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## Women, identity and employment in East Germany

*Debbie Wagener*

The unification of Germany initiated a general process of revelation between East and West Germans regarding a range of perceived differences separating them. Only months after official unification *Der Spiegel* ran a special entitled 'Vereint aber Fremd' ('Unified but strangers'), which pointed to a wide range of differentiating characteristics, even including different physical traits.<sup>1</sup> In the same way, East and West German women have also quickly become aware of differences in attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviour which separate them as women. Instead of being able to greet each other as 'sisters' in the fight against patriarchy, they have come to perceive each other as stepsisters. For example, in *Stiefschwestern* (step-sisters), Katrin Rohnstock, the editor, describes how women first met 'full of impatience to find out all that they had in common but quickly found they couldn't even understand each other'.<sup>2</sup> These differences gradually became summarised in the stereotypes of *Ostmutti* and *Westemanze* (East German 'mummies' and West German feminists), as outlined in Ulrike Helwerth (West German) and Gerlinde Schwarz's (East German) *Muttis und Emanzen*. Here the authors acknowledge that even at the first East–West meetings 'whatever the topic, political or social, there no longer seemed to be a common language' and that 'differences were much greater than [they] had ever realised'.<sup>3</sup>

East German women, if they can be seen as a distinct social group within German society, are generally portrayed as the losers of unifica-

tion. This sense of loss is usually characterised by the loss of their right to work, as well as other aspects of state support, in particular the loss of extensive child-care provision. By 1994, it was claimed that 'even the most conservative press no longer dares to deny what was initially dismissed as prophecies of doom by pessimists guarding their own interests, i.e. that amongst the losers of unification, women had lost twice as much'.<sup>4</sup> As confirmed by many surveys in the five new *Länder*, women are also the most disappointed and dissatisfied social group,<sup>5</sup> some seeing their position in society as 'a step back a hundred years'.<sup>6</sup>

As Jonathan Grix notes in Chapter 1 of this volume, many explanations have been put forward to explain the source of a unique identity amongst East German citizens in general, and women in particular, and these fall roughly into two categories which focus either on pre- or post-unification factors.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand, the 'socialist legacy' approach proposes that East German citizens have different beliefs and values as a result of socialisation in the GDR. On the other hand, there are commentators who see differences arising primarily as a result of the clashes of interests in East and West since unification, exacerbated by unemployment, by unrealistic expectations of unification and by the perceived arrogant treatment of East Germans by those in the West.<sup>8</sup> Clearly there is evidence to support the influence of events both pre- and post-unification upon East German women. However, this chapter will focus primarily on the socialisation experienced in the GDR and its effects on their values, opinions and behaviour in order to investigate the presence of this apparent 'socialist legacy'.<sup>9</sup> Such an approach proposes that, traumatic though unification has been, the dissatisfaction arising from it has its roots in specific expectations which come from women's experience of the GDR that are not being fulfilled. It intends to demonstrate that such expectations are linked to women's lives in the GDR and also to socialist ideology. In order to focus on women's issues, it will relate such socialisation to the essential tenets of Marxist feminism and to the wide range of SED policies supporting women's representation in the workplace. Evidence of such influence will concentrate on attitudes and values relating to female employment. Although I naturally acknowledge the individuality of all East German women, this chapter is to focus on the factors that hold them together as a group and how they differ, collectively, from West German women.

## Marxist feminism and female employment in the GDR

Although there was no women's movement in the GDR as such, there was a strong 'Marxist feminist' ethos which took shape, above all, through the legislation of the SED. This was based on the SED's interpretation of Marx and Engel's theories, in particular the belief that the material base for patriarchy was to be found in capitalism, which had provided men with the means of earning income outside of the home and which, in turn, had confined the traditional 'female role' to the domestic sphere.<sup>10</sup> Female employment was thus viewed as a progressive force and indeed, as Engels wrote, 'the first condition for the liberation of women was to bring the whole female sex back into public industry'.<sup>11</sup> Female economic independence was, therefore, deemed to be an essential aspect of emancipation.<sup>12</sup>

That the SED's policies for women reflected Marxist feminist principles is most clearly visible in the SED's considerable commitment to improving women's access to education and to the employment market as early as the 1950s. The pace of legislation in this area was particularly swift, in comparison to progress in the Federal Republic, which was relatively slow.<sup>13</sup> This is supported by Schaffer's research into GDR legislation, which indicates that laws relating to women promoted a wider range of educational and training opportunities and also obliged employers to enter into contracts with women guaranteeing employment according to qualifications gained during training periods.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, statistics in Winkler's *Frauenreport* reveal that the SED was not squeamish about positive discrimination and set quotas for all branches of industry. It also shows that there was a considerable level of financial support for women to train in more technical areas.<sup>15</sup> These policies were then backed up with an impressive range of laws to support women with children, such as highly subsidised, 24-hour, comprehensive child-care, shorter working hours and extensive leave to look after sick children. The success of this multi-pronged approach was clearly visible in the statistics on female employment at the time of unification, according to which 93 per cent of East German women were employed or studying, with a greater representation in a larger number of fields and at higher levels than in the West.<sup>16</sup>

The SED's brand of Marxist feminism related then very strongly to an essential link between female employment and emancipation, based primarily on the need for economic independence. Consequently, it is this fundamental principle which is likely to have been reflected in East German women's expectations as they emerged from the GDR. In order to assess how 'unique' this combination might be in the Federal Republic, it is also worth considering briefly the feminist background from which West German women have come. Circumstances in the Federal Republic were certainly quite different. Here there was a strong patriarchal voice in the form of a conservative Federal Government, which upheld traditional gender roles and a male-breadwinner philosophy supported by tradition and the market economy.<sup>17</sup> This was reflected in the fact that fewer policy decisions relating to women were made in the FRG than in the GDR, and to the fact that the rate of female employment increased relatively slowly. By 1989 it had only reached about 50 per cent and most of this was part-time.<sup>18</sup> Female equality was thus more a field for debate than policy, with the emergence of a number of feminist voices attempting to achieve 'Emanzipation von unten' (emancipation from below). In this pluralist environment, West German women were able to develop and absorb a very wide range of arguments from a variety of traditions with quite different conceptions about what equality comprised. This differed greatly from the monolithic structure of feminism in the GDR.

Liberal feminism was probably the most widespread movement in the West and, in a similar fashion to the SED's Marxist feminism, it focused on greater female representation in the public sphere.<sup>19</sup> There was, however, never the single-mindedness regarding female employment witnessed in the GDR, as reflected, for example, in the considerably slower support for female quotas in the workplace in the Federal Republic.<sup>20</sup> The West German radical feminists, on the other hand, were very critical of the underlying patriarchy of fundamental systems in the Federal Republic and this permeated West German feminist values.<sup>21</sup> Radical feminists consequently believed that increased representation in the public sphere was not necessarily beneficial to the female cause, as these areas were simply deemed to be protecting male interests.<sup>22</sup> A typical stance was Schmidt-Harzbach's insistence that there would be no progress in the public sphere until equality was gained in the private sphere, where women were seen to face male power and control in its crudest form in terms of sexual exploitation.<sup>23</sup>

The legacy of West German feminism for the individual West German woman was thus quite different to that of an East German woman. Although the general wish for higher female participation in the public sphere was also present, the influence of a patriarchal system combined with radical feminism led to the conviction that employment was not the only criterion for emancipation. Women were not required to imitate men. On the contrary, there was a call for the recognition of the moral superiority of the nurturing female role and the achievement of more sexual equality in relationships and in the family.

There was then a clear difference in focus between East and West German women, relating to the significance of employment for women. On the one hand, East German women express a strong disappointment with the Federal Republic, above all, regarding the absence of the right to work and its effect on their position within society. Süssmuth and Schubert's interviewees in *Bezahlen die Frauen die Wiedervereinigung?* (Are Women Paying for Reunification?), for example, portray female unemployment in extreme terms as 'the loss of their identity and their well-being'.<sup>24</sup> Others describe it as 'isolating, limiting and even degrading'.<sup>25</sup> Western opinion, on the other hand, denies the basis of this disappointment, reflecting at the same time the basic tenets of radical feminism. Thus high female employment in the GDR is interpreted, by commentators such as Conrad, as a simple economic necessity in a less advanced economy, which had no 'emancipatory basis'.<sup>26</sup> East German women's acceptance of the State's role in their emancipation is, therefore, perceived as their collusion in the perpetuation of patriarchy. As a result Western women do not necessarily view East German women's return to the home as problematic, since the GDR's 'Emancipation von Oben' (emancipation from above) is deemed to merely be the manipulation and exploitation of women by men.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, as Hoppe points out, East German women are also seen to have been exploited by the *Doppelbelastung* (dual burden of work and family) and a continuation of patriarchal power structures in the home.<sup>28</sup> The SED Government's 'network of social and family benefits', the so-called *Multipolitik*, is derided by Kolinsky and Hoppe for serving to emphasise women's role in the home by only offering assistance such as 'housework days' to women or single fathers.<sup>29</sup> For Western women, East German women are perceived again as having colluded in this by 'allowing themselves to be exploited, juggling a range of work and household duties'.<sup>30</sup>

It seems then that there are already links between the patterns of dominant feminism in each part of the country and East and West German attitudes. We now turn our attention to the link between East German women's attitudes to work and their socialisation in the GDR.

## **Current attitudes to employment amongst East German women**

In attempting to establish links between current attitudes and socialising influences in the GDR, this chapter reveals significant convergence in attitudes amongst East German women to female employment and how these relate to Marxist feminist principles. At the same time, as Fücks indicates, there is widespread rejection of the concept of a unifying socialist political culture which differentiates ex-GDR citizens from West Germans and there are a number of counter-approaches, as mentioned above, which point rather to the impact of post-unification period events.<sup>31</sup> These will also be discussed.

This section draws on the results of 80 oral history interviews with women taken from a wide sample in Saxony Anhalt in the summers of 1999 and 2000. Women answered questions on a wide range of 'women's issues' but this section will focus on responses relating to their employment, given the significance of this area to Marxist feminist ideology and the environment created for women in the GDR. This significance is indeed immediately apparent in the majority of interviews by the dominance of paid employment as a theme, despite little direct questioning on this topic.

East German women's relationship to work is, nevertheless, a complex one. The majority of respondents indicated, for example, that there was indeed, as is claimed in the West, some pressure to work. The most common reason given for this pressure was the low rate of male pay, but there is also awareness that not working was socially unacceptable and that women were derided for just being housewives

Yet when asked directly, the majority of respondents rejected 'duty' as too strong a description of the role of work in their life and preferred words such as *selbstverständlich* ('natural', 'taken for granted'), claiming that 'it just didn't occur to us not to go to work'(A).<sup>32</sup> This allusion to a passive acceptance of an obligation potentially fits with a common Western

assumption that East German women were forced to go out to work by the State. It does not, however, fit with the very positive nature of respondents' references to work. A factory worker describes, for example, her work as 'great fun and [...] something we really wanted to do'(B). This is supported by the majority of respondents, who, despite the *Doppelbelastung* and long hours, clearly do not view themselves as having been exploited or simply used as workhorses, as some Western commentators seem to believe. Rather, they claim to have fully enjoyed the experience, since 'being able to achieve everything enhanced [their] well-being'(C). Furthermore, they consider it important that they 'were able to realise [their] identity in a profession, to fully develop [their] potential'(D). In a similar fashion to men, East German women show all the signs of having grown accustomed to what was initially an obligation as they 'needed [their] wages, not like in the West' (E).

It is also important to note, in comparison with West German women, that work is automatically considered a full-time experience, except when they have very young children.<sup>33</sup> East German women still want to work full-time and are very critical of the 'typically spoiled West German housewife [...] who just works a few hours' (F) or who is 'happy with just a little job on the side'(G).

Particularly significant as evidence of a 'socialist legacy' is the transfer of a real and positive experience of work to a theoretical belief that work is an essential part of a woman's life and, moreover, essential to her emancipation. This belief is also reflected in interview responses relating to personal concepts of female emancipation, where there was considerable consensus amongst respondents (over 90 per cent) that emancipation meant 'a right to work', 'the same opportunities to get a job' (H) and even that it is 'impossible, to have emancipation without work'(C). The principal link between emancipation and work made by East German women is that they 'cannot envisage emancipation without financial independence and being able to shape their lives themselves'(D). In the GDR, they were, after all, able to 'divorce their husbands and to raise their children alone' when the need arose (I). Only one respondent saw financial independence as achievable via the Welfare State. Again positive personal experience would appear to play a significant role in contributing to the importance of financial independence for East German women. Respondents thus note their appreciation of being able 'to achieve something and earn for the family'(G) and 'not to have to ask for handouts'(B).



The mirror image of this point of view is witnessed in East German women's scorn towards the material dependence of their Western sisters. Such women are seen as far less emancipated than them: 'I had contact with my sister-in-law. She was very dependent on her husband. That was very rare here'(J).

Respondents were also not slow in recognising other important benefits of full-time employment with regards to emancipation. One of these is the claim that they gained a certain respect and status in society, above all from men who 'saw that women were just as capable' and that this had an effect on their thinking so that 'women were held in higher esteem'(K).

The sense of an increase in status was also linked to the wider range of opportunities for women in the GDR and again the recognition given to this by the SED. Respondents thus speak proudly about the 'normality' of women 'driving cranes or welding' (L) and that 'there were lots of women in senior positions'(J). They also state that they 'gained better positions in middle management [...] were more confident and had more sense of self-worth'(K). They were also generally more involved so that 'women would discuss political issues with one another, for example'(G). A very clear majority also describe an increase in status in the family, in that it became necessary that the husband participated as it 'just couldn't work any other way' (M). Children also tended to grow up more independently and 'helped out so that their parents would have more time for them'(J).

East German women have thus not only come to view work as the end but also as a means of gaining emancipation, in that they clearly link it to other improvements they experienced in status and self-esteem. There is much in their relationship with work which is based on the practical and positive personal experience of having worked in the GDR, rather than on feminist theory. This counters the Western view that East German women were simply obliged to work by the SED and this alone explains their determination to remain on the job market.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, it also presents a female work ethic based strongly on a personal need to work rather than on any specific ideological principles.

Yet it cannot simply be perceived as a coincidence that East German women grew to like work and it cannot be assumed that this preference is not related to the Marxist feminism of the SED Regime. There appears to be a correlation between the way East German women view work and Marx and Engels' belief in female employment and economic independence as a liberating force. After all, the SED was very active in promot-

ing a sense of pride amongst women regarding their contribution to society. They were careful, for example, to emphasise their acknowledgement of women's success with their version of 'Women's Day' and donated prizes for individual women's achievements, encouraging a pride in having 'ihren Mann gestanden' (having equalled the achievements of their husband). East German women's attitudes also reflect the SED's disapproval of women who did not work or only worked part-time. East German women's views are, therefore, also indicative of a 'real' socialist legacy, that is of a transfer of socialist ideology to unified Germany in the form of certain Marxist feminist principles, even if they are not recognised as such by the women themselves.

However, as indicated in the introduction, this chapter does not intend, in its support of the existence of a socialist legacy amongst East German women, to discount the presence of post-unification influences. On the contrary, it accepts that they have certainly contributed and reinforced East German women's socialist characteristics. There remains, nevertheless, too much evidence of continuing influences from the GDR to conclude that they are the primary factors in the development of a distinctive identity. To conclude that post-unification events were the only determinant of current differences would be to ignore that identity must be seen, as Hall for example contends, as a 'continuous transformation' which includes past, present and future.<sup>35</sup>

## **Pre-unification versus post-unification factors and their impact on identity formation**

Unification has certainly been a particularly significant event in all East German women's lives. As indicated earlier, the changes women have experienced result in a considerable loss of many important rights and benefits and a clash of interests between East and West. The premise of some commentators such as Zelle and Wiesenthal that circumstances since unification have contributed to or even caused a polarisation between East and West German identity does, therefore, warrant some scrutiny. Current approaches include the influence of factors such as unemployment, 'rising expectations' and 'treatment response', all of which point to a pattern of disappointment, dissatisfaction and *Ostalgie*.<sup>36</sup> This pattern cannot, however, be seen to stand alone but must be viewed

in conjunction with the socialisation process, which took place in the GDR and which will also have influenced attitudes and expectations of its citizens as they entered the Federal Republic.<sup>37</sup>

Approaches based on circumstantial influence are particularly relevant to the identity of East German women, as they comprise the group which is believed by many to have experienced the greatest circumstantial change since unification.<sup>38</sup> They have experienced the greatest unemployment and drop in income. They have become marginalised politically despite their sense of empowerment during demonstrations, Round Table negotiations and their participation in the drafting of the new, but later disregarded, constitution. They have also experienced conflict with West German women and West German feminism.

The most lasting effect of unification for East German women has undoubtedly been that of unemployment and their ultimate loss of a secure place in the job market. Although high unemployment has also been a crushing blow for men, men's right to work and their required role in society has not been questioned in the same way it has for women. Employment is connected to East German women's identity, earning them the reputation of the 'arbeitsame Ostfrauen' (hardworking East German women)<sup>39</sup> when compared with the large numbers of West German women who have accepted a range of possible lifestyles without work. Interviews with unemployed respondents are dominated by the need to find employment: 'I just want to work [...]I've got no time for anything else. I just look for work all the time'(P).

There is also a link made between unemployment and an identification with the GDR. Certainly there is evidence that the unemployed are amongst those most dissatisfied with the Federal Republic.<sup>40</sup> This dissatisfaction cannot, however, be viewed as separate from East German women's perception of the value of work per se. Their views on unemployment are different to those of many West German women as there are clear differences in the level of experience of work. For the majority of East German women, unemployment is clearly perceived as a loss of the benefits which they feel employment brought them personally. Respondents refer frequently to the loss of social integration (Q), a loss of self-respect (R) and a loss of status (B). It is East German women's ability, and indeed natural tendency, to view the Federal Republic through the lens of their experience in the GDR – when 'we at least had a job and some respect in society'(S) – which cannot be ignored in assessing

whether their perception of these circumstances in the Federal Republic is unique.

It may also be argued, of course, that rather than attitudes to work influencing attitudes to unemployment, it is, vice versa, unemployment that has created a positive image of work. Indeed it is the unemployed respondents who speak about work in the most glowing terms (B) and who also make the link to emancipation very strongly, claiming that it is 'impossible, to have emancipation without work'(C). Despite the clear influence of unemployment on East German women's feelings, nevertheless it still cannot be concluded that their belief in the significance of work has arisen purely as a result of unemployment. There is considerable evidence, for example, that work has also remained highly valued by women in employment, who stress the importance of 'being taken seriously and recognised for what you do'(S). Women who have stayed in work are also dissatisfied with levels of unemployment despite their own personal gains, as there is 'simply no real security any more'(T).

The influence of post-unification unemployment on East German women's identity is, in any case, unlikely to be short-term, as the relatively low employment of women constitutes the norm in the old German *Länder* due to the continued dominance of the market economy's 'breadwinner ethos'. Female unemployment is not, therefore, simply the result of the economic collapse of the new *Länder* and is certain to continue even if East Germany's economy prospers. The link between unemployment and increased dissatisfaction with the Federal Republic is not sufficient, therefore, to conclude that East German women's discontentment is likely to be a temporary phenomenon amongst an unemployed minority.

The notion that current identity is based on such 'raised expectations' is also particularly relevant to women. The period immediately prior to unification had seen increased political empowerment of women in peace groups and women's groups, reflected in the high representation of women in the marches and demonstrations of the peaceful revolution.<sup>41</sup> Many commentators, including Helwerth and Schwarz, describe how women at this time had a clear vision that they could now achieve something worthwhile in terms of creating a better GDR, and a democratic state, which still upheld essential socialist ideals.<sup>42</sup> There can be no doubt that the speed of the marginalisation of women's groups post-unification as the Western parties entered the political arena was a bitter blow to

many of the women involved. The conclusion can be drawn, therefore, that dissatisfaction with the Federal Republic has been as a result of raised expectations, which have not been fulfilled. Once more, however, there needs to be due consideration of the provenance of these expectations. Clearly, it is true that the 'peaceful revolution' itself created a sense of euphoria and empowerment, but it should not be ignored that women's experience of the GDR in terms of work and material security was a principal contributor to their desire to create 'a better GDR' as articulated in the draft constitution of Hans Modrow's round table. Their expectations are thus also inextricably linked to socialisation prior to unification and to the continued belief in the benefits of the socialist state, despite its drawbacks, under the SED. Many also claim that the experience of paid employment in the GDR gave women a strong sense of self confidence and belief in their right to societal participation (F) and even that women's participation in the GDR had made them optimistic (H). It would, therefore, again be impossible to separate expectations arising from the unification period from those arising from the experience of having lived in the German Democratic Republic.

As recorded by *Der Spiegel* in early 1991, some East Germans were already criticising the way West Germans were treating them, claiming that Westerners looked down on them, that they were patronising and superficial and had taken everything from them, including their dignity.<sup>43</sup> The 'treatment response' approach attributes differences in East German women to a reaction towards such conflict with West German women, which results in a rejection of 'German' identity in favour of remaining 'East German'. One East German woman describes this phenomenon from her own experience:

Those of us who never would have identified ourselves as East German citizens have come together as a result of the terrible way many of the *Wessis* are treating us. This strong differentiation between *Ossis* and *Wessis* will drive the *Ossis* to identify with each other in a way that we never did before (O).

Whilst accepting that such a reaction exists, and certainly emphasises the polarisation of East and West, there again needs to be consideration of the reasons for the original conflict. As examined earlier, differences in governing ideologies and in the lifestyles of women in the Federal

Republic and the GDR, relating to the significance of work amongst other things, have indeed become foci for disagreement. Thus East German women are scornful of West German 'housewives' who only talk about 'Tupperware'(E) whereas East German women are patronised as naive *Muttis* who have allowed themselves to be exploited. These differences were certainly already in existence before any further polarisation caused by unification.

## Conclusion

This chapter has gone some way to linking the beliefs and values of East German women to Marxist feminism. A large number of East German women believe firmly in the emancipatory role of paid employment for women and that it is a source of many benefits. It is also significant that this ideological transfer is not necessarily a result of direct State socialisation but rather pertains to their personal experiences in the GDR as women. The unquestioning acceptance of work as an essential part of their lives and their emancipation is thus connected by the majority to the benefits they have experienced when working themselves.

By investigating what the link between work and emancipation might mean for East German women's future in the Federal Republic, the prognosis for the short-term, certainly for another ten years, must then be that East German women are likely to continue to retain a distinctive identity. Furthermore, there is likely to be considerable resistance to the female employment rate in the East dropping to the level of that in the old federal *Länder*.<sup>44</sup>

Women interviewed:

- A. Frau E. Bormeister and Frau Speckhahn – Equal Opportunities Officers for *Salzvedel*, 45 years and 41 years.
- B. Frau Staniul – Unemployed, 46 years.
- C. Members of the ÖTV Unemployed Committee, (5 women aged 25–50 years, 1 man 55 years).
- D. Frau Rogee – State MP for the PDS, Women's representative in the trade union HBV, 54 years.
- E. Dagmar Heinrich and Birgit Köhler – Building Engineer, 45 years, Dentist's Technician, 44 years.

- F. Dorith Mydla – Civil Servant (previously a vet), 46 years.
- G. Gerlinde Kuppe – Minister for Youth, Family, Women and Social Security, 55 years.
- H. Waltraud Jänicke – Pensioner, 60 years.
- I. Christine Radak – Accountant for the Green Party, 42 years.
- J. Evelyn Weke – Work experience employee with *Rosa* (women's job agency) 43 years.
- K. Ilone Wichert – Women's representative for the trade union, ÖTV, 47 years.
- L. Katherin Dobbert – Head of the *Koordinierungsstelle für Mädchen* (Coordination Centre for girls), 30 years.
- M. Elke Plöger – former *Staatssekretärin für Frauenpolitik* (State Secretary for Women's Politics) in Saxony Anhalt, 54 years.
- N. Fr. Richter – Unemployed economist, 53 years.
- O. Heidi and Erika – Unemployed, 54 and 62 years.
- P. Frau Overheu – Unemployed, 50 years.
- Q. Christine Stoffl – Women's representative for the trade union DAG, 36 years.
- R. Barbara Kohnert – Employee of *Frauenprojekt haus* (Women's Project House), 42 years.
- S. Jaqueline Brösecke – Head of the *Fraueninitiative* women's group in Magdeburg, 37 years.

## Notes

- 1 'Spiegel Spezial, Vereint aber Fremd', *Der Spiegel*, 1 (1991), 32–48.
- 2 K. Rohnstock (ed.), *Stiefschwestern – was Ostfrauen und Westfrauen voneinander denken* (Frankfurt am Main: 1994), p. 9.
- 3 U. Helwerth, and G. Schwarz, *Muttis und Emanzen – Feministinnen in Ost- und Westdeutschland*, (Frankfurt am Main: 1995), p. 10.
- 4 U. Baureithel, 'Vom schwierigen Umgang der deutsch-deutschen Frauenbewegung miteinander' in Rohnstock, *Stiefschwestern*, p. 150.
- 5 Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum, *Sozialreport IV Quartal 2000* (Berlin: 2001), p. 5.
- 6 K. Rohnstock, 'Die Verschwiegene Ostfrau' in Rohnstock, *Stiefschwestern*, p. 116.
- 7 J. Grix, 'East German Political Attitudes: Socialist Legacies v. Situational Factors – A False Antithesis', *German Politics*, 9/2 (2000), 109–24. See also J. Grix, Chapter 1 in this volume.

- 8 C. Zelle, 'Socialist Heritage or Current Unemployment: Why do the Evaluations of Democracy and Socialism differ between East and West Germans', *German Politics*, 8/1 (1999), 17; H. Wiesenthal, 'Post-Unification Dissatisfaction, or why are so many East Germans unhappy with the new political system?' *German Politics*, 7/2 (1998), 15–18.
- 9 Laurence McFalls, for example, rejects theories on socialist inheritance, given the pluralist nature of all societies, and portrays East Germans as well-adapted post-capitalist citizens in L. McFalls, 'East Germany Transformed – From Postcommunist to Late Capitalist Political Culture', *German Politics and Society*, 17/2 (1999), 2–3; see also Chapter 3 in this volume.
- 10 V. Bryson, *Feminist Political Theory* (Basingstoke: 1992), p. 68.
- 11 F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Peking: 1978), pp. 82–7.
- 12 Engels further argued that there was a new equality developing in capitalist society as a result of increasing female labour in factory production, despite the appalling working conditions; quoted in Bryson, *Feminist Political Theory*, p. 67.
- 13 I. Ostner, 'Slow Motion: Women, Work and the Family in Germany' in *Women and Social Policies in Europe*, ed. J. Lewis (Aldershot: 1993), p. 90.
- 14 H. Shaffer, *Women in Two Germanies: a Comparative Study of a Socialist and a Non-socialist Society* (New York: 1981), p. 21.
- 15 An ordinance granting working women 20 hours per week study time at full pay to upgrade to become engineers, G. Winkler, *Frauenreport* (Berlin: 1990), p. 68.
- 16 *ibid.*, p. 70.
- 17 Thus men could prevent their wives from working until 1977. Women were only given an equal say in decisions effecting the children in 1980, and equal pay was not prescribed until 1982.
- 18 Ostner, 'Slow Motion', p. 92.
- 19 Bryson, *Feminist Political Theory*, pp. 160–63.
- 20 Ostner, 'Slow Motion', pp. 97–8.
- 21 The influence of radical feminism in the Federal Republic is exemplified by the West German Marxist feminists' contribution to the debate on domestic labour in the 1970s. Contrary to the SED, they concluded that patriarchy in the home also has economic roots, with female labour as its product, and thus domestic work merited a wage just like any other; in R. Nave-Herz, *Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in Deutschland* (Berlin: 1993), p. 70.
- 22 Nave-Herz, *Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung*, p. 72.
- 23 Ingrid Schmidt-Harzbach wrote that 'women should [...] focus upon themselves, state why they are unhappy and work together with other women in the same situation' to unite all women in 'the sisterhood', in Nave-Herz, *Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung*, p. 71.



- 24 R. Süßmuth, and H. Schubert, *Bezahlen die Frauen die Wiedervereinigung?* (Munich: 1992), p. 38.
- 25 A. Krätschell, 'Lernen Mutter zu sein', *Rheinische Merkur*, 14 June 1991.
- 26 'Also the chronic labour shortage of an economy with a very low productivity rate made the participation of women more than a desirable goal. Their participation in the labour force was a necessity both for the economy and the family income' in C. Conrad, *et al.*, 'The Fall of the East German Birth Rate After Unification: Crisis or Means of Adaptation', *Program for the Study of Germany and Europe- Working Paper Series*, 5/6 (1993), 3.
- 27 *ibid.* p. 13.
- 28 H. Hoppe, *Frauenleben: Alltag, Aufbruch und neue Unsicherheiten*, (Bielefeld: 1993), p. 35.
- 29 E. Kolinsky, 'Women after Muttipolitik' in *Between Hope and Fear* (Keele: 1995), p. 177. See also Hoppe, *Frauenleben*, p. 12.
- 30 G. Seidenspinner, *Frau sein in Deutschland* (Munich: 1994), p. 35.
- 31 R. Fücks, 'Risse im Gebälk, Kulturelle Differenzen im vereinigten Deutschland' in *Differenz in Einheit – Über die kulturellen Unterschiede der Deutschen in Ost und West*, ed. L. Probst (Berlin: 1999), p. 9.
- 32 Letters refer to the list of respondents given at the end of the chapter.
- 33 Contrary to popular opinion the majority of respondents asserted that part-time work was generally possible for a period whilst raising a young family, and many personal examples of this were given, although it could be refused by employers.
- 34 'Arbeitsame Frauen in Ostdeutschland', *IWD Informationsdienst*, 19 (1997), 3.
- 35 S. Hall, *Cultural Identity and Diaspora in contemporary Postcolonial Theory: a reader*, ed. P. Mongia, (London: 1997), p. 112.
- 36 C. Zelle, 'Socialist Heritage', 16–18; H. Wiesenthal, 'Post-Unification Dissatisfaction', 1–30.
- 37 See Grix, 'East German Political Attitudes'.
- 38 U. Baureithel, 'Vom schwierigen Umgang', p. 150.
- 39 'Arbeitsame Frauen in Ostdeutschland', *IWD Informationsdienst*, 19 (1997), 3.
- 40 C. Zelle, 'Socialist Heritage', 9–12.
- 41 Letter from S. Kenawi 21 December 1998, author of *Frauengruppen in der DDR der 80er Jahre* (Berlin: 1995).
- 42 U. Helwerth and G. Schwarz, *Muttis und Emanzen*, pp. 169–70.
- 43 'Spiegel Spezial, Vereint aber Fremd', *Der Spiegel*, 1 (1991), p. 36.
- 44 Certainly current statistics demonstrate a difference of around 20 per cent between the employment rates of East and West German women, with East German women also still likely to be working longer hours. See *Sozialreport IV Quartal 2000*, Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungszentrum (Berlin: 2001) Furthermore, the unemployment rate of women in the new *Länder*,

initially substantially higher than that of men, has dropped so that women comprised 55 per cent of the unemployed in 1999 rather than the original 66 per cent. See G Wagner, *Arbeitsmarkt Monitor Sachsen-Anhalt* (Halle: 2000), p. 26.