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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

## THESIS

**AN IDENTITY OF VIOLENCE:  
EXPLORING THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

by

Lyndsey Dawn Fatz

December 2011

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Mohammed Hafez  
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**AN IDENTITY OF VIOLENCE: EXPLORING THE ORIGINS  
OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(MIDDLE EAST, SUBSAHARAN AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA)**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The United States Department of Defense and development agencies often attribute political violence and instability to poverty and a lack of economic development. However, the cases of Morocco and Algeria challenge this popular assumption as Morocco is considerably poorer than Algeria, yet enjoys greater political stability with less incidences of political violence. Beyond the traditional answers of economic aid and political intervention, these two nations demonstrate that national identity is also necessary in establishing more stable and sustainable practices.



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM	al Qaeda in the Maghreb
ENA	European Neighborhood Agreement
EU	European Union
FIS	Front of Islamic Salvation
FLN	National Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GICM	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara
OPEC	Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries
PJD	Party for Justice and Development
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra & Rio de Oro
START	Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UN	United Nations
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Algeria and Morocco represent a paradox when it comes to the relative levels of political violence within each country. Algeria benefits from the production of hydrocarbons; enjoys a significantly higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita; boasts much higher literacy rates, and has held completely open elections. Morocco, on the other hand, has minimal petroleum and natural gas resources; is ruled by a monarch, and suffers from extremely low education levels and economic variables. However, Algeria suffers from much higher qualitative and quantitative levels of political violence than Morocco. If the published views of the Department of Defense and international development agencies suggest that economic prosperity and higher education will contribute to a more stable nation, then how can one explain the inconsistencies with this philosophy evident in Morocco and Algeria?

## B. IMPORTANCE/RELEVANCE:

The cases of Morocco and Algeria are a tangible reminder of a major dilemma facing the international community. Political stability and the pervasiveness of violent activism are two critical aspects in the contemporary challenge of state-building and development. However, the popular belief is that fighting poverty and improving education are fundamental to promoting political stability and subsequently mitigating terrorist activity. This perspective is not limited to the uninformed layperson. In 2002, President George Bush declared the fight against poverty as the “answer to terror”.<sup>1</sup> Former World Bank

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<sup>1</sup> George W. Bush, “Remarks by George W. Bush” (speech, International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002).

President James Wolfensohn has repeatedly argued that sustained peace is reliant on the elimination of poverty and provision of economic opportunities.<sup>2</sup>

In 2010, United States military leaders still subscribe to this line of reasoning as well. General William Ward, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Commander, testified before Congress, “enhancing security depends upon...the development of stable and growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of violent extremist organizations.”<sup>3</sup> The U.S. Army proposes that the “U.S. counterterrorism strategy should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for better living.”<sup>4</sup> Agencies dedicated to state development also encourage economic improvement as a method to quell political violence.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the sound bites from influential diplomats, military leaders and development agencies, Algeria and Morocco simply do not fit this archetype. In fact, few nations do. Regardless, the stabilization policies of the United States, European Union, and United Nations continue to target poverty and education.<sup>6</sup> One has to ask, why is there a disconnect between policy and reality? This thesis will attempt to bridge that very gap.

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<sup>2</sup> James D. Wolfensohn "Interview with James D. Wolfensohn on Peace and Poverty: Ten Years at the Bank," The World Bank. May 25, 2005. <http://discuss.worldbank.org/content/interview/detail/2058/> (accessed September 8, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> William E. Ward, *USAFRICOM 2010 Posture Statement* (Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs Office, 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Miemie Byrd, "Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly* 41, (2006): 15–19.

<sup>5</sup> James Clad, *USAID's Role in the War on Terrorism*, (Washington DC: USAID Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009); George W. Bush, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization" (Washington, DC: The White House, 2005), Gordon England, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations" DOD Directive 3000.5 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2005); United Nations General Assembly. "Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy." UN Action to Counter Terrorism. <http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#resolution> (accessed September 1, 2010); The European Consensus on Development, "General Development Framework" November 28, 2007, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/development/general\\_development\\_framework/r12544\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12544_en.htm) (accessed September 1, 2010).

Morocco has the very characteristics of a nation that presumably make it more susceptible to terrorist activity, yet Morocco exhibits substantially lower levels of political violence than Algeria and remains one of the United States' most important allies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Algeria's population is wealthier, more educated but it is also the only state in North Africa with a history of mass insurgency resulting in as many as 200,000 lives lost as recently as the mid-1990s.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the regional organization al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) continues to base its operations out of Algeria.<sup>8</sup>

These two nations demonstrate the need to reexamine the root causes of terrorism, violent militancy and political instability. Doing so will result in a more realistic and effective approach to counterterrorism and stabilization policies at all levels. Economic growth and development are certainly important, but this thesis will show that economics is rarely sufficient in effecting improvements in political stability and internal conflict. While this research is focused on North Africa, the implications can be applied to other struggling regions as well as future nation building projects.

### **C. BACKGROUND**

Algeria has a history steeped in violent insurgencies and mass rebellions. It is North Africa's "largest, richest (and) most repressive" nation.<sup>9</sup> However, Morocco, while having suffered sporadic violent episodes, has enjoyed a comparatively peaceful environment. This directly conflicts with the popular expectation that Morocco, with a poorer and less educated population, should be more unstable and overrun by violent action. Morocco and Algeria were chosen as the case studies for this thesis because of their similar backgrounds. They

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<sup>7</sup> Salima Mellah, "Massacres in Algeria 1992–2004," Algeria Watch, November 2004, [www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf\\_en/massacres\\_algeria.pdf](http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_en/massacres_algeria.pdf) (accessed September 6, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> National Counterterrorism Center, "Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb," National Counterterrorism Center, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ajim.html> (accessed September 9, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Jeremy Keenan, "Security & Insecurity in North Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 108 (Jun 2006): 285.

also present a challenge to a popular explanation for political violence, that poverty breeds terrorism. This section will provide a brief overview of the two case studies in several key areas: history, political institutions, economic systems, and political opposition.

## 1. History

The method by which Morocco and Algeria were colonized and subsequently achieved independence informed their perceptions of an acceptable level of violence. This in turn has potentially shaped the identity of the people and their threshold for violent mobilization. Prior to colonization, Morocco and Algeria were Arab nations with significant Berber minorities. Both nations were eventually colonized by the French, Algeria in 1830 and Morocco eighty years later in 1912.<sup>10</sup> Debt repayments played a considerable role in the French incursions, as Morocco's monarch was heavily indebted to its overseas allies and required a bailout from the French.<sup>11</sup> Algeria was engaged in disagreements over debt repayments to the French and the confrontations led to France's invasion and a four-decade battle for control.<sup>12</sup>

Despite France's initial assumption that Morocco would fall to the colonial power with little effort, Morocco's tribal people "refused to submit gracefully".<sup>13</sup> The outcome of all of the fighting was a French protectorate in Morocco and French administrative provinces established in Algeria. While the French

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<sup>10</sup> Azzedine Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria," in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, by David E. Long and Bernard Reich, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 489.

<sup>11</sup> White, Gregory W. "Kingdom of Morocco." in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. by David E. Long, Bernard Reich and Mark Gasiorowski, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 457.

<sup>12</sup> Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria," 489.

<sup>13</sup> C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003), 142.

excluded the native Algerians from mainstream society, the territory was considered as much French as France itself.<sup>14</sup>

The 1920s were a decade of passive disagreement with French and Spanish rule. While those in the Rif region were fairly organized, opposition amongst the rest of Moroccans was infrequent and small-scale. The opposition to colonial rule grew in the next decade and a violent campaign ensued between 1930 and 1935.<sup>15</sup> Morocco finally achieved independence on March 2, 1956 and reinstated its pre-colonial regime as the foundation for its new post-independent government. It is now recognized as one of the oldest recognized nations in the Middle East and North Africa. While Morocco's war for independence was not as brutal as Algeria's, this is in part because France was fighting two colonies and made the decision to eventually cut its losses in Morocco. The Moroccan tribes also proved to be more resistant than the French credited them for, leading to the French being overwhelmed by nationalist opposition forces.<sup>16</sup>

While the French had initially considered assimilating Algerians into French society, this mentality changed in the years following France's invasion. The primary reason can be attributed to the Frenchmen's fear of Algerians hijacking French culture and society and overwhelming the "real" French population."<sup>17</sup> Under French occupation, Algerians were treated as substandard citizens as the French assumed the mindset that "with such wild beasts the only law is that of the noose."<sup>18</sup> Divisions between the colonizer and the colonized quickly intensified until they exploded into the Algerian Civil War in 1954.

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<sup>14</sup> William R. Polk, "The Algerian War for National Independence," in *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 131.

<sup>15</sup> C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History*, (New York: New York University Press, 2000): 211, 216.

<sup>16</sup> Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, 159–160.

<sup>17</sup> Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830: A History*, 158.

<sup>18</sup> John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 79.

The battle for independence played out differently within each nation and began to shape the political environment for decades to come. The post-independence political environment of each nation is reflective of the battle for independence and the succeeding regimes.

## **2. Political Institutions**

In the aftermath of colonization, Morocco and Algeria were left to establish effective governance. In a manner unique to the region, Morocco maintained its pre-colonial regime even after independence. Political institutions are an influential factor on the frequency and scale of political violence in a given state. The respective regimes in Morocco and Algeria are quite different and may account for the variance in political violence in each country.

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, and is currently ruled by the Alawite dynasty. Its first constitution was created in March 1972 and has undergone at least three significant revisions. Unlike many other MENA nations, Morocco allows the participation of political parties, with eight major political parties currently active.<sup>19</sup>

The first constitution, while giving some power to the people, also allowed the monarchy to retain the ability to declare full control in situations the monarchy deemed appropriate. Such an incident occurred only two years after the country's first elections. In the wake of violent riots in one of Morocco's largest cities the current ruler, King Hassan took advantage of a special provision in the young constitution and assumed full power.<sup>20</sup> He chose to eliminate political opposition and was subsequently threatened by two coup attempts. These coups were unsuccessful, both in assassinating King Hassan, and promoting

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<sup>19</sup> Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Morocco," April 20, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm> (accessed May 5, 2011).

<sup>20</sup> White, "Kingdom of Morocco," 461.

political freedoms. In light of the attempted assassinations, King Hassan was even more persistent in minimizing social and political liberties.<sup>21</sup>

When King Hassan II passed in 1999 and was succeeded by his son, King Mohammed VI, Morocco enjoyed a great deal of political openings. Since then, Morocco has also been working with the International Center of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) to make reparations for past human rights abuses.<sup>22</sup> In addition, the most recent revision of Moudawana, Morocco's Family Code, has improved the rights of women within their own families in addition to society as a whole.<sup>23</sup> Since King Mohammed VI took the throne, Morocco has enjoyed little terrorist activity with the exception of the 2003 Casablanca bombings and the recent Marrakesh bombings in April 2011.<sup>24</sup>

Algeria commenced its revolution on November 1, 1954 and finally achieved its independence on July 5, 1962. Algeria's constitution has undergone many revisions since its creation on September 8, 1963. The most recent of the six revisions went into effect on November 12, 2008.<sup>25</sup> Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been sitting as the elected President of Algeria since April 28, 1999. Since establishing itself as a social republic post-independence, Algeria has experienced extended periods of severe state repression. The nation's people were victim to government repression and corruption through the late 1970s to the late 1980s. As this repression coincided with the expansion of Islamism, the people began to riot against the government's mistreatment. Finally, the government responded with political liberalization. The problem was that it was

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<sup>21</sup> White, "Kingdom of Morocco," 461.

<sup>22</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, "Truth and Reconciliation in Morocco," ICTJ, <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Morocco-TRC-2009-English.pdf>, (accessed June 30, 2011).

<sup>23</sup> *Morocco's Family Code*, Royal Edict n° 1.04.22, Law n° 70.03.

<sup>24</sup> Dalia Dassa Kaye, et al., *More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World*, (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2008), 152–153.

<sup>25</sup> "Algeria," *The World Factbook 2011*, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.



too late; the Islamist parties had already begun to radicalize. At this point in the game, political openness only gave Islamists an in to ruling the government.<sup>26</sup>

### 3. Economic Systems

Algeria is considered a “bunker” state by Henry and Springborg, and is guilty of limiting the “freedom of information or autonomy of economic action necessary for globally competitive economic growth.”<sup>27</sup> Like other bunker states, Algeria is often at the mercy of the global petroleum markets and so its people react passionately to the market changes. In return, they are more likely to accept greater levels of political subjugation. However, when revenues are low and states are unable to fulfill their end of the social contract, the public is more apt to demand economic diversification and political accountability.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, states like Algeria are often “too weak to respond quickly and dramatically to opportunities that policy changes...might offer.”<sup>29</sup>

Henry and Springborg categorize Morocco as a “globalizing monarchy”.<sup>30</sup> Morocco, like other nations in this category, is better positioned to appreciate the benefits of globalization in comparison to bunker states. Globalizing monarchies in the region are more proactive in integrating their economies into the global market. They have stronger private sectors and are more interested in attracting foreign capital.<sup>31</sup> It is possible that globalization has a positive impact on political stability as evidenced by Morocco and Algeria.

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<sup>26</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez, "Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World," in *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes*, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006): 81.

<sup>27</sup> Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 114.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 212.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 212–213, 218.

#### **4. Political Opposition**

By far, Algeria has significantly more incidents of violence in comparison to Morocco. In raw numbers, Algeria has witnessed 2,357 instances of political violence compared to Morocco's 46 incidents.<sup>32</sup> In addition to the quantity, the nature of each incidence plays into the reaction of each country. Violence in Morocco is typically initiated by groups external to that nation, meaning the public is more prone to understanding, and even welcoming, a quick and decisive backlash from the government. However, Algeria has witnessed more uprisings from within the society, juxtaposing the government against the people and creating a hostile environment and a dichotomy between the state and its people.

Anti-colonial movements in Algeria drew on an Islamic identity to demonize the French whereas Moroccans developed a more nationalist identity.<sup>33</sup> These identities have continued to develop in the decades since independence. It is not that Islam is the root of violent political opposition, but rather there is no other unifying identity amongst Algerians. They do not have a sense of national unity as their culture was destroyed during colonialization. Islam is the one characteristic that survived colonialism and represents a rejection of Western influence.

Political opposition in Morocco has tended to be more reserved and simultaneously respectful of the monarchy. Algerian political opposition is cynical of its military rulers and instead relies on violent action to express their dissatisfaction.

#### **5. Terrorism**

The episodes of violence in each nation differ not only in quantity, but also in the nature of the violence. The majority of political violence in Morocco stems

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<sup>32</sup> National Consortium for START, (2011), Global Terrorism Database Algeria, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>; National Consortium for START, (2011). Global Terrorism Database Morocco, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>, Accessed September 9, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, 159–160.

from transnational terrorist attacks. This actually generates a unified nation against violence as external actors victimize the entire state. However, political violence in Algeria is often the result of clashes between internal actors, typically the state and the people. Even in the case of terrorism, Algeria has been known to harbor terrorists, complicating how the public interprets terrorist attacks within Algeria's borders. The following section outlines some of the more prominent recent cases of terrorist violence in each nation in order to illustrate how the different perpetrators influence the national response to said violence.

**a. Casablanca**

Morocco's history of violence is not nearly as torrid as its Arab and African neighbors. This is not to say that it has never been rocked by the violence of domestic terrorism or other forms of political violence; just significantly less so. The most prominent terrorist attacks include the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the recent April 2011 bombings in Marrakesh.

On May 16, 2003, Salafia Jihadiya successfully coordinated multiple attacks in Casablanca and killed over forty civilians while injuring nearly one hundred more.<sup>34</sup> Salafia Jihadiya is an extremist faction associated with Al Qaeda and Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). At a time when Morocco was defending the West in the wake of 9/11, the nation became a target for Islamic extremists and followers of Osama bin Laden.<sup>35</sup> The attack in Casablanca is the largest and most deadly terrorist attack within Morocco's borders. These attacks motivated King Mohammed IV to tighten up his political controls but actually helped moderate the Party for Justice and Development

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<sup>34</sup> Tim Connors, "Analysis: May 16, 2003 Suicide Bombings in Casablanca, Morocco." The Center for Policing Terrorism - Manhattan Institute, <http://www.cpt-mi.org/pdf/Casablanca2.pdf>, (accessed February 06, 2010).

<sup>35</sup> Carol Migdalovitz, *Morocco: Current Issues*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010): 2.

(PJD) in their stance on international terror as well as domestic family values.<sup>36</sup> Where most expected the Islamists to radicalize, the opposite was observed.

**b. Madrid**

The GICM, a terrorist organization suspected of having ties with al Qaeda, financed the 2004 Madrid bombings that killed more than 200 people with profits from drug trafficking.<sup>37</sup> The bombings cost roughly 50,000 Euros and were completely funded by illicit hashish and ecstasy sales, but perhaps the most damning finding from the post-bombing investigation was that several of the terrorists were known criminals, some even on the Spanish payroll as informants.<sup>38</sup> The perpetrators were also predominantly Moroccan expatriates. This attack demonstrates a trend of Moroccans engaging in violent behavior abroad more so than at home.

**c. Marrakesh**

In April 2011, Marrakesh was rattled by a bombing responsible for the death of seventeen people, the majority of whom were tourists.<sup>39</sup> This was the first major terrorist attack in Morocco since the 2003 bombings and came in the aftermath of the Spring 2011 Arab revolutions occurring throughout North African and the Middle East. While there was some speculation that AQIM was responsible and was attempting to reclaim public attention, this assumption was

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<sup>36</sup> Eva Wegner, "Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation," in *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes*, by Oliver Schlumberger, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007): 83–84.

<sup>37</sup> Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism," (Washington DC: US Department of State, 2009): 311.

<sup>38</sup> John Rollins, Liana Sun Wyler, and Seth Rosen, *International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, US Policy and Considerations for Congress*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010): 19–20.

<sup>39</sup> "Marrakech Bomb Suspects Arraigned in Rabat," Magharebia, May 18, 2011, [http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en\\_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2011/05/18/newsbrief-01](http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2011/05/18/newsbrief-01), (accessed June 14, 2011).

quickly refuted. The bomber found responsible was an AQIM hopeful but with no official ties to the regional organization.<sup>40</sup>

**d. GSPC/AQIM**

Algeria has long been home to terrorist activity. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) first emerged during the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s. As the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) militant groups began to phase out, the GSPC succeeded the GIA leader and assumed the role of the local terrorist group.<sup>41</sup> The GSPC used terrorist attacks to intimidate political actors and influence public policy. Their main targets were typically “security services, gendarmeries, commissariats, or city halls.”<sup>42</sup> It was in the mid-2000s when the GSPC began to reference al Qaeda, indicating a shift in loyalties and group structure.<sup>43</sup> It is possible that because of the publicity and fear associated with the name “al Qaeda”, the GSPC saw opportunity for further expansion and strength in assimilating into the local organization, AQIM.<sup>44</sup>

AQIM has been active in Algeria for over four years and primarily operates out of the southern region of the nation. It has factions that spread across the Maghreb, but the Algerian government has been known to turn a blind eye to their operations, thus offering a safe haven within its borders.<sup>45</sup> AQIM continues to focus on political and civilian targets but has weakened in strength and influence within the region.

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<sup>40</sup> Thierry Oberle, “The Incredible Story of Terror Marrakech,” trans. by Google, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/05/06/01003-20110506ARTFIG00667-l-incroyable-histoire-du-terroriste-de-marrakech.php>, (Accessed 15 June 2011).

<sup>41</sup> Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A “Glocal” Organization,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (2008): 546.

<sup>42</sup> Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb,” 546.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 550.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 543.

<sup>45</sup> Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib,” *Middle East Journal* 63, no. 2 (2009): 213–226.

## **D. HYPOTHESES**

Morocco and Algeria both maintain the largest populations in North Africa and are predominantly Arab-Muslim countries with a Berber sub-group and similar Judeo-Christian minorities. They were both French colonies and achieved independence around the same time, albeit Algeria suffered from a much more violent secession. While neither country could be considered a democracy, both have experimented with democratization. Additionally, they both have vibrant Islamic movements that are popular with the general population.

There are three hypotheses that will be discussed and examined within this thesis. The first is that greater economic diversification results in greater political stability. Morocco has minimal hydrocarbon stores and so agriculture and services make up a much higher proportion of its economy than the industrial sector. In contrast, Algeria's economy relies heavily on its hydrocarbon industry. It is possible that a heavier reliance on one volatile good could result in greater political instability and violent militancy.

The second hypothesis examines the relationship between income inequality and relative political violence. It is possible that the feelings associated with having less than one feels they deserve could manifest into feelings of angst and frustration, eventually leading to an outburst against the "haves" and the state that contributes to such inequality. This hypothesis would expect Moroccans, while poorer than their Algerian neighbors, to be more equal based on the country's lower rates of political violence.

The third hypothesis suggests that states allowing for greater political access to all interested groups will enjoy more stable and secure nations. This may seem counterintuitive as only Algeria allowed its Islamist parties to freely participate in the 1992 elections, but the sudden cancellation of the second round led to mass revolt and tens of thousands killed. However, Morocco has enjoyed

relative peaceful relations as it has tentatively permitted Islamist parties to participate in government and has also improved its political violence record.

The main primary sources for this thesis will be gathered from the World Bank and publications from the United States Department of State, United Nations and the European Union. Data and publications from the Governments of Morocco and Algeria will be used to corroborate data from the aforementioned bodies.

## **E. THESIS OVERVIEW**

Algeria and Morocco present a fitting study for comparative analysis based on their similar history and demographics. Thus, as best as can be done in social sciences, they present a case where everything else being equal, we can narrow down the explanatory factors for political violence and terrorist attacks.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The second chapter reviews the relevant literature on the major existing theories of political violence and analyzes their applicability to the current study. Chapter III will analyze the economic aspects of each nation and assess the ability of economic variables to explain why Morocco is more stable than Algeria. Chapter IV will address the political aspects of each nation and analyze the political access theory as it applies to Morocco and Algeria. Chapter V will summarize the findings of this thesis as well as suggest that national identity is a critical aspect in addressing the problem of political violence.

Political access and economic reform are important components to lower levels of political violence; however, a strong national identity is also necessary in establishing more stable and sustainable practices. National identity is an important determining factor into how a nation will perceive and use political violence to achieve political goals. National history and experiences will inform its people's views on the appropriate use of violence. Instituting reform without addressing the unique nuances of national identity will result in a failure of policy

and possibly greater political violence. Political freedoms help explain political violence, but must also incorporate national identity and perspectives in order to better counter political violence and preserve peace and order.



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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. INTRODUCTION

Existing theories on political violence have been developed and refined for decades. They attribute political violence to everything from poverty to political repression. The major theories that are most often referenced in the study of political violence will be reviewed and analyzed within this chapter in order to better understand the problem set presented by Morocco and Algeria.

### B. POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political violence is a term that continues to evolve in the realm of political science. In 1970, Ted Robert Gurr defined political violence as “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors...or its policies.” He added that the use of force, force being the “use or threat of violence by any party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political order”, is inherent to all forms of political violence.<sup>46</sup> This conflicts with others who define political violence as non-institutionalized coercive or threatening interactions between citizens and states.<sup>47</sup> Still others articulate political violence as “the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, or state that undermines people-centered security and/or sustainable development.”<sup>48</sup>

Nicholas Sambanis theorizes that strategy, not tactics, is what differentiates the different types of political violence. Terrorist and riot violence are more strategies of intimidation whereas civil war and genocide are more

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<sup>46</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970): 3–4.

<sup>47</sup> J. Craig Jenkins and Kurt Schock, "Global Structures and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic Political Conflict," *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992): 162.

<sup>48</sup> Elisabeth Gilgen, Keith Krause and Robert Muggah, "Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators," in *Oslo Conference on Armed Violence* (Oslo: Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and the United Nations Development Programme, 2010): 5.

strategies of control.<sup>49</sup> Based on their differing strategies and objectives, Sambanis goes on to argue that effective counter policies will also differ. The implication is that terrorism will be more responsive to political liberalization rather than improvements exclusive to the socioeconomic sphere.<sup>50</sup>

Mohammed Hafez points out that political violence is not a concrete term that has a single definition. He uses the case of Algeria to illustrate how political violence can adapt to changing circumstances. "Political violence in Algeria initially took on the form of clashes with security forces and assassinations of policemen and military personnel. In 1993, violence expanded to include government officials..." and later civilians. Not only did the targets of violence change, but the "methods and instruments of violence also changed over the course of time."<sup>51</sup>

The literature for this thesis utilized a variety of nuances in defining what each specific author perceived political violence to be. As a result, there may be some discrepancies as some scholars separate some forms of political violence, i.e. kidnappings, riots, etc, from terrorism while others consider the two to be equivalent. The data on political violence analyzed for this thesis was gathered from the Global Terrorism Database, which is maintained by the Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. In order for an incident to be considered an occurrence of political violence it must meet the following criteria:

- 1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- 2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
- 3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by

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<sup>49</sup> Nicholas Sambanis, "Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence," *Brookings Trade Forum*, (2004): 169–170.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 172

<sup>51</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," *The Middle East Journal*, 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 584.

international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).<sup>52</sup>

Additionally, both ambiguous and unsuccessful cases were included in the count as they demonstrate violent intent, a detail relevant to this study.

The study of political violence is very dynamic, and may not be as easily confined as Gurr initially proposed. Regardless of how one organizes the types of political violence, the overarching theme is the use of violence in politically charged circumstances. Political violence includes more than terrorist tactics and refers to a state of instability and violent action whether directed at the people or the state. The goal of such violence is to either express dissatisfaction with the status quo, or to exert and demonstrate one's power or authority over another. Within this thesis, the two terms will be used interchangeably.

### **C. RATIONAL CHOICE**

An important component of theories addressing political violence is the notion of rational choice. Rational choice defines political violence as "the result of an organization's decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government."<sup>53</sup> The actors' rationale does not have to be correct or commendable, but simply assumes political violence is utilized in conjunction with a "consistent set of values, beliefs, and images of the environment. Terrorism is seen collectively as a logical means to advance desired ends."<sup>54</sup>

Any situation which accepts the death of innocent individuals may be reprehensible and presumed irrational, but the important aspect of rational choice is that violent actors have calculated the "cost-benefit" of their decisions and determined there is no alternative but violent action. According to their skewed perception, the pros of violent conflict outweigh those of peaceful compliance.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> National Consortium for START, (2011), <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/>, (Accessed September 9, 2010).

<sup>53</sup> Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, (1981): 385.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 385.

<sup>55</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 24; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 396.

When faced with a repressive government and little opportunity for mobilization, rational choice proponents argue that violence is a rational decision because it is a “relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential reward is high.”<sup>56</sup> There simply is not another available option to using violence.<sup>57</sup>

Critics of the rational choice assumption are skeptical that violent action results from calculated cost-benefit analysis. The opportunity costs of engaging in violent rebellion rarely outweigh those of living the status quo. The downtrodden are no match for the larger, stronger and better-trained government and military forces. The impoverished should instead “pursue private aims, like staying alive, or avoiding torture, imprisonment and starvation.”<sup>58</sup> The average individual is not likely to benefit from involvement in a violent rebellion, and thus the rational choice would be to remain on the sidelines and continue living their lives without dissent.<sup>59</sup>

The opposite is true in countries where rebellions have been successful at overthrowing governments. Instead of viewing the government as an insurmountable adversary, the oppressed have proof that violent action works and so the opportunity cost of engaging in violent rebellion is considerably lower. When the public observes how violent tactics earn political power, there is little motivation to pursue nonviolent means.<sup>60</sup>

#### **D. THEORIES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

The origins of political violence are highly scrutinized and debated. This thesis distinguishes itself in that it is focusing on two nations with similar demographics but with a significant disparity in levels of violence. The major existing arguments regarding political violence rely on specific and isolated

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<sup>56</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, 387.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 396.

<sup>58</sup> Erich Weede, “On Political Violence and its Avoidance,” *Acta Politica* 39 (2004): 159.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

indicators of violent mobilization. These theories will be scrutinized in order to establish a framework within which to examine the cases of Morocco and Algeria. Understanding the indicators and factors of political violence is imperative to future regional security.<sup>61</sup>

### **1. Poverty Breeds Terrorism**

A major misconception persists in the study of political violence. Many continue to believe that poverty breeds terrorism and instability, regardless of evidence to the contrary. Perhaps the larger problem is that this belief is not just held by the casual observer inundated with sensationalized media, but that it has also taken hold of national leaders and those leading international development agencies. As such, it is imperative to address the notion that poor people are more likely to violently revolt or engage in terrorist activity.

The “rooted-in-poverty” hypothesis stems from the belief that impoverished countries teeming with poorly educated, unemployed masses qualified by a widening gap between the rich and poor combined with low literacy rates are fermentation tanks for dangerous and violent militants. The low levels of economic and social development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political violence and instability.<sup>62</sup>

While the empirical evidence refutes this hypothesis, it continues to be popular, even with prominent U.S. military and government officials. The ideas encompassed within this hypothesis will be henceforth dubbed “popular wisdom”. It will encompass the beliefs that political violence is a result of poverty, poor education and acute unemployment.

When campaigning for the United States presidency, President Barack Obama wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* in which he stated, “extremely poor societies and weak states provide optimal breeding grounds for disease, terrorism, and conflict.” His position indicated his belief that the United States

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<sup>61</sup> Jeremy Keenan, "Security & Insecurity in North Africa," 285.

<sup>62</sup> James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 160.

has a vested interest in restructuring global wealth and bringing these societies out of despotism. He went on to urge U.S. citizens to “invest in building capable, democratic states that can establish healthy and educated communities, develop markets, and generate wealth. Such states would also have greater institutional capacities to fight terrorism...”<sup>63</sup>

In 2008, the United States organized USAFRICOM in order to address the issues unique and specific to the African continent. Yet even with a focus on the unique challenges of the African continent, both leaders of the newly established USAFRICOM continue to use the same rhetoric as countless other news and public media pundits. That is, Generals Ward and Ham have argued in favor of economic development and wealth as the solution to the instability and conflict problems. Poverty, they say, “erodes confidence in national institutions and governing capacity” and can lead to the security threats that plague American interests.<sup>64</sup>

With data from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, James Piazza illustrates the disparity between speculation and reality. Over a 15-year period, out of ten nations most afflicted by terrorist incidences, “only three...fit the profile of low levels of socioeconomic development”.<sup>65</sup> However, evidence illustrates a starkly different reality. Research indicates that in lesser-developed nations “economic progress is actually negatively related to transnational terrorism.”<sup>66</sup> It is not the poorer countries, but the richer ones that are more prone to transnational terrorism.

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<sup>63</sup> Barack H. Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2007)

<sup>64</sup> Carter F. Ham, Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 2011, Available at: <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Ham%2004-07-11.pdf>.

<sup>65</sup> James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," 161.

<sup>66</sup> S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess, "From (No) Butter to Guns? Understanding the Economic Role in Transnational Terrorism," in *Terrorism, Economic Development and Political Openness*, by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 83.

Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog demonstrated that a disproportionate number of violent extremists were highly educated engineers.<sup>67</sup>

Piazza finds that “None of the economic indicators are significant predictors of either terrorist incidents or casualties.”<sup>68</sup> Rather, in direct conflict with popular wisdom, Piazza claims “there is no empirical evidence to support the crux of the ‘rooted-in-poverty’ thesis...”<sup>69</sup> The fallout from such a revelation can be expected to be quite significant. If poverty is the critical failure point, then it also provides an easy answer to the problem of political violence, instability and terrorism. Thus, determining that poverty is the crux of political violence means that policy makers no longer have “a potential ‘cure’ for the scourge of terrorism and a tool in preventing political violence...”<sup>70</sup>

Even while former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn has gone on record several times touting poverty as the major variable for terrorism and violent conflict, John Underwood of the World Bank disagrees and points out that most terrorists are not impoverished, but rather are “well-educated and middle class.”<sup>71</sup> He observes that while the world overall is coming out of poverty, the incidences of terrorism are not falling as would be expected.<sup>72</sup>

Regardless of the number of news pundits that lament poverty and the agencies that suggest donating more aid to cure political instability, this thesis, corroborated by empirical evidence, firmly stands against these proposed solutions. The truly impoverished are too busy working to make ends meet to engage in violent political action. The case of Algeria’s relative wealth and high violence is just one example that contradicts this hypothesis. Therefore, there

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<sup>67</sup> Diego Gambetta, and Steffen Hertog, "Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?" *European Journal of Sociology* 50, no. 2 (Aug 2009): 201–230.

<sup>68</sup> Piazza, "Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages," 170.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 170

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 170

<sup>71</sup> John Underwood, "Poverty and Terrorism," 2004.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*



must be some other motive for terrorism outside of poverty; being poor, in and of itself, is not a sufficient motivator for violent conflict.

## **2. Relative Deprivation Theory**

Recognizing the pitfalls in attributing political violence to poverty alone, the relative deprivation theory emerged as another popular explanation for political violence. Relative deprivation refers to the discrepancy between “expectation and aspiration. If we expect something to happen then we are likely to feel discontented if it does not materialize. If we aspire to something then we may feel less discontent if it does not materialize.”<sup>73</sup> The theory, made popular by Ted Robert Gurr in 1970, suggests that discontent manifested by the failure to aspire or receive can lead to political violence. Gurr’s three-step model illustrates how discontent grows into violent action: “first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.”<sup>74</sup> Gurr uses relative deprivation theory to fuse psychological variables into the study of political violence.<sup>75</sup> It is less about the absolute resources that are or are not available, but rather the perception of the people as to how fair their share is.

Gurr demonstrates that a necessary aspect of relative deprivation theory is the politicized nature of one’s discontent. When grievances are successfully framed within a political context, they evoke stronger reactions than general discontent. Individuals are able to focus in on a source for their discontent and are left to conclude that violent mobilization will achieve sufficient political change so as to improve their relative station in society. This theory is relevant because it suggests that the notably higher levels of violence in Algeria could be explained by a higher expectation if it could be determined that Algerians, significantly more so than Moroccans, have an expectation for a specific quality of life.

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<sup>73</sup> Craig Webber, “Reevaluating Relative Deprivation Theory,” *Theoretical Criminology*, (2007): 99.

<sup>74</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 13.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

W.G. Runciman used the concept of relative deprivation to describe how an individual compares his own social and economic statuses to how he perceives that of a reference group. The objective is that abject poverty is not an indicator of discontent, but rather the relative inequality within a given society. "If groups that are fairly well off tend to compare themselves with even more privileged strata, this could explain why they are sometimes more discontented than genuinely poor people, as the latter presumably tend to be much more modest in their choice of reference group".<sup>76</sup>

Relative deprivation capitalizes on the existence of disparities in classes within a nation and theorizes that because of this disparity, social friction will result. Even those who may be relatively well off can feasibly become dissatisfied with their station in life when they are comparing themselves to a higher class that is extremely wealthy. This could help explain the situation in Algeria assuming the level of perceived inequality is greater than exists in Morocco. Absolute numbers could mean very little if the entire nation is poor, but if there are distinct classes, this may fuel the fires of growing discontent.

Criminologists Webber and Ross acknowledge that relative deprivation theory is useful in identifying violent tendencies, but is not a sufficient explanation for the rate of violent mobilization.<sup>77</sup> Other critics of the theory observe that "deprivation theorists should expect mass rebellions to be fairly frequent,"<sup>78</sup> and this is no surprise when Gurr purports that "widespread discontent provides a general impetus to collective violence."<sup>79</sup> If discontent alone were sufficient for political violence, we should expect to see large-scale rebellions across the U.S. in light of current economic situations, but this is not the case. Social

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<sup>76</sup> Axel West Pedersen, "Inequality as Relative Deprivation: A Sociological Approach to Inequality Measurement." *Acta Sociologica* 47, no. 1 (March 2004): 39.

<sup>77</sup> Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research*, (1993): 317; Webber, "Reevaluating Relative Deprivation Theory," 114.

<sup>78</sup> Weede, "On Political Violence and its Avoidance", 157.

<sup>79</sup> Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 13.

mobilization theory also argues that grievances alone are not enough to motivate violent collective action.<sup>80</sup> Fearon and Laitin imply that relative deprivation is too preoccupied with economic grievances.

Nicholas Sambanis argues that relative deprivation does not help explain terrorism or civil conflicts. Instead, relative deprivation theorists “do not present systematic evidence to demonstrate that inequality or structural change are necessary and sufficient conditions for violence.”<sup>81</sup> Sambanis suggests that economic inequality could be responsible for “increasing the risk of political instability or regime transition”, but the catalyst is actually regime repressiveness.<sup>82</sup> The combination of the two variables is a “potent...recipe for political instability” and presumably inevitable violent action.<sup>83</sup> Instead, while a relationship between economic inequality and political violence may exist, it is more indirect than relative deprivation theorists would suggest. Muller concludes that by itself, income inequality is a weak indicator of political instability.<sup>84</sup>

### 3. Resource Curse Theory

Does oil preclude democracy? Are nations with large stores of natural resources fated for corrupt governments, greedy consumerism and devastating civil conflict? There are many who think exactly that and developed what is known as the “Resource Curse” theory. The resource curse theory is based on the observation that “states with abundant resource wealth perform less than their resource-poor counterparts.”<sup>85</sup> On the surface, it seems as if this notion can explain why Algeria, with its reliance on hydrocarbons is more unstable than

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<sup>80</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria.” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, by Quintan Wiktorowicz, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004): 37–60.

<sup>81</sup> Nicholas Sambanis, “Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence,” 173.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.

<sup>83</sup> Edward N. Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” *American Sociological Review* 50, no. 1 (Feb 1985): 60.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 60

<sup>85</sup> Michael L. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” *World Politics* 51, no. 2 (Jan 1999): 297.

its resource-poor neighbor, Morocco, is. Yet a deeper and more thorough understanding of this theory is necessary in determining the extent to which it actually explains the cases of Algeria and Morocco.

Miriam Lowi defines the resource-curse theory as “the idea that natural resource wealth...functions as a constraint, rather than an asset, for development.”<sup>86</sup> She argues that academics developed this theory in order to explain how nations that have an abundance of natural resources—specifically hydrocarbons or minerals—perform so much poorer than their resource-poor neighbors do.<sup>87</sup> Yet, what is it about natural resources that breed corruption and instability? Erich Weede speculates, “rich resource endowments reinforce elite predatory behavior and thereby make institutional and economic development more difficult.”<sup>88</sup> Samuel Huntington also supports the idea of a resource curse in his assertion that the democratic trend will bypass the Middle East since many of these states “depend heavily on oil exports, which enhances the control of the state bureaucracy.”<sup>89</sup>

While oil in and of itself does not cause conflict, the rents from such natural resources “tend to consolidate what is already in place: incumbents remain in power and authoritarianism is reinforced.”<sup>90</sup> Ross suggests that natural resource wealth is linked to authoritarianism by state repression “Citizens in resource-rich states may want democracy as much as citizens elsewhere, but resource wealth may allow their governments to spend more on internal security and so block the population’s democratic aspirations.”<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Miriam Lowi, "Oil Rents and Political Breakdown in Patrimonial States: Algeria in Comparative Perspective," *The Journal of North African Studies* 9, no. 3 (October 2004): 85.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 85

<sup>88</sup> Weede, “On Political Violence and its Avoidance,” 170.

<sup>89</sup> Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (Apr 2001): 330.

<sup>90</sup> Lowi, "Oil Rents and Political Breakdown in Patrimonial States: Algeria in Comparative Perspective," 87.

<sup>91</sup> Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" 335.

In his discussion of the “resource curse”, Ross makes mention of how the ailment “Dutch Disease” can afflict political stability. The term Dutch Disease is a media-coined phrase relating to economic misfortune.<sup>92</sup> The term dates back to the late 1950s when the Netherlands discovered natural gas off its shores. The Dutch nation enjoyed massive profits from its discovery, but soon experienced a serious backlash as its non-natural gas exports became less competitive on the world market due to the growing strength of the Dutch guilder.<sup>93</sup> Even when not applicable, this situation evokes a fear of primary commodity-driven markets and has given weight to the Resource Curse theory.<sup>94</sup>

If it is true that mineral or hydrocarbon resources account for increased political instability, the implication is that a more diverse economy will foster a more peaceful and stable nation. States in which revenues are secured from the global market do not have to be as accountable to their people. Most states rely on taxes to fund state programs but this is not the case in nations with profitable natural resources consumed on the foreign market. As such, the state can operate autonomously from its constituents and use rents to essentially buy peaceful obedience from the people.<sup>95</sup> In addition, states with large stores of natural resources are also likely to maintain disproportionately large military forces. Because wealth that is derived from natural resources can instigate civil conflict, resource-endowed states often defend their position with larger militaries. Stronger militaries may indicate a government’s willingness to use force to quell public discontent and so result in more civil wars.<sup>96</sup>

Given that reliance on a single volatile good can increase the likelihood of political violence, greater economic diversification could result in less political instability. However, Henry and Springborg observed how “economic

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<sup>92</sup> Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," 306.

<sup>93</sup> Christine Ebrahim-zadeh, "Back to Basics." *Finance & Development* 40 (March 2003): 50.

<sup>94</sup> Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," 306.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 312; Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, *The Arab Economies in a Changing World*, (Washington DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007): 30.

<sup>96</sup> Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" 336.

liberalization requires a major political change.”<sup>97</sup> This observation is critical because while economic diversification may indicate lower levels of violence, this is not to say that it is sufficient for political change. Rather political change is necessary for economic liberalization, and so simply trying to diversify a national economy without addressing the root issue of policy, it is unlikely there will be long-lasting change.

#### **4. Political Process Theory**

The decision to engage in a collective rebellion is not an impulse decision, but one that has been influenced by a myriad of variables. Several theories purport to explain the decision to mobilize, but none better than the political process theory, which was originally developed in response to the glaring deficiencies of alternative explanations. The Political Process theory distinguishes itself from the other theories because it addresses more than variance between national economics. Rather it suggests that the degree of political inclusion and nature of state repression are better indicators of political violence. This theory implies that because Morocco authorizes more political inclusion and is more discriminate in its oppression; its citizens have a lower inclination towards political discontentment that would lead to violent mobilization. In contrast, this theory would also suggest that because Algeria’s government is more closed off, its citizens are more likely to act out in a violent manner. The “repressiveness of the political system or regime” is the prime indicator of political violence.<sup>98</sup>

As seeds of discontent evolve into violent mobilization that discontent must be politicized in order to effectively mobilize violent behavior. Without feelings of frustration or dissatisfaction with the status quo, it is unlikely that dissident groups would form and mobilize in collective action.<sup>99</sup> The “movement

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<sup>97</sup> Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (2010): 136.

<sup>98</sup> Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” 48.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

behavior is shaped by the broader political context.”<sup>100</sup> It is the character of a nation’s political system, which will determine whether populations will mobilize in violent rebellions or utilize nonviolent alternatives.<sup>101</sup>

Political Process advocates maintain that political violence “is an outcome of an ill-fated convergence of three variables—indiscriminate repression, exclusive organizations and anti-system ideologies.”<sup>102</sup> It is not that poverty, perceived inequality and volatile markets are not potential indicators of political violence, they just are not sufficient for violent collective action.

Luis Martinez questions the causal relationship of the political violence-economic relationship. Does political violence beget economic failure or does economic failure beget political violence?<sup>103</sup> The direction of this relationship is of particular importance because while the two may coincide in weak states, determining the root problem will dictate which course of action can solve the dilemma. If political violence weakens the economy, addressing the economic fallout will only be a superficial band-aid, requiring further corrective action for a full recovery. Nicholas Sambanis notes that while economic factors should not be negated, collective violence “should be responsive to improvements in the degree of political openness even without parallel improvements in economic development.”<sup>104</sup> Thus, nations with low measures of political freedom are presumed to have higher rates of terrorist activity, regardless of their economic welfare.

When the state is oppressive, rebellions ensue and the state often uses violent methods to quell the rebellion. The government’s harsh response is then

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<sup>100</sup> Hafez, “From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria,” 39.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>103</sup> Luis Martinez, “Why the Violence in Algeria?” *The Journal of North African Studies*, 9: 2, (2004): 25.

<sup>104</sup> Sambanis, “Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence,” 172.

met with terrorist retaliation.<sup>105</sup> Unfortunately, the cycle is difficult to break, as one side must choose to respond to violence in a calm and nonviolent manner. Fathali Moghaddam explains that many terrorists believe they are acting as a proxy government because the official government is too corrupt, unwilling or unable to complete the job for which they are appointed.<sup>106</sup>

In the article, “The Economics of Violence”, good governance was found to be an essential variable in the rates of violence within a country. This does not discount the effect of poverty, income inequality and other economic measures, but reinforces the idea that a legitimate political system is just as important as a strong economy.<sup>107</sup> Just as poor governance can manifest itself into a variety of problems; it is also caused by a variety of methods. It is important to understand why states fail to provide good governance in order to understand the negative impact of failed policies.

Those who subscribe to the political process theory do so because they believe that while economics can be an indication of weak governance, and is often correlated with political violence; poverty and income inequality are not sufficient causes of political violence. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) published a study in which they found that “at the macro-level, wealth does not inoculate against (violent extremism), and better economic conditions do not necessarily reduce public endorsement of terrorist tactics.”<sup>108</sup> While donating economic aid is fairly easy, job creation and policy reform are not. This is fundamental as to why things are not changing. Standard economic aid is a western approach that lacks the empathy required to address the unique

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<sup>105</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, 384.

<sup>106</sup> Fathalis M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006): 3.

<sup>107</sup> The Economist, “The Economics of Violence: Are countries poor because they are violent or violent because they are poor?” April 14, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18558041>.

<sup>108</sup> Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, Management Systems International report for USAID (USAID, February 2009): 11.



problems of individual countries and therefore lacks positive and meaningful results as well.

There are still those who firmly disagree with the tenets of the political process approach. Fearon and Laitin argue that poverty and inequality are better indicators of political violence because weak states are the cause of political violence and economic variables are simply indicators of weak governance.<sup>109</sup> It is expected that in nations with weaker governments and corrupt practices, rebellions and insurgencies would be that much higher than in nations with comparatively stronger governments.<sup>110</sup> A significant predicament exists with fully open governments in the Middle East and North Africa. It is a Catch-22, as the regimes do not want an open state to be taken over by extreme Islamists only to have future progress for democratization be lost, however, it is impossible to have a completely open state without allowing all actors to participate.<sup>111</sup>

## **E. CONCLUSION**

Having an understanding of the prominent theories on political violence establishes a baseline from which to build upon in the upcoming chapters of this thesis. The following chapters will examine the various variables specific to Algeria and Morocco within the framework of the aforementioned theories. The goal is to identify the best explanation for why Algeria suffers from higher rates of political violence in comparison to Morocco's more stable political environment.

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<sup>109</sup> James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (Feb 2003): 88.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 75–76.

<sup>111</sup> Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "The Limits of Limited Reforms," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (January 2008): 26.

### III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The field of economics is credited with a wide breadth of successes ranging from explaining why teachers cheat to why drug dealers live with their mothers to how a name establishes one's destiny.<sup>112</sup> However, at some point these "causal" relationships overstep their boundaries. If higher income per capita indicates lower levels of terrorism, should it be assumed that richer nations should hand over money to poorer nations to ensure international security? When do we stop to examine the direction of that relationship?

#### A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STANDARDS

The popular understanding of political violence is that it stems from economic poverty, a lack of education and chronic unemployment. Therefore, these are key areas within which to compare the two case studies. What emerges is a starkly different picture than what popular wisdom implies.

Literacy is a common measure of education and can reflect a nation's skill level; the amount of importance granted to education and may indicate a population's tendency towards collective violence. Those who are uneducated may be more susceptible to the extremist message, leaving them brainwashed and angry with the ruling regime. Morocco's people trail the rest of the world in social development indicators. Data from the period 2004–2008 indicate that nearly half of adults (15 years and older) are considered illiterate (approximately 44%). Youth (15-24 years of age) literacy rates are at 85%, giving hope to the idea that Morocco's situation is improving and that the majority of the illiterate in Morocco are older generations. However, the gender divide is still a very real concern as young women trail behind their male counterparts by nearly 20%.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything* (New York: William Morrow, 2005).

<sup>113</sup> unicef, "At a Glance: Algeria," *UNICEF*, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/algeria\\_statistics.html#77](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/algeria_statistics.html#77) (accessed Apr 29, 2011).

Algeria's literacy rates are significantly higher than Morocco's. The literacy rate among adults aged 15 and older is 73% and is almost 94% amongst young Algerian males (ages 15–24). Young women still trail their male counterparts, but only by five percentage points in comparison to the nearly 20 point differential between Morocco's young men and women.<sup>114</sup> Despite the higher literacy rates, and presumable education and skill levels, Algeria still suffers from more political violence.

Unemployment is a common concern across North Africa, afflicting Morocco and Algeria, both. Morocco's unemployment statistics are estimated to be around 10%, but this number masks a more serious problem of persistent underemployment and youth unemployment.<sup>115</sup> Estimates put youth unemployment in the urban areas around 26%; meanwhile, job opportunities for college graduates are diminishing.<sup>116</sup> Like Morocco, Algeria suffers from high unemployment. While its unemployment rates are gradually improving, recent data suggest total unemployment still hovers around 14%. Even more troubling is that fact the youth unemployment rates range between 15–20%.

Underemployment and high rates of youth unemployment are devastating to political stability because youth who are looking forward and see the bloated labor market have little incentive to work hard for an education. College-educated individuals may be working monotonous positions created by the state to simply employ the citizens. There is little job satisfaction, incentive to work harder or suggestion for a better life. Instead, those who were underemployed, or completely unemployed, are left to lay blame for their position and the lack of better paying and more rewarding jobs in their country. Such lamenting could be a precursor to violent collective action.

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<sup>114</sup> unicef, "At a Glance: Algeria," *UNICEF*, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/algeria\\_statistics.html#77](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/algeria_statistics.html#77) (accessed Apr 29, 2011).

<sup>115</sup> The World Bank "World Development Indicators - Morocco" (2011) <http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco>

<sup>116</sup> Migdalovitz, *Morocco: Current Issues*, 9; White, "Kingdom of Morocco", 15.

## 1. Poverty

Poverty is sometimes thought to increase the rate of political violence because poor people have nothing left to lose. They are living in subpar conditions, often without sufficient nutrition and presumably want to lash out in anger. However, some scholars assert that poverty is not in and of itself a cause of political violence, but rather it measures a nation's ability to govern.<sup>117</sup> Fearon and Laitin justify poverty as a key indicator of ethnic conflict because they argue that poverty is an effective measure of weak governance. Weak states and judicial systems are not equipped to quell violence, and that in such cases, the people view violent action as their only recourse against a failing state.<sup>118</sup> It is the weak state that increases violent behavior, not simply the absence of personal wealth.

Morocco's economic situation, as illustrated in Figure 1, is not enviable. The national GDP per capita in 2009 was \$2,811 and roughly 3% of the population was earning less than \$2 per day.<sup>119</sup> The most recent data for Algeria indicates that 6.5% of the population (nearly twice that of Morocco) earns less than \$2 dollars per day.<sup>120</sup> However, Morocco continues to be a model of a poor nation that still enjoys relative peace and stability to its MENA neighbors. In comparison, Algeria's GDP per capita was \$4,029 in 2009, a figure almost 50% higher than Morocco's GDP per capita but still experiences high rates of political violence.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Sambanis, "Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence," 174–175.

<sup>118</sup> Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," 78–79.

<sup>119</sup> The World Bank, "World Development Indicators – Morocco," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco>

<sup>120</sup> The World Bank, "World Development Indicators – Algeria," (2011) <http://data.worldbank.org/country/algeria>

<sup>121</sup> The World Bank, "World Development Indicators – Morocco," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco>; The World Bank, "World Development Indicators – Algeria," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/algeria>

### GDP per capita at current prices

Gross Domestic Product per capita at current prices. Not adjusted for inflation and converted to US dollars applying market exchange rates. [More info »](#)




Figure 1. Comparison of Morocco and Algeria's GDP per capita (From World Bank, 2011)

Assuming poverty could explain all counts of political violence, Morocco should have much higher rates of political violence and terrorism. However, Algeria's population earns almost 50% more per year than Morocco's population, and still Algeria undoubtedly suffers from more frequent and violent political instability. Poverty is simply a poor explanation for political violence in the cases of Morocco and Algeria. Some may advocate that wars are fought in order to "win wealth and leave poverty" but the analysis of Morocco and Algeria unequivocally refutes this idea.<sup>122</sup>

## 2. Economic Diversification

The resource curse theory would argue that Algeria's political violence is a result of its reliance on hydrocarbons. Morocco, on the other hand, has minimal hydrocarbon stores, instead basing its economy on agriculture and services in addition to phosphate exports. The question still stands as to whether a heavier reliance on one volatile good results in greater political instability and violent militancy.

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<sup>122</sup> Lawrence Kuznar, "Rationality Wars and the War on Terror: Explaining Terrorism and Social Unrest," *American Anthropologist* 109, no. 2 (Jun 2007): 319.

It is possible that political stability is linked to a nation's economic structure. Some contend that greater economic diversification contributes to a more stable nation because there is more interaction and accountability between the government and its people. With the economy divided between public and private ventures, as well as among different industries, the people are more invested in their economic welfare. They are as much responsible for economic success as the government.

On the other hand, an economy founded on a single natural resource creates an entirely different political environment. Natural resources like oil and natural gas are most profitable when traded on the international market. However, this is where they are most volatile as well. In states like Algeria, where the resources are owned, processed, and sold by the state, there is little involvement from the people. They instead rely on the state to disseminate income and provide social services. In times of plenty, the people are content to sit idly by, but when market prices fall, the people are hit hardest. Oil and gas revenues account for more than 80% of Algeria's national income, a detail that could contribute to its higher levels of political violence. Without economic diversification, there is little motive for the incumbents to answer to the people.

Countries with privatized sectors help keep the government accountable. With independent banking systems, the Moroccan economy is also much more privatized than Algeria's state owned banking systems.<sup>123</sup> However, simply refining a nation's economic system is not an isolated endeavor. This is where the resource curse theory begins to fall apart. The government must revise its policies, thus complicating the policy-economy relationship. Morocco may provide an example of economic diversification coinciding with political stability and peaceful state-constituent relationships, but it does not prove that economic diversification is necessary or sufficient for said benefits.

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<sup>123</sup> Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 88.

Algeria went through several periods of leaders who made attempts to liberalize the economy, but these were generally superficial displays with no real change. In the last five to ten years, Algeria has been making more aggressive moves as if it is liberalizing its economy.<sup>124</sup> From Boumedienne to Chadli to Bouteflika, Algeria's leaders' attempts to privatize national businesses have accomplished little more than opening the economy up to manipulation rather than greater efficiency.<sup>125</sup> The economic power is still consolidated into the hands of a few and the people of Algeria are left at the whims of importers and state officials.<sup>126</sup>

It is not the natural resource that causes political instability, but rather the resource that can create a barrier between the state and the people. Stronger governance can override the influence of volatile markets, and it may be that reliance on natural resource wealth is an indicator of weaker governance. Instead, it would seem this is a much larger issue with regards to the drivers of political violence than simply an economy reliant on one natural resource. Economic diversification is not enough to explain the disparity between Algeria and Morocco. The real problem may be that poor economics do not cause violence, but that violence impedes poor economic development.<sup>127</sup>

### **3. Income Inequality**

In an attempt to compensate for the failures in the ability for poverty, as measured by income per capita, to sufficiently account for political violence, some researchers suggested that income inequality could be a better indicator. According to these scholars, nations with a significantly unequal distribution of

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<sup>124</sup> Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (2010): 132-133.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>127</sup> The Economist, "The Economics of Violence," <http://www.economist.com/node/18558041>.

income would see a corresponding increase in violent collective action. This led to the development of the relative deprivation theory.

GDP per capita alone cannot distinguish levels of inequality in a given population as it averages all income across the population. Two nations with similar GDP per capita can be wildly different in the equality of their populations based on how much the earnings of the highest 20% compare with those of the lowest 20%. There are several ways of measuring this poverty gap, one of which is the Gini income coefficient, or the Gini index.

The Gini index is most often used to measure the relative level of inequality and so indicate the projected level of instability in that given data set. The index has also come to be known as the “index of envy”.<sup>128</sup> When interpreting the Gini coefficient, a number closer to zero indicates equality and a number closer to one suggests inequality. For example, “one person has all the income or consumption; all others have none.”<sup>129</sup> The Gini index is similar, but measures from 0 to 100, with 0 representing complete equality and 100 representing complete inequality. A society without a middle class and the rest of the population divided between very rich and very poor would represent “a maximum degree of relative deprivation.”<sup>130</sup> It is this kind of scenario that Runciman would argue most closely aligns to the relative deprivation theory, which states that social grievances lead to conflict.

In the cases of Algeria and Morocco, the Gini index is not very useful. The most recent data for Algeria is from 1995 and the calculated Gini was 35.3.<sup>131</sup> The Gini index for Morocco in 1995 was 39 and rose slightly to 40.9 in 2007.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Pedersen, “Inequality as Relative Deprivation: A Sociological Approach to Inequality,” 33.

<sup>129</sup> Aline Coudouel, Jesko S. Hentschel, and Quentin T. Wodon, “Poverty Measurement and Analysis”, in *The PRSP Sourcebook*, World Bank (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2002): 48

<sup>130</sup> Pedersen, “Inequality as Relative Deprivation: A Sociological Approach to Inequality,” 39.

<sup>131</sup> “Algeria,” *The World Factbook 2011*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

<sup>132</sup> UNDP Human Development Report Office, *Income Gini Coefficient*, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/67106.html> (accessed June 29, 2011).



Thus, the Gini index suggests that Morocco suffers from greater income inequality relative to Algeria. A very telling detail is that the most recent data for Algeria's economic indicators is nearly 16 years old. This could demonstrate two different scenarios, either a closed government hesitant to reveal its questionable economic state, or a weak government incapable of collecting accurate statistics. Neither of these scenarios is desirable and could create an environment of distrust, cynicism and fear. If the public is already prone to violence, a closed or weak government could provide the necessary catalyst for repeated violent mobilization.

If the theory of relative deprivation stands correct, then redistributing the income in Algeria would result in achieving greater political stability, similar to that in Morocco.<sup>133</sup> However, data shows that the richest 10% in Morocco receive nearly one-third of national income while the top 10% in Algeria receive about one-quarter of the national income. In addition, Algeria's top 20% hold nearly half of the national income.<sup>134</sup> Further research needs to be done to determine whether or not relative deprivation theory can explain the discrepancy in political stability between Algeria and Morocco.

There are inherent flaws with the Gini index. These flaws lend support to the idea that a direct measure of income disparity may be more useful in comparing the cases of Morocco and Algeria. One of the most glaring disadvantages of the Gini index is that it "var(ies) when the distribution varies, no matter if the change occurs at the top, the bottom, or the middle (any transfer of income between two individuals has an effect on the indexes, irrespective of whether it takes place among the rich, among the poor, or between the rich and the poor)."<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Insurgency," *The American Political Science Review*, 81, no. 2 (Jun 1987): 444.

<sup>134</sup> World Bank Development Research Group, "Income share held by highest 20%," <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.05TH.20/countries?page=3> (accessed May 5, 2011).

<sup>135</sup> Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon, "Poverty Measurement and Analysis", 48.

It is important to understand that while many economic indicators appear to influence the existence of political violence, the reality is much more complex. Economics may play a role in the level and degree of political violence within a given nation, but they do not fully explain the cases of Morocco and Algeria. Instead, there are other variables at play. Rather than focus on increasing wages or GDP, or decreasing unemployment, other research suggests greater economic openness is critical to economic freedom and is better equipped to increase growth rates.<sup>136</sup> Economic openness often correlates with political openness, a factor, which may prove to be a more reliable indicator of violent action in Morocco and Algeria.

#### **4. Global Relations**

Morocco has a strong relationship with the United States, arguably one of the best in MENA. On the contrary, Algeria has worked to establish and maintain boundaries between itself and other Western nations. Understandably, Algeria's history with colonialism has tarnished its perspective of Western diplomacy. Algerians suspect an ulterior motive and are quick to preserve their autonomy, even to a fault. Morocco distinguishes itself by working to maintain favorable trade and diplomatic relations.

Economic factors are likely the primary motivation to normalize relations with some of the more historically radical countries in the region, but the discovery and development of natural gas industries in Algeria and oil fields in Libya also serves as motivation for U.S. involvement.<sup>137</sup> Algeria's discovery of hydrocarbon stores has made an enormous difference both economically and diplomatically. Unfortunately, oil is a volatile international commodity and Algeria's economic dependence on the resource led to roller coaster economic conditions. Algeria has also made recent oil discoveries with estimated oil

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<sup>136</sup> Weede, "On Political Violence and its Avoidance," 167.

<sup>137</sup> Yahia H. Zoubir, "The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security," *International Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2009): 982.

reserves valued at over twelve billion barrels.<sup>138</sup> This has prompted the significant trading relations between Algeria and the U.S., making the United States “Algeria’s biggest trading partner and largest source of foreign investment.”<sup>139</sup>

Algeria is an active member of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); but is still only an observer of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its membership in transnational organizations appears to be mainly limited to those with an anti-Western bias. This is demonstrative of a nation with a firm distrust of Western nations. Algeria continues to hone an identity independent of Western influence, even in the realm of economics. It is possible that this distrust contributes to a national identity skeptical of foreign influences and ulterior motives. Violent mobilization is more likely when an identity of distrust and skepticism exists.

Morocco was among the first nations to recognize the United States as an independent nation in 1787, and maintains the longest standing diplomatic contract in US history.<sup>140</sup> The two nations share a long relationship based on mutual respect. While Morocco has opposed some U.S. anti-terror initiatives, the small North African country has also been recognized for its contribution to anti-terrorism efforts. Morocco enjoys a bilateral free-trade agreement with the U.S. and has been appointed as a major non-NATO ally. In addition, Morocco continues to receive millions of dollars in aid each year from the USAID.<sup>141</sup> However, despite the favorable relationship between the governments of Morocco and the United States, a clear divide still exists between the state and the people with regard to pro-Western endeavors.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Zoubir, "The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security," 983.

<sup>139</sup> Christopher Hemmer, "U.S. Policy Towards North Africa: Three Overarching Themes," *Middle East Policy* 14 (Winter 2007): 59.

<sup>140</sup> Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008): 28.

<sup>141</sup> Migdalovitz, *Morocco: Current Issues*, 12–18.

<sup>142</sup> White, "Kingdom of Morocco", 482.

Morocco benefits from a favorable trade relationship with the European Union (EU), but this is not without setbacks. Morocco attempted to join the EU in 1987 but was promptly rejected.<sup>143</sup> Still, nearly twelve years later, Morocco and the EU entered into free-trade for industrial goods and Morocco hopes to have a comprehensive free-trade agreement with the EU by 2012.<sup>144</sup> Morocco was also appointed a beneficiary of the European Neighborhood Agreement (ENA) in 2006.<sup>145</sup> The ENA grants special privileges to specified nations that are not a part of the European Union. As a result, the EU has bestowed more than US\$1.4 billion onto Morocco from 1995–2003, making it the “top beneficiary among Mediterranean nations of community assistance from the European Union.”<sup>146</sup>

Morocco is working hard to increase its tourism sector with the king making the expansion one of his primary goals. One of the king’s milestones was to increase the number of international visitors to 10 million, up from 2.2 million in 2003. As of 2008, Morocco hosted 7.8 million foreign tourists.<sup>147</sup> Tourism is an interesting economic sector because the country’s prosperity depends on stability. The people have a vested interest in preserving the security and safety of the nation. However, how much of this relationship is dependent on tourism and not tourism being a derivative of a peaceful nation?

## **B. CONCLUSION**

Economics can highlight deficiencies within a country that may favor violent action.

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<sup>143</sup> White, “Kingdom of Morocco”, 481.

<sup>144</sup> Migdalovitz, *Morocco: Current Issues*, 12

<sup>145</sup> European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy*  
[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm) (accessed March 23, 2011).

<sup>146</sup> Migdalovitz, *Morocco: Current Issues*, 13

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 11; Morocco's Tourism Administration, “Tourism Based on Figures,”  
<http://www.tourisme.gov.ma/english/5-Tourisme-chiffres/ChiffresCles.htm> (accessed May 14, 2011)

However, economic measures of poverty, income inequality, and globalization fail to fully account for why Algeria's population is significantly more prone to political violence as opposed to Morocco. The two may be correlated, but the cause and effect relationship just is not substantiated.

## **IV. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT**

Economic development may encourage a more peaceful environment, but economics alone does not prompt collective violent action. Economic deprivation, while lamentable and likely to foster envy, is not a sufficient explanation for the vast difference in violent action between Algeria and Morocco. In an effort to find a more substantial explanation, many political scientists understandably, look to the nature of political development. The nature of political Islam, Government structures, electoral processes, political parties and accessibility to national leadership are possible explanatory factors for the frequency and degree of political violence in Algeria as opposed to the relative stability of Morocco.

In trying to determine the reason Morocco enjoys greater political stability in comparison to Algeria, the political process theory offers an explanation. Nations with greater degrees of political freedom will also enjoy greater stability and lower incidences of political violence. The political process model goes back to McAdam's assumption that discontent "is relevant as a necessary condition for the formation of dissident groups."<sup>148</sup>

### **A. POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND STABILITY**

Figure 2 illustrates how Algeria's cases of political violence vastly outnumber Morocco's cases. This data demonstrates a glaring disparity in violence levels between Morocco and Algeria, but it does not provide the justification, rationale or fundamental drivers of political violence.

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<sup>148</sup> Muller, "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness and Political Violence", 48.




Figure 2. Political Violence in Algeria and Morocco (After SMART, 2011)

The Western Sahara continues to plague Morocco’s southern border since its independence from Spain in 1976. When the Spanish pulled out, the territory known as Western Sahara became a pawn between Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania has since pulled out and the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to maintain a presence in the region. However, the UN presence has accomplished little considering as recently as June 6, 2011 MINURSO has failed in mediating conflict resolutions.<sup>149</sup> While those within the territory request the opportunity for self-rule, Morocco still considers Western Sahara to be a Moroccan protectorate. To further complicate problems, Algeria continues to defend the right of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) to independence. This is likely a reflection of Algeria’s own deep-seated values of self-rule in light of their bloody war for independence with the French.<sup>150</sup> This position continues to be a source of friction between Morocco and Algeria. Yet

<sup>149</sup> UN News Centre, “Parties to Western Sahara conflict conclude informal talks in New York,” <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39121&Cr=western+sahara&Cr1> (accessed July 26, 2011).

<sup>150</sup> Alexis Arieff, *Algeria: Current Issues*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011): 15.

despite this continued source of violent tensions, the Moroccan government has effectively framed the Western Sahara as an external entity and has used it to unify the Moroccan people against an external force.

Within a region renowned for its violence and instability, Morocco enjoys relative peace and stability, though it is occasionally subjected to sporadic violent attacks. The Global Terror Database only lists twenty-three separate incidences from 1973 to 2008. These cases of violence are in the wake of a fierce but short revolution, culminating in a national victory over French colonials. In the years since its revolution, Morocco has not struggled with political violence as Algeria has. The vast majority of the violent cases in Morocco are the product of transnational terrorist groups. Because the political violence in Morocco is rarely linked to domestic uprisings, as is the case in Algeria, it is possible that conflicts with external forces actually unifies a nation, strengthens its identity and supports the government.

Algeria's long and violent struggle for independence contributes to its high rates of political violence. The indiscriminate use of violence, the disregard for collateral civilian deaths and the frequency of violent action has arguably shaped the Algerian perspective on political violence.

The National Liberation Front (FLN) organized as the primary leader to help Algeria reclaim its territory and sovereignty. In their pursuit of independence from the French, the FLN used violent methods of revolt and were responsible for numerous bombings in the French sectors of Algeria. The nearly 125 years of French colonization had effectively destroyed any previous notion of Algerian identity, leaving the new opposition to define an identity of their choosing. The group used Islam to unify the people against the French and define a new national identity.<sup>151</sup>

On November 1, 1954, the FLN initiated the Algerian War for Independence by calling their fellow Algerians to rise up against the French and

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<sup>151</sup> Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria", 495.



reclaim their nation.<sup>152</sup> The FLN and the French engaged in an eight-year struggle for power, incurring the deaths of more than 200,000 Algerian citizens.<sup>153</sup> In 1962, the French finally gave in and signed a cease-fire granting official independence to Algeria on July 5, 1962.<sup>154</sup> Shortly thereafter Algeria held the first formal elections in her history.<sup>155</sup>

With the rise of Islamism in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, Algeria's Islamist movements mobilized into a broad organization known as the Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS). They continued to spread the message of a unified Islamic state and introduced the idea of Islamism in politics.<sup>156</sup> While the movement did not initially promote violence, the original message quickly crumbled as the FIS made its moves for political inclusion.<sup>157</sup>

At the turn of the decade, Algeria began experimenting with open democratic elections. The FIS entered the election process with two starkly different public messages. The FIS's primary leader, Abassi Madani, claimed to respect the democratic process and professed a willingness to participate and abide by it. He also asserted that Islam and democracy were not conflicting in nature.<sup>158</sup> However, his right-hand man Ali Belhaj professed a different message. Belhaj refuted the idea that Islamism and democracy could coexist and instead declared, "Any victory for Islamists through polls would be 'not a victory for democracy but a victory for Islam.'"<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria", 490

<sup>153</sup> Alexis Arieff, *Algeria: Current Issues*, 7.

<sup>154</sup> Layachi, "Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria", 490

<sup>155</sup> Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Algeria," U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm> (accessed May 5, 2011).

<sup>156</sup> Hafez, "Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World," 79-81.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

The FIS was hugely successful during the first round of the elections, taking 188 of 430 seats in the national assembly.<sup>160</sup> At that point, when it appeared as if the FIS would also win with a landslide vote, Algeria's military cancelled the second round of elections. Algeria, along with the rest of the world, was afraid of the implications associated with Islamists being voted into power. After the cancellations of the elections, the Algerian government moved for the dissolution of the party and "unleashed a campaign of repression".<sup>161</sup>

Algeria's problems intensified after the FIS lost the elections. The nation was so fearful of what would happen if the Islamists took over, they removed any potential for democracy. This also removed little chance of democracy for anyone else in the region. Instead, the Middle East began using Algeria as a rallying call against democracy. Even the rest of the world used Algeria as justification for why democracy could never succeed in the Islamic world. Thus began a long period in the Middle East of a fear of democracy. The term "one and done" referred to the idea that if Islamists were allowed to participate in elections, there would never be any more elections in the future and became the mantra for those pessimistic about the potential for democracy in the Middle East.

The added pressure of Algeria's negative experience with Islamist elections has only served to further justify Morocco's opposition to full political acquiescence to Islamist demands. Nearly ten years of bloodshed ensued after Algeria canceled its 1992 elections rather than let the Islamists win the vote.<sup>162</sup> The Moroccan monarch has since used the incident to justify limiting electoral opportunities to Islamist parties in Morocco.

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<sup>160</sup> Hafez, "Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World," 83.

<sup>161</sup> Hafez, *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>162</sup> Ellen Knickmeyer, "Islamic Party Confident in Morocco." *Washington Post*. September 7, 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/06/AR2007090602547.html>.

## B. POLITICAL ISLAM / ISLAMISM

Islamism is an indispensable facet of politics in Morocco and Algeria. As much as Christianity informs the GOP dialectic in the United States, Islam continues to influence policy in the two case studies. It is a cornerstone of each nation's identity and shapes each nation's respective development as a whole. However, the attitude of the government and the circumstances surrounding the expansion of Islamism in each country has, in kind, directed the course of political opposition in that country. Political Islam promotes the application of Islamic principles to political practice and Islamists are those Muslims that want more from Islam than religion; they want political activism.<sup>163</sup> Islamists "are united in their conviction that the most vexing problems facing contemporary Muslim societies can be resolved through an individual and collective return to religion."<sup>164</sup>

Islamism emerged during Algeria's War for Independence. The political theology denoted a significant distinction between the French culture and the indigenous rebellion.<sup>165</sup> It also continued to shape Algerian national identity towards a more Islamic-oriented nation as opposed to the secular French colonial overtones to which the people had been subjected. The rise of Islamism was predominantly peaceful and not yet known for the protests and rebellions that would eventually tarnish the Islamist reputation.<sup>166</sup> Islamism continued to grow in popularity in Algeria and the rest of the Middle East in the late 1970s and into the 1980s.

By 1988, Algerian Islamist organizations turned more aggressive and violent in their methods against the state and eventually led to Chadli's decision to pursue political liberalization. The people of Algeria wanted a change to the

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<sup>163</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008): 2.

<sup>164</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002): 1.

<sup>165</sup> Layachi, "Democratic & Popular Republic of Algeria", 495.

<sup>166</sup> Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacre," 44.

existing military rule that oppressed the average citizen. However, despite the fact that the Islamists were given the opportunity to participate in the Algerian elections, the majority proclaimed pluralism and democracy were a “French concept designed to sow hatred and division amongst Muslims”.<sup>167</sup> By framing democracy as a colonial invention, the Islamist message resonated with Algerians who resented the government for ignoring the poverty of its people.<sup>168</sup>

While some doubt the capacity of the FIS to hijack democracy in order to take power and institute an Islamic state, the fear of such a scenario pervaded Algerian society.<sup>169</sup> Considering the conflicting messages broadcasted by the two FIS leaders, the FIS was unable to convince skeptics that they would respect the democratic process.<sup>170</sup> In the wake of the Islamist participation in the Algerian elections that fed into a brutal civil war, most Arab nations fear the political backlash and potential violent rebellions believed to be associated with Islamism.

More than how religion is integrated into policy, there are two other political characteristics that matter when it comes to defusing potential conflicts. They are “1) a pluralized political space and 2) iterative free elections.”<sup>171</sup> Algeria’s free elections were too sudden and granted too much access to state authority before the people were ready. In addition, Algeria’s Islamists had combined into one large organization without a clear message, evidenced by the conflicting rhetoric of its two primary leaders. Had there been a more gradual transition, as we see in Morocco, with the opportunity for multiple parties,

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<sup>167</sup> John Phillips and Martin Evans, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007): 147.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, 145–147

<sup>169</sup> Hamou Amirouche, “Algeria’s Islamist Revolution: The People Versus Democracy?” *Middle East Policy* 5.4 (January 1998): 97, 164–165.

<sup>170</sup> John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 12, 171.

<sup>171</sup> McFaul and Wittes, “The Limits of Limited Reforms,” 31.

religious and secular, to form and respond to the will of the people, it is likely the Algerian Civil War would not have played out as it did.

It is often assumed that political Islam is a standardized political philosophy with no variance. However, it is also possible that “expanded political liberty...can facilitate the emergence of multiple versions of political Islam...”<sup>172</sup> Morocco’s experience with Islamism tends to support the latter idea. Within Morocco, there are several Islamic organizations and political parties that demonstrate a wide range of adherence to Islamic values. It is possible that the existence of multiple strong Islamist proponents assists in the moderation of these groups, as they must compete with each other in order to gain popular support.

The most prominent party in Moroccan politics is the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), a group committed to maintaining genuine political participation and legitimate democratic institutions.<sup>173</sup> The PJD has been an active participant but they claim that they are more of a political party with an Islamist background. Their goal is not to dominate politics with their religion, but to be true to their faith at the same time.

The PJD was not a privileged organization and did not enjoy an easy transition into national politics. Instead, the organization has suffered setbacks in its pursuit of greater participation in Moroccan politics. The PJD became the first Islamist party to participate in Morocco’s open elections in 1997, however they enjoyed only limited success.<sup>174</sup> The party succeeded in securing less than 3% of parliamentary seats; however, it set the stage for moderate Islamist parties to

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<sup>172</sup> McFaul and Wittes, "The Limits of Limited Reforms," 31.

<sup>173</sup> Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, *Morocco: From Top Down Reform to Democratic Transition?* Carnegie Papers (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006):15.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 13–14.

participate in electoral politics.<sup>175</sup> The PJD made further inroads in the 2007 elections and continues to gain support and momentum, but remains an uncertain player in future Moroccan politics.<sup>176</sup> This moderate version of political Islam may be in response to the extremist violence witnessed in Algeria, but it may also be due to unique factors embedded in Morocco's political and social make-up.

Morocco has attempted to offer political access to moderate Islamist parties and has witnessed a rise in Islamist political parties.<sup>177</sup> The Islamists constitute a significant representation of Morocco's major political players and they continue to become stronger and slowly gain more power.<sup>178</sup> Morocco allows different parties to participate, including Islamist-associated parties. Despite the façade of political participation, Morocco's monarchy still limits the actual power wielded by the political actors outside of those appointed by the state.<sup>179</sup>

While it is contrary to most contemporary news pundits, the inclusion of Islamism into national identity may actually serve to decrease the occurrence of violence. Islamism is likely not the root of violence and instead lends credibility to the notion that greater political access is a better indicator of political stability. The people are provided the opportunity to share their voices. "With few open channels for political recourse, the result is societal frustration and a sense of alienation. The feeling of political impotence is exacerbated in the face of security service repression and administrative processes that attempt to

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<sup>175</sup> Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and Istituto Affari Internazionali, *Islamist Mass Movements, External Actors and Political Change in the Arab World*, (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010)

<sup>176</sup> Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top Down Reform to Democratic Transition?*, 13–14.

<sup>177</sup> Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): 11.

<sup>178</sup> Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top Down Reform to Democratic Transition?*, 11.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

depoliticize civil society and prevent oppositional activities.”<sup>180</sup> Regardless of a political party’s religious affiliation, a more open political system will earn the trust and compliance of its people.

### **C. GOVERNMENTS**

Morocco and Algeria present two sides of the spectrum in discussing political openness. While Morocco has had periods of government oppression, Algeria’s government has been much more aggressive in defending its power and stalling political liberalization. Morocco’s monarchy has maintained strong control over the nation in a manner that has never existed in Algeria. It is also possible that because the monarchy outlasted both the Ottoman Empire and the French colonization, it has greater perceived legitimacy than Algeria’s takeover governments. Algeria’s people instead had to endure repeated violent takeovers, coups, colonization, invasions, etc. Perhaps Algerians have less faith or identity invested in their government and so they resort to violence in order to express dissatisfaction and potentially influence regime change. It is also possible that because the Islamist groups in Morocco are relatively weak and fragmented, they are unlikely to “mount an effective challenge to the state as in Algeria.”<sup>181</sup> However, the FIS proved to be a formidable opposition because it successfully amassed several Islamist groups into one political opposition group.

Muller points out that regime repressiveness is a “key indicator of the structure of political opportunities available to dissident groups.” Closed regimes provide little opportunity for rebels to mobilize and open regimes typically offer peaceful alternatives to violent collective action.<sup>182</sup> Algeria responded to a large discontented group and in fear, closed the doors to democracy in cancelling its 1992 elections. This gave a glimmer of hope to its people before throwing the

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<sup>180</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Introduction," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004): 8

<sup>181</sup> Kaye, et al., *More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World*, 150.

<sup>182</sup> Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” 48.

population back into a society of political oppression and zero representation. The people saw what they could have and were now angry that they could not have it. Morocco has taken steps to not go down the same road.

Morocco's monarchy has slowly liberalized the economy and political system. This has enabled the Moroccan public to become accustomed to the new rules and for parties to develop into truly representative organizations. Rather than a few forming a political party and directing the public's vote, as evident in Algeria, Morocco's opposition groups have had to work to gain the trust and following of the Moroccan people. While there are cases of disenfranchised Moroccans frustrated with the political environment, the political parties are not given enough leeway to develop their own policies and attempt to hijack the democratic process.

Because Algeria was subject to an overnight liberalization of the electoral process, a strong group, already organized and poised to seize control, was given unfettered access and the people were left in the wake. Dissatisfaction with the sitting regime was enough to support the Islamist parties and believe in their message. Unfortunately, had a more moderate opposition had time to emerge and represent the voices of the moderate, the debacle of the 1992 elections may not have played out as it did.

Its monarchs may have been reticent at first, but the slow assimilation of democratic procedures in Morocco may be why the nation enjoys greater political stability and fewer violent episodes. In addition, the more consistent bouts of violent conflict in Morocco's history have been with the Western Sahara. This results in a cause that is nationally unifying and serves to strengthen the legitimacy of the government. Instead, in Algeria, the conflicts most often result from dissatisfaction with the state's governance.

Abadie demonstrated that open regimes are more likely to enjoy peace, harsh closed ones allow little opportunity for violent action and that intermediate



regimes are most likely to experience high levels of violent political backlash.<sup>183</sup> On the surface Morocco does not fit this mold. The monarchs have periodically reduced political liberties during times when they felt threatened, as well as having submitted alleged political enemies to harsh retribution. The monarchy still holds final authority, and is not afraid to exercise it. However, Morocco is also more apt to allow for the political participation of its Islamist groups. Overall, Morocco continues to do better to improve the political freedoms of its people, in spite of its poor economic welfare. As a result, the nation and its people live in a nation free of mass insurgency.

While a large percentage of Moroccans express disinterest in politics and claim that the political system is fraudulent, the ability to participate and vocalize their discontent may mean Moroccans are less likely to violently revolt. The Moroccan political system instead allows for alternative and nonviolent methods of expressing dissatisfaction.

Algeria has instituted a system of harsh repression. The Islamist rebellion first grew in response to the state's closed politics and repression of the people. When it seemed as if the movement would boil over, Algeria opened the floodgates to allow full political participation. The problem with this policy reversal is that it happened so quickly. One day, the people were faced with zero representation or voice and frustrated to the point of violent rebellion. The next, they were offered the opportunity to take office and effect political change. There was no opportunity to adjust or establish alternative political voices. Rather those that were being the most oppressed were the quickest to rally electoral support. There was a sense that the opportunity may not last and so the most radical had the loudest voice and most aggressive drive to participate in the first elections. Had there been a more gradual political liberalization, it is possible that more moderate voices would have emerged and resonated with a larger majority of the Algerian people. "(Islamic rebellion) is often a defensive reaction

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<sup>183</sup> Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," *The American Economic Review*, 96, 2 (2006): 50–56.

to an overly repressive regime that misapplies its repression in ways that radicalizes, rather than deters, movement activists and supporters.”<sup>184</sup>

The application of indiscriminate versus discriminate oppression is also a key factor in the emergence of violent mobilization. States that institute indiscriminate violence and repressive tactics against their people are more likely to experience a violent backlash than those states that are more discriminate in their treatment of their people. This is because discriminate repression is interpreted as more digestible by constituents. It is as if the victims of discriminate violence “deserved” what they got. However, indiscriminate violence breeds hatred and resentment, even among those who were not radicalized to begin with. Indiscriminate violence is perceived as unfair and tends to breed dissent more strongly than specifically targeted state oppression.

#### **D. ELECTIONS**

The struggle for independence and resulting rule has had a unique and different impact in how each nation established its elections. Elections are an important component of political institutions and it is interesting that the monarchy has freer and fairer elections than the social republic. Recognized as one of the most open societies in the Middle East, Morocco allows political opposition parties to exist, though the regime continues to limit their participation.<sup>185</sup> Morocco’s alleged openness is not equivalent to the openness of elections in established Western democracies but this gradual transition to a more open democracy may be the critical factor as to why it has not suffered a mass insurgency. It is possible that open elections may increase political stability rather than threaten it.

Unfortunately, Morocco is witnessing a diminishing voter turnout. According to RAND researchers, the voter turnout in Morocco has decreased by over fifty percentage points in less than forty years (from 85% in 1970 to 37% in

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<sup>184</sup> Hafez, "Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World," 75.

<sup>185</sup> Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top Down Reform to Democratic Transition?*, 4.

2007).<sup>186</sup> This decrease reflects poorly on Morocco's political development. Low voter turnout can indicate voter dissatisfaction and distrust in the political process. Some scholars suggest that Moroccans may have achieved a level of political development in which they exercise their freedom to vote by choosing not to vote.<sup>187</sup> In comparison, the percentage of US citizens that vote in presidential elections averages out to 52% in presidential elections since 1980.<sup>188</sup> What we see is that open elections may help internal stability but do not necessarily require comprehensive voter turnout. Instead, an open political environment may encourage various forms of political expression outside of backing extremist political groups.<sup>189</sup>

King Hassan II, and later his son King Mohammed VI, claimed to support democratization but was slow-moving in effecting actual political reforms. From independence until the 1990s, Morocco had pretty stagnant political development. Political participation was really only in name, not practice as King Hassan kept close reins on political access. Then King Hassan II "changed tack and started a slow process of opening up the political system."<sup>190</sup> Approximately two-thirds of Moroccans maintain a dismal outlook on political decision-making in their own country. They are of the mindset that the typical Moroccan has little impact on policy change.<sup>191</sup>

The FLN helped Algeria achieve independence from the French in 1962, a new government took power in 1965 through a bloodless military coup.<sup>192</sup> In the wake of Houari Boumediene's death, Chadli Bendjedid assumed Algeria's

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<sup>186</sup> Kaye, et al., *More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World*, 156.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

<sup>188</sup> Michael P. McDonald, "US Voter Turnout 1980–2010," United States Elections Project, 2011, [http://elections.gmu.edu/voter\\_turnout.htm](http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm).

<sup>189</sup> McFaul and Wittes, "The Limits of Limited Reforms," 31.

<sup>190</sup> Ottaway and Riley, *Morocco: From Top Down Reform to Democratic Transition?*, 5.

<sup>191</sup> Kaye, et al., *More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World*, 156

<sup>192</sup> Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Algeria"

Presidency and ruled through the 1980s.<sup>193</sup> In response to the rise of Islamism and the frequent social protests and riots, Bendjedid established Algeria's first free local elections.<sup>194</sup> These elections gave way to the first multipart general elections the following year and set the stage for nearly ten years of brutal conflict.<sup>195</sup> It was these elections that became the example to which people pointed when explaining why democracy would never thrive in the Middle East.

The current President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was elected to office in 1999. The elections were fraught with fraud and Bouteflika's legitimacy is questionable. His reelections in 2004 and 2009 were won with 83.5% and 90.24% of the vote, respectively.<sup>196</sup> Most leaders in established Western democracies are elected with (50–65%) of the votes and indicates legitimate political opposition and campaigning. It is also possible that the state prevents opposition voters from participating resulting in disproportionately high voter ratings. This fear of the people indicates an oppressive government and incapacity to respond to the will of the people. Thus, it is likely that Algerians feel marginalized and ignored, thus fueling their frustrations and animosity towards the state and its institutions.

Algeria currently maintains a multi-party system, albeit not as robust or open as Morocco's. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, three parties emerged as the most prominent: the National Liberation Front, the National Rally for Democracy, and the Movement for a Peaceful Society.<sup>197</sup> In contrast to Morocco's political parties, Algeria prohibits any variant of religious political parties.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Arieff, "Current Issues: Algeria", 4.

<sup>194</sup> Kotze and Garcie-Rivero, "Democracy and Islam in the Arab World: Lessons from Algeria," 328.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 333.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 5–6.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>198</sup> Kotze and Garcie-Rivero, "Democracy and Islam in the Arab World: Lessons from Algeria," 334.

Although Algerians are turning out to vote in much higher numbers than Moroccans, it is possible that Moroccans may be exercising their right not to vote while Algeria could be falsifying its numbers. It may appear as if Moroccans are less politically active, but the reality may be that they enjoy and are exercising greater political freedom than their Algerian neighbors.

## **E. CONCLUSION**

The role of history in shaping a people, combined with the speed of transition, plays a critical role in the decision to resort to violence in situations of discontent and frustration. In societies where level-headed reign, it is more likely that extremism will be mitigated by a public's intolerance for violent action.

## V. CONCLUSION

While it is true ‘Morocco has never held itself out as a model for others and has not undertaken [its] reforms in order to offer anyone any lessons,’ the reality is that the country does offer an example of how integral transformation voluntarily undertaken and carried out both with respect for history, religion, and culture, and at an appropriate speed can offer a path to the future that balances the competing demands of stability and openness to change.<sup>199</sup>

### A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis addressed the puzzle exhibited by Morocco and Algeria with respect to their experience with political violence. Contrary to popular wisdom, Morocco, the much poorer of the two countries, enjoyed greater political stability with less incidences of political violence than Algeria. While prominent leaders advocate economic solutions to the threat of political instability, Morocco and Algeria present a counterexample. This thesis sought to answer what, if not poverty, was responsible for the disparity between the two countries.

The first hypothesis suggested that increased economic diversification would lead to lower levels of political violence. This hypothesis was derived from the Resource Curse theory that nations overwhelmingly reliant on a national resource are more likely to suffer from greater political violence. Funds gained from natural resources sold in a volatile global market can cause significant swings in the wealth of a nation, eroding the regime’s reputation for providing and protecting its people. The wealth from natural resources can also diminish a population’s propensity for demanding better representation. Instead, they are content to sit idly by as they enjoy the state’s welfare programs and totalitarian authority. Yet the problem with fully attributing a case of political violence to a lack of economic diversity is that economic diversification may simply be a proxy for poor governance. A solution to political violence that addresses only the

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<sup>199</sup> J. Peter Pham, “AFRICOM Outreach: Moroccan Exceptionalism?” *World Defense Review* (2011).

natural resource program may be missing the root of the problem and only perpetuate the instability within a country.

The second hypothesis addressed the question of income inequality. This argument is related to the Relative Deprivation theory, which argues that those who feel as if they deserve more than they have are sufficiently motivated to collective violent action. The problem with this hypothesis is that it expects Morocco to be a more equal nation than Algeria due to its lower levels of political violence. Evidence demonstrates that this is not true. Rather, Morocco has a higher GINI index, as well as a smaller percentage of the population holding a greater proportion of national income. Both variables should indicate higher levels of political violence than observed in Algeria, a scenario that does not exist. Therefore, the second hypothesis examined within this thesis fails in explaining the rate of occurrence of political violence in Morocco and Algeria.

The third hypothesis argues that more political access will foster greater political stability. Morocco has demonstrated that greater political openness combined with a gradual rate of democratization and reduced levels of political repression have contributed to greater political stability overall. Yet there is more to Morocco's success than a universal approach to democratization.

Morocco and Algeria illustrate how violence can become ingrained in a society's culture, making the challenge of eradicating violent action that much harder. It appears that so many of the theories addressing the roots of political violence fail to fully capture the identity aspect, leaving the problem only half-solved. It is not enough to apply one solution to all countries and expect it to work. Instead, addressing each nation individually with respect to its background, its social development and personal experiences with external actors may be a more appropriate approach and lead to more effective and relevant policies.

## **B. BUILDING AN IDENTITY OF PEACE**

It is puzzling how two nations with similar demographics, both former French colonies, and sharing an Arab-Berber heritage can be so divergent in their economic, political and social standings. Most would assume the poorer of the two, Morocco, would be less stable and suffer from more political violence yet this thesis has demonstrated that is not the case. Most of the existing theories on political violence attempt to attribute the frequency and scale of political violence to a single variable, whether it is poverty, abundant natural resources or income inequality. The political process theory takes into account how much access the public has to influence policy, the rate of democratization and the state's repression of its people.

What is most worrisome is not which factor Western leadership blames for civil wars, massacres and other forms of political violence. Instead, it is the universal approach the West takes to address all struggling nations. Nation building may involve several common tactics, but the unique circumstances informing that nation's identity cannot be discounted. However, Morocco and Algeria's national identities and how those identities were formed may also play a role in explaining why Algeria suffers from more political violence than Morocco.

Identity influences all matters of life and without a sense of who you are, it is easy to resort to destructive behavior. Algeria was victimized by its colonial occupiers and its culture was deemed inferior to French society. Therefore, it is logical that the Algerians were wandering aimlessly and began grasping at any sense of cultural identity to distinguish themselves from their colonial past. Unfortunately, violent action became an accepted form of expression for Algerians and neither their political nor their economic circumstances were effective in establishing stable customs.

Morocco and Algeria have developed very different responses to conflict dating back to early encounters with invading forces. Morocco was originally inhabited by indigenous peoples who were largely protected from external



influences by the ocean and Rif Mountains.<sup>200</sup> As the Arab-Islam influence spread during the Seventh and Eighth Centuries, Morocco was not immune to the ideology and culture. The end result was the formation of a new Islamic nation ruled over by succeeding dynasties. While her neighbors were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, Morocco was able to integrate much of its original identity and maintain its monarchy's dynastic rule.<sup>201</sup>

In comparison to Morocco, Algeria's history of violence is significantly more robust, enduring and frequent. This dichotomy may suggest that a people consistently exposed and subjected to indiscriminate violence eventually become desensitized to its shocking and terrifying nature. The result is escalating violence in a desperate attempt to be relevant and a people whose only recourse is violence. Muller suggested that a history of violent behavior could influence the continued use of violence in the future. The rationale is people learn that violent behavior can be successful and rewarding, and so they are more likely "to accept violence as a form of conflict behavior in the future."<sup>202</sup> This may lead to one explanation for the frequency and degree of violence observed throughout Algeria's history.

Without a doubt Algeria's experience with colonization was much more violent and demeaning than Morocco's. While Morocco was permitted to maintain control over its domestic institutions, the French completely restructured Algerian society. As the French moved in, Algerian citizens were shoved aside and were treated atrociously. The French abused and mistreated the Algerians, an act that continued for years and bred more inhumane treatment. Over the years the violent repression became "institutionalized" leaving little recourse for the battered Algerians.<sup>203</sup> Assuming that "violence condemns those who

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<sup>200</sup> Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, 24–26.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 81–83.

<sup>202</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," in *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1980): 242.

<sup>203</sup> Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 50.

experience it to repeat it forever”, it is likely that Algerians who have been more frequently and repeatedly subjected to violent action will tend to repeat this cycle and act out violently as well.<sup>204</sup>

Algerians have become accustomed to living in violence and there is research that suggests such an environment encourages continued violence. In situations of persistent violence, the popular attitude towards violence is more tolerant than in those where violence is less commonplace. The perpetrators of political violence in Algeria range from the state itself, small groups and even external forces, whether an official state like France or a non-government actor like AQIM. Additionally, Algerians are active participants in global terrorism and were extremely active as anti-coalition fighters during Operation Iraqi Freedom.<sup>205</sup>

Crenshaw postulates that the popular attitude toward terror is influenced by “the duration and magnitude of the terrorist danger.”<sup>206</sup> The danger for those utilizing terror tactics is to over stimulate its target, thus rendering their shock and awe tactics “normal”.<sup>207</sup> It is possible that Algeria’s population has actually enabled an atmosphere of violent tolerance. Considering Algeria had a relatively more violent revolution from colonial France, its people were subject to more frequent and grotesque terrorist attacks. Thus, they became more numb to its effects whereas the violence in Morocco was more sporadic and imposed a greater feeling of vulnerability and unpredictability. There would be greater backlash towards such attacks and their instigators, whereas violent movements in Algeria have become part of the social scene, an accepted aspect of Algerian life. What is worse, is that once the people are desensitized to repeated incidents of political violence, violent retaliation also becomes normal. It feeds

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<sup>204</sup> Martha Crenshaw Hutchison, *Revolutionary Terrorism: the FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978): 29.

<sup>205</sup> Arieff, “Algeria: Current Issues,” 2.

<sup>206</sup> Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: the FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962*, 27.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

into an ugly cycle that becomes difficult to break, leading to an ever more violent society.

Morocco was better equipped to maintain its own national identity, both through the rule of the Ottoman Empire and French colonialism. In addition, the issue of the Western Sahara also serves to unify a Moroccan identity against a specified “other” supposedly subservient population. The violent activity in Morocco has almost always been between external actors and Morocco, whether the target was the state or civilian population. Whether intentional or accidental, it is likely that instead of dividing the people, these violent incidents actually unified the people against a common enemy.

John Ruedy describes early Algerian governance as “segmentary tribalism”, a characteristic the Algerians maintained even after the Arab-Islamic conquest.<sup>208</sup> This type of governance is based on many tribes that are independently governed, similar to Ernest Gellner’s notion “divide that ye be not ruled”.<sup>209</sup> However, the multiple divisions within the greater nation also led to higher levels of violence, as anarchy was prevalent with little unified identity or trust.<sup>210</sup>

On the contrary, the violence observed in Algeria has almost always been divisive. This is coupled with the fact that Algerians did not benefit from a unified identity under a revered monarch prior to colonization. Rather its segmentary tribalism negated any need for a centralized government and the Ottoman Empire provided no such unity. The issue became particularly potent as the FLN began to gain followers against colonial rule. The idea of nationalism was foreign, as Algeria had no real national history or identity.<sup>211</sup> As Algeria developed into an independent nation, violent action and a mass rebellion tore the country apart from within, pitting Algerians against each other. When people

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<sup>208</sup> Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 24–25.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, 42–43.

are consistently exposed to violence, they no longer benefit from the option of participating or not participating in collective violent action. “Confronted with terrorism, a threatened person can no longer remain neutral or uninvolved in a conflict.”<sup>212</sup> It is possible that the absence of a shared identity has contributed to the significant political stability issues still present in Algeria today.

What becomes evident is that the people within each nation view violent action in different ways. Moroccans try to avoid violent conflict and the government quickly rebukes those that engage in such action. Contrarily, Algerians quickly resort to the use of violence to communicate their discontent and are often dealt with in an indiscriminate manner by the state. Crenshaw suggests that violent action builds upon itself and so we can expect that in states in which violence is ingrained into the culture, we should expect further violence in the future. What this implies is that nations that have a history of political violence cannot play by the same democratization rules as relatively more peaceful nations.

“At the heart of the democratization issue in the Middle East is the question of national identity,” and Islam is a vital facet of the identities for most of those living in Morocco and Algeria.<sup>213</sup> While it may be contrary to most contemporary news pundits, the inclusion of Islamism into national identity may actually serve to decrease the occurrence of violence. Huntington claimed that Islamic nations were indistinguishable and all posed the same threat to Western civilization. This approach should be quickly disregarded. Instead, Western nations should stop viewing the MENA nations as smaller states of a larger conglomerate and rather as individual societies with their own unique nuances. It is only in this manner that theories will be more fitting, policies will be more effective, and the potential for eliminating violent action even remotely possible.

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<sup>212</sup> Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: the FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962*, 29.

<sup>213</sup> Sharp, *U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma*, 2

A history of violence is extremely potent with these two cases studies. It is a relentless circle of violence as those who witness and experience it are doomed to repeat the violent cycle. Yet this is only part of the problem. Violence, whether criminal or political in nature, is not completely avoidable and continues to plague societies everywhere. Yet the scope and frequency of political violence can be attributed to several key factors. A strong government is necessary to quelling violence, but an indiscriminate heavy hand can have the opposite effect.

Algeria is evidence of this fact, as its government has been much more oppressive and fails to distinguish between those responsible for the violence and innocent bystanders. When innocent civilians and victims are subjected to the same punishments as those handed out to the perpetrators, a sense of injustice manifests and can grow into violent rebellion. Morocco exhibits a better method of integrating democratic institutions while establishing clear boundaries for parties, individuals and the public. These clear expectations, combined with gradual democratization and swift punishments for violent actors, have succeeded in a less volatile environment.

Morocco and Algeria are two case studies within North Africa but offer lessons for all developing nations struggling with bouts of political violence, whether brief or sustained. The answer is not for developed nations to pour in international aid combined with Western policies, but for the states to address the needs of their people. Past violence, as well as violence handed down from the government, breeds more violence and instability.

Morocco and Algeria may appear to be synonymous due to their shared cultural foundations, colonial histories and struggles with Islamism. However, each nation has developed its own identity with respect to the use of violence as well as their attitude towards external intervention. Solutions for political violence need to be tailored to each nation and its own unique circumstances as opposed to a one size fits all solution.

### **C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE**

The recent Arab Spring and the global reactions demonstrate the currency of this thesis and its potential policy implications. The success in Morocco's ability to promote political stability should be attributed to its individual characteristics. This thesis suggests that the West should not expect a method to work in Tunisia because it was successful in Egypt. Each nation in North Africa has cultivated its own identity with respect to its unique history and experiences. The West is doing itself and the nations it is trying to help a disservice by ignoring the characteristics that define that nation.

Economic aid is desirable because it is easy money, but it creates a dependency on those who give it. Instead, Western governments should heed the lessons learned from the puzzle of Morocco and Algeria. Economic diversification and aid are not enough to stabilize a tumultuous political environment. It is important for struggling nations to cultivate a national identity that speaks to the country as a whole. Rather than Western nations jockey for credit for any successes, these successes should be turned over to the nation in need. Building an identity of self-reliance will do more to stabilize the violent environment than dependence on foreign intervention.

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