around Lochtay into lots to create individual farms with a fifteen year lease. This operation illustrates the true pressure that recruiting had generated. Rather than prioritising an improvement agenda, and favouring personnel with stock and capital, Breadalbane categorised, in a particular order, those who were to be settled. The first to be settled were those who had served in the fencibles and who also had the stock and ability to take possessions. Second were the industrious tenants who were also able farmers, while those that had not recruited, regardless of ability, were to be removed.⁸⁶

Throughout February to August 1797, Robertson divided the farms as instructed. This wholesale division took on even more prominence when, in 1798, the government announced that those fencible regiments which would not serve outside Scotland would be disbanded the next year. This meant that by 1798, when the leases for the new farms came to be allotted, the Earl was aware that his first and second battalions stood a fair chance of being demobilised. Added to this was the real possibility that the estate would again experience recruiting. The government did, in fact, offer a fencible regiment to Breadalbane on the basis that it serve in Ireland and the European continent. It was this context which explains why a family called Sinclair were continued on the Netherlorne farm of Annat, as they had eight boys who would soon, the estate authorities noted, make excellent soldiers.⁸⁷

As reorganisation was in the process of completion, specific farms were crofted and set aside for tradesmen and poor persons. The farms of East Ballinlaggan, and Stron Cromie were designated for this purpose. However, it was soon accepted that non artisans could also settle upon the farms, and families of soldiers were soon included. Tenants were quickly settled on holdings in an attempt to maintain their important role in the estate economy. However, by March 1798, the Earl was informed; " that as there are a great number of crofters - thirty six in number, on the farms now offered, or to be offered for, some notice must be taken of them before the tenants are finally settled with. " ⁸⁸ In 1799, when the two battalions were disbanded, the farm of Easter Turrerich had returning soldiers

settled upon it. In the district of Glenquaich the crofters found that division resulted in them losing land, not to the tenants as they had feared, but to returning soldiers.⁸⁹ The results of the Perthshire division around Lochtayside was summarised in the following terms;

" To answer the abilities of the people, the lots of some larger and some smaller [farms] were made so small, as in their uncultivated state barely to be sufficient for the sustenance of tenants having little or no other employment than as farmers. " It finally being noted that, " The proprietor had sacrificed what might have increased his revenue by making larger farms, to a desire of providing, if possible, for all his people. " ⁹⁰

The above description demonstrates how prevalent subdivision had become. Indeed, farms of a size that all but necessitated a separate occupation beyond farming is the classic definition of crofting. In Argyll, a similar situation had developed. By 1796, Robertson compiled a detailed report that again illustrated the indecision evident in planning. Breadalbane had exhibited disquiet at the removal of land from farms as a result of the earlier crofting policies, and had considered whether they ought to be returned to the tenantry. Division into single farms had, as Campbell admitted in 1794, collapsed under the weight of population retention. While it was understood that single tenants on each division would bring in a greater rent, the reality was that on the Island of Luing, three of the eight farms had their original tenant divisions planted with additional personnel, while another three arable holdings had crofts taken off them. Robertson summarised that management of the estate had been characterised by inconsistency and confusion, he added that in light of pro-population strategies, crofts could be broken up further;

The most prudent method is to keep the crofts always as they are, and that without lease or tack given to those crofters, but to have these small possessions always at hand in order to provide decaying tenants or any other people that Lord Breadalbane thinks himself obliged to provide for, and perhaps if necessity requires it to place two people in one croft. ⁹¹

The mid 1790s, a period of intense recruitment, again witnessed the imposition of crofting as the only viable option in light of the pro-population stance of the earl. Indeed, crofting as a policy, especially when it deprived tenantry of part of their holdings, was not the preferred option of the landlord. However, several points mitigated this attitude. The first compelling point is that subdivision was the only method whereby recruiting promises could be met. Secondly, while viewed by contemporaries like Robertson as unimproved agricultural practice, crofting did not, in fact, adversely affect revenue. Indeed, his report pointed out

that the original 1783 crofts could be divided again, allowing for a greater augmentation. He highlighted the fact that crofts without leases brought in higher rent. Table 6:7 illustrates that crofts in the Netherlorne district, already acknowledged as rented higher in proportion to tenant land, were, nevertheless, being augmented at a rate that ranged from 10% to almost 30% higher than other areas.⁹²

Table 6:7. Comparative Augmentations on Tenant and Croft Lands in Netherlorne 1797

(Source:- S.R.O. Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/9/3/3/35)

District	Rent in 1797	Augmentation	%
Isle of Luing	£ 510.5.10	£ 107.12.1	21
Isle of Torsa	£ 52.2.11	£ 17.0.8	32.6
Isle of Scarba	£ 60.0.0	£ 15.0.0	25
Isle of Seil	£ 313.18.4	£ 70.5.7	22.3
Nether Lorne Crofts	£ 736.14.11	£ 345.17.8	46.9

The relative profit that crofting represented should, in itself, re-emphasise the economic rationale behind recruiting. It is crucial to note that while recruiting undoubtedly damaged orthodox improvement practices, it was not necessarily seen as retarding revenue from the estate. Just as taking estate recruits exhibited awareness of market conditions outside the region, so there is also evidence that recruitment was seen in a wider perspective. Within all the various estate papers on the future of sheep and tenantry on Lochtayside, was a tract entitled *Observations on Highland Estate Management*. Written by Sir John Murray Macgregor, it stated that a Highland landlord should moderate farm size for the agricultural conditions in the North of Scotland. The paper continued; " It is from richness in the number of men and a moderate revenue in money that the Highland chieftains and proprietors ought to look for wealth and importance. " This extremely naive standpoint was made more realistic with regard to conditions in the late Eighteenth century Highlands, and made more financially acceptable by the explanation of certain

Advantages far beyond easy and overcharged rents, from the various public offices, civil and military to which their ability to support the state would give themselves and their relatives the fairest and strongest pretensions.⁹³

Recruiting was thus set firmly within a context where Highland property performed the same function as a Lowland estate in that it still provided the resources for revenue to the landlord. Profit from the Highland estate was not to come from being organised exclusively in terms of market orientated agriculture, but from its demographic productivity, allied to a still substantial rental. The use of the estate as a profit making concern was in this case linked to the market and to the state. The development of estate management strategies which emphasised population retention for the service of the state meant that Highland landlords, to a far greater extent than their Lowland counterparts, saw the government as an important supplier of revenue. This, in turn, meant Highland landlords necessarily believed that the state should be actively involved in matters regarding the region. This fundamental difference in outlook can be seen from a long letter written by Breadalbane in February 1803, a period when little or no military recruiting was occurring, when fencibles had been disbanded, and the fiscal-military state was at peace. Breadalbane summarised management on his estate, and added that he had failed to implement policies that would have brought about improvement. He continued;

The more I have considered it, the more I am convinced that without the aid of government improvement in these districts cannot be carried on a general system, or to any great extent unless the patriotic patronage and interference of the government of the country is extended to them. The great population, the small size of the farms, and the prejudice of the people all seem to combine as insurmountable bars to any innovation. By enlarging the farms I might have increased my revenue considerably, but my object was to retain the people. I have detached farms in proper situations for a numerous race of crofters answering to the English description of cottagers but this uncommon population is rather a disadvantage.⁹⁴

Such a letter demonstrates that Breadalbane had implemented the ideas of Sir John Murray-MacGregor as opposed to conventional agricultural improvement. Not without hope, Breadalbane felt that, in return for this patriotic retaining of population to the detriment of his own rental, government ought to be involved. There is evidence outwith the estate papers of the Breadalbane family which collaborate aspects of the estate structure as highlighted by the Earl. It was pointed out in a survey of Perthshire that large estates in the county were characterised by relatively low rentals - just as Breadalbane claimed. Further,

the author of the survey pointed out that several proprietors had allowed the retention of pendicle holdings upon their estates. Likewise, Telford's parliamentary report reinforced Breadalbane's assertions regarding his pro-population policies.⁹⁵

As with the fourth Earl, Telford's report argued that large populations increased revenue in peace time, and provided the country with men during war. Thus it was suggested that premiums were necessary to sustain the men, who would then be tied to military service. Breadalbane's comments in 1803 and the other external evidence highlight how significant the military element was for landowners in the region, and the extent to which the possibilities of state revenue and further military activity had deeply influenced the course of estate management on the properties of the fourth Earl.

Conclusion

The object of this study was firstly to demonstrate that within the Highlands analysis of estate management practices must include the military aspirations of the landlord, and perhaps more importantly, of his near relations. It suggests that political concerns must be taken into consideration alongside that of economic development, and that within the perspective of Highland "improvement," it must be conceded that government policies and pressures were a factor that have been deeply underestimated. It is also clear that the relationship between tenantry and landlord did not operate in a vacuum, or, indeed, was one-sided. Significant social and economic pressures were obviously in existence; tension between the tenantry and the landless orders was, without doubt, a predominant aspect of late eighteenth century Highland life. Indeed, this chapter would argue that inter-tenantry tensions were one of the main dynamics evident on Highland estates. Military recruitment profoundly disturbed the balance between estate groups, and raised the expectations and profile of the landless, cottar and subtenant groups. Recruitment severely disrupted the long term process of improvement through the episodic removal of unco-operative tenant personnel. Recruitment prompted the development of subdivision as opposed to large substantial single tenant farms. Thus it was that, in 1783, the new fourth Earl was suggesting the promotion of larger farms and a landless industrialised population, yet by the mid 1790s was apologising to his tenantry for creating crofts. However, as the case of the Breadalbane family demonstrates, recruiting was not evidence of the failure to improve. It was more an alternative strategy whereby the primary aim of improvement - increased revenue, was, nevertheless achieved on the estate. If improvement was all about maximising an estate's inherent resources, then to late eighteenth century Highland landlords recruiting was merely a different means to achieve the same ends.

- 1). R.H. Campbell, ' The Scottish Improvers and the Course of Agrarian Change in the Eighteenth Century ' in L.M. Cullen & T.C. Smout (eds.) *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Social History, 1600 - 1900* (Edinburgh, 1977), 205 - 212; T.C. Smout: ' Scottish Landowners and Economic Growth 1650 -1850 ' in *S.J.P.E*, vol. 11 (1964), 218, 228 - 230; T.M. Devine, *The Transformation of Rural Scotland: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy, 1660-1815* (Edinburgh, 1994), 165.
- 2). For a critical analysis on the course and extent of improvement at estate management level in the Highlands, see: A.I. Macinnes, ' Scottish Gaeldom: The First Phase of Clearance ' in T.M. Devine & R. Mitchison (eds.), *People & Society in Scotland 1760-1830*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1988), 80; T.M. Devine, ' Social Responses of Agrarian " Improvement " : The Highland & Lowland Clearances in Scotland ' in R.A. Houston & I.D. Whyte (eds.), *Scottish Society 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1989), 151 & 158.
- 3). A.I. Macinnes, ' Land ownership, Land Use and Elite Enterprise in Scottish Gaeldom: from Clanship to Clearance in Argyllshire, 1688-1858 ' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), 1.
- 4). For details on the position of the third Duke of Argyll see chapter one. B. L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms, 35450, ff. 179, 204, 207, 214, 237, 241, 244; B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32727, f. 13, B.A.M., Box 47/5/121 & 133.
- 5). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms, 35450, f. 261.
- 6). J. Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1975), 95, 97, 101.
- 7). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms, 35450, ff., 262 - 285.
- 8). B.L., Add Ms 35450, f. 277.
- 9). P.R.O., W.O. 1/979, unnumbered letter dated 17 & 30 July 1759; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, ff. 266, 268 & 270.
- 10). For Breadalbane's Perthshire Rental see; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/15/359/3.
- 11). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, ff. 270, 272-74.
- 12). S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield Papers, GD 14/145-6; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Muniments, GD 170/1061/10; GD 170/1061/17/1; B.L., Add Ms 35450, f. 281.
- 13). B.L., Add Ms 35450, f. 277.
- 14). B.L., Add Ms 35450, f. 281; B.A.M., Box 47/11/115. It should be noted that Breadalbane and Atholl did at least get the benefit of the commissions for the companies they raised. In the case of the Campbell Earl, a company was given to Lieutenant Archibald Campbell brother of John Campbell of Achalader, a prominent tacksman and creditor of the third Earl's. Nine years later show Achalader still held five wadsets for loans to the total of

£ 1177 (Scots). See: J.M. Bulloch, *Territorial Soldiering in the North East of Scotland during 1759-1814*, (Aberdeen, 1914), 25; S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/26/31/1.

15). D.H., Loudon Papers, A/993, ff. 7-8; B.A.M., Box 47/12/3.

16). B.A.M., Box 47/11/119, 123, 128 & 141; Box 47/12/5; B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, f. 287. It should also be noted that Munro himself offered to raise a regiment because of his own poor political prospects in his seat of Tain Burghs, See: L. Namier & John Brooke (eds.), *The House of Commons 1754-90* vol. 3 (London, 1964), 180. Regarding Macleod, it should be noted that Powrie, an Angus Laird, was, in fact, related to the Skye family.

17). Namier & Brooke, loc. cit., 186-7; B.A.M., Box 47/13/46, 52, 90; B.L., Add Ms 35450, f. 305 & 309.

18). B.A.M., Box 54/4/112.

19). The differing types of county have been broken into the following three groups:
Lowland: Ayr, Berwick, Clackmannan, Dumfries, Fife, Haddington, Kinross, Kirkcubright, Lanark, Linlithgow, Mid- Lothian, Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Stirling and Wigton.
Highland line: Aberdeen, Banff, Bute, Kincardine, Dumbarton, Elgin, Forfar, Nairn, Orkney and Perth. **Highland:** Argyll, Caithness, Cromarty, Inverness, Ross and Sutherland. Sutherland provides a specific example that demonstrates the large military element in the Highland electorate. In 1780 the roll of electors totalled 34. 21 of these held military commissions or pensions - 60% of Sutherland's entire voting community. S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/180/47.

20). B.L., Newcastle Papers, Add Ms 32995, ff. 383, 307; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1461, f. 276-7.

21). A. Murdoch, *The People Above': Politics and Administration in Mid Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 132; B.L., Add Ms, 35450, f. 285; D.H., Loudon Papers, A/972, f. 2; S.R.O., Rose of Kilravock Papers, GD 125/22/16/11 & 17.

22). N.L.S., Saltoun Papers, Ms 16521, f. 113; Ms 16708, ff. 174 & 201-2; Ms 16710, ff. 84-5, 88; Ms 16714, ff. 24; P.R.O., W.O. 1/979, unnumbered letter dated 13 September 1759; S.R.O., Campbell of Stonefield, GD 14/ 145; B.L., Add Ms, 35450, ff. 287 & 289.

23). S.R.O., GD 170/1061/18/1; N.L.S., Saltoun Papers, Ms 16709, f. 49; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/15/359/3; GD 112/9/48.

24). S.R.O., Barcaldine Muniments, GD 170/1534; GD 170/1061/10; S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/17/2; N.L.S., Ms 16709, f. 49; Ms 16714, f. 8.

25). S.R.O. GD 112/10/2/1/35-36: Report on Netherlorne 1784; M. Gray, *The Highland Economy 1750-1850* (Edinburgh, 1957), 21; A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 79.

26). Within rentals it can be difficult to distinguish the type of farm structure - especially between single tenant farms and tacksman farms. Generally single tenants did not sublet and therefore held smaller holdings than the traditional tacksman. The calculations for farm type are based on the following. £30 or over = Tacksman. £30- £5 = Single Tenant. Under £5 = croft.

27). W.R.H., Robertson's Report on Netherlorne 1796, R.H.P. 972/5; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/9/3/3/14; GD112/9/62; GD112/9/5/12/2; GD112/14/12/7/8; GD112/14/12/7/8; GD112/12/1/5/18; M.M. McArthur (ed.), *Survey of LochTayside 1769*, (Edinburgh, 1936), xxxiii; D. J. Withrington & I. Grant (eds.), *The Statistical Account of Scotland 1791-1799*, vol. 12 (Wakefield, 1979), introduction xxxvii.

28). B.L., Hardwicke Ms, Add Ms 35450, f. 40. The threat of severe reprisals in the form of estate devastation also made the Earl anxious not to raise men for the government, especially while the main Jacobite army was less than 15 miles from Kenmore.

29). S.R.O., GD112/16/1/5; B.L., Add Ms 35450, f. 72. A family of subtenants had maintained themselves on the farm of Kinreachine in Glenorchy in lieu of military service completed under Campbell of Carwhin in 1745. It is significant to note, however, that the above recruiting drive never resulted in any official tenurial innovations and the above family remained at subtenant status. S.R.O., GD112/11/7/1/15(1-2).

30). B.L., Hardwicke Papers, Add Ms 35450, f. 63; S.R.O., GD 112/9/49.

31). B.L., Add Ms, 35450, ff. 51-2, 65; N.L.S., Saltoun Papers, Ms 16604, f. 65.

32) B.L., Add Ms, 35450, f. 266; S.R.A., T.D. 363, Evaluation Roll of Argyll 1751; A.I. Macinnes, 'Landownership, land Use and Elite Enterprise in Scottish Gaeldom: from Clanship to Clearance in Argyllshire, 1688-1858' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), 5.

33). B.L., Hardwicke Papers Add Ms 35450, f. 281; A.H. Miller (ed.), *Scottish Forfeited Estates Papers, 1715:1745* (Edinburgh, 1909), 301.

34). S.R.O., GD 50/11/1/25; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/4/1/62; GD 112/11/3/4/1 & 2; GD 112/11/3/3/4; A.H. Miller (ed.), loc. cit., 301.

35). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/1/6/4; GD 112/11/3/1/18, 30. In 1778 Argyll again raised a Fencible Regiment under the command of Lord Frederick Campbell putting further pressure on the estate in that county.

36). S.R.O., GD 112/11/1/4/62(2); GD 112/11/1/4/100; P.R.O., WO. 25/3200.

37). S.R.O., GD 112/11/2/5/21.

38). M.M. McArthur (ed.), loc. cit., xv; S.R.O., GD 112/11/3/1/18.

39). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/1/4/89; GD 112/11/1/4/59. For the formalised separation of crofts in Tommachrocher see: M.M. McArthur (ed.), loc. cit., 16-17, and 1793 rental; GD 112/9/62.

40). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/1/4/42; GD 112/11/4/2/34(1-4).

41). M.M. McArthur (ed.), loc. cit., 203-207; S.R.O., GD112/9/62; GD112/11/1/2/1-100; GD112/16/4/1/3.

42). See Argyll Rental 1782, GD 112/9/3/4/4.

43). W.R.H., R.H.P. 972/5; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/14/12/7/8; GD 112/12/1/2/14-15; A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 83-4.

44). W.R.H., R.H.P. 972/5; S.R.O., GD 112/9/3/3/14; GD 112/10/2/1/35 - 36x; GD112/16/4/1; GD 112/16/4/1.

45). S.R.O., GD112/9/3/4/1-15; GD112/3/3/14; GD112/16/4/1/2. For evidence of demobbed soldiers in Stronmellicheann; J.R. Western, *The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain 1793-99* (Unpublished PhD Thesis Edinburgh University 1953), 107.

46). J.B. Caird, 'The Making of the Scottish Rural Landscape' in *S.G.M.*, vol. 103 (1987), 67-9. Given the obvious connection between the crofts for soldiers in 1763 and 1783, as well as the common link of Campbell of Lochend as factor, then the assertions made in the chapter on the Annexed Estates must be interpreted as correct. See chapter four, footnote 92, p. 175.

47). A.I. Macinnes, loc. cit., 83 - 84.

48). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD112/11/2/5/19.

49). *Scots Magazine*, vol. 55 (Edinburgh, 1793), 153. The regiments were Gordon's, Argyle's, Breadalbane's Wemyss's (Sutherland), Grant's, Elglinton's and Hoptoun's. J.M. Bulloch, loc. cit., 192-3; R.G. Thorne (ed.), *The House of Commons 1790-1820*, vol. 2 (London, 1986), 546; S.R.O., GD 112/52/22; N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 4, ff. 103, 124, 164, 179.

50). S.R.O., GD 112/52/22; GD 112/52/23/4 & 9.

51). S.R.O., GD 112/52/23/4. Indeed, the Earl actively discouraged his own tenantry from seeking recruits outwith the estate until local manpower had at least been partly mobilised. In March, when the regiment had just been announced, Alexander Macnab, a substantial tenant on the Perthshire estate wrote to friends in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Argyll telling them to enlist men from areas outwith the estate who, nevertheless, would act as representatives for the farms he held from Breadalbane. Interestingly, the Earl did not consider this appropriate, and insisted the letters be recalled. See GD 112/11/4/3/50.

52). S.R.O., GD 112/52/522; GD 112/11/5/1/57; GD 112/11/7/1/20.

53). S.R.O., GD 112/11/3/2/107; GD 112/11/4/1/62; GD 112/11/2/5/30-31, 65; GD 112/11/7/1/20; GD 112/3/2/107; GD 112/11/4/3/12; GD 112/11/3/3/94. This early policy of "passing over" families with only one son made sense in that, while good recruits were lost, poverty levels on the estate were not promoted unduly.

54). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/3/3/91; GD 112/11/2/5/20-1, 42; GD 112/2/5/60; GD 112/11/4/2/33(1-3); GD 112/11/4/3/69; GD 112/11/3/4/59; GD 112/11/5/1/83.

55). S.R.O., GD112/52/23/9 - 21; GD 112/11/3/2/85. Recruiting in Argyll had an early success when Captain Campbell of Glenfalloch managed to enlist, from the relatively industrialised community of Tyndrum, some miners from the lead works.

56). S.R.O., GD 112/11/4/2/65; GD 112/11/7/1/15(1-2).

57). S.R.O., GD 112/52/23/22.

58). J. Western, loc. cit., 5, 10-11; J. Prebble, loc. cit., 322; S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin Papers, GD 133/220, 227a; S.R.O, Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/6/77/1- 4, 7; N.L.S., Melville papers, Ms 6, ff. 139, 207; S.R.O., GD 112/52/23/4, 9, 14, 6; GD 112/52/42/ 5, 13-14; GD 112/52/102/2, 6; GD 112/52/14/5, 12-13; P.R.O., W.O. 1/617, f. 29.

59). S.R.O., GD 112/14/12/7/17. Despite this cautious policy, the demands for land meant that any vacancy was utilised. On 1 April 1793, despite attempting to repay his debts, John Macintyre tenant on the Lochtayside farm of Shenlarich was evicted in order to begin to meet the demand for places. The farm of Cult of Clocrane was to have all six tenants removed despite two later recruiting. See: Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/2/5/49; GD 112/11/3/2/65; GD 112/11/3/4/10.

60). S.R.O., GD 112/3/2/1; GD 112/11/2/5/3, 14; GD 112/11/2/5/41; GD 112/11/2/5/87; GD 112/52/524/1.

61). S.R.O., GD112/3/4/46; GD112/11/3/4/40; GD 112/11/7/1/6; GD112/11/4/2/76; GD112/11/3/4/24.

62). Within the estate papers ten specific references to promises of farms made at the time of recruitment can be found. (three out of ten were definitely honoured; while the rest are not recorded subsequently). The same type of croft promises are also evident. S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, (Tenant Petitions), GD 112/11/2/5/1-94; GD 112/11/3/1/1-31; GD 112/11/3/2/1-111; GD 112/11/3/4/1-75; GD 112/11/4/1/1-78; GD 112/11/4/2/1-76; GD 112/11/4/3/1-79; GD 112/11/5/1/1-102; GD 112/11/5/2/1-118; GD 112/11/7/1/1-55; GD 112/11/7/2/1-65. For threatened possessors recruiting to hold land see: GD 112/11/3/2/4; GD 112/11/3/4/10; GD 112/11/3/4/59; GD 112/11/3/4/66(1-2); GD 112/11/4/1/66(1-2).

63). S.R.O., GD 112/11/3/2/3. For other examples of specific recommendations made by Glenlyon and Carwhin see: GD 112/11/2/5/66; GD 112/11/3/2/6; GD 112/11/3/2/35; GD112/11/3/2/72.

64). The figure of 453 men certainly does not represent the entire level of recruitment on the Perthshire or Argyll estates. Given the relatively poorer state of Argyll petitions, the number of men from that part of the estate is a conservative figure. The figures are drawn from the military papers, 1793 and 1788 rentals, various estate reports and the estate petitions from 1793-1800. S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/52/524/1-4; GD 112/52/522; GD 112/13/8/8x; GD 112/16/7/3/27; GD 112/9/62; GD 112/11/2/5/1-94; GD 112/11/3/1/1-31; GD 112/11/3/2/1-111; GD 112/11/3/3/1-94; GD 112/11/3/4/1-77; GD 112/11/4/1/1-78; GD 112/11/4/2/1-76; GD 112/11/4/3/1-70; GD 112/11/5/1/1-102; GD 112/11/5/2/1-115; GD 112/11/7/1/1-59; GD 112/11/7/2/1-61; GD 112/11/7/3/1-35; GD 112/11/7/4/1-52.

65). For official bounty levels see: J.M. Bulloch, loc. cit., 143. For the sixty free recruits see: S.R.O., GD 112/11/4/3/9; GD 112/525/23 & GD 112/52/522.

66). S.R.O., GD 112/525/23. For giving of meal and cost see: GD 112/52/524/4. For Glenorchy tenantry offering bounties: S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin Papers, GD 13/221a.

67). The calculations are based as follows. The 79 free recruits represented a saving of both the government bounty and the average market price. This totals £ 703. The other 289 recruits purchased by his tenantry would have cost the Earl, at most, the government bounty of 3 guineas. Nevertheless, this still shielded him from the true market price - £ 8.18.1. Thus, for every recruit purchased by his tenantry Breadalbane saved at least £ 5.15.1. At 289 this totals £ 1662.5.8. The two added together totals £ 2365.5.8.

68). S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin Papers, GD 13/292.

69). The term villagers within the table represents the artisans who had been settled, specifically because of their skills, in agricultural villages like Stron Fernan, Wester Portbane and to an extent Aberfeldie. While a substantial minority, they failed conspicuously to recruit in numbers, which is perhaps explained by their status as a valued commercial and trading sector on the estate. S.R.O., GD 112/9/62; GD 112/11/1/3/12/2; GD 112/11/2/1/1; GD 112/11/1/6/7.

70). For discussion on the problematic nature of rentals see: R.A. Dodgshon, *Land and Society in Early Scotland* (Oxford, 1981), 279-80; S.R.O., GD 112/11/2/5/57; GD112/11/3/2/2; GD 112/11/3/2/26; GD 112/11/3/4/34; GD 112/11/4/2/52. Breadalbane later tended to avoid encouraging the growth of this crofter group. In 1786 he refused crofters holding from tenants on three farms from separating their possessions, which stands in contrast to their creation in the late 1770s. See; S.R.O., GD 112/16/4/1/4; GD 112/11/1/4/26, 54; GD 112/11/2/5/44; GD 112/11/3/1/9/1; GD 112/11/7/2/65.

71). GD 112/11/5/1/90,(1-2).

72). The figures are calculated from the estate petitions for the period involved, as well as the 1793 and 1796 rentals and removal lists. S.R.O., GD 112/9/62 & 64, GD 112/13/8/8x.

73). For critical views on tenurial arrangements and insecurity, see: A.J. Youngson, *After the 45: The Economic Impact on the Scottish Highlands* (Edinburgh, 1973), 14; S.R.O. GD 112/11/7/1/3; W.R.H., R.H.P. 972/5.

74). S.R.O., GD 112/11/2/5/5, 35, 42; GD 112/11/4/3/1; GD 112/13/8/8x.

75). S.R.O., GD 112/11/2/5/9(1), 32, 75, 87; GD 112/11/3/1/7, 30, 31; GD 112/11/3/2/1,68, 107; GD 112/11/3/3/8, 31, 39; GD 112/11/5/1/80; GD 112/11/5/2/66, 81. For 1780s attempts to control labour, see: GD 112/11/1/4/45. For 1790s see: GD 112/13/8/8x; GD 112/4/2/39.

76) S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/26/13/56.

77). Ibid.

78). S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/11/3/2/22; GD 112/11/3/4/3, 7, 10, 44, 66; GD 112/11/4/1/32, 38; GD 112/11/4/2/5, 51, 91; GD 112/11/4/3/12; GD 112/11/5/1/16; GD 112/11/5/2/20, 55; GD 112/11/7/1/34; GD 112/7/2/12.

79). S.R.O., GD 112/11/7/3/15; GD 112/11/7/3/1.

80). In early 1795 one of the tenants on the farm of Ballemore who provided half a recruit, requested from Breadalbane that he annex his mother-in-law's croft to his possession.

Breadalbane stated that if it was a sublet croft it was possible, but he ordered an inquiry into the status of the croft in order to award it to another. S.R.O., GD 112/11/3/4/34; GD 112/11/4/2/5(1-2); GD 112/11/3/3/47; GD 112/11/3/2/51; GD 112/11/3/4/12.

81). S.R.O., GD 112/11/4/2/8; GD 112/11/3/1/9; GD 112/11/3/2/10. See footnote 61, p. 271.

82). The use of gratis meal however insignificant against the acquisition of land, was still an important form of social security (one soldier's father in Netherlorne receiving £6.10.0 worth for the years 1799-1800). Yet while widespread, the policy does not seem to have lessened the desire for land. S.R.O., GD 112/11/2/5/65; GD 112/11/4/1/60; GD 112/11/3/3/30; GD 112/11/7/1/3/4; GD 112/11/2/5/27; GD 112/11/3/1/7; GD 112/11/7/1/3/4-5.

83). S.R.O., GD 112/11/4/1/21-22, 23; GD 112/11/4/2/20-21; GD 112/11/4/3/40.

84). S.R.O., GD 112/12/1/5/48-50x.

85). S.R.O., GD 112/12/1/5/18.

86). S.R.O., GD 112/12/1/2; GD 112/16/3/5/3; GD 112/16/4/2/17; GD 112/11/7/1/42(1-18).

87). S.R.O., GD 112/11/52/90/1; GD 112/11/7/1/34; S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin, GD 13/285a, 292. As the example of the Sinclairs show, recruiting was not considered a short term benefit that could be derived from the estate, it was such a constant reality and possibility that it was always a consideration.

88). These farms were essentially to receive the dispossessed crofters and cottars from divided farms. While the amount of those settled for military promises on this type of farm was small, the amount of dispossessed was in part due to fulfilment or land promises. S.R.O., GD112/11/4/3/39; GD112/11/5/1/96; GD112/11/7/1/1(50); GD 122/16/3/16.

89). S.R.O., GD 112/11/7/2/54. The same scenario is listed in Argyll when Campbell of Easdale listed 10 farms were soldiers were to get either crofts or farms. See: GD 112/11/7/1/3, 15, 34.

90). S.R.O., GD 112/12/1/2.

91). W.R.H., R.H.P. 972/5. S.R.O., GD 112/14/12/7/22. Lochend gave this policy practical expression when he stated that the farm of Oban on the Island of Seil could afford to lose a point of land in order to make out two crofts which could settle four soldiers. S.R.O., GD 112/12/1/5/48; GD 112/11/7/1/3.

92). S.R.O., GD 112/14/12/7/22, 23x; GD 112/4/2/39.

93). S.R.O., GD 112/16/3/5/4.

94). S.R.O., Breadalbane & Gavin of Langton Papers, RH. 4/196.

95). J. Robertson, *A General View of the Agriculture of the County of Perth* (Perth 1799), 67, 73-74, R.D. Clyde, *The Rehabilitation of the Highlander, 1745-1830: Changing Visions of Gaeldom* (Unpublished Ph.D, University of Glasgow 1990), 75.

Chapter Seven

Military Recruiting and the Highland Estate Economy 1756-1815

In terms of the development of Highland estates between 1763-1815, analysis has obviously focused on the rise of commercial attitudes and policies within the landlord class. The result of this new approach towards land use increasingly involved the internal relocation of populations in order that estate resources could be more effectively utilised for commercial pastoralism. This change entailed the rapid break-up of the tacksman and joint tenant system and its replacement across most of the region with large single tenant farms. In kelping areas, a different structure emerged, with small excessively subdivided holdings representing the new tenorial form. Yet within this time frame, there continued an activity which contrasted strongly with the general picture of revolutionary change. The use of estate populations to recruit men for the British army was a procedure that suggests an element of continuity from the days of subsistence and quasi-militarised clanship. There is enough evidence of the direct use of land for military service to give the argument of continuity a certain weight. However, while analysis has increasingly recognised the clear commercial and profit making intent within recruiting, the emphasis remains on the fact that such military activity largely disguised the non-commercial use of estate resources.¹

This stance, whereby the mobilisation of men is explained by the device of residue clanship, has resulted in a rather generalised treatment of the subject. Given the sustained and heightened existence of recruiting alongside wholesale social change in the Highlands, it is rather surprising that military levying has never been assessed from the premise that it could have acted as a catalyst for change in the region. Rather, the discussions concentrate on the reasons for the decline in recruiting - allowing a linked return to an examination of the forces of commercialism and the concomitant decay of clanship. From this perspective, the activity was already obsolete and its demise a certainty with the coming of socio-economic change.²

There are, however, major weak points in this argument. The most obvious is that in 1805 when compared to 1745, larger amounts of Highland males were actively involved in military service of some sort. This fact alone suggests that the crude construction of pitting recruiting against commercial change should be questioned. Examination is therefore necessary to understand in greater detail the motives and reasoning behind why landlords recruited and why, in turn, the middle tacksman elite, joint tenantry, crofter and cottar groups responded in the way they did. The emphasis in this chapter will be on why

levying was sustained, and how it affected the nature, scope and scale of the estates changes that occurred so rapidly during this time period.

Motive and Incentive:- The Highland landlord and the ' Fiscal-Military State.'

The reasons why landlords recruited has already, in one respect, been well documented. The use of their populations in performing military service, above all during the Seven Years War, has been viewed by many commentators as rehabilitating several prominent Jacobite families - the Frasers of Lovat and the Mackenzies of Cromartie to name but the most high profile examples. While undoubtedly a vital concern in 1756-7 for all Highland landlords, rehabilitation was largely a peripheral issue by the time of the American Revolutionary War. Henry Dundas stated on the outbreak of the conflict against the colonists; " It is to talk like children to talk of any danger from disaffection in the north. There is no such thing. " ³ Only for Charles Cameron of Locheil, Duncan Macpherson of Cluny, Kenneth Mackenzie of Cromartie and a few other minor lairds, did this have any relevance, and they constituted but a small part of the total who levied men from their estates. Theories on rehabilitation hardly explain the example of the Argyll family - the largest Highland recruiters. If this same theme is carried through, then as a motive, rehabilitation was non-existent during the apogee of Highland recruiting with the wars against France at the turn of the eighteenth century.

That is not to suggest that wider political motives were not important. Indeed, this chapter will argue the opposite. It has been remarked that Scottish landed gentry from the 1760s onwards developed a hostility towards politics, especially when conducted in London. In its place arose an interest in improvement and the management of their estates. ⁴ While useful, and especially true during the general climate of scotophobia in the 1760s, this argument must not allow the political concerns and ambitions of Highland landlords to be underestimated. In this period, political connections were of growing and, indeed, of vital importance. One of the primary reasons for this was the unrivalled fiscal power that the central legislature and executive had built up in this period. While perhaps not immediately apparent, or of relevance to conditions in the Highlands, these developments in the nature of the British state made involvement in its affairs curiously attractive to the elite from northern Scotland.

Recent historiography has completely altered perceptions regarding the nature of the state in eighteenth century Britain. Far from being weak, under governed and non-absolutist, recent research has pointed to features of the United Kingdom's administration which, in many ways, made it a more absolute country than either France or Prussia - supposedly the

prime examples. Britain had developed as a "fiscal-military state", which exhibited a structural efficiency through the uncontested authority of the crown in parliament. This, in turn, legitimised and ensured the relatively effective imposition of a fiscal burden that was surprisingly intrusive. The taxation system had efficiently harnessed a strong economy, with the resulting level of capital extraction dwarfing that of any private individual. (See table 7:1). The vast sums of money raised by government were overwhelmingly targeted at military spending, with 75-85%, not uncommon in this period. This allowed Britain to develop a military machine which, despite its smaller size in real terms, actually represented a proportionally higher level of mobilisation than that of France. Allied to this militarisation was the fact that Britain saw itself in a context of permanent war. Even periods of peace, like 1763-69, saw fiscal reform on the explicit reasoning that war would recommence. From these developments, a permanent ability to supply the military sector made the state, in turn, a large factor in the domestic economy. ⁵

The impact that this amount of fiscal power had on all sectors of commerce and output is hard to quantify. Several general trends, however, need to be highlighted. The strength of British financing lay in the fact that, through the authorising of public debt by the House of Commons, the state retained a level of creditor confidence that was the envy of western Europe. With parliament able to ensure taxation receipts to the Bank of England, government became a sure investment. This can be demonstrated by the fact that in 1709 there were 10 000 stock-holders, by 1756, 60 000. By 1783 loans equalled 66% of all government expenditure, a larger burden of debt than the level that provoked crisis and revolution in France. The sure return of state investment was matched by the high level of repayment interest. The fiscal-military state, therefore, became an immensely attractive proposition, with creditor confidence regarding its ability to pay, noticeably high. The direct result of the state's attractive financial clout was its "colonisation" by certain elements within Britain, who benefited from their involvement within the echelons of either the civilian or military appendages of government. ⁶

Another aspect of the inherent financial strength of the state was that it drew investment out of the private sector and into public channels. Investors in banks removed their capital to the extent that credit was disrupted. This, in turn, increased levels of interest on borrowing, making mortgages more difficult to obtain during war years. During the American War, interest rates went from 4% in 1777 to 5.3% in 1782; while in Scotland, the banks raised borrowing rates in an attempt to retain capital in the face of drain into government stock. As a direct result of this, land prices fell as potential purchasers either diverted capital elsewhere, or backed off as a result of high repayment charges on borrowing. ⁷

Any study of the Highlands and the role, if any, of the government in the development of the area, must acknowledge these consequences. As part of the United Kingdom, the north of Scotland lay under the influence of the richest administration in western Europe. The state, by inadvertently making finance difficult for those in the private sector, provided a powerful reason for Highland landlords to colonise and access its revenue. This is one reason why, for the 1739-1815 period at least, commentators would do well to add landed proprietors in the Highlands to those such as the monied interest in the city of London that distinguished themselves in successfully completing this colonisation process.

To maintain or construct positive links and patronage opportunities with this fiscal military government, constitutes the central reason why Highland landlords raised regiments. On 31 January 1760, John Maule, secretary to the third Duke of Argyll, informed the Duke of Atholl regarding recruiting. " Whether the scheme is accepted or not, I think it must be of service to you and be reckoned meritorious. " The same line of thinking was evident when, in December 1777, Macdonald of Sleat was specifically informed that; " an opportunity offers to you to distinguish yourself in the eyes of the administration. " Likewise, it was noted in March 1793 regarding the Earl of Seaforth's prospects should he begin recruiting; " I foresee many good consequences to yourself and your family by a good understanding with the honest patriotic parts of administration. " Exactly the same thinking applied to the fourth Earl of Breadalbane when his attempts to raise men were discussed. " It may be very right, and create a union between the Earl and the present administration. " ⁸

That seeking favour in London maintained the landlords' interest in politics, and that this expressed itself in the form of regiment raising, can be summarised by the example of Alexander, fourth Duke of Gordon. On 6 December 1783, in a report to Henry Dundas, Gordon stated that despite his earlier inclination, he had been persuaded to indulge in politics. It was noted by Lord North regarding Gordon; " He thinks it will hurt his interest and credit, not to raise a regiment when so many of his countrymen do. " The interest that Gordon was attempting to construct was, in turn, described on 12 September 1778 by Andrew Macpherson of Benchar in Badenoch. He noted that it was not merely from clannish connections that he had collected five men for Gordon's Northern Fencibles. He expressed the wish that he could have collected more, but pointed out how his son had already drained his small estate. Macpherson noted honestly that it was in the direct economic and financial interest of Gordon's followers to give him men.

I know how deeply his Grace's honour is engaged for his battalion, and that as it is his first essay for support of government in the military line, they will have an attentive eye upon the progress and will be apt to judge of his future ability by the success attending this particular instance..... The more his consequence is established with the administration he will have it more in his power to do for his dependants. ⁹

Given the direct pressure applied by the government, there existed two distinct trends which exerted themselves upon the Highland proprietor; the direct requests from London, and the voluntary attempts by proprietors to maintain or enhance their political influence. These considerations, when allied to the financial motives discussed later, produced a distinct atmosphere of competition. It is not a common perception of landlords in this period to see them as suffering from any form of pressure, except, perhaps, that brought on by chronic indebtedness. However, the drive to recruit was seen as a praiseworthy activity that reinforced the position of any individual landlord within their own ranks. As such, it was an objective which, in order to confirm their status, landowners felt they necessarily needed to be involved in. This thinking was evident when, in April 1778, the Duke of Gordon declared he felt compelled to raise men. The Duke of Buccleugh, who was a close political intimate of Henry Dundas, had been persuaded to offer 2000 men to the government. Gordon stated he had to offer the same or else the Highland counties would appear to lack zeal. He constructed a scheme to ensure that he could emulate Buccleugh's 2000 men. (See appendix two). Gordon felt obliged to recruit in order that he did not fall behind in the race to impress government figures. ¹⁰

The reaction of landlords to the problem of recruiting demonstrate a level of apprehension that is perhaps surprising given their position in society. They were deeply conscious of their respective recruiting records, which largely explains the reasoning behind the opposition to the levying tactics of the Gordon family in 1760. Upon rumours of brutal conscription within areas controlled by the northern family, the third Duke of Argyll, aware from personal experience of the importance of a good reputation in this sphere, tacitly approved of both local and judicial moves to discredit the emerging Gordon regiment. As the undisputed head of the British-Highland military, Argyll was merely attempting to ensure that levies from the region remained largely under his control. To destroy the reputation of an opponent was a useful political strategy that had tangible benefits. This largely explains the concern for reputation which was also evident in April 1778 with regard to Lord Alexander Macdonald's 76th regiment. Lieutenant David Barclay assured Macdonald that he would widely publicise the amounts of men taken from his estate, as well as the fact that it had been completed without the usual "acts of grossest cruelty".

Just over a week later, the Edinburgh newspapers reported that Macdonald had recruited 150 men, a total that did not include men taken from his lands by other officers from the battalion. With perhaps more reason than most to demonstrate their ability to the state, the Locheil interest exhibited the same awareness for reputation. By 1775, it was clear from the sentiments of Henry Dundas that the Annexed estates were to be returned to the formerly attainted families. This policy became widely known throughout the Highlands, and it was in order to confirm the sensible nature of such a strategy that the success of Charles Cameron of Locheil in recruiting for Fraser's battalion was highlighted. Late in 1775, the *Scots Magazine* noted, "Locheil is said to have got seventy two recruits in two days." ¹¹

The need to justify their actions and capabilities within the realm of military levying also demonstrates the extent to which landlords felt recruiting reflected on their local position. In November 1794, during a discussion of the problems raising a fencible regiment in Argyll, it was noted that the county levy had only gained enough officers because of the substantial interest of the ducal family, to which it was added that another regiment was impossible; "unless the honour of his Grace the Duke of Argyll and his family were pledged to government for it." The stakes in terms of reputation were obviously high, with an unsuccessful fencible regiment reflecting personally on even the most powerful landlord. These sentiments were also evident on 25 November 1790, when a series of independent companies were raised within Britain. As a result, Allan McLean wrote to Murdoch Maclaine of Lochbuie in relation to recruiting in Mull, and explained why he had refused to be involved.

I will confess that when I wrote to my Highland friends about recruiting, I more than doubted about any success, and as that was the case, that I might not expose them or myself, or let the War Office know of what little consequence we were as a Highland clan on such occasions. ¹²

Recruiting in the Highlands was thus the most high profile indicator of political activity and local strength. Allied to the wish to gain a partnership with government were other trends which stimulated the landlords' attempts to gain favour. Ironically, these additional pressures were in part generated by the state itself. This involved the structure and consequences of wartime financing on both Scotland and the Highland elite. Here it is important to note the increasingly vital role that non-estate sources of credit, such as London and the provincial banks, played in the revenue strategies of lairds from the area. Increasingly, from the 1770s onwards, these sources of capital meant that the estate itself became a source of security on loans. Credit became easier to find and traditional methods such as wadsetting declined. In an interesting extra dimension to why landlords retained

their estate populations, it was noted by Seaforth in May 1788 that larger populations would enhance the potential economic prospects of his estate. This would result in creditor confidence and willingness to lend him capital.

The consequence of residence would make persons, inclined from oppression to emigrate, [to] select the Lewis as an asylum.... and as no private fortune can alone bring improvement to a country the residence of a proprietor acknowledged of the best local information and management would be more likely to attract the enterprise of monied men. ¹³

In light of the Earl's strategy for external financing, the effects of war on credit is vital. As in the country in general, banks became stringent in their loaning policy as any major conflict continued in length and intensity. In April 1778, when raising his fencible regiment, Gordon found that the bank of Scotland had begun calling in loans on personal security. As a result, Gordon was forced to pay back £ 1 500. So strict did credit become, that even for a £ 2 000 loan, Gordon was forced to link repayments directly to annual rent receipts. In March 1793, as war commenced, the county banks in the north east of Scotland faced a run on their reserves. It was noted;

Last month, we could have commanded £ 10 000 for Lord Findlater, on discounted bills or otherwise. The county banks almost everywhere are under the necessity of declining to discount bills. From this time we must determine to take all sums that are offered by people on Lord Findlater's estate, or in the neighbourhood. ¹⁴

What this statement illustrates is that war stimulated a revenue extracting policy for Findlater's estates. By disrupting the external sources of credit, war forced a rethink on where and by which methods landlords gained spare capital. One such method was to recruit and gain revenue from the state. With regard to the effects of war on money supply, it is important to note that this contraction in credit at the start of the French Revolutionary War was not unusual. In 1759, while large scale recruiting swallowed spare money, it was noted to John Mackenzie of Delvine, lawyer to William, Earl of Sutherland, regarding conditions in Scotland. " I believe that should the war continue two years longer, money would be exceedingly scarce with you. " As credit became tight, those who had spare reserves in the form of money owed to them pressed for repayment. This was evident in the case of the Duke of Gordon who, in February 1778, called in a £ 6 000 debt from the Earl of Aberdeen. Likewise, in late October 1794, Captain Macpherson of Invertromie found his creditors desperate for repayment of his debt. This suggests that weakened credit resources

allowed a cycle to develop that forced bankruptcies to increase. This, in turn, de-stabilised confidence, sending investors into the safer realms of government stocks and shares. In the period after 1778, during the intensification of the American War, the estate papers of the Sutherland, Seaforth and Maclaine of Lochbuie families, demonstrate that they experienced problems retrieving either cash re-payments on debts owed to them, or gaining high levels of credit. Likewise, the Campbells of Glenure noted in mid March 1779 that the banks were refusing loans due to the widespread bankruptcies of Highland lairds.¹⁵

Allied to this lowering of credit sources in general, the situation was compounded by the fact that military conflict, by reducing the circulation of capital, also lowered the price of property. This made the partial sale of estates a self defeating policy, and constant borrowing on their value increasingly difficult. In October 1794, Macpherson of Invertromie, as already noted, found himself so pressurised by creditors that he was forced to consider selling his estate in eastern Inverness-shire. In discussions with his agent regarding Macpherson's estate, it was noted to the Duke of Gordon that he had several options open to him. Firstly, regarding Macpherson's asking price of £ 3800, it was known that had he sold in 1792, before the war, he would have got £ 4200 - 10.5% more. It was also suggested that Macpherson's creditors were so desperate for payment that Gordon would be able to buy up the laird's debts and then offer only £ 2 000 for the entire estate - 47% of its original value. This decline in land prices was a common experience. In December 1794, it was highlighted that Colonel Norman Macleod of Dunvegan was attempting to sell his Glenelg estate. It was also noted that due to the drain into government stocks, only Lord Alexander Macdonald had enough spare capital amongst local landlords to attempt a purchase. The result of this was a fifteen year delay in the sale of the estate.¹⁶

Even in 1775, while credit in Scotland remained relatively easy to obtain, it was noted that a Perthshire laird sold parts of his estate at undervalued prices to gain ready money to recruit. In 1794 in Lochaber, Cameron of Locheil sold sections of his estate at 20% of their real value, again indicating how hard it was to obtain capital. Conversely, in the same year, Cameron of Glendessary, who had returned from East India Company service was told that despite having spare cash, he need not rush into buying the property of Acharn as it was so highly priced it would not sell quickly. In 1797, it was noted by advisers to Seaforth that while the war lasted, the land market as a general rule would remain poor.¹⁷

This partly explains the trend, highlighted by commentators, whereby the land market in the Highlands remained largely stagnant until after 1800. The circumstances and debates by Colonel Francis Humbertson Mackenzie, successor to the substantial Seaforth patrimony, reveal the problems facing landlords in the period. By 7 November 1795, the family debt

totalled £ 90 994. By 1800, it had grown to £ 108 368.8.0. In 1795, the entire rental of Lewis, Lochalsh, Glensheil, the estate of Kintail and the kelping revenues from Lewis totalled only £ 9 049.2.0. This constituted a substantial amount of Seaforth's income, with only the estates of Brahan, Urray and the mainland kelping shores representing other significant areas of income. This wartime situation, in contrast to his optimistic assessment of credit in 1788, made Seaforth seriously consider the sale of Lewis. His adviser, Colin Mackenzie, in a series of letters dated from 17 September 1796, pointed out that while Seaforth's estates were extensive, they were already burdened with debt. Conversely, creditors were increasingly tending towards lairds with unencumbered property. He added that a major creditor, John Polson, planned to arrest his rental remittances, and that this, in turn, would alarm his creditors making the sale of one or even two estates imperative. It was noted that even William Pitt the Younger's policy of excessive loan floatation had contrived to work against Seaforth. By denting investor confidence, the policy had lowered the value of government bonds. Yet rather than sell them at a reduced profit or even loss, investors were calling in additional capital in the form of debts. In a direct and clear summary of the problem of credit diversion, Mackenzie wrote;

" By discounting navy bills at their present rate, besides interest from government, one [investor], in twelve to fifteen months will have a gain of 18-20%. These things are in Scotland better and more generally understood than during the American war and consequently the money lenders are fewer. " Earlier on 26 April 1796 he noted that; " It is obvious that everyday it becomes more difficult for a scotch gentleman of landed property to proceed comfortably under a load of debt, for in times like these which give scope for speculation, Scotland becomes drained of the funds which in ordinary times were lent out. " ¹⁸

The above comment illustrates both the power of the British fiscal-military state and of its ability to profoundly influence local conditions. The subsequent attempts at selling the Lochalsh and Glensheal estates (they were finally selected instead of Lewis, which had greater kelping resources) clearly demonstrate how the war adversely affected the Highland landlord's alternative areas of credit income. Despite suggesting the sale policy on 15 October 1795, no progress had been made by 7 December 1798, with one buyer - a Mr Bain, refusing to proceed further. By 11 November 1799, Colin Mackenzie had attracted the attention of a serious buyer for Lochalsh in the person of Mr. Robert Hill. Seaforth insisted on a price of £ 42 000. In return, Hill offered £ 38 000, saying that the leases which Seaforth admitted he had given the families of his recruits did, in fact, lower the value of the property. The result was that Hill refused to buy, and on 8 August 1800 the estates were re-advertised. On 22 January 1801, Humbertson was urged to accept an offer

of £ 39 000. Simultaneous negotiations with Davidson of Tulloch for farms on the estate of Urray in central eastern Ross-shire, again saw asking prices of £ 7 350 and buyer offers of £ 7 000. These negotiations were settled at £ 7 200. Finally, in January 1801, Lochalsh was sold to a Mr. Innes for £ 38 000: almost 10% less than the original asking price.¹⁹

This situation was also evident in the case of Alexander Robertson of Straloch. In 1775, in a memorial to the government, he stated that his son was a serving officer in the American colonies. He possessed a large estate near New York which had been intended as the collateral to clear the debts on the Perthshire estate. While useful in peacetime, such trans-Atlantic links proved susceptible to the wartime trend of lowering land prices. With an uncertain situation in America, the estate could not be sold, nor could credit be got upon it. In 1775, Robertson had hoped to turn the Perthshire estate over to sheep and gain a small government pension. In 1778, that policy was overturned in response to the changing conditions. Instead, he offered to retain his estate population if he was given the pension and his son made colonel of a regiment.²⁰

War in itself generated such adverse conditions that it is not surprising that military levying became increasingly important for the encumbered Highland elite. Seaforth, Robertson, and other landlords who were anxious to secure sources of capital beyond their immediate rentals, found their new avenues of credit disrupted or made unreliable. This forced a reappraisal of methods whereby money could be accessed. However, just as private sources of credit were disrupted, war heightened and highlighted government outlay, revealing it as a serious alternative for landlords. Within this context, it can be suggested that the relatively new phenomenon of the fiscal-military state was, in fact, the underlying dynamic that motivated proprietary recruiting.

This can be directly illustrated in the case of Seaforth himself. On 26 October 1793, with the news that his battalion had been entered onto the army establishment, the Mackenzie earl was informed in a letter which bluntly demonstrates an indication of motives. " This would be a proper time for you asking something for yourself and your family in consideration of your ready support. " Given the state of his finances, there was reason enough for Seaforth to request favour from the government. By 20 February 1794, it was noted by one adviser that;

I am strongly impressed with the hope that your military career will dissolve all necessity of parting with the Lewis, whole or in part.²¹

In reality, this was too optimistic, and as noted, Seaforth was forced to sell Lochalsh at the turn of the century. His position as Lieutenant Colonel in the army only gave him an additional income of £ 310 per annum. Yet he had not gone to the undoubted trouble of raising 1100 men for the sake of that sum alone. Neither were his advisers naive enough to believe that it would solve the problem of chronic indebtedness. The immediate reason for Seaforth agreeing to levy the men had been to ensure the promotion of his brother-in-law Alexander Mackenzie of Belmaduthie from half pay captain to major. It was widely expected that Seaforth would then sell his commission to his brother-in-law, giving him a sum of £ 3 500 - 87% of an entire annual rental from Lewis. Yet even here, that was not the intended strategy. It was within the context of wider credit concerns that real immediate benefits accrued to the earl. In October 1795, he inquired as to the progress of the army estimates in parliament. Once passed, this would ensure bills of £ 5 000 were sent to the company of Humphrey Donaldson who, in assurance of the cash being repaid, had advanced that sum to the earl. The benefits of this amount of credit can be illustrated by the fact that Seaforth specifically told John Polson, a prominent and disgruntled creditor, that he would get money from the quartermaster of the battalion. ²²

Alongside rising rents and kelp, Seaforth, through his military activity, now had good connections with large financing companies. Seaforth, in essence, had used the state as a bank. Therein lies one of the most relevant reasons for recruiting. Large reserves of exchequer money could be accessed through that policy. Several features of army organisation helped this process whereby civilian use was made of military cash. Scholars of the eighteenth century British state have pointed out that, despite transfers of money from the exchequer to army agents and paymasters, large sums could rest with these persons and be put to their own use, either in short term investments or loans. The result was large unused balances which, in effect, constituted a short term bank. ²³

This is entirely evident in the dealings of military agents Ross and Ogilvie. Agents were the middle men between the Paymaster-General and the regimental accounts. Table 7:1 demonstrates the levels of income and payments by the company, as well as illustrating the vast sums that the state generated for the maintenance of the army. With annual incomes over £ 900 000, Ross and Ogilvie were a standard military agency, and only one of many. The founder, George Ross, was from a Highland background and had benefited from the patronage of the third Duke of Argyll. As a result of this, the company had become a prominent agency for Highland regiments. ²⁴ The table shows that for well over half the French Revolutionary War, the company had over £ 20 000 spare capital.

Table 7:1. Accounts of Ross and Ogilvie 1796-1803

(Source, Court of Session Productions. 96/1429-36)

Year	Income	Expenditure	Balance
1796	£ 1 118 315.17.10	£ 1 094 903.3.11	+ £ 23 413.13.11
1797	£ 994 613.12.8	£ 938 842.1.0	+ £ 55 789.11.0
1798	£ 956 875.10.3	£ 932 775.3.1	+ £ 24 100.7.2
1799	£ 995 222.10.2	£ 974 367.17.10	+ £ 20 854.12.4
1800	£ 882 945.13.8	£ 852.881.15.1	+ £ 30 063.18.7
1801	£ 736.532.10.1	£ 726 211.17.9	+ £ 10 320.12.4
1802	£ 727 455.18.5	£ 715 424.19.3	+ £ 12 030.19.1
1803	£ 599 262.16.0	£ 583 674.0.7	+ £ 15 588.15.5

Thus credit dealers like Gavin Kemp of Leith advanced sums to Captain Graham of the 42nd, as well as to pensioned Highland officers like Lieutenant Roderick McLean and Ensign Allan Macpherson. He did so in the knowledge that agencies like Ross and Ogilvie had the spare capital beyond their immediate regimental requirements to repay such debts. This reinforcing of cash reserves was one of the most significant aspects of the disproportionate involvement of Highland landlords in the wider British military structure. In October 1793, at a time when the beginning of the war had seriously de-stabilised the money market, Murdoch Maclaine of Lochbuie used his position as Quartermaster of the Argyll Fencibles to deposit military revenue into a bank used by himself and his local connections, thus alleviating problems of immediate credit.²⁵ This cross use of military revenue was evident in the case of Highland regiments raised during the Seven Years War. In 1765, two years after the Paris peace treaty, a War Office report showed that £ 6665.9.3 of advances to five Highland levies had not been returned. In the interim, the money was undoubtedly used by the elite officers in these battalions to aid and buttress their private concerns.²⁶

Seaforth was not alone in seeing the financial implications and opportunities of state service. Norman Macleod of Dunvegan in his initial career represents one of the most successful instances of Highland elite "colonisation" of the military state. The parlous

condition of the family finances dominated his concerns in the early 1770s when he became laird. By 1773, Macleod's rental was £ 3918.8.10; the debt totalled £ 40 708.7.9. After deductions and interest payments of £ 2000, Macleod was left with £ 156 a year. By February 1775, local estate creditors who were owed £ 5618 - almost 14% of the entire debt, agreed to hold off action to recover the sum. This is a particularly late example of the old clan elite credit structure allowing the proprietor to remain solvent. In May, he was forced to advertise the sale of his Harris estate. Yet it is at this point that the military options became increasingly prominent. As noted in the chapter on public policy, 1775 saw a spate of rumours concerning regiment raising in the region. In early May, Macleod was in contact with General Simon Fraser of Lovat, who would have been aware of the general trends towards an increase in recruitment. On 19 October, Amelia Moore, the laird's aunt, wrote to Simon Fraser of Lovat pointing out the state of Macleod's debts. Again, in November, Macleod himself wrote to Fraser stating that he had pinned a lot of hope on getting military employment.²⁷ He was subsequently successful, and using his estate population as a springboard to rapid promotion, was appointed to a major's commission by 1778. When this particular promotion occurred, his estate trustees noted that, as he was to go on the lucrative east Indies service, it was assumed he would need no income from the estate and that the whole rental could be diverted into debt reduction. Macleod was later promoted again, and amassed during military service in India, the vast sum of £ 100 000.²⁸

This was an unusual case, and lesser fortunes were undoubtedly the norm. The career of Captain Lachlan Macquarrie has been noted by historians, yet the letters he sent to Maclaine of Lochbuie, which directly equated his new wealth to his military service, could only have heightened perceptions as to the usefulness of maintaining connections with the government. By 1778, in Badenoch, events had come full circle. A Macpherson interest in London used wealth from imperial service in India to ensure a high profile for themselves within the ranks of the Duke of Hamilton's battalion. In this case, money made during military service was now used to perpetuate recruiting, and so continue the flow of imperial profits into local Macpherson families.²⁹

There are widespread examples to illustrate the gains that military service offered. Evidence for this can be seen from the fact that creditors were often pleased at the prospect of their debtors getting a commission. In 1753 Grant of Ballindalloch lent money to the son of Forbes of New in order that he could purchase another company and avoid half pay. This was done because New's son owed Ballindalloch money, and Grant saw military service as the surest means of regaining the loan. This scenario is also evident in the affairs of Hugh Macgilvray and Maclaine of Lochbuie. In 1794, Maclaine gained the lieutenant - colonel's commission in the Dumbartonshire Fencibles. Macgilvray, who

was owed £ 100 since September 1793, had not pressed for re-payment while the laird had recruited. However, on 28 October 1794, he reminded Lochbuie with regard to his new military post; " that you will not forget my son and me seeing that most people are now in good bread in that line of life. " ³⁰

Allied to these examples of credit flexibility, the Earl of Seaforth's accounts highlight the benefits that could accrue. As a result of the family record in raising line regiments, the form most appreciated by the imperial government in London, Humbertson received the governorship of Barbados at the turn of the nineteenth century. Again, his advisers noted that the posting would prove lucrative and prevent a loss of land through sale. Connections with Barbados in the trading sector were also seen as important in surmounting the debt problem. At the turn of the century, his salary and profits from his regiment totalled £ 2 300 - this was equivalent to 98.6% of the combined rentals of his entire Glensheal and Kintail estates. Even by 1808, his governorship was still worth £ 2 000 - exactly one third of his entire landed rental and equal to 18% of his by now enormous keeping income. ³¹

Following the same strategy as Seaforth, Sir James Grant, on 26 March 1801, calculated that an income of £ 1 500 was possible from military service. More immediately, the regiment held by his brother was worth £ 1 400 annually. These concrete and substantial levels of income suggest that those, like Cameron of Glendessary, who believed that regiments could make fortunes, were not basing their plans on mere supposition. The belief that the military was a viable economic avenue was comprehensively held, both across the Highlands as a whole, and within most social groups. Just as creditors saw the opportunity to retrieve their debts, so lairds actively brought their military service to bear on their financial problems. Further down the social scale, Duncan Macpherson, in January 1776, was appointed major to Fraser's battalion. He explicitly noted that military service could help the situation of his debts. ³²

Against the prominent examples of Seaforth and Grant were lesser individuals that, nevertheless, implemented the same policy. Archibald Maclaine of Lochbuie was told in 1779 to sett his estate on long leases and get a commission. It was noted that; " a company you might live genteelly upon, without other aid. " The pay of an army captain was £ 182, over twice the amount of his highest rented farm, and equal to 18% of his entire 1783 rental. To the example of Lochbuie can be added that of Captain Colin Campbell of Glenfalloch. Through his connections with the fourth Earl, Glenfalloch gained a commission in the Breadalbane's Fencibles. By 1794, his rental was £ 482. By February of the same year, his debts totalled £ 1384. He was a half pay lieutenant from the previous war, giving him an additional £ 42.5.0 annually, which, as he held a captain's commission in the

fencibles, had been struck off. His pay as captain was £ 182.5.0 - 37.8% of his entire rental. In a demonstration of the attractiveness of military service to such lairds as Glenfalloch, he stated his chances of gaining the major's position in the regiment were good. If put in context, the pay of a major totalled £ 273.15.0 - 56.6% of his entire rental. Such was the importance of Glenfalloch's military income, that he dreaded the prospect of peace. The direct application of military money onto private affairs is perhaps best summed up with the sentiments of Archibald Menzies of Pitkeathie. In October 1759, Menzies received an inquiry as to whether he would care to have a commission. He replied in the negative, but in doing so he demonstrated that the overall financial position of landed families was an important determinant in military service. Menzies answered; " the only thing that would have made me refuse it was the good way I found my affairs since I came here. " ³³

In a statement which suggests that many saw the accessing of state revenue as a regional speciality, it was noted by Lord Alexander Macdonald in the 1790s that;

There are upon all Highland estates descendants and friends of the respective families, residing upon them, who look upon a war as a sure means to rise under the auspices of their superior. ³⁴

Deliberations in the 1780s amongst the estate authorities and advisers to the young Elizabeth, Countess of Sutherland, powerfully reinforce the analysis that landlords saw government, the state, and the wider empire as uniquely pertinent to conditions and needs in the Highlands. Direct contrasts were drawn between the military capabilities of Highland counties like Sutherland, and Lowland districts like Teviotdale and Tweeddale. Despite emigrations earlier in the decade, in 1779 it was pointed out that in nine to ten days the Sutherland family had gained 1000 men for the state. (The figures are dubious, but the sentiments are, nevertheless, significant). In contrast, it was pointed out that the " Lowland noble of greatest rank " - the Duke of Buccleugh, had failed to find men in his own districts and only managed 800, mostly from the streets of Edinburgh. The contrast between the respective areas was not confined to sycophants for the Sutherlands, but was in fact something that Hugh Montgomery from the south west of Scotland freely admitted was the case. When, in May 1790, he offered only a 500 man regiment to the crown, his reasoning backed up the Sutherland memorial. Montgomerie stating that during the American War, the south west had not, in fact, completed its regiment. This does suggest that the contrast in perceptions between the regions' recruiting abilities was widely held. The Sutherland memorial suggested that with its potential to supply men, the Highlands had the right to call on government assistance more than any other area within Scotland.

Specifically relating to Sutherland, it was believed that it had a more reasonable claim on the revenue of the state than any other county, excepting Argyll. It was pointed out that military levies from the southern county had propelled the Campbells into the position of being the single largest and most high profile kin interest within the empire. ³⁵

What was envisaged, therefore, was a patriotic partnership, which involved government actively giving military commissions and imperial offices to landlords. In return, the proprietors made available to the state both their populations and the acknowledged ability of their class to recruit. There is no doubt that landlords clearly followed this line of thinking. During the spate of regiment raising in the early years of the American War, the military authorities in London, and no less a person than the King, found the determination of Highland lairds to secure military office rather unedifying. In a blatant attempt to gain high rank, Lieutenant Colonel Allan McLean exasperated the King to the extent that he suggested the Mull officer exhibited some of the cunning and artfulness that the cruder followers of John Wilkes attached to most Scots in general. In late 1777, the King again noted the tendency of those offering regiments to make high demands for rank. From amongst all the potential Scottish regimental patrons, only the Duke of Hamilton had not requested inflated promotion. The Duke of Gordon used the precedent of William, Earl of Sutherland, moving from captain to lieutenant-colonel due to his ability to recruit, to press for his brother, Lord William, to receive the same rank. Regarding the Argyll battalion to be raised by Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell of Barbreck, the King refused him the rank of colonel, and said that he could instead "avail himself of the profits of clothing which will be no small encouragement to a Highland laird." ³⁶

This was the case with local units as well as the regular army regiments. The implications of these levies for the lower orders will be discussed in a later section, but for the land owning class, militia regiments and volunteer units were considered a useful buttress to elite income. In May 1797, Lochbuie was urged to obtain high rank in the militia or volunteer forces in Argyll; by this means, it was argued, he could regain control of his own private affairs. So useful was the regular income from this source that John Campbell of Ballaveolin deliberately rented a farm near his levy, so he could keep stricter control over his military affairs. ³⁷

The sums involved in the examples of either direct governorships or spoils do not, at first, compare with the broader consequences of economic change in the region. The access to alternative sources of capital has already been highlighted, yet as the examples of Seaforth, Glenfalloch and Lochbuie suggest, military income probably constituted around 20% of rentals at the turn of the nineteenth century. Commentators have demonstrated how,

from the 1790s especially, Highland estate income was probably rising as fast as any in the United Kingdom. Against this, the influence and importance of such state revenue may seem unimportant. However, it is necessary to review the nature of both types of income.

One of the constant themes of estate management during the era of first phase clearance was the search for regular rent payments. One of the most significant aspects of the emergence of small joint tenantry, was the fear amongst the landlords that regular rent payments would become increasingly infrequent. Characterised by a lack of capital reserves, small tenantry were undoubtedly prisoners to the vagaries of bad crops and poor cattle prices. Table 7:2 illustrates the 1798 to 1810 rentals of the Reay estate in Sutherland. It demonstrates that just as income increased, so did the inability of the tenants to pay. From 1798 through until 1810, arrears were consistently around 10% of the entire rental, and, indeed, had begun to increase.

Table 7:2. Rental of Reay Estate

(Source, N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/3326)

Year	Rental	Arrears	Arrears as % of Rental
1798	£ 1700.12.9	£ 106.16.7	6.2
1799	£ 1775.12.7	£ 151.3.3	8.5
1800	£ 1917.7.11	£ 239.9.8	12.4
1802	£ 2939.12.2	£ 350.0.0	11.9
1805	£ 3003.11.5	£ 292.16.9	9.7
1807	£ 3515.0.6	£ 407.0.6	11.5
1810	£ 4409.9.8	£ 684.0.3	15.5

This picture represents the flip side of the successful landlord drive to raise rentals. The trend for widely differing levels of payment can be illustrated in the case of the Macleod estate. In 1778, real rents paid to Macleod of Dunvegan totalled £ 3757.14.11. A year later, the estate received only £ 3071.18.8 - almost £ 700 negative difference. The case of Campbell of Glenfalloch has already been noted with regard to military income. Part of the rescue package put together to prevent his bankruptcy involved Breadalbane taking one

quarter of his estate in lease. This was an attempt to secure and stabilise Glenfalloch's income, by demonstrating to his creditors that rents would be paid regularly. One of the main reasons for such erratic payments was the over reliance on the droving trade. This was recognised by Macleod's trustees when, in 1781, and in response to the dramatic rise in arrears from 1779, they insisted that in the future, and on pain of removal, only half the rent could be paid by drover's bills.³⁸

Regular payments of rent was the reason Maclaine of Lochbuie's estate was set in long lease in March 1778. These concerns were also evident on the estate of Sutherland, where in 1777, the tenantry had been forced by the drovers to take a 10 shilling reduction in the price per head of cattle. In March 1779, despite initial agreement on bonds, the drovers later attempted to forestall payment. The tenantry opposed this, and insisted on the immediate remittance of bills to the estate authorities. Captain James Sutherland, the factor, stated that for a considerable period of time he had been attempting to get the tenants " on a more certain footing in the credit they give of their cattle. " ³⁹

Likewise, in Lewis by 1779, the credit from drovers had failed, and rent arrears were expected to be high. The problems of the cattle trade, however, were latterly replaced in importance by that of kelping. This activity is well understood as the dynamic that put West Highland rentals on a steep upward curve. However, on 1 March 1794, the factor on Lewis highlighted a negative side. While it allowed a rise in rents, the industry also increased, and, indeed, encouraged arrears. In return for its future manufacture, tenants were receiving meal and then failing to produce the corresponding level of kelp. Allied to this was the fluctuating nature of production in Lewis itself.

Table 7:3 demonstrates the manufacture and concomitant income gained from that article on Lewis from the years 1794-1799. In 1801, production was 275 tons, but the crop was not marketable. What these figures demonstrate is that while the over all amounts of income were high, there were also large swings between the total profits received each year. Moreover, in April 1798, it was calculated that Lewis would produce 331 tons of kelp yet, as the table shows, in reality it came to only 293 - a difference of 38 tons. Given the prices of that year, that would have brought in an extra £ 688 in rent. (This unreliability of production was probably the single largest factor in producing the move to crofting). By 1808, Seaforth's income from kelp was £ 11 000; by 1810, a plan shows that it would be as low as £ 6000 - illustrating the erratic nature of kelp profits.

Table 7:3. Lewis Kelp Production 1794-99

(Source, Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3)

Year	Kelp in Tons	Kelp Account Profits
1794	235	£ 1104.19.7
1795	357	£ 1588.16.2
1796	185, 14 cwt	£ 1400.3.2
1797	185, 3 cwt	£ 1667.0.10
1798	293, 9 cwt	£ 2452.10.5
1799	196, 7 cwt	£ 1766.16.4

The same problems of production effected other areas. In Mull, for example, the interaction of poor kelping prices and the military is evident. By June and August 1800, the upward trend in kelp prices were considered (erroneously as it turns out) at an end. As a result, Murdoch Maclaime of Lochbuie urged McLean of Scalastle, a tacksman who had suffered financially in the kelping business, to enter the East India military, or buy a regular army commission. Despite the high profit margin evident in kelping, even this industry demonstrates examples of tacksmen involved in it, nevertheless, using the military as an alternative economic strategy.⁴⁰

Thus, while the industry was undoubtedly the single most important economic development in the north west, the volatile nature of both its production and price was something that landlords were well aware of. These problems regarding the kelp industry mainly affected the north west Highlands. However, there existed problems with the other new economic activity of sheep farming which had implications across the whole region. Initially, this took the form of lack of expertise and suitable tenants. In March 1775, Duncan Campbell of Glenure failed to find tenants that would stock his farms with sheep and provide him with an increased income. Added to this, was the fact that markets were considered too far away to make sheep viable. This was the case with the Lochbuie estate authorities in September 1784. This hesitancy was probably due in part to the well known fact that the American War had bankrupted a number of sheep farmers in Argyll, and that in 1782-83, many sheep flocks had suffered just as badly as cattle. Even as late 1803, some believed that sheep prices would only remain high until the trade, which involved a few large capitalised

tenants, had completely taken over estates. Then the sheep farmers would link together against landlords, who, with no other income options, would be forced to reduce rents.⁴¹

The reality of the sheep farming trade was, of course, radically different, but the initial insecurities and caution are worthy of note. It is not intended here to underestimate the role of industries like kelping or, indeed, the revenue from estates in general. Yet fluctuating incomes need to be placed within the context of the debt ridden Highland elite. As studies concerning this subject have illustrated, indebtedness was nothing new. Owing substantial sums of money, for instance, had been a characteristic of the seventeenth century lairds. The new element was that, with non-clan sources of funding increasingly prevailing, foreclosure was more likely. Analysis has also suggested that, even here, it was not the whole level of debt that mattered, " but the balance between debt and income. " In order to service the annual interest repayments, yearly levels of finance necessarily needed to be " a combination of stable or increasing income. " This context was demonstrated in February 1775, when against the backdrop of mobilisation, John, fourth Duke of Atholl, summarised his financial position. He declared to his near relation, Colonel John Murray of Strowan, that " my grandfather, as you say, had £ 3000 a year from government. " He told Strowan that he would attempt to live upon that sum, but highlighted the fluctuating income from rentals, noting; " the contingencies which are likely to happen to Highland estates. " In light of this, Atholl added that he expected to be given some financial reward from the state. In early 1778, he raised the 77th Highland regiment, an action that was the direct result of the sentiments expressed above.⁴²

Therein lies the significance of the regular and assured income that military recruiting offered to the Highland landlord. From large magnates like Seaforth to small lairds like Glenfalloch, their military or administrative pay represented a steady and reliable percentage of their overall wealth, giving it an importance beyond its place in their total income. Revenue derived from recruiting fulfilled a specific need of the encumbered elite in the region, and it is this modern function that, to a large extent, explains the motives behind landlord levies. This contemporary financial context also explains the longevity and maintenance of that particular activity during a period of profound change in the region.

Military recruiting and the Highland Estate

Successful recruiting was profoundly important to the landlords because it either reinforced or weakened their political interest and reputation, affecting the future prospects of battalions from government and the ensuing levels of income that came with them. Within this context, the large populations resident on Highland estates were a powerful and

valuable resource. As a result, these populations were targeted by recruiters, whether they were connected to the estate or not. This competition for men, as well as the economic impact at the estate level, explains one of the most important aspects of landlord behaviour in this period - the eager and often precipitant offers of service.

Given that populations were needed for economic development, landlords attempted to avoid excessive loss of manpower upon their estates. In October 1775, Simon Fraser, the archetypal Highland recruiter, received the first new battalion of the American War. Modern commentators have again over-emphasised the fact of the laird's rehabilitation a year earlier in 1774. It is not intended here to suggest that Fraser was not acting out of gratitude to Westminster for returning the family estates, but what motivated him in 1775, was a far more pragmatic agenda than appreciation - namely the commercial welfare of his newly returned property. It should be remembered that Fraser was an experienced recruiter, and that he understood the implications of estate levying. As a result, contemporaries noted that by getting his offer in first and gaining access to undepleted reserves of Highland manpower, Lovat, who had forbidden his officers to use his property, had avoided the necessity of draining his own estate resources in eastern Inverness-shire and Morar.⁴³

Thus rather incongruously, the best method to raise a battalion and avoid the disruption and problems caused by recruiting on estates, was to offer a battalion quickly and hope that government obliged. Fraser's prompt offer before the war properly commenced, was thus symptomatic of concern for the organisational well-being of his estate. This strategy had been evident as early as 1757 when the Grant of Ballindalloch family recruited in such a manner as to avoid the necessity of removing men from a relation's estate.⁴⁴ This context and strategy was well understood by other landlords and explains why, contrary to perception, few proprietors encouraged recruiting upon their estates. In fact, both logic and all the evidence points to a policy of active discouragement, unless it took the form of a levy in which they were personally involved.

The best example of this policy of population protection was on the estates of the Duke of Gordon. By early 1778, in direct competition with Colonel William Gordon of Fyvie, the Duke had failed to secure a regiment and consequently faced a substantial loss of men. By 12 January he had ordered his estate constables to post notices stating that violence against his tenantry would be countered with legal action. Tacksmen on Lochaber and Badenoch farms wrote saying that it was widely expected Macdonnell of Keppoch would receive a commission in Macdonald's or Campbell's regiment, and that this would entail the loss of men from the estate. This scenario is, in fact, what began to occur. By 28 February, Gordon was aware that recruiting by others had taken men he had hoped to utilise in his own future

levy. The frustration felt by the Duke was highlighted by his ordering reports into all the prominent local gentry and tacksmen, directly on his land or connected to his interest, that had entered other levies. The lists reveal that military service had a substantial impact locally. It also demonstrated the extent to which the army was a preferred option for many of the middle elite in the region. In total, there were fourteen local lairds and tacksmen from the Badenoch and Lochaber lordships represented in the regiments that appeared at the end of 1777. They ranged from Lieutenant-Colonels like Macpherson of Cluny, to Ensigns like Donald Cameron of Braeroy. Their total army pay equalled £ 1521.6.0., which was £ 309 more than the entire rental of Gordon's Lochaber estate. Six weeks before he himself started recruiting, Gordon was informed that it had been a political mistake not to have offered a regiment earlier, with the result that his estate was now "distressed." As it was, he had already lost at least twenty five men from his own Lochaber property - 8.8% of the estate's available manpower.⁴⁵ In effect, Gordon had paid the price for his failure to maintain the political connections that ensured he got a regiment before his neighbours.

The Gordons were not alone in opposing the loss of populations. The value put on tenantry for future military use is also evident in the actions of other landlords. During the war with the Americans, Sir James Grant, unlike Fraser of Lovat, had not offered a regiment quickly; as a result he found that by 1779 he had applied too late, and that the manpower of his political allies was deployed in other regiments. Again, on 10 March 1793, when raising his fencible regiment, Grant was told; "would Mackay accept, and bring 100 or 150, it would be still better, as more can be raised in other places, the less hurt will be done to your own estate." This thinking explains why, in November 1775 and January 1778, even small lairds like Duncan Campbell of Glenure gave orders that his estate was to be watched and potential recruits neither harassed or enlisted. On 10 August 1779, while there remained the serious prospect of another Campbell sponsored battalion, the fifth Duke of Argyll's refusal to mention any concrete news concerning new levies for Scotland was seen in the following light. "His Grace's motives for it must have been to prevent any men being sent out of the country, but kept at home for the fencibles."⁴⁶

The estate authorities on the property of Archibald Maclaine of Lochbuie thought in exactly the same manner, but as a small interest it was difficult for the Mull laird and his managers to oppose the demands of the recruiting quotas as constructed for the Duke's fencibles. Lochbuie's advisers noted in late March 1778 that;

" There is no men listed up from your estate as yet, as we expected you will be appointed an officer in one of the new quotas. " However, by July 1779, Lochbuie's had lost so many men to the Argyll fencibles, it was noted; " I think it is very hard your men should be taken of your own estate to other regiments and you have no earthly good of them.... about fifty of as good men as are in the kingdom have been enlisted out of your estate. " ⁴⁷

Another estimate puts the figure between fifty and one hundred men. As table 7:4 shows, in 1775 Lochbuie's available manpower was ninety six men, meaning that at a conservative estimate, the Mull laird had lost 52% of his potential recruits. This constituted a serious loss of resources at a time when such men were becoming increasingly valuable, and it is a measure of the landlord's difficult in controlling the process of enlistment that Lochbuie had been largely unable to prevent the drain. ⁴⁸

This hoarding of manpower, successful or otherwise, had been evident prior to the American War. In January 1757, General James St. Clair, an important relative of William, Earl of Sutherland, remarked that more regiments for home defence would be raised and that the family could benefit from its situation.

If that be the case, the fewer of the Sutherland men that list now the better as the earl is to reap no advantage by this levy [Fraser's] and his honour not concerned in it by any promise to assist, his people may the better wait til he himself shall be employed. The management of this is somewhat delicate so treat it accordingly. ⁴⁹

The result was that a battalion was widely rumoured throughout the whole of Sutherland in 1757. From as late as 1780, it was a deliberate policy of the Sutherland trustees to assess the purchase of estates on the basis of their potential military use. Concerning the property of Pulrossie, it was noted that there was; " hope that the countess will have a number of sons, she can raise a company from this estate for one of them on a very short notice. " ⁵⁰

This organisational attitude towards populations was again evident in 1790, when rumours were sustained amongst the people that the Sutherland family would receive a regiment from the government. This control of population was to ensure that tenantry retained their families so that the largest number of people were vulnerable to landlord leverage for their own levy. It was noted to " continue the vigilance in keeping the men at home, as I am not sure that we shall not raise some more fencibles,

but this is between ourselves. " Likewise, in February 1778, when faced with the loss of large amounts of men to Mackay of Bighouse, the estate management argued that;

I hope the idea of a Sutherland regiment would be kept up by the friends of the family if there be no grounds for it, for without that assistance I will find it difficult to keep our men. ⁵¹

Where tenants failed to observe this facet of estate management, they faced eviction. Thus in 1807, tenants in Kildonan were removed for giving men to the 79th Cameron Highlanders as opposed to the specified levy supported by the Countess - the Earl of Seaforth's regiment. ⁵²

The deliberate and conscious development of population reserves was evident from Sutherland to Argyll throughout the 1757- 1797 period, and was a common feature of estate management strategies in the era of first phase clearance. Such a strategy also illustrates that the climate whereby recruiting was considered imminent, was, in fact, artificially heightened by landlords themselves in order to anchor their populations. The result was that tenantry in the region lived under the semi-permanent assumption that, at some point, a levy would be raised from amongst their ranks. The protection of manpower should be seen in the same light as the development of draconian regulations which increasingly prevented or restricted tenant use of estate supplies of wood, or on the west coast, of seaware. Simply put, all estate management strategies represented the sustaining of a commercial resource or cash crop. Within the context of recruiting, human populations were no different.

The context where a certain value was placed upon the human population also explains one of the most significant aspects of recruiting in this period. This involves focusing on the social origin of the men that entered landlord levies. When a land owner utilised his own men, it made commercial sense to use the least profitable. In many respects this was merely an extension of the thinking behind the Impress Acts examined in the chapter on law and order. The loss of tenants was deliberately avoided, while those with little active involvement in the rent paying sector of the estate were targeted. This strategy is described in the chapter on the Breadalbane estate, and is mirrored in Lewis in 1778, where it was noted that " a list will be made out of such as is able to serve and that can be spared without material loss ." In 1759, in Sutherland, the policy of targeting non tenant personnel was also practised. All eligible males were told to gather together and those that were not tenants were taken as a priority. Only then was it noted; " and those that remain who are

tenants are told that if the Earl cannot otherwise complete his regiment they will afterwards be called upon ".⁵³

The comprehensive nature of this strategy can be seen from the professions of Highland soldiers. Appendix three shows that a large majority of soldiers settled upon the Annexed Estates were simple agricultural labourers. The descriptive roll of Murdoch Maclaine's fencible company of ninety seven men included only six farmers. In contrast there were thirty two labourers. In McLean of Coll's company for the Breadalbane Fencibles, fifty four of the sixty two men were agricultural labourers.⁵⁴ The consequences of this will be examined later, but in an activity that swapped military service for land, it should be noted that the majority of soldiers themselves came from the lowest social groups, with little or no actual possession of land.

There are several other reasons which justify describing Highland tenantry as a cash or commercial crop. The first was the inherent strength of the rapidly developing Scottish economy. Within the country as a whole, employment opportunities were expanding in various sectors. It is not intended here to develop or expand on this theme, merely to state that the army was but one employment avenue amongst a growing number.⁵⁵ Allied to this competition was the fact that, by continually supplying the financial capacity to sustain large amounts of men for long periods, the state drew more and more men into its service, heightening the natural competition of the market. This trend was commented on in parliament by such figures as the Secretary of War. As a result, the bounties paid to men entering the army rapidly increased.

The official bounty levels were £ 3 in 1757. At the beginning of the American War, it was noted that good men would cost 5 guineas, though some recruiters were prepared to pay as much as £10. By the later stages of the war, bounties had reached an official level of £ 10 per man, with market levels reaching £12 - £20. By 1794, men transferring from fencible to line regiments received an official bounty of 5 guineas. Even in the supposedly underdeveloped north west, prices for recruits had reached £ 21- £30 by the mid 1790s.⁵⁶ In light of such rapid increases in bounties, the War Office attempted to control levels. A limit of 15 guineas was put upon new recruits, while the amount for men transferring from fencibles was raised to 10 guineas. This attempt to control the market stood little hope of success, as indeed proved to be the case.⁵⁷

The trend whereby bounties went from £ 3 in the 1750s, to £ 30 in the late 1790s, is the context in which estate recruiting should be seen. By taking men from their own farms, landlords protected themselves from the inflated bounty prices. In return for possession,

tenants were expected to supply the recruit, be it in the form of an immediate family member who cost the tenant nothing, or a purchased man who had his bounty money paid by the tenant. There is evidence that this exchange policy was widely practised across the region. In the case of a Lochalsh tenant in 1793, he was informed that in order to reduce his expenses, Seaforth expected his estate recruits to cost him only the official price. The agreement reached was as follows: " The tenant understands the King's bounty to be part of the listing money and he and the other person connected to pay the surplus, the whole being £ 21. " In all, this saved Seaforth £18. In Badenoch, it was noted generally that " gentlemen of estates allowing their tenants to give high premiums for volunteers, makes it difficult to pick any up. " ⁵⁸

In a vivid contrast between the perception and usefulness of populations, Alexander Matheson of Attadale in Kintail had, on 31 October 1775, bitterly attacked Seaforth for his policy whereby large tacksmen like himself were unable to remove subtenants. However, by 23 March 1778, with his son now in the army, Matheson told Seaforth that he had recruited mostly free volunteers; indeed, four men from his own farm. This use of tenantry meant that with the high mid war bounties, Attadale made a saving that was probably around £ 40. Likewise, in 1793, when Seaforth raised his regiment, the parish of Lochalsh gave up forty " volunteers. " The proportion that came in free to the regiment is unknown, but given Attadale's experience fifteen years earlier, it was undoubtedly a high percentage. ⁵⁹

In Argyll, the belief that estate tenantry had an obligation to provide their landlords with cheap recruits was also evident. In late 1775, when the son of Glenure received a commission in Fraser's 71st Highland regiment, the first reaction was to recruit on the estate as a form of economy. The link between landed possession and cheap men was noted by Glenure when he informed his son regarding an estate recruit; " but for this man you will apply to his uncle and father to make be as sparing as possible of levy money among any that will list of the young men on the estate. " What this demonstrates is that, in many respects, the actual recruit was not important. By dealing directly with the parents, familial pressure to accept a low bounty would then ensue. This strategy was obviously common. As was the case on other estates, as the wider recruiting situation deteriorated landlords returned to their own resources. In 1778, in return for a croft, Colin Campbell, another son of Glenure got a completely free man from an estate inhabitant. This good fortune renewed Colin's interest in estate recruiting. He told his father;

I hope you will therefore remember to be as good as your promise in making the tenants above Deirgan furnish a man or money.... they cannot complain as they will only be doing what most other people's tenants did, viz. Ardkinglass', MacFarlane's, Glenfalloch's and the Breadalbane tenants. ⁶⁰

This quote reveals that estate levying was comprehensively evident across mid Argyll. Attempts were even made to rationalise and integrate aspects of military recruiting with the daily process of estate management. In Strathavon in 1778, it was decided that, as he held a particular farm, John Grant of Achnacyle would pay the whole presentation money of a local recruit. Smaller tenantry also presented soldiers free as a form of grassum; this being the case with John Gordon in Cabarach who, in return for military service, got his father a possession without the usual entrance payment. This was obviously more relevant to the larger tacksman class. In Lochaber in 1778, for example, the Duke of Gordon charged any such lessee entering into possession with a grassum of men as opposed to money. It was even suggested that recruits ought to be supplied in proportion to the land held. Thus William Gordon of Achorachan in Glenlivet who held thirty six oxgates, was highlighted as being responsible for four men. This would give a quota of a man per nine oxgates. Contemporary rentals show Glenlivet and Strathavon had 494 oxgates, giving a rough levy of fifty five men. From recruiting lists it is certain that the area supplied forty two men to the Northern Fencibles and seventeen to other Highland regiments - giving a total of fifty nine men. This is remarkably close to the ratio suggested by the estate authorities. This matching of men to the tenurial structure was also evident in Skye. In 1798-99, when Lord Alexander Macdonald raised his Regiment of the Isles, his regulation was that where a tenant had two sons or brothers who had been dwelling on the estate for the preceding four years, one was to enter the regiment or the tenant removed. ⁶¹

The use of land for recruits is a well known fact of Scottish history. What tends to be understated is the rationale behind this trade off. Taking men from areas under the immediate dependency of the landlord was deliberately designed to counter the wider problems of cheapness and availability. Some examples allow a direct comparison of profits and cost to take place. On 7 August 1779, having been given the command of a second battalion to his Highland regiment, Lord John Murray asked Major Norman Macleod of Macleod if he would take the lieutenant colonel's commission. As it was, the Skye laird already represented a prominent example of how a Highland estate could stimulate its owner's colonisation of the military structure. Having been appointed a captain in 1775 in Fraser's battalion, the reputation of his estate for retaining a large population had resulted in him being offered a major's position in Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie's (Lord Macleod) 73rd battalion. Finally, in a simply letter, Lord John explained that he had not originally

considered Macleod for the post, but that his first candidate did not have the manpower resources to raise his quota of seventy men. Therefore, in just over four years, Macleod had risen from having no position within the military, to that of effectively commanding a regiment. More significantly, he did not purchase any commission on the way through his various promotions. By using his estate and avoiding purchase, appendix seven shows that Macleod saved himself £ 3 500 - equivalent to 114% of an entire annual rental from his lands. In the position of indebtedness which has already been described in this chapter, such a saving demonstrates the true undiluted commercialism that underlay an activity that seemed deeply traditional. ⁶²

Yet the underlying reasoning behind estate levying went deeper than that. As any given conflict continued, bounties got more expensive and men harder to find. The longer the war lasted, the more valuable the estate populations became. This was the case with the Seaforth family. The estate had already experienced intense recruiting in 1778 for the 78th regiment. In early 1780, his brother received the command of the 100th regiment. Such was the strain for recruits that Seaforth wrote to his Lewis factor, noted that the estate;

" must have men and many boys that two years ago we thought unfit for service [and] will now be stout fellows, at any rate you must strain every nerve as we are 100 short. " It was noted to Seaforth. " [I] agree with you in opinion that as few useful members should be taken from your estate as possible, some I am afraid we must take. " ⁶³

Some of these soldiers were later involved in the capture of a Dutch ship, and for reasons of prize money a list of their Lewis relations was made up. This only included the soldiers directly involved, and not necessarily the whole 1780 levy. Nevertheless, it listed twenty three men from sixteen of the island's ninety three farms, illustrating that even a secondary level could affect almost one farm in five. ⁶⁴

This repeated use of estate resources is apparent elsewhere. Estate papers reveal that Macleod recruited from his property every time he received a promotion. The end of 1775 until the spring of 1776, the spring of 1778 and the winter of 1779-80, all saw military levying occurring upon his lands. It is not known how many men he took for his first commission in 1775. However, in order to obtain his rank as major, Macleod raised sixty one men. For that of lieutenant colonel, his quota was seventy, though by February 1780 he had actually raised eighty. The cost of the sixty one men raised in 1778, totalled £ 255. In contrast, Lord John Murray informed a parent in the Lowlands who wished to get his son into the Highland Regiment as an ensign, that the sixteen men required would cost £ 200.

Macleod, by keeping his bounties down, got men for an average of £ 4.3.0.; in contrast, anyone recruiting in the open market was, by Lord John's reckoning, likely to pay £ 12.5.0.. This suggests that estate men were cheaper by as much as two thirds. This is again evident in 1779, as a list of Macleod estate recruits demonstrates. It illustrates twenty two men receiving meal from the landlord. In a demonstration of the use of land as an alternative to money, the list shows only three men had taken bounties, with the result that the twenty two had cost, exclusive of their subsistence, only £ 9.3.0. ⁶⁵

The example of Seaforth and Macleod illustrate two different points. Firstly, both highlight the fact that estate levying was never a singular event, but that recruiting was omnipresent and a constant likelihood as long as any war lasted. In simple terms, the crop of men was harvested regularly. The case of Macleod also shows that the men taken directly from his estate were significantly cheaper than those that were acquired by non-proprietary means. The demarcation between methods is important. Where recruiting took the non estate form, bounties in the Highlands were as expensive as elsewhere. Only where there was a direct connection with the landlord, and where the strategy of land as a proxy bounty was implemented, could lower levels of recruiting costs be achieved. Sir James Grant in 1793 stated this point when noting that it was only by rewarding tenants with land that the high bounties offered by other recruiters could be combated. ⁶⁶

This argument is best illustrated by the example of Murdoch Maclaine of Lochbuie. In February 1794, the Mull laird gained a commission as Lieutenant Colonel of the Dumbartonshire Fencibles. His estate, largely in the south and west of Mull, had already seen recruiting as part of the Argyll Fencibles raised in 1793. Table 7:4 shows that Maclaine had a reasonable amount of men at his disposal. On 26 July 1794, he made an offer to his tenantry which constitutes the best surviving example that details the actual mechanics of estate recruiting. Maclaine said that he would not give his men any bounty, though the government had set aside five guineas for this purpose. Instead, he offered to reduce his rent by thirty shillings on any possession held by the recruit's family for the space of five years. Thus, Maclaine pointed out, the bounty to the recruit would total £ 7.10.0 - £ 2.5.0 more than the government. The point to note is that this was not a continuation of clan methods, but a response to conditions in the Lowlands. In mid March 1794, Lochbuie was informed that the recruiting situation in Scotland and England was best characterised by expense. By 10 April, his relation Charles Macquarrie stated that it was just as well that Lochbuie had arrived in Mull, for there he would be able to get twelve to fifteen men. Another Mull contact recruiting for the laird stated that men in Glasgow were costing £ 21. By 16 August, conditions in the Lowlands were deteriorating to the extent that it contrasted badly with the estate. Table 7:4 shows that Lochbuie did, in fact, get fifty men. This

produced an immediate profit to Lochbuie of £ 262.10.0 - equivalent to 19.7% of his entire rental. However, if the high levels of bounties evident in Glasgow and elsewhere in the Lowlands are taken into account, the real saving to the laird came to £ 1050 - 78% of his rents.⁶⁷

Table 7:4. Levels of Manpower on Lochbuie Estate, Mull 1775-1795
(Source, Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/923, GD 174/916,923, 927)

(a) Willing to Join Army in 1775	(b) Total Fighting Men 1793	(c) List of Suitable Recruits 1795	Total Recruited 1794-5 & % of (b)
96	361	65	50 (13.8)

Landlords across the region protected their tenantry for these reasons, so that when the opportunity arose, they could be utilised as any other crop or resource from their estates. Further, Highland landlords were aware of conditions elsewhere, and recruiting from their own resources is, in fact, indicative of their integration and market awareness.

These range of motives explain several features of recruiting during the first phase of clearance that have rarely been considered. First is its surprisingly comprehensive survival and, indeed, intensification. By 1795, the Highlands exhibited a deeper level of military activity than in 1745. As appendices fourteen, fifteen and sixteen illustrate, across many parishes, differing in local economies and estate backgrounds, military recruiting was obviously a conspicuous activity. Appendix fifteen demonstrates its impact on populations, suggesting that in many areas military levying commonly removed 15% of the male population. In areas where the level of recruiting is known, and can be contrasted with that of the males between the ages of 16-45 (those suitable for the army), then enlistment levels go as high as one man in three. In Kildonan, in central Sutherland during the American War, at least 102 men were in the military. This is from a population of fighting men that was approximately 255 to 286; giving a loss of men to the army of between 35% - 40% of the total. The figures in appendix fifteen should obviously be treated with caution, and only taken as examples of general trends. Nevertheless, the impact of levying was so noticeable that there is little reason to question as wildly inaccurate the figures ministers gave for their respective parishes. Indeed, in the case of Rum, the amount given is verified from an alternative source as exact. The minister stated that eleven men were removed by the laird McLean of Coll, and that from the other Islands making up the parish of the Small Isles no other men were taken. McLean gained a major's commission in the fourth Earl of

Breadalbane's fencibles. In the recruiting records of that regiment, there is a list of men brought in by McLean, it states that exactly eleven were from the Small Isles. ⁶⁸

The Estate Economy and Tenantry Responses:- The Impact of Recruiting 1756-1815

Such a level of recruiting suggests that, despite their acknowledged capacity for coercion, Highland landlords, when attempting to enlist their tenantry, nevertheless, needed to utilise similar financial motives to the ones that they themselves exhibited. The financial benefits that the proprietors hoped to achieve by such military activity were, in fact, also apparent further down the social scale. The impact and prevalence of such state income is hard to quantify, but there is no doubt that it constituted a substantial level of local earnings. The evidence that exists for half pay officers and pensioned men demonstrates the extent to which the Highlands was as much a militarising as a commercialising society.

Table 3:2 demonstrates that the level of pensioned officers from the region grew rapid in the 1740-1780 period. This particular group was so common a feature of Highland estates, that several commentaries specifically mention their role in the local economy. Half pay officers, through the benefit of their additional income, were high profile bidders in the first estate sett on the restored lands of the Locheil family in the spring of 1788. The 1884 Napier Report into conditions in the region mentions that a high level of the substantial tenants in the Western Isles during the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were half pay officers. The Old Statistical Account for the parishes of Kilmuir in Skye, Kingussie and Laggan in Badenoch, also highlight their presence. With regard to Laggan it was noted that the parish was set to three different types of tenant.

Gentlemen farmers consisting of half pay officers and graziers, chiefly those who are professedly shepherds; and the lower class of people who pay £ 3 to £ 6 yearly rent. The gentlemen pay from £ 30 to £ 100 Sterling. Sheep farms pay from £ 60 to £ 190 yearly rents. ⁶⁹

Half pay officers, therefore, represent an important middle elite between the large capitalised sheep farmer and the mass of the tenantry. Appendix seven illustrates that the individual level of pay was high by contemporary standards, which meant that where such officers existed in large numbers, their local influence was high. The best example is undoubtedly the Island of Skye. It has become a matter of accepted tradition that over half the agricultural holdings on the Island in the late eighteenth century were held by such officers. It is certain that in the aftermath of the American War, one colonel, one major, eight captains and three lieutenants can be traced to Skye. This means that, at a

conservative estimate, pensioned officers brought in £ 1213 of assured income into the area in the mid to late 1780s. To put this amount of money into context; in 1799 it would have totalled 21.8% of Macdonald's entire rental, and was a larger amount than any of the parish rentals, excepting Kilmuir. Allowing for the decade increase from the 1780s, this demonstrates how significant such military income was. The ability of such officers to pay rent can be illustrated in the case of the Badenoch estate of the Duke of Gordon. In 1772, the Duke's estate in the parish of Laggan was twenty two farms, with a rental that came to £ 566.11.3. Five pensioned officers held exactly half the holdings, and in a measure of their expanded paying ability, their farms came to £ 363.14.5 - 64% of the whole rental. Allied to this, was the fact that their combined pensions came to £ 358.18.4, only £ 5 short of the entire amount required for the farms held by them. ⁷⁰

Even on very large estates, military officers could represent a substantial section of the highest renting tenantry. Appendix seventeen illustrates that, even as late as 1802, military officers held farms on the Sutherland estate that totalled 17.9% of the rent. In certain parishes they paid between 40-50% of the rent. Moreover, they also held a disproportionate level of the highest rented farms. Only in two of the eight parishes did officers not hold one of the first four highest rented possessions. In light of such levels of income, half pay officers were respected and sought after tenants, developing a reputation as improvers, especially in the droving trade. In early December 1756, Dugald Gilchrist, factor on the Sutherland estates recommended the half pay captain, Kenneth Mackay of Skibo, for a nineteen year tack on the farm of Achevlie. Gilchrist emphasised his ability to improve, the captain's capital reserves, and his high levels of good cattle stock. The same attitude was evident when Captain John Macpherson asked for the farm of Ballachroan on Gordon's Badenoch estate, adding that he would spend £ 600 on improvements if he was given a nineteen year tack. ⁷¹

More fundamentally, a military pension answered the needs of the Highland landlord in a very specific way. The regular nature of the income was undoubtedly its single most attractive feature. This is why military officers were encouraged on estates. In Sutherland, in 1802, a Lieutenant Angus Sutherland was recommended for a place as his half pay would allow him to live easily in the county. This thinking had been entirely evident earlier. In 1776, the Duke of Gordon expressed severe anger at the failure of his estate authorities to negotiate a settlement with Lieutenant Alexander Macpherson, tacksman on the farm of Strathmassie in Badenoch. The lieutenant had refused to accept an increase in rent, and had subsequently been welcomed as a tenant on a neighbouring estate. Gordon made it clear he was unhappy at the loss of such a substantial tenant. In 1776, specific attempts were made to keep Captain Andrew Macpherson, tacksman of Crubinmor, on the estate. In March

1794, Lieutenant Donald Macpherson in Badenoch wrote to the Duke of Gordon stating that he wished to get back into full military service in the fencibles in order to increase his pension. His case was argued in terms of the benefit to the estate. " He does not intend to quit his farm, on the contrary, it will enable him to pay his rent more regular. " ⁷²

Such income meant Murdo Macleod on the farm of Kilpheder in North Uist was, by 1804, still able to keep himself solvent in the face of kelp inflated rents. The value that was placed upon such men is best seen in the example of Captain John Macpherson of Ballachroan. By 1776, Macpherson owed £ 233 in arrears to the estate. He was by far and away the largest defaulter, with Macintosh of Rothiemurchus the next largest on £ 59 - £ 164 less in debt than Macpherson. However, Gordon ordered that Ballachroan be retained, adding the revealing comment that, " he will be good money some time or another. " ⁷³

The growth in this class of pensioned officer could have represented the partial replacement of the large substantial tacksman with a similarly endowed tenant class. However, as the chapter on emigration and public policy suggests, government, for financial reasons, deliberately encouraged these men to retain their military careers, and so they generally failed to stimulate economic development in the region. In the 1790s, the general interaction of military service and land holding was noted by a tacksman in Sutherland;

Every body knows, that a very large proportion of the officers of Highland fencible regiments were tenants of the upper class, who relinquished their farms during the war, or left them to the custody of a manager, with the intention of returning to them on the re-establishment of peace. ⁷⁴

This suggests that military service lowered the involvement of a section of the tenantry whose expertise and capital were acknowledged. The case of John Macpherson of Ballachroan has been noted. However, when he re-joined the military, his proposals for a long improving tack were abandoned, and he was forced to re-negotiate his tack on a short term basis. Military service essentially contradicted and competed with civilian commercial activity. In 1778, Captain Lachlan Macintosh, having joined the army, informed Gordon that his private affairs had suffered as a result. In September 1798, Duncan Macdougall in Lorne informed Colin Campbell of Ballaveolin that his civilian affairs had declined since he had joined the Fencibles. The failure to invest can be illustrated by the case of Captain George Gordon on the estate of Sutherland. In 1793, the year the fencibles were raised, he received the tack of Skelpick. Yet it was not until 1802, the first year of full peace, that Gordon admitted the unimproved nature of the farm, which had not seen new

dykes constructed since 1793. This problem was summarised on 30 August 1759 by an earlier military officer from Sutherland, Charles Gordon, who had just accepted a military commission.

" The longer I consider, I foresee greater disadvantages to myself in accepting of a commission; Even though I had pay sufficient for my subsistence, my cattle and labourings that are pretty extensive will be neglected, and my dealings (of which I always made something), quite at an end. " On 1 September 1760 he noted; " All advantages were taken of my absence as to the droving and I foresaw the same would have happened, tho' I could not help it. " ⁷⁵

The neglect of trading and commercial affairs in such an important capitalised group in Highland society is probably one of the major consequences of such disproportionate involvement in the army. Given their relatively high levels of spare capital, such men were often involved in improvement projects. Yet as a result of their pensioned position, they remained susceptible to a return to military service as a relatively easy option. On 21 March 1795, a merchant in Argyll criticised the middle elite in the county for diverting capital from trade into military spending and recruiting. This significant point regarding the diversion of money from general improvement can be illustrated in the case of Alexander Macdonald of Sleat. By April 1802, as table 7:5 illustrates, the Skye laird had spent over £ 20 000 on his fencible regiment. Yet by the same period, less than half that money had been returned by the government. Added to this, Macdonald had lent his brother £ 6 300 to buy the lieutenant colonel's commission in another regiment. Such levels of investment contrast very well with the spending upon estate improvement. By 1802, exclusive of surveying, Macdonald had spent only £ 2848 on improvements - £ 1048 on one farm in Sleat. The general impact of military investment on estate improvement was summarised on 12 February 1800.

Anxious as I must be for the improvement of my estate, I however wish it to be understood that in considering the heavy expense I have been to in raising a regiment, which continues to be so, I am unwilling to launch into a large state of improvements. ⁷⁶

Table 7:5, General Abstract of Accounts of Regiment of the Isles 1815.

(Source, C.D.T.L., GD221/1542/2)

Expenditure	Receipts
1798 = £2,958.11.3,1/2	1798 = £2,500.2.10
1799 = £14,004.2.5	1799 = £7,392.1.9,1/2
1800 = £1,859.9.4	1800 = £149.7.6
1801 = £1,304.5.6,1/2	1801 = £29.13.5,1/2
1802 = £1,040.5.4,1/2	1802 = £1,000
1804 = £253.12.0	1803 = £2,000
1807 = £47.14.8	1806 = £7.16.8
	1807 = £33.5.6
<hr/>	<hr/>
£ 21,468.0.7,1/2	£ 13,112.7.9

The reality of military recruiting in direct competition with improvement is evident at the lower end of the social scale. The account book of Donald Campbell, tacksman on the Kintyre farms of Unans and Glendale, show the amount spent on dyke building from 1772 - 1777, and act as a general indicator of expenditure on improvement. This totalled £ 21.6.9. In 1778, by contrast, to make up his quota of men for the Argyll Fencibles, Campbell was forced to spend £ 12.15.8 - equivalent to over three years expenditure on improvements.⁷⁷ This diversion into military activity could occur in both matériel and personnel. In 1775, there had been attempts to set up a fishing operation in Assynt. However, the ships were diverted into naval use and the project never attempted as a result. Likewise, in the parish of Kilfinichen and Kilviceuen, Colonel John Campbell, a local heritor, had attempted to invest and manage the development of fishing in the parish. However, in 1793, Campbell returned to full time military service, while the parish minister attributed the failure of the fishing to the military diversion of Campbell's capital and management skills.⁷⁸

The loss of such personnel is merely one facet in the wider economic consequences of military recruiting. The general impact on the non-militarised tacksmen is an important parallel to the loss of such pensioned officers. At first glance, the maintenance of military levying would seem to allow a continuing role for the middle clan elite. An enthusiastic picture has been portrayed regarding the results of military service on this group, and the increased level of army officers gives a certain weight to this. It has been argued that

fencible regiments provided an alternative and successful avenue for this class, resulting in their retention upon estates to a larger degree than would otherwise have been the case had recruiting ceased as a landlord policy after 1745.⁷⁹

The reasons for this particular analysis seem obvious. The tacksman was the military linchpin of the clan, and it was their status as officers of the clan's military levies that was perhaps emphasised the most when commentators highlighted their role in Highland society.⁸⁰ Increasingly, however, modern analysis has rejected the hostile language and perception of eighteenth century improvers with regard to this class, and attempted to define the broader responsibilities of the tacksmen. It has been demonstrated that, as a class, it would be more accurate to distinguish them in two separate ways. The very large tack holders such as Campbell of Airds in Morvern, were political and military managers, specifically placed on land to ensure the clan's hold upon it. Conversely, the entrepreneurial skills and capital reserves of the tacksman has increasingly been emphasised. Wider studies have increasingly highlighted the non-militarised, social and organisational aspects of clanship. In this context, the tacksman appears as a farmer and manager of agricultural resources, giving security of tenure, seed, and land to a large body of subtenantry.⁸¹

In summary, what has emerged is a picture of the tacksman as a manager, a developer of capital reserves, and probably the largest single employer in the region. Allied to this change in emphasis, is a deepening understanding of the nature of farming in parts of the Highlands. What detailed studies have shown is the importance of large amounts of labour in producing crops, especially in marginal districts. In areas like Coll, contemporaries back up this modern assessment on the importance of labour. The Reverend John Walker stated that large populations were deemed vital in order to secure labour for intensive spade agriculture. Likewise, in Mull, he emphasised the dependency of the large lessee on subtenants in order to secure profits. The numbers of such tenants could be high; in Skye, in the 1760s, it was calculated that a £ 30 farm needed ten subtenants and eight male servants.⁸²

This labour intensive agrarian economy explains one of the ironies of Highland society in this period. Given its reputation for over population, the comprehensive complaint of the lack of hired servants is incongruous. This circumstance was noted for nine parishes in the Old Statistical Account for the counties of Caithness, Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, Inverness and Argyll.⁸³ This lack of flexible landless labour was partly brought about as a direct result of excessive recruitment, and, in turn, was vital in determining the tacksmen's responses to such levying. The logical consequence of a lack of hired servants, for whatever reason, was the continuance of subtenure on large farms. Subtenure, in essence, secured

and maintained labour. However, it meant that substantial farmers were forced to adopt land use practices which ensured workers, rather than efficient production. The result in many areas was the overcrowding of possessions. It was noted with regard to the parish of Dores in eastern Inverness-shire; " There are few day labourers, which obliges the tenants to keep more domestic servants, especially in harvest, than their farms can well afford to support. " In the parish of Edderachylis in Sutherland it was noted; " servants being scarce in this country, some tacksmen have fallen upon a way of providing themselves, by granting a piece of land equivalent to the wages of a servant for a year to a man and his family, on condition of giving him his service for one half that time, by alternative weeks, and paying half the rent along with this service. " This situation was summed up in the eastern Ross-shire parish of Kiltearn.

One circumstance very prejudicial to the farmers is, that they are too much at the mercy of their servants. When a servant engages with a poor farmer, he bribes him with a promise of high wages; and when money fails, he allows his servant to sow a quantity of corn for his own use, and to keep a cow in summer and perhaps two or three in winter on the farm, which brings certain ruin upon the tenant in the end. ⁸⁴

These examples conclusively show how labour concerns forced Highland tacksmen and tenants to sublet. As a result, it is hardly surprising that they did not relish any activity that increased the loss of labouring populations. At this point it is worth remembering the trend in recruitment that brought about the disproportionate removal of the labouring class - that group most capable of providing a flexible labour pool. Thus, despite their reputation as a martial class, tacksmen responses were largely dictated by the pressing demands brought on by the new economic and commercial attitudes in the region. High levels of rent hit the tacksmen first, forcing them to keep overheads and costs down. This meant that they actually disliked the prospect of military levying. In simple terms, by forcing wages to rise, it disrupted and competed against their position as agricultural managers and employers.

There are examples where the direct connection between recruiting and wage levels can be made. In the Old Statistical Account, the parishes of Edderachylis, Tiree, Stornoway, and Urquhart and Glenmoriston all directly connect recruiting to wage increases. In the latter parish, the daily wage, as a result of military levying, went from 8-9 d to one shilling. This 33% increase was mirrored at the other geographical extreme of the Highlands, where in Stornoway it was noted; " Indeed by reason of the multitudes levied for the army and navy, the great number of subtenants and the many hands wanted for the fishing boats, labourers and farm servants are become very scarce. " The new wage level is listed at 8 d per day.

However, recruiting had, in fact, driven wages higher than that. On 17 June 1793, just as recruiting had swept the Island, George Gillanders of Highfield, factor on Lewis noted that;

I imagine there will not be sufficient numbers of labourers got to afford to retain the road overseer and I find they demand 9 d per diem, which is high wages. ⁸⁵

Recruiting in Lewis induced, at the very least, a 12.5% increase in wages. This connection with the military was evident both elsewhere and earlier. By the first week in January 1760, the first fencible regiment of Sutherland was largely completed. As a result, a local tacksman, James Mackay, noted to the factor that " at present servants cannot be got even by those of great weight " - a quote that illustrates how it impacted hardest on the larger tenants. In Islay, in 1764, it was noted that; " the wages of a labourer are 6 d and even 8 d a day. This article was never so high till of late, occasioned by the great number of men sent into the war. " ⁸⁶

This situation was also well understood during the period of the American conflict. In April 1778, his tacksmen and tenants came under pressure from the Duke of Gordon to supply the necessary men he needed. Each tacksmen was shown the amount of men expected from each area. It was made clear in the tacksmen's response that to recruit effectively would " lay waste " farms on the estate. This is, in fact, what began to occur. Macpherson of Aberarder in Badenoch stated on 6 April that " the conditions in which we are already reduced for want of servants and labourers is deplorable. " Alexander Macdonnell of Garvamor agreed with these sentiments when he informed William Todd, factor in the Badenoch district, that no servants for farm labouring could be got. ⁸⁷

The best example of the results of such wide scale military activity on both wages and the actions of tacksmen, comes from an earlier incident the district of Badenoch. On 15 May 1761, a committee for the Trustees for the Improvement of the Manufactures and Fisheries, wrote to the Duchess of Gordon noting that tack holders had spread the rumour that anyone spinning yarn was liable to transportation. It was added;

" The trustees are sorry to find that the present scarcity of servants disposes the tenants and lower kind of gentry to discourage these improvements by various means ". Earlier, in January, the situation had been explained in detail. " The opposition the spinning meets with from the gentlemen farmers in the said Highland countries, who being difficulted by the scarcity of servants occasioned by the great number taken out of the country to the army, complain that the spinning makes their servants still scarcer and heightens their wages. " ⁸⁸

That tacksmen could be driven to such extremes calls into question the whole interaction of military levying on all classes in the region. That it adversely affected tacksmen is obvious, and this example further suggests that military recruitment impacted directly on the process of improvement, and not necessarily in a complementary way.

Within the context of military recruitment and its effects on the process of improvement, it does appear that, in the broader sense, recruiting undoubtedly made the construction of new industries more difficult in the region. In 1798, for example, James Anderson on the Sutherland estate complained that the price of landless labour was so high as a result of recruiting, that finding men for his fishing operation in Assynt was both expensive and increasingly difficult. This forced Anderson to ensure that he retained the farm of Culkein in order to maintain and stabilise his work force. In effect, this meant that a fishing population, supposedly landless, did, in fact, retain a hold on their agricultural possessions.⁸⁹

Beyond the wider implications for improvement, such losses of manpower could, in the short term, induce a serious inability to complete the simple task of harvesting crops. For instance, as late as 11 November 1778, tacksmen in Strathavon highlighted the fact that the crops of subtenants who had subsequently become soldiers were still lying in the ground, and that to get them cut would entail significant expense.⁹⁰ Allied to this loss, was the simple problem of excessive population drain. By 3 August 1778, Captain Lachlan Macintosh, younger of Balnespick, who had recruited thirty one men for the fencibles, told Gordon that upon his father's estate waste possessions had appeared. This level of recruitment was also evident in other areas. In Mull, in 1764, in a startling comparison with the days of militarised clanship, the Reverend John Walker highlighted the continuity from that period by stating that the substantial military levying during the Seven Years War had contributed, along with seasonal migration, in ensuring areas forced out of cultivation had not been brought back into arable production. In Lewis, by the spring of 1793, the farm of Swordale in the Point district had lost as much as fifteen men. Waste possessions had subsequently become evident by June, when Gillanders informed Seaforth that; " their [the subtenants] business will be totally neglected and it will ruin them. " On his own farm, he noted that; " the wives of those who went with you have thrown the lands away. " ⁹¹

The emergence of land that could not be cultivated was undoubtedly a short term phenomenon. Yet such a profound level of military recruiting had an inevitable economic impact on tacksmen. It has been pointed out that as landlords increased rent levels, the income from subtenants became more and more important to the tacksman and large tenant classes. A situation, therefore, whereby subtenants either gave up land completely, or became scarcer to the point that they could re-negotiate the terms of their subtenure,

represented a serious disruption of the tacksmens' strategy to cope with the new economic situation. This had been the case during the early years of recruiting for the American conflict, which had taken place against a background of crop failure. Margaret Grant, tack holder of the farm of Pitmain in Badenoch explained how, in 1776, she had failed to get sufficient subtenants to labour her entire holding. The result had been a severe financial drain on her capital resources.⁹²

Exactly this situation was brought about by excessive recruiting. In Strathavon, John Gordon of Achnarrow had lost a subtenant to the army. Now, instead of his income, the man had left behind his parents, who had become a burden on Gordon. The same was the case for Allan Macdonnell in the parish of Laggan, whose remaining subtenantry were reduced in their ability to manage their holdings efficiently. The best example of this type of economic stress is from the estate of Sutherland in 1760. The lack of servants for the tacksmen has already been noted for this estate. Moreover, the shortages produced by recruiting, heightened the trend to sublet. Indeed, in 1761 in Sutherland, the tendency of the large possessors to force subtenant service from their small tenants was specifically highlighted. This was the direct consequence of labour problems, and in this context there can be little doubt that the tacksmen, by pushed for high levels of service, undermining their relationship with the lower tenantry. In contrast to this, the Sutherland estate, like many others, had introduced a policy of limiting subtenure. In light of labour conditions generally, this regulation was directly against the interests of those holding large tacks. This can be illustrated in Kintail in 1794, when, just after the completion of the Seaforth regiment, tenants on the estate reacted very badly to the attempted imposition of no subtenure. Thus a mixture of estate policy and labour shortages, exacerbated by recruiting, persuaded large tack holders to voluntarily begin dropping sections of their holdings.⁹³

Had this been the only damage to the links between these groups, the consequences would not perhaps have been far reaching. However, recruiting was ultimately a corrosive influence on the relationship between the subtenant and tacksmen. By lowering the pool of labour and forcing the latter into excessive demands, alienation of sections of the lower orders appeared. With less labour available, tack holders attempted to secure it by giving the holdings of those who had joined army to persons prepared to undertake work. This occurred on the Lochaber farm of Blairachurin and produced, in turn, a demand from the original soldier for a separate possession. Such circumstances were revealed in a summary of conditions by the minister of Aberarder in 1778. He noted that the tacksmen and leading families had little or no influence over the mass of the population and that the latter group, " aimed at independence ".⁹⁴ Here the role of recruiting is vital, as it provided

the subtenantry with the perfect mechanism to appeal to the landlord in order to gain this tenurial independence.

This move away from the large tenant could take several forms, and did not necessarily need to involve separating possessions off. For instance, it could merely entail a reduction in labour dues. This had been the case with the family of a recruit from the farm of Garvamor in Badenoch. The tacksman, under pressure to provide men, had agreed with the recruit that his wife and brother-in-law would have his subtenant possession for five years without any labour dues. The tacksman informed Gordon that he could probably get two to three more men this way. This could, however, involve the loss of sections of the holding. On the neighbouring farm to Garvamor, Duncan Campbell, a soldier, stated that the tack holder of the possession (Garvabeg) had reacted badly to his decision to enter military service for his own benefit. This trend where the recruits represented themselves also occurred in Lewis, when, on 15 June 1795, the subtenantry of two Morrison tacksmen in Ness refused to enter the military as part of the tacksmen's required quota. The end result of such differing agendas, as in the case of Campbell in Badenoch, was ensuing oppression by the tack holder on his remaining family, resulted in the soldier asking for his possession to be made independent.⁹⁵

This scenario was evident across the Inverness-shire estate of the Gordon family. The best example of this is the petition of Alexander Macpherson, tacksman of Corrieconllie, Achachar and Drumfour in Lochaber. In 1778, in order to better utilise his grazing areas, he had attempted to remove the subtenants from Corrieconllie. In response, they had recruited and Gordon ordered them to be kept. Added to this, was the fact that, as a tacksman, he had been forced to contribute men to the fencibles. His three recruits had negotiated heavy conditions. This involved giving each of their parents three guineas for every year the men were in the regiment. Secondly, they were to get half a merk land from him on the same conditions he, as a tacksman, held from the Duke.⁹⁶ This last stipulation is significant in that it illustrates the important process whereby the distinctions evident in the *baille*, or joint tenant farm, could be eroded by recruiting. The level of social expectation evident from the recruits is obviously high. For the tack holder in this case, it entailed an effective 6% increase in the cost of his rent, on top of which he lost 16% of his entire farm. This case demonstrates why recruiting was, in fact, detrimental to the tacksman. Even more than the financial costs, it resulted in a growing confidence within the lower orders. The subtenants of Inchree in Lochaber, deliberately targeted the tacksman possessions of Auchaneich and Borhogie, and asked how many men they would need to acquire to ensure that, when the lease ran out, the tack holder, James MacBarnet, would be replaced with themselves. Less ambitious attempts, which involved securing independent

possession from the tacksman, were evident on the farms of Blarichirn also in Lochaber, Delanach, Crubinmore, Premucherach, and Breachachie in Badenoch. This means that of the eighteen farms listed on the 1784 Badenoch rental, over a quarter (27%) had seen the tacksman face a subtenant challenge due to recruiting.⁹⁷

Perhaps the best example of military recruiting undermining the position of the tacksman is that of Sutherland in the early 1760s. The estate authorities had already begun to question that particular structure on the estate, but, in 1761, recruiting acted as the catalyst for change when the factor Dugald Gilchrist pointed out that;

The most substantial of the tenants will look on it as a hard step to be put under a tacksman and more especially such of them who gave their sons into the Earl's regiment, as they were promised to be continued in their possessions.⁹⁸

Gilchrist pointed out that by keeping them independently on their farms, a trial could begin on which system of tenure was best suited to the needs of the estate. Recruiting in this case acted as the dynamic whereby a fundamental questioning of the place of the tacksman had begun. Allied to this, in 1763, when the regiment was demobilised, the Earl offered to settle each soldier on twenty acres of improvable moor. Advantageous levels of rent were offered, as was the assurance that no labour dues would be called for. It represented the largest single initiative whereby joint tenantry was actively attempted. So successful was this scheme that, upon the reduction of the first Sutherland fencible regiment, it was known that only one man from Assynt re-enlisted in the army.⁹⁹

What the re-settlement scheme demonstrates, is not the continuity of military service for land, as practised under clanship. Had that been the case, the men would have returned to subtenant status under the large tacksmen. Many did in fact do so. However, as the case of the Sutherland and Gordon estates demonstrate, military recruiting and stable tacksmen/subtenant relations were, in fact, incompatible. There is evidence to support this conclusion in the form of the reactions of tacksmen themselves. Throughout the 1756-1815 period, it was clear that, as a class, they were less than enthusiastic recruiters. In 1775, it was reported in Badenoch that they had remained strictly neutral, not helping or hindering the recruiting there. The tacksmen for that area were well aware that the Duke of Gordon had begun to develop hostile attitudes towards them as a result of their inactions. That they understood this can be demonstrated by the case of Alexander Cameron of Letterfinlay who, on 19 August 1778, became concerned at the rumours in Lochaber regarding his failure to recruit. As a result, he went to see Gordon personally in order to clarify his position. The possibility that tacksmen might not be enthusiastic was also seen as a

possibility further north. In March 1778, while recruiting for Seaforth's regiment, Matheson of Attadale pointed out that the tacksmen of Torridon had declared no men were available, a stance he suspected they would adopt before he had even entered the district. ¹⁰⁰

The most obvious example of recruiting undermining landlord attitudes towards tacksmen, was again on the estate of Sutherland. In 1799, when attempting to raise the 93rd regiment, the estate authorities were struck by the hostile stance of the large tack holders. Commentators on the changes in tenure introduced in Sutherland during this period, place particular emphasis on the damage done to their reputation by the initial failure of recruiting. On 23 September 1799, every tacksman on the estate received a threatening letter which questioned their role in;

The unexpected and unaccountable delays and difficulties by which the recruiting has hitherto been obstructed..... I have now in part executed, in part directed such measures as to enable the countess to judge accurately of the merits and demerits of her own immediate tenants. ¹⁰¹

Tenant Attitudes and Estate Management Responses

It can be argued that, in many respects, the tenantry, through sheer necessity, actually had the same revenue agenda as their landlords. This can be illustrated by the fact that, just as there was a large growth in half pay officers from the region, so a parallel increase occurred in the level of Chelsea pensioners from the Highlands. The figures, if taken alongside that of landlord involvement in recruiting as shown in appendices fifteen and sixteen, demonstrate that the militarisation of the region crossed all social groups.

Table 7:6 does not shown the levels of pensioners actually in the counties, only the origin of men who left their respective regiments with a pension. However, a list of pensioners residing in the Scottish counties in December 1770 confirm the high levels shown in table 7:6. One of the most interesting aspects is the high profile nature of Inverness-shire in particular, though why this should be is not clear. Appendix seventeen demonstrates that within Inverness there was an east/west breakdown, with 75% of parishes in the west citing incidence of recruitment, to only 42% on the mainland. The same pattern is evident in Ross-shire and Argyll. It has been suggested that western areas in the Highlands retained a higher level of martial tradition when compared to the eastern areas of the Highlands. The level of pensioners and the pattern of their origins suggest that, in part, this argument could be correct, though this thesis would argue it probably had little to do with martial tradition,

and more to do with the lack of leases in the west Highlands which left the tenantry there more vulnerable to landlord coercion.¹⁰²

Table 7:6. Chelsea Pensioners From Highland Counties and Battalions 1740-1800
(Source, P.R.O., W.O. 120/5, 7, 14-18)

County	1740s	1750s	1760s	1770s	1780s	1790s	County Total
Argyll	3	18	93	26	98	35	273
Inverness	8	41	263	44	271	141	768
Ross & Crom'	4	12	92	15	143	89	355
Sutherland	-	2	50	16	76	48	192
Caithness	2	3	49	6	54	37	151
Decade Totals	17	76	547	107	642	350	1739

The emergence of large amounts of such pensioners from the Highlands dates from the end of the Seven Years War, and was development highlighted in the report of the Reverend John Walker from 1764. This report also reveals the extent and influence of this particular group of people. Table 7:6 reveals that the possibility existed for a surprising amount of such pensioners to be present in the locality. In the sixty years from 1740-1800, eighty four men from Kilmallie and Kilmonavaig were made pensioners. At the end of this period, during the mass demobilisations after 1815, eighty one pensioners from Sutherland parishes were released from the 93rd Highlanders. With army pensions at a shilling a day, this represented a potential income for the county of £ 1478 per annum. There is additional evidence to suggest that a high level of such annuitants did return home with their military incomes. In evidence to the Napier Commission it was reported that, in the 1830s, there were over 40 pensioners in the parish of Assynt alone.¹⁰³

Table 7:7. Chelsea pensioners as Percentage of Returning Men & Pensions as Percentage of Rent 1764

(Source, M.M. Mackay, *The Rev. Dr. J. Walker's Report on the Hebrides 1764 & 1771* (Edinburgh, 1980), 39-225.)¹⁰⁴

District	Returned Men	Chelsea Pensioners	Ch. Pen. as % of Returned Men	Rent	Pensions as % of Rent
Lewis	34	18	52.9	£ 1200	11.4
Harris	14	8	57.1	£ 544*	11.9
Tiree	12	6 #	50	£ 773	5.8
Canna	3	3	100	£ 88.17.0	25.6

Table 7:7 illustrates that pensioners were evident in even the remotest areas of the west Highlands, and at an early stage of the era of first phase of clearance. Appendix fourteen and table 7:7 allows a contrast to be drawn between the rates at which pensioners returned home, and the corresponding rate for ordinary soldiers. Pensioners constituted a high percentage of those soldiers that elected to return back to their native areas, in the case of the Western Isles over half the soldiers that returned in 1763 were pensioners. When this pattern is allied to the growth of demobilised pensioners in the 1760s, then it can be calculated that such annuitants were a common feature in the region. The reason for this high return rate is due to the preferential treatment that they received at the hands of proprietors. For the same reason that officers were deemed suitable tenants, so the regular income of the pensioner made his chance of land more likely.

In 1775, a sergeant David Grant returned from military service to Strathspey, and when soliciting for a farm, specifically mentioned his standard pension of £ 7.12.0. In August 1800, a William Macdonald from Snizort, who had earlier gone as a bankrupt into the army, returned to Skye. Lord Macdonald gave him a farm in Trotternish on the explicit understanding that the rent was linked to the level of his pension - £ 7. In an interesting contrast, it was pointed out that Macdonald was a poor tenant candidate in terms of age and capital. The fact that he got land demonstrates that it was purely on the strength of his military income. Likewise, in 1800, another pensioner petitioned for a holding in Sleat, again mentioning that lands to the value of his income had been promised. Revealing an important estate consequence of such external funding, he was considered ideal for the new

crofting townships being constructed on Macdonald's lands at the time. Just as half pay officers could pay expanded rents, so the petition of Donald Macleod and Donald Macdonald reveals an underlying motive in prompting the involvement of such men in the army. On 26 December 1807, these two pensioners petitioned Macdonald in the following terms. They asked that they be given the farms of either Glasvein or Brogaig in Kilmuir, and offered a rental increase of 28.5% and 38% on each farm, bringing the rent for each possession to £ 42. Astutely aware of the problems of fluctuating rents, they stated that both their pensions would act as caution for the other. The suitability of such pensioners can be illustrated by the fact that, of the 126 separate tenant possessions in the parish of Strath in Skye in 1801, the military pension would have paid 115 of them with cash to spare. This means that within the ranks of the small tenantry, those with a military income constituted an elite in relative terms. ¹⁰⁵

Allied to the income from those with pensions, was the wider influence of cash from military sources. Thus, for instance, recruits were able to trade their pay to lower their family arrears at home. This was evident in the dealings of Macleod of Macleod and Angus McLean, a recruit from the farm of Gearnie. McLean owed the estate thirteen shillings, an amount which Macleod subsequently took from the total owed by the regimental accounts to the recruit. The same transactions occurred on the estate of Lochbuie, where the brother-in-law of a recruit had £ 7 removed from his debts. ¹⁰⁶

Table 7:8 shows the military earnings sent home in one year to the Mull estate of Lochbuie. It demonstrates that while such earnings were not necessarily large, they could still represent a significant percentage of the rents for individual families on Highland farms. Where only the whole farm rent is known, as opposed to the specific rent for the soldier's family, the percentage of rent paid by military income is low. However, where the individual rents are known, then the corresponding percentage of payment is as high as a quarter to one third. This means that military income constituted a significant and important source of cash, and displays one of the areas where recruiting and the estate economy interacted positively.

Table 7:8. Military Earnings Relative to Rental on the Mull Estate of Lochbuie, July 1795 - July 1796

(Source, GD 174/1506/1; GD 174/935, 916; GD 174/2262; N.L.S., Ms 20758)

Farm	Rent	Military Income	% of Rent
Balmeanaich	£ 6	£ 1.10.0	25
Corrinahenich	£ 30	£ 2.0.0	6.6
Glenbyre	£ 27	£ 6.11.0	24.2
Kinlochspelve	£ 3.0.0	£ 0.10.0	16.6
Finishish	£ 30	£ 10.5.0	34.1
Moy	£ 55	£ 1.10.0	2.7
Cameron	£ 35	£ 8.17.0	25.2
Scobull	£ 13.10.0	£ 1.3.8	8.6
Cillmor	£ 10	£ 2.2.0	21

The direct application of such military revenue for the estate needs of Highland tenantry is the context that explains the relative popularity of the volunteer system in the region. Chapter three demonstrates the relative popularity of volunteering when compared to the general dislike of regular units.¹⁰⁷ This enthusiasm was evident in the attitudes of both proprietors, and, to a lesser extent, the tenantry. In direct contrast to the reluctant or hostile attitudes towards the military use of their tenant populations in line regiments, landlords actively encouraged their tenants to join the volunteers. Maclaine of Lochbuie specifically noted on two separate occasions that, with regard to volunteers, his own tenantry were to be enrolled. His reasoning being that the benefits of income would accrue more closely to his own property. These benefits were evident across the Highlands. In Lewis, by January 1795, the pay of volunteers offset the increased price of meal. At Achnashine in Ross-shire in February 1800, a half pay Ensign, Alexander Mackenzie, stated that to get a company of volunteers " would be beneficial to the place in general. " In North Uist and Skye it was noted that volunteering " would enable the tenants to pay their rents. " The result in North Uist was the formation of a company of eighty men in July 1803. Their pay totalled £ 340 per annum, or 14.7% of the 1799 rental of the whole North Uist estate.¹⁰⁸

This financial support was highlighted to the 1841 Parliamentary Select Committee on Emigration by a former volunteer. He remarked;

In the districts to which I allude, there were at least sixty to eighty volunteers, who were paid about £ 5 to £ 6. That will be found to have been about £ 300. The pay they received tended to make them comfortable, and paid the rents generally. ¹⁰⁹

There is little doubt that, as with other forms of military income, that derived from volunteer units could be significant. In Sutherland the volunteers consisted of 1190 men; six officers at the rank of major and above, fourteen captains and twenty eight lieutenants. In all, the entire annual pay for this establishment in 1803-4 came to £ 9618.14.8. As was apparent at Lochbuie, the volunteers also remitted money home. In 1804, the tenants of the farms of Kintomey and Swordly in the parish of Farr had £ 10.18.10 remitted to them. This constituted 19.5% of their rent. Militia men from the same area sent back £ 80.2.0, which was 10% of the whole parish rental. The Countess of Sutherland assessed the importance of such military income when, on 15 July 1805, she noted that the increases in the estate rental had been due in large part to the money brought in by such local units, as well as the incoming pay of soldiers in the wider regular army. The extent of this general increase was, according to the Countess, £ 3000. ¹¹⁰

The volunteers were popular in the Highlands because they interacted well with local economies. Simply put, they were the only levies within the British army that came closest to old style military activity under the clans. Never designed to move far from their parish, they were mobilised only for set days or weeks in the year, and if taken onto permanent duty, it was only for a regulated maximum of one month, excepting actual invasion. It was understood by the population that volunteer units that extended their services, only needed to do so from October until July. This was the period when the agricultural cycle left large amounts of Highland males relatively under employed, and so even extension of service beyond their immediate area was rarely nothing more than a more organised form of seasonal migration. ¹¹¹

Military service thus had concrete benefits for the highest and lowest in Highland society. However, if the consequences to the tacksman class that remained outside the army appear to have been largely negative, then caution is necessary when addressing the matter of motivation within the mass of the ordinary estate population. At the basic level of individual reactions, there is evidence that, beyond the abhorrence of conscription described in the chapter on law and order, the enlistment of Highlanders brought a profound level of grief and sadness to their families. Describing the effect of recruitment, it was observed;

When any is enlisted for the service, his relations are for some time, inconsolable and in particular, the mothers, sisters and wives, would rather have their respective relatives to pass the most miserable and wretched life with themselves at home, than see them go into the army. ¹¹²

This is the picture of oppression and suffering traditionally associated with military levying in the region. There can be little doubt that it induced real fear and suffering amongst estate populations. Given this dislike, the reasons why so many did in fact join the army becomes all the more important. The fact was that, like their landlords, many Highland tenants saw the reality of the situation. Substantial numbers understood that recruiting was a certainty in one form or another in the period 1739-1815. Many commentaries reveal the brutal nature of recruiting in the region, but rarely credit the mass of the population with any practical responses. The case of the Sutherland tenants is an illustrative one. When recruiting commenced in 1799 for the last Sutherland regiment, the tenantry combined in an attempt to prevent any recruits being taken. Faced with no single examples to evict, it was hoped that the threat of landlord retribution would be nullified. In a powerful demonstration of the inherently weak position of the population, as well as the intensely coercive nature of recruiting, the estate factor casually brought up the subject of sheep farming. Unsurprisingly, the estate population suddenly became rather more enthusiastic for military service. At first glance, another such example is the 1795 declaration of Maclaine of Lochbuie's tenants to remove from their farms as a result of their refusal to give men to the laird. While suggestive of landlord power, upon closer inspection, the power of the tenantry is also revealed. The declaration was signed by seventy one men. This amount represented a large section of the tenant expertise on Lochbuie's estate, and to have removed them all in one large body would have severely damaged revenue from the property. The result was that, even as late as 1804, tenants were still on the farms that they had supposedly been removed from. ¹¹³ In essence, the laird's bluff had been called. This is perhaps unusual, and it would be wrong to describe this example as the common experience of Highland tenantry in this period. What it does reveal is the pragmatic response of the population to the reality of military levying. This attitude was evident in two quotes that must be considered as a parallel and alternative response to the horrified reactions of Highland tenantry usually noted by historians. On 24 January 1780, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Macleod of Dunvegan wrote;

" To procure the men it is absolutely necessary that I converse with, bestow favours on, and arrange the affairs of the fathers and connections of my recruits. " Mirroring exactly his neighbour's statement, Lord Alexander Macdonald of Sleat noted to the Earl of Seaforth in 1795 regarding his own earlier experience during the American War. " I found this to be the case when I was employed last war in the service of government. There are a thousand stipulations upon such an occasion about ' lands when they shall return ' and an interim accommodation for their fathers or mothers. " ¹¹⁴

This scenario reveals a picture of negotiation, interaction and compromise that is rarely attributed to landlord tenantry relations in the Highlands. This pragmatic attitude was summed up by the seventy two men from Macdonnell of Glengarry's estate who, having become soldiers, asked on 27 October 1794;

That we may know where to betake ourselves, indeed we expect to enjoy those possessions which our ancestors so long enjoyed, though now in the hands of strangers, as we do not wish that you should lose by way of us, we shall give as high a rent as any of your Lowland shepherds ever gave and we shall all become bound for anyone whose circumstances may afford you room to mistrust. ¹¹⁵

There is evidence that these soldiers had succeeded to an extent. In October 1801, in an attempt to retain his population, Glengarry offered to accept rents of 10% lower than those offered by sheep farmers. He informed government that he had done this in order to retain his estate's military capacity. It would seem, therefore, that one of the material benefits that recruitment offered the Highlander, was the enhanced value placed on them as tenantry. This, indeed, was one of its most vital consequences, and it has already been pointed out in other studies that recruiting slowed the introduction of large scale sheep farming into central Inverness-shire in the 1790s. ¹¹⁶

However, recruiting had a more substantial impact than delaying removal and emigration for the decade from circa 1793-1803. On the Lochaber estates of the Duke of Gordon, the potential and reality of military levying prevented the large-scale imposition of sheep farming in 1777. Logically, commercial pastoralism could have emerged strongly in that area in the mid 1770s. The failure of cattle prices earlier in the decade had revealed the precarious nature of the rental structure in the region, and it is certain that, by July 1776, Argyllshire sheep farmers were viewing land in the Badenoch and Lochaber lordships. Seven farms were specifically highlighted as suitable for sheep walks, and the prospect of a considerable augmentation seemed clear. However, in an atmosphere of anticipated

recruiting, Gordon, having already earmarked the farms of Achachar and Corriechonnie for sheep, nevertheless, on 29 November 1777, decided not to set farms to Lowland tenants. Likewise, on 13 December 1777, Cameron of Glenevis and Martin of Letterfinlay were noted as reluctant to set their farms under sheep, as they were aware that this would entail the loss of their populations. Instead, Glenevis became a prominent recruiter for Gordon, and was awarded the farm of Achtrichtan to settle some of his followers. By early January 1778, Gordon himself was involved in recruiting. By the end of the war, families that had recruited like Angus Macdonnell on the Lochaber farm of Inch, began to ask for the settlement and securing of their dependants. By March 1782, the factor highlighted Inch as a suitable farm that could be rented at £ 64 under sheep. However, the 1784 rental shows it was let to Macdonnell for £ 60. ¹¹⁷

In 1784, Gordon's Lochaber lands were set for a rent of £ 1338.12.6. The former rent had been £ 1212.19.6 - an increase of £ 126. In general, the experience of the American War had massively reinforced the military use of estate populations. The rental of 1784 is a concrete acknowledgement of this. The failure to impose sheep farming on the estate was summarised in 1784, when a tenant petitioned Gordon to " keep the men not the sheep on your Grace's estate. " That this, in fact, occurred in Lochaber is revealed by Alexander Macdonnell of Keppoch, whose failure in 1790 to gain recruits inspired an anti-tenant backlash that mirrors that of the Countess of Sutherland quoted in the chapter on emigration.

I can point out to you where his Grace the Duke of Gordon might pocket near £ 1000 yearly more than his present rent roll if his Grace did not prefer his present sett of tenants to strangers. But that, and the ingratitude of the people upon the farms which my nephew holds by his Grace's goodness I shall defer at present. ¹¹⁸

The competition between recruiting and commercial sheep farming was a feature of the mid 1770s in certain areas. Given the acknowledged slow down in sheep farming in the 1790s, this suggests that recruiting continued to be an activity which retained a surprising level of influence. Nothing demonstrates this better than the Seaforth estates of Glensheal and Lochalsh. On the latter estate, the extent of the concessions that the tenantry had gained in 1794 became apparent when attempts were made to sell it. In light of seven year leases and the low rental, the estate proved difficult to sell. The rental was £ 1299; but the potential buyer was informed that the estate authorities had rated it at £ 1800. An advisor to Seaforth noted in 1798 with regard to the estate:

" That in making the last set, his Lordship was obliged to submit to some loss in consideration of the alacrity with which his people had enlisted in his regiment then newly raised ". A year later he added to his argument ; " I confirmed my assertion by appealing to your situation as a chieftain and as having raised two regiments of the line just before the last set, the influence of which I knew having one of the conditions for granting leases. " ¹¹⁹

It is not certain that the tenants had in reality managed to keep the rents down by 27% (the figure of £ 1800 may have been inflated to attract the buyer), nevertheless it was conceded that it was a low rented estate. Only in 1801, when the leases given at the time of recruiting expired, was the estate sold. In Kintail and Glensheal, the response of the tenantry elicited a promise from Seaforth that when their leases granted for recruits expired in 1801, they would, nevertheless, be preferred again to strangers if they offered sufficient rents. The only major point that was not allowed was the fact that the landlord reserved the right to remodel the farms. This undoubtedly constituted a major concession to the tenantry. Thus, when, in 1800, a Lieutenant Macdonald from Lochaber asked for a sheep farm in Glensheal, and informed Seaforth's advisers that under sheep the estate rental would double, Mackenzie of Fairburn nevertheless informed Seaforth that; " In the first place, however, as I before proposed, I would call on the present tenants for their proposals. " In 1801, Seaforth attempted to construct substantial single tenant farms, as in Inversheal, but found that this was impossible due to the numbers that had promises of places. An insubstantial tenant, that was recognised as such by the estate authorities, was, nevertheless, given half of the farm of Achnagart because his brother in the Seaforth regiment stood caution for his rent in the form of a loan. The situation was summarised by Colin Mackenzie;

It would have been certainly more advantageous for the farms, to have been let them each to a single tenant, but this would have left twenty one totally unprovided. We found ourselves tied up by an express promise given at the former set to give the tenants a preference to strangers. ¹²⁰

Recruiting, therefore, retarded the development of large scale sheep farming, in this case, over the period of two sets of leases. The impact of recruiting on rent levels was also apparent on the Glengarry and Glensheal estates. In 1802, the soldiers and families of the 93rd regiment ensured that when rents were raised, they were not included. The result was a 14.3% drop in the augmentation levels in Assynt. ¹²¹ Caution is, however, necessary at this point. Too often it has been argued that the reasons why Highlanders joined such regiments, as in the case of the Glengarry men, was to restore and defend the old order and

tenurial structure in the region. This reasoning is certainly evident, but must not stand as the only motivation as it suggests a certain passiveness in the population.

Table 7:9. Social Origins of Estate Recruits on Atholl and North Uist Estates
(Source, B.A.M., Military census Atholl estate 1778; C.D.T.L., GD 221/4388)

Estate	Tenants as % of Estate Groups	Total Recruits & %	Cottars & Servants as % of Estate Groups	Total Recruits & %
Atholl	350 (77)	46 (52.2)	104 (22.9)	42 (47.7)
North Uist	393 (75.8)	22 (53.6)	125 (24.1)	19 (46.3)

It has been commented on earlier that as part of their strategy to maximise the profitability of their populations, landlords tended to target the underclasses on their properties. Table 7:9 demonstrates the social origins of recruits from the Atholl and Macdonald estates. From the figures it appears that the cottar and servant class were far more likely to constitute the actual personnel that entered the proprietary levies. Thus recruiting and estate strategies disproportionately gave land claims to those that, through the normal estate conditions did not, or could not, hold land. This is a vital point because it has a bearing on the nature and consequences of land promises. Table 7:10 shows the type of land promises listed in the estate records of the Macdonald family and the Maclaines of Lochbuie. They suggest that the mere defence of established land holdings was not the main motivation for Highland tenantry. Firstly, there is a substantial push from below, with the landless never constituting less than one fifth of requests for land - indeed, in North Uist they approach 50%. Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that requests for a transfer from their own farm to that of another, was just as common as the defence of original holdings. What recruiting gave scope to, was the social expectations and ambitions of Highland tenantry and populations. This is a radically different scenario from the usual picture of sullen defence of the old established order.

Table 7:10. Type of Land Promise to Highland Soldiers 1790s
(C.D.T.L., GD 221/4388; GD 221/4250-5. Estate Petitions, S.R.O., GD 174/916)

Estate	Land for landless family & %	More land on same holding & %	Land for possessor but on other farm	To maintain same holding & %
North Uist	19 (46.3)	10 (24.3)	12 (29.2)	-
Skye	20 (29.8)	17 (25.3)	18 (26.8)	12 (17.9)
Lochbuie	6 (20)	12 (40)	6 (20)	6 (20)

This is indeed the picture that emerges when the impact of returning soldiery is considered. In simple terms, this amounted to a long term settlement and management problem of significant dimensions. As late as March 1822, Maclaine of Lochbuie noted regarding affairs on a neighbour's estate. " Every vacancy on Lochnell's estate is I may engage, ten deep to old soldiers and other followers. " ¹²²

The same problem of land promises dominated the administration of Lord Macdonald's estates. Between 31 July 1801 and the announcement of the 1803 rental in December 1802, the whole direction of estate management was set out by Macdonald's commissioners. As was apparent on other estates that had recruited heavily, the whole of the 1802 sett was dominated and given over to the re-settlement of those who had given in men. At the most fundamental level of planning, military recruiting, rather than improvement or the ability to stock tenant lands, became the influencing determinant. While it was noted that no poor or unfit people were to get land, this regulation did not apply to those that had been promised possessions. By 1801, the commissioners admitted frankly that some that had been given holdings were of poor material standards. Moreover, the old tenant holdings came under attack as pressure for places came to bear. In Letterfur and Drumfearn in Sleat tenants lost part of their holdings. Substantial tenants like Martin Macpherson who had spent money improving his farm in Sleat, emigrated because he lost part of his possession. In Peinmore in the parish of Kilmuir, as well as in Sollitot, usual tenant holdings of half pennies were replaced with third pennies as men and families of recruits were given land. The rise of the lower social orders was highlighted in the parish of Strath, as it was noted many acres had been distributed amongst the poorer sort in the district, while it was commented that the strategy involved " the serving of so many poor people. " ¹²³

Table 7:11, which gives figures for recruiting on several estates, mirrors in general terms the levels highlighted in appendices fifteen and sixteen. The average of between 15%-20% recruited, again seems to have been common. However, with regard to estate management, it should be noted that even where the overall levels of recruiting were low, as in North Uist, the percentage of farms affected is quite high. This has important implications for the estate management responses to recruiting promises. With so few farms without a family connection to a soldier, the problem of organising places became more complex. On Macdonald's estate this forced a massive series of removals and flittings that were hardly conducive to a sense of security that would foster improvement. The complexity can be illustrated by the exasperated sentiments of Lord Macdonald's factor with regard to the farms of Cammuscross and Scullumas, both of which had soldiers' families on them, yet were, simultaneously, earmarked for the settlement of a favoured tenant. He noted;

Who is there to be removed to accommodate him and if that town is to be [given] out in acres how are those who gave recruits to Lord Macdonald and who have lands in Cammuscross to be accommodated? I now beg leave to ask a question. Does it occur to the Commissioners [of Lord Macdonald] that there will be many complaints from the people of Scullumas who have given sons if they are not accommodated with lands equal to what they lost ? ¹²⁴

Table 7:11. Impact of Recruiting on Estate Manpower and Farm Structure 1778-1799

(Source, B.A.M., Military Census 1778; S.R.O., GD 44/47/7/4; GD 44/25/2/56; S.R.O., GD 174/916, 923; C.D.T.L., GD 221/4388)

Year	Estate	No' of Farms	Farms Affected	%	Man-power	Recruit-ed	%
1778	Atholl	112	46	41	454	88	19.3
1778	Loch- aber	37	33	89.1	284	75	26.4
1778	Strath- avon	74	35	47.2	306	45	14.7
1795	Loch- buie	29	23	79.3	361	50	13.8
1799	N. Uist	43	22	51	1313	83	6.3

The Macdonald estate petitions back up this picture of complex re-settlement problems. From this source and the rentals it appears that of the 179 farms on Macdonald's Skye estate, at least sixty three had the profile of all or part of their tenantry determined by involvement in the army - over one farm in three. The consequence of the low social status of the new possessors and their link to the military was noticeable. On 16 March 1801, the affairs of Norman Macdonald, son of a tenant in Solitot, Kilmuir, were summarised as follows;

" Norman the son has never held any land, he would not be able to take such a quantity but that he is still a sergeant to Captain Martin's company of volunteers and his pay there would come near to £ 30. " More generally by April 1803 after the demobbing of the fencibles it was added; " The young men in the country who have no lands are purchasing the cattle of those emigrants thinking they will have a claim for lands afterwards, among them are some of the late soldiers in the Regiment of the Isles, some who volunteered and others who did not. " ¹²⁵

The interaction of recruiting and estate populations pose some interesting questions with regard to the genesis of the crofting system. The nature of demands by the lower social orders, as articulated by recruiting promises, suggest that, as in Breadalbane, the emergence of croft holdings also involved a substantial element of push from below. This suggests that crofting should not be seen purely in terms of an abstract estate management response to kelp profits, imposed from above onto an unco-operative backward population. Rather, crofting was a more inclusive process, involving inter-tenantry strain and initiative, as much as poor landlord tenantry relations.

The loss of land to lower social groupings was a policy practised across the entire estate of Glengarry. The laird planted the families and dependants of recruits onto farms, often to the extent of five to seven crofter holdings on one possession. Naturally, this discouraged the tenantry and again reveals the extent to which levying disrupted the traditional holding pattern. As in Skye, the social expectations of the less tenurially secure was also evident. Glengarry himself noted this.

While Cameron the subtenant on Inverguseran was only a subtenant, his ambition led him naturally to be obliging and it was by such conduct alone he could cherish the hope of such success as afterwards attended him on being received as a tenant. ¹²⁶

The result of this spread of legitimised land claims through recruiting was an increase in subdivision and the generation of crofting. Given the lower social origins of many recruits and their families, a policy whereby they were given reduced holdings was logical. Added to this common sense approach was the fact that the sheer numbers of requests was bound to stimulate subdivision. Another influence that pushed the authorities in that direction was the large numbers of farms affected. By crofting several specific townships, the problem of multiple land promises was lessened. In 1800, Cammuscross in Sleat and Iridgill in Uig were divided. Those who gave in sons, as well as those removed from tenant possessions for favoured families, were given preference. On 10 February 1802, the policy was decided whereby those with claims were to be put on small lots in order to limit damage to the estate. It was not merely on Macdonald's lands that military promises stimulated such division of land. With regard to Tiree farms like Ballimartin and Ballephail, the fulfilment of promises to soldiers in 1801 was the deciding factor that resulted in them being crofted. More fundamentally, the need for landed possessions meant that the policy of retaining the four mail land unit as the minimum measurement of tenant holdings was done away with in 1803. ¹²⁷

In North Uist, crofting was explicitly linked to recruiting promises. This was in large part due to the fact that it had been recognised recruitment was at odds with the process of improvement. On 25 April 1801, the Uist factor proposed the large fertile farm of Houghary;

" For the purpose of collecting into that farm as many as it may accommodate of the persons who held land under promises from Lord Macdonald ". A month later this was agreed when it was added; " The commissioners do not expect that the whole of the persons who had promises of lands from Lord Macdonald on account of the recruiting service can be accommodated in one farm, but it is desirable to collect them as much as possible in order to prevent the improvement of a variety of farms from being impeded by the dispersion of these people over the estate. " ¹²⁸

While Houghary was rapidly crofted, large tacksmen still found that too many small tenants remained for any enlargement of farms to begin. Yet in Skye, recruiting produced perhaps one of its most paradoxical and ironic consequences. In both Uig and Cammuscross, the division into lotts meant that the traditional levels of souming became irrelevant. The result was that the high grazing areas could be removed in part or in whole and turned into sheep farms. This is exactly what happened, and as was noted in the case of the Breadalbane estate, it is ironic to note that military recruiting could actually stimulate the development of sheep farming in certain circumstances. ¹²⁹

In part, the managerial problems engendered by the rush of recruiting promises explain why, by the end of the first decade in the nineteenth century, the trade of land for men was effectively ended. The incompatibility of recruiting and effective commercial estate management had been understood as early as the 1770s. On 28 January 1778, a senior figure on Gordon's estate noted that, " I think the Duke will take no concern in raising men. I am very glad it is so, they would not be raised without being very hurtful to his interest. " The same sentiments were evident on the estates of Sutherland and Lochbuie. This attitude was summarised by a tacksman from the Urquhart estate of Sir James Grant of Grant. He noted regarding the tenantry;

The Urquhart people make very nice in expectation of advantageous conditions from you..... which might be injurious to your interest in a future sale of your lands, to bring you under obligations which might be extremely inconvenient and disagreeable. ¹³⁰

This circumstance became real on the estate of Sutherland in 1803, when soldiers kept demanding certain rent stipulations or reductions. The factor noted that " we must avoid the allowance he [a tacksman left with soldiers on his farm] wants of. Lord Gower will think he is never to be done of claims on account of soldiers. " ¹³¹ As the result of such thinking the estate, in November 1802, forbade the use of land promises - in effect spelling the end of the recruiting order that had existed in the Highlands since the 1740s.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to illustrate the reasons why recruiting was practised by landlords in the period 1756-1815. It has argued that an insular approach, which sees the continuance of military activity as evidence of a maintained martial tradition within the Highlands, is only partly helpful. Instead, it suggests that by examining the outside influences of government and finance, especially during wartime, the motives for recruiting take on a more relevant and up-to-date aspect. Not merely was estate recruiting seen as the means to gain additional government income, it was also a highly adaptable and market conscious option.

In contrast to the motives behind the landlords' involvement, the incentive and impact of recruiting upon the middle and lower orders is undoubtedly more complex. In the case of the tacksmen it is argued that recruiting competed against their new position as the necessarily profit conscious managers of the agricultural sector. It forced them onto the defensive by removing the normal economic criteria whereby those who held land on

Highland estates were chosen. Conversely, as a result of a deliberate targeting policy, the lower orders found recruiting gave expression to their tenorial ambition. This chapter suggests that by giving claims to land based on non tenorial considerations, recruiting attacked the hierarchical structure of Highland farms, making crofting much more likely. In summary, the chapter suggests that recruiting should be considered as one of the most influential factors in the decline of the tenorial order in the Highlands, and that rather than stressing the uncommercialised nature of military levying, its real significance lay in its role as a catalyst for change.

- 1). T.M. Devine, ' Social Responses of Agrarian " Improvement ": The Highland & Lowland Clearances in Scotland ' in R.A. Houston & I.D. Whyte (eds.), *Scottish Society 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1989), 160.
- 2). J. Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1975), 263-66, 275, 362-63; E. Richards, *A History of the Highland Clearances*, vol. 1 (London 1982), 151-152; R.D. Clyde, *The Rehabilitation of the Highlander 1745-1830: Changing Visions of Gaeldom* (Unpublished PhD University of Glasgow, 1990), 314-15.
- 3). B. Lenman, *Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen* (London, 1984), 186-202; L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, (London, 1992), 140; I. Adams & Meredyth Somerville, *Cargoes of Despair and Hope: Scottish Emigration to North America 1603-1803* (Edinburgh, 1993), 137.
- 4). E. Cregeen (ed.), *Argyll Estate Instructions: Mull, Morvern & Tiree, 1771-1805* (Edinburgh, 1964) ix-x; A. Murdoch, *The People Above' : Politics and Administration in mid-eighteenth century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), 125.
- 5). R.V. Jackson, ' Government Expenditure & British Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century: Some Problems of Measurement ' in *Econ.H.R.*, vol. 43 (1990), 219-20; L. Colley, loc. cit., 283-319; J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688-1783* (London, 1989), 4-6, 27-40.
- 6). J. Brewer, loc. cit., 114-116, 121-122, 187-191 & 201.
- 7). J. Butt, ' The American War of Independence & the Scottish Economy ' in O.D. Edwards & G. Shepperson (eds.), *Scotland, Europe and the American Revolution* (Edinburgh, 1976), 57-59. There is still debate as to the extent of the fall in investment in the private sector as a result of war induced government expenditure, see: A.H. John, ' War & the English Economy ' in *Econ.H.R.*, vol. 17 (1955), 340. Despite its title this article does include evidence from north of the border. For an example of such investment by Highland landlord, see S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection GD 50/26/13/69.
- 8). B.A M, Box 47/12/10; C.D.T.L., GD 221/5516/1; G.U.L., Campbell of Inverneil Papers, Journal Sept. 1792-Feb. 1793. p. 267.
- 9). N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 5, f. 1; J. Fortescue (ed.), *The Correspondence of George III* vol. 3 (London, 1928), 531; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/5/1/35.
- 10). S.R.O., GD 44/47/11/14.
- 11). A. Murdoch, ' More " Reluctant Heroes ": New light on Military Recruiting in North East Scotland 1759-1760 ' in *N.S.* vol. 6 (1984), 163-166; C.D.T.L., GD 221/5516/7; M. L., *Caledonian Mercury* 9 April 1778, p. 110; S.R.O., GD 44/47/3/2/16; *Scots Magazine* vol. 37 (Edinburgh, 1775), 691.
- 12). G.U.L., Campbell of Inverneil Papers, Letter Book, vol. 4, p. 15; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1387/57.
- 13). T.M. Devine, ' The Emergence of the New Elite in the Western Highlands and Isles, 1800-60 ' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Improvement and Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1989), 120-121, S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/4. For additional credit reasons involving tenantry see chapter on emigration, footnote 64, p. 213.

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- 14). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/200/32; GD 44/43/201/15; GD 44/43/202/25; S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/3416/1.
- 15). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1314, f. 114; S.R.O., GD 44/43/197/22; GD 44/47/14/2/58; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/217/28; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1319/1; GD 174/1410/125 & 127; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1113/2; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1354/54.
- 16). S.R.O., GD 44/47/14/2/58; S.R.O., GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 8 Dec. 1794.
- 17). B.A.M., Box 65/2/17, S.R.O., Cameron of Fassifern Papers, GD 1/736/5; S.R.O., GD 46/17/18, unnumbered letter dated 26 October 1797.
- 18). For level of debts see S.R.O., GD 46/17/15, unnumbered letter dated 7 November 1795. For 1800 see: GD 46/17/14/850. For estimated income see: GD 46/4/1/4 & 13; GD 46/17/3 - accounts of Lewis kelp. GD 46/17/15, unnumbered letters dated 27 Oct.; 26 April and 17 Sept. 1796.
- 19). S.R.O., GD 46/17/14/279, 286-87, 675; GD 46/17/18, unnumbered letters dated 14 September 1797, 26 October 1797, 28 December 1797; GD 46/17/19/23, 108, 435.
- 20). S.R.O., Robertson of Straloch Papers, GD 1/90/8; GD 1/90/12/a.
- 21). S.R.O., GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letters dated 26 October 1793 & 20 February 1794.
- 22). S.R.O., GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 15 Oct. 1795; GD 46/6/25/5-6, 9, 78.
- 23). R.V. Jackson, loc. cit., 229.
- 24). A. Murdoch, loc. cit., 77.
- 25). W.R.H., C.S. 96/1429-36, Accounts of Mess'r Ross & Ogilvie; C.S. 96/1437, p. 251, 752-55, 819; C.S.96/1061, Account Book of Gavin Kemp of Leith, p. 117, 212-14; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie, GD 174/1410/131.
- 26). P.R.O., W.O. 123/113, p 26.
- 27). D.C.M., 3/104/2, 15, 19-20; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1171, f. 337; Laing Manuscript, *H.M.C.*, vol. 2 (London, 1925), 481-483.
- 28). D.C.M., 3/104/33; E. Richards, loc. cit., 149. Macleod also owed £ 11 000 to Captain Alexander Macleod of Berneray. This meant that 40% of his entire debt was still to local elites, a factor that undoubtedly prevented bankruptcy. In a powerful example that demonstrates the creditworthiness aspect of military service, the actions of Macleod's creditors can be contrasted with that of John Macdonald of Clanranald. (Then a minor). The Macdonald family were in a similar, if not better, position than Macleod. Yet without access to assured military income, their creditors acted very differently from Macleods in 1778. It was noted; " It is hard to see them so clamorous when Macleod's affairs tho' in a worse condition brings no dispatch on the managers they should consider how peaceable the creditors on Macleod's estate are. " S.R.O., Methven Collection, GD 1/8/17, p. 30-34.
- 29). A.I. Macinnes, ' Landownership, Land Use and Elite Enterprise in Scottish Gaeldom: from Clanship to Clearance in Argyllshire 1688-1858 ' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), 26, S.R.O., GD 174/1373/10/2; S.R.O., GD 44/43/198/21-22.

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- 30). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1284, f. 4; S.R.O., GD 174/1372/22, 24 & 26.
- 31). S.R.O., GD 46/20/4/1/13; GD 46/17/16, Accounts 1808 & 1810 income; GD 46/17/19/274, 356-60.
- 32). S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/3410/10/3; S.R.O., Broastairs Papers, GD 1/616/180; S.R.O., Cameron of Fassifern Papers, GD 1/736/5.
- 33). S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1319/3; GD 174/789/16; S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/26/6; GD 50/26/30/7, 13, p. 13; B.A.M., Box 47/11/149.
- 34). S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/6/25/13.
- 35). N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/979/4, p. 9, 21-26; N.L.S., Melville Papers, Ms 4, f. 186.
- 36). W.B. Donne, *The Correspondence of King George III with Lord North 1768-1783*, vol. 1 (London, 1867), 239-240; J. Fortescue (ed.), loc. cit., 197; S.R.O., GD 44/47/3/2/16.
- 37). S.R.O., GD 174/1426/41; S.R.O., Campbell of Ballaveolin, GD 13/260a.
- 38). For the general background on attitudes to regular payment see: E.R. Cregeen, 'The Tacksman and their Successors: A study of Tenurial Reorganisation in Mull, Morvern & Tiree in the early Eighteenth Century' in *S. S.*, vol. 13 (1969), 109-110; T.M. Devine, *Clanship to Crofters' War: The Social Transformation of the Scottish Highlands* (Manchester 1994), 32; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1096; S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection GD 50/26/6; D.C.M., 3/68/4, 3/104/18.
- 39). S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1319/1; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1485, f. 271; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1112/7.
- 40). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/217/24; S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 1 March 1794; GD 46/17/19/356-60; GD 46/17/16, Accounts 1808 & 1810; GD 46/17/15; GD 46/17/14/630; GD 174/1329/91-92 & 94.
- 41). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1643/17/1; S.R.O., GD 174/1329/28, N.L.S., Dep 313/979/4, p. 20, D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (ed.), *The Old Statistical Account*, vol. 8 (Wakefield, 1983), 99; S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/52/5.
- 42). A.I. Macinnes, 'The Impact of the Civil Wars and Interregnum: Political Disruption and Social Change within Scottish Gaeldom' in R. Mitchison & P. Roebuck (eds.), *Economy & Society in Scotland and Ireland 1500-1939* (Edinburgh, 1988), 61-64, 67; T.M. Devine, 'The Emergence of the New Elite in the Western Highlands and Islands 1800-60' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Improvement & Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 1989), 117-118; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1407, ff. 143, 146.
- 43). B.A.M., Box 65/2/36.
- 44). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1284, f. 109.
- 45). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, 44/25/7/15; GD 44/43/94/16; GD 44/43/195/15, 44; GD 44/43/197/33; GD 44/47/6/63; GD 44/47/2/15 & 37.
- 46). S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/56/4/12-13; GD 248/683/2/64; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1666/6; GD 170/1355/9; GD 170/1354/59; GD 170/1090/33. For retention of population see chapter six, footnote seven, p. 251.

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- 47). S.R.O., GD 174/1316/1; GD 174/1307/3; GD 174/1440/3.
- 48). S.R.O., GD 174/1329/3. For a later example of the same laird preventing the loss of military populations in 1797, see GD 174/1506, unnumbered letter dated 22 March 1797.
- 49). N.L.S., Mackenzie Papers, Ms 1461, f. 199.
- 50). N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1113/2.
- 51). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1487, f. 133; S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/180/33, 66-67; N.L.S., Dep 313/1113/2. For a later example within Sutherland on 28 January 1793 see: Dep 313/1114/22, 31 & 33.
- 52). N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1122/23.
- 53). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/304/4; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1483, f. 277.
- 54). S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie, GD 174/2221/3; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/52/539/17.
- 55). T.M. Devine, 'Landlordism and Highland Emigration' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Emigration and Scottish Society* (Edinburgh, 1992), 90-91; A.I. Macinnes, 'Scottish Gaeldom: The First Phase of Clearance' in T.M. Devine & R. Mitchison (eds.), *People and Society in Scotland*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1988), 79.
- 56). S.R.O., Boyle of Shewalton Papers. GD 1/481/14-15; S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/391/1(b); GD 170/1051/2; GD 174/1316/1; GD 170/1620/2; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie, GD 174/1424/2; S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 27 March 1793; GD 46/17/14/539; GD 46/224/21.
- 57). J. Western, *The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain 1793-1799* (Unpublished PhD thesis Edinburgh University 1953), 72; J. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. 4 (London, 1902), 887-888.
- 58). S.R.O., GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 27 March 1793; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/9/16; GD 44/47/4/46.
- 59). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/208/4; GD 427/304/1; D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 17 (Wakefield, 1981), 548 n.
- 60). S.R.O., Campbell of Barcaldine Papers, GD 170/1643/20; GD 170/1090/38.
- 61). S.R.O., GD 44/43/205/11; GD 44/47/2/85(1); GD 44/47/9/26 & 76. For rentals see GD 44/23/6. For list of Strathavon and Glenlivet men see: GD 44/47/7/16(1); GD 44/43/336; C.D.T.L., GD 221/4250/19; GD 221/4251/4.
- 62). J.R.L., B. 5/1, p. 286; D.C.M., 3/68/6.
- 63). S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/305/5(2), 11.
- 64). S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/11.
- 65). D.C.M., 3/68/240, 340; 3/68/307/1; 3/70/47; S.R.O., GD 170/1090/41. For cost of ensigny in the 42nd, see: S.R.O., Boyle of Shewalton Papers. GD 1/481/13-14.

- 66). S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/683/2/41.
- 67). B. Seton, ' Recruiting in Scotland, 1793-94 ' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 11 (1932), 41; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie, GD 174/2127; GD 174/1484/23, 28, 30, 33; GD 174/935; GD 174/916.
- 68). The figures of 255 and 286 are drawn respectively, from the 1755 census, using the same percentage of men as described in the O.S.A., as well as the number of fighting men in Webster's census. J. Gray (ed.), *Scottish Population Statistics* (Edinburgh, 1952), 63. For Rum, see: D.J. Withrington and I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20 (Wakefield, 1983), 247; S.R.O., Breadalbane Muniments, GD 112/52/539/17.
- 69). C.F. Macintosh, *Antiquarian Notes* (Inverness, 1897), 210; British Parliamentary Papers, 1884, XXI, *Report of H.M.s Commissioners of Inquiry into the Condition of the Crofters and Cottars in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland*, 495; D.J. Withrington and I.R. Grant (Eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20, 170; vol. 18, 201 & 224.
- 70). J. Mackenzie-Semple, ' Bygone Recruiting in Skye ' in *J.S.A.H.R.*, vol. 18 (1939), 52; J. Macinnes, *Brave Sons of Skye* (Edinburgh, 1899), 7-171; F.J. Grant (ed.), *Commissariat Records of the Isles: Register of Testaments* (Edinburgh, 1902), 8. For rentals in 1799 see: C.D.T.L., RH 2/8/24, p. 103; S.R.O., GD 44/27/4/18.
- 71). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine, Ms 1483, f. 154; S.R.O., GD 44/27/11/113.
- 72). S.R.O., GD 44/27/11/114; GD 44/27/12/5. For example from Strathspey see: S.R.O., Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/458/3/20. For earlier 1763 example of military personnel using pay to secure rent, see N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun Papers, Ms 16728, f. 202.
- 73). C.D.L.T., GD 221/868/2; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/27/11/110.
- 74). S.R.O., John Macgregor Collection, GD 50/26/10/8.
- 75). S.R.O., GD 44/27/12/8; S.R.O., Campbells of Ballaveolin. GD 13/284; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/985/21; Dep 313/1089/44; Dep 313/1090/14. For another example of a pensioned officer (this time on the Grant estate in Urquhart) returning to military service and this employment being found incompatible with farming, see: S.R.O. Seafeld Muniments, GD 248/226/2/84.
- 76). G.U.L., Campbell of Inverneil Papers, Letter Book, November 1794 to May 1795, 134; C.D.L.T., GD 221/4190/1 & 6; GD 221/723; GD 221/5559/3.
- 77). W.R.H., C.S. 95/4040, Farm Account Book of Donald Campbell.
- 78). D.J. Withrington and I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 18, 307; loc. cit., vol. 20, 289.
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- 80). M. Gray, *The Highland Economy 1750-1850* (Edinburgh, 1957), 13-14; A.J. Youngson, *After the Forty Five* (Edinburgh, 1973), 12-14.
- 81). A. Mackerrall, ' The Tacksman and his Holding in the South West Highlands ' in *S.H.R.*, vol. 26 (1947), 11-21; E.R. Cregeen, loc. cit., 95-100; R.A. Dodgshon, *Land and Society in Early Scotland* (Oxford 1981), 281-281; R.A. Dodgshon, ' " Pretense of Blude "

and " Place of thair duelling " : The nature of Scottish Clans 1500-1745 ' in R.A. Houston, & I.D. Whyte, (eds.), loc. cit., 170-176.

82). R.A. Dodgshon, ' Strategies of farming in the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland prior to crofting and the Clearances ' in *Econ.H.R.* vol. 46 (1993), 688-691,700; M.M. Mackay (ed.), *The Rev. Dr. John Walker's Report on the Hebrides 1764-1771* (Edinburgh, 1980), 172, 160, 203- 224.

83). The parishes were Halkirk (Caithness), Edderachylis (Sutherland), Kiltarn (Ross & Cromarty), Alvie, Cromdale, Daviot & Dunlichty, Dores and North Uist (Inverness) and Kilfinichen & Kiliceuen (Argyll). For another example see: J. Macdonald, *A General View of the Agriculture of the Hebrides or Western Isles of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1811), 495; V. Morgan, ' Agricultural Wage Rates in Late Eighteenth Century Scotland ' in *Econ.H.R.* vol. 24 (1970), 185, 199.

84). D.J. Withrington and I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 17,66 & 405, 495.

85). *Ibid.*, 404-405; vol. 17, 268-69; vol. 20, 28-29 & 204; S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 17 June 1793.

86). M.M. Mackay, loc. cit., 99; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1090/7. For further evidence on the adverse impact of recruiting upon farming and wages see chapter two, footnote 72, p. 92, chapter four, footnote 74, p. 169., chapter six, footnote 75, p. 279.

87). S.R.O., GD 44/43/202/21; GD 44/43/210/22; GD 44/43/195/46; GD 44/47/2/75(2-3).

88). W.R.H., Trustees for the Manufactures and Fisheries, N.G. 1/3/8, p. 35; N.G. 1/1/16, p. 16.

89). A. Mackay, *The Book of Mackay* (Edinburgh, 1896), 227-228; N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1115/58 & 61.

90). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/5/1/33 & 52; GD 44/47/6/5(1); GD 44/43/204/26.

91). M.M. Mackay, loc. cit., 153; S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/4/8; S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letters dated 16 May 17 June 1793.

92). E.R. Cregeen, ' The Tacksman and their Successors: A study of Tenurial Reorganisation in Mull, Morvern & Tiree in the early Eighteenth Century ' in *S.S.*, vol. 13 (1969), 100, S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/27/11/129.

93). S.R.O., GD 44/43/200/8; GD 44/47/5/2/2; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1483, f. 300; Ms 1319, f. 2; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/17/3.

94). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/9/12; GD 44/47/2/75/(2).

95). S.R.O., GD 44/47/2/75(3); GD 44/9/13; S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter dated 15 June 1795.

96). S.R.O., GD 44/25/7/42.

97). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/27/4/22, Rental of Badenoch 1784. For farms see: GD 44/47/5/9/5, 12; GD 44/27/12/38, 44; GD 44/47/9/7; GD 44/27/12/5.

98). N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1484, f. 15.

- 99). N.L.S., Dep 313/3263/11; N.L.S., Mackenzie of Delvine Papers, Ms 1487, f. 112.
- 100). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/2/75(2); GD 44/47/4/36; S.R.O., Gillanders of Highfield Papers, GD 427/304/1 & 2.
- 101). R.J. Adam (ed.), *Sutherland Estate Management 1802-1816*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1972), xxvi; vol. 2, 9.
- 102). For 1770 figures that show a close correlation between men discharged from regiments and similar levels in the counties see: S.R.O., Grant of Monymusk, GD 345/1249; S.M.D. Carpenter, loc. cit., 76-87; E. Richards & M. Clough, *Cromartie: Highland Life 1650-1914* (Aberdeen, 1989), 38-55. For the influence of leases (or lack of them) see S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/3, unnumbered letter 28 May 1794.
- 103). S.R.O., RH218/99; British Parliamentary Papers 1884, XXIV, *Report of H.M.'s Commissioners into the Condition of the Crofters and Cottars in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland*, 1740.
- 104). * = Walker gives the rental of Harris at £ 857, this, however, is a large overestimate. It was not until 1769 that Macleod raised rents from the old levels under a general renewal of tacks. Even then, Harris was only rented at £ 806, see: M.M. Mackay, loc. cit., 53-54; R.C. Macleod, *The Book of Dunvegan*, vol. 2 (Aberdeen, 1939), 96.
= Regarding Tiree, it was noted that " most " of the returning men were pensioners. In order not to over emphasise the impact of military money, and in absence of an exact figure from Walker, just half the returning men are listed as pensioners.
- 105). S.R.O. Seaford Muniments, GD 248/244/4/64; C.D.T.L., GD 221/4250/8, 41; GD 221/4257/8. For Strath rental see: GD 221/4390/11.
- 106). D.C.M., 3/70/47; S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/916; GD 174/1484/18.
- 107). See chapter three, table 3:5.
- 108). S.R.O., GD 174/1506/ unnumbered letter dated 19 November 1797; S.R.O., Seaford Muniments, GD 46/17/15/9; GD 46/17/14/484; C.D.T.L., GD 221/816/1. For North Uist rental see: RH 2/8/24, 131.
- 109). British Parliamentary Papers 1841, *First Report from the Select Committee on Emigration (Scotland)*, 67.
- 110). For pay of volunteers, see: N.L.S. Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/3282 (Militia Correspondence 1804-05); Dep 313/746/13. For remittances see: Dep 313/987/31 & 33.
- 111). N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/3280/1; Dep 313/746/32.
- 112). D.J. Withrington and I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20, 204.
- 113). For a useful study that reveals the methods and practical opposition to recruiting see R.A.A. McGeachy, *Aspects of Commerce, Community and Culture: Argyll 1730- 1850* (Unpublished M. Litt thesis, University of Glasgow), chapter five. R.J. Adam (ed.), loc. cit., vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1972); S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie, GD 174/926; N.L.S., Minutes of Tutors of Maclaine of Lochbuie, Ms 20758.

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- 114). J.R.L., B. 5/1. p. 364; S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/6/25/13.
- 115). S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/683/63; S.R.O., Melville Castle Muniments, 51/1/844/3.
- 116). S.R.O., RH 2/4/87, f. 151; T.M. Devine, loc. cit., 89.
- 117). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/27/11/114; GD 44/193/20; GD 44/25/2/28; GD 44/25/7/25, 30, 35 & 42; GD 44/47/3/1/2.
- 118). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/27/4/23; GD 44/47/12/27.
- 119). S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/11, unnumbered letter dated 17 December 1798; GD 46/17/14/279.
- 120). S.R.O., Seaforth Muniments, GD 46/17/14/591; GD 46/17/19/60; GD 46/19/19/77-188: Report By Colin Mackenzie on Glensheal 1801.
- 121). N.L.S, Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1117/11.
- 122). S.R.O., Maclaine of Lochbuie Papers, GD 174/1633/3.
- 123). C.D.T.L., GD 221/4389/3; GD 221/4180/13; GD 221/4250/1, 54; GD 221/671/1; GD 221/726; GD 221/4251/38; GD 221/778.
- 124). C.D.T.L., GD 221/671/1.
- 125). C.D.T.L., GD 221/671/3; GD 221/771/2.
- 126). C.F. Macintosh, loc. cit., 142-143.
- 127). C.D.T.L., GD 221/705; GD 221/730/2; E. Cregeen (ed.), loc. cit., (Edinburgh, 1964), 54-55. For the general impact of soldiers see: D.J. Withrington and I.R. Grant (eds.), loc. cit., vol. 20, 275 n.
- 128). C.D.T.L., GD 221/4180/4-5.
- 129) For further evidence on the link between recruiting crofting and sheep farming see chapter six, footnote 83, p. 281-2.
- 130). S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/43/196/45; GD 44/198/21-22, For the examples of Sutherland and Lochbuie see: N.L.S., Dep 313/1093/17; S.R.O., GD 174/1521. For Grant: S.R.O., Seafield Muniments, GD 248/683/63.
- 131). N.L.S., Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/1118/5; Dep 313/1117/41.

CONCLUSION

In the Scottish Highlands, the era from 1739-1815 was a period of transition during which the entire social and economic structure of the area was irredeemably altered. This thesis has attempted to question how the seemingly traditional activity of military service both integrated with and influenced these changes.

The first conclusion that can be noted regards the basic question of how prevalent military recruiting was within the region. The whole era of 'first phase clearance' in the Highlands was set against a wider British backdrop dominated by war. If it is accepted that fundamental social change began in the region around 1737 with tenurial reorganisation on the Argyll estate, then in the following seventy eight years, until the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the United Kingdom was at war for forty three. This total does not include such small colonial conflicts, as those in North America in 1754-56 and India in 1787-90. To this must be added a dimension that can be too easily forgotten. The Highlands, as with the United Kingdom generally, was constantly swept with rumours of war and the recruiting drives that such rumours entailed. Therefore, the whole era of agricultural improvement also saw sustained imperial conflict in which the region naturally played a part. Ironically, even when compared to the period of militarised clanship, the influence of war was as much, if not more, of an influencing factor in the shaping of the new commercialising Highlands.

This thesis argues that the successive and frequent periods of intensive recruiting evident within the region contradicts common conclusions about the Highlands. Scholars have increasingly stressed the fact that, both before and especially after the battle of Culloden, the old military dimension was fading in importance, and that the forces of commercialism had become the dominant dynamic within the region. Moreover, it has become an accepted facet of Highland history that the final Jacobite uprising had little or no long term impact on the development of the region.¹ This study shows, however, that there was no end to military activity in the region. The demise of militarism in the Highlands after Culloden simply did not occur, and was indeed to intensify over the succeeding decades. It has been the main purpose of this thesis to explain this process. Study of the era of 'first phase clearance' should obviously involve the detailed examination of commercial development and links with the rest of the wider economy. However, by highlighting the ongoing military experience of the region as well as demonstrating that regiment raising in the Highlands was often initiated by the state, this thesis argues that the study of commercial development in the Highlands must be

complemented and balanced by a detailed examination of government and its attitudes to the region.

The development of the British 'fiscal-military state' must, in fact, be seen as one of the most important aspects of eighteenth century Highland history. This 'fiscal state' allowed vast sums of capital expenditure in the region, and ensured that government influence in the post Culloden Highlands increased rather than decreased. This thesis demonstrates, through study of recruiting policy, that the fiscal military state was able to profoundly influence eighteenth century Highland society, even at the very localised estate level. Military recruiting was, in fact, the first and constant interest of government with regard to the region in this period. More than economic development, or even the prevention of population loss, the levying of men for military purposes was the ultimate objective of government interest and intervention. The dominance of this objective was accepted by the Highland elite and wider British society because it was unanimously recognised that the state's first duty was defence of the realm.

The financial power of the state can be seen through the £ 171 500.0.0 it spent annually on the British-Highland military during the mid 1770s.² Such levels of investment and initiative by the 'fiscal-military state' in a peripheral region of the country makes the motives behind the recruiting policy for the Highlands vitally important. The first point to note is how distorted government perceptions of the Highlands were in the 1746-1800 period. Clanship and the range of its functions are still only vaguely understood by many modern scholars, and it is hardly surprising that eighteenth century governments exhibited a considerable level of ignorance. As a result, London failed to recognise the decline and extinction of clanship in the Highlands, and instead maintained remarkably consistent views regarding its usefulness. This was demonstrated prior to the 1745 uprising, when government sanctioned the use of clan methods under certain circumstances. By 1744-45, as the British committed themselves to large scale military campaigning on the continent, government figures like Tweeddale and Robert Dundas encouraged chiefs like Macpherson of Cluny to deploy traditional clan ties and interest within the Highlands to complement the wider British effort. Under the strain of large scale war, the intellectual dislike of clanship in government circles was ignored in favour of a policy of pragmatic manipulation. Clanship remained the underlying rationale behind the government's use of the region during the Seven Years War, and again in the 1775-1783 conflict. These successful recruiting drives masked the reality of profound economic change, and instead powerfully confirmed government misconceptions regarding clanship. Thus, as late as 1797, arguably the most powerful fiscal state in Europe believed that it was still possible to mobilise Highland manpower in clan levies.³

Rather than dwelling, as many historians have done, on the intense but short lived assault on clanship after 1746, this thesis argues that government was more usually prepared to accept local kin interest, and utilise its influence in the wider conflict for empire. The result is that, after 1757, British government quickly loses its antagonistic attitudes towards clanship. This reappraisal of the state's approach strengthens the argument that it was the commercial policies of landlords, as opposed to a supposedly hostile government and its legislation, that was ultimately responsible for the decline in clanship. For government at least, clanship was a vital element in shaping recruiting policy as late as 1800; indeed, within this military context, the reality of profound economic change is largely irrelevant. For instance, in November 1758, the existence of a Glasgow Highland Society was highlighted in the *Scots Magazine*, but not as evidence of the connections of Highlanders to the Lowlands or as an early symptom of the drift of population from the region. Instead, the *Scots Magazine* portrayed the Society as raising money for the poverty stricken families of Highland soldiers in North America. This thesis argues that such misconceptions represent one of the most important facets of late eighteenth century Highland history. Rather than exclusively demonstrating the undoubted rapidity of social change in the region, institutions like the Glasgow Highland Society often served instead to buttress and reinforce external perceptions of the traditional military image of the Highlands. ⁴

Just as the *Scots Magazine* failed to see the underlying reasons behind the Glasgow Highland Society, so the British government remained misguided about the changes in the social and economic structure of the region. It remained misinformed for the simple reason that its agents in the Highlands, the landlords, had no reason to apprise government of clanship's rapid decline and extinction; indeed, the opposite was the case. If the state still believed in clanship, and awarded commissions on that basis, then there remained powerful motives for landlords to generate a perception of sustained local and kin based power. Thus the misconceptions in government regarding clanship were prolonged by Highland landlords in order to secure and rationalise their excessive quota of military patronage. Perhaps the greatest success of the later eighteenth century Highland landlord (from their perspective) was not the imposition of commercial policies that increased estate revenues while destroying clanship; rather, it was the successful pursuit of these policies alongside an equally successful ability to obscure in London the reality of clanship's effective extinction. The result of this situation was that the British state constructed its recruiting policies for the Highlands as if clanship was still the supreme social arrangement. What in essence the government's increasingly distorted image of clanship did, was to divert a disproportionate level of state finance into the Highlands. It is ironic that while the new and rational eighteenth century fiscal-

military state exercised disproportionate influence in the area, it did so because it still defined the Highlands through the obsolete framework of clanship. Moreover, to ensure that the government favoured any given family with military commissions, political interest and connections remained of vital importance to leading Highland landlords. The lucrative nature of state service explains why the political dimension to the Highlands did not die with Jacobitism in 1746; rather, dynastic politics were replaced with the politics of state clientage. It is ironic that, as with Jacobitism earlier in the century, a characteristic of the later political struggles for imperial commissions also relied heavily on the rhetoric and language of clan power.⁵ For this reason alone, clanship must be fundamentally re-assessed as a vital influence in the development of the Highlands in the 1746-1815 period. Ultimately, it formed the framework whereby later eighteenth century imperial governments in London understood the Scottish Highlands.

It has been pointed out that after 1745, a rapid break-up of the culture that saw land as primarily a resource for rewarding military service did not in fact occur, and that there was, in effect, no neat ending to clanship.⁶ This is a vital point both confirmed and strengthened by an examination of British military recruiting in the Highlands. Despite the historic antipathy towards this social arrangement at the political centre, after 1746 the influencing effect of clanship was, ironically, more evident in London than in the Highlands. In the capital its role was one of prompting and rationalising the government's decision to award these regiments to Highland proprietors.⁷ This explains why, within Britain, areas that were similar in many ways to the Highlands, like the Scottish Borders, areas of Western Ireland, and the North of England, nevertheless, experienced a significantly different military involvement with the British state in this period. At this point the question of the 1745 uprising assumes a crucial significance. The '45 gave a practical demonstration of Highland recruiting power which, in turn, distorted British recruiting strategy for the following fifty five years. This thesis argues that by prompting the involvement of the 'fiscal-military state' in such a disproportionate way, the long term impact of the last Jacobite attempt on the Scottish Highlands has been seriously underestimated. While examination of the commercial effects of the uprising on Highland society might justify assertions that 1745 was largely irrelevant - that is not the only perspective. Outwith the Highlands, the uprising was seen as the final proof of the innate bellicosity of the population, and it is ironic that Jacobitism was, in effect, the advert for Highland society that stimulated its involvement within the empire in the specialised form of proprietary regiments.

Clanship and the last Jacobite attempt ensured the state's interest in the Highlands. When directly asked to levy men for the state, landlords found this was only possible by continuing to take men from their own and their clients' estates. And that, in turn, was to leave a significant mark on the development of the region. If the initiative of government, as opposed to landlords, was the main element that prompted recruiting, then the militarised nature of the region was another. One of the reasons why the Highlands was so conspicuous during the American War of Independence, was because the 1756-1763 war had left a legacy of pensioned military officers who petitioned the government for a resumption of their military careers. Thus a large element in the successful Highland recruiting drive of the 1770s, was not the influence of fading clanship, but rather the legacy of an earlier period of imperial conflict. It is state militarisation, not continuing clan militarism, which is evident across every facet of Highland society in the 1746-1810 period. The Highland electorate contained disproportionately more military personnel when compared to the rest of Scotland's constituencies. Within the region, the absolute and proportional number of deserters from the army increased, as did the numbers of Chelsea Pensioners and Half Pay Officers.⁸ By a variety of different measurements, the number of people with a direct involvement in military activity had increased after 1745 rather than decreased. While historians of the Highlands have stressed the development of commercialism, this thesis argues that it is vital to take into account this new imperial and state sponsored militarisation.

If 1745 provided an indigenous factor that stimulated recruitment, there were other outside influences that were also vital in rationalising recruiting policy in the Highlands. One of the most important of these was the eighteenth century belief that martial ability and commercial development were incompatible. This intellectual concept had been deployed against the region in the aftermath of the 1745 uprising. It had been understood that the whole phenomenon of disaffection in the region was the direct result of an underdeveloped or non-existent commercial sector. Lowland and English politicians believed only idle men who lacked investment in Britain's wealth generating society would take the desperate risks that, in their eyes, characterised the Jacobite cause.⁹ This was the wider economic context that underlay official recruiting policy in the Highlands. Heavy recruiting throughout Scotland in the 1756-63 war demonstrated the destructive effects that wholesale levying could inflict on both the improving agricultural sector, and the wider developing commercial base.¹⁰ To contemporaries, excessive military reliance on Highlanders amounted to a damage limitation exercise whereby the commercial sectors of Britain's economy could be relatively protected at

the expense of the least developed. Such thinking was evident in the justifications of heavy Highland recruiting by Henry Dundas in both the 1770s and 1790s.¹¹

Such recruiting strategies meant that sections of the military high command and Scottish political leadership, while never opposed to commercial improvement in the Highlands, were at least prepared to see how Highland economic under development had positive benefits for the main English and Lowland Scottish economies. Moreover, they were prepared to institute heavy levying policies on that understanding. Recruiting, as an alternative profit making concern, undoubtedly competed against other commercial developments in the region. This was evident at various levels. The army deprived the Highlands of a large section of its most substantial indigenous tenantry - the pensioned military officers. It diverted their investment and capital into military careers, and while that never precluded involvement in improvement, it did lower their ability to be constantly committed to the process. Above all, recruiting ensured that land would not be efficiently developed, but rather deployed as a resource to assist an alternative economic strategy of military entrepreneurialism. The wider economic motives behind recruiting strengthen assertions that the Highlands experienced some form of " internal colonialism " whereby the region's economic development was merely organised to protect the core economies of the rest of the United Kingdom. The internal colonialism thesis argues that areas like the Scottish Highlands, with under developed economies, developed along complementary, not competitive lines. Moreover, in order to find a market niche, the Highland economy created " highly specialised export economies. " ¹² Recruiting was, in fact, one such economy. This thesis would argue that, as with kelping and the crofting structure that emerged to service that industry, recruiting was a concrete manifestation of imperial integration - in effect, a modern response. Moreover, recruiting in the Highland context suggests that, unlike large tracts of the United Kingdom which found both economic diversity and depth through imperial expansion, the effect of empire in the case of the Highlands was to underwrite economic underdevelopment and over reliance on one or two staple industries.

Beyond this, the continuity evident in the wider thinking that rationalised Highland recruiting also throws into question the whole role of the army and military service in changing attitudes towards the ordinary Highlander. Some historians have argued that the loyalty and bravery of Highland levies helped the positive changes in cultural attitudes regarding the Gael. The argument that Highland regiments were seen by contemporaries as a tool whereby Jacobite families, and the Gael in general, could be rehabilitated is well established.¹³ However, given that military recruiting was explicitly justified on the grounds of the Highland's poor commercial standards, this assertion is in

need of revision. While conspicuous military service undoubtedly altered the image of the Gael from the perception of him as a treasonous and barbaric foreigner, the underlying pre 1745 reasoning behind military activity and lack of commercial development remained. It is ironic that, in a sense, military service acted in the opposite way to this established argument. Justified and rationalised on the premise of no commercial base of any importance in the region, recruiting served instead to maintain the unimproved image of the Scottish Highlander. By enlisting in such numbers, the Gael, from a Lowland perspective, demonstrably proved that he had still not adjusted to the new material culture or outlook of commercial individualism. Soldiers in this period generally had a bad reputation, and were widely assumed to be lazy and work shy. While they served the country in such seemingly disproportionate numbers, Highland levies ensured a sympathetic attitude towards the condition of the region's population. This was especially true during periods of actual conflict and threat of foreign invasion. However, as was to become apparent during the clearances of the mid nineteenth century, hostile perceptions which emphasised the laziness of the native populations re-emerged - a long term legacy of one aspect of the reasoning behind military recruiting in the 1750-1815 period.

Despite the widespread eighteenth century belief in the mutual exclusiveness of militarism and commercial development, the Highlands, as much as the rest of the United Kingdom, proved the fallacy of that argument. In reality, the large scale recruiting of this period did not merely continue as clanship rapidly declined, it also ran parallel to an unprecedented expansion in commercial activity in the region. It is in fact incorrect to divorce British army recruiting from this context of rapid economic change, and then ascribe it to the lingering influence of clanship. Paradoxically, it can be argued that compared to the misguided and obsolete attitudes to clanship that stimulated government to recruit in the area, within the Highlands, more modern forces prompted recruiting. As with kelping and sheep farming, it was an attempt to broaden and increase revenue by the specialised utilisation of domestic estate resources. One of the most prominent commentators on this subject noted the commercialised nature of Highland recruiting, yet failed to follow through the logical consequences of this important point.¹⁴ The commercialised and profit making intent behind such military levying explains why landlords continued to practice what appears to the modern commentator as an increasingly outmoded and obsolete practice. By high profile levying, proprietors accessed alternative state based finances that had the additional benefit of remaining stable and complementing estate based sources of revenue.

Recruiting must be viewed as part of the labour intensive economy that developed in the west Highlands in this period, and as with all their other estate resources, landlords developed commercial attitudes towards their populations. This gave a practical rationale to population retention that was profoundly significant for the region. In the 1770s, the government signified that those who retained their population resources would increase their chances of gaining regiments and state revenue. Thus, even landlords like the Sutherlands, the Dukes of Gordon and the Lairds of Grant, whose estates lay outside the kelping and labour based economy, could, nevertheless, retain positive perceptions of large tenantry. The disproportionate involvement of Highland landlords in the military structure until 1800 demonstrates that this practical avenue for population use remained a viable option for two generations - especially in the atmosphere of anticipated war that characterised late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain. The military dimension to Highland population levels distorted emigration policy and produced a legacy of government intervention and regulation that was not as evident in approaches to population loss in other parts of the United Kingdom. In 1775, and again in 1803, government actively sought to prevent Highlanders from emigrating; paradoxically, this was in order that they could then effectively remove them from the region.¹⁵

However, a study of the motives that prompted government to utilise the Highlands reveal a whole series of contradictions and strains. Conflict between the desire to create a long term professional army, and the need to acquire men quickly during a specific imperial crisis, was a constant theme throughout the 1739-1810 period. Highland recruiting emerged to service the needs of the army on an ad hoc basis, and only in the context of acute imperial need. By its use of civilian proprietary power, the method of recruiting in the Highlands as it emerged in the 1740s and 1750s was flawed, and susceptible to criticism from the British military elite. Conversely, the chapter on estate recruiting demonstrates that the military was seen by the landlords as a method whereby steady income could be achieved. Yet as a result of these differing ideas on the nature and construction of the army, recruiting was, in fact, a structurally unstable activity - again, similar to kelping. Thus, in the 1790s, when government was forced to alter its methods and recruit by conscription legislation, proprietary levying was highlighted as an unpredictable option.¹⁶ Ironically, as with the other new commercial activity of kelping, recruiting could only flourish in a very specific set of imperial and international circumstances.

Historians need to reassess this conflict between proprietary and professional methods of enlisting men. The emergence of professional recruiting at the turn of the century, by denying landlords military revenue, destabilised one of the main financial props of post clanship Highland society. Recruiting justified and gave practical benefits to the landlord who retained a large tenantry, yet it was government that altered the methods of levying to remove the element of profit for the landlord. While admittedly forced to do so by the scale of the French wars, the British government, by abandoning the patriotic partnership with Highland landlords, actually increased the redundancy of Highland populations. This can be seen in its scaling down of the volunteer system that had been such an important part of the estate economy. If the desire to recruit regiments made landlords retain their populations, then the switch by government to compulsive methods from 1797 stimulated the landlord's shift towards pro-emigration strategies.

If the basis for government recruiting in the region lay in its failure to comprehend the reality of clanship's declining position, while the motives of landlords were characterised by new commercialism, then the position of the tenantry is still in need of clarification. The thesis rejects the historiographical portrayal of military recruitment as the method whereby Highlanders defended some form of old order or way of life.¹⁷ Recruiting did delay sheep farming on the Gordon, Seaforth, Glengarry and Sutherland estates, but this needs to be contrasted with the fact that levying undermined the established social structure. This can be seen from the fact that the social origins of recruits reveal the commercial intent behind military levying. Recruiting was practised in the Highlands to complement, not to damage the estate economy. By attempting to utilise those who had the least input into the rent paying structure of the estate, recruiting became characterised by selectivity and social targeting. This practice had the important consequence of ensuring that proprietors continued to levy men. Highland recruits were, in fact, unrepresentative of the hierarchical and complex social structure evident within the *baille*. This contrast, between an essentially heterogeneous Highland society, and military recruits drawn excessively from one group, proved to be one of the most significant consequences of military recruiting in the region. By promising possessions to recruits from a social background that, under the established tenorial structure, was either landless or largely landless, military levying legitimated demands from those who traditionally had little or no tenorial claim on the land. By generating personnel that had to be accommodated, military levying, far from protecting traditional social structures, helped to focus land hunger against the established tenorial arrangements. One consequence was that it facilitated the destruction of the tacksman, and stimulated the creation of both the new crofting structure and a new lesser tenantry. Crofting can be directly linked to British military levying because subsequent demobilisation produced

periods of acute demand for land. Only reduced holdings could meet the settlement needs of both soldiers and those they displaced. Crofting can, in fact, be traced directly to the ambitions of the lower Highland tenantry. These ambitions were realised through the medium of imperial specialisation in the form of soldiering, which led to the deliberate attempts of one group of Highlanders to evict another established group of tenantry. Ironically, recruiting reveals the internal stresses and differences within Highland society, and illustrates that in areas as far apart as Breadalbane and Skye, the genesis of crofting was as much characterised by dispossession as settlement.

In conclusion, from the perspective of the landlord and estate population groups within the Highlands, military recruitment was not the maintenance of clanship, but rather a short term economic activity much in the same vein as kelping. Nevertheless, the financial influence of the state made landlords adopt a whole series of estate strategies that ensured the Highlands of the period embarked, not upon a path of undiluted commercialism, but rather upon a parallel path of landlord led economic change and state led militarisation. The fact remains that the Highlands were more militarised in 1806 than they had been in 1746. Ironically, this had occurred because the 1746-1800 Highlands continued to be heavily influenced by perceptions and attitudes that were neither new nor commercial. The story of the Highlands in the ' first phase of clearance ' not only involves the power of the commercialising landlord; ultimately, it also involves unprecedented and excessive state influence, and thus, most surprisingly, the ongoing influence of clanship.

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- 1). A.I. MacInnes, ' Jacobitism ' in *H.T.*, vol. 34 (1984), 29; T.M. Devine, *Clanship to Crofters' War: The Social Transformation of the Scottish Highlands* (Manchester, 1994), 26-31.
 - 2). See chapter three, footnote 76, p. 133.
 - 3). See chapter two, footnote 23, p. 72; chapter three footnotes 83-84, p. 136.
 - 4). *Scots Magazine*, vol. 19 (Edinburgh, 1758), 609.
 - 5). See chapter two, footnote 79, p.134. The most blatant example of this tendency by Highland landlords to use the perception of clan and kin power to explain their recruiting success to government came in April 1778. The Earl of Seaforth informed the authorities in London that not only had he raised 4 000 men, but that " not one could have been got by anyone but myself. " See: R.K. Donovan ' The Military Origins of the Roman Catholic Relief Programme of 1778 ' in *H.J.* vol. 28 (1985), p. 91.
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 - 7). See chapter three, footnote 65, p. 129.
 - 8). See appendices 12 & 13. Tables 3:2, 6:1 and 7:6.
 - 9). See chapter four, footnote 4, p. 152.
 - 10). See chapter two, footnotes 71 & 72, p. 91-92.
 - 11). See chapter five, footnote 97, p. 227-228.
 - 12). M. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism:- The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1536-1966* (London, 1975), 81.
 - 13). B.P. Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen* (London, 1984), 204-8; R.D. Clyde, *The Rehabilitation of the Highlander 1745-1830: Changing Visions of Gaeldom* (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow 1990), chapter five.
 - 14). J. Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt 1743-1804* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1975), 95.
 - 15). See chapter five footnote 117, p. 237.
 - 16). See chapter three, footnote 88, p. 138.
 - 17). J. Prebble, loc. cit., 96-101.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1:- Recruiting Scheme 1757.
 (Source, N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 17506, f. 127)

County	Number of Men	Raiser	Officer
Ross	100	Mackenzies of Fairburn & Applecross*	Major Francis Fletcher
Western Aberdeen Shire & Perthshire	24	Farquharson of Invercauld	Alex'r Robertson brother to Drumichuine
	24	Robertson of Sratloch & Estate of Rannoch	
	62		
Inverness	70	Macleods of Harris & Raasay	Donald Macpherson of Breackachrie Invercauld & Raasay
	30	Macdonald of Sleat *	
Inverness	40	Macpherson of Invereshie *	Macpherson of Invereshie Grant of Delrachnie Macpherson of ?
	40	Grant of Dalrachnie	
	20	Macpherson of ?	
Inverness & N.W. Argyll	58	Macdonnell of Keppoch	To be captain
	42	Sheriff at Ft. William	Robertson of Cray Macdonald of Tulloch
Inverness & Breadalbane	60	Sleat *	Clanranald Robertson of Aberfeldie MacGillvray of Dunamglass
	40	Breadalbane *	

* = Denotes a political opponent of the third Duke of Argyll

Appendix 2:- Recruiting Scheme of Fourth Duke of Gordon for Two Thousand Fencible men 1778.

(Source, S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/12)

Clan	Raiser	Number of Men
Sutherland	General St. Clair	300
Mackays	Mackay of Bighouse	150
Gunns	-	50
Grants	Sir James Grant	150
Camerons, Mac-Martins and Kennedys	Fassifern, Letterfinlay, Glen-nevis and Callart	100
Macpherson	Invereshie	75
Macintoshes	Balnespick	75
Macdonnells	Glengarry	50
Munro	Sir Henry Munro	50
Frasers	General Simon Fraser	100
Macgregors	-	50
Chisholm	Laird of Chisholm	50
Appin	Stewart of Appin	25

N.B., Another 825 were to be raised on a county and burgh basis in the north east counties.

Appendix 3:- Origins and Social profile of Ex-military settled on Annexed Estates 1763-4.

(Source, S.R.O., F.E.P., E777/288/6 & 20; E783/90/2; E787/28/1, 4-5).

(1). Inhabitants of Strelitz Colony (Perth Estate) 1764.

Total number of soldiers.....	26
Total from Perthshire Parishes.....	20 (32.5%)
Total other Disarmed Counties.....	25 (40%)
Total from Lowland/English Parishes.....	17 (27.5%)

Former Occupations

Day Labourers.....	21 (34%)
Weavers.....	19 (30%)
Shoemakers.....	8 (13%)
Other Occupations.....	14 (23%)

(2). Inhabitants of Benniebeg and Borelandbog Colonies (Perth Estate) 1764

Total number of soldiers.....	42
Total from Perthshire Parishes.....	11 (26%)
Total from other Disarmed Counties.....	11 (26%)
Total from Lowland/English Parishes.....	20 (48%)

Former Occupations

Day Labourers.....	19 (45%)
Weavers.....	11 (26%)
Other Occupations.....	12 (29%)

(3). Inhabitants of Rannoch Colony (Strowan Estate) 1764

Total number of soldiers.....	23
Total from Perthshire Parishes.....	17 (74%)
Total from other Disarmed Counties.....	6 (26%)

Former Occupations

Day labourers.....	19 (83%)
Taylors.....	2 (8.5%)
Other Occupations.....	2 (8.5%)

(4). Inhabitants of Cromarty and Lovat Colonies 1764

Total number of soldiers.....	139
Total from Ross-shire.....	54 (39%)
Total from Inverness-shire.....	43 (31%)
Total from other Disarmed Counties.....	36 (26%)
Total from Lowland/English Parishes.....	6 (4%)

Former Occupations

Day Labourers.....	109 (78%)
Weavers.....	13 (9.5%)
Other Occupations.....	17 (12.5%)

Appendix 4:- Cost British Half Pay & Chelsea Out pensioners 1763-1785. (Source, *Parliamentary History*, vols. 15-16 & 19; *Journal of the House of Commons*, vols. 37-8 & 40)

Years	Annual Half Pay	Annual Chelsea Pensioners
1763	£ 33 351.17.6	£ 51 703.13.4
1765	£ 135 606.12.6	£ 109 107.13.4
1767	£ 135 299.8.4	£ 106 083.2.6
1769	£ 127 020.0.0	£ 107 394.15.10
1775	£ 105.326.0.0	£ 122 221.0.0
1776	£ 97 575.0.0	£ 107 512.0.0
1777	£ 94 371.0.0	£ 105 279.0.0
1778	£ 90 393.0.0	£ 105 431.0.0
1779	£ 87 331.11.3	£ 103 127.14.2
1780	£ 83 513.8.6	£ 87 718.0.0
1782	£ 78 170.17.6	£ 92 881.17.1
1785	£ 201 57.3.8	£ 161 901.16.8

* The figure for 1785 contains the half pay of the Scots-Dutch Brigade which was listed separately from the British and Irish establishments. The figure does not include the half pay for officers in American loyalist regiments which totalled £ 62 845.0.6. Officers from the island of Skye that had been part of the loyalist establishment included, Macdonald of Kingsburgh, Lieutenant Donald Macdonald, Major Alexander Macleod of Lochbay, and Lieutenant John Macleod who settled at Barravaig on Macleod's estate. Their pensions totalled £ 313.5.2. See: J. Macinnes, loc. cit. 20-9, F.J. Grant, (ed.), *Commissariat Records of the Isles: Register of Testaments 1661-1800* (Edinburgh, 1902), 8.

Appendix 5:- Returning Half Pay Officers 1775-78 (By Regiment).
 (Source, *London Gazette*, no's 11665, 11860, 1180-4; *Scots Magazine*, vols. 41 & 55)

Regiment	Number of Officers	Number of half pay	%
71 st Fraser	75*	7	9.3
72 nd (Manchester)	37	13	35
73 rd (Cromartie)	37	1	2.7
74 th (Barbreck)	37	2	5.4
76th (Macdonald)	37	3	8.1
Calcraft's	35	9	25.7
Picton's	35	2	5.7
Edinburgh	37	1	2.7
Glasgow	37	0	0
Royal Highland Emigrants	22#	11	50

* = The figures in appendix five do not include field officers: those ranked major and above. They also only involve the initial appointments to each regiment. Subsequent commissions could also include half pay officers as in November and December 1776, when ten additional officers were appointed to Fraser's. Four were half pay. N.L.S., *London Gazette*, no 11731, 28-31 Dec. 1776. This is true of the other battalions also.

= These figures merely represent the commissioned officers to the rank of Lieutenant. It does not include ensigns, who would not have come from half pay. Including the usual number of that rank would give a half pay total of 29%.

Appendix 6:- Average Cost per County of Company of 71st Highland Regiment.
(Source, S.R.O., Gordon Castle Muniments, GD 44/47/1/3/6)

County	Bounty Average	Number of men
Sutherland	£ 4.16.11	3
Nairn	£ 4.9.5	4
Lincoln	£ 4.9.0	2
Inverness	£ 4.7.0	12
Ross	£ 4.6.7	8
Banff	£ 4.6.0	18
Moray	£ 4.2.9	23
Argyll	£ 3.19.9	2
Caithness	£ 3.13.3	6
Aberdeen	£ 3.11.0	9

Appendix 7.- Exchange rates Half to Full Pay, January 1766.
(Source, P.R.O., W.O. 123/115)

Rank	Annual half Pay	Value of half pay for purchase	Full Price	Difference
Lieut-Colonel	£ 155.2.6	£ 1551.5.0	£ 3 500	£ 1948.15.0
Major	£ 136.17.6	£ 1368.15.0	£ 2 600	£ 1231.5.0
Captain	£ 91.5.0	£ 821.5.0	£ 1 500	£ 678.15.0
Lieutenant	£ 42.11.8	£ 383.5.0	£ 550	£ 166.15.0
Ensign	£ 33.9.2	£ 301.2.6	£ 400	£ 98.17.6

Appendix 8:- Estimated Effective Strength of Highland Counties 1755

(Source, J.G. Kyd (ed.) *Scottish Population Statistics including an Analysis of Webster's Census* (Edinburgh, 1978))

Bute.....	1425	Argyll.....	13257
Perth.....	5614*	Inverness.....	11913
Ross	8584	Cromarty.....	1033
Sutherland.....	4155	Caithness.....	4443*
Total = 50424		(49060) Scotland = 235 076	

* = For definition of the Highland parishes of Perthshire see: C.J. Withers, 'Highland Emigration to Aberdeen, c.1649-1891' in *N.S.* vol. 9 (1989), 36. Using Withers' description of the Highlands, most of Caithness would be considered Lowland. As a result the Caithness total would only = 1187. However, certain other Northern counties, undoubtedly had Highland style parishes within their boundaries. They included: **Banff** = Parish of Kirkmichael (258), **Moray** = Duthill & Rothiemurchus parish (357), **Abernethie & Kincardine** = (334) **Nairn** = Ardlach (233), **Cawdor** = (176), **Aberdeen** = Crathie & Braemar = (534). Total = 1892. Removing the Lowland part of Caithness and adding other various 'Highland' elements gives the revised total shown in brackets.

Appendix 9:- List of Recruits for 1744 Impress Act.

(Source, S.R.O., E. 215/5, p. 130)

Mid-Lothian	4	Dumfries-shire	18
Haddington-shire	2	Wigton-shire	8
Berwickshire	1	Kirkcubright-shire	7
Roxburgh-shire	6	Ayr-shire	1
Lanark-shire	1	Renfrew-shire	2
Stirling-shire	1	Kincardineshire	4
Inverness-shire	2	Fife-shire	3
Forfar-shire	2	Clackmannan-shire	1
Edinburgh-City	6	Aberdeen-burgh	8
Glasgow-burgh	15	Total = 92	

Appendix 10:- The Minto Formula.

(Source, N.L.S., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 17505, f. 97)

This was an attempt to directly relate the amount of men taken from any area, to the known population. Thus one man would be taken from any parish or group of parishes which contained 750 souls. A parish of 1500 souls would have a quota of 2 men. The medium between the two figures was 1000. A parish of 999 gave in 1 man, while that of 1001 gave in two. Thus:

No Men	Medium Less than	Medium More than
1 man	750	1000 375
2 men	1500	2000 1000
3 men	2250	2500 1500
4 men	3000	3500 2500
5 men	3750	4000 3500
6 men	4500	5000 4000

Appendix 11:- Number of Required Men and Those sent by the Commissioners of the Impress Act in Scotland, January-March 1757.

(Source, S.R.O., Fletcher of Saltoun, Ms 17505, f. 98; P.R.O., W.O. 1/974, f. 485)

County	Expected total	Total conscripted	Still required
Caithness	34	24	10
Sutherland	31	22	9
Ross	65	49	16
Cromarty	9	9	0
Inverness	79	52	27
Argyll	80	43	37
Scotland	1836	1733	151

Appendix 12:- Desertion Rates in Scotland 1750 - 1779.
 (Source, S.R.O., Exchequer Records: E. 215/2 - 3)

Years	Total Deserters	% Increase/Decrease
1750 - 1754	297	-
1755 - 1759	729	+ 145
1770 - 1774	268	- 63
1775 - 1779	604	+ 125

Appendix 13:- Comparative Warrants for Desertion Highlands/Lowlands 1729-1779.
 (Source, S.R.O., Innes of Stow, GD113/175-76, 181-83)

Years	Highlands and % of Total *	Lowlands and % of Total
1729 - 1739	15 (6.8)	204 (93.2)
1740 - 1749	51 (7.5)	628 (92.5)
1749 - 1759	94 (11.6)	711 (88.4)
1775 - 1779	63 (13.2)	412 (86.8)

* = The figures for Highland Counties are calculated from:
 Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, Cromarty, Inverness-shire and Argyll

Appendix 14:- Rates of Recruitment and Returning Men: Western Isles 1755-1763.
 (Source, M.M. Mackay (ed.), *Rev. John Walker's Reports on the Hebrides 1764 & 1771*
 (Edinburgh, 1980))

District	Fighting men	Recruited in 1755-63	% of Fighting men	Returned men	% of those recruited
Lewis	1331	170	12.7	34	20
Harris	430	118	27.4	14	11.8
N. Uist	381 *	60	15.7	-	-
S. Uist & Benbecula	441 *	100	22.6	-	-
Barra	230 *	31	13.4	6	19.3
Islay	1068 *	c. 500	46.8	-	-
Skye	2248 *	c. 500	22.2	-	-
Glenelg	363 *	100	27.5	-	-
Canna	114	14	12.2	3	21.4
Coll	238 *	40	16.8	-	-
Tiree	202	57	28.2	12	21
Mull	1057 *	350	33.1	50	14.2
	8103	2040	25.1	-	-

* = This denotes where no figure for fighting men was given by Walker. Consequently the numbers are from Webster's 1755 census. Where possible Walker's population figures are preferred as they tended to give higher estimates than Webster. Thus the figures shown for the percentage of men removed through military service represents a conservative estimate of the impact on communities.

Appendix 15:- Recruiting levels from Old Statistical Account 1755-1796.

(Source, D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), *Old Statistical Account*, vols. 8, 17, 18, 19 & 20)

Parish	Male Population	Years when recruited	Total in military	%
Reay	1228	1778-83	c. 150	13.2
Thurso	1573	1793-94	82	5.2
Kildonan	286 *	1775-83	102	35.6
Avoch	622	1775-83	13	2
Urquhart & Glenmorist'n	1178	1793-96	180	15.2
Lochalsh	640	1793	40	6.25
Glenelg	720	1793	80	11.1
Killmallee & Kilmonavaig	3044	1757-63	750	24.6
Ardnamurchan	804	1793-95	56	6.9
Rum	214 *	1793	14	6.5
Tiree	361 *	1775-78	120	33.2
Tiree	361 *	1793	100	27.7
Kilfinichen & Kilvic-euen	667 *	1775-78	60	8.3
Ditto	667 *	1793	56	8.3

* = In certain cases such as Kildonan, Rum and Tiree the figures for population break the men into their age groups. Where possible, this smaller figure of men capable of military service is used to illustrate the surprisingly high percentage of young men removed by recruiting.

Appendix 16:- Incidence of Recruiting in Old Statistical Account 1790s.

(Source, D.J. Withrington & I.R. Grant (eds.), *Old Statistical Account*, vols. 8, 17, 18, 19 & 20)

County	Number of Parishes	Affected by army	%
Caithness	10	7	70
Sutherland	13	8	61.5
Ross & Cromarty	M = 29 Isle = 4	M = 9 Isle = 2	M = 31 Isle = 50
Inverness	M = 19 Isle = 12	M = 8 Isle = 9	M = 42.1 Isle = 75
Argyll	M = 25 Isle = 10	M = 12 Isle = 5	M = 48 Isle = 50

M. = Mainland parishes and Isle, the Island parishes.

Appendix 17:- Military Officers within Sutherland Estate 1802.

(Source, Sutherland Papers, Dep 313/2124)

Parish	Total Rental	% of rent paid by military officers	Numbers of four highest rented farms held by military
Golspie	£ 336.11.9	5.5	4th
Clyne	£ 354.11.9	24.2	2nd & 4th
Loth	£ 352.1.9	8.3	2nd
Kildonan	£ 259.18.9	4.8	-
Farr	£ 790.9.11	54.6	1st & 3rd
Lairg	£ 214.7.2	40.5	1st & 2nd
Dornoch	£ 742.0.0	1.78	-
Assynt	£ 1332.18.2	21	2nd & 3rd

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