COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY--A COMPLEX
ORGANIZATION ADAPTS TO A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT

Richard D. Heenan

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for

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PREFACE

It has been said that the gap in public administration between academic and practitioner is too wide and needs to be narrowed. As a practitioner in a large complex organization--Navy Department--for over twenty-two years, I have been intrigued with the possibilities of exploring the utility and application of the theoretical concepts in organization thought to the realities of a government bureaucracy undergoing a dramatic change process. My current two-year assignment as a graduate student, completely divorced from the "trees" of my sponsoring agency, has enabled me to observe the "forest" of large organizations in a broad and detached perspective.

Modern organization thought seems to stress the problems of adaptation to change in a turbulent environment and the inherent difficulties accruing when a large bureaucracy must respond to those changes. I have taken the opportunity in this research to examine the United States Army coping with the most significant peacetime change that has occurred in the past three decades--the shift from conscription to an all-volunteer force. It is a unique case because the goals, operational policies, defense strategies, and internal processes remain basically unchanged. Thus my attention will emphasize primarily the introduction of a single variable, manpower procurement, as a new boundary transaction in a competitive labor market, and the adaptive response of the Army to this variable.

ii

Military manpower procurement planning has been of special interest to me because my last assignment prior to entering The American University was in Navy planning in recruitment and retention for the all-volunteer force. My prime academic interest thereafter has been in public personnel management.

The choice of including open-system concepts in theoretical explanation requires an inter-disciplinary backdrop to the change phenomena presented in this research. It will be noted in the bibliography that most of the social sciences are represented.

My purpose in matching an actual case study with scholarly conjectures is not only to illuminate theoretical concepts purporting to be applicable to change and uncertainty in complex organizations but also to either confirm or deny their relevance. By making such heuristic comparisons, it may be possible to refine certain propositions that will describe more accurate reflections of a change process.

I have greatly benefited from the conscientious and helpful guidance of Professors A. Lee Fritschler and Robert P. Boynton from The American University--both in the classroom and as faculty advisers-- in this endeavor. And were it not for the knowledgeable and perceptive insights provided by Stephen Herbits of the Department of Defense, my opportunities in the discovery of data as well as rationale on the all-volunteer force would have been much more difficult.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Setting

Americans are currently witnessing a dramatic change process
in one of the largest and perhaps most complex bureaucratic organiza-
tion in this country--the United States Army. With its members sta-
tioned throughout the world, it is comprised of approximately 800,000
military men and women on active duty plus about 400,000 civilians at
the time of this writing. The adoption of an all-volunteer military
force after three decades of conscription involves a most fundamental
transition from a "given" input of human resources to an impressive
boundary transaction in which the military must actively compete for
sizable numbers of men and women in the labor market. This is a monu-
mental task, unprecedented in any nation's history. At present, the
Administration views a force of 800,000 active Army servicemen as its
minimum peacetime requirement. As will be described later, the change
was clearly stimulated by exogenous variables and not from elements
within the organization.

The Founding Fathers feared conscription by the central gov-
ernment would lead to unnecessary abridgment of personal freedoms.
Until the Civil War there was no draft; the system of compulsory ser-
vice instituted in 1863 was born of necessity and was, in any event,
far short of being comprehensive. In both 1917 and 1940, the draft

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emerged again as a wartime expedient. In 1948 the Selective Service
System was revived to maintain preparedness for cold war crises.
After the Korean War, it remained in existence and was once again an
important source of manpower when the nation became deeply involved
in Vietnam in 1965. Given the nation's legal and political traditions,
it was probably inevitable that the idea of a peacetime draft eventually
would be rejected. Meanwhile, by examining the United States Army as
it progresses in transition, this research explores a case study that
offers intensive analysis of one situation over time and permits a
view in depth of organizational dynamics in a bureaucracy.

The dynamic process of adjustment in the Department of the Army
offers a convenient case study for the analysis and application of
theoretical principles on organizational change and adaptation to a
large complex organization. Such past conjectures about change have
been introduced on the basis of limited exposure to large American in-
stitutions rather recently by several distinguished scholars of the
social sciences. Most of these writers suggest that their theories
require further testing and refinement under actual conditions in order
to prove their relevance and utility. That is the challenge and goal of
this research.

The challenge poses a problem in methodology. Kurt Lewin has
often been quoted as saying that there is nothing as practical as a
good theory.[1] Perhaps one reason why social scientists shun results
is that they are not based on "good" theories; i.e., theories that

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[1]Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality: Selected Papers
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935), p. 12.

are testable or have been tested in reality. In order for a theory to be testable in reality, it must be composed of a set of interrelated concepts that purport to mirror the reality being studied. Partially because of the enormous complexity of the subject matter, there are few theories that purport to mirror the world of "organizational behavior" to the extent that concrete predictions can be made. Organizations are composed of many parts on multi-levels of analyses. They must be studied as total systems. Analyzing their parts without taking into account the pattern in which they are imbedded; by which they are maintained; and for which they exist, may miss a crucial requirement in scientific analysis, namely, that the model used and the research method derived must mirror the known or assumed empirical reality of the phenomena studied.

Theorizing about organizational behavior was confined for many years to a stable paradigm: the bureaucratic model--as amended.[2] The model served both descriptive and prescriptive functions. There is more recently a second paradigm at work, in terms of a descriptive

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[2] The German scholar, Max Weber, introduced the bureaucratic typology of organization between 1905 and 1915 in Europe. His writings on bureaucracy have been the subject of considerable attention and analysis, including critical comment, by such notable authors as: Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957); Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (New York: Free Press, 1954); Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961); Peter Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) and Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956); Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965).

order, that is more comprehensive than the bureaucratic model and one that will be described later in detail. For the moment, it will suffice to state briefly that the newer paradigm is represented in the polarized "mechanistic" and "organic" models developed by Burns and Stalker. These writers see the two models as reflecting different clusters of patterned events in organizations. They suggest that the mechanistic model is found where environmental and technological factors affecting the organization are stable. The behavior that will emerge is a fairly good operationalization of the bureaucratic model: functional differentiation, hierarchical authority, and an emphasis on stable relationships. The organic model calls for fluid adaptations incorporating special skills, tasks, and techniques as conditions and circumstances change.[3]

The significance of Burns and Stalker's framework is that the authors have begun a trend toward the integration of empirically supported propositions. There is much recent evidence that contemporary students of organizational behavior have begun specifying a formidable array of variables in the analysis of organizations. Anthony Downs, James March, and Herbert Simon have described the relationships among hundreds of variables. Organization theorists have also advanced and tested a large number of empirical propositions. The value of these

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[3]Tom Burns and George Macpherson Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961). This research will emphasize some characterizations of the organic model drawn from a variety of sources and synthesized by the late James D. Thompson. Salient features of the mechanistic model are also addressed by Thompson to the extent he deems necessary for understanding the behavior of organizations.

efforts have been in the attempt to build explanatory (and interdis-
ciplinary) bridges within the evolving list of tested propositions.

A relatively recent theorist, James D. Thompson, is best known
for his integration of a wide range of variables including decision
issues, environmental adaptation, and buffer mechanisms, among others,
which reflect his willingness to exploit the ideas of other organiza-
tion typology builders by incorporating their key variables into his
own framework. Thompson has uniquely established relationships among
a large number of empirical studies, models, and hypotheses drawn from
Simon, Dill, Gulick, Urwick, Selznick, Parsons, Perrow, and others who
range across the spectrum of organization thought. The works of
Thompson form the theoretical foundation for case-study analysis in
this research.

To infer that the Army is a large-scale bureaucracy requires
elaboration. The term "bureaucratic organization" calls attention to
the fact that organizations generally possess some sort of adminis-
trative machinery. In an organization that has been formally estab-
lished, a specialized administrative staff usually exists that is
responsible for maintaining the organization as a going concern and
for coordinating the activities of its members. Large and complex
organizations require an especially elaborate administrative appara-
tus. Oscar Grusky has pointed out that the degree of bureaucratiza-
tion in the military is greater than is generally found in business
enterprise for four reasons: (1) Nature of its mission, (2) Size,
(3) Complexity, and (4) Geographical dispersion. The pervasive politi-
cal and social implications involved in the management of destruction

requires stringent controls. The distribution of goods and services
does not require the same degree of control. The enormous magnitude
of a centralized military establishment necessitates controls by ex-
tensive rules and regulations.[4] The many component parts of the mili-
tary mission and the related necessity for dispersing military units
all over the world combine to emphasize the overall complexity of the
American military establishment and to make it highly susceptible to
traditional bureaucratization. Anderson and Warkov have concluded
from their research that large size alone may not require an unusually
large administrative apparatus, but size _is_ positively correlated with
organization complexity and, the more complex the system, the greater
the requirement for a large administrative staff.[5]

By earlier reference to the phrase "boundary transaction" in
connection with the all-volunteer force, there is the implication of
system interaction that is supportive of a systems-approach analysis
to a government agency. The phrase further suggests that transactional
relationships between systems--the Army and the labor market--requires

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[4]Oscar Grusky, ed., _The Sociology of Organizations_ (New York:
Free Press, 1970), p. 440. The author's points are a partial reflection
of Weber's typology on bureaucracy in _Essays in Sociology_, trans. by
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press,
1958).

[5]T. R. Anderson and Seymour Warkov, "Organizational Size and
Functional Complexity," _American Sociological Review_, XXVI (February,
1961), 22-28. Wide variations have been found in the degree of bureau-
cratization in organizations, as indicated by the amount of effort
devoted to administrative problems, the proportion of administrative
personnel, the hierarchical character of the organization, or the strict
enforcement of administrative procedures and rigid compliance with them.

an "open-system" orientation of research.[6]

Open-System Framework

The open-system concept is relatively new and there is a dearth
of writing on its theoretical application to a large government bureau-
cracy undergoing change. It appears that far more scholarly attention
has been directed toward the resistance to change in bureaucracies.[7]
Yet this case study is a reflection of an exogenous mandate for change
that must conspicuously overcome the inertia of past practices.

How can the open-system concept provide a framework for exam-
ining the processes of change in a government organization? First, it
is necessary to examine its underpinnings. It was von Bertalanffy
(1950) who first fully disclosed the importance of openness or closed-
ness of the environment as a means of distinguishing Darwin's living
organisms from inanimate objects. In contradistinction to physical
objects, any living entity survives by importing into itself certain
types of material from its environment, transforming these in accord-
ance with its own system characteristics, and exporting other types

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[6]Traditional or orthodox organizational theories have tended to
view the organization as a closed system. This tendency has led to a
disregard of varying organizational environments and the nature of org-
anizational dependency on environment. It has led also to an over-
concentration on principles of internal organizational functioning, with
resultant failure to develop and understand such processes as feedback.
Principal proponents have been Elton Mayo, Frederick Taylor, and Luther
Gulick.

[7]See for examples: Frederick C. Dyer, and John M. Dyer, Bureau-
cracy and Creativity (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press,
1965); Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University,
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971); Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics
of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); Victor A.
Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation (University, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 1969); and Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 1967.

back into the environment. By this process, the organism obtains the
additional energy that renders it 'negentropic'; it becomes capable of
attaining stability in a time-independent steady-state--a necessary
condition of adaptability to environmental variance.[8]

In some respects, open-system theory is not a theory at all;
it does not pretend to the specific sequences of cause and effect, the
specific hypotheses and tests of hypotheses which are the basic elements
of theory. Open-system theory is rather a framework, a meta-theory, a
model in the broadest sense.

William G. Scott writes that modern organization theory: " . . .
is an offspring of the system concept and all it implies."[9] By its very
nature as an organization analytically separated from other social sys-
tems, it is viewed as being exposed to outside influences deriving from
other systems in which it is empirically imbedded. From them there
flows a constant stream of events and influences that shape the con-
ditions under which the members of the system must act.

The environment places demands upon and constrains the organ-
ization in various ways. The total functioning of the organization
cannot be understood, therefore, without explicit and deliberate con-
sideration of these environmental demands and constraints. The mul-
tiple links between the organization and its environment is thought to

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[8]L. von Bertalanffy, "The Theory of Open Systems in Physics
and Biology," Science, CXI (January 13, 1950), 29. Negative entropy
(a derivative of "negentropic") states that systems survive and main-
tain their characteristic internal order only so long as they import
from the environment more energy than they expend in the process of
transformation and exportation.

[9]William G. Scott, Organization Theory: A Behavioral Analysis
For Management (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 129.

make it frequently difficult for specifying clearly the boundaries of any given organization.[10] Ultimately, a concept of organization is better described by what Edgar Schein calls: " . . . the stable processes of import, conversion, and export, rather than characteristics such as size, shape, function or structure.[11]

Implicit in all of this is that an organization is an open system when it takes the external environment into account; it is closed when it does not. The one organization embraces the world; the other pretends that it does not exist. There is, however, some basis for applying both frameworks. Whether an organization is open or closed—either in its own eyes or that of the researcher—depends on the relative weights given to endogenous and exogenous variables. It is even possible, as will be shown later, to combine the two notions.

Experience and practice in organizations indicate that the environment does play a major role in what happens within an organization. Since both input and output are directly related to the environment and are major components to be included in any analysis, the closed-system perspective is, almost by definition, inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of organizations. From an empirical standpoint, too little of the variance within organizations is explained by internal factors. But despite all these shortcomings, the perspective persists

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[10] Clearly the selection of the military as a case study with its trappings of contract, oath, uniform, and living conditions make it relatively easy to identify and understand where its organizational boundaries lie. The delineation would be less certain, however, if one examined the so-called "military-industrial complex."

[11] Edgar H. Schein, _Organizational Psychology_ (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 45.

in the literature and in practice, apparently for the reason that the closed-system approach does explain some of what organizations do. Organizations do try to maximize rationality, even if they are aware that they can attain only "satisficing" decisions. They do try to buffer, level, and smooth out environmental fluctuations. Since organizational actions are at least partially based on a closed-system perspective, it is a necessary component of the organization analyst's repertoire.

To summarize, the open-system framework is obviously much broader in its conceptual scope than is the closed-system scheme. This breadth is important for better understanding and operation of organizations. At the same time, as Etzioni suggests, the model is much more "exacting and expensive" when used for research.[12] Few researchers have tools or the ability to take into account all of the various components that must be included in even a relatively simple open-system model. The measurement of the various forms of inputs and consequences of outputs have not been even moderately developed. For the practitioner, a full utilization of the model involves the comprehension and evaluation of the multiple factors that impinge upon his organization.

Coping With Change and Uncertainty

That a system is open means not simply that it engages in interchanges with the environment but that this interchange is an essential factor underlying the system's viability, its reproductive ability or

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[12] Amitai Etzioni, _Modern Organizations_ (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 17.

continuity, and--the focal point of this study--its ability to change.
Despite the common occurrence of organizational change, its dynamics
and underlying processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined ways.
Because the organization cannot completely control its environment, it
is continually forced to introduce internal changes which allow it to
cope more effectively with new challenges presented from outside.

Scholars differ on the meaning of "change." Parsons and Shils
describe the more fundamental elements of societal change. They be-
lieve that a system state at a point in time or at a series of points
in time is a basic referent for the analysis of social systems. It
is also a fundamental referent for the analysis of change from that
state to other states of the system. The consequence of an imperfect
integration is in the nature of the case a certain instability, and
therefore susceptible to change if the balance of these forces is al-
tered at some strategic point. Change is a certainty, moreover, for
any society in which the allocations create or maintain dissatisfac-
tion, especially when cultural standards and the allocations combine
to intensify need-disposition. Changes in the external situation of
a social system, either in its environmental conditions, changes in its
technology which are not autonomous, and changes in the social situa-
tion of the system, may be cited as the chief exogenous factors in
change.[13]

Garth Jones describes change simply as: " . . . a somewhat

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[13]Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, _Toward A General Theory
of Action_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 231-232.

self-explanatory term . . . that requires no extended elaboration."[14]

Change relates to movement from one state of organizational affairs to

another. This seems a bit baffling depending on how Jones defines the

word, "movement." Robert Biller goes to the opposite extreme in

stressing its elusive qualities by indicating that it is an abstrac-

tion imparted to reality rather than an inherent attribute of reality.

Change can only be expressed in relational or relative terms rather

than in absolute concepts. When change occurs, it implies that some

state has been altered relative to either a previous state of that object

or some other object to which a relationship has been described. Biller

concludes that one must carefully specify the relational referencing

used in the drawing of any specific inference.[15] Gordon Lippitt appears

to offer the most suitable definition for this research by stating that:

"Organizational change is any planned or unplanned alteration of the

status quo which affects the structure, technology, and personnel of

the total organization."[16] As one studies the concept of change, it

becomes clear that it is not directly given to us from nature. It is

an inferred property. Adjustment from military conscription to an

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[14]Garth N. Jones, Planned Organizational Change: A Study in Change Dynamics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 5.

[15]Robert P. Biller, "Adaptational Capacity and Organizational Development," Toward a New Public Administration, ed. by Frank Marini (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971), p. 106.

[16]Gordon L. Lippitt, Organizational Renewal: Achieving Viability in a Changing World (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 2. An acceptance of this definition is not without some misgiving. Earlier objection to the use of "movement" by Garth Jones can also be applied to Lippitt's "status quo." If it is agreed that organizations are constantly changing, then one cannot really identify a status quo state. However, the linkage here is with the persistence of the military draft over three decades.

all-volunteer force is logically a primary change element in this
study. But, given an unchanging purpose, such a system tends to pre-
serve itself within a reasonable range of normal operating conditions
by what Gerald Caiden describes as:

> . . . maintaining its internal relationships in a steady bal-
> ance (around an equilibrium oscillating between the limits set
> by homeostasis) and by adjusting to the changing environment
> (according to natural laws discovered by cybernetics) revealed
> by feedback from multiple external contacts.[17]

The environment changes: public attitudes are constantly
changing, competition increases, technology alters, new needs are
recognized. Political, economic, legal, and demographic conditions
can all be critical for organizations. Culture is not a constant, even
in a single setting. Values and norms change as events occur that
affect the population involved. These changing elements alter the
operations of the organizations, making practices anachronistic that
were once sacred. Adaptations to the environment by organizations are
reflected in many forms. Since organizations are planned social units,
oriented to specific goals under relatively rational leadership, they
are probably more given to change than other social units. Such condi-
tions and their impact on organizations are considered important for
the sake of analysis. Organizations as a special class of open systems
have properties of their own, but they share other properties in common
with all open systems. These include the importation of energy from the

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[17]Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Reform (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 46. Here Caiden attempts in his lang-
uage to ease the controversy among scholars over "equilibrium"--a
steady state--and "homeostasis"--an adjustment process--by resort to
the use of both terms simultaneously.

environment, the through-put or transformation of the imported energy
into some output form which is characteristic of the system, the ex-
porting of that output into the environment, and the reenergizing of
the system from sources in the environment.

The search for key variables and their evolutionary character-
istics critical to organizational change and adaptation in an open-system
framework is a relatively new focal point of interest to scholars
addressing organizational thought. Richard Hall recently stated:

> There are practical societal problems that organizational
> analysis can address itself to while continuing to build
> basic knowledge about organizational phenomena. The con-
> cern with the natural environment should furnish analysts
> a good opportunity to study organizational-environmental
> transactions.[18]

Any major organizational change involves complex approaches, relation-
ships, and processes that have been only roughly identified and described
in the literature on change. In conventional experimental designs, a
single variable (approach, phase or relationship) is usually manipu-
lated so as to study its effect on other variables. In complex organi-
zational changes, too many changes often occur too fast to permit this
isolation of strategic variables.

One critical point in coping with the environment is the capa-
acity to respond to unstable relations between system and environment,
and hence with uncertainty. The nature of uncertainty is such that it
is not possible to assign a probability to the occurrence of an event.
As will be shown in the case study, the views of Lawrence and Lorsch

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[18] Richard H. Hall, Organizations--Structure and Process
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 347.

are relevant in that uncertainty consists of three components: (1) The
lack of clarity of information, (2) The long-time span of definitive
feedback, and (3) The general uncertainty of causal relationships.[19]

But how can the organization respond to change and uncertainty?
If one is permitted to expand the theoretical framework by including
political systems theory, then it is David Easton who suggests that
such systems include large repertoires of mechanisms through which they
may seek to cope with their environments. Through these, they regulate
their own actions, transform their internal network, and may possibly
even reshape their fundamental goals.[20] They may adopt a wide range of
actions of a positive, constructive, and innovative sort for warding
off or absorbing any forces of displacement. They may cope with a dis-
turbance by seeking to change the environment so that the exchanges
between the environment are no longer stressful; they may seek to insu-
late themselves against further influences from the environment, or the
members of the system may even transform their own relationships funda-
mentally and modify their own goals and practices so as to improve their
chances of handling inputs from the environment. Responses are made up
of efforts, limited only by the variety of human skills, resources, and
ingenuity, to control, modify or basically change either the environment
or the system itself, or both together. A similar framework on adapta-
tion is provided by Morley Segal who writes:

[19]Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environ-
ment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1967), p. 27.

[20]David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 20-31, passim.

> To the extent that organizations respond to these pressures, they do so by shifting their internal relationships; redesigning their system of control, giving some units more independence and discretion and others less, while simultaneously maintaining the viability of the organization itself. This process can be considered as one of balancing organizational differentiation with integration . . .[21]

Michel Crozier is well known for his analysis of bureaucratic behavior but he appears off the mark in this research by suggesting that a crisis is needed to precipitate a dramatic change in a government agency. He goes on to explain that wars as well as social and political crises that upset the customary power equilibrium provide excellent opportunities for effecting changes. These provide a disruption in the essential rhythm prevalent in bureaucracy by the alternation of long periods of stability with very short periods of crisis and change.[22] Borrowing from the writings of several distinguished authors such as Lasswell, Leites, Williams, Furguson, Milburn, and Hamblin to support his view, Charles Hermann posits "crisis" along three dimensions: (1) It threatens high-priority values in the organization, (2) It presents a restricted amount of time in which a response

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[21] Morley Segal, "Organization and Environment: A Typology of Adaptability and Structure," (unpublished paper, The American University, 1972), p. 1. Professor Segal introduces an illuminating typology of organizations based on unit linkage and relationship of organizations to their environments. Since his orientation primarily addresses the influence of clientele support and services, the three-part typology ("chain-structured," "mediatively-structured," and "adaptively-structured") is not elaborated here. For excellent case studies in analysis of the effect of such organization strategies presented in the Easton-Segal paragraph above see Philip Selznick, TVA and The Grass Roots (New York: Harper & Row, 1949); Elliott Jacques, The Changing Culture of a Factory (New York: Dryden Press, 1952); and Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, 1954.

[22] Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, 1964, pp. 196-254, passim. A more likely crisis will occur if the Defense Department is unable to fulfill its requirement for an all-volunteer force.

can be made, and (3) It is unexpected or unanticipated by the organi-
zation.[23] Few would argue that a shift from conscription to an all-volun-
teer force in this case study is other than dramatic; yet, what may
actually be observed is a political mandate for change followed by a
lengthy and deliberate planning cycle reflective of a degree of con-
fidence and optimism--not crises conditions. Nor is bureaucratic
resistance ostensibly pronounced in this case. These observations
support the conclusion of Anthony Downs with respect to the relatively
high strength of an externally induced change.[24]

The primary interest here rests with the phenomenon of a changing
input--human resources or manpower procurement.[25] Theoretically, a
simplistic correlation of this is noted in terms of what Katz and Kahn
describe as one of two "energic" input types representing new or modi-
fied production imports. This entails a modification of quantity or
quality in the inflow of materials and messages. These changes may be
due to environment changes, such as the discovery of new resources and
the depletion of old ones, or to changes in the transactional process
through which the organizational output provides energic return and

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[23] Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit
the Viability of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly,
VIII, (June, 1963), 61-82, passim.

[24] Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 1967, p. 197. Downs
indicates that opportunities for change presented by purely internal
developments are less likely to be utilized than opportunities pre-
sented by external changes, because the latter are visible to external
agents and are therefore more likely to generate pressure from them.

[25] The term "manpower" will be used frequently in this study.
For purposes of brevity and with dubious license, the intention is to
combine both male and female resources within the meaning of the term.

reinforcement. Changes of input may also come from the super-system

which legitimizes various aspects of organizational functioning as

when new laws are enacted.[26] A central feature of organizational change

by the Army as it applies to the all-volunteer force concept points to

a strategy of recruitment and retention (or socialization). The

all-volunteer force obviously places new concerns and demands on the

Army.

The problem of mobilizing human resources concerns a major as-

pect of the external relations of the organization to the situation in

which it operates. Once possessing control of the necessary resources,

then it must have a set of mechanisms by which these resources can be

brought to bear on the actual process of goal-implementation in a

changing situation. There are two aspects of this process. First is

the set of relations to the external situation centering around the

problem of disposal of the product of the organization's activities.

This involves the basis on which the scale of operations is estimated

and on which the settlement of terms with the recipients of this pro-

duct is arrived at. In the military, for example, the product is con-

sidered to be disposed of immediately to the executive and legislative

branches of the government and through them to the public. The second

aspect of the process is concerned with the internal mechanisms on the

mobilization of resources for sustaining the implementation of the goal.

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[26]Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of
Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 446. The
reader will note that the application is not direct except in terms of
the last two sentences. However, the framework provided by these auth-
ors should logically encompass "human resources" as part of the inflow
of materials.

There arises therein a problem of the "claims" of the organization to the resources it needs and hence the settlement of the terms on which they are made available to it.

One additional point from Katz and Kahn is germane. It seems plausible that a proper theoretical base for effecting adaptation in a large bureaucracy is through systemic change rather than the recent notions of organization development which emphasize change through the individual. The authors suggest that a major error in dealing with problems of organizational change both at the practical and theoretical level is to ignore the systemic properties of the organization and to confuse individual change with modifications in organizational variables. The essential weakness is a psychological fallacy of concentrating upon individuals without regard to the role relationships that constitute the social system of which they are a part.[27]

It is hoped that this research will contribute to the limited knowledge of organizational change in terms of a new perspective by examining the realities of a large complex organization confronted with change and uncertainty. It is offered as a response to the following comment of Amitai Etzioni: " . . . the study of organizational change—as well as the study of change in other social units—is still a relatively undeveloped field."[28]

Some studies describe changes in structure, others changes in goals or purposes, and still others present changes in the relationships

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[27]Ibid., pp. 390 and 449.

[28]Amitai Etzioni, A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations (2d ed.; New York: Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 385.

between organizations and their social environments. This study poses
a combination of these elements; and a suitable way of introducing such
specification into problems of social change is to examine two separate
aspects of the matter: the circumstances accruing and methods employed
to bring about change, and the targets at which change is directed.

It has now been noted that social systems within an open-system
framework provide many sources of change. It appears possible to
assess a model of interrelated processes, some of which reinforce one
another in their present state, others which disrupt one another, and
others which reinforce certain tendencies to change. Such a model
should take account of the pressures, counterpressures, and conflicts
in a social system, in an attempt to locate the sources and processes
of change. It may be feasible to predict that a certain type of change,
initiated at a given point, given the salient attributes of the system,
will have specifiable types of consequences at other points. Having
briefly outlined the focus of our attention on the United States Army as
a referent for the application of theoretical principles, the following
key factors will be explored: What were the antecedent political ele-
ments that precipitated the decision for an all-volunteer force and how
has the Army responded to this change? This paper does not attempt to
judge whether an all-volunteer force is wise--rather, to examine the
process of change.

One author, James D. Thompson, has developed a propositional
model for coping with uncertainty in a changing environment that seems
to encompass the views of many scholars on strategies of coping with

a changing environment.[29] Some of his conjectures will next be examined in detail as they relate to the change process now underway in the Army.

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[29]James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967).

CHAPTER II

MATCHING A THEORY WITH REALITY

James D. Thompson's Propositions

The field of organizations does not have a theory, or even a set of theories in the sense of a set of empirically verified propositions that are logically linked. There are, however, a number of perspectives or conceptualizations that are becoming increasingly crystallized and increasingly based upon previous research. Much of the recent literature has attempted to develop some order within the world of organizational theories.

James D. Thompson has developed a set of propositions (a "conceptual inventory") that describes how organizations act (or should act) given the fact of external constraints on rationality. These propositions are supposed to specify what organizations can do, in the face of threats to rationality, to stay as rational as possible. By combining the works of my theorists, Thompson develops propositions about many areas of organizational activities. These form a basis for bringing the insights of the closed- and open-system approaches together. He calls this notion a newer tradition that enables one to: " . . . conceive of complex organizations as open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty."[1] In other words,

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[1]Ibid., p. 10.

organizations attempt to be rational, controlling their internal opera-
tions and environment to the greatest extent possible, but never achiev-
ing a totally closed, rational system. The degree to which the organi-
zation is successful in achieving rationality is dependent upon the
strength of the internal and external pressures and the organization's
capability of control.

A central problem for complex organizations is one of coping
with uncertainty by creating strategies specifically to deal with it.
Chapter Two of Thompson's book (Organizations in Action) contains five
conceptual propositions on organizational response to an uncertain
environment.[2] The propositions are regarded as "maneuvering devices"
which provide the organization with some self-control despite inter-
dependence with the environment. As has been noted in Chapter I, the
Army offers a convenient case study for the application of these pro-
positions to the realities of adaptation to change.

While striving to embrace most types of organizations, Thompson
admits that his attention is directed to "instrumental" organizations
which induce or coerce participation. Business enterprise or industrial
activities, with their conspicuous character of producing an output of
services or physical goods, are most obvious representatives and are
often used by Thompson in his examples. The Army would seem to fit in
the instrumental category although its relationship is less clear and
many theorists are vague on the point. Blau and Scott place the military
with certain other public institutions in a typology they describe as,

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[2] Ibid., pp. 14-24.

"Commonweal Organizations" where the prime beneficiary is the public
at large. They are not supposed to be oriented to the interests of
their "clients." Under external democratic control, the public could
be considered as their owners.[3] The purpose of the military is iden-
tical with that of the state which uses its army for the attainment of
its objective. A distinctive feature is its intermittant character of
active employment. Unlike an industrial unit, the external objectives
of the military are never continuous. Armies are only used when state
policy demands. At other times their objective is wholly internal--
the development of a disciplined efficiency or readiness that will make
them potent for state purposes when they are called upon to fight.

The focal chapter of Thompson's book is entitled, "Rationality
in Organizations." The author's conception of organizational ration-
ality encompasses at least three activities which the reader will recog-
nize has been borrowed from the models of numerous authors, some of
which Thompson identifies and others which are notably overlooked. The
three components indicated are: (1) Input activities, (2) Technological
activities, and (3) Ouput activities. The model is depicted as:

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  ┌ ─ ─ ─ ─◄ ─ ─ ─┌─FEEDBACK─├ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─◄ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐
  ↓              ↓                                       │
┌─────┐       ┌──────────────────┐       ┌────────┐      │
│INPUT├──────►│ "CORE TECHNOLOGY" ├──────►│ OUTPUT ├──────┘
└─────┘       └──────────────────┘       └────────┘
```

The dotted line is incorporated to reflect the influence of output and
environment as possessing "cybernetic" stimuli on subsequent organiza-
tional activities--an influence, although not depicted below because

[3]Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A
Comparative Approach (Scranton Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing, 1962),
pp. 43-44.

of its redundancy, that is inherent in the open-system models. The

organization, of course, may also influence (even change) the environ-

ment.

It is interesting to note that the above model is a direct

derivative of earlier theories by David Laston (1965), Katz and Kahn

(1966), and A. K. Rice (1963) although Thompson does not cite any of

these sources in his writing. The similarities are striking. Easton

states that "inputs" provide what may be called the raw materials on

which the system acts so as to produce something called "outputs."

This is described as a massive "conversion" process.[4] Thus his model

is represented as:

INPUT ⟶ CONVERSION PROCESS ⟶ OUTPUT

Katz and Kahn identify and map the following repetitive cycles of

organizational pattern:[5]

ENERGIC INPUT ⟶ TRANSFORMATION OR THROUGH-PUT ⟶ OUTPUT

Rice's open-system model closely identifies with the above three plus

the novel addition of "waste material" as part of what he describes as

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[4]Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 31. Easton's
orientation is on the political process.

[5]Katz and Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, p. 28.
The authors add a useful term for this case-oriented research with res-
pect to the open system--"equifinality"--which they interpret to mean
that there are more ways than one of producing a given outcome, i.e.,
there does not have to be a single method for achieving an objective
(pp. 26-27). The input-transformation cycle of Katz and Kahn is also
presented by Garth Jones in Planned Organizational Change, (p. 4).

an "export process,"[6] i.e.:

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┌─────────┐        ┌────────────┐         ┌──────────────────┐
│ IMPORT  │───────▶│ CONVERSION │────────▶│     EXPORT       │
└─────────┘        └────────────┘         │     ----         │
                                          │ WASTE MATERIAL   │
                                          └──────────────────┘
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
Before presenting Thompson's propositions, it is necessary to amplify his special terms as they will relate to our case study.[7] It will become apparent that this is a difficult and ominous task because of the intuitive feeling that some of the terms are unnecessarily vague and abstract. The five main elements are:

Organizational Rationality: Because organizations are expected to produce results, their actions are expected to be reasonable or rational. The concepts of rationality brought to bear on organizations establish limits within which organizational action must take place. This involves acquiring the inputs which are taken for granted by the technology, and which are then converted to output units. Input activities are interdependent with environmental elements and therefore demand the logic of an open system. Since these components are interdependent, organizational rationality requires that they be appropriately geared to one another. Organizational rationality is some result of: (1) Constraints which the organization must face, and (2) Contingencies which the organization must face. Robert Merton interprets the rationality of human action as a process in which persons always use the objectively

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[6] A. K. Rice, The Enterprise and the Environment (London: Tavistock Publications, 1963), pp. 18-19.

[7] The definitions, where actually explained by Thompson, are quoted nearly verbatim. The interpretations that follow the author's descriptions are those from other sources including the researcher.

most adequate means for the attainment of their end.[8] Although Thompson

repeatedly uses the expression, "norms of rationality," he does not

specify its meaning. One may assume, consistent with Merton's state-

ment, a conventional definition of a rational standard of pattern or

process within a group. Such usage in the propositions relative to com-

plex organizations that follow is unnecessary because it is considered

that such instrumental groupings are striving to be rational.

Core Technology: Thompson does not offer a direct definition and admits

that it is an abstraction and an incomplete representation of what the

organization must do to accomplish desired results. From an earlier

writing in collaboration with Frederick L. Bates, Thompson describes

"technologies" as: " . . . those sets of man-machine activities which

together produce a desired good or service; in other words, a system

of techniques."[9] For more explicit insight, E. Wight Bakke writes:

"Core technology can be equated with activity processes--essential to

the acquisition, maintenance and utilization of the basic resources for

the performance of the organization's function."[10] Finally, Eric Trist

and his colleagues allude to this notion by their description of a

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[8]Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review, I, (December, 1936), 896.

[9]James D. Thompson and Frederick L. Bates, "Technology, Organi-zation," Administrative Science Quarterly, II (December, 1957), 325. The definition is slightly at odds with a description provided by John T. Zadrozny in Dictionary of Social Science (1st ed., 1959): "The body of knowledge and techniques which pertain to the production of goods."

[10]E. Wight Bakke, "Concept of the Social Organization," Modern Organization Theory, ed. by Mason Haire (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 37. This is a close alignment with Thompson's notion but Bakke's name does not appear in his bibliography.

socio-technical system. They suggest that any productive organization or part thereof is a combination of technology (task requirements, physical layout, equipment available) and a social system (a system of relationships among those who must perform the job).[11] For purposes of application in the case study, it is suggested that "core technology" is analogous to a "conversion process" represented by a complex array of man-machine systems, some of which are labor-intensive (e.g. the combat infantryman) and others are capital-intensive (e.g. an air defense system).

Input: Resources required to sustain or enlarge the core technology. David Easton provides a suitable link between input and core technology by describing the former raw material on which the system acts so as to produce something called "output." The way in which this is done is described as a massive "conversion process."[12] This research will focus on the human element as an input resource.

Output: No definition is provided. In the absence of Thompson's comment, a relational definition to the case study will be applied. Output is represented by a conversion process in a state of readiness that is capable of defending the United States or otherwise conducting operations as directed by the President. In wartime, the mode of readiness changes in large part to combat. Morris Janowitz regards the military as a "constabulary force" when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeking viable

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[11] Eric Trist, G. Higgin, and A. Pollock, Organizational Choice (London: Tavistock Publications, 1963), p. 6.

[12] Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 31.

international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a "protective military posture" doctrine.[13]

Buffer: No definition is provided although Thompson uses the word repeatedly and replete with accompanying examples taken from the business and industrial communities. Sociologist, Walter Buckley, describes "buffer" as a means of delaying the effects of a variable until some later point in a process.[14] This study will reflect a conventional definition that suggests a "cushioning" effect against shock or sharp impact. It appears analogous to Thompson's usage of the "smoothing-out" or "leveling" processes.

The above definitions have now been variously elaborated, modified, and reoriented to reflect properties of the case study. Five propositions from Thompson will now be presented with brief introductory comment on their anticipated relevance to the Army. At the conclusion of each propositional explanation, the conjecture will be restated as a "scenario" in terms of its probable application to the case study and reflecting the revised definitional constructs. Proposition numbers correspond with those stated in Thompson's Chapter Two of Organizations in Action.

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[13]Morris Janowitz, "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose," Foreign Affairs, L (April, 1972), 442. Much of the activity of peacetime military organizations is predicated on rather remote contingencies--remote both in terms of time and probability of occurrence. Although geared for making war, military organizations are manned and maintained over long periods of peace. Yet they must strive for a high state of readiness and a capacity to make a quick transition from peacetime activity to combat.

[14]Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 67.

2.1 UNDER NORMS OF RATIONALITY, ORGANIZATIONS SEEK TO SEAL OFF THEIR CORE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES.

The Armed Forces require a system which provides manpower adequate in numbers and in quality to meet the force levels authorized by civilian political authority. Conscription has been viewed by James Gerhardt as a significant means of relieving budgetary constraints for the organization of military manpower. It is also an aid in overcoming some other restraints on military effectiveness, i.e.: " . . . it helps strengthen those elements of reserve forces under direct federal control; more important, it provides a mechanism for rapid expansion of active forces in emergencies."[15] From 1940 through 1972, the Army has been empowered to treat manpower resources (inputs) as a "given" by virtue of draft legislation permitting a mandatory monthly quota system that automatically provided personnel through-put to match manpower needs in the so-called "core technology."[16] Relative to the events that are to follow, this condition is viewed as an "equilibrium state."

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[15]James F. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy, Issues in Military Manpower Procurement 1945-1970 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 36.

[16]Substitutes for the draft that would have accomplished nearly the same purpose have been proposed over the years. One is the more pervasive "Compulsory National Service" which has also been identified as "Universal Conscription." The other is "Universal Military Training." In addressing these two possibilities, the Gates Commission concluded that the first alternative would be prohibitively expensive because it would mean employing almost 6,000,000 young people continuously at a cost between $16 billion and $40 billion. In effect, it amounts to forced labor. Additionally, glaring inequities on desirable versus undesirable assignments would be prevalent. The second alternative generally suggests the same disadvantages and would impose more untrained personnel on the military than could be productively employed. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission), (New York: Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 169-171.

It is an ideal state from which to develop a sequence of adaptive
actions that are stimulated by change.

SCENARIO A: THE ARMY WAS ABLE TO ENSURE THE DYNAMIC CONTINUITY OF ITS
             CONVERSION PROCESS BY RESORT TO A COMPULSORY DRAFT.

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2.4 UNDER NORMS OF RATIONALITY, ORGANIZATIONS SEEK TO ANTICIPATE
     AND ADAPT TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES WHICH CANNOT BE BUFFERED OR
                            LEVELED.

> The military alone has no manpower shortage, even in time of peace.
> The time has come when the military must make 'the transition from
> primacy to competition among equals' in the allocation of the na-
> tion's manpower and other resources.[17]
>
>   Adam Yarmolinsky, 1971

The change to an all-volunteer force has a political base because it

was advanced as an Administration goal and because it is in the normal

peacetime tradition. It will be shown that, in anticipation of declin-

ing popular support for military conscription by the 1960s, the Army

began deliberate planning for establishing alternative means of main-

taining a high level of manpower resources primarily in terms of recruit-

ment stimulation. The conventional market approach for a particular

employer or industry has been to rely on wage policy as an adjustment

mechanism. This presupposes a relatively high elasticity of labor sup-

ply for the specific firm or industry. In retrospect, a comprehensive

voluntary recruitment plan must encompass the whole range of living and

working conditions which shape the image of military service. The

importance of such occupational values as intrinsic job interest and

status considerations are factors in career choice among youth. Some

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[17]Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts
on American Society (New York: Harper & Row for the Twentieth Century
Fund, 1971), p. 415.

conditions of military service are more amenable to management control,

including policies to assure more effective utilization of individual

skills and abilities, opportunities for upward mobility from enlisted to

officer ranks, improved housing and family living conditions at military

bases, and increased measures designed to enhance the status of both

enlisted and officer personnel in the Armed Services. The first phase

of organizational adaptation is identified as a "change planning" state.

SCENARIO B: BY ANTICIPATING WANING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE DRAFT, THE
ARMY ADOPTED A PLANNING STRATEGY FOR CHANGE THAT WOULD
ASSURE A CONTINUOUS VOLUNTARY INPUT TO ITS CONVERSION
PROCESS.

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2.2 UNDER NORMS OF RATIONALITY, ORGANIZATIONS SEEK TO BUFFER ENVIRON-
MENTAL INFLUENCES BY SURROUNDING THEIR TECHNICAL CORES WITH INPUT
AND OUTPUT COMPONENTS.

As a planning function, the previous proposition is a transient process

which is, of course, subject to modification at later stages. Proposi-

tion 2.2 is the initial implementation. The Army not only has been able

to obtain increased personnel compensation and to implement innovative

programs (e.g.s education and travel) as inducements but has also re-

vamped their recruiting organization by placing additional recruiting

offices near strategic geographical locations, by enlarged staffing of

each office, and by allocating greater resources to publicity and image-

building on military careers. Although attention for the moment to

output concerns is evaded here, this scenario is identified as "primary

adaptational phenomena."

SCENARIO C: THE ARMY HAS REALLOCATED AND IMPORTED RESOURCES, MODIFIED
ITS STRUCTURE AND ENGAGED IN A PROPAGANDISTIC CAMPAIGN FOR
ATTRACTING VOLUNTEERS IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN ITS CONVERSION
PROCESS.

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2.3 UNDER NORMS OF RATIONALITY, ORGANIZATIONS SEEK TO SMOOTH OUT INPUT AND OUTPUT TRANSACTIONS.

The shortfalls in numbers and quality of manpower inputs have prompted the search for alternatives that will assure the maintenance of a given number of manpower resources.[18] Reducing manpower requirements is an obvious alternative but not within the purview of this paper since the size of the core technology has been assumed as stable and the present level of 800,000 is the currently approved figure. Recruiting females, older age groups, former servicemen, and being less selective in mental and physical standards have been posed as possible options in order to maintain a continuing inflow. A more sophisticated alternative, and one that has actually been pursued in the military for many years, is an emphasis on retention, or socialization. By increasing retention, a relatively stable military force is achieved with the requirement of personnel inputs to merely match the egress of retirees. Career development including education, promotion, seniority step wage increases, greater responsibilities, professionalism, and large retirement benefits are socialization elements in support of a career service. Men with critical skills, such as doctors, are being provided added monetary incentives to join and remain in the Service. All of these elements

[18] Harold Wool's analysis of recent recruitment and retention experience provided no clear evidence that the supply of military manpower in the short term is in fact highly responsive to differential pay trends. The evidence indicated that concurrent changes in conditions of military service or other non-military supply factors have overshadowed the impact of changing military-civilian pay relationships upon recruitment and retention. As a result, any policy geared to meeting recruitment needs through increased pay alone would be uncertain in its effects. Harold Wool, The Military Specialist: Skilled Manpower For The Armed Forces (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 175.

serve as "buffers" to protect the core technology but these buffers
have not been completely successful. While still being primarily
attentive to input transactions, the scope is now enlarged to an out-
put aspect in terms of the egress of useful manpower resources from the
organization. Scenario D, therefore, is identified as "alternative
adaptational strategies."

SCENARIO D: THE ARMY SOUGHT TO BUFFER INPUT TRANSACTIONS THROUGH: (1)
LESS STRINGENT SELECTION CRITERIA THAT, IN EFFECT, ENLARGED
THE ELIGIBLE MANPOWER POOL, AND (2) BY SOCIALIZING FACTORS
AIMED AT RETAINING MORE MEMBERS IN THE CONVERSION PROCESS.

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2.5 WHEN BUFFERING, LEVELING AND FORECASTING DO NOT PROTECT THEIR
TECHNICAL CORES FROM ENVIRONMENTAL FLUCTUATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER NORMS OF RATIONALITY RESORT TO RATIONING.

The possible inability of the Army to obtain the numbers and skills
required suggests that the above proposition must be addressed. The
Army may need to resort to a system of priorities delineating the most
important elements of the core technology that must be manned versus
those elements which have lesser significance and can more afford short-
falls. The mix of active duty forces versus standby reserve forces
attains increasing attention at this stage. "Civilianization" of here-
tofore military roles including the contracting of commercial services
formerly performed by military units will receive greater attention.
Kurt Lang notes that contracts are in actual practice in many areas,
with contracted services ranging from food preparation to air transport
and scientific research. It is sometimes forgotten that every military
activity, including fighting, has been performed at one time or another
by personnel in a contract relationship. The relative advantage of

contracting for an activity, or even attracting competent personnel
by way of lateral recruitment, as against having it performed by pro-
fessional military men always has to be considered.[19] Added research
and development toward achieving a more capital-intensive core tech-
nology becomes increasingly important. The scope of our attention
is further broadened by the examination of core technology elements
themselves. This is identified as an "internal reassessment."

SCENARIO E: AS PRIOR STRATEGIES FALL SHORT OF MANPOWER PROCUREMENT
GOALS, THE ARMY WILL RESORT TO THE EXAMINATION OF ITS
CONVERSION PROCESS IN TERMS OF MANNING PRIORITIES, AL -
TERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURES, AND INNOVATIVE TECHNIQUES.

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Thompson does not offer an explicit proposition dealing with
regression--a reversion to an earlier postulate--and yet it is possible
that regression will occur in the case study. The next scenario sug-
gests such a proposition:

SCENARIO F: IF THE ARMY FAILS IN FULFILLING SUCCESSFULLY THE OBJEC-
TIVES DESCRIBED IN THE SCENARIOS, ITS MEMBERS MAY UNDER-
TAKE A STRATEGY THAT STRIVES FOR REVERSION TO A FORMER
CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH THE ORGANIZATION WILL AGAIN SEAL
OFF THE CONVERSION PROCESS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES.

If the organization cannot follow the "rules of the game," it may
try to negotiate a revised set of rules. It is significant to note
that the legislation on conscription remains in standby status.

By attempting a preliminary match of selected propositions
with realistic scenarios, it is suggested at this point that Thompson's

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[19]Kurt Lang, "Military Career Structure: Emerging Trends
and Alternatives," Administrative Science Quarterly, XVII (1972)
496.

conjectures are a reflection of an actual change process. Later chapters will attempt to document and substantiate this assertation by means of a case study analysis that uses the scenarios, not the propositions, as referents.

The immediate task is to describe the strategy of research. Hypotheses will be tested through the course of case study elaboration but these are descriptive hypotheses (with scenarios) which permit only an understanding of the system of relations constituting the phenomena under analysis in the case. They are directly valid only for the case under investigation--a model of a system of relations in action.

Research Design

There have been very few attempts at the experimental manipulation of organizational variables--particularly in large organizations--by social scientists, partly because of the practical difficulties of attaining sufficient power to introduce changes or of persuading organization leaders already planning a change program to carry it out with experimental control and measurements. A common alternative has been the addressal and application of an evolving case study in which a critical variable is easily identified.

This design has been described by Seymour Lipset and others as a "particularizing analysis" involving description and explanation of the single case to provide information concerning its past state and the dynamics through which it changes and proceeds as it does. General patterns of thought are examined in order to carry out the

analysis of the particular case. Previously known generalizations
are applied in order to make particular statements. A diligent re-
cording of events as they occur should fulfill the task of the par-
ticularizing analysis.[20]

In this study of the Army as it moves from conscription to
the all-volunteer force, certain processes, as well as structural and
environmental properties, are highlighted. Variations occurring within
the Army are described relative to different parts of the organization
and for a span of time since 1940 when modern conscription began. Key
societal influences will also be noted because systemic change is fre-
quently stimulated by external pressures. In essence, this is what an
experimentalist does when he varies the conditions under which a par-
ticular system exists, or when he observes the evolution of an object
over a period of time.

The product is essentially "heuristic" in terms of serving to
discover or reveal. The potential of a specific theory and inter-
connected schemata that may be fruitful for further research are empha-
sized.

The thesis presented is that the propositions by James Thompson
pertaining to organizational maneuvering in a changing environment pro-
vide broad and realistic inferences for strategies in adaptation although
his theories require refinement because of obtuse terminology. From his
book, Organizations in Action, the author poses certain conjectures that

[20]Seymour M. Lipset, Martin Trow, and James S. Coleman, Union
Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1956), pp. 393-412, passim.

he suggests require testing and elaboration. Selected propositions from
Thompson's conceptual framework on organizational rationality will be
applied in this research to a complex government organization--the United
States Army--undergoing a dramatic change process. The problem, therefore,
is to describe, test, evaluate, and apply some of Thompson's theories in
the context of a government agency in transition from conscription to an
all-volunteer force. More specifically: Is there a positive correlation
between his general propositions on organizational rationality and the
dynamic processes of a complex governmental organization coping with
uncertainty?

Utilizing standard techniques of a political scientist, the tools
of analysis consist of interviews with executives in the Department of
Defense and Department of the Army, supplemented by a review of tables of
organization, budget analysis, examining relevant administrative structures,
history, public opinion polls, manuals, hearings, statutes, and reports--
all with special reference to the context of the hypotheses.

It is hypothesized that:[21]

(1) The propositions on organizational rationality

offered by James Thompson are relevant to a large

complex government organization.

(2) His propositions, as will be restated in the

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[21]These are not legitimate hypotheses in the scientific sense of
the word because many of the variables under study, such as "buffer" and
"norms of rationality," are not precisely measurable; hence, they are not
testable. Kaplan's version of "working hypotheses" appears more appro-
priate in the context of this research because their purpose is limited
to guiding and organizing the investigation. This choice recognizes a
severe limitation in one's ability to operationalize the concepts pre-
sented here--a point that will be elaborated in the final chapter.
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler
Publishing Company, 1964), p. 88.

form of scenarios pertaining to the Army, will

tend to operate sequentially in terms of timing

and emphasis applied by that organization.

(3) That should these propositions not achieve antici-

pated results, a new one may be added: "If the or-

ganization fails in fulfilling successfully the

objectives described in the prior propositions, its

members may undertake a strategy that strives for

reversion to a former circumstance in which the

organization will again seal off the conversion

process from environmental influences."

It is assumed that:

(1) The conversion process (core technology) contains a
stable manpower level of about 800,000.[22]

(2) The problem of obtaining sufficient resources represents
the primary causal variable for organizational adaptation to change
toward an all-volunteer force.

It will be suggested that there is a correlative linkage between
proposition and scenario that corresponds to the following process model:

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[22]There is the growing possibility of force reductions on the
basis of recent political and popular moods but it would be extremely
difficult to forecast the size of manpower cuts. It seems probable
that there will be slow incremental adjustments downward. The premise
in suggesting a large military force in this decade is based on the
standard explanations including crises in the Middle East, the cold war,
an arms race alleged to be forced upon us by the Russians, and the need to
defend weaker nations of the free world. There has been very little
questioning, let alone opposition to, the maintenance of a large mili-
tary force during the past three decades until the impact of the Vietnam
involvement became apparent.

Fig. 1.--Process Model*

Thompson's Propositions	Matching Description (Hypothesis 1)	Researcher's Scenarios

2.1 — Equilibrium State (Draft) — A

Popular Support For Change

2.4 — Change Planning — B

2.2 — Primary Adaptational Phenomena (Recruitment Emphasis) — C

Partially Successful

2.3 — Alternative Adaptational Strategies (Buffering Through Socialization) — D

Partially Successful

2.5 — Internal Reassessment (Reexamination of the Conversion Process) — E

Unsuccessful?

Return to Scenario A — F

(HYPOTHESIS 2) ... (HYPOTHESIS 2)

(Hypothesis 3)

*The depiction of each element in this model is not intended to portray mutually exclusive, or autonomous, functions. In reality, many elements are at work simultaneously. Emphasis by the organization tends to shift sequentially as shown.

CASE STUDY: AN ARMY IN TRANSITION

Background

The first conjecture relative to this case study was introduced
in Chapter II with Thompson's Proposition 2.1 which broadly emphasized
organizational strategy to preserve or protect a state of equilibrium
by means of sealing off the organization from its external environment.
In terms of a three-step cycle (input→core technology→output) with
respect to the Army, initial attention was given to the exogenous cir-
cumstances that permitted the maintenance of a continuous flow of man-
power resources into the organization. It is readily apparent that
this objective was virtually guranteed as long as the nation supported
a compulsory draft system. There has perhaps been no other national
issue of such continuing, high visibility as Selective Service. It
was the law of the land almost continuously since 1940 and has figured
in every major war this country has fought since the Civil War. It has
been studied and restudied by military experts, Congressional commit-
tees, groups of private citizens, and Presidential Commissions.

As will be shown shortly, popular and political support are
thought to be the pervasive stimuli for the establishment and contin-
uance of this type of "seal" separating the Army from a competitive
labor market since 1940. In describing this phenomenon, the capsulized
version of Thompson's first proposition is repeated:

SCENARIO A: THE ARMY WAS ABLE TO ENSURE THE DYNAMIC CONTINUITY OF
ITS CONVERSION PROCESS BY RESORT TO A COMPULSORY DRAFT.

Throughout American history, both state and federal govern-
ments have compelled service to meet emergencies. Nevertheless, a
permanent and comprehensive peacetime draft, such as we have known
after World War II, is a recent departure from this precedent. There
is little to be gained beyond a very brief review of the historical
antecedents of modern domestic conscription. Although George Washington
asked for a draft law during the American Revolution, no such law was
passed.

It was earlier indicated that the first system of compulsory
service began in 1863, born of necessity, but far short of being com-
prehensive. The draft law under which men were called to the Union
Army was based largely on a quota system in that each state was re-
quired to furnish a certain number of men per month. If the number
could be obtained through volunteers, the state did not have to issue
a draft call. Because the draft was unpopular, states preferred to
offer bounties and bonuses for men who agreed to serve. In theory,
the South had universal conscription; because of a wide range of exemp-
tions, however, only 1.4 per cent were conscripts out of 1.2 million
who served in the Confederate Army.

The United States has traditionally relied upon voluntary
recruitment to provide manpower resources in time of peace, with the
professional cadre being augmented in time of war by militiamen, re-
serves, and conscripts. The notion of a large standing army was not
accepted in this country until the present century as a consequence of

our intensive and prolonged involvement in international crises including warfare. Military conscription has rarely been a popular procedure except in certain times of national fervor.[1] Most young men have not viewed the prospect of leaving home and being shot at with any great enthusiasm. Before World War I, America was considered a haven for those who wished to escape forced service in the armies of Europe where compulsory service was born and where it was a customary part of life. By use of the draft during World War I, however, the United States had accumulated over four million men under arms at the end of the war just prior to demobilization.

Not until after the passage of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was it deemed necessary for this country to undertake a peacetime draft and this was a departure from the rapid post-war demobilization that had previously occurred throughout our history. After World War II this law was allowed to expire in 1947 with the objective of returning to the long-standing policy of small, voluntary peacetime forces. But the respite was brief. By 1948, the combination of difficulties the Services were having in recruiting adequate personnel and the military requirements of the cold war led to a reinstatement of peacetime conscription.

The short and unsuccessful experience with volunteerism after

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[1]Conscription is meant to include all forms of forced service when the force derives from the power of the government which is raising the military services. The definition is taken from Vincent Davis, "Universal Service: An Alternative to the All-Volunteer Armed Services," in The Military and American Society, ed. by Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 221.

World War II provides an interesting and instructive precedent on the problems involved in attempting to attract large numbers of enlistees in peacetime. The experience included various changes in organization and discipline undertaken at the recommendation of the Doolittle Commission in order to improve morale and encourage enlistments. As soon as the collapse of the Japanese forces appeared imminent, the War Department began to develop a nationwide recruiting program. There were three distinct phases of the venture between 1945 and the resumption of Selective Service in 1948. The first phase demonstrated a great dependency on the Selective Service, and in reality, recruitment played a secondary role in Selective Service. The second period was characterized by the Army's attempt to replace Selective Service with an effective recruiting program. The terminal phase consisted of various reevaluations of, and changes in, the recruiting policies which ended in failure of the recruitment effort to attract sufficient numbers of men and women into the Army.[2] Even with a vigorous recruiting campaign and efforts to make the Army more democratic, volunteer enlistments were below manning goals and therefore the draft was resumed in 1948. It is evident that primary attention was given to measures affecting what we have earlier described as the input side of the conversion process model while massive personnel egress was

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[2] The phased approach in the 1940s appears supportive of the second and third hypotheses presented in that a sequence of actions was undertaken until it became necessary to revert to conscription in order to meet manpower needs. Some similarities with the current situation will be alluded to in later chapters. Interviews with Army spokesmen convey the impression that current circumstances are far different from those of the 1940s. They believe that the recent substantial raise in military compensation is a paramount difference.

taking place at the opposite end.[3]

The modern Military Selective Service Act of 1967,[4] was a comprehensive statute designed to provide an orderly, efficient, and a fair procedure for marshalling the available manpower of the country by a relatively autonomous organization; and to impose a common obligation on all physically fit young men. It was calculated to function in times of peril and was designed to provide men for the Armed Forces without delay. The courts normally did not attempt any interference with the organization of the Selective Service System. On frequent occasions, judges praised the patriotic efforts of the unpaid personnel of the System. It was held that Selective Service Regulations had the force and effect of law. It was also held by the courts that, when Congress substantially reenacted the provisions of the 1940 law, the administrative regulations interpreting and construing the act (which had long continued without substantial change) were considered to have Congressional endorsement. Thus local board officials were delegated

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[3]Rocco M. Paone attributes this failure of personnel retention to the following elements: (1) The G.I. Bill induced veterans in large numbers to leave the Service for education, (2) Inadequate military housing, (3) Assignment policies that caused instability, (4) Long working hours, (5) Slow promotions, (6) Unattractive uniforms, and (7) Insufficient pay. "The Last Volunteer Army," Military Review, XLIX (December, 1969), 9-17.

[4]The basic law has been amended several times since 1948 including three changes of Title. Prior titles were: 1948-1951--Selective Training and Service Act; 1951-1967--Universal Military Training and Service Act. Material contained in this paragraph has been taken from Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, Legal Aspects of Selective Service, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January, 1969), pp. 1-4.

significant discretionary power. About 4,000 local draft boards
administered the law and selectively called up men to fulfill their
quotas. Under the provisions of the Act of 1967, Congress had the
power to enlist the manpower of the nation by conscription both for
the prosecution of a war and for a peacetime army. It was a prevail-
ing view by many at the time that the power to wage war successfully
was not limited to combat action, but extended to every matter and
every activity related to war which affected its conduct and progress;
that the Congress was the judge as to whether a clear and present dan-
ger existed requiring the enactment of a selective service law.

The public has more or less accepted the need for a large stand-
ing force since the 1940s. Some of the reasons have already been ad-
dressed. The global competition with the Communists is only a partial
explanation for the larger peacetime forces; the other part of the
explanation is that, with the development of long-range weapons, the
United States is now vulnerable to the possibility of outside attack
in a way that never existed at any earlier time in our history. Con-
scription of whatever form has typically been used whenever no com-
bination of incentives and inducements was adequate to raise the
number and kinds of military services which the government felt were
needed.[5]

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[5]In a survey of ninety-one countries, more than two-thirds
were found to have some kind of compulsory military service. Some
of these systems were universal, while others, like our own selective
service system, were selective in that only some of those eligible
were required to perform actual service. Terrence Cullinan, "National
Service Programs Abroad," Current History, LV (August, 1968), 97.

For over thirty years, the Army manpower procurement has been
a mixed system: partially volunteer, but with a significant proportion
of draftees. It should be noted that many of the volunteers have been
draft-motivated, and enlisted only under the imminent threat of being
drafted.

Public Mood

While there was endorsement for a large standing force by the
majority of Americans as a legitimate end, the means to achieve that
end became increasingly controversial. Unease over the impact of
selective conscription on equity and social goals, and spreading mis-
trust of presidential direction on military operations, made abandon-
ment of conscription and imposition of Congressional control over its
resumption a tempting alternative to the manpower policy of prior years.
The conscription system was subjected to increasingly heavy criticism
in the late 1960s not just from youthful opponents of the Vietnam war,
but from other sectors of American society. Most of these critics
focused on the unfairness of the system, with unfairness being measured
and answered on several sets of criteria. In consequence, Congress was
faced with a dilemma: How to respond to an apparent strong national
sentiment for major revision of the draft--or even its outright aboli-
tion--without compromising the fundamental security needs of the United
States.

For a sampling of public sentiment, seven Gallup and Harris polls
between 1965 and 1972 will be presented. A graphic display of changing
attitudes in this time frame would provide the reader with an optimal

profile for research but there is a constraint in evaluation and comparisons by the problem of differing questions presented by the pollsters.[6] While the inferences from these polls may be reasonably clear, the individual questions must be repeated for the reader.

Respondents were asked by Gallup in September 1965, for example: "Would you favor or oppose requiring all physically fit young men, who cannot pass an educational test, to serve at least one year performing some other form of military service?" The response was 83 per cent favorable and 12 per cent in opposition.[7] This finding is somewhat peripheral to immediate interest because it focuses on one mental set and what is assumed by some as an inequity in the rules of the Selective Service System. Nevertheless, it represents a vast preponderance supporting compulsory induction for this particular group.

Nine months later in June 1966, Gallup posed the following question: "Do you think the present draft system is fair or not?" The response was the least favorable ever recorded by Gallup during a war period. Those respondents believing the system fair represented 43 per cent while 38 per cent regarded it as not fair. Gallup pointed out that the same question in 1953 provided a 60-11 ratio with the

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[6]Significantly, there was no debate or opposition to the extension of the Universal Military Service and Training Act in 1955, 1959, and 1963 according to The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 162.

[7]The Gallup Political Index, Report Number 4, (September, 1965), 13. The remaining, or balance, percentage has been omitted in this and subsequent references to specific polls because they are all represented by either no opinion or uncertainty. For example, the gross findings above (a national sampling without regard to classification such as sex or race) are listed as: "83% favor, 12% oppose, 5% no opinion."

remaining (and rather large) 29 per cent registering no opinion. A
broader inference is gained from the question that was next presented
in the 1966 poll, i.e.: "Would you favor all young men to give two
years of service—either in the military forces, or in non-military
work here or abroad such as the Peace Corps?" The proportion was
72 per cent in favor and 21 per cent opposed. Gallup then asked:
Suppose all young men were required to give two years' service, would
you rather have a son of yours serve in the Armed Forces, or in non-
military work?" Forty-seven per cent favored military service while
28 per cent preferred non-military functions. The following question
on the subject, derived from the previous year (1965), was added to
the report: "Should every able-bodied American boy 18 years old be
required to go into the Armed Forces for one year or not?" Those
favoring compulsory service represented 65 per cent of the sampling
and 31 per cent were opposed.[8] If one is persuaded that all of these
samplings are representative of American attitudes, it is apparent
that the majority of the American public supported compulsory service
of some kind in the mid-1960s.

Similar questions were not again presented by Gallup until
1969. It is again emphasized that only inferences, not direct com-
parisons, can be drawn because the questions about to be described
differ in content with those offered in 1966. Contrary to what has
been implied in the preliminary remarks of this section, the first
two questions pose some surprising responses. Gallup offered in

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[8]The Gallup Political Index, Report Number 13, (June, 1966),
11-13.

January 1969 the most basic and germane question for our research,

i.e.: "After the Vietnam war is over, do you think the United States

should do away with the draft and depend upon a professional military

force made up of volunteers or do you think the draft should be con-

tinued?" The draft was favored by a ratio of 2 to 1 with 62 per cent

and 31 per cent respectively. To the question of whether or not all

men should give 1 year of service (not necessarily military) to their

country, 79 per cent were tabulated in favor and 16 per cent were

against.[9]

Louis Harris provides in September 1970 the first appreciable

drop in popular support of conscription with the question: "Do you

support the idea of an all-volunteer Army, or would you rather see the

present combination of a draft and volunteers continue?" Since the

response categories are different from those presented by Gallup, they

are shown as follows:

<u>Women Respondents</u>

43 per cent for volunteers, 47 per cent for combination, 2 per cent
for some other combination

<u>Men Respondents</u>

50 per cent for volunteers, 45 per cent for combination, 2 per cent
for some other combination[10]

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[9]The Gallup Opinion Index: Political, Social and Economic Trends,
Report Number 44, (February, 1969), p. 4. An interesting query regarding
women was also presented. Q. "Would you favor 1 year of service for
women to give service to the nation--in nursing or some other public
help?" A. 44 per cent favored and 49 per cent objected.

[10]The Harris Survey: Yearbook of Public Opinion 1970: A compen-
dium of Current American Attitudes, (New York: Louis Harris and Associates,
1971), p. 88. The quote is not identical with that listed in the text
and is altered in format only to facilitate explanation and save space.
The figures, identifiers, and categories are identical however.

The most recent poll on the subject (again with only peripheral relevance) was published in early 1972 by Gallup with the question: "Would you favor or oppose requiring all young men to give one year of service to the nation--either in military forces, or in non-military work here or abroad, such as VISTA or the Peace Corps?" The proportion was 68 per cent in favor and 25 per cent opposed. This is a very slight change from a response in 1970 to the same question which yielded 71 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.[11]

In summarizing the only opinion data that has been readily accessible on the subject, the results of the polls are not particularly impressive. They are neither narrow enough in language content for purposes of this research nor are they reflective of a strong and growing popular mandate for ending the draft. Perhaps Americans had become so accustomed to conscription over the years that they were either not inclined to think in terms of something different, or they were distrustful of the possible ramifications ensuing from any alternative of maintaining a large military force.[12] Official statements and actions by

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[11] The Gallup Opinion Index: Political, Social and Economic Trends, Report Numbers 81 and 62, (March, 1972 and August, 1970), pp. 22 and 27 respectively.

[12] There were, and still remain, many sources of opposition to an all-volunteer force. For excellent writings on the pros and cons of volunteerism, see: George H. Walter, Let's End The Draft Mess, (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1967); John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); James C. Miller, III, ed. Why The Draft? (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1968); Gerald Leinwand, ed. The Draft, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1970); Thomas Reeves and Karl Hess, The End of the Draft, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1970); Harry A Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer Army, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1971).

political leaders that are described in the next section may have
served as catalysts for swaying public opinion.

There is the inclination to believe that circumstances in the
late 1960s and early 1970s brought about a change in general attitude.
The change in public mood regarding the draft became most pronounced
during the latter stages of American involvement in Vietnam. One must
be wary in analyzing the severe criticism of our Selective Service
System, per se, because it was difficult to sort out opposition to the
Vietnam war from opposition to the draft itself. As Morris Janowitz
concludes:

> Paradoxically, the prolongation of hostilities in Vietnam
> served only to speed the end of conscription. . . Terminating
> conscription was one issue on which antiwar Congressmen and
> pressure groups could unite with the Nixon Administration.[13]

Assuming that such a trend was actually realized and is a con-
vincing phenomenon, then how was this mood translated into political
action toward ending the draft?

Policy Development--A Mandate For Change

Actions to end conscription, in fact, preceded any perceptible
large-scale public sentiment for an all-volunteer force by several
years. In 1964 for example, two events occurred that helped generate
interest in ending compulsory military service. The first was Senator
Barry Goldwater who as the Republican presidential nominee, advocated
the abolishment of conscription. The second was a Pentagon study on

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[13]Janowitz, "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose,"
Foreign Affairs, L (April, 1972), 427.

military manpower procurement alternatives.

A number of independent studies also preceded any substantive policy formulations. In 1967, two non-military commissions examined the subject. The first was the Clark panel appointed by the House Armed Services Committee; the second was the Marshall Commission appointed by President Johnson. The more recent President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force was convened by President Nixon in 1969. Subsequently in 1971, Congressional hearings were initiated in the respective armed services committees.

The prospects of changing to an all-volunteer force were seen as appealing to the major political parties as well. Language pertaining to the possibility of replacing the draft was inserted in the Republican platform during Goldwater's campaign in 1964. The words were strengthened in the Republican platform of 1968 with: "When military manpower needs can be appreciably reduced, we will place the Selective Service System on standby and substitute a voluntary force through adequate pay and career incentives."[14] In a paid political broadcast on radio and television October 1968, Richard Nixon came out forcefully in favor of an all-volunteer force.[15] With the election of

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[14]Quoted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 92d Congress, 1st Session 1971, XXVll, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1971), p. 257. The presidential platform of the Democratic Party first included the phrase about the all-volunteer concept in 1968.

[15]Richard M. Nixon, "The All-Volunteer Armed Force," An address given over the CBS Network, October 17, 1968. Three sentences of that speech are particularly appropriate to our study, i.e.:

"The military services are the employers today who don't have to compete in the job market. Supplied by the draft with the manpower they want when they want it, they've been able to ignore the laws of supply and demand. But I say there's no reason why our military should be exempt from peacetime competition for manpower, any more than our local police and fire departments are exempt."

the Republican presidential candidate later in 1968, this plank of the

platform was seen by many as a mandate for the end of conscription.

Two months after Mr. Nixon was inaugurated, he appointed a 15-man

presidential commission, headed by former Defense Secretary, Thomas

S. Gates, to work out plans for conversion of the Armed Forces into an

all-volunteer force. The "Gates Commission" was charged by President

Nixon with examining the volunteer military concept (but no other al-

ternatives), determining if it was economically feasible and, if so,

recommending the techniques for implementing it. The Commission re-

ported its recommendations to the President in February 1970.

Resort to an all-volunteer force became increasingly attractive

following the persuasive recommendations of the Gates Commission based

on its conclusion that total volunteerism was both desirable and feasible.

Among the main points held by the Commission were:

> We unanimously believe that the nation's interest will be better
> served by an all-volunteer force. . . We have satisfied ourselves
> that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and
> we believe it will have a beneficial effect . . .[16]

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[16]*The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force,* p. iii. The specific recommendations toward achieving an
all-volunteer force were:

"1. Raise the average level of basic pay for military personnel in
the first two years of service from $180 a month to $315 a month, the
increase to become effective on July 1, 1970. This involves an in-
crease in total compensation (including the value of food, lodging,
clothing, and fringe benefits) from $301 a month to $437 a month. The
basic pay of officers in the first two years should be raised from an
average level of $428 a month to $578 a month, and their total compen-
sation from $717 a month to $869 a month.

2. Make comprehensive improvements in conditions of military ser-
vice and in recruiting as set forth elsewhere in the report.

3. Establish a standby draft system by June 30, 1971, to be activated
by joint resolution of Congress upon request of the President." (p. 10)

Concurrently, Senator Mark Hatfield introduced legislation which, if
passed, would have put into effect the principal recommendations made
by the Commission. The recommendations were in contrast to the nega-
tive conclusions on feasibility by the earlier Marshall Commission
and Clark panel.[17]

While accepting the Commission's recommendations in principle,
the Administration adopted a different timetable for reasons that will
be described below. The Commission had suggested an end to induction
authority by June 30, 1971, but the President sought a two-year exten-
sion to July 1, 1973. The President's request for delay at that time
was a hotly divisive issue in Congress.[18]

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[17]The Clark panel concluded that such an Army would entail:
(1) Uncertainty and inflexibility in the system, (2) Exorbitant
expense, (3) Reprehensible judgment in placing monetary value on the
lives of citizens, (4) The creation of national defense based on
essentially mercenaries, and (5) Abandonment of faith in citizens to
rally to the nation's defense when national security is threatened.
Cited by Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer Army, pp. 29-30.

[18]President Nixon cautioned that the draft could not be ended
prematurely. In his January 1971 message to Congress he stated:

"While I am confident that our plan will achieve its objective of
reducing draft calls to zero, even the most optimistic observers
agree that we would not be able to end the draft in the next year
or so without seriously weakening our military forces or impair-
ing our ability to forestall threats to the peace. . . I propose
that this Congress extend induction authority for two years . . .
We shall make every endeavor to reduce draft calls to zero by
that time, carefully and continually reexamining our position as
we proceed toward that goal."

Quoted in Report to the President: Progress in Ending the Draft
and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, Melvin R. Laird, Secretary
of Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972),
pp. 6-7.

At the strong urging of the Administration, Congress finally agreed to a two-year delay and then approved substantial pay increases for first-term military personnel along with additional bonuses and incentives. These funds were designed to expand recruiting efforts with an overall objective of ending draft calls by June 1973 so that the all-volunteer force concept might then be implemented.

Events in the interim encouraged the Administration to revise the June deadline. When the attempts were made in 1970 to phase out conscription in favor of an all-volunteer armed force, draft inductions averaged over 16,000 per month.[19] Military manpower needs were high and future needs were uncertain. These elements constituted serious impediments to orderly planning in the initial stages, but developments evolving between 1970 and 1973 stimulated the Administration to end the draft earlier than scheduled. The diminishing involvement in Vietnam resulted in reducing military manpower needs, and an intensified recruitment campaign that seemed to attract greater interest in the Services among potential recruits in the general population accelerated the timetable.

These influences are reviewed here from the historical perspective of events from 1960 with focus on the transition years 1970-1973. Draft calls, force levels, and voluntary enlistments are presented graphically as an indication of significant changes that were taking

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[19]Monthly inductions peaked at 30,000 per month during the 1965-1966 period of escalation in the Vietnam war. About 25 per cent of the 6 million who served in the American Armed Forces during the Vietnam war were draftees. Report of the President's Commission, p. 163.

place. The decline in draft inductions shown in Figure 2, particularly during the past 5 years, was closely related to reductions in active

Fig. 2.--Draft Inductions, All Services, Fiscal Years 1960-73

Males (hundreds of thousands)

Sources: 1960-70, Dept. of Defense (Comptroller), Director-
ate for Information Operations, "Selected Manpower
Statistics," (April 15, 1972), pp. 50-52. 1971-73,
Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs,
(February, 1973)

manpower over this period. Both Figures 2 and 3 are reflective of this correlation. From a peak active total force level of 3.55 million in 1968 (at the height of the Vietnam war) military strength declined to about 2.3 million by June 1972 and currently 2.2 million as shown in Figure 3 on the following page. The improving circumstances occasioned by the declining need for such a large standing force greatly enhanced the prospects of achieving an all-volunteer force. The force level in 1973 is the lowest it has been since 1950 and represents a precipitous

40 per cent drop between 1968 and 1973.[20]

Fig. 3.--Active Manpower, All Services, Fiscal Years 1960-73

Military Manpower (millions)

Sources: 1960-71, Dept. of Defense, "Selected Manpower Statis-
tics," p. 21; 1972-73, The Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1974, p. 21.

With a lower active force level, the need for new recruits also

declined to pre-Vietnam levels. The key consideration for the volunteer

concept in the transition period was whether, in the absence of conscrip-

tion, sufficient "true" volunteers with appropriate qualifications

would step forward. The true volunteer is defined within the context

of a man who freely chooses to enter the military forces in the absence

of a draft threat.[21] The growth in true volunteers as a fraction of

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[20] Edward R. Fried, et al, Setting National Priorities: The 1974
Budget, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 296-298.

[21] Estimates of true volunteers are based on lottery data during
the calender years 1970 through 1972 for those eligibles who had not yet
received lottery numbers in a study conducted for the Senate. U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, All-Volunteer Armed Forces:
Progress Problems and Prospects, Report by Martin Binkin and John D.
Johnston, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 8.

total enlistments is shown in Figure 4. The important result is the

Fig. 4.--Total Male and True
Volunteers, All Services, Fiscal Years 1971-74

Males (thousands)

Source: All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft,
Special Report of Secretary of Defense Elliot
L. Richardson, March 1973), p. 3.

attainment of an estimated level of true volunteers in Fiscal 1973

that approximates the total male enlistment needs projected for Fiscal

1974 (354,000). With particular reference to the Army, the data indi-

cated some anticipated shortfalls. In 1972, for example, the Army

received 110,000 true volunteers representing only 73 per cent of their

total enlistments. Their projected needs for the year beginning July

1973 were 162,000.[22]

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[22] The All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft, Special
Report of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson, (March 1973),
pp. 5-8.

Scenario A became inoperative on January 27, 1973 when the former Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird stated:

> With the signing of the peace agreement in Paris . . . the armed forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, airmen and marines. The use of the draft is ended.[23]

Thus the concern is with the specific measures undertaken by the Army in its effort to adapt to an exogenous mandate. The conditions are now established for the introduction of Scenario B, and the next chapter begins with the recognition that Army planning for this contingency began several years before Laird's announcement.

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[23]Reported by David E. Rosenbaum, "Nation Ends Draft, Turns to Volunteers," in New York Times, January 28, 1973, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV

A STRATEGY FOR ADAPTATION--CHANGE PLANNING

A Theoretical Framework

The fact that the Secretary of Defense could make his historic announcement ending the draft to sustain a large standing military force, particularly ahead of schedule, suggests not only the effects of some changing external conditions which have just been presented, but also implies a deliberate and concerted planning process within the Army that began well in advance of the decision. This observation will be explored and tested in light of the following:

SCENARIO B: BY ANTICIPATING WANING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE DRAFT, THE ARMY ADOPTED A PLANNING STRATEGY FOR CHANGE THAT WOULD ASSURE A CONTINUOUS VOLUNTARY INPUT TO ITS CONVERSION PROCESS.

The time frame of this analysis is between early 1969 and January, 1973.

One is reminded by James Thompson and William McEwen that: "Most complex organizations must adopt strategies for coming to terms with their environment."[1] Strategy is a matter of selecting a strategic objective where the organization wishes or intends to be at a future time as differentiated from "tactics" which involves the selection of an immediate action from the organization's available repertoire. The

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[1] James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review, XXIII, (February, 1958), p. 25.

"future state" that comes to mind is total reliance on volunteer service--a condition known within the Department of Defense as a "zero draft" state.

This study of the Army confirms the conclusion of E. Kirby Warren that emphasis in planning by organizations today has moved from simply change adaptation to actively anticipating and planning for change.[2] Obviously with respect to the Army, its environment has determined within broad limits what its strategy must be, but it is in the area of resource availability that more narrowly limits the choices of what strategy will evolve.

To achieve a fully voluntary manpower input to the conversion process, it is necessary to devote major attention to the scheme of inducements. Chester Barnard provided in 1948 an outline of inducement characteristics which, in reality, were to become focal elements for Army planners. The contents of Barnard's framework for "exchange" in the inducement process consisted of, first, the need for material inducements. As will be shown later, this factor seemed to command most of the Army's attention initially. A second element by Barnard pertained to the importance of desirable physical conditions and associational attractiveness--a phenomenon later characterized by Frederick Herzberg as part of the hygienic component of his "Two-Factor Theory" in The Motivation to Work. Correlating with subsequent Army statements on the need for improvement in professionalism and conditions of

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[2]Warren, "Where Long-Range Planning Goes Wrong," Systems, Organizations, Analysis, Management: A Book of Readings, eds. David I. Cleland and William R. King, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 93.

service, Barnard suggested the possible benefits stemming from en-
larged participation, ideal benefactions (e.g. promotions) and non-
material opportunities such as measures encouraging distinction and
prestige.[3]

Robert Katz offers some important considerations in planning
strategy that will apply in this case. He believes that two funda-
mental prerequisites to change planning are environmental and resources
analyses. To these requirements, Katz deems it necessary to add a
definition of the scope of action as well as the scheme for resource
procurement and deployment.[4] Since the reader is now familiar with
environmental circumstances up to the point of decision for an all-
volunteer Army, it is first noted in retrospect, the official estab-
lishment of a special strategic planning unit within the Army for plans
leading to, and facilitating, the implementation of this decision. Fre-
quently when a new program is to be developed, a new organizational
unit is created and charged with the task first of elaborating the new
program and then carrying it on when it has been elaborated. This
procedure, according to March and Simon, usually provides: ". . . for
a spurt of innovative program-developing activity--a spurt that auto-
matically diminishes as the program is elaborated, and the task shifts

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[3]Chester I. Barnard, Organization and Management: Selected
Papers, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 121-122.

[4]Robert L. Katz, Cases and Concepts in Corporate Strategy
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 347-
357, passim. The concepts of strategic planning presented by the
author are based on the practices of business enterprise but the
notion appears realistic for application to the case study. Having
identified the above elements, Katz then points out that there is apt
to be the requirement for frequent change in strategic plans and
therefore the process requires regular recycling.

from one of planning to one of execution."[5]

Charting a Course of Action[6]

The Gates Commission findings provided the impetus for central
planning within the Department of Defense and many of the subsequent
actions taken were based on its recommendations. Mr. Laird established
within his own offices the Project Volunteer Committee in early 1969
which was to provide a working dialogue with the Commission and serve
as the link point for its data. The Committee consisted of key man-
power officials of the Defense Department. There was a consensus in
the conclusions of the two groups regarding the feasibility of the
all-volunteer force and the principal steps needed to end reliance on
the draft. Both recommended substantial pay increases for junior en-
listed personnel, selective pay incentives for specialists, additional
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship support, and a
greatly expanded recruiting program. The Project Volunteer Committee
singularly pressed for a two-year extension of conscription in order
to allow sufficient time to phase-out the draft reliance and test the

[5]James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 187.

[6]The material that follows was largely supplied by Stephen
Herbits, Special Assistant for All-Volunteer Force Actions to the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense For Manpower and Reserve Affairs (Washington,
D.C.) in terms of interviews and access to his files which took place
October-December 1973. Mr. Herbits was also a member of the Gates
Commission. Data presented in this paper without specific citations
were obtained during these meetings and are a reflection of a variety
of sources such as conversations, undated fact sheets and talking
papers, diagrams, and accounting data. The use of "fiscal year" through-
out this research pertains to 12 months beginning July 1. For example,
Fiscal 1973 begins July 1, 1972 and ends June 30, 1973.

effectiveness of a variety of experimental programs including the impact
of a large pay raise. This body continues today as the departmental
steering group responsible for directing the overall plans for the
all-volunteer force and for monitoring the effectiveness of action
programs.[7]

In their early discussions with Mr. Laird, the Army leader-
ship (Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff) was convinced that an
all-out effort must begin at once. Only 30 months remained before the
completion date the Secretary of Defense had set. The Army concept
was: to develop a new program; experiment with, an evaluate, new
initiatives; the removal of no-cost irritants in the Army; and com-
pletely carry out a program which would reverse the habits of 30 years
and raise the level of true volunteerism in the Army from the existing
21 per cent up to 100 per cent. Since the leadership wished to pursue
these objectives in a balanced and interdependent manner, a focal plan-
ning unit was deemed necessary.

The position of Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer
Army (SAMVA) and small staff was established in Washington, D.C. within
the Office of the Chief of Staff in October 1970 for planning and

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[7]Prior to actions recommended or taken by any of the military
services, the Committee arranged for a series of studies, e.g.s: two
youth surveys, the collection of augmented census data, enlistment and
reenlistment behavioral data, advertising analysis, and ten studies to
be conducted by the Services themselves. The complete cost estimates
of this transitional strategy for the Department were about $1.9 billion
in Fiscal 1972 and about $2.7 billion for fiscal 1973. Most of this
information with respect to the Committee is taken from U.S., Department
of Defense, Report to the President: Progress in Ending the Draft and
Achieving an All-Volunteer Force, Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 5-7.

executing a strategy that would lead to the termination of conscription.

The mission of SAMVA, in broad terms, was to develop and manage the Modern Volunteer Army Program. The principal goals were:

(1) Establish conditions which contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the Army as a fighting force while concurrently reducing as rapidly as possible prime reliance on the draft as a means for producing forces for the active Army and its reserve components.

(2) Raise to the maximum extent possible the number and quality of enlistments and reenlistments in both the active Army and the reserve components.

(3) Assist in increasing service attractiveness and career motivation for both officer and enlisted personnel.

(4) Make provisions for a standby draft law to meet national emergencies.[8]

The Special Assistant, Lieutenant General Forsythe, was granted substantial powers and authority. He was authorized direct access to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff for purposes of planning as well as the reporting of progress toward reducing to "zero" the Army's reliance on Selective Service inductions. Heads of major Army Staff Agencies were directed to assign senior points of contact through which General Forsythe could coordinate, issue policy guidance, and direct action in accordance with his delegated functions. The Army had

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[8]U.S. Army, Office of the General Staff, "Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army," Washington, D.C., October 31, 1970, pp. 1-5. (Memorandum.) The following milestones were indicated prior to the establishment of SAMVA: (1) March 1969--A Study entitled, "Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (Provide)" was initiated within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2) October 12, 1970--Secretary Laird established the goal of "zero draft" by July 1, 1973, and (3) October 13, 1970--Chief of Staff, Army, established a list of priorities for Volunteer Army actions.

long been accustomed to designating special units to tackle innovative
projects. The Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, indicated
that Forsythe would have authority similar to that of Project Managers
of major weapon systems that were being developed. In addition to con-
ventional review and monitoring functions, SAMVA was required (as out-
lined by the Chief of Staff) to establish the objectives, specify
priorities for action, and guide and coordinate activities of the
Army hierarchy to assure an integrated effort. General Forsythe was
also given the power to task the Army Staff and Field Commands for the
preparation, coordination, and execution of volunteer Army-related pro-
grams, directives, and actions.

The unit began its activities with thirty-five officers and
men. Initial efforts consisted of:

a. Development of a Master Plan

b. "Think-tank" Research

c. Conduct of Attitude Surveys

d. Experimentation and Evaluation

e. Advertising Guidance

f. Briefings

Subsequent activities within the Army leading up to the zero draft
were largely formulated and initiated within the office of SAMVA.

The Army began with a three-pronged approach to encourage
enlistments: (1) Strengthen professionalism by building positive in-
centives to service, (2) Improve Army life by reducing the negative
aspects--the sources of dissatisfaction--of the military service, and

(3) Modernizing the recruiting system and approach.[9]

A change in the program of an organization--whether by adding
new activities or altering existing ones--involves not just a choice
process in the traditional sense, but requires a process of initiation
through which new program possibilities are generated and their con-
sequences examined. Field testing is a common course of action by
many "change agents" from the social sciences for purposes of evalu-
ating (at limited investment) before such measures are adopted on a
broader scale.

Experiments on improvements in the conditions of service were
begun in early 1970 at Fort Carson, Colorado and Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii. These were initial attempts to ascertain the impact of var-
ious merit and reward systems during the basic and advanced individual
training. As preliminary results were encouraging, three more bases
were added for innovation and evaluation.[10] Various funded actions
were tested in order to ascertain which would have the greatest pay-
off in attracting new enlistments, raising reenlistments, and improving
the retention of high quality officers. Concurrently, attitude surveys,

[9]These seem to correlate with earlier points in this study rela-
tive to both recruiting and socialization as necessary for sustaining
the conversion process (Scenarios C and D) but an inference is assumed
here of "image-building" designed to portray to potential enlistees
that the Army is an attractive profession. General William Westmoreland,
the Chief of Staff, announced a similar formula for success: (1)
Enhanced professionalism, (2) Better life, (3) Improved public esteem.
The significance of these factors is closely allied with Barnard's
notion of inducements described earlier in this chapter.

[10]Test programs were broadened to include: (1) Improving pri-
vacy in barracks, (2) Providing options for combat volunteers as to
unit and location, (3) Reducing number of soldiers performing non-
military tasks, (4) Expanding the advertising programs, and (5)
Expanding ROTC and medical scholarship programs.

reenlistment statistics, special command reports, and measures of unit effectiveness were adopted for purposes of analyzing the favorable and unfavorable impact of changes. By analysis of the results, a framework was to be conceptualized for the application of successful policies, Army-wide, at a later date.[11] All command levels were expected to publicize throughout the Army (as well as to the local and regional media) these policies and tests for making military life more attractive to potential enlistees.[12] It was recognized that overall enlistments must be increased by 250 per cent and 700-800 per cent in combat arms.

Early attention by the Army was directed to a recruiting campaign in terms of structural change, advertising, and the advocacy and adoption of various incentive programs requiring approval by Congress. In the analysis of recruiting practices, the Gates Commission noted that the number of recruiters for all Services varied between 6903 and 7371 during the 1960s with expenditures for recruiting amounting to an

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[11] A study of the British volunteer system in the military was also conducted. The British reported that morale and efficiency had greatly improved since the days of their draft and they concluded that two volunteers could do the equivalent work of three conscripts. Interestingly, the ratio of military to civilian in their Services had changed from 3 to 1 (the same as ours) shortly after World War II to 55-45 today. There will be more information on "civilianization" presented in Chapter V.

[12] The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff scheduled frequent trips for discussions with troops on this subject. It is symptomatic of the high degree of importance attached to this strategy by all levels including those at the top. Time-phased reenlistment goals had also been established: (1) Doubling the volunteer rate by July, 1971, (2) Tripling the rate by July 1, 1972, and (3) "Consider" quadrupling the rate by July, 1973.

average of about one-half of one per cent of the active duty manpower budget.[13] The Army first proposed an increase in recruiters by 536 and the establishment of 105 new recruiting stations. In a speech before the Association of the U.S. Army on October 12, 1971, General Westmoreland stated:

> We are more than doubling the number of recruiters in the Army Recruiting Command. Recruiting stations have been increased by 37 per cent. Recruiters are being given cost of living allowances and government-rented houses.

By the end of 1971, the Army recruiting organization consisted of 5 districts and 39 regional stations.

Application of Monetary Resources

A central feature (and the most controversial element with Congress) in the Army's change planning was the quest for resources.[14] Experimentation, advertising, and incentives all required either the reallocation of resources or the assignment of additional resources. In a letter to the military services dated December 2, 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard stated:

> In putting together zero draft proposals we must put dollars where the problems are. The available funds must be used to achieve our zero draft objectives and, in particular, to ensure that we have adequate manpower.

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[13] The Report of the President's Commission, p. 83. In December 1970, the Army was taking in 27,000 new men a month with only 50 per cent as volunteers. By 1973, the number of recruiters for all Services had increased to 22,000.

[14] The Gates Commission estimated that its proposal for adopting the all-volunteer force in fiscal 1971 would amount to approximately $2.7 billion. (p. 8). In 1968, 41 per cent of the Defense budget was spent for manpower as compared to 56 per cent in 1973.

In response, the Army proposed major actions requiring money to be started immediately. These included: (1) Prime-time advertising on radio and television, (2) Expanded recruiting force as well as supporting facilities, (3) Award of special bonuses for combat skills to reduce service irritants. James Gerhardt reminds the researcher that decisions related to manpower procurement have important implications. A decision to raise spending on manpower by a given amount represents in part a decision not to spend that amount on other elements of military strength and needs—weapons, training, facilities, supplies and the like. It also represents a decision not to spend those funds on other governmental activities, or not to release them through lower taxes.[15]

The Army initially estimated a need for $131 million in Fiscal Year 1971 and $718 million in Fiscal 1972 to prepare for the zero draft in 1973 but this was later scaled down to $71 million and $523 million respectively. Supporting the need for those funds were a total of 50 studies (6 under civilian contract) that were undertaken or supervised by SAMVA. The inclusion of behavioral science activity is of academic interest. SAMVA created a study group in late 1971 to analyze the use of behavioral science expertise and knowledge within the Army staff. The study group visited numerous industrial firms in the nation such as American Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors, Dupont, Sears, as well as the Harvard Business School. In almost every

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[15]James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement 1945-1970, p. xvi.

case, industrial organizations had recently made major reorganizations in order to better deal with human resources problems. These adjustments included the establishment of an office charged with Organizational Development and increased stature for behavioral sciences research. There was frequent evidence of applying new motivational techniques such as job enrichment and team building, as well as using sophisticated measures for diagnosing and improving major staff and line corporate units.[16] Several branches of the military services have also recently undertaken projects in the application of these techniques but a current assessment of their efforts appears premature.

Sensing the urgency of its situation, the Army reprogrammed its own funds to begin field tests, enlistment bonuses, and recruiting facilities. Initial funds provided to SAMVA were for: $12.1 million to the Recruiting Command for immediate expansion of recruiting and advertising; $6.9 million was allocated for exploiting new ideas; $5.6 million was assigned to the civilianization of food service activities (KP) activities in Europe. The Army was asking for about half of the $1.3 billion allocated for the zero-draft effort in Fiscal 1972. The money requested was to be allocated as follows:[17]

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[16]It has been virtually impossible to uncover the extent to which the Army applied these findings and the direct effects of that application.

[17]Aside from the pay increases which represented the majority of funds requested (and approved) the Army was allocated: $135 million for the "improvement of professionalism and Army life," and $59.4 million for recruiting and advertising. Advertising funds were not simply aimed at potential recruits; the scope of operations was aimed at the general public as well. U.S., Department of Defense, Report to the President, Laird, 1972, p. 32.

Recruiting and Advertising	$62.2 million
ROTC	17.8
Medical Scholarships	7.5
Barracks Improvements	60.0
Programs Reducing Irritants	75.0
Selective Pay Increase	419.0
Special Pay Incentives	10.0
Total Requested	$651.5 million

By early November 1971, 1800 recruiters and 500 new stations had been added. Over $10 million had been allocated for media advertising. A total of 39 various enlistment options were established for new recruits. Concurrently, a Fiscal 1972 continuing resolution authority by Congress for $196 million above the Army base budget was granted for continuing experimentation and an expanded recruiting force from 3000 to 6080. In early 1972, the hiring of 2700 low wage rate, or contract, civilians had returned 3300 soldiers to their primary military skill duties.

The key to achieving progress at this time toward an all-volunteer force was virtually assured by partnership with Congress in Public Law 92-129 which, on September 28, 1971, extended the draft for 2 years and authorized pay increases in the amount of $2.4 billion.[18]

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[18]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 124-295, passim. The pay featured: $1.8 billion base pay increase weighted heavily toward first-term enlistees and low-ranking officers; $409.8 million bachelor quarters allowance; $106 million dependents' allowances; $20 million for various bonuses to attract critical skills; $20 million dependents' allowances for reservists; $2.9 million for recruiting. The base pay increase, effective November 1971, was a major boostin compensation. In a speech before the Association of the U.S. Army on March 22, 1972, Laird indicated that privates were paid $78 per month in 1964 at the beginning of the Vietnam buildup. The starting wage of $332 for a new private in 1972 was 325 per cent higher than his 1964 counterpart.

Military pay increases have been the most important single source of changes in recent defense budgets despite the declining number of Servicemen. The legislative decision to make military pay comparable with that in the private sector amounted for about three-fourths of this increase in compensation; special pay incentives to spur enlistments and an escalation in grade structure accounted about equally for the balance. The price of defense manpower would have increased to some extent under these circumstances whether or not the zero draft became a reality.[19]

The impact of these actions by Congress was that military pay was increased substantially at the entry level; recruiting systems were expanded and modernized, and improvements were made in the quality of military life. By early 1973, the Army shortage was only 1.7 per cent and the Services met 97 per cent of their recruiting objectives. It was felt that the shortfall in Army recruiting was caused primarily by the requirement of higher entrance standards between January and June of 1973.

With the enactment of this legislation, officials of the Department of Defense were increasingly optimistic as to the success of achieving a zero draft in 1973. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated:

> Reasonable military pay competitiveness within the private sector has been achieved by the enactment of increased military pay and allowances . . . Pay inequities affecting personnel in the lower military pay grades have been corrected.[20]

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[19] Fried, et al, Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget, pp. 296-298.

[20] Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 92d Congress, 2nd Sess., XXVIII (1972), p. 492.

In gross terms, this may have been an impressive performance but certain critical skills required continuing special attention. A bonus of $1500 was offered to volunteers who would enlist in the Army combat arms for a period of 4 years. The bonus was raised, for test purposes, to $2500 in May 1973. The results produced 4550 enlistments in this specialty area during the month of June 1973--some 1050 above quota.

In the examination of the statistics that have been presented in this chapter, it has been difficult to pinpoint the flow of resources allocated to the Department of Defense for the individual military services and for specific transitional programs leading to a zero-draft condition. For example, it is virtually impossible to prorate among the military services the costs of the dozens of expensive studies conducted in order to determine costs for the Army. Additionally, recruiting costs inevitably include charges that could be legitimately called advertising although the latter is occasionally segregated for budget purposes. Finally, improvements in salaries and working environments are geared both to the goal of recruiting as well as a general effort to improve service conditions in terms of modern life styles and inflation.

In the examination of Figure 4 presented in the last chapter and now the strategy applied between 1970 and January 1973, it is concluded that the number of true volunteers rose because of a wide variety of measures, chief among which were substantial pay increases at the entry level and greater emphasis on recruiting. Beyond the monetary incentives, other measures upgraded the quality of life at military

installations; barracks were modernized, KP duties were assigned to civilians, and additional health and dental programs were provided.

The impact of the principal elements--pay and recruiting-- are now presented graphically in terms of their effects on all of the military services. Figure 5 shows the effect of the pay legislation

Fig. 5.--Comparison of Median Weekly Earnings of Civilian Full-time Wage and Salary Workers and Weekly Earnings of En- listed Males During the First Year of Military Service, Fiscal Years 1967-73*

Median Weekly Earnings (dollars)

*Military earnings refer to base pay, plus allowances for subsistence and housing and tax advantage. First year earn- ings are based on a weighted combination of the pay grades normally attained during the first year of service. Estimate of civilian earnings for Fiscal 1973 assumed 5.5 per cent increase; estimate of military earnings includes the January pay raise.

Sources: 1967, 1968-72, Dept. of Labor, BLS (March, 1973); and Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (March, 1973); 1968, est.

and subsequent comparability increases in January 1972 and January 1973. Average weekly earnings of new recruits, which had lagged behind

those of 19-year-old civilian workers by about 30 per cent in 1970, had

attained reasonable comparability by Fiscal 1972. Beyond the starting

level in manpower procurement, men's earnings (enlisted and civilian)

roughly corresponded for all groups as seen in Figure 6. The data

Fig. 6.--Comparison of Median Weekly Earnings of Civilian
Full-time Wage and Salary Workers and Military Enlisted
Personnel on Active Duty, by Age, May 1972

Weekly Earnings
(dollars)   (Males)

*Military earnings are not given beyond age 54
since almost all of the military personnel are
retired by this age. Estimates of median mili-
tary salaries are based on age, pay grade, and
representative salaries for each grade. However,
years of service for each age group was not avail-
able so that a more rigorous calculation has not
been possible.

Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress,
Problems and Prospects, Report by Martin Binkin
and John D. Johnston, 93d Cong., 1st sess.,
1973, Figure 17, p. 22.

may be somewhat misleading and understated. If fringe benefits such
as tax advantages, retirement, commissary and exchange privileges, and
medical and dental services are added, the military pay advantages are
probably even more pronounced.

The combat arms bonuses plus the wider choices in the selection
of training courses as well as unit and location of assignment are con-
sidered to be major factors influencing the growth of combat arms
enlistments shown in Figure 7.

Fig. 7.--True Volunteers, Ground Combat Arms, Selected Monthly
Averages, 1970-72

Males (Thousands)

Sources: True volunteer data provided by David W. Grissmer,
General Research Corporation (May 1973). Fiscal
1974 requirement from "The All-Volunteer Force and
the End of the Draft," Special Report of Secretary
of Defense Richardson (March 1973), p. 10.

The importance of recruiting and advertising were recognized
early and major changes were undertaken in those fields during the

transition period as reflected in Figures 8 and 9. From Fiscal 1970

Fig. 8.--Trends in Department of Defense Recruiting
Budget for Active Duty Forces, Fiscal Years 1970-73

(Millions of dollars)

Source: Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (January 1973)

to Fiscal 1973, the recruiting budget more than doubled while personnel

Fig. 9.--Trends in Department of Defense Recruiting
Personnel Support (Military and Civilian), Fiscal
Years 1970-73

'Personnel (Thousands)

Source: Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (January 1973)

involved in recruiting programs increased 70 per cent.

According to the Administration, the annual cost will be about $3 billion in Fiscal 1974. This estimate includes only the cost of legislatively enacted programs specifically identified with the all-volunteer force, such as the special pay incentives authorized in Fiscal 1972. The progression of these costs is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

ANNUAL COST OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, BY
CATEGORY, FISCAL YEARS 1972-74

(Total obligational authority in millions of dollars)

Category	1972*	1973	1974
Pay increases	$1,552	$2,377	$2,320
ROTC and health scholarships. . .	19	42	73
Combat arms bonus	12	48	68
Recruiting and advertising. . . .	97	146	221
Living quarters improvements. . .	70	11	19
Education programs.	19	22	53
Other initiatives	117	71	156
Other bonuses	. . . .	. . . .	225
Total.	$1,886	$2,717	$3,135

*The Fiscal 1972 costs are not for a full year because the
pay increases were not effective until November 1971.

Sources: 1972, Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, (March 1973); 1973-74, The All-Volunteer
Force and the End of the Draft, Special Report of
Secretary of Defense Richardson (March 1973),
p. 27.

As attention in this research now moves to conditions in 1973, it will become apparent that the strategy developed and exercised by the Army is incomplete, perhaps because of circumstances that could not be predicted in the early stages of this planning cycle. The number of volunteers, particularly in critical skill areas, is not as high as had been hoped, and there is mounting criticism of the overall expense

involved to sustain a large volunteer Army. These circumstances have forced a search for feasible alternatives in overcoming the shortfalls that presently exist. Derivatives of Thompson's propositions for adaptation to uncertainty will next be explored.

CHAPTER V

MANAGING A CHANGE PROCESS

Primary Adaptational Elements

The previous chapter introduced planning and actions within
the Army prior to January 1973 which now serves as background for next
proceeding with an examination of a primary element in its implementing
efforts--recruiting. Most of the publicity in the media as well as
Congressional oversight statements during 1973 with respect to the
all-volunteer force seem to devote primary attention to this element
as an index of success and that is why the next scenario is featured
as symptomatic of "primary adaptational phenomena." In other words,
the success or failure of intensified recruitment has been viewed by
many as the basic determinant, a barometer, in terms of the ability of
the Army to achieve an all-volunteer force. This characterization is
described as:

SCENARIO C: THE ARMY HAS REALLOCATED AND IMPORTED RESOURCES, MODIFIED
            ITS STRUCTURE, AND ENGAGED IN A PROPAGANDISTIC CAMPAIGN
            FOR ATTRACTING VOLUNTEERS IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN ITS CON-
            VERSION PROCESS.

Resource allocation and apportionment features from 1969 through
calender year 1972 were presented earlier. Of the $3.1 billion budget
authority requested by the Department of Defense during Fiscal 1974 for
the volunteer force actions of all military services, about 75 per cent
is accounted for by legislation enacted in 1971 that made entry level

82

pay of military personnel reasonably competitive with civilian pay.
There seems to be a general consensus that the most fruitful step of
all the actions taken by the military thus far in terms of attracting
volunteers has been the major pay increase. Another 10 per cent of
the $3.1 billion covers other types of compensation programs such as
bonuses for purposes of balancing off the available supply of volun-
teers with the specific job and skill requirements of the Services.
The remaining 15 per cent requested is to be used for expanded recruit-
ing efforts, education programs, post services, and barracks improve-
ments. Included are advertising funds earmarked for propagandistic and
"image-building" purposes.[1] The specific expenditures undertaken or
contemplated by the Army for Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974 are presented
in the Appendix. The amount of funds and their functional apportion-
ment for Fiscal 1975 are expected to be about the same as for Fiscal 1974.

Structural changes have been represented by two principal

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[1]Public attitude is a matter of serious concern to the military.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was quoted as saying: "Un-
less the American people support the military and individuals stop
maligning it, the prospects of an all-volunteer force are dim." "Sup-
port Called Key to All-Vol Success," Navy Times, September 19, 1973,
p. 37. The Secretary of the Army stated: "We are going to make the
volunteer Army work by insuring that service to the country is a mean-
ingful part of the young man or woman's life." Howard H. Callaway,
"The Volunteer Army," Vital Speeches of the Day, November 1, 1973,
p. 35. Former Secretary of Defense Laird stated:

> "The attractiveness of military service, and the capacity to retain
> qualified career people, is strongly affected by public attitudes
> toward military service. It is essential that the vital role of
> the Armed Forces in national security and the many challenges of
> military life be projected in ways that will enhance public under-
> standing and respect for military people, their profession, and
> the uniform they wear."

U.S. Department of Defense, Report to the President: Progress in
Ending the Draft and Achieving The All-Volunteer Force, p. 32.

modifications: the recruiting sector, which is in closest geographic

proximity to the Army's "boundary transactions" at the labor market;

and the central planning and monitoring unit that was described in the

previous chapter as headed by the Special Assistant for the Modern

Volunteer Army (SAMVA). Despite the fact that both units have had

pervasive integrated responsibilities and key coordinative functions

in achieving an all-volunteer Army, it is noteworthy that the head-

quarters of the former was moved in June 1973 to Chicago and the des-

cendant of SAMVA today remains in Washington, D.C. Coordination may

possibly be handicapped by this recent geographic separation.

The Army Recruiting Command is structured along the lines of

a typical large national sales organization with its central headquar-

ters, five district or regional staffs, and over 1000 satellite recruit-

ing offices. Primary adaptational adjustments are reflected in the

growth in numbers of satellite offices, budget increases, recruiter

bonuses, and the channelling of high-caliber Army professionals into

the recruiting organization. Also analogous to a commercial sales

organization is the prevalent usage and emphasis on local recruitment

goals (i.e., "sales quotas").[2]

The central planning and monitoring unit represented by

SAMVA was dissolved in June 1972 without equivalent structural

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[2]In an effort to spur aggressive recruitment in the mili-
tary and to attract the number of soldiers needed in this branch
of the Army, the Defense Department has authorized a special bonus
of $150 per month for personnel assigned to the recruiting organi-
zation. "Recruiters Will Get $100 Pro-Pay Hike," Navy Times, Novem-
ber 7, 1973, p. 5.

replacement.[3] The rationale for dissolution was that the functions of SAMVA as a specially-designated planning agency were fulfilled when the draft ended, and that on-going actions could be decentralized and absorbed by the normal Army organization. Illustrative of this philosophy during the planning cycle was the statement by General Westmoreland to Lieutenant General Forsythe (SAMVA) in early 1972: "You should continue to phase out activities whenever we are confident that desirable new initiatives are fully set as lasting Army practices."[4] Monitoring and policy-making functions as well as further initiatives were thereafter to be conducted under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER) in Washington.

The reader will recall from Chapter IV that SAMVA held considerable power and immediate access to both the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army for purposes of developing and initiating all-volunteer programs. The current organization is a dramatic departure from that concept by virtue both of having a Recruitment and Reenlistment Division (vaguely analogous to SAMVA) several layers removed from the Army's top leadership and with responsibilities for only development, monitoring, and coordinative functions.[5] At the present time,

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[3]The details of structural realignment were provided by Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Jacoby, Division of Recruitment and Reenlistment, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.) from interviews on November 28 and December 3, 1973.

[4]U.S. Army, Chief of Staff memorandum to SAMVA, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1972.

[5]Problems of transition necessitated an interim arrangement because some of the programs developed by SAMVA had not reached fruition by the time the unit was dissolved. A small "Volunteer Army Office" continued with the implementation of SAMVA's work until September, 1973.

DCSPER is the focal point and tasking authority for all-volunteer
Army activities but his responsibilities encompass many other func-
tions as well. Under his supervision are four directorates (Director
of Military Personnel Management, Director of Plans, Programs and
Budget, Director of Civilian Personnel, and Director of Human Resources
Development) that perform duties pertaining to a variety of personnel
requirements. The changing structure is illustrated in Figure 10 for
comparative purposes. One of the principal subordinates of DCSPER,

Fig. 10.--Abbreviated Comparison of SAMVA and DCSPER
Organization Structures

Source: Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Jacoby, USA,
Division of Recruitment and Reenlistment, Dept. of Army,
Washington, D.C., November 28, 1973.

the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ADCSPER), reportedly has

great autonomy for the adoption of tests and experimentation among

Army commands. Current emphasis, however, is not to identify any unit

as a special entity associated with the all-volunteer concept.

Recruiting results in the active Army for 1973 since January

have fallen short of established goals as indicated in Table 2. The

TABLE 2

ENLISTMENT GOALS AND RESULTS: FEBRUARY-OCTOBER 1973

Month	Goal	Enlistments	Per Cent* of Goal
February	11,500	10,000	85% (87)
March	9,300	7,262	77 (78)
April	9,000	4,558	49 (51)
May	8,000	5,264	64 (66)
June	16,500	15,000	91
July	17,300	13,117	76
August	17,000	13,694	81
September	17,800	14,596	82
October	17,200	13,490	78

*Although CQ reports their figures were taken from Defense
Department sources, calculations reveal that the first 4
figures in the far right column are understated by as much
as 1.9 percentage points. Correct figures are shown in
parenthesis.

Sources: February-August, Congressional Quarterly, XXXI
(September 22, 1973), p. 2527; September-October,
Navy Times, November 7, 1973, p. 41.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated

that the Army will continue to fall short of its recruiting goals for

the next several months and will be between 15,000 and 20,000 men short

by next June. Such figures may have to be adjusted depending on reenlistment rates and Congressional action on possible incremental adjustments in approved force levels.[6]

A tally of the figures in Table 2 reveals an overall percentage of about 78 per cent of the manpower objective between February and October. Additionally, it appears that the market for recruits is seasonal and subject to erratic variations between months. Therefore, the program cannot now be run on a straight-line basis. The variances seem to change dramatically among the months with shortfalls in April and May being particularly acute. Historical data within the Department of Defense reveal that the period from February through May are traditionally low recruiting months, and, June through August, the most favorable. These seasonal fluctuations seem to be generally reflected in the monthly goals specified in the table. For example, the average monthly quota in the low period (February-May) is 9450 and, for the high period (June-August) is 16,933. At the present time, numerical goals (and results) do not match the numbers leaving the Service and this immediately presents problems.[7] For instance, the Army's training establishment, particularly the basic training schools, cannot

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[6]"Enlistment Shortages Expected," Washington Star-News, November 15, 1973, p. A-4. As of September 1973, the overall active Army strength was 24,000 below the planned goal according to: "All-Volunteer Force Information," Special Report by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, October, 1973, p. 2.

[7]This abnormality was caused by unusually high draft calls during the Vietnam war which were unrelated to seasonal considerations. Once these draftees leave the Army and cutbacks are stabilized, it is expected that the egress will more or less match the seasonal timing of manpower input. The move in that direction is already perceptible to Army planners.

have a steady workload and must continually adjust its program to match
the oscillating flow of recruits despite a constant overhead level in
staff, plant, and other facilities. There seems to be no easy and con-
venient alternative in accomodating such an erratic input.

The net effect of recruiting thus far in the Army, as suggested
by the data in Table 2, is that not only shortfalls exist but that the
flow of new manpower into the conversion process is disruptively un-
even.[8] As James Thompson has stated in his proposition 2.3, rational
organizations will try to smooth out input transactions. To combat
these dysfunctional tendencies which have not been curbed by the Army's
primary adaptational strategy, the organization has increasingly empha-
sized alternative measures to assure a sufficient and level flow of
manpower.

Throughput Strategies

In order to achieve and maintain the numbers required in the
conversion process at a fairly steady state, the Army has devoted in-
creasing attention to a variety of means that pertain to "throughput"
phenomena--that is, considerations affecting both the flow of manpower
into, and out of, the organization. This is reflected in:

SCENARIO D: THE ARMY SOUGHT TO BUFFER INPUT TRANSACTIONS THROUGH: (1)
LESS STRINGENT SELECTION CRITERIA THAT, IN EFFECT, ENLARGED
THE ELIGIBLE MANPOWER POOL, AND (2) BY SOCIALIZING FACTORS
AIMED AT RETAINING MORE MEMBERS IN THE CONVERSION PROCESS.

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[8] The Army missed its recruiting goal in September allegedly
because it was short of recruiters--a problem that will be corrected
by December 1973 according to the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Manpower and Reserve Affairs. "Army Short in Recruiting For 8 Months,"
Washington Post, October 18, 1973, p. A-6.

A recent study prepared for the Senate Committee on Armed Services has an impressive statistic on the impact of trying to maintain an all-volunteer force under existing selection criteria at present strength levels. If current manpower selection policies are maintained, one out of every three qualified and available men would have to volunteer for active military service.[9] The recognition of such a formidable demand has led the Army to explore possibilities of varying selection criteria in order to enlarge the recruitable manpower pool. The following is a listing of alternatives being examined:

(1) Replacing military men with civilians

(2) Easing mental standards[10]

(3) Easing physical (including age limits) standards

(4) Recruiting more women

(5) Recruiting men with prior service

(6) Lateral hiring

A cumulative estimate on the degree that such measures would enlarge

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[9]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems and Prospects, Report by Martin Binkin and John D. Johnston, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 3. The report optimistically states that the rate at which qualified volunteers enlisted in Fiscal 1973, if continued, should be adequate to meet long-term quantitative needs without any further increase in costs--provided that there are no unforseen changes in present trends and circumstances.

[10]The percentage of high school graduates desired by the Army was actually raised initially after draft calls ceased but this criterion was eased in July 1973 by the Secretary of the Army. The recent rise in percentage of non-high school graduates among new recruits has so alarmed Congress that the House Appropriations Committee has now stipulated that no more than 45 per cent may be non-high school graduates. Michael Getler, "House Panel Cuts Budget For Military," Washington Post, November 27, 1973, pp. A-1, A-7.

the manpower market for the military has not been published. Two

possibilities, as examples, are presented here on what is either

possible or being considered. The Gates Commission estimated that for

a force of 2.5 million men, 117,000 civilians could be substituted for

Servicemen at a savings of perhaps $100 million per year.[11] With

respect to female recruits, the present 40,000 military women will at

least be doubled by 1977 and the hope is that the current 2 per cent

of women in the total force may grow to 10-20 per cent, or even higher.

More than 80 per cent of all job specialities within the Department of

Defense have been declared open to women.[12]

Thus far, the emphasis in this research has been on manpower

procurement--an input transaction. But the requirements for new man-

power procurement can be lessened considerably if steps are taken to

retain those members, now in the Army, for longer periods of time.

Former Defense Secretary Laird aptly stated:

> The availability of draftees and draft-induced enlistments pro-
> duced in the Armed Services the habit of under-using retention
> as a means of meeting manpower requirements. The requirement
> for new enlistments in Army and Navy can be reduced substantially
> by improving the retention of first-term and career personnel.[13]

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[11] The Report of the President's Commission, p. 51. A modest
program to substitute 31,000 civilians for military personnel by the
end of fiscal 1974 is now underway.

[12] The Army had a strength of 8700 military women in Fiscal
1973 with a goal of 12,000 by the end of Fiscal 1974. "All-Volunteer
Force Information," Special Report, p. 7.

[13] Report to the President: Progress in Ending the Draft and
Achieving the All-Volunteer Force, p. 51.

Strategies for the enhancement of retention, a ramification
of socialization and internalization, can be far more subtle and
sophisticated than measures utilized to attract manpower from a com-
petitive labor market; yet, socializing elements are of pervasive
significance. All types of organizations will apply some degree of
both recruitment selectivity and socialization; they vary mainly in
the related emphasis they give to the two processes and, as a result
of their particular philosophy of operation, to attain a given level
of effectiveness and to maintain a given level of organizational qual-
ity. Recruitment affects only initial involvement. Organizational
socialization, communication, and the experience of participation may
change individual attitudes greatly after recruitment. Military units
accepting volunteers require that the volunteer surrender his right to
quit and subordinate himself to the full scope of military law for a
substantial length of time.

Both the Gates Commission and the Army leadership recognized
the influence of various socializing factors on the all-volunteer con-
cept. The former indicated:

> Pay is not the only, and perhaps not even the primary motivating
> force for joining or remaining in the military services. A sense
> of duty, a desire for adventure or travel, society's esteem for
> military life and the general conditions of service--all affect
> individual's decisions.[14]

In his report before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972,
General Westmoreland stated: "Of the three major objectives in improv-
ing the way the Army does things (enhanced professionalism, improved
Service life, and a modernized accession system) the first is

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[14]The Report of the President's Commission, p. 47.

overriding."[15]

Most organizations, according to Bennis, regard economic return as
the main stimulus for peak performance. Such compensation is important
to the professional but, if economic awards are equitable, then other in-
centives become more important. Professionals tend to then seek other
rewards such as full use of their talent and training; professional sta-
tus; and opportunities for personal growth, development, and training.
The most important incentive is to "make it" professionally and to be re-
spected by professional peers and other elements of society.[16] This notion
is augmented by Katz and Kahn who believe that the internalization of or-
ganizational goals is the most effective of motive patterns and the most
difficult to evoke within the limits of conventional organizational prac-
tice and policy. The degree of success depends upon the character of the
organizational goals and their congruence with the needs and values of
the individual.[17] Herbert Simon and his co-authors suggest that each
member will continue participating only so long as the inducements

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[15]U.S. Army, "The Posture of the Army," Speech by General William
Westmoreland quoted in Army Speech File Service, VI (February, 1972), p. 12.

[16]Warren G. Bennis, ed., American Bureaucracy (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1970), p. 170.

[17]Katz and Kahn, p. 389. In another writing, Katz used the term
"internalization" to refer to the extent to which the organizational mem-
bers identify with the system in which they work. Daniel Katz, "The
Motivational Basis of Organizational Behavior," Behavioral Science, IX
(April, 1964), 131-146. The term "socialization" on the other hand,
is the process whereby members are conditioned to take on the values and
behavior patterns prescribed for them by the organization. Barrett has
proposed that the degree of goal integration for any system can be con-
ceptualized as two intersecting sets of elements. One set consists of
individual goals and the other of organizational objectives. The greater
the proportion of the two sets which intersect each other, the greater is
the degree of goal integration. J. H. Barrett, Individual Goals and Or-
ganizational Objectives (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social
Research, 1970), p. 5.

offered him are as great or greater (measured in terms of _his_ values and in terms of the alternatives open to him) than the contributions he is asked to make.[18]

Although the Armed Services in theory have traditionally been concerned with an efficient use of their personnel, socialization has in fact been a major goal. At the enlisted level, basic training is aimed as much at instilling certain attitudes, responses and loyalties in a new recruit as it is at teaching him specific skills. The intent, at every level, is to produce individuals who are useful to and work well within the military, and this necessarily implies a certain amount of indoctrination. There is ample evidence that the military services have not been entirely successful in these efforts. As an example, Kurt Lang believes that making military life compatible with the demands of the specific job within the military and promoting a "modus vivendi" between the demands of a military career and those of family life continue to pose problems. Both the magnitude of the adjustment problem and the satisfactions found in the military situa- tion reflect one's prior orientation to military service and the conditions under which that service is performed.[19]

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[18]Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, _Public Administration_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 382. The military services, according to _Fortune_ in 1971, turned over 60 per cent of their total personnel every 2 years. Few business executives ever witness that kind of turnover. Juan Cameron, "Our Gravest Military Problem is Manpower," _Fortune,_ April, 1971, p. 61.

[19]Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," _Handbook of Organiza- tions,_ ed. by James G. March, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), pp. 846-850.

Several measures that have been employed in the Army to en-
hance professionalism and socialization have already been alluded to.
Professionalism, advertising, "image-building," reduced family sep-
aration, greater training opportunities, reenlistment and travel
options, removal of Service irritants such as KP and base support
functions, "ombudsman" roles--either implied or specifically designated,
and increased stability in career and rotation patterns are typical
examples. The Secretary of Defense implemented a "Human Goals" pro-
gram in early 1972 which prescribes specific objectives (including many
of the examples listed above) that give recognition to the dignity
and worth of each individual.[20]

The impact of socializing elements aimed at retention in the
Army is exceedingly difficult to assess at this time primarily because
these strategies have been undertaken under stipulated conditions of
declining strength levels. It will be recalled that Figure 2 illus-
trated a precipitous drop of the military force from 3.55 million in
1968 to 2.2 million in 1973. Socializing effects can only be inter-
preted under stable force level conditions which have just recently
begun.[21] Moreover as Chester Barnard implied nearly 40 years ago,

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[20]Melvin R. Laird, "The All-Volunteer Force," an address before
the Association of the U.S. Army at Fort Rucker, Alabama, March 22,
1972, p. 5.

[21]On the basis of somewhat favorable reenlistment experience in
the first two months and the increasing first-term rate throughout Fis-
cal 1973, the Army reenlistment objective for Fiscal 1974 appears
attainable. The July-August 1973 total of career enlistments in the
Army exceeded the goal by 400. "All-Volunteer Force Information,"
October, 1973, pp. 10-13.

socializing influences are not panaceas. He stated:

> The centrifugal forces of individualism and competition
> between organizations for individual contributions result
> in rendering incentives and persuasion as being ineffec-
> tive, with few exceptions, for more than short periods or
> a few years. The scheme of incentives is probably the
> most unstable of the elements in a cooperative system,
> since invariably external conditions affect the possibili-
> ties of material incentives; and human motives are like-
> wise highly variable.[22]

Mindful of the inability to achieve the desired strength level
in the Army of approximately 800,000 active duty Servicemen--despite
the concentration on two strategic sets (intensified recruitment and
retention) related to boundary transactions--it follows that another
alternative strategy leads to the reexamination of the conversion pro-
cess.

Internal Reassessment

The Gates Commission suggested that the Services may find it
desirable to economize on manpower without sacrificing the overall
organizational goal of a stable defense posture.[23] Implicit in this
belief is a recognition that one further adaptive possibility is a
reassessment of the conversion process as reflected in the following:

SCENARIO E: AS PRIOR STRATEGIES FALL SHORT OF MANPOWER PROCUREMENT
GOALS, THE ARMY WILL RESORT TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE
CONVERSION PROCESS IN TERMS OF MANNING PRIORITIES,
ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURES, AND INNOVATIVE TECHNIQUES.

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[22]Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 142-158, passim.

[23]The Report of the President's Commission, p. 30.

Without elaborating on the specifics of priority manning within the conversion process because of security classification, it is evident that some personnel manning priorities are in existence today. Such priorities are prescribed by the determination of which Army units are judged more important than others in terms of national security. Those of highest criticality are receiving the greatest attention and some specific examples have been implied in earlier chapters. For example, the special bonuses assigned to combat arms and medical units are already programmed for personnel deemed highly essential to the conversion process. Army divisions composed of a nucleus of active duty forces augmented by inactive reserve strength are illustrative of alternative manning concepts that may achieve an acceptable standard of readiness with fewer standing forces. The overlapping and even duplicative logistic support outlets of the individual military services offer possibilities through merger which may thereby release some personnel for combat force roles.

In Chapter II, the Army's conversion process was described as a complex array of man-machine systems, some of which are labor-intensive and others capital-intensive. The Army may find it advantageous to mechanize tasks now performed manually, and to emphasize (even more than at present) durability, reliability, and ease of maintenance in the design of equipment and vehicles, and in the construction of facilities. As a practical matter, however, these steps will likely require a long period of transition before the process of effecting such substitutions is perceptible. Recent experience with conventional warfare in Vietnam suggests that the role of the combat infantryman will

continue as before despite technological advancement in capital-
intensive weapon systems, and this is generally regarded as difficult
and time-consuming to modify. Support, or logistic, forces however,
are now receiving intensive scrutiny for possible displacement by
capital-intensive substitutes—particularly in materials handling
systems, maintenance techniques, computers, and communications equip-
ment. Since there are increasing pressures for effecting this type
of substitution, it is logical to assume the Army will devote con-
siderable attention to the possibilities of such conversions. Support
forces are also susceptible to the possibilities of being "contracted
out" to civilian enterprise. Base maintenance and food service func-
tions are typical examples reflecting the replacement of soldiers by
civilian workers.

Scenario E is both an on-going and long-range strategy which
cannot be assessed at this time although it offers attractive potential.
Certainly, technological advances in this area are difficult to predict,
but, should Scenarios C and D not achieve desired manpower strength
levels in the conversion process, the internal reassessment or rearrange-
ment becomes increasingly important.

As has been stressed, the dynamics of managing the change
process for adaptation to an all-volunteer Army is still evolving.
Three strategic concepts have been described in this chapter as measures
undertaken by one large complex organization. Such measures for this
organization have been costly and increasingly subjected to public
criticism. Felix Moos points out that the 1974 budget outlays pro-
jected for the all-volunteer force are nearly four times the original

estimate for a force of comparable size. While manpower costs for the
3.5 million men and women in the Armed Forces amounted to $32.6 bil-
lion in 1968, the present strength level of 2.2 million is expected
to cost $43.9 billion in 1974. An all-volunteer force, with 1.3
million fewer men and women, 37 per cent smaller than a combined
volunteer and draft force, will cost over 30 per cent more. Thus,
taking inflationary factors into account, the United States will be
spending about $6 billion more in fiscal 1974 for only two-thirds of
the number of military men and women than had been the case in 1968.
This increase represents an overrun of approximately 300 per cent,
according to Moos, above the estimated 1971 costs predicted by the
Gates Commission.[24]

It is still premature to judge both the impact and outcome of
the various strategies concurrently in process that have been presented
in this study because concrete evidence of success or failure will not
be realized for several months to come. Most observers agree today
that the future of the all-volunteer Army is highly uncertain. Quite
obviously, there is no precedent; no nation has ever attempted to
maintain a volunteer force of such magnitude. Additionally, it is
extremely difficult to attempt any projections based on the current
period of sharply changing technological, economic, social, and political
patterns--all of which have important implications for the structure
and content of military forces. Such effects are only peripheral to

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[24]Felix Moos, "History and Culture: Some Thoughts on the
United States All-Volunteer Force," Naval War College Review, XXVI
(July-August, 1973), 24.

the focus of this research, however. The primary consideration is
whether or not these adaptive phenomena are correlative with a family
of theoretical conjectures that attempt to illuminate the manner in
which a large organization will likely adapt to change. Do such
actions by the Army, in terms of "organizational maneuvering," con-
stitute valid reflections of Thompson's propositions of adaptation by
an organization that strives for successful adjustment to a changing
environment?

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Theoretical Analogies

The identification and isolation of a linkage between theory and practice have been matters of principal concern in this study. The anticipated advantages in applying the theoretical framework of Thompson have been: (1) He incorporates the views of many scholars on organization thought with substance that transcends a single discipline; (2) He uniquely strives for a combination of an open-system framework with the classic character of closed-system models in a more comprehensive explanation of the behavior of organizations; and (3) He seeks an "umbrella" of conjectures applicable to all types of instrumental collectivities. During the course of this investigation, it has become apparent that such an approach has serious deficiencies, however, and these will be elaborated in the final section.

The choice of the United States Army as a practical focus for the application of Thompson's propositions has been enhanced by the introduction of an exogenous change agent which has forced perceptible strategies in adaptation that can be analyzed. However, the organizational response to a single change variable (manpower procurement) necessarily narrows one's ability to transfer lessons learned in this instance to other types of organizations.

The scheme of this research has been to develop conjecture and reality in that order. Table 3 on the next page offers a linkage of the two.

101

TABLE 3

A CORRELATIVE LINKAGE BETWEEN THEORY AND REALITY

Propositions   (Connective Interpretations)   Scenarios

Propositions	Scenarios
2.1 Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental influences.	A. The Army was able to ensure the dynamic continuity of its conversion process by resort to a compulsory draft.
(I S O L A T I O N B Y F I A T)	
2.4 Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes which can not be buffered or leveled.	B. By anticipating waning popular support for the draft, the Army adopted a planning strategy for change that would assure a continuous voluntary input to its conversion process.
(C H A N G E P L A N N I N G)	
2.2 Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores with input and output components.	C. The Army has reallocated and imported resources, modified its structure and engaged in a propagandistic campaign for attracting volunteers in order to sustain its conversion process.
(I N D U C E M E N T M E C H A N I S M S)	
2.3 Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to smooth out input and output transactions.	D. The Army sought to buffer input transactions through: (1) less stringent selection criteria that, in effect, enlarged the eligible manpower pool, and (2) by socializing factors aimed at retaining more members in the conversion process.
(T H R O U G H P U T M O D I F I E R S)	
2.5 When buffering, leveling and forecasting do not protect their technical cores from environmental fluctuations, organizations under norms of rationality resort to rationing.	E. As prior strategies fall short of manpower procurement goals, the Army will resort to the examination of its conversion process in terms of manning priorities, alternative force structures, and innovative techniques.
(C O R E O P T I O N S)	

The first hypothesis in Chapter II suggested that Thompson's proposals on organizational rationality are relevant to a large complex government organization which, in this study, is tested by examination of the Army coping with uncertainty in a changing environment. Table 3 implies that relevance does exist and such an interpretation can now be presented by means of a codified association. The use of "2.1-A" for example, symbolizes initial attention to a correlative match in which the compulsory draft (Scenario A) serves as the "seal" strategy expressed by Thompson. This particular linkage, 2.1-A, is the most identifiable and demonstrative correlation of the five delineated in the matching table.

The next strong linkage, 2.4-B, appears so obvious and fundamental with respect to planning for change that it requires little comment. The need for planning is widely acknowledged as a basic prerequisite for organizations, good business management, and policymaking practices.[1] The change-planning process of the Army described in Chapter IV emphasizes that planning, implementation, and execution in the same focal field are often exercised concurrently and that it can become difficult to isolate one from the other in terms of timing and impact due to inherent complicative factors. A compression by six

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[1]Dror has written a book which dwells on this subject almost exclusively. Since policymaking is directed at the future, it introduces the persistent elements of uncertainty and doubtful prediction that establish the primary character of nearly all policymaking strategies. This is a striking parallel with the change-process strategies of the Army that have been investigated. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), p. 15.

months in the transition process from draft to volunteerism, ostensibly stimulated by the pressures of Congressional and Administration declarations, accelerated the planning phase. Plans, experimentation, feedback, Service-wide adoption of innovative programs, together with a large across-the-board pay hike early in the planning process illustrate the concurrency of plans and execution directed at the same objective.

Linkage 2.2-C is more subtle than the first two. With respect to input and output components as buffers, Thompson focuses primarily on "physical" components such as inventories and distribution systems although, coincidentally, the notion of "recruitment" is mentioned. Scenario C introduces physical components (recruiting and planning organizations) as well, but also the more abstract philosophical component of propaganda. The distribution of monetary resources is also prominent in both Scenarios B and C.

The terminology in splice 2.3-D is much broader than the previous linkages; hence it allows the introduction of a variety of strategies within its rubric. The reader will note that considerable license has been exercised in Scenario D with Thompson's version of "output transactions." He means, of course, the organizational output and its interaction with the environment such as the product of a core technology. The scenarist, on the other hand, ignores this phenomenon by substituting factors related to the egress of manpower as an output consideration. The analogy of 2.3-D, therefore, is not especially convincing nor is the focal proposition very explicit.

Rationing, priorities, and alternative strategies are merged
in 2.5-E. Scenario E is far broader in content than mere resort to
the strategy of rationing that Thompson suggests. The scenario is
admittedly a "catch-all" but, most significantly, it suggests that
an organization may have many more options, given the prerequisites
that Thompson has prescribed, than simply rationing as protection for
technical cores. Conceivably, the measures elaborated in Scenario E
could be broadly interpreted as manifestations of a rationing process.

On balance, it appears that Thompson's conjectures are generally
a valid reflection of adaptive characteristics undertaken by one large
government organization; but Table 3 provides additional insights that
are unaccounted for in his theoretical framework.

Observations Beyond The Theoretical Framework

The second hypothesis of this research expressed a tendency for
the adaptive measures undertaken by the Army to operate sequentially in
terms of timing and emphasis. Further review of Table 3 seems to imply
that such a serial process has taken place in this organization. James
Thompson makes no such inference or expression of this possibility;
moreover, the reader will note that the numerical order of the proposi-
tions as they appear in the book, has been rearranged by the researcher
in order to establish connective characteristics that are more logically
sequential. This is by no means intended to imply that the Army has
dropped one scenario or strategy in favor of another. In fact, all
strategies except Scenario A are concurrently in operation today—and

appear to be making positive contributions to the all-volunteer Army.
There is strong evidence, however, that the direction of increasing
emphasis by the Army moves from top to bottom in Table 3 as earlier
scenarios fall below desired results. Such action entails more com-
prehensive and sophisticated strategies with a higher degree of un-
certainty as to their effects. Only in Proposition 2.5 does Thompson
reflect a contingency that will become operative in the event that
his earlier propositions yield unsuccessful results.

The analysis of adaptive changes by the Army not only suggests
a sequential phenomenon but also poses a key question: What might
occur if none of the scenarios (or propositions) achieves the desired
results? Thompson would probably conclude that the typical organiza-
tion would either no longer survive under such circumstances, or would
continue operating but under a different set of goals.

There is no attempt in this writing to judge the outcome of the
evolutionary means to achieve the all-volunteer Army. However, an op-
tion does presumably exist for the Army to revert to Scenario A in
which its conversion process may again be sealed off from environmental
influences. The Selective Service System is still in partial operation.
The nation's youth must still register, and local boards as well as the

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According to Stephen Herbits (op. cit., p. 64) a federal
statute (Public Law 92-129) in 1971 authorized a continuance of the
Selective Service System on an austere basis but the language of the
law was changed in that the President must first obtain Congressional
approval before the draft can be resumed. Congress has stipulated
that the Administration must call up Reserves and National Guard before
it turns to a reinstatement of the draft to meet further contingencies.
With the System still in operation, a rapid transition to conscription
could be accomplished in an emergency.

national headquarters are still functioning under a budget of approx-
imately $45 million for Fiscal 1973. By continuing the System in its
present state, the possibilities for regression to Scenario A cannot
be discounted. The capacity for a regressive transition, a phenomenon
not envisioned by Thompson in his writing, is obviously unique with
respect to conscription in the context of a standby Selective Service
System. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the reputed dysfunctional
characteristic of "rigidity" (resistance to change) in other bureau-
cracies might operate in similar fashion when adaptive measures are
unsuccessful and discarded. The urge by bureaucrats to return to their
former "modus operandi" is an inclination noted frequently by astute
observers. The third hypothesis of this research suggests that such
a contingency may occur in the Army as described in the following
setting:

SCENARIO F: IF THE ARMY FAILS IN FULFILLING SUCCESSFULLY THE OBJECTIVES
DESCRIBED IN THE SCENARIOS, ITS MEMBERS MAY UNDERTAKE A
STRATEGY THAT STRIVES FOR REVERSION TO A SIMPLER CIR-
STANCE IN WHICH THE ORGANIZATION WILL ACTUAL OF THE
CONVERSION PROCESS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES.

Rigidity in bureaucracies (as it might possibly precipitate in
the Army) has been the subject of continuing scrutiny during the course
of this research. The writings of Crozier, Blau, Downs, Victor Thompson,
Herbert Kaufman, Michels, and Gouldner are clear in their warnings of
this dysfunctional attribute in the bureaucratic typology of organiza-
tions. While their arguments are often valid and convincing, it has been
exceedingly difficult to elicit and identify this characteristic in the
Army's adaptive process for significant reasons. As was stated earlier

in this writing, Anthony Downs concluded that an _exogenous change_ is more likely to stimulate an adaptive response in a bureaucracy because such changes are visible to external agents and are therefore more likely to generate pressure from them.[3] The President and Secretary of Defense have declared that there will be an all-volunteer force. The majority of Congress has endorsed this declaration and many members are closely monitoring the impact of organizational adaptation to the all-volunteer goal. Open resistance to the all-volunteer concept by Army representatives could be regarded as "seditious" in nature and not likely to be a manifestation of this particular change process. Elements of the news media have alleged, however, that the Army has covertly resisted the mandate by more subtle means. The _Congressional Quarterly_ has summarized these assertions from a variety of sources by suggesting:

(1) The increasingly high costs that are reflected in Defense Department proposals for the maintenance of an all-volunteer force, well beyond earlier estimates, will dissuade the political leadership from continuing to endorse the all-volunteer concept because it is too expensive.

(2) The transfer of the Army recruiting headquarters to Chicago last June has left the Army with limited communications facilities with its field recruiters.

(3) The Army had a deliberate shortage of approximately 500 recruiters in the field last summer at a time when these recruiters, if in place, might have delivered 5000 additional recruits in June.

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[3]Downs, _op. cit._, p. 17.

The Army denies these assertions of deliberate attempts to inhibit the all-volunteer force. During the course of this investigation, any evidence of resistance supporting the above allegations was not apparent. The Congressional Quarterly adds that civilian and military leaders deny the existence of any contingency plan for a new draft.[4] The points have been presented here merely for conjecture.

It was assumed at the outset that the stimulus for change to the all-volunteer force was a preponderance of public opinion favoring the end of the draft. The findings based on opinion polls presented in Chapter III imply the contrary, but the inference may have been spurious. The outcome in attempting to draw conclusions from seemingly relevant opinion data on a very narrow issue introduced in this case study has been elusive and frustrating. There is, in fact, no discernible concrete and specific data available on public endorsement of the volunteer force although respondents continue to favor some type of required national service for the nation's youth, but not necessarily military service.[5] The primary stimulus for change in the case study remains a

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[4]"Volunteer Army: Will Draft Be Called Off Bench?" Congressional Quarterly, XXXI (September 22, 1973), pp. 2525-2526. On July 18, 1973, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clements met with members of the Pentagon Press Corps and responded to the following questions:

"At what point would you go back to the draft on a shortfall?"
(Ans.: "We're not.")
"I know, but if the shortfall stopped up manning, at what point would you---"
(Ans.: "I'm sorry; it's not even under consideration.")

[5]As recent as November 22, 1973, over 60 per cent of a national sampling by Gallup favored compulsory service in government for young Americans. George Gallup, "National Service For Youths Favored," Detroit Free Press, November 22, 1973, p. 8-A.

mystery and offers interesting possibilities for further research. The
purpose in dwelling on this point has been to emphasize that the re-
searcher must be wary of basing any conclusions on general opinion
polls because the inferences drawn from what appear to be pertinent
questions and responses may be misleading.

It must be stressed that the selection of a large complex or-
ganization for case analysis represents a single vantage point from which
to analyze one isolated response to a single independent variable. It is
evident that this same theoretical framework of accounting for adapta-
tion to change would have to be applied to other types of organizations--
and under varying circumstances--before such propositions are germane in
broad perspective. But even then, such analogies would not be persuasive
because of the inherent operational shortcomings described in the next
section.

A Critical Overview

This study supports Thompson's concluding comment in which he
states:

> . . . without refinement of the rather crude concepts we have been
> using, we are not going to get very far in testing hypotheses or
> in asking more sophisticated questions. . . we must have operations
> which will enable us to say that in fact the specified conditions
> do or do not exist.[6]

The need for further refinement has been a matter of serious concern in
this analysis. In retrospect, the case presented here is merely an
extension of Thompson's analogies that precludes the operational rigor
he implores. Unfortunately, he offers no guidance on the nature of

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[6]James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, p. 163.

operations that he may have had in mind. Scientific investigators must ultimately face the necessity of measuring the variables of the relations they are studying. Scientific observations are impossible without clear and specific instructions on what and how to observe. What, for instance, constitutes the identity of an operation such as, ". . .organizations seek to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes . . ." in Proposition 2.4 that the researcher can measure in terms of similiarities and differences among organizations? One possibility is that Thompson could have assigned operational meaning to this planning function in terms of identifying the number of personnel and amount of resources committed to planning. Anderson and Warkov's study, for example, attempted to correlate the degree of emphasis on administrative functions with organizational size by measuring, in a variety of organizations, the proportion of members engaged in administrative work.[7] By resort to analogies alone in explanatory discourse, Thompson begs the question of how to operationalize his concepts and thereby falls short of providing us with theoretical building blocks from which to compare the salient attributes of complex organizations.

While a loose connection has now been suggested between theory and reality for one specific organization, a related conclusion is one of general objection to the application of theoretical universals in such a broad framework. It does not appear likely that a consensus will ever be achieved on a single theory of behavior in instrumental organizations that Thompson has implied. He writes:

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[7] Anderson and Warkov, pp. 23-28.

> A central purpose of this book is to identify a framework which
> might link at important points several of the new independent
> approaches to the understanding of complex organizations. . . It
> is probably inevitable that the early history of a scientific
> endeavor will be characterized . . . by the search for universals.[8]
> This certainly has been the case with organizational theory . . .

To the latter point, Professor Robert P. Boynton of The American

University has aptly replied: "There is no such thing as an organization

theory; rather, there is a field of organization thought consisting of a

voluminous number of theories."

It has become increasingly clear from Thompson's own choice of

words that the quest for universals in describing the behavior of com-

plex organizations is an exercise in futility. A close examination of

the propositions cited in this investigation serve as much to obscure

their pertinence to reality as to illuminate. The usage of buffer,

leveling, smoothing, core technology, output, and norm of rationality

are examples of abstractions that have contributed to some of the various

relationships with scenarios experienced in this writing. Such terms are

so sweeping and vague that they lose their utility in attempting to

achieve an "umbrella" which seeks to capture the specific and often unique

attributes of various instrumental organizations. Is it not still another

means of explaining away the behavior of organizations in terms of a new

and isolable "closed-system" framework?

It is recognized that the classification or taxonomy of organiza-

tions is a useful endeavor and should be continued--but there are upper

limits in the extent that such categories can embrace a family of col-

lectivities exhibiting congruous attributes.

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[8]James D. Thompson, _Organizations in Action_, pp. vii and viii.

APPENDIX

ARMY BUDGET FOR THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
(in $ millions)

Category	Fiscal Year 1973	Fiscal Year 1974
Enacted Legislation	$1079.8	$1107.1
Basic Pay and Allowances	$1022.3	$1022.3
Bonuses (Combat Arms)	38.3	54.0
Scholarships	16.8	28.0
ROTC (and Subsistence)	(10.0)	(10.1)
Health Profession	(6.8)	(17.9)
Special Pay (Optometrists)	.3	.3
Recruiter Out-of-Pocket Expenses	2.1	2.5
Administrative Programs	106.2	173.2
Recruiting (Active)	31.4	43.1
Advertising (Active)	19.2	22.6
Recruiting & Advertising (Reserve)	11.6	20.0
Travel Entitlements	0	15.2
Education Programs	0	5.0
Special AVF Initiatives*	44.0	67.3
TOTAL	$1186.0	$1280.3

*Includes funds for civilianization of KP, and certain other non-mission tasks, improvements to commissaries and other post facilities, recreational equipment, on-post transportation services, and expanded medical services.

Source: Fact sheet dated January 1974 (a "quasi-official" document) as backup material for: "Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee" by the Secretary of Defense as required by Report No. 93-385.

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