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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

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MILITARY COMPENSATION ALTERNATIVES  
FOR RETENTION OF OFFICERS IN THE RE-  
PUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY

by

Kim, Chang Hwan

June 1988

Thesis Advisor

Richard A. McGonigal

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Military Compensation Alternatives for Retention of Officers in  
the Republic of Korea Army

by

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Major, Republic of Korea Army  
B.S., Korea Military Academy, 1978

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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June 1988

## ABSTRACT

This research examines the current compensation policies of the Republic of Korea Army with a view toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for recruitment and retention of high quality officers.

The Republic of Korea Army is sustained largely by the loyalty and patriotism of its members. However, several changes in the economic environment have tended to make military service a less attractive career alternative for young men. Today, the ROK Army faces several problems that are relative to inefficient manpower management.

Two separate surveys were utilized in an attempt to determine the attitudes of ROK Army officers relative to compensation policies. The most significant finding of both surveys is that certain changes in the compensation policies could have a positive influence on the recruitment and retention of high quality officers. Specific policy changes that are suggested by the surveys are improvement of pay compensation, focusing on increasing initial pay of junior officers and a special allowance for typical military job conditions, and improvement of current promotion and retirement systems for enhancing job security.

C.1

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. BACKGROUND

Personnel management systems for officers have been developed during the 40 years since the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army was established. In the early 1950s, just after the Korean Conflict, the young men of an elite group entered the officer corps to dedicate themselves to the national defense of their country, which was divided into the North and the South. Just after the May 16th Military Revolution,<sup>1</sup> many young men also joined the Army officer corps mainly to accomplish their ambitions, which meant that they would like to be a leader of the military or a political group. Today, the ROK Army faces several problems concerning its personnel management.

Since the 1960s the Republic of Korea has gone through a major economic transformation from an agrarian society to an increasingly urban and industrial society. The decade between the late 1960s and the late 1970s was a period of rapid economic transformation and growth in Korea. The benefits from this growth spread throughout Korean society, and family income in both urban and rural Korea rose proportionally. This change in the economic environment resulted in fewer young men desiring to join the officer corps.

As the essential institution for National Civic education, the Army has contributed significantly to the socioeconomic development of Korea during the past several decades. Most young men, recruited from every corner of the country, have been intensively inculcated to fight not only for the survival of their nation against North Korea's aggression, but also for their own survival through cooperation and a pioneer spirit. Overall, the ROK Army, as a school for the nation, has produced approximately eleven million veterans, trained soldiers, skilled workers, and loyal citizens since it was established in 1948. The rapid economic growth of Korea without natural resources was made possible by those veterans educated in the military organizations. This successful civic education has been conducted by the officer corps.

---

<sup>1</sup> A group of military officers, led by general Park Jung-hee, took over the government on the 16th of May in 1961.

Today, the Korean military force is critical to the deterrence of North Korea's aggression. The military combat power of North Korea is substantially greater than that of the Korean Armed Force, as shown in Table 1.

**Table 1. COMPARISON OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA**

Distinction		South Korea	North Korea
Military Man-power	Total Active Force	629,000	838,000
	Army	542,000	750,000
	Navy	54,000	35,000
	Air Force	33,000	53,000
	Para Military	5,780,000	5,170,000
Army Equipments	Artillery	3,300	6,000
	Tank	1,300	2,900
	Armed Vehicle	1,050	1,690
Navy Equipments	Submarine	0	27
	Total Naval Vessel	228	566
Air Force Equipments	Fighter & Bomber	476	840
	Transport	61	352

\* Source : The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 1987 - 1988", London, IISS, 1988. pp. 162-165.

North Korea persists in its efforts to modernize its large Armed Forces. The force is approximately 838,000 strong and ranks as the world's fifth-largest military force. The North Korean military includes 100,000 commandos, the largest commando force in the world. Nowhere in the world is there an "unconventional warfare" force in such large numbers as in North Korea. The country, largely isolated and economically poor, has developed quite a formidable military force. It is an "offensive" force, though untested in battle.

In terms of overall military capability, South Korea currently is inferior to North Korea. Moreover, the ROK Army faces deficits of officers in the middle grades. The officer corps in the Army is divided into the compulsory and long-term service group. Over 80 percent of junior officers (Lieutenant grades) leave the military after serving



their compulsory period. The rest of them join in the officer corps of the long-term group.

Military compensation is much lower than civilian earnings. For example, the average pay of Army officers with seven years of service is 70 or 80 percent of the earnings of a civilian with the same term of employment in a large company. Moreover, about 50 percent of the captains who are not promoted to higher grade have to leave the military before the age of 35, and about 50 percent of the majors leave before their 43rd birthday. In other words, about 75 percent of the officers in long-term service must leave the military before the age of 43.

In order to overcome these insufficiencies in military combat power, the Korean military forces should not only employ new modernized equipment but also employ more qualified young officers. For the effective enlistment and retention of qualified officers, the Korean military compensation policy, which includes basic military allowances and job security, should be improved. For this, there is necessity to examine current military compensation policy with a view toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for the ROK Army. This research attempts to provide a good foundation for improved manpower management in this area.

## **B. PROBLEM STATEMENT**

The compensation package as a whole is a major motivator for prospective volunteers. An individual's perception of the compensation package greatly affects the enlistment and the retention decisions. How much compensation is adequate to attract and retain qualified personnel is a vital issue for all of the military services.

At present military members are compensated using a system of pay and allowances. The compensation package of the ROK Army includes basic pay, basic and special allowances, and several fringe benefits. Basic pay is the same for individuals working in the same paygrade and with the same time in service. However, the utilization of the remainder of the compensation can vary depending on such factors as paygrade, occupational specialty-rate, marital status, time in service, number of dependents, family health, duty assignment, and the individual's intentions of making a career of military service.

Any organization expects to get highly qualified people in order to accomplish its objectives efficiently. The Army is the largest organization at the scale of people and budget throughout government or the private sector in Korea. Therefore, the Army



absolutely needs to recruit and retain more highly qualified officers not only to cope with the deficits of company officers, but also to accomplish its objectives.

There are several research questions concerning the military compensation of the ROK Army :

- What are the incentives inducing youths to join the officer corps in the ROK Army ?
- What problems does the ROK Army experience in the retention of lower grade officers ?
- Is the manpower management of the ROK Army officers efficient ?
- Does the ROK Army offer a steady occupation to the officer ?

A problem related to military compensation could be pointed out from the aspect of insufficient compensation policy. Basically, the compensation package paid by an organization takes into consideration the current cost of living, the ability of the organization to pay, the productivity of the work force, the desirability of full employment, and the need for an adequate standard of living. The wage level should also be set according to the level of difficulty in the job and any job special hazards. [Ref. 1: pp. 62-63.]

During the past several decades, the government compensation policy only focused on the minimum cost of living and need for a standard living wage, while the private organization considered all of these factors. However, the Army has more difficult and hazardous job conditions than those of any civilian job. The conditions of military service, such as wartime risks, hazardous missions and trainings, frequent moves, family separations, DMZ duties, and extended duty hours set it apart from work in the civilian sector. Nevertheless, military compensation is much lower than civilian earnings.

✓ As mentioned above, most young people today tend to select an occupation that can guarantee the most income. In addition to the influence of income, factors affecting the choice of a job or career include individual preferences, prospects for economic growth, and middle class opportunities. Therefore, it is very difficult to recruit and retain highly qualified manpower for the officer corps, without the improvement of a compensation policy.

At the same time, a problem of efficiency in manpower management can be found in defense resources management. Today, the Republic of Korea invests a large volume of resources for the national defense, which is estimated at approximately 34 percent of the national budget or about six percent of the GNP of Korea. Currently, spending on

defense in South Korea is considerably greater than is the case in North Korea, even though that amount was less than the North, in the past. Total resources allocated to defense for the period 1976 - 1987 were distinctly larger in South Korea than in North Korea. However, South Korea's total armed forces are smaller than those of the North (as shown in Table 1), and its military capital stock is smaller than that of the North, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2. MILITARY CAPITAL STOCKS, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA**  
(Billions of dollars), Amount of Defense Budget Appears in Parentheses

Year	North Korea	South Korea	Comparison (South/North)
1968	1.998 (.629)	.198 (.234)	0.10 (.37)
1969	2.138 (.695)	.249 (.285)	0.12 (.41)
1970	2.138 (.746)	.328 (.333)	0.13 (.45)
1971	3.111 (.849)	.382 (.411)	0.12 (.48)
1972	3.877 (.443)	.452 (.428)	0.12 (.96)
1973	4.189 (.620)	.543 (.476)	0.13 (.77)
1974	4.802 (.770)	.578 (.558)	0.12 (.72)
1975	4.919 (.878)	.653 (.719)	0.13 (.82)
1976	5.135 (1.10)	.904 (1.52)	0.18 (.15)
1977	5.452 (1.03)	1.481 (1.80)	0.27 (1.75)
1978	5.748 (1.20)	2.129 (2.60)	0.37 (2.17)
1979	5.776 (1.26)	2.885 (3.22)	0.50 (2.56)
1980	5.968 (1.30)	3.455 (3.46)	0.58 (2.64)
1981	6.038 (1.47)	4.125 (4.40)	0.68 (2.99)
1982	5.893 (1.70)	4.703 (3.97)	0.80 (2.34)
1983	5.780 (1.92)	5.443 (4.41)	0.94 (2.19)

\* Source : Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Changing Balance : South and North Korean Capabilities for Long-Term Military Competition" (The Rand Corporation, 1985, p.48) and The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance : 1968 - 1988" (London, IISS).

A Rand Corporation report suggests two possible reasons for the paradox of this contrast between resources devoted to defense and the resulting military capabilities. [Ref. 2 : pp. 42 - 50.]

- First, how real is the paradox (might it be apparent rather than real because of statistical errors in the estimates) ?
- Second, if the paradox is real, how can it be explained ? And what implications follow from these comparisons for the long-term military-economic competition between the South and the North ?

The principal components of the total defense estimates are manpower costs and military investment. The Rand Corporation estimates assume that the relative per capita costs of military personnel in the South are approximately four times that of the North Korean armed forces. [Ref. 2: p. 44.]

Most of the young men of Korea must perform a period of national defense duty in either an officer or non-officer status. If they want to serve as an officer, they can enter officer procurement programs such as the academy, ROTC candidates, and several courses for OCS program. They serve only 30 months for the Army and Marine Corps, and 36 months for the Navy and Air Force as an enlisted man. The officer from the ROTC program serves 24 months of compulsory duty, and 36 months in OCS courses in Korea. On the other hand, young men selected for military duty are at least eighteen years of age and serve until they are twenty-eight for ten years in North Korea.

Therefore, South Korea has spent four times as much on personnel costs as has the North, while the North spent more on procurement of military stock. Because the ROK Army has to recruit and train four soldiers for every one soldier trained in North Korea, the per capita cost of military personnel in North Korea is lower than that of South Korea. In other words, the ROK Army has to persist in its efforts to reduce spending on manpower in order to invest more on procurement and operations for the effectiveness of combat readiness.

### C. RESEARCH METHOD

This study is limited to an examination of current compensation policies influencing retention of officers in the ROK Army. Two separate surveys were utilized in an attempt to determine the attitudes of ROK Army officers in regard to the area of compensation under consideration. The first survey was administered in March of 1987 by the ROK Army Headquarters to gather data concerning the welfare desires of military personnel. The second survey was undertaken to obtain information in regard to the attitudes of ROK Army officers studying at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, concerning their expectations for the future of their military life.

Chapter I of this thesis presents an introduction, including a discussion of ROK Army compensation, a brief description of the research method, and an outline of the thesis.

Chapter II explains the compensation policies of the ROK Army in detail, including requirements for reward systems, describes ROK Army compensation policies, and reviews the literature concerning military compensation.

Chapter III describes the surveys in detail, including the questionnaire design and testing, sample selection, and response rate. The results of surveys are then presented.

Chapter IV explains the analysis of the survey results.

Chapter V summarizes the author's conclusions from the analysis, and presents some recommendations for improving or correcting the problems found and some recommendations for future research.



## II. COMPENSATION POLICIES

### A. REQUIREMENTS FOR REWARD SYSTEMS

The purpose of any organization's compensation system is to attract and retain sufficient numbers of qualified personnel in order to insure the satisfactory completion of the organization's mission. From the organization's viewpoint, the compensation level and procedures should be fair to its members but also cost-effective. [Ref. 3: p. 357.] Optimally, money spent on compensation should be allocated in such a way as to provide adequate levels of satisfaction for employees at a minimum cost to the organization.

The satisfaction of individuals with the rewards received in a work situation depends on many different factors. An individual compares what he or she receives for a task to the expectation of what should be received. If the individual feels that the reward is too little, he or she feels dissatisfied and will terminate the employment if there is no prospect of changing the level of compensation. On the other hand, individuals generally tend to reevaluate upward the value of their services if their compensation exceeds their expectations. [Ref. 4: p. 164.]

Individuals also compare their compensation to the compensation received by other workers in similar jobs. This comparison can be made to employees within the same organization or with other organizations. An individual is satisfied if his or her rewards are equal or higher than those received by others in similar circumstances. [Ref. 4: p. 165.]

Any wage structure sets up differentials in pay for employees if one level of employees is paid more than another level. The question of equity is involved in determining if the differences in pay are felt to be justified by the employees. Is one level more skilled and proficient in job performance? Does one level of employee have more responsibility for production than do other levels? For a reward system to be effective, the employees must judge the resulting pay differentials equitable. [Ref. 5: p. 481.]

Individuals also differ as to what specific rewards or combination of rewards are preferred or valued as compensation. Satisfaction depends on how closely an individual's desired form of compensation is met by the organization. [Ref. 4: pp. 165-166.]

Studies have shown, for example, that married men do not desire more time off the job, while unmarried men do. [Ref. 6: pp. 17-28.] Another study indicated that women value pay less than do men. Women were found to value work atmosphere more highly than pay. There is also evidence that emphasis on salary levels decreases as an employee gets older. [Ref. 7: pp. 47-48.]

The result of differences in desires concerning pay and a general pay policy for all employees is that money is spent that is not valued by the recipients. Because it is not valued, money spent will not serve to increase pay satisfaction of the employees at all. The organization would therefore realize absolutely no return on its investment. [Ref. 7: p. 253.]

Much has been said about the level of pay satisfaction of employees. Is it really important that they feel satisfied for effective operations? Pay dissatisfaction in the civilian sector has been shown to result in strikes, grievances, absenteeism, turnover, and low job satisfaction. Obviously, strikes would result in large money losses. However, problems with absenteeism and turnover also result in large financial losses for any organization. Absenteeism lowers the level of production. Turnover costs an organization in many ways. Production decreases during the interim between an employee's departure from a position and a replacement being hired. There are also the hidden costs of recruitment and training. The new employee also slowly picks up skills over a period of time before becoming as proficient in performance as the previous employee who had been on the job for a lengthy period of time. [Ref. 7: p. 249.]

If pay satisfaction levels are important, what should an organization do to raise what is perceived to be low levels of pay satisfaction? An obvious answer would be to give everyone an across-the-board salary increase as much as giving satisfaction to the employees. This would definitely increase not only the organization's satisfaction level but also the personnel cost of the organization.

Another significant element of requirements for reward systems is the job security that could make employees feel their job a lifetime employment, because job security gives employees freedom from anxiety concerning future employment. Some research coupled with case-report evidence suggests that improvements in the work climate and structure frequently lead to greater productivity as well as to greater job satisfaction. [Ref. 8: p. 229.]

Quality of working life research is concerned with how the relationship between individuals and features of their physical, social, and economic work environment affects



those society considers to be important. One of the important elements to enhance the quality of working life is affording opportunities for continued growth ; that is, opportunities to advance in organizational or career terms. [Ref. 8: pp. 3-4.]

The high turnover rate of employees well trained would be not only increasing their initial training costs but also decreasing the motivation and productivity of an organization. Lifetime employment makes it possible to dismiss personnel just because their task has been redundant.

## **B. PRESENT ROK ARMY COMPENSATION POLICIES FOR OFFICERS**

This section outlines current ROK Army compensation policies for officers. Specifically, policies of pay and allowances and some personnel management policies concerning promotion and retirement are discussed.

### **1. Pay and Allowances**

#### *a. Basic Pay*

Basic pay is the same for individuals working in the same specialty in the same paygrade and with the same time in service. However, basic allowances and special duty allowances can vary depending on such factors as paygrade, occupational specialty-rate, marital status, time in service, number of dependents, duty assignment, and intentions of making a career of military service.

#### *b. Basic Allowances*

Table 3 shows the list of basic and special allowances of the ROK Army. The basic allowances are quarter bonuses and semiannual allowances, subsistence allowance, basic allowance for quarters, family subsidy, continuation allowance, and allowance for social activity.

(1) *Quarter Bonuses.* All active officers receive quarter bonuses four times per year at the end of each quarter. The amount of this bonus is calculated as follows :  $\text{Quarter Bonus} = (\Sigma \text{Basic Pay paid at the end of every fiscal Quarter})/3$

(2) *Semiannual Allowance.* All active duty officers also receive semiannual allowance two times per year, once in January and once in July. Table 4 shows that the amount of this allowance increases by an officer's years of service. This allowance is one of the incentive allowances that are inducing the junior officer to remain in long-term service.

**Table 3. LIST OF ALLOWANCES OF THE ROK ARMY**

Basic Allowances	Special Allowances
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quarter Bonus</li> <li>• Semiannual Allowance</li> <li>• Subsistence Allowance</li> <li>• Basic Allowance for Quarters</li> <li>• Family Subsidy</li> <li>• Continuation Allowance</li> <li>• Allowance for Social Activity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical Allowance</li> <li>• Allowance for Hazards</li> <li>• Allowance for DMZ Duty</li> <li>• Flight Duty Allowance</li> <li>• Allowance for Legal, Religion, Medical</li> <li>• Allowance for Instructor</li> </ul>

\* Source : Adapted from the ROK Army Regulation 026-3, "Pay and Allowances", pp. 4 -35.

**Table 4. PAYMENT RATE OF SEMIANNUAL ALLOWNCE**

Years of Service	Base of Payment Rate	Years of Service	Base of Payment Rate
0 - 1	50% of Base Pay	1 - 2	55% of Base Pay
2 - 3	60% of Base Pay	3 - 4	65% of Base Pay
4 - 5	70% of Base Pay	5 - 6	75% of Base Pay
6 - 7	80% of Base Pay	7 - 8	85% of Base Pay
8 - 9	90% of Base Pay	9 - 10	95% of Base Pay
10 -	100% of Base Pay		

\* Source : Adapted from the ROK Army Regulation 026-3, "Pay and Allowances", p. 31.

(3) *Subsistence Allowance.* The subsistence allowance is intended to provide for the food cost of each officer. All officers are paid the same amount of the allowance without considering paygrade and other factors. The officer in compulsory service also receives this allowance. The officer can receive this allowance in the form of a cash allowance or actual meals by military food preparation facilities. Officers

usually receive the allowance in cash, though some prefer to have meals at the military mess hall.

(4) *Basic Allowance for Quarters.* The basic allowance for quarters is intended to provide for the housing needs of the officer in long-term service. The junior officer (Lieutenant Paygrade) in compulsory or long-term service is not paid an allowance for quarters. Like the subsistence allowance, the quarters allowance can be received in the form of cash or actual government quarters. The cash basic allowance for quarters is the same for all officers without considering paygrade, years of service, and residential areas. Personal experience suggests that the rental value of housing in the middle urban cities may be worth four or five times more than that of rural areas.

(5) *Other Basic Allowances.* Family subsidy is intended to provide for the food cost of officer's dependents (limited to his or her spouse and only two children). This allowance can vary depending on only the number of dependents without considering paygrade. Continuation allowance is one of the incentive allowances that are inducing compulsory officers to retain to the long-term service. Thus, it can vary depending on only years of service. Allowance for social activity is paid for officer's social activity including his or her activity to stimulate morale of his or her unit members. This allowance can vary depending on only paygrade. Most of these allowances are provided only to the officers in long-term service.

As shown in Table 5, as paygrade goes up, the proportion of base pay is getting lower and the proportion of allowance for social activity is getting higher. The proportions of others are not significant as the paygrade goes up. The average proportion of base pay to the compensation package is 63.3 percent. Thus, base pay is the primary factor of military compensation. It seems that the differential of compensation between the officers of long-term service and compulsory service does not exist. In other words, the compensation policy could not give the officers in compulsory service any incentive to be able to join the officer corps of long-term service. Therefore, the junior officer in required service would not want to remain in the Army beyond the required period.

#### *c. Special Duty Allowances*

Special allowances are composed of technical allowance, allowance for hazardous duty, flight duty allowance, allowance for instructor, allowance for Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) duty, and allowance for medical, legal, and religious duty. These allowances are paid to the officers who are assigned to the special duty. However, allowance for DMZ duty is paid only to enlisted personnel.

Table 5. COMPOSITION PROPORTION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES—<sup>1</sup>

Paygrade	O1	O2	O3	O4	O5	O6	Average
Years of Service	1	2	5	9	13	18	
Base Pay	.675	.695	.619	.594	.601	.615	.633
Social Activity Allowance	.125	.117	.173	.210	.225	.226	.179
Subsistence Allowance — <sup>2</sup>	.128	.120	.078	.058	.048	.041	.079
Continuation Allowance	.072	.068	.065	.065	.066	.068	.067
Family Subsidy <sup>3</sup>	. 0	. 0	.065	.073	.060	.051	.042

—<sup>1</sup> Among the basic allowances, quarter bonus, semiannual allowance and basic allowance for quarters were not considered.

—<sup>2</sup> The cash amount of subsistence allowance is same for all grades of the officer corps.

—<sup>3</sup> O1 and O2 were considered as unmarried, O3 was considered with a spouse and a child, the officers above O4 were considered with a spouse and two children.

\* Source : Calculated from the "Base Pay Chart and Allowances Standard Table in 1988" of the ROK Army, pp. 27 - 75.

#### d. Fringe Benefits

A variety of nonpecuniary allowances that are provided to officers represent a significant benefit to them. It is rather difficult to determine the exact cash value of these benefits because of the many variables involved.

(1) *Retirement Benefits.* The retirement program is probably the most valuable benefit provided to military personnel. After serving twenty years of active service, retirement pay amounting to 50 percent of the individual's terminal base pay is provided. Those personnel serving beyond twenty years receive increases at the rate of two percent per year up to a maximum of 70 percent at thirty years. The program is funded half by the individual, and the other half by government. Thus, service personnel make a direct contribution to their retirement. However, the personnel serving below twenty years receive only lump-sum retirement pay cumulated by his or her contribution during his or her active service years.

(2) *Medical Care.* All active military personnel are provided unlimited health care. However, it is not provided to military dependents. Instead, the government pays the 50 percent of medical insurance premium for military dependents. Military personnel must pay another 50 percent of that for his or her dependent's health care.



(3) *Benefit for Children's Education.* This program also provides a valuable benefit to military personnel. Currently, most of the parents whose children go to the middle or high school have to pay tuition fees to the school for their children's schooling in Korea. The government pays the tuition fees to the school instead of military personnel with children being at the middle or high school. The government also provides low-interest loans to military personnel who want to borrow some money for their children's college education.

(4) *Others.* There are other fringe benefits that have been provided by the ROK Army. Examples of these benefits are the utilization of military free-tax home appliance exchanges and military resort facilities.

## **2. Personnel Management Policies**

This subsection outlines current ROK Army personnel management policies concerning promotion and retirement, focusing on the recruiting and retention of officers.

### *a. Promotion*

ROK Army Regulation 110-16 establishes minimum time in grade (TIG) requirements for an officer to be considered for promotion or promoted to the next higher grade. Minimum time in grade requirements is as follows :

(1) *2LT and 1LT.* No minimum TIG requirements for consideration for promotion ; however, the officers must serve 12 months and 36 months TIG prior to being promoted to 1LT and Captain, respectively.

(2) *Captain through Colonel.* An officer in any paygrade of Captain through Colonel must serve 4 years TIG prior to being considered for promotion, respectively.

In comparison with policies of U. S. Army, the minimum TIG requirements of the ROK Army are very short. Faster promotion results in faster retirement, with the exception of those who will be able to reach the level of flag officer. In other words, the promotion system of the ROK Army was established completely for the structure of the military rather than as a reward for the employees. Minimum TIG requirements were set up by those who could remain in the military from a junior officer through a full general. However, the average service period of the ROK Army officers in long-term service has been 15 years. Thus, many officers have to leave the military before their 39th birthday. This short term of military service causes the junior officers to avoid service beyond their compulsory requirements.

*b. Retirement*

Since mandatory retirement is required by law, it must be accomplished on the date established by the applicable statute, regardless of the desire of the officer concerned. An individual may request retirement and be retired voluntarily on his mandatory retirement date. Table 6 shows that there are three different mandatory retirements.

**Table 6. CONDITIONS OF MANDATORY RETIREMENTS**

	CPT	MAJ	LTC	COL
Service in Grade	8	8	8	9
Years of Service	14	20	24	27
Maximum Age	43	43	47	50

\* Source : Adapted from the ROK Army Regulation 110-3, "Officer Personnel ; Separations", 1984.

(1) *Captain.* Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular grade of Captain, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the regular grade of Major, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the following dates :

- The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the eighth anniversary of his appointment to that grade, or
- The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 14 years of active commissioned service, or
- The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 43 years of age.

(2) *Major.* Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular grade of Major, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the regular grade of LT Colonel, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the following dates :

- The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the eighth anniversary of his appointment to that grade, or
- The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 20 years of active commissioned service, or
- The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 43 years of age.



(3) *LT Colonel.* Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular grade of LT Colonel, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the regular grade of Colonel, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the following dates :

- The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the eighth anniversary of his appointment to that grade, or
- The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 24 years of active commissioned service, or
- The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 47 years of age.

(4) *Colonel.* Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular grade of Colonel, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the regular grade of BG General, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the following dates :

- The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the ninth anniversary of his appointment to that grade, or
- The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 27 years of active commissioned service, or
- The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 50 years of age.

A significant finding concerned with the retirement regulation is that the ROK Army intends to acquire more young officers. The conditions of mandatory retirement require that the officer should be retired at the earliest date as indicated by the regulation. It is in contrast to the U. S. Army regulation which requires an officer's retirement on the later of the dates. The requirement of retirement is the opposite of the officer's willingness. Most officers serving under the national conscription system are willing to remain in the military as long as they can.

Generally, the younger officer is more efficient at the combat level, particularly at the grade of company officer (i. e., infantry tactics). However, there is no evidence or study concerning the effect of combat power associated with the physical strength of younger officers. Obviously, at the higher officer levels of the military, older officers could be more efficient in performing the mission than the younger officers.

## C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE CONCERNING MILITARY COMPENSATION

There are few studies concerning the military compensation policies of the ROK Army. Moreover, almost all statistical data on the ROK Army are classified. However, some useful information and insights can be obtained from studies of compensation policies and practices of the U. S. military.

The major factors in all studies of military compensation were visibility and equity. The visibility issue is concerned with the ability to compare accurately military compensation levels with civilian pay levels. The equity issue is primarily concerned with the differences in military compensation between compulsory duty personnel and long-term service personnel.

The military and the civilian sector differ in the way they view compensation. Primarily, military compensation is based on paygrade and years of service. Occupational differences are taken into account only through special duty allowances for those jobs in which hazards and specialty conditions exist. On the other hand, civilian compensation is more likely to be based on the labor market where labor demand and supply for an occupation are more important determinants of the amount of compensation that a particular occupation will receive at any given time. [Ref. 9: p. 2.]

Second, the cost of living also differs between the military and civilian sectors. These costs are affected by geographical location, population, tax policies, and the welfare benefits of an organization. Moreover, there are significant differences between the military and civilian occupations concerning the mission and productivity. Military service often involves hazardous duty, job risk, family hardship, and other personal demands that are not normally found in civilian employment.

✓ The one sure portion of military compensation that can be accurately compared to civilian pay is base pay. The value of housing and subsistence allowances issued in-kind is very difficult to judge. Service members seldom have a good idea of the fair market value of government-provided housing and meals, because most civilian firms also provide a comprehensive medical care package and housing plans for their employees. The other fringe benefits are even more difficult to measure as far as actual monetary value.

Any decision on military pay levels based on a comparison with civilian jobs would have to take into account some sort of differential for the working conditions of military jobs as opposed to the typical civilian job. Military employment involves non-payment of overtime, strict discipline, transfers, and hazards to the life of the service member.

These aspects are not common to many civilian jobs. Therefore, a special compensation policy that can compensate for the typical military job should be considered. Even though there are some special allowances for special job conditions, such as allowance for hazards (i. e., for the officers in airborne units) and flight duty allowance (i. e., for helicopter pilots), these do not represent special compensation for the typical military characteristics. The infantry officers of the ROK Army are the main component of the officer group, accounting for over 60 percent of total officers. They are assigned to DMZ duty during one-third of their military service period. During DMZ duty, they can stay with their families off base just for one night per week or month. For the rest of the time, they have to remain on base.

In addition to DMZ duty, they have to transfer to a new base every 2 or 3 years. This constant moving disrupts their social relations and development, and it can also have an adverse effect on their children's education and family's economic security. [Ref. 10: pp. 47-56.]

Table 7 compares levels of compensation between military personnel and their civilian counterparts with the same number of year in government-run firms and private companies. However, as shown in Table 7, the regular military compensation (RMC) of junior officers (LT) is less than 60-percent of the average earnings of civilians. The RMC for middle grade officers (CPT and MAJ) is also below 80 percent of civilian earnings. This may explain why junior officers and youth people are reluctant to join the officer corps of long-term service or officer programs such as academy and OCS programs.

A study by the Department of Accounting Management of the ROK Army in 1986 revealed a consistent underestimation of total military compensation by the officer corps. Approximately 49 percent of all officers surveyed underestimated their total RMC. RMC involves only base pay, quarter bonus and semiannual allowance, and continuation allowance. The basic reasons of the underestimation might be explained by two aspects. Initial basic pay of officer personnel (i. e., 2 LT's base pay) is set up too much below that of the civilian sector. The beginning pay of a 2LT was just 54.8 percent of his counterpart who was employed by a government-run firm and 59.3 percent of the average person working at a business company.

**Table 7. COMPARISON OF MILITARY COMPENSATION AND CIVILIAN EARNINGS —<sup>1</sup>**

( Unit : WON —<sup>2</sup>)

Paygrade of Mil / Civ (Years of Service)	Military Pay (A)	Government - run Firms (B)	Private Companies (C)	Comparison (%) • (A B), (A C)
2 LT / Employee (1 yr)	247,800	452,050	417,800	54.8 / 59.3
1 LT / Employee (3 yrs)	287,800	559,500	521,100	51.4 / 55.2
CPT / Section Leader (5 yrs)	529,800	699,360	754,600	75.7 / 70.2
MAJ / Section Chief (9 yrs)	700,000	906,500	953,200	77.2 / 73.4
LT COL / Asst. Director (13 yrs)	947,500	1,112,380	1,197,400	85.2 / 79.1
COL / Director (18 yrs)	1,115,200	1,332,400	1,422,600	83.7 / 78.4
Average	638,800	843,700	877,780	75.6 / 72.7

—<sup>1</sup>Regular Military Compensation (RMC) involves only base pay, quarter bonus, semiannual allowances, and continuation allowances. Civilian earnings is also estimated by similar categories of the military.

—<sup>2</sup>Won is a monetary unit in the Republic of Korea.

\* Source : HQ of the ROK Army, "Military Compensation Review in 1986", 1987.

The second reason is that increasing the rates of base pay for officer personnel had been lower than those of the civilian sector. Table 8 shows average increasing rates of base pay between the civilian and military sectors during the last decade. The average increasing rate of military pay was 11.1 percent, while that of the civilian sectors was 15.9 percent. In addition to the lower initial pay level of the military, increasing rates



also were lower than in civilian business. Therefore, the officers surveyed tend to underestimate their regular compensation. The end result of the prevalent misconception of military compensation levels is that money is expended for no benefit to the government. Compensation that is not recognized as such is an inefficient and ineffective way to satisfy military personnel's pay desires.

**Table 8. COMPARISON OF THE INCREASING RATE OF BASE PAY FOR THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS, 1975 - 1986**

( % )

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Average
Average of Civilian	29.5	23.4	21.3	15.8	11.0	8.7	9.2	8.2	15.9
Average of Military	28.2	9.7	10.2	7.7	25.1	0 <sup>1</sup>	2.1	5.5	11.1
2 LT	25.0	9.9	10.0	5.0	36.5	0 <sup>1</sup>	3.5	5.9	12.0
1 LT	25.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	29.8	0 <sup>1</sup>	3.0	5.9	11.6
CPT	28.2	9.9	9.8	11.3	29.5	0 <sup>1</sup>	2.1	5.9	12.1
MAJ	28.1	10.1	13.3	7.9	23.2	0 <sup>1</sup>	1.7	5.9	11.3
LT Col	34.8	10.1	11.0	7.0	18.5	0 <sup>1</sup>	1.3	4.6	10.9
COL	27.9	8.0	7.1	6.0	12.8	0 <sup>1</sup>	1.1	4.8	8.5

—<sup>1</sup> Government budget of FY 1984 for the base pay of all officers was frozen.

\* Source : Compiled data from the pay charts of FY 1975 through FY 1986 of the ROK Army that is attached as Appendix A.

The equity issue is concerned primarily with the perception that military pay is not closely tied to job performance. Equity calls for pay to be equal for all jobs of similar skill requirements and to increase as a member advances to more responsible senior positions.

Another issue would involve the establishment of cost for government-provided facilities such as housing and meals. The fair market value of the facilities would have to be established. The study found the value of family government quarters to be greater than the cash value of BAQ in general. It was estimated that family quarters are occupied by more senior officers. An ROK Army report at the end of 1987 shows that approximately 68 percent of the officer corps live in government quarters. Relatively junior officers have to live in civilian housing. Overall, the cash value received by a



non-resident in government quarters is less than one-third of the value of government quarters.

Most of the military compensation studies noted that there has been insufficient flexibility to cope with changes in the civilian employment market. This lack of flexibility has led to poor retention in many rates. Most of the studies have also recommended the retention of special pay and bonuses to provide some measure of flexibility in rates where normal military compensation has not been sufficient to retain adequate numbers of highly qualified personnel.

### III. SURVEY RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the survey, including the questionnaire design and testing, sample selection, population surveyed, and the results of the survey. The survey was utilized to collect information that could support policy formation and research, necessary for dealing with present and future Korean military compensation issues. The data include information about the behavior, attitudes, preferences, and intentions of military personnel. The data also assess the response of officers to current compensation policies including promotion and retirement systems, and identify possible areas for future compensation policy changes.

#### A. SURVEYS

##### 1. Survey Documents

Two separate surveys were utilized in an attempt to determine the attitudes of ROK Army officer personnel relative to the areas of compensation under consideration. The first survey was administered in March of 1987 by the ROK Army Headquarters to estimate the welfare desire status of service personnel in the Army. The second survey was of Korean students at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School and was used to collect data concerning attitudes toward compensation, promotion and retirement policies for the retention of officers.

ROK Army Headquarters' survey was titled the "Survey Questionnaire On Welfare Desire of Officer Personnel" and is attached as Appendix B. This survey was intended to be administered to the active duty service personnel in the Army during March 1987. The survey could be divided into two basic parts. The first section gathered personal information on each respondent by paygrade, age, years of service, commissioned source, and marital status.

The second section was intended for gathering information concerning military personnel welfare desire status. The personnel management policy questions included compensation, promotion, rewards, evaluation, selection, retirement system and benefits, government quarters, medical care, leave, PX utilization, satisfaction with military life, the condition of family life, job attitudes, and fringe benefits. Each respondent was required to answer every question by selecting one of five responses that represent personal attitudes such as very satisfied, satisfied, normal, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.

The second survey was expected to gather data relative to the attitudes of ROK Army officers in order to supplement the ROK Army Headquarters Survey. This survey was completed by Korean students studying at the Naval Postgraduate School. The survey was titled "Compensation Questionnaire" and is attached as Appendix C.

This survey could be divided into four categories. The first category was concerned with personal data such as, present paygrade, marital status, branch, years of service, and reasons for staying in the service. The second one concerned military compensation policies compared with civilian sectors. The third one concerned promotion and retirement policies. The final one addressed general compensation issues regarding the entire military compensation system. Members could also express their views concerning additional problem areas.

## **2. Population Surveyed**

ROK Army Headquarters Questionnaire was administered service-wide. Eventually, 7343 surveys were completed and returned to Army Headquarters for evaluation. The sample of 862 officer personnel respondents was chosen from 905 completed questionnaires that had been selected by Army Headquarters and sent to the author. Initial selection criteria was paygrade distribution. The remaining 43 questionnaires were not used in the analysis, because the sincerity of their answers was doubtful. To permit the evaluation of the respondent's sincerity, the questionnaire was composed of several similar questions, so that checks could be made between answers to similar questions. As a result of this procedure, 862 samples were selected.

The second survey, "Compensation Questionnaire", was administered to 30 Korean students at the Naval Postgraduate School. The object of the survey, terminology, and how to complete the survey was personally explained to each respondent prior to completing the survey. Respondents' replies were based on what they thought was the best answer to each question. This survey was conducted on 1 March through 30 March of 1988. Questions were extracted from the "1985 DOD Survey", administered by the Defense Manpower Data Center, and modified for Korean students.

## **3. Limitations and Assumptions**

There were some limitations and assumptions in administering the second survey. Survey questions were designed with the assumption that constructive changes in Korean military compensation, promotion, and retirements policies can help to overcome problems of recruiting and the retention of high quality people. In administering

the second survey, the assumption was made that the respondent's duty station and housing were based on their last station in Korea.

## B. SURVEY RESULTS

SPSSX was utilized to compile the results of the survey in tables. The computerized program for analysis of the questionnaires is attached as Appendix D. The results of certain questions from each survey are provided in this section. The results of remaining questions are attached as Appendix E. Data provided by respondents are presented, discussed and compared. However, the emphasis of this section is purposely limited to a presentation of the compiled data without the possible inferences that could be drawn from such information.

### 1. Results from ROK Army Headquarters Survey

#### a. Background of Respondents

Respondents were grouped basically by paygrade. Table 9 indicates the distribution of respondents by paygrade and marital status. Overall, there were 566 married respondents and 296 bachelor respondents to the survey. All respondents above Major, 21.6 percent of the Captains, 7.9 percent of the 2 LTs, and only 5.7 percent of the 1 LTs were married.

Table 9. CROSSTABULATION OF MARITAL STATUS BY PAYGRADE

COUNT	PAYGRADE						ROW TOTAL
	I2ND LT	1ST LT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LT COL	COL	
MARITAL STATUS	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I
SINGLE	82	139	75	0	0	0	296
MARRIED	5	12	272	176	83	18	566
COLUMN TOTAL	87	151	347	176	83	18	862
	10.1	17.5	40.3	20.4	9.6	2.1	100.0

Table 10 gives a breakdown of respondents by paygrade and service branch. The distribution of respondents by service branch is representative of the actual pro-

portions of each branch within the ROK Army. Infantry is the largest branch of the service in the Table, as it is in the actual composition of the Army. The second largest is the Artillery, which is only one-fourth as large as the Infantry.

Table 10. CROSSTABULATION OF SERVICE BRANCH BY PAYGRADE

COUNT	BRANCH							ROW TOTAL
	I I I I1	I I I I2	I I I I3	I I I I4	I I I I5	I I I I6	I I I I	
PAYGRADE	INFANTRY	ARTILLER Y	ARMOR	ENGINEER	COMMUNI CATION	OTHERS		
2ND LT	67	6	2	8	4	0	87	10.1
1ST LT	102	24	3	9	6	8	151	17.5
CAPTAIN	188	58	3	22	43	33	347	40.3
MAJOR	83	22	5	44	11	11	176	20.4
LT COL	51	21	2	4	3	2	83	9.6
COL	12	4	0	1	1	0	18	2.1
COLUMN TOTAL	503	135	15	88	68	53	862	
	58.4	15.7	1.7	10.2	7.9	6.2	100.0	

Table 11 displays the distribution of responses concerning each individual's personal adaptability to military life. Almost all the officers surveyed indicated that their adaptability to military life was proper, except 8.4 percent of officers who judged it as unsuitable. Table 11 shows that the lower the paygrade of respondents, the lower the degree of personal adaptability to military life.



Table 11. CROSSTABULATION OF PERSONAL ADAPTABILITY TO MILITARY LIFE BY PAYGRADE

		PERSONAL ADAPTABILITY TO MILITARY LIFE					
PAYGRADE	COUNT	I	I	I	I	I	ROW
		VERY HIGH	HIGH	NORMAL	LOW	TOTAL	
2ND LT		17	19	31	20	87	10.1
1ST LT		10	51	72	18	151	17.5
CAPTAIN		85	99	136	27	347	40.3
MAJOR		43	75	53	5	176	20.4
LT COL		34	36	11	2	83	9.6
COLONEL		3	6	9	0	18	2.1
	COLUMN TOTAL	192	286	312	72	862	100.0

*b. Military Compensation*

Table 12 indicates the distribution of respondents concerning satisfaction with regular military compensation and satisfaction with pay levels of each paygrade as compared with civilian sectors. Over 63 percent of all officer respondents indicated that they were not satisfied with their RMC. 54.5 percent of the field grade officers, and 67 percent of the company grade officers were dissatisfied with their RMC. It is interesting to note that the company grade officers have more dissatisfaction with RMC than the field grade officers.

In comparing pay levels with the civilian sector, 594 members (68.9 percent of the group) indicated that they were dissatisfied with their pay level when compared with civilians of the same age. Table 12 indicates that a high proportion of middle grade officers were dissatisfied. It could be explained that their cost of living was relatively larger than the others.

Table 12. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH RMC AND PAY LEVEL BY PAYGRADE

		SATISFACTION WITH RMC							
PAYGRADE	COUNT	I							ROW TOTAL
		ISATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DIS	SATISFIED			
1	2ND LT	0	33	37	17			87	
2	1ST LT	18	36	62	35			151	
3	CAPTAIN	16	90	180	61			347	
4	MAJOR	21	56	67	32			176	
5	LT COLONEL	15	18	47	3			83	
6	COLONEL	9	7	2	0			18	
COLUMN TOTAL		79	240	395	148			862	
		9.2	27.8	45.8	17.2			100.0	

		SATISFACTION WITH PAY LEVEL COMPARED WITH CIVILIAN							
PAYGRADE	COUNT	I							ROW TOTAL
		EVERY SATISFIED	SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DIS	SATISFIED		
1	2ND LT	0	0	52	35	0		87	
2	1ST LT	0	0	36	83	32		151	
3	CAPTAIN	6	28	54	189	70		347	
4	MAJOR	0	43	12	64	57		176	
5	LT COL	0	7	17	59	0		83	
6	COLONEL	0	1	12	5	0		18	
COLUMN TOTAL		6	79	183	435	159		862	
		.7	9.2	21.2	50.5	18.4		100.0	

c. Retirement

Table 13 indicates the distribution of respondents relative to the retirement systems of the ROK Army by paygrade. There were 45.8 percent of the total who judged the current retirement system as unsuitable (indicating very dissatisfied or dissatisfied). Officer personnel above the middle grades (i. e., CPT through COL) tend to have more dissatisfaction with the retirement system, while junior officers, probably in compulsory service, do not have so much.

As shown in the first one of the Table 14, there were about 39 percent of the total who judged the retirement benefits of the Army as dissatisfied. They were not satisfied with retirement benefits including an annuity pension and lump-sum retirement pay. The lower the officers's paygrade, the greater was the proportion of the group concerning the dissatisfaction with retirement pay.

About 46.4 percent of the total who was highly concerned with jobs after retirement, and only 27 percent of the respondents not concerned were under the paygrade of Major.

Table 13. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH RETIREMENT SYSTEM BY PAYGRADE

SATISFACTION WITH RETIREMENT SYSTEM												
PAYGRADE	COUNT	I VERY DIS SATISFIE		DISSATIS FIED		NORMAL		SATISFIE D		VERY SAT ISFIED		ROW TOTAL
		I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	
2ND LT		1		18		51		16		1		87
												10.1
1ST LT		0		33		101		17		0		151
												17.5
CAPTAIN		96		125		94		29		3		347
												40.3
MAJOR		36		46		74		20		0		176
												20.4
LT COL		12		19		37		15		0		83
												9.6
COLONEL		2		6		9		1		0		18
												2.1
COLUMN TOTAL		147		247		366		98		4		862
		17.1		28.7		42.5		11.4		.5		100.0

Table 14. CROSSTABULATIONS OF RETIREMENT PAY AND CONCERNS ABOUT JOB AFTER RETIREMENT BY PAYGRADE

COUNT	RETIREMENT PAY					ROW TOTAL
	I VERY D SISFIED	I SAT D	I SATISFIE D	I NORMAL	I DISSATIS FIED	
PAYGRADE	+	+	+	+	+	+
2ND LT	I 5	I 12	I 23	I 26	I 21	I 87
	I	I	I	I	I	I 10.1
1ST LT	I 7	I 23	I 62	I 45	I 14	I 151
	I	I	I	I	I	I 17.5
CAPTAIN	I 47	I 73	I 106	I 87	I 34	I 347
	I	I	I	I	I	I 40.3
MAJOR	I 3	I 19	I 77	I 72	I 5	I 176
	I	I	I	I	I	I 20.4
LT COL	I 0	I 8	I 48	I 18	I 9	I 83
	I	I	I	I	I	I 9.6
COLONEL	I 1	I 3	I 9	I 5	I 0	I 18
	I	I	I	I	I	I 2.1
COLUMN TOTAL	63 7.3	138 16.0	325 37.7	253 29.4	83 9.6	862 100.0

  

COUNT	CONCERN ABOUT JOB AFTER RETIREMENT					ROW TOTAL
	I VERY HIGH	I HIGH	I NORMAL	I LOW	I VERY LOW	
PAYGRADE	+	+	+	+	+	+
2ND LT	I 17	I 19	I 36	I 15	I 0	I 87
	I	I	I	I	I	I 10.1
1ST LT	I 54	I 31	I 21	I 18	I 27	I 151
	I	I	I	I	I	I 17.5
CAPTAIN	I 100	I 67	I 71	I 70	I 39	I 347
	I	I	I	I	I	I 40.3
MAJOR	I 11	I 23	I 78	I 43	I 21	I 176
	I	I	I	I	I	I 20.4
LT COL	I 43	I 19	I 21	I 0	I 0	I 83
	I	I	I	I	I	I 9.6
COLONEL	I 10	I 6	I 2	I 0	I 0	I 18
	I	I	I	I	I	I 2.1
COLUMN TOTAL	235 27.3	165 19.1	229 26.6	146 16.9	87 10.1	862 100.0

*d. Promotion and Selection*

Table 15 displays the distribution of respondents by paygrade concerning satisfaction with promotion opportunity. About 49.4 percent of the total was dissatisfied with promotion opportunity. As shown in Table 15, officer personnel in middle grades (CPT through LT COL) have higher dissatisfaction with promotion results.

Table 16 shows the distributions of respondents concerning selections for advanced educations and performance evaluations for officer personnel. Table 16 indicates that there were a few officers dissatisfied, about 12.1 percent for selection and 18.7 percent for performance evaluation. The paygrades of Major and Captain tend to have higher proportions of dissatisfaction with both cases, possibly because they have greater concern with selection and evaluation relative to promotion.

**Table 15. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION BY PAYGRADE**

		SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION									
COUNT	PAYGRADE	I	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY DIS	DIS	SATISFIE	ROW	
		VERY	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY DIS	DIS	SATISFIE	TOTAL	
		IISFIED	D	D		FIED	SATISFIE				
	2ND LT	9	10	37	31	0				87	
		3.9	11.5	35.2	34.7	14.7				100.0	
	1ST LT	16	21	97	17	0				151	
		5.3	6.7	29.8	5.1	0.0				17.5	
	CAPTAIN	0	23	54	172	98				347	
		0.0	6.6	15.8	49.6	28.2				40.3	
	MAJOR	6	30	87	48	5				176	
		1.8	8.8	25.6	13.6	1.4				20.4	
	LT COL	3	10	17	29	24				83	
		0.9	3.0	5.1	8.7	7.2				9.6	
	COLONEL	0	5	11	2	0				18	
		0.0	1.5	3.1	0.6	0.0				2.1	
	COLUMN TOTAL	34	99	303	299	127				862	
		3.9	11.5	35.2	34.7	14.7				100.0	



Table 16. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SELECTION FOR ADVANCED ED-  
UCATION AND SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE  
EVALUATION BY PAYGRADE

		SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION									
PAYGRADE	COUNT	I	I	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY DIS	ROW		
		I	I	I	D	I	FIED	SATISFIE	TOTAL		
		----	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
1		I	12	I	6	I	54	I	15	I	87
2ND LT		I		I		I		I		I	10.1
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
2		I	4	I	5	I	129	I	13	I	151
1ST LT		I		I		I		I		I	17.5
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
3		I	18	I	112	I	168	I	49	I	347
CAPTAIN		I		I		I		I		I	40.3
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
4		I	12	I	24	I	117	I	23	I	176
MAJOR		I		I		I		I		I	20.4
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
5		I	15	I	18	I	47	I	3	I	83
LT COLONEL		I		I		I		I		I	9.6
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
6		I	2	I	7	I	8	I	1	I	18
COLONEL		I		I		I		I		I	2.1
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
	COLUMN		63		172		523		104		862
	TOTAL		7.3		20.0		60.7		12.1		100.0

  

		SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE EVALUATION											
PAYGRADE	COUNT	I	I	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY DIS	ROW				
		I	I	I	D	I	FIED	SATISFIE	TOTAL				
		----	+	+	+	+	+	+	+				
1		I	10	I	17	I	46	I	14	I	0	I	87
2ND LT		I		I		I		I		I		I	10.1
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
1		I	0	I	54	I	76	I	21	I	0	I	151
1ST LT		I		I		I		I		I		I	17.5
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
3		I	97	I	56	I	123	I	71	I	0	I	347
CAPTAIN		I		I		I		I		I		I	40.3
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
4		I	7	I	56	I	69	I	24	I	20	I	176
MAJOR		I		I		I		I		I		I	20.4
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
5		I	16	I	40	I	19	I	8	I	0	I	83
LT COL		I		I		I		I		I		I	9.6
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
6		I	1	I	5	I	9	I	3	I	0	I	18
COLONEL		I		I		I		I		I		I	2.1
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
	COLUMN		131		228		342		141		20		862
	TOTAL		15.2		26.5		39.7		16.4		2.3		100.0

e. *Other Compensation Packages*

Table 17 gives a breakdown of respondents by paygrade concerning satisfaction with government quarters. It shows that about 51.9 percent of the total was dissatisfied with government quarters. It is interesting to note that no one in the Lieutenant grades was satisfied with government quarters.

Table 18 displays the distribution of respondents concerning satisfaction with rewards and leave policies for officer personnel. About 21.7 percent of the officers surveyed indicated that they were dissatisfied with rewards. In addition, 82.1 percent of the total were dissatisfied with leave policies. This may be due to the fact that, even though Army regulations encourage officers to take regular leave twice a year, it is not always allowed. That seems to be an unwritten law in the Army.

Table 17. **CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH QUARTERS BY PAYGRADE**

COUNT	QUARTERS										ROW TOTAL
	I VERY D	SAT ISFIED	SATISFIE D	NORMAL	DISSATIS FIED	VERY DIS SATISFIE					
PAYGRADE	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
2ND LT	0	0	0	32	55	0					87
	0	0	0	32	55	0					10.1
1ST LT	0	0	0	36	54	61					151
	0	0	0	36	54	61					17.5
CAPTAIN	17	29	101	157	43						347
	17	29	101	157	43						40.3
MAJOR	0	22	89	65	0						176
	0	22	89	65	0						20.4
LT COL	19	38	15	11	0						83
	19	38	15	11	0						9.6
COLONEL	6	9	2	1	0						18
	6	9	2	1	0						2.1
COLUMN TOTAL	42	98	275	343	104						862
	4.9	11.4	31.9	39.8	12.1						100.0

Table 18. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS AND LEAVE BY PAYGRADE

PAYGRADE	COUNT	REWARDS					ROW TOTAL
		VERY SATISFIED	SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	
2ND LT		0	39	33	15	0	87
		14.3	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0
1ST LT		0	45	79	27	0	151
		17.5	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0
CAPTAIN		102	76	111	43	15	347
		40.3	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0
MAJOR		0	67	43	54	12	176
		20.4	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0
LT COL		17	19	26	21	0	83
		9.6	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0
COLONEL		4	11	3	0	0	18
		2.1	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL		123	257	295	160	27	862
		14.3	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1	100.0

  

PAYGRADE	COUNT	LEAVE				ROW TOTAL
		SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	
2ND LT		0	17	37	33	87
		10.1	13.5	30.7	51.4	100.0
1ST LT		0	19	45	87	151
		17.5	29.8	34.2	18.6	100.0
CAPTAIN		21	12	48	266	347
		40.3	29.8	34.2	18.6	100.0
MAJOR		17	27	77	55	176
		20.4	29.8	34.2	18.6	100.0
LT COL		0	36	47	0	83
		9.6	29.8	34.2	18.6	100.0
COLONEL		0	5	11	2	18
		2.1	29.8	34.2	18.6	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL		38	116	265	443	862
		4.4	13.5	30.7	51.4	100.0

Table 19 displays the distribution of respondents by paygrade concerning dissatisfaction with extended work hours. There were 39.8 percent of the respondents who were dissatisfied with extended work hours when not given any compensation for the extra work hours. The higher the paygrade of the respondents, the higher was the degree of dissatisfaction with extended work hours. This could be related to the marital status of respondents. No one likes extended work hours ; however, the level of dissatisfaction differs between married and single personnel. The married personnel tend to dislike work after service hours.

**Table 19. CROSSTABULATION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS BY PAYGRADE**

COUNT	DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS										ROW TOTAL
	I	VERY DIS	DISSATIS	NORMAL	SATISFIE	VERY SAT					
	ISATISFIE	IED		D	ISFIED						
PAYGRADE	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I					
2ND LT	0	6	69	12	0						87
											10.1
1ST LT	0	24	81	46	0						151
											17.5
CAPTAIN	28	154	107	42	16						347
											40.3
MAJOR	43	56	44	33	0						176
											20.4
LT COL	7	11	58	7	0						83
											9.6
COLONEL	2	12	3	1	0						18
											2.1
COLUMN TOTAL	80	263	362	141	16						862
	9.3	30.5	42.0	16.4	1.9						100.0

*f. Summary*

The survey results of 862 officers have shown that the majority of the officer personnel surveyed found their compensation packages unsuitable. They also found the current retirement system unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, 88.8 percent of officer personnel surveyed judged their units' combat readiness to be high, as shown in Table 20.

Moreover, 31.3 percent of the total officers indicated that they were satisfied with military life, while 26.2 percent of the group responded as dissatisfied, as shown in Table 21. Officers in lower grades tend to have lower satisfaction with military life. About 56.3 percent of the total judged their military career as satisfactory. It is very difficult for foreigners to understand the situation that officers may be satisfied with military life even though they are not satisfied with compensation packages.

**Table 20. CROSSTABULATION OF ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS BY PAYGRADE**

COUNT	ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS							ROW TOTAL
	I I I I I I I	VERY HIGH	HIGH	NORMAL	LOW	VERY LOW	I	
PAYGRADE	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I	I	
2ND LT	9	24	43	11	0	87	10.1	
1ST LT	0	46	87	16	2	151	17.5	
CAPTAIN	61	161	79	31	15	347	40.3	
MAJOR	23	89	43	21	0	176	20.4	
LT COL	18	54	11	0	0	83	9.6	
COLONEL	3	13	2	0	0	18	2.1	
COLUMN TOTAL	114	387	265	79	17	862	100.0	
	13.2	44.9	30.7	9.2	2.0			



Table 21. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE AND MILITARY CAREER BY PAYGRADE

		SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE								
COUNT	PAYGRADE	I	VERY	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY	DIS	ROW
		IISFIED	SATISFIED	D	D	FIED	FIED	SATISFIED	SATISFIED	
	2ND LT	10	18	20	39	0				87
	1ST LT	0	39	54	44	14				151
	CAPTAIN	15	67	200	65	0				347
	MAJOR	21	23	79	53	0				176
	LT COL	29	25	18	11	0				83
	COLONEL	6	8	4	0	0				18
	COLUMN TOTAL	81	180	375	212	14				862
		9.4	20.9	43.5	24.6	1.6				100.0

  

		SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER								
COUNT	PAYGRADE	I	VERY	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY	DIS	ROW
		IISFIED	SATISFIED	D	D	FIED	FIED	SATISFIED	SATISFIED	
	2ND LT	14	33	14	24	2				87
	1ST LT	34	36	59	19	3				151
	CAPTAIN	68	81	164	18	16				347
	MAJOR	66	74	25	11	0				176
	LT COL	51	11	18	3	0				83
	COLONEL	10	7	1	0	0				18
	COLUMN TOTAL	243	242	281	75	21				862
		28.2	28.1	32.6	8.7	2.4				100.0

## 2. Results from NPS Students Questionnaire

There were 30 respondents returning the questionnaire that was administered at the Naval Postgraduate School. Table 22 indicates the distribution of the respondents by paygrade and service branch. Paygrade distribution was one Lieutenant, 12 Captains, 16 Majors, and one LT Colonel. Branches represented for the respondents were 12 Infantry, 3 Artillery, 6 Engineer, 5 Communication, and 4 other branches. All were graduates of the Korea Military Academy, except one officer commissioned from an ROTC program. Though this sample is not considered large enough to make broad generalizations, it does supplement the analysis of ROK Army compensation policies.

**Table 22. CROSSTABULATION OF SERVICE BRANCH BY PAYGRADE**

COUNT	BRANCH					ROW TOTAL
	I INFANTRY	A RTILLER Y	E ENGINEER	C COMMUNIC ATION	O OTHERS	
PAYGRADE	1	0	0	0	0	1
1ST LT	3	0	2	4	3	12
CAPTAIN	8	2	4	1	1	16
MAJOR	0	1	0	0	0	1
LT COL						3.3
COLUMN TOTAL	12	3	6	5	4	30
	40.0	10.0	20.0	16.7	13.3	100.0

Table 23 shows the frequency of reasons why the respondents chose to stay in the military. In order to accurately assess the attitudes of the respondents, the respondent was asked to select one or more reasons why he was staying in the service. Each respondent chose an average of 3 reasons from the 9 items given in the example. The numbers (1 through 9) under the cell of 'VALUE' represent the serial order of U. S. Navy officers' reasons for staying in the military service. The result shown in Table 23 differs from those of U. S. Navy officers. Specifically, ROK Army students at NPS responded that they were staying in the service "for the opportunity to serve my country"

as the most significant reason, while U. S. Navy officers indicated it as the fourth. No one chose "to obtain a military retirement".

Table 23. FREQUENCY OF REASONS STAYING IN SERVICE

REASONS STAYING IN SERVICE					
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
TO PERFORM MEANINGFUL, CHALLENGING WORK	1	20	23.3	23.3	23.3
TO OBTAIN RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY POSITIONS	2	6	7.0	7.0	30.3
TO USE MY ABILITIES, SKILLS, EDUCATION	3	13	15.1	15.1	45.4
FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE MY COUNTRY	4	21	24.4	24.4	69.8
TO OBTAIN A MILITARY RETIREMENT	5	0	0	0	69.8
TO OBTAIN GOOD PAY AND ALLOWANCES	6	2	2.3	2.3	72.1
FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMAND	7	11	12.8	12.8	84.9
TO ENJOY MILITARY LIFE	8	8	9.3	9.3	94.2
OTHERS	9	5	5.8	5.8	100.0
TOTAL		86	100.0	100.0	

Over 83 percent of the respondents indicated that they were dissatisfied with their RMC as compared with civilian earnings. The remaining respondents (16.7 percent) estimated that their RMC was comparable to the earnings of their civilian counterparts. No one answered that he earned more than his civilian counterpart, as shown in Table 24.

Table 25 displays the distribution of the respondents concerning their expectation for RMC compared with their civilian counterparts. In considering military job characteristics, such as wartime risk, frequent movings, hazardous missions and trainings, family separation, DMZ duty, and extended work hours, 70 percent of the respondents thought that their RMC should be greater than civilian's earnings. About 26.7 percent indicated that their RMC should be similar to that of their civilian counterpart, while 3.3 percent felt it should be lower.

Table 24. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH CURRENT RMC BY PAYGRADE

SATISFACTION WITH RMC	COUNT	PAYGRADE				ROW TOTAL
		1ST LT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LT COL	
1. RMC IS GREATER THAN CIVILIAN EARNINGS	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
2. RMC IS COMPARABLE TO CIVILIAN EARNINGS	5	1	4	0	0	16.7
3. RMC IS LOWER THAN CIVILIAN EARNINGS	25	11	12	1	1	83.3
COLUMN TOTAL	30	1	12	16	1	30
		3.3	40.0	53.3	3.3	100.0

Table 25. CROSSTABULATIONS OF RMC EXPECTATION COMPARING WITH CIVILIAN COUNTERPART

RMC EXPECTATION	COUNT	PAYGRADE				ROW TOTAL
		1ST LT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LT COL	
1. RMC SHOULD BE GREATER THAN CIVILIAN	21	1	7	12	1	70.0
2. RMC SHOULD BE SIMILAR TO CIVILIAN	8	0	5	3	0	26.7
3. RMC SHOULD BE LOWER THAN CIVILIAN	1	0	0	1	0	3.3
COLUMN TOTAL	30	1	12	16	1	30
		3.3	40.0	53.3	3.3	100.0

Table 26 indicates the respondents' expectations relative to compensation and job security. They were asked to select one response from the expectations that had been given, such as lifetime employment in the military, remarkable increases in current R.M.C, and others. About 60 percent of the respondents chose lifetime employment,

while 40 percent of the total preferred the improvement of current RMC conditions. The table shows that, as their paygrade goes up, they tend to slightly prefer lifetime employment over the improvement of RMC conditions.

**Table 26. CROSSTABULATION OF CHOICE OF EXPECTATION BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND JOB SECURITY BY PAYGRADE**

CHOICE OF EXPECTATION	COUNT	PAYGRADE					ROW TOTAL
		I	1ST LT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LT COLONEL	
		I	I	I	I	I	
1. LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT		0	7	10	1	18	
						60.0	
2. IMPROVEMENT OF RMC LEVEL		1	5	6	0	12	
						40.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		1	12	16	1	30	
		3.3	40.0	53.3	3.3	100.0	

Table 27 displays the distribution of the respondents' expectations concerning their job security in the future. About 93.9 percent of the respondents estimated that they would leave the military someday and get another job, feeling that the military could not give them the opportunity for lifetime employment. There were only 6.7 percent of the total who judged their job security as permanent.

Table 28 displays the opinions of the respondents relative to the best method for the retention of high quality officers. Eighteen respondents suggested that the ROK Army should first improve the compensation level for the retention of qualified officers. Seventeen respondents also pointed out that the Army should offer the officer corps job security and lifetime employment policies. It is very interesting to note that improvement of the compensation package was preferred more by junior officers, while senior officers preferred job security over compensation improvement. One of the most surprising comments was that almost all officers indicated that the ROK Army could not recruit or retain high quality officers solely based on loyalty and patriotic spirit.



Table 27. CROSSTABULATION OF EXPECTATION OF JOB SECURITY BY PAYGRADE

EXPECTATION	COUNT	PAYGRADE					ROW TOTAL
		I	1ST LT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LT COL	
		I	I	I	I	I	
1. EXPECT AS A LIFETIME JOB		0	1	1	1	0	2
		I	I	I	I	I	6.7
2. CANNOT EXPECT AS A LIFETIME JOB		1	11	15	1	1	28
		I	I	I	I	I	93.3
COLUMN TOTAL		1	12	16	1	30	30
		3.3	40.0	53.3	3.3	100.0	100.0

Table 28. FREQUENCY OF OPINIONS FOR RETENTION OF HIGH QUALITY OFFICERS

VALUE LABEL	OPINION ORDER	TOTAL FREQUENCY	JUNIOR GRADE	SENIOR GRADE
1. IMPROVEMENT OF COMPENSATION PACKAGES	1	18	11	7
2. JOB SECURITY AND LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT	2	17	8	9
3. ELIMINATION OF AUTHORITY IN MILITARY SOCIETY	3	8	8	0
4. EXPANSION OF OPPORTUNITY FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION	4	7	2	5
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW MILITARY ETHOS	5	6	4	2
6. EFFICIENT AND SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	6	4	2	2
7. INCREASED RECOGNITION FOR EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE	6	4	3	1
8. PUBLIC INFORMATION FOR MILITARY LIFE	6	4	3	1
9. IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT QUARTERS AND FACILITIES	7	3	2	1

## IV. ANALYSIS

### A. COMPENSATION POLICIES

A result of both surveys that seems at first glance to be relatively minor really is of great overall importance. That result is the difference between the distributions of satisfaction with military life and compensation. The distribution of satisfaction with military life should be affected by satisfaction with military compensation packages in a normal manner. However, this is not necessarily true in the ROK Army. It is very difficult for foreign people to understand this aspect of Korean ethos. A major proportion of the respondents were not satisfied with current military compensation packages, extended work hours, hazardous job conditions, frequent movings, and family separation. Nevertheless, a large number of the respondents were satisfied with military life, because they believe that serving their country without concern for personal profitability is the best worth in life.

The traditional Korean ethos has been changing along with changes in the social environment. Korean society has been at the edge of multi-consumption since the late 1970s, due to the rapid growth of the economy. Therefore, many young men prefer to get a job that would provide a stable and economic life. Youths do not want to join the military without substantial compensation for their service to the country. As shown in Table 28, the ROK Army of today could not recruit and retain high quality officers based solely on loyalty and patriotic spirit.

The ROK Army compensation packages have taken a turn for the better as the civilian wage levels increase. However, the level of military compensation still is far below average civilian earnings. The services have typically indicated that if pay policies do not meet junior officers' needs, these officers may leave the military just after completion of the compulsory service term.

Approximately two-thirds of the respondents were not satisfied with current military compensation policies. A large percentage of the respondents indicated that their RMC was much lower than that in the comparable civilian sector, and that their RMC should be higher than civilian average earnings. About 63 percent of the respondents on the first survey indicated that they were dissatisfied with their RMC itself, and about 68.9

percent of respondents indicated that they were dissatisfied with their pay level compared with that of their civilian counterpart.

It is also interesting to note that the degree of academy graduates' dissatisfaction with RMC was slightly higher than that of others. Approximately 83.3 percent of respondents to the NPS survey, who all were graduates of the military academy, indicated that their RMC was lower than the average earnings of their civilian counterpart. About 70 percent of the respondents also indicated that their RMC should be higher than compensation in the civilian sector, when considering military job characteristics. This refers to the fact that their expectations of compensation are slightly higher than non-academy graduates, because they may be assigned to key positions in a unit, and thus have more difficult assignments. It could be explained that academy graduates' dissatisfaction with extended work hours was much higher than that of the total respondents.

The respondents in paygrade Captain and above were predominantly married; however, these career personnel were far from adhering strictly to the present pay and allowance system. As members become more senior and accept more job responsibility, they also become more independent and self-reliant.

A sizeable portion of junior officers were more dissatisfied with their RMC than were senior officers. Moreover, as paygrade decreases, the proportion of allowances to base pay decreases, as shown in Table 5. That fact infers that some incentive allowances do not have any effect on the retention of junior officers. As shown in Table 7, as the members become more junior, their RMC level becomes lower. Basically, the base pay of the junior officer, without distinction of long-term or compulsory service, is not usually applied to living expenses but used more as pocket money. Because junior officers might not have dependents, the government provides Bachelor Officer Quarters, and mess dining facilities.

Obviously, current military compensation policies do not compensate members for their selfless contribution to the country. Even though they are being provided government quarters and medical care, a large percentage of the respondents were not satisfied with those compensation packages. Business firms also provide those compensation packages to their employees. Although several kinds of basic allowances are provided, they have little effect on retention of junior officers, because the proportion of allowances to base pay is too small. Special allowances such as allowance for hazards and technical allowance also do not provide satisfaction to junior officers. Thus, the retention effect of RMC and special allowances on junior officers is probably small.

Most respondents also indicated that a special allowance for typical military job conditions should be provided for recruitment and retention of qualified officer personnel. Currently, DMZ duty allowance is provided to only the enlisted personnel. However, a sizeable portion of the respondents suggested that a DMZ duty allowance should be provided to officer personnel when assigned to DMZ and FEBA (Forward Edge Battle Area) duty. A major proportion of junior officers who are serving in compulsory service may be assigned to the DMZ and FEBA, usually isolated from nearby civilian villages. They are usually not afforded leave and a break time, even on holidays and weekends. However, there is no hardship allowance for service without holidays and leave at the DMZ or FEBA. Junior officers probably recognize that DMZ duty is a way of military life. Under these conditions, it is very hard to get high retention of qualified officers.

When the world-wide depression in the economy arose in 1973 and 1979 (the first and second oil shock), the retention rates of junior officers increased remarkably. However, it was doubtful that a significant proportion of qualified people really wanted to stay in the Army. Of course, there are a lot of factors that go into the retention decision. Compensation is only one of the factors. If members feel that the service is sincerely concerned with their individual needs and that compensation is equitable, the probability of recruiting and the retention of high quality youths would probably be higher than at present.

## **B. PERSONNEL MANPOWER MANAGEMENT POLICIES**

A large percentage of the respondents of the NPS survey indicated that the ROK Army needs to improve not only compensation policies but also the condition of job security when attempting to recruit and retain high quality officers. Improvement of job security conditions is necessary not only for high retention, but also for efficient manpower management of the ROK Army.

As described in chapter I, the ROK Army should improve a significant problem in manpower management, which is the shortage of officer personnel. The personnel manpower requirements for the military services in Korea are approximately 430,000 youths every year for both officer and enlisted personnel. However, the youth population of service age has gradually decreased since the early 1980s, and continues to decrease through 1985. This is a result of the government-administered policy of reducing birth-rates in 1962 and the youth population just now coming of age for military service.



If the youth population of service age does not meet the personnel manpower requirement needs of the services, two methods are suggested: to reduce military strengths or to increase the term of military service (currently 30 months as an enlisted person in the Army). However, it is impossible to reduce military strength when confronted with North Korea's increasing military strength. Therefore, the government had to focus on the extension of the term of military service. As a result, the military service law, concerned with extension of the military service term of enlisted personnel, was revised in 1985.

As the youth population decreases, the recruitment of officer personnel also becomes more difficult. Consequently, the quality of officer personnel is getting lower and lower. Thus, the ROK Army should strive to improve the efficiency of its manpower management system.

### **1. Promotion and Retirement Systems**

A large portion of the respondents indicated that the ROK Army should work to improve the current promotion system. Primarily, this is necessary for efficient personnel manpower management, and could solve the problem of officer shortage and reduce manpower costs.

A sizeable proportion of the respondents who were graduates of the military academy pointed out the fact that the minimum time-in-grade requirements for promotion are too short, and that they could hardly have the opportunity to improve their knowledge or acquire experience since time requirements in key positions is critical to career paths.

For example, the minimum time in grade requirement for Captain is four years. In the case of an infantry officer, just after promotion to Captain, he must take the Officer Advanced Course (OAC) for six months and then take over the post of a rifle company commander for 30 months. Thus, he must spend 36 months as the basic requirement for careers advancement. After finishing a term as company commander, he is probably assigned to a staff officer position of a Battalion or Regiment Headquarters to prepare to be selected for promotion to the next higher grade.

Such a fast promotion system hardly utilizes personnel manpower efficiently for very long. If the officer is not selected for promotion in a given time, he must leave the service. As the result, the Army has to spend more to educate and train replacement officer personnel, and does meet the problem of officer personnel shortages. Therefore, if the minimum time in grade requirement is extended by changing the current pro-



motion system, the Army can utilize officer manpower for a longer time and cope with the problem of officer shortages.

The second purpose is to obtain the effect of increasing officers' satisfaction relative to job security, so that the officer corps can serve in the military with high morale and sincerity, and the Army can sustain high levels of combat readiness. As shown in Table 27, 93.3 percent of the respondents estimated that they expected to leave the military in the near future and get a civilian job because of the cost of living. As members become more senior, they have more concerns about job security than have junior officers. The respondents in senior grades also prefer the improvement of job security conditions over compensation packages, while junior officers prefer the improvement of compensation packages over the improvement of job security. This may indicate that senior officers obtain higher levels of RMC as compared with junior officers, and that they have to leave the military sooner than junior officers. Therefore, the changing of the current promotion system may offer the officer corps the opportunity of staying in the service more along the line of lifetime employment.

The retirement system is directly related to the promotion system. As described in the previous section, each officer of the Army who is not recommended for promotion to the next higher grade must be retired on the earliest date stipulated by the law of mandatory retirements. A majority of officers who were retired by the mandatory retirements had to leave the military because of maximum service years in each grade.

For example, the conditions of mandatory retirement in the paygrade of Captain are a maximum 8 years service as a Captain, 14 years of service, and 43 years old. If an officer was commissioned at age 24, he could be promoted to Captain at least by age 28, which is four years after commission. In considering years of service, he could remain in the service until his 38th birthday (i. e., 14 years from age 24) or until his 43rd birthday when considering maximum age. However, he must leave the military before age 36 by the maximum years service in grade, which is the earlier date of the conditions of current mandatory requirement. If the law were such that the officer shall be retired on the latest of the dates, he could serve in the military until age 43 as a maximum. Thus, if he is not selected for promotion, he would leave the military 7 years earlier when compared with retirement due to maximum age. Therefore, if the Army revises the condition of mandatory retirement requirements, the Army can use its officer personnel for a longer time and thus cope with the problem of manpower shortages.

Any organization within the military or most businesses has basically a pyramidal form of rank structure. Under this organizational structure, as members reach a higher rank, promotion opportunity to the next higher rank is getting more and more difficult.

As members become more senior, the proportion of promotion for academy graduates increases considerably. It means that the promotion of non-academy graduates is getting more and more difficult. Thus, almost all junior officers who are not graduates of the academy realize the fact that their promotion opportunity is getting more difficult as they progress higher and higher up the pyramid, and thus would have negative effect for retention of qualified officers.

## **2. Cost and Effectiveness**

It is not easy to analyze the cost and effectiveness of current systems as compared with an alternative, specifically focusing on training costs and manpower efficiency. Table 29 shows the typical education and training costs of an infantry officer who was commissioned after graduation from the Korea Military Academy (KMA). The reason why the academy graduate is selected as a sample of the model is that they have typical education and training courses rather than others.

The major portion of the education and training costs for an infantry officer is the result of education and training at the KMA for 4 years. The costs for the education at the KMA was calculated from the total budget of the KMA divided by the total number of cadets for 4 years, which included base pay of cadets for 4 years. The costs of other courses did not include the base pay and allowances of the officer students.

The military's investment of the military in the education and training of its members is probably greater than that of any organizations in the government or private sector in Korea. Nevertheless, the ROK Army may not be paying much attention to the returns of its investment. The Army should consider the effect of its investment in the education and training of officer personnel relative to efficient personnel manpower management. Thus, the higher the extension rate of qualified officers, the lower the manpower costs being consumed for training of recruited personnel.

Table 29. TYPICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING COSTS OF THE ACADEMY GRADUATED INFANTRY OFFICER, IN 1987  
(Unit : WON)

Courses	Period	Paygrade	Cost per person
Military Academy	4 years	Cadets	33,765,000
Officer Basic Course	18 weeks	2 LT	1,307,000
Officer Advanced Course	28 weeks	Captain	1,090,000
Army War College	16 - 48 weeks	Major	2,443,776
Total Cost	-	-	38,605,776

\* Source : Current costs of Training and Education for the Officer Personnel reported by the Office of Accounting Department, 1988.

Table 30 shows the average service years of academy graduates in the current promotion and retirement systems : Case 1 is the case of officers who promoted to General officers with average service of 26 years ; Case 2 is the case of those who promoted to Colonel, but did not promote to General, and average years of service of 24 years ; Case 3 is the case of officers who did not promote to Colonel and retired with paygrade of LT Colonel with average years of service of 19 years. The proportion of each case in the cohort was estimated to be 15 percent for Case 1, 40 percent for Case 2, and 45 percent for Case 3. Therefore, the total average of service years of the academy graduates might be less than 23 years.

Almost all academy graduates promote to at least LT Colonel. Among them, less than 55 percent promote to Colonel, and less than 15 percent of the total graduates might promote to General. Thus, approximately 45 percent of academy graduates must leave the military before their 20th year in the service, even though the Army had invested a tremendous cost in their education and training.

**Table 30. CURRENT AVERAGE YEARS OF SERVICE OF ACADEMY GRADUATES**

Paygrade	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3
Lieutenant	3	3	3
Captain	4	4	4
Major	4	4	4
LT Colonel	5	6	8
Colonel	5	8	-
General	6	-	-
Total Years of Service	27	25	19
Portion of the Cohort	15 %	40 %	45 %
Average Years of Service of Total Cohort	22.6 Years		

\* Source : Adapted from ROK Army Regulation 110 - 3, "Officer Personnel ; Separations", and Data from The Personnel Department of ROK Army Headquarters.

Table 31 displays the estimated years of service of academy graduates when considering alternative changes in the promotion and retirement system in the ROK Army. This alternative model does not consider all of the factors that affect the personnel manpower management of the ROK Army. It is just an example of the alternatives available when considering the efficient management of manpower, which might lead to the elimination of manpower problems and the expansion of job security for the recruiting and retention of high quality officers.

The minimum time-in-grade requirement for promotion, in the case of the alternative model, is extended one year longer than the current system, which is improved over consideration of maximum years of service in the retirement system. As a result, if an officer promotes to General, he could serve in the military for at least 33 years, which is 6 years greater than under the current system. Even if he could not promote to Colonel, it might be possible to stay in the service for a minimum of 24 years, which is 5 years longer than that of the current system. These changes in the promotion and retirement systems would be helpful for efficient manpower management of the ROK Army. In other words, extension of years of service is necessary for not only recruiting



and retention of high quality officers, but also for reducing the costs of training of officers.

**Table 31. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR EXTENDED YEARS OF SERVICE OF THE ACADEMY GRADUATES**

Paygrade	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3
Lieutenant	5	5	5
Captain	5	5	5
Major	5	5	5
LT Colonel	6	6	9
Colonel	6	9	-
General	6	-	-
Total Years of Service	33	30	24
Portion of the Cohort	15 %	40 %	45 %
Average Years of Service of Total Cohort	27.8 Years		

Therefore, an improvement of the current promotion and retirement system could have the effect of increasing the efficiency of personnel manpower management, by eliminating manpower problems and strengthening the levels of combat readiness of the ROK Army, through the recruiting and retention of high quality officers.

### C. OTHER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICIES

A large proportion of the respondents indicated that the ROK Army should strive to resolve some insufficiencies of personnel management for the successful recruiting and retention of qualified personnel. A majority of the respondents suggested that the Army make efforts to remove typical military authoritarianism, such as exact obedience to any order of a superior, ignoring a junior officer's reasonable suggestion, and extended work hours without compensation. These shortcomings caused by authoritarianism probably reduce the retention of high quality officers.

A significant proportion of the respondents also suggested that the Army should strive to work for an efficient personnel management system, specifically focusing on



reasonable selections for promotion and advanced education, fairness of performance evaluations of officer personnel, and fairness of rewards. They also suggested expansion of education opportunity as a way to increase retention rates. This dissatisfaction with the quality of personnel management in the Army undoubtedly had a negative effect on qualified officers' retention decisions.

Dissatisfaction with the quality and conditions of government quarters was considerable for junior officers. Dissatisfaction with leave was also greatest regardless of paygrade. This dissatisfaction with quarters and leave also had a negative effect on junior officers' retention decisions.

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research has examined current military compensation policies with a view toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for the recruitment and retention of high quality officers.

The most obvious finding of both surveys is the desire by sizeable portions of all respondents for changes in the present compensation system. In general, present compensation policies are not sufficient enough to cope with the problems of personnel manpower management of the ROK Army. Specific policy changes that might be indicated by the surveys are as follows :

1. Pay compensation should be improved to at least the level of the civilian sector, specifically focusing on increasing initial base pay of junior officers and a special allowance compensating for typical military job conditions and DMZ/FEBA duty. Before finishing their compulsory service, junior officers probably compare military compensation with level of civilian compensation that they could obtain by entering a private firm after military service. However, current levels of military pay do not compare favorably with compensation in the civilian sector. Compensations of this type may already be having an adverse effect on the retention rate of high quality officers. The Army should offer sufficient compensation to the officers who want to serve in the military after compulsory service. All officers should be considered, though the Army may wish to give special attention to career military officers with between 3 and 10 years of service. This would eliminate pay differentials between the military and the civilian sectors, and increase recruitment and retention rates of high quality officers.

2. Current promotion and retirement systems should be improved for enhancing job security of officer personnel. All officers would like to be able to serve by their age of late 50's as like the civilian sectors where the average of employees retire as a middle manager when their age becomes late 50's. In the long run, providing this job security would increase individual satisfaction and retention rates of high quality officers, and reduce the present manpower problem and training costs.

3. The Army should attempt to improve its own constitution, not only to increase the levels of combat readiness but also to increase the retention rate of high quality officers, as follows :

- The authoritarianism in the Army should be eliminated for the democratization of military life.
- The management and operations of the Army should be rationalized for efficiency and effectiveness.
- Most education and training should be undertaken with the objective of cultivating professionals.
- Individual capabilities should be esteemed primarily at the process of selection for promotion or education, and assignment to a key position.

Of course, it is impossible to expect immediate improvement of the Army's constitution. However, the Army should strive gradually to set it. Basically, the regulations for routine work must be kept for providing personal freedom after duty-hours, and regular leave.

4. The Army should expand the opportunity of education for degrees. The majority of those who get the opportunity of education are academy graduates. Thus, non-academy graduates are not satisfied the result of selection for advanced education. The expansion of education opportunities would provide greater incentive for the junior officer to remain in the Army.

5. The ROK Army should strive to make its personnel management system more objective. Performance evaluation and rewards systems should be improved not only to set a fairness of promotion selection, but also to provide increased recognition for excellent performance.

6. The ROK Army should pay attention on the public information for military life, which would increase the recruitment of excellent youths and the retention of high quality personnel.

7. The ROK Army should improve the quality and conditions of government quarters and facilities. There is a sizeable portion of married junior officers who are not provided quarters because of the shortage of the facilities.

## **B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

This study is explanatory and is intended to build a framework for further analyses. The results suggest that certain changes in the compensation policies of the ROK Army could have a positive influence on the recruitment and retention of high quality officers.

This finding is based largely on the responses of ROK Army officers to questions on two separate surveys. However, it should be noted that survey responses of the type examined here often tend to overstate the true level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a particular situation or policy. Survey respondents understand that expressions of satisfaction with pay or living conditions or the quality of military life will lead policymakers to accept the status quo and leave as much as possible unchanged. In particular terms, this means that no steps will be taken to raise pay or make improvements in areas where dissatisfaction does not appear to exist. When survey respondents are given anonymity, then, they may be more inclined to be "dissatisfied" with items such as compensation--realizing that there is nothing to be lost and something to be gained (a pay raise) by expressing their dissatisfaction.

A good test of members dissatisfaction is behavior. Survey responses can be linked with behavior through data file matching or longitudinal studies when personal identifiers are available. For example, there would be greater certainty that a particular expression of dissatisfaction about compensation was honestly stated if it could be shown that this attitude may have contributed directly to the member's decision to leave the military. The attempt to correlate attitudes with behavior would be an important area for further research.

## APPENDIX A. BASIC PAY MATRIX

Table 32. BASIC PAY MATRIX, 1980 - 1988

(Thousands of 1988 Wons)

YOS	Paygrade	1980	1981	1982	1983/4 -1	1985	1986	1987	1988
- 1	2 LT	91.0	100.1	105.1	143.5	148.5	157.3	163.3	177.9
1 -	1 LT	100.8	110.9	120.9	159.2	164.2	173.9	180.5	196.7
2 -		108.6	119.5	130.3	169.1	174.1	184.4	191.4	208.6
3 -	CPT	128.9	148.0	157.7	209.7	214.7	227.4	236.1	257.5
4 -		138.2	156.5	169.0	221.6	226.6	240.0	249.2	271.5
5 -		147.5	167.0	180.3	233.5	238.5	252.6	262.3	285.8
6 -		156.8	177.5	191.6	245.4	250.4	265.2	275.4	300.1
7 -	MAJ	179.0	202.8	218.9	274.2	279.2	295.7	307.5	334.2
8 -		186.9	214.8	231.8	287.8	292.8	301.1	322.4	350.6
9 -		200.2	226.8	244.7	301.4	306.4	324.5	337.3	367.0
10 -		210.8	238.8	257.6	315.0	310.0	338.9	352.2	383.4
11 -	LT COL	247.9	275.2	294.4	352.4	357.4	371.1	385.2	419.3
12 -		258.5	287.0	307.0	365.6	376.6	386.2	400.9	436.5
13 -		269.1	298.8	319.6	378.8	383.8	401.3	416.6	453.7
14 -		279.7	310.6	332.4	392.0	397.0	416.4	432.3	470.9
15 -		290.3	322.4	344.8	405.2	410.2	431.5	448.0	488.1
16 -	COL	332.9	356.4	377.8	428.3	433.3	452.0	469.3	511.4
17 -		343.7	368.0	390.1	441.2	446.2	466.7	484.6	528.1
18 -		354.5	379.6	402.4	454.1	459.1	481.4	499.9	544.8
19 -		365.3	391.2	414.7	467.0	472.0	496.1	575.2	561.5
20 -		378.1	402.8	427.0	479.9	484.9	510.8	530.5	578.2

-1 The government budget of FY 1984 was frozen.



## APPENDIX B. ROK ARMY HEADQUARTERS QUESTIONNAIRE

\*\*\*\*\* Note \*\*\*\*\*

- *The original questionnaire was composed of 107 questions, however, 29 questions were selected, concerned with the thesis topics.*

In answering to each question in section B, please answer on your answer sheet such as following example :

[ Example ]

- \* Strong Agree ----- 1
- \* Agree ----- 2
- \* So - So ----- 3
- \* Disagree ----- 4
- \* Strong Disagree ----- 5

**A. BACKGROUND**

1. In what branch are you serving ? ----- ( )  
(1) Infantry                      (2) Artillery                      (3) Armor  
(4) Engineer                      (5) Communication              (6) Others
  
2. What is your present paygrade ? ----- ( )  
(1) 2 LT      (2) 1 LT      (3) CPT      (4) MAJ      (5) LT COL      (6) COL
  
3. How long have you been on active duty ?  
(            ) years of service
  
4. How old were you on your last birthday ?  
(            ) years old
  
5. What is your marital status ? ----- ( )  
(1) Single                      (2) Married                      (3) Others

**B. GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

1. I think that I have pretty good adaptability to the military life.
2. I am quite satisfied with military career.
3. I think that military job coincides with my personal characteristics and preferences.
4. Military compensation package is comparable to that of the civilian with same career.
5. My tasks are too much to accomplish in proper time.
6. There is no problem concerning government quarters for officer personnel.
7. I have no problems in purchasing military clothes (utilization of military clothes exchange).
8. I think the citizens have good trust in military.

9. I have too much frequent times of day duty.
10. Rewardings in my unit are being done fairly.
11. I am concerned about finding job after retirement.
12. National security is the best important among other things as economical, social stability.
13. My unit has a good combat readiness to enemy's attack.
14. I think it is very difficult for the retirees to connect military career with the civilian jobs
15. Military pay level is proper when comparing with that of civilian sector.
16. I am very satisfied for being in military life.
17. I think the completion of performance evaluation is done with fairness.
18. It is very difficult to purchase electronic appliances on proper time.
19. There are many senior officers who are not willing to listen to their subordinates.
20. There are enough facilities provided for sports and recreation activities.
21. There are some military personnel who are worry about their debt problems.
22. I am quite agree with the selection process for promotion in the Army.
23. Currently, retirement benefits are well reflecting the compensation for the past military active service.
24. I should frequently stay in the base for extended work hours.
25. Medical care for the active service personnel is not provided by some reasons.
26. Most officer personnel is satisfied with the results of selection for advanced educations.

27. I am satisfied with my residential environments such like school, shopping and public transportation.
28. There are many military personnel who are dissatisfied with the requirements of mandatory retirements.
29. Regular leave for officer personnel is well scheduled and executed.

## APPENDIX C. COMPENSATION QUESTIONNAIRE

( *NPS Students Survey* )

### A. BACKGROUND

1. In what branch are you serving ? ----- ( )  
(1) Infantry                      (2) Artillery                      (3) Armor  
(4) Engineer                      (5) Communication                      (6) Others
  
2. What is your present paygrade ? ----- ( )  
(1) 2 LT      (2) 1 LT      (3) CPT      (4) MAJ      (5) LT COL      (6) COL
  
3. How long have you been on active duty ?  
(            ) years of service
  
4. How old were you on your last birthday ?  
(            ) years old
  
5. What is your marital status ? ----- ( )  
(1) Single                      (2) Married                      (3) Others
  
6. How long have you served at the DMZ areas ?  
(            ) years of service
  
7. What was (were) the significant reason(s) in your joining to the officer corps ? ( )
  - a. To perform meaningful and challenging work
  - b. To obtain positions of responsibility or authority
  - c. To use my abilities, skills, and education
  - d. For the opportunity to serve my country
  - e. To obtain a military retirement
  - f. To obtain good pay and allowances
  - g. For the opportunity to command
  - h. To enjoy military life
  - i. Others



## B. MILITARY COMPENSATION

8. Comparing your present RMC with civilian's earnings with the same age, which of the following items is the best statement ? ----- ( )
- a. My RMC is greater than civilian's earnings
  - b. My RMC is similar to civilian's earnings
  - c. My RMC is lower than civilian's earnings
9. Considering military characteristics such as, **wartime risk, frequent movings, hazardous mission and training, family separation, DMZ duty, and extended work hour**, which of the following conditions would you prefer ? ----- ( )
- a. RMC should be greater than civilian's earnings
  - b. RMC should be similar to civilian's earnings
  - c. RMC should be lower than civilian's earnings

## C. PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS

10. In terms of job security, which of the following statement is the best proper in considering your expectations both of promotion and retirement ? ----- ( )
- a. I can expect to serve in the military for my lifetime
  - b. Someday I should get another job when I have to leave the military
  - c. Not sure
11. If you were given a opportunity to chose one of between the improvement of current RMC and lifetime work in the military, which of the condition would you prefer ? ----- ( )
- a. Lifetime work in the service
  - b. The improvement of current RMC
  - c. Others

**D. GENERAL COMPENSATION POLICY**

12. Please give me any additional comments concerned ---

a. For Retention of qualified officers

b. For Efficient Personnel management of the Army

## APPENDIX D. COMPUTERIZED PROGRAM FOR ANALYSIS (SPSSX)

```
TITLE 'SURVEY1'  
FILE HANDLE SURVEY1 / NAME='SURVEY1 DATA A1'  
FILE HANDLE TEST / NAME = 'TEST SYS A1'  
DATA LIST FILE=SURVEY1 RECORDS=1 FIXED TABLES  
/1 PAYGRADE 2 (A)  
  BRANCH 4 (A)  
  AGE 6-7 (A)  
  YOS 9-10 (A)  
  MSTATUS 12 (A)  
  ADAPTBLT 14 (A)  
  CARSAT 16 (A)  
  COINCIDE 18 (A)  
  PAYLEVEL 20 (A)  
  OVERWORK 22 (A)  
  READINES 24 (A)  
  QUARTERS 26 (A)  
  MILCLOTH 28 (A)  
  RELIABL 30 (A)  
  DAYDUTY 32 (A)  
  REWARDS 34 (A)  
  RETIRJOB 36 (A)  
  NATNSECU 38 (A)  
  MCRELATN 40 (A)  
  PAYSATIS 42 (A)  
  MILSAT 44 (A)  
  EVALUATN 46 (A)  
  PXUTLZTN 48 (A)  
  COMNATTD 50 (A)  
  RECREATN 52 (A)  
  DEBTPROB 54 (A)  
  PROMOTN 56 (A)  
  FRNGBNFT 58 (A)  
  EXTENDWH 60 (A)  
  MEDICAL 62 (A)  
  SELECTN 64 (A)  
  ENVIRMT 66 (A)  
  RETIRMNT 68 (A)  
  LEAVE 70 (A)
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### VARIABLE LABELS

```
YOS 'YEARS OF SERVICE'  
MSTATUS 'MARITAL STATUS'  
ADAPTBLT 'ADAPTABILITY TO THE MILITARY LIFE'  
CARSAT 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER'  
COINCIDE 'PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS COINCIDANCE WITH MILITARY JOB'  
PAYLEVEL 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY PAY'  
OVERWORK 'DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS'
```

READINES 'LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS'  
 QUARTERS 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS'  
 MILCLOTH 'SATISFACTION WITH PURCHASING CONDITION OF MILITARY CLOTHES'  
 RELIABL 'CITIZEN TRUST IN THE MILITARY'  
 DAYDUTY 'FREQUENCY OF DAY DUTY TIMES'  
 REWARDS 'SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS'  
 RETIRJOB 'CONCERN ABOUT THE JOB AFTER RETIREMENT'  
 NATNSECU 'CONCERN ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY'  
 MCRELATN 'RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY JOB AND CIVILIAN JOB'  
 PAYSATIS 'SATISFACTION WITH PAY COMPARED WITH THE CIVILIAN'  
 MILSAT 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE'  
 EVALUATN 'SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMNACE EVALUATIONS'  
 PXUTLZTN 'DISSATISFACTION WITH UTILIZATION OF PX SYSTEM'  
 COMNATTD 'DISSATISFACTION WITH COMMANDER ATTITUDE'  
 RECREATN 'SATISFACTION WITH SPORTS AND RECREATION FACILITIES'  
 DEBTPROB 'DEBT PROBLEMS'  
 PROMOTN 'SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION'  
 FRNGBNFT 'SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS'  
 EXTENDWH 'DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENTED WORK HOURS'  
 MEDICAL 'DISSATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL CARE'  
 SELECTN 'SATISFACTION WITH SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION'  
 ENVIRMT 'SATISFACTION WITH RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS'  
 RETIRMNT 'DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS OF RETIREMENT REQUIREMENTS'  
 LEAVE 'SATISFACTION WITH REGULAR LEAVE'

VALUE LABELS

PAYGRADE '1' '2ND LT'  
           '2' '1ST LT'  
           '3' 'CAPTAIN'  
           '4' 'MAJOR'  
           '5' 'LT COLONEL'  
           '6' 'COLONEL'

/BRANCH '1' 'INFANTRY'  
           '2' 'ARTILLERY'  
           '3' 'ARMOR'  
           '4' 'ENGINEER'  
           '5' 'COMMUNICATION'  
           '6' 'OTHERS'

/MSTATUS '1' 'SINGLE'  
           '2' 'MARRIED'  
           '3' 'OTHERS'

/ADAPTLT COINCIDE READINES RELIABL DAYDUTY RETIRJOB  
 NATNSECU MCRELATN DEBTPROB  
           '1' 'VERY HIGH'  
           '2' 'HIGH'  
           '3' 'NORMAL'  
           '4' 'LOW'  
           '5' 'VERY LOW'

/CARSAT PAYLEVEL QUARTERS MILCLOTH REWARDS PAYSATIS MILSAT EVALUATN  
 RECREATN PROMOTN FRNGBNFT SELECTN ENVIRMT LEAVE  
           '1' 'VERY SATISFIED'  
           '2' 'SATISFIED'

'3' 'NORMAL'  
'4' 'DISSATISFIED'  
'5' 'VERY DISSATISFIED'

/OVERWORK PXUTLZTN COMNATTD EXTENDWH MEDICAL RETIRMNT

'1' 'VERY DISSATISFIED'  
'2' 'DISSATISFIED'  
'3' 'NORMAL'  
'4' 'SATISFIED'  
'5' 'VERY SATISFIED'

ADD VALUE LABELS

AGE '0' 'NO RESPONSE'  
/YOS '0' 'NO RESPONSE'  
/BRANCH '0' 'NO RESPONSE'

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=ALL/

FORMAT=DOUBLE/

CROSSTABS PAYGRADE BY MILSAT

CROSSTABS MILSAT BY PAYSATIS

CROSSTABS MILSAT BY READINES

SAVE OUTFILE =TEST



## APPENDIX E. STATISTICS DATA OF SURVEY RESULTS

### Q 1. PAYGRADE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
2ND LT	1	87	10.1	10.1	10.1
1ST LT	2	151	17.5	17.5	27.6
CAPTAIN	3	347	40.3	40.3	67.9
MAJOR	4	176	20.4	20.4	88.3
LT COLONEL	5	83	9.6	9.6	97.9
COLONEL	6	18	2.1	2.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

### Q 2. BRANCH

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INFANTRY	1	557	64.6	64.6	64.6
ARTILLERY	2	135	15.7	15.7	80.3
ARMOR	3	6	.7	.7	81.0
ENGINEER	4	65	7.5	7.5	88.5
COMMUNICATION	5	55	6.4	6.4	94.9
OTHERS	6	44	5.1	5.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

### Q 3. AGE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
	24	54	6.3	6.3	6.3
	25	68	7.9	7.9	14.2
	26	104	12.1	12.1	26.2
	27	44	5.1	5.1	31.3
	28	102	11.8	11.8	43.2
	29	114	13.2	13.2	56.4
	30	49	5.7	5.7	62.1
	31	60	7.0	7.0	69.0
	32	95	11.0	11.0	80.0
	33	29	3.4	3.4	83.4
	34	30	3.5	3.5	86.9
	35	12	1.4	1.4	88.3
	36	11	1.3	1.3	89.6
	37	24	2.8	2.8	92.3
	38	10	1.2	1.2	93.5

39	8	.9	.9	94.4
40	11	1.3	1.3	95.7
41	4	.5	.5	96.2
42	7	.8	.8	97.0
43	8	.9	.9	97.9
45	5	.6	.6	98.5
46	5	.6	.6	99.1
47	4	.5	.5	99.5
48	3	.3	.3	99.9
50	1	.1	.1	100.0
TOTAL	862	100.0	100.0	

Q4. YEARS OF SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
	1	54	6.3	6.3	6.3
	2	102	11.8	11.8	18.1
	3	82	9.5	9.5	27.6
	4	85	9.9	9.9	37.5
	5	112	13.0	13.0	50.5
	6	84	9.7	9.7	60.2
	7	60	7.0	7.0	67.2
	8	96	11.1	11.1	78.3
	9	42	4.9	4.9	83.2
	10	21	2.4	2.4	85.6
	11	9	1.0	1.0	86.7
	12	15	1.7	1.7	88.4
	13	17	2.0	2.0	90.4
	14	26	3.0	3.0	93.4
	15	10	1.2	1.2	94.5
	16	10	1.2	1.2	95.7
	17	12	1.4	1.4	97.1
	18	5	.6	.6	97.7
	19	4	.5	.5	98.1
	20	7	.8	.8	99.0
	21	4	.5	.5	99.4
	22	3	.3	.3	99.8
	23	2	.2	.2	100.0
TOTAL	862	100.0	100.0		

Q5. MARITAL STATUS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
SINGLE	1	296	34.3	34.3	34.3
MARRIED	2	566	65.7	65.7	100.0
TOTAL	862	100.0	100.0		

Q 6. ADAPTABILITY TO MILITARY LIFE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	192	22.3	22.3	22.3
HIGH	2	286	33.2	33.2	55.5
NORMAL	3	312	36.2	36.2	91.6
LOW	4	72	8.4	8.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 7. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	243	28.2	28.2	28.2
SATISFIED	2	242	28.1	28.1	56.3
NORMAL	3	281	32.6	32.6	88.9
DISSATISFIED	4	75	8.7	8.7	97.6
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	21	2.4	2.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 8. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS COINCIDANCE WITH MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	172	20.0	20.0	20.0
HIGH	2	187	21.7	21.7	41.6
NORMAL	3	380	44.1	44.1	85.7
LOW	4	73	8.5	8.5	94.2
VERY LOW	5	50	5.8	5.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 9. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY PAY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	6	.7	.7	.7
SATISFIED	2	79	9.2	9.2	9.9
NORMAL	3	183	21.2	21.2	31.1
DISSATISFIED	4	435	50.5	50.5	81.6
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	159	18.4	18.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 10. DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	80	9.3	9.3	9.3
DISSATISFIED	2	263	30.5	30.5	39.8
NORMAL	3	362	42.0	42.0	81.8
SATISFIED	4	141	16.4	16.4	98.1
VERY SATISFIED	5	16	1.9	1.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 11. READINES ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	114	13.2	13.2	13.2
HIGH	2	387	44.9	44.9	58.1
NORMAL	3	265	30.7	30.7	88.9
LOW	4	79	9.2	9.2	98.0
VERY LOW	5	17	2.0	2.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 12. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	42	4.9	4.9	4.9
SATISFIED	2	98	11.4	11.4	16.2
NORMAL	3	275	31.9	31.9	48.1
DISSATISFIED	4	343	39.8	39.8	87.9
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	104	12.1	12.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 13. SATISFACTION WITH PURCHASING CONDITION OF MILITARY CLOTHES

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	36	4.2	4.2	4.2
SATISFIED	2	54	6.3	6.3	10.4
NORMAL	3	213	24.7	24.7	35.2
DISSATISFIED	4	383	44.4	44.4	79.6
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	176	20.4	20.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 14. CITIZENS' TRUST TO THE MILITARY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	85	9.9	9.9	9.9
HIGH	2	206	23.9	23.9	33.8
NORMAL	3	346	40.1	40.1	73.9
LOW	4	203	23.5	23.5	97.4
VERY LOW	5	22	2.6	2.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 15. FREQUENCY OF DAY DUTY TIMES

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	249	28.9	28.9	28.9
HIGH	2	322	37.4	37.4	66.2
NORMAL	3	229	26.6	26.6	92.8
LOW	4	47	5.5	5.5	98.3
VERY LOW	5	15	1.7	1.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 16. SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	123	14.3	14.3	14.3
SATISFIED	2	257	29.8	29.8	44.1
NORMAL	3	295	34.2	34.2	78.3
DISSATISFIED	4	160	18.6	18.6	96.9
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	27	3.1	3.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 17. CONCERN ABOUT THE JOB AFTER RETIREMENT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	235	27.3	27.3	27.3
HIGH	2	165	19.1	19.1	46.4
NORMAL	3	229	26.6	26.6	73.0
LOW	4	146	16.9	16.9	89.9
VERY LOW	5	87	10.1	10.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	



Q 18. CONCERN ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	585	67.9	67.9	67.9
HIGH	2	173	20.1	20.1	87.9
NORMAL	3	75	8.7	8.7	96.6
LOW	4	29	3.4	3.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 19. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY JOB AND CIVILIANS'

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	204	23.7	23.7	23.7
HIGH	2	243	28.2	28.2	51.9
NORMAL	3	248	28.8	28.8	80.6
LOW	4	103	11.9	11.9	92.6
VERY LOW	5	64	7.4	7.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 20. SATISFACTION WITH PAY COMPARED WITH THE CIVILIAN SECTORS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
SATISFIED	2	79	9.2	9.2	9.2
NORMAL	3	240	27.8	27.8	37.0
DISSATISFIED	4	395	45.8	45.8	82.8
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	148	17.2	17.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 21. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	81	9.4	9.4	9.4
SATISFIED	2	180	20.9	20.9	30.3
NORMAL	3	375	43.5	43.5	73.8
DISSATISFIED	4	212	24.6	24.6	98.4
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	14	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 22. SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMNACE EVALUATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	131	15.2	15.2	15.2
SATISFIED	2	228	26.5	26.5	41.6
NORMAL	3	342	39.7	39.7	81.3
DISSATISFIED	4	141	16.4	16.4	97.7
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	20	2.3	2.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 23. DISSATISFACTION WITH UTILIZATION OF PX SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	247	28.7	28.7	28.7
DISSATISFIED	2	344	39.9	39.9	68.6
NORMAL	3	184	21.3	21.3	89.9
SATISFIED	4	51	5.9	5.9	95.8
VERY SATISFIED	5	36	4.2	4.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 24. DISSATISFACTION WITH COMMANDING ATTITUDE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	100	11.6	11.6	11.6
DISSATISFIED	2	329	38.2	38.2	49.8
NORMAL	3	227	26.3	26.3	76.1
SATISFIED	4	179	20.8	20.8	96.9
VERY SATISFIED	5	27	3.1	3.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 25. SATISFACTION WITH SPORTS AND RECREATION FACILITIES

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	63	7.3	7.3	7.3
SATISFIED	2	80	9.3	9.3	16.6
NORMAL	3	238	27.6	27.6	44.2
DISSATISFIED	4	397	46.1	46.1	90.3
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	84	9.7	9.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 26. DEBT PROBLEMS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY HIGH	1	12	1.4	1.4	1.4
HIGH	2	164	19.0	19.0	20.4
NORMAL	3	287	33.3	33.3	53.7
LOW	4	249	28.9	28.9	82.6
VERY LOW	5	150	17.4	17.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 27. SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	34	3.9	3.9	3.9
SATISFIED	2	99	11.5	11.5	15.4
NORMAL	3	303	35.2	35.2	50.6
DISSATISFIED	4	299	34.7	34.7	85.3
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	127	14.7	14.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 28. SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	63	7.3	7.3	7.3
SATISFIED	2	138	16.0	16.0	23.3
NORMAL	3	325	37.7	37.7	61.0
DISSATISFIED	4	253	29.4	29.4	90.4
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	83	9.6	9.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 29. DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	353	41.0	41.0	41.0
DISSATISFIED	2	370	42.9	42.9	83.9
NORMAL	3	103	11.9	11.9	95.8
SATISFIED	4	18	2.1	2.1	97.9
VERY SATISFIED	5	18	2.1	2.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 30. DISSATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL CARE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	71	8.2	8.2	8.2
DISSATISFIED	2	434	50.3	50.3	58.6
NORMAL	3	227	26.3	26.3	84.9
SATISFIED	4	76	8.8	8.8	93.7
VERY SATISFIED	5	54	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 31. SATISFACTION WITH SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	63	7.3	7.3	7.3
SATISFIED	2	172	20.0	20.0	27.3
NORMAL	3	523	60.7	60.7	87.9
DISSATISFIED	4	104	12.1	12.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 32. SATISFACTION WITH RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENT FACTORS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY SATISFIED	1	36	4.2	4.2	4.2
SATISFIED	2	79	9.2	9.2	13.3
NORMAL	3	264	30.6	30.6	44.0
DISSATISFIED	4	334	38.7	38.7	82.7
VERY DISSATISFIED	5	149	17.3	17.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

Q 33. DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS OF RETIREMENT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	147	17.1	17.1	17.1
DISSATISFIED	2	247	28.7	28.7	45.7
NORMAL	3	366	42.5	42.5	88.2
SATISFIED	4	98	11.4	11.4	99.5
VERY SATISFIED	5	4	.5	.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		862	100.0	100.0	

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY MARITAL STATUS

COUNT	MARITAL STATUS				ROW TOTAL
	I SINGLE		MARRIED		
	I1	I2	I	I	
SATISFACTION	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	
1	I 10	I 71	I	I	81
VERY SATISFIED	I	I	I	I	9.4
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	
2	I 83	I 97	I	I	180
SATISFIED	I	I	I	I	20.9
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	
3	I 88	I 287	I	I	375
NORMAL	I	I	I	I	43.5
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	
4	I 101	I 111	I	I	212
DISSATISFIED	I	I	I	I	24.6
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	
5	I 14	I 0	I	I	14
VERY DISSATISFIE	I	I	I	I	1.6
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	
COLUMN TOTAL	296	566	862		
	34.3	65.7	100.0		

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY BRANCH

COUNT	BRANCH								ROW TOTAL				
	I INFANTRY		ARTILLERY		ARMOR		ENGINEER			COMMUNICATION		OTHERS	
	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I	I		I	I	I	
SATISFACTION	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	
1	I 70	I 8	I 3	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	81	
VERY SATISFY	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	9.4	
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+		
2	I 136	I 21	I 1	I 0	I 11	I 11	I	I	I	I	I	180	
SATISFIED	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	20.9	
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+		
3	I 205	I 61	I 0	I 65	I 33	I 11	I 11	I	I	I	I	375	
NORMAL	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	43.5	
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+		
4	I 137	I 40	I 2	I 0	I 11	I 22	I	I	I	I	I	212	
DISSATISFY	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	24.6	
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+		
5	I 9	I 5	I 0	I 0	I 0	I 0	I 0	I 0	I 0	I 0	I 0	14	
VERY DISSATISFY	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	1.6	
	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+	+-----+		
COLUMN TOTAL	557	135	6	65	55	44						862	
	64.6	15.7	.7	7.5	6.4	5.1						100.0	



SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH PAY COMPARED WITH THE CIVILIANS

PAY SATISFACTION

MILSAT	COUNT	PAY SATISFACTION					ROW TOTAL
		1 VERY SATISFIED	2 SATISFIED	3 NORMAL	4 DISSATISFIED	5 VERY DISSATISFIED	
		24	12	25	20	81	
		9.4					
		19	57	85	19	180	
		20.9					
		28	133	167	47	375	
		43.5					
		8	38	118	48	212	
		24.6					
		0	0	0	14	14	
		1.6					
	COLUMN TOTAL	79	240	395	148	862	
		9.2	27.8	45.8	17.2	100.0	

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY PAY

PAY LEVEL SATISFACTION

MILSAT	COUNT	PAY LEVEL SATISFACTION					ROW TOTAL
		1 VERY SATISFIED	2 SATISFIED	3 NORMAL	4 DISSATISFIED	5 VERY DISSATISFIED	
		0	11	26	33	11	81
		9.4					
		0	16	46	100	18	180
		20.9					
		6	52	87	169	61	375
		43.5					
		0	0	24	132	56	212
		24.6					
		0	0	0	1	13	14
		1.6					
	COLUMN TOTAL	6	79	183	435	159	862
		.7	9.2	21.2	50.5	18.4	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS

SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS

MILSAT	COUNT	SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS					ROW TOTAL
		VERY SATISFIED	SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	
1	VERY SATISFIED	3	10	37	15	16	81
							9.4
2	SATISFIED	30	19	98	32	1	180
							20.9
3	NORMAL	25	75	101	127	47	375
							43.5
4	DISSATISFIED	3	34	89	71	15	212
							24.6
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	2	0	0	8	4	14
							1.6
	COLUMN TOTAL	63	138	325	253	83	862
		7.3	16.0	37.7	29.4	9.6	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS

QUARTERS

MILSAT	COUNT	SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS					ROW TOTAL
		VERY SATISFIED	SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	
1	VERY SATISFIED	11	14	35	21	0	81
							9.4
2	SATISFIED	12	54	42	55	17	180
							20.9
3	NORMAL	19	30	124	141	61	375
							43.5
4	DISSATISFIED	0	0	74	126	12	212
							24.6
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0	0	0	14	14
							1.6
	COLUMN TOTAL	42	98	275	343	104	862
		4.9	11.4	31.9	39.8	12.1	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY JOB CONCERNS AFTER RETIREMENT

JOB CONCERNS

MILSAT	COUNT	JOB CONCERNS					ROW TOTAL
		VERY HIGH	HIGH	NORMAL	LOW	VERY LOW	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I
1	VERY SATISFIED	28	26	12	15	0	81
							9.4
2	SATISFIED	40	17	66	36	21	180
							20.9
3	NORMAL	126	42	96	56	55	375
							43.5
4	DISSATISFIED	41	66	55	39	11	212
							24.6
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	14	0	0	0	14
							1.6
	COLUMN TOTAL	235	165	229	146	87	862
		27.3	19.1	26.6	16.9	10.1	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION

PROMOTION

MILSAT	COUNT	PROMOTION					ROW TOTAL
		VERY SATISFIED	SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED	VERY DISSATISFIED	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I
1	VERY SATISFIED	2	11	10	33	25	81
							9.4
2	SATISFIED	3	25	89	45	18	180
							20.9
3	NORMAL	28	48	68	148	83	375
							43.5
4	DISSATISFIED	1	15	122	73	1	212
							24.6
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0	14	0	0	14
							1.6
	COLUMN TOTAL	34	99	303	299	127	862
		3.9	11.5	35.2	34.7	14.7	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH REGULAR LEAVE

LEAVE

MILSAT	COUNT	SATISFACTION WITH REGULAR LEAVE					ROW TOTAL
		1 VERY SATISFIED	2 SATISFIED	3 NORMAL	4 DISSATISFIED	5 VERY DISSATISFIED	
		0	34	19	28	81	
		9.4					
		19	11	62	88	180	
		20.9					
		8	64	75	228	375	
		43.5					
		11	7	109	85	212	
		24.6					
		0	0	0	14	14	
		1.6					
	COLUMN TOTAL	38	116	265	443	862	
		4.4	13.5	30.7	51.4	100.0	

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER

MILSAT	COUNT	SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER					ROW TOTAL
		1 VERY SATISFIED	2 SATISFIED	3 NORMAL	4 DISSATISFIED	5 VERY DISSATISFIED	
		67	5	0	9	0	81
		9.4					
		68	72	33	7	0	180
		20.9					
		81	75	170	32	17	375
		43.5					
		27	90	66	26	3	212
		24.6					
		0	0	12	1	1	14
		1.6					
	COLUMN TOTAL	243	242	281	75	21	862
		28.2	28.1	32.6	8.7	2.4	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY DISSATISFACTION WITH  
EXTENDED WORK HOURS

MILSAT	COUNT	DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS					ROW TOTAL
		VERY DISSATISFIED	DISSATISFIED	NORMAL	SATISFIED	VERY SATISFIED	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I
1	VERY SATISFIED	21	2	42	16	0	81
		9.4					
2	SATISFIED	5	75	94	6	0	180
		20.9					
3	NORMAL	33	130	111	85	16	375
		43.5					
4	DISSATISFIED	21	56	104	31	0	212
		24.6					
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0	11	3	0	14
		1.6					
	COLUMN TOTAL	80	263	362	141	16	862
		9.3	30.5	42.0	16.4	1.9	100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS

COMBAT READINESS

MILSAT	COUNT	ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS					ROW TOTAL
		VERY HIGH	HIGH	NORMAL	LOW	VERY LOW	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I
1	VERY SATISFIED	10	34	22	0	15	81
		9.4					
2	SATISFIED	36	102	40	2	0	180
		20.9					
3	NORMAL	37	178	133	27	0	375
		43.5					
4	DISSATISFIED	31	73	70	38	0	212
		24.6					
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0	0	12	2	14
		1.6					
	COLUMN TOTAL	114	387	265	79	17	862
		13.2	44.9	30.7	9.2	2.0	100.0



SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS

REWARDS

COUNT		I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	ROW
		VERY	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY	DIS		TOTAL
		IISFIED	D	D		FIED	SATISFIE			
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I			
MILSAT	-----	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
1	VERY SATISFIED	9	37	0	9	26				81
		9.4								
2	SATISFIED	28	52	68	32	0				180
		20.9								
3	NORMAL	86	83	148	57	1				375
		43.5								
4	DISSATISFIED	0	85	79	48	0				212
		24.6								
5	VERY DISSATISFIE	0	0	0	14	0				14
		1.6								
	COLUMN TOTAL	123	257	295	160	27				862
		14.3	29.8	34.2	18.6	3.1				100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMNACE EVALUATION

COUNT		I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	ROW
		VERY	SAT	SATISFIE	NORMAL	DISSATIS	VERY	DIS		TOTAL
		IISFIED	D	D		FIED	SATISFIE			
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I			
MILSAT	-----	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
1	VERY SATISFIED	32	22	12	5	10				81
		9.4								
2	SATISFIED	24	57	67	32	0				180
		20.9								
3	NORMAL	69	69	189	38	10				375
		43.5								
4	DISSATISFIED	6	80	62	64	0				212
		24.6								
5	VERY DISSATISFIE	0	0	12	2	0				14
		1.6								
	COLUMN TOTAL	131	228	342	141	20				862
		15.2	26.5	39.7	16.4	2.3				100.0

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH  
SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION

SELECTION

MILSAT	COUNT	I					ROW TOTAL
		VERY SATISFIED	SATISFIED	NORMAL	DISSATISFIED		
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I	
1	VERY SATISFIED	31	15	34	1	81	
						9.4	
2	SATISFIED	7	65	87	21	180	
						20.9	
3	NORMAL	21	72	247	35	375	
						43.5	
4	DISSATISFIED	4	16	155	37	212	
						24.6	
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	4	0	10	14	
						1.6	
	COLUMN TOTAL	63	172	523	104	862	
		7.3	20.0	60.7	12.1	100.0	

SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY DISSATISFACTION WITH  
CONDITIONS OF RETIREMENTS

RETIREMENT CONDITIONS

MILSAT	COUNT	I					ROW TOTAL
		VERY SATISFIED	DIS DISSATISFIED	NORMAL	SATISFIED	VERY SATISFIED	
		I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	
1	VERY SATISFIED	15	14	22	30	0	81
							9.4
2	SATISFIED	3	62	88	25	2	180
							20.9
3	NORMAL	85	88	175	26	1	375
							43.5
4	DISSATISFIED	44	69	81	17	1	212
							24.6
5	VERY DISSATISFIED	0	14	0	0	0	14
							1.6
	COLUMN TOTAL	147	247	366	98	4	862
		17.1	28.7	42.5	11.4	.5	100.0

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