

1992

A hideously complicated problem: Anglo-American relations with Austria, 1945-1955

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Recommended Citation

Denton, Margaret, A hideously complicated problem: Anglo-American relations with Austria, 1945-1955, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Department of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 1992.
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**'A HIDEOUSLY COMPLICATED PROBLEM':
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA
1945-1955**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

MARGARET DENTON, B.A. (HONS)

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICS
1992



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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the University of Wollongong for awarding me the scholarship which has made this project financially possible, and for accommodating with a minimum of fuss my special needs for overseas research trips.

My sincerest appreciation goes to my supervisor, Dr Ian McLaine, for unfailingly putting his professional expertise at my service, and for always being there with good-humoured encouragement and advice. I am especially grateful for the seemingly endless patience he has displayed in imparting greater fluency and subtlety to my English.

A special acknowledgement must be paid my husband Terrence for his enthusiastic support of my work. He not only spent many hours in the Public Record Office, taking care of the more tedious aspects of research, but expertly kept house, both in England, Austria and at home, and listened patiently to interminable expositions of my ideas.

I am indebted to Dr Kurt Peball, Director-General of the Austrian State Archives, for making the initial access to archival material possible. Michaela Follner of the Austrian State Archives deserves a special mention for her cheerful and prompt procurement of documents at sometimes exceedingly short notice.

Last but not least, I want to thank Dr Damaso Marengo, whose suggestion that I investigate this important historical problem happily coincided with my abiding interest in Austrian affairs.

Abstract

In February 1942, during the earliest planning stages for post-war Europe, Austria was seen as a 'hideously complicated problem'¹ by Washington and London alike. Surprisingly, when one considers existing literature on the post-war occupation of Austria, this sentiment remains a fitting description of Anglo-American relations with Austria during the ten years of the Allied occupation. For me, born in occupied Vienna and growing up in that city during the 1960s, this is a compelling revelation, since during that period one of the most powerful staples of the political education of young Austrians was that Austria had been saved by the Americans and the British from a fate worse than occupation - that of Communism.

My own recent examination of an aspect of US post-war foreign policy and practice and their effects on Anglo-American relations² raised a fundamental question: why did Austria remain occupied for ten long years, when the conditions for evacuation, as set down by the Allies during the war, had been fulfilled within the first nine months after liberation? To appreciate the significance of this question, it is crucial to understand what the aims of the Allies were. Austria was to be separated from Germany originally in a deliberate attempt to weaken the German war effort and then to deprive Germany permanently of Austrian support. To achieve this purpose, the Allies decided to restore Austria to independence. The conditions for independence would be deemed to be satisfied once Austria was demilitarised, her administration severed from that of Germany, adequate denazification measures in progress, and a freely elected Austrian government installed. By the end of 1945 these conditions were fulfilled. Why, then, did Austria have to wait until 1955 to regain her freedom?

¹ Minute by Geoffrey Harrison, 27 February 1942, PRO, FO 371/30942, C2401

² M. Denton, *'No Way to Conduct an Alliance': Britain, the United States and Formosa, 1950* (Honours thesis, University of Wollongong, 1987)

Although this question has not been asked for the first time, the small body of literature which attempts to answer it has done so only in a limited way.³ Most noticeable in existing treatises on the subject is an emphasis on the relations between Austria and the Soviet Union and a bias towards acceptance of the Cold War thesis as proclaimed by the Americans. The Soviets, no doubt, until recently made comfortable villains and this may be part of the reason for the prominence given to the occupation period up to 1950. The years 1951 to 1955 are usually either ignored or given short shrift. It would appear that 1950 has presented a convenient point of termination for those who contend that Soviet intransigence prevented the conclusion of an Austrian treaty. By emphasising Soviet unwillingness to respond favourably to Anglo-American demands and, I suggest, by giving too much credence to the letter rather than the spirit of American documents, a skewed picture has been allowed to emerge, perpetuating the myth of the American saviour.

My primary aim, then, has been twofold: to investigate the portrayal of America as the party which untiringly strove to free Austria from the occupation, and to explore the British part in the occupation and assess its effect on Anglo-Austrian as well as Anglo-American relations. To that end I have examined British and American policy towards Austria and the Soviet Union, Anglo-American tactics at treaty negotiations, and the extent to which London and Washington took Austrian wishes and complaints into consideration. This raised many important questions. Why, for instance, was there such disagreement, particularly after 1950, between Britain and the United States over the benefits to Western security of ending the occupation? In what ways did British and American assessment of Soviet policy differ between 1943 and 1955, and what effect, if any,

³ Cf. W.B.Bader, *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955* (Stanford, 1966); G.J.Bischof, *Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation: Austria in International Politics, 1940-1950* (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1989); A.K.Cronin, *Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955* (Cornell University Press, 1986); M.Rauchensteiner, *Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Oesterreich 1945-1955* (Graz, 1985); G.Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945-1955* (Graz, 1985)

did Austrian demands to end the occupation have on British and American views of Austria's role in Europe?

The answers emerging paint a fascinating picture of Britain as the original cold warrior - both under Churchill and Attlee - but then, as the American ideological crusade gained momentum, insisting on a common-sense solution to Austrian security and Austria's place in Western Europe. Britain's pragmatic approach to the Austrian problem was, however, repeatedly frustrated by American intransigence and by Britain's own efforts to safeguard her economic interests in Austria. The evidence also suggests strongly that from 1948 onward American military considerations prevented the ending of the occupation until, in 1955, it was no longer politically feasible to keep it going. By 1955 the Americans feared that their failure to sign the treaty would prejudice the containment of Soviet Russia by encouraging further Austrian-Soviet bilateral deals. They also feared being placed in an untenable propaganda position by remaining the only occupying power unwilling to end the occupation. These factors and a shift in emphasis of US foreign policy towards Asia, as well as a greater reliance on massive retaliation rather than mere containment, determined American action in 1955.

A crucial consequence of Austria's occupation was her choice of neutral status after being nurtured as a 'Western outpost' for ten years. It has invariably been asserted by writers outside Austria that neutrality was imposed by Moscow. But this is far too simplistic a view. The question needs to be asked, in what way did Austrian assessment of Soviet policy differ from British or American assessment, and why did Austria's initial sense of relief at the arrival of American and British occupation forces change to disillusionment? It is my contention that Austria embraced neutrality because satisfying the role imposed by the United States had become an intolerable burden and threatened - as, indeed, was acknowledged by some of the more determined cold warriors in Washington - to last for the duration of the East-West conflict. This, as we now know, would have added some thirty-five years to the occupation.

Austria's own part in the ending of the occupation has not been adequately explored. The Austrian Government, if its actions

are considered at all, is often treated as if it were a homogeneous entity, when in fact it consisted of the representatives of two diametrically opposed ideologies, who as recently as 1934 had fought a civil war against each other. A fundamental question, therefore, is why did the two major political parties in Austria - the Socialist Party (SPO), comprising Socialdemocrats and its left-wing faction, the Revolutionary Socialists, and the People's Party (OVP), an amalgamation of conservative Christiansocials and former right-wing corporate-state enthusiasts - co-operate in a coalition government throughout the occupation? What problems did the leaders of the coalition parties face, and why did the Socialist Party half-way through the occupation insist on the formation of new political parties? The importance of these issues lies in the essential connection between the burden imposed by the occupation, the potential for serious internal instability which it engendered, and the growing disaffection between Austria and the Anglo-American powers.

I have divided the thesis into ten chapters. The running civil wars between Socialist and Conservative forces during the 1920s and early 1930s - culminating in the brutal suppression of Austrian Socialdemocracy by the authoritarian Dollfuss Government in 1934 - were pivotal in the forcible incorporation of Austria into the German Reich in 1938. Chapter One explores Anglo-American attitudes in the 1930s to the civil war and to the *Anschluss* in order to show what bearing they had later on Allied planning. The Allied proclamation in November 1943 that Austria was to be re-established as an independent state is examined in the light of the first of many serious misconceptions about Austrian aspirations, the belief - very likely inspired by Churchill's predilection for a Danubian Empire centred on Vienna - that independence held little appeal for the Austrians.

Chapter Two shows how as early as 1944 British assessment of Soviet aims in Europe and the presumed threat to British European policy clashed with the Americans' preoccupation with the Far East and caused considerable disagreement between the two governments over the proposed post-war control of Austria. By 1945 Britain saw itself as the only power sufficiently aware of and prepared to fight

the Soviet-led Communist threat to Europe. It was this notion of its role in Europe that caused the British Government to refuse recognition of the Austrian Provisional Government established by Karl Renner in Soviet-occupied Vienna in April 1945. The ensuing disagreement between the British and US governments provides one of the earliest examples of the Austrian Government quietly proceeding with the administration of the country while the occupying powers fought amongst themselves. British reactions to the Provisional Government's preparations for the first post-war elections, to be held in November 1945, offer an instructive glimpse of British anxiety over the Communist threat, a concern which was only temporarily alleviated when the Austrian Communists suffered a decisive defeat in the elections.

The focus of Chapter Three is the first battle of wills between the Austrian Government and the occupation forces over the inordinate number of occupation troops in Austria and the devastating burden they imposed on the country's resources and population. This chapter also explores the different responses by the British and Americans to these complaints and to the Communist threat thought to be posed to Austria's future independence. In direct contrast to their attitudes after 1950, in 1946 the Americans wanted a quick end to the occupation, whereas the British saw the problem as one of physical protection of Austria by the presence of Anglo-American occupation troops to deter the Soviet military, and insistence on co-operation between the Socialist Party and the People's Party to forestall the Austrian Communists.

The ambiguities in British policy towards liberated Austria are explored in Chapter Four. These include the war-guilt clause contained in the British draft treaty, perceived as a monstrous injustice by the Austrians, who protested that they had been the victims of Nazism. The British draft also set the stage for a protracted battle between HMG and the Austrian Government, supported by Moscow, over British oil interests in Austria. In 1947 the first negotiations for an Austrian treaty witnessed a new-found determination by the Americans to defy the Soviets' alleged economic subversion of Austria. The resulting conflict between the Austrian

leaders, who saw the Soviet claims as reparation demands susceptible to business-like settlement between Vienna and Moscow, and the Anglo-American negotiators, whose tactics were believed to prolong needlessly the occupation and thus pose a threat to internal stability, contributed to Austrian disenchantment with Western aims and to Austrian determination not to participate in ideological crusades against the Soviet Union.

The impact of the Communist coup in Prague and of deteriorating East-West relations in Berlin on Anglo-American willingness to grant Austria her freedom are examined in Chapter Five. British policy had changed from the notion prevalent in 1946, that Austria should be protected from Communism by the physical presence of Western troops, to the conviction that a politically stable Austria - which in Britain's opinion could only be guaranteed by the conclusion of the treaty and the ending of the occupation - was vital to British European policy. In contrast, the worsening international ideological conflict saw the emergence in the United States Government of a policy of 'no treaty, but keep pretending'. The period also saw a shift in relations between Austria and the Anglo-American occupation forces. The administrative authorities were believed to be reactionary, insulting and insensitive, and Anglo-American troops were rivalling early Soviet behaviour in their treatment of the population. Austrian awareness of the Western Powers' reluctance to evacuate the country provoked a campaign against the occupying powers and a growing inclination to embrace neutrality as an answer to the problem.

Chapter Six analyses the effects on the treaty negotiations of American domestic disputes over US foreign policy and the consequent unwillingness on the part of the Austrian Socialists to continue to restrain their political ambitions for the sake of American Soviet policy. It was during this period, when the hard-liners were gaining the upper hand in Washington, that the British - conscious of the potential harm to Austrian-Western relations - argued most fervently in favour of an end to the occupation.

Anglo-American efforts to keep Austria 'friendly' are examined in Chapter Seven. These efforts are scrutinised against a background

of the waning fortunes of the British Labour Government and US determination to keep Austria occupied until East-West relations in general were resolved in America's favour. Closely linked to Anglo-American inertia on the treaty question were the Austrian Government's difficulties in dealing satisfactorily with the economic grievances of the Austrian workers, leading to the incongruous situation of the Government having to defend itself both against Communist-led disturbances and efforts by the Western occupation powers to safeguard their own economic interests in Austria.

The introduction in 1952 of the so-called abbreviated treaty, one of the most provocative actions of the Americans, is examined in Chapter Eight. This proposed treaty set both the British and French against Washington and had the unintended effect of being welcomed by Austria as an 'evacuation instrument'. At the same time, one of the most galling issues of the occupation - the requirement that Austria pay for occupation costs - led to serious disagreement between Britain and the United States, as the US Government attempted to lessen the burden on Austria while insisting on onerous rearmament measures for Britain.

Chapter Nine covers the period from October 1952 to February 1954. It deals with the essential connection between the constraints of the continuing occupation and the emergence of those political forces in Austria which favoured Austrian-Soviet bilateral negotiations to gain Austrian freedom, and saw neutrality as the deciding factor in future negotiations. These developments also witnessed a reassessment by Britain of Austria's role in Europe, thus bringing both Austria and Britain into conflict with US aims concerning Western defence.

The concluding chapter examines the last year of the occupation, when Austrian leaders defied Anglo-American efforts to keep Austria 'on ice' and engaged directly in negotiations with Moscow, promising Moscow the security of a neutral Austria in exchange for Austria's freedom.

The evidence has vindicated my doubts about the received opinion of the American role in the prolonged occupation. The portrayal of America the Saviour is changed to one of a determined

ideological warrior, whose grip on Austria was relaxed only when continuation of the occupation threatened to damage the overarching aim of containing the Soviet Union. Anglo-Austrian relations during this period were determined by the inherent conflict between Britain's political aims for Austria and Britain's economic hardships, which obliged dependence on American goodwill regarding European security. A comment made early during the occupation by an Austrian diplomat in Washington is suggestive of the complexities governing Anglo-American-Austrian relations. He warned his government that although the US Government's aims in respect of the occupation coincided with those of the Austrian Government, ultimately Washington would bow to the needs of Britain if a conflict between Austrian and British interests arose.⁴ Yet as the occupation progressed, the tables were turned and London bowed to American policy in prolonging the occupation. Thus, as a result of the British Labour Government's demise in 1951 and the weakening of the British will in the face of American obduracy, the Austrian Government pursued the idea of neutrality as the only alternative to continued occupation. By 1955 the Soviet Government, driven by pragmatic rather than ideological considerations, represented the only reasonable negotiating partner in the Austrians' quest for independence.

A Note on Sources

My research for this study coincided with an extraordinarily sensitive time in Austrian political affairs. When I first arrived in Vienna at the beginning of 1988, Austria was beleaguered by allegations, widely reported in the Anglo-American press, that her head of state, President Kurt Waldheim, was a war criminal. At the same time, the 50th anniversary of the *Anschluss* resurrected old differences over whether or not Austria had welcomed the Nazis in 1938. As a consequence, English-speaking scholars were viewed with considerable suspicion by the Austrian Government and the repercussions of this on my research were only too apparent. Access to Austrian

⁴ Ludwig Kleinwaechter to Karl Gruber, 23 April 1946, Austrian State Archives, AdR, BMAA, K5, 110.850-111.192

Foreign Ministry papers was severely restricted, all papers undergoing renewed inspection by the Foreign Ministry before their release to the archives. This situation was partly alleviated by the sympathetic consideration of my requests by Dr Kurt Peball, Director-General of the Austrian State Archives. Nevertheless, my repeated applications for access to Cabinet papers have elicited no reply to date. Thus, although I have undertaken four research trips to Austria since 1988, these restrictions necessarily limited the amount of data gathered from Austrian archives. However, I have been able to supplement this data with some excellent published document collections⁵ and several contemporary accounts by leading Austrian figures.

The Public Record Office in London has proved a veritable gold-mine of information on Austria. I have made extensive use of Foreign Office papers, Cabinet papers and the collections of the Prime Minister's Private Office. The holdings of the Austrian and British archives have been complemented by the invaluable series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, published by the State Department. As well, I have had access to unpublished CIA reports and State Department documents from the Harry S. Truman Library, kindly lent to me by my supervisor, Dr Ian McLaine.

⁵ E.M.Csaky (ed), *Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutralitaet: Dokumentation zur oesterreichischen Aussenpolitik 1945-1955* (Vienna, 1980); A.Schilcher (ed), *Oesterreich und die Grossmaechte: Dokumente zur oesterreichischen Aussenpolitik 1945-1955* (Vienna, 1980)

List of Persons

- Acheson, Dean, US Assistant Secretary of State, 1941-45; Under Secretary of State, 1945-47; Secretary of State, 1949-53
- Attlee, Clement R., British Deputy Prime Minister, 1942-45; Prime Minister, 1945-1951
- Bethouart, General Emile Marie, French High Commissioner for Austria, 1945-1950
- Bevin, Ernest, British Foreign Secretary, 1945-51
- Bidault, Georges P., French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1946, 1947-48, 1954; Premier, 1946; Vice-Premier, 1950, 1951; Minister of National Defence, 1951-52
- Bischoff, Norbert, Austrian Political Representative in Paris, 1946; Austrian Political Representative, later Ambassador, in the Soviet Union, 1947-1960
- Boehm, Johann, Vice-President of Austrian National Assembly, 1945-1959; Minister of Social Administration, Provisional Government, 1945; Member of Executive Committee of the Austrian Socialist Party, 1945-1959; President of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, 1945-1959
- Bohlen, Charles E., Counsellor of the US Department of State, 1948-49; US Minister in Paris, 1949-51; Counsellor of the Department of State and member of the Senior Staff, National Security Council, 1951-52; US Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1953-57
- Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich, Soviet Minister of Defence, 1947-49, 1953-55; First Deputy Chairman of Soviet Council of Ministers, 1949-55; Chairman of Council of Ministers, 1955-58
- Burrows, Bernard, Counsellor, German Department, British Foreign Office, 1945-50; Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington, 1950-53
- Byrnes, James, US Secretary of State, 1945-1947
- Caccia, Harold, British High Commissioner for Austria, 1950-54; Ambassador to Austria, 1951-54; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 1954-56.
- Chamberlain, Neville, British Prime Minister, 1937-40.
- Cheetham, Nicolas John, Counsellor of British Legation, Vienna, 1948-50
- Cherriere, General Paul, French Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, 1945-48; French Representative, Austrian Treaty Commission, 1947
- Churchill, Winston S., First Lord of the Admiralty, 1939-40; Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 1940-45; Prime Minister, 1951-55
- Clark, General Mark W., US High Commissioner for Austria, 1945-1947; US Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers, 1947
- Cullis, Michael, Head of Austrian Section, British Foreign Office, 1946-50; Political Adviser, Austrian Treaty Commission, 1947
- Dean, Patrick, Head of German Political Department, British Foreign Office, 1946-50
- Dodge, Joseph, US Representative, Austrian Treaty Commission, 1947
- Dollfuss, Engelbert, Austrian Chancellor, 1932-34
- Donnelly, Walter J., US High Commissioner for Austria, October 1950 to July 1952; Ambassador to Austria, 1951-52
- Douglas, Lewis, US Ambassador in London, 1947-50

- Dowling, Walter C., Counsellor of the US Legation in Austria, 1949-50; US Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, 1950-53
- Dulles, John Foster, US Secretary of State from January 1953
- Eden, Anthony, British Foreign Secretary, 1935-38, 1940-45, 1951 to April 1955; Prime Minister, April 1955 to January 1957
- Eisenhower, General Dwight D., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until May 1952; President of the United States from January 1953
- Erhardt, John G., Political Adviser to US High Commissioner for Austria, later US Minister in Austria, 1946-1950
- Figl, Leopold, Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Provisional Governor of the Province of Lower Austria, 1945; Chancellor of Austria, December 1945 to April 1953; Austrian Foreign Minister, November 1953 to June 1959; Chairman of the Austrian People's Party, 1945-52
- Fischer, Ernst, Member of the Politburo of the Austrian Communist Party, 1946-1961; Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Chief editor of Austrian daily *Neues Oesterreich*, April 1945 to December 1947
- Franks, Oliver S., British Ambassador in Washington, 1948-52
- Galloway, Lieutenant General Alexander, British High Commissioner for Austria, October 1947 to December 1949
- Gruber, Karl, Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, September to December 1945; Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, December 1945 to November 1953; Austrian Ambassador in the United States, 1954-1958
- Gruenther, General Alfred M., Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1951-53; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1953-56
- Gusev, Fedor Tarasovich, Soviet Ambassador in London, 1943-46; Soviet Representative on the European Advisory Commission; Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, 1946-55
- Hancock, Patrick F., Assistant Head of German Political Department, British Foreign Office, 1952-53; Head of German Political Department, 1954-55
- Harrison, Geoffrey W., First Secretary in the Central, later German, Department, British Foreign Office, 1941-1945; British Minister in Moscow, 1947-49; Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers, 1951; Superintending Under-Secretary, Austrian Section, British Foreign Office, 1951-56
- Harvey, Oliver, Private Secretary to Anthony Eden, 1941-43; Superintending Under-Secretary of the Central, later German, Department, British Foreign Office, 1943-1946; Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Political), 1946-47
- Healey, Denis, Secretary of the International Department, British Labour Party, 1945-52
- Heinl, Eduard, Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Minister for Trade and Reconstruction, 1946-1948
- Helmer, Oskar, Deputy Governor of the Province of Lower Austria, May to October 1945; Chairman of the Parliamentary Socialist Party, 1945-1959; Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Minister for the Interior, 1945-1959; Deputy Chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party, 1945-1959
- Henderson, Lord, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 1948-51

- Honner, Franz, Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Deputy Chairman of the Austrian Communist Party, 1946; Executive member of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, 1945-1948
- Hood, Viscount Samuel, British Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers, 1947
- Hull, Cordell, US Secretary of State, 1933-44
- Hynd, John B., Head of the British Control Office for Germany and Austria, 1945-1947
- Ilyichev, Ivan Ivanovich, Soviet High Commissioner for Austria, 1953-1955; Ambassador to Austria, 1953-57
- Jerram, Cecil Bertrand, British Minister in Austria, 1948-1949
- Johnson, Louis A., US Secretary of Defence, 1949-50
- Kamitz, Reinhard, Austrian Minister of Finance, 1952-1960
- Kennan, George F., Counsellor of US Embassy in Moscow, 1946-47; Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, 1947-50; Counsellor of the Department of State, 1949-50; US Ambassador in Moscow, May-September 1952
- Keyes, General Geoffrey, US High Commissioner for Austria, May 1947 to October 1950
- Kirkpatrick, Ivone, Assistant Under-Secretary, British Foreign Office, 1945-1948; Permanent Under-Secretary, German Political Department, Foreign Office, 1948-1949; British High Commissioner for Germany, 1950-53; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1953-57
- Kiselev, Evgeniy Dmitriyevich, Political Adviser to the Soviet High Commissioner for Austria, 1945-48
- Kleinwaechter, Ludwig, Austrian Political Representative, later Ambassador, in the United States, 1945-52
- Koerner, Theodor, Mayor of Vienna, 1945-51; President of Austria, 1951-57
- Koktomov, Nikolai Petrovich, Soviet Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers, 1948-49
- Koniev, Marshal Ivan, Soviet High Commissioner for Austria, 1945-46
- Koplenig, Johann, Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Chairman of the Austrian Communist Party, 1946-65
- Kreisky, Bruno, Secretary of State in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1953-59
- Kurasov, General Vladimir Vasilyevich, Soviet High Commissioner for Austria, 1946-49
- Mack, William H. Bradshaw, Political Adviser to the British High Commissioner for Austria, later British Minister in Austria, 1945-48
- Macmillan, Harold, British Minister of Defence, 1954-55; Foreign Secretary, April to December 1955
- Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 1946-53; Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom from 1953
- Mallet, W.I., British Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers, 1949-50; Assistant Under-Secretary, British Foreign Office, 1949-50
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- Massigli, Rene, French Ambassador in London, 1944-55; Representative on the European Advisory Commission

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- Rusk, Dean, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, US Department of State, 1949-50; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1951
- Sargent, Orme, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 1939-46; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1946-49
- Schaerf, Adolf, Chairman of Austrian Parliamentary Socialist Party, 1945-56; Member of the Austrian Provisional Government, 1945; Austrian Vice-Chancellor, 1945-57; Chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party, 1945-57
- Schuman, Robert, French Prime Minister, 1947-48; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1948-53
- Stalin, Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union; Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; died March 1953

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- Sviridov, Vladimir Petrovich, Soviet High Commissioner for Austria, 1949-53
- Thompson, Llewellyn E., US High Commissioner for Austria, 1952-55; US Ambassador in Austria, 1952-57
- Tito, Josip Broz, Leader of Yugoslav Partisan forces after German invasion; Marshal of Yugoslavia and President of National Liberation Committee, 1943; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, 1945-53; President from 1953
- Truman, Harry S., President of the United States, 1945-53
- Vansittart, Robert, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 1930-37; Chief Diplomatic Adviser to HMG, 1938-41
- Vishinsky, Andrei Yanuarevich, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, 1940-49; Foreign Minister, 1949-53; First Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Soviet representative at the United Nations, 1953-54; died 22 November 1954
- Wallinger, Geoffrey, British High Commissioner for Austria, 1954-55; British Ambassador in Austria, 1954-58
- Webb, James E., Under-Secretary of State, US Department of State, 1949-51
- Wiley, John C., US Charge d'affaires in Austria, 1938
- Williamson, Francis T., Assistant Chief, Division Central European Affairs, US Department of State, 1948; Chief, Division of Austrian Affairs, 1949-50; Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, 1951-52; Director of the Planning Staff of the Office of Western European Affairs until January 1953
- Wimmer, Lothar, Austrian Ambassador in London, 1950-55
- Winant, John Gilbert, US Ambassador in London, 1941-46; US Representative on European Advisory Commission, 1943-45
- Winterton, General John, British Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, 1945-49; British High Commissioner for Austria, January to August 1950
- Yost, Charles W., Counsellor of the US Legation in Austria, 1948; US Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, August 1953 to August 1954
- Zarubin, Georgiy Nikolayevich, Soviet Ambassador in London, 1947-52; Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers, 1949-52

List of Abbreviations

AC	Allied Council for Austria
ACA	Allied Commission for Austria
AdR	<i>Archiv der Republik</i>
ATC	Austrian Treaty Commission
BMAA	<i>Bundesministerium fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten</i>
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EAC	European Advisory Commission
ECA	Economic Co-operation Administration
EDC	European Defence Community
FAM	Free Austrian Movement
FO	Foreign Office
FORD	Foreign Office Research Department
FRUS	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
HC	House of Commons
HMG	His (Her) Majesty's Government
IAGA	Inter-Allied Governing Authority
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPO	<i>Kommunistische Partei Oesterreichs</i> (Communist Party of Austria)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSDAP	<i>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei</i> (National Socialist German Workers' Party)
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OGB	<i>Oesterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund</i> (Austrian Federation of Trade Unions)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OVP	<i>Oesterreichische Volkspartei</i> (Austrian People's Party)
PRO	Public Record Office
PWE	Political Warfare Executive
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SPO	<i>Sozialistische Partei Oesterreichs</i> (Socialist Party of Austria)
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USIA	<i>Upravlenye Sovetskogo Imushchestva v Avstrii</i> (Administration of Soviet Property in Austria)
VdU	<i>Verband der Unabhaengigen</i> (League of Independents)
WEU	Western European Union
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WPIS	<i>Weekly Political Intelligence Summaries</i>