1996

A review of journalism in Iran: the functions of the press and traditional communication channels in the Constitutional Revolution of Iran

Ali Asghar Kia
University of Wollongong

A REVIEW OF JOURNALISM IN IRAN:

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESS AND TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF IRAN

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

ALI ASGHAR KIA

FACULTY OF CREATIVE ARTS
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM
1996

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the work analysed in the functions of the press and traditional communication channels in the Constitutional revolution of 1906 in Iran is entirely my own work. References to the work of others are indicated in the text. This work has not been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any other university.

Ali Asghar Kia
August 1996

ABSTRACT

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESS AND TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF IRAN

This thesis is essentially a study of the development of the Iranian press, principally in the latter 19th Century and early 20th Century, and its relationship with traditional communications systems during the broad period of the Constitutional Revolution, a seminal event in contemporary Iranian history. Although the core period of the Constitutional Revolution was 1906-11, the thesis also studies the role of both mass and traditional communications systems in the preparatory period from the early 1880s. Furthermore, it looks more briefly at the aftermath of the Constitutional period until 1925 when the Pahlavi dynasty succeeded to the throne of Iran.

Thus, the thesis examines the press and its evolving role in Iranian society during a crucial period of more than 50 years after establishing a context for the introduction of printing and a press tradition in Iran. Overall, the Iranian press has had a turbulent history of some 150 years complicated by the country's struggle for democracy and national independence. The fortunes of the press have followed the political fortunes of the country. From the early 19th century until the Islamic revolution of 1979, the print media has been strictly controlled by the political regimes.

The Constitutional Revolution was the first step toward the realisation of freedom of press in Iran. However, the revolutionary forces were defeated by strong feudal elements who were supported by British and Russian imperialists. Nevertheless, one of the most remarkable features of the revolution was the rapid development of publications and the creation of new forms of political journalism which deeply influenced the modern history of Iran. During the revolutionary period, the number of

publications increased and journalism as a social instrument of change played a significant role in enlightening the Iranian people. This thesis considers in particular three types of publications: the Political papers, the Humorous or satire (Tanz) and Nocturnal Letters (Shabnameh) or Underground Papers. Then, three functions of the press during the mobilisation of 1906-12 are identified and analysed:

- The leadership function of the political press;

- The persuasion or stimulative function of the humorous or satire (Tanz) papers; and

- The information function of the nocturnal letters (Shabnameh) or underground papers.

This thesis will also briefly discuss the Iranian exile publications and their functions.

Analysis of political and satire (Tanz) papers in particular reveals the manner in which the press played an active role in the social awakening of the Iranian people during the constitutional revolutionary period. Iran's political press expanded dramatically between 1900-1925, and some of those papers, notably the *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of Resurrection), the *Habl al-Matin* (Firm Cord), the *Mosavat* (Equality), and *Nasime-Shomal* (Northern Breeze), played a serious role in popular enlightenment. Today, we cannot understand Iranian journalism without tracing its historical, political and economic backgrounds. Hence, a part of this thesis is devoted to the socio-political and economic development culminating in the Constitutional Revolution, so as to establish a context for the analysis of print media, *bazaar* and *mosque* systems of communication.

In addition to the print media (Newspapers & Magazines), the traditional communication channels, especially the *bazaar* and pulpit *(Minbar)*, also played a central role as political channels during the Constitutional Revolution.From the early 19th century until the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the *bazaar* in Iran was constantly in conflict with the various political regimes in power. Historically, the

bazaar in Iran has also served as a centre of urban life and an effective communication and political network largely independent of central government. During the constitutional revolutionary period the *bazaar* and merchants were the main agents of revolution, with the emergent press essentially complementing their decisive role. The thesis compares and assesses the respective role and contribution of both the formal mass communications channels through the press and traditional communications system through *bazaar* and *mosque*. While it stresses the overriding importance of these traditional channels in the Constitutional Revolutionary period, it also argues that during this period the basis was established for an increasingly viable and influential system of mass communications in Iran.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to all Iranian journalists throughout history who have striven to publish their opinions and new ideas, discover new worlds, and to obtain knowledge and science;

To all of the people and journalists throughout history who respected human rights and tried to print freely accurate facts and to establish understanding between nations;

To my parents. To my wife Soheila Kia; my son Kiarash and my daughter Kemeya.

GLOSSARY

Adalat Khaneh: House of justice

Anjoman: Society

Aqayid: Ideas, ideology

Arbab: Master, Landowner, Landlord

Ashura: A religious day associated with the Battle of Karbala, tenth day of the month of Moharram

Ayatollah: Highest religious rank and title

Azan: Call to prayer

Bast: Taking of sanctuary

Caliph: The political and Religious Leader of the Islamic empire, Ruler

Dang: One-sixth part of any piece of real estate

Dehgan: Peasant attached to a plough-land, landed proprietor

Enghelab-e-Mashrutiyat: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911

Faghih: Man learned in Islamic Jurisprudence.

Fatva: Religious proclamation or declaration, a religious opinion or edict by a Faghih, Mujtahid or Ayatollah.

Ghasbi: Usurpation, dispossession

Hadith: A record of an action or saying of Prophet Mohammad.

Hijrat: Migration after the model of prophet Mohammad's migration from Mecca to Medina

Ifratiyun: Radicals, Democrats

Ijma: Consensus of opinion

Ijtihad: Endeavour; exercise of independence legal judgement

Imam: Prayer-Leader, religious leader

Iqta: Land assignment

Itedaliyun: Conservatives, moderate

Jadalhum: Reasoned debate, argumentation

Jahad: Holy war

Jangalis: Younger group of the Mashruteh revolutionaries in Gillan Province struggling against British and Reza Khan, member of Islamic Unity (Etehad-e-Islam) party

Karbala: The place where Imam Hossein and his followers were massacred by the army of Yazid

Kharaj: Land tax to the Arab overlords, government and ruler

Khatib: Preacher

Khrdeh Malik: Peasant proprietor, petty landowner

Khutbah: Sermon

Madrasa: Religious school, traditional school

Majlis: Lower House of Parliament

Malik: Landowner

Marja-e-Taghlid: Source of imitation

Mashruta: Constitutional

Masjid: Mosque

Matboa't: The Press

Mellat-e-Iran: Iranian people, Iranian nation

Minbar: Pulpit

Moharram: Religious month of the year. The traditional Islamic calender is lunar, and dates from 15 July 622 AD, the day of the *hijra* (Migration) of Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina.

Mujtahid: Member of the religious classes who has reached a degree of eminence which permits him to issue opinions on matters of faith

Nasaq: Land-right, capacity of a village in plough lands

Naus. He became Minister or Trade and Industry under Muzaffaru'd-Din-Shah of theQajar dynasty. Naus increased customs duties for the Iranian products exported abroad and decreased custom duties on the Russian products imported to Iran.

Owqaf: Plural of *vaqf*, religious endowments

Qadi: Muslim Judge, also Qazi

Qharbzadegi: Westernisation, super-imposition of the Western culture, plagued by the west.

Raiyyat: Peasant, subjects of ruler

Ruhaniyat: Clergy

Ruznameh: Journal, Newspaper

Sadre-Azam: Prime Minister

Sayyed: Descendent of the prophet Mohammad through his daughter, *Fatimeh*

Tawhid: Unity of God

Ulama: Muslim theologians and scholars.

Urf: Customary law

Usul-e-Figh: The principle of jurisprudence

Vaqf: An endowment land

Vazir: Minister

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Iranian press has had a long and distinguished history complicated by the country's struggle for democracy and national independence in the 20th Century. The fortunes of the press have followed the political fortunes of the country. From the early 19th century until the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the print media had been strictly controlled by monarchical and political regimes.

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 was the first step toward the realisation of freedom of the press in Iran. However, the revolutionary forces were defeated ultimately by the aristocratic and feudal landlords who were supported by the British and Russian imperialists. Nevertheless, one of the most remarkable aspects of the Constitutional Revolution was the rapid development of newspapers, and the creation of a new form of journalism which has deeply influenced the contemporary history of Iran. The number of papers and periodicals increased during the Constitutional Revolutionary period together with the traditions of a free and independent press that flourished briefly, providing both historical memory and effective models that profoundly influenced the Islamic Revolution of 1979, hence contributing to the social and political awakening of the Iranian people.

In contrast to the print media (newspapers, magazines, periodicals and a wide range of informal formats), the traditional communication channels, particularly the *bazaar*, played a central role as a political channel during both Iranian Revolutions. In fact, from the early 19th century until the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the *bazaar* in Iran was constantly in conflict with the various political regimes in power. The only period in which the *bazaar* did not openly oppose the government was under the Prime Ministership of Mohammed Mosaddeq (1951-53), but even then it retained its hostility to the Pahlavi regime. [Mozaffari 1991, 377]

Historically, the *bazaar* in Iran has served as a centre of urban commercial life and an effective communication and political network relatively independent of central government. The country and the press since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 have alternated between periods of political centralisation and political fragmentation which may be identified as follows:

- Parliamentary democracy and political fragmentation beginning with the Constitutional Revolution (1906-25);

- Monarchical dictatorship and political centralisation (1925-41);

- Parliamentary democracy and political fragmentation (1941-53);

- Monarchical dictatorship and political fragmentation (1953-79);

- Parliamentary democracy and political centralisation during the Islamic Revolution (February 1979 to the present).

Basically, the emergence of the Islamic Revolution in the last quarter of the 20th century was the second step toward the realisation of democracy and a free press. Since 1979, the number of newspapers and magazines, in terms of variety and circulation has proliferated dramatically. The purpose of this thesis, however, is to review the press in the first period (1906-1925), focussing particularly on the Constitutional Revolution which began in 1906. Today, we cannot understand Iranian journalism without tracing the country's historical, political, and social developments. Thus, part of the thesis is devoted to the socio-political and economic situation of Iran since early 19th century, so as to establish a context for the analysis of print media, *bazaar* and *mosque* systems of communication.

Therefore, this thesis is conceived as as comprehensive a study as is possible, given limitation of sources, of the print and traditional communications systems in Iran with particular emphasis on their functions during the Constitutional Revolution. There is a range of classic studies in the history of journalism in Iran written by Iranian and non-Iranian writers in Persian and English. But the main portion of these works comprise

lists and newspapers in alphabetical order and/or compilations of the names and dates of publications (See Rabino 1911; Tarbiyat, Browne 1914; Sadre-Hashemi 1953; and Qasemi 1993). These works are very similar because the writers have followed the same pattern and their methodology involved the standard framework of just listing papers in alphabetical order without comment or analysis. While this process has historical merit, there is little substantive comment and clearly it is not designed for intensive analysis of communication systems. An exception is Hamid Mowlana's comprehensive review of *History and Interpretation of Journalism in Iran*, printed in 1963. Regrettably, however, there is no comprehensive Iranian study reviewing the print media's functions and effects on the social and political awakening of the Iranian people in the early 20th century, especially during the Constitutional Revolution. Therefore, this study includes specific analysis of several major publications and their functions during the Constitutional Revolution.

1.1 Why the Constitutional Revolutionary Period?

There are several reasons why the Constitutional Revolutionary period has been selected for the purposes of this study. First, the Constitutional Revolution was the unfinished revolution that brought the most serious challenge to the political, economic, and cultural autocracy of the ruling powers, and consequently created new forms of literature and journalism.

Secondly, the Constitutional Revolutionary period clearly was of both national and international significance. It was an important link in the chain of anti-colonial revolutions and struggles ranging from the Indian revolt (1843-44), to the Egyptian independence struggles (1831-41), to the Turkish Constitutional revolutions (1876 and 1909), to the Chinese revolution (1911). Furthermore, the writings and the thoughts of the ideologues of the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionary period, particularly Sayyed-Jamalled-Din-Assadabadi and Agha-Khan-Kermani, became influential in the intellectual circles of Turkey, India, Afghanistan, Egypt and Russia, providing stimulus to other revolutionary movements.

Thirdly, the national significance of the Constitutional Revolution lies in the fact that it represented the most formidable challenge by the new political forces to traditionalism in the modern history of Iran. Some have gone so far as to proclaim it the most significant event in Iranian history and certainly the Constitutional Revolutionary period was the first major confrontation of the rising Iranian bourgeoisie against colonialism and feudal autocracy. [Malekzadeh 1951, 34]

Fourthly, during the Constitutional Revolutionary period many papers were printed which, subsequently, played a significant role in the social and political awakening of the Iranian people. The Revolution of 1906-11 not only contributed new ideas to the cultural and educational systems, but also created socio-economic reforms in Iranian Society. As a result, it spearheaded a systematic attempt to integrate the fragmented society of Iran, at the turn of the century, into a modern state. The rising middle class was not the only new force that had entered the political arena. The increasing ranks of urbanites, (primarily workers) small shopkeepers, artisans, were henceforth to become increasingly active in Iranian politics.

Fifthly, social democratic organisations also began their active role in Iranian politics in this period. The aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution meant the beginning of the formation of new alliances that were to dominate the fabric of the Iranian society for decades to come. The far reaching philosophical and literary implications of the Constitutional Revolution period constitute another aspect of its significance.

1.2 Thesis Structure

Broadly, the thesis has two main objectives: Firstly, to describe the rise of the Iranian press from the early 19th century through the Constitutional Revolutionary period of the early 20th Century, and to analyse its distinctive formats and content, particularly during the constitutional revolutionary period. Secondly, to analyse the functions of traditional communication channels, especially the *bazaar*, merchants classes, the *mosque*, and clergy during the constitutional revolutionary period.

In terms of structural organisation, this chapter briefly discusses the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 as the first step toward the realisation of an independent Iranian press. It also considers a number of methodological and textual matters related to the thesis. Chapter Two combines a conventional literature review with a sustained attempt to establish a communication model embodying both traditional systems of communication and mass communications systems as they function during transforming social movements. A model is proposed which is then applied thematically throughout the thesis. The literature review is designed to contribute to this process, and also to illuminate more generally traditional and mass communications systems in Iran.

Chapter Three looks at Iran's socio-political and economic structures before the Constitutional Revolution. It argues that structural obstacles were to become much more formidable in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries with the increase of the Soviet and British colonial influence. Chapter Four contextualises the Constitutional Revolution as an historical process, a culmination of trends discernible in the historical evolution of Iran.

This study distinguishes two types of communication systems, (Traditional and Press) in which the sources, channels of delivery and formats were fundamentally different. Chapters Four, Five and Six scrutinise the contributions of both traditional communications and the press as political channels in Iran. Chapter Five considers the function of traditional communication channels (*bazaar* and *mosque*) and their alliances in the Revolution. It attempts to establish whether during the Constitutional Revolutionary period the *bazaar* or the merchants were the main force of the Revolution. This part also includes a brief political history of the *bazaar*, the *bazaar-mosque*, and *ulama* alliance as a political channel during the Revolution. The last part of this chapter will attempt to demonstrate that it was Shi'i revolutionary discourse and the religious leaders that shaped the action of the merchant class (*bazaaris*) in the revolutionary direction.

The development of the Iranian press from its origins in the early 19th century to the end of the constitutional revolutionary period in 1911-12 is taken up in Chapters 5 and 6. The main focus of Chapter 7 is on the constitutional revolutionary period of 1906-1911, considering three genres of press publication: the political papers, the nocturnal letters *(Shabnameh)* and the humorous or satire *(Tanz)* papers. The functions of the press discussed include provision of news and information, contribution to leadership and social mobilisation, and whether processes of the press were persuasive or stimulative.

Chapter 7 more briefly considers Iranian press publication from the end of the Constitutional Revolution's period of direct action period in 1906-11 to 1925 when the last vestiges of revolutionary influence had disappeared, and a dictatorial monarchy had been restored under the Pahlavi regime. The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the study. An extended bibliography and four appendices are included.

1.3 Methodology

Essentially, the methodology of this thesis mingles conventional communications theory and analysis, both imbued with traditional social sciences methodology, with a standard historiographical approach. In short, it is predominantly orthodox in its methodology. A number of alternative approaches were considered and discarded as inappropriate for a study of Iranian traditional and press communications systems. (A full account of this process is to be found in chapter 2). As noted above, the methodology attempts to devise a model incorporating both traditional and mass communication elements to be used to link and underpin the following analysis. Because the historical material is limited, resort is also made to content analysis in sifting out the principal elements of the Iranian press during the revolutionary period. Some consideration is also made of Iranian literature, particularly poetry, in the context of the Iranian press and journalism.

Nevin has defined history as meaning the search for knowledge and the truth, a searching to find out: 'History is any integrated narrative or description of the past events or facts written in a spirit of critical inquiry for the whole truth.' [Nevin 1938, 22] This sort of traditional approach has fallen out of favour in an era of post-modernist influence. Documentary-based historical research, however, in the social sciences tradition is indispensable for researching the communications history of what was essentially a semi-feudal state until the constitutional revolutionary period.

Furthermore, this was an era before mass communications when, even in 1925, the press was not highly developed in terms of technology, content and distribution. It was also an era when popular culture was essentially undiversified and powerfully influenced by Islamic traditions. There were none of the mass communication artefacts that were commonplace in Western mass communications and mass culture by the 1920's. Unavoidably, this thesis has been conceived and developed on the basis of conventional documentation. In any case, documents have always been used as a source of information in social research, either as the only method or in conjunction with other methods. They are employed in the context of many diverse studies, such as quantitative studies, qualitative methods, and case-study research. It is most unusual that any research study is carried out without some form of documentary method, even if it is only a basic library search.

Consequently, this thesis has involved a vigorous search to obtain all materials relevant to both traditional and press communication systems in English and Iranian. A substantial body of material in English has been collected from searches particularly in Australian, English and United States libraries. This material is listed fully in the bibliography and the bulk of it is held in photostat form by the author. Furthermore, a considerable body of relevant material has been collected in the Iranian language, both from the author's previous research into Iranian journalism, and extensive fieldwork in Iranian collections conducted in 1994. Particular use is made of edited collections of documents in the Iranian language from the constitutional revolutionary period. The

relevant elements of this material have been translated by the author, assisted by Iranian colleagues at the University of Wollongong. Copies of both original and translated material is held by the author.

In translating material, the objective has been to translate Iranian as closely to the contemporary Library of Congress system as possible, without the use of diacritical marks and employing spellings that have become common usage for the names of various newspapers. Inevitably, some disrepancies have arisen because of differences in spelling and style in the wide range of publications consulted. Hopefully, these have been kept to a tolerable minimum The western calendar has been used throughout, with dates from Iranian language material altered from the Islamic calendar. Use of Iranian-language terminology has been kept to a minimum, although widely-used labels such as *bazaari*, *ulama*, *mosque*, *minbar* and *bast* have been used consistently throughout. Titles of newspapers have been presented in both Iranian and English. As far as possible, *Iran* and *Iranian* have been used as the national designations throughout. *Persia* and *Persian* have been retained in quotes and where the meaning would not be clear without use of the historic designations.

Although the specific events that sparked the Constitutional Revolution occurred in December 1905, this thesis follows the accepted designation of the central period of the Constitutional Revolution as 1906-11.

CHAPTER TWO

MASS COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

2.1 Introduction

The erroneous assumption is often made that traditional systems of communication have been absorbed effectively into mass communications systems and therefore have little practical influence on contemporary media structures and practice. The reality is that traditional media systems in many countries have remained an important influence on people's daily lives, beliefs and attitudes; that in many ways their traditional power as communications systems has endured alongside press systems and even electronic broadcasting systems. This has been the case particularly where a strong traditional relationship remains between religion and state as in the world's great Islamic nations.

Thus, Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 and its Islamic Revolution which began in 1979 were dramatically successful 20th Century social movements rooted in traditional communications and information systems. In the Constitutional Revolution small press systems worked closely with the traditional communications systems to generate social mobilisation. It is necessary therefore to analyse public forms of traditional communications and small media as effective generators of massive social mobilisation, creating a revolutionary politics in a context of apparently strong state hegemony over mass media evolution.

The main purpose of the following analysis is to present, in a summary form, the most influential social scientific theories about mass communication structures and institutions. Further, the analysis is designed to assess their relevance to the distinctive linkage between mass and traditional media in Iran since the introduction of print media in the early 19th Century to the end of the constitutional revolutionary period in 1925. The continuing role of traditional communications is then considered leading to the devising of a model designed to link together both traditional and mass media

communications systems. Although this model applies particularly to the circumstances of Iran, it could readily be adapted to other societies where traditional communications systems remain strong relative to mass media.

In considering mass communications media systems, this review chapter considers briefly attempts to place traditional media systems in the context of mass media development. The analysis goes on to consider five major approaches to categorising perspectives on mass communication systems. These are: the Mass Society Approach; the Marxist Approach; the Functionalist Approach; the Culturalist (or Social Cultural) Approach; and the Critical Political Economic Approach. Because the media used in the Constitutional Revolution was necessarily the print press, the analysis goes on to assess the relevance of conventional press theory. Six major press theories are analysed: Authoritarian, Free press, Social responsibility, Soviet media, Development media, and Democratic-participant.

2.2 Traditional Communications—the Absorption Approach

Historians of the mass media and journalism have largely ignored the interpretative difficulties associated with the survival of significant elements of traditional communications in the contemporary world. The standard response is to gloss over traditional systems as effectively absorbed into the mass communications frameworks, surviving at best in a folkloric sense as quaint anachronisms. Such interpretation is totally at odds with the evidence of potent traditional systems continuing into the late 1990's. Iran is perhaps the outstanding example of the contemporary impact of customary communications systems, but it is by no means an isolated one.

A principal exponent of the absorption approach in recent mass communications history has been Mitchell Stephens, author of the influential study *A History of News, From the Drum to the Satellite*. [1988] Stephens studies the development of traditional systems of spoken and written news at length up until the development of printed news from the late 15th Century. From this point, there is only occasional reference to

surviving, indeed flourishing, mechanisms of oral and written news. The history of news and information news is predicated on an evolutionary continuum, with written news displacing spoken news, printed news displacing written news, and electronic news increasingly displacing printed news. Essentially, traditional news systems are conceived as merging into a linear configuration; oral merging into written, written into print, print into electronic and, projecting further, electronic into digital, multi-media and on-line systems. A conceptual approach of this kind does little justice to the survival of traditional systems of communication alongside newer, more innovatory systems. It is perhaps understandable that Stephens' absorption model does not take account of traditional systems of news.

Furthermore, in the expanding field of comparative journalism study, clear instances of conjunction of traditional and contemporary communications systems are either ignored or noted without analysis. Hachten [1993] notes the use of audio-cassettes and photo-copying in the Islamic Revolution starting in 1979, labelling it as 'the first cassette revolution' and quoting Anthony Sampson's epitaph for the Shah's regime, 'he forgot the cassette':

> Thousands of cassette recordings of the Ayatollah's [Khomeini's] speeches propagating his revolutionary ideas were played in the mosques, which were not kept under surveillance by the Shah's secret police. These small, portable instruments were able to reach millions while circumventing the government-controlled press, radio and television. At the same time, when mysterious "night letters" and pamphlets arrived mysteriously at offices in Tehran, sympathetic secretaries made many photocopies, quickly and more secretly than possible with a printing press. [33]

The emphasis here is wholly on the mass communications technology, rather than on the adaptation of this technology to the traditional communications of the *mosque*. Hachten also makes a point of stressing the *night letters* but, strangely enough, fails to mention their crucial importance in traditional communication systems, notably the *bazaar*. Such 'night letters' or *shabnameh* had been important communication elements in the Constitutional Revolution. Stevenson [1994] includes a chapter on revolutionary

media which largely accepts the absorption notion that developing technology has largely eliminated any significant role for traditional communications:

> Written language ended the power monopoly of the elders who preserved and passed on the oral sagas and poems that contained the accumulated knowledge of preliterate tribes. Inexpensive printing with moveable type challenged the authority of church and crown and allowed the flowering of vernacular languages and, eventually, democracy. [262]

Thus, Stevenson gives a very strong impression by default that traditional communications systems are largely irrelevant in the contemporary context. Stevenson's treatment of revolutionary journalism was very much dictated by audience response in western media cultures, particularly to 'global' television audiences. It was very much influenced by the revolutionary 18th Century and American independence. His account of the contemporary revolutionary context is largely confined to China and the former Eastern bloc countries of Europe. Apart from a brief reference to the inability of the border police to intercept smuggled audio tapes, there is no consideration of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Again, the emphasis is on the technology and not the traditional systems that exploited it. The pervasive impression is conveyed that traditional communications are irrelevant to revolutionary social movements in the 20th Century.

2.3 Approaches to Mass Communications Theory

Mass Communications is a hybrid discipline whose origins can be traced back to the journalism schools of the United States in the early 1930's. Particularly influential in the emergence of mass communications theory was Wilbur Schramm, whose pioneering work still commands respect in contemporary communications theory. Since World War II, there has been a remarkable explosion in communications theory, both as an underpinning of media practice and as a focus in its own right for academic study. Unquestionably, the teaching of mass communications and the rapid grown of ancillary research has been an influential factor in the internationalisation of both higher education and media practice.

There are some signs, however, that the impact of mass communications may have peaked since the early 1990's . This is largely due to two reasons: the rapid spread and pervasive influence of post-modernist doctrine and methodology; and the increasing influence of a culturalist, or cultural studies perspective. Changes in the nature of communications theory are best exemplified in the three editions of a standard conspectus of communications theory, Dennis McQuail's *Mass Communication Theory* [1983, 1987 and 1994]. In particular, there are significant changes in conceptualisation between McQuail's 1987 edition and his most recent re-formulation in 1994. It is proposed here to describe briefly the main elements of the principal approaches to mass communications theory in contemporary terms, drawing particularly on McQuail but also taking account of other relevant texts.

2.3.1 Mass Society Approach

This approach is based on a dominant media model positing that the media is integrated into the interdependent institutions that exercise social power. The result is large-scale society with an atomised public and a highly-centralised media having little interactivity with a mass audience. In short, media is used to manipulate the dominance of powerful social interests, offering littler critical alternative definition of the world and rendering people dependent on the media for their cultural identify:

> This vision of society is pessimistic and more a diagnosis of the sickness of society than a social theory, mixing elements of critical thought from the political left with a nostalgia for a golden age of community and democracy. As a theory of the media, it strongly evokes images of control and portrays the direction of influence as from above. Mass society is paradoxically, both 'atomised' and centrally controlled. [McQuail 1994, 94]

In recent years, the mass society approach has declined in influence, McQuail arguing that it is now more important for historical reasons than any contemporary relevance it might have. In some respects, it might be considered a useful tool for analysing aspects of Iranian media development, particularly the dominant influence of the Shah and the ruling classes on media content and practice. The picture of an atomised post-industrial class, however, is not consistent with the semi-feudal, homogeneous character of the

Iranian people and their attachment to Islamic religion in the decades before the Constitutional Revolution.

2.3.2 Marxist Theory and Mass Communication

Early Marxist perspectives viewed the mass media as a powerful ideological weapon for maintaining public submission to capitalism. The means of media production conform to the general capitalist industrial format with factors of production and relations of production:

> [The media] are likely to be in the monopolistic ownership of a capitalist class, nationality or internationally organised and to serve the interests of that class. They do so by materially exploiting cultural workers . . . and consumers. . . They work ideologically by disseminating the ideas and world views of the ruling class, denying alternative ideas which might lead to change or to a growing consciousness by the working class of interests and by preventing the mobilisation of such consciousness into active and organised political opposition. [McQuail 1987, 63]

Thus, the classic statement of the Marxist approach would include bourgeois ownership of a mass media operating in their class interest, promoting a false working class consciousness and denying access to political opposition. This classic tradition of Marxism has waned sharply in influence in the 1990's and, as McQuail affirms, the original Leninist formulation of a vanguard press leading the revolutionary class struggle is no longer realistic. [1994, 77] Marxism, however, has spawned a number of variants which retain some influence, including the formulations of Althusser, Gramsci and Marcuse. McQuail also suggest a continuing role for Marxism either in a critical role in disclosure of media propaganda and manipulation (Herman and Chomsky) or in the nurturing of new alternative or grassroots media.

In terms of Iranian history, society and culture a classic Marxist perspective offers little assistance, particularly in the period up until 1925 which is the broad period covered by this thesis. The absence of either an industrial proletariat or a dominant, integrated bourgeois class is a conspicuous element in Iranian socialist organisation. Indeed, the merchants and *bazaari* (bazaar workers) who might be conceived as constituting an embryonic bourgeois class largely supported the Constitutional Revolution and were

responsible for much of its success. Conversely, the contribution of the working classes was subsidiary, although their support strengthened after the revolution started and it might be argued that an embryonic political class consciousness had emerged briefly. Furthermore, the dormant semi-feudalism of Iranian society in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, together with the dominance of the Islamic religious tradition, did not provide fertile ground for the emergence of class struggle and overthrow of the State in terms of Marxian analysis.

2.3.3 Functionalist Approach

In earlier formulations, this approach was categorised as the Structural Functionalist approach. According to R. K. Merton, in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* [1957], functionalism claims to explain social practices and institutions in terms of the 'needs' of society and of individuals. [Cited McQuail 1994, 77] In terms of functionalist theory, McQuail has summarised the essential contribution of media to society as providing integration; co-operation; order, control and stability; adaptation to change; mobilisation; management of culture and values. It contributes directly to society, information and entertainment and, less directly, to correlation of events and information, continuity of culture, and mobilisation for achievement of social objectives.

In short, by gratifying individual desires, the media also provides benefits, sometimes unintended, to society as a whole. Thus, the needs and demands of participants in society, whether as individuals or collectivities, are the primary generators of media's contribution to society. By responding to each separate demand in consistent ways, the media achieve benefits for the society as a whole. Thus there are elements of demand for information and individual gratification in functionalism which also justify commodification, or the development of mass media as commodities for consumption.

The major problem with functionalist theory is its vagueness in practical application. McQuail described it as beset with conceptual difficulties, partly over confusion about

what *function* means and also about who is likely to benefit apart from an abstract society. It has also been criticised as contributing to the status quo by preservation of what already exists and what endures; as McQuail puts it, 'at root, whatever persists is assumed to be necessary.' Despite, these limitations, there is no doubting the widespread influence of functionalist, or structural-functionalist, approaches to the media in society. Indeed, it has been one of the most influential channels of communications discourse and analysis over many years, offering virtually a pervasive *lingua franca* for communications:

> It offers a language for discussing the relations between mass media and society and a set of concepts which have proved hard to escape from or replace. This terminology has the advantage of being to a large extent shared by mass communicators themselves and by their audiences and being widely understood. [McQuail 1994, 78]

Clearly, functionalist theory has some virtues in its application to both traditional and mass communications. Because it does not attempt to explain the durability of traditional institutions such as *mosque* and *bazaar*, it provides a framework for analysing their effectiveness free of value judgments based on such criteria as class and contemporaneity. Unquestionably, also, the terminology of functionalist communications theory is useful in describing even an embryonic media structure such as that of Iran at the time of the Constitutional Revolution. The much criticised 'circularity' of functionalist theory is less of a problem in analysing the continuity of culture and values in traditional societies.

Furthermore, the emphasis on social mobilisation is clearly useful in analysing the development of a major political and social revolution. While functionalism is a useful tool in separate analyses of traditional and mass communications systems, it is much less valuable in accounting for their evolution in parallel and the duality of their involvement in social mobilisations. Care has to be taken in using even the terminology of functionalist communications when looking at a dual communications model inter-linking traditional and mass communications systems. For example, this claim by

Curran points up the inherent problems in applying a functionalist approach to a communications system inter-meshing traditional and mass communications:

> The mass media have now assumed the role of the Church, in a more secular age, of interpreting and making sense of the world to the mass public. Like their priestly predecessors, professional communicators amplify systems of representation that legitimise the social system.. . the new priesthood of the modern media has supplanted the old as the principal ideological agent building consent for the social system. [1982, 227-28]

Such an interpretation is clearly inapplicable in a communications system where the 'priestly predecessors' remain as powerful communicators and the professional communicators fulfil a lesser role. In many ways, the enduring power and influence of traditional communicators undercut the power attributed to mass media to change fundamental values in societies such as Iran.

2.3.4 The Culturalist Approach

The culturalist approach, previously the social-cultural approach, has increased phenomenally in influence since the late 1980's. The enhanced status of this approach is reflected in differences between McQuail's brief summary of the social-cultural approach in 1987 to the extended chapter included in the 1994 edition of his *Mass Communication Theory*. Although still approaching communications from the standpoint of a social sciences/ communications theoretical approach, McQuail acknowledges both the impact and potential value of the culturalist approach, describing its evolution in these terms:

> Since the earlier days of mass communications research, a distinctive 'culturalist' perspective on mass media has been developing, particularly under the influence of the humanities (literature, linguistics, philosophy) as distinct from the more social scientific emphasis of 'mainstream' communication science. At some points, or on some issues, the two traditions have merged, although there remains substantial differences of thinking and method. [McQuail's book and chapter] is written primarily from a social scientific perspective, but it aims also to benefit from some of the insights and ideas of the 'culturalists. [1994, 94]

Clearly, the culturalist approach commands respect and its power in giving new insights and conceptualisation has been widely recognised. Furthermore, its distinctive

terminology has permeated other disciplines and discourses. Apart from the influences

mentioned by McQuail, the development of the culturalist approach has also been

shaped by earlier critical traditions such as social literary criticism, and the critical

approach of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School. Critical cultural theory was stimulated

largely by the 'Birmingham School' of the 1970's, embodied most cogently in the work

of Stuart Hall, who thus described the cultural studies approach:

> It stands opposed to the residual and merely reflective role assigned to the
> 'cultural'. In its different ways it conceptualises culture as inter-woven
> with all social practices; and those practices, in turn, as a common form of
> human activity... It is opposed to the base-superstructure way of
> formulating the relationship between ideal and material forces, especially
> where the base is defined by the determination by the 'economic' in any
> simple sense... It defines 'culture' as both the means and values which
> arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their
> given historical conditions and relationship, through which they 'handle'
> and respond to the conditions of existence. [Quoted McQuail 1994, 100-
> 101]

The sweep and impact of the culturalist approach has been largely preoccupied with the

mass culture and mass media of advanced western societies. While the approach could,

and undoubtedly will, be applied to traditional and developing societies, its current

utility in analysing an historical context lacking both conventional mass culture and

mass media on western lines appears limited. Valuable studies using a culturalist

approach could certainly be made of aspects of the Constitutional Revolution period; for

example, the role of poetry in Iranian journalism. Predicating an analysis of the

historical development of a dual system of traditional communication and emergent

mass communication, on the basis of the culturalist approach at its present stage of

development would most likely prove to be an unproductive exercise, particularly in the

absence of adequate cultural historical materials.

2.3.5 Critical Political Economic Approach

Political economy, of course, is a venerable label pre-dating contemporary economics,

referring particularly to the development of economic theory within a broader political

context. It is used in contemporary media theory to designate media structure and media

content determined essentially by market forces. The consequences of this economic

determinism of media structure and content are a highly concentrated media structure, increasing globalisation of media structures and control of content, commodification of audience and content, decreasing diversity, marginalisation of opposition and alternative media, and the supremacy of private interest over public interest. [McQuail 1994, 83] Apart from economics, this approach draws heavily on political science and sociology and was influenced in its origins by Marxist political-economic theory. As McQuail observes, the media institution has to be considered as part of the economic system with close links to the political system. [82]

A political/economic approach is undeniably attractive in the climate of the contemporary western countries where market forces are dominant and the public sector is in decline. Many public sector media enterprises have already dissolved and transferred to the private sector, and survivors are under increasing pressure. Media concentration is clearly growing rapidly and the great global media agglomerations appear certain to dominate new information and media industries based on technological convergence. Whatever its theoretical deficiencies, the political-economic approach accurately reflects much of the contemporary reality.

It must be questioned, however, whether such an approach has any significant relevance to traditional societies and the developing world. Its application to circumstances in contemporary Iran would be a highly dubious task, let alone to the Iran of the early 19th Century. Furthermore, it would be an extremely difficult and probably useless exercise to correlate Iranian media with Western media for the equivalent period; for example, comparing Iranian media in the 1890's with US or Australian media in the 1890's. While the political-economic approach has value in a descriptive sense, it is largely irrelevant as a comparative media tool outside the Western media framework.

2.3.6 Conventional Approaches—A Summary

Conventional approaches to media theory can provide insights into traditional communications systems but, in aggregate, their value in extended analysis of these systems and their linkages with mass communications systems are negligible. Because the Iranian mass communications system during the constitutional revolutionary period was wholly a press system in the narrowest sense, the next logical step in the quest for an acceptable theoretical basis is to move to consideration of standard press theories.

2.4 Six Major Press Theories

In defining models of the press, the inevitable starting point is the four theories of the press defined in 1956 by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm in their influential monograph *Four Theories of the Press*. Siebert and his colleagues had been influenced by the formulation of social responsibility theory of the press by the 1947 US Commission of the Freedom of the Press. Although they were at pains to point out that they applied *press* in their context to all media of mass communication, their analysis applied essentially to the newspaper and periodical press, then the most influential agenda-setting medium of mass communication. Although Siebert et al espoused a comparative approach, their foci of comparison were rather limited:

> In simplest terms the question behind this book is, why is the press as it is? Why does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in different forms in different countries? Why, for example, is the press of the Soviet Union so different from our own, and the press of Argentina so different from that of Great Britain? [1956, 1]

The authors' outline of their rationale does offer a basis for a valuable analysis of the press system of a nation such as Iran, modernising by the mid-50's but still very much in the grip of a dictatorial monarchy ruling a society retaining pronounced semi-feudal elements:

> The thesis of this volume is that the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the

press. . .To see the social systems in their true relationship to the press, one has to look at certain basic beliefs and assumptions which the society holds: the nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth. Thus, in the last analysis the difference between press systems is one of philosophy, and this book is about the philosophical and political rationales or theories which lie behind the different kinds of press we have in the world today. [1-2]

Clearly, this rationale was highly relevant to effective analysis of the idiosyncratic press system developed in Iran by the mid-1950's. Indeed, it remains so today. In an era dominated by the increasing cold-war rivalries of Russia and the United States, before the emergence of interest in, and argument about, developmental journalism, Iranian press systems were of scant interest to these theories. Although *Four Theories of the Press* is largely concerned with historical issues, the peculiar circumstances of the development of the Iranian press and its conjunction with traditional communications systems in the Constitutional Revolution was not a theme that caught the interest of the authors.

Essentially, Siebert et al adapted social responsibility theory as a primary normative model, and added three other models to it: Authoritarian theory, Libertarian theory, and Soviet theory. They conceded that this four-part classification might easily have been reduced to two, as Soviet Communist theory was only a development of the much older Authoritarian theory, and Social Responsibility theory was only a model of the Libertarian theory. [2] Possibly, they may have gone too far with this concession, because the two adaptations do add something to the overall typology, having merits of differentiation from the primary models, as the authors also recognised:

> . . .Because the Soviets have produced something so spectacularly different from older authoritarianism, and something so important to the world today, and because the social responsibility theory road is the apparent direction of development which our own press is taking, we have thought it better to treat them as four separate theories, meanwhile trying to point out their relationships. [2]

In the summation of Siebert et al, these four categories largely determined what kind of press the Western world has had, with their theoretical approaches firmly grounded in philosophical tradition and great revolutionary movements:

The Authoritarian theory grounded in centuries of authoritarian political thought from Plato to Machiavelli; the Libertarian grounded in Milton, Locke, Mill and the Enlightenment; the Social Responsibility, grounded in a communication revolution and in certain behaviouristic doubts about the philosophy of the Enlightenment; and the Soviet Communist, grounded in Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. [1956, 6]

This four-part typology has served as the model for the great majority of press theory typologies and conceptual models over the past 40 years. The most influential has been the adaptation in successive formulations of McQuail [1983, 1987 and 1994] who used the initial four-part structure as the basis for his consideration of normative theories of the press added two further normative categories: *development'* and *'democratic participant'* theories. This six-part typology remains the basis commonly adopted for contemporary analysis of media structures, although with some modification by other theorists. These six models are considered briefly below in the order applied by McQuail. [1987, 111-124]

2.4.1 Authoritarian theory

This model identifies press arrangements in societies when and where the press originated. Mostly these were monarchies in which the press was subordinated to state power and ruling class interests. It can also refer to contemporary press arrangements, ranging from where the state automatically expects support or neutrality from the press to where the press is directly used as an instrument of repressive state power. In both cases, the exercise of true independence is denied to journalists, and they are subordinated to state authority.

Authoritarian theory justifies censorship prior to publication (the so-called doctrine of prior restraint), for deviation from external guide-lines applicable to political and ideological materials. Prior restraint can be enforced through direct legislation; direct control of news production by the state; enforceable codes of conduct; taxation and other economic sanctions; controlled import of foreign media; government veto on appointment of editorial staff; suspension of publication. [McQuail 1987, 110] The

authoritarian model is readily identifiable in pre-democratic societies and in openly dictatorial or repressive societies such as a military junta at the head of the state, martial law or occupation by an external power. In such circumstances it would be virtually impossible for the press to operate in any way other than authoritarian. As McQuail observes, authoritarian tendencies can emerge in societies that are not generally or openly totalitarian.

> There are cases and occasions when authoritarianism expresses the popular will and, in all societies, there are situations where media freedom may conflict with some interests of the state or society in general, for instance under conditions of terrorist insurgency or threat of war. It is also the case that elements of authoritarianism linger on in relation to some media rather than to others. [1987, 111]

The main principles of the theory can be briefly summarised. The press should not do or print anything likely to erode established authority or cause popular disturbance, and it should always (or ultimately) be subordinate to established authority. The press should avoid offence to majority, or dominant, moral and political values. Censorship can be justified to enforce these principles. Unacceptable attacks on authority, deviations from official policy or offences against moral codes should be criminal offences. Journalists or other media professionals have no independence within their media organisations.

On the basis of these criteria, it cannot be denied that there is a large element of the contemporary world press that is essentially authoritarian in its structure and practice. Even in countries where liberal traditions of the press are firm tenets of faith, there is a residue of the doctrine in the willingness of government to submit mass communications to varying degrees of oversight and regulation for reasons of public and private interest. As McQuail observes, the model still offers a justification for submitting the media to those who hold power in society, whether legitimately or not.

2.4.2 Soviet Press Theory

The Russian press and other media were completely re-organised after the 1917 Revolution on the basis of theoretical writings by Marx and Engels as interpreted and

applied by Lenin. The theory so constituted and embodied in institutional structures provided the main framework for news media practice, training and research in the former Soviet Union until its disintegration from the late 1980's. Under Soviet media theory, the working class by definition held power in a socialist society and kept it by controlling the means of intellectual production. Thus, all media were controlled by agencies of the working classes, primarily the Communist Party. Because socialist societies were, theoretically, classless societies reflecting class conflict, the press should not be structured along conventional lines of factional conflict.

In socialist societies, the press had a positive role to play by way of socialisation, informal social control and mobilisation towards planned social and economic goals. Because Marxism posited objective laws of history and thus an objective reality that the press should reflect, there was virtually no scope for personal interpretation and news gathering initiatives such as investigative journalism. News gathering was dictated by government and party imperatives, completely different from the conventional 'newsworthiness' tests of liberal press systems. Thus, Soviet press theory was based on essentially total submission of the press to the control of the state, with a Soviet state requiring the media to submit to ultimate control by organs of the state and to be integrated, in varying degrees, with other political instruments of the state. [McQuail 1987, 13]

Within these daunting limits, there were expectations that the press should be largely left alone to exercise its responsibilities under the Soviet state, to regulate itself in awareness of the prevailing guidelines. In short, the government and the party intervened mainly when requirements were flaunted or their authority challenged. Furthermore the elements of the press were expected to develop their own standards of professional conduct and to show responsiveness, and be accountable, to their audiences by some market research, by institutionalised means of audience involvement such as printing and answering letters, and by attending in a limited way to public demand.

The similarity, indeed overlap, between Authoritarian theory and Soviet theory have often been noted in comparative analysis of media structures. There is some merit in the notion that Soviet theory was essentially Authoritarian theory in a specific historical context, as Sibert et al suggested in their initial outline of the four theories. In particular, both theoretical models impose a strong emphasis on support for the existing social order.

There are also important differences. Under Soviet theory, the press are not subject to arbitrary or unpredictable interference, but work within familiar limits. Their censorship is largely the censorship of self-imposition. They are adjured by the state to serve and respond to public needs, to act positively in their news reporting and to restrict or eliminate negative news, emphasising public compliance with desired norms of behaviour and stressing desirable functions such as education, information, motivation and mobilisation. Thus, events such as great natural disasters are often reported in terms of a triumphant popular response in adversity rather than emphasising huge numbers of casualties. They pay some attention to diversity of interest, not invariably those of a monolithic state. Furthermore, they serve positive social functions by stimulating compliance with desired norms of education, information, motivation, and mobilisation.

2.4.3 Free Press (or Libertarian) Theory

This is essentially the traditional liberal or libertarian theory of the press that had its origins in the long struggle of emerging liberal democracies to free the printing press from state control. This struggle was conducted in varying ways and over differing time spans in the struggle to assert liberal-democratic frameworks of government and public administration. In the English-language tradition the struggle began virtually with the foundation of the printing press in England in the late 15th Century and culminated in the late 18th Century with the inclusion of press freedom in the United States Bill of Rights [The First Amendment Freedoms]. Thus, it was possible for countries such as Australia, colonised from 1788 and establishing its first newspaper in 1803, to have a

virtually free press, even under colonial sovereignty, from the early 1830's. As McQuail observes, freedom of the press is the main legitimating principle for news media in liberal democracies, largely because of its long history, great potency and high symbolic value. [1987, 14]

Certainly free press theory dominates the literature of normative media theory. In its most basic form free press theory prescribes a basic right of freedom to publish equivalent to other basic rights such as freedom of expression, religion and assembly. These complement the underlying principles and values identified with the liberal democratic state: the supremacy of the individual; a firm belief in rationality, truth and progress; the ultimate sovereignty of the people. Control and censorship of the press can only lead ultimately to irrationality or repression, even if it may seem justifiable in the short term. According to Pool:

> No nation will indefinitely tolerate a freedom of the press that serves to divide the country and to open the floodgates of criticism against the freely chosen government that leads it. [Cited McQuail 1987, 115]

In practical terms, the application of freedom of the press is generally directed to freedom from prior restraint, the notion that a press should be unencumbered in what it prints but should be subject to legal processes if it transgresses against individual rights and legitimate social claims. Thus, freedom of the press in liberal democratic societies is not an absolute right; it may be qualified by factors such as security or dignity of the state or protection of individual rights to reputation, property and privacy. Much difficulty has arisen over the institutional forms in which press freedom have become embodied. In many contexts, press freedom has become identified with property rights, meaning the right to buy, own, use and sell media as a commercial commodity without restraint or interference from government.

Apart from the assumption that freedom generally means freedom from government intervention, this commodification of the press has been justified through the transfer of the analogy of the *'free market of ideas'* to the real free market of commodities. Press freedom thus becomes identified with private ownership of the media and freedom from

interference in the market. McQuail summaries the anomalies and inconsistencies inherent in this most widely invoked theory of the media:

> The pure theory of press freedom presupposes that some tangible benefits of liberty will actually be delivered. Certain other problems and inconsistencies can also be noted. First, it is very unclear to what extent the theory can be held to apply to public broadcasting... It is also unclear how far it applies to other important spheres of communication activity where freedom may be equally important-as in education, culture and the arts. Secondly, the theory seems designed to protect opinion and belief and has much less to say on 'information', especially in matters to do with access, privacy and publication, where personal or property interests are involved. Thirdly, the theory has been most frequently formulated to protect the owners of media and cannot give equal expression to the arguable rights of editors and journalists within the press, or the audiences, or other possible beneficiaries, or victims, of free expression. Fourthly, the theory proscribes compulsory control but provides no obvious way of handling the many pressures to which media are subject, especially, but not only, arising from market circumstances. [1987, 114-115]

2.4.4 Social Responsibility Theory

As noted earlier, Social Responsibility theory is attributable to the American Commission on the Freedom of the Press which reported in 1947. This theory emerged from feelings of dissatisfaction with conventional free press media theory as having failed to deliver press freedom and social benefit. The rise of the new and powerful media of radio, film and television had generated the need for additional mechanisms of public control and accountability. According to McQuail, social responsibility theory emerged as a means of reconciling independence with obligation to society:

> Its main foundations are: an assumption that the media do serve essential functions in society, especially in relation to democratic politics; a view that the media should accept an obligation to fulfil these functions-mainly in the sphere of information, and the provision of a platform for diverse views, but also in matters of culture; an emphasis on maximum independence of media, consistent with their obligations to society; an acceptance of the view that there are certain standards of performance in media work that can be stated and should be followed. [McQuail, 116]

In short, the media professional is not only responsible to consumer and shareholder, but also to society at large. As Siebert et al expressed it, the press is conceived of as a *partner in the search for truth*. [1956, 3, original emphasis] Social responsibility theory

then tries to reconcile three somewhat divergent principles: of individual freedom and choice; of media freedom; and of media obligation to society.

The theory favours two main kinds of solution to these problems. Firstly, the development of public, but independent, institutions for the management of radio and television developed much later than for traditional print media, and thus are able to advance the political value and potency of the social responsibility concept. Essentially, it was argued that because of its longevity, restrictive regulation could not be applied to print media protected by the sacred doctrine of freedom of the press. Public policy objectives and processes, however, could be applied to new media without the historical sanction of freedom of the press. Further, the continued development of media professionalism could achieve higher standards of performance, while allowing the media to persist with significant degrees of self-regulation.

In short, the media should accept and fulfil certain obligations to society, met largely by setting high professional standards of informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity and balance. In discharge of its obligations media should be self-regulating within established legal and institutional frameworks. Social responsibility journalism implies that the media should avoid material conducive to crime, violence, civil disorder or offence to minority groups. If high standards of performance are not forthcoming then, under social responsibility theory, intervention is justifiable in pursuit of public interest. Furthermore, a pluralist media should reflect social diversity and give ready access to a range of views, observe a right of reply and publish corrections. Also implicit in socially responsible journalism is the notion that journalism should be accountable to society as well as to media proprietors and the market.

2.4.5 Development Media Theory

Hachten considered the developmental concept of media as a derivation from a revolutionary concept which by its nature was a short-term affair:

. . .the successful subservience of mass communication to topple a despised regime is self-limiting. Once goals are achieved, the gains must be consolidated, and then another concept takes over. [1992, 34]

Thus, developmental media was effectively a variation on authoritarian media, associated particularly with the political independence of impoverished third-world countries in the decades following World War II:

> The Developmental concept is an amorphous and curious mixture of ideas, rhetoric, influences and grievances. As yet the concept is not clearly defined. There are aspects straight out of Lenin and the Communist concept of the press. Perhaps of greater importance are the influence of Western social scientists who have posited a major role for mass communication in the process of nation building in newly independent countries. [Ibid]

Thus, communications theorists such as Schramm, Lerner and others may have unintentionally provided a rationale for autocratic press controls by emphasising the central role of the communication process in achieving national integration and economic development. Developmental journalism has been closely linked to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the doctrine known as the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), essentially an attempt to redress the imbalance of media resources at the disposition of the world's 'have nots' relative to the lavish media resources of developed countries.

Hachten elaborated his concept of developmental media in a series of principles which may be briefly summarised. All instruments of mass communication must be mobilised by the central government to foster the great tasks of nation building. The media therefore should support authority and not challenge it. Information (or truth) thus becomes the property of the state. Implicit is the view that individual rights of expression and civil liberties generally are irrelevant when confronted with overwhelming problems of disease, poverty, illiteracy and ethnicity. The end result is a guided press with each nation having a sovereign right to control news flows and the activities of foreign journalists. [1992, 35]

Supporters of the Western tradition in media theory have often been harsh critics of developmental journalism and its manifestations in the NWICO and UNESCO. Writing in 1994, Stevenson described it as having established a record which was not impressive:

> In the 1970's, the goals of third-world "national development" often changed from economic and social growth along Western lines to the vagaries of cultural sovereignty and political identity. In practice, the nation often came to mean the regime in power—hardly a new idea—and development news consisted of endless puffery of government leaders and the nation's progress, even where there wasn't much. Several of the alternative news organisations created both to implement the NWICO and to fill legitimate gaps in the global news system have operated for 10 to 15 years, most with little evidence of success. [13]

In his influential re-formulation of press theories, McQuail saw developmental media as arising from some common circumstances of developing countries that limited the utility of other theories or reduced their potential benefits. One was the absence of conditions necessary for a developed mass communication system such as the communication infrastructure, professional skills, production and cultural resources, an accessible audience. A related factor was the dependence of Third World countries on the developed world for deficiencies in technology, skills and cultural products.

In varying degrees, these societies were committed to economic, political and social development as a primary national task, to which other institutions should submit. Furthermore, it was increasingly the case that developing countries recognised a similar identity and interests in international politics. [1987, 119] From these conditions emerged a set of expectations and normative principles about mass media deviating from those that seemed to apply in either the capitalist or communist world. McQuail, like Hachten, recognised the derivation of developmental principles from authoritarian and, less often, Soviet theories, but also saw discernible influences in libertarian and, less often, social responsibility theories:

> The normative elements of emerging development theory are shaped by the circumstances. . . have both negative and positive aspects. They are, especially, opposed to dependency and foreign domination and to arbitrary authoritarianism. They are for positive uses of the media in national development, for the autonomy and cultural identity of the particular national society. To a certain extent they favour democratic, grass-roots

involvement, thus participative communication models. This is partly an extension of other principles of autonomy and opposition to authoritarianism and partly a recognition of the need to achieve development objectives by co-operative means. [1987, 120]

2.4.6 Democratic-Participant Media Theory

Democratic-participant media theory was conceived by H.M. Enzenberger in an influential article, *Constituents of a Theory of the media*, published in 1970. The theory was largely a response to calls from the 1960's onwards for alternative, grassroots media responsive to the needs of citizens. It was incorporated by McQuail into his six-category typology of media theories and thus is a relatively late addition to the normative theory of the media. Conceptualisation of this media theory has presented difficulties because, as a latecomer, it lacks the legitimation of earlier theories, and because elements of it are to be found in earlier theories of the press.

Furthermore, it has not adapted readily to incorporation into institutional media structures. Its emergence is partly a reaction to perceived deficiencies in other media theories, but also as a positive means of establishing new media institutions and reforming existing structures in the direction of greater democratic involvement. The influence of democratic-participant media theory is to be seen in the development of public and community journalism ventures in the United States in recent years. Much of the impetus for these formats has come directly from the grassroots, although there has been some commitment by newspapers wanting to counter falls in circulation by greater involvement of local communities and citizens.

McQuail, in his latest formulation of democratic participation media theory [1994] sees it as supporting the right to relevant local information, the right to answer back and the right to use the new means of communication for interaction and social action in small-scale settings of community interest group or culture. [131] This return to more modest units of media production has been induced by technology change such as desktop publishing and desktop video as well as changes in theoretical perception. In combination, the new theoretical base and access to new, cheaper technology have

challenged the hegemony of commercialised, centralised, professionalised or state-controlled media. The theory represents both a challenge to traditional media and a disillusionment with conventional party politics and the media institutions that sustain it:

> The practical expressions of the theory are many and varied, including the underground or alternative press, pirate radio, community cable television, 'samizdat' publication, micro media in rural settings, neighbourhood media, wall posters and media for women and ethnic majorities. The theory rejects the market as a suitable institutional form as well as all 'top-down' professional provision and control. Participation and interaction are key concepts. [McQuail 1994, 132]

Although the impact of democratic-participant media theory is largely concentrated on societies exercising the western liberal traditions of media theory and structure, its practice encompasses elements of development media theory, especially its emphases on social involvement and organisation on a horizontal rather than an historical structure. Its accessibility to small-scale technology, such as duplicated newsletters and extensive re-copying of audio tapes, gives it a certain resonance in the context of both the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 and Iran's Islamic Revolution beginning in 1979.

2.4.7 Press Concepts

There is no denying the substantial influence of the press theory approach deriving very largely from Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's Four Theories of the Press. The initial typology has been widely used in subsequent communications theory, amended and adapted but still discernibly the same in its fundamentals. In its amplification of the original typology, the treatment here has largely followed McQuail's evolution of a six-part typology, a formulation which seems most relevant to the contemporary circumstances of mass communications media theory and practice. Any attempt to analyse the total incidence of this influential body of theory and its employment in numerous other works by communications scholars is beyond the resources of this thesis. It is intended, however, to look briefly at the treatment of the press theory approach in influential works by comparative communications scholars.

Hachten [1992, 14] devised a changing ideologies approach to media theory and structuring, suggesting five press concepts which, although clearly based on Siebert et al, made some significant additions and modifications. According to Hachten, differing perceptions about the nature and role of journalism and mass communications are rooted in divergent political systems and historical traditions broadly reflected in five political concepts of the press found in the contemporary world: Authoritarian; Western; Communist; Revolutionary, and Developmental. [15]

Hachten's Authoritarian concept is essentially the same as the Authoritarian theory expressed by Siebert et al. He suggests further that the Communist and Developmental models are essentially 20th Century modifications of the Authoritarian concept. The Western concept, described as the model under which the press in Western democracies generally functions, represents a fundamental alternative to the Authoritarian concept. In essence, the Western concept incorporates elements of both the libertarian and social responsibility theories developed by Siebert et al and articulated in McQuail's six-part typology. Hachten's formulation of the Developmental concept is similar to that of McQuail, describing it as an emerging pattern associated with the new nations of the Third World, mostly lacking adequate media resources.

In some ways, Hachten's Five-Concepts approach is a more concise and accessible framework than the six-theory model articulated by McQuail. It has the further asset of extending the scope of the received approach by adding another category of a revolutionary concept or theory, an important omission from the earlier constructs. The revolutionary concept, says Hachten, has one thing in common with the Western concept; both try to operate outside of government controls. [15-16] It is not proposed here to go through Hachten's typology in detail; much of it recapitulates principles established by the earlier models. It is intended, however, to look at how Hachten conceptualises revolutionary and developmental theories of the press.

Hachten defines the revolutionary press as a concept of illegal and subversive communication 'utilising the press and broadcasting to overthrow a government or

wrest control from alien or otherwise rejected rulers.' [1992, 31] The revolutionary concept includes material external to the country involved, as in the production of *Pravda* outside of Russia before the 1917 Revolution. The wide distribution of smuggled copies within Russia was cited by Hachten as a fine example of the revolutionary concept.

Fundamental to Hachten's Revolutionary concept was the notion that a revolutionary press was a press of people who believed strongly that the government they lived under did not serve their interests and should be overthrown: 'They believe they owe such a government no loyalty whatsoever.' [31] As a 'pure example' of his revolutionary concept, Hachten cited the underground press in Nazi-occupied France during World War 11. Another contemporary example of the Revolutionary concept was the *Samizdat* publications, clandestine typed duplicated and photocopied copies of revolutionary material passed from hand to hand during the extended dissident movement which ultimately destroyed communism in the Soviet Union. The Samizdat approach to surreptitious publication and distribution had much in common with the publication of *Shabnameh*, or nocturnal letters, during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11. (See Chapters Three and Six)

Much of Hachten's analysis is directed to the anti-colonial movements which established new nations in the Third World, particularly in the former British Empire. He notes that dissidents in the former British colonies had first expressed revolutionary and national aspirations through small newspapers, often hand-written. The editors of these underground *newspapers* included aspiring national leaders who ultimately emerged as founders of their nations: Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Kaunda. The revolutionary input of such newspapers was often tolerated by British colonial powers because it was not contradictory to the American-Anglo traditions deriving from libertarian/social responsibility models:

> Had not Thomas Paine used political pamphlets to help run the British out
> of the American colonies? Had not Thomas Jefferson said. . .the people
> have a right to revolution, including the right to subsequent revolutions if
> that proved necessary? [32]

Thus, the Anglo-American tradition of a revolutionary press dominates Hachten's conceptualisation of a revolutionary movement as an impact on world journalism. In contemporary terms, he has a preoccupation with radio, particularly its importance in the various times of political crisis and *coup d'etats* in Black Africa. The partnership of traditional communications and revolutionary print media, the essential format of Iran's Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th Century, are beyond his limited horizons. Even the Islamic Revolution of the late 20th Century which had a significant impact on global alignments and distribution of political power is conceived only in terms of its application of technology. The internal dynamics are totally ignored.

Hazchten's treatment of developmental journalism is much more satisfactory because it clearly establishes linkages with Authoritarian and Communist press theories. Most importantly, it acknowledges the contribution of libertarian and social responsibility theories, factors largely avoided by McQuail. The influences of Western social scientists, says Hachten, are perhaps more important for the Developmental Concept than aspects straight out of Lenin and the Communist Concept. These Western theorists have posited a major role for mass communications in the process of nation building in newly independent countries:

> American academics such as Wilbur Schramm, Daniel Lerner and others–
> all libertarians at heart–have argued that the communication process is
> central to the achievement of national integration and economic
> development. In so doing, they may have unintentionally provided a
> rationale for automatic press controls. Other more radical academics,
> mostly Europeans, have echoed Marxist views and added a strong touch
> of anti-Americanism to the concept. For the concept is to some extent a
> critique of and reaction against the West and its transitional media....Some
> critics say that central to the Developmental concept is the rejection of the
> Western view. [34-35]

The elements of Hachten's outline of the Developmental Concept are broadly similar to McQuail's formulation. He observes that by 1992 the concept appeared to be losing momentum in the Third World, suggesting that general trends favoured democratic systems with an independent media anchored in the private sector. This had boosted the Western press concept while the Communist model had largely disappeared. His

analysis, however, conspicuously avoided any attempt to come to grips with the Islamic Revolution and its distinctive blend of traditional and mass communication systems.

Stevenson [1994] reduced the number of press theories to four: Authoritarian Theory, Libertarian Theory, Communist Theory and Social Responsibility Theory, essentially the framework proposed by Siebert et al. On this limited basis, he closely followed Hachten's Five Concept model, not distinguishing with any clarity between *theory* and *concept* which clearly overlap in his analysis. He did make one modification by linking Authoritarianism loosely with Communism which he described as mostly an 'artifact' except for a few outposts such as Cuba and North Korea. [1994, 110] His chapters on Development and Revolutionary Media ignore the Iranian experience and do not consider the survival of traditional communications systems as a potent revolutionary force.

2.4.8 Press Theories, Concepts and Iran

Iran is an ancient civilisation and a potent force in history and geopolitics because its traditional territory provides a historical land bridge between Europe and Asia, between Russia and the southern oceans. For more than 200 years, its oil resources lured colonial exploiters. In the 20th Century it has spawned two great social revolutions with significant consequences for both national and global power alignments. It has fought one of the major wars of the post World War II period, been a dominant force in the continuing significance of Islamic religion and society, and preoccupied the conduct of Western foreign policy, particularly the United States, for almost two decades. Yet, as the preceding review shows, it has been very largely disregarded in the development of communications theory and global communication.

Unquestionably, the press theories and concepts considered above are applicable in certain respects to Iran, and these will be considered in the chapters that follow. In particular, the Authoritarian Theory of the press is relevant particularly to the extended periods of monarchical rule in Iran. Iran, however, has lacked any tradition of Marxism

and the communist variation of authoritarian theory has found no place in its government or society. Except for one brief interlude in the 1870's, libertarian and social responsibility theories of the press made no lodgment in Iran, at least until the end of the constitutional revolutionary period in 1925, the period covered by this thesis. It might be argued that developmental theory has had some place in Iranian communications since the end of World War II, but this consideration is also beyond the scope of this thesis. The revolutionary concepts considered above are based on selective historical experience and analogies completely alien to the Iranian experience. In the absence of any appropriate theoretical model drawing on both traditional systems and mass communications systems, it is incumbent to propose one here. This is the principal task addressed in the remaining sections of this chapter.

2.5 Public Communication in a Historical Process

The thesis turns now to consider important examples of non-mass mediated communication in a context of public communication. Firstly, it looks at the extensive nature of public communication in ancient empires whose media effects seems to have been overlooked and underestimated. The second focus is the enduring and contemporary power of traditional channels of communication in the developing world, reflected in the role played by the political-religious leaders in social awakenings in countries such as India, China, and Iran. A third section presents a model of political communication designed to assist in analysing both functions of the news media and traditional communication channels.

As we move from an industrial to an information society, the media represent one of the more dramatically changing sectors. Traditional media practice and organisation face enormous challenges from new forms of competition and industry structure; altered regulatory frameworks; major changes in technology, products, and actual distribution methods. The 18th Century was the era for analysing society as a machine, the early 19th Century for analysing society as a organism, and the 20th Century for analysing society as a communications network. Harold Innis, Marshall Macluhan, and Raymond

Williams are among the prominent communications and cultural scholars who have taught us that the effort to interpret society and culture must include analysis of how public discourses are communicated. What has been neglected in much of this consideration has been the enduring role of traditional communications systems.

The modern world has witnessed five major *communication revolutions* based on technology, all of which were initiated or incorporated primarily in the west. Each of these revolutions grew out of a technological invention and stimulated a profound transformation of socio-political organisation and practice. Table 2.1 reviews these changes.

Table 2.1

Principal Communication Channels

Channels	Approximate Age in Mid-1990s
Print	520 years
Film	100 years
Radio	70 years
Television	55 years
Satellite	30 years
Digital	20-25 years

*Source: Kia 1992, 25.

The print 'revolution' in the west was a long and slow process dating conventionally from Gutenberg's invention of moveable type in the mid-15th century. Print preceded by a half-century another important process in modern western history—the development of maritime exploration, which initiated European colonisation of many parts of the globe. The conjunction of the two processes is neatly encapsulated by the printing of a pamphlet in Spain in 1492 incorporating a letter by Columbus about his great discoveries in the Americas. [Stephens 1988, 83] Though the effects of print were

genuinely revolutionary, its emergence as a social institution did not occur until 300 years after the technology was invented.

The social impact of print on the developing world did not occur until the mid-19th Century. In considering the origins of media in the developing world, the most useful model is that developed by Lerner, who conceptualised a two-fold model of historical systems of public communication which he termed Oral and Media.

Table 2.2

Lerner's Model of Communications

Model	Media System	Oral System
Channel	Broadcast (Mediated)	Personal (Face-to-Face)
Audience	Heterogeneous (Mass)	Primary (Group)
Source	Professional (Skills)	Hierarchical (Status)
Content	Descriptive (News)	Perspective (Rules)

*Source: Lerner 1964, 55.

Lerner called these 'idealised sets of paired comparisons' and, although he added the disclaimer that few societies would fit the model perfectly, he believed a secular trend of global importance was embodied in the typology. In short, he argued that traditional communication is necessarily and inevitably overtaken by mediated communication. According to Lerners' hypothesis there was a correlation between urbanisation, literacy, exposure to media and political participations. [Lerner 1958, 42]

Pye argued that the most striking characteristic of traditional communication was that it was not organised as a distinct system sharply differentiated from other social processes. [1963, 40-42] Traditional systems lacked professional communicators, with people participating on the basis of their political or social position in the community or according to personal ties of association. Information flowed along the lines of the social hierarchy or according to the particularistic patterns of social relations in each

community. Thus the process was not independent of either the ordering of social relations or the content of the communication. Since the communication process was generally so intimately related to the basic structure of traditional society, the acts of evaluating, interpreting and responding to all communications were coloured by considerations directly related to the status relations between communicator and recipient.

Eisenstadt elaborated and extended concepts demonstrating the power of ancient communication networks, focussing on the communication patterns of centralised empires. He suggested that within various imperial systems, such as Egyptian, Chinese, Roman, Greek, and Persian, there developed sophisticated political, religious and cultural centres with the development of imperial symbols, currency, language, and the channels to transmit these to the far reaches of the Empire that these empires were also the seat of the development of the great traditions meant competition between the various imperial centres. [1980, 28]

The economic historian and communications scholar Harold Innis [1950] was one of the first and most persuasive advocates of drawing attention to the role of communication in linking together a nation. The work of Innis also establishes the role of particular mixes of communication media and forms (oral/written; state/church) in maintaining flexible and durable social orders, as in Ancient Greece and Byzantium. [29] This work suggests that far more sophisticated networks of communication existed at least in these ancient empires than the model of oral communication provides. Furthermore, concern for the incorporation of peripheral groups and their identification with the centre is not simply a phenomenon of contemporary history. Curran [1977] has shown that a variety of signifying forms were used in pre-industrial societies which often reached huge audiences. He provided a detailed analysis of the centralised control of symbolic content exercised by papal curia in medieval Europe, showing how a communications network was established which transmitted the hierocratic themes of

the papacy, translated into popular and comprehensible ideological forms, across Western Europe. [30]

Thus the historical evidence suggests the centrality of communications adaptations that were extensive, highly organised and effective in the maintenance of empires and other political units, well before the advent of mass media. Therefore, notions of face-to-face communication and a focus on primary groups alone seem an inadequate typification of past systems of communication where extensive public communication was achieved. Evidence from the contemporary Third World emphasises the continuing importance of traditional forms of communications as credible, effective carriers of information and as powerful channels of cultural identity.

This affirmation of the enduring strength of traditional communications is extremely relevant when considering revolutionary mobilisation in Iran, reflected in the embedding of traditional networks of communication in the heart of urban social life as well as the enduring social status of the clergy as spiritual/political leaders. Fathi [1979] has challenged the notion that there did not exist any distinct, organised system of public communications nor class of professional communicators in traditional societies. He argues that the function of the Islamic *Minbar* was, and still is, as a medium of public communication, not only for specifically religious messages but also for political and social issues. [103]

Traditionally, oral communication has been a significant form of public communication in Iran. The Iranian culture has been an oral culture, and most literature and traditions are transmitted from generation to generation through reading in public and private places. [Mohsenian Rad 1995, 75] Indeed, Iranians are predominantly Shi'i Muslim, and the unique characteristics of the Iranian culture include its religious practices and the role of public places, such as *mosques* and *bazaars*, and the influence they have on public interaction and communication. Traditionally, it has been in the *mosque* that members of the public engaged in both religious practice and social discourse. Indeed, architecturally the *mosques* were designed for large numbers of people to participate in

ceremonies. For example, in 1612, there was a mosque in Isfahan designed for speakers to reach audiences of more than 1000 members. [Kamalipour and Mowlana 1994, 75]

Religious leaders used these forums to disseminate their religious, social and political messages. For that purpose, *mosques* still play a central role in social communication, since they can easily accommodate large audiences at any time. [Mohsenian Rad 1995, 65] The *mosque* was not only the location of the weekly communal prayers but also the centre of the community much as the Forum was to Rome or the Agora to Greece. Thus throughout the history of Islam, the *mosque* has been the centre and scene of numerous uprisings, revolts and social movements often led by popular preachers from the *minbar*. [Fathi 1979, 104] Another important development in Islam was the early appearance of another type of religious orator who was called *Qauass* or storyteller. There were also distinctions between preachers, with the *Khatib*, or religious man, delivering a more strictly religious sermon while the *Qauass* or storyteller, was often more directly political and developed a considerable following and influence. Thus the *minbar* has played a considerable political role at various junctures of Iranian history.

2.6 The Press and Traditional Communication Channels

The 1970s re-affirmed the importance of the traditional forms of communications and small media in contemporary history, perhaps most notably in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Schramm was among the first to propose a distinction between the two different systems of mass media.

> Some Big Media, of course, are considerably bigger than others, and some of the little ones much smaller than others. By the Big Media, we mean complex, expensive media like television, sound films and computer-assisted instruction. By the Little Media, we mean the simpler ones, which stretch all the way from slides, slide films and projected transparencies to radio and programmed texts. [1972, 54]

The linkage between Schramm's formulation here and the democratic participant media theory discussed above is readily apparent. Some of this re-thinking still implied a model of communication experts instructing a passively absorptive audience, with the

content and process of development orchestrated from above and the people volunteered

for involvement. [Rogers 1976, 32] The rethinking of the 1970s, however, did lead

towards recognition of the need for a better cultural fit between the methods employed

for development and traditional patterns of communication and interaction. Thus

Schramm and Lerner illustrated the shifting perspective:

> We have learned that most media, well used, can contribute to
> development-not only television from the ATS-6 satellite to India or from
> ground towers to El Salvador and the Ivory Coast, but also the humbler,
> less costly, less complex media like slides and posters at village meetings,
> traditional media like the dances and puppet shows of Southeast Asia, and
> above all the medium of interpersonal face-to-face talk. Dollar for dollar,
> the smaller, less expensive media may often be more efficient in a
> development program than the larger, more expensive ones. And any
> medium is likely to be more effective when combined with two-way
> communication of one kind or other. [34]

Obviously the process works best when communities and individuals take the initiative

in creating their own appropriate means of communication, as the UNESCO publication

Many Voices, One World pointed out:

> These means cover a wide range of media from local and wall
> newspapers, mimeographed leaflets, photos, posters and *dazibao*, local
> radio and itinerant loudspeakers, to pamphlets, slides, tape recorders,
> exhibitions, experimentations, local fairs, film and music festivals, puppet
> shows, itinerant information vans, street theatre and an endless list of
> similar devices and means. [1980, 54]

The benefits of using such channels are that they may accomplish tasks and purposes

for which the mass media are not suited, saving resources and promoting broader

horizontal communication. Thus, for different development purposes different

combinations of media can be used, and each nation and culture will most effectively

use those forms that are a part of its traditional culture. The variety and complexity of

traditional communication is great : in Botswana the performing arts are crucial; in

China after folk songs, opera and serial pictures, the *dazibao* [1] or wall newspaper is the

most important in facilitating popular participation; in Bolivia the miners run local radio

stations; and in Mali there are rural newspapers. [UNESCO 1980, 58] In Egypt,

---

[1]. Newspaper pasted in walls for the public readership.

folkloric forms such as puppets coexist with religious channels like the *mosque* and the socio-economic arenas of the *bazaar* and markets. [Samir 1980, 7]

Some analysts focus on group media augmented by communications technology, and suggest it can both support and maintain traditional forms of communication as well as allowing participation in the group process and in the active production of meaning. Adult education practices based on the ideas of Paulo Freire, the role of the churches based on Liberation theology, radio-schools, community video and community radio are some of the channels and tools used within the developing world by minority forces aiming at fundamental changes in society, and comprising a necessary counter-balance to mass media.

There is increasing agreement that traditional and interpersonal/group forms of communication should be fostered both for their intrinsic value and because they act as correctives to limiting communication to professionals, to emphasising information at the expense of discussion, and toward the introduction of technology simply because it is modern and impressive without consideration of its social utility. [Serberny-Mohammadi 1984, 31] Thus, small media come to stand both for channels of cultural authenticity but also as important forums of popular participation. It is therefore not surprising that they have played such an important role in political and social mobilisation.

Pye notes that a modern communication system consists of 'a fusion of high technology and special professionalised processes of communication with informal, society-based and non-specialised processes of person-to-person communication'. [1963, 26] From this the derives the real test of modernisation as being not simply the level of advanced technology in a society, but rather 'he extent to which there is effective feedback between the mass media systems and the informal, face-to-face systems'. [27] In Iran the last monarchy, the Pahlavi regime, actively severed whatever residual linkages it had maintained with the traditional networks, and attempted to orchestrate all

participation within its constructed party format. All this achieved was to empower the traditional networks as sites of political and cultural resistance to the state.

For Pye, the 'transitional' communication process between traditional communication and contemporary mass communication can be characterised by its fragmented nature. Thus, the two levels are not closely integrated but each represents a more or less autonomous communication system. [1963, 24] The linear assumption of this model may be challenged by examination of the historic experience in Iran. An integrated and complex communication structure had existed in Iranian history, and during the revolutionary period a public sphere of independent publishing and autonomous political groups flourished. The extremely bifurcated communication structure existing under the Pahlavi regime was a regression from the previous integrated models.

2.6.1 The Print Media

The brief outline here tries to indicate the role of the press in political communication during socio-political crises, particularly revolutions. Religious communication was central in the English Civil War, or 'Puritan Revolution', when sermons and pamphlets played a crucial role. Hill has written of the church monopoly over thought and opinion in Britain during the 17th Century, so that 'in the absence of other media of communication, sermons were for the majority of Englishmen their main source of political information and political ideas'. [1964, 58] Control of the pulpit was a question of political power and clergymen acted for both King and Parliament in reading declarations from their pulpits. In a similar manner, traditional communications including *bast* (sanctuary) and *minbar* (pulpit) performed essential communication functions during the revolutionary periods in 20th Century Iran.

According to Mayer the 'proper functions' of the press are classified into five categories including *information, instruction, entertainment, reflection of public opinions* and *advocacy*. [1985, 49] The print media has played a vital role as an agent of social change and print has the longest history as a medium of radical expression. It has been

estimated that between 1640-1660 in England, at the height of the Civil War, 22,000 speeches, pamphlets, sermons, and newspapers were printed [Stone 1972, 60] Pamphleteers, among them Tom Paine, were important during the American Revolution. The printing of the Encyclopedia in France was a massive undertaking requiring great resources and its impact was elaborated through oral discussion and reiteration, and a barrage of underground leaflets during the French Revolution of the late 18th Century.

Indeed, such open social spaces as French salons and the English coffee-house were themselves critical carriers and elaborators of political ideas and intellectual trends. The development of this public space as a means of oral and written communication was a crucial element in the development of bourgeois society and public opinion. Radical tracts, like those of William Cobbett, helped to mobilise Chartism and the British trade-union movement in the early 19th Century.

Clearly in the West, as Lerner pointed out, there was an important relationship between literacy and political participation. The problem with this model, and indeed a real problem for many inhabitants of the contemporary Third World, was that the nexus has been broken. In many states electronic media were introduced before mass literacy was obtained, because the mass media provided regimes with the means of political indoctrination and control, forces which literacy and small media have the potential to undermine. Even the performing arts, puppeteers and other traditional cultural forms have played their role in political mobilisation, acting to espouse protest, dissent and reform. In India, 'these native media of sung communication and enacted information proved more than a match to the Government-controlled mass media during the many political and social campaigns launched by Ghandhi'. [Ranganath 1985, 64] Clearly, each historical context provides different possibilities. As Gurr has described in his analysis of mass mobilisations:

> If the articulators of revolutionary symbolism lack access to existing media, or find them closed by censorship, they may establish new media like newspapers and journals. If these are suppressed, they may resort to

clandestine or foreign communication media, face-to-face agitation or the generation of rumours. [1973, 224]

Gurr refers to the distribution of anarchist tracts among Spain's Andalusian peasants in 1919, the appearance of clandestine pamphlets against Peron in Argentina in 1955, and propaganda broadcasts from Egypt into Jordan in the 1950s. Occasional, small circulation and rudimentary materials are, in a censored context, of direct political significance. According to Downing:

> Books, irregularly appearing periodicals, almost illegible press, retyped lectures, public gatherings of 80 people squashed inside a single apartment, public lectures attended by 120 people: these are potent reconstructions of an oppositional public realm. [1984, 308]

In Czechoslovakia, film, literary magazines and the Writer's Union were key channels of resistance leading up to the dramatic events of 1968, and during the brief 'Prague Spring' when the mass media began to reflect current concerns and broadcast in minority languages: 'people were buying six or seven newspapers a day, and some of them were listening to the radio till three in the morning'. [Downing 1984, 314]

In the Polish experience with the growth of Solidarity, there are perhaps surprisingly close similarities with the Iranian situation. These include the importance of the Church as an alternative public space and guarantor of Polish culture and values in a centrally administered environment; the scepticism about the official media; the initiation of the underground media network by KOR (Committee for Worker's Self-Defense) with signed communiques which published the struggles of workers and intellectuals, and which carried the exhortation that by 'disseminating this bulletin you are acting within your rights, and playing a part in their defense. Read it, copy it, and pass it on'. [1984, 326] Downing describes the production of worker-oriented mass-circulation newspapers, literary journals and NOWA, the independent publishing house which became the publishing wing of Solidarity. He argues:

> In terms of message reproduction, the movement graduated from the classic *samizdat* method of reproduction based on typewriter and carbon copies to the recycling of antiquated duplicators, photocopiers and offset litho to create the technological tools of the underground network. Cassette tapes of the Gdansk negotiations also circulated through factories. The

political police spent a considerable part of its time trying to repress this growing underground small media movement, and even a year after martial law had been imposed, its squads had seized over a million leaflets, silenced eleven radio transmitters, found 380 printing shops and confiscated nearly 500 typewriters. [1984, 327]

Independent media work still continued, however. Within the Polish context, these self-managed media created new spaces for public argument and debate, independent of the power structure, and proved to be important small first steps in the giant movement that ensued. As Downing observes, 'no alternative communication channel should be written off simply because it is small'. [345]

Clandestine communication developed under and against Franco's Spanish dictatorship from typewritten letters to underground press agencies, from underground political press to anonymous poetry, or simply the symbolic painting of letters on walls: "P for protest, A for amnesty, L for liberty". [Bassets 1983, 72] While this particular underground movement was not able to play a catalytic role in developing a powerful social movement, as happened in Iran, and change occurred naturally with the death of Franco, it is interesting to note the reduction of Spanish society and communications practices into two separate realms, similar to the dualism of mass and traditional communications in Iran.

2.6.2 Traditional Communications and Leadership

Communication in traditional societies has been described as an indistinct, unorganised, non-professional system which is totally based on face-to-face communication. [Fathi 1979, 103] However, in certain traditional societies, Fathi argues that there is a distinct, organised system of public communication operated by a communication dynamic carried on face-to face, but it is institutional, not inter personal in nature. [104] Such a system can have a powerful impact on socio-political activity. This section briefly reviews the role played by inspirational leaders in social and political awakenings in countries such as India, China, and Iran·

Exploitation of the traditional communications systems proved a strong political instrument during social mobilisations in Third World countries through the 20th Century. Gandhi and Mao's multi-model style successfully reached a large group of people despite poverty, illiteracy, and lack of access to mass communication facilities. Gandhi's daily prayer meetings, Mao's discussion meetings and various mass campaigns attended by hundreds of millions of people substituted for audio-visual or scarce print media. During campaigns the walls were plastered with posters and hand written *slangs* or popular poems, news sheets by illegal printing presses were produced and distributed. Further, the materials were written in language specifically aimed at particular audience–political opponents, the intellectual elite, and the masses. The language Mao and Gandhi used against their opponents was highly combative and their arguments were carefully hinged on moral grounds to embarrass their enemies. [Singh 1979, 99]

When communicating with the intellectual elite, Gandhi and Mao sought to change centuries–old colonial ways of thinking and acting, arousing in them a repugnance to the national consequences of living so far removed from the lives of the masses. [Ibid, 99] In writing for the masses, both Gandhi and Mao stressed 'traditional' aspects of their languages. Ghandhi, of course, was also a journalist. Although reliance on the anglicised translations of Gandhi's and Mao's statements limits conclusions, reports of eyewitnesses or journalists provide some clue to their styles. Observers have described their respective styles as simple and earthy, their use of words having a traditional quality which made it easier for them to communicate effectively. Mehta Ved, a Gandhi follower, thus described his leader:

> He spoke in a low singsong. His tone was always conversational, even when he was addressing millions of people. Whatever he said was to the point, and he used mostly simple words to say simple things. He never resorted to histrionics, or any rhetorical device, although he was fond of using parables and proverbs, and quotations from Bhagavad Gita and other sacred books. [1976, 94]

Traditional communication was a strong political channel during the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. Mowlana argues that the revolution 'grew naturally from native soil,

and revolutionaries and people in general relied on traditional channels of communication, primarily public meetings or other meeting places at which to spread their messages and organise their resistance'. [Mowlana 1979, 107]

The *mosque* apart, the most important meeting places in Iranian cities is the *bazaar* the traditional place of commerce, which played an active role in the victory of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Islam is the heart of Iranian social life, the traditional *public sphere* of communal activities. When the two interlocking social institutions of *mosque* and *bazaar* suffered the specific attacks of the political regimes, especially during the Constitutional Revolutionary (1906-25) and the Pahlavi periods (1926-79), the extensive personal and traditional values associated with both great institutions became the core of popular mobilisation. [Sreberny-Mohammadi 1990, 354] Islam as a religious imperative and as the basis of social community and individual identity remained the most potent cultural and ideological force in Iran. [357] Indeed, Islam was the language and essence of political discourse as Mottale affirms:

> Over 60% of the Iranian population were illiterate and directly exposed through the mosque to whatever the clergy wishes to inculcate in their minds. The mosque is thus the focal point in mass mobilisation and socialisation, and the clergy essentially interprets the world at large for lower orders. In a changing and often threatening world, the mosque became a fixed point of reference. [Mottale 1982, 21]

One of the major features of Iranian political history is the active role played by the *Shi'i Ulama* (Clergy), in the historically significant events of Iran's political evolution over the past century: the Tobacco Protest Movement (1891-2), the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11), the Oil Nationalisation Movement of the early 1950's, the violent protest of 1963 against the Pahlavi regime, and finally, the Islamic Revolution (1979). This analysis concludes with a brief examination of Imam Khomeini's leadership and the traditional processes of communication he employed in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Imam Khomeini played a crucial role in motivating the clergy and people to participate more actively in political life. [Sreberny-Mohammadi, 362-64] From early 1970, he

stressed the need for religious leadership to become involved in politics, arguing that

imperialism had promoted a remote and pedantic religion obsessed by specific points of

legal interpretation. He encouraged the *Ulama* to publicise and to preach, arguing the

need for promulgating the ordinances of God and teachings of Islam, but also stressing

the power in numbers and influence of the clergy as a social force, arguing thus:

> There are more than 150,000 students and scholars of the religious
> sciences in Iran. If all these scholars, authorities, proofs of Islam, and
> *Ayatullahs* were to break the seal of silence from the list of crimes
> committed by the regime, would they not achieve their aim? Would the
> authorities arrest them all, imprison and banish them, destroy them?
> [1981, 95-98]

Imam Khomeini utilised a simple language and politico-religious orientation familiar to

the Iranian masses. His rhetoric provided a simple binary division of social inequality

between the *Mostakberin*, the oppressors, and the *Mostazafin*, the dispossessed, the

latter term neatly encompassing the various social elements which made up the popular

movement against the regime. One of Imam Khomeini's most powerful communiques

appeared just before Moharram, the Holy Month of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein

(Third Imam). A quotation suggests its rhetorical power:

> *Moharram* is like a divine sword in the hand of the soldiers of Islam...it is
> the month when blood triumphed over the sword, the month in which
> truth condemned falsehood for all eternity and branded the mark of
> disgrace upon the foreheads of all oppressors and satanic government...
> the month that proves the super-powers may be defeated by the world of
> truth, the month in which the Muslim leader taught us how to struggle
> against all the tyrants of history, how the clenched first of those seek
> freedom, desire independence, and proclaim the truth may triumph over
> tanks, machine guns and the armies of Satan... it is the duty of the entire
> nation that has now risen in revolt to pursue and broaden its struggle
> against the Shah with all its strength and to bring down his harmful,
> disastrous regime...it is the duty of everyone to oppose the usurpatory
> military government...it is the duty of all oil company officials and
> workers to prevent the export of oil, our vital resource...there is no excuse
> for any class of people in the nation to remain inactive today: silence and
> apathy mean suicide or even aid to the tyrannical regime. [Sreberny-
> Mohammadi 1990, 36]

Imam Khomeini concluded by offering his congratulations to the families of those

youths who gave their lives for the cause of Islam and freedom, making martyrdom

again a cause for celebration instead of mourning. Imam Khomeini offered Iranians

both other-world and early redemption from the injustices of death, tyranny and

imperialism. Salvation was offered to all, with promises that even the educated middle classes found tempting. His rhetoric was enticing, highly normative, based on a traditional value system which all Iranians understood. According to Sreberny-Mohammadi:

> Thus not only did the traditional fora of social and religious life provide space for spread of communication but also the rhetoric of [Imam] Khomeini and the grand *Ayatallah* was a traditional form of coercive persuasion that precipitated the rapid and massive political mobilisation. [1985, 235]

Small media (cassette tapes and leaflets) were two significant political tools in the hand of religious leaders during the Islamic revolution of 1979 as western comparative communications scholars have noted:

> Supposedly blank tapes were found to contain [Imam] Khomeini's messages. Tapes were duplicated by thousands and distributed along with other goods through the bazaar system inside Tehran and out to other cities and towns...these tapes were [Imam] Khomeni's electronic pulpit, a switched on *Minbar*, for a population with 65% illiteracy, in a cultural milieu where oral communication is still the preferred means of communication for interactions as diverse as inter-personal compliment. [Sreberny-Mohammad, 358]

Massive participation in the revolutionary movement grew because of the direct demands made on Islamic identity by the coercive persuasion of the clergy, particularly, the charismatic power of Imam Khomeini. Clerical leaders thus played on the popular devotion to Islam. They utilised traditional communication channels as a strong political instrument in the popular awakening.

2.7 Class and Revolutionary Movements

Several significant mass communication theories have been discussed in this chapter. These approaches, however, are inadequate to explain the processes of mass communication in a traditional society. As these approaches do not incorporate the interaction between modes of communication (mass and traditional), and culture (value system, belief, and religion), they cannot analyse this process appropriately (See Figure 2.1).

Early Marxist perspectives viewed the mass media as a powerful ideological weapon for maintaining public submission to capitalism. The theories of communication based on a conflict model of society derived initially from Marx's historical analysis of the emergence of early capitalism stressing the unequal distribution of economic and political powers in the world economy. The mass media, along with education and the church, are considered an essential part of the ideological state apparatus. Mass media are said to play crucial roles in the distribution of power and the process of legitimation in society .

Mass media are also viewed as powerful economic institutions concerned with profit-making as much as with ideological control, and with increasing tendency to monopolisation, eroding any possibility of consumer sovereignty. Yet others see the power of the media in taking over the cultivation of ideas, images and consciousness in contemporary industrial society. Thus Gerbner argues that 'the truly revolutionary significance of modern mass communication is...the ability to transform historically new bases for collective thought and action quickly, continuously and pervasively across the previous boundaries of time, space and status', and thus create new public identities. [1976, 76] Hall considers the media to have 'progressively colonised the cultural and ideological sphere' and to 'have established a decisive and fundamental leadership in the cultural sphere'. [Hall 1982, 55] Politically, the media play a central legitimating function and confer status.

Thus for many, the mass media have taken on the role of a contemporary priesthood. But if the mass media were and are credited with outstanding ideological, political, cultural and economic power in the Western industrialised setting, they were also endowed with great powers within a Third World context. In the orthodox diffusions perspective, mass media technologies and institutions were expected to create a climate of change in developing societies by introducing new values, attitudes and modes of behaviour favourable to modernisation. [Lerner 1964, 34]

The mass media were expected to teach new skills 'from literacy to agriculture to hygiene to repairing a motor car' and to act as multipliers of resources and knowledge. [Schramm 1964, 18] The media could raise levels of aspiration, which acted as an incentive for action, and thus could help make people more prone to participate in decision-making in society. [Lerner 1964, 56] Mass Media could also facilitate the planning and implementation of development programs which corresponded to the needs of the population. But perhaps most important of all for developing nations, the media were supposed to help to create a sense of national integration and national identity. Even the critical perspective, using the notions of 'media imperialism,' 'cultural dependency' or 'electronic colonialism,' centred on the power of exogenous mass media contents in undermining indigenous culture and social values in the Third World. [Boyd-Barrett 1982, 65]

In short, there is an immense range of media theory suitable for many types of analysis but unsatisfactory for the major purposes of this thesis which is based on a dual communications system encompassing both mass media and traditional communications systems. It has been necessary, therefore, to assemble a model to illuminate both the separate components of mass and traditional communications systems, and to illustrate the relationships between them.

The theoretical framework here is a cultural model of communication based on a perspective defining culture as a social setting in which a certain framework has taken concrete form or has been institutionalised and structures the interaction and communication of people within that context. Therefore various cultures also manifest different identities. [Servaes 1992, 36] According to this model there is a close relationship between culture and modes of communication (See Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1

Model of Cultural Approach and Modes of Communication

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  ┌─────────────────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │ INDIVIDUAL (Option, Will)   │──────│ COMMUNICATION SYSYTEM        │   │
│  │ SOCIAL (Groups, Classes)    │      │                              │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────┘      └──────────────────────────────┘   │
│                  ▲                                    │                    │
│                  │                                    │                    │
│                  ▼                                    │                    │
│         ╭──────────────────╮         ┌───────────────────────────────────┐│
│        ╱  CULTURE           ╲        │ MODES OF COMMUNICATION            ││
│       │  (Value System,      │       ├──────────────────┬────────────────┤│
│        ╲  Belief)    ────────╲──────▶│ Modern           │ Traditional    ││
│         ╰──────────────────╯         │ ○ The Press      │ ○ Bazaar       ││
│                  ▲                    │ ○ Television     │ ○ Mosque       ││
│                  │                    │ ○ Radio          │ ○ Islamic Centers││
│                  ▼                    │ ○ Cinema         │ ○ Islamic Groups││
│  ┌─────────────────────────────┐     │ ○ Theatre        │                ││
│  │ POLITICAL-RELIGIOUS         │────▶│                                   ││
│  │ LEADERS                     │     └───────────────────────────────────┘│
│  └─────────────────────────────┘                                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

This cultural approach focuses on modes of communication and characteristics of individuals (opinion, will), and social groups, and classes. Based on this approach political-religious leaders are able to play a basic role in revolutionary social movements. These leaders utilise traditional channels of communication for their socio-religious activities during social movements. The role played by such politico/religious leaders has been particularised in this model to incorporate the traditional communications dynamics of an Islamic tradition and society. It could also, of course, be particularised to accommodate the national traditional systems of other countries; for example, India and China, Gandhi and Mao.

The relationship between religion, as a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate condition of his existence, and politics, more particularly the relationship between religion and political struggles, has attracted the attentions of many scholars.

For example, Lenski and contemporary sociologists of culture have suggested that religious subcultures, even after controlling for class position, can continue to have an important effect on the formation of political ideology. [1984, 65] Far from being mere reflections of economic relationships, political and ideological forms are instruments in the class struggle which can be used in diverse ways by diverse classes and class alliances. Marx, however, believed that ideology corresponded closely with the class situation.

Gramsci argued that ideologies which develop as the organic expression of the life situation and aspirations of one social class can be taken over by other social classes as a means of extending their rule over society as a whole. In much the same vein he distinguished between "*organic intellectuals*" arising directly from the life conditions of a fundamental social class and articulating its aspirations, and "*traditional intellectuals*" attached to institutions which had grown up under past social formations, and now linked to a new ruling class as subordinate elements in their systems of class rule. This theory has been applied to classify engineers, managers, marketing and advertising specialists as organic intellectuals while teachers and clergy are categorised as traditional intellectuals. [Mansueto 1988, 261-277] Nima has argued the crucial significance of religion in Iranian social consciousness:

> It is the most important ideological force for social control; one of the fundamental bases of religion, and in particular Shi'i Islam, is the submission to the authority and the acceptance of a governing elite. Shi'i came into being as an ideology of protest, and from its birth it acted as a political force. Shi'ism, therefore, proclaims the inseparability of politics and religion. [1983, 230]

In the case of Iran, a revolution which would dispel foreign influences could naturally rely upon a native ideology such as Shi'ism. Historically in Iran the political economy of the governing class did not conform with the ideology of the middle class. So, the middle class criticised and eventually attacked social structures, culminating in the Constitutional Revolution. The emergence and expansion of a middle class in Iran can be demonstrated and analysed in the context of the Iranian industrialisation process since 1800, as Adams demonstrated:

The expansion of industry has resulted in the creation of substantial middle class located primarily in Tehran. Composed of the children of bazaar merchants and civil servants, these individuals obtained some modern education and then took up administrative positions in private or government industries. In addition, large numbers of them became part of the modern commercial sector by establishing shops or wholesale houses outside the traditional bazaars. The middle class has also expanded as a consequence of the phenomenal growth of the civil bureaucracy. Finally, an even larger growth of this middle class may be expected in the future as vastly expanded system of higher education, including both universities and technical institutes, begins to turn out graduates in substantial numbers. [1971, 198]

The middle class played a major role in the Constitutional Revolution, displaying a high level of class consciousness by comparison with the lower classes. [Iman 1993, 13] The populist alliance of merchants, *ulama*, artisans, and intelligentsia managed to force a transition from a despotic state to a constitutional autocracy. They were supported after 1906 by Iran's small working class, which organised its first unions among printers, telegraphers, fishery workers, and other groups, and went on strike to secure better pay and working conditions. [Foran 1991, 804]

Bahar found that in the beginning of the Constitutional era, there were two groups in Iran: *Mashrutikah* and *Mostabed* (constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists). [1942, 76] He classified upper, lower and middle classes during the revolution and concluded that the majority of the people and some of the major clergy supported the Constitutional Revolution. Foran and Goodwin found that middle class intellectuals occupied a leadership position in the Revolution. They describe the constitutional supporters participating in the Constitutional Revolution as "... a broad coalition of classes and groups in the course of the revolution, including clerics *(the ulama)* and middle-class intellectuals in leadership positions, as well as a massive base of merchants and artisans of the bazaar economy, students, office workers, professionals, and urban lower-class women and men from the shantytowns of the major cities". [1993, 213] Halliday also believes that the "Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1912 was an attempt by merchants and intellectuals to reform the monarchy and establish a constitution and a National Assembly. [Halliday 1979, 22]

In short, the intellectual as a member of professional class is someone who, using education as his/her significant resource, engages in mental activity and thereby makes a living. An intellectual works in those professions that necessitate an active and informed and trained approach to society's problems. Under this definition, therefore, only those people are regarded as intellectuals who are directly involved in shaping society's way of thinking, and whose lives as well as their professions make their involvement with society's culture unavoidable. This definition of the intellectual in Iran embraces students, teachers (from primary to higher education), writers, artists, part of the clergy (the educated section), and university graduates who support themselves through their own work. Intellectuals try to discuss and interpret the current social structure to the members of professional (middle) class. So, they have a strong role in the heightening of professional class consciousness and in the leadership of different social movements in Iran.

The following chapters discuss the Iranian Constitutional Revolution as a example of a social movement where the combined forces of the traditional networks of social communication and the contemporary press played an important role in popular mobilisation and revolutionary victory.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

3.1 Introduction

Determining precisely the span of the constitutional revolutionary period is an exercise of some complexity. There are differences among scholars even about the core period of the revolution although most accounts agree broadly on 1906-11. In practical terms, the initial events of the revolution occurred in December 1905, and Milani refers to it as the 1905 revolution. [1976, 4] Persuasive argument can also be made for nominating 1912 as the end of the principal part of the Revolution. Although there is no lack of relevant incident after either date, there is a perceptible falling away after the defeat of the constitutional forces in December 1911. So there is an element of rounding off about the selection of 1906 as the starting point or that of 1911 as the conclusion.

Some analysts also designate a much broader life for the broadly-defined Constitutional Revolutionary period, such as Milani who at one point suggests from 1840 to 1912. More frequently, he nominates the period from 1880-1912 as the revolutionary epoch. Browne in his *Brief Chronology of the Persian Revolution*, prescribes a preparatory period of two parts before the revolution proper, one of intellectual preparation and propaganda, and one of actual revolt against 'prevailing intolerable conditions'. [1914, 311] Concerning the first part of this preparatory period he nominates the intellectual preparation as reliant on the work of two major figures, Sayyed Jamalled Din-Assadabadi (1838-97) and Prince Malkom Khan (1833-1908), together with their disciples.

This would suggest a revolutionary period beginning in the early 1880s when both seminal figures were entering the periods of their most cogent and enduring influence. Concerning the 'actual revolt' itself, Browne suggests that the overturning of the Tobacco Concession in 1891 was a momentous event in Iranian history and may be

fairly regarded as the starting point of the revolution. He also states, however, that the 'immediate prodomata' of the revolution began in 1905. [312] Browne's analysis of a two-part preparatory period is a useful one which is taken up in the examination here. It is also accepted, however, that the Constitutional Revolution proper (or core revolution) occupied the years 1906-11.

The brief historical analysis which follows is directed essentially to setting contexts relevant to the analysis of the contributions of Iran's traditional communications and press to the Constitutional Revolution. Thus, a number of issues and events alluded to here are taken up in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. Important themes are the beginnings and emergence of modernisation in Iran; the developing importance of the merchant classes, the bazaar workers and the institution of the bazaar; the decisive role of the clergy at several crucial points; the significant impact of foreign intervention and semi-colonisation; and the administrative style and personal qualities of the Qajar regime.

The account begins with a brief overview of Iran's historical context from the early civilisations to the end of the Savafid dynasty in the 18th Century. It then takes up at greater length the principal issues and events in the reign of the Qajar Shahs from the late 18th Century until the expiry of the dynasty in 1925. The survey includes a brief summary of the principal events of the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) itself.

3.2 Early Iranian Civilisations

Between 10,000 and 15,000 BC primitive communities were already living on the Iranian plateau. In terms of antiquity, there are countries such as Egypt whose recorded history extends back further than Iran. In terms of impact on the development of civilisation, Iran cannot pretend to a record comparable to Greece. On the basis of uninterrupted importance on the world stage stretching back to the first glimmers of civilisation, Iran's record stands comparable with countries such as China and Japan. It has occupied a consistent place over many centuries in what William Haas calls

dramatis personae, as an important participant in the world drama. [Cited Mowlana 1963, 13]

Even after the eclipse of the ancient Persian Empire built by the Achamenid dynasty of Cyrus and Darius the Great (521-486 BC), viable Persian empires endured, although slowly decaying, until Achamenian power ended ignominiously with Alexander the Great's occupation in 331 BC. This new Macedonian empire was short-lived, although for a further 80 years the Seleucids exercised brief sovereignty over the Iranian Plateau. They were succeeded by the Parthians, a northern Iranian tribe whose language and writing were known as Pahlavi, a title chosen by the last reigning Iranian monarchs in the 20th Century. [Mowlana 1963, 28]

The Parthian dynasty inflicted heavy defeats on Imperial Rome, surviving until 226 AD when it gave way to the Sassanid Kings who strove to the revive the magnificence of the Achamenids and Imperial Persia. As soldiers, they were extremely successful in repelling the Roman and Byzantine Empires, and the Turks. Their successes, however, were not limited to the battlefield as Mowlana points out:

> Their roads, bridges and irrigation works were of a very high order; remains of the latter are still to be seen. They were fond of the nobler sports. . . .Above all, they encouraged literature. . .[In the early 1960's] in the Iranian mind this Sassanian period is idealised as a time when life was happily ordered. In legend, noble warriors and common soldiers play polo together. Peasants talk to their Shah freely and fearlessly. [1963, 31]

Another vigorous Iranian tribal group, the Alans, nomadized in Caucasian regions and eventually penetrated far into Europe. [McEvedy 1961, 14]

Ancient Persia also made a remarkable contribution to the world's spiritual history. About 600 BC, Zoroaster, a prophetic figure from north west Iran, evolved the basic tenets of Zoroastrianism, a faith based on the perpetual struggle between darkness and light, good and evil. Zoroaster claimed his divine message came from his God, Abura Mazda, the *Wise Lord,* and he worked ceaselessly to propagate his doctrines. According to Mowlana, Zoroaster 'stirred all Iran, and his name rung through distant

lands.' [24] His traditions and articles of faith were perpetuated in the *Avesta*, the sacred book and national epic of the Persians, a work codified and interpreted by the Asssanid kings. (Zoraster was also known as Zarathustra, the name used in the influential *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, a philosophical work by Friedrich Nietzsche).

In a number of ways, Zoroastrianism foreshadowed Christianity, particularly in its conception of a dualism between God and the devil, with the individual challenged to align on the side of justice and righteousness in a continuing struggle. This doctrine also had a powerful impact on Persian imperialism, challenging the rulers to extend religious domination as well as temporal domination over the earth, bringing peace and justice to all peoples.

By the time of the Sassanids, the force and purity of Zoroastrianism had been diluted, although it retained significant influence. In particular, the cult of Mithraism, essentially a fertility cult, imbued Zoroastrianism with an element of mysticism but also incorporated earlier primitive traditions of ritual sacrifice. An even greater influence was the doctrine of Manicheanism, originating in the third century AD. Like Zoroastrianism and Christianity, the doctrines of Mani (215-276) sought to draw existing religions into one global and united faith. Manicheanism's relationship to Zoroastrianism has been likened to that between Christianity and Judaism. It preached an advanced personal ethic similar to the Christian and spread rapidly in Iran, although it did not supplant Zoroastrianism. It also briefly challenged Christianity's newly-won position in the Roman Empire. Another religion flourishing briefly in the sixth century was Mazdakaism which mingled elements of Zoroastrianism and primitive communism. Successful military resistance to the Roman and Byzantine Empires prevented encroachment from Christianity into Iran, although by the sixth century the Byzantine, Turkish and Persian empires were enervated by centuries of remorseless war:

> In the sixth century AD the Turks of Turkistan to the north-east of Iran rose in strength, alternately enemies and allies of the Persians. Byzantine Rome, Persia and the Turks wore themselves out, and the Arabs wore themselves out, and the Arabs swept across the land. The terrible campaigns, waged almost incessantly, exhausted Persia and Rome alike.

Iran, ruled by weaklings, was ripe for falling and in the deserts of Arabia the new power had risen. The Sassanian Empire fell under the onslaught of the Arabs. Islam came into Iran and neither Islam or Iran was ever the same again. [Mowlana 1963, 35-36]

3.3 Islamic Iran

By 650 AD the first flood of Islam was spent and Iran had been drawn within the rapidly expanding orbit of the Arab Caliphate. Iran became Muslim but not Arabic. Initially, this Caliphate was dominated by the aristocratic Umayyad family with the successors of the prophet Mohammad combining, as he had, the religious and political leadership. The Umayyad ascendancy was interrupted briefly by the Caliph Ali, the son-in-law of the great Prophet, but he was unable to break the hold of the Umayyads by his death in 661. This dynastic struggle also had vital religious consequences, with doctrinal differences incorporated into the schism between the contending factions. This laid the foundations for the divide between Sunnite and Shi'i Islam which persists to the present day. In 779, the dynastic control changed with the Abbasids displacing the Umayyads and supporting the orthodox (or Sunnite) doctrines, although the Shi'i, including Iran, had strongly supported their accession. [McEvedy, 44] By 888 AD, the Abbasid caliphate had contracted, and the Iranian territories had emerged as Emirates of the Caliph with significant autonomy. It was something of a national revival for Iran. This relative independence was strengthened with the further decline of the Caliphate and the emergence of the pro-Shi'i Emirates of the Buwayhid dynasty in Iran.

In the 400 years of the Caliphate and the succeeding emirates, the Iranians relinquished national autonomy while retaining some freedom of action. The Arabs brought them into high administrative positions and economic activity was not discouraged. There was the intellectual challenge of adjusting to Islamic religion and imbuing it with a distinctive Iranian flavour. The Shi'ism in Islam gave the Iranians, who supported the Caliph Ali, the opportunity to shape Shi'ism into a national religion. Under the Abbasids, the capital of the Caliphate was moved from Damascus to Bagdad, part of the former Persian empire and close to the former Sassanid capital. Sassanian court

etiquette prevailed and the old Sassanian families had equal status in rank and access to office:

> Iranians soon appropriated the expressive and flexible Arab tongue and used it with such perfection that a large part of the literary and scientific works in the Arab language were written by authors of Persian origin. On the other hand, in the ninth century, when Persian became a literary language enriched by a high percentage of Arab words, the knowledge of Persian and Persian literature became an indispensable element of education and culture. [Mowlana 1963, 37]

3.4 The Feudal Ascendancy

A significant development in the last century of the Caliphate/Emirate systems was the emergence in eastern Iran of the Ghazavid Emirate, founded by a Turkish general. Mercenaries from Turkestan had long formed the basis of the Muslim armies in the Near East. They defeated the existing dynasties in the eastern Emirates of the former Persian Empire, establishing the Seljuk sultanate which transformed the Iranian feudal system. The Seljuks introduced the *iqta* system which was essentially a military and service fief. The conquering Seljuk generals were granted the right to collect the revenue of different villages in return for their services. This system evolved into one of expanding private property, as Lambton points out:

> Later, as the weakness of the central power grew, the population were forced in order to preserve their property more and more to seek the patronage of the influential. Since it increased the influence of the latter, this reinforced the tendency to alienate to assignees not only the right to collect the revenue but also the land itself. [1955, 55]

Consequently, the history of Iranian feudalism was characterised by the bloody struggle of warring factions to extend their spheres of influence to include eventually the whole of Iran. Yet, in spite of frequent and often violent changes in the administration of the *iqta* system, the structure and absolutism of the feudal relations established under the Sultanate remained essentially unchanged. In short, the basis of the peasant/landlord relationship did not alter. The ultimate result was an extension of large private estates and a worsening of peasant conditions. [Keddie 1957, 5]

By the 13th Century the strength of the Seljuk sultanate had been significantly weakened as its area of control contracted and it split between dynastic rivals. The Turks, however, were swept peremptorily aside by the onslaught of rapacious and destructive Mongol invaders. For Iran, the rise of Genghis Khan and the *Golden Horde* spelled slaughter and destruction. Major centres of trade were totally destroyed and an estimated million people killed.[1] Mowlana described the Mongols as following the Turks down the historic invasion routes from the north:

> Genghis Khan is still vividly recalled. Razed cities seeded to grass and an abiding hatred were his monuments. Iranians even today speak of him with horror and point out vestiges of his depredations with the suppressed fervour and enmity of victims...The conquest of Iran was completed a quarter of a century later by his grandson Hulagu, who centred his rule there. [1963, 39-40]

In terms of the feudal system, the burden of the strict taxing policies of the Mongol Khanate fell, once again, upon the peasants. Contemporary documents indicate that up to 30 different types of taxes were levied upon the peasantry. [Lambton 1953, 103] To counter the consequent flight of peasants from their lands, laws were passed legally tieing the peasantry to the land and establishing penalties for absconding. [Keddie, 8]

With the rapid disintegration of the Persian Khanate after the death of Genghis Khan in 1288, Iran dissolved into native provincial administrations. Another Turkish noble, Timur (known in the Anglicised form as Tamburlane) succeeded in reviving the Khanate of Turkestan, placating the Mongol descendants of Genghis and embarking on repeated destructive forays into Iran, eventually forcing it to submit after 20 years of sacking and terror. The Timurid Emirate was continued by Timur's successors, milder in disposition and encouraging the restoration of economic activity and, remarkably enough, the arts, science and literature of Iran. According to Mowlana, it was the great

---

[1]. In the city of Nishapoor, one of the major urban centers of the time, one million people were reported killed in the course of the Mongol invasion.

outpouring of noble poetry during this period that spread the glory of Iran through the

Islamic world and thence throughout the civilised world:

> It is due to [these poets] that the Persian language accompanied the Mogul
> conquerors into India and became the language of court, society news-
> writers and administration until it was replaced by English early in the
> 18th century. [1963, 41]

(The spread of the Persian language tradition into India was a factor in the development

of the Iranian press, a theme taken up in Chapter 5.)

By the late 15th Century, the great Emirate of Timur was in decline, as indeed was the

mighty Khanate of the Golden Horde north of the Caspian. The Timurid Emirate had

split into smaller territories, effectively marking the end of the historical medieval era

for Iran. The transition deriving from the break-up of the control established by Timur

and his descendants sparked another great rejuvenation of the Iranian state with the

emergence of the Safavid dynasty in 1499.

3.5 The Safavid Period

Religion was closely associated with the rise to power of the Savafids who led the Shi'i

order in Azerbaijan. The dynasty's founder claimed direct descent from the house of

Ali, Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law. The Shi'i division of Islam had become

increasing influential in Iran, with its adherents rejecting the legitimacy of the Caliphs.

The Safavids also sought to trace their lineage back to the Sassanian dynasty through

links by marriage between Ali's son, Hussein, and the daughter of the last Sassanian

Shah:

> On Ali and his sons who had died the death of martyrs, and on their
> spiritual successors called Imams, the Shi'i conferred a saintly and quasi-
> divine character.. It was to the seventh Imam Musa Kazem who lived in
> the second half of the eight century that the Safavids traced their origin. It
> was during this period that the Shi'i branch of Islam was established as
> the state religion and used as an instrument of nationalism. . .The first
> Safavi to become shah, Ismail, was looked upon by Iranians as "both
> Saint and Shah." [Mowlana 1963, 42]

The Safavids established an autocratic and arbitrary rule consistent with despotic traditions of Iranian monarchs. In the hands of the Safavids dynasty, religion became a particularly significant tool, using Shi'ism as a doctrine to control Iranian society. It became the state religion of Iran and remained a potent force in the subsequent history of the country. The essence of Shi'ism's significance can be seen in the period of Safavids rule (1501 to 1722):

> The position of the ruler was reinforced by the theory of divine right. Significant is the difference in phraseology between documents granting *iqtas* or appointing officials to various offices in Seljuk times and similar documents in Safavid times. The ruler has become the central figure to the exclusion of all else. [Lambton 1953, 105]

The Safavid period led to many socio-economic changes. The establishment of a centralised government capable of ensuring a certain level of security helped trade and agriculture to flourish. Western diplomats and traders had established themselves in Iran even before the Safavid victory, and their presence increased after it. This stimulated demand for Iranian merchandise to service trade with the West, particularly during the rule of Abbas Shah, described by historians such as Keddie and Mowlana as the greatest ruler of the period. Apart from his prowess as a soldier, Abbas was a superb administrator who united Iran, reorganised the military as an agent of the Crown, and embarked on extensive public works:

> The great Safavid Shah Abbas (1587-1629) encouraged international trade through building roads, caravaransarais, and workshops to produce the luxury textiles and ceramics demanded in the West. Silk was the main export. [Keddie 1981, 10]

A new capital was established at Istafan displaying the finest examples of Iranian architecture. Under the Savafids substantial factories, some employing up to 1,000 people, sprouted over the country. The numbers of bazaars and market places multiplied. The Shah also indirectly encouraged the establishment of Iran's printing press by his patronage of Armenian families whom he established in the separate suburb of Julfa and gave many privileges:

> To these industrially and commercially-minded people the Shah gave many privileges, including liberty of worship, the right to construct their

own churches and to elect their own mayor. It was in 1639 that the Armenians of Julfa established the first printing press in Iran. [Mowlana 1963, 44]

(The Armenian contribution to the establishment of printing in Iran is taken up in chapter 5) The urban centres witnessed rapid development and the emergence of a merchant class, though part of the trade was carried on by the court and members of the feudal class themselves. [Issawi 1971, 1] In spite of the growing merchant class, and the economic significance of their urban trade, cities remained the stronghold of the feudalists. [Keddie 1957, 54]

Iran had always been splendidly situated to exploit the great trade routes between Europe and the Orient, both by land and sea. Land routes, however, remained very much a factor of good relations with the Turks at a time when the acceptance of Shi'i as Iran's nation religious had exacerbated strains with the Ottoman Turks. To counter this antagonism with Turkey, Iran turned to European powers also concerned about the aggrandisement of the Ottomans. This fostered diplomatic and trading relations between Iran and European powers such as England and Portugal. It also brought the first stirrings of colonial ambitions on the part of European powers. The political emissaries were followed quickly by merchants, many as agents of the East India Company but others trading on their own behalf. [Mowlana 1963, 44]

At the beginning of the dynastic rule of the Safavids in 1507, the Portuguese had attacked the significant trade centre of Hormaz on the Persian Gulf. This marked the start of European attempts to interfere in and dominate Iranian affairs for trade and commercial benefits. Fierce competition ensued with European trading firms proving very successful in arranging favourable trading and tariff agreements. The pressures brought by foreign interests at this time helped to stifle any stimulus for an autonomous capitalism emerging in Iran. This became a determining factor in deciding the patterns of the future socio-economic history of the country. Rivalries between European

powers over dominance of the Persian Gulf ended with the British achieving hegemony at the expense of the Portuguese.

By the time of his death in 1629 Abbas had created a strong Iranian state within traditional boundaries. He had succeeded also in secularising the state despite the theological basis that had brought his dynasty to power, effectively diverting politics and religion into separate spheres while maintaining a fervent adherence to Shi'i as the national religion. The stability that Abbas and the early Safavids brought through external trade and economic expansion proved relatively short-lived. Disruptive military tribes, weak agricultural production, and changing patterns of western trade in the Far East, particularly the displacement of overland routes by sea, contributed both to economic and political decline. Frequent wars with the Ottomans enervated Savafid administrations lacking the military skills of Abbas. Furthermore, his successors were unable to avert the restoration of the religious leadership in political and administrative matters.

The decline of the Safavids began from the mid-17th century, accelerating early in the 18th Century with an Afghani revolt in 1722 and the subsequent fall of the dynasty in that year. Iran entered a long period of political and social chaos, with internal conflict between khans and feudal lords. This internal confusion was accompanied by external wars in quest of more land, resources and riches caused by internal decay in economic, political and military administration.

In a military sense, there was a brief recrudescence of national glory under the rule of Nadir Ali Shah, who defeated the Turks and Russia, then invaded Northern India capturing Delhi and winning victories over the Moguls. Nadir Shah's great military skills and his thirst for conquest and spoils, however, were not matched by abilities as an administrator and politician. His assassination was followed by 50 years of turmoil, although there were some glimmers of feudalism's decline in the Afsharid period beginning in 1760. [Lambton 1953, 56] The costly and devastating wars drained the

economy and famines became a fact of annual life. The increased cost of the army

brought an increase in the already over-burdening taxation by the government. The

authority of the central government rarely extended beyond major cities, subjecting

transport and travel to constant threats of harassment and theft. [Milani 1975, 82]

3.6 The Qajar Dynasty

Chaos lasted until 1779, when the Qajars, a Turkish tribe that migrated from Central

Asia into the Middle East in the 14th Century, emerged as the new rulers of Iran. Aga

Mohammad Khan Qajar, head of the powerful clan, led its successful bid for the

Peacock throne, although his occupancy was short-lived:

> Refusing the Crown on the grounds that he did not yet rule the whole of
> Iran, Aga Mohammad Khan turned his attention to the north, moved the
> capital to Tehran, an obscure town near the Qajar territories, and then
> mustered a large expeditionary force to conquer the north eastern
> provinces. While leading this army into Georgia he was assassinated by
> two of his household servants. [Abrahamian 1982, 37]

After a fierce struggle for the succession, the crown prince, Fath Ali Khan entered

Tehran victorious, remaining as Shah for 37 years. With his successors Muhammad

Shah (1834-48) and Nasseru'd-Din Shah (1848-94), Fath Ali Shah ensured a Qajar

dominance that did not begin to falter until the early 1890's. In total, the Qajar

ascendancy lasted for almost 150 years, stimulating both the modernisation of Iran and

the furtherance of a remorseless despotism.

With the Qajar dynasty Iran entered a new place in her history, that of European

infiltration as it fell increasingly under the shadow of the west. The basis of Western

intervention was the tension between Czarist Russia's expansion into Central Asia

which directly threatened Iran. In turn, this impinged on British interests, particularly

the ascendancy it had established in the Persian Gulf and its vital interests in the Indian

sub-continent :

> Under the Qajar dynasty a great drama begins, in the course of which Iran
> is drawn deeper and deeper into the net of the European powers—at first
> as a potential instrument and active partner, later merely as a tool and
> victim. Russia nibbled the northern edges of Iran; France negotiated;

Germany infiltrated; Great Britain manoeuvred diplomatically and economically. The nineteenth century was a buyer's market for commercial concessions as the Shahs discovered. The Shahs were no longer creators of national power but mere retailers. Britain and Russia elbowed each other at the bargain counter, and their competition kept Iran from falling under either one's complete dominance. [Mowlana 1963, 46-47]

Fath-Ali Shah and his two successors tried to move away from the tribal style of personalised leadership associated with Muhammad Khan, returning to the ancient traditions of imperial Shah-in-Shahs, the grandeur of the traditional Peacock Throne:

They tried to routinise their power by constructing a statewide bureaucracy; stabilising their position by creating an effective standing army; and legitimising their dynasty by imitating the court manners of a previous dynasty. [Abrahamian 1982, 38]

The attempt to create a state-wide, centralised bureaucracy failed and local communities preserved significant autonomy, with governors often remaining powerless outside their provincial capitals. The Qajars were equally incapable of developing an effective standing army, and re-asserting the glory of the ancient Shahs, although they adopted the trappings of the Peacock Throne. They were also unable to quell the aspirations for temporal leadership of the higher echelons of the religious establishment who, as Abrahamian observes, interpreted the early texts of Shi'ism to argue that 'the state was at worst inherently illegitimate and at best a necessary evil to prevent social anarchy'. [40] Having no military security, no administrative stability and little ideological legitimacy, it might be questioned how the Qajars lasted at the head of Iran for 130 years. The most plausible explanation has been summarised succinctly by Abrahaamian:

The Qajars remained in power by systematically pursuing two concurrent policies; retreating whenever confronted by dangerous opposition; and more important, by manipulating the many communal conflicts within their fragmented society. The Qajar dynasty ruled nineteenth century Iran with neither the instruments of coercion nor the science of administration, but with the practice of prudent retreats and the art of manipulating all the possible variations in the complex web of communal rivalries. [41]

According to one British observer, "The Qajars ensured their own safety by safely balancing and systematically fomenting mutual jalousies". [Quoted Abrahmian, 42]

This did not mean that the Qajars were conspicuously less despotic, tyrannous and cruel than their predecessors. If opportunities occurred, the Qajars were as ruthless and unprincipled as any regime in Iranian history. Because their power was finite their opportunities were more limited, and they were more selective in their exploitation. This selectivity, however, did not curb their avaricious demands on state revenues or their willingness to plunder the national income for their own purposes. In achieving these ends, they had ample opportunity at hand in the contending rivalries of European powers to intervene, and even control, the internal economy and society of Iran. This produced a significant element of semi-colonialism which predominated through the 19th Century and ultimately was instrumental in sparking the Constitutional Revolution early in the 20th Century. The origins of this semi-colonialism are traced briefly here.

3.6.1 Semi-Colonisation of Iran

While Iran restored and re-built its society under the Safavids dynasty, Western Europe had advanced rapidly towards industrial and capitalist maturity. Inevitably, Iran with its rich endowment of natural resources and bounteous opportunities for development across the economic spectrum, became increasingly attractive to European colonisers. Due to the degree of modernisation achieved, with all its imperfections, Iran's military capability, resolute opposition by all elements of Iranian society, debilitating competition between two of the principal colonisers, England and Russia, Iranian colonisation was only partly achieved. [Nakhaie 1986, 95] Consequently, the ascendancy of the Qajars was also an era of extended semi-colonisation.

In the early 19th century, the rivalries between France and Russia in Europe and between France and England in the Indian Ocean, together with the search by all three major powers for cheap resources, sparked their increasing interest in Iran. The British envoy, Sir John Malcolm, visited Iran in 1801 and secured a treaty with Fath Ali Shah, giving British and Indian merchants the right to settle anywhere in Iran and to leave at will without paying any tax for their merchandise.

Napoleon's emergence as a competitor against Russia and England, together with his territorial ambitions towards India, prompted a French military mission to Iran in 1807 led by General G.A. Gardanne. Ostensibly, Gardanne sought to organise the Iranian army against Russia and to prepare the ground for a Napoleonic thrust towards India. In return, Iran expected to receive arms and military instruction so that it could resist increasing pressure from expansionist Russia which had annexed Georgia in 1801. On January 17, 1807, Napoleon wrote to the Shah calling for an offensive against the Russians in Georgia. Napoleon had resolved to send the Shah 4,000 infantry, commanded by experienced officers, 10,000 muskets and 50 cannon. Unquestionably, Napoleon was influenced also by a desire to reduce English influence in Iran. [Chandler 1993, 528] Napoleon's defeat of the Russian armies and the ensuing Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia in 1807 effectively ended negotiations for a military treaty between France and Iran.

3.6.2 Early Modernisation—Fath Ali Shah

The first Russo-Iranian War broke out in 1813 with Russian attacks on the Caucasian territory of Iran. The war ended in 1813 with the Treaty of Gulistan which confirmed Russia's possession of Georgia. In 1814, England and Iran signed a treaty of defensive alliance that remained in force until 1857, but proved of little value to Iran.

The first serious attempt at modernisation occurred early in the 19th Century during the reign of Fath Ali Shah. It was driven by Prince Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince, heir apparent and governor of the crucial province of Azarbaijan. His initial motive was military, a response to deficiencies in the tribal cavalry evident in the First Russo-Iranian War. He reorganised his forces on the model of the Ottoman empire, established industries for producing armaments in Tabriz, and appointed military missions in Paris and London. To secure the future, he sent students abroad to study military science and manufacture, together with relevant subjects such as engineering, armament design and manufacture, typography, and modern languages. These initiatives were financed by

cuts in court salaries and expenses, and by imposing protective tariffs and import restrictions. As a hedge against religious revolt, he obtained clerical pronouncements in favour of his new model army. Unfortunately for Abbas Mirza, his ambitious plans were eroded by political intrigues and growing opposition from interests afflicted by his financial policies. His military strength also incurred the enmity of his numerous family.

Most importantly, the model army was ineffectual in the second Russo-Iranian war of the late 1820's. [Abrahamian 1982, 52] Iran's initial successes were followed by serious defeats, culminating in the capture of Tabriz by Russia. The Treaty of Turkamanchi, signed in 1828, gave Russia the large and prosperous states of Erivan and Nakhichevan. Furthermore, it granted extra-territorial jurisdiction over Russian subjects (capitulation rights), a 'most favoured' nation clause, and the monopoly of shipping rights on the Caspian sea to the Russians.

The Treaty imposed severe war reparations upon the Iranian government with heavy penalties for any delay in the payment, established complete freedom for Russian citizens to conduct commercial business in Iran, reduced tariff rates to a maximum of five percent, and eliminated Iranian taxing power over the profits and the properties of Russian citizens. The immediate impact of the treaty was the worsening of economic conditions in Iran resulting from the pressures to pay the reparation. The increased interference of Russia in the political and economic affairs of Iran was another consequence. As well as permission for interference in the socio-economic and political affairs of Iran by the Russian authority, the Tsar obtained the right to interfere in the Iranian Court under the pretext of protecting the crown prince and the reigning Shah. [Milani 1975, 87]

In the modern history of Iran, the wars against Russia, undertaken by the Qajar kings, became a turning point. The Turkamanchi treaty signified the transformation of an independent, though extremely corrupt, government to one increasingly dependent

upon foreign powers. From the late 1820's until well into the 20th century, Iran was to be riven between the conflicting interests of Russia and England. Russia had embarked on a course of expansion in Asia, with visions of a warm-water port on the Persian Gulf. England strove to control the Persian Gulf and areas adjacent to the Indian sub-continent, the jewel in her political crown.

3.6.3 Modernisation Renewed—Nasseru'd-Din Shah

The drive for modernisation was revived by Amir Kabir, the first Prime Minister under Nasseru'd-Din Shah who succeeded Muhammad Shah in 1848. Amir Kabir, referred to by some later historians as the 'Bismarck of Iran', was a protege of Abbas Mirza, serving as special secretary for the Army and conceiving an admiration for the model army of his patron.. As a special envoy to the Ottoman empire, he had observed the process of reform in Turkey and, on return, had gradually gained the confidence of the future Nasseru'd-Din Shah. Under the new monarch, he was appointed Prime Minister and Lord of the Army. The new Shah encouraged his Chief Minister to initiate vigorous reforms. Following the trail blazed by Abbas Mirza, he revived the standing army and established factories to supply its needs, also cutting foreign imports in the process. Believing that Iran's economy should rely on a strong local manufacturing base and that it should not be a captive market for foreign commodities, he sought to transform hand-made industry into a machine-intensive process. Cotton spinning, long cloth, silk-weaving, samovar manufacture, casting of iron, sugar refining and lump sugar production, carpentry, wheel making and carriages—these manufactures were encouraged by him to build up the army and substitute for imports. Amir Kabir sent craftsmen to Moscow and St. Petersburg to learn new techniques, producing a paper factory in Isfahan, glassworks in Tehran, and textile and foundry factories in Sary. [Nakhaie 1986, 96]

Amir Kabir was opposed to foreign commercial and economic expansion in Iran. He encouraged mining and the construction of dams. To foster the development of skills,

he ordered the construction of a technical university *(Dar-al-Funun* or Abode of Science). Like his predecessor, he pruned court expenses and raised tariffs, applied a moratorium on the sale of offices and imposed a new tax on fief holders no longer contributing armed men for imperial defence. Amir Kabir's vigour and resourcefulness frightened the British colonisers whose fears were soundly based. If Iran acquired a high level of economic development and political independence, the coloniser's policy would be gravely impeded. For the English, the more backward the society, the easier it was to penetrate and control. [Nakhaie, 96]

Apart from the colonisers, particularly the English, Amir Kabir's efforts to economise, stamp out corruption and implement wide-ranging reforms alienated feudal landlords, tribal chiefs, and courtiers including Mahd-Olia, the King's Mother. An untimely revolt by an extreme religious faction also increased the pressures on him. In 1851 after Amir Kabir had been just over three years in office, a coalition of hostile interests persuaded the Shah to remove him from office. He was banished to the provinces, then killed:

> His plans for the future were cast aside, and his industrial factories, despite heavy investments were left to wither away. Thus ended the last nineteenth-century attempt at rapid, defensive and state-wide modernisation.. . .although Nasseru'd-Din Shah and his ministers themselves brought about many innovations over a long reign that lasted until 1896. But these innovations, instead of driving for rapid change, induced a slow drift towards change; instead of defending the state against external enemies, they were aimed at buttressing the court against internal opponents; and instead of protecting the economy, they sought to tempt Western interests further into the Iranian economy. [Abrahamian 1982, 53]

Several of these sporadic reforms derived from the Shah's extensive travelling in Western countries, notably a brief venture into establishing a free press. (See Chapter 5) Amir Kabir's reforms were the last attempts in the 19th Century to generate rapid development of Iranian indigenous industries. Five years after Amir's fall, the Paris Treaty in 1856 gave the British the capitulation rights, with a five percent custom tariff, added to the negation of any rights by the Iranian government over Harat Qhandehar and Afghanistan. Effectively, the treaty gave the British similar rights to the Russians for the plunder of Iran's national resources and right to invest in, and even dominate,

Iran's socio-economic and political affairs. This sparked a fierce rivalry, with each imperial power trying to secure as many profitable concessions as possible at the expense of the other.

3.6.4 Concession Hunting

With a policy of attracting foreign trade, it was only a question of time before European imperialists sought to exploit the cupidity of Nasseru'd-Din Shah's administration. Britain and Russia and, to a lesser degree, France and Belgium, were seeking overseas ventures in which to invest capital. Fortuitously, the Shah was anxious to raise revenue, particularly to finance his penchant for extended European travel. Thus began an era in which extensive concessions were granted by the Shah's administration to European entrepreneurs. These concessions aroused the wrath and increasingly the effective resistance of both the religious leaders and the merchant class whose interests were jeopardised by siphoning off Iranian industry, agriculture, and public works to overseas investors, particularly the increasingly important joint stock companies.

This *concessionaire* era got under way in the early 1870's with the purchase by Baron Julius de Reuter, a British citizen, of a concession encompassing the exclusive right to finance a state bank, contract out the entire customs services, develop all minerals save for gold, silver and precious stones, exercise a 70-year monopoly over building railways and tramways, and establish all future canals, irrigation works, roads, telegraph lines, and industrial factories. [Abrhamian, 55] The great British plenipotentiary, Lord George Curzon, the future Viceroy of India, described the deal as an 'international bombshell':

> The agreement contained the most complete surrender of the entire resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished in history. [Curzon 1892, 480]

Not surprisingly, Russia strenuously resisted the Reuter concession. Coupled with effective resistance from within Iran, the Qajar regime executed a strategic withdrawal and cancelled the concession. Instead of a portmanteau approach, lumping all of the

concessions into one bag, concessions were generally offered singly, building into a substantial wad of monopolies and similar arrangements over the next 20 years but done with sufficient caution to deflect serious resistance. Concessions mounted from virtually nothing in the 1850's to £12 million by the late 19th Century. Reuter retained mining and banking interests, and numerous other concessions granted included fishing, shipping, telecommunications, dredging and port development, paved roads, and quarries. Abrahmiam has aptly described the process as opening Iran to European capital as well as European trade. [56]

3.7 The Preparatory Period—Intellectual Enlightenment

The two great intellectual figures of the constitutional revolutionary period were unquestionably Sayyed Jamalled-Din [1838-1897] and Prince Malkom Khan [1833-1908]. Jamalled-Din was a questing, restless intellectual whose writings and ideas permeated much of the Islamic world and its drive towards independence, freedom and unity in the late 19th Century. His family provided him with a traditional education but he explored several unconventional interests before going to India in search of modern science. Concerned that modern technology, having mastered India was a threat to the Middle East he concluded that the western onslaught could be avoided only by the Middle East countries adopting modern technology immediately. Despite his respect for modernism, he decided that the traditionalism of Islam was an effective creed for mobilising the public against these western colonisers. According to Abrahamian, Jamalled-Din retained these fundamental beliefs throughout his long career, although he often made a pragmatic response to immediate situations. [1982, 63]

Jamalled-Din visited most of the Islamic countries and his influence was pervasive in independence and reform movements, particularly in India and Egypt, where he lived for many years. He was, for a time, an adviser and counsellor to Nasseru'd-Din Shah but, unfortunately, had no enduring influence on that erratic monarch. In particular, he tried to persuade the Shah to lead a campaign against the British, then tried to mobilise

popular opinion more broadly for a crusade against the heathen and imperialistic west.

His propogandising aroused the concern of the Shah and Jamalled-Din was forced to

take *bast* but was seized and deported in chains to the Ottoman Empire where he spent

the last years of his life. He retained an implacable animosity to his former patron, the

Shah of Iran:

> His hostility to the Shah was now declared; he denounced him in speech
> and writing, advocated his deposition and gathered around him a number
> of disciples. Finally the Shah decided on deporting him from the country,
> though it involved the serious step of violating the [sanctuary]. [Browne
> 1910, 11]

Apart from his stature in Islamic countries, Jamalled-Din visited a great many European

capitals and was well known to leading figures of both east and west. Browne gives a

vivid pen picture of this magnetic. multi-faceted personality:

> . . .a man of enormous force of character, prodigious learning, untiring
> activity, dauntless courage , extraordinary eloquence both in speech and
> writing, and an appearance equally striking and majestic. He was at once
> philosopher, writer, orator and journalist, but above all politician, and
> was regarded by his admirers as a great patriot and by his antagonists as a
> dangerous agitator. [1910, 4]

Jamalled-Din has been identified with a loosely-defined movement known as the Pan

Islam movement, identifying a resurgent Islamic nationalism extending from India

through the Middle East to Egypt. He was regarded as a philosophical influence on the

Young Egypt movement and with the awakening of nationalist sentiment in Egypt.

During his years in Europe, Jamalled-Din started a weekly newspaper in Paris, *Al-*

Urvatul-Vosgha (The Indissoluble Link) published in Arabic, which was strongly

political and vehemently anti-English. He also publicised his views in the European

press and his political articles were largely quoted in the English press. During some

years in Russia, he induced the Tsar to permit the publication of the Quran and other

religious books in Russian.

According to Browne, Jamalled-Din over a period of at least 20 years probably influenced the course of events in the 'Muhammadan East' more than any of his contemporaries:

> To write his history in full would be to write a history of the whole Eastern Question in recent times, including in this survey Afghanistan and India, and, in a much greater degree, Turkey, Egypt and [Iran] in which latter countries his influence is still in different ways, a living force. [1910 12]

Prince Malkom Khan was a less striking figure and the influence of his diplomacy and journalism was largely felt in his native country of Iran. His philosophy and its exposition lacked the Pan Islamic resonances of Jamalled-Din but his influence was comparable within Iran both in the preparatory period and during the Constitutional Revolution itself. The son of an Armenian prince, Malkom Khan studied engineering in France where he also came under the influence of freemasonry and contemporary philosophers such as Saint Simon's social engineering, and Compte's religion of humanity. In Iran, Malkom Khan gained the support of the Shah, converted to Islam then formed a secret society devoted to promulgating the Religion of Humanity, claiming at one point to have 30,000 converts. [Browne, 38]

Malkom Khan drafted for the court a *Book of Reform* urging immediate changes of laws to prevent Iran from being engulfed by western colonisers. He designated these news laws as *qanun* to differentiate them from the *shar'ia* of the Islamic canons and the old state regulations. His systematic exposition of the new law was based on improving public welfare and procuring equality of all citizens:

> The book concluded with a list of specific recommendations: the separation of the government into a legislative council and an executive cabinet, both to be appointed by the Shah; the acceptance of public opinion; the codification of the previous laws; the formation of a professional army; the creation of an independent tax department; the introduction of a comprehensive educational system; the building of new highways between the main towns; and the establishment of a state bank to finance economic development. [Abrahamian, 66]

Malkom Khan lost the Shah's support when the clergy denounced the *Qanun* as heresy. His secret society was banned and he was exiled to the Ottoman Empire. He was

brought back briefly as a special adviser to the Shah in 1871 but dismissed again after a hostile reaction to a package of controversial policy changes which included the Reuter Concession. He was packed off to London with the Shah appointing him to the comprehensive position of 'Ambassador General to all the Courts of Europe.' After losing his post for refusing to share the spoils of a non-existent concession he had been forced to sell, Malkom Khan emerged as a radical journalist, establishing a small printing house to publish primers, journals and, most notably, the newspaper *Qanun* (Law) from 1890 on. (See Chapter 5) From an insider working for reform, he became an outsider advocating revolution, ' from a mild liberal seeking the protection of the Shah against the *ulama* into an outspoken radical allying with the *ulama* against the Shah. . .'[Abrahamiam, 67] He sought to embody contemporary philosophies into forms acceptable to traditional Iran, blaming political despotism and cultural insularity for Iran's backwardness.

Although the influence of both Jamalled-Din and Malkom Khan on the growing Iranian intelligentsia was incalculable, much also was derived from western ideas and values that permeated the country through increased contact, travel, dissemination of newspapers and books by exiled Iranians, and students studying in Europe. New and more progressive schools had been established, and there was an increasing awareness in Iran of the political and social currents in the west associated with liberal-democratic ideas and values. Furthermore, there was increasing evidence that imperialism, particularly that of England, was increasingly under strain, as evidenced by the Egyptian revolt of the early 1880's and the spirited resistance, although ultimately unavailing, of the Boers in the South African war of 1899-1901.

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904- 1905 had seen the humiliation of the Tsarist power, which had encroached ceaselessly into Iran, by a increasingly influential Asian power. Although the regime had prevailed in the Russian revolution of 1905, its obvious discomfiture by a disparate revolutionary movement had provided a demonstrable model for the spirit of revolution in Iran. A combination of philosophy, journalism,

western influences, and the discomfiture of colonial powers all formed part of the Iranian awakening and its ultimate expression in the Constitutional Revolution. This account turns now to the direct action factor in the constitutional revolutionary period.

3.7.1 The Preparatory Period—The Tobacco Concession

The concessions awarded by the administration during the 1870's and 1890's were eventually cumulative in their impact, an assembly of smaller concessions not overwhelming individually but building into a formidable structure with a substantial influence on Iranian economic and social development. This period of gradualism terminated abruptly with the resurgence of the gigantic concession, its incidence comparable in scale to the Reuter concession of 1872, although rather more concentrated in overall dimensions. Furthermore, the infamous Tobacco Concession was awarded at the same time as a handful of much smaller concessions, including an extension of de Reuter's banking and mining arrangements, a lottery concession to an English company, and railway concessions to Russia. According to Browne, the misfortunes of Iran, which overshadowed the last six years of the Shah's reign, and ultimately its destruction, dated from the announcement of the Tobacco Concession to the British on March 8, 1890. [1910, 32]

The Tobacco Concession was concocted during the Shah's visit to Europe in 1889. According to Browne, these regular peregrinations had done no particular harm, although they were costly and had not brought any benefits to his subjects: 'But this was a year of evil. . .' [31] The concessionaire, Mr G. F. Talbot, was granted full control over the production, sale, and export of all tobacco in Iran for 50 years, paying in return for his monopoly an annual rent of £15,000, a quarter of the annual profits, and a five percent dividend on capital. Even with the recoupment by the Iranian Government, it was an extraordinarily lucrative deal with a flourishing export market and captive domestic market in a nation of almost universal tobacco smoking, irrespective of rank, class or gender.

In many respects, the deal was similar to an earlier arrangement for British handling of Turkish tobacco through the Turkish Regie, established in 1884. However, the annual rent paid to Turkey was more than 40 times the £15,000 paid to Iran, and the arrangement was to last only 30 years and not 50 years. Not surprisingly, the British entrepreneurs considered the Iranian arrangement to be much more profitable, and looked forward to huge profits. With regard to Iranian consumers it was argued that they would benefit by the arrangement because it would cut out the middle men and a number of internal duties.

The British entrepreneurs blamed the Iranian merchants for over-charging and also for diluting the quality of the product. In particular, they pointed to lower charges for the Iranian *tambakou,* a tobacco product designed to be smoked through water-cooled earthenware pipes. Talbot argued that the population would be a true partisan of the British *Regie* because they would buy cheaper, and without admixture. The growers, however, would be most favoured because the merchants did them a grave disservice by depreciating their goods, and colluding to place orders at lower prices and payable over long terms. The *Regie,* however, would encourage the production of the better qualities of tobacco by paying remunerative prices, and by making advances. Talbot envisaged a 'very brilliant future' for the venture, which would realise large profits from the very beginning for everyone except the hapless merchants. Browne, who discussed the concession with the British entrepreneurs, commented acidulously on the proposal:

> Thus everyone was to be happy and pleased, and to derive a profit from the beneficent Corporation (which itself was to be rewarded by a conscious sense of rectitude and a profit of anything over 50 percent on its capital) except the wicked Persian tobacco vendors, who, "with the small capital they possess," were apparently regarded as unworthy of serious consideration. [Browne, 35]

In 1891, however, when the time came to implement the concession, it soon emerged that the deal had outraged patriotic and religious sensibilities across Iran. In the absence of an independent and public-spirited domestic press, it took time for popular

awareness of the concession to percolate through the traditional channels. As Browne observes, as soon as it was realised, it was bitterly and violently resented throughout the length and breadth of the land. Both the clergy and populace were profoundly offended that the passage of their tobacco through the hands of Christian infidels who profaned what they touched should even be contemplated. Through the year, there was constant turmoil through the country expressed with a fervour that was virtually revolutionary. Attempts were made by the Government to procure assistance from the Russians who refused to intervene, enjoying the discomfiture of the traditional rival and working to overturn the concession.

The crucial step came in December 1891 when the senior clergy applied a *fatwa* enjoining the people to complete abstinence from tobacco until the concession was withdrawn. This was a master-stroke which rendered the concession worthless without any need for popular rebellion. Tobacco merchants closed their shops, pipes were abandoned, and the people stopped smoking. On the eve of Christmas, placards were pasted on walls threatening foreigners with death unless the concession was rescinded within 48 hours. The Shah sought to quell popular feeling by bidding the principal religious leader involved to either set an example by smoking or leave the country. Troops fired on angry crowds around the Shah's palace and several people were killed. On January 26, 1892 the public crier announced in the streets that the religious embargo on smoking had been withdrawn, effectively heralding that the tobacco concession was also at an end. The announcement was received with universal joy and the employees of the unlamented Imperial Tobacco Corporation withdrew, the company receiving a handsome compensation of £500,000 for its troubles. [Browne, 52-54]

The consequences of the Tobacco Concession fiasco were immeasurable. It gave Russia an inestimable tactical advantage in the distributional of concessions within Iran, at least until the early years of the 20th Century. It asserted the primacy of the religious leaders and the importance of traditional communications systems. (See chapter 4). It also, however, provided opportunities for an Iranian exile press. (See Chapter 5)

Furthermore, it underpinned the growing importance of the merchant class who stood to lose considerably, both in prestige and wealth from the introduction of a concessionary scheme which significantly eroded their role in the domestic economy. It was also a notable political victory for the people as a whole, not only the groups already influential:

> Only one great and good thing came out of this wretched business. The [Iranian] people, led by their spiritual guides, and led, moreover, with wonderful wisdom and self-restraint, had shown that there was a limit to what they would endure, that they were not the spiritless creatures which they had been supposed to be, and that henceforth they would have to be reckoned with. From that time especially, as I believe, dates the national awakening of which we are still watching the development. [Browne 1910, 57]

(Browne's history was published in 1910, when the Constitutional Revolution was nearing its end.)

3.8 Decline of the Qajars

For Nasseru'd-Din Shah, and indeed for the Qajar dynasty, the overthrow of the Tobacco Concession was a devastating blow. In April 1896, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of his ascent of the throne, the ageing Shah was shot dead by an assassin during a visit to a *mosque* outside Tehran. His assassin was apparently motivated by a combination of religious motives and personal grievances arising from suffering and persecution he had endured because of the regime. He also said he had been inspired by the ideals and writings of Jamalled-Din about the unification of the Mohammadan peoples and restoration of the ancient powers and glory of Islam. [Browne, 97]

Muzaffaru'd Din Shah who became Shah in June 1896 was of a milder temperament than his father, but was lacking initiative and self-reliance. In Browne's view he 'suffered rather than caused the government of Persia to grow steadily worse, while refusing, or at least omitting, to follow those methods of repression whereby his father had to a considerable extent held in check overt manifestations of the discontent which was universally prevalent.' [1910, 101] His demands on the public purse were no less

remorseless, and it seems that a principal cause may have been personal vices. According to Milani, the Shah's private perversions, 'and they were many, preoccupied him throughout his reign. [Milani 1975, 120]

It has been noted earlier that the chief beneficiary of the Tobacco Concession fiasco was the Russians. Apart from the growth and influence of their concessions, the Russians already exerted powerful leverage on the Shah and the Government through their crucial military role within Iran. In 1876, a Cossack Brigade had been established under Russian officers, the only-modern, well-paid and well-equipped military unit within Iran. This provided the necessary military power to support their concessions and implement their expansionist policies. Furthermore, it gave them a potent tool to place at the disposal of the Shah if simmering popular discontent boiled over into revolution. In the period between the Tobacco Movement (1890-91) and the start of the Constitutional Revolution, increased colonial influences again surged through Iran, this time favouring the Russians. [Milani, 120]

Russian influence solidified further after a 1903 agreement granted even more favourable economic terms, provoking serious popular opposition, particularly among the merchants. The newly increased tariffs levied upon Iranian commodities by the Belgian comptrollers aggravated popular grievances. The mood of unrest was intensified by Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah's recurrent expensive trips abroad, and talk of yet another loan to pay for yet another trip was received with strong opposition in the cities of Iran.

Despite the widespread popular loathing of the Belgians Russia had come to be increasingly identified as the most serious obstacle to reforms in Iran. Aligning themselves with the most reactionary elements of the Qajar bureaucracy, and backed by the strength of the Cossack Brigade, the Russians succeeded in creating an image of the Russian Empire as invincible and omnipotent. This predominant image had become

an element of social control in that it implied the futility of any efforts to undermine Russian influence.

With the British discredited after the Tobacco Concession, circumstances favoured the Russians who negotiated a huge loan of £500,000 to Iran, virtually becoming its sole creditor and further embarrassing the British. Furthermore, an arrangement was negotiated handing over the administration of all the customs houses to Belgian control, the Belgians being the allies, in popular parlance the 'jackals', of the Russians. This gave considerable power to the insidious M. Naus, a Belgian who held several functions: Director of Customs, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, High Treasurer, Head of the Passport Department, and Member of the Supreme Council of State. Arbitrary and tyrannical, Naus was hated by the Iranians who were also affronted when a photograph captured him dressed as an Iranian religious leader.

On the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, Iran's social, political and economic systems had become meshed into the international capitalist system in a manner that facilitated the semi-colonialisation of the country. According to Turner:

> This process had a double effect on the process of development. It had a peculiar impact on the economy, and to some extent dissolved the feudal structure through the exchange relation. But also, it created unfavourable conditions for the structural transformation necessary for capitalist development. On the one hand, the state apparatus' dependency on Russia and Britain inhibited any autonomous act of the so-called centralised state to perform economic changes in the line of capitalist development. [1980, 85]

Despite their rivalries, England and Russia exerted a common influence in keeping Iran in political, economic and technological backwardness. Three factors saved Iran from total colonialisation: public resistance; national and religious ideas; and rivalry between the super-powers. Etehadieh has clearly stated the impact of these factors:

> "...the gambling and lottery concessions that were granted to the British were cancelled due to opposition from the public and religious clerics. Furthermore, Tobacco rebellions forced the government to disregard another commercial contact with British businessmen. It cost the government £500,000 pounds and a concession to the people indicates that most of the participants in the rebellion were from the middle class,

thus stressing the national bourgeois character of the opposition". [1961, 59]

3.9 Constitutional Revolution—The Early Period

The Constitutional Revolution began with a series of relatively small incidents early in December, 1905 which aggravated the mood of general discontent. Apart from the Naus photograph, there was anger over oppressive rule in a number of centres, including gunshots fired at a crowd of people, the bastinadoing of two *ulama* and, most importantly, the bastinadoing of a group of merchants in Tehran for increasing the price of sugar. The Tehran incident had been sanctioned by the Aynud Dowleh, the Shah's Chief Minister The *bazaars* closed in protest and there was a further incident in Tehran when men armed with sticks expelled a group of merchants from the *Royal Mosque* where they had taken *bast*.

Following this incident, which had also been sanctioned by the Shah's minister, a group of some 2,000 merchants, *ulama,* and students took *bast* at a shrine outside of Tehran. This incident was known as the 'lesser exodus'. After lengthy negotiations with the Shah and his court, the fugitives returned in mid-January 1906 after the Shah gave a signed promise which, as signification, was read in the *mosque* on the following day. Copies were also photographed and sent around the country. The rescript promised the creation of a House of Justice to include representatives of clergy, merchants and landed proprietors and presided over by the Shah, equality of all citizens before the law, the dismissal of the objectionable Chief Ministers, and other popular demands as formulated by the *ulama*. There was no mention of either a constitution or a national assembly. There was popular rejoicing, Tehran was illuminated and, according to Browne, the popular cry, 'Long live the Persian Nation", was heard for the first time. [1910, 312]

By April 1906, however, there was no sign of the agreed reforms and the *ulama* of Tehran petitioned the Shah to enforce them. (The petition was also published in the

official Journal or Gazette.) Furthermore, the popular demands escalated with calls for a Constitution and a National Assembly *(Majlis)*. Throughout subsequent Iranian history, the *Majlis* has remained the symbol of constitutionalism. The petition and representations were ignored and the streets of the capital deteriorated with curfews and a strong presence of soldiers, including members of the Cossack Brigade.

The Shah was denounced in the *minbar* and in the *bazaars*, particularly by the *bazaari*, the artisans and humbler workers of the market place. Secret societies or *Anjomans* spreading revolutionary ideas multiplied, supplemented by a National Library dedicated to educating the people in patriotism. In June a number of popular leaders were exiled. Popular resistance prevented soldiers from removing one of them, although a student leading the rescue was shot dead by an officer. There were further disturbances and soldiers fired on the crowd, killing 15 persons. A large group led by *ulama* took *bast* in a *mosque*, obtaining after four days the Shah's approval to withdraw to the holy city of Qum. A vast concourse of people participated in this 'Greater Exodus', one observer describing the main road between Tehran and Qum as resembling the street of a town. [Browne 1910, 118] When the chief minister, Aynud-Dowleh ordered *bazaars* and shops to be re-opened by force, the British legation permitted merchants and their supporters to take *bast* in its summer legation.

After three days, some 5,000 people had assembled at the Legation, increasing daily to a peak of about 14,000. They demanded as the price of their return the dismissal of the brutal Aynud Dowleh, promulgation of a Code of Laws, and the recall of ecclesiastical leaders. Faced with such massive resistance, the Shah gave way, bowing to the national outpouring of feeling, signing a Royal Proclamation enacting the establishment of a *Majlis* to 'carry out the requisite deliberations and investigations on all necessary subjects connected with important affairs of the State and Empire'. [Milani, 131] So low in repute were the Shah and his administration that when the proclamation was first forwarded to the protesters in the British Legation, they refused to sanction it. The verification and assurances of the British *charge d'affaires* was necessary before they

would accept the promises of the Royal Proclamation. Apart from the election of a *Majlis*, other pledges include 'blood money' to relatives of those killed, the return of the exiled religious leaders, and establishment of Courts of Justice.

3.9.1 The First Constitutional Period

The solemn official opening of the new House of Parliament in the presence of leading formally inaugurated the First Constitutional period. A 'Committee of Notables' was chosen to write the laws regulating the elections to the *Majlis*, and on September 9, 1906 the election codes were issued. These comprised 33 articles of which articles 1 and 2 were the most significant because they set out the rules for selecting the electors:

> Article 1. The electors of the nation in the well-protected realms of Persia in the provinces and the Departments shall be of the following classes: (i) Princes and the Qajar tribe: (ii) Doctors of Divinity and students: (iii) Nobles and Notables: (iv) Merchants: (v) Landed proprietors and peasants: (vi) trade-guilds.

> Article 2. The elector shall possess the following qualifications: (i) their age must not fall short of 25 years: (ii) they must be Persian subjects: (iii) they must be known in the locality: (iv) the landed proprietors and peasants amongst them must possess property of the value of at least one thousand *tumans*: (v) the merchants amongst them must have a definite office and business: (vi) the members of trade-guilds amongst them must belong to a recognised guild, must be engaged in a definite craft or trade, and must be in possession of a shop of which the rent corresponds with the average rents of the locality. [The Electoral Law of September 9, 1906, translated by Browne 1909, 35-56, Cited Milani, 132]

The franchise conveyed by the electoral laws was a limited one. Of abut 20 million people in Iran at the time, only about 120,000 were eligible to vote. Although 'equality" had been debated with approval in the various ideological discussions in the preparatory period before the revolution broke out, it was applied only nominally in practice. It was defined and applied to include relative equality only within specific circles. Consequently, the class representation in the *Majlis* was also restrictive and inequitable as Table 3.1 indicates. Furthermore, 60 of the 150 delegates came from Tehran, a distortion of national representation.

According to statistics (See Table 3.1) from the Plan and Budget Organisation, in the first session of the *Majlis*, the political representation of various social classes is set out in Table 3.1. [Parsa 1974, 279-280]

Table 3.1

Class Composition of the First *Majlis*

Classes	Percent
Landowners	23.3
Merchants and Guildsmen	30
Clergy	13.5
State officials	12.4
Non-State officials	7.4
Others	12.9

*Source: The Plan and Budget Organisation, Parsa 1974, 279-80

The *Majlis* met for the first time on October 7, 1906. Its initial deliberations focussed on two important matters: enactment of a Fundamental Law and the creation of a National Bank. [Browne 1910, 18] The Bank question demonstrated the increasing political importance and influence of the rising bourgeoisie class, to whose interests the proposal was directed rather than to overall economic benefit. In a sense, the establishment of the bank was also a slap in the face for the rival colonial powers who had dominated hitherto the finances of Iran. With the establishment of the bank dependent on the subscription of a certain level of capital, it was expected that the merchants and other bourgeoisie elements would subsidise the bank's creation through the power base they

had acquired through their enthusiastic participation in the struggle for the Constitution

and the *Majlis*:

> A hundred persons subscribed 5,000 *tumans* each, while some gave yet
> larger sums, up to 30,000 *tumans*. The poor also contributed: Students
> sold their books and women their ornaments to support the Bank. A
> million *tumans* was subscribed in Tehran (sic) alone, while Tabriz
> promised another million. [Browne 1910, 19]

The *ulama* urged all Muslims to contribute as much as possible, distributing a leaflet to

that effect among the faithful. Despite the enthusiastic subscriptions, whether expedient

or patriotic, the total fell below the two million tumans loan sought by the Shah to

procure his approval of the Bank. The English and Russian bankers also worked to

block any new Bank of Iran by restricting credit and reducing the money supply. The

defeat of the proposed bank law ensured the continued dominance of the Iranian

economy by the two colonial banks.

The success of the Constitutional Revolution was also threatened by tensions between

the participants. The working men and women in the cities and the peasants had

conceived constitutionalism as a remedy to the injustices they had long endured: feudal

exploitation, barbaric feudal laws, security from government agents and tax collectors.

The *Ulama* perceived it as producing improved income provisions and a stricter

observance of Islamic precepts. [N. Kermanai, cited Milani, 134] Despite some popular

disillusionment, the revolutionary spirit remained strong and the power of the

constitutionalists was increasing. The *Majlis* opened on October 76, 1906 and one of

its early acts was the pointed rejection of a joint Anglo-Russian loan of £400,000:

> This important decision at once made it clear that the new Parliament had
> no intention of being a mere tool in the hands of the Shah and the Court
> Party and that it was thoroughly alive to the danger of foreign
> intervention, and the Absolute necessity of checking the foreign influences
> which had grown with such appalling rapidity during the past 17 or 18
> years (before 1906). [Browne 1910, 125]

On December 30 1906, the Shah ratified the fundamental laws and the form of the

Iranian Revolution was fixed and defined. He also signed a separate document

promising not to dissolve the existing Parliament for at least two years. It was the last

significant act of Muzaffaru'd Din Shah who had been increasingly ill for some time and died on January 8, 1907. It seems that stern reminders from the clergy that he was about to meet his God may have induced the Shah to sign the Constitution.

His successor, Mohammad Ali Shah adopted an intransigent attitude to the *Majlis* from the beginning, declining to invite its members to his coronation. According to Browne the new Shah had looked forward to exercising the same autocratic and irresponsible powers as his forbears and resented the limitations imposed by the Constitution which the *Majlis* was determined to enforce. [1910 134] The accession of Mohammad Ali Shah, however, gave new heart to the opponents of the Constitutional Revolution and to the Russians, with whom the new Shah was closely linked. The *Majlis* had a notable coup when it compelled the Shah to dismiss Naus as chief of the customs, and began much other constructive work. An ominous sign, however, was the signing of an agreement between Britain and Russia effectively dividing Iran into spheres of influence:

> Their hitherto struggle for the extension of their hegemonic spheres was to give place to their co-operation in consolidating their positions in their respective spheres of influence. The *de facto* division of Iran into spheres of influence was to receive the officiality of a treaty. More significantly the implications of the treaty were the eventual defeat of the Constitutional Revolution with the intervention of foreign troops. In Mohammad Ali Shah, who had come to power shortly after the Constitutional proclamation, they found a staunch anti-constitutionalist, who had long since proved his [unquestioned loyalty] to the Russians. [Milani, 134-5]

The anti-constitutionalists were able to exploit the aggravated tensions within the constitutional movement by equating constitutionalism with 'anti-Islamic' policies. The constitutionalists retaliated by forming more secret societies(*Anjomans*) which organised armed resistance and aroused the peasantry.

3.9.2 The Role of the *Anjomans*

The role of the *anjoman* or secret societies in Iran has been touched on previously in the context of the late 19th Century. They now assumed a crucial role at an important point in the unfurling saga of the Constitutional Revolution. In the period following the

assassination of Nasseru'd-Din Shah in 1896, the *anjoman*s had been primarily intellectual societies, the standard-bearers of bourgeois ideology. Lambton observes that the *anjomans* "... seem to have regarded their task as being merely to awaken the people to the evils of the despotism and the benefits of freedom, and to convince them that progress was to be achieved by means of new learning'. [1970, 50] Because of the despotic nature of the regime, they could not emerge as genuine political parties but had to operate in an unobtrusive, often clandestine, manner. The *anjomans* of the first constitutional period played a significant role in the Revolution primarily because they were an organisational expression of the popular mass movement in the cities.

There were two kinds of *anjomans*: official *anjomans*, and unofficial *anjomans*. The official *anjomans*, as Browne called them, were originally formed to supervise the elections but then refused to disband and assumed substantial responsibilities in the conduct of the public affairs of their cities. There could only be one such *anjoman* in each city or town. The most famous among these *anjomans* was the *Anjoman-e Melli* or (Anjomane-Ayalati) in Tabriz, which forms the basis of the following account of the *anjomans'* participation.

After the completion of the elections in October 1906, Mohammad Ali Mirza, then the Crown Prince, requested the disbandment of the *anjomans*. Most members of the *Anjomans* became apprehensive and were generally ready to obey the order. The radical wing of the opposition in Tabriz, however, launched an effective public agitation which brought the city to the verge of revolt and forced Mohammad Ali Mirza to rescind his order and also to grant the *Anjoman-e Melli* official status. Behind the offensive was the newly formed *Markaz-e Ghibi* (Secret Centre) whose members were in contact with the circles of Iranian Social Democrates in Baku and other Caucasian towns. Throughout this period and in the subsequent armed resistance in Tabriz the *Markaz-e Ghibi* played an important role in organising the *bazaaris* and merchants. (See Chapter 4.)

From press accounts, it appears that the *anjoman* was trusted by the people who brought to it all sorts of complaints and expected it to resolve their problems. At the beginning, a committee consisting of the *anjoman* secretary, three merchants and two craftsmen was formed to attend to the people's complaints. In February 1907, however, discussions were held in the *anjoman* for the formation of a Court of Justice); in effect, the *Anjoman* taking over the judicial responsibilities of the government.

That the people brought their complaints to the *Anjoman* and not to the Crown Prince showed that the institution was trusted by the people. This, however, did not prevent the people from vigorously objecting to what they considered the *anjoman's* shortcomings, and holding it responsible for the lack of tangible improvements. For example, on November 25, 1906, there was a great commotion around the *anjoman* in Tabriz with people objecting, among other things, to the insecurity in the countryside resulting from tribal lawlessness, and demanding more vigorous action. The next day the *bazaars* were completely closed and everyone assembled around the *anjoman*. It was with great difficulty and after a lot of promises from the *anjoman* that the *bazaar* and merchants reluctantly agreed to reopen their shops. [Afshari 1981, 75]

The *bazaaris* and merchants were probably the only organised groups who consistently pressured the *anjoman* for better organisation and action. (See Chapter 4) In fact, they had their own *Anjoman-e Asnaf* (Merchants Guild) which met separately and established a working relationship with the official *anjoman*. At one point the *Asnaf's* deputies demanded that the minutes of the *Anjoman's* discussions be 'published in the *Ruznameh-Meili* (National Newspaper), so that people would become aware of every deputy's views. The following incident indicates the political strength and active involvement of the *Asnaf* (Guilds) in the constitutional movement in Tabriz.

In late December 1906, the *Asnaf's* deputies met and, following a long discussion, presented a note to the *anjoman* in which they tried to clarify their relationship with that

body. They informed the *anjoman* that from then on anything that was not signed by all the *Asnaf's* deputies should not be considered as the opinion of the *Asnaf*, and asked the *anjoman* to answer the *Asnaf's* correspondence only in writing. They went on to demand that any member of the *anjoman* accused of a treasonable act should not be dismissed until his case was referred to the *Asnaf's* deputies who would take two days to investigate the charges and announce their opinion. Increasingly, the *Anjoman-e-Melli* in Tabriz became a government within the government, and its anti-feudal political line left little doubt as to whose government it was. [Afshari 1981, 77]

The second kind of *anjomans* that appeared in different cities after the granting of constitutional rule were political associations of people with similar political views and/or common ethnic or cultural backgrounds. Browne called them "*unofficial Anjomans*":

> They played a great part in the history of this period, especially on the occasions of the two coups detat and constituted the back-bone as it were of the popular party. And again, after the disaster of June 23, 1908, it was they, when the [Majlis] was no more, who organised the national resistance. [1910, 245]

With the advent of relative political freedom, people began grouping together in *anjomans*. For examples, the Tehrani *bazaaris* and merchants organised themselves in a political-professional *anjoman*, as did the inhabitants of different quarters of the city. In a short period of time some 200 *anjomans* came into existence in Tehran alone, although only a few of them were large enough to have a significant political impact on the course of the Revolution.

In general, in the commercial centres of the country where the *bazaar* and merchants were relatively strong and new ideas had made sufficient impact, the popular *anjomans* exhibited characteristics which did not, on the whole, negate the principles of the Constitutional Revolution. Here, the organisational bonds of the *bazaaris* and merchants were strong enough to overcome, to a certain degree, the tribal-feudal relationships which still existed in the society at large. Afshari argues:

> The great revolutionary potential that existed in the popular *Anjomans* remained, for the most part, unrealised. The fact remains, however, that for the first time the Iranians were trying, on a relatively large scale, to overcome the long ingrained superstitious belief that the business of the government was the hereditary domain of the tribal-feudal elements. [1981, 224]

In the second half of 1907 and the first part of 1908, the British diplomatic correspondence conveyed the belief that it was the *anjomans* who really ruled the country. It was stated that "...the moral authority of the old regime has been destroyed by the local *Anjoman*". [Parliamentary Papers 1909, 100] Of course, Mohhamad Ali-Shah's fears of the political-military activities of the *anjomans* were real and he repeatedly expressed his apprehension to the British in Tehran. Available evidence suggests that Mohammad Ali Shah was using a tactic which was aimed at destroying the *anjomans*, this being the first and necessary step towards making the *Majlis* subservient to the Palace. He professed to the British agents that '...he was himself the only true constitutionalist in Persia,' and that his opposition was not directed against constitutional rule but against 'irresponsible' *anjomans*. [British Parliamentary Papers, 101]

Considerable numbers of the Qajar princes and reactionary courtiers changed their attitudes to the revolution following the assassination of the Amin'us -Soltan, for many years a senior minister, by a *sarraf* (a bazaari banker). Overnight they became the supporters of the *Majlis* and strongly warned the Shah against further anti-constitutional activities. They had felt the danger involved in the intervention of the masses at the political level of the country, so all their efforts were directed at the removal of that danger. Under the existing conditions the only course available to them was to co-operate with the *Majlis* over whom they could at least have some measure of control. According to Tafreshi :

> The Mohammad-Ali-Shah immediately refused to pay all those who were in the Palace's service, blaming the *Majlis* for the cut in his budget. Then a palace-induced political agitation was launched among those affected, and the common people whose names were struck out from the pension list were encouraged to make their complaints as noisy as possible. [1973, 50]

The Shah was also shaken by the assassination and the mass demonstrations. He sought conciliation with the *Majlis*, vowing to respect the Constitution and ratifying the Supplementary Fundamental Laws that he had sought to resist. The royalist position, however, gradually improved as the constitutionalists lost support among the upper and lower classes, and the Liberals pressed for additional reforms.

Abrahamian [1969, 141] has shown that the influence of the conservative *ulama* and the negligent attitude of the *Majlis* towards the urban poor turned this most unfortunate group in Tehran against the Revolution. People such as dyers, carpet-weavers, brick-layers, camel-drivers, muleteers, pedlars, bath-attendants, colliers, and labourers began to participate in anti-constitutionalist demonstrations:

> In the early stages of the revolution, the rebels had successfully attracted the poor to their side by championing the demand for cheaper bread, and persuasively arguing that the government was to blame for the high food prices. [Tafreshi, 142]

Having found no tangible improvements in their living conditions, the urban paupers became receptive to the reactionary agitation, especially when by participating in demonstrations, they received free meals and some money widely believed to have originated from the palace. [Kermani 1965, 2: 99] Events were moving quickly towards a confrontation as this unruly crowd occupied (under the protection of government troops) the main square in Tehran and went wild, killing two passers-by suspected of constitutional inclinations. Tents were erected in the square and clubs were supplied to the crowd. [1965, 76-77]

Meanwhile, to protect the National Assembly, the members of *anjomans* armed themselves and assembled in the square in front of the *Majlis* buildings near the conservative crowd. For a few days neither side made any move against the others, but at the eleventh hour, the Mohammad-Ali-Shah lost his nerve and backed off from a confrontation by ordering his ruffians to clear the Square. This was the 'Abortive Coup detat' of December 1907. From that moment until June 23, 1908 (at which time the Shah's second coup d'etat succeeded) tensions escalated between the Palace and the

constitutional camp. The *anjoman* and the nationalist press intensified their struggle against the Shah. Rumors which greatly alarmed the *anjomans*, were circulating about the Shah's purchase of rifles and his attempt at organising his retainers from Varamin, a rural district near Tehran. [Kermani 1965, 109]

For the second coup detat, the Shah was more determined and better organised, mainly because of the active involvement of the Russians in the planning and execution of the attack on the *Majlis* and the *Anjomans*. Colonel Liakhoff, the commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, was given total authority in directing the operation. On June 3, the Shah, escorted by the Cossack Brigade, left his palace and resided in his garden just outside Tehran, remaining there with his forces until the destruction of the *Majlis* was completed. The Shah proclaimed martial law and demanded the expulsion of popular leaders, control of the press, and disarmament of national volunteers.

On the constitutional side, the bazaar and merchants resorted to a general strike which lasted for the duration of the confrontation; the *anjomans'* members began arming themselves and assembled around the *Majlis* building. It was reported that the *anjomans* were very active and were 'drilling men and preparing arms'. The *Majlis* however, was vacillating between rhetoric and a search for a compromise solution. On June 12, the Shah demanded the disarmament of the *anjomans'* members and the expulsion of eight revolutionaries who were popular among the craftsmen and merchants. On June 23, Colonel Liakhoff and other Russian officers led a frontal attack on the *Majlis* building which was defended by the *Anjomans'* armed volunteers. The Persian Cossacks' artillery bombarded the *Majlis* building, and despite the heroic resistance of the defenders, Liakhoff carried the day and, in the words of the Times' correspondent, a 'Muscovite reign' was inaugurated in Tehran. The incident was known as the second coup d'etat or *reactionary triumph*. Liakhoff was appointed Governor of Tehran and bloody reprisals were exacted. Tafreshi argues that the relatively easy victory of the Shah's forces can be explained by at least two reasons:

> One was the *Majlis'* vacillation and its inability to provide a resolute leadership for the resistance. It, had also caused great vexation among the armed volunteers when the deputies tried to disarm them in compliance with the Shah's request. Had a unified military command existed, the movement would not have collapsed that easily. The second reason was that the defenders were supposed to fight the battle without shooting at the commanders of their enemies". [1973, 98]

The British Charge d'Affairs confirmed to his Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, that the Russian officers who presented easy targets to the *Majlis* forces were not fired upon because the constitutionalists feared direct Russian intervention. [Tafreshi, 99]

3.9.3 Civil War

Although the Shah and his supporters had triumphed in Tehran, strong support for the Constitution emerged in the provinces with *ulama* denouncing the Shah:

> Armed volunteers arose in defence of the revolution, first in Tabriz, later in Isfahan and Rasht, and eventually in most other cities, including Tehran. In the past, the capital had determined the course of events in the provinces. Now the provinces determined the course of events in the capital. [Abrahamian 1982, 97]

With provinces in revolt and two rebel armies converging on Tehran, the Shah's position became increasingly untenable. Foreign banks refused further support for military forces, and there were strikes in the *bazaars*. The constitutionalists within Tehran re-organised and opened the city gates for their invading armies from the provinces. Liakhoff and the Cossack Brigade surrendered. The Shah took refuge in the Russian Embassy, a Grand Assembly of 500 constitutional supporters was formed and deposed the Shah who abdicated in favour of his 12-year-old son Ahmad. A new electoral act was ratified and the way cleared for the calling of the Second *Majlis*. According to Abrahamiam, the revolution had finally secured the constitution. [101] Thus ended the period known as the "Lesser Tyranny" to be followed by the Second Constitutional Period.

3.9.4 The Second Constitutional Period

The events of the Second constitutional period, which began with the accession of Sultan Ahmad Shah and ended with the closure of the Second *Majlis* are too complex to summarise even baldly here. Browne's chronology for this period ranges over 18 pages of tightly-packed detail. Essentially, the *Majlis* and the Constitutionalists attempted further social and electoral reform, but grew progressively weaker in the face of internal disruption and an increasingly aggressive Russian intervention. These processes culminated in the forcible closure of the *Majlis* by the Government under threat of Russian occupation in December 1911, and the brutal suppression of constitutionalist forces by Russia at Tabriz in the early months of 1912. Effectively, the Constitutional Revolution ended with the dissolution of the *Majlis* under duress in December 1911.

3.10 Conclusion

According to Milani's summary, heroism in the face of barbarity abounded in the period between 1905 and the final defeat of the constitutionalists in 1911-12:

> While part of the middle-class leadership and part of the ulama had compromised with colonial powers and the court—once they had been insured their profits—the heroic struggles of the many in the face of the 'reign of terror' unleashed by constitutionalists continued. . .the same figures who had been the beneficiaries of the ancient regime became the peers of the new "constitutional' government. It was their leadership that led to the further pauperisation of the economy and a new stage of increased colonial activities in Iran. [1975-137]

In a gloomy summary of Iranian society on the eve of World War I, Miroshnikov concluded that the Revolution had not altered the feudal structure of the prevalent modes of production. Political power remained in the hands of feudal landowners succeeding one another in short-lived ministries. The state was headed by the last of the Qajars, the juvenile weakling, Sultan Ahmad Shah. The khans of the nomadic tribes and feudal lords backed by paramilitary forces ruled much of the country. Iran endured as a semi-colony which was formally independent but was, in fact, entangled by the meshes of financial and political dependence. [1964, 24-25]

The failure of the Constitutional Revolution provided the basis for the modern dictatorship of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), and its ultimate overthrow by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Politically, the failure of the Constitutional Revolution loomed larger than its achievements, having a distinctive impact upon Iranian political history. The Revolution left a legacy that has continued to inspire those who have followed the path marked by the revolutionaries of 1906-11. Anyone familiar with the contents and the forms of the political Revolution in Iran of 1978-79 can recognise the strong influence of this legacy.

The fact that the Constitutional Revolution failed to achieve its aims is stamped indelibly in the historiography of the Revolution. The topic of failure is a major theme, marked by indignation and bitterness in contemporary historical writings. Almost all tend to blame the conspiracy of the Qajar dynasty against constitutional rule, a conspiracy that succeeded in destroying the Revolution from within. For example, Malekzadeh, a major Iranian historian of the Revolution wrote:

> "...during the forty years since the Revolution the same absolutist notables who ruled the people in the period of absolutism were in charge of the country's affairs and monopolised all important government posts. Even the notorious absolutists...who were unwavering enemies of the Constitutional rule and shed the blood of thousands of the Constitutionalists, successively ruled the people as the head of the Constitutional government" [1951, 225]

Although the Constitutional Revolution was largely a failure in procuring enduringly effective constitutional, political and social change in Iran, it was a remarkable landmark in Iranian history. That the Constitutional Revolution had brought a temporary halt to Iran's long history of despotism and dependence was due to many factors, not least the effectiveness of traditional communication systems and the growth of an increasingly vigorous press. The contributions of both traditional and rudimentary mass communications systems are analysed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION—TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a historical analysis of the role of the *bazaar* as a political

channel during the revolution of 1906. Some significant components of the traditional

religious communication channels, such as *mosque* (masjid) and *pulpit* (minbar) are

also discussed. Because there was a strong alliance between the *ulama* and *bazaaris*

during the revolutionary period, the last part of this chapter will attempt to show that

the Shi'i revolutionary discourse and the *ulama* shaped the actions of the *bazaaris* in a

revolutionary direction.

From the early 19th century until the Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the

institutional bazaar in Iran was constantly in conflict with the various political regimes

in power. The only period in which the *bazaar* did not openly oppose the government

was under the Prime Ministership of Mohammad-Mosaddeq, (1951-53). Even then,

as Mozaffari points out, it retained its hostility to the Shah. [1991, 377] The *bazaar*

has traditionally been a significant economic-political channel, a place of work and

commerce with differentiated structures, a distinctive socio-economic environment and

functional ethnic, cultural and professional systems. [Mozaffari 1991, 31]

The *bazaar* played an important role in many protests and revolutionary movements of

the 19th and 20th centuries. Traditionally the *bazaar* embraced the largest part of the

commercial sector, trade and financial networks. The scope of the term *bazaaris* has

been defined by Floor:

> [It is] applied only to those socio-political classes such as guilds *(Asnaf)*,
> craftsmen *(Pishehvaran)*, small shopkeepers *(Kasabeh)*, wholesalers
> *(Bunakdaran)*, exchange agents *(Sarrafan)*, brokers *(Dallalan)*, and retail
> merchants (Furushandehgan), as well as a certain number of large
> businessmen *(Tujjar)* who remained a part of the traditional Bazaari
> system". [Floor 1976, 126]

One of the visible expressions and symbols of powerful group in all Iranian towns is the bazaar. The *bazaar* comprises what could be called the Iranian bourgeois of the wealthy merchants, the shopkeepers, and craftsmen.The *bazaar* designates first location and buildings, then what is housed there: the workshops where wares are produced, the shops where local and imported merchandise is sold, the offices of big merchants who dominate the local market, and the import and the export business. There are also the bankers and money-lenders. The *bazaar* is a comprehensive industrial centre, a world complete in itself, a vibrant focal point for the life of town and region.

Apart from its importance as a commercial and social centre, the *bazaar* has also been crucial to the press both as a market-place and as a source of news. It is where all newspapers are first circulated and where advertisers are active. Thus, it is a fulcrum of both press and traditional social communication, steeped in the rich history and culture of Iran. As Mowlana observes, the great bazaars of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz, and other cities still stand: 'They are still filled with life, and imagination may not find it difficult to conjure up the past'. [1963, 127] The power of the *bazaar* was not only indicative of the merchants' economic importance but also a reflection of the awesome political power that it could command as an integrated institution:

> The bazaar is well organised. But it did move only when its immediate interests were at stake. And when it did act, the situation so created could not be trifled with. Cases are not rare when even powerful kings had to withdraw their decrees once the bazaar had decided to close its door in protest and had threatened to stop the economic life of the country. Those familiar with the recent history of Iran will remember the part the bazaar played in the fight for the Constitution of 1906, and in the Nationalisation of Iranian oil in 1951. [Mowlana 1963, 127]

The *bazaar* was also instrumental in the greatest of these upheavals, the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Iran's geographic location and its well-developed system of petty commodity production were conducive to the expansion of commerce in pre-capitalist Iran. Around 1800, Iran's main trade partners were Afghanistan, the principalities of Central Asia, Turkey and India. Trade with India consisted mainly of native products on both sides, the East India company's export of British goods to Iran being very

small. Trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia included a large amount of European goods re-exported from Iran, and with Turkey also it comprised mostly goods coming through Istanbul or Baghdad. The consolidation of state power under the newly established Qajar dynasty at the turn of the 19th century, also contributed to Iran's commercial growth. In real terms, trade rose about three fold between 1800 and 1850 and quadrupled again by 1914, a total rise of about twelve fold during the whole period under review. In Issawi's view, the outstanding feature of this period was the rapid growth in international trade. [1971, 45]

With the merchants heavily involved in generating this great economic leap forward, there was considerable potential for social conflict. Trade is not merely the material basis of the *bazaar*; it is also the principal network of communication. Traditionally, commerce in the *bazaar* was governed by custom. The *bazaar* also obeyed an ethic rooted in traditional values. Thus the ethics of the *bazaar* have provided both a refuge and an anchoring point for national identity in periods of social crisis. In this sense the *bazaar* is a source of folk memory for the people of Iran.

The physical and geographical environments of the traditional *bazaar* have been significant because the geographic placement of the *bazaar* reinforces both its functional specificity and its autonomy. It occupies the traditional and vital centre of the capital, Tehran, and of the other large cities. The Grand Mosque is usually at the centre of the bazaar and relations between *mosque* and *bazaar* are close, constant, and organic. Never in competition, they co-operate and coordinate their common actions. The bazaar also enjoys an independence of communication by display of its own traditional signs and symbols.

The Iranian political conflicts, especially the revolution of 1906 and the Islamic revolution of 1979 cannot be understood without an analysis of the struggles of the *bazaaris*, as noted earlier, a term that encompasses merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans. *Bazaaris* were among the principal actors in the Constitutional Revolution of

1906. [Parsa 1989, 80] They also played a significant role in the conflicts against royalists and the British during the nationalisation of oil in the 1950's. [Parsa, 81]

There were significant reasons why the *bazaaris* played an effective role in political conflicts in Iran. Fundamental is the distinctive structure of the central *bazaar* with its pronounced capability for mobilisation and collective action in times of conflict. Parsa argues:

> In most major cities, the central bazaars are concentrated in a single location, in narrow alleys under covered roofs. The concentration and proximity of shops facilitate communications. All bazaaris meaning both merchants and shopkeepers who distribute goods and artisans who produced goods on a small scale, deal in very specialised commodities. They buy, sell, or produce a single line of goods only. Furthermore, all those who deal in that specific product work in the same street or alley. [1989, 81]

Thus, the entire *bazaar* is closely inter-connected. Proximity and concentrated dependence on selling single commodities can generate intense competition for customers. At the same time, however, proximity and dependence on similar commodities for livelihood can also create a common fate with respect to market conditions, changes in technology, rise of new competitors, and external factors such as the intervention or non-intervention of the state in business. These conditions can generate strong solidarity during periods of crisis and conflicts, especially when various segments of the *bazaaris* are faced with a common enemy. [Parsa, 91]

Another significant factor enabling *bazaaris* to play an important role in political conflicts has been their resources. By the time of the Constitutional Revolution, Tehran's central *bazaar*, the heart of the nation's trade, numbered close to 40,000 shops and workshops, one-half of which were located within the covered *bazaar*. Shopkeepers outside of the covered *bazaar* followed *bazaari* politics, even though their shops were not part of the *bazaar* proper. Finally, *bazaaris* sold goods to shopkeepers throughout the country on the basis of extended credit. This practice created a dependent relationship in which *bazaaris* exerted additional influence over the commercial sector outside the *bazaar*. [Parsa, 92]

In summary, the ability of the *bazaar* to close its doors in protest and disrupt or effectively suspend economic and social activity are potent weapons against government. This is particularly so if the press and other avenues of communication are unavailable or restricted due to repression and censorship. Consequently, resolute action by the *bazaar* against government can create opportunities for other adversely affected classes and groups to act collectively in conjunction with it. Mobilisation of the *bazaaris* has been crucial to the success of concerted action by the people against the Government, as in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11.

4.2 The Islamic Sermon as a Political Channel

Islamic history has provided the precedents for the sermon serving as a channel of political communication. The sermon has been a means whereby the ruling elite has informed the public of its policies, programs and ideas. The political content of the sermon has varied, but at least in theory it has always been considered a channel of communication for the Iranian state. There are two types of Islamic sermons: the homily *(Wa'z)* given any time during the week when an *ulama* can gather around him a group of listeners on the floor of the mosque, and the Friday sermon *(Khatbat-al-Jum'ah)* delivered from the pulpit during the Friday noon worship service which all adult Muslim males are obligated by the Islamic law *(Shariah)* to attend. [Borthwick 1967, 300]

Before World War II, the Friday sermon was stylised and pedantic. Often the preachers simply memorised and recited sermons which were hundreds of years old. But in the post-war period several members of the *ulama* advocated reform of the sermon. They have urged preachers to speak about the problems Muslims face in modern life and about the nations in which Muslims live. The reform in the education of the *ulama* and the reform of the sermon structure and content have enabled the preachers to become mediators between the traditional and modern cultures. As a result, the sermon in some Arab states is now an amalgamation of traditional Islamic concepts together with the policies of the contemporary ruling elites. In short, it is

channel of communication for the state as well as a traditional religious communication. [Borthwick 1967, 300]

During the lifetime of prophet Muhammad and for approximately one hundred years after his death in 632 AD, political content of the sermon was quite high. Then this secular content disappeared from the sermon almost entirely until the 20th century:

> [Excellency] Muhammad was a "prophet and statesman" and the community he left behind was both political and religious. This fusion of religion and state and the fact that the sermon and related institutions have performed social and political functions in the past have made it easier for contemporary political leaders in the Arab world to give an Islamic colouring to themselves, their programs to modernise the society and the economy, and their policies of nationalism. [Borthwick 1965, 300-301]

From the beginning of Islam the responsibilities of the preachers have been religious and political. At least in theory, and often in practice, they have been representatives of the state charged with exhorting the 'believers' to uphold Islam and with informing them of the policies of the government. Today, the preachers continue to carry out these dual functions.

Prophet Muhammad was the first preacher, and when he preached, he acted in two capacities: the leader and spokesman of the Islamic community, and the Prophet, or Messenger, bringing the revelations of God to man. Sometimes one role predominated, sometimes the other. Prophet Muhammad's successors, the Caliphs, inherited these secular and religious roles, as symbolised by two of the appellations given to them: *Amiru' Mu-Minin*, "the commander in chief of the believers," and *Imam*, "the leader of prayer." Not only did this unity of political and religious office exist at the very top, but also down through the hierarchy of the Islamic empire. [1967, 301]

The sermon is as old as Islam. Prophet Muhammad created it, and he was the first to use it to communicate political messages. This use of the sermon remained a tradition, if not always a practice, in Islamic society. The sermon is preached in the midst of traditional Islamic rituals and in the setting of the mosque whose architecture evokes

memories of the great Islamic past. The sole sources which the *Shariah* permits the preachers to use to justify their arguments are the *Quran* and *Hadith* books which the traditional people memorised to some extent.

The preachers are members of a traditional social and occupational group, the *ulama*, and are generally of humble birth. They have usually been educated in part at a Islamic school, where only the *Quran* is taught. They mostly wear the traditional dress, have a modest standard of living, and live close to the traditional people. The legitimacy of the sermon makes the traditional people more willing to listen to it and also comply with the modern messages not being communicated in the sermon. [1967, 302]

The Islamic sermon is a channel of communication which is well suited to the needs of contemporary Middle Easterners. It is an old Islamic institution with a high degree of legitimacy among the traditional people. Thus the sermon is one way by which the ruling elites can communicate across the communication gap to the traditional people. According to Borthwick :

> The twentieth century reformers of the sermon took the first step in making the sermon a bridge across the communications gap. Prior to their reforms the sermon was only a channel of communication among the *ulama*. Ancient sermons, which only the *ulama* could understand, were usually recited. The reformers of the sermon established communication between the *ulama* and the Muslim masses by writing their own sermons, by simplifying their language, and by preaching on topics which concerned their listeners. These reforms connected the traditional Muslims to the output end of the sermon. [1967, 312]

In the next part, some significant components of traditional communication channels are introduced.

4.2.1 The Islamic Pulpit (Minbar)

In two 20th-century political struggles in the Middle East, the constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the *Minbar* has served as a public forum and legitimising force for revolutionary groups. Communication processes in modern societies have often been used as the basis for assessing those same processes in traditional societies. Thus, modern communication (primarily mass

media) has been characterised as a distinct and highly organised system operated by professional communicators. Communication in traditional societies, however, has been described as an indistinct, unorganised, non-professional system which is totally reliant on face-to-face communication. [Fathi 1979, 103]

In certain traditional societies, however, there is a distinct, organised system of public communication operated by a class of professional communicators who do not rely on modern technology. Communication is carried on face-to-face, but it is institutional, not personal, in nature. Such a system can have a powerful impact on socio-political development. One such system is demonstrated by the function of the Islamic *minbar* in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11.

Gradually the *minbar* became a kind of throne to be used on official occasions by the *Caliph* and for proclaiming important decisions and announcements. As a medium of public communication, it was also used for defending certain policies, stirring public emotion, or spreading propaganda.

> The mosque was not only a place for the weekly communal prayer but also the centre of the Muslim community. However, due to the expansion of Islam and the appearance of the imperial caliphate, among other factors, a learned religious man or *chatty* gradually came to deliver the oration or *khutba* during the prayer of the assembly on Friday instead of the *caliph* or his governors, and the political nature of the *khutba* also was transformed into a religious sermon. These purely religious aspect of the mosque increased and the *minbar* became a semi-sacred pulpit. The political character of the mosque, though diminished, never disappeared. And in a major crisis or community dissatisfaction, the people flocked to the mosque to discuss the problem and to seek remedy or redress. [Borthwick 1967, 314]

Thus, throughout the history of Islam, the *mosque* has been the centre and the scene of numerous uprisings, revolts and social movements often led by popular preachers from the *minbar*. As an example, in the next part, the role of the *minbar* as a channel of political communication using the mobilisation of 1906 is reviewed

4.2.2 *Minbar*, Political Communication and the 1906 Revolution

Islam has served many countries as both religion and political state, as in the Ottoman Empire (1453-1919) in which the Sultan was considered both the clergy and the state, a role legitimised through religion, but denied to the Iranian monarchs. Thus, the tension between the religious leaders and the civil government turned the former into a natural opposition party. When the government was powerful the religious leaders did not enjoy much influence; whenever there was a weak ruler, or general discontent, religious leaders tried to reassert their influence. [Fathi 1979, 104]

The conflict between the clergy and the state was an important factor in the development of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. On August 5, 1906, this struggle was temporarily terminated by the granting of the Constitution by Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah. But his son, Mohammad Ali Shah, began his rule on January 19, 1907, by ignoring the *Majlis* set up by the Constitution and on June 23, 1908, he dissolved it. It was at this point that the effective use of the *minbar* helped the survival of the seemingly obliterated Constitutional movement . According to Fathi:

> In Tabriz in the north-west there was still active resistance to the Shah under the leadership of twelve Constitutionalists who were in close collaboration with the preachers in Tabriz. Between them it was arranged that on Fridays in three mosques, well-known preachers would conduct sermons and discuss issues related to the Constitutional movement. During the 10-month siege of Tabriz by 30,000 Royalist troops, the preachers not only encouraged the people to take up arms, but also served as the distribution centre for information about the movement's activities. The preachers informed the public about activities in the capital, in other parts of the country and abroad, interpreted the events, and restrained the people when the situation required calmness and patience. The resistance of Tabriz encouraged the Constitutionalists in other parts of Iran to rally in a coordinated effort, one group from the north and another from the southern region capturing the capital and forcing Mohammad Ali Shah to abdicate on July 13, 1909. [1979, 106]

The importance and effectiveness of the *minbar* as a medium of public communication were also recognised by the Royalists. Disgruntled clerics were encouraged to attend the *minbar* and denounce the Constitutionalists. Mohammad Ali Shah was perfectly aware of the preachers' influence on the public. For example, in one of his many

negotiations with the *Majlis* to settle their differences, he asked for the exile of eight Constitutionalists, three of whom were preachers. Later, after the destruction of the first *Majlis* in June 1908, he put to death two very eloquent Constitutional clerics. [1979, 107]

Thus, during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, the *minbar* was extensively utilised by both sides as a medium of public communication for the promotion of their political positions. Furthermore, in acute circumstances, such as during the siege of Tabriz, the *minbar* was used primarily as a focus and a channel for communication, with religious ceremony cut to the bare minimum. Politically speaking, constitutional leaders legitimised the Constitutional Revolution through their use of the pulpit. Further, with respect to the diffusion of an ideology and propaganda in a social movement which could have been done by a mass medium such as the newspaper in a literate society, it is significant that a centuries-old system of public communication was effective in these circumstances.

4.3 The Functions of the Bazaar and Mosque in the 1906 Revolution

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906-12 sprang naturally from native soil. The shock of the Revolution has been traced to many factors, such as the weakness of political and economic conditions, and intervention in the internal affairs of the country by Russia and England. (See Chapter 3) Essentially, the mobilisation of 1906 was a rational response to the despotic Qajar Shahs.

The print media, particularly newspapers and magazines, were controlled by the Shah during the Qajar dynasty which lasted from the late 17th century to 1925. (See Chapter 5). The revolutionaries and people generally used the traditional channels of communication, primarily public meetings or the *mosques* and *bazaars* to spread messages and organise resistance. These traditional communication channels, in frequent conjunction with the press, played an active role during the Revolution. In

this part, the main components of traditional communication (*bazaar* and *mosque*) and their roles will be analysed further.

4.3.1 Definition of the Bazaar

The word *merchant* is the translation of the Iranian term *'Tajer'* referring to the wholesale merchant. The merchants were engaged in long-distance and relatively large–scale domestic and international trade. In each city a few merchants dictated economic life. The merchants also played an important part in financing the activities of the government through the payment of revenue quotas or dues to provincial governors. Their economic status, however, was not the sole factor in the constitution of the merchants as a class.

Shi'i Islam and Iran's traditional culture were also important elements in defining the merchant's class identity. In traditional Iran, the merchants occupied a high position in the distribution of social honour. Their prestige was rooted in the Islamic culture. Pristine Islam was favourably disposed towards commerce and commercial activities. Besides the *Quran*, many eulogistic formulations about commercial activities can be found in the dicta attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and in other religious texts. (See below)

In light of Islam's pro-merchant tendency, it is hardly surprising that the 19th century Iranians considered the merchants to be more respectable than any other social class. [Floor 1976, 102] The merchants were also among the better educated segment of the population. For instance, in northern Iran more than half, sometimes even 90 percent, of the merchants could read and write. [Issawi 1971, 76] Therefore, it is little wonder that they were considered notables of the city in which they lived.

The *bazaars* were organised by the merchants, craftsmen, and retailers who had been the commercial focus of the city and its hinterland. The *bazaar* was not merely a market-place for economic transactions in the modern sense of the term. It was also a type of community centre. The *bazaar* area included one, or several mosques, public

baths, religious school, and many tea houses. Religion was the basic common denominator in the *bazaar*, creating ties and bonds among *bazaaris* of different guilds and professions:

> The bazaar constituted the major source of support for the *ulama* and religious institutions. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the bazaar has been the major source and centre of support for oppositional politics. Underpinning the bazaar's political dynamism was the coalition between the merchants and the petty bourgeoisie, which made the bazaar a powerful force in the opposition movement. [Moaddel 1993, 106]

Politically, the *bazaar* has been one of the most important communication channels in Iranian social and political events. Moaddel [1992, 527] argues that from the mid-1820's, the Iranian merchants and the handicraft producers were constantly harassed by European companies. Consequently, financially strong European concerns were gradually able to take over much Iranian commerce:

> The Iranian merchants were no match for these foreign interests. They lacked the organisational and administrative capabilities as well as the capital necessary to finance and run their affairs on the same scale as the Europeans. The situation was exacerbated by the very different manner in which European governments and the Iranian government treated their domestic interests. The European companies were receiving strong backing from their governments; while the Qajar state not only left Iranian merchants unprotected, but also constrained by a financial crisis, was granting concessions to the foreign monopolies. The consequence was increasing hostility of the merchants and the craftsmen toward the state. [Moaddel, 527]

Thus, while in Western Europe the domestic middle class was able to gradually control their domestic market and direct the state policies in a manner consistent with their interests, a different trend emerged in Iran. The merchants and traditional petty bourgeoisie were politically and economically marginalised, with important consequences for the alignment of class forces in Iran. As Moaddel notes, the merchants began making common cause with the traditional petty middle class against the state and foreign interests. [529]

4.3.2 The Political History of the Bazaar

The rise in 19th century Iran of the merchant class with sufficient resources to be able to resist the state was greatly facilitated by a host of economic, political, and cultural

factors. The merchants played an important part in financing the activities of the government, and the payments of the revenue quota due from a provincial governor designate prescribed for his government. [Lambton 1980, 54] The merchants had considerable social prestige and were considered to be more respectable than any other social class. The merchant's prestige was also embedded in Islamic culture, which tended to view commerce and commercial activities favourably.

Torrey [1892, 2] observed that the *Quran* manifested everywhere a lively interest in trade and commerce. The ideology of the *Quran* was expressed in words elsewhere used to express familiar commercial ideas, but transferred to the relations between God and man. Thus, commercial terms such as "reckoning," "weights," "measures," "payments," "loss," "gain," "fraud," "buying," "selling," "profits," "wages," "loans," "and" security," occurred about 370 times in the holy *Quran*, giving a commercial flavour to the whole. Numerous expressions of esteem for merchants are also to be found in the sayings of the Prophet and other religious texts. According to Moaddel, the prophet is reported to have said:

> "The merchant who is sincere and trustworthy will (at the Judgement Day) be among the prophets, the just and the martyrs. The trustworthy merchant will sit in the shade of God's throne at the Day of Judgment, and merchants are the messengers of this world and God's faithful trustees on Earth". [1992, 455]

According to Islamic holy tradition, trade is a superior way of earning one's livelihood. Other classes closely allied with the merchants were craftsmen and retail traders, organised into guild by type of occupation. Mecca, the birthplace of Islam, was a major centre of local, regional and some international trade. The city was, 'at the time of the rise of Islam, dominated by the merchant patricians'. [Tabari 1973, 28-29] According to Goitein:

> Friday congregational prayer, one of the most important Islamic institutions articulating the religious community and the state, coincided with the day on which the business activities of the weekly bazaar heightened because the people of the town and surrounding areas gathered in the marketplace for business transactions. [1966, 111]

The prophet Muhammad, whose first wife and many members of his clan were prosperous merchants, engaged in trade on behalf of his wife. [Tabari 1973, 829–33] Religious reform thus includes the reform of the *bazaar*, the main social centre outside the family as well as a focal point for believers. Both religious and commercial images were projected onto the whole spectrum of Islamic thought and society, even to the character of God:

> The mutual relations between God and man are of a strictly commercial nature. God (Allah) is the ideal merchant. He includes all the universe in his reckoning. All is counted, everything measured. [Torrey 1892, 51]

Islamic law specifically recognised the *bazaar* as a social meeting-place. Business transactions in the *bazaar* went way beyond commodity transactions, to the expression of religious norms and cultural values. [Udovitch 1987, 163] The *bazaar* was, therefore, basically a religious and commercial entity.

The urge to be active and influential in civic, religious, and political affairs of the community as well as commerce was a hallmark of the typical merchant, a rational and calculating character but also religious. According to Ashraf:

> The social hierarchy of the bazaar had the big merchants (Tujjar) at the top of the pyramid, the headmen and the masters of artisans and shopkeepers of well over 100 guild-like associations at the middle level, and the masses of apprentices and footboys at the bottom, with some marginal elements such as poor peddlers, dervishes, and beggars at the lowest level. [1988, 55-24]

These economic and status distinctions had broader civic and political significance. During the election of the first *Majlis* in 1906, merchants and guild masters, with the *ulama* , were granted the franchise, but most *bazaaris* were denied it.The *bazaari's* political leadership was indebted to the merchants and guild leaders occupying seniority in the *bazaar* status hierarchy. In an early session of the first *Majlis*, a leading constitutionalist addressing a merchant during a bitter debate among the *bazaari* deputies said:

> This assembly is called the *Majlis*, where all members are equal, not the bazaar where you, as a merchant, are allowed to humiliate and command a petty trader. [Majlis-e Shora-ye-Melli 1946, 12]

The point was made firmly that the powerful *bazaari* used to getting his own way in the *bazaar* could not transfer this power to the National Assembly. By the early 20th Century, the *bazaar* provided the state with revenue from taxes, custom dues, road tolls, credit charges and forced labour for senior civil and military authorities. Reciprocally, the Government protected the *bazaaris* in their workplace and shielded them in some degree from the law. While the state supervised the routine administration of the *bazaar*, such as fair pricing and accuracy of weights and measures, the overall interests of the *bazaaris* were dealt with collectively through the leadership of the merchants and the guild masters. The leading *bazaaris* were also closely involved with civic administration by serving as town mayors, exercising a dual role as trustees of bazaar and municipal property, but also serving as appointees of the state. [Floor 1975, 65]

The *mosque* was the other major channel of traditional communication during the great Iranian social mobilisations. The next part considers the *mosque* as a political communication channel with emphasis on the alliance of the *bazaar, mosque* and *ulama.*

4.4 The Mosque (Masjid) as Political Communication

The *mosque* is where all important national and religious questions of Islam have been discussed. This status was embedded in the *mosque* at the time of its creation, and it has remained ever since. As we have already seen the mixture of worship and political activity characteristic of the contemporary *mosque* is not at odds with the historical context. This has been reflected historically in a widespread resort to the *mosque* as the traditional and informal communication system in Iran. Denied the outlets of free press, free speech, political parties, labour unions, and student organisations, opponents of the Qajar regime moved inexorably towards the only accessible forum: the 100,000 or so *mosques* and holy shrines supervised by some 200,000 clergy.

The *mosque* and Islamic sermon have been important, sometimes decisive, channels of political and social communication in Iran. In contemporary history, theological disagreements have been used to foster revolution or to force unpopular governments out of power. A combination of religious sermons and mass media also has been used to propagate modern ideas and social change in the context of Islamic and Shi'i philosophy and theology. The *mosque* is a place of general public assembly and the *minbar* has historically been used in Iran--as in many other parts of the Middle East-- for political sermons which have prompted political action.

The clergy possess a language accessible to the masses, a rhetoric refined and polished through immediate and continual public contact. They are figures of traditional social authority, possess rare knowledge, interpret traditions for the people, and wear distinctive garb. They are virtually professional communicators linked closely to the traditions of the *mosque*, the fundamental workplace. Borthwick has described the origins of the mosque traditions:

> The mosque came into existence as a place where members of the Muslim community could congregate. It is said that the Prophet Muhammad needed a place where he could gather his followers together for instruction and discussion and, therefore built the first mosque next to his house in Medina in A.D. 622. As the Muslim community grew larger, it became necessary to designate a time when all the members could get together in the mosque regularly, and the Friday prayer of the assembly came into being as a "day of congregation "Every mature Muslim male is required to attend the prayer of the assembly in the mosque, bringing together the members of different social strata in the Muslim community. Associated with the prayer of the assembly in the mosque on Friday is *Khutba* or an oration. This oration is delivered from the *minbar* which is an elevated seat. It is said that the Prophet Muhammad frequently used an elevated place to address the Muslims. The mosque in the time of prophet Muhammad and his early successors was not only the spiritual centre of the Muslims, but also their political, educational and social centre. [1965, 11]

If the community was forced to take up arms in self-defense, the planning and preparation was done in the *mosque*. If there was an important announcement to be made, the community was called to the *mosque* to hear it. Diplomatic delegations from other tribes were received in the *mosque* and were lodged in tents erected in the courtyard. In the *mosque*, the prophet was defended against the abuse of his enemies,

and judicial disputes were settled. The *mosque* was used in this informal and comprehensive manner under prophet Muhammad. As a result, the *mosque* in Islam is not just a shrine or exclusively a holy house of worship. It is rather a communal centre that serves religious and political functions.

4.5 The Bazaar—Mosque and *Ulama* Alliance During the Constitutional Revolution

An examination of the historical roots of the bazaar-mosque alliance will help us to understand their functions in Iranian society. Analyses of protest movements in contemporary Iran have emphasised the central role played either by the *ulama* or the *bazaaris*. The Tobacco Rebellion of 1890-91 was the first successful protest movement originating in the *bazaari-ulama* alliance. The tobacco concession granted to a British subject effectively turned Iranian tobacco dealers into salesmen working on commission for an English firm, seriously undermining the economic status of thousands of tobacco merchants. In the major cities protests and riots were sparked in the bazaars in opposition to the concessions given the British. (See Chapter 3)

The *bazaaris* prevented the agents from entering the tobacco fields, burnt the tobacco stock, wrote petitions and sent delegations to the Shah, took *bast* in a shrine and disseminated a *Fatwa*, issued apparently by Mirza Hasan Shirazi (the highest religious authority), forbidding the public to smoke. Under the pressures that mounted from the *bazaari-ulama* alliance, the Shah cancelled the tobacco concession. It was a remarkable example of a successful political campaign essentially based on the resolute combination of commercial, religious and social mobilisation. This successful action gave merchants courage and served as a prelude to the constitutional movement of 1906. [Dowlatabadi 1947, 105-111]

The alliance of the *ulama* and the *bazaaris* in Iran gained strength in several ways and for a variety of reasons. The *bazaaris* were allied traditionally with the independent Shi'i *ulama* (those who had no official appointments) in their mutually-held belief that

the patrimonial domination, though often recognised as legitimate on a *de facto* basis, had only quasi-legitimacy. This approach had political weaknesses which necessitated the need of *bazaaris* and *ulama* to work together. The physical proximity and the interdependence of the *mosque* and the *bazaar* in the structure of the Islamic town reinforced them as a closely-knit community. The *bazaar's* enclosed physical space increased their awareness of each other's public activities. According to Mottahedeh:

> The religious sentiment and traditional orientation of the bazaaris were reinforced by their ties with the *ulama*, by the physical setting of the bazaar, and by its communal character. Paying one's religious taxes, contributing to charitable funds, and maintaining a generally good relationship with the ulama were all signs of piety and, as such, helpful to maintaining one's respect and honour in the bazaar community. [1985, 346]

The major social instruments for sustaining cohesion among *bazaaris* as well as maintaining their networks for protest mobilisation were *hey'ats* (primary religious groups), sermons of preachers, and the noon and the late-afternoon/early-evening congregational prayers. Prominent merchants and guild leaders were expected to gather in the major *mosque* of the *bazaar*, using this occasion to discuss matters of mutual interest in business and, occasionally, politics.

The religious groups are multi-faceted and inter–penetrate many levels of civic life through informal face-to-face groups which serve as occupational, neighbourhood, religious, inter-personal, friendship, co-operative, self-help, or political networks in various sections of the *bazaars* and neighbourhoods of different communities. Many of the functions formerly fulfilled by the guilds were assumed by the *hey'ats*, such as helping the poor, organising co-operative relief efforts helping bankrupt merchants and collecting funds for building schools, contributing to hospitals, and similar charitable and community activities. [Thaiss 1971, 202]

Through their incessant activity the *hey'at* seemed to be everywhere and to know everyone, from whom they asked nothing but religious loyalty. Thus, through the periodic meetings of the religious groups (weekly, bi-monthly or monthly), communication networks were developed throughout the city.

It is through these interpersonal networks and the participation of the same individuals in several different gatherings during the week that bazaar information, ideas, and rumours are passed on. Participants in these religious gatherings are not only merchants but also smaller businessmen local religious leaders workers and porters and some government bureaucrats as well. [Thaiss 1971, 202]

Such established social networks and groupings could be activated when necessary by the *bazaari*. They could readily mobilise processions of mourners, feed large groups, and arrange congregational prayers. Beyond these essentially routine functions, they could organise mass mobilisation, diverting mass action where and when it most suited their interests. In pre-modern Iran, the *bazaaris'*political orientation was influenced mainly by their relationship with the *ulama,* on the one hand, and governing authorities on the other. The traditional alliance between the *bazaaris* and the *ulama* was further bolstered through the 19th century by the strains and antagonisms between their interests and the state. Rooted deeply in the history of the conflicts between the Shi'i clerical establishment, the state and the *bazaar*, the conflict between the state and the *bazaari-ulama* alliance intensified notably from the mid-1880's.

An early protest by the *bazaaris* against the state occurred in 1884, when the big merchants of Tehran demanded the dismissal of the Minister of Commerce and the establishment of an Assembly of Merchant Deputies. They issued a proclamation that demanded the convening of an Assembly of Merchants' Deputies composed of ten representatives selected from the merchants of Tehran and other major cities. The essential tenet of the proclamation was that the merchants' collective interests could only be protected by limiting domestic oppression and external colonialist exploitation.

They proposed protecting private property, preventing state functionaries from taking advantage of merchants, empowering merchants to settle their own affairs in an assembly of their peers, and liberation from the traditional judicial system, all measures designed to reduce oppression from within. Protecting local merchants from their European competitors, both in and beyond Iran, developing modern industries to

replace the declining handicrafts, creating a national banking system that would reduce British and Russian control of the money markets, and reducing the control exercised by foreign powers and the entrepreneurs over customs houses were the measures directed against the semi-colonial control over the country's economy. [Ashraf 1988, 542]

Although the efforts of these merchants to increase their political power were unsuccessful, their grievances and their opposition to the regime continued until it was given, in alliance with the ulama, a powerful and successful expression. This pervasive alliance was a instrumental force in all of the subsequent great political and social mobilisations of Iran from the early 1890's to the present:

> In alliance with the *ulama*, the *bazaaris* served as the driving force or as a significant component of all the major political movements in modern Iranian history. Starting with the Tobacco Rebellion of 1891-92 and continuing with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, the anti-republican movement of 1924, the Oil Nationalisation Movement of 1950-53, the urban uprising of 1963, and finally, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, this alliance held firm and was reinforced over time. [Ashraf 1988, 543-44].

With the beginnings of the accelerated growth of foreign trade and increasing contact with the West in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the *bazaars* in the major cities grew and prospered. The balance of economic power within them shifted gradually from the traditional patrimonial agents to the emerging big merchants. In addition a group of successful and relatively enlightened merchants emerged in the principal urban centres and began to articulate new economic and political demands based on the merchant's proclamation of 1884. [Ashraf and Hekmat 1980, 725-50; Gilbar 1977, 275-303]

Thus, the *bazaar* and the *mosque*, as inseparable twins, have served, for many centuries, as the primary arena of public life in urban Iran. In combination, they formed the context in which city dwellers organised their communal life and, often as a direct consequence, their political alliances. According to Ashraf:

> In the Islamic city the bazaar has long been: (1) a central marketplace and production centre for handicrafts, located in old quarters of the town; (11)

the primary arena (together with the mosque) of extra-familial sociability; and (111) the embodiment of traditional urban lifestyles. [1988, 538]

Each element of the alliance, however, had been facing long-term structural decline. For the *bazaar* functions of credit were being absorbed by modern banking, production and distribution of goods were shifting to transnational companies, and retailing in the narrow alleyways of the *bazaar* in Tehran was threatened by department stores and modern merchandising. Even so, the *bazaars* showed remarkable resilience and capacity for regeneration. For the clergies, their influence narrowed as much of the traditional religious control over justice and education was replaced by separate secular institutional structures.

These threats strengthened the closely-interconnected and mutually supportive nature of the alliance. A further source of strength were the extensive family ties connecting the two institutional frameworks. Historically, the two institutions acted together to oppose autocratic Shahs, the *bazaars* shutting their doors in protest as the *mosques* opened theirs. Culturally, they shared traditional religious outlooks and practices. The *bazaar* provides much economic support for religious activities, such as the *haji* (pilgrimage) to Mecca. Thus the *mosque* and *bazaar* were the two major traditional social pillars of Iranian society and, together, projecting a formidable communication network throughout Iran, particularly in the capital, Tehran.

4.6 Bazaar, Merchants and *Ulama* in the Constitutional Revolution

The Constitutional Revolution was primarily a revolution by the *bazaar*, merchant class and the *ulama*. This is not to deny the active participation of other groups and classes but to assert that the *bazaari* and *ulama* provided the core around which other activities crystallised. In the second half of the 19th century the *ulama's* political power had increased considerably, and the intellectuals, especially the reformist bureaucrats, were insiders in the game of Iranian politics. The *bazaar*, however, had been totally excluded from political power and the merchants partly-excluded. For the first time in Iranian history, the Constitutional Revolution gave the *bazaar* and

merchants the opportunity to place their representatives in a *Majlis* with substantial political power, and whose authority over the Shah's government was guaranteed by a constitution. The brief account of the Constitutional Revolution that follows is directed primarily to the involvement of the *Ulama/Bazaari* alliance and its subsequent dissolution.

In 1905, political agitations began over the Belgian administration of the customs and the new tariffs. In late April, the merchants closed their shops and gathered at the Shrine of Shah Abdol'azim outside Tehran; the cloth merchants were the most active. The *Habl al-Matin's* (Firm Cord) correspondent reported the consequent paralysis in the capital:

> Today is the fifth consecutive day that all the commercial and the shops of cloth merchants, moneylenders and others are completely closed and a state of prolonged stillness is felt in the bazaars. [Vol. 19, issue 36, 1905; cited Afshari 1981, 188]

In an early example of interaction between press and traditional communication, this correspondent interviewed the merchants' spokesman, Haj Mohammad Ismaile Maghazeh, who described the familiar sequence leading to the taking of *bast* at the shrine. They had been trying for three months to bring their grievances to the attention of the government officials, a meeting was held during which the merchants proved their charges against the Belgians by showing customs documents and the merchants' account. No actions, however, were taken to rectify the injustices. The spokesman linked specific grievances to the general ones, arguing that the new tariffs and the Belgians' handling of the customs were detrimental to the development of Iranian manufactures and commerce. According to Kermani [1965]:

> At the same time, other serious acts of protest against the Belgians' administration of the customs occurred in Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Kerman and Yazd, all of which greatly alarmed the ruling class elements and indicated the profundity of social restlessness. The Shah, who was departing for Europe and wanted a quick end to the agitations, gave in, at least partially, to the basic demands of the striking merchants; he ordered M. Naus to be placed under the authority of the *Majlis-e Tejjarat* (Association of Commerce) consisting of leading Tehrani merchants and headed by the S'ad od-Dowleh, the liberal Minister of Commerce. Like all such promises, the order was only intended to end the crisis temporarily and not to be seriously carried out. [294]

One event at this time indicated the advancement of the movement to a relatively high level of militancy even before the advent of the Constitutional Revolution. It also showed the boldness of the *ulama* in directly challenging the state authorities. The Russian Bank was expanding its building in Tehran on an old burial ground which provided a pretext for anti-Russian agitations. In the nearby *mosque* and at the climax of an anti-imperialist sermon, an *ulamac* invited his aroused audience to go to the site and utter a *fateha* (prayer for the dead) for the last time. He then descended from the pulpit and led the crowd, some of whom were already prepared to destroy the building. By the time they returned to the *mosque*, there was nothing left on the site for the Russian Bank. Unrest in Kerman and maltreatment of *ulama* by governors in Qazvin and Sabzevar provided further fuel for the *ulama's* agitations. Nazem al-Islam described the popular mood in Tehran:

> . . .The people were just waiting for an excuse or permission from the ulama to close their shops; not only that, there was among common people a talk about *Jahad* (Holy War); although it was apparent that it had no basis, the talk caused disturbances and people were contemplating great upheavals. [1965, 45]

On December 11, 1905, the governor of Tehran submitted a number of sugar merchants to the humiliating discipline of the bastinado. This action, which graphically demonstrated the contemptuous attitudes of the tribal-feudal elements towards merchants, kindled a series of continuous acts of protest which came to be collectively known as the Constitutional Revolution. Among the merchants was an elderly man, with a considerable reputation as a pious person, who had paid for the construction of three *mosques* in the city:

> The merchants were still at the governor's when the news quickly spread throughout the bazaars, leaving behind a trail of shock and anger. At sundown, upon the closure of their shops, the people of the bazaars gathered in the mosque (Masjed-e Shah) for a demonstration. The next day the Revolution was on in earnest. The closure of the bazaars and the gathering in the mosque were done after consultation with the two leading ulama in Tehran, Sayyed-Mohammad-Tabataba'i and Sayyed-Abdollah-Behbahani (the "two Sayyeds"). The former was not motivated by personal gains in opposing the government and was very close to the people; the latter was believed to have been largely motivated by personal considerations, working for the dismissal of the 'Ain od-Dowleh, the Premier. [Malekzadeh 1946, 22]

There were two other leading *ulama* in Tehran. The first, Shaikh-Fazlollah-Nuri, who considered himself superior in knowledge to the two Sayyeds, stayed away from the confrontation as long as the Ain od-Dowleh was the Premier. He later supported the Revolution following the establishment of the first *Majlis*. The second, the *Imam Jome'h*, was a staunch royalist throughout. Sayyed Behbahani was not alone in his endeavour to have the Ain od-Dowleh dismissed as Premier:

> There was another influential caique headed by the Amin os-Soltan, the ex-premier, who hoped to regain the post he had occupied for a long time. [Kermani 1965, 339]

At the same time, Mohammad Ali Mirza, the Crown Prince, and subsequently Shah, wanted the Premier dismissed. [Browne 1910, 113] It was against this background of intra-ruling-class rivalry that the first major protest movement, merchants, started on December 12, 1905. The following day the *bazaaris* and merchants did not open the *bazaars* and again assembled at the *mosque*. At sundown, they sent after the *ulama* who were dragged to the mosque. Tabataba'i and Behbahani assumed leadership and formulated demands for the next day's demonstration: the dismissal of the governor of Tehran and the establishment of a *Majlis* to attend to the people's grievances. That night, however, the gathering was dispersed by the followers of the Imam-Jome'h who used a premeditated disturbance tactic. This was considered a victory for the Ainod-Dowleh, since the Imam-Jome'h was acting in league with the Premier. At that stage of the struggle, the use of such tactics could only intensify the opposition. [Ashraf 1988, 545].

The following day the two Sayyeds, Tabataba'i and Behbahani, along with other friendly *ulama*, left the city and took sanctuary in the Shrine of Shah Abdol'azim. The Ain od-Dowleh moved quickly to prevent another day of general strike in the *bazaars* by sending his men there with the order to plunder those shops which remained closed. They ravaged some shops to intimidate other *bazaari*. According to Kermani [1965, 361-62]:

> The number of those who took bast swelled, in the next few days, to about two thousand, and these mostly from the ranks of theology

students. Their daily provisions, for the duration of the *bast*, were paid for by money collected from the merchants. From the beginning, until the time when the Shah was forced to accept the newly formulated demands of the bast any attempt by the Premier to have the ulama brought back to Tehran was met by further disturbances and closures of the bazaars, both in Shah Abdol'azim and Tehran. A spirit of rebellion prevailed over the city, with the bazaars closed most of the time and people constantly going back and forth in excitement between Tehran and the Shrine; one day the Shah's carriage was mobbed by Tehrani women who demanded the return of the ulama after giving satisfaction to their demands.

The new demands went beyond the previous ones in asking, among other things, for the acceptance of the 'House of Justice' and the dismissal of the Governor of Tehran In the Iranian tradition, this accorded with the concept of just rule which the *bazaar* and merchants had cherished for centuries. They were most likely to benefit from such an establishment, because it would give some security to the merchants' properties.

The Shah was forced to comply with the demands of the *ulama* who had, by then, ended their month-long *bast*. On the day of their return to Tehran, the *bazaars* were closed and people thronged the path of their arrival. The magnificent return of the *ulama* on the royal carriage and the exuberant welcome that people accorded them were symbolically more significant than the Shah's formal acceptance of the 'House of Justice' and the dismissal of the governor. The people made the day a grandiose display of the Palace's isolation. Nazem ol-lslam noted that 'it was on this day that for the first time the cry "Long Live the Iranian Nation" was heard, which was offensive to the members of the ruling class present to escort the *ulama*'". [Kermani 1965, 364]

The Shah's health was progressively deteriorating and the Amin od-Dowleh resorted to procrastination in delaying the "House of Justice," while intimidating the opposition by selective punishment of the most outspoken. In Tehran, a secret association of leading merchants was formed to conduct political agitation among the people. [Malekzadeh 1946, 1: 237] At this time, social unrest exploded in two other cities, Shiraz and Mashhad. The causes of the unrest in both cities were traditional and the current protest movements showed characteristics similar to the old limited-objective

protest movements. Nevertheless, both movements in December 1905 became part of the Constitutional Revolution.

In Tehran, an attempt to arrest one outspoken *ulama* sparked an incident which ended the five months interlude in the popular protest movement. The *ulama* had been arrested on the street, but a group of theology students in the nearby *mosque* intervened and in the ensuring melee a young theology student was killed by the soldiers. The people managed to rescue the body from the soldiers. The body was taken to the Friday *Mosque*, and as the news spread through the city, all the *bazaars* and caravanserais were closed

The demand was still for the establishment of the 'House of Justice.' The Ain od-Dowleh decided to meet the popular challenge with a show of military strength. Throughout the night the government's criers announced: "Anyone who does not open his shop....tomorrow, his merchandise will be plundered and himself will be punished". [Kermani 1965, 483] In the morning soldiers were posted on every main crossroads, especially in the *bazaars*. Because there had been a number of clashes between women and soldiers the day before, the soldiers were ordered to prevent women from coming out of their homes.

Despite the threat to plunder, the *bazaars* remained closed and the number of people in and around the *mosque* increased. The stand-off lasted for two days, until protesters organised a procession on the *bazaars* and streets. The day before, a new regiment of the Shaqaqi tribesmen had been posted around the *mosque*. The tribesmen stopped the people as soon as they emerged from the *mosque* and dispersed them by gunfire, causing an unknown number of dead. In a horrified retreat, the crowd could only rescue two corpses.

The *ulama* made the next move, and in July 1906, in a highly effective and symbolic act of protest, left Tehran for the announced destination of the holy cities of Iraq but stopped at the Holy City of Qum. It appeared as if the decisive military and police

actions of the 'Ain od-Dowleh had won the upper hand in the continuous struggle, and the *ulama's* exodus seemed a desperate move, with no other action possible without a blood-bath. Kermani described the mood at the time:

> Some bazaars are closed, some are open; people are confounded, bewildered and do not know what to do; theology students and merchants are in a state of dread and fear; nobody dares to walk on the streets or the bazaars. [1965, 500]

This was, however, a temporary relapse. The *ulama's* departure provided the movement with a further emotional cause since in the people's mind the government was responsible for the state of the city:

> The religious status of the ulama protected them, to a considerable extent, from governmental retaliation in its most brutal forms; they were also able to extend, under certain circumstances, that protection to the bazaar and merchants. Feeling very insecure by the threatening actions of the 'Ain od-Dowleh and the ulama's absence from Tehran, the bazaar and merchants resorted, on July 19, 1906, to a move which brought the movement to its climax. They took bast in the large garden of the British Legation in Tehran and within a few days their number had increased to 15,000 almost all of them Bazaaris and merchants. [1965, 18]

The sanctuary lasted for one month, during which the *bazaaris* and merchants were organised and led by the merchant's guild which had acquired a new life in the rising protest movement of the *bazaaris* and merchants. Their organisation was impressive even to the British, the guild allowing only the *bazaaris* and merchants to enter the garden and join the *bast;* when low–rank governmental functionaries wanted to go in, they were prevented from doing so. Each guild set up its row of tents, and common kitchens prepared food for everyone.

For the duration of the *bast* , the *bazaars* remained closed and the political, as well as social, life of the city revolved around the British Legation. It was an act of political protest which became at the same time, an occasion for social activities, almost a kind of festival, where a culturally homogenous people lived, ate, drank and smoked together, held political discussion groups and entertained each other. This festival atmosphere was reinforced after it became clear that the Shah's government was

unable to harm them. These kinds of protest acts have become a hallmark of Iranian movements since the Constitutional Revolution.

The merchants paid for all expenses incurred inside the garden, and twice provided money to the guild masters for distribution among their apprentices, helping them remain in the *bast* by alleviating their families' financial burdens. [Tafreshi-Hosseini 1973, 30] The merchants clearly provided the leadership for the duration of the *bast*. The few wealthiest members of the new bourgeoisie, who had the most to lose, did not identify themselves too closely or too quickly with the movement. On the ninth day of the bast, Haj-Hossien-Amin Oz-Zarb, a prominent merchant who was subsequently a member of the First *Majlis*, and a few supporters arrived at the Legation. They were received suspiciously by the *bazaaris* and merchants but insisted, on their good will, and swore on the Quran that they were united with the *bazaaris* and merchants in their goals. [Kermani, 533]

The *bast* was a complete success, mobilising the people around the *bazaaris* and merchants and giving the movement the needed momentum to bring about the triumphant return of the *ulama* from Qum. Never before had the *bazaaris* and merchants exhibited such a high degree of enthusiastic and optimistic involvement in the political affairs of the country; other segments of the urban population giving them lively support. It was reported that there was even a discussion among Tehrani women to join in by setting up their own tents on the streets adjacent to the Legation's garden. [Kermani, 536]

At the beginning, the *bast* formulated five demands which were still moderate and conveyed them to the government through the British Charge d'Affaires. Four of the demands were concerned with such immediate matters as the return of the *ulama* and the granting of general amnesty; the fifth repeated the previous demand for the opening of the 'House of Justice' in which the *ulama*, merchants and members of other guilds could participate in investigating all disputes.

As the people's militancy in Tehran increased, news from provincial cities indicated the spread of rebelliousness to other parts of the country. Some of the provincial *ulama* left their cities to join the *ulama* at Qum. At the same time, there was restlessness among the government's forces in Tehran which alarmed the Shah. Some of the merchants resigned their posts and joined the people in the Legation. The court panicked and the frightened Shah decided to give in to the people's demand by dismissing the 'Ain od-Dowleh as Premier. The movement, however, had already passed the stage in which such a dismissal, initially a goal, could have reversed the growing revolution. Had it come before the *bast*, it might have delayed the final showdown, but following demonstration of political strength and solidarity, new demands were raised to correspond to the popular mood. Then, nothing short of a *Majlis* and constitution would have satisfied the people.

> On August 5, 1906, the Muzaffaru'd-Din-Shah succumbed to the force of the popular movement and issued a farman [proclamation] for the foundation of an elective assembly. The prestige and authority of the Shah and his government, however, had fallen so low that the people refused to end their bast until they were satisfied by the correction made in the farman and received further assurances for its implementation. [Kermani 1965, 561]

On the day they ended the sanctuary , the *bazaaris* and merchants went, in a ceremonial move, to open the *bazaars*, although it was Friday, the day of worship. This was a day of historical victory for the *bazaaris* and merchants who were looking forward to a significant voice in the *Majlis* . On September 9, 1906, the regulations for parliamentary elections were issued, according to which the electorate was divided into six states. They were (1) Princes and the Qajars (2) the *ulama* and theology students (3) notables (Ayan) (4) merchants (5) landowners and peasant proprietors and (6) the craftsmen.

The intellectuals and reformist bureaucrats were responsible for the writing of the constitution and regulations for elections. The sacrifices of the *bazaaris* and small merchants, had given them a chance a chance to put into effect ideas that they had been expounding for more than three decades. According to the election code, however, the

peasants and tribesmen as well as labourers in the *bazaars* were excluded from participating. The franchise was still based on possession of property.

A modification, however, to include the *bazaaris* who had been, totally denied any direct involvement in Iranian politics was significant, as, to a lesser extent, was the inclusion of the merchants. One hundred and five guilds were listed as 'recognised guilds,' and they, together with merchants, elected 42 of the 60 representatives from Tehran. The ratio between the two groups was also significant; the craftsmen 32 and the merchants 10. [Kermani 1965, 1: 632] The percentages for all people's deputies elected throughout the country were: craftsmen 26 percent, merchants 15 percent and the *ulama* 20 percent. Thus the people of the *bazaars* and their allies, the *ulama*, elected about 60 percent of all representatives in the first National Assembly. [Shaji'i 1965, 176]

Although the Revolution was victorious in Tehran no simultaneous movement developed in other cities. After the Shah's acceptance of constitutional rule, however, other cities began to react in sequence. Since the country was not homogenous, and different regions had undergone unequal development, the responses of different cities and towns differed considerably. Their responses depended largely on the numbers of the *bazaaris* and merchants and the strength of the feudal-tribal impediments.

When the former was strong, the results were similar to those in Tehran, usually the case in the Northern cities, notably Tabriz and Rasht. When the impediments were strong, the new constitutional issues fused with and were sometimes overwhelmed by traditional feudal tribal infighting. This generally was the result in the southern provinces and remote tribal areas. According to Kermani:

> The feudal-tribal courtiers hoped, that by preventing the spread of the Revolution to other cities, they could eventually take back what they had been forced to grant in Tehran. The movement in Tabriz, however, forestalled the realisation of that desire. Tabriz, which was the second largest city and one of the main commercial centres of the country, was ruled by Mohammad Ali Mirza, the Crown Prince. He was not about to change the methods of rule he had inherited from his feudal-tribal ancestors merely because constitutional rule had been granted in Tehran; nor were other governors ready to change themselves. [1965, 24]

The people of Tabriz would have to fight their own battle for constitutional rule. A number of people decided to do what the Tehranis had done and took sanctuary (in the British consulate in Tabriz. Consequently, the *bazaars* were closed; the *bazaaris* or merchants joined the *bast* and crowded the consulate, and its surrounding area and the nearby mosque. When the leading *ulama* arrived at the *mosque*, the Crown Prince confronted a major act of rebellion.

The leading merchants in Tabriz were more radical than their counterparts in Tehran. The *bast* lasted for ten days and the *bazaars* remained shut down. The Shah sent a telegram to the embattled Mohammad-Ali-Mirza confirming the Constitution and ordering him to allow elections for the *Majlis*. Thus, in Tabriz the *bazaaris* and merchants provided the main thrust of the Revolution, After celebrating their victory they began preparations for the elections. They were determined to have an active role in the affairs of their own city, clashing with the governor's methods of rule. An *anjoman* (Society) was formed consisting of 20 *ulama*, merchants and revolutionary intellectuals, to which each guild introduced a representative who participated in the *anjoman*. Like similar *anjomans* in other cities, this became, in effect, a government within the government. It was around these *anjomans* that the next round of the struggle was fought .

4.7 Conclusion

These examples of action through traditional channels had a dramatic impact in the successful igniting of the Constitutional Revolution. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the revolution would have been sparked without these traditional channels. Furthermore, these examples of the *bazaar* and *ulama*, acting either individually or in conjunction, have been taken from the early period of the Constitutional Revolution lasting only a few months. They could be multiplied many times with incidents taken from the whole span of the Revolution.

It has been shown here that the *bazaar* is an important centre of news, a place where opinions are formed and from which rumours are spread over wide areas with almost telegraphic speed. The importance of the *bazaar* as an intermediary channel of communication becomes even more pronounced when one considers that it is linked through religious ties to other informal communication channels such as *mosques*, Islamic schools, and welfare and community organisations. It also provides financial support for religious and political organisations. The *bazaar* itself had also maintained extensive national linkages. At the time of the Constitutional Revolution, the traditional propertied class of the *bazaar* continued to control half the national handicraft production, two-thirds of the retail trade, and three-quarters of the wholesale trade. It comprised half-a million merchants, shopkeepers, traders, and workshop-owners and had extensive ties through the independent craft and trade guilds with armies of peddlers, and small retailers. There is no denying, therefore, its immense potency as a medium of traditional communication or, indeed, of political communication.

The emergent merchant class was still connected by hundreds of economic, political and cultural ties to its birth place, the *bazaar*. Because of their connection with the palace, some of the wealthiest merchants were suspected by the less-fortunate *bazaaris*. Nevertheless, the merchant class remained embedded in the bazaars and moved along with the revolutionary movement originating there. By comparison with traditional radicalism of the bazaar, the wealthy members of the merchant class appeared cautious during the beginnings of the Revolution. After the initial victories, they wholeheartedly committed themselves to the cause of the Constitutional Revolution .

In the final analysis, the movement that evolved in the *bazaars* of the major cities was deeply rooted in the history of social conflicts of the country and had all the characteristics of the traditional movements of the *bazaaris* and merchants. Involved in the production of commodities and trade in the bazaars, the *bazaaris* and merchants

provided the main thrust of the Revolution. They forced the tribal-feudal ruling classes to accept their participation in the political affairs of the country. In the struggle, they relied heavily on centuries-old traditions of resistance in the urban centres, traditions closely associated with the *bazaar* and its merchants for whom the Constitutional Revolution, in the early phases at least, was a great historical victory.

However, the objective conditions prevailing in the country as a whole were still working against the realisation of the historical dream of the craftsmen and merchants, particularly against the political aspiration the emerging merchant class. As far as the *bazaar* and merchants were concerned, the defeat of the Revolution came with the end of the armed resistance in Tabriz in 1911-12. From then on the deteriorating conditions in the provinces and the large-scale tribal intervention (for and against the Revolution) on the national scene overwhelmed and bewildered the *Bazaar* and merchants. The revolution they had set in motion had run away from them. In contrast to the First Constitutional Period, the Second Constitutional Period was characterised by the absence of the *bazaar* and merchants in the political struggle.

The important fact to be noted about the bazaar and the traditional merchants was the duality involved in their tradition of resistance. On one hand, the radical aspects of that tradition lent themselves effectively to the Constitutional Revolution and found organisational expression in the popular *anjomans*. On the other the *Majlis* and the constitution did not provide the substance to fulfill the aspirations of the masses.

The Constitutional Revolution indicated how the patriotic and democratic movement of the masses exhausts itself within the framework of a parliamentary system, which was itself the product of the struggle of a different class in a different historical era. It was the discrepancy between the dynamism of the mass movement and the timidity of the adopted institutional forms that enabled, in part the conservative politicians to destroy the former by pretending that they were safeguarding the latter. Stripped of the dynamism that produced them, the *Majlis* and the constitutional form of government were not only harmless to the ruling classes, but were also a welcomed legitimatising

asset in their hands. Not surprisingly, they retained them. The profound alienation of the intellectuals is revealed by their beliefs that a constitution and a *Majlis* were the panacea for all political, social and economic evils; they would bring national self-determination and guarantee political liberty, rule of law and justice. Because the print media, particularly newspapers, were controlled by the Shah during the Qajar dynasty, the revolutionaries and people in general relied on traditional channels of communication, primarily public meeting places at the *mosque* and *bazaar* to spread their messages and organise their resistance.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RISE OF THE IRANIAN PRESS

5.1 Introduction

As with all ancient civilisations, Iran has covered the full spectrum of communications media. Oral communication evolved from the rudimentary signals of primitive human beings to the extremely sophisticated oral discourse of contemporary Iran. As noted in Chapter 4, oral communication, whether on a one-to-one basis in the *bazaar* or through sermons and other *minbar* discourse were crucial during the Constitutional Revolution and retain over-riding importance today. Written communication was evident very early in Iranian history with the survival of cuneiform bricks in the ruins of Persepolis and stele with written inscriptions at other imperial sites. The technique of making papyrus and writing semi-permanent records on it facilitated the effective administration of the far-flung empire. Although Imperial Persia lacked the elaborate road systems of the Roman Empire, transport networks must have been at least adequate for the transmission of imperial edicts and other administrative material from the centre of empire to remote outposts.

The strength and reliance of oral tradition in the Islamic state, coupled with effective written systems, appear to be the main reasons why the printing press was a relatively late comer to Iran. Even more belated were the exploitation of the printing press as a newspaper press and the regular appearance of viable newspapers. Although the electronic media are outside the scope of this thesis, the emergence and exploitation of radio and, particularly, television, have shown similar time lags. It is very difficult to explain these lags by the major media of news mass communication without taking account of the traditional systems with their heavy reliance on oral communication.

5.2 The Missionary Press

The printing press arrived in Iran in the early 17th Century, roughly comparable to the export of the first presses to Britain's American colonies. Religious emissaries from a variety of sects and nations were largely responsible for its initial usage. Although proselytising by missionaries from foreign countries was strictly discouraged among the overwhelming Muslim population, religious activity among minority ethnic groups such as the Armenians was generally tolerated. Printing facilities were brought in by these sects to support their missions.

The first recorded book printed in Iran in the Armenian language, was published by the Armenian Archbishop of Julfa in 1640. A second press imported from Europe in 1670 was also established in Julfa. [Kaveh Magazine 1921, Cited Mowlana 1963, 167-70] Several other printing presses were introduced over the ensuing 100 years or so of Safavi rule, although there are no firm details. Statements by Christian missionaries provide indications that religious orders were publishing materials in both Persian and Arabic, using their own presses. All semblance of this early expatriate religious press had largely disappeared by the mid-18th Century in the years of disruption and chaos following the death of Nadar Shah. (See Chapter 3)

5.3 The Iranian Press in India

The print media tradition emerged much earlier in the Indian sub-continent than it did in Iran. Consequently, the first Iranian language newspaper appeared in India. The Indian press was an artefact of British colonisation with the first press despatched to Bombay by the East India company in 1674. By the end of the 18th Century, a burgeoning newspaper industry had emerged under the British Raj in India. This capability included, in North Indian cities, the skills necessary to reproduce 'oriental' scripts, including Iranian. Thus, the tradition of press communication was much more strongly

developed in India than Iran, although the printing press reached India at much the same time as the Armenian missionaries published the first books in Iran.

Furthermore, the Persian language had been part of the inheritance brought into India by the Moghul Emperors. In the Moghul courts of the early 18th Century, English was the formal language but Persian was widely used for conversing and disseminating information. A further stimulus to the production of Iran-language newspapers in India was the liberal and Westernised character of India by comparison with the feudal despotism of Iran. There was also a degree of freedom of expression and opinion under the British, conducive to a wide range of publication. For these reasons, Iranian newspapers were among the earliest of India's vernacular newspapers. [Mowlana 1963, 182-3]

There is no complete or accurate listing of the Iranian press in India but it is believed that some Iranian newspapers had appeared by the end of the 18th Century. The first may have been the *Akbar-Irani* (Iranian News) a weekly newspaper published in Delhi in 1798. Later newspapers included *Meratul-Akhbar* (Mirror of News), *Meratul-Ahval* (Mirror of Conditions), *Jame-Jahan-Nama* (Cosmorama), and *Shams-al-Akhbar* (Light of News). (Mowlana's research indicated that *Meratul Akhbar* was the first Iranian language Indian newspaper, and *Jame-Jahan-Nama* the first weekly) If *Akhbar Irani* was indeed the first printed Iranian-language newspaper, and that it circulated in Iran, then it could be argued that the country's print news tradition goes back about 200 years.

To look briefly at one example of this early Iranian press in India, the *Jame-Jahan-Nama* was a weekly which was first published at Calcutta in 1822. Its publisher was a Hindu who successfully sought a similar concession to that granted to missionary publishers. The printer was English. Considered the best quality and most popular Iranian language newspaper in India, it was published for at least 54 years:

> The object of its conductors was declared to be the dissemination of news
> from English newspapers and all the cities of India. . .This paper

> published letters from correspondents and strongly criticised the system of government in Oudh and other states allied to the British Government, a fact which perturbed the British authorities. . .[Mowlana, 187]

An English official, Mr A. Sterling, described it as the best 'native newspaper' that had yet appeared, its merit consisting largely of judicious selections from the British newspapers. Its translations, however, from the news sheets of the Hindustani courts were invariably inaccurate. On the whole, the editor displayed great propriety and discretion in observing the spirit of the relevant press regulations. [Cited Mowlana, 191-92] Other critics praised the simple style of the *Jame-Jahan Nama*, comparing it favourably to the ornate style prevalent in other Indian newspapers.

Remarkably enough, this Iranian-language press had a significant impact on the development of the Indian press. Although partly subsidised by the government, they were essentially privately owned, reformist in outlook but more informational and religious than political. Local content was directed largely to shipping movements, appointments, police reports and religious articles, rarely touching upon either local or international politics. Although it might seem that these newspapers presented excellent models for emulation within Iran, they were distributed only to a few court officials in Tehran. They were local papers designed for local consumption within a vast sub-continent; clearly a newspaper published in Calcutta had minuscule relevance to Tehran, even though the language was Iranian. Although essentially a diversionary alley off the mainstream of Iranian press development in the 19th Century, the tradition of the Iranian language press in India proved extremely valuable in the development of an *exile* Iranian press in India in the late 19th Century. (See below)

5.4 The Press Under the Qajars

The initial steps towards the development of an Iranian press were taken in the early years of the Qajars by Fath Ali Shah's dynamic Crown Prince, Abbas Mirza. As part of his substantial reforming of the Iranian army, he sent Iranian students to Europe to study military science. As part of this exercise, Abbas Mirza facilitated the import in

1891 into Iran from Russia of a set of printing presses, using both moveable type and the lithographic processes. These presses were used to establish the first regular printing industry in Tabriz. Because Tabriz was the first Iranian city to utilise the printing press, the city gave its name to the new technology. The later Iranian name for the printing press was *Chap Khana*, incorporating part of the Turkish name for Tabriz (*Basma Khana*) with an old word for paper money (*Chaw*) used by the Mongol invaders in the late 13th Century. Browne also suggests that *chaw* may have been an adaptation of the Iranian *chap*, used to describe both moveable type and the lithograph process. [1914, 7]

By 1824, Tabriz had several presses in operation. The first book published in the city was a lithograph edition of the holy *Qu'run*. Other early books were interesting ventures into contemporary history, a chronicle of the recent war between Russia and Iran; and an account of Fath Ali Shah's reign dedicated to Abbas Mirza, the dynamic chief minister of the early part of his reign. In the absence of a newspaper press, these books could be said to represent Iran's first attempts at descriptive journalism. Given the stature of Iranian poetry it is not surprising that a work by the famous Iranian poet *Sa'di* was among the early publications, as was a treatise on smallpox inoculation.

In 1824, the first printing press was established in the Qajar capital of Tehran. The facts are uncertain, but it is believed that Mirza Zeinul Abedin, founder of the first printing press in Tabriz, was asked by Fath Ali Shah to transfer his printing press to the capital. The press was supervised by a government official and the first works published were the *Qu'run* and a book of poetry. A second press, a lithographic press, was transferred from Tabriz in Tehran in 1824 in circumstances related in 1835 by a European missionary, Justin Perkins, who lived in Iran for some years:

> I learn that the [Iranians] are not entire strangers to the art of printing. A press which operated at Tabriz for several years . . .was sometime ago transferred to Tehran. A lithographic press is now in use, in this city, and books are bound here very well. The owner of this press was once ambassador to England and speaks our language. [Perkins diary, cited Mowlana, 175]

The printing press then spread rapidly to the other principal cities throughout Iran. According to Browne , the Christian missionaries were active during these years in the north-west of the country, working particularly among the relevant sections and using printing presses for their work. American missionaries in particular used an 'imported printing' press for the publication of English, Syriac and Persian works. [1914, 8]

The extensive use of the lithograph press in Iran through much of the 19th Century provides an interesting contrast with the western press which preferred moveable type. This is partly due to the development of western newspapers with their requirement for quick, daily publication for which moveable type was much more suitable. Indeed, it might be argued that lithography was impractical for news publication. It was much more suitable, however, for printing attractive art works and this suited the Iranian taste for fine calligraphy and art work, particularly in the publishing of the holy books and poetry.

5.4.1 News Traditions and Iran

By the 1830's, the basic requirement for the emergence of newspapers had been established: a widespread and commercially viable printing industry. The universal pattern for the extension of printing from book and pamphlet production to newspapers was set by Gutenberg in the mid-15th Century. Essentially, the first books published with the newly-devised printing press were works of religion, most notably Gutenberg's edition of the Christian bible. Publication moved at an early stage into the production of works of literature and history designed for a restricted, elite audience. The demands of practical administration and conduct of trade generated the publication of official government documentation and commercial development. A desire for more popular material spawned the publication of ballads, broadsides and other crudely illustrated publications. With the gradual extension of education stimulated by printing, there developed a thirst for news which eventually culminated in the publication of newspapers.

In western countries, this process of evolution often extended over lengthy periods. For example, in England the first printing press was introduced by William Caxton who published the first books, including scriptures, poetry and chronicles in the late 15th Century. It was not until the early 18th Century, however, that a mature newspaper press emerged.

Iran followed this broad pattern of development with the early ventures of Christian missionaries in the 17th Century opening the way for entrepreneurial printing enterprises encouraged by government in the early 19th Century. With reduction of printing costs and increasing accessibility to printed materials with the spread of popular education, it became much less risky for printers to diversify their enterprises into popular literary forms such as the newspaper. As noted earlier, the emergence of an Iranian press in India contemporaneously with the growth of Iranian printing houses also provided a model which could be emulated in Iran. There is little evidence, however, that this model was actually used.

Despite the absence of newspapers, the craving for news was not lacking among the Iranian people. Apart from traditional oral forms of news, other expedients were used to disseminate news. Closer contacts with Europe meant increasing visits there from Iranian students, merchants and officials who wrote letters back to Iran containing international news. Merchants and traders in Iran Europe were in frequent contact and their letters invariably contained commercial and some social and political news. With the growth of Iranian-language newspapers in India, occasional packets of these journals circulated in Iran although they were designed primarily for Indian consumption. By the mid-1830's, the basis had been laid for an initial venture into indigenous publication.

5.4.2 The First Newspaper—*Akhbar Vaghayeh*

The first newspaper published in Iran was long believed to be the *Ruznameh-Vaqayeh-Ittefaqiyeh*, a weekly first published in Tehran in 1851, the third year of Nasseru'd-Din

Shah's reign. Indeed, Browne's account, based on earlier research by Iranian scholars, described it as 'the first Persian lithographed newspaper published in Tehran'. [1914, 10] Another account by a British scholar, L.P. Elwell-Sutton describes Iran's first newspaper as a 'bulletin of court activities' which appeared in 1851. [Cited Mowlana 1963, 196] Research by Mowlana almost 50 years later, however, revealed that this newspaper was actually the third to appear in Iran, the first being *Akhbar Vaghayeh* (News of Occurrence), a monthly which was first published in late January 1837, during the reign of Mohammad Shah, Nasseru'd-Din's predecessor. Mirza Saleh Shirazi, its Iranian editor and publisher, had been a pioneer of printing in Iran.

Shirazi studied printing in London in the 1820's, then established one of the first regular printing presses in Iran. Later he served at the court of Fath-Ali-Shah in Tehran and became an Iranian ambassador in London. While in England, Shirazi spent many hours at the Royal Asiatic Society further dissecting, and learning from, the British press. It seems likely that Shirazi tried to convince Fath-Ali Shah to publish a newspaper for the court but had no success before the Shah's death in 1834. He did persuade Mohammad Shah to start the *Akhbar Vaghayeh*. [Mowlana, 198] The English meaning, *News of Occurrences*, bears an uncanny resemblance to early English newspapers, also called 'occurrences', and to America's first newspaper, the short-lived *Public Occurrences* in the late 17th Century.

Considerably more is known about *Akhbar Vaghayeh* than of most other Iranian newspapers of the 19th Century because Shirazi lodged several copies of his paper with the Royal Asiatic Society in London which published the complete text of one issue in its journal for 1839. [Cited Mowlana, 199] This only surviving copy precisely delineated the format and content of the newspaper:

> [It] was lithographed on two large folios, printed on one side only: It was closely written in a plain hand, and was surmounted by the Persian emblem of the Lion and Sun. The newspaper was equally divided into domestic and foreign news. . .While one full page is devoted to four domestic items, another page contains eight stories from. . .Italy, the United States, England and Turkey. Three out of four domestic news [items] are events of the Court of Mohammad Shah and have been written

in his praise. The fourth story covers the birthday ceremony of the King of England at the British Embassy in Teheran. Foreign items are drawn largely from the letters received from Europe and the United States. Political and controversial issues have been avoided; even foreign news includes items such as commerce, fires and navigation. [Mowlana 199-200]

The items of the court are a combination of serviceable narrative and servility, not dissimilar from stories in other authoritarian press systems, such as the early years of the *Sydney Gazette* in Australia from 1803, under the direct surveillance of the British colonial governors. The newsletters from overseas in *Akhbar Vaghayeh* have a strong naval content: a new steam vessel developed in America capable of crossing the Atlantic in 12 days; the arrival of a British ship-of-war in Bombay. Other items include a fire in Naples; the 25th anniversary of the translation of the new-testament into Persian; the arrival of the Turkish ambassador, a former superintendent of the Turkish government gazette; and a confrontation between Sultan Mahmud and a 'petulant, naked, matted-haired, foul-tongued, impudent, impious dervish who was in both mind and body a demon.' Subsequently the hairy-head of the mad dervish was 'separated from his body.' [Translation cited Mowlana, 200-07]

The newspaper or, more accurately, the gazette, ceased publication in 1840. It has been argued convincingly by Mowlana that the weaknesses of the Shah and the disorganised condition of the regime was largely responsible for the newspaper's failure. Figure 5.1 shows the headline of Issue No. 10 of *Vaghayeh-Ittefaqiyeh*, the first regularly published newspaper in Iran .

5.4.3 Amir Kabir and *Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh*

The next two newspapers emerged under the rule of Mohammad Shah's successor, Nasseru'd-Din, who became Shah in 1848. During the vigorous modernising and reformist administration of Amir Kabir, (See Chapter 3), the foundation of the first University College, Darul-Fonon, together with the establishment of mail services and improved roads, created a favourable climate for newspaper publication. The college press printed hundreds of books and stimulated a literary movement stamped with Iranian nationalism. In 1851, two new newspapers appeared. An American missionary journal *Zararit Bahra* (Ray of Light), published in the Syriac language and of limited circulation, survived for over 63 years, through the reigns of four Qajar kings and the Constitutional Revolution ending only during World War 1. This was designed for a sect of Syrian Nestorian Christians living in Azerbaijan. It was dedicated solely to religious material, not touching on social or political controversy and its circulation was limited to a small Protestant sect in one province of Iran. In the circumstances, its longevity was remarkable.

According to Browne, the first newspaper circulated in Tehran was entitled *Ruznameh Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh* and was a weekly comprising four but sometimes eight pages. It was the first Iranian lithographed newspaper. [Browne 1914, 10-11] As noted above, however, Mowlana has shown that what Browne considered Iran's first regularly-published newspaper was actually the third. He designates it as *Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh* very similar to Browne's title as *Ruznameh* means newspaper. A duplicate copy located by Mowlana measured seven and one half inches by 13 inches, smaller than foolscap and significantly different in format from standard western newspapers. The paper was established under the direction of Amir-Kabir who considered the country was in need of a newspaper to complement its university and other aspects of modernisation: A royal order in the first issue described its editorial policy:

> . . .Since the ambition of His Majesty. . .is the education of Iranian people, and to inform the citizens of this country of both internal and

foreign affairs therefore, it has been ordered that a paper, which in other countries is known as a Gazette be put out, and every week the appointments of the Court and other news be published. . .[Cited Mowlana, 99]

This proclamation was amplified by an editorial in the same edition:

It has been resolved that every week a gazette will be published to inform the people of the decisions and the decrees of his Royal Majesty and his government, and also to bring news of national and international affairs. This gazette will not only be instrumental in bringing awareness and information to the subjects of this government, it will also put an end to the existing misleading or inadequate rumours or information in regard to government decrees. [Igbal-Ashtiyani 1962, 148]

Thus, the paper had much in common with the historical gazettes of the authoritarian press systems. Similar official publications had launched the press of Britain, the United States, Australia and many other countries. Interestingly, it seems to have been partly devised to counter disinformation flowing from rumours and other excesses of the oral tradition.

As with western papers, the masthead of the paper included an emblematic device, the Lion and Sun of Iran. The paper occasionally appeared in six or eight pages but most issues were four pages. The first page comprised local and court news, with foreign and other domestic news on the inner pages. As with all gazettes of limited circulation, subscriptions were high. It seems that subscriptions were maintained by compelling government officials up to a certain rank to take the paper which was also distributed to the provinces and local authorities. Some copies were also sold to the public in the *bazaar*. Apart from the founder, Amir-Kabir, the paper had an editor and publisher, a translator and business manager a reporter and staff writer, and a printer.

The business manager, an Englishman called Edward Berjis, was an interesting figure who had worked as a printer in Tabriz, then became an official translator for the Shah, Nasseru'd-Din. He wrote foreign news and translated news from European papers, collected subscriptions and handled the accounts. The reporter, Mirza Abdulah, was responsible for coverage of the court and local news. He and Berjis were awarded court honours for their outstanding contributions to the paper. [Mowlana, 223]

Although direct subscriptions and sales of the paper were limited, the conventional

phenomenon of heavy usage of each individual copy was also evident in Iran:

> The paper was read and handed around among subscribers' friends in Tehran and the provinces so that there was not much opportunity for circulation promotion, especially since [the newspaper] was still a luxury in Iranian society. Widespread illiteracy placed a further ceiling on circulation increase. Bad roads and slow postal services limited subscriptions almost entirely to government officials. Furthermore, the paper was only a governmental sheet and its nature and contents were such that it could not raise any anxiety in the public. [Mowlana, 223]

According to one analysis, apart from the official decrees, the material that appeared in

the first year of the publication primarily extolled the developments of Europe and

America. They included articles on the consultative assemblies of European countries,

the struggles of the Italian leader Mazzini, and other revolutionaries and libertarians in

their struggle against Austria, plans for the Suez Canal, European railroad construction,

investigations in human evolution, and the history of American civilisation. [Arianpur

1971, 75]

In issue four of the *Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh* appeared Iran's first newspaper

advertisement, for real estate. The house for sale belonged to a Christian and interested

buyers were asked to apply to Monsieur Rafaeil or 'whosoever may happen to be in that

house.' [Cited Mowlana, 224] This appears to have been an informal venture as

advertising was not officially accepted until issue 22. Its commercial value, however,

was quickly appreciated as costs per line were equivalent to the sale price of the entire

newspaper. This constrained the volume of advertising which was mostly confined to

houses for sale, changes of address and lists of new books published.

With the death of Amir-Kabir in 1851, much of the impetus towards a varied and

vigorous press flickered away. Publication of *Vaghayeh Ittefaqiyeh* continued under the

direction of the Ministry of Sciences but by the late 1850's it had become increasingly

irregular. In 1860, it became Iran's first illustrated paper under the editorship of Saniel-

Mulk, the most distinguished Iranian artist of his time. The paper was re-named with

the resonant title of *Ruznameh-Dowlateh-Aliyeh-Iran* (Newspaper of the Sublime State

of Iran). It remained much the same in its editorial content, but was given a more attractive content through the fine portraits of Saniel-Mulk. But, says, Mowlana , it was still the loud-speaker of the court, the state and those in authority. [1963 225] According to Browne, Saniel-Mulk was not really a newspaper editor but was chiefly engaged in making designs of the national emblem and drawing pictures of state notables. [1914, 10]

5.5 Nasseru'd-Din Shah and the Press

Feeble as was the nascent press in Iran during the late 1860's, it did not escape the close scrutiny of an inherently despotic Shah. Nasseru'd-Din, however, did not resort to the standard controls of the press in authoritarian western systems, usually the imposition of licensing or the so-called 'taxes on knowledge' such as stamp duties. Licensing was unnecessary because the press was already a state monopoly. Because of the small circulation there was little revenue-raising potential in taxes on the press nor was there any real need for official censorship when strict controls on publication prompted stringent standards of censorship. With only one regular newspaper circulating in Iran in 1860, the burdens of formal censorship were hardly onerous. Nor was there in any sense a competitive market system, with the single newspaper forced upon government employees, public servants and land owners. There was, however, a requirement for censorship with the rapid spread of printing houses and the proliferation of book publication. With increasing literacy and interest in the outside world, a 'black market' in books and other printed material began to emerge. Accordingly the Government established a strict censorship of all literary production, including newspapers..

The first censor was, effectively, Saniel-Mulk, former editor of the *Ruznameh-Dowlateh-Aliyeh-Iran* and superintendent of the state printing press. In 1863, a royal decree appointed him to guide and control the production of all printing houses within the Empire:

. . .Publication of the books and pamphlets which are harmful and
disastrous for the State and cause aversion and repulsion of the tastes will
not be allowed. [Cited Mowlana, 231]

With the government firmly in control of the press, the Shah also decided to increase

the number of newspapers in Tehran to four by introducing three new papers to be

published at the Darul-Fonon University College. The newspapers were monthlies,

directed to avoid political material and deal only in scientific, literary and historical

discussion. The first of these journals, *Ruznameh Elmiyeh* (The Scientific Journal)

appeared in January 1864, devoted to science and literature, and published at varying

times in three languages—Persian, Arabic and French. The *Ruznameh Mellati* (The

National Journal) appeared in July 1866, with a focus on historical biography. A

further monthly paper, *Ruznameh Dowlati* (The State Journal) was published a month

later as a monthly review of court, national and foreign news, supplementing in many

ways the weekly *Ruznameh-Dowlateh-Aliyeh-Iran*. [Mowlana 1963, 253]

These new papers were the responsibility of the Ministry for Science and its minister

Etemadul-Saltaneh. Editors were constantly changed and, in any case, had little

authority, lacking approval to sign their names to articles. According to Browne,

several editors were chosen to write and compile the papers, depending on the whim of

the Minister. [1914, 10]

By this time, the Iranian press had settled firmly into the mould of an authoritarian

press. Essentially, the press was a mechanism designed to buttress and enhance the

autocratic government of the Shah. The government dictated the cultural and political

aspects of the press. The problems of audience were resolved not by trying to attract a

mass readership, or even a popular readership, but by establishing a captive audience,

based on compulsory subscription of all government officials and employees to all three

newspapers. According to figures published in *Ruznameh Mellati* in 1867, the total

circulation of each newspaper was 1,115. Almost half the circulation was concentrated

in Tehran, Azerbaijan and the officers of the foreign service. If the circulation of the

Ruznameh Dowlateh Uliyah Iran is added to this list of subscriptions to governmental papers, it seems a reasonable assumption that total newspaper circulation in Iran fell below 5,000.

5.5.1 Technology and Transport

Despite this rather dismal picture of an authoritarian, minimal-circulation press, technological change was starting to bring development in communications and journalistic process through the 1860's. The telegraph system began to spread through the provinces and by 1875, the government newspapers were picking up telegraphed material. Following a pattern common in western newspapers as the new technology spread, the *Ruznameh Dowlati* in 1876 was printing a full page of provincial news drawn mainly from telegraphed items. Furthermore, crucial advantages of geography plugged Iran into the international cable system, a matter of urgency to the British for communication with their Indian Empire. Iran was one of the first recipients of telegraph systems in the Middle East, with an international line running from the Iranian frontier near Bagdad via Tehran to the Persian Gulf. [Mowlana 1963, 238]

A fascinating sidelight of the introduction of the telegraph was the extension of the traditional Iranian privilege of *bast* or sanctuary to the telegraph office. In the public mind, the wires ended at the foot of the throne in the royal palace. Thus, the telegraph offices were accorded *bast,* providing some defence against oppression and also a traditional way of asserting press freedom. This protection was used extensively in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, with people congregating in telegraph offices throughout Iran and refusing to leave until their demands had been met. This was an innovatory adaptation of a traditional privilege with mass communications technology.

Despite the arrival of the telegraph, Iran remained hampered by poor communication infrastructure, particularly roads which had been allowed to decay under the Qajars. According to Mowlana, in the late 19th Century, Iran was unprovided with even tolerably good mule tracks in major areas of the country. [1963, 235] Even so, the

telegraph did much to imbue Iran with the flavours of mass communication and internationalisation. It stimulated notions of progress and reform while providing a means by which they might be advanced. Like the press, however, the telegraph system remained very much a government monopoly controlled by the Shah.

Evidence of this is provided by Nasseru'd-Din Shah's use of both the press and the telegraph to influence public opinion and, to use contemporary terminology, project a useful image of himself among the populace. On a state visit to a remote province occupying several months, he appointed his chief physician, Hakimul Mamalek, to produce a newspaper devoted exclusively to the royal visit. According to Browne, the physician was a front for the Shah who wrote his own travel paper entitled *Ruznameh Hakimul-Mamalek* after the royal physician. [1914, 91] Similar journals were produced for later royal visits to the provinces, including one with the euphonious English translation of *The Mirror of Travel and Lamp of Sojourn*.

5.5.2 A Press Ministry

As noted above, the Ministry of Sciences had been largely responsible for establishing newspapers and oversighting their conduct, including censorship. By the early 1870's. the government had decided that this departmental administration had not been a success. Lack of popular appeal had forced the closure of the only weekly, Ruznameh *Dowlateh Uliyeh Iran* in 1870, leaving only three monthly papers with very poor circulations. Faced with increasing penetration by imperialists, particularly Britain and Russia, the government needed a more effective mechanism for advancing its policies.

In 1871, a Ministry of the Press was founded under the direction of Mohammad Hassan Khan-Etemadul-Saltaneh, who, emerged as the government's chief propagandist over the next 25 years. Hard-working and scholarly, the author of a biography of Christopher Columbus in the Iranian language, Etemadul-Saltaneh acted decisively from the beginning, abolishing the three existing monthly papers and replacing them with a tri-weekly called simply *Iran*. He also established an Office of

Censorship following the appearance of material critical of the Shah, some of it printed in India and other neighbouring countries, explaining this decision in the following terms:

> The function of the office of censorship was to investigate the books and pamphlets directed against the state. Some of the materials imported from foreign countries were libellous and seditious. When the pamphlet of Sheikh Hashem Shirazi, published in Bombay, was brought into Iran the flames of anger of His Majesty went on. It was ordered that all copies of this book should be removed and destroyed. . .I submitted to the Shah that there was an office of censorship in European countries to prevent such incidents and told of its usefulness. [Etemadul-Saltaneh 1890, 117]

Iran was also a lithographed paper, and the printing technology must have strained the production resources on a tri-weekly basis. In format, it was ten by 16 inches, about foolscap size, and larger than its weekly predecessors. Like them, it was essentially a government gazette, published by authority of the court and including formal court news such as decrees, appointments, dismissals, posts and titles. Its front page was invariably devoted to the activities of the Shah and state functions. Figure 5.2 shows the front page of an issue of *Iran*.

Browne described the purpose and business of *Iran* as to 'praise the Royal performance and the doings of the Courtiers, and to enlarge on the security of the country and the progress of the Government.' [1914, 90] The fawning effusiveness of *Iran* made it a principal target of criticism by Iranian liberals.

Despite these limitations, Mowlana detected some changes in the pattern of news writing from earlier publications. The style was less formal and more akin to popular idioms. Contents were compartmentalised to accommodate specific ministries; finance, science, justice and so on. Most importantly, human interest stories, such as disasters, weather, fires and accidents, appeared for the first time in Iranian newspapers. A disproportionate amount of space was given to telegraphic news, including foreign cables. There were few advertisements, reflecting the lack of demand from a largely non-urbanised population. The quality of paper used was rough, there were no headlines, and the-front page title and an occasional woodcut were the only illustrations. [1963, 247-8] This lack of embellishment was probably due to the technical pressures of producing a lithographed newspaper three times a week.

With his scholarly background, Etemadul-Saltaneh sought to inject a greater literary content into Iran, a factor that had been lacking in the earlier publications:

> [He] offered a starved reading public something new in literary fare. From its beginning, the *Iran* ran serials on Iranian and European history. In thus broadcasting the new literature, Etamadul-Saltaneh and the *Iran* made their contribution to the culture and to early journalism. Otherwise, the paper was nothing but a propaganda sheet of the Shah and his Government with its most conservative and autocratic nature. [Mowlana, 249]

Etemadul-Saltaneh was both Minister for the Press and editor of the *Iran*.

5.5.3 Provincial Papers

One of the iron rules of newspaper development is that provincial newspapers inevitably follow the establishment of a metropolitan press, no matter how rudimentary. With the elements of a newspaper press established in Iran by the early 1870's, it is not surprising that publication of papers by provincial governors became increasingly

common. The religious paper *Zararit Bahar*, published in Azerbaijan, has been noted earlier. Another Azerbaijani newspaper, *Tabriz,* had been published briefly by a governor in 1858. It could not said, however, that such publication constituted a viable provincial press. As Table 5.1 shows, only 12 newspapers were published in Iran between 1838 and 1872, most of them in Tehran and several with only short periods of publication. All were government-owned except for the American missionary journal, *Zararit Bahar.*

Table 5.1

The Early Newspapers Printed in Iran (1837-1872)[1]

Name	Frequency	Founded	Location
News of Occurrences *(Akhbar-Vaghayeh)*	Monthly	1837	Tehran
The Ray of Light *(Zararit Bahar)*	Monthly	1851	Rezaiyeh
The Current Events *(Vaghayeh-Ittifaqiyeh)*	Weekly	1851	Tehran
Tabriz	Monthly	1858	Tabriz
The Sublime State of Iran *(Dowlate-Uliyeh)*	Weekly	1860	Tehran
The Scientific Newspaper *(Ruznameh-Elimiyeh)*	Monthly	1864	Tehran
The National Journal *(Ruznameh-Mellati)*	Monthly	1866	Tehran
The State Newspaper *(Ruznameh-Dowlati)*	Monthly	1866	Tehran
The Newspaper of Hakimul-Mamalek	Irregular	1869	Tehran
The Mirror of Travel and Lamp of Sojourn	Monthly	1871	Tehran
Iran	Tri-Weekly	1871	Tehran
Fars	Weekly	1872	Shiraz

The trail-blazer in provincial publication was *Fars*, a lithographed weekly published in Shiraz, the capital of the Fars province in the south-east of Iran. It was an eight-page

---

1. These papers are in chronological order. The table is based on the work of Hamid Mowlan, History and Interpretation of Journalism in Iran, 1963, p. 252.

paper, half in Iranian and half in Arabic, its initial publication coinciding with the arrival of the Shah's son as governor. The content emphasised education and cultural subjects, and it was published in the 'Mirror Room' of the government offices in Shiraz. Its editor Kashani, produced another early provincial newspaper, the *Farhang* (Culture or Education) at Isfahan in 1879. Browne described him as a 'profound and accomplished scholar.' [1914, 12-13]

Apart from this brief flurry in the provinces, there was little to distinguish patterns of newspaper development in the remaining years of Nasseru'd-Din Shah's long reign. During the 20 years between 1876 and 1896, when the Shah was assassinated, only six newspapers appeared in Iran. Most collapsed after a only few issues. The Ministry of the Press remained the nation's principal newspaper publisher. The Shah and his ministers were deeply involved with foreign concessionaries, largely ignoring their propaganda and publicity network. [Qasemi 1993, 17]

In fact, *Iran* was the only enduring newspaper in Tehran through this period. When the Ministry of the Press published *Elmi* (Scientific) paper it survived for only sixty-four editions. During 1878-79 there appeared two other papers called *Ettela'a* (Information) and *Nezami* (Military), the latter soon disappearing and giving place to *Merrikh* (Mars). *Merrikh*, did not attract readership and after 18 editions it, too, ceased publication. Hence for several years *Iran* and *Ettela'a* were the only papers published regularly within Iranian borders. [Qasemi, 18]

5.5.4 The Shah and Freedom of the Press

The only lively interlude in a generally dreary era for the Iranian press was a brief flirtation by Nasseru'd-Din Shah with a free press in Iran. During his extended visits to Europe, the Shah was immensely diverted by newspapers, particularly their wit and humour. An interpreter had to read the relevant newspaper to him every morning. On his first trip he had bought a modern press in Istanbul with a complete set of Roman type, using it largely for the production of foreign books and pamphlets. Mowlana

observes that the propagation of ideas through the press interested him and he was fond

of European papers: 'For a monarch who had a complete monopoly of the press in his

kingdom, the free press of Europe was a wonder.' [1963, 260] During a visit to

Belgium, he wrote glowingly about Belgian press practice:

> . . .The kingdom of Belgium is very free, the ordering of all matters being
> in Parliament, where the Deputies meet together and give judgment. . .The
> editors of the public papers in this country are extremely free. Whatever
> they may write, they are in fear of no-one. [Cited Mowlana, 26]

By the mid 1870's, the Shah wanted his own well-edited and interesting paper which

would also be a tool for projecting a favourable persona for him on the international

stage. He decided that this could best be done by recruiting a European editor. The

Ministry of Foreign Affairs recruited Baron Louis de Norman, a Belgian-born French

citizen to edit a new paper to be called *La Patri*, a multi-lingual publication in both

French and Iranian. When de Norman arrived in Iran in 1876, he was informed by the

government to conduct his newspaper precisely as he would in France. The liberalism

and desire for 'Europeanisation' of the Shah were presented to him with enthusiasm:

> The Frenchman, a republican, totally ignorant of the shah's ways, took
> this for plain, and wrote his editorial in accordance with it. The first
> number of La Patri was printed on the 5th of February, 1876, a historical
> date without any tomorrow. [Mowlana, 261]

An infuriated Nasseru'd-Din Shah terminated publication of *La Patri* after one issue,

and expelled de Norman from Iran, placating him with three years' salary. In Browne's

under-stated account: '...the inkling of freedom perceptible in the first number proved

displeasing to [the Shah], and the paper was therefore suspended and its editor

dismissed.' [1914, 17] A brief extract from de Norman's 'inkling of freedom' must

suffice to explain the Shah's electrifying response to *La Patri*:

> As to the internal affairs, we shall speak of them with the most absolute
> independence. We have no party, and do not want to have any, we want
> to service the country in showing its true needs. We shall support
> progress; every time that it manifests itself we shall help it by our
> encouragement, but we shall never be vile flatterers. We shall not burn
> incense to power; we shall defend every just cause and blame every
> reprehensible act. . .We shall devote all our cares to merit popular favour,
> in constituting ourselves everywhere, and on every occasion, the

champion of the rights of the country and of the people. [Cited Mowlana, 263]

The fresh air of libertarian press theory had no place in the repressive atmosphere of a monopolistic, authoritarian press structure.

5.6 Conclusion

In the remaining years of Nasserud-Din's reign and, indeed, in the subsequent years until the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, there were few developments of lasting significance in the established patterns of authoritarian publication. Some interesting ventures were attempted. After the debacle with *La Patri,* another French paper, *Echo de Perse* was approved and lasted for three years without enraging the Shah. [Browne, 17] Among the better papers was *Tarbiyat* (Education), published in 1896 in Tehran, and including cultural, scientific, and social content. Its journalism was notable for a new emphasis on interpretation rather than reportage, and its style, composition, and quality of discourse were well regarded. *Tarbiyat* published regularly until the start of the Constitutional Revolution.

Ruthless censorship was maintained with swift reprisal directed against any hint of criticism. One of the few newspapers tempting fate was *Ehtiyaj* (Need), a weekly political, economic and critical paper appearing in 1898-9. It lasted only seven issues after criticising the regime and its policy. Its director moved on to publish the aptly named *Eqbal* (Chance) paper. [Sadre-Hashemi 1953, 222]

A rare non-government paper was *Adab* (Manner), published in 1900-01 and notable mainly for introducing several pages of photographic reproductions. One final newspaper is worthy of mention in the context of an authoritarian press. This was the appearance of the *Khulasatu'l-Havades* (Summary of News), Iran's first daily news daily newspaper. Like most of the papers published within Iran since 1837, this was published in 1898 under the imprimatur of the Minister for the Press. Figure 5.3 shows the headline of Iran's oldest daily paper. (Issue No. 874 (Aug 7, 1902)

Khulasatu'l-Havades was the brain-child of Abidul-Mameluk who succeeded Etemadul-Saltaneh as Minister for the Press. The initial issue was published in 1898 on the birthday of Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah's birthday, and a copy was presented to him as a birthday present in a court ceremony. He was also assured that the paper would keep the citizens informed of the 'important happenings of Iran and the world.' [Mowlana 304] Mowlana has been particularly scathing about the aesthetic quality of *Khulasatu'l-Havades* , which he described as from first to last a 'sorry-looking, poverty-stricken sheet', and also about its news content which he considered ridiculously inadequate. He did acknowledge, however, that it was the first Iranian paper to use foreign telegraphic news and its foreign dispatches were 'rather up to date'. Ironically, much of the foreign news came from Reuter's news agency, owned by the same Baron Julian de Reuter who had been denied the concession of 1972. [See Chapter 3]

The epoch of government-financed and controlled newspapers effectively ended when the *Khulasatu'l-Havades,* ceased publication in 1903 after 995 issues. Its publication had been stopped, together with that of the longer-running *Iran*, and a new fortnightly was created called *Iran-e-Sultani* (The Royal Newspaper of Iran.) It became increasingly clear, however, that there was no longer a role for such dreary, reactionary and authoritarian publications.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter produced a classic picture of an authoritarian press system, its publications and journalists hamstrung by powerful state control. The government structure, particularly the Ministry of the Press, was dedicated to producing official publications propagating the interests of the Shah and his regime in the most slavish way. In terms of promoting the interests of a highly-political monarch and his court, the exercise was conducted with some flair by Etemadu-Saltaneh as Minister for the Press or, more accurately, the chief editor of the regime. Etemadu-Saltaneh also had an oddly liberal tinge and a respect for scholarship with gave a quirkish quality to some of his publications. Even so, it was a dispirited, enervated state press in the late 1890's. Journalism was the creature of the men in power.

Despite this generally depressing picture, something of a sea change was under way in the last 20 years of the 20th century, although it took time for this new configuration to emerge. In short, there was a passage of journalism from men of power to men of revolution, exemplified in the emergence of a spirited, talented Iranian press in exile, defined by Mowlana as the new press of Iran. [1963, 256] It was a privately owned press, not the creature of authoritarianism. Indeed, it had all of the attributes of a libertarian press system, courageous and outspoken, committed to the public interest. It was progressive, not reactionary. And it was revolutionary, not conservative and repressive:

> It launched its attack on the autocratic regime of the Shah most vigorously. As the press became offensive and effective, the authorities yielded. By the beginning of the 20th century, [1906-11] when the long battle was over, the press had won: Iran had a Parliamentary Constitution and the new press had won. [Mowlana, 266]

6.2 The Exile Press

The procession of Iranian publishers, writers and journalists from Iran to avoid the autocratic regime and practice their crafts in relative freedom began in the 1870s. These migrants pioneered the production of *exile* papers directed against the Shah and his court. When social and economic conditions worsened in Iran in the 1890's, a new wave of liberal and progressive Iranians left for Europe and neighbouring countries. Additional *exile* newspapers appeared in Turkey, France, India, and Egypt. The history of Iranian journalism in the latter 19th century was largely the history of Iranian exiles producing critical newspapers free of the Shah's constraints. The following notes briefly describe the principal *exile* papers and their contributions to the Constitutional Revolution. It should be noted that different aspects of some papers considered here are discussed from different angles in Chapter Seven.

Akhtar (Star) Paper

The first exile newspaper was the eight-page weekly *Akhtar* (Star) a weekly newspaper first published in Istanbul in 1875 under the editorship of two young liberals—Mirza Mehdi and Mohammad-Tahir, both from Tabriz. As soon as the paper rolled off the press, the first copies were the way to Iran. *Akhtar* transmitted the notions of fundamental reform and modernisation into the country. In the later period of the concessions, it fought vigorously against economic penetration of European imperialism in Iran. Although the paper was banned in Iran, *Akhtar* was circulated clandestinely by liberal opponents of the regime. The paper attained such importance and influence that its news was considered the authority for discussion in assemblies and meetings. It was always under remorseless attack by government publications. In 1893 the government paper, *Nasseri*, was published in Tabriz, with a principal objective of stifling *Akhtar* 's 'influence on the public. According to Browne [1914] *Aktar* in 1887-8 was the only Iranian paper worth reading:

> The light of civilisation shone from its page on the people's hearts, and
> the taste for reading newspapers was derived from it. . . The *Akhtar* was

always in each period of its existence the lamp of all assemblies of cultivated men and the centre round which rallied the most accomplished and enlightened of the Persian exiles, and was maintained by the literary cooperation of patriotic scholars. [Browne, 17-18]

It became so influential in Iran that the term *Akhtar* was applied as a generic label to newspaper sellers. It had a readership and influence beyond the Iranian borders in southern Russia, Turkistan, India and Iraq. Its sellers were even regarded with veneration by the common people of the Caspian region who considered the reading of newspapers improper. Another innovatory feature of *Akhtar* was that it had its own printing press in Istanbul, publishing a printed product from moveable type, differentiating it from traditionally lithographed newspapers in Iran. Thus, *Akhtar* contributed to the development of typography in Iranian journalism for it was the first newspaper printed with moveable type.

According to Sadre-Hashemi , a famous Iranian scholar and journalist, *Akhtar* was not only the first paper printed by the Iranian liberals in exile but it was also the first successful paper privately owned by Iranian journalists. [1948, 1: 64] The paper continued its publication for more than 20 years, until 1896. The newspaper also had an impact in stimulating new publications, as the subsequent publishers of the *Hikmat* paper in Egypt and the publisher of *Sorayya* and *Parwarish* papers were involved in publication of *Akhtar*. Apart from setting a model for *exile* publications, it was also the first successful venture into private newspaper ownership by Iranians. After 20 years publication, the *Akhtar* was finally suppressed by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul and its printing house confiscated in the dramatic events associated with Nasseru'd-Din's assassination. The paper also contributed early martyrs to the cause of press freedom when one of its editors and a respected writer were butchered in Tabriz because of suspected complicity in the Shah's death. [Browne 1910, 94-95]

Hikmat (Wisdom) Paper

Hikmat was a weekly newspaper printed in Cairo (Egypt) in 1892-3. Its publisher, Mahdi-Khan-Nyrisi, also co-operated in the publication of *Akhtar*. *Hikmat* also

achieved considerable recognition in Iran, especially for its promotion of pure Persian language undiluted with Arabic. One of the most notable productions of *Hikmat* was a poem known as *Faryade-Watan* (the Lament of Fatherland) in the metre known as *Tawil* (Long).

Sorayya (The Pleiades) Paper

Sorayya was also a weekly printed in Cairo (Egypt) in 1898-9, a few years after *Hikmat*. It secured particular repute under its first editor, Mirza-Ali-Muhammad-Khan-Kashani, some of its admirers nominating it as the best paper published during the Qajar regime. One of its best-known articles was the Topic of Conversation *[Maqala-i-Musahaba]*, a regular comment piece. It engaged in a prolonged controversy over Haji-Najmu'd-Dowel's Calendar with *Tarbiyat* newspaper. One of its editors was a founder of Tabret College in Tabriz, and the paper was a staunch defender of the college against its critics. In the middle of its second year Mirza Muhammad-Khan left *Sorayya* and founded the *Parwarish* (Education) paper [Browne 1914, 67].

Parwarish (Education) Paper

Parwarish was a weekly newspaper first published in Cairo in June 1900. The owner, editor, and writer was Mirza-Ali-Muhammad-Khan-Kashani. Many Iranians considered this the best Iranian newspaper, and it was highly regarded by the young, exciting the emotions and compelling the affections of the Iranian public. In terms of style and tone, the paper was considered to have a peculiar quality of beauty. The fiery utterances and sweet eloquence of this paper caused something of an intellectual revolution. After the *Qanun* (The Law) paper, it was freest in its language of all the Iranian papers during the period of autocracy. It earned respect by the vehemence of its utterance, and its violent attacks on the administrative methods of the government. It was a persistent critic of the unpatriotic actions and policies of the Chief Minister, Aminu's-Sultan. [Brwone,1914, 58]

Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord) Paper

Habl-al-Maitn was a weekly newspaper published in Calcutta (India), originally lithographed and subsequently printed in 1893-4. It was edited and written by Sayyed-Jalalu'd-Din-Kashani. *Habl-al-Matin* held a particular esteem among men of learning and influence. Part was always devoted to religious matters, and it was a champion of Pan-Islamism. The *Habl-al-Matin* established such a firm hold on the Iranian audience as an exile newspaper that it was launched in a Teherani edition in April 1907 at the height of the Constitutional Revolution, appearing daily under the editorship of Sayied Hasan Kashani. The revolutionary journalist, Sheikh Yahay Kashani who had contributed extensively to the Calcutta edition was responsible for its editorials, making *Habl-al -Matin,* in Mowlana's judgment 'the most important daily newspaper of the constitutional period.' [346]

The Qanun (Law) Paper

The *Qunun* was first printed in London in 1889-90. It was edited and written by Mirza-Malkom-Khan. (See Chapter 3) The entry of *Qanun* into Iran was absolutely prohibited, and access to it was highly prized. *Qanun* was printed with a simple language and format. In the first editorial, its director wrote: '...My purpose of publication of the *Qanun* paper was the creation of law and order in the Iranian society...and encouragement of the state to obey the law...'. [Qanun 1889, No. 1] It wasted no time in launching an onslaught on the detested Iranian government:

> The control of all affairs of state in the hands of ignorant and base-born persons. The right of the state bartered to please legation dragomans. The titles and offices of the state playthings of successful knaveries. Our army the laughing-stook of world. Our princes deserving of the pity of beggars. Our towns each a metropolis of dirt. Our roads worse than the tracks of animals. [Browne 1914, 37]

The word *Qanun* was an anathema to Nasseru'd-Din Shah who opposed any system of jurisprudence. The establishment of a newspaper under this rubric by his old antagonist, Malkom Khan added further salt to the wounds, particularly as Malkom

Khan wrote the bulk of the editorials. Malkom-Khan was particularly insistent in demanding a *Majlis* representing the people, and ensuring their freedom to discuss all matters connected with the welfare of the State. His writings indicate that he was much impressed by the British parliamentary system:

> The leaders of church and state, and all persons of intelligence, must in response to the demands of this time for increased watchfulness, unite to support this Assembly, and seek by every means to make the [Iranian] people understand that the regeneration of [Iran] depends on carrying out the law, and the carrying out the law depends on the consideration and authority enjoyed by this Assembly. [Cited in Browne 1914, 37]

Many Iranians were imprisoned and punished for reading *Qanun* or having it in their possession. The *Qanun's* style was so lucid that it was comprehensible to large segments of the population. Despite stringent prohibitions, *Qanun* was smuggled into Iran inside books and envelopes.

Table 6.1 presents the 12 major newspapers in exile published between 1875 and 1900.

Table 6.1

Some Iranian Publications in Exile[1] (1875-1900)

Name	Frequency	Founded	Location
Akhtar (The Star)	Weekly	1875	Constantinople
Al-Urvatul-Vosghe (Indissoluble Link)	Weekly	1882	Paris
Qanun (The Law)	Monthly	1889	London
Shahsavan (After a Tribe in Iran)	Monthly	1889	Constantinople
Hikmat (The Wisdom]	weekly	1892	Cairo
Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord)	Weekly	1893	Calcutta
Sorayya (The Pleiades)	Weekly	1898	Cairo
Parvarish (Education)	Weekly	1900	Cairo

---

[1]. The papers appear in chronological order based on the work of Hamid Mowlana, 1963, p. 295.

6.2.1 The Rationale of the Exile Press

In many ways, the development of the exile press was an unco-ordinated venture into the unknown. Expatriate Iranians in several countries, some in the Middle East, some in Europe, some in India, shared similar patriotic impulses and the pragmatic skills to raise capital and start newspapers. It is very much the story of trail-blazing journalists who could not have known where their labours would lead. In the early difficult days of the mid-1870's, the achievement in just over 30 years of a National Parliament, a constitutional government and a free press was not even remotely foreseeable. It was, says Mowlana, the story of individuals who participated in the drama without foreseeing what the ultimate product would be. [1963, 272]

The Tobacco Concession of the early 1890's gave the exile press the first opportunity to campaign in a relatively concerted away about the conduct of the regime. With the domestic press totally controlled by the government, little critical scrutiny was applied to this extraordinary arrangement within Iran. The *exile* press, however, had no such inhibitions and they tackled the issue with considerable virulence. *Akhtar* in Istanbul was able to draw on sources in Turkey to announce the deal before it was public knowledge in Tehran. It was followed by detailed questioning of the issues involved from the other *exile* newspapers. Newspaper campaigns from outside of Iran generated public pressures within the country which encouraged the religious leaders to prohibit the usage of tobacco. (See Chapter 3) With the withdrawal of the concession the exile press acquired immense stature and influence within Iran:

> In the tobacco issue the press won a beach-head. A quarter century had changed the Role of the journalist. No longer was journalism a state monopoly. It was showing that it could be a new engine of public opinion in Iran. . .The tobacco issue was ended, but not its consequences, and among them undoubted was a great loss of royal influence as well as foreign prestige. On the other hand, a corresponding gain of prestige could be seen for the liberals and the clergy as well as those few papers in exile. The government papers published in Tehran and other cities were at their lowest ebb. [Mowlana, 294]

6.2.2 Expansion of the Exile Press

The Tobacco Concession controversy was a great boost for the development of the exile press through the 1890's, despite the demise of *Akhtar*. A second paper was started in Istanbul, *Shahsaven*, called after an Iranian tribe. It published only 300 copies a month, each placed in envelopes and addressed to statesmen, merchants, and theologians in Iran. [Browne 1914, 106] *Hikmat* and *Habl-al-Matin* were first published in the early 1980's. (See above) In total, 22 newspapers were published outside Iran, almost all of them liberal and revolutionary. Fifteen of these newspapers were located in India, with seven in Calcutta and four in Bombay. Because of the common eastern border and the Persian Gulf it was relatively easy to smuggle newspapers into Iran from India. The only other significant concentration was in Istanbul with two, although the influence of the Ottoman city was disproportionate because of *Akhtar's* role. Again, the common border assisted distribution, particularly into the important north-west province of Azerbaijan. Iranian merchants abroad played a significant role in funding these expatriate publications.

Mowlana has identified several 'shared characteristics' of the newspapers in exile. They were extremely patriotic and they pressed for constitutional and individual rights. They advocated modernisation, perhaps even westernisation for Iran. However, there was considerable divergence about how traditional patterns could be supplanted by modern institutions. Papers such as *Al-Urvatul Vosgha* (Indissoluble Link), influnced by the editorials of Jamalled Din, emphasised Pan Islamicism and reform in the framework of Islam and traditional cultures of the Middle East. On the other hand *Parvarish* in Cairo and *Akhtar* in Istanbul were strongly committed to westernisation. [1963, 298]

Of the *exile* press, it must be said that it had very little of the qualities that characterised the western press, In particular, there was little sense of traditional journalistic method, the adoption of a pro-active role in hunting out news, of

building up information through extensive research and investigation. It was polemical in the best sense of the term, but lacked the urgency and vitality of western journalism. It was hortatory and subjective, not stamped with the passion for the objectivity principle that dominated much western journalism, particuarly American journalism, of the period. It still smacked of the conventional pamphlet rather than the broadsheet or the tabloid, usually consisting of four pages of roughly foolscap size.

What news there was invariably dated quickly because of distribution difficulties. Getting a paper from Cairo, Calcutta, Paris or London took several weeks, and there was always the risk of interception at the borders or strictly enforced bans within Iran. Even from Istanbul, the logistics of distributing newspapers across the border in Iran were often extreme. For long periods all subscriptions to the *Habl-al-Matin* were banned in Iran. Even so, the exile newspapers built up considerable audiences, penetrating several thousand homes regularly but with a much greater readership per copy than could be contemplated today.

With all the imperfections, the exile press did a remarkable job in establishing journalism as a social and revolutionary force within Iran. It demonstrated to potential publishers and journalists within the country the potency of a libertarian (or social responsibility) press. It established the newspaper and the journalist as intruments of influence and power. Above all, it established an order of battle for Iran, placing the press squarely in the vanguard of an incipient revolutionary movement.

6.3 The Domestic Press in Iran

With the government press essentially moribund, and the Iranian audience picking up most of its foreign and domestic news from the exile press, opportunities began to open for a cautious extension into Iran, based on the precepts of private ownership. This did not mean that the *exile* press dried up. After the assassination of Nasseru'd-

Din in 1896, further exile newspapers appeared in Calcutta (1897 and 1899), Baku (1905), London (1906) and Bombay (1906). Iranian audiences learned first of the Russo-Japanese war and the Russian revolution of 1905 from the exile press. The government papers remained universally drab and lacking in news values. Although the newspapers in exile were rarely profitable, their product was much better than the domestic in terms of editing and production. Their presses, paper and ink were superior to anything available in Iran. Subsidies from Iranian merchants and business people abroad helped to cover deficits. Even so, the configuration of newspaper publishing within the country began to change.

In particular, the government newspapers were close to expiry. The death of Nasseru'd-Din Shah had moved an irresistible force from the path of a more flexible press. The ingenious Etemadu-Saltaneh had died, further weakening the organisation of the government press. Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah and the Ministry of the Press were less capable of keeping the screws down hard on the indigenous press. For the first time, there was a recognition that the established system of irregular publication based on monthly, weekly and bi-weekly publication had to go. Furthermore, the problems of distribution within the country had to be addressed. The primitive postal system, circulation through government office, or collection at newspaper offices did not constitute an adequate infrastructure for the dissemination of news. Aberrations of publication depending on whether it was summer or winter could no longer be countenanced. It was much easier, says Mowlana, to get an exile paper from Baku or Instanbul to Azerbaijan, or a paper from the Indian borders to the western and southern provinces of Iran than to get a government paper from Tehran to the outer provinces.

One consequence of this re-assessment was the introduction of the first daily newspaper the *Khulasatul-Havades*, whose introduction was referred to briefly in Chapter 5. This paper, however, ceased publication in August 1903, lasting for almost five years. It had some merits, notably its telegraphic news, but its

journalistic style owed nothing to the terse presentation of news. Essentially, it was producing court news in a manner even more effusive and nauseating than the government newspapers at the height of Nasseru'd-Din's reign. One alternative might have been to subsidise a private press, even if subject to strict government controls on licensing. Muazffaru'd-Din Shah, however, was preoccupied with overseas travel and his private concerns, failing to address the challenges of the *exile* press and the lack of an effective domestic counterpoint within Iran. Thus, issues such as the Russian loan in 1903 permeated public opinion through the vigorous protests of the *exile* press, with no effective response from the government.

In sum, the vitality and popularity of the *exile* press was in gross imbalance with the increasing impotence of the detested and little read domestic press. The rising fortunes of one were inversely proportionate to the decay of the other. There was a clear opportunity emerging by 1903-04 for the extension of the *modus operandi* of the *exile* press into the vacuum left by the disintegration of a feeble domestic press. This synthesis was achieved by the emergence of a revolutionary press within Iran, deriving from the exile press but ultimately absorbing it.

6.4 The Rise of a Revolutionary Press

In basic terms the rationale for the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 has been summarised with characteristic elegance by Mowlana. The Iranian Revolution was conceived by the twin movements of nationalism and constitutionalism. And printers, publishers, and journalists were important influences in preparing the public for revolution and in maintaining the fighting spirit against despotism. [1963, 300]

The fundamental conjunction was simplicity itself. Revolutionary ideas were brought into Iran by the distribution of the *exile* press. And a growing revolutionary movement was organised to distribute these papers and exploit their radical content. In time, a rapidly-growing revolutionary press within Iran largely assumed the revolutionary functions undertaken so effectively by the press in exile. A further

factor in this equation was the development of an underground press through the publication of *shabnameh* or *nocturnal letters*. Furthermore, the growing strength of the *anjomans*, or secret societies fostered the emergence of a political press in Iran which evolved into an embryonic political-party press. Finally, the wholly-government-controlled administration of the domestic press was supplanted by an increasingly-privately-owned press.

In a tactical sense, the way for the revolutionary press had been cleared by the existence of clandestine printing of revolutionary pamphlets, periodicals and even placards from at least as early as 1891. According to Browne, the revolutionary leaders used the 'tool of journalism' to put out this material. On October 7, 1981, a government paper in Teheran conceded that revolutionary pamphlets and placards had been distributed:

> It minimised their importance, but declared that four persons accused of their authorship had been arrested and exiled. [1914, 102]

By 1903, the latent hostility within Iran over the customs tariffs and the handing over of organisation to Belgian officials, notably M. Naus, began to find expression within the country. There were serious riots in Teheran and Yazd. The *ulama*, particularly in Tabriz (Azerbaijan) were active in denouncing the new customs duties and trade regulations. [Browne 1910, 107] The *London Times* in August 1903 described the outlook in Iran as gloomy, the disturbances as continuing, and the government as helpless for lack of troops and money. [August 21, 1903, cited Mowlana, 310]

Under considerable pressure, the Chief Minister resigned and was replaced by the redoubtable Aynu-Dowleh, an intermittent but influential figure on the Shah's side through the Constitutional Revolution. (He was a grandson of Fath Ali Shah, the first of the Qajar rulers.) Aynu-Dowleh detested the press, even the languishing government newspapers; both the daily *Khulasatul-Havades* and the tri-weekly *Iran* collapsing during his ministry. His greatest fear was that the controlled press in Iran

might become as aggressively revolutionary as the *exile* press. Accordingly, he imprisoned or exiled several editors and suppressed newspapers. According to Malekzadeh, press control in Iran became so severe that news reading was made a political crime. [1951, 1: 270]

Aynu-Dowleh's ill-considered repression had the effect of accelerating the revolutionary movement by generating extreme discontent among Iranians. This was reflected in increased activity by the *Anjomans*. And it also gave increased momentum to the emergence of an underground press and the widespread publication of *Shabnameh*. This was at a time when rivalries between Russia and Britain were at fever pitch and both sides were propagandising heavily in Iran. The Russians published a newspaper in Iranian to present their case, a weekly edited by a Russian and aimed particularly at the Caspian Sea border region of Iran. According to Browne, the Russian newspaper was founded during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 to proclaim the Russian advance and victories which, of course, never transpired. It was distributed throughout Iran by Russian consulates. [1914, 110; 1910, 134]

6.4.1 Journalists and the *Anjomans*

The advent of a more confident and competent press was also apparent in the growing participation of journalists in the *anjomans*. This was largely a recognition of the increasing importance of public opinion, as influenced, and refracted, through the newspapers, but it also recognised the growing professional stature of journalists. With religious leaders, journalists played an important role in the formation and development of *anjomans*. Of the 54 members of the first revolutionary committee, 20 were journalists and writers with the remainder, largely comprising *ulama* and merchants. [Mowlana 1963, 315] The distinction between writers and journalists is unclear. A logical division would be to categorise writers as the producers largely of the extensive pamphlet material, confining journalists to

press materials. Journalists, however, produced pamphlets and writers contributed material to the newspapers.

Apart from stature given by access to the columns of the press, journalists were invaluable to the organisation of the revolutionary movement because they were accustomed to operating clandestinely. Furthermore, they had the virtue of anonymity because much of their material was published anonymously. It is unclear whether Iranian journalists abided by any code of protection of sources, part of the journalistic method applied in many Western countries. They had the opportunity, however, to operate secretly or openly by and through the newspapers. [Mowlana 1963, 318] In short, they could act as both journalists and citizens; they could operate either through the newspapers or by clandestine networks. An outstanding example of the prominence of journalists in the *anjomans* was Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, one of the editors of the *Akhtar* and the founder of an *anjoman* in Kereman. Thus, their status differed from the religious leaders who were important and respected because of their access to and, frequently, virtual control of religious and educational networks. Inevitably, intelligence of the revolutionary movement in Russia in 1904-05 filtered into Iran, particularly in Tabriz in the north-west. A number of journalists were members of the *Anjomans* in Tabriz, and assisted the creation of awareness of the rising revolutionary tide in Russia, a further stimulus to the national awakening in Iran.

A crucial step was the drafting in May 1904 by the revolutionary committee in Tehran of a charter containing 14 articles as a general program for a general uprising. The thrust of the charter was the dissemination of information and it contained specific tasks for translators, writers, intelligenstsia and printers. Particular stress was placed on the revolutionary press whose functions were laid down in articles 10 and 11. Under article 10, journalists and other revolutionary writers were directed to establish and maintain contacts with the important *exile* press, and to prepare explanatory articles for foreign newspapers on the incipient revolutionary spirit in

Iran. More importantly, journalists and writers were ordered to establish an underground press, giving formal status to the *shabnameh* or noctural letters which had existed since the early 1890s.

6.4.2 The Underground Press

Some consideration has already been given to the *shabnameh* and the treatment here is directed largely to their qualities as newspapers. According to Mowlana, some 50 samples of these small sheet papers, generally about quarto size, have been preserved in the *Majlis* Library in Tehran. Regrettably, very little of their content is available in English. The *shabnameh* usually bore the imprint of an individual journalist or writer rather than a conventional newspaper masthead. Some of the papers were produced by small printing presses operated secretively; others were 'jelly graphed', an indigenous duplicating or roneoing process. Mostly, the *shabnameh* carried neither title nor date of publication:

> [The shabnameh] carried the editorials of the revolutionary leaders and news of general uprising. Some of these papers even came out daily but most of them were weekly, and often irregular. As the time went on the secret societies made use of this new technique in their struggle to overthrow despotism. The papers were usually delivered at night to the homes of people...[Mowlana 1963, 310]

Printing supplies were often short and expedients for ink and paper were applied. Lack of type was a more serious constraint. All supplies had to be imported and irregular import flows constrained printed papers. Mowlana expressed amazement at the ingenuity and energy of revolutionary journalists, propagandists and popular political writers servicing the underground press:

> The fact is that the newspaper had won great respect in this period. [1901-06] 'I saw it in the paper' began to be taken seriously in answer to the question, 'how do you know that?' Information was also disseminated among the common people by the public reading of newspapers in coffee houses and other public places. [Mowlana 1963, 319]

Among the underground papers published regularly and under distinctive titles were:

Lisanul-Ghayb (The Tongue of the Unseen), published during 1901-02 by a revolutionary *anjoman* in Tehran.

Ghayrat (The Zeal) edited and published by another *anjoman* in Tehran during the same years. A member of the revolutionary committee publishing *Ghayrat* was Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan who was killed during the subsequent revolution.

Ghaybi (The Unseen), edited by a revolutionary leader, and published in Isfahan.

Hamman-e-Jinniyan (The Genie's Bath) published in Iran during the final days of Qajar authoritarianism [Browne 1914, 20].

In terms of press theory, the role of the journalists who worked for the underground, revolutionary press has many elements of the democratic participant model outlined in Chapter 2. In short, the journalists were not objective observers applying a rigorous and standard journalistic method to gather and present news. They were actually participating in the build-up of the revolution as direct participants, by writing propaganda and polemical content to stir up the revolutionary consciousness of the mass audience. Thus, they provided a democratic-participant counterpoint to the remaining vestiges of the Qajar's autocratic press.

6.5 Journalists and the Revolution

It is virtually impossible to give a comprehensive, cohesive account of the role of Iranian journalism during the Constitutional Revolution (1906-11) in the absence of primary source material. While newspapers multiplied during this period, and many copies survive of single issues, very little of this material has been rendered into English. While the Constitutional Revolution has spawned a substantial literature from Iranian scholars, a very small part of it deals with the methodology of Iranian journalists or any sort of consistent content analysis of the individual papers. This is a pity because the Constitutional Revolution provides an opportunity rare in the history of journalism to analyse an authoritarian press at the point of becoming a

revolutionary, or democratic participant press, and then a modified libertarian press. It is, therefore, something of a misnomer to talk about 'covering the revolution', the heading that Mowlana gives to his account of the press during the revolution proper. The account that follows, therefore, does not pretend to be anything other than a commentary on principal themes.

6.5.1 The Constitutional Basis

The greatest fundamental reform that the revolution brought to Iranian journalism was the protection of the constitution, a benefit, of course, that it shared with the Iranian population at large. Thereafter, the Iranian press had a constitutional basis that might be ignored or discounted but that could never be totally rejected. In theory, the constitutional documents established libertarian press theories in Iran, although this libertarian foundation was not always been applied, even during the currency of the revolution itself.

The initial constitutional document, the *Farman* or Royal Proclamation by Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah on August 5, 1906, does not make any direct reference to the role, freedoms or responsibilities of the press, although it does provide that the text of 'this August rescript' should be published and proclaimed 'so that all the people of [Iran], being duly informed of our good intentions, all of which the progress of the Government and people of [Iran], may with tranquil minds, engage in prayer for us." [Browne 1910, 354]

The Electoral Law promulgated on September 9, 1906 makes no direct reference to the press as having a recognised role in the conduct of elections, although there are two sections which imply such a role. Article 18 provides that the time and place of the election must be made known a month beforehand by the local government 'by means of printed leaflets and other suitable channels of advertisement.' [Browne 1910, 358] Article 23 provides that all written or spoken statements of members of the Assembly on the affairs of the Government or Nation shall be 'free', evidently an

extension of parliamentary privilege on statements made inside the parliamentary chambers. This privilege, however, is seemingly qualified by confinement to comment on government and national affairs. Furthermore, such privilege is not available to a member making speeches or writing contrary to the public good. Such members, according to the enactment of the 'most luminous law', shall deserve punishment. It is unclear to what extent such qualified privilege would extend to press reporting or comment on such material. In Westminster countries at least, coverage of such matters would attract a limited privilege for reporting of parliamentary proceedings.

The Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906 are rather more specific in relation to press rights to report the *Majlis,* particularly in the rights given to the press in the initial section on the Constitution of the Assembly. Under Article 13, it is prescribed that the deliberations of the *Majlis* must be public in order to give effect to their results. The internal regulations of the *Majlis* provide that journalists and the public have the right to be present but not to speak. Article 13 continues:

> Newspapers may print and publish all the debates of the Assembly, provided they do not change or pervert their meaning, so that the public may be informed of the subjects of discussion and the detail of what takes place. Everyone, subject to his paying due regard to the public good, may discuss them in the public Press, so that no matter may be veiled or hidden from any person. Therefore all newspapers, provided that their contents be not injurious to any one of the fundamental principles of the Government or the Nation are authorised and allowed to print and publish all matters advantageous, such as the debates of the Assembly, and the opinion of the people on these debates. But if anyone, actuated by interested motives, shall print in the newspapers or any other publications anything contrary to what has been mentioned, or inspired by slander of calumny, he will render himself liable to cross-examination, judgement and punishment, according to law. [Browne, 364]

Although heavily dependent on interpretations of the 'public interest', or 'interested motives', or 'change or pervert their meaning', this is a more copious statement on press privileges in relation to reporting Parliaments than most western-nation constitutions provide. In theory at least, it gives the press a reasonable guide to what they may or may not publish

The Supplementary Fundamental laws promulgated on October 7, 1907 include a section on 'Rights of the Persian Nation' which is essentially a Bill of Rights in the accepted western sense. Although it includes no specific press freedoms, it does incorporate a qualified protection against censorship in Article 20:

> All publications except heretical books and matters hurtful to the perspicuous religion [of Islam] are free, and are exempt from the censorship. If, however, anything should be discovered in them contrary to the Press Law, their publisher or writer is liable to punishment according to that law. If the writer be known, and be resident in [Iran], then the publisher, printer, and distributor shall not be liable to prosecution. [Browne, 375]

The rights guaranteed by the Fundamental Laws also protected from censorship material passed through the post office (Article 22) or transmitted by telegraph. (article 23) Clearly, the main punitive thrust of article 23 was levelled against the writer or journalist, rather than the publisher or the printer and distributors who have only a technical responsibility for what appears in the paper. Furthermore, the only restraint on publication is heresy or other material considered deleterious to the Islamic religion. There is a clear intent that political and public debate should be free.

The reference in this constitutional provision to the press law refers to a set of laws comprising an introduction, six chapters and 52 articles. This codification includes sections on Journals and Newspapers; The limitation of fault in relation to the Assembly; and Trial and Punishment for infringements. This suggests that censorship and punishment of newspapers and journalists would also be applicable to reporting of wider matters of public interest. This is the interpretation of Qasemi, that publications and the press are free to present all matters 'except those that are detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.' If, says Qasemi, publishers, journalists or writers published a critical article in breach of the press law, then they would be liable to punishment. [1993, 30] Regrettably, it is impossible to carry this analysis any further in the absence of the detailed provisions of the Press Law.

6.5.2 The Journalistic Record

The role of journalists in the revolution itself was threefold: to report the news of the general uprising and subsequent developments to the people; to interpret events as far as possible; to disseminate knowledge, and awareness about constitutionalism to the people. Remarkably, it is possible to pick up more from the various accounts of how the *London Times* covered the war than the practical details of how the swelling ranks of Iranian journalists, working in a constitutional context of significant freedom, covered the war.

On the analogy of information about how foreign correspondents covered the war a few suggestions might be made. Journalists were given reasonable access to what today would be called 'news opportunities'. That is, they were able to attend and report public events with some official recognition of their role and responsibility. Secondly, major public and military officials were available for interview, although there were not formal press conferences on contemporary lines. Thirdly, there were designated spokespersons who made material available and answered questions.

This kind of projection, of course, must be treated with considerable caution. There are numerous reasons why the correspondent of the august *London Times* might be given special privileges. References to reports from lesser European correspondents, however, do suggest that channels of formal assistance existed for journalists, particularly in Tehran. It would also seem that Iranian journalists exercised their skills in a manner consistent with conventional notions of news gathering. Clearly, Iranian journalists directly reported the tumultuous events in the capital in 1907-09, although coverage of events in other cities was largely dependent on newsletters or reportage from observers. Conversely, newspapers in the provincial centres were dependent on similar informal news sources for their coverage of what was happening in Tehran. There seems to have been no organised or co-ordinated use of the telegraph for extensive newsgathering in a national sense.

Summarising the achievement of Iranian newspapers in covering the Constitutional Revolution, Mowlana concedes that it seems incredible that newspapers had no organised means of covering the general uprising but relied almost wholly on the chance arrival of private letters and of official and semi-official telegrams: 'Only in Tehran were the newspapers able to cover the events on the spot.' [1963, 329]

In the absence of direct, observational coverage a useful expedient was to fill the columns with activities of the *anjomans*. This was certainly revolutionary news but in terms of professional journalistic method it was akin to covering World War 11 from the pages of the House of Commons Hansard. Even so, the newspapers were dominated by politics and revolutionary coverage. There was little other topical news and advertising was sparse. Monthly magazines had largely gone out of fashion, and the drift was firmly towards daily and weekly production.

Even if the Constitutional Revolution was restricted in the opportunities it gave for journalistic development it did impose intense pressures on newspapers and journalists. The oscillations in fortunes between the revolutionary movement, focussed on the *Majlis*, and authoritarian reaction, focussing on the Shah and his Russian supporters, were reflected in the opportunities, and indeed the fate, of individual newspapers and journalists. By late 1906, on the eve of the principal period of revolution, Mowlana concluded that the press had done well and that Journalism had made distinct gains in prestige:

> Iranian journalists were beginning to understand that there was something called 'public opinion' and that they could circulate their papers among a large audience if they recognised the right method. Newspapers were coming to be regarded as a necessity in Iranian society. . .There can be do doubt that the level of literacy in Iran was rising. . .The state of reading was fed largely by journalism. Newspapers probably went to the homes of a great majority of the literate population. But each copy passed from hand to hand, and was read aloud in the coffee-houses and assemblies, and its articles were discussed and thoroughly digested. [1963, 330]

The Qajars had wasted their historical opportunities to establish, and perhaps to manipulatre, a mass press. By acting as a conduit between new and old an increasingly independent press made a substantial contribution to the early phases of

the Constitutional Revolution, effectively laying the foundation stones for its success. Between 1906 and 1909, it went through a 'remarkable series of transfigurations.' [Mowlana 1963, 332]

6.5.3 A Transfigured Press: 1906-11

The inauguration of a constitutionally 'free' press was relected initially in the removal of the prior restraints on publication. Where the censorship processes of the Qajars required submission of all material for publication to the Ministry of the Press for approval, the newspapers now were technically clear of such prior restraint. Some constraints still lingered, however, in a technical obligation for a newspaper to obtain a licence before starting publication. The first 'free' newspaper appeared in Tabriz in October 1906, almost a year after the start of revolution. This was the quarto-sized *Melli* (The National), a weekly which became the official journal of the Tabriz *Anjoman*.

Of great significance was the appearance of the eight-page daily *Majlis*, first published in late November, 1906. *Majlis* was the vision of Agha Mirza Mohsen, a liberal who sought a license to publish a free newspaper and to report the news of the National Assembly. A royal decree gave him 'the privilege of a free press to publish his paper and to choose his own staff of reporters and writers.' According to Mowlana, this decree was an important document because it effectively led to the end of press censorship in 1907. [1963, 335]

Majlis had the basic attributes of a parliamentary record in the sense of the Westminster Hansard and the US Congressional Record. It was staffed by an outstanding group of revolutionary journalists who stuck with the paper through five turbulent years. They included Sheikh Yahya Kashani, who had been a contributor to the exile *Habl-al-Matin* in Calcutta. It was arguably the most successful newspaper of the period because of its direct concern with the most important topical issue, what happened in the newly-formed *Majlis* and how well it did its job:

> The appearance of the free press and the rise of the common man were closely integrated. The daily *Majlis* appeared just as the common man began to win recognition under the parliamentary constitution. The [editorial staff] not only gave the public what it wanted, but also what was in its best interest. The result was tremendous. The circulation of the *Majlis* first reached 7,000 and then gradually rose to 10,000. [Mowlana 1963, 337]

For the first time, Iranian journalists were also compelled to grapple with the intangible quality of news, news values and newsworthiness, a battle which had preoccupied their colleagues in advanced western systems of news organisation for more than a century. Under the Qajars, news values were essentially irrelevant. The requirement was for basic material which could be translated into fulsome praise of the regime and government:

> If God let things happen that were not in accordance with this conception of the fitness of things, [the journalist] simply suppressed them. He refused the responsibility of letting his readers learn about things that he knew ought not to have happened. However, in the 20th Century, the [Constitutional Revolution] was giving editors a new conception of news. [Mowlana 1963, 337]

Conversely, there was a remarkable development in news sources as public groups and individuals recognised the benefits of a free press and public opinion. This was, perhaps, manifested firstly in the members of the *Majlis* and their recognition that their deliberations were not confined to the four walls of the parliamentary building, but projected to a vast mass audience. The new privilege of the franchise, albeit to a limited group of voters, was accompanied by the broader privileges of access to regular news coverage.

These new-found freedoms and the aspirations associated with them were rudely dashed after the death of Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah who had ratified the Fundamental Laws a few days beforehand, In a symbolic gesture, his successor and son, Mohammad Ali, spurned the *Majlis* and the press by excluding them from his coronation. The Ministry of the Press revived attempts to impose prior restraint and further restrictions on the newly-free press. The *Majlis*, however, was not to be intimidated and, as we have seen, the Supplementary Laws contained a vigorous

statement of the right to a freepress. According to Sadre Hashemi, the press was already recognised as the western conception of a 'Fourth Estate of the Iranian Constitution' and 'we cannot have freedom' unless we have a freepress.'[1948 1: 17-18] A society was formed called the *Anjoman-e-Gulestan* comprising newspaper editors and other revolutionary leaders who sought for the constitutional freedom of the press bestowed in the Bill of Rights in the supplementary laws which were approved by the *Majlis* in October 1907.

Despite the guarantees of press freedoms, there was repression of newspapers during the Constitutional Revolution, even from the *Majlis*, which suppressed newspapers particularly for criticisms of the religious leaders. This, of course, was not inconsistent with the constitutional provisions outlined above, but it did not accord with the notion of the press as a Fourth Estate of the Realm. At the height of his powers, the suppression of the press by Mohammad Shah was an overwhelming disincentive, and many newspapers were either forcibly closed or effectively discouraged from maintaining publication. With the abdication of Mohammad Ali Shah and the assertion of the Constitution in 1909, newspaper publication resumed but in a much more muted way.

The ebb and flow of fortunes during the Constitutional Revolution also took a heavy toll of journalists. Two were strangled, including Mirza Jahangir Khan, considered by both Browne and Mowlana to be one of the most courageous editors of the revolution, if not the greatest one. Another was poisoned. Others were imprisoned, banished or had their right to publish taken away. The constitutional provisions did not guarantee any right to either publication or protection from the excesses of the law. At the height of the authoritarian reaction under Mohammad Ali Shah, newspapers and journalists were exceedingly vulnerable. Although constitutional rights were essentially restored after the overthrow of Mohammad Ali Shah, repression rose to new heights of severity in the years of Russian supremacy in 1911-12 and subsequent years, as Browne records:

> Behold, then, Tehran prostrate beneath the iron heel of Colonel Liakhoff and his Cossacks, despotism once more triumphant, the young Constitution crushed, the Press gagged, the popular leaders either violently slain(like Mirza Jahangir Khan, the editor of the *Sure-Israfil.* . . or in chains. . .or fugitives in the forests. . .or refugees at the British legation. For the time being all hope of freedom and better government in Persia seemed to be at an end. [1914, 213]

The press was very much a target in this bloody saga of repression. In terms of sacrifice, particularly loss of human life, the Iranian press in the Constitutional Revolution made a more substantial contribution to press freedoms than their colleagues in most Western countries.

While Browne was sometimes inclined to patronise the Iranian press, he was a staunch defender of its basic achievement. He praised particularly the standards of newspapers such as *Sure-Israfil* (Angel of the Resurrection), the *Habl-al-Matin*, and the *Musawat* (Equality). These newspapers, he said, were of a very high order, and the papers afforded examples of a prose style 'forcible, nervous and concise, hitherto unknown.' [1910, 121] He fiercely rejected criticism by the *London* Times in 1908 that the 'free press of [Iran]. . .proved to be as mischievous and as dangerous as it that proved to be in other Oriental lands.' At its best, said Browne, the free [Iranian] press reached a very high level, and at its worst it was superior to certain 'English, French and American papers'. [128]

6.6 An Enhanced Press

In a technical sense the Constitutional Revolution enhanced the press in two ways. Firstly, it brought new formats of design and genre to the traditionally cramped confines of Iranian newspapers. Despite supply problems, the new breed of publishers was prepared to experiment with larger formats. For example, the *Irane-Nuw* (New Persia), first published in August 1909, adopted a folio-size common to many western newspapers, which it also emulated in form and style. There was also an enhancement of genres with entry into hitherto neglected fields such as scientific newspapers and women's newspapers (see below). The spread of the *Tanz*

newspapers— satirical, comical or derisory newspapers, often with strong social and political elements, is considered separately in Chapter Seven.

The enhancement of circulation was a largely inevitable consequence of changes in audience. The *exile* newspapers had given Iranians a taste for news which had never been tapped by the drab government newspapers whose audience was largely conscripted government officials. The *shabnameh* were not really alternatives to conventional newspapers but also a complement. In turn, they contributed to the increasing audience demand for the widening range of genre newspapers. Improvements in format, design and style made newspapers more attractive, enhancing audience appeal and access. All of these factors coalesced in audience demand which stimulated the rapid growth of new titles and the aggregate circulation.

Appendix 3 illustrates this great surge in newspaper demand and its consequent ebb and flow in a series of tables extending from 1907 until 1925, the end of the Qajar dynasty. In particular, it lists the titles published each year, their places of publication, and their genre. It must be emphasised that the titles do not distinguish between new and existing newspapers published each year, but give an aggregate picture. Thus, it is possible to point to the peak of the new wave of newspaper publishing in 1907-08, its precipitate decline after the Second Coup d'etat and suppression of the press by Mohammad Ali Shah in 1909, renewed growth but not to the peak previous level after the restoration of the constitution, then further decline after the reactionary triumph of December 1911 and the subsequent plunge into drift and disorder. Although the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution is not a principal theme here, the tabulation presented until 1925 makes it possible to trace the subsequent erratic patterns of sporadic growth and contraction.

Browne estimated that during the Constitutional Period the circulation of the newspapers went up significantly, with most enjoying sales of 2-3,000. Thus the *Mosavat* (Equality) had a circulation of 3000, the *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of

Resurrection) from 5000 to 5500; the *Majlis* (Parliament) gradually rose from 7000

to 10,000 and the *Anjoman* (Assembly) in Tabriz 5000. [1914, 25] During the

Second Period of the Constitutional Revolution, (July 1909 -late 1911), although

more daily newspapers appeared, and they were generally bulkier, their overall

circulations declined. Thus the *Istiqlale Iran* (Independence of Iran) paper had a

circulation of from 800 to 1000 copies, and the *Irane Nuw* (New Iran) paper, which

had the largest circulation very rarely reached the 3000 mark. Browne ascribed this

diminution in the number of readers to greater poverty resulting from incessant

disorder and disturbances, and a continuing high illiteracy rate: There were,

however, some bright spots in these erratic patterns of demand:

> One point worthy of mention is that in the latter days of the period of
> Autocracy the wealthy and well-known Hajji-Zaynu'l-'Abidin Taqioff of
> Baku, an eminent philanthropist, subscribed yearly for nearly 500 copies
> of the Calcutta, *Habl-al-Matin*, paying the subscription himself, and
> arranged that they should be sent gratuitously to the Shi'i doctors of
> theology and students 'residing at Karbala, Najaf and others of the Holy
> Shrines, regularly and directly from the chief office. This great service
> rendered by his director to the enlightenment of the *Ulama'* and their
> political awakening was conducive to the circulation of newspapers in
> spiritual circles and societies. [Browne 1914, 26]

Another advance conducive to higher circulation was the replacement of the

traditional *Nasta'liq* writing, with *Nask* writing in newspapers. The latter style was

better suited to the increasing shift from lithograph publication to moveable type.

In terms of numbers of newspapers published, the peak year was 1907 when 84

newspapers were published, followed by 1910 when 36 newspapers were

circulated. This fall by more than half illustrates the net impact of Mohammad Ali

Shah's ferocious clampdown on the press. Somewhat remarkably, the gradual

decline in the fortunes of the constitutionalists from 1911 was reflected in a relatively

minor decline in newspaper titles, with 33 newspaper titles listed in that year. The

greatest number of newspapers was published in Tehran (148 newspapers),

followed by Tabriz (51), Rasht (25), Isfahan (20), and Mashhad(10). [See Appendix

3]

6.7 A Party Press

The official political parties, such as the Democrats, Union and Progress, Moderates, only emerged in the Second Period of the Constitution, and were generally recognised only after the opening of the Second *Majlis.* on November 15, 1909). It is, therefore, not correct to link any of them to newspapers before that date. During the First Period of the Constitution the only organised party was the Social Democrats whose organ was the *Mujahid* (Fighter) paper, published at Tabriz.

The number of political newspapers increased gradually in subsequent years, and the political parties began to publish their own newspapers. It was inevitable that political leaders, once they had discovered the usefulness of the press in dealing with controversy, should employ newspapers as political tools to help them fight the battles which revolved around the Parliamentary Constitution. According to Mowlana :

> After the Iranian Revolution, as party feeling grew, many editors found themselves the mouthpieces of the political parties. To some extent, the power of the press in this period rested in the final analysis upon the ability of its editors to create a party and lead it. The journal of opinion of the revolutionary days was, by its very nature, predestined to become the organ of a party, or at any rate the mouthpiece of a school. The flood of Iranian opinion suddenly released after years of suppression was not to be denied an outlet. During 1911-1925 it found expression in high-sounding phrases and often irresponsible abuse. Yet, the years between 1912 and 1925 were stormy also because of the clash of the big powers-especially Germany, Britain and Russia- in Iran. While this rivalry was not a new phenomenon in itself, its effect on Iranian journalism was important because it was coloured by propaganda and profound ideological differences. [1963, 406]

With the introduction of a constitutional system and Parliament influenced by western models, it was perhaps inevitable that Iran should gradually adopt a political party system. Thus, the new parties were often modelled after European archetypes. Apart from western influence, there was also the experience with, and development of the *anjomans.* In 1909 the first two official parties were founded, under the names of Democrat and Moderate. The Moderates who had a majority in the *Majlis*, represented the privileged classes, the aristocracy, the rich merchants, and a few of the liberal clergy. They were in favour of gradual and moderate reform. The Moderates had three

dailies, two weeklies and one bi-weekly-papers, printed in Tehran. The *Anjoman* (Council) paper was their official organ. Other papers were affiliated with other parties and supported their policies. The Democrats were a minority but had considerable influence in the National Assembly. They were highly liberal with a decided tendency toward socialism. [Mowlana, 1963, 408]

Unlike the Moderates, the Democrats established a relatively large network of newspapers throughout the country. There were 14 papers, including 11 weeklies, two bi-weeklies, and one daily paper. Their main organs were the daily *Irane-Nuw* (New Iran) in Tehran, the weekly *Shafagh* (Aurora) paper in Tabriz, and the bi-weekly *Nuw-Bahar* (Early Spring) in Mashhad. By 1912, journalism in Tehran was almost completely partisan. Although some papers such as *Sharq* (The East) and *Raad* (Thunder), claimed to be independent, they were linked in the popular consciousness with the Moderates. Editorials assumed the right of a newspaper to play a leading role in political leadership, to write about merits of candidates, to instruct and direct the public, to criticise the local and national administrations, and to speak with authority on many subjects.

One example of an important political paper was the *Tajaddod* (Renaissance), the organ of the National Democratic Party founded by Mohammad-Ali-Khiabani. A former deputy to the *Majlis*, he was a talented orator and vigorous politician. He went to the Caucasus in 1911 and established contacts with Russian revolutionaries. Returning to Tabriz, he started underground activity with the aim of liberating Iran from foreign influences by founding the National Democratic Party. [Mowlana, 1963, 419] The *Tajaddod* was his main weapon in the early period. His paper printed his fiery speeches and demands for radical reform.

6.8 A Women's Press

During the Constitutional revolutionary period, women journalists were active, creating a range of new publications targetted at a female audience. Between 1906 and

1925, 12 newspapers and magazines were printed and edited by Iranian women. If the number of women contributors is included, it is a reasonable assumption that at least 30 women journalists were active in writing, editing and publishing newspapers.

Table 6.2

Women's Publications—1906-1925

Name	Frequency	Year	Location
Danish (Knowledge)	Irregular	1910	Tehran
Shokofeh (The Blossom)	Fortnightly	1913	Tehran
Zabane-Zanan (Language of Women)	Fortnightly	1919	Isfahan
Alame-Nasavan (The World of Women)	Bi-monthly	1920	Tehran
Jahane-Zanan (The World of Women)	Fortnightly	1921	Mashhad
Nasavane-Vatankhah (Patriotic Women)	Irregular	1924	Tehran
Nassavan-Sharq (Women of the East)	Fortnightly	1925	Anzali

Contents of these publications included social, ethical, and family topics. The bulk of the newspapers were printed in Tehran.

6.9 Conclusion

Appendix 4 presents a series of tables directed to giving an overview of the growth of the Iranian press between 1837, when the first newspaper appeared, until 1925, when the Qajars were displaced by the Pahlavi regime. The tabulations reinforce three key points. Firstly, very few newspapers were published in Iran before 1906, the era of authoritarian Government population. Secondly, the Constitutional Revolution produced a remarkable generation of news titles. Admittedly, this level was not sustained but even under extreme repression, overall publications did not slump to the levels of the pre-revolutionary period. Thirdly, a reasonable record of press publication was sustained until 1925.

The conclusion is unmistakable that the Constitutional Revolution pushed Iran firmly into the mass communications era. Furthermore the Constitutional Revolution established the constitutional basis of an enduring system of press freedom, press independence and press initiative. Constitutionally, Iran has had a libertarian press system with enduring revolutionary overtones. In no sense has its press tradition ever reflected the tenets of developmental journalism. Finally, the Constitutional Revolution established journalism as a profession with its own distinctive ethos and methodology. In every respect, the revolution had a transfiguring impact on the Iranian press and the practice of Iranian journalism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A REVOLUTIONARY PRESS

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, three types of publications of primal importance in the Constitutional Revolution are considered: the political papers, the humorous or satirical papers (*Tanz*), and nocturnal letters or underground papers (*Shabnameh*). Examples of each genre will be discussed in the light of their basic functions:

- The leadership function of the political press;

- The persuasive or stimulative function of the Tanz;

- The information function of the *Shabnameh* or underground papers.

Further account is also taken of the important contribution of *exile* papers that were published outside of Iran during the revolutionary period. (See chapter 5) Finally, the role of the press associated with the secret societies (*anjomans*) during the revolution is considered.

During the revolutionary period, popular literature and poetry, especially new poetry and satires, played an effective role in enlightening Iranians. It should be noted that the best humorous or caricature publications appeared in poems. Poetry embodies many Persian values and, reciprocally, sensitivity toward these values culminate in love of poetry. The result is an idiosyncratic form of poetical expression whose distinctiveness and subtlety often eludes successful translation. Even so, the satirical quality and the biting humour of this characteristic poetry emerges in the translations quoted below. The Iranian journalists recognised that emotive poetry could be a powerful instrument for the revolution. Hence, popular poems were used by journalists and revolutionary forces as a political instrument, particularly against corrupt and hypocritical officials.

A characteristic of the poetry of the constitutional revolutionary period was its attempt to liberate itself from the strict metric requirements of traditional Iranian poetry, and to bring the language of the poet closer to the vernacular. Political journalism was supported by the new form of poetry, and many of the political issues of this period were translated into poetic forms. Arianpur argues:

> Poetry was used in the revolutionary struggle to educate and excite the people, and ballads became a popular genre. Many ballads of nationalist content spread rapidly in the major cities and were recited by the populace. [1971, 30]

7.2 The Leadership Function of the Political Press

The evolution of the main newspapers comprising the political press has been considered in chapter 5. To recapitulate briefly, the first, and perhaps the most important of the papers to emerge during the actual revolution was the *Majlis* (Parliament), providing full reports of the debates in the National Assembly. Even earlier in the revolutionary period, however, active and influential newspapers with a firm political orientation had been published. Examples were *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of Resurrection), *Habl-al-Matin* (Firm Cable), *Mosavat* (Equality), *Nasime-Shomal* (Northern Breeze). According to Browne, these newspapers provided patterns of a prose style, forcible, nervous, and concise, hitherto almost unknown in Iran. [Browne 1914, 25]

Thus, revolutionary thought was fostered and expanded by political journalism during both the lead-up to the Constitutional Revolution and its culmination. The year 1907 was significant for Iranian journalism not only because the number of political papers increased but also the format and size of some papers were changed. Newspapers published editorials against the Shah's policies. New writing styles emerged dictated by simple, pungent prose, and there was a greater focus on religious and political ideas. Political journalism was supported by the new forms of poetry and the vernacular. In total, the political press was summoned as a social and political tool for awakening the

people against the autocracy, illuminating public opinion and supporting the revolutionary forces.

Table 7.1. provides a select list of important political newspapers and periodicals published during the broad preparatory period to the Constitutional Revolution and the Revolution itself. Included are publications which contained criticisms, mild or vituperative, of the principles of administration, complaints about government policies, guidance for the revolutionary spirit in assailing the detested aristocracy. It will be noted that there is some overlap between *exile* papers and political-leadership newspapers here, although the bulk of the newspapers were published in Tehran. It is impossible to differentiate the two categories completely, so the political qualities of some *exile* newspapers are treated here, although the principal examination of *exile* newspapers falls in a subsequent section.

Table 7.1

Political Press Leaders of the Constitutional Revolution

Name	Frequency	Founded	Location
Star *(Akhtar)*	Weekly	1875	Istanbul
Indissoluble Link *(Al-Urvatul Vosgha)*	Weekly	1882	Paris
Law *(Qanun)*	Monthly	1889	London
The Pleiades *(Sorayya)*	Weekly	1898	Cairo (Egypt)
Education *(Parvarish)*	—	—	Calcutta
Parliament *(Majlis)*	Daily	1906	Tehran
The Call of Homeland (Nedaye Vatan)	Daily	1906	Tehran
The Angel of Resurrection *(Sure-Israfil)*	Weekly	1907	Tehran
The Firm Cord *(Habl-al-Matin)*	Daily	1907	Tehran
The Holy Spirit *(Ruhul-Ghudus)*	Weekly	1907	Tehran
Equality *(Mosavat)*	Weekly	1907	Tehran
Civilisation *(Tamaddun)*	Weekly	1907	Tehran
The True Dawn *(Sobhe-Sadeq)*	Daily	1907	Tehran
New Iran *(Irane-Nuw)*	Daily	1909	Tehran

7.2.1 *Akhtar* (Star) Paper

Akhtar was both the first Iranian newspaper printed outside of the country and the first important political newspaper. It appeared for more than 20 years, until publication was ultimately suspended in 1895-6 by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul. *Akhtar* (Star) was a liberal newspaper published by exiled intellectuals but also expressing the general concerns of the Iranian merchant class, summarised by Keddie :

It is clear enough that the concessionaire will commence the work with a small capital and will purchase the tobacco from the cultivators and sell it to the merchants and manufactures for higher prices, and all the profits will remain in the purse of the English. As the Persian merchants have no rights to export tobacco from Persia, those who were formally engaged in the trade will be obliged to give up their business and find some other work. The Caucasian does not take into account how many merchants who were engaged in this business will be left without employment. [1966a, 49]

Throughout its existence, the *Akhtar* was ever the beacon around which rallied the most accomplished and enlightened of Iranian exiles. In Mowlana's summation, it was maintained by the literary co-operation of patriotic scholars. [1963, 274] Journalists working on *Akhtar* included Mirza Aqa-Khan-Kermani, author of many volumes, and Shaykh Ahmade-Ruhi, also of Kerman, two of the revolution's earlier martyrs; Mirza Mahdi of Tabriz; Mirza Ali Muhammad Khan of Kashan, (editor of the *Sorayya* or Pleiades and *Parwarish* or Education) and Hajji Mirza Mahdi of Tabriz, who was principal writer and acting editor of the paper until it ceased publication. Figure 6.1 shows the first page of the *Akthar* (Star) paper, Vol 21, No. 1, 1894.

7.2.2 *Al-Urvatul-Vosgha* (The Indissoluble Link) Paper

ALUrvatul Vosgha (The Indissoluble Link) paper, printed in Paris by Sayyed-Jamalled-Din-Asadabadi in 1882, with mainly political and anti-foreign content, was published in Arabic. This paper was widely read in the Muslim countries of the Near East including Iran, Turkey and India. Although the paper was forbidden by Nasseru'd-Din Shah, it was circulated in Iran. According to Mowlana:

> The Autocratic rulers of the Near East were alarmed by its attack and its growing influence. The British government stopped its circulation in India Sayyed Jamalled-Din-Asad-abadi [the editor] travelled to Europe for two years till 1892 and wrote articles for an Arabic magazine. . .[1963, 280]

Sayyed-Jamalled-Din was also closely associated with *Qanun* (The law), printed in London by the Iranian exile, Malkom-Khan, and discussed in detail below. Speeches and newspapers were his favourite political tools. His ferocious editorial style emerges in this onslaught on the Shah published in *Ziyaul Khafiqayn* (The Light of two Hemispheres), another *exile* paper published in London on March 1, 1892;

> When this Shah, this viper of sin obtained control of the kingdom of Iran, he began gradually to infringe the rights of the ulama, lower their status, and diminish their influence, on content of his desire to exercise despotic authority in his vain commands and prohibitions, and to extend the scope of his tyranny and oppression. [Browne 1910, 25]

He sought to show in his editorials the corruption of all branches of administration, and the absence of the rule of law. The February issue of *Ziyaul-Khafqyn* in 1892 carried one of his longest editorials. He wrote in part:

> A fifth of the Persians have fled into Turkish or Russian through the streets and markets...rejoicing in spite of their tattered garments, their sombre countenances, and the meanness of their deliverance and thanking God for satellites...The government has over-ridden and destroyed the Holy Law, detests and repudiates civilised administration, despises and ignores the laws of reason and common sense...[Browne 1910, 27-8]

Sayyed-Jamalled-Din was a great journalist who was largely responsible for the inception of revolutionary journalism in Iran. He wrote critical articles against the concession given to Europeans, particularly the establishment of the Russian Cossack Brigade in Iran in the 1870's. According to one editorial:

> All foreigners have learned that yours is an authority not to be resisted, a strength not to be overcome and a word not to be ignored... But the danger is now great and the emergency critical, for the devils have combined to repair the hurt which they have sustained, and are eager to attain their end, and they are determined to mislead that man of sin into the expulsion of all the religious leaders from the country. [Browne 26]

7.2.3 *Qanun* (The Law) Paper

Malkom Khan founded the famous newspaper *Qanun* (The Law) in 1890 in order to propagate his views to Iran from London, where he was in exile. Although the paper was a sporadic, one-man enterprise, it became so influential in Tehran that it was banned. Its mere possession became a state crime, and it was later hailed as a major factor in the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution. The first issue set the tone for the 40 issues that appeared in the next eight years. Headed with the slogan 'unity, justice, and progress'; it began with a Muslim prayer in Arabic and then a long editorial in straightforward Iranian stressing the need for national laws. [Abrahamian, 1979, 398] Here is a sample of Malkom Khan's vigorous editorial writing:

> God has blessed Iran. Unfortunately, his blessing has been negated by the lack of laws. No one in Iran feels secure because no one in Iran is safeguarded by laws. The appointment of governors is carried out without laws. The dismissal of officers is done without laws. The monopolies are sold without any laws. The state finances are squandered without laws.
>
> The stomachs of innocent citizens are cut open without laws. Even the servants of God are deported without laws. Every one in India, Tiflis, Egypt, Istanbul, and even among the Turkaman tribes knows his rights and duties. But no one in Iran knows his rights and duties.
>
> By what law was this *mujtahed* deported?
>
> By what law was that officer cut into pieces?
>
> By what law was this minister dismissed?
>
> By what law was that idiot given a robe of honour ?

The servants of foreign diplomats have more security than the noble princes of Iran. Even the brothers and sons of the Shah do not know what tomorrow will bring whether exile to Iraq or flight for dear life to Russia [Qanun, February 1, 1890].

Subsequent issues of *Qanun* described the type of laws that would establish security and thus stimulate social progress, free discussion of all topics and freedom of expression. Malkom-Khan printed the letter of an Iranian merchant describing his views on the increasing number of concessions being granted by the government:

A merchant from Qazvin writes: By what law does the government sell our national rights to foreign racketeers? These rights, according to both the principles of Islam and the traditional laws of Iran, belong to the people of our country. These rights are the means of our livelihood.

The government, however, barters Muslim property to the unbelievers. By what law? Have the people of Iran died that the government is auctioning away their inheritance?

Dear merchant, the government has mistaken our inception for death. It is time for the *Mujtaheas* and other knowledgeable persons to arise and save the people of Iran: law and more law. [Qanun, July 6, 1890]

The writings of Malkom-Khan were of two-fold historical importance. Politically, they buttressed and advanced the Revolution, the renovation of Iran, and the founders of the movement of Iranian nationalism. From the literary point of view, they were the sole origin of a peculiar style, at once easy and agreeable, admirably suited to fluent political communication. [Browne, 1914, 19] Figure 7.3 reproduces the first page of *Qanan* (Law) paper No. 21, 1895.

7.2.4 The Political Press in the 1890's

Following the pioneering work of *Akhtar* and *Qanun*, both *exile* newspapers, the political press developed its skills and influence through the turbulent 1890's, both exploiting and taking advantage of mounting unrest. With the arrival of the agents of the British Tobacco Company and the public knowledge of the granting of the monopoly, opposition surfaced immediately. The callous insensitivity of colonial agents further inflamed the people. *Shabnameh* began to appear condemning the government for selling the country to infidels. Nationalism conceived through a religious perspective was the dominant theme of the anti-monopoly agitations.

There was also increasing awareness permeating all strata of Iranian society about freedom, liberal equality, and democratic rule due to an increasing interaction with Western societies. Prominent critics such as Mirza Saleh Shirazi, Mirza Ali Khan Amin-Al Dowleh, Sayyed Jamalled Din Assadabadi, and others who were critical of the feudalist state and foreign domination of Iranian socio-economic affairs, were among the first to generate a bourgeois awareness in the society. Newspapers such as *Sorayya* (Pleiades), *Parwarish* (Education), *Habl-al-Matin* (Firm Cord), together with established newspapers such as *Qanun* (The Law), and *Akhtar* (Star) continued as effective critics and propagandists.

For example, the first issue of *Qanun* in February, 1890, emphasised the 'disordered and corrupt conditions of Persia, which were ascribed, firstly to the absence of any law, and secondly, to the misdeeds of the Prime Minister, the Aminus Sultan'. [Browne 1910, 35] Other political newspapers capable of giving political leadership gradually emerged in the build-up to the Constitutional Revolution: *Sorayya* (Pleiades) , and *Parwarish* (Education) were both *exile* newspapers. *Habl-al-Matin* (Firm Cord) was an *exile* paper published in Calcutta in its first incarnation then, from 1907, published in Tehran where it became perhaps the most significant of the political-leadership papers published in the capital.

Largely through the efforts of the *exile* press, journalism had emerged as a social and political force by the end of the 19th Century. As Mowlana points out, even the most obstinate bureaucrat had been forced to concede that the press was not to be abused with impunity:

> The 19th century Iranian journalists had learn a lesson that apparently has to be re-learned at regular intervals – when the public supports them, no power is strong enough to throttle press freedom. They learned that when editors are identified with the public cause and put responsibility to the people above whims and personal convenience, they not only win the essential backing, but help to generate other forces for freedom within the country. The newspapers in exile did their work well. In the closing years of the 19th century Iranian journalism had established itself as a revolutionary force. From then on, the country was in battle, fighting for the ultimate victory that the press had helped to engineer . [1963, 295]

Although the *papers in exile* suffered financially, they were better edited and printed than government papers within Iran. Europe and India had better printing presses, better paper and ink, and better facilities for transmission of news. Iranian journalists were able to capitalise on this strength through the financial aid of Iranian merchants abroad so many revolutionary papers were able to continue their publication. The rise of the *exile* press caused the decline of government papers in Iran. In the closing years of the 19th century, there were about six exile papers for each newspaper published in the country. The intellectual and political atmosphere in Iran at the end of the 19th century was stimulated by an educated group very small but with great influence. The *newspapers in exile* shared several characteristics. They were intensely patriotic and they wanted constitutional rights. They advocated westernisation or, in a more general sense, modernisation of Iran, but differed widely on how the traditional ways could be replaced with modern institutions.

7.2.5 *Habl al-Matin* (Firm Cord) Paper

The *Habl al-Matin* (Firm Cord) began publication in Calcutta in 1893-4 with a staff of

Iranian intellectuals. It was the oldest and most important of the regularly published

newspapers. Part of it was always devoted to religious and political matters during the

revolutionary period. According to *Habl-al-Matin* :

> The government must reverse its present disastrous policy of helping
> Russian merchants, creditors, and manufactures at the expense of Iranian
> businessmen. The government must protect our businessmen, even if
> their products are not yet as good as those of foreign competitors. If the
> present policy continues, our whole economy will be ruined. [June 19,
> 1905]

Habl-al-Matin's criticism of the Shah strengthened during the Constitutional

Revolution:

> At all events the National Assembly ought to make an investigation, and
> should ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether the report is true that
> while we are living in our house others are arranging its disposal and
> making compacts and conventions with one another without even
> informing us of the matters. [1907, No. 113, 1907]

Publication of *Habl al-Matin* was interrupted by the reactionary Coup d'etat and

Bombardment of the *Majlis* on June 23 1908. After the restoration of the Constitution

and the conquest of Tehran by Nationalists it again issued several numbers. It was,

however, suspended and its editor tried and condemned to two years imprisonment by

the restored Nationalists for printing a critical article. *Habl-al Matin* was the most

important daily newspaper of the constitutional revolutionary period, influential

particularly in its political articles on foreign affairs, especially its criticism of the

Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. Figure 7.4 shows the first page of the *Habl al-Matin*

(Firm Cord) paper, Vol 5, No. 1, 1898.

Habl-al Matin exemplified the good qualities of both the *exile* press and the political-leadership newspaper published in Iran during the Constitutional Revolution. It was also a strong affirmation of both the literary, poetical and *Tanz* traditions. An example is a poem by Maliku'lsh-Shuara-Bahar (The King of Poets) entitled *A critical Tribute to Sir Edward Grey* printed on November 11, 1912. This long political poem satirises the British Foreign Secretary and reflects the interesting perspective of *Habl-al Matin* in its treatment of the regime and the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of the country, particularly Russia, Britain and France:

> To London speed, O breeze of dawning day,
>> Bear this my message to Sir Edward Grey.
>
> To thee in skill, wise Councillor of State,
>> Ne'er did the world produce a peer or mate!
>
> Great Peter's schemes to thine were shifting sand;
>> And weak by thine the plans that Bismarck planned
>
> Ne'er from Toulon Napoleon's hosts had gone
>> If on the Pyramids thy name had shone.
>
> Had Paris been in league with thee, in vain
>> The German hosts had swamped Alsace-Lorraine
>
> Had England 'gainst the States sought help from thee
>> No Washington had won them victory.
>
> Had the prestige companioned England's arms
>> Ne'er had the Boers caused England such alarms.
>
> Would Kuropatkin's hosts before Japan
>> Had fled had he been guided by thy plan ?
>
> Had the Manchus been aided by thy thought
>> The rebels ne'er against their king had fought.
>
> And had thy schemes included Persia's life
>> Not fruitless had remained this storm and strife.
>
> "When fortune frowns on man," the proverb goes,
>> "His wisest act no good resultant shows."
>
> Alas that thou, for all thy wits, hast wrought
>> A deed which save regret can yield thee naught!

[Browne 1914, 255-57].

7.2.6 *Irane-Nuw* (New Iran) Paper

The biting, satirical emphasis of the *Tanz* papers was also pervasive in *Irane-Nuw* (New Iran), also a major participant in the Constitutional Revolution. This example depicts 'the disordered dream of Mohammad-Ali-shah on the first night of his arrival in exile at Odessa in Russia' following his abdication in July 1909 It was printed on December 16, 1909, in issue 91:

> I dream once more I rule o'er Persia's land,
> > And in my garden scoff at God's command.

> *Bahadur Jang* before me still I see,
> > Who cries' O King! May I thy ransom be!

> Liakhoff too, my Russian colonel true,
> > Marshals his Cossacks still before my view.

> While old Mushiru's-Saltana, the cow!
> > Drains, as of yore, the people's life-blood now,

> And Sa'du'd-Dawla, egotist unique,
> > Still loot the town of Tabriz in my dream.

> Still from the Russian Bank my wars to wage.
> > I beg for cash and offer pledge and gauge.
> > > [Browne 1914, 221].

The *Irane-Nuw* (New Iran)effectively created a new form of political journalism by composition of popular poems dedicated to political issues, intelligible to a wider audience than literary poetry. The following sample poem entitled *Mother's Lullaby* (lay-Lay-i-Madaraneh) shows this exciting function of the paper during the Revolutionary period. It uses the repetition of popular refrains to drive home the message of protecting Iran against invasion by foreign powers. It was printed on February 2, 1910, in No. 123 of the *Irane-Nuw* paper.

> Morn hath come and the time for work, with a lam-lay, lam-lay;
> > Tis a shame any longer to sleep or to shirk, with a lam-lay,

> War's toward, and work for all; no time to waste, with a lam-lay
> > "Our country's hope on this work is based, with a lam-lay,

> Rise, then, rise, and to college haste, lam-lay, lam-lay!

From the martyrs' blood and thy forbears' dust, with a lam-lay, lam-lay,

A rampart rings thee which thou canst trust, with a lam-lay, lam-lay:
Sorrow we may, but struggle we must, with a lam-lay, lam-lay!

A Persian boy art thou, and Persia thy fatherland, with a lam-lay
Well in a faultless body a fearless soul doth stand, with a lam-lay!

That soul art thou, and this body of thine is the Persian land, with a Lam Lay.
Rise in arms, and to save the State thy quality show, with a lam-lay!

Wherefore, O tender rose-bud, is Persia brought so low, with a lam-lay!.
With a garment of glory invest thyself, that it be not so, with a Lam-lay!

No longer the cot but the saddle now is thy proper place, with a lam-lay!
O lion-cub, 'tis time for the chase, with a lam-lay, lam-lay!

Arise, arise, for a foamed lurks in each sheltering space with a lam-lay!
Suffer not that thy native land be the foeman's share, with a lam-lay !.

Since it hath like thee a hero bold and a champion rare, with a lam-lay !
Let not its honour decline and its hope be turned to despair, with a lam-lay!

Lay-lay, bala-lay! Lay-lay, bala-lay-lay!

[Browne 1914, 226]

7.2.7 *Ruhul-Ghudus* (The Holy Spirit) Paper

The *Ruhul-Ghudus* (The Holy Spirit) paper, printed in Tehran in 1907, achieved a special notoriety by its exceptional courage, publishing in its thirteenth number a personal attack on Mohammad Ali Shah and his anti-constitutional actions, threatening him with the fate of Louis XVI, King of France, and recalling the Great French Revolution:

The editor [Sultanu 1-Ulama Khorasani] of this paper was a man of extraordinary convictions and zeal, and took a personal share in the National efforts to defend the Constitution. Thus he participated in the struggle between the Nationalists and the troops of Mohammad-Ali Shah on the occasion of the Reactionary Coup d'etat of June 23, 1908, and fought valorously in defence of the *Majlis*. Finally, he was taken prisoner, was confined in chains in the *Bagh-i-Shah*, and ultimately suffered a martyr's death, and was thrown into a well. [Browne 1914, 87-88]

The *Ruhul-Ghudus* was thoroughly liberal and revolutionary in its politics. Toward the end of October, 1907 the Shahs' conduct aroused great suspicion, sparking press attacks and consequent conflicts between editors and the Shah. Sultanul-Ulama-Khorasani, also published a critical article entitled 'A Word from the Unseen, or Unambiguous Hint,' against Mohammad-Ali-Shah's policy in its issue of November 6, 1907:

> We neither dream of authority, nor think of office: we strive with our whole souls to guard our native land and protect our fellow countrymen, nor will we disregard the duty of uttering the truth. There is a difference between subjects and slaves: to submit to selfish ambitions is incumbent on slaves, not on subjects, who are no slaves but free men, even equal to the king himself. It is for them to reward the king's claims for his guardianship only when the king fulfils the duties of such guardianship and shepherd ship. The sheep does not exist for the benefit of the shepherd, Rather does the shepherd exist for its service. [Browne 1914, 155-7]

He briefly analysed modern Iranian history, recalling the names and deeds of Iran's great kings, who despite their wars and conquests had been concerned with securing the lives and overcoming the poverty of their subjects. With considerable virulence, he castigated the Qajar dynasty;

> When the cycle of sovereignty reached Nasser'ud Din-Shah the leaf was turned back, and the evil star of the nation was in the ascendant. A gang of pampered, poor-spirited courtiers, bereft of honour, encouraged the autocratic tendencies of the King. . .Have all the kings of the World neglected their duties and proper functions and turned their attention to butchery? Are all the nations of the World, like the unhappy nation of Iran, become thralls to the tyranny and selfish ambitions of their rulers? ... Is it not possible, then, that the story of Louis the sixteenth may be repeated in this kingdom?. . . No rule can endure to the king in the face of foreign dominion, under which he will have to exchange the dream of Empire for the dervish's horn and glory of sovereignty for the misery of subjection. [Browne, 1914, pp. 157-9]

Figure 7.5 shows the first page of *Ruhul-Ghudus* paper No. 1, 1907.

7.3 The *Tanz* Press—a Stimulative Function

The effectiveness of the *Tanz* press as a means of ridicule and elucidating important themes in a popular way has already been demonstrated in the previous section. The virtues of this genre were much intensified in the mobilisation of 1906-7 when *Tanz* really came into its own, with humorous newspapers writing in a simple, unadorned style, and using caricature in a manner intelligible to a mass audience. Popular and satirical poetry became common literary forms as well. In each of these genres a political culture of opposition and resistance was elaborated and spread widely, at least in urban settings, during the revolutionary movement. [Foran, 1991, 27]

In such a factorable context for political satire and caricature, the number of satirical or comic and humorous publications increased. The most amusing of the comic and satirical papers included the *Charand-parand* column of the *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of Resurrection), the *Sharq* (East) and *Nasime-Shomal* (Northern Breeze), *Kashkul* (The Alms-Gourd), *Buhlul* , *Shikhe-Chughoundar* (The Reverend Beetroot), *Mulla-Nasru'd-Din, Ehtiyaj* (Need), and the humorous newspapers *Azarbaijan* and *Hasharatu'l-Arz* (Reptiles of the Earth). Table 7.2 lists (Tanz) papers that were printed during the revolutionary period, preparatory to an examination of their content.

Table 7.2

Significant *Tanz* Press of the Revolutionary Period

Name	Frequency	Founded	Location
The Dawn *(Tullu)*	Weekly	1901	Tehran
Admonition *(Tanbih)*	—	1907	Tehran
Azarbaijan	Weekly	1907	Tehran
Northern Breeze *(Nasime-Shomal)*	Weekly	1907	Rasht
Charivari *(Charnd-Parand)*	----	1907	Tehran
Need *(Ehtiyaj)*	----	1907	Tabriz
Ay-Mulla-Amu	Weekly	1908	Tabriz
Reptiles of the Earth *(Hasharat' ul-Arz)*	Weekly	1908	Tabriz
The Alms-Gourd *(Kashkul)*	Weekly	1909	Tehran & Isfahan
Madcap *(Sheida)*	----	1911	Istanbul
Mulla-Nasiru' d-Din	Weekly	---	Tabriz
The Lord's Jungle *(Jangle-Mowla)*	Weekly	1910	Tehran
The People's Herald *(Jurchi-ye-Millat)*	Weekly	1910	Tehran
The Beggar's Wallet *(Chanta-ye-Pabrehna)*	Weekly	1911	Tehran
The Reverend beet Root *(Shikhe-Ghuqundar)*	Weekly	1911	Tehran
The Scale *(Mizan)*	----	1911	Tehran
Buhlul	Weekly	1911	Tehran

7.3.1 *Nasime-Shomal* (Northern Breeze) Paper

Northern Breeze *(Nasime Shomal)* was one of the better literary papers, containing many notable poems, both serious and satirical. The following specimen poem entitled *"Ayway-Vatan-Way"* (Thou-Sight Fatherland) by Ashraf of Gilan, illustrates the ferment of the revolutionary movement and the press participation in it. It was printed in Number 9 of the *Nasime-Shomal* paper on January 2, 1908 when the revolutionary movement was at peak momentum. (In February 1908, an assailant threw a bomb at the Shah's car, killing one of his attendants and wrecking the vehicle.) This political poem excited patriotic feelings among Iranians, stimulating them to join the national protests against the autocracy of the Qajar Shahs. The use of slang (vernacular) distinguished the *Tanz* press of the revolutionary period from the more restrained literary conventions of traditional poetry. It alludes satirically to intervention of foreign countries in internal affairs of Iran (verse 4), corruption of statesmen (verse 7), and social inequality (verse 8).

1-Our country is flooded with sorrow and woe,   O, for our land woe
Arise, and for coffin and cerements go   O, for our land woe

2-With the blood of our sons for the fatherland shed. The moon shines red;
Hill, plain and garden blood-red glow: O, for our land woe

3-Where are zeal and courage and strife   A Nation's life?
The floods of trouble around us flow   O, for our land woe

4-Foreigners trample on every side   On Islam's pride;
Of our Freedom naught but the name they know: O, for our land woe

5-Not only our land is lost and misnamed;   Our faith 's defamed:
E'en the flowers in the garden stunted grow: O, for our land woe

6-The nightingale dares not to sing of the rose: Red the daffodil
grows, And red the lily-white flowers blow,   O, for our land woe

7-Some of our statesmen are brigands sheer;   No mystery here

8-For Khalkhal's sake are our hearts in gloom: 'tis the Day of Doom
Not even a shirt hath the peasant to show: O, for our land woe

9-To Urmi the Turkish commander, we hear,   Swift draws near,
While at Astara Shahsevents strike a blow   O, for our land woe
    [Browne 1914, 184]

It is not surprising that the best humour, satire and caricature of the revolutionary period appeared in poems. Poetry was a venerated art in Iran and the Persian language had a noble traditional literature whose resonances echo even in translation. Love of poetry was deeply embedded in Iranian society and culture. It was not surprising, therefore, that the press recognised the appeal of poetic forms to the popular audience and used it with great skill to disseminate revolutionary messages. The number of *Tanz* publications, rather more than overtly political newspapers, suggests that poetic genres had more audience impact than direct political exhortation, despite the skills of the political journalists. The press of the revolutionary movement was fortunate in attracting the skills of fine poets such as Ashraf of Gilan who used the simple folk language to depict social problems in his poetry. This specimen of Ashraf's poetry adopts the satirical device of placing the exhortation in the mouth of an imaginary reactionary opposed to Ashraf's support for the revolution. Thus, it enables the poet to bring out the evils of autocratic reaction, social insecurity, and lack of constitutional law without stating them directly himself:

O Ashraf, be no longer over-bold!
        Be not so insistent about the Constitution!

I am an adversary and enemy to all the people;
        I will not unite with any one;

I am a Reactionary, a Reactionary, a Reactionary!
        Do not thou preach Constitutionalism!

O little minstrel, arise, strike the harp and the lute!
        O little cup-bearer, give wine quickly!

If the Empire is lost, to Hell with it!
        Prate not of the Turk and the Empire!

I drink for wine the blood of the people;
        I eat for roast meat the flesh of the people;

I have no fear of torment and retribution;
        Do not put me off with threats of to-morrow's Resurrection!

Put not thy trust in the words of the Franks;
        Talk not of the maxims of the schools;

Do not find fault with such as love the ancient ways;
Do not exult in the awakening of the Nation!

What can I do ? the enemy is sharp-witted?
He has broken into this garden and meadow:
All Sawujbulagh is topsy-turvy.
Weep not over the people's condition!

If Urumiyya is gone, Khurasan is enough;
If that too goes, Isfahan is enough;
If naught else be left, Tehran itself is enough !
O Ashraf, work no further mischief!
[Browne 1914, 189].

As well as extensive satirical verse, *Nasime-Shomal* supported the revolutionary forces

by printing critical articles against the Shah's policies and those of his reactionary

ministers. Unquestionably, this combination of humour, satire and vigorous, polemical

prose made it an extremely potent force during the Revolutionary period. Here, Ashraf

Gilan argues that the country is controlled by the despotic regime. [*Nasime* Shomal,

No. 16, April 14, 1908]

O Ashraf, what is this outcry and lamentation ?
What is this sighing and crying for the people?

Speak out plainly: who and what are you?
Are you [a man of] one maund, or ten maunds, or twenty?

Even if the flood carries away this city and land,
Know for a surety that sleep overpowers us.

What is the newspaper ? What is this disturbance ?
Think of some action, for there is no dearth of talents.

Russia and Japan are nothing to us!
What have we to do with Russia and Germany?

If the luminary of the Constitution hath shone forth, what is that [to us] ?
If the Sun of Knowledge hath arisen, what is that [to us] ?
[Browne 1914, 193]

This poem makes an interesting, if ambiguous, reference to the role of the press. It

appears to confirm the transforming call of the press by satirising the apathy of public

opinion in view of the impact of the press. [*Nasime Shomal* , May 11, 1908.]

The following poem, containing considerable slang, adopts a cynical approach to the proposition that Iran has at last attained a free press.

We say that now at last the Press is free,
That Persia shall regain prosperity,

That firmly based is now our Liberty,
That colleges abound increasingly.

Bottle and stone best typify our state!
Needs must our caravan be lame and late!

An ass becomes our arbiter supreme,
A dog controls each project and each scheme,

A fox the object of respect doth seem,
Shapshal' a trusty treasurer we deem:

What piece can move to save the King from mate?
Needs must our caravan be lame and late.
[Browne, 1914, 196].

Another long poem appeared in the same paper, Number 27, issued on March 5, 1909. It is supposed to express the despair of the Devil at the downfall of Despotism and, apart from its satirical power, is not, as Browne observes, lacking in merit and originality.

The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'll I do? O what'll I do?

"For the Constitution has found its feet:
What'll I do ? O what'll I do ?

The Bird of Liberty preens its wings in a rose-girt land,
And Tyranny's vein is severed at last by Justice's hand,
And the Despot's eyes are blinded by Freedom's gleaming brand,
And the autocrats are, it would seem, dead beat,
What'll I do? O what'll I do ?

The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
What'll I do ? O what'll I do ?

* * *

Men of sense I am mad: Twere best you should let me alone!
Lest I arise and break your heads with stick or with stone !
For the autocrats all are uprooted and scattered and over-thrown,
And the Flag of Freedom the people greet:
What'll I do ? O what'll I do ?

The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
> What'll I do? O what'll I do?

* * *

Deceit is dead, and cruel oppression hath passed away:
Hypocrisy's crushed and godless bribery's lost its sway:
Fallen and dead is the despot, his head with grief grown grey:
His sighs to heaven rise swift and fleet,
> What'll I do? O what'll I do ?

The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
> What'll I do? O what'll I do?

* * *

For seven months this country no Constitution knew:
With our whips and our scourges the backs of the peasants were black and blue.
But now from the libertine's tables the chickens and game and stew
Have taken their flight with hurrying feet:
> What'll I do? O what'll I do?"

The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
> What'll I do? O what'll I do?

* * *

Heavens! What hath become of our curses and oaths and blows ?
Our pavilions and pomps, and the thrones and truncheons which we dispose?
The sticks and scourges and rods that were ready in ranks and rows ?
What hath arrested our nimble feet ?
> What'll 1 do? O what'll I do?"

The wily old Devil did groan and greet,
> What'll I do? O what'll I do?

* * *

What hath become of our slaughter of peasants and torments grim ?
What of our roasted lambs and our goblets filled to the brim ?
What of our sherbets sweet and the succulent capon's limb ?
Whither is gone our delectable meat?
> What'll I do? O what'll I do?

The wily old Devil did groan and greet

[Browne 1914, 210-12].

7.3.2 *Charand-Parand* (Charivari) Paper

Charand-Parand was essentially a weekly column which was part of another newspaper, the *Sure Israfel* (The Angel of Resurrection). In effect, it was the satirical portion of that paper. The title of this satirical section clearly acknowledges the *London Punch* , the pre-eminent English humorous and satirical journal of its era, also known as the London *Charivari*. *Punch* was widely imitated; for example, in the successful Melbourne *Punch* published for some years in Australia. It might also be argued that the drawings in *Charand-Parand* and other Iranian *Tanz* papers had a certain resemblance to *Punch* caricatures. A principal contributor was the poet *Dakhaw*

or Dih-Khuda of Qazwin, who was familiar with the Azarbayjani dialect. Like other

Tanz writers, *Dakhaw* directly invokes his own person in his appeal to the reader,

personalising the trials and those of the Iranian people by reference to his own

misfortunes.

(1)   To-day the appeal of Dakhaw ascends to the Throne of God; with grief for the Constitution the bones of Dakhaw are burned.

(2)   In this land of Qazvin, through the tyranny of Despotism, the household of Dakhaw is utterly forgotten.

(3)   When the luminary of the Constitution arose from Persia the spirit of Dakhaw was illuminated by its dawning.

4)   When the Sun of the Constitution arose talk of it was ever on Dakhaw's tongue.

(5)   May my tongue be cut out now that I hear that harm befalls the pillars of the Parliament!

(6)   The ambassador of Autocracy hath set his foot in the Majlis; an autumnal blast hath blown over Dakhaw's garden.

(7)   The foreigner hath stepped into the midst of the Deputies; Dakhaw's gelder-rose and cypress and Judas-tree are broken !

(8)   If (which God forbid!) the Parliament suffers hurt, Dakhaw's enemies will set fire to his soul.

(9)   The Imam-Juma (Chief Priest) of Qazvin hath cast the fire of tyranny, malice and despotism on the family of Dakhaw.

(10)   On account of the tyranny and spite of this autocrat in sheep's clothing the wailing and lamentations of Dakhaw affect the very stones.

(11)   I will become one of the humble servants of Ashrafu'd-Din if this piteous poem of Dakhaw's should be inserted [in his paper]" [Browne 191].

7.3.3 *Azarbaijan* Paper

The *Azarbaijan* first printed in early 1907 in Tabriz, was notable for its use of colour,

paving the way for the popularity of colour illustration in the Iranian press. Its wit and

vivacity made an important contribution to the revolution, Browne describing it as one

of the funniest and most effective of the numerous *Tanz* papers. Indeed, its genre might

accurately be described as illustrated comic paper. It combined direct political analysis

with a quirky satirical perception, the quality of its caricature vividly enhanced by

colour. *Azarbaijan* was published in Persian and Azari Turkish and its politics were overwhelmingly Liberal and pro-Constitutional. According to Mowlana :

> When the *Azarbaijan* got the colour process in its printing press, Saffarof [the editor] had a new medium to exploit His illustration which had steadily expanded in size, now could appear in colour, as could the bold-type headlines. [1963, 345]

This political poem was printed in Number 17 of *Azarbaijan* on October 11, 1907. The poem has some interesting aspects, particularly the foreshadowing of Germany as an intruder into the internal affairs of Iran. Although German was in expansionary mode at that time, the writer's satire would appear to have been better directed at Russia and England, the two colonial powers already dominant in Iran. Perhaps, also, the writer was subtly using the growing power of Germany and the increasing tensions in Central Europe to strike indirectly at Russia and England, also threatened by rising German power.

(Fortunate is your advent! Greeting and Welcome to thee, O Germany!)

O newly-arrived guest of Persia, welcome!
    O Germany! Your place is on our eyes: welcome!

Persia is like a well-filled table with foreigners for guests;
    O guest unbidden to this table, welcome !

Thanks be to God ! The morning of union hath appeared;
    The nights of separation have come to an end: welcome !,

Having finished with the affairs of these two, without delay
    Thou didst appear in the land of Persia: welcome!

To shear the heads of a handful of innocents
    Thou bringest in thy hand a sharp razor: welcome!

Wantonly, with pretexts of College and Bank,
    Thou hast attained thy secret object: welcome !

Our cry of lamentation still rises to heaven
    On account of the Russian and British Banks: welcome !

In short it seems that we have now no option.
    Save to submit to the orders of the Franks: welcome!

Yet the circling heaven remains not in one position;
    Say, 'Despair not of God! Welcome!

            [Browne 1914, 258-9].

Another critical poem, appearing in *Azarbaijan* (May-June, 1909) shows the more

directly polemic style of the paper, directly adjuring the autocratic regime of

Mohammad-Ali Shah to avoid despotism and follow the Constitutional Law of Iran.

O King, at what dost thou aim by thy despotism?
From such deeds naught will be witnessed save evil fortune!
Shew generosity in the way of the Constitution, that thou may'st be adored:
The honour of a man is in generosity and his nobility in worship:
Whoever has not these two his non-existence is better than his existence !

Who, indeed, is the King, with this his pride and egotism,
That his intentions with regard to us should be good?
We are the worshippers of God and His Divinity,
In whose service, from the dust to the Pleiades,
All are engaged in commemoration, prayers, rising up and bowing down.

The Constellation of the Constitution appears from the Firmament of Perfection:
The Night of Parting draws to an end, and the Morn of Union dawns:
All will be well through the Glory of God Most High.'
O thou who art in hardship, poverty and distracted circumstance.

Be patient, for these few brief days will come to an end!'
One must not expect from this king but mistakes, for what wee see in him is
wrong from one end to the other: counsel him not, for vain is counsel to those of
evil nature.

[Browne 1914, 266-69].

At this time, Constitutional forces were mobilising in the provinces and initiating the

march on Tehran which ultimately defeated the Russian forces and led to the abdication

of Shah Muhammad Ali.

7.3.4 *Buhlul*, A Comic Weekly Paper

Buhlul, another weekly illustrated comic paper was lithographed in Tehran, and first

published in the early part of 1911, towards the end of the constitutional revolutionary

period. This paper defended the ideals of the Democratic Party and attacked and

criticised the government, skillfully exploiting the popularity of political caricatures.

Buhlul was notable for its involvement in the Shuster incident and its criticism of the

consequent Russian ultimatum.

An American, W. Morgan Shuster, had been engaged as Treasurer-General of Iran in May, 1911. Disillusioned with the interference of Russia and Britain, the Iranian liberals had turned to the United States for financier who could put the budgetary system of the country on a firm basis. When Shuster arrived in Tehran, the Iranian National Assembly invested him with very extensive powers, and Shuster and his American advisory group began their work. Russia strenuously opposed his involvement, and in November, 1911 presented Iran with an ultimatum demanding that Shuster be dismissed. Britain quickly joined Russia in imposing pressure on Iran to eject the American administrator.

The *Majlis* rejected the Russia ultimatum, with the strong support of the press whose editorials criticised the spinelessness of the government and the intrigues of Russia and Britain. The incident inevitably attracted the attention of the satirical poets of the comic newspapers. This poem, written by Arif of Qazwin, entitled "On the departure of Mr Shuster from Iran" was published in 1911. It was written about the time that the hapless Shuster was forced from Iran, according to the poet as the direct result of joint pressure from the semi-colonial powers.

(1)

Shame on the host whose guest unfed doth from the table rise!
    Rather than this should happen, make thy life his sacrifice!

Should *Shuster* fare from Persia forth, Persia is lost in sooth:
    O let not Persia thus be lost, if ye be men in truth!

(2). . .

Our cup is full unto the brim, our measure overflows;
    Our homes are meanly filched away by base and cruel foes!

And if we suffer *Shuster* now to leave our Persian land
    Eternal infamy our name in history shall brand!

(5)

The wolf and shepherd's dog are one like *Layla* and *Majnun;*
    A cowardly herdsman guards the flock and will betray it soon.

O what creative energy our Hearts' Exemplar showed!.
　　　　　Let not our faithful guardian quit our desolate abode!
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　[Browne, 252]

(Layli and Majnun are the classical lovers of Eastern Romance, like Romeo and Juliet,

or Heloise and Abelard.)

Figure 7.8 shows the first page of *Buhlul* Number 34, 1911. It shows a caricature of

W. Morgan Shuster caught between insidious pressures of a guileful England and a

forceful Russia to frustrate his financial reforms for Iran. Shuster was eventually

dismissed in December 1911.

7.3.5 *Sheida* (Madcap) Paper

Sheida (Madcap), a combination of the *exile* press and the *Tanz* genre, was printed in Istanbul in 1911 under the editorship of Muhammad-Ziya'ul-Din. It was founded by a committee of Iranian students. According to Browne [1914, 315], not more than four or five numbers of it were published, and it was a Democrat paper in politics. *Sheida* also printed a critical article against the Russia ultimatum, an estimated 12,000 Russian troops having poured into Iran once again demanding Shuster's dismissal. They advanced as far as Qazvin, some 90 miles south of Tehran, slaughtered many Liberals at Tabriz in Azarbaijan, and at Mashhad bombarded the shrine of Imam Reza.

The Iranian press was muzzled by both the Russians, who had complete control over the northern provinces, and by the Tehran officials, who favoured acceptance of the Russian ultimatum. Despite the strong resistance of the people, on December 23, 1911, the Iranian cabinet accepted and submitted to the Russian ultimatum. Orders were sent to the people of Tabriz and other northern cities to stop fighting. Political meetings were prohibited in Tehran, and most newspapers were suppressed [Browne 334-35] Because *Sheida* was an *exile* paper, it was able to publish these virulently satirical responses to the Russian ultimatum. (See Fig 7.9)

7.4 Nocturnal Letters *(Shabnameh)* —The Information Function

During the Constitutional Revolution period, the number of *shabnameh* increased because the bulk of the press was still controlled by the government. Mehdi-Malekzadeh has suggested that the *shabnameh* or underground papers played a central role in the Constitutional Revolution, and that these papers had a deep influence in the political awakening and the extension of new ideas such as liberty and law in Iranian society [Malekzadeh 1951, 65]. *Shabnameh* were banned by the Shah, but the people would endure much inconvenience and difficulty to obtain them. Each single copy often circulated among more than 100 people. When tradesmen and merchants received a *shabnameh*, they would hold a small meeting in a remote caravanserai [a resting area] and debate the political issues raised by the papers. Mokhberull-Saltaneh wrote that 'the number of Iranian papers and Nocturnal Letters increased during the revolutionary period...and sometimes there were a horrible picture in first page of these papers such as dagger, gun, knife, and spear'.[1908, 15] Kuel-Kohan, a contemporary researcher, has stressed the paramount importance of the *shabnameh* during this period:

> A short time after the *Bageh-Shah* revolt, a group of journalists stayed in the capital and established a few Secret Societies, because they could not print official papers. Also, they used the *Shabnameh* as a strong political instrument to communicate with the people...their purposes reaching to the national awakening of Iranians. [Cited Qasemi 1993, 31]

A common means of self-expression was the innumerable *Shabnameh* that were posted anonymously, their themes calling resounding clarion calls against foreign intervention and domestic oppression. During the Qajar's despotic rule, many other *Shabnameh* were published, including *Maqaleh-Melli* (National Article), *Elamiyeh-Vatan-Parastan* (Manifestation of Patriotism), *Maktabe-Melli* (National School). These papers played a central role in the awakening of the people during the Qajar dynasty, as Mowlana acknowledges:

> In 1892 the first revolutionary underground paper appeared in Tabriz. This secret publication, *Shabnameh* (Nocturnal), was the first of its kind in Iran. It was published by Ali-Gholi-Khan. Turkish is the spoken

language in Azerbaijan and the *Shabnameh* printed in Turkish offered a new choice to Azerbijani readers. Because of its contents it had great popular appeal. In amusing idiomatic language Ali-Gholi-Khan sarcastically criticised the local authorities. [1963 293]

Thus the title of the first underground paper gave its name to the subsequent genre.

Browne argued that the impact of the *shabnameh* was comparable to that of newspapers such as *Akhtar* (Star) and *Qanun* (Law), the eloquent journalism of Prince Malkom Khan, and the courage and passionate political expression of Mirza-Yusuf-Khan-Mustasharud-Dowleh of Tabriz, martyred in Qazvin. According to Browne, the nocturnal letters developed from traditional forms of 'jellygraph' printing, essentially reproduced written publications, often with excellent drawings in coloured inks. These publications were first widely noted at Tabriz and were known as *shabnameh*, literally meaning 'night books' but more eloquently described as 'nocturnal letters'. Some nocturnal letters were issued by newspaper editors such as 'Ali-quli Khan, editor of the *Ihtiyaj* (Need).

A notable *shabnameh* was *Talqin-Nameh-Iran* , issued in Tabriz during the reign of Nasseru'd-Din Shah in the form of an admonition addressed to the dying. A garbled copy was subsequently published in the paper *Irsha'd* (Guidance) paper at Baku during the period of liberty It read:

> O servant of God, and son of the servant of God, hear and understand! When there come to thee the proximate envoys from the Russians, the English and the House of Ottoman [the Ottoman Turks] and ask thee concerning thy colleges, thine army, thy roads, thine arts, thy commerce and thy science...fear not, be not grieved, and say in answer to them...etc. [Browne 1914, 21]

Another jellygraphed nocturnal letter was printed at Istanbul under the name *Shah-Savan* (King-Lover). This was the name of a well-known group of tribes in North-West Iran Under the title was written, " one number is published every forty years." It criticised the old methods and principles of administration in what Browne describes as a very entertaining and laughable manner. Secret Jellygraphed publications resembling *shabameh* were produced in Tehran early in the 20th Century under the names *Lisanu'l-*

Ghayb (Tongue of the Unseen) and *Ghairat* (Zeal). Another was the *Ruznameh-Ghaybi*

(The Unseen Newspaper), which was written in Isfahan and printed in St. Petersburg.

The *Ghaybi* paper is ascribed to Maliku'l-Mutakallimin, one of the most eminent

victims of the Coup d'etat of June 23, 1908. Table 7.3 sets out more information about

significant *shabnameh* in the preparatory years of the Constitutional Revolution.

Table 7.3

Significant *Shabnameh* 1900–02

Name	Year	Location
The Tongue of the Unseen *(Lisanul-Ghayb)*	1901	Tehran
The Zeal *(Ghairat)*	1902	Tehran
The Unseen *(Ghaibi)*	1901	Isfahan
The Genies Bath (Hammame-Jinniyan)	1901	Tehran

An underground paper was usually a small quarto sheet without title and generally

lacking date of publication. It carried the editorial statements of the revolutionary

leaders and news of the general uprising. Some of these papers even came out daily but

most were weekly, and often irregular in appearance. [Malekzadeh 1951, 102] The skill

and energy of revolutionary journalists, propagandists, and popular political writers

displayed in these underground papers commands respect, not least because of the wide

range of journalistic and illustrative devices used to win public support for the

revolutionary movement. Similar techniques have been used in many subsequent

revolutions. It is not unreasonable, however, to claim that Iranians during the

preparatory period to the Constitutional Revolution and the Constitutional Revolution

itself were among the first to develop and apply this technique.

7.5 The *Anjoman* Press

As we have seen, an important phase of the Iranian revolution was the formation of secret societies (*Anjomans*) in which the Iranian writers and journalists played a great part. These groups, which began to meet toward the end of the 19th century, were essentially discussion groups generally considering liberation from despotism and benefits of freedom, justice, and education. In the beginning, they did not have any precise ideology or program of action. Discontent with existing conditions and a belief in modernisation held their members together. Certainly, they bore little resemblance to the political parties of the West.

Two groups played a more important role in the formation and organisation of the *Anjomans*. They were religious leaders and journalists. Of the 54 members of the first revolutionary committee about 20 were writers and journalists and the remainder religious leaders and merchants [Malekzadeh 1950, 10] Journalists occupied an important place in the revolutionary committee because, aside from their literary and scholastic background, they could operate secretly or openly by and through the newspapers. The religious leaders were important and respected because they had virtual monopoly of the dissemination of learning through the religious colleges and schools, so that the people looked to them for guidance.

The religious societies regarded their task as being merely to awaken the people to the evils of despotism and the benefits of a constitutional government, and convince them that the progress was to be achieved by means of the National Assembly (Majlis) where people could participate in the election of public officials. Again the exile *newspapers* were a significant influence:

> An important part in the enlightenment of the members of these societies was played by the exile press. Copies of the newspapers printed in exile were read with avidity by the members. [Mowlana, 1963, 316]

In terms of publication, members of the Secret Centre in Tabriz published *Azad* (Free) and *Mujahed* (National Volunteer). Nizam-al-Islam Kermani, of the Secret Society in Tehran, issued the *Nedaye-Vatan* (Voice of Fatherland) paper. Four members of the Revolutionary Army Committee edited their own papers, all published in Tehran: *Huquq* (Rights), *Mosavat* (Equality), *Ruhal-Ghudus* (The Holy Spirit) , and *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of Resurrection). Thus, the political opposition, after years of enforced silence, rushed to the printing presses to promulgate their new, and old, political ideas. Circles of intellectuals in Tabriz, whose knowledge of Turkish enabled them to follow cultural trends in the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire, published an influential Persian language journal named *Ganieh-Funun* (Treasury of Knowledge). These newspapers associated with the secret societies assisted the numerous *exile* newspapers in propagating a strong sense of nationalism. [Browne 1914, 45]

7.6 Conclusion

In general, the descriptive analysis of samples of the papers and periodic journals reveal that the political press and *Tanz* papers also played a significant role in the awakening of Iranian public consciousness in the early 20th century. The ideologies of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution used the pulpit and the press, poetry and prose to propagate their ideological perspectives. The volume of political literature (leaflets, pamphlets, *shabnameh*) distributed in the cities of Iran in this period is said by Rizvani to 'cause surprise and wonder' to the historians researching the period. [1964, 232]

The social turmoil, and hence the increased receptivity of the masses to political and ideological agitation, facilitated the diffusion of the new ideology. The nomenclature of the newspapers that sprang up during the revolution reflected these broad ideological precepts: *Tragi* (progress), *Bidari* (Awakening), *Adamiyat* (Humanity), *Azad* (Free), *Huquq* (Right), *Adalat* (Justice), *Mosavat* (Equality), *Nedaye-Vatan* (Voice of Fatherland). [Browne 1914, 128] The authority of the *ancien regime* and its legitimising devices had already declined by the time the symbols, particularly the

press, of the new order began to emerge. This ideology was responsive to the economic needs and political aspirations of a class whose struggle for political power and recognition had the support of many other strata essentially rejecting Qajar rule.

In the absence of substantial content analysis of the newspapers considered here, assessment of the virtues of this revolutionary press are largely dependent on scholars like Browne who had consulted a substantial part of the available newspaper stock at the time of the revolution. Furthermore, Browne also had access to earlier scholarship into the origins and development of Iranian newspapers, both from Iranian and non-Iranian sources. In his judgment, the simplest of the Persian newspapers in style were the *Qanun* (Law) of Malkom Khan, *Al-Jamal*, (Beauty), *Sharafat*, (Nobility) and the *Chanta-pa'-Barahna*, (Satchel). *Chanta-pa'Baraha* was particularly important because of its successful diffusion of liberal ideas among the villagers and common people, awakening their minds by using language easily intelligible to them. The most firmly established and prosperous of the Iranian- language newspapers, were the *Akhtar* and the *Habl-al-Matin*, both exile papers in Calcutta. Browne concludes that the services rendered by these great newspapers were incomparable. Leaving aside the *Akhtar* (Star), which was relatively mild—the *Qanun* (The Law) had the strongest impact on public opinion. The *Tarbiyat* (Education), *Adab* (Manner), and *Bahar* (Spring) must be reckoned first amongst the Persian literary papers. [Browne 1914, 24]

Inevitably, this account of the revolutionary press had dwelt heavily upon the newspapers supporting the revolution and opposing the Qajar governments. It is necessary here to make some brief comment about the press supporting the regime. Only three newspapers openly championed autocracy, namely the *Uqyanus* (Ocean), *Ay-Mulla-Amu* and the *Fikr* (Thought). The broadsides published by Shaykh-Fazlu'llah-Nuri and his followers at Shah-'Abdu'l-'Azim, where they had assembled and taken sanctuary from the National Assembly in 1907, if these can be considered as

genuine newspapers, were the most important reactionary media, and have a special significance in the history of the Revolution. [Brown 1914, 20]

During the period of the Constitutional Revolution the intellectual awakening spread rapidly in terms of reach and vigour. The newspapers had a substantial influence in the renovation of public opinion, especially through the reports of the debates in the National Assembly, which were published in the eponymous *Majlis* paper and less fully in other papers. While the *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of Resurrection) and *Irane-Nuw* (New Iran) elevated people's political outlooks, the *Sharafat* (Nobility), *Al-Jamal* (Beauty), the *Chanta-i-Pabrahna,* and others contributed to the rising political consciousness of the working people.

Browne concluded that in point of literary style and expression the best of the older papers were the *Qanun* (The Law) of Malkom-Khan, and the *Sorayya* (Pleiades) and *Parwarish* (Education) of Mirza-Ali-Muhammad-Khan. Among the later papers the better were the *Sure-Israfil* (The Angel of Resurrection), *Tamaddon* (Civilisation), daily *Habl-al-Matin* (Firm Cord) of Tehran, and *Irane-Nuw* (New Iran). The boldest in their language were the *Ruhu'l-Ghudus, Mosavat, Nuw-Bahar, Sharq, Barq, Sure-Israfil,* and *Suhbat.* Those most distinguished by moral courage were the *Sure-Israfil* which criticised the spiritual authorities, and the *Suhbat* which condemned prevailing customs.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: INDEX AND AGENT

8.1 Introduction

The fundamental objective of this thesis has been to review the press and traditional communication channels in Iran, particularly emphasising their participation in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11. There have been few studies of press history and methodology in Iran either by Iranian or other writers. All too often, those that have been written have comprised lists of newspapers organised in alphabetical order, and compilations of the names of publications. [See Rabino 1911; Tarbiyat, Browne 1914, Sadre-Hashemi 1953, and Qasemi 1993] Consequently, these works are very similar because all the writers have followed the same methodological pattern. The principal exception is Hamid Mowlana's comprehensive review of Iranian journalism in an historical context.

Printed in 1963, Mowlana's work offered both an historical evolutionary account and an interpretative analysis of Iranian journalism from its first stirrings in 1837 until the early 1960's. There have been no other comprehensive studies reviewing the history and functions of the print media and their effects on the social and political awakening of the Iranian people, particularly during the Constitutional Revolution. Inevitably Mowlana has been a principal source, although this study differs in emphasis and approach. Informative as was Mowlana's text on aspects of traditional communications, the press and Iranian journalism were his dominant themes.

Accordingly, the principal advance offered here on Mowlana's classic research is an attempt to place the development of a mass communications model of the press in the context of traditional patterns of Iranian communication, particularly the *mosque* and the *bazaar*. Thus, the thesis has been organised to present a dual communications model, incorporating both traditional and mass communications systems. Much of the

analysis has been directed to identifying the separate elements of the two models, but with the objective of creating a contextual, rather than an integrated, model. A principal conclusion here is that an integrated model is neither warranted nor, indeed, feasible. What is proposed is that the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 brought traditional and mass communications together in a loosely-linked dual framework, with the traditional element unquestionably the most powerful but with a rapidly developing and potentially potent mass communications component. This is essentially the model developed and presented in Chapter 2. (See Table 2-3)

8.2 Revolutionary Tradition and the Constitutional Revolution

In many ways, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 confounds the conventional historical wisdom of revolutions. Compared with the majority of the world's great revolutions, it is atypical in several ways, perhaps most importantly in the broad support given by Iranian middle class elements to the constitutional cause: the religious leaders, merchants, skilled artisans, intelligentsia, and an emerging bourgeois group mingling professional and commercial interests. Such a configuration of bourgeois elements opposed to the established order and prepared to support a revolution has few parallels. Perhaps the most notable would be the Spanish Civil War where the clergy and the traditional bourgeoisie overwhelmingly supported the revolutionary forces. There is no analogy in the Spanish Civil War, however, with the decisive fusion of *mosque* and *bazaar* of religion and commerce, that was instrumental in the revolutionary successes of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The clergy and the merchants played a predominant role in generating the revolutionary forces through control of the traditional institutions of *mosque* and *bazaar*. In conjunction, the two institutions with inter-relationships established over more than a thousand years constituted an extraordinary effective revolutionary instrument. Traditionally, this relationship of religion and trade, sanctioned by holy text, has been more than a match for even the most despotic regime. It was, however, a combination that until the early 20th Century at least, could only have been put together in exceptional circumstances.

Certainly, it would not have been as successful in earlier periods as an ongoing revolutionary force, and certainly its impact lessened the longer the Constitutional Revolution lasted.

The contribution of *proletariat* or working class interests to the decisive early phase was relatively insignificant. Although it developed some momentum after the Constitutional Revolution began, it was a minor factor in the Revolution's successes. It may even have been a distinct liability because of the propensity of many workers to give their loyalty to the monarch in return for inducements. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, therefore, was untainted by any whiff of Marxism or even significant working class participation. Nor was it any way marked by contending religious factions, as was the English Civil War of the 17th Century.

While nationalism was an important stimulus to the revolution it was nationalism without a clearly defined focus. It was not comparable, for example, with the European revolutions of 1848, although both revolutions had a common theme in overthrowing vestiges of feudalism and despotism. A predominant thrust in the 1848 revolutions, however, was nationalism, the restoration of traditional regional and ethnic identities. Unquestionably, Iran was governed by monarchical despotism with strong feudal survivals, but it was not an occupied nation. Furthermore, despite its many iniquities and connivance with imperial powers, particularly Britain and Russia, the monarchy was the traditional embodiment of the Iranian state. Although the detested *concessionaires*—Britain, Russia and, in lesser degree, Belgium-- rapaciously exploited the country, they were at best *semi-colonisers*. While resentment and resistance to the colonial exploiters was a principal source of the popular grievances contributing to the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution, it was not directly the consequence of full-blooded nationalism. It did not seek to overthrow the monarchy but at reforming it and curbing its powers to a constitutional monarchy. It must be concluded, therefore, that the Constitutional Revolution was limited rather than total in

its objectives, determined to establish a constitutional government and to protect it but not to destroy and re-build the Iranian state.

8.3 Religion and the Constitutional Revolution

One of the distinguishing features of Iranian political history has been the active role played by the *ulama*, or religious leaders, in the political events of the country. The *Ulama* had both ideological and material motivations to support the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, especially in its early stages. As Algar [1969, 54] has shown, the *ulama* had for several generations opposed the state on a variety of popular issues, particularly, the threats posed by foreign penetration of society. The *ulama* retained their spiritual powers though the *mosque* and *minbar*, and revived an alliance with the bazaar merchants to curb and perhaps frustrate the monarchy but certainly not to overthrow it.

Shi'i Islam is a major but not a predominant branch of Islam, and Iran is the only nation-state where Shi'i rather than Sunni believers are in the majority. As a religious world-view, Shi'i Islam arguably has relevant symbolic values which justify resistance against unjust authority, and legitimates the role of religious leaders as competitors with leaders of the state. The founding myth is the story of Husssein's (Third Imam) willing martyrdom in the just cause of resisting the usurper caliph, Yazid.[1] Legitimate authority in the Shi'i community has long been shared between political and religious leaders, neither of whom can unambiguously claim to represent fully the will of the 'Hidden Imam', a supreme leader who, according to Islamic tradition, went into trans-historical oscillation in the ninth century. The Shi'i clergy, or *ulama*, are trained to interpret Islamic law for believers, and they can assert superior claims to a monarch in representing authentically the will of the hidden Imam. Nima has argued the crucial significance of religion in Iranian social consciousness:

---

[1]. The events leading to Imam Hussein's martyrdom began with the division of Islam into Sunni and Shi'i branches upon the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century (the first century of the Muslim era).

It is the most important ideological force for social control; one of the
fundamental bases of religion, and in particular Shi'i Islam, is the
submission to the authority and the acceptance of a governing elite. Shi'i
came into being as an ideology of protest, and from its birth it acted as a
political force. Shi'ism, therefore, proclaims the inseparability of politics
and religion. [Nima 1983, 230]

Thus, a revolution with one of its prime objectives the elimination of foreign influences

in Iran could naturally rely upon a native ideology such as Shi'ism. It could not be

relied on, however, to overthrow, or even move decisively away from, a traditional

monarchy. This is a convincing explanation for the gradual drifting away of important

elements of the religious leadership from the Constitutional Revolution after the initial

objectives had been achieved. It is also significant that the *ulama* decided to exercise

their powers in conjunction with its old ally, the *bazaar*, in a revival of an historically

effective conjunction. It is therefore, essential that *mosque* and *bazaar* should be

considered as an alliance in the Constitutional Revolution, perhaps a transitory alliance,

but a powerful one nonetheless. They did not participate in the constitutional

Revolution as separate entities both supporting the same cause. Their co-ordinated

participation in the revolution is best illustrated by one of the maxims quoted earlier:

that when the bazaar closed its doors, the mosque opened its doors.

8.4 Class and the Constitutional Revolution

Another factor in the alignment of the *ulama* and the *bazaari* leadership with the

bourgeoisie was that both groups were essentially bourgeois because of their

established leadership roles. Although the linkage with more conventional bourgeois

elements was not a typical revolutionary configuration in international perceptions of

revolutionary alignment, it was readily explicable in Iranian history and tradition. The

other principal elements of this bourgeois front against the forces of despotism, were

the intelligentsia, an incipiently revolutionary grouping, the skilled artisans, and a

growing professional and commercial group stimulated by western liberalism and

education, a group mingling both the religious leaders (*ulama*), merchants, skilled

artisans, intelligentsia, and an emerging professional class mingling professional and

commercial interests. If *bazaar* and *mosque* were reliant on traditional communication and education, the intelligentsia, and in increasing degree, the *nouveau* bourgeoisie looked more to liberal education and propaganda. The intelligentsia particularly contributed to the development of the press and drew strong sustenance from it

Through the *mosque* and *minbar*, the *ulama* inculcated the revolutionary spirit. The merchants, together with other increasingly bourgeois groups such as the skilled artisans and craftsmen, utilised the powerful communications networks of the *bazaar* to bring the *bazaari*, including workers, into the revolution. The intelligentsia used the emergent press as the tool for their revolutionary propaganda and organisation.

Thus, the political objectives and the political communication channels of *mosque*, *bazaar* intelligentsia and professional bourgeoisie were fundamentally different. The intelligentsia, saw constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism as vital for establishing a dynamic, modernised Iran. Educated in secular schools, the contemporary intelligentsia and growing professional classes often lacked a close relationship with religious scholarly traditions. Furthermore, the commercial element of the new professional classes were also increasingly attuned to western institutions such as banks and department stores, lacking the traditional associations with the *bazaar*. All had in common, however, the political objective of constitutionalism. With the overwhelming support of an emergent press, the constitutional forces were an inherently incompatible alliance but formidable nonetheless.

8.5 The Press and the Constitutional Revolution

The Iranian press was very much the creation of the Qajar monarchies. Though the printing press, in theory at least, was available to Iran from the late 15th Century, it did not appear in Iran in any viable sense until the early 19th Century. (The earlier printing activities in Iran of missionary groups were very limited, essentially a *blind alley*.) First in book publication and then, from 1837, in newspaper and periodical production, the Qajars sanctioned a very limited newspaper press in Iran. Any attempt

at involving the press in modernisation of Iran's society and economy effectively ended with the removal of Amir kabir in the early 1850's. From his death until the outbreak of revolution in 1906 Iran's domestic press was essentially the propaganda instrument of the Qajars. The consequence was an authoritarian and uncritical press, lacking any commitment to the independence, technical virtuosity and scrupulous application of journalistic method inherent in the libertarian model.

From the early 1880's, this authoritarian press was increasingly challenged by the development of an *exile* press with a strong polemical flavour but also responsible for disseminating important news, such as the Tobacco Concession arrangements, within Iran. Towering journalistic figures like Sayyed Jamalled Din and Malkom Khan had an incalculable influence on the nurturing of the Iranian intelligentsia and its native journalists. In time, these influences filtered through to the development of the underground press, the publication of the *shabnameh*, and the engagement of increasingly confident Iranian journalists with the revolutionary movement through the *anjomans*.

It is difficult to make any convincing assessment of the professional performance of the press in the Constitutional Revolution in the absence of detailed information about how journalists did their job, and comprehensive analysis of newspaper content. One measure of achievement is the enthusiastic audience response, measured in the surge of new publication and rising circulation figures in the First Constitutional period. Although these were not sustained, the basis of an assertive, independent and professional press had been firmly established. Another measure of professionalism is the innovation and variety the revolutionary press brought to its journalism. Indeed, the development of a satirical, humorous press, a sophisticated political press, and a superb literary press displaying the traditional Iranian prowess with poetry were professional achievements that any contemporary western press might have envied.

An even more significant yardstick of achievement is the response of its opponents whose own meagre press was comprehensively routed in the propaganda war. The

publishers and journalists of the revolutionary press paid a heavy price in terms of lost employment, harassment, humiliation, denunciation, imprisonment, banishment and even agonising death. For performance of duty in the creation of an independent press, the revolutionary press suffered heavily. Their sacrifice was rewarded in the durability of the press traditions they had created in the difficult years that followed the Constitutional Revolution.

In summary, it must be conceded that the Constitutional Revolution would almost certainly have achieved the successes it did with little or no press presence. The traditional communications mechanisms of the *mosque-bazaar* alliance were powerful enough in their own right to frustrate the Shah and ensure the granting of the constitution. Thus, it is possible to assess the Constitutional Revolution as a triumph for oral and written news utilised through communications systems which had shed little of their traditional power. The contribution of the intelligentsia, however, both in the preparatory period and the revolution itself, must be acknowledged as a new factor in the accustomed patterns of Iranian political confrontation. The press was both the inspiration and the spearhead of the intelligentsia's contribution and also that of the developing professional and commercial bourgeois elements. Its journalists participated directly in the revolutionary movement as Iranian patriots, serving also as chroniclers of a great revolution in the columns of numerous publications. In the vivid phrase of Mowlana, the press had been both index and agent of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

English Language References:

Abrahamian, E. (1982), *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

_____.(1969), "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution", *Iranian Studies,* (Autumn) .

_____.(1974), "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 .

_____.(1975), "European Feudalism and Middle Eastern Despotism", *Science and Society,* 39.

Adams, M. (1971), *The Middle East: A Handbook* (ed.), London: Anthony Blond Ltd.

Afshar, N. (1974), *"The Settlement of Nomads and its Social and Economic Implications"*, Paper presented at the Conference of the Problem of Nomadism in Regional Planning, Persepolis, Iran, 1-4 June.

Afshari, M. (1983), "The Pishevarn and Merchants in Pre-Capitalist Iranian Society: An Essay on the Background and the Causes of the Constitutional Revolution", *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 15, 133-155.

_____. (1981), *A Study of the Constitutional Revolution Within the Framework of Iranian Society,* Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, Philadelphia, US.

Ajami, I. (1969), "Social Classes, Family Demographic Characteristic", *Sociological Ruralis,* Vol. IX. pp, 62-70.

Akhavi, S. (1980), *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran,* Albany: State University of New York Press.

_____.(1973), *Mirza Malkum Khan: A Biographical Study of Iranian Modernism,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____.(1969), *Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Algar, H. (1970), "An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry in Iran", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6.

Al-e Ahmad, J. (1982), *Gharbzadeqi* (Westernisation), trans. Paul Sprachmann, New York: Caravan Books.

Althusser, L. (1981), *Lenin and Philosophy*, London: New Left Books.

Amin, S. (1974), *Accumulation on a World Scale, a Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*. 2 vols. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Amir Sadeghi, H. (1977), *"Twentieth Century Iran"*, New York.

Arasteh, A.R.(1961), "The Character, Organisation, and Social Role of Lutis in Traditional Iranian Society of the Nineteenth Century", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 4 (February).

_____.(1969), *Education and Social Awakening in Iran, 1850-1968*, Leiden: E. G. Brill.

Arberry, A. J. ed. (1953), *The Legacy of Persia*, Oxford University Press.

_____.(1944), *Modern Persian Reader*, Cambridge University Press.

Arjomand, S. A. (1979), "Religion, Political Action and Legitimate Domination in Shi'i Iran", *European Journal of Sociology*, 1.

_____. ed. (1984), *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Aronowitz, S. (1992), *The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements*, London: Routledge.

Asad, T. (1978), "Equality in Nomadic Social System: Notes Towards the Dissolution of an Anthropological Category", *Critique of Anthropology*, 3 Spring.

Ashraf, A. (1969), "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran", *Iranian Studies* 2.

_____. (1981),"*Iran: Imperialism, Class and Modernisation*", Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, New York: New School for Social Research.

_____. (1981), "The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth Century Iran", *Iranian Studied*, Vol. XIV, pp. 5-27.

_____. (1983), "Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Revolution", *MERIP Reports*, March-April 13, 3, No. 113.

Asifnia, A. (1979), "The Rise and Fall of Iran's Underground Press", *Tehran Journal,* November 2.

Assadi, A. and Vidale, M. (1977), *Survey of Social Attitudes in Iran*, Tehran: Iran Communications and Development Institute.

Avery, P. (1965), *Modern Iran*, New York: Praeger Publication.

Bagdikian, B. (1984), *The Media Monopoly,* New York: Beacon Press.

Bakhash, S.(1971), " The Evolution of Qajar Bureaucracy: 1779-1879", *Middle Eastern Studies,* VII (May), pp. 139-169.

_____. (1978), *Iran, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform Under the Qajars, 1858-1896,* London: Ithaca Press.

Banani, A. (1961), *The Modernisation of Iran: 1921-41*, Stanford University Press.

Barns, M. (1940), *The Indian Press*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Barth, F. (1965), *Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy,* New York: Humanities Press.

Barrett, D. (1953), *Persian Painting of the Fourteenth Century*, London: Faber.

Bausani, A. (1971), *The Persian: From the Earliest day to the Twentieth Century.* Trans. from Italian by Donne, J.B, New York.

Bayat, M. (1982), *Mysticism and Dissent: Socio-Religious: Thought in Qajar Iran,* Syracuse University Press.

Beeman, W. O. (1988), *Comparative Journalism: The Cultural Role of the Media in Iran*, Geelong: Deakin University Press.

Benab, Y. (1977), "The Origin and Development of Imperialist Contention in Iran", *Review of Iranian Political Economy and History*, 1 June.

Bellah, R.N. (1964), "Religion Evolution", *American Sociological Review*, 29, pp.258-378.

Behnam, J. (1960), *Population of Iran*, Tehran: University of Tehran Press.

Benjamin, S. (1886), *Persia and the Persians*, Boston: Houghton & Mifflin.

Berelson, B. and Morris J, eds. (1950), *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Bharier, J. (1971), *Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970*, London: Oxford University Press.

_____. (1972), "The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1900-1966", *Middle Eastern Studies*, VIII Jan, pp. 51-63.

Bill, J. A. (I963), "The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary Iran", *Middle East Journal* 17.

_____.(1969), "Class Analysis and the Challenge of Change", *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 October.

_____.(1971), "Politics of Legislative Monarchy: The Iranian Majlis", *In Comparative Legislative System: A Reader in Theory and Research*. Ed. Herbert Hirsch & M. Donald, New York: Free Press.

_____. (1972) *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernisation*, Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.

Blumler, J. and Elihu K. eds.(1974), *The Uses of Mass Communication*, Beverley Hills: Sage.

Borthwick, B. (1965), *"The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication"*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan.

Boyd-Barrett, O (1982),"Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the analysis of media systems", *In Mass Communication and Society,* edited by James Curran.

Brinton, C. (1956), *The Anatomy of Revolution,* New York: Vintage Books.

Browne, E. G. (1909), *A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia,* London.

_____. (1910), *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____.(1913), *The Persian Press and Persian Journalism.* London: Johan Hogg.

_____.(1914), *The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. (1917-18), "The Persian Constitutional Movement", *Proceedings of the British Academy,* VIII, pp. 313-330.

_____. (1924), *Persian Literature in Modern Times,* Cambridge University Press.

_____.(1929), *A Literary History of Persia,* Cambridge University Press.

Busse, H. (1972), *History of Persia Under Qaiar Rule,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Burke, K. (1966), *language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method,* California: Berkely University Press.

Cahen, C. (1968), "Tribes, Cities and Social Organisation", *The Cambridge History of Iran,* Vol 4. pp. 305-9, Cambridge University Press.

Chandler, David. (1993), *The Campaigns of Napoleon,* London.

Cottam, R.W. (1964), *Nationalism in Iran,* Pittsbugh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

_____. (1980), "American Policy and the Iranian Crisis", *Iranian Studies,* Vol. XII, pp. 279-305.

Cresson, W. (1908), *Persia: The Awakening East,* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.

Curran, J. (1977), *Mass communication and Society*, London: Edward Arnold and Open University.

Curzon, G. (1892), *Persia and the Persian Question*, 2 vols. London: Longmans & Green.

Curzon, H.N. (1934), *The last Phase, 1919-1925*, London: Constable and Co.

Darnton, R. (1982), *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime*, Camberidge: Harvard University Press.

Davidson, P. (1949), *Propaganda and the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Davis, H. (1953), *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Davision, W. (1980), *International Political Communication*, New York: Fredrick Praeger.

De Morgan, J. (1913), Feudalism in Persia: Its Origin, Development, and Present Condition", *The Smithsoment Institution*, Annual Report, pp. 579-606.

Dervin, B. (1980), "Communication Gaps and Inequalities: Moving Toward a Re-Conceptualisation", in Brenda Dervin and Melvin Voigt, eds. *Progress in Communication Sciences*, Vol.11, New Jersey: Albex.

Donaldson, D.M. (1933), *The Shi'i Religion*, London: Luzac Company.

Dorman, W. A. (1979), "Iranian People vs. US News Media: A Case of Libel", *Race and Class*, Summer.

Downing, J. (1984), *Radical Media*, US: South End Press.

Eisenstein, E. (1979), *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*, London: Cambridge University Press.

Enayat, A. (1970), "The Problem of Imperialism in Nineteenth Century Iran", *Quarterly Journal of Economic Research*, 7 Spring.

Enayat, H. (1982), *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, London: Macmillan.

Entner, M. L. (1965), *Russo-Persian Commercial Relation, 1828-1914,* Galnesville: University of Florida Press.

Fanon, F. (1965), *A Study in Dying Colonialism,* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Farman Farmaiyan, H. (1968),*"The Forces of Modernisation in 19th Century Iran: A Historical Survey",* In Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East, in the Nineteenth Century. Ed. William Roe Polk and Richard L. Chambers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fateh, M. (1926), *The Economic Position of Persia,* London: P. S. King.

Fatemi, N.S. (1952), *Diplomatic History of Persia: 1917-1923,* New York: Russell F. Moore Company.

Fathi, A. (1979), "The Role of the Islamic Pulpit", *Journal of Communication,* 29, 3, Summer.

Fisher, M.J. (1982), *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution,* Harvard University Press.

Foran, J. (1991), "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iran's Populist Alliance: A Class Analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906", *Theory and Society,* Vol 20.

Franklin, W. (1790), *Observations Made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia in the Years 1786-7,* London: n.p.

Fraser, J. (1812), *A Journey Through Persia in 1808-1809,* London. n.p.

Frechtling, L. E. (1938), "The Reuter Concession in Persia", *Asiatic Review* 34.

Galtung, J. and Vincent, R. (1992), *Global Glasnost: Toward a New World Information and Communication Order?* New Jersey: Hampton Press.

Garthwaith, G. R. (1946), "The Bakhtiyari Khans, The Government of Iran, and the British, 1846-1915", *International Journal of the Middle East Studies,* 3.

Gerbner, G. (1976), "The Scary World of TV's Heavy Viewer", *Psychology Today,* April,

Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (1946), *From Max Weber* (eds.), New York.

Girshman, R. (1954), *Iran: From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest,* New York: Penguin Books.

Goitein, S.D. (1966), *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*, New York: Leiden.

Green, J. D. (1982), *Revolution In Iran,* New York: Praeger.

Gurr, T. (1970), *Why Men Rebel,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hachten, W. A. (1992), *The World News Prism: Changing Media of International Communication*, Iowa State Uniuversity Press.

Haigh, W. and Byrne, R. (1981), *Communication in the Twenty-First Century,* New York: John Willy.

Hairi, A. H. (1977), "Shaykh-Fazl-Allah Nuri's Refutation of Idea of Constitutionalism", *Middle Eastern Studies,* 13.

_____.(1977), *Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran,* Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Hall, S. (1982), *Culture, the Media and the Ideological Effects*, in Curran et al. op. cit.

Halliday, F. (1979), *Iran Dictatorship and Development,* London: Penguin Books.

_____. (1982), "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism", *Journal of International Affairs,* 36, 2, p. 193.

Helfgott, L. M. (1977), "Tribalism as a Socio-Economic Formation in Iranian History", *Iranian Studies* , 10 Winter-Spring.

Hill, C. (1964), *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England,* London: Panther.

Hone, J. M. (1910), *Persia in Revolution, with Notes of Travel in the Caucasus,* London: T. F. Unwin.

Ibn Khaldun. (1969), *The Muqaddimah,* (An Introduction to History), Trans. F. Rosenthal. Ed. and abridged, N. J. Dawood: Princeton University Press.

Innis, H. (1950), *Empire and Communication*, Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Issawi, C. (1971), *The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914,* Chicago University Press.

Jamal Zadeh, M.A. (1951), "An Outline of the Social and Economic Structure of Iran", *International Labor Review*, 63 .

Jones, W. (1771), *The History of the life of Nader Shah*, London.

Kamalipour, Y. R and Mowlana, H. (1994), *Mass Media in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Handbook*, Wesport: Greenwood Press.

Katouzian, H. (1981), *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, London: Macmillan.

Kazemi, F. (1968), *Poverty and Revolution in Iran*, New York: New York University Press.

Kazemzadeh, F. (1957), "Russian Imperialism and Persian Railway. R. Harvard, *Slavic Studies, 4.*

_____ (1968), *Russian and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kamshad, H. (1966), *Modern Persia Prose Literature*, Cambridge: England.

Keddie, N. R. (1962), "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 4, April.

_____.(1966a), *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-2*, London.

_____.(1966b), "The Origin of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran", *Past and Present,* 4, July.

_____. (1967), British Policy and the Iranian Opposition: 1901-1907", *Journal of Modern History,* 39.

_____.(1968), *An Islamic Respond to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamaled-Din"*, Berkeley: Berkely University Press.

_____ (1969), "Iranian Politics, 1900-1905", *Middle Eastern Studies*, October, pp. 234-250.

_____. (1971), "The Assassination of the Amin os-Sultan" (Atabak-i Azam), 31 August 1907. In *Iran and Islam*, Ed. Clifford E. Bosworth, Edinburgh University Press.

_____.(1972), "The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, and its Political Impact: An Overview", *Iranian Studies,* 5.

_____.(1980), *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society,* London: Frank Cass.

_____.(1981), *Roots of Revolution,* Yale: Yale University Press.

_____.(1983), *Religion and politics in Iran,* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Khomeini, R. (1981), *Islam and Revolution,* Trans. by H. Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press.

Klapper, J. (1960), *The Effects of Mass Communication,* New York: Free Press.

Kudzi-Zadeh, A. (1969), "Iranian Politics in Late Qajar", *Middle Eastern Studies,* V, October, pp. 251-257.

Lambton, A. K.S. ed. (1950), *Cambridge History of Islam,* Cambridge University Press.

_____.(1953), *Landlord and Peasants in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration,* Oxford University Press.

_____.(1958), "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6", *St. Antony's Papers,* No. 4, pp. 43-60.

_____.(1961), "Persian Society Under the Qajars", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,* XLVIII, April, pp. 123-139.

_____.(1965), "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution", *Studia Islamica ,* 22, 119-157.

_____. (1963), "Persian Political Societies, 1906-11", *St. Antony's Papers,* No. 16.

_____.(1968), "The Internal Structure of Saljuq Empire", *The Cambridge History of Iran,* pp. 203-283, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lasswell, H.and Kaplan, A. (1965), *Power and Society,* New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____. H, and Lerner, D. (1980), *Propaganda and Communications in World History,* 3 Vols, Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii.

Lawrence, S. (1972), " The Causes of English Revolution", Cambridge University Press.

Layard, H. (1887), *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and Babylonia*, 2 Vols. New York: Longmans & Green.

Lenczowski, G. (1949), *Russia and the West in Iran*, Cornell University Press.

Lerner, D. (1958), *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernisation of the Middle East*, Glencoe: Free Press.

Levy, R. (1951), *The Persian Language*, New York: Philosophical library.

_____.(1955), *Persian Literature; An Introduction*, Oxford University Press.

Lewis, B. (1937), "The Islamic Guilds", *Economic History Review*, 8.

Lockhart, L. (1958), *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McDaniel, R.A. (1971), "Economic Change and Economic Resiliency in 19th Cetury Persia", *Iranian Studies*, 4 .

_____.(1974), *The Shuster Mission and the Culmination of the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911*, Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica.

McEvedy, C. (1971), *The penguin Atlas of Medieval History*, Melbourne: Penguin Books.

McMurtrie, D. C. (1943), *The Book: The Story of Printing and Bookmaking*, Oxford University Press.

McQuail, D. (1987, 1994), *Communication Theory: An Introduction*, London: Sage Publications.

Malcolm, J. (1815), *The History of Persia, From the Most Early Period to the Present Time*, 2 Vols, London: J. Murray.

Mansueto, A. (1988), "Religion, solidarity, and class struggle: Marx, Durkheim, and Gramsci on the religion question", *Social Compass*, XXXV, 2-3, pp. 261-277.

Marlow, J. (1963), *Iran: A Short Political Guide*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Martin, B.G. (1959), *German-Persian Diplomatic Relations: 1873-1912*, S-Gravenhange, Netherlands:Mouton & Co.

Mayer, H. (1985), *The Press in Australia,* Sydney: Lansdowne Press.

Mehta, V. (1976), "Mahatma Gandhi and his Apostles", *The NewYorker,* May 10.

Merton, R. (1957), *Social Theory and Social Structure,* Glencoe: Free Press.

Milani, A.M. (1975), *Ideology and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution: The political Economy of the Ideological Currents of the Constitutional Revolution,* Ph.D dissertation, University of Hawaii.

Millespaugh, A. C. (1925), *The American Task in Persia,* New York: Century Company.

Minorsky, V.F. ed.(1943), "Tadhkirat al-Muluk", *A Manual of Safavid Administration,* London: Luzac.

_____.(1955), *"Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt. In Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilisation",* Ed. Gustav Edmund Von Grunebaum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moaddle, M. (1986), "The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran", *Theory and Society,* 15, pp. 519-556.

_____. (1992), "Shi'i Political Discourse and Class Mobilisation in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-92", *Sociological Forum,* Vol 7, No. 3.

_____.(1993), "Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution", New York: Columbia University Press.

Moore, A. (1914), *The Orient Express,* London: Constable.

Morgan, J. M. (1913), *Feudalism in Persia: Its Origin, Development and Condition,* Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution.

Motamed-Nejad, K. (1977), *The Impact of Mass Media on Iranian Society,* Honolulu: East-West Communication Institute.

Mottahedeh, R. (1985), *The Mantle of the Prophet,* Princeton Universitry Press.

Mottale, M. (1982), "Politics in Post-Revolution in Iran", *Middle East Focus,* Jan, pp. 17-21

Mowlana, H. (1963), *Journalism in Iran: A History and Interpretation,* Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Chicago.

_____.(1979), "Technology Versus Traditional: Communication in the Iranain Revolution", *Journal of Communication,* 29, 3, Summer.

Mozaffari, M. (1991), "Why the Bazaar Rebels", *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol 28, No 4, pp. 377-391.

Mumini, B. (1977), "Iran on the Eve of the Constitutional Revolution", *Review of Iranian Political Economy and History,* 1 June.

Murdock, G. (1973), "For a Political Economy of Mass Communication", *Socialists Register,* London.

Nakhaie, M. R. (1986), "Development of Capitalism in Iran", Ph.D dissertation, Waterloo, Ontario: The University of Waterloo Press.

Nasseru'd-Din Shah. (1874), *The Dairy of H. M. The Shah of Persia During His Tour Through Europe in 1873,* translated by J.W. Redhouse, London: John Murray.

Nemazee, S. (1962), "Constitutional Revolution", *Indo-Iranica ,* 15.

Nicholson, H.C. (1934), *The Last Phase, 1919-1925, A Study in Post-War Diplomacy,* London.

Nima, R. (1983), *The Wrath of Allah,* London: Pluto Press.

No'mani, F. (1972), "The Origin and Development of Feudalism in Iran, 300-1600 A.D.", *Quarterly Journal of Economic Research,* Nos. 27 and 28.

Perry, J. R. (1979), *Karim Khan Zand: A History of Iran, 1747-1779,* Chicago University Press.

Petrushevsky, P. (1968), "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran Under the ll'khans", In *The Cambridge History of Iran,* 6 vols. Cambridge: University Press.

Phillip, M. B. (1974), "Mirza Aga Khan Kirmani: A Nineteenth Century Persian Nationalist", *Middle Eastern Studies,* 10 (January).

Pool, I. S. (1951), *Trends in Content Analysis,* Urbana: University of Illionois Press.

Pye, L. W. ed. (1963), *Communication and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rabino, J. (1892), "Banking in Persia", *Journal of Institute of Bankers*, 13 (January).

Ranganath, H. K. (1980), "Note a Thing of the Past: Functional and Cultural Status of Traditional Media in India", *International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems*, Report No. 92, Paris.

Ricks, T. (1979),"Islamic Republic and Iran Today", *Review of Iranian Political Economy and History,* 3 (Spring).

Riley, J. W. (1959), "Mass Communication and the Social System", in Robert K. Merton, ed., *Sociology Today*. New York: Basic Books.

Rodinson, M. (1974), *Islam and Capitalism*, Trans. Brian Pearce. London: Allen Lane.

Rogers, Everett M. ed. (1976), *Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives,* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Rosengren, K. E. ed. (1981), *Advances in Content Analysis,* Beverly Hills: Sage Annual Review of Communication Research, Vol. 9.

Rypka, J. (1968), *History of Iranian Literature,* Ed. By Karl Jahan. Dordrecht, Holland.

Saba, M. (1931), *Modern Persia and Her Educational System,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Sadiq, I. (1931), *Education in Iran,* Teachers College, New York: Columbia University Press.

Samir, H. (1980), "Main Forms of Traditional Communication: Egypt", International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, Report No. 93, Paris: UNECO.

Servaes, J. (1992), "Cultural Approach and Modes of Communication", *Journal of Communication,* summer, pp. 90-110.

Schiffrin, H. Z. (1968), "The Enigma of Sun Yat-Sen", *In China in Revolution: The First Phase*. Ed. M. C. Wright, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schiller, H. (1976), *Communication and Cultural Domination*, White Plains: International Art and Science.

Schramm, W. (1957), *Responsibility in Mass Communication*, New York: Harpers and Brothers.

_____.(1960), *Mass Communication*, Illinoise: University of Illinois Press.

_____. (1964), *Mass Media and National Development*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

_____.(1972), *Big Media Little Media*, Washington D.C.: Information Centre on Instruction Technology.

_____., and Lerner, D. (1978), *Communication and Change.*: The Last Ten Years and the Next, Honolulu: Hawaii University Press.

Shafag, R. S. (1952), "Patriotic Poetry in Modern Iran", *Middle East Journal*, IV (June) pp. 417-428.

Sheehan, V. (1927), *The New Persia*, New York: The Century Company.

Shinar, D. (1982), "The Myth of the Mighty Media: Communication Networks in the Process of Social Change", paper presented at IAMCR Conference, Paris.

Shuster, W. M. (1912), *The Strangling of Persia*, London: T. F. Unwin.

Siddique, K. ed. (1980), *The Islamic Revolution in Iran*, London: Open Press with the Muslim Institute.

Siebert, F. S. Theodore P., Schramm, W. (1956), *Foure Theories of the Press*, University of Illinois Press.

Singh, K.J. (1979), "Gandhi and Mao as Mass Communicators", *Journal of Communication*, 29, 3, Summer, pp. 94-100.

Speier, H. (1950), " Historical Development of Public Opinion", *American Journal of Sociology*, 4.

Sreberny. M. A. and Mohammadi, A. (1983), "*Religion Versus Ideology as Modes of Political Communication: The Case of Iran*", Presented to MESA Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November.

_____.(1984), *Communications and Democracy: Direction in Research*, Leicester: IAMCR.

_____. (1985),*"The Power of Tradition: Communication and the Iranian Revolution"*, Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University Press.

_____. (1990), "Small Media for a Big Revolution: Iran", *Politics, Culture and Society*, Spring, 3, 3. pp. 341-371.

Stauffer, T. R. (1965), "The Economics of Nomadism in Iran", *Middle East Journal*, 19.

Stephens, M. (1988), *History of News: From the Drum to the Satellite*, NewYork: Panquin Press.

Stevenson, R. (1994), *Global Communication in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Longman Press.

Stone, L. (1972), *The Causes of the England Revolution, 1529-1642*, London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

Sunderland, E. (1968), "Pastoralism, Nomadism and the Social Anthropology of Iran", In *The Cambridge History of Iran*, 6 vols. Cambridge University Press.

Sykes, P. M. (1963), *A History of Persia*, 2 vols. London: Macmillan.

Sykes, E. C. (1910), *Persia and Its people*, New York: Macmillan .

Tabatabai, Allamah.S.M. (1975), *Shi'i Islam*, Translated from Persian by S. H. Nasr, New York: State University of New York Press.

Tehranian, M. and Hakimzadeh, F., and Vidale, M. L. (1977), *Communication Policy for National Development*, London: Routledge Kegan Paul.

_____.(1978), *Communications Policies in Iran: A White Paper*, Tehran: Iran, Communication and Development Institute.

_____. (1980), "Communication and Revolution in Iran: The Passing of Paradigm",

Iranian Studies, XIII, pp. 1-4.

Terray, E. (1972), *Marxism and Primitive Societies,* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Thaiss, G. (1971), *The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change,* in Yar-Shater, pp. 189-216. New York: Macmillan.

Turner, B. S. (1980), *Capitalism and Feudalism in Iran (1502-1979),* New York: Stauth.

Upton, J.M. (1960), *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Watson, R. G. (1866), *A History of Persia from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Year 1858,* London: Smith & Elder.

Weber, M. (1958), *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* Trans. from the German by Talcott parsons. New York: The Free Press.

Whigham, H. J. (1903), *The Persian Problem; An Examination of the Rival Positions of Russia and Great Britain in Persia,* New York: The Century Company.

Wilber, D. N. (1963),*Contemporary Iran*, New York: Praeger.

Wilson, A. T. (1941), *South West Persia: A Political Officer's Diary, 1907-1914,* Oxford University Press.

Wishead, J.C. (1908), *Twenty Years in Persia,* New York: Longmans & Green.

Wismen, D. J. (1976), *Iran Past and Present,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Young, T. C. (1948), "The Problem of Westernisation of Modern Iran", *Middle East Journal,* 11 (Jan), pp. 47-59.

Persian Language References

Abrami, H. (1973), *Sattar Khan, Sardar-e Melli* (Sattar Khan: the National Commander). Tehran.

Adamiyat, F.(1955), *Amir Kabir-wa-Iran* (Amir Kabir and Iran), Tehran.

_____.(1961), *Fekr-e Azadi wa Moqadameh-e Nehzat-e Mashruteh* (Thought of Freedom and the Beginning of the Constitutional Revolution), Tehran: Sokhan Publication.

_____.(1967), *Andisheha-ye-Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani* (Thoughts of Mirza Aga Khan Kermani), Tehran: Tahori Publication.

_____.(1973), *Andisha-e Taraqi wa Hokumat-e Qanun: Asr-e SePah Salar* (Thoughts of Progress and the Rule of Law: Sepah Salar's Era), Tehran: Kharazmi Press.

_____.(1976), *Edeology-e Nehzat-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (Ideology of the Constitutional Movement in Iran), Tehran: Payam Publication.

_____ and Nateq, H. (1978), *Afkar-e Ejtema'l wa Siasi wa Eqtesadi dar Asar-e Montasher Nashode-ye Qajar* (Social, Political and Economic thoughts in Unpublished Literature of the Qajar Era), Tehran: Agah Press.

Adibul-Mamalek Shirazi, M. G. R. (1903), *Afzalul-Tavarikh: Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah* (History of Muzzafaru'd-Din Shah), Tehran.

Amin'od-Dowleh, M. A. (1962), *Khaterat-e Siyasi-e Amin od-Dowleh* (Political Memoires of Amin od-Dowleh), Ed. H. Farman Farmayan. Tehran.

Amiri, M., trans. (1970), *Safarnamahha-yi Veniziyan dar Iran* (The Venetians' Travels in Iran), Tehran: Kharazmi Publication.

Amir-Khizi, E. (1959), *Qiam-e Azarbaiian wa Sattar Khan* (The Azarbaijan Revolt and Sattar Khan), Tehran.

Arianpur, A. H. (1971), *Yahya. Az Saba ta Nima* (From Saba to Nima), Tehran.

Arunova, M. R. & Ashrafian, K. Z. (1977), *Dolat-e Nader Shah-e Afshar* (The State of Nader Shah Afshar), Trans. H. Mumani. Tehran.

Ashouri, D. (1971), *Enaelab Mashruteh-e Iran: Zamineh Eqtesadi wa Eitem'i* (Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Economic and Social Background), Tehran.

Ashraf, A. (1980), *Mavana Tarikhiy ye-Tosai'a-Sarmaya Dary dar Iran: Doreh Qajar*, (Historical Obstacles to Development of Capitalism Iran: Qajar Period), Tehran: Zamineh Publication.

_____. (1980), *Tabaqate Ijtemai Doran Qajar* (Social Strata During Qajar), Agah Book, *Iran and Middel East Questions*, pp. 71-99, Tehran: Agah Publication.

Assadi, A. and Hormoz M., eds. (1976), *Naqsh-e Rassnehha dar Poshtibani-ye Tause'a-ya Farhanqi* (Role of the Mass Media in the Cultural Development), Tehran: Communication and Development Institute.

Ayati, A. H. (1947), *Kashf ol-Heyal* (Discovery of Political Intrigues), Tehran.

Bahar, M. (1942-3), *Tarikh Mokhtasar Ahzabe Siasi: Ingheraze Qajariyeh* (A Short History of Political Parties: The fall of the Qajars), Tehran: Amir Kabir Press.

Barzin, M. (1975), *Matbu'ate-Iran* (Iran's Press), Tehran: Behjat Publications.

_____. (1991), *Tajziyeh-va Tahlile-Amari ye-Matbu'ate-Iran* (Statistical Analysis of Persian Press: 1836-1978), Tehran: Centre for Media Studies and Researchers.

Bastani Parizi, M. A. (1967), *Talash-e Azadi* (Struggle for Freedom), Tehran: Novin Press.

Bayani Islami, S. (1974), *Iran dar Barkhord-e be Moghol* (Iran and the Mongol Encounter), Tehran.

Behzad, K.T. (1955), *Qiyam-e Azarbaijan dar Engelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (Azarbaijan's Revolt in the Constitutional Revolution), Tehran.

Behnam, J. R. (1969), *Moqadameh Jameashnasi Iran* (Introduction to Sociology of Iran), Tehran: Kharazmi Press.

Contarini, A., M. (1970), *Safarnameh-e Ambroso Contarini* (Ambroso Contdrinl's Travels), In Safarnameha-ye Veneziyan dar Iran (The Venetians' Travels in Iran). Trans. M. Amiri, Tehran: Kharazmi Publication.

Dashti, A. (1923), *Asre Taffavogh-e-Anglo-Saxon* (The Age of Britain Dominance), Tehran: Gagherzadeh Press.

Dehkoda, A. A. (1960), *Amsal-Va-Hakam* (Proverbs and Anecdotes), Tehran: Amir Kabir Press.

Dneshpoor, M. (1941), *Bank-e Shah-an-Shahi va Emtiaz* (The Emperial Bank and the Concessions), Tehran.

Dolatabddi, Y. (1947), *Tarikh-e Mo'aser, va Hayat-e Yahya* (A Contemporary History and Yahya's Life), 4 vols. Tehran: Chihre Press.

Etehadieh, M. (1982), *Tolua Ahzbe Siyasi dar Inqelabe Mashrutiyyate Iran* (The Rise of Political Parties in the Constitutional Revolution): First and Second Session of the National Parliament, Tehran: Goustardeh Press.

Etemadu-Saltaneh, M. H. K. (1875-6), *History of Iran*, Tehran: Iqbal Publication.

_____.(1876-9), *Miratul-Buldan* (The Mirror of the Lands), 4 Vols, Tehran.

_____.(1890), *Al-Ma'asir val A'sar* (Monuments and Achievements), Tehran: Kharazmi Press.

_____.(1891-93), *Baniul-Askhan* (A History of Parthians), 3 Vols, Tehran.

_____. (1966), *Ruzname-ye Khaterat-e I'temad os-Saltaneh* (The Papers of I'temad os-Saltaneh). Ed. Iraj. Afshar. Tehran.

Farman-Farma, F. M. (1963), *Safarnama-i Kerman wa Baluchestan* (Travels of Kerman and Baluchestan). Ed. Mansura Nizam Mafi, Tehran.

Fashahi, M. R. (1975), *Tahavolat-e Fekri wa Ejtema'i dar Jam'ae-i Faudali-Iran* (Ideological and Social Transformations in Iran's Feudal Society), Tehran.

Fumani, A. F. (1970), *Tarikh-e Gilan* (History of Gilan), Tehran: Bonyade- Farhangi-Iran.

Golistaneh, A. H. (1965), *Mojmal ot-Tavarikh* (Compendium of Histories), Ed. Rezvani. Tehran: Shirkate Tab-e Kitab.

Hazin, M. A. (1831), *Tarikhe -Ahval - Siyasi* (History of the Political Conditions, Ed. F. C Belfour, London.

Igbal-Ashtiyani, A. (1962), *Mirza-Taqi-Khan-e-Amir-Kabir,* Tehran: Iqbal Press.

Ivanov M. S. (1978), *Enqelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (The Constitutional Revolution of Iran), Tehran: Now Bahar Press.

Jamal Zadeh, M. A. (1957), *Ganj-e Shayagan* (An Immense Treasure), Tehran.

Javid, S. (1966), *Fadakaran-e Faramush Shodeh* (Self Sacrificing People Who Have Been Forgotten), Tehran.

Kasrawi, A. (1939-41), *Tarikj-e-Hijdah Saleh Azarbaijan; Ya Dastan-e Mashroteh-e Iran* (Eighteen Years of Azarbaijan History; or the Story of the Iranian Constitution), 6 Vols, Tehran: Amir Kabir Publication.

_____.(1977), *Tarikh-e- Mashrutah-ey-Iran* (History of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran), 2 vols. Tehran: Amir Kabir Publication.

Katirai, H.(1969), *Faramsuneri-dar Iran*. (Freemasson's Hall in Iran), Tehran: Iqbal Press.

Kayhan, M. (1932), *Joghrafiya-ye- Mofassal-e- Iran* (A Detailed Geography of Iran), Tehran.

Kermani, A. M. I. (1971), *Tarikh-i Ingilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran* (History of the Constitutional Revolutyion In Iran), Isfahan.

_____.(1972),*Tarikh-i Inhitat-i Majlis* (The History of Parliament's Decadence), Isfahan:

Kermani, N.I. (1965), *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iranian* (History of the Awakening of the Iranians), 2 vols. Tehran: Bunyade-Farhangi- Iran.

Khomeini, R. (1973), *Khomeini and Movement: Speeches and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* Tehran: 15 Khordad Publication.

Kia, A. A.(1991), *Tarikh-e-Matbua'te-Iran* (History of Iran's Press), M.A. dissertation Tehran: Azade-Islami University.

_____(1992), *Baresi-ye-Avamel-e-Moasser-bar Enteshar va Adam-e-Enteshar-e Majallat-e Elmi dar Iran* (Review Effective Factors on Publishing and Non-Publishing of the Scientific Magazines in Iran, 1979-1992), M.A. dissertation, Tehran University, Iran.

Kohan, K. (1984), *Tarikhe-Sansor-dar Matbua'te-Iran* (History of Censorship in Iran's Press), 2 Vols, Tehran: Agha Publication.

Kuznetsova, N. A. (1980), *Ouza-e Siyasi va Ejtemaie-Eqtasadi-e Iran dar payan-e Sadeh-i Hijdahom ta Nimah-i Nakhost-e Sadeh-i-Nuzdahem-e Miladi* (Political and Socio-

Economic Conditions of Iran from the End of Eighteenth Century to the Middle of Nineteenth Century), Trans. S.Yazdani.Tehran.

Lisan ol-Molk Sepehr, M.T.(1958), *Nasekh ot-Tavarikh* (Copyist of Histories), 3 Vols. Ed. Qa'im Maqami, Tehran: Firdausi Press.

Mahmud, M. (1979), *Tarikh-e Ravabet-e Siasi-e Iran va Englis dar Gharn-e Nozdahom* (History of Anglo-Iranian Diplomatic Relations in the Ninteenth Century), 3 Vols, Teharn: Iqbal Publication.

Makki, H. (1958), *Tarikh-e-Bist Saleh Iran* (The Twenty Years History of Iran), Tehran: Amir Kabir Press.

_____.(1958), *Zindegani-ye- Mirza Tagi Khan Amir Kabir* (The Amir Kabir's Life), Tehran: Amir Kabir Press.

Majlis-e-Shora-ye Melli, (1946), "Mozakerate Majlis-e Dowreh Avval" (Debates of the First Parliament) in *Roznameh Rasmeyeh Keshvar*, Tehran.

Malekzadeh, M. (1946), *Zendeqani-e Malek ol-Motakalemine,* Tehran..

_____.(1951), *Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutyat-e-Iran* (History of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran), 6 Vols. Tehran.

Maraghei, Z. A. (1965), *Siahatname-ye Ebrahim Bayk* (Itinerary of Ebrahim Bayke), Tehran.

Mar'ashi, M. K. (1950), *Mojamal ot-Tavarikh* (Compendium of Histories), Ed. Abbas Iqbal, Tehran.

Mazar'ai, 'A. (1970), *Tarikh-e Eqtesadi wa Eitem'ai-e Iran wa Iranian as Aqaz ta Safaviya* (Economic and Social History of Iran and Iranians from the Beginning to Safavids), Tehran: Kharazmi Press.

Mohammad Hashim, R. H. (1969), *Rostam ul-Tavarikh* (Hero of History). Ed. Mohammad Moshiri, Tehran..

Mohsenian Rad, M. (1995), *Ertebat-Shenasi* (Communicology), Tehran: Surosh Press.

Mokhtari, H. (1947), *Tarikh-e Bidari Iran* (History of Iran's Awakening), Tehran University Press.

Mostafavi, A. (1945), *Tarikh-e Ejtemaie va Edarie Doreh Qajarieh* (Social and Administrative History of the Qajar Era), 3 Vols, Tehran: Iqbal Press.

Mottahari, M. (1982), *Jamea-va Tarikh* (Society and History), Tehran: Sazemane-Tablighate-Islami Press.

Mumini, B. (1963), *Iran dar Astaneh-Engelab-e Mashrutiyat* (Iran on the Eve of the Constitutional Revolution), Tehran.

Naraqi, H. (1977), *Kashan dar Jonbesh-e Mashrutah-e Iran* (Kashan in Iran's Constitutional Movement), Tehran.

Nasseru'd-Din Shah. (1890), *Safarnameh Nasser-u-Din Shah be Uropa* (The Dairy of Nasseru'd-Din Shah to Europe).

Nateq, H. (1980), *Farang wa Farngi-Ma'abi* (The West and the Westernisation), *in Mosibate Waba wa Balai Hokomat* (Plague's Disaster and Government's Calamity), Tehran..

No'mani, F. (1980), *Takamol-e Feudalism dar Iran* (Development of Feudalism in Iran), Tehran.

Ozhan Bakhtiari, A.F. (1967), *Tarikh-e Bakhtiari* (The History of Eakhtiyari). Tehran.

Pavlovitch, M. (1978), *Enqelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (The Constitutional Revolution of Iran), Trans. M. Hoshyar. Tehran.

Qasemi, S. F. (1993), *Rahnama-ye-Matbuat-e Iran: Asre Qajar* (Directory of Iran's press: Qajar Era 1837-1925), Tehran: Centre for Media Studies and Researches.

_____.(1993), *Rahnama-ye-Matbuat-e Iran* (Directory of the Iran's Press, 1979-1992), Tehran: Centre for media Studies and Researches.

Rabine, H. L. (1973), *Mashruteh-e Gilan* (Constitutional Revolution in Gilan). Ed. M. Roshan. Rasht.

Rabino, H. L. (1911), *Sorat-e-Jaraed Iran va Jarae-dike dar khareje Iran Bezabane Farsi Tab Shodeh Ast* (A Table of Newspapers of Iran and of Newspapers in the Persian Language Published Outside Iran), Rasht: Urvatul-Vosgha Press.

Rahimi, M. (1963), *Qanun Asasi-e Iran* (Iran's Fundamental Law), Tehran.

Rain, I. (1966), *Anjoman-ha-ye Seri dar Engelabe-e Mashruteh* (The Secret Societies in the Constitutional Revolution), Tehran: Amir Kabir Press.

Ra'isniya, R. and Abd al-Husayn N. (1969), *Do Mobarez-e Jonbesh-i Mashruteh* (Two Militants of the Constitutional Movement), Tabriz: Ebne-Sina Press.

Ravandi, M. (1957), *Tafsir-e Qanun-e Asasi-e Iran* (Commentary of Iran's Fundamental Law), Tehran.

_____.(1975), *Tarikh-e Ejtema'i-e Iran* (The Social History of Iran), 2 Vols. Tehran: Amir Kabir Press.

Rezazadeh-Malek, R. (1973), *Chekiday-e-Engelab* (Abstract of the Revolution), Tehran.

Rezvani, M. I. (1966), *Engelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (Iran's Constitutional Revolution), Tehran.

Sadre-Hashemi, M. (1948-53), *Tarikh-e Jaraed va Majallat-e Iran* (History of the Iran's Newspapers and Magazines), 4 Vols, Isfahan: Kamal Publication.

Sadrzadeh, Z.D. (1967), *Saderat-e Iran* (Iran's Exports), Tehran..

Safavi, R.Z. (1930), *Iran-e Eqtesadi* (Economy of Iran), 2 vols. Tehran: Taragi Press.

Seddigui, G. H. (1970), *Dah Resaley-e Digar Az Sadre-Mashruteh* (Ten Dissertations of the Early Constitutional), Rahnema-ye-Ketab, 13 (March), pp. 17-24.

Shaikh ol-Islam, M.A. A. (1977), *Dow Sanad az Engelab-e Mashrutah-ye Iran* (Two Documents from the Constitutional Revolution of Iran), Tehran: Tooka Press.

Shaji'i, Z. (1965), *Namayandegan-e Majlis-e Shura-ye Melli dar Bist-o-yak Dowrah-e Qanungozari* (The Members of the National Assembly during Twenty-one Sessions), Tehran: Institute for Social Studies and Research, Tehran University Press.

Shamim, A. A. (1964), *Iran dar Doureh-ye Saltanat-e Qajariyeh* (Iran During the Qajar Rule), Tehran: Ibn-e Sina Publication.

Sodagar, M. (1980), *Systeme Feodali Dar Iran* (Feudalism System in Iran), Tehran: Pazand Publishing Company.

Tabari, E. (1970), *Barkhi Barresiha dar Barh-ye Jahanbeeniha va Jonbeshha-ye Ejtema'i dar Iran* (Review Some Ideologies and Social Movements in Iran) Tehran.

Tabatabai, M. (1970), *Nagsh-e Sayyid Jamal al Din Assad Abadi dar Bidari Mashreq Zamin* (The Role of Sayyed Jamalled Din on the Awakening of the East), Tehran: Iqbal Press.

Tafareshi-Hosseini, S. A. (1949), *Ruznamah-Tahrim-e Tanbaku* (The Tobacco Boycott's Newspaper), Tehran: Bita.

_____. (1973), *Roznameh Akbar-e Mashrutiyat va Engelab-e Iran* (The Newspaper of the Constitution and the Revolution of Iran), Ed. Iraj Afshar Tehran.

Taghi-Zadeh, S. H. (1949), *Tarikh-e Avael- Engelabe Mashrutiyat-e Iran* (History of the Early Constitutional Revolutionin Iran), Thran: Amir Kabir Press.

_____.(1973), *Akhbar-e Mashrutiyat* (News of the Constitutional). Ed. Iraj Afshar, Tehran.

Tajbakhsh, A. (1958), *Tarikh-e Rawabet-e Iran wa Russeyeh dar Nimey-e Avval-e Qarn-e Nuzdahom* (A History of Russo-Iranian Relations During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century), Tabriz.

Tarbiyat, M. A. (1935-6), *Daneshmandan-e Azarbaijan* (Scholars of Azarbaijan) Tehran: Majlis Press.

Teiymouri, I. (1953), *Asr-e Bikhabari ya Tarikh-e Emtiyazat* (The Age of Ignorance or History of Concessions), Tehran: Iqbal Publication.

Watson, R. G. (1961), *History of Iran Under Qajar*, Trans. Mazandarani, Tehran: Sokhan.

Zaker Hossein, A. R. (1989), *Matbua'te-Siassi-ye Iran dar Asre-Mashrutiyyat* (Iran's Political Press during the Constitutional Era), Tehran: Tehran University Press.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

THE PERSIAN ROYAL PROCLAMATION (FARMAN) 0F THE
CONSTITUITONAL REVOLUTION OF 1906

The Persian Royal Proclamation of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906

APPENDIX 2

THE TRANSLATION OF ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1906

The Translation of Royal Proclamation (Farman) of August 5, 1906

Whereas God Most High (glorious is His State!) hath entrusted to our hands the direction of the progress and prosperity of the well-protected realms of Persia, and hath constituted Our Royal Personage the Guardian of the Rights of all the people of Persia and of all our loyal subjects. Therefore on this occasion, our Royal and Imperial judgement has decided, for the peace and tranquillity of all the people of Persia, and for the strengthening and consolidation of the foundations of the State, that such reforms as are this day required in the different departments of the State and of the Empire shall be effected; and we do enact that an Assembly of delegates elected by the Princes, the Doctors of Divinity (Ulama), the Qajar family, the nobles and notables, the land- owners, the merchants and the guilds shall be formed and constituted, by election of the classes above mentioned, in the capital Tehran; which Assembly shall carry out the requisite deliberations and investigations on all necessary subjects connected with important affairs of the State and Empire and the public interests; and shall render the necessary help and assistance to our Cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as are designed to promote the happiness and well-being of Persia; and shall, with complete confidence and security, through the instrumentality of the first Lord of the State, submit [their proposals to Us], so that these, having been duly ratified by Us, may be carried into effect. It is evident that, in accordance with this August Rescript, you will arrange and prepare a code of regulations and provisions governing this Assembly, and likewise the ways and means necessary to its formation, so that, by the help of God Most High this Assembly may be inaugurated and may take in hand the necessary reforms. We likewise enact that you should publish and proclaim the text of this August Rescript, so that all the people of Persia, being duly informed of our good intentions, all of which regard the progress of the Government and People of Persia, may, with tranquil minds, engage in prayer for Us. Given [under Our hand] in the *Sahib-Qiraniyya* Palace on the fourteenth of Jumada the Second in the eleventh year of Our Reign (August 5, 1906).[1]

---

[1]. The Translation of the Royl Proclamation of August 1906 is based on the work of Browne, 1914, pp. 353-354

APPENDIX 3

THE IRANIAN PRESS—AN OVERVIEW
ANNUAL PUBLICATION—1907-1925

APPENDIX THREE

THE IRANIAN PRESS—AN OVERVIEW

ANNUAL PUBLICATION—1907—1925

The tables below are designed to provide an annual snapshot of the Iranian press from the peak of the Constitutional Revolution in 1907 until the accession of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925. Each annual table sets out three things:

- A complete listing of each news publication published in the designated year;

- Regularity of publication for each newspaper or journal listed;

- Designation of genre for each publication.

  For selected years, place of publication is also included.

It should be noted that the tables list the **gross** number of publications each year, not the **net** number. In short, publications extending over more than one year will be counted more than once. This needs to be kept in mind when assessing trends in publication over 18 years. In broad terms, the tables indicate fluctuations in newspaper publication which can be attributed to direct consequences of decisive events in the constitutional Revolution and its aftermath.

Of particular interest to non-Iranian readers are the poetic, evocative titles given to many of these newspapers, totally different from the crude labelling mostly applied to western newspaper titles.

Table 1

Newspaper Publication—1907

Name	Frequency	Subject
A'ina-i-Ghayb-Nama (Mirror Showing the Unseen)	Twice per-week	Political-Economic
Adamiyyat (Humanity)	Twice per-week	Scientific-Economic
Agahi (Information)	Weekly	—
Al-Jamal (Beauty)	Weekly	Political-Social
Anjumane-Baladiyyeh (The Municipal Council)	Weekly-Monthly	News-Historical
Anjumane-Millie Vlayate-Gilan (The National Provincial Council of Gilan)	Weekly	News
Anjumane-Asnaf (The Trades Guide)	Daily-Weekly	Economic-Social
Azarbaijan	Weekly	Critical-Humorous
Baladiyyeh (Municipality)	Weekly	News-Scientific
Baladiyyeh-Isfahan (The Municipality of Isfahan)	Weekly	Social-News
Bamdad (Morning)	Weekly	Political-Economic
Basirat (Insight)	Weekly	News
Bidari (Wakefulness)	Weekly-three times per-week	Political-News
Bistun (Bebistun)	Twice per-week	News-Political
Ekbatan (Ekbatan)	Weekly	News
Farhang (Culture)	Weekly	Political
Faryad (The Lament)	Weekly	Political-News
Favayedeh-Ammeh (Public Benefits)	Weekly	Political
Ganje-Shayegan (The Royal Treasure)	—	Political
Ganjineh-Ansar (The Treasure of the Helpers)	Weekly	Political
Ghayb-Nama (Showing the Unseen)	—	——

Gulestan (The Rose-Garden)	Weekly	Political-Religious
Gulistan-i-Saadat (The Rose-Garden of Happiness)	Twice per-week	Political-Social-Critical
Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord)	Daily	Political-Social
Hamadan	Weekly	News
Haqiqat (The True) in Tehran and Isfahan	Weekly	Political-Economic
Harfe-Haqq (Right Talk)	Weekly	Political
Hawa-va-Hawas (Freak and Fancy)	Twice per-week	News
Hedayat (Guidance)	Weekly	Political-News
Hoda	—	Political
Huquq (Rights)	Weekly	Political-Historical
Ibrat (Admonition)	Monthly	Political
Ilm-Amuz (The Teacher of Knowledge)	Weekly	Cultural
Ilme-Umur (The Science of Affairs)	—	Financial
Insaf (Equity)	Weekly	Political-News
Insaniyyat (Humanity)	Weekly	Social
Iraq-Ajam	Weekly	Scientific-Literature
Isfahan	Weekly-three times per-week	Political-News
Ittehad (Union)	Two weekly	Political-News
Ittihadiyeh-Sa'adat (Happiness of Union)	Weekly-Monthly	Social-Political
Jahan-Ara (The World Adorning)	Weekly	Political-Social
Jame-Jam (The Goblet of Jamshid)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Kashgul (The Alms-gourd)	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Kashife-Haqayeq (The Revealer of True) in Tehran and Rasht	Twice per-week-weekly	Political
Kukabe-Durri (The Shining Star)	Weekly	Political-Economic
Khayr'ul-Kalam (The Best of Discourses) in Tehran and Rast	Twice per-week	Political-Humorous
Khurram (Gay)	Weekly	Political

Khurshid (The Sun)	Weekly	Political-News
Kelide-Siyasi (The Political Key)	Weekly	Political
Majalleh-Istibdad (The Magazine of Autocracy)	Weekly	Political
Mashruteh-Bi-Qanun (The lawless Constitution)	Weekly	Political-News
Mashverat (Council)	Weekly	Political-News
Muayyed (Aided)	Weekly	Political-News
Muhakemat (Judgements)	Daily-twice per-week-	News
Mujahed (The National Volunteer) in Tabriz and Rasht	Weekly-three times per-week	Political-Social
Mosavat (Equality)	Weekly	Political-Social
Namehe-Haqiqat (The Letter of Truth)	Weekly	News
Naqshe-Jahan (The Picture of the World)	Weekly	Social-News
Nasime-Shomal (Northern Breeze)	Weekly	Political-Humorous-Critical
Nuw-Ruz (New Year's Day)	Weekly	—
Nayyer-Azam (The Greater Luminary)	Twice per-week	Political-Scientific
Neday-ye-Islam (The Voice of Islam)	Weekly	Political-News
Qajariyya	Weekly	Political
Qasimu'l-Akhbar (The Distributor of News)	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Rahnama (The Guide)	Monthly-Weekly	Political-Social
Ruhu'l-Ghudus (The Holy Spirit)	Weekly	Political-Scientific-Critical
Ruznameh-i-Shaykh-Fazlu'llah,	Weekly	Political Religious
Sa'adat (Felicity)	Weekly	News
Safineh-Nejat (The Ark of the Deliverance)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Sahele-Nejat (The Shore of Safety)	Twice per-week	Scientific-Literature
Salam-Alaykum (Peace be upon you)	—	—

Shajareh-ye-Khabise-Kufr va Shajareh-Tayyibeh-Iman (Origin of Faith and Profanity)	Weekly	----
Shamse-Taleh (The Rising Sun)	Weekly	Social
Shukr (Gratitude)	Weekly	Social-News
Shura-ye-Baladi (The Municipal Council)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Sehhat (Health)	Weekly	Hygienic
Seratu'l-Mustaqim (The Straight Way) in Tehran and Tabriz	Weekly	Political-Religious
Subhe-Sadeq (The True Dawn)	Daily	Political-Economic
Sure-Israfil (The Trumpet-Call of Israfil)	Weekly	Political-Social
Surush (Message)	Weekly	Political-News
Tadayyun (Religiousness)	Weekly	Political-Social
Tafakkur (Thought)	Weekly	News
Tanbih (Admonition)	Weekly-once every ten days	Political Social
Tariqatu'l-Falah(The Way of Happiness)	Weekly	Social
Tashviq (Encouragement)	Weekly	Political-Social
Traqqi (Progress)	Twice per-week	Political-Scientific
Ulfat (Friendship)	Weekly	Political-Social
Uromiya Orthodoxyaita	Weekly	Religious
Urvatu'l-Vosgha (Indissoluble Link)	Weekly	Political
Zabane-Mellat (The Tongue of the Nation)	Twice per-week	Political News
Zesht-va-Ziba (Foul and Fair)	Weekly	Political-Social

Table 2

Newspaper Publication—1908

Name	Frequency	Subject
Amuzgar (Teacher)	Two weekly	Cultural-Social
Anadili (The Mother Tongue)	Weekly	Political
Ay Molla-Ammu	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Barqe-Sabz (The Green Leaf)	Twice per-week	News-Political
Dabiriyyeh (Teacher)	Weekly	Literature
Entesahare-Azadi (Publication of Freedom)	—	—
Gillan	Twice per-week	Political-News
Haqiqat (True)	Weekly	Political
Hashra-Tul-Arz (Reptiles of the Earth)	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Hedayat (Guidance)	Weekly	News
Ishraq (Dawn)	Weekly	
Ittefaq (Concord)	Weekly-Monthly	Political-News
Ittehad (Union)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Jang (War)	Weekly	News
Kakhva (The Star)	—	—
Khair-Andysh (Well Meaning)	Weekly	Political-News
Maarif (Instruction)	Twice per-week	Cultural
Mare-Fatul-Akhlaq (Knowledge of Ethics)	Weekly	Ethical-Literature
Muhakemat (Judgement)	Weekly	Political
Nahid (Venus)	Weekly	Political-News
Naleh-Mellat(The Nations' Cry)	Weekly	Political-News
Naqure (The Clarion)	Weekly	Political-Critical-Humorous
Nazmiyyeh-Tabriz (The Police of Tabriz)	Weekly	Military

Okhvvate-Shiraz (Fraternity of Shiraz)	Weekly	News
Ruhul-Amin(The Trusty Spirit)	Weekly	Political-Historical
Sedaghat (Fidelity)	Weekly	Social
Seratul-Sanayyeh (The Way of Art)	Weekly	Economic-Political
Sharaf (Honour)	Weekly	Social
Sharafat (Nobility)	Monthly	Political-Social
Shura-ye-Iran (The Council of Iran)	Weekly	Political-News
Tebabat (Medical Profession)	Weekly	Scientific-Medical
Tehran	Twice per-week	Cultural-Political
Tiyater (The Theatre)	Three per-week	Social-Literature
Oghiyanos (The Ocean)	Weekly	Political

Table 3

News Publications—1909

Name	Frequency	Subject
Afaq (The Horizon)	Weekly	Literature-Social
Aravot or Sobh (Morning)	Weekly	Political-News
Azad (Free)	Weekly	Political-Scientific
Azarbayjan	Weekly	News
Baladiyyeh (Municipality)	Monthly	Social
Biza (Clear)	—	——
Buqalamun (Turkey)	Weekly	Humorous-Critical
Daneshvaran (Scholar)	—	——
Darul-Ilm (Home of Learning)	Weekly	Political-Scientific
Habl-al-Matin (The Firm Cord)	Daily	Political-News
Hayat (Life)	Daily	Political
Hayate-Imiyyeh (Scientific Association)	Monthly	Cultural-Scientific
Irane-Nuw (New Iran)	Daily	Political-Social

Isteqlal (Independence)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Itebar (Validity)	Weekly	Political-News
Ittefaq (Concord)	Two weekly	—
Kashkul (The Alms-Gourd)	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Khavarestan (Eastern)	Daily	News
Khurasan	Weekly	Political-Social
Kermanshah	Weekly	Political
Kesalat (Indisposition)	—	—
Marefat (Knowledge)	Weekly	News
Mofateshe-Iran (Iran's Inspector)	Weekly	Political-Scientific
Mohakemate-Yazd (Judgement of Yazd)	Weekly	News
Mokafat (Recompense)	Weekly	Political-News
Mosavat (Equality)	Weekly	Political
Nejate-Vatan(The Country's Salvation)	Weekly	News
Police-Iran (The Police of Iran)	Daily	Political-Social
Safhe-Ruzgar (Age Sheet)	Once every fifteen days	Political-Historical
Sharq (East)	Daily	Political-Social
Suhbat (Talk)	Daily-Weekly	Political-Humorous
Tamaddun (Civilisation)	Weekly	Political-News
Tanqid (Critic)	—	—
Sorayya (Pleiades)	Weekly	Political-Economic
Tos	Weekly	Political-Economic
Urvatu'l-Vosgha (Indissoluble Link)	Weekly	Political-Social
Vatan (Fatherland)	Weekly	Political-News
Yadegare-Inqelab (Memorial of the Revolution) in Tehran and Qazvin	Twice per-week	Political
Zayandeh Rud (River Zayandeh)	Weekly	Political-News

Table 4

News Publications—1910

Name	Frequency	Subject
Aflatun (Plato)	Weekly	Humorous
Asr (Age)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Asre-Jadid (New Age)	Weekly	Economic-News
Bahar (Spring)	Monthly	Political-Social
Balad'ul-Amin (The Secure Land)	Weekly	News
Barq (Lighting)	Daily-Twice per-week	Political-Social
Danesh (Knowledge)	Weekly	—
Dastur (Command)	Twice per-week	Political-Literature
Diwane-Adalat (The Court of Justice)	Weekly	News-Social
Gillan	Three times per-week	Political-Economic
Hayat (Life)	Weekly	Political-Social
Irshad (Direction)	Twice per-week	Political-Social
Istiqlale-Iran (Independence of Iran)	Daily	Political-News
Isteqlale-Iran (Independence of Iran)	Non-Periodically	News
Ittefaq (Concord)	Weekly	News
Ittefaqe-Kargaran (Union of Workers)	Two weekly	Political-Social
Jarchi-ye-Mellat (The Herald of Nation)	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Jarchi-ye-Vatan (The Herald of Country)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Junub (South)	Weekly	Political
Khbar (News)	Daily	Political-News
Kankash (The Council)	Twice times per-week	Political-News
Mahdi-Hammal (Mahdi's the Porter)	Weekly	Humorous
Nuw-Bahar (Early Spring)	Twice times per-week	Political-Literature

Nazmiyyeh (The Police)	Monthly	Military
Parwaneh (The Moth)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Qazvin	Twice per-week	Political-Ethical
Ranjbar (Toiling)	Weekly	Political
Sahile-Nejat (The Shore of Safely)	Daily	Scientific-Literature
Saslsabill	—	Political
Shafag (The Afterglow)	Weekly	Political-News
Siyasi (Political)	Weekly	Political-News
Surush (Message)	Weekly	Political-News
Tabriz	Weekly	Political-Social
Tamaddun (Civilisation)	Weekly	Political-News
Okhvvat (Fraternity)	Weekly	Literature-Ethical
Vagt (Time)	Daily	News
Valad'ul-Amin	Weekly	—
Yadeghar-Junub (Memorial of the South)	Weekly	Political-News
Zang (Bill)	Weekly	Political-Social

Table 5

News Publications 1911

Name	Frequency	Subject
Aftab (The Sun)	Monthly	Scientific-Social
Agahi (Information)	Weekly	Political-Historical
Aineh (Mirror)	Weekly	Political-Social
Akbare-Imruz (Today's News)	Daily	News
Amuzghar (Teacher)	Weekly	Scientific-Literature
Anjumane-Velayati-Yazd (The Provincial Council of Yazd)	Weekly	News

Buhlul	Weekly	Political-Critical-Humorous
Chante-Pa-Berehneh (The Beggar's Wallet)	Weekly	Political-Humorous-Critical
Dar'ul-Aman (Home of Safety)	Weekly	Political-Religious
Dastore-Okhvvat (The Command of Fraternity)	Weekly	Political-Social
Defayyeh (Defence)	—	News
Dehgan (Farmer)	Weekly	Political-News
Farwardin	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Faryad (The Lament)	Weekly	Ethical-Political
Hekayate-Jangudaze-Vaqayi-as-Yazd-Illa-Shiraz (The Soul-Meeting Tale of Events from Yazd to Shiraz)	—	News
Idare-Kulle-Poste-Iran (The State Post Office)	Yearly	—
Ihyaa (Revivification)	Weekly	Political-News
Iran-Nuvin (Newest Iran)	Daily-Weekly	Political-News
Islah (Reform)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Itilaate-Ruzaneh (Daily Information)	Daily	News
Ittefaq (Concord)	Bi-weekly	Political-Literature
Ittelaat (Information)	Daily	News
Ittelaate-Muhammeh (Important Information)	Daily	News
Jangale-Mula (The Loard's Jungle)	Weekly	Political-Humorous-Critical
Jarche-Asrar (The Herald of Secrets)	Weekly	Political
Jarideh-Kirman (Journal of Kirman)	Once every ten days	Political-Religious
Kashan	Weekly	News
Merate-Junub (The Mirror of the South)	Weekly	Political-News
Mizan (The Balance)	Weekly	Political-Ethical
Naw-i-Bashar (The Human Race)	Twice per-week	Political-News

Nejat (Salvation)	Weekly	Political
Neda-ye-Junub (The Voice of the South)	Weekly	Political-Social
Neda-ye-Rasht (The Voice of Rasht)	Twice per-week	News
Payetakht (The Capital)	Weekly	Humorous-Political
Paykar (Strife)	—	
Rade-Qazvin (Thunder of Qazvin)	Weekly	Political-News
Rahbare-Iran-Nuw (The Leader of New Iran)	Daily-Weekly	News
Rahe-Khiyal (Fancy's Way)	Weekly	Political-News
Ruznameh-Rasmi-ye-Dawlati-Iran (Official Newspaper of the Iran's Government)	Daily-Three times per-week	News
Saadat (Felicity)	Two weekly	Scientific-Cultural
Seda-ye-Rasht (The Rasht Echo)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Shaykh-Chughandar	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Takalife--Umumi (The Public Tasks)	—	—
Tazeh-Bahar (Early Spring)	Twice per-week	Political-Literature
Ummide-Traqgi (Hope to Progress)	Weekly	Artistic
Zamane-Vesal (The Time of Union)	Weekly	Political-Literature

Table 6

News Publications—1912

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Aftab (The Sun)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Akhlaqi (Ethical)	—	—	Tehran
Chaman (Grass)	Weekly-Three times per-week	Social-News	Mashhad
Farvardin	Weekly	Political-Humorous	Uromiya
Faryade-Vatan (The Lament of Country	Weekly	News	Tehran
Fekr (Thought)	Weekly	Political-News	Tabriz
Hafteh (Week)	Weekly	News	Tehran
Iqtesad (Economy)	Weekly	Economic-News	Tehran
Khiyal (Imagination)	Weekly	Political-Social	Rasht
Nejat (Salvation)	Weekly	—	Rasht
Raad (Thunder)	Daily	Political-News	Tehran
Shafaq (The Afterglow)	Weekly	Political-News	Khoy
Shahabe-Saqeb (Metor)	Bi-weekly	Political-Social	Kerman
Shukufeh (Blossom)	Bi-weekly	Ethical-Literature	Tehran
Talia-ye-Saadat (Vanguard of Felicity)	Once every ten days	Social-News	Tehran

Table 7

News Publication 1913

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Agagan or Khros (Rooster)	Monthly	Cultural-Social	Tabriz
Arshalouis or Fajr (Dawn)	Weekly	Political-News	Tehran
Ayeq or Tullu (Dawn)	Weekly	Political-News	Tabriz
Bitaraf (Impartial)	Weekly	Political-News	Tehran
Fars (Persia)	Weekly	Political-Social	Shiraz
Irane-Kununi (Present Iran)	Bi-weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Kashef ul-Asrar (Discovery of Secrets)	Twice per-week	Political-Critical	Mashhad &Tehran
Kurdestan	Monthly	Political	Uromiya
Majalleh-Al-Islam (Islamic magazine)	Monthly	Religious-Historical	Tehran
Majalleh-Rasmi-Maarif (Knowledge Official Journal)	—	—	Tabriz
Minak	—	—	Tabriz
Qaradaq	Monthly	Political	Tabriz
Raad (Thunder)	Daily	Political-News	Tehran
Tufiq (Success)	Weekly	Political	Tehran

Table 8

News Publication—1914

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Asre-Jadid (New Age)	Weekly Three times per-week	Political-Social	Tehran
Idalat (Justice)	Weekly	Political-News	Tabriz
Irane-Imroz (Today's Iran)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Ittilaat (Information)	Weekly	News-Political	Tehran
Jarideh-Islami (Islamic Journal)	Weekly	Political-Cultural	Tabriz
Jasus (Spy)	Weekly	Political	Tehran
Khavar (East)	Weekly	Literature-Historical	Tehran
Kurshied (The Sun)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Kushk (Palace)	—	—	Tehran
Mashverat (Consultation)	Twice per-week	News	Tehran
Minu (Paradise)	Weekly-Three times per-week	Political-Religious	Mashhad
Mitaq	Weekly	Political	Tabriz
Shura (Council)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Tabriz	Weekly	Political-Social	Tabriz
Tanbihe-Derakhshan (Light of Punishment)	Monthly	Political-Humorous	Tehran
Tehran	---	—	Tehran
Utarud (Mercury)	Weekly	News	Tehran

Table 9

News Publications—1915

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Adl (Justice)	Weekly	Political-Ethical	Shiraz
Agahi (Information)	Weekly	Social-News	Mashhad
Ahde-Inqelab (The Age of Revolution)	Twice per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Ahde-Traqi (The Age of Progress)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature	Tehran
Akhlaqi(Morality)	Weekly	Social	Mashhad
Arin	Monthly	Political-Historical	Shiraz
Bamdade-Rushan (Light of Morning)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Chaman (Grass)	—	—	Tehran
Ekbatan-Nameh-Ishqi	Twice per-week	News	Hamadan
Insaf (Equity)	—	Political	Tabriz
Ittehad (Union)	Twice per-week	News	Hamadan
Ittelaat (Information)	Daily	News	Mashhad
Jame-Jam (The Goblet of Jam)	Weekly	Political-Social	Shiraz
Karghar (Worker)	Weekly	Political-Economic	—
Majalleh-Ilmi (Scientific Magazine)	Monthly	Scientific	Tehran
Mukhbre-Yazd (Reporter of Yazd)	—	—	Yazd
Musaj-Duliran (A Christian Publication)	Weekly	Religious	—
Nasime-Shomal (Northern Breeze)	Weekly	Political-Humorous-Critical	Tehran
Nuw-Bahar (Early Spring)	Daily-Weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Nedaye-Haq (The Country's True)	Weekly	Social-Ethical	Khoy
Parvin (Pleiades)	Bi-weekly	Scientific-Literature	Tehran
Qazvin	Weekly	Political-Ethical	Qazvin

Sa'lem (Health)	Weekly	News-Social	Tehran
Setare-Iran (Star of Iran)	Daily	Political-News	Tehran
Shahabe-Saqib (Meteor)	Bi- weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Taziyaneh-Ghairat (Zeal of Scourge)	Twice per-week	Political-Social	Shiraz
Traqi--Iran (Progress of Iran)	Weekly	—	Tehran

Table   10

News   Publications—1916

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Ahde-Jadid (New Age)	Weekly	Political	Tehran
Akbar (News)	Twice per-week	Political-News	Bakhtaran
Bistun (Bebistun)	Daily	Economic-News	Bakhtaran
Bitary (Veterinary)	Bi- weekly	Hygienic-Agricultural	Tehran
Hafeze-Isteqlal (Keeper of Independence)	Weekly	Political-News	Shiraz
Iran	Three times per-week	News	Tehran
Inteqam (Vengeance)	Weekly	Social-Political	Shiraz
Ittehade-Islam (Unity of Islam)	Twice per-week	Political-News	Shiraz
Kankash (The Council)	Daily	News-Political	Tehran
Parsi (Persian)	Bi- weekly	Political-Literature	Tehran
Rahe-Nejat (The Way of Salvation)	Weekly	Political-Economic	Isfahan
Talia-ye-Subh (Vanguard of Morning)	Weekly	Social-News	Uromiya
Tazehe-Iran (New Iran)	Weekly	Scientific-Ethical	Hamadan
Tullu (Rising)	Weekly	News	Tehran

Table 11

News Publications—1917

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Amuzghar (Teacher)	Weekly	News-Social	Rasht
Asre-Saadat (The Age of Felicity)	Weekly	Political-News	Rasht
Bahare-Khorasan (The Spring of Khorasan)	Weekly	—	Mashhad
Buhlull	Weekly	Political-Humorous	Rasht
Fars (Persian)	Weekly	Political-Social	Shiraz
Ferdus (Paradise)	Monthly	Social	Tehran
Garbe-Iran (The West of Iran)	Weekly	News	Bakhtaran
Gulshan (Flower of Garden)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Jangal (Forest)	Weekly	Political-Religious	Foman
Khurshid (The Sun)	—	—	Tehran
Kliede-Nejat (The Key of Salvation)	Weekly	Political-News	Tabriz
Kucabe-Iran (The Star of Iran)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Lawa-ye-Islam (The Banner of Islam)	Weekly	Political-Literature	Isfahan
Mashreq (The East)	Weekly	News	Tabriz
Navid (Glad Tidings)	Weekly	—	Tehran
Parvin (Pleiades)	Three times per-week	Political	Tehran
Seda-ye-Iran (The Voice of Iran)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Setare-Iran (The Star of Iran)	Daily	News	Tehran
Surushe-Iran (The Message of Iran)	Weekly	Literature	Tehran
Tajaddud (Revival)	Weekly	Political	Tabriz

Tallia-ye-Saadat (Vanguard of Felicity)	Weekly	Political	Tabriz
Tebbe-Musawwar (The Illustrated Medicine)	Monthly	Hygienic-Medicine	Tehran
Vatan (Fatherland)	Three times per-week	Political-News	Tehran
Zabane-Azad (Free Language)	Three times per-week	Political-Literature	Tehran

Table 12
News Publications—1918

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Amuzghar (Teacher)	Monthly	Cultural-Social	Tehran
Bahar (Spring)	Daily	Social-News	Mashhad
Daneshkadeh (Faculty)	Monthly	Literature-Social	Tehran
Gule-Zard (Yellow Flower)	Two weekly	Literature-Humorous	Tehran
Gulistan (Rose Garden)	Twice per-week	Political-Social	Shiraz
Istakhr (Pool)	Weekly	Political-Social	Shiraz
Kashefe-Asrar (Discovery of Secrets)	Weekly	Political-News	Isfahan
Khulde-Bairn (Eternal Heaven)	Weekly	News	Tabriz
Kuhak (An Armenian Journal)	–	–	Tabriz
Majalleh Adabi (The Literature Magazine)	Bi- weekly	Literature-Scientific	Tehran
Majalleh-Al-Adab (The Literature Magazine)	Once every two month	Scientific-Literature	Tehran
Qiyame-Sharq (The Rising of East)	Three times per-week	News-Political	Tehran
Rastiy (True)	Weekly	—	Tehran
Sharq (The East)	Twice per-week	News	Tabriz
Subhe-Saadat (The Felicity of Morning)	Weekly	Social	Rasht
Talia-Saadat (The Vanguard of Felicity)	Daily-Weekly	Social-News	Bakhtaran
Zendegani (Life)	Weekly	Social	Shiraz

Table 13

News Publications—1919

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Adab (Manner)	Monthly-Irregular	Scientific-Social	Kerman
Akhtare-Danesh (The Star of Knowledge)	Monthly	Literature-Scientific	Tehran
Al Badr'ul-Munir	–	–	Anzali
Aravad or Sobh (Morning)	Weekly	---	Tehran
Armaqan (Present)	Monthly	Social-Literature	Isfahan
Baharestan	Weekly	Political-News	Shiraz
Baladiyyeh (Municipality)	Monthly	Social	Rasht
Falahat-va-Tejarat (Trade and Agricultural)	Twice weekly-Monthly	Economic-Scientific	Tehran
Fanni (Technical)	Monthly	Scientific-Technical	Tehran
Hayate-Javid (Immortal Life)	Weekly	Political-Literature	Tehran
Marifat (Knowledge)	Bi- weekly	Cultural-Social	Isfahan
Mihan (Motherland)	Twice per-week	Political-Cultural	Isfahan
Nameh Musavvar-Iqbal (Iqbal's Illustrated Letter)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature	Tehran
Paykar (Strife)	Bi- weekly	News	Tehran
Rahnama (Guide)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature	Tehran
Ruitry	–	–	-
Salamat (Health)	Twice per-week	Political-News	Mashhad
Sharqe-Iran (The East of Iran)	Twice per-week	Political-Religious	Mashhad
Shomale-Gharb (The Eastern of North)	Weekly	News	Tabriz
Zabane-Zanan (Women's Language)	Once every fifteen days	Political-Social	Isfahan

Table 14

News Publications—1920

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Adab (Manner)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature	Tabriz
Ahan (Iron)	—	—	Tehran
Akhtare-Massud	Weekly	Scientific-Literature	Isfahan
Al-Kamal (Perfection)	—	—	Tehran
Aliyans-Faransses	—	—	Tehran
Alame-Nasavan (The World of Women)	Once every two months	Ethical-Cultural	Tehran
Armaqan (Present)	Monthly	Literature-Social	Tehran
Asayesh (Rest)	Bi- weekly	News	Tehran
Badre-Munir (Moon Shining)	Weekly	Political-Social	Anzali
Berjis (Guipure)	Bi- weekly	Humorous	Tabriz
Bubukh or Lolo (Bugbear)	Weekly	Humorous	Tehran
Communist	Twice per-week	Political	Rasht
Danesh (Knowledge)	Monthly	Scientific-Social	Mashhad
Dunya ye-Iran (The World of Iran)	Monthly	Literature-Scientific	Shiraz
Farhang (Culture)	Monthly	Cultural	Rasht & Tehran
Fekre-Azad (Free Thought)	Monthly	Literature-Cultural	Shiraz
Garne-Bistum (The Twenty Century)	Weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Gilan	Twice per-week	Political-News	Rasht
Hallaj (Beater)	Weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Inqelabe-Sorkh (The Red Revolution)	Weekly	Political-News	Rasht
Iqtesade-Iran (The Economy of Iran)	Weekly	Economic-News	Tehran
Iran-Javan (Young Iran)	—	Social-News	Tehran
Irane-Surkh (Red Iran)	—	Political	Rasht
Irane-Tazeh (New Iran)	Twice per-week	News	Hamadan

Jangal (Forest)	–	–	Rasht
Kaqasar or Dostare-Hunar (Lover to Art)	Once every three months	Literature-Social	Tabriz
Khawar (East)	Monthly	Scientific-Historical	Shiraz
Ma'd	–	—	—
Manarat	Weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Mulla-Nasr'udin	Weekly	Political-Humorous	Tabriz
Rahnama (Guide)	Three times per-week	Social-News	Tehran
Ruznameh-i-Divar-Kobe-Rusta (The wall Paper of Village)	Irregular	Political-News	Rasht
Sa'adat (Felicity)	Weekly	Political	Tehran
Salah (Advisability)	Weekly	News	Tehran
Seda-ye-Tehran (The Voice of Tehran)	Twice per-week	Political-Social	Tehran
Tebbi (Medicine)	Monthly	Medical	Tehran
Tahzib (Refining)	Weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Urizan (An Armenian Journal)	—	—	Tabriz
Usule-Talimat (The Principles of Education)	Monthly	Scientific-Cultural	Tehran

Table 15

News Publications —1921

Name	Frequency	Subject	Location
Akhlaq (Ethic)	Weekly	Cultural	Mashhad
Akhghar (Ember)	Three times per-week	Economic-Social	Isfahan
Al-Nejat (Salvation)	—	—	Tehran
Amuzesh (Education)	Weekly	News	Rasht
Ankar	–	—	—
Asia	Monthly	Social	Tehran
Asrare-Jalali	Weekly	News	Hamadan

Asraru'l-Ansar (The Secrets of Friend)	Monthly	Ethical-Literature	Isfahan
Asre-Azadi (The Age of Freedom)	Daily-Weekly	Political-Social	Shiraz
Azadistan	Bi-weekly	Cultural-Literature	Tabriz
Bidari (Awakening)	Weekly-Once every ten days	News	Rasht
Chaman (Grass)	Three times per-week	Social-News	Mashhad
Donya-ye-Iran (The World of Iran)	Monthly	—	Mashhad
Ghurresh (Thunder)	Weekly	News	Isfahan
Gholle-Atashi (Fiery Flower)	Weekly	Political-News	Shiraz
Gholle-Surkh (Red flower)	Once every fifteen days	Humorous-Literature	Shiraz
Gholle-Zendegi (Flower of Life)	---	–	—
Gulush	Weekly	—	Shiraz
Harzan or Ofoq (Horizon)	Weekly	Political-Social	Tehran
Hegola or Nejat (Salvation)	Weekly	News	Tehran
Huquq (Law)	—	—	—
Ilm-va-Akhlaq (Science and Ethic)	Monthly	Ethical-Scientific	Tehran
Ilm-va-Tarbiyat (Science and Education)	Weekly	Social	Shiraz
Irane-Askhadavur or Karegare-Irani (Iranian Worker)	Bi-weekly	Political-News	Tehran
Islah (Reform)	Three times per-week	News-Political	Tehran
Jahane-Zanan (The World of Women)	Bi- weekly	–	Mashhad
Jannat (Paradise)	Weekly	Political-Economic	Tehran
Jarideh-Khurasan (Journal of Khorasan)	Three times per-week	—	Mashhad
Jarideh-Sabah (Journal of Morning)	Monthly	Social	Bakhtaran
Kargar (Worker)	Weekly	Political-Economic	Khoy
Marifat (Knowledge)	Monthly	Social	Burujird

Mehre-Munir (Shining of Effecting)	Weekly	Economic-News	Mashhad
Mihan-Yomiyeh (Country of Daily)	Twice per week	Political-Cultural	Tehran
Mellat (Nation)	Weekly	Political-Social	Shiraz
Nameh-Melli (National Letter)	Weekly	—	Tehran
Namehe-Banuwan (Ladies's Letter)	Bi-weekly	—	Tehran
Ranjbare-Irani (Iranian's Toiling)	Weekly	Political-News	Tehran
Seda-ye-Isfahan (The Voice of Isfahan)	Weekly-once every fifteen days	Literature-Ethical	Isfahan
Seda-ye-Junub (The Voice of South)	Weekly	News	Shiraz
Sharqe-Vosta (Middle East)	Daily	News	Tehran
Subhe-Ummid (Morning of Hope)	Weekly	Political-Social	Isfahan
Sohail (Canopus)	Weekly	Political-News	Malayer
Takamul (Evolution)	Weekly	Political-Literature	Tabriz
Tebbe-Konuni (The Present Medical Professional)	Monthly	Scientific-Medicine	Mashhad
Tehrani Ayag or Sobhe-Tehran (Morning of Tehran)	—	Political-News	Tehran
Usulle-Talim (The Principle of Education)	Monthly	Literature-Cultural	Tehran
Zabane-Iran (language of Iran)	Twice per-week	Political-Social	Tehran
Zanane-Iran (Iran's Women)	Weekly	Social	Tehran

Table 16
News Publications—1922

Name	Frequency	Subject
Afkar (Thought)	Daily-weekly	Political-Social
Ahshuyrush	Weekly	News
Akhbare-Amri (Directive News)	Monthly	Political
Asre-Jadid (New Age)	Weekly	Political-Social
Azad (Free)	Weekly	News-Cultural
Badr (Full Moon)	Weekly	Political-Historical
Baharestan	Three times per-week-weekly	Political-News
Baide-Shomal	Weekly	News
Baladiyyeh (Municipality)	Bi-weekly-monthly	Social-News
Dasture-Okhvvat (Command of Brotherhood)	Weekly	Political-Humorous
Edalat (Justice)	Weekly	Political-Historical
Eqdam (Action)	Daily	Political-News
Farda (Tomorrow)	Weekly	Social
Faryad (Shout)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Ferdowsi	Once every two months	Literature-Scientific
Furoqe-Tarbiyat (Brightness of Education))	Monthly	Scientific-Literature
Ghararne-Bistom (The twenty Century)	Three times per-week	Political-Humorous-Critical
Haqiqat (True)	Twice per-week	Political-Social
Irane-Azad (Free Iran)	Daily	Political-News
Isteqamat (Perseverance)	Twice per-week	News
Ittehad (Union)	Daily	News-Political
Ittelaate-Uromiya (Daily Information)	Daily-weekly	News
Jahan-Zanan (The World of Women)	Monthly	—
Khalq (Mass)	Weekly	Political-News
Khorasan	Weekly	News

Kord	Weekly	Political-News
Kerdar (Behaviour)	Twice per-week	News-Political
Mahe-Naw (New Moon)	Weekly	Political-Religious
Mahnamehe-Artesh (The Army Journal)	Monthly	Political-Social-Military
Mahtaban	Monthly	–
Nahid (Venus)	Twice per week	Political-Humorous
Nejate-Iran (Salvation of Iran)	Weekly	–
Neda-yi-Dehqan (The Voice of Peasant)	Weekly	News
Nehzate-Sharq (Movement of the East)	Twice per-week	Political-Religious
Nure Kianak or Zendegi Nuw (New Life)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Nuroz (New Day)	Weekly	Social-Literature
Qanun (The Law)	Daily-Weekly	Political-Social
Qoshon (Military Forces)	Weekly-Monthly	Scientific-Technical
Raporte-Amaliyat (Report of Operation)	Yearly	Medicine-News
Rustaie (Peasant)	Weekly	Cultural-Social
Sadeh (Decade)	Monthly	Literature-Historical
Saeqeh (Thunder)	Weekly	News-Social
Sahiyeh-va Omure-Khiriyeh	Monthly	Scientific-Hygienic
Sayhe-Asemani (Heavenly Thunder)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Setare-Sharq (Star of the East)	Three per-week	Political
Shafaqe-Sorkh (Red Aurora)	Three times per-week-Daily	Political-News
Shire-Koh (Lion of Mount)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Siyasat (Politic)	Twice times per-week	Political-Critical
Tabiyat (Nature)	Monthly	Humorous-Literature
Talieh-Afkar (Vanguard of Thought)	—	—
Tofan (Deluge)	Three per-week	Political-News
Yqanegi (Unity)	Monthly	Social

Zabane-Zanan (The Language of Women)	Monthly	Educational-Literature
Zanbor (Bee)	Weekly	Political-Social
Zareh (Farmer)	Weekly	Social

Table 17

News Publications—1923

Name	Frequency	Subject
Azar	Weekly	News-Social
Majalleh-Azar (Azar Magazine)	—	—
Astaneh-Razavi	Twice per-week	Social-News
Asia	Weekly	Social-Economic
Asia-Markazi (Central Asia)	Daily	Social-News
Asia-Vosta (Medial Asia)	Daily	Political-News
Islami (Islamic)	Twice per-week	News
Ofuqe-Roshan (The Light of Horizon)	Weekly	Political-News
Enteqad (Criticism)	Weekly	Social
Inekas (Reflection)	Twice per-week	News
Irane-Imruz (Today's Iran)	Daily	News-Political
Irane-Kohan (Old Iran)	Weekly	Social
Irane-Mostaqel (Independent of Iran)	Weekly	—
Baran (Rain)	Bi- weekly	Social
Bahre-Khazar (Caspian Sea)	Weekly	News
Buhlull -be-Jayeh- Azadi	—	—
Bidar (Awake)	Daily	Political-News
Partow (Ray)	Three times per-week	Literature
Parvaneh (Butterfly)	Weekly	News
Paykan (Arrow-Head)	Twice per-week	Political-News

Pajuhesh (Research)	Daily-weekly	News
Paikar (Battle)	Three times per-week	Political-Literature
Taziyaneh-Ibrat (Scourge Warning	Weekly	—
Toh-Fatul-Odaba (Present of Literary Man)	Monthly-once every three months	Scientific-Literature
Taqdire-Akhlaq (Moral of Destine)	Weekly	Social
Jamea-Islami (The Islamic Society)	Weekly	Islamic
Hesare-Addl (Limitation of justice)	Daily-weekly	Social-Humorous
Haya't (Life)	Three times per-week	Political-News
Khandeh (Laugh)	Weekly	Humorous
Ha'yate-Iran (Life of Iran)	Twice times per-week	Political-News
Khorsid (The Sun)	Monthly	Social-Literature
Dabestan (Primary School)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature
Donya-ye-Imroz (Today's World)	Weekly	Scientific-Social
Donya-ye-Iran (World of Iran)	Weekly	Political-News
Ruznameh-ye-Islami (Islamic Paper)	Daily	News
Sepahyan (Army)	Once every twenty days	Historical-Literature
Junub (South)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature
Sehate-Iran (Honesty of Iran)	Weekly	News
Sepidehdam (Dawn)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature
Shams (Sun)	Weekly	Economic-News
Saadate-Junub (Prosperity of the South)	Weekly	Political
Shahab (Meteor)	Three times per-week	News-Political
Sedaye-Islam (The Vice of Islam)	Twice per-week	Political-Social
Sedaye-Asia (The Voice of Asia)	Weekly	News
Saihe(Shout)	Weekly	Political-News
Teb (Medicine)	Monthly	Hygienic-Medicine
Tabiat (Nature)	Weekly-Monthly	Literature-Humorous

Asre-Nuw (New Age)	Weekly	News
Amal (Action)	Weekly	—
Fruqe-Khavar (Brightness of East)	Weekly	News
Frah-va-har (An Zoroastrian Journal)	Weekly	News
Fekre-Azad (Free Thought)	Twice per-week	Political-Critical
Flaq (Twilight)	Weekly	Political-Economic
Qalame-Pak (The Right Pen)	Weekly	Political
Qiyamat (Resurrection)	Daily	News
Qiyam (Rising)	Three times per-week	News-Political
Kar (Working)	Three times per-week	Political-Social
Qiyam be-Haq (Raising to Right)	Weekly	Political-Social
Karegar (Worker)	Weekly	—
Keshavarz (Farmer)	Weekly	Agricultural
Goftare-Rast (True Speech)	Weekly	Political-Social
Golle Atashi	Weekly	Political-News
Golzar (Rose Garden)	Monthly	Literature
Mah (Moon)	Weekly	Social
Ganjineh-Ma'aref (Treasure of Knowledge)	Monthly	Scientific-Literature
Majalleh-Tazkkur (Reminding Journal)	Bi-weekly	Religious-Social
Majalleh-Huquq (Law Magazine)	---	---
Majalleh-Homi (Journal of the Osprey)	Monthly	Social-Literature
Merat'ul-Al-Melleh (Mirror of Nation)	Weekly	—
Meraat (Mirror)	Weekly	Social
Makhzane-Danesh (Treasure of Knowledge)	Weekly	Social
Mardane-Kar (Workmen)	Twice per-week	Social-Political
Marde-Azad (Free Men)	Daily	Social-News
Margh(Died)	---	—

Mesbah (Light)	Monthly	Social
Mamat-va-Hayat (life and Died)	Monthly	Technical
Nameh-Amal (Letter of Actions)	Twice per-week	News
Nameh-Farhang (Letter of Culture)	Twice per-week	Social-News
Nejate-Iran (Salvation of Iran)	Twice per-week	Social-News
Neda-ye-Asemani (Heavenly Voice)	Weekly	News
Neda-ye-Iran (Voice of Iran)	Three times per-week	Political-News
Nur (Light)	Weekly	--
Nahzate-Islami (The Islamic Movement)	Weekly	Social-Religious
Hayyem	Weekly	News
Yaghma (Plunder)	Monthly	Literature

Table 18

News Publications—1924

Name	Frequency	Subject
Addl (The Justice)	Weekly	News
Aflak (Firmament)	Weekly	Political
Ahang (Music)	Weekly	Political-Social
Ahde-Inqlab (The Age of Revolution)	Bi-weekly	Political-News
Ahde-Tajaddud (The Age of Modernisation)	Daily	News
Aieneh-Afkar (The Mirror of Thought)	Weekly	News
Aiena-Khlqat (The Custom of Creation)	Daily	News
Al-Haq (Justify)	—	—
Asman (Sky)	Three per-week	Political-News

Asre-Nahzat (The Age of Movement)	Twice per-week	Political-Social
Asre-Tammaddun (The Age of Civilisation)	Weekly	Political-News
Azadi (Freedom)	Weekly	Political-Economic-Humorous
Azadi-ye-Sharq (Freedom of the East)	Monthly	News
Azar	Twice per-week	Political-Social
Azemate-Islam (The Greatness of Islam)	Weekly	Political-Religious
Bahare-Delkash (Nice Spring)	Weekly	Literature-News
Banuvar or Karegar (Worker)	Daily-Weekly	News-Economic
Bidari (Awaking)	Daily-Weekly	Political-Social
Binul-Nahrain	Weekly	News
Danesh-Pajuhan (Researchers)	Weekly	News-Cultural
Democracy	Four times per-week	Political-News
Farrukhi (Auspicious)	Monthly	Social
Fekre-Iran (The Thought of Iran)	Daily	News
Ganjineh-Danish (The Treasury of Knowledge)	Weekly	Cultural-Social
Gharbe-Iran (The East of Iran)	Twice per week	News
Gharne-Chardahum (The Fourteen Century)	Weekly	Political
Haeyona	Daily	Political-News
Hay'ate-Addl (Justice of Life)	Daily	News
Iqtesad (Economy)	Weekly	Economic-News
Iran	Once every three months	Scientific-Literature
Iran-Nuwin (New Iran)	Daily	News
Irteqa (Progress)	Weekly	News-Social
Jannate-Adan (Paradise)	Daily	News-Political
Jangale-Muwla (The Lord's Jungle)	Weekly	Humorous-Critical
Jaredeh Tehran (Magazine of Tehran)	Weekly	Social

Javied (Eternal)	Weekly	—
Jnub (The South)	Weekly	Political-Religious
Karun (River Karun)	Weekly	Political-News
Khurshid (The Sun)	Weekly	Political-News
Khurshid-i-Iran (The Sun of Iran)	Weekly	Political-Social
Korna (Trumpet)	Weekly	Scientific-Literature-Humorous
Gozareshe-Rayese-Kole-Maliyeh Iran (Iran's Official Financial Report)	Once every three months	Economic
Lavai-Bainul Nahrain	Weekly	Scientific-Literature
Mahshar (Gathering Place of Mankind on the day of Judgement)	Weekly	Political-Social
Majallehe-Al-Islam (The Islamic Journal)	Bi- monthly	Religious-Ethical
Marde-Kar (Workmen)	Weekly	Political-Religious
Nahzate-Iran (The Movement of Iran)	Weekly	Social-Economic
Naleh-Iran (The Cry of Iran)	Weekly	—
Nameh-Javanan (Youth Letters)	Weekly	Political-Social
Nameh-Kherad-Pajuhan	Monthly	Literature
Nasavane-Vatankhah (The Patriot Women)	Weekly-monthly	Social-Scientific
Naseru-Malleh	Weekly	Political-Economic
Nasihat (Admonition)	Weekly	Economic-News
Nasime-Sabah (The Breeze of the Zephyr)	Weekly	Social-Literature
Nehzate-Islam (Islamic Movement)	Weekly	Social-Religious
Nejate Vatan (The Country's Salvation)	Weekly	News
Neda-ye-Gilan (The Voice of Gilan)	Daily	Political-News
Nure-Bakalam or Payame-Nur (Message of the Light)	Weekly	Social-Cultural
Padash (Reward)	Monthly	—

Pahlavi	Weekly-Monthly	Military-Scientific
Parvaresh (Education) in Rasht and Qazvin	Daily-Weekly	Political-Social-Critical
Payam (Message)	Weekly	—
Payame-Jadid (New Message)	Monthly	Social
Qalame-Azad (The Free Pen)	Bi-weekly	Political-Literature
Rahnam-ye-Dehghan (The Farmer Guide)	Monthly	Agricultural
Ranjbar (Toiling)	Weekly	Political-News
Rastakhiz (Resurrection)	Weekly	—
Sa'adate-Vatan (Felicity of Fatherland)	Weekly	—
Sa'adate Iran (Felicity of Iran)	Weekly	Political-Social
Sabi-Al-Reshad (Direction of Way)	Weekly	Religious-Social
Saha	—	—
Seda-ye-Sharq (The Voice of East)	Weekly	News
Sh'ai (Ray)	Weekly	News
Shoaleh (Flame)	Weekly	Political-Social
Siyasate-Islam (Policy of Islam)	Bi-weekly	Political-Religious
Sohail (Canopus)	Weekly	Social
Surushe-Iran (Message of Iran)	Bi- weekly	Political-News
Taliahe-Qoads (The Holiness Vanguard)	Weekly	Social-News
Tamaddun (Civilisation)	Twice per-week	Scientific-Political
Tanbih ul-Ghafelin (Admonition Unaware)	Monthly	Social
Tawfiq (Success)	Weekly	Humorous-Critical
Tebbe-Jadid (New Medical Professional)	Monthly	Medicine
Tejarat (Trade)	Monthly	Economic
Tulu (The Dawn)	Twice per-week	Political-Social

Ulume-Maliyh va Iqtissad (Commence and Economic Sciences)	Once every three months	Economic
Ummid (Hope)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Vafa (Fidelity)	Monthly	Literature-Social
Vaqt (Time) Printed in Mashhad and Rasht	Twice per-week	News

Table   19

News   Publications—1925

Name	Frequency	Subject
Afkare-Sutodeh (Worthy Thought)	Daily	News
Aftabe-Sharq (The Sun of East)	Three times per-week	Political-Social
Akhtare-Sharq (Star of the East)	Weekly	—
Asare-Jam (The Traces of Goblet)	Weekly	Social-Religious
Asayesh (Rest)	Twice per-week	News
Asre-Nuw (The New Age)	—	—
Atash (Fire)	Three times per-week	News
Atashfeshan (Volcano)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Azad (Free)	Weekly	Political-Economic
Azar	Weekly	News
Azar-Abadgan	Weekly	News-Social

Azemate-Iran (Greatness of Iran)	Twice per-week	News
Azemate-Sharq (Greatness of the East)	Weekly	Social-News
Badre-Munir (Shining Fullmoon)	Daily	Political-Social
Bahare- Sharq (Spring o the East)	Weekly	News
Bani Hashimi	Weekly	Political
Bayane-Haqiqat (Expression of True)	Three times per-week	News-Political
Bustan (Garden)	Weekly	Ethical-Historical
Daneshkadeh (Faculty)	Monthly	Literature-Scientific
Daste-Intiqam	Weekly	Political-News
Erfan (Knowledge)	Weekly	Social-Scientific
Fallah (Happiness)	Weekly	News
Farhang (Culture)	Weekly	---
Farsnameh (Persian's letter)	Weekly	News
Fekre-Azad (Free Thought)	Twice per-week	Political-Literature
Fekre-Javan (Young Thought)	Weekly	Political-Critical
Gharbal (Riddle)	Weekly	Political-News
Iblagh (Conveyance) in Shiraz and Tehran	Twice per-week	News-Political
Isteqamat (Persevere)	Twice per-week	Political-Literature

Ittellate-Bisim-va -Seta	—	—
Ittihade-Islam (Unity of Islam)	Twice per-week	Political-News
Ittehade-Sharq (Unity of the East)	Three times per-week	News
Jahannama (Cosmorama)	Weekly	Political-Social
Kaqapar or Arman (Ideas)	Weekly	Social-News
Kukabe-Deakhshan (Bright of the Star)	Bi- weekly	News
Mashreq (The East)	Bi-weekly	News
Mihyman & Ranjbar (Toiling)	Weekly	Social-Cultural
Merrikh (Mars)	Weekly	—
Nameh-Azad (Free Letter)	Weekly	Scientific-News
Nameh-Tajaddud (Modernisation Letter)	Three times per-week	Political-Literature
Nurafkan (Search Light)	Weekly	News-Social
Paik (Courier)	Twice per-week	News
Parsad	—	—
Parwaneh (The Moth)	Weekly	Political-Literature
Pulad (Steel)	Three times per-week	Social-Scientific
Qazai (Judicial)	Bi-weekly	Judicial

Salahe-Bashar (Godness of Human)	Twice per-week	Political-Social
Sarhad (Frontier)	Weekly	News
Shahpur	—	—
Sharq (The East)	Monthly	Literature-Historical
Sehat (Health)	Monthly	Medicine-Hygienic
Subhe-Sadeq (True Dawn)	Weekly	News
Surat (Face)	Weekly	Humorous
Takhte-Jamshid (Persepolis)	Weekly	News
Tanha (Alone)	Monthly	Social
Targhib (Persuasion)	Daily	News
Tariqe-Nejat (The Way of Salvation)	Weekly	Social
Tarjumane-Haqiqat (Expression of the Right)	Monthly	—
Traqi (Progress)	Three times per-week	News
Ufoqe-Iran (Horizon of Iran)	Weekly	Political-News
Urdibehesht	Weekly	News
Waqt (Time)	Monthly	—
Ziya-ye-Sharq (Light of the East)	Three times per-week	Social-News

APPENDIX 4

THE IRANIAN PRESS—1837-1925

NEWS PUBLICATION TABULATIONS

APPENDIX FOUR

IRANIAN PRESS—1837-1925

NEWS PUBLICATION TABULATIONS

Table 1

Types of Publications.. 1837-1925

Type of publication	Number	Percent
Periodic Journals	983	81.7
Shabnameh (Nocturnal Letters)	90	7.4
Exile Papers	130	10.8
Total	1203	100

Table 2

Distribution of Newspapers Before the Revolution

The place of publication	During years 1837-1900	Percent	During years 1900-1906	Percent
Tehran	29	67.4	16	40
Tabriz	9	20.9	17	42.5
Rezayieh	3	6.9	—	—
Shiraz	1	2.3	—	—
Isfahan	1	2.3	2	5
Mashhad	—	—	2	5
Hamadan	—	—	1	2.5
Bushir	—	—	2	5
Total	43	100	40	100

Figure 1

Types of Publications 1837-1925

Number (X)

Bar chart with y-axis labeled 1000, 900, 500, 100, 0 and x-axis categories Periodic Journals, Nocturnal Letters (Shabnameh), Exile Papers. Bars show: Periodic Journals 983, Nocturnal Letters (Shabnameh) 130, Exile Papers 90.

Table 3

Subject of Publications—1837-1925

Subject	Number	Percent
Agricultural	8	0.41
Artistic	2	0.10
Critical	28	1.44
Cultural	69	3.56
Economic	66	3.4
Ethical	77	3.98
Historical	60	3.1
Humorous & Jokes	57	2.94
Hygienic	12	0.62
Judicial & Legal	11	0.56
Literature	152	7.86
Medical Professional	15	0.77
News	508	26.2
Political	457	23.6
Religious	41	2.12
Scientific & Technical	105	5.43
Social	265	13.7
Total	1933	100

Figure 2

Subject of Publications—1837-1925

Number (X)

Subjects	Economic	Ethical	Scientific	Literature	Social	Political	News
	66	77	105	152	265	457	508

Table 4

Frequency of Publications—1837-1925

According to: Frequency	Number	Percent
Four times per-week	5	0.9
Daily	84	7.2
Three times per-week	65	5.5
Twice per-week	104	8. 9
Weekly	592	50.5
Once every ten days	6	0.51
Bi-weekly	33	2.8
Once every fifteen days	15	1.23
Once every twenty days	1	
Monthly	129	11.
Bi-monthly	4	0.3
Once every three month	9	0.76%
Yearly	7	0.59%
Occasionally	118	10.
Total	1172	100

Table 5

Language of Publications—1837-1925

According to: language	Number	Percent
Armenian	32	41.5
French	5	6.5
Hebrew	1	1.3
Kaldani	6	7.8
Persian & Arabic	3	3.9
Persian & Arabic & French	1	1.3
Persian & Gilak (A Local language)	1	1.3
Persian & Hebrew	2	2.6
Persian & Russian	3	3.9
Persian & Turkish	6	7.8
Persian & French	10	12. 9
Turkish	7	9.1
Total	77	100

Table 6

Place of Publication—1837-1925

According to: The place of publication	Number	Percent
Ahvaz	1	
Anzali	4	0.5
Arak	2	0.2
Ardebil	1	
Bakhtaran (Kermanshah)	11	1.1
Brujird	2	0.2
Bushir	2	0.2
Foman	1	
Hamadan	14	1.4
Isfahan	55	5.6
Kashan	2	0.2
Khoy	8	0.8
Khoramshahr	1	
Kerman	14	1.4
Lahiyjan	2	0.2
Malayyar	1	
Mashhad	52	5.3
Qazvin	11	1.1
Qum	1	
Rasht	64	6.6
Ray	1	0.1
Shiraz	59	6.
Tabriz	101	10.4
Tehran	543	55.7
Turbate-Hydariyya	1	
Uromiya	13	1.3
Yazd	8	0.8
Total	975	100