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A POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CHILE?
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS ON THE LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY
BY
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The Report discusses the likelihood of a political transition from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic format in Chile. After drawing on comparative experiences in Southern Europe and South America, the Report analyzes the political actors and their strategies in either promoting or opposing a transition. It is argued that a transition is not likely due to President Pinochet's commitment to remain in power and the division within the opposition, which remains removed from the population in any case.		

A POLITICAL TRANSITION IN CHILE ?

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS ON THE LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 1

Thomas C. Bruneau

Mary Mooney

Probably the most dramatic political phenomenon in countries of Iberian heritage in recent decades is the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. In the context of the contemporary political histories of most of these countries, and of our understanding of authoritarian regimes, the transitions in Southern Europe, South America, and even the Philippines are remarkable. While the consolidation of the Southern European democracies seems likely, the prospects are rather less optimistic in South America (particularly Bolivia and Peru) and the Philippines. Currently, however, virtually all of these countries have popularly elected civilian governments, and in several cases - Ecuador, Peru, Portugal and Spain - there have been multiple national elections with different parties or coalitions assuming power. A striking absence in this list of transitions is Chile; in South America only Chile and Paraguay remain under authoritarian regimes. As Paraguay has known virtually nothing but dictatorship, with General Stroessner ruling since 1954, there is little surprise. Chile is a different situation. Our purpose here is to analyze the absence of a transition and evaluate prospects for the future.

Despite Chile's long history of democratic government,

General Pinochet remains the supreme ruler today, nearly a decade and a half after the coup of 11 September 1973. Indeed, Pinochet's regime is the longest in Chilean history. While repression has tended to decrease (as would be anticipated given the high level during the first years after the violent coup and exile of activists) the regime remains under his personal and arbitrary control. The Congress remains closed, political parties are still either outlawed or 'in recess', there are no elections at the national or even municipal levels, and the carabineros and army remain ready to put down demonstrations in favor of a return to democracy. Now, however, there are a variety of indications -events, processes, and suggestions- which may finally culminate the alternate waves of hope and despair that characterize the political opposition and much of the population. Some of the more significant of these are as follows.

Important external actors are encouraging a transition. Pope John Paul II visited Chile for six days in early April, 1987. He was the first figure of international stature to visit the country since 1973 and this was the first visit ever by a Pope. Even before arriving he criticized the dictatorship, and in speeches stressed such themes as democracy and participation. These statements in and of themselves were not, and could not have been, expected to lead to anything immediately. However, they provide support for those favoring a transition by a highly regarded international figure whom General Pinochet has not

criticized. The other most important external actor is the United States government. The US, having been involved in the demise of the Allende government, has been distancing itself from the Pinochet regime and encouraging a transition to democracy. Added to the continuing prohibition on military assistance to Chile and other measures imposed by the US Congress, are the statements and actions emanating from the Reagan administration. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliot Abrams has stated that a transition is necessary and Ambassador Barnes has conveyed this message in Chile. Internally, there are also indications of increased activity. The representatives of the Navy, Air Force, and Carbineiros on the Junta have come out in favor of the next president being a civilian and relatively young. Since March of 1987 four committees for free elections have been formed, and public opinion surveys indicate broad support for free elections. The parties of the Left, outlawed and otherwise, have recently formed the Izquierda Unida or "United Left" which replaces the earlier MDF, Popular Democratic Movement. And, reminiscent of the Acuerdo Nacional of 1985, there is again an attempt by a broader group of political parties from the "nationalists" on the right to the socialists on the left to forge a common opposition platform and party, and to oppose Pinochet, the most likely candidate, in the plebiscite. This is in response to a highly pressurized, authoritarian context where there is a generalized expectation that the institutional framework which is currently operative in Chile,

stipulating a plebiscite by September 1989 to certify (or possibly not) the single candidate chosen by the junta as the next president, will be brought forward to September 1988.

Do these activities presage a political transition? It is our evaluation that a transition is currently unlikely, barring an unforeseen major change such as the death of Pinochet or a natural catastrophe. In order to elaborate the analysis behind this conclusion, it is necessary to first review some of the main features of the recent experiences of political transitions. 2

Some of these experiences are less relevant than others. In Argentina, Greece, and Portugal the main, or perhaps catalytic, factor making for a transition was defeat (or expected defeat in the case of Portugal) in war. This could have been relevant if Argentina chose to fight Chile over the Beagle Channel rather than Britain over the Malvinas in 1982. In Uruguay, the defeat of the military government in the 1980 plebiscite, followed by the defeat of their candidates in the party primaries in 1982 set in motion the process of transition. Pinochet, however, won a similar plebiscite the same year as he had the consultation in 1978. In Ecuador and Peru the military governments themselves attempted reforms. When these did not work out the unity of the armed forces, already tenuous, was threatened and the governments popularity among significant classes in society plummeted even further. Consequently, their hold on power diminished substantially. In the Philippines much of the reason for the transition can be found in the absence or weakness of political

organizations, either of the Marcos regime or the opposition. This meant that the anti-Marcos forces were able to focus their campaign without concern for satisfying pre-existing political agendas. While facilitating the transition itself this weakness has made consolidation problematic.

None of these cases are comparable to Chile: there is no defeat in war, Pinochet has been successful in institutionalizing his rule on the basis of the 1980 plebiscite, he has never sought reforms but rather their elimination and has been supported by significant classes, and there is a very high degree of political organization and mobilization. Through the process of elimination, the most similar cases of transition to the situation in Chile are Brazil and Spain. Through a brief review of these roughly comparable cases we may be able to better understand the prospects for Chile.

In Brazil the political transition was begun by President Geisel in 1974, ten years after the coup which brought the military to power. It was initiated from above by a regime which had seen tremendous economic growth, but where the terms of trade were turning against Brazil with the drastic increase in the price of oil in 1973. There is still speculation as to why the transition, which was termed "distensao" or relaxation, was begun. The most convincing arguments center on Geisel's intention to broaden the support of the regime following the period of rapid growth, which did not decrease extremely unequal distribution of income but did see the further elaboration of a

dynamic entrepreneurial elite. This elite increasingly perceived the state apparatus as a hindrance to its economic and political actions. 3 Further, under his predecessor, President Medici, there was extensive use of repression which resulted both in the virtual elimination of threats from the left and alienation of even the middle classes, whose children may have been hit by the increasingly uncontrollable security apparatus. The transition began without pressure 'from below' either from unions or the semi-official opposition party MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement) operating in the largely powerless Congress which remained open virtually throughout the military regime.

Between 1974 and approximately 1982 the main dynamic centered on the regime promoting liberalization (elimination of most censorship, amnesty for political exiles and prisoners, a party reform, etc.) but seeking to control the tempo and content of the transition through intimidation and constitutional engineering, and on the expanding opposition participating but demanding more speed and voice in the overall process. While the focus of the opposition was the MDB, and after the party reform of 1979 the other three or four opposition parties, it also included organizations such as the Catholic Church, Order of Brazilian Lawyers, the 'union opposition', and a myriad of emerging civic associations. 'Civil society' did emerge and played a role in the transition at a late stage. This role was most obvious in the elections for the federal Congress and state assemblies, which were held regularly, if constrained, throughout

the military regime, and in the popular demonstrations for direct elections in 1984. It played only a secondary role, however, and was not the critical factor at any point of the transition. Indeed, the final stage of the transition involved a complex process of negotiation between a small group in the FMDB around the venerated and reliable political figure, Tancredo Neves, and the regime. Neves was able to use the regime's mechanisms, specifically the Electoral College, to bring the FMDB to power, but only after the details were discussed and guarantees made to the military resulting in what must be termed a 'conservative transition'. The military exited direct governing roles and civilian politicians came to the fore.

Since early 1985, when Jose Sarney replaced the deceased Neves as President, there have been recurring waves of political mobilization due to the serious economic situation, as well as elections in November 1985 for mayors and November 1986 for the Constituent Assembly, Congress, state assemblies, and governors, and some focus on the Constituent Assembly itself. So far, however, despite all of this activity the Brazilian transition remains conservative, negotiated at the elite level, and with little involvement of or impact from the general population. While there is indeed significant popular mobilization, promoted by the Catholic Church, unions, the PT or Workers' Party, and civic associations, there is limited contact between them and the centers of political power.

In Spain as well the political transition was initiated from

above and controlled by the regime through the most critical period which extended from Franco's death in November 1975 until the first general elections and local elections were held under the new Constitution in March and April 1979. 4 On the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos was sworn in as prescribed under Franco's law. When Premier Carlos Arias, a former premier under Franco, was unable to gain acceptance of his proposals for limited democracy, he was dismissed by the King in July 1976 and replaced by Adolfo Suarez who initiated the many elements of the political transition. Significantly, he used the instruments of the old regime - the Cortes, National Council of the Movement and the Council of the Realm - to transform the very nature of the regime. Once initiated, the splintered and weak political opposition began to come together, as in the Coordinacion Democratica in 1976, but it remained weak. For example, despite the campaign for mass abstention waged by most of the opposition (and the campaign for a negative vote waged by the most conservative forces of the old regime) more than 70% of the electorate backed the Reform Law in a referendum. This Law was passed by the Francoist Cortes, on the initiative of the Suarez government, which dissolved the Assembly and formally opened the way for general elections. In short, the Cortes, which had been appointed during the Franco regime, voted for its own elimination.

As in Brazil, the regime gradually opened political space, or liberalized, by legalizing political parties (February to

April 1977) and decreeing amnesty (in March and October 1977). The first general election of the Parliament, in June 1977, selected the Congress of Deputies and a Senate, and had as its main function the drafting of a constitution. During its work in late 1977 and throughout 1978 the defining characteristic of this process was undoubtedly the consensus which the party leaders promoted by compromise, demobilization of the bases, and elite understandings. In what has been termed "the politics of consensus" the constitution was framed, which was approved in referendum in December 1978, but two of the main actors, the UCD and PCE came apart in the process due to their neglect of the links with their bases. 5 Since 1979 the democratic regime has been consolidated and power has shifted from the UCD to the PSOE, elected in 1982 and reelected in 1986.

In the early, and probably most important stages of the Spanish transition, from 1976 through 1979, and continuing in the Brazil transition until the present, we see a process whereby an old regime transforms itself, through its own legal mechanisms which of course are not static. In Spain this was through the Leyes Fundamentales and in Brazil through the Constitution of 1967, as (frequently) amended. In neither case did the old regime break down due to some external fiasco, such as defeat in war, or pressure from 'civil society' or the political opposition. Rather, the initiative was on the part of the regime which then allowed space for a political opposition to participate and help define the form and content of a new regime. It must be

stressed, then, that there was willingness on the part of the regime leaders to liberalize, if not to democratize, and political mobilization was limited. Not only were the established political institutions, the Cortez in Spain and the Electoral College in Brazil, utilized for key aspects of the transition, but there was substantial attention to formal legality. We will see in Chile that there is no willingness by President Pinochet to begin a process of liberalization. There are other important sectors which are seeking to initiate a transition. Due to the fragmented nature of these sectors, however, and fundamental differences regarding not only strategy but also the nature of the Chile they envision, they are unable to offer a viable alternative to Pinochet.

President Pinochet

In identifying the key actors in Chilean politics, the first and foremost is Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, President of the Republic, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Commander of the Army. What sets him apart from other actors to be dealt with here is his almost singular belief that he is the ideal government candidate for the upcoming plebiscite. For Pinochet, the plebiscite is seen merely as another national consultation, the third, that will provide Chileans with an opportunity to express their approval or disapproval of the regime's 15-year record. What he expects, of course, is what was expected in 1980: that he will remain in power for another eight years to

fully implement a new "protected" democracy according to the Constitution. This would be a total of sixteen years as constitutional president, in addition to the previous seven as the predominant member of the Junta. If he loses the plebiscite, he will still serve as president for an additional year, at which time there will be free, competitive elections.

With the date of the plebiscite expected to be announced for September 1988 rather than in 1989, it is not surprising that there is evidence suggesting that his campaign is in full swing. To this end, and having successfully weathered the visit by the Pope in April, 1987, he has made important changes in his cabinet. In contrast to the Pope's message of reconciliation, the changes have not only given hardliners a more prominent role but also provided Pinochet with an efficient team for pleasing regime supporters and ensuring a successful outcome. The most important of the new figures in the "campaign cabinet" is actually an old one. Sergio Fernandez, returning to his former post as Minister of the Interior.

Fernandez is considered the very essence of loyalty (and manageability) to Pinochet, as well as the spearhead behind both the successful consultation of 1978 and the constitutional plebiscite of 1980, and intimately knowledgeable on matters dealing with the Constitution and its implementation. Most Chileans remember him as the most "military" of the civilian ministers, a reputation that comes from his tough response to dissent as well as from the official coverup of the Letelier-

Moffitt assassination in September 1976. However, as the director of one of the opposition bi-weeklies suggests, this reputation may be his greatest asset at the moment - since no one expects any great advances for the opposition under Fernandez, anything he does offer will put the regime, and thus Pinochet, in more favorable light than would otherwise be the case. 6 In fact, in one of his first statements as minister, Fernandez said that contrary to his hardliner image, he would be willing to meet with the political parties that conform to the constitutional criteria, that he sees the possibility of the Catholic Church playing an intermediary role in the transition process, and is concerned about the situation of the remaining exiles.

His appointment is understood as a clear message that, barring an extremely heavy registration turnout, the government has no intention of modifying its constitutional agenda. With regard to the political parties, one of his moves probably will be to make it easier for the small right-wing parties to register by reducing the requisite number of signatures. Currently, 14 political entities have applied for full recognition, almost all of them supportive of the regime, and not one has been able to secure the 32,000 signatures necessary to complete the second stage of the process. 7 Again it is likely that he will try to consolidate the support of Renovacion Nacional which is the most significant party supporting the regime, and neutralize the largest and still most widely-recognized and supported party, the Christian Democrats (PDC). The regime's ongoing strategy of

Keeping the opposition divided with offers of some recognition is working. The government sees the FDC as more amenable now to further offers given the election of conservative Patricio Alwyn as party president and the party's refusal to publicly ally itself with the latest leftist front, Izquierda Unida.

Another notable change in the cabinet was the exit of Javier Cuadros as Secretary General of the Government. Though seemingly popular with Pinochet, his extremely confrontational style with all of the opposition, including the Church and FDC, was becoming counterproductive for the presidential candidate. The key figures remaining are the "Chicago Boys" Sergio Melnick at ODEPLAN (Oficina de Planificacion Nacional which, incidentally has its plans already drawn up for 1987-1997, specifically directed toward the continuation of the regime), Hernan Buchi as Minister of Finance, and Juan Antonio Guzman in Education.

Overall, the changes strengthen Pinochet's personal position within the government and the ultraliberal economic policies followed particularly since 1984. This gives Pinochet more leverage for the kind of approach to the opposition that he is best at controlling - that of a more acrimonious confrontation. The discovery of rockets aimed at the government palace and the "confrontations" between government troops and members of the extreme left in June 1987 enhance his oft expressed warning that the only possible alternative to his continuation as President is that of chaos of the 1970-1973 era: where political parties, because of their self-interest and inconsistency created a

political vacuum that brought the country to the brink of disaster. 8

Pinochet has not been restrained in his own attacks on the parties. He has spoken vehemently against the people trusting "democrats, with cristian surnames, that hand things over to communism" as well as "renewed" socialists who try to "change their position with democratic phraseology which looks like moderation, that seeks to create an image of another socialism... with the intention of fooling the people". He justifies his own role as "coming from above ... God put me here - it is Providence, destiny ...". 9 By all indications, this attitude is becoming only slightly more conciliatory as in his September 11 speech celebrating fourteen years of the regime, he distinguished politicians who are willing to follow the road of understanding as opposed to the Izquierda Unida (mentioned by name) for whom he has nothing but the "mano dura". 10

Pinochet has also projected himself by extensive public appearances throughout the country, particularly in connection with the government's campaign to supply a record number of housing units, primarily to lower income families. The ceremonies for handing over the keys to the new homeowners are elaborate, attended not only by the mayor and other local officials, but by the Minister of Housing and often by the President himself. This receives extensive coverage on the television news programs. The public see a grandfatherly Pinochet, without dark glasses, handing over the keys to dozens

of working class Chilean families.

The presence of the mayors at these ceremonies is part of what is known as the National Plan of Civic Action (FNAC) by which Pinochet is involving the mayors throughout the country in his re-election process. Alberto Cardemil, subsecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, denied that the mayors (who are appointed by the minister) are overstepping their administrative role in aiding the government's "legitimate desire for re-election". But it seems clear that, with the line of command directly to the President via the governor and intendent, they have little choice but to commit their resources and their authority toward this goal. One of the clearest indications of this has been in the elimination of more than 8,000 teaching positions by late 1987. Those selected for dismissal frequently have been precisely those teachers who have been politicallaly active. 11 It is likely that, despite complaints from the opposition, the mayors will continue to follow this broad and aggressive interpretaton of their powers.

This highlights another instrument to enhance the likelihood of success in the plebiscite, that of controlled access to the use of television. Theoretically, legally constituted parties (of which there are none at the moment) will have ample access to airtime. The cost, however, is prohibitive: 18-21 million pesos (approximately \$90,000) for a 6-minute spot aired four times a month. This makes it virtually impossible for any party to use this key medium.

Finally, there is the manner in which the registration process itself is being handled. It is necessary as electoral lists were destroyed after the coup. In the constitutional plebiscite of 1980, registration was not required, helping to quickly push through the document with little scrutiny by the public. The electoral population is approximately 8,400,000 Chileans (45% of whom are new voters) but at the current rate of inscription (until October 1987), only five million will have registered by June 1988 which would be the cutoff date for a September 1988 vote.

The process is being done manually rather than by readily available computer processes, registration stations are only open for three hours a day, and each voter must obtain a new identity card which costs the equivalent of a day's wages for labourers. To these factors are added: a high level of public skepticism that the plebiscite will be fair or that anything will change; and the fact that military personnel have already been registered and as "public employees", a move to confuse political analysis after the vote. Pressure is also being put on other employees in public offices to register, with strong implications concerning which way to vote. One sees then the benefits to the government candidate of the registration campaign.

Pinochet, of course, is not without support among the population. The basic fact that he survived the disastrous effects of his economic policies in the early eighties attests not only to his ability to adapt quickly but to his support

among sectors. Various apparently credible opinion polls show that he can command between 13 and 20% of the vote. In terms of supportive organized entities, the most numerous is probably CEMA-Chile, headed by his wife, which is an organization of women's clubs (centros de madres) which has over 10,000 local and very active groups throughout the country. 12

In terms of political parties, the Avanzada Nacional has expressed its strong, unconditional support to Pinochet as the most appropriate candidate. Many mayors and members of the Armed Forces are sympathetic (if not outright members) and others are former members of the extreme right-wing group known as Patria y Libertad. 13 The party defines itself as a faithful follower of the National Security Doctrine and has also been adamant in calling for the application of Article 8 of the Constitution which proscribes any individual or party from the "distribution and propagation of any doctrine that undermines the family, advocates violence, class struggle or a totalitarian concept of the state and the law." It in effect legalizes the exclusion of the political left and has been used to justify violence against them.

However, Pinochet is facing more opposition today than he ever has and it is coming from several sectors. It can be analyzed according to various criteria but the basic and the most important is that which separates those who wish to see a continuation of the regime with little or no change other than that of Pinochet himself, from those who desire more fundamental

changes in regime structure and policy. Within the latter group, or rather conglomeration of groups, a further and very significant division exists between those who want the transition process limited to political negotiation, i.e. elite politics, and those who believe that the only legitimate and effective transition will take place with the broader participation of the grass-roots, in other words, social mobilization as well.

The Junta and the Armed Forces

The closest to Pinochet among those who wish to see him withdraw from the political scene while maintaining the system intact, are the other members of the Junta, of which he is the president. First to come out publicly and clearly state his position was Admiral Jose Merino. Just weeks after the Pope's visit, he stated that the most appropriate government candidate would be a civilian, preferably younger (@ 52) and clearly one who upholds the values of the regime and nation. Soon afterwards, General Fernando Matthei of the Air Force concurred with Merino's opinion and reconfirmed his position that the Air Force would retire from government in 1989. Finally, the head of the Carabineros (el Orden), General General Rodolfo Stange added his endorsement after returning from a personal trip to Germany where he had met informally with Matthei. If there is no consensus within the Junta, for the choice of candidate must be unanimous, the decision on a government candidate rests with the National Security Council 14 where Pinochet may stand a better

chance given that he appoints most of the members of that body. It has been suggested that Pinochet retire first and run as a civilian. As president he would then assume the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Within the Chilean Armed Forces Pinochet still enjoys considerable support although the situation is becoming more complex. The results of several public opinion polls carried out within the last year have not been lost on the military brass. For example, one such survey, done by SUR and published in El Mercurio, indicates that only 18% would prefer a government like that of the present one, even with reforms, for the future. This, of course, brings into question the role of the military itself.

The Armed Forces have been a very significant part of the regime, even more so than was the case in the Brazilian or Argentinian military governments. Overall, the ratio of soldiers per 1000 population has been significantly greater, and increasing, in Chile at 9.0 in 1974 to 10.4 in 1984 compared to only 5.9 and 5.8 respectively in Argentina, for instance. 15 The Army under Pinochet quickly became the dominant actor after the coup and has remained so since. 16 For example, of the 56 military members of the cabinet during the past fourteen years (of a total of 118 ministers), 23 have been Army, 12 Navy, 12 Air Force and 9 Police. At the level of subsecretaries, the Army has supplied 25.4 % while the Navy in comparison, only 4.5 %. CORFO, the national development corporation has almost always been under

the direction of an Army general, while within the enterprises under its control, the total military involvement at the level of directorship has been 54: 39 Army, 8 Navy, 3 Air Force, and 4 Police.

The overall result has been the verticalization of the state apparatus and power, particularly under the Army and Pinochet himself. This is even more visible in the prevalent use of high command active duty Army personnel as regional intendents (11 of the 13, while 1 is Navy and 1 Air Force); and in the role of governor. This latter combines civil authority and troop command in one person. And in this role in 1986, 28 of the 50 governors were Army officers, 2 Navy 2 Police and none from the Air Force. This has greater significance when it is seen that since 1973, when the Army and the Police had approximately the same number of men in uniform, today the Army has increased by 21,000 while the police are down 2,000.

The involvement of the military, and especially the Army, does not end there. In addition to the rectorships of several key universities over the years, diplomatic posts have often been Pinochet's gifts to loyal "uniformados". Between 1973 and 1986, Chilean representatives in other nations and in international organizations have been military in 47.5% of the appointments and of these, 48.7% have been Army. In terms of other benefits, military personnel live in special neighbourhoods with their own hospitals, etc. and they receive good pensions. Only 2.6% of retired uniformed personnel receive pensions classified in the

lowest percentile compared to 71.3% of the civilian population, while 8% of civilians are in the highest category, 25% of the military are found there. Significant as well, is the increase in the number of generals in the Army from 19 in 1966 to 57 in 1987. Pinochet is not reticent to retire less than supportive generals and replace them with younger men who have received their higher commands under him and are more imbued with the tenets of the National Security Doctrine that constitutes the basic philosophy of the regime.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that even the Army is a monolith in terms of its attitudes toward the succession. The fact that approximately a dozen generals are being replaced or retiring early attests this. Part of the question likely involves the desire to recuperate full professional status and prestige for the Armed Forces. There is a feeling that the Armed Forces would be taking a great risk in losing the plebiscite if indeed Pinochet is the government candidate. This would not bode well for them in terms of an eventual return to the barracks without retribution for their role in the regime. General Gordon is probably a good example of this: his loyalty to the regime is unquestionable, as is that of his support for Pinochet should he decide to run as a civilian. But he has made clear that he believes the military must exit government by 1989 to preserve their institutional integrity.

The United States

This is very close to the position of the United States

government. As part of his final visit to Chile, General John Galvin, Commander-in-Chief of SOUTHCOM, met with several high level military officials (many of whom were reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with the military's role in the burning of the two youths last year) and said he felt they were supportive of a return to democratic government. 17 The continuation of Pinochet is now seen as one of the key obstacles to what is most fundamental to US interests - stability. Last year, Elliot Abrams stated that "Chile is ...approaching a crucial turning point...It could go either way, toward democracy or ...toward the chaos that would accompany a government whose legitimacy is broadly questioned at home and abroad" 18. The US feels that the Chilean military has a key role to play in promoting stability in the Southern Cone, and that Pinochet will have to go. A more legitimate government and more professional role for the Armed Forces would allow closer relations and exchanges between the two militaries which are now extremely limited. 19

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Robert Gelbard, reinforced the view noting that "It is clear that the climate for investment in Chile is subject to growing uncertainty given that the plebiscite is approaching" and Pinochet is still posturing to be the government candidate. 20 This does not deny that there have been some positive developments in the US frame of reference, such as the attempts by the centre and centre-left parties to minimize their

association with the Communist Party (PC). This is most evident in their almost unanimous call for registration in the electoral lists as opposed to the early PC refusal to do so. Again, in the election of the new national directorate of the Christian Democratic Party the victory of the conservative slate under Patricio Aylwin, although by a relatively small margin, reinforces the move of that party away from supporting social mobilization as a strategy against the government. This is reassuring to the State Department since any strategy that involves street demonstrations, strikes, work stoppages and so on only opens up the possibility of further participation by the marxist left.

US government statements discredit Pinochet personally. For example, as a result of the re-opening of the Letelier-Moffitt case in Washington early in 1987, evidence pointing to the direct involvement of Pinochet in the authorization of the murders has received a great deal of press in Chile. Further, in the US calling for the expulsion of two high-ranking military officers from Chile rather than issuing an extradition order (i.e. the political rather than judicial route) it has forced Pinochet to issue a public refusal and set himself up for greater criticism within Chile.

While Pinochet began to undergo the pressure of the Junta members declaring in favor of a civilian, Ambassador Barnes publicly criticized the "glacial" pace of the investigation into the burning of the two youths, as well as the promotion while the

investigation was still going on, of the officer accused of responsibility in the incident. 21 Finally, the US has refused to grant a visa to Pablo Rodriguez, a former leader of "Patria y Libertad", which is a source of Pinochet's support. The combination of these factors has produced for Pinochet a complex and somewhat difficult situation for perpetuating his personal rule.

Parties of the Right

Given the high degree of political party identification in Chile, one would expect to find political parties that are supportive of this option as well, i.e. a conservative transition wherein the rider is changed but not the horse. As we have seen, Avanzada Nacional occupies the space on the extreme right in full support of Pinochet continuing. However, there is not a strong democratic right, i.e. one favoring a political transition. The traditional right in general, though still loyal to the regime, has little influence. There is a desire to see Pinochet leave but this is countered by an even stronger fear of social conflict and economic instability if greater social mobilization becomes part of the plebiscite process. And because of its relative isolation from the regime, the right does not seem to have a viable mediating role to play with the rest of the opposition.

There have been numerous efforts to remedy this predicament. The most notable attempt to re-unite and thereby strengthen the right has been via its less democratic elements, in the formation of the Renovacion Nacional party (RN) comprised of UDI

(Union Democratica Independiente), MUN (Movimiento de Accion Nacional) and Onorfo Jarpa's FDT (Frente de Trabajadores), with the express purpose of providing an "heir" to the present regime. Because Sergio Fernandez was one of the founders of UDI (though not currently a member), it is expected that this party will be able to establish closer ties to government in the near future. The RN's very active policy favoring the firm application of Article 8 and in strongly supporting the continuation of the current economic and political policies makes it very amenable to other regime supporters - the Junta, large entrepreneurs, and the military. The RN does not see Pinochet as essential. At the very least, it feels that he should separate the functions of the presidency and the Armed Forces in order to preserve the integrity of the latter.

Renovacion Nacional, however, has to resolve some basic internal differences before it can offer a viable role in any transition. The MUN and FNT favor free elections as the best way to extradite the Armed Forces from their involvement in the government, while UDI members support the plebiscite as a more secure method of preventing greater polarization that would encourage mobilization of the left. UDI was also the only one of the three which refused to sign the Acuerdo Nacional of 1985, and sees even the FDC as too "socialist". It is therefore in the unenviable position of being neither really of the government nor establishing significant ties to the rest of opposition. 22

The other major member of the political right is the

Partido Nacional which identifies itself as more independent of the government and its authoritarian policies. It sees the current government as Pinochet's personal system and certainly not representative of the legitimate right in the country. It signed the Acuerdo Nacional in 1985 and is more flexible than RN in its range of acceptable political allies which extend as far as the Izquierda Cristiana, breakoff from the FDC. Its president, Patricio Philips states that excluding the left will only bring civil violence. The party clearly favors free elections or, failing that, negotiations between the Armed Forces and the democratic political parties to select a consensus candidate for the plebiscite. Though clearly against Pinochet prolonging his stay, the FN feels that he would be the lesser of two evils if the opposition cannot produce a viable alternative.

To change the regime

Perhaps the most important change that has occurred within the opposition is the more definite articulation of a sector that, in contrast to the above - other members of the Junta, sectors of the military, US government, and the few small parties of the right - supports not only a change of the rider but also of the horse, i.e. the regime itself and many of the policies it espouses. It must be remembered that the fourteen years plus since the coup have seen the creation of a new regime, an economic system in many ways radically different from that of pre-1973, and an increasingly fragmented society with a clear tendency towards polarization.

Within this sector there are several distinctions. The most important is between, on the one hand, those who feel that political mobilization, focused in the campaign for free elections, is sufficient and indeed the only road to follow in order to expect any kind of negotiations with the Armed Forces re their exit; and, on the other, those who are convinced that no significant change will take place without a combination of both political and social mobilization, with a high level of involvement of the masses.

The Center

Exemplifying the first position are the Christian Democrats, at least as far as the new national directorate is representative of the party. The FDC is still, after a 14-year hiatus of legal political activity, the most readily identified and most popular political party, even among the youth. 23 In the first contested election for its president in several years, Patricio Alwyn received about 60 % of the vote, reflecting internal differences the effects of which remain to be seen. According to Genaro Arriagada, there was a last-ditch effort by some members to come up with a consensus candidate but they were not successful. This would not only have minimized divisions within the party itself but also avoided a lot of public animosity based on the FDC's perceived lack of concern for opposition unity in general. 24

Under Alwyn, the emphasis is on the campaign to register voters for what is hoped will be a multiple candidate election

instead of a plebiscite, though this would necessitate constitutional revision. Also, despite significant internal opposition, particularly from the youth wing of the party, the directorate has decided to go ahead and seek legal recognition as a party. Other parties feel this is a dangerous step. Of all parties, the FDC is probably the only one that has the possibility of meeting the heavy requirements and thus give credibility to a system that they want extensively revised. Juan Hamilton, a national advisor of the FDC, said in response that it is only a pragmatic move to take advantage of all available political space. 25 In terms of political alliances, it sees possibilities at the moment for agreements with parties that extend from the FN to the PS-Nunez socialist faction. The FDC has not given much support to the sporadic efforts by other social groups regarding national strikes and mass demonstrations, and cannot be expected to change this under Alwyn.

Many members of the FDC, however, are working at other important levels one of which is that of gremios and unions. Although the number of gremios is not great, they take on more significance given the fact that for many years they were controlled by government appointed directors, and there are no other areas of public life where elections take place. Thus they not only reflect current opinions among professional and worker groups, but also help to focus the efforts of the opposition where political parties are still restricted. 26 In 1987 examples of this kind of political mobilization have

consistently seen the opposition lists come out on top. Two of the most significant associations have been the colleges of lawyers and teachers.

Between 1974 and 1981 the executive of the college of lawyers was appointed by the government, and in the first elections in 1981, the right wing slate won a significant victory. In early 1987 the combined slate of PDC and independents won over 60% with second place (30%) going to the centre-right. The Renovation Nacional slate received just 9 percent. 27 Before the election of the national directorate of teachers took place, many observers saw it as an important indicator of the national mood because of the number of voters involved (65,000) and the country-wide extent of the constituency. It was significant then that the slate under Osvaldo Verdugo, the PDC and centrist candidate, won 47% and has since allied with the third place socialist group which tallied 22%. Some, however, have pointed to the 30% won by the government candidates as the most significant outcome of the vote. It attests to the ability of the government either to convince or intimidate even a fairly sophisticated sector of the electorate which has been a favorite target of the government.

The most recent gremial development has been the concerted effort by the professors, with full support of the students via strikes, of the University of Chile, to limit the intervention of the government in university life. The universities have been particularly hard hit since 1981 when the policy of self-

financing came into effect. Not only have students been forced to withdraw because of lack of financial support but the number of teaching hours have been reduced and the general level of resources is inadequate. Students have held a number of strikes over funding but the broader issue came to a head when Jose Luis Federici, a person considered academically unqualified and ruthless regarding budget cuts, was appointed to take over from general Ricardo Soto who was sacked by Pinochet for his sympathetic consideration of student and faculty demands. After the professors continued to recognize the deans who were democratically elected who, in turn, were refusing en masse to submit to Federici's demands for resignations, the new rector closed the university. The closing was not respected by students, staff or faculty, and has become a rallying point for most of the opposition. The continuing student demonstrations, where all political colors from the RN to the left for the first time are on the same side in disciplined protest, have made the university ungovernable. While Federici refers to the students as "terrorists" and Pinochet attempted to forcefully control the situation, the professors, deans and the university community have received broad support. This was a battle that Pinochet was anxious to win since he wants neither to be plagued by student unrest during the campaign nor a precedent set that would upset the economic plans already in place that limit social spending. 28 By December, however, Pinochet gave into the pressure and removed Federici.

Regarding the situation of unions, it has improved since 1983 in terms of freedom to hold meetings, elections and in numbers: from a total of 500 recognized unions in 1983, the number has jumped to 4,200 in 1987. Their capacity to focus political opposition, however, is severely limited by the fact that in 1986 this encompassed only 12% of the workforce, making it very difficult to claim to represent all the workers and successfully call for mass demonstrations. Still it is important that 80% of the unionized workers are members of the CNT (Comando Nacional de Trabajadores) which made an effort to consolidate its convocatory role with other groups in the Acuerdo Nacional. Its latest independent effort at a national strike on October 7 of 1987, the first since 1985, was not successful enough to initiate a new wave of popular mobilization. It may again have greater impact in co-ordination with other groups but thus far, for example, it has been ambivalent in its support for the campaign for free elections.

Committees for Free Elections

The newest important specifically "political" entities on the scene are the various committees for free elections. They attempt to counter the skepticism regarding the plebiscite process itself and the distrust of politicians in general, to encourage people to register and become eligible to vote against the government. After a slow start in March, the momentum is picking up as more political and social groups publicly support the effort. The fact that there are four of these committees,

however, reflects both the continuing high sense of party identification in Chile and the inability of the opposition to unify its efforts in confronting the regime.

The first to appear was the Committee for Free Elections (CEL) under the leadership of Sergio Molina and consisting of 15 nationally respected political personalities. In June, two others were formed: the Committee of Political Parties for Free Elections (COPPEL), a committee of the political parties of the Alianza Democratica on the initiative of the FDC and Gabriel Valdes; and the Committee of the Left for Free Elections (CIEL), largely of the MDF parties with Ricardo Lagos of PS-Nunez as the chairman. One of the additional aims of CIEL is to pressure the centre and right parties to fight for the inclusion of the left in the electoral process. COPPEL may be dissolving as a separate entity in order to greater focus the centre-right under Molina as the FDC wishes to concentrate its efforts on this issue. The latest to appear is the Command for Popular Demands and Free and Democratic Elections (CDF). It is made up of leftist parties and includes the PC and strongly advocates social mobilization as a necessary instrument of the political effort. One of the aims of the committees has been to create groups that will spur on the population at the local level. Members of the various committees in Concepcion held a "symbolic vote" September 4-6, the traditional day of Chilean elections, specifically asking voters to express their preference for a plebiscite or free elections. With a very high level of electoral participation, (i.e almost

45,000) 94% cast their vote in favor of elections. The effort received the support of the local archbishop, the unions, the slum neighborhoods, and the local IU group, though it did not participate, acknowledged its importance. All this was done without interference of the military intendent, and because of its success in avoiding violence, it is likely that similar events will be held in other cities. 29

The Church

In contrast to the CELs, the last actor seeking a controlled transition has been around a long time, i.e. the Catholic Church as represented by the hierarchy. It is worthwhile giving some attention to the Church since according to a number of polls, priest and bishops (along with teachers) are the most trusted leaders in the country, politicians being among the lowest. 30 In addition to supplying legal, medical and material support to victims of the regime, protective environment for union and academic activities etc., it has spoken out strongly on exile and other major issues. Regarding the potentially co-optive visit of the Pope, the bishops succeeded in maintaining control of the visit, not bending to government pressure to change the itinerary more to Pinochet's liking. Even Cardinal Fresno, who is politically less astute in comparison to his predecessor was successful in bringing together much of the opposition in the Acuerdo Nacional of 1985. It was the best effort yet in presenting a united front to the regime. Many political analysts in Chile feel that the Church has

acquired much moral power among the population in general from its social role during the regime and that it thus has a great potential to play a unifying role.

With Pinochet's refusal to even consider the Acuerdo Nacional, however, Fresno has withdrawn from the political arena, the result being a vacuum of leadership in Santiago and an apparent paralysis of the Episcopate as a whole. Following the government's swift and brutal response to the assassination attempt on Pinochet in September 1986, the bishops issued a weak statement asking the government to be "moderate" in its application of the state of seige. Similarly Fresno went ahead with the celebration of an annual mass that is always attended by military officials despite protests from many in the Church that the repression by the government, including summary executions, should be strongly condemned. In contrast to the bishops, for instance, the representatives of the laity meeting in their annual conference in August (i.e. even before the assassination attempt) had already issued a strong letter against the abuses of the regime, stating that in no way could the government consider itself either Christian or legitimate. 31 Again, seemingly unaware of the impact of his actions, Cardinal Fresno was prominently featured on television at La Moneda shortly after the Pope's visit receiving an honor from Pinochet. Shortly afterward, he flew to the Antarctic, as representative of the Pope, in the company of two members of the Junta, Generals Matthei and Gordon. These actions seemed more jarring, perhaps,

since they followed the rapid dismissal of the Vicar of Youth, F. Andres Peretiatkowicz immediately following the pope's visit because the youth representatives spoke very frankly in the National Stadium. These compromising actions give rise to the feeling, on the part of the grass-roots church at least, that the hierarchy for the most part has become an obstacle rather than a support in defending themselves against the effects of the regime.

In contrast, a group of seven progressive bishops (with the support of another six) met separately in Chillan outside Santiago in October of 1986 and drafted a letter to the whole Episcopate calling on their colleagues to speak more clearly against the abuses of the regime and not to abdicate their leadership role through ambiguity. They warned that doing so only created paralysis within the Church and undermined the faith of the people in the ability of the Church to represent them. This they felt was leading to the development of alternate authority among the adults while driving the youth toward groups that promote violence. 32

The Chillan meeting made public the split that had been developing for some time among the bishops. This results in part from the latest episcopal appointments, particularly the last two in Santiago, Mons. Moreno and Medina, who are known to be sympathetic to the regime. This leaves Mons. Hourton alone in that Archdiocese as a critic of the government, and he has taken a leave of absence of several months.

The most controversial figure in the Church at present is not a member of the Chilean hierarchy but the Papal Nuncio, Angelo Sodano who, in addition to his role in the selection of new bishops (including the nomination of Fresno as prelate of Santiago) has taken on many tasks not usually assumed by a papal representative. Since his appointment in 1978, he has attended most of the meetings of the Episcopal Conference, interfered in the jurisdiction of at least two different zones of Santiago regarding their pastoral orientation, and took a very active role in the planning of the Pope's visit. He made an attempt to censor the speeches to be given to the Pope by the representatives of the poor so as not to create problems with the government. As it turned out, they were not successful and for the first time, clear criticism of the regime was broadcast on national television.

The bishops have not fully utilized the opportunity presented by the visit of Pope John Paul II. Although he did not come out and condemn the regime while in the country, the Pope did clearly support efforts toward full participation and the need for justice and respect for human rights. At Parque O'Higgins, for example, he urged all to work "toward the common good and to develop all that assures conditions of justice, peace and reconciliation ..." and that entails the "rejection of violence and terrorism, wherever it comes from". And quoting from 'Gaudium et Spes' he urged that Chileans "build politico-juridical structures that offer to all citizens without

discrimination real possibilities for actively and freely taking part in the ...election of those who govern them." 33

He had a tremendous impact on a personal level for many, calling them out of their cynicism and lack of hope and providing the first opportunity in fourteen years for Chileans to gather in massive numbers in the streets without retaliation from the police. He also made an extremely important move in meeting with the representatives of all political parties, including the PC, thereby supporting the legitimacy of all to participate in the process toward democracy.

In the first session of the Permanent Committee of the Episcopal Conference following the visit, however the bishops were so divided on how to address the situation that they ended up putting out a fairly weak statement. This is not to say that the bishops have totally abdicated an intermediary role, only that it will not be as concerted as in the past. For example, a month after the plenary session, the permanent executive issued a long-awaited statement regarding the plebiscite. The bishops added their collective weight to the efforts of the CELs, directly calling on all Catholics to register and to vote when the time came. Several bishops, including Fresno, individually called for the same. The call to vote however, may prove more problematic since the bishops did not pronounce on free elections per se. Many members of the basic Christian communities in Santiago and some of the workers see this as legitimizing the Constitution, and even several bishops have said voting depends

on what the process involves. In their meeting in August they asked the government to meet with the various political "currents" to modify the Constitution particularly Articles 8 and 24, and noted that for the process (be it elections or plebiscite) to be legitimate, a large percentage of the electorate must be registered and all sectors of opinion must have access to the mass media, including television. If the hierarchy could unify its position and become more forceful in its support for free elections, then the possibility of the opposition defeating the official candidate in the plebiscite are greatly enhanced.

Change_via_Mobilization

The next sector of the political scene struggles not only for a change of regime but also demands that the process include all segments of the political spectrum with emphasis on social mobilization. This inclusion and mobilization would, they argue, ensure the Armed Forces' exit from direct political control and significant change in the social and economic priorities set by a new democratic government.

Probably the most important actors in this sector are the Socialist and Communist Parties. Both have had a significant place in Chilean politics, going back fifty and sixty-five years respectively, and the Communist Party being the largest in Latin America outside Cuba. Together, of course, they formed the basis of Allende's Unidad Popular government, the last democratic experience for Chileans. However, the predicament of this sector

now is one of sectarianism and confusion - division within the socialist camp regarding its identity and a fundamental shift in tactics by the PC.

The leadership of both groups was decimated by death, disappearances and exile, and from within by the doubts, recriminations and self-criticism that followed the coup that no one anticipated, at least in the severity in which it was carried out. In 1979 the socialist party underwent a serious fragmentation into several small parties based on different ideas for bringing an end to the dictatorship. By August 1987, the majority of exiled socialist leaders, most notably Clodomiro Almeyda and Aniceto Rodriguez, were home again and the key issues were the viability of re-uniting the socialist parties (and the timing whether it is better to do so before becoming part of any unified opposition), and the relationship of the PC to the rest of the opposition. There have been some efforts toward unifying the left as a whole, not just the socialist parties, spurred on by the return (March 1987) of Almeyda, ex-Chancellor of the Allende government. This has taken the form of the Izquierda Unida, which includes the PC, with Almeyda as secretary general. Because of fundamental differences between the PC and many of the socialist factions over the registration issue and the acceptability of violence as a political tool, the new leftist front seems to be doomed to failure from its very inception. Also, missing in the IU is the other major socialist party, PS-Nunez, the "renovated socialists" against which Pinochet railed:

it is more centrist than FS-Almeyda, seeing its role as an intermediary between similarly-oriented socialists of the IU and the PDC, helping the latter to understand the dilemma of the FC, believing that without some kind of alliance between these two major groups there will be no change of regime.

Almeyda's return saw the government, for the first time, apply Article 8 to an individual. After being relegated to 90 days of internal exile in the south, he was charged with several crimes against the security of the state and kept in detention after his return to Santiago. Prominent citizens of many different parties testified on his behalf and the way in which the government handles the case will be an indication of its intentions to enforce that article and the costs it will entail for the image of the regime.

The FC made a major shift in its strategy in 1980 after being outlawed by Pinochet's Constitution. It began supporting "all forms of struggle" as legitimate in bringing down the government. This has been a very costly stance since the FPMR to which it is tied, has had no real success in either securing broader popular support or in inflicting significant damage on the regime via armed attacks, such as the September 1986 assassination attempt against Pinochet. In fact it has brought on much more repressive measures from the government. The FC's policy has become a major stumbling block to the parties of the centre-left forcing them to exclude the FC from possible alliances and preventing a stronger front to the government. It

also gives the latter a convenient excuse to label all of the opposition as dangerous. Again, although the FC favors free elections it refuses to endorse the registration process as encouraged by the committees for free elections. An important exception has been Maria Maluenda, an ex-parliamentarian who defied the party directive and registered publicly on her own. It is expected by some that the FC will distance itself from the FFMR and/or give tacit support to other initiatives from any centre-left alliance as it did at the time of the Acuerdo Nacional. 34 To date the opposition has not found the way out of this impasse which impedes unity of the left and makes impossible an alliance with the centre.

Virtually all sectors have failed to confront the increasingly alienated state of the people. The continued sectarianism and debates over exclusively partisan issues, as if the politicians were still living in a democracy, has led the general population to believe there is no leadership or sufficient political will in the opposition to move the current regime. Not only is this sector economically and politically repressed but, for the most part, alienated from the regime. According to the Church's National Commission of Justice and Peace, in 1983 30% of the Chilean population could not meet the minimum standard of living set by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In 1987 their purchasing power was only 50% of the 1970 level while unemployment averages 15% (including PEM, Programa del Empleo Minimo and POJH, Programa de Obra para Jefes

de Hogares, the two government support systems) and 48% among the youth of the slums of Santiago. PEM and FOJH are included because the wage received is not only below the national minimum but workers often receive only half of their pay and no other form of labour is permitted at the same time. These are gradually being replaced by PIMO, Programas Intensivos en Mano de Obra, a joint government-private enterprise scheme where the government pays the entrepreneur to absorb some of the unemployment (i.e. free labour). Much of the employment that is being created are temporary jobs, without benefits and at very low wages.

Politically, the situation is tense at the base. Within the poblaciones, for example, it has been difficult for people to get beyond individual responses to the serious problems (other than emergency situations) which they face, resulting in an atomization that impedes the formation of viable local structures. It is true that there have been hundreds of organizations of various types (nutritional, recreational, social, housing, skill-training workshops, and so on) that have formed at the neighborhood level. This became notable as the economic crisis of the early eighties became a prolonged reality. For example, the Vicaria de Solidaridad under the Archbishop of Santiago, which supports a large number of these, reported that in 1986 there were over 2,500 such organizations in Santiago under their auspices alone. However, many of these have had a roller coaster existence. With a combination of minimal satisfaction of needs (e.g. housing) and the continued use of

violent response to any public protests, the government has kept the organizational capability of the base at a low level. The continued use of repression should not be underestimated. After the major demonstrations of 1983, 1984 and 1986, the regime responded with massive raids on poblaciones, arrests and disappearance of neighbourhood leaders, states of seige prohibiting any local organization, and vicious personal attacks (e.g. the murder of three professionals in 1984 and the burning of two youths in 1986) that terrorized the protesters into withdrawing from the streets. The momentum of protest has yet to be recovered. The latest human rights surveys indicate that the situation in almost every category of abuse had become worse in 1986 than in the previous year, and it would seem that 1987 will have a similar record. 35 The result has been tremendous disenchantment, fear and skepticism of any possibility of change.

This awareness of being excluded from participation in various areas of national life is most dramatic in the case of youth. In the two major areas of education and work, the position of the youth has become notably more marginal under this regime. In 1973, 63 % of young people (ages 15-25) were able to matriculate while in 1982 it had fallen to 52%.

Similarly un- and underemployment have reached very high levels with about 1 million youth over 15 without productive labor. And because of their strong participation in public demonstrations, they account for 75% of the injuries, tortures and deaths. From the results of a study conducted in the

poblaciones of Santiago by the Youth Vicariate of the Church, their disenchantment is even deeper than that of their elders. It is important to note, however, although more youths are being attracted to groups like FPMR, the majority certainly do not see violence as the primary alternative. Only 10% of the study preferred parties of the extreme left while 45 % opted for parties of either the centre or the right. 36

In 1985 it was estimated that 16% of the pobladores participated in some kind of organization. In addition to the subsistence-style groups mentioned above, the hundreds of basic Christian communities that have been developing over the past 20 years or so are another important organizational element in the popular areas. Although most are mainly religious in their orientation, many others are explicitly involved in the social as well as religious dimension of communal life. Their members too have been the target of the government and suffered attacks on houses, kidnappings, beatings, murders and exile. These communities, numbering about 300, refer to themselves as the "popular" Christian communities and are loosely organized under the umbrella of a co-ordinating body. Unlike the bishops, they feel that the Church's mediating role has to come from its commitment to those who have most suffered the effects, both political and economic, of the regime. 37 It is this particular body which has been highly critical of the hierarchy's more "diplomatic" rather prophetic condemnation of government attacks even on its own personnel at the grass-roots level. This

reflects the same elite/base split that characterizes the general political situation of the country. And there is, finally, an uneasy relationship, also, between the Christian communities in general and local political groupings. Many Christian communities feel the political groups are superpoliticized and manipulated from above while they in turn see the basic Christian communities in general as being only partially committed to political change.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly the greatest difference between the regime in Chile today and Brazil and Spain when they initiated their transitions is the ineluctable fact that President Pinochet does not want a transition. He has taken no measures to open or liberalize politics, having instead maintained pressure throughout the regime and acted skillfully to keep the opposition off balance. He has recently reorganized his cabinet with an eye to becoming the junta's candidate in, and subsequently winning, the plebiscite. He also successfully maintains his support among important economic and social groups, and enjoys the loyalty of the armed forces. As the president is not sponsoring a transition, what of the oppositions' potential for forcing Pinochet or the junta to initiate an opening which would result in some form of civilian solution?

We think this situation is unlikely. As indicated throughout the text, the opposition agrees only on the need for Pinochet's departure and the return to a civilian regime. Beyond

this, each sector is not in agreement with other sectors nor even internally on the strategy whereby a transition might be promoted. Of greatest significance are the fundamental splits regarding the role of mass mobilization. Each sector described above is separated not only analytically but also politically on this issue and others. Divided as they are, they do not generate sufficient pressure to force a transition nor to offer a viable option should elements in the armed forces finally decide that Pinochet should vacate power. While there are new initiatives to form a common front, and some indications which suggest possibilities for success, earlier promising efforts also failed.

Of particular concern today are two relatively new or at least clearer facts. First, the Church, which has offered itself and to which many civilian politicians look for a mediating role in a transition, is openly divided concerning both a transition and its possible role. Second, the masses of the population are atomized with minimal organizational links among themselves and bereft of links with the political parties. They are under such pressure just to survive in increasingly difficult economic conditions that they do not have the luxury to become organized, and the regime actively discourages it in any case. In the absence of a minimally unified opposition with links to the bases of the society, Pinochet is able to continue to offer himself as the only viable option to confusion and chaos. This has been his strongest card all along and appears to remain convincing.

FOOTNOTES

1. The field research for this paper was conducted between April and July 1987 when Mary Mooney interviewed thirty political activists at all levels in four regions of the country. This paper is part of a larger comparative study on political transitions as well as religion and politics.

2. Some examples of the rapidly expanding literature on the topic are: Enrique Baloyra, ed., Comparing New Democracies. Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone (Boulder: Westview, 1987); Paul Drake & Eduardo Silva, eds., Elections and Democratization in Latin America 1980-85 (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, 1986); James Malloy & Mitchell Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

3. See in particular Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Factos Politicos: do populismo a redemocratizacao (Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1985) and his Development and Crisis in Brazil, 1930-1983 (Boulder: Westview, 1984). For a summary article see Thomas Bruneau, "Consolidating Civilian Brazil," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, October 1985.

4. See in particular David Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain: From Franco to the Constitutional Monarchy (N.Y.: Quartet Books, 1986); Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), and Paul Preston, Spain: Conditional Democracy (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

5. See in particular Richard Gunther, "Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain," in Keith Banting & Richard Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

6. Abraham Santibanez, Hoy, No. 521, July 13-19, 1987, p. 5.

7. Analisis, September 14-20, 1987, p. 7.

8. El Mercurio, June 28, 1987, p. 1.; La Epoca, June 17, p. 1. Within a 24 hour period June 15-16, twelve people were killed in what the government termed "confrontations" with members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) whom they had been tracking in "Operation Albania". However, the evidence and even first reports were so blatantly contradictory that most people saw this simply as the government's warning that the grace period of the Pope's visit was over and that there was no change in its policy toward the marxist left.

9. La Epoca, July 2, p. 8 and July 4, 1987, p. 8.

10. Analisis, September 14-20, 1987, p. 8-9.

11. La Epoca, July 6, 1987, p. 9; Mensaje, No. 359, June 1987, p. 192; The official reason for the dismissals was given to be an excess of teachers for the school population and the criteria for those to be dismissed were lack of tenure and having had over 26 years experience, in other words, close to retirement. The interviews confirm that many of those dismissed did not fit either of the two criteria but were politically active in the local community. See also Cauce, #115, July 6-12, 1987, pp. 16-18 for similar views.

12. La Epoca, May 31, 1987, p. III.

13. Its president, Benjamin Matte, is a former member of the the group. Many mayors, including 10 the Santiago area, he claims, are very sympathetic to Avanzada Nacional. Interview with El Mercurio, July 5, 1987, p. D2; Hoy, "Los Presidenciales" #4, June 1987, p. 107.

14. The members include: the heads of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Director General of the Carabineros, president of the Senate (which does not exist at this time so has been replaced with the president of the Council of State, i.e. Pinochet's advisor), president of the Supreme Court and the Controller General of the Republic. Analisis, July 27-August 2, 1987, pp. 8-9.

15. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986. April, 1987, pp. 65, 70.

16. The information for this section draws upon an article based on the research of two political scientists, Carlos Huneeus and Jorge Olave from the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporanea (CERC), Academia de Humanismo Cristiano. Analisis, July 27-August 2, 1987, pp. 32-36.

17. Analisis, August 24-30, 1987, p. 36.

18. "Latin America and the Caribbean: The Paths to Democracy", Address before the Washington World Affairs Council, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1987.

19. Orlando Saenz, Analisis, August 24-30, p. 36.

20. La Epoca, August 20, 1987.

21. La Epoca, July 3, 1987, p. 16.

22. Apsi, June 15-21, 1987, p.9; Hoy, July 6-12, p. 9; Hoy, "Los Presidenciales" #4, June 1987, pp. 113-114.

23. FLACSO study done October/November 1986 in Santiago wherein 59% mentioned the FDC when asked for political party remembered. Analisis, August 31-September 6, 1987, pp. 7-8. Also, see FLACSO, "Religion y Politica", Vicaria de Juventud" p. 18 for preference of working class youth in Santiago;

24. Interview in La Epoca, July 1, 1987, p. 11.

25. Quoted in Analisis, August 10-16, p. 6-7.

26. "Informe sobre la situacion chilena actual (March-December 1986)", Comision Nacional "Justicia y Paz" Area Pastoral Social de la Conferencia Episcopal Chilena, p. 8.

27. Analisis, May 4-10, 1987.

28. Analisis, September 14-20, 1987, pp. 30-37.

29. CIEL planned another symbolic vote for early October in Valparaiso. Analisis, September 14-20, 1987, p. 15-16; LARR Southern_Cone, RS-87-03, p. 2.
30. Joint CEF/Gallop poll of Dec. 86-Jan. 87, on a scale of 1 to 7, respondents gave 5.3 to Catholic bishops and priests and teachers, 5.1 to student federations, 4.9 to unions, 4.8 to non-Catholic pastors, 4.7 to businessmen, 4.0 to the Armed Forces, 3.7 to political parties and 2.0 to movements that advocate violence. El Mercurio, June 14, 1987, p. C2. Similar results were found in a SUR survey conducted at the end of 1985. See Proposiciones, No. 13, SUR, 1987. Review of this also in Mensaje, No. 360, July 1987, pp. 263-268.
31. Public Declaration, II National Meeting of the Laity, Punta del Tralca, August 14-17, 1986.
32. Iglesia_y_Politica, No. 9, December 1986, pp. 4-5.
33. Speech at Parque O'Higgins, Santiago, April 3, 1987.
34. Interview with member of team which co-ordinated the Acuerdo Nacional, Santiago, July 7, 1987.
35. Teresa Valdes, "El Movimiento Poblacional: La recomposicion de las solidaridades sociales", FLACSO, Santiago, No. 283, January 1986, pp. 32-38; Vicaria de la Solidaridad, Undecimo ano de labor 1986, Arzobispado de Santiago, p. 62.
36. Apsi, July 22-28, 1987, p. 26; "Religion y Politica: Actitudes y experiencias de Jovenes Pobladores de Santiago," Arzobispado de Santiago, Vicaria de Pastoral Juvenil, Area de Estudios, p. 6; Mensaje, No. 360, July 1987, pp. 267-68.
37. Enrique Correa y Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo, Iglesia_y_Dictadura, CESOC, Santiago, 1986. See Chapter 4, esp. pp. 198, 199.

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