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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS AND PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
AFFECTING THE RETENTION OF OFFICERS IN
THE
UNITED STATES ARMY AND UNITED STATES
MARINE CORPS

by

Jay D. Steele

June 1987

Thesis Advisor

Stephen L. Mehay

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Socioeconomic Factors and Personal Characteristics Affecting the Retention of Officers in the United States Army and United States Marine Corps

by

Jay D. Steele Lieutenant, United States Naval Reserve B.A., California State University, Hayward, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addressed the question of which factors most highly influence the career decision of officers in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps who are between their fourth-year and twelfth-year of service. This was accomplished using data from the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel in a logistic regression model.

Several conclusions were drawn from this study. Intrinsic factors appear to contribute more to the career decision than extrinsic factors. Specifically, promotion probability and satisfaction with current job have the most influence. Extrinsic factors are still significant but to a lesser degree. Personal factors, especially length of service and sex, are also important. The impact of individual factors, however, is generally quite small; so an effective retention program must include a combination of factors. Finally, the Army as a whole, Marine Corps as a whole, and Army medical specialists are not homogeneous and so must be considered separately when determining policy changes intended to increase retention.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTR	ODUCTION .	• • •	• •	• •	•	• •	• •	•	•	•	•	•	•	10
A.	BACKGROUND				•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	12
В.	LITERATURE	REVIE	₩ .		•	• •		•	•	•	•		•	18
II. METH	OD		• •		•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•'	29
III. STAT	ISTICAL RES	SULTS		• •	•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	38
IV. DISC	USSION OF F	RESULT	s .		•	• •	• •	•	•	•	•	•	•	79
V. SUMM	ARY AND COM	CLUSI	ONS		•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	86
APPENDIX A	DESCRIPTI	ON OF	THE	VAR	IAB	LES		•	•	•	•	•	•	89
APPENDIX B	MEAN VALU	JES OF	VAR	IABL	ES	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	96
APPENDIX C	CORRELATI	ON MA	TRIC	es .	•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	99
APPENDIX D	FREQUENCI	ES OF	SUB	JECT	's I	RESI	PONS	ES	TC) V	/AF	RIA	BL	ES
	BY CAREER	R DECIS	SION	AND	SP	ECI <i>F</i>	LTY	•	•	•	•	•	•	126
1.	ARMY			• .•	•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	126
2.	MARINE CORE	es			•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	144
APPENDIX E	LOGIT EQU	JATION	FOR	MAR	INE	COF	RPS	TAC	CTI	ECA	L			
	OPERATION	NS, MAI	RRIE	O EX	CLUI	DED		•	•	•	•	•	•	160
LIST OF RE	FERENCES .				•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	161
BIBLIOGRAP	нч		• •	• •	•	• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	164
INITIAL DI	STRIBUTION	LIST				• •		•	•	•	•	•	•	165

LIST OF TABLES

1.	List	of Variabl	.es		34
2.	LOGIT	Equation	for	All Army, Model 1	40
3.	LOGIT Model		for	Army Tactical Operations,	41
4.	LOGIT	Equation	for	Army Medical, Model 1	42
5.	LOGIT Model	_	for	Army Administrative,	43
6.	LOGIT Model	_	for	Army Non-Occupational,	44
7.	LOGIT	Equation	for	All Marine Corps, Model 1	45
8.	LOGIT Model		for	Marine Corps Tactical Operations,	46
9.	LOGIT Model	_	for	Marine Corps Administrative,	47
10.	LOGIT Model		for	Marine Corps Non-Occupational,	48
11.	LOGIT	Equation	for	All Army, Model 2	49
12.	LOGIT Model		for	Army Tactical Operations,	50
13.	LOGIT	Equation	for	Army Medical, Model 2	51
14.				Army Administrative,	52
				Army Non-Occupational,	53
16.	LOGIT	Equation	for	All Marine Corps, Model 2	54
17.				Marine Corps Tactical Operations,	55
18.		Equation 2		Marine Corps Administrative,	56

19.	LOGIT Model	-			. fo	or I	Ma •	rin	e •	Cor	:ps	• N	on •	•	•	up •	•	•	na •	1,	•	•	57
20.	Predi Model											•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	5 8
21.	Predi Model											•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	5 8
22.	Predi Model																		•	•	•	•	59
23.	Predi Model											.ca	1	0p	er •	at •	.i	ons •	•	•	•	•	59
24.	Predi Model													•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	60
25.	Predi Model													•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	60
26.	Predi Model																	•	•	•	•	•	61
27.	Predi Model								_									•	•	•	•	•	61
28.	Predi Model											•	up •	at •	io •	na •	1,	•	•	•	•	•	62
29.	Predi Model	cti l,	on	Tab	le f F	for	r .	Arm 883	y]	Nor	•-O	•	up •	at •	io •	na •	1,	•	•	•	•	•	62
30.	Predi Model	cti l,	on	Tab tof	le f F	for	r .	All 5 .	M:	ari •	.ne	•	or •	ps •		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	63
31.	Predi Model															•	•	•	•	•	•	•	63
32.	Predi Model	cti l,	on	Tab tof	le f F	for	r .	Mar 5 .	ine	e ·C	or	ps •	. T	ac •	ti •	c a	1	q0 •	er •	at •	i c	ns,	, 64
33.	Predi Model	cti 1,	on cu	Tab	le f F	for	r •	Mar 864	ine	e C	or	ps •	. T	ac •.	ti •	ca •	1	0p	er •	at •	ic.	ns.	, 64
34.	Predi Model																					•	65
35.	Predi Model	cti l,	on	Tab	le f F	for	r .	Mar 821	ine	e C	or	ps •	. A	.dm	in	is	tr	at	iv	e,		•	65

36.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Non-Occupational, Model 1, cutoff P = .5	66
37.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Non-Occupational, Model 1, cutoff P = .864	66
38.	Prediction Table for All Army, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	67
39.	Prediction Table for All Army, Nodel 2, cutoff P = .874	67
40.	Prediction Table for Army Tactical Operations, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	68
41.	Prediction Table for Army Tactical Operations, Model 2, cutoff P = .874	68
42.	Prediction Table for Army Medical, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	69
43.	Prediction Table for Army Medical, Model 2, cutoff P = .724	69
44.	Prediction Table for Army Administrative, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	70
45.	Prediction Table for Army Administrative, Model 2, cutoff P = .947	70
46.	Prediction Table for Army Non-Occupational, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	71
47.	Prediction Table for Army Non-Occupational, Model 2, cutoff P = .859	71
48.	Prediction Table for All Marine Corps, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	72
49.	Prediction Table for All Marine Corps, Model 2, cutoff P = .882	72
50.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Tactical Operations Model 2, cutoff P = .5	
51.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Tactical Operations Model 2, cutoff P = .901	
52.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Administrative, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	74

53.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Administrative, Model 2, cutoff P = .858	74
54.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Non-Occupational, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	75
55.	Prediction Table for Marine Corps Non-Occupational, Model 2, cutoff P = .879	75
56.	Summary of Prediction Tables, Model 1, cutoff P = .5	76
57.	Summary of Prediction Tables, Model 1, cutoff P = mean value	76
58.	Summary of Prediction Tables, Model 2, cutoff P = .5	77
59.	Summary of Prediction Tables, Model 2, cutoff P = mean value	77
60.	Results of Chow Test	78

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to sustain an adequate defense force, it is necessary to bring into the service a sufficient number of personnel to meet anticipated manning requirements. Once these individuals are recruited, the problem becomes one of influencing the best people to remain in the service in order to maintain an effective force structure. Successful retention programs would benefit the services in at least two important respects: they would increase the overall quality of the senior officer corps and also help to create a military that is most effective, in terms of cost as well as action.

Before World War II the military used a promotion system based primarily on seniority. Under this system an officer could be promoted only if an officer senior in rank either resigned or died. This resulted in junior officers remaining in their current ranks with little chance of promotion and a relatively old senior officer corps. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was enacted to remedy this situation. It established a requirement that officers who twice fail to be selected for promotion to 0-3 or 0-4 be separated from the service, and that those who fail to be selected for 0-5 or 0-6 be required to retire. The Defense Office Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) has expanded on this by allowing for officers who twice fail to be

selected for O-5 to be separated before retirement. This new system allows for the separation of marginal performers in order to create openings for upcoming junior officers and also motivate junior officers to improve their performance as they are now competing for a limited number of promotions. [Ref. 1: pp. 29-31, 34] Reducing the number of O-3s and O-4s lost to voluntary separation would increase the pool of potential selectees for promotion. Assuming the quality of performance of these officers is randomly distributed (i.e., non-careerists include both high and low quality officers), this would result in more higher quality officers being available for selection.

The recent trend towards tighter budgets under the shadow of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) has made cost reduction a major consideration in the establishment of policy. In order to maintain required manning levels at minimum cost, the question becomes one of retention versus replacement. Although the military's retirement system is increasingly coming under attack as being too generous and costly, it has been shown that it is less costly to retain an officer for a 20-year career than it is to recruit and train a new officer only to lose that training and experience every six to 10 years [Ref. 2: pp. 18-19]. As the overall quality of the officer corps increases, presumably they will, in aggregate,

increase productivity, produce better decisions, and, in general, be more efficient and effective.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to identify factors which contribute to the career decision made by Army and Marine Corps officers. This knowledge could then be exploited to influence policy decisions which would increase retention and result in lower recruiting and training costs, higher quality leadership, and ultimately in increased combat readiness.

A. BACKGROUND

Before attempting to identify specific factors which influence an individual's career decision, it is worthwhile to become familiar with some of the motivational theories currently being used to explain human behavior. An understanding of these theories will give an appreciation of the general underlying factors which form the foundation of the decision either to remain in the military for a 20-year career or to look for work in the civilian market.

One of the most well-known theories of motivation is the need hierarchy theory developed by Abraham Maslow (1970). According to this theory, all behavior is motivated by certain needs. All needs can be categorized into one of five types. Physiological needs are concerned with survival and include food, water, and air. Safety needs are concerned with self-preservation and include freedom from threat or danger. Social needs are concerned with one's

association with other people and include companionship and friendship. Self-esteem is concerned with one's sense of adequacy and includes self-confidence, respect, and recognition. Self-actualization is the need to realize one's full potential or to "be all that you can be." According to Maslow, these needs are characteristics of all people and are related to each other in a hierarchy with physiological needs at the bottom and self-actualization at the top. Behavior is influenced by the lowest level of unsatisfied needs. Once a need is satisfied, Maslow finds, it no longer influences behavior, but then the next higher level need takes over. Thus, behavior is a series of attempts to satisfy increasing levels of needs. [Ref. 3: pp. 35-58] If the military does not provide an avenue for the satisfaction of one's needs, particularly the higherlevel needs, that individual will choose to leave the service to seek satisfaction elsewhere.

Another theory, proposed by Adams (1965), concerns social comparisons and is known as the "equity theory." According to this theory, motivation is based on how an individual sees his own situation compared to his perception of that of other people. The individual brings certain assets ("inputs") to his job, such as education, experience, effort, and so on. As a result of his work, he receives certain benefits ("outputs"), such as pay, working conditions, recognition, and the like. Assuming people can

quantify these factors into a common scale of units, the individual relates his inputs to his outputs. He then compares his ratio with his perception of the ratio of other people. If he feels his own ratio of inputs to outputs is 50/50 and the ratio of another person is 75/75 then the ratios are the same ("equity") and there is no problem. However, if he perceives the other's ratio as 50/75, then this situation is deemed unfair ("inequity"), tension will result, and the individual becomes motivated to reduce this tension. This could be accomplished by reducing inputs, such as effort, or by leaving the job (or military service) to seek equity. [Ref. 4: pp. 272-287, 292]

"Expectancy theory," made popular by Victor Vroom (1964), describes motivation in terms of "valence," "instrumentality," and "expectancy." Valence is the individual's feelings about the outcome of a job. The outcome, and so the valence, could be positive (such as a pay raise) or negative (such as termination). Of course, if the individual, for some reason, wanted to be fired, then termination would have a positive valence. If he is indifferent to an outcome, his valence would be zero. Instrumentality is the perceived relationship between performance and outcome. If the individual believes good work leads to a promotion, his instrumentality will be high; but, if promotions are given based only on seniority, instrumentality will be low. Expectancy is the perceived

relationship between effort and performance. If it seems like your performance remains low no matter how hard you try, then your expectancy will be low. These factors are used in the following equation: force = $f[E(\sum_{i=1}^{n} V_i I_i)]$, where force is the amount of motivation, E is the expectancy, V is the valence, and I is the instrumentality. 1 If an individual sees no relationship between personal effort and performance (low expectancy), believes there is no relationship between how well he performs and the acquired outcomes (low instrumentality), or feels indifferent or negatively about available outcomes (low valence), then motivation will be low. [Ref. 5: pp. 15-19] If the individual believes the outcomes available from a civilian job are more valuable than those available from the military, believes performance in a civilian job will have a higher impact on these outcomes, or believes there will be a greater relationship between effort and performance in a civilian job, he will be motivated to leave the service.

Goal setting, according to Edwin Locke (1968), assumes people behave consciously and rationally. People consciously set goals, and these goals are the basis for motivation and so direct behavior. The more difficult and

l Vroom actually breaks the process down into two propositions: $V_j = f[\sum_{k=1}^{n} (V_k I_{jk})]$ and force $= f[\sum_{j=1}^{n} (E_{ij} V_j)]$ where $V_j =$ valence of outcome j, $I_{jk} =$ instrumentality of outcome j for attainment of outcome k, and $E_{ij} =$ expectancy that act i will be followed by outcome j.

specific the goal, the greater the motivation to work towards this goal, so long as the goal is not deemed to be so difficult as to be unobtainable, in which case it would be rejected. [Ref. 6: pp. 183-186] According to this view, if an officer decided that a civilian job would provide the best means to achieve important goals, the officer would then be motivated to leave the military.

Many previous studies, which are reviewed in the following section, have found that retention is highly correlated with job satisfaction. In light of this, a brief review of some of the theories of job satisfaction is included.

Comparison processes theories say that job satisfaction is based on a comparison of what an individual wants from his job and what he receives. The smaller the difference between these, the greater his satisfaction will be. Some researchers view these "wants" as based on needs [Ref. 7: pp. 383-384]. Others believe they are based on learned values [Ref. 8: pp. 316-319; Ref. 9: pp. 480-482]. Since everyone has the same needs, differences in satisfaction from similar jobs are attributed to differing strengths of these needs between different people. Values, which are what a person desires or considers valuable, are acquired and so are obviously different for different people. The extent to which an individual's needs or values are met determines his job satisfaction.

Herzberg's (1959) two-factor theory divides all jobrelated variables into two classes. The first class,
satisfiers or "motivators" (content factors) are factors
which contribute to job satisfaction and include
achievement, recognition, and responsibility. Dissatisfiers
or "hygienes" (context factors), on the other hand, are
factors which contribute to job dissatisfaction and include
company policy, salary, and working conditions. If a lot of
content factors are available in a job, then that job will
provide individuals with a high degree of satisfaction;
however, if these factors are absent, rather than feeling
dissatisfied, employees will feel indifferent toward the
job. At the same time, if context factors are good, then
employees will feel indifferent; but, if they are bad, then
employees will feel dissatisfied. [Ref. 10: pp. 113-119]

Although these theories are varied and often quite involved, they can be simplified and related to one another. The need hierarchy, comparison processes, and two-factor theories are basically concerned with satisfying extrinsic and intrinsic needs or values. The equity, expectancy, and goal setting theories are concerned with meeting expectations of receiving extrinsic or intrinsic rewards. The primary differences lie in the internal mechanisms which convert these external stimuli (rewards) into a behavior.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Many studies have been conducted to try to determine factors related to turnover and retention. The services currently give exit interviews to officers choosing to leave the service to determine their reasons for leaving. While this is important, it answers only half the question. What we also need to ask is why people stay. This may not necessarily be the opposite of why people leave. Flowers and Hughes (1973) did a study on civilian employees based on 406 questionnaires administered to employees from three companies. They found that retention is related to job satisfaction and environmental pressure. Job satisfaction is based on intrinsic factors, such as recognition and responsibility. Environmental pressure is based on extrinsic factors, such as pay and job location. If job satisfaction is high, then employees will stay because they want to; but, if it is low, then they will stay only if they feel they have to because of environmental pressure. While these people are still on the job, this is not necessarily good for the company. Since these employees are dissatisfied with their jobs but feel trapped, they may become unproductive or "do exactly what I'm told and no more." They may even decide to "get even" with their company or instigate unionization. [Ref. 11: pp. 49-52] This study indicates that both intrinsic and extrinsic

factors will motivate employees to stay on the job, but extrinsic factors alone will not keep them satisfied.

Another study, by Wernimont (1966), showed that both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards could generate job satisfaction. In this study, each of 50 accountants and 82 engineers who worked for one of nine Midwestern industries were asked to describe an event that had occurred on the job that made him happy with his job and then check one of a pair of statements (50 pairs total) which best described how he felt in that situation. Each pair included an intrinsic and an extrinsic factor which could be related to the incident. Each respondent was also asked to do the same for an event that made him unhappy with his job. The results showed that intrinsic factors were chosen 60 percent of the time in both situations. Wernimont concludes that intrinsic factors contribute to satisfaction and lack of intrinsic factors leads to dissatisfaction. Extrinsic factors also contribute to both, but to a lesser degree. He adds that an employee's expectations about what his job involves and the rewards he should get are important; and, if these expectations are not met, he will be dissatisfied. [Ref. 12: pp. 48-50]

Porter and Steers (1973), in a review of 15 studies conducted by other researchers, conclude that turnover is inversely related to overall job satisfaction. They expand on this by viewing job satisfaction as "the sum total of an

individual's met expectations on the job" [Ref. 13: p. 169]. The closer the job comes to meeting these expectations, the greater the individual's job satisfaction. It is proposed that four general categories of factors are involved in job satisfaction: organization-wide factors (pay and promotion policies); immediate work environment factors (supervision and worker relations); job-related factors (the nature of the job); and personal factors (age, seniority, family considerations). In addition, it is noted that these expectations are concerned with both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. This breakdown attempts to go beyond the well-established fact that individuals who are satisfied with their jobs tend to remain in their jobs and attempts to determine what specifically makes an individual satisfied. [Ref 13: pp. 154-172]

There are also many studies concerned specifically with turnover in the military. Githens (1966) studied the job factors that were considered to be important to NROTC commissioned officers with three through 13 years of service. A list of 25 career values was given to each officer, and he was asked to rate each value in the following manner: on a five-point scale signifying how important that value was personally, on a five-point scale indicating the expected likelihood of receiving that reward while in the Navy, and whether he felt there was a greater probability of receiving that reward in the Navy as compared

to a civilian job. A total of 644 officers were involved in the study. The analysis determined that content factors were considered more important than context factors. In addition, it was found that, although values which were considered to be easily obtainable in the Navy were also considered to be more obtainable in the Navy than in a civilian job, the civilian market was considered to be slightly better at delivering the rewards which were considered most important. The following five values were rated high in importance but low in likelihood of being obtained in the Navy: satisfactory home life, full use of abilities, work under consistent and intelligent personnel policies, feelings of accomplishment, and success through ability alone. These values are concerned primarily with content factors. [Ref. 14: pp. 5-7]

Dudley and Hoyle (1979) conducted a study similar to Githens' to find what types of rewards Army and Marine Corps officers valued and how these affected retention. In this study, 92 Army and 119 Marine Corps officers, in the ranks O-1 through O-4, were given a list of 41 rewards and asked to rank each on a one-to-five scale with respect to their importance to the officer personally, the expected probability of receiving that reward during his career, and the influence of each on his decision to stay in or leave the service. The results for the Army were similar to those of the Marine Corps. They found that while extrinsic

factors were important to the officers, intrinsic factors were considered much more important. They also found that the factors the officers considered most important were also most important in determining career intentions. In addition, the expected probability of receiving these rewards was highly correlated with the officers career intentions. [Ref. 15: pp. 62-67]

Hayden (1985) used the 1978 DoD Survey to determine factors influencing the career decision of Army officers with one through three years of service. The officers were divided into three occupational groups: combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. Using regression models and discriminate analysis with "expected years of service" as the dependent variable, it was found that overall satisfaction with military life was the most important factor influencing retention. Beyond this, the different occupational groups had different specific factors affecting retention, but most were based on comparisons of military with civilian life. [Ref. 16: 94-104] Other studies using various sample groups and methods confirm the importance of job satisfaction with respect to retention [Ref. 17: p. 3; Ref. 18: p. 72].

The main point to be emphasized from reviewing these studies is that retention is based largely on job satisfaction, which is a function of the degree to which

expectations of intrinsic and, to a lesser degree, extrinsic rewards are realized.

In addition to the plethora of studies relating retention with satisfaction, there are many studies which incorporate economic and demographic factors into the career decision. Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983) reviewed various studies published through 1981 and attempted to consolidate the findings into a comprehensive picture of why people quit. Although compensation is an important consideration, it is, in general, not as important as a non-pecuniary factor. Job security is also an important factor; the higher the probability of being laid-off the greater the likelihood of quitting. At the same time, the higher the unemployment rate, the less likely an individual is to quit. Since unemployment and layoffs tend to go hand in hand, it is difficult to distinguish which has the greater influence, so a complete econometric model should include both variables. However, a layoff in the military, in terms of a reduction-in-force (RIF) or a twice fail-to-select, does not appear to have a large influence on officer retention. Although the authors are not convinced, they concede that it is possible that good advancement opportunities will contribute to increased retention. Adequate procedures for resolving disputes with supervisors also contribute to retention, as does education, age, length of service, and lack of a spouse and dependents. Race and sex show mixed results. In some cases it appears that fear of discrimination influences blacks and women to keep a job once they have one; in others, their retention appears to be lower due to the need to take care of children or because race affects attitudes which contribute to dissatisfaction. However, many of these differences may be due to correlations between race/sex and other variables, such as education. The authors conclude that if other variables are held constant then race and sex do not influence retention. Finally, as in the previously cited studies, it is noted that met expectations and satisfaction are important contributors toward retention. [Ref. 19: pp. 17, 27-30, 35-37, 47, 58, 61-63]

Mullens (1984) used a LOGIT model with data from the June 1983 Medical Officer File, which contains individual data on physicians who have left the Navy, are currently on active duty, and are soon to come on active duty. The study was confined to physicians who entered the Navy during or prior to September 1981. The dependent variable was whether or not the physician left the Navy in FY82. It was found that a physician's specialty had a significant impact on the decision to leave, with more specialized doctors tending to stay in: psychiatrists were least likely to leave, whereas general practitioners were most likely to leave. Physicians with a service-specific qualification, such as flight surgeons, which is not readily transferable to a civilian

job, are slightly less likely to leave the service. Another factor influencing retention is where the officer is in his career path. It is noted that there are two critical points in an officer's career: the point when his obligated service expires and the point when he becomes eligible for retirement benefits. As expected, officers who were at these critical points in their career were more likely to leave the Navy. Graduation from a foreign medical school was found to influence individuals to stay in; however, it is believed that these individuals feel the Navy offers increased job security. Source of entry (commissioning source) was also found to affect the decision, as was the commissioned status (regular or reserve). Finally, compensation, as a function of length of service, was considered; however, the author concludes that if compensation is increased, then retention will decrease. [Ref. 20: pp. 5-11]

Other studies exist which investigated other variables along with those already mentioned. Braunstein (1974) found that an individual would be more career-motivated if his spouse had a good attitude toward the service [Ref. 21: p.36]. Daubert (1985) found that individuals who are overseas have a higher retention rate than those stationed in the continental United States, but this may be due to the expectation of less frequent moves, voluntary assignment overseas (if the individual enjoys it), or trading a tour

overseas now for a more desirable tour later (if the individual does not enjoy it) [Ref. 22: pp. 38-39]. Estabrooks (1981) found that an officer's billet assignment has a limited but definite impact on the career decision. The influence may be through the desirability (for either personal or career motivated reasons) of the new billet or satisfaction with the detailing process [Ref. 23: pp. 61-63].

A more involved model, which was developed to model the reenlistment decision made by Navy enlisted personnel, is the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model (Warner and Goldberg, 1984). The authors attempt to establish a relationship between pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of a job. Basically, this is done by first estimating the difference of the sum of the present values of an individual's expected future military earnings for a particular number of years (including retirement benefits) and the sum of the present values of his expected civilian wages over this same time period if he was to leave the service. This figure is then divided by the sum of the present values of a dollar received each year for the designated period. This gives the individual's annualized cost of leaving the military (ACOL). His ACOL is then compared to his net preference for civilian life (the difference between the annual monetary equivalent of the non-pecuniary aspects of a military job and that of a

civilian job). If his ACOL is greater, the individual will choose to reenlist. [Ref. 24: pp. 27-28]

Then, Warner and Goldberg set up a PROBIT model using ACOL, marital status, and unemployment rates as independent variables and the reenlistment decision as the dependent variable. This was done in each of 16 occupational groups. It was found that ACOL was a significant factor in determining the reenlistment decision. Marital status was also found to be significant; however, unlike Stolzenberg and Winkler, the authors conclude that married individuals are more likely to reenlist. The impact of unemployment was less certain: it was found to be significant in only about half of the groups. [Ref. 24: pp. 31-33]

Gotz and McCall (1984) developed a retention model for the Air Force which expands on the ACOL model. Their "dynamic retention model" assumes individuals will make retention decisions based on which alternative (stay in or leave the service) offers the greatest expected payoff. Factors which contribute to the determination of these payoffs are promotion probabilities, military pay, retirement benefits, severance pay, expected civilian pay, net monetary equivalent of non-pecuniary aspects of service life (military less civilian aspects), and the monetary equivalent of "transient shocks" (unexpected events which may influence, either positively or negatively, a retention decision). Future payoffs of each of these must be

discounted to their present values, except for transient shocks which, by definition, are not expected. Variables which contributed to the determination of retention rates are fiscal year in which the individual's service obligation ends, number of years of initial obligation, aeronautical rating (equivalent to occupational specialty), source of commission, LOS, component (regular or reserve), rank, and year of service in which promoted to that rank. While individual components of the model were not tested for significance, the model as a whole was found to accurately predict retention rates. [Ref. 25: pp. 1, 3-4, 8-11, 17, 25-27]

In reviewing these studies, it is obvious that there are a myriad of factors which contribute to the career decision. In addition to those cited, there are, undoubtedly, many others which have been overlooked and still others which have yet to be discovered. However, in examining this list, it is noted that all relevant factors fall into one of only three broad categories: personal, intrinsic, and extrinsic factors. Centering this study around the concept of these categories will simplify the approach to determining which factors are most influential and may help in the determination of other potentially influential factors which have not been specifically considered.

II. METHOD

The data used in this thesis are from the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. This survey was conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). It was administered between January and June 1985 (with most responses collected during March) and included active duty military personnel stationed world-wide who were on duty 30 September 1984. It was conducted in order to establish a cross sectional data base from which military policy issues could be studied. [Ref. 26: pp. 1-1 to 2-9]

This study is confined to Army and Marine Corps officers who are between their fourth-year and twelfth-year of service, since this is the time period in which most individuals make career decisions. It has been shown that an officer's original career intentions generally have only a slight relationship to later career plans [Ref. 27: p. 272], and the tendency to leave a job decreases as age and length of service increase [Ref. 28: p. 13]. Warrant officers and individuals holding less than a bachelor's

² Only four out of 1620 Army officers and 14 out of 1256 Marine Corps officers with over 12 years of service who answered the survey expressed an intention of leaving the service before retirement.

degree are not included. The Army and Marine Corps are being studied and compared because of the common assumption that both branches perform similar missions. Both are concerned with fighting a war on land: fighting on a traditional battlefield, utilizing armor and artillery (although the Marines, perhaps, to a lesser extent), conducting amphibious assaults, and such. In the public's eye, the primary difference is that the Marines are "tougher" whereas the Army is often thought of as the "branch of last resort" if an individual is unqualified to enlist in any other branch. In addition to looking at the Army and Marine Corps as a whole, each branch is divided into DoD occupational specialties; however, due to limited sample sizes, the only specialty areas that will be considered are the tactical operations, administrative, non-occupational, and medical specialties. Since the Marine Corps depends upon the Navy to supply medical support, only Army medical specialists are included.

Individuals are considered to be either careerists or non-careerists based on their response to the question, "When you finally leave the military, how many total years of service do you expect to have?" (question ID: O27E26). Those who answered 20 years or more are considered to be "careerists;" those who answered 19 years or less are considered to be "non-careerists."

Several determinants of the career choice decision are identified from the survey. Variables are selected based on the literature review cited above and fall into one of three categories: personal, intrinsic, and extrinsic variables. Personal variables include AGE, SEX, RACE, education (EDUC), marital status (MARRIED), number of dependents (DEPEND), commissioning source (COMM), and length of service (LOS). Intrinsic variables include the probability of promotion (PROM), military life as expected (EXPECT), and satisfaction with current job (as a proxy for satisfaction with the detailing process; DETAIL). In addition, two variables are derived using factor analysis. These variables incorporate various aspects of "satisfaction" variables with nonpecuniary aspects of military life. These aspects include satisfaction with personal freedom, environment for the family, frequency of moves, opportunity to serve your country, working environment, job training, and job security. Factor analysis, or more specifically principle components analysis, is useful for establishing the existence of a pattern of relationships among a set of variables. First, the correlation between the given variables is examined. These variables are then reduced into a series of uncorrelated variables or factors, each of which explains a portion of the variance of the data. Finally, these factors are rotated in order to transform them into simpler and more meaningful factors. The first

factor generated explains the most variance of the data as a whole, the next the second most, and so on. [Ref. 29: pp. 469-473] The first factor, designated "JOB", is heavily weighted by variables concerned primarily with the job itself. The second factor, designated "FAMILY", is heavily weighted by variables concerned with effects of military life on the individual's family. Extrinsic variables include total military pay (TOTPAY), probability of finding a good civilian job (CIVJOB), and satisfaction with retirement benefits (RETIRE). Other variables which are deemed important but are excluded due to a lack of data include unemployment rates at home of record, adequate procedures for resolving disputes with supervisors, component (regular or reserve), military/civilian pay ratio, and number of years of initial obligation. Whether or not a spouse agrees with an individual's career plans is not included since it applies only to married personnel.

The variables are defined as follows. AGE is simply the respondent's age in years. SEX is a dichotomous (dummy) variable which equals one for females and zero for males. RACE is captured by three dummy variables: BLACK, Hispanic (HISP), and other non-white (OTHER); whites are the omitted category. EDUC is a dummy variable that equals one for either a master's or doctoral degree and zero for a bachelor's degree. MARRIED is also a dummy variable with married equals one and not married equals zero. DEPEND is

the number of dependents the respondent has excluding his spouse. Commissioning source (COMM) uses four dummy variables: officer candidate school (OCS), reserve officer training corps (ROTC), direct commission (DIRECT), and a health professional scholarship or medic specialist program (MED); academy graduates are the omitted category. LOS is months of service. The probability of promotion (PROM) and probability of finding a good civilian job (CIVJOB) are measured on a scale from zero to ten, with zero equal to "no chance" and ten equal to "certain." EXPECT is used on a one to five scale with one equal to "strongly agree" and five equal to "strongly disagree." DETAIL, RETIRE, and the seven "satisfaction with" variables included in the JOB and FAMILY factors are measured on a one to five scale with "very satisfied" equal to one and "very dissatisfied" equal to five. TOTPAY is total military income in dollars. The variables are listed in Table 1 for ease of reference and discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.

In an attempt to clear up some problems which surfaced in this model, a second model was estimated which modified the first in three respects. AGE was deleted since it is highly correlated with LOS, and LOS appears to have a more significant influence on the career decision. MARRIED and DEPEND were combined into one variable, total number of dependents (TOTDEP), which is simply the number of dependents (DEPEND) plus one if the individual is married.

TABLE 1

LIST OF VARIABLES

AGE = age

SEX = sex

BLACK = black (RACE)

HISP = Hispanic (RACE)

OTHER = other (RACE)

EDUC = education

MARRIED = - marital status

DEPEND = number of dependents

TOTDEP = total number of dependents

OCS = officer candidate school (COMM)

ROTC = reserve officer training corps

DIRECT = direct commission (COMM)

MED = medical program (COMM)

LOS = length of service

PROM = promotion probability

EXPECT = military life as expected

DETAIL = satisfaction with current job (detailing process)

JOB = satisfaction with job related factors

FAMILY = satisfaction with family related factors

TOTPAY = total military pay

SUPPAY = supplemental pay

CIVJOB = probability of finding a good civilian job

RETIRE = satisfaction with retirement benefits

Finally, another extrinsic variable, supplemental pay (SUPPAY) was included. This was done in an attempt to determine whether family income other than military pay might account for TOTPAY results which are counterintuitive.

One of the basic assumptions of multiple regression is that there is no relationship between any of the independent variables; a change in one should not have any effect on any of the others. Of course, in reality, this is very seldom the case; however, if the correlation is not very strong, its effects may be overlooked. On the other hand, if two variables are highly correlated then the coefficients of the model may be unstable and unreliable. [Ref. 30: pp. 87-90] This situation, known as multicollinearity, may, to some extent, be avoided by using a correlation matrix in order to anticipate or detect potential problems. At the same time, a complete econometric model should include all relevant variables; at this point a judgment call must be made in order to balance multicollinearity with completeness.

Another use of the correlation matrix is to predict the direction of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. If the matrix shows them to be positively correlated, then the regression model should not show a negative correlation. However, this is not considered to be a serious problem for coefficients which are determined to be insignificant.

Data were analyzed on the IBM 3033 mainframe computer using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSSx) program.

Logistic regression analysis (LOGIT) was used to investigate the impact of the explanatory variables and to identify those which have the strongest influence on the career decision [Ref. 31: pp. 602-619]. The dependent variable in the LOGIT model is the careerist/non-careerist decision, measured as the log of the odds of being a careerist.

Coefficients of continuous variables were converted to elasticities. This was done by using the following formula: elasticity = coeff * X(i) * (1-p),

where elasticity = elasticity at the mean

coeff = variable coefficient estimated in the model
X(i) = the mean value of variable i

p = the probability of being a careerist (actual number of careerists divided by the total group size) [Ref. 32: p. 189; Ref. 30: p. 91]. The effects of dichotomous variables were determined in the following manner. First, P(0) (predicted probability of being a careerist) was found when the variable in question equals zero and using the mean values of all other independent variables. Since the model gives us the log of the odds $(\ln(P/1-P))$, the antilog of the results was found and then P(0) was determined. Then P(1) was found when the variable equals one while all else

remains constant. The difference between P(1) and P(0) will be the effect of the dichotomous independent variable on the probability of being a careerist at the mean. The mean values of each variable are shown in Appendix B.

As an indication of the validity of the results, the models were used to predict the probability of an individual desiring a 20-year career, and this was compared with his stated intentions using crosstabulations. Specifically, the model was manually placed back into the computer program using the COMPUTE command. Two different cutoff points were used for determining whether an individual would be categorized as a careerist or non-careerist. First, .5 was used with individuals whose P was .5 or greater being careerists. In addition, the mean value of P was determined for each group and used as the cutoff value in an attempt to improve correct prediction rates.

To compare the two branches and the various occupational specialties within each branch, a Chow test was performed on the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of each group [Ref. 33: pp. 173-175]. OLS was used in order to simplify the calculations and is justified because the purpose of the Chow test is to determine whether two groups are equivalent and can be treated as a single group. While specific parameters may be slightly different than what would be obtained using the LOGIT models, the overall results should be the same.

III. STATISTICAL RESULTS

Tables 2 through 10 show the results of the LOGIT regressions for Model 1 and Tables 11 through 19 for Model Sample sizes of each group are as follows: all Army, 2. 1161; Army tactical operations, 292; Army medical, 191; Army administrative, 158; Army non-occupational, 140; all Marine Corps, 926; Marine Corps tactical operations, 335; Marine Corps administrative, 117; and Marine Corps nonoccupational, 162. Since the SPSSx program divides the LOGIT equation by two and adds five to the intercept [Ref. 29: pp. 605-606], the figures in these tables were derived from the output by subtracting five from the intercept and then multiplying this and all coefficients by two. The variables found to have a statistically significant impact on career intentions are highlighted with asterisks.

The last column in each table shows the elasticities of continuous independent variables and effects on the probability of being a careerist of dichotomous independent variables. For example, from Table 2 it can be seen that for all Army officers, if the probability of promotion were increased by ten percent, then the probability of an individual being a careerist would increase by 3.29 percent. Likewise, if an Army officer were female, the probability of being a careerist is .022 less than that of a male officer.

Tables 20 through 55 show the results of the predictions based on the estimated models, and these results are summarized in Tables 56 through 59. As shown in Tables 56 and 58, if .5 is used as the cutoff point, the prediction tables show a fairly accurate overall prediction rate and an excellent correct prediction rate for careerists, but this is accomplished at the expense of correctly predicting non-careerists. Using .5 as the cutoff value essentially predicts that everyone will be a careerist and does little to isolate the non-careerists. However, as shown in Tables 57 and 59, using the mean value of the predicted probabilities of being a careerist as the cutoff value somewhat decreases the proportion of careerists correctly predicted but greatly increases the proportion of non-careerists correctly predicted.

Table 60 shows the results of the Chow test. From this table it can be seen that all Army and all Marine Corps are significantly different from each other and cannot be treated as a single group. Likewise, Army and Marine Corps tactical operations are also significantly different. Within branches, statistically significant differences are found only for the Army medical and tactical operations groups and the Army medical and administrative groups.

TABLE 2

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL ARMY

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	.15130	6.833	
personal:			
AGE	.00164	.039	.006
SEX	48132*	-1.815	022#
BLACK	.07102	.200	.003#
HISP	58876	992	031#
OTHER	43430	806	021#
EDUC	.11258	.366	.005#
MARRIED	.09830	.365	.004#
DEPEND	.06602	.608	.008
OCS	.88732	1.394	.035#
ROTC	•53394	1.603	.024#
DIRECT	.45842	1.051	.022#
MED	-1.11446**	-2.400	105#
LOS	.04090***	7.243	.436
intrinsic:			
PROM	.36060***	6.699	.329
EXPECT	.10070	.727	.024
DETAIL	36504***	-3.246	090
JOB	28076*	-1.853	083
FAMILY	36038***	-2.768	118
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00004**	-2.027	120
CIVJOB	07430	-1.143	067
RETIRE	12756	987	033
	* = significa	nt at p = .10	
		nt at $p = .05$	
		nt at $p = .01$	
	019	P (dummy varia	able)
	1161 valid obs	_	

TABLE 3

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-2.72206	1.601	
personal:			
AGE	.09370	.491	.222
SEX	-1.55320	-1.605	100#
BLACK	51674	628	019#
HISP	-1.74588	-1.264	121#
OTHER	. 53 87 8	.349	.012#
EDUC	.83612	.624	.021#
MARRIED	.67094	.962	.026#
DEPEND	13762	 519	013
ocs	.44638	.412	.028#
ROTC	1.35922*	1.907	.060#
DIRECT	38558	221	034#
MED	.00000		
LOS	00604	303	044
intrinsic:			
PROM	.46436***	2.802	.312
EXPECT	14436	407	025
DETAIL	65146***	-2.605	112
JOB	27634	751	055
FAMILY	02532	083	006
extrinsic:	•		
TOTPAY	.00012	1.062	.242
CIVJOB	09678	588	059
RETIRE	49108	-1.602	091
	V 32 2 3 5		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	* = significa	nt at p = .10	
		nt at p = .05	
	*** = significar		
		P (dummy varia	ble)
	292 valid obse		

TABLE 4

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY MEDICAL

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	.40570	3.152	·
personal:		•	
AGE	09050	-1.425	.753
SEX	.19320	.307	.023#
BLACK	.05676	.071	.006#
HISP	-3.72782	-1.555	730#
OTHER	 75450	853	 105#
EDUC	.07214	.110	.008#
MARRIED	20990	341	024#
DEPEND	.24680	1.160	.078
OCS	.00000		
ROTC	26536	 235	030#
DIRECT	.44284	.486	.038#
MED	-1.36762-	-1.418	221#
LOS	.06638***	5.030	1.476
intrinsic:			
PROM	32962***	2.825	.610
EXPECT	.16760	.589	.092
DETAIL	42508	-1.524	247
JOB ·	11298	316	082
FAMILY	61750 **	-2.056	430
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00002	704	160
CIVJOB	11912	815	258
RETIRE	.27886	. 872	.163
	* = significa	nt at p = .10	
		nt at p = .05	
		nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy varia	ble)
	191 valid obs		

TABLE 5

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-10.72616	054	
personal:			
AGE	.30574	1.110	.730
SEX	-1.91884	-1.576	014#
BLACK	-2.31496*	-1.733	030#
HISP	2.31370	.089	.003#
OTHER	-2.84836	-1.051	 053#
EDUC	.02194	.020	.001#
MARRIED	67800	611	 003#
DEPEND	.17952	•355	.014
ocs	4.89414	.364	.004#
ROTC	85004	 333	003#
DIRECT	-1.70068	621	- 019#
MED	.00000		
LOS	.01232	.350	•095
intrinsic:			
PROM	.98848***	3.273	.625
EXPECT	71940	-1.322	117
DETAIL	.73732	1.148	.119
JOB	.26466	.498	.053
FAMILY	.04406	.067	.009
extrinsic:	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
TOTPAY	00018	375	352
CIVJOB	11916	431	070
RETIRE	1.30950*	1.871	.235
,			
	* = significan		
		nt at p = .05	
		nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy varia	ble)
	158 valid obse	ervations	

TABLE 6

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-15.65416	539	
personal:			
AGE	.49198*	1.667	1.600
SEX	.25270	.202	.001#
BLACK	7.22466	.442	.008#
HISP	5.94032	.201	.008#
OTHER	-1.40266	392	023#
EDUC	.46884	.285	.002#
MARRIED	2.24362	1.538	.021#
DEPEND	92514	-1.356	108
OCS	1.28560	.058	.003#
ROTC	.20318	.182	.001#
DIRECT	-1.79884	969-	017#
MED	-3.12834	-1.569	071#
LOS	.04832*	1.718	.489
intrinsic:			
PROM	.74586**	2.371	.677
EXPECT	.36198	.390	.083
DETAIL	.00216	.003	.001
JOB	-1.23626	-1.560	318
FAMILY	.09782	.162	.033
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00006	552	167
CIVJOB	29930	770	267
RETIRE	15672	335	038
	* = significa:	nt at p = .10	
	** = significa:	nt at p = .05	
	*** = significa	nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy varia	ble)
	140 valid obs	ervations	

TABLE 7

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL MARINE CORPS

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable .	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-2.13216	4.289-	
personal:			
AGE	.11660	1.631	.512
SEX	83412***	-2.994	 075#
BLACK	.75372	1.220	.039#
HISP	50352	842	044#
OTHER	69396	-1.061	066#
EDUC	15622	475	012#
MARRIED	.31794	1.225	.018#
DEPEND	 11598	-1.028	017
OCS	49652*	-1.785	 038#
ROTC	26426	922	018#
DIRECT	7.40824	.168	.066#
- MED	.00000		
LOS	.02522***	3.658	.345
intrinsic:			
PROM	.20632***	4.030	.244
EXPECT	39664***	-3.020	122
DETAIL	33476***	-3.430	101
JOB	12964	936	049
FAMILY	17126	-1.379	073
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	.00002	.496	.078
CIVJOB	04230	680	052
RETIRE	21134*	-1.714	073
	•		
	* = significan	nt at p = .10	
		nt at p = .05	
	*** = significan		
		P (dummy varia	able)
	926 valid obse	-	·

TABLE 8

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

intercept personal: AGE SEX	-6.70768 .31716** -1.96662*	845 2.072	
AGE		2.072	
		2.072	
CEV	-1.96662*		1.436
SEA		-1.943	206#
BLACK	9.77844	.138	.047#
HISP	95776	-1.078	067#
OTHER	98994	970	070#
EDUC	26186	324	013#
MARRIED	.90344*	1.844	.051#
DEPEND	42820*	-1.904	069
ocs	-1.19046**	-2.223	061#
ROTC	 72318	-1.508	 029#
DIRECT	.00000		
MED	.00000		
LOS	.04824***	2.982	•673
intrinsic:			
PROM	.14380	1.524	.175
EXPECT	28954	-1.187	094
DETAIL	32788*	-1.841	101
JOB	24628	970	099
FAMILY	14874	714	067
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00006	-1.063	259
CIVJOB	08382	681	106
RETIRE	07420	327	028
•			
		nt at $p = .10$	
	** = significa		
		nt at $p = .01$	
		P (dummy varia	pie)
	335 valid obs	ervations	

TABLE 9

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	2.39174	2.055	
personal:			
AGE	04910	237	243
SEX	73074	 877	 063#
BLACK	.76422	.632	.059#
HISP	7.51656	.075	.118#
OTHER	-1.24254	490	 198#
EDUC	.40628	.528	.034#
MARRIED	24422	310	021#
DEPEND	 19792	 773	026
ocs	35068	480	031#
ROTC	26250	222	 023#
DIRECT	1.08506	008	130#
MED	.00000		
LOS	.05482**	2.424	.851
intrinsic:			
PROM	.22356	1.145	.294
EXPECT	58976	-1.036	190
DETAIL	14966	453	051
JOB	.10408	.245	.043
FAMILY	.13050	•332	.058
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00018	 755	746
CIVJOB	.10512	.632	.141
RETIRE	22486	619	086
		nt at p = .10	
		nt at p = .05	
		nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy varia	ble)
	117 valid obs	ervations	

TABLE 10

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL

MODEL 1

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio ·	elasticity
intercept	5.90008	2.746	
personal:			
AGE	08918	393	345
SEX	99046	-1.008	049#
BLACK	8.38940	.343	•052#
HISP	65826	 355	044#
OTHER	•00000		
EDUC	-1.72844	-1.489	120#
MARRIED	.92654	1.076	.041#
DEPEND	03094	078	004
ocs	04238	033	001#
ROTC	-1.33458	-1.614	065#
DIRECT	.00000		
MED	.00000		
LOS	.06460**	2.229	.770
intrinsic:			
PROM	.30262*	1.955	.316
EXPECT	51616	-1.310	139
DETAIL	38502	-1.368	106
JOB	73324*	-1.689	252
FAMILY	 35950	812	134
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00010	836	355
CIVJOB	01582	094	017
RETIRE	44028	-1.186	132
		nt at p = .10	
		nt at $p = .05$	
		nt at $p = .01$	
		P (dummy varia	pTe)
	162 valid obs	ervations	

TABLE 11

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL ARMY

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	.23030	9.324	
personal:			
SEX	45740	-1.626	020#
BLACK	.05894	.165	.002#
HISP	59108	998	031#
OTHER	45040	838	 022#
EDUC	.12990	.432	.005#
TOTDEP	.07708	.920	.016
OCS	.88608	1.410	.034#
ROTC	.53614	1.609	.024#
DIRECT	.45770	1.097	.021#
MED	-1.11266**	-2.396	102#
LOS	.04096***	7.834 -	.436
intrinsic:			
PROM	.35972***	6.768	.328
EXPECT	.10510	.752	.025
DETAIL	36608***	-3.260	091
JOB	28170*	-1.863	083
FAMILY	36290***	-2.790	119
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00004**	-2.195	120
SUPPAY	.00000	256	.000
CIVJOB	07420	-1.143	066
RETIRE	12800	992	033
		nt at p = .10	
		nt at p = .05	
		nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy varia	ble)
	1161 valid obs	ervations	

TABLE 12

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
- intercept	 95602	2.728	GIGSCICICA
personal:	• 55002	2.720	
SEX	-1.56450	-1.447	 073#
BLACK	 39386	 479	010#
HISP	-1.65044	-1.219	081#
OTHER	.49300	•331	.001#
	.82378		:015#
EDUC		.615	
TOTDEP	.05408	.280	.009
ocs	. 52642	.501	.023#
ROTC .	1.33224*	1.897	.042#
DIRECT	15842	096	009#
MED	.00000		
LOS	.00098	.069	.007
intrinsic:			
PROM	.45628***	2.741	.306
EXPECT	 14578	410	025
DETAIL	66062***	-2.721	114
JOB	22398	 623	045
FAMILY	01016	034	002
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	.00016	1.308	.322
SUPPAY	.00000	.252	.000
CIVJOB	10608	654	065
RETIRE	49960	-1.619	107
	• 13300	2023	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	* = significa	int at $p = .10$	
	** = significa	-	
	*** = significa		
		P (dummy variab	10)
•		ervations	710)
	292 Vallu ODS	SELVACIONS	

TABLE 13

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY MEDICAL

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-2.16908	3.066	
personal:			
SEX	.47134	.722	.066#
BLACK	17096	212	022#
HISP	-2.88896	-1.287	605#
OTHER	-1.07044	-1.197	181#
EDUC	.09756	.151	.013#
TOTDEP	.20838	1.230	.103
OCS	.00000		
ROTC	.20346	.175	.024#
DIRECT	.43530	.491	.048#
MED	 98758	-1.056	173#
LOS	.06210***	4.879	1.381
intrinsic:			
PROM	.36002***	3.146	.667
EXPECT	.21342	.754	.117
DETAIL	45568*	-1.649	265
JOB	03880	112	028
FAMILY	66754**	-2.126	465
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00006	-1.494	479
SUPPAY	00002	-1.280	080
CIVJOB	10348	721	224
RETIRE	.30272	.961	.177
	* = significan		
	223	nt at p = .10	
	519.111.00	it at p = .05	
	519111110011	•	
		P (dummy variab)	Le)
	191 valid obse	ervations	

TABLE 14

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-3.25282	.633	
personal:			
SEX	-2.27226*	-1.735	020#
BLACK	-2.58654**	-2.066	043#
HISP	2.58522	.101	.003#
OTHER	-3.45354	-1.369	100#
EDUC	.42084	.422	.002#
TOTDEP	09176	249	012
OCS	5.74080	.444	.005#
ROTC	-1.18762	520	011#
DIRECT	-1.21070	488	011#
MED	.00000		
LOS	.02238	.722	.172
intrinsic:			
PROM	.98910***	3.349	.625
EXPECT	74440	-1.303	121
DETAIL	.96400	1.582	.156
JOB	.16280	.321	.032
FAMILY	04956	075	010
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00012	257	234
SUPPAY	.00002	.300	.020
CIVJOB	22352	844	131
RETIRE	1.30538*	1.747	.235
11011110	2 0 0 0 0 0	20,1,	• 400
	* = significa	nt at p = .10	
		nt at $p = .05$	
		nt at $p = .01$	
		P (dummy varia	blel
	158 valid obs		
	100 valia obs	CLVGCLOIIS	

TABLE 15

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

variable	coefficient -	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	-3.38172	1.120	
personal:		-	
SEX	03942	030	001#
BLACK	5.90286	.301	.015#
HISP	6.80750	.167	.015#
OTHER	-2.30322	967	116#
EDUC	1.27598 -	.918	.009#
TOTDEP	.25088	.668	.051
OCS	4.85022	.258	.013#
ROTC	.78556	.794	.008#
DIRECT	38680	250	 006#-
MED	-3.53266*	-1.789	313#
LOS -	.05792**	2.462	• 586
intrinsic:	•		
PROM	.49634**	2.377	.450
EXPECT	.25078	.356	.057
DETAIL	03844	071	008
JOB	89332	-1.346	230
FAMILY	19312	 363	065
extrinsic:		•••	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
TOTPAY	00002	102	056
SUPPAY	.00002	.231	.022
CIVJOB	06628	214	059
RETIRE	18444	403	045
	*******	1.00	***
	* = significa	nt at p = .10	
	——————————————————————————————————————	nt at p = .05	
	51911104	nt at p = .01	
	Dignition.	P (dummy varia	ahlel
	140 valid obs	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	

TABLE 16

LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL MARINE CORPS

MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	.43536	9.792	
personal:	-		
SEX	 73896**	-2.435	064#
BLACK	.81854	1.336	.041#
HISP	49732	834	043#
OTHER	 55720	854	050#
EDUC	06148	191	004#
TOTDEP	.00562	.069	.001
OCS	30860	-1.234	023#
ROTC ·	19258	 670	014#
DIRECT	7.85400	.177	.070#
MED	.00000		
- LOS	.03126***	5.480	.427
intrinsic:			
PROM	.20062***	3.933	.237
EXPECT	41832***	-3. 193	129
DETAIL	34566***	- 3.577	104
JOB	10968	800	041
FAMILY	17878	-1.441	076
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	.00004	1.304	.157
SUPPAY	.00000	321	.000
CIVJOB	05058	812	062
RETIRE	21872*	-1.770	076
	* = signification	nt at p = .10	
		nt at p = .05	
	•	nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy variabl	e)
	926 valid obs		

TABLE 17

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	.13764	4.434	
personal:			•
SEX	-1.92988*	-1.808	204#
BLACK	9.76622	.138	.049#
HISP	85228	 958	 059#
OTHER	40398	 393	 023
EDUC	15858	 198	008#
TOTDEP	06220	412	017
ocs	87166*	-1.917	042#
ROTC	 77358	-1.593	- .035#
DIRECT	.00000		
MED	.00000		
LOS	.06266***	4.184	. 874
intrinsic:			
PROM	.16136*	1.710	.197
EXPECT	29452	-1.237	096
DETAIL	 29718*	-1.722	092
JOB	 22754	901	092
FAMILY	18560	 905	084
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00002	476	086
SUPPAY	.00004	1.474	.037
CIVJOB	09248	 749	117
RETIRE	 05998	268	022
	* = signification		
		nt at p = .05	
	519.111104	nt at p = .01	. 7 . 1
		P (dummy varia	ole)
	335 valid obs	ervations	

TABLE 18

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	00352	1.770	
personal:			
SEX	.25184	.272	.018#
BLACK	.73300	.595	.044#
HISP	5.82928	.058	.087#
OTHER	- 1.13570	414	143#
EDUC	.95324	1.082	.057#
TOTDEP	10548	494	025
OCS	50236	682	038#
ROTĊ	.71728	.546	.032#
DIRECT	•59698	.004	.028#
MED	.00000		
LOS	.05390**	2.376	.836
intrinsic:			
PROM	.19332	.972	.255
EXPECT	88242	-1.485	284
DETAIL	13662	383	047
JOB	.00522	.012	.002
FAMILY	.33064	.799	.147
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00012	 583	497
SUPPAY	00004**	-2.198	098
CIVJOB	.08416	.502	.112
RETIRE	15748	417	060
		•	
	* = significa	nt at $p = .10$	
	** = significa		
		nt at $p = .01$	
		P (dummy variab)	le)
	117 valid obs		

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL

MODEL 2

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)

variable	coefficient	t ratio	elasticity
intercept	4.10736	3.809	
personal:			
SEX	-1.23494	-1.152	083#
BLACK	7.89462	.303	.064#
HISP	94714	559	086#
OTHER	.00000		
EDUC	-1.52796	-1.373	120#
TOTDEP	.19990	.800	.047
OCS	24802	289	008#
ROTC	-1.30008	-1.607	075#
DIRECT	.00000		
MED	.00000		
LOS	.05622**	2.366	•670
intrinsic:			
PROM	.29856**	1.964	.312
EXPECT	45070	-1.165	121
DETAIL	39428	-1.430	109
JOB	69182	-1.632	238
FAMILY	36848	834	137
extrinsic:			
TOTPAY	00012	970	426
SUPPAY	.00002	•677	.024
CIVJOB	00938	057	010
RETIRE	 35986	999	108
	* = significa	nt at $n = .10$	
		nt at p = .05	
	019.111100	nt at p = .01	
		P (dummy variab	ale)
	162 valid obs		,10,
	101 (4114 005	CITACIONO	

TABLE 20

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY MODEL 1 (cutoff P = .5)

			pred	icte	đ		
		non-c	areerist	C	areerist	-	total
actual	non-careerist	I I I	42 3.6%	I I I	87 7.5%	I I I	129
	careerist	I I I	26 2.2%	I I I	1006 86.6%	I I I	1032
	total		68		1093		1161

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 21

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .894)

		predic	ted	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	1 98 I I 8.4% I I	31 I 2.7% I	129
	careerist	I 216 I I 18.6% I	816 I 70.3% I	1032
	total	314	847	1161

TABLE 22

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .5)

		predi	cted	
		non-careerist	careerist	_ total
actual	non-careerist	I 10 I 3.4%	I I 13 I 4.5%	I I 23 I
	careerist	I I 14 I 4.8% I	I I 255 I -87.3% I	I I 269 I
	total	24	268	292

TABLE 23

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .909)

		predi	cted	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I I 19 I 6.5%	I	23
	careerist	I I 65 I 22.3% I	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	269
	total	84	208	292

TABLE 24

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL MODEL 1 (cutoff P = .5)

		predic	cted	
		_non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 22 I I 11.5% I	1 25 I I 13.1% I	47
	careerist	I I 5 I 2.6%	I 139 I I 72.8% I	144
	total	27	164	191

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 25

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .773)

		predic	ted	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 37 I 19.4% I I 19.4% I I	10 I 5.2% I	47
	careerist	I 34 I I 17.8% I	I 110 I 57.6% I	144
	total	71	120	191

TABLE 26

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL 1 (cutoff P = .5)

		predic		
actual	non-careerist	non-careerist I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	careerist 9 5.7%	total I I I I I
	careerist	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	145 91.8%	I I 146 I
	total	4	154	158

TABLE 27

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL 1
(cutoff P = .924)

		predic		
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	1 1 I 1 0.6% I	12
	careerist	I 30 I 19.0% I	I 116 I I 73.4% I	146
	total	41	117	158

TABLE 28

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 1 (cutoff P = .5)

		cted		
		non-careerist	careerist T	total
actual	non-careerist	I 9 I 6.4% I	6 I I 4.3% I	15
	careerist	I 2 I 1.4%	I 123 I I 87.9% I I I	125
	total	11	129	140

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 29

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 1
(cutoff P = .883)

		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 13 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	2 I 1 1.4% I	15
	careerist	I 19 II 13.6% II	I 106 I I 75.7% I	125
	total	32	108	140

TABLE 30

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .5)

		predic		
		non-careerist	careerist	_ total
actual	non-careerist	I 21 I 2.3% I	1 115 1 12.4%	I I 136 I
	careerist	I 6 I 0.6% I	I I 784 I 84.7%	I I 790 I
	total	27	899	926

TABLE 31

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .868)

		predicted				
	non-careerist	non-careerist I I 96	careerist I I 40	total I I 136		
actual	non-careerist	I 10.4%	I 4.3%	I I		
	careerist	I 210 I 22.7% I	I 580 I 62.6% I	I 790 I L		
	total	306	620	926		

TABLE 32

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .5)

		predi			
		_non-careerist	careerist	-	total
actual	non-careerist	I 11 I 3.3% I	I 40 I 11.9%	I I I	51
		I I 1 I 0.3%	I I 283 I 84.5% I	I I I	284
	total	12	323		335

TABLE 33

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .864)

	predicted					
		non-careerist	careerist	total		
actual	non-careerist	I 41 I I 12.2% I I	10 I I 3.0% I	51		
		I 63 I 18.8% I	I 221 I I 66.0% I	284		
	total	104	231	335		

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .5)

		predicted					
actual	non-careerist	non-careerist I I 4 I 3.4% I	careerist I I I 15 I I 12.8% I I I	total			
	careerist	I I 1 I 0.9% I	I 97 I I 82.9% I I I	. 98			
	total	5	.112	117			

TABLE 35

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 1

(cutoff P = .821)

	predicted					
		_non-careerist	careerist	total		
actual	non-careerist	I 14 I I 12.0% I I	I 5 I I 4.3% I	19		
		I 27 I 23.1% I	I 71 I I 60.7% I	98		
	total	41	76	117		

TABLE 36

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 1 (cutoff P = .5)

predicted non-careerist careerist total Į. I I Ι Ι 14 I 21 non-careerist Ι 4.3% Ι 8.6% Ι actual I Ι Ι 3 Ι Ι careerist Ι 138 141 85.2% 1.9% Ι Ι total 10 152 162

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 37

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 1
(cutoff P = .864)

		predic		
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 16 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	5 I I 3.1% I	21
		I 28 I 17.3% I	I 113 I I 69.8% I	141
	total	44	118	162

TABLE 38

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY MODEL 2 (cutoff P = .5)

predicted

		*		
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 42 I 3.6% I	[87] [7.5%]	129 [
	careerist	I 23 I 2.0% I	I 1009 I I 86.9% I	1 1 1032 1
	total	65	1096	1161

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 39

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY

MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .874)

			_			_		-	
n	r	0	d	1	~	+	0	d	

actual	non-careerist	non-careerist I I 101 I 8.7%	careerist I I I 28 I I 2.4% I	total
	careerist	I I 243 I 20.9% I	I	1032
	total	344	817	1161

TABLE 40

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS MODEL 2 (cutoff P = .5)

	predicted			
		_non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 8 I 2.7% I	15 I I 5.1% I	23
	careerist	I 8 I 2.7% I	I 261 I I 89.4% I	269
	total	16	276	292

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 41

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .874)

	· predicted			
		non-careerist	careerist T	total
actual	non-careerist	I 18 I I 6.2% I I	5 I 1.7% I	23
	careerist	I 68 I 23.3% I	201 I 68.8% I	269
	total	86	206	292

TABLE 42

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL MODEL 2 (cutoff P = .5)

	predicted			
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 26 I I 13.6% I	21 I	47
-	<pre>careerist ;</pre>	I 13 I I 6.8% I	131 I 68.6% I	144
	total	39	152	191

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 43

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL

MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .724)

		predic	cted .	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 37 I 19.4%	I 10 I I 5.2% I	47
	careerist	I I 36 I 18.8%	I 108 I I 56.5% I	144
	total	73	118	191

TABLE 44

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .5)

		predic	cted	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 3 I 1.9% I	9 I I 5.7% I	12
	careerist	I I 2 I 1.3%	I 144 I I 91.1% I I I	146
	total	5	153	158

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 45

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL 2
(cutoff P = .947)

	predicted			
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 10 II I 6.3% II	I 2 I I 1.3% I I	12
	careerist	I 31 I I 19.6% I	I 115 I 72.8% I	146
	total	41	117	158

TABLE 46

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 2 (cutoff P = .5)

predicted

		non-careerist	careerist	total
	non-careerist	I T 9	I I I I	15
actual	non carcerise	I 6.4%	I 4.3% I	10
	careerist	I I 5 I 3.6%	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	125
	total	14	126	140

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 47

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .859)

predicted

		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 13 I I 9.3% I	2 1.4%	I I 15 I
	careerist	I 29 I I 20.7% I	96 68.6%	I I 125 I
	total	42	98	140

TABLE 48

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS

MODEL 2 (cutoff P = .5)

		predic	ted	
		_non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 23 I 2.5% I 1	1 113 I 1 12.2% I	136
	careerist	I 7 I 0.8% I	I 783 I 84.6% I	790
	total	30	896	926

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 49

PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS

MODEL 2
(cutoff P = .882)

		predicted		
		_non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 94 I I 10.2% I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	42 I 4.5% I	136
	careerist	I 207 I I 22.4% I I	583 I 63.0% I	790
	total	301	625	926

TABLE 50

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .5)

		predic	cted	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 10 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	I 41 I I 12.2% I	51
	careerist	I 0.0% I	I 284 I I I 84.8% I I	284
	total	10	325	335

TABLE 51

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .901)

		predic	cted	
		non-careerist	careerist	total
actual	non-careerist	I 39 I I 11.6% I	12 I 1 3.6% I	51
	careerist	I 66 I 19.7% I	I 218 I I 65.1% I	284
	total	105	230	335

TABLE 52

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2
(cutoff P = .5)

		predicted					
		non-careerist	careerist	total			
actual	non-careerist	I 3 I I 2.6% I I	16 I 13.7% I	19			
	careerist	I 3 1 1 2.6% I	95 I 81.2% I	98			
	total	6	111	117			

TABLE 53

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

MODEL 2

(cutoff P = .858)

	predicted					
		_non-careerist	careerist	total		
actual	non-careerist	I 15 I I 12.8% I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	4 I 3.4% I	19		
	careerist	I 20 I I 17.1% I	78 I 66.7% I	98		
	total	35	82	117		

TABLE 54

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 2
(cutoff P = .5)

	predicted					
		_non-careerist	careerist	total		
actual	non-careerist	I 8 I I 4.9% I I	1 13 I I 8.0% I	21		
	careerist	I 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	I 138 I I 85.2% I	141		
	total	11	151	16-2		

TABLE 55

PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL MODEL 2
(cutoff P = .879)

	predicted				
actual	non-careerist	non-careerist I 15 I 9.3%	careerist I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	total 21	
actual	careerist	I 30 I 18.5% I	1	141	
	total	45	117	162	

TABLE 56

SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES MODEL 1 proportion of correct predictions (cutoff P = .5)

group	overall	careerists no	on-careerists
all Army Army tactical operations Army medical Army administrative Army non-occupational all Marine Corps Marines tactical ops Marines administrative Marines non-occupational	90.2% 90.7 84.3 93.7 94.3 87.0 87.8 86.3 89.5	97.5% 94.8 96.5 99.3 98.4 99.2 99.6 99.0	32.6% 43.5 46.8 25.0 60.0 15.4 21.6 21.1 33.3

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 57

SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES MODEL 1 proportion of correct predictions (cutoff P = mean value)

group	overall	careerists	non-careerists
all Army Army tactical operations Army medical Army administrative Army non-occupational all Marine Corps Marines tactical ops Marines administrative Marines non-occupational	78.7% 76.4 77.0 30.4 85.0 73.0 78.2 72.7	79.1% 75.8 76.4 79.4 84.8 73.4 77.8 72.4 80.1	76.0% 82.6 78.7 91.7 86.7 70.6 80.4 73.7 76.2

TABLE 58

SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES MODEL 2 proportion of correct predictions (cutoff P = .5)

group	overall	careerists	non-careerists
all Army	90.5%	97.8%	32.6%
Army tactical operations	92.1	97.0	34.8
Army medical	82.2	91.0	55.3
Army administrative	93.0	98.6	25.0
Army non-occupational	92.1	96.0	60.0
all Marine Corps	87.1	99.1	16.9
Marines tactical ops	87.8	100.0	19.6
Marines administrative	83.8	96.9	15.8
Marines non-occupational	90.1	97.9	38.1

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

TABLE 59

SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES

MODEL 2

proportion of correct predictions

(cutoff P = mean value)

group	overall	careerists	non-careerists
all Army	76.7%	76.5%	78.3%
Army tactical operations	75.0	74.7	78.3
Army medical	75.9	75.0	78.7
Army administrative	79.1	78.8	83.3
Army non-occupational	77.9	76.8	86.7
all Marine Corps	73.2	73.8	69.1
Marines tactical ops	76.7	76.8	76.5
Marines administrative	79.5	79.6	78.9
Marines non-occupational	77.8	78.7	71.4

TABLE 60 RESULTS OF CHOW TEST

	F value	
comparison groups	Model 1	Model 2
all Army with all Marine Corps	2.104**	2.104**
Army with Marine Corps tactical operations	1.916**	1.928**
Army with Marine Corps administrative	0.668	1.038
Army with Marine Corps non-occupational	0.666	0.603
Army: tactical operations with medical	2.003**	2.101**
Army: tactical operations with administrative	1.165	1.180
Army: tactical operations with non-occupational	0.799	0.734
Army: medical with administrative	1.594*	1.635*
Army: medical with non-occupational	0.938	0.868
Army: administrative with non-occupational	0.774	0.728
Marine Corps: tactical ops with administrative	0.554	0.855
Marine Corps: tactical ops with non-occupational	0.696	0.630
Marine Corps: administrative with non-occupational	0.487	0.693
<pre>* = significant ** = significant</pre>		

IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

By comparing Tables 2 through 10, the first conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that intrinsic factors appear to contribute more to career intentions than extrinsic factors. In every group except "Marine Corps administrative," there are more significant intrinsic than extrinsic variables, and the relative level of significance of intrinsic factors is higher. In the Marine Corps administrative group, neither intrinsic nor extrinsic variables show any significance. This may be due to the small sample size involved: this group had the smallest number of valid observations (N = 117) of any group included in the study.

Looking at specific variables, the only factors which are not significant for any group are HISP, OTHER, EDUC, DIRECT, and CIVJOB. This means that Hispanics and other races are neither more nor less likely than whites to be careerists. Education also does not significantly affect an individual's career intentions. Officers receiving a direct commission are just as likely to be careerists as academy graduates. At the same time, in a couple of instances, OCS commissioned officers are less likely to be careerists than academy graduates (all Marine Corps and Marine Corps tactical operations), but ROTC commissioned officers (Army tactical operations) seem to be more likely than academy

graduates to be careerists. It is suspected that, since most individuals in the study are past their initial obligations, the commissioning source will have less of an impact on career intentions than it would for individuals within the first four years of service.

Perhaps surprisingly, the probability of finding a good civilian job does not influence the career decision. This indicates that officers in the Army and Marine Corps, as a whole, do not seriously consider the possibility of changing to a civilian career. These individuals are either satisfied with a military career or choose to leave for reasons other than just to get a better job. While the benefits of leaving the service in order to make more money in the outside world is a common topic of discussion among military officers, apparently it is an option which, in fact, does not significantly influence the career decision, or, at least, not that of individuals who have already served a number of years.

On the other hand, two factors, LOS and PROM, are consistently significant. Clearly, the more senior an individual is in terms of length of service and the greater his probability of promotion, the more likely he is to make the service a career. DETAIL and SEX also show up more often than the other factors. This indicates that the more satisfied an individual is with his current job the more

likely he is to be career motivated. Women, however, appear, overall, to be less career motivated than men.

The remaining factors show up as being significant only once or twice. Most of the results are reasonable in light of the literature review. Older individuals tend to be more career motivated (in Army non-occupational and Marine Corps tactical operations); this would be expected as age is highly correlated with length of service (see Appendix C). Satisfaction with job- related factors (all Army and Marine Corps non-occupational), family-related factors (all Army and Army medical), and retirement benefits (all Marine Corps) all contribute to an increase in career intentions in their respective groups. Individuals who are commissioned through a medical program are less likely to be careerists than academy graduates (all Army); this implies that doctors are less likely to be careerists than other officers, and this appears to be the case (see Appendix D); however, this topic should be studied in greater detail before any specific conclusions are made. Finally, Marine Corps officers whose expectations of military life are met tend to be more career motivated, as would be expected.

There are a few variables which stand out and warrant a closer investigation. The most obvious is TOTPAY for all Army. According to these results, if total military pay is increased by ten percent then the probability of an individual being a careerist will decrease by 1.2 percent.

Even though this result is in keeping with Mullens' conclusion, it is not one that follows common sense. Although TOTPAY is highly correlated with LOS, multicollinearity is not suspected to be the problem since TOTPAY is negatively correlated with career intentions (see Appendix C). There is no apparent reason why this negative relationship exists, but if this is truly the case, then retention could be improved by decreasing pay, and that, obviously, should not work. (An interesting possible study could be one which investigates the reason for the negative correlation between military pay and career intentions.)

According to the results, individuals who are in Marine Corps tactical operations are more likely to be careerists if they are married but less likely if they have dependents. The most likely reason for this discrepancy is multicollinearity between DEPEND and MARRIED. These two factors are highly correlated (see Appendix C), and this may cause DEPEND to be unstable. This assumption is verified by running the regression without MARRIED. As expected, this causes DEPEND to become positive (see Appendix E).

Lastly, blacks in Army administrative occupations are less likely to be careerists than whites. Since this is the only group in the study in which race is significant, this may indicate possible discrimination problems within this one specialty in the Army. However, a more likely explanation is simply that most of the 25 blacks (see

Appendix D) who are included in the study have decided against a military career for reasons independent of their race (BLACK is just barely significant at p = .10).

Model 2 was estimated in an attempt to clear up these problems and develop a better model; however, the results of Model 2 are comparable to those of Model 1. The influence of intrinsic factors still dominate over that of extrinsic factors. Likewise, the specific factors that were found to be significant, and their corresponding elasticities, change very little between Models 1 and 2. Nonetheless, there are a couple of differences worth noting.

Although MARRIED and DEPEND are both significant for Marine Corps tactical operations, TOTDEP is not; nor is it significant to any other group in the study. In the literature review, it was noted that Stolzenberg and Winkler found single individuals without dependents to be more career oriented whereas Warner and Goldberg found the opposite to be the case. The situation may be that some individuals feel they should stay in the military for their family's sake (job security and the like), whereas others feel they should get out in order to improve their family life (avoid long separations and so forth). Based on this study, no determination can be made concerning the impact of dependents on the career decision. Apparently, overall, it has no (or, perhaps, unpredictable would be more accurate) influence on the career decision.

SUPPAY is found to be significant to only one group:
Marine Corps administrative. This indicates that the
individuals in this group who are receiving a relatively
greater income from sources outside the military are less
likely to stay in, which makes sense. Nevertheless, the
lack of significance of SUPPAY to all other groups supports
the conclusion that extrinsic factors are relatively
unimportant to the career decision. As with the probability
of finding a good civilian job, most officers are not highly
influenced by outside income: they serve in the military
because they like it (intrinsic factors).

Since the services can do little to change an individual's personal characteristics, any policy changes aimed at improving retention must concentrate on either intrinsic or extrinsic factors. A closer look at the elasticities in Tables 2 through 19 reveals that most of the elasticities of these factors are quite small. In some cases, PROM exceeds .6, but most of the statistically significant elasticities of the factor are around the .1 to This means that a ten percent increase in that .2 range. factor will result in only a one to two percent increase in retention. Therefore, any policy changes should include a combination of factors if it is to have a significant impact. In addition to the additive effect, this would allow the policymakers to take advantage of any interactions between factors or multiplicative effects of one factor's

elasticity on that of another (e.g., if two factors each improve retention by 2%, then the net improvement from incorporating both factors will be $2\% + 2\% + (2\% \times 2\%)$).

The results of the Chow test (Table 60) indicate that there are three general groups included in this study: Marine Corps, all Army (excluding medical specialists), and Army medical specialists. The results show a statistically significant difference between all Army and all Marine Corps and between Army and Marine Corps tactical operations. While the difference between Army and Marine Corps administrative and Army and Marine Corps non-occupational is not significant, this suggests only that the null hypothesis (i.e., that the two groups are not significantly different) cannot be rejected. It is suspected that if larger sample sizes were available, then a difference would manifest itself. Likewise, Army medical is significantly different from Army tactical operations and from administrative but not from non-occupational. At the same time, Army nonoccupational is the smallest Army group (N = 140), and it is suspected that a larger sample would show a difference between these groups.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis attempts to locate and describe factors which are important contributors to the career decision of Army and Marine Corps officers. In addition, the thesis examines whether Army and Marine Corps officers, both as a whole and as members of specific specialties, would be similarly affected by certain policy changes. This was done in order to guide potential policymakers in determining what factors would have the greatest impact on officer retention.

In order to conduct this study, data were taken from the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. Army and Marine Corps officers between their fourth-year and twelfthyear of service were looked at both as members of their specific DoD specialties and as members of their respective branch of service. Individuals were classified as either "careerists" or "non-careerists" based on their intended total length of service (persons with 20 or more years were considered careerists and those with 19 or less years were defined as non-careerists). A LOGIT regression was estimated for each group using career intentions as the dependent variable based on a collection of independent variables which previous studies have determined to influence the career decision. These variables were classified as one of three general types: personal, intrinsic, or extrinsic factors. The results of these

regressions were used to estimate the elasticities of significant factors. The predictive validity of these models was also estimated. Finally, the individual models were compared to determine whether the respective groups are significantly different or could be considered, functionally, as a single group.

In attempting to use these models to predict career intentions, which is incidental to the primary purpose of this study, it cannot be assumed that an individual will be a careerist if his predicted probability of being a careerist (P) is simply greater than .5. Although using .5 as the cutoff point gives a high overall proportion of correct predictions, potential non-careerists are more accurately identified by using the mean value of the predicted probabilities as the cutoff point. Otherwise, it would be easier to just assume that everyone is a potential careerist.

The basic conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows. For the groups examined, intrinsic factors apparently contributed more to the career decision than did extrinsic factors. It should follow, then, that increased retention may be achieved by improving intrinsic factors or rewards in the military, particularly the individual's promotion probability and placement in a satisfying job. Extrinsic factors still exercise a strong influence on the officer's career decision, but the available evidence

suggests that intrinsic elements of service are relatively more important. Personal factors also contribute to career intentions, specifically length of service and sex; however, the services, obviously, have little control over these factors other than to limit the number of billets available to specific groups (discriminate), such as women. Most factors alone do not contribute much to retention (average elasticity is around .2), so an effective retention program must include a combination of factors. Lastly, although similar factors motivate all officers to be careerists, the three groups studied here—Army as a whole, Marine Corps as a whole, and Army medical specialists—cannot be viewed as a single group. Each group has a certain unique character and must be considered separately when determining policy changes intended to increase retention.

APPENDIX_A

DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES

AGE: question ID 036E35

"How old were you on your last birthday?"

Variable used as given.

SEX: 035E34

"Are you male or female?"

Variable was recoded: male = 0, female = 1.

RACE: RACE4

A composite variable created by the surveyists based on two questions related to descent:

question one (O39E38) -- "Are you:

American Indian/Alaskan Native
Black/Negro/Afro-American
Oriental/Asian/Chinese/Japanese/Korean/Filipino/
Pacific Islander
White/Caucasian
Other (specify) "

question two (O40E39) -- "Are you of Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent?

No, not Spanish/Hispanic
Yes, Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano
Yes, Puerto Rican
Yes, Cuban
Yes, Central or South American
Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic"

black includes "black" on question one and "no" or
 blank on question two;

Hispanic includes any "yes" on question two; other includes "American Indian," "Oriental," or "other" on question one, or question one not answered and question two answered "no;" white includes "white" on question one and "no" or blank on question two;

missing if neither question is answered.

Variable was recoded into three dummy variables:

white = 0, BLACK = 1; white = 0, HISP = 1; white = 0, OTHER = 1.

EDUC (education): 046

"As of today, what is the highest degree or diploma that you hold? Do not include degrees from technical, trade, or vocational schools. Mark one.

No Degree or Diploma
GED Certificate
Certificate of Completion/Attendance
Home Study Diploma
High School Diploma
Associate/Junior College Degree
Bachelor's Degree (BA/BS)
Master's Degree (MA/MS)
Doctoral Degree (PhD/MD/LLB)
Other Degree not listed above."

Variable was recoded: bachelor's degree = 0, master's or doctoral degree = 1, all others = missing.

MARRIED: 051E48

"Are you currently:

Married for the first time Remarried Widowed Divorced Separated Single, never married" Variable was recoded: single = 0 (includes single,
 widowed, and divorced), married = 1 (includes
 married for first time, remarried, and separated).

DEPEND (dependents): 067E64

"How many dependents do you have? Do not include yourself or your spouse."

Variable was recoded: none = 0, one dependant = 1, two = 2, etc.

TOTDEP (total number of dependents): 051E48 + 067E64

This variable was constructed by adding one to the number of dependents if the individual is married.

COMM (commissioning source): 010

"Through which of the following officer procurement programs did you obtain your commission/warrant?

Academy Graduate
Limited Duty Officer Program
Officer Candidate School or Officer Training School
ROTC (Regular)
ROTC (Scholarship)
Aviation Officer Candidate or Aviation Cadet
Warrant Officer Program
Direct Appointment from Civilian Status
Reserve Officer Candidate
Platoon Leaders Course/WOC
Health Professional Scholarship Program
Medical Specialist Program
Other"

Variable was recoded into four dummy variables:
 academy = 0, OCS = 1 (includes OCS/OTS and AOCS),
 academy = 0, ROTC = 1 (includes regular and
 scholarship ROTC),

academy = 0, DIRECT = 1 (includes direct appointment
 from civilian status),

academy = 0, MED = 1 (includes health professional
 scholarship program and medical specialist
 program).

LOS (length of service): 06E6

"To the nearest year and month, how long have you been on active duty? If you had a break in service, count current time and time in previous tour(s), and count prior enlisted time."

Variable used as given (total months).

PROM (promotion probability): 032

"What do you think your chances are of being promoted to the next higher pay grade? Mark one.

Does not apply, I plan to retire
Does not apply, I plan to leave the Service
Does not apply, I do not expect any more promotion
(0 in 10) No Chance
(1 in 10) Very slight possibility
(2 in 10) Slight possibility
(3 in 10) Some possibility
(4 in 10) Fair possibility
(5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
(6 in 10) Good possibility
(7 in 10) Probable
(8 in 10) Very probable
(9 in 10) Almost sure
(10 in 10) Certain"

Variable was recoded: no chance or do not expect any more promotions = 0, very slight possibility = 1, etc, certain = 10, I plan to retire or I plan to leave the Service = missing.

EXPECT (military life as expected): 0108104A

"How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about military life? Life in the military is about what I expected it to be."

Strongly Agree = 1
Agree = 2
Neither Agree Nor Disagree = 3
Disagree = 4
Strongly Disagree = 5

Variable was recoded: question not answered = missing.

DETAIL (satisfaction with current job): 0109105J

"Below is a list of issues particular to a military way of life. Considering current policies, please indicate your level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with each issue: Satisfaction with current job."

Very satisfied = 1
Satisfied = 2
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied = 3
Dissatisfied = 4
Very dissatisfied = 5

Variable was recoded: question not answered = missing.

JOB/FAMILY

These two variables were constructed using factor analysis. The following variables and their corresponding weights are included in these factors:

Ol09105A: Satisfaction with personal freedom
Ol09105F: Satisfaction with environment for family
Ol09105G: Satisfaction with frequency of moves
Ol09105I: Satisfaction with opportunity to serve
country
Ol09105M: Satisfaction with job security
Ol09105N: Satisfaction with working environment
Ol09105L: Satisfaction with job training/in service
education

The question, possible responses, and recoding were the same as O109105J.

	JOB	FAMILY
0109105A:	.18059	.17300
O109105F:	10641	.52866
0109105G:	22024	.61477
01091051:	.41619	21243
O109105M:	.38846	13446
0109105N:	.28574	.08529
O109105L:	.35009	04588

The two factors were constructed by adding the products of each variable with its corresponding weight.

TOTPAY (total military pay): WAGES + BAS + BAQ + VHA

This variable was computed from the values found by the surveyists in the 8503 JUMPS file and was computed as the sum of taxable military income, basic allowance for subsistence, basic allowance for quarters, and variable housing allowance.

Variables were used as given.

SUPPAY (supplemental pay): INCOME2 - (WAGES + BAS + BAQ + VHA)

This variable was constructed by subtracting total military pay from total family income.

CIVJOB (probability of finding a good civilian job): 096E92

"If you were to leave the Service now and tried to find a civilian job, how likely would you be to find a good civilian job? Mark one.

- (0 in 10) No Chance
- (1 in 10) Very slight possibility
- (2 in 10) Slight possibility
- (3 in 10) Some possibility
- (4 in 10) Fair possibility

- (5 in 10) Fairly good possibility (6 in 10) Good possibility
- (7 in 10) Probable
- (8 in 10) Very probable
- (9 in 10) Almost sure
- (10 in 10) Certain"

Variable was recoded: no chance = 0, very slight possibility = 1, etc., certain = 10, don't know or question not answered = missing.

RETIRE (satisfaction with retirement benefits): 0109105H The question, possible responses, and recoding were the same as 0109105J.

APPENDIX B

MEAN VALUES OF VARIABLES

	ALL ARMY		ARMY	TACTICAL OP	ERATIONS
	MEAN	STD DEV		MEAN	STD DEV
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.889 31.370 .286 .109 .034 .035 .351 .767 1.146 1.912 .068 .549 .161 .056 95.861 8.202 2.183 2.228 2.654 2.947 26972.225 11163.551 8.066 2.333	.314 3.839 .452 .312 .182 .185 .478 .423 1.256 1.475 .252 .498 .368 .230 27.085 2.020 .862 1.106 .902 .949 .949 .949 .949 .949	CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.921 30.092 .062 .099 .045 .031 .137 .784 1.223 2.007 .072 .682 .021 .000 92.942 8.524 2.185 2.185 2.185 2.979 25581.932 7299.736 7.795 2.353	.270 2.764 .241 .300 .207 .173 .344 .412 1.236 1.460 .259 .467 .142 .000 26.011 1.671 .862 1.121 .870 .988 2867.500 10367.856 1.970 .924

ARMY MEDICAL

ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE

	MEAN	STD DEV		MEAN	STD DEV
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY	.754 33.817 .639 .105 .021 .068 .649 .733 1.277 2.010 .000 .079 .513 .288 90.351 7.524 2.230 2.366 2.947 2.828 32438.298	.432 5.250 .482 .307 .144 .253 .478 .444 1.491 1.701 .000 .270 .501 .454 28.367 2.519 .814 1.087 .881 .888	CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY	.924 31.430 .361 .158 .032 .013 .373 .741 1.006 1.747 .139 .614 .133 .000 101.139 8.323 2.139 2.127 2.614 2.756 25720.361	.266 2.989 .482 .366 .176 .112 .485 .440 1.170 1.427 .347 .488 .341 .000 26.328 1.936 .947 1.081 .907 .862 2246.359
SUPPAY CIVJOB	16341.984	15968.742 1.687	SUPPAY CIVJOB	12912.810	16846.465
RETIRE	2.377	. 811	RETIRE	2.367	.893

ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL

	MEAN	STD DEV
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB	MEAN .893 30.357 .207 .071 .043 .029 .336 .821 1.086 1.907 .064 .557 .093 .036 94.450 8.471 2.129 2.057 2.404	.310 2.854 .407 .258 .203 .167 .474 .384 1.135 1.335 .246 .499 .291 .186 26.720 1.769 .838 .935 .876
FAMILY	3.130	.890
TOTPAY	25953.914	4078.423
SUPPAY	10324.893	12543.465
CIVJOB	8.314	1.645
RETIRE	2.279	.930

ALL MARINE CORPS

MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

	MEAN	STD DEV		MEAN	STD DEV
CAREER AGE SEX . BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB	.853 29.874 .173 .042 .030 .015 .163 .724 .976 1.700 .306 .171 .005 .000 93.100 8.054 2.092 2.054 2.559 2.909 26694.614 8355.661 8.325	.354 2.957 .378 .201 .171 .122 .370 .447 1.122 1.394 .461 .376 .073 .000 26.288 2.061 .822 1.089 .894 .915 5683.675 12413.734 1.740	CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY SUPPAY CIVJOB	.848 29.731 .024 .006 .039 .021 .093 .764 1.051 1.815 .299 .191 .000 .000 91.639 8.006 2.134 2.027 2.651 2.971 28320.546 6101.788 8.322	.360 2.728 .153 .077 .193 .143 .290 .425 1.119 1.380 .458 .394 .000 .000 26.261 2.111 .884 1.082 .910 .964 5945.999 10031.246 1.826
RETIRE	2.364	.892	RETIRE	2.436	.896

MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL

	MEAN	STD DEV		MEAN	STD DEV
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.838 30.504 .581 .103 .017 .017 .274 .641 .821 1.462 .436 .068 .009 .000 95.547 8.111 1.983 2.103 2.519 2.743 25510.496 15163.675 8.231 2.342	.370 2.690 .495 .305 .130 .130 .448 .482 1.201 1.471 .498 .253 .092 .000 26.078 1.865 .629 1.020 .840 .875 3024.784 17726.558 1.886 .892	CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.870 29.833 .130 .049 .025 .000 .093 .759 1.068 1.827 .259 .247 .000 .000 91.963 8.056 2.074 2.123 2.656 2.872 27391.056 9351.302 8.154 2.321	.337 2.913 .337 .217 .156 .000 .291 .429 1.132 1.386 .440 .433 .000 .000 26.502 2.001 .800 1.225 .887 .923 4974.055 12298.838 1.799 .896

APPENDIX C

CORRELATION MATRICES

ALL ARMY

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLAGK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	1.0000 .0398 1523** 0078 0234 0511 0440 .0576 .0519 .0607 .0520 .1089** 0688* 2119** .2344** .2526** 1283** 1283** 1973** 1973** 1140** 0996* 0576 0576 1188**	.0398 1.0000 .0250 0690% 0010 .0485 .4331** .0441 .2919** .0248 2871** .0888* .5026** 2009** 0791* 0018 0092 0657 .5570** .0586 .0095 0629	1523** .0250 1.0000 .05910255 .0235 .00932546**2328**2713**00452802** .4435** .0698*1588**1210** .0887* .1004** .1434**0790*0514 .3619** .0030 .0939**	0078 0690* .0591 1.0000 0662 0671 0614 0154 .0077 .0022 .0368 .0572 .0116 0133 0322 0365 .0407 .0749* .0966** 0679 0512 0353 0408 .1033**	0234001002550662 1.000003610302 .0038 .0383 .0337 .0240 .0290018502550470 .03950019030500810597 .024401130360 .0297
OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
0511 .0485 .0235 0671 0361 1.0000 .0351 0158 .0336 .0241 0146 0328 .0304 0060 0030 0146 .0080 .0196 .0342 .0134 .0483 0280 .0128 .0017	0440 .4331** .0093 0614 0302 .0351 1.0000 .1076** .1546** .1626** 0914** 2388** .2173** .2210** .2225** 0130 0458 09458 0192 .0060 .4254** .0613 .1650** 0421	.0576 .0441 2546** 0154 .0038 0158 .1076** 1.0000 .3932** .6218** .0278 .0274 1127** .0458 .1305** .0422 0527 0389 0417 .0013 .0874* .2825** .0031 0649	.0519 .2919** 2328** .0077 .0383 .0336 .1546** .3932** 1.0000 .9646** .0150 0093 0153 .0673 .1889** .0217 0127 0481 0713* .0352 .2501** 1045** .0445 0300	.0607 .2612** 2713** .0022 .0337 .0241 .1626** .6218** .9646** 1.0000 .0207 .0000 0454 .0704* .1983** .0306 0522 0727* .0304 .2381** 0079 .0388 0442	.0520 .0248 0045 .0368 .0240 0146 0914** .0278 .0150 .0207 1.0000 2979** 1184** 0658 .0326 .0474 0456 .0185 0056 .0326 0976** .0138 0591 0165

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

ALL ARMY (CONT)

	ROTC .	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIREC MED LOS PROM EXPECT LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOBA TOTPAY CIVJOB	2979** 1.00004831**2685**0324 .0506 .0625 .00410364 .01262129**1446**1190**	0688 × .3737 × × .4435 × × .0116 0185 .0504 .2173 × ×1127 × ×0153 0454 1184 × ×4831 × × 1.0000 1067 × ×0329 1727 × ×0172 .0409 .0977 × ×0977 × × .1577 × × .1577 × × .1773 × × .0239	2119** .0888* .0698*013302550060 .2210** .0458 .0673 .0704*06582685**1067** 1.000001580411 .0351 .0650 .1067** .0135 .3332** .0646 .1416**	.2344** .5026**1588**032204700030 .2225** .1305** .1889** .1983** .0326032403290158 1.00000869**0923**001206350153 .2546**0183	.2526 **2009 **1210 **0365 .039501460130 .0422 .0217 .0306 .0474 .05061727 **04110869 ** 1.00001416 **1380 **2831 **02471523 **0356 .1941 **
RETIRE	.0185	0113	.0180	0853×	0177

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB .	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
1283**0791* .0887* .04070019 .008004580527012702600456 .06250172 .03510923**1416** 1.0000 .2825** .3655** .2968**0208 .03110089	1973**0018 .1004** .0749*0305 .01960084038904810522 .0185 .0041 .0409 .065000121380** .2825** 1.0000 .4969** .1575**0271 .03090602	2269**0092 .1434** .0966**0081 .0342019204170713*0727*00560364 .0977** .1067**06352631** .3655** .4969** 1.0000 .0418 .0142 .06040475	1140**06570790*06790597 .0134 .0060 .0013 .0352 .0304 .0326 .01260977** .013501530247 .2968** .1575** .0418 1.0000 .01470204 .0614	0996** .5570**05140512 .0244 .0483 .4254** .2501** .2381**0976**2129** .1577** .3332** .2546**1523**02080271 .0142 .0147 1.0000 .0108 .1279**	0548 .0586 .3619** 0353 0113 0280 .0613 .2825** 1045** 0079 .0138 1446** .1773** .0646 0183 0356 .0311 .0309 .0604 0204 .0108 1.0000 .0270
.1678××	.1651××	.2549**	.2349××	.0150	.0093

ALL ARMY (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY	0576 .0095 .0030 0408 0360 .0128 .1650** .0031 .0445 .0388 0591 1190** .0239 .1416** 0617 .1941** 0689 0602 0475 .0614 .1279** .0270	1188* 0629 .0939** .1033** .0297 .0017 0421 0649 0300 0442 0165 .0186 0113 .0180 0853* 0177 .1678** .1651** .2549** .2349** .0093
CIVJOB RETIRE	1.0000	.0649 1.0000

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT	1.0000 .0605 1894** 0304 .0015 0214 .0795 .0939 .0837 .0973 0170 .1003 1369*	.0605 1.0000 0241 0402 .0770 .0156 .3260** .1292 .2757** .2699** 0093 .0709 .1526*	1894**0241 1.00000375 .0137 .03670193107905780794 .03890693 .4647**	0304 0402 0375 1.0000 0717 0592 .0342 .0350 0135 0016 .0848 .0304	.0015 .0770 .0137 0717 1.0000 0385 0377 0482 0120 0238 0601 .1119
MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0958 .2061** 1736* 2821** 2374** 0873 .1009 0481 .0147 1638*	.7981**1861**0390 .068900420380 .6942** .061507920774	1365* 0208 .0111 .0602 .0709 .0346 0773 .2493** 1180	0658 .0261 0181 .0485 .0351 .0019 0782 .0249 0002 .0964	.0114 .1213 .0115 0350 0288 1524* 0266 0582 1378* 0285

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
0214 .0156 .0367 0592 0385 1.0000 0710 0510 0161 0280 .1038 0907 0258	.0795 .3260** 0193 .0342 0377 0710 1.0000 .0153 .0815 .0733 .0048 1125 .0827	.0939 .1292 1079 .0350 0482 0510 .0153 1.0000 .4253** .6424** .0493 0548 0414	.0837 .2757** 0578 0135 0120 0161 .0815 .4253** 1.0000 .9668** .0787 .0280 0261	.0973 .2699** 0794 0016 0238 0280 .0733 .6424** .9668** 1.0000 .0806 .0083 0338	0170 0093 .0389 .0848 0601 .1038 .0048 .0493 .0787 .0806 1.0000 4072** 0403
.0057 .0034 0844 .0419 0146 .0512 0635 0210 0519	.3361** .1137 1088 0736 1270 .0025 .2919** .0454 .0720	.1454* .0400 .0160 0712 0081 0171 .1271 .2412** .0299 0251	.1891** .0398 0162 0516 0747 0565 .2071** 1194 0418 0208	.2011** .04500092063806550527 .2112**033002700247	0576 .0715 0290 .0496 .0646 .0244 1947** .0864 0383

ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED	.0083 4072** 1.0000 2119**	1369* .1526* .4647** .0326 .08580258 .082704140261033804032119** 1.0000	1.0000	.0958 .7981** 1365* 0658 .0114 .0057 .3361** .1454* .1891** .2011** 0576 .0412 .0152	.2061**1361**0208 .0261 .1213 .0034 .1137 .0400 .0398 .0450 .07151813** .0413
LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0412 1818** .0872 .0255 .0677 0507 .1550* 0640 0864 0573	.0152 .0413 0592 .1060 0196 0035 0049 .0960 0462 .0493		1.0000 1474* 0708 0002 0664 0690 .6584** .0452 .0254 1059	1474* 1.0000 2522** 1647* 2879** 0320 2194** 0573 .2801** 0244

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
1736*0390 .01110181 .011508441088 .0160016200920290 .08720592	2821** .0689 .0602 .04850350 .04190736071205160638 .0496 .0255 .1060	2374**0042 .0709 .0351028801461270008107470655 .0646 .06770196	0873 0380 .0346 .0019 1524* .0512 .0025 0171 0565 0527 .0244 0507 0035	.1009 .6942** 0773 0782 0266 0635 .2919** .1271 .2071** .2112** 1947** .1550* 0049	0481 .0615 .2493** .0249 0582 0210 .0454 .2412** 1194 0330 .0864 0640
0708 2322** 1.0000 .3246** .4018** .3621** .0473 .0115 .0063 .1983**	0002 1647* .3246** 1.0000 .4880** .1778* 0306 0219 0188 .1304	0664 2879** .4018** .4880** 1.0000 .1124 0602 .0920 0383 .2750**	0690 0320 .3621** .1778* .1124 1.0000 0209 .0490 .1243 .2887**	.6584**2194** .0473030606020209 1.0000 .098704200494	.0452 0573 .0115 0219 .0920 .0490 .0987 1.0000 .0119 0761

ARMY -TACTICAL OPERATIONS (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY CIVJOB RET	.01470792118000021378*0519 .0720 .029904180270038308640462 .0254 .2801** .00630188038308830188038301928	1638*0774 .0718 .09640285 .03920336025102080247 .03720573 .049310590244 .1983** .1304 .2750** .2887**04940761 .0928 1.0000

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

ARMY MEDICAL

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS	1.0000 .0450 .1017 .0366 1711* 0869 1398 0426 0078	.0450 1.0000 1616 .0120 .0400 .0650 .3137** 0686 .4046** .3367**	.1017 1616 1.0000 .0792 .0339 .0734 3929** 2814** 2775** 3165**	.0366 .0120 .0792 1.0000 0500 0924 1069 .0132 .0397 .0382	1711* .0400 .03390500 1.00000395 .1075 .0883 .2432** .2361**
ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB - FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0312 .1001 2004* .3813** .1287 0924 1769* 1715* 1940* 1231 0385 1126 0945	1793* .2520** 1058 .3376** 2040* 1391 1616 2342** 1020 .5506** 0748 .0611 1680	1856* .2487** 2679** .0201 1253 .0120 .1135 .1155 1421 4819** .3185** 0912 .0406	0363 .1279 0287 0048 1257 .1347 .0421 .1089 1464 0900 0026 .1025 0326	0427 0038 0123 0160 0596 .0035 .0130 .0588 .0444 .1968* .1404 0257 .0675

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
0869 .0650	1398 .3137**	0426 0686	0078	0180	•
.0734	3929**	2814××	.4046** 2775**	.3367** 3165**	•
0924	1069	.0132	.0397	.0382	•
0395 1.0000	.1075 .0680	.0883 0248	.2432**	.2361××	•
.0680	1.0000	.2507××	.1034 .1814×	.0841 .2244**	•
0248	.2507**	1.0000	.3594××	.5756××	•••
.1034 .0841	.1814× .2244××	.3594××	1.0000	.9700××	
.0041	. 4444	.5756**	.9700**	1.0000	1.0000
0016	0709	.0002	0807	0706	1.0000
.0553	1234	1618	0014	0434	•
0800 0724	.2252** 0320	.1747¥ 0699	.0679 .1383	.1051	•
.0430	.1095	1493	0193	.0220	•
.0001 .0812	.0194	1203	0616	0854	•
0004	.0056 0874	0907 0581	1118 1512	1217 1476	•
0918	.0524	0528	.0126	0027	•
.0488	.5242**	.1595	.4240××	.4131××	•
1250 .0575	0222 .0738	.3553** 1224	.0121 .1021	.1032 .0576	•
.0026	.0578	0406	0260	0334	•

ARMY MEDICAL (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MEDS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB, LY TOTPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0312 1793* 1856* 0363 0427 0016 0709 0002 0807 0706 1.0000 2997** 1857* 1013 1561 0109 0628 0266 0303 0908 0550 0585 0398	.1001 .2520** .2437** .1279 0038 .0553 1234 1618 0014 0434 2997** 1.0000 6528** 1208 1847* .0055 .0298 .0242 1148 0912 0353 0684 0122	2004*10582679**028701230300 .2252** .1747* .0679 .10511857*6528** 1.0000 .0714 .0470 .0759 .0730 .0638 .1552 .1816* .0077 .1115 .0181	.3813** .3376** .020100480160072403200699 .1383 .103010131208 .0714 1.000014051346034212530662 .1395 .012109591855*	.12872040*125312570596 .0430 .1095 .14930193 .0220 .15611847* .04701405 1.0000041206472475** .09100761 .0476 .1900* .1013

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
0924 1391 .0120 .1347 .0035 .0001 .0194 1203 0616 0854	1769*1616 .1135 .0421 .0180 .0812 .0056090711181217	1715*2342** .1155 .1089 .058800040874053115121476	1940*102014211464044409180524052801260027	1231 .5506** 4319** 0900 .1968* .0488 .5242** .1595 .4240** .4131**	0385 0748 .3185** 0026 .1404 1250 0222 .3553** .0121 .1032
0109 .0055 .0759 1346 0412 1.0000 .2075* .2761** .2441** 0959 0054 .0459 .2027*	0628 .0298 .0730 0342 0647 .2075* 1.0000 .5669** .1741* 1728* .0570 0078 .3980**	0266 .0242 .0638 1253 2475** .2761** .5669** 1.0000 0304 1219 .0402 0435	.0303 1148 .1552 0662 .0910 .2441** .1741* 0304 1.0000 .0675 1316 .0222 .2652**	0908 0912 .1816* .1395 0761 0959 1728* 1219 .0675 1.0000 1697* .1958* 0628	0550 0353 .0077 .0121 .0476 0054 .0570 .0402 1316 1697* 1.0000 0868 .0076

ARMY MEDICAL (CONT)

e	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP	1126 .0611 0912 .1025 0257 .0575 .0738 1224 .1021	0945 1630 .0406 0326 .0675 .0026 .0578 0406 0260 0334
OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0585 0684 .1115 0959 .1900* .0459 0078 0435 .0222 .1958* 0868 1.0000 .0373	0398 0122 .0181 1855* .1013 .2027* .3980** .3240** .2652** 0628 .0076 .0373

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001
(1-TAILED, " . " PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)

ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE

	CAREER	AGE	SEX _	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED	1.0000 .1456 1329 1376 .0518 1812 .0731 0062 .0630 .0497 .1153 0311 0989	.1456 1.0000 0289 2372* .0224 .0216 .4198** .0128 .1368* .1571 .1996* 4352** .3064**	1329 0289 1.0000 .1077 0605 .0328 1167 3370** 3317** 3758** .0405 2705** .5212**	1376 2372* .1077 1.0000 0784 0491 0837 0203 .0422 .0284 0241 .1301 0165	.0518 .0224 0605 0784 1.0000 0205 .0099 .0245 .0300 .0322 .1362 0052 0708
LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOS FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0762 .3203** 0842 0107 0846 0035 0127 0177 .0465 0426	.6202**05940708 .057909370240 .5480**052916100972	2440* .0382 .0009 .1074 .062912531005 .3746**0212 .1483	1199 1354 .0279 .1422 .1248 0312 1154 0904 1781 .1902*	.0748 .0822 0267 0883 0397 0192 0132 0686 .0416 .1278

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
1812 .0216 .0328 0491 0205 1.0000 0874 .0670 0977 0594 0455 1428 .1224	.0731 .4198** 1167 0337 .0099 0874 1.0000 .0988 .2426* .2293* 0837 1135 .1988*	0062 .0128 3370** 0203 .0245 .0670 .0988 1.0000 .4612** .6862** 0121 .1830 2361*	.0630 .1868* 3317** .0422 .0300 0977 .2426* .4612** 1.0000 .9619** 0179 .1046 1619	.0497 .1571 3758** .0284 .0322 0594 .2293* .6862** .9619** 1.0000 0184 .1421 2055*	.1153 .1996* .0405 0241 .1362 0455 0837 0121 0179 0184 1.0000 5072** 1575
.0469 0776 0167 0133 .0762 .0579 .0547 .1004 0420	.4222** .0743 0723 0421 1088 0212 .3564** 1068 .1396 0535	.1693 .0018 .0108 0644 .0826 0150 .0323 .2955** .1110	.2055*020602950762 .0086 .0716 .07991110 .03600628	.2206*016302090823 .0325 .0541 .0755 .0000 .06370612	0683 .0843 0787 .0206 0099 0660 2446** 0549 .0156 0220

ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROME EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY CIVJOB RETIRE		0989 .3064** .5212** 0165 0708 .1224 .1988* 2361* 1619 2055* 1575 4937** 1.0000 .1947* 0655 0972 .0924 0090 0470 .1751 .2417* 0891 0356	1.0000	.0762 .6202** 2440* 1199 .0748 .0469 .4222** .1693 .2055* .2206* 0683 2043* .1947* 1.0000 1205 0534 0214 0061 .0177 .7042** 0819 0884 0251	.3203**0594 .03821354 .08220776 .0743 .001802060163 .0843 .011406551205 1.00002330*2053*3579**14502210* .0192 .2499**1931*

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY.	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
0842 0708 .0009 .0279 0267 0167 0723 .0108 0295 0209 0787 .0894 0972	0107 .0579 .1074 .1422 0883 0133 0421 -,0644 0762 0823 .0206 0637	0846 0937 .0629 .1248 0397 .0762 1088 .0826 .0325 0099 .0254 0090	0035 0240 1253 0312 0192 .0579 0212 0150 .0716 .0541 0660 0518 0470	0127. .5480** 1005 1154 0132 .0547 .3564** .0323 .0799 .0755 2446** 0820	01770529 .3746**09040686 .10041068 .2955**1110 .000005490939 .2417*
0534 2330* 1.0000 .3682** .4715** .3525** .0222 .1239 .0292 .1940*	0214 2053* .3682** 1.0000 .4293** .2067* 0266 .0684 0935 .0174	0061 3579** .4715** .4293** 1.0000 .2171* 0104 .1160 0210 .3113**	.0177 1450 .3525** .2067* .2171* 1.0000 0419 0235 .0541 .2574**	.7042**2210* .0222026601040419 1.000007071259	0819 .0192 .1239 .0684 .1160 0235 0707 1.0000 .1408 .1573

ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED	.0465161002121781 .04160420 .1396 .1110 .0360 .0637 .0156 .07920891	0426 0972 .1483 .1902* .1278 0464 0535 0314 0628 0612 0220 .0638 0356
LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	0884 .2499** .0292 0935 0210 .0541 1259 .1408 1.0000	0251 1931* .1940* .0174 .3113** .2574** .0440 .1573 .0674 1.0000

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLASP OTHER ED DEPEND TOTS CC DIRE LOS PROMECT LOS	1.0000 .2384* 1079 .0961 .0733 0792 .0506 .0797 .0467 .0626 .0908 .1096 0483 1822 .2999** .3678** 0296 2018* 3047** 0626 .0970 .0142	.2384* 1.0000126200560266 .0237 .3735** .2291* .3237**3411**1105 .1935 .0164 .6399** .041913960077 .03310745 .5308** .0105	10791262 1.0000 .2004*1032 .0181102117592414*2558* .00980411 .2616** .091606562267* .0479 .1578 .085003200794 .3817**	.09610056 .2004* 1.00000587047602100526 .0402 .1535 .0239 .00680534 .0703 .0360 .0237 .1616 .0709047705690450	.0733 0266 1082 0587 1.0000 0363 0757 .0064 0784 0553 0243 0538 0407 0884 .1235 .0097 0130 .0742 0650 .0917 0037
CIVJOB RETIRE	0745 ` 0953	0823 0107	1303 .1888	1378 .0663	1266 .0887

OTHER	EDUO	MADDIED	DEDEND	TOT DED	000
OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
0792 .0237 .0181 0476 0363 1.0000 .2412* .0800 .1766 .1731 0450 .0666 0549 0330 .0277 0945 .1276 .0815 .0882 .1244	.0506 .3735** 1021 0210 0757 .2412* 1.0000 .2130* .2939** .3111** 0013 0361 .0331 .1077 .2334* .0501 0189 0274 .0040	.0797 .2291* 1759 0155 .0066 .0800 .2130* 1.0000 .3982** .6263** .0462 0402 .1492 0108 .1305 .0189 1069 .0886 .0166 1136	.0467 .3237** 2414* .0526 0784 .1766 .2939** .3982** 1.0000 .9645** .1089 0342 0460 .1556 .2132* .1123 .0110 0386 0871 0301	.0626 .3411**2558* .04020648 .1731 .3111** .6263** .9645** 1.0000 .10590406 .0038 .1292 .2188* .10090214007206920583	.0908 .2129* .0098 .1535 05555 0450 0013 .0462 .1089 .1059 1.0000 2940** 0839 0504 .2581* .1117 0055 .0464 0433 .1283
0043	. ,3648 XX	.1182	.2020*	.2057¥	.0508
.0030	0053	.2969**	3369**	2008×	.0012
.0717 0516	.1313 0505	.0780 0410	.1820 0228	.1772 0312	1036 0788
. 0210	0505	. 0410	. 0220	.0215	. 0700

ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT LOS PROM EXPECT JOB FAMILY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.109611050411 .02390243 .066603610402034204062940** 1.00003589**2159*06221205 .08560071 .0076 .0091172803871186	0483 .1935 .2616** .0068 .0538 0549 .0331 .1492 0460 0038 0839 3589** 1.0000 0616 0914 0995 0198 .0860 .1582 1019 .1174 .2311* 0764 .0898	1822 .0164 .0916 0534 0407 0330 .1077 0108 .1556 .1292 0504 2159* 0616 1.0000 0452 .0577 0296 .0708 .0375 1220 .1878 0961 .1510 0579	.2999** .6399**0656 .07030884 .0277 .2334* .1305 .2132* .2188* .2581*062209140452 1.0000 .1074119805401981*0149 .4007**036310551354	.3678** .04192267* .0360 .12350945 .0501 .0189 .1123 .1009 .111712050995 .0577 .1074 1.000009452078*3367**1068 .04870722 .08960498

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
0296 1396 .0479 .0237 .0097 .1276 0189 0110 0214 0055 .0856 0198	2018*0077 .1578 .16160130 .08150274 .0886038603860071 .0860 .070805402078* .1833 1.0000 .5574**0226052303041754	3047** .0331 .0850 .0709 .0742 .0882 .0040 .0166037106920433 .0076 .1582 .03751981*3367** .2084* .5574** 1.000005830262 .04901191	0626 0745 0320 0477 0650 .1244 .0412 1136 0301 0583 .1283 .0091 1019 1220 0149 1068 .2249* 0226 0583 1.0000 0881 0423 .1132	.0970 .5308** 0794 0569 .0917 0043 .3648** .1182 .2020* .2057* .0508 1728 .1174 .1878 .4007** .0487 0644 0523 0644 0523 0262 0881 1.0000 0030	SUPPAY .0142 .0105 .3817**04500087 .00300053 .2969**3369**2008* .00120387 .2311*0363072201990304 .049004230030 1.00000682
.0368	.1388	.2682**	.1324	.0219	0383

ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROME EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY	07450823130313781266 .0717 .1313 .0780 .1820 .1772103611860764 .15101055 .0896076517541191 .1132 .05240682	0953 0107 .1888 .0663 .0887 0516 0516 0516 0228 0312 0788 0268 0579 1354 0498 .0368 .1388 .2682* .1324 .0219 0383
CIVJOB RETIRE	1.0000	.0505 1.0000

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

ALL MARINE CORPS

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED	1.0000 .1774** 1170** .0262 .0020 0736 .0428 .0914* .0592 .0770* 0492 0227 .0306	.1774** 1.0000 .1326** .009002660007 .2889** .1558**3078** .2976** .3853**1895** .1428**	1170** .1326** 1.0000 .04640473 .0136 .1153**2220**1432**1864** .2549**1086** .1222**	.0262 .0090 .0464 1.0000 0370 0260 .0384 0507 .0140 0050 .0126 .0192 0154	.0020 0266 0473 0370 1.0000 0219 0267 0178 0244 0253 0761 0130 .0730
LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.2346** .1131** 1950** 1980** 1828** 1461** .1482** 0293 .0056 1386**	.7447**2592** .01010069 .07470855* .5908** .1310**0889*0047	.0048 .0130 0093 .0902* .0645 0594 1697** .3841** 1232** .0633	0026 .0180 .0224 .0587 .0277 0428 1144** .0215 .0103	.0209 0016 0428 0146 .0030 0303 0734 0300 0620 .0057

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
0736 0007 .0136 0260 0219 1.0000 .0411 .0370 0211 0051 .0139 .0144 0091	.0428 .2889** .1153** .0384 0267 .0411 1.0000 .0572 .0693 .0741 .0625 0526 .1270**	.0914× .1558×× 2220×× 0507 0178 .0370 .0572 1.0000 .4845×× .7106×× 0354 .0365 0204	.0592 .3078** 1432** .0140 0244 0211 .0693 .4845** 1.0000 .9598** .0663 0826* 0116	.0770× .2976×× 1864×× 0050 0253 0051 .0741 .7106×× .9598×× 1.0000 .0420 0547 0158	0492 .3853** .2549** .0126 0761 .0139 .0625 0354 .0663 .0420 1.0000 3009** 0489
0281 0462 .0400 .0670 .0343 .0578 0288 .0158 .0379 0009	.2359**0967* .0076019201400152 .1062** .0761 .03180359	.1952**0670004402260173 .0021 .2284** .2857**0289 .0059	.3016**1061** .0727 .0117 .0636 .0133 .2607**05940442 .0378	.3052**1069** .0571 .0021 .0456 .0114 .2830** .04390448	.1301**0527 .0257 .0257 .0231 .0973* .0389 .0863* .0899*0472

ALL MARINE CORPS (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM .
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED TOTHER EDUC MARRIED TOTO TOTO OCS ROTC DIREC DIREC DIREC LOS PROM CT	02271895**1086** .01920130 .01440526 .03650826*05473009** 1.000003341540** .053604370304062603020889* .0405 .04070274	.0306 .1428** .1222** 0154 .0730 0091 .1270** 0204 0116 0158 0489 0334 1.0000 .0805* 0806* .0276 0172 0081 0482 .0143 .0772* 0138 0135	1.0000	.2346** .7447** .00480026 .02090281 .2359** .1952** .3016** .3052** .1301**1540** .0805* 1.00002124**0021 .0270 .00280530 .5536** .0829*04310035	.1131**2592** .0130 .0180001604620967*06701061**1069**0527 .05360806*2124** 1.00001497**1246**2566** .00122777**0377 .1920**0654
· · · - · · · -	·				

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
1950** .01010093 .02240428 .0400 .00760044 .0727 .0571 .02570437	1980**0069 .0902* .05870146 .067001920226 .0117 .0021 .023103040172	1828** .0747 .0645 .0277 .0030 .034301400173 .0636 .0456 .0973*06260031	1461**0855*059404280303 .05780152 .0021 .0133 .0114 .038903020432	.1482** .5908** 1697** 1144** 0734 0288 .1062** .2284** .2607** .2830** .0863* 0889* .0143	0293 .1310** .3841** .0215 0300 .0158 .0761 .2857** 0594 .0439 .0899* .0405 .0772*
0021 1497** 1.0000 .2142** .3749** .2952** .0825* 0303 0640 .2389**	.0270 1246** .2142** 1.0000 .4142** .1955** 0385 .0147 0498 .1344**	.0028 2566** .3749** .4142** 1.0000 .0456 .0849* 0036 1135** .2720**	0530 .0012 .2952** .1955** .0456 1.0000 0278 .0087 .0283 .2683**	.5536**2777** .0825*0385 .0849*0278 1.0000 .03160428 .0365	.0829* 0377 0303 .0147 0036 .0087 .0316 1.0000 0837* .0079

ALL MARINE CORPS (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED	.00560889*1232** .01030620 .0379 .03180289044204480472 .04070138	1386**0047 .0633 .0471 .005700090359 .0059 .0378 .0323 .052602740135
LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	0431 .1920** 0640 0498 1135** .0283 0428 0837* 1.0000 .0149	0035 0654 .2389** .1344** .2720** .2683** .0365 .0079 .0149

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT	1.0000 .2724** 1514* .0328 0009 1124 .0493 .1952** .0862 .1300* 0686 0477	.2724** 1.00000276063505960009 .2244** .2240** .3674** .3668**2002**7866**2285** .0001	1514*0276 1.000001210314 .1138 .01751434*1471*1634* .11160760	.032806350121 1.0000015601130247 .0431 .0658 .0666 .0341 .06090979 .07330118	0009 0596 0314 0156 1.0000 0294 0642 .0024 .0047 .0046 0973 .0203
DETAIL JOB - FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	2126**2018**1513* .2148** .110404811000	0138 .0436 1450* .6420** .0843 1960** 0132	0039 .0838 0102 1642* .0922 1993** .0986	0019 0160 .0726 0723 0074 .0501	.0236 .0103 0309 0895 0410 0525 .0403

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
1124 0009 .1138 0113 0294 1.0000 .0974 0172 0814 0712 0041 .0352	.0493 .2244** .0175 0247 0642 .0974 1.0000 .0803 .1607* .1550* .0393	.1952** .2240** 1434* .0431 .0024 0172 .0303 1.0000 .4973** .7110** .0089 .0017	.0862 .3674** 1471* .0658 .0047 0814 .1607* .4973** 1.0000 .9636** .1455* 1376*	.1300*3668**1634* .0666 .00460712 .1550* .7110** .9636** 1.0000 .12071110	0686 .3948** .1116 .0341 0973 0041 .0393 .0089 .1455* .1207 1.0000 3170**
. 0808 0400 .0014 .1316* .0401 .0755 0771 .0290 .0200 0012	.2381**1524*03690366 .00430773 .1651*044209040519	. 2688** 0485 1306* .0073 0407 0743 .2043** .2355** 1062	.3420**1028 .0143 .0459 .07670428 .2352**1361*1209	.3600**09830286 .0394 .04970576 .2535**03771307*	. 1744**0823 .0633 .0683 .1085 .0756 .1259 .06100366

MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS(CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB	0477 2002** 0760 .0609 .0203 .0352 .0544 .0017 1376* 1110 3170** 1.0000 	1.0000	1.0000	.3491**7866**10600979 .02050808 .2381**2688**3420**3600**1744**1387* 1.00002018**045900320217	.07612285** .0181 .0733029904001524*0485102809830823 .09592018** 1.00001930**1719**2711**
FAMILY TOTPAY	0472 1386×	•	•	1237 .6232**	.0305 2927**
SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0925 .0390 0670	•	•	.0745 1629* 0440	.0174 1922** 0314

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
2274** .0001 .109101180656 .001403691306* .01430286 .06330654	2126**013800390019 .0236 .1316*0366 .0073 .0459 .0394 .06830683	2018** .0436 .08380160 .0103 .0401 .00430407 .0767 .0767 .10851133	1513* 1450* 0102 .0726 0309 .0755 0773 0743 0428 0576 .0756 0472	.2148** .6420** 1642* 0723 0895 0771 .1651* .2043** .2352** .2535** .1259 1386*	.1104 .0843 .0922 0074 0410 .0290 0442 .2355** 1361* 0377 .0610
0459 1930** 1.0000 .3282** .4857** .3054** .0375 0250 0380 .2924**	0032 1719** .3282** 1.0000 .4388** .2205** 0342 0712 0059 .1423*	0217 2711** .4857** .4388** 1.0000 .0952 .0424 0580 0499 .2698**	1237 .0305 .3054** .2205** .0952 1.0000 1042 0070 .0214 .2791**	.6232**2927** .03750342 .04241042 1.0000104408870025	.0745 .0174 0250 0712 0580 0070 .1044 1.0000 1491* 0392

MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED	0481 1960** 1993** .0501 0525 .0200 0904 1062 1209 1307* 0366 .0390	1000 0132 .0986 .0056 .0403 0012 0519 .0034 .0615 .0509 .0905 0670
LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	1629* .1922** 0380 0059 0499 .0214 0887 1491* 1.0000 .0346	0440 0314 .2924** .1423* .2698** .2791** 0025 0392 .0346 1.0000

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT	1.0000 .0829 1389 .0725 .0581 1207 .1142 0396 0467 0511 0803 0644 .0409	.0829 1.0000 .0887 1583 .1475 0248 .2210* .0877 .2205* .2086 3622** 2027 .1905	1389 .0887 1.0000 1127 .1119 1554 1010 3463** 1274 2174* .2920** .0927 .0788	.0725 1583 1127 1.0000 0446 0446 0454 0407 .0743 .0473 0131 .0200 0314	.0581 .1475 .1119 0446 1.0000 0174 .0670 0388 .0198 .0035 1159 0357 .7041**
MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.2538* .1761 1229 0696 0968 0547 .0779 2476* .1651 0914	.6611**2243*03560064 .074605047385** .178402311551	1022 .0228 0232 .1539 .2475* 0018 1468 .3646** 1632 .1902	0993 .0101 .0991 1173 .0514 1873 1663 0927 .0785 .1236	.1724 .0276 .0036 0133 0089 .0620 .0925 .0385 1566 .0977

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs
1207	.1142	0396	0467	0511	0803
0248	.2210*	.0877	.2205*	.2086	.3622**
1554	1010	3463**	1274	2174*	.2920**
0446	.0454	0407	.0743	.0473	0131
0174	.0670	0388	.0198	.0035	1159
1.0000	0809	.0987	0354	.0035	.0170
0809	1.0000	.1794	0522	.0161	.0020
.0987	.1794	1.0000	.4242**	.6736**	1686
0354	0522	.4242**	1.0000	.9550**	.0455
.0035	.0161	.6736**	.9550**	1.0000	0181
.0170	.0020	1686	.0455	0181	1.0000
0357	.0617	.1321	0726	0160	2381*
0122	.1513	.0695	.0139	.0341	0816
0104	.1754	.1304	.2375*	.2365*	.0472
3274**	.0149	1471	0757	1100	1083
.0036	0139	.0649	.0986	.1017	1410
1431	0242	0648	0693	0777	.0131
.0349	0407	1209	0302	0643	.1786
.0145	0867	.0531	.0319	.0435	0034
.0996	.1327	.1711	.2044	.2228*	.1463
0474	.2215*	.4370**	.0949	.2206*	.0714
.0189	.1696	0314	0577	0573	1539
0508	1066	1934	1193	1607	.0303

MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT	0644 2027 .0927 .0200 0357 0357 0617 .1321 0726 0160 2381* 1.0000 0252	.0409 .1905 .0788 0314 .7041** 0122 .1513 .0695 .0139 0341 0816 0252 1.0000		.2538 × .6611 × ×10220993 .17240104 .1754 .1304 .2375 × .2365 × .04721648 .1268	.17612243* .0228 .0101 .02763274** .014914710757110010830344 .0444
MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	1648 0344 .0614 .0726 .0583 .1697 0738 .3212** .0569 .0863	.1268 .0444 .0025 0094 .0077 0773 .0677 .1277 .0380 0357	1.0000	1.0000 1939 .0095 .0082 0128 .0102 .6999** .0927 .0219 1345	1939 1.0000 2040 0377 1833 .0212 3923** 1974 .2009 0334

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB .	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
122903560232 .0991 .0036 .00360139 .0649 .0986 .10171410 .0614 .0025	0696 0064 .1539 1173 0133 1431 0242 0648 0693 0777 .0131 .0726 0094	0968 .0746 .2475* .0514 0089 .0349 0407 1209 0302 0643 .1786 .0583	0547 0504 0018 1873 .0620 .0145 0867 .0531 .0319 .0435 0034 .1697 0773	.0779 .7385** 1468 1663 .0925 .0996 .1327 .1711 .2044 .2228* .1463 0738 .0677	2476* .1784 .3646**0927 .03850474 .2215* .4370** .0949 .2206* .0714 .3212** .1277
.0095 2040 1.0000 .2175* .2475* .1907 0320 .0307 1999 .0412	.0082 0377 .2175* 1.0000 .4625** .2600* .0028 .1084 2095 .2263*	0128 1833 .2475* .4625** 1.0000 .0447 .0006 .1294 1475 .2401*	.0102 .0212 .1907 .2600* .0447 1.0000 .0116 .1266 0930 .2523*	.6999**3923**0320 .0028 .0006 .0116 1.0000 .174907931455	.0927 1974 .0307 .1084 .1294 .1266 .1749 1.0000 0800 .0827

MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT	.165102311632 .07851566 .0189 .16960314057705731539 .0569 .0380	0914 1551 .1902 .1236 .0977 0508 1066 1934 1193 1607 .0303 .0863 0357
MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE-	.0219 .2009 1999 2095 1475 0930 0793 0800 1.0000 1446	1345 0334 .0412- .2263* .2401* .2523* 1455 .0827 1446 1.0000

MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL

	CAREER	AGE	SEX	BLACK	HISP
CAREER AGE SEX . BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM EXPECT	1.0000 .1424 0152 .0380 0570 0035 .0836 .1372 .1380 .0606 0773	.1424 1.0000 .1867*0916 .0365 .2823**.1218 .3783**.3467**.4025***2629*** .7411***2136**0133	0152 .1867* 1.0000 0031 0614 .0035 0406 0721 0714 .3168** 0931	.0880 .0916 0031 1.0000 0363 .1238 0716 0390 0540 0698 .0677	0570 .0365 0614 0363 1.0000 0508 0965 0448 0665 0941 .0011
DETAIL	2469**	0377	.0964	0230	.0165
JOB	2952**	.0793	.1245	.0157	
FAMILY	2164*	0948	0872	1147	.0141
TOTPAY	.0858	.5877**	0923	0721	.0035
SUPPAY	.0236	.1432	.4543**	.0217	0560
CIVJOB	.0025	.0203	0742	.0122	1246
RETIRE	1493	.0920	.0053	.0457	.0319

OTHER	EDUC	MARRIED	DEPEND	TOTDEP	ocs .
	0035 .2823** .0035 .1238 0508	.0836 .1218 0406 0716 0965	.1372 .3783** 0721 0390 0448	.1380 .3467** 0714 0540 0665	.0606 .4025** .3168** 0698 0941
1.0000	1.0000 .0304 0192 0063 .0054 1829×	.0304 1.0000 .4689** .6925** .0366 0124	0192 .4689** 1.0000 .9619** .0518 1233	0063 .6925** .9619** 1.0000 .0536 1045	.0054 .0366 .0518 .0536 1.0000
•		.1353 .1315 .0885 0613 .0201 .0415 .1225 .2963** 0240 .0407		.3298**0301 .04520569 .01570114 .3155** .02210690 .0349	

MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL (CONT)

	ROTC	DIRECT	MED	LOS	PROM
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER	0773 2629** 0931 .0677 .0011	•	•	.2040* .7411** .0882 .0165 .0439	.1582 2136* .0353 0349 0443
EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT	1829× 0124 1233 1045 3388×× 1.0000	1.0000	•	.2745** .1353 .3525** .3298** .0680 -	0836 .1315 0867 0301 .0471 .1563
MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	1926× .1563 0711 .0242 1267 0943 3076×× .0629 .0066 0135		1.0000	1.0000 2205* 0526 .0269 0203 0175 .6242** .0402 .0241	2205* 1.0000 0297 1219 2332* 0855 3238** .1444 .1201 1035

EXPECT	DETAIL	JOB	FAMILY	TOTPAY	SUPPAY
2176*	2469**	2952**	2164*	.0858	.0286
0133	0377	.0793	0948	.5877**	.1432
0128	.0964	.1245	0872	0923	.4543**
.0503	0230	.0157	1147	0721	.0217
.1348	.0165	.0435	.0141	.0035	0560
.0237 .0885 .0218 .0452 0373 0711	0149 0613 0464 0569 0137 .0242	.0501 .0201 .0116 .0157 .0448	0186 .0415 0296 0114 0353 0943	.1785 .1225 .3399** .3155** 0267 3076**	0437 .2963** 0852 .0221 .1967* .0629
0526	.0269	0203	0175	.6242**3238**02260906 .08710938 1.00000418 .0728 .1361	.0402
0297	1219	2332*	0855		.1444
1.0000	.1554	.3604**	.2970**		0464
.1554	1.0000	.3625**	.3390**		.0519
.3604**	.3625**	1.0000	.0587		0670
.2970**	.3390**	.0587	1.0000		0003
0226	0906	.0871	0938		0418
0464	.0519	0670	0003		1.0000
0943	.0618	0729	0724		.0185
.1658	.0712	.33333**	.1473		0084

MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL (CONT)

	CIVJOB	RETIRE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS ROTC DIRECT	.0025 .0203 0742 .0122 1246 1981* 0240 0753 0690 0588 .0066	1493 .0920 .0053 .0457 .0319 0194 .0407 .0274 .0349 0864 0135
MED LOS PROM EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY CIVJOB RETIRE	.0241 .1201 0943 .0618 0729 0724 .0728 .0185 1.0000	.0986 1035 .1658 .0712 .3333** .1473 .1361 0084 .0885

* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001

APPENDIX D

FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECT'S RESPONSES TO VARIABLES BY CAREER DECISION AND SPECIALTY

1. ARMY

		I CAREER				RON
AGE	:	I 0	I	1	I -+	TOTAL
AGE	23	I 0 I	Ĭ	1	I I -+	.1%
		I 1 I	I I	0	I I	1.1%
	25	I 0 I	I I	9	I I	9 .8%
	26	I 7	I I	37	I I -+	44 3.8%
		I 21 I	I I	85	I I -+	106 9.1%
	28	I 11 I	I I	99	I	110 9.5%
		I 14 I	I I	108	I I -+	122 10.5%
	30	I 16 I	Ĭ I	105	I I -+	121 10.4%
		I 17	I I	136	I I	153 13.2%
		I 8 I	I I	108	I I -+	116 10.0%
	33	I 7 I	Ï	115	I I	122 10.5%
	34	I 9 I	Ï	70	I	79 6.8%
	35	I 4 I	I I	37	I I -+	41 3.5%
	36	I 5 I +	· I	37,	Ĭ I -+	42 3.6%

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

. 405					`	1.		
AGE (CONT)	37	I I	1	I I	20	+ I I +	21 1.8%	
	38	I I	2	I	20	Ĭ	22 1.9%	
	39	I I	0	I	12	I I	12 1.0%	
	40	I I	2	I	8	Ï	10	
	41	I I	1	Ï	7	I I	8 .7%	
	42 .	I I	1	Ĭ	3 -	I	. 3% _.	
	43	I I	0	I I	1	I	.1%	
	44	I I	0	I I	5	İ	. 4%	
	45	i I	0	Ï	1	Ï	.1%	•
	46	I I	. 0	I I		Ĭ	.1%	
	47	I I	0	İ	3	I I +	3.3%	
	48	I I	0	I		I I +	. 2%	
	49	I I	0	I I	0	Ĭ	0 0%	
	50	I I +	0	Í I		Ï	.1%	
	54	I I	2	I I	1	I I +	. 3%	
	COLUMN TOTAL	•	129 11.1%		1032 88.9%	r	1161 100.0%	

SEV		I CAREER I O I	1 <u>I</u>	ROW TOTAL
SEX	MALE	67 I	762 I	829 71.4%
	FEMALE	62 I	270 I	332 28.6%
	COLUMN TOTAL	129	1032 88.9%	1161

40	~· -	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
RACE		0	I	1	I	
RACE	BLACK	15	I I	112	I	127 10.9%
	HISP	6	I	34	I	40 3.4%
	OTHER	8	I I	33	I	41 3.5%
	WHITE	100	I	853	I	953 82.1%
	COLUMN TOTAL	129 11.1%		1032 88.9%	7	1161 100.0%

	I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
EDUC	Ī	0	I	1	I	TOTAL
BACHELOR	I	76	I	677	I	753 64.9%
MASTER/ DOCTOR	I	53	I	355	I	408 35.1%
COLUMN TOTAL	•	129 11.1%	T-	1032 88.9%	T	1161 100.0%

		III	CAREER 0	Т	1	T	ROW TOTAL
MARRIED	SINGLE	Ī	39	+III	232,	+ I	271 23.3%
	MARRIED	I	90	I I	800	I	890 76.7%
	COLUMN TOTAL	+•	129 11.1%	+-	1032 88.9%	+	1161

	:	CAREER		ROW TOTAL
DEPEND	:	0	I 1	I
DEFEND	0	I 65	I 434 I	I 499 I 43.0%
•	1	I 30	I 200	I 230 I 19.8%
	2	20 [I 251	I 271 I 23.3%
	. 3	5	I 106	I 111 I 9.6%
	- 4	7	I 25 I	32 I 2.8%
	5	1		1 12 1 1.0%
	. 6	1	I 4 I	I 5 I .4%
•	7	0 [I 1 I	I 1 I .1%
	COLUMN TOTAL	129 11.1%	1032 88.9%	1161

		I I	CAREER		ROW TOTAL
TOTRER	:	Ī	0	1	I
TOTDEP	0	I I		197	I 229 I 19.7%
	1	I I		256 I	I 295 I 25.4%
		I I		192 I	I 217 I 18.7%
	3	Ĭ I		243 I	I 262 I 22.6%
	4	I I		104	I 109 I 9.4%
		I I	7	24	I 31 I 2.7%
	6	I I	1	12	I 13 I 1.1%
	7	I I	1	3	I 4 I .3%
	8	I I	0	1	I 1 I .1%
	COLUMN TOTAL	_	129 11.1%	1032 88.9%	1161

-]	CAREER			ROW TOTAL
COMM		0	I 1	I	TOTAL
COMM	ocs i	4	Ĭ 75 I	I I	79 6.8%
	ROTC	51	Ĭ 586 I	Ĭ	637 54.9%
	DIRECT	30	I 157	I	187 16.1%
	MED .	25	I 40 I	I	- 65 5.6%
	ACAD	14	I 123 I	I I	137 11.8%
	COLUMN TOTAL	129 11.1%	1032 88.9%	- ∙ τ	1161 100.0%

]				ROW TOTAL
1.00]	. 0	I	1	I
LOS	4]	30	I	98	† 128 I 11.0%
	5	34 [I I	119	I 153 I 13.2%
	6	25	I	136	I 161 I 13.9%
	7	16	Ï	134	I 150 I 12.9%
	8	10	Ï	134	I 144 I 12.4%
	· 9 · 1	7	Ï	142	I 149 I 12.8%
	10	4	İ	142	I 146 I 12.6%
	11	3	I	127	I 130 I 11.2%
	COLUMN	129 11.1%		1032	1161

		I	CAREER			ROW TOTAL
0004		İ	0	I 1	I	TOTAL
PROM	0	† I	3	I 2 I	I	5 .4%
	- 1	I	6	I 2 I	I	.7%
	2	I	5	i 5 I	I	10 .9%
	3 _	İ	8	I 10 I	İ	18 1.6%
	4	i I I	6	I 26 I	İ	32 2.8%
	5	i I I	10	I . 53	İ	63 5.4%
•	-	İ I	13	I 55	İ	68 5.9%
	7	İ I	13	I !	İ	104 9.0%
	8	+ I I +	19	180 I	İ	199 17.1%
	9	i I	23	I 247 I	İ	270 23.3%
	10	i I +	23	361 I	İ	384 33.1%
	COLUMN TOTAL	•	129 11.1%	1032 88.9%		1161 100.0%

	I	CAREER		ROW TOTAL
EXPECT	I	0	I 1	[
LA, LOI	1 I	13	I 177	190 . 16.4%
-	2 I	71	I 636	707 60.9%
•	3 Î	18	I 122	140
	4 I	22	I 87	109 9.4%
	5 I	5	I 10 I	15 1.3%
	COLUMN TOTAL	129 11.1%	1032 88.9%	1161

		I	CAREER				ROW
DETAIL		Ĭ	0	I	- 1	I +	TOTAL
DEINIE	1	I	15	I	292	I	307 26.4%
	2	† I	52	I	477	I	529 45.6%
	3	I	15	I	116	I	131 11.3%
	. 4	III	32	I	109	I	141
•	5 ·	Ī	15	İ	38	İ	53 4.6%
	COLUMN TOTAL	т.	129 11.1%		1032 88.9%	· T	1161
•		I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
IOB		Ī	0	I	1	I	TOTAL
JOB	<1.50	I	5	Ĭ	107	Ī	112 9.6%
	1.50- 2.49	I	19	I I	381	I	400 34.5%
	2.50-	I	59	İ	403	I	462 39.8%
	3.50- 4.49	I	37	Ĭ	108	I	145 12.5%
	>4.49	I	9	I	33	I	42 3.6%
	COLUMN TOTAL	T	129 11.1%	,	1032 88.9%	•	1161 100.0%
	COUNT	I I I	CAREER 0	I	i	I	ROW TOTAL
FAMILY	<1.50	Ī	1	I I	36	Ī	37 3.2%
	1.50-	i I I	34	I I	380	I I	414 35.7%
	2.50-3.49	I I	41	I I	352	I I	393 33.9%
	3.50- 4.49	+ I I	38	I	197	+ I I	235 20.2%
	>4.49	+ III	15	I	67	+III.	82 7.1%
	COLUMN TOTAL	+	129 11.1%	+-	1032 88.9%	+	1161 100.0%

•		I	CAREER				ROW .
TOTPAY		İ	0	I +	1	I	TOTAL
1017 A7	0-10	Ï	1	I I	. 6	İ	.6%
T H	10-20	I		I I	33	Ï	42 3.6%
0 U S	20-30	I I		+-· I I	886	I I	968 83.4%
O U S A N D S	30-40	I I		+ - · I I	76	+- I I	88 7.6%
S	40-50	+- I		+ I I	17	+ I I	39 3.4%
	50-60	I I	3	- 	10	I I	13 1.1%
	60-70	 I T	0	I I	3	-+ I I	3.3%
	70-80	I I		- I I	1	- - I I	.1%
	COLUMN	+-	129 11:1%	+ - ·	1032 88.9%	-+	1161
		I	CAREER				ROW
01100414		I	0	I	1	I	TOTAL
SUPPAY	0-10	I	66	I I	651	I	717 61.8%
T H	10-20	I I	19	+- I I	133	I I	152 13.1%
0 U S	20-30	I I	28	+- I I	139	I I	167 14.4%
U S A N D S	30-40	I	10	i I	70	I I	80 6.9%
S	40-50	I I	4	+- I I	15	I I	19 1.6%
	50-60	I	1	I I	13	I I	14 1.2%
	60-70	+- I I	1	+- I I	5	I I	6 . 5%
	70-80	I I	0	+-· I I	1	I	.1%
	80-90	I I	0	+-· I I	2	I	. 2%
	90-100	I I	0	I I	1	I	.1%
	100-110	I I	0	+ - · I I	1	I	.1%
	140-150	I I	0	+ I I	1	I I	.1%
	COLUMN TOTAL	+-	129	+	1032 88.9%	-+	1161

	Į	CAREER		ROW TOTAL
CIVJOB	I I	0	I 1	I
CIVJUB .	0 I	0	I 1 I	I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	1 1	0	I 5	I 5 I 4%
	2 Î	1	I 6 I	Ĭ 7 I .6%
	3 'I	1	I 13 I	I 14 I 1.2%
	4 I	5	I 34 I	I 39 I 3.4%
	5 I	4	I 59	I 63 I 5.4%
•	6 I	13	I 91	I 104 I 9.0%
	. 7 I	11	I 131 I	I 142 I 12.2%
	8 I	17	I 199	I 216 I 18.6%
	9 I	25	I 188	I 213 I 18.3%
	10 I	52	I 305	I 357 I 30.7%
	COLUMN TOTAL	129 11.1%	1032	1161

١	I	CAREER		ROW TOTAL
RETIRE	Ī	0	I 1 1	_
Na Faria	1 I	6	I 153 I	159 13.7%
-	2 1	64	I 558 I	622 53.6%
	3 I	34	I 196 I	230 19.8%
•	4 I	21	113	134
	5 I	4	I 12 I	16 1.4%
٠	COLUMN TOTAL	129 11.1%	1032 88.9%	1161

CAREER		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
CAREER	0	I 23	I 47	12	15 II	129 I 11.1% I
Pr.	1	I 269	I 144	I 146 I	125 II	1032 I 88.9% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

AGE		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
AGE	23	I 1 I		_ ,	I 0 I	I 1 I I .1% I
	24	I 0 I	0		I 1 I	I 1 I I .1% I
-	25	I 7 I	1			I 9 I I .8% I
	26		2			I 44 I I 3.8% I
	27	I 31 I				I 106 I I 9.1% I
-	28	I 38 I	8			I 110 I I 9.5% I
	29		15			I 122 I I 10.5% I
	30		21		I 20 I	I 121 I I 10.4% I
	31	I 37 I				I 153 I I 13.2% I
	32	i 32 i		,		I 116 I I 10.0% I
-	33	I 23 I				I 122 I I 10.5% I
	34	I 22 I		I 15		I 79 I I 6.8% I
	35	I 5 I				I 41 I I 3.5% I
	36	I 1 I	17			I 42 I I 3.6% I
		+		+	++	++

AGE		+			4_		. 4				
(CONT)	37	I 5	I	6	Ĭ	0	I I	1	II II	21 1.8%	I
	38	I I	I	11	I I	4	I I	0	II II	22 1.9%	Ĭ
	39	I 1	I	5	I I	2	I I	0	II II	12 1.0%	I
•	40	I O	İ	4	İ	0	İ	0	II II	10 .9%	İ
	41	İ 0	I	4	İ I	0	İ I	0	II II	.7%	I
. •	42	I O	I	2	İ I	0	I I	0	II II	. 3%	I I
	43	I O	I	0	İ I	0	İ I	0	II II	.1%	I I
	44	I O	I	2	İ I	0	I	1	II II	. 4%	İ I -+
	45	İ O	İ	1	İ	0	İ I	0	II II	.1%	İ
	46	I C	I	0	I I	0	I I	0	II II	.1%	I I
	47	i o	I	3	İ I	. 0	I	0	II	. 3 . 3%	I I
	48	I o	I	1	I	0	I I	0	II II	.2%	I I
	49	I C	I	0	I I	0	I I	0	II II	0 0%	I I
	50	I O	I	1	I I	0	İ	0	II II	.1%	I I
	54	I O	I	3	I	0	I	0	II II	. 3 . 3%	I
	COLUMN	292		191		158	-	140		1161	

cev		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL		NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY	
SEX	MALE	I 274	69	101	111 II . II	829 71.4%	I
	FEMALE	I 18	122	57 I	29 II II	332 28.6%	I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161	_+

DACE		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL -	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
RACE	BLACK	I 29	20 I	25	10 II	127 I 10.9% I
	HISP	I 13	I 4 I	5	6 II I I I	40 I 3.4% I
	OTHER	I 9 I	, 13 I	2	4 II I II	41 I 3.5% I
	WHITE -	I 241	I 154	126	120 II I II	953 I 82.1% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

EDUC	ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
BACHELOR	I 252	67	99	93 II II	753 I 64.9% I
MASTER/ DOCTOR	I 40	124	59	47 II I II	408 I 35.1% I
COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

MARRIED		TACTICAL OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY	
PIARKIED	SINGLE	63	51	41	25 I	I 271 I 23.3%	I
	MARRIED	229	140	117		I 890 I 76.7%	I
	COLUMN	292	191	1,58	140	1161	-+

DEPEND		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY	
DEFEND	0	I -113 I	86	. 75	58 II		I
	1	I 64	28	29	33 II		I
	2	I 70]	42	39	32 II		I
	3	I 30]	20	10	14 II		I
	4	I 12	7 -	4	2 II		I
	5	I 3 1	5	0	1 II		I
	6	I 0 1	2	1	0 []		I
	7	I 0 1	1	0	0 11		I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161	-+

					-	
TOTDEP		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL
TOTDEF	0	I 55 I	37	38	22 I	I 229 I I 19.7% I
	1	I 62	58	I 39]		I 295 I I 25.4% I
	2	I 63	23	28		I 217 I I 18.7% I
	3	I 67 I	39	· 38]		I 262 I I 22.6% I
	4	I 31 I	19	10	14 I	I 109 I I 9.4% I
	5	I 11 I	7	4]	2 I	I 31 I I 2.7% I
	6	I 3 1	5	[0] []	1 I	I 13 I I 1.1% I
	7	I 0 1	2	1		I 4 I I .3% I
	8	I 0 1	1	0]	0 I	I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

COMM		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
COMM	ocs	I- 21 I	0	22	9 1	I 79 I
	ROTC	I 199	15	97	78 I	
	DIRECT	I 6 1	98	21	13 I	I 187 I I 16.1% I
	MED	I 0	55	0	5 I	I 65 I I 5.6% I
	ACAD	I 64	1	11	I 30 I	I 137 I I 11.8% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

LOS		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
LUS	4	I 32	31	11	17 II I II	
	5	I 43	I 30	1 14 I	23 ^ II	153 I 13.2% I
	6	I 44	I 39	1 22 1	16 II I II	
	7	I 44 I	1 18 I	23 °	1 17 II I II	
	8	I 43	I 18	1 13 I	19 II I II	
	9	I 34	1 11	29 I	16 II I II	
	10	I 28 I	22 I	23	20 II I II	
	11	I 24 I	22	[23]	12 II I II	130 I 11.2% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

PROM		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
FRUIT	0	I 0]	3	0	1 1	
-	1	I 0 1	3	1	0 []	
	2	I 3 1	2	1	1 11	
	3	I 2 1	8	1	1 II	
	4	I 2 I	14	5	2 II	
	5	I 12 I	10	10	5 II	
	6	I 16 I		10	5 II	
	7	I 28 I	9	15	15 II	
٠	8	I 53 I		19	25 II	
	9	I 67 I	47	38	37 II	270 I 23.3% I
	10	I 109	47	58	48 II I	
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

EXPECT		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
EXPECT	1	I 52	20	I 34]	23]	I 190 I I 16.4% I
	2	I 167	130	I 90 I	92]	I 707 I II 60.9% I
	3	I 41 I	21	I 17	11	I 140 I I 12.1% I
	4	I 31 I	17	1 12 1 I	12	I 109 I I 9.4% I
	5	I 1 I	3	I 5 I	2]	I 15 I I 1.3% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

DETAIL		TACTICAL OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
	1	84 [35	50	39 I I	
	. 2	133 [97	67	70 I	I 529 I I 45.6% I
	3	28 I	22	16	17 I	I 131 I I 11.3% I
	4	32 [28	21	12 I I	I 141 I I 12.1% I
-	5	15	9	4	2 I I	I 4.6% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

JOB		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY	_
JUB	<1.50	I 39	7 -	11		I 112 I 9.6%	I I
	1.50- 2.49	I 106	50	58	–	I 400 I 34.5%	I I
	2.50- 3.49	I 108	83	71		I 462 I 39.8%	I I
	3.50- 4.49	I 32	[44 [9		I 145 I 12.5%	I I
	>4.49	I 7	7	9		I 42 I 3.6%	I I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161	T

FAMILY		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
TANIET	<1.50	8	7	7	2 1	I 37 I I 3.2% I
	1.50- 1 2.49	111	70	I 64]	· · · · · ·	I 414 I I 35.7% I
	2.50-] 3.49	89	72	57 I		I 393 I I 33.9% I
	3.50-] 4.49	58 I	32	26 I		I 235 I I 20.2% I
	>4.49	26	10	4		I 82 I I 7.1% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

TOTPAY		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
7011 KI	0-10	I 0 I	2	0		I 7 I I .6% I
THOUSANDS	10-20	I 19 I	7	2		I 42 I I 3.6% I
	20-30	I 258	99	153		I 968 I I 83.4% I
	30-40	I 15	33	3]		I 88 I I 7.6% I
	40-50	I 0	34	0		I 39 I I 3.4% I
	50-60	I 0]	12	0]		I 13 I I 1.1% I
	60-70	I 0 1	3	0]		I 3 I I .3% I
	70-80	I 0 1	1	0]		I 1 I I .1% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

SUPPAY		IT I	ACTICAL OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	- ALL ARMY
JOITAI	0-10	I	210	85	I 93		I 717 I I 61.8% I
T H	10-20	I		28			I 152 I I 13.1% I
0 U S A	20-30	I		39			I 167 I I 14.4% I
N D S	30-40	I	13	25			I 80 I I 6.9% I
S	40-50	I	0	7			I 19 I I 1.6% I
	50-60	I	2				I 14 I I 1.2% I
	60-70	I	0		I l		I 6 I I .5% I
	70-80	I	0]		_		I 1 I I .1% I
	80-90	I	0		I l I		I 2 I I .2% I
	90-100	I	0]		I 1 1		I 1 I I .1% I
	100-110	I	0]		I 0 1		I 1 I I .1% I
	140-150	I	0]		I 0]		I 1 I I .1% I
	COLUMN	+-	292	191	158	140	1161

CIVJOB		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY
CIVJUB	0	0	0	0	0 I	I 1 I I .1% I
	1	2	0	_		I 5 I I .4% I
	2	2	0	3		I 7 I I .6% I
	3	3	1	1		I 14 I I 1.2% I
	4	10	5	10		I 39 I I 3.4% I
	5	26 I	6	7		I 63 I I 5.4% I
	6	31 I	13	1 15 I	7 I	I 104 I I 9.0% I
	7	35 I	12	17_		I 142 I I 12.2% I
	8	61	24	I 38]		I 216 I I 18.6% I
	9	48	27	35 I		I 213 I I 18.3% I
	10	74	103	I 31]		I 357 I I 30.7% I
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161

RETIRE]	TACTICAL OPERATI	MEDICAL	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL ARMY	
REITRE	1	40	17	18	24 I	I 159 I I 13.7% I	
	2	156	106	89		I 622 I I 53.6% I	
	3	53	49	28		I 230 I I 19.8% I	
	4]	39 <u>1</u>	- 17	21		I 93 I I 11.5% I	
	5	4	2	2		I 16 I I 1.4% I	
	COLUMN	292	191	158	140	1161	

2. MARINE CORPS

		I I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
405		İ	0	I	1	I	TOTAL
AGE -	22	I I	2	+- I I	3	+ I I	. 5%
	23	I I	4	I I	1	+ I I	- 5 .5%
	24	I I	4	I I	9	I	13 1.4%
	25	I	5	I I	9	+ I I	14 1.5%
	26	I I	22	I I	50	+ I I +	72 7.8%
	27	I	19	I I	7 5 -	I	94 10.2%
	28	I	10	I . I	111	I	121 13.1%
	29	+III	20	I I	100	İ	120 13.0%
	30	I	15	I I	89	I I	104 11.2%
	31	I I	18	I I	95	I I	113 12.2%
	32	+ I I	6	I I	90	II	96 10.4%
	33	+III	2	I I	63	I I +	65 7.0%
	34	+ I I	2	I	48	I	50 5.4%
	35	I I	3	I I	21	I	24 2.6%
	36	I	1	I I	10	I	11
	37	† I I	2	I	5	I I	.8%
	38	+ I I	0	I	8	I	. 9%
	39	+III.	0	I I	Ź	I	2.2%
	40	+III.	1	I I	0	I	.1%
	41	+III	0	I I	1	I I	.1%
	COLUMN	+	136 14.7%	+-	790 85.3%	+	926 100.0%

		I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
SEX		I	0	I	1 .	I	TOTAL
SEX	MALE	I I +-	98	I I	668	I	766 82.7%
	FEMALE	I	38	İ I	122	I I	160 17.3%
	COLUMN	•	136 14.7%	•	790 85.3%	•	926 100.0%
		I I I	CAREER	-	-		ROW TOTAL
RACE		Ī	. 0	I	1	I	TOTAL
RACE	BLACK	I	4	I I	35	I	39 4.2%
	HISP	İ	4	İ I	24	İ	28 3.0%
	OTHER	İ	5	I I	9	İ	14
	WHITE	I I	123	İ I	722	I	845 91.3%
	COLUMN TOTAL	•	136 14.7%	•	790 85.3%	•	926 100.0%
		I I I	CAREER 0	I	1	I	ROW TOTAL
EDUC		-+-		-+-		+	775
I	BACHELOR	I	119	I	656 _.	I	775 83.7%
	MASTER/ DOCTOR	I	17	I	134	I I	151 16.3%
	COLUMN TOTAL	T-	136 14.7%		790 85.3%	· •	926 100.0%
		_					
	·	I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
MARRIED		-+-	0	I -+-	1	- +	
	SINGLE	I I +-	51	I I -+-	205	I I +	256 27.6%
	MARRIED	I I +-	85 	I I +-	585	I I +	670 72.4%
	COLUMN		136 14.7%		790 85.3%		926 100.0%

-	1	I	CAREER			ROW TOTAL
DEPEND .	j	I L	0	I	1 I	TOTAL
DEFEND		I I	76.	I I	362 I	438 47.3%
		I I	·27	İ	157 I	184 19.9%
		İ I	20	İ	200 I	220 23.8%
		I I	10	İ	56 I	66 7.1%
		i I	2	İ	. 10 I	12 1.3%
·	5]	I I	0	I	3 I I	. 3%
	6]	Ï I	1	Ï	1 I	. 2%
		I I	0	I	1 I	.1%
	COLUMN	•	136 14.7%		790 85.3%	926 100.0%

TOTRER]]]	CAREER 0	į i	ROW TOTAL I	•
TOTDEP	0 1		I 191 I	I 238 I 25.7	%
ı	1 1		I 180	I 212 I 22.9	
	2 I		I 152 I	I 177 I 19.1	%
	3 I	19	Í 197 I	I 216 I 23.3	%
	4 I		Ĭ 55 I	I 65 I 7.0	
	5 I		I 10 I	I 12 I 1.3	
	6 I	0	I 3 I	I 3	%
	7 I	1	I 1	I 2 I .2	%
	8 I	0	I 1 I	I 1 I .1;	%
	COLUMN TOTAL	136 14.7%	790 85.3%	926 100.0	%

		I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
COMM		Ī	0	I	1	I	TOTAL
Curni	ocs	I	49	I	234	I	283 30.6%
	ROTC	I I	26	İ	132	Ï	158 17.1%
•	DIRECT	I I	0	I	5	I	.5%
	MED	I I	.0	I	0	I	0 0%
	ACAD	I I	19	I	98	Ī	117 12.6%
	COLUMN TOTAL	Τ'	136 14.7%		790 85.3%	7	926 100.0%

		I CAREER		ROW TOTAL
1.00	:	. O :	I 1 I	
LOS	•	I 45	1 92 I	
		I 21	I 82 I	103
	6	I 22	I 121 I	143 15.4%
		1 18. I	1 111 I	129 13.9%
	8	I 13	I 102 I	
	. 9	I 5	I 120 I	125 13.5%
	10	7 I	I 85 I	92 9.9%
	11	I 5	77 I	
	COLUMN TOTAL	136 14.7%	79 0 85.3%	926 100.0%

]	CAREER		ROW
DROM .]		I 1 1	TOTAL
PROM -	0	6	-	6
	1	4	4	8
	2	3	5 I	8 .9%
	3	3	8	- 11
	- 4	6	I 19	25 2.7%
	5	10	I 45 I	55 5.9%
	6	8	I 61	69 7.5%
	7	8	I 98	106
	8	12_	I 134	146 15.8%
	9	34	I 184	218 23.5%
	10	42	I 232	274 I 29.6%
	COLUMN TOTAL	136 14.7%	790 85.3%	926 100.0%

EVDECT	,	CAREER 0	I 1	ROW TOTAL I
EXPECT	1	15	I 170	I 185 I 20.0%
	2	70	I 486 I	I 556 I 60.0%
	3.	23	I 81 I	I 104 I 11.2%
	4	27	I 50	I 77 I 8.3%
	5	1	I 3 I	I 4 I .4%
	COLUMN	136 14.7%	790 85.3%	926 100.0%

		I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
DETAIL		İ	- 0	I	1	I	TOTAL
DETAIL	1	I		I I		I I +	328 35.4%
	2	I	54	I I	322	I	376 40.6%
	3	I	17	I I	90	+ I I +	107 11.6%
	4	I	26	I I		Ŧ I I +	74 8.0%
•	5	I	12	I I	29	I I	41 4.4%
	COLUMN TOTAL	-	136 14.7%		790 85.3%	•	926 100.0%
		I I I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
JOB		Ī	0	I 	1	I	·
301	<1.50	I	9	I I	, 93	I I +	102 11.0%
	1.50- 2.49	I		I I		I I +	374 40.4%
	2.50- 3.49	I		I I	261	I	306 33.0%
,	3.50- 4.49	I	34	+- I I	87	+ I I	121 13.1%
	>4.49	I	7	+- I I	16	+ I I	23 2.5%
	COLUMN	+-	136 14.7%	+-	790 85.3%	+	926 100.0%
	COUNT	I	CAREER				ROW TOTAL
FAMILY		I	0	I +-	1	I +	
	<1.50	I	4	I I	26 	I I	30 3.2%
٠.	1.50- 2.49	İ		I I	289	I I +	323 34.9%
	2.50- 3.49	I	40	I I	316	I I +	356 38.4%
	3.50- 4.49	I	42	I I		T I +	157 17.0%
	>4.49	I	16	I I	44	+ I I	60 6.5%
	COLUMN TOTAL	+-	136 14.7%	-	790 85.3%	7	926 100.0%

	•	I	CAREER			ROW TOTAL
TOTPAY		Î	0	I	1 1	
	0-10	I	2	I	13	15 1.6%
T H 0	10-20	I	14	I	32	46 5.0%
U S A N	20-30	I	108	I	620	728 78.6%
N D S	30-40	I	11	I	103	114
3	40-50	I	1	I	21	22 2.4%
	50-60	I	. 0	I	1	.1%
	COLUMN TOTAL		136 14.7%		790 85.3%	926 100.0%

		I I I	CAREER 0	I	- 1	I	ROW TOTAL
SUPPAY	0-10	I	96	I I	555	+I I	65 1 70.3%
T H O	10-20	I	12	I	89	I	101 10.9%
U S A	20-30	I	12	I	88	I	100 10.8%
N D S	30-40	I	12	I	40	I	52 5.6%
. 3	40-50	I	1	İ	14	II	15. 1.6%
	50-60	İ	2	I	2	İ	. 4%
	60-70	III	0	I	1	III	.1%
	70-80	I	0	I	1	III	.1%
	80-90	I	0	I	. 0	III	0 0%
	90-100	I	1	I	0	III+	.1%
	COLUMN TOTAL		136 14.7%		790 85.3%		926 100.0%

	I	CAREER	•	ROW TOTAL
CIVJOB	.]	0	I 1 I	•
CIVJUB	0 I	0	I 0 I	
	1 1	0	2 I	
	2 I	0	2 I	
	3_ I	2	8 I	10 1.1%
	4 I	. 4	14 I	18 1.9%
	5 I	5	I 35 I	
	6 I	13	. 63 I	76 8.2%
	7 I	15	81 1	
·	8 I	22	I 150 I	172 18.6%
	9 I	27	176 I	203 21.9%
	10 I	48	259 I	307 33.2%
	COLUMN TOTAL	136 14.7%	790 85.3%	926 100.0%

DETIDE	I I		ı i i	ROW TOTAL
RETIRE	1 I	12	I 108 I	120 13.0%
	2 I	51	I 427 I	478 51.6%
	3 I	47	I 164 I	211 22.8%
	4 I	23	I 82 I	
	5 I	3	9 I	12 1.3%
	COLUMN TOTAL	136 14.7%	790 85.3%	926 100.0%

CAREER		I OPERATI	RATIVE	PATIONAL .	MARINES
JAKEEK			I 19	21 I	I 136 I I 14.7% I
•	1		_	I 141 I	
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926
AGE		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
AUL	22	[0]	_	0 1	
-	23	2		0 I	
	24	[2]		0 1	
	25			I 3 I	
		I 25]		1 17 I	
	27	39 I		16 I	I 10.2% I
		58 I		1 19 I	
	29			I 30 I	
				20 I	I 104 I I 11.2% I
	31	38		1 16 I	
				1 14 -I	I 10.4% I
		I 26	11	1 10 I	I 7.0% I
		1 15 I		6 I	50 I I 5.4% I
				3 I	I 2.6% I
		I 3]		2 1	I 1.2% I
	37	1 1	0	1 1	
		1 1	1	5 1	I 8 I I .9% I
		0		0 I	I 2 I
	40	0]		0 I	
	41	0	0]	0 I	1 1 1
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

SEX		ITACTICAL I OPERATI		NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
SEX	MALE	I 327	I 49		766 I 82.7% I
	FEMALE	I 8	I 68]		160 I 17.3% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

DACE			CTICAL PERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL		ALL MARINES	;
RACE BLAC	BLACK	I I	2	12	8	II II	39 4.2%	I
· 🚁	HISP	I I	. 13	2	4	II	28 3.0%	I
	OTHER	I I	7	2	0	II	14 1.5%	I
-	WHITE	I I	313	101	150 [II II	845 91.3%	I
	COLUMN	T	335	117	162		926	T

	ITACTICAL I OPERATI		NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
BACHELOR	I 304	85	147 II I II	775 I 83.7% I
MASTER/ DOCTOR	I 31	32 	15 II I II	151 I 16.3% I
COLUMN	335	117	, 162	926

MARRIED	=	ITACTICAL I OPERATI		NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
MAKKIED	SINGLE	79 I	42	39 II II	256 I 27.6% I
	MARRIED	256 I	75	123 II II	670 I 72.4% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

DEDEND		TACTICAL OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
DEPEND	0	148	6.5		II 438 I II 47.3 I
	1	[66]	24		II 184 I II 19.9% I
	2	85	20		II 220 I II 23.8% I
	3	29	5		II 66 I II 7.1% I
•	4	6	0	3	II 12 I II 1.3% I
	5	1	1		II 3 I II .3% I
	6	[0]	2		II 2 I II .2% I
	7 -	0	0		II 1 I II .1% I
*	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

						•	
TOTDEP		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL		ROW DTAL	
TOTAL	0	I 77	36	36 I	II II	238 I 25.7% I	
•	1	I 71 I		36 I	II II	212 I 22.9% I	
	2	I 68 I	_	I 34 I	II II	177 I 19.1 I	
	3	I 83 I	20	I 35	II II	216 I 23.3% I	
	4	I 29 I	5	18	II II	65 I 7.0% I	
	5	I 6 I	0	I 3	II	12 I 1.3% I	
	6	I l	1	0	II II	3 I .3% I	
	7	I O I	2	0	II II	2 I .2% I	
	8	I 0 I	0	I 0	II	1 I .1% I	
*	COLUMN	335	117	162	17-	926	

COMM		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
COMM	ocs	I 100	51 <u>-</u>		II 283 I II 30.6% I
	ROTC	I 64	8	· ·	II 158 I II 17.1% I
	DIRECT	I 0	1		II 5 I II .5% I
	MED	I 0	0	· ·	II 0 I II 0% I
	ACAD	I 39	9		II 117 I II 12.6% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

LOS		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
F02	4	I 44 I	19	30 II I II	137 I 14.8% I
	5	I 50	7	13 II I II	103 I 11.1% I
	6	I 62	I 14 I	25 II I II	143 I 15.4% I
	7	I 41 I	I 14 I	25 II I II	129 I 13.9% I
•	8	I 31	I 20 I	22 II II	115 I 12.4% I
	9	I 46 I	I 18 I	17 II I II	125 I 13.5% I
	10	I 36	I 18]	14 II I II	92 I 9.9% I
	11	I 25	I 7]	16 II I II	82 I 8.9% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

PROM	_	TACTICAL OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
PROM		4	1	11 0 11	6 I .6% I
	1			2 II I II	8 I .9% I
	2			1 11	8 I .9% I
	3	3		0 II II	11 I 1.2% I
	4			II 8 II	25 I 2.7% I
	5		9	12 II I II	55 I 5.9% I
•	6			6 II I I	69 I 7.5% I
	7		9	23 II I II	106 I 11.4% I
				26 II I II	146 I 15.8% I
	9			36 II I II	
	- 10	97	I 28	1 48 II I II	
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

EVDECT	_	TACTICAL OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
EXPECT	1	70	21	31	II 185 I II 20.0% I
	2	190	80		II 556 I II 60.0% I
	3	36	13	19	II 104 I II 11.2% I
	4	38	3	9	II 77 I II 8.3% I
	5	1	0	2	II 4 I II .4% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

DETAIL		TACTICAL OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
DETAIL	1	125	33	62 II II	328 I 35.4% I
	2	129	57 [57 II I II	376 I 40.6% I
	3	41	13	15 II I II	107 I 11.6% I
	4	27	10	17 II I II	74 I 8.0% I
	5	13	4	11 11	41 I 4.4% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

JOP.		ITACTICAL I OPERATI		NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
JOB	<1.50	I 29	13		II 102 I II 11.0% I
	1.50- 2.49	I 133 I	46		II 374 I II 40.4% I
	2.50- 3.49	I 105	42		II 306 I II 33.0% I
	3.50 - 4.49	I 59	13		II 121 I II 13.1% I
	>4.49	I 9 I	3		II 23 I II 2.5% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

FAMILY		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
PARILLI	<1.50	I 14 I	5	8 II I II	3.2% I
	1.50- 2.49	I 105	50	55 II	
	2.50- 3.49	I 130	43	62 II	
	3.50- 4.49	I 62	14	28 II II	
	>4.49	I 24 I	5	9 11	
	COLUMN	335	117	· 162	926

TOTPAY		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
TUTPAT	0-10	I 0 1	0	I 0 I	
THOUSANDS	10-20	I 15	3	1 I	
	20-30	I 242 I	111	131 I	
	30-40	I63	3	24 I	
	40-50	I 15	0	6 I I	I 22 I I 2.4% I
	50-60	I 0	0	I 0 I	
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

SUPPAY		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NÕN-OCCU PATIONAL	
SUFFAT	0-10	I 258		107	II 651 I II 70.3% I
Т Н 0	10-20	I 37 I		I 16	II 101 I II 10.9% I
Ü S A	20-30	I 22 I	المساف المساف	29 I	II 100 I II 10.8% I
N D S	30-40	I 12 I	18	7	II 52 I II 5.6% I
3	40-50	I 6 I	3	2	II 15 I II 1.6% I
	50-60	I 0 I		I 0	II 4 I II .4% I
	60-70	I 0 I	0	I 0	II 1 I II .1% I
	70-80	I 0 I	0	1	II 1 I
	80-90	I 0 I	0	0	II 0 I II 0% I
	90-100	I 0 1		0	II 1 I II .1% I
	COLUMN	335 .	117	162	926

CIVJOB		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
CIVJUB	0	I 0 1	0		
	1	I 2]	0	0 []	
	2	I 1 1	0	1 11	
•	3	I 4 1		- 1 II	
	4	I 8]		3 II I II	
	5	I 14		9 II I II	
. •	6	I 25 I		1 21 II	
	. 7	I 31 I	10	1 16 II	
	8	I 60 I		I 29 II	
	9	77	22	I 31 II	
	10	I 113]		51 II	
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

RETIRE		ITACTICAL I OPERATI	ADMINIST RATIVE	NON-OCCU PATIONAL	ALL MARINES
KLIIKE	1	I 35	15	24 II I II	120 I 13.0% I
	2	I 171	63	83 II I II	478 I 51.6% I
	3	I 83]	25	36 II I II	211 I .22.8% I
	4	I 40]	12	17 II II	105 I 11.3% I
	5	6	2	2 II II	12 I 1.3% I
	COLUMN	335	117	162	926

APPENDIX E

LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS

MARRIED EXCLUDED

(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)

	an affi ai au b	h and the
variable	coefficient	t ratio
intercept	6.59986	2.968
personal:		
AGE	12124	 568
SEX	97614	-1.005
BLACK	8.12650	•309
HISP	 88692	508
OTHER	•00000	
EDUC	-1.42150	-1.275
DEPEND	.19688	•597
ocs	.18830	.172
ROTC	-1.10462	-1.398
DIRECT	.00000	
MED	.00000	
LOS	.06238	2.279
intrinsic:	***************************************	
PROM	.30324	1.999
EXPECT	45162	-1.181
DETAIL	40592	-1.490
JOB	64274	-1.561
FAMILY	36112	831
extrinsic:	-,50112	• 031
TOTPAY	00008	780
CIVJOB	00810	049
RETIRE	40048	-1.115
	335 valid observations	

source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel

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