AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTIES AND POLITICAL PROTEST IN ASIA

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by
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The undersigned, appointed the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled

AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTIES AND POLITICAL PROTEST IN ASIA

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This study examines authoritarian legacies in Asian democracies through the eruption of political protest. As a person who was born and raised in South Korea, I have often witnessed political unrest and clashes between the state and protesters on the street since my childhood. Why does the state repress people? When does the state decide to use violent means to their people? Why do people resist even when they face state repression? Why do people protest? I always pondered about these basic questions when I was in puberty. Then, I decided to study political science to find answers to these questions. Throughout my journey as a student and a researcher in Political Science, I have been very passionate about my research agendas. Now, I am about to make one more big accomplishment in my journey. I will be a Ph.D. However, my journey as a researcher will never end here. I will keep examining these questions throughout my life.

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ABSTRACT

How does an authoritarian successor party (ASP) interact with civil society in East and Southeast Asia? Does an ASP's control over the executive and legislature increase or decrease protest movements? Do ASPs effectively mobilize protesters? Why do ASP supporters organize protests? Among third wave democracies from 1974 to 2010, 75 percent of countries produced authoritarian successor parties and 54 percent of them had ASPs returned to power. In Asia, in particular, many ASPs still remain successful in elections. By employing various research methods ranging from frequentist and Bayesian to qualitative analysis of interviews, this study examines the relationship between ASPs and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Asia and provides an answer to each question.

Introduction

Most democracies in East and Southeast Asia have shorter democracy histories. With an exception of Japan, democracies in the region have gone through vibrant and dynamic regime changes (Lind 2011; Pepinsky 2017).

Figure 1 shows 7 Asian countries' democracy score changes since 1980. These 7 countries are selected based on their democracy scores since 1980. If a country displays a Polity score of 6 or above at some point since 1980, the country is selected for this figure.[1] The data seems to suggest that most countries have shown an increase in their levels of democracy and have exhibited stabilities in their democracy, once it is established. However, with a close look at these countries, one can find other stories. Malaysia in 2018, an opposition coalition won a majority in parliament in over 60 years. This victory surprised the world since it ended the country's longstanding ruling by the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. Although this is a significant step forward with respect to the country's democracy, it is still too early to say that the country is democratized (Izzuddin 2020; Slater 2012; Lemière 2018; Pepinsky 2017). In the Philippines—a country that was democratized in 1987 and has shown a stable democracy history in the region—, civil rights and civil liberties are significantly challenged under a populist president (Tigno 2018; Atienza 2019; Atienza 2020; Dressel and Bonoan. 2019;

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[1] Japan is excluded because the country is not a third wave democracy.

Thompson and Teehankee 2016). In South Korea—another enduring democracy in East Asia—, it seems that contentious forms of political participation have become a dominant practice. South Korean people had organized large scale political protests to impeach their president for her cronyism scandal in 2016. After the impeachment and the formation of a new administration through an election, other side of people who supported the impeached president organized a series of anti-government political protests. Thailand has exhibited more dramatic ups and downs in its democracy score. Thailand experienced a coup in 2014 followed by the establishment of a junta and the dissolution of the Senate (McCargo 2019).

Figure 0 Changes in Level of Democracy over Time



These phenomena elicit questions about democracy in the region. Why do some countries display stabilities in its democracy while others do not? Why do some seemingly stable democracies still exhibit inconsistencies and discrepancies in democratic practices? This study examines Asian third wave democracies and suggests that authoritarian legacies remaining in political institutions and civil societies impact the interactions between governments and citizens—and ultimately impact the qualities of democracy in these countries.

Among many authoritarian legacies, this study particularly pays attention to authoritarian successor parties. Third wave democracies in East and Southeast Asia do not have long democracy history. Dictators and authoritarian incumbents have been dominating politics in the region and democratization has not ensured a complete separation from their authoritarian past. A country's authoritarian legacy, to varying degrees, impacts political institutions. One of the common manifestations of the authoritarian legacy is the emergence of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs). Many authoritarian political parties have not only survived democratic transitions but have also thrived in the elections that followed. After the third wave of democratization in Asia, many ASPs still play a major role in their country's politics and sometimes return to power.

These ASPs interact with their supporters, opponents, and other parts of civil societies in a democratic environment to attract voters and win elections, to prevent other parties' victories in elections, and to achieve parties' other political agendas. The most dynamic form of these interactions is the eruption of political protest. Political protest erupts when people have discontent about their governments and when people are endowed with mobilizing organizations. Political parties are involved in both conditions. On the one hand, civil society organizations organize political protest that is against certain parties' rule. On the other hand, political parties can be a main protest organizer who mobilizes protesters. Therefore, by studying the eruption of political protest in relation to ASPs, one can understand how civil societies view ASPs' rule and how ASPs mobilize their supporters after democratization.

This study is comprised of three empirical chapters and each chapter casts different sets of research questions. Yet, all three chapters examine authoritarian legacies through ASPs and political protest. First chapter casts the following questions: what would happen when ASPs gain power in the executive and/or the legislature?; how do civil societies—particularly civil society organizations that actively participated in democracy protest—react to the return of ASPs in democratic institutions?; do those civil society organizations organize protests against ASPs' rule? Second chapter asks the following questions: what would happen when ASPs lose power?; do ASPs mobilize their supporters to protest other parties' rule? Finally, the last chapter asks who ASP supporters are and how/why they organize mass rallies for their parties?

By answering these questions, this study contributes to the literature on democratization. First, this study reveals authoritarian legacies in ASPs and shows how those legacies can impede democratic consolidation. After democratic transitions, ASPs use many reinvent strategies such as changing names, developing sets of policy programs, and forming coalitions with other parties to adjust themselves to a democratic environment (Grzymala-Busse 2020). However, these efforts may not ensure their complete disconnection from the past, and thus civil society organizations—particularly organizations that had organized democracy protest before transitions—can find undemocratic practices in ASPs when they return to power. These legacies will ultimately impede democratic consolidation of a country.

Second, this study uncovers authoritarian legacies in citizens. Supporters of ASPs can have a deeper emotional affiliation with a past authoritarian government because they were socialized during the authoritarian period. After democratization, these people still support ASPs because of this deep attachment. This can lead them to have biased ideas about democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic ways of political participation, preventing democratic consolidation of a country. Overall, by revealing authoritarian legacies in political parties and citizens, this study suggests that the fluctuations in democratic practices observed in Asian third wave democracies can be attributable to these authoritarian legacies.

Each chapter proceeds as follows. In Chapter 1, I examine the relationship between ASPs and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Asia and argues that the number of political protests increases when an ASP is in control of the executive and/or the legislature. When an ASP returns to power, it is more likely to utilize the authoritarian tactics that had been used by its predecessors. This will prompt CSOs to mobilize protests in the hope of making a clean break with the authoritarian past and creating effective democratic institutions. In this chapter, I conduct cross-national quantitative analyses and estimate zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression models to test whether ASPs' control of the executive and/or legislature increases protests.

In Chapter 2, I examine ASPs' capability of mobilizing protestors. I argue that ASPs are less capable of organizing protests in general, because they had limited experience in organizing protests with little to no incentive to mobilize protests in their authoritarian past. Consequently, they are poorly endowed with protest organizing techniques and tactics. I also argue that ASPs with stable ideologies are better equipped to mobilize protestors than ASPs that have fluctuating ideologies. Using both single-level and multilevel analyses, I examine four Asian countries— Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia—that have politically powerful ASPs and find evidence that supports my hypotheses.

In Chapter 3, I conduct a case study on South Korea. Supporters of South Korean authoritarian successor party have organized a movement called the *Taegeukgi Rally*. This movement started in late 2016 to oppose the impeachment of then President, Park Geun-hye. Then, the movement transformed into anti-government protest after the formation of the new administration by President Moon Jae-in. This movement is interesting in many ways and the literature on mass mobilization does not provide a good explanation about the movement's timing, demographic composition, and protest agendas. This study suggests an alternative explanation to understand the mobilization. By conducting in-depth interviews with 25 rally participants, this study finds that the collective identity of participants that was shaped in the authoritarian period motivates certain individuals to participate in the rally.

Chapter 1. Authoritarian Successor Parties and Political Protest in Asia

Most democracies in East and Southeast Asia do not have long democracy histories. Instead, dictators and authoritarian incumbents have been dominating politics in the region and democratization has not ensured a complete separation from their authoritarian past. A country's authoritarian legacy, to varying degrees, impacts political institutions (Loxton 2018; 2015; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; 2015). One of the common manifestations of the authoritarian legacy is the emergence of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs). Many authoritarian political parties have not only survived democratic transitions but have also thrived in the elections that followed. After the third wave of democratization in Asia, many ASPs still play a major role in their country's politics and sometimes return to power (Loxton 2018; 2015; Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011; 2015). Meanwhile, democratization has widened political opportunities (Mavrikos-Adamou 2010; Bae and Kim 2013; Weiss 2009; Fishman 2017; Petrova and Tarrow 2007). Civil societies in these new democracies have become more active since democratization served as a critical juncture and provided them with new political opportunities (Beaulieu 2014; Boulding 2014; Brancati 2013; Tucker 2007; Bratton and Van de Walle 1992). In particular, civil society organizations (CSOs) have been emboldened by their successful fights for democracy and have become increasingly active.[2] Overall, both authoritarian legacy and expanded opportunities for civil society coexist in Asian third wave democracies. Given this, what happens when a civil society in a recently expanded political space encounters an ASP situated within the country's democratic institutions? This study examines how CSOs react to ASPs' control over the executive and/or the legislature.

I argue that when ASPs are in control of the executive and/or the legislature, CSOs will organize more protest movements. An ASP sometimes returns to power by becoming a majority party in the legislature or a ruling party in the executive. Post-democratization, these ASPs are not fully disconnected from their authoritarian pasts. They are likely to maintain their connections with authoritarian allies and promote policies for those allies. Moreover, after returning to power, they will attempt to restrict civil societies to preserve their connections with those allies.

Meanwhile, civil societies will continue to increase and mobilize protests after a democratic transition. Studies in developing countries find that protests are a dominant form of political participation when citizens believe formal democratic institutions are imperfect (Moseley 2018; Boulding 2014; Beaulieu 2014; Tucker 2007; Brancati 2013). As political opportunity structures expand after democratization, civil society in developing countries becomes more active. Endowed with more resources and political opportunities after a democratic transition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs in marginally democratic countries attempt to pressure the state through protests, to further strengthen democratic institutions and ensure the protection of civil liberties (Boulding 2014). Therefore, one observes more contentious mobilizations in marginally democratic settings.

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[2] In some cases, the role of civil society is limited and democratization happens through elite splits within authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, a democratic transition can embolden civil society organizations that fight for democratization since these CSOs will interpret the transition as resulting from their efforts.

When ASPs are in control of the executive and/or the legislature, NGOs and CSOs are more likely to mobilize anti-government protests in the hope of making a clean break with the authoritarian past. When ASPs return to power these parties are more likely to utilize authoritarian tactics employed by their predecessors in an attempt to shrink political space for civil society.[3] This will produce a contentious environment leading to more protest movements organized by CSOs. In order to examine protests due to the inefficiencies in democratic institutions, I particularly focus on anti-government demonstrations and do not include other types of protests such as general strikes.

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[3] It is debatable whether policies that ASPs implement and tactics that ASPs employ for ruling are similar to their authoritarian predecessors. As Loxton (2018) predicts, some ASPs try to disconnect themselves from the authoritarian past and deal with their "authoritarian baggage". Regardless of their efforts, it is not easy for ASPs to separate themselves from their authoritarian past. The relationship between an ASP and civil society groups may already be unfriendly because of the authoritarian baggage. More importantly, when these parties try to walk away from their past, they are in danger of

I examine ASPs in East and Southeast Asian countries and test whether their dominance of formal democratic institutions increases protests. Loxton defines ASPs with two criteria (Loxton 2018, 2-5). First, ASPs need to operate after democratization. Second, they should emerge from authoritarian regimes. These parties can either be former authoritarian parties or reactive authoritarian successor parties (Loxton 2015; 2018). Based on this definition, I identify six ASPs in East and Southeast Asian countries.[4] I code their presence in the executive and/or the legislature from the year of a country's democratic transition to 2016.[5] Then, I estimate zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression models to test whether ASPs' control of the executive and/or legislature increases protests (Yang et al. 2009). This is a cross-national time series analyses in the

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losing their authoritarian resources at the same time. Therefore, I do not expect to see ASPs' fully escape from their authoritarian legacy in terms of their policies and tactics.

[4] See Table 1-1.

[5] See appendix Table A1

Asian context, examining 16 East and Southeast Asian countries.[6] By doing so, I can test my argument that political protest is more likely in a democracy where democratic institutions are somewhat connected to authoritarianism but its civil society is endowed with political opportunities as compared to a full authoritarian regime where its civil society is not endowed with political opportunities or a democracy where its institutions are not connected to authoritarianism. Finally, I simulate three scenarios--an average-case, a low-risk, and a high-risk scenario--based on the number of political protests to see substantive effects. With the analyses, I find evidence that the number of political protests increases when ASPs are in control of the executive and/or the legislature.

This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study furthers our understanding of the democratic decay occurring in the region (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Kurlantzick 2013; Bermeo 2016; Massola 2019).[7] Although the notion of democratic backsliding is not new, the recent scholarship on democratic decay and backsliding has increased. This is due to the prominence of democratic retreat across the developing world. According to Freedom House, "in 2018, Freedom in the World recorded the 13th consecutive year of decline in global freedom."[8] Political polarization, the rise of populism, and the failure of democratic institutions are blamed for democratic decay (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). This study adds one more possible explanation for democratic decay, by arguing that authoritarian legacy in democratic political institutions prevents democratic consolidation in third wave democracies. The literature finds evidence that ASPs aid in installing democratic party systems and facilitating democratic transitions (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015; Riedl 2014). Even though this is a meaningful finding about the role of ASPs in democratic transitions, it is still unclear how ASPs operate after democratic transitions. This study treats the process of democratization as incremental and examines whether ASPs are truly democratic actors after democratization by examining their interactions with civil society and CSOs. The results of this study suggest that ASPs do not ensure democratic consolidation in new democracies, because they utilize authoritarian techniques and tactics toward civil society and implement policies in favor of former authoritarian allies.

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[6] Cases include Mongolia, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia from 1987 to 2016 and Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2016.

[7] Joshua Kurlantzick, "Southeast Asia's Democratic Decline in the America First Era," *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 27, 2017; James Massola, "Democracy and human rights are in retreat in Southeast Asia. Here's why," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 5, 2019.

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[8] Freedom House, "Democracy in retreat: Freedom in the world, 2019," https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat.

Second, this study assesses the role of civil society. There are two distinct views on the role of civil society: neo-Tocquevillians and neo-Gramscians (Bernhard 2017). Under the first perspective, civil society facilitates citizens' moderate political participations, such as voting, that are essential for democracy. The second view, on the other hand, sees civil society as more confrontational, organizing protests, riots, demonstrations, and even revolutions against the state. This study reconciles these two competing schools by providing a condition that determines the role of civil society in democracy. In particular, I compare the activity of civil society when non-ASPs' rule and when ASPs' rule in a country after a democratic transition. By doing so, I find that when democratic institutions are inefficient and undemocratic, civil society will use more confrontational means to achieve more democratic institutions.

I develop my argument over the next four sections. First, I review the literature on authoritarian successor parties and their impact on civil society. Then, I discuss my theory on how ASPs’ control over formal institutions cause more protest movements in third wave Asian democracies. Third, I explain my empirical strategy. Lastly, I discuss my findings and their implications.

Authoritarian Successor Parties and Democracy

Even after a transition to democracy, countries are not fully disconnected from the previous authoritarian regime (Loxton 2018; Hicken and Kuhonta 2015). The impact of authoritarian legacy remains in both political institutions and political practices. The most noticeable manifestation of authoritarian legacy in political institutions is the existence of ASPs (Loxton 2015; Loxton 2018). Such political parties in many new democracies find their roots from former authoritarian regimes (Loxton 2015; 2018; Hicken and Kuhonta 2015; Riedl 2014). In fact, Loxton finds that among third wave democracies from 1974 to 2010, 75 percent of countries produced prominent authoritarian successor parties. Moreover, in 54 percent of third wave democracies ASPs returned to power (Loxton 2018, 8).

The reason behind their persistence after democratization is the result of what Loxton calls, authoritarian inheritance (Loxton 2015; 2018). Authoritarian inheritance includes party brands, territorial organizations, clientelistic networks, source of party finance, and source of party cohesion (Loxton 2015; 2018). These resources enable ASPs to not only operate after democratization but also succeed in elections. At the same time, ASPs have to address their predecessors' wrongdoings such as human rights violations or poor performances in important policy areas such as the economy and national security. Loxton defines these negative aspects of authoritarian legacy as authoritarian baggage (Loxton 2015; 2018). In summary, ASPs enjoy authoritarian inheritance while simultaneously dealing with the negative effects of authoritarian baggage.

Extant studies find that ASPs can contribute to democracy in newly democratized countries (Loxton 2018, 28). First, they promote the institutionalization of a party system (Riedl 2014; Loxton 2018). Riedl (2014) examines Sub-Saharan Africa and finds that a strong authoritarian incumbent yields a more stable party system. Hicken and Kuhonta

(2015) also find that party systems in Asia are rooted in “some element of authoritarianism,” and former authoritarian parties and political parties from semi-authoritarian regimes have contributed to the institutionalization of party systems in Asia (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015, 4-5). Second, ASPs incorporate authoritarian actors into the democratic system (Loxton, 2018). Otherwise, these authoritarian actors become spoilers who prevent democratic transition, consolidation, and plan authoritarian regressions. However, the incorporation of authoritarian actors into the democratic system contributes to their attempts to achieve their goals within the democratic system. Finally, ASPs’ successful electoral outcomes encourage new democratic transitions in neighboring countries (Slater and Wong 2013). According to Slater and Wong (2013), autocrats can make democratic concessions when they calculate that they can continuously win after transitions. Democratization in South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia occurred because of the elite's political calculations regarding their future after transitions.

However, the listed positive effects of ASPs on democracy above are debatable. When evaluating the impact of ASPs on democracy, one needs to distinguish their impact on the democratic transition and consolidation separately (Przeworski et al. 2000; Carothers 2002; O’Donnell et al. 1986; O’donnell and Schmitter 2013; Huntington 1993). First, it is clear that ASPs contribute to the institutionalization of party systems in new democracies. However, it is unclear whether the institutionalization that has its root in authoritarianism will ensure the consolidation of democracy. The alleged benefit of the institutionalized party system to democracy is that it produces more accountability and programmatic linkages between politicians and voters (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015; Kitschelt 2000). But ASPs enjoy authoritarian resources that involve authoritarian territorial organizations and clientelistic networks (Loxton 2018, 11). By strategically employing these authoritarian resources, ASPs perform well in elections. Therefore, whether ASPs attract and mobilize voters with programmatic linkages remains under inquiry. In fact, Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) argue that the concept of institutionalization must be disconnected with the concept of democracy. While examining Asian countries, these scholars find that party system institutionalization can appear in both democratic and nondemocratic settings (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015, 5).

Furthermore, ASPs can incorporate authoritarian elites into democratic systems, preventing possible democratic spoilers in a transition period. However, it is unclear whether these actors will exhibit democratic behavior after the transition. Albertus and Menaldo (2018) claim that if democracies originate from authoritarian elites, these elites will not design democratic institutions to benefit a majority of society. Political and economic elites during the authoritarian period accumulate economic wealth, networks, and economic knowledge. These elites initiate a democratic transition to participate in crafting democratic institutions (Slater and Wong 2013; Albertus and Menaldo 2018). Authoritarian elite control over this process ensures the preservation of existing networks and connections between political and economic elites rather than the creation of institutions to provide democratic inclusiveness (Albertus and Menaldo 2018).

Overall, as Loxton predicts, ASPs' effect on democracy remains unclear (Loxton 2018, 25). Institutionalized party systems are not always related to the expansion of programmatic linkages; when authoritarian elites initiate transition processes, these elites can continue to maintain their relations with particular economic elites and promote policies on behalf of their allies' economic interests. Therefore, although the possibility of continuous ruling as an ASP can facilitate a democratic transition in a top-down manner, it is still unclear whether the existence of ASPs in new democracies contributes to democratic consolidation.

Civil Society and Democracy

In evaluating the relationship between ASPs and democracy, the literature overlooks one relevant variable: civil society.[9] Democracy could be installed in a top-down manner and authoritarian elites may continue to operate to maintain their interests under a democratic setting. However, facing inefficiencies in democratic institutions, civil societies mobilize to achieve more democratic political reforms (Beaulieu 2014; Boulding 2014; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Brancati 2013; Tucker 2007). Bratton and van de Walle (1992) assert that continuous confrontations between civil society and authoritarian elites can promote democracy. They describe democratization as a "two steps forward, one step back" (427) process; civil society demands political reforms with popular mobilizations, and authoritarian elites sometimes make concessions in response to those demands. Both Beaulieu and Tucker find that when electoral fraud is widespread and elections are considered rigged, civil society organizes political protests to achieve cleaner elections (Beaulieu 2014; Tucker 2007). Boulding (2014) also suggests that NGOs are more likely to use contentious forms of political participation when democratic institutions perform poorly in minimally democratic countries. These studies suggest that civil society will continuously demand political reforms to remove the authoritarian legacy imprinted upon new democratic institutions.

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[9] Defining civil society is not an easy task due to the vagueness of the term. In this study, I define civil society as NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs). That is, these organizations are the main actors who mobilize protests. Also, by defining civil society as these organizations that are observable, I can examine civil society and its activities.

After democratic transitions, civil society will continue to expand. Although ranging in degree, democratization endows civil society with more political opportunities (Tarrow 2011). CSOs and NGOs under democratic settings face fewer restrictions while having access to more resources compared to their counterparts under authoritarian governments. Although a democratic government may utilize various tactics to restrict civil society (Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Levitsky and Way 2010), compared to its authoritarian predecessor, a democratic government after a transition is less likely to employ overt forms of repression. In a democracy, overt types of repression become more costly for the government because of regular competitive elections and increased press freedom.[10] Although I do not expect a full removal of restrictions on civil society, marginally eased levels of repression provides civil society with more space to operate (Beaulieu 2014; Boulding 2014; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Brancati 2013; Tucker 2007).

Democratization not only eases repression but gives civil society new resources. First, with the introduction of competitive elections, democratization creates or empowers opposition parties to become possible resources for NGOs and CSOs (LeBas 2013; Beaulieu 2014). Transitions may create opposition parties or these parties may have already been in place. Either way, these parties interact with NGOs and CSOs to expand their influence in democratic political institutions and win over authoritarian incumbents in elections (LeBas 2013; Beaulieu 2014). Furthermore, these parties can come into power. When they do, they are more likely to implement policies that empower civil society compared to authoritarian incumbents. Second, democratization generates more opportunities for the press as well. Under authoritarian rule, the press is less likely to convey information that is unfavorable to authoritarian elites. However, after a transition, the press starts to play an increased role in checking the government and conveying information. Figure 1-1 shows the level of press freedom in countries from the most authoritarian (-10) to the most democratic (10).[11] Although there is a range in press freedom in countries with similar democracy scores, it is still clear that as a country becomes more democratic, the country's press becomes freer. A free press is more likely to deliver information on the government's poor economic performance, human rights abuses, and/or inefficiencies in democratic institutions. The increase in accurate information from a free press empowers civil society to judge politicians and democratic institutions and politics more accurately. Also, since the media makes information universally available through the media, NGOs and CSOs find it easier to mobilize people.

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[10] This is a temporal comparison within a country rather than a cross-national comparison. If a country experienced a democratic transition, compared to the country's authoritarian predecessor, the transition government will ease the level of repression to some degree and this process gives its civil society a new opportunity structure.

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[11] This figure is constructed with Freedom House press freedom scores and Polity IV in 2016.

Figure 1-1 Relationship between press freedom and democracy in 2016



Accordingly, democratization increases the political space in which civil society can operate (Tarrow 2011). NGOs and CSOs will take this new political opportunity to organize protests more frequently in the pursuit of further democratic reforms.

Clashes Between Authoritarian Successor Parties and Civil Society

Although democratization does not ensure a complete disconnect from a country's authoritarian past, it provides civil society with new political opportunities. Therefore, frequent clashes between the state and civil society is inevitable. When NGOs and CSOs find inefficiencies in democratic institutions and undemocratic practices among political elites, they organize protests to push the state to become more democratic. These inefficiencies are most likely to occur when there is an ASP in the political arena. After a transition and the introduction of competitive elections, ASPs still operate and even return back to power. I argue that when they become a ruling party in the executive or a majority party in the legislature, CSOs will organize more protest movements.

First, because of their connections with the authoritarian past, ASPs are more likely to propose and implement policies that are more favorable to their authoritarian allies. ASPs maintain their relationships with former economic and political allies they established before transition, to enjoy the resources gained from authoritarian inheritance (Loxton 2018; Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Slater and Wong 2013). Therefore, when ASPs are in control of the legislature and/or the executive, they are more likely to propose and enact policies that are in favor of their allies rather than policies in the interest of the majority of the population (Albertus and Menaldo 2018). When democratic institutions function for special interests and increase socioeconomic inequalities, CSOs will mobilize protests to address it.

Second, ASPs' positions in power in and of itself can create tensions between the state and civil society, leading civil society to become more confrontational. After a transition, ASPs may try to restrict civil society and civil society will likely respond by resisting those restrictions. ASPs want to restrict civil society to preserve their positions in government and enjoy authoritarian resources. Since overt repression becomes costly for authoritarian incumbents after a transition, they may use legal means to restrict civil society (Levitsky and Way 2010). Legal repression entails “the use of libel or defamation laws against journalists, editors, and media outlets" (Levitsky and Way 2010, 9) and the use of other legal means of repression, like tax investigations, to pressure civil society into demobilizing. Targeted groups within civil society will perceive these legal actions as not only restrictive but undemocratic. Hence, these groups or CSOs will organize protests to confront the situation.

Democratic transitions, nevertheless, provide civil society with new resources and a new sense of empowerment. With the introduction of competitive elections, CSOs discover firm allies operating within newly democratic institutions. Non-authoritarian successor parties that are operating under the democratic system tend to take majority seats or a plurality of seats in the legislature. From time to time, these non-ASPs generate peaceful power transitions in many new democracies and become ruling parties. These allies incrementally empower civil society by proposing policies that impose less restrictions on civil society and by opposing bills that constrain civil society activities. In addition, the press supports civil society activities by delivering information on inefficiencies in democratic institutions and on undemocratic practices of the government. These pieces of information can legitimize mobilizations against governments by NGOs and CSOs. Therefore, while ASPs attempt to restrict civil society when they are in control of the legislature and/or the executive, empowered CSOs after a transition will take contentious actions to prevent those ASPs' actions.

In summary, ASPs are more likely to propose and implement undemocratic policies and have negative interactions with civil society. Civil society, afforded new opportunities from a democratic transition, will respond to undemocratic policies and practices. Therefore, contentious forms of political participation are more likely when ASPs are in control of the legislature and/or the executive. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: The number of anti-government protests increases when an authoritarian successor party controls the executive branch.

H2: The number of anti-government protests increases when an authoritarian successor party takes majority seats in the legislature of a country.

H3: The number of anti-government protests increases when an authoritarian successor party takes a plurality of seats in the legislature of a country.

Spatial Scope of This Study

The spatial scope of this study is limited to East and Southeast Asian countries. Why study political protests in Asian countries? Scholars investigate the impact of authoritarianism on democratic institutions and political behavior in regions such as Latin America (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Thies and Arce 2009; Bellinger and Arce 2011; Boulding 2014; Moseley 2018) and post-communist Europe (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). That is, each region has its own history of democracy and authoritarianism justifying independent investigation. Nevertheless, there are a limited number of large N cross-national studies in the context of Asia. Asian countries are mostly investigated with case studies or small N controlled comparisons.[12] These studies are valuable and make great contributions to the literature. Nevertheless, a large N statistical examination in the Asian context will also provide meaningful understating about the region by increasing generalizability and avoiding selection bias. At the same time, by examining Asian countries, I can control for unobserved heterogeneities such as culture and history.[13]

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[12] For protest movements in Asian countries, see Paul Chang, *Protest dialectics: State repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970-1979* (Stanford University Press, 2015); Kurt Schock, *Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies* (U of Minnesota Press, 2005); and Sunhyuk Kim, "Contentious Democracy" in South Korea: an active civil society and ineffectual political parties," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 2 (2012), 51-61. For authoritarianism, see Lee Morgenbesser, "Cambodia's transition to hegemonic authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 1 (2019), 158-171; and Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Dictators and their secret police: coercive institutions and state violence* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[13] There is an argument that Asian countries are culturally and historically unique. These cultural and historical aspects are not easily observable. Thus, it is hard to find a variable that operationalizes these aspects. By examining countries in a region, I can avoid the

Therefore, I conduct cross-national time-series analyses, examining16 East and Southeast Asian countries.[14] These cases include both democracies and authoritarian regimes. Including all these cases enables me to examine my argument that political protest is more likely in a democracy where democratic institutions are somewhat connected to authoritarianism but its civil society is endowed with political opportunities as compared to an authoritarian regime where its civil society is not endowed with political opportunities or a democracy where its institutions are not connected to authoritarianism.

ASPs in East and Southeast Asia

Third wave democracies in East and Southeast Asia have authoritarian successor parties. The impact of authoritarian legacy among Asian third wave democracies resides deep

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impact of these unobserved heterogeneities better. For Asian culture and values, see Richard Robison, "The politics of 'Asian values'," *The Pacific Review* 9, no. 3 (1996), 309-327; Steven J. Hood, "The myth of Asian-style democracy," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 9 (1998), 853-866; Fareed Zakaria, and Lee Kuan Yew, "Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign affairs* (1994), 109-126; and Kim Dae Jung, "Is culture destiny? The myth of Asia's anti-democratic values," *Foreign Affairs* (1994), 189-194.

[14] Cases include Mongolia, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia from 1987 to 2016 and Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2016

within their political institutions (Hichen and Kuhonta 2015). Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) find that party systems in Asian countries have their roots in their authoritarian predecessors. Accordingly, third wave democracies in East and Southeast Asia produced authoritarian successor parties (see Table 1-1). Although some ASPs are more competent than others, the existence of these political parties validates the authoritarian influence on democratic institutions among Asian democracies. Moreover, except Philippines's Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, other ASPs returned to power after democratic transitions.[15]

Table 1-1 ASPs in Asian Democracies

Countries	Years	ASPs
Indonesia	1999-2016	Golkar
Mongolia	1992-2016	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party/Mongolian People's Party
Philippines	1987-2016	Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
South Korea	1988-2016	Democratic Justice Party/Democratic Liberal Party/Grand National Party/Saenuri
Taiwan	1992-2016	Kuomintang
Thailand	1992-2005 and 2011-2013	New Aspiration Party

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[15] See Table A2 in the appendix.

Table 1-1 summarizes authoritarian successor parties and their operating years in East and Southeast Asian democratic countries. ASPs are coded based on the criteria defined by Loxton and Mainwaring.[16] These parties must "operate after a transition to democracy" and "emerge from authoritarian regimes" (Loxton 2018, 2-3). In defining democratic transition, I followed the minimalist approach of Huntington (Huntington, 1993). If a country has nominally competitive electoral processes that are considered free and fair, I define the country as being a democracy. Specifically, a country which has a Polity score of 6 or above is coded as a democracy.

For some, using the minimalist approach to define democracy maybe problematic since democracy is more than just elections. However, for the purpose of this study, the definition is justifiable. First, this study examines countries that range from weakly institutionalized to more strongly institutionalized democracies in order to examine how differences in the quality of democratic institutions affect political protest. In other words, the premise of this study is that introducing competitive elections is not enough to satisfy civil society nor constitute consolidated democracy. Democratization is an incremental process. Civil society will demand more when their democratic institutions are inefficient and undemocratic, and it will push to create more democratic institutions. Second, elections and the quality of elections remains one of the most consistent defining factors in the literature on democracy (Huntington 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000). As a parsimonious definition of democracy, it helps scholars avoid type I error (Neyman and Pearson 1967). By using this definition, I can avoid falsely categorizing democratic countries as autocratic. Therefore, I follow the minimalist approach to identify Asian democracies.

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[16] Authoritarian successor parties and their operating years in East and Southeast Asian democratic countries can be found in the appendix (Table A2). Loxton, 2015; 2018.

Research Design

The dependent variable is *protest* measured as the number of anti-government protests in a given year per country. I use CNTS data for this variable (Banks and Wilson 2017). *Protests* is an event count variable that accounts for anti-government protests. I only focus on anti-government protests because protests can erupt for many reasons and inefficiencies in democratic institutions are one of those reasons. Since my theory predicts that CSOs mobilize protests to make a clean break from the authoritarian past, among other types of protests, anti-government protest is the most relevant type to test my theory. The main explanatory variables are dichotomous and asks whether authoritarian successor parties were in control of the executive, the legislature, or both. The *ASP executive* variable is coded as 1 if the president or the prime minister of a country is from an ASP, and 0 otherwise. The *ASP legislature majority* variable is coded as 1 if an ASP takes the majority of seats (over 50%) in the lower house, and 0 otherwise.

The *ASP legislature plurality* variable is coded as 1 if an ASP takes a plurality of seats in the lower house, and 0 otherwise.[17]

I add several control variables that are considered theoretically important in previous studies. First, I control for democracy with the Polity IV index (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). The index ranges from -10 to 10, with 10 being the most democratic and -10 being the most autocratic. The empirical record suggests that the level of democracy can influence the level of mobilization (Bellinger and Arce, 2011). As a country becomes more democratic the country experiences less contentious politics. People might use less contentious avenues, such as voting or filing petitions, to express their discontent. Also, marginally democratic countries exhibit more contentious politics because of ineffective institutions and continued authoritarian practices (Boulding 2014; Moseley 2018). Therefore, I control for the level of democracy in my models.

Second, I control for *repression* with the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights index (Cingranelli et al. 2014). This index is an additive and is constructed from 4 different indicators—Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full respect for these four rights). I recode the variable to make it more intuitive. Recoded *repression* ranges from 0 (least repressive) to 8 (most repressive). The protest-repression nexus has been heavily studied in the literature (Moore 2000; Davenport 2005; Sullivan et al. 2012;

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[17] A detailed coding scheme can be found in the appendix.

Carey 2006; Chenoweth et al. 2017). Although these studies do not reach a definitive agreement, it is obvious that the level of repression influences protests. If physical integrity rights are heavily violated, the cost of protest participation will be very high, which will create demobilizing effects. Therefore, I control for the level of repression with the physical integrity rights index.

Third, I control for economic conditions with three different economic variables.[18] I add the natural log of GDP per capita as a proxy for wealth (Bellinger and Arce 2011). I expect that wealthier countries are less protest-prone because a wealthier population is more likely to be risk-averse and thus less likely to engage in contentious forms of political behavior (Bellinger and Arce 2011). For similar reasons, I control for a country's economic performance with a measure for annual GDP growth. As a country performs well economically, contentious movements will be less likely. I also control for the inflation rate for each country operationalized as the consumer price index. I expect that protests will rise during high inflation periods.

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[18] Although some may argue that I should lag these economic variables, I did not lag them. The argument for lagging these variables is that the discontent about the economic conditions will come before the mobilization. This is logically true. However, I do not think that the mobilization occur the year after an economic downturn. Even though mobilizing protests takes some time, civil society organizations can mobilize protests around an issue fairly quickly. Therefore, I do not lag these variables.

Fourth, apart from these economic variables I control for the Asian Financial Crisis by adding a binary variable indicating the crisis. This variable is coded as 1 for the year 1998, which is one year after the Crisis started in Thailand. The Crisis started in Thailand in 1997 and primarily affected South Korea and Indonesia. The Crisis hurt most other Asian economies as well, including Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Additionally, the Crisis not only affected their economies, but also their political structures. In 1998, the president of Indonesia, Suharto, was removed from power after a nearly 30 year dictatorship. Because of its greater economic and political impact in Asia, I control for the Crisis.

In addition, I add the natural log of population from the World Bank. The literature finds that protest is more likely when a country has a larger population because a larger population provides a greater opportunity for collective action (de la Luz Inclán 2008). Additionally, I include a variable for the number of years after a democratic transition in the model. I expect that contentious movements are less likely to be a dominant form of political participation in older democracies.

Also, I address the spatial and temporal dependence of protest movements by adding two control variables that account for the dependence (Bellinger and Arce 2011). First, I add a lagged dependent variable—$protest_{t-1}$—to account for the potential temporal dependence as this year's movements are not independent from last year's movements. Second, I address the possible diffusion effect of protest movements by adding the variable, *regional contention*. This variable is measured as the summation of anti-government protests of the sample in a given year.[19] I expect that as the aggregate number of protest movements across the region increases, the number of protest movements within a country will increase as well.

Finally, I control for democracies without ASPs. These countries are defined with Polity score.[20] By controlling for these no-ASP-democracies, the reference category of my models will be authoritarian regimes and democracies with ASPs where ASPs are not in control of formal democratic institutions. I define Japan in all years from my sample, Myanmar in 2016, Malaysia from 2008 to 2013, and Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2016 as no-ASP-democracies.

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[19] Bellinger and Arce, 2011.

[20] A country that has a Polity score of 6 or above are coded as a democracy. If the coded democracy does not have an ASP, the country will be categorized as a no-APS-democracy.

Figure 1-2 Histogram of the number of anti-government protests



To test my hypotheses, I employ zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression models (Yang et al. 2009). I use ZIP regression models, because the main dependent variable counts protest movements in a given year. This means that the outcome variable only contains non-negative integer values. The Poisson distribution helps me to account for the probability of a given number of events occurring with a discrete probability distribution rather than treating the counts in a continuous spectrum. Second, as Figure 1-2 shows, there is a zero-inflation problem in the dependent variable. This is expected with the protest event count variable since protests are very costly and thus are a rare event. To account for the excessive zero counts in data, I use zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models. This model has two subprocesses. The first process is ruled by a binary distribution that produces structural zeros. In the process, the model classifies always-zero groups. Then, the second process uses a Poisson distribution to generate counts. Some of the counts include zeros. These two processes can be described as follows.

$$\Pr(y_i = 0) = \pi + (1 - \pi)e^{-\lambda}$$

$$Pr(y_i = h_i) = (1 - \pi)\frac{\lambda^{h_i}e^{-\lambda}}{h_i!}\,, \qquad h_i \geq 1$$

where y_i has non-negative integer values, λ is the expected Poisson count for the ith individual, π is the probability of extra zeros.

Empirical Results

Table 1-2 displays four models using the sample of all East and Southeast Asian countries.[21] With this unrestricted sample, countries where ASPs are in formal institutions will be compared to both authoritarian regimes and countries where ASPs are not in formal institutions. Model 1 shows the coefficient for *ASP executive*. It has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the .1 level. This means that the number of protests increases when the president or the prime minister is from an ASP. Model 2 and 3 shows the coefficients for *ASP legislature majority* and *ASP legislature plurality*. The coefficients for both variables are positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. This means that when an ASP takes the majority of seats in the legislature, the number of protests increases. Likewise, when an ASP does not take the majority of seats but still takes a plurality of seats in the legislature, the number of protests increases. Finally, Model 4 exhibits the coefficient for *ASP both*. It is positive in sign and statistically significant at .01 level. This means that when an ASP is in control of both the executive and the legislature, the number of protests increases. Overall, these models confirm my hypotheses that the number of protests will rise when ASPs are in control of the executive and/or the legislature.

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[21] Cases include Mongolia, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia from 1987 to 2016 and Timor-Leste from 2002 to 2016.

The coefficients for *no-ASP-democracy* are positive and statistically significant in all four models. This means that as compared to the reference category, democracies with ASPs where these ASPs are not in formal institutions, anti-government protests are more likely in a democracy without an ASP. The coefficients for *Polity score* in all four models are positive, meaning protest is more likely in more democratic countries. The coefficients for *repression* also show positive signs. As the level of repression increases, the number of protests increases. The coefficients of *years of democracy* have negative signs and are statistically significant in all four models. This means that as a country has a longer democratic history, the ASP effect will diminish. That is, over time after democratic transitions, ASPs will evolve as democratic actors. The coefficients of *population* are positive and statistically significant in all four models per the literature's expectation. Interpreting the three economic variables, however, is not so straight forward. Coefficients for *GDP per capita* in all four models are positive, meaning protest is more likely in wealthier countries. This is not expected. One possible explanation for this is that civil societies in wealthier countries are endowed with more resources and that enables them to organize political protests better. The coefficients for *GDP growth* are positive in Model 1,2, and 4 but negative in Model 3. However, these effects are not statistically significant. The coefficients for *inflation* in all four models have positive signs as expected, even though they are not statistically significant.

Table 1-2 ASPs' control of the executive and/or the legislature and protest

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Protest	Inflate	Protest	Inflate	Protest	Inflate	Protest	Inflate
Protest$_{t-1}$	-0.001		0.011		0.014		0.012	
	(0.018)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.016)	
ASP executive	0.594*	-15.030						
	(0.318)	(764.234)						
ASP legislature (Majority)			0.956***	-1.620				
			(0.358)	(1.500)				
ASP legislature (Plurality)					1.411***	-0.027		
					(0.373)	(0.501)		
ASP both							0.993***	-14.300
							(0.343)	(825.471)
No-ASP-democracy	0.950**		0.973**		1.404***		1.204**	
	(0.468)		(0.462)		(0.500)		(0.473)	
Polity score	0.021		0.022		0.021		0.021	
	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.021)	
Repression	0.153**		0.179**		0.220***		0.191***	
	(0.068)		(0.071)		(0.070)		(0.072)	
Years of democracy	-0.044***		-0.043***		-0.042***		-0.044***	
	(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)	
Population	0.637***		0.632***		0.674***		0.635***	
	(0.130)		(0.133)		(0.141)		(0.132)	
GDP per capita	0.225*		0.178		0.072		0.144	
	(0.117)		(0.125)		(0.135)		(0.124)	
GDP growth	1.344		0.234		-0.137		0.438	
	(1.719)		(1.793)		(1.742)		(1.746)	
Inflation	0.011		0.005		0.004		0.009	
	(0.008)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)	
Asian Financial Crisis	-1.754***		-1.137*		-0.879		-1.291**	
	(0.625)		(0.648)		(0.665)		(0.651)	
Regional contention	0.118***		0.098***		0.090***		0.100***	
	(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.020)	
Constant	-14.857***	0.212	-14.292***	0.076	-14.534***	-0.104	-14.299***	0.070
	(2.062)	(0.266)	(2.055)	(0.267)	(2.133)	(0.317)	(2.061)	(0.290)
Observations	276		276		276		276	
Log likelihood	-215.13		-217.64		-216.59		-213.00	
χ^2	171.84		171.84		172.88		175.24	

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The coefficients for *Asian Financial Crisis* across the models have negative signs, meaning the Crisis demobilized protestors. Although this is not expected theoretically, in the context of Asia, this result can be justified. Unlike economic downturns, a crisis like the Asian Financial Crisis can unify a country in order to overcome the crisis. For example, during the Crisis South Korean TV stations avoided airing comedy shows and people avoided enjoying leisurely activities. Furthermore, the country's gold-collecting campaign surprised the world (Kim and Finch 2002). Media outlets reported that 23 percent of Korea's households either donated or sold their privately held gold for the country. This example shows that a Crisis can prevent protests by serving as a unifying force.

Finally, control variables related to temporal and spatial dependence have positive coefficients as expected except the coefficient of $Protest_{t-1}$ in Model 1. If a country experiences a larger number of protests in a year compared to the previous year, one may expect the number of protests to continue increasing in the subsequent year. Also, if there are many protest movements in a region, those movements may diffuse into neighboring countries.

Table 1-3 displays four models that control for authoritarian regimes.[22] By controlling for authoritarian regimes and democracies without ASPs, the reference category in these four models will be democracies with ASPs where these ASPs are not in control of formal institutions. I do this to exclude authoritarian regimes where the concept of ASPs cannot exist from the reference category and compare the effects of ASPs among democracies where ASPs exist. I exclude *Polity score* because regime types are controlled for. Other control variables remain the same with the original models. Coefficients for ASP variables are positive and statistically significant, meaning that anti-government protests are more likely when an ASP is in control of formal democratic institutions than when an ASP is not in formal institutions. Other control variables remain the same from the original models.

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[22] Authoritarian regimes are defined with the Polity score. A country has a Polity score of 5 or less is coded as an authoritarian regime.

Table 1-3 ASPs' control of the executive and/or the legislature and protest (democracy comparison)

	Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8	
	Protest	Inflate	Protest	Inflate	Protest	Inflate	Protest	Inflate
Protest$_{t-1}$	0.007		0.017		0.025		0.021	
	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.016)	
ASP executive	0.607*	-15.387						
	(0.331)	(968.941)						
ASP legislature (Majority)			0.908**	-1.581				
			(0.357)	(1.484)				
ASP legislature (Plurality)					1.355***	-0.085		
					(0.386)	(0.520)		
ASP both							1.001***	-13.970
							(0.353)	(921.610)
No-ASP-democracy	0.892*		0.874*		1.274**		1.137**	
	(0.473)		(0.459)		(0.500)		(0.476)	
Autocracy	0.046		-0.055		0.150		0.097	
	(0.269)		(0.259)		(0.278)		(0.269)	
Repression	0.186***		0.209***		0.260***		0.230***	
	(0.067)		(0.070)		(0.072)		(0.072)	
Years of democracy	-0.037***		-0.037***		-0.033**		-0.036***	
	(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.013)	
Population	0.545***		0.540***		0.537***		0.528***	
	(0.107)		(0.108)		(0.117)		(0.109)	
GDP per capita	0.293***		0.249**		0.188		0.233**	
	(0.107)		(0.111)		(0.119)		(0.111)	
GDP growth	1.117		0.038		-0.400		0.176	
	(1.678)		(1.768)		(1.720)		(1.715)	
Inflation	0.011		0.005		0.004		0.009	
	(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)	
Asian Financial Crisis	-1.877***		-1.226*		-1.124*		-1.467**	
	(0.644)		(0.658)		(0.677)		(0.657)	
Regional contention	0.120***		0.099***		0.093***		0.102***	
	(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.020)	
Constant	-13.938***	0.199	-13.305***	0.059	-13.308***	-0.093	-13.340***	0.036
	(1.850)	(0.272)	(1.859)	(0.275)	(1.903)	(0.324)	(1.870)	(0.304)
Observations	300		300		300		300	
Log likelihood	-219.97		-222.54		-221.65		-217.95	
χ^2	178.70		179.13		179.38		181.92	

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To see substantive effects, I simulate average-case scenarios by using median values for continuous variables, 6 for *Polity score*, and zeros for *no-ASP-democracy*, *autocracy*, and *Asian Financial Crisis*. The purpose of this simulation is to see the expected number of protests in a democracy with an ASP that has a Polity score of 6 and average levels of previous year's contention, repression, democracy history, population, economic performances, and regional contention. I allow the main ASP variables to vary and calculate the first difference of the expected number of protests by subtracting the expected number of protests when an ASP is in formal institutions from the expected number of protests when an ASP is not in formal institutions. For executive scenarios, I use *ASP executive* models (Model 1 and Model 5). For legislature scenarios, I use *ASP legislature plurality* models (Model 3 and Model 7). Figure 1-3 shows the results. The values of the first difference are negative, meaning the expected number of protests is greater when an ASP is in the executive or in the legislature. The 95% confidence intervals do not contain zeros for the executive models. This means that ASPs' effect on protest is significant when ASPs are in control of the executive. The 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero in the main legislature model while they contain zero in the democracy comparison legislature model.

Figure 1-3 First difference of expected count (average-case scenarios)



How do my models predict real world cases? I pick two real world cases and show the substantive effects of ASPs on protest. I examine the data and find that the number of political protests is at its highest in South Korea in 2016. I consider South Korea in 2016 as a high-risk case. Also, I find that no anti-government protest reported in Mongolia in 2016. Therefore, I consider Mongolia in 2016 as a low-risk case. Some may argue that in a high-risk case such as South Korea, protests will erupt regardless of ASP's political control. Likewise, in a low-risk case such as Mongolia, the expectation is that protests will not erupt. In order to test these possible arguments, I simulate scenarios based on these two cases: South Korea in 2016 and Mongolia in 2016. To simulate high-risk scenarios, I use the actual values of each variable for South Korea in 2016.[23] To simulate low-risk scenarios, I use the actual values of each variable for Mongolia in 2016.[24] Then, I allow the main ASP variables to vary in order to calculate changes in predicted probabilities in each scenario.

Figure 1-4 visualizes the first difference of expected count of protests for both low-risk and high-risk scenarios. This is calculated by subtracting the expected number of protests when an ASP is in formal institutions from the expected number of protests when an ASP is not in formal institutions. Original models use Model 1 and 3 for simulation while democracy comparison models use Model 5 and 7. Simulations for original models and simulations for democracy comparison models do not differ. The values of the first difference are negative, meaning the expected number of protests is greater when an ASP is in the executive or the legislature. The 95% confidence intervals do not contain zeros for the executive models while they contain zeros in the legislature models.

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[23] I use the value 4, for $protest_{t-1}$, 0 for *no-ASP-democracy*, 0 for *autocracy*, 8 for *Polity score*, 29 for *years of democracy*, 17.75 for *population*, 10.15 for *GDP per capita*, 0.03 for *GDP growth*, .97 for *Inflation*, 0 for *Financial Crisis*, and 56 for *regional contention*.

[24] I use the value 0 for $protest_{t-1}$, 0 for *no-ASP-democracy*, 0 for *autocracy*,10 for *Polity score*, 25 for *years of democracy*, 14.92 for *population*, 8.27 for *GDP per capita*, 0.12 for *GDP growth*, 1.05 for *inflation*, 0 for *Financial Crisis*, and 56 for *regional contention*.

Figure 1-4 First difference of expected count (high and low-risk scenarios)



Overall, these empirical results support my hypotheses that the number of protest increase in response to an ASP being in control of the executive and/or the legislature. Also, from the simulations, I find that civil society is more sensitive to ASPs' control of the executive than their control of the legislature.

Conclusion

Authoritarian incumbents have survived through ASPs in East and Southeast Asian third wave democracies. Do ASPs promote or harm democracy? The literature supports the argument that ASPs aid in installing stable democratic party systems and facilitating a democratic transition. Nevertheless, after a transition ASPs propose and implement undemocratic policies, preventing a country from consolidating democratic institutions and practices. This study treats democratization as an incremental process where civil society encourages consolidation through activism. Therefore, in this study I examine the relationship between ASPs and civil society.

I find evidence that civil society organizes more protests when ASPs are in control of the executive and/or the legislature than when ASPs are not in control of these formal institutions in Asian third wave democracies. The implications of this finding are many-fold. First, ASPs operating in democratic settings do not ensure democratic consolidation. Because of their connections with their authoritarian pasts, they still implement policies that benefit their authoritarian allies and employ authoritarian methods to interact with civil society. Through ASPs, authoritarian elites retain their privileged positions after democratization. Moreover, authoritarian elites use these positions to maintain their relations with their authoritarian business and political allies. The continued relations between ASPs and their former allies are not just the result of path dependence. Rather, authoritarian elites after a transition strategically rely on these relationships to preserve their privileged positions and accumulated wealth. Former allies will be permanent supporters of ASPs and will supply them with resources and votes. In exchange for this, ASPs will propose and implement policies on behalf of their allies' economic interests. As a result, ASPs' control of democratic institutions strengthens clientelistic linkages, rather than promoting democracy. Moreover, ASPs are more likely to use authoritarian methods, such as repression or cooptation, to restrict civil society. As the friendly relationship between authoritarian elites and their allies continues after democratic transitions, the relationship between these elites and civil society does not change as well. Finally, ASPs need to restrict civil society in order to maintain their relations with allies. Overall, the resulting policies and measures are undemocratic and prevents democratic consolidation.

Second, civil society organizes protests when they find institutional inefficiencies or undemocratic practices. Democratization, which is a critical juncture, provides NGOs and CSOs with new opportunities and resources. Although these resources maybe marginal, they are enough to empower civil society, because democratization boosts civil society confidence. Accordingly, CSOs will be ready to organize collective actions whenever they observe undemocratic institutions and practices.

When it comes to the role of civil society in democracy, neo-Tocquevillians and neo-Gramscians suggest different perspectives. While neo-Tocquevillians believe that civil society promotes moderate political participations, neo-Gramscians emphasize a more contentious civil society that organizes protests, riots, and revolutions. This study reconciles these two competing schools by presenting and testing a condition under which civil society will organize protests. By comparing the number of protests when an ASP is in power to when a non-ASP is in power, I find that civil society is more likely to organize protests when they identify undemocratic policies and practices from actors in formal institutions.

Appendix

Table A1 ASP coding scheme

Variable	Value	Rule
ASP executive	1	If the president or the PM is from an ASP.
	0	If the president or the PM is from a non-ASP/ if the country is not a democracy (Polity score is less than "6")/ if there is no ASP in the country.
ASP legislature (majority)	1	When the ASP has majority seats in the lower House.
	0	Otherwise.
ASP legislature (plurality)	1	When the ASP has a plurality of seats in the lower House.
	0	Otherwise.

Table A2 ASP operation countries and years

Country	Year	ASP executive	ASP legislature M	ASP legislature P
Thailand	1992			
	1993			
	1994			
	1995			
	1996			yes
	1997	yes		yes
	1998			yes
	1999			yes
	2000			yes
	2001			
	2002			
	2003			

	2004			
	2005			
	2013			
Taiwan	1992	yes	yes	yes
	1993	yes	yes	yes
	1994	yes	yes	yes
	1995	yes	yes	yes
	1996	yes	yes	yes
	1997	yes	yes	yes
	1998	yes	yes	yes
	1999	yes	yes	yes
	2000		yes	yes
	2001			
	2002			
	2003			
	2004			
	2005			
	2006			
	2007			
	2008	yes	yes	yes
	2009	yes	yes	yes
	2010	yes	yes	yes
	2011	yes	yes	yes
	2012	yes	yes	yes
	2013	yes	yes	yes
	2014	yes	yes	yes
	2015	yes	yes	yes
	2016			
South Korea	1988	yes	yes	yes
	1989	yes	yes	yes
	1990	yes	yes	yes
	1991	yes	yes	yes
	1992	yes		yes
	1993	yes		yes

	1994	yes		yes
	1995	yes		yes
	1996	yes		yes
	1997	yes		yes
	1998			yes
	1999			yes
	2000		yes	yes
	2001		yes	yes
	2002		yes	yes
	2003		yes	yes
	2004			
	2005			
	2006			
	2007			
	2008	yes	yes	yes
	2009	yes	yes	yes
	2010	yes	yes	yes
	2011	yes	yes	yes
	2012	yes	yes	yes
	2013	yes	yes	yes
	2014	yes	yes	yes
	2015	yes	yes	yes
	2016	yes		
Philippines	1987			
	1988			
	1989			
	1990			
	1991			
	1992			
	1993			
	1994			
	1995			
	1996			
	1997			

	1998			
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	2012			
	2013			
	2014			
	2015			
	2016			
Mongolia	1992		yes	yes
	1993		yes	yes
	1994		yes	yes
	1995		yes	yes
	1996			
	1997	yes		
	1998	yes		
	1999	yes		
	2000	yes	yes	yes
	2001	yes	yes	yes
	2002	yes	yes	yes
	2003	yes	yes	yes
	2004	yes		yes
	2005	yes		yes
	2006	yes		yes

	2007	yes		yes
	2008	yes	yes	yes
	2009		yes	yes
	2010		yes	yes
	2011		yes	yes
	2012			
	2013			
	2014			
	2015			
	2016			yes
Indonesia	1999	yes		
	2000			
	2001			
	2002			
	2003			
	2004			yes
	2005			yes
	2006			yes
	2007			yes
	2008			yes
	2009			
	2010			
	2011			
	2012			
	2013			
	2014			
	2015			
	2016			

Chapter 2. Authoritarian Successor Parties and Mass Mobilization in Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia

How does authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) interact with their supporters after democratic transitions? In particular, post-transition do they frequently organize mass protests such as street demonstrations, rallies, and other types of mass mobilization? This study seeks to provide an answer to this question. The literature on political parties and protest almost exclusively focuses on opposition parties during democratic transitions. Recent studies have found that opposition parties organize political protests to confront authoritarian incumbents when elections are rigged (Beaulieu 2014; Knutsen et al. 2017; Tucker 2007; Sato and Wahman 2019), when the economy is not good (Brancati 2016), or when they are endowed with strong civil society networks (Boulding 2014; LeBas 2011; Moseley 2015; 2018). However, studies on how former autocrats mobilize protesters in the post-democratization political environment are very limited.

This study fills this gap by examining ASPs' mass mobilization patterns after a democratic transition. Examining former autocrats' mobilization behavior is important, because it helps us understand how these former autocrats behave in a changing political environment and assess whether they become democratic actors after democratization. Although former autocrats may survive democratization as an ASP, post-democratization, their political power is limited by democratic institutions. Under this situation, whether they adjust to democratic procedures will influence the likelihood of democratic resilience. In context where ASPs frequently organize protests to break political deadlocks and to attain their political goals, their actions can be detrimental to the emergence of a heathy democracy.

I argue that ASPs are less capable of mobilizing protesters. That is, these former autocrats are less experienced in organizing protests than their counterparts. Since these former autocrats dominated political institutions during their reign, they had no incentive to protest their own rule. Consequently, they lack the ability to organize protests and coordinate the necessary tactics and skills. Conversely, their counterparts (opposition parties during the authoritarian periods) have acquired protest mobilization strategies through their ample experiences participating in pro-democracy movements. Comparatively, these former opposition parties are more capable of organizing protests.

I also argue that an ASP's characteristics can influence their mobilizing capabilities as well. If an ASP is ideologically constant, the ideology can serve as a strong mobilizing force and aid in mobilizing protesters after democratization. On the contrary, if an ASP does not have a constant ideological foundation, its mobilizing power will be limited.

To assess these claims, I examine four Asian democracies that have produced substantive ASPs: Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia. By using the four waves of the Asian Barometer Survey Data, I conduct both single level and multilevel analysis. I find evidence that ASPs are in general less likely to organize protests. I also find evidence that when ASPs maintain their old political ideology they are more capable of organizing protests than ASPs that completely change or modify their old ideology.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I will briefly review the literature on mobilization and demonstrate why political parties can be a strong mobilizing force for protests. Then, I outline my theory, hypotheses, and explain the cases used in this study. Fourth, I display my empirical strategy and explain the statistical models used to test my hypotheses. Finally, I discuss and summarize my core findings.

Problems of mass mobilization

The literature on mass mobilization and protest examines how protests are organized and assesses mobilizing structures. The collective action problem makes it difficult to mobilize a population (Olson 1965; 2009). It is often assumed that individuals who share common interests will band together to further their interests. If this assumption is true, groups of individuals with similar interests should not face difficulties in mobilizing to pursue a common goal. However, in reality, leaders of social movements often find it difficult to mobilize group members to participate in protests. The reason behind this problem is two-fold. Participating in protests is costly and the gains made through protests are shared by everyone in a group, even those who do not participate in the protests. In this situation, individuals will attempt to free ride rather than putting their time and effort into protesting.

In kind, organizing protests requires resources. Carrying out protests not only requires tangible resources such as money, but also needs non-material resources such as social networks and expertise. These various resources serve as the essentials for making protests possible. Furthermore, consistent access to these resources is important for sustained mobilization.

In order to assess how movements overcome these issues, scholars examine how organizations—labor unions, professional associations, religious organizations, and NGOs—aid collective action efforts (Boulding 2014; LeBas 2011; Fu 2017; Putnam 1994; 2000). Organizations help actors overcome the collective action problem by providing resources, lowering the cost related to protest participation, and boosting the morale of protestors. In particular, if an organization is rich in financial resources, strong in organizational structures, and have abundant mobilization experiences and expertise, the organization working with movement leaders will be able to employ their resources to mobilize protestors.

Political parties as a mobilizing force

Among many organizations, scholars study the role political parties in protest mobilization (Kitschelt 1993; Beaulieu 2014; LeBas 2011; Anria 2019). Political parties can be an effective mobilizing force for protests because of their organizational structure and ability to attract potential protestors with their ideology. First, political parties have organizational structures that can provide grassroot networks and resources. Strong parties are endowed with institutionalized, stable structures that facilitate interactions and communication between party leadership and party supporters (LeBas 2011). In some cases, these communications can be one-sided (top-down) when a charismatic leader dominates the party. In other cases, interactions can be from the bottom up when the nature of the party encourages grassroot participation from its supporters (Anria 2019). Either way, a strong organizational structure that can connect the central party leadership to actual supporters is crucial for both electoral and protest mobilizations.

Second, political parties promote political ideas that can make their supporters stick together despite differences in their background (Pappas 2009). An ideology or a stable set of political ideas is a powerful tool in mobilizing followers. It can serve as the foundation for uniting people and motivating them to participate in political activities by presenting a framework for what they ultimately want to achieve (Lange et al. 1990; Dickson 2014). Historically, one can easily find many cases where political parties were formed to promote a certain ideology or formed to counteract the spread of a certain ideology. In those cases, it has been proved that ideologically-driven parties were more successful in mobilizing their supporters. In summary, political parties can effectively mobilize people and initiate protests using their organizational structures, ideology, and discourse.

Also, political parties are most likely to organize protests when protests are considered to be the best means of achieving their political purposes. First, through protests, political parties can tighten their bonds with their supporters and strengthen their political power. A political party can reorient the preferences of their supporters by hosting rallies and organizing street demonstrations. Protest sites are a place for a party supporter to meet other supporters and party officials, and this helps build strong relations between the party leadership and supporters. Second, political parties may seek to achieve their political goals through protests if their goals seem unachievable by other means. If a party cannot accomplish its political agendas within formal political institutions—because it is a minority party or because institutions are ineffective and unfavorable to the party—a party can take the mass mobilization route to achieve its political goals. For these reasons, political parties can be incentivized to organize protests.

In studying how/when parties organize protests, scholars primarily pay attention to opposition parties. Beaulieu (2014) examines opposition parties in developing countries and argues that opposition parties will protest when electoral fraud is rampant. LeBas (2011) studies opposition parties in Sub-Saharan African countries and claims that protests can be coordinated by opposition parties. These studies provide a comprehensive explanation of how opposition party-initiated protests operate, including the processes of interactions between opposition parties, the role of civil society, and incumbent parties and how these interactions lead to democratic transitions. However, studies on how authoritarian incumbents mobilize supporters is limited (Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020).

In many third wave democracies, authoritarian incumbents have survived democratic transitions. Loxton (2015; 2018) introduced the term ‘authoritarian successor parties (ASPs)' to indicate political parties that have their roots in the authoritarian era. According to Loxton, of the third wave democracies that formed between 1974 to 2010, ASPs emerged in 75 percent of them and 54 percent of them had ASPs return back to power (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). Authoritarian incumbent parties often have strong organizational structures and abundant resources that have been accumulated throughout their reign. After a democratic transition, these former autocrats—if they survived the transition—are likely to continue to enjoy their rich resources (Loxton 2015; Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Riedl 2014). Meanwhile, after a democratic transition, ASPs lose office and become opposition parties from time to time, meaning protests can be considered to be a reasonable political tool. This elicits a set of questions: do ASPs frequently organize protests after democratic transitions? Is a strong organization enough to mobilize protesters?

This study aims at studying ASPs' protest mobilization patterns and providing an answer to these questions. The main value of this study is two-fold. First, by examining ASPs' mobilization behavior after democratization, this study will add an implication in the literature on democratization. New democracies face many challenges from former autocratic actors. Incorporating these former autocrats into democratic institutions is essential to prevent democratic regression. If these former autocrats hold protests too often to achieve their political agendas rather than pursuing them within democratic institutions, it can damage political stability and impede democratic consolidation.

Second, by studying ASPs' mass mobilization, this study will reveal important factors that can affect parties' propensity toward mass protests. Endowed with strong organizations and resources from the authoritarian era, ASPs will be equipped with preconditions for a mass mobilization after a democratic transition. That is, ASPs should exhibit strong mobilization orientation compared to other parties. When ASPs are not in power, in particular, they should use these mobilizing resources to organize protests. If ASPs do not exhibit strong mobilization patterns, however, that means there can be other factors that affect parties' propensity to mass protests than strong organizational structures and tangible resources. This study suggests that protest mobilization expertise is one of those important factors that has been understudied in the field.

ASPs and Protest Mobilization

Why do some parties constantly organize protests when they have to break the political deadlock or promote certain political agendas, while others do not? Is this just a pattern of path-dependence? I argue that if a party doesn't have prior mass protest experience, the party is less likely to organize protests. Mobilizing resources entails many components such as funds, staff, organizational structures, and networks. Among these components, expertise is less studied even though it plays an important role in mobilizing people. Without protest mobilization expertise, parties cannot effectively organize protests (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

In arguing this, I need to differentiate protest mobilization from other forms of mass mobilization. Authoritarian parties were consistently able to mobilize their supporters during the authoritarian period with incumbent advantage and strong party discipline. For example, the Chinese Communist Party during the Mao era mobilized people with campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (Bachman and Bachman 2006; Lovell 2019). Through those mass mobilizations, authoritarian incumbents were able to strengthen their power.

Nevertheless, mobilizing protests is different from those types of authoritarian mobilizations. Planning protests and street demonstrations requires certain tactical and logistical knowledge. For instance, protest organizers must be able to make people gather in a certain location at a certain time, which is not necessary for other types of mobilization. Also, organizers must think about what they will do after making people gather. Organizers must provide them with protest programs. Protestors can listen to speeches of organizers, chant slogans, sing songs etc., and parties will be responsible for coordinating these features for the masses gathered.

Parties initiate mass protests for many reasons. However, the most prominent reason is that they perceive themselves as disadvantaged in the political system and thus their political agendas can most likely be achieved on the street through mass protests and demonstrations. This is the reason why the literature on party-initiated protests focuses primarily on opposition parties. Authoritarian incumbent parties are less likely to perceive that they are not favored by the political institutions they designed for themselves. Thus, there is no reason for them to organize mass protests against their own rule. Consequently, after a democratic transition, former autocrats in ASPs are almost unlikely to have any prior experience mobilizing protests. Experiences are important since through those experiences, parties are able to accumulate expertise on protest mobilization. Moreover, because ASPs are former authoritarian incumbents, they have not built friendly relationships with the civil society organizations that organized pro-democracy protests prior to the democracy transitions. This means that ASPs are not positioned to glean from the expertise of these protest mobilizing organizations.

In contrast to these former autocrats, pre-transition opposition parties are more likely to have ample experience in protest mobilization because of their participation in pro-democracy movements (Beaulieu 2014; LeBas 2011; Anria 2019). They can either directly lead to democracy movements or form coalitions with civil society organizations that had organized democracy protests. Either way, former opposition parties can develop protest mobilization techniques and tactics on their own or can borrow those skills from the civil society organizations that they are aligning with. From this, I draw the following hypothesis.

H1: In general, ASPs are less likely to mobilize their supporters to participate in protests compared to pre-transition opposition parties.

Although ASPs lack protest mobilization expertise, they still have strong and stable organizational structures established before democratic transitions, which means they still have potential capabilities necessary for protest mobilization after democratic transitions. After democratic transitions, ASPs sometimes lose office. When they lose office, they will use their resources to come to power again. When they are not in office, protests can be seen as an effective political tool to promote their party agendas and break the political deadlock. Therefore, ASPs will reference other parties to learn protest mobilization tactics. Combined with their strong organizational structures, they may be able to equip themselves for protest mobilizations by learning relatively quickly.[25] This leads to the following hypothesis.

H2: ASPs are more likely to mobilize their supporters to participate in protests when they are not in office as compared to when they are in office.

Although ASPs try to use other parties as a benchmark and learn mobilization tactics, if they do not have a stable ideological or ideational orientation for mobilizing people, I argue that they are less capable of mobilizing protestors. During their rule,

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[25] Although ASPs can actively engage in learning and benchmarking, it will take time for them to fully develop their own protest mobilization skills. Therefore, in terms of protest mobilizations, other opposition parties still enjoy their superiority.

ASPs developed a stable set of political ideas and promoted those ideas during their incumbency. These ideas served as the basis for legitimizing their power and help them remain in power prior to democratization (March 2002; 2003; Lorch and Bunk 2017).

After democratization, these former autocrats will face challenges related to their actions while in power. According to Loxton (2018), ASPs benefit from their authoritarian resources, but are also hindered by their past wrongdoings. This creates a dilemma for ASPs: how much can an ASP distance itself from its authoritarian past? If its attempt to distance itself from the past is too ideologically extreme, it will likely lose its original supporters. However, if the ASP insists on maintaining its original ideology, it is less likely to attract new supporters who did not support its authoritarian rule. In facing these challenges, ASPs may change their original political ideology and be assimilated into other parties to attract more voters. This may be beneficial for electoral outcomes. However, it may not be a good strategy for protest mobilization.

If an ASP abandons its original political ideology, changes its political stance on core issues that are considered important by their original base, and promotes practical policies that are very similar to other parties, the party will not effectively mobilize protests. When mobilizing protestors, parties have to provide higher incentives since participating in protests requires more time and energy than participating in voting. This is where ideology becomes very important (Jenkins 1995). Political ideas can motivate people to participate in very costly political activities like street demonstrations, rallies, and marches. Political ideas have the ability to appeal to people's emotions and galvanize people to act. Also, even in the middle of protests, these ideas will effectively boost people's morale and strengthen their resolve. In fact, the mobilizing force behind political ideologies is historically proven. In the history of the world, one can find many examples where people chose to face even death for an ideology or a political thought. Therefore, ideology serves as a great protest mobilization resource for political parties. This leads to the following hypothesis.

H 3: ASPs that have not change their political ideology are better able to mobilize their supporters than ASPs that change their political ideology after democratic transitions.

Nevertheless, I also expect that this ideology effect will be more significant for old party supporters than new supporters. In other words, if an ASP's political ideology is unchanged, the party will be better at mobilizing its old supporters than its new supporters. Old supporters have stronger attachments to their party's political ideology compared to the party's new supporters, because they were vested prior to the democratic transition. This means that when their party organizes protests using its old political ideology as a rally point, old supporters are more likely to actively participate. Even though new supporters are also attached to their party’s ideology, their attachment to the ideology will not be as strong as the party's old supporters. Therefore, I expect that the effect of political ideology is less strong for new supporters. From this, I draw the following hypothesis.

H 4: ASPs that have not changed their core political ideology are better able to mobilize their old supporters than their new supporters.

ASPs in Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia

In order to assess my core assumptions, I examine four ASPs from four Asian countries, Taiwan (the Kuomintang), South Korea (the Grand National Party/Saenuri Party), Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Party), and Indonesia (The Golkar). I select these ASPs because they are still active in their countries' political arena post-democratization. Other Asian democracies have produced ASPs after democratization. Notably, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan emerged in the Philippines and the New Aspiration Party emerged in Thailand. I exclude Kilusang Bagong Lipunan from this assessment, because it only attracts a small number of supporters. In fact, in the Asian Barometer dataset, there is only 1 supporter in Wave 1, and are 6 supporters in Wave 4. Likewise, the New Aspiration Party is excluded because in 2001 the party merged with the Thai Rak Thai Party and thus it is hard to distinguish between the New Aspiration Party supporters from the Thai Rak Thai Party supporters.

Among the four ASPs explored here, the Grand National Party (GNP)/Saenuri Party in South Korea (Lee and Glasure 1995; Heo and Yun 2018) and the Golkar in Indonesia (King and Rasjid 1988) are right-leaning parties and have anti-communism ideologies. Their strong anti-communist focus has their origin in the authoritarian period and has been maintained after democratization. I expect that their strong and consistent anti-communist ideology will help these parties mobilize protesters after their countries' democratic transition.

MPP in Mongolia was a far-left communist party during the authoritarian period. After democratization, they modified their ideology and are now left-leaning but not too far from the center (Dierkes 2017). Their movement toward the center on the ideological spectrum can be helpful for electoral mobilizations. In fact, the party won presidential elections in 1997, 2001, and 2005 after the democratic transition. Nevertheless, I expect that the party's protest mobilization power has become weaker since the party's core ideological focus was diluted by their movement towards being a Centre-left party.

Finally, the circumstances surrounding the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan is complicated. The party has its origin in anti-communist ideology. At the same time, the party claims Chinese nationalism as its slogan and has pursued policies that are more pro-integration/pro-unification after Taiwan's democratic transition, which dilutes anti-communist ideology (Yu 2020; Moody 1992). This is not particularly harmful for the party's electoral success, it weakens its ability to mobilize protests.

Empirical Strategy

For my empirical strategy, I use individual-level survey data. I employ the four waves of the Asian Barometer datasets. To test whether an ASP is able to mobilize protesters, I analyze their supporters' protest participation patterns. The dependent variable is each respondent’s protest participation experience in the past. This is a binary variable coded as 1 if they have at least one prior experience, and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable is whether a respondent is an ASP supporter. This is a binary variable coded as 1 if a person is an ASP supporter, and 0 otherwise. ASP supporters are identified based on their party identification.

I operationalize the ASP's ability to mobilize protesters with individual level indicators because this is the most plausible way to test the hypotheses. First, if I operationalize this with country-year indicators, I run into issues created by having only 4 countries and a few years since democratization, which means a small number of observations. I do not think that I can draw a meaningful conclusion with the aggregate level analyses with such a small sample size.

More importantly, I argue that an analysis of individual ASP supporters' protest participation propensity is a good indicator of how well ASPs mobilize protesters. Intuitively, if certain party supporters exhibit a certain protest participation tendency, this tendency will provide hints about the parties' mobilizing power.[26] Supporters of a party with weak mobilizing power will display weaker protest participation tendency while supporters of a party with strong mobilizing power will show stronger protest participation tendency.[27]

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[26] This mobilizing power can be originated from the party's legacies, structures, and characteristics. At the same time, it can be borrowed from other civil society organizations such as trade unions and labor unions through forming coalitions with those organizations.

Theoretically, without organizers, individuals will be hesitant to participate in protests due to the collective action problem and parties will be the primary protest organizer in new democracies (Beaulieu 2014; LeBas 2011). Sometimes, protest can be spontaneous and uncoordinated and organized via the internet. However, these spontaneous protests are less able to continue to mobilize people, hence less able to last longer. Also, even in spontaneous protests, parties are highly likely to be involved afterward and help set protest agendas and organize protest programs. Most times, protests will be coordinated and parties will be directly or indirectly involved in organizing protests. First, parties will directly organize protests and mobilize their supporters in new democracies. Due to the shorter democracy history, democratic institutions are weaker and democratic norms are not firmly established in new democracies. When political parties face inefficiencies in their democratic institutions, they can find it more attractive to organize protests for their political goals (Mosely 2018). Weakly established democratic norms deteriorate the situation. In theory, democratic decision-making process is not that majority parties dominate minority parties in the legislature. Parties should engage in communications and dialogues and reach to an agreement through persuasion. Although this process is arduous and time consuming, democratic norms help political parties to respect this procedure. However, when parties do not have strongly embedded democratic norms, they often try to take more contentious routes to achieve their political goals (Mosely 2018; Huntington 1993; Huntington 2006). Hence, combined with parties mobilizing resources, parties can be one of the major mobilizing organizations in new democracies. Second, parties can indirectly organize protests through coalitions with other civil society organizations (LeBas 2011). Civil society organizations have incentives to form a coalition with political parties. These organizations want to make policies that are in line with their goals and political parties are the ones who can make those policies. Parties also have incentives to align with certain civil society organizations as they need strong supporter groups and organizational structures from civil society organizations. With the alliances, parties can organize protests indirectly. In summary, without strong organizers, individuals will be hesitant to participate in protests and in third wave democracies, parties will be the main protest organizer. Therefore, if supporters of a certain party show a certain protest participation propensity in the sample, that will provide implications about the party's mobilizing power.

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[27] It is also likely that certain demographics of supporters of a certain party makes them more or less likely to protest. To address this concern, I conduct t-test to see if there are systematic differences in age, income, and education between supporters of different parties. There is a clear pattern that ASP supporters tend to be older than non-ASP supporters. Therefore, I will employ a propensity score matching technique to deal with the influence of age. For other demographic characteristics, I did not find a systematic difference.

Furthermore, an individual level approach has its own advantage for this research. By disaggregating party supporters into individuals, I can account for demographic compositions of a group of supporters, which enables me to deal with the possible selection effect in my models. Supporters of a particular party may be comprised of a group of people who share similar demographic characteristics and this group of people might be more protest-prone because of the demographic features. In that scenario, frequently protests may be a result of certain demographic features rather than the party's mobilizing power. In order to address this selection effect, I conduct t-test to see if there are systematic differences in age, income, and education between supporters of different parties. Then, I employ the propensity score matching technique on the demographic characteristics that display systematic differences.

My empirical strategy is three-fold. First, I estimate single level logistic regression models for each country and each wave. In these models, I control for the demographic characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, education, and income. I also control for religion. Churches can provide strong organizational networks for their attendees, which can be beneficial for protest mobilization. Therefore, I control for Protestant and Catholic Christians respectively with two binary factors. Also, I control for the level of political interest. Supposedly, people who are strongly interested in politics are more likely to participate in protests. Finally, when ASPs are the ruling party, I control for nonpartisans who do not self-identify with one political party over another. When ASPs are not the ruling party, I control for both incumbent party supporters and nonpartisans. Therefore, non-ASP, non-incumbent party supporters are the reference category.

Second, I employ propensity score matching models. It is likely that ASP supporters are relatively older than non-ASP supporters because their ties to the party are rooted in the authoritarian period. It is also likely that older ASP supporters and young ASP supporters support ASPs for different reasons. They may have different political experiences and take different views about certain political issues. Therefore, it is possible that they exhibit different political behavior patterns (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). With the t-test, I find that ASP supporters tend to be older, although the difference is not big. If ASP supporters tend to be older than non-ASP supporters and there is a systematic difference in political behavior between older ASP supporters and young ASP supporters, simply controlling for the age cannot capture the systematic age effect on the dependent variable. Propensity score matching (PSM) is a technique that helps resolve this issue (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984; 1985; Rubin 1974). First, I define the treatment group and the control group. The treatment group consists of ASP supporters whereas the control group consists of non-ASP supporters. Then, I calculate propensity scores by estimating a logit model to calculate the predicted probability of being an ASP supporter by age. Based on the propensity scores, I match each observation from the treatment group to the control group. Finally, I estimate the probabilities of participating in protests with the matched set of observations. In the PSM models, I control for the same variables with single-level models.

Lastly, I estimate Bayesian multi-level logistic regression models for cross-national comparisons (Gill 2004; Gelman and Hill 2007). The unit of analysis for level 1 is individual survey respondents and for level 2 is country-year of each wave in the Asian Barometer dataset. I also allow the intercepts and the slopes to vary based on the function of level 2 indicators. I estimate Bayesian multi-level models for two reasons. First, multi-level models are appropriate since they allow me to compare the effects of ASPs on protests by country-year. For example, I can compare the size of the effect of the GNP in South Korea on protest mobilization to the size of the effect of the KMT in Taiwan. These comparisons cannot be made with single-level models. Second, in conducting cross-national comparisons, I can account for level 2 indicators such as the economic conditions, levels of repression, and whether an ASP is in office in a certain year. In single level models, I cannot control for these country-year level indicators. That is, these indicators will remain the same across all observations as the survey responses are collected in the same country in the same year. By employing multi-level models, I can add these level 2 indicators that can affect each respondent's decision to participate in a protest. Finally, Bayesian models produce less biased estimates with a smaller number of level 2 indicators. In level 2, I only have 14 observations.[28] This small sample can cause biased estimates with a frequentist approach that makes inferences with the asymptotic assumptions. On the contrary, the Bayesian approach does not make asymptotic assumptions. Bayes' theorem permits the researcher to make inferences that are conditional on their data. Therefore, the small sample inferences are not significantly different from larger sample inferences. Stegmueller (2013) conducts Monte Carlo experiments to compare frequentist multi-level models with Bayesian multilevel models. From 5 observations to 30 observations in the level 2, Bayesian multilevel models produce less biased estimates compared to frequentist models.

In the Bayesian multilevel models, I control for demographic variables of age, gender, education, and income. I also control for Protestant church attendees as well as Catholic church attendees. Other control variables include the level of political interest, incumbent party supporters, and nonpartisans.[29] Lastly, I control for an age cohort group. The age cohort group is defined by whether a respondent became voting eligible age before or after the democratic transition in her/his country. If a respondent became voting eligible age after the transition, the cohort variable is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. I also interact this age cohort variable with the ASP supporter variable. I interact them in order to determine if there is a difference in protest behavior between old ASP supporters and new ASP supporters. I argue that older ASP supporters become supporters before democratic transitions based on the literature on partisanship that argues partisanship is stable once established (Barnes 1985; Brader and Tucker 2001). Therefore, I argue that these older ASP supporters have supported the party for a long time.

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[28] These 14 observations include South Korea in 2003, South Korea in 2006, South Korea in 2015, Mongolia in 2006, Mongolia in 2010, Mongolia in 2014, Taiwan in 2001, Taiwan in 2006, Taiwan in 2010, Taiwan in 2014, Indonesia in 2006, Indonesia in 2011, and Indonesia in 2016.

[29] Continuous variables are all group mean centered to make the cross-case comparison convenient. These rescaled variables are also used for single level models.

In level 2, I control for whether an ASP is in office in any given year. I also control for the economic conditions with the lagged GDP growth variable form the World Bank. Then, I control for the level of repression using the Political Terror Scale State Department measure.[30] I employ non-informative independent normal priors for the regression coefficients with the mean set at zero and variance set a 100. I allow both the intercept and the slope to vary based on the function of level 2 indicators. Mathematically, the following equations explain the varying intercept/slope model.

$$\Pr(Y_i = Protest) = logit^{-1}\left(\alpha_{j[i]} + ASP_{j[i]}\beta_1 + \mathbf{X}_i\beta + \varepsilon_i\right), \qquad for\ i = 1,2,3,\ldots\ldots,n$$

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[30] I cannot use the CIRI dataset since CIRI indicators are only available to 2011.

$$\alpha_j = \gamma_{1j} + ASP\ in\ office_j\gamma_2 + Economy_j\gamma_3\ + Repression_j\gamma_4 + \varepsilon_j,$$

$$for\ j = 1, \ldots, 14$$

$$ASP_j = \gamma_{1j} + ASP\ in\ office_j\gamma_2 + Economy_j\gamma_3\ + Repression_j\gamma_4 + \varepsilon_j,$$

$$for\ j =\ 1, \ldots, 14,$$

where i represents individual respondents, j represents country-year, α_j is the varying intercept, and ASP_j is the varying slope. I use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to calculate joint posterior distributions for model parameters. MCMC estimation is conducted using JAGS and R package rjags (Plummer 2003; 2013). I conduct convergence diagnostics and do not find the absence of convergence.

Results

Figure 2-1 depicts the summary of single level models. Each figure reflects the ASP supporters' protest participation propensity compared to other non-incumbent party supporters using 90 percent confidence intervals. In South Korea, the coefficients are all negative and the CIs do not include zeros. ASP supporters in South Korea are less likely to protest compared to other non-incumbent party supporters. In Mongolia, the coefficients for ASP supporters are negative in 2006 and 2010, and positive in 2014. The 90 percent CIs do not include zero in 2006 whereas they include zeros in 2010 and 2014. When the Mongolian ASP, MPP, is the incumbent party, party supporters are less likely to protest. In contrast, when the ASP is not in the office, its supporters are more likely to participate in protests. In Taiwan, ASP supporters tend to be less likely to protest as the sign of coefficients are all negative. However, the effect is more significant when the ASP is in office as compared to when the ASP is not in office. In Indonesia, the coefficients for ASP supporters are positive in 2011 and 2016, meaning ASP supporters are more likely to participate in protests. Also, there is almost no ASP effect in 2006.

Figure 2-1 Summary of single level models



In summary, from these single level models, I find three patterns. First, ASP supporters are less likely to participate in protests in South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan. This means that ASPs in South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan are less capable of mobilizing protests. Second, the ASP effect is statistically significant when ASPs are in office in those three countries. When ASPs are not in office, ASP supporters in Mongolia and Taiwan tend to protest more. Third, the ASP in Indonesia mobilizes protests better. Since there is no year in the sample where the ASP is in office, I cannot make inferences about how the ASP in Indonesia mobilizes protests when the party is in office.

Figure 2-2 summarizes propensity score (PSM) models. I exclude Indonesia because the smaller number of ASP supporters causes larger standard errors and this makes matching difficult.[31] Observations in the treatment group (ASP supporters) and observations in the control group (non-ASP supporters) are matched with age. In South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan, the coefficients for each year are all negative, still confirming that ASP supporters are less likely to protest as compared to other non-incumbent party supporters. However, the 90 percent CIs contain zeros when ASPs are not in office in all three countries whereas they do not contain zeros when ASPs are in office. PSM models also confirm hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 in South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan.

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[31] 140, 72, and 47 ASP supporters are defined respectively in 2006, 2011, and 2016 from the Asian Barometer Data.

Figure 2-2 Summary of PSM models



Table 2-1 exhibits the results of the Bayesian multilevel model. The mean of *ASP supporters* is negative in sign and the 95% credible intervals do not contain zero. This means that on average, ASP supporters are less likely to participate in protests as compared to other non-incumbent party supporters. Also, incumbent party supporters are less likely to protest compared to non-incumbent party supporters as the mean of *incumbent supporters* shows a negative value and its CIs do not contain zero. On average, as people get older, they are less likely to protest. People in the younger cohort—which comprises people who became voting eligible age after democratization—tend to protest less, but the effect is not statistically meaningful. The mean of the interaction term of *ASP supporters* and *young age cohort* exhibits a positive sign, but it is not statistically meaningful as the CIs contain zero. For other demographic variables, I can infer that people who have a higher level of education, are higher income earners, and men are more likely to protest than people with a lower level of education, are lower income earners, and women. I can also infer that both Protestant and Catholic church attendees are more likely to protest, because the means of these two variables are positive in sign. For level 2 indicators, none of the three variables display statistically significant effects on protest.

Table 2-1 Bayesian multilevel model summary

	Mean	95% CIs
Level 1		
ASP supporter	-0.72	[-1.38, -0.11]
Incumbent supporter	-0.23	[-0.45, -0.01]
Nonpartisan	-0.95	[-1.12, -0.79]
Age	-0.01	[-0.01, 0.00]
Education	0.12	[0.09, 0.15]
Income	0.09	[0.04, 0.15]
Male	0.24	[0.11, 0.36]
Protestant	0.28	[0.05, 0.52]
Catholic	0.25	[-0.11, 0.60]
Interest in politics	0.24	[0.12, 0.35]
Young age cohort	-0.01	[-0.23, 0.20]
Young age cohort × *ASP supporter*	0.06	[-0.29, 0.39]
Level 2		
ASP in office	0.26	[-0.63, 1.16]
Economy	0.28	[-8.36, 8.53]
Repression	0.18	[-0.37, 0.70]
Intercept	-2.54	[-2.86, -2.23]
Var(intercept)	0.21	[0.26, 0.17]
Var(ASP)	0.17	[0.29, 0.15]
Deviance	7772.24	[7757.04, 7790.89]

To explore the substantive effects of these models, I create two hypothetical average figures of those living in a country with an average level of GDP growth and an average level of repression: the first person is from the age cohort of those who became voting eligible age before the democratic transition and the second person is from the age cohort of those who became voting eligible age after the democratic transition. The first person is a male with an average level of education and an average income; he is not an incumbent party supporter and is not a nonpartisan. He is also not a church attendee and lives in a country where an ASP is not in office. Then, I calculate his predicted probability of protest participation when he is an ASP supporter. I also calculate his predicted probability of protest participation when he is not an ASP supporter. Because the reference category in the model is non-ASP/non-incumbent party supporters, he is a non-incumbent party supporter in this case. Finally, I calculate the first difference of these two predicted probabilities.

Additionally, I examine the same person, but this person lives in a country where an ASP is in office. Then, I calculate predicted probabilities for both scenarios where he is an ASP supporter and he is not an ASP supporter. Finally, I calculate the first difference of these two predicted probabilities.

Figure 2-3-a shows the results of these assessments. Four patterns can be gleaned from these results. First, generally, the medians of the posterior distributions are negative, meaning ASP supporters are less likely to protest than other non-incumbent party supporters. Second, one can find no difference in protest behavior between ASP supporters and other non-incumbent party supporters in South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia in 2011. Third, in the case of Indonesia in 2006, ASP supporters display more active protest participation patterns than other non-incumbent party supporters. Finally, these findings are consistent when ASPs are in office as medians of the posterior distributions in Figure 3-b are not significantly different from the medians in Figure 3-a.

Figure 2-3 First difference of ASP supporter effects (old age cohort)



a.Difference in protest propensity for ASP supporters compared to non−supporters (ASP not in office)



b.Difference in protest propensity for ASP supporters compared to non−supporters (ASP in office)

I also examine a second person who is living in a country with an average level of GDP growth and an average level of repression. He has the same demographic characteristics as the first average person except for age. This person belongs to the age group where people became the voting eligible age after the democratic transition. Just like the first person, I calculate predicted probabilities of his protest participation when he is an ASP supporter and when he is not an ASP supporter.

Figure 2-4-a depicts the results of these estimates. Here, I also find four patterns. First, in general, ASP supporters are less likely to protest. Second, in the cases of Taiwan in 2010, South Korea in 2003 and 2011, the ASP effect is not statistically meaningful. Third, in Indonesia, younger ASP supporters are less likely to participate in protests. This finding is noticeable given the fact that older ASP supporters in the country tend to protests more. This confirms my hypothesis that the party's stable ideology better mobilizes its older supporters than new supporters. However, in South Korea, the age cohort effect is not significant even though the South Korean ASP has maintained its old anti-communist ideology. One possible answer is that their ideology attracts younger supporters and thus the South Korean ASP is capable of mobilizing younger and older ASP supporters with their ideology. Finally, these findings are consistent when ASPs are in office, since the medians of the posterior distributions in Figure 4-b are not significantly different from the medians in Figure 4-a.

Figure 2-4 First difference of ASP supporter effects (young age cohort)



a.Difference in protest propensity for ASP supporters compared to non−supporters (ASP not in office)



b.Difference in protest propensity for ASP supporters compared to non−supporters (ASP in office)

Finally, I test whether ASP supporters protest less when their party is in office as compared to when their party is not in office. I use the same demographic information and the same country information of the first average person. However, this time this person is an ASP supporter. Then, I calculate the predicted probability of his protest participation when the ASP is in office. I also calculate the predicted probability when the ASP is not in office. Lastly, I calculate the first difference of these two predicted probabilities. These results are reflected in Figure 2-5. The posterior medians are negative in most cases, meaning that ASP supporters are more likely to protest when their party is not in office. However, I find null effects in the Taiwan in 2001, South Korea in 2011, and Indonesia in 2006 cases.

Figure 2-5 First difference of ASP in office effects



Conclusion

This study examines ASPs' ability to mobilize protests in the context of Asian democracies. Currently, the literature on party-organized protests focuses almost entirely on the role of opposition parties during democratic transitions. However, it is also important to examine how former authoritarian incumbent parties mobilize protests after democratic transitions in third wave democracies. In the post-democratization political environment, these former incumbents lose their power from time to time. By studying how they behave and how they interact with their supporters, one can understand how resilient democracy is in those countries. This study is an attempt to understand ASP behavior in the post democratization environment.

The implications of this study are as follows. First, in general, ASPs are less capable of mobilizing protests. That is because they have less protest mobilization experience as compared to other parties. Second, ASPs are less likely to organize protests when they are in office than when they are not in office. Third, ASPs that have a stable ideological orientation can mobilize their supporters better than ASPs that have changed their ideological orientations after democratic transitions. Compared to the ASPs in Taiwan and in Mongolia, the ASPs in South Korea and Indonesia are more capable of mobilizing protestors, since these two ASPs kept their anti-communist ideology after their democratic transitions. Finally, this ideological effect is more stable for older ASP supporters than new ASP supporters.

Chapter 3. Authoritarian Legacies, Citizens, and Protest: Lessons from the Taegeukgi Rally in South Korea

On October 3rd in 2019, more than 460,000 people gathered in *Gwanghwamun* Square in Seoul to protest against South Korean President, Moon Jae-in.[32] Various issues motivated these protesters. One biggest issue included the President's appointment of Cho Kuk as the Minister of Justice. People's anger reached its highest as the scandal regarding Cho Kuk's daughter's academic credentials was revealed. Although Cho Kuk issue was one main driver for the gathering, there were other issues too. Some expressed their frustrations on Moon's economic policies that may be considered as more redistributive such as the raise of the minimum wage. Others raised their concerns regarding Moon's dovish policy toward North Korea. All combined, this was a conservative protest where all conventional conservative demands in South Korea were raised. Yet, this was not a simple uprising by conservative party supporters; in fact, this protest was not just a one-time gathering. It was part of an ongoing movement called the *Taegeukgi Rally* (South Korean National Flag Rally) that started from November in 2016. At first, the movement started as a series of pro-government rallies and counter-protests to prevent the impeachment of then President, Park Geun-hye. After the impeachment and the formation of the new administration by Moon Jae-in, the movement transformed into anti-government protests. Protesters have gathered every week and on national holidays since Park's impeachment, demanding the resignation of Moon and the restoration of Park's presidency.

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[32] "10·3 광화문집회 누가 나왔나 보니…50 대 엄마, 20 대 아들, 강남 3 구 주민 "조국 사퇴" 외쳤다. " [10·3 kwangwamunjiphoee nuga nawanna poni…50tae ŏmma, 20tae adŭl, kangnam3ku chumin "choguk sat'oe" oech'yŏtta, Who participated in the 10·3 *Gwanghwamun* rally: moms in their 50s, sons in their 20s, and Gangnam residents gathered and shouted "Cho Kuk, Resign!"], *Chosunilbo*, October 13, 2019, https://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/10/13/2019101300010.html.

The *Taegeukgi Rally* is puzzling in three ways. First, it is a first organized political protest by conservative party supporters (Stent 2019; Heo and Yun 2019). With the fact that the participants are supporters of a certain party, it is logical to assume that they organize protests more frequently, when their party loses office. Contrary to this prediction, however, the party supporters had not arranged organized protests during the times when their party lost the executive branch. This is why this time's movement is interesting. This is the very first movement by the conservative party supporters that is organized with several organizers, large in scale, and long in duration. The movement has sustained for more than 3 years and has attracted a large number of masses.

Second, the demographical composition of protesters makes this movement exceptional. Interestingly, more than 70 percent of participants are the elderly who are older than 60 years.[33] The literature suggests that older people are less likely to participate in protests (Kim 2017). Participating in protests involves risks such as facing state repression and violence by other protesters or by counter protesters. These risks prevent older people who are more risk-averse than younger people from participating in protests. Also, taking part in street demonstrations requires stamina, which further hinders older people's participation in protests. That being said, a movement dominated by the elderly who are older than 60 years is a very exceptional phenomenon.

Third, this movement started as a series of pro-government rallies in 2016 to prevent the impeachment of then President, Park Geun-hye. However, after the impeachment and the formation of a new government through an election, the movement transformed into a series of anti-government protests. This transformation makes this movement unique since it implies that a series of protests under Moon's presidency is not just an uprising by the conservatives to protest certain policies that do not reflect the conservatives' political and economic interests. In fact, a slogan like "the Republic of

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[33] "10·3 광화문집회 누가 나왔나 보니…50 대 엄마, 20 대 아들, 강남 3 구 주민 "조국 사퇴" 외쳤다. " [10·3 kwangwamunjiphoee nuga nawanna poni…50tae ŏmma, 20tae adŭl, kangnam3ku chumin "choguk sat'oe" oech'yŏtta, Who participated in the 10·3 *Gwanghwamun* rally: moms in their 50s, sons in their 20s, and Gangnam residents gathered and shouted "Cho Kuk, Resign!"], *Chosunilbo*, October 13, 2019, https://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/10/13/2019101300010.html.

Korea is completely ruined (*taehanmin'gugi manghaetta*)" shows that this movement is not just a protest against certain policies. The movement views the current government as an illegitimate one and the current system as something that is completely different from the previous one.

These features elicit several questions about the movement participants. What explains the timing of this first organized conservative movement? What motivates the elderly to participate in protests? What triggers these participants to have a biased view on the current government and the current political system? To answer these questions, I conducted in-depth phone interviews with 25 *Taegeukgi Rally* participants. The average age of these interviewees is 70; the oldest is 88 and the youngest is 62. Each interview was divided into two parts with two different sets of questions. In the first part, interviewees were asked to share their life stories. In the second part, interviewees were asked about their motivations of participating in the protest and their evaluations on the current and previous governments. After collecting interviews, I analyzed each interview and traced each interviewee's life journey based on their personal narratives to find an answer on each interviewee's motivation in the protest participation. With the analysis, I found that participants share deep-seated nostalgia for Park Chung Hee era.[34] For them, Park Chung Hee's economic accomplishments are not just a South Korea's industrialized story (Kim and Vogel 2011). They had observed the industrialized process and they had taken part in the process. The impeachment of Park Geun-hye and the following government's anti-corruption (*chŏkp'yech'ŏngsan*) campaign lead them to feel that their whole life accomplishments are neglected and discarded, which motivates them to participate in political protest.

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[34] Park Chung Hee is one of the dictators who had accomplished industrialization and economic development in the 60s and the 70s in South Korea.

This study's contribution is two-fold. First, it sheds light on the authoritarian legitimation literature (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; March 2003). Studies on authoritarian politics often focuses on two strategies to manage masses: repression and co-optation (Greitens 2016; Svolik 2012; Geddes et al. 2018). This study suggests one more option: authoritarian legitimation. Some autocrats legitimize their rule with economic performances and public goods provisions. Autocrats also make efforts to create a communal national identity to ensure the legitimacy of their political rule (Hur 2020). By studying *Taegeukgi Rally* participants, this study unveils not only how authoritarian legitimation works but also how authoritarian legitimation could have persisted among citizens after democratization. Second, this study also reveals post democratization political behavior of citizens who were socialized under the authoritarian rule and provides implications on democratic consolidation in third wave democracies (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011; 2017). Scholars examine authoritarian legacies in democratic institutions and political parties (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Grzymala-Busse 2020; Albertus and Menaldo 2018). This study suggests that authoritarian legacies can remain in individual citizens, determining their post democratization political behavior as well.

Taegeukgi Rally

The *Taegeukgi Rally* started in November in 2016 as a counter movement against the Candlelight Rally (*ch'otpuljiphoe*) that demanded the impeachment of then President, Park Geun-hye for her cronyism scandal. The Candlelight Rally attracted a large number of protesters, remained peaceful, and provided protesters with various interesting protest programs and activities, and thus received global attention.[35] The *Taegeukgi Rally*, on the contrary, did not draw significant attention in 2016; at first, the movement attracted only a small number of people; rally organizers failed to deliver clearer movement goals and agendas other than the prevention of the impeachment; and organizers did not provide interesting rally programs. Nevertheless, the rally has been sustained and has mobilized more and more protesters with weekly and monthly gatherings—protesters stopped gathering due to Coronavirus and social distancing orders from March in 2020—and has evolved into a more structured movement. Organizers have developed various protest programs, have created sub-organizations for effective mobilization, and have come up with clearer protest agendas and goals. On October 3rd in 2019, more than 460,000 people gathered in Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul, which is considered as one of the biggest *Taegeukgi* rallies. Participants hold the South Korean National Flag, *Taegeukgi*, throughout the time of the event and the name of the movement is originated from this feature.

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[35] "Protest Against South Korean President Estimated to Be Largest Yet," *the New York Times*, November 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/world/asia/korea-park-geun-hye-protests.html.

Three aspects of the movement make it interesting and worthy of study. First, it is the first structured political protest by conservative party supporters. South Korean conservative party has its root in its authoritarian past. After democratization, South Korean authoritarian incumbent party, the Democratic Justice Party, survived and participated in subsequent elections as an authoritarian successor party (ASP) (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). Forming coalitions with other parties, changing names, and using other reinvention methods, the party has been very successful electorally (Grzymala-Busse 2020). The party only lost three presidential elections since democratization in 1987: in 1997, in 2002, and in 2017. When the party lost its power from the executive and presidents from other parties took office, the conservative party supporters could have organized political protests against other parties' rule frequently. Contrary to this prediction, however, the party supporters had not arranged organized protests during the times. From time to time, ASP supporters have carried out small scale sit-ins and street protests individually. Nevertheless, these individual activities had not been organized into a larger, organized movement. This is why this time's movement is interesting. The movement is very organized with several organizers, large in scale, and long in duration.

The movement has sustained for more than 3 years and has attracted a large number of masses. It has become more and more structured, forming coalitions between different organizers, constructing sub-organizations, and setting clearer agendas, hence mobilizing more masses.

Second, the demographical composition of protesters makes this movement exceptional. Interestingly, more than 70 percent of participants are the elderly who are older than 60 years. This is really a movement attended, led, organized, and dominated by the old people. Studies on mass mobilization suggest that younger people are more likely to participate in protests than older people (Kim 2017). Younger people tend to be more risk-taking whereas older people tend to be risk-averse. Participating in protests involves a higher level of risks than participating in other types of political activities. Participants can face repression; they can be fined, be arrested, or even get physical harms while protesting. Clashes with security forces and other protesters are always likely in protest sites. In the presence of such risks, older people can be less motivated than younger people. Also, participating in protests is demanding, requiring stamina, which serves as a further barrier for the old people. Participants should come to the designated protest sites; during the winter, they need to bear the cold; during the summer, they need to withstand the heat. Also, protesters need to actively engage in protest programs under the direction of protest organizers; they need to chant, sing, and hold signs and placards as organizers request; if organizers call for a march, participants should be able to march long distances. All these activities require physical strength. This can hinder older people's participation in protests. Given that, this movement that is dominated by the elderly is very exceptional.

Third, the movement has made a transformation in its form; this movement started as a series of pro-government rallies in November of 2016; after the impeachment and the formation of a new government through an election, the movement transformed into a series of anti-government protests. Still, these two sub-movements are in line. They share common slogans, rhetoric, participants, and methods. The pro-government rally participants chanted "oppose the impeachment (*t'anhaek pandae*)". After the impeachment, the slogan was changed to "nullify the impeachment (*t'anhaek muhyo*)". Participants claim that they gather on the street for patriotic reasons; they do this to protect the Republic of Korea from "the threats of North Korea and pro-North Korea leftists (*chongbukchwap'a*)". The two sub-movements have attracted the same groups of people: the elderly, veterans, evangelical church attendees, and other traditional conservative groups. Finally, participants hold the South Korean National Flags in every rally. Some of them wear T-shirts and caps that have the Flag on it. The use of the National Flag in rally sites started from the pro-government rallies in 2016 and the tradition has lasted to the anti-government protests. This is why the two sub-movements are discussed in a same category of the *Taegeukgi Rally.* The transformation makes this movement unique because it shows that this movement is not just a protest campaign by the conservative party supporters to oppose certain policies of the new president. In fact, participants view the current government as an illegitimate one and the current system as something that is completely different from the previous one. A slogan like "the Republic of Korea is completely ruined (*taehanmin'gugi manghaetta*)" well shows this view.

The *Taegeukgi Rally* is a good case to study why individuals do not withdraw their support for authoritarian regimes and hold pro-authoritarian rallies (Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020). First, in the *Taegeukgi Rally*, the mobilization process is mainly from the bottom up. The movement was initiated from ordinary citizens, not from an authoritarian government or a political party. Parties have joined the movement later and communicated with the rally participants. Yet, the main mobilizing process still has been directed by ordinary citizens and civilian organizations. This is interesting given the fact that studies on pro-government rallies pay significant attention to authoritarian governments as a main mobilizer. Pro-government rallies are often studied as a strategy of an authoritarian government for the purpose of the regime survival (Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020). It is not reasonable to raise a question about the intention of participants in government/party-initiated mobilizations. Nevertheless, a citizen-initiated mobilization will be a more legitimate case to study why participants support an authoritarian government.

Second, the *Taegeukgi Rally* is a pro-authoritarian rally yet it is organized after democratization. More importantly, the rally proceeds in a country that has a longer democracy history and is praised for its "good democracy" among third wave democracies.[36] This rally is different from other pro-government rallies that are organized to support a current authoritarian government—e.g., pro-Putin rallies in March 2012 in Russia—or a current government that moves toward authoritarianism—e.g., the rally for President Erdoğan in 2016 in Turkey (Hellmeier and Weidmann 2020). Rather, the rally participants openly express their support for a past authoritarian government in democratic South Korea, which makes the case exceptional. Hence, by examining this case and studying the rally participants, one can understand how authoritarian legacies persist among citizens after democratization. In summary, this case enables researchers to better understand how authoritarian past has impact on the political attitude of citizens who live in a democracy.

Explanations on Mass mobilization

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[36] Christian Caryl, "South Korea Shows the World How Democracy Is Done." *The Washington Post*, March 10, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/03/10/south-korea-shows-the-world-how-democracy-is-done/; John Delury, "How Democracy Won the World's First Coronavirus Election: South Korea has been a model of testing and tracing during the epidemic. Now it is for voting, too," *The New York Times*, April 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/opinion/south-korea-election-coronavirus.html.

The distinctive characteristics of the *Taegeukgi Rally* elicit several questions concerning participants of the rally. What explains the timing of this first organized conservative movement? What motivates the elderly to participate in protests? What triggers these participants to have a biased view on the current government and the current political system? To answer these questions, I will employ three main theories on when/why individuals participate in protest in the literature of contentious politics in this section. By doing so, I will show how these theories provide only partial explanations regarding the movement; they do not show a complete picture about the *Taegeukgi Rally*.

First, grievances school focuses on individuals' discontent and dissatisfaction that result from economic conditions, relative deprivation, or social exclusion and sees protest as an expression of the discontent (Gurr 1970; Arce and Bellinger, Jr. 2007; Tucker 2007; Brancati 2016; Moseley 2018). Based on this view, individuals are highly likely to participate in protests when they are dissatisfied with certain government policies.

In fact, the *Taegeukgi Rally* participants express their discontent on Moon's economic, social, and foreign policies. Particularly, the biggest concern of these participants is Moon's dovish North Korea policy. They strongly opposed the inter-Korean Summit in 2018, demanding the suspension of the meeting plan. Rally participants also dislike Moon's economic policies such as the raise of the minimum wage that are considered as more redistributive. Participants have expressed their discontent on these issue areas in each rally.

However, the set of policies Moon's administration proposes and implements does not appear overnight. These policies were developed and implemented in previous administrations when the Democratic Party—the party where Moon belongs to—came into power. Nonetheless, the conservatives had not carried out this much street rallies to protest those policies in the times. There were some fragmented and spontaneous protests and rallies held by the conservatives. Yet, those events were poorly-attended, attracted only a small number of people, and did not last longer. Thus, grievances/discontent do not adequately explain the timing of the movement. The question on what makes this time's movement so well-attended still remains unanswered.

Second, political opportunity school argues that potential protesters participate in protests when they find new opportunities such as increasing pluralism, declining repression and/or extension of franchise (Tilly 1978; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 2011). Dissidents can also consider national/global events that attract large media attention as new opportunities since they can deliver their messages to national/global audiences through the media.

Did participants in the *Taegeukgi Rally* find new opportunities? It is hard to say that there were identifiable new political opportunities for the rally participants. There were no significant national/global events held in 2016 when the rally first started. At first, the rally was a counter-protest against the Candlelight movement. That time, the Candlelight movement was on the rise and drew significant national/global attention. Whereas, the *Taegeukgi Rally* did not receive much attention from the media. Moreover, when the movement started as pro-government rallies, the incumbent party was *Saenuri Party* that is known as less tolerant to street demonstrations and rallies, meaning it is hard to argue that the rally participants were motivated due to the decline in repression (Kim et al. 2013; Shin and Chang 2011; Chang 2015). After the impeachment, the new incumbent, the Democratic Party, is arguably more tolerant to protests, which may explain the growth of the *Taegeukgi Rally* (Kim et al. 2013; Shin and Chang 2011; Chang 2015). Nevertheless, the political opportunity school does not provide a good explanation for the start of the movement in 2016 when there were no significant new opportunities identified.

Third, resource mobilization school stresses mobilizing structures and pays attention to organizations (Boulding 2014; LeBas 2011; Fu 2017; Putnam 1994; 2000). Organizations such as political parties, labor unions, professional associations, religious organizations, and NGOs help protest mobilizations by connecting organizers with participants through their organizational structures. These organizations bring resources to potential protesters, provide information, educate potential collective actors, and promote social capital in societies. All these activities lower the cost of participating in political activities and increase the motivations for political protest among citizens.

Were *Taegeukgi Rally* participants endowed with organizations? Many participants are affiliated to various organizations such as veterans' organizations, evangelical church organizations, and high school alumni associations and they participate in the rally as members of these organizations. Some organizations directly host rallies and street demonstrations and mobilize their members. Others help mobilize supporters to participate in existing rallies. Organizations were involved from the beginning of the movement. However, at first, some of these groups were spontaneously organized to prevent the impeachment of Park, and thus loosely structured. These spontaneous groups only provided narrow rally agendas. As the movement progresses, old, strong, and better organized groups start to participate, organizing rallies and mobilizing their members. Rally organizers begin to provide clear, formulated rally goals and agendas. Each meeting has become more structured and planned with various protest programs. Although the resource mobilization school helps understand the movement's expansion, it does not provide a good answer to the core question on the timing of the movement. Conservative party supporters have been endowed with strong organizations that are capable of mobilizing protesters as it is proved through the *Taegeukgi Rally*. Then, why had these groups not mobilized a large number of protesters and organized sustained movements before when their party lost office? Why were conservative movements before the *Taegeukgi Rally* fragmented and less powerful? These questions still remain unanswered under the resource mobilization frame.

In summary, existing theories on when/why people protest do not provide a full understanding about the emergence of the *Taegeukgi Rally*. In particular, they cannot explain the timing of the movement; the question on what makes the movement so big and organized this time is not adequately answered with these theories.

Also, none of three theories can explain why the movement is dominated by the elderly. It is possible that the elderly are more sensitive to certain policy areas, and thus if they observe certain policies that are not in line with their interests and beliefs, they act more radically. If this proposition is right, the main protest issues must hang around certain policies. In the *Taegeukgi Rally*, however, although protesters denounce certain policies, the main protest agenda is not the criticism of policies; the main agenda is much bigger and much vaguer than that. Their main goal for the rally is to defend liberal democracy (*chayuminjujuŭi*) and to protect the nation from the communism's threat.[37] Protesters mainly argue that the current government is illegitimate and the current president, Moon Jae-in, does not have an intention to protect liberal democracy. Thus, Moon must resign from office at best, or must be impeached at worst. Figure 3-1 is a main flyer to mobilize protesters in the *Taegeukgi Rally*. It contains the rally's goals and agendas with the main catch-phrase, "the Republic of Korea is completely ruined

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[37] These participants insist to use the term, liberal democracy, to refer to the ideal form of democracy. Participants' understanding on the notion of liberal democracy is different from what usually refers to liberal democracy. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project defines liberal democracy as democracy that protects minority rights and prevents the tyranny of the government and the majority (Coppedge et al. 2019). For them, however, the term is mostly used as the opposite notion to socialism and communism.

(*taehanmin'gugi manghaetta*)". This well displays that the rally is not just a protest around certain policies.

Figure 3-1 Taegeukgi Rally flyer



자발적헌금 : 농협 351-0280- 6275-23 예금주 : 사랑제일교회

3.1절(2월 29일)국민대회

"미친 자에게 운전대를 맡길 수 없다"본회퍼(Dietrich Bonhoeffer)

2월 29일 토요일 낮 12시, 광화문 이승만 광장

(교보문고 3,4번출구, 동화면세점 6번출구)

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다섯째, 4대강 보 해체
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The literature on bottom up democratization argues that when citizens witness a series of policy failures of an authoritarian government, they raise a question on the legitimacy of the government and demand a new form of government—a democratic government (Brancati 2016; Beaulieu 2014; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce

2011). However, under a democratic system, it is very rare that citizens doubt on the legitimacy of a democratically elected president due to the policies they dislike and organize political protest. It is even rarer that the protest mobilizes a large number of participants. In a nut shell, the active participation of the elderly in the movement cannot be explained by the fact that Moon's policies do not well reflect the elderly's interests and beliefs.

Overall, these features on the movement's timing, demographic composition, and protest agendas make the movement an exceptional case in terms that contemporary theories on social movements do not well explain the movement. Aggregate level analysis that scrutinizes political and economic conditions, political opportunities, and mobilizing structures cannot provide a good answer for why/how this movement has arisen. This movement, therefore, can be better understood with an in-depth individual level analysis that examines the motivations of participants.

Collective Identity of the Elderly

Studies on mass mobilization do not provide a wholistic explanation on the rise of the *Taegeukgi Rally* and the active participation by the elderly. To understand the movement and the motivation of the elderly, it is important to look at the collective identity of the age cohort. I argue that the collective identity shaped in a certain period of their lives determines their political behavior and this is why a particular age cohort—the elderly—dominates the rally. On October 3rd in 2019 when one of the largest rallies was conducted, a news agency estimated the number of participants and the demographic composition of participants by using the mobile phone usages in *Gwanghwamun* Square.[38] Among 466,000 participants, the number of participants who are older than 70 years is 191,000 (41.1%) and the number of participants who are in between 60 years old and 70 years old is 147,000 (31.7%).

This age cohort shares the following life journey: (1) they born before 1960; (2) they either had attended schools or had worked for a living during Park Chung Hee era in the 60s and the 70s; and (3) most of them were out of school, worked for a living, and got married and formed families during Chun Doo Hwan era in the 80s.[39]

This shared journey determines their collective characteristics. First, these citizens had experienced poverty and had witnessed the economic development in South Korea in the 60s and the 70s. South Korean economic development and industrialization were led by former dictator, Park Chung Hee (Kim and Vogel 2011; Kwon 2020). With state-led economic development plans, he made a successful economic development in South Korea. Agriculture-centered economy was transformed into light/heavy industry-centered economy. With the New Community Movement (*Saemaŭl undong*), he modernized rural communities. Traditional thatched houses in rural areas were demolished and replaced with modernized houses. Living in the times, these citizens went through the hard times of poverty and observed and experienced the changes made through the economic development. For them, South Korean economic development is not just a story one can read from a textbook.

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[38] "10·3 광화문집회 누가 나왔나 보니…50 대 엄마, 20 대 아들, 강남 3 구 주민 "조국 사퇴" 외쳤다. " [10·3 kwangwamunjiphoee nuga nawanna poni…50tae ŏmma, 20tae adŭl, kangnam3ku chumin "choguk sat'oe" oech'yŏtta, Who participated in the 10·3 *Gwanghwamun* rally: moms in their 50s, sons in their 20s, and Gangnam residents gathered and shouted "Cho Kuk, Resign!"], *Chosunilbo*, October 13, 2019, https://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/10/13/2019101300010.html.

[39] Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan are dictators in South Korea. Both of them came to power through coups.

Second, these citizens not just witnessed the economic development and modernization of South Korea in the 60s and the 70s, but also took part in both processes as a worker, a business person, a farmer, etc. They worked hard in their occupations and they actively participated in state campaigns such as the New Community Movement. By doing so, they contributed to the economy and to the state. Therefore, for them, South Korea's economic development and modernization is also their personal stories where they were the main players.

Third, this is the time when they were socialized through elementary and secondary school education (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). Schools were served as a place to introduce, educate, and indoctrinate regime ideas in many authoritarian regimes (Perry 2015; Sanborn and Thyne 2014). These citizens attended their primary and secondary schools during the Park Chung Hee era. In schools, they listened to regime propaganda and learned ideas that were intended to legitimatize the authoritarian rule in South Korea. During the Chun's era, most of them were out of school. Therefore, the socialization through the school education mostly happened during the Park Chung Hee era.

Overall, the Park Chung Hee period is the most critical moment for these citizens. They attended schools and were taught regime messages. They made contributions to the state as young and active economic agents. They witnessed the economic progresses made through their contributions. Thus, these citizens absorbed regime's messages for authoritarian legitimation and these messages became deep-seated beliefs in them.

Political socialization literature argues that "political regimes seek to inculcate attitudes supportive of the regime into their citizens" (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017, 3; Dennis 1968; Greenstein 1971; Greenberg 1973). Two factors interacted to make the political socialization of these citizens the most effective during the Park Chung Hee era. First, Park Chung Hee's regime was very active in its attempt to socialize its citizens (Kim and Vogel 2011; Kwon 2020). Political socialization can be accomplished not only in the schools but also in the workplace and in community meetings that were organized by the regime. He employed all these means to create a "model citizen" who complies with the regime rules and works hard for the country. He employed the slogan, "let's make our life better economically (*chal sarabose*)," and called for ordinary citizens' efforts and compliance for the country's economic development. Through the New Community Movement and the network created for the movement—this network reached to all small rural villages—, citizens had to listen to this regime slogan every day. Second, the Park Chung Hee period was the time when these citizens actively engaged in learning. They attended primary or secondary schools during this time. They were at an age where they were open-minded to receive regime messages well. Therefore, they became the active learners of the regime messages.

With the political socialization during the period, these citizens share the collective identity. They are the citizens who respect Park Chung Hee the most; who have a communal national identity—with which they believe that individual citizens should make contributions to the state; and who have anti-communist ideology shaped from the Park Chung Hee regime's messages.

This collective identity of the elderly well explains the rise of the *Taegeukgi Rally*: the timing, the demographic composition, and the main protest agenda. First, citizens who were socialized during the Park Chung Hee era project their life journeys onto Park Chung Hee and his daughter, Park Geun-hye. When Park Geun-hye was impeached, therefore, these citizens felt that their whole life accomplishments were disregarded. Park Geun-hye is Park Chung Hee's daughter. With that fact alone, many supporters and opponents have seen her presidency as a succession of her father's legacy. Moreover, Park Geun-hye stepped in as the de facto First Lady after Park Chung Hee's wife, Yuk Yong-soo, was assassinated in 1974. For the cohort, Park Geun-hye is associated with duty and grace after the tragedy. In that regard, for the supporters, the impeachment of Park was the impeachment of her father's legacy, and ultimately the impeachment of the elderly's life accomplishments. Moreover, the Moon Jae-in administration formed after the impeachment implementes an anti-corruption campaign called "Cleaning Accumulated Evils (*chŏkp'yech'ŏngsan*)" and imprison former presidents, Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak. This campaign makes supporters feel that their lives and accomplishments are treated as past evils (*chŏkp'ye*). Hence, these citizens organize rallies and participate in protests to express their frustration and anger.

Furthermore, these citizens are very engaged who have a communal national identity (Hur 2020). They believe that when the state is under threat, they must sacrifice their individual interests to save the country. This identity had formed through socialization in the Park Chung Hee era. They had actively engaged in state-led events and campaigns without any hesitation because they believe that "without the state, without individuals".[40] Also, due to the strong anti-communism/anti-North Korea education during the Park Chung Hee era, these citizens strongly think that peaceful relations with North Korea are impossible and the government should be hawkish toward North Korea. Therefore, they consider President Moon's dovish North Korea policies as pro-North Korea/pro-communism policies. Overall, these citizens believe that South Korea is under threat from North Korea, communism, and pro-North Korea communists (*chongbukchwap'a*) and as engaged citizens, they gather to "fight for the nation".

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[40] This phrase also appears in flyers of the *Taegeukgi Rally*, showing that this belief is deeply embedded in these citizens (see Figure 1).

There are two possible alternative explanations. First, the *Taegeukgi Rally* participants are just supporters and fans of Park Geun-hye and they protest only for the restoration of her presidency. I acknowledge that some of the participants are from a support group of Park Geun-hye (*paksamo*). However, I do not think that all participants are mere supporters of Park Geun-hye. Participants have argued that the impeachment is illegitimate and demanded that her presidency must be restored. However, this is not just because they have a personal attachment to Park Geun-hye. Rather, it is their longstanding emotional attachment to Park Chung Hee and their deeply embedded identity shaped under the Park Chung Hee's rule that lead them to demand the restoration of Park Geun-hye's presidency. Second, these citizens' anti-communist/anti-North Korea ideology was not shaped during the Park Chung Hee's era through his propaganda. It was shaped through their personal experience of the Korean War. While experiencing the war, they witnessed many horrible incidents committed by North Korean soldiers, which shaped their very negative view on the North Korean regime and communism. This is a very reasonable proposition. I will test these two alternative propositions with the interview data in next sections.

Data

I conducted in-depth interviews with 25 *Taegeukgi Rally* participants: 10 females and 15 males. The average age of these interviewees is 70; the oldest is 88 and the youngest is

62.[41] I employed snowball sampling method to recruit interviewees. After finishing each interview, I sent a mobile Starbucks gift card that is worth about $10. Interviews were proceeded via phone in my personal office without any person attended, which protects interviewees' privacy. I received verbal/oral consents from interviewees for interviews and recordings.[42] Each interview took about 1-2 hours.

Each interview was divided into two parts with two different sets of questions. In the first part, interviewees were asked to share their life stories. In the second part, interviewees were asked about their motivations of participating in the protest and their evaluations on the current and previous governments. I analyzed these two subsets of data in following ways. First, I coded interviewees' personal narratives and analyzed them to find patterns and themes in their life journeys that are shared across interviewees. This step allows me to find a critical period where a significant socialization occurred. In that moment, interviewees' collective identity was shaped. Second, I coded and analyzed the second subset of the data to see how the shared identity functions and leads them to participate in the rally.

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[41] I selected my respondents on the dependent variable (protest participation). It is important to note that this project is for theory generation. I will conduct matched interviews with non-participants who are in the same age cohort in the future.

[42] This research is approved from the University of Missouri IRB and the project IRB number is 259105.

Findings

I find that the rally participants had formed their collective identity in the Park Chung Hee era. When they are asked to share their life stories, they mention about the era the most since that was the time when they were economically, politically, and socially active the most. First, they describe how poor it was in South Korea before Park.

> *It was a hard time because we were always hungry. Have you heard of porigogae (the season of spring poverty)? Do you know it? I mean it was the time that everyone was starved. [Then], Park Chung Hee started the 5.16 revolution*[43] *and some people say that he was a dictator, but he was the president who made ordinary lives of citizens better. We were no longer hungry (male, 77).*

Then, they explain how Park made economic development and how it changed their everyday lives.

> *When Park Chung Hee became the president, he did not satisfy his personal interests and desires. Instead, he used all the resources to industrialize the country like building highways. This is something to be thankful of. Our peers*

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[43] A coup plotted and implemented by Park Chung Hee on May 16, 1961.

> *consider Park Chung Hee as a hero. That is why we supported his daughter, Park Geun-hye and voted for her (male, 74).*

Also, they show how they worked hard in their occupations and made contributions to the economic development under the Park Chung Hee's leadership.

> *Park Chung Hee is the savior of the country. Even more so than Sejong daewang*[44]*. He built highways, shipbuilding factories (promoted heavy industry) and he dispatched troops to the Vietnam War. Many of my friends were dispatched to Vietnam. Some people were sent to Germany as mine workers and nurses. This country was built because of their blood and sweat. [Due to the soldiers who were in the Vietnam War], South Korea was industrialized and the military was modernized. It was a great turning point (male, 74).*

How do they see communism and democracy? Clearly, they view these concepts in accordance with Park Chung Hee and his economic success story. This connection appears in their descriptions on North Korea, South Korea, communism/socialism, and liberal democracy. Their understandings on these concepts are in conjunction with the economic development. I schematize these views as follows: North Korea = communism

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[44] A great king who created Hangeul, Korean alphabet in 1443.

= poor economy, South Korea = liberal democracy = developed economy. Because the economic development was made under the Park Chung Hee's great leadership, those of who criticize Park are pro-North Korea communists. The following excerpt epitomizes this view.

> *My peers did a lot for our country... We made the country economically prosper... We received anti-communism education heavily... I have traveled around the world a lot and I haven't seen any other country that is richer than ours. We have built this great country. But [they] keep attempting to make changes [to this perfect country] and communize the country, I can't bear this anymore (male, 74).*

They are aware that Park Chung Hee's regime was repressive. However, they justify Park's use of non-democratic means. They argue that it was somehow necessary to unite the people and create the economic miracle.

When I ask them about the Korean War, most of them reply that they do not have particular memories about the time because they were too young when the war broke out. They did not have horrible experiences from the war.

> *I was just three years old when the Korean War broke out so I do not have a significant memory on that (male, 72).*

In a nutshell, from my sample, I find that the participants' anti-communist ideology comes from their socialization from the Park Chung Hee's regime propaganda, not from their personal experiences of the Korean War and horrible memories of North Korean soldiers during the war.

When it comes to the rally participation, I ask them if they have previous experiences of protest participation. Most of them respond that they do not have such experiences. Then, I ask them to share their motivations of participating in the rally. Findings are as follows. First, they have a shared perception that South Korea is under the threat of North Korea, communism, and pro-North Korea communists. As engaged citizens, they believe that they must commit themselves to the country and save the country from the threat.

> *It is our duty to sacrifice our personal interests for the common good of the country when [the country] is under threat, isn't it? [Participating in the Taegeukgi Rally] is not for any personal gains... Of course, [the impeachment] can be one of the reasons [to participate in the protest], but that is not the complete reason. The biggest reason is that I am very concerned about the collapse of the liberal democratic system. So I attend the rally every week [for three years] to protect the liberal democratic system (male, 72).*

Second, they have this threat perception through the impeachment of Park Geun-hye. Through the impeachment, they believe that their essential time—the time when they made significant contributions to the nation's economic development as young and primary social, political, and economic players—is totally disregarded. This triggers their frustration and anger. Also, because of the schema they have from the socialization, they regard those of who oppose Park Chung Hee's accomplishments as pro-North Korea communists. Consequently, they perceive that the nation is under communism's threat.

> *It has only been about 70 years [since the establishment of the Republic of Korea]. In that short period,... [we] made this [economic] miracle. But seeing this country communizing and becoming more like North Korea, I am filled with rage. Thinking about South Korea's future and out descendants' future, I am very stressed and can't fall asleep at night. My peers who are in their 70s and 80s remember what it is like to be starved and how we overcame the hard period (male, 72).*

Third, interviews confirm that these participants are not just supporters of Park Geun-hye. When they evaluate Park Geun-hye's presidency, they are pretty critical. Although they argue that the impeachment and the imprisonment of Park are very wrong, their assessments on Park's administration are varying.

In summary, from the interviews, I find that the collective identity shaped during the Park Chung Hee era motivates the elderly to participate in the *Taegeukgi Rally*.

Conclusion

This study examines the rise of the *Taegeukgi Rally* in South Korea. Because of the movement's unique features, existing explanations of mass mobilization do not provide good accounts about the movement's timing, demographic composition, and protest agendas. This study suggests that the collective identity shared by a certain age cohort motivates them to engage in this political activity. In particular, the elderly who were socialized during the Park Chung Hee era have a deep emotional connection to the regime. They share a collective identity through the socialization. They believe that the economic development accomplished during Park's era is their achievements as well; they worked hard to make the economic success with Park Chung Hee. When Park Geun-hye was impeached and her party—the longstanding authoritarian successor party in South Korea—was divided after the impeachment, these citizens feel that their whole life accomplishments are disregarded. Hence, they participate in the rally to express their anger and frustration. Through a series of in-depth interviews with the rally participants and the analysis of their life stories, I find that for the elderly, the Park Chung Hee era was the critical time when their socialization took place.

This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study suggest that authoritarian legitimation can be persistent after democratization. Studies on authoritarian politics often focus on two strategies of autocrats: repression and co-optation (Greitens 2016; Svolik 2012; Geddes et al. 2018). This study suggests a third strategy: authoritarian legitimation. Some autocrats like Park Chung Hee were very successful in legitimizing their authoritarian rule by accomplishing economic successes, socializing and educating citizens, and providing public goods. This study finds that this legitimization can be so effective that even after democratization, citizens still support their former dictators and organize rallies to show their loyalty. Recent study by Hellmeier and Weidmann (2020) examine pro-government mobilizations in authoritarian regimes and reveal how autocrats use pro-government rallies strategically for securing their rule. This study further uncovers individual-level motivations of organizing pro-government rallies and unveils why these citizens support authoritarian governments.

Second, this study provides implications on how to communicate with citizens who were socialized in an authoritarian period. Because this socialization will impact their post-democratization political behavior, incorporating these citizens into a democratic system and making them democratic citizens are important for democratic consolidation of a country. This study suggests that blaming and criticizing citizens who support a past authoritarian government are fruitless. They have reasonable grounds for the support. Therefore, policy makers must think about ways to re-socialize these citizens.

Conclusion

This study examines authoritarian legacies in Asian third wave democracies through political parties and political protest. In Chapter 1, with a cross-national quantitative analysis, I found that political protest is more likely when ASPs are in control of the executive and/or the legislature. That is, when an ASP returns to power, it is more likely to utilize the authoritarian tactics that had been used by its predecessors. This will prompt civil society organizations to mobilize protests in the hope of making a clean break with the authoritarian past and creating effective democratic institutions.

In Chapter 2, I examined ASP's protest mobilizing capabilities through four Asian countries— Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia—that have politically powerful ASPs. Due to the fewer protest organizing experiences during their authoritarian past, these parties are poorly endowed with protest organizing expertise, thus less likely to organize protests after democratization as compared to other political parties.

In Chapter 3, I conducted a case study on South Korea's *Taegeukgi Rally*. This rally is organized by South Korean ASP supporters. With in-depth interviews with 25 rally participants, I found that they share an identity that was shaped through the authoritarian period. These citizens, therefore, tend to equate a dictator's achievement—in South Korea, this is the economic success made by Park Chung Hee— with their life achievements. Consequently, when their dictators are blamed after democratization, they feel that their lives are blamed as well.

This study's contribution is two-fold. First, this study reveals authoritarian legacies in ASPs and shows how these legacies can impede democratic consolidation. Although ASPs use many reinvent strategies such as changing names, developing sets of policy programs, and forming coalitions with other parties after democratization, civil societies can still find undemocratic practices in ASPs when they return to power. These legacies can hinder democratic consolidation of a country.

Second, this study discovers authoritarian legacies in citizens. Some supporters of ASPs can have a deeper emotional affiliation with a past authoritarian government through the authoritarian socialization. After democratic transitions, these people still support ASPs because of this deep emotional attachment. The problem of the authoritarian socialization is that this can lead some citizens to have biased ideas about democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic ways of political participation, preventing democratic consolidation of a country.

In a nutshell, one observes some undemocratic phenomena among Asian third wave democracies these days. Why do Asian democracies still show some inconsistencies in their practices of democracy? This study suggests that authoritarian legacies remaining in political parties and citizens can be an answer to that question.

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