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# Classical versions of $\mathrm{BCI}, \mathrm{BCK}$ and BCIW logics 

Martin W. Bunder<br>University of Wollongong, mbunder@uow.edu.au<br>John K. Slaney<br>Australian National University

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## Classical versions of BCI, BCK and BCIW logics

## Abstract

The question is, is there a formula $X$, independent of $B, C, K 1, I$ and $W$ that creates distinct subclassical logics BCIX,BCKX and BCIWX, while BCKWX is the full classical implicational logic TV?

Keywords
logics, bciw, bck, classical, bci, versions

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John K. Slaney
Martin W. Bunder

## CLASSICAL VERSIONS OF $B C I, B C K$ AND $B C I W$ LOGICS

Karpenko in [2] raises an interesting problem which can be represented in the diagram below.


Each of the corners of the cube is to represent a distinct system of implicational logic based on some of the axioms:

$$
\begin{array}{rll}
I & : p \rightarrow p \\
B & :(q \rightarrow r) \rightarrow((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow(p \rightarrow r)) \\
C & : & (p \rightarrow(q \rightarrow r)) \rightarrow(q \rightarrow(p \rightarrow r)) \\
W & :(p \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q) \\
K_{1} & :(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow(r \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q)) \\
X & : \quad ?
\end{array}
$$

and the rules modus ponens and substitution.
The axioms shown on the cube for the logic $B C I$ and the relevance logic $R \rightarrow(B C I W)$ are well known to be independent. Karpenko shows that $I, B, C$ and $K_{1}$ and $B, C, K_{1}$ and $W$ are independent axioms for $B C K$ logic and intuitionistic implicational logic $\left(H_{\rightarrow}\right)$ respectively.

The question is, is there a formula $X$, independent of $B, C, K_{1}, I$ and $W$ that creates distinct subclassical logics $B C I X, B C K X$ and $B C I W X$, while $B C K W X$ is the full classical implicational logic $T V_{\rightarrow}$ ? In [1] Karpenko considers various candidates which do not meet all of the requirements. Since then however he has, in [3], found such an $X$ (which we will call $X_{k}$ ):

$$
X_{k}:(p \rightarrow((q \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p)) \rightarrow(((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p)) .
$$

He has also extended the work so that he now has an alternative to $C$ and one to $K_{1}$ which are independent of each other and of $B, W, X_{k}$ as well as $I$.

Independently the present authors arrived at another version of $X$.
We show here that:

$$
X:((((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow r) \rightarrow(((((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow r) \rightarrow r)
$$

meets the requirements. We also show that our $B C K X$ and $B C I W X$ have $B C K X_{k}$ and $B C I W X_{k}$ respectively as proper subsystems. Our $X$ is not provable in $B C I X_{k}$, but whether $B C I X_{k}$ is a subsystem of our $B C I X$ is still open.

Other interesting open questions are:
(1) Is there an infinite number of distinct systems $B C I X_{i}, B C K X_{i}$ and $B C I W X_{i}$ ?
(2) Is there a weakest and stronger system $B C I X_{i}, B C K X_{i}$ or $B C I W X_{i}$ ?

Our $X$ is due to Meyer and Parks [4], who proposed it as the independent axioms for the system $R M_{\rightarrow .} . B C I W X$ is in fact equivalent to $R M_{\rightarrow}$.

Our results are expressed as the following theorems:
Theorem 1. $H_{\rightarrow}+X=T V_{\rightarrow}$
Proof. $\quad I, C \vdash((p \rightarrow r) \rightarrow r) \rightarrow[(((p \rightarrow r) \rightarrow r) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p]$, so $\quad I, C, B, X \vdash((p \rightarrow r) \rightarrow r) \rightarrow[((((r \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow r) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p]$ and $\quad I, C, B, X, W \vdash(((((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$ (with $p \rightarrow q / r$ ).
$B, C \vdash(p \rightarrow v) \rightarrow[((p \rightarrow s) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow((v \rightarrow s) \rightarrow p)]$, $K, B, C \vdash((p \rightarrow s) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow(((u \rightarrow p) \rightarrow s) \rightarrow p)$ (with $u \rightarrow p / v$ ) and $\quad I, C, B, X, W, K \vdash[(p \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow p] \rightarrow p$ (with $p \rightarrow q / s,(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p / u)$.
Finally $\quad W, B \vdash((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow((p \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow p)$
so $\quad I, C, B, X, W, K \vdash((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$.

The above proof was discovered using the automatic theorem prover SCOTT (see [5]).

This formula strengthens intuitionistic implicational logic to classical implicational logic.

Theorem 2.
(i) $B C K W X \neq B C K W$
(ii) $B C I W X \neq B C K_{1} W X$
(iii) $B C K_{1} X \neq B C K_{1} W X$

Proof.
(i) It follows from Theorem 1 that $X$ is a classical but not an intuitionistic tautology. It is therefore not derivable in $B C K_{1} W$.
(ii) It is easy to show that every theorem of $B C I W X$ logic has value 1 or 2 under the given matrix, but $K_{1}$ does not.

| $\rightarrow$ | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |

(iii) It is easy to show that every theorem of $B C K_{1} X$ has value 2 under the given matrix but that $W$ does not.

| $\rightarrow$ | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 |

Note that other inequalities come directly from these. For example from (i)

$$
\begin{gathered}
B C K W \neq B C I W X, \quad B C I W \neq B C I W X, \quad B C K X \neq B C K W, \\
B C I X \neq B C K W, \quad B C I X \neq B C I W
\end{gathered}
$$

The matrices in (ii) and (iii), as well as a discussion on $R M_{\rightarrow}$, appear in Anderson and Belnap [1].

Theorem 3. $\quad X$ is not provable in $B C I W X_{k}$ or $B C K X_{k}$ and so not in $B C I X_{k}$.

Proof.
(i) All theorems of $B C I W X_{k}$ satisfy the following matrix (generated by MaGIC [6]), where 1,2 and 3 are designated values.

| $\rightarrow$ | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |

Our $X$ has value 0 when $p=2, q=1$ and $r=0$.
(ii) All theorems of $B C K X_{k}$ satisfy the following matrix (generated by MaGIC [6]), where the designated value is 3 .

| $\rightarrow$ | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |

Our $X$ has value 2 when $p=1, q=0$ and $r=2$.
Theorem 4. $X_{k}$ is provable in $B C K X$ and in $B C I W X$.
Proof.
(i) By $I$ and $C$,

By $K$
so by $B$ and $C$,
Therefore
Then using (1) and $X$ hence

$$
\begin{aligned}
& (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q \vdash(((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p . \\
& \vdash p \rightarrow((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p), \\
& \vdash(((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow(p \rightarrow q) . \\
& q \rightarrow p,(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q \vdash(((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p . \\
& q \rightarrow p,(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q \vdash p, \\
& \vdash((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow q) \rightarrow((q \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p)
\end{aligned}
$$

and $\vdash X_{k}$ follows by $K$.
(ii) The system $B C I W X$ is the system $R M \rightarrow$ of Anderson and Belnap [1]. R. K. Meyer shows in [1] that a formula $Y$ is provable in $R M \rightarrow$ iff it has only nonnegative valuations $v(Y)$, where $v$ is defined over the integers as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
v(p \rightarrow q) & =\min (-v(p), v(q)) \text { if } v(p)>v(q) \\
& =\max (-v(p), v(q)) \text { if } v(p) \leq v(q) . \\
v\left(X_{k}\right) & =\max (|v(p)|,|v(q)|), X_{k} \text { is provable in } B C I W X .
\end{aligned}
$$

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Automated Reasoning Project
Australian National University
Cannberra ACT 0200
Australia

Department of Mathematics University of Wollongong Wollongong NSW 2522
Australia

