

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SCIENCE

KHADER, NAIM H. MPA UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 1981

BSC JORDAN UNIVERSITY, 1976

THE IMPACT OF THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING OF 1987-1993 ON THE PEACE

PROCESS: A PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Committee Chair: Dr. Hashim Gibrill

Dissertation dated July 2011

This study has two major objectives. The first is to analyze and to assess the role and the impact of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 on the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The second objective is to set forth the Israeli government's *practices and its policies against the* Palestinians during the uprising. These two objectives were investigated by searching the available literature that is related to the subject matter and by conducting face-to-face and telephone interviews from both sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis. Students, farmers, businessmen, prisoners, teachers, politicians, military and religious leaders were interviewed.

From the findings, many factors worked together and played a significant role in bringing both parties to negotiate peace. Some of these factors, including the Israeli harsh treatment of the Palestinians which brought a wide range of condemnation to Israel by various governments around the world, and the media coverage of the incidents in the Occupied Territories, brought a great deal of support to the Palestinians and their cause, and produced temporary peace between the PLO and Israel. Our investigation and our

analysis showed in detail how both parties to the peace negotiation tried to adjust their position toward each other after forty years of hostility in ways that may help to achieve long-lasting peace in the land of peace.

THE IMPACT OF THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING OF 1987-1993  
ON THE PEACE PROCESS: A PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

NAIM H. KHADER

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JULY 2011

© 2009

NAIM H. KHADER

All Rights Reserved

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Praise be to Allah, who gave me life, patience and guidance to complete this work.

In a special way, I would like to thank Dr. Hashim Gibrill for guiding me through the rugged terrain of this research. Again, thank you Dr. Gibrill for your overwhelming support which is above the call of duty. I am equally thankful for professor Robert B. DeJanes for his kindness to be in my committee replacing Dr. Hamid Tagi. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Fatima Shafi for serving on my committee. A special thanks for the spiritual father of the Political Science Department, Dr. William H. Boone for being in my academic life experience. I would like to thank my brother Ziad, my mother Zainab and my grandmother Saleha for their support. I'm extremely thankful for my friend Mahmud A.W. Alo-Hennawi of Egypt and my friend Lutfi Al-Barghouthi of Palestine by allowing me to be their friend. Finally, I would like to give my thanks to Ms. Dudd Dempsey from Dalton State College for typing this work.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	ii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	1
Hypothesis.....	3
Research Methods.....	4
Theoretical Framework.....	7
Organization of the Study .....	22
The Palestinian’s National Liberation Struggle.....	23
Review of the Literature .....	28
Significance of the Study .....	43
II. FACTORS BEHIND THE UPRISING .....	44
Introduction.....	44
The Hashemites as a Proxy for Israel .....	75
The Israeli Factor .....	76
The Israeli Policy of Antagonism Toward the Palestinians.....	78
The Israeli Land Confiscation Policies .....	82
Israeli Settlement Policies.....	83
Israeli Detention Policy in the Occupied Territories .....	86
Israeli Policies in Torturing and Harassing the Palestinians.....	87
Israeli Economic Policies in the Occupied Territories .....	91
Other Factors.....	93

III.	ISRAEL REACTION TO THE UPRISING.....	100
	Introduction .....	100
	Israeli Defense Forces Shooting Policy .....	104
	Collective Punishment .....	111
	House Demolition .....	111
	Curfew.....	113
	Detention, Deportation and the Treatment of the Prisoners .....	116
	The Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising.....	124
	School Closure .....	127
	Economic Measures.....	128
	Summary .....	132
IV.	The 1987 UPRISING AND THE PEACE PROCESS .....	138
	Introduction.....	138
	The Impact of the 1987 Uprising on Israel .....	139
	The Impact of the 1987 Uprising on the Palestinians .....	152
	The Impact of the 1987 Uprising on the Peace Process .....	160
V.	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	200
	APPENDIX.....	215
	BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	219

---

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Palestine Map After 1948.....2



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Statement of the Problem

In 1948, the Zionist movement succeeded in occupying most of Palestine and in creating the State of Israel.<sup>1</sup> As a result, 750,000 Palestinians became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries. Two major regions of Palestine that remained under Arab control were the eastern sector and the Gaza Strip, with the former being the larger and more populous of the two. In the early 1950s, Jordan annexed the eastern sector, which came to be known as the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian administration. In 1967, Israel invaded these two regions and brought them under its control. (*See Figure 1*).

After twenty years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians felt the heavy burden of the occupation in every aspect of their lives. In 1987, a Palestinian Uprising erupted in the Occupied Territories and continued until Israel and the PLO signed a peace accord in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993. Since this is the period being studied, one is bound to ask some pertinent questions regarding the Palestinian Uprising and its impact on the peace process.

---

<sup>1</sup>See the attached map on the following page. This map adapted from: H.M. Sachar, *A History of Israel* (New York, New York: Knopf, 1981).




Figure 1. Palestine Map After 1948

*The shaded area, Palestinian land occupied by the Jews and now called Israel. The two lighter shaded areas are the West Bank that was given to Jordan and the Gaza Strip that was given to Egypt. Both were occupied by Israel in the 1967 War.*

Questions that are likely to arise include the following: Why did the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories wait twenty years before they started their uprising? To what extent had the Israeli policies affected their decision to stage the uprising? Why did the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) fail to end the uprising? What was the impact of the uprising on Israel's society and political system? What role did the media coverage play in mobilizing people around the world to support the Palestinian cause? How did the uprising force the PLO to change its policies and tactics regarding Israel? And finally, how did the uprising contribute to the creation of an environment in which peace may be achieved?

It is not the intent of this work to chronicle every aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The purpose of this endeavor is to assess the impact of the Palestinian Uprising on the on-again off-again peace process between the PLO and Israel, and to expose the harsh Israeli reprisals against the Palestinians during the Uprising.

### Hypothesis

The relationship between the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 and the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is still a controversial issue. Some believe that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 played a core role in pushing both sides (Israel and the PLO) to first dialogue and subsequently, to negotiate peace. To others, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had nothing to do with the peace talks or the peace process.

I propose two hypothetical statements. First, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had no or little if any impact on the peace process between Israel and the PLO. Second, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987, as defined in this study, significantly impacted the peace process between Israel and the PLO. Data collected for the purpose of this study will test both hypotheses. The null one will be the winner and will be confirmed, and the alternative result will be rejected.

### Research Methods

Both primary and secondary data will be used for the study. Primary sources will include:

1. Official government documents: Government of Israel, the U.S. Government and documents from the Palestine Liberation Organization.
2. The United Nations documents.
3. Official statements and speeches of both Israeli Prime Ministers, Shimon Perez and Itzhak Rabin, partners in the peace process with the PLO.
4. Statements from Palestinian Leaders.
5. Statements from interviews with Palestinians and Israelis living in Israel, the West Bank and the United States.

Secondary sources will include:

1. Published works dealing with the subject matter.
2. Scholarly and journalistic articles.
3. Newspaper reports. In this case, the study quotes from major Israeli newspapers such as *Haaretz*, *Jerusalem Post*, *Yediot Aharonot*, *Davar* and others. My choice of Israeli media is essentially because of their easier access to reported events in the Occupied Territories and Israel. Other data used in this study were obtained through investigating specialist literature produced by many investigatory bodies including the U.N. Commission on Human Rights regarding Israel, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, the Israeli Peace Movements and the Palestinian Human Rights Organization (AL-Haq). Many important materials were available in the library of the Emory University in Atlanta. Also, other data were obtained from the database center at Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Center.

Secondary analysis will be used to evaluate that data which had been collected from various sources. According to Bailey, secondary analysis is the examination of a document or data gathered or authored by another person. The secondary analyst generally has a research goal different from that of the first researcher.<sup>2</sup>

Interviews will be conducted in the process of collecting data for the purpose of this study. Some interviews were conducted through telephone, others through face-to-face, and some others through the email. In general, one question will be asked of the participants: Do you think that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-93 had any impact on the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)? Furthermore, if your answer is yes or no, please substantiate your personal views.

Finally, scholars should maintain high ethical standards in their research by presenting the truth in a scientific manner.

### Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study is based on the frustration-aggression theory, which explains the violent behavior of individuals, groups, and society as a whole. In social science, it is difficult to give a clear-cut explanation or definition to any social phenomena, and this theory is not an exception. In their book, *The Dynamics of Aggression* (1970), Megargee and Hokansons wrote the following:

There are almost as many theories of aggression as there are individuals doing research on it. Partly, because different scholars studied the problem from the viewpoint of different disciplines and research methods vary tremendously. The situation here is similar to the situation of three

---

<sup>2</sup>Kenneth D. Bailey, *Methods of Social Research*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 295.

blind men asked to describe an elephant. Each one touched a part of the elephant. So each one described the part he touched. For this, their description will be different.<sup>3</sup>

In this theory, there are concepts that need to be clarified so the reader will appreciate their contextual meaning. The first concept is “frustration,” which is defined as any event or act of others that prevents an organism from obtaining a goal that is actively being pursued.<sup>4</sup>

According to John Dollard, the second concept “aggression” is defined as an act whose goal-response causes injury to an organism.<sup>5</sup> There are two concepts that are related to aggression. One is “instigation,” which refers to those forces within the individual that motivate, drive, or impel a person towards behaving aggressively. The second concept is “inhibitions,” which refers to those factors in an individual’s personality that oppose the overt expression of aggression.<sup>6</sup>

To further delineate, Megargee and Hokanson wrote the following:

We have to understand that man does not live in a vacuum. His behavior is a function not only of his individual personality traits but also of the situation in which he finds himself. These situational factors may either act to facilitate or to inhibit the expression of aggressive behavior.<sup>7</sup> Also, relative deprivation is an idea first advanced by Aristotle as an explanation of political discontent and revolt. Those who seek to disturb the stability of society, he argues, are not necessarily the poorest and most under-

---

<sup>3</sup>Edwin I. Megargee and Jack E. Hokanson, *The Dynamics of Aggression* (N.Y., N.Y.: Harper and Row Publications, 1970), 1-2.

<sup>4</sup>James T. Tedeschi and Richard B. Felson, *Violence, Aggression and Coercive Action* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1994), 39.

<sup>5</sup>John Dollard, et al, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 11.

<sup>6</sup>Megargee and Hokanson, 2.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 2.

privileged. Any group or social category that feels it is not being given due reward for its status and merits may become discontented.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, Frank W. Bealey wrote the following about political violence:

This can be an all-embracing term as violence is ubiquitous, but it is usual to use it only to mean domestic political violence to exclude 'state violence,' violence committed by the state against its citizens, and also repression without physical harm often called 'structural violence.' Hence, political violence means rebellion, rioting, looting, sabotage, terrorism and physical conflicts between groups. This last includes communal violence, usually between different ethnic and/or religious groups which, at its worst, can descend into civil war and massacres. Statistics show that the worst examples have been in Africa and Asia and coincide frequently with autocratic rule. Internal extremes of wealth and poverty are often associated with political violence, especially where economical difference is linked to ethnic difference. Violent groups also seem to emerge in countries which have lost wars so that a decline in national self-esteem may provoke political violence.<sup>9</sup>

The third concept is "relative deprivation," which can be defined as a perceived discrepancy between one's hopes and one's reality. Increasing relative deprivation leads to more frustration, more frustration leads to more anger, and more anger leads to more violence.<sup>10</sup>

The fourth concept is "political instability," and the definition used in this study limits its meaning to aggressive, politically relevant behavior. It is specifically defined as the degree or the amount of aggression directed by individuals or groups within the

---

<sup>8</sup>Frank Bealey, *Dictionary of Political Science* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1999), 284.

<sup>9</sup>Frank W. Bealey, 260.

<sup>10</sup>Steven E. Barkan and Lynne L. Snowden, *Collective Violence* (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 18.

political system, against other groups or against the complex of officeholders and individuals and the groups associated with them.<sup>11</sup>

It is not the purpose of this section to give a complete historical account of the development of frustration-aggression theory; this would require an independent volume. The basic processes postulated in frustration-aggression theory can be stated very simply. Frustration produces aggressive energy, which activates aggressive behavior.<sup>12</sup> In order to say that frustration exists, one must be able to specify two things: (1) that the organism could have been expected to perform certain acts and (2) that these acts have been prevented from occurring.<sup>13</sup>

The frustration-aggression hypothesis presented aggression as a natural and inevitable consequence of frustration. In later modifications of the hypothesis, aggression was regarded as a natural, but not inevitable, consequence of frustration, since nonaggressive responses to frustration could be learned. Nevertheless, aggression was still considered the naturally dominant response to frustration, and nonaggressive response was likely to occur only if aggressive responses had previously met with no reward or with punishment.<sup>14</sup> In addition, frustration may lead to other models of behavior, such as constructive solutions to problems. Furthermore, aggression is not likely to occur if aggressive behavior is inhibited through devices associated with the

---

<sup>11</sup>Megargee and Hokanson, 23.

<sup>12</sup>Tedeschi and Felson, 39.

<sup>13</sup>John Dollard and Others, 7.

<sup>14</sup>Megargee and Hokanson, 35.



notion of punishment. Aggression may also be displaced onto objects other than those perceived as frustration agents.<sup>15</sup>

In applying the frustration-aggression framework to the political sphere, the concept of punishment may be identified with the notion of the coerciveness of political regimes. Also, the constructive solution of problems is related to the political as well as to the administrative, entrepreneurial and other factors within the political environment. The notion of displacement may furthermore be associated with the occurrence of scapegoating against minority groups or with aggression in the international sphere, or with individual behaviors.<sup>16</sup>

John Dollard and others, in their book, *Frustration and Aggression* (1939), stated the following about Germany:

They were defeated in the War itself after an exhausting effort. They lost the "place in the sun" for which they had fought and their national prestige suffered a staggering blow. At Versailles and thereafter they had to admit defeat and the hopelessness of further aggression toward the conquerors; they were compelled to relinquish their colonies and additional territory. Their navy was confiscated, their army was reduced to one adequate only for internal policing, and in almost every way they were made to feel a third-rate power. Nor can it be forgotten that millions of people were partially starved during the war and that large number of Germans had to abandon military careers. Economically, too, the country remained frustrated. The inflation of German currency brought loss and misery to the middle class and interfered with the plans of all others who were attempting to achieve personal security through saving. As a result of these conditions almost every German experienced and resented at least some of these various frustrations personally. It is clear that aggression would increase and would be expressed in one form or another. Direct aggression toward the Allies was not possible; such a response had already failed and had been punished in part by new frustration. For that, this

---

<sup>15</sup>Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," (Public Affairs Institute, San Diego State College, January 1965), in Megargee and Hokanson, 214.

<sup>16</sup>Feierabend and Feierabend, in Megargee and Hokanson, 215.

aggression had to be displaced. It was easy, consequently, for Nazi propagandists to suggest that Jews and Jews alone were economic rivals. The presence of a number of foreign Jews, especially from Poland, and of other Jews who had not been completely acculturated was used as evidence of a cultural threat. German persecution of the Jews, in short, is aggression that has been displaced from the agents really responsible for the frustration.<sup>17</sup>

It is clear that Post-World War I Germans were faced with conditions which interfered with a variety of strongly instigated goal responses. They were defeated in the war itself after an exhausting effort. They lost their “place in the sun” for which they had fought, and their national prestige suffered a staggering blow. Frustration remained and increased the strength of instigation to aggression. As the Germans began to appreciate their humiliating position in the eyes of the world and as the economic life of the country declined, this aggression had to be displaced. Hitler’s movement (National Socialist German Workers) was overtly aggressive toward the republic, which had not prevented what was considered antisocial aggression; toward Russia, which symbolized the rise of a proletarian state internationally; toward the Treaty of Versailles and the European order that it had established; and toward an internal scapegoat group, the Jews.<sup>18</sup> This is just one example of what can occur as a result of unbridled manifestations of frustration and aggression.

From the brief discussion of the frustration-aggression theory and its related concepts, one can see that it is the best choice for this study, because it can offer a good

---

<sup>17</sup>John Dollard, et al, 153-155.

<sup>18</sup>John Dollard, et al, 154.

explanation for Palestinian behavior and their actions in the Occupied Territories against Israeli oppression and mistreatment.

From this theory, one can also infer that the Palestinians had no control over some aspects of their daily life, which could be interrupted by the Israelis at any given time without prior notice. Michael Adams described the situation in the Occupied Territories (OT's) as follows:

Indeed, the level of repression in the OT's was at its highest level for many years. A record number of Palestinians had been "administratively" detained (i.e., without trial) during 1987, and deportations, house demolitions, and other repressive measures were beginning to take their toll on the Palestinians' collective patience.<sup>19</sup>

Mariam Ward, in her article, "Another Perspective on Middle East Peace,"

(1995), described the Palestinians' life in the OT's as follows:

Palestinians may not build homes on their own land without a permit, and it is rarely given. When their children marry and build an addition to their home, Israelis demolish it. There are midnight raids at homes, arrests and detention without charges, and curfews imposed on entire villages.<sup>20</sup>

Emile Nakhleh, a Palestinian-American scholar who had visited the area a few months earlier added, "Gaza resembles a pressure cooker ready to explode" and advanced a very revealing and astute observation:

In this forgotten corner of Palestine, one witnesses overcrowding, poverty, hatred, anger, frustration, drugs and crime. The Palestinian population is daily becoming more resentful and rebellious. The military occupation responds by becoming more insecure and oppressive.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup>Michael Adams, "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1967-1988." *The Middle East and North Africa*, 1989, 35<sup>th</sup> ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 57.

<sup>20</sup>Mariam Ward, "Another Perspective on Middle East Peace," *America*, 173, no. 1 (1995): 8.

<sup>21</sup>Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 682.

In an interview by the Israeli Radio's English language service in December 10, 1987, Rasghad Al-Shawa, former mayor of Gaza and a highly respected Palestinian politician, described the situation in the Occupied Territories as follows:

One should expect such things (the Uprising) after twenty years of miserable occupation. The people have lost hope. They are absolutely frustrated. They don't know what to do. They have taken the line of fundamentalists, being the last resort they can take up. They have lost hope that Israel will ever give them their rights. They feel that the Arab countries are unable to accomplish anything. They feel that the PLO, which they regarded as their representative, has failed to accomplish anything.<sup>22</sup>

Some described the situation and the Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories as follows:

Books by the thousands were banned. The colors of the Palestinian flag were outlawed; even the word "Palestine" could earn its user a jail sentence. To plant a tree you required a permit. To hold a meeting required a permit. Entry and exit required a permit. To dig a well required a permit . . . one that was never given.<sup>23</sup>

Israel Shahak, one of the well-respected scholars in the field of political science in Israel, saw how the occupation affected the Palestinians and tells an illustrative story about the "Confiscated Cake." Shahak related:

When a new house was finished in the town of El-Bireh, a big cake was ordered for the celebration party. The military governor had heard that this cake was coated with icing in the four colors (the colors of the Palestinian flag). He sent an officer to the party and the cake was solemnly confiscated.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>Aryeh Shalev, "The Intifada: Causes and Effects," *Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem, 1991), 13.

<sup>23</sup>Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, *Intifada: Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South Press, 1989), 7.

A Palestinian graduate student from the Territories described the miserable situation in the Occupied Territories as follows:

“The Revolt” is a result of the ceaseless harassment and humiliation. It makes no sense to shoot at young people who are throwing stones. It is senseless to order armed soldiers to face population . . . Our life here has become an indescribable nightmare. The prisons are crowded with humiliated detainees. Who hears about them? Where is the coexistence they are talking about?<sup>25</sup>

Hadly Cantril, in his book, *The Psychology of Social Movement* (1994), wrote the following:

When institutions and social values are disturbed, it means the people are disturbed. And the people are disturbed. They are anxious to regain mental stability. The easiest and most usual way to accomplish this is to look for a leader, identify oneself with him, transfer one’s troubles to him, and believe that he can always cope with things, that he always has another trick up his sleeve, that he can safely protect one against external danger.<sup>26</sup>

I will investigate whether Cantril’s conclusion is valid based on my analysis.

Ted Robert Gurr, in his book, *Why Men Rebel* (1970), wrote the ensuing words:

The potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents among members of the society. The potential for political violence is a function of the degree to which such discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup>Israel Shahak, “Palestinian Life Under Israeli Apartheid,” *Race and Class* 30, no. 1 (1988): 1-12.

<sup>25</sup>David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989), 106.

<sup>26</sup>Hadly Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movement* (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994), 234.

<sup>27</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 8.

To Gurr, the basic frustration-aggression proposition is that the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration.<sup>28</sup> Also, intense politicized discontent can be widespread and persistent over a long period without overt manifestation, because a regime can monopolize coercive control and institutional support. A weakening of regime control or the development of dissident organizations in such a situation is highly likely to lead to massive violence.<sup>29</sup>

Hoselitz and Willner, delineating their distinction between expectations and aspirations, link deprivation with potential revolution.

Unrealized aspirations produce feelings of disappointment, but unrealized expectations result in feelings of deprivation. Disappointment is generally tolerable. Deprivation is often intolerable. The deprived individual feels impelled to remedy, by whatever means are available, frustration produced in him. Whereas disappointment may breed the seeds of incipient revolution, deprivation serves as a catalyst for revolutionary action.<sup>30</sup>

In a similar vein, H.L. Nieburg, in his book, *Political Violence: The Behavioral Process* (1970), wrote the following:

Deprivation begins with a discussion of relative inequity, injustice, and inequality among social groups, postulating that the sharper the perception of inequity, the more intense the tactics of protest. Frustration-aggression theory is frequently used to explain violent behavior. Frustration imposed by external sanctions of the physical world generates accumulative rage that, at some point, breaks through violent behavior.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>30</sup>Bert Hoselitz and Ann Willner, "Economic Development, Political Strategies, and American Aid," 363 in Gurr, 39.

<sup>31</sup>H.L. Nieburg, *Political Violence: The Behavioral Process* (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1970), 39-40.

Anthony Oberschall, in his book, *Social Movement: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities* (1995), substantiated Gurr's central hypothesis that:

Gurr's central hypothesis is that relative deprivation is the basic precondition of civil strife, and the greater the deprivation, the greater the magnitude of strife. Relative deprivation in turn is produced by discrepancy of what people think they are entitled to and what they are actually getting. As deprivation increases, frustration and anger will ensue. These psychological states will produce aggression. At the level of aggregates, many aggressive acts and tendencies will produce civil strife.<sup>32</sup>

Also, I will show in subsequent chapters and in my analysis of the subject matter how characteristics and tactics of the Israeli occupation impacted the decision to go with the Uprising.

#### Organization of the Study

This study will be divided into five chapters.

##### Chapter I — Introduction

In this chapter, many areas will be discussed such as the statement of the problem, the hypothesis, the research methods, and the research tools used in this study, what theoretical framework will be adopted to fit the study, and what kind of information this study will need. The literature review will answer the question. Also, this chapter will discuss the significance of the study, why this study is important. The last issue in this chapter will address the efforts of the Palestinian national struggle and why it failed on many fronts.

##### Chapter II — Factors Behind the Palestinian Uprising

---

<sup>32</sup>Anthony Oberschall, *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 48-49.

This chapter will explore some factors that pushed the Palestinians to stand up against the Occupation and to have their own uprising. Some factors have something to do with the Arab-Palestinian relationship such as the treatment of the Palestinians in the Arab world, the ignoring of the Palestinian problem by Arab leaders, and the killing of Palestinians in some Arab countries. Also, this chapter focuses on the Israeli Occupation and the bad treatment of the Palestinians. Finally, the chapter will discuss some other economic, political and social factors affecting Palestinians and the impact of worldwide opinion about Palestinian liberation.

### Chapter III — Israeli Reaction to the Uprising

This chapter is concerned with the means used by Israel to quell the Uprising. For example, enforcement of curfews, random killings, jailing of dissidents and ordinary citizens alike, deportation, house demolition, restrictive water policies, economic punishment, and many other descriptions of reprisals against Palestinians will be included.

### Chapter IV — The Palestinian Uprising and Peace: The Impact on Israel, the Palestinians, and the International Community.

The media coverage for the events in the Occupied Territories played a significant role in convincing the world that this situation could not be allowed to continue and that something must be done.

In this chapter, I will discuss how the Uprising affected the Israelis as well as the Palestinians and the PLO. Also, I will examine how the international community worldwide participated in pushing both parties to negotiate peace.

### Chapter V — Conclusions and Recommendations



This chapter will present analysis of the findings in the study, and determine if the findings will support the hypothesis around which this study evolved. Also, this chapter will present recommendations to the Palestinians and to the Israelis and their leaders. If these peace opportunities are missed or ignored, the gates of hell will be opened and the stream of blood will be running again.

### The Palestinian's National Liberation Struggle

A brief history of the Palestinian National Liberation struggle shows that the Palestinians learned from previous revolutions, specifically those of the people of Vietnam, Algeria, Korea, Angola, Congo, and Mozambique.

It can be noted that the first Palestinian national movement started in 1936 against the British forces in Palestine. By 1939, the Palestinian Uprising or the General Strike as they still call it in Palestine, was virtually at an end. As a military force, the Palestinians had been defeated. Official British figures for the number of Palestinian casualties during the 1936-1939 disturbances have never been made fully known, but according to the careful calculations of the Palestinian scholar Dr. Waled Al-Khaldi, the dead must have exceeded 5,000 and the wounded 14,000.<sup>33</sup> During its various phases, the 1936-1939 uprising was more spontaneous and less organized.

By the end of the 1948 War and the loss of the majority of Palestine to the Jews, part of what was left of Palestine came under Jordanian rule. Jordan used active suppression and repression to prevent any public voicing of a national Palestinian

---

<sup>33</sup>David Hirst, *The Roots of Violence in the Middle East: The Gun and the Olive Branch* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 93.

identity.<sup>34</sup> Abdullah, King of Jordan, erased the identity of the Palestinians in a single act: in March of 1950, Abdullah instructed the word “Palestine” to be removed from all maps and official statements.<sup>35</sup>

The PLO was established at an Arab summit conference in Cairo in 1964 as an official voice of the Palestinian people, and shortly thereafter, organized a conventional military component – The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). Both the PLO and the PLA were centered in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and kept under tight control by the Egyptian government. Fatah, which was formed in the late 1950's, was committed to guerilla warfare.<sup>36</sup>

Robert O. Freedman, in his book *The Intifada* (1991), wrote the following:

Conditions were marginal at best. While these political and economic conditions contained the seeds of popular support, there were limitations inherent in other elements of the human milieu. The fractious nature of Palestinian society, with its segmented structure of competing families and clans, plus residual political loyalties to the Hashemite regime in Jordan on the part of some local elites, impeded insurgent efforts to mobilize the people behind their cause. Moreover, Jordanian political and economic discrimination against the Arab states had created the PLO in 1964; this was considered more a means of controlling Palestinian nationalism than allowing it free reign.<sup>37</sup>

Fatah's emphasis on violent resistance was due to the attractiveness of the alternative guerilla focus strategy popularized by the Cuban revolution. The guerilla

---

<sup>34</sup>Robert O. Freedman, *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers* (Miami: Florida International University, 1991), 22.

<sup>35</sup>Kimmerling and Migdal, 191.

<sup>36</sup>David McDowall, 69.

<sup>37</sup>Freedman, 38.

focus strategy differed from the popular war strategy in that it downplayed the need for substantial political organization prior to hostilities.<sup>38</sup>

In order for any revolution to succeed, the human and the physical environment have to be suitable and fit a revolutionary war. In the period after the 1967 War, the human environment was moderately conducive to armed struggle. The people of the Territories were Arabs (mostly Muslim) who resented subjugation to Jewish military rule. Moreover, tens of thousands of Palestinians were living in refugee camps where living conditions were marginal at best. Ironically, Jordanian political and economic discrimination against West Bank Palestinians prior to the 1967 War provided an opportunity for Israel to make relative improvements, especially in the economic arena, which might contribute to stability in the short term. In short, while the human environment contained some aspects generally favorable to an insurrection, it was not ideal.<sup>39</sup>

Robert O. Freedman, in his book *the Intifada* (1991), wrote the following describing the physical environment in the Territories:

The physical environment in Palestine was highly unsuitable for protracted popular war, since the area was small and open. The road and the communication system were excellent in Israel and good in the Territories. The guerilla fighters could not set up their bases in the rural area of the West Bank. Even moderate concentrations of fighters or supplies were easy to spot and destroy. The Gaza Strip, with its heavy population, was out of the question as far as guerilla bases. In the final analysis, the poor physical environment was a major impediment to the protracted popular war waged by the fedayeen.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup>McDowall, 31.

<sup>39</sup>Freedman, 42-43.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 41-42.

The Palestinian armed struggle of 1968-1973 can be described as a failure due to poor organization.<sup>41</sup> The Palestinian fighters lost their bases in Jordan after September 17, 1970 (Black September). Many fighters were killed. Others crossed the Jordan River to Israel, some were left in the Jordanian prisons and other survivors fled to Syria and then to Lebanon.<sup>42</sup>

Furthermore, the Palestinian armed struggle from Lebanon came to an end by August 30, 1982, after three months of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. A total of 14,398 Palestinian fighters were evacuated. Between September 16 and 18, 1982, with the approval of the Israeli army, the Maronite Phalangists (a military wing of the Maronite Christian Political Party) entered the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla to “clean out” the 2,000 Palestinian guerillas who, according to reports, were still hiding there. They massacred between 600 and 700 Palestinians – children, women, and men.<sup>43</sup>

By 1982, the Palestinian struggle received its biggest blow when the Palestinian forces evacuated from Lebanon. The Palestinians of the Territories realized that there was no hope for them from outside of the Territories to free them from the Israeli occupation. It was the time for them to stand up to the Israeli army and to take their salvation into their own hands. On December 7, 1987, the Palestinian Uprising erupted. Men, women, and children participated in the Uprising, each according to his or her

---

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 41.

<sup>42</sup>For more information about this subject see David Hirst, *The Roots of Violence in the Middle East: The Gun and the Olive Branch* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, Inc., '1977), or visit [www.KingHussein.gov](http://www.KingHussein.gov).

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., xiv.

ability until 1993, when the peace accord was signed by the Palestinians and the Israelis. According to the late Dr. Edward W. Said, the Palestinian Uprising of 1978 changed not only the Palestinians and the Israelis but the whole Middle East.

### Review of the Literature

A tremendous amount of literature has been written on the Arab-Israeli conflict from both sides of the fence, as well as from third and independent parties. Therefore, the gigantic task of sifting through this great amount of literature for relevant data is further complicated by the differing views presented by the biases of the authors.

It is not the intent of this study to chronicle every aspect of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The purpose of this work is to assess and to examine the impact of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993, on the peace process between the Israeli and the Palestinian. Since the subject of this study is specific, it became imperative that a closer look should be focused on literature which employed the micro-view approach to the area of study rather than the macro-view approach which is interested in the whole Arab-Israeli conflict from historical perspective, which is not our intent in this study. I will discuss some works which examined the impact of some Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, and how these policies ignited the Uprising, and how the Uprising forced both parties with the help of the international community to come to agreement to negotiate peace.

In the economic arena, Ted R. Gurr and others, the authors of *Revolution of the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), acknowledged that Israeli's policy after 1967 aimed to prevent the development of a strong Palestinian economy, which might compete with the

Israeli economy. Israel tried in every way to make the Palestinian economy dependent on the Israeli economy by creating a work force out of thousands of Palestinians.<sup>44</sup>

Supporting Gurr's arguments, Frank Collins, in his article "Palestinian Economy in Chaos After Gulf War" (1991), stated:

The Israelis have systematically done everything in their power to block the normal development of the Palestinian economy. They have striven to make the Palestinian economy totally dependent on, and subordinate to, that of Israel. A major result has been creation of a work force of 120,000 who are forced to cross the Green Line every day.<sup>45</sup>

Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, in his book *The Economics of the West Bank and Gaza* (1985), argued that Israel induced the Occupied Territories' dependency through three major avenues: recruitment and exploitation of Palestinian labor, restriction on movement of products from the territories to Israel, and the free flow of Israeli goods into the Occupied Territories.<sup>46</sup>

Israel also controlled the water of the West Bank and its use to serve its own interests. Israel Shahak, wrote an article, "Palestinian Life Under Israeli Apartheid," that acknowledged by fall of 1987, according to Israeli data, the 60,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank were using more water than the 850,000 or one million Palestinians. Similarly, in the area of Land Confiscation, it was, and continues to be, the policy of the State of Israel to confiscate Palestinian land, and they found all kind of legal justifications to take it. Sixty percent of the land on the West Bank was susceptible to expropriation

---

<sup>44</sup>Ted Robert Gurr, et al, ed. *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century* (Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 303.

<sup>45</sup>Frank Collins, "Palestinian Economy in Chaos After the Gulf War," *The Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs X*, no. 2 (1991): 23.

<sup>46</sup>Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, *The Economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985).

under the Israeli interpretation of the Ottoman Law. Any uninhabited land and land beyond the sound of the human voice from the nearest village revert to the state.<sup>47</sup>

In the political arena, Israel tried hard to prevent the rise of any Palestinian nationalist movements in the Occupied Territories. In his book, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank* (1985), Moshi Máoos affirmed that:

A major theme in Israel policy toward the West Bank was to forbid, by both word and deed, Arab political activities and to curtail the establishment of an all-West Bank leadership, be it Palestinian-nationalist or Jordan-oriented.<sup>48</sup>

To achieve their political goals, the Israelis attempted to assassinate the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah, and Al-Beireh in 1982, after they were elected by Palestinian voters. Also, Máoos provided material and insight into Israel's hostile stance and ceaseless effort to prevent the rise of a genuine Palestinian leadership in the West Bank. For many years, Israeli officials insisted that there be no Palestinian leaders in the Occupied Territories.

In another work, *Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land* (1986), David Shipler reached a similar conclusion as Máoos, when he mentioned the assassination attempt on newly elected mayors of the cities of Nablus, Ramallah, and Al-Bireh, because they were nationalists and they did not like the occupation. The first two mayors were maimed by explosions, while Ibrahim Al-Tawil escaped injury in 1982.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup>Israel Shahak, 1-12.

<sup>48</sup>Moshi Máoos, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank* (London, England: F. Cass, 1985). in Jalal Abed, 13.

<sup>49</sup>David Shipler, *Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land* (New York, New York: Time Books, 1986).

The Israelis always denied the existence of the Palestinians and if they acknowledged their existence, they did not and currently do not want to be with them in the same place. Arie Bober, in his book, *The Other Israel* (1972), acknowledged that this country (Israel and the Territories) is too small for both of us. I have to transfer them to neighboring countries, not one of them should be left. This idea was supported by Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister to Israel in 1948. He said, "Israel is the country of the Jews and only the Jews,"<sup>50</sup> In 1969, Golda Meir, then Israeli Prime Minister, said of the Palestinian people, "They do not exist."<sup>51</sup> On April 17, 1989, in an interview with *Time Magazine*, Ariel Sharon, then Prime Minister of Israel, affirmed, "Jordan is Palestine. The capital of Palestine is Amman. If Palestinian Arabs want to find their political expression, they will have to do it in Amman."<sup>52</sup>

Many authors have their own interpretations. Lockman and Beinin, in their book *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (1989), argued that the mistreatment of the Palestinians from 1967-1988 led to the Uprising. Also, they described the Israeli government:

The new Israeli government is composed of men whose hostility not just to the Palestinian aspiration but to Palestinians as human beings is undying. Men like Rabin, Sharon, Netanyahu, Ares, and Shamir are the inheritors of a tradition of uncompromising brutality and lying, in which all means are justified as long as the end — Israel ascendancy at the expense of Palestinian life itself — can be assured.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup>Alfred Lilienthan, "Zionism the Occupying Power." *Middle East Perspective* XVIII, no. 3 (1984): 4.

<sup>51</sup>Ali Jalal Abed, *Israel's Policies in the West Bank and Gaza* (Ph.D. dissertation, Clark Atlanta University, 1988), 17.

<sup>52</sup>M.J. Gart, "Never, Never, Never!," *Time Magazine*, 17 April 1989, 40.

<sup>53</sup>Lockman and Beinin, 21.



Lockman and Beinun came almost to the same conclusion as Máoz that the Uprising affected both people--Israelis and Palestinians--and peace is the only way out of this mess. Also, they added that the Middle East will not be the same because of the influence of the Uprising.

Sharing the view of Lockman and Beinun about the causes of the Uprising, Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal argued in their book, *Palestinian: The Making of the People* (1993) that the bad economy and the political situation led to the 1987 Uprising. In addition, the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories can be described as harsh and bad.<sup>54</sup> With the same point of view about the cause of the Uprising, in his book, *Israel's Wars 1947-1993* (2000), Ahron Bregman argued that the Palestinian Uprising could be caused by many factors, such as the unjust treatment of Palestinian workers by their Israeli employers, or because of the high unemployment rate among the young Palestinians. On the eve of the Intifada, 15,000 graduates were unemployed: they were desperate and bored and directed their anger and frustration at the Israelis.<sup>55</sup> Joost R. Hilterman, the author of *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories* (1991), acknowledged that some incidents that took place in the areas sparked the Uprising. First, the killing incident which took place in Jabalya Refugee Camp, where four Palestinians were killed by an Israeli driver; and second, the Arab summit in Amman, Jordan, which completely ignored the Palestinian issue and the humiliating reception of Yasser Arafat by King Hussein. The Palestinians realized that

---

<sup>54</sup>Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinian: The Making of the People* (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1993), 236.

<sup>55</sup>Ahron Bregman, *Israel's Wars, 1947-1993* (London: Routledge Publishers, 2000), 118.

they could not rely on Arab states to help them in their struggle for national liberation, and they had to take their struggle completely into their own hands. Third, the harsh Israeli treatment of the Occupied Territories sparked the Uprising.<sup>56</sup>

Israel used all available means to quell the Uprising, and their leaders threatened to use more punishment against the Palestinians. Geoffrey Aronson, in his book, *Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada: Creating Fact on the West Bank* (1990), acknowledged that Rabin declared that he was going to make the Palestinians suffer more and more if they tried to achieve their goals through violence and terror. The author also acknowledged that the “riots” represented no mere skirmish or passing episode of civil unrest, but a full-scale rebellion against Israel.<sup>57</sup>

The author presented the story of the village of Qabatiyah — south of Jenin — as an example of Rabin’s policy of sanction and of the high costs attending the campaign against collaborators. The Israel Defense force (IDF) placed the village under a complete blockade, which lasted more than a month. Supplies of running water, electricity, and cooking gas were shut off, and outside medical assistance was forbidden. No export licenses were granted, so that economic hardship was created. Bridge crossing permits for visiting relatives were denied and most of the village youth were detained.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup>Joost R. Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1.

<sup>57</sup>Geoffery Aronson, *Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada* (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 328.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 338.

In terms of peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians, a number of books have been published with varying points of view. Aryeh Shalev, author of the book, *The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (1991), pointed out that the Palestinian Intifada created a new situation in the Middle East. He argued this situation cannot be solved by the use of force; according to Shalev, political initiative and negotiations between Israel and the PLO will solve the problem:

Israeli political leadership finds it increasing difficult to put forward and initiate a political process acceptable to the United States and certainly for Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the OT's. The central element in such a process must be negotiations on a Palestinian (not Jordanian) option. Thus, it was not until April 1989, sixteen months after the start of the Uprising, that Israel proposed a political initiative.<sup>59</sup>

Shalev acknowledged that Israel was unable to suppress the Uprising. For that, Shalev in another place affirmed:

The United States concluded that the Intifada had generated a new situation in the Middle East, which it could not ignore. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the United States to begin looking seriously for a political solution to the Palestinian problem.<sup>60</sup>

Sharing the same viewpoint, Zéev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, in their book, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising — Israel's Third Front* (1990), acknowledged that the Palestinian Uprising created a new situation in the Middle East and its impact can be felt everywhere in Israel:

Frustration also stems from the fact that many Israelis, of all political persuasion, have come to feel that where the conflict with the Palestinians is concerned, their country has been living a lie. They now believe that their leaders deceived them in pronouncing that the Palestinian people did

---

<sup>59</sup>Aryeh Shalev, *The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 13.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, 130.

not exist; that the Arabs in the territories did not want their leaders; that the PLO forced itself on the Palestinians by violence and intimidation; that the status quo of occupation could be maintained indefinitely; that Israel could control the inhabitants of the territories by punitive action and never face revolt; and that only Israel wanted peace; while all the proposals coming out of the Palestinian camp were merely cynical ruses.<sup>61</sup>

Schiff and Ya'ari in another place in their book, acknowledge that the Uprising affect can be felt in Washington:

While Schultz's aides were still puzzling over how to proceed after his decision to "leave the Middle East alone," the Intifada broke out and forced the Secretary to overcome his irritation and turn his attention back to the region.<sup>62</sup>

At the same time, positive signs were coming from the Israeli side:

Shamir had even announced that he would be prepared to enter into negotiations without any preconditions, leaving Schultz and his staff feeling that the Intifada might indeed be the long-awaited opportunity to score a breakthrough.<sup>63</sup>

Both Schiff and Ya'ari concluded that without reaching an accommodation with the PLO, any other settlement would be a partial one and thus liable to collapse.

Don Peretz is another author who looked at the Uprising from different points of view and from a different perspective. In his book, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising* (1990), he acknowledged that the Palestinian Uprising enjoyed widespread support throughout the world and put back the Palestinian issue on the international agenda. At the same time, Peretz argued that finding a peaceful solution to the conflict is remote, as remote as ending the conflict in Northern Ireland, Kurdistan or Cyprus.

---

<sup>61</sup>Zéev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising — Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 289.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 296

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 297.

Barry Rubin, in his book, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (1994), argued that the Intifada was incapable, by itself, of ending Israel's rule or creating a Palestinian state. Only a diplomatic agreement between Israel and the Palestinians could achieve this goal. Since the Intifada had no structured, independent leadership or power to force Israel's withdrawal, it was the task of Arafat and the PLO to reach a negotiated solution. If he was unable to do so, local activists might look elsewhere for leadership: or deprived of hope, the Uprising could collapse.<sup>64</sup> This viewpoint was similar to that one put forth by F. Robert Hunter, the author of *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means* (1991), that it was the Intifada that brought Arafat's strategy to fruition. Without the impetus provided by the revolt, the PLO could not have moved so fast or traveled so far toward a political settlement.<sup>65</sup> According to Nassar and Heacock, there are two national communities, with two separate and distinct national identities who have distinct values and norms and are governed by two sets of social, cultural, and political institutions. One political structure may not meet the national needs of the two peoples in a satisfactory manner; each must seek its expression equally and independently in a structure of its own making on the same soil.<sup>66</sup> In another perspective on the Uprising's impact on peace, Rex Bryen, in his book *Echoes of the Intifada* (1991), agreed with many previous authors that Israel has no choice but to

---

<sup>64</sup>Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 92.

<sup>65</sup>F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War By Other Means* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 153.

<sup>66</sup>Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, *Intifada: Palestinians at the Crossroads* (New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 10-11.

negotiate peace with the Palestinians as a way out of its present situation. Gad Yáacobi, a Labor Party minister in the national unity government, said, "Negotiation with the Palestinians is the only way to stop the Uprising."<sup>67</sup> Also, Shlomo Lahat, mayor of Tel Aviv, and a prominent Likud politician, told an interviewer during the 1988 election campaign, "I believe a Palestinian state is inevitable. I believe, unfortunately, that the PLO represents the Palestinian people. I know that the price of peace and real security is withdrawal."<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, an Israeli intelligence report discussed in the news media in March 1989 concluded that Israel has no choice but to talk with the PLO if it wishes to end the Uprising and make progress toward peace. The report also concluded that the PLO is sincere in its call for accommodation with the Jewish state.<sup>69</sup>

In concluding this literature review I will discuss Moshe Máoz's thoughts about the Uprising and about peace. In his book, *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993* (1994), Máoz argues like many other before him that peace between the two parties cannot be achieved by using military forces; peace can only be achieved through a direct negotiation with the Palestinians and their leadership (the PLO). Máoz affirmed:

By 1989 the fourth stage of negotiating peace had started. When the Israeli leadership, even the government led by Prime Minister Yhzhak Shamir, understood that if they wanted to go ahead, there was no serious possibility of doing so without confronting the Palestinian problem. By May 1989, Shamir and Rabin came out with what became known as the Shamir-Rabin Plan. It emphasized the need to come to terms with the Palestinians and suggested a method for bringing the Palestinians into the

---

<sup>67</sup>Rex Brynen, *Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussion of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993), 280.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., 76.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 78.

negotiating process. Moreover, on the Palestinian side the Intifada created the need to achieve practical results on the ground that they knew were attainable only by means of negotiation, with Israel, and thus induced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a more flexible attitude and seek — like the government of Israel — an acceptable formula that would enable the beginning of the peace negotiations.<sup>70</sup>

Máoz also acknowledged that the Palestinian Uprising affected the Israelis' life:

The Palestinian Uprising, in my opinion, had led to the opening up of the arenas of security, international relations, and military relations, to intensive political debate, the like of which has not been known in the State of Israel since its establishment in 1948. Also, the Israeli society has been undergoing a process of changing its own format in a very intensive way, even if it was not always fully conscious of it.<sup>71</sup>

Based on this literature review, it may be argued that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993 paved the way for more political negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. I shall attempt to use rigorous analysis to investigate and document whether the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993 had any impact on the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

### Significance of the Study

I believe this study will enhance the reader's knowledge by adding information about the Occupation, its tactics and its methods of oppressing the Palestinians. At the same time, it shows how the Palestinians with limited resources – manpower, guns, ammunition, war gear, food supply, and many other things – could fight back the occupational forces.

---

<sup>70</sup>Moshe et al., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 103-104.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 151-152.

In addition, this study may give the reader or the researcher a better understanding of the history of the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I believe there has not yet been a paradigm shift with regard to Frustration-Aggression Theory. By that, I mean frustration will almost always lead to aggression. In this case, the diplomatic process may or may not be put in place as a political process.



CHAPTER II  
FACTORS BEHIND THE UPRISING  
INTRODUCTION

Ali Baghdadi, in his article, "Palestinians Denied the Right to Work," wrote the following description of Palestinian life under the Israeli Occupation:

The Palestinians have been abused by the Israeli government and the Israeli Jews for half a century. Not only have their lands been confiscated; their homes demolished; their water and their natural resources stolen; their livelihood taken away; their skull and bones broken; but their rights in entirety have been usurped. They have been denied the most basic rights guaranteed by all laws and constitutions—to move freely in their own homeland; to look for a job; to feed their children; to provide for their own families; and to eat a loaf of bread so they may live and work.<sup>1</sup>

Also, Walid Khalidi, in his book, *Palestine Reborn* (1949) wrote the following:

After forty years of ghostly wandering in no man's land and twenty-one years of occupation, the Palestinians want to start living and stop dying. They want to start laughing and stop crying. They want to breathe Palestinian oxygen, plough

Palestinian soil, watch Palestinian skies, hear Palestinian accents. They want their own, their very own nest, hole, perch or haunt. They want to turn this into a badge of identity, a center of pride, a symbol of dignity and a refuge of last resort.<sup>2</sup>

In the search for the causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 against the Israeli occupation, it is difficult to give one clear-cut reason as a cause for the Palestinian

---

<sup>1</sup>Ali Baghdadi, "Palestinians denied the right to work," *The Final Call* 16, no. 7 (1996): 13.

<sup>2</sup>Walid Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn* (London, England: I.B. Tavis and Company, Ltd., 1992), 158.

Uprising of 1987. But it can be said that more than one factor worked together to produce the Uprising of 1987 in Palestine Occupied Territories. Indeed, there were two factors that can be targeted as the major causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987: (1) The Arab Palestinian factor and (2) the Israeli factor. Also, there were many other issues that can be seen as minor elements in the dynamic.

For the purpose of this study, many interviews were conducted. Some were face-to-face dialogues and others were completed by phone. Too, others were conducted by asking the interviewees to answer questions in writing, particularly if access by telephone, transportation issues, or safety challenges were operative.

In their book, *Blessed Are the Peacemakers: A Palestinian Christian In Occupied West Bank* (1990), Audeh G. Rantisi and Ralph K. Beebe, wrote the following:

Palestinian despair turned into action in 1987. From the bottom of their hearts our people cried for respect. Israel's insecurity is understandable, given their victimization throughout history. They have suffered dehumanization and treatment as non-persons. Yet, who better than they should identify the deep inner longing for freedom, the desire to have one's own nation? Who better than they should recognize that enforced indignity embitters the victim and promotes retaliation? Persistent dehumanization burns in every Palestinian consciousness and calls out for redemption. Jews should understand.<sup>3</sup>

The Palestinians realized with a shock that henceforth, their own liberation was up to no one but them. Arab armies were of no further use to them or the Palestine

---

<sup>3</sup>Audeh G. Rantisi and Ralph K Beebe, *Blessed Are the Peacemakers: A Palestinian Christian In Occupied West Bank* (Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1990), 113.

Liberation Organization commandos in Beirut or Tunis; they had at last to fight their own battles against their oppressors, and in doing so, they energized their people.<sup>4</sup>

Ten days of serious clashes took place in Gaza in October 1987, during which seven supporters of a resistance group new to the Occupied Territories, who called itself “Islamic Jihad,” were killed by the Israeli Security Forces.<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, the level of repression in the Occupied Territories was at its highest level in many years: a record number of Palestinians had been “administratively” detained (i.e., without trial) during 1987, and deportations, house demolitions, and other repressive measures were beginning to take their toll of the Palestinians’ collective patience.<sup>6</sup> In addition to the Israeli measures against the Palestinians, the Amman Summit itself was, doubtless, another factor in driving the Palestinians to revolt.<sup>7</sup>

In an interview, Dr. Abu Jaber, the head of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to Madrid sent to negotiate peace with Israel, suggested that many factors could have inflamed the Palestinian Uprising in 1987:

1. The political and the economic situation in the Occupied Territories which had been worsened lately, with the majority of the population young people who lived all their lives under military rule, for that they have no fear from the military and they are ready for confrontation.
2. There is no hope that Israel will withdraw from the Occupied Territories. Also, day after day the Israeli confiscation of the Palestinian land and its

---

<sup>4</sup>Andrew C. Kimmens, ed., “The Palestinian Problem.” *The Reference Shelf* 61, no. 1 (1989): 176.

<sup>5</sup>Michael Adams, 157.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 57.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 57.

natural resources increased. Also, the building of new settlements on the Palestinian land increased, too.

3. The Palestinian leadership outside and inside Palestine have been convinced that the popular resistance is the only way to force the enemy to back off . . . and to start negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict.<sup>8</sup>

In another interview, during his February 23, 2001 visit to Harvard University, a PLO member, who refused for security reasons to give his name, mentioned the following as causes for the Uprising:

1. The departure of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon in 1982, which created more frustration for the Palestinians than they had before, which resulted in increased Israeli violence and harsh treatment to the Palestinian.
2. The silence of the Arab world and the International Community about what had happened to the Palestinians in Lebanon after being killed and slaughtered by the Israeli and by the Maronite forces.

In another interview, Mr. Máin Erakat, from the Department of Negotiation Affairs — The Palestinian Authority, posited, “The Uprising was a result of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli military practices against the Palestinians, the miserable economic situation.”<sup>9</sup>

In another interview, Salama Hijawi, General Director for the Palestinian Planning Center, acknowledged that the Uprising was a result of the Israeli military pressure against the Palestinians. He also acknowledged that the PLO had found in the

---

<sup>8</sup>Kamel Abu Jaber, a university professor, a former Minister of Economics in the later 1970s, a former foreign Minister of Jordan in 1993. He is the Director of Jordan Institute of Diplomacy. The interview was on March 14, 1998.

<sup>9</sup>Máin Erakat, interview by the author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

Uprising a chance for creating an alternative place for the Palestinian struggle after the loss of their bases in Lebanon.<sup>10</sup>

Mr. Hassan Al-Kashif, another Palestinian official from the Authority — Ministry of Information, mentioned several causes for the 1987 Uprising, and they can be stated as follows:

1. The continuation of the occupation, over twenty years, and the absence of the efforts to find a solution to the situation.
2. The evacuation of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon in 1982, and before that, from Jordan in 1970, and then from Syria.
3. The mistreatment of the PLO by the Arab countries, and the closure of the borders in the face of the Palestinian fighters prevented the PLO from getting into Israel/Palestine.
4. The Israelis failed to find alternative leadership to the PLO, either from the Arab countries or from the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
5. The Palestinians had the faith and the trust in themselves to do their job and not to depend on someone else, because they have no trust in anyone but themselves.<sup>11</sup>

In another interview, Mr. Said Ouida from the Financing Ministry mentioned several causes for the 1987 Uprising against the Israeli Occupation, as he saw them:

1. After twenty years of occupation, there was no sign of a solution to the problem in the near future.
2. Too many long term frustrations and latent anger lingered in the hearts of the Palestinians, as a result of the Israeli military practices against them. So they were waiting for the right time for expressing their anger and their frustration.

---

<sup>10</sup>Salama Hijawi, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

<sup>11</sup>Hassan Al-Kashif, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

3. The building of the secret organizations and institutions in the Occupied Territories to run the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation forces.
4. The killing of the four Palestinians and the injuries of several more in Gaza ignited the Uprising.<sup>12</sup>

Osama Al-Farra from the municipality of the City of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip, explained the causes for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 as follows:

1. The feeling of injustice among the Palestinians was the major factor that promulgated the Uprising.
2. The international neglect of the Palestinian problem was another crucial factor. For example, Secretary of State Shultz said, "We have to keep the Palestinian issue in the refrigerator after the election in the U. S. is over."
3. The Palestinian issue was an unimportant issue on the Arab leaders' agenda during 1985, 1986, and 1987, especially during the Amman Summit where the Palestinian issue was not on the Summit agenda.
4. The Israeli military rule in the Occupied Territories and the difficulties created by it to the Palestinians in all aspects of their life.
5. The growth and development of national aspiration in the Occupied Territories and the establishment of students and workers unions.<sup>13</sup>

Dr. Hussein Al-Araj, Under Secretary for the local governments, was the last one I interviewed. To Dr. Al-Araj, there were many factors that worked together and led to the Palestinian Uprising of 1987. These factors and causes can be summarized as the following:

---

<sup>12</sup>Said Ouida, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

<sup>13</sup>Ossama Al-Farra, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

1. The long years of occupation and Israeli military practices in the Occupied Territories can be seen as a major cause for the Uprising of 1987.
2. The increased level of frustration and the growth of nationalist sentiment among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories fueled the need to be independent of Israel.
3. Economic difficulties led to daily hardships for families confined in often inadequate housing and sometimes in refugee camps.
4. The treatment of the PLO in the Arab world proved demoralizing to those who supported the goals of the PLO.
5. The universities could be credited with heightening a national awareness among the students and that sensibility helped in the formulation of a resistance strategy against the Israeli occupation.<sup>14</sup>

In a series of interviews conducted by the author's brother, Khaled Khader, with citizens from the Occupied Territories, dated June 14, 2003, the causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 can be seen as almost similar to the interviewees' answers in most of all the interviews.

In an interview, Mr. Abu Alrub from the village of Messilyah, a 36-year-old member of the militant group Black Panther, revealed that he spent three years characterized as an outlaw by the Israeli forces, was captured, given seven life jail sentences, spent seven years in jail, and was subsequently released as a result of the White River Agreement. He is now the head of the local government. Alrub stated the following as causes for the Uprising of 1987:

1. The Uprising was planned by the PLO, especially after the departure of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon in order to transfer the battle and the struggle against Israel to the Occupied Territories.

---

<sup>14</sup>Dr. Hussein Al-Araj, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

2. Israeli treatment of the Palestinians was inhuman. An example is the demeaning procedures used when Israeli police searched Palestinians at various street check points, of which there were many.<sup>15</sup>
3. Resentment about the prevention of students from completing their educations, because schools were forcibly closed.
4. The Israeli policy of randomly arresting students at critical times during the school year, such as the final exam period, which meant that students were not going to get their diplomas and had no chance to attend an institution of higher learning. Also, Israel prevented those who had diploma from leaving the country to continue their education.
5. The unjustified arrest and jailing of young men and women was another point of contention. Ironically, these jails became schools for the Palestinians to become radicalized by senior prisoners. These sometimes hardened revolutionaries educated them to awareness of their historical mistreatment and advised them as to what should be done to protect their identities and their lands against the occupation forces.
6. The Israeli methods of forcing people to work for them as collaborators against their own people, by giving them money or offering them sexual relationships with Israeli women was anathema to many Palestinians. The prevailing Israeli attitude was that one way or another, you work for us or you will suffer economically and in other ways as well.
7. The willingness and the desire of the Palestinians to be free and to get rid of the occupation finally morphed into active violence.
8. The desire of the Palestinians to preserve their identities, especially when some Arab countries tried to erase Palestinian identities in the fifties, in the sixties, and even in the seventies, was a key motivating factor.
9. The refusal of Israel to allow significant populations of Palestinians to live in most areas, by not giving them permission to build homes undermined the stability of families. At the same time, Israelis allowed other Israeli settlers to expand their settlements in legally designated Palestinian lands.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>Anonymous, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

<sup>16</sup>Abu Al-Rub, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Messilya, 14 June 2003.



In another insightful interview, Dr. Maruan Jarar, 35 years old, from the village of Jabá, and a Ph.D. in Political History, remembered that he was a high school student during the Uprising of 1987. Dr. Jarar mentioned the following as causes for the Uprising of 1987:

1. The economic situation was unacceptable when the vast majority of Palestinians existed at levels far below the poverty line.
2. PLO frustration increased at the time of their departure from Lebanon. In addition, the shifting of the Palestinian struggle from outside to inside and the building of a new leadership base in the territories resulted in a good relationship with the outside leadership of the PLO.
3. The closure of many PLO offices in key Arab countries was interpreted by many Palestinians as a debilitating loss of support for the cause of liberation.
4. The division among the Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories led to the creation of a new front and leaders inside the territories.
5. The Iraq-Iran War drew attention away from the Palestinian issue forcing the Palestinians to find a way to regain a place on the world political agenda. The Uprising was a way to recapture the previous level of world attention.<sup>17</sup>

In another interview, Dr. Waled Said Jarar, 59 years old, from the village of Aljadedah, and Ph.D. in Current Palestinian Literature, said the Palestinian Uprising was caused by:

1. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza resulted in severe damage to the Palestinian economy, to their educational system, and to their political aspirations.
2. Israeli control over Palestinian labor forces did not include recognition of Palestinian worker rights. Palestinians were not allowed to join labor

---

<sup>17</sup>Dr. Marwan Jarar, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank Villiage of Jabá, 14 June 2003.

unions, and had no medical insurance or retirement benefits. Most of the time, the Israelis gave the workers no wages for their work because the Palestinians had no legal redress in Israeli courts. In addition, working conditions, especially for lower level laborers, were typically unsafe.

3. At the educational level, the Israelis closed schools and universities, changed a lot of the material in the books and added information about the Palestinians that was either distorted or untrue.
4. Palestinians typically have many political parties and a variety of interest groups, but all of them were united in their desire to get rid of the Occupation, thus igniting the Uprising.
5. Village leagues had a bad impact on the Palestinian way of life because they are working with Israel to oppress the Palestinians.
6. A final cause was the rise of nationalist sentiment and the feeling that Palestinians had their own identity and deserved their own country, the same as any other people in the world.<sup>18</sup>

In another interview, Mr. Abu-Ahmad, 40 years old, from the city Brukin, who spent one year in jail and is affiliated with Fatah, mentioned the following as the causes for the Uprising:

1. Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were unacceptable.
2. The lack of basic freedoms led to frustration among the Palestinians, and the feeling that there was no future in the Occupied Territories under Israel's heavy handed rule.
3. Arab countries would assist in freeing Palestinians from the oppression of the Occupation. The Palestinians had to depend on themselves for their salvation.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>Dr. Waled Jarar, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Al-Jadedah, 14 June 2003.

<sup>19</sup>Abu Ahmad, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Burka, 14 June 2003.

In yet another interview, Abu-Assem, a 36-year-old Master's Degree recipient in Education and a Fatah affiliate from the village of Yabad was a student at the University during the Uprising and cited the following as causes for the Uprising:

1. The Israeli policies as enforced by the authorities in the Occupied Territories were oppressive and intolerable.
2. The psychological pressure on the Palestinians brought about by such acts as random and unjustified arrests and the humiliation felt by Palestinians at the check points and roadblocks eventually led to violence and rebellion.
3. The poor economic situation and the financial difficulties because of an unjust and unequal Israeli taxation system were further irritants. Palestinians were unreasonably taxed at much higher levels than Israelis.
4. There was a general loss of hope that a political solution to the Palestinian problem would ever come to fruition.<sup>20</sup>

In another interview, Abu-Qais, 40 years old, from Jenin Refugee Camp, jailed twice for 15 months, and with a Fatah affiliation, works as a cab driver. Abu-Qais believes the Uprising was a result of:

1. The Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, along with psychological, social, and economic pressure and lack of citizen freedoms, led to unrest.
2. The discrimination against Palestinian workers by Israeli workers was offensive and often turned violent. An example of the repeated instances of disrespect by Israelis was the habit of calling Arabic workers names like Arabi, which was offensive to Palestinians.
3. The dehumanization of the Palestinians at the many roadblocks throughout the country was a key cause of the rebellion.
4. The unjustified arrests and killings were a primary cause of the Uprising.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup>Abu Assem, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Yabad, 14 June 2003.

<sup>21</sup>Abu-Qais, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Jenin Refugee Camp, 14 June 2003.

In another interview, Mr. Abu-Zainah, a 52-year-old businessman from the city of Jenin, added that the Uprising was a direct result of the killing of the workers in Jabaliah by Israeli drivers. Also, Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were concomitant causes of the rebellion and included, in his opinion, a kind of general discrimination that severely reduced the quality of life. That, along with the dehumanizing treatment of Palestinians at check points and roadblocks, was a re-occurring complaint.”<sup>22</sup>

Mr. Abdulah Zakarnih, 39 years old, from the city of Qubattia, was jailed 27 times for a period of eleven and a half years. He is a high school graduate with Fatah affiliation, and believes the Uprising took place because of the following:

1. The harsh treatment of the Palestinians, such as the unjustified arrests and killings, was a basis for deep-seated anger, which was at long last expressed in outright rebellion.
2. The occupation and the confiscation of Palestinian lands remained a source of latent pain.
3. The destruction of the Palestinian education system with Israeli-trained, uncertified teachers who knew nothing about the Palestinian culture. Additionally, the Israelis closed educational institutions for long periods of time, which ultimately prevented thousands of students from going to college, earning degrees and perhaps establishing viable careers.
4. The continuous unemployment among the Palestinians exacerbated restlessness.
5. The accident which took place in Jabalia refugee camp, during which seven Palestinians were killed by an Israeli truck driver, was a catalyst for immediate violence.

---

<sup>22</sup>Abu-Zainah, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Jenin, 14 June 2003.

Khaled Jamal, from the city of Qubattia, 33 years old, jailed three times for a period of 18 months and owner of a clothing factory, stated the causes for the Uprising as follows:

1. The occupation of the Palestinian lands, which was considered a grave injustice.
2. Life under the Occupation was like life in jail and the cause of much frustration.
3. Preventing students from completing their education was an Israeli strategy that truncated ambition and lowered expectations for future success. It also was a key cause of the Uprising.
4. The unavailability of careers for average citizens, who found themselves working in Israel on jobs that did not fit their social status, caused much unrest.
5. The Israeli policies of preventing Palestinians from traveling abroad for work or for education and an increased awareness among the young about their history, identity and mistreatment contributed to the beginnings of the Uprising.
6. Mr. Jamal owned a clothing factory and used to employ thirty workers and their families. The Israeli authorities made business travel to Israel difficult because of their refusal to issue the needed permits. Thus Mr. Jamal could not purchase materials unavailable in the Palestinian sector. The inability to purchase needed supplies caused him to lose customers and finally, he was forced to close the factory. Thirty families remain without jobs or support. This is one example of Israeli maneuvers designed to prevent the development of a thriving industrial sector in the territories. Their tactics included not only refusal to import or otherwise obtain raw materials from Israel, but stringent restrictions on imports from abroad.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup>Khaled Jamal, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Qubattia, 14 June 2003.

Khaled Dwiakat, 38 years old, from the city of Nablus, with a Masters degree in Education from Jerusalem Open University Center in the City of Tubass, mentioned the following as causes for the Uprising:

1. The Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories for the last twenty years of occupation and the suffering of the Palestinians during this period caused hardship and unrest.
2. The desire of Palestinians to be free from outside domination and to have control over their land and over their destinies was a fundamental motivation for the Uprising.
3. The Jabaliah incident further incensed Palestinians.
4. The deep seated fire of revolt inside each Palestinian's heart led to an explosion of violence.
5. Palestinians felt isolated, as though they were the only nation in the world under occupation.<sup>24</sup> Such feelings encouraged unity of thought and action.

Abu-Ahmad, 40 years old, from Al-Fará Refugee Camp and a teacher by occupation, proposed the following as causes for the Uprising:

1. Israel's unethical and demeaning policies, such as forcing citizens to take their clothes off in the street or kiss a woman in public, even if she was a stranger — all these policies created instability and discontent.
2. The growing awareness of the Palestinian people about the true meaning of an occupation and the danger to their values, identity and way of life promoted a general feeling that the only means to break free was an uprising.
3. The Jabaliah incident.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup>Khaled Dwiakat, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Nablus, 14 June 2003.

<sup>25</sup>Abu-Ahmed, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Al-Fará Refugee Camp, 14 June 2003.

In another interview, Mr. Abu-Hassan, 28 years old, teacher at Jerusalem Open University who was born in the village of Maythaloun and has a Fatah affiliation, offered the following as causes for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987:

1. The occupation and the psychological pressure which it imposed on Palestinians were acceptable.
2. The occupation policy of television broadcasting of programs not compatible with Palestinian traditions and values served to verify the insidious nature of the perceived enemy.
3. The occupation methods used to force Palestinians to work for Israelis as spies by threatening to use their wives or daughters in a shameful way proved a strong impetus for rebellion.
4. The destruction of educational and learning opportunities, particularly by suppressing any information that might develop Palestinian national identities or help the Palestinians to understand their own history, was just one more way that the Israeli government exercised illegal powers over the Palestinians. An insurrection was inevitable.
5. The destruction of the agricultural sector by flooding the Palestinian market with Israeli products at very cheap prices prevented Palestinian farmers from competing with Israeli farmers. Along with prohibitions against digging wells to extract the needed water for growth and irrigation, Israeli policies drove many to near starvation.
6. The expansion of Israeli settlements and confiscation of Palestinian lands virtually at will was a constant source of conflict.<sup>26</sup>

Abu-Ali, 33 years old, who earned a bachelor's degree in the field of Islamic Studies, spent four years in jail, and has Hamas affiliations, believes the Uprising was the result of:

1. The Israeli's punitive and ruthless economic, social and political policies that caused much suffering among Palestinians also were the genesis of the Uprising.

---

<sup>26</sup>Abu-Hassan, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Maythaloun, 14 June 2003.

2. Israel exploited many Palestinians by forcing them to spy on their fellow citizens. This divide and conquer scheme backfired in that it caused some of the most virulent bitterness and eventually led to sporadic, and then sustained violence.
3. Resentment was especially kindled by the unjustified arrest and killing of Palestinians.<sup>27</sup>

To Uzi Amit-Kohn, author of *Israel, the "Intifada" and the Rule of Law*, there are many reasons for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987, and he mentioned the following:

1. The first major cause for the Uprising can be found in the nationalist sentiments of the residents of the Occupied Territories, coupled with a profound dissatisfaction with the PLO and its lack of progress in advancing the Palestinian status in the political and social realms. From 1982 until 1987, a decline in the influence of the PLO in the international arena can be noted. This failure is exemplified by the PLO's refusal to have the Palestinian issue addressed during the Amman Summit Conference in November 1987 "at which the Palestinian cause had been totally eclipsed by the gulf War, and King Hussein had given the PLO the cold shoulder. Young Palestinians in the Territories came to the realization that achievement of their nationalist aim would not come from abroad and concluded that it was incumbent upon them to take matters into their own hands."<sup>28</sup>
2. The second cause for the Uprising can be seen in the internal infrastructure that had been built in the Territories since the late 1970s. The Palestinians in the Gaza District, Judea, and Samaria had established a number of social and professional organizations, each espousing the political line of one of the various groups within the PLO or Islam. These organizations did not incite the start of the Uprising, which began unmistakably as a mass outburst. They did, however, provide an organizational base for the continuation and direction of the "Intifada" once it had begun and they provided the leadership necessary to chart its course.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup>Abu-Ali, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, 14 June 2003.

<sup>28</sup>Uzi Amith-Kohn, Israel, *The "Intifada" and the Rule of Law* (Israel: Israel Ministry of Defense Publication, 1993), 28.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 28.



3. The third cause of the Uprising can be seen in the changing of the guard within the Palestinian society in the Territories. A new generation of Palestinians was born and educated. This younger generation did not possess memories of Jordanian rule over Judea and Samaria, or Egyptian rule over Gaza, during which the government of these countries did not hesitate to use tanks and live ammunition to quell civil unrest. Rather, this was a generation that had grown up under the leadership of an Israeli democracy and had learned that the organs of democracy, such as the Supreme Court and the free press, were at its disposal. These young people, moreover, worked in Israel and learned what it means to live in an open society. Consequently, the fear of military or governmental intervention and retribution for internal strife had not been inculcated into the consciousness of this generation. A year after the onset of the “Intifada,” Salah Khalaf, a member of the General Committee of Fatah, stated that a new generation had emerged that knows no fear, [and] is free of the complex that we suffered from when we lived in the Arab world.<sup>30</sup>
  
4. The fourth reason can be seen from Israeli policy in the Territories. This policy (military authorities) produced a feeling of absence of rule among the young Palestinians. The laxity on the part of the Israeli military instilled the Palestinians with the belief that Israel would not be prepared or interested in maintaining its rule over the area at all costs. This misguided belief fostered the protest by the Palestinian youths.<sup>31</sup>

For those Palestinians interested in preserving their own identity, the Intifada became the vehicle by which they could rhetorically reaffirm the existence of the Palestinian state. For many of the social actors on the Gaza and the West Bank, the Uprising was more than a land dispute — it was a struggle to maintain a fragile identity in a world that has too easily erased many other colonies.<sup>32</sup>

“The Revolt,” a university graduate explained bitterly, “is a result of the ceaseless harassment and humiliation. It makes no sense to shoot at young people who are

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>32</sup>Marouf Hasian and Lisa A. Flores, “Children of the Stones: The Intifada and the Mythic Creation of the Palestinian State,” *Southern Communication Journal* 62, no. 21 (1997): 89-106.

throwing stones. It is senseless to order armed soldiers to face the population . . . Our life here has become an indescribable nightmare. The prisons are crowded with humiliated detainees. Who hears about them? Where is the coexistence they are talking about?”<sup>33</sup>

Frustration and a powerful sense of humiliation, deprivation and discrimination, according to a Palestinian lecturer at An-Najah University in Nablus, were chief catalysts of the Uprising.<sup>34</sup>

During the Amman Summit, King Hussein of Jordan and a number of other Arab leaders indicated that they now considered Iran, rather than Israel, to be the most serious threat to the Arab world. The summit had failed to devote any serious attention to the situation in the Occupied Territories or to the Palestinian struggle more generally.<sup>35</sup>

In the words of Emile Nakhleh, a Palestinian-American scholar who had visited the area a few months earlier, “Gaza resembles a pressure-cooker ready to explode. In this ‘forgotten corner of Palestine,’ one witnesses overcrowding, poverty, hatred, violence, oppression, poor sanitation, anger, frustration, drugs, and crime. The Palestinian population is daily becoming more resentful and rebellious. The military occupation responds by becoming more insecure and oppressive.”<sup>36</sup> To Nakhleh, more

---

<sup>33</sup>Geoffery Aronson, *Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank* (London, England: Kegan Paul International Limited, 1990), 320.

<sup>34</sup>Aryeh Shalev, “The Intifada: Causes and Effects,” *Jerusalem Post* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 17.

<sup>35</sup>Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994), 682.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 683.

and more Palestinians in the territories were now persuaded that only their own efforts offered any hope to a change in the status quo. “Reliance on outside help has proven futile,” he noted following his visit, and hence, “It has become apparent to West Bank and Gaza Palestinians that outside actors — Arab and foreign — have been unable either to resolve the conflict or to end the occupation.”<sup>37</sup>

In an interview with Israel Radio’s English-Language Service on December 10, 1987, Rashad Al-Shawa--former mayor of Gaza--said, “One should expect such things after 20 years of miserable occupation. The people have lost hope. They are absolutely frustrated. They don’t know what to do. They have taken a line of fundamentalists, being the last resort that they can look up. They have lost hope that Israel will ever give them their rights. They feel the Arab countries are unable to accomplish anything. They feel that the PLO, which they regarded as their representative, has failed to accomplish anything.”<sup>38</sup>

A graduate student from Bir Zeit University described the situation in the Occupied territories, by saying, “We have to remember that 75 percent of the population of the West Bank is under 28 years old, which makes us a very young society compared to the rest of the world.” Also, “We have been under occupation for over 20 years, which means we have a new generation, a Palestinian generation, born under occupation. This generation does not know anything but Israeli military rules, Israeli military oppression, demolition of houses, settlement building, and soldiers patrolling the streets beating up

---

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 684.

<sup>38</sup>Shalev, 17.

Palestinians. This is their image of the occupation. This is why they took the lead at the beginning of the Uprising, and why they are right now fighting the occupation and making the Uprising more successful.”<sup>39</sup>

The Intifada came on the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the conquest of Palestine by the British Imperial forces led by General Allenby. Barely 21 years after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the concomitant inhumane treatment of the local population, the Palestinians confronted their occupiers in the Intifada. Israel should have expected the Intifada. But, blinded by its ideological and historically rooted racism by its role as a colonial power and by its close affiliation with the principal Western Power of the world, Israel and its friends were caught by total surprise when the Intifada broke out.<sup>40</sup>

The resultant Israeli attacks on Palestinian bases in Lebanon, where many West Bank and Gaza residents had relatives, was perceived as an attempt to liquidate the whole Palestinian community. The failure by Arab states to intervene in Lebanon or take other action that might deter Israel — the Arab Conspiracy of Silence — was regarded by Palestinians as an act of treachery. It — the failure of the Arab states or the attacks by Israel? Clarification needed] was even compared to the Palestinian defeat in 1948 and to Jordanian repressions of 1970-1971.<sup>41</sup> The Palestinians were seen as isolated and lonely,

---

<sup>39</sup>Phylis Bennis, *From Stone to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising* (Brooklyn, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1990), 44.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>41</sup>Don Peretz, *Intifada, The Palestinian Uprising* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1990), 19.

as distinct from other Arabs; many were thus led to feel “shame for being an Arab, but pride in being Palestinians.”<sup>42</sup>

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, routed the 15,000 strong PLO fighting force and put its entire infrastructure under siege for nearly the entire summer. At the end of August, Palestinian military, administrative, and political forces were evacuated from Lebanon under U.S. supervision. Their only shred of honor [wording] was the ability to hoist their weapons as they boarded ship in Beirut Port.<sup>43</sup>

If the PLO was still in Beirut, “there would have been no Intifada” because people in the territories would still be waiting for salvation from the outside.<sup>44</sup>

A sense of hopelessness pervaded the territories in November 1987 — a feeling that all the diplomatic jet-setting by PLO executive members and Arab statesmen would not bring an end to the occupation.<sup>45</sup>

The Palestinian Uprising, in my view, is the most important political development in the history of the Palestinian people so far. Where the Arab revolt of 1936-1939 failed, the Uprising has succeeded in uniting all Palestinians in a common endeavor.<sup>46</sup> This is freedom of mind and spirit, the discovery of dignity and self-respect after decades

---

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>43</sup>Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of the People* (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1993), 236.

<sup>44</sup>Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and the History of the PLO* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), 92.

<sup>45</sup>Kimmerling and Migdal, 266.

<sup>46</sup>David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989), VIII.

of helplessness, frustration, and dependence. This is the most important outcome of the Uprising.<sup>47</sup>

On the evening of September 16, 1982, the Phalangists entered the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps in Lebanon — and began the massacre which was to end in the death of perhaps 2,000 refugees. Although it has since been established that Israeli officers knew the massacre was taking place that evening, they allowed the Phalangists to remain inside the Camps until September 18, and even assisted them with flares and logistical help.<sup>48</sup>

Intifada was an explosion of frustrated energy waiting to happen after 20 years of Israeli military occupation and repression, and the repeated failure of diplomatic and political efforts to improve the Palestinians' conditions or move toward statehood.<sup>49</sup>

The Intifada, however, cannot be understood as an isolated event frozen in particular time periods. In order to comprehend its underlying significance, we must view it as a dynamic part of the Palestinian struggle, as an alternative means with a singular goal: freedom from occupation and independent statehood — which the Israelis have historically tried to deny rhetorically and obstruct concretely.<sup>50</sup>

One of the indirect causes for the Uprising was the suffering of the Palestinians while they were traveling through the Arab countries, especially if they had Palestinian

---

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 206.

<sup>48</sup>Michael Adams, 50.

<sup>49</sup>Edgar O'Ballance, *The Palestinian Intifada* (London, England: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998), 25.

<sup>50</sup>Samih K. Farsoun and Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 215.

travel documents. But when the Palestinians traveled with a U.S. or Canadian passport, or any other foreign passport, he or she was welcome.<sup>51</sup>

The growth of the Islamic movement in the Occupied Territories had its own impact on the Palestinians' life and the Uprising in the future. One Israeli officer said, "When I used to enter houses in Gaza or in the West Bank, I used to see Arafat's pictures and a verse from the Quran hanging on the wall. I asked myself this question, 'What will happen if Arafat is gone?' I guess nobody will replace him, but I am afraid "Mohamed" will, then he is not going to attend the peace conference in Geneva."<sup>52</sup>

David Muller, British Foreign Minister, described the life of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories as "humiliation in any civilized standard."<sup>53</sup> According to Moshe Máoz, the Intifada began on a very ripe soil of frustration, of poverty, of a feeling that occupation would go on forever and something should be done.<sup>54</sup>

In a 1989 interview with Hanan Ayad, a Bir Zeit University student, the following was postulated about the causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987:

The Uprising was a result of the bad treatment of the occupation to the Palestinians. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are oppressed peoples. They cannot do what they want to do. Deportation, killing, and economic and social war are waged against them by the occupation forces. Planting of collaborators among the people created more and more trouble to the Palestinian people, along with the closing of learning institutions

---

<sup>51</sup>Tysier Jubarah, *The Palestinian Popular Uprising* (Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National University Press, 1988), 13.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>53</sup>Rajiah I. Sudqi, "The Palestinian Uprising and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *International Politics* 192, (1988): 150.

<sup>54</sup>Moshe Máoz, et al, *From Peace to War*, New York, New York: New York University Press, 1994), 27.

(universities, schools, and other institutions). The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories could not take any more of this treatment. They were ready to explode, and, on December 7, 1987, they did.”<sup>55</sup>

In another interview given on November 8, 1989, Kamal Gibril, 23-year-old worker from the city of Kalkilah, hypothesized that “The Palestinian Uprising erupted as a result of frustration accumulated over 20 years of occupation. The killing of innocent people, the demolition of houses without justification, deportation, jailing people — young, old, men, and women — all these things had left a psychological impact in the lives of the people. Also, the Palestinians have nobody to depend on for their salvation. They cannot depend on Jordan, Syria or Egypt or any other country in the Arab world, because all these countries have ties with imperialist countries. For that, the Palestinians realized that they have to depend on themselves for their salvation and the Uprising is the way.”<sup>56</sup>

In another interview, Issam Romaneh, 25-year-old employee from Bir Ziet, stated, “The Palestinian Uprising occurred because (1) The people used to dream that the leaders who are charged with running their affairs are working to serve them, but they woke up from their dream to discover that their leaders are the ones who found Israel, and they are working hard to protect it. For that, there is no hope from these regimes to liberate any part of Palestine from the enemy; (2) In my opinion, the problem here is a matter of justice. The Palestinians were oppressed too hard and too much by the occupation forces, and denied justice — for this they upraised [sic] to lift oppression

---

<sup>55</sup>Yahia Adel, et al., *Who is Making the History? The Oral History of the Uprising* (Shuffat, Jerusalem: Tamer Publication for Social Education, 1994), 152-153.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 195-196



from their shoulders and from their life, in order for them to live free in their own homeland.”<sup>57</sup>

In another 1995 interview conducted in Washington, D.C., Jamal Hassan, a 53-year-old ex-prisoner now working with the Palestinian authority, mentioned the following causes for the Uprising:

1. The loss of the Palestinian bases in Lebanon, and the evacuation of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon gave the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories a sense of hopelessness, and the feeling that their salvation had to come from themselves and nobody else.
2. The life of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories became unbearable as a result of the military rule and the Israeli policies which intervened in every aspect of the Palestinians' life. For the Palestinians, the Uprising was the solution to decades of suffering.
3. The disrespectful treatment of the Palestinians in the Arab world included name calling, conferring foreign status, i.e., non-membership as true Arabs, and exhibiting no respect for Palestinian rights in their own usurped homelands. Also, the PLO and its leaders were generally subjected to shameless effronteries at important political and economic meetings hosted by Arab countries, which often showed a complete lack of sensitivity to Palestinian problems.
4. When news of secret talks between Israel and some Arab countries emerged, the result was Palestinian mistrust of any Arab country that negotiated on behalf of the Palestinians. Palestinians adopted a “go it alone” attitude and realized that they had to decide their future by themselves, depending on nobody but themselves -- and the Palestinians did just that in December 1987.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 251-252.

<sup>58</sup>Jamal Hassan, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Maythaloun, 13 March 1995.

### The Hashemites as a Proxy for Israel

The Zionists and the Hashemites are long time allies, who through many years of clandestine cooperation, worked to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.<sup>59</sup> In a series of secret meetings in the 1940s and early 1950s, Ábdullah — King of Jordan and Zionist leaders (especially Golda Meir) struck a deal whereby Ábdullah would occupy and annex Central Palestine — known today as the West Bank — and leave the rest to Israel. This deal allowed Ábdullah to transform Jordan and make himself into a full-fledged king, while giving the Zionists a free hand to defeat the military forces of other Arab counties and conquer most of Palestine.<sup>60</sup>

The Israeli-Hashemite “special relationship” endured for decades, rooted in a common rejection of Palestinian rights and independence. It was, in the end, the Intifada that finally induced Hussein to reassert Jordanian influence in the West Bank and formally renounce his dynasty’s claim to Palestine.<sup>61</sup>

On September 6, 1970, a civil war took place in Jordan, between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian guerrillas. Full warfare ensued, using heavy armor, artillery, and air attacks. The Jordanians inflicted a shattering defeat with around three thousand Palestinians dying in the fighting. Some units (Palestinians) preferred crossing the Jordan River and surrendering to the Israelis rather than falling into Jordanian hands. In

---

<sup>59</sup>Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1989), 206.

<sup>60</sup>Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1989), 198.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, 198-199.

the aftermath of this episode, Jordan closed all the PLO institutions and arrested those leaders who had not managed to flee.<sup>62</sup>

### The Israeli Factor

It is not the intent of this section to chronicle every policy that Israel had carried out in the Occupied Territories between 1967 and 1987. The purpose of this section is to assess the impact of the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories on the Palestinians, and how those policies participated in pushing the Palestinians to revolt against the Israeli occupation.

The ultimate Israeli objective in the Occupied Territories was not merely to benefit economically from its underdevelopment policies but rather to use them as an instrument to tear down the fabric of Palestinian society and subsequently de-Palestinize the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>63</sup> The Israelis were no different from the French in Algeria, the Belgians in the Congo, or the British in Palestine.<sup>64</sup>

F. Robert Hunter, in his book, *The Palestinian Uprising* (1991), wrote the following about the Palestinian Uprising and why it took place late:

Increased incomes and consumer spending prevented many Palestinians from apprehending the dangers of the occupation more quickly. The same value of work in the Arab world also helped produce acquiescence. Also during the 1970's, owing to increased oil production and higher prices, many Palestinians found lucrative employment in the Persian Gulf. Transfer payments from Palestinians outside to their families inside the Occupied Territories were a very important source of exchange. This additional income contributed to consumerism, but it also made possible higher education for Palestinian children (which raised

---

<sup>62</sup>Kimmerling, 230.

<sup>63</sup>Shanee Marks, *Where is Palestine? The Arabs in Israel* (London, England: Pluto Press, 1984), 49.

<sup>64</sup>Ali Jalal Abed, 2.

political awareness) and the building of all kinds of social organizations that later became a base for opposition to the occupation.<sup>65</sup>

In the early years, the occupation did not greatly interfere in the daily lives of most people. Minimum intervention was the policy of the Labor government, which believed that if it could enable the population to lead a “normal” life, Palestinians would be brought to accept the status quo and be weaned away from their own national aspirations.<sup>66</sup>

Palestinians thus possessed no right that should be defended against the authorities of an occupation which was by no means benign.<sup>67</sup>

#### The Israeli Antagonism Towards the Palestinians

Most of the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, if not all of them, are the reflection of the Israeli way of thinking, their image, and their perception of the Palestinian people. Many Israelis would argue that Palestinians do have a right to form their own nation. They simply need to look elsewhere.<sup>68</sup>

Ariel Sharon, later Prime Minister of Israel, told one American interviewer that:

Jordan is Palestine. The Capital of Palestine is Amman. If Palestinian Arabs want to find their political expression, they will have to do it in Amman. The land west of the Jordan River, between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, is Israel. Judea, Samaria — the so-called West Bank — and Gaza are Israel. We will never give them up. There will be no second Palestinian land west of the Jordan River.<sup>69</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup>F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991), 38-39.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 40.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 45.

<sup>68</sup>T. Katriel, “Site of Memory: Discourse of the Past in Israel. Pioneering Settlement Museum,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 80 (1941): 1-20.

<sup>69</sup>M.J. Gart, “Never, Never, Never!” *Time*, 17 April 1989, 40.

R. Weitz, who was for many years head of the Jewish Agency's Colonization Department, stated the following:

Between ourselves, it must be clear there is no room for both people together in this country . . . There is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to neighboring countries, to transfer all of them: not one village, not one tribe, should be left.<sup>70</sup>

A Zionist emissary, during an official 1930s visit with Ghandi, the founding father of modern, independent India, brazenly asserted that "Palestine itself was a wasted space when we went there . . . No one else wanted it."<sup>71</sup>

Even after they completed the conquest of Palestine in 1967, Zionist leaders continued to reassert the view. In 1969, Golda Meir, then Israel's Prime Minister, said of the Palestinian people, "They did not exist."<sup>72</sup> A young Israeli soldier participating in the invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 said, "I would like to see all the Palestinians dead because they are a sickness wherever they go."<sup>73</sup>

In a moment of undisguised contempt, Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel in the late 1970s, declared that the Palestinians to him are "two-legged vermin." To General Rafail Eytan, Israeli Chief of Staff, they were "drugged roaches in a bottle." To Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister, they were "grass hoppers." To the more polite, Palestinians were "the Arab of Judea and Samaria." To the *New York Times*, they were

---

<sup>70</sup>Arie Bober, ed., *The Other Israel* (New York, New York: Double Day Press, 1972), 13.

<sup>71</sup>Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens, ed., *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Questions* (New York, New York: Grand Street Publications, Inc., 1988), 249.

<sup>72</sup>*The Sunday Times*, 15 June 1969.

<sup>73</sup>*The Times*, 17 June 1982.

simply “Arabs.”<sup>74</sup> General Avigdor Ben Gal, former Commander of the Northern Front, described the Arabs inside Israel as “a cancer in the Israeli body politic.”<sup>75</sup> Ahad Haán observed: “We think that the Arabs are all savages who live like animals and do not understand what is happening around.”<sup>76</sup>

In 1981, Rabbi Meir Kahane made the following assertion, “I do not feel sorry for the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), no matter how much they feel that the land is theirs. I do not feel for them because I know that the land is not theirs, that it is Jewish.”<sup>77</sup>

Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister in 1948, plainly put it, “Israel is the country of the Jews and only the Jews.”<sup>78</sup>

Until recently, most Zionists have claimed that the Palestinians do not exist or that they are simply part of the Arab world with no distinct identity. The Zionist slogan first coined by Israel Zangwill, a founder of Zionism, that Palestine was ‘ a Land without people, waiting for people without land,’ captured the essence of Israeli denial of the essential humanity of the Palestinian people.<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup>Lockman and Beinin, 11-12.

<sup>75</sup>Michael Jansen, *Dissonance in Zion* (London, England: Zed Book Ltd., 1987), 16.

<sup>76</sup>Ofira Seliktor, *New Zionism and the Foreign Policy of Israel* (Chicago, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 48.

<sup>77</sup>Ali Jalal Abed, 17.

<sup>78</sup>Alfred Lilienthal, “Zionism: The Occupying Power,” *Middle East Perspective* VIII, no. 3 (1984): 4.

<sup>79</sup>Israel Zangwill, “The Return to Palestine,” *New Liberal View*, December 1901, 627.

Israel has always based its institutions on the denial of equality to non-Jews. This principle derives from the tents of Zionism from its very inception, long before the establishment of Israel.<sup>80</sup>

### The Israeli Land Confiscation Policies

Up to 60 percent of the land on the West Bank is susceptible to expropriation under the present Israeli interpretation of Ottoman law. Under the old Turkish law Code, lands which are uninhabited and beyond the sound of human voice from the nearest village revert to the state. The burden of proof is carried by the counter-claimant.<sup>81</sup>

By 1984, the total amount of land taken by Israel under this category (non-cultivation and non-registration land) had reached 1,800,000 dunams (one dunam = .25 acre). Lands were also seized through various other mechanisms; for example, expropriation for public use (50,000 dunams were so taken with 100,000 designated for future expropriation).<sup>82</sup>

Military orders were also used justify the expropriation of land. According to Order 393 (1970), a military commander could prohibit construction in any area. By the mid-1980s, 580,000 dunams had been placed under such restrictions.<sup>83</sup> Other lands were declared Combat Zones (Military Order 271, 1968), and thus rendered virtually

---

<sup>80</sup>Israel Shahak, "Internal Criticism "Anti-Semitic" Outside Israel," *The Washington Report of the Middle East Affairs* X, no. 3 (1991): 23.

<sup>81</sup>U.S. House of Representatives, *The Unfinished Business of the Peace Process in the Middle East*, November 6-20, 1982, 28.

<sup>82</sup>Hunter, 48.

<sup>83</sup>Hunter, 48.

inaccessible to Palestinian property owners.<sup>84</sup> By the mid-1980s, 250,000 dunams had been declared nature reserves, another way of restricting Palestinian land use and construction. All these things were done to acquire sufficient space for Jewish settlements.<sup>85</sup>

About 55 percent of the total land area in the West Bank and 30 percent of the total land in Gaza are now in Jewish hands.<sup>86</sup>

#### Israeli Settlement Policies

Israel's settlement policies on the West Bank together with its other West Bank policies have led to more violence and deterioration of Israeli-Arab relations in the Occupied Territories over the last two years. It is difficult to say today whether the de facto annexation of the West Bank has occurred or not.<sup>87</sup>

The rate of Jewish population increase on the West Bank rose above the Arab population growth rate around 1987 and 1988. By that time the Jewish population in the West Bank reached around 100,000 inhabitants, excluding Jerusalem. There were 75 settlements existing or under construction and at least 25 others in the planning stages. The most significant development is the planning and construction of ten urban settlements whose population could eventually rise to 320,000.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup>Hunter, 48.

<sup>85</sup>Hunter, 48.

<sup>86</sup>Lockman and Beinin, ed., 130.

<sup>87</sup>U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Middle East, 1982: The Unfinished Business of the Peace Process in the Middle East*, 28.

<sup>88</sup>*Yediot Ahronot*, 19 October 1982.



It is not just the Israeli army that is responsible for acts of brutality against the local population. Both Jewish settlers and members of the Village Leagues have been similarly involved. An article by Michael Meron in *Yediot Ahronot* (19.10.82) described the settlement of Kiryat Arba — a Jewish settlement near Hebron in the West Bank — following the arrest of four of their members on charges involving the use of explosives. Meron met with a number of settlers and their view of the Palestinians was quoted. Tzvi Katzover, husband of the deputy head of the local council, had this to say, “The Arabs don’t understand democracy. They understand a different language. With them you must use collective punishment in order to deter.”<sup>89</sup>

In another article about the settlers, published in *Davar* (9-4-82), Dani Rubinstein wrote the following:

The truth is that they (settlers) can behave as they wish in the Occupied Territories, not only when they are under attack, but even with their punishment operations. Those who broke car windows in Arab towns have never been caught. Those who threw hand grenades at the house of the widow in Hebron have never been caught, nor those who put bombs under the cars of the Arab mayors. And if some of them are caught, as in the case of causing damage to Arab houses in Hebron or the murder of the Arab from East Jerusalem, the Lederman Affairs, are not punished seriously, or they are freed.<sup>90</sup>

Also, there are hundreds of incidents during which settlers kidnapped and killed Palestinians and an equal number of cases involving settlers who uprooted trees, destroyed crops, poisoned water wells, and killed livestock in many villages in the Occupied Territories. Though the intent of this section is not to delineate every incident

---

<sup>89</sup>Timothy Hiller, *Law in the Service of Man/AL-Haq* (Ramallah, West Bank: 1983), 17.

<sup>90</sup>Dani Rubinstein, *Davar*, 4 September 1982, In *Al-Haq*, 17.

in detail, it is important to provide brief but insightful information about the settlers and what they are doing to the Palestinians.

#### Israeli Detention Policy in the Occupied Territories

Under Military Order 378, the military authorities in the West Bank have broad powers of arrest. Section 78(a) states that a soldier may arrest, without an arrest warrant, any person who commits, or is suspected of having committed an offense under the Order. A person so detained can be held for up to 18 days on the warrant of a police officer before being brought before the court. A military court may then extend the arrest warrant for a period not exceeding six months (section 78(f)).<sup>91</sup>

Under the Defense (Emergency) Regulation, any soldier or police authority can make an arrest in the Occupied Territories without a warrant. Suspects can be detained up to four days by any soldier or policeman and held for an additional four days for little or no reason. Detainees can be kept up to eighteen days before being brought to a military court, which could extend detention up to six months without trial.<sup>92</sup>

On February 27, 1982, David Shipler reported in the *New York Times* on the arrest of many Palestinian youths and their detention for a period of several weeks, "Boys of 14 and 15 are taken by the Israeli army for days of interrogation without formal charges; without counsel, without a visit from their parents."<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup>Al-Haq, 20.

<sup>92</sup>Don Peretz, 7.

<sup>93</sup>David Shipler, *The New York Times*, 27 February 1982.

Mussa Ahmad Massud, 15, was arrested on December 12, 1981, and released after 49 days. The Israeli Defense forces' spokesman, Aluf Ya'acov Even, said that he "did not confess during questioning and was released for lack of evidence."<sup>94</sup> From 1967 to 1982, more than 300,000 Palestinians were detained without trial for various periods by Israeli security forces.<sup>95</sup>

#### Israeli Policies in Torturing and Harassing the Palestinians

During the months of March, April, and May of 1987, independent researchers recorded instances of child abuse by the Israeli military. The data were collected from children living in refugee camps established by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency in Jalazone north of the town of Ramallah, Balata south of Nablus, Dahisha south of Bethlehem, and refugee communities in the Gaza Strip.<sup>96</sup> Evidence compiled from this report reveals that children are subjected to arbitrary arrest, are interrogated, humiliated, and tortured during lengthy periods of incommunicado detention, and are denied access to a fair trial. The report includes instances of children being shot by the military with live ammunition.<sup>97</sup>

The modus operandi of the Israeli military rule ensures that every child arrested, whether held for two hours or two months, is subjected to intimidation, humiliation, and excessive use of force. The West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of

---

<sup>94</sup>Al-Haq, 20.

<sup>95</sup>Lockman and Beinun, 108.

<sup>96</sup>U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 100<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1987, 97.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 97.

Jurists cites as a matter of Israeli policy, the random detention, humiliation, and intimidation of Palestinians. The incidence of torture of children is not exceptional. It is an institutional method of controlling the population within the Occupied Territories.<sup>98</sup>

In many cases, children are imprisoned without charge and released without trial, usually after 18 days of detention. In its 1986 Occupied Territories Human Rights Report, the U.S. State Department found that most Palestinians do not know the reason for their arrest.<sup>99</sup> The research discloses that often children are tortured into confessing to acts they never committed. Moreover, since confessions are written in Hebrew, and few Palestinian children can read Hebrew, the children do not know to what they are confessing.<sup>100</sup>

Furthermore, after a child has been arrested, even if kept for 18 days without charge and released, the child's chance for re-arrest increases. When children reach the age of 16, they are issued an I.D. card. If they have been arrested, that information is stamped on the I.D., making them more vulnerable to arrest. Prisoners have a progressively harder interrogation the more often they are arrested.<sup>101</sup> Michael Adams, an English Journalist, made an inquiry on the spot concerning Israel's treatment of the civilian population of the Gaza Strip. In his report he wrote: "I had my ups and downs during four years as a prisoner of war in Germany, but the Germans never treated me as

---

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 98.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., 98.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., 98.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., 99.

harshly as the Israelis are treating the Arabs of the Gaza Strip, the majority of who are women and children.”<sup>102</sup>

Harassment of Palestinians still persists. There are midnight raids at homes, arrest and detention without charges and curfews imposed on entire villages. During this year’s Passover, 60,000 Palestinians in Hebron were shut up in their homes all week so that Jewish settlers could saunter in the streets.<sup>103</sup> In May 1982, a press conference was called by ten members of the Israeli group Peace Now. All ten of them had recently returned from service in the army in the Hebron area. They outlined a long list of atrocities carried out by the Israeli army. One of the soldiers, Yural Neriya, described the situation in the Occupied Territories as one of “oppression, humiliation, maltreatment, and collective punishment.” Other soldiers spoke of particular incidents:

I witnessed many cases of collective punishment; I saw a shocking case. A soldier wrote the identity numbers of Arab prisoners on their arms. Ironically it was Holocaust Day. The feeling is that such things are legitimate . . . Gabi Bainot.<sup>104</sup>

Another soldier said, “I saw a shocking thing. They put clubs in the hands of newly recruited soldiers, who can’t use guns yet, and told them: ‘Have a go at the local . . .’ The Arab detainees clean the lavatories, the rooms, and the plates of the soldiers. At night they are put in a small room and beaten. Many of them can’t stand on their legs

---

<sup>102</sup>Henry Cattan, *The Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice* (London, England: Longmans, Green and Company, Ltd., 1969), 112.

<sup>103</sup>Mariam Ward, “Another Perspective on Middle East Peace,” *America* 173, no. 1 (1995): 8.

<sup>104</sup>Al-Haq, 15.

afterwards. These are detainees, most of them won't even be brought to court but will be released due to lack of evidence . . . Rami Avni."<sup>105</sup>

As a result of the press conference and the ensuing publicity, seven soldiers were brought to trial to face a variety of assault charges. The Court reached its verdict on February 17, 1983. Three of the defendants were acquitted and the other four were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of between two to six months.<sup>106</sup>

Uri Benstein, in a speech before Tel Aviv University Press, stated the following, "We, the Jews, that have been through so many fires, so much repression of religion and repression of culture, today restrict, prevent and confiscate literature in the Occupied Territories."<sup>107</sup>

#### Israeli Economic Policies in the Occupied Territories

For the past 24 years of their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israelis have systematically done everything in their power to block the normal development of the Palestinian economy. They have striven to make the Palestinian economy totally dependent on, and subordinate to, that of Israel. A major result has been creation of a workforce of 120,000 Palestinians who are forced to cross the Green Line every day to work in menial jobs in Israel.<sup>108</sup> One Israeli military order in the West Bank,

---

<sup>105</sup>*Al-Hamishmar*, 5 November 1982, and in *Jerusalem Post*, 5 November 1982.

<sup>106</sup>*Al-Haq*, 15.

<sup>107</sup>Uri Benstein, Tel Aviv University Press, Quoted in *Haáretz*, 13 March 1982, also in *Al-Haq*, 25.

<sup>108</sup>Frank Collins, "Palestinian Economy in Chaos After Gulf War," *The Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs* X, no. 2 (1991): 23.

for example, makes it illegal for Palestinians to pick and sell wild thyme, to protect Israeli families' monopoly over the herb's production.<sup>109</sup>

Israel's policy after 1967 was aimed at preventing the development of a strong and independent Palestinian economy, which might compete with the Israeli economy and create the infrastructure for a Palestinian state. Dependency was assured by forcing Palestinians to work in Israel and the integrating of road, electricity, and water networks.<sup>110</sup>

Economic frustration was further exacerbated by the growing number of young people and university graduates who were not able to find employment that fit their educational levels either in Israel or in the Territories.<sup>111</sup> It is clear that a combination of social, political, economic, and demographic factors formed the background of the Uprising.<sup>112</sup>

#### Other Factors

Many reasons have been mentioned as causes for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987, but there are still other causative issues that should be referenced.

1. The inability of Palestinians families to visit with family members who lived abroad is considered by some a reason for the Uprising. Tens of thousands of applications had been submitted to the authority but they

---

<sup>109</sup>Lockman and Beinin, 108.

<sup>110</sup>Ted R. Gurr, et al, *Revolution of the Late Twentieth Century* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 303.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., 303.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 304.

approved only 200 cases in 1985. Israel also used the desire of Palestinians to re-unite with family members living overseas in order to force Palestinians to work for Israel as spies or agents, thus assuring application and permit approval.<sup>113</sup> In addition, Palestinian applicants stood in long lines for hours in front of the military governor's office and, in many cases, they had to come back the next day. In contrast, a Jew was given every consideration and his or her request to go abroad for any reason was quickly expedited. Such treatment was one more reason for acute dissatisfaction with the status quo.<sup>114</sup>

2. The National Identity — Israel for a long time tried to suppress the propensity of Palestinians to pursue their right to a national identity. The Palestinians rebelled against their efforts many times and on many occasions. For instance, they did not want King Hussein to speak in their name on any occasion. They wanted the PLO to be their representative. Also, the Palestinians felt that their problem — the Palestinian Case — no longer occupied the interest of the Arabs or the International Communities. They realized that they have to do something to put back their case on the international agenda of the United Nations, major

---

<sup>113</sup>Tysier Jubarah, 19.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., 19.



countries, and the Arab world who had forgotten about Palestine and its people. The Uprising was the way to do so.<sup>115</sup>

3. The rise of Islamic sentiment in the Occupied Territories among university students helped to keep the people in Occupied Territories from acceding to the influence of perceived depraved values found in Israeli society and promulgated through mass media over which the Palestinians had no control. References to sex, drugs, and many other seeming vulgarities that did not fit in with Islamic principles added to the pervasive aggravations of the Palestinians. A professor from Bear Zait University explained, “Students used to support Jamal Abdul Nasser until 1967, and the PLO until 1982, when they left Lebanon. The students replaced the PLO with the Islamic movement organizations.” Also, he said that, “Israel could uproot my trees, burn my house, but they could not uproot my Islam.”<sup>116</sup> When Ahmad Yassin, the founding father of Hamas, was asked about the Uprising, his answer was, “the active element in the Uprising is the Islamic element with the participation of other elements.”<sup>117</sup> Also, when he was asked why the Uprising had come so late, he said, “because the Islamic awakening came late.”<sup>118</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., 19-20.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., 29-30.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., 32.

4. Also contributing to Palestinian outrage were the Israeli policies of humiliation to the Palestinians, the confiscation of their lands (65% of the West Bank and 45% of Gaza), the control of 70% of the water resources of the Palestinians, the construction of settlements on the Palestinian lands, in a massive way, in order to transfer the Palestinians beyond the Jordan River and consider the Palestinians as “aliens” in their own land.<sup>119</sup>
5. From the Israeli point of view, there are two schools of thought about the Uprising. One argues that the Uprising occurred because of government policies in the occupied Territories. The other says the Uprising was a matter of Fundamentalist Islamic fervor. The first school of thought focuses on the fact that the Palestinians do not want Israelis to rule them, and they do not want to live with Israelis and are trying to destroy the Jews for good. Rabin, at the beginning of the Uprising explained, “There are three major reasons for the Uprising. The fundamentalists, and they are few, the local and the outside media (Arab and international and the outside Palestinian organizations).” Rabin said later when the Uprising was progressing, “The reason for the Uprising is because of the religious, political, and ideological differences between the Palestinians and the Jews.”<sup>120</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup>Omar Masaleha, *The Promised Peace* (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Saqi Publisher, 1994), 236.

<sup>120</sup>Suhail Hussein. *The Uprising* (Jerusalem, West Bank: The Palestinian Academic Foundation for International Affairs, 1991), 140.

6. The other school of thought focuses on religious fundamentalism. For Moshe Arens, Defense Minister during the Uprising, the Islamic movements, especially “the radical” and the rise of radicalism and fundamentalism in the Arab world, ignited the Uprising. Also, the two schools of thought both allow that frustration was a major factor: the feeling of despair, the bitterness of life for the people in the territories, and the unacceptable way of life in the refugee camps. Economic and political difficulties and the impact of an Israeli democracy in conflict with an Islamic theocracy were generally thought by Israel to be reasons for the Uprising.<sup>121</sup>
7. Palestinians, therefore, can be said to also have experienced what Ted Gurr, drawing on James Davies’ earlier work, has characterized as a “progressive deprivation,” as their capabilities for satisfying economic expectations generated by contact with Israeli society and higher education and employment opportunities during the 1970s diminished in the 1980s.<sup>122</sup>  
  
As Aryed Shaleve, Joshua Teitelbaum, and Joseph Kastiner have indicated, the economic downturn in the Gulf countries along with Israel’s growing economic problems, both beginning in the early 1980s,

---

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., 41.

<sup>122</sup>Erika G. Alin, “Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising, and Consequences,” *Comparative Politics* 26 (1994): 478-498.

significantly reduced the economic opportunities and alternatives of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians.<sup>123</sup>

As Edward Siad indicates in Zachar Lockman and Joel Beinin's edited work, that following the 1967 War, Palestinians realized that they "had to arrive at their vision of their own future on their own" and that they could no longer depend on Arab states to fight their military and political battles for them.<sup>124</sup> Yet, it was not until after the losses during the Lebanon War of 1982 that the option of a military struggle was not considered feasible and the PLO was forced to focus more seriously on the prospects of a negotiated settlement. The exiled leadership shifted the concentration of its political attention and significant financial resources to the West Bank and Gaza, and resident Palestinians assumed a central role in the national struggle.

---

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 483.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., 483.

CHAPTER III  
ISRAELI REACTION TO THE UPRISING

INTRODUCTION

During his visit to Paris in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson famously stated, “...Trying to stop a revolutionary movement by troops in the field is like using a broom to hold back a great ocean.”<sup>1</sup> The Palestinian Uprising was a result of twenty years of suffering of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories at the hands of the Israeli Occupation, which tried to hold back that great ocean of rising rebelliousness. It was primarily a social and political movement by the Palestinians against the Israeli oppression.

Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, in their book, *Intifada: Palestinian at the Crossroads* (1990), wrote the following:

The Uprising was essentially a movement of the lower classes, especially the working class and

the semi-working class. For example, a sample of 160 people killed between December 9, 1987, and October 17, 1988, reveals that 44 percent were wage-workers, 33 percent pupils, 5 percent university students, 3 percent farmers, 2 percent office employees, 1 percent intellectual professionals, 2 percent craftsmen, 2 percent merchants and other categories.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>David Sullivan and Martin Sattler, ed., *Revolutionary War: Western Response* (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), vii.

<sup>2</sup>Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, ed., *Intifada: Palestinian At The Crossroads* (New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 177.

The Israeli Shin Bet, the intelligence agency responsible for detecting and monitoring subversion in the Occupied Territories since the 1967 War, was criticized by the Israeli government and senior officials for failing to give advance warning of the Intifada.<sup>3</sup>

Israel used every available means to quell the Uprising. In that regard, Israel's Justice Minister, Dan Meridor, said on 25 September 1989 that "Israel must take extraordinary measures of deterrence, including collective punishment to deal with the Intifada. Since this is a "war" that Israel must win."<sup>4</sup> Security has thus become the ultimate justification for the use of live ammunition, for throwing tear gas canisters into mosques, for breaking bones, for house demolitions, and deportations, and for a Security Service that can beat alleged terrorists to death with impunity and lie under oath in the court.<sup>5</sup>

During the six-year-long Palestinian Uprising against Israeli occupation, Hanan Ashrawi, then a professor of Arts at Bir Zeit University, wrote a poem entitled "From the Diary of an almost Four-year-old" which poignantly captures the human dimension of Palestinian fear and suffering:

Tomorrow the bandages will come off.  
 I wonder, will I see half an oven?  
 Half an apple?  
 Half my mother's face with my one remaining eye?  
 I did not see the bullet.  
 But felt its pain exploding in my head.  
 This image did not disintegrate

---

<sup>3</sup>Edgar O'Ballance, *The Palestinian Uprising* (London, England: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998), 20.

<sup>4</sup>Rex Brynen, 32.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 32.

The soldier with the big gun and steady hands.  
 And the look in his eyes  
 I could not understand.  
 If I can see him so clearly with my eyes closed,  
 It could be that inside our heads  
 We each have one spare set of eyes  
 To make up for the ones we lose. . . .  
 I hear a nine-month-old has also lost an eye.  
 I wonder if my soldier shot her too.  
 A soldier looking for little girls  
     who look him in the eye.  
 I'm old enough, almost four,  
 I've seen enough of life.<sup>6</sup>

From the beginning of the Palestinian Uprising on December 7, 1987, the Israeli government, with the help of the IDF and other security agencies, attempted many kinds of initiatives to stop the Uprising at any cost, but they failed, at that point, to do so.

Military action and measures taken by the IDF within the framework of the law and with a national consensus included curfews and clamp downs, the use of riot batons, teargas, rubber and plastic bullets, and in some cases, live fire. Measures imposed in the civilian sphere by Civil Administration proved unsuccessful in stopping the violence.<sup>7</sup>

In May 1989, the Defense Minister of Israel stated the following:

The mission set for the IDF in the Territories was to lower the level of violence significantly and to allow the normal functioning of the government apparatus and the Civil Administration in the Territories. Unfortunately, I am unable to say today that these objectives have, in fact, been attained.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Hanan Ashrawi, "From the Diary of an Almost Four-year old," in Nancy Murray, *Palestinian: Life Under Occupation* (Boston, Massachusetts: Middle East Justice Network, 1991), 68.

<sup>7</sup>Aryeh Shalev, *The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (Jerusalem Post Press, Jerusalem, Israel: 1991), 13.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 122.

In this work, some of the policies and procedures which were taken by the Israeli government and its apparatus to stop the Uprising will be discussed.

### Israeli Defense Forces Shooting Policy

Israeli forces, under the direction of then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, attempted to control the Uprising by use of extraordinary violence, especially that of breaking Palestinian bones.<sup>9</sup> Hundreds of Palestinians were killed outright, while thousands were injured or permanently maimed. Thousands more were interred in concentration camps without trial. None of these measures had the slightest effect on the Intifada, whose time, evidently, had come with a vengeance.<sup>10</sup>

In the first 18 months of the Uprising alone, according to Chicago-based Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights, 650 Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops and settlers. Serious injuries to fighters or civilians receiving hospitalization or outpatient treatment exceeded 64,000. Forty-six Palestinians were expelled from their homeland, and 30 others were in the process of appealing expulsion orders.<sup>11</sup>

Israeli soldiers used the latest in advanced weapons technology to quell the Uprising. Palestinians sardonically called the steel bullets used in the most current weaponry, “exploding chocolate bars,” Majid Sub’hair said. The 14-year-old from the village of Qabatiya, south of Jenin, spoke from his hospital bed: “I was in the camp

---

<sup>9</sup>Elaine C. Hagopian, “Is The Peace Process a Process for Peace? A Retrospective.” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1997)

<sup>10</sup>Andrew C. Kimmens, 176.

<sup>11</sup>Phyllis Bennis, *From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising* (Brooklyn, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1990), 81-82.



outside the village with my sheep,” he told us. “I saw the soldiers throw something. I did not know what it was. There were about 10 soldiers in the patrol, and they kept walking after they threw it. I picked it up, and it looked like chocolate. It exploded when I tried to open it. Two of my sheep were killed in the explosion. The flames were about two meters across.”<sup>12</sup> A senior physician, treating the boy at Al-Ittihad Hospital in Nablus, said, “I did not know exactly what it is but the only thing I had ever heard of that is anything like this is napalm. We call these things mini-napalm bombs. We have never seen anything like this before.”<sup>13</sup>

According to the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) statistics compiled just in Gaza Strip from the start of the Intifada to the first of March this year, 19,715 children under the age of 15 required medical attention due to IDF acts of violence. Of these, 2,590 were wounded by live ammunition, not rubber bullets.<sup>14</sup>

In 1989, the Palestinian fatalities under age 17 increased to 80, compared to 51 in 1988. Twenty-eight children below the age of 12 were killed in 1989, compared to nine in 1988. In January 1990, military sources confirmed that 72 Palestinian children age 14 or younger had been killed by the security forces since the Uprising began. Young children continued to be shot and killed. In March 1990, a ten-year-old boy was shot

---

<sup>12</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 89.

<sup>13</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 89.

<sup>14</sup>Stephen J. Sosebee, “How to Explain American Apathy Over Israel Killing of Palestinian Children.” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* X, no. 2 (1991): 24.

dead. In April 1990, of nine Palestinians shot dead by the security forces, one was 11 years old and three were between the ages of 13 and 16.<sup>15</sup>

The United States State Department Country report stated, "IDF guidelines often were not followed, resulting in avoidable deaths and injuries. Many deaths and wounds were from bullets in the head or upper body. Misuse of plastic and rubber bullets continued to result in death and serious injury.<sup>16</sup> A report from Amnesty International reported that there were some 128 deaths as a result of the use of plastic bullets."<sup>17</sup>

In Jabaliya Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip on April 26, 1990, the incident began shortly after dawn prayers, the day of Eid al-Fitr Feast which marks the end of Ramadan. In keeping with Moslem religion and custom, families visit cemeteries and private homes to honor the dead. In the wake of stone-throwing by residents, soldiers responded with gunfire and teargas dropped from helicopters. Three Palestinians were shot dead and many more were injured. According to the initial statistics compiled by UNRWA, 215 men, women, and children were injured, 147 by lead, plastic, and rubber-coated metal bullets and 67 by beating.<sup>18</sup> The worst atrocity of the Uprising to date occurred on April 7, at the village of Nahalin, near Bethlehem. Members of the Israeli border police

---

<sup>15</sup>Ben Lynfield, "IDF Violating Its Rules on Shooting Children." *The Jerusalem Post*, 19 January 1990.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1988. 9 May 1990, 46.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 46.

<sup>18</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Development in the West Bank and Gaza*, May 1990, 81.

entered the village early in the morning and attacked people leaving the mosque, killing five and injuring more than 50.<sup>19</sup>

The Jenin area, at the northern end of the West Bank, is a center for young desperadoes. Several have been shot by soldiers in what looks suspiciously like a shoot-to-kill policy. After one incident in nearby City of Nablus, the army spokesman gave contradictory accounts of how three wanted men had been killed. Israel boasted publicly that much of its action was being carried out by undercover units of Arabic-speaking soldiers.<sup>20</sup>

Based on press accounts, the estimated number of Palestinian deaths in June and July of 1989 was 94 of which 27 were instances of Palestinians killing other Palestinians.<sup>21</sup> From December 9, 1987 until December 10, 1989, 795 Palestinians died in the Occupied Territories at the hands of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The victims ranged in age from newborn infants to elderly and included women; however, the vast majority were in their teens and early twenties.<sup>22</sup>

Patrick Leahy, a senator from Vermont, observed on February 10, 1993, after a visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, that there must be a better way for a democratic country to defend itself against a 13-year-old girl throwing stone than

---

<sup>19</sup>Michael Adams, 61.

<sup>20</sup>Anonymous, "Palestinians: A Deadlier Intifada." *Economist* 323, no. 7754 (1992): 43-44.

<sup>21</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Development in the Middle East*. 1989, 30.

<sup>22</sup>Rex Brynen, 33.

shooting her dead. More than a quarter of those killed by soldiers in recent months had been minors, less than 18 years old.<sup>23</sup>

In the village of Salem near the city of Nablus, soldiers buried several inhabitants alive, and three Arab workers were burned alive in the settlement of Or Yahude.<sup>24</sup>

The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were at war not only with the Israeli government apparatus (the IDF, the Secret Service, the border police, and the undercover Arabic-speaking soldiers), but with the settlers from neighboring settlements, too. Since June, the IDF instigated eight highly coordinated attacks by Jewish militants against Palestinian civilians. The settlers were armed with a bewildering array of war material, including grenade launchers, mortars, land mines, and assault rifles. "The idea of this kind of advance weaponry in untrained hands is particularly distressing," says a Mossad (Israel Intelligence Service) director.

The IDF soldiers asked to assist in the resettlement of Jews have received death threats from anonymous organizations. The threats, according to Jonathan Silvers, can be read as follows:

We are at war not only with Arabs, we are forced to do battle with all who oppose God's will, including the common Israeli soldier, if you execute the lunatic orders of your superiors, we will in turn execute you."<sup>25</sup>

Phyllis Bennis, wrote the following describing the settlers action against the Palestinians:

---

<sup>23</sup>Anonymous, "Guns and Stones." *Economist* 326, no. 7798 (1993): 43-43.

<sup>24</sup>Lockman and Bein, 224.

<sup>25</sup>Jonathan Silvers, "Wholly War," *New Statesman and Society* 8, no. 378 (1995): 28.

One Autumn afternoon, in the tiny village of Hawwara, off Nablus Road, Neal and I found two she-goats, two kids, and five chickens, that had been shot by Israeli settlers only moments earlier. The youngest child in the family that owned these animals, about six-years-old, had thrown a small stone at the settlers' car as it passed the family's house. In response, the carload of six settlers entered the back of the house and fired 20 to 30 shots at the sheep and goats. "Next time I'll come back to kill you and the sheep," one of the settlers shouted. Two carloads of soldiers arrived during the settler attack, and waited outside until the settler left.<sup>26</sup>

On May 24, 1992, a Palestinian from Gaza's Nusseirat Refugee Camp killed an Israeli teenager in a town south of Tel Aviv. The murder set off days of rioting by Jews chanting, "death to the Arabs."<sup>27</sup>

### Collective Punishment

This kind of punishment is illegal under international law. Nevertheless, collective punishment was used against the Intifada. There are many forms for this punishment, ranging from house demolition to curfew, school closure, to many other actions taken by the authorities against the Palestinians and all of them are in violation of human rights.

### House Demolition

This is the worst form of collective punishment used against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. By the end of 1988, 184 Palestinian homes had been totally or partially sealed. In addition, 363 homes had been demolished on the grounds that they

---

<sup>26</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 60.

<sup>27</sup>Anonymous, "The Gaza Strip Bottled Up." *Economist* 323, no. 7763 (1992): 43-44.

had been built without licenses. These demolitions were widely viewed by Palestinians as punitive, because such licenses were almost impossible to secure.<sup>28</sup>

According to a press release by B'Tselem (the Israeli Human Rights Monitoring Organization) dated January 28, 1990:

432 Palestinian houses in the West Bank and Gaza were demolished or sealed from the beginning of the Uprising through January 1990. Typically, the houses of Palestinians suspected of serious security offenses.... such as murder or the throwing of Molotov cocktails.... have been demolished within days of a suspected offender's arrest, often before he is charged, tried, and prosecuted in the court of law.<sup>29</sup>

In addition, Defense Minister Rabin stated the following:

505 illegally built houses were demolished in the first year of the Intifada.<sup>30</sup>

In most cases of demolition, entire families are rendered homeless before the suspect is even tried; in a small number of cases he has not even been apprehended.<sup>31</sup>

Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director of Human rights Watch, testified before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization saying the following:

While we (in the U.S. House of Representatives) favor the introduction of judicial review, we note that the court never overturned a demolition order on appeal, more important, we share the U.S. administration's view that demolitions are a form of collective punishment and, as such, contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup>Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada. *Palestine and the Palestinians* (Canada, 1989), 60.

<sup>29</sup>U.S. HR, 9 May 1990, 71.

<sup>30</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Development in the West Bank and Gaza*, May 1990, 71.

<sup>31</sup>*Christian Science Monitor*, 28 June 1989, 12.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. HR, 9 May 1990, 120-121.

According to information taken from Palestine Human Rights Information Center in Jerusalem and Chicago, the number of the houses demolished or sealed is 2013 from the beginning of the Uprising to July 31, 1991.<sup>33</sup>

#### Curfew

Israeli measures of collective punishment impose hardship on every Palestinian resident of the Occupied Territories. The use of curfews is one example. At the start of the Intifada, they were imposed mainly in response to disturbances. Soon, Israeli authorities began regularly imposing them in anticipation of disturbances, and eventually as a form of collective punishment. In the fall of 1989, the village of Beit Sahour was under round-the-clock curfew almost continuously for 40 days during its nonviolent tax revolt. Nablus, a city of more than 100,000 inhabitants, was twice placed under curfews lasting at least ten days during 1989. Curfews like the ones imposed in Beit Sahour and Nablus are clearly punitive and violate the prohibition against collective punishment in the Fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>34</sup> Curfews are accompanied by the disconnection of power, water and phone lines. Food supplies run low, sick persons have difficulty obtaining medicine and treatment, and farmers must sit at home while their crops rot.<sup>35</sup>

The focus of the Palestinian Uprising remained on the Gaza Strip until mid-January 1988, when the authorities imposed long curfews on all eight Gaza Strip refugee camps. No one was allowed outside. Food and water shortages added to the people's

---

<sup>33</sup>Palestine Human Rights Center X, no. 2 (1991).

<sup>34</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, 9 May 1990, 117.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 118.

misery. Soldiers fired tear gas into homes and dropped tear gas into courtyards by helicopter.<sup>36</sup>

On March 30, 1988, the Israeli government sealed off the West Bank and Gaza Strip, barring 130,000 Palestinians from their jobs inside Israel.<sup>37</sup> In Gaza Strip two weeks into closure, the price of eggplant had dropped 50 percent, green peppers by 55 percent, tomatoes by 65 percent, cucumbers by 81 percent, and squash by 90 percent.<sup>38</sup> Reports of food and medicine shortages during the long curfew on Gaza camps brought a tremendous outpouring of emergency relief from Palestinian institutions inside Israel and the West Bank, including trucks of food, milk, and clothing from the Galilee and Golan, and from women's groups and other charitable organizations in the West Bank.<sup>39</sup>

Hunger was a problem in the Occupied Territories between 1989 and 1990. By June 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, UNRWA was already distributing emergency food rations to 120,000 refugees and non-refugee families in Gaza Strip and to 165,000 families in the West Bank.<sup>40</sup>

To the Palestinians, closure is a form of apartheid, segregation in its most bitter and destructive form. Israeli author Meron Benvenisti said recently, "This is apartheid, complete with a pass system. The Arabs are perceived as a work force, and beyond that,

---

<sup>36</sup>Lockman and Beinini, 48.

<sup>37</sup>Sara M. Roy, "Joyless in Gaza: Apartheid, Israel Style," *Nation* 257 (1993): 136-139.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 136-139.

<sup>39</sup>Lockman and Beinini, 49.

<sup>40</sup>Anonymous, "Palestinians: A Deadlier Intifada." *Economist* 323, no. 7754 (1992): 43-44.



no one cares what happens to them.”<sup>41</sup> One woman from a refugee camp in Gaza Strip tragically captured the mood of the people when she said, “I have nothing left to feed my children but black milk, what good am I?”<sup>42</sup> In the fall of 1992, the UNRWA field office in Gaza advertised eight jobs for garbage collectors and received more than 11,000 applications. Many of the applicants had a post-secondary education.<sup>43</sup>

#### Detention, Deportation and the Treatment of the Prisoners

The U.S. State Department, in its *Country Report*, May 9, 1990, stated the following:

The Israeli Supreme Court is not the guardian of Palestinian rights that Israeli officials often claim it to be. As the report pointed out, the Court has never overturned an IDF decision to deport or administratively detain a Palestinian or demolish the home of his family.<sup>44</sup>

Since the outbreak of the Intifada, the authorities have doubled the sentences for administrative detainees to a maximum sentence of one year which could be, however, renewed indefinitely. As well, authorities empowered all officers with the rank of colonel and above to issue detention orders which were then carried out without adequate judicial review. Thousands of those arrested were held in extremely harsh conditions in a Negev desert prison camp within Israel.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 43-44.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 43-44.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 43-44.

<sup>44</sup>U.S. State Department. *Country Report*, 9 May 1990.

<sup>45</sup>U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Development in the West Bank and Gaza*. 9 May 1990, 402.

In the first two years of the Uprising, an estimated 48,000 Palestinians were arrested and detained for three days or more. Of these, some 7,900 were placed in administrative detention, without charge or trial. Another 61 persons were deported during this period.<sup>46</sup>

There were numerous reports of ill treatment and torture of detainees “to extract information or confession or to harass and intimidate.” This form of torture mentioned in the statement included beating and kicking of prisoners all over the body, including the head and genitals; falaga (beating soles of the feet); hanging by rope from the ceiling and being swung from wall to wall; prolonged exposure to cold; use of electric shocks; long periods of solitary confinement and sleep deprivation; and verbal abuse and threats.<sup>47</sup>

An Israeli officer served in the Occupied Territories and registered his confession on a cassette that was sent by Israeli Knesset member Dedi Zucker to military police. The officer stated:

He and his soldiers persecuted Arabs on the Jewish religious holiday, Yom Kippor. Stripping people of all their clothes and leading them to orchards. The soldiers tied them up and released dogs at them. Then they chained and tied them to tree trunks for the entire night. The officer and his soldiers established a “private” prison surrounded by barbed wire for “drying the Arabs in the sun” and baking them. “You have to understand that the issue is about harsh conditions, severe cold in the night, and dogs, and unbearable heat in the day,” the officer confessed.<sup>48</sup>

The story was disclosed when the officer was interviewed by the Israeli newspaper *Yerushalim* on October 7, 1988.

---

<sup>46</sup>Rex Brynen, 33.

<sup>47</sup>Don Peretz, 47.

<sup>48</sup>*Yerushalim Newspaper*, Israel. 7 October 1988. In Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, 1990.

Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch, testified before a subcommittee hearing emphasized that, “The U.S. is on record as opposing the practice of “widespread” administrative detention, a characterization that applies to the current reality in the territories. During the first two years of the Uprising, there were some 50,000 Uprising-related arrests and imprisonments. This month, the IDF stated that some 10,000 Palestinians had been placed in administrative detention during the Intifada.<sup>49</sup>

B’Tsaalem, the Israeli human rights group, reported that more than 25,000 Palestinian prisoners were tortured by the Israeli authorities in the first five years of the Intifada alone, and more than a thousand were killed.<sup>50</sup>

The number of Palestinians who have died in Israeli prison custody since the Intifada began numbered 12. One 1989 case was clearly proven to be the murder of a prisoner by interrogators.<sup>51</sup> Amjad Jabriel, a 14-year-old American citizen and native of Denver, Colorado, was the victim. He was taken into custody by Israeli authorities and later found dead, shot in the back at close range.<sup>52</sup> The Israeli Supreme Court refused to temporarily prevent Israeli interrogators from tying a Palestinian detainee onto a tilted

---

<sup>49</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Situation in the West Bank and Gaza*, 9 May 1990, 119.

<sup>50</sup>Sara Roy, *Women's Review of Books* 12, no. 6 (1995): 26-27.

<sup>51</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Development in the West Bank and Gaza*, 9 May 1990, 25.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 52.

stool with his hands cuffed behind his back, a sack over his head and music blasting in his ears.<sup>53</sup>

The most shocking part of this report is the torture of children in Israeli military prisons. They were young persons who civilization normally shelters and cares for; youths between ten and eighteen, not yet finished their schooling, and usually thought, in industrial societies, to be not yet able to earn a living and to care for themselves. The report claims that even though these youths were described as “only” eighteen, sixteen, twelve, or ten, nevertheless they were “terrorists,” violent antagonists of the State of Israel, if not full-fledged, then in the making.<sup>54</sup>

Torture chambers may be referred to as “guest houses” and particular methods of torture by pet names, such as “a birthday party” or the “parrot perch.” The prisoner is stripped of all dignity and privacy. The most intimate parts of the body, the ones normally sheltered, are exposed to glaring lights and public gaze, before being made the apertures for pain to invade the body.<sup>55</sup>

Evidence compiled from this report reveals that children are subjected to arbitrary arrest, are interrogated, humiliated, and tortured during lengthy periods of incommunicado detention, and were denied access to fair trial. The report includes instances of children being shot by the military with live ammunition.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup>*The Atlanta Journal Constitution*, 13 January 1988. A10.

<sup>54</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Development in the Middle East*, September 1987, 93.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 97.

In many cases, children were imprisoned without charge and released without a trial, usually after 18 days of detention. In its 1986 Occupied Territories Human Rights Report, the U.S. State Department found that most Palestinians do not know the reason for their arrest. During the first 18 days, they are prohibited from seeing family, lawyers, the Red Cross, or any civil rights organization. There is no appeal process: The military judge's sentence is final.<sup>57</sup>

In this story, we will see how the Israeli justice system works when it comes to interfacing with the Palestinians. Haim Gordon, in his book, *Quick Sand: Israel, Intifada, and the Rise of Political Evil in Democracies* (1995), recorded an incident that appeared in the Israeli press in October 1989:

An Israeli officer caught a young Palestinian man and accused him of throwing rocks at him and then running away when he was told to stop. The young Palestinian was jailed immediately, even though he firmly denied any involvement. He was put on trial after about two months. At his trial it turned out that the young man was blind; his lawyer submitted medical documents proving that he had been blind from birth, and school certificates indicating that he had been enrolled in schools for the blind throughout his life. The lawyer then asked the judge how his client could have aimed and thrown rocks at the Israeli officer when he could not see? How could he have run away, when all his life he used a blind man's cane? The judge found the blind man guilty, and he was sentenced to a period in prison identical to the period he had already been jailed. Thus, he was released, but told he was guilty.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 98.

<sup>58</sup>Haim Gordon, *Quick Sand: Israel, Intifada and the Rise of Political Evil in Democracies* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 1-2.

Unfortunately, however, much sadism emerged during Israel's six-year oppression of the Palestinian Uprising, especially, but not exclusively, in the interrogation of Palestinian suspects by the Israel Security Service.<sup>59</sup>

IDF Judge Advocate General Amnon Strashnow stated on January 28, 1989:

It is not allowed to shoot at people who are running away. Only during demonstrations when someone is changing position in order to come back and throw stones. It is forbidden to open fire at people who are escaping, or to shoot people in the back.<sup>60</sup>

Deportation is one of the strongest weapons Israel used to stop the Uprising, especially when the deportees were the leaders. As a result of the deportations, the original unified leadership of the Uprising was decimated: 69 leaders sent into exile by mid-1991, there were well over 600 shooting deaths, and 40,000 were arrested through May 1990.<sup>61</sup> The deportation of 415 Palestinians from Israel's Occupied Territories has been described by former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohen as "illegal and immoral."<sup>62</sup>

Phyllis Bennis, in his book, *From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising* (1990), stated the following:

The Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights, reported that Israeli soldiers repeatedly barred ambulances, doctors, and health teams from their work in refugee camps and villages when there were no demonstrations, particularly in communities that had been placed under curfew. At every hospital, clinic, physician's office and UNRWA facility our team visited told with special urgency of repeated instances in which

---

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 90.

<sup>60</sup>Joel Greenberg and Michal Sela. "One killed during security raids on villages in areas. Troops not ordered to shoot fleeing rioters, says IDF Legal Chief." *Jerusalem Post*, 29 January 1989.

<sup>61</sup>Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of the People* (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1993), 265.

<sup>62</sup>James M. Wall, "Immoral" Deportations", *Christian Century* 10, no. 6 (1993): 195-196.

Israeli soldiers and police had refused entry to ambulances, physicians, and other health workers trying to reach the victims of beatings and shootings. These reports were precise and specific.<sup>63</sup>

Proportional to the populations, more Palestinians were killed by Israeli soldiers during the Intifada than U.

S. soldiers during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. All of this was part of an orchestrated campaign to exterminate Palestinians as a political presence in Palestine.<sup>64</sup> This is one of the Israeli occupation's more successful efforts to de-Palestinize Palestine from its people, and we saw the tactics Israel used to achieve its goal of uprooting the Palestinians from their homeland.

#### Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising

In a statement to the forty-fourth session of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights in New York on February 5, 1988, Amnesty International reported that "human right violations on an extensive scale have become the feature of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza in recent months. Women and children were beaten by soldiers with clubs and rifle butts. Many have been hospitalized with broken limbs, fractures, head wounds, and extensive bruising. Some were reportedly beaten after soldiers had taken them into custody and after being injured by gunfire. Soldiers were reportedly seen dragging wounded Palestinians from hospitals and beating them."<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup>The Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, (1989), 60.

<sup>64</sup>Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, 11.

<sup>65</sup>Don Peretz, 46.

The delegation sent by the Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights visited the Occupied Territories in February, two months after the Intifada began. The team found that hospitals in the Territories were “overwhelmed” by the flood of casualties and their condition was “worse than the TV series ‘Mash’.”<sup>66</sup>

The Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights reported the following in their report:

Israeli soldiers repeatedly barred ambulances, doctors, and health teams from their work in refugee camps and villages when there were no demonstrations, particularly in communities that had been placed under curfew.... At every hospital, clinic, physician’s office and UNRWA facility our team visited, we were told with special urgency of repeated instances in which Israeli soldiers and police had refused entry to ambulances, physicians, and other health workers trying to reach the victims of beatings and shootings. These reports were precise and specific....<sup>67</sup>

The use of tear gas by Israeli troops in enclosed spaces was responsible for a large number of miscarriages. On two nights in Gaza alone, 23 women who had been subjected to the gas miscarried in hospitals.<sup>68</sup> Women were shot in the streets, they were gassed, and they were imprisoned under administrative detention.<sup>69</sup>

Early in March, a CBS television crew in Nablus filmed from a distance, without being seen, a sequence in which four Israeli soldiers beat two Arab youths who were sitting on the ground with their hands tied behind their backs. The soldiers kicked the

---

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>67</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 54.

<sup>68</sup>The Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, *Palestine and the Palestinians* (Canada, 1989), 60. In James A. Graff and Farid Ohan.

<sup>69</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 31.



Arabs in the head and chest, and then beat them on arms and legs with heavy rocks. According to the CBS Israeli bureau chief, the beating lasted about forty minutes. Within a day, the television clip was being shown throughout Europe and the United States. The incident aroused a storm of protest, and Israeli embassies in Washington, London, Paris, and Amsterdam were flooded with angry calls. In some countries, the incident sparked anti-Israel demonstrations; even supporters of Israel were shocked or chagrined.<sup>70</sup>

However, as the U.S. State Department noted in its 1988 Country Report, “Many individuals, including academics, journalists, and human rights workers, who have not engaged in or advocated violence or other acts threatening security.... are administratively detained by Israeli military authorities.”<sup>71</sup>

The toll of human rights violations by Israeli forces since December 9, 1987 through July 31, 1991 includes the following:<sup>72</sup> 968 Deaths; 115,970 Injuries requiring hospitalization; 66 Expulsions; 15,100 Administrative detentions; 10,391 Curfews (areas with 10,000+ population under 24-hour curfew); 94,825 Land confiscation (acres); 2,013 House demolitions/sealings; and 118,735 Tree uprootings.

---

<sup>70</sup>Don Peretz, 51.

<sup>71</sup>Don Peretz, 51.

<sup>72</sup>Palestine Human Rights Information Center X, no. 2 (1991).

### School Closure

In a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives on May 9, 1990, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East heard a report on the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, which stated the following:

One of the most wide-ranging and controversial administrative sanctions has been the forced closure of Palestinian educational institutions, including all universities. For more than two years now Israeli authorities have effectively closed Palestinian schools, community colleges, and universities by imposing a succession of military orders and extended curfews on entire communities. Israeli authorities have justified school closures on security grounds, charging: "Since 1987 the schools have frequently served as one of the centers for organizing and launching violent activity."<sup>73</sup>

The U.S. House Subcommittee also concluded:

These closures have directly affected approximately 320,000 school children ranging from kindergarten through twelfth grade and 18,000 students in institutions of higher education. More than 10,000 high school students have recently passed their matriculation examination and so are eligible to attend local colleges and universities. Sources associated with the universities report that thousands of young Palestinians have been forced to emigrate in search of higher education and many professors also have had to seek positions abroad.<sup>74</sup>

In other hearings before sub-committees on Europe and the Middle East, Mr. Bereuter, a member of the Subcommittee, substantiated the following conditions:

I also find Israel's treatment of Palestinian systems of education to be quite troubling. Palestinian people have always placed a high priority on literacy and higher education. Education is pivotal to their society, Yet, for two years the university system has been closed by order of Israeli

---

<sup>73</sup>Consulate Report, Development in the West Bank and Gaza, *Suprs*, No. 5, at 17.75.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

authorities. Elementary and secondary schools have been closed, opened, and closed again. Alternative education in the home has been banned.<sup>75</sup>

### Economic Measures

The economy of the Occupied Territories is subordinate to the Israeli economy and bound to fit in a periphery-centered relationship.<sup>76</sup> At the same time, Israel used its policies in the Occupied Territories as an instrument to destroy the fabric of the Palestinian society and consequently, de-Palestinianize the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>77</sup>

According to Uzi Amith Kohn, et al, in *The "Intifada" and the Rule of Law* (1993), Israel took some economic measures to make the people's life in the Occupied Territories miserable and stressful in order to stop the Uprising. Some of these measures can be stated as follows:

The regulations concerning importation of monies to the area (permit and request for a permit) (Amendment No. 2), 1988, restricted the general permit to import money. In the case of truck drivers driving trucks between Jordan and the Area, 200 Jordan Dinars (J-D) per entry, a sum at that time approximating 500 U.S. dollars. Because of the frequency that the truck drivers were likely potential carriers of funds to fuel the Uprising, and these regulations represented an attempt to meet the danger. This amount of money reduced to 100 J-D by Amendment No. 5 in 1988.<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Development in the West Bank and Gaza*, 9 May 1990, 5.

<sup>76</sup>Lockman and Beinun, 225.

<sup>77</sup>Ali Jalal Abed, 2.

<sup>78</sup>Uzi Amit-Kohn, et al., *The "Intifada" and the Rule of Law* (Israel Ministry of Defense Publication, Israel, 1993), 183-184.

Under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, and in particular, regulation 84(1), the commander of the IDF forces in the Area had the authority to confiscate property of unlawful association even if there was not enough evidence.<sup>79</sup>

Also, Uzi Amith Kohen, etal, added the following:

On March 30, 1988, the commander of IDF forces in Gaza District issued the order concerning the use of telephone services (Temporary Provision), 1988. On April 10, 1988, the commander of IDF forces in Judea and Samaria issued an identical order. These orders determined that for a six-month period (or a short period to be determined by the commander), "Area residents will not be given.... telephone services for international communications either directly or through a telephone exchange."<sup>80</sup>

The orders in both Judia and Samaria (on February 16, 1989) and the Gaza District (on January 25, 1989) were accordingly amended to restore international telephone services to residents of the territories."<sup>81</sup>

Furthermore, a hearing before the U.S. House Subcommittee on the Development in the West Bank and Gaza, revealed:

In January 1988, the Israeli Government introduced changes into the income tax law which raised tax brackets for Palestinians. Palestinians earning \$16,000 are taxed at 55%, Israelis, by contrast, do not reach the top tax rate until annual income reaches \$30,000, and then the rate is 48 percent.<sup>82</sup>

Another measure creating hardship for Palestinians involved the acquisition of permits and licenses. The Subcommittee reported the following:

---

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 186.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 190.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., 190.

<sup>82</sup>U.S. H.R. Development in the West Bank and Gaza, 9 May 1990, 149.

In December 1988, a military order was enacted which included conditions for the acquisition of permits and licenses upon payment of all taxes, including income, property, and value-added tax, and the payment of all fines and levies imposed by the military government.<sup>83</sup>

Phyllis Bennis, in his book, *From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising* (1990), affirmed:

On a broader scale, Palestinian agriculture in general has been one of the targets of Israel's effort to suppress the Intifada. According to the Jerusalem-based Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights, "Olives and olive oil constitute the most important single crop in the West Bank. The olive harvest season opened on October 15. By October 24.... at least 12 villages had been formally prohibited from harvesting. They included Asira Ash-Shama-lia, Kufur Malek, Maythaloun, Saris, Belá, Nuba, Kharess, Burká, Kufdr thilith, Brtaia and Luban Ash-shargiya."<sup>84</sup>

At the same time, the impact of curfews on the harvesting of other crops, especially tomatoes, watermelon, squash, peppers, and grapes should not be underestimated.

Don Peretz, in his book, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising* (1990), wrote:

A major constraint against expansion of Palestinian agriculture in the Occupied Territories has been the limited water supply. The vital resource was removed from the control of the indigenous population and integrated into the Israeli imposed "Common Market."<sup>85</sup>

According to Israel Shahak

By autumn of 1987, according to official Israeli data, the 60,000 settlers in the West Bank were using more water than the 850,000 or million Palestinians.<sup>86</sup> In addition to the water problem, there is another problem which is the uprooting of trees. According to Phyllis Bennis (1990), about

---

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 149.

<sup>84</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 60.

<sup>85</sup>Don Perez, 10.

<sup>86</sup>Israel Shahak, 1-12.

100,000 olive and fruit trees were uprooted, as well as hundreds of thousands more seedlings and other plants.<sup>87</sup>

All these measures had one purpose: to force Palestinians to abandon their agrarian way of life, and to become workers in Israeli factories and in the Israeli cities.

#### SUMMARY

The Palestinian Uprising was a source of trouble to the Israeli government and its leadership. The authorities had to use every available means to stop the Uprising. Here are some of the tactics and policies that Israel took to stop the Uprising. (1) A shoot-to-kill policy, instituted almost immediately, resulted in 650 Palestinian deaths and 64,000 injuries in the first 18 months of the Uprising. By March 1989, 19,715 children under the age of 15 required medical attention because of the new policy. (2) Israeli settlers were allowed to both in fact and spirit to operate above the law. They were permitted to invade any Palestinian village or city, indiscriminately shooting, killing, and destroying property. IDF soldiers typically ignored the carnage, much to the dismay and anger of Palestinians. (3) The policy of house demolition or sealings as a collective punishment tool against the Palestinians was justified by universal denial by Israeli authorities of “necessary” licenses and permits. By July 31, 1991, around 2013 homes were demolished and many more were demolitions were planned for the future. (4) Israel used curfews to restrict Palestinian movement and disrupt business and agricultural progress. Sometimes curfews were imposed to prevent upcoming demonstrations or disturbances. But, later on during the Uprising, the curfew was used as a collective punishment tool designed to further control the entire Palestinian community. In the village of Biet Sahour, a forty

---

<sup>87</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 81-82.

day, around-the-clock curfew was imposed. At the same time, two curfews, lasting ten days each, were enacted on the City of Nablus. Most of the time, curfews were accompanied by the disconnection of the electricity, water, and food supply. Treatment of the ill and infirm posed a special problem with no electricity or water. Many crops, such as tomatoes, okra, watermelon, squash, peppers, and grapes, were lost, and thousands of Palestinians were unable to sustain their livelihoods in Israel or support their families and were therefore forced to live in extremely uncomfortable conditions. The UNARWA, by 1991, supplied more than 320,000 families with food in both the West Bank and Gaza because of wide-spread hunger. (5) Detention and deportation were other anti-Palestinian policies instituted by Israel. By 1989, more than 48,000 Palestinians were arrested. Some detainees spent three days in confinement, others a few months and always, the Israelis mistreated their prisoners.

Many human rights organizations from Israel, the Occupied Territories, the U.S., and Amnesty International monitored the arrests and exiles. According to B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights monitoring group, more than 25,000 Palestinian prisoners were tortured and one thousand were killed while incarcerated during the first five years of the Uprising. Israel used many ways to torment the prisoners including the use of electrical shock, very bright lights to prevent prisoners from sleeping, blasting music in their ears and forcing prisoners to function in the nude, a form of sadistic humiliation for many. Finally, more than 500 Palestinians were deported with no means of legal appeal or redress. (6) Human rights violations, unacceptable by the standards of the Geneva Convention, regularly occurred in the Occupied Territories. Women and children were

routinely beaten by soldiers. Hospital workers and emergency vehicles were prevented from serving hospital and clinics. The use of tear gas by the military police resulted in many documented cases of miscarriages and stillborn births. In the village of Salem, east of Nablus, three Palestinians were buried alive. (7) Israel crippled the entire Palestinian education system by methodically closing all institutions of learning throughout the Territories from the lowest grades to the colleges and universities. More than 320,000 students in the school system and 18,000 university students were prevented from attending school. Many students were forced to leave for other countries in order to continue their educations. At the same time, a large number of teachers and professors left the Territories searching for a country in which to continue their careers.

(8) Israel targeted their most powerful directives towards the prevention of a viable Palestinian economy. The goal of these policies was to reduce economic competitiveness, desert their land due to lack resources such as water, and become the central work force for Israeli manufacturing and industrial factories. To achieve this goal, Israel placed a \$500 limit on the amount of money that could be imported by truckers who entered the Territories from Jordan. The area military commander had the authority to confiscate any land or properties without any legal justification, and that land became off-limits to Palestinians. Last, the residents of the Territories were forced to pay all taxes owed to the government before any permits or licenses were issued. (9) Israeli agricultural policies also helped to provoke the Uprising. Many crops were lost because of curfew laws and unfair control of the water supply. Even more virulent was the uprooting of 100,000 trees in the Territories by both soldiers and settlers. As a case in



point, Israel once prevented 12 villages from harvesting their olive crops, thus impeding a key source of income and forcing many farmers out of business.

Israeli leaders thought that the tactics and the policies they carried out in the Territories would stop the Uprising. They were wrong. The policies exposed Israel's true intentions to the entire world, and engendered a heightened awareness of injustices and atrocities. The images of soldiers killing children, women, and elderly people sparked anger and Israel's image was tarnished. An unexpected result of Israel's exposure as a rogue nation that ignored human rights was the response of at least some of the Israeli citizens, who began to publically question the ill treatment of the Palestinians in the Territories. Envoys from countries friendly to Israel began to express disapproval of what they read about and saw in the media about Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians. Even the Jewish community in the United States asked Israel to reconsider their response to dissident activities and perceived threats to Israel's right to exist. At last, Israel began to feel the pressure and leaders reluctantly acknowledged that the Uprising could not be stopped by force alone. Negotiations with the Palestinians could be a more constructive alternative.

In the following chapter, these issues will be discussed: the impact of the Uprising on both the Palestinians and the Israelis, and the impact of the Uprising on the peace process.

## CHAPTER IV

### The 1987 UPRISING AND THE PEACE PROCESS

#### INTRODUCTION

The late Dr. Edward W. Said wrote:

The Intifada therefore accomplished a number of unprecedented things. In my opinion, the future of the Middle East as a whole is going to be influenced by them, and Palestine and Israel will never be the same again because of them.<sup>1</sup>

The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 is considered one of the major events of the twentieth century. The impact of the Uprising went far beyond the changes in political and economic dynamics between the parties involved. The Middle East as a whole was affected and inevitably, the super powers were too.

Amos Oz said of the Intifada, “What was will never be again, and what will be, is not what was.”<sup>2</sup>

This chapter will answer many of the questions which were raised at the beginning of Chapter One, such as how the Uprising brought both parties to the peace table; how both parties adjusted their political positions to accommodate each other; and how the Uprising influenced the PLO to make changes to its position regarding Israel, including a no negotiation, no reconciliation

---

<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Lockman and Beinon, 20.

<sup>2</sup>Freedman, 336. in *Jerusalem Post*, 19 February 1988, 4.

stance (the outcome of Al-Khurطوم Summit in the 1970s). Another policy is the one in which the PLO Charter called for the wiping out of Israel.

Other considerations are encapsulated in the following questions: How did the Israeli public influence their government to participate in peace negotiations with the Palestinians? What was the role of the United States of America in the peace process? What was the role of the International Community in encouraging open dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians? What was the role of the media in influencing worldwide public opinion to support peace and end the cycle of violence in the occupied Territories? This chapter will explore the ramifications of the Uprising utilizing the above questions as an organizational framework.

#### The Impact of the 1987 Uprising on Israel

The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 successfully challenged many assumptions that had previously been taken for granted by many, if not most, Israelis and many Palestinians as well.<sup>3</sup>

To Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, the Lebanon War and the Intifada had an even deeper impact on Israel than the Yom Kippur War of 1973.<sup>4</sup>

The Lebanon War was especially important because for the first time in the relatively short history of the State of Israel, matters of security and military arrangements were no longer a matter of a narrow political consensus. These areas of

---

<sup>3</sup>Robert O. Freedman, 377.

<sup>4</sup>Moshe Máoz, 150.

national interest were at last opened to public discourse and debate, particularly in the media. The Yom Kippur War, while certainly important, did not result in a more flexible approach to security matters.<sup>5</sup>

Moshe Máoz, et al (1994), stated the following:

The Intifada had the same impact but in a different way because it shook some of the implicit assumptions about the nature of the Palestinian political will, the Palestinian entity, and possible relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The Intifada had a very important effect, the culmination of which, in my opinion, has led to the opening up of the areas of security, international relations, and military relations, to intensive political debate, the life of which has not been known in the State of Israel since its establishment.<sup>6</sup>

Robert O. Freedman, in his book, *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, The Arab World, and The Superpowers* (1991), agreed:

The Uprising seemed to force Israeli public and political leadership to think about the future of the Territories in a more concrete and realistic manner than they had in the past. In a survey conducted in the weeks before November 1, 1988, election (and about ten months after the beginning of the Intifada), 55 percent admitted that their opinions regarding security and politics had changed as a result of the Intifada. Also, Israel appears to have become more “realistic.”<sup>7</sup>

Israel appears to have become more “realistic” as a result of the Intifada.

It is not only the leadership of Israel that has changed its attitude. The Israeli public wants peace and prosperity and the same lifestyle as other Western, consumer-oriented industrial societies. They tend to be less interested in Zionist notions of settling new land and battling with the Arabs for every stone. They are tired of land, blood, and

---

<sup>5</sup>Moshe Máoz, 150.

<sup>6</sup>Moshe Máoz, 151.

<sup>7</sup>Freedman, 272-280.

fire. They realize that war has become a loser's game; that cities could become battlefields; that civilians can become combatants, and that weapons of mass destruction can unleash horror.<sup>8</sup>

Haim Gordon, in his book, *Quick Sand: Israel, Intifada and The Rise of Political Evil in Democracies* (1995), wrote:

The Intifada was a topic of great concern, at least according to the discussions in the media and in many debates in the Knesset and in the Israeli government. Moreover, it was a concrete event that took place daily, not many kilometers from Tel Aviv University.<sup>9</sup>

Rami Tal, an Israeli journalist added:

The most important feature of the Uprising is it put the future and the fate of the Occupied Territories back on the political agenda of the government and the political parties. Also, he added, "The events in the Occupied Territories required from us to make decision we ignored for the past twenty years. If the land is part of the land of Israel, let us annex it and if it is dangerous to the Jewish State and its Jewish makeup, let us start the procedures to get rid of it or its inhabitants (transfer), the most important thing is to do something."<sup>10</sup>

The Uprising of 1987, also sparked an unprecedented debate over the strategic importance of the Occupied Territories for Israel. Lockman and Beinon expressed their opinions:

One group of senior officers believes the Occupied Territories are the most important strategic defense factor for Israel in the upcoming war and should be kept under Israel control even if this prevents peace. In any case, peace with the Arab world is not on the agenda, and Israel should

---

<sup>8</sup>Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "Toward Peace in the Middle East," *U.S. News and World Report*, 113, no. 6 (1992): 80.

<sup>9</sup>Haim Gordon, 238.

<sup>10</sup>Rami Tal, *Yidihut Ahranot*, 17 December 1987. In Hani Abdullah, "The Uprising is Not a Passing Cloud," *Palestinian Affairs*, vol. 179, February 1988, 78.

adopt Henry Kissinger's notion that no-war arrangements are better for Israel than peace agreement.<sup>11</sup>

A second group would give up most of the territories with certain security arrangements. Proponents of this view advocate a wide range of political positions, from autonomy to confederation with Jordan. It is best represented by former Chief of Staff General Mota Gur Urior, former Commander of the Central Region, and Avraham Ben Gal, former Commander of the Northern Region.<sup>12</sup>

A third group of officers regards the territories as a burden with threatens internal security and increases the likelihood of a future war. They call for negotiations with the PLO and do not object to the establishment of a Palestinian State, if that is the only solution.<sup>13</sup>

Yehoshafat Harkabi, a retired general and the head of the Israeli military intelligence, spoke out. In 1988, he warned:

We will have to negotiate with the Palestinians, the majority of whom, in any referendum, would vote for the PLO as their representative, not out of love, but as the unparalleled symbol of the idea that the Palestinians are a human public worthy of a political expression. The U.S. does not determine the composition of the Soviet delegation to negotiations, and Israel's presumption in trying to determine the composition of Arab delegations is an absurdity.<sup>14</sup>

In the words of Major General Mota Uri Orr, "I think we should all agree that the occupation should end because maintaining it does more damage to our security than ending it."<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>Lockman and Bein, 222.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 222.

<sup>13</sup>ibid., 222.

<sup>14</sup>Audeh G. Rantisi and Ralph K. Beebe, 121.

<sup>15</sup>Rex Brynen, 83.

At the same time, Israel was beginning to find, as the Intifada indicated, that the Occupied Territories were a metaphorical bone in its throat. The captured land could not be swallowed, nor could it be spit out.<sup>16</sup> By 1988, the Uprising seemed to have increased the number of Israelis willing to negotiate with the PLO by nearly 50 percent.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the Intifada had left the ruling Labor Party in a state of ideological and political disarray. Its chairman, Shimon Perez, understood that there was no hope of reaching an understanding with the Palestinians without the involvement of the PLO.<sup>18</sup>

Rabin's concern is not with the ideology of "greater Israel," but with the practicality of a "safer Israel." He knows too well that Israel's security cannot come from American guarantees. As former Prime Minister Golda Meir said of a later offer of American guarantees, "By the time you get here, we won't be here."<sup>19</sup>

During the course of the Intifada, Rabin had changed his thinking on three critical issues. First, he realized that Hussein would not bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table but rather the king would follow Israel's leadership on the Palestinian question. In addition, Rabin realized that Israel must negotiate directly with the local Palestinians, not just treat them as "mailmen" bearing messages to Jordan and the PLO. Finally, he

---

<sup>16</sup>Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, 206.

<sup>17</sup>David McDowall, 218.

<sup>18</sup>Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, 322.

<sup>19</sup>Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 80.

appreciated the benefit of holding elections in the Territories—a prospect he had earlier refused to consider.<sup>20</sup>

Rabin conceded that, “Since the start of the Intifada, [Israel has come] to the conclusion that it will be impossible to end the conflict without reaching accommodation with the PLO. Any other settlement will be only a partial one and thus liable to collapse.”<sup>21</sup>

Army commanders agreed with Defense Minister Rabin that a political rather than military solution would have to be found.<sup>22</sup> Also, after a long period of ambivalence, the high command openly acknowledged that “there is no military solution to what we are facing. . . . It is mainly a political problem.”<sup>23</sup>

In March 1989, an Israeli intelligence report was leaked stating:

That the Uprising could not be ended in the near future—that a political solution could be found only if the government entered dialogue with the PLO. The report also maintained that “there was no serious leadership in the occupied territories outside of the PLO and that the PLO had truly moved toward moderation.”<sup>24</sup>

For the first time since the occupation began, the Israeli forces lost control of the population in the Occupied Territories.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup>Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yáari, 324.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 333.

<sup>22</sup>Don Peretz, 44.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 80.

<sup>25</sup>Kimmerling and Migdal, 262.



It would appear that the single event leading to realization of the need for compromise with the Palestinians was the Intifada. Furthermore, Israeli policy makers became aware that this time they were faced with a national struggle whose solution could only be found in the realization of, and Israeli readiness to allow, the implementation of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.

The Intifada led to the awakening from the illusion that, from the start, had no chance of succeeding. . . . the Jordanian option.<sup>26</sup>

The Intifada played a remarkable role in pushing Israel toward political accommodation with the Palestinians in spite of Israel's resistance to negotiations that could have potentially pressured it to give up control over the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>27</sup>

By May 1989, Shamir and Rabin presented what came to be known as the Shamir-Rabin Plan. This model for peace emphasized the need to come to terms with the Palestinians and suggested a method of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiating process.<sup>28</sup> Rabin himself declared early in 1988 that "I've learned something over the past two and one half months. You cannot rule by force over one-and-a-million Palestinians." A week later, Rabin further reflected, "You cannot saddle the IDF with a mission that is outside its proper function. The unrest in the areas reflects a problem that can only have a political solution."<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>Reuven Pedatzur, "Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967." *Middle East Journal* 49, no. 2 (1995): 269-291.

<sup>27</sup>Ed Koufman, et al, *Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 1993), 280.

<sup>28</sup>Moshe Máoz, 104.

<sup>29</sup>Rex Prynne, 49.

A former member of the Israeli military establishment substantiated a popular sentiment among a growing number of Israelis: “The Palestinians do not need to throw any more stones to convince us. They have made their point and sensible people in Israel and the rest of the world have gotten the message.”<sup>30</sup> In January 1989, with public opinion strengthening in support of peace, four Israeli Knesset members joined PLO officials in Paris for discussion-debate on Middle East Peace, which both sides characterized as a step toward formal and high-level dialogue.<sup>31</sup>

Describing the Israeli feelings toward the Uprising, Cohen wrote:

Israelis are very upset by the Intifada. From August 1988, when we first asked, to November 1990, 60 percent of Jewish reported feeling insecure as a result of the Intifada.<sup>32</sup> They also added that in 1988 (February, June, August) 23 percent of Israeli Jews felt “the way we behave toward the Arabs in the territories is not good enough,” compared with only 1-2 percent who thought so in the early 1970s.<sup>33</sup>

In another place they wrote:

The Uprising of the Palestinians in the areas occupied by Israel has, no doubt, had significant influences on Israelis as individuals and on the Israeli society as a whole. While this conclusion might have been reached by logic alone, the present empirical findings led to empirical support.<sup>34</sup>

Concerning the Intifada’s impact on both the Israelis and the Palestinians, Ayala

M. Pines wrote:

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>32</sup>Cohen and Wolfsfield, 55.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 56.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 88-90.

Compared to the Palestinians and their unity, the Israeli public is very much divided in its response to the Intifada. At one end of the spectrum are the left wingers, who believe that the Palestinians deserve to have their own state and that peace is the best solution for both Israelis and Palestinians.<sup>35</sup> At the other end of the spectrum are the Orthodox Jews who are both religious and nationalistic, and who believe that Israel was promised to Jews by God and that all means are justified to protect it. Right wingers share the Orthodox Jew's nationalistic conviction but are less religious. Israeli Arabs like the Palestinians. They see the Intifada as a just struggle and take pride in it.<sup>36</sup>

One man explained, "What I read in the papers reminds me of stories of the Nazis and I feel horrible guilt. This is what burns me out."<sup>37</sup>

From a military point of view and because many officers had direct contact with the Intifada, a large percentage (72%) described themselves as apprehensive about the continuing conflict with the Palestinians. One officer explained: "The Intifada is very unpleasant to see our soldiers dealing with this instead of doing their military duty." Another said, "I started feeling more stressed since the Intifada crossed the borders of the Green Line. But I make a complete separation between these things and what I need to do on my job." Still another said, "I'm not one of those who hits but when I was in Gaza, I chased an Arab who threw rocks at me. When I caught him, I hit his face with my gun and split it open. It's a terrible memory that follows me all the time. But when you're there, you become apathetic. You have no choice."<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup>Ayala M. Pines, "The Palestinian Intifada and Israel. . . . burnout. . . .," *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology* 25 (1994): 438-451.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 439.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 446.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 447.

Early in the Intifada, there were enough signs of stress among the Occupation troops to warrant recruitment of additional psychologists to deal with the situation.<sup>39</sup>

In the first days of the Intifada, Yesh Gvul decided to sharpen its tone and circulated an updated version of the same petition (2,500 reserved soldiers signed a petition that they do not want to participate in operations of repression in the Occupied Territories). It also published a “declaration of refusal” to serve in the territories or to “take part in the suppression of the Uprising.” Close to 500 reservists, including two majors, had signed it as of early June 1988.<sup>40</sup>

Adding to Israeli willingness to come to the negotiation table was the weakening of the economy with an estimated loss in 1988 of at least 1.5 billion dollars because of the Uprising. Minister of Finance Shimon Perez confirmed in June 1989 that “the Intifada had cost Israel, directly and indirectly, between 1.5 and 2 billion dollars per year.”<sup>41</sup> One bank reported in September 1988 that the Uprising was responsible for a two percent drop in national income, with a 30% decline in tourism and a 15% decline in key Arab employment areas of textile production and sales, building construction, and related industries.<sup>42</sup>

David McDowal, in his book, *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond* (1989), reported:

---

<sup>39</sup>Don Peretz, 127.

<sup>40</sup>Lockman and Beinon, 236.

<sup>41</sup>Shalev, 154.

<sup>42</sup>Bank Hapaolim Statement, reported in *Facts Weekly Review*, No. 26, Sept. 18 - Oct. 1, 1988, in David McDowal, 207.

Based on information from Bank Hapaolim statement of September 1987, that the Uprising was responsible for a two percent drop in national incomes, with a decline particularly marked in tourism (30 percent down), and in Arab employment in areas of textiles, cement, and in construction industries (15 percent down).<sup>43</sup>

The United States Embassy in Israel estimated the monthly military and police bill at 120 million dollars, plus a further \$38 million in indirect costs.<sup>44</sup> Israeli exports decreased by 30 percent.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, in normal times, about 50,000 Palestinian workers crossed the border every day, generating millions in income for the Israeli economy. The dependency is mutual, if unequal: many Israeli building sites, farms, garages, and restaurant kitchens closed down without cheaply paid Palestinian laborers.<sup>46</sup>

#### The Impact of the 1987 Uprising on the Palestinians

The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had a tremendous impact on the Palestinian society inside and outside the Occupied Territories. In this regard, the late Dr. Edward W. Said summarized some of the unprecedented goals that the Uprising achieved:

In the first place, collaborators with the occupation were encircled and gradually rendered ineffective, as the entire mass of people under occupation. Even the class of merchants and shopkeepers played a major role in this transformation. Second, the old social organizations that depended on notables, on family, on traditional hierarchy, all they were large marginalized. A new set of institutions emerged and, in fields like health, education, food, and water supply, and agriculture, these provided an alternative social organization to that dominated by the occupation regime. Thirdly the role of women was substantially altered. During the

---

<sup>43</sup>David McDowall, 207

<sup>44</sup>David McDowall, 207.

<sup>45</sup>Al Hamishmar, 5 May 1988.

<sup>46</sup>Anonymous, "The Gaza Strip: Bottled Up," *Economist* 323, no. 7763 (1992): 43-44.

Intifada, women became equal partners in the struggle. They confronted Israeli (male) troops; they shared in decision-making; they were no longer left at home.<sup>47</sup>

The Uprising of 1987 transformed a Palestinian society in which members of the professional elites had often been forced to become farm laborers in daily contact with the peasantry and other manual laborers with whom they had little in common.<sup>48</sup>

The Palestinian Uprising represents a landmark in terms of Palestinian self-assertion. With the impetus of Intifada courage and spirit, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories took the initiative and established new patterns of collective behavior, including the formation of progressive grassroots organizations. Taking one's destiny into one's own hands and collective behavior are two characteristics of democratic behavior.<sup>49</sup>

The Intifada also enhanced the role of women in the Palestinian community. Many women became community leaders, and some even emerged as international spokeswomen for the Palestinian cause (Dr. Hanan Ashrawi). The centrality of women in the Palestinian community undermines the traditional view of women in the Arab world and brings the Palestinian society one step closer to social equality.<sup>50</sup> A woman belonging to the City of Ramallah Branch of the Union of Palestinian Women's Committee stated:

---

<sup>47</sup>Lockman and Beinin, 20.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 92.

<sup>49</sup>Kaufman, et al, 47.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 47.

The role of women has changed a lot in the course of the Uprising. Palestinian women's role has been very involved in all aspects of the resistance: from participating in demonstrations, throwing stones, to taking care of what we now call 'being ready' for the national disobedience stage. That means taking care of the work at home, being ready in their houses, with stored food, with supplies. . . . They are getting used to this idea of home economy. Women have been shot in the streets, they have been gassed, they have been imprisoned under administrative detention. So you can feel that there is a big change in the role of women during the Uprising.<sup>51</sup>

With the outbreak of the Intifada and the imposition of Israeli curfews, the Palestinian Relief Committees served as models for coping with the hardship caused by the new situation. Food supplies had to be organized for besieged refugee camps and villages, a much more extensive medical emergency network was required for the mounting casualties, care was needed for the families bereft of wage earners, and child care was necessary for younger children locked out of schools. Committees to meet the challenge of these new emergency needs were organized in camps, villages, and sectors of large cities.<sup>52</sup> A village leader from Beit Sahour reflected:

We are creating a different kind of person now, even as we build the Uprising. In the past, sometime there was selfishness, or a lack of cooperation. People wanted to build their own castle, alone, to say, "I want my wife, my children, to be better off." Now it is different, now people are cooperating. We all have the same feeling toward the future, because we had the same problems in the past. We share the same dreams now.<sup>53</sup>

A popular committee in Qabatiya, a village south of Jenin City, described how "Social organization here used to be based on tribal and clan affiliation, with status

---

<sup>51</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 31.

<sup>52</sup>Don Peretz, 88.

<sup>53</sup>Phyllis Bennis, 27.

determined by family ties. Now it is based on our new democracy, with respect based on how much each person participates. We are changing our culture and consciousness. Building a new culture is part of building a new state.”<sup>54</sup> Perhaps one of the more encouraging changes was in the way disputes were settled by Sulha, or peace made between two parties, rather than through courtroom judgments and decisions, which often did not provide satisfactory justice or was overly influenced by Israeli legal impediments. The return to the traditional Sulha was still another result of the Intifada and helped to reinforce resistance to the Occupation.<sup>55</sup>

The Uprising signified a shift in the center of gravity of Palestinian politics, from the Palestinian diaspora communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.<sup>56</sup> The Uprising is also significant because it involved not only the West Bank and Gaza but, for the first time, full participation of Israeli Arab citizens in Galilee and elsewhere.<sup>57</sup> The Uprising today sets the tone for the formulation of Palestinian politics outside.<sup>58</sup>

The Uprising created an instrument of political unification for almost all the Palestinian factions that had, up to that point, been divided. The United National Leadership of the Uprising, which since the war has been issuing political directives, was

---

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>55</sup>Frank Robert Hunter, 132.

<sup>56</sup>Lockman and Beinun, 133.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 133.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 133.



a direct result of the Intifada. The often politically and religiously diverse population has actually responded to and followed these directives, whether they concern strikes, confrontations, or civil disobedience.<sup>59</sup>

Another significant result of the Uprising was the a far-reaching shift in the political position of the national movement away from a focus on preserving the option of military struggle and liberating all of historic Palestine to a commitment to political negotiations as the exclusive means of achieving the goal of a Palestinian state confined to the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>60</sup>

The Uprising also furthered the political prospects of the Palestinian struggle. It did so primarily by focusing international attention on the continued contestability of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza at a time when many Israelis and members of the world community were displaying a growing tendency to acquiesce to the political territorial status quo. A direct consequence of this heightened world attention to the Palestinian issue was a greater emphasis on the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian intercommunal--and not only the Israeli-Arab interstate--conflict in the consideration of possible formulas for a Middle East peace.<sup>61</sup>

Still another result of the Intifada was the re-Palestinization of the conflict--confrontation between inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and Israel.<sup>62</sup> Now the

---

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 133.

<sup>60</sup>Erika G. Alin, "Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising: An Assessment of Causes, Character, and Consequences," *Comparative Politics* 26 (July 1994), 479-498.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 480.

<sup>62</sup>Don Peretz, 192.

Arab states were the secondary participants, with Palestinians again in the lead.<sup>63</sup> Máoz wrote the following about the Palestinian Uprising:

On the Palestinian side, the Intifada created the need to achieve practical political results on grounds that were attainable only by means of negotiations with Israel and thus induced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a more flexible attitude and seek—like the government of Israel—an acceptable formula that would enable the beginning of the peace negotiations.<sup>64</sup>

F. Robert Hunter, in his book, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means* (1991), postulated that:

The Intifada had great impact upon the PLO. Not only did the Intifada rescue the PLO from the relative impotence, it resolved the long-standing political struggle within it between those who clung to the old idea of replacing Israel by a secular democratic state, and those who supported the negotiating tactics that had been developed by Arafat since the mid 1970s.<sup>65</sup> It was the Intifada, however, that brought Arafat's strategy to fruition. Without the impetus provided by the revolt, the PLO could not have moved so fast or traveled so far toward a political settlement.<sup>66</sup>

The Intifada was incapable, by itself, of ending Israel's rule or creating a Palestinian state. Only diplomatic agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis could achieve this goal. Since the Intifada did not have a structured, independent leadership or the power to force Israel's withdrawal, it was the task of Arafat and the PLO to reach a

---

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 193.

<sup>64</sup>Moshe Máoz, et al, 104.

<sup>65</sup>Hunter, 150.

<sup>66</sup>Hunter, 153.

negotiated solution. If he was unable to do so, local activists might look elsewhere for leadership, or, deprived of hope, the Uprising could collapse.<sup>67</sup>

In February 1988, at a dinner hosted by Hani al-Hasan at his house in Saudi Arabia, Abu-Iyad agreed, up to a point, that the Uprising was not a PLO revolution but the Palestinian's own revolution, though the PLO could play an important role in negotiations. "Seeing children risking their lives imposed on us the need to achieve a realistic peace."<sup>68</sup>

Along with broadening the role of the PLO, the Intifada put the Palestinian issue back on the world agenda, winning it considerable international sympathy. It strengthened the PLO's hand vis-a-vis Jordan, polarized Israeli opinion, and isolated Israel.<sup>69</sup> At the same time, the PLO was able to take advantage of the Uprising to place the Palestinian problem on the international agenda and keep it "hot."<sup>70</sup>

By the end of 1989, the Intifada had stabilized at its own level. Politically, its main achievement during the second year had been to produce direct talks between Israel and the PLO, which had become established de facto.<sup>71</sup>

If the PLO was still in Beirut, "there would have been no Intifada" because people in the territories would still be waiting for salvation from the outside. Another PLO

---

<sup>67</sup>Rex Brynen, 85.

<sup>68</sup>Barry Rubin, 92.

<sup>69</sup>Rubin, 86.

<sup>70</sup>Shalev, 5.

<sup>71</sup>Hunter, 215.

leader called the Intifada, “the real mother of the peace process.”<sup>72</sup> The Intifada gave the PLO and the Palestinian people enhanced standing as a party to the conflict.<sup>73</sup>

#### The Impact of the 1987 Uprising on the Peace Process

Ed Koufman, in his book, *Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian*

*Conflict*, expressed it well:

The intellectuals understood, too, that postponing settlement of the conflict was impossible. The Middle East is going to be in grave danger if we wait. It seems to me that Arafat was very alive to that factor of threat, to himself and to his movement, from Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement). If Hamas should take over, it will become a conflict to the bitter end because of the involvement of the religious elements. You cannot compromise on religious views, especially when you believe that God is on your side and you will prevail in the end, and that victory is bound to be yours.<sup>74</sup>

Yossi Beilin is one of the most respected scholars in Israel in the field of political science. Israelis and Arabs, according to Dr. Beilin, were experts in missing peace opportunities:

Perhaps the earliest was in 1947, had the Palestinians then decided to have their own state, we would have been in a much better situation. Two states, two people, some such arrangement. All their dreams which have not been fulfilled—and God knows whether they will be fulfilled--could have been met in 1947.<sup>75</sup>

And about another opportunity that was missed, he wrote:

---

<sup>72</sup>Barry Rubin, 92.

<sup>73</sup>Rex Brynen, 137.

<sup>74</sup>Kaufman, et al, 229.

<sup>75</sup>Máoz, 25.

Then we missed a chance too, to use Itamar's example, Hosnie Zaim, who was elected in April 1949 and assassinated in August 1949, did not want our land. The situation was different from today. When Zaim suggested talks with Ben-Gurion (first Prime Minister of Israel) about peace between Syria and Israel in spring of 1949, Ben-Gurion was not ready to talk to him because Syria was encroaching on our side of the border between Syria and Israel.<sup>76</sup>

In another place he wrote:

Another opportunity was missed by the Arabs. Immediately after the 1967 War, we were ready to withdraw, especially from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. A famous secret resolution on June 19, 1967, a resolution one week after the war, referred especially to this idea: that Israel was ready to withdraw, to negotiate with Syria and Egypt on the basis of international borders and Israel's security needs.<sup>77</sup>

The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Goldberg, who submitted the secret resolution to the Egyptians and Syrians, received in return the famous No's of Khartum: No negotiations, no peace, and no recognition of Israel. That was an opportunity totally missed by the Arabs.<sup>78</sup> Just as frustrating for those interested in sincere peace efforts: in 1971 Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, rejected Gunnar Jarring's plan for peace—total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace with Israel. Anwar Sadat's was that a full, just, and comprehensive peace would not take place in the Middle East unless Israel withdrew from all occupied territories.<sup>79</sup> Dayan, Israeli Defense Minister, replied, "It is better to have Sharm El-Sheikh in Sinai than to have peace."<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup>Máoz, 25.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 26.

Moshe Máoaz analyzed the missed opportunity:

Yossi Beilin believed that Golds Meir can be blamed for the disaster of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. She did not read the answer. I think that was perhaps the biggest opportunity missed by Israel since statehood.<sup>81</sup>

Shimon Shamir further commented:

Israel needed the October War in order to make peace with Egypt based on the principle of territory for peace, and Israel needed the Intifada for making a compromise with the PLO.<sup>82</sup>

President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, described Egypt's perspective on the Israeli-

PLO agreement with the following words:

The glorious October War had opened wide the chance of peace to all the peoples of the region. The Palestinian-Israeli agreement could not have happened without the deep influence the October War had created in the region of the Middle East.<sup>83</sup>

In his November 1977 Knesset speech, President Anwar Sadat's words reflected

his broad and correct assessment of the new trends in the Arab-Israeli conflict:

There are certain facts that have to be faced with courage and clear vision. There are Arab territories which Israel occupied [since 1967]. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories. As for the Palestinian cause, no one can deny that this is the heart of the whole problem. . . . In all faith I tell you that peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians. . . the only language to deal with it, for a just and lasting peace, is the establishment of their state. With all the international guarantees you request, there should be no fear of a new-born state. . . . When the bells of peace ring, there will be no hand to beat the drums of war, and if there are any, it shall be soundless.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., 27.

<sup>82</sup>ibid., 38.

<sup>83</sup>Al-Ahram Newspaper, 6 October 1993. In Máoaz, 56.

<sup>84</sup>Arab Republic of Egypt, White Paper on the Peace Initiatives Undertaken by President Al-Sadat, 1971-1977 (Cairo, 1978), 175-179. In Máoaz, 59.

Yair Hirschfeld was the main Israeli negotiator during most of the secret talks held with the PLO. He believed that, “Israeli-Palestinian talks in the 1970s made no progress because of the PLO’s high level demands.”<sup>85</sup>

In May 1989, Shamir and Rabin revealed what became known as the Shamir-Rabin Plan. It emphasized the need to come to terms with the Palestinians and suggested a method of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiation process. On the Palestinian side, the Intifada created the need to achieve practical political results on grounds that were attainable only by means of negotiations with Israel and thus induced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a more flexible attitude in seeking—like the government of Israel—an acceptable formula that would enable the beginning of the peace negotiations.<sup>86</sup>

Finally, the decisive stage in the history of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations began. With the help of the country of Norway, a secret back channel was created, providing a venue for clandestine negotiations between the government of Israel and the PLO and ultimately leading to the mutually agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. A formal agreement ceremony between representatives of the two sides was held in Washington, on the White House lawn, on September 13, 1993.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup>Máoz, 99.

<sup>86</sup>Máoz, 104.

<sup>87</sup>Máoz, 106.

Without Rabin's support, analytical thinking, and decision making, the Oslo process would never have been significantly advanced or concluded.<sup>88</sup> Rabin's willingness to explore the Oslo channel derived in part from his analysis of international and regional changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and the political shifts caused by the Gulf War.<sup>89</sup>

In a seminal speech at Tel Aviv University in November 1992, Rabin explained:

I believe that among the leadership of the territories and outside of the territories, maybe in [PLO headquarters in] Tunisia, there are today Palestinian leaders who have wised up, and they understand that they cannot repeat the mistakes of the past . . . There are so many among them who understand that it is better to establish the nucleus of a Palestinian entity, even if it is administrative.<sup>90</sup>

In short, peace was more than an opportunity not to be missed—it was imperative that Israel needed to seize to stave off threats down the road.<sup>91</sup>

Then in his inaugural Knesset speech on July 13, 1992, Rabin stressed the need to explore the unparalleled window of opportunity in the peace process in order to avert long-term threats:

. . . . We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation that is spreading all over the entire globe these days. We don't want to be the last to remain, all alone, in the station. . . . A number of countries in our region have recently stepped up their efforts to develop and produce nuclear arms . . . The possibility that nuclear weapons will be introduced in the Middle East in the coming years is a very grave and negative development from Israel's standpoint. . . .

---

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., 107.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., 107.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., 110.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., 111.



This situation requires us to give further thought to the urgent need to end the Arab-Israel conflict and live in peace with our Arab neighbors.<sup>92</sup>

Rabin told his friend Shimon Sheves, “The premiership for me is an option, not an obsession. I have done everything and have had jobs that people only dream of. I don’t need the honor of being prime minister again. But I think I can bring peace to Israel and a change in priorities. The money we spend building settlements in the West Bank should be used for education, building industries, providing jobs and absorbing new comers.<sup>93</sup>

In a further step towards peaceful negotiations, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres struck a deal with King Hussein in Paris 1987. Meeting secretly in London, both agreed to an international conference (which Hussein believed was necessary to confer legitimacy on any agreement) that would serve as an umbrella for separate bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors.<sup>94</sup>

In remarks that surprised American officials, Rabin admitted that only Arafat could make a deal for the Palestinians because the Palestinians living in the territories were not willing to defy him.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 111-112.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., 423.

<sup>94</sup>David Makousky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 7.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., 47.

Shimon Peres stressed the following when he said, “I have never doubted that the Palestinian problem is a mine that could trigger any number of others, and that defusing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is the key to regional peace.”<sup>96</sup>

Israel found it necessary to come up with its own initiative for negotiation on an interim agreement between Israel and a Palestinian representative from the territories whose members would be chosen in a free and democratic election. According to this framework plan, negotiations on a permanent settlement would begin following several years of an interim settlement.<sup>97</sup>

Israel came with its “Seven Points,” which was Israel’s idea of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. The Seven Points were:

PLO recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security; its commitment to resolving the conflict on the basis of U.N. Security Council resolution 242 and 338; repeal of the provision of the PLO Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel; renunciation of terrorism and cooperation with Israel in countering violence; ending the Intifada; a commitment to resolve all outstanding issues with Israel peacefully; and Arafat’s agreement to represent himself in meetings with Israelis in his capacity as Chairman of the PLO and not as president of Palestine.<sup>98</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup>David Landau, ed., *Shimon Peres: Battling for Peace Memoirs* (London, England: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1995), 229.

<sup>97</sup>Shalev, 5-6.

<sup>98</sup>David Makousky, 64.

There could be no military means of ending the Palestinian Uprising without undermining the ethical foundation on which Israeli democracy is based. Ironically, the Intifada, which began without PLO initiative or direction, has proven that Israel cannot achieve a political resolution of the conflict without negotiating with the PLO.<sup>99</sup>

The children who are living today's nightmares will become the leaders of tomorrow. If the Intifada continues for long, their fears of the Israeli intruder may turn to hatred, which will undermine possibilities of dialogue. And as we have seen, the longer the uprising, the greater the support for Islamic fundamentalists who oppose all compromise. How imminent, then, is the prospect that Israel will recognize that there is an urgent need to reach settlement, before it is too late?<sup>100</sup>

In his article, May 4, 1990, Joel Brinkley wrote:

It would be a mistake to believe that the Uprising is "controlled" or that the Palestinian resistance will cease before a political settlement is reached.<sup>101</sup>

By the same token, the Israelis cannot hope to usurp Palestine, to uproot and expel its inhabitants, to pillage their homes and to live thereafter in peace. These facts are recognized by leading Zionists. "Israel has no long-term future without accord with the Arabs," said Nahum Goldman, late President of the World Jewish Congress.<sup>102</sup>

A keen political observer Lord Mayhew wrote:

---

<sup>99</sup>Freedman, 338.

<sup>100</sup>Don Peretz, 116.

<sup>101</sup>New York Times, 4 May 1990.

<sup>102</sup>Andrew C. Kimmens, ed., "The Palestinian Problem," *The Reference Shelf* 61, no. 1 (The H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1989), 186.

If Israel continues in its present path, relying solely on military firepower and the Washington Lobby, its survival as a sovereign Jewish state into the next century seems problematical.<sup>103</sup>

Yehashafat Harkabi, one time Chief of the Israeli military intelligence, and now a professor of international relations at the Hebrew University substantiated the need to keep talking and negotiating: “Our choice is not between good and bad. That bad and worse. Israel cannot defend itself if half its population is the enemy. The Arabs understand that if there is no settlement, then there will be hell, for them and for us.”<sup>104</sup>

Herkabi, in another place said, “The establishment of a Palestinian state, with appropriate security guarantees and a commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel, may be the best way for Israel to maintain its own integrity.”<sup>105</sup> Related to this point, Rabin, in an interview with Time Magazine continued to clarify his position: “I oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan, and I don’t believe that at this stage it would be a good idea if I brought out the option.”<sup>106</sup>

Nasser E. Nashashibi said, “In his office, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told me that the future solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict will depend on two “Pillars”:

1. A political confederation between Jordan and any Palestinian entity in the West Bank.
2. An economic confederation between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup>*Middle East International*, 17 May 1985. In Kimmens, 187.

<sup>104</sup>Lance Morrow, *Time*, 4 April 1988.

<sup>105</sup>Yehuda Lukas, et al, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 337.

<sup>106</sup>Lisa Beyer, “I Oppose the Creation of a Palestinian State.” *Time*, Vol. 42, No. 13 (1993), 33.

<sup>107</sup>Máoz, 186.

Dr. Azmy Bishara talked about peace and the Israeli public support to peace when he wrote:

Rabin contributed more to peace with his death than he did in his life. Israeli public opinion was never as supportive of the peace process than it is now, and the Israeli right was never so reluctant to go against it. A prominent leader of the settlers worried after Rabin's death that the campaign against Oslo lost its morality. A deep feeling prevails in Israel that the integrity of the land threatens to destroy the integrity of the people.<sup>108</sup>

Bassam Abu-Sharif, the political advisor for Arafat in an interview stressed the following:

The Palestinians want the kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins of another's. We are confident that this desire and this realization is shared by all but an insignificant minority in Israel. The means by which the Israelis want to achieve lasting peace and security is direct talks, with no attempt by any outside party to impose or veto a settlement.<sup>109</sup>

In an interview with *Time Magazine*, Chairman Arafat said, "For many years, I have been asking the Israelis to start making peace."<sup>110</sup>

The Intifada shook up PLO policy and thinking, especially when the local residents spearheading it demanded the PLO act effectively to end the occupation.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>108</sup>Dr. Azmy Bishara, "Facing Up to a Violent Society," *World Press* 33, no. 1 (1996): 20-21.

<sup>109</sup>Bassam Abu-Sharif, "Prospects of Palestinian-Israeli Settlement," Palestine News Agency, 6 June 1988.

<sup>110</sup>Dean Fischer, "This Is a Step Toward A Palestinian State," *Time Magazine* 142, no. 13 (1993): 32.

<sup>111</sup>Barry Rubin, 102.

The PLO was pushed toward tough decisions and irreversible choices as West Bank and Gaza Palestinians demanded action.<sup>112</sup>

At the same time, the Palestinians have been coming to terms with the irreversibility of Israel's existence as an established state and adjusting to their demands. They now seek the end of the occupation in the remaining areas of Palestine occupied by the Jewish army after 1967. In a special sense, accommodation to two states, side by side, seems available long-term proposition.<sup>113</sup>

In summer of 1988, Arafat's adviser, Bassam Abu-Sharif, unequivocally accepted a two-state solution and indicated that Arafat would welcome a meeting with Israel's Prime Minister. There had been such indicators earlier, as Shimon Peres acknowledged at the end of 1987.<sup>114</sup>

The Intifada has had a profound effect on the course and dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and many have pointed out the need for political, rather than military solutions to the Palestinian issue. The Intifada also had created new regional pressures, constraints, and opportunities, and altered political environment for Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and other regional actors. Finally, the Uprising has affected the foreign policies of the two super powers, just as hope for settlement will necessarily be shaped by U.S. and Soviet policy and changes in East-West relations.<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 169.

<sup>113</sup>Kaufman, 55.

<sup>114</sup>David McDowall, 209.

<sup>115</sup>Rex Brynen, 3.

The conclusion to be drawn from this uprising is that the present state of affairs in the Palestinian occupied territories is unnatural and the Israeli occupation cannot continue forever. Real peace cannot be achieved except through the recognition of Palestinian national rights, including the right of self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian national soil.<sup>116</sup>

Only after the Intifada began and the international media—led by television news—brought the violence into hundreds of millions of homes worldwide, did the leaders of the great powers realize that something had to be done. The United States, committed to Israel's existence and security, quickly developed a new peace plan to attempt to sell to political leaders in the Middle East.<sup>117</sup> The Intifada also helped to motivate the Reagan administration to undertake a new diplomatic effort to foster movement toward Middle East peace.<sup>118</sup>

Washington utterly neglected the peace process until the Palestinian Uprising forced it back on the agenda. The Intifada had inspired a significant portion of Congress, and of the Organized American Jewish Leadership, to recommend greater attention to peacemaking on the part of the United States and Israel alike.<sup>119</sup> Unfortunately, as Secretary Shultz observed:

---

<sup>116</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Document on Middle East Peace, 1982-1988, 101<sup>st</sup> Congress, April 1989, 49.

<sup>117</sup>Yossi Melman and Don Raviv, *Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians* (West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1989), 14.

<sup>118</sup>Tessler, 713.

<sup>119</sup>Freedman, 115.

As of September 1988, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians seemed ready yet for political talks with each other. Talks that would require, in America's view, a different approach by both sides: Palestinians must renounce terrorism and violence, they must accept the right of Israel to exist . . . They cannot murder or threaten other Palestinians who maintain contact with Israeli authorities. Israel . . . cannot claim there is no one to talk to while suppressing political expression, arresting or deporting . . . even those who speak in moderate terms.<sup>120</sup>

Despite these obstacles, the United States according to Shultz, continued to advocate "direct negotiations. Launched if required, through an international conference that could support direct negotiations without interfering in them."<sup>121</sup>

Secretary of State George Shultz began his first visit of the year to the Middle East on February 1988, impelled not so much by an overriding desire to settle the region's problems as equitable as possible, as by pressure from within the United States, particularly the Jewish community to do something to relieve the pressure on Israel which the Intifada had brought about.<sup>122</sup>

In much the same vein, Shultz's initiative of 1988 was a reaction to the Intifada. Without the eruption of violence in the Occupied Territories, Shultz would probably not have devised his plan.<sup>123</sup>

While the Intifada resulted in heightened international attention to the Palestinian cause, U.S. led diplomatic efforts to initiate Israel-Palestinian negotiations during 1989

---

<sup>120</sup>Freedman, 116.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., 116.

<sup>122</sup>Michael Adams, 58.

<sup>123</sup>William B. Quandt, 379.



and 1990 stalemated.<sup>124</sup> King Hassan, the late King of Morocco summed up the situation when he said that President George Bush told him: “My friend, tell your Arab brothers and especially the Palestinians that after me . . . and for a long time to come, they shall not find support such as the support I am giving now and will continue to give in the future.”<sup>125</sup>

At a news conference, Secretary of State George P. Shultz issued a statement:

The PLO today issued a statement in which it accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and renounced terrorism. As a result, the United States is prepared for substantive dialogue with the PLO representative. In that light, I view this development as one more step toward the beginning of direct negotiations between the parties, which alone can lead to such a peace. The United States does not recognize the declaration of an independent Palestinian state.<sup>126</sup>

Also, American Jewish leaders, who were deeply distressed by the daily television images coming from Israel of violent clashes resulting from the Palestinian Uprising, had reportedly played a significant role in persuading Shultz to resume an active American role in reviving the moribund peace process.<sup>127</sup>

President Clinton said, “For more than a quarter of a century, our nation has been directly engaged in efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict. We have done so because it reflects our finest values and our deepest interests ... Our interests in a stable Middle

---

<sup>124</sup>Erica G. Alin, 293.

<sup>125</sup>Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “Toward Peace in the Middle East,” U.S. News and World Report 113, no. 6, (1992): 80.

<sup>126</sup>Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Statement at a news conference on the U.S.-PLO dialogue. December 14, 1988. Washington Post, 15 December, 1988.

<sup>127</sup>Robert O. Freedman, 273.

East where Israelis and Arabs can live together in harmony and develop the potential of their region, which is tremendous.”<sup>128</sup>

Robert O. Freedman, in his book, *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, The Arab world, and The Superpowers* (1991), mentioned that President Gorbachev, stated the following:

The Palestinian people have extensive international support and this is the earnest of the solution of the main question for the Palestinian people—the questions of self-determination. Just as recognition of the State of Israel and accounts for its security interests, the solution of this question is a necessary element of the establishment of peace . . . in the region on the basis of the principles of international law.<sup>129</sup>

During the first three or four months of the Uprising, the media was the single important influence in moving Middle East peace work forward.<sup>130</sup> One of the Uprising’s most notable achievements in its earlier stages was to bring about international press, particularly television, coverage which was unprecedentedly hostile to Israel.<sup>131</sup> Western TV viewers were shown footage of Israeli troops firing live bullets and tear gas at Palestinian demonstrators; most spectacularly, perhaps, on January 15, when the

---

<sup>128</sup>Bill Clinton, “The Middle East: Opening the Door to a Comprehensive and Lasting Settlement,” Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 37, 13 September 1993.

<sup>129</sup>Robert O. Freedman, 143.

<sup>130</sup>Lockman and Benin, 281.

<sup>131</sup>Michael Adams, 57.

security forces invaded the precincts of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and attacked worshipers.<sup>132</sup>

The place where Israel's reputation was beginning to suffer greatest damage was in the United States, most significantly among the American Jewish community, its staunchest and most crucial source of support. Shocked by the extensive TV coverage of violent scenes in the Uprising, American Jewish leaders began to voice the community's discontent to their Israeli counterparts and to the U.S. Government.<sup>133</sup>

The Uprising also scored another international success when European Economic Community Commissioner Claude Cheysson publicly condemned Israel's action as "shameful" and called for its "evacuation" of the Occupied Territories. Also, the incoming Chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers, the West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, caused further embarrassment to Israel by stating his intention to make the Middle East the priority of his foreign policy during his six-month 'presidency.' He made clear, with the full EEC backing, his intention to seek a role for Europe in pushing forward plans for an international peace conference under U.N. auspices.<sup>134</sup>

The European Parliament joined the chorus of criticism when it called on Israel to halt reprisals against Palestinian protestors, and executives of the EEC accused it of

---

<sup>132</sup>Ibid., 57.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid., 58.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid., 58.

“scandalous” acts of repression.<sup>135</sup> France, Spain, and Greece would renew the 1980 Venice Declaration that called for PLO “association” in peace talks and recognition of Palestinian right to self-determination.<sup>136</sup> By the end of 1988 diplomatic fallout from the Intifada had spread across Europe. Poland scuttled its plan to raise the level of diplomatic representation from the existing Interest Section to a higher level. Greece reneged on a promise to raise diplomatic representation to an ambassador when it took the chair of the EEC. The U.S.S.R. delayed issuing visas to Israel’s Moscow Consular delegation. Ireland continued to refuse to accept an Israeli ambassador. Portugal decided not to open a chancery in Tel Aviv.<sup>137</sup> It is not surprising that African countries began to pass resolutions through the Organization of African Unity and at the United Nations in support of Palestinian rights to a homeland and to Palestinian representation at peace negotiations—with the PLO as the sole legitimate representative.<sup>138</sup>

According to Abu-Lebdeh, several important events influenced, shaped, and permitted the process that resulted in the signing of the accord. Some of those events were the following:

- 1) The fragmentation of the Soviet Union in 1991, following the fall of Communism, removed the Arab-Israeli conflict from the realm of the U.S. and Soviet Union rivalries in the Middle East. Some of the Arab

---

<sup>135</sup>Don Peretz, 165.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid., 165.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., 116.

<sup>138</sup>Glenn E. Perry, 67.

states that had depended on military support from the Soviet Union could no longer rely on it--Syria and the PLO.

- 2) The active U.S. role in the lengthy process of mediating Middle East peace, from the early 1950s to the present. It was this incremental process that brought the Arabs and Israelis closer to peace and to the signing of the Camp David Accord, March 1979, between Egypt and Israel.
- 3) The Arab-Israeli conflict took its toll on the people of the region and created constituencies that supported peace in Israel and in the Arab countries. Those who oppose the peace process are on the fringes and are likely to be isolated and marginalized by the prevailing sentiment.
- 4) The domestic influence of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on the economies of those countries, and the diversion of national resources to the arms race to serve as preparation for the next war or a deterrent to one.
- 5) Perceptual changes of Israeli and Arab leaders stemming from the mutual benefits in achieving comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and from historical precedents of making peace between enemies.<sup>139</sup>

Also, in another place and according to Abu-Lebdeh, major political and military events in the international system and in the Middle East influenced the evolution of new perceptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of these included:

---

<sup>139</sup>Hatem Shareef Abu-Lebdeh, *Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: National Perception and the United States-Jordan Relations* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 155.

The Intifada in 1987-1993 in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza, represented a different political and military challenge to Israel. (The Intifada was an uprising of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.) Unprecedented mass Palestinian Uprisings, protests, military clashes, and strikes on a continuing basis evolved to become a national movement that exposed the heavy cost of Israeli occupation.

The Gulf War in 1991 created a political and military realignment in both the international system and the Middle East. During the Gulf War, Iraq's Scud missile attack on Israel and Saudi Arabia underscored Israel's vulnerability and diminished the importance of proximity in warfare.<sup>140</sup>

Furthermore, in a series of interviews conducted in the West Bank and outside the Occupied Territories, one question was asked: Do you think that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had an impact on the peace process? Dr. Kamel Abu-Jaber, head of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference, answered this way:

The Uprising had a deep impact on the Israeli leadership by convincing them it is important and necessary to reach a peaceful settlement with the PLO. Also, the Uprising had a far reaching impact on the Israeli society, and for the first time, the Israeli public opinion started to talk about the occupation to the territories, law, morals among soldiers serving in the territories, the treatment of the Palestinians which is inhumane, division among the scholars and the educated people about Jewish values and the future of the Jewish state. And, for the first time in the history of the Jewish state that the international opinion at the official and unofficial level no longer have sympathy for Israel as it did before. All these phenomena played a role in pushing Israel to the negotiating table, hopefully to find an acceptable political solution to the Palestinian question by the Palestinians.

---

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., 156.

In the same interview, Dr. Abu-Jaber talked about the military procedures which had been carried out in the occupied territories by the IDF, and all these procedures targeted the young, the women, and the elderly, which all was in violation of international laws, human values, and all God's religions. Such heinous acts gave the Uprising international media coverage, which gave the Uprising the sympathy and the support of the international communities. At the same time, that put the Israeli government in an untenable position and in obvious violation of international law, and they had to resolve this dilemma.

In another interview that took place in February 19, 2001, Mr. M. Erekat affirmed, "The Uprising of 1987 was one of the most important causes which led to the peace process, because the U.S. and Israel had reached a conclusion that the region will not be calm as long as the Palestinian people are under occupation, and there is no peace between Israel and the Palestinian." He added that "the Gulf War also participated in pushing the peace process forward."<sup>141</sup>

In another interview that took place in February 21, 2001, and in the words of Mr. Salama Hujazi: "I do not think that the Uprising of 1987 was a major player in pushing both parties to the peace process. The peace was a result of the Gulf War, and the emergence of Arab and international policies to reorganize and to reshape the politics of the Arab countries and the Middle East as a whole. The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the first priority of this new policy."<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>141</sup>Máin Erekat, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

<sup>142</sup>Salama Hijawi, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

In another interview that took place in February 21, 2001, Mr. Hassan Al-Kashif said, "Itzhak Rabin was aware that the military solution to the Uprising was a failed one, and there must be another solution, which is the negotiation one."<sup>143</sup>

Also, the Uprising tarnished Israel's reputation in the world, especially through the media coverage, and Israel had to react to what was at least a public relations and image nightmare. The only alternative seemed to be to end the Uprising by discussing peace with the PLO through an international peace conference.

In another interview that took place on February 21, 2001, Mr. Abu-Ali indicated that, "The peace process took place because the PLO was afraid of the existence of the alternative leadership in the territories." To re-affirm leadership, the PLO reopened the negotiation channels with Israel, especially after the Madrid Conference. The Israeli objective after Oslo was to end the Uprising and to bring the PLO leaders from outside, for the people to see them from close distance."<sup>144</sup>

Dr. Hussein Al-Araj said, "As a result of the Uprising, and as a result of six years of fierce fighting, Israel was forced to discuss peace with the PLO."<sup>145</sup>

Abu-Ahmad said, "The New World Order, and the tendency toward the Globalization, and the need for change in cultures, values, and religious beliefs required peace in the world, and without peace none of these can be achieved. For that, the world

---

<sup>143</sup>Hassan Al-Kashif, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

<sup>144</sup>Abu-Ali, T, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.

<sup>145</sup>Dr. Hussein Al-Araj, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.



community has to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in order to achieve the Globalization.”<sup>146</sup>

Dr. Waled Jarar said, “There was no relationship between the Uprising of 1987 and the peace process. Peace came as a result of the Israeli reaction to the Uprising, and to the way that Israel dealt with the Uprising.”<sup>147</sup>

Dr. Marwan Jarar said, “The international opinion and especially the American, pushed Israel to negotiate peace with the PLO. The same pressure applied to the Palestinians to do the same.”<sup>148</sup>

Mr. Naser Zakarneh said, “The Uprising forced both sides—the Israeli and the Palestinian—to look for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Also, the international pressure on Israel forced Israel to open a dialogue with the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Also, the media coverage participated in showing to the world the Israeli oppression to the Palestinian in the Occupied Territories.”<sup>149</sup>

Abu-Hassan said, “The peace negotiation came to put an end to the Uprising, because this Uprising cost Israel too much.”<sup>150</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup>Abu-Ahmad, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Village of Burkeen, 14 June 2003.

<sup>147</sup>Dr. Waled Jarar, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Al-Jadedah, 14 June 2003.

<sup>148</sup>Dr. Marwan Jarar, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Village of Jabá, 14 June 2003.

<sup>149</sup>Mr. Naser Zakarneh, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Qubatih, 14 June 2003.

<sup>150</sup>Abu-Hassan, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Jerusalem Open University, 14 June 2003.

Abu-Ahmad said, "There was a strong feeling in the Israeli military establishment that it is not in the best interest of Israel to control the Palestinians militarily, but to substitute their existence with somebody else (PLO) to control the Palestinians and to do what Israel wants without being in contact with the Palestinians." Also, he said, "Israel was afraid that if the Uprising continued and for a long time that might awake the conscious of the Arabs and the Muslims, and that is not in Israel's interest, for that, setting on the negotiating table is the best to end the Uprising."<sup>151</sup>

Abu-Muhammed said, "There was no relationship between the Uprising of 1987 and the peace process. Peace was a result of the Gulf War. America entered to liberate Kuwait, at the same time, American had to show the world communities that we have to solve the Palestinian questions, and we have one standard in dealing with different issues, and we do not want to be accused of a double standard when it comes to Israel."<sup>152</sup>

Abu-Marwan said, "After the evacuation of the PLO forces from Lebanon in 1982, the PLO could not find basis to continue the fighting against Israel. At the same time, the PLO was under tremendous pressure from some Arab countries to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because these countries were under pressure from Israel, the U.S. and other countries."

---

<sup>151</sup>Abu-Ahmad, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Al-Farea Refugee Camp, 14 June 2003.

<sup>152</sup>Abu-Muhammed, interview by author's brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Jenin, 14 June 2003.

Abu-Muhammed said, “There was not relationship between the Uprising of 1987 and the peace process. Peace came because international public opinion took a decision to solve the Palestinian problem.”<sup>153</sup>

Abu-Hantash said, “The Palestinian people were tired from the continuation of the Uprising and from the Israeli treatment to them. That led them in searching for a new way, and the peace process was the way. Also, the desire of the Palestinians to be free from dependency on Arab regimes by establishing their own system where they can be free to do what is good for their lives.”<sup>154</sup>

Abu-Yousef said, “The Uprising was the reason for highlighting the Palestinian problem to the world. Also, the Uprising created an atmosphere in the world, interested some countries to initiate a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to give the Palestinians people the right to live as any nation or any people in the world.”<sup>155</sup>

Abu-Khaled said, “The Uprising of 1987 was the vehicle that was used by the PLO as an instrument to pressure Israel before international opinion to negotiate peace and to find a solution to the long-standing conflict.”<sup>156</sup>

Dr. Amin Ghanim, a Palestinian businessman residing in the U.S., said, “There is no doubt that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 participated in pushing both parties—the

---

<sup>153</sup>Abu-Marwan, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Maythaloum, 14 June 2003.

<sup>154</sup>Abu-Hantash, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Arabeh, 14 June 2003.

<sup>155</sup>Abu-Yousef, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Ramallah, 14 June 2003.

<sup>156</sup>Abu-Khaled, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, 14 June 2003.

Palestinians and the Israelis—to negotiate peace, especially when the United States and the international communities decided to solve the Palestinian problem, because it is the core of all problems in the region and the hottest spot in the world.”<sup>157</sup>

The late Lutfi Al-Barghuthi, from the Jordanian Parliament, said, “The Uprising of 1987 participated in pushing both parties to accept peace.” Also, he said, “The United States and other Arab countries realized that if the Uprising continued for a long time, it might put some Arab regimes in danger and that will not be in the interest of the United States, Israel and other countries in the region, For that, a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem has to be found, and negotiation between Israel and the PLO is the best way to solve the conflict peacefully, to end the Uprising, and to insure the safety of some regimes in the region.”<sup>158</sup>

For the purpose of this study both Palestinians and Israelis alike were interviewed. Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Palestinians residing in the United States were interviewed as were Israelis from Israel and Israelis who live in the United States – especially in the State of Georgia. Also included are Palestinians who are Israeli citizens and live in Israel and in Georgia.

The most difficult part of the study was convincing the Israelis to answer the question around which this study evolved. Do you think that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993 had any impact on the peace process between the Palestinians and the

---

<sup>157</sup>Dr. Amin Ghanim, interview by author, tape recording, Atlanta, GA, 16 June 1998.

<sup>158</sup>Lutfi al-Barghathi, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 14 August 1999.

Israelis? If not, what factors do you think motivated the Israeli government to negotiate peace with the Palestinians?

Professor Shlomo Aronson, Head of the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University wrote:

In my view, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993, did not contribute to the peace process between Israel and the PLO, but on the contrary created a sense of siege related to the very personal security of each Israeli in Israel proper due to suicide bombing and the inability of the Palestinian authority to constrain Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and its own Al-Aksa guerillas. Hence, for most Israelis, the Palestinians are playing a zero sum game, aimed at the destruction of Israeli society, not at a peace process. As such, the Israelis will fight, of course, and go on fighting until the Palestinians may realize that they need a domestic structure, that may bring them back to the peace track.<sup>159</sup>

In another response from Professor Manachem Klein, Political Science Department at Bar-Ilan University, wrote:

Honestly, my answer is very simple – Yes. Israel saw it cannot crack down the Intifada and that the occupation costs too much for Israel, therefore Israel was ready to sign an interim agreement with the PLO and make some concessions. It was not a peace treaty. Unfortunately both sides violated their commitments during the Oslo years, and managed a failure negotiation on a final status peace treaty.<sup>160</sup>

Another response came from Dr. Hillel Cohen, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Hebrew University. Dr. Cohen wrote:

I think that the Uprising was a major consideration in the Israeli decision-making in all what regards the Palestinians, including the decision to go to Madrid conference (and to lesser extent – to Oslo process).<sup>161</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup>Dr. Shlomo Aronson, Head of the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, November 14, 2004.

<sup>160</sup>Dr. Manchem Klein, Political Science Department, Bar-Ilan University, November 12, 2004.

<sup>161</sup>Dr. Hillel Cohen, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, November 29, 2004.

Dr. Zadka Shaul, Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University wrote:

My answer is yes, that the Uprising of 1987, had impact on the peace process, but not the only factor to influence peace.<sup>162</sup>

Professor Sam Lehman-Wilzig, Chairman, Department of Political Studies, at Bar-Ilan University wrote:

Given my position, I do not have time to answer such questions which demand a long discourse and explanation.<sup>163</sup>

In another telephone interview, Debbi, Master Coordinator of Political Graduate Studies at the University of Haifa, said:

I am not in a position to answer your question, but I will give you a number of professors' names from the Political Science Department and they will answer your question.<sup>164</sup>

In addition to that, in January of 2005, I sent more than 40 e-mails to professors, Doctors, and Directors in many of Israel's higher education institutions such as the University of Haifa, University of Tel-Aviv, Bar-Ilan University, Hebrew University, Ben-Gurion University, and many other universities and colleges. Unfortunately, none of them wrote me back. Also, I found it necessary to include the Palestinians who are living inside Israel, and the so-called Arabs of Israel.

In a telephone interview Mr. Zaid Oruk, 59, owner of Driving School and from the City of Nazarit, said:

---

<sup>162</sup>Dr. Zadka Shaul, Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, November 21, 2004.

<sup>163</sup>Dr. Sam Lehman-Wilzig, Chairman of the Political Science Department, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, November 21, 2004.

<sup>164</sup>Debbi, Political Science Department, University of Haifa, Israel. November 21, 2004.

The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 was a major factor in pushing Israel to negotiate peace with the PLO. Israel wanted to put an end to the Uprising because it cost Israel a huge amount of money. Force and the use of power did not do anything to the Uprising, and the only way out to the Israelis from this, is to negotiate peace.<sup>165</sup>

Toni Daud, 45, construction worker, from the Triangle district, said:

Without the Uprising, Israel will never sign a peace deal with the PLO. The Uprising with its determination and continuation forced Israel to realize that there is no way to end this uprising by using the Israel might force. Peace, even if it is not a real peace, is the only way out.<sup>166</sup>

Ashraf, 35, former Israeli border police, said:

I was serving in Gaza during the Intifada. The Palestinians have no fear from the Israeli army. We shoot at them, they shoot back. We killed from them, they killed from us. I saw soldiers depressed, burned-out, disoriented, and tired. We do not want this war, because there is not ending for the fighting, and that put the military personnel in a difficult position. For that, we soldiers refused to fight. Others refused to serve in the Territories and other committed suicide. I believe that the Uprising forced Israel to take the path of peace in order to rescue itself from further destruction to its society, its economy, and its reputation worldwide.<sup>167</sup>

Labib Abur-Aqel, 35, owner of a landscape company, from the city of Kufor

Yassif, resident of Marietta, Georgia, said:

The Uprising of 1987 created many things that Israel does not like. One of these, the renewing of the national sentiment to the Palestinians who are living in Israel. We are Arabs. We are Palestinians. We have to stand with our brothers in the Territories in their fight against the occupation. Israel does not like these feelings to be reborn. The Uprising also made it very difficult and unsafe for the Israeli civilians to do business in the Territories for security reason. Israel used everything in its power to end the Uprising and they could not. For that, the military leaders with the political leaders saw peace is the only way to put an end

---

<sup>165</sup>Zaid Oruk, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 13 March 2005.

<sup>166</sup>Toni Daud, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 15 June 2005.

<sup>167</sup>Ashraf, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA 15 June, 2005.

to the Uprising, and they did. The Palestinians, with this peace agreement, achieved a little of what they fought for.<sup>168</sup>

Jehad Abdullah, 48, from Kufor Qassim, resident of Marietta, Georgia, owner of a gas station, said:

Without a doubt, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 is a major factor in forcing Israel to accept to negotiate peace. Israel was not used to this kind of war. It is a costly war in all measures—economically, socially, and politically. Also, Israel in its wars was used to a quick war, but this one is too long for them for that. It touched every Israeli in every aspect of their lives. For that, something must be done to end this uprising, and peace is the only way out, and they did it.<sup>169</sup>

Before ending this chapter, I find it important to discuss the position of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) regarding the peace process.

Hamas' charter stated that the Land of Palestine is an Islamic trust (waqf), to be held as such for generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgment. No one has the authority to give up any part of Palestine.<sup>170</sup>

This premise infers that negotiations with the enemy over the Land of Palestine are tantamount to treason. Hamas also rejected the international conference to decide the future of Palestine because such conferences are, according to Hamas, nothing but a form of judgment passed by infidels on the land of the Muslims.<sup>171</sup>

Hamas considers itself part of the Uprising without subscribing to its slogan and objectives: It does not recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the

---

<sup>168</sup>Labib Abu-Agel, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 14 June 2005.

<sup>169</sup>Jehad Abdullah, interview by author's brother, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 14 June 2005.

<sup>170</sup>Lockman and Beinun, 174.

<sup>171</sup>Ibid., 174.



Palestinian people. It is against the convening of an international conference and it does not support the establishment of a Palestinian state.<sup>172</sup>

It is difficult to understand Hamas' zeal in furthering the Uprising while at the same time rejecting its main slogans. This enigma can be understood on two different levels, the most simple explanation, and one which has some currency in the Occupied Territories, is that Israeli Intelligence Services (Musad) has incited or at least encouraged Hamas to sow discord and disunity among Palestinians.<sup>173</sup> Hamas knows that it cannot block a political settlement once the process is initiated. Given this, it aims to guarantee a presence "on the street" so to speak, during the process leading up to and beyond such settlement.<sup>174</sup>

Hamas' active participation in the Uprising, then, should be seen as part of the campaign of a prospective opposition Islamic party in the future Palestinian state. As such, there is no doubt that Hamas should be taken seriously.<sup>175</sup> Shimon Peres said in 1993, "That the PLO under the leadership of Arafat signed the Oslo agreement because of fear that Hamas will pull the carpet from under its feet and take over."

From the materials collected and presented in this study, I can say that the majority of the facts, along with the extensive interviews of stakeholders on both sides of

---

<sup>172</sup>Ibid., 175.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., 175.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., 176.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid., 177.

the issue, are in support of my main hypothesis that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993 indeed impacted the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The region west of the Jordan River has been the scene of many wars between many nations throughout history. For the last seventy years, there were wars between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In 1948, the majority of Palestine was occupied by the Jewish army and became known as Israel. As a result 750,000 Palestinians became refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In 1967's Six Day War, the rest of Palestine came under Israeli occupation. Twenty years later, the Occupied Territories erupted in violent demonstrations against the Israeli domination and the Israeli forces, and later became known as the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 or the Intifada.

The goals of the Palestinian Uprising were to achieve self-determination, to establish the Palestinian State, and to achieve peace with Israel.

In the upcoming pages, there are a few subjects that need to be discussed: first, the future prospect of a Palestinian state next to the State of Israel; second, peace and cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian State, and neighboring states, such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and other countries in the region; and third, democracy in the Palestinian State and its impact on the region.

The establishment of a Palestinian State on Palestinian land is the ultimate goal of every Palestinian, because tens of thousands of Palestinians have paved the way to

statehood by their blood. Having a country, a flag, a passport, an independence day, a national anthem, and a president, all these are priceless to the Palestinians who have experienced nothing like it for a long time.

The new Palestinian State will have to live side by side with the State of Israel. The advocates of the Palestinian State say that the Palestinian State would not only pose no danger, it would enhance Israeli security by enabling Israel to make peace with other Arab countries.<sup>1</sup>

Some say once Palestinians becomes independent, it will be advantageous for Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria to absorb the Palestinians now living in "refugee camps" in those countries. This could mean the addition of another million refugees. Still, even a hostile and armed Palestine will pose no great threat by itself to the powerful Israeli army.<sup>2</sup>

The issue of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria should and will be discussed between the Israeli and the Palestinians. This issue is a very complicated one. Israel, according to its officials, will not allow and will not accept any Palestinian to return and live in Israel. At the same time, Israel may accept the idea of paying compensation to the Palestinians in the refugee camps, as long as the U.S., Europe and the Arab states pay the bill.

---

<sup>1</sup>David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a Mortal Threat" *Commentary* 9, no. 5 (1993): 27-31.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 27-31.

Prime Minister of Israel, Rabin, responded to a question by *Time Magazine*, September 27, 1993. How do you assess the security risk to Israel from a Palestinian state? Rabin in his answer stated, "The Palestinians do not present a military threat to the existence of Israel. There are certain risks to personal security of a limited number of Israelis."<sup>3</sup>

In his speech before the Israeli Knesset, November 1977, President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt said:

In all faith, I tell you that peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians.... The only language to deal with it, for a just and lasting peace, is the establishment of their state. With all international guarantees you request, there should be no fear of a newborn state.<sup>4</sup>

President Sadat was a man with a clear vision of the future of the region, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thirty years after that speech, the leaders of both parties are still struggling with what to do with the issues of peace, the Palestinian State, and many other concerns such as water, cooperation, security, arms control, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem.

Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock wrote:

There are two national communities, with two separate and distinctive national identities who have distinct values and norms and are governed by two sets of social, cultural, and political structures that may not meet the national needs of the two peoples in a satisfactory manner; each must seek its expression equally and independently in a structure of its own making on the same soil.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>Lisa Beyer, "I Oppose the Creation of a Palestinian State," *Time* 142, no. 13 (1993): 33.

<sup>4</sup>Máoz, 59.

<sup>5</sup>Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, 10-11.

The Israelis and the Palestinians are two different people in every aspect of their lives. You cannot apply to the Palestinians what is right for the Israelis and vice versa. As such, the separation of both people in separate political structures will be the best for both people. A Palestinian State is the answer because it will meet the needs of the Palestinian people and their aspirations.

The late Faysal al-Husayni, a Palestinian activist from East Jerusalem, said:

When a Palestinian state will be established, it will have an open relationship with Israel. We do not need an army or heavy weapons to protect us, if we are safe from an Israeli attack.<sup>6</sup>

I believe that most of the Palestinians have the same point of view that Mr. al-Husayni had.

The reason for the failure to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian agreement has its roots in the political culture and apparatuses that have developed in Israeli and Palestinian societies. Their political cultures developed over the course of seven decades of conflict and were nurtured by violent incidents, military struggle, deportation, and denials by each side of the rights of others. There was no real opportunity following the June 1967 War to reach a settlement between the two nations. An analysis of the conditions and the constraints under which the attempt was made to reach a historic compromise between Israel and the Palestinians show that it was doomed to failure from the start. A quarter of a century of living together had to pass, in the shadow of the Israeli occupation, in order for both sides to realize that only compromise would lead to a

---

<sup>6</sup>Ze'ev Schiv and Ehud Ya'ari, 232.

political settlement.<sup>7</sup> Israeli policy toward the Palestinians has always contained a large element of denial--denial of rights, denial of legitimacy, and denial of voice.<sup>8</sup>

It would appear that the event that led the Israelis to understand the need for compromise with the Palestinians was the Intifada. Israeli policy makers became aware that they were faced with a national struggle whose solution could only be found in the realization of, and Israeli readiness to allow, the implementation of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.<sup>9</sup>

During the signing of the peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians on September 13, 1993, Rabin's speech was a reflection of what he wanted and what the Israelis wanted from the agreement, as well as his vision for the future of the Middle East. In a speech, Rabin stated the following:

It was not easy to achieve peace after there had been so many casualties and victims; but, he went on, those who had fought were now saying, enough of blood and tears. Enough. We have no desire for revenge.... We, like you, are people who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, live side by side with you in dignity, in empathy, as human beings, as free men.... We wish to turn over a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together -- a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding. We hope to embark on a new era in the history of the Middle East. Such a shift will give us an opportunity to embark upon the process of economic, social and cultural growth and development, and we hope the international participation in that process will be as extensive as it can be.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>Reuven Pedatzur, "Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967," *Middle East Journal* 49, no. 2 (1995): 269-291

<sup>8</sup>Lockman and Beinun, 35.

<sup>9</sup>Reuven Pedatzur, 269-291.

<sup>10</sup>Barry Rubin, 200.

At the same time, Yasser Arafat, in a speech, assured the Israelis to calm their fear of a Palestinian state next to them, and he said:

Our people do not consider the exercising of the right to self-determination could violate the rights of their neighbors or infringe on their security. On the contrary, he added, doing so was the "strongest guarantee" for coexistence.<sup>11</sup>

Even before that, Arafat was looking to make peace with Israel. In 1989, Arafat said, "We are looking to have peace for our children and their children."<sup>12</sup>

It is not only the leadership of Israel that has changed, but its overall attitude. The Israeli public wants peace and prosperity and the lifestyle of other Western, consumer-oriented industrial societies. They are less interested in Zionist notions of settling new land or battling with the Arabs for every stone. They are tired of land, blood and fire. They realize that has become a losers' game; that cities could become battlefields; that civilians could become combatants, and that weapons of mass destruction could unleash horror.<sup>13</sup>

In order to achieve long-lasting peace between Israelis and the Palestinians, the conditions for peace must be acceptable to the Palestinians, not imposed upon them by force. Also, the peace conditions must be clear and easy to understand by both societies. Cooperation must exist between the two peoples. In addition, these conditions must be respected by both peoples. If this is achieved, no one will violate the rights of others.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>Barry Rubin, 199-200.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 207.

<sup>13</sup>Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "Toward Peace in the Middle East," *US News and World Report* 113, no. 6 (1992): 80.

<sup>14</sup>Ze'ev Schiv and Ehud Yéari, 272-273.



Once the peace agreement is finalized by both peoples, no one has the right to come back and ask the other for any more things.<sup>15</sup>

Also, the Palestinians have to understand that their dream to go back to their homes in Israel of 1948 is not realistic. Both parties have to discuss the settlement of this issue and any related issues in a civilized and faithful manner. Peace will not last long as long as hundreds of thousands of refugees live in miserable conditions in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.<sup>16</sup>

One other condition that the Palestinian State will have to ensure and guarantee is not to represent the Palestinians in Jordan or the Palestinians who are living in Israel, and not to encourage them to do something against the State of Israel, or encourage them to ask for separation from the State of Israel.<sup>17</sup>

Other changes in the region demonstrate the power of the peace process to catalyze regional stability and cooperation. True peace will afford the participants the opportunity to discuss some issues very important to the stability of the region, such as water, the environment, economic development, refugees, arms control, and security.<sup>18</sup>

This region has a wealth of resources, including a well-educated population of over 100 million, a rich culture and history, enormous natural resources, and critical transportation routes. Yet, regional conflicts, as well as statist and protectionist economic

---

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 273.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 277.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 277.

<sup>18</sup>Department of State Dispatch, 6, no. 38, September 1995.

policies, have prevented the region from realizing its economic potential.<sup>19</sup> Only the United States can play the honest broker to bring the Israelis and the Arabs together.<sup>20</sup>

The key to the shift from confrontation to conflict resolution will come to fruition when Arab leaders prepare their people to accept peace with Israel on realistic terms.<sup>21</sup>

Syrian-Israeli relations are pivotal to the Middle East peace process; no comprehensive, stable, and durable peace can be achieved without a political settlement between the two countries.<sup>22</sup>

Zeev Schiv and Ehud Yeári wrote the following:

We cannot mention the role of the United States in the peace settlement in the Middle East without mentioning the role of Russia, too. Because there is no hope in achieving peace in the region without Russian participation.<sup>23</sup>

They think that Russian involvement in the peace process will prevent Syria from derailing the peace process because Russia is Syria's strongest ally. At the same time, Russia is a friend to the PLO.<sup>24</sup>

Democracy in the Palestine State is something that every Palestinian is looking for. There is little or nothing written about this subject. The Palestinians are the only Arabs exposed to a democratic system, second to the Arab people in Lebanon. They saw the Israeli democracy and they lived it for more than four decades. They understand the

---

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 696-699.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 696-699.

<sup>21</sup>Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 80.

<sup>22</sup>Moshe Máoz, 157.

<sup>23</sup>Zeev Schiv and Ehud Yeári, 276.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 276.

meaning of democracy and the meaning of the rule of law. The question here is whether the Palestinian leaders are ready for democracy. We believe that democracy is the people's choice not the leaders, because people have the power to elect their leaders, especially when there is a constitution, institutions and laws designed to protect the rights of the individuals and the rights of the state.

I believe that democracy in the new Palestinian State will be a good example for other states in the region to follow. Everybody knows that the seeds of democracy need much care and nurturing, and it takes time to produce results. It takes a lot of time and effort to prepare the societies in Palestine and across the region to accept changes in their lives. Societies that have lived decade after decade in a dictatorship find it is very difficult to change their way of life overnight, but they can adapt to the new democratic life in a short period of time. What really do the people in the Middle East want? The people of the Middle East want justice and equality to govern their life in a democratic system. The people of the Middle East have their own way of life, norms, traditions, history, religion, and culture. An imported democracy from the West will not work in the Middle East. The West can help by improving the life of the people in the region through education, communication, development in the economic, political, and social systems. The changes have to come from the people themselves, not forced upon them by outsiders. I believe that the people of Palestine and the people of the region will love democracy and will nurture it and will defend it. Democracy will become a way of life to the people in the region because without it they cannot function.

In the final analysis, peace and cooperation between the Palestinians and the Israelis is a very important step toward peace and cooperation between Israel and other countries in the region. The Israelis have to understand that the Palestinians have aspirations they would love to achieve -- a Palestinian State living in peace side by side with Israel. This new state will work with Israel in every aspect that may enhance peace, such as economic development, communication, transportation, intelligence, security issues, and the implementation of the peace conditions.

It is in the best interest of Israel to have peace with the Palestinians, because this peace will encourage other countries in the region to come and talk peace with Israel. Arabs would love to see peace take place between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This peace will help the leaders in the region prepare their people to accept peace with Israel, by arguing that if the people of the problem -- the Palestinians -- sign peace with Israel, why are we not? Israel will be safer if Israel has peace with Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

From an economic point of view, peace in the Middle East and cooperation between Israel and the Arab world will open the door wide for economic development in that part of the world. Israel has the expertise in almost every aspect of development, especially the economic and the technological development and what the countries in the region need. At the same time, the Arab world has the wealth of natural resources, manpower, educated people, waterways, location and money. Cooperation, trust, and mutual understanding between Israel and the Arab world, combining Israeli expertise and

Arab resources, would make the Middle East region a major political and economic player in the world. This region would have the power to reshape international politics.

To the United States, by achieving peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis on one hand, and the Arab world and the Israelis on the other, the nations in a very volatile region will have time to reshape its policies toward the world and resolve its internal problems. Also, instead of spending billions of dollars in development assistance to the countries in the region, the United States would save many millions at a time of economic duress for the country.

Opening the door for regional cooperation will encourage economic development that will impact the lives of the people in a very positive way. These developments will lead to political stability and to the democratization process that would take place in the region. With peace and cooperation, there is no need for military expenditures of billions and there is no need for standing armies by hundreds of thousands. Also, there will be no need for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the region. We want the Middle East to be an oasis for peace and love.

In case there is not settlement of the Palestinian problem, and there is no peace between Israel and its neighbors, the Middle East return to the cycle of violence. Also, we will witness more and more wars between the Arabs and the Jews, and the upcoming wars will be more destructive than the previous ones because of the involvement of high tech weapons, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

In addition, I believe, also, many countries will be involved in any Middle East conflicts that have never been involved before, such as Iran and Pakistan. In this case,

the United States will become involved in the conflict to help Israel, and to grasp the opportunity to attack Iran and Syria.

Peace will be the best choice for the Middle East and the rest of the world.

## APPENDIX

Here is a list of some of the Israeli colleges and universities, and the names of the professors I tried to contact through E-mail, for the purpose of this study. Some of them E-mailed me back, and the majority did not.

From Ben-Gurion University

Department of Research Contracts, Moshe Amir, Director,  
tivoli@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Natalie Haimovitch, natali@bgumail.bgu.ac.il, Judith Fried, Budget  
officer, jfried@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Moshe Palombo, Budget officer, palambo@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Oshra Pinuan, pinuan@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

David Spivak, sdpival@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

Daniel Rosenthal, Budget officer, danros@bgumail.bgu.ac.il.

From the University of Bar-Ilan

Department of Psychology, Prof. Alan Apter, apter@posttau.ac.il

Lecturer, Eva Gilboa-Shechtman, gilboae@mail.biu.ac.il

Prof. Rachel Levy-Shiff, levyra@mail.biu.ac.il

Ass. Prof. Shaul Fox, Foxsha@mail.biu.ac.il

Ass. Prof. Rachel Ben-Ari, benarir@mail.biu.ac.il

Ass. Prof. Yinon Yeel, yinony@mail.biu.ac.il

Prof. Yehuda Shlomo, yehudas@mail,biu.ac.il

Prof. Weller Aaron, weller@mail.biu.ac.il

Department of Political Study at Bar-Ilan University

Dr. Amara Hasan Mohammad, [amaram@mail.biu.ac.il](mailto:amaram@mail.biu.ac.il)

Prof. Don-Yehiya Eliezer, Director of the Argov Center for the Study of the Jewish People and the State of Israel, [donyee@mail.biu.ac.il](mailto:donyee@mail.biu.ac.il)

Dr. Moshi Mira, [moshemi@mail.biu.ac.il](mailto:moshemi@mail.biu.ac.il)

Dr. Tzabag Shmuel, [tzabags@mail.biu.ac.il](mailto:tzabags@mail.biu.ac.il)

From the Hebrew University, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies

Prof. Amikam Elad, [amikam@2.hum.huji.ac.il](mailto:amikam@2.hum.huji.ac.il)

Prof. Amnon Cohen, [amnonc@vms.huji.ac.il](mailto:amnonc@vms.huji.ac.il)

Prof. Miriam Hoexter, [mshoexter@mscc.huji.ac.il](mailto:mshoexter@mscc.huji.ac.il)

Dr. Miriam Frenkel, [mfrenkel@h2.hum.huji.ac.il](mailto:mfrenkel@h2.hum.huji.ac.il)

Mr. Shraga Assif, [shrassif@hotmail.com](mailto:shrassif@hotmail.com)

From Tel-Aviv University, Department of Psychology

Prof. Daniel Algom, [algomd@freud.tau.ac.il](mailto:algomd@freud.tau.ac.il)

Prof. Nehemia Friedland, [nehemia@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:nehemia@post.tau.ac.il)

From Tel-Aviv University, Department of Public Policy

Dr. Dan Ben-David, [danib@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:danib@post.tau.ac.il)

Dr. Israel Drori, [droris@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:droris@post.tau.ac.il)

Prof. Thaima Lobel, [taima@freud.tau.ac.il](mailto:taima@freud.tau.ac.il)

Prof. Ariel Marari, [marari@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:marari@post.tau.ac.il)

Dr. Gilla Menajhem, [gilam@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:gilam@post.tau.ac.il)

Prof. Elia Werczberger, [wrcabrgr@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:wrcabrgr@post.tau.ac.il)

Prof. Abraham Ben-Zui, [doreen@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:doreen@post.tau.ac.il)

Prof. Azar Cat, [azargat@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:azargat@post.tau.ac.il)



Prof. Zeev Maoz, zeevmoaz@post.tau.ac.il

Prof. Shaul Mishal, mishal@pst.tau.ac.il

Prof. Dan Zakay, dzakay@post.tau.ac.il

Dr. Amal Jamal, ajamal@post.tau.ac.il

From the University of Haifa

Dr. Amalia Levanoni, levanoni@research@haifa.ac.il

Prof. Joseph Nevo, jnevo@research.haifa.ac.il

Dr. Itzhak Wiesman, weisman@reasearch.haifa.ac.il

Prof. Arie Kochavi, akochavi@research.haifa.ac.il

In addition, I e-mailed the entire membership of the Political Science Department at Haifa University. Unfortunately, none of them responded.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abed, Ali Jalal. *Israel's Policies in the West Bank and Gaza: A Study of Underdevelopment, 1967-1986*. Atlanta, Georgia: Atlanta University Center, 1989.
- Abu-Lebdeh, Hatem Shareef. *Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: National Perception and the United States-Jordan Relations*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1997.
- Abu-Sharif, Bassam. Prospects of Palestinian-Israeli Settlement. *Palestine News Agency*. June 1988.
- Adams, Michael. *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1967-1988*. 35<sup>th</sup> Ed., 1989. London, England: Europa Publication Limited, 1988.
- Adel, Yahia and others. *Who is Making History? The Oral History of the Uprising*. Shuffat, Jerusalem: Tamer Publication for Social Education, 1994.
- Alin, Erika G., Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising: An Assessment of Causes, Character, and Consequences, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 26, July 1994.
- Amit-Kohn, Uzi, et al. *Israel, the "Intifada" and the Rule of Law*. Israel: Israel Ministry of Defense Publication, 1993.
- Anonymous. The Gaza Strip Bottled Up. *Economist* 323, No. 7763 (June 13, 1992): 43-44.
- Anonymous. Guns and Stones. *Economist* 326, No. 7798 (February 13, 1993): 43.
- Anonymous. Palestinians: A Deadlier Intifada. *Economist* 323, No. 7754 (April 11, 1992): 43-44.

- Arab Republic of Egypt. White Paper on the Peace Initiatives Undertaken by President Anwar Al-Sadat, 1971-1977.
- Aronson, Geoffery. *Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada*. London, England. Kegan Paul International, 2000.
- Ashrawi, Hanan. "From the Diary of an Almost Four-year-old." In *Palestinian: Life Under Occupation*, Nancy Murray. Boston, Massachusetts: 1996.
- Baily, Kenneth D. *Method of Social Research*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. New York, New York: The Free Press, 1987.
- Baghdadi, Ali. Palestinians Denied the Right to Work. *The Final Call* 16, no. 7 (December 10, 1996): 13.
- Bank Hapaolim Statement, reported in *Fact Weekly Review*, no. 26 (September 18-October 1, 1988).
- Barkan, Steven E. and Lynne L. Snowden. *Collective Violence*. (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 2001.
- Bar-Illan, David. "Why a Palestinian State is Still a Mortal Threat." *Commentary* 9, no. 5 (1993): 27-31.
- Bealy, Frank. *Dictionary of Political Science*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1999.
- Bennis, Phyllis. *From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising*. Brooklyn, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1990.
- Beyer, Lisa. "I Oppose the Creation of a Palestinian State," *Time Magazine* 42, no. 13 (September 27, 1993): 33.
- Bishara, Azmy. "Facing Up to a Violent Society," *World Press* 33, no. 1 (January 1996).
- Bober, Arie, Ed. *The Other Israel*. New York, New York: Double Day Press, 1972.
- Bregman, Ahron, *Israel's War: A History Since 1947*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002.
- Brynen, Rex. *Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussion of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynee Riener Publishers, Inc, 1993.
- Cantril, Hadly. *The Psychology of Social Movements*. New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1941.
- Cattan, Henry. *The Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice*. London, England:

- Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1969.
- Chaliand, Gerard. *Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects*. New York, New York: The Viking Press, 1977.
- Christian Science Monitor*, June 28, 1989.
- Clinton, Bill. The Middle East: Opening the Door to a Comprehensive and Lasting Settlement. *Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 37, September 13, 1993.
- Collins, Frank. Palestinian Economy in Chaos After Gulf War. *The Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs*. X, no. 2 (July 1991): 23.
- Dollard, John. et al. *Frustration-Aggression*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1939.
- Farsoun, Samih K. and Christina E. Zacharia. *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.
- Feierabend, Ivo K. And Feierabend, Rosalind L. "Aggressive Behavior in Politics, 1948-1962." *A Cross National Study* (January 1965).
- Fischer, Dean. This Is a Step Toward a Palestinian State, *Time Magazine* 142, no. 13 (September 27, 1993).
- Freedman, Robert O. *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World and the Superpowers*. Miami, Florida: International University, 1991.
- Gart, M.J. "Never, Never, Never!" *Time Magazine*, 17 April 1989.
- Gharaibeh, Fawzi A. *The Economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.
- Gordon, Haim. *Quick Sand: Israel, Intifada and the Rise of Political Evil in Democracies*. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1995.
- Gurr, Ted R. *Why Mem Rebel*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Gurr, Ted R., et al. *Revolution of the Late Twentieth Century*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
- Hagopain, Elaine C. "Is the Peace Process a Process for Peace? A Retrospective...." *Arab Study Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (Summer 1997):

- Hasian, Marouf and Lisa A. Flores. "Children of the Stones: The Intifada and the Mythic Creation of the Palestinian States." *Southern Communication Journal* 62, no. 21 (Winter 1997): 89-106.
- Hiller, Timothy. *Law in the Service of Man / Al-Haq*. Ramallah, West Bank: 1983.
- Hilterman, Joost R. *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Hirst, David. *The Roots of Violence in the Middle East: The Gun and the Olive Branch*. London, England: Faber and Faber Limited, Inc., 1977.
- Hoselitz, Bert and Ann Willner. "Economic Development, Political Strategies, and American Aid," 363 in Gurr, 39.
- Hunter, F. Robert. *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991.
- Hussein, Suhail. *The Uprising*. Jerusalem, West Bank: The Palestinian Academic Foundation for International Affairs, 1991.
- Jansen, Michael. *Dissonance in Zion*. London, England: 235 Zed Book Ltd., 1987.
- Jerusalem Post*, 19 January 1990.
- Jerusalem Post*, February 1988.
- Jerusalem Post*, 29 January 1989.
- Jubarah, Tysier. *The Palestinian Popular Uprising*. Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National University Press, 1988.
- Katriel, T. "Site of Memory: Discourse of the Past in Israel." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* no. 80 (1941): 1-20.
- Khalidi, Walid. *Palestine Reborn*. London, England: I.B. Travis and Company, Ltd., 1992.
- Kimmens, Andrew C., ed., The Palestinian Problem. *The Reference Shelf* 61, no. 1 (1989): 176.
- Kimmerling, Baruch, and Migdal, Joel S. *Palestinians: The Making of the People*. New York, New York: The Free Press, 1993.
- Koufman, Ed., et al. *Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 1995.

- Landau, David, ed., *Shimon Peres: Battling for Peace Memoirs*. London, England: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1995.
- Lilienthal, Alfred. "Zionism: The Occupying Power." *Middle East Perspective* 8, no. 3 (June 1984): 4.
- Lockman, Zachary and Beinin, Joel. *Intifada: Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*. Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1989.
- Lukas, Yehuyda, et al, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988.
- Makousky, David. *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1996.
- Máoz, Moshé. *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank*. London, England: F. Cass, 1985.
- Máoz, Moshé, et al. *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993*. New York, New York: New York University Press, 1994.
- Marks, Shannee. *Where is Palestine? The Arabs in Israel*. London, England: Pluto Press, 1984.
- Masaleha, Omar. *The Promised Peace*. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Saqi Publisher, 1994.
- McDowall, David. *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989.
- Megargee, Edwin I. and Hokanson, Jack E. *The Dynamics of Aggression*. New York, New York: Harper and Row Publications, 1970.
- Melman, Yossi and Raviv, Don. *Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1989.
- Middle East International*, February 16, 1990.
- Nassar, Jamal R., and Heacock, Roger. *Intifada: Palestinian At the Crossroads*. New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.
- Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada. *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Canada, 1989.
- Nieburg, H.L. *Political Violence: The Behavioral Process*. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1970.

- O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Palestinian Intifada*. London, England: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998.
- Oberschall, Anthony. *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995.
- Pedatzur, Reuvan, "Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967," *Middle East Journal* 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 269-291.
- Peretz, Don. *Intifada, The Palestinian Uprising*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1990.
- Pines, Ayala M, "The Palestinian Intifada and Israel... Burnout...," *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology* 25 (December 1994): 438-451.
- Rantisi, Audeh G. and Ralph K. Beebe. *Blessed Are the Peacemakers: A Palestinian Christian in Occupied West Bank*. Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1990.
- Roy, Sara M. "Joyless in Gaza: Apartheid, Israel Style." *Nation* 257 (July 26, 1993): 136-139.
- Roy, Sara. *Women's Review of Books* 12, no. 6 (March 1995): 26-27.
- Rubin, Barry. *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and the History of the PLO*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Rubinstein, Dani. *Davar*. 4 September 1982.
- Sachar, H.M. *A History of Israel*. New York, New York: Knopf, 1981.
- Said, Edward W. and Hitchens, Christopher, ed., *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Questions*. New York, New York: Grand Street Publications, Inc., 1988.
- Schiff, Zéev and Ehud Ya'ari. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising — Israel's Third Front*. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.
- Seliktor, Ofira. *New Zionism and the Foreign Policy of Israel*. Chicago, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.
- Shahak, Israel. "Internal Criticism "Anti-Semitic" Outside Israel." *The Washington Report of the Middle East Affairs* 10, no. 3 (August/September 1991): 23.

- Shahak, Israel. "Palestinian Life Under Israel Apartheid." *Race and Class* 30, No. 1 (July-September 1988): 1-12.
- Shalev, Aryeh, *The Intifada: Causes and Effects*. Jerusalem Israel: Jerusalem Post Press, 1991.
- Shipler, David. *The New York Times*, 27 February 1982.
- Silvers, Jonathan. "Wholly War." *New Statement and Society* 8, no. 378 (November 10, 1995): 28.
- Sosebee, Stephen J. "How to Explain American Apathy Over Israel Killing of Palestinian Children." *The Washington Report of Middle East Affairs* 10, no. 2 (July 1991): 24.
- Sudqi, Rajiah I. "The Palestinian Uprising and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East." *The International Politics* 192 (April 1988): 150.
- Sullivan, David, and Sattler, Martin, ed., *Revolutionary War: Western Response*. New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Tal, Rami. *Yidihut Ahonot*. December 17, 1987. In "The Palestinian Uprising is Not a Passing Cloud," Hani Abdullah. *Palestinian Affairs* 179 (February 1988).
- Tedeschi, James T. and Richard B. Felson, *Violence, Aggression and Coercive Action*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1994.
- Tessler, Mark. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994.
- U.S. House of Representatives. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *The Middle East 1982: The Unfinished Business of the Peace Process in the Middle East*.
- U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. 100<sup>th</sup> Congress. 1987.
- U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Development in the West Bank and Gaza*, May 1990.
- U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Development in the Middle East*, 1989.
- U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Development in the Middle East*, 1987.



U.S. Department of State. *Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1988*. May 9, 1990.

U.S. Department of State. Dispatch 4, no. 37, September 13, 1993.

U.S. Department of State. Dispatch 6, no. 38, September 1995.

Wall, James M. "Immoral Deportations," *Christian Century* 10, no. 6 (February 24, 1993).

Ward, Mariam. "Another Perspective on Middle East Peace." *America* 173, no. 1 (July 1995).

Zangwill, Israel. "The Return to Palestine." *New Liberal View* (December 11, 1901).

Zuckerman, Mortimer B., "Toward Peace in the Middle East," *U.S. News and World Report*, 1132, no. 6 (August 10, 1992).