

ABSTRACT

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**COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND POLITICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN
POST-COLONIAL AFRICA: THE CASE OF NIGERIA, 1960-1990**

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Historically, the hallmark of "independent Africa" is inextricable underdevelopment crises. Thus, the fundamental objective of this study is to determine the causality of politics of underdevelopment and evolving stiffening crises in post-colonial Africa, by using Nigeria, a former British colony, as a case in point. Nigeria was chosen whereas its economy personifies the pre-colonial African kingdoms, empires, fiefdoms, and states, as well as arbitrary created colonies by a model European colonial power - Great Britain. Thus, the findings in the Nigerian dilemma could manifest a profound comprehension of the raison d'etre of continuous political incohesion, cum facts and factors of underdevelopment crises in "independent Africa." And ipso facto enabled us to evolve generalizations indispensable in establishing an authentic theory of development in Africa at the dawning of the 21st century.

Based on African historiography, the fact evolved that pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria was developing and transforming on its own accord from tribal organizations to magnificent kingdoms, empires and "city" states. Additionally, authentic universal history resolved that African Kemetic (Kmt) kingdom - Egypt, evolved continental and universal model of civilizations before the imposition of colonial capitalist mode of production by European powers, two critical issues were raised.

The first striking issue was whether or not colonial capitalism originated contemporary uncontrollable political incohesion with astronomical underdevelopment dilemma in Nigeria. The second issue was why are the post-colonial leaderships unable to minimize or reverse underdevelopment?

To that end, we hypothesized that -

- (i) **colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa.**
- (ii) **that failure to Africanize the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the resolution of underdevelopment crises, or authentic and sustained development in post-colonial Nigeria and**
- (iii) **that the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by "post independence" regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.**

The study, using a dialectical materialist method, affirmed the hypotheses. Consequently, we recommended an authentic democratization of governmental procedures, as well as a scientific indigenization of contemporary mode of production by a leadership committed

to concrete reactivation of the latter as a viable way out. In this context a scientific development of Afrocentric paradigm and evolving theory of development was asserted as a priority.

COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND POLITICS OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN POST COLONIAL AFRICA:
THE CASE OF NIGERIA, 1960 - 1990

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Mankind unquestionably is a social creature and therefore our personality is formed on the basis of interaction with people. In much the same way, the societies in which we periodically reside provide us with the social existence upon which our social consciousness is nurtured. Thus, this research effort is not exclusively the by-product of our lone endeavors, for it is a finished product of scholastic influence, social and economic support of my mentors, colleagues and family, all of whom I cannot enumerate. However, I am heartily indebted to Drs. Mack Henry Jones, my academic advisor, Cheikh Anta Diop, my mentor; members of my dissertation committee, Drs. Hashim Gibrill, Chairperson, Isola Kokumo and Robert Fishman for their genuine professional guidance; my beloved parents, Jonah and Lily Udomekong Udoko; my sister, Mrs. "Minika" Rosemary Usoro; my beloved wife, Eme and my children, Aniekeme Udomekong, Minika and Unwanabong whose love has manifested in me an essential stairway to this pinnacle in education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

An historiography of African political economy asserts that pre-colonial Africa was civilizing or developing on its own before the European adventurism and colonization of the continent, vis-a-vis an imperial, implantation of colonial capitalism on the indigenous mode of production. Thus, an authentic African history affirmed that pre-colonial Nigeria was basically transforming or developing from a communal to the feudal mode of production, for the most part, when it was colonized by Britain in 1861. And that those stages of transformation or development were essentially proper, albeit varied in magnitude in a universal historical context.

Therefore, pre-colonial economic history of African nations, en masse and Nigeria, in particular, resolved that indigenous forces of production and manifest fundamental technologies, essential for developing a sustained economic system in any society existed in Africa, at large and Nigeria, in question. But in Nigeria (and in colonial Africa), this developing mode of production and consequent industrial development was stultified and gradually reversed after colonization and forceful implantation of a more advanced colonial industrial capitalism on the indigenous mode of production by colonists. Colonial

capitalism, genuine history affirms, entailed a systematic and domination of indigenous mode of production. Consequently making it a satellite of the center.

Through the latter process, Britain and other centers established industries in Nigeria (or Africa), dominated and Europeanized the indigenous economic system. As a consequence, Britain and associated colonists mobilized indigenous resources and manifested wealth to develop their centers respectively thus rendering Nigeria and Africa underdeveloped.

Hence, in colonial Nigeria, the latter manifested an increasing penury as well as underdevelopment of the indigenous productive forces, and catalyzed nationalism which won independence in 1960. It was the massive expectation that after independence, Nigerian leadership would control and revitalize the economy for the benefit of its masses. A process they envisioned would reverse underdevelopment and contain colonial economic osmosis, which essentially means re-Africanization of mode of production.

But disappointingly, the expectation of the masses and the objective of the founding fathers of Nigeria in 1960, to end the metropolitan economic exploitation of the country has not, for the most part, been attained. Nigeria today, after three decades of independence, remains an appendage of Britain as well as other developed centers of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. She historically depicts a stiffening underdeveloping political economy. Colonial industries still dominate and exploit the economy.

These transnational industries are basically owned and controlled by the industrialized centers. Because of this foreign ownership and control, these industries are siphoning off the surplus value to the west, this being a necessary condition for their prosperity. As a consequence, Nigeria, in reality, remains a neo-colonial nation in profound historical contrast to its developing pre-colonial economy.

To remedy the crisis situation since independence in 1960, various post-colonial governments have developed and implemented successive eclectic development plans or strategies, respectively, which they perceived as profound development models essential for concrete development of the country.

Such neoclassical economic models of advance capitalist centers evolving from the doctrines of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill (i.e., government planning and regulation of the economy); Ragnar Nurske, Gerald Meir and Gottfried Harbeler Model of International Development (i.e., stimulation of economic growth and maximum use of world development aids) were crystallized into national development philosophy and plans.

Simultaneously, various regimes have embodied and implemented recommendations of Nigerian academics as part of national development plans, but to no avail. Besides the latter, even some nationalistic oriented strategy as indigenization promulgation decree, which was a policy aimed at placing the control of metropolitan industries in the hands of the indigenes, and by such actions, contain economic osmosis or foreign exploitation have been executed with no sustained success.

In a large part, it turns out to be anathema as penury of the masses, social incoherency, or underdevelopment dilemma exacerbates. And historically, whether in domestic programs or international protocol, for the most part, the reality is that the more the contemporary plans were executed, the more underdevelopment crisis stiffened. In this regard, an epidemic penury of the masses is the barometer.

Thus, superstructural crisis resulting in functional anarchy, catastrophic change of leadership, intermittent and insidious coup d'etats, inefficiency of policy executions as the causality of underdevelopment became an epidemic. And the end is not in sight. Obviously, contemporary Nigeria is in shambles.

Today, Nigeria political economy depicts an historical substructure and consequent superstructure of colonial capitalism. And foreign economic and political exploitation which her masses lamented during the colonial epoch has increased to astronomical proportions. Hence, whereas contemporary regime, like its predecessors, is yet to mobilize Nigeria's historically rich resources or develop its authentic forces of production, the future is bleak.

Thus, this dilemma now impacts on Nigeria's immediate and strategic potentiality to develop its indigenous productive forces, in a quest to be and become a developing state of Africa and the world.

Therefore, whereas the post-colonial development strategies or plans have not manifested authentic development or contained metropolitan exploitation as anticipated, a profound and dialectical study of Nigerian historical political economy with an objective of ascertaining the causality of failing development strategies becomes a

profound essentiality. We must originate an authentic theory of development or resign our posterity to an abyss of undercivilization by attempting to resolve the crisis within the existing national paradigm.

Thus, in light of the devastating gravity of this problem on the Nigerian/African masses, the urgency of its resolution cannot be postponed. Today, the suffering and exploited indigenous masses are demanding an authentic development strategy and leadership that would be committed to reversing underdevelopment, and guarantee for all Nigerians a fair share of the evolving national wealth. They want genuine political leadership that would minimize and contain the vicious circle of underdevelopment in Nigeria. It is upon the urgency of this essential demand that our purpose of this study evolves.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to critically appraise and dialectically analyze the essence of colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria. This is a catalyst case study intended to generate profound similar studies in the contemporary underdeveloping post-colonial African states, and thus illuminate a holistic causality of the politics of underdevelopment without which a profound speculation for solutions to end underdevelopment would continue to be a nightmare.

Consequently, our findings in this study would epitomize an authentic development theory, essential for a concrete development

of Nigeria, and strategically manifest development principle or genuine Afrocentric law of development essential for minimizing underdevelopment in Africa beyond the '90s, when embodied and steadfastly implemented.

Such Afrocentric tenet would reactivate the eclipsed fact and factors of amazing civilizations of pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa and indigenous pre-colonial school systems; and ipso facto manifest a fundamental African school system, cum paradigm as an essential star at night.

Our contention here is predicated on two facts. First, the fact that after three decades of post-colonial regimes efforts failed to reverse underdevelopment and increasing penury of the Nigerian masses, hence the urgent need to critically and dialectically determine the essence of this failure, as a base for constructing scientific strategies for a sustained concrete development of Nigeria becomes a profound and uncompromising challenge in the '90s and beyond.

Second, the historiography of pre-colonial African societies en masse affirmed that the pre-colonial Africans developed the first university with a curriculum featuring subjects such as astronomy, music, dialectics, arithmetic, rhetoric, grammar, philosophy, theology, first picture writing models (to name just a few), and manifest star technologies with civilizations, or strong developing economies. And that this indigenous school system through its profound nature study and great essential inventions attracted and educated foreign personalities and societies (and in particular, Greece which is the cradle of the civilizations of Nigerian/African colonizers) until

successive invasions by foreign societies and colonization by European powers.

Thus it follows that African heritage depicts a developing economy or is replete with politics of concrete development. But whereas the contemporary post-colonial Nigeria/Africa stands as a contradiction to its heritage, a critical need to determine and resolve the causality of the later contradiction or why the rich indigenous African heritage or developing economy is eclipsed becomes a profound scholastic necessity in the '90s.

Explanation of Concepts

The Socioeconomic Formation

By this term we imply the integration of those non-economic aspects of society, such as the political system, the ideological system, and the legal system, otherwise characterized as the superstructure (whose survival is dependent and determined by the economic system) with the economic system or the substructure. In brief, the superstructure and the substructure constitute the socio-economic formation of the society.

Its significance lies in the perception that by our comprehension of the socioeconomic formation of Nigeria, we would have a succinct and clear notion of Nigeria's social existence, its contemporary leadership consciousness, and therefore, could speculate on what appropriate innovation needs to be made.

Neoclassical Economic Philosophy

By this is meant the adaptation of classical laissez-faire economic theory with modifications, i.e., postulation that maximum

economic growth could be attained in a stable or fixed economic condition wherefore a zero net per capita investment and a subsistence wage is ascertained, with modifications which emphasized efficient allocation of resources.

In other words, according to Charles Wilber (1979:54),

Neo-classical economics, beginning in the 1870s, turned away from the classical concern with economic growth and concentrated instead on the problem of efficient resource allocation. In this abstract model, input supplies, including labor, were taken as given. And, thus population receded into an ad hoc explanation that was trotted out whenever the free market was blamed for continuing poverty.

The significance of this philosophy in this study is twofold.

First, it catalyzed the process of colonial development plan in Nigeria, in the colonial government for Nigeria, whereby the government intended to establish business conditions essential for the free enterprise or the survival of the metropolitan firms even after independence.

Second, it provided a philosophical orientation from which the post-colonial regimes deduced the post-development strategies, which have not yet minimized penury of the masses or reversed the stiffening underdevelopment.

Dependence or Economic Osmosis

We use these concepts in alternation. In an economic sense, "dependence [or economic osmosis] is the result of an unequal economic relationship whereby the weaker of the two parties is dominated by

the stronger,"¹ or the wealth of the weaker party is amassed by the stronger party by means of exploitation. Self-reliance is the antonym of dependence. Self-reliance implies the ability to conduct a nation's internal and external, social, economic and political affairs within the international milieu with a minimal of (or, if possible, without) external domination. Self-reliance, however, does not imply isolation but rather cooperation which excludes economic osmosis, dependence or exploitation. Two examples of dependence systems are colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The concept of economic osmosis is significant to our study because it illuminates the nature or pattern of the development gap between the United Kingdom and its satellite colony of Nigeria.

Contradiction

This concept "is generally used to mean something that stands in contrast to the way things are suppose to, or appear to be, to contradict an argument is to show up the inconsistencies in it."² Thus in ordinary terms, the world implies that two opposing phenomena or "qualities cannot coexist within the same thing, or that something cannot contain both its characteristic quality and its opposites at once."³ We reject this unscientific definition.

¹Timothy N. Shaw, The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), 75.

²RCP USA, The Science of Revolution (Chicago: RCP Publishers, 1980), 8.

³Ibid., 9.

For the purposes of our study, therefore, of contradiction as applied here is dialectical or logical and scientific or objective. In this context "a contradiction is the simultaneous co-existence and struggle of opposite forces within a process or a thing,"⁴ or, as applied to this study, the capitalist mode of industrialization in Nigeria.

In summation, contradiction is the symbiotic, but mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies within a thing or a process and their interaction or struggle to bring about progressive change in a particular phenomenon.

According to Mao Tse-tung:

As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of the materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things . . . the fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal . . . Changes in society due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society--between the productive forces and their relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new pushes the society forward and gives the impetus for the suppression of the old by the new.⁵

In retrospect, this concept implies that any phenomenon is a manifestation of essential and complementary unity of opposing forces, hence without the latter forces, nothing could develop and grow. Therefore, to comprehend a character objectively, it is necessary to question profoundly and analyze its holistic history. This entails

⁴Ibid.

⁵See selected readings from Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1971), 87-88.

a determination of its nucleus or seed, its development and growth like a seed-plant and its manifestations in the society like fruits.

This concept is highly significant in the present study because it will enable us to see the basic nature of colonial capitalism and the fundamental fact and factors of politics of underdevelopment which pervades post-colonial regimes in Nigeria/Africa.

Second, it will enable us to determine whether or not Nigeria/Africa with a remarkable developing pre-colonial economy is manifesting insidious politics of underdevelopment today; or is yet to design a workable scientific theory of development since independence in 1960.

Neocolonialism

According to Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonialism is a condition whereby a state "is independent de jure and dependent de facto. It is a state where political power lies in the conservative forces of the former colony and where economic power remains under the control of international finance capital."⁶

In the final analysis, the country that is continually exploited by foreign interests or by interests which are foreign to the masses of the ex-colonized population, but are intrinsic to world capitalism, is a neo-colonial state. It is a state we also refer to as having a "flag independence." Nigeria perfectly fits this description. Therefore, it is in this context that we use neo-colonialism to characterize Nigeria.

⁶Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 8.

Colonial Capitalism

Colonial capitalism, as operationalized in this study, is an imposition of British mode of production on the indigenous or African economic system during colonization, and the manifest colonial sub-structure and superstructure in Nigeria, as a fact of making Nigeria a satellite of the center.

Under the aegis of the mother country, the catalytic indigenous technologies, industries and outputs were either illegalized as was with firearms, local gins, or were outright replaced by colonial factories of scale whose mother technologies were at the center and was its best kept secret or patent right, as with textile industries, and indigenous essentialities gradually replaced and dominated by European outputs, e.g., rice, cigarettes, clothing, et al., on one hand. On the other hand, the indigenous superstructure was Europeanized. Hence, indigenous civilization was rendered dormant, and thus the underdevelopment of indigenous mode of production was set in motion.

The significance of operationalizing colonial capitalism lies in the fact that while the contemporary economic system does not manifest authentic development and political stability for the benefit of Nigerian masses, it illuminates the fact that the present economic system is a satellite cultured capitalism, designed to frustrate an essential indigenous development, be it capitalist or socialist. And by that fact, this concept clarifies the misconception that a single comparable capitalist model exists for the center and the periphery, when, in reality, colonial capitalism historically transforms and subjugates a pre-colonial developing economy into its satellite.

Historical and Dialectical Materialism⁷

Historical materialism is a scientific study of a society's mode of production and manifest transformations since antiquity to the contemporary. And dialectical materialism is a profound process of critical analysis of the contradictions in a phenomenon such as an economic system.

The significance of these concepts lies in the fact that they would objectively enable us to cognize and study holistic Nigerian economy, (i.e., since pre-colonial era) and then be in position to locate where positive transformations or development was reversed and why, in our study.

Statement of Objective, Hypothesis, and Testing Procedures

The phenomenon of colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment with neo-colonialism, and their consequential economic crises cry out for a fundamental and critical investigation of colonial industrial mode of production and its manifested superstructure and politics. Such scrutiny is essential in order to profoundly determine the causality of politics of underdevelopment, and thus formulate a realistic or an authentic strategy and tactics as a fact of concrete industrialization of Nigeria, and strategic Africa's emancipation and development in general. Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to understand the true essence of colonial capitalism,

⁷Both concepts are used here in the Marxian sense. For an elaborate explanation of the concepts, see Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (New York: International Publishers, 1973), 5; The Science of Revolution (Chicago: RCP Publishers, 1980), 6.

its contradictions and its probable linkages to the insidious and pervasive politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.

The latter, from the indigenous populace's point of view, could serve as a predicate to objective comprehension of the underlying forces of Nigeria/Africa's contemporary underdevelopment crises. Consequently, such critical examination would also enable us to objectively or realistically determine why Nigeria's post-colonial leadership philosophies and evolving development strategies are yet to resolve its growing political incohesion and to minimize massive poverty or the increasing politics of underdevelopment as promised and anticipated by the successive post-colonial regimes.

Our second objective is to locate, recapture and organize fundamental factors which inspired great civilizations or genuine developing economies in pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa. Study of such economies will provide the foundation essential for the reactivation of an indigenous school tenet and development of an indigenous paradigm and manifest Afrocentric development theory as a fundamental strategy of Nigerian/African development, just like contemporary developed centers.

Historically, contemporary centers attain such great levels of development by designing and fine tuning their development theories or strategies on the basis of their holistic indigenous tenet, e.g., Eurocentricity. Thus an authentic Afrocentric theory when formulated, embodied and steadfastly implemented could be a factor at night in resolving Nigeria's/Africa's politics of underdevelopment.

We believe that for African economic problems to be minimized or contained in the wake of neo-colonialism or hostile foreign centers

seeking to perpetuate their economic dominance and exploitation of Africa, the viable solution must come from genuine African school and leadership. This implies the development of authentic development theory that evolves out of a complete indigenous experience. Thus to that end, we advance the following hypotheses:

1. That colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevelopment crisis in post-colonial Africa;
2. That failure to Africanize the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the resolution of underdevelopment crisis, or authentic and sustained development in post-colonial Nigeria;
3. That the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by "post-independence" regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

Our null hypothesis is the reverse of all the stated hypotheses. These hypotheses are generated by our assumption that the understanding of our social existence should form the basis of our social consciousness. The facts about our problem could best be described by us, the victims of oppression, rather than by the foreign custodians of our "existence," who basically are our exploiters.

Our position is contingent upon, or distilled from, historical experiences of former underdeveloped states which have managed to resolve underdevelopment dilemma. This experience objectively demonstrates that it is only the oppressed philosophy of liberation that would free the oppressed, but not his adaptation of the oppressor's.

Therefore, for us to become developed, we must contain the exploitative industrial model into our experience, instead of digesting our native colonial mode of production by authentic indigenization. In short, we must Africanize the colonial capitalism and center-oriented development strategies, which have been implemented since flag independence if we really want to scientifically develop Nigeria or Africa. It is in this context that we posit that it is an Afrocentric model, not liberal Eurocentric neoclassically derived development strategies, that will resolve underdevelopment crises in Nigeria and Africa.

In order to confront and resolve the latter problem, we would be more inductively inclined and less deductive in our research efforts. In this regard, we hope that the valid generalizations of these findings would lead to the development of a paradigm of African political economy with a view to catalyzing a development model capable of containing underdevelopment in Nigeria.

Methodology--A Theoretical Frame of Reference

The method that we have chosen for this case study is dialectical materialism. This "is a method which gives primacy to material conditions, particularly economic factors, in the explanation of social life."⁸ This is, to our knowledge, the most appropriate method that must be used in the study of contradictions in things. For "dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradictions in the

⁸Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Nigeria: Longman Press, Ltd., 1981), 1.

very essence of objects."⁹ In summation of the utility of dialectical materialism, Mao Tse-tung posits thus:

. . .the world outlook of materialist dialects holds that in order to understand the development of a thing, we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it.¹⁰

In other words, this case study method will enable us to see the essence of the colonial capitalist industrial mode of production and the contradictions inherent in it, which is the major concern of this study. Further, by understanding the internal working of the said mode of production, we will, in essence, understand the problem of this study and simultaneously speculate on probable solutions.

The methodological implication of this approach is that we must pay strict attention to the structure of colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria by appraising its contradictions. In that context, we will use it as a point of departure to study the underdevelopment problems and economic crises in post-colonial Nigeria. Once we comprehend the character of the colonial capitalist mode of production and its linkages to politics of underdevelopment in postcolonial Nigeria; how the goods were produced and distributed; what type of social relations arose from the organization of production; how the colonial mode of production replaced the pre-

⁹Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1971), 85.

¹⁰RCPC, The Science of Revolution, 8.

colonial mode of production; and the impact of the latter on the colonial and post-colonial development strategies, we will have understood the nature of the problem facing Nigeria, in particular and Africa, in general. We would be in a position to clearly resolve our hypotheses and to realize the objective of this study.

This method will also enable us to examine pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial economics of Nigerian dialectically as opposed to the functional school or mainstream Western social science which discourages dialectical thinking and is presently utilized by most Nigerian scholars.

Thus the dialectical method, unlike the functional approach, is capable of uncovering the truth in the material world; it scrutinizes people's ideas as the products of their social experience. By more deeply grasping the laws of material world, and especially society, it seeks to change the world and the people in it through the critical analysis of the contradictions in a phenomenon under study.

At this juncture, the major issues then become the following: (a) How shall we organize our study? (b) What, precisely, will our analytical approach entail? and (c) what will be the nature or character of the contradictions under study? A resolution of these issues will unquestionably make our study quite objective or scientific. In this context, our dialectical approach is most profound. Further, historically, the dialectical method, Lenin observes, is: ". . .the

way to an all embracing and comprehensive study of the process of the rise, development and decline of socio-economic systems."¹¹

Thus, we consider dialectical materialism imperative for our purpose to avoid any hasty, superficial appraisal of any aspect of our study of Nigeria. To that end we shall arrange our study into five chapters and then utilize the dialectical materialist approach to appraise or analyze the phenomenon per respective chapters.

Despite the contradictions permeating the process of development of every phenomenon, according to Mao,

Every form of society, every form of ideology has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. . . Of course, unless we understand the universality of contradiction, we have no way of discovering the universal cause, or the universal basis for the movement of things; however, unless we study the particularity of contradiction we have no way of determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things; no way of discovering the particular cause or particular basis for movement or development of a thing. . . Only after man knows the particular essence of many different things can he proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things.¹²

Thus, the pre-colonial mode of production and colonial capitalism in Nigeria is no exception. Hence, in order to objectively illuminate the universality of contradiction in colonial capitalism and use that as a point of departure to ascertain whether or not it has any correlation to the politics of underdevelopment in post-independent Nigeria, we shall dialectically appraise the contradictions in the pre-colonial modes of production as well. Such analysis is significant in this context since the pre-colonial cum colonial socio-

¹¹V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, English ed., vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 25.

¹²Ibid., 96-97.

political and economic developments constitute the antecedental base of our study to determine the causality of politics of underdevelopment in the post-independence era, in view of our objective and hypothesis.

This approach is necessary for the reason that, except we objectively establish bases of the current underdevelopment crises as depicted by our research problem, our study is bound to be frustrated by superficial perceptions. It is our contention that unless the origin of a disease is known, it cannot be cured.

Significance of the Study

Since the granting of "flag independence" by the metropolitan powers to African nations, the common thread that binds these nations' post-colonial economy, unquestionably, is social, political and economic crises. Related problems usually result in underdevelopment of the economy and a hastily formulated (and usually unsuccessful) development strategy to uplift the masses or the economy from such a chaos, by military after military takeovers. These strategies historically do not catalyze the anticipated developing economy. Thus, insidious politics usually evolve and manifest political incohesion and sustain economic inertia.

Such developments usually generate and buttress the ill-pre-conceived notion by the colonial powers that Africans, or in this case Nigerians, are incapable of governing themselves, or developing their economy; and this view furthers the myth of the "white man's burden." Thus, the only option Nigeria has to develop an industrial base is the neo-classical, colonial mode of capitalism. But amazingly, the latter colonialist's view contradicts the great pre-colonial

African civilizations or developing economies which historiography affirmed. In retrospect, the preceding analysis seems to be a gross misconception of the way situations really are. Consequently, the post-colonial leadership spuriously embraces, embodies, and implements the centeroriented development strategies. But the more this model is used, the worse the economic crisis that the masses of Nigeria and Africa face. Despite the magnitude of these problems, the various regimes that usurp the state power in Nigeria basically are not yet committed to question the appropriateness of the inherited colonial capitalist development philosophy or to make rational changes when necessary, based on developing pre-colonial African economic experience which historiography asserts. Their main criticism of the reason for crises in Nigeria is that the ousted government "stultified economic growth through inappropriate policies and corrupt practices. The most universal pledge made by the new military juntas is to provide honest and efficient administration in promoting economic development."¹³ In spite of this contention, the economic conditions usually remain the same or worsen.

It is in the light of these persistent failures in development strategies that the essence of this study becomes unquestionably significant in terms of its expected theoretical or philosophical framework.

The problem of Nigeria's inability to evolve political cohesion, essential to the containment of underdevelopment and of the penury

¹³Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa--Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 24.

of the masses arises in no essential way from corruption in government, the mismanagement of resources, or failure to develop what already exists. This is because the present economy is structurally disarticulated as a satellite colonial capitalism or a peripheral political economy still dominated by the center. And consequently, like most post-colonial states that adopted the metropolitan strategies of development but historically failed, Nigeria is not capable in its present setting of takeoff into economic development. Its development "strategies and tactics" lack authenticity or clear indigenous base. Ostensibly, there is a dilemma of developing a genuine development philosophy and strategy; probably, according to Basil Davidson:

What already exists, in this meaning and context, is either an inheritance from a world that is past, or the merely peripheral fragment or fragments of an international system built and controlled for the benefit of non-Africans. On the one hand, the past cannot be recalled, however valid it may once have been.¹⁴

According to Eurocentric paradigms, Africans had no civilizations worthy of fine tuning on their merit to catalyze political cohesion, and concrete development, unlike the metropole. Hence, except we model our economy after the metropole or adopt the center's suggested development philosophies and evolving development strategies, Nigeria's/ Africa's economic future is a nightmare.

And although African historiography depicts pre-colonial Africa as developing societies, and although the colonial development strategies have been implemented for over three decades, yet politics of

¹⁴Basil Davidson, Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth Without Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 4-5.

underdevelopment pervades. Thus, this study encompasses a revision of holistic pre-colonial economy of Nigeria/Africa with a view to deducing therefrom such essential factors that generated positive transformations or a genuine cohesive mode of production and manifest politics of development in pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa. The latter inferences, based on indigenous tenet and historiography, would be used to resolve our hypothesis. Hence our generalizations would contribute to the formation of a realistic Afrocentric theory of development as well as a genuine African school with a unique scientific paradigm, just like the contemporary European school and its "universal" paradigm-personified by the centers in Europe and its diaspora-the United States.

Therefore, since our study would recapture historical fact and factors, without which no historic nation-state could evolve a cohesive developing economy, such as indigenous school, development tenet, norms and traditions of pre-colonial African societies, our study could offer a profound remedy in contemporary efforts to create a scientific Afrocentric paradigm. In other words, our study could minimize abstractive deductions from such Afrocentric ideas, such as depicted by Molefi Kete Asante in The Afrocentric Idea (1987) and thus evolve a realistic theory of development.

Our study compromises Asante's Afrocentric philosophy when he articulates:

I am not questioning the validity of Eurocentric tradition within its context; I am simply stating that such a view must not seek an ungrounded aggrandizement by claiming a universal hegemony

as it has frequently done in the social sciences. Both the positivist and the Frankfurt School theorists have contributed to European thinking, albeit in quite different ways. And while I sympathize with the critical theorists in regard to the philosophic error in positivism, where it is possible for a person to have poor epistemological knowledge yet be able to test and use first order theories in natural science, I am not convinced that the critical theorists themselves appreciate the kind of unity expressed in the African view of reality. They are, in essence, captives of a peculiar arrogance, the arrogance of not knowing that they do not know what it is that they do not know, yet speak as if they know what all of us need to know . . . To know the African foundations of human society would be to possess a built-in check on such arrogance.¹⁵

Thus, we think that to profoundly abstain from revisitating a people's holistic history and utilizing its virtue is undercivilization or politics of underdevelopment per se. Simultaneously, a steadfast visitation of foreign societies' histories and an embodying the latter's virtue historically eclipse a people's natural capacity to develop and grow. Hence, we are convinced by a universal tenet that every society has its genuine personalities, its unique culture and virtue essential for its indigenous civilizations.

It is in the latter position that we find some Nigerian scholars and government development planners and regimes not manifesting realistic theories and strategies of development. They simply embrace the center's school norms, philosophies and theories of development, without questioning its comparative historical significance. For this reason, most of the theoretical constructs aimed at developing strategies and guides to development fundamentally appear subjectively derived from the industrial historical experiences of the European,

¹⁵Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 4-5.

North American, the Japanese or Eurocentric paradigm, be it socialist or capitalist in character.

In this context articulations of Nigerian scholars in such volumes as Achieving Even Development in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, edited by E. J. Nwosu (1985); Nigerian Government and Politics featuring about fourteen political economists on Nigerian political economy, edited by Oyediran (1979), as well as the state economist and policies in post-independent national development plan, are pointers to the latter postulation. From our position, the serious flaws here are twofold. First, these academics are basically descriptive in their analysis, not dialectical. Second, they have failed to revisit and analyze, dialectically, Nigerian societies to determine whether or not they had essential facts and factors of a developing economy worthy of fine tuning and revitalization. A dialectical analysis of pre-colonial Nigeria could have probably manifested an indigenous tenet essential for creating a profound and authentic development strategy for post-colonial Nigeria. Hence, the center's strategies can only be a complementary factor but not a fact of development. Dialectics could have enabled them to overcome a subjective and superficial appraisal of the neo-classical model. Because of this intellectual inertia, Nwosu and Oyediran have failed to critically examine colonial capitalism and determine why the neo-classical model, which is the contemporary bedrock of the Nigerian development strategies, is yet to enable the nation to overcome its structural underdevelopment problems, or why politics of underdevelopment exacerbates.

For instance, in the First National Development Plan (1962-1968), designed by some of the nation's noted economists ("from the Federal and Regional Ministries of Trade, Finance, Economic Planning, Agriculture and National Resources and the Central Bank")¹⁶ or Joint Planning Committee (J.P.C.), the utilization of the center's development model for post-colonial Nigeria was recommended. This essentially entailed functioning within the center's technology and modernizing same. Thus, continuity of the classical colonial industrial model was guaranteed. According to the Plan, the major national objective was "the achievement and maintenance of the highest possible rate of increase in the standard of living and the creation of necessary conditions to this end including public support and awareness."¹⁷ One other expectation of the Plan (according to J.P.C.) was that Nigeria under this Plan would have a "modernized economy,"¹⁸ just like the mother country. But nobody questioned whether a modernized economy necessarily meant a developed indigenous economy or rather implied must the vitalization of the existing satellite or colonial economy; the latter would imply a sustained underdevelopment of indigenous substructure cum the contradictions of colonial economy in the post-independence era.

¹⁶Federation of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Economic Development, 1970), 7.

¹⁷Ibid., 10.

¹⁸Ibid., 16.

A critical and dialectical appraisal of the colonial political economy under the neo-classical (or colonial) industrial development model could have revealed the contradictions of colonial capitalism. The latter analysis could have objectively revealed the causality of politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria. In other words, it could have enabled the post-colonial Nigerian development planners to determine whether the economic dilemma the colonized Nigerians encountered had any correlation to the colonial capitalism based on such findings and whether a metropolitan model could resolve underdevelopment crises in post-independent Nigeria. But the latter critical study was not steadfastly conducted, for the most part.

As a consequence of the uncritical celebration of the colonial industrialization philosophy and model, the development strategies in Nigeria are simply anathema. Despite the pessimism regarding the success of this model which the reality of economic chaos pinpoints, this group of scholars still posits that since the Eurocentric model enabled the mother country to develop in a matter of time, Nigeria using such a prototype model would also develop.

But did the desired results follow? No! For example, the 1966 socio-political and economic crises which resulted in a Civil War and the stultification of the 1962-1968 Development Plan were a consequence of metropolitan oriented political and economic development strategy. It fostered the growth the exploitative metropolitan mode of production which drained the economy and it depressed and underdeveloping at independence. Thus leaving the Nigerian ethnicities fight for the control of the little that was left for bare

survival. Hence, the plan failed to inspire authentic development. The neo-classical colonial capitalist model-based First National Development Plan was still enforced until the end of the Civil War on January 15, 1970.

In 1969, the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research conducted the "Ibadan Conference [on post war]* Reconstruction and Development from March 24-29, 1969."¹⁹ The documents published by the Institute "show that the foundations for the [Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974 or]* or current. . .development efforts were. . .laid at the Conference."²⁰ The 1970-1974 Plan's objectives were to establish Nigeria as a "united, strong and self-reliant nation; a great and dynamic economy, a just and egalitarian society, a land bright and full of opportunities for all citizens and a free and democratic society."²¹ The major flaw in the First Development Plan was not corrected, as the Second Plan designers failed to dialectically appraise the neo-classical capitalist development model to determine whether it had any correlation to the political incohesion that catalyzed the Civil War.

*Mine.

¹⁹Ibid., 5.

*Mine.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

In fact, such findings would have enabled the state to opt for an authentic rational national development model, and hence to effectively or successfully manage the economic crises in the future. Such an evaluation was never done. Thus, politics of underdevelopment stiffened. Consequently, the economy was in a state of crisis.

Third, another example could be cited in a volume captioned Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979, edited by Oyediran. In this volume, about fourteen Nigerian political economists used the traditional approach to review the development efforts of the military regime. Albeit their studies highlighted some of the economic problems most Nigerians were experiencing, some of these scholars remained, for the most part, uncritical or highly descriptive of colonial capitalism and evolving metropolitan development philosophy which was the base of the government plans. They failed to question precisely the essence of the neo-classical-based development plans as a viable remedy. Because of this flaw, they could not objectively determine the causality of underdevelopment politics in an attempt to mobilize the leadership toward the formation of an authentic development model for Nigeria. Consequently, these scholars could not arrive at conclusions that would necessitate significant radical change in the structure of the economy.

Furthermore, this uncritical appraisal of our colonial industrial experience has led most Nigerian scholars to base their studies not on the indigenous mode of production, but to assure that the Nigerian past, and even the present, resembles the earlier stages of

contemporary industrialized capitalist nations. Our study categorically refutes this assumption or assertion.

In sum, these forms of scholastic contributions are a misrepresentation of the Nigerian reality. They result in inadequate development models which are not authentically Nigerian or Afrocentric and are thus incapable of catalyzing development toward egalitarianism in the nation. Additionally, they exacerbate the superficial colonial mythology that unless we follow the advanced capitalist states' development models, our future will be bleaker.

Therefore, to resolve this intellectual crisis, we intend to go beyond the descriptive analysis by utilizing a dialectical method of analysis in this case study. As a case study, we shall seek to determine why politics of underdevelopment abounds in post-colonial Nigeria. In retrospect, the burden of this study then becomes how to objectively determine the causality of politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria. And based on such findings, to suggest a realistic remedial theory capable of transforming the present underdeveloping satellite economy to a coherent self-propelled developing African economy.

A successful affirmation of our hypothesis and generalization of our finds on the Nigerian situation could generate similar efforts across neo-colonial and underdeveloping states in Africa. And whereas no comprehensive studies have been conducted in a case study format in this setting before, our efforts would lead to the formation of scientific Afrocentric development theory in Africa. This, then, is the essence of the significance of this study.

Limitations of the Study

The study spans from 1960 to 1990. This is the period that has witnessed both the civilian and the military governmental failures to catalyze and sustain economic development of the country. As a case study designed to contribute toward the formation of an Afro-centric paradigm, however, we would be both inductive and deductive in our quest to distill out of Nigeria's social existence and establish a qualitative antecedent to the post-colonial crises. Hence, our objective to utilize the pre-colonial experience as part of the antecedental data is indispensable. We intend to correct any misconceived propositions on ending Nigeria's underdevelopment crises that are rooted in colonial experience and do not depict authentic indigenous experience. This is predicated on our conviction that errors not corrected over a period of time, among the oppressed, might evolve into damaging facts and myths that could manifest erratic development theories, and consequently frustrate their development.

Organization of the Study

This study is divided into three parts. In Part One, we shall provide the blueprint or antecedental historical base of this study as a point of departure. Thus, Chapter I of Part One encompasses the introductory statements which lay out the general guidelines of the study such as statement of the problem, purpose of the study, explanation of concepts, statement of objective, hypotheses and testing procedures, methodology, significance of the study, limitations and organization of the study.

Chapter II is a critical analysis of Africa Pre-colonial Economic System. Our inferences here would be utilized as a basic historic antecedent, essential for the resolution of our hypotheses. To that aim, the following variables would be analyzed:

A. The Labor Development or Process - Indigenous technology vis-a-vis the manifested industries and output would be epitomized and dialectically analyzed to determine their fundamental impact on indigenous societies en masse.

B. The Pre-colonial Superstructure of Africa/Nigeria - We would revisit, epitomize and dialectically analyze the political system to determine the logical impact of leadership in mobilizing indigenous masses to realize the end of the society.

Our major concern here would be to determine whether or not the pre-colonial superstructure cum manifested politics (i.e., the affairs of the society which are rooted in historical native authority and culture), did catalyze strategies of developing economic system. In the quest, we would seek to determine the role of the indigenous school in mobilizing the society to realize its end; having in mind that every society has a school as a fact of its civilization.

This historical analysis is essential in determining the efficiency and effectiveness of an authentic indigenous mode of production in generating concrete development strategies and its probable potentiality if embodied as a fundamental of post-colonial development strategies.

C. Colonial Capitalism in Colonial Nigeria - The substructure and the position of the colonized in it. We would determine the character and role of the colonial industries and its impact on Nigeria.

Colonial superstructure would be analyzed to determine its role in sustaining colonial capitalism, as well as its logical impact on indigenous productive forces. To that end, we would locate and analyze the basic factor institutions that the colonialists set up to consolidate colonial capitalism. The basic contradictions of the colonial superstructure and substructure would be epitomized and dialectically analyzed as essential antecedent in the resolution of our hypotheses.

D. A juxtaposition of colonial and pre-colonial mode of production would be made. The latter would be dialectically analyzed and logically synthesized to depict the historical impact of colonial capitalism on the pre-colonial mode of production on one hand, and the post-independent economic system, on the other. In retrospect, the preceding analysis will constitute an historical antecedent without which our hypotheses cannot be resolved in the subsequent analyses.

Part Two of the study would comprise three chapters, each representing the hypothesis to be tested. Thus, Part Two is an summation of the object of our study. In Part Two, Chapter One, Hypothesis One would be tested. We would determine, based on our antecedents, whether or not colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-independent Nigeria. We would determine whether the contradictions noticeable and lamented by Nigerians under

colonial capitalism repeated or noticeable in the post-independent era (i.e., the character of colonial and metropolitan capitalism in post-independent Nigeria would be evaluated).

- Type of industries then and now
- Process of labor in the colonial industries then and now
- Technologies and control of the colonial industries then and now
- The output of the colonial industries then and now
- The character of labor then and now
- The factor institution of labor training (i.e. schools as a producer of colonial labor then and now)
- The contradictions in the above variables then and now would be synthesized and dialectically analyzed to determine their consequences of scale on Nigerian masses as well as on politics and manifest superstructure.

The deduction therefrom would resolve Hypothesis One. This would constitute Chapter Three.

Herein, in Part Two, Chapter Four, Hypothesis Two would be tested. Contingent on our antecedents, we would determine whether or not the post-independent development philosophy and manifest plans and strategies are essentially and dominantly indigenous or metropolitan. And by such facts and factors, be objectively able to evaluate their impact on national industrialization or development efforts.

We would also determine the extent of interrelatedness, if any, of these plans and strategies as formulated, modified and implemented by respective post-colonial regimes to date; vis-a-vis why the latter failed to contain political incohesion or manifest concrete

development. A consideration would be paid to why no rational departure has been implemented.

To that end, we would separately analyze various development plans or strategies under different regimes. In each case, our main issue would be to determine whether or not their implementation generated concrete development and growth on a national scale or on the contrary whether it further exacerbated the growth and development of metropolitan industries. Our barometer would be the penury of the Nigerian masses expressed in unemployment indicators. We would precisely utilize the Nigerian national labor data to affirm whether or not there is sustained massive unemployment since independence. Sustained unemployment data in this study would indicate and thus affirm failing economic policies or affirm the dominance of politics or underdevelopment in the policies of post-colonial leadership. The above deductions would be epitomized, dialectically analyzed and synthesized to resolve Hypothesis Two.

In Part Two, Chapter Five, Hypothesis Three would be tested. We would appraise, based on our antecedents, whether the post-colonial superstructure is essentially and dominantly colonial and metropolitan indigenous. Further, based on that, we would determine whether or not colonial substructure manifested a crises-laden superstructure cum underdevelopment dilemma in post-independent Nigeria and vice versa; having in mind the contemporary development crises.

To that end, we would look at the character of colonial politics, leadership, government, and institutions, cum their impact on

the Nigerian masses, and compare and contrast with that of post-colonial regimes. In view of the latter we would revisit class structure of the colonial political elite and the position of the indigenes therein and juxtapose it with the class structure of the post-colonial leadership and the position of the masses in their respective regimes; we would then be in a position to determine the character of national politics, policies and implementations, etc. and thus their contradictions would be revealed.

Then based on those findings, we would resolve Hypothesis Three. The issue here is to locate the leadership orientation, evaluate same to determine its failure in containing underdevelopment crises and stiffening penury on the citizens.

Our objective is to determine why post-colonial politics and regimes do not manifest civilizing theory of national development to ensure sustained development and growth of the economic system, but the contrary. Part Three shall constitute Chapter Six or the Conclusion.

The final chapter shall be a synthesis of resolutions, compendium of the deductions from the hypotheses and/or generalization complementing our thesis. By looking at the historical economic system in this light, the essential causality of our undercivilization would be located and solution concretized into authentic theory of development.

Data Collection and Analysis

In order to establish a strong theoretical basis for our study, an exhaustive use of literature--books on political economy, scholarly

journals, government statistics, and magazine reports on colonial mode of production and model of development in Nigeria, Africa and the Third World--is made. These sources are critically examined. But, in general, the analysis is highly qualitative and utilizes various secondary data from the literature at our disposal. In the context of originality, the study is inductively and critically rooted in Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial industrial development plans and, in particular, incorporates reviews of the state of economic development strategies or models in post-colonial Nigeria.

In sum, to attain this objective we shall use as much literature and data from Nigerian governmental official development plans or documents as our primary sources. These sources would be supplemented with relevant literature written by African and foreign scholars.

Review of Relevant Literature

Books on Nigeria which analyze African pre-colonial economy according to African historiography which depict contradictions of colonial capitalism from which deductions about the [with a view to theorizing that the source contemporary economic crises stem from the latter (and hence, speculate that only a rational and radical departure from the former could resolve the dilemma)], are in short supply, vis-a-vis those devoted to the perpetration of the economic status quo. In Nigeria, as in many other parts of Africa, a main source of theoretical influence has been underdevelopment theory as represented by Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin and as popularized by Rodney and reinforced in important respects by Frantz Fanon's

earlier devastating exposure of a subservient, imaginative, corrupt, parasitic, and unproductive "national bourgeoisie." But such underdevelopment theory is selectively incorporated into the ideological arsenal of the aspiring domestic bourgeoisie itself.

Therefore, we would unfortunately be exposed only to a handful of books by Nigerians on this problem. However, efforts would be made to supplement these materials by books and reviews on the Nigerian economic situation by African and other "radical" international scholars. Some of this literature is reviewed hereunder.

A book captioned An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-1960 (1971) by Olufemi Ekundare provides a substantial insight into the pre-colonial industrial mode of production in Nigeria. It analyzes the developments in industries throughout the pre-colonial African kingdom of the present British imperial creation called Nigeria and the way their growth was summarily disrupted by the introduction of the European capitalist mode of production. Olufemi's study is a precise chronological presentation of development history of pre-colonial Nigeria, and as such, does not emphasize the impact of colonial capitalism. His work manifests that industrial development was commonplace in pre-colonial Nigeria.

Although Ekundare admits that this work would only serve an "introductory" purpose for scholars on the economic history of Nigeria which as "a vast subject has remained largely unexplored," it will serve as a valid antecedent to our understanding of colonial capitalism. This work attempts to piece together the fragments of statistical information on the pre-colonial and colonial economic

developments in Nigeria. Its major flaw is that it is purely a descriptive work. No hypotheses have been raised to test the impact of the imposed colonial capitalism on post-colonial Nigeria and thus determine whether or not there is an objective correlation between colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.

A Political Economy of Africa (1981) by Claude Ake provides a "lively and stimulating study" of colonial industrialization in Africa and cites a series of examples when reviewing the nature of the contradictions of the capitalist mode of producing, using Nigeria. It contains a series of statistical data on the colonial industrialization developments in Nigeria, in particular, and Africa, at large. Besides, the author seeks to clarify the striking or salient phenomena of the colonial mode of production by basing his discussion on the laws of motion of society.

Ake succinctly argues that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism are yet to be resolved since the contemporary development models in post-colonial Africa, for the most part, are colonial based. Hence, such models could only exacerbate metropolitan exploitation and consequently underdevelopment, as it would neither allow for independent capitalist development nor transition to scientific socialist development. Albeit a profound analysis of African economy, its failure to depict historical base of civilizing pre-colonial societies, which African historiography asserts, ipso facto, eclipsed Ake's potentiality to suggest a concrete way of resolving the present politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

Although Ake does not take a stand on the possible ways by which transformation in Africa to socialism might be carried out (which we intend to do), his thesis is a drive toward that goal. Therefore, this book constitutes an indispensable resource in our study.

Decolonization and Dependence--Problems of Development of African Societies edited by Aguibou Y. Yansane and published by Greenwood Press, London (1980) is a volume with scholarly articles on African underdevelopment and on that of Nigeria, in particular. Chapter Seven of this volume is specifically devoted to Yansane's analysis of the impact of imperialism and multinational corporations in the underdevelopment of Nigeria. In other words, it attempts to appraise the character and role that multinational corporations play in the underdevelopment of Nigeria by revealing some striking contradictions that are inherent in the industrial capitalist mode of production.

The author's position is validated by up-to-date quantitative data, which would be instrumental in the proof of our hypotheses. The major argument is that the Nigerian underdevelopment crisis is a consequence of colonial and metropolitan capitalism, a capitalism which today merges into and assumes the character of multinational capitalist corporations. In effect, his hypothesis tries to provide empirical validation for the basic Marxist thesis that the serious problems of the Third World countries, like Nigeria, can be traced directly to the maintenance of dependency operations by imperialist

forces whose most powerful catalysts are the colossal multinational corporations. This volume concludes with speculation that revolution shall be the only option for the transformation of Nigeria. But as to how this would be conducted, the author remains somewhat uncommitted. Thus, the major flaw of this volume is the author's inability to objectively clarify the character and method of this anticipated revolution. This lack of clarity makes his analysis essentially abstractions for the most part. This is our point of departure. We shall take a position on possible remedial strategy or a way out in resolving the stiffening politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.

A volume captioned Independent Africa, edited by Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, published by Vintage Books (1970), is a vivid documentary based on the writings of African political leaders and writers. In it, African institutions, resistance to European penetration, European rule, and movements toward independence are appraised. Many articles by Nigerians on the Nigerian colonial experience are articulated, such as "A Denunciation of European Imperialism (in Nigeria)" by Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Early Political Organizations in Nigeria" by Obafemi Owolowo, "Unity and Diversity in Independence" by Alhaji Sir A. T. Balewa. These articles trace the basis of nationalism, but basically from a historical point of view. The fundamental argument articulated is that colonialism, cum colonial capitalism, is basically exploitative and manifests underdevelopment of Nigeria. Hence, Nigeria must be freed from the center's domination if it must develop. Al-

though they do not root their analyses on mode of production, the articles provide a solid base of departure on the essence of colonial superstructure and contradiction therein, which resulted in "flag independence." Albeit these elite by their positions attribute the causality of Nigeria's underdevelopment to colonial capitalism with which we fundamentally agree, their anticipated remedial strategy is Eurocentric. They see no need of resubstructuring/resuperstructuring for the most part. They also fail to revisit pre-colonial African civilizations, objectively analyze them, and distill systematic virtue to design strategies and tactics of reversing underdevelopment. This failure is a major flaw and this is where we depart. our study will critically revisit the indigenous world of production. We consider it a highly essential and significant volume for our purpose since these Nigerians were the leading founding fathers of Nigeria's nationalism.

Imperialism from the Colonial Age to the Present by Harry Magdoff, published by Monthly Review Press (1978), is a volume with a series of essays rooted on modes of production and aimed at illuminating historical basis and essence of imperialism from the era of Europe's global expansionism associated with the industrial revolution to the period of the multinational corporation, or era of neo-imperialism. The author profoundly argues that imperialism, and consequently colonialism and colonial capitalism, constitutes a factor of underdevelopment of colonies and post-colonial states like Nigeria.

Hence, for the development of the underdeveloped states, the essence of imperialism must be understood and neo-imperialism contained.

Furthermore, this volume examines the often neglected aspect of the last bicentennial history of the spread of Euro-capitalism in light of structural changes in the metropolises, which created the need for colonialism and development of the peripheries like Nigeria, cum nationalism in the colonial countries. The volume, therefore, is highly significant for our study since it does reveal the motive force behind the colonialist self-proclaimed good intention of developing the "under-industrializing" pre-colonial world like Africa, in general, and Nigeria, in particular. Although this study enables us to objectively comprehend the essence and strategy of colonial capitalism as exploitation, it remains objectively quiet in suggesting specific and realistic means of containing the perceived exploitation which could fundamentally resolve underdevelopment crises in post-colonies like Nigeria. This is its flaw. Our study objectively suggests realistic and specific strategies of ending underdevelopment crises in Nigeria/Africa.

Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth Without Development by Basil Davidson (1974) is a volume that appraises the essence and impact of Euro-capitalism in Africa. From his findings, the author articulates that pre-colonial Africa was transforming toward a more developed and civilized society until Europe colonized the continent and introduced its capitalist mode of production. Under the Euro-capitalism mode, African resources, like Nigeria's experienced growth.

In his analysis, there was "more production, more money," but this wealth was amassed by the metropole, and thus "the growth, if anything, impoverished Africans, just as it enriched the Europeans." Second, this process of colonialization resulted in the highly effective socio-politico and economic institutions; thus what was left at the time of independence was the dominant exploitative colonial institutions. Davidson then raises an issue which unquestionably reflect our study's intent, i.e., can these [colonial]* institutions work in [independent]* Africa of which Nigeria is a part? And can the advanced capitalist development model activate structural development in a post-colonial state in Africa?

Since most of the factual base of his discussion is predicated on concrete examples of Nigeria or the Nigerian situation, we consider Davidson's work, although too general in scope, an additional solid base of departure. The work is illuminating since his methodology reflects the dialectical materialist approach. Its major flaw is the author's failure to scientifically suggest authentic and specific strategy based on indigenous African tenet and historiography, whereas he disfavors Eurocentric paradigm for the most part. Hence, this failure to reconcile articulation with African reality today makes this volume a scientific abstraction, and thus practically a fantasy. Our study aims to reveal the causality of the problem.

*Mine.

*Mine.

Federation of Nigeria, National Development Plan, 1962-68, published by the Federal Ministry of Economic Development (Lagos, Nigeria) is a tremendous original source for our study. This document reviews the epistemological foundations of previous development planning in colonial Nigeria and affirms thereto that such colonial development strategies, unquestionably, provided impetus for post-colonial development planning in Nigeria. From that base, the government sets out development strategies which are conceived as the foundation upon which the future socio-political and economic development strategies in Nigeria could be based.

According to the then Federal Minister of Economic Development Waziri Ibrahim (1962), "in preparing this plan we [the government] have drawn upon the pool of international knowledge and experience"; that includes "experts" from advanced capitalist centers, as well as the latter's institutions. Thus, although the plan was designed to resolve the colonial problem or enable Nigeria to win her economic independence (from the Nationalist government perspective), it seems to lose touch with concrete post-colonial underdevelopment problems, insofar as it was for the most part designed by colonialists and neo-colonialists who are traditionally against total independence of any former colony, or who created the problem in the first place.

The plan's major flaw is that it has a neo-classical colonial/metropolitan underpinning and is not based on Nigerian historical experience, but rather on advanced capitalist nations' experience. Hence the plan remains in self-contradiction on the issue of defining

its major objective--development--in the interest of Nigeria. At best it is tantamount to a rat seeking a safe custody from a hungry cat. In this context, development strategies on application become anathema and further exacerbate politics of underdevelopment.

This blind reliability on the exploitative philosophy and strategy of the metropolis eclipsed post-colonial regimes' effort to design genuine strategy of development based, for the most part, on a holistic indigenous experience, just like the centers. To the leadership Nigeria is developing, which we refute. Development is viewed as growth of the economy within the framework of modernization. But on whether or not such growth could uplift the masses from present poverty remains inconclusive. Our study seeks to scientifically refute the government's assertion of Nigeria's development.

Second, in spite of this problem of underdevelopment, inasmuch as the plan is the fundamental government document with well defined strategy to develop post-colonial Nigeria, we consider it a highly indispensable original source for our study.

A book captioned Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-79, edited by Oyediran, is a volume in which fourteen Nigerian scholars articulate on different aspects of the post-colonial dilemma in the political economy of Nigeria. For instance, the development strategies and their implementation, under the title, "The Military and the Economy," are reviewed by Akin Iwayemi. In his analysis, Akin appraises, albeit positively, the national development strategies during the military regimes and pinpoints their achievement as well as failures.

In all, however, his work is highly descriptive; his major flaw is that he does not hypothesize to move us toward the formation of a model of development of Nigeria. Second, his traditional approach only enables him to interpret modernization in Nigeria during the military regimes as development. To him, as long as the economy was recovering high gross national product (G.N.P.), that was development. Third, his major argument is that the failure of the economy is a consequence of corruption and inefficiency in the government, but as to what created and bred that syndrome or how the inefficiency could be basically contained, his approach does not reveal.

We intend, in our method and hypotheses, to question the basis of underdevelopment politics. Because of his traditional approach, Akin cannot recommend a radical modification in the economy, even when he acknowledges that there is economic crisis in the economy. Because of his scholar critical analysis of the economy, we consider his work a great resource for our study.

Federation of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, published by the Federal Government Printer (Lagos), is the next major government document which contains the policy framework or national development objectives which the government was committed to at the end of the first development plan period.

This book is a review of the first plan and highlights the problem encountered with a view of targeting this plan for a possible resolution of underdevelopment crises. Although the government, unlike in the first plan, resolved that "its policies and actions [would] be guided solely by the best interest of the people of Nigeria"

because of its undetachment from the neo-classical metropolitan model of the first plan, its commitment to resolve the underdevelopment problem remained in limbo, just like the preceding strategies.

Although the government claims to make Nigeria a "self-reliant nation. . .and a just and egalitarian society" by winning "economic independence," the plan remains a paper tiger insofar as its strategy for the economic liberation is designed, for the most part, by the neo-colonial forces. Its major flaw is that no part of the plan questioned whether the neo-colonial model has ever enabled post-colonial states to win economic independence. Because of lack of profound and dialectical analysis of the adopted neo-colonial model, spurious judgements were used to legitimize the latter development plans. As a consequence, no remedy was in sight; the crises stiffened. However, for our purpose, we consider the Development Plan's original data whereas it is a key document upon which the testing of our hypothesis could not be conducted without its elaborate information.

Another development plan characterized--Federal Government of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, published by Federal Government Printer (Lagos)--is another original source we will use. This plan which stresses "self-reliance" through indigenizing industries still remains unclear on how to precisely implement the neo-classical international model of development. Just like the previous plans, development is not concretely defined from the viewpoint of the indigenous masses. No question is raised as to why, in the face of the petroleum boom the country was witnessing during

the second plan, the Nigerian masses were still dwelling in penury just as they had been before the flag independence.

According to the Plan, development was still measured as the growth of the gross national product (G.N.P.). This is the volume's main flaw. In any case, since it outlines the development targets for the country such as needed for rapid industrialization, as well as prescribes the model to be used to attain that objective, we consider it a fine original resource for our study. A critical analysis of it will manifest the causal factors of underdevelopment of Nigeria. It will enable us to establish whether or not there is a correlation between colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.

Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, published by the Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction (Lagos) is a review that highlights the achievements as well as the failures of the Third National Plan, while pinpointing the problems in its implementation and recommending measures for remedies. For our study, the review enables us to determine whether the measures were simply a symbolic gesture meant to mystify the state's uncommitment to real or even development, and second whether or not there was a consequential improvement on the state of the economy.

Achieving Even Development in Nigeria--Problems and Prospects, edited by E. J. Nwosu and published by Economic Development Institute,

University of Nigeria (1985) is a volume in which Nigerian scholars appraise the post-colonial economy of Nigeria. Their debate, emerging from their concern for underdevelopment syndrome in Nigeria, is captivating. However, their analytical method is basically descriptive and traditional; as such, they only give a peripheral appraisal of the economy. This probably grows out of their commitment to their Western capitalist or elitist orientation; as a consequence, no hypothesis that would have suggested the abandonment of neo-classical international economic model to a radical model had been posited, as we are committed to do.

Thus, while the book argues that the present model of development does not reflect, for the most part, the Nigerian reality, and therefore could not ensure or contribute to equitable distribution of wealth, or enable Nigeria to win economic independence, it remains silent in the context of recommending ways out, which might have suggested a radical revolutionalization of the state. In spite of that flaw, the work remains a scholastic masterpiece, based on its rich data and sense of objectivity. From our position, it is tantamount to intellectual inertia. Thus it is simply a research for debate purposes but not for transformation of a neo-colonial state like Nigeria. Since it is regarded as "the first of its kind [according to the publisher] to deal in great depth with the issue of equity" as a post-colonial development problem in Nigeria, we consider it necessary original data indispensable in determining the causality of underdevelopment politics in post-colonial Nigeria.

The Challenge of Nigeria's Indigenization, edited by Akinade

O. Sanda and published by Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), Ibadan, 1982 is basically an analysis of the problem that the state encountered in the implementation of industrial indigenization model, characterized as The 1972 Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD). Under this decree, the federal government sought to have the control of foreign businesses legally transferred to Nigerians, as a step to contain exploitation of the economy by foreign businesses.

The book brings to light the pitfalls in the decree implementation as exemplified by public discontent as well as the formation of the Industrial Enterprises Panel to assess the problem. It also informs the evaluation outcomes the panel uncovered to be the major obstacles to successful indigenization of foreign business, such as low level of patriotism on the part of Nigerians who cooperated with foreigners to exploit their masses. Again, the major argument is that the failure of development strategies is a consequence of corruption in the polity, which is questionable from our position.

Thus, while the author brilliantly concludes that unless the "human problems" frustrating the decree implementation are eradicated, his silence on where the problem is centered (i.e., the state) indicts the latter and unquestionably makes his work a manifestation of intellectual inertia. This stance consequently frustrates his ability to determine objectively the causality of underdevelopment politics, and realistically speculate for possible solutions. This is his major

weakness. The volume will be very useful in our analysis, however, of the indigenization model.

Review of African Political Economy, edited by Doris Burgess and Judith Mohan, is a quarterly publication in which such distinguished scholars such as Amin, Leys and Davidson critique the current failing efforts of independent Africa to develop by appraising the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production on the political economy of Africa.

Special volumes are particularly devoted to the critique of the political economy of colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. For instance, in volumes 5 and 13, a series of well-researched studies on the colonial capitalism and their consequence for post-colonial development of Nigeria are articulated. In volume 5, the impact of multinational corporation and the Nigerian state (both a manifestation of colonial industrialization) is examined as it affects the development efforts in the post-colonial era.

In the findings, the state is reflected as a comprador *per se* of the Multinational Corporations (MNCs). The government functionaries are satisfied from profit in the form of bribes they receive from "organizing the access of foreign firms to local markets and raw materials." This fact reveals an uncommitment on the part of the state to contain the metropolitan exploitation and activate development in Nigeria.

In volume 13, an appraisal of the political economy of under-developing states is conducted from a historical materialist perspective. In the findings based (among other theses) on Frank's analysis

of capitalism and its impact on post-colonial Latin America, and on a critique of political economy of Nigeria by Segun Osoba, the volume argues that the colonial capitalist mode of production (sustained by classical and on neo-classical development models), is what constitutes underdevelopment in Third World states like Nigeria. Burgess and Mohan's work contributes to our study by highlighting the facts that the persistent crises in post-colonial Nigeria are outcroppings of the contradictions of colonial capitalism and hence depicts essential data from which we can deduce that there is a correlation between colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

This volume concludes that only a rational departure from the colonial-oriented capitalist model to scientific socialist model will catalyze development in Third World states like Nigeria. And for our purposes, these critiques shall be very useful when testing our hypotheses. The major weakness in the book is that it did not specify a realistic method by which the departure from colonial capitalist model could be efficiently effected, which we intend to do.

Industrialization and Income Distribution in Africa, edited by J.F. Rweyewamu and published by Codesere, P. B. (Dakar, Senegal, 1980) is a volume with scholarly articles in which industrialization dilemma and strategies designed to resolve the latter (in post-colonial Africa) are quantitatively appraised and solutions advanced.

In chapters seven and eight, income distribution in English-speaking West Africa (which includes Nigeria), and the impact of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (which is a development strategy

designed to place the ownership and control of foreign industries in the hands of Nigerians in order to arrest economic osmosis or capital drain and underdevelopment) on indigenous ownership quantitatively are analyzed by Kodwo Ewusi, Akinola Owosekun, and Moses Oligba.

Their approach to the studies is traditional and functional. In their studies they depict the contemporary Nigerian economy as structurally incoherent and, simultaneously, dependent on the center for technological and economic support needed for its industrialization insofar as it remains a raw material export economy.

Owosekun and Oligba articulate that this dependency problem manifests economic osmosis since most of the net earnings are ploughed back to the centers.

Efforts to place the industrial assets equitably among Nigerian people have been frustrated due to lack of political commitment by the state to design and implement a development model capable of resolving Nigeria's problems of dependency and its resultant penury. They argue that such lack of political will by the state has been the reason the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree has remained a "paper tiger." In the face of this lack of decolonization of industries and massive population increases, the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.), they argue, does not fetch adequate foreign earnings to improve the income per capita in the nation; thus the penury increases. Their findings are supported by a series of quantitative data which would be a valuable supplementary resource in our efforts to test our hypotheses. Thus, because of their traditional method

of analyzing colonial capitalism they could not reveal the contradictions in the latter; hence, they simply analyzed the effects but not the essence of colonial capitalism, which our dialectical method would. Hence, their approach basically, then, does not suggest a scientific indigenization of the colonial model and a revitalization of the precolonial development tenet, if necessary.

Their major flaw is that they failed to hypothesize on the problem, and consequently they could not move us toward the formation of a theory and philosophy of development capable of bringing about concrete development in Nigeria. Our studies basically would move to formulate a theory of development in Nigeria/Africa based on a holistic African experience.

A book entitled Path to Nigerian Development, edited by Okwudiba Nnoli and published by Codesere, P.M. 3304 (Dakar, Senegal), features scholarly articles on the beginning and causes of underdevelopment in Nigeria. The method applied by these scholars is historical in some concerns and dialectical in others. They separately argue that the problem of underdevelopment in Nigeria is a manifestation of unresolved contradictions of colonial industrial mode of production, and that the lack of commitment on the part of the leadership to design a development strategy capable of resolving those contradictions has simply stiffened underdevelopment crises.

The major flaw in this volume is that there is no sense of dialogue, which could have enabled these scholars to agree on the hypothesis needed to test the validity of their contentions. Such

findings could have evolved a development theory and ideology of development for Nigeria in particular and Africa at large. In this respect, they simply identify the problems but fail in their responsibility of theorizing toward the transformation of Africa in their capacity as intellectuals. In this respect, their studies become merely studies for scholastic debate, not for the resolution of concrete African problems.

In retrospect, their studies are captivating in that they raise critical questions that could help one to truly understand the root of the underdevelopment problems in Nigeria. It is this aspect of their contribution which we consider useful in our study and efforts to test our hypotheses.

Nigerian Modernization: The Colonial Legacy (1972) by Ukandi G. Damachi is an epitome of the colonial industrialization history of Nigeria. The author's methodology is traditional-historicism. In this volume, Damachi articulates or "attempts to present some of the disruptive and constructive social aspects" of the development of colonial industrial mode of production in Nigeria.

This study enabled him to posit and conclude that colonial capitalism, in reality, has some positive impact or manifestations. The objectivity of the studies in this volume is predicated on the fact that they were separately and independently conducted in collaboration with International Institutes for Labor Studies (IILS), Geneva. It is the basic concern of IILS to ensure that development strategies in underdeveloped countries contain the penury of their

masses and underdevelopment syndrome, and catalyze concrete development. These concerns are depicted in articulations in this volume.

In chapter seven, Ukandi G. Damachi of IILS (a Nigerian), critically analyzes Nigeria's post-colonial development models or plans to determine whether or not they manifest real and even development as anticipated by the state. Some categories, such as employment conditions, income distribution, the social relations of production, and the position of the leadership in development planning and implementation are utilized as measuring indicators of success or lack thereof. The preceding indicators are in consonance with our study.

What is significant in Damachi's analysis is that his studies are a compendium of inductive and deductive theories. Damachi's approach in this study is traditional and functional. However, this approach only enabled him to study the underdevelopment crises on the periphery and thus its causality could hardly be located in the colonial mode of production and evolving development strategies and tactics.

In the study, the author reveals that Nigeria's post-colonial regimes have failed in their efforts to contain underdevelopment dilemma in the state. Based on his findings, Damachi contends that the Nigerian development strategies have not yielded the desired objective or have "not been successful because government plan designers] experts embark[ed] on grandiose or overly ambitious plans without setting out clear techniques for realizing their targets; [hence] the government becomes aware of these problems without knowing what to do;" thus, the crisis escalates.

In retrospect, Damachi rests his study on a position that except some structural improvements of the economy are made by Nigerians, the country's future could be bleaker. But as to how the development should be attained, he remained silent. However, in spite of this flaw, because of his familiarity with Nigeria (as a citizen), his experience in working with the IILS, and the fact that this study was performed in Nigeria (thus giving it more inductive cum deductive underpinnings), we consider this work as an essential original resource in our study.

In the volume entitled Africa: What Can Be Done? by Ben Turok of the Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA), the author dialectically explores Africa's experience and thus argues that "Africa's dilemma is a function of World Capitalism Crises in which the Third World is the main victim."

Turok also argues that the crisis stiffens as a consequence of chauvinism in Africa's post-colonial leadership. Thus the book epitomizes African underdevelopment. Turok precisely depicts "why African governments did not fulfill their promises of development and democracy following the defeat of colonial rule." The volume analyzes the basics of neo-colonialism in Africa and consequently illuminates the essential contradictions in the post-colonial era.

The author concludes that whether or not these contradictions can be resolved will depend on how soon the academics and other social forces agree on programs of development in theory and praxis, which we share. Hence, we consider this volume indispensable

in our efforts to resolve politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.

Besides the above volumes, books on underdevelopment theory that influenced theoretical framework in recent years for underdevelopment studies in Nigeria or elsewhere in Africa are represented in such volumes as Unequal Development (S. Amin, 1976), The Development of Underdevelopment (A.G. Frank, 1969), Political Economy of Backwardness (Baran). Rodney's brilliant work, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, also will be used as our basic point of departure in our argument to test the hypotheses.

This is not all. Works of authentic African history such as The Stolen Legacy (George James, 1985); African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality (Cheikh Anta Diop, 1972); Pre-colonial Black Africa (Cheikh Anta Diop, 1987); The African Background to Medical Science (Charles S. Finch, 1990); Africans and Their History (Joseph E. Harris, 1987); Introduction to African Civilizations (John G. Jackson, 1970); Black Man of the Nile (Yosef Ben-Jochannan, 1972); Kemet and the African Worldview (Maulana Keranga and Jacob H. Carruthers, 1986); From Ancient Africa to Ancient Greece (Henry Otele, 1981); The Destruction of Black Civilization (Chancellor Williams, 1987); Black Africa, The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State (Cheikh Anta Diop, 1987); Egypt Revisited (Ivan van Sertima, 1989); The Egyptian Book of the Dead (E. A. Wallis Budge, 1967), et al. would be used in our revisitation and dialectical analysis of pre-colonial economy of African light of our study objective, as vide our Chapter Two outline.

CHAPTER II

PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA/NIGERIA: DEVELOPING OR UNDERDEVELOPING?

But what has Africa contributed to the world progress? . . .not the wheel, not the writing, not the mathematics, not art. . .not the other thing. . .These critics of Africa forget that men of science today are, with few exceptions, satisfied that Africa. . .for many hundreds of centuries. . .was in the forefront of all world progress.¹

L.S.B.Leakey

Post-colonial Africa, indigenous historiography has affirmed, is a watershed of stiffening, underdeveloping political economy. But to what extent is this underdevelopment crisis a fact and factor of aboriginal African societies as suggested by the above caveats and many similar assertions? This issue shall be our focus here.

Today in Africa/Nigeria after decades of flag independence, the hope for an autarky is just as remote, as it was in the colonial era. According to African authentic post-colonial history, contemporary nation-states are largely dominated by wanton underdevelopment crises, such as stiffening poverty of the masses and timely political incoherence.

Consequently, contemporary African leaderships, and in particular, Nigeria's, have historically become suspect. They are no longer

¹Quoted in Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 2.

celebrated as the zealous nationalists they were thought to be at the inception of flag independence by Nigerian masses.

Such dispirited, poverty stricken masses are not uncommon. In fact, African/Nigerian historiography has attested that such discontent is noted to generate friction in the regimes, and manifest abrasive leadership. Nigeria has witnessed such political incoherences in its regimes or leadership en masse. They manifest systematic and insidious coup d'etats. Hence, there has yet to be a lasting esprit de corps in the leadership capable of designing a functional or viable development strategy for Nigeria.

According to genuine development history the absence of a vivid development strategy basically aggravates and frustrates the capacity of under-developing societies and nation-states to design and implement efficient and effective models for a concrete development. This is a fact in Nigeria today. Hence, poverty of the masses exacerbates in post-colonial Africa.

Consequently, haunted by violent outlash from the masses, authentic African/Nigerian historiography has affirmed the post-colonial leadership historically solicit development philosophies and strategies from the metropolis and manifest centers which historically colonized and exploited Nigeria as a viable remedy. Indeed the masses resented a reunion with the colonial leadership and opted for independence.

But has post-colonial leadership succumbing to the center directives evolved a functional development model capable of arresting and reversing underdevelopment? To the latter, objective national

history of Nigeria, or continental Africa indicates the contrary. For the most part, postcolonial history infers that the more the post-colonial regimes utilized the centers' oriented development plans, the worse underdevelopment crises among masses. Thus, it appears that these centers derived development strategies are essentially inconsistent with the uncompromising need of catalyzing a developing political economy for post-colonial Africa/Nigeria.

In reality, the latter model is structurally and practically just an exploitative replica of the colonial administration. The colonial development strategies, history asserts, disarticulated the political economy of the colonies and, ipso facto rendered the colonized nations vulnerable to the exploitative tendencies of the centers. Economic osmosis was the reality. Today this is still the order.

Therefore, whereas the more the center plans are utilized, the more the underdevelopment crises deepen. Consequently, according to post-colonial history, the evolving political instability and the development strategies are probably perjorative to post-colonial development, philosophy and strategies of Africa/Nigeria. Historically, the post-colonial leadership has yet to distill from the center's development philosophies a functional development strategy capable of generating a sustained development and leadership resilience. There is yet to be a supra nation-states development model. The post-colonial economy is becoming bleaker and Africa seems to be retiring to the colonists' characterization of a DARK continent.

In the face of all these failures and crises, the leadership does not appear to be imminent. The Nigerian leadership today is yet

to re-examine the centers' development philosophy that they inherited, discounted, re-embraced, and applied as an optimistic remedy, albeit to no avail. Such introspection could illuminate the causality of the inconsistencies, if any, in the applied center evolved development strategies in the post-colonial era.

Objective systematic introspection informs or suggests to the persons in control a fundamental modification in their plans. Simultaneously, an examination or a profound nature study of the political economy of the center which these leaderships emulate would have, probably, catalyzed remedies in absence of the authentic development history of Africa/Nigeria which the leaderships do not embody.

According to genuine omni history, societies and manifest nation-states become developing, as a result of embodying and exercising their authentic culture, or holistic experience as essential facts and factors of development and vice versa. Such axiom would have been tested against the history of the centers, and unquestionably would have made the post-colonial regimes to realize that the fundamentals of development strategies can be distilled from their indigenous culture just as the centers'. It would have emphasized to the leaderships a historical postulate that development eclecticism not absorbed or digested into one's history before implementation has always frustrated authentic development.

In retrospect, neither of the above considerations appealed to leadership. Despite successive failures, Nigeria's leadership today still opts for metropolitan development philosophies and strategies, academically, politically and economically. The regimes are languid,

and the worst is that they are training in the colonial oriented school system. They are being educated to embody the concept that Africa could not develop without the center's guidance. Therefore, Africa has no history worthy of revisiting to distill essentials for concrete development. But to what extent is such position a logical argument? The post-colonial leadership remains passive.

Hence, Basil Davidson's profound and fundamental delving into omni historiography infers that:

The bundling of all societies into the same crudely linear concept of development process ignored the bulk of human history. To argue that Africans were undeveloped or underdeveloped peoples was tantamount to saying that they had no history of their own; whereas, in fact, it lies beyond any serious question that they were in no way undeveloped or underdeveloped, in terms of their own frameworks. On the contrary, they had developed their societies from Stone Age simplicity to Iron Age complexity. They have passed from one stage to another of technological achievement. If these peoples were undeveloped or underdeveloped in 1960, this could only be in terms of quite different history of quite different peoples.²

And regrettably, the Africa/Nigeria colonial-oriented school system and evolving elite are yet to compromise Davidson's caveat and attestation.

Therefore, the striking issue becomes: why? In this context, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, in his findings, asserts that:

Colonialism imposed its control of the social production of wealth through military conquest and subsequent political dictatorship. But its most important area of domination was the mental universe of the colonized, the control, through culture, of how people perceived themselves and their relationship to the world. Economic

²Basil Davidson, Can Africa Survive? Arguments Against Growth Without Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 74.

and political control can never be complete or effective without governmental control to control a people's culture is to control their self-definition in relationship to others.³

Thus, in light of the preceding axiom and caveats, both based on authentic omni historiography asserting that indigenous political culture or -

. . .the distribution of patterns of cognitive, affective and evaluation orientations among the population towards political objects special roles of structures, such as legislative bodies, executives or bureaucrats, incumbents of roles such as particular monarchs, legislators and administrators and particular public policies, decisions or enforcement of decisions.⁴

is only historical base for distilling genuine development philosophy and strategies; our revisitation to pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria becomes a highly profound and fundamental priority in the resolution of our hypotheses. Our inferences here would enable us to determine why these politics of underdevelopment pervades post-colonial Africa/Nigeria and would be utilized as a basic historical antecedent, essential for the resolution of our hypotheses. To that aim, pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria, based on the following variables, would be analyzed:

A. The Labor Development or Process - Indigenous technology vis-a-vis the manifested industries and output would be epitomized and dialectically analyzed to determine their fundamental impact on indigenous societies en masse.

³Quoted in Asa G. Hillard, III, Lucretia Payton Stewart, and Larry Obadell Williams, Infusion of African and African American Content in School Curriculum (Morristown, NJ: Aaron Press, 1989), 3.

⁴James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics. The Quest for Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1981), 87.

B. The Pre-Colonial Superstructure of Africa/Nigeria - We would hereby dialectically describe and analyze Africa/Nigeria's political system to determine the logical impact of leadership in mobilizing the masses to realize economic independence.

And whereas, our study delves into authentic aboriginal history of development in Africa or questions a historical African civilization, development strategies become objective cultural issues. As history asserts, culture is the essence of society's development.

The burden of our study or hypotheses is made culturally significant, while resolution could generate authentic political development in post-colonial Africa/Nigeria at the dawning of the 21st century.

Therefore, according to Cheikh Anta Diop:

The cultural concept, especially will claim our attention here, the problem was posed in terms of restoring the collective African personality. . .admittedly three factors compete to form the collective personality of a people a psychic factor, susceptible of a literary approach; this is a factor that would be called national temperament, and that Negritude poets have overstressed. In addition, there are the historical factor, and the linguistic factor, both susceptible of being approached scientifically - the subject of our studies; we have endeavored to remain strictly on scientific grounds. Have foreign intellectuals who challenge our intentions and accuse us of all kinds of hidden motives or ridiculous ideas, proceeded any differently when they explain their own historical past that seems normal? Yet when an African does likewise to help reconstruct the national personality of his people, distorted by colonialism, that is considered backward or alarming. We contend that such a study is the point of departure for cultural revolution properly understood. All who try to bypass this effort can be explained by intellectual inertia, inhibition, or incompetence. The most brilliant pseudorevolutionary eloquence ignores that need which must be met if our peoples are to reborn culturally and politically. Many Africans find this vision too beautiful to be true; not so long ago some of them could not break with the idea that Blacks are not existent culturally and historically.

. . . Today, what interests most is to see. . . not passive readers but honest bold research workers, allergic to complacency and busy substantiating and exploring ideas. . . such as the Ancient Egypt was a Negro civilization. . . We must restore the historical consciousness of the African peoples.⁵

Thus, in the wake of stiffening underdevelopment crises, (a) political lack of cohesion with a potentiality for insurrection, center-oriented ineffectiveness in minimizing and/or reversing underdevelopment crises; (b) sustained passive embodiment and exercise of center development strategies, in spite of their inefficiencies; (c) leadership inability to determine the failures in the respective development elitism implemented since independence, reminiscent of pre-colonial political economy becomes our profound and fundamental concern.

In this quest, the essential issue then becomes what is Africa? In a more soluble term, the question seeks to illuminate the character of aboriginal-oriented civilization.

Thus, we precisely and dialectically seek to describe and analyze the aboriginal or the indigenous society that manifest contemporary African nation-states. Historically, such objective analysis enabled researchers to determine the basic character, or the fact and factors of development and growth of a society's essential mode of production. Consequently, we could then locate the historical catalysts which transformed and advanced that society on its own, or vice versa.

⁵Cheikh Anta Diop, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1974), xiii-xiv.

Therefore, the solubility of our essential issue here (what is Africa?) would enable us to determine whether or not there existed authentic "productive forces - labor power, objects of labor and means of labor."⁶

Thus, according to Ake, whereas:

The productive forces express the overall productive capabilities of the society. They tend to develop at all times. When one talks of the development of productive forces one may be thinking of the quantitative and qualitative improvements in labor power, for instance, when people acquire more scientific education and technical skills, one could be thinking of the improvements of natural assets such as irrigation of arid lands to make it arable. One could be thinking of the technology with which man produces. The importance of the development of productive forces to a society cannot be overemphasized. The state of the development of productive forces decisively influences social organization, culture, the level of welfare and even consciousness. The history of Africa itself bears testimony to the importance of productive forces. . . Africa's economic backwardness and object dependence today reflects the state of the development of productive forces. One major reason why we have failed to make sense of politics and other events in Africa is because we have not paid enough attention to the state of the development of productive forces, and its powerful influence on everything else.⁷

Hence, by analyzing the productive forces in pre-colonial Africa, we would objectively determine antecedent facts and factors essential for the attestation of our hypotheses. Therefore, Africa, before colonialism, indigenous historiography affirms, was a compendium of varied but culturally limited societies: the fundamental issue now becomes: (a) where do we begin an analysis of pre-colonial Africa

⁶Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Nigeria: Longman Nigerian, Ltd., 1981), 11.

⁷Ibid.

and why? (b) what correlation does an analysis of pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria have in the resolution of our impending hypotheses?

To these issues, African historiography as articulated by Diop asserts that: -

Our investigations have convinced us that - ancient Egypt was a Negro civilization. The history of Black Africa will remain suspended in the air and cannot be written correctly, until African historians dare to connect it with the history of Egypt. In particular, the study of languages, institutions, and so forth, can not be treated properly; in a word, it will be impossible to build African humanities, body of African human sciences, so long as that relationship does not appear legitimate. The African historian who evades the problem of Egypt is neither modest nor objective, nor unruffled. He is ignorant, cowardly and neurotic. Imagine, if you can, the uncomfortable position of a western historian who was to write the history of Europe without referring to Greco-Latin antiquity and try to pass off as a scientific approach.⁸

Thus, we deem it, not out of objectivity, to understand pre-colonial Africa by describing and analyzing the Egyptian society of antiquity and manifest civilization and development whereas the latter was a star, or a model civilization aboriginal society of Alkebu-Lan.*

According to authentic history:

Among the many names Alkebu-Lan [the "mother of mankind" or "Garden of Eden"] were the following: Ethiopia, Corphye, Ontegia, Libya, "and 'Africa' - the latest of all." AlkebuLan is the oldest and the only one of indigenous origin. It was used by the Moors, Nubians, Numidians, Khant-Haddans [Carthagenians], and Ethiopians. "Africa,"

⁸Diop, Origin of Civilization, xiv.

*We infuse into this study the concept - Alkebu-Lan, to underscore the authenticity of indigenous society's history, prior to inter-continental contact, and shortly thereafter, but before colonialism. This is to objectively ensure that the essential fact and factors of development here, if any, are indigenous.

the current misnomer adopted by almost everyone today, was given to this continent by the ancient Greeks and Romans.⁹

As a star or most advanced of the indigenous societies in antiquity, pre-colonial Egypt played a pivotal role in historical African civilizations. Egypt's positive culture pervaded continental Alkebulan or Africa, with probably an identical intensity which the "Greco-Latin" culture of antiquity had on the European civilizations cum developments. Therefore, "the return to Egypt in all fields is a necessary condition to reconcile African civilization with history, to be able to build a body of human sciences and to renew African culture"¹⁰ indispensable in the designing of authentic and essential development philosophy and strategies for contemporary underdeveloping Africa/Nigeria. Thus, Egypt or "Kemet will offer fertile ground in the areas of philosophy, culture and sciences for a new African and a new paradigm for humanity which this implies."¹¹

In retrospect, our study utilizes the African/Egyptian culture as a point of departure because it personifies an authentic indigenous outstanding civilization, according to historiography of Africa. We share the position of African historians that:

It does not mean we minimize or neglect other African cultures, but that we have an authentic ancient classical culture as a point of departure, rich in primary sources, and complex and inclusive

⁹Yosef ben Jochannan, Black Man of the Nile (New York: Alkebulan Books Associates, 1973), 47.

¹⁰Quoted by Maulana Kauenga in Kemet and the African World View - Research - Rescue and Restoration (Los Angeles: Institute of Pan-African Studies, 1986), xiii.

¹¹Ibid.

enough to offer foundations in the various disciplines on human knowledge critical to the posing of an authentic African paradigm of human science, culture and society. . .to explore other cultural centers in Africa. . .and reject that which is intrusive and alien to the African human spirit and integrate that which is affirmative and expansive and contributive to human liberation and a higher level of human life.¹²

Since history attests that Africans become better by learning from a holistic and African heritage, we deem such learning to be our profound and fundamental point of departure. More importantly, because the ancient Egyptians were "Negroes," the moral fruit of their civilization is to be counted among the assets of the black world.¹³

The Egyptian Ancestry: African or Not?

How do we attest that the Egyptians and their great civilizations of antiquity are Alkebu-Lans or Africans? A resolution of this issue is fundamental to establishing an essential base from which the post-colonial societies, schools and evolving leadership that largely question and doubt the authenticity of African "forces of production" or indigenous development, could revisit, and ipso facto, desire to distill their development strategies.

In sum:

It is simply a matter of providing few landmarks, to persuade the incredulous Black African reader to bring himself to verify this. To his great surprise and satisfaction, he will discover that most of the ideas used today to domesticate, atrophy, dissolve, or steal his "soul" were conceived by his ancestors. To become conscious of that fact is perhaps the first step towards a genuine retrieval

¹²Ibid.

¹³Diop, Origin of Civilization, xiv.

of himself. Without it, intellectual sterility is the general role or else the creations bear not what imprint of the sub-human.¹⁴

The Egyptians, African historiography confirms, are aboriginal and indigenous to the continent now called Africa. They had lived there prior to intercontinental ethnic societies contact. Even in contemporary Africa, there exist genuine cultural similarities, i.e., in etiological development, with indigenous nationalities and kingdoms such as the Yorubas of Nigeria, Walof of the Gambia and Senegal, as well as Ethiopia and ancient kingdoms of Mali Empire or the belt of nation-states of western Sudan, i.e., West Africa.

But on the physiognomy, identify with other Africans, history resolved that -

There are many physical varieties of African peoples. The complexions of Africans are mainly black and brown. Most of the light skinned people in Africa today are late comers or interlopers. They have little or no relationship to Africa's ancient history. The Egyptians are a distinct African people. They did not originally come from Europe or Asia. Their history and their culture started in what is now Ethiopia and Sudan. It is incorrect to refer to them or any African people as Hamites. There is no such thing as Hamite people. This is another term that was imposed upon African history by Europeans* who wanted to prove that everything good in African history was brought in from outside. The Hamites are supposed to be "black white people."¹⁵

In fact, after further profound investigations, Diodonus of Sicily writes:

¹⁴Ibid., xv.

*European colonist - my emphasis.

¹⁵John Jackson, Introduction to African Civilization (NJ: The Citadel Press, 1970), 6.

The Ethiopians say that the Egyptians are one of their colonies which was brought into Egypt by Osiris. They even allege that this country was originally under water, but that the Nile, dragging much mud as it flowed from Ethiopia, had finally filled it in and made it a part of the continent. . .They add that from them, as from their authors and ancestors, the Egyptians get most of their laws. It is from them that the Egyptians have learned to honor kings as gods and bury them with such pomp; sculpture and writing - were invented by the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians cite evidence that they are more ancient than the Egyptians but it is useless to report that here.¹⁶

This is not all; further evidence illuminates and objectively resolves any doubts about authenticity of Egyptian African ancestry. According to J. Olumide Lucas in Diop (1974) the Yoruba nation of contemporary western Nigeria, and a manifestation of aboriginal African kingdoms i.e., the Yoruba kingdom, share identical etymological foundation with ancient Egypt. Such conceptual underpinning has not been found between Egypt and any ethnicity outside Africa, since antiquity.

Lucas cites the following concepts and ethos identical in Yoruba and Egypt:

"ran: name
 bu: place name
 Amon: concealed
 Miri: water
 Hor: to be high
 Fahaka: silvery fish

. . .and most of the principal gods were well known, at one time to the Yoruba. Among these gods are Osiris, Isis, Horus, Shu, Sut, Thoth, Khepera, Amon, Anu, Khonsu, Khnum, Khopri, Hator, Sokaris, Ra, Seb, and the four elemental deities. Most of the gods survive in name, or in attributes or in both."¹⁷

¹⁶Diop, Origin of Civilization, 1-2.

¹⁷Ibid., 184-185.

Besides the evidence of cultural semblance of Egypt and the Yorubas by Lucas, Diop findings assert that: "Egypt proper and Senegal have the following names in common:

<u>Egypt</u>	<u>Senegal</u>
Atoum	Atu
Sek-met	Sek
Keti	Keti
Kaba	Kaba, Keba, Kebe
Antef	Anta
Fari: the pharaoh	Fari: title of Emperor
Bara	Bara-Bari (Reue)
Ramses, Reama	Rama
Bakini	Bakani

This list could be prolonged indefinitely and thus localize in the Nile Valley the early habitat of all the Negro peoples scattered today over the different parts of the continent."¹⁸

Finally, Gaston Maspero (1846-1916) expresses the attestation of omni genuine historians on Egyptian ethnicity thus:

By the almost unanimous testimony of ancient historians, they belong to an African race [read: Negro] which first settled in Ethiopia on the middle Nile, following the course of the river, they gradually reached the sea.¹⁹

In light of the preceding assertions and caveats, we resolve that a critical, and dialectical analysis of Africa's Egypt could catalyze fact and factors essential in designing a concrete development philosophy with strategies for undeveloping Nigeria in a continental context. To this end, we visit Egypt.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 2.

Ancient Egypt: Developing or Underdeveloping? - Why and How?

The preceding axiom and caveats have objectively resolved that Egyptian ancestors were Black Africans, for instance, Egyptology affirms that:

pharaohs (Narmer, first dynasty, the actual founder of the pharaonic line; Zoser, third dynasty, by whose time all the technological elements of the Egyptian civilization were already in evidence; Cheops, the builder of the great pyramid, a cameroon type; Mentuhotep, founder of the eleventh dynasty, very black; Sesostris I, Queen Ahmosis Nefertam; and Amenhophis I) show that all classes of Egyptian society belong to the same black race.²⁰

Second, whereas "Apollodories, first century before our era, Greek philosopher" Aeyptos conquered the country of the black-footed ones and called it Egypt after himself.²¹

Moreover, based on the language of and the literature by the Egyptians of the pharaonic epoch - which the Egyptians had only. . . =km=black. . . a collective now which. . . described the whole people of pharaonic Egypt as a black people²², we attest that Egyptian society of antiquity is authentically indigenous African, and such is their technological base and manifest civilization. Further findings assert that:

The Edfu text - an important document on the early history of the Nile Valley. . . found in the temple of Horus at Edfu, . . . account, Egyptian civilization - was brought from the South by a band of invaders under the leadership of King Horus, later deified and became the Egyptian christ. The followers of Horus were called "blacksmith" because they possessed iron implements traced back to Somaliland. Although it may have originated in the Great

²⁰Ivan van Sertima, Egypt Revisited (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 14.

²¹Ibid., 17.

²²Ibid., 20.

Lakes region of Central Africa, in Somaliland, there are ruins of buildings constructed with dressed stone showing a close resemblance to the architecture of early Egypt.²³

Political Development

According to historiography, "Egypt first became an organized nation at about 6000 B.C.²⁴ That is several thousand years before any settlement of foreign ethnicity or ancestry, like the "Asiatics in northern Kmt²⁵ or Egypt during the eighth dynasty" - ca 2173-2160²⁶ B.C. By 3200 B.C., Egypt had evolved an indigenous dynasty kingdom of Ta Seti-Nubian Dynasty (xustul): ca 3400 (?) - 3200 B.C. . . .Kemitic Dynasty 1: ca 3200 (?) - 2890 B.C. - King Narimr; ,Menes)²⁷ was the first ruler over United Egypt.

Along with the art of governing which evolved from Ethiopia, as we indicated earlier, the Egyptians also developed their technology from an authentic African ancestry of Nubia. For instance, in "Somaliland, there are ruins of buildings constructed with dressed stone, showing a close resemblance to architecture of early Egypt."²⁸ This is indeed a fact that has yet to be established about Egyptian technological connection with any ethnicity outside Africa in antiquity.

²³Jackson, Introduction, 93.

²⁴Ibid., 13.

²⁵Sertima, Egypt Revisited, 108.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 105.

²⁸Jackson, Introduction, 93.

Further findings affirm that "the ancestors of Southern Egypt came originally from this region.²⁹ [Somalia] In fact, Professor G. Brodeur, in his book The Pageant of Civilizations inferred that the early Egyptians from the interior of Africa and Somaliland entered the Nile Valley through Nubia and brought with them a well developed civilization.³⁰

The latter's findings succinctly assert that:

the Egyptian migration occurred long before 5000 B.C. That these ancient Africans possessed tools and weapons of iron should occasion no surprise, for in the magazine, Natural History, Sept.-Oct. 1932 . . . there is an article by the Italian explorer, Nino del Grande, entitled "Prehistoric Iron Smelting in Africa" in which he tells of his discovery of an iron smelting furnace in Northern Rhodesia of an antiquity of from five to six thousand years.³¹

Northern Rhodesia is contemporary Zambia and in antiquity was an aboriginal kingdom of Zimbabwe.

What does this imply? Our synthesis deduces that there was an indigenous African iron processing technology in Egypt and the rest of Africa which was all aboriginal. Hence, such indigenous technology could be fine tuned and advanced, if iron smelting technology is to catalyze in contemporary Africa. This is essential because mother technology, history affirms, is the fundamental of developing society.

The Egyptian School System

After the formation of the monarchy in Egypt, a school system evolved the first institutionalized Star University. Like a modern

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., 94.

university but the only notable one in antiquity, this African university, the Mystery order, developed a curriculum. The curriculum of the Egyptian mystery system consisted of: "grammar, arithmetic, rhetoric and dialectic, i.e. quadrivium, geometry, astronomy and music (i.e. the trivium)."³²

Besides the liberal arts, the Mystery School evolved sciences of monuments (pyramids, temples, libraries, obelisks, sphinxes, idols), architecture, agriculture, mining and forestry. Art drawing and painting were secret sciences³³ as were myths and parables. This mystery system curricula were effected by virtuous indigenous priests who functioned as lawyers, judges, officials of government, businessmen, sailors and captains.³⁴

This program indicates that the priests "have been trained in economics, civic law, government, census-taking, navigation, ship building."³⁵

Consequently, these virtuous faculty members of the mystery system, history asserts, produced a genuine cultural cadre of Africans or Egyptians. Thus, the African kingdom of Egypt evolved a magnificent society, replete with wonderful indigenous technology and inventions essential for her outstanding and sustained developing substructure and evolving superstructure.

³²Ibid., 135.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., 136.

³⁵Ibid.

The latter made Egypt, authentic historiography resolves, a star civilization in Africa, (before intercontinental ethnicity contact) and a universal basic model of civilization in the era preceding intercontinental ethnic contact. The following are the facts.

Historic Indigenous Developments in
Science, Technology and Art of Government

In a revisit to African historiography, most scholars educe, and thus assert that, contrary to the colonists, Africa/Egypt was a developing political economy. These findings profoundly shatter the colonists' perception that Africa is a DARK continent, as in Dukes (1776), and Baker in Hillard (1990). Both Dukes and Baker echoed the colonists' characterization of Africans as DARK continent of uncivilized beings.

For instance, in 1776, David Hume, in reflecting on African heritage positioned that:

Negroes. . .in general. . .are naturally inferior. There was never a civilized nation. . .nor individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturer among them, no arts, no sciences.³⁶

Furthermore, like David Hume, Samuel Baker, while exploring the Nile River, negatively characterized Africa, and/or Africans:

Human viewed in its crudest state, as seen among savages is quite on the level with that of the brute and not compared with the noble character of the dog. . .There is neither duty. . .no religion but cruelty.³⁷

In retrospect, these perceptions had been infused into the colonial and post-colonial school system. Hence, in contemporary post-colonial Africa/Nigeria, the leaderships, for the most part, embody these

³⁶A. G. Hillard, III, L. P. Stewart, and L. O. Williams, Infusion, xiv.

³⁷Ibid., xv.

ideas. But to what extent are the positions of uncivilized Africa valid? The findings on the latter could validate or invalidate the optimism of seeking fact and factors of development from the center, by the past regimes.

In this respect, African historiography and Egyptology have this to attest:

For thousands of years, the Nile Valley was the mainstreet of the civilized world. Especially in mathematics and natural sciences, Egyptian scholars played a major role in building the foundations of our modern science. Yet the full scale of this African contribution is either little known or attributed to other peoples - a brief outline of the 4000 years of the Nile Valley pre-eminence in mathematics . . . engineering and technology which developed hand-in-hand with mathematics.³⁸

The illumination of pre-colonial African political leadership would not be out of order. The latter would enable us to affirm whether or not the present politics of underdevelopment is an indigenous African syndrome.

Science and Technology in Pre-Colonial Africa-Egypt

During the 1960s, a decade when most African nation states attained "flag independence," committed indigenous scientists and historians began to question some academic tenet of the dominant colonial school system that produced them, but celebrated, in the main, the historical heritage of Europe. The paper freedom ignited freedom of academic exploration into Africa's past, characterized by the colonialists as DARK. They questioned whether the latter (i.e. Dark Africa) is a myth or fact. Cheiekh Anta Diop, a respected Egyptologist, scientist and pioneer producer of African historiography, in his

³⁸Ivan Van Sertima, Nile Valley Civilizations, Morehouse College ed. (Journal of African Civilizations Ltd., Inc., 1989), 102.

nature study of Africa in antiquity, resolved that Africa or Egypt produced revolutionary models in sequences, like mathematics, medicine, et al. In his study, Diop deduced that "since Struve edited the mathematical papyrus of Moscow, the world scientific community knows that Egyptian mathematics was highly elaborate and theoretical."³⁹

To put it succinctly, the Egyptians invented the formula " $S = 2 R^2$ " to calculate the surface area of pyramids they were building, long before any foreign ethnicity. According to Diop:

Those who have dealt with mathematics, even minimally, know how delicate the treatment of the curved surface is. But the "formula" found by the scribe 1700 years before Archimedes is rigorously accurate: $S = 2 R^2$ for the surface area of the hemisphere. Indeed to solve the problem it was necessary to calculate what the surface area of the hemisphere was and then multiply the results by two to obtain the surface area of the whole sphere.^{40*}

Further studies have affirmed that, besides mathematics, African technological inventions became universal catalyst models universally.

In fact, these findings attest that:

There have been an impressive number of inventions in Africa, between 2000 and 3000 B.C. This was the time in which indigenous domestication of plants and animals occurred, and this was done by means of indigenous techniques. It was that time that metallurgy was invented. The Egyptians of the ancient empire, no doubt, knew the metallurgy of iron. Also, the recent archeological discoveries made by the Belgium in Burundi confirm our challenging ideas concerning the first Iron Age in Africa.⁴¹

A revisit to ancient Africa also reveals that

in 4236 B.C., the Egyptians had already invented a calendar based on the helical rising of Sothis, or Sirius (the brightest star in

³⁹Ibid., 69.

⁴⁰Ibid.

*For elaboration of the Egyptian mathematics, see Diop in Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., 78.

the sky) which appeared every 1460 years. Indeed, the Egyptians knew the two types of years: 365 days and 365 days + $\frac{1}{4}$. The first one contains 12 calendar months and 30 days = 360 + the epagomenal days which were dedicated to the birthdays of Osiris, Horus, Seth, Isis, and Nephthys, the five Egyptian gods. . . So, methodically speaking, Osiris was indeed born the night of December 25 as was Jesus Christ who can be compared to Osiris, in this case and in many others. . . Even Neugebauer, who was a great detractor of Egyptian science said that 'this calendar is indeed the only intelligent calendar which existed in human history.'⁴²

Thus, we deduce that whereas the calendar is, historically, instrumental and fundamental to planning and implementation of events, and hence, an indicator of objective organization, its invention attests that Africa-Egypt was a highly organized kingdom by the fourth millennium B.C.⁴³

Aeronautical Inventions

Further findings affirm that the African Egyptians made great studies in mechanics. By the fourth millennium they had already invented a glider or aircraft model. Further studies affirm that "an Egyptian glider dating from the third or fourth century B.C. was discovered in Sakkara in 1898."⁴⁴ Thus, we deduce that there was a potential to develop an aircraft technology by Africans in Africa.

Medical Inventions

Egyptologists have found in the Egyptian official records or hieroglyphics the outstanding accomplishments of the African Mystery System or School of Egypt. These findings assert that "in medical knowledge,

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

Egypt leaves the rest of the world behind."⁴⁵ The latter indicates that "like all African medicine, Egyptian medicine has baffled scholars because of the complete interpenetration of 'magico-spiritual' and rational elements, based on authentic medical records of 5000 years ago."⁴⁶

More findings confirm that:

The Egyptians were writing medical textbooks as early as 5000 years ago. This indicates not only a mature civilization but also a period of medical development. Out of the hundreds and thousands of medical papyri that must have been written only 10 have come down, the most important being Edwin Smith papyri. . . The basis of what most Egyptologists know about Egyptian medicine.⁴⁷

A critical analysis of the medical papyri indicates that an "ancient Egyptian diagnostic method reads disconcertingly like a modern textbook on physical diagnosis."⁴⁸ It details how:

a physician. . . questions to elicit a description of the complaint. The colour of the face and eyes, the quality of nasal secretions, the presence of perspiration, the stiffness of the limbs or abdomen, and the condition of the skin were all noted. . . smell of the body, sweat, breath. . . wounds. . . urine, feces. . . the pulse, palpated and measured, and the abdomen, swellings and wounds probed and palpated. . . the pulse-taking indicates that the Egyptians knew of its circulatory and hemodynamic significance.^{49*}

⁴⁵Charles S. Finch, The African Background to Medical Science. Essays on African History, Science and Civilizations (London: Karnak House, 1990), 122.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., 123.

*For elaborate medical developments in Egypt or Africa, see Ibid.

Hence, the findings conclude that the African-Egyptians were alone among the nations of antiquity in the development of medicine.⁵⁰ This "belies the notion that African doctors were without some knowledge of the body's physiological process⁵¹ and that the traditional doctors of Africa from the earliest times had a high level of medical and surgical skills."⁵²

State Craft

Based on a functional mystery school system, Egypt. . .through science brought mankind out of pre-history to the real civilizations.⁵³ "The first state organization in the world was in the Nile Valley, in Nubian Sudan, first in Qustul, then in Egypt with Menes (cira 3150 B.C.)."⁵⁴

In fact Egyptologists attest that:

the bureaucracy - the scientific and scholarly organization of the state. . .was not an invention of the Indo-European city-state in the period following the pre-historic era, it was without question an African invention for controlling the organization of the human community on a large scale of the Egyptian nation state from 3150 B.C.⁵⁵

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., 132.

⁵²Ibid., 140.

⁵³Sertima, Nile Valley, 81.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid.

The Egyptians Mystery Order developed the general principles of governance⁵⁶ as a fundamental of efficient effective people oriented leadership. These principles, Egyptologists have stated, grew out of ancestral African maxims, and we shall cite four of them here. Hence, these principles are titled official maxims - and named after the reigning pharaoh.

A. State Control

The leadership is advised to be mindful "of the dangers and remedies for sedition, rebellion - factionalism"⁵⁷ and to that end the leadership has to "police the disaffected person."⁵⁸ The maxims or "the teaching here supports the general conclusion that division, partisanism, factionalism and politics. . .are detrimental to the country and should be decisively and efficiently destroyed before damage is done."⁵⁹

But, prior to policing the affected person, "the accused should be given due process, i.e. brought to the court. - Except for the rebel whose scheme is discovered - God wipes out his evil in blood."⁶⁰

B. Communication and Virtue

A people's pharaoh was expected to personify his culture by

⁵⁶Manlana Kerenga and Jacob H. Carruthers, Kemet and the African World View (Chicago: Kemetic Institute, 1986), 22.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

embodying and expressing the indigenous maxims - efficiently and effectively. This principle states thus:

. . .be skilled in speech and you will be victorious. . . Words are more powerful than all fighting. A wise pharaoh educates his officials because truth comes to him without corruption, like the wisdom in the saying of the ancestors. . .Imitate your fathers who were first. . .in. . .speech, education and governance. . .all are gifts from the ancestors.⁶¹

The statement is an embodiment and effective exercise of culture, was regarded as a fundamental fact of a virtuous and genuine public servant.

C. Generosity

The public servant was educated and expected to be generous to the masses "because through benovence the pharaoh achieves glory based on the love of the people."⁶² Most importantly, the pharaoh was a personification of the peoples authentic government. He was educated to "show respect for the officials and bring prosperity to the people."⁶³ The pharaoh embodied an historical assertion that, when the "officials are made great, they will enforce laws."⁶⁴ Only by alleviating insecurity from officialdom does the government enable itself to rise above corruption and favoritism.⁶⁵

⁶¹Ibid., 23.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid.

To that aim, the pharaoh is admonished to always speak the truth so that officials will respect⁶⁶ and "work for the future of the nation."⁶⁷ In sum, the pharaohship must be genuine.

Righteousness as a Fundamental of Civilizing Society

In order that society be realized as civilized, the pharaohship or the leadership was educated to "do moat (justice) to every Egyptian."⁶⁸ For instance, a pharaoh was culturally obligated to "comfort the weeper, not oppress the widow, not expel a man from the property of his father"⁶⁹ and to be "against unjust punishment, and capital punishment, with the exception of. . .seditions⁷⁰ in order to "prevent factionalism which often grows out of alienation."⁷¹

To the above end, the leadership or pharaohship must abdicate authoritarianism. These findings or "passages simply point out that pharaohship is a collective office, because of the entourage of officers who actually participate in decision-making process."⁷²

Religion

According to omni historiography, a conviction about the existence of God, and a committed worshipping of God in society, or religion,

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., 23-24.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

is the logos of the human family. Historically, the preceding conviction manifests righteousness from which evolves the systematic or ethnic eschatologies cum religious esotericism or praxis. Hence, religious maxims are natural to any ethnicity. Therefore religion is an essentiality of evolving societies' basic maxims. It is a fact of humane society. Since Africans are organic components of the human family, one would objectively resolve that Africans had their systematic religion on a par with any ethnicity since antiquity.

Second, systematic religion is a commonplace and nationally manifest maxim, and African religious heritage had to be cosmic just as any other ethnicity in antiquity. However, colonial history and foreign religious associations dispute the existence of a fundamental cosmic order in African heritage. To the latter, African heritage is inhumane. The Africans had no righteous order, hence, they must embrace their foreign religions which claim that African heritage is barbaric. In addition, in regards to religion, history further asserts that it is a fact of civilizing humanity by virtue of its being the basis for genuine culture and civilization. It follows naturally that a society without a fundamental religion is an undercivilizing one.

Hence, inferring from the colonists' characterization of Africans as uncivilized, it suggests to most post-colonial leadership that our index of measuring ethics must evolve from foreign religious experiences. To the latter, the foreigners' position, that Africans are uncivilized, is true. The foreigners' position is personified by 1856 Putnam's Monthly, that -

the most minute and most careful researchers have as yet failed to discover a history or any knowledge of ancient times among the

Negro races. They have invented no writing, not even the crude picture writing of the lowest tribes; they have no gods, whereas, no epic poems and no legends, not even simple traditions. There never existed among them an organized government; they never ruled a hierarchy or established a church.⁷³

Thus, Africa since the colonial epoch becomes target and a depository of foreign-based religious associations and doctrines. The latter associations historically appear to the colonized Africans as civilizing agents.

Hence, Africans, and more importantly, the post-colonial leadership, for the most part, tends to embody foreign religion as a fact of humane and civilizing society. To this leadership, modeling Africa after foreign ethical standards is the viable option to an essential social cohesion. And whereas, history asserts that authentic religion is the basis for genuine cultural unity, a fact which the centers' heritage affirmed, it follows that the fundamental of cultural unity could mostly be found in genuine African heritage. Regrettably, the dominant belief in contemporary Africa is the colonial school position that African heritage is barbaric. Therefore, the viable remedy imposed by foreign religious order is that Africans must embrace foreign religions as a means to regeneration.

As a consequence, most African/Nigerian elite become passive custodians of foreign major religious doctrines such as Christianity and Islam as a means to civilization. For instance:

. . . in the process of converting blacks to Islam and Christianity
 . . ., millions of Africans became non-Africans. Africans who were

⁷³Hillard, III, Stewart, and Williams, Infusion, xv-xvi.

neither Muslims nor Christians were classified as pagans, and therefore required to disavow their whole culture, and to regard practically all African institutions as "backward or savage." The blacks in their own right became none persons, members of a race of nobodies, so hopeless that self-realization as personalization even in subordinate status could only be achieved by becoming Muslim or Christian. Indeed, in order to destroy not only their African heritage. But identity psychologically, they were forced to change their names to Arabic and Christian names. . .Therefore. . .during the last thousand years widespread segmentation and attending disunity among the Africans made them easy to conquer and dominate.⁷⁴

Therefore, the religious order of Africa/Nigeria became eclipsed. Africa became a DARK continent. Hence, Diop's question, (does African heritage depict 'civilization' or 'barbarism') becomes highly profound and fundamental, as we study to resolve politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Africa/Nigeria.

A resolution of religious factionalism as witnessed in the post-colonial Nigeria and evolving regimes could mean an escape from political incohesion. Since independence, religious polarity between the northern Moslems and the southern Christians has widened to astronomical proportions. And the end to it is not in sight. Obviously, an authentic righteous order is needed. Thus, to that end, we ask: Had Africans or Egyptians any righteous heritage worthy of embodiment and exercise by post-colonial states like Nigeria?

To this issue, our findings infer that "by 10,000 B.C. a thorough-going religious system had already been formulated in Africa for the first time in the intellectual world history."⁷⁵

⁷⁴Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization - from 4500 B.C. to 2000 A. D. (Chicago: Third World Press, 1987), 5657.

⁷⁵Oléla, From Ancient Africa to Ancient Greece. An Introduction to the History of Philosophy. (USA: The Select Publishing Company, 1981), 70.

History asserts that to African peoples man lives in a religious universe, so that natural phenomena and objects are intimately associated with God.⁷⁶ In a profound way, Africans. . .see in the universe not only the imprint but the reflection of God, the only image known in traditional African societies.⁷⁷ Hence, all universal objects are godly or cosmic. Thus, every life is sacred. From this we deduce that in Africans' praxis, the sanctity of humans is supreme. Here again we reiterate Diop's question - Does such conviction suggests barbarianism?

In response, further findings affirm that:

. . .on top of high level organization and technical skill among the ancient Egyptians was their religious devotion which consumed daily life. . . .Gods worship took many forms in village norms. As dynasties evolved, gods became personifications of kings or pharaohs. By the Third Dynasty (2700 B.C.), the Egyptians had documented a clear intellectual concept of the origin of God and destiny of humans.⁷⁸

This documentation is volumned as the "book of the coming forth by day," or the papyrus of Ani. This papyrus was acquired by the Trustees of the British Museum in the year 1888.⁷⁹ Hence, in light of the preceding findings, we infer that African heritage is a cosmic order, and this manifested fact and factors civilizing pre-colonial kingdoms as Egypt.

⁷⁶John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), 63.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Kerenga and Carruthers, Kemet, 71.

⁷⁹E. A. Wallis Budge, The Egyptian Book of the Dead (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967), v.

Ingenuity in African Heritage?

Based on the preceding inferences, we resolve that albeit, "Egypt is essentially a red desert, without adequate rainfall, the land would be completely inhabitable if not for the Nile River,"⁸⁰ but most importantly, Africans applied their mental powers in transforming these arid lands into usable farmland. "The Mystery System enabled them to undertake essential challenges - such as cleaning the marsh, cultivating the land and controlling flood waters which became the economic basis for Egyptian civilization."⁸¹

Reminiscence to pre-colonial African heritage reveals a technological kingdom. For instance:

. . .the technical precision required for pyramid building began with the engineering and construction of irrigation projects along the Nile. While the masses worked the land, a civil service class emerged to coordinate the collective affairs of the community or 'nome.' Civil servants managed irrigation, collected taxes, managed royal property and administered justice. They knew how to write and keep records in the very First Dynasty (3100 B.C.) They fulfilled intellectual, scientific and religious functions for the nation.⁸²

Thus, by 1325 B.C. Rameses II, whose reign lasted sixty-six years, conquered extensive territories in western Asia and built colossal temples in the Nile Valley.⁸³ All these accomplishments resolve that African ethnicities transformed from indigenous African

⁸⁰Kerenga and Carruthers, Kemet, 71.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Jackson, Introduction, 112.

societies to kingdoms and eventually empires and were developing into viable states much like the contemporary United States, England and France. Also, on account of leadership in culture, Egypt was supreme in the leadership of civilization,⁸⁴ and students from all parts of the world flocked to that land seeking admission into its mysteries or wisdom system.⁸⁵ Students like Pythagoras, a native of Samos, traveled frequently to Egypt for the purpose of education according to Herodotus Bk III 124.⁸⁶

In the years that followed, however Egypt would become vulnerable to the exploitative tendencies of foreign societies and was subjected to foreign invasions.

. . .conquered by the Persians in 525, from then on it was continually dominated by the foreigners. After the Persians, came the Macedonians, under Alexander (333 B.C.) the Romans under Julius Caesar (50 B.C.), the Arabs in the 7th century, the Turks in the 16th century, the French, with Napoleon, then the English at the end of the 19th century.⁸⁷

In light of the above findings, our striking issues become thus: after the invasion, was there anything left that could be salvaged and utilized as fact and factors of development in post-colonial regimes? To this question, our findings are positive. Insofar as the cultural history of Egypt is well preserved, and the progeny of aboriginal Egyptians are quite alive, then, the genuine cultural heritage of Africans here is indestructible. It has only been eclipsed but never

⁸⁴George A. M. James, Stolen Legacy (San Francisco: Julian Richardson Associates Publishers, 1985), 42.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., 43.

⁸⁷Diop, The African Origin, 10.

extinguished. For instance, the Mystery System is alive and some scientists wonder about the possibility of its revitalization. Therefore, insofar as indigenous descendants, despite colonialism have not been decimated, and whereas the Egyptians, like the rest of the African forbears, passed on their knowledge, for the most part, orally, to new generations, a determined research could manifest concrete facts of the Egyptian star civilization. Culture is the lifeblood of society. Hence, its contamination should not mean its destruction.

Thus, we deduce that the technological fact and factors which manifested industries are still there in Egypt and the rest of Africa. They were only rendered dormant or dwarfed by persistent foreign invasions and domination of the country.

Epitome of African Society

While the achievements of Egypt are the best known among African nations, these are not the only achievements that African nations can claim. The nations to the south, called Kush, Nubia and Ethiopia, developed many aspects of civilization, independent of Egyptian influence. These nations gave as much to Egypt as Egypt gave to them.

John G. Jackson (1970)

A revisit to pre-colonial era manifested facts that advancing and magnificent civilizations existed in Africa. Along the eastern coastline of the continent, contrary to historical speculation that Arabs and Moslems as well as early European associations catalyzed a developing political economy, we find that:

their pre-colonial or early civilizations of this part of Africa are splendid with achievements. . . .The influence of Islam and the Arabs in East Africa has been highly overstated. . . .In fact, the Arabs, like other invaders, did more harm than good. They, like the Europeans, destroyed many African cultures that they did not understand. Their role in the East African slave trade brought wreck and ruin to the nation states of this part of

Africa. They were not without achievements, but their achievements are outweighed by the harm they did.⁸⁸

Islamic Arabic associations, unlike the European associations, then compromised the objective of African cosmic conviction which subscribed to oneness or sameness in extended familihood. "Islam did offer an attractive promise of equality in a Muslim community which required little basic change from traditional African life."⁸⁹

The Arabic Islamic fusion was successful, for the most part, because of its basic cultural similarity. "Islam's heritage, like traditional Africa, included the extended family and plural marriages, magic and divination."⁹⁰ The latter factors contributed to the steady increase in Muslim African converts."⁹¹ This cultural accommodation was consolidated with the 'building of Koranic schools'⁹² and evolving Arab settlements by the 8th century, for trade in African gold and ivory, which was later abandoned for the enslavement of Africans.

More Arabs, under the name of Islam from Arabia are said to use Arabic settlers in East Africa to enslave Africans. The early Islamic settlers had inter-bred to produce Arab-African descendants called

⁸⁸Jackson, Introduction, 26.

⁸⁹Joseph E. Harris, Africans and Their History (New York: A Mentor Book, 1987), 74.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

Swahilis. Hence, Arabs were the principal slave dealers in East Africa prior to the nineteenth century.⁹³

The Arabs "ventured into the Hinterlands and purchased slaves from coastal allies, many of whom were persons of mixed Arab African descent - Swahilis" and took them to Persia, India, and China where African slaves were used as mercenary soldiers, domestic servants, concubines, crewmen on dhows, . . . pearl divers in Bahrain, . . . the date plantations of Basra. . . and the Persian Gulf gang labor.⁹⁴ Thus, the Arabic Islamic influence frustrated, for the most part, the developing East African kingdoms.

Now, the striking question becomes, if the Arabs stunted the indigenous developing economy of the East African kingdoms, what was the status of the central and southeastern Africa that had not much Islamic influence? We find that this area was civilizing because "these nations have succeeded in keeping most of their culture intact."⁹⁵ For instance, in Zimbabwe, Monomotapa and the kingdoms of the interior, . . . remarkable development in nation building, and arts. . . had already started.⁹⁶ And "these were the main land-locked nations that saw fit to avoid the troubles of coastal African states."

Some more stable tribes in the Congo region were bringing notable kingdoms into being. The kingdom of Loango, extended from Cape Lopez

⁹³Ibid., 85.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Jackson, Introduction, 26.

⁹⁶Ibid.

(Libreville) to near the Congo; and the Kongo Empire was mentioned by the Portuguese as early as the 14th century. These kingdoms, according to Jackson:

. . .had been in existence for centuries. When the Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century, they spoke admiringly of its capital Sette-Camo which they called Salvador. The kingdom of the Kongo dates back to the fourteenth century. At the height of its power, it extended over modern Angola as far east as Kasai and upper Zambesi Rivers.⁹⁷

Besides the Kongo, there were kingdoms in the interior with well organized political economies. For instance, there were "the kingdom of Anskia whose artistic talents were very remarkable,⁹⁸ and the "Bakuba kingdom (or Bushongo) still noted for its unity, the excellence of its administration, its arts, its craftsmanship and the beauty of its fabrics.⁹⁹ On the authenticity of the Bakuba or Bushongo kingdom, further findings resolve that:

. . .the Bushongo culture kept its records and transmitted them almost intact to modern research. The Bakubas are an ancient people whose power and influence once extended over most of the Congo. Their history can be traced to the fifth century. For many centuries, the Bakubas have had a highly organized social system, an impressive artistic tradition, and secular form of government that expressed the will of the people through a democratic political system - the Bakuba hierarchy. . .composed of six dignitaries responsible for cabinet-like matters, such as military affairs, justice, and administration.¹⁰⁰

The Bashongo had a humane monarchy, such as "Shamba Bolongon who was the greatest of the indigenous kings. This wise African king used

⁹⁷Ibid., 27-28.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

to say 'kill neither man, woman or child; are they not children of Chembe (God) and have they not the right to live?'¹⁰¹

Besides the kingdoms of the central Africa which we have cited above, were many other kingdoms and empires west of Sudan. This is the area designated as west Africa. Some of the ethnicities of these kingdoms, such as Nigeria, have cultural linkages to Egypt. In this regard, the Yorubas of contemporary Nigeria are a case in point.

For instance, further findings affirm that:

. . . great trading empires namely: Ghana (700-1200), the first great empire of the medieval Sudan, Mali (1200-1500), which absorbed the empire of Ghana and expanded it westward; Songhay (1350-1600), which took over the Empire of Mali; and Kanem-Bonu which evolved separately further eastward in the Sudan.¹⁰²

At the height of their power, most of these kingdoms had remarkable technology that advanced their mode of production.

For instance, Ghana which covered contemporary "Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania,¹⁰³ produced artisans who engaged in metal-working, such as blacksmith, goldsmith, silversmith and other specialized activities as agriculture, fishing, animal husbandry and manufacturing of clothing."¹⁰⁴ Ghana also had an inexhaustible supply of gold¹⁰⁵ and salt. Our findings indicate that Ghana traded its outputs to the north African societies like Morocco.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid., 27-29.

¹⁰³Ibid. 199-200.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

In Mali, "the rich soil was planted with cotton, peanuts, grains, and variety of other crops. Poultry¹⁰⁶ was also raised. With adequate food supply, the foundations of the empire were greatly strengthened . . . Law and order prevailed in her provinces and merchants traveled freely having no fear of Banditry.¹⁰⁷

In retrospect, we also find that:

in Mali - food supply existed in plenitude and was of such a variety to assure a balanced diet to all. Large cotton crops were grown, and cotton cloth was manufactured. From the baobab tree which grew wild, there were derived a meal for making bread, a red dye, and a liquid possessing medicinal properties. Besides weavers, dyers and tanners, there were blacksmiths, goldsmiths, silversmiths, and coppersmiths, but the life blood of the empire was trade. Taxes were a paramount source of income for government.¹⁰⁸

Other than Mali, at about the year 1475, the Songhay Empire arose with its capital at Goa. Our findings indicate that the Songhay Empire evolved out of indigenous group identified as the "Sorko" from around Lake Chad in northeastern Nigeria.¹⁰⁹ "Goa were the founders of the Songhay nation" and their most important settlement was Koukya or Gounguia, near the falls of Labbezenga in the Dendi country, lying on the northwestern frontier of what is now Nigeria."¹¹⁰

History further resolved that at its peak, these indigenes founded "a strongly centralized government in the Songhay Empire;¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 207.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 211.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 213.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibid., 217.

and also had an outstanding university at Sankore, in Timbuktu. A critical revisitation to the empire's superstructure attests an existence of a highly cultured administration in its monarchy.

For instance:

. . .the governors of the several provinces were the personal appointees of the sovereign and a council of ministers was instituted, and was directly responsible to the crown. The important ministerial posts were the chief tax collector; the chief of the Navy; the chiefs of forests, woodcutters, and fishermen; and treasurer. The Songhay Empire not only enjoyed a high level of material culture, but was also the home of intellectual achievements of no mean order. In the principal cities of west Africa, such as Goa, Jenne and Timbuktu, universities and other educational institutions were established . . .and courses were given in astronomy, mathematics, ethnography, medicine, hygiene, philosophy, logic, prosody, diction, elocution, rhetoric and music.¹¹²

Further findings attest that besides the civilizations cited in the preceding empires, there were great states and kingdoms as well as chiefdoms in the region now characterized as Nigeria.

Pre-Colonial Nigeria Revisited

After the colonization of Nigeria, in 1861,¹¹³ Ekundare attests, that "it was thought that the people of Nigeria and for that matter the whole of Black Africa, had no established history."¹¹⁴ Hence, they had no civilized heritage worthy of revisitation.

That sort of assessment historically dehumanizes the indigenous nationalities and obstructs their authentic development and growth. At best it historically distorts their African heritage and thus can

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³R. Olufemi Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria, 1860-1960 (New York: A Division of Holmes and Mercer Publishers, Inc., 1973), 12.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 8.

create mental osmosis, causing them to seek such enlightenment in other cultures. Could this be the case in Africa/Nigeria?

In retrospect, contrary to the latter belief, archaeological findings assert that:

In pre-colonial Nigeria, the archaeological discoveries of such things like axes, knives, spears, and arrowheads have indicated that palaeolithic civilization existed in west Africa, as in other parts of the world at that period. It is also believed that the neolithic arts were introduced by those tribes which filtered into Nigeria from the Sudan at about 7000 B.C.¹¹⁵

In any case, "the neolithic, aeneolithic and iron ages are believed to have existed simultaneously at different places in west Africa."¹¹⁶ In addition, iron ore which existed in abundance in Nigeria had been worked for centuries for a number of indigenous smelting furnaces in different stages of development have been discovered."¹¹⁷

This is not all; other archaeological findings resolve that:

. . .in and around the Bauchi plateau in what is now northern Nigeria, archaeologists have demonstrated the existence of a completely developed neolithic culture, the Nok culture, beginning to turn to the use of iron and also producing fine sculptures, from about 800 B.C. to about A.D. 200. This culture and its peoples were directly ancestral to the kingdoms and peoples that we can discern in the Nigerian region from about the eleventh century onwards.¹¹⁸

From the neolithic revolution evolved a mode of production which manifested "the beginning of urbanization, an organized government and administration - and the idea of a king as a godlike being supreme over

¹¹⁵Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸J. D. Fage, A History of West Africa (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 11.

all his subjects. . .have been in the neolithic revolution as it was in that of ancient Egypt."¹¹⁹ Thus, "the neolithic revolution brought to west Africa a new dynasty of kings and also great adventures in human development."¹²⁰

In light of the preceding development, the critical issue becomes from which African ancestry did the peoples that inspired this development evolve? A resolution of this issue would enlighten us on whether or not pre-colonial Nigeria had indigenous developing mode of production worthy of distilling facts or factors for essential developing strategy in the post-colonial era.

Here, our findings indicate that besides the Nok culture in northern Nigeria, the Yoruba kingdom also flourished in southern Nigeria. Outstanding among their accomplishments were the art of processing copper and governmental organization. In sum, history resolves that -

the arts of using copper and bronze were introduced into Nigeria from upper Egypt by the Yorubas, who moved down there from the northeast around 2000 B.C. The Yorubas were followed into Nigeria by the Bamba (Borgaua), the Bassava, Nupe, Dakkaherri and Jukon. By A.D. 900, great civilization had grown among the Nupe and the Yorubas who were later followed by the Benin culture.¹²¹

¹¹⁹Ibid., 10.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ekundare, An Economic History, 9-10.

From these advanced nationalities came extraordinary fine bronze and brass works, the art of engraving on brass pottery, and carvings in wood and ivory.¹²²

On the monarchy per se, history asserts that "the kingdoms established by them were well organized and controlled by a hierarchy of nobles headed by semi-divine sovereigns."¹²³

By "constant movement of invaders from Egypt. . .trans-Saharan trade developed between north and west Africa.

. . .by A.D. 1000 Kano in northern Nigeria had developed into a strong and prosperous trading center, and most of the earliest cultivated crops and some domestic animals were introduced into northern Nigeria from Egypt.¹²⁴

Further findings assert that prior to the colonization of Nigeria in the eighteenth century, the major ethnic groups, such as "the Yorubas and the Binis in the south, and the Hausas, Nupes, Fulanis, Kanuris in the north had founded a monarchical and civilized form of government completely independent of any European influence."¹²⁵

What must be objectively noted of the civilization here, is that whereas these pre-colonial ethnicities in Nigeria evolve out of indigenous African high culture of Egypt, the organizational structure and evolving superstructure were the brainchildren of Egypt. Thus, it was such scientific heritage that catalyzed a developing mode of production in the pre-colonial kingdoms, such as the Yorubas.

¹²²Ibid., 11.

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid.

At its peak in "the nineteenth century, the Yoruba kingdoms extended in the west across what is now Dahomey and Togo Republics to Accra, . . . in the south east to Benin;¹²⁶ from where it influenced the organization of 100 chiefdoms.¹²⁷

According to history, "the king of Benin was a Yoruba and it was believed that the king (Obi) of Onitsha was a descendant of the Oba of Benin."¹²⁸

With a coherent political economy or civilization in pre-colonial Nigeria, evolved technologies which inspired industrial development and growth in the pre-colonial societies.

The Nature of Pre-Colonial Kingdoms of Nigeria

Our motive here is to affirm whether or not pre-colonial economy was developing on its own. And based on such findings would have a profound antecedent to resolve our problem - colonial capitalism, and politics of underdevelopment, and ipso facto, affirm or debunk the - proponents of the primitive Africa of stateless peoples.¹²⁹

Based on historiography of Africa, we find that there existed institutionalized political systems in pre-colonial Nigeria. "Pre-colonial political systems were both centralized and non-centralized."¹³⁰ For instance, the centralized systems consisted of empires of Oyo,

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria - The Dialectics of Mass Poverty. (London: Zed Press, 1982), 18-19.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰Ibid.

Benin and Kanem-Borno, the Hausa states and some Igbo chiefdoms,¹³¹ besides other chiefdoms, like the Ibibios in the far southeast.

In fact, history attests that "from about the 9th century A.D. to 1860, four major separate and successful experiments in statecraft involving Kanem, Borno, Hausa states were recorded in Nigeria,¹³² besides the Yoruba kingdom.

For instance:

Oyo and Benin kingdoms were founded in the first millennium as the two most powerful states along the west coast. Both spanned the three pre-colonial modes of production. In the 16th century, Oyo Empire, which was founded Oranmiyan, expanded into an empire controlling most of Yorubaland from the Niger to the sea and from Benin to Togo.¹³³

The character of the pre-colonial kingdoms/empires was similar and well organized as in the rest of pre-colonial Africa, and Egypt, in particular. In Nigeria, this is personified by the Oyo kingdom.

In the 16th century, in the Oyo Empire:

. . .the government was based on title grades and palace societies organized around the Alafin or king, who ruled with three eunuchs who were responsible for political, judicial and religious affairs. The Oyo Mesi (kingmakers) selected the Alafin and controlled his prowess. There were seven councillors including a Basorun or prime minister. Feudal supervisors or ajele resided in vassal kingdoms to oversee tribute payment to the Alafin. Balance of power was maintained between the Alafin and his administration on one hand and the Oyo Mesi and Ogboni society on the other. Oyo had a large army including cavalry which was raised by the Oyo-Mesi and commanded by the AreOna-Kakanfo. This empire survived long after 1549 when a new Oyo Igboho was founded.¹³⁴

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Ibid.

¹³⁴Ibid.

In retrospect, in every pre-colonial political system currency and fiscal arrangements evolved.¹³⁵ In brief, the pre-colonial political systems emphasized democratic monarchy,¹³⁶ just like the pharaohship of Egypt - the ancestral star civilization.

Pre-Colonial Industries

According to historiography, pre-colonial Nigeria was a compendium of a coherent agrarian economy. Though dominantly agrarian, the well institutionalized democratic monarchy and chiefdoms created a harmonized political system essential for development of essential technologies and manifest industries. Hence, the bulk of pre-colonial population were farmers - some people were engaged in local industries and crafts.¹³⁷

According to Ekundare, "the canoe industries developed along the coastal areas and the river banks."¹³⁸ In Ibibio chiefdom, canoe industry was commonplace.

Besides the canoe, for example:

. . . in Nigeria, cotton had been grown and manufactured into cloth for many centuries past, had been spun handwoven in simple cloth and dyed with colours obtained from natural plants; it provided the clothing of the people and long before the nineteenth century the people of Nigeria had been mining iron, tin, gold, salt and other minerals. Iron works existed in many areas, including Ijebu-Ode, Horin, Bida and Awka.¹³⁹

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Ekundare, An Economic History, 42.

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Ibid.

¹³⁹Ibid., 44.

For the latter, blacksmiths manufactured "anvils, hammers, files and other working tools."¹⁴⁰ Wood carving was also commonplace. To the north, "there was a long established leather industry utilizing the hides of domesticated animals."¹⁴¹ And in the south, "soap industry flourished."¹⁴² There was also technology for the production of bows and arrows, spears, cutlasses, swords, knives, and later, guns."¹⁴³

In sum, according to findings by Onimode - "ox-driven ploughs, industrial fuels, brewery industries" and many other were developing in the pre-colonial mode of production. His findings also affirm that pre-colonial Nigeria evolved from communal mode of production to feudal mode of production - personified by her pre-colonial kingdoms and empires.

In the final analysis, we deduce and resolve in this chapter that pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria had a developing mode of production. And that it developed coherently from communal to feudal mode of production, with all potentiality for growth and development when it was colonized by foreign nationalities, who imposed their mother mode of production on the pre-colonial mode?

Hence, in our next chapter we would dialectically analyze the colonial mode of production or colonial capitalism in Nigeria to determine its position in the developing pre-colonial political economy.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid.

This would enable us to juxtaposition both mode of productions and resolve our hypotheses in the context of determining whether or not colonial capitalism is a fact and manifest factors of politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.

CHAPTER III

AN EVOLUTION AND POSITION OF COLONIAL CAPITALISM IN AFRICA: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE REVISITED

In the preceding chapter, African historiography enabled us to resolve and infer that pre-colonial Africa was a developing and growing political economy. Furthermore, in our critical nature study of the latter economy, we found that the pre-colonial societies en masse were replete with essential and magnificent indigenous technologies and manifest fundamental industries; a functional super-structure; a virtuously organized school and university system whose "structural functionalism" profoundly personified, civilized and advanced aboriginal societies into great chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires.

From the latter school and university system, our study found an acute personalities of culture evolved to fine tune and catalyze societies into institutionalized democratic fiefdoms and empires, such as Egypt, Nubia, Congo, Monomopata, Mali, Songhay, Hausa states, Yoruba Benin, et al. The latter four formed most of contemporary Nigeria in question.

Thus, we inferred in Chapter II that authoritarianism, or un-democratic societies, for the most part, is un-indigenous African. The latter assertion was succinctly personified and validated by the systematic functionalism of the Egyptian pharohship, the Yoruba

monarchy vis a vis other pre-colonial chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires. Hence, ingenuity abound pre-colonial heritage of Africa.

In view of the preceding inferences and caveats, we resolved that pre-colonial Africa was a functional, and cohesive developing economy. Consequently, the star indigenous technologies and virtuously organized political institutions which ensured political cohesion and guaranteed civilizing politics and essential cultural unity cum magnanimity was a cultural fact.

Moreover, on a continental scale, the fundamentals of African heritage were a model looking glass from which pre-colonial societies utilized in planning, organizing, identification and resolution of problems in the society. Therefore, the societies were harmonizing and developing. The paradox is the case in contemporary post-colonial Africa, and particularly so in Nigeria.

In retrospect, the political incohesion and underdevelopment crises which astronomically abound contemporary African nation-states like Nigeria was minimal or negligible. Further findings affirmed that the intellectuals of pre-colonial Africa as well as the leadership virtuously embodied and exercised their indigenous culture. Such education made them to see the society as an end. And thus, worked to better the same for the enjoyment of the polity. In this context, contemporary African nation-states is a paradox.

Yolamu Barongo states that in Africa today:

Corruption and gross indiscipline--in order to get to the top
. . . deliberate. . .embezzlement of public funds, flagrant

regard for regulations. . .all these characterized the behavior of African elite groups, and especially so in Nigeria.¹

With a coherent developing pre-colonial economy whose elite was not lacking in essential technological ingenuity, post-colonial African nation-states by inheritance should be advancing a more developed economy today. But amazingly, using the Nigerian example and experience as points of departure, politics of underdevelopment is the existing order. Hence, we explore in this chapter the issue WHY? Why and how did an efflorescent developing pre-colonial mode of production become eclipsed and how did it backslid into underdevelopment crises?

Since the native mode of productions and pre-colonial heritage have no inherent fact and factors of manifest underdevelopment, and whereas their dominancy was replaced by colonial capitalism, could the present crises have evolved from the latter mode of production? This will be our focus here.

The Causality of Political Underdevelopment in Africa: The Nigerian Experience

How is it that the nations of the underdeveloped world so fortunately endowed with raw materials, a huge labor force, and great potential markets as we have seen, are in fact so poor? . . .in these nations, for the most part, lived the brown, black and yellow people who make up roughly two-thirds of the world population---the cradle of civilization---Egypt and the kingdoms of Africa were flowing at a time . . .many parts of what we call the underdeveloped world were once the richest and most culturally advanced part of the globe!²

¹Yolamu Barongo. Political Science in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1983), 29.

²Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach - The Power of Multinational Corporations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 133.

Or putting the issue in a more soluble form, we reiterate--why is post-colonial Nigeria enmeshed in politics of underdevelopment?

Pre-colonial Nigeria possessed a magnificent substructure and superstructure. Its technological development and evolving industries and monarchies were developing. For instance, according to Bade Onimode:

industrial technology has been best documented for industrial fuels, drinks, leather, food, soap, as well as for clothing. In addition to soap and brewery industries, the leather industry produced saddles, slippers, and handbags. From the communal epoch, when cloth was made from tree barks, clothing has been a well established industry in Nigeria. With cotton and indigo as ancient crops in West Africa, all stages of the cloth manufacturing process, including ginning, carding, spinning, dyeing, weaving, and cutting were performed locally in the different Nigerian kingdoms, especially from the 18th century.³

In many parts of Nigeria, weaving with the handloom still persists. For instance, at Ikot Ekpene, in the Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, handbags are still handwoven. Weaving in the pre-colonial era was therefore, unquestionably a well developed trade. "Weaving is documented to have boosted the fame of Kano to the same level of Manchester by the 1850s."⁴

Simultaneously, industrial fuels such as wood and coal were (produced) and used by early miners and blacksmiths. The processing of staple foods and drinks (such as brukutu, peto, ogororo, [or ufiop mmin, "illicit gin"] or palm wine, etc.)⁵ were also produced. Also, "before the end of the 15th century, craftsmen in Benin exchanged

³ Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria. The Dialectics of Mass Poverty (London: Zed Press, 1982), 15.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

their surplus cloth and beads for the gold of the Akans in the Gold Coast (modern Ghana*)."

Thus, the pre-colonial economy was coherent and cohesive. In a coherent economy---"its regions and sectors will be complementary and there will be reciprocity of exchanges between them."⁶ Moreover, our findings also resolve that:

The pre-colonial political systems emphasize[d]* centralized democratic monarchy, succession, balance of power, military action, foreign relations and similar concepts of modern statecraft in Nigeria.⁷

Consequently, these democratic underpinnings of monarchy made the government people-oriented. Unfortunately, the contrary is the case in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa. Post-colonial leaderships are for the most part undemocratic and are characterized by . . .

fragile legitimacy of authority, political corruption and crippling political instability which have marked the persistent underdevelopment of Nigeria and other parts of black Africa⁸, were not pervasive as we have them today.

Hence, we further deduce that pre-colonial Africa developed on its own an efficient and effective people oriented administrative hierarchy of civilized states. Based on our final deductions in Chapter II, we resolve that pre-colonial Africa boasted magnificent civilizations.

*Mine. Ghana was known under colonialism as "Gold Coast" until the country obtained a "flag" independence on March 6, 1957.

⁶Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Nigeria: Longman Nigeria Ltd., 1981), 43.

*Mine.

⁷Onimode, Imperialism, 20-21.

⁸Ibid.

For our purpose then, the striking issues become, if a heritage, built over many centuries without contribution by foreign societies or ethnicities, was naturally developing until the dawning of colonialism, could colonial capitalism manifest fact and factors that obstructed the indigenous heritage and, by that very fact, arrest and reverse its historical development?

To that end, we analyze colonial capitalism to determine whether or not it contained factors or contradictions which inherently and mechanically manifested political underdevelopment in post-colonial Africa.

The Character of Colonial Capitalism Revisited

According to history, from a dynamic viewpoint, the British industrial mode of production in Nigeria or British colonies contain[ed]* contradictions.⁹ And except those contradictions and their probable consequences in Nigeria are determined, in light of the findings that pre-colonial economy was developing, and that contemporary capitalism was implanted in Nigeria, an objective causality of politics of underdevelopment cannot be understood and resolved. Neither would there be a modification or systematic departure from the frustrating strategies of development which the post-colonial leadership had utilized since flag independence in 1960, but to no avail.

*Mine.

⁹Damachi, Nigeria Modernization, 112.

Hence, a dialectical analysis of colonial capitalism is highly significant here. In retrospect, we would determine whether or not any noticeable contradictions and exploitative of colonial capitalism lamented by the Nigerian masses in the colonial epoch are repeated in the post-independence era. In this analysis, we would juxtapose the colonial substructure and superstructure with the post-colonial political economy, by utilizing the following index factors:

- the character of colonial capitalism, i.e., the type of metropolitan industries dormant then in colonial economy, and now in post-colonial era.
- the process of labor in colonial industries then, and now in the post-colonial industries.
- the technologies and control of the colonial and metropolitan industries then and now in post-colonial era.
- the character of labor and superstructure then and now in post-colonial era.
- the factor institution of labor training (i.e., schools) as a producer of colonial labor then and since independence.
- the authenticity of their academic program or vice versa.
- the contradictions in the above variables then and now would be synthesized and dialectically analyzed to determine their consequences of scale on Nigerian masses, as well as politics and manifest superstructure.

The deductions therefrom would constitute our caveats and resolve our hypothesis one: that colonial capitalism evolved contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa.

Character and Type of Colonial Industries

The primary salient feature of the colonial industries, for instance, in Nigeria was their elementary processing nature. We find that:

Six out of the total of eleven of these industries established in Nigeria during 1860-1960 involved the processing of agricultural and timber products, while the seventh, cement, engaged in transforming domestic deposits of limestone. [It is important to note in passing that mineral production which has been treated as primary production has not been included] as so called "extractive industries" are not factory processes. If such rudimentary and secondary processing activities like oil milling, cotton ginning, rubber processing and tanning are included, the number of processing industries rises to ten out of the new total of twenty-three colonial industries.¹⁰

The second feature of the colonial industries was their small scale. For the most part, the colonist industries:

. . . had an average capital outlay of a few thousand pounds, and employed 10 to 100 workers, while the largest ones, such as textiles, cement, beer, soap and cigarettes, had an average capital investment of about 2 million, employed about 300 to 700 workers each, consisted of only about nine establishments by 1960, when Nigeria obtained her flag independence.¹¹

And the third general feature was that:

. . . these small scale colonial industries were basically producers of consumer goods such as cigarettes, soap, textiles, canned food, beer, margarine and plastics. [Of all]* only the cement and boat building industries, which consisted of barely five establishments, could be identified with capital goods. [Lastly]*, most of these industries were owned by the British imperialist, [as far as African ownership was concerned], Nigerians only owned two of twenty-two industrial establishments. Private imperialist interest owned fourteen of them either solely or jointly with government.¹²

In view of the articulated or noticeable features of the colonial industries, what must be noted are the following: (a) that colonial industries were not geared to producing or completing the transformation of raw materials to finished products as was the case in the

¹⁰Onimode, Imperialism, 77.

¹¹Ibid.

*Mine.

¹²Ibid., 77-78.

mother industries in Britain. Thus, the colonial industrialization process, for the most part, was ostensibly only a fraction of the industrial processes, but never the whole as in the center. Hence, the colonial industries were structurally and functionally satellite industries or pre-colonial industries.

Thus, the colonial industries in Nigeria could be characterized as incoherent, whereas its industrial processes or capacities did not result in the complete manufacturing of products in colonial Nigeria, as was the case with indigenous or pre-colonial industries. The only exception to this was in the manufacturing. The colonial industrialist deemed it unprofitable to complete its production at the center before shipping output for sale in the colony. The transformation of the Nigerian or domestic limestone in the manufacturing of cement is a case in point.

Hence, we resolve that the colonial industries were essentially involved in the accumulation of domestic raw materials, transformation of processed raw materials into parts, assembly of product parts from the center, creation of capital goods to sustain the industrial processes of the mother industries, distribution for consumption of the center's industrial output, etc. Therefore, we deduce that the colonial industries were basically a satellite industrial setup. Because additionally, its structural incoherence, was reflected in the colony economy. These colonial industries were established in the colony for exploitative purposes since their establishment did not evolve the concrete manufacturing. Such complete commodities manufacturing could have essentially involved the transfer of the

mother technology to Nigerians in the strategic future, a cohesive integration of Nigeria's economy and consequently evolved a sustained developing economy. But as the essence of colonialism pinpointed, the contrary was the case.

(b) That the dominant nature of the colonial industries and productivity over the pre-colonial societies' basically rendered dormant the indigenous productive forces. This was obvious, contingent on the facts that the indigenous manufacturers abandoned their trade because their productivity was outsold by the center's complementary industrial outputs imported for sales in Nigeria at a massive and cheaper rate; and because the indigenous technologists did not develop a potentiality enabling them to compete favorably against the mass productivity in auxiliaries of colonial industries in Nigeria at the beginning of colonialism, or both. A typical example of this is depicted by the indigenous textile industry. Our findings reveal that the native industries became disarticulated and stultified under the colonial industrial schema or model. Hence, the striking issue now becomes, could this exploitative essence of the colonial industries be contained using the very colonial industrialization model in postcolonial Nigeria? This issue is the major concern in the next chapter.

(c) That these industries were very small in nature, and therefore, were only capable of employing a negligible fraction of Nigerians.

Thus, in light of the very poor wages, overtaking of markets for indigenous manufacturing, e.g., the textile market, and by that

fact capping the growth of indigenous technologies and thus phasing out the pre-colonial industries, massive unemployment and uneven distribution of income, unheard of in pre-colonial economy became prevalent in colonial Nigeria. Most Nigerians lived in want. What is of significance here is that the sustenance of the colonial industries was predicated on the aggressive and successful implementation of satellite and exploitative industrialization philosophy and model. This model aimed at exploiting the colony by imposing the center's mode of production mechanically in the colony. Second, it also aims at transforming the indigenous industrializing mode of production into a dependent metropolitan industrial sector producing basically raw materials, semi-finished commodities, while basically monopolizing the colonial market for the center's productivities, as was the case in Nigeria.

Thus, in light of our analysis here, the emergent issue now becomes striking. If the colonial industrialization model manifested underdevelopment syndrome, cum socio-politico and economic crises for colonial Nigeria, to what extent will a predication of the post-colonial development strategies on colonial model arrest and reverse underdevelopment in the latter? Again, this issue shall be our priority as we move to resolve our hypothesis in Chapter IV.

Upon resting our analysis of the character of colonial industries, their volume of productivity and consequently the impact of colonial productivities on Nigeria, an appraisal of the phases of establishment and types of colonial industries is highly necessary. Without a precise knowledge of the density and types of a phenomenon,

any objective effort to determine its manifestations qualitatively could be superficial. Therefore, to determine the type and volume of productivity in the colonial industries, the sequence of their establishment and their types must be a priority.

The Evolution and Character of Colonial Industries In Nigeria

The Nigerian colonial industries, based on the various developments that evolved in the course of colonization of the country by the United Kingdom, will best be clearly examined in four phases: (1) 1860-1900, (2) 1900-1929, (3) 1929-1945, and (4) 1945-1960.

(1) Between 1860-1900, the British were busily trying to reconcile and merge the indigenous kingdoms into one political entity in order to acculturate them into the metropolitan stereotype, and by so doing render the local institutions subordinate to the metropolis. This move was designed to consolidate grip of the British over the pre-colonial political economy. Thus, during this period, pre-occupation with "pacifying the natives" left little opportunity for economic concerns; therefore, "no industry has been identified for this period"¹³ in consideration.

(2) However, between 1900-1929, which was characterized by industrial growth and gains for the mother country, and which period is usually identified as "the boom years," further findings reveal:

. . . about six industries including tanning, oil milling, rubber processing and cotton-ginning (which started in 1905) were established. In 1927, the Miller Brothers established a saw mill at Koko on the Benin River and became effectively the first company to engage in organized industrial production in colonial

¹³Ibid.

Nigeria. The venture, which utilized local woods, was inherited by the U.A.C. and moved to Sapele in midwestern Nigeria in 1935. The second industrial venture was soap manufacturing by Lever Brothers (later Unilever) which, in 1925, established the West African Soap Company, Ltd. at Apapa to utilize palm oil for the production of bar soap.¹⁴

Unlike the 1900-29 industrial "development" years, though phase three or showed little industrial development. Onimode observes that:

. . .the 1929-45 phase witnessed the establishment of only one new industry. This was the cigarette-making industry, established by British-American Tobacco Company (later Nigerian Tobacco Company, NTC) in 1933. Initially, tobacco input was imported until the company later encouraged its local production by distributing seeds to farmers. This succeeded so well that a new factory was built at Ibadan in 1936. So, in these two and a half decades, colonial Nigeria had only two additional industrial establishments.¹⁵

Probably the reason for the decrease in the establishment of more colonial industries at this period was due to world economic crises (great depression), and imperialist World War II, both of which had some regressive economic effects on the industrial development of the metropole as more energy was diverted to containing the war in an effort to secure the strategic capitalist interest of the British Empire, i.e., safe and secured colonies. In that War the colonized Nigerians were recruited to defend the colonial interest.

After the war, stemming from the worsening global economy, the discharged Nigerian veterans of the second world war, as well as the Nigerian masses, faced critical unemployment. Consequently,

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

nationalist sentiment generated by the limited Nigerian intelligentsia, who found themselves cheated out of the great natural resources of Nigeria, caused Nigerians to organize and to demand that:

- the government* 'guarantee for African workers a reasonable standard of living';
- the government find money for free education;
- the government 'introduce measures to enable the peasant population to derive maximum benefit from the land';
- the government 'formulate and carry out plans ensuring that within five years free medical facilities would be made available to all men and women throughout the country, etc.'¹⁶

These demands catalyzed and exacerbated nationalist vision of political and economic liberation of Nigeria from Britain. According to Onimode:

. . .this [nationalist fervor] prompted the post-war industrial debate about the desirability of establishing industries in order to alleviate poverty and reduce dependence on imperialist manufactures [and] this development prompted the colonial ten-year development plan--1946-66--which together with the post-war boom, attracted four new industries and seven new industrial establishments or branches during 1945-50. For instance, in 1949, in Lagos, the Department of Commerce and Industries started experiments with canning meat, fruits, and vegetables. In the same year, two indigenous companies, with government assistance, established two textile companies in Lagos and in Kano with 30 and 60 looms, respectively. In 1949, the Nigerian Brewery Company started producing 'star' beer in Lagos, using imported hops and malt.

Finally, in 1950, the government established experimental boat yards at Opobo and Mukurdi, with another one at Epe later.¹⁷

*colonial government

¹⁶Obafemi Awolowo, Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Cambridge: 1960), 24.

¹⁷Onimode, Imperialism, 78-79.

*Ukaridem is the concept that in Ibibio nation's lingua franca of Nigeria means self-government and independence.

From 1950-60, as a result of intensified nationalist struggle and agitation for Ukaridem* and a demand for rapid industrialization of Nigeria from Britain, a regional government was established by Britain under Nigerian leadership in 1952. As a token to nationalism, three new industries and eleven new industrial branches were established.

Van Den Berghs (Nig.) Ltd. started production of margarine, with annual capacity of 1,500 tons using domestic palm oil and kernel in 1954. This was followed in 1957 by the establishment of the 2.25 million pounds Nkalagu Cement Factory owned jointly by the federal and state regional governments, the Eastern Regions Development Corporation, Colonial Development Corporation, Turnnel Portland Company Ltd., F. L. Smith and Co., and the Nigerian public; in 1960, this factory employed 300 workers. The third new industry established jointly by the Western Regions Development Corporation U.A.C., and another British company was a plastic factory, producing tubes, pipes and household utensils.¹⁸

Further nationalist pressures resulted in the establishment of colonial industries.

. . . in 1951 and 1954, respectively, an experimental food canning venture and the Lafia Canning Factory at Ibadan, and by 1955, Kaduna Textiles Ltd. were jointly established by the Northern Region Marketing Board, Northern Regional Development Corp. and David Whitehead and Sons (Holdings) Ltd. at the cost of one million pounds, which started production in 1957. Other establishments that expanded existing industries were the West African Portland Cement Company Ltd. at Ewekoro near Abeokuta, jointly owned by Associated Portland Cement Manufacturing Ltd. (51%), Western Nigerian Development Corporation (39%), and U.A.C. (10%), which was started in 1958 and produced its first output in 1960; two cigarette factories in Port Hacourt and Zaria in 1956 and 1958, respectively; Aba Soap Factory by Alagbo Industries, Ltd. owned by Paterson, Zochonis and Company, Ltd., with a capacity of 5000 tons of plain and carbolic soap per annum in 1960, and the Aba branch of Nigerian Brewery in 1957.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

In view of this general analysis, then, which precisely depicts the salient phenomena of the colonial industries, we deduce that the latter's productivities fall into four industrial formations.

In the first category are raw material processing factories. These industries processed raw materials for the mother industries, whose auxiliary establishments in Nigeria were considered less or unprofitable. Their products include according to Okwudiba Nnoli:

Cotton for British textile factories, rubber for tyres and other products, palm oil and kernel for soap and margarine, groundnuts for manufactured oil, hide and skins for leather products, timber for furniture.²⁰

In the next category were industries involved in production of capital goods. These included the cement and the boat building factories and their products were cement and small river crafts, respectively.

The third category industries were consumer goods production factories. Their industrial output, so to speak, were textiles, canned food, cigarettes, soap, margarine as well as plastics. These were mainly produced for the local markets and not for export.

The last category was a composite of extractive industries. These groups of industries were established to extract and process crude minerals for eventual refinement into various chemical products at the mother plant. Their products included "tin, limestone, iron

²⁰Okwudiba Nnoli, Path to Nigerian Development (Codesria, B. P. Dakar, Senegal, 1981), 80-81.

ore, marble, lead, zinc, and gold,"²¹ as well as coal and petroleum. In sum, these were the chief products. At this point, our next striking issue becomes, how voluminous was the colonial industrial productivity? In this regard, based on the everincreasing rate of investment in all colonial industrial concerns (which our analysis of the character of colonial industries revealed), we posit that productivity was commercially massive. In other words, commodities were produced at commercial industrial estate, and research and industrial advertisement were offered between 1950 and 1960.²²

Moreover, as Onimode states:

The investment institutions included Regional and Federal Development Corporations, the 1959 Investment Company of Nigeria which was established by the Commonwealth Development Finance Company; Northern Nigerian Investments Ltd., and the Industrial and Agricultural Company Ltd., both in 1959—the latter by the Colonial Development Corporation and the Eastern Nigerian Government. Then between 1952-1958, clearly over-generous and dubious tax incentives involving aid to foreign investors in so-called pioneer industries, accelerated depreciation of invested capital, tax holidays, import duty relief, special duties on 'dumped and subsidized goods' and full repayment of import duties on re exports were offered. Research assistance involved the Institute of Applied Industrial Research established in 1956, when 'Opportunities for Overseas Investments in the Federation of Nigeria' were also advertised.²³

Eventually industrial estates were established by the colonial federal government of Nigeria at various regional enterprising commercial/government headquarters, such as Apapa, Ikeja, in the western

²¹A. Y. Yansane, "Imperialism and Multinational Corporations: A Case Study of Nigeria" in Decolonization and Dependency (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980), 148.

²²Onimode, Imperialism, 79.

²³Ibid., 79, 81.

region; Enugu and Port Harcourt in the eastern region; and Kaduna, Kano and Zaria in the northern region of Nigeria.

Further findings reveal that:

The supply of power was increased through peak output of 925,000 tons of coal in 1959 increased electricity generation; from 6.1 million in 1950 to 448.3 million kwh in 1960, of which 50% was for industry and commerce. Expenditure on transport and communication rose from 4.7 million in 1950-51 to 32.5 million in 1959-60. In spite of these indulgent colonial incentives, the total output of the industrial sector stood at barely 15.7 million in 1960, less than 50% of the export value of cocoa alone for that year.²⁴

In light of the cumulative unimpressive performance (productivity) of the colonial industrial sector--despite government subsidies in the development of Nigeria--and considering the fact that pre-colonial political economy was industrializing, and given the fact that the center, despite its war losses, was recovering very rapidly economically, it becomes clear that probably inherent in the colonial mode of production were economic factors or exploitative factors that only worked to the benefit of the center. In light of the above findings, we deduce that colonial capitalism was antagonistic to the indigenous mode of production.

Moreover, since it failed to harmonize colonial Nigeria, but rather rendered it incoherent, colonial capitalism was inherently contradictory. According to Ake:

. . . the contradictions of western capitalism impeded the accumulation of capital and forced the imperialist power to resort to imperialism, particularly the colonialization of foreign lands, in order to counteract the obstacles to capitalist accumulation

²⁴Ibid., 81.

arising from the internal contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.²⁵

The contradictions probably had repercussions for the stability of colonial mode of production. Therefore, from the point of view of its contradictions and their manifestations for change or continuity, a profound analysis of the contradictions here is a sine qua non.

However, for an illuminating and objective analysis to be conducted, there must be a double focused critical analysis of the colonial economy. First, we would need to analyze the substructure of the colonial industries, otherwise the colonial industrial mode of production, and then secondly, the superstructure that it supported. This is necessary as a scientific sequence, using our methodology of dialectical materialism.

Since the economic structure of society [is the primacy]* on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. [For in other words] the mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general.²⁶

Hence, for the contradictions of capitalism to be understood and their exploitative capabilities exposed and resolved, the capitalist structure must be examined.

²⁵Ake, A Political Economy, 43.

*Mine.

²⁶Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 24.

The Nature of the Contradictions Within the Colonial
Industrial Mode of Production and the Consequences Therein

. . . [I]f Western capitalism failed to improve materially the lot of the peoples inhabiting most backyard areas, it accomplished something that profoundly affected the social and political conditions in underdeveloped countries. It introduced there, with amazing rapidity, all the economic and social tensions inherent in the capitalist order. It effectively disrupted whatever was left of the 'feudal' coherence of the backward societies. It substituted marked contracts for such paternalistic relationships as still survived from century to century. It reoriented the partly or wholly self-sufficient economics of agricultural countries toward the production of marketable commodities. It linked their economic fate with the vagaries of the world market and connected it with the fever curve of the international price movements. . . . This superimposition of business moves over ancient oppression by landed gentries resulted in compounded exploitation, more outrageous corruption and more glaring injustice.²⁷

The capitalist mode of production then, and the superstructure concomitant of it, developed during the latter part of the 18th century and still more during the entire nineteenth century, a framework for a continuous and, in spite of cyclical disturbances and setbacks, momentous expansion of productivity and material welfare. Consequently, the said material progress was not only spotty in time but inequitably and unevenly distributed in space. It was confined to Western industrialized capitalist centers vis-a-vis their violently created satellites or colonies, where the industrial capitalist mode of production had been instituted to cap or frustrate the progressive native mode of production, as was evident in the pre-colonial Africa/Nigeria.

In retrospect, African historical development was harshly interrupted by the expansion of European capitalism. This new system

²⁷Paul A. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Growth" in The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, ed. Charles K. Wilbur (New York: Random House, 1979), 91.

growing out of capitalist economies that were replacing feudalism in Europe generated some grave contradictions (albeit characteristic of the capitalist mode of production) in the political economy of colonial Nigeria. Their destructive character or effects frustrated the development prospects for the country, and thereby rendered it increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by the centers. Except these contradictions are aggressively and critically analyzed and resolved, the future industrial development of Nigeria resides on unsteady ground. Consequently, politics of underdevelopment abounds post-colonial Africa and especially in Nigeria. In order to contain likely revolutionary violence which might end colonist exploitation, Nigerians were trained in the centers' culture.

The Essential Superstructure of Colonial Capitalism

In Nigeria, schools were set up to train Nigerians in the British culture. The colonial school system, according to Cartey and Kilson:

by 1933 comprised 36,626 schools, 380,305 pupils, 240 European and 8,815 Nigerian teachers (of this 2678 schools with 135,162 pupils with 51 European and 5,470 Nigerian teachers are supported by the native administration) in Nigeria according to Table 8, Nigerian Census 1933.²⁸

The dominating colonial capitalism became highly pronounced as it capped the indigenous technologies. As a result, massive unemployment ensued. Thus, Nigerian youth for the most part, had to attend schools to learn the colonist culture with the objective of finding employment in the colonial economy of Nigeria.

According to Nwafor Orizu:

²⁸Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, Independent Africa (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 65.

. . .as time went on, English schools were established in Nigeria and young boys attended these with one ambition: to learn enough to become clerks and interpreters, or employees of European trades. From these "pinnacles" they thence forth surveyed their ancestral culture with high contempt, obeying no laws, and observing no rules except the Englishmen. This contempt for culture and institutions of their own people, then became a sign of "education". The educated class became a new privileged class--because they felt themselves above the chiefs, above the elder, above the Nigerian diet, above the Nigerian attire, above the Nigerian form of marriage, above the peoples ceremonies, in fact, above Nigeria. . . .Later, this privilege expanded into study abroad--the young men go to Oxford or Cambridge. . . .when they return to Nigeria. . . .become more English than English themselves. When they talk to the other Nigerians, they say "but this is not the way it is done in London". . . .one has to know the British parliamentary procedure in order to be acclaimed as cultured in Nigerian meetings. . . .This educated class now exploits the masses.²⁹

In affirmation of Orizus' position, the colonial governor of Nigeria, in 1920, described the educated class thus:

. . .men. . .who have peacefully pursued their studies under British teachers in British schools in order to become ministers . . .whose eyes are fixed not upon African history or tradition or policy, nor upon their own tribal obligations and the duties of their natural rulers which immemorial custom should impose upon them but upon the political theories evolved by Europeans to fit a wholly different set of circumstances, arising from a wholly different environment. . . .³⁰

These elite found it difficult:

. . .to cogitate on native African philosophy and thought. To them the colonists had better culture. That is not all. Automobiles, telephones, flying boats in the air, diving engines below the sea, electric fans, battleships. . . .what more? Africa has none. The intangibles and abstractions of Nigerian institutions are as far beyond their comprehension as they are to a foreigner.³¹

²⁹Ibid., 67.

³⁰Ibid., 66.

³¹Ibid., 67.

In retrospect, the great developing political civilizations affirmed in Chapter II were viewed with passive ignorance or as culturally insignificant. This practice has historically left intact the colonists' culture.

Consequently, the authentic pre-colonial developing societal facts and factors, which insured systematic social, political and economic development before colonialism were eclipsed. The elite embodiment and exercise of the colonist's capitalist ethics institutionalized colonial capitalism in Nigeria. Thus, the process of westernization became complete. A cultured Nigerian leadership class had emerged. Our findings indicate the following:

. . .the danger from the educated class does not lie wholly in their helping the west stamp out the basis of a people's culture and pride, but rather in their ability to substitute anything for what they are taking away. Besides they have influenced the younger generation to think that an educated man is one who best knows how to deal contemptuously with indigenous institutions and original creative works of his ancestors. . .They are sons of Nigeria, but the history of Africa. . .even of Nigeria is difficult for them to grasp. It is difficult for them to cogitate on native African philosophy and thought. They have no understanding of the forces of history responsible for the cyclical drama of the rise and fall of one nation and another, even as it applies to Africa. On the contrary, to them everything is natural. Nigeria is. . .British.³²

Further findings affirmed the above caveat. The post-colonial economy is basically colonial. For instance, the industries, the government, the bureaucracy and the facts and factors that sustain them or insure their existence is essentially colonial.

³²Ibid.

In sum, all the colonial industries enumerated in our Table 3.1 technologically are center-owned. The mother technology directly instrumental in their productions or operations, to a large extent, are metropolitan based. They exist essentially today as they were in the colonial era. The labor relations are virtually the same. Nigerians are merely employees, and compradors, at best, insofar as the technological underpinnings of these industries are concerned.

History has affirmed that whoever owns the technology owns the industries, and, thus, the outputs and revenue. Therefore, as long as the technologies used in the operations of these high-tech industries are not Nigerian owned or based, but are center based, their documentations and regulations on paper as Nigerian-owned is merely camouflage. In fact, on a historical critical assessment of the impact of metropolitan Transnational Corporations (TNC) which are a manifestation of colonial capitalism Norman Girvan has this to say:

The Transnational Corporation embodies not only a pattern of economic relationships but also a pattern of domination, as expressed in the power relations within it. Raw materials operations have to be subjected to the absolute control of the parent firm, for they are the basis upon which rests the whole edifice of production and marketing, and hence capital accumulation. Therefore, the social groups whose corporations are indispensable for raw material flows. . . principally labor and then the state bureaucracy in the periphery. . . must be subjected as far as possible to the control of the firm. They must be relegated to a dominant and dependent status. A diagrammatic view of the principal relationship involved is given in Figure [3.2].* The workers and the state bureaucracy in the periphery deal initially with the managers of the local subsidiaries. But these managers are themselves subject to the authority of the parent cooperation.

*Mine.

. . . Ultimately then, labor and government have to deal with the management of the corporation as a whole. This implies a considerable weakening of . . . power. Furthermore, the Transnational Corporation normally enjoys a close relationship with the government of its home country which means the center country's government will bring pressure to bear on the peripheral government in the interest of the firm.³³

Hence, whereas the technology of the colonial industries and the bureaucracy that oversees their essential operations are center-based and oriented, these industries have not been fundamentally taken over in post-colonial, as claimed in the Nigerian indigenization promotion decree by the post-colonial regimes.

In the post-colonial era, the leaderships have sought to change the colonial capitalism, in an effort to establish indigenous industries. In Nigeria, the promulgation of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act (NEPA) is a pointer to this initiative. The Act sought to preserve certain essential industries for the operations by Nigerian citizens only.

According to post-colonial regimes, these companies are Nigerian owned. The question then becomes, what extent are the technological basis of these industries indigenous? The answer is an unequivocally none. Their technologies are dominantly center owned. And whereas technology is the essence of industrial ownership, its lack thereof disqualifies personalities, or societies ownership. And this is succinctly the status of colonial capitalism in Nigeria. The industries listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 as are essentially metropolitan.

³³Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation - Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 36-37.

Whereas the status and roles of these industries have not been altered in the post-colonial era; and whereas technology determines the mode of production, our findings resolve that post-colonial mode of production and manifest political developments are consequences of colonial capitalism and evolving inherent contradictions.

Thus, we infer that the character of the industries, process of labor, industrial output, labor status and roles, factor institution of labor training, i.e., school and university programs, massive unemployment and abject poverty of the colonized Nigerians, neglect for development of indigenous pre-colonial technologies, leadership's disregard for authentic social, political, and economic institutions that existed in the colonial era, have not essentially changed in the post-colonial era. Moreover, since the latter is a fact of colonial capitalism, we deduce that colonial capitalism is fundamentally the basis of post-colonial capitalism in Nigeria and evolving unresolved socio-politico cum economic incohesion, or contradictions in post-colonial Nigeria and Africa in general.

Hence, we resolve that colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa/Nigeria. In colonial Africa, the developing mode of production that manifested great civilizations, as we cited in Chapter II, became underdeveloped and stultified by the implantation of colonial capitalism, according to our findings. As a result:

Africa's. . .enormous wealth. . .is underdeveloped. Most people live under conditions of abject poverty. That is, most of the

African people cannot afford three good meals per day or meet the basic necessities, such as good shelter and clothing.³⁴

And this has been a consequence of the center-periphery economic osmosis, which the implantation of colonial satellite capitalism generated. Under the latter, the few colonists and colonial agents amassed wealth in Nigeria by monopolizing the industries and markets, thus leaving the indigenous masses to unemployment and abject poverty.

As Barongo notes in his work:

in Nigeria, for example, up to 9.5% of the great wealth of the country is controlled by about .01% of the population. Many of the wealthy Nigerians made their big money off the backs of the poor farmers, through the marketing board device, or by serving as compradors to the multinational corporations, which really control the economy and dictate the manner and pace of the countries development.³⁵

Such practice of colonial aristocracy is historically, not uncommon of colonial capitalism. Thus, we resolve that colonial capitalism resulted in contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa and in Nigeria.

In our next chapter we will describe and analyze the development strategies utilized by post-colonial regimes to reverse underdevelopment in an effort to determine why underdevelopment stiffens. Our objective here is to resolve our next hypothesis--that failure to indigenize the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the leadership's effort to contain politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

³⁴Barongo, Political Science in Africa, 27-29.

³⁵Ibid.

TABLE 3.1

COLONIAL INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN NIGERIA: 1860-1960

	1860-1960	1900-1929	1929-1945	1945-1950	1950-1960	TOTAL 1860-1960
New Industries Established	---	2 Saw-milling (1917) Soap making (1924) Oil mill- ing, tanning, ginning & rubber pro- cessing	1 Cigarette making (1933)	4 Textiles (1949) Food canning (1949) Beer brewing (1949) Boat building (1950)	3 Margarine (1954) Cement (1957) Plastics (1957)	10
New Industrial Branches	---	2	2 Cigarette making at Oshogo & Ibadan	7 Textiles(2) Beer brewing(1) Food canning(1) Boat building(3)	11 Margarine(1) Cement(2) Textiles(1) Food canning(2) Cement(2) Plastics(1)	22

(table continued)

TABLE 3.1

	1860-1960	1900-1929	1929-1945	1945-1950	1950-1960	TOTAL 1860-1960
Indigenous Industrial Enterprises	---	---	---	2	---	2
Foreign Industrial Enterprises	---	2	2	1	9	14

Source: Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 80.

TABLE 3.2
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (LIST OF PIONEER INDUSTRIES) NOTICE

[CAP. 369 135]

Privatisation and Commercialisation Act

FIRST SCHEDULE Section 1

PART I.—ENTERPRISES IN WHICH EQUITY HELD SHALL BE PARTIALLY
PRIVATISED

<i>Enterprises</i>	<i>Present Federal Government Holding %</i>	<i>Maximum Federal Government Participation as % of Equity (after privatisation)</i>
<i>Commercial and Merchant Banks</i>		
Savannah Bank of Nigeria Limited	51.34	Present holding to be maintained.
Union Bank of Nigeria Limited	51.67	Present holding to be maintained.
United Bank for Africa Limited	45.76	Present holding to be maintained.
International Bank for West Africa Limited	50	Present holding to be maintained.
Allied Bank of Nigeria Limited	51	Present holding to be maintained.
Continental Merchant Bank Limited	51	Present holding to be maintained.
International Merchant Bank Limited	60	Present holding to be maintained.
Nigeria Arab Bank Limited	60	Present holding to be maintained.
Nigeria Merchant Bank Limited	60	Present holding to be maintained.
First Bank of Nigeria Limited	44.8	Present holding to be maintained.
NAL Merchant Bank Limited	20	Present holding to be maintained.
Merchant Bank of Africa	5	Present holding to be maintained.
<i>Agricultural, Co-operative and Development Banks</i>		
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria	100	Not more than 70% by the Federal Government and its agencies.
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Limited	100	Not more than 70% by the Federal Government and its agencies.
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry Limited	100	Not more than 70% by the Federal Government and its agencies.
Federal Savings Bank	100	Not more than 70% by the Federal Government and its agencies.

(table continued)

TABLE 3.2

51 13562 CAP. 369]

Privatisation and Commercialisation Act

<i>Enterprises</i>	<i>Present Federal Government Holding %</i>	<i>Maximum Federal Government Participation as % of Equity (after privatisation)</i>
<i>Oil Marketing Companies</i>		
Unipetrol	100	Not more than 40%
National Oil and Chemical Co. Limited	60	Not more than 40%
African Petroleum Limited	80	Not more than 40%
<i>Steel Rolling Mills</i>		
Jos Steel Rolling Mill	100	Not more than 40%
Katsina Steel Rolling Mill	100	Not more than 40%
Oshogbo Steel Rolling Mill	100	Not more than 40%
<i>Air and Sea Travel Companies</i>		
Nigeria Airways Limited	100	Not more than 40%
Nigeria National Shipping Line Limited	100	Not more than 40%
<i>Fertiliser Companies</i>		
Nigerian Superphosphate Fertiliser Company Limited	100	Not more than 40%
National Fertiliser Company Nigeria Limited	70	Not more than 40%
<i>Paper Mills</i>		
Nigeria National Paper Manufacturing Company Limited	64.03	Not more than 40%
Nigeria News Print Manufacturing Company Limited	100	Not more than 40%
Nigeria Paper Mills Limited	100	Not more than 40%
<i>Sugar Companies</i>		
Savannah Sugar Company Limited	75.4	Not more than 40%
Sunti Sugar Company Limited	90	Not more than 40%
Lafaji Sugar Company Limited	70	Not more than 40%

(table continued)

TABLE 3.2

[CAP. 369 13563

Privatisation and Commercialisation Act

<i>Enterprises</i>	<i>Present Federal Government Holding %</i>	<i>Maximum Federal Government Participation as % of Equity (after privatisation)</i>
<i>Cement Companies</i>		
Ashaka Cement Company Limited	72	30%
Benue Cement Company Limited	39	30%
Calabar Cement Company Limited	68	30%
Cement Company of Northern Nigeria Limited	31.53	30%
Nigeria Cement Company Limited, Nkalagu	10.72	10%
<i>Motor Vehicles and Truck Assembly Companies</i>		
Anambra Motor Manufacturing Company Limited	35	Present holding to be maintained.
Leyland Nigeria Limited	35	Present holding to be maintained.
Nigeria Truck Manufacturing Company Limited	35	Present holding to be maintained.
Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria Limited	35	Present holding to be maintained.
Volkswagen of Nigeria Limited	35	Present holding to be maintained.
Steyr Nigeria Limited	35	Present holding to be maintained.

PART II.— ENTERPRISES IN WHICH 100% OF EQUITY HELD BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHALL BE FULLY PRIVATISED 1989 No. 22

1. Nigeria Hotels Limited.
2. Durbar Hotel Limited.
3. Aba Textile Mills.
4. National Cargo Handling Limited.
5. Nigerian Dairies Company Limited.
6. Nigerian National Fish Company Limited.
7. Nigerian Food Company Limited.
8. National Grains Production Company Limited.
9. National Poultry Production Company Limited.
10. National Root Crops Production Company Limited and other such food production companies.
11. Nigerian National Shrimps Company Limited.
12. New Nigerian Salt Company Limited.
13. National Fruit Company Limited.

(table continued)

TABLE 3.2

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Privatisation and Commercialisation Act

-
14. National Salt Company Limited, Ijoko.
 15. South-East Rumanian Wood Industries Limited, Calabar.
 16. Nigerian-Rumanian Wood Industry Limited, Ondo.
 17. Nigerian Yeast and Alcohol Company Limited, Bacita.
 18. Nigerian Film Corporation.
 19. National Freight Company Limited.
 20. National Animal Feed Company Limited, Port-Harcourt.
 21. Opobo Boat Yard.
 22. Madara Dairy Company Limited, Vom.
 23. Ore-Irele Oil Palm Company Limited, Ondo.
 24. Okomu Oil Palm Company Limited, Bendel.
 25. National Livestock Production Limited.
 26. Road Construction Company of Nigeria Limited.
 27. National Film Distribution Company Limited.
 28. Nigerian Ranches Company Limited, Kaduna.
 29. Impressit Bakolori Nigeria Limited.
 30. North Breweries Limited, Kano.
 31. Nigerian Beverages Production Company Limited.
 32. West African Distilleries Limited.
 33. Nigeria Engineering Construction Company Limited.
 34. Tourist Company of Nigeria Limited (Owners of Federal Palace Hotels).
 35. Electricity Meters Company Limited, Zaria.
 36. American International Insurance Company Limited.
 37. Guinea Insurance Company Limited.
 38. Sun Insurance Company Limited.
 39. United Nigeria Insurance Company Limited.
 40. United Nigeria Life Insurance Limited.
 41. Niger Insurance Company Limited.
 42. Mercury Assurance Company Limited.
 43. Crusader Insurance Company Limited.
 44. Royal Exchange Company Limited.
 45. NEM Insurance Company Limited.
 46. Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Limited.
 47. Prestige Assurance Company Limited.
 48. British American Insurance Company Limited.
 49. West African Insurance Provincial Company Limited.
 50. Manchok Cattle Ranch.
 51. Mokwa Cattle Ranch.
 52. Poultry Production Units in Jos, Ilorin and Kaduna.
 53. Kaduna Abattoir and Kaduna Cold Meat Market.
 54. Bauchi Meat Factory and Galambi Cattle Ranch.
 55. Minna Pig Farm.
 56. Kano Abattoir Company Limited.
 57. Umuahia Pig Farm.
 58. Giant Cold Store, Kano.
 59. Avip-Eku Oil Palm Company Limited.
 60. Ihechiowu Oil Palm Company Limited.
 61. Sokoto Integrated Livestock Company Limited.
 62. Motor Engineering Services Company Limited.

(table continued)

TABLE 3.2

[CAP. 369

Privatisation and Commercialisation Act

-
- 63. Flour Mills of Nigeria Limited.
 - 64. Nigerian Yeast Alcohol Manufacturing Company Limited.
 - 65. Nichemtex Industries Limited.
-

SECOND SCHEDULE

Section 12

PARTIAL AND FULLY COMMERCIALISED ENTERPRISES

PART I.— PARTIAL COMMERCIALISATION

- 1. Nigerian Railway Corporation.
- 2. Nigerian Airport Authority.
- 3. National Electric Power Authority.
- 4. Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company Limited.
- 5. All the River Basins Development Authorities.
- 6. National Provident Fund.
- 7. Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited.
- 8. Delta Steel Company Limited.
- 9. Nigerian Machine Tools Limited.
- 10. Federal Housing Authority.
- 11. Kainji Lake National Park.
- 12. Federal Radio Corporation.
- 13. Nigerian Television Authority.
- 14. News Agency of Nigeria.

PART II.— FULL COMMERCIALISATION

- 1. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
 - 2. Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL).
 - 3. Associated Ores Mining Company Limited.
 - 4. Nigerian Mining Corporation.
 - 5. Nigerian Coal Corporation.
 - 6. National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria.
 - 7. Nigeria Re-Insurance Corporation.
 - 8. National Properties Limited.
 - 9. Tafawa Balewa Square Management Committee.
 - 10. Nigerian Ports Authority.
 - 11. African Re-Insurance Corporation.
-

(table continued)

TABLE 3.2

.3565

[CAP. 179 1987
Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (LIST OF PIONEER INDUSTRIES) NOTICE S. 19 of 1982

under section 1

Commencement: 29th April 1982

1. The industries mentioned in the Schedule to this Notice are hereby declared as pioneer industries to which the Act shall apply. Declaration of pioneer industries.
2. This Notice may be cited as Industrial Development (List of Pioneer Industries) Notice. Short title.

SCHEDULE

LIST OF PIONEER INDUSTRIES

1. Cultivation and processing of food crops, vegetables and fruits.
2. Manufacture of cocoa products.
3. Processing of oilseeds.
4. Integrated dairy production.
5. Cattle and other livestock ranching.
6. Bone crushing.
7. (a) Deepsea trawling and processing;
(b) Coastal fishing and shrimping;
(c) Inland lake fishing and processing.
8. Manufacture of salt.
9. Mining of lead and zinc ores by underground mining methods.
10. Manufacture of iron and steel from iron ore.
11. Smelting and refining of non-ferrous base metals and the manufacture of their alloys.
12. Mining and processing of barytes and associated minerals.
13. Manufacture of oil well drilling materials containing a predominant proportion of Nigerian raw materials.
14. Manufacture of cement.
15. Manufacture of glass and glassware.
16. Manufacture of lime from local limestone.
17. Quarrying and processing of marbles.
18. Manufacture of ceramic products.
19. Manufacture of basic and intermediate industrial chemicals from predominantly Nigerian raw materials.
20. Manufacture of pharmaceuticals.
21. Manufacture of surgical dressings.
22. Manufacture of starch from plantation crop.
23. Manufacture of yeast, alcohol and related products.
24. Manufacture of animals foodstuff.
25. Manufacture of paper-pulp, paper and paperboard.
26. Manufacture of articles of paper-pulp, paper and paperboard.
27. Manufacture of leather.
28. Manufacture of textile fabrics and man-made fibres.
29. Manufacture of products made wholly or mainly of metal.
30. Manufacture of machinery involving the local manufacture of a substantial proportion of components thereof.
31. Manufacture of goods made wholly or partly of rubber.
32. Manufacture of spare parts including automotive spare parts and components.
33. Manufacture of telecommunication equipment, cables, etc.
34. Manufacture of educational and science equipment.
35. Manufacture of medical and dental equipment.
36. Manufacture of office and school stationery.
37. Manufacture of building and home furnishing materials.

CHAPTER IV

THE POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND IMPACT ON EVOLVING COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND POLITICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

As we resolved in Chapter III, in post independent Nigeria, the substructure and its evolving superstructure is fundamentally an outcroppings of an insidious and exploitative colonial capitalism. Thus, in an essential move to contain the latter, the citizenry and manifest nationalist leadership were united in optimism of ending the excessiveness of colonist capitalism, or realizing economic autarky in the pre-colonial era. According to our findings in Chapter III, the flourishing precolonial economy was depressed by colonist capitalism. Hence, in colonial Nigeria, the systematic, coherent and developing pre-colonial economy, was contained disarticulated and rendered underdeveloped by the colonist. Consequently, underdevelopment crises abound Nigeria.

At independence in 1960, the colonial government, our study found, left the first republican nationalist government of Nigeria with an astronomical economic woe. The first post-independent government was a parliamentary republican headed by Prime Minister Sir Abubarka Tafawa Balewa.

In retrospect, we find that --

. . .the Balewa government* inherited a whole gamut of socio-economic problems from the British colonial government. First,

*First post-independent government of Nigeria, 1960-66 was headed by Prime Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa.

Britain left Nigeria with an inherent long-term adverse balance of trade at independence. Post-second world war growth resulted in the worsening of balance of payments situation, and over a six-year period following 1955, the trade deficit increased by fifteen times. Imports generally grew faster than incomes. For example, while the gross domestic product in the 1950s was growing at annual simple average rate of 8%, imports and exports were growing at 15% and 6%, respectively. While imports remained relatively steady at about 15% of the gross domestic product during the decade in question, the growth in exports declined from roughly 6% in the early part of the decade in question to about 4%. Given this trend, it was evident that with the increasing importation of capital goods, which industrialization demanded [and continues to demand]* added to increasing loans commitments, Nigeria had difficulty in obtaining enough foreign exchange.** This invariably imposed severe restraints on the growth of the gross domestic product when Nigeria became independent.¹

Thus, in view of the aforementioned worsening economy at independence, which the Balewa*** government and post-Balewa regimes were destined to confront or compelled to resolve, the profound and essential question becomes, what strategy would resolve this crisis in the new Nigeria? Therefore, there developed a need to design and utilize a viable development strategy to resolve the unfortunate imminent crises in the new nation.

In view of the magnitude of the underdeveloping economy that Nigeria's post independent leadership inherited from Britain, the citizenry anticipated a development strategy which implementation would

*Emphasis mine.

**By foreign exchange (in this context) it is meant the process by which Nigerian government arranges to settle accounts with foreign trading centers, or with the international monetary institutions.

¹Ukandi Damachi, Development Paths in Africa and China (Colorado: West View Press, 1976), 159.

***Abubarka Tafawa Balewa was the first prime minister of Nigeria until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1967.

resolve an aggressive exploitation of colonial capitalism. Such would entail a concrete reactivation pre-colonial mode of production. A re-activated indigenous mode of production basically means a revitalization of a coherent and growing pre-colonial substructure cum evolving indigenous political institutions which were systematically depressed, dominated and exploited negatively by the center.

In the developing pre-colonial economy (affirmed in Chapter III), the societies' resources were objectively mobilized by the leaderships to civilize the indigenous nations. The resources were not exploited to develop foreign societies at the expense of the native. Thus, a choice of a development strategy based on the pre-colonial experience, which ensured concrete developing economy becomes a highly demanding option for the new government.

Our question then becomes, to what extent was the post-independent leadership themselves being pupils of the colonial school system abandon the colonial capitalist legacy, and opt to apply the indigenous? For our purpose, then, a revisitation of the post-colonial planning history and evolving development strategy is essentially not out of order here. In fact, an understanding of the latter could manifest profound fact and factors towards a resolution of our impending hypothesis.

In this chapter, we seek to resolve that failure to Africanize the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the resolution of underdevelopment crisis, or authentic and sustained development in post-colonial Nigeria.

The Basis of Development Strategies By the Post-Colonial Leaderships

According to history, probably the most critical issue of development planning is the philosophy that guides the planners in the construct of the development model. This philosophy is usually based on their intellectual orientation. Unquestionably, such orientation, for the most part, is derived from the latter's experience in the economic system that supported the educational system which produced them. In this regard, the Nigerian elite that inherited the post-colonial government embraced the traditional or colonial socio-political and economic culture. They were mostly eclectic; to most of them the development approaches of the center should be the models to be emulated in the development of Nigeria. This is demonstrated by their move (in spite of the exploitative effects which nationalism rejected) to join the Commonwealth, which the Crown retained a permanent seat as its head. The leadership assumed, according to Adedeji (1983), that whereas the colonial model enabled the center to develop into magnificent economic power, the emulation of the latter could also catalyze development in independent Nigeria.

Second, the elite nature of the nationalist government consequently inhibited from the state the ability to question the essence of colonial institutions, historical experiences, and then compare it to that of their African ancestors. A deduction from the latter may have revealed to them that perhaps the African underdevelopment problems developed from colonial capitalism, and may have suggested that a rational departure from a center based development model could be the only option that could contain the center's exploitation or

activate development in Nigeria. But they failed to do so, deciding rather to continue the structural and superstructural leftovers of the metropole, a problem which some intellectuals in Nigeria such as Adebayo Adedeji lamented. According to Adedeji,

We ["independent Africans or Nigerians"]* have just assumed that by continuing the way the [colonial]** economies have been run in the past we would achieve transformation [and development]**. We also made one very false assumption--we tried to fit ourselves into words such as socialism and capitalism--instead of asking ourselves how we really could achieve development. [For]** development is a unique thing for each country, for each society. It is the cumulative result of cultural, political and social history and development. We got ourselves embroiled in ideological predilections that were more destructive than helpful.²

In retrospect, the first independent government, or even the subsequent governments of Nigeria (despite repeated failures of the metropolitan models) negated in their decision the omni historiographically evolved cannon of concrete development. The latter asserted that authentic development model, for the most part, historically are known to manifest concrete and sustained developing economies. Such as evidenced in both the center and pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa.

Additionally, according to Schatz (1977), the decision to adapt a center oriented development strategy instead of designing an authentic rational model could be traceable to nationalist and colonist 'development' compromise of 1949. In that year, the colonial economic philosophy of absolute control of the Nigerian economy by the British

*Adebayo Adedeji (a Nigerian) was the Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa, 1983.

**Emphasis mine.

²Africa Report 28 (September/October 1983):15.

colonist was modified (because of persistent nationalist political pressure) to reflect Nigerians' participation in the national industrial sectors.

According to Schatz, after 1949, this approach "involved the dual goals of promoting some measure of modern development of the economy, and increasing Nigerian participation, both to be sought largely by government nurture of private enterprise."³ Such orientation, in the perception of the Colonial Nigerian Department of Commerce and Industry, according to the Annual Report:

. . . will ensure the maximum participation by Nigerians themselves in industrial enterprise [and] to provide all possible opportunities for Nigerian businessmen to take an increasing share in the trade of the country. The emphasis throughout [was]* to develop industry and trade in such a way that Nigerians themselves will play an increasingly important part in the commercial life of the country. That was the main objective, and it was the general wish that it should be pursued with vigor and with the utmost possible speed.⁴

From the perception of the Department of Industry, the end of colonial exploitation and its consequential ills could be contained by opening up the formerly closed colonial economy to the indigenes, in the short run, and by the eventual Nigerianization of all business enterprises in the long run. In that context, it was implied that if the Nigerianization of industrial concerns could be effectively and

³Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 4.

*Emphasis mine.

⁴Nigeria Federation, Annual Report of the Commerce and Industries Department, 1949-50 (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1951), 4-5.

efficiently implemented, foreign exploitation could be ended and the underdevelopment process reversed in the strategic future.

Besides, the foremost concern in the mid-1950s (the period Nigerians assumed increasing power in the national economy) in the nationalist circle was the notion that except there was a Nigerian participation in the industrial concerns, which was mostly foreign-owned and controlled, the containment of the latter's exploitation might not be realized after flag independence. But the unanswered (or probably unraised) questions were (1) Could the Nigerians be trained in just less than a decade (before independence in 1960) by the colonial capitalist (who saw the indigenous businessmen as a threat to the survival of their businesses) to master the industrial operations? (2) Would this training ensure or imply the exposure of the Nigerians to the technology that determines the operations of these industries, since the industrial control basically is predicated on the control of technology?

But by the close of the 1950s, it was clear to the Nigerian nationalist parties that Nigerians were, for the most part, deficient in the operation of profitable businesses and that they could not possibly in less than a decade acquire skills to compete favorably against colonial industrialists. Therefore, to contain this managerial deficiency, the Nigerian public corporations were set up to undertake the growing number of productive and profit-motivated enterprises. This was seen as a way of promoting national (as opposed to foreign-dominated) development of the large scale modern [industrial] activities which few Nigerian entrepreneurs were capable of undertaking. To some degree, this turn to public enterprise also reflected

socialist ideology which dominated African nationalism at that epoch. It was not based on any scientific or concrete foundations. For example, when Premier Okpara of Eastern Region explained that his party's [philosophy was] "pragmatic socialism",⁵ he never practically meant that the state or his party had committed itself to socialist praxis. What he really meant was a free enterprise commitment dressed up in socialist gown, in order to win the support of the Nigerian masses.

This was the mood that dominated the nationalist party. With this elitist orientation at the close of the 1950s, the country's post-colonial government moved to adopt the colonial industrial capitalist development philosophy. The leadership simply chose economic development orientation characterized as "nuture capitalism"* with "state capitalist and welfare tendencies."⁶ This, in other words, implies the adaption of Neo-classical and Keynesian economic philosophy that held sway at the center of Britain, especially after the Great Depression, i.e., 1923-33, "turned away from classical concern with economic growth and concentrated instead on the problem of efficient resource allocation. In this abstract model, input supplies were taken as given and thus population receded into an ad hoc explanation that

⁵Schatz, *Nigerian Capitalism*, 5-6. (By pragmatic socialism, according to Okpara, it is meant "a system in which everyone had the right to start his own business.")

*By nuture capitalism, it is meant a developing capitalism pivoted by the nationalist government of Nigeria, as well as other post-colonial states, geared to transform simple "subsistence economy into a modern capitalist economy."

⁶Ibid., 6.

was trotted out whenever the free market was blamed for continuing poverty," especially after the Great Depression. According to Onimode (1982:115), "when the bourgeoisie science of wealth had nothing meaningful to say about the greatest economic catastrophe ever," out of this context, the Keynesian revolution was born to disown Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and invent a critical role for the state sector in economic development. Both the neo-classical and Keynesian model imply economic planning, whereby the state would seek to regulate the national economy to the point that the private sector would profitably attain the growth of the economy.

It is worth to note in passing that

. . . as the post-war reconstruction of Europe under American marshal plan represented the triumph of this state sector, the same remedy was recommended for the colonies--hence a major role for the public sector in the so-called 'mixed economy' figured largely in colonial planning. Government was to expand resources and rationalize their allocation, and to provide infrastructural facilities. [And] the residual laissez-faire element in this planning philosophy dictated a special role for the capitalist private sector. This was still to be guided by the 'invisible hand' and constitute the engine of growth. Government was to provide the favorable economic and social environment for the private sector to dominate the growth of the economy. In effect, this meant that these dominant British imperialist firms that had been exploiting Nigeria should continue to transfer her economic surplus for Britain's development. [Furthermore], foreign aid implying a resource gap to be filled through grants and loans from London was to complement the activities of the private sector. This increased the grip of the imperialist bourgeoisie on the colonial economy and anchored the country to the 'debt trap'* of the international capitalist.⁷

*For elaborate reading on the consequences of the debt trap, see C. Payer, The Debt Trap, the International Monetary Fund and the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), Chapters 1, 2, and 10.

⁷Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 115.

What must be significantly noted in this neo-classical/Keynesian model is its bureaucratic component. It was to be formulated and implemented by the "British colonial civil servants and imperialist 'experts' who were more concerned to use Nigerian resources to ameliorate Britain's post-war dollar shortage than to develop the Nigerian economy."⁸ This is not all. Peculiar Keynesian economic concepts as Gross Domestic Product, "GDP, gross investment, fiscal monetary measures, and financial accountability,"⁹ were used in the planning process, especially when Africans started "running regional governments after 1951"¹⁰ in Nigeria. This development marked the beginning of colonial planning using GDP and per capita income to measure growth of the economy. This was the model that the colonist used. Thus "economic planning [became]** the accepted method of stimulating economic development [and]** has been adapted in many of the colonial countries achieving independence since World War II."¹¹

In Nigeria, after 1951, the regional government started to use the neo-classical/Keynesian model to plan development strategies since this implied the benefiting from the "experts" advice of the colonial bureaucrats. The consideration to accept the colonial development philosophy and model was given impetus primarily by the "poor perfor-

⁸Ibid., 116.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

**Emphasis mine.

¹¹p. B. Clark, Planning Import Substitution (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1970), 1.

mance of the public corporations that was intended to compete with private [colonial]* business [but failed and]* led to the loss of confidence in public enterprise,"¹² and consequently made the nationalist to superficially conclude that Africans had insufficient know-how to operate firms, or develop Nigeria.

A second factor was that since

the capital sink into the public development corporations was largely lost or frozen and financial stringency set in, reliance on [nationalist]* government to implement new development in the directly productive sectors of the economy went on receding though existing public enterprise continued to function.¹³

Such confidence in the metropolitan capitalist development model produced serious impacts in the post-colonial government circles and its development strategies in Nigeria. For example, ostensibly it frustrated the nationalist government's hope to break away from the mother country and carry on the development of Nigeria without outside dictation. It simply had to continue with the colonial planning philosophy of development for Nigeria, while at the same time, turning to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)* for advice.

*Emphasis mine.

¹²Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, 7.

¹³Ibid.

*The IBRD, the largest of the world bank groups, chartered at the end of World War II as a mechanism for financing the reconstruction of war devastated Europe in the 1950s, embarked on lending and economic development advisory missions to Third World states. Its voting power among its Board of Governors (which is made up of all active members' state representatives) resides with twenty executive directors from most industrialized capitalist states. In fact, voting power in the IBRD depends on each country's capital subscription. Thus, the United States has the greatest voting power--21,

This embrace of the IBRD signifies not just the willingness to adapt the neo-classical model but to internationalize it as well. Therefore, the approach they considered then could be characterized as the neo-classical international model.**

In light of the IBRD's composition, it can be seen that Nigeria joined a treeful of neo-imperial, capitalist hawks. As an outgrowth of the colonial capitalist formation, we raise the question of whether the IBRD could be counted upon by Nigerian nationalist government as good friend or counselor whose aid could help her overcome underdevelopment or vice versa. Thus, the profound and fundamental issue becomes, to what extent would the chosen plan enable the republican government contain colonist exploitation?

In this quest, a critical analysis of the post-colonial development models becomes a profound and basic imperative. Therefore to justify the significance of this analytical approach, one must agree with Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in their statement that:

Scientific understanding proceeds by way of constructing and analyzing 'models' of the segments or aspects of reality under study. The purpose of these models is not to give a mirror image of reality, not to include all its elements in their exact sizes and proportions, but rather to single out and make available for intensive investigation these elements which are not decisive. We abstract from non-essentials, we blot out the unimpor-

48% of total). Several major U.S. allies have sizeable voting power: United Kingdom, 8.12%; Japan, 4.25%; and France, 4.0%. Neither the Soviet Union nor allied eastern European countries are members. [Frances Moore Lappe, Aid As Obstacle, USA (ed.) Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980, 172.]

**See our operational definition of neo-classical international model in Chapter I.

tant to get an unobstructed view of the important, we magnify in order to improve the range and accuracy of our observation.¹⁴

Thus, to that end, the debate on legitimizing the development strategy into a sovereign development model in the first republican government is significant. The latter is essential, in that, it would enable us to determine the commitment and authenticity of the post-colonial leadership activities vis-a-vis their pre-independence nationalist ideology of resting the country from colonist.

Second, for the purpose of preasnen, the documents on development strategies shall be classified and characterized as distinct models depicting each of the post-independent regimes (e.g., first national development plan, etc.). The latter would enable us to determine the correlation between each leadership's development strategies and evolving colonial woes - abrasive underdevelopment crisis.

**The First National Development Plan (FNDP) Revisited:
Legitimization Process and Impact**

In the first republican government, some "socialist" Nigerian politicians began to debate what strategy of development was suitable for post-colonial Nigeria. This faction of nationalist remained of the opinion that "political independence without administrative and economic independence was worthless."¹⁵ The implication was that

¹⁴Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), 14.

¹⁵Chibuzo S. A. Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy: Nationalism or Pragmatism?" African Affairs 82 (April 1983): 244.

the sanctioning of the colonial industrialization development philosophy would not resolve the underdevelopment problems in Nigeria.

For instance, digressing from the parliamentary debate in 1959, Jaja Nwachukwu, a ranking member of the Nigerian House of Representatives, put the fundamental concern of the nationalist leaders in the following terms:

It must be remembered that nearly all our industries are in the hands of foreigners. For instance, our cement company, our air transport, our shipping, our tin and other mining industries, now oil and probably iron and steel. . .¹⁶

Next, in further reflection on nationalist development intent, another House member, K. O. Madiwe, had this to say: "We do not want to be hewers of wood and drawers of water all the time--we want to be manufacturers."¹⁷ In view of the above debates, it becomes apparent that the common theme running through the debates of most Nigerian nationalists was how to free the country from economic underdevelopment, and all the elements of neo-colonialism. Ogbuagu asserted that "Nigerianization of the economy was therefore seen as a process for bringing about economic decolonization and emancipation."¹⁸ at least from the perspective of most nationalists. On the contrary, some influential socialist political leaders such as Obafemi Awolowo and S. G. Ikoku argued that Nigerianization of the economy alone would not lead

¹⁶Federation of Nigeria, Han Sand, House of Representatives Debates, Official Report, Session 1959-60, Vol. 11 (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1959), 578.

¹⁷Ibid., 585.

¹⁸Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," 246.

to the indigenous businessmen taking over the "commanding heights" of the nation's economy from foreign investors. This group of politicians was in favor of a more aggressive policy that would make it mandatory for "all foreign enterprises established in Nigeria to be owned from the outset in joint partnership with the government and/or the local entrepreneurs."¹⁹ This group, for the most part, was implicitly in favor of nationalization.²⁰ But in spite of that contention, the Balewa's government favored the demands for increased Nigerian nationals participation in the economy; it objected to the strong approach [nationalization]* favored by Awolowo.²¹

In articulating the Balewa's government position, the then influential finance minister, Festus Okotie-Eboh, argued that "the position of the federal government was that the council of ministers was more inclined toward the creation of an independent economy through Nigerianization than through nationalization."²² Therefore, from the government's intention above, the government's conception of "an independent economy" was based on a selective programme of indigenization aimed at increasing the participation of the state

. . .and its people in the economy without such a policy hurting or being prejudicial to continued and desirable foreign investment

¹⁹Ibid., 346.

²⁰Nationalization as used here is meant to denote government ownership of most of the means of production.

*Emphasis mine.

²¹Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," 347.

²²Ibid.

in especially the intermediate and capital goods sectors. In all, the policy that the prime minister [Balewa] and his cabinet preferred was less radical than that proposed by Obafemi Awolowo and some leaders of organized business groups represented not only in the action group party of Awolowo [mostly western Nigerians of Yoruba origin], but also in the N.C.N.C. of Nnamdi Azikiwe [predominantly] a Hausa-Fulani party of Northern Nigeria.]²³

Thus, the (first) post-colonial national government of Balewa was practically of anti-radical economic philosophy, but favored the continuation with little or no modifications of the colonial or the neo-classical/Keynesian model. This was the basis of the First National Development Plan or model.

From the ongoing analysis, it is revealed that the post-colonial government favored both the continuity of the industrial capitalist mode of production; and this "neo-classical mode of production was decidedly capitalist, though there were remnants of feudal and village communal modes of production mainly in the northern and rural southern Nigeria, respectively."²⁴ The strategy of development, however, was initially conceived to be based on the neo-classical/Keynesian economic model, and later modified to reflect a prototype of "neo-classical model of international development."

In view of this metropolitan development path which the post-colonial government decidedly sanctioned and adapted, one can see that Balewa's neo-classical development model was based on eccentricism. It did not reflect the Nigerian's historical materialism. This is why

²³Ibid.

²⁴Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 138.

the people favored Nigerianization or indigenization,* over nationalization, based on neo-classical economic development strategy. The question now becomes: Could this plan contain the woes of colonial industrialization? The indigenization or Nigerianization (under Balewa's neo-classical based development philosophy) implied the "open door policy"*** to foreign capital since 1960. This process encouraged the invasion of the Nigerian economy by multinational neo-colonial capitalists. Thus, the initially predominantly British finance capital became increasingly invaded by American, French, Western German and other European neo-imperialist capital. This was the economic atmosphere which preceded the beginning of the implementation of Nigeria's official development plan. Thus, the neo-classical/Keynesian based development model, adapted in the first two years of flag independence,*** which favored the open door policy could be traceable pre-independence development plan of 1946.

The Pre-Independence Planning History

A review of the pre-independence planning history revealed that

Development planning in Nigeria can be traced back to 1946 when following the initiatives of Secretary of State for the colonies in 1944, the ten-year Plan of Development and welfare came into operation. The formulation and implementation of the plan up to 1954 was highly centralized, the plan being actually prepared under the general direction of a small central development board

*Private enterprise system where Nigerian entrepreneurs are "expected" to compete "freely" along side with foreign counterparts.

**Open door policy as used here implies opening of the Nigerian economy to more foreign capital or investment.

***By flag independence is meant a political independence; without self-sustained economic development.

consisting exclusively of senior colonial government officials. [Due to the introduction of the federal system of government in Nigeria, which meant that certain autonomy in decision-making was to be given to each composite federal region from October 1954], this brought the Plan to a premature end. And in 1955 each regional government as well as federal government launched new plans . . . The 1955-60 Economic Development Plan [was] revised and extended to 1962. At this time Nigeria had become a federation.²⁵

Significant here is that (1) the nationalist parties up to the eve of Nigerian independence had come to embrace the neo-classical/Keynesian development model; (2) they had also come to modify that model which formerly restricted Nigerian socio-political and economic ties to Britain by considering "open door policy;" (3) the implications of open door are two-fold: first, it allowed the pre-independent nationalist parties to seek advice from the metropolitan development institutions on what strategy of development Nigeria should take. For instance, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was a consultant since 1954. "Two bureaucratic planning institutions [i.e., J. P. C. and N. E. C.]* were established on recommendations of the IBRD Report of 1954;"²⁶ (4) the nationalist inclination to develop intellectual link with development planning experts outside the mother country consequently legitimized their eccentricism as far as the need

²⁵Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1975), 6.

*The National Economic Council (NEC), created in 1955, was to act as consultative body for the development of national, social and economic policies. Its membership included Crown's governor General of Nigeria and four African ministers from each Nigerian region and two from southern Cameroon. And the Joint Planning Council (JPC), created in 1958, was to advise the NEC. It was a composite of experts like the Governor of Central Bank and college professors.

²⁶Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 117.

of keeping Nigeria open for foreign capital was concerned. The neo-classical/Keynesian philosophy (or colonial plan), which was formally extended to 1962, reflected that orientation. This plan precisely stated that

Nigeria is an open economy, whose development depends to a high degree on her ability to pay for essential imports, both development goods, and of those consumer goods required for a rising level of living and as incentives for increased production.

Because the Nigerian economy depends so largely on the fortunes of its export sector, whose prices and outputs depend on weather and world markets, the balance of payments must be constantly watched. Monetary and fiscal measures will be the primary means of containing demand so that Nigeria does not lose the undoubted advantages of a free economy, which is one of the prime assets from the point of view both of domestic and foreign investment.²⁷

(5) Since the First Development Plan philosophically implied the neo-classical/Keynesian economic philosophy and was modified by experts' advice from other international capitalist institutions such as the IBRD, we hereby posit that the First National Development Plan of Nigeria (FNDP) was rooted in the "neo-classical model of international development."²⁸

According to this model, national development in the world capitalist economy could best be attained through the "stimulation of economic growth and maximum and efficient use of the world's resources."²⁹ In other words, the arguments in favor of this model posit that development could be attained through

²⁷Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Development Plan, 1962-68 (Lagos: Nigerian National Press, Ltd., 1962), 24.

²⁸James Petras, Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 14.

²⁹Ibid.

. . . international trade, unrestricted tariff [and other protectionist measures]. . . [if] each nation should concentrate on producing those products in which it has relative advantage in terms of its national factor endowments. This concentration will serve as engine of growth by allowing underdeveloped economy to overcome the advantages of small domestic markets. The additional income gained from this specialization will permit the purchase of new forms of technology and other material goods needed to stimulate development. In addition, specialization is said to encourage foreign investment, thus bringing additional capital, technology and managerial skills into the economy . . . [it is also recommended that to achieve the above objective] underdeveloped nations producing primary commodities should continue. . . to the level of specialization that international demand will support.³⁰

Hence, since the composition of the FNDP. reflected the latter strategy, it was largely distilled from the neo-classical model of international development. Because of that, we hereby characterize the First National Development Model of Nigeria as basically the neo-classical model of international development. From the preceding analysis, the key issues at this point are (1) What were the objectives of the First National Development Plan (FNDP)? (2) Could this plan enable post-colonial Nigeria to contain and reverse the exploitation of colonial capitalism cum politics of underdevelopment? (3) Could it activate pre-colonial mode of production depressed by forcefully imposed colonial mode of production thereby making independent Nigeria a developing economy it once was? If not, why? These shall be our foci.

An Analysis of the First National Development Plan or Model

What necessitated this model? Ostensibly, the need for planning in post-independent Nigeria grew out of the Africans' dissatisfaction with colonial exploitation. The colonial industrialist siphoned wealth from colonial Nigeria through the colonial industries to invest in the

³⁰Ibid.

industrial development of the mother country. As a consequence, Nigeria, "a potentially rich country,"³¹ was left underdeveloping. She had experienced, for example, balance of payment deficit, massive unemployment, food shortage, high inflation, poor housing, poor infrastructures, incoherent economy, a dependency on foreign capital, and technology. The country had been a rich but poverty-stricken nation whose masses were persistently entertained by economic crises. In view of the said economic osmosis, which Nigeria's colonial status has catalyzed, "its virile population [during the colonial era] has scarcely yet been developed to a degree to alleviate poverty of the bulk of the people."³²

In fact, to the nationalist, there is no reason that the rich natural resources of Nigeria cannot be developed to support and improve the living conditions of the Nigerians. "It is on the basis of this faith that this--the first national six-year plan for economic development--evolved."³³

Goal of the Plan

In the wording of this plan,

The present First National Plan [was] seen as the first in a series which will bring Nigeria to [economic development, or] "take off" stage. This means that within a reasonable period of time, Nigeria should be in a position to generate from a diversified economy, sufficient income and savings of its own to finance a steady rate of growth with no more dependence on external sources for capital

³¹Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Development Plan, 1962-68, 1.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

[Emphasis mine].

and manpower than is usual to obtain through natural incentives of international commerce. This means that it will then be possible to have established at optimum efficiency the institutions . . . and essential industries which will make such growth possible, [and also that] she intends to develop her economy to be less and less dependent upon such external factors of development as foreign private investment, and the sudden changes in the prices of her primary export products. Until this stage is reached, Nigeria will continue to need and indeed welcome foreign capital and skills.³⁴

From the above contradictory articulation which basically is derived from the neo-classical model of international development, we ask: Were the desired objectives of this plan realized? If not, why? In this context, we deem an analysis of the First National Development Plan (FNDP) a priority. We would precisely establish and analyze the plan objective, and simultaneously evaluate the latter to determine its success or failure to meeting its targets within the planned period.

Our intention here is to establish and translate the goals of the FNDP into measurable indicators of objective accomplishment in the real-life of the Nigerian masses. In this regard, our analysis shall be complemented by data that pinpoints the actual performances of the economy within planned epoch (as anticipated by the government).

The Objective of the First National Development (FNDP)

As designed in the planned document, the Balewa government's objective was the following:

. . .to surpass the past growth rate of the economy of 3.9 percent per year compound to achieve a rate of four percent per annum and if possible to increase this rate [and] to develop opportunities in education, health, and employment; and to improve access for all citizens to these opportunities. . .[as well as among other things] to achieve a modernized economy consistent with democratic political and social aspirations of the people. This includes the

³⁴Ibid., 3.

achievement of a more equitable distribution of income both among people and among regions. It includes, more specifically, the creation of more jobs and opportunities in non-agricultural occupations; the provision of advisory and training services to Nigerian businessmen to enable them to compete more effectively at home and abroad [etc.].³⁵

It must be noted that the plan did not appraise the role of existing colonial industries in post-colonial Nigeria to determine whether those industries had any correlations to the underdevelopment crises in Nigerian leadership, and whether or not the plan could fundamentally reactivate pre-colonial mode of production. Such critical issues could enable the government to set new guidelines for the foreign industries still operating during the plan period, as well as the new ones that might come in with a view to minimizing, containing and reversing the centers exploitation.

Second, there has been no appraisal of the role of the colonial superstructure in maintaining the colonial industrial mode of production. Perhaps the plan itself should not have been based on the European experience but rather on the pre-colonial African model. A strategy which evolved developing economies affirmed in our preceding chapters two and three. Had this been done, such appraisal would have been determined just as findings detailed, that (1) the present crisis is an outcropping of that mode of production and development model. Consequently, it would have enabled the leadership to question the possibility of any centerbased development strategy as a viable remedy for developing Nigeria.

³⁵Ibid., 23.

Instead, the latter was spuriously rooted and distilled from the British experience. With this problem in view, we ask: Could this plan live up to its declared objectives? Did it enable Nigeria to overcome her underdevelopment problems, as stated in the plan? It is against these criteria that the plan's effectiveness or success has to be objectively measured and consequently our impending hypothesis is offered or nullified.

Evaluation of the FNDP

In retrospect, our findings reveal that at the end of 1968, when the plan was expected to be concluded, most of the items on its agenda were yet to be accomplished. To be more precise, in 1966, when the Balewa government was ousted in a military coup, most of the items on the agenda had not been implemented. For the implemented part of the program, the desired objective had not really been attained in terms of real development (or containing unemployment, effecting equitable distribution of income et al.).

Albeit the government evaluation of the FNDP (in the Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 (SNDP) document, p. 14) epitomizes that whereas such major projects (essential for a modernized economy and economic "take off") such as:

(a) the Oil Refinery, (b) the Nigerian Security and Minting Plant, (c) the Paper Mill, (d) the Sugar Mill, (e) the Niger Dam, (f) the Niger Bridge, (g) some trunk roads (including Marduguri-Benisheik, Gusausokoto, Bauchi Gombe-Yola, Shagamu-Benin and Kano-zaria Trunk Roads) [and] Ports Extension [were completed], the plan can be judged on a balance to be a success.³⁶

³⁶Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, 14.

Second, according to the government evaluation (SNDP, p. 14), "the behavior of the national economy during the period reflected a good potentiality for expansion greater than the four percent minimum annual growth rate set by the planners."

Third, the government also claimed in the SNDP that new economic institutions such as Nigerian Industrial Development Bank was successfully inaugurated in 1964 to finance industrial development. This move was designed to boost Nigerians' increasing ability to participate in the "industrial ownership, direction and management."

However, although the establishment of the claimed infrastructure is unquestionable, the government's failure to establish how this institution (in concrete terms) enabled Nigeria to develop, i.e., put the real control of the industries under Nigerians, developed Nigerian technologically based industries, increased education and employment opportunities, and effected equitable income distribution, simply amounts to a superficial characterization of the Plan's success. Thus, the plan practically failed to contain the center's domination and exploitation of the economy. In essence, a prototype of colonial economic osmosis was still in motion. Metropolitan industries were still exploiting the economy, and most Nigerians were still unemployed and poverty-stricken. According to pre-colonial experience and even the historical development model of the centers, a viable development strategy evolves out of a society's authentic experience. Thus, a universal development historiography has affirmed the latter as a fact of authentic development. But the plan theoretically and practically negated

the preceding position. Consequently, unemployment was alarmingly on the increase. Economy was underdeveloping.

A critical juxtaposition of the government's objective as stated in the Plan, and the real achievement of the latter further contradicts the administration's claim that the Plan was a success. For instance, the balance of trade was still in adverse state just as before the flag independence. Unemployment was alarmingly on the increase and the economy was still largely dominated and exploited by the foreign firms. In fact, further findings revealed that the "open door policy" espoused by Balewa's government did not end the domination and exploitation of the economy by expatriate firms. It only intensified the economic osmosis from Nigeria to Great Britain as well as aggravated the penury of the Nigerian masses.

In retrospect,

The 1962-68 National Development Plan failed to achieve its economic diversification targets. Consequently, the value added as a percentage of gross output in most industries remain[ed]* remarkably low. Imported raw materials constituted about 45 percent of industrial cost in the country. The problem [was]* even worse in metal production where the value added was as low as seven percent. . . [And]* another [unresolved] problem facing industrial development of Nigeria was the low level of indigenous ownership and control [of industries].*³⁷

Moreover, the growth rate in the GDP was seriously on the decline.

"In fact, between 1962 and 1967, there was hardly any growth in the GDP."³⁸

*Emphasis mine.

³⁷Damachi, Development Paths in Africa and China, 165.

³⁸Ibid.

The plan was also frustrated by implementation problems. Two years after Balewa's administration was ousted, the military government of Ironsi* and Gowon, respectively, could not commit even more than a third of the plan budget to its implementation.

Damachi continues by observing that

The plan made provision for a capital expenditure of U. S. \$270m., roughly 13 percent of public investment for the expansion of trade and industry over the six-year period. By March 1968, when the duration of the plan expired, less than one-third of the amount had in fact been committed.³⁹

In terms of employment, many Nigerians were out of the job market; the "unemployment situation [was] critical. The National Manpower Board estimated that about 2 million persons were unemployed at the end of 1970,"⁴⁰ especially because of the influx of people to the urban areas in search of jobs. From that standpoint, this was a consequence of stressing the modernization of high-tech industries, which are foreign owned and controlled, and the abandonment of the reactivating of indigenous industries in the rural areas.

The plan was functionally a failure, whereas its application failed to contain metropolitan exploitation and resultant politics of underdevelopment by its failure to reactivate the pre-colonial technologies and manifest industries on a national scale. Such reactivation of the industries would have helped arrest labor flow to the urban areas, as more people would have preferred working closer to

*Ironsi was head of the first military government of Nigeria in 1966, while Gowon was head of the second military government from 1966 to July 21, 1975.

³⁹Ibid., 161.

⁴⁰Ibid., 164.

their native villages or towns. It would also have catalyzed indigenous technology and consequently the production of culturally-based products as in the pre-colonial era. Such would have placed Nigeria on a sure path to overcoming underdevelopment problems or regain its pre-colonial capacity to self develop its societies. The latter was rendered dormant or incapacitated and depressed by forced implantation of colonial mode of production on the natives.

Moreover, we find that "the objectives of the industrial development programme [or model] though laudable were not matched with articulated projects and closely defined policies geared toward their achievements."⁴¹

For instance, further documentations reveal that

. . .no well-prepared feasible projects were identified prior to launching the plan. The iron and steel project which was supposed to be the cornerstone of the public industrial sector had not by the end of the plan period (1968) passed beyond the investigation stage.⁴²

Also, the liberal open door policy, in which the government gave mostly foreign investors and entrepreneurs incentives such as: "liberal income tax, and import duty relief, accelerated depreciation allowances, protective duties and import quotas,"⁴³ are not critically examined to determine its timely and strategic consequences on the economy.

⁴¹Ibid., 162.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., 161.

Hence, we further deduce that the absence of such profound critical assessment created loop holes in the economy, whereby the beneficiary expatriate firms steadily amassed profits at the expense of the lawful Nigerian taxpayers. The incentives only fostered metropolitan industries, while simultaneously furthering the dysfunctionality of authentic mode of production.

Fundamentally --

. . . industrialization has long been a key issue for national and anti-colonial movements, the colonies right to manufacture was a factor in the American Revolution and the inability to develop manufacturing industries in colonial and semi-colonial conditions was a growing grievance in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The experience of primary exporters in the depression of the 1930s underlie the need for economic diversification, and by the end of the second world war industrialization had become an important component of developing countries* aspirations.⁴⁴

Consequently, the Belawa administration was under massive pressure to make good the promises of nationalism. A commitment to liberate Nigeria from economic exploitation of the centers, and in that sense give employment hope, at least, to the Nigerian have-nots through rapid industrialization. Thus, "this impetus to industrialize led the government to seek external aid. The apparent success of obtaining foreign aid led to the problem of utilization."⁴⁵ But foreign aid, according

*Developing countries, as used by this author from our viewpoint, is purely symbolic. In this study it is synonymous with underdeveloping countries or states like Nigeria.

⁴⁴Pradip K. Ghosh, Industrialization and Development: A Third World Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 1.

⁴⁵Damachi, Developing Paths in Africa and China, 162.

to Lappe, Collins and Kinley (1980) is an "obstacle" to concrete development, a factor of underdevelopment per se.

This anomaly historically originates from the fact that

each donor country had its own requirements and as a result project documentation had to meet the idiosyncrasies of particular lenders. This called for versatility [or flexibility]* on the part of planning officials and thus accentuated the problems of shortage of skilled manpower.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the aid packages were often "tied to the financing of particular projects in the development plan. These projects were not those to which the government attached a high priority from the point of view of development strategy."⁴⁷ As a result, the Balewa's government was adamant in terms of releasing its limited resources for implementing the latter.

In conjunction with aid was the issue of matching the aid with the local resources. In this context, our findings revealed that

. . .there was the practice of lenders providing aid for foreign exchange component of approved projects, while Nigeria had to provide the local cost component. . .where local resources were fully stretched, it was difficult or virtually impossible to provide the required local cost. This limited the utilization of the foreign exchange component guaranteed.⁴⁸

*Emphasis mine.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

For precise consequences of aid as an obstacle to concrete development, see Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins and David Kinley, Aid as Obstacle (San Francisco, Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980).

Because of the aforementioned handicap, the Balewa's government called for a "more generous local cost finance and program support."⁴⁹ This implied the financing of a fraction of the local cost of the planned project, but it did not solve the problem since the "overall gap" was greater than the foreign exchange.

Second, the Balewa's government also called for "an examination of the development programme as a whole in the light of the resources expected to accrue from all sources, and subsequently deciding on some degree of financial support for the overall program."⁵⁰

The essence of this modification was to increase "both the magnitude and rate of utilization of foreign aid in Nigeria."⁵¹ Unfortunately, though, before this change could be effected, the massive outcry against the administration's failure to achieve economic independence had reached a boiling point. Haunted by fear and in an apparent move to salvage their privileged "juju prestige" in the state, the nationalist politicians started politics of nationalities or tribalism. Just as the destitution and economic insecurity among the urban unemployed Africans in the colonial era catalyzed tribal unions. The penury of the masses generated nepotism and the rebirth of the pre-independent indigenous welfare cleavages in the form of tribalism. This turn of affairs consequently ended prematurely the Balewa's government by a military takeover. Thus, we inferred that colonial

⁴⁹Ibid., 163.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

capitalism catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.

Also what must be deduced here is that the military takeover of the Balewa's government was symptomatic of a failing neo-classical model of international development to resolve the contradictions of a component, the First National Development Plan (FNDP). The latter was theoretically the objective of the first plan which was to increase "the rate of economic growth and the standard of living of the people,"⁵² among other things, has simply not been attained. What this model did was simply generate growth without development in the satellite post-colonial economy. The model simply had no place for the development of the indigenous industries. At best, its incentives component only served as an engine of modernization and growth of the metropolitan industries. Besides, since industrialization in the First Plan was seen as modernization and modification of the existing industries by the application of foreign technology, it ip so facto failed to reactivate technologies or develop indigenous skills essential for sustained developing economy as in the pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa. But, unfortunately, the objective of developing the economy in the First Plan was not attained. It was not attained because the First Development Plan was an extension of the colonial model; for that very fact, it was based on the neo-classical colonial industrialization model. This model essentially was designed and supplanted to

⁵²E. J. Nwosu, Achieving Even Development in Nigeria, Problems and Prospects (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985), 5.

secure the colonies of European powers like Nigeria as markets for European oriented products, as well as sources for vital raw materials, instead of generating the further development and growth of native mode of production.

In Nigeria, the latter was achieved by setting up in the colonial epoch, center-based auxiliary factories to process raw materials for export to Britain for use in the mother factories, whose finished products would then be exported from the center to the colonial markets like Nigeria for sales.

In addition, in Nigeria, some auxiliaries of the center factories were also set up to manufacture (using local productive forces) a prototype of metropolitan products just for sales in Nigeria, but not for export to the metropole. What is important of note here is that the colonial industries were owned and directed by the colonial bourgeoisie. Since they were foreign-owned, the profits from those colonial firms were ploughed back at will to the center for strategic industrial development. For short, under the colonial development strategy, Nigeria was a monopolized economy of the metropole; hence, economic osmosis was the order. Therefore, since the First Development Plan of Nigeria did not change the substructure of the colonial industries or their superstructures and the center continued to drain the resources of post-colonial Nigeria, our findings resolved that the first plan only sustained underdevelopment syndrome. The first plan therefore was a fact of economic inertia and manifested politics of underdevelopment.

The only modification in the post-colonial industrial formation was primarily that the overt presence of Europeans was minimized by the latter's mobilization of Nigerian compradors to function as managers of the colonial firms. Second, the center industrialists in the post-colonial era, in a move designed to maximize their profits as well as to give "independent Nigeria" a false optimism that she is now a manufacturing state, established subsidiaries of mother factors, which could now manufacture in toto European products for sales in Nigeria just to escape the payment of any small tariffs that might have been imposed on imports from the centers.

Thus, at best, the "open door policies" which the Balewa government coined into the indigenization concept of the First Plan only exacerbated the influx of the multinational corporations to exploit Nigeria. Because of the centers' fear of losing their colonial markets, because of intensified nationalism in their colonies or former colonies, worldwide competition for markets and raw materials had intensified. This consequently, as Onimode notes:

. . .compelled MNCs to shelter behind the protective tariff barriers of satellite countries for the development of their subsidiaries as 'tariff factories.' In the process, the MNCs have sought both economic and political control, through co-opting and corrupting willing indigenous comprador bourgeoisie in order to dictate events in their exploitative interest. In Nigeria, since 1960, these mechanisms have been employed to ensure the domination of such critical economic sectors as petroleum, and mining, manufacturing, banking insurance, construction, import-export trade, transport and communications as well as agriculture. Exploitation of these sectors by MNCs is based either on full foreign proprietorship or on joint venture, with private indigenous capitalist or with the government.⁵³

⁵³Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 141-142.

Hence, the latter further affirmed that colonial capitalism fostered politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria. Therefore, under the First National Development Plan, Nigeria remained locked in underdevelopment problems, just as in the colonial era. Further, a revisit to the post-colonial industrial activities revealed a domination of the economy by evolving metropolitan multinational corporations (MNCs) in conjunction with the colonial industries.

But the influx of the latter (MNCs) essentially has manifested as a capitalist challenge to the hegemony or exploitative monopoly of the latter, which held sway the colonial Nigeria, by aggressively invading the economy and seeking to reduce the benefits enjoyed by the colonial industries in every aspect of Nigeria's post-colonial political economy. In fact, since the implementation of the "open door" aspect of the FNDP according to Nnoli (1981:80), other capitalist centers such as "the U.S.A. and Japan have been seriously challenging British hegemony in this country [Nigeria]* in a framework of multilateral integration of the country into world capitalism." What must be noted here is that, in the face of this challenge or the threat to the future of the colonial industries from the invading MNCs, the colonial industries altered its operational character, and consequently became more institutionalized in Nigeria.

Thus, most of products which used to be shipped to the mother firms as raw materials would now be processed into finished products in Nigeria. Furthermore, most of the managerial staff would now be

*Emphasis mine.

recruited from the indigenous elite to supplement the Europeans in an effort to camouflage the latter's dominant presence in the independent epoch.

This modification in the operational character had actually begun in less than a decade preceding the flag independence when development planning was introduced into Nigeria. It was designed to starve off violent nationalization of the colonial industries in the strategic independent era.

Empirical evidence in Onimode pinpoints that the major agricultural industrial products exported to the mother country (in the colonial era) such as cotton, cocoa, rubber, groundnuts, palm oil, kernel silk and beniseed would now be manufactured into various Eurocentric commodities of trade in Nigeria, in addition to what was already manufactured by the colonial industries--just for local consumption not for export. However, some agri-products needed as raw materials such as cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil, etc. continued to be exported to the center. But these were exported by the Nigerian marketing boards in joint venture with the colonial industries representing that speciality.

In retrospect, the colonial industries continued to proliferate independent Nigerian markets with the consumer goods of the colonial epoch, such as textiles, canned food, cigarettes, soap, margarine as well as plastics and others. Even in the area of capital goods production, productivity was essentially the same and targeted to meet the local demand as well as designed to avoid any mass production that might cause surplus, and consequently loss of profit. Cement and boat

building or small river crafts, for instance, continued as the capital products that the latter produced.

The only products that colonial industries continued to export to the mother country for complete manufacturings were those from extractive industries. This was because the utility of these products, for the most part, were desperately needed in the development of high technological industries. Therefore, minerals like tin, iron ore, gold and petroleum continued to be exported in the independent era. But in the latter, our study asserts is the area in which the colonial industries met with uncompromising or cutthroat competition from MNCs based in other capitalist centers, such as Japan and the U.S.A. The character of outputs and the colonial industries that produced and distributed them remained essentially the same.*

Contingent on the preceding analysis of the functioning of the colonial industries, a major striking issue then becomes, How did the colonial industries' continue their dominance and exploitation in "independent" Nigeria? In this context, the answer subsequent analysis clarifies the issue.

Primarily, the elite Nigerian working class, formed to service the colonial industries and superstructure (in the colonial Nigerian political economy), now evolves as a replica of the colonial bourgeoisie in the post-colonial political economy. This class of Nigerians--very small, percentagewise--now would dominate the state and

*To avoid repetition, which enumeration would cause here, we refer to Chapter IV - Phases and Types of Colonial Industries/Products. For a condensed detail on the latter, read Bade Onimode, 1982, 7881.

promulgate legislations that would affect the post-colonial state. Thus we have the "bourgeoisification" of that fraction of the Nigerian working class elite that were originally "nationalist." Because of the latter's new status as a mechanical replica of the colonial industrialist and colonial government, it essentially functioned as national bourgeoisie. Thus, since the FNDP was not designed to enforce nationalization of the colonial industries but instead to encourage indigenization within the framework of "open door" policy, this national bourgeoisie had practically no control either over the colonial industries or over the destiny of Nigeria as far as containing foreign economic exploitation is concerned. As a consequence, they functioned in practice as compradors in the government and petit bourgeoisie in the private sector. The latter had abandoned their nationalist objective of developing Nigeria, and were now mobilized to boost their economic status to those of the Europeans in the colonial times. This new status and aspirations essentially detached the state leadership from the Nigerian masses. By aligning their aspirations with the centers, the leadership essentially embodied colonial partisan politics for the colonies. The latter was designed to suppress indigenous development. Hence, these findings further affirmed that failure to base the First National Development Plan on authentic pre-colonial culture only exacerbated politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial era. Because of the latter, the leadership simply could not commit itself to containing the exploitation of the economy by foreign industries. Thus, the national bourgeoisie, now in conjunction with foreigners, exploited the economy and the Nigerian masses. For in-

stance, since the employment conditions in post-colonial Nigeria remained basically colonial, only this national bourgeoisie, by their status as replica of the Europeans benefited economically. Otherwise, the income and wages of labor remained essentially colonial.

Simultaneously, the taste of the European life-style by the emergent comprador-bourgeoisie would now evolve a cutthroat politicking in the state. The Nigerian elite now viewed political office as a means to an end, vis a vis their earlier nationalist stand, which to them, the latter was to be an end per se--a vision that after independence, Nigeria would be transformed into an egalitarian state.

In sum, this mechanical Euro-capitalist ethos introduced and catalyzed sectional politics, corruption, nepotism, tribalism and others into post-colonial politics. This further frustrated the development of the state, for the reason that their uncommitment to the welfare of the masses and their preoccupation with personal aggrandizement handicapped their vision to see the need of evaluating the FNDP after its implementation in spite of cries of penury from the masses. The latter appraisal could have determined the causality of crises and could have inspired the drive design an Afrocentric or an authentic development model as a rational solution. But this was paid only passive attention.

Since the underdevelopment problems remained basically what they were before the implementation of the first national development model, or the flag independence, we ultimately validate our second hypothesis. We find more justification in the assertion of the critics of the First Plan that this failure was because Nigeria

. . . still adopted a development strategy which was applicable to Victorian Europe and which is not oriented to the demands of our society. [And] that our insatiable quest for imported products and the resulting need to produce import substitutes have been a direct result of a development strategy which is based on imported technology.⁵⁴

Synthesis of the First National Development Plan (FNDP)

In retrospect, whereas the FNDP failed to resolve incoherence in the substructure, Nigerian economy under the First National Development Plan continued to function as a satellite of the metropole. This in economic terms means that Nigerians did not take over such essential technology that propelled the metropolitan industries.

Because the metropole still controlled the industries, they basically controlled the output, the market and the financial benefits. Hence, there was inadequate finance to "develop opportunities in education, health and employment," as envisioned in the plan objective. Also the second objective, of improving access for all citizens in the envisioned modernizing economy, "consistent with democratic, political, and social aspirations of the people, turned out to be a fantasy; Nigerian businessmen and technologists could not compete successfully with the expatriate firms. Hence, in view of these unaccomplishments, our findings invalidate the governments assertion that the First National Development Plan was a success. Our disagreement stems from the governments distortion of its accomplishment from its stated intentions in the goal of the plan and objective (see pp. 159-162).

In retrospect, judging from the industrialization standpoint, the crises experienced by Nigerians in the colonial era persisted and

⁵⁴Ibid., 8.

stiffened. The economy was still dominated and exploited by European firms. Local technological development was still stultified.

Whereas the economy was still eurocentrically oriented the super-structure that it supported was essentially unauthentic. Thus, the leadership continued to view Nigerian development from the European paradigm or colonial experience. Hence, economic osmosis increased under the FNDP to epidemic proportions.

In the final analysis, since the continuation of colonial philosophy did not bring about real and even development, but instead increased the penury of the Nigerian masses; the colonial philosophy was unquestionably a failure. It was a failure because the contradictions of the colonial capitalism and evolving politics of underdevelopment continued unabated, according to our findings. But will this error be corrected? This would be resolved as we analyze the Second National Development Plan (SNDP) under the military regime of General Yakubu Gowon.

It is in light of the anticipated failures that the military government of Gowon developed the Second National Development Plan. According to our findings --

The Gowon government, which succeeded the Ironsi government, was confronted with four important problems--unemployment, high rate of inflation, how to diversify the economy through industrialization and low level of indigenous ownership and control [of industries].⁵⁵

⁵⁵Damachi, Development Paths in Africa and China, 63-65.

In order "to combat these problems, Gowon government launched the Second National Development Plan, 1970-74."⁵⁶ The latter sought to make Nigeria a "united strong and self-reliant nation; great and dynamic economy; a just and equalitarian society; a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and a free and democratic society [and is a continuation] of the same liberal policies of Balewa."⁵⁷

Because of the above articulation of the plan, we hereby characterize same as: The Second National Development Plan of Nigeria. Here our fundamental question becomes: What were the objectives of this Plan? Could this model enable Nigeria to resolve the rising crises of Balewa's administration, a crises of political underdevelopment of colonial industrialization by containing its manifested crises, or by activating industrial development? This would be analyzed with a view to completely validifying our hypotheses "B" or vice versa. We would precisely seek to determine whether or not the objectives of the Second National Development Plan were realized.

The Objectives of the Second National Development Plan (SNDP)

As worded in the Plan,

What Nigeria lacks most in the past has been a national sense of purpose in economic matters. [Hence] government intervention in economic matters designed primarily to protect and promote the public interest is therefore fully justified. [In this context, the] five principal national objectives are to establish Nigeria firmly as: (a) a united strong and self-reliant nation; (b) a great and dynamic economy; (c) a just and egalitarian society;

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., 165-166.

- (d) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and
- (e) a free and democratic society.⁵⁸

In view of these objectives, the demanding and essential issues become, To what practical extent would this second plan or model contain the astronomical underdevelopment crises left uncontained by the ousted republican government of Balewa? Could this plan ensure political development?

A realization of the said objectives would functionally imply a different planning and implementation philosophy. Hence, the critical issue now becomes, how different is the second plan in terms of its priorities?

Here we find that for the military administration of Gowon

To encourage the employers to continue to play an important role in the Nigerian development process, the government has very liberal investment policies. As previously noted, the Balewa regime extended very favorable investment terms to investors, foreign and indigenous. The Gowon administration is continuing the same, if not more, liberal policies of Balewa.

First, the government has stated unequivocally that it does not intend to nationalize or expropriate foreign or indigenous firm industries. But where nationalization becomes absolutely necessary, the government will enter into negotiations with the company concerned and will pay compensation in accordance with the agreements reached.⁵⁹

It was in the latter light that the federal government set out to implement the Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 1970-74.

⁵⁸Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Economic Development, 1970), 32.

⁵⁹For elaborate analysis of the implementation of this plan, see Chapter 7 of Damachi, Development Plans in Africa and China, 152185.

An Analysis of the Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 1970-74

In retrospect, as reviewed in the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) 1975-80, the federal government, in order that it generated economic development, "earmarked" a capital expenditure program of \$3.192 billion for the Plan period. This amount was to be "distributed between the public and private sectors," with the sole objective of stimulating industrial growth; or the "rise in gross output of the economy from a level of \$3.028 billion in 1969-70 to \$3.987 billion in 1973-74, in real terms." Such investment was designed to spawn a seven percent average growth rate (approximately) during the Plan period.

The intention here (based on the government's neo-classical/ Keynesian orientation) was that with a sustained growth in the economy, the objectives of the Plan would be realized. Thus, efforts and resources were targeted toward industrial modernization in order to promote industrial growth and performances of the dominant industries. But to a large extent, and like the preceding Balewas regime inequitable attention was paid to the reactivation of the pre-colonial mode of production, or the development of native industries, or suppressed by colonialism and its evolving colonial mode of production. The industrial growth anticipated in the Plan merely applied to the increases in the performances of the dominant metropolitan industries at the expense of colonial disarticulated native industries.

Hence, although the "Gross Domestic Product factor cost rose from a level of \$9.442 billion in 1976-77 to \$14.40 billion in 1974-75, indicating an average growth rate of about 8.2 percent per annum,"

(a percentage higher than projected in the Plan) in terms of the Plan's objectives, we ask: To what significant extent did this growth rate been representative of indigenous industries?

According to the government's review of its accomplishments, the following synopsis of accomplishments was attained. In the Eastern states, for instance, most of the farms and plantations abandoned during the Civil War were rehabilitated and brought back into production. Second, the manufacturing industries in war-torn areas, such as cement factories at Nkalagu and Calabar were reactivated; and "extensive expansion of facilities initiated." New ventures, for instance, the establishment of fish trawling and the paint projects, inauguration of Alcohol Factory at Bacita, petrochemical and nitrogenous fertilizer projects under construction were established. Third, more federal secondary schools and colleges of technology and trade centers were established. In mining industrial sector, for instance, "the government established the National Oil Corporation through which it now participates actively in the production sector." The latter was accomplished by acquiring majority equity in the oil industry. The government precisely claimed to have recorded improvements in social and economic infrastructure needed for development. But the token wages increment recommended to the proletariat during the Plan period was considered unwise, and further increases were ordered frozen while import liberalization was ordered.

Therefore, according to governments review --

it can be justifiably claimed that despite the financial and administrative difficulties experienced at the beginning of the Plan period, Plan implementation, however, measured has been reasonably satisfactory (which our findings contradict).

Our findings reveal that Nigeria was far from being a self-reliant nation, as in the objectives of the Plan. The economy was excessively dominated and exploited by metropolitan multinational corporations (MNC) during the Plan period. In the face of this domination, Nigeria was rather backsliding into underdevelopment. Most of the country's industries prospering were controlled or owned by foreigners. This, in essence, pinpoints the fact that the profit made by the industries, in real terms, belonged to foreigners, who, as usual, would plough them back for investment in the centers. Even so, the little wages that were due the Nigerians now were frozen. That meant that the natives would continue (even in post-colonial era) to work for slavery-type wages for the metropolitan industrialist. Therefore, Nigeria was far from being "a great and dynamic economy or a just and egalitarian society;"⁶⁰ where full and equitable opportunities could be realized.

Obviously, the national mood was from massive standpoint tantamount to crises which demanded that the Gowon administration urgently acted to calm the massive fear of a bleaker economy or abdicate. Therefore, faced with the excessiveness of the MNCs created by the "open door" strategy of Balewa and an evolving masses discontent with the continued exploitation of the economy by foreign firms

in 1966, an Expatriate Quota Allocation Board was established and charged with the function of ensuring greater indigenous par-

⁶⁰Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, 32.

participation in the control, development, and management of certain economic resources of the society.⁶¹

Besides the establishment of the above board, another significant strategy to contain the exploitation by the MNC was the promulgation of COMPANIES DECREE⁶² of 1968. The 1968 Companies Decree precisely and expressly demanded that:

. . .every foreign company shall in respect of its operations in Nigeria be deemed to have been incorporated under this decree as a separate entity from the company incorporated outside Nigeria in whose name a place of business in Nigeria was established, and the company so deemed to have been incorporated in Nigeria shall have as part of its name the word 'Nigeria.'⁶³

Among other things, "the 1968 decree forbade the MNC or companies in general to assist any Nigerian to purchase its shares or shares in its holding company.,"⁶⁴ and set a fine of 2,000 Naira or 1,000 pounds for companies and 200 Naira or 100 pounds for individuals who breach the Decree, respectively. Because of the stern language of the latter, the 1968 "decree was widely criticized by transnational corporations in Nigeria and their home governments,"⁶⁵ since they were left with two options:

⁶¹Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," African Affairs 82 (April 1983): 248.

⁶²An order by the military government having the force of the Parliamentary Acts promulgated to enable execution of the affairs of the state in lieu of Parliamentary Acts, which of course were suspended by the military government.

⁶³Decree number 51 of 1968 (Companies Decree, 1968) Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette, No. 70, Vol. 55, 16 October 1968 (Part A), Section 369 (1).

⁶⁴Ibid., Section 35 (1).

⁶⁵Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," African Affairs 82 (April 1983): 249.

Either they had to continue operating in Nigeria, or they had to end their business altogether in the country without being able to repatriate their assets or even to get a Nigerian 'shadow' owner to buy them or manage subsidiary companies as 'caretaker.'⁶⁶

Faced by further serious pressure and criticism leveled especially by the Nigerian business elite against military governments initial, ineffective and go-slow politics, the planners of the Second National Development Plan of 1970-74 adjusted the plan priorities from Nigerianization to indigenization model of the ousted Balewa's government. Thus, the 1970-74 development plan became a composite of indigenization promotion degree model or Nationalization Promotion degree, cum import substitution component added.

But did the said modifications helped contain the exploitation of Nigeria by the MNCs*, activated the development of growth of the indigenous industries as a response to resolve the national crises? And how different was the Nigerian economy from its satellite position of the colonial through the Balewa's first development plan era? To that end, an appraisal of the indigenization model is indispensable.

The Nigerian Indigenization Promotion Decree

The state intervention to regulate the activities of the MNCs using this model grew out of the massive outcry against exploitative effects of the MNCs such as unemployment and inflation. This intervention was done in an effort to attain even development as espoused in the plan. Thus, "the state intervened in the private sector in order to prevent undesirable and continued foreign monopoly

⁶⁶Ibid.

*Multinational Corporations.

of the commanding heights or vital, productive sectors of the countries' economy."⁶⁷ In other words, "indigenization implied the grouping of certain types of business activities and reserving these for exclusive ownership and control by Nigerians."⁶⁸

Under the 1972 decree, "twenty-two small scale enterprises in Schedule 1 were reserved for Nigerians and thirty-three others in Schedule 2 in which Nigerians must have 40% equity participation."⁶⁹ Although the Gowon administration toed the path of indigenization policies of the Balewa government's development model, his swift move, at least theoretically, to aggressively indigenize the economy was seen as a threat to end the exploitation of Nigeria by the MNC and the local compradors.

According to Onimode there was a "loud outcry of foreign enterprises against Nigeria's indigenization of them [since the indigenization promotion decree]* was launched in 1972."⁷⁰ In fact, in support of Onimode's contention above, Teresa Turner articulated that the July 29, 1975 coup d'etat which ousted Gowon administration and

⁶⁷Ibid., 141.

⁶⁸A. E. Ekukinam, Nigeria's Indigenization Policy, Proceedings of the 1974 Symposium organized by Nigerian Economic Society on Indigenization: What Has Been Achieved (The Caxton Press, 1974), 1.

⁶⁹A. Y. Yansane, Decolonization and Dependency: Problems of Development of African Societies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 165.

*Emphasis mine.

⁷⁰Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria (London: Zed Press, 1982), 165.

installed Murtala Mohammed involved the political machinations of multinational oil oligopoly and "led to the events which culminated in the coup."⁷¹ At this juncture, perhaps the urgent striking question becomes, What precisely led to the coup? And of what significance was the coup d'etat to implementing of this indigenization decree model?

In retrospect, it was Gowon's move which evolved into tension between collaborators-compradors*--who had been benefiting with their alliance with the MNC and who had favored complacency--and technocrats** in the oil bureaucracy. Consequently, according to Turner:

Since the compradors were alienating middle and military officers by monopolizing, the tension spilled over into the wider context dominated by triangular relationships when technocrats exposed the compradors' nexus with oil companies [because of aggressive attempt to extinguish their essence by the bureaucratic compradors]. In their attempt to cover up this scandal, compradors [who were Gowon's civilian top advisers] like Asiodu, Gowon's right hand man [who]^{***} was subscribing to rhetoric of statism to exclude middlemen and the oil companies, were forced to act arbitrary.⁷²

Most members of the military officers who were excluded from influencing policies formulation and implementation by the administration--which would have established contact between the latter and the MNCs--

⁷¹Teresa Turner, "Multinational Corporation and the Instability of the Nigerian State," Review of African Political Economy, No. 5 (January-April 1976): 71.

*By collaborator-comprador (according to Teresa Turner, p. 66), it is meant corrupt Nigerian officials who work in alliance with "private intermediaries" and the MNCs to exploit the economy and attain personal aggrandizement.

**Technocrats (according to Turner) are those technically skilled professionals who were hired to put into effect the military's new policy of state intervention designed to foster capitalist development.

***Emphasis mine.

⁷²Ibid., 70.

were mobilized to oust Gowon. In fact, the statement by the succeeding Head of State Mohammed that Gowon was ousted because the "affairs of state had become characterized by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect" [and] that Governors had been running their fiefs like private estates is an affirmation of Turner's contention above. Also, it pinpoints the seriousness of the military consideration of being ousted from policy-making and implementation process, while the regime was military.

It is important to note in passing that this marked the origin of the injection of oil into bureaucratic politics in Nigeria. According to our findings, during the first Republican government (1960-65):

. . .politicians took little interest in oil and civil servants remained on the margins of the industry. No policy was initiated. But after January 1966, Shell B.P., responsible for most of the oil production offered the new military regime improved financial terms. Since these oil related matters had to do with funds, they were handled by the ministry of finance, which established a petroleum section and began to initiate the making of oil policy. The oil ministry remained in the background and had even less of a role with the decrease in production during part of the civil war. Abudul Atta, permanent secretary* of the Ministry of Finance, advocated a strong state role in the industry and formed cadres of oil technocrats to realize his nationalist policies.⁷³

Atta also tacitly sold the notion of Nigeria joining Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC) to Gowon in 1971 and worked to establish institutions to handle oil politics and policies, as well as the

*By permanent secretary, it is meant (under the British bureaucratic system or its prototype) the highest-ranking civil servant who remains as chief bureaucrat or head of a ministry or department, as some countries might call it.

⁷³Ibid.

latter's implementation in an effort to curb excessiveness by the petroleum MNCs. Thus, in Turner's view:

. . .the Petroleum Advisory Board (PAB) as a forum for decision-making and the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) to implement the policies in an efficient way administrators in the ministry of mines and power view with alarm the expansion of Ministry of Finance into their sphere of interest, oil companies opposed the interventionist policies of Atta and the technocrats who were concentrated largely in Finance. Nevertheless, Nigeria, in line with OPEC, adopted a program of 'active participation in the oil industry' as part of the 1970-74 Development Plan.⁷⁴

From the 1970s, the leadership and administration in the ministry of mines and power and middlemen were being invaded by oil politics given impetus by the MNCs. In this context lay the reason for Gowon's administration's ouster by Murtala Muhammed. Muhammed had cited Gowon's inability to contain exploitation of Nigeria by the MNCs as a problem that needed to be challenged and resolved. But by 1976, there was no rational departure of significance undertaken by Muhammed until his abrupt death by coup de tat in February 1976, or by the succeeding Obsanjo's administration. Both Muhammed and Obasom regimes had continued along the pathway of Gowon's 1972 indigenization promotion decree model. For instance, based on the latter model:

In 1976, enterprises in Schedule 1 were increased by seventeen, Schedule 2 was increased by nineteen, and indigenous equity participation in them by government agencies or Nigerian citizens was raised by 60 percent. . .[and to]* a new Schedule 3 starting on March 31, 1978, and embracing all other enterprises

⁷⁴Ibid., 165.

*Emphasis mine.

in 1 and 2. These require 40 percent indigenous participation. In addition, the insurance decree No. 30 of 1976 offers majority equity shares in foreign insurance companies to Nigerians.⁷⁵

Other strategies utilized by the Gowon regime to effect the Second National Development Plan or to contain excessive exploitation by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) included a Standard Decree of 1971. This decree was to ensure that MNCs output was of world qualities or standards. Also by 1977, the Price Control Decree Number 1, which was to ensure that MNCs do not charge excessive prices for their products and other enterprises, was enacted. Other administrative regulations such as foreign exchange regulations, labor code, et al. were promulgated in order to regulate the activities of the foreign enterprises. In light of these supposedly efforts to contain evolving crises of colonialism, our striking issue becomes, To what extent did these decrees manifest or insured concrete national development? In this quest, our findings reveal that despite massive quibbles over the critical issue of immediate national economic liberation from an implementation standpoint, the indigenization strategy did not contain the centers exploitation. "Indigenization has been ambivalent, diversionary and ineffectual."⁷⁶ In retrospect, we observe that:

. . .from available statistics, a total of about 950 existing enterprises excluding exemptions were effected by the [1972] Decree 357 of which fell under 100 percent indigenization (Schedule 2). As of June 30, 1975, only 58 percent of Schedule 1 enterprises and 89 percent of Schedule 2 enterprises had provisional compliance. Confirmed cases of compliance after

⁷⁵Yansane, Decolonization and Dependency, 165.

⁷⁶See "Imperialism and Multinational Corporations: A Case Study of Nigeria in Decolonization and Dependency, ed. A. Y. Yansane, 197.

proper inspection numbered only 314 as of June 30, 1975; about 33 percent. The enterprises exempted from the Decree, many of them on questionable grounds numbered 81. Defaulters have up to the time of this [observation in 1976]*, not been brought to book--two years after the original appointed day of March 31, 1974.⁷⁷

Therefore, in absolute terms, while it may not be denied that since independence in 1960 through 1990 (i.e., the period in post-colonial era covered by our study), indigenization strategy or other development models used resulted in an unprecedented growth in the number of native entrepreneurs. Such "growth in number has, however, not resulted in many Nigerians acquiring a meaningful role in the control and management of the 'commanding heights' of the economy."⁷⁸ For two reasons: first, historically according to Girvan:

. . .the workers and state bureaucracy in the periphery [like Nigeria]* deal initially with the managers of the local subsidiaries. But these managers are themselves subject to the authority of the parent corporation. . .The Transnational Corporation (TNC) not only has tremendous resources of finance and technology, it also has an enormous flexibility growing out of the fact that its operations are based on a large number of countries. Such flexibility gives it options to shift accounting profits, and ultimately new investment even existing production facilities from one country to another. Furthermore, the TNC enjoys a close relationship with the government of his home country which means that the center

*Emphasis mine.

⁷⁷Federal Republic of Nigeria, Federal Military Government's View on the Report of the Industrial Enterprises Panel (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1976), 4.

⁷⁸Ogbuagu, "The Nigerian Indigenization Policy," African Affairs 82 (April 1983):

*Emphasis mine.

countries government will bring pressure to bear on the peripheral government in the interest of the firm -- [e.g., ITT and US in Alendes Chile]*⁷⁹

Therefore, because the national development practically further stiffened an institutionalization of exploitative MNCs and Nigeria compradors, we further deduce that it was not authentically indigenized and that failure to indigenize these plans exacerbated underdevelopment politics in Nigeria.

Second, other obstacles cited for the failure of the indigenization model were viz:

The ignorance of a sizable majority with regard to the details of government's indigenization effort, the intentions and the relevant actions to take by interested members of the public who were desirous of availing themselves of the new opportunities for business and industrial ventures; [especially]* information was inadequately transmitted to the mostly half-educated and illiterate businessmen and women who used to dominate or aspire to dominate the private sector. Secondly, there had been low level of patriotism or moral weakness of many Nigerians. This situation resulted in considerable collusion between Nigerians and expatriates in order to avoid compliance with requirements of indigenization. Such unscrupulous Nigerians who violated the decree, or acted as "fronts" or "screens" for expatriate owners of companies [e.g.]* through sales of shares which are merely on paper and not transferable to Nigerians, or appointment of normal managers or directors who have no policy-making functions as a result of unwritten or 'gentleman's agreements' with the real expatriate owners of the company.

--government errors at various stages of the exercise--the early implementation processes were rushed and not preceded by thorough pre-implementation planning--[as well as] inadequate staffing of the board--obstructed its effectiveness and thereby retarding the progress of indigenization efforts.

⁷⁹Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 37.

*Emphasis mine.

--Widespread malpractices and violations of the decree [were]* not corrected or penalized. There were reports of companies remitting false information to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Board [NEPB]** with the assistance of government officials.

--Widespread location of incompetent personnel in many strategic levels of the economy, and the inadequate manpower at the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Board itself, especially at the inspectorate division.

--The final major obstacle as far as the masses are concerned [was]* capital shortage. The commercial houses would lend only to the already rich [a practice predominant among expatriate bankers before the flag independence].* This factor largely accounts for concentration of shares in the hands of a few affluent Nigerians.⁸⁰

In light of the above impediments to the successful implementation of the plan, we think that the indigenization model was a cosmetic solution to the substructural problem of colonial industrialization. Thus, we assert that there can be no complete indigenization or Nigerianization of any foreign industries without a simultaneous control of the technology behind their operations. In fact, it is the monopoly of this technology or its absolute control at the centers that guaranteed the successful domination and exploitation of the Nigerian economy. For one thing, owners of technology all over the world are reluctant to part with their technology because the latter is the causality or essence of their development and growth. And this, history

*Emphasis mine.

**Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board.

*Emphasis mine.

⁸⁰Sandra Akinade, The Challenge of Nigeria's Indigenization (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1982), 90.

affirmed, is made possible because their respective development strategies are based on their national or cultural experiences for the most part.

Other reasons cited for the failure were attributed to the ambiguity in the formulation and operationalization of the key concepts in the model. For instance, Section 23 (1) of the 1977 enterprises promotion decree defined a Nigerian citizen as:

Any person of African descent, not being a citizen of Nigeria, who is a national of any country in Africa which is a member country of the Organization of African Unity and who continues to reside and carry on business in Nigeria, if the country of which he is a national also permits citizens of Nigeria to establish and operate businesses or enterprises on the basis of reciprocity.⁸¹

Because of the ambiguity of the latter, many alien investors simply went into the neighboring African states friendly to Nigeria; these aliens became citizens there and then came back to present their documents to continue business as usual. Therefore to check these abuses, the NEPB* redefined an African to be "any national of any O.A.U. member country. . .that at least one of his parents is of African descent. Naturalized citizens are therefore excluded."⁸²

Again to the latter, we argued that such definitive action is tantamount to chasing a shadow of a criminal instead of the actual criminal per se. The fact of the matter is that whoever originates the development model and evolving technology consequently controls

⁸¹Ibid., 65.

*Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board.

⁸²National Enterprises Promotions Board, Fourth Progress Report on the Implementation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Decree, 1977 (November 1, 1978, February 28, 1979), 14.

the economy. According to history an economy based on a foreign development plan for the most part always remains an underdeveloping satellite of the mother economy. Consequently, such economy has always remained vulnerable to the exploitation by the center. In fact, what made the Nigerian pre-colonial economy a developing one was that the African then utilized his indigenous experiences as facts and factors of his civilization. And thus, controlled the technology that propelled or evolved developing modes of production.

Therefore, in absence of complete practical nationalization of foreign firms, which should mean the control of all their operational tenets, only those industries willing to sell their technologies within a particular timeframe should have been permitted to function as partners in Nigeria. Any refusal to consider such arrangements should have been interpreted as proof of the expatriates' hidden intention to continue to exploit and underdevelop the economy. But this issue was neither articulated nor implemented in the indigenization development model; hence, the latter model failed to contain underdevelopment. What is also significant of this model is that it rendered the already underdeveloping economy to remain vulnerable to overt domination, control and exploitation by foreign monopoly capital - just as it had been in the colonial era. Anticipating imminent failures in the development plan, the Gowon's regime decided to utilize an import substitution model, as a modeled way out. But to what extent is this model authentically Nigerian?

The Import Substitution Model

This model in Nigeria evolved from the "first neo-classical budget" speech of Balewa's government. In that manifesto, Chief Festus Okotie Eboh, the Federal Minister of Finance, stated that "the governments are all resolved to encourage the growth of local industry by providing newly established industries with a degree of protection until they are strong enough to stand on their feet."⁸³

And such was the prevailing strategy which most flag independent states, like Nigeria, considered as an economic option that could catalyze their national development. According to Helen Hughes: "As most developing countries began to break out of their traditional economic productive structures, balance of payments considerations became another strong argument for import-substituting industrialization."⁸⁴

In Nigeria, we also observe that:

. . .tariff policy, which in colonial times was used as an easy source of revenue, became increasingly a two-edged sword for simultaneously protecting infant industries and managing the balance of payments. Tariff policy has been manipulated by successive governments since 1960 to encourage import substitution in manufacturing subsidiaries of many MNCs were established in the country, both for fear of having their products excluded from the large markets by steep custom barrier and for the advantage of exploiting comfortable tariff protection.⁸⁵

Therefore, the period of the establishment of these industries in Nigeria "coincided with the imposition of tariff or increase in

⁸³Chief Festus Okotie Eboh, Federal Government of Nigeria Budget Speech quoted in Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria (London: Zed Press, 1982), 179.

⁸⁴Ghosh, Industrialization and Development, 2.

⁸⁵Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, 180.

tariff."⁸⁶ Now the issue becomes, Did the import substitution model, as strategy of development, help activate industrialization or development to the extent that Nigeria did become, in the words of the plan 'a self-reliant' nation? In this context, our findings revealed the contrary. This model further led to the influx of MNCs into the country. The cumulative impact was that it has only intensified and sustained Nigerian technological inertia, as well as underdevelopment politics. Second, the policy also frustrated whatever African pre-colonial technological resilience was left in the Nigerian nationalism. In sum, import substitution model only aggravated economic crises in the country because as further findings indicate:

The present position of import substitution offers no possibility of transforming the traditional import substitution industries into export industries for high quality and durable consumption and investment goods which would have a change of being saleable on the markets of industrialized countries.⁸⁷

Moreover, contingent on the preceding analysis, our findings reveal that the indigenization and import substitution model has been anathema instead of a panacea it was intended to be. The "Gowon's model" simply intensified further underdevelopment of Nigeria.

The Gowon's model again failed to see Nigerian underdevelopment problems as structural rather than as a functional problem just like the first civilian government. To them, the problem was that of failures of plan implementers whose lack of know-how prevented them from implementing the development strategies. As far as the economy,

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Novebari Barati and F. Sellow, Perspectives of Strategy of Collective Import Substitution (Vierteljahesbeichte, Nr 75, 1979), 80.

GDP and GNP indicators were increasing, the economy was developing. Never did it occur to his administration to question the scientific accuracy of the said indicators from a dialectic and massive national development standpoint.

In this connection, such question arises as, Why does Nigeria's economy grow asymmetrically to the penury of our masses? Such an issue would have pinpointed to them that this was simply growth without development or at best it is simply a consequence of modernization not real and even development. Real improvement should have (a) developed the stultified indigenous industries, (b) indigenous industries replaced the technical, not just the managerial control in the hands of Nigerians, (c) ensured even distribution of income among the proletariat, and consequently enabled all Nigerians to have equitable opportunity to acquire the assets of the expatriate firms, but not just functioning as comprador-bourgeoisie in an independent Nigeria; and (d) ensured the re-development and growth of native productivity for export (if not to the metropole, at least for marketing in the third world, or Africa per se).

Besides the production of indigenous African commodities should be incorporated in any development strategy by the government as a condition for authorizing any light foreign firms wanting to invest in the economy. This in the long run would better the quality of African products in a global market.

Through this strategy, African products would be exported to world markets and the revenue would, for the most part, be retained for further development of the economy. Further, the disarticulated

neo-colonial economy would become a coherent developing Nigerian political economy. But this was not considered in the indigenization or the import substitution model, the latter model being vague in addressing this point.

Thus, in terms of what was produced, Nigeria was still dominated by metropolitan industrial products. At the end of Gowon's administration, these products were still produced by metropolitan industrial capitalist firms. The colonial substructure and evolving bureaucratic leadership simply existed as guardians of the mother country. Moreover, this is yet so because the model of development has remained essentially colonial and metropolitan, unlike the pre-colonial era.

For instance, in terms of income distribution, since there was "lack of income distribution policy. . .[and] any clear cut directives on the spread of ownership"⁸⁸ in the Gowon indigenization model, there was essentially "apparent lack of an equitable distribution of assets"⁸⁹ among all Nigerians. Hence, assets were concentrated in few hands, and the Nigerian masses were locked out of the economic benefits. This pattern further intensified class contradictions, which cut across industrial to bureaucratic agencies. Both within the lower ranks of the military and the proletariat, there was an uneven income distribution, which when viewed in the net, was below the subsistent level vis-a-vis that of the Nigerian elite class.

⁸⁸J. F. Rweyemamu, Industrialization and Income Distribution in Africa (Dakar, Senegal, 1980), 182.

⁸⁹Ibid.

Synthesis of the Second National Development Plan/Model 1970-74

In view of the preceding tenet by the critics of the Gowon administration's development strategies for the fiscal 1970-74, that whereas: (a) the Gowon's open door model allowed for intensification and exploitation of the economy by metropolitan industries; (b) that the Gowon's center evolved model did not address the transfer of the technology that propelled the mother industries in Nigeria to Nigerians, hence the dominant industries were fundamentally still metropolitan; (c) that the Gowon's model, by basing the development strategy on the colonial and metropolitan experience and not a wholistic African or indigenous experience, only intensified the indigenous technological arrest and manifest underdevelopment politics of the colonial era. We assert that the Second National Development model was in praxis a failure and thus an anathema to the Nigerian masses. Such were the circumstances which led to the overthrowing of Gowon in a coup of July 21, 1975 and consequently propelled General Muritala Muhammed to power.

The Muritala government inherited the Third National Development Plan, which was basically an extension of the indigenization policies of Gowon's plan; or a "product of the Gowon's military/bureaucratic machine in government [from July 21, 1975].⁹⁰ The 1975-80 plan stressed business assistant programs for Nigerians. It also emphasized indigenization measures aimed at containing the domineering and exploitative excessiveness of the metropolitan industries and corporations. And whereas the latter was the objective of the Nigerian masses. Its

⁹⁰Ogbuagu, The Nigerian Indigenization Policy, 32.

compromise by the Muritala's military regime would naturally legitimize and popularize the new leadership. Therefore, the Third Plan appeared unquestionable by the new military regime. Only its implementation strategy was considered modifiable to the public. But what significant extent would this modification take place? And how authentic would the modification be? An authentic modification would ensure a revitalization of indigenous industries, whereas it would utilize, to a large extent, the pre-colonial development strategies, which generated developing economies in pre-colonial Nigeria (See Chapter II). As we found out this critical modification was not the intent of Muritala's military government. Our findings indicate that in the understanding of General Muritala's regime, the major obstacle to the national's economic development centered on control of ownership stock of the metropolitan industries and multinationals. Thus, if the ownership of the industries-in terms of stock, at least --could be placed in the hands of Nigerians while under the same indigenization model of Gowon's administration, industrial development would become a reality. Hence, to realize that objective, the Muritala regime promulgated a 1977 indigenization decree. But in reality, the decree was indeed a supplement to the implementation strategy and the objectives of the Third National Development Plan Gowon designed, as articulated below. There was no structural difference because he still relied on the same colonial bureaucracy that legitimized the preceding plans.

Objectives of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) 1970-80

The Five National Objectives of Nigeria, as identified in the Second National Development Plan, are not operational magnitudes

against which the success of a plan can be unambiguously measured. They do, however, provide a broad view of the ultimate aspirations of the society. These national objectives are therefore still valid for the Third Plan. [But] the specific short-term objectives aimed at facilitating the ultimate realization of the Five National Objectives under the Third Plan are as follows: (1) increase in per capita income; (2) more even distribution of income; (3) reduction in the level of unemployment; (4) increase in the supply of high level manpower; (5) diversification of the economy; (6) balance development; and (7) indigenization of economic activity.⁹¹

However, in light of the failures of both the indigenization as well as import substitution strategies of Gowon's administration, General Muhammed's government appointed a panel of inquiry to re-examine the Gowon indigenization model, and secondly, to advise the Federal military government on how best to make the indigenization program effective; as well as to "plan the methodology and mechanics of [executing] meaningful and rapid indigenization scheme."⁹² Based on the panel's recommendations, "the military government in 1977 promulgated another indigenization law which made major revision and extension of the 1972 economic policy."⁹³

Consequently, in 1977 the government received the following guidelines which emphasized the removal of:

. . . a few economic enterprises with an annual turnover of less than 2 million from Schedule 2 (of the original 1972 Decree) to Schedule 1 included wholesale distribution of all locally produced and manufactured goods. Commercial agents or middlemen and

⁹¹Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, Vol. 1 (Lagos: Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development, 1975), 29-30.

⁹²New Nigeria, Kaduna, 14 July 1976.

⁹³Federal Government of Nigeria, Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1977 Supplement to Official Gazette, 64, No. 2, Part A (Lagos: Ministry of Information Planning Division, 1977).

virtually all transportation services in the Schedule 2 were added thirty-three new economic activities such as commercial, merchant and development banks, insurance companies, manufacturers of food, basic iron and steel production and petrochemical industries. The new Schedule 3 included the capital intensive import substitution industries which were exempted in the original 1972 Decree.⁹⁴

But what concrete difference would these guidelines ensure? To determine the latter, an analysis of the Third Plan is *sine quo non*.

An Evaluation of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP)

In retrospect, the 1977 Decree raised equity share participation of native Nigerian associations in the productive and commercial sphere of the economy. For instance, "in the Schedule 2 enterprises, there was to be 60 percent Nigerian participation as against 40 percent in the original law [i.e., 1972 Decree]."⁹⁵ Moreover, "the very large commercial intensive industries which came under Schedule 3 were required mandatory to allow 40 percent Nigerian participation."⁹⁶

Majority of Nigerians did not have the resources as well as the privilege to buy the stocks of these foreign firms. As a consequence, income distribution was alarmingly uneven. The latter, in turn, intensified and exacerbated class contradictions between the comprador-bourgeoisie-Nigerians, and the proletariat. There was widespread poverty among the underclass workers, even in the civil service. While few Nigerian elite lived alongside foreign industrialists in wealth, the majority of Nigerians were tied up in poverty. To some members

⁹⁴Ogbuagu, The Nigerian Indigenization Policy, 253.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

of the latter class, the pathway to luxury was therefore through corruption. Consequently, dishonesty pervaded the bureaucracy and the private sector. In spite of the great natural resources of Nigeria, given the said conditions, the Nigerian masses were still locked up in penury. Therefore, so long as the colonial type of exploitation was never contained, the economy was still underdeveloping and incohesive. In sum, the even development hoped for in the 1977 decree only continued the previous strategies that manifest economic despair.

Synthesis of the Third National Development Model

In light of the preceding analysis of the Third National Development strategy, we profoundly support the critics' position and tenet that the Third National (colonial-centric) Development strategy was a failure because: (a) the anticipated objectives of making the economy coherent, controlling the metropolitan industries, even income distribution, reducing unemployment, developing indigenous human resources were not realized for the most part; and (b) the supplanted colonial mode of production and colonial development strategy prevailed.

Thus, since the latter was not Africanized in praxis, the underdevelopment of the indigenous industries and the domination, exploitation of the economy by the metropolitan industries stiffened. As a result, the penury of the Nigerian masses which the previous Balewa and Gowon's regimes set to contain but failed continued unabated. Nigeria was far from being a self-reliant nation.

Therefore the objective of the plan in terms of its realization turned out to be a fantasy. From the preceding synthesis it becomes

clear that the colonial oriented industrialization philosophy is a factor of crises in post-colonial Nigeria. And Nigerians were beginning to be convinced that its continuity will never lead to concrete development and a self-reliant economy.

In light of these failures, the guidelines of the Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP) 1980-85, which for purpose distinction, we hereby characterize as the Neo-classical Model of National Self Reliance, defined and stressed what the true national development should be. It posits as objective thus:

Objective Guideline to the Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP) Strategy (1980-85):

The answer to that question has often been couched in terms of material things rather than people, in terms of creation, rather than evolution. True development must mean the development of man--it is also clear that development does not start with goods the things--it starts with people.⁹⁷

Analysis of the Objective

From this articulation, although this model was an extension of the Third Development Plan, it stressed the Nigerian "man as the chief beneficiary of development efforts. In other words, even development should be related to the development of man, of creating opportunities for everybody, and this should mean people in towns and villages and indeed every corner of the country."⁹⁸

⁹⁷Federal Republic of Nigeria, Guidelines to the Fourth National Development Plan, 1980-85.

⁹⁸Clement Isong, "Spreading the Benefits of Development to All Nigerians" in Achieving Even Development in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, ed. E. I. Nwosu (Lagos: Economic Development Institute, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985), 4.

The point is then even development and self-reliant economy were qualitatively not attained. The achievements of the indigenization model during the Fourth Development Plan were worse, for the mere fact that the state tinted its development strategies with Balewa's prototype "open door policy." In sum, "indigenization failed to meet its primary objective which was to turn over the stipulated foreign ownership, management and control of some industries to local Nigerians."⁹⁹ Thus, in the final analysis, since the post-colonial development models were not scientifically indigenized, the latter continued to manifest as underdevelopment crises. In essence, what these models did was to further mystify the neo-colonialist grip over the economy, while aggravating the contradictions of the colonial industrialization.

Probably, some catastrophic flaw of these development models has been their continued articulation of development as basically growth potential, measured in GDP. This, for a post-colonial state, is deceitful, since in concrete terms, it simply does not mean the development of what has been underdeveloped, but instead modernization of the economy. The fact is that:

. . . various post-independence plans have succeeded in making increases in the national product . . . ; these growth rates exceed what the developed countries attained during their early years of development and indeed the long-term growth rate prevailing in the developed countries now ranges between 2 and 2.5 percent per year, [thus justifying the states claim that] the efforts of Nigerian governments have yielded some fruits.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹Ogbuagu, The Nigerian Indigenization Policy, 265.

¹⁰⁰Isong, "Spreading the Benefits of Development to All Nigerians, 5-7.

While the contrary is the reality, the penury of the Nigerian masses remained at just about the same before the flag independence. Therefore, although "our national income has grown 30 times since 1960, but [in reality] it is far from certain that the quality of life of the ordinary Nigerian gripped as he is in the 'vicious circle of poverty' has improved."¹⁰¹

Because of the articulated failures of the development models, one of Nigeria's leading dailies characterize the development models as "cosmetic exploitations of econometric models loaded with nice theoretical concepts which fail to fulfill the aspirations of the people in terms of need by the programme lapses."¹⁰²

In summation, then, since the post-independent development models, all distilled from the centers capitalist or neo-classical development model, did not reflect the Nigerian historical materialist experience, it simply enhanced the center-periphery relationship in Nigeria. This is why the successive promulgations by the state could not activate development, but only created optimal conditions for continued operation and exploitation of the economy by foreign monopoly capital in Nigeria. One source of the trend observed is as follows:

These laws among other things guaranteed to private investors tax-free holidays, exemption from import duties on machinery and other components, freedom to repatriate capital and profit and a relatively low level of company taxation.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹Ibid., 63.

¹⁰²Editorial Nigerian Statesman, 1 November 1980.

¹⁰³"Nigerian Bourgeoisie," The Review of African Political Economy, No. 13 (May-August 1978): 70.

Given the innumerable exploitation of the post-colonial Nigerian economy by MNCs, it was impossible to develop or industrialize Nigeria under the contemporary development models. Thus Nigerian masses could not reap the cumulative benefit from the vast natural resources with which Nigeria is blessed. Therefore, it is not accidental that after less than ten years of the much-trumpeted Nigerian petroleum boom, the Nigerian economy continued to manifest such underdevelopment crises of solvency, that the state became alarmed. Chased by the fear of massive revolt, the leadership resorted to seek a loan of:

. . .one billion U.S. dollars [for instance]* from their main collaborators in rendering the economy bankrupt. This is, in fact, the ideal situation which western mono-capitalism has placed Nigeria in because the more dependent on them we are for credits to shore up our own pseudo-capitalist economy, the greater their own freedom of action to manipulate and control our whole economy for their own benefit and to our disadvantage.¹⁰⁴

The final issue then becomes, Could bank loans and foreign exchange receipts remedy the Nigerian underdevelopment crises looming looming so impending in the nation? In this context, the reality revealed the paradox, that:

. . .foreign exchange receipts from oil, in particular, increased more than eight-fold between 1972 and 1974 (from N 612 million to N 5057 million resulting in a balance of payment surplus in 1974) foreign exchange expenditures soon caught up and by 1976, Nigeria experienced the first of a series of growing, large balance of payment deficits. Thus, oil did not transform Nigeria and the [structural] constraint on Nigeria economic development continued.¹⁰⁵

*Emphasis mine.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 77. [For an elaborate appraisal of crimes of economic sabotage of chauvinist leadership of post-colonial Nigeria, see Segun Osoba (1978:77) in Review of African Political Economy, No. 13].

¹⁰⁵Schatz, "The Nigerian Economy Since the Great Oil Price," 33.

As a consequence, Nigeria, in the words of Buhari, who took over from Shagari in coup d'etat at the dawn of 1983, "Nigeria [remained] a debtor and beggar nation."¹⁰⁶

In sum by 1983, the economy was experiencing a serious balance of trade deficit. The indigenization decree, characterized as NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES PROMOTION ACT of 1977, has not generated and sustained even development and growth. The latter Act was designed and implemented by the military oligopoly with the objective of placing most industrial control with the Nigerians. This was to be obtained by carving out certain industrial sectors as vide our Table 4.1 for Nigerians only, in order to ensure economic development. Industrial control, history asserted, is synonymous with technological control. But according to our findings, the technologies and essential expertise that Table 4.1 industries were founded, were for the most part, metropolitan. And whereas the technological control of the industrial sector, history has affirmed, means actual ownership, we infer that Nigerians were merely employees but not their essential owners. As Ankie Hoogvelt observed, "the indigenization model has been effective mainly as a device for harmonizing foreign interest with small class of indigenous entrepreneurs means"¹⁰⁷ --the compradors* but what was the impact?

¹⁰⁶Revolutionary Worker, 13 January 1984, 9.

¹⁰⁷Ankie Hoogvelt, "Indigenization and Foreign Capital: Industrialization in Nigeria," Review of African Political Economy, No. 14 (Jan-Apr 1979), 67.

*Comprador is a Portuguese concept designating those citizens organizing foreign traders access to local markets, according to Teresa Turner (1976:65), Review of African Political Economy, No. 5, 1976.

Foreign firms in Table 3.2, we found, were still exploiting the economy. Their exploitation was aggravated by the technological control and regulation of these industries. Thus, the indigenization decree failed to reverse the exploitation of colonial capitalism as other preceding center oriented plans.

In practice:

The implementation of these decrees has left much to be desired. The indigenization decrees have created a few Nigerian merchant capitalists and worsened the distortion of income distribution. Throughout most of this period was an ever increasing and largely unsatiated consumer of scarce economic resources, and it contributed little of its return to the economy in terms of productive services.¹⁰⁸

Consequently, by 1983, Nigeria's "foreign debt added up to \$14 billion, making Nigeria the largest debtor nation in all of Africa. Every measure taken to alleviate it only intensified it."¹⁰⁹ The latter had been echoed by General Buhari's military leadership as the *raison d'etre* for their seizing the leadership from a republican government of President Shagari. The Shagari's government had continued on development strategies of his predecessors. Hence, his leadership could not resolve an evolving crisis of colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment. As the only viable option, his government perceived to seek development aids from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The latter traditionally insisted that the beggar government undertake austerity measures, such as cutting all other government

¹⁰⁸Akin Iwayemi, "The Military and The Economy" in *Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-79*. ed. Oyeleye Oyediran (New York: MacMillan Publishers, 1984), 47-48.

¹⁰⁹*Revolutionary Worker*, 13 January 1984, 9.

spending and quotas, otherwise there would be no loans or "aids." With no remedy in sight, Shagari complied.

This was the austerity program Shehu Shagari began to unveil before he was overthrown in 1983 by General Buhari in a coup d' etat.

The critical question here is, had the coup failed and the Shagari's government remained in power to implement the austerity program, would he had been successful?

What is historically noteworthy of the austerity model are its center base and manifest "open door" economic strategy. This strategy historically allows for a proliferation of local markets, like Nigeria, with metropolitan industries and commodities, and manifest dominance of the indigenous industries and consequently containment of the development and growth of the beginning of nation state. Thus, Shagari's national development plan failed practically to contain foreign exploitation as anticipated. This led to the ousting of Shagari's government.

With the overthrow of Shagari's leadership came into power General Buhari. The latter's administration positioned to reverse the crises of underdevelopment but its strategy was in essence the development philosophy of the preceding administration. Buhari's leadership again failed to question the causality of failure of the preceding administration's development models. A critical analysis of the latter and a profound juxtaposition with the historical development strategies of the center would have revealed the contrary. It would have compromised the universal development historiographical assertion that

only an authentic indigenous development model could inspire in developing en masse. Moreover, such a critical revisit to historical development models would have affirmed that the golden epoch of Nigeria/Africa was attained when indigenous development strategies were implemented in the pre-colonial era. (See Chapter II).

This lack of revistation into the past failing strategies of his predecessors frustrated Buhari's effort to contain the crises. By the failure of Buhari's neo-classical based development models to contain dominance or excessives of the MNCs, the siphoning of the MNCs surplus value needed for development of industrial projects was continued unabated just as before the flag independence. As a consequence, the Nigerian economy by the dawn of the 1980s was in shambles. As economic crises intensified, Buhari's administration was overthrown and replaced by another military leadership headed by General Babangida.

By 1989, the new leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida opted from indigenization strategy to privatization strategy. To that effect, PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION ACT was promulgated by July 5, 1988. This Act sought to privatize federal government enterprises. This implied that the comprador class in the leadership would be contained.

But the fundamental issue the government failed to resolve was whether or not an objective containment of the compradors would guarantee the control of foreign exploiters and their metropolitan capital. And could the latter be realized under the center-based development plans? In the absence of this critical question and the implementation of the Privatization Act, the government failed again to inspire anticipated development. As a result, the economy at the end of 1990 could

not overcome underdevelopment crises. This prompted the designing of a three year development plan called "Guidelines for the National Rolling Plan" which was scheduled for implementation from 1990-92. This plan was to adjust the economic structure of Nigeria to the point of self-reliance. According to the government:

A major thrust of the structural adjustment program was to put the economy on the part of self-sustaining industrial drive and in the process, de-emphasize the assembly type industries that have been predominant since the attainment of independence . . . in order . . . to mitigating the current high incidence of unemployment, . . . economic recovery and the attainment of self-sustaining growth.¹¹⁰

What is noteworthy here is the government placing the back the economy in the hands of metropolitan capitalists. Historically, insofar as the ownership and control of assembly type industries rested in the center, the circle of colonial exploitation and politics of underdevelopment is bound to be unbroken.

In the final analysis, our study inferred that, Nigeria's underdevelopment crises, such as unemployment, lack of self-sustaining growth, insidious coup d' etats, the post-colonial development models, which are essentially metropolitan, only aggravated the exploitation of colonial capitalism and continued unabated because of continued development planning errors.

These essential errors are summed up by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere thus:

Our most basic errors have resulted from too closely following - or trying to follow - the European models of political, economic,

¹¹⁰Federal Republic of Nigeria, Guidelines for the National Rolling Plan 1990-92.

and administrative organization. Our independence constitutions, based on these of our colonial masters, ignored (and for the most part) were incompatible with our history, our geography, our political realities.¹¹¹

Thus, we resolve a hypothesis that the failure to Africanize the post-colonial development strategies frustrates the resolution of underdevelopment crises or authentic and sustained development in post-colonial Nigeria.

Our position is validated by omni development historiography which asserted that the fundamental fact and factors of sustained development in a society is founded, for the most part, in the authentic indigenous experiences of that society. In the wake of the affirmed failures in development strategies, the colonial substructure and evolving superstructure grows in the reality of deepening underdevelopment crises. Could this deepening crisis and the inability of post-colonial leadership be a consequence of evolving and sustained colonial superstructure by the post-colonial regimes? This would be our focus in our final hypothesis in our next chapter. Our final hypothesis states that the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by "post-independence" regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

¹¹¹African Commentary, May 1990, 4. President Nyerere's address to the Economic Commission for Africa in 1988.

CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF EVOLVING COLONIAL SUPERSTRUCTURE ON POST-INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA

In the preceding chapters, our findings resolved that pre-colonial Nigeria or Africa en masse was an historically, developing or civilizing until the dawning of colonialism. Our Chapter II affirmed that upon colonialism, the colonist mechanically and systematically implanted colonial capitalism in Nigeria by 1861. Consequently, the latter catalyzed to suppress, contain, dominate, disarticulate, transform and integrate a coherent and developing indigenous feudal mode of production (at a potential stage of transition to the indigenous capitalism or socialism) with the center. This unequal integration reduced the developing pre-colonial economy of Nigeria to a mere underdeveloping satellite of the center. Thus, an authentic transformation from the feudal to capitalistic or socialistic economies was stalled.

The latter modes of production, omni development history has affirmed, is the next stage after the feudal mode. Historically, in societies en masse, "there have been five major types of production relationships known to man -- communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism.¹

¹Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (New York: International Publishers, 1981), 13.

Based on our preceding findings in Chapters II and III, pre-colonial Nigeria/Africa did transform on its own through the preceding modes until the pre-capitalist or socialist stage. The pre-capitalist stage or the feudal mode featured flourishing kingdoms, empires and states. This is the epoch that transformation to capitalism or socialism would have been realized in Nigeria, but became stalled by colonialism. Colonialism contained further transformation by imposing colonial capitalism on the indigenous economy.

Based on the preceding facts and caveats, it follows that if pre-colonial Nigeria (or Africa) has been historically and systematically transforming on its own, it primarily would have naturally evolved either indigenous model of capitalism or socialism. Second, it would have developed an indigenous capitalist or socialist relations of production. These relations, history has affirmed, determines a fact and manifest factors of quality capitalism or socialism respectively.

Thus, whereas these social relations historically evolve from the dominant mode of production, it follows that in such a natural development, the evolving superstructure with inherent elite and leadership would have developed the pre-colonial societies into sovereign developing states of Africa. This organic leadership would have been committed to making Nigeria be and become like the centers. Therefore, we deduce that for authentic and even development to be realized, there must be an authentic leadership whose mode of leadership evolves from its indigenous mode of production. Social relations of production

are based on a particular brand or mode of production. For instance, as Eaton's findings indicate:

In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will. These relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development. Of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation on which rise the legal and political superstructures [social institutions]* and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness²

Indigenous developing mode of production would have meant even development. But the latter was stalled by the colonist capitalism. Thus, the colonial capitalism basically catalyzed the process of economic osmosis which drained and underdeveloped the flourishing pre-colonial economy of Nigerians to supplement the magnitude of fundamental capitalist development of the center. Consequently, the indigenous feudal mode of production became disarticulated and unequally integrated as an underdeveloping satellite of the center since the Nigeria's indigenous mode of production, to a large extent, ceased to be. Indigenous substructural and superstructural inertia became a reality.

Hence, at independence in 1960, the post-colonial leadership, itself being an outcropping of nationalism which protested the excessives of colonial capitalism, promised to contain or reverse colonial capitalism. And in its place, the post-independent leadership promised to design and implement strategies which would reactivate

*Emphasis mine.

²John Eaton, Political Economy (New York: International Publishers, 1966), 18.

the stalled indigenous, once developing mode of production. Such strategy claimed would inspire concrete and even development. To that end, the post-colonial governments en masse separately developed strategies which they explained to the masses, would contain the dominancy and exploitation of colonial capitalism. But as our findings in Chapter IV indicated, it failed.

Furthermore, whereas an authentic mode of production, history has affirmed, in any society and even in the centers, is a fact and manifest factors of sustained development and growing economy, it follows that only an indigenous evolved development strategy would have resolved underdevelopment and contain underdevelopment problems in Nigeria. But because the development and implementation of the latter was negated, according to our findings in Chapter IV, underdevelopment abounds in Nigeria. Therefore, the post-colonial development plans continuously failed to reactivate or revitalize the pre-colonial mode of production because they were, to a large extent, based on the center's experience or capitalist development strategy for the colonies. The center's colonial capitalist development strategies were meant to retain and exploit Nigeria as an appendage or dependency of the center.

In retrospect, the center oriented plans did not transform a capitalist dependency of Nigeria into an independent capitalism, capable of competing efficiently and effectively with the center. Such a transformation, history has affirmed, would have been possible had the post-colonial superstructure or social institutions, for the most part, been indigenized. And whereas the economic

structure is a base upon which social institutions and ideas arise -- such as social, academic, and political institutions, and the latter evolves a particular form of consciousness, it follows then that only a concrete indigenization of the colonial substructure and superstructure would contain colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

The preceding findings, deductions and caveats, to this point, which affirm that:

(a) pre-colonial Nigeria experienced and sustained development when its substructure and evolving "societies institutions" were indigenous;

(b) that underdevelopment in contemporary Nigeria is a consequence of restructuring the indigenous substructure and societies institutions into a unique colonial of economy;

(c) that the development strategies or plans designed and utilized by colonial government fundamentally institutionalized colonial capitalism by disarticulating, integrating, dominating and exploiting the developing pre-colonial economies in Nigeria.

(d) that the post-independent development strategies utilized by post-colonial regimes which, to a large extent, were distilled from the colonial and metropolitan development strategies, have significantly failed to contain the center's exploitation and reverse underdevelopment in contemporary Nigeria.

Thus, whereas, the above factors are inherent in the colonial superstructure which has not been indigenized since independence, we conclusively hypothesize -- that the perpetuation of colonial super-

structure by post-colonial regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria. Our hypothesis evolves from a historical position that the pre-colonial substructure of Nigeria manifested essential superstructure from which arose spontaneous leadership, which organized flourishing societies, kingdoms and empire-states until the dawning of colonialism in 1861.

In light of this assertion and caveat, the striking issues become: why and how have Nigeria's post-colonial leadership failed to indigenize the colonial superstructure in spite of the failures of metropolitan-based post-independent strategies to reverse underdevelopment? And, on what basis do we hypothesize that indigenization of colonial superstructure would contain colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in "independent" Nigeria?

A resolution of these issues fundamentally is the resolution of our hypothesis. Consequently, it would suggest a viable and authentic theory for the development and growth of Nigeria. To that aim a reminiscent and epitomization of our preceding findings on pre-colonial and colonial substructure is profound and fundamental. Such a reflection would enable us to assert the historical and essential position of colonial superstructure in a post-colonial state like Nigeria, and most of "independent" Africa. In retrospect, a revisit to historiography of colonial superstructure and findings therefrom resolved that: in a post-colonial state like Nigeria, the evolving superstructure at independence is an outcropping of the mother substructure. Second, whereas historiography of developing economies

en masse, resolved that any superstructure or the societies institutions is a consequence of the mother substructure, it follows that the dominant societies institutions or superstructure in post-independent Nigeria would be a satellite of the mother experience or culture. Thus, whereas a superstructure is a composite of essential societies leadership, it naturally follows that the essential leadership class to be in post-colonial Nigeria has to be an embodiment of the mother culture. Third, whereas the superstructure is a fact of society's genuine cultured personalities and whereas the universal institution that evolves the position, it follows therefore that the institutionalization of the center school satellite was considered sine qua non by the colonial administration.

Moreover, whereas omni historiography affirms that the leadership in any society is a manifestation of the dominant mode of production, by virtue of the fact that they are an outcropping of that society's institutions and culture, it follows therefore that in a colonial setting the native elite are historically an embodiment of the mother culture. Hence, in colonial Nigeria, since the dominant mode of production was colonist capitalism, which our findings have affirmed, post-independent elite in Nigeria, for the most part, personified the mother ethos.

Second, whereas the colonist recognized the above tenet as a fact and evolving factors consolidating their grip over a colony, an establishment of an essential English cultural institutions was a prima facie in colonial Nigeria.

Thus, in the process of institutionalizing colonial capitalism in Nigeria, the British crown systematically replaced and dominated the indigenous societies institutions and culture with the centers. To that end, an establishment of schools was a priority.

Nwafor Orizu recalled --

English schools were established in Nigeria and young boys attended these with one ambition: to learn enough to become clerks and interpreters, or employees of European traders. From these "pinnacles" they thence forward surveyed their ancestral culture with contempt, obeying no laws and observing no rules but the Englishman's. This contempt for cultures and institutions of their own people then became a sign of "education." The educated class became a "new privileged" class - privileged because they felt themselves above the elders, above the Nigerian diet, above the Nigerian attire, above the Nigerian form of marriage, above the people's ceremonies, in fact above Nigeria - [customs and traditions] . . . This class now exploits the masses. It has no use for the poor and underprivileged millions of the country . . . they prefer it [the latter] to returning to a creative aspect of Nigerian life - the reclamation and acceptance of things Nigerian, the construction of new institutions upon the best in the old ways added to new ideas.³

Thus, the post-independence leadership became committed to utilizing the center-based development plan. In order to institutionalize the colonist culture, and thereby effectively sustain the center's capitalism, schools were developed.

These schools would now develop into contemporary academies and manifest superstructures in Nigeria. As articulated by Orizu, the educated class being colonial by orientation has yet to indigenize the colonial superstructure.

In retrospect, findings by Ebitimi Chikwendu reveals that:

³See Nwafor Orizu in Martin Kilson, Independent Africa (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 65-66.

in the waning years of the 1970s because the quality of our current education for the upliftment of our nations and race falls short of our developmental needs . . . our education is directed towards the wrong set of goals; it is focused on the creation of urban-based institutions, oriented towards interaction with western capitalist institutions. The staff of these institutions [for the most part]*, a small but inefficient middle class of local agents are trained along capitalist, liberal-democratic ideological lines to uphold unachievable models of western development. The western model is unachievable because while the west operates capital intensive technology, with the underdeveloped world as the hopeless dumping ground for their contaminated surpluses, we, in Africa are faced with reality of a capital short, labor intensive society with no recourse to captive European market.

Thus, colonial education has grossly failed to civilized authentically post-colonial Nigeria. Colonial "education" has remained relatively conservative and stagnant, geared to the needs and self-image of a restricted elite. Education has lost its dynamic innovative and change-oriented potential. The recipients of such education are incapable of bringing about far reaching social and economic changes because the broader strata of society are denied full participation in a common political system.⁴

In Nigeria and the rest of former British colonies in Africa, such education targeted to create an indigenous elite class to embody and continue the structural functionalism of the center was a common place. In retrospect, our findings revealed that through colonial education:

European-style elites -- discerned among the African [or Nigerian] bourgeoisie. Under colonialism, the Africans were chiefs in the colonial legislative councils, and in the colonial administrative services; lawyers and doctors; judges and magistrates; top civil servants; senior army and police officers. After independence, the old elites remained virtually in tact, and acquired greater strength. The position of members of Parliament, national assemblies, cabinet ministers, top civil servants, senior

*Emphasis mine.

⁴Yolamu Barango, Political Science in Africa (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1985), 38.

army officers and so on were enhanced. They were no longer subordinate to colonial authority. For example, [most]* teachers lawyers and doctors - emerged [as]* the "party nouveaux riches," an elite which developed from among the ranks of the party which successfully won political freedom from the colonial power. . . They exploit their new positions of power and indulge in nepotism and corruption, thereby discrediting the party and helping to pave the way for reactionary coups de e'tat.⁵

Thus, the evolving elite has no need of committing the government to authentic Africanization of the superstructure. A concrete indigenization of the latter would naturally, create by education functional literates and leadership, as in the pre-colonial civilizations, essential or committed to even development of Nigeria/Africa. In fact, our findings in Chapters II and III affirmed the latter.

Pre-colonial African education was relevant to Africans. It had close links with social life. And it was directly connected with the purpose of society. By contrast, colonial education did not grow out of Africa; neither was it designed to promote the most rationale use of material and social resources. It was not an educational system designed to give confidence and pride to young people as members of African societies. Instead colonial schooling was education for subordination, exploitation, the creation of mental confusion and the development of underdevelopment.⁶

Hence, after independence, the evolving elite just exploited the nation as did the colonist. The government development plans are center-oriented as well as the superstructure. In retrospect, after independence, and with the implementation of development plans -- indigenous business enterprise, local budding capitalists, to some extent, acquired new opportunities to the extend their interests.

*Emphasis mine.

⁵Ibid, 33-34.

⁶Ibid, 38.

The African businessman [or elite] is, in general, not so much interested in developing industry as in seeking to enrich himself by speculation, black marketing, corruption and the receipt of commissions from contracts, and by various financial manipulations connected with the receipt of so-called "aid." The African capitalist thus becomes the class ally of the bourgeoisie of the capitalist world.⁷

Thus, because of the latter benefits realized by the post-independent elite, there has been no profound and an authentic Africanization of the essential superstructure. Therefore, the colonial superstructure continues and becomes more institutionalized in colonialist traditions of exploitation. For instance, in Nigeria, the post-colonial "ruling class" owns and controls the means of production by virtue of economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.⁸

In view of our findings, the consequences of unauthentic Africanization of the superstructure become a profound and fundamental issue.

Consequences of Perpetuation of Colonial Superstructure in Post-Independent Nigeria

As we reflect on our current disorders, we are struck forcibly by the omnipresence of those Nigerians conventionally referred to as intellectuals, we are struck not merely by their prominence but alas by their notoriety, by their opportunism, the parochialism, and the negativity of their activity. To those persons who hope that greater diffusion of education will carry with it a greater awareness and civility, the present activity of the most educated elements in society must seem a betrayal of hopes. We are where we are at the moment, because, in large measure, our self-identified leaders of thought have put us there.

Ukpabi Asika 1967

⁷Nkumah, Class Struggle (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 45.

⁸Ralph Milliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1961), 23.

In retrospect, further findings reveal that in post-independent Nigeria or Africa at large, the African elite or:

that rich and politically influential Africans have no nationwide base in production because productive industrial capital remains largely in foreign hands while foreign firms also remain dominant in the market. Hence, self-sustaining economic growth seems remote and the economy is inefficient and deformed, "a kind of drain for the outflow of surpluses."⁹

This drain in our findings is the catalyst of economic osmoses, inherent in colonial capitalism. It manifests politics of underdevelopment in the leadership.

In fact, we find that in Nigeria:

. . .it is this elite bourgeoisie that is subordinated by foreign capital and dependent upon it, yet seeking its own space in typical entrepreneurial fashion, Nigerian compradonism has not prevented the growth of sectors of the [colonial]* economy.¹⁰

Further findings eclipsed any hope of optimism of ending the post-colonial crises insofar as the contemporary academic system remains colonial. In fact, the crises is well positioned by Chief Semeon Adebo, on the occasion of his retirement as chairman of the National Universities Commission. Adebo, succinctly, has this to say:

I don't think what is coming out of our universities is satisfactory at all. They are indolent in public life. They don't think and teach themselves. We are producing intellectual robots.¹¹

⁹Ben Turok, Africa: What Can Be Done? (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1987), 56.

*Emphasis mine.

¹⁰Ibid, 56-57.

¹¹Yusufu Bala Usman, For the Liberation of Nigeria (London: New Beacon Books, Ltd., 1978), 241.

Hence, albeit the post-colonial elite dominantly evolve from Nigerian universities which are colonial and metropolitan oriented and dominated the post-colonial superstructure, they remain essentially cultured in the colonist customs and tradition of exploitation; their nation just like the center. The latter is a fact of politics of underdevelopment since the Nigerian academia is a creation of Britain and had not been indigenized or authentically Africanized since independence in 1960. Thus, the functionalism of the elite is that of robots for the center. A human robot, according to Usman (1978:241) is "somebody whose structure of motivation and thoughts makes him or her incapable of thinking, feeling or extending to the very objectives of his thinking and action and existence."¹²

Therefore crises abound the post-colonial political system today because there is yet to be an authentic Africanization of the academia which produces even in the developing centers, which underdeveloping countries like Nigeria commits to emulate the elite that dominates its national politics. A concrete Africanization of the superstructure would have fundamentally meant a re-establishment of indigenous paradigm and manifest indigenous scientific mode of production, essential for the civilization of post-independent Nigerians. Such was the paradigm in pre-colonial Africa and it is a historical fact of development of the center. But the abandonment or uncommittedness of the post-colonial leadership consequently

¹²Ibid.

breeds, to a large extent, miseducated elite and uncommitted leadership in contemporary Nigeria.

This crisis of miseducation is highlighted by Usman when he says:

Teaching and research in the majority of disciplines in Nigerian universities involve uncritical imbibing of concepts and theories accepted in Britain and America. The notion of economic man, centrality of demand and supply, analysis (party system) believed so unquestionably by many Nigerian economists are only held outside dependencies like Nigeria . . . what you have are backward robots increasingly . . . performing the function set for them by their masters [or the center]*¹³

Hence, there is no marked even development in the post-colonial economy of Nigeria. In every respect it seems the contention of Belgian Lieutenant General Emile Janssons that in Congo "before independence [is same as]* after independence"¹⁴ in Africa is becoming a reality in contemporary Nigeria. And this has remained a reality because the colonist educational system is not as civilizing as the civilizing educational system of pre-colonial era (See Chapters II and III - Colonial Education), but for the most part was a "repressive education" and such is its manifest in post-independent academia of Nigeria.

British colonial education, as Kwame Nkrumah recalls was:

*Emphasis mine.

¹³Ibid., 243.

*Emphasis mine.

¹⁴Henry F. Jackson, From Congo to Soweto, U. S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1982), 27.

. . .formulated and administered by an administration desirous of extending its dominant ideas and thought process to us. We were trained to be inferior copies of Englishmen, caricatures to be laughed at with our pretensions to British bourgeois gentility, our grammatical faultiness and distorted standards betraying us at every turn. . . .we denied knowledge of our African past and informed that we had no present . . .what future could they be for us? We were taught to regard our culture and traditions as barbarous and primitive. Our textbooks were [and are dominantly today]* English textbooks, telling us about English history, English geography, English ways of living, English ideas.¹⁵

Thus, Nigerian/African elite, civil or military remained largely committed to the institutionalization of colonial capitalism. They manifest theories that sustain satellite capitalist growth in Nigeria. Regrettably, further studies affirmed that in reality in Nigeria, although the African bourgeoisie is small numerically and lacks the financial and political strength of its counterparts in highly industrialized countries, it gives the illusion of being economically strong because of its close tie-up. According to Nkrumah:

. . .with foreign finance, capital and business interests. Many members of African bourgeoisie are employed by foreign firms and have, therefore, a direct financial stake in the continuance of the foreign economic exploitation of Africa. Others notably in the civil service, trading and mining firms, the armed forces, the police, and in the professions, are committed to capitalism because of their backgrounds, their western education, their shared experiences and enjoyment of positions of privileges. They are mesmerized by capitalist institutions and organizations. They are the way of life of their old colonial masters and are determined to preserve the status and power inherited from them.¹⁶

Thus, the superstructure remained the same for the most part since independence.

*Emphasis mine.

¹⁵Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 43.

¹⁶Nkrumah, Class Struggle, 12.

Historically, the post-colonial elite and evolving leadership, as depicted by the social functionalism of the various regimes that we analyzed in Chapter IV are evidently self-contradictory. Both the military and the civilian governments seek to retain their compradoral *esprit de corps* and evolving exploitative class relationships with the center, instead of developing authentic development strategies for redevelopment of the society as was the case in the pre-colonial era. Consequently, the military regimes and civil governments became political adversaries and never compatriots. But whereas the military has the "guns," they dictate and contain the civil leadership. In fact:

the occasional creation under military auspices of national "political" parties is evidence, however, that the army is sometimes aware of its quasi isolation from the bulk of the population and seeks the legitimization that might be gained through such structures. On the other hand, fearful that any such "liberalization" might snowball into a demand by their own "parties" that they step down from power, military juntas have seen to it that the political organs created to date have either been paper structures or under their tight control.¹⁷

Thus, the post-colonial leadership simply are non-representative of the masses. They govern without a mandate from the people. Such mandate was a custom and political tradition in pre-colonial societies of Nigeria/Africa. In fact, further findings indicate that:

[in post-colonial] Africa, where economic development is uneven, a wide variety of highly sophisticated political systems were in existence over many centuries before the colonial period began. . . .The political maturity of African masses may, to some extent,

¹⁷Samuel Decalo, Coups and Military Rule in Africa. Studies in Military Style (London: Yale University Press, 1977), 33.

be traced to economic and social patterns of traditional times. . . Chiefs were strictly controlled by counselors [or legitimate representatives of the masses]* and were removable.¹⁸

In retrospect, the contemporary factional leadership and opportunist politics of underdevelopment, uncustomary of pre-colonial Nigeria became the order of colonial epoch. Hence,

at the end of the colonial period, there was. . . a highly developed state machine. . . and a veneer of parliamentary democracy concealing a coercive state run by elite bureaucrats with practically unlimited power. . . There was an intelligentsia, completely indoctrinated with western values. . . professional army and police force with an officer corps largely trained in western military academies; and chieftaincy used to administering at local level on behalf of the colonial government.¹⁹

Today, this colonial-oriented elite, which manifests contemporary leadership continuously serves the metropolitan interest as in the colonial era as compradors. Hence, they have not committed to authentic Africanization of the superstructure. Therefore, whereas the latter remains, to a large extent, westernized (i.e., British bureaucracy persists) this perpetuation of colonial superstructure by post-colonial regimes exacerbates politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, contrary to timely euphoria which successive military regimes, traditionally inculcate in the unpoliticized masses:

military regimes have not proven more than their civilian counterparts and remain tied to the financial apron strings of metropolitan countries and the west creating a neo-colonial relationship.

*Emphasis mine.

¹⁸Nkrumah, Class Struggle, 13.

¹⁹Ibid, 16.

In the final analysis, in military regimes, . . . stability - the ultimate justification for military rule is not a necessity outcome of the replacement of bickering and plotting civilian leaders by a military junta. . . a detailed analysis of features and characteristics of army rule. . . validated by scholars validate a negative image of military elites in office. The specific army faction that initiates the coup, and the officer corps, in general, is neither more cohesive, nationalist, progressive, nor self-denying than the civilian clique being toppled. While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity and good intentions of some military leaders (especially in the earlier phase of coups) their motives for intervention have always been complex and included personal considerations or corporate motives camouflaged. Once in power, military leaders have not been able to resolve the socioeconomic and political issues facing them; many are linked to external factors outside their control.²⁰

Thus, from the preceding analysis, we deduce that whereas the postcolonial leadership is evolving personification of the colonial superstructure, they essentially perpetuate the latter. Consequently, they align themselves to a large extent with the centers to continue, unabated the exploitation of the Nigerian masses. Therefore, albeit the physical presence of the colonist is missing since independence in 1960, the character colonial political economy remains essentially the same. In post-independent economy colonial mode of production becomes fully established or institutionalized. Therefore by mechanical institutionalization of colonial capitalism and evolving British culture as a universal model of development and civility, most educated Nigerians who sought universal recognition as elite, mobilized to embrace colonial philosophy and ethics in their post-colonial status and roles. Through this elite from which evolved most post-colonial leadership, colonial superstructure, such as bureaucracy was sustained and vitalized.

²⁰Samuel Decalo, Coups, 36-37.

Consequently, British ethics was celebrated as a high culture by most elite and leadership. British culture was embraced as a fact of national development and growth worthy of sustenance and emulation. Hence, there was no revolutionary uprising for concrete transformation of the superstructure by the leadership. As a result the colonial status quo was maintained. Through the latter the center continued to control and exploit post-colonial Nigeria.

Thus, Great Britain was able to overcome all serious challenges to its superiority.²¹ The crown's control and exploitation were to Nigeria as the king is to feudalism, the colonial position that some humane British disliked.

Britain's behavior in Nigeria was not different from her imperialism in the 18th century which her foremost political philosopher Burke dreaded in 1793. In revisiting British imperialism, Burke has this to say:

. . .I dread our own power and our ambition. I dread our being too much being dreaded. It is ridiculous to say we are not men, and that as men we shall never wish to aggrandize ourselves, in some way or other. Can we say that even at this very hour we are not invidiously aggrandized? We are already in possession of almost all the commerce of the world. . .absolutely able . . . to hold the commerce of all other nations totally dependent upon our good pleasure.²²

In the ultimate analysis: Great Britain. . . with cultural imperialism. . . won a more complete victory. . . on a more stable ground than any military conqueror or economic master. . . by persuasiveness of a superior culture and a more attractive political philosophy.²³

²¹Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), 163.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid, 61.

In the last analysis, our findings deduced that the perpetuation of colonial superstructure by post-colonial regimes is the fulcrum around which the metropole spins Nigeria in politics of underdevelopment. As a consequence, post-colonial Nigeria, for the most part is still a colonial capitalist satellite. The economic, social and political crises of the colonial era abound the nation as a vicious circle today.

Today, Nnamdi Azikiwe's reflection on the colonial era holds true and prophetic. In the colonial era Zik stated:

Socially, the ogre of social segregation makes it extremely difficult for the colonial to develop his personality to the full. Education. . .is limited to the privileged. Hospitals are not available to the great number of people, but only to a negligible minority. Public services are lacking in many respects. There are not sufficient water supplies, surfaced roads, postal services and communication systems in most communities in Nigeria. The prisons are medieval, the penal code is oppressive and religious freedom is a peace of great price. Economically, the colonial people have been made to appreciate that colonial possessions constitute "underdeveloped estates" specially reserved as a legacy for the exploitation by control. . . .as a dumping ground. . .of the protecting states.²⁴

Thus in light of the preceding findings and evolving caveats, we ultimately resolved our final hypothesis that -- **THE POST-COLONIAL SUPERSTRUCTURE BY POST-COLONIAL LEADERSHIP** has only mechanically institutionized and exacerbates the growth colonial with metropolitan capitalism in post-independent Nigeria.

In the final analysis with the resolution of our final hypothesis, the striking and demanding issue becomes what do we deduce

²⁴Address delivered by Nnamdi Azikiwe at the Plenary session of the British Peace Congress in London, October 23, 1949, Wilfred Cartey, Independent Africa, 1970.

to generalize about the causality of underdevelopment in post-independent Nigeria. To that end a revisitation or the synthesis of our respective hypothesis is highly indispensable.

CONCLUSION AND FUNDAMENTAL REMEDY

HYPOTHESIS REVISITED

In light of underdevelopment crises which have dominated post-colonial Africa at large, and its composite confederate nation, of Nigeria in particular, we decided to revisit a holistic historiography of Africa at large and Nigeria in particular -- pre-colonial and colonial. Our intention here was to determine the causality and character of contemporary underdeveloping economies of "independent Africa." To that end, we tentatively assembled and critically juxtapositioned the historiography of sovereign pre-colonial Africa, and compared it with colonial Africans.

In our critical exploratory analysis we found tentative fact and factors which suggested that **PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA** was civilizing or developing on its own before European adventurism and colonization of the continent, vis-a-vis an imperial implantation of colonial capitalism on indigenous mode of production (see Chapter II). Thus, we tentatively articulated that whereas sovereign Africa was developing until the creation of colonial Africa probably, colonial capitalism is the causality for underdeveloping historically developing pre-colonial Africa. Hence, colonial capitalism probably has correlation to politics of underdevelopment in Africa since emancipation; and whereas Nigeria personifies much of eminent pre-colonial societies and kingdoms such as (a) the Yoriba's whom etimological connection

to pre-colonial star civilization of Egypt, and (b) the Hausas' whose population is widespread in pre-colonial and colonial Africa are historically affirmed, we considered Nigeria as a fundamental case study whose findings would have a profound fundamental and significant impact on African development strategies beyond this century.

In light of the latter, we hypothesized viz: (a) that colonial capitalism catalyzed contradictions of underdevelopment crises in post-colonial Africa; (b) that failure to Africanize the post-colonial development strategies frustrate the resolution of underdevelopment crises, or authentic and sustained development in post-colonial Nigeria; (c) that the perpetuation colonial superstructure by "post-independence regimes catalyzed politics of underdevelopment. And whereas our findings and evolving caveats have affirmed these hypothesis in Chapters II, III and IV respectively, we resolved that colonial capitalism, as personified by Nigeria is the causality of politics of underdevelopment in post-colonial Africa. In light of the latter generalization, the critical and fundamental question becomes, how do we contain these crises? How do we generate political development in Nigeria and post-colonial Africa? What is a viable way out? These issues call for a realistic and scientific strategy which historically did catalyzed authentic development in pre-colonial Nigeria and Africa at large, with a potentiality of accommodating by containment, the contemporary crises in leadership and manifest national instability cum underdevelopment.

Fundamental Remedy

According to history, leadership is a cultural fulcrum around which national fate rotates. Thus, leadership is a manifestation of the dominant societies culture. Therefore a leadership that does not embody the dominant culture of the majority is a pseudo and vicious leadership. A reminiscent to history asserts that effective leadership is a manifestation of the dominant mode of production by virtue of its being an outcropping of the superstructure. Hence, it objectively follows that only an authentic leadership could inspire concrete development. And whereas authentic leadership history has affirmed, are manifestations of indigenous experience or culture that personified by indigenous school systems, we deduce that efficient and effective leadership in Nigeria is contingent for the most part on leadership that embodies, finetunes and executes a holistic indigenous culture. Whereas culture is a historical fact of societies development and transformations, it follows therefore that only a post-colonial leadership rooted in pre-colonial Nigerian culture would inspire, sustain and catalyze political cohesion essential for stable, social political and economic development.

In pre-colonial African kingdoms leadership was mandated by the majority of the society. This is a historical fact in model eminent pre-colonial Egyptian, Nubian, Yoruba, Ife, Hausa states, Mali, Songhay, et al. kingdoms. The monarchy was a collective leadership or a people-oriented authority. Thus, leadership was an organ of the people but never the mind of the people. Hence, authoritarian kingship historically is un-African. Therefore we deduce that indigenous

African leadership was a manifestation of the people. Moreover, today, the process of election of chieftains is in rural Nigeria, where indigenous culture is in tact is very democratic and peaceful. The fact that there has never been factionalism aimed at overthrowing the native leadership, at least at the rate we have coup d' etat in post-colonial regimes in Nigeria is a testament to our assertion. Therefore, since pre-colonial leadership was democratic, and whereas contemporary Nigeria is a composite of varied pre-colonial kingdoms, states and chiefdoms, only an authentic bicameral, democratic federal government would be viable. Only the latter would reconcile the indigenous and colonial mode productions in contemporary Nigeria. The contemporary politics of underdevelopment our study indicates is a consequence of clash of both economic philosophies and systems.

Thus, we recommend that for the containment of factional politics, a bicameral democratic federalism enveloped in Nigeria's dominant indigenous lingua franca must be embraced, legitimized and formalized by subsequent federal governments as a national language. Any foreign language should be systematically phased out in the superstructure to remain a secondary language. The contrary is tantamount to a retention of status quo. By that we mean the vitalization of colonial capitalism with its mechanical life support system that sustained Nigeria as a satellite of Britain. In retrospect, omni history has affirmed that a people's culture could best be preserved as a catalyst of unity and manifest factors of development, only on its etymological foundation, and vice versa.


Penultimately for the containment of politics of underdevelopment subsequent administrations should consider - implementation of our authentic bicameral democratic federalism as shown on the next page (Fig. 5.1). On the preceding page, cum most of **Ancient African Constitutional and Fundamental Rights of the African People** (See Appendix 1) - the people are the first and final source of all power,²⁵ Our bicameralism suggests the retention of eclecticism on authentic indigenous superstructure. The latter guarantees an authentic political separation of powers with systematic checks and balances. For instance, our model suggests that the senate should be a composite of authentic indigenous leadership, and that each member state of the federation should have equal representation and vote on evolving bills, regardless of natural resources or population, while the house of representatives and the presidency should be elitist. In our model the senate must ratify treaties and sanction critical foreign affairs to ensure that indigenous interest is preserved. Additionally, the National High Court should be relatively represented by justices appointed by the president and affirmed by the senate, for a decade, as well as members of the senate on a fifty-fifty basis. In all juris prudence, Ratio Decidendi - the basis of decision,²⁶ in any area of Diversity Jurisdiction,²⁷ common law or

²⁵Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization (Chicago: Third World Press, 1987), 170.

²⁶Harold J. Spaeth, An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision Making (New York: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), 79.

²⁷Ibid, 78.

FIGURE 5.1
NIGERIA BICAMERAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM



KEY:
—— Bills Flow
- - - Ratified Bills

Source: Nsikitima Udoko

As vide our model above based on authentic African high cultures enveloped in a dominant indigenous lingua franca is sine qua non.

international issues should be by simple majority vote. This would ensure the cultural authenticity of indigenous democracy as an Afro-centric fact of Nigeria Republicanism, as a continental model. To that aim, an authentic revolutionary people-oriented, objective leadership committed to revitalization of pre-colonial mode of production as well as concrete indigenization of all aspects of centers mode of production and eclecticism must be a priority. Moreover, most importantly, in order to contain foreign oriented distabilizing political action factions (PAF) in government, aliens campaign contributions should be outlawed, and senate elections should be non-partisan and nationally funded. Only an authentic nonpartisan senate would manifest or culturally united leadership committed to re-development of our underdeveloping mode of production, through a systematic indigenization of school programs as a fact and manifest factors of even development. The contrary is manifest politics of underdevelopment.

The Functionalism of the African House

The fundamental issue now becomes, how would our designed African House function to manifest our recommendation and why? Thus, an explanation of the process of implementing our recommendation becomes indispensable.

The test of science of a basic research effort, history has affirmed, is the measure of positive impact of the researcher's resolve at the implementation stage. Thus, a research finding is characterized as superficial, insignificant and obsolete if the evolving deductions cum recommendations are irreconcilable in praxis.

Hence, scientific generalizations and resultant viable solutions positioned, to a large extent, must manifest positive impact when operationalized. Therefore, it follows naturally that whereas the priority of a basic research, like ours, is a relative, positive transformation of societies (post-colonial Africa) into a harmonizing place to live any impracticability of viable ways out frustrates the preceding objective. Consequently, the problem remains unminimized and astronomical.

Therefore, history resolves that a successful operationalization of a research recommendation is the hallmark of a theory and vice versa. By this very fact, we resolve that if our quest to develop "Afrocentric" theory of development for Nigeria and Africa must materialize, our paradigm must reflect this assertion. The contrary, is an eclipse of Afrocentric theory of development, and manifest Darker Africa. Therefore, whereas our ultimate purpose is to contribute our generalizations toward the formation of Afrocentric theory, a discussion of process of realizing our research recommendation, (as personified by our model), - Nigeria Bicameral Democratic Federalism is sine qua non. Such elaboration could not be out of order, since it would objectively illuminate our position. To that end our graphic presentation depicting the "structural functionalism" of the African House (see Fig. 5.2) is highly indispensable.

In light of Fig. 5.2, the critical fundamental question becomes, why and how would this government or "African House" function to reverse politics of underdevelopment. To this aim, a review of

our deductions in the preceding chapters is quite in order. To a large extent, the resolution of these issues could guarantee the reversal of politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria/Africa. The issues personify the academic crises in our efforts to construct strategies for the development of Africa. This is where scholars and academics on African problems and future differ. This is where we vary. Our variance is born by our findings on an authentic historiography of developments in pre-colonial epoch. This is the era when African mode of production -- was authentic, and never was disharmonized by any colonist. This assertion unquestionably resolved that the causal fact and factors which civilized tribal communities into magnificent kingdoms, empire-states and chiefdoms, such as Nubia, Egypt, Songhay, Mali, Sudan, (Yoruba, Oya, Binin, Housa-states, Ibibio, Ibo of contemporary Nigeria, et al) was authentic cultural harmony.

Authentic cultural harmony, omni historiography of developing societies resolved, is the fulcrum around which developing centers gravitate to sustained development and growth. The latter assertion is sustained by development history of European powers of the centers.

What Must Be Done: An Authentic Operationalization of Our Recommendation

In light of the latter deductions and caveats, the infusion of aboriginal or pre-colonial democratic culture of Nigeria/Africa (see Appendix 1), into the "structural functionalism" of our recommended bicameral federal government -- African House, underscores the validity of our recommendation. And consequently guarantees the containment of politics of underdevelopment.

Thus, the striking questions then become: How could this be realized? What is the possibility of a successful implementation of our recommendation? And what validates our optimism, having in mind the prevalent contending violent factions cum systematic factors such as: "tribalism," religious conflicts, foreign ideologies, colonial-based academic programs, metropolitan economic dominance and Nigeria, colonial-based bureaucracy and compradorism? All which have frustrated a catalization of a concrete and sustained development, as well as an institutionalization of sovereign republican federalism in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa? How do we bridge the gulf in political incohesion that transcends socio-politico, and economic cleavages in the post-colonial regimes in Nigeria/Africa?


In retrospect, deducing from our findings in Chapter IV on the failure of post-colonial development strategies to evolve authentic republicanism in Nigeria. A failure which evolved civil war, and catalyzed factional violence. A profound and fundamental issue becomes how to ensure that African house execution of our recommendation manifest politics of even and sustained development.

A resolution of these issues, in itself is the containment of politics of underdevelopment. To that end a revisit of the basis of power the Nigerian party government is quite in order.

Nigeria's Party Politics

According to K. W. J. Post findings in COLONIAL AFRICA by Cartey and Kilson, the sanctioning of party and party politics by Britain in 1951 evolved around three key nationalist fathers from the three regions which were united into a federation by Britain. In the east

Figure 5.2
 OPERATIONAL MODEL OF NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM



was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, West was Chief Obafemi Awolowo and in the North was Sir Abubaka Tafawa Balewa. Each of these leaders which personified the dominant ethnicities in their respective regions formed and headed a political party. In the east, Dr. Azikiwe led the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (N.C.N.C.). In the west Chief Awolowo headed the Action Group (AG) and in the north, Sir Abubaka led the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC).

What is more, the big three also dominated their intra-regional party politics. Post further found that the:

control regional governments did not give the major parties an opportunity to appoint members of public boards; they were also able to influence the decisions of a number of boards which had very considerable amount of money at their disposal. The marketing boards which came under the control of the regional governments in 1954, had large reserves, the result of their purchase of cash crops from the farmers at a guaranteed price each season, and sold them on the world market at a price which for a number of years was considerably higher than that paid to the farmer.²⁸

Thus, Post's findings resolve that:

business, then, added another dimension to politics in Nigeria in 1959. It created new interest and relationships, new alliances and obligations. It help to bind together the major parties more closely to attract them the support of people who hoped those to advance their business career.²⁹

Hence, the latter evolved into a spoils party system. The leadership of these parties became elitist powers that be in the regional politics. They led their ethnicities to dominate their regional minorities.

²⁸Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, Colonial Africa (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 227.

²⁹Ibid., 235.

What more? It became a tradition for each of these major contending political parties to resent their contemporaries' extension of powers into their regional sphere of dominance of regional politics and governments.

In the assertion of Post:

without going into vexed question of morality, it may be concluded that there was a general failure in Nigeria to distinguish between public, party, and private financial interest. Thus, the former nationalist leaders who professed to liberate Nigeria from British exploitation of the masses would now establish themselves as autocrats in their respective regions as a consequence of these privileged positions.³⁰

From that political pinnacle these three political leaders and their parties vied for control of the remains from colonial economic osmosis. Such was the constellation of political cleavages at independence in 1960. Albeit the three autocrats no longer play an active role since the first republican government, their elite followers in subsequent civil and military regimes still embodied and exercised a prototype of their factionalism.

Consequently, violent factional politics abound and undermined Nigeria's post-colonial regimes. But to what extent is this a violent factionalism which evolved into the Civil War of 1967 a consequence of tribalism as is popularly characterized in the international media? And how would the African House contain it?

In this quest, the African House would enact legislation that would legitimize only a two party political system. In that act, there would be a clause guaranteeing that each of the two parties would

³⁰Ibid.

separately reflect the population ratio of Nigerian ethnicities in their respective party organs. Such entrenchment would basically democratize the electoral process and consequently ensure that all nationalities are truly represented.

Second, the role of all political party organs (PPO) would be limited to politicism and organizing the electorate to embody their respective platforms, while being restricted from raising funds for any political agenda. The federal government through revenue from taxation would fund all federal elections. Through this restriction the influence of the Multinational Corporations (MNC) which were exploitative and metropolitan owned, and only managed by Nigerian compradors would be contained. The latter business influenced as post findings affirmed, is what corrupts, for the most part, the post-colonial leadership.

Third, there would be a clause, making it a priority that before any bill, affecting the external relations or affecting the governmental structure be signed into law before any bill signed into law by the president that deals with intra-African and international relations, or changing the governmental structure, a national referendum would be conducted. Such an act would serve as a check by the masses on the mandate of the legislative assembly. In this capacity, the president would channel that bill to the respective state assemblies. The latter then would, on the nationally fixed date, conduct the referendum. In the pre-colonial ear such referendum was not uncommon. It basically guaranteed against oligarchy, autocracy or any form of absolutism in evolving leadership.

In pre-colonial Nigeria, the leadership was an organ but never the mind of the masses. The contrary had been the case since the colonial era. The colonial leadership and the evolving post-colonial regimes think and claim to know and do it all for the masses. This leadership by their metropolitan elite orientation regarded the masses, as the know nothing, just as the colonial officials viewed the Nigerians.

Through this referendum, the ordinary citizens would have an input into the formation of public policy. Thus, the government would be a true republic in principle and process.

Approval ratio of the referendum would be three-fifths of the electorate, but not the states. This would inspire patriotism as the masses would be voting above their ethnic cleavages, which the states personify.

Fourth, there would be a ban on politicians or their nuclear family members having a foreign bank account or buying foreign stocks. Such would contain conflict of interest which had characterized Nigerians and make them demagogues. The latter had catalyzed political puppet regimes in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.

Fifth, the African Assembly would legislate for the transfer of mother technology with any foreign industries operating in Nigeria for at least a decade. Otherwise, the latter should only sell the products in Nigeria, but not produce it even under patent rights secured by Nigerians after a decade. This would essentially indigenize the metropolitan mode of production. Thus the economic gains would be retained for authentic industrial research and development. This would increase tax base for the federal government, which in turn it

would use to the Aboriginal Research Council (ASRC) [see Fig. 5.2]. The latter would be in charge of authentic scientific research and development of the indigenous mode of production.

Sixth, to contain foreign ideological and religious factionalism, the federal government would nationalize all colleges and universities. The colleges' enrollment would be based on population quota, regardless of the location. This would imply that biological factors, which dominated the university structure, whereby students were attending schools where their aboriginals evolved, would be practically replaced by sociological factors depicting national personalities or character. This genuine composition would minimize and strategically contain ethnic chauvinism, and balkanization of the federation, based on ethnic origin. In post-colonial academia it is not uncommon to find federal government supported institutions lacking in the latter composition. For instance, most colleges in the western region are dominated by the Yorubas, the dominant ethnicity there in the north by the Hausa Fulani, the dominant ethnicity and in the east by the Ibos the dominant nationality.

In this regard a cultural renaissance act would be enacted. There would be a clause illegalizing any establishment of a religious academy. All religions would be taught in the university. This clause would allow for the revitalization of indigenous religious orders which had sustained the golden heritage of Nigeria and Africa in the pre-colonial developing civilizations. These orders were eclipsed and downgraded during the colonist invasions of pre-colonial Africa.

Penultimately, the African Assembly will utilize its revenue to recruit at any affordable cost indigenous scientist abroad, as well as foreign born scientific best into the Aboriginal Scientific Research Council (ASRC). But for the latter academics, they should be made naturalized citizens. The ASRC should be funded enough to enable it to procure dissertations or theses written by Nigerian scholars, to study or analyze them and utilize their academic fundings to development of Afrocentric theories. To that end, a research fund should be provided at a post graduate level by Nigerians for the dissertation acquired, the authors should be fairly compensated. At the present, many profound research findings by Nigerians/Africans never found a way, for the most part, into African development strategies.

Last, a legislation would be promulgated authorizing ministry of internal affairs to indigenized school curriculum. This would entail the stressing of authentic indigenous mode of production in stead of the metropolitan mode. This would inspire nationalism and patriotism and consequently make the subsequent elite in military or civilian be and become authentic personalities of culture, committed to the development of Africa, as in the pre-colonial developing societies.

As a final operational procedure whereas our findings further resolved that concrete positive transformations in Nigeria/Africa came to a halt since the imposition of colonial mode of production, and entailed a planned disharmonization of indigenous culture. And whereas colonialism evolved politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria/

Africa, our study affirmed, it follows naturally then that a steadfast scientific revisit, embodiment and exercise of pre-colonial leadership philosophy (see Appendix 1) is sine qua non. Authentic culture must dominate the African House. To that end, all legislative lingua franca, like Hausa; and in turn further translated into other national languages. Such would politicize the masses and therefore inspire cultural cohesion of the nation. Such cultural harmony being realized, political stability of the pre-colonial era would catalyze political development. Cultural unity, omni history resolved is a fact of sovereignty and manifest factors of development. Therefore, a rejection of a people's aboriginal culture by its leadership, historically, is tantamount to lack of sovereignty per se. Such a leadership and its citizens could not be independent. Politics of underdevelopment becomes obvious and that is a reality in post-colonial Nigeria/Africa.

In spite of this reality, some African scholars, like Davidson, refute any hope in cultural renaissance as a viable remedy for Nigeria and Africa. To him the past is obsolete. It cannot be recalled. The implication here is that we should ignore or get about the pre-colonial culture because we cannot recollect most of it in the least.

To Davidson and Davidsonites we ask: Could a people exist without ancestors? And could societies come to be and become without aborigines? Could there be the present without the past? And the future without the present and the past? We think it is impossible in reality. Aboriginal culture of a people is the seed-plant of a society's development and growth. And that is the universal logic

which Nigeria or Africa cannot be a scientific exception if a people's cultural traits must reflect such traits as indigenous language as a fact of communication and manifest recalling of a people's holistic experience.

Thus, colonial language is a fact of neo-colonialism and underdevelopment. Whereas language is a fact of society's conceptualization of its being and characterization of its nature, **authentic language is a social magnetic looking glass. It is a composite of the do's and don'ts of a people's holistic experience or history.** So far, experience is history, and history is an account of how factions harmonized to improve their conditions of being and becoming. **Language, by that fact is to culture what natural blood vessels are to humanity.** Therefore, authentic language is indispensable of authentic culture. Thus, authentic culture is a natural looking glass. As a looking glass, it reflects instant personality functionalism, and enables societies to comprehend their present nature with a view to adjusting into aboriginal imprint. In light of this caveat, which are deductions from cosmic historiography, we resolved that **language is creation by itself.** Without it no humanity can relate to its kind. And without social communications such a humanity is dead. Whereas death is the end of social communication, it follows naturally then that without a people's language a society is dead. Without indigenous language, Nigeria is dead. **Foreign language is "robotism,"** to borrow a term from Bala Usamn.

Secondly, based on omni historiography, no ethnicity could exist without a historical medium of communicating their experience.

Hence, Africa's nationalities could not be and become without indigenous language. Whereas aboriginal languages are still dominantly spoken, we scientifically invalidate the Davidson's assertion that African past is obsolete as a mythology. Since our proposed African House would function in indigenous language, it will like pre-colonial developing governments, become an arbiter of concrete development in Nigeria/Africa. Therefore, to enforce our recommendation **our proposed democratic Bicameral Federalism** has to have authentic personalities of aboriginal culture at every state. To that aim, our National Security Council (NSC) must be composed of authentic personalities of culture, half from national universities based on academic merit and the remainder from aboriginal leadership, (e.g., kings) from every composite state of the federation and from the federal government. Their roles would be to convey the government's significant intentions to the masses and replay the people's reactions to the government too. Through the National Security Council, Nigeria would become a truly sovereign nation.

The dichotomy in leadership qualities since 1861, when Nigeria was colonized until the present, is that there were culturally programmed to function in the mother's culture, as warrant leadership, according to our findings in Chapter V. To resolve the linguistic issue, the federal government must establish a national language -- in the superstructure and exercise the latter as a sole medium of exercising its sovereignty by systematic scientific indigenization of academic programs.

In retrospect, the National Security Council would be a fact of indigenous democratic federalism in principle and process. To realize that objective the government would be eccentric. It would set up an Aboriginal Scientific Research Council (ASRC) whose objective would be to aggressively seek, attract and naturalize foreign scientists as well as attract and retain Nigerian professionals and scientists abroad, to camp research and reactivate the pre-colonial mode of production, as well as create new technological basis for Nigeria.

Hence, for the containment of colonial capitalism and politics of underdevelopment in Nigeria/Africa aboriginal imprint is the antidote.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1

SOME POLITICAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES OF ANCIENT AFRICAN CONSTITUTION LAW AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE

(Drawn from African Traditional Constitutional and Customary Laws. Different versions and modifications of the same laws occurred in different societies.)

- I. The People are the first and final source of all power.
- II. The rights of the community of people are, and of right ought to be, superior to those of any individual, including Chiefs and Kings (a) The Will of the People is the supreme law; (b) Chiefs and Kings are under the law, not above it.
- III. Kings, Chiefs and Elders are leaders, not rulers. They are the elected representatives of the people and the instruments for executing their will.
- IV. Government and people are one and the same.
- V. The family is recognized as the primary social, judicial, economic and political unity in the society; the family council may function as a court empowered to try all internal (non-serious) matters involving only members of the Extended Family Group.
- VI. The Elder of each Extended Family or Clan is its chosen representative on the Council.
- VII. Decisions in council are made by the Elders. The Chief or King must remain silent. Even when the Council's decision is announced, it is through a Speaker (Linguist). Decrees or laws are issued in the same manner to assure that the voice of the Chief or King is the "voice of the people." (This is an example of a provision that had wide variations.)
- VIII. The land belongs to no one. It is God's gift to mankind for use and as a sacred heritage, transmitted by our forefathers as a bond between the living and the dead, to be held in trust by each generation for the unborn who will follow, and thus to the last generation.

- IX. Each family, therefore, has a right to land, free of charge, sufficient in acreage for its economic well-being; for the right to the opportunity and means to make a living is the right to live.
- (a) The land, accordingly, cannot be sold or given away.
 - (b) The land may be held for life and passed on to the family's heirs, and so on forever.
 - (c) The Chief is the Custodian of all land, the principal duty being to assure fair distribution and actual use.
- X. All moneys, gifts, taxes and other forms of donations to Chief or King still belong to the people for relief or aid to individuals in times of need.
- XI. Every member of the state has the right of appeal from a lower to higher court. (In some states appeals could be taken even from the King's Court to the "Mother of the Nation.")
- (a) The procedure was from the Chief's Village Court to the District Court, to the Provincial Court, to the King's Court.
 - (b) Such appeals were allowed in serious or major crimes only (those affecting the whole society).

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