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SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE OF CULTURE: EXPERIENCE IN INTERPRETATION¹

The authors construct in the article a consistent justification for dividing culture into material, social and spiritual. The opinion is substantiated that such a decomposition of culture in sociological discourse is supplemented by data from modern psychology, which speak in favor of just such a structure of human needs. The authors give the point of view that such a methodological solution to the problem is of the most general nature and requires further development and concretization, while they note that this

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approach is promising, in particular, in that it makes it possible to transfer such a complex problem of the social sciences into the sphere of specific sociological research as a problem of values. It is quite obvious that social values are not arbitrary phenomena, but functions of human needs, and therefore can be investigated by empirical methods.

Keywords: *sociological discourse, culture, values, human needs, material needs, spiritual needs, social needs.*

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СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ДИСКУРС КУЛЬТУРЫ: ОПЫТ ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ

Авторы выстраивают в статье последовательное обоснование деления культуры на материальную, социальную и духовную. Обосновывается мнение, что такая декомпозиция культуры в социологическом дискурсе дополняется данными современной психологии, которые говорят в пользу именно подобной структуры потребностей человека. Авторы приводят точку зрения, что такое методологическое решение проблемы носит самый обобщенный характер и требует дальнейшего развития и конкретизации, при этом они отмечают перспективность этого подхода, в частности, в том, что он позволяет перевести в сферу конкретно-социологических исследований такую сложнейшую проблему социальных наук, как проблему ценностей. Достаточно очевидно, что социальные ценности являются не произвольными феноменами, а функциями человеческих потребностей, и потому могут исследоваться и эмпирическими методами.

Ключевые слова: *социологический дискурс, культура, ценности, потребности человека, материальные потребности, духовные потребности, социальные потребности.*

The concept of culture as one of the most fruitful explanatory and initial principles was established in social science as a whole only after it proved its viability in the framework of the private social sciences – ethnography and ethnology, which initially studied only primitive societies. Europeans first became acquainted with these societies in the 15th-16th centuries, thanks to tectonic civilizational changes as a result of the initial experience of globalization, which later became known as the great geographical discoveries. Studying the numerous "primitive" societies that opened up for them (mainly in the New World) and descriptively comparing them with each other, as well as with the Western and Eastern societies known to them (as a starting point) of the Old

World, European ethnographers and ethnologists were forced to gradually abandon many signs that were then included in their concept of society as necessary and, therefore, move towards the ultimate generalization of this concept. To do this, they needed to establish that minimum common, which would allow them to bring all these extremely different social systems, under a single concept-plateau of human society. And this concept for them eventually became the concept of culture.

At the same time, one of the main difficulties for scientists of that time was (and in many respects still is) the fact that the concept of culture initially contains the meaning of something higher, standard, excellent and good, separating everything cultural from the

uncultured as something then inferior, unworthy and bad. In other words, the concept of culture initially contains an axiological moment that greatly complicates its functional use in a purely descriptive, objective sense. And it is not so easy to get rid of this feature of the concept and the term "culture", as modern practice also shows. And even M. Weber in his sociology proceeded from the axiom that "the concept of culture is a value concept" [1].

As you know, the ancient Greeks, in their scientific reflection, acutely felt and realized the difference between their society and all the other peoples surrounding it, which almost a priori were considered by the Greeks to be "barbaric" societies. Moreover, they included not only the Scythians, Gauls, Germans and other peoples who were then still at the preliterate and pre-state level of their development, but even the Persians, despite the fact, had created by that time the greatest (in all respects) empire in The Middle East, as well as the Romans, who eventually subjugated the entire ancient world, including the Greeks themselves. Only in relation to the Egyptians (and this is understandable !!) did the Greeks have some doubts, since they were forced to recognize many cultural borrowings they had made from this ancient society. Contact with the Egyptian civilization significantly advanced the technical and scientific thought of Ancient Greece itself. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, the division of all peoples and societies into Hellenic and barbaric was considered a kind of unshakable social axiom throughout antiquity. Numerous wars fueled this dichotomy, rooting in the minds of the inhabitants of the polis "the alienation of the other." In particular, the Greek geographer Strabo, who already lived at the turn of the ancient and Christian eras, noted, as a matter of course, "that some peoples are dominated by law, statehood and dignity associated with education and sciences, while others are opposite" [2]. Another culture was perceived as an under-culture, because its codes and symbols were incomprehensible and not accepted. And in this indication one can already see one of the first attempts to give a clear definition, if not the very concept of culture (in the modern sense), then the very close to it concept of civilization, which, for example, was used by French scientists in this sense even in the days of E. Durkheim (and himself) [3]. The

Greeks and the late Romans themselves designated this phenomenon with the term "morals", "morality", due to the broad understanding of morality since the time of Aristotle.

Christianity, which then replaced the Greek culture, adopted many ancient stereotypes and "ideologemes", preserved and preserved this distinction, which was expressed among Christians in the form of the antithesis "Christianity – paganism". The latter for Christians was synonymous with barbarism and carried all the traditional negative connotations characteristic of this ancient word. When the Europeans discovered new even more "primitive" societies, a new reality appeared that was not described by these terms, the words "barbarism" or "paganism" became functionally insufficient, and then the word "savagery" was introduced into circulation, denoting the lowest stage of cultural development, at which people, according to the researchers of that time, are almost indistinguishable from animals (animals). Therefore, at first the Europeans tended to regard savages as creatures almost completely devoid of any culture, as something generally uncultured. This explains the cruelty, practically not condemned by anyone, in the treatment of peoples, whose fault was only that the unacceptability and unreadiness of their cultural symbols led to the fact that they fell into the indicated matrix. And it was at this (largely tragic) stage that initially ethnography and then ethnology were formed in Europe as sciences that study precisely the "savages", that is, "wild", "uncultured" peoples.

However, the further development of these sciences quickly enough led the scientists who were engaged in them to a rather trivial idea that it is generally impossible to talk about the "lack of culture" of wild peoples, since in fact they have exactly the same culture as all "civilized" peoples, only - less developed. But the very essence and structure of their, even if, primitive culture is fully comparable with the structure of all more developed cultures, and the general patterns of functioning and development of primitive cultures are essentially the same as for highly developed cultures. As a result, by the end of the 19th century ethnologists (mainly British and American, among whom F. Boas stands out in this respect) substantiated the key provisions of the general concept of the so-

called "cultural relativism", according to which the culture (cultures) of all societies should be studied as absolutely equal and equal. This concept was quickly recognized and developed also in Russian social science at that time. "The moment of evaluation," wrote, for example, at the beginning of the twentieth century the famous Russian linguist and sociologist N.S. Trubetskoy, – must be expelled from ethnology and the history of culture once and for all ... There are no higher and lower. There are only similar and dissimilar. It is arbitrary, unscientific, naive, and, finally, simply stupid to declare those who are similar to us superior, and those who are unlike those who are inferior" [4].

On this basis, it happened then – already in the first half of the twentieth century – the transfer (dissemination) of ideas and methods of studying society, developed initially in ethnography and ethnology, to sociology as a whole, including empirical methods of studying modern societies. For the first time and with particular success, this was done by the founders of the famous Chicago school of sociologists in the United States (W. Thomas, F. Znanetsky, R. Park, E. Burgess, etc.), which was greatly facilitated then by the social itself ("multicultural" or even patchwork) the situation prevailing by that time in this fast-growing industrial city.

On the other hand, this natural extension of the concept of culture to the entire field of social sciences turned it into one of the fundamental principles of all social cognition in general and contributed to the emergence and development of a special general theoretical (or socio-philosophical) science – cultural studies, which began to claim the role of a general methodology of social knowledge in general. And in this capacity, cultural studies first of all entered into confrontation with the paradigm of "historical materialism" put forward for substantiation in the 19th century by K. Marx, F. Engels and their followers, as a rule, left discourse, which, due to the historical realities of that time, the emphasis was placed on the study of the material side of social life, the basis. Culturology, on the other hand, focused on the study of primarily the spiritual side of social life, and in this sense, it acted as an antithesis to Marxism. As the most significant achievement of this (culturalistic or culture-centric) approach, one can consider, in particular, the sociology of

M. Weber [1] (although he himself, of course, did not explicitly define his approach as a cultural one).

However, if we compare both of these approaches in terms of clarity and clarity of their initial concepts and principles, then the comparison will not be in favor of cultural studies. And first of all, this refers to the most key concept of the culturological approach – to the concept of culture. The classical and historically first clear definition of this concept is considered to be the formulation proposed back in 1871 by the outstanding British ethnologist (anthropologist) E.B. Tylor. "Culture, or civilization," he wrote, "in a broad ethnographic sense, is composed in its entirety of knowledge, beliefs, art, morality, laws, customs and some other abilities and habits assimilated by a person as a member of society" [5].

The most important points of this definition are, first, an indication that culture is something assimilated by an individual after his birth; and, secondly, it is an indication of what society, first of all, endows a person with culture. From birth, people do not have any culture, but at the same time they will have the culture that this or that particular society will be able to endow them with. Thus, society is recognized as the primary bearer and custodian of culture, and not an individual person (the latter also becomes a bearer of culture, but only after he receives it from the society in which he was formed).

For all the clarity and clarity of this definition, its obvious drawback is that it does not allow us to concretize the concept of culture into the concept of material culture, which is fundamentally different, for example, from spiritual culture, while this most important distinction is almost as ancient as well as the very concept of culture. Tylor's definition refers only to the mental-psychological (and partly social) nature of culture and therefore is well suited for the study of the spiritual and social culture of the individual and society. An attempt to bring the concept of material culture under it also causes severe difficulties. Therefore, it is no coincidence that this definition has been subjected to largely fair criticism from the very moment of its introduction into scientific circulation, and attempts have been made to improve it in this direction.

One of the most successful and original such

attempts belongs to the famous American scientist, anthropologist L. White, who for the first time proposed the very name for this new science, due to which he received well-founded recognition as the founder of cultural studies. "Those who define culture as ideas, abstractions or as behavior," wrote L. White, "are logically inevitably forced to admit that material objects are not culture and cannot be. "Strictly speaking," says Gebel, "material culture is not culture at all." Tylor goes even further: "The concept of 'material culture' is erroneous," because "culture is a purely mental phenomenon." Beals and Hoijer: "Culture is an abstraction of behavior and should not be confused with real acts of behavior or with material objects such as tools ..." The denial of material culture, says L. White, looks ridiculous from the point of view of the traditions of ethnographers, archaeologists, museum workers of old instruments, masks, fetishes and other "material culture. "Our definition, – he asserts, – leads away from this dilemma" [6].

Before further citing L. White's original definition of culture, let us first note that all the "cultural objects" (artifacts) he listed above are, of course, directly related to culture, but, at the same time, to spiritual culture and not material. Leslie White is absolutely right in trying to defend the very concept of material culture, but he does it, in our opinion, completely unsuccessfully, namely, he tries to offer material things as material culture. But this, from the point of view of social science, is a misunderstanding. Material things can relate to both material and spiritual culture, but this belonging is not determined by what they are made of. For example, an amphora, Hercules or Zeus can be sculpted from the same clay. The point is not in their matter itself, but in something else (which will be discussed in the final part of our analysis) in the symbolization and axiology of the act of the act itself.

Let us now consider the definition of culture proposed by L. White. "As we have already shown," he writes, "culture" refers to a certain order or class of phenomena, namely, objects and phenomena associated with the manifestation of a special mental ability inherent exclusively to the human species, the ability to symbolize. More precisely, culture consists of material objects – tools, utensils, ornaments, amulets, etc., actions, beliefs and relationships

that function in a symbolic context. It is a complex extrasomatic mechanism that a certain species of animals – man – uses in the struggle for survival and existence" [6].

But here for those wishing to understand the essence of White's approach, the unusual difficulty arises, which is due to the very specifically American use of the words "symbol", "symbolization", "to symbolize", "symbolic", etc. Throughout the world, for a long time, this verbal series denotes phenomena associated with the use of a special kind of signs by people, in which some objects are given the ability to represent (represent) some abstract qualities naturally associated with these objects. For example, a lion or an eagle among many Western peoples are symbols of royalty, domination; an owl is a symbol of wisdom; heart is a symbol of love, etc. However, in American literature, especially sociological and cultural, the word "symbolization", from the time of one of the founders of American sociology – J. Mead (and with his submission) began to be given such a broad meaning that it practically began to replace (for Americans) the words "thinking", "mind", "consciousness" etc. Even a whole trend of sociological thought, which is based on the recognition of the rationality of human behavior and the conditionality of this rationality of any human actions, institutions, etc., has received, thanks to this, specifically American scientific jargon, the confusing name of "symbolic interactionism", which is Russian is simply translated as "meaningful interaction", "intelligent behavior and relationships of people." Therefore, when L. White tells us that culture is "a certain order or class of phenomena ... associated with the manifestation of the ability to symbolize inherent exclusively to the human species," he only wants to say that culture is always a product of human thinking, human mind, not a given or a heritage of nature. Animals don't think, so they don't have any culture either. But at the same time (according to White's approach) the society itself, which is the bearer and custodian of culture, receives it thanks to the rationality of its members and their ability to make their personal contribution to this culture common to all of them (Ortega y Gasset). Not only does society endow its members with culture, but they also develop and improve this culture with their work and the efforts of their mind.

And in such a semantic interpretation, L. White's concept appears as clear as it is traditional for the entire European (Western) scientific culture in general. And at the same time, it significantly improves and promotes E. Tylor's concept. In contrast to the latter, L. White suggests considering culture as a specific form in which society exists and develops. People and things represent the matter of society, and culture is a specific form into which this matter is organized in the process of its real existence. Thus, White for the first time in social science gives culture not only epistemological, but also ontological status, which radically changes the optics of cultural studies.

However, modern cultural studies, as you know, recognizing L. White as the founder of this science, did not accept at the same time his concept in its entirety. And therefore, the most popular definition of culture among culturologists (and sociologists) is still the one that belongs to other authoritative American authors in this area of knowledge – A. Kroeber and K. Klachon, who think, however, rather in the tradition of E. Tylor than L. White. “Culture,” they write, “consists of internally contained and externally manifested norms that determine behavior learned and mediated through symbols; it arises as a result of human activity, including its embodiment in means. The essential core of culture is made up of traditional (historically formed) ideas, primarily those that are attributed with special value. Cultural systems can be considered, on the one hand, as the results of human activity, and on the other, as its regulators” [7].

Unfortunately, it is precisely this understanding of culture that currently dominates in most Russian textbooks on cultural studies and sociology of culture [8]. But the objection to it remains the same – it is not functional, does not allow a satisfactory definition of culture in the concept of material culture, without which any understanding of society in the mainstream of this approach will always not only yield to the Marxist approach to it, but also simply show its inferiority [9]. L. White understood this well, but this understanding, due to the “new” attitudes, is practically lost among modern culturologists, which undoubtedly impoverishes and narrows its (culturology) methodological potential [10].

In Russian cultural studies, the closest to L. White's concept is the theory developed since the 70s of the last century by M.S. Kagan, which, unfortunately, has such an abstract (philosophical) and ponderous character that it practically defies its direct interpretation in terms of the sociology of culture [11]. In support of this idea, we present here an extremely abbreviated definition of culture, offered by an undoubtedly very profound author [12].

In the philosophical analysis of culture, writes M.S. Kagan – appears before us ... as such a form of being, which is formed by human activity, covering:

a) the qualities of the person himself as a subject of activity are supernatural qualities;

b) those methods, activities that are not innate to a person – neither a species nor an individual, but which are invented by him, improved and passed from generation to generation, thanks to training, education, upbringing;

c) a variety of objects – material, spiritual, artistic, – in which the processes of activity are objectified, which become a “second nature”, created from the material of the “first”, genuine nature in order to satisfy supernatural, specifically human needs and serve the transmitter of this human principle to other people;

d) secondary methods, activities that no longer serve to objectify, but to de-objectify those human qualities that are stored in the objective existence of culture;

e) again a person, whose second role in culture is due to the fact that in the process of de-objectification he grows, changes, enriches, develops, in short, becomes a product of culture;

f) the connection between the processes of objectification and de-objectification with the communication of the people participating in them as a special aspect of human activity and, accordingly, a phenomenon of culture ... This is how the “circle of culture” is closed, – the author sums up, – its movement from person to person, mediated by the object that he creates-tyu “[13].

It is obvious that it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to translate this overcomplicated philosophical understanding into any minimal set of “instrumental” concepts, a system of operationally interpreted terms that could guide a sociologist in his field (and theoretical)

research. But serious objections can be raised to the conceptual side of this understanding.

First, the definition of culture as a “form of being” is too broad, and to go from it immediately to “human activity”, which supposedly “forms” this “form of being”, means to make too wide a leap in thinking, which can be traced in details are almost impossible.

Secondly, referring to culture only “supernatural human qualities” and objects (artifacts) designed to satisfy “only supernatural, specifically human needs” is obviously incorrect, since all this reduces culture, in fact, to only one spiritual culture, and there is no room for material culture.

Finally, thirdly, the division of all “cultural objects” into “material, spiritual and artistic” also proceeds from an incorrect (or not entirely correct) idea of objectivity in general. There are no separate material, spiritual and artistic objects, but in all real objects involved in the life of society, one can distinguish between their material (material) and spiritual sides, and the artistic side of material objects from time immemorial has been traditionally attributed to the spiritual, and not to something. Then the third, existing independently of the material and spiritual and along with them.

At the same time, an extremely valuable side of M.S. Kagan sees his understanding of human activity not abstractly, but as a form of activity aimed at satisfying certain needs. Although this understanding is not explicitly expressed in the texts of the author himself (and, perhaps, he is not even fully aware of it), nevertheless the very logic of his reasoning leads to just such an understanding.

In accordance with this, a brief definition of culture, in our opinion, can be formulated as follows. Culture is a specifically human way of life, the essence of which is the constant development (invention), storage and transmission to more and more generations of people of specifically human forms, methods and objects of activity aimed at satisfying human needs, both specific to him (spiritual) and he has in common with animals in general and “social animals” in particular [14].

At the same time, the material culture includes those aspects of a person’s social life that “serve” the “material” (or vital) needs of a person, which he has in common with animals. These needs are innate to humans as well as to

any animal. But, unlike the latter, nature does not determine any specific forms, objects and methods of their satisfaction for a person, and a person must find (invent) them on his own. What he finds in this respect (develops) in the process of his development, and constitutes his material culture.

Spiritual culture includes those aspects of human social life that “serve” his specific needs, which animals do not have. These needs are also innate (invested) in a person, since a person is endowed with reason precisely from nature, and not from education or training. And his mind has its needs as well as the body (soma). It is empirically clear that the needs of the mind are satisfied by three main forms of spiritual activity – scientific (cognitive), religious and artistic.

Finally, social culture includes those aspects of a person’s social life that “serve” the needs of people in each other. These needs are also present in many animals, referred to as the so-called “social animals.” Although, strictly speaking, “non-social” animals do not exist at all, since sexual dimorphism gives rise to the need for specific (sexual) communication in individuals of almost any species. However, in “social animals”, to which man also biologically belongs, this need (or these needs) is developed to the maximum extent. The long-term helplessness of children alone indicates the enormous role of social needs in human society. These needs are also innate to man, since man is by nature a social being.

The empirical substantiation of the proposed by us three-term division of culture into material, social and spiritual can be the data of modern psychology, which speak in favor of just such a structure of human needs [15]. So, with all the twists and turns of scientific fashion (and this is also recorded by sociologists), the currently most recognized theory of needs, developed by the famous American psychologist A. Maslow, distinguishes the following types of them (built by Maslow himself in a hierarchical order from lowest to highest):

1. Physiological needs (food, water, air, rest, sleep).
2. Security needs.
3. Needs for love and belonging.
4. Needs for respect.
5. The need for self-actualization.
6. The need for knowledge and understanding.

7. Aesthetic needs.

Without going into the discussion of correctness (there are remarks to it) of the very hierarchy of needs proposed by Maslow, we note only that the first and second rubrics contain vital (“material”) needs that are satisfied with the help of physical things. The third and fourth sections contain social needs that are satisfied only in the course of communication with other people. The fifth, sixth and seventh sections contain an indication of spiritual needs.

Essentially, the same classification of needs is accepted by the community of Russian scientists. In particular, in the work of one of the most authoritative Russian authors in this area [16], we find the following classification of needs:

1. Material needs (food, clothing, housing).
2. Spiritual needs (for knowledge and understanding, for aesthetic pleasure, for creativity).
3. Social needs (for communication, for work, for recognition, etc.).

Thus, the division of culture we propose can be considered quite empirically grounded.

Of course, our proposed solution to the problem is of a very general nature and requires further development and concretization. But we see the promise of this approach, in particular, in the fact that it allows us to transfer into the sphere of specific sociological research such a complex problem of the social sciences as the problem of values. It is quite obvious, in particular, that social values are not arbitrary phenomena, but functions of human needs, and therefore can be investigated by empirical methods.

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