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

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Democratization and commitment to peace, South Africa's motivations to contribute to peace operations

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2 Democratization and commitment to peace

South America's motivations to contribute to peace operations

Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez

The decision to deploy troops overseas to observe, keep or enforce peace is not an easy one. Peace operations are difficult to sustain. War can break out again at any time and belligerent groups can attack peacekeepers. Conflicting interests and mistrust between the parties involved can spoil peace agreements.[1] The fact that peace is so difficult to achieve raises an interesting puzzle for those interested in analyzing the supply side of peace operations. If peace missions are so hard to maintain, why would any state want to contribute troops to United Nations (UN) peace efforts?

This chapter will empirically analyze why South American nations contribute to peace operations (PKOs). In fact, South America's participation in UN PKOs has generated interest in Latin American foreign policy. The region's engagement in Haiti, predominantly through the United Nations Stabilization Mission there (MINUSTAH), has been hailed as a "coming-out party" for the South American community. Through MINUSTAH, *nine Latin American nations* (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) have broadened their military and diplomatic cooperation, all while contributing to the effort of constructing a difficult peace in the Caribbean island nation.

Yet, strictly speaking, South America is not a newcomer to peacekeeping trends. Many of these Western Hemisphere countries were involved in the growth of peace observation *missions in Suez* and Kashmir. Moreover, these states have increased their commitments to UN efforts worldwide since the end of the Cold War era. Specifically, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have gained, at least, 25 years of peace operations experience. Why do these states supply blue helmets? What domestic factors explain their peacekeeping commitments?

Conventional explanations for participation *in peace operations* (PKOs) include national security interests, international system power dynamics, middle-power explanations and normative considerations.[2] This chapter takes a different approach, by exploring the relationship between domestic democratization and the commitment of troops to PKOs. Indeed, since a considerable number of South American peace operations participants come from democratizing and transitional states—states with

fresh memories of military authoritarianism—it is not surprising that their commitment to these operations is generally driven by domestic imperatives as well.

As Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse argue, democratization is an especially potent impetus for states to join international institutions, especially since these types of states have a difficult time sustaining the liberal reforms needed to consolidate their own democracies.[3] Uncertainty is indeed the defining characteristic of democratization, involving a process of "undetermined social change, [and] large-scale transformations which occur when there are insufficient structural or behavioral parameters to guide and predict the outcome."[4]

My contention is that one key impetus to join UN peace missions originates in the selfsame domestic political arena. Although states' motivations to participate in UN PKOs vary substantially from case to case, I argue that South American democratizing nations have committed themselves to peace operations for three main reasons: international signaling, domestic reform and monetary incentives. By signaling I mean an international commitment to show to the rest of the world that irreversible domestic change and fundamental foreign policy re-alignment have occurred. It represents, in short, a declaration that the state is indeed building a new identity that will permit future access to additional international organizations or security communities in which democratic practices are the norm.[5]

On the other hand, civilian leaders in democratizing states may conclude that performing peacekeeping duties will change their soldiers' professional self-image via international socialization, leading perhaps to some kind of military reform. UN peace operations are thus a service provided by a donor country, but they are also a schoolhouse where a democratizing state's armed forces might internalize new roles, doctrines and social norms. Finally, peace operations can provide an incentive to use such operations as a source of income for the military. Depending on the level of national income and military spending, peacekeeping resources can be used by democratizing states to cover individual military salaries, sustain operational costs and perhaps even purchase military equipment during periods of budgetary uncertainty. Having said this, it is important to point out that these three motivations (signaling, military reform and economic incentives) are not always present at the same time, nor are they necessarily constant. In fact, they have evolved and varied over time and from case to case.

This chapter traces in depth the participation of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in UN PKOs. It emphasizes various time sequences of events and offers an assessment of the causal relationship between countries' commitments to UN PKOs and the democratization trends we see within them domestically. Argentina is the first case study presented here as, of the three countries analyzed, its theoretical motivations for participating in

these operations were the strongest—it needed to send positive signals about its intentions to the international community, take steps to reform its military and exploit the financial benefits offered by peace missions. The second section analyzes Brazil's reasons for participating in UN PKOs, largely defined by the need to signal international commitment and obtain prestige. Finally, the third section of this chapter focuses on Uruguay, a country whose commitment to peace operations is driven primarily by economic considerations.

Argentina's engagement in peace operations: signaling, military reform and economic incentives

Argentina's proactive approach to peace operations first began in 1991, when two Argentine frigates with 450 Navy personnel were deployed to the Persian Gulf.[6] In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Buenos Aires pledged a total of over 15,000 individual soldiers to participate in more than five PKOs worldwide from 1992 to 2001. In total, about 40 percent of the country's commissioned officers gained some kind of peace operations experience during this period, thus making Argentina the most active Latin American troop contributor and one of the top five UN troop contributors between 1992 and 1996.[7]

Such a trajectory may initially seem insignificant. After all, the country was merely fulfilling its responsibilities as a founding member of the UN. This was of course no accident. Argentina's engagement in UN PKOs clearly coincided with the government's efforts to realign the country internationally and to restructure its restive armed forces (see Diamint in this volume). In this first phase, therefore, Buenos Aires wanted to broadcast its new role as a democratic player on the international stage, to promote and consolidate internal political and military reform and to defray the costs of its military institutions.

The country's external image was damaged by the legacy of its authoritarian past (1976–1982) and its aftermath (the Falklands/Malvinas war). In this context, peacekeeping participation became a prime way for Argentina's emergent democratic government to send clear and far-reaching signals of its commitment to change. The government, in particular, sought to participate in PKOs in order to secure greater US support and international exposure. The move expressed not only tacit support for US policies abroad, but a tacit alignment with Washington.[8]

On a broader level, Argentine engagement in UN peace operations was also a way to improve and redefine the abysmal human rights record the country had acquired while under military rule. While Argentina could have used regional organizations to signal its new resolve, its leaders determined that the UN was the most appropriate forum for this, in part because it had come to embody an unstinting commitment to human rights norms and values. As Rut Diamint argues, "[t]he Argentine

government in Buenos Aires was not merely interested in reestablishing cordial relations with its North, South and Central American neighbors; it also had a broader desire to reconnect to the international community."[9]

Additionally, the impulse to participate in peace operations coincided with the government's desperate need to both shepherd and reform a repeatedly insubordinate military. In fact, between 1982 and the early 1990s, Argentina's armed forces experienced a period of professional crisis characterized by defeat, scarcity, exclusion, fragmentation and punishment. In this sense, peace operations not only enabled Argentina to signal its dependability as an international actor, but also to begin rehabilitating its armed forces by exposing large numbers of its troops to out-of-area missions conducted by multinational forces. The government thus began deploying observers, units and even full battalions[10] to various UN PKOs. Argentine military officers became ubiquitous peacekeepers in Central America, Africa and Europe.

Similarly, in this initial phase, monetary considerations played a key role in Argentina's pursuit of a UN peace operations role. Budget reductions had intensified the internal disorder of the armed forces, almost causing institutional paralysis. Peacekeeping participation provided both a political and an economic opportunity to resolve various tradeoffs. Argentina thus used peacekeeping resources as "carrots" to reduce military unrest and make it easier for the military to cope with economic scarcity. The salaries and operational costs of troop deployments to UN missions, for example, were funded by the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which saw the missions as an integral part of the nation's foreign policy. At the same time, the Argentine government usually provided its peacekeepers with a monthly allowance of US$1,000 dollars and an additional 25 percent pay increase.[11]

Nevertheless, the dynamism described above did not last. By 1996, troop commitments began to decline and fewer soldiers were sent abroad. In 1997, while President Menem was still in power, the country began to experience the first symptoms of what would become a severe economic crisis, which subsequently prompted the government to reduce its force levels abroad from almost 3,000 in 1995 to 1,464 in 1996, to less than 600 by 2000. As Cynthia A. Watson argues,

> What could go into peace operations for a military that cannot be completely funded by external sources is money that can go into keeping Argentines off the streets and from looting stores and business establishments.... It would appear that peace operations will remain a low level of interest for the Republic as long as the severe economic turmoil persists.[12]

This phase was thus shadowed by the economic uncertainties that prompted Argentina to reduce its international commitment to peace

operations. The armed forces were not considered responsible for this crisis and did not intervene, but the absence of political leadership once again forced them to focus their attention on the domestic turmoil that surrounded them. Argentina embarked upon a new peace operations trajectory in 2004, once the political and economic crises had died down. A new impetus for the country to send international signals was fueled by President Néstor Kirchner's request for Congressional permission to deploy a full battalion and a unit of observers to the UN mission in Haiti, totaling 1,103 soldiers. This was the first large deployment after the crisis and the third largest national contingent in Haiti from a South American nation.

What was Argentina trying to signal? The decisionmaking process behind this large deployment was complex, since at the time Kirchner had little interest in foreign policy matters and was heavily focused on the domestic agenda. However, Defense Minister José Pampuro and Foreign Affairs Minister Rafael Bielsa convinced an apathetic Kirchner to use peace operations as a foreign policy tool to signal two goals. First, Argentina increased its peacekeeping commitment in order to promote subregional military cooperation with its South American neighbors, among whom Brazil and Chile were the most important. In fact, Kirchner requested Congressional authorization not only to deploy troops abroad, but also to allow Argentine forces to cooperate actively with Chilean and Brazilian soldiers in the field.[13] Although the country's diplomatic relations with Chile and Brazil had been quite stable and peaceful, military–military cooperation was very limited among these South American nations; thus peace operations also served as a means of signaling commitment to regional defense integration by compelling the armed forces to participate in joint peace efforts.

This was a particularly sensitive issue for Argentine–Chilean relations, given their historical mistrust and differences over sovereignty and territory; these had almost led to a war in 1978 over the Beagle Channel. In that sense, a joint peacekeeping force with regional neighbors provided an important foreign policy mechanism with which to signal the arrival of a new era of regional relations. This culminated in the creation of an Argentine–Chilean binational force for peace operations, known as Brigada Cruz del Sur (Southern Cross Brigade), which, according to Diamint, "opened up the prospect of further defense cooperation and helped to definitively end mutual conflict scenarios."[14]

Second, Ministers Pampuro and Bielsa persuaded the President to use Argentina's active role in Haiti as an opportunity to establish a new division of labor between the region's middle powers (Brazil) and the US. In the view of these decisionmakers, peace operations would permit a minimum level of cooperation with the George W. Bush administration, with which Argentina had a tense and difficult relationship due to Washington's steadfast refusal to support a bailout for Argentina.[15] Hence,

peace operations were once again used to signal the country's commitment to cooperate, especially when US–Argentine relations were at their lowest ebb. As of October 2012, Argentina maintains a battalion and an air force unit in Haiti and it is still South America's third largest contributor to the UN mission there.

Brazil as peacekeeper: signaling and reform

Brazil has traditionally been a major player in the UN system, having served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council more times than any other country in the Americas, and surpassed only by Japan at the global level. Historically, it has also been one of Latin America's major troop contributors, having deployed UN observers and troops to missions in Sinai, Gaza, Congo, India–Pakistan, Cyprus, Angola and Mozambique.[16]

However, it is also important to note that, between 1968 and 1988, Brazil decided not to participate in UN peacekeeping, following a similar path to that of Argentina and Uruguay. This assessment was influenced by the military coup of 1964, which effectively installed a dictatorship that would last for more than two decades. The military regime had an ambitious agenda, including the development of nuclear weapons, but participation in the UN Security Council and PKOs was not part of the plan.[17] Like most bureaucratic–authoritarian regimes in South America, Brazilian military leaders reasoned that isolationism would silence international criticism of their poor human rights record.

The return to democracy brought Brazil back to UN politics. As the country democratized, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also known as Itamaraty) increased its presence in the international organization. Democratization has played an important role in shaping Brazil's multilateral policy and its return to peacekeeping affairs has largely been motivated by foreign and domestic policy imperatives, in which a perceived need to send signals internationally and domestic reform have been the key factors. In that sense, Brazil has interesting similarities to Argentina. But its peace operations trajectory is also quite different from its neighbor's. Civil–military relations in Argentina and Brazil differ considerably; unlike the Argentine armed forces, the Brazilian military emerged from the transition to democracy with relative strength. This fact enabled the military, and particularly the branch commanders, to formulate defense policy with a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis civilian control.[18] Hence, the Brazilian armed forces did not face the same economic and mission constraints suffered by their Argentine counterparts.

In contrast to Argentina, in Brazil peace operations have been conceived of as a mechanism to help integrate defense and foreign policies, which in turn will enable the country to effectively signal its aspiration to be considered a global power. Signaling and domestic reform (integration) thus provided an impetus for Brazil to join UN peace efforts. In its

first decade as a democratic state, Brazil pursued a strategy in which international signaling was key, given the uncertain nature of the country's domestic politics at the time. While Brazil did not experience a traumatic transition to democracy through collapse—as did Argentina—its democratization was uneven and at times rocky. There was also uncertainly about the role of the military. The armed forces continued to exercise autonomy and intervened actively in politics during this period. As Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz argue,

> on numerous occasions the military unilaterally decided whether or not to send military units to quell strikes. Active duty army officers continued in control of the National Intelligence Service. None of Brazil's controversial nuclear projects were discussed by Congress. The military played a major role in setting the boundaries to agrarian reform.[19]

So what was Brazil trying to signal? Participation in UN PKOs was part of a broader strategy, intended to achieve two related foreign policy goals: namely to increase the country's visibility in the UN system after years of isolation (see Kenkel on Brazil in this volume); and to encourage the internationalization of its economy after decades of import substitution. First, peace operations were used to signal credibility and commitment in UN politics. As the country democratized, Brazil's foreign ministry increased its presence at the UN, publicly reviving the country's age-old intention to gain a permanent, veto-endowed position on the UN Security Council. Brazilian diplomats and politicians alike engaged in an international public relations campaign to push for rapid UN reform, which would grant Brazil the desired permanent seat.[20]

To signal interest in UN affairs and to demonstrate democratic and status credentials, Brazil gradually increased its UN troop contribution in the late eighties and early nineties, including larger deployments to Mozambique and Angola.[21] These constituted the first deployments of Brazilian combat troops to a foreign country since the end, in 1967, of the first UN Emergency Force in the Suez. Interestingly enough, these commitments were made precisely when Brazil was experiencing its worst post-dictatorial political and economic crisis. While the forces in Angola and Mozambique undoubtedly represented Brazil's largest contingents abroad during this first phase, the various democratic governments of Brazil deployed observers and troops to other UN missions as well, including El Salvador, Guatemala and East Timor.[22]

By far Brazil's largest troop contributions during this initial period were in support of UN missions in Africa and Asia, including the peace operations in Angola, East Timor and Mozambique. These contributions reflect Brazil's zone of regional projection. With regard to a commitment for troop presence, Brazil explicitly chose Portuguese-speaking (Lusophone)

Africa and Asia. In total, 4,942 individual Brazilian officers and non-commissioned officers were sent to participate in UN PKOs in this period.

It is important to note that, while Brazil was internationally active, it too behaved very cautiously. Brazilian officials were keenly interested in signaling their intention to cooperate with the UN in a democratic era, but not at any cost and not in any country. When the UN requested troops for operations in Haiti and the Balkans, Brazil refused to join. During this initial phase, Brazil was reluctant to support peace enforcement operations and was adamantly opposed to the establishment of any force that, although designed for traditional peacekeeping, could possibly be drawn into peace enforcement, especially in complex emergencies where prevailing conditions verged on chaos.[23] Instead, it opted for observational and peacebuilding operations in countries with which it had cultural, linguistic and political connections.

Second, Brazil approached international institutions, like the UN, in part because it was also signaling its intention to change its national economy and global strategy. Pro-reform politicians in Brazil, such as Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, wanted to abandon the nationalist–developmentalist and isolationist model that had been followed by the previous dictatorial regime.[24] A more liberal regime, whose trademarks were regional integration and international cooperation, then replaced the old, inward-looking model. In that sense, peacekeeping participation was an attempt to integrate defense policy into the country's new grand strategy. But for Brazil, unlike Argentina, military reform was not the main objective of its signaling strategy. As Thomaz Guedes da Costa argues,

> Brazil's international military presence has not been the subject of internal debate, whether as part of the consideration of foreign policy or in specific discussions of the role of the armed forces. Peacekeeping activities are viewed as part of the international role of the country.[25]

Instead, participation in the UN and in other international forums was part of the country's broader agenda to reform the national economy, not the armed forces. The advent of democracy in itself failed to bring about a dramatic transformation of the Brazilian economy, however. So, liberal Brazilian leaders designed a foreign policy intended to implement a liberal economic regime once and for all by signing international agreements, founding regional institutions and actively participating in existing global forums, such as the UN. Regionally, Brazil was pursuing economic integration with its neighbors, Argentina and Uruguay, via Mercosur.[26] Globally, it was assuming an active role in multilateral affairs, in an effort to project a new international identity via participation in peace operations, the Security Council and the hosting of the 1992 UN Conference on

Environment and Development (also known as the Rio Summit). Scholars such as Etel Solingen have branded this the "internationalist revolution" in South America, in which liberal politicians (such as Collor and later Henrique Cardoso) seized the opportunity to join international forces to address domestic and social agendas.[27] Peace operations were thus part of a much larger Brazilian foreign policy strategy to embrace international forces and heavily engage in international transactions with those who shared the same liberal and democratic norms.

By 1998, Brazilian UN troop contributions had decreased substantially from 1,000 to just a token 49 soldiers. Similar to Argentina, Brazil experienced a financial collapse in 1999, leading to a traumatic devaluation of the national currency and high inflation rates. This made it extremely difficult for President Cardoso, a former Foreign Minister and a staunch supporter of Brazil's peacekeeping engagement, to deploy troops abroad.

Brazil once again deployed troops with the UN in 2004, under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In fact, that year the country substantially increased its role by sending more than 1,200 soldiers to Haiti, a non-Lusophone nation. The decision to deploy Brazilian troops there came in response to a formal request from the US and France to assist with the stabilization of the Caribbean nation in the aftermath of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's controversial ouster as its President.[28] In March of 2004, amidst the political crisis in Haiti, French President Jacques Chirac reportedly asked Lula whether Brazil could assume command of the mission.[29] To some extent, the US and France were trying to persuade local and regional stakeholders to participate in the operation in an attempt to legitimize the overall enterprise. In the absence of Caribbean supporters, they turned to South America. Surprisingly, Lula committed a force of over 1,000 soldiers, which facilitated the creation of MINUSTAH in April 2004.

The force appeared to be relatively small, but it had major symbolic significance. In the space of six years (2004–2010), 5,960 individual Brazilian soldiers participated in MINUSTAH, making it Brazil's largest foreign military commitment since UNEF and World War II.[30] It is further important to note that Brazil was permanently given the general military command of a UN peace operation, initially composed of roughly 7,000 soldiers and 1,600 police, half of whom came from Latin American countries.[31] Moreover, this was the first time that soldiers from the Brazilian armed forces were involved in a mission mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, about which Itamaraty had previously expressed reservations. Finally, President Lula was deploying forces to take over from American and French forces in a Caribbean nation that had few or no linguistic or political linkages to Brazil.[32]

So, why did Brazil make this ambitious commitment? It did so for two main reasons. First, a desire to send signals to the international community, albeit with a different message from those sent in the past. At this

point, the country was no longer engaging in UN peace operations to signal reliability and credibility amidst political adversity. Instead, it used the mission to publicize its commitment to international stability and to demonstrate that it possessed sufficient leadership skills to be considered a so-called "global player" or "emerging power."[33] In other words, participation in UN PKOs is helping a transitioning state to redefine its global identity.

Yet, with a total force of almost 300,000 soldiers—roughly seven times that of Argentina—Brazil could have deployed far more troops than it actually committed.[34] As an overall deployment, the Brazilian presence in Haiti, as of late 2012 (*c.*2,000 troops), is small compared to those of the largest global troop-contributing countries (TCCs). States like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India deploy eight times more soldiers per year than Brazil, while much smaller countries, such as Nepal and Uruguay (see below), supply substantially more than Brazil as well. Indeed, Brazil has never been among the top five UN TCCs; as of late 2012, it sits in fourteenth place.

However, Brazil not only expressed a willingness to commit and sustain troops in Haiti; it also signaled its intention to lead and command the mission and to thus go beyond its linguistic and cultural sphere of influence, and beyond a mere Chapter VI peacebuilding mission. Whereas Argentina was motivated to join the MINUSTAH mission to signal willingness to cooperate with neighbors, Brazil was primarily driven by its own global ambitions. Certainly, the most relevant difference between Cardoso's and Lula's foreign policies lies in the latter's willingness to act in a more assertive and proactive way. Lula diverged from previous democratic administrations in that he used Brazil's military might to accomplish foreign policy objectives in UN PKOs.

Second, domestic imperatives appear to play a supporting role in Brazil's peace operations strategy. In particular, the Lula administration sought to improve interbureaucratic coordination between soldiers and diplomats by forcing both establishments to work jointly in peacekeeping. Decisionmakers have thus come to realize that, if Brazil is to increase recognition of its status as a global player, it needs to synchronize the messages and activities of its various bureaucracies, especially its most visible ministries.

Unlike the country's first phase of participation in peace operations, which involved no discussions about military reforms, its current engagement in Haiti has been the subject of a much broader national debate on the role of the armed forces and the use of national resources. Scholars such as Ivani Vassoler-Froelich saw criticism from all sides of the political spectrum. Members of the intellectual community and the political left perceived Brazil's command of MINUSTAH as legitimizing Washington's military policy in Haiti. Isolationist and nationalist groups saw the mission in Brazil as a diversion of resources that could otherwise be used to

combat poverty and crime at home. Critics also questioned the ability of the armed forces to conduct peace operations effectively, given their inexperience in the field and their limited international exposure.[35]

On the other hand, Lula's supporters view large peacekeeping commitments, of the kind we have witnessed in MINUSTAH, as a valuable opportunity to reform an anachronistic military institution. For instance, Monica Hirst considers Brazil's peace operations strategy as an attempt to gradually expose the armed forces to democracy and globalization. In places like Haiti, the Brazilian military is not merely a tactical supporter of Brazil's foreign policy; it is also largely responsible for the policy's strategic implementation on the international stage, which is expected to force diplomats and soldiers to coordinate policies, and to thereby increase inter-agency collaboration, or "service jointness."[36] Ultimately, this should improve foreign policy cohesion at a time when Brazil is in the international spotlight. It should also help enhance relations between civilians in the Brazilian government and uniformed personnel.

For *The Economist*, peace operations are a means of modernizing the armed forces; with democracy firmly established, it claims, the Brazilian army needs a new job and peace operations can facilitate the process.[37] Citing a Brazilian geopolitics expert, the journal claims that

> peacekeeping encourages the democratization of the military mindset. The old generation is all about war and security. In another generation we'll have a new military, with an international outlook and new ideas about conflict prevention, civilian government and the rule of law.[38]

Uruguay's involvement in peace operations: small country, large contributions

Uruguay has become one of the world's largest troop-contributing nations. The number of blue helmets sent to UN missions has substantially increased from less than 100 observers in 1982 to some 1,000 peacekeepers in 1993 and over 2,500 blue helmets in 2010. In 1982, Uruguay participated in only two PKOs (the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, UNMOGIP, and the Multinational Force Operation in Sinai, MFO) yet, by 2010, it was involved in at least nine different peace operations and today over 24,335 of the country's soldiers have been involved in at least one mission. This fact makes Uruguay the world's largest UN troop contributor per capita. With a population of fewer than four million people, there is one Uruguayan peacekeeper for every 280 citizens. Officially, Uruguay was the eighth-largest UN troop contributor between 1990 and 2010. It is also Latin America's leading supplier of blue helmets. To date, Uruguay sustains three battalions in at least two concurrent missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, deploying

almost three times more soldiers than Argentina and more than the neighboring emerging power, Brazil. In fact, more than 50 percent of Army officers and 34 percent of all non-commissioned officers have some kind of blue-helmet experience. Currently, on any given day, more than 10 percent of Uruguay's total armed forces are deployed in UN PKOs around the world.[39]

Why does this small buffer state in South America supply such a large number of soldiers to UN PKOs? Certainly, the Uruguayan case can be compared to those of Argentina and Brazil, based on important control variables. Like its two big neighbors, Uruguay underwent a democratization process that motivated an internal interest in international affairs (see Guyer in this volume). The three nations are also all members of the same subregion and have experienced similar authoritarian regimes and parallel democratization processes. But the similarities are not as intriguing as the differences. In contrast to the two previous cases analyzed in this chapter, Uruguay has not relied on peace operations as a signaling strategy. Instead, participation in UN peace operations has primarily been used to fund the armed forces and, by extension, to justify their existence in a democratic era.

In order to fully understand Uruguay's involvement in UN peacekeeping efforts in the 1990s, we need to assess the context of its democratization. In fact, this South American country would have never volunteered blue helmets had it not been for two fundamental crises within the armed forces themselves; namely an identity crisis and a budgetary emergency, both of which were caused by the democratization process itself.

Unlike Argentina's transition to democracy, which took place as a result of the collapse of the military in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, and Brazil's transition to democracy, which was negotiated with the military, the redemocratization of Uruguay stemmed from domestic and international pressures that forced the military government to withdraw from direct rule and to hold extrication elections.[40] The circumstances of Uruguay's transition to democracy in 1985 afforded civilians both political leverage and influence. In contrast to Brazil, where the military and their conservative allies partially managed the transition, in Uruguay the democratization process ultimately remained in the hands of civilians.[41] Hence, the democratization process did not provide the military with the degree of autonomy required to proactively assume the role it deemed necessary. Slowly but surely, civilians began to introduce an unprecedented number of initiatives that diminished the role and political influence of the military.

It is in this critical domestic context that participation in UN PKOs provided an opportunity to cope with the existing institutional crisis in the military. The need to reform the military's mission prompted an interest in peace operations, and a small window of opportunity emerged in 1991. That year, Venezuela accepted a UN invitation to join the peace mission in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,

UNTAC) by sending a contingent of approximately 1,000 peacekeepers. The following year, a failed military coup organized by then-Colonel Hugo Chávez impeded Venezuela from deploying its troops to UNTAC.[42] This gave Uruguay the justification to assume Venezuela's role. Hence, in 1992 "Batallón Uruguay I" was deployed, consisting of close to 1,200 men, including Army officers and non-commissioned officers as well as Navy personnel. Uruguayan peacekeepers were positioned across four Cambodian provinces, occupying six border patrol positions.[43]

The government was prompted to join PKOs by economic and military considerations. Military advisors in Uruguay reasoned that UN peace operations were a relatively inexpensive mission that could divert the focus of the armed forces away from domestic politics and budgets to external roles. Peace missions thus provided an ongoing role that was more likely to be funded by some sort of international assistance. Decisionmakers in Uruguay thought that peace operations would also help alleviate budgetary ailments by providing both additional salaries and operational resources. Indeed, the military has strong monetary incentives to join UN efforts, since salaries can be more than tripled during peace operations service.

After UNTAC, Uruguay engaged in other deployments in Africa, including Mozambique, Angola and Congo. In fact, by 2004, the South American state became the leading troop contributor to the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), providing 21.32 percent of all of the mission's military personnel.

The engagement in MONUC indicated a gradual transformation of Uruguay's peace operations trajectory. Whereas in the first phase Uruguay had supplied contingent troops, in the second the country assumed a much more active logistical role, taking over tasks that included not only the massive deployment of troops, but the provision of services for the UN peace operations system. For instance, in MONUC, Uruguay maintains three battalions responsible for air and river transportation. Army engineers have also been responsible for installing water treatment plants that supply drinking water to all UN units in the Congo.[44] As of late 2012, there are six functioning plants in Congo and four in Haiti.[45] Gradually, Uruguay established not only a way of keeping its armed forces busy, but a niche specialty area within UN PKOs that has proven to be quite profitable.

In 2005, Uruguay became the second largest troop contributor to MINUSTAH, second only to Brazil, yet larger than Argentina and Chile.[46] The irony is that Uruguay was not originally included in the core group of South American states involved in MINUSTAH. This group coordinated the political aspects of participation in MINUSTAH and was formalized into the "2×3" (later "2×9"; see Marcondes in this volume) coordination mechanism, which regularly brings together deputy ministers of foreign affairs and defense. The "ABC" group (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) excluded Montevideo, in part because the country believed that it was already overcommitted in the Congo.

MINUSTAH was by no means a Mercosur initiative, although its members converged in Haiti by chance and then cooperated in an ad hoc manner. Chile (not a Mercosur member) was the pioneer state, getting involved in Haiti early on because of its close relationship with Washington. Brazil and Argentina followed suit. Uruguay, the largest South American peacekeeper, was left aside. In fact, it did not join the ABC until late 2005, when its government offered water treatment plants for Haiti, almost two years after MINUSTAH had been approved. Since then, the "ABC" has added a "+U" for Uruguay.[47] The emerging policy convergence and defense coordination amongst South American troop contributors have led scholars to believe that the region has now become an exporter of peace, which in part reflects its own experience with dictatorships and democracy.[48]

But why did Uruguay join MINUSTAH when it was already fully committed in MONUC? There are no public data available on how much money is paid to Uruguay for its peacekeeping services, but it does receive generous UN allowances. In 2010, Montevideo had, on average, close to 2,300 soldiers abroad, participating in several PKOs. This translates into US$2.3 million per month or US$27.6 million a year just in UN allowances. Uruguay's total defense budget for 2010 was US$375 million; peace operations reimbursements thus represent approximately 8 percent of the defense budget.[49] This figure includes neither reimbursements for equipment amortization, nor compensation received for services, such as water treatment, provided to the UN. But, given that at any time 11 percent of the Uruguayan armed forces are abroad,[50] while another 11 percent are training for the next deployment (troops are rotated every six months), it appears that peace operations help maintain at least a quarter of the force and may finance an even greater share.

Uruguay therefore appears to have been more successful, in relative terms, than Argentina and Brazil in identifying potential sources of income from peace operations. Its military can actually make a profit from the activity, since operational and salary costs are cheaper in Uruguay than in neighboring countries. In this sense, peacekeeping has become a true military profession, since its practitioners are being generously paid to perform their duties. This, of course, comes at a cost. The lack of military reform has raised controversy, since Uruguayan soldiers have been accused of serious human rights allegations while on peacekeeping duty. In August 2012, five blue helmets from Uruguay were accused of sexually abusing an 18-year-old teenage boy. An investigation is underway, and it remains to be seen if any punishment will be applied.[51]

Conclusions

The previous sections have provided a number of possible reasons why South American states participate in UN peace operations. The reasons confirm empirically that democratization is an especially potent impetus

for joining UN peace missions. Peace operations have offered South American states the possibility of improving the clarity of their internal and external political signaling, enhancing their capacity for internal military reform, and increasing their defense budgets in times of contraction, all of which are necessary to consolidate democracy.

Certainly, these motivating factors have not been present at all times and in all cases. As previously analyzed, some TCCs, like Uruguay, have been more enticed by the economic incentives of participation, while others, such as Argentina, have joined UN peace operations in order to introduce domestic reforms.

However, this is not to say that a national-level commitment to PKOs will necessarily have the desired effects on military reform, foreign policy or defense budgets. Even if leaders in democratizing states are fully committed to military reform, the effects of peacekeeping participation are likely to be diffused by the equally diverse motivations states pursue in peace operations. This, of course, raises the question of what would happen if a country no longer required peace operations for signaling, domestic reform or economic incentives. Brazil may in fact have reached that point. In 2011, the new Brazilian Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim (formerly Foreign Minister under Lula), announced that his country would pull out of Haiti after more than seven years of MINUSTAH.[52] This may effectively put an end to Brazil's—and perhaps South America's—large peace operations contribution in a democratizing era, at least for now.

Notes

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2 See, for instance, H. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 53, 1967, 425–436; L. Neack, "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, 1995, 181–196; and A. F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy. Middle Powers After the Cold War*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 1–24.

3 E. D. Mansfield and J. C. Pevehouse, "Democratization and International Organizations," *International Organization* 60, 2006, 137–167.

4 G. O'Donnell and P. C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 6.

5 For arguments on international signaling, see K.T. Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," in M. Kahler, ed., *Liberalization and Foreign Policy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 27–65; J. Morrow, "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics," in D. A. Lake and R. Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 77–114.

6 The deployment was part of an operation sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolutions 661, 665, 669 and 670.

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8 D. L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions," *International Peacekeeping* 2, 1995, 330–349.

9 R. Diamint, "Security Communities: Defense Policy Integration and Peace Operations in the Southern Cone, An Argentine Perspective," *International Peacekeeping* 17, 5, 2010, 670.

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13 See E. Llenderrozas, "Argentina, Brasil y Chile en la Reconstrucción de Haití: Intereses y Motivaciones de la Participación Conjunta" ["Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the Reconstruction of Haiti: Interests and Motivations of Joint Participation"], Paper presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 15–16, 2006; L. Micha, "Una Visión Integrada de la Participación Argentina en MINUSTAH" ["An Integrated View of Argentine Participation in MINUSTAH"], *Security and Defense Studies Review* 5, 2005, 109–129. For an analysis of Congressional debates in Argentina regarding peacekeeping deployments, see G. Follietti, "La Participación Argentina en Haití: El Papel del Congreso" ["Argentine Participation in Haiti: the Role of the Congress"], *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* 19, 2005, 37–56.

14 Diamint, "Security Communities," p. 671.

15 Telephone interview with Professor Rut Diamint, former advisor to José Pampuro, Argentine Ministry of Defense, 14 September 2008 (see contribution to this volume).

16 D. Bobrow and M. A. Boyer, "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, 1997, 742.

17 See, for instance, R. U. Sennes, "Intermediate Countries and the Multilateral Arenas: Brazil in the General Assembly and UN Security Council Between 1980–1995," in A. Hurrell, A. F. Cooper, G. G. González, R. U. Sennes and S. Sitaraman, *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States*, Working Paper 224, Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000, p. 91; and S. Miyamoto and W. S. Gonçalves, *Militares, Diplomatas e Política Exterior [Soldiers, Diplomats and Foreign Policy]*, Campinas: UNICAMP, 1991.

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19 J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 169.

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