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The use of quality management to address the problem of wastage from the Australian Army's recruit training process

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**The use of Quality Management
to address the problem of
wastage from the
Australian Army's Recruit Training Process**
(PROJECT DUNLOP)

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (HONOURS)

from the
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

MAJOR L.R. ADAMS

BA, Grad Dip TQM

The Business School (Faculty of Commerce)
January 1998

Disclaimer

This work contains the observations and opinions of the author. It in no way reflects any official opinions or policy of the Australian Army.

Preface

In late 1994 there was great enthusiasm within Army that the introduction of Total Quality Management would, at last, lead to dramatic improvements in many of its cumbersome practices. It was also at this time that the very real problem of excessive wastage from the Army's recruit training process was given to my work area. To say the very least, this significant issue presented me with a rare and exciting opportunity to study the application of Quality Management theory within Army.

It was immediately recognised that a high proportion of recruit wastage was due to injuries received in training. Accordingly, the project was given the name of a figure whose concern for the individual soldier was legend, the renowned Australian Army Medical Officer, Sir Edward 'Weary' Dunlop. As a result of attention generated, Project DUNLOP, and the trainee wastage issue in general, received front page national media coverage and attracted attention at ministerial level.

Having being DUNLOP's initial project officer, I was most fortunate to have had continuous involvement with it until its official end on 1st December 1996. It is, however, only in early 1998, that the true outcome of the Project can really be assessed.

At the time of writing Quality Management has been quietly forgotten within Army. Nevertheless, both the Army, and the Defence Force as a whole, are in the midst of a massive number of sweeping changes. Quality Management or not, this thesis will provide valuable insights to all those who would seek to successfully implement change within Defence.

Lastly, this thesis reflects the facts as I observed them. If I have made any errors of interpretation, these errors are mine alone and I apologise for them in advance.

Lindsay Adams
Sydney
January 1998

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Lieutenant Colonel Rod Jewel, who was especially keen that more be done to prevent recruit wastage, provided me with invaluable access to Army Personnel Division's excellent archival data.

At the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, the two physiotherapists, Captain Mike Cunningham and Mr Rod Pope, deserve immense praise for their highly influential research data on recruit injuries. For my part, I thank them for their advice and the free access I was given to their work.

The Ernst & Young Soldier Induction Process Culture Study Team were terrific to work with and I thank them for their stimulating ideas and for access to the data collected at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. In particular, I would like to thank Julie Allen for her encouragement and suggestions.

To Major Maurice Legeret, Ruth McCarthy, Daniel O'Conner and Donna McCarthy, I owe a truly great debt for their patient and immensely valuable proof-reading. In particular, I thank Maurice for his friendship, his boundless enthusiasm for the wastage project, and, above all, for his invaluable assistance in obtaining the key documents from his days as 'Staff Officer DUNLOP'.

I also pay tribute to all those who have played key roles in the effort to combat the recruit wastage problem. Individuals who deserve special mention are Major General Frank Hickling, who had the wisdom to initiate the project in late 1994; Colonel Peter Lawrence, who, as Chairman of the DUNLOP Steering Group fought to keep up the Project's momentum; Colonel David Buchanan, who, as the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, completely embraced the spirit of the Project and, in many cases, lead it by simply making decisions without waiting for policy guidance; and Colonel Mark Samson, who, following David Buchanan, immediately continued to make the hard changes needed, including the pushing through of the critical pre-enlistment fitness test. Not least of all, then Major, now Lieutenant Colonel, Stephen Rudzki deserves special recognition for his efforts to reduce injuries not only in recruit training but throughout the entire Australian Defence Force. Whether they are aware of it or not, many hundreds of recruits already owe their success in training to these officers and many more will follow.

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1. Key Internal Correspondence.
2. 'Training injuries force rethink on women's place in the military', *The Australian*, June 23rd, 1995, pages 3 & 15.
3. 'High Wire Recruits', *Army*, May 16th, 1996, pages 10 & 11.
4. 'New platoon trains failed recruits to be civilians', *The (Wagga Wagga) Daily Advertiser*, February 8th, 1996, page 16.
5. Copies of letters from four 'graduates' of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's 'Weary DUNLOP' Platoon.
6. 'You're in the Army Now', *The Canberra Times*, September 8th, 1996, pages 17 & 19.
7. 'No personnel at RISC in new Kapooka', *Army*, June 26th, 1997, page 5.

Introduction

1.1 Problem Status and Relevance

In September 1994, it came to the attention of the staff of the Army's Headquarters Training Command that the wastage rate from the induction training conducted at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka was in the vicinity of 20%. At a time of considerable resource constraints, this seemingly unsatisfactory situation caused the then General Officer Commanding Training Command, Major General F.J. Hickling, to direct that the recruit training process be examined with the aim of reducing wastage to a more acceptable level ^{Note 1}.

Using archival material sourced from Army's Personnel Division, it soon became apparent to the author that the high wastage rates involved with the recruit training process had been a cause of concern to various parts of the Army since at least the mid 1970's ^{Note 2}, with wastage rates at that stage being around 13% ^{Note 3}. Indeed, in early 1989, following recruit wastage rates of 26% and 20% in 1987 and 1988 respectively, the issue was of such concern that the then Chief of the Defence Force directed that the Army's induction training be examined to see if it could be modified to produce the same product, but with fewer casualties ^{Note 4}.

This preliminary review of the wastage issue also revealed that many officers believed that the causes of recruit wastage lay not only with the basic training conducted at Kapooka but also very much with the Army's medical, psychological and recruiting selection processes. Most markedly, it was discovered that there was a keen desire in many quarters of the Army to address the problem: Army's policy makers were concerned with the cost of recruiting individuals only to see approximately one fifth of them fail in basic training; key sports medicine specialists believed that the high recruit injury rates (an obvious cause of many discharges) could be reduced; many of Training Command's specialist training establishments were concerned that they were regularly receiving students who still carried injuries from their recruit training; and those Army chaplains who had exposure to the recruit training process were extremely concerned with the individual and social trauma that often accompanied a recruit's failure to complete training ^{Note 5}.

With regard to the cost of recruit failures, it was calculated by the author that each discharged recruit was costing the Army an average of \$24,000 when expenses such as rations, ammunition, clothing, instructor time, medical compensation payouts and recruit salaries were taken into account ^{Note 6}. Using this figure, it was conservatively estimated that a Training Year 1994/95 recruit wastage rate of 17% (ie. 400 recruits discharged from a recruit training intake of 2,354) would translate into a \$9.6 million loss of productivity to the Army in that financial year alone. It should be noted that this figure did not even take into account the cost of recruiting those discharged, which was

initially estimated to be about \$2-3,000 per recruit enlisted but later revealed to be closer to \$9,000 per recruit enlisted ^{Note 7}. Nor did it take into account the presumably quite considerable costs of the psychological and medical services provided to the Army's recruiting organisation ^{Note 8}.

In addition to the above concerns, it must also be noted that the author considered that the experience of addressing the wastage problem would be relevant to future career opportunities, both within and outside the Australian Defence Force.

1.2 The Setting

Fortuitously, the recruit wastage problem was raised at a time when the Army was actively embracing 'Quality' as a solution to many of its financial and organisational challenges. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Grey, had addressed over 1400 delegates at the Total Quality Management Institute's (now the Australian Quality Council) First International Conference held in Sydney on 29th March 1993; in Army Headquarters, a Directorate of Management Development - Army, had been created and provided with significant funds ^{Note 9}; hundreds of Army 'Quality Practitioners' had been trained on five day courses run by consultants; quarterly 'Army Quality Working Group Meetings' were conducted by the Directorate of Management Development and attended by all of the Army's key functional areas; and certain officers in appropriate management positions were able to obtain funding to pursue postgraduate Quality Management studies ^{Note 10}. The stated intent of all this activity was to *"...develop a culture of continuous improvement as the basis for Army's management doctrine and practice by the sustained application of Quality Management principles"* ^{Note 11}.

Amongst all this enthusiasm, it had soon become evident to this author ^{Note 12} that it was unlikely that the above overall intent would be achieved. Rather than hoping to create the desired outcome by sponsoring generic unfocused quality training, Headquarters Training Command put forward the argument that the Directorate of Management Development's role, as a change agent within Army, should be the co-ordination of a series of focused, cross functional, high payoff improvement projects ^{Note 13}. The aim of these projects, using quality management tools at the lower end of the change scale and Value Management and Re-engineering at the higher end, would be to generate what General Donn Starry in his article *To Change an Army* refers to as a *"convincing demonstration of value"* (1994:25). This was something that had certainly not been achieved to date ^{Note 14}.

Given the overall failure to conduct the above high value, cross-functional projects, the Command Planning Branch of Headquarters Training Command saw the wastage problem as an opportunity to try to prove what quality management theory could achieve when applied to a meaningful project. Accordingly, with such significant concerns and sums of money involved, in early November 1994, the Branch formally adopted the recruit wastage issue as a Command improvement project.

1.3 The Stakeholders

A key part of the initial review undertaken by the author was the identification of all of the key stakeholders in the recruit training process. These emerged as shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Army Induction Process Stakeholders

- ***The Directorate of Personnel Planning-Army***, located in the Army's primary headquarters in Canberra, which determines the number of recruits required based on factors such as the numbers leaving the Service. Included in this function is the Soldier Career Management Agency which, according to the Army's needs, allocates recruits to various Army trades prior to the completion of their basic training.
- ***Headquarters Training Command***, located at Georges Heights, Sydney, which commands the 1st Recruit Training Battalion and the Army's various specialist training establishments as well as resourcing and co-ordinating their training activities.
- ***The Army recruiting organisation***, based on a Directorate of Army Recruiting in Canberra and the Army elements of the seven regional Defence Force Recruiting Units located in Brisbane, Townsville, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth and Hobart. This organisation has the dual task of attracting applicants to join the Army, and co-ordinating the selection of those who meet the Army's General Entry enlistment requirements.
- ***The recruits***, who could be enlisted for service as a soldier in the Regular Army, referred to as General Entry ^{Note 15}, or as a soldier or officer in the Ready Reserve ^{Note 16}. On average, only 30% of General Entry applicants are accepted ^{Note 17} with approximately 10-15% being female ^{Note 18}. Their ages range from 17 to 34, with the average age being 21 ^{Note 19}. Their average education standard is Year 12, although this is not a requirement ^{Note 20}.
- ***The 1st Recruit Training Battalion***, located at Kapooka ^{Note 21} near the town of Wagga Wagga, in southern New South Wales. During a ten week recruit course, this establishment has the task of providing recruits with basic military skills such as the use of personal weapons, basic fieldcraft and drill. It also seeks to inculcate recruits with attitudes and behaviours appropriate to the Army's values and ethos. A recent photograph of recruits in training at the Battalion is shown at Figure 2.
- ***The Army's various specialist training establishments*** located throughout Australia, such as the School of Infantry at Singleton NSW. These establishments provide the graduates of basic training with Initial Employment Training in their allocated trades prior to their being posted to Army units.
- ***the Army's units***, which employ the graduates of Initial Employment Training.

- ***the Army's medical organisation***, controlled by the Canberra based Director General of Army Health Services. This organisation includes the dedicated medical support provided to the Army elements of the regional Defence Force Recruiting Units, the 1st Recruit Training Battalion and the Army's various specialist training establishments and units.
- ***the Army's psychology organisation***, controlled by the Army's, Canberra based, Director of Psychology. This organisation includes the dedicated psychology support provided to the Army elements of the regional Defence Force Recruiting Units, the 1st Recruit Training Battalion and the Army's various specialist training establishments and units.

Figure 2

**Recruits in Training at the
1st Recruit Training Battalion**



Along with knowledge of the stakeholders, a sound understanding was gained of why recruits were failing to complete their training. It was discovered that in late 1994 a recruit could opt for discharge in two ways; 'Discharge at Own Request' or, if the recruit was under 18 years of age, discharge due to the 'Withdrawal of Parental Consent'. Discharges initiated by the Army resulted from recruits being classified as 'Medically Unfit', usually due to an injury received prior to enlistment; 'Below Medical Standard', usually due to an injury received during training; or, 'Not Suited' (for Army service) due to psychological reasons. Recruits could also be

discharged if it was decided that their 'Retention (was) Not in the Interests of the Service', if they proved 'Unsuitable for Further Military Training' or if it was discovered that they were guilty of 'Provision of False Information on Enlistment'.

As already noted, comments from a random telephone survey of the Commanders and Deputy Commanders of Training Command's schools indicated that the induction process was producing good results and was widely perceived to be performing well. There was, however, wide agreement that there was a need to improve those aspects that were contributing to a high wastage rate. This view, combined with that of other stakeholders in the induction process and the pressure on the system to produce more recruits, placed the process in the situation where, no matter how good its output, changes were required ^{Note 22}. It should also be noted, however, that although there was much support for the reduction of recruit wastage, in some areas, wastage was actually seen as a good and normal situation ^{Note 23}. Indeed, 'conventional wisdom' supposedly decreed that a certain wastage rate was inherent in the system and that it could only be lowered by lowering graduation standards ^{Note 24}.

It was at this early stage that the project to reduce recruit wastage was given the name DUNLOP after the renowned Army surgeon Sir Edward 'Weary' Dunlop. Aside from honouring a famous Australian ^{Note 25}, this name was a quite deliberate and shameless attempt to win the favour of Army's medical establishment. This was considered important as it was thought likely that the greatest impact on wastage would be made by reducing the number of recruit injuries. This was a task that would be made considerably easier if fully supported by the Army's doctors.

1.4 Conceptual Framework of the Research Approach

The research approach to the Wastage Project was considered by the author to be very much hypothetico-deductive. In other words, it set out with a theory that it wished to test, as opposed to attempting to develop a theory through ethnographic-inductive research (Kellehear, 1993:16). In line with this approach, the central hypothesis was that contemporary quality management theory, notably in the areas of Change Management and Performance Measurement, could be successfully applied to a seemingly intractable Army problem.

In view of the Army's struggle with the introduction of Quality Management, the testing of this hypothesis was seen as a key contribution to the overall intent to improve the Army's approach to its business.

1.5 Value of the Research

At the commencement of the wastage project it was considered that it had the potential to be valuable on three levels.

In the first instance, its success would mean that many hundreds of recruits, who would otherwise have been discharged, would successfully graduate from training; many hundreds of injuries during training would be avoided; and, the productivity of the

Army's induction process would be improved by millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars. As a result of these outcomes, it was considered likely that the Army's image in the community would be improved and that the flow on effects would be likely to reduce wastage in the Army's Initial Employment Training (notably at the School of Infantry, which, like recruit training, was known to suffer from a high wastage rate due to injuries)^{Note 26}. Additionally, it was hoped these benefits would flow-on to the Army's officer training conducted at the Royal Military College and the Australian Defence Force Academy. Further, if such success was enduring, the short term outcomes would be multiplied many times over, resulting in significant and lasting benefits, not only to the Army, but also to many generations of recruits and their families.

On a second, higher, level it was considered that the wastage project would provide valuable insights into the conduct of an important cross-functional project within Defence. It was hoped that this might, in turn, positively influence the change management and performance measurement aspects of a number of future Defence improvement efforts.

Lastly, given that Defence - at least at its higher levels - is essentially the same as a large civilian corporation^{Note 27}, it was considered that the Wastage Project might produce many lessons equally applicable to change efforts outside of the Defence environment^{Note 28}.

Literature Review

2.1 The Approach

In order to focus what could otherwise have been an extremely wide ranging review of quality management literature, the themes of 'Management of Change' and, to a slightly lesser extent, 'Performance Measurement', were identified as being of relevance to the Recruit Wastage Project. To explore these themes, a large range of contemporary texts and articles were reviewed. It was, however, also recognised that the contemporary guidance gained would have to be implemented within the quite distinctive culture of the Australian Defence Force. Accordingly, texts and articles specifically dealing with this culture were also reviewed.

Recognising that many more documents would turn up as the project progressed, as many texts, articles, internal studies and pieces of correspondence on the subject of recruit wastage as could be located, were reviewed. In particular, it was considered that these references would provide vital background material to any initial cross-functional stakeholder examination of the recruit wastage issue.

It should be noted that, where considered appropriate, this review has been updated throughout the project so that the observations made in the discussion section could take into account all of the literary influences on the project. John Kotter (1995), Gordon R. Sullivan et al. (1995) and James Collins et al. (1996), for example, were not read until after the initial project strategy was developed, but they never-the-less provided valuable insights into what influenced it during its course.

2.2 The Management of Change

The importance of 'planned change' is highlighted by Robbins (1993:668) who distinguishes between change, which is simply reactive, and planned change which is intentional and goal orientated. Planned change, however, can take many forms. As Dexter Dunphy and Doug Stace point out in their text *Beyond the Boundaries - Leading and Re-Creating the Successful Enterprise*, although executives often believe that they know what to do, they are often unsure how to do it (1994:3). Dunphy and Stace argue that, no matter how appealing the prospect, there is no one right way such as Total Quality Management, Benchmarking, or Re-engineering, etc. to approach change (1994:5) and that there are many dilemmas to be faced. These dilemmas include the choices between adaptive versus rational strategy development, cultural change versus structural change, continuous or incremental improvement versus radical transformation, and empowerment versus leadership and command. Dunphy and Stace label these choices as the 'soft' and 'hard' approaches to managing change (1994:13) and argue that dramatically different approaches to change can work in different circumstances. To cope with this situation, the essence of their argument is that any organisational change should be approached as shown at Figure 3.

Figure 3

The Dunphy & Stace Approach to Organisational Change

- *Determine the Level of 'Organisational Fit'*
- *Determine the Scale of Change Required*
- *Determine the Time Available to make the Change*
- *Determine the Type of Leadership Required*
- *Create a Change Strategy*

In his article *Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail*, Kotter observes that the most general lesson to be learned from successful examples of corporate change is that, "*the change process goes through a series of phases that, in total, usually require a considerable length of time*" (1995:59). In his text he puts forward eight very concise steps for transforming an organisation. Taken together, these cover such issues as: establishing a sense of urgency; forming a powerful guiding coalition; creating a vision; communicating the vision; creating short-term wins; and, institutionalising new approaches - form a very powerful and logical plan for bringing about change with the minimum resistance from those involved (1995:61). Interestingly, Kotter notes that "*critical mistakes in any of the phases can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum and negating hard won gains*" (1995:60).

Kotter's view of change is consistent with the large number of models proposed by authors which describe the phases or steps involved in the change process. Kanter et al. for example, in *The Challenge of Organisational Change: How Companies Experience it and Leaders Guide It*, recommend the steps for executing change as: analyse the organisation and the need for change, create a shared vision and a common direction, separate from the past, create a sense of urgency, support a strong leader role, line up political sponsorship, craft an implementation plan, develop enabling structures, communicate and involve people, and reinforce and institutionalise the change (1992:382-392).

It is interesting to note that while authors such as Kotter and Kanter et al. propose set formulae for change this approach is contrary to Dunphy and Stace who are, in effect, saying that there is 'no one right way'. This is a view agreed with by Shapiro who in *Fad Surfing in the Boardroom - reclaiming the courage to manage in the age of instant answers*, argues that each of the various options of re-engineering, empowerment, cultural formation, Quality Management, etc can all create good results when modified to meet the needs of a particular organisation (1995:xiii).

Change, it would appear, can be driven by the desire to exploit an opportunity or forced by 'pressures' such as a dramatic event, increasing competition, customer dissatisfaction, new technologies, or even poor organisational morale. Whichever the case, in *Managing Change in Organisations*, Carnall contends that to achieve change a group of people must first recognise that it is desirable and feasible (1990:68). He argues that the "energy for change" in any group or organisation will equate to "the dissatisfaction felt with the current situation" multiplied by "the level of knowledge of the practical steps forward" and "the shared vision" (1990:99); a formula which implies that where any of the variables are zero, or close to zero, the rest will be negated and change will be unlikely to occur. Carnall also argues that, irrespective of the size of the other factors involved, the energy for change must be greater than the perceived cost of making the change.

Hutton would appear to agree with Carnall's approach of assessing the likelihood of achieving successful change. In *The Change Agents' Handbook - A Survival Guide for Quality Improvement Champions*, he cautions, "farmers don't plant their seeds in parking lots. People who seek change also should try to avoid wasting their efforts on situations where there is little hope of a fruitful outcome" (1994:34). He also agrees that an organisation's change journey cannot begin until there is recognition by top management of a compelling reason for change (1994:36).

The vital importance of shared vision is extensively covered by James Collins and Jerry Porras in their article *Building Your Company's Vision*. They observe that many of those companies that are truly successful commit themselves to what they refer to as "Big, Hairy, Audacious Goals" that are huge, daunting challenges (1996:73). Collins et al. argue that these goals should be clear and compelling, serve as a unifying focal point of effort, and act as a catalyst for team spirit. They should have a clear finish line and, to be effective, they require a certain level of unreasoned confidence and commitment (1996:75). Also, they need only have a 50 to 70% probability of success. The important thing is that the organisation must believe it can do it, even if it will require "extraordinary effort and perhaps a little luck" (1996:75). Shapiro develops this notion of vision. She observes that the achievement of vision will depend on a "deep, gut-level commitment of the person or people who hold the critical resources of the organisation...". Additionally, she notes that "democratically based group processes do not necessarily lead to visions that will be implemented" (1995:4).

The understanding of the drivers for change that we gain from Carnall, Collins et al. and Shapiro is especially useful when combined with Lewin's theory of how effective change can take place. Lewin (1951) argues that change involves the phases of 'Unfreezing', 'Movement' and 'Refreezing'.

Lewin's 'Unfreezing' phase involves the disruption of the organisational status quo and the creation of a general dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. Depending on the situation, this might be achieved by using surveys of staff and/or customers to highlight dissatisfaction or benchmarking studies to compare performance with competitors or recognised best practise. Alternatively, a dramatic event or

circumstance might be exaggerated or even engineered in order to justify sweeping change. In the words of a former Chief Executive Officer of a large European company quoted by Kotter (1995:60), the challenge is "to make the status quo seem more dangerous than launching into the unknown". If this unfreezing phase succeeds in creating a genuine sense of urgency regarding the need to change, as advocated by Kotter (1995:60), then the change process is off to a good start.

At the conclusion of the unfreezing process, top management should be able to state a vision that not only bridges the identified gap in performance but also clearly states the desired long term position of the organisation.

Having created an environment for change, the next phase is to move the organisation towards its desired future state by developing the attitudes and policies which will take it there. This 'movement' will require the development of a practical plan which details strategies ranging from how the vision will be communicated to how employees will be empowered to act on it. Ideally, this plan should also include the engineering of highly visible short-term performance improvements (Kotter, 1995:65).

In particular, it would appear that it is of great importance that top management fully understands, accepts and plans for the costs of making the change before it is initiated. Indeed, in his article *Why Big Companies are so Tough to Change*, Hammonds (1991:28) contends that depending on the amount of pain associated with the change, it is quite likely that it will be top management that is one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome. Also, Dichter et al. in their article *Memo to a CEO : Leading organisational transformations*, argue that unless the total commitment of top management is gained, any attempt at a change program is unlikely to be successful (1993:89).

As the word implies, Lewin's final stage of 'refreezing' requires actions which prevent a return to the previous status quo. One such action, for example, could be to reward those individuals who act as appropriate role models, thereby reinforcing desired new behaviours.

Another key change management issue would appear to be resistance to change. In their text *The Expertise of the Change Agent - Public Performance and Backstage Activity* Buchanan and Boddy (1992:15) recognise that it is often people and change issues, rather than technical issues, that are the barriers to successful change. Accordingly, the issue of 'resistance to change', already alluded to above, will always be an important issue. Indeed, in a 1993 survey, entitled *Organisational change in Australia: what's really happening?*, Waldersee and Blackstock found that nearly 60% of the major problems experienced by organisations implementing change were related to employee resistance (1993:12).

The reasons for this resistance might typically include 'loss of face', concern about future competence and/or threatened self interest in the form of lost employment, promotion possibilities or status etc (Deakin Australia, 1995:3-14). Typical forms of resistance are increased complaints, higher rates of absenteeism and resignations, lower

productivity and, occasionally, marked aggression (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992:15). In particular, Robins (1993:670) concludes that it will be the implicit and deferred resistance efforts such as loss of loyalty to the organisation, loss of motivation and increased errors that will be the most difficult to detect and deal with.

The strategies used to overcome this resistance to change will largely depend upon the degree of change required. In *Under New Management*, Dunphy and Stace conclude that "*change agents should select the most effective strategy and mode of change, rather than reflexively relying on a change strategy compatible with their personal values*" (1990:90). These approaches might range from explaining the logic of change at one end of the scale, threatening job loss, transfer or demotion at the other (University of Wollongong, 1995:28).

It is suggested that the best way to minimise resistance to change is to simply examine and counter all those forces acting against change. This method will undoubtedly work best, irrespective of the approach to change adopted, where the people involved in the change are actively encouraged to participate. Indeed, the experience of the New South Wales Government Public Works Product Evaluation Unit suggests that it is only through the constructive overlap achieved in a cross functional, multi-disciplined environment that maximum creativity and innovation are likely to occur (New South Wales Government, 1992:10). As Waterman states in his text *The Renewal Factor - How the Best Get and Keep the Competitive Edge*, "*it is only common-sense that people are most likely to support what they have had a hand in creating*" (1987:7).

Given that it is often people and change issues, rather than technical issues, that are the barriers to successful change (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992:5), removing key obstacles to change and assisting those who need help coping will be vital elements of any incremental change process. Key strategies for removing obstacles to the new vision might include altering organisational structures so that people are empowered to act in support of the vision and adjusting reward and appraisal systems to support the new vision so that, as Kotter puts it, people are not made to "*chose between the vision and their own self interest*" (1995:64). Other strategies include firmly, but fairly, removing individuals who undermine the vision by paying it lip service while working against its initiatives; and convincing people, through ongoing communication, that they really can, indeed must, act differently in the new environment.

Having made the above points, it should be noted that not all strategies and effort can, or even should, be fully planned in advance. Collins et al. for example, note that "*visionary companies often realise their goals more by organic process than by well-laid strategic plans*" (1996:76). Dichter et al. (1993:105) also observe that management will undoubtedly learn as it proceeds and that, over time, goals, objectives, strategies, performance indicators, and even the vision and mission are all likely to be refined and made more specific.

However, while accepting the above approach, Dichter et al. argue that, in order to meet people's expectations of change, management must provide clear,

consistent, and ongoing direction (1993:92). Kotter also backs this stand by arguing that management must aggressively communicate its initiatives and motivate people to co-operate with the strategies required to make these initiatives succeed (1995:60). He also notes that, although words are important, it will be the deeds of management which will be crucial to the success of the change and that *"nothing undermines change more than behaviour by important individuals that is inconsistent with their words"* (1995:64)

Dichter et al. also make a strong argument that the complexity of change might easily overwhelm if not managed correctly. They suggest that rather than trying to 'fix everything at once' it makes good sense to focus on just a few strategies and to devote a lot of energy to them to ensure that measurable progress is achieved (1993:105). The aim should be to create and celebrate short term wins which encourage people to carry on. Kotter advises that such wins must be widely publicised and those involved recognised and rewarded for their efforts, noting that if this does not occur many supporters of change may simply give up or, worse still, actively join the ranks of those who chose to resist the new direction (1995:65).

Finally, Kotter warns that the temptation to declare victory too soon must be consciously avoided and that wins achieved in the short term must be quite unambiguous and not able to be discounted by those opposing change (1995:65). He also warns that a change agent must ensure that a suitable successor is found to carry on the work (1995:67). If this succession is not handled properly, years of hard work and progress can literally be undone regardless of the momentum built up.

2.3 Performance Measurement

Hutton points out that *"You absolutely need measures as indicators of progress. You will never know for sure whether something is improving or not - whether your efforts are succeeding - unless you can measure something that will serve as an indicator"* (1994:130).

As the wording suggests, performance indicators are measures that describe or 'indicate' a level of performance or productivity. While such 'measures' are far from new, Maskell contends that what is new is the increased importance now being attached to them (1991:19). Indeed, in an Australian environment, spurred on by studies such as *Enterprising Nation* produced by Dr David Karpin, even the most conservative of companies, such as those of the type referred to by Toffler as 'organisational dinosaurs' (1995:1), are beginning to focus on improvement via the application of tools such as performance indicators and measures.

The Oxford Dictionary defines 'measure' as *'a size or quantity in relation to a standard'* when used as a noun, and *'to ascertain the size or quantity or proportions of'* when used as a verb (Fowler et al. 1966:489). Given that measurements of all kinds are part of our everyday lives, most people have no difficulty with the concept of performance measurement. At its simplest level, the logic for measuring performance is that it allows decisions based on an awareness of the gap between 'current' and 'desired' performance.

As Hilmer puts it in his 1991 paper on competitiveness and productivity, "*until a firm knows what to measure, it cannot sensibly address the issue of how to measure productivity*". The 'what' depends on the firm's strategy having regard to customers, competitors and its own skills and resources (1991:15). Having said this, Hilmer makes the point that while measures must be consistent with and reinforce strategy, they must also be understood and 'owned' by the people who use them. If not, they are unlikely to be used as tools for learning and improvement (1991:22).

Hilmer suggests that it is extremely important for an enterprise to "*select a set of indicators that capture the three aspects of cost, value and time most critical to its success*" (1991:iii). Indeed, the essence of his competitiveness and productivity paper is that it is the measures, or rather the assessment of measures within enterprises, that provide the inputs to individual and organisational learning, improvement plans, actions and remuneration processes (1991:i). Where successful measures are developed, Adams in his article *The Development of Performance Metrics*, contends that they have the ability to clearly communicate strategy throughout an organisation and are likely to be a critical factor in determining its success (1995:25). This is a position that seems to have been comprehensively verified by Lingle and Schiemann who, having conducted a national survey of senior executives in the United States, found that measurement plays a crucial role in translating business strategy into results (1996:56).

Given the simplicity and irrefutable logic of measuring performance, one might ask why performance measurements are so often ignored or despised?

One possible reason is a recognition by middle managers and workers that performance measures, although intrinsically valuable if used well, are often ill conceived or implemented in the wrong way or for the wrong reasons. Hilmer warns of this problem and stresses the importance of drawing a clear distinction between measurement itself and the assessment or interpretation of the measures. He points out that measures "*can never tell the whole story and at best they provide insights from which people can draw inferences*" (1991:iii). His point is that any measure, when not seen in this light, can either mislead, be abused or lead to quite dysfunctional results.

In her text *Performance Indicators for Government*, Mary Duckett identifies several common problems with the way performance measures are developed and used. She contends that they often tend to focus on levels of activity (ie. we ran 23 workshops or trained 2,355 people) rather than meaningful outcomes; report things that are easy to quantify as opposed to those that are really important; appear to have been developed in relative isolation from the general organisation; or only cover a narrow spectrum of the desired results (1992:2).

To prevent the development of misleading and dysfunctional performance measures, Hilmer suggests that firstly, "*measures should deal with those relatively few factors most critical to the enterprise or work group*" (1991:17). Or, couched in slightly different terms, he is really suggesting that management should focus its performance measurement efforts on those 20% of activities that create 80% of the outputs or incur

80% of the costs (Hilmer, 1991:17). Whilst making this statement, Hilmer stresses that outputs should be considered *"in terms of units and services produced as well as value and time factors"* (1991:18).

Secondly, measures should highlight tangible factors that relate as directly as possible to the work of the individual or group using the measure (1991:19). This statement suggests that a measurement that cannot be related to the work at hand is probably quite meaningless. For example, a measure that only looks at 'work completed' and ignores 'work in progress' is unlikely to give an accurate picture of the work being done. Hilmer observes that measures are often less than useful when they aggregate too much information and, in doing so, lose their relevance to the individual or work unit (1991:19).

Thirdly, Hilmer argues that measures should be designed and presented to encourage improved performance (1991:20). A point that is supported by Dichter et al. who point out that Federal Express, a US courier company, publishes its daily on-time performance as a figure rather than a percentage. If the performance was 99.45 % one day and 99.41% the next, everyone would probably be quite satisfied. To avoid this situation, the company only publishes an absolute number of late deliveries. In this way, if 3,567 packages were delivered late yesterday, everyone can understand that 3,567 customers were inconvenienced or annoyed (1993:92) ^{Note 29}. Likewise, Federal Express might choose to benchmark the performance of various centres against each other to engender an environment of healthy competition.

Lastly, the measures should be able to be related to challenging but credible performance goals (1991:21).

Hilmer stresses that a measure in and of itself says little about performance, rather, insight on performance is gained by comparison (1991:21). This comparison can be with previous performance, the performance of a competitor (ie. often referred to as benchmarking) or ideally, it will be with a standard of perfect performance ie. zero defect, zero waste or zero delays.

Even with the above 'operational' performance measure guidelines being observed, Hilmer notes that other 'higher level' measures will be required to deal with the issue of competitiveness in the marketplace. For example, a firm may have no waste, no inventories, zero turnaround times and high quality but still be uncompetitive if other factors such as under-investment in plant and systems are working against it (1991:23).

A local example of excellent operational performance but less than satisfactory 'higher level' performance is the development of the third runway at Sydney's airport. Looked at from a narrow cost, value and time perspective, the performance measures for the project would undoubtedly have indicated that it was extremely successful. It was completed ahead of time, under budget and was of high quality. However, looked at from the perspective of a wider set of performance measures, the project has been a financial and public relations disaster. It has provoked massive public protests and incurred a massive public cost, with the public having to foot the bill, via a tax on the

majority of Sydney's air traffic, for the acoustic insulation of houses in several suburbs. The lesson here is that performance measures will only provide managers with accurate and worthwhile knowledge if they take into account all the key aspects of the activity.

Finally, it must be remembered that different performance indicators can be applied to many aspects of a situation. For example, when deciding whether the level of water pollution at a certain beach is safe enough to allow swimming, one swimmer might be satisfied with knowing the percentage and number of individuals who get ill each year after using the beach. Another might want to have the same data but based on particular ocean conditions and times of the day for each month of the year. Whilst, at the extreme end of the spectrum, another might want a daily or even hourly indication of the percentage and number of contaminants in the water compared with national and international health standards. On the other hand, local Government might want to measure the changes in all of the above to ascertain the 'improvement' made by expensive new water treatment procedures.

Unfortunately, many authors have observed that performance measures are not well used within most of Australia's enterprises. When Hilmer was doing his field work on the issue of performance measurement, he found that much time had to be spent developing measures and then collecting data that should already have been in place (1991:26). Given the general tone of the Karpin Report produced in 1995, it appears that things have not changed that much. Indeed, even in the United States, Adams agrees with this point of view and indicates that many performance measurement systems in use are not linked to strategy and are therefore inadequate tools for executing it (1995:25).

Noting the clear logic of the adage that "one cannot manage that which one cannot measure", Hilmer considers that the challenge for every enterprise is to drastically improve its performance measures so that enhanced competitiveness and productivity gains become more than just wishful thinking (1991: 28).

In particular, the challenges of making performance measures work in an organisation would appear to be to as follows. The enterprise must: commit itself to the serious collection and use of performance measures; ensure that its measures capture the aspects of cost, value and time most critical to the organisation, without forgetting the key 'higher order' measures; remember that different types of performance measures will be required at different levels of the enterprise; be constantly aware of the limitations of all measures; review the ability of the enterprise's information systems to capture the data required; and, encourage the enterprise's people to achieve in accordance with the measures set (Hilmer, 1991:29-30).

2.4 Change and Measurement in the Defence Environment

In their article, *Changing the way we Change*, Pascale et al. argue that larger and older organisations tend to be less receptive to new ideas than their younger counterparts (1997:130). From this point of view it might be said that the Australian Army is perhaps no different from many other organisations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to examine how the culture within the Australian Defence Force might

impact on any change and measurement initiatives.

Although it could be argued that, with the expansions and contractions in size before and after conflicts, defence forces might be quite used to change, this would appear not to be the case. Certainly the ability of the military to adjust to change has received special attention from a number of authors, perhaps none more famous than Norman Dixon. His 1976 text *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* has become a classic study of the British Army's historical inadequacies in the area of adjusting to change amongst its various other foibles.

In the same theme as Dixon, in a 1974 lecture on *Military Science in an Age of Peace*, Sir Michael Howard, observed that "*The military profession is, like all other professions, also a bureaucracy, and bureaucracies accommodate themselves with great difficulty to outstanding original thinkers. Secondly, of course, the military is a hierarchy which is, for perfectly good functional reasons, exceptionally rigid*" (1974:5). Likewise, in *The Soldiers*, Stanhope gives a bleak assessment of the military's enthusiasm for change. He contends that, "*Historically, the Army has resisted change until its trenches have been overrun, after which it has retreated in orderly fashion, regrouping and defending its new positions*" (1979:321). In addition, Kiszely notes that, "*for reasons of its social origins, education, ethics and mores, the officer corps has tended to be highly conventional and conformist*" and that, "*In this atmosphere, criticism or suggestion that things are not being done as well as they could be, has often perceived to be tantamount to insubordination, and therefore 'bad form'.*" (1991:15).

While all of the above writers are referring to the British Army, given the extremely strong historical links that exist, it can be postulated that the Australian experience is not very different ^{Note 30}. It is a proposition that would seem to be supported by Nicholas Jans in his paper *Military Professionalism: Changes in the Australian Defence Force*, where he notes that the Australian military, with its distinct cultural roots and distinct strategic and political environment, is different but perhaps not markedly so from other armed forces (1989:188). It might also be supported by Agnew, who, whilst writing on urgent need for the Australian Army to embrace strategic level Human Resource Management, questioned whether prescriptive statements and initiatives such as the introduction of Total Quality Management could "*overcome decades of conservative resistance to change*" (1994:10).

Interestingly, Furry, whilst a serving Australian Army officer, noted that, "*The usual difficulty in generating interest in TQM is that Army Officers are used to an unending stream of management approaches and programs, most of which are introduced with great fanfare but then fail to live up to expectations*" (1990:1). Likewise, Anglian, also a serving Australian Army officer, noted in his paper *Breaking the Mould: Approaches to Military Problem Solving into the 21st Century*, that, "*Much of what is espoused in TQM is anathema to officers and without a clear idea of how it can be utilised and what it can offer, it may flounder*" (1993:2).

In 1995, Jennings, obviously felt that change management was a critical issue for the Australian Army. In his then role of Chief Research Officer with the Australian

Army Directorate of Research and Analysis, he prepared a paper for the Australian Army Chief of the General Staff's 1995 Corporate Strategy Seminar entitled *Why Armies Change*. Having examined the evolution of world armies from 1945 to present ^{Note 31}, he concluded that *"there are exceptions, but for the most part the book is a depressing catalogue of errors of judgement, failures in political and budgetary will and a reluctance to embrace large scale change when it is most needed"* (1995:2). Using this historical perspective, he went on to examine those factors working for and against change within the Australian Army. He identifies one of these factors as sectionalism and notes boldly (considering his position and high level audience) that the modern Australian Army is an organisation *"riven by internal sectionalism and rivalry for preferment and resources"* (1995:10). He concludes that because of this, and other factors, such as the tendency towards budget driven crisis management, *"there is a tendency to favour an incremental approach to change and a risk-averse management style"* (1995:10).

Grainger, in his essay *The Management of Change in the Defence Environment*, would appear to agree with Jennings when he points out that *"..Defence is, in fact, extremely adaptable to incremental, minor change"*, (1989:328) and cites the reason for this as the nature of its staffing. Given that Service officers usually only serve in any given appointment for two or, less commonly, three years, ^{Note 32} Grainger argues that most are keen to 'leave their mark' by carrying out some minor change. Change that will bring them personal satisfaction and, ideally, some wider acclaim. Conversely, Grainger also observes that the result of such short postings, is that major change is less often attempted because it is *"all too easy to put the matter off to let it become someone else's problem"* (1989:329). He also notes that *"major changes occur in military organisation and doctrine only upon the impetus of major or compelling external pressures, usually of a political - rather than professional military - nature"* (1989:329). This is an observation that would undoubtedly be backed by Jennings, who notes that many of the pressures for change currently being applied to the Australian Army are a direct result of wider pressures for change in Australian society (1995:8).

One text that details a strategy for bringing about change in the military is General Gordon R. Sullivan and Anthony Coroalle's *Seeing the Elephant*. Writing on the introduction of massive change in the United States Army, he observes that *"effective, long-lasting change can seldom be mandated from the top"* and that the natural human resistance to change has to be taken into account (1995:29). He notes the vital importance of a shared vision (1995:29) and the creation of a *"learning organisation"* that *"welcomes change as a way to improve"* (1995:31). Above all, he talks about the importance of the United States Army recognising that the new way ahead *"would entail a significant departure from the way the Army previously thought about and effected change"* (1995:35).

In a similar vein to Sullivan, General Donn Starry, in his article *To Change an Army*, outlines the following requirements for change; a mechanism to identify the required change, a common cultural bias, a proponent for the change, a broad consensus for change, continuity, high level sponsorship, and a convincing demonstration of value (1994:23-25).

In regard to the issue of performance measurement in the Australian Army, it would seem, from this author's observation over the years, that it is avoided like the plague. Where measures do exist they seem to be largely unused, poorly used or they are used to judge rather than as a tool for continuous improvement. Indeed, the regard with which performance measurement is held by some, is nicely illustrated by the following:

ANOTHER DAY ENDS
All targets met
All systems working
All clients satisfied
All staff eager and enthusiastic
All pigs fed and ready to fly

This anonymous quote, which has undoubtedly done the rounds of the Australian Defence Force, Public Service and many other industries, is possibly the result of a recognition by middle managers and workers that performance measures, although they are intrinsically valuable if used well, are often ill conceived or implemented in the wrong way or for the wrong reasons.

This judgement is lent considerable weight by Hartmann in his 1993 analysis of why, after 17 years of trying, the Australian Army had still failed to introduce an effective systems approach to its collective training. He concludes that one of the main factors was a fear that, as opposed to the optimisation of training, the primary use of such a system would be external assessment (1994:2).

2.5 Relevant Literature on Recruit Wastage

In an organisation where it is often difficult, if not impossible, to access archival material due to poor file naming and maintenance ^{Note 33}, the author was fortunate indeed to be able to source a wealth of archival material on the recruit wastage issue from Army's Personnel Division. Given the value of this data, several key documents referred to are attached at **Enclosure 1**.

Among the many documents uncovered, the oldest was a letter dated 17th June 1976 from the Director of Army Psychology to the Director of Army Personnel Planning regarding "*a wastage of personnel (from recruit training) which is expensive and disturbing*". In this letter (**Enclosure 1-1**) the author notes that at a recent high level conference on the issue of recruit wastage, "*No definite conclusions on failure at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion were drawn*". In a subsequent letter dated 5th July 1976 (**Enclosure 1-2**), the same author accuses the Army's then Director of Recruiting of advancing arguments in regard to recruit wastage that are "*patently illogical*" ^{Note 34}.

In June 1989 Reynolds, in a detailed report entitled *RTB Wastage*, attempted to review the reasons for recruit wastage during the period 1976-1988. He noted, amongst other things, that the introduction of females to 1st Recruit Training Battalion in 1985 had dramatically added to the problem of wastage due to medical reasons. He observed,

for example, that in 1987 approximately 61% of the females entering training were discharged with well over two thirds of this figure failing due to medical reasons. Reynolds concludes this report by recommending, *"that we recognise that there is a problem with 1 RTB training which appears to be related to the physical standards imposed on recruits"* (1989:4).

In 1989 the recruit wastage issue was obviously a concern at the most senior levels of Defence. This is amply illustrated by a letter dated 25th May 1989 to the Chief of the Defence Force (General Gration), from the Chief of Defence Personnel (Rear Admiral Beaumont) (**Enclosure 1-3**) in which the writer noted that the number of involuntary separations on medical grounds from the Army's training force was, *"very high compared with the other Services"* ^{Note 35}. In his margin note response this caused the most senior officer of the day to comment that, *"there should be further investigation into whether Army's practices at Kapooka could be modified to make it less physically stressful early in the training period while finishing up with the same product"*. This was a comment that obviously focused the minds of many, as two months later, a detailed 'interim' report on recruit medical discharges during the period 1984-88 was produced by the 1st Recruit Training Battalion Regimental Medical Officer, Captain M.A. Slater.

Slater's key recommendations were that: enlistment medical boards place greater emphasis on lower leg fitness and the detection of recruits with a positive history of asthma; a clear policy be developed on the use of orthotics by recruits; the recruit course be extended by one week to allow a more gradual approach to physical training and the incorporation of a regular rest cycle; a basic physical fitness test be introduced at the time of enlistment; more thorough enlistment medicals be conducted to identify pre-existing injury/illness; and statistics continue to be collected in an attempt to determine the causes (of recruit) injury (1989:12-15). Slater also noted that Israeli Defence Force studies suggested there was a clear relationship between the lack of regular scheduled rest in a recruit training program and training injuries (1989:15). The comment by the then Commandant of Kapooka in his covering letter to this report (**Enclosure 1-4**) was that, *"Measures to reduce recruit wastage rates cannot be introduced in isolation at 1 RTB but must be considered by all agencies involved in the initial entry process"* ^{Note 36}.

In response to Slater's paper, the Army's Chief of Personnel directed, in a letter dated 24th August 1989 (**Enclosure 1-5**), that a conference of *"the players"* be convened to *"find the right answers and set some changes in motion"*. This conference subsequently took place in Canberra on 29th September 1989. Unfortunately, an examination of the conference minutes (**Enclosure 1-6**) reveals that, although the meeting was chaired by the Deputy Chief of Army Personnel (a brigadier), the Director of Army Recruiting was represented by the most junior officer present (a captain). Additionally, it appears from the minutes that no actual conclusions were reached ^{Note 37}.

In line with Grainger's observation that it usually takes a major event or external political pressure to cause real change in Defence (1989:329), it is interesting to note the contents of a March 1991 brief prepared for the Senate Estimates Committee. In

this brief (**Enclosure 1-7**), which deals with the occurrence of recruit suicides, it is noted that, in response to a 1990 recruit suicide, "Army conducted a review of training at 1 RTB in an effort to reduce the stress reaction of recruits undergoing training" and, "As a result of this review, the training course was increased in length from 12 to 13 weeks....to allow recruits more time to transition into military life and to better assimilate military training" ^{Note 38}. In a related internal brief dated September 1990 (**Enclosure 1-8**), it was noted that this increase in course length was only one of a whole range of measures taken to improve recruit retention. Other measures were the introduction of a four day pre-course orientation for new recruits, the reduction of physical training standards including a "more gradual" step to the more difficult activities, increased flexibility in the completion of training objectives and a, "Review of 1 RTB staffing requirements to overcome problems such as the accumulation of leave credits and increased domestic dislocation due to excessive work pressure" ^{Note 39}.

One of the most comprehensive documents uncovered on the issue of injuries was Major Steven Rudzki's *Injuries in the Australian Army 1987-1991 - A Comparison to the US Army Experience* which was completed as a Defence Force Fellowship in 1992. This work allowed the recruit injury situation to be compared with the Army at large and provided further evidence of the tremendous cost the Army was incurring through injuries. However, perhaps of most interest of all, was the unpublished work provided by Rodney Pope, the resident Recruit Training Battalion physiotherapist, on the correlation of recruit injuries with the scores achieved on an aerobic capacity test referred to as the 20 metre Shuttle Run. As a result of testing successive groups of recruits on the run and then observing the aerobic fitness of those subsequently discharged, Pope speculates that the introduction of the test prior to enlistment and the rejection of those applicants below a certain level, could predictably lower wastage by as much as 6% (1994:4).

With regard to the status of the recruit wastage problem in late 1994, a 1st Recruit Training Battalion minute to Headquarters Training Command dated 15th December 1994 revealed that, of the 1,263 General Entry Recruits who marched into recruit training during the period July-November 1994, 218 (a total of 17%) had been discharged ^{Note 40}. A breakdown of the reasons given for discharge is shown at Figure 4.

Figure 4

Reasons for Recruit Wastage (July-November 1994)

Medically Unfit or Below Medical Standard	101	46 %
Not Suited to Military Life due to Psychological Reasons	53	24 %
Discharged at Own Request	35	16 %
Withdraw of Parental Consent (for under 18 year olds)	22	10 %
False Information provided on Enlistment	7	4 %
Unsuitable for Further Military Training	0	0 %
	----	-----
	218	100 %

2.6 Gaps and Omissions in the Literature

Within the contemporary literature, it would appear that gaps by one author, such as Carnall's failure to recognise the vital nature of top management's attitude towards change, are more than adequately covered by others. Likewise, within the military context, Jennings does an excellent job of identifying the factors working for and against change in the Australian Army but fails to note the important point made by Grainger regarding the length of postings.

The one area not well covered in the military specific literature, is how to successfully approach change in a military environment. Most, such as Jennings, simply point to the challenges without offering detailed suggestions. The exception to this statement is Sullivan's 1995 text on change in the American military, *Seeing the Elephant*. His position, however, would appear to be that the military is no different from any other major organisation and he draws heavily on mainstream texts such as Kanter, Stein and Jick's *The Challenge of Organisational Change* (1992).

The wealth of background material in the form of archival data was much better than expected, however, many omissions were evident. Reynolds, for instance, provides no data on females trained separately prior to 1985, so it is difficult to conclude if any change in the female wastage rate actually took place. Also, his figures are percentages only, so it is not possible to determine the number of recruits his percentages refer to. Slater's 1989 study only covers medical wastage and fails to consider that, for example, a large number of recruits discharged for medical reasons may in fact have been using injury as a face saving way of exiting the system. Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that many recruits with undeclared pre-enlistment injuries have been discharged on the basis of untruthful statements made on enlistment. If this is the case, without an overview of all discharges, it is hard to tell if Slater's figures are truly representative of the situation. It is also interesting to note that some of Slater's figures are very different from those provided by Reynolds. For example, in 1987 Slater records 21.12 % of females being discharged for medical reasons (1988:17), as opposed to Reynolds' 46% (1989:4).

The inadequacy of the whole recruit injury data issue is highlighted in a 15th September 1989 letter from the Director General of Army Health which states, "*In the past five years at 1 RTB the reliability of statistics has been variable depending on the availability of staff, particularly medical officers. The present Regimental Medical Officer at 1 RTB is collecting data for a PhD project and therefore the data is sound. Reliable, accurate data will come with the modernisation of the Health Records System which has been in gestation for 15 years*" ^{Note 41}.

Another problem is that no authors adequately explain their methods for calculating the wastage rate. This is important because recruits do not necessarily start and finish their training in the same calendar or financial year. Hence statistics based solely on calendar or financial years must be suspect. The only consistent method would appear to be measurement by cohorts ie. 40 start in a group; four months later x number will have graduated and y number will have been discharged for whatever reasons.

Unfortunately, because no source data is available, none of the figures offered by any authors are able to be independently substantiated.

In November 1995, the above inconsistency was glaringly highlighted by a review of the Defence recruiting function which reported, *"The ability to draw sustainable conclusions regarding training failures and times of the year is further hampered by the inconsistent approach to recording training data. The 1st Recruit Training Battalion, 1st Recruit Training Unit (Royal Australian Air Force), and the Australian Defence Force Academy record recruit discharges by months, whereas Recruit Training Squadron at HMAS Cerberus records discharges by courses, as does the Royal Military College and the Royal Australian Air Force College"* (1995:10-14). However, even this apparently quite comprehensive document, seems to put wastage rates in the too hard basket. Instead of attempting to develop comparisons based on source cohort data, it contents itself with recommending that, *"The Defence Force Recruiting Branch establish a working partyto determine agreed definitions for discharges under training, the types of statistical data required, and the means of data collection, transmission, collation, display and interpretation required .. to make informed management decisions on the basis of reliable statistical information"* (1995:10-20).

Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks

3.1 Theoretical Framework

In his 1993 text *The Unobtrusive Researcher - a Guide to Methods*, Kellehear summarises the hypothetico-deductive approach to research as; read first (literature review), get an idea (theoretical framework), go out (methods), test it (results), see if you were right in the first place (discussion) (1993:20). He also defines a theoretical framework as "*ideas developed before the empirical encounter with the world*" (1993:18).

Based on this hypothetico-deductive approach, the recruit wastage project was designed to apply Change Management and Performance Measurement theories to the recruit wastage problem in order to:

- ▶ test the theories on a live project with the hope of producing a positive outcome, and
- ▶ draw conclusions of value to those who would attempt similar improvement efforts, both within Army and in external environments.

In particular, given a set of disparate and often antagonistic stakeholders and a culture which has traditionally resisted meaningful measurement, the Project was designed to discover whether the use of contemporary Quality Management theories could bring effective change to a complex process. If a certain approach could be supported with empirical evidence and be appropriately recorded and disseminated, it was felt that the Project would meaningfully contribute to the Army's wider understanding of how to successfully improve its key processes.

It must be said at the outset that the approach of this thesis was dictated by the nature of the problem. The recruit wastage rate issue was a very real problem within the author's workplace. It was a problem which demanded a concrete outcome - not simply research pointing to a solution. Hence an 'action research' type approach which focused on a specific problem was necessary as it would allow the Project to attract the funds and staff effort necessary to support its implementation. Interestingly, when discussing the nature of research in *The Management of a Student Research Project*, Sharp et al. note that this type of 'applied' research, is more likely to result in successful completion than 'pure' or 'basic' research (1996:13).

Given the approach adopted, it is freely acknowledged that the Project is situation and setting specific and that it might not be possible to generalise from some of its outcomes. Having said this, it is interesting to note the point made by Sharp et al.

that, *'Outside mathematics, the researcher cannot prove explanations or predictions completely, merely render them more probable'* (1996:111).

3.2 Methodological Framework

Following confirmation of the very real value of pursuing the wastage problem, and bearing in mind the collective wisdom of authors such as Carnall, Dunphy & Stace and Grainger, it was hoped that Project DUNLOP would succeed where other attempts had not. Accordingly, at the highest level of abstraction, it was decided to approach the project in the following way:

- ▶ **Phase 1.** Use the advice of Dunphy and Stace, to assess how the wastage issue should be approached (ie. determine the level of 'organisational fit', consider the scale of change required, the time available to make the change and the type of leadership that would be most appropriate) whilst, at the same time, ensuring that the strategy developed would stand a good chance of attracting the support and resources necessary for it to succeed.
- ▶ **Phase 2.** Implement the Wastage Project strategy using appropriate theoretical guidance from the literature reviewed. In particular, it was envisaged that middle and senior management workshops would be conducted and some style of steering group of key stakeholders formed to progress the Project.
- ▶ **Phase 3.** Assess the strategy's effectiveness in bringing about change via the collection and analysis of relevant wastage rate data, the conduct of appropriate interviews with stakeholders and intelligent observation.
- ▶ **Phase 4.** Provide relevant and valid insights to those 'change agents' who would attempt similar improvement activities within Defence and similar environments.

In regard to the methods to be used during the conduct of the Project, it was intended to use as much archival data as could be obtained; to conduct an extensive number of unstructured interviews with Project stakeholders at all levels; and, for benchmarking purposes, to statistically manipulate recruit wastage data sourced from the records of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. Where it was considered constructive, it was also intended to conduct surveys of those participating in various aspects of the Project.

From the point of view of data collection, it was considered that the short life-span (10-12 weeks) of the recruit induction process would readily allow changes to be observed and quantified. The process involved relatively small intakes of between 30 and 50 recruits, drawn from six identical recruiting centres around Australia, going through identical training patterns, being administered by four identical recruit training companies at the Recruit Training Battalion.

At the time of Project commencement, there were still a great many unknowns. If nothing else however, there was a faith that, if correctly applied, the principles of quality management would guide the Project to a good outcome.

3.3 Ethical Issues

At the time of project commencement, the overwhelming ethical issue was the immorality of not quickly acting to reduce the wastage and injury rates of recruits in basic training. It was noted, however, that there would undoubtedly be ethical questions to be addressed if, for example, the Project initiated trials of methods to reduce injuries. Fortunately, it was soon realised that consultation with the Defence Medical Ethics Committee would be an integral part of any trial conducted by the Army's medical establishment.

Also raised by Kellehear is the issue of ensuring that individuals are aware that they are a part of an experiment (1993:4). Whilst those participating in wastage related workshops and meetings intended to progress the wastage issue, would most certainly be aware that they were part of an effort to reduce recruit wastage and prove the validity of certain quality management approaches, this awareness would not extend to the actual recruits in training. This, however, was considered to be acceptable given that the recruit training program had always been subject to frequent amendment as various Chief Instructors and Commandants had sought to impose their will upon it ^{Note 42}.

It should be noted that in some instances, notably certain interviews, names are not given. This is done sparingly but where it occurs, it is done intentionally in order to provide anonymity, and therefore confidentiality, to the individuals concerned.

Chapter Four

Results

4.1 The 'Strategy for Change'

The preliminary review of the wastage issue has already been described in detail at Chapter One.

Based on the guidance provided by Dunphy & Stace (1994), the induction process' 'level of fit' suggested that a 'developmental transition' was appropriate, as opposed to a radical 'transformation' or 'turnaround'. Coincidentally, this type of approach was also most consistent with the value guidance provided in the Training Command Corporate Plan *Training to Win 94/95* which encouraged process improvement "...after consultation with all relevant parties" and, where practical, "via the use of facilitated teams" (1994:16).

Bearing in mind the importance and cost of the wastage issue, it could not be allowed to continue any longer than necessary; however, this said, there was not an overwhelming imperative to rectify it 'overnight'. Accordingly, it was decided to address the situation over an 18-24 month time-frame using a structure Quality Management approach.

It must also be noted that within Headquarters Training Command there was a strong predisposition towards using a participative, rather than a directive or coercive, approach to address the wastage problem. Fortunately, this desire coincided with the appointment of a new Commandant of the Recruit Training Battalion who had no strong ownership of the current system. Another issue was that no single Army organisation owned the whole induction process. Change in many areas would therefore require the co-operation of several different stakeholders.

Although not referred to as such in correspondence at the time, in essence, the strategy developed to address the wastage problem was as outlined in Figure 5. This strategy, which was based on the guidance provided by authors such as Carnall (1990), Kanter (1992), and Dichter et al. (1993), did not attempt to pre-plan every contingency. Rather, it was expected that the Project would inevitably involve lots of on-the-spot trouble shooting to deal with surprises. It was also expected, despite the obvious historical difficulties outlined in the archives, that the sponsorship of the General Officer Commanding Training Command, combined with a sound approach, would be sufficient to ensure the Project's success.

Figure 5

The Project DUNLOP 'Strategy for Change'

- Stage 1: Create a Higher Level Recognition of the Need to Change*
- Stage 2: Build Grass Roots 'Energy for Change'*
- Stage 3: Win Key Stakeholder Support and Ownership*
- Stage 4: Form a Strong Guiding Coalition*
- Stage 5: Create Short Term Wins*
- Stage 6: Go for the 'Big Wins'*
- Stage 7: Consolidate Improvements and Institutionalise New Approaches*

4.2 Creating a Higher Level Recognition of the Need to Change

Within the Planning Branch of Headquarters Training Command it must be said that it was assumed that at least two major factors would provide an ongoing climate of support for any effort to reduce recruit wastage ^{Note 43}.

Firstly, it was taken as a given that as the Army was increasingly being forced to operate in an environment where funding levels were decreasing and/or constrained, productivity enhancement initiatives such as DUNLOP would be looked upon favourably. In this regard, it was thought useful to have the costs of the wastage quantified so that all concerned could appreciate the financial magnitude of the problem. The message that every discharged recruit was costing the Army \$24,000 dollars was an easy one to grasp and made a compelling argument that this waste of funds should be avoided if at all possible.

Secondly, it was assumed that as Australian society was becoming demonstrably more concerned with an employers 'Duty of Care' to its employees ^{Note 44}, Projects such as DUNLOP would be popular within a Defence Force seeking to cite concrete examples of this duty of care being put into action.

A third, more esoteric reason, that might well have figured in the thinking of the Army's personnel policy makers, was the known future reduction in the numbers of potential recruits that would be available to the Army due to the demographic shadow cast by the post World War Two baby boom ^{Note 45}.

Irrespective of the above issues, it was considered that a 'powerful higher level recognition of the need to change' already existed given the current concerns in many areas (described in Chapter One) and the direct involvement of the General Officer Commanding Training Command. Accordingly, this phase was deemed to have been achieved when, in mid December 1994, the General Officer Commanding Training Command wrote to all of the key induction process stakeholders clearly outlining his intent to address the wastage issue and seeking their support.

4.3 Building a Grass Roots 'Energy for Change'

In order to build a grass roots 'Energy for Change' (and to understand the wastage problem more fully), an initial examination of the wastage problem was conducted at Kapooka during the period 6th-10th February 1995. The vehicle used for this examination was a Total Quality Management Facilitator Course specifically designed to use the wastage problem as a 'real time' teaching medium. This course was conducted by the author and two consultants from APTECH Australia.

Despite the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's extremely high workload, the support of the General Officer Commanding Training Command ensured that three Recruit Company Commanders, the unit Training and Training Development Officers, representatives from the Kapooka medical and psychological units and the unit Physical Training Cell were made available to participate in the five day course. In order to provide a vital 'supplier' perspective to discussions, representatives from the Melbourne and Brisbane Defence Force Recruiting Units were also made available by the Directorate of Army Recruiting which brought the course size to 17.

At each stage of the course, rather than using standard hypothetical problems as a teaching medium, the course focused on the wastage rate problem. Given the tailored group on the course, this strategy proved enormously successful. Indeed, over the period of the course, most of the participants became quite passionate about really doing something to address the wastage problem.

Together with the existing literature and data outlined in Chapter Two, the group's own experience was added to by two detailed (and thought provoking) presentations. The first of these was given by Lieutenant Colonel Rod Jewel from the Army's Directorate of Personnel Planning. From his long standing personal interest in the topic, he was able to outline how the wastage problem complicated the Army's manpower planning. The second presentation was made by Major Steven Rudzki, the then Officer Commanding of the Albury Wodonga Medical Centre, who presented statistics which benchmarked the Army's injury rates with those of civil industry and suggested possible ways to address the issue. This presentation was made all the more credible by the fact that Rudzki had served as the Regimental Medical Officer at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion in a prior posting and had recently completed a Defence Force Fellowship on training injuries within the Australian Army during the period 1987-91. He was also the medical officer responsible for recruits then in training at Albury-Wodonga.

Given the sources discussed above, the course came up with 121 potential causes of recruit wastage. This list was critically reviewed twice and seven ideas identified for further detailed examination as outlined in figure 6.

Figure 6

Seven Key 'Wastage Reduction' Ideas Developed by 6-10 February 1995 TQM Course held at 1st Recruit Training Battalion

- Improve the selection of recruits via the conduct of a pre-enlistment selection weekend.
- Correlate the psychological and Enlistment Officer ratings given to recruits at the Defence Force Recruiting Centres with the actual discharges from recruit training in order to validate the accuracy of the ratings.
- Improve the medical process in order to better detect pre-existing injuries and more accurately ascertain if an applicant is likely to succeed at recruit training. (It should be noted that this was the area considered to have by far the greatest potential to reduce recruit wastage!).
- Improve the Recruit Training Battalion's recruit physical training program in order to reduce the number of discharges due to physical training related injuries.
- Examine the effect of high Recruit Training Battalion staff workloads on recruit wastage.
- Analyse the issue of recruit 'culture shock' in order to reduce wastage.
- Examine the Recruit Training Battalion's staff performance with the aim of reducing recruit wastage.

Each of these areas of examination was voluntarily adopted by a self selected sub-group from the course which effectively became the 'champion' of their proposal. Each group undertook considerable developmental work on how 'their' proposal could be progressed if the time, resources and authority were allocated.

On the morning of the last day of the course the sub-groups presented their developed proposals to the Colonel Plans from Headquarters Training Command who was extremely pleased with the outcome. Unfortunately, the new Commandant of the Recruit Training Battalion, who had been absent from Kapooka for the duration of the course, was only available to attend presentations on the afternoon of the final day. Furthermore, due to time constraints, he had not been briefed on what to anticipate from the presentations. His somewhat unexpected response, as he heard his key staff, one after another, outlining the magnitude of the problem they believed existed within his organisation was one of growing disquiet followed by an abrupt departure.

Despite the unfortunate outcome of the final briefing session, at the end of the five day Total Quality Management course, it appeared that a very sound foundation had

been laid for addressing the wastage issue. The course had radically challenged the values of those participating and created a widespread 'paradigm shift' regarding the acceptable level of recruit wastage. It had also created a genuine dissatisfaction with the status quo and a real (and voluntary) commitment to the need to change. Indeed, when surveyed by the author attendees indicated that the concept and outcomes of the course were excellent ^{Note 46} and all agreed that the Army had gained good value from its conduct.

Another advantage of the course was that it had also successfully identified some of those individuals with the talent and desire to become a part of Project DUNLOP's guiding coalition, notably Rudzki and Jewel, as well as several others with the desire to act as 'change agents' at the middle management and line supervisor level. As well, it had further refined the nature of the changes needed, thereby providing an excellent start point for examination by key stakeholders.

It is interesting to note that the focused, problem orientated nature of the above Total Quality Management Course was initially opposed by the Army's Directorate of Management Development as they were unsure of its value, as opposed to the standard generic courses of the day ^{Note 47}. Had the course not been directly linked to a project backed by the General Officer Training Command, it is most probable that it would not have proceeded, or if it had, it would not have focused on the wastage issue. Also of interest is that the consultants, who had conducted several generic courses for the Army, were enthused by its real time experiential learning approach and were most pleased with the outcome ^{Note 48}.

4.4 Wining Key Stakeholder Support and Ownership

The next step in the DUNLOP Plan was to win Key Stakeholder support and ownership of the changes that would be required to achieve real change. This was achieved by conducting a highly structured two day examination of the wastage rate issue which involved all of the key stakeholders. Using the excellent historical data sourced from the Army's Directorate of Personnel Planning (going back to 1976) and the data and ideas generated by the Facilitator Course as a basis, the problem solving technique chosen for this much higher level activity was an externally facilitated two day Value Management Workshop. This activity was held at Kapooka in late February 1995 and was attended by:

- ▶ key Defence Force Recruiting staff (including the Director of Army Recruiting, the Senior Army Recruiting Officer - Sydney and the Royal Australian Navy officer leading a review team examining the Defence Recruiting function);
- ▶ key 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff (including the Commandant, Chief Instructor, Training Officer, Regimental Sergeant Major and Officer Commanding Kapooka Medical Centre);
- ▶ representatives of the Army's personnel and financial policy makers;

- ▶ the Army's medical and psychology experts (including the representatives of the Director General Army Health services and Director of Psychology - Army, and the Officer Commanding Albury Wodonga Medical Centre;
- ▶ the Project Team and key Training Policy staff from Headquarters Training Command; and
- ▶ several invited guests (including the Chief Instructor of the Royal Australian Air Force Recruit Training Unit, the Operations Officer of the School of Infantry [a key customer of the recruit training process]) who brought various unique perspectives to the workshop.

It is interesting to note that, the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's trainees were even represented at the Key Stakeholder meeting via the circulation of a hand-written 'summary of grievances' that was secretly organised by a visiting chaplain. A heated discussion on the validity of this summary, certainly contributed to the creative tension that the meeting was intended to generate.

The intention of the Workshop was to use a proven problem solving and consensus building technique to explore the wastage issue. Its overall aim, in the words used by the General Officer Commanding Training Command in his correspondence to all participants, was *"to challenge current assumptions and practices with a view to producing workable and innovative solutions to the wastage problem"*.

The Workshop's stated aims were as shown in Figure 7 ^{Note 49}.

Figure 7

**Project DUNLOP
Key Stakeholder Workshop - Stated Aims**

- *To bring together the key stakeholders in the recruiting and recruit training processes with the single aim of addressing the recruit wastage problem*
- *To generate consensus on the objective of Project DUNLOP*
- *To stimulate creative and 'bottled-up' ideas*
- *To ensure joint ownership of the decisions of the workshop*
- *To reinforce the current enthusiasm for achieving a meaningful and measurable Project result*
- *To generate an improved level of communication and a team focus towards the wastage rate problem which will last long after the workshop has been completed.*

The Workshop structure was based on an *Information Phase*, during which perspectives on the wastage problem were given by the Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command; the Director of Army Recruiting; the Commandant, 1st Recruit Training Battalion; and representatives of the Army's Director of Personnel Planning and Director General of Health Services. Next was an *Analysis Phase*, which clarified the Workshop objectives and examined the Project assumptions, constraints, key issues and concerns; a *Speculation Phase*, which generated ideas and options as to how wastage rate might be reduced; and an *Evaluation Phase*, which evaluated those ideas produced and considered further options. Finally, a *Development Phase*, was used to develop an agreed Project DUNLOP Action Plan.

Based on the author's discussions with the participants, the workshop was considered to be most effective. In particular, the result reinforced the value of hand picking people with a positive attitude toward such an activity. It also reinforced the value of having a few 'outsiders' involved in the process, with the Chief Instructor of the Royal Australian Air Force Recruit Training Unit (for example) providing several excellent insights into successful strategies employed by an organisation in similar circumstances.

At the conclusion of the Workshop, the participants had agreed that the desired outcomes of Project DUNLOP were as shown at Figure 8 ^{Note 50}.

Figure 8

**Project DUNLOP
Key Stakeholder Workshop - Agreed Desired Outcomes**

- *To minimise wastage rates during Recruit and Initial Employment Training*
- *To reduce the costs of such wastage to the Army*
- *To improve the Army's image in the community as a result of reduced failures and injuries during recruit training*
- *To maintain the quality of the recruits marching out of recruit training*
- *To confirm the validity of the Project's methodology for other Continuous Improvement projects within the Army*

In all, 50 actions, encompassing the whole spectrum of the Army's induction process, were agreed upon for inclusion in the initial action plan. To see these outcomes realised, a Project DUNLOP Action Plan was produced. This plan represented the final consolidation of the approaches which the participants had agreed to explore in an effort to reduce the wastage rate. Despite this success, one of the disappointments of the

workshop was that the notion of setting visionary performance goals (such as 15% wastage by December 1995, 10% wastage by December 1996 etc) was dismissed as impractical ^{Note 51}.

Interestingly, prior to the conduct of the workshop, the Directorate of Management Development had, once again, expressed its dissatisfaction with the intended Training Command approach ^{Note 52}. It was strongly opposed to the use of the Value Management technique and exerted strong pressure on the Planning Branch of Headquarters Training Command to dispense with its preferred workshop facilitator in favour of one of their preferred consultants. Had it not been for the fact that a verbal agreement was already in place, and that the facilitator was being funded by Planning Branch, it is highly unlikely that the Value Management approach would have been permitted.

4.5 Forming a Strong Guiding Coalition

One of the key actions agreed upon by the Key Stakeholder Workshop was to establish a Project DUNLOP Steering Group which would oversee the implementation of all other agreed actions. With the Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command as its chairman, the plan was for the Steering Group to meet roughly every three months to ensure that the momentum gained during the early stages of the Project was not lost ^{Note 53}. No time limit was set on the life of the Steering Group. Rather, it was inferred that it would function until the wastage problem was solved - a period generally thought to be two years or less.

As a further sign of the investment that Training Command was willing to make to ensure that the Project and Project Steering Group received adequate staff support, on 5th May 1995, an Army Reserve officer was employed on a full-time basis to co-ordinate the Project.

The key results obtained via the Project DUNLOP Steering Group's progression of the Action Plan are outlined below in order of their perceived impact to date on the wastage problem. It must however, be realised that many of the strategies are interrelated, with benefits derived in one area frequently having positive flow-on effects in others. Additionally, it must be realised that in several areas, Project DUNLOP simply provided added impetus to changes already planned or was used as a means of advancing ideas which had been striving for acceptance for some time.

4.6 Creating Short Term Wins

Conscious of the need to get some early 'runs on the board', the Project DUNLOP Steering Group initially focused on goals that appeared as though they could be relatively easy achieved. Included in this list were elimination of the ability of recruits to take discharge due to the 'Withdrawal of Parental Consent', modification of the training regime at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion to reduce injuries, and the improvement of recruit motivation during training. The Steering Group was also keen to examine the area of psychological screening given that it appeared that approximately

24% of recruits were being discharged as 'Not suited to Military Life due to Psychological Reasons' (see Figure 4).

It must be noted however, that in addition to the above targets, almost all of the 50 'Action Items' developed by the Key Stakeholder Workshop remained on a 'Project DUNLOP Action Plan' that was addressed at each of the Steering Group Meetings.

4.6.1 - Parental Consent

Recognising that many recruits who apply to be discharged, later withdraw their request once they have recovered from the initial shock of training, one of the first quick successes of DUNLOP was to discontinue the policy of allowing recruits under the age of 18 to be discharged as a result of a withdrawal of parental consent. This policy, which the Key Stakeholder Workshop revealed to be unique to the Army among the three Services, allowed for immediate discharge without the normal 42 day cooling off period applied to standard requests for discharge. Even though this change would potentially only effect around 10% of discharges, it was considered to be a very tangible and quick result that would undoubtedly have some immediate effect.

4.6.2 - Recruit Injuries

It was clear from the archival data that the largest proportion of recruit wastage was due to discharge for medical reasons and the current figures (see Figure 4) suggested that this reason was responsible for 46% of discharges. Given this fact, and the belief that this was an area where dramatic early gains could be made, the area of recruit injuries was targeted for rapid improvement.

In accordance with the above, on the 17th April 1995, a revised recruit training program was instituted which allowed greater rest periods between endurance activities and reduced the total amount of running which was known to be a key cause of recruit lower limb injuries. These changes were, however, only seen as an interim step.

In October 1995, following detailed consultations with sports medicine specialists, the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion requested and received the authority from the General Officer Commanding Training Command to fundamentally change the recruit physical training program. Specifically, these changes involved significant modification to the training methods for running, including; the cessation of road runs as a formed body, the introduction of interval training and the introduction of a Recruit Basic Fitness Assessment, which incorporated a 2.4 km run, as opposed to the then current 5 km run. Also, greater control of the speed of marches was introduced, with the loads carried graduated, and deep water running was introduced as a cross training technique. The objective of these changes was to reduce the incidence of running related lower limb injuries to recruits whilst maintaining the overall fitness level of the recruits provided to Training Command's schools.

The statistics on recruit musculo-skeletal injuries between July 1995 and

March 1996, shown at Figures 9 and 10, provide clear evidence of the success of this strategy.

Figure 9

Recruit Upper Limb Injuries : July 1995 - March 1996 ^{Note 54}





Figure 10

Recruit Lower Limb Injuries : July 1995 - March 1996 ^{Note 55}



To prove that this data was not overly influenced by seasonal factors, such as a variation in the quality of recruits provided for training at different times of the year, the last three recruit platoons to complete their training under the pre October 1995 physical training program were compared to the first four recruit platoons to complete their training under the post October 1995 physical training program. The results are shown by Figure 11.

Figure 11

**Comparison of Musculo-skeletal Injuries Sustained
by Similar Groups Undertaking the Pre and Post October 1995
Recruit Physical Training Programs ^{Note 56}**

Period	11 Sep - 4 Dec 95	9 Oct 95 - 22 Jan 96	% change
No of Recruits	113 (3 Platoons)	193 (4 Platoons)	
No of Injuries	30	30	
% of Injuries	26.5%	15.5%	42% fall

One of the many small indicators of the success of the new physical training program was the noticeable fall in the number of bone scans required by the pre and post October 1995 groups. Shown below is a comparison of bone scans (the usual method used to detect suspected stress fractures resulting from physical activity) required by male recruits undertaking the pre and post October 1995 physical training programs.

Figure 12

Comparison of Bone Scans required by Males undertaking the Pre and Post October 1995 Recruit Physical Training Programs ^{Note 57}

Period	1 Jan - 30 Jun 95	1 Jan - 30 Jun 96	% change
No of Recruits	1759	1153	
No of Bone Scans	115	51	
% of Recruits undergoing scans	6.5%	4.4%	35% fall


It should be noted that, at a cost of approximately \$281 per scan, this fall equates to a saving of \$6,744. This is just one of the many, largely unquantified, savings that have undoubtedly resulted from the reduction in recruit injury rates ^{Note 58}.

It would be accurate to say that the focus on injuries generated by Project DUNLOP had the effect of generally raising the profile of this politically sensitive issue. The best example of this was the article, attached as **Enclosure 2**, 'Training injuries force rethink on women's place in the military', published in *The Australian* on 23rd June 1995, which focused on the injuries of female trainees at the Royal Military College Duntroon. This raised awareness, in turn, appears to have influenced the Army's leaders in their consideration of training injuries within the wider Army. In a December 1995 interview with *Army Ordnance*, when asked about potential changes to the Army's Basic Fitness Assessment, the Army's Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Personnel replied, "*The Basic Fitness Assessment is under constant review by the Director General of Army Health Services and Training Command, but Project Dunlop, which is looking at the wastage rate of recruits and Initial Employment Trainees, has given the need for re-examination more emphasis*" (1995:11).

In May 1996 a paper by Major S.J. Rudzki, one of DUNLOP's key supporters, entitled *Development of a Cost Model for Injury and Premature Separation*, provided further startling evidence of the significant cost of injuries to the Army. In particular, his data relating to the Army's medical discharges, shown at Figure 13, indicated that by far the largest number of Regular Army medical discharges were occurring during the first year of a soldiers' service (1996: Annex C). Presumably, the great majority of these medical discharges were due to injuries received during recruit training.

Figure 13

Total Number of Regular Army Soldiers Discharged as Medically Unfit or Below Medical Standard during the period 1 Jan 86 - 30 Apr 96



Indeed, based largely on the persuasive evidence from DUNLOP's early work on training injuries, on 16th June 1996, the Army's Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee approved changes to the Army's Basic Fitness Assessment based on the Recruit Training Battalion model^{Note 59}. It is entirely reasonable to expect that this key change will result in significant long term benefits to the Army's people and finances.

Ironically, partly due to the success of reducing male recruit injuries, the problem of female injuries came to be recognised as one deserving special attention. Indeed, in late February 1996 the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion claimed that although female recruits only made up some 14% of the recruit intake, they accounted for 55% of discharges due to injury and that, relative to their male counterparts, female recruits were *"three times as likely to be discharged for medical reasons"*^{Note 60}.

Given the magnitude of this problem, in late July 1996, Project DUNLOP convened a two day workshop at the Royal Military College Duntroon to specifically focus on female injuries in training. Interestingly, the key finding of this meeting was that it was the level of fitness on entry to induction training, rather than gender, which was the key indicator of likely success. The problem appeared to be that, on average, female entrants tended to be less fit and therefore, at a heightened risk of injury when compared with males^{Note 61}.

Figure 14

Army Cartoon on Basic Fitness Assessment
published 14th November 1996



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4.6.3 Orthotics

Those who do not wear orthotics may not be aware that they are a type of footwear insert. They are usually prescribed by a physician and individually manufactured by a podiatrist in order to improve the bio-mechanical performance of the individual concerned. Early on in the author's investigation of recruit injuries it became clear that some injuries were the direct result of prescription orthotics being removed from recruits on arrival at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. When raised as an issue the Commandant confirmed that this was the current practice and that his belief was that this was current Army policy. He also went on record as saying that he disagreed with the practice and would like to see it cease. Like the parental consent issue described in Section 4.6.1, this seemed to be a relatively clear cut case of poor policy which could be quickly corrected to the benefit of all.

This issue, however, was not so clear cut to the Army's medical establishment who were almost violently divided. Most believed that 'recruits must prove that they can survive the rigours of this training without prescription orthotics' while others argued that orthotics were no different in concept from prescription glasses and, in any case, were worn by approximately 10% of serving soldiers.

Although a breakthrough of sorts was made at the 26th February 1996 Steering Group meeting, when it was agreed that all recruits could wear moulded off-the-shelf inserts, the issue of wearing prescription orthotics remained in contention. To try and break this deadlock, at the 6th May 1996 Steering Group meeting, the author provided a brief which pointed out that the practice of removing orthotics was not in accordance with the extant policy which simply stated that orthotics were 'not to be issued to recruits at Kapooka'. The brief also advised that informal Army Legal Corps advice was that the Commonwealth might well be leaving itself liable to a claim of negligence and the subsequent payment of damages if, for example, it removed from a recruit a prescription device and an injury was suffered as a direct consequence of this act.

Interestingly, the Steering Group's medical representative was unmoved by this advice and indicated that, in any event, the whole area was under review. Nevertheless, the Commandant decided that, irrespective of policy guidance, the practice would cease immediately.

4.6.4 - Recruit Motivation

At the same time as recruit injuries were being addressed, the issue of recruit motivation was acted upon. This factor was seen as being responsible for the 16% of recruits opting for discharge at own request as well as the 10% arranging discharge due to the withdrawal of parental consent.

In an effort to enhance recruit motivation, several changes were made to the training program in order to introduce recruits to the more interesting training activities earlier. The most important of these changes was the introduction of a closely supervised introductory live-fire shoot in week one of training. Also, the initial field training exercise was brought forward from week nine of the program to week three.

In addition to the above, a completely new motivational activity was introduced in the form of a three day adventurous training package in week seven of the recruit course. This addition appears to have been extremely successful and is highlighted by the *Army* article '*High Wire Recruits*' attached as **Enclosure 3**.

4.6.5 - Recruit Culture Shock

In an effort to reduce what was perceived to be the 'culture shock' experienced by recruits, DUNLOP attempted to address both the actual conditions encountered on arrival at Kapooka and recruit expectations prior to arrival. To give applicants a more realistic understanding of the training ahead of them, the glossy "*Year of Challenge*" video used by Defence Force Recruiting Centres was replaced by a much more 'true to life' portrayal of recruit life that was produced with significant Recruit Training Battalion input. Also (again with significant Recruit Training Battalion input) a booklet detailing the answers to "*the 50 questions most commonly asked by recruits*" was produced and made available to potential enlistees.

Another important initiative taken by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion was the formation of a platoon dedicated to improving the way in which recruits are looked after whilst being discharged. Named the 'Weary DUNLOP' Platoon, this organisation is well described in the *The (Wagga Wagga) Daily Advertiser* article 'New platoon trains failed recruits to be civilians', which is attached as **Enclosure 4**. Since the Platoon's establishment, on 12th February 1996, recruit letters, such as those attached at **Enclosure 5**, would suggest that it has been very well received.

4.6.6 - Psychological Screening

Noting that the 1st Recruit Training Battalion data from December 1994 indicated that the second largest reason for recruit discharge was due to psychological reasons (24% of discharges), efforts were made to address this area. Unfortunately, no progress was made due to the insistence of Army's psychologists that their results were 'psychological in confidence' and unable to be examined by anyone but themselves.

4.7 Going for the 'Big Wins'

Having achieved good success in some of its short term goals, towards the end of 1995 the Project DUNLOP Steering Group started to focus its attention on the more difficult targets of pre-enlistment fitness testing, the 'training culture' at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, the concept of 'muster recruiting' and the development of sound wastage statistics.

4.7.1 - Pre-enlistment Fitness Testing

Even given all of the injury reduction achievements at Kapooka, it was considered that there was still significant scope to further decrease the number of discharges by introducing a physical fitness test into the recruit selection process. As of June 1996 the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion estimated that 65% of recruit medical discharges could be directly related to the lack of such a test at the time of recruit selection ^{Note 62}. Although this issue had been frequently raised since the mid 1980's ^{Note 63}, it would appear to have been strongly resisted by the Defence recruiting organisation at every step ^{Note 64}.

The advantages of such a test had been amply demonstrated by Pope's work and are referred to in the article 'You're in the Army Now', published on 8th September 1996 in the *The Canberra Times* and attached as **Enclosure 6**. By using the shuttle test it could be statistically shown that those with a low score were more likely to be injured and therefore had a higher probability of being discharged for medical reasons ^{Note 65}. It was also anticipated that the test would inevitably expose many of the applicants 'previous injuries' and medical conditions, such as asthma, irrespective of whether their existence was being hidden or had genuinely been forgotten. This, in turn, would reduce the number of recruits discharged under the category of 'provision of false information on enlistment'. Regardless of whether the test took the form of a comprehensive pre-selection test or a simple elementary fitness test, it was expected that this initiative

would dramatically reduce the overall wastage rate and the female wastage rate in particular.

The reasons given by the Director of Army Recruiting why this could not be done ranged from lack of time during the recruiting process to a lack of facilities^{Note 66}. Also, the Medical establishment expressed ongoing concern about the legal problems that might eventuate should someone be injured during the test^{Note 67}.

This resistance was somewhat weakened when comprehensive evidence was produced by the DUNLOP Project Officer which showed that almost every state police force, ambulance service and fire brigade conducted some type of occupationally relevant fitness test as a part of their selection procedure. As an example, police recruits in NSW are required to be able to hold, load, grip and squeeze the trigger of a hand-gun; drag a 75 kg human shaped dummy for seven metres; climb a mesh fence etc. It seemed incongruous that no such occupationally relevant fitness tests was used for Army recruit selection.

Despite the pressure being applied through the DUNLOP Steering Group process, it was not until direct discussions were held between the General Officer Commanding Training Command and the Director General Recruiting (the officer in overall charge of recruiting for the three Services) on 22nd July 1996, that it seemed that Recruiting was at last going to give some ground. Having said this, in a brief to the Defence Force Chief of Personnel, dated 23rd September 1996 (**Enclosure 1-9**), the Director General of Recruiting advised that 16 out of the 18 regional Recruiting Units did not have suitable facilities to conduct the test and that he was *"not prepared to fund a single Service initiative involving additional medical expenditure or the hiring of local gymnasiums to conduct fitness tests"*^{Note 68}.

As an aside to the issue of pre-enlistment fitness testing, in late July 1996 it was suggested that injuries might also be reduced by incorporating bio-mechanical screening procedures into the Army's recruiting medicals. These, relatively simple tests, primarily developed by the Australian Institute of Sport for its elite athlete programs, would allow those with a predisposition to various types of injury to be detected. This enhancement of current procedures was also supported by the DUNLOP Steering Group but required action by the Director General of Recruiting.

4.7.2 - The Recruit Training Culture

To address the more complex and sensitive issue of the training culture at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, it was agreed, after wide consultation, to initiate a comprehensive external review of the appropriateness of the cultural aspects of the Army's recruit and Initial Employment Training. Known as the *Soldier Induction Process Cultural Study*, this detailed external review was conducted by a team from Ernst & Young. With the full backing of the DUNLOP Steering Group, this team commenced their review in early June 1996 and delivered a final report in late November 1996. One of the key elements of this Study was a comprehensive survey of a

wide cross-section of the trainees and staff currently in recruit and Initial Employment Training.

The conduct of the Induction Study involved an extensive number of interviews and surveys with those actually involved in the recruit training process. This approach at last acknowledged the recruits as one of the key customers of the induction process and sought to discover their feelings and degree of satisfaction with it.

The overall finding of the Study was that the Army's soldier induction program was extremely successful but nevertheless some improvements could be made (1996:7-1). While strongly praising the staff of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion for their dedication and professionalism, the Study made a number of quite sophisticated suggestions on how the training might be improved. It noted, for example, that the training "*places too much emphasis on fear, threat and motivation by the staff 'driving' the students and too little upon support and self motivation*" (1996:7-2), and that recruits were encouraged to conform, as opposed to develop initiative and a commitment to excellence (1996:8-4).

A series of strategies were suggested to improve this situation including the conduct of regular surveys on various aspects of recruit satisfaction (1996:7-8); encouraging recruits to learn in a more democratic way (1996:8-5); improving the transparency of training to recruits (1996:8-5); the instituting of weekly 'off the record' feedback sessions between recruits and instructors (1996:8.6); the formal gaining of confidential feedback on instructors from recruits (1996:8.7); and improving the way staff are able to express themselves (1996:8-8).

4.7.3 - Muster Recruiting

Another key motivational strategy advanced by the Project DUNLOP Steering Group was the concept of 'muster' recruiting. This concept envisaged recruits actually being enlisted into their choice of employment, as opposed to the traditional 'batching' system which allocated them an area of employment, convenient to the Army, during their sixth week of training ^{Note 69}. It was considered that this system, which was already being used by the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Airforce, would do much to relieve the problem of recruits either discharging at their own request because they were dissatisfied with their allocation or, applying for employment transfers as soon as possible once they had graduated. This initiative was lent weight by the *External Review of ADF Recruiting* which observed, "*Lack of satisfaction with Corps allocations is believed to be a major factor on requests for Corps Transfer and early discharge from the Service*" (1995: 11-3). It was also fully supported by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, who noted that disappointment with employment allocations was the single greatest de-motivator during recruit training, and the most frequently cited cause of 'Discharge at Own Request' submissions ^{Note 70}.

Unfortunately, the spirit of this initiative ran directly counter to the position of the Army's Director of Psychology who reportedly argued that mustering was "*not appropriate to Army because too many trades have no civilian equivalent*", "*Potential*

recruits would have no awareness of some specialised trades", and "...the Army needs to have the opportunity to assess their ability and aptitude for these trades" ^{Note 71}.

4.7.4 - Wastage Statistics


In his text *Introduction to Statistical Quality Control* Montgomery defines statistics as *"the art of making decisions about a process or population based on an analysis of the information contained in a sample of that population"* and points out that statistical methods play a vital role in improvement (1991:21). In DUNLOP's case the key statistic / performance measure of interest was the recruit wastage rate and, within this rate, the wastage rate for each of the various categories of wastage. One, very successful aspect of DUNLOP has already been discussed in the section dealing with recruit injuries. This, however, was a success entirely attributable to the professionalism of the Recruit Training Battalion physiotherapy staff. The larger issue of gathering accurate statistics on the overall wastage rate was, a completely different issue.

In November 1995 the *External Review of the Recruiting Function*, in its report to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, summed up the situation. It noted that, *"the absence of useable, consistent statistics on failure rates as a percentage of recruit numbers and times of the year indicates a significant gap in the management information available to the Defence Force Recruiting Branch"* (1995:10-20). While this comment related to all Service induction institutions, nowhere could it have been more accurate than at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion.

In DUNLOP's early investigations, sound historical data had simply seemed to be unavailable ^{Note 72}. Accordingly, it was assumed that data presented from the period July-November 1994 was both accurate and representative. It was considered that the process of collecting data on wastage was so simple that it was something that could easily be addressed in due course. As time went on however, it was realised that all data emanating from the 1st Recruit Training Battalion was suspect, as it was being manually collected and manipulated by individuals who had no training in or understanding of statistics ^{Note 73}. The resultant inaccuracy of the statistical output of the 1st Recruit Training battalion is discussed in detail at Annex A. Suffice to say that the only accurate record of discharges during the period August 1995 - April 1996 seems to have been developed by the author based on source data collected by the Ernst & Young Soldier Induction Process Study team. This data set is shown at Appendix 2 to Annex A however, the key overall wastage chart is also shown at Figure 15.

Figure 15

**Wastage Rate of all Recruits from 1st Recruit Training Battalion
Intakes : August 1995 - April 1996 (from source data)**



As can be seen from the data at Appendix 2 to Annex A, it would appear as if DUNLOP was most effective in the area of male wastage and that this success is mainly due to a decrease in medically related discharges.

As discussed in Annex A, well researched suggestions were made to the Project DUNLOP Steering Group on how to correct the desperately poor statistics situation, however, despite acknowledging the importance of the problem, the issue remained unresolved throughout 1996.

Finally, it should be noted that in mid 1996 the author did attempt to gather wastage data from the Training Management Cell of Headquarters Training Command. This attempt however was deemed unworthy of pursuit when it was observed, and acknowledged by the operator, that the (incomplete) database in use was treating each 'backsquadded' recruit as being discharged ^{Note 74}.

4.8 Institutionalising New Approaches

Unfortunately, the opportunity to consolidate improvements and institutionalise new approaches was largely denied to the DUNLOP Steering Group. At the 6th August 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group Meeting, the Chairman, on the direction of the newly appointed General Officer Commanding Training Command, formally advised all stakeholders that DUNLOP would be 'wound up' on 1st December 1996. No explanation was provided at the time, however, from subsequent informal discussions with the Chairman, it would appear that General considered DUNLOP to be outside of the 'core business' of his Headquarters ^{Note 75}.

As a result of the above decision, all outstanding strategies were 'handed-off', with the appropriate stakeholders being made responsible for implementation. This hand-off occurred at the 24th October 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group meeting held in Canberra. In essence, it left the Director of Army Recruiting to pursue the issue of pre-selection fitness testing, the Army's Director of Personnel Planning to pursue muster recruiting, the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion to pursue the improvement of his unit's training culture in accordance with the guidance offered by the *Soldier Induction Process Culture Study* and the Operations Branch of Headquarters Training Command to pursue the improvement of recruit wastage statistics ^{Note 76}.

Overall, however, it must be said that it appeared to some (notably the author) that the Wastage Project was being closed down just as its key initiatives were beginning to be realised. Without the stimulus provided by the Project DUNLOP Steering Group, it was thought highly likely that several of the 'more difficult' initiatives would be sidelined. The Director of Army Recruiting, for example, was in favour of incorporating simple bio-mechanical screening procedures into the Army's recruiting medicals which would detect those with a predisposition to various types of injury ^{Note 77}. While these procedures would undoubtedly be an excellent addition to the screening process, a cynical view might be that this was a ploy to negate, or at least defuse, the argument for the introduction of the more onerous pre-selection fitness test.

In addition to the above, it was considered by the author that DUNLOP had only just started to reach the stage of maturity (and level of co-operation with the other Services) which might have allowed true benchmarking to take place. Since the very beginning of DUNLOP the desirability of benchmarking the Army's induction process with the induction processes of the other Services had been acknowledged. Indeed, representatives of the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force had been active participants in all of DUNLOP's key workshops and this co-operation had led to several visits between recruit training establishments and the adoption of a number of innovations. Notably, the abolition of 'Withdrawal of Parental Consent' as a category of recruit discharge and the introduction of an adventurous training roping course for recruits were both gained from the Air Force's 1st Recruit Training Unit. Also, the development of strong support for the concept of muster recruiting was heavily influenced by the experiences of both Navy and Air Force. Despite these interchanges, as at December 1996, no attempt had been made to compare recruit discharge data between the Services.

It is also worth noting one final area that DUNLOP had effectively left untouched. Aside from the initial calculations used by the author to harness interest, no attempt had been made to accurately assess the cost of recruit wastage to the Army or to seriously articulate the productivity savings that had been, or might have been, achieved via the DUNLOP process. This situation, although unfortunate, is perhaps not at all surprising given the failure to come to grips with the much more basic issue of collecting accurate wastage statistics.

4.9 Post Project Developments

As stated above, following the handing off of the DUNLOP responsibilities, it appeared to this author as though the full potential of the Project might never be realised. This might indeed have been the case had a new, and much larger, 'driver of change' not fortuitously arrived on the scene.

Early in 1997 the new Chief of the Army unveiled a sweeping plan for change known as Restructuring the Army. One of the key elements of this change was a far greater reliance on the part-time component of the Army known as the General Reserve.

Traditionally, due to the need to limit their absence from their civil employment, Reservists had only undertaken a two week recruit course, as opposed to the Regular Army's ten week course. If the Reserve was now to play an enhanced role in the Nation's defence, this previously tolerated discrepancy needed to be addressed ^{Note 78}. Accordingly, in February 1997, the Chief of the Army Advisory Group agreed that those joining both the Regular and General Reserve elements of the Army would undergo a common basic training program. This program was termed Common Induction Training and its implementation was made the responsibility of the Army's Chief of Personnel and the Commander of its training organisation ^{Note 79}.

Noting that General Reserve soldiers have to be released from their normal civil employment to undergo basic training, a recruit course of ten weeks was no longer viable. Accordingly, one of the areas requiring major change was the length of the new common recruit course and a period of (approximately) six weeks was decided upon ^{Note 80}. This reduced course length essentially demanded an entire rethink of the Army's induction process and to implement it, a working group was established which effectively re-raised the Project DUNLOP Steering Group, only under a different name. This new group however had a much higher level directive and, accordingly, a much clearer focus.

A powerful illustration of the momentum of the Common Induction Training initiative is the dramatic re-engineering of the existing ten week recruit course into the new six and a half week course which commenced at Kapooka on 21st October 1997. Also, because of the time constraints on the General Reserve trainees, another key outcome of the Common Induction Training directive was an even greater need to reduce injuries which might delay the completion of the course. In essence, the traditional approach of 'back-squadding' injured recruits was now much less acceptable. This need effectively guaranteed that the pre-enlistment physical fitness test concept, so long advocated by DUNLOP, and the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, could no longer be avoided by the Defence recruiting organisation. Interestingly, this requirement coincided with the appointment of the previous Director of Infantry as the new Director General of Recruiting. Having seen first hand the problem caused by injuries in training, this new director was in favour of a pre-enlistment physical fitness test ^{Note 81}. Accordingly, Recruiting quickly embraced the concept, issued an excellent guide to the test (shown at Figure 18) and officially introduced it to Recruiting Units in mid July 1997.

It would also seem that Common Induction Training also inspired the introduction of a variation of batch recruiting whereby groups of recruits, having completed their basic training, move on, as a group, to their Initial Employment Training. At a Common Induction Training Working Group meeting attended by the author on 23 October 1997 both the Directors of Infantry and Artillery reported that the recruit groups they had received under this system had exceptionally good motivation. At the time of writing, it could not be established if this system will evolve into true muster recruiting as advocated by DUNLOP. In the opinion of the new Director General of Recruiting this, however, would seem to be a likely outcome, especially given changes to the structure of the Defence Personnel Program, brought about by the Defence Reform Program ^{Note 82}.

Common Induction Training also seems to have further reinforced the need to implement the cultural change recommendations of the *Soldier Induction Process Culture Study*. As illustrated by the 26 June 1997 *Army* article 'No personnel at RISC in new Kapooka' at **Enclosure 7**, the 'dreaded' Recruit Instructor Selection Course (RISC) has been replaced by a much less daunting Recruit Instructor Development Course (RIDC). A course focused on finding instructors with the right attitude, as opposed to those with outstanding instructional skill.

In regard to recruit wastage statistics, the Operations Branch of Headquarters Training Command did indeed publish a comprehensive report on the outcomes of Training Year 1996/97 in November 1997, the key pages of which are attached as Annex B. The report presents some potentially interesting data in relation to age group, delays in training and categories of discharge. For example, the most successful male age group was 22, with only 7% being discharged, whereas the most successful female age group was 24, with 25% being discharged ^{Note 83}. It is however most disappointing that the report lacks clarity in many areas, draws no conclusions and makes no recommendations.

Although the sample size at the time of writing was very small (only 259 recruits), it is most interesting to compare the pre Common Induction Training wastage rates with those being experienced at the time of writing ^{Note 84}. This comparison, which included the eight months worth of source data developed by the author for the period August 1995 - April 1996, is shown at Figure 19. It shows unexpectedly high recruit wastage during 1996-97 but predictably improved results since the commencement of Common Induction Training, which would seem to be reaping the benefits of the newly introduced pre-enlistment fitness test.

Figure 16

Army Recruiting Brochure : *Are you fit to join the Army? A simple guide to passing the Army's pre-entry fitness assessment* (published mid 1997)

Cover

Introduction Page



Not surprisingly, physical fitness plays a vital role in both the full-time and part-time Army, especially during basic training.

In fact, on the day of your enlistment, you must pass a fitness assessment or you won't be accepted. So you can see just how important it is to be fit. But don't think you have to be a world-class athlete.

The fitness assessment is not an incredibly difficult one and most people have little trouble passing it. If you're an active person who walks, runs, swims or plays competitive sport, you should pass without a worry.



This pamphlet explains what you'll need to do to pass the Army's pre-entry fitness assessment and shows you how to perform the exercises properly. There's also a detailed programme designed to help you reach the level of fitness needed in only four weeks.

The Army's pre-entry fitness assessment has three parts and you must pass each one to join the Army.

Figure 17

**Comparison of Recruit Wastage Data from the periods
August 1995 - April 1996, July 1996 - June 1997
and 21 October 1997 - 20 January 1998**

Period	Male	Female	Total
Aug 95 - Apr 96	12.32%	28%	14.38%
Jul 96 - Jun 97	15.97%	37.97%	20.03%
Oct 97 - Jan 98	5.6%	11.11%	6.54%

Overall, if the 1996-97 data produced by Headquarters Training Command is assumed to be accurate, it would appear as if DUNLOP had no lasting quantitative effect on the wastage problem. This outcome is surprising and is therefore somewhat suspect. It is indeed unfortunate that this author was denied the opportunity to independently examine the source data ^{Note 85}. It was also disappointing to discover that the 1st Recruit Training Battalion did not have its own data which could have been compared with that of Headquarters Training Command ^{Note 86}.

On a final note, it was pleasing to discover that the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion has now issued firm direction that the Battalion establish its own credible database ^{Note 87}. This action, if acted upon, might at least ensure that the wastage resulting from Common Induction Training has some chance of being correctly recorded.

Chapter Five

Discussion

5.1 So, how did it go?

Viewed from almost any perspective, Project DUNLOP was an exciting opportunity to facilitate desperately needed high value change. Kellehear notes that the discussion section of a thesis seeks to "*to link back to the literature review and theoretical framework*", and answers such questions as, "*How right were we after all? How wrong were we? Where did we go wrong? How are the findings accounted for in light of the theory? Does the theory need modification and in what ways?*" (1993: 19-20). This chapter seeks to address these questions. Readers should note however, that its content relies on them having a sound knowledge of all previous chapters.

5.2 The 'Strategy for Change'

Almost without exception, the importance of planning change was stressed by all authors reviewed in literature. DUNLOP took this requirement seriously and, using the Dunphy & Stace approach outlined at Figure 3, developed an essentially 'soft' incremental approach to change. Shown at Figure 5, this approach appeared to be right for the circumstances. It did, however, rely heavily upon, what appeared to be firm direction from senior management, to generate the required commitment and teamwork between the various stakeholders.

The outcomes of this approach are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

5.2.1 - Stage 1 : Creating a Higher Level Recognition of the Need for Change

While Sullivan et al. note that "*effective, long-lasting change can seldom be mandated from the top*" (1995:29), many of the authors reviewed join with Hutton in pointing out the necessity of top management recognising that there is a compelling need to change (1994:36). Indeed, Hammonds stresses that, if they do not recognise this need, they may be one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome (1991:28).

It is fair to suggest that the Project team (at this stage essentially consisting of the author) had a fairly inward, and hence somewhat naive, view of the world. Because a directive had been issued by the General Officer Training Command to 'make it so', the need to create a 'higher level recognition of the need for change' was essentially taken as a given. The General's direct involvement in the issue had obviously created a sense of urgency at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, and from discussions with a series of stakeholders, there seemed to be widespread support for the concept of reducing wastage. All in all, the Project was deemed to have had an excellent start.

A better analysis of the senior management input vital to the success of the Project, would have identified the importance of having both the Director General of Recruiting and, more importantly, his superior, the Chief of Defence Force Personnel, firmly committed to the goal of reducing wastage. Had this been recognised at this early stage, a 'General to General' arrangement could have been worked out which would have saved much frustration at the Project DUNLOP Steering Group level.

Another deficiency in this first stage was the failure to get senior management to clearly articulate a vision or desired endpoint and a desired time-frame. Collins et al. argue most convincingly that many of those companies that are truly successful commit themselves to huge, daunting challenges; what they refer to as "*Big, Hairy, Audacious Goals*" (1996:73-75). They also point out that these goals should be clear and compelling so that they might serve as a unifying focal point and act as a catalyst for team spirit, irrespective of the chances of success. Using this logic, it would have been most desirable to get the General Officer Commanding Training Command and the Chief of Defence Force Personnel to jointly issue a directive that required ambitious reductions in wastage and identified targets such as 'below 15% per annum by the end of 95, below 10% pa by the end of 96' etc.

Given that these goals were not set from above, it was easy for DUNLOP's stakeholders to refuse to set them for themselves, therefore avoiding the possibility of being seen to fail. Within the term of DUNLOP, no "*big, hairy, audacious goal*" was set. Arguably, the consequence of this failing was that one was never achieved.

5.2.2 - Stage 2 : Building a Grass Roots 'Energy for Change'

The concept of developing an 'energy for change' was taken from Carnall. Using his argument that the "*energy for change*" in any group or organisation will equate to "*the dissatisfaction felt with the current situation*" multiplied by "*the level of knowledge of the practical steps forward*" and "*the shared vision*" (1990:99), the second stage of the DUNLOP plan was to create an 'energy for change' at the grass roots level prior to bringing together the key stakeholders in Stage Three.

It must be said that this stage was very successful. At the end of the focused five day Total Quality Management course held at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, the people closest to the problem agreed that there really was a problem and were genuinely 'dissatisfied'. Importantly, the course had also engendered a strong vision of what could be achieved and a feeling of ownership for the potential solutions. In other words, it had achieved all of the elements deemed necessary by Carnall. In addition, the course had revealed a huge amount of previously unknown information, especially in relation to additional stakeholders and the location of pre-existing data.

The single aspect of the course that might have been improved was the preparation of the newly appointed Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion for its outcomes. The lack of this opportunity was, however, brought on by circumstance rather than a lack of recognition of its importance.

5.2.3 - Stage 3 : Winning Key Stakeholder Support and Ownership

Like the focused grass roots course in Phase Two, the two day Key Stakeholder Workshop was designed to create an 'energy for change' but at the next level up in the hierarchy. The mix and level of representation at the Workshop seemed excellent and its Value Management approach of 'challenging assumptions' and developing an agreed 'Action Plan' were very well received.

It is, however, considered that the Workshop went wrong in two areas. Firstly, as alluded to in Section 5.2.1, the collective group of stakeholders refused to acknowledge the importance of setting any wastage rate targets let alone any ambitious target of the type referred to in Section 5.2.1. Secondly, it failed to effectively cull the number of actions listed in the Project 'Action Plan'. This effectively prepared the ground for a 'shotgun' approach to change to be adopted and failed to heed the advice of Dichter et al. who suggested that rather than trying to 'fix everything at once' it makes good sense to focus on just a few strategies and to devote a lot of energy to them to ensure that measurable progress is achieved (1993:105).

5.2.4 - Stage 4 : Forming a Strong Guiding Coalition

One of the outcomes of the well received Key Stakeholder Workshop was the formation of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group. Like the Workshop, this group seemed to have the right mix and level of representation and there was no reason to expect that it would not be effective. In particular, it was considered that the increased personal contact between stakeholders that would result from regular Steering Group meetings would play a significant role in facilitating communication and positive change.

5.2.5 - Stage 5 : Creating Short Term Wins

In his article *Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail*, Kotter strongly advocates the need to create and celebrate short term wins, a strategy designed to encourage those involved in the change effort to carry on. He also advised that such wins must be widely publicised and those involved recognised and rewarded for their efforts (1995:105).

Despite having some 50 actions to deal with, the concept of creating early wins was well understood by the DUNLOP Steering Group. It must be said, however, that the initial focus was on those areas where it was considered results would be easiest to achieve, as opposed to those areas that might have had the most dramatic impact on the problem at hand. The pre-enlistment fitness test, for example, was felt to be vitally important but achievable only once the Director of Army Recruiting became more enthused with the spirit of the Wastage Project.

As indicated in Chapter Four, DUNLOP's early efforts produced mixed results.

- ▶ **Parental Consent** : The early win regarding a change in the policy of allowing under-age recruits to withdraw from training once parental consent was withdrawn was real enough. It was however, not overly significant and to publicise it would simply have made the Army look foolish for unnecessarily adhering to such a policy in the first place.
- ▶ **Recruit Injuries** : The early wins in the area of recruit injuries were, in contrast to the above, most significant. As Figures 9-12 show, quite dramatic gains were made in reducing injuries and costs. This was an achievement which heavily influenced changes within the wider Army in the form of a revised Army Basic Fitness Assessment. It must be noted however that, in this particular area, DUNLOP was simply very lucky. Almost by chance, it occurred at a time when it was able to support two physiotherapists at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion who were undertaking external studies on their own initiative. Had this situation not been in place, it is extremely unlikely that such comprehensive and persuasive data would have been available. It must also be noted that although the efforts of both physiotherapists were acknowledged and appreciated, they were not formally recognised in any significant way.
- ▶ **Orthotics** : The win on the issue of orthotics, much like parental consent, was a small one which, if publicised, would have made the Army look extremely foolish. In any case, given the ongoing internal debate within the Army's medical establishment, it was far from being a clear cut victory.
- ▶ **Recruit Motivation and Culture Shock** : In the area of recruit motivation, the introduction of the 'high wire' course was a clear success which, as illustrated by **Enclosure 2**, received wide publicity. Its link to wastage however was too tenuous and accordingly it was unable to be exploited. Similarly, the small wins in the area of culture shock were too tenuous to link to any reductions in wastage.
- ▶ **Psychological Screening** : The failure to produce any outcome in the area of psychological screening was frustrating and acknowledged as such by the Chairman of the Steering Group ^{Note 88}.

5.2.6 - Stage 6 : Going for the 'Big Wins'

The concept of achieving 'big wins' was essentially an extension of the philosophy of achieving short term wins. The thought was that as the Steering Group process gained momentum, some of the more difficult and contentious issues could be better handled.

As in Stage Five, this stage produced mixed results. It achieved a brilliant success in the area of the training culture at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, but only

managed limited progress on the issues of pre-enlistment fitness testing, muster recruiting and the collection of accurate wastage statistics.

With regard to the development of accurate statistics, it must be said that the failure of the Steering Group to address this issue meant that it not only had no grasp of changes in the wastage situation but could also make no comment on wastage rates with any confidence whatsoever. This was a situation that made it virtually impossible to claim any results at all, let alone the 'unambiguous positive results' which Kotter suggested were necessary to counter those opposing change (1995:65).

5.2.7 - Stage 7 : Institutionalising New Approaches

Given the unexpected termination of the Project in late 1996, this final stage of the Project was not able to be implemented as planned. Instead, it consisted of the handing over of uncompleted strategies to the responsible stakeholders with the request that they be separately progressed. The one key exception to this was the changes to the training culture at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. In this case, the requirement to implement the agreed recommendations of the *Soldier Induction Process Study* was included in the Commandant's personal directive from the General Officer Training Command.

5.3 Post Project Developments

The events post-DUNLOP provide an extremely interesting contrast to the Project itself in that another quite powerful driver to reduce wastage arrived on the scene in the form of Common Induction Training, itself being driven by the Chief of the Army's 'Restructuring the Army' initiative. This new driver produced a new sense of 'sense of urgency' to reduce wastage. On this occasion however, change was being driven from a much higher level and both the General Officer Commanding Training Command (now known as Commander, Training Command - Army) and the Army's Chief of Personnel had been directed to develop the Common Induction Training initiative.

Just as DUNLOP was able to build on initiatives that came before it, so too was Common Induction Training able to build upon DUNLOP. Accordingly, several of the DUNLOP strategies handed off were given new life. In particular, the long fought for pre-enlistment physical fitness test was finally introduced in mid July 1997 with seemingly quite dramatic results. Indeed, in addition to detecting those statistically most likely to be injured during training, the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion also observed that the test works at the psychological level, as those applicants with the right attitude are those most likely to put the effort into passing it ^{Note 89}.

5.4 Resistance to Change

Although authors such as Hammonds (1991), Buchanan and Boddy (1992), Waldersee and Blackstock (1993), Hutton (1994) and Kotter (1995) stress the importance of planning for resistance to change, it is evident that this factor was not

adequately taken into account in DUNLOP's planning. Indeed, if only from the plethora of literature on such resistance in the military, it demanded much greater consideration.

In addition to the general reluctance to set any targets for wastage reduction, resistance to DUNLOP was encountered from a variety of areas. Its use of a focused Total Quality Management course to prepare the way for higher consideration was resisted by the Army's Directorate of Management Development as was its use of the Value Management approach to conduct the Key Stakeholder Workshop. Resistance to virtually any major change involving recruiting was encountered from the Defence recruiting organisation, and very lukewarm assistance was obtained from the Army's medical and psychological establishments.

In the case of all of the above, it is evident that the 'early wins' were not significant enough to influence all players. Also, although Waterman points out that "*it is only common-sense that people are most likely to support what they have had a hand in creating*" (1987:7), in the case of DUNLOP, it would seem that the benefits of co-operative effort (in the absence of firm direction) were somewhat limited.

5.5 Measuring Change

Despite the immense value offered by effective performance indicators, it is evident that a widespread lack of understanding of even basic statistics existed in several key areas of the induction process. At the end of DUNLOP nothing had been done to overcome "*the absence of useable, consistent statistics on failure rates as a percentage of recruit numbers and times of the year..*" identified by the *External Review of the Recruiting Function* (1995:10-20).

Overall, the Project was incredibly slow to recognise the data problem and, when it finally acknowledged the problem, it failed to take effective action. Because of this failure, the project (aside from a quite superficial initial analysis) did not ever truly explore the link between wastage and financial productivity, and despite good contacts with the other Services, was never able to meaningfully benchmark the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's wastage rates with those of the Royal Australian Navy or Royal Australian Air Force or any other institutions.

5.6 The Role of the Sponsor

Kotter makes the point that sponsors must not only direct change they must also aggressively communicate their initiative and seek to motivate people to co-operate with the strategies required to make it work (1995:60). As discussed in Section 5.2.1, DUNLOP seriously underestimated the issue of sponsorship and what the sponsor must do. Although the sponsorship of the General Officer Commanding Training Command had an obvious and direct effect on Training Command, and to a lesser extent, on the Army, it proved insufficient to truly influence the wider Defence players. Accordingly, because an understanding had not been reached with the superior of the Director General of Recruiting, DUNLOP experienced considerable resistance to change in this area. Likewise, the importance of the sponsor stating exactly what the desired end point was,

was not appreciated. This was an oversight that led to considerable frustration as the Project proceeded.

This experience can be contrasted with the change driven by the Common Induction Training initiative, which suffered from neither of these deficiencies.

In order for a project to get a good start it might well be necessary for the sponsor to use every means at his or her disposal to charge the change process with energy and sweep people along. Just some of the strategies that might have been used are a series of personal letters to key stakeholders; a series of visits to key stakeholders to "walk the talk"; the linking employee appraisals with how they have helped (or not helped) to support the project's vision; and, ongoing upward liaison to ensure that the highest level of management is aware of and visibly supportive of the project's endstate. All of these activities should be stage managed to inspire the project's people, to create a sense of excitement about its future direction and engender a feeling of confidence in the vision.

The issue of sponsor succession is also of considerable importance to a project, especially in a military environment which has a two year posting cycle. As Kotter points out, if this succession is not handled properly, years of hard work and progress could literally be undone, regardless of the momentum built up (1995:67). In retrospect, this is exactly what happened to DUNLOP.

5.7 The Sum of the Parts

To sum up the outcome of DUNLOP it is useful to reflect on Carnall's formula for creating the *"energy for change"*. This formula dictates that this energy will be equal to *"the dissatisfaction felt with the current situation"* multiplied by *"the level of knowledge of the practical steps forward"* and *"the shared vision"* (1990:99).

In the case of DUNLOP, it might be argued that the level of dissatisfaction created was adequate within Training Command, but not great enough for some of the key non-Training Command participants. Given the lack of higher guidance obliging them to act with urgency, the moral and productivity imperatives of the wastage issue were simply too vague to effectively motivate them. (A situation which can be contrasted with Common Induction Training, where higher guidance has obviously provided the motivation to act).

One thing that DUNLOP certainly did not lack was the second element of Carnall's formula. In addition to a strategy to approach the problem, a mass of knowledge and ideas were available to the Steering Group from: earlier studies of the wastage problem, conducted by the likes of Slater (1984); the staff of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion; the likes of Rudzki and Pope; the *Soldier Induction Process Culture Study*; the other Services; and non-military organisations such as the state police forces and fire brigades. The one exception to this wealth of knowledge was an accurate appreciation of the true wastage situation. A glaring failing for any group seeking to improve a process.

The final element of a shared vision can also be identified as a weak point for the Project. There was no agreed "*big, hairy, audacious goal*", or time-frame, that inspired bold action.

The combination of the above circumstances in fact leads to a very weak "*energy for change*". It is an interesting confirmation of Carnall's approach that this is exactly the fate that befell DUNLOP. It was a fate that meant that the Project, like the wider efforts of Total Quality Management within the Army, failed to produce what Starry referred to as a "*convincing demonstration of value*" (1994:25). Hence it did not survive to go onto bigger and better things ^{Note 90}.

5.8 Limitations on Work

It must be recognised that this thesis does suffer from a number of limitations.

Firstly, due to the very real need to quickly develop a strategy to address the recruit wastage problem, not enough was read prior to its commencement. Accordingly, the merit of many ideas was only appreciated after the opportunity to incorporate them in the Project had passed. Perhaps the most significant of these 'missed ideas' was the need to carefully consider how to overcome resistance to change before it actually becomes a problem. Nevertheless, it is pleasing to note that several concepts developed in the literature after the commencement of the project, were in fact taken into account during its planning. Perhaps the most important of these relates to the need for an ambitious vision to inspire urgency and bold action.

It must also be recognised that, once the Wastage Project was set in motion, the author was only one of many (often higher ranking) participants. While much could be influenced, there was also much that could not. This however was the price to pay for being involved a project of consequence where many stakeholders had very real and different agendas.

Likewise, it is recognised that the Wastage Project was only one activity. Having said this, it was considered that its outcomes would be able to be generalised. Also, although future projects would be different in many ways from DUNLOP, it was considered that it was likely that its conclusions would be able to be replicated.

Fourthly, it must be said that there are undoubtedly aspects of the Wastage Project that this thesis has not done justice to. This is simply due to its complexity and the many different stakeholders involved. In some cases however it might be due to the fact that the author was simply too close to the issues and this reduced the degree of objectivity that was exercised. Also, some pieces of data could not, or were not, collected due to real or perceived organisational restraints imposed on the author as a serving officer in the Australian Army. For example, the author did not seek to interview the Commander of Army's Training Command regarding his decision to close down DUNLOP. In cases such as this, comments are based on observation and third party input.

Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

Sharp et al. point out that quite different conclusions might be reached by different analysts (1996:21). At the very least, it must be said that Project DUNLOP failed to produce credible data that proved that it had succeeded. Having said this, the worth of its policy innovations cannot be denied and, lack of data aside, it undoubtedly laid the foundation for dramatically lower wastage under the Common Induction Training system. It also allowed the author to draw a series of conclusions that will hopefully be of real value to those who would attempt similar improvement efforts, within and external to the Army.

The key conclusions drawn from DUNLOP are considered to be as follows:

- ▶ **Creating a 'Strategy for Change'** : The experience of Wastage Project adds weight to the validity of Carnall's 'Energy for Change' formula (1990:99). Those seeking to bring about effective change must ensure that there is indeed a genuine dissatisfaction with the status quo, a shared vision of what needs to be achieved and an articulated strategy for moving towards the new state. In addition, even when all of these aspects are in place, it is highly desirable that a project quickly achieve a 'convincing demonstration of value' to cement its place in the organisation.
- ▶ **Resistance to Change** : The degree of resistance to change suffered in the Defence environment is likely to be inversely proportional to the degree of commitment to the change displayed by top management. If this full commitment does not exist, as it did not in DUNLOP, expect organisational politics to take precedence over issues such as the 'common good'. Indeed, Army projects would do well to start on the premise that they will be operating within a culture that is quintessentially conservative, bureaucratic and largely unconcerned with costs.
- ▶ **Measuring Change** : Change agents within the Army should be alert to the fact that performance measures are likely to be misunderstood, inaccurate and/or poorly used, however, they are vital to proving a project's success. Accordingly, the temptation to bypass the difficult, and seemingly less interesting, task of improving these measures must be strongly avoided.
- ▶ **The Role of the Sponsor** : In the Defence environment the attitude of top management towards change will be critical. Prior to commencing a project it is therefore advisable to ensure that *all* of the senior managers involved are fully supportive and openly committed to its success. In particular, it is most desirable to have an agreed "*big, hairy, audacious goal*" (with a time-frame)

that inspires bold action. If this is not achieved, as happened in DUNLOP, Hammonds makes a most valid point that senior management might present "*one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome*" (1991:28).

6.2 Recommendations

In regard to the Army's recruit induction process and the use of Quality Management techniques within the Australian Army, the following is recommended:

- ▶ The method of wastage rate calculation proposed at Annex A, together with the use of a simple fraction non-conforming control chart, should be adopted by the 1st Recruit Training Battalion to monitor, and further reduce, recruit wastage.
- ▶ Reference to this thesis should be made on appropriate Defence management courses so interested parties might have a reasonable chance of being able to access it via the Defence Library System.
- ▶ The Army should actively seek to conduct a series of high value improvement projects which draw upon the experience of DUNLOP and any other like projects undertaken both within and outside of Defence.

6.3 Suggestions for Future Work

The following suggestions are made for future work:

- ▶ The military is in desperate need of improvement in many areas. High value projects such as DUNLOP should be frequently attempted and the results added to the knowledge base of how best to approach change in the military environment.
- ▶ It would be interesting to examine the implementation of Total Quality Management within the Army, to explore why it failed and to draw lessons of potential value to other large organisations approaching the same challenge.
- ▶ Quality theories might be better accepted in some areas of the military if they were expressed in familiar military terminology. It might therefore be interesting to see if such an approach produced better results than the use of standard terminology.

Notes

1. Direction issued at Training Management conference held at 1st Recruit Training Battalion on 28th October 1994. See minutes of conference on Headquarters Training Command Minute OPS 7135/94 (file 93/113) dated 3rd November 1994.
2. Director of Psychology Minute P/174/76, *Review Boards at 1 RTB*, to the Director of Personnel Planning regarding dated 17th June 1976. [Enclosure 1-1]
3. Director of Psychology Minute A84/3956, *RTB Wastage*, to the Assistant Chief of the General Staff (Personnel) - Army dated 20th June 1989.
4. Margin note by the Chief of the Defence Force on Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Personnel) Minute 844/89, *Defence Manpower Statistics - Involuntary Separations*, to the Chief of the Defence Force, dated 25th May 1989. [Enclosure 1-3]
5. Discussions conducted by author during the period 11th-18th November 1994 with the following:
 - a. Staff Officer Strength Management, Army Directorate of Personnel Planning (Canberra).
 - b. Operations Officer, School of Infantry (Singleton).
 - c. Commanding Officer, Albury-Wodonga Medical Unit (Albury-Wodonga).
 - d. Deputy Commander, 5th Training Group (Perth).
 - e. Commanding Officer, School of Infantry (Singleton).
 - f. Commanding Officer, School of Artillery (Sydney).
 - g. Commanding Officer, School of Engineers (Sydney).
 - h. Staff Officer Personnel, 1st Recruit Training Battalion (Kapooka).
 - i. Chaplain, Army Chaplain Centre (Sydney).
6. Director of Costing and Financial Analysis - Army, Minute 013/94, *Costing of Recruit Training - 1 RTB Financial Year 93/94*, dated 13th January 1995.
7. *An External Review of into the ADF Recruiting Function*, November 1995, Volume 1, page 4-7, paragraph 4.32, which gave the 1994/95 cost of enlisting a recruit as \$9,086.37.
8. *Ibid*, page 8-3, which estimated the medical costs per recruit enlisted to be \$179.
9. In accordance with Chief of the General Staff Advisory Group Submission Number 26/92 (Introduction of Total Quality Management), on 26 March 1993, funds of \$0.55 million in Financial Year 1993/94 and \$0.52 million in Financial Year 1994/95 were provided to "provide the initial investment to implement TQM programs".
10. This sponsorship included the author and two other officers from the Planning Branch of Headquarters Training Command, Sydney.
11. This objective is identified on page 4 of *Army Office Staff Instruction 17/94* (file A93-33240/1), *The Army Improving Management Program : Quality Management in the Army*, dated 5th July 1994.
12. Perhaps as a result of some of the insights gained whilst enjoying the benefits of postgraduate Quality Management studies.
13. Discussion between author and Staff Officer Grade One Management Development, December 1994.

14. An observation based on the author's attendance at regular Army level Quality Forum meetings.
15. It should be noted that the Army's General Entry Soldier and General Service Officer induction processes are similar except that the basic training for the later is much more comprehensive and takes place at the Royal Military College in Canberra over a much longer period.
16. Service in the Ready Reserve involved one year of full time training / service followed by four years of part-time Army service in nominated units. In early 1996 a decision was made to discontinue the scheme. Ready Reserve officers undertook four weeks of basic training at Kapooka followed by further training at the Royal Military College, Duntroon in Canberra.
17. Based on statement by the Director of Army Recruiting at the Project DUNLOP Steering Group meeting held on 4th July 1995.
18. Based on Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion data presented at the Project DUNLOP Steering Group meeting held on 26th February 1996.
19. *Op Cit, An External Review of into the ADF Recruiting Function*, page 10-7, paragraph 10.19.
20. *Ibid*, page 10-10, paragraph 10.26.
21. Those recruits selected for the Army's Adult Trade Training Scheme are trained by 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff outposted to the Army Logistic Training Centre, Latchford Barracks (previously known as the Army's College of Technical and Further Education) located at Albury Wodonga.
22. See Note 6.
23. A statement based on the author's interview with one of the senior officers of Headquarters Training Command on 18th November 1994. It is also backed up by observations later made by *Soldier Induction Process Culture Study* (see Section 4.7.2 of the text) as reported by Mugford who noted that, '*other things being equal, ..., high wastage rates are often culturally accepted as defensible, usually by reference to rhetoric such as 'you can't make omelettes without breaking eggs'*' (1996:12).
24. Based on words used by the Chairman of Project DUNLOP Steering Group, Colonel Peter Lawrence, in an address (delivered jointly with the author) to a joint meeting of the Public Sector Quality Network and the Canberra Evaluation Forum in Canberra on 19th June 1997.
25. At considerable personal risk 'Weary' Dunlop, cared for Australian prisoners of war on the infamous Thai-Burma Railroad. After the Second World War he continued to work with all victims of war and in 1976 was named Australian of the Year. His contribution to Australian society was also recently commemorated on a 45c postage stamp and a 50c coin.
26. Based on research conducted for the author by the Training Management Cell of the Operations Branch of Headquarters Training Command. This research indicated that the School of Infantry Initial Employment training course had a wastage rate of approximately five percent.
27. Noted by Nicholas Jans (1989:172).
28. This notion is supported by authors such as Richard Pascale et al. who in *Changing the way we Change*, point to the similarities between Sears (a large American Retail Company), Royal Dutch Shell (a large petroleum company) and the United States Army (1997:128-139)

29. For more information on the Federal Express approach to performance see Shapiro (1997:101).
30. Having said this, Dixon, for one, makes the point that Australian soldiers have always been relatively free from the more extreme 'spit and polish' tendencies of their British comrades (1976:176).
31. Based on his review of Peter Tsouras' book *Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World Armies 1945 to Present* (Arms and Armour Press, London, 1994).
32. Jans' work, for example, indicates that overall, the rate of job rotation of Australian military officers serving in Defence higher headquarters seem to be high, with only 51% having been in their current positions for ten months or more. *Op Cit*, page 183.
33. A comment based on author's experience as a serving Army officer during the period 1984-1997.
34. Director of Psychology Minute P/202/76, *Recruit Wastage - 1 RTB*, to the Director of Personnel Planning, dated 5th July 1976. [Enclosure 1-2]
35. *Op Cit*, Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Personnel) Minute 844/89, *Defence Manpower Statistics - Involuntary Separations*, to the Chief of the Defence Force, dated 25th May 1989. [Enclosure 1-3]
36. See paragraph 19 of Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion Minute R538-1-44, *Medical Aspects of Recruit Training*, to Headquarters Training Command, dated 19th July 1989. [Enclosure 1-4]
37. See *Record of Proceedings of a Meeting on ARA (Australian Regular Army) Recruit Wastage in Training*, Chaired by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, on 29th September 1989. [Enclosure 1-6]
38. See *Senate Estimates Committee Brief on 1 RTB Suicide Rate*, Cleared by Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, March 1991. [Enclosure 1-8]
39. See Internal brief on Recruit Wastage, Cleared by Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, dated September 1990. [Enclosure 1-7]
40. 1st Recruit Training Battalion Minute 871-1-5, *Recruit Wastage*, to Headquarters Training Command, dated 15th December 1994.
41. This is perhaps a good indication of how slowly the Defence bureaucracy sometimes works.
42. A fact deduced by the author from many discussions with 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff and later commented on by Commandant of the Battalion, in his article on 'Army Recruit Training' where he noted that "...the course has had numerous adjustments as changing situations have required modifications to length, style and content" (Buchanan 1996:119).
43. Assumptions made by author in December 1994.
44. At this time, the activities of, for example, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, had a reasonably high profile due to rulings affecting the Department of Defence.
45. For example, Agnew, while serving as a major in the Army's Directorate of Plans and Analysis in 1994, published an article in the *Australian Defence Force Journal* in which he noted that there would be a significant reduction in the total target age group for the Army recruiters in the short and medium term - at least until 2007 and probably out to 2031 (1994:9).

46. Course participants were asked to rate its various aspects out of 10 where a score of 10 indicated excellent. Using this system 'Course Concept' received a mean rating of 9 with a mode of 9. 'Course Outcomes' received a mean rating of 9.1 with a mode of 9.
47. This opposition was outlined in a draft minute sent to the author by the Deputy Director Management Development on 24th January 1994 in which he expressed a desire to "...see the project undertaken using the correct TQM project methodology..." and recommended that "*the 1/95 Facilitator Course be conducted as a standard course*".
48. Comment based on author's discussions with the course facilitators (Mr John Brown and Ms Annie McGinniskon of APTECH) on 10th February 1995.
49. See *Project DUNLOP Two Day Workshop (28th February - 1st March 1995) Workshop Report*, dated 15th March 1995.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Based on Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion comments made during the 28th February - 1st March 1995 Project DUNLOP Two Day Workshop.
52. Based on discussions between Colonel Training, Headquarters Training Command and the Director of Management Development - Army, and the Colonel Training, Headquarters Training Command and the author during early February 1995.
53. It should be noted that the core composition of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group consisted of:
- a. the Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command (Chairman);
 - b. the Director, Personnel Planning - Army;
 - c. the Commandant, 1st Recruit Training Battalion;
 - d. the Director of Army Recruiting;
 - e. a representative of the Surgeon General of the Australian Defence Force;
 - f. a representative of the Director of Psychology - Army; and
 - g. the Project DUNLOP Project Officer, Headquarters Training Command.
54. In regard to the data shown at Figure 9 it should be noted that:
- a. all data was collected by the Recruit Training Battalion Physiotherapist, Captain M.J. Cunningham;
 - b. all recruits during this period were referred to the Physiotherapy Section by the same doctor and referral patterns did not alter significantly; and
 - c. any recruit suffering injury was only counted once ie. subsequent or recurrent injuries were not counted.
54. Notes for Figure 10 as per Figure 9 at Note 53.
56. In regard to the data shown at Figure 11 it should be noted that:
- a. all data was collected by the Recruit Training Battalion Physiotherapist, Captain M.J. Cunningham;
 - b. the training timings of the two groups overlapped for eight weeks;
 - c. all recruits during this period were referred to the Physiotherapy Section by the same doctor and referral patterns did not alter significantly; and
 - d. any recruit suffering injury was only counted once ie. subsequent or recurrent injuries were not counted.
57. All data collected by the Recruit Training Battalion Physiotherapist, Captain M.J. Cunningham.

58. Based on data presented by Captain M.J. Cunningham to the Project DUNLOP Steering Group meeting held on 6th May 1996.
59. General Officer Commanding Training Command direction to Colonel Operations, Headquarters Training Command dated 16th June 1996 following the Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee meeting held mid June 1996.
60. Based on Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion data presented to the Project DUNLOP Physical Training Continuum Workshop held 20th-21st June 1996. Refer to Workshop Report (Headquarters Training Command, Minute 696-10-5) dated 5th July 1996.
61. See Pope, R. (1996) *Injury Risk in Soldiers : Is Gender a Major Determinant?* Presentation delivered to Project DUNLOP Female Injuries Workshop held at Canberra on 31st July and 1st August 1996 (unpublished).
62. Comments made by Commandant of 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Project DUNLOP Physical Training Continuum Workshop held 20th-21st June 1996. Refer to Workshop Report (Headquarters Training Command Minute 696-10-5) dated 5th July 1996.
63. See, for example, the reports produced by Reynolds (1989) and Slater (1989).
64. An observation based on the very anti-fitness test comments of the Director of Army Recruiting in successive Project DUNLOP Steering Group meetings.
65. *Op Cit*, Pope, R. (1996)
66. See Information Brief for Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, *Medical Screening at Point of Enlistment*, cleared by Director General of Recruiting, dated 23rd September 1996. [Enclosure 1-9]
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid.*
69. A system that applies to approximately 84% of recruits enlisted during Training year 1996-97 according to Annex A of a draft, undated discussion paper distributed by the Army's Directorate of Personnel Planning to members of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group in mid 1996.
70. Statement by Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion in 1st Recruit Training Battalion Minute 871-1-26, dated 6th June 1996.
71. See Army Personnel Division Minute 017/96 (file A95-10610), *Plan DUNLOP 2 Meeting - Summary of Proceedings*, dated 22nd January 1996.
72. Based on author's experience when asking for statistics to use in early DUNLOP workshops.
73. Based on author's observations and discussions with 1st Recruit Training Battalion staff during the period December 1994 - June 1995.
74. Based on observations made by author during a visit to the Training Management Cell in mid 1995.
75. Author interview with the Chairman of the Project DUNLOP Steering Group dated mid October 1996.

76. These hand-off strategies were outlined in a minute from the General Officer Training Command to all of DUNLOP's key stakeholders. See Headquarters Training Command 696-1-14 (OGOC 35025/96) *Project DUNLOP - Hand-off Strategies*, dated 14th November 1996. [Enclosure 1-10]
77. Discussions between author and the Director Army Recruiting held during September and October 1996.
78. 10th July 1997 Chief of the Army Strategic Advisory Group, *Common Induction Training - Progress Report*, cleared by Colonel Plans, Headquarters Training Command, dated 8th July 1997.
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*
81. Author interview with Director General of Recruiting on 27th November 1997.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Training Command Recruit / Initial Employment Plan Report Training Year 1996/97*, dated 24th November 1997, prepared by Major M.J. Billingham, Operations Branch, Headquarters Training Command.
84. Author interview Major Palmer, 1st Recruit Training Battalion, dated 20th January 1998.
85. It should be noted that Billingham's *Training Command Recruit / Initial Employment Plan Report Training Year 1996/97* was only issued on day that he left his job. Previous requests to examine the database were politely denied on the basis that the 1996-97 report was not ready for viewing.
86. *Op Cit*, author interview with Major Palmer, dated 20th January 1998.
87. *Ibid.*
88. *Op Cit*, address by the Chairman of Project DUNLOP Steering Group (delivered jointly with the author) to a joint meeting of the Public Sector Quality Network and the Canberra Evaluation Forum in Canberra on 19th June 1997.
89. Or, to quote the words used by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at a Common Induction Training conference held in Sydney on 23rd October 1997, "*a healthy body more than likely equals a health mind*".
90. Based on the author's observation, the same can be said of the Directorate of Management Development - Army (see references in Sections 1.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 5.4) which was disbanded in late 1996 - arguably for failing to demonstrate its value. Unfortunately, without the Directorate, the Quality Management movement within Army was left without a formal sponsor and was quickly forgotten.
- A1. Quote attributed to the famous Scottish physicist Lord Kelvin.
- A2. Based on author's interview with Staff Officer Training, 1st Recruit Training Battalion, dated 30th April 1996.
- A3. Based on author's brief to the Project DUNLOP Steering Group entitled '*Project DUNLOP Data Collection Plan*', dated 3rd May 1996 (Held on file K96-00510).

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The Accuracy of Recruit Wastage Statistics July 1994 - April 1996

"When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind" ^{Note A1}

As noted in Section 4.7.4, in early 1996 all recruit wastage data emanating from the 1st Recruit Training Battalion came to be viewed with suspicion as it was evident that it was being produced by individuals who had little training in or understanding of statistics. In April 1996 it was, for example, confirmed that the 1st Recruit Training Battalion's method of calculating the wastage rate was as follows ^{Note A2}.


$$\% \text{ Wastage Rate} = \frac{\text{Total No of actual discharges since 1 July}}{\text{Total No of recruits marched in * since 1 July}} \times \frac{100}{1}$$

* ie. these recruits might be training, have already graduated or have already been discharged.

Based on this method of calculation, wastage data for the period July 1994 - April 1996 was presented to the 6th May 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group by the Commandant of the Recruit Training Battalion. An exact copy of this data, as presented, is attached as **Appendix 1**. For ease of comparison, however, a portion of it is shown at Figure A-1.

Figure A-1

**Monthly Recruit Wastage Rates during the period August 1995 - April 1996
(According to Data Provided by 1st Recruit Training Battalion in May 1996)**



The great weakness with this method was that it included not only those recruits that had graduated or been discharged but also those recruits still under training. This figure was not only irrelevant to the true discharge rate but also guaranteed that any figure produced from the calculation would be distorted. For example, if a large influx of recruits was to take place for any reason, ie. if 10,000 recruits started training in any given week, the wastage rate (since 1st July) would drop dramatically. This would occur because the total number of recruits discharged since 1st July would suddenly only be a very small fraction of the total number of recruits marched in since 1st July. This situation is illustrated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \% \text{ Wastage Rate} &= \frac{\text{Total No of actual discharges since 1 July}}{\text{Total No of recruits marched in since 1 July}} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 \text{(as at 26th April 1996)} & \\
 \text{eg.} &= \frac{150}{1500} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 &= 10\%
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \% \text{ Wastage Rate} &= \frac{\text{Total No of actual discharges since 1 July}}{\text{Total No of recruits marched in since 1 July}} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 \text{(as at 3rd May 1996)} & \\
 \text{eg.} &= \frac{165}{11,500} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 &= 1.43\%
 \end{aligned}$$

This method of calculation also resulted in a situation where the Recruit Training Battalion considered that the only valid comparison of wastage rates could be made with the rate that existed 12 months before it, a logic that was flawed given the effect of sudden large intakes for whatever reason.

This situation, which could only be described as totally inadequate, went essentially unchallenged until early 1996, when the author sought to clarify the situation. In a paper presented to the 6th May 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group, it was suggested that there was an urgent need for a wastage rate "formula" which was clearly defined, easily understood, and (most importantly) which represented a 'true' wastage rate figure. Also, once this formula was established, it was suggested that it should be used on an ongoing basis to clearly chart DUNLOP's progress in addressing the wastage rate issue ^{Note A3}.

In order to obtain a true wastage rate, it was recommended that the calculation only deal with relevant figures ie. the number of recruits who marched in with a certain intake and the number of those same recruits who failed to graduate for whatever reason - noting that this calculation could also be made at any time during the training of the intake to check on its progress in relation to the norm. For example:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{\% Wastage Rate} &= \frac{\text{Total No of actual discharges from the intake}}{\text{Total No of recruits in the intake}} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 \text{(for a given intake)} & \\
 \text{eg.} &= \frac{6}{48} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 &= 12.5\%
 \end{aligned}$$

It was also suggested that, for the purpose of gaining an overall perspective, a rolling *average* discharge rate could be calculated. For example:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Average \% Wastage} &= \frac{\text{Total No of actual discharges from}}{\text{Total No of recruits in the last 10}} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 \text{Rate (for the last 10} & \text{the last 10 intakes to graduate} \\
 \text{intakes to graduate)} & \text{intakes to graduate} \\
 \text{eg.} &= \frac{54}{480} \times \frac{100}{1} \\
 &= 11.25\%
 \end{aligned}$$


However, even given the advantages of the above, it was strongly suggested that the best means of visually representing and examining wastage trends over time was the control chart, and given the variable size of recruit intakes, the control chart identified as most applicable was the fraction non-conforming chart. It was pointed out that the development of such a chart would simply involve the plotting of the percentage wastage from each recruit intake on a graph. It was also explained that with very little extra effort control limits could be established which would allow management to investigate unusually high or low wastage rates in order to discover why they had occurred.

Following the above revelations and recommendations, the Project DUNLOP Steering Group agreed to pursue improvement to the method of calculating wastage rates. Accordingly, with data input assistance from the Soldier Induction Process Culture Study team, during mid 1996, detailed recruit wastage data was developed by the author for the period August 1995 - April 1996. The overall chart developed by the author from this data is shown at Figure A-2, however, for reference, the complete set of

source data developed for all categories of wastage is at **Appendix 2**. This was the first time that such data had been presented to, or considered by, the DUNLOP Steering Group.

Figure A-2


Percentage of Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons from Recruit Intakes during the period August 1995 - April 1996 (According to Source Data developed by the author in July 1996)



At the Project DUNLOP Steering Group Meeting held on 6th August 1996, the author's source data was compared with wastage data previously presented for the period July 1994 - April 1996 by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion. As can be seen, the differences are significant.

Figure A-3

Recruit Wastage during the period August 1995 - April 1996 (Comparison of 1st Recruit Training Battalion data and data developed by the author)



Appendixes:

1. Recruit Discharge Rates: July 1994 - April 1996 (as presented to the 6th May 1996 Project DUNLOP Steering Group by the Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion)

2. Recruit Wastage Data : August 1995 - April 1996 (as developed from source data by the author)

Page 1 - Recruits Discharged at Own Request

Page 2 - Recruits Discharged due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent

Page 3 - Recruits Discharged as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury)

Page 4 - Recruits Discharged as Below Medical Standard


Page 5 - Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Service Life

Page 6 - Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Further Training

Page 7 - Recruits Discharged due to the Provision of False Information


Page 8 - Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons

Recruit Discharge Rates




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged at Own Request (Cat A)

Intake	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	Totals
Source										
Brisbane	8	4	3	1	1	4	6	0	3	30
Sydney	3	3	2	3	0	17	1	4	0	33
Melbourne	2	3	1	1	0	3	4	0	0	14
Adelaide	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	7
Perth	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	2	8
Hobart	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	7
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	16	12	6	8	1	33	12	5	6	99
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	4.13	7.55	3.73	4.85	2.70	5.16	3.02	3.03	2.94	4.28




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged at Own Request (Cat A)

Intake	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	Totals
Source										
Brisbane	3	2	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	10
Sydney	3	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	7
Melbourne	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
Adelaide	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	7	3	3	1	2	3	1	2	1	23
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	7.87	6.12	10.00	3.85	16.67	7.14	3.13	6.25	2.63	6.57




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Discharged at Own Request (Cat A)

Intake	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	Totals
Source										
Brisbane	11	6	5	1	1	5	6	2	3	40
Sydney	6	3	3	4	0	19	1	4	0	40
Melbourne	2	4	1	1	1	3	4	0	1	17
Adelaide	3	1	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	10
Perth	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	2	8
Hobart	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	7
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	23	15	9	9	3	36	13	7	7	122
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2664
% Wastage	4.83	7.21	4.71	4.71	6.12	5.29	3.03	3.55	2.89	4.58




1 RTB Male Recruits Disch due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent (Cat B)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00




1 RTB Female Recruits Disch due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent (Cat B)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adelaide	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	1.12	2.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.57




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch due to Withdrawal of Parental Consent (Cat B)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adelaide	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2864
% Wastage	0.21	0.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury) (Cat H)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	11	1	2	2	1	5	1	0	0	23
Sydney	6	2	2	3	0	6	2	0	0	21
Melbourne	3	1	3	1	1	2	2	0	0	13
Adelaide	3	0	0	3	1	2	1	0	0	10
Perth	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hobart	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	26	5	7	10	3	15	7	0	0	73
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	6.72	3.14	4.35	6.06	8.11	2.35	1.76	0.00	0.00	3.15




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury) (Cat H)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	5	3	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	11
Sydney	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Melbourne	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Adelaide	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	4
Perth	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hobart	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	16	10	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	33
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	17.98	20.41	6.67	3.85	16.67	4.76	0.00	0.00	0.00	9.43




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Medically Unfit (due to prior injury) (Cat H)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	16	4	3	3	1	6	1	0	0	34
Sydney	10	4	2	3	0	6	2	0	0	27
Melbourne	7	4	3	1	1	2	2	0	0	20
Adelaide	4	0	0	3	3	3	1	0	0	14
Perth	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Hobart	3	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	7
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	42	15	9	11	5	17	7	0	0	106
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2664
% Wastage	8.82	7.21	4.71	5.76	10.20	2.50	1.63	0.00	0.00	3.98




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Below Medical Standard (Cat J)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	4
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	3	11
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.76	1.82	1.47	0.48




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Below Medical Standard (Cat J)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	3
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	8
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	12.50	12.50	0.00	2.29




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Below Medical Standard (Cat J)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	1	6
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	6
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	3
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	3
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	7	3	19
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2664
% Wastage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.29	1.63	3.55	1.24	0.71




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Svc Life (Cat L)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	6	1	2	1	0	8	3	1	3	25
Sydney	4	1	3	2	0	4	1	1	0	16
Melbourne	5	0	2	0	1	2	5	0	1	16
Adelaide	2	1	0	2	0	2	0	1	0	8
Perth	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	6
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	18	4	8	5	1	18	9	4	5	72
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	4.65	2.52	4.97	3.03	2.70	2.82	2.27	2.42	2.45	3.11




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Svc Life (Cat L)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	7
Sydney	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	5
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	4
Adelaide	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	3
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	3	1	2	1	0	2	2	2	6	19
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	3.37	2.04	6.67	3.85	0.00	4.76	6.25	6.25	15.79	5.43




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Unfit for Svc Life (Cat L)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	7	1	4	1	0	9	3	2	5	32
Sydney	6	2	3	2	0	4	2	1	1	21
Melbourne	5	0	2	0	1	3	5	1	3	20
Adelaide	2	1	0	3	0	2	1	1	1	11
Perth	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	6
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	21	5	10	6	1	20	11	6	11	91
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2664
% Wastage	4.41	2.40	5.24	3.14	2.04	2.94	2.56	3.05	4.55	3.42




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Further Trg (Cat M)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melbourne	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perth	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total Intake	367	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	0.00	0.63	0.62	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged as Unfit for Further Trg (Cat M)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.13	5.26	0.86




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch as Unfit for Further Trg (Cat M)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
Melbourne	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perth	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	5
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2664
% Wastage	0.00	0.48	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.83	0.19




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged due to Provision of False Info (Cat P)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Bnsbane	4	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	10
Sydney	3	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	1	9
Melbourne	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Adelaide	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Perth	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	3
Hobart	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	7	2	4	2	1	7	3	0	2	28
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	397	165	204	2314
% Wastage	1.81	1.26	2.48	1.21	2.70	1.10	0.78	0.00	0.98	1.21




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged due to Provision of False Info (Cat P)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Bnsbane	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	6
Sydney	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Melbourne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adelaide	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Perth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hobart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	1	1	4	1	0	1	0	0	2	10
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	1.12	2.04	13.33	3.85	0.00	2.38	0.00	0.00	5.26	2.86




Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch due to Provision of False Info (Cat P)

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Bnsbane	5	1	4	2	0	2	1	0	1	18
Sydney	3	1	2	1	0	2	1	0	1	11
Melbourne	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Adelaide	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	4
Perth	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	3
Hobart	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	8	3	8	3	1	8	3	0	4	38
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2664
% Wastage	1.68	1.44	4.19	1.57	2.04	1.17	0.70	0.00	1.65	1.43




1 RTB Male Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	29	7	8	5	2	20	13	1	7	92
Sydney	16	6	8	9	0	29	5	7	2	82
Melbourne	10	7	6	2	2	8	12	0	2	49
Adelaide	7	2	1	6	1	7	2	2	0	28
Perth	4	0	2	0	1	8	1	1	3	20
Hobart	1	2	1	3	0	3	1	1	2	14
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	67	24	26	25	6	75	34	12	16	285
Total Intake	387	159	161	165	37	639	347	165	204	2314
% Wastage	17.31	15.09	16.15	15.15	16.22	11.74	8.56	7.27	7.84	12.32




1 RTB Female Recruits Discharged due to all Reasons

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	10	6	8	2	0	3	0	5	3	37
Sydney	9	4	2	1	0	2	2	3	3	28
Melbourne	4	4	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	15
Adelaide	3	0	0	1	3	2	4	0	2	15
Perth	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hobart	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	28	16	11	4	4	8	7	9	11	98
Total Intake	89	49	30	26	12	42	32	32	38	350
% Wastage	31.46	32.85	36.67	15.38	33.33	19.05	21.88	28.13	28.95	28.00



Total (Male & Female) Recruits Disch due to all Reasons

Intake Source	Aug-95	Sep-95	Oct-95	Nov-95	Dec-95	Jan-96	Feb-96	Mar-96	Apr-96	totals
Brisbane	39	13	16	7	2	23	13	6	10	129
Sydney	25	10	10	10	0	31	7	10	5	108
Melbourne	14	11	6	2	3	9	13	1	5	84
Adelaide	10	2	1	7	4	9	6	2	2	43
Perth	4	1	3	0	1	8	1	1	3	22
Hobart	3	3	1	3	0	3	1	1	2	17
Darwin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	95	40	37	29	10	83	41	21	27	383
Total Intake	476	208	191	191	49	681	429	197	242	2884
% Wastage	19.96	19.23	19.37	15.18	20.41	12.19	9.56	10.66	11.16	14.38



Recruit Wastage Data July 1996 - June 1997

The attached pages are exact copies of pages taken from the following:


Training Command Recruit / Initial Employment Training Plan Report Training Year 1996/97

Prepared by :
Major M.J. Billingham.

Published:
24th November 1997

- Page 2 - Intake Achievement TY 96/97
- Page 3 - Intake Achievement (Male) TY 96/97
- Page 4 - Intake Achievement (Female) TY 96/97
- Page 5 - Discharge Reason Numbers
- Page 6 - Discharge Reason Percentages


INTAKE ACHIEVEMENT TY 96/97



	1	2	3	4	4.1	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
IN ■	48	48	48	47	48	49	48	30	33	39	63	61	79	85	35	31	38	36	36	25	35	35	40	41	37	37	30	32	29	31	34	31	30	59
OUT+INTRG □	39	31	36	36	36	45	38	20	30	26	55	49	50	68	30	24	28	30	29	17	32	35	37	35	32	33	25	23	24	24	29	24	23	49
DIS ■	9	17	12	11	12	4	10	10	3	13	8	12	29	17	5	7	10	6	7	8	3	0	3	6	5	4	5	9	5	7	5	7	7	10
WASTAGE%	19	35	25	23	25	8	21	33	9	33	13	20	37	20	14	23	26	17	19	32	9	0	8	15	14	11	17	28	17	23	15	23	23	17


INTAKE ACHIEVEMENT (MALE) TY 96/97

Australian Army Recruit Wastage Study




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IN ■	36	36	36	35	48	49	37	24	30	22	37	47	49	66	34	29	29	28	31	19	28	33	33	33	25	35	27	27	24	27	23	26	23	47
OUT + IN TRG □	30	27	29	30	36	45	31	17	27	18	35	41	33	55	29	24	23	23	26	14	26	33	32	30	24	31	22	21	22	21	22	21	20	41
DIS ■	6	9	7	5	12	4	6	7	3	4	2	6	16	11	5	5	6	5	5	5	2	0	1	3	1	4	5	6	2	6	1	5	3	6
WASTAGE%	17	25	19	14	25	8	16	29	10	18	5	13	33	17	15	17	21	18	16	26	7	0	3	9	4	11	19	22	8	22	4	19	13	13

INTAKE ACHIEVEMENT (FEM) TY 96/97



	1	2	3	4	4.1	5	6	7	8	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
IN ■	12	12	12	12	0	0	11	6	3	17	26	14	30	19	1	2	9	8	5	6	7	2	7	8	12	2	3	5	5	4	11	5	7	12
OUT+INT TRG □	9	4	7	6	0	0	7	3	3	8	20	8	17	13	1	0	5	7	3	3	6	2	5	5	8	2	3	2	2	3	7	3	3	8
DIS ■	3	8	5	6	0	0	4	3	0	9	6	6	13	6	0	2	4	1	2	3	1	0	2	3	4	0	0	3	3	1	4	2	4	4
WASTAGE%	25	67	42	50	0	0	36	50	0	53	23	43	43	32	0	100	44	13	40	50	14	0	29	38	33	0	0	60	60	25	36	40	57	33

DISCHARGE REASON NUMBERS




	A	H	J	L	M	P	Total
F NO ■	12	21	49	12	15	3	112
M NO ■	39	17	56	44	4	14	174
Total NO ■	51	38	105	56	19	17	286

DISCHARGE REASON PERCENTAGES



F



M

ALL



Key Internal Correspondence

- 1-1 Director of Psychology, Minute P/174/76, *Review Boards at 1 RTB*, to the Director of Personnel Planning, dated 17th June 1976.
- 1-2 Director of Psychology, Minute P/202/76, *Recruit Wastage - 1 RTB*, to the Director of Personnel Planning dated, 5th July 1976.
- 1-3 Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Personnel) Minute 844/89, *Defence Manpower Statistics - Involuntary Separations*, to the Chief of the Defence Force, dated 25th May 1989.
- 1-4 Commandant 1st Recruit Training Battalion Minute R538-1-44, *Medical Aspects of Recruit Training*, to Headquarters Training Command, dated 19th July 1989.
- 1-5 Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, Minute 627/89, *ARA (Australian Regular Army) Recruit Wastage in Training*, to Deputy Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, dated 24th August 1989.
- 1-6 *Record of Proceedings of a Meeting on ARA (Australian Regular Army) Recruit Wastage in Training held on 20 September 1989*, chaired by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, dated 27th September 1989.
- 1-7 *Internal brief on Recruit Wastage*, cleared by Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, dated September 1990.
- 1-8 *Senate Estimates Committee Brief on 1 RTB Suicide Rate*, cleared by Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, March 1991.
- 1-9 Information Brief for Assistant Chief of Personnel - Army, *Medical Screening at Point of Enlistment*, cleared by Director General of Recruiting, dated 23rd September 1996.
- 1-10 Headquarters Training Command, file 696-1-14 (Office of the General Officer Commanding Minute 35025/96) *Project DUNLOP - Hand-off Strategies*, dated 14th November 1996.

MINUTE PAPER

DPE 2022

Subject: REVIEW BOARDS AT 1 RTB - CONFERENCE OF INTERESTED PARTIES 2 JUN 76

P/174/76

DPP

1. In recent months the responsible officers of Pers Branch have expressed concern at a concurrent increase in the numbers of recruits at 1 RTB who have been presented to Boards of Review and subsequently discharged. This represents a wastage of personnel which is expensive and disturbing.

2. A conference of officers representing interested parties was held at 1 RTB to examine the problem, its likely causes, its effects, and if considered advisable or possible, to make recommendations as to its amelioration. Those present included:


Brig E.S. SWINBOURNE	CofS EQ Trg Cond
Col R.D.F. LLOYD	CO 1 RTB
Col A.G. OWENS	D Psych
Lt Col C.F. DOBBS	DREC

The following is based on notes made by D Psych following the conference.

3. Relevant statistics prepared by DPP and D Psych were produced and discussed. They showed clearly that an increase in the numbers and proportion of recruits discharged was occurring. Although in absolute terms the proportion of failure thus evidenced would not be considered high in the general employment field, in the Army context the increase was sufficient to alert staffs to a problem which could increase to an intolerant level.


4. CO 1 RTB made a number of observations:

- a. that he was charged with training recruits to an acceptable standard of performance and attitude to the Army, sufficient for them to enter IET at Corps Schools;
- b. that he and his staff were now able to make early identification of those unlikely to make appropriate adjustment to the Army;
- c. that most of the training failure was attributable to attitudinal shortcoming (i.e., those who no longer wanted to be soldiers and resisted attempts at their recovery);
- d. that attempts to persevere with such failures were of little avail and resulted in their affecting the training of others. Perseverance was therefore uneconomical in the long and short term;



- e. that in his opinion increases in Review Boards were attributable to poorer quality of recruits enlisted. When this was challenged as to quality (see below) it was further implied that current attitudes to employment were such that recruits were now less tolerant of disciplinary constraint than they were in the past; and
- f. summarising his position CO 1 RTB suggested that the 'quality' of recruits was declining and that to reduce discharges through Review Boards would necessitate a lowering of standards, and in the long run cause uneconomical wastage of personnel or performance at a later stage in the recruit life cycle.
5. DREC, in relating to the query of recruit quality, stated that the quality of applicant had declined citing as evidence a recent increase in applicant rejection rates, and subjective 'priority' assessments by enlistment staffs.
6. D Psych rejected the notion that the standard of recruit had declined in the past few years basing his argument on comparisons of recruit testing results from a period in 1974 with those from the first three months in 1976. In no measurable way were the populations different. The recent rise in rejection rates cited by DREC was a transitory phenomenon brought about by rates resuming former levels after a sharp decline.
7. Also rejected was the notion of a change in community attitudes to employment sufficient to cause rapid increases in recruits whose retention was uneconomical. Such radical and fundamental changes would not be expected to occur in such a short time. Recent stringencies of the civilian employment market also would be expected to give the Army a better choice of better applicants who would be more reluctant to separate.
8. Problems of the introduction of the Systems Approach to Training were discussed as a likely cause. The Training Officer 1 RTB discounted this on the grounds that apart from allowing earlier recognition of those failing to achieve training objectives and the introduction of quality control methods no significant changes have been introduced to training.
9. No definite conclusions on failure at 1 RTB were drawn. On the one hand CO 1 RTB was stating that the quality of recruits had declined and defended the non reduction of training standards. On the other hand the evidence of D Psych and DPP rejected that there had been any diminution of recruiting standards.
10. Apart from his acceptance of the argument concerning the desirability of early identification and removal of the uneconomical recruit the conclusion of CofS HQ Trg Comd could not be ascertained.
11. Although the conference was inconclusive it is added that it is the opinion of D Psych that the causes of increased recruit wastage at 1 RTB have still not been determined. Whatever they are they are not related to changes in the standard of entrant. It seems to negate the Systems Approach which seeks to 'objectivise' the learning process, when instructors 'personalise' its failures. Furthermore the solution to the problem is considered to be more likely to be in the imposition of restraints on Review Boards than in the tightening of entry qualification.

17 Jun 76


A. G. OWENS
Director of Psychology

RECRUIT WASTAGE - 1 RTB

P/202/76

DGPP

For Information:

DPP
DREC-A

- References: A. DREC-A 272/76 of 20 May 76
B. DREC-A 227/76 of 13 Jun 76

1. It is surely time to lay the spectre of the lower quality of recruit entering 1 RTB as presented in the References.
2. What DREC-A is saying is:
 - a. Recruit wastage is high because the standard of recruit is low - witness the high recruit wastage.
 - b. Recruit standards are low because there is a high reject rate of applicants.
3. Both arguments are patently illogical. The first requires no comment. The second refers to those not selected for enlistment and more aptly illustrates the maintenance of the standard of the recruit population.
4. DPSYCH believes that by justifying training failure on the basis of a haphazard "post-selection" categorization of applicants, DREC-A is doing himself a disservice and could in the long term do a mischief to manpower control. The claim that application rates of 1976 have barely met Army's need is ill founded and gives a false impression of the recruiting situation. DREC-A is simply the victim of Army policy.
5. The soul searching concern of Enlistment Officers over Review Board discharges at Reference A is commendable but misdirected, particularly in a climate of inexplicable wastage. Not only can they not influence the Review Board decisions, which more frequently than not are made for reasons totally foreign to any pre-enlistment information, but there is a danger that they may be tempted to over correct in future but unrelated areas. They should let the trainers train and take some comfort from the thought that until 1975 the Australian Army was highly successful in training 'marginal' manpower. That "training failures" are not admitted to be failures of training should not distress them. Not only can they not control those who apply but also they have maintained constancy in the input of training quality.
6. Will no-one admit that the current training standard at 1 RTB has been raised?

File 193-10-10
72B



(A. G. OWENS)
Colonel
Director of Psychology

5 Jul 76

Department of Defence

MINUTE

ACPERS 844/89

~~_____~~ AS 30/5**DEFENCE MANPOWER STATISTICS - INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS****References:**

- A. ^CAPERS Minute 277/89 24 Feb 1989
- B. ACPERS Minute 542/89 of 5 May 1989

1. You would recall that in commenting on the ADF Manpower statistics for 31 Dec 88, I drew your attention to the number of involuntary separations on medical grounds from Army's Training Force which was very high compared with the other Services. I advised I had asked SGADF to investigate whether this was a consequence of initial training or whether those might be problems with Army's medical screening process or possibly some different reporting terminology in use.

2. SGADF has advised that:

- a. terminology is the same for the whole ADF (confirmed by FASMIMP); and
- b. medical screening processes are performed by the same DFRC Medical Officers for the whole ADF to the same general standards (JSP(AS)701).

This leads him to conclude that the differences in wastage rates of trainees is a product of both the immediate initial training Army enlistees are subjected to, and in the level of medical intervention and investigation provided, particularly at 1 RTB, Kapooka.

3. He has commented further that whilst errors do occur at the DFRC's, the error rate is not statistically significant and is currently acceptable. He makes the point also that the intensive training stress, both physical and mental, to which Army enlistees are subjected produces training injuries, some of which are aggravation of old injuries leading to recording them as 'pre-existing conditions'.

- 2 -

4. In view of SGADF's advise, I propose no further action unless circumstances change.

5. For your information.

A.L. Beaumont

A.L. BEAUMONT
 RADM
 ACPERS

25 May 89

ACCEPTS

Thank you. There should be further investigation into whether Army's practices at Kapooka could not be modified to make it less "physically" stressful early on the training period, while finishing up with the same product. (I will be surprised if Army have not already done this, but you should check).

Further advice please.

#18

30/5

From: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE (PERSONNEL)

ACPERS-A

Noting CDF's manuscript comment (on page 2 under),
I would be grateful for your advice please. I note
it may be more in ACOPS-A area.

[Signature]
31/5/89


DAA

Please prepare me a suitable
response. You should seek
input from HQ Ty Land.

This is an issue I particularly
brooked to take up with IRTB
when I visit on 27 Aug.

I would be interested to see
the med wastage for males & females
at IRTB/WRAC School over the last,
say, 10 years.

5 Jun 89 *[Signature]* ACPERS-A



AUSTRALIAN ARMY

1st RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION
Milpo Kapooka
KAPOOKA NSW 2661

Telephone

(069) 210 210

In reply please quote

R538-1-4A

Headquarter Training Command

For Information:

Department of Defence (Army Office) - DGAHS

MEDICAL ASPECTS OF RECRUIT TRAINING

GENERAL

1. IRTB is concerned about medical discharge rates (approximately 10%) and injury rates during Recruit training. In the former little guidance has been provided on what is an acceptable wastage rate, but it is clear that it can be reduced.

2. IRTB is conducting a number of trials, and gathering detailed statistics to isolate and quantify all the factors involved. The attached report by the RMO 1 RTB was the stimulus for much of this research within IRTB, and it has clear implications for the Army as a whole. The report makes recommendations which, if implemented, should significantly reduce wastage rates, conserve resources and save money.

LOWER LEG FITNESS

3. The RMO has highlighted the emphasis placed on the use of lower limbs in recruit training. The statements made in paragraph 7a, b and c also apply to the Army at large. It is therefore logical to suggest that close attention needs to be paid to lower leg fitness during induction medical examinations.

Recommendation: That initial medical boards place greater emphasis on lower limb fitness during enlistment procedures.

ASTHMATICS

4. Applicants who admit to any history of asthma should be fully screened prior to enlistment. Careful examination at the enlistment stage should assist in the identification of asthmatics and reduce the treatment costs associated with discharge at IRTB.

Recommendation: That initial medical boards undertake a comprehensive examination of applicants who present with a positive history of asthma.

19 July 1988 RG COMD	
C88/3056	
FOLIO No. 103	
ACTION BR/SECT.	
OB	
FILE AT:	DATE:

5. It would appear that there is no policy preventing the enlistment of applicants who use orthotic devices. Until such time as a clear policy is issued 1RTB will cease the practice of removing orthotic devices from recruits who have been enlisted.

Recommendation: A clear policy be promulgated to recruiting medical officers and 1 RTB on the use of orthotic devices in the Army.

REGULAR REST CYCLE

6. 1 RTB is the only training organization that operates on a seven days/week training cycle. The increased emphasis on running in the physical training programme, combined with the continuous nature of all types of training, has resulted in a greater incidence of lower leg injuries than has been evident in the past.

7. The RMO 1 RTB feels that a regular rest cycle within the training programme is required to allow for the healing of the body and the psyche between physical exercise loading.

Recommendation: That the Recruit Course be extended by one week to enable a regular rest cycle to be incorporated into the programme.

FEMALE PHYSICAL TRAINING

8. The physical training programme for females is merely a modified version of the male programme. As a result females sustain a consistently higher rate of injury.

Recommendation: There is a need for the Army to design and develop a physical training programme specifically for females.

PRE-ENLISTMENT PHYSICAL FITNESS LEVELS

9. It is the perception of medical and training staff at 1 RTB that many recruits (particularly females) do not have an adequate level of physical fitness on enlistment. For example in a recent female platoon in excess of 80% of enlistees had undertaken no physical activity of any kind in the last five years. The introduction of basic physical fitness tests at the enlistment point should be considered to identify those applicants who have an unacceptable standard of physical fitness.

10. No additional physical training can be programmed to cater for this perceived lower level of general fitness. This perceived lower level of general fitness may be a contributing factor to increasing medical presentations and injury. In addition, as outlined in paragraph 7, little or no rest is provided between training activities. Although the extension to the course sought in paragraph 7 will not enable extra physical training to be programmed it would enable the program to be less demanding.

Recommendation: That the Recruit Course be extended by one week to allow a more gradual approach to physical training to be adopted and that DAR investigate the introduction of a basic physical fitness test at point of enlistment.

PRE-ENLISTMENT INJURY/ILLNESS

11. The report has revealed that some 75% of medical discharges over the period 1984-88 involved recruits who suffered from some form of pre existing injury or illness which precludes them from training. In other words some 1075 recruits (or approximately 22 platoons) should not have been enlisted at all.

12. The training and medical costs associated with enlisting recruits with pre-existing injury/illness have not been calculated however they are considerable. As an example a recruit enlisted with a lower leg injury could be expected to visit a specialist, undergo a bone scan (normally in Canberra) and be placed on up to eight weeks convalescence leave. It may be more cost effective to redirect treatment costs to a more thorough medical screening at enlistment. At the very least enlistment MO should pay closer attention to lower limb fitness and Asthma histories.

Recommendation: That more thorough enlistment medicals be conducted to identify pre-existing injury/illness and that enlistment MO pay closer attention to lower limb fitness in medical examinations.

SHORT TERM INCREASES IN RECRUIT THROUGHPUT

13. In 1987 Project Booster was initiated to boost the number of general enlistees in a given financial year. It is apparent from the statistics displayed in the attached report that the effort failed with the increase in throughput being completely negated by an increase in discharge. It would appear that medical standards adopted to facilitate booster were, at the best, suspect.

Recommendation: Every effort should be made to provide a Steady State throughput commensurate with the resources available at 1 RTB. Surges should be limited to the resource capability available and in future similar efforts such as Booster should be avoided.

CHANGES IN RECRUIT MORBIDITY

14. The four most common causes of discharge in the period 1984-88 were:

- a. knee pain;
- b. back pain;
- c. Asthma; and
- d. Pes Planus.

In addition there has been a marked increase in lower leg injuries, particularly stress fractures, over the last nine months. It must be observed that the increased incidence of stress fractures is partially a result of greater medical interest in this type of injury.

15. In an attempt to determine whether training methods are responsible for the increase in incidence of stress fractures a number of trials are currently being conducted. These are Weight Load Marching trial, and in female platoons, a sandshoe trial which is aimed at a more gradual introduction to the wearing of boots. An attempt is also being made to collect a statistical data base. A computer system would be invaluable in this effort.

Recommendation: That collection of statistics continue in an attempt to determine the causes of injury.


CONCLUSION:

16. The attached report is the first attempt to analyse the causes of recruit medical discharges. The most telling statistic to emerge from the study is that 74.5% of medical discharges in the period 1984-88 had pre-existing injury/illness. It should also be noted (from Table 3) that the incidence of these discharges remain constant throughout the four year period. In essence, if measures were taken to reduce enlistment of recruits suffering pre-existing injury/illness then the medical wastage rate would be an acceptable 2%. It would not be possible to totally prevent all recruits with pre-existing problems from enlisting however it should be possible to reduce their numbers by raising the awareness of enlisting MO.

17. Injuries inflicted on recruits at 1 RTB are exacerbated by the lack of a regular rest cycle. We are attempting to reach a high level of physical fitness in a very short time without acknowledging the (perceived) lower level of entry fitness. An extension to the course would assist in providing a regular rest cycle as well as providing more flexibility in the training programme and assist in reducing stress on instructor staff. The introduction of a pre-enlistment physical fitness test should also reduce wastage.

18. The report has shown the value of recording statistics on recruit wastage. 1RTB in attempting to broaden its data base to include statistics on training causes of wastage. The collection effort would be vastly improved by the provision of an appropriate computer system. This report only covers medical wastage in 1 RTB. It may be appropriate for HQ Trg Comd to investigate the incidence of medical wastage in IET Schools.

19. Measures to reduce recruit wastage rates cannot be introduced in isolation at 1RTB but must be considered by all agencies involved in the initial entry process.




I.F. AHEARN
Colonel
Commandant

Enclosures:

1. 1 RTB Recruit Medical Discharge Interim Report : /
1984-88.

Department of Defence

MINUTE

ACPERS-A 627 /89

DACPERS-A

ARA RECRUIT WASTAGE IN TRAINING

1. Having visited 1 RTB and read the attached papers, I am in no doubt as to the significant problem faced on this subject and the need to solve it. There is no single solution, so a number of lines need to be pursued. Some catalyst is needed to produce results.

2. In order to forge a way ahead, I would like answers to these questions:

- a. What is recruit wastage in training costing us in dollar or other terms?
- b. What is a reasonable level of recruit wastage to aim for? (Intuitively, I suggest 10% of which half would be for medical reasons).
- c. How might that objective be achieved?
 - (1) By providing additional training time?
 - in basic or IET or both?
 - for all, or just women?
 - (2) By reducing terminal objectives?
 - for all, or just women?
 - where would the objectives be met?
 - (3) By improved screening at the Recruiting point?
 - by more thorough medical exams?
 - by fitness tests?
 - (4) By revised physical fitness training and/or tests?
 - for all, or just women?
 - by less emphasis on running?
 - by improved footwear?
 - by allowing orthotics?
 - (5) How else?

- 2 -

3. In order to find the right answers and set some changes in motion, I see some merit in a conference of the players involved, viz:

- | | | |
|----|-------------------|------------------------|
| a. | Manning | - DPP |
| b. | Recruiting | - DAR |
| c. | Training advisers | - DAT &/or HQ Trg Comd |
| d. | Medical adviser | - DMS-A |
| e. | Equipment adviser | - Mat Br |

Please convene a conference of the players in the near future. Para 2 above might be useful as an agenda.

4. I would appreciate your assistance later in responding to GOC Trg Comd letter of 17 Aug 89 (attached). He raises the need for a steady - state throughput at 1 RTB and experience tells me that such will never be achieved: in any event, it relates to staffing problems at 1 RTB which should not bear on the recruit wastage problem.

5. The proposal for creation of a Centre for Clinical Army Research, while relevant to the subject, need not be pursued. I will take it up separately with DGAHS. However, the need to keep adequate statistics on the subject is essential and needs consideration as to what and by whom.

6. I would like to effect necessary changes by the end of this year and before the numbers in training rise in the new year.



P.R. PHILLIPS
MAJGEN
ACPERS-A

24 Aug 89

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A MEETING ON
ARA RECRUIT WASTAGE IN TRAINING

1. A meeting was held in the I-2-18 Conference Room, Army Office at 1030 hrs Wed 20 Sep 89 to discuss the problem of ARA recruit wastage in training. The meeting was attended by:

BRIG B.M. Edwards	DACPERS-A	(Chairman)
COL G. McCormack	COL OPS	Trg Comd
COL W.H. Hall	DPSYCH-A	
LTCOL R. Heyde	CI 1RTB	
LTCOL M. DeVries	SO1 Med Svc	DMS-A
LTCOL M. Hall		Mat Br rep
LTCOL R.J. Linwood	SO1 Ind Trg	DGAT-A
MAJ B.J. Greatorex	SO2 Ind Trg/Trg Spt	DGAT-A
LTCOL R.A. Wigney	SO1 Concepts and Research	DPP-A
LTCOL R.E. Newton	SO1 Strength Management	DPP-A
MAJ N.J. Reynolds	SO2 Research	DPP-A
CAPT A. Wilcock		DAR rep
MAJ G.C. Hughes	SO2 Concepts	DPP-A

Footwear

2. The subject of footwear was discussed first, to allow the Mat Br representative to leave early should he so desire. Criticism was made of the current GP Boot and the issue KT26 runner. Although the boot is not designed for running, it is unsuitable for all training involving shock to the feet such as jumping, forced marching and drill. Additionally there are problems with the standardization of the lasts for the boots and the rigidity of the back of the boot. It is felt that these problems contribute significantly to the medical wastage rates from 1RTB. Mat Br was asked, in consultation with 1RTB and DMS-A, to look at a solution to the problem. Although a product improvement is being looked at now, a new GP boot will be four to five years away.

3. Although the current running shoe is considered an improvement on the previous Dunlop Volley, the KT26 is inadequate particularly for running. The requirement for running in the PTT/BFT, and the community trend towards distance running, has created a major problem. A running shoe which provides cushioning, support for ankles, flexibility and suitable general purpose characteristics is required. The ASICS GEL (Tiger) runner is recommended by 1RTB and is supported by DMS. ACMAT-A should be informed that an improved running shoe is given high priority by ACPERS-A and Trg Comd. There is no need to design an Army runner as there are suitable runners available for evaluation.

4. The policy on orthotics was discussed. The DMS-A representative stated that a distinction needs to be made between orthotics, which require a prescription, and inner soles, which do not. The policy has been recently reviewed. DGAHS believes that the Army should not accept any applicant who needs to wear orthotics. The use of inner soles and similar devices, however,

The Costs Attributable to Recruit Wastage

5. Although various amounts have been previously quoted as costs attributable to recruit wastage, it is necessary for a common figure to be used by Army. DPP-A, in consultation with DGAF, DMS-A and DAR, is to compile some indicative costs for Recruit failures at various stages of training and under various circumstances, e.g. requiring medical treatment and compensation.

A Reasonable Level of Recruit Wastage

6. With the current wastage rate of 20% it is extremely difficult to man the Army. Although an acceptable wastage rate cannot be easily determined, it was felt that it needs to be below 12%, with somewhere between 5 and 10% being the ideal.

Measures to Reduce Recruit Wastage

7. Medical wastage at 1RTB has increased over the last ten years due to a combination of factors. These include a lower standard of physical fitness of applicants, an increase in the course intensity particularly in relation to running, and the introduction of a common syllabus for females. A more sensible approach towards the development of physical fitness in the Army could reduce the present high medical wastage. Physical fitness training should be a continuum which commences at 1RTB and goes through to units. The current high levels of physical training at 1RTB are not directed by policy. Trg Comd, in consultation with Medical and PTI staff, needs to develop a physical training plan on the lines of the shooting policy. A lower standard is required at 1RTB, but the physical training development needs to continue through IET into units. This may produce a requirement for more qualified sub-unit PTIs. Other areas of training should also be similarly examined. Perhaps other subject could be pushed into IET or units.

8. The Army cannot afford to increase the length of time for training at 1RTB, particularly with the current undermanning situation. Every week added to training adds 100 plus soldiers to the Training Force and due to the constraints of the Authorised Average Strength, reduces the Trained Force by the same amount. Equally IET should not be extended.

9. This trend of increased physical standards has led to false training objectives, such as passing BFT, being included in many courses. BFT should be conducted by units. All training institutions should conduct physical training but not BFT.

10. Training of Women. It seems inconsistent to be demanding that women complete all the terminal objectives which relate to combat and combat related duties other than those which are for self protection. The terminal objectives for women at recruit and IET should be examined. Once this examination has been completed, measures introduced should flow on to officer training.

11. Screening at Recruiting Centres. Improved screening at recruiting centres could reduce the subsequent high medical wastage in training, particularly amongst those with pre-existing conditions. Doctors need to be made aware of the stresses placed on recruits by either visiting 1RTB or viewing the video 'Remember Kapooka'. A pre-enlistment physical test is not suitable as:

- a. it could lead to the rejection of many candidates who could, with training, have been satisfactory soldiers; and
- b. it could lead to compensation problems.

Steady State Manning Throughput

12. 61 platoons per year is the requirement for steady state at 1RTB, but this assumes no change to AAS and a constant wastage rate. In reality this is not possible. It may be possible to adjust the time of maximum intakes to 1RTB to match the availability of school leavers in January. DPP-A, in consultation with Trg Comd and DAR, is to examine the flow to 1RTB. The recruit demographics need to be examined, as well as the advertising programme and the ability of Trg Comd to handle the input.

Discharge at Own Request

13. Discharge at own request at week 10 was originally proposed to cut back IA's and attempted suicides by providing hope to recruits in training. The policy is not causing inordinate problems, so it should be retained. It is requested that recruiters continue the practice of not advising potential candidates of the discharge at 10 weeks option.

Conclusion

14. Trg Comd needs to determine the physical training standards required at 1RTB and the impact this will have on Corps schools and physical training in the Field Army. It is implicit in our physical training policies that units continue PT. Perhaps ACOPS-A needs to go to the Field Army and remind them of their responsibilities.

G C Hughes

G.C. HUGHES

MAJ

SO2 Concepts DPP-A

27 Sep 89

Introduction

Recruit wastage has increased by 12% since 1980 to a high of 22% in 1987. Army's requirement to improve retention, and the recent suicide at 1RTB has prompted a review of RTB procedures. As a result a number of initiatives have been introduced to reduce this attrition rate.

Retention Initiatives

- . From 6 Jun 90 the 12 week recruit course was increased in length to 13 weeks. This allows for;
 - . a reduction in the intensity of training,
 - . a softer approach with recruits during their initial transition to military life,
 - . a reduction of stress levels amongst 1RTB staff and,
 - . a lowering of back-squadding (and subsequent distress) among recruits.
- . Commencement of a four day pre-week one induction course to introduce recruits to the requirements of military training.
- . The physical training regime has been changed so that recruits are no longer required to pass a Basic Fitness Test (BFT) and Combat Fitness Tests (CFT) before march out. They must now pass a recruit fitness test which is of lesser standard than the BFT or CFT.
- . Flexibility in training matters has been increased. For example certain requirements to pass terminal objectives at specified stages may now be waived in some instances provided the objective is passed prior to march out.
 - . This flexibility is apparent in the progression through physical training where the step to more difficult activities is more gradual.
- . Review of 1RTB staffing requirements to overcome problems such as the accumulation of leave credits and increased domestic dislocation due to excessive work pressure. The staffing review is designed to increase retention through improved quality of training.

Prepared by: MAJ D. Craig, SO2 Other Rank Strength Management, DPP-A, Ext 56171

Cleared by: MAJGEN P.R. Phillips, ACPERS-A

Sep 90

SENATE ESTIMATE COMMITTEE
BRIEF ON 1 RTB SUICIDE RATE

Introduction

- 1 RTB is responsible for training new Recruits for employment in the Regular Army. Given the disciplined and demanding nature of training, stress on some recruits is inevitable and the possibility of suicide or suicide gesture is always present. 1 RTB staff receive training in counselling, interviewing and stress management skills, and take great care to reduce the risk of suicide.

Suicide at 1 RTB

- The number of deaths resulting from suicide at 1 RTB since 1985 is one, having occurred on the 6 April 1990.

Suicide Gesture Rate

- Determining the rate of Suicide Gestures at 1 RTB is more difficult due to the requirement to determine the nature of a suicide gesture. Recruits have used the verbal threat of suicide as their primary means of securing discharge. Army psychologists have the responsibility to assess the nature of these threats and recommend the appropriate course of action.
- 1 RTB Psychologists and medical staff report that the incidence of Suicide Gestures is less prevalent today than in 1985. The average number of suicide gestures (those notified through the Army's Notification of Casualty system) has declined from 4.6 per year for the period 1985-1987, to 2.6 per year for the period 1988-1990.

Policy Aspects

- In response to the 1990 suicide, Army conducted a review of training at 1 RTB in an effort to reduce the stress reaction of recruits undergoing training.
- As a result of this review, the training course was lengthened from 12 to 13 weeks. This was done to allow Recruits more time for transition into military life and to better assimilate military training. Since implementation of this new policy there have been no suicides, and the incidence of suicide gestures has reduced.

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Cleared by: MAJGEN A.J. Fittock, ACPERS-A

Mar 91

INFORMATION BRIEF FOR ACPERS-A ON MEDICAL SCREENING AT POINT OF ENLISTMENT

Background

- Project DUNLOP has highlighted the need to decrease 1 RTB wastage. Injury screening at the place of enlistment, is one significant area the Project team believes that overall wastage will decrease. The preliminary Project DUNLOP data collection report covering the period Aug 95 - Apr 96 indicates the following:
 - 14.38 % overall wastage; 12.32 % male and 28.00 % female.
 - 3.98 % of the overall wastage were discharged as medically unfit due to a prior injury; 3.15 % male and 9.43 % female.
 - 0.71 % of the overall wastage were below medical standards.
- Two major medical strategies have been identified by the Project DUNLOP Steering Group to reduce 1 RTB wastage. These are enhanced injury screening and physical testing at ADFRUs.

Enhanced Injury Screening

- The Female Training Injury Workshop held on 24-25 Jul 96 highlighted the need to improve injury screening prior to enlistment. Of particular concern is 72% of 1 RTB injuries are lower limb injuries. Ms Donna Harvey, EO Australian Sports Injury Prevention Taskforce, AIS, a participant of the workshop, has produced a draft document to increase focus on injury screening at ADFRUs medical examinations. A SGADF staff member, MAJ Rudzki, assisted in the compilation.
- DGAHS is considering the increased screening option. If DGAHS accepts the perceived benefits of the proposal, the intention is to have stakeholders consider the best method of implementation. This will include staff from SGADF, HQ Trg Comd, DGR, 1 RTB, and Ms Harvey. The screening may be applicable for all Army entrants, and if proven to be cost effective could be used on a tri-service basis.
- The intended outcome of the screening protocol is to identify potential recruits who have an existing injury that is not fully rehabilitated, and those that have a high risk of sustaining an injury and are unlikely to complete the course.
- Given the high incidence of lower limb injuries resulting in either "backsquadding", discharge, compensation payments and the loss of Army goodwill, it is believed that additional up front medical screening will be cost effective.
- DGR is happy to support the initiative, including providing the manpower to produce any documentation and to coordinate meetings. DGR will not accept any additional medical costs for the initiative. Funding would need to be diverted from the Army Program. Given the potential savings from wastage and compensation payments, transfer of funding is considered appropriate.

Pre-Enlistment Fitness Screening

- 1 RTB has conducted physical fitness testing on Day 3 at Kapooka since Feb 96. The test includes a 20m shuttle run, pushups and situps. Recruits who pass the test proceed with training. Those that fail are placed in a remedial training program. HQ Trg Comd

statistics indicate that the test is a predictor of injury and that further investigation is required to validate the relationships between fitness levels on entry, injury and discharge rates at 1 RTB. HQ Trg Comd and 1 RTB believe that this testing should be conducted prior to enlistment. DGAHS, the Physical Fitness Training Adviser, is still to be convinced of the requirement.

- The space required to conduct the test is approximately the size of a basketball court. Two minor ADFRUs have suitable facilities, the other 16 ADFRUs/Careers Reference Centres do not. 40 minutes is needed to conduct the test.
- Potentially the pre-enlistment fitness testing will identify those applicants more likely to sustain injury at 1 RTB and could prove cost effective. DGR supports any initiative that will reduce wastage, however does not have the resources to conduct an Army specific fitness test. This includes facilities, transport, showers, and time. Conducting the fitness test on test day would not be feasible.
- An alternative is to conduct the test within the six week period from time the applicant is warned in for enlistment and attestation day. The test would need to be held at a suitable military gymnasium or a civilian contract would need to be established. These details are to be investigated.

Predictor of Injury

- Both initiatives are aimed at reducing wastage, and overall costs to Army. HQ Trg Comd and the AIS believe that empirical evidence justifies the conduct of fitness tests. The question is where the test is conducted. DGAHS is yet to be convinced that the testing should occur and has asked HQ Trg Comd to provide documentary evidence.
- The AIS support enhanced medical screening as a predictor of injury.

Recommendation

- It is recommended that you note that investigations into enhanced medical screening and pre-enlistment fitness testing are occurring.
- It is recommended that you note that DGR is not prepared to fund a single Service initiative involving additional medical expenditure or hiring of local gymnasiums to conduct fitness tests.

Prepared by: LTCOL N.R. Littlewood, DAR, Extn 68724

Cleared by: BRIG K.J. O'Brien, DGR, Extn 68722

23 Sep 96



MINUTE

Headquarters Training Command

696-1-14

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
See Distribution List

PROJECT DUNLOP - HAND-OFF STRATEGIES

References:

- A. PDSG VII of 24 Oct 96
 - B. HQ Trg Comd 696-1-14 34003/96 dated 6 Nov 96
1. Project DUNLOP will cease on 1 Dec 96. Actions which are ongoing, and the responsibility for effecting agreed strategies is detailed at Annex A. A 'Lessons Learnt' paper based on the project's stakeholder's comments, invited at Reference B, will be issued by 29 Nov 96.
 2. **SIPCS Implementation.** The SIPCS Report will be distributed by 20 Nov 96. The recommendations flowing from the Report are to be addressed through the following strategies:
 - a. **Strategy 1 - Adult Learning.** COMDT 1 RTB to conduct an externally facilitated analysis to determine improvements to training delivery using the Recruit Instructor Selection Course (RISC) as the principal change tool. This refers to recommendations 1-8, 13 - 17, 20-21 and 23. **Responsibility - COMDT 1 RTB - included in personal directive.**
 - b. **Strategy 2 - Cultural Change.** COMDT 1 RTB to implement cultural change through the conduct of an internal review of current practices with a particular focus on Recommendations 9-12. **Responsibility - COMDT 1 RTB - included in personal directive.**
 - c. **Strategy 3 - Personnel Issues.** Recommendations 25 - 28 (smoking, alcohol, fitness testing, gender difference in training) have Army and Defence implications; they are also the subject of extant Army policies. These recommendations should be referred to ACPERS-A. Additionally, the application of these policies at 1 RTB needs review by the COMDT 1 RTB in line with Strategies 1 and 2. **Responsibility - COL ADMIN - to refer Personnel Issues to Pers Div.**
 - d. **Strategy 4 - Prototyping.** Recommendation 22, which proposed that all initiatives be first trialed and modified in a small organisation (pl or coy) was not universally accepted. Where this approach offers advantages, it should be considered. **Responsibility - COMDT 1 RTB.**

3. Enquiries are to be directed to COL PLANS (02) 99609 644.



M.J.KEATING
MAJGEN
GOC

14 Nov 96

Enclosure:

1. Project DUNLOP Hand-off Strategies

Distribution List

External:

COMDT 1 RTB
DPPLANS-A
DAR
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PROJECT DUNLOP HAND-OFF STRATEGIES

ANNEX A TO
HQ TRG COMD 696-1-14
DATED 14 NOV 96

Strategy Area	Current Situation	Desired Outcome	Strategy	Lead Action by
Information and Data Management	Data collection is fragmented and consequently data is not trusted by the various stakeholders.	A data collection system that: 1. Allows accurate monitoring of wastage 2. Is able to identify factors affecting wastage. 3. Is trusted by all stakeholders	Continue development of Trg Comd <i>Throughput Planning Data Base</i> with the development of the <i>Recruit Wastage Module</i> . Transfer an operational capability for monitoring wastage to 1 RTB by 30 Jun 97	Ops Br HQ Trg Comd with 1 RTB
Culture	The SIPCS is complete. Broad strategies to implement the SIPCS recommendations are to be agreed on 24 Oct 96.	Minimisation of the impact of cultural factors on wastage rates, without compromising standards.	<p>1. Adult Learning. Comdt 1 RTB to conduct an externally facilitated analysis to determine improvements to training delivery using the Recruit Instructor Selection Course (RISC) as the principal change tool.</p> <p>2. Cultural Change. Comdt 1 RTB to implement cultural change through the conduct of an internal review of current practices with a particular focus on Recommendations 9-12.</p> <p>3. Personnel Issues. Recommendations 25 - 28 (smoking, alcohol, fitness testing; gender difference in training) have Army and Defence implications; they are also the subject of extant Army policies. These recommendations should be referred to ACPERS-A. Additionally, the application of these policies at 1 RTB needs review by the COMDT 1 RTB in line with Strategies 1 and 2.</p>	<p>1. COMDT 1 RTB with COL ETD</p> <p>2. COMDT 1 RTB</p> <p>3. DPP-A & COMDT 1 RTB</p>


Strategy Area	Current Situation	Desired Outcome	Strategy	Lead Action by
Fitness / injury screening	No injury screening currently takes place possibly compounding non-disclosure. AIS has supplied suitable injury screen. Physical screening currently takes place at 1 RTB	Minimise the effect of injury on the wastage rate from: pre-existing injury and / or non-disclosure; injury at 1 RTB; Fulfil Army's duty of care obligations by minimising risk of injury to individuals.	<p>1. Injury screening: DAR to request SGADF approval to enhance medical examination with an injury screening programme delivered by physiotherapists.</p> <p>2. Fitness screening: HQ Trg Comd to inform SGADF of the high correlation between low initial fitness screening result and risk of injury at 1 RTB (based on Pope's paper). Gain Defence concurrence to prohibit recruits commencing training until they have met the entrance level of physical fitness.</p>	<p>1. DAR with DPPlans-A and DGAHS</p> <p>2. COL PLANS</p>
Muster / batch recruiting	Limited batching occurs	Reduction of the effect of dissatisfaction of corps allocation on wastage	Pers Div to develop a <i>change strategy paper</i> acknowledging the value of muster / batch recruiting. The improved recruit / IET planning throughput process appears suitable to enable mustering to be effected with minimal change to extant procedures. Future policy changes will include adopting Phase 2 Psych assessment at enlistment.	DPPLANS-A with DPpsych
Physical Training Continuum	No PT continuum - active investigation under way. DGAHS preparing policy paper on PT Continuum. 1 RTB trialing remedial PT programme. DPPLANS-A considering options for PT streaming. Ops Br HQ Trg Comd is investigating determination of suitable job-related physical fitness standards DGAHS has agreed retrospective study of medically discharged females from 95/96.	Develop a physical training continuum for recruit and initial employment training that takes into account job requirement, gender and initial fitness level while minimising training injury.	Pers Div to establish Army policy on job-related physical fitness standards. If appropriate, recently developed UK Army job-related physical fitness standards could be validated. Training outcomes would then need to be developed by TAs to achieve those standards.	DPPLANS-A



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Training injuries force rethink on women's place in the military

By DEBORAH HOPE

FEMALE officer cadets like Ms Kerry Affolter have trained alongside their male peers at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, for the best part of a decade, studying, drilling, sharing barracks, playing war games, slogging through RMC's arduous physical training.

But now a heavy toll on female officer cadets and recruits in impact injuries suffered during their training has forced the Federal Government and the Australian Defence Force establishment to reassess whether women are capable of undergoing the same kind of physical regime as men.

A phalanx of high-level committees, reviews and task forces has been established to investigate the issue of females suffering a higher rate of injuries than their male counterparts during training.

Most recently the vice-chief of the Defence Force, Vice-Admiral Robert Walls, has instigated a review which will inquire into the army's requirement that women be trained to combat fitness standard. This follows ADF alarm over a high rate of women leaving the army through its compensation scheme.

In other moves, the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, Mr Punch, initiated Project Dunlop to investigate a 20 per cent wastage rate among army recruits training at Kapooka base in southern NSW. The project has discovered female recruits suffer injuries at twice the rate of their male colleagues.

An ADF medical ethics committee is carrying out a retrospective analysis of medical

records from Kapooka and Duntroon in an attempt to establish injury patterns among trainees. And a series of reviews and panels has been set up to investigate the role of women in defence organisations and find solutions to the services' "glass ceiling".

The background to the investigations is a culture of army machismo in which women have had to prove their toughness to be accepted as professional equals of men.

Despite the heavy physical toll, most of the women cadets support Duntroon's rigorous training, believing that every officer needs to understand infantry training.

There is a strong support network among the women which helps them to endure the physical and mental demands. Asked if she ever thinks of leaving, Ms Affolter replies, laughing: "Every day."



New research by Dr Hugh Smith, of the Australian Defence Force Academy, has found that one in five first-year male officer cadets in Australia's armed services last year believed military training was less effective because of the presence of women on a course. Figures for the army are higher, with 30 per cent of male and female officer cadets saying this is the case.

Mr Punch describes the rethinking as an essential second-generation issue for women in the military. If the first generation of issues was about access for women to ADF positions, the new generation is about accommodating them, he said.

Women on the warpath — Page 15



Eyes right ... camouflage-cream-smearing female Duntroon officer cadet Kerry Affolter soaks up the punishment on field exercise in southern NSW — Picture: RAY STRANGE



WOMEN ON THE WARPATH

■ Although barred from combat, female officer cadets at Duntroon are expected to keep up with the men in the gruelling physical training. But, as Deborah Hope reports, there is concern that injuries force a high rate of needless wastage

Doing it tough: female officer cadets are put through their paces at Duntroon — Pictures: RAY STRANGE

'GO for it Amanda! Push it! Run it!" comes a female chorus from the hill, where 120 Duntroon officer cadets are watching their colleague make her second attempt at the run, dodge and jump section of a combat fitness test.

Rigged out in sweatshirt, army pants and boots and 9kg of webbing and weaponry, staff cadet Amanda Williamson this morning has already completed a 6m rope climb and a "fireman's carry", lugging across her shoulders another cadet for 100m. In the run, dodge and jump Williamson has 50 seconds to make it through an obstacle course including two 1.3m walls, difficult step-overs and a leap across a ditch. On the home run, she makes an impressive bound at the final wall and passes the test. Of the 110 male and 10 female cadets present for the test, only one, a male, fails.

Character-building physical challenges like this are central to the tradition and ethos of military training at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the Australian Army's officer training establishment.

While young women such as Williamson cannot join combat corps when they graduate as officers, her success in Duntroon's gruelling physical training and combat fitness programs is essential to her acceptance as a professional equal among her peers.

A decade after Duntroon opened its elite doors to female officer cadets however, the Federal Government is questioning whether female physiology is capable of undergoing the same intense physical training as men.

The reason is a costly toll on female army recruits and officer trainees in lower-limb injuries, especially the painful impact injury shin splints, fractures and hip problems as well as back injuries.

The issue is political dynamite for defence science and personnel minister Gary Punch. Punch's thinking on the matter is economical as much as humanitarian. "It is time for a mature look at the differences between the female and the male body," he says. This is not just about footwear. It is about whether enough science is being applied to the training.

For Australia's army the issue cuts deep into its tradition of machismo, an ethos female recruits and officer cadets have had to fit into since being admitted into training alongside their male peers.

To Colonel Diane Harris, second-in-charge at RMC and director of military arts, the issue of physical training for female officer cadets is fundamental to their acceptance as the equals of their male colleagues. One of the four most senior women in our army, Harris's female-only officer training in the Women's Army Corps 20 years ago involved no weapons handling, minimal physical training and etiquette advice, such as the appropriate

occasions for a female officer to wear gloves. She says, "I feel it is very important female cadets do the same training as males. In the past they have been regarded as sub-professional. Now they get equal treatment."

The question being raised by observers, however, is whether this kind of rugged physical training is really necessary for a modern defence force, or just part of an outmoded, masculine and irrational tradition.

According to Dr Greg Pemberton, a Duntroon graduate and military historian, the physical training insisted on by Royal Military College "actually entrenches men's attitudes, because women will always look inferior physically".

Pemberton continues, "We should say, are we going to retain a larger pool of women in the forces if we look at training more carefully. Machismo has always been more important than science in the army but we have to question the value of that tradition. You have to ask first of all whether this kind of training is necessary for any part of the armed forces. A lot of it is just army machismo. I mean, does every bank teller have to be Arnold Schwarzenegger in case there is a bank robbery? If women are being injured the army needs to analyse what exercises are necessary for good command skills."

Project Dunlop, a taskforce established to investigate a 20 per cent wastage rate among new recruits at the army's Kapooka training camp near Wagga Wagga in southern NSW, this year found female recruits suffer injuries, especially of the lower-limb variety, at twice the rate of their male colleagues.

As a result, Kapooka has introduced modified training programs for female recruits, reducing the weight they carry on endurance marches, cutting the distance they must march and run, allowing them to train in running shoes instead of regulation-issue army boots and introducing more warm-up regimens to reduce the likelihood of stress fractures.

At Duntroon, only minor concessions have been made for female cadets. A culture of peer pressure to succeed rules — officer cadets often conceal injuries for fear of damage to their career prospects or, worse, medical discharge or being put out to pasture on medical management.

Of the 43 women included in Duntroon's current 240-strong officer course intake, eight have dropped out — but only two for medical reasons. The figures do not reflect the picture drawn by 10 of Duntroon's female cadets interviewed for this article. All 10 had suffered injuries ranging from broken ankles and dislocated shoulders to bone fractures, back problems and shin splints.

'Machismo has always been more important than science in the army'

Late in May, I visited the Monga State Forest near Braidwood to meet and observe female cadets participating in a 10-day field exercise. At the wheel for the hour-long drive from Canberra was Private Kim Nicolls. Laughingly describing her 13-week recruit training at Kapooka as "hell", Nicolls recalled breaking her jaw when she fainted on the parade ground.

Waiting to meet us at the entry to the military zone were staff cadets Christina Van der Hulst and Rebecca Fleuren, both withdrawn from the field because of shin pain. After a short, steep drive into the bush we met a platoon preparing for an ambush exercise. Disguised beneath camouflage gear and camouflage make-up, carry-

ing weapons, webbing, humping packs and with hair well out of sight, it was almost impossible to distinguish cadets Nerrolle McDonald, Kerry Affolter, Donna Benson and Leanne Carroll from their 26 male colleagues. Each had been injured at some point during their military training with shin or back problems. McDonald had undergone surgery for a compartmental bone fracture — a result, she said, of training in army boots.

A week later, back at barracks, Carroll has a bandaged foot, broken, she explains, in a fall during the rope climbing section of her combat fitness test the previous day. Not realising how badly she had damaged her foot, Carroll had pushed on with the test — successfully carrying out the fireman's carry and the run, dodge and jump — before succumbing to the pain and seeking medical aid.

"You have to put it in perspective," said another cadet, Sally Reid, referring to Carroll's stoicism. "If someone's guts are coming out and you have a broken foot, it's nothing. It's what's expected."

All cadets, male and female, experienced sore shins at some time during their training, says cadet Susannah Reed, but most grin and bear it. Reed also broke her wrist when she fell off the obstacle course. Jodi Johnstone lost six weeks out of training after dislocating a shoulder when she fell out of a tree as she attempted to secure a flying fox, while a knee injury temporarily knocked cadet Sue Manning out of the physical program. "A podiatrist would probably have a heart attack if they saw our footwear," she laughed.

Amenorrhoea is another side effect of their military training. According to Reed, about half the female class of 95 had experienced interruption to their menstrual cycle as a result of the physical and emotional stress of the course.

Despite the toll, the cadets support Duntroon's rigorous physical training. "We think we should do it," they said. "Every officer needs to understand infantry training." The strong female

support network helped them survive the physical and mental demands. Did they ever think about leaving? "Every day!" laughs Affolter.

"This is not a university," says Captain Hannah Myssonski, a 1988 graduate, back at the college as officer commanding Long Tan Company. "The majority of training is physical, so you are going to get injuries." All training at Duntroon is relevant, says Myssonski, because it is "character building".

Combat fitness training is essential for female cadets as well as for males, reasons Duntroon Commandant Brigadier Simon Willis, because of the ambiguity of the front line in modern warfare. "The Gulf War showed the definition of the front line can be very blurred," says Willis. "There is always the possibility a rear-end officer will be required to take command."

Punch accepts army thinking that women need a minimum degree of fitness to be able to defend themselves, but says, "The question is, can we do it differently and get the same results?"

Injuries in military recruits are a concern to military forces worldwide, says Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Patterson, commanding officer in charge of the medical centre at Duntroon. "The most common trend is a preponderance of lower-limb injuries, with females having higher injury rates than males. Lower-limb injuries are a topic of great concern at RMC. We see a lot of shin splints and knee injuries here, not many bone fractures. Lots turn out to be ligament strains. In the past there has been a tendency for people to strap up their ankles and put up with it."


"I would not be surprised if in five years we do things a lot differently. Maybe we need to look more closely at anatomical lower-limb standards. A lot of cadets come at 17 or 18 when they are not skeletally mature."

Says Harris, "In barracks we are forever trying to rework our program to assume a start at zero-level fitness and to work up gradually throughout the course, working on whole body strength."

The cadets wear running shoes for long-distance runs, reserving army boots for endurance marches, field exercises, drill, combat training and most other daily wear. To help prevent impact injuries in field exercises more attention is being paid to ensure lighter cadets carry lighter loads.

For Punch, the issue is clear cut. "Training won't change overnight but it does have to change," he says. "Any change to training has to ensure it does not produce another gulf stream of discrimination at a time when equal employment opportunity in the ADF is doing quite well. We don't want to set that back with an unthought-out position."

HIGH WIRE



Clockwise from main photo ... getting up there is almost as much trouble as getting across.


Phase 2 of the adventurous-training package requires putting the new roping skills to the test on a real feature.

Negotiating obstacles 12m above the ground puts a new slant on an old problem.


Maximum concentration ... safety harnesses don't reduce the necessity to overcome natural fears in an unnatural environment.

Preparations take place at The Rock, a local feature near 1RTB. Rock climbing and abseiling was conducted on the feature.

Belayers ensure that no real danger is present while negotiating the high-wire obstacle course.



RECRUITS



1RTB's newest recruit tester flies high

KAPOOKA'S latest addition to recruit training began its official history at 1RTB recently as the first recruit platoon negotiated the high-wire obstacle course.

Story and photos by WO2 GRAHAM MCBEAN

The aerial obstacle course is part of a three-day adventurous-training package for C Coy recruits who are trialling a new 10-week training syllabus.

But if there were any dissenters to this new addition to training then it was hard trying to find someone to say so.

In fact, Rec Ryan Murray, 22 Pl C Coy, reckoned it was an excellent idea.

"It is quite scary at first but it gets your confidence up — but to begin with I was scared totally," Rec Murray said.

"It is quite hard physically and you feel like you are going to fall."

Safety precautions such as belayers

remove any real danger from the course but overcoming natural fears still presents a challenge.

The course includes a number of mid-air obstacles such as cargo nets, trapezes and an abseiling wall.

Even for experienced abseilers and climbers the course is physically taxing and requires maximum effort and concentration.

Rec Murray said the high-wire course was a good test for the physical training conducted at 1RTB.

"Some obstacles require a lot of upper-body strength just to hang on but for the last few weeks we have been getting pretty fit."

"It is realistic when you are hanging there — you forget sometimes that you are safe and you want to hang on for dear life."

PI Commander 22 Pl Lt Paul O'Donnell said the package provided a good break from the recruits' normal training

routine and let them see another angle to military life.

"We put them through the course to give them confidence in the equipment and their mates who are belaying them and just to build self-esteem," Lt O'Donnell said.

"So it's a number of things — not only do they become familiar with basic climbing and abseiling equipment, they learn to break that fear of heights as an individual."

Because 22 Pl was only 25 strong, the training package was reduced to two days.

On day two, 22 Pl moved to The Rock (a local feature) where the newly learnt skills were practised on natural features.

Rec Mark McPherson said the training package was an unexpected addition to what he thought recruit training would entail.

"The [adventurous training] has been really relaxed and you get to try something that not too many other people get to try," Rec McPherson said.



New platoon trains failed recruits to be civilians

By LOUISE SHUTER

THE Army is about team work and mateship.

If anyone fails, the military machine must still go on.

At least that has been a long-standing philosophy until Kapooka Commandant Col David Buchanan had a vision for the new Weary Dunlop Platoon to start on February 12.

It is a rare sort of platoon in that it doesn't train recruits to be soldiers so much as civilians.

It is a kind of half-way house preparing the recruits who failed to make the grade, whether for medical, psychiatric or motivational reasons, to move back into civilian life.

Col Buchanan compares the platoon with Kapooka's midlife upgrade where they are not changing the nature of the facilities so much as bringing them up to 1990s standards.

But unlike the \$21 million upgrade, the new platoon is being run on a shoestring with no direct funding.

Col Buchanan saw the need for a more caring way of dealing with recruit discharges, and is hoping the bricks and mortar facilities will follow.

In the meantime they are making do with old accommodation quarters, tucked away on the far side of the base.

He said the Army had always had a system of entitlements for soldiers who were discharged, but it needed updating.

Recruits being discharged will spend a week or two in the Weary Dunlop Platoon where they will be offered the services of counsellors, doctors, chaplains, career advisors and army staff who will assist them to move back into the civilian work force.

"The world has changed and the Army has changed with it," Col Buchanan said.

"The expectations of society about the way people ought to be treated has changed."

Col Buchanan said there was more focus on human rights, equal opportunity and anti-discrimination, and the Army was mindful of these changes.

"I have a duty of care, as far as possible, for the people under my care, and not just the people who are succeeding."

Col Buchanan said the Army had a great deal of compassion for recruits having difficulties during training, but in the past that compassion seemed to stop the minute a recruit was discharged.

"In the past, in a sense, they were written off," he said.

Every recruit lost costs the Army \$30,000, and they then had to spend an additional \$30,000 to replace them.

Without even considering the up-front costs of recruitment advertising, travel, inductions and medical checks, each recruit costs \$1500 a week to train throughout the 12-week course.

Col Buchanan is introducing programs to reduce recruit "wastage" by introducing physical training that has less injury risk and offering a more interesting and challenging course.

The results are already showing with recruit wastage dropping from a high 16.8 per cent this time last year to 12.1 per cent.

Col Buchanan is predicting an even lower average wastage of 10 per cent.

"This is not a growth industry," he said.

Recruits not going on, called holdovers, previously remained in uniform

and lived in the same company area while awaiting their discharge.

Under the new scheme recruits will be taken out of uniform and will live in the Weary Dunlop platoon area over the other side of the base.

They will be removed from training and placed in the administrative system with the platoon commanded by Lt Sharon Parker and overseen by Personnel Staff Officer, Major Colin Gould.

Col Buchanan said he saw the new platoon as an exciting opportunity for Lt Parker, who at a young age (she is 23) has a free hand to "get in and make it work".

While Lt Parker has had only a short career in the Army, having graduated from Duntroon in 1994, she has already distinguished herself with a commendation for saving a two-year-old girl from drowning at Howard Springs in the Northern Territory.

Lt Parker, who was stationed at Darwin when it occurred in February last year, was with her platoon at Howard Springs when the girl fell into the water.


"Her father was under the weather and her mother was nine and a half months pregnant," Lt Parker said.

The mother went into labor, while Lt Parker breathed life back into the toddler.

"There was a lot of panic going on and my Army training helped there," she said.

It is a quality Lt Parker expects to use in her latest challenge with the Weary Dunlop platoon.

Lt Parker said many of the recruits gave up jobs to join the Army, did not have much money and had real concerns about where they would go when they did not make it to the march out parade.



HOWEVER HUMBLE: Lt Parker gives a guided tour of accommodation blocks. Pictures: DEBORAH PARKER.

"Many have a Hollywood idea about what basic training is going to be like and not making it doesn't come into that," she said.

"They have not got a Plan B.

"We are their Plan B. We will come up with a lot of the answers."


She has been liaising with the Department of Social Security and the CES in Wagga to discover entitlements and employment prospects in recruits' local areas.

Lt Parker will be offering recruits self-motivation training and even help with resumes and practice interviews.

Her staff were undergoing counselling courses so they can assist with individual needs.

Major Gould said the recruits were at different stages of training, some coming to the platoon after discovering they were not coping after only three days, while others may have been forced out of training through a medical injury after 10 weeks.

With most recruitment done through word of mouth, the Weary Dunlop project is also seen as a good public relations exercise in recruits leaving



ANYONE FOR POOL?: Even instructors need a break. Lt Parker and Major Gould try out the facilities.


the Army with a more positive attitude and a sense that they were treated fairly.

Recruits discharged at their request have minimum entitlements, but re-


cruits with maximum entitlements such as those injured during training will be sent back to their place of enlistment where they can undergo programs such as retraining in

fields like bookkeeping or clerical duties.

"We will make them members that society will want back in," Lt Parker said.



NEW PLATOON HEADQUARTERS: The accommodation blocks earmarked for the new Weary Dunlop Platoon.



BEFORE VIEW: Major Gould and Lt Parker discuss a facility to the old accommodation quarters that will house the new platoon.

CPL TAYLOR,

Thank you for being so understanding & helpful during my stay at "Weary" Dunlop. I greatly appreciated the way you got my paperwork through so quickly. It is hard to explain ~~to~~ how much it meant for me to get home for mum. I wish you ~~&~~, CPL Holmes ~~&~~ & SGT Crout the best of luck in establishing the "Weary" Dunlop centre. Hopefully you will silence anyone ^{who} was bagging the concept of the "Weary" Dunlop Centre.

Yours sincerely
Rec. Daniel Donnelly
1810 714.

Dear Weary Dunlop,

21.4.36

I'm writing this card just to say thank you for all your help. Coming from Puckapunyal the only thought that was going through my head was "I want to go home." But after being at Weary Dunlop I have realised what a great program you guys are running. I think it's the best thing the Army can do to make the transition from a very hectic recruit town lifestyle back into CIV life. Say hello to

DAVIS for me because I know that you are still there. At times I felt quite depressed but when I kept myself busy time flew and I enjoyed myself heaps. The thing that made it most enjoyable was all your staff. I had never come across staff like you guys before. Thank you heaps and I wish you the best of luck for the future. Best wishes.

Ben Knight

To the staff of Weary Dunlop Pl.,

Just writing to say thanks and to show the appreciation that I and no doubt other previous recruits have for the professional and very friendly way that you go about your jobs.

My stay at Weary Dunlop was enjoyable and relaxing, even though at times boring compared to the training lines. Your efforts in keeping the recruits active was great because it did keep our minds off the paper work, and surprisingly enough time did pass by relatively quick.

It was noticeable that time went quick if the recruits made friends quickly and shared the work load of their daily duties.

Special thanks to CPL Holmes, CPL Taylor and SGT. Grant for working very closely to the recruits. The level of support, encouragement and over all efficiency and professionalism shown by you all proved that Weary Dunlop Pl. should and will be a successful and required project within 1 RTD.

The Australian Army is very lucky to have your services and it was a privilege to be associated with you all during my stay at 1RTD.

Thanks once again, REC KRA ARCH (140001)

• Weary Dunlop.

I would like to thank you in making my transaction into civilian life an easy one.

I no longer brace up when spoken to, no longer run out into the hallway at 6am with my bedsheets and no longer eat my meals in 5 min flat, and yet I am still able to respect my seniors, have self discipline and conduct myself in a respectable manner.

The staff at 'weary Dunlop' made an environment in which was livable, even enjoyable at times which made my record breaking stay bearable.

I appreciate the professional manner in which the staff at 'weary Dunlop' take towards their work. It was reassuring to know that every thing that could be done, was being done to get my paper work done.

I was grateful of the opportunity to be able to work in the office

The work was able to take my mind off the fact that I was becoming a part of the furniture. It was great to be able to work with people that were dedicated and interested in what they were trying to do for recruit discharging for various reasons.

I found myself calling 'weary Dunlop' 'HOME', which was a worry because in a sense that made col Taylor and col Holmes, mum and dad! HELP! JOKE
Weary Dunlop and its staff, are a credit to IRTB, their dedication and professionalism is admirable.

All the best in the future and thank-you once again.

Yours faithfully

Ex-recruit DAVIS N.L

74803457.

-96-



One of the recruits in training at Wagga demonstrates that water is no obstacle when transport is provided by a flying fox.



It's been a hard day's training and Recruit S. J. Müssig shows it.

Photos by Martin Jones

You're in the ARMY now

Becoming a soldier has changed, yet recruits still have to survive the change between military and civilian life, writes Graham Cooke.



The commander at Kapooka, Colonel David Buchanan.



Army recruits go through a physical assessment.

THE SKY, alternately golden sunshine and grim clouds is as changeable as a sergeant-major's mood. Collier Milliken, seven weeks a member of what used to be called a man's army, allows herself the luxury of a shiver.

"It's going to be cold tonight," she says with a little, forced laugh.

That's one of the few things Milliken can count on as an almost-rare addition to the Australian Army's First Recruit Battalion at Kapooka, just outside Wagga. Times he changes but the differences — some would call it a chasm — between civilian and military life remain.

As she is quickly discovering on exercise First Fling, an introduction to sleeping under canvas for many of the Kapooka newcomers, the army is not "just other job".

No-one seriously tries to pretend it is. For the vast majority, joining up is the biggest decision of their lives, possibly the biggest decision they will ever make.

Yet there have been subtle breaks with the past. Recruit Milliken is an example. Perhaps no more than a couple of years ago she would probably have been on her way home, booked as unsuited for army life.

Instead she is back in training after hospital treatment and a stint in the Digger James Platoon, a special unit designed to bring recruits up to a minimum level of fitness.

She admits that "PT" (physical training) was her greatest worry, despite needing the hospital treatment after blisters on her feet turned septic, but she never entertained thoughts of quitting.

"It's been my heart's desire to join the army — it's what I want to do with this part of my life," the self-confessed Jill of All Trades from Batemans Bay says. "I've done a lot of travelling and had plenty of jobs from au-pairing to secretarial. Now I've got fresh goals and challenges."

Her commander at Kapooka, Colonel David Buchanan, agrees that it would have been all too easy for Milliken to have become a statistic part of the dropout rate that sees the female component of the average

Eye's right for a career

FOR SEBASTIAN BOEHM joining the army has been a race against time — and his bank balance.

When he originally applied for officer training at Duntroon he was told he could not be accepted because he was short-sighted in one eye.

There was an operation that could fix it, but it would cost \$2500 and he would have to pay for it himself.

And if that wasn't bad enough, he was just a couple

of years away from the upper age limit of 25.

But Mr Boehm, who has worked as a barman and cellar man at various places around Canberra since leaving school, was not ready to give up.

"I saved like crazy," he says. "At one point I had three jobs and was working virtually around the clock."

"Even when I saved the money and had the operation there was no guarantee that I would be accepted."

But he added that he felt that the motivation he had

shown would not do his case any harm.

In the event he was selected, and will go to Duntroon in January — a few months before his 25th birthday.

"It's a bit of an honour because I'm one of 20 from throughout Australia," he says. "Just being part of the history of the place will be a big thrill."

"In the longer term, there's the mateship, and security for the next 20 years. I left it late, but I know it's the right career move for me."

— GRAHAM COOKE

recruit intake drop from 14 to 10 per cent by the time the three-month basic training at the base is over.

A further breakdown of those figures proved even more alarming.

"They showed a woman who enters Kapooka is twice as likely to be discharged as a man; that she is three times as likely

to be discharged for medical reasons and, up to a short while ago, four times as likely to be discharged for an injury during training," he says.

"The obvious inference was that there was something wrong with our training methods. We did a lot of research into this and canvassed all the popular reasons, such as discrimination in a male-dominated organisation.

"But it wasn't until we brought in a sports physiotherapist that we found it came down to a simple factor — women enter Kapooka at a generally lower level of fitness. At the level there were plenty of women failing as well — and the fitter women were doing at least as well, if not better, than their male equivalents.

That highlighted a bigger problem — perhaps the biggest

— that the modern Australian army faces: in the sedentary 1950s, where computer games are displacing sport as the favoured occupation of thousands of teenagers, more and more couch potatoes are offering themselves for life in the armed forces.

Colonel Buchanan says this has led to some "creative ten-

ethos that ranges from scientific boot fittings — Kapooka's Regimental Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer Class One Colin Lee, believes ill-fitting footwear is one of the curses of civilian and army life — to having ice available in the residential buildings for the easy treatment of injuries.

New recruits are also introduced to the "beep test" — a shuttle run exercise known to any athlete who has aspired to elite competition.

Failure to reach stage 55 on the test means relegation to Digger James and a hard get-it regime. Apart from the anecdotal evidence provided by recruits like Milliken, this system has yet to show it has a lasting influence on improving success rates: recruits whose level of activity is very low are likely to have more deep-seated problems, which cannot be so easily fixed.

"We show a video of what is involved here, we give people who are planning to sign up a fitness program to do while they are waiting for their intake, but you are never going to erase the culture shock of transition from civilian to army life," Colonel Buchanan says.

"All we can hope to do is

make it a manageable culture shock."

If society is changing, so is the army, albeit at a slower pace. "We are an inherently conservative organisation which appeals to traditional values such as service and sacrifice, so we might be a couple of years behind the prevailing trends," he says.

"But you must remember that, just as the recruits come from a new generation, so do we who train them. We do move with the times, and we do adapt to new attitudes."

Conservative and traditionalist it may be, but increasing numbers of Australians appear to be comfortable with the way of life the army offers. Unlike Britain, which is experiencing a recruiting crisis, Kapooka's intake is down only because there are fewer places to fill. Financial restrictions, a higher than normal retention rate, and the fact that members of the disbanded Ready Reserves are signing on as regulars, means there have been no recent difficulties in meeting recruiting targets.

So if the quantity is right, does it follow that quality is there also?

Colonel Andy Reynolds, director of public affairs for Defence Public Relations in Canberra, thinks so, citing examples of a corporal who performed the harbour-master duties at Jogselsu while on duty in Somalia, and a man of similar rank who was the de facto administrator of the entire eastern half of Cambodia for six months.

"We are putting 20-year-olds in charge of multimillion-dollar pieces of equipment as a matter of routine," he says. "They have to be good."

What is why Australian forces are always among the first to be asked when there are United Nations duties to be performed, and in turn that leads to our people picking up invaluable knowledge of the world.

"It is a broadening experience to travel through countries like Cambodia and Somalia and see the conditions under which many of the people have to live. You get a feeling of just how fortunate you are."

At Kapooka, Colonel Buchanan takes a longer view of the current readiness of the army to meet emergencies.

Continued on Page 19

The facts about life in the forces

Facts and figures from last year's census of the Australian Defence Force.

■ In March 1985 there were 58,395 serving ADF members, down by 10,889 on the time of the last headcount, four years earlier.

■ Of these, 45 per cent (26,104) were in the army, 25 per cent (14,845) in the navy and 30 per cent (17,438) in the air force.

■ The ADF remains overwhelmingly male (86 per cent), with 53 per cent either married or in a recognised de facto relationship.

Nearly 14 per cent had partners who were also serving.

■ There were 43,290 dependent children of defence force members.

■ More than half of all personnel (56 per cent) had been serving less than 10 years. Just 10 per cent had been members for more than 20 years.

■ The ADF has a relatively young workforce with 49 per cent aged between 20 and 29.

Females tend to be younger than males.

■ The proportion of serving members with tertiary qualifications was 57 per cent — a significant increase on the 34 per cent recorded in 1981. Eleven per cent had a BA degree or higher.

■ Just under two-thirds (65 per cent) of members with a spouse or partner said they had been separated for service reasons in the previous year.

— GRAHAM COOKE

“Done a lot of travelling and had plenty of jobs . . . now I've got fresh challenges”

ARMY NEWS 26 JUN 87



Rec Mark Charlton, 6 Pl, gets serious on the bayonet-assault course during the final stages of the gruelling Challenge. Soldiers following in Rec Charlton's footsteps will benefit from sweeping changes to the way 1RTB conducts recruit training. Instructors posted to Kapooka will undergo a two- to three-week recruit instructor development course aimed at 'training the trainer'. A new regimental-wing system will provide benefits to instructors as well. Photo by Sgt Noel Gilby.

No personnel at RISC in new Kapooka

Involuntary postings for 1RTB

SWEEPING changes to the way 1RTB conducts recruit training have seen the abolition of the Recruit Instructor Course (RISC) and the introduction of involuntary postings to Kapooka.

By Sgt Noel Gilby

Postings to 1RTB are no longer voluntary but by consultation with career advisers through SCMA.

The dreaded RISC has been replaced by a two- to three-week recruit instructor development course to be undertaken on posting to 1RTB.

Comdt 1RTB Col Mark Sampson said RISC had been binned because it had become a barrier to soldiers volunteering for a posting to the battalion.

"Soldiers found the RISC daunting and felt they shouldn't have to prove themselves as instructors again after completing subjects one for corporal and sergeant," Col Sampson said.

"The RIDC differs from the RISC in that if you failed the RISC you didn't come here but no action was taken to improve you. On the new course we will work on you until you pass."

The RIDC includes subjects required of a recruit instructor in the '90s with particular emphasis on an instructor's ability to have a recruit retain knowledge.

Col Sampson said the RIDC would not relate to 1RTB's TMP but more to a soldier being able to instruct on anything.

"The RIDC relies on your attitude, not your background or experience.

"It will be a case where instructors will look for and understand why a particular recruit is not picking up a lesson or is slower than his or her peers."

In line with the RIDC, the battalion has introduced a regimental-wing system where every company will be in charge of a particular competency.

A Coy, for example, would still have recruit platoons but could also be the subject-matter experts for field training; B Coy could become the small-arms experts.

Instructors will be divided into junior, intermediate and senior levels, depending

on experience, and taught how to teach all lessons of all wings.

"The idea is that within two years of arriving here as an instructor, you would have been trained on and delivered training on every element of every competency so that when you leave here you will be an allrounder," Col Sampson said.

"By the time you walk out the door you would have just about passed your next subject one course."

Instructors will also have instructional specialties above the wing subjects.

He said instructors in Field Wing could qualify as a combat medic, for example, because it would also run the medical training. It would also qualify an instructor in competencies such as GPS and Project Ninex equipment.

The regimental-wing system also allows better integration of reservists as instructors and has the full support of all training group commanders.

Col Sampson said he was adamant soldiers would not be adversely affected within their corps by a 1RTB posting.

"As SCMA identifies people for promotion or corps training, this system enables us to post that soldier to a general-studies wing, which will give him or her up to three months to go on course.

"No-one posted to Kapooka will suffer within their corps because they can't be released for a trade or promotion course. I guarantee that."