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TARGET ARTICLE



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Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs

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ABSTRACT

on drugs."

Historically, laws and policies to criminalize drug use or possession were rooted in explicit racism, and they continue to wreak havoc on certain racialized communities. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, psychologists, and other allied professionals who have come together in support of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and ethically recommended. We call for the immediate decriminalization of all so-called recreational drugs and, ultimately, for their timely and appropriate legal regulation. We also call for criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses pertaining to the use or possession of small quantities of such drugs to be expunged, and for those currently serving time for these offenses to be released. In effect, we call for an end to the "war on drugs."

A series of prominent killings of unarmed Black peopractice, it has worsened many aspects of public ple by police in spring 2020 has renewed calls to health while inordinately harming certain racialized address systemic racism in the United States and communities (Mauer and King 2007). In addition, the around the world. Among those killed was Breonna "war on drugs" has fostered a condescending moral-Taylor, whose home was wrongfully entered by offiism that conflates drug use with violence or bad charcers without warning as part of a drug-related search. acter and casts drug users-especially Black and As we will detail, Black people in the United States Hispanic drug users-as criminals-in-waiting who are disproportionately targeted, arrested, and incarcerdeserve to be punished (Mallea 2014). Indeed, the very language of a "war" can work to reinforce "a set ated for crimes related to non-medical drug use, and this is one area where social reform is urgently of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems needed. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, and gain political power" (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). psychologists, and other allied professionals (see In contrast to this approach, we argue for ending the Appendix for details) who have come together in supdrug war and investing in the most heavily affected port of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and communities. If managed carefully, this shift in policy ethically recommended. We call for the immediate will not only improve public health, reduce crime and decriminalization of all psychoactive substances currecidivism, lower unemployment and poverty rates, rently deemed illicit for personal use or possession,¹ and save governments large sums of money (which and, ultimately, for their full legalization and careful could be better spent; see Box 1); it will strike a necesregulation. In effect, we call for an end to the "war sary blow against racial injustice.

In principle, the "war on drugs" aims to protect people from harm and promote public health. In

The context here is instructive. Historically, drug laws and enforcement have reflected and perpetuated explicit racism, including early legislation against

KEYWORDS race and culture/ethnicity: health policy; regulatory issues

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⁹⁹ ¹By "decriminalization" we mean that all relevant jurisdictions should adopt *de jure* decriminalization so that criminal penalties for the personal possession and use of small amounts of currently illicit drugs are removed by an act of legislation or judicial decision. This is in contrast to merely de 100 facto decriminalization, whereby the suspension of criminal penalties depends on local, contingent administrative or law enforcement practices, such as 101 the non-enforcement of the relevant laws and/or referral of offenders to treatment or education programs (Single, Christie, and Ali 2000; Hughes et al. 2016). Thus, although we will argue that individuals struggling with substance-related disorders or other drug-related difficulties should be offered 102 treatment and education, such supportive efforts should be handled through social care institutions that are not tied to the criminal justice system. 103 © 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 104

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Box 1. Saving money and reinvesting in communities.

Drug prohibition harms communities because it is a poor use of limited public resources. For communities that lack sufficient public investment in education, health care, social housing, or infrastructure, drug prohibition diverts public resources away from more socially pressing and worthwhile causes. In the U.S., it is estimated that state and local annual expenditure on drug prohibition amounts to \$29 billion, with an additional \$18 billion of federal spending (Miron 2018). Meanwhile, drug legalization could yield \$58 billion in federal, state, and local tax revenues, with up to \$106.7 billion in overall annual budgetary gains for federal, state, and local governments (Miron 2018).

In states that have legalized cannabis, education and public health programs, including substance use disorder treatment and drug use prevention programs, have been the biggest beneficiaries of cannabis tax revenues (DPA 2018). For instance, in Colorado, the state distributed \$230 million to its Department of Education between 2015 and 2017 (Colorado Department of Education 2018). In 2019, Washington State collected a total of \$390.3 million from cannabis excise and sales tax, with \$188.3 million distributed to health care programs and \$9.5 million to substance use disorder, education, and prevention initiatives (Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board 2019). And as a part of California's Adult Use of Marijuana Act (Proposition 64), the California Community Reinvestment Grants ("CalCRG") program has allocated \$28.5 million of the revenues from cannabis legalization to support restorative justice projects (with an additional \$30 million planned for 2021, \$40 million for 2022 and \$50 million for 2023), focusing on job placements, mental health treatment, substance use disorder treatment, legal services to address barriers to societal reentry, and access to medical care (California Community Reinvestment Grants Program 2019).

These states have shown that they are able and willing not only to allocate large percentages of the saved funds toward social goods including schools, health care, and infrastructure (DPA 2018), but also to invest in community-building projects for communities that have been disproportionately affected by the "war on drugs," mass supervision, and mass incarceration. But we need to be clear. To fully rebuild those communities that struggle with the greatest concentration of substance use disorders, and which suffer from the cumulative, collateral effects of unjust drug enforcement will require public and charitable expenditures that significantly exceed the potential savings from ending prohibition in any given municipality or state.² Responsibly reinvesting these savings is a minimum first step, not a final answer.

Chinese "opium dens" and Mexican "reefer madness" (Musto 1999; Manderson 1999; Vagins and McCurdy 2006; Provine 2007; Fellner 2009; Campos 2012; Lopez 2014; Luna 2016; Netherland and Hansen 2016; Rosino and Hughey 2018). As we will discuss, the harmful effects of prohibition continue to be especially burdensome for certain racialized groups. Black and Hispanic men, in particular, are subject to heightened scrutiny in relation to suspected drug-related activities, for example, during "investigatory" traffic stops (Weitzer and Brunson 2015; Epp et al. 2017). They are more often met with police use of force, controlling for potentially confounding variables (see Fryer Jr. 2019). They are more likely to face arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration (Mauer and King 2007; Fellner 2009; Mitchell and Caudy 2015; Koch, Lee, and Lee 2016; Nellis 2016; Omori 2019). Moreover, when convicted, they face harsher criminal penalties (Turner and Dawkar 2014; TSP 2018; Lynch 2019).

145These discriminatory practices exacerbate vulner-146abilities within affected communities, including those147mired in structural disadvantages tracing back to slav-148ery and Jim Crow—with persisting inequities that are149still widely underestimated (Small 2001; Nunn 2002;150Clear 2007; Alexander 2010; Del Toro et al. 2019;151Onyeador et al. 2020). It has become evident that152piecemeal reforms are not enough to address these

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 ²Potential federal enforcement savings are unlikely to result in a significant reduction in the size or budgets of the many agencies involved that are not exclusively focused on drug enforcement, and specialized drug enforcement agency funding is likely to be reprogrammed to regulatory enforcement. problems. Rather, what is needed is a paradigm shift in how we think about drugs in society. As we will argue, even if racial discrimination in drug arrests, prosecutions, and sentencing could somehow be eliminated, drug prohibition itself would remain unjust and harmful on balance (Huemer 2007; Fellner 2009).

Our proposal to decriminalize and subsequently legalize non-medical drug use applies especially to cannabis, as the benefits and risks of this drug and associated policy options have been the most exhaustively researched. Cannabis is, on the whole, much less harmful to users and others than alcohol, tobacco, and a range of prescription medications that are not prohibited despite the greater potential for dependence and abuse (Nutt, King, and Phillips 2010; Anomaly 2013). But changing the policy on cannabis does not go far enough. In our view, the deep-seated racial injustices associated with current drug laws and their biased enforcement, the harms associated with illegal drug markets that thrive under prohibition, and the violence both within and between communities that such markets engender, call for a more comprehensive approach. Accordingly, we are in favor of the ultimate legalization and careful regulation of MDMA (ecstasy), psychedelic drugs such as LSD and psilocybin, heroin and other opioids, methamphetamine, and powder and crack cocaine-that is, all drugs used for nonmedical purposes that are currently deemed illicit (for related discussions, see e.g., Abbott et al. 2020; Hoss 2019; Marlan 2020).

The personal use and possession of small quantities of these substances, we argue, should be entirely 158 159

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excluded from the purview of criminal law (see footnote 1 for details). Policymakers should pursue this first step-decriminalization-without delay. Although this step alone would, at least in principle, mitigate some of the harms and injustices we have mentioned, the shift away from prohibition would of course need to be accompanied by supportive policies and initiatives to minimize the risks and potential negative externalities that might be associated with such a transition. In particular, while the groundwork for a fully legalized and regulated system is being developed, a combination of decriminalization and harm reduction akin to the Portugal model (see below) is strongly advised.

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The bottom line, however, is that if and when problems with substance use or misuse arise, these should be approached through healthcare programs and social support, not prison time. Moreover, once the groundwork for legalization has been laid, the production, storage, handling, distribution, sale, and supply of drugs currently deemed to be illicit should be legally regulated like other drugs in the U.S. and the Anglosphere in general, such as alcohol, nicotine, and prescription medications.³

As a part of this process, policymakers should directly involve current and former drug users and their social networks in the revision of relevant policy, while implementing community-building programs based on coherent, long-term strategies that meet the needs of those affected (for details and further discussion, see Zigon 2019). We suggest that policymakers also develop racial and ethnic impact statements for any new regulations or changes to existing laws (DPA 2015).

Two final points of clarification. First, it is not our aim to argue either for or against the prudence or permissibility of personal use of drugs for non-medical purposes. Thus, in advocating for the proposed policy changes, we are not making any specific normative commitment as to whether individuals should or should not use any of the aforementioned drugs. More importantly, we do not suggest that all currently illicit drugs should be readily available to any potential consumer: the precise modes of access, and barriers to accessibility, must depend on the drug and its particular profile of benefits and risks as it would

264 realistically be used under different conditions.⁴ Accordingly, it is possible that some drugs should be 265 266 heavily regulated, with their sale or administration 267 requiring, for example, a special license, and/or some 268 individuals who are at an especially high risk of harm 269 being dissuaded by appropriate means (e.g., a person 270with severe psychosis seeking access to a high dose of 271 psilocybin; see Smith and Sisti 2020). The question of 272 how to devise and implement such regulatory policies 273 in order to minimize harms and achieve successful 274compliance is beyond the scope of this paper. 275 Nevertheless, we maintain that many, if not most, 276 of the negative outcomes that are associated with 277 so-called recreational drug use and dissemination in 278 society are either produced or made worse through 279 prohibition (Ostrowski 1991; Barnett 2009; Hart 2013; 280 Todd 2018; Hart 2020). 281

Second, our paper should not be read as a general 282 defense of the rights of adults to access, possess, and/ 283 or use drugs currently deemed illicit nor is it an 284 attempt to argue for the constitutional protection of 285 such rights enforced by the judiciary. Although we are 286 not, in principle, opposed to a rights-based approach 287 (for example, see Flanigan 2017), we intend our pro-288 posals to be considered within the domain of demo-289 cratic politics. This is, therefore, a call for citizens to 290 lobby their elective representatives, and for policy-291 makers at state and federal levels to act by drawing up 292 and passing appropriate legislation, and/or ensuring 293 that these ideas are put on the ballot.⁵ 294

DRUG PROHIBITION HARMS USERS

The standard case for drug prohibition is that it protects people from using certain drugs, which are thought to be harmful and inherently addictive. However, the "war on drugs" is based on a misunderstanding of the science of addiction (for example, it discounts contextual factors contributing to harmful

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304 ⁴Obviously, further painstaking scientific research into such benefits and 305 risks will be necessary to inform relevant policies. Also note: the case of 306 heroin-assisted treatment in the Netherlands offers an example of the ways in which different regulatory standards can be operationalized for 307 different substances (Blanken et al. 2010). 308 ⁵Recent events have proved encouraging. While our article was under review in November of 2020, ballot measures were passed in the U.S. 309 state of Oregon simultaneously decriminalizing the possession of all 310 currently illicit drugs for personal use, legalizing the therapeutic use of 311 psilocybin, and expanding access to evidence-informed drug treatment, peer support, housing, and harm reduction services. During the same 312 time period, voters in Arizona, Montana, New Jersey, and South Dakota 313 opted to legalize cannabis use, bringing the total to 15 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia that have legalized cannabis. Non-medical 314 cannabis use is decriminalized in a further 15 U.S. states, as are all so-315 called recreational drugs in Portugal as of 2001 (Greenwald 2009; Hughes and Stevens 2010; Kreit 2010; Silvestri 2015). 316

³Criminal penalties could still apply to certain activities, of course, such as the unlawful sale or manufacture of certain drugs, even under a legalized system. However, such a system would ensure that individuals are not targeted with offenses relating to personal possession and use.

317 drug use; see more generally Hart 2020; Pickard 318 2020), and it undermines the wellbeing of people who 319 use drugs (Barnett 2009; Room and Reuter 2012; 320 Csete et al. 2016), especially low-income racial and 321 ethnic minorities (Clifford 1992; Provine 2007). 322 Prohibition has not met its explicit aim of substan-323 tially lowering the overall rate of drug use, partly 324 because severity-based deterrence, enforced by crimin-325 alization of drug possession and use, has historically 326 been counterproductive (MacCoun 1993). Indeed, 327 there has been an increase in global consumption of 328 illicit substances over the last half century (Hall 329 2018).⁶ Drug prohibition, like alcohol prohibition, is 330 criminogenic and can therefore be harmful to both 331 users and non-users; it can motivate users to commit 332 burglaries and robberies in order to purchase drugs; it 333 contributes to systemic violence; it is associated with 334 corruption in the criminal justice system; it diverts 335 law enforcement efforts away from solving predatory 336 crimes and arresting their perpetrators; and it can 337 contribute to a cycle of ongoing criminal behavior for 338 those who hold criminal records for trivial drug-339 related offenses (Duke 2009). 340

When combined with criminalization, prohibition 341 harms users by exposing them to criminal sanction, 342 making them more vulnerable to arrest and incarcer-343 ation-which itself poses health risks, including lower 344 life expectancy and inadequate access to treatment for 345 substance use disorders (Mauer and King 2007; 346 Barnett 2009; Csete et al. 2016). In addition, prison 347 conditions as normally found in the U.S. isolate peo-348 ple from their friends and family, deprive them of 349 education and employment opportunities, exacerbate 350 mental health problems, and may make people more 351 prone to aggression (Petteruti and Walsh 2008; 352 Raphael and Stoll 2009; Harding 2019). These experi-353 ences can generate lifelong personal, economic, and 354 social obstacles (including for those who only experi-355 ence community supervision), such as barriers to 356 housing, employment, and welfare, as well as the 357 denial of voting rights (Western 2002; Clear 2007; 358 Petersilia 2009; Western and Pettit 2010; Natapoff 359

2020). Even the knowledge that one is subject to surveillance and the heightened risk of incarceration can be highly distressing (Miller and Stuart 2017; Del Toro et al. 2019).

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From a wider public health perspective, prohibition undermines programs to reduce disease transmission within drug-using communities (Bertram et al. 1996; Rhodes and Hedrich 2010; WHO 2014; Csete et al. 2016; UN 2019), perpetuates unhelpful stigma surrounding drug use (Ahern, Stuber, and Galea 2007; Csete et al. 2016; Buchman, Leece, and Orkin 2017; UN 2019), and discourages users from seeking medical and non-medical help and support when needed (Bertram et al. 1996; Ahern, Stuber, and Galea 2007; Csete et al. 2016; Buchman, Leece, and Orkin 2017; UN 2019). As such, drug prohibition imposes a multitude of health-related costs. As we will discuss, it leads to unsafe drug use and inadequate knowledge of the real effects of drugs; it provides barriers to treatment for substance-related disorders; it diverts funds away from health organizations; it can threaten or block access to the therapeutic benefits of certain drugs; and it precludes the existence of "safe supply" programs and health and safety regulations relating to presently illegal drugs.

DRUG PROHIBITION HARMS COMMUNITIES AND FEEDS SYSTEMIC RACISM

As we noted, drug prohibition and criminalization reflect and perpetuate racial injustice in many contexts (Musto 1999; Vagins and McCurdy 2006; Provine 2007; Fellner 2009; Campos 2012; Lopez 2014; Csete et al. 2016; Luna 2016; Netherland and Hansen 2016; Rosino and Hughey 2018). These policies have been directly linked to police militarization and brutality (ACLU 2014) and are among the important contributing factors to mass incarceration and mass supervision, especially of Black and Hispanic men (Sterling 2004; Alexander 2010; Pfaff 2017).

One of the most significant problems with prohibition is that it leads to illicit markets: specifically, unregulated markets that result in the production of drugs of unknown and inconsistent purity, and, in many cases, dangerous bulking agents and toxic additives, thus increasing rather than reducing the potential for harm (Barnett 2009; Csete et al. 2016; Veit 2018). It has also contributed to the production of novel psychoactive substances in an attempt to circumvent existing laws. Accordingly, some jurisdictions have responded with "catch all" laws against all psychoactive substances, including those not currently

³⁶⁰ ⁶Note: even if decriminalization did lead to an increase in the rate of 361 non-medical drug use among certain subgroups, it would still be an effective policy if it reduced the overall harm to drug users and to society 362 at large (e.g., by reducing violence associated with illegal drug markets). 363 In this context, it should be noted that U.S. government drug policy has 364 primarily sought to undermine the capacity of drug suppliers to meet, grow, and benefit financially from drug demand, so as to drive up drug 365 prices and lower drug purity. These measures were intended to make it 366 prohibitive to start using drugs while incentivizing treatment efforts by making it harder for users to sustain their habits. However, drug 367 prohibition and enforcement have not achieved these ends. Rather, drug 368 prices have generally fallen or remained stable, drug potency has increased, and drug use has steadily risen (Sterling 2006). 369

prohibited, but these laws have a number of problems (see, for example, Thorne Harbour Health 2017).

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Prohibition also fails to deal with the background conditions, such as deep-rooted economic deprivation, that sustain illegal industries (Thoumi 2003), and the associated exploitation of structurally vulnerable indicriminal gangs and viduals by drug cartels (Wainwright 2016). Prohibition thus expands opportunities for crimes against drug users (Barnett 2009) and sets the stage for violence within and between criminal organizations, as well as violence against state officials and innocent parties (Reuter 2009; Thoumi 2010; Csete et al. 2016).⁷ Furthermore, reductions in community safety and cohesion are exacerbated by increased exposure to state-backed violence and law enforcement, including dangerous raids by SWAT teams and other forms of policing that disproportionately target Black neighborhoods (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; ACLU 2014; Ghandnoosh 2015).

In the U.S., overall rates of illicit drug use and opioid misuse among Black people are very similar to those among White people (Figure 1). However, Black people are more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated-with longer sentences-for drug offenses (Vagins and McCurdy 2006; Mauer and King 2007; Fellner 2009; Turner and Dawkar 2014; Mitchell and Caudy 2015; Csete et al. 2016; Koch, Lee, and Lee 2016; Nellis 2016; Lynch 2019; Omori 2019). Notably, sentencing disparities persist even after accounting for baseline differences in criminal history and crime severity (see, e.g., Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000, 2001; Spohn 2000). Moreover, the possession or distribution of drugs that are perceived to be more commonly used by Black people (e.g., crack cocaine) than by Whites people (e.g., powder cocaine) have been associated with harsher sentences,8 despite approximately similar harm/benefit profiles and chemical constitutions (Vagins and McCurdy 2006; Lynch and Omori 2018).

When we take into account the harms of incarceration to individuals that have already been mentioned, initial race disparities in arrests, convictions, and sentencing can lead to and maintain long-term

476 vulnerabilities and widening socio-economic dispar-477 ities (Chin 2002; Clear 2007; Alexander 2010). In 478 turn, differences in socio-economic status can contrib-479 ute to disparities in the effectiveness of substance 480 abuse treatment programs. Specifically, Black and 481 Hispanic people, who make up approximately 40 per-482 cent of the admissions to such programs in the U.S., 483 are roughly 4 to 8 percentage points less likely than 484 White people to complete treatment for substance-485 related disorders largely due to socio-economic rea-486 sons (Saloner and Lê Cook 2013). Relatedly, because 487 substance abuse treatment programs in the U.S. are 488 linked to the criminal justice system (Kreit 2010), 489 Black and Hispanic adolescents are more likely, com-490 pared to White adolescents, to be discharged from 491 treatment due in part to incarceration (Marotta 492 et al. 2020).⁹

493 The incarceration of a parent can also have pro-494 foundly adverse effects on children (Murphey and 495 Cooper 2015), effects that have clear racial implica-496 tions given that Black children are far more likely 497 than children from other racial groups to have a par-498 ent involved in the criminal justice system (Raphael 499 and Stoll 2009; TSP 2019). But public officials are 500 rarely held accountable for unjust enforcement tac-501 tics-let alone the enforcement of unjust laws-502 because they are protected by indemnification provi-503 sions and the legal doctrine of civil immunity. 504

To address these more specific racial injustices, we 505 call for criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses 506 pertaining to drug use or possession of small quanti-507 ties of non-medical drugs to be expunged, and for 508 those currently serving time for these specific offenses, 509 including those with drug-related parole and proba-510 tion revocations, to be released. Failing that, criminal 511 records for these offenses should be, at the very least, 512 protected from judicial access in future criminal pro-513 ceedings and decoupled from a person's rights and 514 entitlements as a citizen. Furthermore, those who 515 would continue to hold a conviction on their record 516 for these offenses should receive retroactive ameliora-517 tive relief under new decriminalization and/or legal-518 ization laws (Yuen Thompson 2017). 519

Taking a wider perspective, we note that the U.S. commitment to drug prohibition has not only influenced drug policy worldwide (Csete et al. 2016; Coyne

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⁷Indeed, violence driven by conflicts within and among gangs and drug-selling crews has, historically, constituted the majority of urban homicide problems (Block and Block 1993; Kennedy, Piehl and Braga 1996; Papachristos 2009), the bulk of which are intraracial (Braga and Brunson 2015). This suggests that the illegal drug market is a major contributing factor to violence within Black communities.

⁸The well-known federal sentencing disparity between powder and crack
cocaine offenses has only recently and partially been addressed by the
Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) of 2010, which reduced the statutory ratio from
100:1 to 18:1, respectively. In 2018, the First Step Act made this reform
retroactive.

⁹The findings of Marotta and colleagues (2020) suggest that Black and Hispanic adolescents were less likely to be discharged when they had been referred by schools and other social institutions, indicating that racial and ethnic disparities in treatment attrition could be mitigated by a combination of *de jure* decriminalization and the enhancement of links between substance abuse treatment programs and social institutions (see footnote 1). 528




Figure 1. Percentage of White vs. Black US population to use an illicit drug/misuse opioids in the past year. Note that use/misuse is similar between the racial groups, with two main exceptions: crack, which has a higher rate of use among Black people, and hallucinogens and methamphetamine, which have higher rates of use among Whites people. Data source: SAMHSA (2018).

and Hall 2017; Koram 2019; Piaggio and Vidwans 2019), but also contributed to human rights abuses and other harms in countries along the illegal drug supply chain (Villar and Cottle 2011; Paley 2014; Piaggio and Vidwans 2019) while providing a power-ful mechanism for increased U.S. "dominance" over poorer countries of the Global South (Telles 2019). There are also implications for gender equity in these countries, as noted by a United Nations task force on women: "Even when women may not directly partici-pate in drug use or the drug trade, they are often responsible for mitigating the associated risks for themselves and for their families, and they are forced to carry the double and triple burden of care when families break apart and community life deteriorates" (UN Women 2014).

Finally, the same harms and racial disparities in U.S. drug enforcement persist in other countries. For example, in England and Wales in 2016/2017, Black people were almost nine times more likely than White people to be stopped and searched for drugs (Shiner et al. 2018, p. 15). They were more likely to be arrested following a stop and search than White people and more likely to be prosecuted (ibid., p. 35). In addition, Black people were con-victed of cannabis possession at almost twelve times

the rate of White people, despite lower rates of selfreported use (*ibid.*, p. 44), and they were over nine times more likely than White people to be sentenced to immediate custody for drug offenses (*ibid.*, p. 45).

DRUG PROHIBITION VIOLATES RIGHTS

Drug prohibition and criminalization not only negatively impact individual users and communities, they may also violate people's rights (Barnett 2009; Fellner 2009). Although some voters and public officials may disapprove of others' personal drug use, people generally have rights over their own bodies that allow them to make decisions not only about their health, but also about the substances they choose to consume, including those drugs that have been legalized in the U.S. and elsewhere, such as alcohol and tobacco. For example, people may use drugs to examine their consciousness, to explore their character, to access and respond to their values, motivations, and desires, and to engage in self-development and self-understanding (Fadiman 2011; Kaelen et al. 2015; Schmid et al. 2015; Liechti, Dolder, and Schmid 2017; Preller et al. 2017; Griffiths et al. 2018; Veit 2018; Earp 2018; Lewis 2020; Earp and Savulescu, in press). Although most drugs,

635 including alcohol, can be used in ways that harm the 636 user, the potential for self-harm does not normally 637 provide adequate grounds for outright prohibition. In 638 general, prohibition conflicts with one's right to con-639 trol what substances one can put into one's body for one's own enjoyment or self-exploration (Huemer 640 2007; Barnett 2009).¹⁰ Moreover, people who freely 641 642 choose to use drugs for personal purposes do not (as 643 such) violate the equal liberty of others and are, there-644 fore, not presumptively liable to civil penalties. As 645 Ostrowski (1990) noted decades ago:

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Drug prohibition is [the] initiation of physical force against persons engaging in non-violent actions and voluntary transactions involving prohibited drugs. By definition, drug suspects and drug convicts have not been arrested or convicted for having initiated force against the police or private citizens. They would be suspected or convicted of robbery, rape, murder, etc., if they had initiated force against others. (p. 609)

In addition to directly violating some rights, prohibition with criminalization indirectly weakens other rights (Barnett 2009). As demonstrated by the case of Breonna Taylor, for instance, it makes some people more vulnerable to violations not just of their civil liberties but also of their right to life, even when they are not engaged in illegal activity (Husak 1992). For example, drug laws can be used as a pretext for privacy-invading police actions that violate constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches (e.g., noknock raids), unreasonable seizures (e.g., civil asset forfeiture) and excessive force (Bertram et al. 1996; Barnett 2009). Finally, to the extent that drug prohibition is enforced in ways that discriminate on the basis of race, it also undermines rights to equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Fellner 2009).

¹⁰The right to health may also sometimes be at stake. For some people, prohibited substances such as marijuana, psilocybin, MDMA, LSD, or Ketamine, may be used to treat conditions or manage symptoms in light of the limitations or side-effects associated with conventional medications, or to augment existing therapies (Fadiman and Korb 2015; Griffiths et al. 2016; Mithoefer, Grob and Brewerton 2016; Polito and Stevenson 2019). Although participation in "medical marijuana" ("MMJ") programs varies considerably by state, registry estimates in 2016 suggest that there were around 650,000 registered MMJ users in the U.S. (Fairman 2016), with the majority of participants reported to be in their 40s and 50s (Ilgen et al. 2013; Zaller et al. 2015). However, for those who, for example, cannot access MMJ programs, or whose optimum therapeutic drug is not approved for medical use, drug prohibition impedes their right to access beneficial medical treatment. This problem has been exacerbated by a hostile regulatory and funding climate that has, historically, inhibited research into "illicit" drug treatments and novel drug-assisted therapies, especially those involving MDMA, LSD, or psilocybin (Mithoefer, Grob, and Brewerton 2016; Abbott et al. 2020).

THE BENEFITS OF DECRIMINALIZATION AND LEGAL REGULATION

690 Decriminalizing drug consumption and possession of 691 small amounts of drugs currently deemed to be illicit 692 would not, on the whole, undermine public health or 693 public safety. Rather, decriminalization makes drug 694 use safer and eliminates the harms and injustices asso-695 ciated with arresting and incarcerating drug users. For 696 example, in Portugal, the decriminalization of all rec-697 reational drugs in 2001, together with preventive, 698 treatment, and other harm-reduction efforts plus 699 social reintegration, reduced the harmful effects of 700 arresting and incarcerating drug users, freed up scarce 701 resources in the criminal justice system, and lowered 702 the rates of reported substance use disorders, overdo-703 ses, and drug-related HIV and hepatitis (Greenwald 704 2009; Hughes and Stevens 2010; Kreit 2010; Silvestri 705 2015; DPA 2019). 706

By 2017, Portugal's drug-induced mortality rate 707 among adults was substantially lower than the 708 European average (4 deaths per million compared to 709 22 deaths per million) (EMCDDA 2019). Although 710 the rate of cannabis use in the overall population over 711 a twelve-month period increased from 3.3% in 2001 712 to 5.1% in 2017, use of all other previously illicit 713 drugs (over a twelve-month period) has fallen below 714 2001 levels (Balsa, Vital, and Urbano 2017; DPA 2019; 715 EMCDDA 2019). In addition, since the introduction 716 of these policies, drug offenses, including trafficking 717 and related crimes, have not spiraled upwards 718 (Hughes and Stevens 2010; DPA 2019; SICAD 2019). 719

As the Portugal example shows, when drug users 720 do not fear criminal charges, they are able to seek out 721 medical treatment, mental health care, and social sup-722 port programs, and can access government-approved 723 public information about the harms involved in drug 724 use. In Portugal, the social institutions that focused 725 on harm reduction instead of punishment were also 726 able to engage and help more young people than the 727 criminal system (Silvestri 2015). Additionally, drug 728 decriminalization enabled officials to more effectively 729 deliver housing, health, and employment assistance to 730 populations that would have been more difficult to 731 reach under a prohibitive regime (Kreit 2010; Silvestri 732 2015; DPA 2019). 733

Decriminalization alone, however, does not remove the harms associated with illicit markets (Ostrowski 1990). Such markets do not prioritize consumer safety, and sellers may not be concerned with the age, medical history, or vulnerability of their customers. In addition, decriminalization without legalization would continue to subject people who use drugs to civil 740

741 penalties, including fines, which, in the case of a fine 742 default, could still lead to imprisonment (Hall 1997). 743 Consequently, as we have said, while the first and 744 immediate step should be to decriminalize the per-745 sonal use and possession of small amounts of all drugs 746 currently deemed to be illicit, subsequent steps should 747 find ways to safely and legally regulate the production, 748 storage, distribution, handling, sale, supply, and use of 749 such drugs.

750 Legal regulation offers several advantages over 751 mere decriminalization. It would allow governments 752 to introduce "safe supply" programs for cannabis, 753 opioids such as heroin, stimulants such as cocaine 754 and crystal meth, empathogens such as MDMA, and 755 psychedelics such as psilocybin and LSD in order to 756 curtail the harms associated with illegal markets, 757 end the stigmatization of drug use and drug users, 758 and increase the benefits of responsible drug use 759 and treatment options for substance use disorders 760 (CAPUD 2019). If the drug industry were a regu-761 lated business, governments could provide drug 762 safety-and-hygiene regulations, expanding upon those 763 measures already known to be cost-effective and 764 efficient at reducing harms associated with drug use, 765 such as needle exchange programs (in combination 766 with medication-assisted therapy where appropriate) 767 (Rhodes and Hedrich 2010; Kimber et al. 2010). 768 Accordingly, they would be able to tax drugs 769 according to proper assessment of their respective 770 harms (e.g. Nutt, King, and Phillips 2010), and 771 regulate production, storage, handling, and distribu-772 tion. In collaboration with scientists, regulators, and 773 local authorities, governments could enforce drug 774 safety laws, with qualified officials inspecting pro-775 duction and distribution premises in order to ensure 776 compliance. 777

In addition, state and local authorities could pro-778 vide drug consumption rooms, in which people can 779 use a range of substances through different routes of 780 administration (EMCDDA 2018), as well as clinical-781 like settings for injection drug use. They could pro-782 vide government-approved health information and 783 guidelines relating to safe use, potential harms, and 784 potential benefits. They could also restrict advertising, 785 set appropriate age limits, ban sales to intoxicated 786 people, ensure that public health information is clearly 787 displayed on all packaging, and facilitate and enforce 788 appropriate licensing laws. Such laws could not only 789 limit purchase amounts and purchasing times, but 790 also require special licenses for the purchase of certain 791 drugs deemed to be higher-risk. Of course, we recog-792 nize that whether, and to what extent, these suggested 793

features of a possible regulatory regime will lead to a reduction in relevant harms in practice will, ultimately, depend on the types of enforcement strategies that policymakers adopt to ensure compliance and the rigor with which these strategies are carried out.

All told, we consider a policy of legal regulation to be preferable to decriminalization on its own, which in turn is preferable to criminalization.

IMPLEMENTING DRUG POLICY REFORM

Those seeking to implement drug policy reform need to be aware of the complexities of international law and associated policies. For example, they need to be aware of the U.N.'s international drug control treaties, which have been ratified by the majority of member states, and of the U.N.-based international drug control system, which has been partially responsible for the rise of the "global drug prohibition regime" built around its multi-lateral conventions (Nadelmann 1990). Several U.N. treaties¹¹ prohibit the non-medical use of many of the drugs currently deemed to be illicit, and have been criticized for the very same reasons discussed in this paper (Hall 2018). Given the legalization policies that have come into effect in certain jurisdictions (see footnote 5), the future of these treaties is uncertain (ibid.). However, the question is how to justify domestic policy shifts in light of preexisting international commitments, especially as the global drug prohibition regime has-at least historically-generated a substantial amount of compliance (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As Bewley-Taylor (2018) suggests, one option might be to modify certain treaty provisions by means of a "special agreement" among a group of like-minded nations.¹² For instance, if the U.S. sets a precedent for the legalization of the personal possession and use of all drugs deemed to be illicit (plus their regulation as described), and if other influential nations follow suit,

¹¹See: Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). ¹²Another option, one that was pursued by the Obama administration in response to the legalization of cannabis in Washington State and Colorado, is to highlight the "flexibility" reserved to signatory parties in seeking to achieve the treaties' aims (Bennett and Walsh 2014; Bewley-Taylor, Jelsma, and Barrett 2015). With the 2018 proposal of the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States ("STATES") Act, which seeks to continue to class cannabis as a Schedule I drug while prohibiting federal law enforcement from prosecuting those in compliance with state law, it seems that the U.S. still considers the "flexibility" approach to treaty compliance to be a politically attractive option (e.g., see Firestone 2019). Given that we call for the legalization and regulation of cannabis as the first of a series of policy changes, the "flexibility" approach could support the implementation of our proposals in the short term.

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then the treaties in question would likely become "dead letter[s]" (Hall 2018).

Although it is not our aim to defend a particular solution for how a given jurisdiction should navigate the tension between (a) implementing drug policy reform at a local/national level and (b) responding to the demands of international law, we do suggest that if the U.S. is to set a standard for other countries to follow, its reforms must be both evidence-based and ethical-and driven by a firm commitment to racial justice. Indeed, responsible drug policy is about more than just drugs: it is about the flourishing of entire communities. And in this context, it is most especially about the flourishing of Black and Hispanic communities that have been disproportionately harmed by the 862 "war on drugs." Thus, while we ultimately call for the 863 adoption of de jure decriminalization (as qualified 864 above), one way to mitigate racial disparities in pros-865 ecution, conviction, and sentencing rates in the short 866 term is by immediately shifting the focus away from 867 the criminal justice system to a civil "drug court" 868 model (Kreit 2010). This shift would ameliorate harms 869 caused by criminal proceedings and provide less puni-870 tive points of contact to treatment and social services. 871 Such a shift is already widely supported among public 872 health and policy experts (*ibid*.). 873

But we need to be upfront. A full recovery from the failed "war on drugs" will require more than minor shifts and tinkering. Rather, it will require a domestic, postwar "Marshall Plan" consisting of (1) community-building programs focused on poverty alleviation, job creation, improved schooling and housing, and social mobility, thereby reducing the systemic harms that are either caused or made worse by the "war on drugs," mass supervision, and mass incarceration; (2) adequately expanded healthcare, social support programs, and rehabilitation efforts for those who struggle with addiction or other harms associated with drug use or misuse; and (3) realistic, evidencebased educational programs oriented around dissuading minors from drug use, promoting safety among adults who choose to use drugs, and honestly informing the public, policymakers, and other stakeholders about the benefits and risks of using different drugs in different settings.

CONCLUSION

Little of what we argue here is new. The ideas regarding decriminalization, at least, have been the consensus or near consensus of people who use drugs, drug policy experts, harm reduction advocates, criminal justice reformers, and others for decades (Bennett 900 901 1974; Maloff 1981; Farr 1990; Duke 1995; Kerr et al. 902 2006; Stimson 2007; WHO 2014, 2017; UN 2019). 903 Here, we simply add our support as bioethicists and 904 allied professionals to this long-proposed policy 905 change while calling for its extension through to legal 906 regulation of all drugs currently deemed to be illicit, 907 and highlighting the implications for systemic racism 908 (Danis, Wilson, and White 2016). As we have 909 observed, the "war on drugs" has disproportionately 910 targeted historically vulnerable communities. In par-911 ticular, Black and Hispanic communities have borne 912 the brunt of this misguided "war" with its unjust drug 913 laws coupled with discriminatory policing, prosecu-914 tion, conviction, and sentencing. The moral impera-915 tive now is for policymakers to act. Drug prohibition 916 and criminalization have been costly and ineffective 917 since their inception (Miron and Zwiebel 1995; 918 Sterling 2006; Miron 2018): it is time for these failed 919 policies to end. The first step is to decriminalize the 920 personal use and possession of small amounts of all 921 drugs currently deemed to be illicit and to legalize 922 and regulate cannabis. Policymakers should pursue 923 these changes without further delay. 924

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Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics University Center for Human Values	
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