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# Malicious KGC attacks in certificateless cryptography

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# Malicious KGC attacks in certificateless cryptography

## Abstract

Identity-based cryptosystems have an inherent key escrow issue, that is, the Key Generation Center (KGC) always knows user secret key. If the KGC is malicious, it can always impersonate the user. Certificateless cryptography, introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003, is intended to solve this problem. However, in all the previously proposed certificateless schemes, it is always assumed that the malicious KGC starts launching attacks (so-called Type II attacks) only after it has generated a master public/secret key pair honestly. In this paper, we propose new security models that remove this assumption for both certificateless signature and encryption schemes. Under the new models, we show that a class of certificateless encryption and signature schemes proposed previously are insecure. These schemes still suffer from the key escrow problem. On the other side, we also give new proofs to show that there are two generic constructions, one for certificateless signature and the other for certificateless encryption, proposed recently that are secure under our new models.

## Keywords

attacks, certificateless, malicious, kgc, cryptography

## Disciplines

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# Malicious KGC Attacks in Certificateless Cryptography

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## ABSTRACT

Identity-based cryptosystems have an inherent key escrow issue, that is, the Key Generation Center (KGC) always knows user secret key. If the KGC is malicious, it can always impersonate the user. Certificateless cryptography, introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003, is intended to solve this problem. However, in all the previously proposed certificateless schemes, it is always assumed that the malicious KGC starts launching attacks (so-called Type II attacks) only after it has generated a master public/secret key pair honestly. In this paper, we propose new security models that remove this assumption for both certificateless signature and encryption schemes. Under the new models, we show that a class of certificateless encryption and signature schemes proposed previously are insecure. These schemes still suffer from the key escrow problem. On the other side, we also give new proofs to show that there are two generic constructions, one for certificateless signature and the other for certificateless encryption, proposed recently that are secure under our new models.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Certificateless cryptography, introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003 [1], is intended to solve the key escrow problem which is inherent in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography [18, 7], while at the same time, eliminate the use of certificates as in the conventional Public Key Infrastructure

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(PKI), which is generally considered to be costly to use and manage.

In a certificateless cryptosystem, a Key Generation Center (KGC) is involved in issuing *user partial key* to user whose identity is assumed to be unique in the system. The user also *independently* generates an additional user public/secret key pair. Cryptographic operations can then be performed successfully only when both the user partial key and the user secret key are known. Knowing only one of them should not be able to impersonate the user, that is, carrying out any cryptographic operations as the user. There are two types of attacks that are generally considered in certificateless cryptography:

**Type I - Key Replacement Attack.** A third party tries to impersonate a user after compromising the user secret key and/or *replacing* the user public key with some value chosen by the third party. However, it does not know the user partial key.

**Type II - Malicious KGC Attack.** The KGC, who knows the partial key of a user, is malicious and tries to impersonate the user. However, the KGC does not know the user secret key or being able to replace the user public key.

A defense against Type II attacks is for solving the key escrow issue that is an inherent problem in ID-based cryptography. That is, even if the KGC is malicious, the KGC should not be able to perform any cryptographic operation as the user, provided that the KGC cannot replace the user public key or find out the user secret key, but the KGC knows the user partial key. In addition to this, even though we say that the KGC is *malicious*, we actually assume that the KGC is *passive*, in the sense that the KGC would not actively replace the user public key (which would have been published on a bulletin board in some real implementation) or corrupt the user secret key. For certificateless encryption as example, the malicious KGC may passively eavesdrop the ciphertexts sent to a user and try to decrypt them using its knowledge of the user partial key. In the rest of the paper, we refer to this KGC as *malicious-but-passive KGC*.

Of course, if the malicious KGC is active, that is, the KGC not only knows the user partial key but is also able to replace user public key or compromise user secret key, then the KGC is always able to impersonate the user. This situation also happens in PKI. A malicious and active CA (Certification Authority) can do similar damage to a user in PKI by generating a certificate on a contradictory public key for impersonating the user. With this comparison in mind, for certificateless cryptography, we target to alleviate damage caused by malicious-but-passive KGC rather than eliminate any trust to the KGC.

Now if we take a look at all previously proposed certificateless encryption and signature schemes and adversarial models [1, 20, 21, 19, 2, 6, 3, 9, 15, 22, 12, 17, 10], we will notice that all of them have an implicit assumption that this malicious-but-passive KGC always generates its master public/secret key pair honestly according to scheme specification. In other words, all of them assume that the KGC is originally benign, but once after setting up its own key pair, it suddenly becomes malicious and gets ready to impersonate users.

It seems to be more natural if we consider this malicious-but-passive KGC to have already been malicious at the very beginning of the setup stage of the system. This KGC may generate its master public/secret key pair maliciously so that it can launch the Type II attack more easily in the later stage of the system. The KGC may even have already targeted a particular victim, say the president, when choosing its master key pair. For example, in the Al-Riyami-Paterson certificateless encryption scheme [1], we find that the KGC can have its master key pair specifically generated so that all the encrypted messages for the president can also be decrypted by the KGC. This is because the KGC is able to derive the user secret key generated by the president once after the president has published the user public key (details are in Sec. 3 of this paper). In addition, this specifically generated master public key is computationally indistinguishable from an honestly generated master public key. Therefore, it is infeasible for the president to find out that he is the target of the Type II attack.

## 1.1 Our Results

In the example above, the KGC can find out the user secret key if the KGC maliciously generates its master public key which is computationally indistinguishable from a key generated honestly according to the master key generation specification of the underlying scheme. This means once we remove the assumption that the KGC must generate its master key pair honestly, the key escrow problem reappears in some of the previously proposed certificateless schemes.

In this paper, we propose to capture the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks by specifying extension and new Type II adversarial models. The new models (one for certificateless encryption schemes and another one for signature schemes) remove the assumption that the KGC must be benign during the master key generation step and when performing user partial key generation. The models also allow the KGC to choose a user to attack during the master key generation stage. We also adopt the notion of simplifying the definition and strengthening the adversarial models of certificateless signature schemes due to Hu, Wong, Zhang and Deng [14] to simplify the definition and strengthen the two adversarial models for certificateless encryption schemes.

Our simplified definition of certificateless encryption schemes is composed of five algorithms, while all previous definitions require seven algorithms. The unique feature of certificateless encryption is also maintained, that is, the partial key generation and the user public/secret key pair generation can be carried out by the KGC and the user *independently*. Our new adversarial models also allow the adversary to compromise the target user secret key in Type I model and to replace non-target users' public keys in Type II model. These capabilities are not captured in previously proposed models for certificateless encryption schemes.

We show that the schemes proposed in [1] are vulnerable to malicious-but-passive KGC attacks (i.e. Type II attack) in our new models. The same attack technique can also be applied to schemes in [15, 16] as they share the same key structure and generation procedures as that of [1]. On the other side, we give new proofs for the generic certificateless signature scheme proposed by Hu, Wong, Zhang and Deng [14] and the generic encryption scheme proposed by Libert and Quisquater in [17] to show its security under our new models.

## 1.2 Related Work

Certificateless encryption schemes and signature schemes were first defined and proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] in 2003. Each of the definitions for certificateless encryption and signature schemes consists of seven algorithms. This definition approach has then been adopted by all others [20, 21, 19, 2, 6, 3, 9, 15, 22, 12, 17, 10] until a simplified definition for certificateless signature schemes was proposed by Hu, Wong, Zhang and Deng in [14] this year<sup>1</sup>. Their definition consists of only five algorithms and is shown to be more versatile than the previous one while maintaining the unique feature of certificateless cryptography, that is, the user public/secret key pair can be generated *independently* by the user even before obtaining the user partial key from the KGC. In Sec. 2, we adopt their approach and give a five-algorithm definition for certificateless encryption schemes.

In [3], Baek et al. proposed a certificateless encryption scheme that fits in a slightly different model that does not maintain the unique feature of certificateless cryptosystems. In their scheme, the user has to obtain a partial public/private key pair first before being able to generate a user public key. In this paper, we focus ourselves on constructing secure schemes which support the unique feature of certificateless cryptography.

On the security of certificateless encryption schemes and signature schemes, various kinds of security models have been defined. In [17, 14, 10], nice survey and discussions can be found and therefore, we skip the details in this paper, and only emphasize that all the current security models have the assumption that the KGC starts launching Type II attacks only after it has honestly generated a master public/secret key pair. In Sec. 2, we propose new Type II adversarial models for capturing malicious-but-passive KGC attacks that remove this assumption.

<sup>1</sup>Recently, Dent in [10] also mentioned that the **Set-Secret-Value** and **Set-Public-Key** algorithms in the original seven-algorithm definition can be replaced with a single **Set-User-Keys** algorithm. The approach is the same as one of the two simplifications proposed by Hu, Wong, Zhang and Deng in [14] and can reduce the number of algorithms in the certificateless encryption definition to six.

**Paper organization.** In Sec. 2, the simplified five-algorithm definition for certificateless signature schemes of [14] is reviewed and by following the approach, a new five-algorithm certificateless encryption scheme is defined. New security models for capturing malicious-but-passive KGC are also proposed. In Sec. 3, malicious-but-passive KGC attacks against some previously proposed schemes are described. In Sec. 4, the Hu-Wong-Zhang-Deng generic certificateless signature construction [14] is reviewed. A new proof is given to show its security under our new security model. In Sec. 5, the Libert-Quisquater generic certificateless encryption scheme [17] is also proven secure in our new certificateless encryption security model.

## 2. DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODELS

In this section, we first give the definitions of certificateless encryption and certificateless signature schemes. Then, we propose security models for both types of the schemes. The models corresponding to Type II attacks will capture those launched by the malicious-but-passive KGC.

In the definitions, we adopt the notion introduced by Hu, Wong, Zhang and Deng in [14] for defining schemes as sets of five algorithms rather than seven. As shown in [14], the new approach of defining certificateless signature schemes is more versatile than the original seven-algorithm definition [1, 20, 15], and still maintains the unique feature of certificateless signature schemes, that is, user partial key generation and user key generation can be done *independently* by the KGC and the user, respectively. In particular, a user with identity  $ID$  can generate a user public key denoted by  $upk_{ID}$  even before the KGC generates a user partial key denoted by  $partial\_key_{ID}$  for the user. In the following, we apply their notion on defining a certificateless encryption scheme.

As the certificateless signature and certificateless encryption schemes are sharing the same set of key generation algorithms, in the following, we first define these key generation algorithms, and then define the specific algorithms for each of signature and encryption schemes.

A *certificateless cryptosystem* has three key generation algorithms: **MasterKeyGen**, **PartialKeyGen**, **UserKeyGen**. All of them are polynomial-time and may be randomized.

1. **MasterKeyGen** (Master Key Generation): On input  $1^k$  where  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  is a security parameter, it generates a master public/secret key pair  $(mpk, msk)$ . Let  $MPK(k)$  be set of all possible master public keys generated by **MasterKeyGen( $1^k$ ). Without loss of generality, we assume that it is computable to determine if a master public key  $mpk$  is in  $MPK(k)$ .**
2. **PartialKeyGen** (User Partial Key Generation): On input  $msk$  and user identity  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , it generates a user partial key  $partial\_key$ .
3. **UserKeyGen** (User Key Generation): On input  $mpk$  and user identity  $ID$ , it generates a user public/secret key pair  $(upk, usk)$ .

A **certificateless signature (CL-SIG) scheme** has two additional polynomial-time algorithms: **CL-Sign** and **CL-Ver**.

1. **CL-Sign** (Signature Generation): On input user secret key  $usk$ , user partial key  $partial\_key$  and message  $m$ , it generates a signature  $\sigma$ .

2. **CL-Ver** (Signature Verification): On input  $mpk$ , user identity  $ID$ , user public key  $upk$ , message  $m$  and signature  $\sigma$ , it returns 1 or 0 for accept or reject, respectively.

Both of them may be randomized but the second one is usually not, but for generality, we do not mandate that the verification algorithm must be deterministic. Boneh and Franklin [8] described a generic method for converting any ID-based encryption scheme into a standard signature scheme. The transformed signature scheme has a randomized verification algorithm. When this standard signature scheme is used in the construction of a CL-SIG scheme, for example, in the Hu-Wong-Zhang-Deng generic CL-SIG construction, the CL-SIG verification algorithm will also be randomized.

*Signature Correctness.* For all  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ,  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , if  $(mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{MasterKeyGen}(1^k)$ ,  $partial\_key \leftarrow \text{PartialKeyGen}(msk, ID)$ ,  $(upk, usk) \leftarrow \text{UserKeyGen}(mpk, ID)$ , and  $\sigma \leftarrow \text{CL-Sign}(usk, partial\_key, m)$ , we require that

$$\text{CL-Ver}(mpk, ID, upk, m, \sigma) = 1.$$

A **certificateless encryption (CL-ENC) scheme** has two polynomial-time algorithms in addition to the three key generation algorithms: **CL-Encrypt** and **CL-Decrypt**. Similar to the case of signature schemes, both of these algorithms may be randomized but usually the second one is not.

1. **CL-Encrypt**: On input  $mpk$ , user identity  $ID$ , user public key  $upk$ , message  $m$ , it returns a ciphertext  $c$ .
2. **CL-Decrypt**: On input user secret key  $usk$ , user partial key  $partial\_key$  and ciphertext  $c$ , it returns a message  $m$ .

*Cipher Correctness.* For all  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ,  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , if  $(mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{MasterKeyGen}(1^k)$ ,  $partial\_key \leftarrow \text{PartialKeyGen}(msk, ID)$ ,  $(upk, usk) \leftarrow \text{UserKeyGen}(mpk, ID)$ , then we require that

$$m \leftarrow \text{CL-Decrypt}(usk, partial\_key, \text{CL-Encrypt}(mpk, ID, upk, m)).$$

**Case of invalid input:** For each of the algorithms above, we implicitly assume that there is a domain for each of its inputs if it is not specified. An input is said to be *valid* if it falls in its corresponding domain. For example, the domain of  $msk$  is defined by the set of all possible output values of master secret key of **MasterKeyGen** for each given security parameter  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ . Hence if any of the inputs of an algorithm above is invalid, then the algorithm will output a symbol  $\perp$  indicating that the execution of the algorithm is halted with failure.

In practice, the KGC (Key Generation Center) could be the one who performs **MasterKeyGen** and **PartialKeyGen**. The master public key  $mpk$  will then be published and assumed that everyone in the system has got a legitimate copy of it. The partial key is also assumed to be issued securely to the intended user so that no one except the intended user can get the partial key. For each user in the system, the user is supposed to be able to carry out **UserKeyGen**, and also **CL-Sign** and **CL-Ver** for CL-SIG or **CL-Encrypt** and



CL-Decrypt for CL-ENC. It is the user’s responsibility to forward the user public key  $upk$  to the intended signature verifier(s)/encryptor(s) and announces the user’s identity.

In the rest of the paper, we denote the user partial key of a user with identity  $ID$  as  $partial\_key_{ID}$  and the user public/secret key pair as  $(upk_{ID}, usk_{ID})$ .

## 2.1 Adversarial Model for Certificateless Signature (CL-SIG)

There are two types of adversaries,  $\mathcal{A}_I$  and  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ . Adversary  $\mathcal{A}_I$  simulates attacks when user secret key  $usk$  has been compromised or user public key  $upk$  has been replaced. However,  $\mathcal{A}_I$  is not given master secret key  $msk$  nor user partial key  $partial\_key$ . Adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  simulates attacks when the adversary controls  $msk$  and  $partial\_key$ . But  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  cannot get access to  $usk$  nor replace  $upk$ . Different from [14] or any other old models [1, 20, 15], in our model,  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  controls the key generation of the KGC while in all the previous models, the adversary is not allowed to do so. Informally,  $\mathcal{A}_I$  models a third party launching key replacement attack and  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  models attacks launched by a malicious-but-passive KGC.

There are five oracles which can be accessed by the adversaries according to the game specifications which will be given shortly. For simulating signing oracle, we assume that the game simulator keeps a history of “query-answer” while interacting with adversaries.

1. **CreateUser:** On input an identity  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , if  $ID$  has already been created, nothing is to be carried out. Otherwise, the oracle generates

$$partial\_key_{ID} \leftarrow \text{PartialKeyGen}(msk, ID)$$

and

$$(upk_{ID}, usk_{ID}) \leftarrow \text{UserKeyGen}(mpk, ID).$$

In this case,  $ID$  is said to be *created*. In both cases,  $upk_{ID}$  is returned.

2. **RevealPartialKey:** On input an identity  $ID$ , it returns  $partial\_key_{ID}$  if  $ID$  has been created. Otherwise, a symbol  $\perp$  is returned.
3. **RevealSecretKey:** On input an identity  $ID$ , it returns the corresponding user secret key  $usk_{ID}$  if  $ID$  has been created. Otherwise, a symbol  $\perp$  is returned.
4. **ReplaceKey:** On input an identity  $ID$  and a user public/secret key pair  $(upk^*, usk^*)$ , the original user public/secret key pair of  $ID$  is replaced with  $(upk^*, usk^*)$  if  $ID$  has been created. Otherwise, no action will be taken.
5. **Sign:** On input an identity  $ID$  and a message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , the signing oracle proceeds in one of the three cases below.
  - (a) A valid signature  $\sigma$  is returned if  $ID$  has been created and  $(upk_{ID}, usk_{ID})$  has not been replaced. Signature  $\sigma$  is *valid* (with respect to  $ID$  and  $upk_{ID}$ ) if  $\text{CL-Ver}(mpk, ID, upk_{ID}, m, \sigma) = 1$ .
  - (b) If  $ID$  has not been created, a symbol  $\perp$  is returned.

- (c) If the pair  $(upk_{ID}, usk_{ID})$  has been replaced by, say  $(upk^*, usk^*)$ , the oracle returns

$$\sigma \leftarrow \text{CL-Sign}(usk^*, partial\_key_{ID}, m)$$

if  $\sigma$  is valid (with respect to  $ID$  and  $upk^*$ ). If  $\sigma$  is not valid, the oracle runs a special “knowledge extractor” to obtain a valid signature and returns it to the adversary. Note that the construction of knowledge extractor is specific to each CL-SIG scheme.

*Remark 1:* When querying oracle **ReplaceKey**,  $usk^*$  can be an empty string. In this case, it means that the user secret key is not provided. If the user secret key of an identity  $ID$  is replaced with an empty string, then the empty string will be returned when the **RevealSecretKey** oracle is queried on  $ID$ . Also note that even if  $usk^*$  is not an empty string, it does not mean that  $usk^*$  is the corresponding secret key of  $upk^*$ . Hence as mentioned, the signature generated by the signing oracle **Sign** using  $usk^*$  for case (c) may not be valid.

*Remark 2:* The definition of signing oracle above follows the original idea of the model for CL-ENC in [1], that is, an adversary is expected to obtain valid decryption from a decryption oracle, even after the corresponding user public key has been replaced. This means that the simulator of the model should be able to correctly answer decryption queries for public keys where the corresponding secret keys may not be known to the simulator. To do this, a scheme-specific knowledge extractor [1] will be used by the game simulator to decrypt a requested ciphertext. In our signing oracle, case (c) above, we adopt this idea. We would also like to emphasize that case (c) of the signing oracle is a very strong security requirement. In addition, it is *unclear* on how realistic this requirement is. As later adopted and argued by many other researchers [20, 14, 22, 6, 9, 10], the game simulator is not obliged to provide valid signatures or correct decryption of ciphertexts (for the case of CL-ENC) after the corresponding user public key has been replaced. Instead, they only require that valid signatures are generated or ciphertexts can be decrypted if the user public key has been replaced while the corresponding user secret key has also been supplied by the adversary. We suggest that if this strong security requirement is not needed, one may use the signing oracle defined in [14] to replace the definition above.

We define two games, one for  $\mathcal{A}_I$  and the other one for  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ . The game for  $\mathcal{A}_I$  below is the same as the corresponding game defined in [14], except that the signing oracle is specified differently. The game for  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  is new. It captures malicious-but-passive KGC attacks discussed in Sec. 1.

**Game Sign-I:** Let  $\mathcal{S}_I$  be the game simulator and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be a security parameter.

1.  $\mathcal{S}_I$  executes **MasterKeyGen**( $1^k$ ) to get  $(mpk, msk)$ .
2.  $\mathcal{S}_I$  runs  $\mathcal{A}_I$  on  $1^k$  and  $mpk$ . During the simulation,  $\mathcal{A}_I$  can make queries onto **CreateUser**, **RevealPartialKey**, **RevealSecretKey**, **ReplaceKey** and **Sign**.
3.  $\mathcal{A}_I$  is to output  $(ID^*, m^*, \sigma^*)$ .

$\mathcal{A}_I$  wins if  $\text{CL-Ver}(mpk, ID^*, upk_{ID^*}, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$  for some created  $ID^*$  and the oracle **Sign** has never been

queried with  $(ID^*, m^*)$ . One additional restriction is that  $\mathcal{A}_I$  has never queried  $\text{RevealPartialKey}(ID^*)$  to get the user partial key  $\text{partial\_key}_{ID^*}$ .

A CL-SIG scheme is secure in **Game Sign-I** if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$ , it is negligible for  $\mathcal{A}_I$  to win the game.

**Game Sign-II:** Let  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  be the game simulator and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be a security parameter. There are two phases of interactions between  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  and adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ .

**Phase 1.**  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  executes  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  on  $1^k$  and a special tag **master-key-gen**.  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  returns a master public key  $\text{mpk} \in \text{MPK}(k)$ . Note that  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  is not allowed to query any oracle in this phase<sup>2</sup>.

**Phase 2.** This phase starts when  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  invokes  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  with  $1^k$  and a special tag **forge**. During the simulation,  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  can make queries onto oracles **RevealSecretKey**, **ReplaceKey** and **Sign**.  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  can also make queries to **CreateUser**. However, the oracle is changed to the following.

**CreateUser:** On input identity  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$  and user partial key  $\text{partial\_key}_{ID}$ , if  $ID$  has been created, nothing is to be carried out. Otherwise, the oracle generates  $(\text{upk}_{ID}, \text{usk}_{ID}) \leftarrow \text{UserKeyGen}(\text{mpk}, ID)$ . In this case,  $ID$  is said to be **created**. Also,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  associates  $\text{partial\_key}_{ID}$  and  $(\text{upk}_{ID}, \text{usk}_{ID})$  to  $ID$ . In both cases,  $\text{upk}_{ID}$  is returned.

Note that oracle **RevealPartialKey** is not accessible and no longer needed as all the user partial keys are now generated by  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ .

At the end of this phase,  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  is to output a triple  $(ID^*, m^*, \sigma^*)$ .

$\mathcal{A}_{II}$  wins if  $\text{CL-Ver}(\text{mpk}, ID^*, \text{upk}_{ID^*}, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$  for some created  $ID^*$  and oracle **Sign** has never been queried with  $(ID^*, m^*)$ . One additional restriction is that  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  has never queried **RevealSecretKey** $(ID^*)$  to get the user secret key  $\text{usk}_{ID^*}$  nor queried **ReplaceKey** $(ID^*, \cdot, \cdot)$  to replace the user public key  $\text{upk}_{ID^*}$ .

A CL-SIG scheme is secure in **Game Sign-II** if for all PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ , it is negligible for  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  to win the game. Note that  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  in the game above can not only generate master key pair maliciously, but also generate user partial key maliciously.

## 2.2 Adversarial Model for Certificateless Encryption (CL-ENC)

Similar to the adversarial model for CL-SIG above, there are two types of adversaries,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  and  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$ . Adversary  $\mathcal{B}_I$  models a third party launching key replacement attack and  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  models attacks launched by a malicious-but-passive KGC. Five oracles can be accessed by the adversaries: **CreateUser**, **RevealPartialKey**, **RevealSecretKey**, **ReplaceKey** and **Decrypt**. The first four oracles are defined in the same way as that in Sec. 2.1. Below is the definition of oracle **Decrypt**.

<sup>2</sup>The exception is that if the security analysis is done under some model such as random oracle model [5], then the adversary is allowed to access the specific random oracles of the underlying scheme at any stage of the game.

**Decrypt:** On input an identity  $ID$  and a ciphertext  $c$ , the decryption oracle proceeds in one of the three cases below.

1. A message  $m$  is returned if  $ID$  has been created and the pair  $(\text{upk}_{ID}, \text{usk}_{ID})$  has not been replaced, where

$$m \leftarrow \text{CL-Decrypt}(\text{usk}_{ID}, \text{partial\_key}_{ID}, c).$$

2. If  $ID$  has not been created, a symbol  $\perp$  is returned.
3. If the user public/secret key pair of  $ID$  has been replaced by, say  $(\text{upk}^*, \text{usk}^*)$ , the oracle returns  $m$  which is generated as

$$m \leftarrow \text{CL-Decrypt}(\text{usk}^*, \text{partial\_key}_{ID}, c)$$

if  $m \neq \perp$ . However, if  $m = \perp$ , the oracle runs a special “knowledge extractor” to decrypt the ciphertext  $c$  and returns the message to the adversary. Note that the construction of knowledge extractor is specific to each CL-ENC scheme.

Again, as a remark similar to Remark 2 on page , if we do not require the simulator to correctly answer a query to **Decrypt** oracle when the user secret key is not known, we should modify item 3 of **Decrypt** oracle above accordingly.

**Game Enc-I:** Let  $\mathcal{C}_I$  be the game challenger and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be a security parameter.

1.  $\mathcal{C}_I$  executes **MasterKeyGen** $(1^k)$  to get  $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$ .
2.  $\mathcal{C}_I$  runs adversary  $\mathcal{B}_I$  on  $1^k$  and  $\text{mpk}$ . During the simulation,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  can make queries onto **CreateUser**, **RevealPartialKey**, **RevealSecretKey**, **ReplaceKey** and **Decrypt**. At the end of this phase,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  outputs two equal-length messages  $(M_0, M_1)$  and a target identity  $ID^*$ .
3.  $\mathcal{C}_I$  picks a bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  at random and gives a challenge ciphertext  $c^*$  to  $\mathcal{B}_I$  where

$$c^* \leftarrow \text{CL-Encrypt}(\text{mpk}, ID^*, \text{upk}_{ID^*}, M_b).$$

4.  $\mathcal{B}_I$  makes queries as in step 2. At the end of the game,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  outputs its guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ .

$\mathcal{B}_I$  wins if  $b' = b$ . The restrictions are:

- $\mathcal{B}_I$  has never queried **RevealPartialKey** $(ID^*)$  to get  $\text{partial\_key}_{ID^*}$ ; and
- $\mathcal{B}_I$  has never queried **Decrypt** on the pair  $(ID^*, c^*)$ .

A CL-ENC scheme is secure in **Game Enc-I** if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm  $\mathcal{B}_I$ , it is negligible for  $\mathcal{B}_I$  to win the game.

Note that in **Game Enc-I** above,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  may have queried **RevealSecretKey** $(ID^*)$  before any key replacement queries made on  $ID^*$ . To the best of our knowledge, this adversarial capability has never been captured in any Type II adversarial models for CL-ENC before. In previous models, although the adversary corresponding to  $\mathcal{B}_I$  is able to replace user public/secret key pairs, the adversary is not able to retrieve the ‘original’ user secret key generated by the honest user with identity  $ID^*$ .

**Game Enc-II:** Let  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  be the game simulator and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be a security parameter.

1.  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  runs adversary  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  on  $1^k$  and a special tag **master-key-gen**.  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  returns a master public key  $mpk \in \text{MPK}(k)$ . In this phase,  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  is not allowed to query any oracle with one exception specified in footnote 2 on page .
2.  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  invokes  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  again with  $1^k$  but with another tag **choose**. During the simulation,  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  can make queries onto oracles **RevealSecretKey**, **ReplaceKey** and **Decrypt**.  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  can also make queries to **CreateUser** as described in **Game Sign-II**. At the end of this phase,  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  outputs two equal-length messages  $(M_0, M_1)$  and a target identity  $ID^*$ .
3.  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  picks a bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  at random and runs  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  on input a challenge ciphertext  $c^*$  and a tag **guess** where  $c^* \leftarrow \text{CL-Encrypt}(mpk, ID^*, upk_{ID^*}, M_b)$ .
4.  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  makes queries as in step 2. At the end of the game,  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  outputs its guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ .

$\mathcal{B}_{II}$  wins if  $b' = b$ . The restrictions are:

- $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  has never queried **RevealSecretKey**( $ID^*$ ) to get the user secret key  $usk_{ID^*}$ ;
- $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  has not queried **ReplaceKey**( $ID^*, \cdot, \cdot$ ) before  $c^*$  is received; and
- $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  has never queried **Decrypt** on the pair  $(ID^*, c^*)$ .

A CL-ENC scheme is secure in **Game Enc-II** if for all PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$ , it is negligible for  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  to win the game.

In previous models corresponding to **Game Enc-II**, the adversary cannot replace the user public key of any user in the system. In **Game Enc-II** above, we relax this restriction and allow the adversary to access **ReplaceKey** as long as the user public key corresponding to  $ID^*$  has not been replaced before  $c^*$  is received. We allow the user public key of  $ID^*$  to be replaced after  $c^*$  is received though.

### 3. MALICIOUS-BUT-PASSIVE KGC ATTACK

In [1], Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a CL-ENC scheme and also a CL-SIG scheme. These schemes share the same set of key generation algorithms, which we will show to be vulnerable to malicious-but-passive KGC attack. In the following, we first review these schemes using the definitions in Sec. 2, then we describe how the malicious-but-passive KGC attack works.

1. **MasterKeyGen:** On input  $1^k$ , choose a bilinear group pair  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  of prime order  $q$  with pairing operation  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ , where  $q$  is of  $k$  bits long. Choose a random generator  $g$  of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . Set the master secret key  $msk$  as  $s \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . Compute  $W = g^s$ , and choose two hash functions  $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , where  $n$  is the bit-length of message. The master public key  $mpk$  is  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, e, g, W, H_1, H_2)$ . For the signature scheme, an additional hash function  $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  is needed.
2. **PartialKeyGen:** On input  $s$  and user identity  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , compute  $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID)$  and output user partial key  $partial.key_{ID}$  as  $D_{ID} = Q_{ID}^s$ .

3. **UserKeyGen:** On input  $mpk$  and user identity  $ID$ , randomly select  $x \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , compute user secret key  $usk_{ID} = D_{ID}^x$ , and set user public key  $upk_{ID}$  as  $(X_{ID} = g^x, Y_{ID} = W^x)$ .

In [1], a basic encryption system is first described, followed by a final system which possesses security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). The final system is obtained by transforming the basic one using the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [11]. In the following, we only review their basic system since the malicious-but-passive KGC attack to be described allows the KGC to compromise all the secret information of a user, and therefore the attack can be applied directly to the final system.

- **CL-Encrypt:** On input  $mpk$ , user identity  $ID$ , user public key  $(X_{ID}, Y_{ID})$ , message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,
  1. check if  $X_{ID}, Y_{ID} \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and also  $e(X_{ID}, W) = e(Y_{ID}, g)$ , abort otherwise;
  2. compute  $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID)$  and randomly choose  $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ; and
  3. output ciphertext  $c = \langle g^r, m \oplus H_2(e(Q_{ID}, Y_{ID})^r) \rangle$ .
- **CL-Decrypt:** On input user secret key  $usk_{ID} = D_{ID}^x$ , user partial key  $partial.key_{ID} = D_{ID}$  and ciphertext  $c = \langle U, V \rangle$ , return a message  $m = V \oplus H_2(e(usk_{ID}, U))$ .
- **CL-Sign:** On input user (with identity  $ID$ ) secret key  $usk_{ID} = D_{ID}^x$ , user partial key  $D_{ID}$ , and message  $m$ ,
  1. choose a random  $a \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , compute  $r = e(g, g)^a$ ;
  2. compute  $v = H_3(m, r)$  and  $U = (usk_{ID})^v g^a$ ; and
  3. output signature  $\sigma = \langle U, v \rangle$ .
- **CL-Ver:** On input  $mpk$ , identity  $ID$ , user public key  $(X_{ID}, Y_{ID})$ , message  $m$  and signature  $\sigma$ ,
  1. Check if  $X_{ID}, Y_{ID} \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and also  $e(X_{ID}, W) = e(Y_{ID}, g)$ , abort otherwise;
  2. compute  $r = e(U, g)e(Q_{ID}, Y_{ID})^{-v}$ ; and
  3. check if  $v = H_3(m, r)$  holds, output 1 for accept if yes and output 0 for reject otherwise.

#### 3.0.1 Malicious-but-passive KGC Attack.

We now show how a malicious-but-passive KGC can obtain the user secret key of the victim user of the KGC's choice. Also note that this attack is not captured in the original security model in [1], but only in the models proposed in Sec. 2.

In order to obtain the user secret key of an arbitrarily chosen identity  $ID^*$  (not necessarily to be random), the KGC randomly chooses  $\alpha \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$  and computes  $g = H(ID^*)^\alpha$ . The rest follows the original **MasterKeyGen** and **PartialKeyGen**.

Suppose the user public key published by the user with identity  $ID^*$  is  $(X_{ID^*} = g^{x^*}, Y_{ID^*} = g^{sx^*})$ , where  $x^* \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ . From the user public key, the KGC can compute the user secret key by  $usk_{ID^*} = Y_{ID^*}^{\alpha^{-1}}$ . Since the user partial key is generated by the KGC, after obtaining the user secret key of the victim, the KGC can then decrypt all the ciphertexts for or generate any signature on behalf of the victim.

Several other certificateless cryptosystems [15, 16], employing the same key structure as [1], are also vulnerable to this attack.



## 4. A GENERIC CL-SIG

In [14], Hu, Wong, Zhang and Deng proposed a generic composition of CL-SIG (HWZD-CL-SIG scheme for short), that is based on a standard signature scheme denoted by  $\Pi^{SS} = (\text{Setup}^{SS}, \text{Sign}^{SS}, \text{Ver}^{SS})$  and an ID-based signature scheme denoted by  $\Pi^{IBS} = (\text{Setup}^{IBS}, \text{Extract}^{IBS}, \text{Sign}^{IBS}, \text{Ver}^{IBS})$ . The HWZD-CL-SIG generic composition is proven secure in the Type I and Type II games defined in [14] provided that  $\Pi^{SS}$  is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack (euf-cma) [13] and  $\Pi^{IBS}$  is existentially unforgeable against chosen message and identity attack (euf-cma-ida) [4]. For detailed definitions of  $\Pi^{SS}$  and  $\Pi^{IBS}$ , please refer to Appendix A.

If we replace the signing oracle defined in Sec. 2.1 with the signing oracle defined in [14], we can see that **Game Sign-I** (that is the Type I game) is identical to that in [14]. Hence HWZD-CL-SIG scheme is secure in our **Game Sign-I** provided that we use the signing oracle of [14]. However, being secure in the Type II game defined in [14] does not imply that HWZD-CL-SIG generic composition is also secure in **Game Sign-II** because the game in [14] does not capture the malicious-but-passive KGC attack. In the following, we review the HWZD-CL-SIG scheme and show that it is secure in **Game Sign-II** provided that the signing oracle of [14] is used.

$(mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{MasterKeyGen}(1^k)$   
 Run  $(mpk^{IBS}, msk^{IBS}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{IBS}(1^k)$ ;  
 set  $mpk := mpk^{IBS}$  and  $msk := msk^{IBS}$ .

$partial\_keyID \leftarrow \text{PartialKeyGen}(msk, ID)$   
 Run  $usk^{IBS} \leftarrow \text{Extract}^{IBS}(msk, ID)$ ;  
 set  $partial\_keyID := \langle usk^{IBS} || ID || mpk \rangle$ .

$(upkID, uskID) \leftarrow \text{UserKeyGen}(mpk, ID)$   
 Run  $(upk^{SS}, usk^{SS}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{SS}(1^k)$ ;  
 set  $upkID := upk^{SS}$  and  $uskID := \langle usk^{SS} || upk^{SS} \rangle$ .

$\sigma \leftarrow \text{CL-Sign}(uskID, partial\_keyID, m)$   
 Run  $\sigma^{SS} \leftarrow \text{Sign}^{SS}(usk^{SS}, m || mpk || ID || upk^{SS})$ ;  
 $\sigma^{IBS} \leftarrow \text{Sign}^{IBS}(usk^{IBS}, m || mpk || ID || upk^{SS} || \sigma^{SS})$ ;  
 and set  $\sigma := \langle \sigma^{SS} || \sigma^{IBS} \rangle$ .

$1/0 \leftarrow \text{CL-Ver}(mpk, ID, upkID, m, \sigma)$   
 Parse  $\sigma$  into  $\langle \sigma^{SS} || \sigma^{IBS} \rangle$ ;  
 $b_1 \leftarrow \text{Ver}^{IBS}(mpk, ID, m || mpk || ID || upk^{SS} || \sigma^{SS}, \sigma^{IBS})$ ;  
 $b_2 \leftarrow \text{Ver}^{SS}(upk^{SS}, m || mpk || ID || upk^{SS}, \sigma^{SS})$ ;  
 and set output to  $b_1 \wedge b_2$ .

**THEOREM 1.** *The HWZD-CL-SIG scheme is secure in the **Game Sign-II** if the standard signature scheme  $\Pi^{SS}$  is euf-cma secure and the signing oracle in **Game Sign-II** is replaced by the one defined in [14].*

**PROOF.** We construct a PPT forger  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  which breaks the euf-cma security of the signature scheme  $\Pi^{SS}$  by running  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  and answering  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ 's queries as defined in **Game Sign-II**. Consider a game for euf-cma [13] simulated by a simulator  $\mathcal{S}'$ .  $\mathcal{S}'$  gives a challenge public key  $upk^*$  to  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  and simulates a signing oracle with respect to  $upk^*$ .  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  is to forge a message-signature pair such that the signature is valid with respect to  $upk^*$ .

At the beginning of **Game Sign-II**,  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  is executed and a master public key  $mpk$  is returned. Note that  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  may not run **MasterKeyGen** to get  $mpk$ . Below are the oracle simulations.

1. **CreateUser:** On input an identity  $ID$  and a user partial key  $partial\_keyID$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  executes **Setup**<sup>SS</sup> of  $\Pi^{SS}$  to generate  $(upk^{SS}, usk^{SS})$ .  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  returns  $upk^{SS}$  as user public key  $upkID$ .  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  also maintains the restriction that each identity  $ID$  can only be created once. The above is carried out every time when **CreateUser** is queried except one:

Suppose  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  creates at most  $q_c$  distinct identities. Among all the distinct identities,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  randomly picks one, say the  $i$ -th query with identity  $ID^*$ , and answers the query with  $upk^*$ , that is,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  sets  $upkID^* := upk^*$ .

2. **RevealSecretKey:** If  $ID$  is not created,  $\perp$  is returned. Otherwise, if  $ID \neq ID^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  returns the corresponding user secret key; if  $ID = ID^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  halts with failure.

3. **ReplaceKey:** If  $ID$  is not created, no action will be taken. Otherwise, if  $ID \neq ID^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  replaces its copy of user public/secret key pair with the query inputs denoted by  $(upk^*, usk^*)$ ; if  $ID = ID^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  halts with failure.

4. **Sign:** If  $ID \neq ID^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  executes **CL-Sign** according to the scheme specification. If  $ID = ID^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  sets  $m' := \langle m || mpk || ID^* || upkID^* \rangle$ , queries the signing oracle of  $\Pi^{SS}$  with  $m'$  to get  $\sigma^{SS}$ , and generates  $\sigma^{IBS}$  using  $\text{Sign}^{IBS}$ . Finally,  $\langle \sigma^{SS} || \sigma^{IBS} \rangle$  is returned.

When  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  outputs  $(\hat{ID}, \hat{m}, \hat{\sigma})$  where  $\hat{\sigma} = \langle \hat{\sigma}^{SS} || \hat{\sigma}^{IBS} \rangle$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  outputs  $(\hat{m}', \hat{\sigma}^{SS})$ , where  $\hat{m}' := \langle \hat{m} || mpk || \hat{ID} || upkID \rangle$ . When  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  halts,  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  halts.

For the event that  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  does not fail, we can see that the simulation is correct as all the operations involving  $\Pi^{IBS}$  are carried out according to the scheme specification and the game specification, and all the operations involving  $\Pi^{SS}$  are carried out accordingly as well provided that  $ID \neq ID^*$ . If  $ID^*$  is involved, the **Sign** query can still be performed correctly with the help of the signing oracle simulated by  $\mathcal{S}'$ . In addition, the running time of  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  is in polynomial of that of  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$ . If  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  does not fail, all queries simulated by  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  will be indistinguishable from that of a real game.

If  $\mathcal{A}_{II}$  wins the game and  $\hat{ID} = ID^*$ , this implies that oracle **Sign** has never been queried with  $(\hat{ID}, \hat{m})$ . In addition, the corresponding user secret key of  $ID^*$  is neither revealed via **RevealSecretKey** nor replaced via **ReplaceKey**. Since  $ID^*$  is randomly chosen among at most  $q_c$  identities, the probability that  $\hat{ID} = ID^*$  is at least  $1/q_c$ . Since the only case that the signing oracle simulated by  $\mathcal{S}'$  may be queried by  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  is when simulating the **Sign** oracle. Without querying **Sign** with  $(\hat{ID}, \hat{m})$ , it is impossible for  $\mathcal{S}_{II}$  to have queried the signing oracle simulated by  $\mathcal{S}'$  with  $m'$  where  $m'$  is an encoding of the form  $\langle \hat{m} || mpk || \hat{ID} || \dots \rangle$ . Therefore,  $(\hat{m}', \hat{\sigma}^{SS})$  must be a valid forgery with respect to the signature scheme  $\Pi^{SS}$  under the public key  $upk^*$ .  $\square$

## 5. A GENERIC CL-ENC

Libert and Quisquater [17] proposed a generic CL-ENC construction secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). The construction is based on conventional Public Key Encryption (PKE) and ID-Based Encryption (IBE). In the following, we use  $\Pi^{PKE} = (\mathcal{K}^{PKE}, \mathcal{E}^{PKE}, \mathcal{D}^{PKE})$  and  $\Pi^{IBE} = (\text{Setup}^{IBE}, \text{Extract}^{IBE}, \mathcal{E}^{IBE}, \mathcal{D}^{IBE})$  to denote a PKE

scheme and an IBE scheme, respectively. For their complete definitions, please refer to Appendix A. We now review the Libert-Quisquater generic CL-ENC scheme.

- **MasterKeyGen:** Run  $\text{Setup}^{IBE}(1^k)$  to generate  $(mpk^{IBE}, msk^{IBE})$  and set master public/secret key pair  $(mpk, msk) := (mpk^{IBE}, msk^{IBE})$ .
- **PartialKeyGen:** Run  $usk^{IBE} \leftarrow \text{Extract}^{IBE}(msk^{IBE}, ID)$  and set  $partial\_key_{ID} := usk^{IBE}$ .
- **UserKeyGen:** Run  $(upk^{PKE}, usk^{PKE}) \leftarrow \mathcal{K}^{PKE}(1^k)$  and set  $(upk_{ID}, usk_{ID}) := (upk^{PKE}, usk^{PKE})$ . The message space is defined as the message space of  $\Pi^{PKE}$  with respect to  $upk^{PKE}$ . It is required that the ciphertext space of  $\Pi^{PKE}$  with respect to  $upk^{PKE}$  is a subset of the message space of  $\Pi^{IBE}$  with respect to  $mpk$ .
- **CL-Encrypt:** To encrypt a message  $m$  under identity  $ID$  and  $upk_{ID}$ , the algorithm computes
$$C = \mathcal{E}^{IBE}(mpk, ID, \mathcal{E}^{PKE}(upk_{ID}, m))$$
- **CL-Decrypt:** To decrypt a ciphertext  $C$ , the algorithm computes
  1.  $\tilde{m} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}^{IBE}(partial\_key_{ID}, ID, C)$ . If  $\tilde{m} = \perp$ , output  $\perp$  and halt.
  2. Otherwise, compute  $m' \leftarrow \mathcal{D}^{PKE}(usk_{ID}, \tilde{m})$  and output  $m'$ .

This scheme has been shown to be semantically secure (i.e. CPA secure) [17] provided that the underlying  $\Pi^{PKE}$  and  $\Pi^{IBE}$  are CPA secure. The following theorem shows that it is also CPA secure in our new models.

**THEOREM 2.** *The scheme above is secure in **Game Enc-I** and **Game Enc-II** as defined in Sec. 2 provided that the **Decrypt** oracle cannot be accessed and also  $\Pi^{PKE}$  and  $\Pi^{IBE}$  are CPA secure.*

**PROOF.** Without access to the decryption oracle **Decrypt**, the games **Game Enc-I** and **Game Enc-II** only capture the CPA (chosen plaintext attack) security.

We first show how an attacker  $\mathcal{C}_I$  uses adversary  $\mathcal{B}_I$  (i.e. Type I adversary) to break the CPA security of  $\Pi^{IBE}$ . We omit the review of the security model of IBE schemes and refer readers to [7] for details.  $\mathcal{C}_I$  obtains ID-based master public key  $mpk^{IBE}$  from its simulator  $\mathcal{S}^{IBE}$  and forwards  $mpk^{IBE}$  to  $\mathcal{B}_I$  as  $mpk$ . In  $\mathcal{C}_I$ 's interaction with  $\mathcal{B}_I$ , we denote  $ID_i$  as the  $i^{th}$  distinct identity among the queries made by  $\mathcal{B}_I$ . Let  $q_{ID}$  be the total number of distinct identities involved among all the queries.  $\mathcal{C}_I$  randomly chooses an index  $\ell \in_R \{1, \dots, q_{ID}\}$ .  $\mathcal{C}_I$  simulates the following oracles:

- **CreateUser:** on input  $ID_i$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_I$  runs  $\mathcal{K}^{PKE}$  to generate user public/secret key pair  $(upk_i^{PKE}, usk_i^{PKE})$ . If  $i \neq \ell$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_I$  queries  $\mathcal{S}^{IBE}$  for  $ID_i$ 's user partial key  $usk_i^{IBE}$ , otherwise,  $usk_i^{IBE}$  is set to  $\perp$ .  $\mathcal{C}_I$  stores  $(ID_i, usk_i^{PKE}, upk_i^{PKE}, usk_i^{IBE})$  in its database and returns  $upk_i^{PKE}$ .
- **RevealPartialKey:** on input  $ID_i$ , if  $i = \ell$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_I$  aborts. Otherwise it looks up its database for  $ID_i$ 's user partial key  $usk_i^{IBE}$  and returns to  $\mathcal{B}_I$  if there exists. Otherwise,  $\perp$  is returned.

- **RevealSecretKey:** on input  $ID_i$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_I$  returns  $usk_i^{PKE}$  if there exists. Otherwise,  $\perp$  is returned.
- **ReplaceKey:** on input  $ID_i$  and  $(upk^*, usk^*)$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_I$  replaces the user public key of  $ID_i$  with  $upk^*$  and the user secret key with  $usk^*$  if  $ID_i$  has been created. Otherwise no action will be taken. Note that  $usk^*$  could be an empty string.

At the challenge step,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  outputs two equal-length messages  $(m_0, m_1)$  and a target identity  $ID^*$ .  $\mathcal{C}_I$  aborts if  $ID^* \neq ID_\ell$ . Otherwise, it encrypts  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  into  $c_0 = \mathcal{E}^{PKE}(upk_\ell^{PKE}, m_0)$  and  $c_1 = \mathcal{E}^{PKE}(upk_\ell^{PKE}, m_1)$ , respectively, which are then sent to  $\mathcal{S}^{IBE}$  together with the target identity  $ID_\ell$  as part of the challenge request. The challenge  $c^* = \mathcal{E}^{IBE}(mpk, ID_\ell, c_b)$ ,  $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ , prepared by  $\mathcal{S}^{IBE}$  is relayed to  $\mathcal{B}_I$ .

$\mathcal{B}_I$ 's output  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$  is output by  $\mathcal{C}_I$  as its guess for the hidden bit  $b$  of  $\mathcal{S}^{IBE}$ . If  $\mathcal{B}_I$  is successful,  $\mathcal{C}_I$  is also successful. The latter has a probability of at least  $1/q_{ID}$  to successfully guess the identity on which  $\mathcal{B}_I$  produces its attack. Also note that in the case that  $ID^* = ID_\ell$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_I$  is not allowed to query **RevealPartialKey** on  $ID_\ell$ , hence, the simulation is not going to abort in this case.

Next, we show that the scheme is CPA secure against Type II adversary (in particular, against malicious-and-passive KGC). We describe how an attacker  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  uses adversary  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  to break the CPA security of  $\Pi^{PKE}$ . In the first step of **Game Enc-II**,  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  is executed and  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  returns a master public key  $mpk$ . Note that  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  may not execute **Setup**<sup>IBE</sup> to generate  $mpk$ .  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  then randomly selects an index  $\ell \in_R \{1, \dots, q_{ID}\}$ , where  $q_{ID}$  is the total number of distinct identities involved among all the queries, and obtains a challenge public key  $pk^*$  from its simulator  $\mathcal{S}^{PKE}$ .  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  simulates the following oracles.

- **CreateUser:** on input  $ID_i$  and  $partial\_key_i$ , if  $i = \ell$ , it sets  $upk_i^{PKE} := upk^*$ . Otherwise, it runs  $\mathcal{K}^{PKE}$  to generate  $(upk_i^{PKE}, usk_i^{PKE})$  and stores
$$(ID_i, partial\_key_i, upk_i^{PKE}, usk_i^{PKE})$$
in its database.  $upk_i^{PKE}$  is returned.
- **RevealSecretKey:** on input  $ID_i$ , if  $i = \ell$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  aborts. Otherwise it looks up its database for  $ID_i$ 's user secret key  $usk_i^{PKE}$  and returns it to  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  if there exists. Otherwise,  $\perp$  is returned.
- **ReplaceKey:** on input  $ID_i$  and  $(upk^*, usk^*)$ , if  $i = \ell$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  aborts. Otherwise,  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  replaces the user public key of  $ID_i$  as  $upk^*$  and the user secret key as  $usk^*$  if  $ID_i$  has been created. Otherwise no action will be taken.

At the challenge step,  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  outputs two messages  $(m_0, m_1)$  and a target identity  $ID^*$ .  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  aborts if  $ID^* \neq ID_\ell$ . Otherwise, it forwards  $(m_0, m_1)$  as a challenge query to  $\mathcal{S}^{PKE}$  which responds with  $c^* = \mathcal{E}^{PKE}(pk^*, m_b)$  for a random bit  $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ . This ciphertext is further encrypted into  $C^* = \mathcal{E}^{IBE}(mpk, ID^*, c^*)$  and is given as a challenge to  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$ .

$\mathcal{B}_{II}$ 's final result  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$  is output by  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  as a guess for the hidden bit of  $\mathcal{S}^{PKE}$ . If  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  is successful,  $\mathcal{C}_{II}$  is also successful. The latter has a probability of at least  $1/q_{ID}$  to successfully guess the identity on which  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  produces its attack.  $\square$

Let  $C = \text{CL-Encrypt}^{CPA}(mpk, ID, upk_{ID}, m; coin)$  be the encryption algorithm of the CL-ENC above, where  $coin$  is the randomness involved in the generation of  $C$ . Let the decryption algorithm described above be denoted by  $\text{CL-Decrypt}^{CPA}(usk_{ID}, partial\_key_{ID}, C)$ . To transform this CPA-secure CL-ENC scheme to a CCA-secure one, the following modifications are proposed by Libert and Quisquater [17], where the superscripts of CL-Encrypt and CL-Decrypt are replaced with  $CCA$ .

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{CL-Encrypt}^{CCA}(mpk, ID, upk_{ID}, m) \\ & := \text{CL-Encrypt}^{CPA}(mpk, ID, upk_{ID}, m || coin; r) \end{aligned}$$

where  $r = H(m || coin || upk_{ID} || ID)$  where  $H$  is a hash function. For security analysis, it is considered to behave as a random oracle [5]. The decryption algorithm is modified as follows:

1. Compute

$$\begin{aligned} & (m' || coin') \\ & \leftarrow \text{CL-Decrypt}^{CPA}(usk_{ID}, partial\_key_{ID}, C). \end{aligned}$$

2. If the output is  $\perp$ , output  $\perp$  and halt. Otherwise, compute

$$C' \leftarrow \text{CL-Encrypt}^{CPA}(mpk, ID, upk_{ID}, m' || coin'; \Omega)$$

where  $\Omega = H(m' || coin' || upk_{ID} || ID)$ .

3. If  $C' = C$ , output  $m'$ , otherwise, output  $\perp$ .

**COROLLARY 1.** *The modification above is secure in **Game Enc-I** and **Game Enc-II** as defined in Sec. 2 under the random oracle model.*

By following the proof of [17, Theorem 1] to simulate the additional random oracle  $H$  and decryption oracle  $\text{Decrypt}$ , we can obtain the results that  $\mathcal{B}_I$  and  $\mathcal{B}_{II}$  win **Game Enc-I** and **Game Enc-II**, respectively, with negligible probabilities.

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## 6. ADDITIONAL AUTHORS

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## APPENDIX

### A. DEFINITIONS

In the following, we review the definitions of Standard Signature (SS) schemes, Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes, ID-based Signature (IBS) schemes and ID-based Encryption (IBE) schemes.

Let  $\Pi^{SS} = (\text{Setup}^{SS}, \text{Sign}^{SS}, \text{Ver}^{SS})$  be an SS scheme, where the three algorithms are polynomial-time and all of them may be randomized although the last one is usually not.  $\text{Setup}^{SS}$  takes  $1^k$  for some security parameter  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , outputs a public/secret key pair  $(upk^{SS}, usk^{SS})$ .  $\text{Sign}^{SS}$  takes  $usk^{SS}$  and message  $m$ , outputs a signature  $\sigma^{SS}$ .  $\text{Ver}^{SS}$  takes  $upk^{SS}$ , message  $m$  and signature  $\sigma^{SS}$ , and outputs 1 or 0 for accept or reject. For correctness, we require that for any  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $(upk^{SS}, usk^{PKE}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{SS}(1^k)$  and any message  $m$  in the message space defined by the public key,  $\text{Ver}^{SS}(upk^{SS}, m, \text{Sign}^{SS}(usk^{SS}, m)) = 1$ .

Let  $\Pi^{PKE} = (\mathcal{K}^{PKE}, \mathcal{E}^{PKE}, \mathcal{D}^{PKE})$  be a PKE scheme which consists of three polynomial-time algorithms. All of them may be randomized although the last one is usually not.  $\mathcal{K}^{PKE}$  takes  $1^k$  and outputs a public/secret key pair  $(upk^{PKE}, usk^{PKE})$ .  $\mathcal{E}^{PKE}$  takes  $upk^{PKE}$  and some message  $m$ , and outputs a ciphertext  $C$ .  $\mathcal{D}^{PKE}$  takes  $usk^{PKE}$  and  $C$ , and outputs either a message  $m$  or a symbol  $\perp$  meaning that the decryption failed. For correctness, we require that for any  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $(usk^{PKE}, upk^{PKE}) \leftarrow \mathcal{K}^{PKE}(1^k)$  and any message  $m$  in the message space defined by the public key,  $m = \mathcal{D}^{PKE}(usk^{PKE}, \mathcal{E}^{PKE}(upk^{PKE}, m))$ .

Let an IBS scheme  $\Pi^{IBS} = (\text{Setup}^{IBS}, \text{Extract}^{IBS}, \text{Sign}^{IBS}, \text{Ver}^{IBS})$  be denoted by four polynomial-time algorithms. All of these algorithms may be randomized although the last one is usually not.  $\text{Setup}^{IBS}$  takes  $1^k$  and outputs a master public/secret key pair  $(mpk^{IBS}, msk^{IBS})$ .  $\text{Extract}^{IBS}$  takes  $msk^{IBS}$  and user identity  $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , and outputs a user secret key  $usk^{IBS}$ .  $\text{Sign}^{IBS}$  takes  $usk^{IBS}$ ,  $ID$  and a message  $m$ , and outputs a signature  $\sigma^{IBS}$ .  $\text{Ver}^{IBS}$  takes  $mpk^{IBS}$ ,  $ID$ , a message  $m$  and a signature  $\sigma^{IBS}$ , and outputs 1 or 0 for accept or reject. For correctness, we require that  $\text{Ver}^{IBS}(mpk^{IBS}, ID, m, \text{Sign}^{IBS}(usk^{IBS}, ID, m)) = 1$  provided that  $(msk^{IBS}, mpk^{IBS}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{IBS}(1^k)$ ,  $usk^{IBS} \leftarrow \text{Extract}^{IBS}(msk^{IBS}, ID)$  and message  $m$  in the message space according to the scheme specification.

Let  $\Pi^{IBE} = (\text{Setup}^{IBE}, \text{Extract}^{IBE}, \mathcal{E}^{IBE}, \mathcal{D}^{IBE})$  be an IBE scheme consisting of four polynomial-time algorithms.

All of them may be randomized although the last one is usually not.  $\text{Setup}^{IBE}$  and  $\text{Extract}^{IBE}$  are similar to  $\text{Setup}^{IBS}$  and  $\text{Extract}^{IBS}$ , respectively. We use  $(msk^{IBE}, mpk^{IBE})$  to represent master secret/public key pair and use  $usk^{IBE}$  to represent user secret key.  $\mathcal{E}^{IBE}$  takes  $mpk^{IBE}$ ,  $ID$  and message  $m$ , and outputs a ciphertext  $C$ .  $\mathcal{D}^{IBE}$  takes  $usk^{IBE}$ ,  $ID$  and ciphertext  $C$ , and outputs either a message  $m$  or a symbol  $\perp$  meaning that the decryption failed. For correctness, we require that the equation  $m = \mathcal{D}^{IBE}(usk^{IBE}, ID, \mathcal{E}^{IBE}(mpk^{IBE}, ID, m))$  holds as long as  $(msk^{IBE}, mpk^{IBE}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}^{IBE}(1^k)$ ,  $usk^{IBE} \leftarrow \text{Extract}^{IBE}(msk^{IBE}, ID)$  and message  $m$  in the message space defined by the master public key.