

**Delegated Safeguarding or Surveillance by Proxy? The Problem with
Prevent – A Critical Discourse Analysis of Community-level Counter-
Radicalisation Strategy.**

Aram Ghaemmaghami

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Abstract: Research generated by Prevent is abundant. The majority of studies focus on the delivery of Prevent as a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative but rarely question the methodological pretences that underpin its practices. There is however mounting pressure from the public sphere and sections of the research community that is casting doubt on Prevent's effectiveness as a policy as well as its potentially harmful effects on the vulnerable communities it professes to serve. This qualitative investigation evaluates the implementation of Prevent and its statutory duty at the community level, drawing on the experiences of Local Authority (LA) Prevent managers, education providers, NGOs with a vested interest in Prevent and community advocates and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). It utilises the Foucauldian concept of governmentality as an explanatory tool to navigate the interplay between the bureaucratic, economic and ideological suppositions that facilitate Prevent, whilst also drawing upon Bourdieu's methodological framework regarding the educational field to explore the paradox generated by Foucault's concept of governmentality in practice. This study argues that Prevent is symptomatic of neo-liberal mechanisms of power that are primarily focused on generating large scale, quantitative data to answer societal questions only smaller, more focused qualitative studies can hope to solve.

Keywords: Prevent, community, CVE, Counter Radicalisation, Governmentality

Declaration

Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award

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Abbreviations

DfE: Department of Education

PEO: Prevent Education Officer

DSL: Designated Safeguarding Lead

FBV: Fundamental British Values

SMCS: Spiritual, Moral, Cultural and Social guidance (school's curriculum).

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

CBO: Community Based Organisation.

BSBT: Building a Stronger Britain Together

NaCTSO: National Counter Terrorism Security Office

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because of the people you were.*

Chapter 1. Introduction:

CONTEST, the counter-terrorism strategy currently enforced across the UK is organised around four main work streams: 'PREVENT: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; PURSUE: to stop terrorist attacks; PROTECT: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attacks and finally PREPARE: To mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack (Home Office, 2011: 8).' This study will focus on the 'Prevent' strand of the CONTEST framework. PREVENT, as its title suggest, precedes the other three work streams. Its purpose is to seek out and neutralise any potential avenues to terrorist activity before they are committed. In effect, it is creating a 'pre-criminal space' occupied by communities deemed at risk (CAGE, 2016, p.12). The policy itself has many detractors, from both the public and civic domain. For example, former Chief Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police and Chairman of the Association of Muslim Officers Dal Babu described Prevent as a 'toxic brand' in 2016. Furthermore, Dal Babu purports that Prevent is targeting Muslims, particularly creating mistrust within the community by offering money ringfenced by the Home Office to anti-Islamic organisations such as the Quilliam Foundation (<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/anti-radicalisation-prevent-strategy-a-toxic-brand>).

Dal Babu's proclamations of the adverse effects of Prevent are merely one of many that populate the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) landscape. The critical discourse surrounding Prevent led to the Home Office initiating a review of its practices in late 2019. Lord Alex Carlile had originally been tasked with conducting the *independent* review, where

he claimed that the review is an ‘opportunity to take stock of the UK’s strategy to safeguard those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism (<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-independent-reviewer-of-prevent-lord-carlile-has-issued-a-call-for-evidence>).’ Lord Carlile’s appointment as the independent reviewer was met with condemnation from many sections of civil society because he is a long-time proponent of Prevent. Rights Watch UK issued a formal judicial review challenge to the Secretary of State because they contend that Carlile cannot act with true jurisprudence because he recently sat on the Prevent oversight board and conducted the last review of the strategy under the jurisdiction of the Home Office in 2011. They place emphasis on Carlile’s focus for the review, which does not question the theoretical underpinnings of the Prevent strategy but rather its ‘efficiency’, circumnavigating the human rights concerns of its many detractors (<https://www.rwuk.org/rights-watch-uk-extends-its-challenge-to-governments-independent-review-of-prevent-october-2019/>).

Following Right Watch UK’s legal challenge, Carlile’s appointment was rescinded by the Home Office who launched the recruitment process for a new independent reviewer in April 2020 (<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/recruitment-for-independent-reviewer-of-prevent-launched>). Whether Carlile’s successor will offer any more critical oversight to the role remains to be seen. What is illustrated by Carlile’s appointment is the lack of critical engagement the Home Office was initially willing to accommodate. This should not really come as too much of a surprise. The focus on the *efficiency* of Prevent as a strategy is a process which favours the government’s ability to counter potentially seditious populations using its existing bureaucratic mechanisms in order to utilise its preferred ‘art of governance

(Foucault, 1991: 88).’ The promotion of the government’s technical efficiency is primarily carried out at the behest of the economy, which is the main concern of its security apparatus (Foucault, 2014a: 92).

Carlile’s preliminary appointment is the epitome of the ‘technologies of discipline’ of State whose core purpose is to safeguard the economy through biopolitical means (Lemke, 2019: 68). Prevent’s targeted vulnerable communities wellbeing is not, and will never be, its primary focus. The factors that make communities vulnerable to hypothetical subversive behaviours are not something government has the will or perhaps even the capability to comprehend; it is beyond the scope of its *governmentality* (Foucault, 1991: 88-89). A problematic has been presented to the UK government where its practices have faced sufficient opposition that threatens the economic order. This thesis investigates security as a problematic that is the product of various ‘objective communities’ of expertise under the norms of *Etat Providence* (Beck, 1992: 46). The Welfare State in the 19th century once integrated the pauperised urban working class through policing and education as ‘technologies of discipline,’ creating class divisions anew (Lemke 2019: 214). At the same time, the danger posed by radical Islam for the classical liberal State required a network of intelligence officers handling information from native informants, and when these measures in the colonies failed, pacification of a more violent kind from the largest standing army in the world was carried out (Hevia 2015). My conclusion is that for Britain today, ‘the unstable association of community and market society’ also demands transformations in security with ‘politically provocative effects (Beck 1992: 98).’ Where once the State apparatuses mobilised security personnel to enforce order and educators to maintain civility

in civil society, the contemporary model of governmentality also creates conflicts between racial groups, where some are identified as sharing *our* values of productive citizenship and others are marked as countercultural and subversive.

The competing fields of State described by Bourdieu (2014: 4-5) have explanatory value in this instance. The 'objective' methods of State, the practices of the Prevent managers, education providers, the NGOs who wilfully inhabit this domain and the community members who have little choice too are all held captive by the symbolic nature of the State (Loyal, 2017: 84). It is a symbiotic relationship between the 'material order', in this case the Prevent statutory duty and the institutions tasked with implementing it and the ideological pretences of *Britishness* that empower their actions (Loyal, 2017: 83). This study pays special focus to education as a pathway for Prevent because it is the primary 'field of bureaucracy' that the UK government's utilises to 'legitimate' and 'reproduce' the narrative that best suits its aims (Bourdieu, 1994: 11-12). In short, education is a core component of what Bourdieu (2014: 4) describes as the 'administrative state', where the 'specific logic of the bureaucratic field' – in this instance the statutory duty and its CVE methodological focus, is both generated and reproduced (Bourdieu, 2014: 112). In the first section of this introductory chapter, I will provide an overview of Prevent in real terms, how it has been conceptualised and in turn how it operates within the UK context.

1.1. Background

CONTEST was first developed in 2003 as part of a wider EU initiative to counter violent extremism. Originally only designed to be in force over a five-year period, CONTEST and its subsidiary parts are almost unchanged from their inception to this day. The EU's response to counter-extremism (CVE) is also practically identical in scope, with the UK's experience in Northern Ireland playing an important role in its design. At the Home Office-sponsored counter-terrorism conference held in May 2017 in London, Rob Wainwright, then acting as director of Europol described Prevent as the 'best practice model in Europe' for fighting extremism – something the majority of the international security community agree with wholeheartedly (<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/european-embrace-uk-counter-extremism-policies-despite-human-rights-concerns-1550167935>).

The events of 9/11 focused attention in Westminster, raising CVE as an issue of the utmost importance for policy makers. This resulted in a continued effort to centralise the UK's efforts to deal with a newly developed problem within the UK context, the threat of domestic terrorism and the rise in extremism on the UK mainland. CONTEST was initially devised as a joint effort between the Cabinet Office and law makers in Whitehall in 2002 but it quickly transcended the policy making process and was put into action by early 2003 (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015: 1040). The next major development came in 2006 when an updated version of CONTEST was released to integrate the change in the counter terrorism narrative, which realised that the threat of Islamic terrorism had changed to incorporate both 'domestic and international dimensions (HM Government, 2006: 3).' It was at this

point that the strategy devised and implemented the 'four Ps': Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015:1043). This structure has not been substantially changed for the past 14 years, even though it has seen considerable criticism from its inception. Many in the security services, sections of civil society and governmental institutions did not believe the Cabinet Office had the expertise or the legitimacy to create such a policy (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015:1041).

Although criticism of the effectiveness of CONTEST persists, there is very little to no resistance within the political spectrum, with no major parties seemingly having an opinion on the issue. The original author of CONTEST, the former U.K. government's security and intelligence coordinator David Omand (2005: 108) states that the lack of criticism from both national and local governmental agencies of the strategy is down to the fact that it is spread ethereally across agencies and departments and anodyne to existing bureaucratic mechanisms. In sum, it becomes another mechanism to adopt within a workstream and not a complete transformation of the work each department does.

Foucault (2000: 218) denotes that this corporeality of State, where policy is diffused across a multitude of agencies and departments is also manifested within the civil sphere. Private enterprises interact with the State through the macro-economies created within the vast network of governmental agencies. Entire industries of NGOs have been created with the sole purpose of offering services that help government departments streamline their practices to facilitate policy such as the Prevent strategy (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015: 234). In this instance, Prevent creates a fiscally charged space that NGOs can exploit for financial


gain. A participant of this study, working for an international NGO which focuses *'exclusively on counter-extremism'* admits that *'the reaction of policy-makers at both the national and local level'* to CVE is central to the objectives the NGO has at any one time. Of equal importance is the NGOs ability to decipher *'the doctrine of national government policy.'* NGOs ensure this by employing personnel with a working background in government. In this case the participant was a former Prevent manager who was head hunted by the NGO after working with them delivering a project within her local authority (LA).

It is also important to note that within the UK context, the *"doctrine"* that underpins State security apparatus that this particular participant describes is not in any shape or form, new. The Northern Ireland example has set much of the precedent of CONTEST. Where it differs is in the PREVENT strand. The idea that potential sympathisers to extremist or terrorist causes can be intercepted by counter-insurgency operatives is not a novel one. However, the methodology and its implementation have been streamlined into governmental agencies beyond the scope of the security agencies who historically have control over such mechanisms.

The NPCC (National Police Chief's Council) have developed a four-tiered delivery framework to address its obligation to Prevent. This framework is comprised of four tiers (see fig.1). At the base of the pyramid or 'Tier 1', sits 'all members of the community'. 'Tier 2' consists of individuals vulnerable to radicalised ideology. This grouping is seen as a 'targeted' subset for policing and surveillance. 'Tier 3' individuals are those that have adopted a radicalised way of thinking or those that are 'moving towards extremism.' An 'interventionist' approach is

adopted by counter-terrorist practitioners to attempt to intercept and divert the flow of information produced by persons at 'Tier 3' from disseminating to 'vulnerable' individuals lower down the structure. Finally, 'Tier 4' individuals are those 'actively breaking the law'. In such instances, an 'enforcement' approach is adopted, and any individuals will be sought, arrested, and prosecuted (Staniforth et.al, 2013: 35-37).

Fig.1. NPCC Prevent Framework.



The framework put forward by the NPCC has several limitations. The individuals identified as 'vulnerable to radicalisation' are ill defined and do not constitute a tangible demographic or community (Christmann, 2012: 11). Furthermore, the framework does not identify the reasons of how and why an individual may move from the base of the pyramid (members of the wider community) to the extremes of radicalisation and ultimately, to potentially commit acts of terrorism (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014: 72). Finally, it interprets the

radicalisation process to be linear. In practice the path to committing a terrorist act is unique to the individual and thus unpredictable (Spaaij, 2010: 867). Essentially, the four-tier delivery approach is systematising counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies on the native population of the UK.

The focus on the ‘pacification’ of potential seditious populations by the State is effectively its attempt to micro-manage its geographies which are now global in scope. The State is forced to ‘rescale’ its efforts from the colonial heartlands that are the traditional battlegrounds of the counterinsurgent in order to securitise what it considers to be the ‘besieged urban homeland (Graham, 2010: 54-55).’ But besieged by whom? There is no denying the Orientalist overtures of the contemporary counterinsurgent, focused on uncovering the Islamist extremist within the peripheries of the urban landscape, locating ‘the foreign devil’ within populations made vulnerable by processes indicative of urban decay (Said, 2003: 4).

Perhaps the most pertinent question posed by the radicalisation model is defining who exactly vulnerable people or communities are in relation to extremism. Using Foucauldian reasoning, one could postulate that policing powers would define the vulnerable in this instance by first defining ‘legality’, or what is legally *acceptable* behaviour within the context of subversion of the State (Foucault, 2001: 328). This definition would then be used to construct ‘the field of illegality’, a hierarchy of behaviours unacceptable to the State (Foucault, 2001: 329). Those in society deemed to exhibit such unacceptable behaviours are in turn defined as a risk – or to use Prevent’s terminology, vulnerable (Johnson, 2014: 7).

The NPCC Prevent framework found in fig.1. is a prime example of such a typology in relation to violent extremism. In this instance police action is *medicalising* infractions against State power. Pariah's of extremism – or perceived extremism using the definition of legality formed using Foucault's (2001: 328-329) reasoning – are being observed as propagating a pathogen that vulnerable groups are susceptible to contracting. Ultimately, Prevent and CVE methodology in general is proclaiming to be the vaccination of such discourse. What Prevent and CVE discourse cannot accurately do is define vulnerable groups beyond shared, mostly benign characteristics with identified extremists. For instance, Educate Against Hate (2020), a Department for Education (DfE) run initiative designed to equip schools with the tools to spot signs of radicalisation, indicates a young person's susceptibility to extremism extends to being 'argumentative', 'feeling persecuted', 'changing friend groups' and 'changing appearance', all things young people are *guilty* of on a regular basis, yet very few if any actually commit acts of extremism or violence (<https://educateagainsthate.com/signs-of-radicalisation/>) .

The 'de-radicalisation' model employed by Prevent (and the Police and government bodies that enact it through such mediums as the Channel Programme, The UKs de-radicalisation education programme) is based on a study conducted by psychologists Christopher Dean and Monica Lloyd whilst in the employ of the UK government in the National Offender Management Service (NOMs). The study produced '22 'factors' that were used to construct a tool called the Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) that security and safeguarding professionals are obliged to use when administering Prevent to individuals they deem at risk (CAGE, 2016: 14).

The original study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has not been made available for public scrutiny due to its importance to *national security*, however both researchers have produced an article defending the methodology used within the study in 2015. It is important to note that both Dean and Lloyd have identified key weaknesses in their research framework. For instance, the study used a very small sample of convicted terrorists within the UK prison system that had committed a variety of offences, ranging from proliferation of 'extremist' material to violent crime. Dean and Lloyd admit that no systematic analysis was conducted with any data collated. A basis within the existing literature was also not conducted, due to the 'exploratory' nature of the study (Dean & Lloyd, 2015: 50-51).

Not surprisingly, sections of the academic community surrounding the policy area of counter-extremism and race politics have found serious issue with this circumstance. In 2016, 140 leading experts within the field – remarkably including Marc Sageman, a proponent of 'de-radicalisation' discourse and the original creator of the radicalisation model which has been modified by the NPCC – have written an open letter to the UK government, calling for the original Dean and Lloyd study to be released to enable real scientific scrutiny to be conducted (<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/29/academics-criticise-prevent-anti-radicalisation-strategy-open-letter>).

Creating a framework to predict terrorist violence based on a limited psychological experiment – or to be more precise the proposed journey one may take to it is obviously problematic. Foucault (1982: 220-221) ascertains that the field of psychology is often used as a mechanism of government to facilitate the ‘conduct of conduct’ or, using the reasoning of the State, to set the limits of freedom of the individual to ensure the freedoms of the whole. Lemke (2019: 68) argues that to do this effectively, the State needs to enable ‘technologies of discipline’ that can provide oversight over the conduct of its citizens – the ERG 22+ is one such technology.

Professor Arun Kundnani, working with CAGE (2016: 9) on a report to underline the precarities of a science that creates a ‘pre-criminal space’, highlights that the ‘knowledge’ of radicalisation has been deliberately constrained by the State. Furthermore, it ignores the ‘political, social and historical’ reasons that perpetuate acts of terrorism to embody a surveillance rationale that makes suspects of law-abiding citizens. Professor David Miller, writing in the same report, argues that fundamentally the whole concept of radicalisation is inherently flawed. Miller purports that radicalisation theory has ‘no scientific basis’ and is ‘relentlessly’ perpetuated by a ‘nexus’ of state security and intelligence agencies whose core interests are not aligned with true objectivity (CAGE, 2016: 10). The report compiled by CAGE (2016: 15) and peer reviewed by eighteen leading academics within related social science fields (including Kundnani, Miller, and Stampnitzky to name but a few) have outlined five key areas of concern regarding the ERG 22+:

- The study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has generated theory that is unproven which has then been put into practice.
- The original remit of the study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has been deliberately overstretched to create the rationale that underpins the 'pre-criminal space.'
- Political proliferation of Islamophobic rhetoric as a factor of causation for disenchantment within the Muslim communities of the UK has been roundly ignored.
- Lack of any evidence to suggest the Dean and Lloyd study went under any credible peer review process or that the study met any recognised ethical review standards.
- The initial study has not been repeated or built upon to test the theory that has been put into action through the Prevent programme.

In this instance, the relationship between 'consent and force' is an 'effect' of the biopolitical imperative of State (Lemke, 2019: 317). CAGE have highlighted a reality in which the UK government has set into motion practices that coerce sections of society into a gambit that identifies them as potential suspects. However, this reality is not owned by Prevent or its many detractors. It is important to understand that the 'power relations' between the State and actors within it are based upon structures of control that necessitate the security of the biopolitical – society as a whole – which often outweigh any notions of consent (Lemke, 2019:

316). Furthermore, consent can be granted and withdrawn within any given moment by the State (Lemke, 2019: 317). Consent is merely a component of a total structure of actions of State that are deployed upon an acting subject by virtue of their capability to act. The matriculation of risk found in the ERG22+ example creates a pre-criminal space whereby Channel referrals act as an ethical imperative to shape the *vulnerable* subject by recasting the policing power as a codification of conduct. Therefore the State, or in this example the UK government, is acting in the only way it knows how to act. This does not take away from the fact that the practice of Prevent and the ERG 22+ that enable it is inherently flawed. However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that in spite of its prominent detractors and the obvious gaps found in the methodological research that underpins it, Prevent still persists.

Prevent is predominantly enacted through its statutory duty, which is imposed upon local governments to administer. All local authorities (LAs) within the UK have a legal obligation to ensure that they 'monitor' populations vulnerable to extremism and share that data with the Home Office (Home Office, 2015a: 5). They also have an obligation to ensure that all LA agencies and staff that work directly with the 'public understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2015a: 6).'

The Home Office (2016: 6) specifies further that frontline staff 'need to be aware of what we mean by the term "extremism" and the relationship between extremism and terrorism (Home Office, 2015a: 6).'

In this instance, the definition of 'extremism' has been set by the Home Office as: 'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British Values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of

members of our armed forces (Home Office, 2015a: 3).’ This definition is clearly lacking in many regards however the most important observation to be made here is the use of ideological terminology such as ‘Fundamental British Values’ (FBV) which are impossible to quantify across the broad spectrum of the UK population.

In terms of direct LA agency work, the statutory duty is mainly facilitated through education. Foucault (1977: 141) denotes that mechanisms of regulation such as the statutory duty require the ‘protected place(s) of disciplinary monotony.’ The ‘educational regime’ that schools employ act as the perfect vector for the form of disciplinary power that Prevent takes (Foucault, 1977: 141). The duty bestows two main responsibilities on education providers such as schools: firstly to monitor its students and report any safeguarding concerns relating to extremism through the relevant channels and secondly, to promote ‘Fundamental British Values’ across its curriculum. FBV enables a field of surveillance that education practitioners populate; it helps identify those within their cohorts that show opposition to the ideology FBV promotes. This monitoring process is dualistic. It allows the practitioner to intercept pupils that show signs of radicalisation, either to re-educate those with radical views or to separate harmful ideologies from its cohorts – ‘a libertine either alone or between two pious pupils (Foucault, 1977: 147).’

For Bourdieu (2013: 93-94), the primary aim of State is to disseminate its core ideologies within the collective consciousness of its governed societies – its *habitus* – through the medium of its ‘social fields.’ The objective of State in this instance is to create a durable norm of obedience, or in the ideal case a ‘permanent disposition’ of its ideology within said

habitus. Bourdieu (1990: 130-131) postulates that within the ‘social fields’ – that constitute the totality of societal interactions – resides the ‘bureaucratic fields’ of State which mechanise its dominion over *the social*. Like Foucault (2001: 233), Bourdieu (1990: 132-133) recognises that the language and motivations of State are largely dictated by economic imperatives, which also dictate and are dictated by biopolitical realities and their associated risks. Bourdieu (1990: 267-268) also acknowledges the use of bureaucratic language to control discourse, to create ‘practicable taxonomies’ to relate economic obligations to social phenomena where they have no logical right to be. The field of education acts as the ideal site to disseminate its ideology because it is the main producer (and reproducer) of ‘social and cultural capital’ that re-embeds the doctrine of State within the *habitus* (Jenkins, 1992: 52).

This Bourdieusian position identifies FBV as the UK government’s attempts to instil its hegemony through the ‘cultural capital’ of the concept of *Britishness*, creating a sense of the *moral* (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-9). Dean (2010: 19) concludes that government is an intrinsically moral actor – it uses morality or a moral code to illustrate that it holds itself accountable for its own actions. In doing so it discerns both its legitimacy to govern and its rationale for action. This discourse is then transposed upon the polis. Self-governance of the individual is enforced through varying physical mechanisms like policing and surveillance; however, the ideological field of education is the primary vector of its delivery because it already holds a captive and predominantly docile audience. For the State, as long as the moral language citizens adhere to fits the praxis of the moral code set out by government their citizenship by proxy is assured. Education providers are the ideal adjudicators of citizenship – they are

designed to disseminate knowledge and assess the individual's capacity to understand and utilise it in wider social contexts (Dean, 2010: 21).

Education being used as a vector of State ideology – its *governmentality* – is not a contemporary fixture of the liberal State, although it remains an essential tool of government to this day. The colonial States of the 18th and 19th century brought upon the Western world a new global order, causing the breakup of 'traditional societies' both at home and abroad (Weber, 1976: 98). Eugen Weber (1976: 72) denotes that the western 'peasant' was no longer assured of their lowly status as a new system of class emerged, with the 'savage' from faraway lands lifting their biopolitical power upward and onwards (Viswanathan, 2015: 136). During this period, education within the Western State was reformed to accommodate this new 'consolidation of power' – to shape its own populations 'moral and intellectual' ideology within the new global order (Viswanathan, 2015: 2-3). This method of biopolitical control used forms of 'indirect violence' committed on the inhabitants of its conquered lands to pacify its home populations (Baron et.al. 2019: 200). These acts of indiscriminate violence were legitimised by the Western State through the educational field, where education was used to construct a sense of 'habitus' that homogenised its home populations as superior to those it had conquered (Bourdieu, 2013: 94).

The education field was also an important tool in the colonial State. Imposing the spoken language of the Western State upon indigenous populations was often seen as a 'right of conquest' for colonial powers. Creating a 'linguistic unity' across its borders was essential to

avoid the danger posed by ‘persistent diversity (Weber, 1976: 73).’ The *danger* for the colonial power and their answers to it were twofold in this instance: firstly, any form of resistance cannot be averted if you do not understand the language of those who may perform it. This of course remains a problem after the language of the colonial State has been imposed, however the target populations will no longer be ‘closed to outside influences’ and can be directed by the State’s form of ‘national consciousness’ to counter any ‘revolutionary agitation (Weber, 1976: 98-99).’ In short, the colonial State used its language as a tool to create a new form of national identity that better fitted its own vision. However, this creates a new set of problems – a population empowered by its *newfound* ‘civility (Weber, 1976: 305).’

The Second issue for Western powers was controlling the use of its language by its colonial subjects once it had become rooted within its systems of ‘cultural domination (Viswanathan, 2015: 5).’ Gauri Viswanathan (2015: 142-143) describes how the ‘transmission of ideas of moral autonomy’ within the colonial educational system in India led to many young Indians questioning ‘their position in life’ assigned by their colonial rulers. In practice, the educational regime in colonial India became ‘a vehicle of acquiring and exercising power’ for Indian elites who used it to obtain incremental forms of autonomy, which over time allowed them to levy considerable power (Viswanathan, 2015: 167). However, the British colonial state of India continued to exist for decades under these circumstances. It managed to do so by means of liberal pacification not too dissimilar to those it utilised upon its home populations over a century earlier. The empowerment of sections of the indigenous Indian populations was shaped by the British as a form of ‘liberal improvement’, where this new

type of 'hegemonic pacification' allowed for an Indian elite to form and to take on some of the administrative duties of the colonial state (Baron et.al. 2019: 206). Once again, the educational field was used by the British state to emboss its own 'cultural capital' upon its populations, but this time it was applied to those who were not British by nationality but British by means of 'subjectification (Bourdieu, 1990: 144-146).'

Using 'Eurocentric' reasoning, the British educational system in India divided its populations along 'racial and cultural' lines – dividing and conquering using ideology, not domination through violence (Willinsky, 1998: 3). It is important to note that forms of violent punishment persisted right up until the end of colonial rule in India in 1947. However, its usage was not to impose 'domination' through fear, but to perform hegemony by shared interest (Foucault, 2001: 273). The Caste system in India had been modified by the British to create *ideal types*, or those who exhibited the British ideals of the *civilised* Indian. In this exemplar of imperialism, the threat to British rule from 'the mass of the population' was also shared with its chosen Indian elites (Foucault, 2001: 221-222). The educational field was ideally suited to perform the transformation of the Indian social system because it has the unique ability to 'transmute living reality' through modalities of 'specialization (Said, 1979: 86).' In this instance, specialization creates experts. The educational field is populated by these experts who define the behaviours of both the 'primitive' and the 'civilized', and those who are instructed by them (or their *knowledge*) suffer with delusions of superiority through the agency of their educators *expertise* (Willinsky, 1998: 17). In this instance, the educational field is being used as an 'instrument of social classification', where its students are taught how to *perform* their superiority (Bourdieu, 1996: 42).

The form of governance the British colonial state conjured during this period in their history was the precursor for the liberal order we now see in the contemporary context – one not of ‘force, but of guidance (Mill, 1998: 232-233).’ FBV are one of the current forms of guidance adopted by the British state. However, the educational field as a modus of the ‘moral’ has always been a permanent fixture of the liberal State since its inception (Oakshott, 1989: 62). For the infamous *conservative* liberalist Michael Oakshott (1989: 63), education is fundamentally a ‘moral transaction’, where the primary aim of the educator is to equip the student with the skills necessary to navigate ‘the world they are to inhabit.’ In Oakshott’s (1989: 64-65) educational paradigm, the student must be guided on how to perform as a citizen in accordance with both the written and unwritten ‘rules and rule-like considerations’ of the State. Oakshott’s (1989: 140) classical liberal conception of the role of education dictates that tuition in the *moral* must precede the tuition of the *practical*, where ‘empiricism is preceded and guided by an ideological activity.’ The ‘ideological activity’ Oakshott (1989:66) speaks of is composed of ‘aspirations, sentiments, images, opinions, beliefs, modes of understanding, customs and practices.’ For Oakshott (1989: 66-67), the ‘procedure of learning’ employed by the educational field is primarily constructed to teach its student body how ‘to perform humanly’, a concept he uses interchangeably with the role of the State and its responsibility to guide society.

Examples of Oakshott’s rationale appearing within the contemporary British educational system are not hard to find. For example, Section 28 of the Education Act 2002 impose a responsibility upon schools to create a curriculum that incorporates ‘spiritual, moral, social

and cultural' (SMCS) guidance (Department for Education, 2014: 2). The SMCS provision has provided the perfect conduit for the rollout of FBV, with corroboration between both statutory provisions actively encouraged by the Department for Education (DfE). FBV are described by the Home Office (2015a: 11) as the promotion of 'spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development' whilst also promoting 'community cohesion.' There are clear parallels between the official descriptions of FBV and SMSC, which theoretically aids FBV assimilation within the pedagogic discourse. However, in practice the role FBV plays within the school setting causes much dispute. A participant of this study, a secondary school teacher and pastoral lead thinks FBV "*make no sense.*" He also argues that the four pillars of FBV: democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and tolerance being attributed to Britishness is "*a fallacy.*" He believes this stance "*smacks of jingoism.*" Rather than build consensus as they are purported to be designed to do, they are in fact "*divisive towards other members of communities who are not [intrinsically] British.*" Even though there is evidence of a lack of faith in FBV there is often little resistance to it. One potential reason being that it is but one of many *identikit* regulatory practices placed upon schools, with another participant in this study, a designated safeguarding lead (DSL) in a secondary school describing FBV as just another "*box to tick from the LA, something we've kind of got to do*" to fulfil the schools obligation to Ofsted.

The implementation of the statutory duty is stratified. School leadership are required to undergo specific Prevent training and a *Prevent lead* – who is most often the Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) – is selected to oversee the school's legal obligation to the statutory duty to disseminate Prevent training within the general staff population. This

process is externally monitored by Ofsted inspection (Home Office, 2015a: 11). Further Education providers and universities also have a legal requirement to adhere to the statutory duty and have to follow predominantly the same protocol as schools, however there is less of an obligation to instil FBV within their workstreams, presumably because it's too difficult to monitor (Home office, 2015a: 11-12).

The statutory duty is also applicable to other forms of education providers, identified as *independent learning providers*, such as English as a Foreign Language (EFL) centres (English UK, 2015: 1). Their obligation is mostly the same as state schools, however they're subject to spot checks from the governmental department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) who will monitor the EFL providers by ensuring that the required training and safeguarding mechanisms are being administered in line with the duty (English UK, 2015: 3).

The Prevent statutory duty is also administered through partnership working with NGOs that help facilitate school compliance. For instance, a participant NGO for this study provides *awards* recognised by the DfE and Home Office that showcase a school's commitment to the duty and delivering FBV for a fee, starting at £500 per school for a "Bronze" award. Although it may seem obvious that schools and LAs are the target market for NGOs focused on CVE in education a question is still posed; who exactly are these awards designed for? Foucault (2007: 265) would likely draw to our attention the theatrical nature of the award system offered. They act as a performance – almost ritualistic, ceremonial even, that rewards schools for producing evidence of compliance to the states mode of disciplinary power (Foucault, 2004a: 155). Elton-Chalcraft et.al (2016: 29) argue

that FBV is deliberate politicization of education by the UK government that is ‘instilling the expectation that teachers are state instruments of surveillance.’ In this instance, the performative nature of FBV is being played out across two stages, the pragmatic and the moral. Schools that can show obedience to FBV are a real-world example of the counter-insurgent doctrine of manufacturing consent – of winning hearts and minds.

The relationship between the targeted community setting and the Prevent duty is less clear than that with the school. Under current legislation, unless the organisation works under a governing body that has a safeguarding responsibility there is no legal obligation for a Community Based Organisation (CBO) to engage with Prevent. However, LAs are required to produce Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CLTPs) that necessitate local authorities develop a ‘joint understanding’ of counter-terrorism legislation across all local partners which is promoted through the integration of Prevent ‘across local communities (Home Office, 2012: 7- 12).’ Such activity can take many forms and varies across LAs, however the Home Office does provide monetary rewards for those that actively engage, with over £5 million pounds being awarded to community groups that have shown a *commitment* to fighting extremism through the Building a Stronger Britain Together fund as of October 2018 (<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/over-5-million-awarded-to-community-groups-to-fight-extremism>).

Prevent and its statutory duty is fraught with limitations to engagement, mainly because it lacks the apparatus to effectively administer and communicate its aims, which are unclear for those obligated to abide by them. Thus far, this thesis has provided the reader with a

miniature portrait of the problematic presented by Prevent and how it operates in real terms. In the following section, the research focus and theoretical framing of this study, the Foucauldian concept of governmentality is discussed in greater analytical detail. It will also introduce to the reader the Bourdieusian concept of the bureaucratic field that is used by this study to navigate the pedagogical implementation of the Prevent duty within the school and community setting – a thematic Foucault is often accused of neglecting in his analysis of the discourses of power.

1.2. Research focus

Ferguson and Gupta (2005: 105) denote that the totality of State is only partially visible within the physical world. In fact, the manifestation of States lies predominantly within the realm of ‘metaphors and practices.’ A ‘spatial’ reality is created by the infractions of State that permeate society. Such infractions form the basis of its governance structures (Ferguson and Gupta, 2005: 105-106). The actual practices of government take a form akin to religious institutions – societies earliest attempts at governance. Governments act pastorally, shepherding their respective flocks in ways deemed acceptable to state doctrine (Foucault, 1988: 71). Such institutions of government and the ideology they embody are both empowered and protected by collective ‘knowledges (Foucault, 2000: 212).’ Mitchell Dean (2010: 184), highlights that such *knowledges* are safeguarded from wider society using specialised language, specifically bureaucracy and the rule of law. This bureaucratic language encompasses all matters of State however it has special relevance to economic commerce, which is paramount to a State’s security needs in the contemporary context. I

argue that the ideological principles of market rationale are a core driver for Prevent, as they are for most State incursions upon the biopolitical. Before I do so however, it is first pertinent to discuss the state of exception that Prevent represents in its totality.

For Carl Schmitt (2005: 12) in his 1922 book *Political Theology – Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* the State's existence is 'undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm'. As such, 'all law is situational law' with the 'sovereign' or State dictating the situation in its 'totality (Schmitt, 2005:13).' Therefore, no 'general norm' can be considered absolute (Schmitt, 2005: 6). According to Schmitt (2005: 6), the key to understanding this dynamic is to uncover 'what constitutes the public interest or interest of the State, public safety and order' and most importantly, 'who decides' what exactly this means in practice. The use of sovereign power is only effective if those wielding it can provide 'unity' of viewpoint across the demos (Schmitt, 2005: 19). Such 'unity' can only be ascertained if the sovereign power is used under the guise of impartiality and fairness, which most often takes the form of the judiciary in the State system of control (Schmitt, 2005: 20).

Foucault (1978:136) builds upon Schmitt's assertions of sovereign power, detailing the advent of biopower that underpins sovereignty in the contemporary age. To be precise, he discerns that the judiciary has been created to normalise the sovereign's capability to 'take life or let live', the ultimate expression of sovereign power. This can be performed upon the individual that poses a threat to the sovereign State in the form of execution or incarceration, or if the threat is supranational in scope it can take the form of diplomacy or

war. For Foucault (1978:137) biopolitics are paramount: 'Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone.' In effect, the threat of 'massacres' has 'become vital' to the envisaged safety the State provides and more importantly, those who reside within it that are deemed to belong there (Foucault, 1978:137).

As part of the increasing entanglement of the biopolitical and the apparatus of State, issues of power have become ever more secretive, often disguised through the complicated nature of the judiciary and the legal language it uses. This creates a distance from the day to day lives of the average citizen – ignorance becomes bliss (Foucault, 1978: 87). The network of entrenched judicial powers described by Foucault (1978: 87-88) in this instance reacts to issues emerging from the social domain; the autonomy of the courts, largely a political fiction in the west in the constitutional, time-honoured form of a separation of powers between judiciary, executive and legislature, is supposed to guarantee reflexivity amongst the stewards of our democratic regimes (Dean 2010: 150).

But Schmitt's (2005: 5) 'states of exception' convey to us how rare such cases are. Take Theresa May's difficulty in deporting Abu Qatada to Jordan after the failure of the British courts to uncover enough evidence to prosecute as an example. Found innocent in Amman, the British government's measures are now limited to preventing the comments of his Twitter account from reaching British citizens (<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/26/twitter-abu-qatada-al-qaida-jihadi-syria-islamic-state>).

Biopower is the most effective means of establishing security for neo-liberal States. CVE and by proxy Prevent is the contemporary iteration of the management techniques employed to steer this discourse across different, cultures, economies, and political ideologies (Dean, 2010: 150). In Britain, the form this took was populist nightmares of Qatada and his family on welfare. The utilitarian calculation of the cost to the public (£3m) to extradite him now meets efforts to deny his family their citizenship, with 'sources' stating that the then 'Home Secretary would also use the powers available to her to prevent the family from returning to Britain in the future (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10246167/Abu-Qatadas-family-follow-him-out-of-Britain.html>).' May routinely contrasted her success in deporting Qatada with Jeremy Corbyn's putative sympathy for terrorists in the General Election campaign of 2017, a strategy that failed to garner too much support.

Although the law is designed to be the apparatus of authority for both the State and its citizens, it does not designate who can wield such authority, what purpose they have for using it and finally, what changes they have made through the precedent of its usage, intentional or otherwise (Schmitt, 2005: 32). When legal precedent does change, it is often done so using risk or 'security concerns as justification (Chomsky, 2007: 160-161).'

The concept of risk is difficult to define. Nothing is inherently a risk and conversely, everything can be perceived to be a risk dependant on context and circumstances (Dean,

2010: 177). Nevertheless, governments seek to understand risks to construct an order of the reality of the present to best understand how to govern and how to keep its position as the dominant power-mechanism within its locale (Hope, 2015: 872). Beck (1992: 157-158) draws to our attention that the State will seek to manufacture calculations of risk that adjudicate the 'measurability' of the field of 'immeasurable side effects' such risks pose to the biopolitical and by proxy State sovereignty, no matter how accurate such measurements actually are in reality. In order for the measurements of its target *risky* populations to be useful to the State, it must separate them from the 'legitimate' actions of the biopolitical (Beck, 1992: 87).

In terms of CVE, 'epidemiological risk', which is often attributed to the health sciences is the form of risk analysis most often utilised by governments and security agencies (Dean, 2010: 189). In essence, 'epidemiological risk' is a quantitative science designed to observe and monitor populations deemed at risk from 'epidemics' to pre-empt the risk they potentially possess becoming a security concern and spreading (Aven, 2014: 15-16). This assertion is problematic for security analysts as there is a considerable margin for error (Bauman, 2012: 171). An extremist or a terrorist act is not a pathogen. Witnessing terrorism does not (in the vast majority of cases) make an individual want to commit a terrorist act themselves. Stampnitzky (2013a: 182) argues that the politics of 'pre-emption' within counter-terrorism discourse has created a situation where this reality is ignored. The case of the ERG 22+ and NOMs study conducted by clinical psychologists Dean and Lloyd referred to earlier in this chapter is an exemplar of the epidemiological risk model. The typology of risk it creates is designed to act as a sample frame for inoculation – with the Prevent statutory duty acting as

a vaccination for extremism. A question is asked of the State in this instance: where is the ideal site for such vaccinations to take place?

The Prevent statutory duty is enforced on the basis of section 26 of the *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015*, which acknowledges that LAs are responsible to show a 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2015a: 2).'

The duty itself is principally enacted through the safeguarding agendas of LAs. There are several bodies within any given LA that exhibit a safeguarding responsibility however, education is primarily where the strictest forms of safeguarding policy can be found. The duty takes a 'risk-based approach' which places a responsibility on schools to 'ensure all staff understand the risk' posed by radicalisation (Home Office, 2015a: 3-4). Special emphasis is placed on insuring 'that there are clear and robust safeguarding policies to identify children at risk' whom the Home office identify as being the most vulnerable to extremist material (Home Office, 2015a: 7). The Home Office (2015a: 10) dictate that all schools are required to promote 'community cohesion' through the mechanism of Fundamental British Values (FBV). In this instance, the school is acting in the capacity of a 'bureaucratic field' of the State (Bourdieu, 1994: 1). The implementation of FBV is effectively the State's attempt to 'produce and impose categories of thought' that it wants the next generation to instinctively apply to their conceptions of society, and ultimately their expectations and allegiances to the State (Bourdieu, 1994: 2). In sum, it is an action of government that is designed to both ensure continued fidelity to the State and to safeguard against ideology that could harm such a position (Loyal, 2017: 84).

This study considers the *field* of education, in its Bourdieusian capacity, to be central to understanding the nuances of the Prevent statutory duty. The UK government is utilising the field of education, through bureaucratic channels i.e. the Prevent duty to create a reality of society that best suits its purposes. The Home Office (2015b: 8), in their guidance to schools regarding the Prevent duty, stipulate that it is a school's legal responsibility to equip students with the ability to 'develop positive character traits' and to 'prepare them to play a full and active part in society.' In the Home Office's specific guidelines for the implementation of FBV it is strongly implied that such 'positive character traits' are intrinsic to British society. The guidance defines FBV as 'democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs (Home Office, 2014: 5).' In the same paragraph, it is laid out in no uncertain terms that schools are legally obliged to teach 'the difference between the law of the land and religious law' with British law being promoted as paramount.

To the cynic, this could be seen as a not so subtle attempt to single out the practice of Islamic Sharia law and insinuate its un-Britishness. *Britishness* is being promoted as ideologically superior to any other prevalent form of ideology found within the UK to reproduce the 'symbolic capital' of the British state within the student body (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-9). The State's main priority is to garner a 'monopoly' over universally held propositions that are dear to society. The State then uses the 'bureaucratic field' – in this case the field of education, to diffuse and maintain this hegemony (Loyal, 2017: 85). For Bourdieu (2013: 93-94), the primary aim of State is to disseminate its core ideologies within the collective consciousness of its governed societies – its *habitus* - through the medium of

its 'social fields.' The objective of State in this instance is to create a durable norm of obedience – or in the ideal case a 'permanent disposition' of its ideology within said *habitus*. Bourdieu (1990: 130-131) postulates that within the 'social fields' – that constitute the totality of societal interactions – resides the 'bureaucratic fields' of State which mechanise its dominion over *the social*. Like Foucault (2001: 233), Bourdieu (1990: 132-133) recognises that the language and motivations of State are largely dictated by economic imperatives, which also dictate and are dictated by biopolitical realities and their associated risks. Bourdieu (1990: 267-268) also acknowledges the use of bureaucratic language to control discourse, to create 'practicable taxonomies' to relate economic obligations to social phenomena where they have no logical right to be. The field of education acts as the ideal site to disseminate its ideology because it is the main producer (and reproducer) of 'social and cultural capital' that re-imbed the doctrine of State within the *habitus* (Jenkins, 1992: 52).

This Bourdieusian position identifies FBV as the UK government's attempts to instil its hegemony through the 'cultural capital' of the concept of *Britishness*, creating a sense of the *moral* (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-9). Dean (2010: 19) concludes that government is an intrinsically moral actor – it uses morality or a moral code to illustrate that it holds itself accountable for its own actions. In doing so it discerns both its legitimacy to govern and its rationale for action. This discourse is then transposed upon the polis. Self-governance of the individual is enforced through varying physical mechanisms like policing and surveillance. However, the ideological field of education is the primary vector of its delivery because it already holds a captive and predominantly docile audience. For the State, as long as the moral language

citizens adhere to fits the praxis of the moral code set out by government their citizenship by proxy is assured. Education providers are the ideal adjudicators of citizenship – they are designed to disseminate knowledge and assess the individual’s capacity to understand and utilise it in wider social contexts (Dean, 2010: 21).

The Foucauldian concept of governmentality, where a ‘government state of mind’ dictates the discourse surrounding risk and security has explanatory value in this instance (Foucault, 2004a: 3). For Foucault (2004a: 4-5), the use of bureaucratic language to describe instances of violence, the use of legal pathways to legitimise the polarisation of unpolitical Islamic practice, as seen in the example of the French ban on face coverings in 2009 by then president Nicolas Sarkozy, from the Western, democratic world are all instances of governmentality in action. This mode of government legitimises its punitive actions through a narrative it constructs that illustrates its Islamic communities as ‘separate but equal (Afary and Anderson, 2005: 93).’ Prevent and its statutory duty is a typical example of Foucault’s assertions, creating typologies of risk that are based on the principles of exclusion. Defining what is *unsafe* by attempting to define what is known to be *safe* as a measure of risk (Dean, 2010: 98). This epistemological approach to risk, where the probability of an individual or group committing an act of violent extremism is defined by how closely they relate to factors that differ from the ideal types that are perceived to be *safe* treats such communities like a disease. A disease that can be prevented by modifying the behaviour of *susceptible* communities or individuals to fit *safe* behaviours (Lemke, 2019: 221-222).

Foucault (2000: 219-220) depicts his conception of governmentality to have three main apparatus: firstly, the institutions of state function through the analysis of the polis to examine and control social normative action. Secondly the data or, as Foucault describes it, the *knowledges* created by these institutions becomes a calculable entity unto itself and those that hold such knowledge become the guardians of society through the pretence of expertise. The calculable nature of *knowledges* allows the institutions who use them to further entrench themselves within the biopolitical sphere via the economy which engages with elements of civil society creating new areas of expertise. Finally, this 'new political economy' has administrative needs that only the state has the capacity to facilitate, primarily through the rule of law, cementing its role as executive of state and society.

In Dean's (2010: 155) descriptions of 'authoritative governmentality' he draws upon the connection between 'bio-politics and sovereignty' that Foucault describes which shape the trajectory of such discourses. Entrenched systems of knowledge have created a *paradigm* for researchers looking at systems of rule and sovereignty beyond their own lived experience (Dean, 2010: 56). Thomas Kuhn (1970: 10) defines *paradigms* to be inherent within the scope of scientific study. He argues that the 'rules' of enquiry that are engaged by academia and beyond are rarely challenged. They are accepted as verbatim by the scholar, practitioner, and student alike (Kuhn, 1970: 11). In fact, Kuhn (1970: 11-12) believes that the scientific system or the endeavour to practice 'normal science' is self-replicating, in essence, it becomes an echo chamber that grows in on itself rather than towards the concepts it originally set out to understand.

Examples of Kuhn's analogies are not hard to find within the field of CVE and terrorism studies. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2019, 7th Edition, produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace using data supplied from US homeland security sanctioned research centre based at the University of Maryland is one example. It purports to be the most 'comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity available globally' which has 'codified' over '170,000 terrorist incidents (GTI, 2019: 2).' The presence of bodies such as the GTI, the level of influence they hold over governments through their codification of 'incidents' of terrorism which is dependent upon the creation of a field of statements from various domains, and the relationship with the media which interplays between experts and government is a prime example of self-replicating technologies of discipline (Foucault, 2002:146). Used together, they create an 'archive' of knowledge which is drawn upon to create indices, which are easy for the bureaucratic mechanisms of government to digest (Foucault, 2002: 147).

GTI (2019: 6) indicate that it is important to 'analyse and aggregate' data related to terrorist activities to 'better understand its various properties.' GTI purely exists to find patterns in terrorist activities, as such, its actions are perpetual. In this instance, terrorist events are being used by State-sponsored experts to develop models, which is a foundation for their future practice (Kuhn, 1970: 11). Furthermore, the creations of 'statements' of intent by organisations such as the GTI entrench and reproduce a 'discursive' regime that is practiced as a norm of science (Foucault, 2002: 64). In effect, GTI and their contemporaries are using scientific 'norms' to justify methodology that is not a correct fit for the problem at hand. For

Foucault (2002:145), the question presented here is for whom is this 'archive' of knowledge being created?

For Gearson and Rosemont (2015: 1049), the crux of Prevent lies in the notion of 'deradicalization', which is not clearly defined within the strategy therefore those implementing it are left without the scope to make any such efforts work effectively (if they indeed will work at all). The implementation of Prevent in Higher Education (HE) institutions such as universities strictly inhibits freedom of expression, a core component of academic freedoms and debate (Gearson and Rosemont, 2015: 1049). Such discourse has not discouraged subsequent governments who continue to implement Prevent without revision. It also important to note that universities play a role in shaping the discourse surrounding Prevent. For instance, the Centre of Defence Studies (CDS) at Kings College London run professional development programmes that work closely with the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Office for Security and Counterterrorism, the Metropolitan Police Service and the NPCC. In CDS' own words, the programmes on offer are focused on issues such as 'national security; terrorism; counter-terrorism; intelligence; defence policy; and public policy.' These include 'an MA-level accredited programme' as well as offering 'shorter, more intensive courses.' With CDS working 'closely with clients in identifying the most appropriate content and delivery style for each of its programmes.'

(<https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/study/graduate/tss>).

The question posed regarding the continued usage of the *pre-criminal* Prevent strategy in the face of its detractors, many of whom that are unparalleled experts in their field is an interesting one. Equally, the prevalence of research groups and NGOs with a CVE focus and individuals who produce research within the schematic of intelligence-based policing by government bodies is equally as interesting, if not that surprising. It could be argued such groups enjoy such capacity due to their willingness to produce research and practice that fits the prevailing dynamic (Foucault, 1991: 88). However, is such an explanation enough to justify the ignorance of the UK government and the continued failures of COIN and CVE initiatives such as the Northern Irish conflict, the colonial examples found in the Indian sub-continent (to name but a few) and the contemporary example found in Prevent?

The answer to this question in part can be found in the manifestation of ‘insurance technologies’ that dominate the public sphere in the contemporary context (Lemke, 2019: 216). For Lemke (2019: 217), the continued entanglement of the State and the economy necessitates the State safeguard itself from threats to the economic order, of which conflict, both internal and external is a factor. As such, the economy demands the State quantify such risks and insure itself against them. Although CVE initiatives have many weaknesses, they do have one main strength – they eagerly produce quantitative data that can be used to construct a tableaux of risk. In turn, this data, or as Foucault (2000: 219) would describe it, ‘knowledges’ can be used to both reassure the economic order that any threats to it are being curtailed and also create new areas for the economy to grow into within the CVE sphere of influence (Lemke, 2019: 218).

The methodology of Prevent is based upon radicalisation theory which creates a pre-criminal space, ignores outlier factors such as the war in the Middle East, political proliferation of discontent over immigration and mental health. Prevent is ideologically driven. It creates ideal types for who is an *extremist* and who is a *citizen* based on arbitrary and ill-defined definitions of acceptable behaviours (Foucault, 1977: 217). Typologies are open to interpretation; consequences arise as no one definition of extremism exists. As such, common ground is found in generalisations, which are not precise enough and alienate large populations such as the Islamic communities of the UK.

Kundnani (2014: 128) states how radicalisation theory mistakes 'attitudes of disaffection and opposition to foreign policy for signs of extremist risk.' Whether this mistaken *logic* is wilful or not is still open to debate. Prevent and its statutory duty has enforced surveillance by proxy across the UK's LA agencies such as education providers and social services, which has seen a cross section of the Muslim population of the UK becoming viewed as 'potential terrorist recruits (Kundnani, 2014: 129).' This reality will be the focus of chapter 6 of this thesis where the responses of educational practitioners describe their responsibility to spotting signs of radicalisation within their cohorts to be 'at the forefront of their minds.' This narrative will also be discussed in chapter 5 which is designated to Prevent managers who describe education as 'a key partner' and chapter 7 which focuses on NGOs who provide education practitioners with training and resources designed to help schools understand 'what we mean by extremism.' In chapter 8, the responses of community advocates are also examined, with some respondents feeling like they are being forced "to

be retaught [their] religion” because the Prevent strategy prefixes their faith as inherently violent.

A consequence of the CVE discourse surrounding Prevent has been the production of a closed methodological ecosystem that is shaped by a process that Foucault (1991: 88) would describe as ‘governmentality.’ The language of governance, ergo bureaucracy, inhibits critical discourse. In short, to successfully interact with power mechanisms organisations need to speak bureaucratically which in turn enforces State ideology; participation is only on the government’s own terms. Therefore, change happens slowly and incrementally, leaving little agency for critical debate. Such debate is needed to successfully counter security issues that are based upon populist discourse, which is most often used by extremist groups to promote their dialogue – to endeavour to justify it to the masses. The precise content of such discourse is often transient and based on a skewed perception of current affairs, which Prevent and its enactors are ill equipped to respond to (Pantucci, 2015: 272).

There is a distinct lack of critical oversight found within the implementation of Prevent. This study will yield data that will shed light at both the LA and the practitioner level; it will also assess the effectiveness of current CVE practice in contemporary, localised and real-life conditions without theoretical pretences which dominate the literature and research strategies within this field to date. There is an apparent gap within the pre-existing literature that fails to explore the diffusion of Prevent in terms of how the model of surveillance is outsourced and delegated across both LA agencies and third-party organisations. The existing literature fails to assess the communication between state actors at the localised level (such

as education providers) with private enterprise that have a CVE focus (Alieo et.al., 2018: 448-449). There is also little existing research that seeks to evaluate how Prevent is operationalised on the ground and how it both measures its successes and checks its accountability (Lewis and Hamid, 2018: 156-158). Additionally, there is a lack of oversight offered to private entities that perform CVE related practices on the ground (Lewis and Hamid, 2018: 162). There is also a largely unexplored dynamic between member of targeted communities who are both pro and anti-Prevent (Parker and Lindekilde, 2020: 2). This thesis will examine the prevalence of NGOs with a CVE focus within the localised context and investigate the economic revenue streams that enact them. It will also assess the effectiveness of current CVE practice in contemporary, localised, and real-life conditions without theoretical pretences which dominate the literature and research strategies within this field to date. In the following section of this chapter, the overall research aims and individual research questions will be defined in more detail. The selected methods and justification for the chosen sample frame will also be outlined.

1.3. Research aim and objectives

Research aim: The primary research aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess the implications of Prevent and its statutory duty across education, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring and administering communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority level. The following research questions have been developed to facilitate this task:

Research questions:

1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?
2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?
3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?
4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

Methodology: This study's choice of methods is critical discourse analysis. Individuals whose main workstreams are enacted and/or affected by the Prevent statutory duty make up the cohort of participants. The processes of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, whereby the structuration of governmental institutions both shape and constrict policy will form part of this analysis, however it will not be restricted by it (Foucault, 1991: 12). For instance, the Bourdieusian concept of 'bureaucratic fields' is particularly pertinent to the focus on education as a mechanism of Prevent (Bourdieu, 2014: 112). Thematic analysis of

the data will be collated, and any emergent theories or concepts will be observed and evaluated.

1:1 semi structured interviews of the following cohorts form the basis of the investigation:

Fig.2. Sample frame:

Prevent Managers within the Local Authority



| Have a statutory duty: legally obliged to cooperate | Do not have a statutory duty: co-opted or coerced into cooperation |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LA Schools • Private schools • Universities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Based Organisations (CBOs) • community advocates • NGOs working with and constructing/delivering Prevent based materials |

The cohorts above have been selected to illustrate the dynamics of dissemination of the Prevent Duty at the community level. The Prevent managers have been selected on the basis that they are instrumental in the implementation of the Prevent duty across LAs; they are the focal point of the dissemination of the CVE narrative directed by the Home Office. Education is the primary mechanism or ‘field of bureaucracy’ in which the Prevent Duty is

delivered and as such schools have been selected to observe this dynamic (Bourdieu, 1994: 2). This will provide an interesting contrast within the dataset and elicits an opportunity to test the applicability of one of the principles of governmentality – the role the language of economics plays within the praxis of governmental institutions and policy.

Analogously, NGOs facilitating Prevent at the community level are doing so with the primary aim of generating a profit. Where they differ however is that they are choosing to do so, being a clear example of the intersection between neo-liberal governance and civil society. Finally, CBOs have been selected because they have no legal obligation to engage with the Prevent Duty. However, they are actively courted by the LA and there are consequences if these advances are rejected. This provides an opportunity to investigate the incentivization techniques used to engage with CBOs and to test implications to forms of resistance from *vulnerable* communities. All the participants have been drawn from four specific LAs. All the LAs have received designated funding from the Home Office to deliver Prevent as they have been deemed areas of high risk. All the cases under investigation allow the study to test the flexibility of the duty and observe instances of modification. The reader will now be provided with a brief breakdown of the thesis chapter structure:

1.4. Thesis structure

Chapter 1. Introduction

This chapter provides the reader with the key background information on the formation of CVE initiatives such as Prevent and its statutory duty in the UK context. It has introduced radicalisation theory as the methodological foundation of Prevent as a CVE initiative and its inherent flaws. It has also focused upon the Foucauldian concept of *governmentality*, which has explanatory value in navigating the landscape of bureaucracy that both enables and safeguards Prevent, despite its many failings. It has presented to the reader the Bourdieusian concept of the bureaucratic field, and how that helps elicit the role education plays in the delivery of Prevent. The focus of this research and the gap in the current understanding found in the existing literature is deliberated and the overall research aim, individual research objects and sample frame have been outlined and justified.

Chapter 2. Theoretical foundation: Governmentality and the formation of Ideal types

This chapter will begin by exploring the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, whereby the gatekeepers of knowledge are controlled by the languages of governance. It will then build on the previous chapter's assertions based on the construction of ideal types in CVE initiatives and shows how this fits within this praxis. The historical foundations of CVE that can be found in the colonial exploits of western powers, namely the British Empire will be discussed. It will provide a historiography (using empirical examples) of CVE initiatives in action from the past to contemporary contexts. Finally, it will examine the core principal of COIN initiatives i.e. the formation of ideal types and deliberate how they are both its core strength and weakness.

Chapter 3: Radicalisation theory: Modus Operandi of CVE

The following chapter will focus on the theoretical model of contemporary CVE, radicalisation theory. It will move on to discuss how a closed research community has developed around this philosophy and show how the processes of governmentality has created the nexus upon which this *body politic* revolves. This chapter concludes by discussing the gap in current understanding found within the academic literature at large that this study is designed to fill by reviewing the current critical discourse surround prevent and CVE initiatives.

Chapter 4: Research Methods

This chapter discusses and justifies the chosen research strategy (critical discourse analysis) and data collection techniques (centred on 1:1, semi-structured interviews) which have been adopted by the researcher in the empirical collection of data. The specifics and reasoning of the sample frame are provided along with a detailed description of the framework for analysis found within the praxis of governmentality that is employed within this study. This chapter concludes with a discussion on the limitations of the adopted approaches in terms of validity and reliability.

Chapter 5. Analysis: Prevent Managers

In the first instance, the findings from the interviews with the Prevent managers are discussed, which are structured around the specific research objectives outlined in the introduction and methods chapters. The framework of analysis is used to create a synthesis of understanding from the data obtained through the 1:1 semi-structured interviews which is then deliberated within the praxis of governmentality and the bureaucratic field. The findings argue that the Prevent managers act in a pastoral capacity, disseminating knowledge and acting as a point of contact for those within the LA who have a statutory duty, whilst simultaneously courting influence over communities deemed at risk that do not have a statutory duty, primarily through economic means. Bureaucratic language is a core modus of their activity and how they maintain their position within the localised hierarchy. They also adhere to the Home Office and must pass on data they collect through their activity within the LA. Finally, they also act as a conduit for private enterprise – a symbiotic relationship between NGOs who operate within a CVE context is encouraged which acts as a legitimiser for both parties.

Chapter 6. Analysis: Education providers

Education is the primary modus operandi for the Prevent statutory duty. This chapter's primary focus is on education providers and how they operationalise the Prevent duty. How different types of education providers make sense of this legal requirement and what its delivery looks like in real terms. Responses from state secondary schools (some of which that have a further education contingent), universities and private schools form the focus of this analysis. The data elicits that there are varied responses across the spectrum of the cohort both in favour and as detractors, however that there is often little resistance from

education providers to the Prevent duty. There are tangible links between the Prevent Managers and the cohort, as well as with private NGOs who have created resources and delivered sessions within educational settings.

Chapter 7. Analysis: NGOs

This chapter concentrates on NGOs and their role in the dissemination and facilitation of Prevent across LAs. Examples from both the localised setting and the national context are discussed. The analysis shows that NGOs legitimise their practice in two major ways: by utilising bureaucratic language which is facilitated by employing ex LA personnel and by offering packages that produce the results the LA and the duty demand at a price point below what the education providers and LAs would pay if produced by themselves. Close relationships are created and maintained with Prevent managers, who often act as gatekeepers to the NGOs revenue streams.

Chapter 8. Analysis: CBOs and community advocates

This chapter focuses on CBOs and their interactions with the LA and Prevent managers specifically. The analysis shows that there is general apathy towards Prevent from targeted communities and there is little scope for resistance. Prevent managers have actively engaged with the community on projects designed to gather data but advocates felt like their actual concerns are not being meaningfully heard. On the other hand, CBOs who actively engage with Prevent managers on a regular basis do receive (mostly) economic benefit from this – often this is delivered as resources rather than actual monetary exchange.

Chapter 9. Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter revisits the overall aim and objectives of this study: to analyse the ideological pretences of the Prevent programme; assessing the dissemination of Prevent at the community level; examining how community level organisations adopt, modify or reject Prevent and investigating the role of third-party organisations in facilitating Prevent. The findings will be summarized and related to the specific research objectives. The key findings will derive conclusions that will be used to make recommendations, primarily aimed at the research community who create CVE models and the policy makers that enact their methodologies. The limitations of this analysis are also acknowledged, along with a discussion related to managing the implementation of the recommendations made. The overall contribution to knowledge this piece of research has generated is clarified along with a dedicated section of self-reflection, to provide the reader with a personal account of the processes and pitfalls encountered by the researcher when undertaking this work.

Bibliography and Indices

This study uses the Harvard APA 6th edition system of referencing; an alphabetical listing of the literary sources referred to in this work along with a list of tables and figures can be found at the end of this thesis.

Chapter 2. Theoretical foundation: Governmentality and the formation of Ideal types.

This thesis investigates how in the early 21st century political violence has come to be engaged with by the State in terms of ‘dispersed and discontinuous offensives (Foucault 2004a: 5).’ The ‘thematic’ presented in the form of extremism and terrorism – in relation to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality – offers many different potential routes to action or, ‘problematics (Chatterjee, 1993: 38).’ This chapter will firstly demonstrate the problematic posed by CVE discourse and the nexus between security and governmentality it inhabits by providing a historiography of the colonial origins of its methodology. I will use the empirical examples of 19th century colonial India, the *Mau Mau rebellion* in 1950s Kenya and *the Troubles* in Northern Ireland to show the evolution of counter-insurgency practices employed by the British state that have produced the precursor technologies of the CVE apparatus the Prevent statutory duty utilises.

Although Prevent is primarily deposited as a security apparatus with homeland security in mind, it is the product of the transitional growth of risk produced from the ever-increasing globalised nature of governance. Western powers such as the UK largely hold onto their hegemonic position within the *new* global order through careful management of their ideological propriety – that of the liberal democracy– and economic prosperity, often at the behest of their former colonial states. The liberal order constructed by Western powers in the contemporary setting has created a whole new set of ‘antagonisms’ for governments charged with insuring against the threat of western homogeny in the post-colonial context.

The continuum of risk to the Western State is now decided upon by the relationships 'between those who *produce* risk definitions and those who *consume* them (Beck, 1992: 46).'

This new identity of the nation State, that of the 'risk society', creates 'communities of danger' that, according to Beck (1992: 48), can only be organised at the supranational level – a 'world society' of risk management. However, notions of 'sovereignty' still determine many matters of the nation State, which can lead to an impasse when dealing with supranational security concerns (Dean, 2013: 137-138). For Beck (1992: 75), the 'political inaction' induced by the inability of nation States to cooperate over real risks to the global context – for example, racial inequality – creates a global multiplicity of 'scapegoat' societies. In this paradigm, the actual 'hazards' to the liberal order are ignored – 'displaced from the screen of consciousness' – and are replaced by artificial risks that are often attributed to constructed suspect communities that point out the real dangers to the *body politic* (Beck, 1992: 75-76). In the UK context, British Muslims continually point out they are subject to widespread discrimination and Islamophobia which marginalises their community. However, The British state largely ignores this circumstance and instead focuses on their perceived vulnerability to committing acts of extremism. It is also important to note that the British Islamic community have continually labelled the Prevent duty as 'alienating and provocative', adding fuel to the fire for 'an increasingly frustrated Muslim youth', who believe themselves to be British citizens in name only (Ansari, 2018: 21).

Common sense would dictate this response on pragmatic grounds, where the methods used to identify the young person as a fellow citizen on a railway platform – to use Sir Richard Dearlove’s example – may want to blow themselves up. What is interesting from the former Head of British Secret Intelligence’s view of the danger we all face, is that ‘a set of beliefs whose virulence is in total disharmony with our liberal democratic and tolerant values’ should be held by an individual that is ‘a fellow citizen in much more than name in our multicultural society (Dearlove in Johnson 2010: 37).’ The equivalent of ‘M’ in real life goes on to explain, as the typical expert, that the actual statistical likelihood of being killed in a suicide bombing is extremely remote. Regardless of this reality and in agreement with Dearlove, over 23,000 individuals are monitored by MI5 as suspects of extremism within the UK. Col Richard Kemp, a former chair of the Cobra Intelligence Group, an advisory body that coordinates the work streams of both MI5 and MI6, describes this number to the BBC as ‘the tip of the iceberg. (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-40409658/estimates-for-uk-based-terrorists-are-tip-of-iceberg>).’

Regardless of how ridiculous the notion that over 23,000 extremists who mean to enact or support acts of domestic terrorism reside on British soil at any one time actually is – to add some perspective, at its peak Camp Bastion in Afghanistan housed around 40,000 military personnel – this statistic has been used to justify sweeping changes under counter-terrorism legislation to current policing methods. In terms of port and border controls, authorities have the power to stop, search and detain an individual for up to 6 hours without the need of prior knowledge under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. According to the House of Commons briefing paper released on 6 October 2017, data pertinent to Schedule 7 is only available from 1 April 2009. Between 2009-2017, 392, 921 such ‘examinations’ where

conducted. In terms of ethnicity of those targeted, 38% are described as white (no indication of country of origin is given) 26% of those stopped described themselves as Asian or Asian British, 18% described themselves as Black or Black British, and 28% described themselves as of another ethnicity or declined to comment (Allen and Dempsey, 2017:9).

The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 also allows border control agencies to enforce Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) following instruction from the office of the Secretary of State. According to the then Secretary of State Amber Rudd and the Home Office Report she commissioned in February 2017, once an individual is deemed liable for a TEO, it 'makes it unlawful for the subject to return to the UK without engaging with the UK authorities.' This is implemented through cancelling the TEO subject's travel documents and adding them to 'watch lists.'

Perhaps even more concerning, the 2014 Immigration Act has given the government statutory powers to strip British Nationals of their citizenship if they are believed to have fought in the Syrian conflict, although evidence of *fighting* or what constitutes it are vague, as *jihadi bride* Shamina Begum would surely testify. The only official figures publicly released by the government are for the period between 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015, whereby there are 5 document usages of this power (Home Office, 2017b:25). However, it has been widely reported in the press that up to 2017, around 150 UK citizens have been made stateless through this legislative mechanism (<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/30/uk-has-stripped-150-jihadists-and-criminals-of-citizenship>).

The erosion of freedoms described in the examples of TEOs, stop and search procedures and stripping British citizens of their citizenship are just some of many made under the pretext of security from acts of terrorism, however, they are met with little to no resistance from the public at large. The 'passivity' of citizens within the 'new urban' landscape of metropolitan states such as the UK has established a 'repressive space', whereby the individual is removed from the mechanisms of their local community, including how it is policed (Lefebvre, 2003: 181-182). The social order is implied by those who govern, design, build and maintain the urban landscape, not by those who inhabit it. For Febvre (1973: 48), the urban landscape not only dominates our geographies but also our collective consciousness; they have become the physical manifestation of the State's power. The administration of State occurs almost exclusively within the confines of the urban landscape and as such, the street becomes the perfect space for insurrections against it. The urban landscape is the physical 'frontière' or boundary of the State's expression of power, which it fervently polices (Febvre, 1973: 208).

In the contemporary UK context, policing has become an indispensable feature of governmental power as it constructs the *terrorist subject*. The MI5 watchlists, enhanced stop and search powers and TEOs are all examples of the boundaries set by State, which limit the capacity of the observer to define exactly who a terrorist or extremist is. The 'power' exerted by the State in this instance has three distinct apparatus or *dispositifs*, the 'law', 'discipline' and 'security' which it uses to formulate its system of domination over its populations (Foucault, 2007: 108). These *dispositifs* are best described in their totality as the 'economies of power', with 'security' acting as the government's 'essential technical

instrument' on which all other apparatuses revolve (Foucault, 2007: 109). Security mechanisms hold such prominence because they are employed by the administrative arm of State that seeks to surveil and categorise the 'mass of population' to unlock its 'knowledges (Foucault, 2007: 110).' The State then uses this knowledge base to legitimise its claims of sovereignty over its populations, often using *emergencies* to further its means of surveillance and control (Dean, 2013: 48). The example set by the UK government's response to terrorist threat is a perfect illustration of the *emergency* created by acts of terrorism being used by government to make sweeping changes to legislation that enhance their powers of discipline which would ordinarily face stiff opposition by society if viewed in isolation (Dean, 2013: 50).

In his lectures from 1976 that take alternative regimes of truth or 'subjugated knowledges' as the starting point, Foucault (2004a: 5) regards 'the strange efficacy' of discourses that challenge systematised forms of understanding about the nature of social order. To be more precise, Foucault (1977: 217), when speaking of the state's response to challenges to its sovereignty in his work *Discipline and Punish* argues that the (deemed) hostile individuals or groups are 'carefully fabricated' within the 'centralization of knowledge' that surrounds the prevailing conceptions of social order. This form of governance can be found in contemporary CVE initiatives across the globe, targeting and countering the narrative of extremist recruiters online. The focus put upon the identification of *risky* discourses is in part due to the 'growth of the informational economy' that seeks to further the liberal pacification of counter ideologies found within the wider global sphere (Duffield, 2001: 46). In the contemporary context, the online space is one of the primary sites of the counter-

identification of such threats to the liberal order. The liberal nation State finds itself incapable of managing this space without contradicting the logic of 'market liberalisation' that is a cornerstone of its ideology (Duffield, 2001: 47).

The liberal State's answer to this question is to open such concerns to the market itself. NGOs have taken advantage of the liberal States inability to administer its will legitimately within 'unstable regions' of the global *body politic* – both at home and abroad (Duffield, 2001: 54). They also can work in a supranational fashion, becoming the de-facto 'advocates of international reform' that they promote through the international network of NGO – State interactions (Duffield, 2001: 54-55). A participant of this study, a senior project manager for an international NGO with a CVE focus, details how they work across national boundaries on a daily basis. In one instance they are focused on a project in Lebanon that is investigating "*the impact of Daesh content*" on Muslim youth communities in the online space. In another, they are working with the UK government to "*utilise the online space for ethnographical research*" regarding the growth of the far-right in economically deprived areas. Such interactions between NGOs and nation States is becoming 'increasingly formalised' within the global context, with supranational organisations such as the EU looking to congregate the approaches of nation States to their homeland security, with the internet being a focus point in the contemporary context (Duffield, 2001: 56).

The EU, which adopts a four-tier strategy (Protect, Pursue, Prevent and Respond) that is, for all intents and purposes identical to the UK example found in CONTEST, denotes that all EU member states must 'develop common approaches to spot and tackle problem behaviour,

in particular the misuse of the internet (European Council, 2005: 9).’ Then Prime Minister of the UK Teresa May in her speech to the G7 leaders in May 2017 maintained that the fight against ISIS and its contemporaries is shifting from the ‘battlefield to the internet’, even though such discourse has been prevalent within counter-terrorism legislation since the mid 2000’s (<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/25/theresa-may-calls-on-tech-giants-to-lead-fight-against-online-extremism>). Although this agenda is widely pushed by state actors and CVE agencies, there is little to no evidence within academic discourse linking the proliferation of extremist material and acts of terrorism. In reality, studying the interactions between online and offline activities of individuals is seriously hampered by the lack of access to subjects to study (Behr et.al., 2015: 21).

The reliance of the State on unsubstantiated patterns in extremist behaviour to use as roadmaps to safety is an example of government’s ‘obligation’ to purport a ‘regime of truth’, even considering evidence that such truths could be anything but (Foucault, 2014a: 93). Such obligations are underpinned by State actors attempts to circumvent the ‘moral offence’ of lacking efficiency, or to be more exact, ‘discipline (Foucault, 1977: 154).’ For the State to maintain its position of power, which translates to control through the biopolitical, it must also maintain the illusion that it is infallible (Dean, 2013: 29). Dean (2013: 19-20) considers that the ‘shadow of the sovereign’ looms over Foucault’s analysis of contemporary manifestations of State power even though he is cautious about its explanatory value. However, much like the religious institutions whom Foucault (1991: 88) would proclaim contemporary modes of governance imitate, the State must also emulate the sovereign forms of governance that preceded it (Dean, 2013: 137).

Foucault's self-ironising tendency aside, if we are to examine how State and non-State actors alike are mobilised in the effort to eliminate the danger of terrorist events, the conceptual scheme of analysis has to include the locations where these dispersed and discontinuous offensives against the democratic order or regime meet.

For Krasner (1985: 185) the relationship between 'regimes and related outcomes and behaviour' is paramount to understanding such dynamics that traverse the 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures' which dictate our behaviour as citizens. It is also important to appreciate the differences between 'evolutionary knowledge', ergo knowledge devised to propagate a current regime's sphere of influence and 'revolutionary knowledge', which is designed to create regime change (Krasner, 1985: 204). Not surprisingly, state and government actors are often drawn towards research that is 'evolutionary' in scope as it both instils hegemony and creates space for innovation, something that is needed to compete in the global economy (Schumpeter, 1964: 3). Regimes of knowledge are both driven by public policy issues as well as tasked with steering them. A problem is presented when such regimes of knowledge are not consistent with the problem being faced, such as a danger to the State's claim to preserve our way of life, or even more seriously, to life in general from within its own populace. In terms of current counter-terrorism policy and its enactment, the dominant regime of knowledge must start investigating society for 'subjugated knowledges' of people who appear to be like citizens but, as deemed by their actions, are not (Foucault, 2004a: 5).

Foucault (1977: 149-150) asserts that mechanisms of power have become entrenched in a system of 'discipline' that is governed by state level bureaucracy in the form of the judiciary and penal systems. This system, he argues, creates 'docile bodies', those who conform to the mechanisms of power's 'will' to evade the possibility of punishment and those who resist it despite the risks involved in doing so (Foucault, 1977: 74). As such, any effective forms of sovereign government must pre-empt resistances (which necessitates) the production of knowledge that is collected beyond what is understood to be 'liberal, democratic and tolerant values (Dearlove in Johnson, 2010: p.37).' I argue that to fully examine the relationship between State, regimes of knowledge and the behaviour of its citizens it is paramount to understand the effects of a governmental state of mind, or in Foucault's (1991: 88) words 'governmentality.' This chapter will begin by discussing how civil society is shaped by this 'state of mind' of government. Furthermore, it will examine how governmentality has formed both enclaves of perceived collective danger that operate in resistance to the state and in contrast the communities of experts who actively work to embody it.

2.1: Governmentality: a government state of mind.

The concept of Governmentality can be broadly understood as the 'art of government', or conversely, the 'conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1991: 89-90).' In more didactic terms, power mechanisms have sought to shape, influence, and even design the conduct of those it seeks to control (Gordon, 1991: 3). Foucault (1991: 91) denotes that the themes of governance in the modern era are consolidated upon the notion of self-identity and self-regulation. To

govern well, it is important to understand how to govern oneself, which demonstrates to those who you seek to govern how to act and in turn, to govern their own behaviour and of those around them (Dean, 2010: 10-11). For Foucault (2008: 4), this scenario is the foundation of normative society and the birthplace of 'biopolitics', the notion that human beings, not the state itself, provide the sovereignty for governance in the contemporary context. The *security* that the state provides is determined by the biographies of its citizens (Foucault, 2008: 5). As such, government is perceived to be a rationalised actor (Mills, 1956: 242).

The rise of biopolitics as the *legitimiser* of the actions of government may well be a recent development in the art of governance, however the reliance on the individual to self-regulate is not. Foucault (1991: 89) denotes that western states are structured around the pretext of religious institutions, in particular Christianity. Governments are patriarchal; Foucault uses the analogy of the Shepherd and his Flock – the pastor delivering the sermon to the pastorate (Dean, 2010: 91). Ideology is central to this form of governance; who belongs, in this context – the *citizen* and who does not – the *extremist*; the *saint* and the *sinner* (Foucault, 2001: 221). Foucault (2001: 222) also alludes to the production and protection of *knowledges* or *dispositifs* that underpin such pastoral forms of governance. He uses the example of the early Catholic church's exclusive use of Latin within their written texts and bibles which could only be read by a *learned* priesthood; if you wanted to access the *Word of God* you had to do so through the church (Foucault, 2001:233). In the contemporary context, power structures also protect access to the knowledge of governance through the restriction of language. In sum, legitimisation to govern is gained

via perceived expertise. Interaction with power mechanisms is deliberated by the ability to speak governmentally – through the language of law, economics, security or to be more precise, the language of bureaucracy (Dean, 2010: 140).

Bureaucracy is born of the ‘logic of hazard prevention’, where those who wield it seek to ‘prevent what must be prevented’ by creating mechanism of power that enable the State to attain ‘dictatorship over dangers (Beck, 1992: 78-79).’ Although it may seem a worthy endeavour of the State to create political action that is designed to safeguard society from danger, there are consequences to the overuse of bureaucratic mechanisms. When persistent risks to the *biopolitik* present themselves, there are often calls to legitimatise ‘totalitarian’ measures from society at large. Bureaucratic mechanisms are often manipulated by actors that wish to impose such measures because they are the perfect tool to do so. This is largely due to the fact that although they can promote moralistic discourse, they are not bound by it. More often than not, by looking to avoid the *worst*, the State ends up creating ‘something even worse’ by enshrining in law processes that ‘threaten the continued existence of the democratic political system (Beck, 1992: 80).’

In the UK context, homeland security is maintained by the CONTEST framework, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy consists of four main work streams for state officers:

Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism

Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack

Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

(Home Office, 2011: 6).

The four work streams detailed above all offer problematics at the state level in logistical terms, with Prevent in particular posing complications with the rule of law by operating in a pre-criminal space.

A premise of accountability for the Prevent strategy is founded on the notion that ‘some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by apparently non-violent organisations (Home Office, 2011:9).’ In fact, little distinction is made by surveillance and security agencies between violent and non-violent actors. Theresa May, when writing the foreword for the Counter-Extremism Strategy as Home Secretary in 2015, describes the focus of the revised strategy to encompass the ‘full spectrum of extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi – hate and fear in all their forms (May, 2015: 7).’ Conventionally, citizens could protest peacefully against any State actions they deemed un-democratic, but now there are cases of exception where the traditional distinction of political resistance to State authority now no longer applies. The Home Office’s distinction (or lack thereof) between violent and non-violent extremism compounds this issue, becoming an innovation par excellence, of Schmitt’s (2005:26) ‘state

of exception.’ Ultimately, this tautology is used as justification for State level, multi-agency facilitated targeted surveillance of communities deemed at risk.

It is not only at the State level that such issues are addressed. There is a whole system of NGOs that specifically exist to address the problematic of effective CVE techniques. Some, like the RAND Corporation, an NGO think tank for the US administration that offers ‘expert’ research and analysis, have successfully influenced states’ responses to extremism worldwide (Todd et.al. 2017: 1-2).

Other civil society organisations operate in opposition to the above. CAGE, an ‘independent advocacy organisation’ cite policing and surveillance methods that employ the radicalisation process (advocated for by organisations such as RAND) as ‘the abuse of due process and the erosion of the rule of law (CAGE, 2016: 38).’ They argue further that this instance is creating divisions within communities that may lead to acts of terrorism. Although both the examples of RAND and CAGE offered above operate within the same field and look to influence similar audiences, both have contrasting abilities to do so. RAND and their activities are funded by both U.S. and international government agencies and ministries, local government, colleges and universities, foundations, industry, professional associations, and other non-profit organizations. They also have research centres in 53 countries worldwide, including the US, Australia, and most of Europe, including the UK (RAND, 2015: 39). In comparison, CAGE have been operating without a bank account since 2014 because their outreach coordinator, Moazzam Begg, former Guantanamo Bay detainee and political activist, was again detained under terror charges but was released three months later

without charge. CAGE continue to stipulate that they are put under ‘sustained pressure’ by UK state authorities (CAGE, 2015: 6).

The space in which RAND proliferate and CAGE falter is one of the numerous ‘bureaucratic fields’ of State which facilitate its mechanisms of governance (Bourdieu, 1994: 3). Bourdieu (2014: 11) would likely assert that security, one of Foucault’s (2007: 108) central *dispositifs*, is the primary modus of the bureaucratic field inhabited by RAND, and to a lesser extent, CAGE. To be precise, RAND and its contemporaries inhabit the field of security expertise. RAND enjoy more access to the ‘field’ of security expertise in the UK context (as well as across the world) because they do not challenge the ‘symbolic power’ of the State (Loyal, 2017: 83-84). In fact, their actions are designed to empower it. RAND replicate the ‘restricted narratives’ set by the State when categorising or codifying the threats against it (Loyal, 2017: 84). CAGE, acting in opposition to the UK government are challenging the State’s capacity to ensure the ‘defence of the social (Bourdieu, 2014: 20).’ When comparing the fortunes of RAND and CAGE, the capacity of CAGE to influence the UK government is restricted because the ‘exchange rate’ of their philosophy falls short of the State’s expectations. Ultimately, in the State’s estimations, CAGE lack the ‘cultural capital’ that RAND possesses (Bourdieu, 1996: 264-265).

In this instance the language of bureaucracy is also the language of State (Foucault, 1977: 138). This is the corporate element in Foucault’s delineation of the ways in which the political anatomy of the State becomes transformed into the ‘mechanics’ of power. For example, the State now produces competition between such bodies as RAND and their

contemporaries for defence budgets that they deem are best able to deliver security to the citizen. The bureaucrat's pen is truly mightier than the King's sword.

In the examples of RAND and CAGE, RAND offers a narrative that better fits the State's current capabilities and resources. In particular, RAND's narrative of threat to the civilian domain is specifically State-oriented; this piecemeal social engineering requires a circle of expertise that is responsive to acts of spectacular violence. In contrast, CAGE's open critique of state mechanisms will not be co-opted into this pre-existing model as its agenda is more difficult to bureaucratise than the alternative posited by RAND and its contemporaries. This is primarily due to CAGE's design – it takes a form of ideological resistance the State cannot modify through bureaucratic or economic means.

Foucault (1977: 138) describes this environment as guided by 'a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location' which imitate one another, only distinguishing themselves through eliciting 'their domain of application.' This creates a 'micro-physics of power' that is often governed by forces that are not necessarily best placed to offer the most appropriate solution to a socio-political concern (Foucault, 1977: 139). For instance, RAND is a multinational corporation that was created from an arm of the United States air force following the Second World War. Although it has undergone many transformations between that time and now, it is still primarily a research organisation focused on the development of technologies of war. It is not best placed to present solutions to issues that manifest at the community level within populations such as the Muslim communities of the UK, which it has no tangible connection to. On the other hand,

CAGE has tangible connections with British Muslim community, although it is also important to note that its capacity to act as a conduit of the British Islamic community is constrained.

Although it can be argued that the distribution of security apparatuses beyond the scope of traditional governmental bodies is a step towards more accountability, their actions are still limited by the bureaucratic mechanisms found within government (Dean, 2010: 136). It is also important to note that the role of the expert has not always been able to operate outside the realms of traditional governmental structures. In fact, the security expert has a long history steeped within the colonial past of western powers. For instance, the exploits of the Great British Empire and its counter insurgency (COIN) practices created the foundations for the theory utilised by RAND and its contemporaries today. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the British empire employed the educational field to manage its potentially seditious populations in its colonial states. This chapter will now examine the educational field's role in the creation of the security expert and how they have used typologies and ideal types to shape contemporary CVE initiatives such as Prevent.

2.2. Ideal types, the language of commerce and the creation of the security expert.

It is widely regarded within the security community that the restructuring of the British army and its units from standalone entities to a more centralised organisation (with the treasury providing oversight) during the latter half of the 19th century created the role of the security *expert* (Luengo-Gutiérrez and Smith, 2016: 139-140). Well into the 1800's, For

those that served in the military, rank was largely designated to those at birth; high ranking officers were also members of high society, with the Duke of Cambridge, a member of the royal family acting as 'Commander in Chief' of the British army between 1856-1895 (Hevia, 2012: 38). However, following a report commissioned by Lord Panmure on the role of the Scientific Corp, it was found that the education of the specialised units and of the wider army were not of the same standard of its European rivals (Hevia, 2012: 41-42).

Although military reform was a long and drawn out process, real change ensued. By the 1870s there was a shift in how officers were recruited, from personal recommendations made by those in power to public examinations that were supervised by the Civil Service Commission (Hevia, 2012: 43). Once recruited, officers went through various training regimes depending on their specialism of choice. Would-be officers would first have to 'pass out' from the newly formed Military academy before being allowed to take positions within the field. If officers wished to move up the chain of command it was required that they take further specialised training (Hevia, 2012: 44-45).

The 'engineer' in this new, modern British Army of the 19th century was the precursor for the intelligence services we see today (Braun, 2014: 2-3). Their skills in map drawing and surveying terrain were imperative to early reconnaissance work. This put them in a position of power and cemented their worth (Luengo-Gutiérrez and Smith, 2016: 141). The work of engineers, the new experts within the field whose maps and critical observations created a tapestry of information made colonial territories *visible* to the bureaucratic mechanisms of

government back within the UK for the first time. Dedicated Intelligence services inevitably established themselves within the data yielded by such engineers.

Although the primary focus of the activities of the British Army at that time were threats generated by other nations engaged in empire building of their own, the British Empire had security problems within its own borders where intelligence was beginning to be used more frequently. William Wilson Hunter, a Scottish historian cum statistician who rose through the ranks of Indian Civil Service, eventually reaching Bengal Presidency in 1862, compiled 9 volumes of the Imperial Gazetteer of India, an encyclopaedia of sorts detailing the geography, history, economics and administration of the Indian sub-continent which he had been requested to provide as a 'statistical survey of the country' by the British government in the late-1860s (Frowde, 1909: 5-6).

During his tenure, Hunter had several security concerns to contend with. In particular, the Muslim population of Bengal, then referred to as the 'Indian Muslamans' posed a significant threat. A decade or so before Hunter's tenure as the President of Bengal in 1857, a large proportion of the Indian British Army made up of Bengali Muslims mutinied and led a revolt that lasted until 1858 when Imperial rule was re-established. Subsequently, rebel groups persisted in the Northern territories of India for decades, permitting raids on British held regions, killing subjects of the empire as well as recruiting conspirators from the Bengal to their cause (Hunter, 1876: 9).

Hunter's (1876: 10-11) conclusion on why Muslim Bengali resistance was so prevalent during the British occupation of India does not differ significantly to that found in today's popular conceptions of radical Islam. For example, Hunter (1876: 11) declares that '[Fatawa or Shariatic rulings] will convince every reasonable mind, that while the more reckless of the Musalmans have for years been engaged in overt treason, the whole community has been agitated by the greatest State Question that ever occupied the thoughts of a people.' Here Hunter is essentially claiming that Islam's creed that Allah is the only sovereign is not compatible with the imperial vision of the British state. In making these assumptions, Hunter (1876: 217-218) draws upon information obtained by his network of intelligence agents. He pinpoints scholars in Arabia and their influence on the scholars within India, who in turn he argued had motivated the actions of the Bengali rebel groups. What is perhaps quite surprising for a man of his time and station is Hunter's (1876: 146) notions on how best to nullify the tensions within occupied Bengal. He argued that conceptions of British statehood should not have been forced on the Muslim population as it only perpetuates the grievances that entrench the rebel cause.

The *raison d'Etat* for Britain's attempts at imperial state building in Hunter's India is an experiment in native-sovereign disciplinary power. The imperial security state Britain constructed during the latter half of the 19th century in India forced them to recognise the biopolitical power of a restive Muslim population that could not be controlled via sovereign power alone. This becomes the point at which sovereign and disciplinary power are reinvented 'not as opposite forms of power but as different technologies of government (Lemke, 2013: 53).' Hunter's understanding of the Bengali Muslim insurgency in India can be

directly transposed on the contemporary understanding of the home-grown terrorist perpetuated by the experts of today. Ultimately, the British Empire failed to nullify the Bengali concern, in fact it left it to a newly formed India to deal with following the collapse of British rule in 1947.

For Devji (2017:19), the revival of the narratives created by colonial experts such as Hunter by his modern-day equivalents is not surprising. It gives historical context and thus some sense of predictability; it fits the model of governmentality discussed by Foucault (1991; 89-91), where he signifies the role of ideal types in creating a typology of who belongs and who does not – who is *friend* and who is *foe*. The narratives perpetuated by academia are equally prolix, fixated on the role of ‘propaganda’, focused on being an aide to policy makers rather than their ‘scholarly integrity’ and the pursuit of knowledge that explains rather than attempts to solve problems it has no capability or will to understand (Devji, 2017: 21-22).

British imperial rule in India evolved following WWI. For Ghosh (2017:27), the passage of the Government of India Act in 1919 was an opportunity for the British government to diffuse tensions generated from ‘radical Indian’ pressure groups who had been committing sustained acts of political violence against colonial rule. It purported to extend to the Indian people representative power through democratic means, even offering maligned marginalised groups such as the Muslim population their own, separate forms of governance. In reality, the Act only entrenched long held divisions and hierarchies within the populations of India that had been fostered by imperial British rule (Sivanandan, 2006: 41). Those eligible to vote in elections were severely limited to a subsection of Indian elites.

The British government only extended voting rights to members of their respective communities that fitted a profile in line with the ideal types constructed decades earlier by Hunter and his contemporaries (Ghosh, 2017: 28). It is also important to note that any decision made by these newly created democratic councils also had to be ratified by British administrators before it was passed – something the British government described as fostering ‘responsible government.’ Ultimately, the British did not trust the indigenous population to ‘self-govern’ in a way that would not threaten their hegemony (Ghosh, 2017: 30). Those that did not fit such ideal types were impeded at every turn. The Bengali separatists who harried Hunter during his tenure were deemed ‘seditious’ and were targeted by legal reforms which made it illegal for them to hold meetings or rallies. If any of these individuals were found guilty of sedition by the authorities, they were denied the right to a trial by jury, facing a court of three judges selected by the British government who would have little sympathy for their cause (Ghosh, 2017: 42-43).

The actions of the British government following the 1919 India Act is a form of muscular liberalism (Lemke, 2013: 44). Foucault (2008: 63) is quick to point out that liberal forms of governance do not guarantee liberty or freedom as they perhaps suggest doing at face value. In fact, the move to more liberal forms of governance is a process that replaces the ‘external regulation’ of society conducted by the State with an ‘internal production’ of discipline where society begins to regulate itself (Lemke, 2013: 45). For this to work within a schematic acceptable to the State it must first set the parameters of freedom afforded to society. In sum, liberty is not a mechanism to confront the power of the state, but ‘the positive effect of government action (Lemke, 2013: 45).’ The State ‘consumes freedom’, it

calculates liberty, it uses the knowledges it produces to create the balance between 'security and insecurity' that is essential for its existence (Foucault, 2008: 64; Lemke, 2013: 46-47).

WWII saw over 2.5 million Indians fighting on behalf of the British Empire in a 'war for freedom' in Europe and North Africa. When these soldiers returned home the thought of their own freedom was at the forefront of their minds (Sivanandan, 2006: 44-45). India finally gained its independence following British Parliament passing the Indian Independence Act in 1947 (Sivanandan: 2006: 49). Legislative authority was transferred to the Indian Constituent Assembly – India's first parliament. However, the spectre of British rule still loomed over the newly formed country. Violence between Hindu and Muslim groups preceded the Act in 1946 – the entrenched hierarchy of Indian identities constructed by the British to divide and conquer the sub-continent still very much at play (Subhash and Kedia, 2017, 8). The Muslim league demanded a separate constitution and the last British Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten decided to separate the colonial territories into two separate countries, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and India (Subhash and Kedia, 2017: 9).

Contemporary CVE initiatives and the research that underpins them is prefixed in the colonial advance of western powers such as the UK and France into South Asia and Africa (Porch, 2013: 1). In such instances, 'western values,' were transposed on indigenous populations to produce governance that fitted the narrative found within their own governmental systems, which was almost always met with resistance (Porch, 2013: 2). For

Gopal (2006: 142-143), it is the separation of 'subaltern' or *peasant* 'action' from *peasant* 'consciousness' by colonial elites and their administrators which led to this dynamic. The motivation of rebellion from indigenous populations were wilfully ignored because they challenged the narrative being imposed upon them by the State – hear no evil, see no evil. For Guha (1988: 45), this is how the 'prose of counter-insurgency' became into being. It has been specifically designed to distort the 'optics' of the observer to the motivations of rebellion so that it becomes harder to empathise with it (Guha, 1988: 77). The technological superiority of western powers dictated that open warfare was impossible to win for indigenous populations. As such, small scale attacks made on a mass scale became common place. This created the 'small wars' narrative still seen in use across the world in the contemporary context (Porch, 2013: 3).

There are many examples of traditional COIN operations within the old British empire, however there is perhaps no starker example than the Mau Mau rebellion also known as the 'The Emergency' in Kenya between 1952-1960 (Bennett, 2012: 8). Primarily a conflict between the Kikuyu people and British colonists and their loyalist Kikuyu enclaves, the rebellion led to the loss of many lives and caused mass displacement of entire communities, particularly in the rural areas to the north of the country (Elkins, 2005: 234). The conflict itself arose from the disproportionate land use allocated to white European settlers and the widespread deprivation of the indigenous population as a result. For the British, there were simply two types of Kikuyu during this time, the loyalist Kenyan and the separatist Mau Mau (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017: 159-160). The main problem for the British however, was telling them apart. The principal strategy of the British administration was to co-opt the indigenous

populations to curb their 'excessive behaviours (Bennett, 2012: 18).' This endeavour to divide and conquer – a tactic employed many times over by the British empire, created more unrest. Specifically, the differences in fortunes of colonial appointed Kenyan 'chiefs' and their communities and the wider population exacerbated these tensions (Bennett, 2012: 13).

Those that were co-opted by the British government were operationalised through a newly embodied intelligence agency. By May 1953, the information collected by the British field agents through their networks of informants led to the arrest of 103,379 people, with a further 89,820 people being 'screened' to discern their threat level (Bennett, 2012: 19).

Although perhaps not on such brutalist terms, current CVE initiatives such as Prevent also use similar mechanisms of co-option and surveillance. Prevent coordinators are actively encouraged by the Home Office (2015a: 4-5) to engage with community groups not covered under the statutory duty. Furthermore, the use of informants by the police and intelligence services whose remit is to infiltrate populations is commonplace within the UK in the contemporary context. In effect, this is an example of the State's endeavour to control the activity of the social body through 'the means of correct training (Foucault, 1977: 170).' The State recruits informants to act as its agents with a dualistic purpose, both to inform on infractions against the State and to disseminate the 'suspicious power' of government to recruit new informants from within targeted communities (Foucault, 1977: 170-171).

The Mau Mau capitalised on the unrest created by the mass arrests in 1953 to propel their cause, which snowballed during the summer months of 1954 (Bennett, 2012:20). In June

1954, the British War council acted hastily to quell this insurgency. They forcefully removed the population of the Kikuyu reserves, some 1 million people into 804 villages which were put under British Military control, with barb wire fences surrounding each settlement (Elkins, 2005: 235). As part of the forced removal, homes were burnt, cattle and crops destroyed, and any resistance was met with deadly force. The conditions within the villages themselves were equally dire. There were not enough huts to effectively house all the detainees, therefore it was not uncommon for two or more families to occupy a hut that would struggle to house one (Elkins, 2005: 240). This region was targeted by the British government because it had been known to be occupied by militant Mau Mau groups, who used the scattered homesteads as a supply line (Bennett, 2012: 23).

The British explained the use of such tactics to its detractors by proclaiming that it was for the communities of Kenya's own good, that the camps were not imprisonment but a form of protection, that it was an opportunity to spread civilisation and 'British values' to the Kikuyu people during this time of bloodshed (Elkins, 2005: 237). Such 'education' was carried out by 'development officers', a mixture of personnel from the white settler communities and the loyalist Kikuyu communities who were tasked with 're-educating' the population of the villages, who were predominantly women, into the *civilised* British colonial Kenya. Those that were 'successfully re-educated' were forced to work or protect the newly developing pipelines running through the heart of the country (Elkins, 2005: 239-240). The education programmes were marred by violence, and of particular depravity was the level of rape carried out by the Colonial British forces and their loyalist Kikuyu counterparts, with many women dying in the process and being buried in mass graves (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017: 161).

Women were targeted by British forces because previously they had been used by Mau Mau rebels as informers and message carriers, due to them being less likely to be suspected of collusion (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017: 163).

Exact figures of the death toll are difficult to quantify, but Elkins (2005: 248) claims that it totals 'tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands.' Blacker (2007: 212), alleges that British forces are reported to have killed over 12,000 Mau Mau militants. Of particular note, there were 1090 recorded instances of capital punishment committed by British forces, the most carried out by the British empire in recorded history (Anderson, 2005: 7).

For Gramsci (2012: 239), the 'educational field' is the location where hegemony is reproduced. Furthermore, there is a distinct delineation between the doctrine targeted at the 'intellectual' and the 'simple souls.' The example of the Mau Mau re-education programmes illustrates this point. During the emergency, European settlers, the primary targets of Mau Mau attacks grew discontented with the British forces' inability to protect them and their properties. In response, British administrators created the 'European Settler committee' which acted as a conduit to the European settler community (Bennett, 2012: 32). Through this mechanism, the British upskilled prominent members of the European settler population who helped to create policy reform that appeased their respective communities concerns (Bennett, 2012: 33). This is in obvious stark contrast to the Mau Mau experience where the focus of the education programmes was to, in the British administrations view, 'defeat Mau Mau savagery (Bennett, 2012: 33).' Although the methods are clearly different, the desired result is the same – to ensure State hegemony

(Gramsci, 2012: 240). In the Kenyan Mau Mau example, the 'field of education' has become stratified due to the differences in the respective 'social capital' of the indigenous Kenyan and the European settler (Bourdieu, 1996: 286). The 'symbolic value' possessed by the European settler dictates that they have greater control over the inclusion of their own ideologies within the schema of education than the indigenous Kenyan and the Mau Mau (Bourdieu, 1996: 287).

This thesis will not argue that the conditions of 'the emergency' in Kenya are directly transposable to the contemporary UK context. However, the example of the Mau Mau rebellion and the education programmes instilling *civilised* British values has clear parallels with CVE models in use today, namely Prevent, of which the teaching of Fundamental British Values within schools and the education sector is a core component. It is also apparent that Foucault's delineation of the construction of ideal types to attempt to govern the *ungovernable* is as paramount to understanding the Mau Mau example as it is Prevent (Dean, 2010: 98-99). Furthermore, the use of informants by the colonial British government in Kenya is also a core component of the contemporary COIN and CVE landscape. Kundnani (2014: 147) would describe this as an industry of the 'professional' informant, working towards the State's aim to 'win the hearts and minds' of communities it deems to be on the periphery of its influence.

However, a glaring question presents itself; if COIN and by proxy, CVE operations are ineffectual and brutal, why do they persist? Porch (2013: 247) argues that the traditional COIN narratives employed by the UK are still so widely used because they have been

imbedded in 'institutional learning' and therefore are rarely questioned by those who enact them. Another, more contemporary example of typologies being used to govern a *hostile* population can be seen in *the Troubles* in Northern Ireland (NI). Although the conflict mainly took place throughout the 20th century, the problems that caused it stem back hundreds of years and are multi-generational in scope (Mitchell, 2013: 5). For the Catholic Republican, NI should not exist as a subsidiary of the United Kingdom but become a part of a united Ireland with the Republic of Ireland to the south, for the Protestant Loyalist, NI should remain a part of the UK (English, 2005: 3).

The Troubles began as a Republican protest in 1969 which was staged as a response to continued discrimination from the Loyalist government, its police force, and its supporters. The protest was marred by instances of police brutality and ultimately culminated in the August 1969 riots - six days of sectarian violence and civil disobedience which led to British troops being deployed in the streets of NI (Shanahan, 2009: 13). The main contributors to *the Troubles* were Republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British armed forces and security organisations (Shanahan, 2009: 15). Violence raged for the best part of three decades, with over 3500 recorded deaths, many (if not most) being civilians (Elliot, 2007: 188).

The conflict finally ended during the peace talks held throughout the mid-1990s, culminating in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, where a multi-party and multinational agreement with the Republic of Ireland was reached which detailed that NI would remain a

part of the UK but enjoy a soft boarder with free movement with the Republic of Ireland through membership of the EU, with only one party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) not agreeing the deal (HM Government, 1998: 2-5). However, peace within the region remains tenuous – something the looming spectre of Brexit has intensified.

Tony Blair (2010: 157), when talking about the peace process in NI in his autobiography, states that “politicians are obliged, from time to time, to conceal the full truth, to bend it and even distort it” to produce a solution suitable to all sides with entrenched, socio-political problems such as those presented in *the Troubles*. Tomlinson (2012: 442) denotes that prior to the 1998 Good Friday agreement, a criminal justice industry was created in NI, fuelled by the ‘war economy’ that was set upon countering republican ideology and containing those who acted upon it. In short, *the Troubles* was an ideological war driven by economies of scale that cannot exist without each other (Foucault, 2001: 207).

Foucault (2001: 207) contends that the State’s exertions of authority should be viewed as ‘the art of exercising power in the form, and according to the model, of the economy.’ In the NI example, the criminal justice system is a model of the economy which demands ‘a form of surveillance and control’ to ensure the fragile State’s legitimacy (Foucault, 2001: 207-208). Tomlinson (2012:443-444) highlights the reluctance of the criminal justice system to adapt to the reduction in investment from ‘conflict-related industries’ to ‘investment in social reconstruction’ – an episteme of the resistance to evolution found within the praxis of governmentality (Dean, 2010: 176). In this instance, the economic ‘reasons of state’ are acting as an obstacle to the effective resolution of the NI paradigm (Foucault, 2001: 213).

The peace process is still marred by an overly complicated legal process that removes any form of 'sovereignty' from those engaged with it, with the criminal justice system remaining decidedly British rather than unified Northern Irish (McEvoy, 2007: 425). For Brewer et.al. (2010: 37), prevailing sociological concerns i.e. Loyalist- Republican divide, are too widely ignored for any form of coherent democratic process to develop, which leaves only the predominant institutions in power who are both politically and economically focused on hard policing techniques. Moreover, the peace process has heavily focused on 'economic liberation' rather than on social equality, cohesion and inclusion which has limited its effectiveness (Olsen et.al. 2010: 166-167).

The transition period has focused on the de-militarisation and disarmament of paramilitary groups; however, the British authorities still have an armed presence within the region (Tomlinson, 2012: 446). The total cost for the UK's war on terror in NI leading up to the Good Friday agreement was £23.5 Billion, which has the purchasing power of over double that amount in the contemporary context. The NI economy has been supplanted around this flow of capital and as such it could not operate without keeping these channels of commerce afloat. As a result, existing mechanisms have been modified rather than replaced with more appropriate ones. Understandably, this has affected the overall success of the peace process. As such, sectarian violence still exists, albeit on a smaller scale (Tomlinson, 2012: 444-445). The inflexible nature of governance, restricted by economies of scale and the bureaucraties that bind them has created continued biopolitical contention, one NI

cannot escape easily or willingly because of the symbiotic nature of government and commerce (Foucault, 2001: 221).

Much like the examples of colonial India and Kenya, COIN and CVE initiatives in NI also rely heavily on the construction of ideal types and typologies of threat. Leahy (2015: 123) highlights the important role high level informers played in the counter-insurgency tactics utilised by the UK government in Northern Ireland during the period between the 1970's and mid 1990's. Furthermore, many high-profile IRA members, including Freddie Scappaticci (reportedly codenamed Stakeknife by the UK authorities), one-time leader of the counter-intelligence IRA task force Internal Security Unit (ISU) - who were tasked with rooting out informants for the IRA Northern Command (INC) - were actually acting as double agent informants for the UK government (Leahy, 2015: 124).

Scappaticci's case is an interesting one. Former British Army Soldier and Force Research Unit (FRU) operative Ian Hurst, writing under the pseudonym Martin Ingram (2004: 60-62) for his whistleblowing book titled *Stakeknife*, denotes that Scappaticci was regularly given the names of other FRU informants that held lower positions within the IRA to execute, so that his commitment to the cause was not questioned. Ingram (2004:30-31) stipulates that this illegal activity was made possible in part because the FRU enjoyed unprecedented access to funds but did not have a centralised command structure linked within the armed forces. In this case, the State has rationalised illegal violence through its mechanisms of bureaucracy, whereby the connection between the chain of command and the person committing the acts is lost in the bureaucratic processes (Foucault, 2004: 13).

Ingram (2004:31) also points out that there was a lot of 'competition' for funding between other intelligence agencies such as Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) special branch and the FRU, which led to rushed decisions that rarely panned out well for everyone concerned. Furthermore, this lack of coordination between agencies lead to a culture of 'distrust' to develop between the RUC and the FRU, with both actively sabotaging operations at points during the Troubles (Ingram 2004: 31).

This illustration of institutional sabotage is an example of a culture of economic competition that is systemic of the language of commerce that underpins the governmentality of security (Foucault, 2001: 207). To be more precise, the 'art of government' is primarily concerned with how to introduce the economy into 'political practice (Foucault, 2001: 207).' A core component of a healthy economy is to produce conditions that allows competition over resources. However, a paradox is created when introducing an economic rationale to the praxis of security: with competition comes the promise of insecurity (Foucault, 2007: 207-208). This problematic is difficult for governments to overcome. Essentially, the State is tasked with attempting to square a circle, as the example of the RUC and the FRU competing over resources and actively sabotaging one another testifies.

Another contributing factor to the cycle of violence in NI has been the 'collusion' between British forces and the Loyalist movement (Cochrane, 2013: 77-78). Successive British governments had no problem with members of its armed forces being members of the

Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the largest loyalist parliamentary group in NI with an estimated 40,000 members at its height in the 1970s and 1980s. In this instance, a typology of violence has been constructed based on the severity of threat presented to the continued governance of NI by the UK (Foucault, 2004b: 165). Foucault, (2004b: 165-166) denotes that only 'a citizen by origin' can exert 'parrhesia' or *free speech*. For Foucault (2004b: 166), acts of violence acceptable to the state are the ultimate form of freedom of expression. The ability to exert violence without reproach symbolizes that those committing it have moral 'superiority' over those who are its victims – the definitive manifestation of 'ascendancy', of ownership of the 'discourse of truth (Foucault, 2004b: 173-174).' The UDA enjoyed the capacity to commit violence without reproach because the UK government considered them natural citizens and their Republican counterparts as *persona non grata*. In short, those who committed violence were not categorised by their acts but by who they were.

Although intelligence gathering was a primary focus of counter-insurgency practice in NI, general military tactics were still heavily employed. Mass arrests were common. After the 1975 ceasefire, it was the UK government's priority to cast IRA regulars as criminals and to try them as such. This effectively prevented the Republicans from advocating their cause through legal channels in NI, which in turn led to further violence (Leahy, 2015: 128). It is also important to note that throughout the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, many such cases were thrown out of court (Butler, 2017: 3). Most were upheld due to witness testimony lacking corroboration or there was evidence that statements were being made under duress (Leahy, 2015: 129). Lafree et.al. (2009: 18) maintain that deterrent-based punishment has been key to CVE practice in Western states from its first usage and that the NI Troubles are a

textbook case. Furthermore, the use of 'deterrent' based practices enforced a 'backlash' from the IRA, which created and imbedded a cycle of violence that became impossible to break (Lafree et.al, 2009: 19).

Dixon (2012: 304) theorises that the role the UK's 'dirty war' policies played in the *successes* in NI have been largely overplayed by the predominant neo-conservative political arm of the loyalist movement, backed up by the private military complex with entrenched business interests in the region. Dixon (2012: 305) suggests that the narrative found in NI whereby 'Britishness' is synonymous with *safeness* provides several problematics: firstly, coming to a conclusion on what constitutes 'Britishness' is not definable, and what is regarded as un-British is equally equivocal. Secondly, the promotion of 'Britishness' or British values as something to be transposed upon lesser cultures is steeped in colonial discourse, which is often at the root of terrorist groups' claims to legitimacy (Dixon, 2012: 316-317). The construction of ideal types in this instance is systemic of the processes of a form of governmentality being forced upon a resistance populace that do not recognise it. As with most cases of CVE initiatives that have come before it and that continue to come after, the lasting effect of the ideology promoted by those who govern is unstable and subject to change, in the worst cases violently.

For Dnes and Brownlow (2017: 718-719), leniency and amnesty programmes have shown the greatest success rates in turning former IRA members away from terrorist activities and towards more traditional, political avenues of expression. However, entrenched republican and loyalist groups persist within the region. Factional differences are very difficult to break

down, which Dnes and Brownlow (2017: 719) theorise is inherent to some form of inter-generational pride; this is about a fear of being the generation that surrenders.

For Gallagher (2005: 429), the 'over-privilege of difference' in the Northern Irish education system, where students are segregated on religious lines and have been since the Butler Education Act 1944, has created a dynamic where it is impossible to create consensus on what Northern Irish citizenship means in real terms. Gallagher (2005: 433-434) argues further that the promotion of 'particularistic identities' within a homogeneous, *British* whole and the conflicts that arise from this is the primary contributing factor to the start of troubles, and why sectarian divisions still persist to this day. Additionally, the 'legacy' of sectarian divisions in NI cannot be erased by education programmes that promote 'shared values', which is the dominant form of CVE education within the contemporary NI context, as they do not address the primary cause – long standing ideological pretensions (Anderson-Worden and Smith, 2017: 291-392). McCully and Clarke (2016: 365) also acknowledge that any successes educational programmes based on shared values has had in the NI context has been down to the skills of individual schools and practitioners, with the policy framework surrounding its implementation found to be largely inadequate. Despite this reality, schools in NI are still tasked with persisting with shared values-based education and there is little resistance to its implementation from practitioners, even though they may well question its effectiveness.

The lack of resistance from schools in NI to shared values-based education could be attributed to the field of education's core modus operandi - to 'reproduce its essential

features' on a subconscious level within its student body (Bourdieu, 2014: 173). In sum, the practice of shared values education is reproduced because practitioner and pupil alike know no different. Furthermore, they are not given the apparatus (nor do they seek them) by the State to change this dynamic. For Bourdieu (2014: 174), the 'corporeal knowledge' the State instils, predominantly through the bureaucratic field of education remains unquestioned because it is propositioned as *natural*, preordained. Foucault (1988a: 71) would attest that the sectarian divisions within NI empower the pastoral nature of governance in this instance because they create a 'state of exception' that could result in violent consequences if questioned (Schmitt, 2005: 5).

Nevertheless, grievance and injustice played a large part in drawing public support during *the Troubles*. Hoyt (2017: 209) denotes that this lesson has not been learnt by the UK in the shape of Islamic domestic terrorism, with many of the same mistakes made in Northern Ireland during the Troubles being made today within the Islamic communities residing in the UK. Furthermore, the war on terror and the actions of the UK, the US and the other members of the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a similar, inter-generational disdain for western powers (Hoyt, 2017: 210). Al Qaeda, ISIS and its contemporaries, have also adopted a similar approach to the IRA in the way they have provoked the UK and the US into making decisions that have been costly – particularly the involvement of Western powers in Syria where US and UK weaponry have ended up in the hands of ISIS affiliated terror groups.

This chapter has illustrated the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, whereby knowledges of governance are controlled by the languages of bureaucracy, law and commerce to the praxis of counterterrorism and extremism. It has also focused on the construction of ideal types as a method of surveillance and control. I have explored how the implementation of Fundamental British Values within the Prevent statutory duty, mobilised through the bureaucratic field of education is steeped in colonial discourse and that similar instances can be found throughout history, from colonial India and Kenya to Northern Ireland. The following chapter will focus on the theoretical modus operandi of contemporary CVE; radicalisation theory. It will move on to discuss how a closed research community has developed around this philosophy and go on to discuss the gap in current understanding found within the academic literature at large.

Chapter 3: Radicalisation theory

The role of the *expert* as functionary arbiters of socially derived problematics such as home-grown terrorism often raises questions related to their ability to act legitimately. In particular, the ability of experts to ‘remain neutral’ of the cultural motivations of the *body politic* – which they are duty bound to do by the liberal State – is questionable (Turner, 2001: 125-126). In reality, total neutrality is pragmatically impossible. Each individual is located within their own locus of subjectivity, with their expertise being shaped by a ‘per-speculative discourse’ that is centred on ‘the survival of the speaking subject’ themselves, rather than the subject of their observations (Foucault, 2004a: 52-53). The discourse that dictates the activities of the CVE expert in the contemporary context is a colonial one. CVE experts are ultimately working towards the ‘reproduction’ and maintenance of the Western liberal State’s ‘hegemonic position’ on the global scale in a post-colonial era (Novelli, 2017: 837-838). The demise of the colonial epoch has also led to some unforeseen consequences. The ‘boomerang effect’ of colonial rule, where the security apparatus deployed in colonial States to control hostile populations has been brought back to Western shores has led to the liberal Western State conducting a form of ‘internal colonialism’ upon itself (Foucault, 2004a: 103).

Whether the CVE research community is willingly or subconsciously working towards this end is up for much debate. Regardless, communities of CVE experts have the ability to wield their own authority – a ‘micro-power’ deposited from the State of whom they are in service – through the archology of knowledge they create via their research practices (Foucault,

2008: 186). The knowledge base such experts collate is established upon the proclivity of risk – specifically the risk of violent extremism and those deemed most likely to commit this crime. These loosely put together communities are defined as *vulnerable* by experts, which enables the State to enforce its ‘pastoral practices’ legitimately upon its target populations *for their own good* (Foucault 2004b: 349). This cycle of the creation and consumption of risk is the driving force behind the industry of expertise that surrounds the Prevent statutory duty. The CVE expert is motivated to contribute to the ‘production of risk definitions’ both morally and financially, ‘drawing lines of causation’ that the State’s security agencies can use to control its potentially seditious populations (Beck, 1992: 46). The State’s primary concern in this instance is how it may control the research produced by its CVE experts; how its data ‘is received, understood and used’ by the *body politik* to meet its own aims (Massoumi et.al., 2019: 2).

In the contemporary context, the underlying philosophy of CVE research and practice is radicalisation theory. Peter Neumann (2008: 4), Director of the International Centre for the study of radicalization (ICSR) at Kings College London and one of the forefathers of radicalisation theory, asserts that ‘it was through the notion of radicalisation that a discussion about the political, economic, social and psychological forces that underpin terrorism and political violence became possible again’ after the extremely charged responses of Western powers following 9/11. Foucauldian scholars will be particularly interested in the language chosen by Neumann to illustrate his point. Neumann (2008, 4-5) views radicalisation as a process that is influenced by factors that are also utilised by Foucault (2001: 221) to describe the reasoning of State. The relationship between the

language of economics and violence sanctioned via biopolitical means are central to Foucault's (2001: 222) analysis of the State's capacity to securitise itself.

For Foucault (1991: 89-90), acts of State violence must be *rationalised* to its populations.

The acceptance of State violence by the biopolitical is central to the State's capacity to exert such power. Such acceptance is generated through the production of knowledges, or as Foucault (1980a: 194) describes them, *dispositifs*. Such *dispositifs* exist through the mediums of law, administration, science, philosophical and 'moral and philanthropic propositions' that are the core elements the State uses to exhort its ideological position. The effectiveness (and perhaps usefulness) of such apparatus of State are calculated by how fiscally 'discursive' they can be with both one another and the State itself. For Foucault (1980a: 195), economic imperatives act as an enabler of the State to mobilise its agents to enact its will. Neumann (2008: 4-5) and his conception of radicalisation theory uses State rationale to attempt to decipher the motivation of terrorist groups and the methods they use to attract people to their cause. However, for Neumann and his contemporaries a problematic is presented in the terms set by the State for their investigations; the State determines that radicals or extremists are to be studied as rational actors but portrayed as ideologically irrational.

Foucault (1980a: 195) propositions that the security-based apparatus of State, its *dispositifs*, are operated through the pretext of 'responding to an urgent need.' Under such conditions, circumstance often supersedes context. The obvious contradiction in terms laid out to Neumann and his contemporaries is merely a technicality, an 'unintended, negative effect

(Foucault, 198a: 196).’ The core purpose of radicalisation theory and the experts who use and devise it is not to question why one may become a radical or extremist, but to identify those who are or those that have the potential to be on the basis that they present an urgent threat to life.

The threat to life the would-be terrorist has potential to carry out is not necessarily the primary focus of the State’s intentions. For Dean (2010:20), the morality of governance dictates that it has a duty to reform those that do not fit the ideal typology of the ‘moral’ citizen. As such, a typology of risk is created to identify those that require reformation. In such instances, the primary focus for government is not one of ‘identity’, which cannot be effectively measured across an entire population but of ‘identification’ of those that challenge the ‘values’ that underpin regimes of governmental practices (Dean, 2010: 44-45). Ultimately, the primary objective of CVE initiatives such as Prevent is not to eliminate the threats to the *moral* problem they presumed to tackle, but rather to ‘distinguish them, distribute them; to use them’ as a means to entrench the State’s position as the guardians of the biopolitical (Foucault, 1977: 272). It is through this process a classification of illegality is constructed and mobilised. In essence, radicalisation theory is the States signifier of the ‘delinquent milieu’ of the extremist, the ‘strategic completion’ of the State’s attempts to mobilise its security apparatus within the public domain (Foucault, 1980a: 196). The State is obliged to disseminate this practice through economic means to ensure that its civic actors have significant motivation to both comply with and enact its will.

This chapter will begin by discussing the nature of radicalisation theory and how it has become entrenched within the existing CVE discourse. It will go on to discuss the explanatory value of Foucault's (2001: 221-222) analysis of the entanglement of the economy and security apparatus of State and the role the construction of ideal types plays in the contemporary context. Furthermore, the manifestation of an epistemic research community that underpins radicalisation theory will be deliberated upon. Finally, it will examine how the 'field of education' has become the ideal site to disseminate CVE doctrine within the western - and by proxy the UK – setting (Bourdieu, 2014: 112).

3.1. Radicalisation theory.

Regardless of the scholarly fragilities of radicalisation theory it remains the primary theoretical perspective adopted by CVE initiatives across the globe. Radicalisation by definition is a process of drastic change, whereby an individual undergoes a transformation in views and ideology. The Counter Terrorism Handbook provided to all CVE practitioners in the UK defines radicalisation as 'the process by which people adopt an interpretation of religious, political or ideological belief which may lead to them legitimising the use of violence (Staniforth et.al, 2013: 38).' Scholars that adhere to this model for the most part agree that this process is gradual and does not happen instantaneously (Christmann, 2012: 6). To date, various models have been developed to identify characteristics of radicalisation and a common consensus within the study of terrorism has emerged to describe the process of radicalisation to be comprised of distinct phases (Christmann, 2012: 10). Advocates of


this methodology argue that it can be used to map the journey from early engagement to active participation in radical ideology up to a potential act of terrorism.

Perhaps one of the strongest proponents of the radicalisation process is Marc Sageman, a former CIA operative and eminent forensic scientist with putative experience of mobilising the Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sageman (2008: 223) suggests that the progression of 'Jihadi radicalisation' to actual acts of terrorism consists of four stages or 'prongs.' Firstly, there is the 'moral outrage' - an event or sequences of events that are perceived by the individual to be morally unjust. This develops over time into a 'specific interpretation of the world', such as the 'war against terror' being a war against Islam. This then 'resonates with personal experiences' and the individual links themselves to their perceived injustice. Finally, the 'mobilization' stage occurs, where the radicalised individual moves through networks and likeminded groups or persons, acquiring new skills and the validation necessary to move onto violent acts of terror.

In agreement with Sageman, McCauley and Moskalenko (2014: 70) conceptualise and identify key indicators of what creates a 'radicalised individual' and how they come to commit terrorist acts. They argue that the radicalisation process is split into two main spheres that operate in pyramidal fashion, each with their own independent stages (see fig.3). Firstly, there is the 'radicalisation of opinion' pyramid. Initially, the individual forms a 'neutral' standpoint, but accepts the assertion that Islam is under attack from a Western crusade led by the United States. They then move onto the mind-set of the 'sympathiser', whereby Jihadists, referred to as terrorists by the West are defending Islam against this

attack. The actions Jihadists take is then ‘justified’ by religious sanctity by the individual. Finally, a ‘personal moral obligation’ is felt by the individual to support the Jihadists and their actions in any way possible to remain a ‘good Muslim (McCauley and Moskalkenko, 2014: 70-71).’ The second sphere is the ‘Radicalisation of Action’ pyramid. At the base level resides the ‘politically inert’ Muslim - whatever their beliefs they do not engage with radicalised actions. Above them lie the ‘activists’, those involved in legal and nonviolent political action. Higher yet are ‘radicals’ who engage in political action that can be violent in nature. At the Apex of the pyramid are the ‘terrorists’, radicals that are actively targeting civilians with lethal violence (McCauley and Moskalkenko, 2014: 71-73).

Fig .3. McCauley and Moskalkenko Model of Radicalisation



McCauley and Moskalkenko’s (2014: 70-73) model shares many similarities with Sageman’s (2008: 223) ‘Four Prong Process’. It differs on the assertion that each stage does not have to

happen concurrently or be linked across each mode – individuals can move up and down the scale at any given time (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014: 73). It also suggests that there is more potential for violent terrorist acts to occur when the individual has high levels of ‘radical opinion’ with the means of ‘radical action.’ However, they do acknowledge that ‘most activists do not become radicals’ and that it is not ‘necessary to be an activist to become a radical’ which does really bring into question the validity of their model (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014:73-74).

There are clear parallels to be drawn between Sageman and McCauley and Moskalenko’s conceptions of the *radical Muslim* and the experiences of the British colonial state in 19th century India. The contemporary radicalisation model creates a typology or hierarchy of *ideal types* in much the same way the British colonial state divided the diverse populations of India into subgroups. In Colonial India, those found exhibiting behaviours closer to the British ideal enjoying a degree of autonomy under British Rule, whereas those that did not were heavily policed and controlled via methods of surveillance and subjugation. Emphasis was placed upon assimilation of British civility within the indigenous population via education. For instance, the earliest Muslim migrants to the British homeland in the 19th century were often Indian elites who were only allowed to do so in order to acquire a British education to enable them to better serve the empire on their return to India (Ansari, 2018: 35). It is also important to note that the British elites who had expertise of the Colonial Indian state regarded even the most *moderate* Muslim as lacking ‘self-control.’ They lobbied the institutions tasked with taking care of the Muslim migrants to impose many punitive methods to regulate their freedoms, no matter the length of their stay (Ansari, 2018: 80-81).

In short, the colonial state and its methodological system of divide and conquer considered even the least *risky* Muslim as a risk if left unchecked.

Although there has been a considerable development in how Western States determine their *risky* populations, radicalisation theory follows a similar format in the way it manages them. Prevent and its statutory duty functions through the methodological principles of radicalisation theory outlined by *experts* such as Sageman and McCauley & Moskalenko and their models of radicalisation. It creates *at risk* categories that government agencies use to identify and quarantine demographics that fit the factors delineated by the ‘bureaucratic judgement’ of such experts (Dean, 2010: 219). This leads to an epidemiological or clinical approach to risk, whereby the role of government is to identify and contain individuals or groups exhibiting ideology deemed hazardous to the State before it can spread to the general population. It is through this process governments are allowed to act in a way that undermines its biopolitical capital, such as limiting freedom of expression and the retraction of civil liberty for sections of society – much in the same way the British colonial state restricted the freedoms of its Muslim populations (Dean, 2010: 207).

A key component of radicalisation theory is the notion that a ‘radicalised’ individual could potentially be ‘de-radicalised’. De-radicalisation programmes are conducted all over the world. For example, in Singapore a de-radicalisation programme is run within the prison system that adopts a mental health-based approach. In Germany, the EXIT programme is designed to give people who find themselves ‘trapped’ within the many far-right movements sweeping the country a ‘route out’ and in Egypt there are various youth

programmes designed to 'warn' children of the dangers of getting involved in radicalised and extremist groups (Kooman & Pligt, 2016: .253).

In the UK, the Channel Programme identifies members of vulnerable communities who, through the medium of LA safeguarding agencies are deemed to be exhibiting extremist behaviour and *re-educates* them. The programme is based on a study conducted by Psychologists Christopher Dean and Monica Lloyd whilst in the employ of the UK government in the National Offender Management Service (NOMs). The study produced 22 'factors' that were used to construct a tool styled as the Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) that security and safeguarding professionals are obliged to use when administering PREVENT to individuals they deem at risk (CAGE, 2016: 14).

The original study conducted by Dean and Lloyd has not been made available for public scrutiny due to its importance to *national security*. However, both researchers have produced an article defending the methodology used within the study in 2015. It is important to note however, that both Dean and Lloyd have identified key weaknesses in their research framework. For instance, the study used a very small sample of convicted terrorists within the UK prison system that had committed a variety of offences (ranging from proliferation of 'extremist' material to violent crime) and that no systematic analysis was conducted with any data collated. A basis within the existing literature was also not established, due to the 'exploratory' nature of the study (Dean & Lloyd, 2015: 50-51).

Although the risk factors themselves are not available for public scrutiny, Powis et.al. (2019: 1-2) have assessed the validity of the ERG 22+ under the directive of the Ministry for Justice. They state that the factors of 'Engagement, Intent and Capability' are the core domains of the ERG 22+ and that each individual case is graded on a scale using the formula of 'strongly present, partly present and not present' to calculate how *radicalised* an individual is. The conscientious observer will notice clear parallels with McCauley & Moskalenko's (2014:73) model of radicalisation here, where the relationship between 'Intent' and 'Capability' can easily be transposed with the terminology of 'radical opinion' and means for 'radical action.' Powis et.al (2019:1-3) conclude that the ERG 22+ are applied in good faith by practitioners and often as a last resort when more traditional safeguarding mechanisms fall short of recognising the threats of extremism. They also propose that they are a useful tool for identifying those at risk of extremism if applied in enough time to re-direct an individual before they can harm themselves or others around them. In total, 171 individuals were used in Powis et.al. (2019: 1) analysis, with all respondents being described as 'Islamic extremists.'

The epistemological nature of the studies conducted by researchers such as Dean and Lloyd and Powis et.al. serve two purposes: firstly, to dilute the sociological factors that lead to individuals becoming extremists into digestible, calculable units and secondly to provide a scientific basis which the State can use to legitimise its efforts to control the 'conduct of conduct' of its citizens (Foucault, 1982: 220). Fundamentally, the ERG 22+ is acting as a 'technology of discipline' that the State employs to limit the freedom of the individual,

which it then justifies as a necessary evil to ensure the freedoms of the whole (Lemke, 2019: 68).

There are obvious issues with the de-radicalisation process as a model of counter extremism. Firstly, less than 1% of terrorism related research is conducted directly with individuals who have been deemed 'radicalised' or extremist (Silke, 2008: 33). This is partly because no one can effectively determine who exactly a radicalised individual is. There are also obvious ethical issues involved when researching individuals within the judiciary system. It is also important to note that the causal relationship between radicalisation and acts of violent terrorism are tenuous; correlation alone does not equate to causation. Even with a clear definition of what or whom a radicalised individual is, the fact remains that not all (in fact, very few) individuals that hold *extreme* views will commit a violent act. Secondly, not every terrorist can be considered radical. According to Neumann (2008: 5) and the model of radicalisation he promotes, some individuals commit acts of terrorism to further political or financial gain. Finally, and most importantly, many of the reportedly *successful* de-radicalisation programmes offer the least transparency. For instance, the Singapore and Egypt examples have received widespread criticism from civil and human rights groups for the lack of information they share with the public domain, particularly the lack of information regarding the wellbeing of those involved (Coolsaet, 2011: 174).

There have also been many miscarriages of justice, some very public. If the prevailing model of radicalisation is applied to the experiences of Moazzam Begg, a British Pakistani man who was identified as an 'enemy combatant' by the US military and imprisoned, both in the

Bagram Theatre Internment Facility and Guantanamo Bay for over three years, its flaws become very apparent. Begg was politically active within Afghanistan where he was working as part of a humanitarian project to build wells in the northern territories in 2001. He later went on to start his own initiative to build a school for girls in Kabul, a project technically illegal under the then Taliban leadership. In 2002, The US authorities believed Begg to be visiting training camps within the surrounding areas which were considered to be associated with Al Qaeda, however this has since been declared to be untrue following Begg's tribunal in 2004 (QARDEC, response to tribunal process, Begg, 2004). Begg was extracted and detained by a joint US and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) task force during the night of the 31 January 2002 from his family home in Islamabad, Pakistan. He was held for several weeks by the Pakistani authorities who questioned him, along with US and British intelligence officers, who identified themselves as MI6 operatives.

After his initial incarceration, Begg was sent to the notorious Bagram Theatre Internment Facility, where he was detained for one year. During this period he was subjected to torture; he was hog-tied, beaten, put in isolation with a bag put over his head, emotionally and verbally abused, denied access to legal support, threatened with sexual abuse and with extradition to Egypt to face the death penalty if he did not sign pre-written confessions. It was also during this time that Begg witnessed the fatal beatings of other detainees (Begg, 2007:260-261). Begg was transferred to Guantanamo Bay in February 2003 without warning. During his detention there, Begg was subjected to over 600 days of solitary confinement interrupted by sessions of integration under torture, still having not been charged with any crime (Begg, 2007: 262). Begg was put through systematic torture

throughout his incarceration and he continually professed his innocence throughout. However, under duress of torture, Moazzam relinquished false information that he perceives to have played a part in the murder of two other detainees, which he witnessed first-hand (Begg, 2004).

Eventually, under sustained pressure from the media and civil society, Begg was released from US custody in January 2005. Upon returning to the UK, he was arrested and questioned for 24 hours before finally being released to his family (Begg, 2007: 356-358). Since his release, Begg has been an avid campaigner against Prevent. He has also been arrested by the West Midlands Police for being suspected of attending a terrorist training camp and facilitating terrorism overseas in 2014. The case was thrown out of court because Begg had legally travelled to Syria with the consent of MI5 and he was cleared of any wrongdoing (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/moazzam-begg-freed-case-collapses>). Ultimately, Begg was identified, investigated, and detained on the basis of his fitting the radicalisation model developed by researchers such as McCauley and Moskaleiko, Neumann and Sageman. In short, the US authorities believed him to be a would-be *radicaliser* and removed him from the public domain, with the backing of the UK and Pakistan agencies also operating within Northern Afghanistan.

Begg's experience at the hands of the western military complex is an atypical case of the State's incursion on the biopolitical via the mechanism of 'hierarchical subordinations (Foucault, 2007: 2-3).' Afghanistan was largely under US allied control during 2002 when Begg was picked up by US forces. By this point, the US had developed and employed a vast

network of surveillance designed to identify and intercept individuals and groups who were perceived to undermine US authority within the region. The US military's subversion of the 'subaltern' populations in Afghanistan (which Begg was a party to) is their attempt to 'coerce via observation (Foucault, 1977: 171).' In this paradigm, the application of power over individuals such as Begg has two primary loci. Firstly, to make the consequences of incursions against sovereign forms of control visible to the governed 'subaltern' populations and secondly, to make the methods of surveillance that highlight such incursions to the sovereign invisible via diffusion to and also through the governed (Foucault, 1977: 171-172).

Although the US occupying forces were in Afghanistan on the pretext of ensuring democracy, they very much governed the Afghan population in a sovereign, colonial form. The surveillance methods they employed embody an omnipotent power; 'each gaze would form a part of the overall functioning of power' exerted both upon and by the bodies of the governed (Foucault, 1977: 171). In this instance, the model of radicalisation employed by Neumann, Sageman, Macaulay and Moskalenko and their contemporaries acts as justification for US intrusions on the Afghan population on the pretence of safeguarding them from *dangers* found within. In effect, the occupying US forces are exercising practices that seek to 'normalise judgement' upon aspects of Islamic culture which do not conform to the US ideology being enforced upon the Afghan people (Foucault, 1977: 177). This is legitimised on the assertion that it is for the Afghan people's own wellbeing, when in reality it is designed to administer the US hegemonic order – control through coercion (Foucault, 2007: 20).

The example found in the Begg case is not a singular one and such incidents are not restricted to the conventional theatres of war that are found thousands of miles away from the homelands of the Western powers that fight them. In the UK, the advent of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, colloquially known as the *Snoopers Charter*, is designed to provide government policing and security agencies the power to obtain 'bulk warrants' to surveil the private communications of thousands of people at any one time (HM Government, 2016:113). The *Snoopers' Charter* and surveillance initiatives like it exemplify the fragility of the radicalisation model and the wider security apparatus which underpin them; they are particularly vulnerable to misinformation or to be more exact, bad information (Stampnitzky, 2013a: 191). For Stampnitzky (2013a: 194), a 'politics of anti-knowledge' underlies the radicalisation discourse which has led to mass surveillance initiatives such as the *Snoopers Charter*. In short, the notion that extremist groups are instruments of 'evil' stops researchers from engaging with the discourse of terrorist and extremist groups critically. Extremist discourse becomes an 'object of knowledge' rather than a source of knowledge; discourse becomes data which is quantified rather than qualified (Stampnitzky, 2013a: 195).

For Stampnitzky (2013a: 195 -196), the primary aim of government and the research community of 'terrorism experts' created to empower it have devised methods to calculate the potential risk of perceived extremist discourse rather than understand its motivations – knowledge that could ultimately nullify its potential risks if acted upon sympathetically. Foucault (1997: 122-123) postulates that the ideological capital of good versus 'evil' is a primary motivator of security mechanisms such as the *Snoopers Charter*. The trajectory of

the identities of those deemed extremists (or vulnerable to extremism) are assessed via a field of 'political calculations' that do not consider the authenticity of the agents of knowledge production or *dispostifis*. Instead, emphasis is placed on the quantity of information they can provide, not its validity (Foucault, 1997: 125). In sum, quantity of information is valued over quality of information.

A consequence of the process of data accumulation that places precedent on volume over detail leaves little room for nuanced interpretations. For instance, Arun Kundnani (2014: 121) draws attention to the conspicuous lack of sociological awareness amongst experts about the way Islamist movements may be infiltrated by marginal groups for whom terrorism is a viable reaction to the history of military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, Kundnani (2014: 128) purports that radicalisation theory misidentifies 'attitudes of disaffection and opposition to foreign policy for signs of extremist risk' with state actors visualising a 'cross section of young Muslims as potential terrorist recruits' rather than politically active citizens with valid concerns about Western military interventions in the Middle East. To provide some context, in February 2003 coordinated protests against the Iraq war were held in over 600 countries worldwide, with an estimated 6-11 million participants believed to have been present (Walgrave & Rucht, 2010: 13). All protests were legal and peaceful and those involved, from countless different cultural and ethnical backgrounds, held similar views to many young Muslims who, if found exhibiting similar behaviour within sites of State surveillance would be deemed as at risk of radicalisation.

The result is that 'belief systems' become denominators. This suits State security strategists as it creates a scientific basis to facilitate widespread surveillance of individuals who hold

similar beliefs, even though there appears to be no causal link between particular strands of Islam and those who commit acts of terrorism (Stampnitzky, 2013b: 625-626). Foucault (2001: 213) would elicit that the economic imperative of the security apparatus makes such discourse inevitable. In effect, communities are being created from loosely put together demographics to suit the needs of State funded surveillance strategists, which is being legitimised by sections of the research community who also profit from such discourse (Stampnitzky, 2013b: 623). Radicalisation theory and those who use it are creating a 'pre-criminal space' occupied by individuals and communities deemed at risk (CAGE, 2016: 12).

This chapter has so far sought to analyse the wider discourse surrounding the core empirical issues within contemporary CVE research and practice. It has also examined the dominant academic theory which underpins such apparatus - radicalisation theory and subsequently the concept of 'de-radicalisation. In the following section, the relationship between the concept of governmentality and radicalisation theory will be discussed in greater detail. Furthermore, it will be argued that the creation of typologies or ideal types of the extremist are a proponent of a government state of mind that restricts theoretical debate.

3.2. Creating typologies: radicalisation theory as a mechanism of governmentality

Foucault (1978: 235) would describe acts of terrorism as 'fundamental crimes' against 'sovereignty' and most importantly by association, 'citizenship' that necessitate a moral response. Such 'fundamental crimes' against the 'normal liberal state' subjugate traditional

security apparatuses. To justify such actions, the 'perverse individual' and the characteristics that tie to such notions are paramount to the contemporary security expert who utilises the radicalisation process in their work (Foucault, 1978: 236).

Acts of terrorism, in essence, are violent crimes. Instances of violent crime are common. Often, the best 'stories' are the ones that researchers and criminologists focus on in their analysis, even though they have no more value than any other comparable crime in the aim of categorisation. If anything, the nuances of such crimes become denominators, thus skewing the overall understanding (and potential preventative capability) of policing institutions that use such studies to supplement their work (Foucault, 1977: 2). For certain crimes that create a forceful moral response (such as killing a loved one), the mental state of the defendant is often overlooked in their punishment and in their route to punishment. This is further inflamed if such crimes have political implications, such as an act of terrorism. Severe punishments are often rationalised in such instances (Foucault, 2007: 4). Foucault's (2004: 11-13) four '*dispositifs*' or 'technological security apparatus' that shape discourse surrounding factors of risk (such as violent crime) and the use of force exercised by security agencies describe how such punishments are legitimised:

Spaces of security

Securitized spaces are bound by territorial mechanisms, be that States, cities, schools, shopping malls or prisons. The notion of territory is intrinsically linked to the notion of sovereignty, which forms the basis for 'ownership' of space, which subsequently gives

security agencies legitimacy to perform outside of traditional codes of conduct to protect these spaces, especially in times of ‘emergency.’

The aleatory

The notions of territory and sovereignty are only discernible by what they are not. As such, the ‘aleatory’ or the random/unknown – the ‘alien’ – are often used to define boundaries, both in the physical world and in the moral, administrative and economic spheres of society. Frequently, this is where security concerns are brought to the fore in the minds of the ‘bodies’ or population and the mechanisms of power that govern them.

Normalisation of security

Security mechanisms such as legal violence and lethal force that can be exercised by the police and the armed forces are normalised by sovereign bodies on the proviso that they keep the necessary equilibrium between the individual bodies that make up society, the space in which they reside (territory) and the balance between moral and economic concerns within the bounded territory.

Relationships between populations and security

Normalisation of security is only sustainable if the relationship between governed populations and security agencies develops within the ‘milieu’ or the ‘environment of society’ it is bound by. What can and cannot be normalised and the process to normalising

security mechanisms is unique to each territory and the populations that inhabit it at any given time. In short, the relationship between the State and its population is context dependent. The state must manage biopolitical expectations by convincing its populations that its interests coalesce; it shares core identities and thus interests with its populace. One way for States to do this is to create a sense of the *other*, a body that does not share such identity – those who may threaten the prevailing identity of its population.

The genealogy of the *dispositifs* described by Foucault (2004: 11-13) can be easily transposed upon the discourse surrounding contemporary CVE. The work of Rabasa & Bernard (2015: 56) of the RAND corporation suggests that the ‘threat of radicalisation’ is particularly prominent within second generation Muslims in a UK context. It is through this statement that Rabasa and Bernard create a sense of the space being securitised, the sovereignty or identity being threatened and the *aleatory* nature of the ‘accused’ radicalised individual. Rabasa & Bernard (2015: .58) describe the proliferation and consumption of ‘jihadi material’ coupled with a lack of belonging within a western cultural space to be the main denominators of potential terrorist actors, but then contradict this assertion by making the point that individuals often appear as integrated as the ‘average’ (whatever that is supposed to mean) citizen.

It is also important to observe that much of the above assertion is made on the basis of one case, that of Mohammad Siddique Khan. For a living, Khan was involved in youth and mentoring work with his local mosque and primary school. It is alleged that he proliferated ‘jihadi material’ to vulnerable individuals, an activity that may have led to the 7/7 bombings

which Khan is believed to have spear headed. Based on this one case, Rabasa and Bernard (2015: 59) proclaim that the aim of all terrorist conspirators is to disseminate material to vulnerable individuals within communities deemed at risk. This can be seen as an effort by Rabasa and Bernard to 'normalise' the use of surveillance strategies by citing a particularly prominent member of the biggest 'jihadi' terrorist act on UK soil as justification, even though there is questionable validity in the process of 'behaviour replication' that is central to their narrative and typology. Raffaello Pantucci (2015: 3-4), Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), argues that the 7/7 bombings and the events that led up to them can be described as a 'confluence of historical trends and local dynamics' that shaped the narrative of Khan and his accomplices. For Pantucci (2015: 5), the bombers contact with Jihadi individuals and groups was the catalyst which gave them the agency to carry out the attack but that their own sociological contexts made them more vulnerable than the *average* citizen.

However, it is important to note that all the conspirators had varied biographies and junctures in their life that deviate from the linear process of radicalisation proposed by Rabasa and Bernard (2015: 56-57). For instance, Khan's disassociation from his family is often cited as evidence of him being pulled along the radicalisation process. However, the initial break with his family was actually a result of him refusing a proposed arranged marriage (Pantucci, 2015: 27). It is also worth noting that Rabasa and Bernard (2015:.60-66) used a 'database' of 30 individuals to create their typology, most of which is based on witness testimony, which has been proven to be unreliable, especially when taken under duress (Thompson, 2012: 331). In many cases, especially those connected to violent

aleatory crime, witness testimony is 'loaded', particularly when taken after the fact.

Harmless or even common behaviours are perpetuated as indicators of the individuals' potential to exhibit violent behaviour (Foucault, 1978: 24-25).

Rabasa and Bernard (2015: 58) assert that 'second generation, British Muslims of Pakistani origin' are predominantly responsible for terrorist acts carried out by British Muslims, both 'domestically and abroad' based on such limited data. Put into context, there are an estimated 1.17 million people living in the UK who identify as Pakistani (ONS, 2011). This narrative is designed to appeal to those that wish to maintain the relationship between populations and security apparatus. For those in governance, this information puts a boundary to the problem that they face regarding extremism. Although 1.17 million people is a vast demographic to surveil or securitise it is decidedly smaller than the purported 1.5 billion Muslims found across the globe (Pew Research Centre, 2011: 13).

Dean (2010: 206) denotes that typologies of risk are established through the technologies and languages of governance, specifically statistical analysis and the calculation of probabilities. This process presents a problematic within the praxis of human and social interaction; by attempting to quantify its processes to fixed values the qualitative nature and thus, principally, mutable and fluid interactions between actors is largely ignored. In short, government aims to make the incalculable calculable. Prevent and its focus on targeting demographics at risk of radicalisation is a case exemplar of the State's risk-based security apparatus failing to understand the qualitative milieu that makes individuals or

groups *vulnerable* in the first place. Failing to understand such factors can lead to vulnerable communities becoming isolated and often, demonised (Said, 1979: 26).

Public discussion surrounding terrorism is often dominated by the concepts of 'evil' and the 'irrational hatred' of western culture (Stamptnitzky, 2013a: 187-188). Terrorist actors and the groups they are perceived to speak for are put through many 'de-rationalising' practices by both the media and the government without any evidence, empirical or otherwise, to support such claims (Stamptniitzky, 2013a: 189). Using the circumstances surrounding Khan as an example, security analysts have followed a system of categorisation that fulfils the notion of the 'perverse individual' described by Foucault (1978: 231), where like 'all heinous criminals' Khan had muted his 'voice of conscience' and yet remained 'cogent' of his nefarious aims. Khan had seemingly sought out vulnerable members of his community who he purportedly radicalised over a period of time to the point that some of them have committed a *fundamental crime* against the sovereign authority of the State and the moral crime against the citizen.

What is most problematic with this assertion however is that Khan was in fact a citizen himself, as were all his assailants. Moreover, considerable emphasis is put upon his international links in areas of conflict even though the connections are often tenuous. The portrayal of Khan is essentially an extension of the Western interpretation of the Islamic world as 'sadistic, treacherous'; with the individual Muslim only a cog in the illogical machine of Islamic 'mass rage', blighting the West and all that it holds dear (Said, 1979: 286-287). For Said (1979: 290), Khan and those even remotely like him can never truly be a

citizen of the West. Although the *good Muslim* can find asylum within the Western world, they must remain 'passive', compliant, and above all 'non-active' in the affairs of state (Said, 1979: 97). For Said (1979: 97-98), the construction of a 'typology' of the Muslim based upon Eurocentric ideology will inevitably result in rebellion against it from sections of the communities that it targets. Furthermore, it is the Western world's obligation to posit such resistance as zealous, salacious, and ultimately 'irrational (Said, 1979: 313).'

Prevent and the radicalisation methodology it is endowed with is, in essence, a normative mechanism of power. It proclaims that it is not culturally or racially motivated policy; however a significant proportion of its targeted demographics happen to be Muslim populations within the UK. It justifies this because acts of Islamic terrorism have occurred on British soil. It does not however consider that such acts of terrorism have, in the words of those committing them, been in response to the UK's involvement in the war on terror and the fallout that persists to this day. This is an example of a 'race struggle', whereby the dominant race or culture – in this instance the UK government and its Eurocentric, white British born ideology – has set the precedent on where such discourse takes place; absolving itself from any moral conflict by depoliticising the dialogue of engagement (Foucault, 2003: 61-62). The State portrays its detractors from within its target demographics as irrational. The State would argue it is not worthwhile to reflect on their motivations, only on their actions – or perhaps more pertinently the actions of the select few (Lemke 2019: 233).

For Crenshaw (2011: 52) the Islamic terrorist is the symbolic outcaste, the figurative barbarian who dwells in the space between the physical and perceptual world, which is

often (if not always) deeply rooted in the historical perspective of East versus West (Said, 1979: 27). However convoluted our understanding of exactly what terrorism is or who extremists are, an elaborate CVE industry exists and purports to know the answers to these questions. Actors within this sphere range from university research groups, NGOs, and private security firms to government agencies (Stampnitzky, 2013a: 84). In short, counter terrorism and counter extremism is big business. In the next section of this chapter, the establishment of a closed research ecosystem that self-perpetuates narratives that are proven to garner economic favour will be explored, with this thesis arguing that there is little room available for truly critical analysis of CVE initiatives such as Prevent.

3.3. Epistemic research ecosystem surrounding CVE initiatives

For Dean (2010: 153), the logic of competition that the capitalist economic model offers would denote that technological advancement is better facilitated by private organisations that will produce more innovative security apparatus in the search for profit, with the aim of distinguishing themselves from their competition. However, this analysis does not consider that the organisations manufacturing security products might shape potential security concerns around the products they have to offer rather than develop effective assistive technology suited to the purpose for which they are intended. In addition, political decision-making that is primed by risks that originate outside of the political sphere but require State intervention are prolific in the contemporary context (Giddens, 2003: 5-6).

If a risk is deemed serious by actors or agencies within society and they believe that it requires State level attention, the risk must be proliferated through communitive channels such as the media (and ever more importantly, social media) to create public attention, which is the currency used to create biopolitical will. The State and its agents must ensure that their sovereign power is 'media-filtered' in order to distance themselves from tensions caused by rising inequality and 'ethnic conflict', of which their policy is the architect (Stenson, 2005: 281). This process can often lead to 'scaremongering' and consequently, rushed political action (Walkate & Mythen, 2015: 10). In such instances, governmentality and the due process it employs falls short of providing democratic oversight of both the modelling and the execution of security related affairs (Dean, 2010:154). The State and its agents are acutely aware of this contradiction, and use media manipulation as a means to navigate the 'side effects' of the policy they create to mitigate risks such as those posed by radicalisation, which create negative socio-political outcomes of their own (Beck, 1992: 80).

In this instance, Prevent acts as a component of the 'economy of illegalities', where the motivation of government and the rule of law have shifted away from prosecution of criminality (Foucault, 1977: 62). Consequently, the 'condemned' has very little biopolitical or economic value to prevention, which is focused on the acquisition of knowledge through enforced surveillance (Foucault, 1978: 262). This process yields more valuable results because it creates both a product that is sellable to biopolitical sensibilities i.e. prevention is better than cure, and it creates an industry of knowledge that embeds the will of governance within the broader spectrum of the mechanisms of power and wider society (Lemke, 2019: 78-79). A by-product of this form of governance is that a hierarchy of illegality

is formed through the construction of knowledge. This 'new economy of power', where the transgressions of the superordinate is outweighed by those of the subordinate is functionally concerned by how widespread the potential for illegality is, not necessarily on the number of crimes being committed (Foucault, 1980b: 104).

In sum, if evidence is found of pervasive misdemeanours against the prevailing ideology of State within a target demographic it takes precedent over actions of the State that have negatively impacted on said target demographics (Lemke, 2019: 81). For example, Prevent largely ignores the UKs involvement in the war on terror and the political proliferation of immigration (that has led to widespread racism) as factors that could lead to vulnerable individuals or groups becoming radicalised.

Current CVE initiatives are an iteration of classic counterinsurgency (COIN) models pioneered by western militaries in the 19th and 20th century described at length in the previous chapter of this thesis. David Galula (2006:4) describes how in times of 'revolution' or 'insurgency', terms he uses interchangeably, the 'insurgent' or extremist can often obtain legitimacy through legal channels, which the 'counterinsurgent' or sovereign power in juxtaposition has a 'duty' to make as difficult as possible. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual translates this movement beyond the sovereign power of the State to civil society as paramount to 'resolving insurgencies (The United States Army, 2007:64).' Galula's (2006:84) asserts that contact with civil society engineers a systematic process that re-establishes the counter-insurgents' control over the population, which in turn gives them access to intelligence that can both remove the target population from the

insurgent organisation and lead to the capture of individuals who are actively pursuing subversion of the State's power. In essence, 'the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies' for the State as it provides them with the legitimacy to act with force if deemed necessary (United States Army, 2007:8-9).

Stephen Graham (2010:14) describes this process of the securitisation of discourse as an extension of a 'new military urbanism', whereby the widespread availability of advanced technologies in global markets for groups who want to deploy them has created an overlap with the interests of the State. In some cases, surveillance and military technology created by civilian markets can be of a higher standard than that produced by the State. For Graham (2010: 15), it is this definitive shift which renders 'communal and private spaces', along with their 'civilian populations' both a location for 'targets and threats' and the site in which the terrorist inhabits. As such, the citizens that reside in our urban centres have also become potential suspects. Further compounding this problem, the work of 'experts' within the field of counter-terrorism is in fact far removed from actual 'terrorists' or 'terrorist groups (Hoffman, 2006: 36).'

Neumann and Kliemann (2013: 370-371) assert that most studies conducted on CVE initiatives are generated from the academic fields of criminology, political science and sociology. Primary data is the preferred source of choice, however first-hand accounts of radicalisation are extremely rare to non-existent (Neumann and Kliemann, 2013: 372).

Gielan (2017: 14) denotes that CVE based research has a dearth of 'effect evaluations' of

said theory being applied to target demographics. Furthermore, those that do endeavour to test the effects of CVE initiatives have limited access to empirical data, which limits their explanatory value and overall generalisability. In short, very specific case models are being used to justify widespread policy rollout when they have little scope to do so (Gielan, 2017: 15).

For Neumann and Kliemann (2013: 363) the renewed interest in CVE research globally following the 9/11 attacks is primarily economically driven. However, this incentivised, 'renewed vigour' has not guaranteed higher academic standards (Gielan, 2017: 17). Whilst conducting a study of CVE based research, Neumann and Kliemann (2013: 378) found that just over half of the research's methodologies originating within the field met general scholarly requirements but that over a third fail 'to meet minimum standards' of academic rigour. Perhaps quite surprisingly for such proponents of radicalisation theory, Neumann and Kliemann (2013: 379) concede that this is tolerated within CVE focused research (when it would not in other areas of academic study) because the majority of funding comes from governmental sources that have their own agendas, which they wish to legitimise through the medium of an *impartial* research community.

Nasser-Eddine et.al. (2011: 16), whilst writing a report for the Australian government regarding CVE related studies and methodologies observe that CVE is rarely defined beyond its basic terminology; it is a universally accepted phenomenon that lacks real conceptualisation. Nasser-Eddine et.al. (2011: 17-18) highlight that there is an upsurge of CVE focused research teams within academia who seek to foster a closer relationship

between public and private entities, which is evidence of the increasing coalescence between the economy and State, where both entities court each other's amity to legitimise their services and for economic favour (Foucault, 2001: 272). Perhaps the most damning finding of Nasser-Eddine et.al.'s (2011: 70) is that insufficient academic analyses is dedicated to critiquing research into CVE initiatives. They argue further that there is a limited number of studies that focus on empirically evidenced investigations and that there is a 'lack of seriously tested quantitative and qualitative field research' found within the field, nor an obvious will to fill this gap (Nasser-Eddine et.al, 2011: 70).

Heath-Kelly (2013: 397) argues that much like the exotic hypothetical material 'dark matter' is used to fill the gaps in some aspects of theoretical physics, radicalisation theory and by proxy CVE methodologies are being used by academics and governments to fill the gaps in knowledge found in 'unknown risks' to the prevailing social order. For Heath-Kelly (2013: 398), it is the performative nature of governance, the appearance of government to predict and react to potential future risks that cement legitimation for radicalisation theories as *the* theology of contemporary security, or as Foucault (2001: 233) might attest, as the crook the Shepherd uses to tend their flock.

If the performative example can be used further to describe the replication of security narratives such as CVE methodologies and radicalisation theory, much like any performance it must be rehearsed and repeated before it can be convincingly performed (Foucault, 2004b: 61-62). As such, a closed research community has developed around the perceived threat of extremism to provide an environment conducive for such rehearsal. So far, this

chapter has discussed the core methodology of CVE initiatives, radicalisation theory and its inherent flaws. It has also deliberated the epistemic research community that has developed around this practice, driven by economic factors and the performative nature of governance. In the following and final section, the example of Prevent and the literature surrounding it will be discussed in more detail. It will conclude by alluding to the current gap in understanding this study is designed to fill.

3.4. Prevent; the current literature.

Although there is an apparent unwillingness within the broader research community to critique CVE initiatives such as Prevent it still has many detractors within academia. Richards (2011: 150) argues that attributing a 'language of vulnerability' to extremism and terrorism is non-conducive to what Prevent professes its purpose is – to keep society safe and its communities harmonious. Its focus on the principles of a pathogenic transference of extremism on the grounds of arbitrary risk factors, which for Richards (2011: 151) creates a pre-criminal space that only makes communities more vulnerable to isolation – something Prevent is apparently designed to, perhaps ironically, *prevent* from happening. The paradigm described by Richards also has a contradictory element that is hard to coalesce from a public engagement perspective; evidence of vulnerability becomes an indicator for potential dangerousness (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 405-406). Those most vulnerable, those most at risk become risks in themselves from a governance perspective. For Heath-Kelly (2013: 407), the most obvious weakness of this rhetoric is that both the research community and

the UK government have failed to define the exact moment somebody 'at risk' becomes 'a risk.' As such, everyone 'at risk' is 'a risk' at inception (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 408).

Skoczylis and Andrews (2019: 2-3) argue that the 'loose' connections Prevent makes between extremism, terrorism and targeted vulnerable communities is the basis for most of its criticism. They also argue that this is also one of the reasons it persists; it is merely 'othering' – something that comes as second nature to mechanisms of State, which still have one foot firmly placed in its colonial past. This prejudicial ideology is legitimised by the biopolitical danger presented in an act of terror which is operationalised in a fiscal format, which is in turn conducive to the dominant political order (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2019: 3). Austerity measures and the retention of subsidy for public services have also compounded the negative effects of Prevent and proliferated its uptake due to its potential to form a revenue stream for LA agencies severely lacking in funding (Abbas, 2018: 13).

Skoczylis and Andrews (2019: 4) denote that historically the Muslim communities of the UK have been the primary targets of Prevent's operations, however the threat of a resurgent far-right has posed a significant problem for Prevent. The far-right in the UK, buoyed by the proliferation of anti-immigration rhetoric within contemporary political discourse during general elections and Brexit have exponentially grown. What is particularly difficult for Prevent and those that enact it is that not all those vulnerable to far-right extremism are in fact vulnerable in the *traditional* sense. They do not come from isolated communities, they are not always from areas of economic deprivation and they also may not lack education or critical thinking skills (Skoczylis and Andrews, 2019: 5-6).

The one thing Prevent can use to delineate or categorise those who have become a *risk* in the shape of far-right extremism is by using its schematic of Fundamental British Values (FBV). However, in this instance, far-right rhetoric is intrinsically *British* and based on the politics of othering, deciding what is British by defining what it is not, in the exact same way Prevent has attempted to do in the form of FBV. As such, the line between far-right extremism and *acceptable* political discourse is blurred. This is particularly apparent when you consider the politics of exclusion exhibited by the current government in the form of the Windrush scandal and the prevailing anti-immigration sentiment that led to Brexit (Abbas, 2018: 13). It can also be argued that the primary targets of the far-right in the UK are its Muslim communities. Strategies such as Prevent that highlight differences within communities only exacerbate this issue (Abbas, 2018: 2).

For Abbas (2018: 12), Muslim communities are left with no choice but to tackle both Islamophobia and any forms of radicalisation within their communities on their own terms, not because they are inherently Muslim problems but because the State or Prevent by proxy is incapable or not willing to address these issues. Choudhury and Fenwick (2011: 174-175), when conducting a qualitative study across four local authorities found that there is a distinct and alarming difference between the perceptions and lived experiences of Muslim and non-Muslim residents within the same local areas, with Muslims being much more likely to have interacted with Prevent personnel than their non-Muslim counterparts. Lewis and Hamid (2018: 161) highlight that the British Muslim community are conscious that the rising level of far-right extremism and the subsequent hate crimes the community has felt as a

result have not been given the same level of attention by those implementing Prevent as instances of radical Islam, which are much less common.

Foucault (1981: 52) asserts that there are three modalities utilised by government to regulate discourse; firstly, by determining what is forbidden via normative action, secondly by establishing what is rational and irrational behaviour and finally, by defining what is 'truth' and what is not. Prevent works on the principles of all three modes of Foucault's analysis. It uses case studies of extremists to establish what is prohibited behaviour. These examples also act to establish what is rational and irrational thought, which is further embodied by training, lessons and engagement activities that are designed to resonate with both practitioners and vulnerable individuals/groups. It is also through these mechanisms that a social truth is created through the formation of resolute norms; in the case of Prevent it takes the form of FBV. This is then disseminated and replicated across a network of agencies that engage with the target demographics.

Fundamentally, Prevent is a 'technology of security' that projects the optimum model, the ideal type of the citizen, by first distinguishing what is not citizenship (Foucault, 2007: 56-57). This negative modality is then operationalised by implementing procedures to evaluate individuals and groups against an ideal, that is to say, a fabricated norm of conduct. Instead of establishing what is the norm, which is an almost impossible task, Prevent becomes the apparatus of what is normal. It does this by conferring with the knowledges created through various levels of statistical analysis – creating an average of averages (Lemke: 2019: 194).

This data is primarily collated through practitioners in frontline services such as education through their respective safeguarding agendas and administrative responsibilities.

Bryan (2015: 213-214) observes the changing trajectory of Prevent from a wholly community-based surveillance tool into the safeguarding agenda of LAs, cumulating in the Prevent Statutory duty. The statutory duty is primarily enacted through schools, facilitated through teaching staff. Schools also employ a multitude of NGOs with a CVE focus to help enable staff to deliver CVE focus activities, both through training and by directly delivering workshops/lessons to students. Bryan (2015: 224) acknowledges that teaching staff are mainly unaware of the contentions surrounding Prevent – lamenting the lack of resources available to them to fully enact their responsibility to it. That is not to say that schools and teachers are merely ‘passive receptors’ to the Prevent duty or their obligations to it (Vincent, 2019: 23). There is ‘ground-level mediation’ of Prevent by individual practitioners who do see conflicts of interest. However, resistance is mostly fractured and often no more than a compromise (Thomas, 2017: 315-316). In reality, the methods used by teachers to mediate the conflict that can arise via the implementation of FBVs often become a source of information that is *resourced* by the duty, marketized as a means to continue its assimilation into the wider educational discourse (Vincent, 2019: 24). Bryan (2015: 224) denotes that there is a lack of research that fully explores this dynamic, which is greatly needed if we are to understand, what Foucault (1982: 220–221) would call the ‘conduct of conduct’ in relation to how educators teach students modality of behaviour as a means of freedom of expression via FBV whilst having their own freedom of expression restricted by the stipulations of the State.

Bourdieu (1994 1-2) considers the field of education to be the ideal site for the State to disseminate its ideology, in this case FBV, through the bureaucratic channels of the safeguarding agenda to create an order of reality that best suits its purposes. It also possesses the tools to replicate such narratives – to reproduce norms CVE initiatives such as Prevent and its apparatus require to function (Loyal, 2017: 86). Education is a fundamental element of what Bourdieu (2014: 4) describes as the ‘administrative state’, where the ‘precise rationality of the bureaucratic field’ – in this instance FBV and the Prevent statutory duty, is both generated and reproduced (Bourdieu, 2014: 112).

FBV and the ideological position of *Britishness* it fosters is driven by a fear of difference (Elton-Chalcraft et.al, 2017: 41). It places focus upon the assimilation of this sense of *Britishness*, with no agency given to adapt it to better fit the multi-cultural society that FBV proclaims to promote. Elton -Chalcraft et.al (2017: 41-42) highlight that teachers are also tasked with implementing an ‘unsophisticated’ narrative of FBV which is largely left open to their own interpretation. This creates two problematics, firstly, the delivery of FBV lacks continuity. In fact, FBVs offer a ‘civic rather than cultural understanding of identity’ which places institutions as bastions of morality on which conceptions of citizenship must revolve (Vincent, 2019: 29). They act as part of a wider ‘civic rebalancing agenda’, where previous indicators of the moral (such as religion) are losing their relevance and are being replaced by muscular liberalism that is inherent within the contemporary democratic logic of the UK State (Keddie, 2014: 540). Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, FBV creates a narrative of the ‘insider/outsider’ that centres ‘white Britishness’ as the normative centre that all should adhere too (Elton-Chalcraft et.al., 2017: 42).

Ultimately, FBV and the discourse it generates is ‘inherently divisive’ by design (Farrell and Lander, 2019: 479). It magnifies the dysphoric effects of structural racism – particularly when Muslim teachers are tasked with delivering them. Muslim teachers are left with a choice – to deliver FBV and become alienated from their own identities or resist them and become alienated from their professional roles (Farrell and Lander, 2019: 480).

Lemke (2019: 189) acknowledges that the ideology of policy such as Prevent is legitimised by the premise of ensuring the continuation of civil liberty and freedom of expression. It aims to set a precedent for ‘the conditions under which individuals are able to be free (Lemke: 2019: 190).’ As such, freedom, or to be more precise, a sense of freedom is a fabrication. In terms of Prevent, the construction and proliferation of FBV offers a case in point. Nothing about them is particularly intrinsic to a sense of *Britishness* but they do set an ill-defined notion of liberty upon the British way of life whether they agree with it or not.

This fragile sense of freedom constructed by Prevent is constantly under threat precisely because it does not translate into many people’s notions of liberty. For instance, a senior teacher who was a part of this study described FBV as “*problematic*” because they create a vision of the UK that wasn’t accurate because they didn’t take into account the role wider cultural contexts has played in shaping our “*shared values as human beings.*” However, it is important to note that they continued to teach them because it was central to their role as a pastoral lead – they simply could not fulfil their function without them. Prevent creates ideal types that closely fit the artificial liberty constructed by the State, which in turn creates the hierarchy of *risky* behaviour that form its methodological focus. The fragile nature of

this ideology in turn generates more risks and Prevent keeps enabling its existence through its practice, a terrarium of risk if you will. Foucault (2008: 60-61) argues that 'security mechanisms' such as Prevent act autonomously from the state even though they are working to preserve its interests. This leaves room within the bureaucratic regime for dissonance such as that expressed by the participant teacher when asked about their opinion regarding FBV. However, there is little avenue to act upon it because the apparatus afforded to actors and agencies that may disagree with aspects of the liberal order are controlled by the State. In this case, the teacher is left with no choice but to implement them because not doing so would effect every other aspect of his work.

In addition to schools responsibility to deliver FBV they are also tasked with being the primary site of surveillance within the localised context. For Bourdieu (1996: 184), the educational field is the ideal site for the state to exhibit the 'counter identification' of those that do not fit the desired 'trajectory' modelled by the state in order to intercept them and change their course. Bourdieu (1996: 184-185) describes the mechanisms of the school in this instance as morally obliged to present such discourse as a choice to the 'deviant' individual, however in reality there is no agency to diverge from the predetermined path set by State. As such, the school is obligated to detect and remove such 'deviant' individuals if they do not respond to reformation for fear that they may pass on their aberrant behaviour to their peers (Bourdieu, 1996: 185-186).

The corroborative relationship between Bourdieu's and Foucault's conceptions of the regulatory regime is at its most evident when viewing the educational field through the

paradigm of surveillance and its relationship to self-regulation. For Foucault (1977: 201), the 'permanent visibility' the student body are subject to within the confines of the school produces their 'docility' to their educators will, and by proxy, to the education system that promotes the 'functioning power' of the State. Bourdieu (2013: 164) argues that this system of docility is supplemented by the schools endeavour to make the State sanctioned 'social world appear as self-evident' through targeted educational programmes such as FBV. This process takes advantage of what Bourdieu (2013: 160) terms 'Doxa', the 'social experience' where an individual determines their behaviour according to the 'natural order' presented to them by external sources of power which they then internalise and develop into their own regulatory practices (Schlosser, 2012: 39).

The point where Foucault (2004a: 5) deviates from Bourdieu is in his conception of the 'regimes of truth.' For Foucault (2004a: 5-6), the State produces layers of reality that are acceptable to it by utilising aspects of the discourse of target communities – their 'subjugated knowledges' – to make State ideology more palatable to those who have the capability to be resistive. To do this successfully, the State 'produces reality' that is tailor made for essential 'enclosed disciplines' that serve society, such as the school. Within these parameters, security apparatus like the Prevent duty act as a mode of 'social quarantine' to identify those not susceptible to the State's chosen ideology in order to retrain or remove them (Foucault, 1977: 216). Prevent produces several different 'rituals of truth' which constrict the interpretation of freedoms that are inherent within the liberal order (Foucault, 2000: 194). For example, although FBV uphold freedom of speech as one of its core tenants, exceptions to this rule are allowed on the basis of *exceptionalism* – when freedom of

expression has the potential to threaten life. This assertion is based upon the radicalisation model adopted by Prevent which has direct parallels with the safeguarding agendas of LAs – to protect life. The duty's focus on freedom of expression as a potential safeguarding concern becomes a *ritual of truth* that is repeated across agencies with a safeguarding responsibility. Although the logic of freedom is paramount to social educational projects such as FBV, only 'certain forms of freedom' are permissible within the field of 'specific limitations' set by the State (Foucault, 2007: 353). Those who fall outside of the State's estimation of exhibiting appropriate 'respect for freedoms' become the targets of policing agencies (Foucault, 2007: 354-355).

For Sian (2015: 196), Muslims have become the individuals schools have been tasked with identifying, who require the 'intervention and regulation' that Foucault and Bourdieu speak of. This endeavour is a 'post racial' mechanic of State that is merely rephrasing forms of structural racism that are steeped in the UK's colonial past (Sian, 2015: 197). Sian (2015: 197-198) proposes that the monitoring of Muslim pupils within the educational setting systematically removes their agency to challenge the Islamophobic rhetoric that will inevitably shape their lives. In short, if they do not feel capable of discussing the societal processes that make them vulnerable in a centre of learning they will never be able to escape their vulnerability when they grow beyond it (Sian, 2015: 198). Examples of Sian's assertions are not hard to find with the UK Muslim community. In the context of this study, a member of the Islamic community in charge of a Community-Based Organisation (CBO) who took part in this study describes how young people in their community are subjects of surveillance, where their social media, their friendship groups, "*every piece that comes out*

of them is examined.” The participant, who works with hundreds of young Muslims, has seen first-hand how such practices *“actually change the future of people.”* They believe that Prevent has created an environment that *“criminalises them, and alienates them”*, which ultimately *“stops them being able to speak and develop themselves”* which in turn leads to them becoming more marginalised and vulnerable.

In this cycle of ‘vulnerability production’, the school and the field of education in general has become a tool of the ‘surveillance bureaucracy of the security state’ designed to highlight the vulnerable, both to its *dispositifs* and to the vulnerable themselves (Ramsay, 2017: 155). Universities in particular have been tasked by Prevent and its statutory duty to identify students with opposing political views to the prevailing notions put forward in the form of FBV, which is an obvious ‘subversion of the educational mission (Ramsay, 2017: 156).’ Essentially, FBV is a form of political virtue, where ideological pretexts become almost theological in scope (Dean, 2010: 102-103). The usage of FBV by Prevent and its subsidiary mechanisms is a case exemplar of this in action. The danger exhibited within any theological based form of governance is that rules become rationalised based upon ideological contexts – they may not actually be rational if measured outside this mode of supposition (Dean, 2010: 104).

However, this isn’t necessarily a problem for the State or the Prevent duty. FBV are by design a form of ‘political marginalisation’ that identifies what is acceptable citizenship by defining what it is not (Foucault, 1988a: 150-151). The moralistic discourses of FBV – its *values*– are a ‘tactical element’ of government that promotes ‘asceticism’ or in more

didactic terms, loyalty to normative values in pursuit of the ‘endless obedience of one man to another’, much like any other pastoral form of governance (Foucault, 2007: 207). The use of nationalistic language like *British values* allows the State to ‘wield a power that cannot be taken’ from them even if they are not based in reality, because a ‘higher authority’ does not exist within the *body politick* that has the power to do so (Foucault, 2007: 208).

In this chapter, I argue that the prevalence of radicalisation theory and the closed research community that has grown around it enable CVE methodologies such as those used by Prevent. I have also deliberated the current literature surrounding this problematic and have identified a gap within in it that this investigation is placed to fill. In the following chapter, the research methods of this study will be outlined. A qualitative study of 31 participants ranging from LA Prevent managers, education providers, NGOs with a CVE focus and local community groups and advocates has been conducted across four LAs in the South East of England. The specific rationale for case selection and the chosen research method – critical discourse analysis – will now be discussed in more detail.

Research Methods

Thus far, this thesis has explored the historical implications of the colonial governmentality of Western powers and its impact on the State as an amalgam of security apparatus.

Emphasis has been placed upon the COIN rationale employed by the British Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries that act as a precursor to CVE initiatives such as Prevent. I have also highlighted the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and how it applies to the current model of CVE that Prevent and its statutory duty follow: radicalisation theory. The primary site of the Prevent duty's delivery, the Bourdieusian bureaucratic field of education, has also been explored. This research methods chapter will provide the reader with details of the research strategy I have adopted together with the means of data collection and the chosen analytic framework. In addition, the reader will also be supplied with a discussion of the potential limitations of the chosen research strategy and its implementation.

The primary research aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess the implications of Prevent and its statutory duty across education, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring and administering communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority level. The following research questions have been developed to facilitate this task:

1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?

2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?

3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?

4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

The research questions have a twofold focus; in the first instance, they have all been designed to uncover the explanatory value of governmentality when explaining the ‘very subtle explicit and tacit combination’ of ideology and repression that goes into producing security as problematic (Althusser 1970). The repressive elements of Prevent and its CVE mechanisms are attenuated, or concealed in the form of ‘non-statutory advice’ where the law (in this case, the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act) is evoked as a *general requirement* in the school when ‘promoting Fundamental British Values’

(<https://educateagainsthate.com/resources/dfeguidance-schools-providing-advice-promoting-fundamental-british-values-spiritual-moral-social-cultural-sm-sc-development-pupils/>).

The methodological issues at stake for social scientists when examining the elements that constitute the CVE strategy as ideological repression requires a double-fold focus because:

Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to ‘discipline’ not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family.... The same is true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc. (Althusser 1970, emphasis added).

Although many academics are keenly aware of the ideological and repressive functions of Prevent, this thesis closes the gap in the literature concerning the ways in which Prevent as a model of surveillance is outsourced and delegated across LA agencies and in third-party organisations in civil society. In other words, this study examines the various realities encountered by the personnel in charge of implementing a counter-terrorism strategy by examining the responses of agencies that both share a legal obligation and those that *choose* to opt into the statutory duty.

To achieve this aim, this study has adopted a qualitative, interview-based research design. 31 semi-structured interviews have been conducted with individuals that work within a LA or community setting – the primary locations of the Prevent statutory duty’s delivery. Respondents form four main sub-groups: LA Prevent managers, education providers, NGOs that deliver educational programmes with a CVE focus and finally, CBOs and community advocates who have significantly interacted with Prevent and its statutory duty. Education is the primary mechanism that the Prevent statutory duty is delivered through. As such, the Bourdieusian concept of the ‘field of education’ as the ideal site for the state to disseminate its doctrine – which Prevent and its CVE discourse acts as an example of – has informed the sampling frame adopted by this investigation (Bourdieu, 1996: 184). This chapter will now begin by discussing the research strategy adopted by the researcher and the use of critical discourse analysis as a methodological approach.

4.1. Research strategy

The analytical viewpoint that I have adopted is described by Margaret Archer (2012: 1) as the 'reflexivity imperative.' To negate the problem of confirmation bias implicit in any form of social research, Archer (2012: 1-2) describes how researchers must adopt a more *reflexive* approach to investigating social phenomena. For Archer (2012: 2), the reasoning behind this approach is threefold: firstly, the 'sense of self' one occupies within any social dynamic is more important to objectivity than preconceived notions of where one fits within any given social order. For instance, in the case of this study, I had several preconceptions of where I fell within the CVE narrative and subsequently the Prevent framework before conducting fieldwork.

On the one hand, as a seasoned practitioner within LA environments working as an educational keyworker for 7 years, facilitating the education of young people who could not access full time education for a variety of reasons, (such as young offenders, marginalised ethnic minorities, refugees and those with behavioural special education needs) I found the landscape surrounding the safeguarding duty straightforward to navigate. On the other hand, my ethnic and cultural background as a second generation, mixed race Middle Eastern man, places me within the target demographics of Prevent, which acted as another mode of reflection. As part of my role within the LA, I was asked to take part in surveillance practices aimed at young people who were not that different to me – certainly no less vulnerable to radicalisation than me according to the metrics being deposited upon them by the

safeguarding rationale of the LA. Awareness of these issues did act as a restraint against bias when conducting analysis.

Secondly, the 'reflexive monitoring' I conducted in light of my lived experiences within the praxis of Prevent and its LA contexts allowed the investigation to avoid the potential to fall back on 'traditional' modes of thought – that of the educator tasked with safeguarding their student cohort – whilst also acknowledging this ingrained philosophy within the practices of participants (Archer, 2012: 2). I have spent a considerable amount of time working as an educational key worker within the LA setting and have been party to numerous safeguarding procedures during this time. It is important to note that practitioners are tasked with keeping those in their charge safe from harm. This primary imperative is imprinted upon practice daily by educational bodies and agencies from inception.

As such, safeguarding methodology is often practiced without much critical thought precisely because it adjudicates the dilemma of keeping those in the practitioners care *safe*. It is an attractive methodology to employ as a practitioner – despite its pertinacity to potentially marginalise the vulnerable – because it provides them with a network that aids them in monitoring their cohorts, to share the burden of care. I have had to critically reflect on the use of safeguarding procedures, which has almost become second nature, in order to effectively assess the implementation of Prevent – which places itself firmly within the safeguarding agendas of educational providers such as schools.

Finally, the conflicts between ‘norms’ that present themselves when investigating any social phenomena, which in this instance acts as an ‘open system’ and as such is situational, is also extremely important to forming an objective viewpoint (Archer, 2012: 2). Prevent acts as a ‘generative mechanism’ inside the open system of the LA, facilitating the exchange of material goods, personnel, capital, and information through its networks of NGOs and CBOs (Archer, 2007: 152). These ‘unscripted realities’ form the basis of new information that any analysis of this nature demands (Archer, 2012: 3). This investigation seeks to explain the duty’s systematic nature by examining the ‘unscripted realities’ it uses in order to conform to the existing mechanisms of the LA. In particular it will focus on the relationships between Prevent managers, schools and educators, NGOs, and CBO’s/ community advocates who are the functionaries of the ‘normative system’ of the State transposed upon the local setting (Archer, 2007: 27).

The denomination of risk bestowed upon target demographics (such as the Islamic community) by an epistemological calculation based on scant evidence is troubling in itself. In order to understand how such methods of denomination have been constructed and wilfully carried out without critical oversight is perhaps the most pertinent question. To effectively assess the mechanisms of Prevent and how it is adapted by practitioners and organisations alike the ‘normative conventionality’ of how marginalised groups are treated must be taken into account (Archer, 2007: 94). What I mean by this statement is that there is an underlying normative language exhibited by individuals that relates to their understanding of the ‘particular other’ – in this case the Islamic community – that is deeply rooted in colonial discourses (Archer, 2007: 95). All the participants are acting reflexively

within their own environment, balancing their internal normative understanding they have acquired through their own life course with the normative discourse they must exhibit in their respective roles within the LA setting. The same of course can also be said about myself. Whether this is a conscious effort or not is open to debate – certainly one this study does not aim to settle. However, it is essential to view the responses of participants as a relationship between the performance of Prevent as a structural apparatus of State and the individual as an actor in their own right. It is imperative to do so in order to allow the situational data to reveal itself naturally and to take its true form. It has been equally important for me to objectively question my own normative understanding whilst conducting this study – which has been a conscious effort of reflexivity on my own part.

Another normative language of State that is critical to understanding the practices of Prevent is its economic functions. For Archer (2012: 206), the encroachment of the ‘market’ upon the State has created an environment where the ‘institutional hegemony of State’ is dependent on the health of its economy. Foucault (2008: 244) postulates that the *raison d’être* of all mechanisms of State are fiscally motivated and Prevent is no exception. In relation to this investigation, those enacting Prevent and those advocating for it may be doing so to ensure their own financial wellbeing and not because it is the best fit for the problematic at hand. Dean (2010: 208) would argue that this is an example of how systematic governmentality is anchored by financial profitability – the fiscal properties of Prevent are what perpetuate its practitioners, not necessarily a belief in its properties as a safeguarding mechanism. For example, a Prevent manager who took part in this study is quick to point out that acquiring “*associated funding*” – or funding from a body that isn’t

necessarily associated with Prevent – is one of the core functions of their role. When asked to elaborate on why this was the case, the Prevent manager detailed that much of their work lay in “*areas outside of risk*” because this was a stable workstream with guaranteed income. The “*preventative side*” of their role is often less “*intense*” because it is aligned to a risk that “*fluctuates*”, making it harder to maintain and ultimately, to evidence to the Home Office in order to get further “*funding [for] certain projects.*”

The economic imperative driving Prevent as a social policy has a core weakness; it predicates that social issues are merely trends that can be shaped by economic means. It does not take into consideration the complex social milieu that create pockets of deprivation and thus vulnerability that extends beyond the economic (Dean, 2010: 259). In particular, pre-emptive policies such as Prevent inhibit free choice, one of the cornerstones of the *body politic* in the liberal order. The economic crisis of the early 21st century and the culmination of the war on terror has seen the rescission of risk analysis from the global transposed back onto the national context (Dean, 2010: 263). Prevent and the industry in which it inhabits has grown as a result and the interplay between ‘risk, security and liberty’ has shifted the rationality of government. The State has shifted its focus from the risk posed by external powers to the potential threat posed by its own ‘populations and communities.’ Subsequently the regimes of practice of public servants and experts has also shifted to accommodate this new form of risk management (Dean, 2010: 264-265).

To view and assess the regimes of practice created by Prevent, the modality of discourse which enable them must be deciphered and interpreted. For Machin and Mayr (2012: 4),

language both shapes and is shaped by society. As such, power relations are played out through discourse. Engaging with the methodological approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) allows the reflexive researcher to analyse and apply meaning beyond the initial statement, to question the ideological pretexts that have constructed the narrative being performed by the subject (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 5). This study has chosen to employ a CDA methodological approach, normally utilised by critical linguistics in this instance because of its focus on Foucault's (1991: 88) concept of governmentality, which similarly chooses to engage critically with the discourse of power, to look beyond its performance – to delineate its true meaning (O'Regan and Macdonald, 2009: 80).

Machin and Mayr (2012: 77) highlight that discourse is never neutral, and that categorisation of those we interact with is key to our ability to communicate both our own needs and the perceived needs of others. At any one-time multiple classifications of actors populate the dialogue of society and power mechanisms will promote those that 'best serve their interests (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 103).' This study is designed to define these different 'representational strategies' found across its cohorts of participants and connect this to the broader safeguarding discourse surrounding Prevent and its CVE focus (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 103).

Engaging critically with the responses of participants also allows this study to analyse the 'nominalisation' of the discursive effects of Prevent, whereby those who enact the strategy filter the negative effects through bureaucratic language (Foucault, 2001: 233-234). In particular, the Home Office and by proxy its agents – the Prevent managers, use the

language of economics to incentivise the uptake of its practices. For example, Prevent coordinators act as gatekeepers for resources and funding for both agencies who work with vulnerable communities and NGOs assisting service providers and/or community groups.

The dialogue that enables this process of economic dependencies within the localised setting can only be interpreted by examining the dynamics of power posited in the responses of the Prevent managers and those of education providers, NGOs with a CVE focus and CBOs/ community advocates. For Johnston (2018: 12-13), establishing the 'locations of meaning' through the subtext of discourse can only be established if at first you can determine the 'locus' of intent. The expression of the Prevent duty's power, or its 'public transcript' as Scott (1990: 45-47) would describe it, is effectively locked into a relationship with the 'hidden transcripts' of its target demographics – their subtextual discourses that are not within the duty's ability to observe. Those producing Prevent have to assume that its target demographics mean to resist it, even if publicly they seem to accept it. The enactors of Prevent must continuously manufacture 'the appearance of consent' in order to maintain its legitimacy to act (Scott, 1990: 55).

Prevent, like all forms of governance is subject to public resource and to political demand (Foucault, 1984b: 73). Prevent operates on the presumption that vulnerable communities are economically motivated, which creates a common ground for engagement (Foucault, 2008: 245-248). It is this logic that propels Prevent in its community engagement work. It stimulates participation by offering resources. Once embedded, Prevent attempts to steer community group's actions to match its intended outcomes. Social transactions merge with

economic ones to the point that they are no longer distinguishable from one another. This creates a relationship of dependence between community groups and the LA, where any concerns participating social actors may have are supplanted by economic imperatives (Lemke, 2019: 259).

For example, a community advocate that took part in this study reported that they were tasked by the Home Office to implement a set of workshops in several mosques in a few neighbouring LAs. When this person was approached via recommendation from a Prevent manager, they were offered funding and a level of autonomy the person was happy with. However, once the workshops were ready to role out, the Home Office stipulated that the speaker must “*widen the [interpretation] of extremism*” to incorporate “*political Islam.*” The community advocate was not happy about this, citing that promoting political Islam was essential to the Muslim communities prosperity – “*political Islam means instead of violent Islam you work through politics [to] try to change, or achieve your dreams through going into politics and democracy and elections.*” Unfortunately, the community advocate had to go ahead with the project as stipulated by the Home Office because the organisation he ran was already economically invested in it – he had to “*take money from Prevent*” because he had already spent too much time and resources on the project to give it up.

O’Regan and MacDonald (2009: 84) denote that CDA techniques allows the researcher to differentiate one ‘order of discourse’ from another, where a ‘regime of truth’ can be established by acknowledging the power dynamics at play between actors. An analysis of ‘the totality of the discursive practices’ across ‘social domains’ is the only way to create a

holistic view of the problematic under investigation (O'Regan and MacDonald 2009: 85). For Fairclough (2005: 53), critically engaging with the discourse of all actors across hierarchies of power unlocks an understanding of the 'multiple modalities' of power. For Foucault (1984b: 211), this analytical emphasis repositions the researcher away from the seductive position of evaluating power from the viewpoint of what it subjugates or prohibits. Additionally, it allows me to analyse power mechanisms in the terms of its productions, which is both a more objective and constructive position for the researcher to take (Foucault, 1984b: 212).

Public policy such as Prevent dictates what is 'thinkable and unthinkable (Woodside-Jiron, 2011: 154).' The use of CDA techniques show how the language of governance is used to generate a language of legitimation for Prevent and its soft surveillance techniques and the role that individuals play in its enactment. The approach adopted is the perfect tool for assessing how Prevent sets the parameters for its enactment, how it shapes the agenda of its discourse and ultimately, how it convinces the affected parties to validate its existence despite fierce opposition (Edmondson, 2002: 114).

4.2. Data collection and sampling:

Etikan et.al. (2016: 3-4) denote that purposive sampling techniques are the most common approach in qualitative research projects because 'the deliberate choice of participants due to the qualities each participant possesses' allows the researcher to collect data that comes

from a source that is well informed on the 'phenomenon of interest.' The criteria for the sampling frame in this instance have been designed to incorporate the dissemination of Prevent from its operational base, in this case Prevent managers and associated personnel within the LA. It also focuses on how the duty is then circulated within the organisational structure of wider local authority mechanisms through the safeguarding agenda, which is predominantly facilitated through education providers. Education providers are legally obliged to interact with the Prevent statutory duty however there are also bodies and organisations that are co-opted into engagement. Therefore, the sampling frame has been extended to encompass the perspectives of NGOs who operate within the localised context delivering CVE based training and services and community voices in the form of CBOs and community advocates.

This study has also followed the principles of theoretical sampling. The concept of theoretical sampling is effectively to collect, code and analyse data in accordance to the theory that the research questions are grounded in and to develop the understanding of the theory and its dimensions within the thematic under discussion as they develop (Morse and Clark, 2019: 146). The process of theoretical sampling starts with the generalised thematic presented in the research questions which develops into a theoretical sample frame, then data is collected and analysed. Eventually the researcher reaches a point where theoretical saturation is achieved i.e. when the data presented from within the sample frame has reached the point where it successfully answers the problematic presented within the research questions (Robins and Eisen, 2017: 768).

The nature of the sample frame denotes that some element of 'snowball' sampling has occurred to reach theoretical saturation (Morse and Clark, 2019:162). The dissemination of Prevent (and general local government inter-agency work) is heavily reliant on networking. Such networks are in a constant state of flux and are ever changing. As such, it is important that the collection of data has been equally transitional and open to exploring emergent sources of information. It is also important to note that there is opposition and distrust from Prevent managers for those who engage critically with Prevent and as such the research strategy has had to remain fluid rather than fixed.

Etikan et.al. (2016: 3) suggest that heterogeneous sampling techniques are best utilised when there are a diverse cohort of individuals or groups that are affected by the phenomena under investigation. The likelihood of 'outliers' affecting the sample is greatly reduced when all varying perspectives have been considered and all attempts have been made to include them within the analysis (Etikan et.al. 2016: 4). Critical case sampling is best employed when there are key gatekeepers or a central site of investigation that tie the cohorts together. Bourdieu (1996: 184-185) views education as the primary 'bureaucratic field' in which State doctrine is disseminated within any population. It should perhaps come as no surprise that the field of education acts as the primary site for the delivery and distribution of the Prevent duty. As such, the following cohorts have been interviewed by the researcher:

- Local Authority (LA) Prevent managers
- Safeguarding and pastoral leads within secondary education and Higher Education (HE) academics

- Relevant NGOs with a CVE focus
- Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and community advocates

The 'educational regime' that Prevent inhabits, which Foucault (1977: 141) considers to be the perfect trajectory of disciplinary power, is not only restricted to educational providers. The services that relevant NGOs offer all centre around educational outputs. For example, a participant of this study who works for a national level NGO provides FBV resources to over "12,000 members who are schools and teachers" in LAs across the country, with funding provided by the Home Office on a "contract or a grant basis." The participant's NGO uses the 'educational regime' Foucault speaks of to evidence their "policy and campaigning work" which gets them the attention of "government departments...to keep the message" Of FBV at the forefront of policy makers agendas.

It is also important to note that Prevent managers provide training and funding for educational programmes for CBOs as a matter of course to encourage their engagement and ultimately their docility. The roll out of FBV within schools is effectively an effort by Prevent to 'impose categories of thought' on both the children it is designed to be delivered to and upon those tasked with delivering it (Bourdieu, 1994: 2). This is imposed by Prevent managers and NGOs who oversee and train teachers and community members in the correct modalities of engagement with their own cohorts. The ultimate aim of this pastoral form of governance is to create an environment where obedience becomes self-regulation; where practitioners and citizens alike are held responsible to incorporate the 'wisdom' of

the pastorate, in this case taking the form of Prevent and FBV, into their own daily practices (Dean, 2010: 92).

To be precise, the sampling frame utilised by this study is a tautology – critical case sample. However, it is important to note that most of the respondents do not belong to a tangible community and have been targeted based on their occupation and/or their relationship with the Prevent statutory duty. As such, it is difficult to define the sample size as a grouping, which is directly related to the weaknesses of Prevent to transfuse within its own targeted demographics, which are even more loosely related. The makeup of interested parties in each sight of investigation is situational. The number and focus of Prevent managers are determined by the risk tier status determined by the Home Office and can change according to the funding available to each LA. The number of DSLs and the work that they do in any given LA is determined by how many schools there are and the size/demographics of their student bodies. The nature of CBOs is related to the demographical makeup within the LA and their existence is often the result of an individual/small groups who come from the community setting creating a service not provided by the LA in which they preside. Finally, the type and amount of NGO activity in an LA is an amalgamation of all the above factors, where they tailor their services to fill in gaps in provision that they identify via proximity to Prevent managers, often aided by the Home Office. Nevertheless, the variants presented in the targeted individuals is worthy of study and analysis due to the relationship between ‘experience and structure’, or in this case the day to day applicability of the Prevent statutory duty to the workstreams of Prevent

managers, educational safeguarding leads, CBOs/community advocates and CVE focused NGOs within the localised context (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006; 493).

The participants have been sourced from 4 LAs in the south east, two located in London and two on the South coast. Each LA has been deemed by the Home Office as a priority Prevent area and given guided funding to implement the statutory duty. NGOs that are CVE focused are also national in scope and as such are not restricted to any particular LA. However, such organisations do predominantly operate at this level and all participants from this cohort have worked in at least one of the LAs of the Prevent managers interviewed.

4.3. Framework for analysis

4.3.1. *Interviewing techniques:*

As is widely ascertained, interviewing is the most extensively used research method in the qualitative researcher's toolbox. This mainly due to its flexible nature, where the line of enquiry can be tailored at the individual level if required (Roulston, 2017: 324). For Tim May (2011: 131), the interview technique of data collection and analysis yields 'rich insights' into the biographies of the people who enact social conditions, for themselves and for wider society. However, May (2011: 132) is also quick to point out that the quality of the data yielded is directly proportional to the quality of the interviewer, who must maintain oversight of the study's aims throughout the process. A balance must be struck between the pursuit of 'objectivity' and that of rapport with each participant. An 'intersubjective

understanding' needs to be reached between the participant and the interviewer (May, 2011: 140). For this to be successful, three main criteria have to be established: 'accessibility' i.e. does the interviewee hold the knowledge necessary to answer the questions posed?, 'cognition' i.e. does the participant understand the format of the interview and why it is being conducted? And finally, 'motivation' i.e. is the participant interested in the research context and do they feel valued as a contributor? (May, 2011: 141-142).

This study has employed a semi-structured interview process. The reasoning behind this is directly related to the problematic under study. Prevent and its statutory duty is a policy area that seeks to be heavily standardised. However, it operates in a biopolitical space that is transitional and dependant on social groups that are everchanging in reaction to the world around them. the semi-structured approach is the only way to uncover both sides of the problematic presented by Prevent. It has allowed the interviewer to map the standardized elements of the Prevent policy and its mechanism whilst also giving the freedom to probe further; to gain a 'clarification' of its usage and to 'elaborate' on its *real-world* effects on those that are enacting it and perhaps more importantly, those who are affected by it (May, 2011: 134). This process has allowed participants to respond to the questions on their own terms – to tell their *truths*. The theoretical interpretation of the data participants yield has granted this study the ability to contextualise this *truth* – to deliberate its true meaning.

For Bryne (2004: 184), interviewing offers a 'flexibility' to data collection that other forms of analysis are incapable of. Its interactive nature allows the researcher to respond to new information in real time and there is less scope to miss phenomena worthy of analysis. However, there is a question raised about the power dynamics between those involved, the differences in understanding between researcher and participant and the artificial nature of the interview process itself. As such, I have adopted a 'reflexive' approach (Bryne, 2004: 184).

Although I cannot directly mitigate the power dynamics between participants, I can be cognizant of 'the boundary between the researcher and the research subject as an exercise of disciplinary power (Ackerly and True, 2008: 698).' In practice, this has resulted in me examining the impact of both 'similarities and differences' between participants and how my own identity and reason for investigation might affect the participants' responses or behaviours (Bryne, 2004: 185). This 'on-going self-reflection' has allowed me to assess the 'multiplicity' of the social processes revealed by the participants responses as and when they present themselves (Ackerly and True, 2008: 699). This study is designed to uncover knowledge beyond the 'dominant institutional cultures' that the Prevent duty is a component of, and to do so effectively I have had to acknowledge my own place within that hierarchy (Ackerly and True, 2008: 700-701).

The use of In-depth qualitative interviewing has allowed me to make objective observations of not only the social constructs surrounding the problematic presented by Prevent, but also the personal experiences of each participant – which act as evidence of the performance of

those social constructs in real world settings (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006: 484-485). This gives the study a deeper understanding of what entrenches such social constructs within the schematic, in this case the Prevent statutory duty within localised contexts. Although the 'objects' of our assessments differ, both the researcher and the interviewee share the same epistemological position, that of the assessor (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006: 486). This adds value to the responses overall because the discussion is not being led by the interviewer's predispositions. The knowledge created from the participants responses is not outlined by the theoretical framework but can be confidently used to test it – with a less fear of producing a *false positive* relationship (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006: 487).

The exploratory nature of this piece of research requires a semi-structured approach to the interview process. An interview schedule is employed, however deviation from this has been encouraged upon the basis of the relevance of the topic under discussion. The interview schedules have been designed to engage with the research questions and each interview is structured around the key areas of enquiry (For an example of the interview transcripts used by this study for each cohort, see appendix 2). Each script varies depending on the level in which Prevent is implemented based on their job role. Context is paramount to the success of each interview which have been tailored individually, with the research questions remaining the core line of enquiry. All interviews have been audio recorded and transcribed. The interview data itself has gone through a CDA analysis, details of which can be found in the following subsections.

4.3.2. Interview data analysis:

May (2011: 153-154) denotes that an 'ethnographic understanding' of the participants must be reached prior to the first phase of data analysis. Each interview is situational and should be treated as such when categorising responses. For instance, data collated from participants from educational bodies, such as those working within the LA, is a mixture of 'performance' responses i.e. those formed through the entrenched understanding of the Prevent policy facilitated through their daily work-related activities and their personal/professional understanding and critique formed from their own unique life courses. Both are equally important to understanding the dynamics at play throughout the implementation of the Prevent statutory duty but should be understood in proximity of each other rather than as one homogeneous dataset. In effect, the relationship between both sets of data, both from an operational and theoretical viewpoint is an important variable.

The interview data has been thematically analysed. Seal (2016: 445) states that the starting point of any form of thematic analysis is relating the data obtained throughout the study to the understanding of the problematic that caused the investigation to be conducted in the first place. As has been ascertained at length throughout the previous chapters, the theoretical underpinnings of governmentality in relation to contemporary CVE initiatives such as Prevent is the core understanding of this investigation and any data yielded has been obtained with this theoretical principle in mind. Equally, Bourdieu's (1996: 184)

concept of the 'educational field' as the ideal bureaucratic mechanism to disseminate State doctrine is also being used to create understanding within the data analysis.

The process of governmentality is not being assessed by this investigation. I am overtly proclaiming governmentality as the driving mechanism behind all social policy, Prevent included. All coded data is both situational and framed through the analytical lens of governmentality. This gives the data meaning beyond a simple 'code book' of findings, a criticism that can be levied at the predominant narrative set by CVE initiatives such as Prevent and the epistemic research community that underpins it with the *knowledges* it creates (Seal, 2016: 448). The themes found throughout the coding process have been formed with explicit regard to the overall research questions. Although patterns within the data that do not fit this line of enquiry have not been ignored, they have been prioritised according to their explanatory value to the overall schematic of governmentality and the breakdown of this found within the research questions.

4.3.3. Theoretical focus

The analysis process commenced with the first stage of coding. The interview transcripts were initially scouted for emergent themes that were related to the overall research questions – which form the basis of the coding schematic. The first stage analysis was then embedded by creating the second, more formal stage of analysis, where the praxis of governmentality was used to elicit a framework of understanding that can be used to

navigate the data. The impact of governmentality and its processes on the work of practitioners within the LA is a key measure of this study. Although participants may not be actively aware of the Foucauldian concept, they have offered many observations of its processes that are worthy of analysis.

The second level of analysis has grounded the findings within the praxis of what Foucault (1978: 221) would describe as the 'genealogy' of state or *governmentality*, further described by Dean (2010: 52) and Lemke (2019: 153) as the balance between the biopolitical and ideological pretences of contemporary governance and how this relates to security mechanisms – in this case Prevent and its statutory duty. I have also utilised Bourdieu's (1996: 183-84) concept of the 'bureaucratic fields' of State, specifically how government uses the field of education to disseminate its ideology through instruction.

This analytical schematic has been applied across all cohorts found within the dataset. The explanatory value of governmentality, and particularly its pastoral nature, has been used in this instance to navigate the Prevent statutory duty and the actors that both enact and participate within its praxis. The construction of ideal types is central to the CVE focus of Prevent, which is based upon the methodological underpinnings of radicalisation theory. This process has become a central focus of this study's mode of enquiry. An understanding of the bureaucratic languages of government is essential to understanding the relationships between the cohorts targeted by this study. Finally, education is the both the primary target of the Prevent statutory duty and its core *modus operandi*, enabled through the safeguarding agendas that shape the practice of educators. Bourdieu's (1996: 184)

conception of the field of education acting as an enabler of state level doctrine, evidenced by the delivery of FBV, has also informed the data analysis.

4.3.4. *Realities of data collection*

The Prevent duty must negotiate two distinct discourses: firstly its 'public transcript', that is to say the narrative it wishes to convey as an instrument of public safety, and secondly the 'hidden transcripts' or the implicit realities of the demographics it targets as *risks* to the social that fall beyond the capabilities of its surveillance apparatus (Scott, 1990: 18). Those in charge of enacting Prevent at the LA level (i.e. Prevent managers) are habitually concerned with identifying evidence of 'dissonant political culture' within their target demographics in order to subdue it (Scott, 1990: 19). As a result, Prevent managers are often distrustful of those who critically engage with the Prevent duty, particularly of those who have the agency of institutional apparatus (such as the university) that can legitimately challenge their own.

When I first started this study, I initiated the data collection within a tier 2 LA and the Prevent coordinator was my first point of contact. I began as I meant to go on, by expressing my intentions to critically engage with the Prevent duty as I found it to be ineffective and counterproductive. The Prevent coordinator of course respectfully disagreed with me and as a measure of goodwill, invited me to attend several training events and workshops that he ran within the community in the coming months. I duly accepted, out of courtesy more than

anything else. I believe this was an effort on his part to inculcate me into his 'pastoral' network – to 'steer' me with displays of his expertise (Foucault, 2004: 184). During this time we had several more discussions which lengthened out over a year. His terms for engagement with the project were initially quite narrow, but with careful negotiation – and several rewrites of the study research aims – I acquired his participation. My experience with all the other Prevent managers I engaged with was pretty much identical. Gaining their trust was a lengthy and protracted process. All of them wanted me to attend their training courses and workshops and all of them were very particular about how they would take part and what information they were willing to share.

My experience with education was a very different affair, with the vast majority of schools I approached very willing to engage with the project. I surmise this is largely due to my proximity to the 'educational field' via my association with the university setting that they to inhabit (Bourdieu, 1990: 132). I mainly engaged with Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSL) and Pastoral Leads because they are the members of staff on which the responsibility of the Prevent duty predominantly falls. One DSL in particular who worked for a secondary school with a sixth form in a tier 1 LA was very eager to share his experiences of working with his Prevent manager and with the Home Office directly. A particular challenge that I found when engaging with him (and the cohort in general) was that although he had acquired a lot of practical experience with the duty, he had little conception of how contentious some of its practices (such as FBV) could be for sections of his student cohort who fell within the target demographics of the duty.

Getting the attention of NGOs with a CVE focus was particularly hard to do. This should not come as a huge surprise as these organisations are largely economically motivated – time is money after all. I was lucky enough to acquire the participation of several high-profile NGOs.

A particular coup was a supranational NGO that had security clearance of the highest level – working with the Home Office, DfE and Foreign Office directly on all matters CVE. This was largely due to their ability to speak the language of governance, acting as a conduit of the ‘bio-economic reality’ of the CVE landscape that Prevent inhabits (Dean, 2010: 135-137). In the case of this particular NGO, it appears that they actively acquire this ‘lexicon’ of governance by employing personal from the public sphere (Lemke, 2019: 243). The participant I interviewed from this NGO – a project manager for a CVE programme that networks LAs across the world – was an ex Prevent coordinator from a tier 1 LA in London. She was surprisingly critical of Prevent at times; however one must assume that her services are only required if there are problems that her organisation can solve. It was this cohort where it was particularly difficult to ascertain the true meaning of statements – was the participant being critical because they guessed it was the position I took or because they actually believed this to be the case? I could not entirely be sure in this instance.

Engaging with CBOs and community advocates was similar in many ways to that with the Prevent managers. Potential participants were very wary of my intentions at first, but for very different reasons; the Prevent duty targets them by virtue of its ‘typologies’ of risk that heightens their vulnerability (Foucault, 2001: 221-222). There were also several instances where participants imparted sensitive information. For instance, one participant detailed

how he had been the subject of surveillance for several months due to a lecture he had given at a university about political Islam that had been leaked to the press, where what he had presented had been recorded, edited and deeply misrepresented. Ensuring the anonymity of all participants is of course paramount, however in these instances it was particularly important. This adds limitations to the analysis of data – on what one can report.

Engaging with the totality of the Prevent duty's populations is beset with difficulties. There is a wide spectrum of narratives that populate the duty's discourses and it can be difficult to adjudicate their relationships to one another. However, to appraise the Prevent duty in terms of its effectiveness as a mediator of risk, you must also evaluate the understanding of all actors involved in enacting it. Perhaps most importantly, you must also ensure that the voices of those targeted by Prevent – its vulnerable communities – are heard, because Prevent is very eager for those voices to be silenced.

4.4. Limitations

The data yielded within this study has been narrative rich. In some instances, it has been impossible to summarise the complexities of such discourse. This can be seen as a potential limitation to its applicability to the wider schematic under investigation. However, generalised applicability is not always a good thing, especially when critiquing social phenomena (Flyjberg, 2001: 84). The generalised narratives perpetuated by CVE initiatives

and the research that underpins it is the focus of this investigation. It falls short of dealing with the social milieu that surrounds acts of violent extremism and consequently does little to actually prevent them.

In order to mitigate the potential to overgeneralise, a distinction needs to be made between 'performance' data i.e. reiteration of organisational language to succeed a viewpoint on the Prevent statutory duty and that of personal/professional observations (May, 2011: 153-154). The same premise can also be ascribed to the nature of the interview structure. An interview in itself is a performance and is not a form of natural conversation. There is an assumption that no truths exist beyond the accounts expressed within their bounded contexts, when in reality this is clearly not the case (May, 2011: 156). Furthermore, not all the accounts recorded can be accurately posited as truthful. Equally, there may be circumstances shaping the experience of participants without their knowledge, which creates a scenario of misunderstanding that both the participant and interviewer are unaware of (May, 2011: 158).

I have attempted to combat this by adopting a semi structured interview design tailored to each participant to keep the premise of enquiry as open to natural discourse as possible without straying from the problematic at hand. Participants' responses have not been attributed to create a verbatim fact-based dataset, they have been analysed to determine the relationship between viewpoints, which has been grounded through the theoretical position of this thesis, governmentality. The data yielded throughout this study has undergone critical discourse analysis that has synthesised all the data collected into a

schematic that sheds light onto the interventions of Prevent and how the work of NGOs has affected both the operational aspects of LA departments and their stakeholders.

Finally, it also must be acknowledged that Prevent and its wider CVE focus holds both historical and contemporary social sensitivities that can skew perceptions, which inevitably inform actions. For Silverman (2004: 68), fully understanding the problematic under investigation within socio-political concerns is paramount to producing findings that are objective i.e. can transcend these realities by acknowledging them. This study has sought to do just that by framing the findings through the lens of governmentality. However, media accounts, social media practices and social prejudices also play a part outside of this narrative, even if they are shaped by them.

Throughout this investigation I have sought to illustrate such deviances when and where they arise, but it also must be acknowledged that such activity can be enacted beyond the researcher's gaze. With that in mind, this study has not proclaimed that it can provide a *catch all* description of the enactment of the Prevent statutory duty in each location, but it does provide a succinct and multi-faceted evaluation of its CVE mechanisms, the role research is playing/has played in its inception and its broader effects on the communities it targets.

This chapter has provided the rationale and operational details of the research strategy utilised by this study. It has also addressed the limitations of this research design and steps

taken to minimize their potential effects. The next chapter – Analysis: Prevent Managers – places the study within the context of the Prevent managers within the LA setting. I will discuss and analyses the variated responses of respondents tasked with facilitating the LA’s statutory responsibility to prevent violent extremism.

Chapter 5: Prevent Managers Analysis.

Foucault (2007: 102-105) indicates that the production of knowledge and the way it is used is primarily dictated by economic circumstances, which in turn are determined by biopolitical factors. All forms of governance must operate fiscally. This necessitates the continued reproduction of economically viable policy, which takes precedent over other measures of performance (Foucault, 2007: 109-111). In short, economic or 'market rationality' informs the evaluatory tools employed by all forms of biopower (Foucault, 2007: 269). This *raison d'être* incorporates issues of security that policies such as Prevent are designed to facilitate; it takes for granted that economic factors dictate the actions, and by proxy the capability for action, of both individuals and groups.

Thus far, this thesis has established the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality within the praxis of Prevent. It has also defined the primary focus of this study, a qualitative analysis of the individuals and actors that facilitate and are affected by Prevent and its statutory duty. In this first analysis chapter, the responses of Prevent managers will be examined. All LAs have a responsibility to implement Prevent but only a select number receive funding from the Home Office to employ specific Prevent managers. Whether an LA qualifies or not is dependent on their designated *threat level*. The threat level of each LA is quantified across three tiers, with tier 1 areas (highest threat level) receiving the most funding and tier 2 areas (heightened risk) receiving some funding dependent on need, whilst tier 3 areas are defined as only holding a *general* threat level and as a result receive no funding. In this case, the categorical differentiation of *heightened* risk

from the highest priority areas (tiers 1 and 2, respectively) is a conflation of pastoral and policing narratives, transforming the ‘pastoral of souls to the political government of men (Foucault, 2007: 227).’ In short, the ideological pretext of the supposed threat posed by those that populate areas outside the gaze of the LA’s conventional mechanisms is used as justification to bolster the State’s security apparatus with modes of surveillance.

The funding supplied by the Home Office is used to employ individuals to fit certain job roles and titles which can vary across LAs, yet their responsibilities remain broadly the same. For example, Prevent Coordinators are responsible for coordinating the delivery of the Prevent statutory duty across agencies with a safeguarding responsibility, businesses and targeted communities – generally widening the footprint of Prevent within the local. Prevent Education Officers (PEOs) have a much more focused responsibility – to disseminate Prevent across its primary targeted demographics: schools and education providers. They do so by placing themselves in a position of authority, mandated by the legal requirement for schools to adhere to the Prevent duty. However, PEOs primarily promote themselves as the educator’s collaborators. They posit that they are there to help educators to steer the *vulnerable*, those deemed to sit on the periphery of the ‘ecclesiastical authority’ of the ideology of the State – taking the form of Fundamental British Values (FBV) as its current guise (Foucault, 2007: 230).

This chapter and all subsequent analysis chapters will be structured around the individual research questions utilised by this study, which can be found on page 40. The cohort for this chapter offers an oversight of both Prevent Coordinators and PEOs. All respondents operate

in the South East of England; two come from tier 2 designated LAs on the South Coast and two come from tier 1 LAs in London. Pseudonyms will be used to ensure the anonymity of all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description of each participant found within this chapter can be found below:

The cohort:

- **Peter:** Peter is a Prevent Coordinator for a tier 2 LA in the South East and has held the post since its inception in 2015. He is in his late-30's and of British – Mediterranean descent. Peter is a seasoned community worker, having spent most of his working life employed by the LA in some capacity, most notably within the hate crime team and the community safety partnership before his tenure with Prevent.
- **William:** William is a PEO working for a tier two LA in the South East. He was the first person within the LA to hold the post, having been employed for just over one year. William is in his early-40's and of white British descent. His professional background is in primary education, with 18 years' experience – most recently as a headteacher.
- **Brian:** Brian is a PEO in his mid-30's for a tier one LA in London of white British descent. He has held the post for 2 years but has been involved within the delivery of

Prevent in the LA for around 4 years. Brian has a professional background in facilitating community development projects for both local government and NGOs.

- **Julian:** Julian is a newly promoted Prevent Coordinator and former senior PEO in his mid-30's in a tier one LA in London of white British descent. He was one of the first PEO's in the country and helped create the role in 2014. He previously worked as a religious education teacher where he held senior leadership and safeguarding responsibilities in a multitude of schools across London.

This study utilises the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to reveal how the pastoral and policing functions present themselves in the Prevent manager's accounts in response to their designated level of threat. Of particular interest is the dynamic between the paternalistic and authoritative functions of the Prevent managers and how much freedom they have to interpret their briefs. It will also incorporate the Bourdieusian concept of the bureaucratic field of education which is pertinent to understanding the role of PEOs who are essentially acting as both arbitrators and instructors of the moral code dictated by Prevent and its statutory duty. It will do this by discussing how the Prevent managers have made sense (and perhaps peace) with the dynamic between tolerance and intolerance, both within their practice and the formal representative of the *radical extremist* within the opaque mass of the community.

5.1. the Ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?

LAs are designated at risk on a tier basis, with tier 1 LAs being determined as harbouring the most risk and tier 2s having communities that pose a significant risk. Tier 1 and Tier 2 LAs are supplied with funding by the Home Office to employ specific Prevent focused personnel, but they still must bid for funding for specific events or activities pertinent to their role.

Julian, a newly appointed Prevent Coordinator and former senior PEO working for a tier 1 LA in London declares that *“different boroughs will get different amounts of funding depending on risk and threat”*, and that evidencing levels of risk is a key part of any funding bid he may make. It is also important to note that keeping one’s tier status is an ongoing concern for Prevent managers – if designation is lost, so too is the funding for their employment. When pressed on this issue, Peter, who is the Prevent Coordinator for a tier 2 LA on the south coast with a decade long work history of LA community work acknowledges that funding for his and other members of his teams’ roles are *“aligned to our risk.”* Building on Julian’s assertions, Peter denotes that being designated as *“a priority area has added value”* when applying for funding for projects from the Home Office. If tier status is transitional, a question is posed on how such status is both won and lost. All the respondents reported that they were heavily monitored, with their respective services being measured by quarterly performance indicators set by the Home office.

A problematic is raised here – it appears that the delivery of Prevent across LAs is not being applied objectively to accommodate the welfare of the citizens the duty has been set up to

serve. Instead, it appears to be operating based on threat level with the *need* being decided by designated agents of pastoral power. In this instance risk is being calculated on the grounds of market logic – the Prevent team with the best pitch receives the funding (Foucault, 2008: 243). Peter implies that successful funding bids are dependent on how well Prevent teams interpret the regular *“guidance coming out from the Home Office”*, which alludes to the pastoral nature of the implementation of Prevent’s methodology from central to local government (Foucault,2007: 123).

Brian, a PEO working within a tier 1 LA with an administrative background delivering community safety and safeguarding initiatives to London boroughs for 4 years, made clear that his role dictated that he bid for funding from the Home Office on a regular basis. Taking a similar position to Peter, Brian denotes that the Home Office regularly contact his and other Prevent teams within his network and *“come in and say this is what’s required”* to help generate ideas for projects they are willing to fund. Brian also made clear that the *“range of projects”* the Home Office funds can differ significantly in orientation and impact. Taking an essentially defensive posture, Brian purports that his team *“run community question events, like our supplementary Madrassa network”* which elicits to a more interventionist model that LAs are more accustomed to running in order to eliminate criminality by addressing the causes of crime they are used to dealing with, including youth engagement programmes where *“some sessions [are] run within schools in terms of specific workshops.”* Brian denotes that this activity all falls under the jurisdiction of the *“Prevent Advisory Group”* which he runs under the guidance of his Prevent Coordinator. The group works as a network between community-based organisations, schools, supplementary

Islamic education providers and community leaders to provide *“safeguarding guidance and governance”* across his target demographics. Brian acts proactively within this space, using social media platforms such as WhatsApp groups to ask questions like *“what’s the feeling within your communities, is there anything we can do.”* At this level, it is hard to discern what security imperative Brian is employing beyond the ‘relatively stable field of correlation’ between technologies and agencies being utilized to identify *problem* mentalities by inducing maximum visibility (Dean 2010: 37).

At this point in the interview with Brian, it became apparent that he may not be able to clearly discern any difference between the pastoral government of souls (winning hearts and minds), or the diagnosing of risk, an overtly policing function within Prevent. Brian’s concern was about a justification of oversight (*“making sure that all feeds in well”*) by process: *“it’s a formal process where you are writing a very detailed Word document or Excel spreadsheet which says why you’re doing this, loads of evidence into why you’re doing it.”* In this instance Brian must use information derived from projects to defend both his practice and his continued suitability for the role of PEO. Brian was asked what kinds of things he reports on to renew his contract, but this was met with resistance even at the most nominal, generic level.

Brian’s role as PEO is essentially determined by policing norms of knowledge production, a more strategic enterprise of collecting data on immanently *dangerous* elements within society by the officers of the state – *“you’ve got to show how it’s addressing the risk locally, and evidence is absolutely vital.”* Brian’s usefulness for the intelligence community lies in his

ability to inform on local bodies. He must provide *"loads of evidence."* A further question is raised – how confident is Brian that the information he is registering to renew his tenure or to fund projects from the Home Office is accurate? Brian is not particularly forthcoming on that question, but he does state that a *"broad selection of data and information"* is collated because *"we never know what [the Home Office] are going to ask in the future."* When pressed further, it becomes apparent that one of Brian's primary concerns is providing evidence for question such as *"how many people have you trained, how many communities have you met with, how many meetings are you part of"* which are posed by the Home Office which then *"have to be reported back"* on a quarterly basis.

Brian is also keen to point out that he fosters close ties with the community and local schools, which he describes as *"key partners."* For Brian, this engagement acts as both a legitimiser of his practice and his role as the gatekeeper of 'knowledges' pertinent to his sphere of influence (Foucault, 2000: 219). At this juncture it is perhaps pertinent to discuss who exactly is all this 'knowledge' being collated for? (Foucault, 2002: 91). Brian is quick to mention that the community responses he collates *"don't just go into a vacuum, instead they are logged and written down, they're sent up the chain so they can have an impact at central government."* When asked who exactly *"central government"* were in real terms, Brian mentions the Home Office as the primary recipient of such data, but the DfE and Ofsted are also partners; these are all regulatory bodies with a vested interest in monitoring target populations to mitigate potential risks.

Brian is essentially reporting a hierarchy of responsibility, where the assessor, in this case the PEO, is being assessed by agencies deemed to be in receipt of a broader knowledge base than they themselves possess. The processes described by Brian are archetypical devices of 'pastoral power (Foucault, 2007: 123-125).' In essence, Prevent managers disseminate knowledges and practices across target demographics and the agencies that serve them, 'shepherding' their flock with ideological – yet broadly secular – proficiency (Dean, 2010: 89). Obedience becomes self-regulation. Prevent managers, service providers and citizens are held responsible for incorporating the 'wisdom' of the pastorate, in this case the Prevent duty and its creators the Home Office (and to a lesser extent its collaborators such as the DfE and Ofsted), into their own daily practices (Dean, 2010: 92).

The introduction of educational bodies by proxy of PEOs such as Brian envelopes the 'bureaucratic field' of education upon the security apparatus that Prevent embodies (Bourdieu, 1994: 2). He aids the assimilation of the duty within the 'established academic order' by facilitating the modification of 'school programmes', incentivising his activity by drawing attention to the 'social problem' posed by the threat of radical extremism and how that fits within the safeguarding responsibility of the school (Bourdieu, 1994: 2-3). This process of adaptation is expediated by the 'specific logic' of the State, which dictates that education as a 'field' acts as a natural progression to the pastoral nature of Prevent, which is formulaically identical to the educational process i.e. pastor - pastorate *vis-à-vis* teacher - student (Bourdieu, 2014: 4-5).

Peter was eager to describe a network of pastoral power overseen by the Home Office that links his LA with others across the region of the South East. He attends regular events held in London in *“some of the higher risk areas who come out with lots of different recommendations on what we should be doing.”* Peter is essentially describing a hierarchy of expertise set by the Home Office, where the practices of higher risk areas delineate their expertise over that of his team, although he would be unlikely to want to acknowledge it as such. The premise of expertise that the Prevent managers garner is often difficult for them to relinquish.

William, a PEO employed in a tier 2 LA also participates and sometimes delivers at Prevent education workshops that are run by the Home Office, both regionally and nationwide.

William, much like all of the participants within this cohort, is keen to promote any examples where he has contributed to the pastoral process; where he has been given the opportunity to disseminate his expertise by *“contributing to conferences sharing best practice.”* William legitimises his presence as the facilitator at such events by regularly collecting data from his interactions with LA agencies. In this instance, William’s ‘vocation’ is primarily one ‘of saving souls (Strenski, 1998: 359).’ He does so through the statement and repetition of the duty’s ‘truths’, its *“best practice”* (Tirkkonen, 2015: 306). This ‘ritual prescription’ William levies upon his audience is designed to locate the ideal site for him to position his own practice within the continuum of the ‘archaic’, subaltern behaviours of his target demographics and the ‘rational’ actions needed to participate within the community setting (Tirkkomen, 2015:306). He is equally aware that in order for him to prescribe the duty’s ‘truth’ across its communities he must be in possession of the ‘knowledges’ that can

be found within them, and the resources needed to maintain his own form of 'political power (Foucault, 2011: 200).' William collects his data to identify "*any gaps in training*" he could highlight to both his peers and the Home Office, which is often the first step in accruing the means to apply for further funding – resources needed to participate in Prevent's socio-political economy.

A key question is raised here - how much of this *secular pastorate* produced by Prevent is acting as a normative *in-group* system of belief; a system that is increasingly divorced from the social reality shared by the *objects* of their surveillance? Both Peter and William describe the focus of such conferences to centre on the needs of facilitators of the duty i.e. LA agencies such as education, and not on the respective needs of those deemed *vulnerable* within their respective LAs – ultimately the primary focus of their gaze. This conundrum could be partly explained by the responses of Brian who, similarly to William sees the regular Prevent network meetings as a means to acquire the knowledge necessary to make successful funding bids. Brian is also quick to point out that this is only one facet of being successful in getting funding and delineates the importance of monitoring each project that is undertaken. In sum, having a good track record of meeting the Home office's performance indicators with previous projects makes it much more likely that a LA will receive further funding for future ones. Collecting a "*broad selection of data and information*" is central to Brian's workstreams precisely for this reason.

Brian states that he is required to report back to the Home Office quarterly regarding the projects he is running, providing information, answering questions such as "*how much have*

we spent so far ... how many people have you trained.” To the outside observer, such indicators seem to focus on how successfully the Prevent agenda has been disseminated within LA agencies and the economic viability of each project rather than on the actual responses of the communities the duty purports to serve. Moreover, interacting with Prevent and its statutory duty is not met with much resistance from those it targets – primarily LA practitioners. This is likely due to their association with the Home Office and the effort they put into promoting their *expertise*.

Julian is a Prevent Coordinator and former PEO for a tier 1 LA in London. Much like the rest of the cohort he is not afraid to promote his professional credentials. He began his interview by asserting himself as one of the most experienced Prevent managers in the UK, who was *“now the longest person who’s being doing this in the country.”* One of Julian’s primary tasks was to assist in the management and deployment of new PEOs across the South East. His main responsibility is to *“coach”* new PEOs, who Julian conveys would *“come to meet [him] one-on-one”*, where he and other senior colleagues would share their resources (lesson plans, presentations etc.) and teach the new PEOs about the ethos of the role and the practicalities of the job. The primary focus of such meetings is to convey the importance of *“monitoring”* to the role, which involves the PEO completing *“checklists”* that are designed to evaluate the scale at which a partner organisations or school comply with the duty. When pressed on what such *“checklists”* look like in reality, Julian wasn’t particularly forthcoming – something he has in common with the rest of the cohort who were cautious about divulging the specificity of their monitoring techniques.

Julian's responses raise a pivotal question – why is it so important for a PEO to assess the compliance of schools? Schools are legally required to comply with the Prevent duty and are already assessed on this via Ofsted inspection. When this question was posed to William, he revealed that the rescission of LAs across the educational landscape, where academy trusts have taken the place of LA-run schools has raised concerns about whether academies can *“effectively risk manage.”* When pressed further, William explains that *“trusts have their own safeguarding team, part of that will be their own Prevent experts”* and as such there is the possibility that *“some of these central messages aren't always clearly communicated.”* The problem William faces in terms of the growth of autonomous service provision that is in competition with his own is compounded by the fact such activity is encouraged by the State. However, the State does impose some caveats – it demands that such agencies produce ‘contributions to the knowledge of the state’ whilst also promoting the State’s ‘particular vision’ upon their delivery (Bourdieu, 1994: 3-4).

It is also important to note that the precarious nature of William's tenure – where his continued employment is largely based upon his ability to create and foster pastoral relationships with schools could also play a part in his willingness to view such autonomy or diversity of provision in the field of education as problematic. When William was asked how he creates links with academy trusts that already employ their own experts he was keen to promote his connections to the Home Office; he is the only individual within the LA that possessed the knowledge that came with the *“Home Office seal of approval.”* William denotes that only he and his fellow Prevent managers can ensure that the delivery of the duty is *“proportionate”* to need. Guaranteeing *“the right kind of message”* is essential to this

task and proximity to the Home Office – the architects of the duty itself is critical in this instance. Although William does not outrightly state this, he is indirectly alluding to the differences in provision across tier threat level LAs and their respective abilities to deliver the duty in line with their capacity and need. In reality there is very little variation in terms of the focus and delivery of the duty across tier levels. The only discernible differences is the manpower LAs have at their disposal to “*compile data*” – crucial for ensuring the duty’s viability in terms of maintaining direct funding.

The taxonomy of pastoral power exhibited by Julian and William ultimately formulates across four primary locus; firstly ‘ontology’ or deciding on the nature of discourse, which can be seen in the example set by William who is actively looking to subvert the *expertise* of others within his sphere of influence and replace it with his own, which in turn is guided by the Home Office’s central ‘knowledges (Dean, 2010: 26).’ Secondly – ‘ascetics’ – or more simply what resources are available to meet this need. For example, Julian and his senior colleagues in tier 1 areas are acting as a primary resource to guide less senior PEOs such as William who interact with each other through networking groups. Thirdly, ‘deontology’ or identifying weaknesses in the approach and creating mechanisms to negate them, in this case, the PEO network acts as a constant connection between PEOs, allowing them to share and assess each other’s work to ensure some level of continuity that could be an issue when working over such a large area. PEOs in this instance are employing a ‘regulatory principle’ that is pastoral in nature, using ‘pedagogical apparatus’ to shape their practices through a ‘network of authority’ that acts as an orthodoxy of sorts (Foucault, 1984b: 377-378). Finally, ‘teleology’ which is agreeing on an end goal and a way of measuring outputs which is

enabled by the monitoring process and the attempt to imbed continuity across PEOs by getting them to learn how to complete this from more senior members of the network (Dean, 2010: 27).

Although Dean's (2010: 27) understanding of pastoral power goes some way to explaining the apparatus of the Prevent duty and the actions of those tasked with enacting it, it does not explain the failure of reality to shape the deontological process. Prevent continues to fall short of its aims because it is constructed on weak theoretical foundations which are based on limited empirical evidence – yet it persists. It could be argued that this is the case because the terrorist *threat* the Prevent strategy is designed to pre-empt necessitates an abstraction of the surveilling consciousness from material reality (Foucault, 2007: 110). Simply put, any counterfactual evidence is not permitted to enter the debate on Prevent at the policy making level. Prevent, acting as a reactive policy to a threat to the biopolitical and by proxy the state's legitimacy to govern, is primarily concerned with maintaining continuity, whatever the cost. That is what such a teleology entails, a monistic discourse that is designed to resist infiltration of any dialogues that weaken its resolve.

The field of education is the site that infractions against the doctrine of state are most likely to arise (Bourdieu, 2014: 11-12). As such, Prevent is placed in the hands of its custodians, who in this instance take the shape of PEOs such as William and Brian who use the pastoral network, with the Home Office at its apex, to facilitate the 'symbolic power' of the State. They do so to both legitimise their positions of authority and to replicate said power within the educational field (Loyal, 2017: 83). Furthermore, the 'cultural capital' of the threat of an

act of terrorism would outweigh any prospective frailties of Prevent's delivery (Bourdieu, 1996: 264). In essence, Prevent relies on the notion that it is better to be safe than sorry. It mobilises this sentiment by creating an evidence base to perpetuate its theoretical underpinnings – radicalisation theory.

Radicalisation theory features heavily within the Prevent manager's worldview. At one level, this is self-evident: the British state helped foster it by producing the modalities of evidence for the experiences of typical cases. Marc Sageman's radicalisation-as-process is one way the National Offender Management Service applied dubious metrics from psychology to assess the risk of terrorist recidivism among the prison population. The Prevent managers also adopt a version of this. Its principal function is to create a typology of risk that government, and by proxy Prevent managers can follow to facilitate their work.

The core problematic presented to the State is that risk is primarily a qualitative concern, one that can only be fully understood by delving into the minutiae of each case. However, the State's apparatus is only set up with a quantitative focus in mind; it is not capable of taking a case by case approach (Dean, 2010: 195). In response, the State creates narratives that perpetuate the responsibility of the individual to negate their own proclivity to risk.

This process – the 'individualization' of risk – is a unique feature of the neoliberal model of government (Dean, 2007: 63). Individuals are left to decipher both their own proneness to risk and the potential risk posed by others based upon the 'expert knowledges' afforded to them from government or their endorsed actors (Dean, 2007: 65). As such, a continuum of risk is constructed by the State with common junctures used as quantifiable measures

(Dean, 2010: 195-196). Prevent uses radicalisation theory as its own continuum of risk. It produces a roadmap that can be used by enactors or 'active citizens' of the statutory duty to construct a typology of risk. Furthermore, it legitimises modes of surveillance by purporting inherent altruistic qualities, to enable 'targeted populations' or those vulnerable to safeguard themselves from such risks (Dean, 2010: 195).

Prevent managers are tasked with engaging with targeted demographics as part of their remit from the Home Office, however the guidelines they are given are open to some interpretation. Brian came into his post following on from a senior PEO who had set up several networks within the Islamic community. Eager to make his own mark, Brian set out to grow this network and used the guidelines sent out by the Home Office to identify any gaps within it. He noticed that the Prevent team had no engagement with "*supplementary schools*", areas within the LA setting that the Home Office guidelines stipulate can often harbour extremism. As a solution, Brian set up a network of Madrasa (Islamic faith) schools who liaise with him on a regular basis – something he is very proud of. When Brian was pressed on what evidence the Home Office were basing their claim that supplementary/faith schools are particularly vulnerable to extremism he was unable to give a clear answer. Brian proclaims that the reason Madrasa schools were targeted was not because he thought they were "*some hotbed of extremists*", but rather "*because they're the best equipped to address the narratives pedalled by groups like Daesh and Al-Qaeda.*" As the conversation progressed, Brian highlighted that his primary objective was to make the recruitment process of the Madrasa schools "*more robust*" and to instil safeguarding

mechanisms that would reduce the likelihood of “*someone with extremist views coming through*” within the Madrasa setting.

For Brian, prevention is better than cure. The radicalisation theory he is using to substantiate his practice predicates that individuals or groups are susceptible to extremism via risk factors which are beyond the control of the vulnerable, an accident waiting to happen. In this instance, Prevent is effectively acting as an extension of the ‘insurance technologies’ of the State, which utilises radicalisation theory to create a hierarchy of risk; functioning at the intersection of the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ within the biopolitical schema (Lemke, 2019: 216-218). This technique of governance – its management of risk – is born from the emergence of ‘individualization’ as a priority of neo-liberalism, the modus operandi of contemporary government (Dean, 2007: 74).

The drive to promote ‘self-governance’ above that of a unilateral consensus on behaviours is designed to create the conditions for the economy to grow and to create (potentially) an infinite number of new markets to exploit (Dean, 2007: 76). Conversely, this creates an infinite number of possible *risky* outcomes, which insurance technologies have been designed to offset (Dean, 2007: 78). The basic premise of insurance is to safeguard the individual (or bodies of individuals) from accidental harm, with the probability of their coming into harm deciding the premium they must pay to insure themselves against it (Lemke, 2019: 217). In the case of the Madrasa network, the premium Brian exacts is twofold: firstly the Madrasa’s facilitate the collection of data for the purposes of his continued employment with the Home Office, which in turn allows him access to their

curriculum, details on whom they chose to employ to deliver it and admittance to the communities they deliver it to. Secondly, the Madrasas offer up compliance to Brian by allowing him to shape their practice through the medium of training. However, a question is posed – who (or what) exactly are the Madrasas insuring themselves against? Is it the potential extremist within their midst or the perpetual obligation of the State placed upon the Islamic community in the shape of Prevent?

Prevent has introduced a pre-criminal space that disproportionately targets vulnerable communities, making them suspects of crimes that have not yet been committed. When William was asked to state his position on this perspective he acknowledged that it was problematic, but was quick to distance himself and Prevent as a whole from any wrongdoing: *“I think in the Prevent world what we’re asking people to do is to support individuals where they notice something. We are talking about an arena where people haven’t done anything wrong yet, we’re just responding to behaviours that we’re seeing.”* In this instance William is qualifying his work through the typology of risk produced by Prevent, which is primarily based around and through discourse. The nature of statements and wider expression of communities deemed at risk are effectively graded against how closely they fit or do not fit the ‘ideal type’ constructed by the experts in William’s *“Prevent world”* (Foucault, 2002: 30). This in practice makes Prevent a hermeneutical mechanism of governance. A language of expertise is constructed and the enactor of policy, in this case William, must determine the subjective risk from the function (Lemke, 2019: 40).

Similarly to Brian, Julian took it upon himself to deliver training to all the education providers within his LA, including sixth form colleges, primary and secondary schools, “*even the nurseries.*” Julian essentially believes that schools are an ongoing security concern – something he is uniquely positioned to insure against. Julian went onto explain that he saw his obligation to the duty and the schools he operated within to be directly related to their own safeguarding agendas. Julian also considers it his responsibility to inform the curriculum being taught within the classroom setting, placing emphasis on the subject areas of ICT, RE and PSHE – which he describes as the ‘*base*’ subject areas schools can use to showcase their commitment to the statutory duty. For Julian, the stronger that ‘*base*’ is ‘*the fewer referrals there are going to be.*’

Julian was not willing or perhaps even able to divulge figures on how many children had been referred to the safeguarding board from the nursery setting, which cater to children as young as three. Prevent legitimises its existence in two main ways in this instance. Firstly, by proclaiming to teach the vulnerable to be less vulnerable, reducing the premium they pay to interact with society because of their *risky* status. Secondly, Prevent declares that it is reducing the amount of, or at least the potential for, acts of terror to safeguard society. Prevent is a mechanism of the securitization of probabilities, where actual liability is superseded by potential to be culpable (Lemke, 2019: 221-222). In this instance, Prevent, and the radicalisation methodology that underpins it is effectively being used as a formula for risk.

When Brian was asked how he utilises the radicalisation process in his work he went on to describe how his primary focus is to identify vulnerabilities within the target demographics in his LA and to communicate strategies to overcome them to whoever was charged with safeguarding them. For Brian, this is “*the key aspect of radicalisation*” as a methodological approach – to educate the vulnerable, to “*make them less vulnerable.*” When Brian was asked how he made his assessment on what vulnerability looked like in real terms he asserted that he would look for an absence of “*protective factors.*” Effectively, Brian is looking for any potential avenues where a vulnerable person/s could gain proximity to “*extremists*” without appropriate, state sanctioned safeguarding mechanisms in place. Common sense dictates that for Brian to make such a judgement he must first have a conception of whom exactly an extremist is. Brian, like the rest of the cohort, used several real-world examples of individuals (such as, Umar Haque, Shamina Begum, Ahmed Hassan etc.) convicted of terrorist offences to illustrate his points.

The stylization of the ‘delinquent’, which in the case of Prevent is the extremist, has its political advantages. Visual delinquency, which is the form extremism most often takes, be it verbally or through an act of terror, offers an opportunity for policing powers to create a portrait of the nefarious *other* in order to generate support from the populace (Lemke, 2019: 85). Prevent Managers often draw parallels with extremist groups and other forms of criminality deemed to be morally bankrupt to galvanise support. In this instance, Prevent is attempting to split the ‘popular classes’ by creating a typology of the criminal from marginalised groups on a moralistic basis (Foucault, 1977: 280).

For example, William made several links between forms of organised crime and acts of extremism and terrorism. He also makes a connection between the radicalisation process and other forms of grooming that are more traditionally accepted within existing safeguarding protocols to aid its transition into the daily practices of schools and other LA agencies. Similarly to Brian, William saw his primary objective to highlight vulnerabilities within target demographics to the service providers working within them. What was particularly interesting about William's perception of the extremist's grooming rationale was how they coalesced with his own methods. For William, the extremist groomers were also "*looking for vulnerabilities, people who can be manipulated.*" William would argue that his methods are not designed to cause the vulnerable individual any harm and are instead being utilised to guide them, shepherd them. Fundamentally, William and his peers are endeavouring to steer the 'trajectory' of persons of interest away from the 'deviant (Bourdieu, 1996: 184).' The potential benefits to the individual in doing so are sold by the likes of William and his fellow Prevent managers as a chance to improve one's 'cultural capital' to community leaders, however it is unlikely that they would describe it as such in their own terms (Bourdieu, 1996: 186).

The Prevent managers responses show how the production of knowledges under the duty is rooted within the ideological position of the State. This is dispersed and graded across targeted institutions by the Prevent managers, cementing together the constitute apparatus of the bureaucratic education field that best fulfil its means of reproduction. In the next section of this chapter, this process will be looked at in more detail; how exactly is Prevent reproduced by its target agencies in real terms?

5.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?

For Foucault (2000: 212) the strength of pastoral forms of government are based upon the knowledges of those that wield it. Although it is similar to Patristic authorities in the sense that the knowledges of power are safeguarded by the select few experts, it differs in the fact that the knowledge in which it is founded has to be material, measurable, and ultimately provable to those that seek to scrutinise it. However, the scope given to those who wish to scrutinise the knowledge base of pastoral governance structures is limited by the ideology that interlaces them (Lemke, 2019: 164). Prevent operates in the same manner, it uses mechanisms such as the safeguarding agenda to proliferate its objectives. Practitioners are less likely to question Prevent's credentials because the principles of safeguarding the vulnerable communities and individuals they serve is ingrained in their practice. As such, Prevent managers are eager to streamline their practices into pre-existing safeguarding mechanisms wherever possible.

When asked what were his biggest successes whilst in his post as Prevent Coordinator, Peter was particularly proud of the fact that he had embedded Prevent within the safeguarding agenda of partner organisations, proclaiming his and his team's efforts have enabled Prevent to "*become part of the safeguarding language*" spoken within the LA. For Peter to do this, he had to ensure "*that people understand that vulnerability [to radicalisation] is present in young people.*" If a critical standpoint is taken to Peter's assertion, a question is posed: are all young people vulnerable to radicalisation? Vulnerability is a relative concept,

as is the disputed concept of resilience to vulnerabilities. Such discourse is motivated by a new industry of ‘humanized securitization (Amar, 2013: 7).’ The ‘juridical personalism’ or the shift towards viewing security through the lenses of individual responsibility has led to various actors, both State and private, having to create a language of expertise that coalesced with their own capacity to act. In real terms, this has led to practitioners on the ground having to find the best fit for their services in order to proliferate them. Often, this discourse takes a ‘moral’ standpoint (Amar, 2013: 7-8).

Peter’s focus on the perceived vulnerability of young people, coupled with the tendency of the Prevent managers to draw comparisons with radicalisation theory and traditional forms of grooming (such as sexual exploitation, gangs, drugs etc.), is an exercise designed to manipulate the morality of education practitioners in order for them to accept the Prevent agenda. This gives Prevent managers the licence to diffuse its normative philosophy through the mechanisms of other LA agencies. Prevent Coordinators are agents of diffusion in such instances, or agents of the ‘coaching’ of Prevent’s CVE normative discourse, which can be difficult for the uninitiated to understand because it is shrouded in technical and legal jargon. In short, they demystify the bureaucratic language that underpins the Prevent’s statutory duty to those who are tasked with enacting it, which legitimises their role as the expert in their relationships with their partner LA agencies (Dean, 2010: 108 -110).

For William, one of the most important functions of his work is embedding the Prevent ecosystem within each school in his caseload and assessing their respective Designated Safeguarding Lead’s (DSL) level of understanding – topping up the Prevent provision as and

where necessary. William views each school's delivery of the Prevent agenda to be *"somewhere on a continuum of Prevent."* William described how he would assess each partner school by questioning them, deciding on their level of understanding *"through the responses that they gave [him]."* He would pay attention to whether *"they were aware of local risks, or whether they had something in their curriculum."* In this instance, William is acting as the mediator of expertise – as an agent of pastoral power administering to his flock; he is deciphering the code of conduct by directing behaviour (Foucault, 2007: 123). William and his counterparts facilitate this role by creating a network of quasi-experts within the partner organisations and schools. For example, William prefers to use existing personnel to administer the Prevent statutory duty wherever possible, tutoring professionals that already work with the target demographics with specific Prevent training. In short, William uses these key personal to facilitate the Prevent agenda for himself. He describes this activity as *"upskilling"*, allowing him and his team to *"work through"* that practitioner by proxy.

One of the reasons Prevent managers may want to operate in this way is because it can create pathways to new information. Prevent works across two main workstreams: firstly to disseminate ideology deemed favourable by the Home Office to displace ideologies it deems unfavourable and secondly to create indices and databases, creating new areas of knowledge and ultimately expertise. Foucault (1977: 224) observes that the interrelation between the accumulation of knowledge and the increase in power is exponential; knowledge truly is power. Prevent has been designed to simultaneously repurpose the 'subjugated' but also learn more about them. It creates a 'corpus of knowledge' that

reinforces and extends the effects of government and the power that they wield (Lemke, 2019: 77).

Nevertheless, programmes of governance such as Prevent must assert they understand the reality of the demographics they are designed for to garner biopolitical legitimacy (Lemke, 2019: 149). If a programme of governance is to satisfy such realities, they must first be rendered 'programmable.' The phenomena are not actually the subject of analysis but a facet of it, a production. In the case of Prevent, it proposes that there are tangible communities of people vulnerable to radicalisation that are identifiable through arbitrary factors when there is little to no evidence that this is the case. Effectively, such factors generate the 'intellectual transformation of reality' which is readily replicated by political institutions because it provides a rationale of both discourse and practice that fits the modalities they are accustomed to (Lemke, 2019: 149). Although such forms of practice are not formed in total reality, they do have real world effects that end up shaping reality (Foucault, 200: 346). Prevent is, at its most basic elements, a programme of social engineering. Whether or not there is any basis for its assertion that there are communities vulnerable to radicalisation is a moot point to those responsible for executing it. These communities have been formed nonetheless and, although loosely, have become homogenous groupings that do exist in reality. One way Prevent tries to socially engineer its moral positioning is through the agency of those affected by extremism.

All the Prevent managers mentioned their work with "*formers*", individuals who were formally involved in extremist groups who now promote CVE discourse as part of some

advocacy group. Interestingly, most of these “*formers*” came from “*ex Far-Right*” backgrounds and presented workshops of their experiences at schools and colleges. When Peter was asked why that was the case, he was happy to point out to me several Islamic focused NGOs that offer similar services. When probed further on if he had approached any of these groups, he decided to talk about a couple of events he had helped organise alongside a local NGO, where victims of terrorist attacks came along to speak to a local FE college. Michael Haynes presented at one of the events, the brother of David Haynes, a humanitarian aid worker executed by ISIS in 2014. What is particularly interesting about these two examples is that the story of Islamic forms of terrorism and extremism were told from the perspective of its victim, however the experiences of Far-Right extremists were being told from a first-hand perspective. One is a story of the ultimate deviant that can never be truly forgiven, the other is a story of the long road to redemption that can only be avoided if those attending listen.

Dean (2010: 96-98) denotes that there are special roles for ‘outsiders’ that can potentially conform to the dominant form of pastoral power who were once classed as interlopers. They are used as positive examples for reform; models of what to become or as negative specimens, what not to be. As such, citizenship is based on the principles of exclusion – it is defined by what it is not (Dean, 2010: 98-99). It is also important to note that biopolitical emergencies – such as extremism and acts of terrorism – enable the politics of prejudice. When an act of violence is committed by a deviant, society looks for the most obvious fragmentation from itself to delineate a difference between the enactor and themselves; an attempt to know one’s enemy by knowing oneself (Foucault, 2004a: 254).

Government will reflect society in such instances. Prevent is an example of this in action. Its hierarchy of risk is constructed upon racial and cultural lines. Although it has made efforts to incorporate the risk that Far-Right elements of society have within its schematic, the Home Office specifically target areas with a high Muslim population based on little to no evidence that this makes them vulnerable to extremism. The Home Office, and by proxy, its agents the Prevent managers, also ignore the role government has played in creating the conditions deemed to have made Muslim communities vulnerable in the first place. Institutional racism, poor social, economic, and mental health outcomes have all played a part in increasing the vulnerability of marginalised communities such as the UK Muslim population but are roundly ignored by the Prevent managers in their training and delivery. The typology of risk becomes less about identifying conditions of vulnerability and more about reduction of accountability (Lemke, 2019: 238).

In sum, the reproduction of Prevent's surveillance apparatus within the localised setting is an exercise designed to dilute responsibility across agencies and individuals; to create a hydra of liability, where the body of the State is buried beneath the oleaginous mass of its constituent agencies. However, in order to do this effectively Prevent must have a modicum of flexibility. In the next section, this will be analysed in more detail.

5.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?

Education providers have little choice but to adopt the Prevent duty as it is a statutory requirement but there are community groups that lie outside this area that do engage with Prevent to varying degrees. The success of such interaction is reliant on Prevent managers creating avenues for dialogue. Peter denotes that the “*brand*” of Prevent has stopped him from engaging with community groups in the past. Peter divulges further that a large amount of his time early in his tenure was taken up convincing his stakeholders that “*there needs to be a preventative point to this issue.*” In short, Peter and his contemporaries must *sell* Prevent to its target demographics to embed the ‘knowledges’ it deems to be true.

Foucault (1982: 212) reasons that the language of contemporary governance is dictated by the societal conception of ‘truth’, or to be more precise, to convince those that they govern that the State is the guardian of the ‘truth.’ The form of power they exercise makes individuals ‘subjects’ of those ‘truths.’ Moreover, it is the government’s job to construct an ‘order of the true’ or a regime of truth (Foucault, 1984b: 72). The construction of this ‘truth regime’ must be facilitated by a system of governance that allows the ‘truth’ to be distinguished from falsehoods. This is the role of the expert, using the apparatus of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it as the cornerstone of their legitimacy (Foucault, 1984b: 73). The expert is employed by the State to ‘evaluate and approve’ the data collected by its agencies to permit the development of the State’s technologies of performance (Beck, 1992: 229). Prevent is one such performative technology, an

‘information technology’ to be exact, that seeks to make target populations ‘intelligible and evaluable’ in order to perpetuate its continued existence (Beck, 1992: 234).

The consumption of this industry of truth is the basis of Prevent’s economy; the industry of knowledge its *experts* administer generate its capital. Its central truth is that violent extremism acts like a pathogen and that there are vulnerable communities within society that are particularly susceptible to it. To make itself operational, it needs to sell this truth to frontline staff from education, LA agencies and community groups who work or may encounter *vulnerable* communities.

For Brian, the importance of community engagement is “*crucial*” to his team, with a clear focus placed upon embedding his team within the community, which Brian describes as a “*key partner*.” When questioned as to why community engagement was so key to his workstreams, Brian was quick to point out that “*these people are not just yes men and women, these are people who will be challenging and ask questions*.” Brian was pressed further on what he meant by this statement. He claimed that it was paramount for him to demystify the Prevent programme – to challenge any “*anti-Prevent feeling*” that might be present within his target demographics. For Brian, there was little to no anti Prevent sentiment within his LA, something he puts down to “*the fact that community engagement has been [made] a priority*.” Brian was then asked how he measured the outputs of his community engagement activities. He pointed out that the responses of community advocates were “*logged and written down*.” When questioned on how this data is utilised,

Brian revealed that the responses are” sent *up the chain..... it gets passed up to Home Office, or the Department for Education, or Ofsted.*”

In Brian’s responses he makes the point that interactions (both negative and positive) with community groups become information that is passed on back to the Home Office, which in itself is a form of the codification of ‘counter conduct (Foucault, 1982: 220).’ In short, ‘counter conduct’ is an instance where the moral code or lexicon of governance structures is questioned (Foucault, 2007: 202). This can take both passive and proactive forms depending on the actor/s involved. The most stable forms of ‘counter conduct’ are procedural and take root over a significant period of time, becoming less radical as time progress when a middle ground is reached (Foucault, 2007: 194-196). The Community groups liaising with Brian and his Prevent team are an example of this form of governance where resistance has become pacified.

There are several other examples of similar positions taken by all the other Prevent Managers interviewed. For instance, Peter indicates that his “*community focused*” engagement work has allowed him to be more “*flexible*” in his approach to “*organisations the duty doesn’t fall on, like youth groups or mosques*” who he denotes can sometimes be resistant to the aims of his projects. Julian created school-parent coffee mornings within schools with a large Muslim demographic where he would liaise with the parents that were uncomfortable with certain aspects of the FBV curriculum being taught to their children. In these sessions he would seek to allay their concerns, by offering to change aspects of its delivery if he thought that they had “*a point.*” However, Julian was also careful to mention

that he would often *“stick to his guns”* and try to explain why aspects of the FBV agenda are important, which he would then *“back up with the LA values and the school values”* which broadly align with FBV. In short, Julian’s coffee mornings were being used to subvert and pacify any resistance to its core agenda within the target schools – to promote FBV and the wider CVE Prevent framework. In this instance, Julian was willing to modify some of this agenda to ensure that this core premise was instilled.

The conflict between the ‘technologies of domination’ and the ‘technologies of the self’ that drive the production of knowledges in policies such as Prevent are difficult to solve for those tasked with steering them (Foucault, 1982: 219). In one instance, Prevent is acting as the conduit of pastoral power that is designed to lead the targeted demographics, sometimes through coercion, towards behaviours it deems appropriate. In juxtaposition, it requires those it wishes to control to create new knowledges and technologies for it to act reflexively to an everchanging societal reality. Therefore, for Prevent managers to assert their authority over those it is required to govern they must be able to navigate the near infinite ‘field of possibilities’ they could encounter (Foucault, 1982: 220). The narrative and mechanisms they wish to embed must be easily replicated and as such should be straightforward to modify (Foucault, 1982: 222). Julian acknowledges that he is competing with many other pressures put upon education providers and as such needs to make the duty and the resources he creates as accessible and flexible as he can to ensure uptake. He makes the point that the resources he provides *“have to be creative”* and modifiable to fit within the schema of the existing curriculum, which is delivered differently from school to school. In short, Prevent has to compete with a multitude of other forms of bureaucracy put upon

schools. Peter also acknowledges that national level NGOs input at the LA level is mostly positive, however it can sometimes undermine the work that he does because it is not specific to the localised community setting. Peter divulges that he “*would have liked to have developed more locally-based projects*” however the funding of the NGOs came from the Home Office and he had little scope to steer their activities, which he deemed could sometimes be too general in their approach.

Foucault (2008: 20) argues that liberal forms of governance and the policy that they create is formed on the praxis that there is ‘too much government.’ In this instance, the role of government is to position itself out of the equation of any societal problematic and let society evolve itself, to teach society to swim rather than to stop it sinking (Lemke, 2019: 177). Overtures of the oft-cited invisible hand of Adam Smith aside, the art of government in this instance is not testing the limits of power but of limiting the power of society to hold it to account (Foucault, 2008: 22). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Prevent also operates upon these principles. The primary objective of Prevent Coordinators is to disseminate the responsibility of the statutory duty across as many mechanisms of society as it can. In fact, Prevent Coordinators often have a conflict of interest they need to balance when interacting with other forms of governance themselves. They are directly funded by the Home Office rather than the LA’s they work in, on the basis that the LA has a problem with extremism within its communities. Part of their funding requirements is to evidence they have made an impact on extremism within vulnerable communities. In short, part of the conditions of their continued employment is to prove that they are no longer needed.

During the data collection period of this investigation, Peter's LA lost its tier 2 status as the Home Office had deemed the threat level to have sufficiently reduced during his tenure. Effectively, Peter lost the funding for his role because he did too *good* a job. Peter remained in post as the LA still had a legal responsibility to the Prevent duty however his team was downsized from four personnel to just two and moved into another department. Peter suggests that the process of embedding the Prevent framework had slowed because the partner organisations became "*well aware of what the [statutory duty] is, they've had plans in place to deal with it*" which made his team's role less important as time progressed. Peter acknowledges that the volume of data he reported to the Home Office also reduced as time progressed. Similarly, Julian describes how the yearly surveys he sends out to local schools to assess their understanding of the duty struggled to get uptake, where "*the numbers of returns we get back have dropped off*" year on year. For Julian, the biggest challenge was how he was going to continue to "*monitor this*" information if he could not get access to it.

The precarity of the Prevent manager's employment is an example of the core weaknesses of contemporary forms of pastoral power; it is too reliant on the technologies of governance, in this case the production of data for its own stability and reproduction (Foucault, 1988a: 71). A vacuum is created when the flow of data or knowledges begins to ebb. The drive to create statistical data, to create an 'average of averages', is what underpins the practices of policy such as Prevent (Lemke, 2019: 194). In such instances, Prevent managers will likely fall back on the biopolitical value of the Prevent duty: to combat extremism, to encourage partner agencies to take part in their knowledge production (Foucault, 2007: 102-105).

Although targeted LA agencies are becoming savvier about the requirements of the Prevent duty, rejection of it still takes place. William believes that the pressurised environment such agencies occupy is the main reason that partner organisations may be difficult to engage with. Using schools as an example, William believes that the pressures of attainment tables, “Ofsted inspections, academy trust audits” and the like put the Prevent duty quite low down on the list of their priorities. William describes how he has to be reflexive when “promoting” the duty to garner the schools’ attention – he needs to make the duty as accessible as possible to enable its uptake. Foucault (2008: 243) acknowledges that the language of neo-liberalism has shaped the practices of government structures and its institutions – in this case schools – to prioritise their practices in order of their economic proprietary, not necessarily according to their primary function. As the Prevent duty does not impact directly on the schools’ budgets on a regular basis it tends to fall down the list of priorities to complete. In this instance, William has to become reflexive in his practice to ensure that his responsibilities are fulfilled and that he keeps dialogue with his target audiences open, to ensure the ‘technology of government’ – of which he is an agent – continues to operate (Dean, 2010: 146).

The Prevent managers’ responses illustrate that the statutory duty is flexible to a degree, however there are instances when they meet resistance to engagement that often fall out of their control. Third party organisations also play a part in this circumstance. On the one hand they can act as a conduit for engagement with target communities inaccessible to the Prevent managers and on the other they can act as a barrier to them by replicating their

work – making them redundant. In the next section of this chapter, this dynamic will be discussed in more detail.

5.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

All the Prevent managers mentioned that they regularly networked with the private sector, namely NGOs with a CVE focus and universities producing CVE-based research. Brian is quick to emphasise the importance of liaising with academia and private research organisations such as the Research and Development group (RAND) for him as well as the wider Prevent manager networks. The nature of this interaction takes various forms (such as mailing lists, attending conferences and bringing in speakers to the Prevent network events) however the core premise for this activity is the same across the board, to make *“sure that we’re at our optimum in terms of knowledge.”* When asked if Brian had reciprocated and had presented his own expertise to RAND, he exclaimed that he would jump at the opportunity, however he felt that he was *“not at that level.”* In this instance, Brian is very quick to point out the reverence he holds for these organisations, holding up their expertise as beyond his own capacity or knowledge base; he is trying to learn and replicate from them – to reach their *“level.”* In this instance, the third sector is legitimising Prevent. Its existence is predominantly supplanted by the problematic biopolitical realities of creating a pre-criminal space. It supports the technologies of government that generate radicalisation discourse, it becomes another *voice of reason* (Foucault, 2008: 295). It also defuses

responsibility beyond government and fits the ‘quasi – natural’ processes of the economy: NGOs operate based on generating a profit from their activity and therefore speak the same language as government (Dean, 2010: 63). In sum, they supply a ‘new frame of reference’ to the ‘complex whole’ without directly challenging prevailing political norms (Foucault, 2008: 312).

Of all the Prevent Managers interviewed, Julian had the most prolific network within the NGO sector. He has presented at RAND conferences and his work has allowed him to network on the international stage – sharing “*best practice*” with governments and NGOs based in Australia, the USA, the Netherlands and Germany. For him, this is an opportunity to create “different kinds of thinking.” Perhaps paradoxically, Julian denotes that this grouping of experts is “*quite a tight network..... all the project providers I know.*” In this statement, Julian is describing how he maintains close working relationships – this is a closed ecosystem of expertise that is hard to penetrate unless you are a legitimate actor. Prevent managers become gatekeepers of such knowledge, embodied by their access to funds that the third sector is eager to acquire.

However, NGOs can threaten the relevance of Prevent managers because they often emulate their practices and have the resources to reproduce them in a more tailored way. In response to this, William thinks that the legitimacy his connection to the LA offers negates this issue simply because they are the most direct conduit to the legislative apparatus put upon LA agencies in the form of the Prevent duty. For him, only he and his fellow Prevent managers can provide the “*correct training.*” Although there is a plethora of

“third party groups” offering similar services to William and his team, he believes the localised knowledge he possesses, along with his connection to the Home Office is the only way a partner organisation can be sure *“they’re getting the right kind of message.”*

Foucault (2008: 148) argues that the core institutional responsibility of the contemporary neo-liberal government is to provide the format for ‘economically rational’ freedoms beyond that of the State, even if it puts them in direct competition with mechanisms of the State. However, the praxis of economic freedom is controlled by the rule of law, therefore, such competition is regulated and rarely contradicts the overall nature of State mechanisms (Dean, 2010: 184). This becomes a ‘strategic game between liberties’ where there are several forces vying for authority through the semblance of expertise, regulated by both jurisprudence and the need for competitors that create the industry these personnel inhabit (Foucault, 1988b: 19). The work of NGOs parallels that of Prevent managers, and in some instances replicates it. This puts them in direct competition with Prevent managers for the attention of the statutory duty’s primary audiences and by proxy, State funding. In reaction to this, the enactors of the State at the community level (i.e. Prevent Coordinators) select NGOs to engage with. They share the marketplace with a select few NGOs that share their agenda and use them as allies to stave off further competition from NGOs that do not. In short, the ‘enterprise’, in this case the Prevent statutory duty and the Prevent managers tasked with facilitating it, become the ‘entrepreneur’ by facilitating the profiteering of select NGOs on the basis that they’re the most legitimate actors (Dean, 2010: 185-186).

All the Prevent Managers showed a preference for employing NGOs that had access to *formers*. Brian has used several private organisations that are approved by the Home Office at community question events “*to address vulnerabilities.*” He believes that *formers* are “*best placed*” to address the potential of extremism to take a foothold within a community setting. For Brian, the NGOs that offer this service “*promote a really powerful message*” that he and his team are not placed to provide unaided. Brian “*bids*” for these services from the Home Office directly – often in competition with other priority areas where people are also bidding at the same time, using the data he collects to provide proof that the NGO’s services are needed more in his LA than elsewhere. The language used by Brian shows how the typology of risk formed through the methodology of radicalisation theory has been embedded within the community work that Prevent managers coordinate. His comments also show how the language of commerce has permeated the Prevent landscape through the medium of NGOs.

The structuration of such forms of neo-liberal governance has also forced upon targeted demographics the responsibility of reformation. In order to participate freely within society they must prove they’re not a risk, which Foucault (1984a: 56) describes as the realisation of the care or ‘practices of the self.’ A core component of this ethos is that the targeted individual must acknowledge their own accountability as paramount and that they have a moral obligation to modify their risky behaviours for the betterment of themselves and wider society (Foucault, 1984a: 57). This is scaffolded by governance structures through mechanisms of social enterprise, through partnership programmes that encourage collaborative working with service providers, who are in turn working in proximity to

experts in the form of bureaucrats and professional bodies (Dean, 2010: 221). Prevent managers utilising NGOs who use *formers* within their targeted schools and community groups is a prime example of this in action.

This chapter has assessed the role of the typical Prevent manager. It has shown how they operate as both a conduit and component of the pastoral functions of power delineated by the State. They facilitate the security apparatus of government by embedding soft surveillance systems within LA agencies through ideological prepositions of vulnerability. Their work is a constant balancing act – attempting to equalise forms of sovereign power with that of the liberal, economic order of the contemporary State. Additionally, the bureaucratic mechanisms of the educational field have proven to be the primary site of the Prevent managers activity. This is the case because education, much like the structures governing Prevent, operates within the pastoral mechanisms of the State. In the next chapter, the educational field and the practitioners who inhabit it will be investigated in more detail. It will focus on the delivery of the Prevent statutory duty, which primarily acts as a safeguarding initiative, but it will also examine how state ideology is manufactured through the Fundamental British Values curriculum.

Chapter 6. Education; the Prevent statutory duty in action.

If the theoretical position of the State as a 'conceptual variable' is adopted by the would-be researcher, the relationship between its 'empirical value' and its socially constructed milieu becomes paramount (Nettl, 1968: 559-561). In short, the State and its languages of governance are dictated and created by humans and their reaction to both material and ideological *artefacts*. This produces a language of governance that is focused on predicting the reactions of the *citizen*, or the codification of the 'conduct of conduct (Foucault, 1982: 220).' The ability to predict the course of the biopolitical and its influence on governance can help shape it. However, this produces a conundrum for the State. Firstly, the State must circumscribe the *polis* it governs to cement its authority. At the same time, the State is obliged to give biopolitical systems the room they need to grow in order to fulfil the needs of the free market that underpin the State's legitimacy to govern – but only in ways desired by those that govern (Dean, 2010: 18). In sum, governance in the contemporary context has become the science of how 'groups or individuals might be directed' to better fulfil the aims of government (Foucault, 1982: 222). Furthermore, the 'educational field' that operates within the wider schema of the bureaucratic processes of government becomes the ideal site for the State to model the 'trajectory' of its citizens; it is shaping the biopolitical at its inception (Bourdieu, 1996: 184).

I argue that the UK government has infiltrated civil society in the way Bourdieu (1996: 184) has described the nature and function of the educational field, disseminate both nodes of surveillance and modalities of behaviour it deems appropriate. The Prevent statutory duty

demands that schools and other educational providers have a legal responsibility to report any signs of extremism within their stakeholder communities through the relevant safeguarding channels (Home Office, 2014: 4-5). Furthermore, Schools are legally obliged to promote a curriculum of Fundamental British Values (FBV) to their student populations. In the Home Office's (2014: 5) official guidelines on FBVs, they delineate that schools are responsible for promoting a commitment to the concepts of 'democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.' Schools are required to encourage 'spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development' through their FBV curriculum, which is measured by Ofsted inspection (Home Office, 2015: 11). The implementation of FBVs in this instance becomes the State's endeavour to promote its own form of 'symbolic capital' within its targeted demographics, who will ideally reproduce these narratives within the wider population (Bourdieu, 1994: 8-9). Such machinations of the State are an attempt to maintain its hegemony, to pre-empt any narratives that may challenge it (Loyal, 2017: 85).

Thus far, this thesis has established the explanatory value of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality and Prevent in practice. It has also discussed the relevance of the Bourdieusian notion of the bureaucratic educational field, which acts as the primary site of Prevent's securitised gaze. Education, and by proxy the school, is the ideal site to identify those who do not fit the State's preferred 'trajectory', allowing for their interception and modification (Bourdieu, 1996: 184). It is also important to note that the school is obliged as an agency of the State to identify and if necessary, remove 'deviant' individuals if they do not respond to their proscribed reformatory action (Bourdieu, 1996: 185-186). In the

second analysis chapter, the responses of education providers – the core focus of Prevent Coordinator’s and PEO’s activity – are analysed. The implementation of the statutory duty itself is stratified. All school’s leadership teams undergo specific Prevent training and a ‘Prevent lead’ – who is most often the designated safeguarding lead (DSL) – is selected to oversee the school’s legal obligation to the statutory duty by disseminating Prevent training within the general staff population (Home Office, 2015: 11).

This responses of the DSL’s and other participants of relevance form the cohort for this study, with the analysis being structured around the individual research questions, which can be found on page 40. The cohort for this chapter offers an oversight of the main enactors of the Prevent statutory duty: educational practitioners. Pseudonyms will be used to ensure the anonymity of all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description of each participant that appears within this chapter can be found below:

The Cohort:

- **Wendy:** is a DSL and deputy head teacher in an independent school, situated in a tier 2 level LA. She is in her early 50s, having worked as a teacher for the last 30 years, primarily as a teacher of Business, and later ICT. She is of white, British descent. William is the PEO that serves her school.

- **Victor:** is an assistant head, pastoral lead, head of RE and Personal, Health and Economic Education (PSHE) in the same independent school as Wendy, who acts as his line manager. He is in his mid-40s. Victor is white and French, having moved to the UK to work as a teacher – which he has done for the last 20 years.

- **Sarah:** is a pastoral lead and science teacher in an academy school situated in a level 2 LA, with William acting as its PEO. She is of white British descent and in her mid-30s, having worked as a teacher for the last 12 years.

- **Belle:** is a pastoral lead in an academy school in a tier 2 LA, of white British descent and in her mid-30s. She has worked as a Teacher for the last 12 years, primarily as a science teacher but later as a SEN specialist. Peter is the Prevent Coordinator that covers her school’s provision.

- **Patrick:** is an assistant head, Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) and pastoral lead in an academy trust school that has only recently been established in an economically deprived area within a tier 2 LA. He is of white British descent, in his late 40s and has been a teacher for the last 25 years, originally trained as a RE teacher but later specialising in PSHE. Peter is the Prevent Coordinator that liaises with his school.

- **Margret:** is an assistant head, DSL and pastoral lead within a tier 2 level LA of white British descent. She is in her early 50s having worked in teaching for the last 20

years, with a prior professional background in clinical psychology and counselling.

William is the PEO responsible for the schools Prevent provision.

- **Wayne:** is an assistant head, DSL, pastoral lead and head of sixth form provision within an academy school in a tier 1 LA. He is of white British descent and in his early 40s. He has worked in education for nearly 20 years and is a PSHE specialist. Brian is the PEO that liaises with his school.

- **Whitney:** is a deputy head teacher, DSL and Pastoral lead of an academy school in a tier 1 LA. She is of white British descent and in her late 40s. She has worked in education for the last 25 years. Julian is the Prevent coordinator that works with her school.

- **Rachel:** is a recently qualified educational psychologist working in a tier 1 LA. She is of white British descent and in her mid-30s. Previous to her current employment, Rachel has worked as a SEN teacher, with 10 years prior experience. Brian works as the PEO within her LA.

- **Paul:** works for a group of universities that operate in the south east on projects to widen participation from targeted demographics. Paul is of white British descent and in his mid-30s. Previous to his current role Paul was an FE teacher for over 10 years. Paul is responsible for working with schools within Julian's tier 1 LA.

- **Oliver:** is a senior university lecturer of sociology within a tier 2 LA, having worked there for 6 years. His research interests include race, national identity and attitudes towards immigration. He is of white British descent and in his early 40s. Peter is the Prevent coordinator that facilitates the university where Oliver works.
- **Johanna:** is a senior lecturer of sociology within a tier 2 LA – working in the same university as Oliver. Her research interests include critical race theory, intersectional feminism, gender and sexuality. She is in her mid-30s and of white British descent. Peter is the Prevent coordinator that operates within her local.

In the first section of this chapter, the responses of educators will be used to discern the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme. The terminology it uses to embed itself within Bourdieu's (1996: 184) educational field will be examined to identify the factors that control the environment in which its central *knowledges* are both constructed and re-constructed.

6.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?

The Prevent statutory duty was first implemented in 2015, which dictates that all LAs within the UK are required by law to 'monitor' populations vulnerable to extremism and share that data with the Home Office (Home Office, 2015: 5). LAs are also obligated to enlist their

frontline staff in the duties delivery, ensuring that they fully ‘understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it (Home Office, 2015: 6)’ The Home Office (2016: 6) stipulate that LA staff with a safeguarding responsibility should also be made ‘aware of what we mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between extremism and terrorism (Home Office, 2015: 6).’ The Home Office’s (2015: 3) definition of ‘extremism’ is designated as the ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces.’ For the purpose of this analysis the term ‘Fundamental British Values’ (FBV) must be observed as the ideological foundation of the Prevent statutory duty – as a process of what Foucault (1991: 88) describes as *governmentality*.

The role of the Prevent managers is a simple one: to disseminate the Prevent statutory duty within the LA setting and to imbed its practices within its existing safeguarding structures. In the first instance, this is largely facilitated by training programmes, where educators attend sessions led by PEOs who *teach* what radicalisation may look like in real, tangible terms. All the cohort were able to recite a description of the radicalisation process in line with the Home Office’s definitions. Sarah, a pastoral lead and science teacher working in an academy secondary school, sees the radicalisation process as initiated by a would-be radicaliser, somebody who disseminates extremism ideology amongst the vulnerable, the impressionable – “*taking somebody from thinking thoughts to taking action.*” For Sarah, radicalisation starts in the minds of those who do not “*necessarily know how they feel or*

why they feel the way they feel" and her responsibility as a teacher is to teach them an appropriate method to navigate such thoughts.

Belle, a pastoral lead within another secondary academy school in the same tier 2 LA as Sarah, believes that a core component of her role is to identify children within her cohort that she *"thinks are vulnerable to being taken on this journey of extreme values and ideals, and through targeting them and intervening we would then de-radicalise them... back into more mainstream beliefs, ideals, values."* Although Belle freely admits that her students as individuals are *"entitled to believe what they want"* she, like Sarah, believes that *"there's an appropriate way to express their opinion, and a safe way to do that."* For Belle, her job is to discern the *"motive"* of statements, and if appropriate, to subvert their *"momentum"*, to stop them from spreading within her cohorts. In this instance, the practises of both Sarah and Belle are modelled on the 'bureaucratic judgement' of experts – taking the form of the Prevent manager – to create a typology of risky behaviours they are morally obliged to steer their students away from (Dean, 2010: 218-219). This process is epidemiological by design. The risk of extremism is viewed as a pathogen and the role of the teacher, the *pastoral leads*, is to stop it from spreading, even if it limits the individual's freedom of expression (Dean 2010: 207). The purpose of Belle and Sarah's safeguarding procedures are to act as an 'extra-legal functioning of power', a cog in the machine that mechanises the 'perpetual surveillance' of the social field conducted by the State (Foucault, 1977: 280-281).

Surveillance by design creates a pre-criminal space. Its primary function is to insure against 'a series of probable' criminal acts that make suspects of those deemed most likely to

commit them (Foucault, 2007: 6). The 'subjectivizing power' exercised by surveillance apparatus is technocratic by design, however it is often carried out by sections of society that have their own bias which adversely affect its efficiency (Beck, 1992: 189). This process is also influenced by the surveillants understanding of the continuum of the 'permitted and the prohibited' behaviours established by the State, where the 'bandwidth of the acceptable' is transmutable dependent on current biopolitical will (Foucault, 2007: 6-7). The implications for the State in such instances are fairly evident – if the 'means of subsistence' of the biopolitical is exceeded by the States surveillance apparatus, the balance between the 'population and the sovereign' is fraught (Foucault, 2007: 71).

In terms of the implementation of the statutory duty, Prevent managers address the moral problematic presented by the pre-criminal space by using a perception of vulnerability to nullify it. They also profess that there are multiple vulnerabilities that afflict the population and that teachers need to be vigilant in order to anticipate them. Patrick, a DSL and pastoral lead in a secondary academy school also views the radicalisation process to occupy a diverse frame of reference, even mentioning "*animal liberation groups*" as potential sources of influence he would look for within the school population and potentially intervene against. For Patrick, his role as a pastoral lead is to develop his student's "*moral compass*" to make appropriate judgments, to make them less vulnerable to "*brainwashing*." Patrick believes he is duty bound to do this pre-emptively because, in his mind, once a person has become radicalised it becomes harder to challenge their extremism; the only real way to tackle extremism is by "*stopping it in the first place*." Margret, also a DSL and pastoral lead in an academy secondary school views the process of radicalisation to be intrinsically linked to

vulnerability. She uses terminology such as *'indoctrination'* and *'brainwashing'* quite freely in her responses. Similarly to Patrick, Margret believes that whether a young person could overcome potential radicalisation would ultimately *"depend on how far along the process they are."* For Margret, prevention is better than cure.

In this instance, Patrick and Margret – both agents of the educational field – are enactors of the 'counter identification' of those that do not follow the 'trajectory' of the prevailing ideology sanctioned by the State (Bourdieu, 1996: 184). They're obligated to do so because education acts as the primary producer of the 'cultural capital' of the State, which bestows a duty upon the educator to safeguard its charges, to 'defend the social' from the anti-social (Bourdieu, 2014: 20). Educators enable this responsibility through pastoral mechanisms, which are ideally suited to such a task; it multiplies the 'technologies of domination' by the 'technologies of the self (Foucault, 2000: 212-213).' In sum, it allows instruments of ideological diffusion to imbed themselves within the educational discourse upon moral grounds, to safeguard the vulnerable. In terms of the Prevent duty, the pastoral functions of the educational field allows Prevent managers to entrench radicalisation discourse within the safeguarding agenda simply by mimicking it.

For instance, Prevent managers cement their role as the expert in the localised context by providing DSLs with comprehensive details of the local *extremist threats*. Wendy, a deputy head teacher and DSL in an independent school in a tier 2 LA describes how she was informed by William, her PEO, of the local threat of *"county lines"*, where young people are groomed into criminal activity such as drug dealing which has been linked to local extremist

groups. For Wendy, “*keeping abreast of local threats*” is central to her role as a DSL.

Although such concerns may seem remote to her cohort of broadly middle class, fee-paying students, local instances of extremism have been brought to her attention by William. This has bolstered her resolve. Wendy, as a means of persuasion to her sometimes dubious staff, uses an example whilst delivering safeguarding training provided by William of a group of young people from another local independent school that left for Syria and is quick to point out that “*just because we’re a nice little school [don’t think] that it can’t happen here.*”

Prevent, and CVE initiatives in general are a product of ‘problematization (Foucault, 1988a: 257).’ In sum, certain events or aspects of society become problematic for government if they are not entirely explainable. The occurrence of acts of terror or extremism by home-grown terrorists – citizens born in the UK, is one such instance. They happen sporadically and do not appear to follow a completely predictable pattern using atypical methods of deduction – that of the foreign terrorist infiltrating our shores. This gap in knowledge represents a gap in power. Prevent and its mechanisms have reacted to this problematic by setting new parameters; creating the conditions that generate new knowledges or *truths*. The power of narratives generated from historical reference and *known* knowledges can manufacture a reality that finds the truth in, for want of a better word, fiction, simply because it is believable (Foucault, 1979: 193). Whether the knowledges posited by the Prevent managers and their Home Office superiors answer the questions posed by home grown terrorism does not necessarily discern how credible they are; it is how sellable they are to the target audience that dictates the uptake of this new *truth* (Lemke, 2019: 358).

Bourdieu (1996: 5) recognizes that the balance between ‘power and legitimacy’ described by Foucault can only be facilitated through devices of ‘cultural transmission (Reed-Danahay, 2005: 38).’ The educational system has been designed to facilitate the State’s ideological functions through mechanisms of ‘functional duplicity’ – appearing as an entity autonomous to the State whilst acting to replicate the State sanctioned ‘established order (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 199).’ The delivery of FBV is a central component of the statutory duty’s ideologically driven agenda. FBV is delivered in a pastoral fashion in the main through the mechanisms of PSHE and RE. It is also important to note that the people in charge of its planning and delivery are in most cases called pastoral leads. Patrick is one such pastoral lead. He describes how the delivery of Prevent is stratified over different age groups, following the thematics of FBV delivered through a PSHE curriculum he has designed, facilitated by both Patrick and form tutors. Key stage 3 (ages 11-14) are taught “*ethics and morals lessons*”, which can focus on topics such as “*social media, online safety*”, however the overall emphasis of this teaching block is to introduce the cohort to the border question of “*what being British means... and what we want to be proud of to be British.*” Key stage 4 (ages 14-16) take part in the “*citizenship*” curriculum which provides more of a targeted approach. Pupils discuss the FBVs themselves, with focused discussion on “*democracy, the rule of law, liberty and freedom of speech and tolerance*” which Patrick describes as the “*key messages*” of the PSHE programme at the school.

PSHE lessons facilitated by Patrick and his peers inculcate FBV by instilling a specific ‘sociocultural-milieu’ through discursive immersion within the ‘cultivated-habitus’ both designed and desired by the State (Bourdieu, 2013: 88-89). In the school setting, ‘symbolic

constructions' – which take the form of academic cultural capital – are used to mask ideological, societal gradations that permeate both the educator and their student bodies (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 68). These procedures, of which PSHE and FBV are prime examples, are designed to create docility, compliance – to dilute resistance (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 201).

When the participants were asked about the most challenging aspect of teaching FBV, most respondents who deliver it agreed that the concept of individual liberty was the hardest to get across to their students. Victor, a pastoral lead within the same independent school as Wendy, believes that it is difficult for young people to understand because they “*take liberty for granted.*” Sarah highlights that her students struggle with the concept of free speech and its consequences, which she describes to her students as “*not necessarily your right to free speech*” but to speak responsibly to preserve one’s individual liberty. The primary focus of the Prevent statutory duty in this instance is to equip its enactors to balance the perceived needs of two types of governed subjects: citizens that already adhere (or appear to adhere) to the stratification of the form of pastoral power in operation, in this case taking the form of FBV and the targets of said power and the vulnerable, needy and uniformed who need to be educated how to adhere to the desired pathway of norms that Prevent purports to deliver (Dean, 2010: 93).

In essence, FBV is a moral enterprise where the teacher is both legally and morally obliged to teach them, under the premise that the vulnerable student is in need of their guidance if they’re to become *good* citizens. Ultimately, the Prevent managers, and by proxy the

schools that facilitate their target demographics are worried about students encountering the *wrong* information. FBV is rationalised as a modus of critical thinking, which most of the participants agree FBV delivers to some degree. For instance, Wendy wants her students to leave her care with the ability to see “*both sides of the story [whilst] being able to make an educated decision*” which she believes FBV and the wider PSHE discourse is uniquely positioned to deliver.

Nevertheless, the symbolic nature of FBV can be challenging to deliver for practitioners. For Whitney, the politicised nature of FBV can prove problematic in her school, where her student population is “*67% Bengali Muslim*” but the majority of her teaching staff are white British. Whitney acknowledges that FBV focused lessons can foster a sense of “*otherness*” and that she must ensure that any staff tasked with delivering FBV are “*mindful and sensitive*” to the cohort’s cultural dispositions. In this instance, the school – and by proxy Prevent – is not acting as an instrument of liberation as Whitney would likely profess; it is modifying the behaviour of the school’s practitioners to ‘legitimate domination’ over its potentially unruly student population (Bourdieu, 1996: 5).

Educational apparatus that feign liberatory intent like FBV are a form of ‘social alchemy’, where a cocktail of ideology is formulated to facilitate the manipulation of student’s minds into docile facsimiles of State allegiance (Bourdieu, 1996: 81). The proactiveness of Whitney, where she manages the delivery of FBV in order to pre-empt the conflicts it creates is a form of ‘mechanical solidarity’, where the educator assimilates inert aspects of subcultures of resistance and diverts the more *harmful* ones through mediation (Bourdieu, 1996: 91). For

Whitney to cultivate the ‘certain type of culture’ that the Prevent duty demands, she must adopt a position that acknowledges the ‘shared certainties’ of her student cohort (Bourdieu, 1996: 92-93). She acknowledges that there is resistance to the duty but endeavours to create a ‘practical harmony’ that allows her to implement the duties requirements, limiting the resistance to affordable levels (Bourdieu, 1996: 94). This requires Whitney and her team to “do a lot of groundwork”, always being “mindful of how [they] presents information” to guide her students and staff so that everyone is working on an “even keel.”

Overall, the responses of the participants suggest that the ideological gradations of the Prevent statutory duty within the field of education are formulaic, facilitated through mechanisms of surveillance and behaviour modification. Although the theoretical perspectives of Foucault and Bourdieu are accurate descriptions of pedagogical authority, the realities of how its *functions* are multiplied and implemented within the school setting require further analysis. In the following section, the responses of participants will illustrate exactly how Prevent’s model of surveillance is disseminated and embedded in practice.

6.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?

Metric values of performance have become calculable entities in the neo-liberal age, where the acceptable actions of the *free* individual are rendered measurable against them (Dean, 2010: 194). In this instance, neo-liberalism is performing as a stylisation of neo-

conservatism, which proliferates on the basis that the moral corruption of society can be avoided by instilling an ethos of *self-discipline* within the populace (Dean, 2010: 192). Where it differs from traditional neo-conservatism is that the State becomes a custodian of values rather than sole arbiter (Dean, 2010: 192). Prevent and its CVE contemporaries follow this narrative – they use indicators of safety that they diffuse through a network of agencies that work with communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation. These agencies in turn measure these cohorts against such indicators and pass on this information to the LA and subsequently the Prevent managers. In practice, this exercise takes the form of *safeguarding* policy.

The statutory duty has enabled the Prevent managers, under the guidance of the Home Office, to streamline its surveillance procedures into the general safeguarding agenda of the LA. This is primarily because safeguarding is ingrained within the teachers psyche. When Belle was asked about the importance of safeguarding, she replied that she was “*hyperaware*” of any potential issues that may affect the safety of her students, and that her training had instilled in her the need to “*refer as many people [as possible]*”; it is better to be safe than sorry. For Belle, her role as a teacher is dependent on her interaction with her students and “*the interpretation of their voice.*” The safeguarding practices exhibited by Belle are programmed through discourse, with judgments ruled by a typology of risk designed to ascertain how well individuals fit the ‘ideal type’ designed by experts (Foucault, 2002: 30-31). Belle and her contemporaries are motivated to act by a moral obligation instilled through their own training – to recognise the role of the ‘practices of the self’ and

how they impact on their vulnerable cohorts, who they are duty bound to protect (Foucault, 1984a: 56-57).

In order to instil the moral imperative within their discourse, Prevent managers often draw parallels between radicalisation and grooming. When asked to consider if the radicalisation process and grooming are linked, Wendy was quick to exclaim that “*obviously it is.*” She considers this risk to be a “*major threat*” and seeks out the guidance of William her PEO on a regular basis – information she then uses to demonstrate her understanding of the “*local threats*” when her school is audited by Ofsted. Knowledge of local threats is employed by schools when making risk assessments. As part of Victor’s role as PSHE and RE coordinator, he is responsible for organising school trips. This requires him to conduct risk assessments which are guided by the information shared by Prevent managers. For instance, Victor disclosed that when planning a trip to a local mosque, his PEO advised him to avoid the one he had originally planned to visit because it did not have “*a particularly good atmosphere*” – advice he duly heeded. The management of both Wendy and Victor’s activities by their PEO William is an example of Prevent’s capability to steer the student body through the ‘spontaneous social order’ found within the local, unguided population (Hayek, 1979: 163). Such activity is designed to instil a system of regulation; the ‘discipline of freedom’ deemed necessary to instil and reproduce the narrative of the State through mechanisms of ‘punitive sovereignty (Dean, 2007: 126).’

As part of the guidance delivered by Prevent managers, teachers are educated on potential vulnerabilities within their student bodies that might elicit a radicalisation risk. Often, there

is a focus on monitoring the online activity of the students, something difficult to do because most of this activity happens beyond the teacher's gaze. Patrick explains that his school uses a programme called "*Smoothwall*" to both monitor students when logged into the school computers and to block sites deemed inappropriate. The programme monitors keystrokes and search inquiries of each student looking for signs of extremism or other safeguarding concerns. For Patrick, the software is useful because it allows him to spot "*patterns*" in student behaviour that he can then use to build a profile of vulnerability, both for the whole school population and for the individual/s concerned. Although Patrick cannot monitor the individuals when they are using their own devices, "*Smoothwall*" allows him to create a picture of what they may be looking at – an educated guess at their potential vulnerabilities that he can then attempt to counter through PSHE lessons.

Patrick is using "*Smoothwall*" as a form of 'knowledge management', where the behaviours of the student body are being collected and remodelled in order to systematise the regulation of the student bodies' behaviours (Bauman and May, 2019: 51-53). The knowledges created by "*Smoothwall*" are acting as an extension of biopower – to be precise a 'biotechnical power.' This *biotechnic* calculates the possibilities of the infinite field of possibilities in order to assemble a finite, malleable intelligence. This intelligence becomes a device of disciplinary power, its modality of control (Foucault, 1979: 138-139).

However, a question is raised: how are such modalities utilised? Margret, acting as DSL gets specific training annually which she then disseminates to the rest of her staff. For Margret, extremism and radicalisation are not issues she ever faced as a teacher before the

introduction of the statutory duty but it is now *“in the forefront of the minds of staff.”* Margret asserts that the consolidation of the Prevent duty within general safeguarding procedure helped demystify it for her. Additionally, she proclaims that her PEO William helped her realise that her obligation to the duty was not *“rocket science”* and that safeguarding against extremism was much like safeguarding against traditional vulnerabilities such as abuse and neglect. As time has progressed Margret and her team have become *“very hot on”* spotting signs of extremism, *“constantly monitoring”* her student cohort to protect them from who she believes may cause them harm.

The repetitive nature of training and monitoring processes described by Margret is designed to enable her and her staff to separate the ‘subjectivity and intersubjectivity’ of her student’s behaviours in order to make them calculable to Prevent and its custodians (Rose, 1999: 7-8). By simplifying the nature of practice through regular association with *expert* knowledge, forms of resistance against Prevent’s systems of power are diluted (Rose, 1999: 10). Regular contact also allows the Prevent managers to keep the risk of radicalisation at the forefront of educators minds – so that they are always ready to spot any ‘deviation from the norm’ that could pose a *danger* to the student body as a whole (Poster, 1990: 91).

When pupils do display safeguarding concerns Prevent managers are often consulted by DSLs, even though they have no official remit to do so. Most responses from the participants implied that this was largely due to staff lacking the confidence to make a reliable judgment. For instance, Sarah does not feel like she *“actually knows what [radicalisation] looks like”* in real terms. She highlights that many of the case studies used as

examples by PEOs in their training show extreme cases rather than a depiction of the “*early stages*” of the radicalisation process which she feels is her responsibility to monitor. Sarah’s hesitancy is likely due to the fact that the acts of the *radical extremist* have been introduced to her without sufficient context (Foucault, 2014b: 214). Although all the crimes presented to her had been made with a form of ‘avowal’ – that is to say, the perpetrators acknowledge their guilt which legitimates their importance as case studies – the reasoning behind their actions have not been rationalised to her (Foucault, 2014b: 215). Although the PEOs that present to Sarah and her peers provide a symptomatic approach to radicalisation, in practice Sarah finds it hard to attribute this to her students because the process itself is portrayed as ‘devoid of motivation (Foucault, 2014b: 216).’ She is quite conscious of the ‘social danger’ acts of extremism and terrorism pose, however relating them to her students as subjects of extremism seems impossible to comprehend beyond a sudden outbreak of ‘madness’ within her student cohort (Foucault, 2014b: 218).

Sarah’s uncertainty could in part be due to the nature of safeguarding systems in general, where there is a clear chain of command to follow when reporting concerns. For Wayne, “*the duty of the teacher first and foremost is to simply report anything they believe is a real concern*” in order to not only protect the child, but also to “*safeguard themselves*” from charges of negligence. Ultimately it is the DSL’s responsibility to gather as much data as possible on the case and pass on that information to the safeguarding boards within the LA. As part of this process, DSL’s such as Wayne may contact their PEOs “*to pass the buck a little bit... to get a second opinion*” which often ends in the PEO (in this case Brian) coming into the school to deliver an intervention. The safeguarding practices displayed by Wayne are

one of many 'technologies of security' that are utilised by the State to demonstrate *normality* by identifying what it wishes it not to be (Foucault, 2007: 56). Undesirable behaviours, no matter how innocuous are identified and passed on through the mechanisms of the State by Wayne and his peers who are actively encouraged to do so because of a potential risk to their own freedoms. The PEOs delivering interventional work when there is no discernible threat, is an example of 'normalization', where the PEO is operationalizing their pastoral functions (Lemke, 2019: 194). The PEO delivering their workshops allows staff to view good practice, to reflect on it so that the safeguarding concern can be mediated whilst also allowing the PEO to supervise the teaching staff, embedding themselves in a role of superiority (Lemke, 2013: 14).

The PEOs' position of authority is further embodied by the fact that almost all of them have a background in teaching which allows them to enjoy close working relationships with DSLs. DSLs and teachers in general value this arrangement because the Prevent agenda is being delivered to them from their perspective. Whitney appreciates the input of Julian because of his background as a RE teacher and pastoral lead. Whitney feels that because Julian is "*very grounded in classroom practice*" it makes him more "*sensitive to teacher's needs.*"

This type of relationship is often co-dependent. For example, Wayne was approached to take part in the creation of Home Office training resources because he had actively participated within the Channel process involving one of his students. Wayne's performance had impressed Brian, his PEO, who subsequently passed on this information to the Home Office, who then set about recruiting him. Wayne appeared on a "*DVD [which] they created*

alongside a training package, which was delivered by Prevent officers and police up and down the country in all the public services.” Interestingly, Wayne describes his contributions as not being “*real life*” – a fabrication if you will – however he was largely brought in to give a first-hand account of the referral process concerning students that display extremism ideology. The educational field and its primary actors – in this case Wayne and the PEOs with teaching backgrounds – produce a ‘collective recognition’ within its target audience, which in turn reproduces docility and compliance (Bourdieu, 1990: 138). The fact that most PEOs have a teaching background is not surprising. They aim to shape the language of the educational field through shared discourse. The co-option of Wayne into the Prevent training materials is an extension of this practice. Its aim is to seduce, to certify Prevent’s desired ‘modes of conduct (Rose, 1999: 7).’

However, Prevent managers do not always enjoy a good working relationship with educators, particularly when it comes to possible critique from the university setting. Oliver, a senior university lecturer in a tier 2 LA has been at events with a critical focus on Prevent where Prevent managers have turned up en-masse and attempted “*to dominate discussion.*” He also describes how Prevent managers actively court the university management to impose a “*sturdier*” Prevent training platform that they wish to facilitate. The university has not accommodated this invitation to date. It is important to note that Prevent has its detractors, not only within its target demographics but also within the apparatus of State and civil society it attempts to utilise. The most robust forms of resistance use the maxims of liberal government and the contradictions found within the praxis of Prevent as their justification: ‘the guarantee of freedom is freedom’ after all

(Foucault, 1982: 245). The subjectification of target demographics by Prevent, the basis of its knowledges, is met with resistance because they present a paradox – Prevent embodies qualities it professes to combat; namely it encourages critical thinking but not about itself (Lemke, 2019: 327).

Johanna, a senior lecturer of sociology at a university in a tier 2 LA has had several run-ins with the local Prevent managers at events she has organised. In fact, they have actively tried to stop her from booking high profile speakers such as Moazzam Begg by contacting the university prior to the event, often being privy to information that is not public at the time of their communication. Although in this case the university denied their advances, there are some bureaucratic responsibilities that are impossible for academics to negate. Johanna detailed how she is forced to fill out risk assessment forms related to the “*external speakers policy*”, where she must provide detailed information about the speaker, likely attendees, and the topics under discussion. Johanna is acutely aware that any event she organises that is critical of prevent or CVE in general maybe subverted by Prevent managers in the audience, often finding that she is “*bracing [herself] for the Prevent officer coming.*”

Johanna recalls one occasion where she was contacted prior to an event she was organising by Peter the Prevent Coordinator who is responsible for the LA in which her university is based. Peter wanted Johanna to include him on the presenting panel to provide “*balance.*” Johanna refused to allow this. However, Peter turned up at the event, along with three of his colleagues – another Prevent manager and two police officers. Johanna details that the group took over discussion, and “*derailed*” the focus of the event and, quite ironically, made it impossible for Johanna acting as chair to create “*some balance*” between the arguments

being made. Although Johanna is careful to point out the university is generally supportive of her right to platform events critical of CVE, they offer little assistance in safeguarding them from outside interference from the Prevent managers who can turn up to research seminars unchallenged. For Johanna, *“there’s a sense of powerlessness”* that inhibits her ability to facilitate such events and as such she no longer organises them.

Peter and his peers’ actions at Johanna’s seminar is an example of the physical manifestation of the ‘disciplinary mechanism’ of surveillance (Foucault, 2007: 5-6). Although its primary focus is to identify the ‘prohibited’ within the field of ‘permitted’ behaviours, it also serves a secondary function: correction, or the ‘possible transformation of individuals.’ Peter is obliged by his appointment as Prevent Coordinator to intercept discourse that matches the indicators denoted to him from the Home Office, to judge and assess their performance within his local (Foucault, 2007: 17). Peter’s endeavour to divert and lead discussion is testament to his desire to embed himself within the university setting, which is his attempt to maximize the ‘circulation’ of discourse that benefits Prevent’s doctrine ‘by diminishing’ the flow of information that contradicts it (Foucault, 2007: 18).

The participants have demonstrated that the dissemination of the surveillance techniques of the Prevent duty are varied, however there are common junctures. The safeguarding mechanisms that are deeply embedded within the school setting are the modus operandi of Prevent managers, closely followed by the delivery of FBV that acts as both an ideological educational tool and as a petri dish to isolate individuals that question such ideology. In the

following section, the dynamics of Prevent's delivery will be analysed, with specific focus paid to the flexibility of Prevent's apparatus for those tasked with delivering them.

6.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?

In the contemporary context, the fundamental obligation of the State is to ensure that individuals or 'subjects of freedom' can act freely because it embodies the concept of free market and enterprise; money makes the world go around after all (Dean, 2010: 193). However, individuals, or 'subjects' must first be 'shaped, guided and moulded' through a system of authority so that they act in a way that is both predictable and beneficial to the State. Subject and subjectification become one and the same, facilitated through a 'regime of truth' embodied by the State under the guise of morality (Foucault, 2003: 6). Prevent's statutory duty is one such apparatus. On the one hand it demands that LA agencies adhere to its *soft* surveillance mechanisms and that they also deliver FBV on the basis it is enabling their vulnerable cohorts to safeguard themselves from extremism. Conversely, it allows such agencies a level of autonomy on how such materials are delivered, actively encouraging creative licence and fostering an environment where such resources can be shared. This activity is guided by the Prevent Coordinators who act as gatekeepers of such knowledges.

Sarah denotes that FBV is predominantly delivered by non-specialist teachers in PSHE lessons taught in tutor groups during "*extended form time*" held once a day. The

programme is delivered to all the staff at the beginning of the school year during a planning session guided by their PEO, where they all get some input on the subjects covered.

Whitney makes it clear that the school is free to incorporate FBV anywhere in the curriculum they see fit, with her school implementing it across subject areas as diverse as Drama, Geography and History. Whitney is also careful to point out that the School is aware that Ofsted could turn up and look for proof of FBV's delivery, which would be evidenced by the school's *"promoting and supporting spiritual and moral and cultural development"* checklists. Julian has provided Whitney with support in this endeavour, supplying her with a *"Blue Peter-already filled in"* example of the checklist, which is designed to elicit how the activity has developed the student's levels of *"oracy, participation and articulation"* in relation to FBV. Whitney has then distributed this to her staff who can use it to scaffold their lesson plans which in turn fulfil their obligation to Ofsted.

Both Sarah's and Whitney's activity, where their delivery of FBV is shaped by the 'pedagogy' delineated by their respective PEOs, is motivated by their ignorance of its processes (Foucault, 2005: 45). In this instance the PEO is using the pastoral functions of the school to guide the uninitiated through the perceived 'modalities of experience' they possess that both Sarah, Whitney and their peers do not (Foucault, 2005: 46). This allows the PEO to assert their pastoral functions within the school setting, becoming the 'saviour' of practitioners who feel ill equipped to deliver what is required of them (Foucault, 2005: 47-48). The disciplinary mechanisms of Ofsted, that will punish the school – and by proxy its practitioners – for not delivering FBV in line with their expectations exemplify the PEO's value. The PEO acts as the school's conduit to becoming a 'subject of truth' that need not be

afraid of Ofsted's punitive power because the PEO's *knowledges* absolve them (Foucault, 2005: 365).

Although there is widespread uptake of Prevent and its agenda across education, not all staff are fully on board with its methods – particularly the focus that FBV can take. Victor is tasked with both the planning and delivery of FBV. He believes that FBVs are largely “*a fallacy*” because they suggest universal values are intrinsically British, which hampers their effectiveness. For Victor, “*they are not British values, democracy is not British, it's Greek, tolerance is not British it's universal... to me that smacks of jingoism.*” Victor's judicious stance on FBV is highlighting the ‘micropractices’ of power found within the biopolitical; although technologies of discipline dominate the discourse of power, they can never fully nullify all dialogue found within its populations (Dreyfus and Rabinow: 1983: 184-185).

For Victor, the Prevent agenda is “*designed to cater for people who have a problem as opposed to an agenda that's here to enlighten people who haven't.*” in short, Victor is worried that his students are designated as problematic before they have been given the opportunity to prove otherwise. Belle is of a similar opinion, arguing that young people are still acquiring the skills to express themselves and that forcing them to adhere to a system of surveillance is harmful to their development, believing that there must be better methods of safeguarding children “*without suppressing them or risk them becoming further disengaged.*” It is worth mentioning however, that although Victor and Belle have reservations about the functionality of Prevent, they do not stop adhering to it. Ultimately, any ideological differences individuals or groups may have with power mechanisms such as

the Prevent duty do not impact on its operative functions because resistance is fragmented (Foucault, 1979: 95). Such fragmentation occurs because the ritualistic 'logic' of the wider discourse Victor and Belle inhabit – in this case the pastoral mechanisms of the school – inhibits them from doing so (Foucault: 1979: 93). In short, they do not have the will to upset the 'equilibrium' of their environment; to pull on this one thread could unravel the whole ball of string (Dreyfus and Ranibow, 1983: 188). Consequently, 'domination is not the essence of power' – convincing the biopolitical to impose domination on oneself is (Dreyfus and Ranibow: 1983: 186).

Rachel, an educational psychologist working within a tier 1 LA has used several targeted behaviour management programmes with young people who have displayed extremist behaviour. In one case, Rachel was drafted in to work with a young mixed-race boy with an autism and ADHD diagnosis who was repeatedly reported for safeguarding concerns. The incidents reached a crescendo when the young person turned up to school, claiming he had a *"bomb in his bag"* and that he was a *"Muslim and [wanted] to blow the school up."* When questioned by Rachel he proclaimed that the incident was a *"joke"*, but the school wanted to take further action. Rachel put together a mentorship programme involving *"a student in sixth form who was a practising moderate Muslim to buddy up with him [which] was overseen by the DSL."* They had *"Weekly sessions together"* over a period of six months, where the school provided them with resources that focused on activities that promoted FBV, such as visiting a local Mosque (which was known to the school and risk assessed) and regular discussions about responsible social media use. What is particularly interesting about Rachel's account is the use of the word *"moderate"* in relation to Islam. Colonial and

orientalist connotations aside, the use of peers to moderate *radical* behaviours within the educational field is a well-trodden path. The school often mobilises the 'reproduction of the established order' through the 'controlled selection' of students who steer individuals who do not already conform through peer modelling techniques (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: 167). Schools - along with any other pastoral functioning apparatus of State – utilise the function of 'kinship' in this way because of its specious properties. In short, conformity fostered within peer groups appears more natural and less conflictual to those it is imposed upon – improving its effectiveness (Bourdieu, 1990: 171-172).

Although peer mentorship programmes are effective and follow the pastoral functions of the school, the zealous nature of extremist risk still dictates that traditional safeguarding methods take precedence. Belle describes how safeguarding tasks take up a lot of her time, with "*a lot of investigation into our worries for the children*" conducted continuously.

Although the majority of her monitoring is focused on more conventional risks, when a Prevent related issue presents itself, Belle implies that they create "*a panic*" where there is "*more urgency in the way it's approached*" by the DSL and the wider safeguarding network.

Wayne also acknowledges that his staff are often hypersensitive to the "*scary*" nature of instances of perceived extremism within their cohorts, which can cause them to overact at times. Wayne sees it as his responsibility as DSL to manage the "*internal individual complexities and fears*" of his teaching staff and that his close working relationship with his PEO Brian is invaluable in this endeavour. For Wayne, Brian is equally invested in maintaining equilibrium because he is "*scared of getting it wrong too.*"

The Ideological pretensions of Prevent, its moral imperative if you will, dictates that those who enact it are morally obliged to be precise; potentially the lives of those in their care are at stake after all. It perhaps comes as no surprise that a sense of panic is created, especially when you consider that the life courses of young people are used in the public imagination as 'barometers' of social decay (Thompson, 1998: 44).

There is no sociological grouping more associated with risk than youth, with young people considered equally 'as risks and at risk' in situations that create moral panics (Thompson, 1998: 43). As such, 'moral panics' are 'pre-interpreted' conceptions of the socio-political schema made by the 'layperson' which the sociologist cannot ignore in their analysis, even if they're not based in any form of tangible reality (Thompson, 2006: 60-61). In the context of Prevent, its narrative produces an 'ideological conflict', where the perceived threat of extremism creates a hysteria beyond the scope of its 'episodic events (Thompson, 1998: 122-123).' Emphasis is placed on deciphering symptomatic behaviour of perpetrators, rather than focusing on the 'political-economic factors' that cause individuals to act in the first place (Thompson, 1998: 131-134). Such instances of hysteria are common within the school setting. During Wendy's interview, she described a procedure called "*lockdown*", where her small, independent school in an economically affluent area on the outskirts of a tier 2 LA prepares itself for a terrorist attack. The fire alarm system (which can play different sounds) is used to alert staff, who lock all the doors of classrooms, barricade all possible entry points, pull the blinds and get all the children to sit underneath their desks. After a period of time, Wendy will then go around each classroom, check that each room is secured adequately and "*release*" them one by one.

In this case, the physical barricades constructed by the teachers to secure their classrooms at Wendy's behest are also acting as the moral barricades described by Cohen (2002: 1) in his seminal account of moral panics. For Cohen (2002: 1-2), the State encourages moral panics in order to enable the cooperation of various actors across all levels of society to create a version of reality in order to 'orchestrate consent', no matter how ridiculous the premise of the perceived risk may seem (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995: 560). This process is mechanised by a 'regime of truth', enacted by an 'exclusive control culture' which is committed to framing 'objects of problematization' that the State has no other means of controlling (Foucault, 2014: 93; Cohen, 2002: 66). All schools are required to have their own "lockdown" procedures regardless of the designated threat level of their LA, although not all of them are as *thorough* as the one conducted in Wendy's school. Events such as "lockdown", through their repetition, imprint a logical anxiety upon an illogical fear; by acting the threat out it becomes more real. The legitimization of the threat then creates an environment of compliance. The primary aim of events such as "lockdown" is not to prepare the school for a terrorist attack, it is used to construct an 'institutional anxiety' which promotes solidarity between agencies with similar aims. In this case, it is a solidarity among experts in the form of Prevent managers and their school counterparts (Schinkel, 2013: 298).

However, it is important to note that many educators are not blind to the way elements of the statutory duty are utilised to manipulate them into compliance. For Paul, a widening participation professional who works in several secondary and FE schools on behalf of a University in a tier 1 LA, the delivery of Prevent training leaves a lot to be desired. Paul

describes the training as *“too similar to other safeguarding training, which is to escalate and don’t think”* which he believes actively discourages teachers to think critically. Ultimately, Paul thinks this message is counterintuitive to the apparent agenda of FBV – to equip young people with critical thinking skills. Paul is quick to point out that he has seen some good examples of FBV in his partner schools that *“promote multicultural society”*, however he is left to wonder *“whether it’s tokenism”* rather than something that is empowering the communities it is purporting to help. Similarly, Belle sees the implementation of FBV problematically. Belle believes FBV is just *“another box to tick”* which is easy to evidence to Ofsted because it is much more adaptable than most curriculums; an easy win if the school implements the duty with gusto. For Belle, FBV is not an effective tool to create an environment where young people feel *“as if they’re part of a community”* and if not handled correctly it is much more likely to have the opposite effect.

The interviewees have described the Prevent duty to be flexible in its delivery, and it is broadly adopted by the education providers as a whole. Although there are some instances of rejection from within the education community, it is by and large placated by processes of regulation inherent to the educational field – namely the safeguarding responsibilities placed on schools and Ofsted inspections. In the following and final section of this chapter, the role of third-party organisations within the praxis of Prevent will be examined from the viewpoint of educational practitioners. Emphasis has been placed on uncovering the impact such organisations have on delivery and how they interact with the Prevent managers.

6.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

The State has created various ‘technologies of performance’ to gain access to the enclave of knowledge held within its constitute parts and use it to optimise them (Dean, 2010: 197-198). In doing so, it has encouraged both the growth of the private sector and its amalgamation with State bodies. The knowledges of the State’s agencies or the ‘technologies of agency’ are now largely held accountable by how they perform fiscally – to aid the assimilation of the economies in which private enterprises operate (Dean, 2010: 198). NGOs working within the praxis of Prevent are a prime example of this in action. They become the technical means of shaping conduct into the optimization of economic performance because they are predominantly focused upon generating a profit through their services.

In practical terms, NGOs that work with schools are primarily offering services that help them facilitate their obligation to the delivery of FBVs – another conduit of *expertise* available to schools. For instance, Wayne runs several workshops throughout the academic year with targeted sections of his student population that have been identified as having “*very strong ideological views that we feel make them vulnerable.*” These workshops are facilitated by NGOs that offer resources and expertise “*which the Home Office will often recommend*” to Wayne via his PEO Brian. The nature of each workshop is different, however they often mirror PSHE lessons but with the added benefit that less students are present,

making them more personalised. A mixture of discussion and practical tasks are utilised to give the students some context but most of the content is designed to be peer led.

When Wayne was asked to describe the demographical make up of these sessions, he went on to explain that the school has a predominantly Muslim population and as such, most of these targeted sessions were designed to challenge radical Islam and forms of “*anti-Semitism.*” He also described that these workshops have “*raised some flags*” in the past, enabling him to make safeguarding decisions much quicker than if he was relying on more traditional methods. Wayne also holds whole school events which use NGOs with a CVE focus on a regular basis. This involves bringing in outside speakers, often facilitated by Brian Michael Haines, the brother of David Haines, an aid worker who was murdered by ISIS in 2014, has come several times to talk about his experiences to the student cohort, which Wayne believes has had a positive effect on his students that no one else within his staff could deliver.

The activity of the NGOs working with Wayne and his peers are capitalising on the ‘political economy’ of Prevent, facilitated by its localised socio-political auditor – Brian the PEO (Lemke: 2013: 42-43). In this instance the involvement of privatised entities within the Prevent apparatus has not supplanted the regulatory functions of government, it has supplemented them (Lemke, 2013: 51-52). Although NGOs bring autonomous functions to Prevent’s delivery, the scope of their autonomy is controlled by the ‘transactional reality’ of fulfilling the brief of those purchasing the products they deliver (Foucault, 2008: 297). Much like the Prevent managers who steer their activities within the localised setting, NGOs

replicate the functions of the organisations they deliver their products to in order to aid their assimilation into their practices.

The activity of NGOs is not restricted to the delivery of programmes within the classroom setting. NGOs also provide training services for schools that supplement the training offered by the LA. Interaction with these organisations almost always go through the Prevent managers. For example, Victor's online Prevent training was delivered by an NGO which works in partnership with the Home Office and Patrick's safeguarding training was provided by an outside agency in conjunction with Peter his Prevent Coordinator – training paid for with funding from the LA. The training provided to both Victor and Patrick is an example of how private enterprise has assimilated the technologies of government. In this case government – taking the form of Prevent – is operating 'through' rather than 'on' civil society (Sending and Neumann, 2006: 668-669). The NGOs are acting as a 'technology of agency' employed by the State to carry out its 'regulatory functions' – to extend its sphere of influence beyond its own limited capacity to act within the consumer market (Dean, 2010: 167-168). As such, the training providers deliver the perfect apparatus for the 'introduction of economy into political practice' that the *modern* State requires to function (Foucault, 1991: 92).

Schools can also act proactively and employ NGOs to fill gaps in provision they have self-identified. Belle's school is one of a group of academies that perform their own internal inspections or "*mock Ofsted*s" to establish areas for improvement. Following an internal inspection it was highlighted that the school needed to improve their FBV provision. The

senior leadership team then contacted Peter, their Prevent Coordinator, who put them in contact with an NGO that provided PSHE training – which Peter could supply at a discount.

The NGO came into Belle's school and conducted several training sessions with their personnel, all of whom being ex-teachers, on how to plan PSHE activities and lessons that fulfil the duty, along with resources to help facilitate them. During this training event, the school was upsold a training package that was part of a tiered award scheme, where they were effectively assessed and awarded certification by the NGO. Belle's school went for the *"bell's and whistle option"* which also brought in a number of the NGOs practitioners who delivered *"targeted sessions... one for each strand [of FBV]"* with the student cohort. When the NGO had completed its task and provided the school with its certification after a 12-week programme, the academy group came back in to do another inspection. They were left *"pretty satisfied"* that the school was now up to speed and ready for Ofsted. In this instance, the NGO's certification is acting as an extension of the 'practical taxonomies' of the bureaucratic field of education (Bourdieu, 1988: 194). The NGO is offering the school an assurance of their functionality – or to be more precise, proof of their ability to function – via the 'pedagogical machine' that is the educational field (Foucault, 1977: 173). What is perhaps most fascinating about this activity is that in isolation such certification is non-translatable – it is an artificial construct that offers no transferable value beyond the bounded context of an impending Ofsted inspection (Bourdieu, 1988: 195).

The artificial construction of *knowledges* by NGOs within the educational field is not only limited to pedagogy. The third sector also offer several surveillance technologies to schools

to streamline their safeguarding processes into a quantifiable, computerised format. One such technology of surveillance being increasingly utilized by schools is a programme called Child Protection Online Management System (CPOMs) – dedicated safeguarding software promoted by LA’s across the country. Patrick’s school is heavily invested in the software and it is used across all six of the schools within the academy group. According to Patrick, every staff member has an account and every pupil within the school has their own profile. If a staff member has a concern about a pupil, they log it in the programme where he and the other DSLs have oversight. For Patrick, the main advantage of using the programme is that *“it’s not relying on one person”* and that if a number of concerns are logged it is possible to see *“patterns”* in behaviour which can be used as evidence if the case is passed onto the safeguarding board. Furthermore, the programme is integrated within the wider IT network and data can be transferred across attendance programmes such as SIMs or behaviour management and rewards systems. Interestingly, if a child moves to another school with a CPOMs subscription their profile can also be transferred, making sure that any pre-existing concerns can continue to be monitored.

In this instance, CPOMs acts as the mechanism to collect the aggregate of seemingly random behaviours which is being amassed and reassembled to produce a biopolitical truth (Foucault, 1979: 138-140). This process seduces the practitioner – in this case Patrick – by creating a semblance of sequential reality from disordered contexts (Rabinow, 2005: 186) Once assembled, the data collection technique almost takes on a life of its own, a Frankenstein’s monster of cyclic interpretation, a process Rabinow (2005: 187) defines as a ‘biosociality.’ The surveillance apparatus occupies the milieu of biopower within this socio-

biology, acting as the connective tissue, rendering the State upon its populations (Nelson, 2005: 239). The fact that the technology of surveillance in this instance is created by the third sector should not come as a surprise. The public sphere has been encroached upon to such an extent that public spaces are dominated by private enterprise (Wakefield, 2005: 529-530). CPOMs is a facet of a *post-panoptic* industry replicating the functions of State whilst also fulfilling its own requirements; this reportage of deviant subjects is formed out of a 'modality' of private enterprise that has been transposed upon the public sphere to generate profit (Deleuze, 1992: 3-4). This example can be seen throughout the schema of education and beyond. Patrick's school itself is owned by a private academy group employed by the State to facilitate its *function*: to provide free at the point of access schooling for young people in compulsory education.

This chapter has outlined how the Prevent statutory duty is primarily operationalised through the bureaucratic field of education. The responses of the educational practitioners have provided an account of the practicalities of the duty's delivery. Although there is evidence that the ideological underpinnings of Prevent and its soft surveillance techniques are met with some scrutiny, by and large, Prevent negates any resistance to its implementation within the school setting. It does so by utilising the pastoral functions of the educational field, using the safeguarding agenda and the pretence of vulnerability to sell its significance to educators. The bureaucratic nature of safeguarding procedures and the broader educational field are also used to embed Prevent's functions within daily practice. The private sector has been welcomed into this dynamic, multiplying the functions of Prevent managers and the wider CVE discourse they advocate for through programmes that

aim to simplify a schools legal obligation to the duty. In the following chapter, this dynamic will be investigated in more detail. The responses of personnel that work for NGOs that operate both within the localised and national context will be analysed, discussing topics such as their modes of production, creative process, and their means of communication with their target audiences.

Chapter 7. NGOs: Those who Profit from Prevent

Foucault (2008: 243) recognizes that the language of neo-liberalism has shaped the discourse of security. To be precise, security agencies are not only charged with policing acts of criminality, they are also tasked with making them quantifiable, calculable entities. This calculation of criminality has led to the advent of security apparatuses designed to act preemptively; to insure against the risk such criminal acts represent to the social and by proxy, the economic (Lemke, 2019: 217). In short, CVE initiatives such as Prevent, although inherently flawed, produce measurable results that can be easily translated into economic values. The fact that acts of terrorism are sporadic is immaterial because they produce a morally driven socio-political response. This can affect societal perceptions of the State's ability to safeguard society – a core component of its *brand* if you will – which also translates into an economic value of its own. New industries emerge within the biopolitical milieu created by acts of terrorism and extremism, populating the 'episteme' or systems of knowledge required to manage such discourse (Foucault, 1989: 33-35). Consequently, organisations who operate within these emergent economies perpetuate the politicisation of extremism as a threat beyond its actual scope simply because such discourse generates them a profit.

Thus far, this thesis has examined the responses of Prevent managers and discussed how they disseminate the Prevent agenda across their respective LAs. They do so through pastoral mechanisms: diffusing the ideology of the State through FBV and policing it through its apparatus of soft surveillance. It has also assessed how this practice is incorporated

within the educational field – the primary focus of Prevent managers – by analysing the responses of DSL’s and pastoral leads who are tasked with implementing the Prevent statutory duty within the school setting. The duty is facilitated through safeguarding agendas and pastoral education which primarily takes the form of PSHE and RE lessons. As part of this process, schools and LAs employ a plethora of third sector agencies to assist them in this endeavour. Such organisations offer *expertise* and training which is assimilated by LA agencies within their own practice. In the third analysis chapter, the responses of personnel from the third sector – people who work for NGOs that populate the discursive field of Prevent – are analysed. The analysis is structured around the individual research questions found on page 40.

The cohort for this chapter reveals the perspectives of NGO personnel that work within the international, national, and localised context on education and CVE focused projects. Pseudonyms will be used to ensure the anonymity of all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description of each participant that appears within this chapter can be found below:

The cohort:

- **Emma:** is a programme manager for an education NGO that focuses on PSHE and Pastoral support within the school setting at the national level. The organisation works across two main workstreams: training/consultancy and direct delivery to

student cohorts. They also offer accreditation schemes for schools. Emma is an ex-drama teacher and has worked in education for around 11 years. She is in her mid-30s and of white British descent. She works in both Brian and Julian's LAs.

- **Holly:** is an area manager for a national level NGO whose core focus is to raise aspirations for young women of school age through mentorship programmes. Her previous professional background is in education, having worked as an English teacher for 5 years before this appointment. She is in her late 20s and of white, British descent. She works in both Peter and Williams LAs.
- **Sian:** is a programme coordinator for an international NGO that focuses on CVE, international development, and risk management. She runs an international programme that organises cities internal security around the world, bolstering their CVE apparatus. As part of this responsibility, Sian coordinates the organisation's educational facilities and manages a team of individuals who produce scholastic tools that are sold to educational bodies. She also regularly appears on TV as an *expert* when acts of terror/extremism occur, having appeared on the BBC, ITV, and Channel 4 News. Previous to her current role, Sian has worked for both the Home Office and local government – perhaps most pertinently as a Prevent Coordinator. She is in her Late 30s and of white British descent. She operates in all the Prevent managers' LAs.

- **Pavel:** is a CEO of a localised NGO that provides educational programmes that focus on music and drama with young people excluded from schools/in danger of exclusion because of behavioural needs. He set up his organisation 15 years ago and employs a small number of staff who help facilitate delivery. Pavel is in his mid-40s, British and of white Polish descent. Pavel works in William's LA.

- **Bethany:** is a deputy CEO and a subject specialist lead for a national level NGO that focuses on PSHE provision. They provide PSHE resources, certification programmes and staff training/consultancy as well as delivering directly to the student body of partner schools. Bethany is of white British descent and in her early-50s. She has 20 years' experience in teaching, specifically as a pastoral lead, PSHE specialist and deputy head teacher. Bethany operates in all the Prevent managers LAs.

- **Tim:** is the managing director and cofounder of a localised NGO (that is beginning to operate at the national level). The NGO's primary focus is developing aspiration within the school and FE setting. They deliver student focused workshops and events with one of their core strands being CVE based. Tim is in his early 20s and of white, British descent. Tim's organisation works in Peter's LA.

The first section of this chapter will uncover exactly how NGOs incorporate their services within the Prevent landscape. It will focus on the methods used by NGOs to create *new*

knowledges within the schema of CVE and how it sells such narratives to its target audiences.

7.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?

Sian, a programme coordinator for a major supranational NGO who works in all the Prevent managers' LAs that appear in this study describes the importance of research which "*feeds into everything*" that she and her organisation does. The research activities she employs primarily implement statistical analysis techniques. However, the organisation is keen to adopt "*ethnographical*" approaches to provide a more holistic approach to their workstreams, even though this can often prove difficult to initiate on the ground. The project that Sian runs, which she describes as the organisation's "*Flagship Programme*", creates a network of cities across the world where the civic and policing leaders utilise the data produced by her organisation, often sharing best practice scaffolded by the organisations expertise. Membership to this scheme is exclusive, with her organisation currently operating within seven LAs in the UK context outside of London, where all the boroughs are involved in the scheme. LAs, must "*identify priority areas*" which Sian will assess to see if they meet her criteria. Accessing the scheme is quite a competitive affair and more LAs are rejected than are signed on at any given time. Sian was clear that any successful application relies heavily on the LA being able to work "*with national government to help us get some funding*" so that they can offer their expertise and services.

The main question raised here is why are LAs across the world lining up to be associated with Sian's organisation? Sian freely admits that working out how to *"take all of our programming and run that on a city level"* is often problematic; finding ways to fit her products within the LA setting takes up most of her team's time and resources when a partnership has been established. Interestingly, Sian denotes that the best way to *"build different constituencies"* into the programme is to utilise local project workers such as the Prevent managers, whom she describes as *"the experts that are working [in] this area."* Using the Prevent managers as a *"consultative body"*, Sian works the products and services at her disposal into the gaps in provision within a partner LA. Much of Sian's organisation's success is due to their ability to successfully *"lobby"* government departments such as the Home Office and DfE at the national level with the data they collect at the local level. She describes this as a *"big part of our work."*

The division in labour between private and public enterprise found in the example of Prevent and NGOs like Sian's organisation is a medium of diffusion between the practices of State and the free market economy. It also acts as a mechanism of change – creating new forms of government and economic structures (Lemke, 2019: 186). The most successful NGOs in this sector act as both service providers and as lobbying groups. Working within the community setting, they gather their data or their 'knowledges', which they then take to governmental bodies such as the Home Office and DfE to influence their policy-making moving forward (Foucault, 2002: 211). This 'transactional reality' propels the interests of State and empowers elements of civil society that adhere to the economic model of governance simultaneously (Foucault, 2008: 307). Sian utilises the agents of pastoral

diffusion – in this instance, the Prevent managers – because they also legitimise her organisation’s objectives; their evangelical zeal to safeguard their subjects requires her direction. This symbiotic relationship allows her to collect localised data in the format most digestible to the Home Office and its peer departments of government. This aids her organisation’s assimilation within the ‘epistemological’ rational of State, helping her to become a component of its *archaeology of knowledge* (Foucault, 2002: 212).

Emma, a programme manager for an education NGO that operates at the national level (within the LAs of both Brian and Julian) describes a different arrangement with government than Sian’s organisation. Emma’s NGO is supplied with most of their funding through central government, with the Home Office and DfE their primary source of capital. Although Emma’s NGO does offer services to individual schools who may wish to approach them directly, her organisation primarily targets the Home Office and DfE – her organisation sells these ministries their programme as a complete package. Once terms have been agreed, the Home Office will advertise Emma’s services within their Prevent network events. Prevent managers will then put in bids to the Home Office, who in turn will decide – dependent on a hierarchy of need – “*where they think [Emma’s NGO] should be, where we’ve got the capacity to go.*” Emma will then be given a budget for her programme and it is her role to “*work with*” the LAs to “*spend*” it on services that best fulfil their needs. In this example, the Home Office is creating a market of ‘enterprise’ within its cohort of Prevent managers, picking the best ‘entrepreneurs’, those who best utilise the ‘human capital’ at their disposal and rewarding them with the services of Emma’s NGO (Dean, 2010: 185-186). The ‘socio-economic determinations’ levied by the State towards their Prevent managers also extend

to Emma's NGO, where her operations are determined by the 'regime of truth' established by the Home Office. Emma must go where they decide the greatest need is, which in turn dictates the nature of her organisations delivery (Foucault, 2014: 340).

In practicable terms, Emma will meet with the Prevent coordinator and PEO in whichever LA she is designated. They will work out the *"logistics of how to roll out"* the programme together, costing various products, with different fees for services in *"primary or secondary"* education and for *"staff training."* Emma encourages a *"holistic approach"* to LAs, promoting a mixture of delivery between staff training and direct workshops with student bodies. Emma presumably pushes this narrative because it offers value to the LA as well as providing her with a wide frame of reference to collect data to evaluate her organisations services. Similarly to Sian, Emma's NGO must *"make sure that our work is researched and evidenced"* for it to continue offering its services – it needs to prove it can adapt to the environment it places itself in. Once the terms of delivery are set out, Emma will align her workstreams to that of the LA, producing *"quarterly reports for them, and end of year reports"* which the Prevent manager will use to supplement their own reports to the Home Office that also operate on a quarterly and annual basis. Emma did not divulge the actual content of the reports she made, however she did denote that they focused on mapping areas of *"risk and priority"* which could be used to develop the next phase of her organisations work within partner LAs.

Emma's services are tailor made to provide the LA with a system of delivery that fits their own as closely as possible. Emma denotes that her remit is to produce *"effective work on*

Prevent” and that regardless of the format, the products offered by her organisation must promote the “*safeguarding [of] everyone and provide all young people with the skills to think critically*” which directly align with the Prevent managers responsibilities and the aims of FBV. In this example, Emma’s NGO is complicit in creating a ‘regime of veridiction’ in conjunction with the State. To be precise, Emma’s organisation chooses to avoid its own objective analysis of the social artefacts at its disposal and instead uses the State’s ideological position to frame its understanding or ‘regime of truth (Foucault, 2014: 341).’ For example, Emma’s NGOs staff training programmes are designed to showcase the “*proactive education side of Prevent*” and inform teaching staff on how the duty “*fits into [school’s] safeguarding.*” She is more concerned with fulfilling her brief set by the Home Office than critically assessing how relevant her products are to the school’s student cohort.

Emma’s willingness to replicate the LA’s systems as closely as possible is a factor of the ‘transformations in statehood’, where the functions of State are being harmonised – transposed even – upon the biopolitical ‘continuum (Lemke, 2013: 84-85).’ In sum, the third sector’s assimilation within the functions of State should not be viewed as the receding of State power, it is in fact an example of its growth into the emergent socio-economic landscape. There are a multitude of other examples found within this field, however Bethany’s NGO offers a perfect illustration. Bethany is a deputy CEO of an education NGO that focuses on the delivery of the PSHE curriculum within schools at the national level. Similarly to Emma, most of her organisation’s funding is delivered “*on a contract or grant basis*” from governmental departments such as the Home Office and DfE. A core function of Bethany’s organisation is to “*address extremism through PHSE*” which often takes the form

of lesson plan packs and staff training programmes that are delivered within the school setting.

What is most interesting about Bethany's organisations activity is that they design the nationally recognised PSHE curriculum which is implemented in schools across the length and breadth of the country. Although the DfE offer broad guidance on the content of PSHE syllabuses, they have decided against creating an actual curriculum themselves, preferring instead to sanction the expertise of Bethany's NGO in its place. Although technically a non-regulatory subject area, PSHE is assessed by Ofsted who do have criteria set by government that need to be fulfilled by schools. The need for Bethany's NGOs services is effectively State assured, where they act as a mechanism of *"quality assurance"*, ensuring all schools and education providers are delivering PSHE programmes in line with Prevent, FBV and other statutory requirements levied upon them by the State.

Although Bethany enjoys close working relationships with Prevent managers and the Home Office, sometimes there is a conflict of interest between them and her team, specifically over issues like the content of FBV lessons. Bethany seemed quite critical of FBV as a concept during her interview, not willing to go into her *"own personal opinion of the whole FBV thing"*, however she was clear that it was *"very much woven through PHSE"* and couldn't be ignored by her organisation. As such, Bethany and her team have developed resources that *"don't label [FBV] in the programme"* but can still be used by schools to evidence their commitment to it. In this instance, Bethany and the third sector she inhabits both enforces and undermines the modes of pastoral power occupied by Prevent. It

enforces it by engaging with the format of pastoral power adopted by the State in the form of the educational system but undermines it by proclaiming to have better answers to the problems State actors find difficult to solve. This creates an environment where State actors are both reliant on the third sector for their *expertise* and assistance but also in competition with them for influence over its target audiences (Dean, 2010: 90-91). This activity, where NGOs like Bethany's are both in league and competition with the State is an aspect of 'enterprise society', where the balance between a 'society for the market and a society against the market' is struck (Foucault, 2008: 242-243).

Ultimately the State dictates the relationship between the third sector and itself because it is the only party with the apparatus of the adjudicator at its disposal – the power to shape and wield the law (Dean, 2010: 71). In the praxis of Prevent, FBV have been deemed a legal requirement by the State and any actor that operates within this sphere, be that a State body or a private entity like Bethany's NGO must adhere to them. It must be understood that FBVs are merely a strand of the fabric of security apparatus that envelopes Prevent – they do not define the statutory duty's function. The languages of law and commerce have combined to determine that issues of security encompass the threat to the economy as a forefront concern (Foucault, 2007: 108). The biopolitical mechanisms adopted by government – in this instance taking the form of FBV – are only important because they promote the economic viability of the neo-liberal model, not because the security of the individual citizen matters to those that govern. The political economy also plays a part in the shaping of this discursive field; Prevent ends up having a political value that exceeds its actual needs because it is embodied by an economy of its own (Dean, 2010: 113).

Fundamentally, if NGOs wish to navigate and profit from this circumstance, they too must perpetuate this narrative.

Most NGOs that inhabit the Prevent space empathize with its ideological position; the moral imperative to support Prevent and its CVE apparatus to protect the vulnerable. For instance, Tim is a managing director of a localised advocacy NGO working in Peter's LA. Tim's organisation is currently enjoying rapid development and is starting to operate at the national level, in part due to him taking advantage of "*various different opportunities*" within the CVE industry. Tim believes that "*the role that education plays*" in keeping young people safe from "*disillusionment, which will eventually lead to vulnerabilities*" is paramount, especially when it comes to extremism because "*education can be a hotbed for radicalisation.*" For Tim, Prevent is "*absolutely crucial [because it] gives schools and colleges the strategic imperative to invest in this agenda.*" Tim's own investment in Prevent has allowed him to travel the world acquiring expertise, working in collaboration with the Kofi Annan Foundation, RAND and the European Council to name but a few.

Tim's organisation specialises in providing workshops and events that brings in speakers from these arenas to deliver to young people directly. In particular, Tim has organised several events that utilise victims of acts of terror, having run successful workshops with speakers who were survivors of 7/7 and the Andres Breivik attacks. He has also worked closely with *formers*, establishing a partnership with another localised NGO that has several former far-right activists that deliver workshops to young people about their experiences. In this example, Tim utilises the functions of the educational field to propagate his activities.

Tim's organisation acts as the 'specialised agent' that facilitates the diffusion of FBV within the target demographics (Bourdieu, 1990: 73). Tim's account of the importance of Prevent to the educational field and his willingness to incorporate its 'pedagogic actions' allows him to pertain 'practical mastery' over its 'habitus', in this case taking the form of FBV (Bourdieu, 1990: 74). Tim's willingness to use *formers* and people directly affected by acts of terrorism further embodies his position as the expert. They provide an anchor for his organisation's 'professional jurisprudence', acting as a legitimising factor to his State sanctioned taxonomy of truth (Bourdieu, 1988: 195-197). A truth that asserts that young people are potentially vulnerable to extremism, both as victims of its actions and as victims of its functions.

From an ideological standpoint, the third sector diffuses through the Prevent landscape, primarily through economic means. It actively replicates the functions of State to aid this process, by using and becoming pastoral agents of diffusion within the educational field. In the next section of this chapter, the practicalities of how the third sector replicates Prevent's functionary apparatus within the LA setting will be analysed in more detail.

7.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?

Surveillance apparatus are fashioned through a process of calculation, often in response to a biopolitical imperative where a relationship between cause and causation is sought. In such instances, the surveillant facilitates the 'transposition of technical models' – in this case CVE

– upon target demographics to meet this aim (Foucault, 2001: 227-228). In sum, the method of surveillance is designed to classify the opaque mass of the social body into tangible entities, constructing ‘ideal types’ which the surveillant can use as markers for their observations (Foucault, 2001: 231). Whether such indicators can quantify the original socio-political quandary is largely immaterial. The actual goal of the surveillant, which takes the form of the Home Office in this example, is to implement a system of discipline within the populace so that they will choose to surveil themselves (Foucault, 1977: 108).

In terms of the third sector, NGOs are largely complicit in this endeavour. Holly, a project manager and area coordinator for a national level NGO that focuses on raising aspirations for young women within the school setting describes how her target demographics are determined. Holly has regular contact with Prevent managers within the LAs that she operates, who, alongside the schools she works with, determine the cohorts who take part in the programmes she delivers. Targeted students are regarded as “*vulnerable*” by their school, with most having “*ongoing safeguarding concerns*” that, in the eyes of the schools at least, have attributed to lower than expected attainment. When the students are enrolled on the programme they become ‘*mentees*’ and are paired up with mentors – women volunteers who sign up to the programme from various professional backgrounds. Holly will pair mentors and mentees according to the needs of the student. She will couple “*more experienced*” mentors with students with a “*safeguarding concern*” because she wants them to be aware of the safeguarding process from the outset, so that any issues can be dealt with promptly and efficiently in accordance with the LA’s existing mechanisms.

In one case that Holly disclosed, a mentor had passed on information about one of the secondary school aged mentees she was working with that had been engaging with “*the Israel and Palestine situation*” online. This raised “*a few alarm bells*” for Holly, who duly reported it to both the partner school’s DSL as well as Peter, her Prevent coordinator for that region. The case itself did not go beyond the multiagency level, however this did lead to Holly running “*a session with the girls on critical thinking*” as a group, which Peter helped design. Holly’s interaction with the Prevent managers often extends to her practice. They keep her abreast “*of policy change*” as well as delivering training to both her and her cohort of mentors. In Peter’s LA he delivers training and workshops on FGM to her team of mentors at the beginning of every academic year. When asked why this was the case, Holly explained that the LA has “*a relatively large cohort of Bengali and Nigerian young ladies and there is a potential link there in terms of FGM.*” When pressed further on whether Holly had ever seen any examples of FGM within any of her cohorts she was clear that she had not, however she still thought it important for it to be “*emphasised to [the] mentors.*” This perhaps can be attributed to Holly’s need to liaise with the Prevent managers to garner business, after all, “*networking is good*” for Holly’s role and her ability to embed herself within the LA setting.

In Holly’s safeguarding example, she has adopted the ‘genealogy’ of the State within her practices to such an extent that her methods are indiscernible from that of an LA agency (Ofstad and Marin, 2019: 431-433). Much like the schools Peter’s role has principally been designed for, Holly does not question the Prevent coordinator’s *truths*, even when she is forced to consider how prevalent the threat of FGM (or lack thereof) is within her cohorts. If

anything, her proximity to young women from the communities Peter professes are vulnerable – something he does not enjoy – should supplant her experience over his, yet she does not even consider this an option. In short, Holly isn't equipped to question Peter's knowledges of the local threats because he represents the physical manifestation of the 'technologies' of government that provide her with the means to operate within the 'territorial space' of the LA (Rose-Redwood, 2006: 470).

Instances of Prevent managers disseminating technologies of surveillance within localised NGOs that deliver programmes to target demographics is not uncommon. Tim describes an initiative he runs called "*the council for students*", where William, the LA's PEO, acts as a "*mentor*." William helps guide the sessions that are related to racism and tolerance – which Tim believes William is ideally placed to "*facilitate*" because he has the knowledge to shape the discussion of "*young people that are passionate about these issues*." However, a question is raised here: in what ways is William mentoring these young people? William's guidance has shaped Tim's organisations community projects, instilling a need for Tim and his team to focus on developing "*young people's understanding of one another*." For Tim, it is essential for young people to understand that "*in terms of spotting signs*" there isn't a catchall definition of extremist behaviours, however there "*are things to be aware of*" which should be taken into consideration when interacting with one another.

When Tim was asked to describe what *signs* he made young people aware of in his sessions, he produced a document on his phone that was supplied by William via email. Reading from his script, Tim recited his list of behaviours from the Prevent manager's playbook much like

a sermon: “*unwillingness or inability to discuss their views, increased levels of anger, secretiveness, especially around internet use.*” Essentially, Tim is reproducing the soft surveillance techniques of the Prevent manager within the student body, much like his counterpart educators do in the school setting. In this instance, Tim is as much an agent of the Prevent agenda as William is – developing technologies of self-surveillance within targeted, *vulnerable* demographics.

Evidently, Tim’s organisation is enterprising within the industry that surrounds the mitigation of ‘socially produced’ risk – taking the form of extremism - using the Prevent managers ‘calculations of risks’ as guidelines (Lemke, 2013: 51-52). The Prevent managers’ ideological indicators hold a form of ‘symbolic domination’ that Tim must utilise if he wishes to act legitimately within the educational field – to access its ‘forces of cohesion’ in order to embed his organisation within its practices (Bourdieu, 151-153). In short, William’s factorial approach is the State’s attempt to classify the ‘subjugated knowledges’ of the extremist. This process of categorisation produces target demographics, and the only way Tim can interact with them is to reproduce the narrative of the Prevent manager – to speak their languages fluently (Foucault, 2007: 7-8). Tim, much like Holly, adopts this approach without pausing to question it. This is in part due to the methodology of the Prevent manager being rooted within the ‘pedagogy of care’ of the educational setting (Pereira, 2019: 24-25). In this instance, the pastoral functions of the safeguarding mechanisms found within schools are being monetised, from ‘economies of salvation’ to economies of scale (Foucault, 2007: 222).

It should not come as a surprise that Tim values his interactions with William. He feels “*very lucky to have community-focused individuals*” such as William to work with – they offer him “*plenty of contact time*” and Tim is always looking to find ways to “*embed those individuals in some of our student voice programmes.*” When Tim was pressed further on why Prevent managers were such assets to him and his work, he claimed that his organisation was “*tapped into the local education community*” and he regarded them as an integral part of that landscape. Tim is well aware that it “*is a priority for head teachers to find interesting ways of delivering their Prevent duty*” and he feels his organisation is best placed to offer that service.

For Tim, “*the lynchpin*” of any successful programme he runs within the school setting is his “*contact with the local Prevent coordinators.*” They help ensure that his services are “*not [a] duplication*” of what is currently being delivered by them and other NGOs who are already entrenched within the LA. Much like any marketplace, Tim is trying to balance the placement of his product between novelty and function; he is “*trying to find creative ways*” to meet “*the core premise of preventing radicalisation*” delineated to him by those employing his organisation’s services. Essentially, Tim is using William’s access to the ‘technologies of government’ to help him make sense of the local market forces (Dean, 2010: 146).

Tim’s reliance on the Prevent managers is not unexpected because the marketplace itself is constructed upon ‘quasi’, artificial practices created by the Prevent statutory duty (Dean, 2010: 175). In essence, the Prevent manager acts as the statutory duty’s gatekeeper. They

turn it into a 'programmable' entity within the LA setting, identifying gaps in provision and matching NGOs to fill this need (Lemke, 2019: 149).

In juxtaposition, there are NGOs that possess resources that supplant the knowledges of the prevent managers. Sian's organisation has several supranational programmes that allow her to collect data on a much larger scale than any Prevent manager could ever hope for, even rivalling national government level departments such as the Home Office in their scope. Her ability to do so is based on the "*network approach*" her organisation takes when establishing their projects. Sian's NGO works with a multitude of stakeholders – "*youth, a network of mothers, of formers, of national governments, of local governments.*" She looks to "*join the dots*" between each network in order to bring "*together all those actors*" to produce programmes that have a much wider frame of reference than the governments employing her have access to. Sian's NGO equips her with the resources too "*identify experiences, challenges, gaps in learning and aspirations for this kind of programming... identify priority areas*" whilst also allowing her "*to be independent*" of the bureaucratic constraints imposed upon governmental departments. As a result, Sian can develop "*large-scale implementation*" programmes which governments are eager to finance because they give them access to information beyond their own ability to obtain.

One such programme, run in conjunction with Google focusing on online safety called "*internet citizens*" has given her access to 20,000 students in the UK context. The data collected from this programme alone has allowed her to lobby the UK government for legislative change. As a result, the Home Office have now ordered their Prevent managers to

set up cyber clinics within their LAs, getting them to focus on online safety on a much larger scale than they had done before Sian's involvement. It will come as no surprise that many of the cyber clinics Sian has helped create are directly affiliated with her organisation, another stream of data and revenue placed at her disposal.

Sian's '*Stronger Cities network*' also gives her the ability to shape the genealogy of government within an LA setting. She regularly tests teachers within partner cities to ascertain "*their confidence and their ability to teach the subject matter*" related to Prevent and feeds this information back to the Home Office, leapfrogging the Prevent managers in the process. She also runs large-scale data collection programmes within a partner LA in order to "*rank*" them against each other. Sian denotes that she employs "*three evaluation points*", when assessing each LA. Firstly, she scores their "*understanding of local risk*", then she assesses their "*capabilities*" to meet the challenges presented by these risks, and finally she assesses the "*engagement*" the LA has with her NGO; that is, whether they are asking for support that she has the capability to "*match with.*" This data is collated and quantified, with each partner LA given an overall "*score.*" Sian points out that she is well aware of "*who [the] top city is, [who is] the bottom one.*" When Sian was asked if she passed on this data to the partner LAs, she stated that some of the performance data was shared to improve services however the ranking system was not – this was an entirely in-house operation. However, Sian did provide national government agencies with an indication of underperforming LAs if she thought they were incapable of change at the level she deemed necessary without government intervention.

Sian's ability to displace the expertise of the Prevent manager is largely down to the economic power her organisation wields – it is a multimillion-pound enterprise that operates on the global stage. Sian's organisation's pre-eminence within the "CVE world" is an example of how market forces have been imprinted on the legal functions of State, which in turn generate the functions of its security apparatus (Vatter, 2014: 163). This 'certain legal order' makes it impossible to separate the knowledges of the State and the knowledges produced by the processes of economic markets (Foucault, 2008: 159). The neoliberal re-ordering of the security apparatus of State depicted by Sian's organisations position of authority could be seen as a form of 'juridical regression', where the field of probabilities found within the biopolitical now have jurisdiction over the State's reasoning (Foucault, 1979:144). However, similarly to how the Prevent managers acts as a gatekeeper to the localised market for Tim and Holly, the Home Office and national level government departments grant access to Sian and her organisation to the national market. As the sums of capital have been multiplied, so too have the functionaries of pastoral power. The means of control are still State centric, however, the hegemony of State is now expressed as the 'hegemony of financial capital (Vatter, 2014: 179-180).'

In sum, the surveillance practices of the State are largely disseminated through NGOs that populate the LA setting through economic means. This circumstance motivates the NGOs to reproduce the functions of State within their own practice. It gives them access to exclusive, specialised markets that they can shape around the devices they have at their disposal. The following section of this chapter will focus on the flexibility of the Prevent duty to accommodate the services of the third sector within its operative discourse.

7.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?

For the most part, NGOs working within the scope of Prevent act as an extension of the State and its agents of pastoral diffusion, the Prevent managers. They too act as gatekeepers of knowledge, profiteering from education providers who have a statutory requirement to facilitate the Prevent duty (Foucault, 2014; 92). In addition, they can (and often do) act in an advisory role to the Prevent managers themselves from superseding the authority of State actors. They legitimise this practice on the pretension of expertise that is underpinned by neo-liberal economics; the market knows best (Lemke, 2013: 45).

Pavel is a CEO of a localised NGO that works within William's LA providing educational services to young people with behavioural needs created 15 years ago. Pavel describes how he applied to a job advert to run a government initiative for young people to access music, with the post looking *"for someone to come in and appropriately shut down the organisation"* as it wasn't reaching as many young people as it had targeted. Pavel managed to convince his potential employers that he could save the initiative, which he turned into an independent NGO after securing funding from the same government departments wishing to shut the original scheme down.

One of the strands of funding Pavel has recently acquired comes via the Home Office, specifically the Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) fund introduced by David

Cameron's government in 2016. Pavel describes the BSBT community as a "closed" one. They often interact through "invite only" social media groups where they "share their successes." Pavel suspects that the Home Office are "scared of ethical review" and as such they use these closed access groups to vet material of its partner NGOs before it uses it to promote the BSBT programme publicly. As part of the stipulations of this funding, Pavel must supply the Home Office with data. This is organised through "Ipsos MORI" – an independent marketing and research body that operates internationally with a multibillion-pound turnover. As part of this assessment, Pavel must assess his cohort of young people, asking them questions like "do you feel happy in your community, do you feel safe in your community."

Pavel argues that his own ingenuity saved a valuable service from being closed down; that his methods differ significantly from that of government and that is why he has made a success of the service and why they "failed badly." Pavel believes that his service is "a lot more dynamic, a lot more responsive" than what the government is able to offer. However, much like the other respondents his actions have merely verified the pastoral functions of State, just in a more economically justifiable way (Foucault, 2008: 35). Pavel and his peers are actors within the schema of 'behavioural economics', where the State populates its functions within pockets of 'economic subjectivities (McMahon, 2015: 139).'

Put succinctly, Pavel's organisation, much like Ipsos MORI who have been contracted to evaluate his services, act as an 'essential mechanism' of the economic market, allowing the government to economise its security apparatus (Foucault, 2007: 107–108). The data

collected by Ipsos MORI is the Home Office's attempt to codify the nature of statements of their target demographics. This is then used to assess the capabilities of Pavel's work at disseminating the self-surveillance apparatus of the State (Foucault, 1982: 220). It also gives the Home Office an indication of emergent threats within the localised area. Once analysed, this information is fed back to their Prevent managers who can use it to enhance their 'technical efficiency', which in turn augments their pastoral function as the *expert* within the local context (Bourdieu, 1990: 117). Ultimately, the Home Office are "*afraid of evaluation*" because scrutiny could undermine the States 'apparatus of power-knowledge.' In short, the State wishes to be the sovereign arbiter of what is truth and what is falsehood (Foucault, 2008: 19). If NGOs wish to profit from the State, they must accept this circumstance and assimilate the State's practices within their own.

Subsequently, NGOs must base their operations upon a 'particular production of truth' if they too are to be considered purveyors of truth (Read, 2009: 34). Bethany's organisations core objective is "*to influence PHSE quality on different levels.*" Whether it is "*influencing the quality of PHSE in the classroom*" or "*writing a national guidance document,*" recruitment of the right personnel is key to meeting this aim. Bethany only recruits people who "*have been a PHSE lead in a school*" for this reason. She is certain that the organisation would not be able to deliver its services within schools had they all not been "*teachers before*" because they need to "*understand*" the environment they are delivering in. In this instance, Bethany is acting identically to the Home Office when they employ their PEOs who almost exclusively come from a teaching background. She presumably does this for the same reasons, firstly to capitalise on the pastoral functions of the educational setting by

replicating it and secondly, to portray expertise through the pedagogical experience of herself and her staff. The symbolic capital afforded to her organisation through her staff's qualified teacher status and PSHE *expertise* creates a 'mechanical solidarity' between the partner schools and Bethany's practitioners; they speak the same language (Bourdieu, 1996: 81).

The pedagogical mechanisms that allow Bethany to permeate the school setting also extend to the services offered by Bethany's NGO. In terms of Prevent, there are a series of lesson plans devised to be administered over short, mid and long terms – a format the school uses for the delivery of all its syllabuses. Bethany sees it as her role to teach educators that "*it's not just learning about extremism as a thing.*" Her organisation provides services that facilitate "*the personal angle*" of PSHE as a mechanism to tackle extremism and she often replicates the rationale of the Prevent managers when discussing extremism as a concept. For Bethany, "*understanding what leads to extremist views, and trying to build resilience to going down that path*" is the core message of Prevent – something PSHE, and by proxy her organisation, are well placed to demonstrate through their programmes.

In this instance, Bethany's practices are embedded within the *habitus* of three separate entities: FBV, PSHE and the school itself. What allows her to dominate discourse within these *habitués* is that they are not easily quantifiable modes of study – like a GCSE qualification for example – they are open to interpretation. For a tactile entity such as the school, the unknown field of possibilities presented by FBV and subjects that enable it (such as PSHE) are problematic (Bourdieu, 1993: 184). Bethany's organisation possesses a 'habitus

attuned to the situation' by proxy as they design the nationally recognised PSHE curriculum sanctioned by the DfE (Ferrare and Apple, 2015: 48). Bethany's organisation is acting as an 'ascetic' effort of the State, where Bethany's contract with the DfE dictates that she must replicate the State's 'deontology' – in this case taking the form of its typology of extremist risk – within its practices (Dean, 2010: 26).

In terms of the Prevent duty, NGOs deliver the State's *deontology* through two main mechanisms: consultation and workshops/events that are delivered directly to the student body. Such workshops often employ *formers*, ex-members of extremist groups who go and present their experiences to young people, presumably to guide them away from making the same mistakes. Sian indicates that there is a plethora of such individuals she draws upon when delivering programmes within her stronger cities network. When Sian was asked to describe the backgrounds of the typical *former* she may employ, Sian denoted that the majority came from far-right backgrounds. When pressed further on why this was the case, Sian proclaimed that "*the far-right is probably a bit more credible for some, and a bit more acceptable for some schools because it's a bit more understandable in a sense....it's less taboo.*" Sian also pointed out that she had used *formers* from "*the Islamist side*", however they were often harder to sell to partner LAs and schools because they "*are a bit more scared by it.*"

The value of *formers* to the Prevent agenda is obvious. They are employed as a 'biopolitical strategy' to disseminate State sanctioned normative discourse through *soft* disciplinary power (Rasmussen, 2011: 38-39). The fact that Sian and her peers take advantage of this for

economic gain is not unexpected. It is also not surprising that *formers* from Islamic backgrounds are viewed as “*taboo*” by schools. The ‘discourse of war’, in this case the war on terror, has shaped the Islamist as the ultimate form of social degenerate – the ‘abnormal’ which society must be defended from (Foucault, 2003: 300-301). This specific form of racism operates in the spaces between ‘the technique of power’ and the ‘technology of power’, an ideologically constructed biopolitical mechanism that binds society to the State’s technologies of government (Foucault, 2004a: 258). Sian is acutely aware of this prejudicial authority, even though she does not express so in as many terms. Essentially, she is just responding to economic realities; one will quickly go out of business if you offer services nobody wants.

In terms of consultative services, NGOs’ interactions with their partner schools is often less convoluted. Emma starts any interaction with a partner school by conducting a “*mini audit*” of their current provision. This “*mapping exercise*” allows her to assess what targets the school is already meeting, “*finding the gaps*” she can then come in and “*fill*” by developing collaborative resources. More often than not, Emma finds that partner schools “*just don’t realise that they’re [already] doing it*” and she can show them how to evidence the work they already have – “*make it meaningful.*” One-way Emma’s organisation facilitates this process is through an award system that schools can buy to evidence their commitment to PSHE, and by proxy, FBV. The system is organised over three different levels, each at different price points: Bronze, Silver and Gold. Regardless of what level of award the school chooses to pay for, each one “*has been designed in line with Ofsted’s inspection framework*” which enables the school to evidence their commitment to their statutory duty. For Emma,

the allure of buying an award is that it offers the partner school with some assurance – “*If they’ve got an award then they know that they’re definitely meeting that duty.*” Emma’s organisation provides the school with a “*portfolio*” of evidence they can present to Ofsted on completion of the award scheme. The size and detail of this portfolio is dependent on how much the school is willing to pay. Many schools chose the Gold award, or the “*bells and whistles*” option. Belle the pastoral lead described in chapter 6 for this very reason, to provide Ofsted with the best evidence base possible to ensure that they meet all the necessary criteria being lobbied at them.

The reproduction of Prevent predominantly occurs through pre-existing bureaucratic channels; in the case of education it is assimilated through pastoral mechanisms. Agents of the State in the localised context i.e. the Prevent managers and State sanctioned NGOs control this dissemination by acting as gatekeepers of knowledge – purveyors of the State’s ‘regime of truth (Foucault, 2014: 93).’ Emma’s NGO is acting as a facilitator in the ‘standardization’ of the language of State within the school setting (Lemke, 2013: 30). Her awards scheme is an example of the creative responses of the economic market to the State’s attempt to control the discourse of *extremism* through enforced bureaucratisation (Dean, 2010; 27). The following and final section of this chapter will look at the creative process of NGOs within the Prevent schema in more detail. It will focus on how such NGOs legitimise their activity and on how they assess their impact upon their target demographics.

7.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

NGOs working within the Prevent landscape have varying levels of impact upon the strategy. How much impact they generate is directly proportional to how much access they have to governmental departments. NGOs garner such access by proving that they possess ‘authoritative knowledge’ that can be utilised by State actors like the Home Office for the delivery of their doctrine within their associated agencies and services (Sending and Neumann, 2006: 659). In order to prove their credentials to State agencies and departments, NGOs create systems of ‘professionalism’ that align with governmental processes (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 104). The most successful NGOs within this arena claim the transformative properties of the knowledges they possess; they become agents of the State’s endeavour to socially engineer its populations (Latham, 2000: 33).

For instance, Sian’s organisation’s primary objective is to map evidence of extremism at the localised level, something she describes as the “*the evolving threat*”, whilst trying to gauge “*the reaction of policy-makers at both the national and local levels*” so she can adapt her services to match their expectations. There are many opportunities for Sian’s NGO to employ such analytical devices within the UK setting, working on projects for departments such as the “*national counterterrorism police, the MET, the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Office of Security Counterterrorism, the Consumers and Analysis Unit.*” Sian acknowledges that the UK government’s CVE apparatus is “*very robust*” however she also

points out that UK governmental departments can also be overconfident, even describing the Home Office as *“arrogant about its [analytical] capabilities.”* As such, Sian must design sophisticated research projects that go beyond the scope of the government agencies’ capabilities in order to convince them that her NGO possesses the knowledges to provide *“the most accurate ways to address [CVE] issues.”*

This process, where Sian’s NGO is both competing and collaborating with agents of the State is an example of the ‘socio-political ontology’ of the State’s security apparatus being operated through its economic sphere (Tellmann, 2010: 287). Sian’s organisation is functioning as an aspect of the ‘milieu’ of ‘circulation’ that the economy demands from its ‘dispositifs (Foucault, 2007: 21-24).’ To be precise, Sian’s NGO and others like it are creating new markets through its delineation of the ‘aleatory’ within the scope of CVE. This is in turn scaffolded by the State’s own understanding of its targeted populations which it enforces upon Sian through economic means, in juxtaposition to its statutory enforcement upon its own institutions such as education (Tellmann, 2010: 288). The industry Sian’s organisation inhabits has been designed by the State to create ‘ever wider circles’ of economic and ideological influence through the re-interpretation of its ‘technologies of power’, but only within the scope of the State’s ‘techniques of discipline (Foucault, 2007: 45).’ Sian’s organisation becomes both a producer of the State’s ontology – its fields of knowledge – and a facet of the economic markets that link the private and public sectors together, but only if she plays by the rules afforded to her by the State.

Another core component of Sian's work is dedicated to coordinating the activities of her community networks with the requirements of her governmental employers. Sian must take *"the doctrine of national government policy"* and develop it into a more *"nuanced approach"* that she can apply at the localised level. Sian describes this process as *"capacity building"*, where she promotes *"unified approaches"* between the public sector and private enterprise to address radicalisation within the community setting – something she refers to as the *"threat landscape."* For example, Sian's NGO provides smaller scale products such as lesson plans and resources to schools that focus on the experiences of *"formers"*, whilst also administering large scale *"online safety"* projects in conjunction with tech giants such as *"Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Google"* which she runs on the ground with schools and communities in her 'Stronger Cities' network. Sian sees this as an opportunity for her to assist the development of *"new kinds of solutions for the online space to be harnessed [by] counter extremism"* which she markets to her government department contacts.

Sian sees her organisation as a mediator between government security agencies and the tech industry, establishing *"a code of conduct"* between them to meet both of their aims as well as hers. Several joint projects have been facilitated through Sian's action. One such project took deradicalization *"techniques [from the] Channel"* programme and ran them online with Facebook. Sian coordinated State actors, Facebook's analytical department and her own team to locate *"individuals who are showing and expressing significant signs of radicalisation"* with Facebook profiles and took a direct interventionist approach with them via an experimental Facebook outreach programme. When asked about the outcomes of this project Sian wasn't keen to go into too much detail, however she did mention that the

“ethnographical data” collected from it had influenced several other projects moving forward. For instance, some of the information collated from the Facebook project had influenced her organisation’s work with their *formers* network – currently 350 individuals strong – helping them to create an *“architecture of support”* that they employ when recruiting former extremists from the prison setting.

In this instance, Sian is attempting to influence the ‘level of reality’ of the quasi economic-political market presented by the Prevent duty (Foucault, 2007: 95). She cements her organisation in areas of service provision dichotomously. At the service delivery level Sian embeds resources created by her organisation within its practices – validating her organisation’s connection to the frontline of the Prevent duty. At the governmental level, Sian acts as the intermediary – the broker if you will – between the State and supranational technology firms who also have a vested interest within the CVE industry through their proximity to the social sphere. Social media giants such as Facebook and Twitter and technology firms that offer both communitive software and hardware such as Google and Microsoft offer a public service; they have become the mechanics of *the social* in the technological age. The rise of social media in the contemporary biopolitical milieu and the technological firms that enable it has truly economised the cultural and social development of society (Stäheli, 2010: 271).

It is also important to note that although social media firms wish to keep their services secure from extremism in all its forms, they will not enact procedures of surveillance if it could affect their bottom line. Furthermore, direct dialogue between security agencies and

tech and social media firms is often difficult to achieve for State agencies. Acting as an intermediary, Sian has taken advantage of her entrepreneurial status, using a language that both parties understand – economics – to homogenise the ‘plurality of fields’ that separates the State from the industries that inhabit it (Stäheli, 2010: 273). In short, Sian has managed to transpose the workings of State surveillance within the machinations of a social media company such as Facebook by proxy of her organisation being more economically minded. This activity also generates data Sian can use to influence her service delivery for State level enterprise such as her “*formers*” network, creating a cyclic system driven by the mechanics of Sian’s organisation.

The private enterprise of NGOs such as Sian’s allows the State to access areas of the biopolitical it cannot with the apparatus afforded to it through its sovereign endowment. As such, Sian and her contemporaries are allowed almost unfettered access to State institutions and agencies because they pass the ‘market test’ set by the technologies of government (Foucault, 2008: 246). For example, Bethany’s PSHE focused NGO works across two main workstreams: advocacy work and service delivery to its membership base. Bethany’s organisation has become the “*default national programme of study of PHSE*”, with both MPs and Ministers referring to her organisation’s curriculum in official documentation pertinent to PSHE and FBV. Bethany’s influence also extends to governmental departments. Her NGO has worked on several projects for the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), producing “*teaching materials*” to run alongside its “*run hide and tell*” CVE programme that is facilitated by PEOs in schools, even helping to produce a film that runs alongside the programme. The NaCTSO, in conjunction

with the Home Office has also commissioned Bethany's NGO to produce a handbook for schools and police officers to promote "*best practice in police working in the classroom on PHSE.*"

Bethany's organisation's position as the *voice* of PSHE within the national context is an example of the State self-imposing a 'limitation of governmental reason' upon its own practices (Foucault, 2008: 13). This circumstance has manifested for several reasons; however it has chiefly arisen because the State has rescinded funding to many of its auxiliary functions within its agencies of government. In terms of education, non-assessed curriculums, of which PSHE is one, have taken the brunt of such funding cuts. As such, agencies tasked with implementing PSHE have had to look for services that can provide them with adequate support beyond government. Bethany's NGO has taken advantage of this circumstance. They have replicated the methods of government – its taxonomy – and in doing so they have embedded themselves within the State's institutional structures. They have incentivised the uptake of their PSHE curriculum above that of their competitors by adopting a theoretical rationale in line with the State's expectations- "*helping young people to apply their learning ... to be a positive member of their community.*" In short, Bethany's PSHE curriculum has communicated its ethos as the 'maximization' of individual responsibility for one's own prosperity – a core component of liberal governmentality – to State agencies such as the DfE which has allowed them to embed themselves within the fabric of educational practice (Bröckling, 2010, 262).

However, the flexibility of economic markets dictate that the confidence Bethany enjoys with the State is not guaranteed indefinitely. To maintain her NGO's influence at the national government level, a fair amount of Bethany's time is taken up with her *"policy and campaigning work"* which involves her lobbying governmental departments on the importance of PSHE and its benefit to FBV and the Prevent duty – *"to keep the message"* of her NGO relevant to her primary audiences. In order to do this effectively Bethany must foster a strong membership base within the educational setting. There are currently *"4000 plus paid memberships"*, equating to *"12,000 people"* which her organisation provides a direct service to, with another *"20,000"* people operating within the wider networks of the NGO. Most of the membership base are *"PHSE leads in schools"*; however, there is a lucrative market within the private sector. Bethany's NGO has run projects for high profile organisations such as *"the Premier League, Siemens, Google"*, providing *"teaching resources.... or quality assuring teaching resources that they're [already] producing."* For example, Bethany worked on a project for the Premier League where she produced and quality assured PSHE resources for their *"Premier League Allstars"* programme that, amongst other things, focuses on promoting FBV within the primary schools setting. Bethany has also worked with Google in conjunction with Sian's NGO regarding online safety. Google already had CVE focused materials they had produced and rolled out within the school system in the US and employed Bethany's NGO to *"adapt [them] for the UK market and the UK curriculum."*

In this instance, Bethany's NGO is acting as an agent of cultural transmission, synchronising the capabilities of organisations such as the Premier League and Google with the

pedagogical apparatus adopted by the UK education system (Grenfell and James, 1998: 11). Specifically, Bethany is tasked with translating the symbolic capital of the partner organisations employing her services into the 'structured structure' of the educational setting (Bourdieu, 1971: 1255). Bethany must adopt 'reflexive objectivity' when acting in this way, taking the 'objective structure' of the an organisation such as the Premier League – which has no tangible business operating within the sphere of PSHE and by proxy CVE – and applying it within its desired context (Bourdieu, 1984: 252). In truth this is an entirely subjective endeavour. Bethany is tasked with creating a 'doxa' or a 'self-evident' connection between the 'habitus' of education and the actors employing her to embed them within it (Bourdieu, 2013: 164). Ultimately, the primary driver of Bethany's activity and the entities employing her is an economic one. The educational setting is a market of consumers much like any other, but it is a restricted one. Bethany's "*quality assurance*" is effectively a certification that organisations such as Google and the Premier League can use to gain access to these markets, to become a voice in the 'discursive networks' of the educational space by embedding themselves within its 'pedagogic discourse (MacDonald and Hunter, 2019: 293-294).'

Further examples of economies of scale dictating the 'rules of formation' within the Prevent landscape are not uncommon (Foucault, 2002: 37-38). In terms of delivery, the level of interaction and impact Emma's NGO has at the localised level is determined by the amount of funding each partner LA has at its disposal. For instance, in Julian's LA where there is a "*large pot of money*", Emma has run "*60 workshops in 28 schools*" in the last academic year. This is likely to increase considerably in the second phase, where Emma will be given more

money to “*spread*” her programme out across the LA and “*go to new schools*” as well as continue the programme she has initiated in schools already running the programme. In terms of delivery, Emma will “*deliver to one full year group at each school*” with around “*eight workshops*” run over a two-year cycle. In LAs with less funding, Emma’s programme of delivery must be adapted and become more targeted in its approach. In Brian’s LA which has marginally less funding than Julian’s, Emma has run “*37 workshops in 19 schools*” in the first phase of her programmes roll out. Emma has had to work closely with Brian to budget accordingly, with the “*majority of the work*” being conducted in primary schools because their unit price is cheaper than secondary schools.

Even though Emma denotes that there is an overall preference set by the Home office for work to be principally conducted in secondary schools, Brian is forced to employ Emma’s services predominantly in the primary setting to get the best coverage. Quantity is preferred over perceived *quality* in this instance. Effectively, Emma’s service provision is being determined by a ‘transactional ontology’ that supplants the government’s own delineation of best practice (Kiersey, 2010: 63). Evidently, the value of the services offered by Emma are being determined by ‘economic truths’ that minimise the influence of the State and strengthen the enterprise offered by Emma’s organisation (Foucault, 2008: 320). The ‘regime of truth’ deposited upon the LA’s employing Emma’s services place frugality above that of any other priority. The security of its markets supersede the security of its citizens by the State’s own metrics (Foucault, 2008: 28).

The biopolitical imperative presented by Prevent and its CVE focus being superseded by measures of 'economic performance' does however, create a paradox (Toplišek, 2019: 66-67). This 'crisis in governmentality' is central to Foucault's (2008: 68) analysis of the neoliberal order and its effects on the affairs of the State, particularly matters of security such as those presented by the threat of extremism and terrorism. This chapter has described how private enterprise has merged with the State through social enterprise – both mimicking and developing State practices primarily through economic means. In the following and last analysis chapter, the responses of the primary objects of the securitised gaze of State agencies and the NGOs discussed in this chapter — community groups and advocates that fall within the Prevent duty's target demographics – will be analysed.

Chapter 8. Target communities: Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Community Advocates.

Alexis de Tocqueville (2004: 805), one of the preeminent forefathers of the contemporary social sciences warned of the governmentalisation of religion in his seminal work, *Democracy in America* in 1835. During his sociological study of America in the early 19th century he observed how Christianity had all been absorbed by the State; clergyman now worked for salaries, the property of the church was now the property of the government and clergymen now acted as the 'functionaries' of the State within communities beyond its capacity to reach.

This process, the facsimile of the State's functions upon religious institutions, has been facilitated by the structuration of State around that of the hierarchy of the church, a form of pastoral power itself (Foucault, 1988a: 71). Tocqueville's observations can still be observed in the contemporary context across many sections of society. However, their interpretative value for the praxis of Prevent is worthy of note. Prevent coordinators actively seek out community groups and leaders and propose partnership working programmes. They incentivise this collaboration by providing spaces for the groups to use, by offering resources and sources of funding which can only be accessed by showing that they are fostering FBV and actively combating extremism within their communities. In effect, Prevent is disseminating its preferred form of pastoral power to members of its target demographics who possess superior access to the community as a whole by taking advantage of their often-fragile economic circumstances.

To be precise, Prevent and its statutory duty is an apparatus of the State's 'technology of discipline (Lemke, 2019: 68).' Such technologies are predominantly purposed to target 'bodies' that lie outside the normative structure with the aim of making them 'docile' and productive (Lemke, 2019: 69). Its purpose is to heighten an individual's or group's economic potential whilst simultaneously limiting their political agency and will to contest the prevailing ideology of governance. It is not happenstance that the communities targeted by Prevent also happen to be traditionally economically deprived within the UK context, even though poverty is not one of its indicators of vulnerability. The reasoning is twofold: vulnerable communities act as an emergent market, untapped by existing industries and secondly, like many normative based subjects of discipline they often exist on the periphery of the rule of law (Foucault, 1977: 222-223).

Thus far, this thesis has examined how Prevent managers deliver the Prevent agenda throughout the community setting. Primarily they do so pastorally using State institutions such as education to disseminate surveillance practices through the safeguarding agendas of schools. The responses of DSLs and pastoral leads have highlighted that the delivery of FBVs mostly take the form of PSHE and RE lessons, and alongside their Prevent manager counterparts, schools often employ the services of third sector NGOs to facilitate this task. NGOs with a CVE focus also offer *expertise* and training that is assimilated by LA agencies within their own practice, with the Home Office acting as gatekeeper of their activity in the main. In the fourth and final analysis chapter, the responses of Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and community advocates will be analysed. They offer a perspective of

the subjects of Prevent's securitised gaze, its target demographics. Their responses highlight the tools Prevent has at its disposal to navigate the terrain of its 'dispersed populations' and why they often fall short of meeting the needs of those it targets (Rasmussen, 2011: 42).

The analysis is structured around the individual research questions found on page 40.

The cohort for this chapter reveals the perspectives of community members and organisations targeted by the Prevent statutory duty. Pseudonyms will be used to ensure the anonymity of all the participants throughout the analysis. A brief description of each participant that appears within this chapter can be found below:

The Cohort:

Madiha – is co-founder and head of research at an Islamic advocacy CBO that operates both internationally and nationally, a position she has held for 23 years. The CBO holds consultative status with the UN department of Economic and Social Affairs. She is of South Asian British descent and in her mid-40s.

Shaheen – is co-founder and chair of the same Islamic advocacy CBO as Madiha, a position he has also held for 23 years. He is of Iranian descent and in his early 60s.

Ullah – is a senior INGO specialist working within the Islamic aid sector, as well as a Muslim chaplain for a university on the south east coast of England. He chairs several CBOs within the UK and international context and holds a PhD in finance, with professional expertise in *Zakat* (Islamic social finance). He is in his mid-30s and of Bengali British descent.

Altair – is a Syrian refugee and former asylum seeker who has been volunteering for a migrant charity operating within London for the last 5 years. He acts as a mentor for new asylum seekers and helps the organisation with its advocacy work, taking part in several media initiatives as well as collaborative work with LAs. He is in his mid-30s.

Valentina – is the Mentoring and Volunteering Coordinator for the charity Altair volunteers for. Part of her role is to coordinate educational programmes for new migrants which requires her to work closely with LA agencies. She has held this position for 7 years, with a professional background in social work. Valentina is of Italian descent and in her mid-40s.

Keyvan – is the founder and chair of a CBO that caters to migrants from Iran and Afghanistan that has been operating for over 30 years. The organisation offers programmes of education to 20,000 migrants annually on issues such as citizenship, health, welfare, immigration, culture, and arts. The organisation is partly funded by the government. He is of Iranian descent and in his early-60s.

Choti – is a prominent member of the Muslim community within a tier 2 level LA on the south east coast, which she also works for as a health development officer. She helps coordinate several annual community events designed to develop community cohesion. She is in her early-40s and of British – Bengali descent.

Rusha – is a prominent member of the Muslim community within a tier 2 level LA on the south east coast. She has worked for social care as a community development coordinator for the last 15 years but has also worked within the community both for statutory and voluntary organisations for the last 25 years. Rusha has coordinated several large-scale community development projects within her LA and often acts in an advocacy capacity for disenfranchised communities. She is of Bengali British descent and is in her late-40s.

Salih – is an Islamic scholar and activist that has worked on deradicalization programmes for the Home Office, as well as running his own Islamic education CBO that operates nationally. In juxtaposition, he has also been the subject of surveillance and legal disputes with UK security agencies. He is of Egyptian descent and in his mid-50s.

The first section of this chapter will focus on how the Prevent programme ideologically locates itself within the community setting and how that relates to its target demographics on the ground. Furthermore, it will concentrate on how CBOs and community advocates adapt their own ideological predispositions considering the pressures put upon them by Prevent – the *hostile environment* of which it is a component – and its agents of diffusion.

8.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?

Bio-politics has become the primary concern of government. The concerns or risks to society are both numerous beyond measure and entropic by nature (Dean, 2010: 118-119). To make sense of this reality, populations are organised into subgroups by those who wish to control them, groups that are considered to contribute to the welfare of society and those that are deemed to enervate it. The majority of communities deemed detrimental to society are its most vulnerable, particularly ethnic minorities within the western context (Dean, 2010: 119). The growth of the economy as the primary focus of the State has encouraged its institutions to communicate its processes statistically, translating the actions of the populations they supposedly serve into numerical values. The subjection of communities to a process by numbers has formed political action that is designed to be devoid of moral consequence. However, an unintended consequence of the neo-liberal order dictates that vulnerable communities still hold an economic value of their own, which CVE initiatives such as Prevent and those that facilitate them, both from the public and private sphere, aim to exploit (Dean, 2010: 138).

The way community groups and individuals react to the social, political and economic realities created by Prevent is directly proportionate to the level of critical engagement each party has with CVE more generally. For Madiha, co-founder of an Islamic advocacy CBO that

operates internationally but primarily within the UK (within the LAs of both Brian and Julian in the context of this study) Prevent is driven by deeply rooted, historical contexts. During our conversation, she provides a detailed account of how this discourse has been manipulated by the bureaucratic arm of the State. She acknowledges that 9/11 was a seminal moment in the contemporary context, however, Mahida stipulates that Prevent is a natural progression of the UK's colonial security apparatus, "*bringing to the mainland*" practices it has historically implemented across the commonwealth, facilitated by a perfunctory "*majoritarian nationalism*." For Mahida, Prevent acts as a "*coercive mechanism*" of the State's 'dispositifs' that have become "*industrialised*", a "*conveyor belt*" of State security doctrine (Foucault, 2001: 222). At this point in the interview Mahida highlights Paddy Hillyard's (1993: 5-6) work on 'suspect communities' within the Northern Irish context to illustrate her point, where Hillyard describes the demonization of disenfranchised Republican communities that deviate from the socio-cultural expectations put upon them by the UK government.

Essentially, Mahida sees Hillyard's observations as directly transposable to the "*demonization of Muslims*" seen in the contemporary context. She believes that State sanctioned "*Islamophobia*" is entrenched within wider society by legal practices such as the Prevent duty, mechanised by a refreshed "*third tier in the legal system*" that deposits the Islamic communities of Britain directly within its "*anti-terror gaze*." Mahida is also quick to point out that from a community perspective, the Prevent duty is "*very hard to resist*" because of the "*penalties that are involved*" for those that attempt to do so.

The force that Mahida is describing which makes Prevent unassailable to its targets within the Muslim community is the State's 'parresia', the enforcement of its ideology, its 'virtue' that allows it to dominate every aspect of its citizens' lives (Foucault, 2014: 43). This mode of governance is hierarchal by nature. It has been designed to highlight the functions of the State's power above the capabilities of those it aims to control. This hierarchy cascades throughout the biopolitical sphere, creating pockets of power as it does so. The nature of this form of power, its 'essential technique', dictates that in order to direct the behaviour of populations, the individuals that construct them must be able to locate themselves within the field of the 'other (Foucault, 2014: 44).' This is enforced upon the would-be citizen through the actions of the 'collective subjects' of biopower, which is both incentivised and made operational through the auxiliary functions of the State (Foucault, 1977: 31-33). Each individual must locate themselves by their proximity to the *other* because of the biopolitical will of the majority, who's collective identity is shepherded by the State. In short, the credulity of the majority dictates the permitted creed of those that fall outside it.

For example, Rusha, a community development officer for Peter's LA and prominent member of the Muslim community highlights the importance of obtaining citizenship for migrant community members in order to access basic facilities such as health care and housing. To begin with, migrants must complete several "*English Speakers of Other Language tests*" to get an interview with the Home Office to start the procedure of obtaining British citizenship. Prospective British citizens must then complete the citizenship test. The tests themselves consist of multiple-choice questions, focusing on topics that pertain to "*British culture... when was the Second World War, when was the First World*

War, how many people died etc.” Rusha also points out that this procedure has many added financial barriers, with many people having to *“find a way”* to access them but with many others *“not able to because the cost is really high.”* During our conversation, Rusha starts to talk about her sister in law’s experience of the citizenship test. Rusha’s sister in law was required to *“religiously”* study the materials supplied by the Home Office – an added cost for the would-be citizen that must buy them, either electronically from the Home Office directly or via outlets such as WHSmith for a physical copy. Of particular interest was Rusha’s description of the citizenship graduation process – *“you go to the ceremony to get your certificate to say that you’re now a British citizen and you sing the national anthem...so they know the national anthem by heart.”*

The verification of *Britishness* bestowed upon an individual who performs the functions of the citizenship test is an example of the ‘internal racism’ that allows the State to function (Foucault, 2004b: 216). It illustrates the internal struggle, the ‘ongoing war beneath a situation of peace’ the State must endure in the process of its self-determination, an endeavour that never ends (Rasmussen, 2011: 39). Fundamentally, the citizenship tests have been designed by the State to define who belongs within its ideological borders, and who belongs *‘le dehors’* - its outside (Foucault, 2004a:112-116). This ‘macro-level’ conflict, a battle between the sovereign and its populations for determination over what is an ‘worthy and un-worthy life’ is central to the State’s capacity to exert its pastoral functions (Rasmussen, 2011: 40-41). Of equal importance is the method of determination exerted by government; it utilises the educational field to offer verification. The graduation ceremony Rusha’s sister in law attended where she sang the national anthem, the formal tests she had

to complete in order to be there, are all examples of the reproduction of the State's cultural and symbolic capital through the 'pedagogic action' of education (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 5). The 'symbolic strength of the pedagogic agency' allows the State to garner the compliance of Rusha's sister in law and the many others who also attempt the citizenship test year on year, even paying for the privilege (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 9).

For Valentina, a mentoring and volunteer coordinator for a refugee and migrant charity operating in London within the LAs of Brian and Julian, the citizenship tests described by Rusha are part of a wider shift of government policy that is designed to increase the *"polarisation of how people behave and how they see people."* Valentina believes the Prevent duty has been designed to *"maintain certain stereotypes and certain ways of working and certain division in society"* that enable government to impose its will, using *"people's ignorance"* to negate any resistance to it. Although Valentina believes this discourse to be almost *"embedded everywhere"*, she highlights the *"education system"* as its primary locus – where *"language is being used to create more hate, there's a lot [of that] happening in schools."*

When Valentina was asked why she thought this was the case, her belief was that it was primarily economically motivated. Valentina believes that *"spending money"* on Prevent rather than *"leaving the money where it should have been in the community"* is ultimately more cost effective for the State. Valentina highlights that there have been widespread *"cuts across all the young people's programmes, they have a huge impact on issues that are related to mental health, wellbeing, community integration"* that are the most significant

outliers to tackling extremism within vulnerable communities. For Valentina, Prevent has been designed to paper over the cracks left in the wake of austerity measures, to hide “*human beings behind paperwork... ticking boxes.*”

The biopolitical realities of the landscapes Prevent must inhabit dictate that moralistic lines will inevitably be crossed by its agents. The bureaucratic processes described by Valentina – the *box ticking* – have been designed by the State to distance the processes of government from the morality of its effects. In this instance, Prevent is acting as the currency of the ‘economy of power’ Valentina and her counterparts are legally required to populate (Foucault, 2007: 108-110). Although Valentina may well find the moral ambiguity of Prevent – its “*ignorance*” – distasteful, she is left with little choice but to mimic its processes in her own practices. Prevent is effectively a manifestation of the ‘essential mechanism’ of power she must interact with to meet the needs of her charges (Foucault, 2007: 107). Valentina’s compliance is further assured by the economic realities of austerity measures that have cut service provision in her sector. Although on the face of things such measures have developed a ‘state-phobia’ within Valentina’s thinking, the involvement of the free market (of which Valentina’s charity is a component) has created a situation where she must focus on her own productivity, her own responsibility to perform supplants her conceptions of the State’s performance (Foucault, 2008: 75-76).

Ultimately, Valentina and her organisation are a product of the State opening its functions to the free market, which it has done by rescinding its agencies that develop similar services. Indeed, Valentina's employment with her organisation came about because her job with

social services, where she worked with migrant communities, was cut short due to austerity measures. Valentia much prefers the freedom her role at the migrant charity gives her now. Although she thinks the government were wrong to impose the cuts to the provision in social services where she was previously employed, she would not go back to work for the service, she doesn't *"want to work in that kind of role again because I can't see myself supporting people in that way."* The freedom offered to Valentina is effectively a condition of the fragilities of programmes such as Prevent which proscribe community organisations to fill in those gaps. Valentina has been given funding for several small-scale education-based projects by the Home Office in conjunction with Prevent, with budgets in the tens of thousands. Although they give her a level of autonomy, they are *"asking for quite a lot...for the amount of work they want, but also for the kind of information they want and what they want to see that has been achieved."* In short, Valentina's autonomy comes at a price; the 'shadow of the sovereign' still looms large over everything she does (Dean, 2013: 67).

The genealogy of government practice that has been applied to Valentina's interaction with the Prevent landscape, where she is unable to fully resist its moral implications, is a stark one. The didactics of Prevent's ideological position is equally austere. Shaheen, co-founder of the same Islamic advocacy organisation as Mahida, identifies Prevent's focus on *"non-violent extremism"* as a core problematic because it forces those using it to operate in a pre-criminal space. For Shaheen, this circumstance is a process of *"social engineering"* that targets communities who are doing *"nothing illegal"* but who fall outside the State's basic ideologies. He believes Prevent has been designed to subdue problem communities - to *"stop them even thinking"* about the injustices carried out upon their communities by the

State. As the interview progresses, Shaheen illustrates his point by noting the *“double standards”* employed by the British intelligence services, where they have been *“involved in the promotion of certain lines of extremism in Syria”* whilst many individuals within the UK Muslim community *“are being demonised and criminalised when they’re not doing anything criminal.”* Shaheen believes the British Muslim community will never fully accept the narratives claimed by Prevent *“when our institutions and establishments are involved in exactly the criminality”* they are accusing British Muslims of.

Effectively, Shaheen is describing a facet of Prevent that has criminalised critical political engagement from an Islamic perspective. It is part of a wider partisan narrative that accuses Muslim communities of being ‘captive to ideology’ when it is easily argued that the processes driving Prevent are guilty of it to a greater degree (Lewis and Hamid, 2018: 106 - 107). A pre-criminal space is created, based upon ideology that posits British Muslims as an ‘unprecedented security threat’, whilst the State simultaneously manufactures the conditions that prescribe this narrative where they did not exist prior to their action (Lewis and Hamid, 2018: 108). This production of risk is designed to produce ‘states of exception’ which enable the security apparatus of the State to navigate the spaces between the perceived moral integrity of ‘democracy and absolutism (Agamben, 2005: 2-3).’ In essence, the sovereignty that the State must exert to safeguard itself is in juxtaposition with the totality of democracy; ‘all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others’ after all (Orwell, 1945: 75). The State creates programmes of security such as Prevent to enable this discourse, the construction of its ‘states of exception’ in order to manufacture its

biopolitical borders – to decide who belongs within them and who does not (Dean, 2007: 167).

The ideological factors of the Prevent duty which are presented at the community level are particularly precarious for British Muslims. Prevent is largely imposed upon CBOs and advocates active within their communities through legal channels and enforced through economic incentives. In the following section of this chapter, the actual methods of Prevent's surveillance apparatus will be examined in more detail, with specific focus placed upon the agency of its target communities within this practice.

8.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?

Vulnerable or targeted populations most successfully interact with the bureaucratic mechanisms of the State through the medium of performance indicators. In short, the more they mimic the actions of the State and the free market the more autonomy they enjoy (Dean, 2010: 198-199). In terms of Prevent, community groups that can display an ability to quantify the needs of the communities they purport to speak for often get the most funding. Funding does come with a caveat however, one that insists that technologies of agency are employed to turn communities at risk into 'active citizens (Dean: 2010: 199).' In

such instances, the responsibility of State agencies is then effectively passed onto private enterprise in the form of community and interest groups (Dean, 2010: 202-203).

For example, Keyvan, the founder of a CBO operating within the LAs of Brian and Julian that caters for Iranian, Kurdish and Afghani migrants indicates that Prevent “*met [the] objectives*” of much of the work his CBO was already doing with his stakeholders. Keyvan details the primary focus of his CBO’s workstreams, to help “*the community to integrate into British society*” by offering educational programmes that focus on language skills, “*helping with CVs, jobs and [running] group cultural activities.*” When Keyvan was asked why he thought Prevent was relevant to this type of work, he thought it pertinent to point out that most of his stakeholders belong to the “*Muslim community.*” In this instance, Keyvan is replicating the State’s ontology of radicalisation where Islam in all its forms is effectively an early warning sign for extremism (Kundnani, 2014: 51-52). Furthermore, it appears that Keyvan is reproducing one of the flaws in Prevent’s conception of the radicalisation process; it fails to make a distinction between ‘cognitive’ thought processes that may or not be attributed to a vulnerability to extremism and actual instances of ‘behavioural’ participation in extremist discourse (Gabon, 2016: 18). When Keyvan was asked if he saw many instances of actual extremism within his stakeholder communities, he proclaimed that “*we haven’t had this issue, there have been a few cases [where] we have had to talk to people, but fortunately we spend most of our time educating people and families about citizenship, improving their understanding about extremism.*” Despite this reality, Keyvan remains adamant that his collaboration with Prevent is a necessary one.

Keyvan believes that his interaction with Prevent managers, such as Brian, allows him to keep abreast of extremism – being *“more aware on a daily basis”* of what he considers to be a threat to his community – allowing him to *“help other groups and collectively raise awareness about extremism and prevent it.... also educate the community about extremism issues and citizenship issues.”* In practice, Keyvan’s engagement with Prevent managers happens on a very regular basis, either by keeping *“in touch”* via email with the Prevent managers about *“community issues”* where they offer support and guidance or via regular networking events. One such event is held monthly, called the *“Prevent advisory group”* – a network of CBOs working within the targeted demographics of the duty, with meetings led by Prevent managers. Keyvan describes these meetings as a *“good opportunity for networking, signposting, sharing information and best practice.”* The content of each of these meetings can vary greatly. However, there is a strong emphasis on training activities pertinent to Prevent, with *“People coming in to train us with regards to preventative measures that we have to learn.”*

In addition to this activity, Brian the Prevent manager has assisted Keyvan in obtaining funding from the BSBT fund supplied by the Home Office to CBOs that are proven to be tackling extremism within their stakeholder communities. Keyvan is very grateful for this help – *“otherwise small community groups”* like his *“don’t have sufficient capacity”* to offer simple services – even *“hiring rooms for activities”* can be a huge stumbling block which Brian and his counterparts can (and do) help facilitate. Brian regularly assists Keyvan *“to apply for funding for workshops, for courses, for activities that engages the community.”* There is one caveat however, these activities must have *“the aim of increasing awareness*

about preventing extremism... the aim of promoting British values” as a core component of their design. The funding itself is supplied on a case-by-case basis, with every activity being vetted before funds are released by the Home Office. Keyvan makes the point that “*you don’t get money for everything*” and it is expected that his organisation “*contribute in kind to the [BSBT] project*” by supplying data and promotional materials that the Prevent managers can use to show that they are meeting their own targets. For Keyvan, the main benefit of his engagement with Prevent is that “*it increases the social capital*” of his organisation and by proxy his stakeholders, whom he describes as “*vulnerable*”, because “*it improves trust*” relations between them and the authorities.

Keyvan’s interaction with Brian his Prevent manager is an example of how the State takes advantage of the economic circumstances created by the neoliberal order, where community groups are struggling to obtain resources and those on offer from its subsidiary mechanisms such as the Prevent duty become a lucrative revenue stream. In short, economic transactions become social contracts (Foucault, 2008: 246). Often this interaction starts innocuously, however once the duty becomes rooted within the CBO’s framework it steers the organisation’s activities to match its own needs to the point that they are no longer distinguishable from one another (Lemke, 2019: 259). This ‘transactional reality’ is difficult for CBOs such as Keyvan’s to refuse. Not only does it offer resources directly, it aids them in legitimising the organisation to the wider socio-economic landscape, a seal of approval if you will (Foucault, 2008: 307). Perhaps not surprisingly, Keyvan is very aware of how raising his “*social capital*” equally raises his ‘economic capital (Fine, 2010: 37).’ This practice is aided by a process of ‘autodidacticism’, where Brian the Prevent manager

diffuses his expertise to Keyvan via training, which he then replicates within his CBO's educational programmes (Bourdieu, 1984: 328). The 'aesthetic disposition' of Brian as the *expert* allows him to embed the State sanctioned ideology within the services of Keyvan's CBO through the medium of the educational field (Bourdieu, 1984: 329). Subsequently, Brian, by proxy of his denomination as the gatekeeper of Prevent and the funding at its disposal, uses his 'symbolic power' to entice Keyvan's compliance (Bourdieu, 2013: 165-166).

Although the agents of Prevent have many tools at their disposal that they use to facilitate their pastoral functions within the community setting, such tools are not always as performative as they would like. Ullah, a Muslim Chaplain for a university on the south coast and chair of several Islamic CBOs that operate within all the LAs of the Prevent managers that appear in this study, describes how the trust between Prevent managers and the Muslim community is fraught. Ullah is disappointed by the calibre of Prevent managers he has had to work with – they do not “*understand the community.*” As a result, they “*miss out a lot of marginalised and vulnerable community members that need the support*” in the LA because “*they don't have trust in the community*” and spend all their efforts – and funds – on surveillance. During our discussion Ullah gives several examples of this in action. In one case, Ullah was working for a “*Muslim youth helpline*” that received Prevent funding through the BSBT network. He details how the helpline had to deal with some serious issues affecting the Muslim community – “*rape, paedophilia, grooming, forced marriages.*” Ullah implies that these issues were not being effectively tackled because a considerable amount of time was spent gathering information that was not relevant to his stakeholder's

circumstances. Instead, Ullah and his fellow charity workers were forced to scope his stakeholders, “to see if they’re extremists or terrorists” and dependent on if they met the criteria set by their Prevent funders, having to “refer them” to the authorities.

In this example, Ullah’s stakeholders have been targeted by Prevent because their vulnerable status has marked them as ‘uncertain’ entities – the ‘aleatory’ aspects of society the State must understand in order to ‘manipulate the circulation’ of ideology within the biopolitical (Dillon, 2007: 46). The surveillance practices that Ullah has been made to implement by proxy of Prevent is designed to secure the ‘mobilities’ of those that follow the ideologies of State by limiting the mobility of those that do not (Aradau and Blanke, 2010: 45). Subsequently, Ullah has been coerced by the State into managing the circulation of biopower within the scope of the ‘imagined movement’ of individuals and populations that may not adhere to the State sanctioned ideology because it appears that it does not benefit them (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 208). This reality is not lost on Ullah and this experience has affected his interaction with Prevent from then on – *“the very nature of Prevent [is] to single out the Muslim community... that’s a very slippery slope. The government has created [extremism] by doing this.”*

Part of Ullah’s role as Muslim Chaplin is to facilitate his students’ ability to practice their faith within a community setting. A young group of Muslims asked for his help setting up a prayer group where they wanted to hire a hall and bring in an Islamic scholar to help them study the verses of the Quran. Peter, the Prevent coordinator for the LA in which Ullah is located subverted this activity. Ullah could not understand why, after all, *“there was nothing*

problematic being discussed.” What Ullah believes however, is that his community is viewed problematically. He wonders what the actual thought process Peter is employing when he disrupts the prayer group – *“unless you’re claiming the Quran itself is problematic, unless you’re claiming that Islam is problematic, unless you’re saying the whole Muslim community’s problematic.”* For Ullah, his community is forced to exist in an environment where they are viewed as *“guilty until proven innocent”* – an assertion that is difficult to argue with.

Ullah goes on to describe just *“how disruptive Prevent has been”* for CBOs when they organise community events, where *“Prevent officers will do their hardest to try and disrupt”* anything that has not first received their seal of approval, no matter how innocuous their subject matter. A common tactic Prevent managers employ is to put pressure on venues to cancel bookings but *“not to cancel it well in advance, but to cancel the day before.”* This causes *“disarray”* and panic for the organisers, they lose money from catering expenses and all the other hidden costs associated with running a community event. This loss is hard to bear – all these organisations operate on tight budgets, something Prevent wishes to exploit.

The agents of the disruptive forces of Prevent, in this case Peter the Prevent coordinator, dislocate the target bodies from their resources with the aim of interrupting their means of commutative circulation. They do so as a pre-emptive action to ensure that their message is heard the loudest – they make themselves responsible for ‘maximising the good circulation by eliminating the bad (Foucault, 2007: 18).’ Peter’s disruptive behaviours are an example of

the 'inflationary critical value' of the State's ideology that its security apparatus require in order to function (Foucault, 2008: 187). The subversion of the State's intervention, where Peter acts to undermine community events indirectly through removal of resources is an attempt to 'free relations of power' from the object of what it wishes to control (Foucault, 2007: 117). The "*disarray*" the last-minute cancellations cause limits the scope of the organisers to fight back against Peter's actions. Firstly, because they have more pressing concerns to contend with in terms of funds and secondly, Peter can share the responsibility of the cancellation with the event organisers, absolving him to some degree. In sum, Peter creates a cycle of 'problematization' that shifts the focus away from State practices towards the 'emergence of new problems' of which he is the architect (Voelkner, 2010: 142). Perhaps the most pertinent observation to be made here is that if community organisations wish to avoid barriers to organising events they must consult more closely with Peter and his fellow Prevent managers.

Part of this consultation will involve the implementation of Prevent's surveillance apparatus within the organisation's services. For instance, Altair, a Syrian refugee and former asylum seeker who volunteers for Valentina's migrant charity as a mentor – a programme he was a mentee for when first entering the country – describes how there is a "*special screening*" process employed by LAs when a refugee enters their care. He describes how upon arriving in this country it was "*always clear*" the authorities were "*really cautious about refugees, especially from Islamic countries.*" When Altair started working as a volunteer for Valentina's organisation after the gruelling asylum process was complete and he was granted indefinite leave to stay in the UK, he attended a meeting with Brian the PEO who

trained him and the other new volunteers on his duty to Prevent. He explains how Brian and his team were *“really clear that it’s required”* Altair and his fellow volunteers were *“very cautious and very alert to any signs, any type of extremist religious [behaviour], anything that doesn’t fit with our culture here should be flagged straightaway because we need to see what’s going on.”* Altair goes on to describe the criteria Brian wished him to employ in his *“unofficial screening.”* Brian asked him to surveil the families he was working with, to look out for changes in behaviour – *“even their reaction to things that are not really related to [extremism], for example if they saw someone gay in the street, or about names, or about people eating pork or not, these kind of things.”*

When Altair was asked how he felt about that training and the subsequent meetings and interactions with Brian and his team he has had during his time as a volunteer he said it was very dependent on who he interacted with. Some of the people he worked with in this capacity were *“really understanding, really welcoming”* whereas others were *“close minded”* and were much harder to work with. In addition, Altair believes that his personal circumstances allowed him to get more out of his interactions than some of his peers may have. For Altair, the fact he *“could speak English really well, I’m Muslim but I’m not that religious, maybe because I’m not that dark [skinned]”* all factored in the way people like Brian and his peers interacted with him – *“it fitted a criteria that this person will never be dangerous, we are not worried about it.”* As this train of thought advances Altair muses over how things are different for many of his peers – *“if I was a bit darker, if I didn’t speak English, and I was a bit more religious, it might have been really, really difficult for me, even though I’m the same person it’s just a few bits and pieces that’s different.”*

Altair is effectively describing how Prevent and its agents are attempting to create an ordering of its habitus where no obvious order exists, 'structuring structure' to maintain a hierarchy in line with its ideological predispositions (Bourdieu, 1984: 170-171). This 'duality of structure and agent' goes some way to explaining the forms of racism seen in how the Prevent duty is applied, however, it does not explain how such ambiguous factors which posit a vulnerability to extremism can persist without some form of sustained resistance (Awan et.al., 2019: 48). Ultimately, Prevent has taken advantage of the 'dispositif of precautionary risk', where the threat to life acts of terrorism present to the biopolitical enable prejudicial practices to go unchallenged (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 103). Essentially, Prevent is applying its power through the 'capillary functioning' of its biopolitical enactors (Foucault, 1977: 198). As such, it both assimilates the prejudices of the diverse populations tasked with implementing it and diminishes the accountability to them across the social field (Foucault, 1980b: 156).

The surveillance apparatus of the Prevent duty is primarily imposed upon the community through coercive means. Economic factors are used as both an incentive to collaborate and as a stick to beat CBOs with that do not interact with the duty on terms deemed acceptable to its agents, the Prevent managers. What is apparent is that CBOs that do adopt Prevent's mechanisms enjoy more autonomy and access to funds to facilitate their services. The following section will focus on what happens when Prevent comes across resistance to its mechanisms within the community setting and how adaptable it is to this circumstance, both from the LA perspective and that of CBOs and community advocates whom the duty targets.

8.3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?

Prevent is one of many governmental mechanisms that is designed to control the socio-political conception of 'truth.' The Prevent managers primary objective, acting as the duty's agents of diffusion, is to convince its subjects that they are the sole custodians of this 'truth (Foucault, 1982: 211-212).' This 'order of the true' or regime of truth deposited by the Prevent managers is facilitated by their position as the *expert* within the localised setting (Foucault, 1984b: 72-73). Anything that endangers the Prevent manager's position at the apex of the system of pastoral power Prevent inhabits within the community setting is subsequently targeted for removal. Prevent managers follow a system of 'problematization' in such instances, where they construct new parameters that resolve problem behaviours as and when they arise, no matter how innocuous (Foucault, 1988a: 257).

For example, Rusha, who has been working for Peter's LA for the last 15 years for community development as well as within the community in a personal capacity, has been targeted by Prevent several times. When Rusha came across Prevent in its current guise in 2015, she originally cooperated with it fully, believing it to be useful revenue stream to "*help people who need that help*" in a system of austerity that had eroded many of the other services she may have used in its stead. However, as time progressed, Rusha noticed that it "*was mainly targeting Muslims*" which was creating "*negative vibes*" within the community that inhibited her interaction with it – "*I felt like people were seeing me differently because they thought I was spying on them... I was the agent that was working*

for [the LA] to tell them what was going on in the community. I found people were closing their doors on me because they felt that I wasn't one of them."

Rusha realised that the duty may well profess that it focuses on the wider community, however, she questioned why she was being employed to facilitate Peter's access to Muslim areas. As the discussion develops, she asks the question – *"If Prevent is about everyone, and it's about the far-right, and it's about safeguarding, why are we holding it in mosques, why are we just targeting Muslim families?"* It was this realisation that made Rusha back away from the duty, when she noticed she *"was able to get that trust from people again because they didn't directly see me involved with Prevent."* For Rusha, the biggest weakness Prevent has is its inability to build meaningful relationships with its target communities – *"it was just ticking boxes to show that they've done the work."* When instances of extremism have presented themselves within the community Rusha is quick to point out that Prevent is incapable of action. In one instance, where several young men went off to Syria to fight in the civil war, the families left behind were targeted by far-right groups – *"they were abused, there were lots of racial attacks, they closed their business, so many things happened."* Rusha is adamant that *"if there was appropriate support put in place by Prevent, and if they were really working positively, then those families wouldn't"* have experienced what they had to.

Rusha's account of Prevent's workings and her early role in them illustrates its hidden normative functions. Although it proclaims to not be motivated by cultural or racial bias it is impossible for it to circumvent the dysphoric effects of institutional racism because its

actions stimulate the same response within its target demographics. Ultimately, Prevent and its agents of diffusion are enactors of the 'race struggle' between the dominant State sanctioned philosophy that is steeped in colonial discourse and those that are maligned by it (Foucault, 2003: 62). The duty focuses its apparatus on the actions of the select few – in this case the few young men who went off to fight in Syria – because it is a tangible entity that fits its modelling of radicalisation. It does not focus on the wider community response because they are not 'programmable' entities using the apparatus available to it (Lemke, 2019: 149). Prevent is driven by 'technologies of performance' that are ill equipped to deal with the experiences of the communities it targets because they are not its desired beneficiaries, no matter how much it professes they are (Dean, 2010: 197-198).

Rusha has also been the target of Prevent's securitised gaze. In one instance, she attempted to organise an event with a speaker critical of Prevent for a CBO she chairs outside of her LA work. Similar to Ullah's experience where he observed the way Prevent managers get events cancelled at short notice, Rusha's event was cancelled "*on the day*" because Peter had pressurised the venue, citing that "*the person that was going to deliver the workshop had a certain ideology that was against the Prevent duty*" as his reason. Rusha denotes that the speaker passed all the usual checks she would make for an external speaker if she was doing so for the LA themselves – "*she had a law degree, she was British, she had everything that you would get as a normal speaker.*" Several weeks later Rusha went to attend an event in a neighbouring LA in her own time that was running a workshop with the same speaker. It was at this point that she believes that her work "*phone was tapped.*" After she attended the event, Peter and her line manager brought her in for questioning and she faced

disciplinary action – “*they questioned me, they said if you were told not to [book] this person why did you go to this talk?*”

In this instance, Peter is using his position as the Prevent Coordinator as an extension of the ‘regulatory language’ of law to safeguard the Prevent knowledge base from those that could limit its pastoral functions within the localised context (Dean, 2010: 140). Peter’s proximity to the ‘policing functions of state’ allow him autonomy over Rusha, even though she occupies a more senior position than he does within the LA (Foucault, 1979: 144). What is particularly interesting in this context is that Peter is not only interested in cementing the norms of Prevent, he is acting as a normative actor himself. He uses the nomenclature of Prevent’s radicalisation modelling to enact disciplinary measures on Rusha despite her *erroneous* activity being perfectly legal by most day-to-day interpretations of the law. In short, Peter’s proximity to Prevent’s pastoral functions allows him to create an ‘*État de droit*’ or rule of law on a case by case basis which Rusha has fallen foul of through no real error of her own (Foucault, 2008: 321).

If for one moment we set aside the contradiction in terms Peter the Prevent Coordinator’s illiberal actions illustrate when we consider the ideological position of Prevent – to safeguard the liberal order – it is possible to imagine how he legitimises his actions. When Peter exercises his pastoral power upon Rusha, he is doing so on the basis that it may be an instance of a ‘necessary exceptions to the norm’ that demands his intervention (Neal, 2006: 31-32). Equally, Peter’s actions against Rusha has allowed him to collect new data, to build upon his ‘Archaeology of knowledge’ by deliberating the meaning of statements – to justify

his acts with proof of action (Foucault, 2002: 177). Subsequently, the collection of data is paramount to Peter's position and therefore the conditions required to produce it need to be manufactured by him at any given opportunity.

Such instances of Prevent's endeavour to fabricate data are dispersed across the community setting. For example, Choti, a Health Development Officer in William's LA as well as a prominent member of the Bengali community, describes a programme she ran in conjunction with the Home Office designed to work with migrant women. The programme targeted *"60 [migrant] women"* and trained them to become English as a Second Language (ESOL) teachers. The reasoning behind this was twofold. Firstly, *"to empower them to take lead of their home life, but also to start thinking about career pathways"* and secondly, it provided a platform for the LA to engage more with the community – *"building a sustainable model... it's women from ethnic minority backgrounds teaching others from ethnic minority backgrounds."* When Choti was asked to elaborate on why this was so beneficial to her work in health development, she argues that because *"they've had that lived experience"* it made them better educators. Although there is little wrong with Choti's assertions here, what is interesting is how the Home Office, who primarily provided the funding for the project, stipulated she manage the programme. Choti was required to *"filter through the women"* on the programme, *"to make sure that they had indefinite leave to remain...check their passports, their status, and feed that back"*, which was all facilitated by William the PEO who played the role of silent partner.

Choti's data collection at the behest of the Home Office is the operationalisation of its typology of risk. In this paradigm, the Home Office is not really concerned with the 'identity' of its population but focused on the 'identification' of possible agents that can aid the diffusion of its apparatus within its target demographics (Dean, 2010: 44-45). Using the principles of exclusion, the Home Office employs its PEO William to guide Choti into re-educating those that potentially fall outside of its ideological foundation, who in turn replicate this behaviour within the target demographics to which they belong (Dean, 2010: 98). In short, Choti's migrant women education programme is the State's endeavour 'to distinguish, to distribute, to use' carefully selected conciliators from its dispersed populations to entrench its biopower (Foucault, 1977: 272).

Although Choti has had to comply with the Prevent duty in both her professional work with the LA and in her community work that she does in her own time, she is not blind to its incongruous nature. Choti believes the duty "*leaves the ethnic minority community highly vulnerable*" to misrepresentation and open to being reported for extremism where there is none. For Choti, the duty has created an environment that "*feeds people's fears*" which leads to people targeting communities that have done nothing wrong, to "*judge them before anything's happened.*" She is also quite clear that "*Prevent needs to change.*" Choti believes that Prevent's core weakness is its focus on "*preventing [radicalisation] from reporting it*" rather than offering proactive initiatives that help people navigate their potentially vulnerable circumstances.

In short, Choti feels Prevent perpetuates the narrative that ethnic minorities are a “burden” on society rather than the assets they are. The description of the racial divide provided by Choti is a well-trodden paradigm deposited on most matters of State and its expressions of sovereignty. In the case of Prevent, the duty acts as a ‘technique of power’ exerted by government that binds the biopolitical to the State through ethno-nationalist discourse and by proxy, racism (Foucault, 2003: 258). In this example, Prevent is acting to divert the attention of its subjects towards the ‘cultural relativism’ of those that commit acts of extremism and away from the ‘structural disadvantage’ that are its primary drivers, which coincidentally are also the areas of the *social* government is responsible for maintaining (Abbas, 2020: 6). Although Choti is very critical of Prevent, she is held captive by a ‘tension-filled narrative’ which ensures her compliance precisely because she is placed squarely within the politics of racism that the duty inhabits because of her ethnicity and religion (Awan et.al., 2019: 51-52).

The nature of interactions between Prevent and its target demographics is a perilous one. Nevertheless, it is impossible for members of target communities to completely bypass its securitised gaze because it is ‘inscribed in the social space’ that they populate (Foucault, 1980b: 146). Members of target communities that do cooperate with Prevent are required to manage a precarious relationship with the duty’s agencies and agents. Salih, an Islamic Scholar and chair of his own educational CBO that operates within the LAs of both Julian and Brian has had several dealings with Prevent, both at the LA level and with the Home Office directly. He has taken part in designing the deradicalization materials created by the

Channel programme in 2010, as well as delivering talks to the *“Muslim Police Association in their annual dinners in front of the head of the Home Office.”*

Salih has also been the target of Prevent’s securitised gaze. One of his online videos published on his YouTube channel was assessed by Julian and passed on to the Home Office who designated it as extremist material. According to Salih, this happened because he criticised the UK government of demonizing the Muslim community, who are the biggest victims of acts of terror in terms of fatalities by *“labelling these victims as enemies.”* Salih was subsequently arrested but released on bail, with his passport confiscated. This experience has fixed Salih’s resolve, he is convinced that *“Prevent is going in the wrong direction.”* For Salih, the problem with Prevent is its inability to decipher what is an actual threat and what is not, which he believes is by design – *“if you go regularly to a mosque, if you are interested in Middle East politics, if you care about it you are labelled as a non-violent extremist.”*

What Salih is describing here is Prevent’s attempts to control the ‘disposition of space’, to limit the ‘field of expansion’ offered to the Muslim community in order to control its production of both its social and symbolic capital (Foucault, 1980b: 148-149). This process of social exclusion mimics cultural racism, which in this case takes the form of Islamophobia, because it needs the biopower inherent within its ethno-nationalist rhetoric to drive its apparatus forwards (Abbas, 2020: 6-7). Of course, any process that is ideologically driven is subject to inefficiency. Policing agencies – which Prevent acts as a functionary – are tasked with evaluating the risks and the potential rewards of policing acts of criminality or allowing

some to occur. Governments tend to consider how effective the methods of policing must be to ensure bio-political survival, not total efficiency (Foucault, 2008: 256). It is also worthy of note that even though Salih has been targeted by the policing functions of Prevent he is still regularly approached by agents of the State for cooperation, recently taking part in a roundtable discussion with the office of the London Mayor regarding non-violent extremism. The question Salih posed to the Mayor's representatives when he attended the workshop was an obvious one to make – *“how come you bring me to a room and we eat together and [yet] you consider me a non-violent extremist and want me to help you?”* Salih was not given a clear answer to this question, not that he expected one.

Although the Prevent duty is not legally bound to its target demographics in the community setting, it does demand that representatives from these targeted communities adopt its functions. It actively seeks out their cooperation through economic means, as well as taking advantage of their vulnerability as suspect communities to engineer their compliance. In the following and final section of this chapter, the role of third-party NGOs in facilitating this dynamic will be evaluated.

8.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

Various NGOs populate the community setting and often employ members of the community to aid their transition into this space in much the same way Prevent managers do, however they are often more successful at it. Prevent encourages this activity because such NGOs offer a form of legitimisation to their targeted approach whilst fulfilling its bureaucratic functions (Dean, 2010: 63). In sum, NGOs allow Prevent and its enactors to provide answers to the biopolitical realities of creating a pre-criminal space by producing empirical data which acts as a 'new frame of reference' that agrees with the State's assertions (Foucault, 2008: 312).

NGOs that do run projects within the community also operate in a similar fashion to their Prevent manager counterparts in the way that they acquire access to the community and the funding streams they exploit. In real terms, the Home Office offer funding for jobs that they advertise to NGOs who bid to take on the role being advertised – an interview process of sorts. For Ullah, this creates a paradigm that is both hard to navigate and resist if you live within one of Prevent's targeted communities. He describes how "*bid winner NGOs*" will often create "*a narrative to say that there is a problem so they can keep on getting funding*" even if there is little evidence to suggest one actually exists. Ullah goes on to explain how a culture of justification has been created alongside a "*whole industry of terrorism and Prevent*" that requires a "*narrative effect*" to keep it in place.

In one example, Ullah details how he was employed by an NGO as a community “*advisor*” that had been given “*Prevent funding*” for a “*mapping project*” that was run across Julian’s LA. Ullah describes how representatives from the Home Office were driving the NGO to collect “*stats and data*” that answered their questions – “*are there any problematic elements, are there any extremist elements?*” Ullah goes on to detail that there “*was no signs of extremism*” however Julian the Prevent coordinator and his Home Office superiors “*were so determined*” for the mapping exercise to highlight them. Ullah believes that the core premise of the project was to “*put everyone on the map*” and to identify exactly “*who’s in the community....which organisations have some sort of pull, are they anti-establishment, are they critical of the government, or who’s pro-government.*” In effect, Prevent was being mobilised through an NGO to both surveil its target demographics for evidence of threat to justify its means of production and to assist the mapping of potential agents of its diffusion. No doubt Julian and the Home Office would justify their focus as a means to ensure the safety of the communities under their care – ‘protecting citizens from each other’ if you will (Jabbar and Ali, 2019: 540). However, a question is raised here, who exactly is a citizen in the eyes of Prevent and those charged with enacting it?

Prevent effectively functions as a component of the ‘political anatomy’ of the State which mandates knowledge of its citizens to allow it to administer its will (Foucault, 1977: 138). For the State to do so, it must first locate its citizens by creating ‘particular subjects’ from the endless field of subjectivities found within any population (Hallaq, 2014: 99). The agents of the Prevent duty, in this instance, Julian the Prevent coordinator and his Home Office

handlers, are exhibiting the ‘totalizing subjectivity’ of the State’s ‘pedagogical machine’ that demands the NGO, and by proxy Ullah, to produce the ‘citizen, the national subject’ by providing evidence of peoples who cannot be citizens to use as reference markers (Hallaq, 2014: 104). Equally, there is an added benefit in employing the services of the NGO and Ullah – it allows the State to apply virulent economies of scale that produce the conditions for economic growth whilst also re-producing the ‘ideology of the liberal state’, a win-win situation (Lemke, 2019: 187).

For Shaheen, the Prevent “*industry*” that Ullah describes is largely economically motivated which “*gives it a life of its own*”, however, its ideological stance is much deeper rooted, a “*natural progression*” of the “*demonization and otherization of the Muslim community*” that has been embedded within western society following colonialization. To illustrate these points, Shaheen describes a meeting he had with Asma Jahangir in 2010, then acting as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Beliefs. One of Jahangir’s remits at the end of her tenure had been to compile a report to advise the CVE apparatus of member states, with the findings informing the precursor legislation to the Prevent statutory duty. Shaheen and Jahangir’s business had been facilitated by his CBO’s status as a consultative body to the UN department of Economic and Social Affairs. Shaheen and Jahangir had several disagreements about the contents of her report, with Jahangir apparently stating that “*it’s the job of secular government to say what Islam is good, and what Islam is bad.*” Shaheen also highlights the Tony Blair Foundation’s endeavour to create “*a true Islam*” to make his argument that supranational governmental bodies and NGOs are working together on “*social engineering*” projects.

When asked to elaborate on this point, Shaheen begins to describe how NGOs like the Tony Blair Foundation and the Henry Jackson society, in partnership with national government, are employing ex-British Muslims to represent the Muslim community, creating an environment where “*people who have nothing to do with Islam are [employing] social engineering to create a form of Islam which appeases them*” with no considerations made on “*how legitimate that process is or isn’t.*” The processes of social engineering Shaheen is describing in this instance is the State’s endeavour to endow its target demographics with the metaphysical qualities it desires of them – the ‘training of the subject’ that is ‘pedagogically incubated’ within the Muslim population through mechanisms of pastoral power (Hallaq, 2014: 107). In addition, the ex-Muslims employed by the likes of the Tony Blair foundation also reproduce the ‘deontology’ of the CVE industry. Their perceived proximity to populations of interest allows Prevent to normalise its presence within the Islamic community — to become a normative actor. The knowledges the chosen ex-Muslims produce allow them to claim expertise which they use in turn to delineate and/or reproduce the typology of risk employed by the Prevent duty (Dean, 2010: 26).

Shaheen deems the government sanctioned, “*Halal*” Islam as “*very dangerous*” to British Muslims because it “*alienates*” the vast majority of them who do not recognise it within themselves. Madiha describes this situation as failing the “*cricket test*”, where British Muslims are forced to accommodate an “*impossible aspiration*” of integration that can never be achieved because of the normative structures that demonise them, or in the case of Prevent, criminalise them. Mahida is quite clear that most actors within the community have been “*disempowered*” by this unattainable ‘*parresia*’, which she believes is designed to

facilitate the machinery of Prevent (Foucault, 2014: 43). Furthermore, Prevent's "industrialised" nature has promoted NGOs or, as she describes them "Prevent Wallahs, people making a good amount of money in [the] colonial system" who now act as "obtuse auxiliaries" of the State. Mahida considers these NGOs to be producing research that replicates the "bureaucratic language" used by the State which acts to remove the "morality from the discourse" that deposits Muslims as the "vanguard of problematic communities." In short, Mahida believes that NGOs are utilising the space created by Prevent to "troubleshoot" target demographics – "problematizing and then finding solutions" to issues they have generated to sell resolutions to the government to garner business.

For Mahida, much of the CVE work created by NGOs is snake oil, a "coercive mechanism" designed to facilitate their position within the Prevent landscape to profiteer from it. Mahida's description of the field of CVE focused NGOs found within the Prevent landscape as some form of Cuckoo bird infiltrating the sovereign nest is a seductive one. Indeed, many of the NGOs who have taken part in this study have described the replication of the State's 'administerial and managerial' functions – that are essential mechanisms of biopower – in order to cooperate with the Prevent duty (Oksala, 2013: 322). However, the activities of these NGOs are necessary to the State and by proxy the Prevent duty. It is a symbiotic relationship, they are an 'essential technique' of government (Foucault, 1979: 136). They create and process data critical to the regime of power/knowledge that enables the State to utilise biopower in order to govern, providing scholastic legitimacy to the practices of Prevent (Oksala, 2013: 322-323). Moreover, NGOs facilitate Prevent and its State enactors to access communities beyond their reach through a 'network of dispersed elements' that

soften its effects through a pastoral network of 'micro power' overseen by the Home Office (Foucault, 1979: 307).

This chapter has illustrated how the Prevent duty both interacts and attempts to steer its target demographics. It does so through various socio-economic means, using pedagogic action to both seduce and embed itself within the community setting. Although it does meet resistance from within its target communities it is mostly passive – the community tends to employ avoidance tactics in the main. It is this circumstance, where target communities are held captive within the 'archipelago' of Prevent's securitised gaze which makes it so hard for them to resist its incursions upon them (Foucault, 1977: 27). The Muslim communities of Britain are surrounded by a mass of third sector bodies that attempt to speak for them with little legitimacy to do so. Community members have little agency to challenge this narrative unless they work with the NGOs directly. This often leads to pacification, where community advocates produce data piecemeal, with NGOs collating and framing it in a way that satisfies their Home Office employers. In the next and final chapter– the conclusion – this thesis will revisit the original paradigm set out in the introduction, delineating what exactly is the problem with Prevent?

Chapter 9: Conclusions.

The overall aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess the implications of Prevent and its statutory duty across education, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring and administering communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority level. The following research questions were developed to facilitate this task:

Research questions:

1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?
2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?
3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?
4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

In order to answer these questions, the study has conducted 31 semi-structured 1-1 interviews with participants from 4 main groupings: Prevent managers, educators, NGOs that populate the Prevent landscape and finally, CBOs and community advocates that form Prevent's targeted demographics. This critical case sample frame has been created because the cohorts comprise a comprehensive subsection of the biopolitical corpus Prevent has been designed to inhabit. The Foucauldian concept of *governmentality*, where the apparatus of the State both shapes and controls the *biopolitik* is central to the analytic framework adopted by this study (Foucault, 1991: 12-13). In supplementation to this theoretical standpoint, the Bourdieusian concept of the 'bureaucratic field', specifically how it relates to the 'educational field', has informed the research findings because education is the primary vector of the Prevent statutory duty's delivery (Bourdieu, 2014: 112-113).

The methodological approach implemented by this study is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which has been adopted because it has allowed the interpretation of the true meaning of statements beyond that afforded at face value (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 5). This analytical framework is essential to any form of Foucauldian analysis which chooses to question the 'ready-made syntheses' afforded to them in a technique of government such as Prevent and its normative functions (Foucault, 2002: 24). The utilisation of CDA has allowed this research to uncover the meanings behind the bureaucratic languages of the State that are used to pacify populations it deems as *risks* (Foucault, 2001: 233-234).

This chapter – conclusions – will revisit the specific research aim and research questions adopted by this study and offer conclusions based upon its findings. Firstly, the previous 4

chapters that comprise the research findings for the targeted cohorts will be summarised and synthesised in the following subsection – research objectives: summary of key findings. In the next subsection – contributions and limitations – the specific contribution to knowledge this study has provided will be discussed. It will also consider the value of this study and to what degree it has met the aims it set out to accomplish at its inception. The final subsection will outline recommendations for further research and offer the would-be researcher an honest reflection of the barriers to carrying out critical research within this field.

9.2. Research objectives: summary of key findings.

The existing literature that examines the problematics presented by CVE initiatives such as Prevent have highlighted colonial discourse – which underpins CVE design – as one of the primary contributing factors to their ineffectiveness and divisiveness. Although this information is unlikely to shock many who choose to read this study, this realisation still manages to elude the governments who implement CVE policy, the people who produce the research that underpins it and the industry of *expertise* that they all inhabit.

There are many rationales to be found within the academic literature that can be used to explain why this closed ecosystem of *expertise* continues to exist. For instance, Foucault (1988a: 71) highlights how the ideology of State is steeped in theological discourse and much like religious doctrine, its rationality is assured by how government frames its policy.

In effect, rules and regulations that may appear irrational to the forensic eye are demonstrated as rational by the mode of supposition the State forces one to adopt if they wish to interact with it on any meaningful level (Dean, 2010: 104-105). In addition, the State embeds this ideology by incentivising it through economic markets, whose propriety also happens to be government's primary concern (Foucault, 2008: 61-68). Together, this praxis of power the State has created to marshal its biopolitical enclaves creates a 'regime of truth' that is unassailable for those that resist it; one is forced to talk to Smith's hand as the face isn't listening (Foucault, 2003: 6).

Although it is all well and good to debate the overtures of the literary contribution to the thematics of this studies aims, we must now look at how such critical discourse is applicable within the biopolitical communities it seeks to describe. This study has aimed to provide an understanding of the totality of Prevent as a normative function of the State's security apparatus. As such, the findings from each cohort for the respective research questions will now be synthesised to identify the overall relationships between them.

9.1.1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?

Each cohort had varied responses within the praxis of the above research question, however the construction of *ideal types* was a common theme visited throughout the analysis. To be precise, the responses of participants illustrate that one of the primary

ideological gradations of the Prevent programme is a 'typology' of risk that designates target communities as particularly vulnerable to extremism (Foucault, 2001: 328-329). Additionally, Prevent managers and educational practitioners described a form of stratification of the Prevent duty facilitated through bureaucratic mechanisms. This systematic bureaucracy controls the production of new *knowledges* that are used to construct *ideal types*, which in turn are applied by safeguarding mechanisms to identify who requires intervention or steering (Dean, 2010: 26). The relationship between actors and agents in this instance is maintained through pastoral networks of expertise which are readily replicated by the 'pedagogic actions' of the school that also operate in this way; assimilation of Prevent via its replication of the practices of the educational field (Bourdieu, 1990: 74).

Indeed, those who take charge of the production of FBV materials and who manage their delivery are branded as *Pastoral* leads. Additionally, in the educational setting the soft surveillance apparatus of the Prevent duty is streamlined within the safeguarding agenda of schools. This has aided its uptake considerably. The depiction of radicalisation theory as a process akin to grooming – an atypical risk factor teachers are trained to look out for in any case – has allowed Prevent managers to align themselves with DSLs. Prevent managers use this position to dictate the safeguarding language spoken within the LA to embed themselves as one of its functionary custodians. In turn, this position provides them with the opportunity to collate regular data or 'knowledges' from the school setting which they then use to justify their existence to the Home Office – this happens at the apex of the Prevent programme's pastoral system (Foucault, 2000: 212).

It is important to note that Prevent managers in LAs with tier threat level status are funded by the Home Office directly, even though they are technically employed by their respective LAs. The Home Office demand Prevent managers provide evidence of threats at the community level to justify their own employment. This often takes the form of quarterly reports which ask for data pertinent to local threats, level of engagement with target agencies/demographics and progress reports on localised training programmes that Prevent managers are required to run throughout the year.

As a consequence of their often-perilous employment, Prevent managers will attempt to gather support from potential agents of diffusion found operating at the community level. In the first instance, there are a plethora of NGOs who produce educational and CVE programmes who court LAs and schools as their primary consumers. Dependent on their standing within the 'archaeology of knowledge' of the State, Prevent managers either act as their gatekeepers or as their collaborators through the sanction of the Home Office (Foucault, 2002: 212). These NGOs act in a similar way to their Prevent manager counterparts, embedding themselves within the operations of the LA through replicating its bureaucratic mechanisms and collecting data that requires their expertise. Although many of the NGOs interviewed for this study would describe themselves as not for profits, they must generate one in order to survive and to grow within their targeted areas. Their existence within the Prevent landscape illustrates how the State is attempting to embed the economy within its 'dispositifs (Foucault, 1980a: 195).' Artificial or 'quasi' markets are produced through this process (Dean, 2010: 175). For instance, Prevent managers often bid

for the services of NGOs through the Home Office who have bought the NGOs programmes as a package deal. They then break up the NGOs' services piecemeal and provide it to the LAs that provide the most evidence – who produce the best pitch.

Economies of scale also permeate the community setting. CBOs who are not legally obliged to comply with the duty are incentivised to interact with Prevent managers through economic means. Those that do cooperate in line with the Prevent managers' expectations receive funding for services and resources they are unable to obtain without their support, with the caveat that they must be in some way furthering the Prevent agenda's aims.

It is also important to note that it is impossible for CBOs and community advocates to completely forgo interaction with the Prevent managers if they find themselves within their *securitised gaze*. The pre-criminal space the duty creates, as well as the wider hostile environment it inhabits, predicates that members of the Islamic community are particularly vulnerable to the tactics produced by the strategic 'technologies of performance' that constitute the duty in action (Dean, 2010: 197-198). Although the Prevent managers would likely advocate their interventions as guiding the community for its own good, they are effectively acting to make its setting 'programmable' to the State's functionary apparatus of security, as well as creating the conditions for economic growth by attempting to negate any potential risks to the markets it inhabits (Lemke, 2019: 149).

In sum, the ideological gradations that permeate the Prevent landscape are dualistic in scope. The primary conclusion made here is not one that seeks to define precisely what these forces are, it is to distinguish what is their intent *vis a vis* what they appear to be intended for. The pastoral mechanisms of the State populate the field of knowledges the Prevent duty's actors and target demographics construct. Prevent embeds itself within education, and to a lesser extent the wider community, through pedagogic action. Pre-existing safeguarding mechanisms have been used to streamline its processes into the school setting. It further incentivises itself through economies of scale that invite private NGOs to populate its discursive field, that, in turn help construct the knowledge base that both reinforces and reproduces the Prevent statutory duty. Ultimately, the reproduction of the duty is the primary concern of its agents of diffusion as it is the sole reason for their existence.

9.1.2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the community level; how is it reproduced?

In short, the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme aid its assimilation within the community setting and once embedded, enable its reproduction. Prevent managers, NGOs and to a lesser degree, educational practitioners and CBOs are all able to benefit from its multifarious mechanisms in one way or another. However, to fully examine the minutiae of the modus operandi of Prevent – its soft surveillance apparatus – it is important to gain an understanding of what exactly is reproduced by Prevent's actors. In the first instance, Prevent managers have streamlined its mechanisms through the safeguarding agenda of

schools. This should really come as no surprise, safeguarding procedures have always been the medium by which LA service providers such as schools tackle the task set by the State to assess and delineate the 'conduct of conduct' of their stakeholder communities (Foucault, 1982: 220). What is interesting, however, is how the Prevent managers convince DSLs – safeguarding experts in their own right with much more practical experience under their belts in the main – that they possess expertise that supplants their own.

Prevent managers utilise the bureaucratic language of State to cement their position of authority within the educational setting (Dean, 2010: 90). They break down the technical apparatus of the Prevent duty, translating its meaning to the DSLs who are charged with defining the difference between 'subjection and subjectivity' within their student body (Dean, 2010: 92). To be more succinct, the Prevent managers are the custodians of the 'precise rationality of the bureaucratic field' in terms of the Prevent duty because only they have access to its 'specific logic' through their proximity to the Home Office, the duty's architects (Bourdieu, 2014: 112).

In practical terms, communication between Prevent managers and DSLs occurs over two workstreams. In the first instance, Prevent managers entrench and reproduce Prevent through 'pedagogic action', where they regularly train DSLs in safeguarding procedures related to extremism and inform them of the local threats which are determined by their data collection across the LA (Bourdieu, 1990: 74). In effect, the Prevent managers are purporting that they have access to the 'subjugated knowledges' of the extremist which they use in turn to convince DSLs that the assimilation and reproduction of Prevent within

their own pedagogy is vital for their own safety (Foucault, 2007: 7-8). This tactic is largely successful and there is very little resistance to the duty or its agents the Prevent managers, in fact they are very much welcomed in the main.

In the second instance, schools provide the Prevent managers with safeguarding data that is being increasingly collated on several different types of computer software. This serves two purposes. Firstly it, feeds the Prevent managers' knowledge base which they then aggregate and re-disseminate as expertise as the duty's 'truths (Foucault, 1979: 138-140).' In the second instance, it translates the safeguarding discourse at the community level into calculable units of data (Foucault, 2008: 243). It is this system of data production, collection and dissemination that is the primary vector through which the Prevent duty is reproduced. This process by numbers acts as a form of 'insurance technology' of the State designed to produce a tableaux of potential risks to its ideological predispositions (Lemke, 2019: 216). It is not by happenstance that this systematic evaluation of risk mimics economic forms of risk mitigation. Prevent's response to the risks it finds within the biopolitical is focused on the threat to economic propriety because the ideology of State dictates that all its actors are primarily economically motivated (Foucault, 2008: 245-248).

The pedagogic response to the risks delineated by the duty take the form of FBV. FBV as a process is designed to embed the 'symbolic power' of the liberal order within the educational field (Loyal, 2017: 83). It is delivered through PSHE and RE lessons in the main, scaffolded by pastoral leads who are in turn managed by their DSLs, or in some cases they are one and the same person. The duty employs a specific targeted approach in this

instance, where PEOs are tasked with providing support, training and teaching resources that schools can utilise to showcase their commitment to FBV for Ofsted inspection. PEOs are more often than not ex-teachers themselves. This permits them to multiply the 'technologies of domination' ergo FBV and its normative functions by the 'technologies of the self' where their qualified teacher status allows them to mimic the pedagogy of the school setting to aid FBVs' diffusion (Foucault, 2000: 212-213).

This process of pedagogic reproduction is not limited to Prevent managers. NGOs that work within the school setting also employ a plethora of ex LA personnel to aid their transmission within the LA agencies who make up their consumer base. Many project leads are ex DSL's and pastoral leads who produce resources and supply training which is sanctioned by the Home Office and DfE. Prevent Coordinators and PEOs also find employment working with NGOs whom they share strong connections with, even though it can be a tenuous relationship at points where the pastoral hierarchy becomes blurred. Ultimately this competition is an aspect of the State's endeavour to involve the free market within the praxis of Prevent. The economy is an 'essential technique' of the neoliberal order FBV has been designed to help ensure after all (Foucault, 2014: 44). For NGOs to facilitate the functions of Prevent it must be able to interpret the 'knowledges' of the State's 'dispositifs' - employing those who can decipher such mechanisms is the only way to do so (Foucault, 2001:233).

In brief, NGOs replicate the functions of State in the facilitation of the Prevent duty by employing people who can speak its languages of bureaucracy (Dean, 2010: 140). This

allows them to situate themselves within the pastoral networks at the community level, whilst also having the ability to move beyond them to the 'pastoral' functions of departments such as the Home Office and DfE. As such, the economies of scale that these NGOs inhabit in part dictate the 'deontology' or the practices of Prevent and its modes of delivery, embedding themselves into its discourses in the process (Dean, 2010: 27).

Economies of scale also play an important role in terms of the duty's target demographics. CBOs are incentivised to interact with the duty through economic means. If CBOs incorporate Prevent's surveillance apparatuses and FBV within their practices they are rewarded with access to resources, something in short supply following 10 years of austerity measures that have eroded community development programmes across the board. This 'transactional reality' allows Prevent managers to embed themselves within the community setting (Foucault, 2008: 297). Once a network has been established, Prevent managers then use the pastoral mechanisms of the 'educational field' to legitimise the activities they are asking CBOs to complete, seducing them through the familiarity of pedagogic discourse (Bourdieu, 1990: 138). Supplying data to the Prevent managers also serves another function for CBOs, it increases their 'social capital' by proxy of their working relationships with Prevent managers and the 'symbolic power' they wield (Bourdieu, 2013: 165-166).

In sum, the reproduction of Prevent's surveillance apparatus is reliant on two distinct factors. Firstly, the pastoral nature of Prevent creates regions of expertise that its agencies and actors revolve around. Such expertise is exercised through the educational field, with the familiarity of pedagogic action acting as a legitimising factor. Secondly, economies of

scale are used to incentivise compliance within its targeted demographics, especially those that fall outside the legal obligation to comply with the duty.

9.1.3. How do community level organisations adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?

Prevent's pastoral network is fundamentally assembled around and through the Home Office. However, the duty is designed to attract an ever-increasing number of actors to populate its discourses. As such, the duty must be flexible to some degree to facilitate its growth into the populations it targets. For instance, it can be advantageous for CBOs to engage with Prevent and its broader CVE objectives. In particular, the language of commerce within the 'liberal state' that dominates the discourse of governance also plays a significant role within this dynamic; it can reap financial rewards which enable the CBO to develop upon their own core aims (Lemke, 2013: 45-46).

There is considerable scope for CBOs to modify such funding, with many choosing to use it to subsidize community-building exercises. However, there are restrictions applied by bureaucratic mechanisms. CBOs are routinely asked to prove that their chosen activities are fighting extremism/ teaching FBV. Prevent managers act in a pastoral capacity in this regard, guiding CBOs through the completion of forms so that they will satisfy the Home Office decision makers in charge of administering funds. In effect, the duty and its constituent parts control the CBOs' discourse through enforced bureaucratisation that is economically incentivised (Dean, 2010: 27). Although there is scope for CBOs to create

events and workshops that fit their needs in a more holistic capacity, the core functions of the duty must be satisfied for the events to take place.

One could argue that that if the Home Office is funding the events then it is fair to ask the CBO for something in return. However, Prevent managers routinely subvert the purpose of community held events that do not consult or involve them or the Home Office, no matter how innocuous their subject matter. Prevent managers are obliged to do so because a core function of their role is to enforce the 'ontology' of the duty upon its target demographics (Dean, 2010: 26). Prevent managers must attempt to oversee the near infinite 'field of possibilities' targeted communities could produce by forcing them to act only in ways they can translate into their own processes (Foucault, 1982: 220). In brief, activities do not have to pose a *risk* to be considered *risky*.

Targeted communities are held captive by their vulnerability. In most cases they must adopt the Prevent duty to some degree because of a transmutable 'rule of law' that is applied by Prevent managers (Foucault, 2008: 321). Prevent managers use the 'knowledges' they collate to justify their exercises of disciplinary power, with each instance in turn justifying the next by illustrating the need for it to be put in place. Proof of action becomes proof of need to act (Foucault, 2002: 177). The mechanics of Prevents bureaucracy – its 'regimes of truth' – act to absolve the Prevent manager of any doubt or scepticism through its formulaic functions (Foucault, 2003: 6).

Resistance is pacified through its 'nominalisation', where bureaucratic language fragments the arguments of those that oppose the duty's processes (Foucault, 2001: 233-234). For

instance, resistance to Prevent, particularly the formula and function of FBV, is easy to find within the educational setting. However, much like their CBO counterparts, educators that do oppose FBV have little option but to comply with their obligation to teach them through the regulatory 'educational regime' performed by Ofsted inspection (Foucault, 1977: 141). The moral imperative of the safeguarding duty, which directs educators to keep their student bodies safe from 'incursions' upon them, dictates they surveil them for signs of vulnerability (Foucault, 1977: 27). Prevent relies on this circumstance to establish itself within the school setting – very few educators question the Prevent specific safeguarding protocols or the radicalisation theory that underpins them.

The university setting is a perfunctory outlier to the situation found in the school – perhaps in part because safeguarding mechanisms are less pronounced. Workshops and seminars that are critical of Prevent – or even those that just appear to be by Prevent managers – are subverted in a similar fashion to those conducted within the community setting. Although academics are often in a less vulnerable position to their community advocate counterparts, they too succumb to the 'disciplinary monotony' of the Prevent duty in a war of attrition of sorts (Foucault, 1977: 141).

Perhaps not surprisingly, the most adaptable actors found within the Prevent landscape are the NGOs who aim to become a 'new frame of reference' within it (Foucault, 2007: 312). In fact many do just that. NGOs both create and facilitate national level policy pertinent to the duty's delivery, modifying the Prevent landscape to fit the services it has to offer. Of all the cohorts interviewed by this study, NGOs reported the least constraints, with little obligation to adhere to disciplinary mechanisms – even less than the Prevent managers themselves

who were often under a considerable amount of pressure to collect data to present to the Home Office. In part, this is likely down to the 'veridiction' their programmes offer to the duty on the ground. The legitimising capacity of NGOs, wrought by their perceived proximity to the community setting, acts as a buffer between the State and its political enclaves – a veil to conceal those who surveil (Foucault, 2014: 341). The services and products NGOs generate in turn create the 'socio-economic determinations' the Home Office will use to multiply the duty across the community setting (Foucault, 2014: 340).

To conclude, the Prevent duty is flexible in the sense that it allows itself to be modified to fit within any emergent market that presents itself. Where it is inflexible however, is when it meets resistance to its core aims. In such instances, the Prevent duty and its agents, the Prevent managers, employ a regime of discipline that operates on a case-by-case basis to subvert resistance by fragmenting it, often taking advantage of the vulnerability of those whom it targets to do so.

9.1.4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do NGOs legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

The third sector plays an important role in the implementation of the Prevent statutory duty. Although there is sometimes a conflict of interest between Prevent managers and NGOs within the local authority setting, by and large they work symbiotically to establish a pastoral network that aims to regulate the 'guidance of conscience' across the duty's target

communities (Foucault, 1988a: 71). The balances of power between them is largely dictated by how economically ingrained the NGO is within the Prevent landscape. For smaller NGOs, Prevent managers act as gatekeepers to LA agencies and community groups. They select NGOs on the basis they can multiply their functions, creating new avenues to collect data to inform their knowledge base (Foucault, 2002: 211).

For larger NGOs, the relationship with Prevent managers is generally reversed. NGOs with a greater footprint within the Prevent landscape often communicate with the Home Office and other relevant governmental departments directly. Once their terms of service have been determined, NGOs guide the Prevent managers, whilst also using them as a consultative body to roll out their services within the educational setting. They mimic the bureaucratic mechanisms of the State to aid their own practices' assimilation into the 'epistemological' rational of the Prevent duty (Foucault, 2002: 212). Their primary aim is to become a core component of Prevent. To do this, they must balance their ability to adapt to the core functions of Prevent and their capabilities to advocate for change within the duty's functions (Lemke, 2019: 186). Consequently, they, much like their Prevent manager counterparts, must collect copious amounts of data to justify their continued existence.

The data they collect comes from various sources. The vast majority of NGOs that work within the praxis of the Prevent duty focus on the educational sector as a primary consumer, but many also work within the vulnerable communities targeted by the duty. NGOs also utilise the legitimising factor of education to embed themselves within this habitus. Effectively, pedagogic discourse allows the NGOs to employ 'temporal discipline' through 'structural exercises' that have symbolic value that is recognised by those whom it

targets (Bourdieu, 1990: 75). Once established, NGOs will problematise its stakeholder communities, seeking evidence for 'new problems' they can use to create solutions only they can administer (Voelkner, 2010: 142). Although the community advocates and CBOs interviewed by this study seemed broadly aware of this circumstance, they were left with little option but to engage with NGOs because they were the only forms of advocacy they had at their disposal.

NGOs have used austerity to further inaugurate themselves within the LA setting by taking the place of LA services who have fallen foul of funding cuts, replicating their functions whilst performing in a more economically viable way. They also act as a gateway to other private markets bringing in transnational corporations and other interested private bodies to the Prevent landscape transforming the 'level of reality' of Prevent's quasi markets through their mediation (Foucault, 2007: 95). This market rationale is primarily made operational through the educational field, where 'practicable taxonomies' or constructed *knowledges* are employed to translate its biopower into economies of scale (Bourdieu, 1990: 267). In more broad terms, NGOs produce PSHE resources that are specifically designed to replicate the 'implicit pedagogy' of the school whilst also satisfying the 'circumstantial observances' of regulatory bodies such as Ofsted (Bourdieu, 1990: 69). NGOs capitalise on their 'modalities of experience' – created by employing ex-teachers and LA personnel – which they multiply by their 'specified practices' to incorporate themselves within the pedagogical arrangement of PSHE and by proxy, FBV (Foucault, 2005: 46).

In conclusion, NGOs work in collaboration with government and the Prevent managers in the LA setting. They provide legitimation, access to new knowledges and as a gateway to

private economic markets. This relationship is stratified. Prevent managers act as gatekeepers to educational bodies and to some extent, targeted communities. However, larger NGOs often possess a greater footprint within the Prevent landscape than their Prevent manager counterparts and as a result their knowledges often surpassing them. The impact the NGO can exert is determined by economies of scale. Their ability to establish themselves within the community setting is proportional to the rescission of LA agencies due to austerity measures – which NGO services have been chiefly designed to replace.

NGOs engineer social problems through careful data collection by informants on the ground. The harvesting of testimony by ‘vulnerable’ individuals – whether they espouse far-right beliefs or the tenets of radical Islamism – is the sole rationale for their continued employment by the Home Office. In brief, NGOs capitalise on the distances between the State and the community setting. They purport to have superior access to targeted communities which allows them to act as an agent of legitimisation, a bridge between the State and its political enclaves. The community itself is forced to interact with these bodies in some capacity if it wishes for its needs to be heard, no matter how diluted they end up being in reality. In terms of educational bodies, NGOs provide tailor made PSHE resources and workshop sessions. They produce resources that directly correlate with the Prevent duty and Ofsted criteria for FBV, replicating, in turn, the pedagogical expertise that the schools currently lack, again due to cuts in provision. During this process, NGOs collect data that they use to lobby governmental departments such as the Home Office and DfE that allows them to shape the evolution of the pedagogy of FBV.

9.2. Contribution to knowledge and limitations

The conclusions made by this study must be viewed with a caveat. They have been made based on a qualitative investigation in 4 LAs that have tier threat level status, consulting the various actors that populate Prevent's discursive field to provide clarity on the precise mechanics of the statutory duty in its real-world setting. However, it does not purport that its findings can be used to generalise the experience of those affected by Prevent across the UK in its entirety. Indeed, most LAs in the UK do not have tier level status but still do have a statutory responsibility to adhere to Prevent. The reason this study has only examined targeted areas is twofold. Firstly, it has allowed me to test the applicability of the metrics of vulnerability applied by the Home Office, a critical observation lacking within the existing literature to date. Secondly, only tier level status LAs provide a view of the entirety of the Prevent statutory duty's bureaucratic mechanisms. Without this oversight it would be impossible to examine the totality of the duty's processes, a core aim of this study. Subsequently, the reader must apply the principles of *relatability* rather than *generalisability* when viewing the findings of this study.

In terms of the metrics of vulnerability, Prevent purports that it engages with both Islamic forms of extremism and far-right extremism in equal measure. Although there is some evidence to suggest Prevent managers are making a concerted effort to tackle the far-right space – particularly in education – there seems to be little evidence that this focus extends to the community setting. The reasons for this are self-evident. Muslim communities are visible, tangible entities that exist in the physical world, whereas the far-right community is much more diffuse, existing by in large on internet forums and social media groups.

Prevent's inability to apply its metrical evaluation of vulnerability across its target demographics has also translated to the way this study has applied its own sample frame. In terms of targeted communities – putting aside the obvious ethical concerns of engaging with self-identified far-right groups – this study has focused on the responses from the Muslim community because they are the only accessible community members who have a working knowledge of the duty on the ground.

To meet this study's aim, I have applied the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to examine Prevent's bureaucratic mechanisms. Each research question has been designed and implemented to map the production and mobilisation of Prevent and its CVE narrative across the localised context, using Foucault's genealogy of discourse to explain emergent dynamics. One of the key observations made during this study is the focus on education as the primary vector of the statutory duty's delivery. This is not a particularly novel observation, with several examples to be found within the existing literature that similarly highlight the relationship of education to Prevent as paramount (Sian, 2015: 197; Ramsay, 2017: 155; Awan et.al., 2019: 41). Where this study has added to this discourse is its use of a synergy of theory to dissect this relationship, coupled with its focus on the various actors that also populate this field. It draws attention to the seductive nature of pedagogy that Prevent utilises to aid its diffusion, critically examining the functional apparatus of education that depict it as an emancipatory force.

From a theoretical standpoint, Foucault's analysis falls short of being able to fully explain the educational field, instead focusing on education as a process, on 'its development, its functions' as a modus of the State, not as an agent of the biopolitical in its own right

(Deacon, 2006:177). Although Bourdieu (1996: 286) may seem like an unlikely ally of Foucault's in many respects, his understanding of the bureaucratic fields of State mirrors that of Foucault's to some degree. Bourdieu (1996: 287-288) builds upon Foucault's conception of education as an ideal vector of State control by introducing the 'symbolic value' of education as a determining factor of biopolitical engagement. This understanding of the educational field can be used to delineate the motivations of actors beyond that offered up by Foucault's objective stance (Masquelier, 2019: 136). This synergy of theory has contributed to our further understanding of the Prevent duty and how it diffuses itself amongst its targeted populations. This study has used this theoretical perspective to fill the gap within the pre-existing literature that fails to explore the dispersion of Prevent in terms of how the model of surveillance is outsourced and delegated across both LA agencies, the community setting and third-party organisations. Furthermore, it has applied meaning and understanding to the varied responses of agencies and actors that share a legal obligation and those that *choose* to opt into the statutory duty that have been collected by this study, information lacking within the current academic discourse surrounding Prevent.

The empirical findings of this study are important to the academic discourse surrounding Prevent and CVE in general. Although there are a multitude of academics engaging critically with the Prevent landscape, their numbers pail into insignificance compared to those who engage with the CVE industry without any critical oversight. I found the contribution and observations from the participants fascinating and informative. This study's findings also provide a springboard for further critical research into Prevent's statutory duty and its implementation. Recommendations on what such research should look like will be discussed in more detail in the following and final section of this thesis.

9.3. Final reflections and recommendations for further research

This investigation was a life changing experience for me. Although the journey to its completion has been long and arduous, it has also been an enjoyable and fulfilling one.

However, one cannot become complacent. As the study's findings have highlighted, Prevent and its agents subvert any form of resistance to it, no matter how minor. For instance, in the initial stages of this investigation, I had to spend a year in deep discussion with the Prevent managers determining the conditions of their involvement with this study. Many drafts and re-drafts of the investigation's design were made, with the specific terminology of each research objective forensically analysed by the Prevent managers before they eventually agreed to participate.

Such trepidation was not exclusive to the Prevent managers. For instance, many NGOs were originally unwilling to participate with the study, citing various reasons – though one could determine that they were fearful of engaging critically with their means of employment. As a result, NGOs in general required a considerable amount of communication to guarantee their engagement, often taking place over several months. Community advocates and CBOs were similarly wary of engaging with the study, though for very different reasons. The mere mention of Prevent can cause panic within the community setting within the duty's target demographics. Capacity building took a considerable amount of time, working through networks of gatekeepers – attending and facilitating community events and workshops to open channels of communication. Any prospective researcher who wishes to conduct further academic discourse who also intends to engage with targeted communities must

understand that it is imperative to treat this setting with special sensitivity. Of all those interviewed in this investigation the responses of the CBOs and community advocates were particularly valuable and made at great potential cost to their own wellbeing, something I will be eternally grateful for.

Of all the cohorts, educational providers were the easiest to engage with. In truth, this is likely due to my proximity to the educational field and its pedagogical mechanisms that have acted to legitimise the study in much the same way Prevent managers and NGOs use it to legitimise their activity within this setting. For instance, nearly all the educators interviewed agreed to participate from the initial contact email – something no other individual from the other targeted cohorts were willing to do. To be clear, I do not want to diminish the responses of educators to this study, they are integral to gaining an understanding of the Prevent duty as education is both its primary vector of delivery and modus of dissemination. This study could not have happened without their contributions. However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that much of the critical academic engagement pertinent to Prevent uses this perspective because of the pedagogic proximity academia is afforded through its own educational foundations.

With all the above reflections in mind, I have several recommendations for further research within the framework of this investigation, as well as some recommendations to make in general for the application of Prevent and those who enable it through its own industrialised research community.

In the first instance, during this investigation there were several aspects of the diffusion of the Prevent programme that became apparent. Of note was the use of *formers*, to be precise, self-identifying former extremists, to perform the function of demonstrating the transformative power of reformation – the journey from the ‘outsider’ to the insider (Dean, 2010: 98). The responses of NGOs who are the primary employers of these individuals dictated that the work of *formers* is stratified. In general, most *formers* come from an ex far-right background, with fewer coming from Islamist backgrounds because their services are effectively harder to sell to their intended audiences – schools. The reason given for this by respondents is that schools find the far-right narrative easier to digest than Islamist ones. This study has argued that this is due in part to the ‘discourse of war’, in particular the war on terror, which has delineated the Islamic extremist as the ultimate ‘abnormal’ from the ideal citizen and therefore any proximity to it is to be avoided at all costs (Foucault, 2003: 300-301).

Although the ideological predispositions generated through the employment and deployment of *formers* is interesting enough to study in itself, there is considerable scope to investigate the proliferation of them within the CVE discourse that populates the Prevent landscape. Unfortunately, due to the nature of this investigation and its sample frame it was not possible to study the work of *formers* in specific detail. A broader understanding of how *formers* are organised and distributed across the ‘ontology’ of the Prevent statutory duty would be of great benefit to the critical academic discourse of the wider CVE landscape (Foucault, 1982: 220).

Secondly, this study has forced me to critically assess my own understanding of the many pedagogical practices that have shaped my interpretations of professionalism within the educational setting. For instance, I have a working background in special education – specifically working with young people with behavioural needs who are targeted by the Prevent duty. The ontological practices of one’s safeguarding responsibilities is engrained upon the educator. In most cases the duty of care afforded to one’s charges supplants that of every other facet of the educational process. It is rare for the educator to question the methodical approach of safeguarding mechanisms afforded to them, almost as rare as questioning the emancipatory value of education in general. There is a great need for academic research that critically appraises both dichotomies, especially when it comes to the life chances afforded to vulnerable communities which programmes of surveillance such as the Prevent statutory duty target.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I want to draw attention to the closed research ecosystem that underpins the CVE industry that drives policy such as the Prevent statutory duty. The use of epistemological research models to attempt to create a roadmap of extremism is quite frankly, absurd. If we first consider that it is impossible to create a consensus on what extremism is without generating a discussion that can never have a satisfying end, there are so few people who actually end up committing acts of terrorism on which to base any generalisations that could be made. It is effectively impossible for any researcher to claim they can create an accurate tableaux of risk we can use to assess whole communities of people to safeguard them from becoming extremists. In short, the data they would need to do so does not exist in the volume necessary to do so. Members of the research community that purport their outputs are capable of mapping extremist

behaviours to prevent their proliferation are almost certainly prevaricating about their findings at best, being outright dishonest at worst.

Although this study has achieved its overall aims locating the Prevent statutory duty at the community level – its primary actors and its modes of diffusion – it does not fall into the same trap that those within the CVE industry do: to claim to have a catch all description of the Prevent landscape and the communities it targets. What it has provided is a detailed analysis of the discourse of power spoken across the discursive fields of the state and its biopolitical enclaves within the community setting. The Prevent landscape is in a constant state of evolution. As such, the research community is required to be vigilant about the advances made by Prevent on the complex realm of the *biopolitik* by offering a critical understanding of its core CVE narrative, otherwise *quis custodiet ipsos custodies?*

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Appendices.

Appendix 1: Data collection

The data collected during the investigation is closed access. Data management and future use of data will be managed by the author of this thesis and subject to the University of Portsmouth's policy on long-term retention of data. participants have been invited to participate within the study by direct contact from the researcher, either by email, phone call and meetings in person. Audio files and Interview transcripts have been collated and thematically analysed. Participants have had access to the data that they have provided throughout the process of the study.

Access, ethics, and informed consent.

The project has strictly adhered to the University of Portsmouth's ethics policy. Due care and diligence have been undertaken to ensure that all research conducted regarding participants is based upon the principles of informed consent and that all efforts have been made to respect the confidentiality and to mitigate harm that participants may face. The broader social context and possible implications have also been considered at all times and any possible benefits that may arise as a consequence of this research have been maximised and disseminated accordingly (Kolstoe, 2017: 5-6).

Participation in this study has been entirely voluntary. Participants are informed, both verbally and in writing that they are under no obligation take part and may exit the process

at any given time. Participants have been supplied in advance with information detailing the nature of the investigation and the aims of the enquiry. They have also been given guarantees of anonymity and that any information they provide has been held under the strictest confidence subject to the proviso that the researcher is under an overriding legal obligation to disclose certain types of information which has been communicated to all active participants in advance. All data under analysis has been subject to the return of a signed consent form. A statement listing the main purpose of the study, along with details specifying the anonymity process and their ability to exit the research process at any time if they do choose to participate has been provided to potential participants during the recruitment stage and throughout the research process. Any ethical issues arising from the process of interviews (particularly concerning the personal safety of participants and/or the researcher) have been addressed by following the measures set out by the professional guidelines for sociologists (http://www.britsoc.co.uk/the-bsa/equality/statement-of-ethical-practice.aspx#_rel)

Appendix 2: Example Interview questions

These interview questions should be viewed with a caveat. As the interviews were semi-structured, they often followed narratives that transcended the basic question structure found below. In many cases, prompts were not necessary as the participants were encouraged to set the tone of the interview, however they were guided by the interviewer to keep the content of our discussion on track.

A) Example Interview Schedule for a Prevent Manager:

1. What are your main responsibilities?

Prompts

- *On a daily basis, weekly, monthly, Annually*
- *Are you monitored for progress? If so, how often and based on what criteria?*
- *Has your role evolved over the period you have been employed? By how much? If so, what do you believe has driven this change?*

2. As part of your responsibility within your role, do you carry out any research on things such as best practice?

Prompts:

- *If so, how often?*
- *What is the nature of the research task? Does it vary or are they sequential?*
- *Is your research monitored? Do you pass on the data to other bodies, if so to whom?*
- *Do you design this research or is the research design passed onto you to collect the data?*

3. Is your work influenced by outside agencies? Do you receive advice on best practice, research articles pertinent to your role etc.?

Prompts:

- *If so, how often?*
- *Can you give me examples of who provides such information?*
- *How much do you believe this affects your practice?*

4. How much of your role involves working with stakeholders directly and how much of it is in an advisory role to other local authority agencies who have a safeguarding responsibility?

Prompts:

- *Do you provide advice to agencies regularly?*
- *Do you provide support to private organisations?*
- *What is the general response from stakeholders?*
- *What is the general response of outside/ local authority agencies?*

5. What are your thoughts on the radicalisation process? Is it possible to successfully de-radicalise an individual?

Prompts:

- *How difficult is it to spot a radicalised individual? What would be your response protocol if this comes to pass?*
- *Where do you think the research that created your understanding of the radicalisation process comes from?*

6. How effective do you think the Prevent programme you deliver is?

Prompts:

- *Strengths: what do you think your major success have been*
- *Weaknesses: areas for improvement i.e. where are you focusing your energy at this moment in time?*

B) Example Interview schedule for educational practitioner:

1. Can you give me a brief breakdown of your responsibilities as a safeguarding lead and how Prevent fits into this role?

Prompts:

- *How important is Prevent to this role?*
- *How does it affect your workstreams on:*
- *A daily basis?*
- *Overall practice?*

2. What is your understanding of the PREVENT Statutory duty?

Prompts:

- *(if applicable) Have you had any Prevent training?*
- *Do you deliver Prevent training to other members of staff?*

- 3.** A key proponent of PREVENT is to stop individuals being drawn into violent extremism. With this in mind, what is your understanding of:

Prompts:

- *Radicalisation*
- *De-radicalisation*

- 4.** How aware are your stakeholders/the communities that you serve of your obligation to the PREVENT statutory duty?

Prompts:

- *Do you mention it in your practice? How often?*

- 5.** Keeping the previous question in mind, do you think there is an impact on the communities that you serve due to PREVENT?

Prompts:

- *Positives*
- *Negatives*

- 6.** What is your understanding of the research that promotes the de-radicalisation method of countering violent extremism?

Prompts:

- *Do you think it is possible to de-radicalise a violent extremist?*
- *How does your current setup prepare you to identify a potential victim of the radicalisation process and how confident do you feel in dealing with such an eventuality?*

C) Example interview schedule for Prevent related NGO worker

- 1.** Can you please give me a breakdown of the work of your organisation and how you fit into that?

Prompts:

- *What are your main responsibilities?*
- *What (if any) are the barriers to engagement with stakeholders/ local authority workers?*

- 2.** What is your understanding of Prevent and its statutory duty?

Prompts:

- *Have you been given/offered Prevent training? Would you take up the offer?*
- *How much of your work focuses on Prevent?*

- 3.** A key proponent of PREVENT is to stop individuals being drawn into violent extremism. With this in mind, what is your understanding of:

Prompts:

- *Radicalisation*
- *De-radicalisation*

- 4.** Keeping the previous question in mind, do you think there is an impact on the communities that you serve due to PREVENT?

Prompts:

- *Positives*
- *Negatives*

5. What is your understanding of the research that promotes the de-radicalisation method of countering violent extremism?

Prompts:

- *Do you think it is possible to de-radicalise a violent extremist?*
- *How do you envision the development of Prevent? Where is your organisations place in this?*

D) Example interview schedule for Community advocate.

1. Can you please tell me a little bit about yourself;

- *Do you consider yourself a member of a community/s?*
- *What role (if any) do you occupy within your community?*

2. what do you consider to be the key challenges facing the community/s you belong to?

- *At the individual level*
- *At the group level*
- *How do these challenges relate to wider society; what impact does wider society have on you and those around you?*

3. What is your understanding of Prevent?

- *Does it affect you at all?*

4. A key component of Prevent is to stop individuals being drawn into violent extremism. It is based on the principles of radicalisation theory, where the idea is that vulnerable individuals are 'radicalised' by extremists.

- *In light of the above, how relevant do you think Prevent is to your community?*
- *Have you ever been targeted by mechanism's of Prevent? i.e. have you as an individual or as part of a group been party to a counter-extremism event/activity? If so, how often has this happened?*

5. What are relationships like between local authority agencies and your community?

- *Are they active within your community?*
- *If so, how are they received? Are they trusted?*
- *Do they make an impact? Positive or negative aspects?*

6. In your opinion, what changes could be made to better serve your community and those that are vulnerable within it?

- *At the local authority level i.e. local services*
- *Within the community itself*
- *From wider society*

Appendix 3: Invitation letter – Information sheet – Consent form



| | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Project title | Delegated Safeguarding or Surveillance by Proxy? The Problem with Prevent – A Critical Discourse Analysis of Community-level Counter-Radicalisation Strategy. |
| Student investigator | Name: Aram Ghaemmaghani Email: aram.ghaemmaghani@port.ac.uk Telephone: 07889814684 |

To whom this may concern,

My name is Aram Ghaemmaghani and I am writing to you with a request. I'm a PhD student working on a University of Portsmouth funded project under the supervision of ~~Dr.~~ Naheem Jabbar which is designed to map the PREVENT statutory duty at the national level and uncover how this is turned into practice at the local authority level. I would very much like you to be a part of this process by participating in an interview.

I will be interviewing relevant local government personnel to uncover how PREVENT is implemented across local authorities. In addition, this study will involve interviewing local interest groups, NGOs and community voices as I believe them to be key to understanding the effects of PREVENT and its targeted approach on communities deemed at risk to radicalisation. I will investigate its effectiveness and the value of this approach throughout this study and the knowledge and understanding you and your organisation can contribute will be invaluable.

I will be conducting interviews over the next few months. I think it is very important that voices such as yours are heard on this issue, which I believe the current policy structure does not accommodate to its full potential. Please find attached an information sheet and consent form which will give you more detailed information regarding the project and why you have been chosen to participate.

Many thanks

Aram Ghaemmaghani

Information sheet:

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Project title | Delegated Safeguarding or Surveillance by Proxy? The Problem with Prevent – A Critical Discourse Analysis of Community-level Counter-Radicalisation Strategy. |
| Student Investigator | Name: Aram Ghaemmaghami Email: aram.ghaemmaghami@port.ac.uk Telephone: 07889814684 |
| 1st Supervisor | Name: Dr. Naheem Jabbar Email: naheem.jabbar@port.ac.uk Telephone: 023 9284 6093 |

Project aims:

The primary research aim of this study is to evaluate the impact and assess the implications of Prevent and its statutory duty across education, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tasked with monitoring and administering communities deemed vulnerable to radicalisation at the local authority level. With this in mind, the following research questions have been developed to facilitate this task:

Research questions:

1. What are the ideological gradations of the Prevent programme; what factors control its production of knowledge?
2. How is the Prevent model of surveillance disseminated at the localised level; how is it reproduced?
3. How do community level organisations and education providers adopt, modify or reject the Prevent duty; how flexible is Prevent?
4. What role do third-party organisations play in the facilitation of the Prevent statutory duty; how do they legitimise their activity and what impact do they have?

Why have I been invited and why should I participate?

Although there is substantial information available on the legal framework surrounding PREVENT, there is little to no information of how it is implemented on the ground by practitioners working within the communities themselves. You have been invited to participate because your main workstreams are enabled or effected by the PREVENT statutory duty and related counter-terrorism legislation. Your views and any insights you can provide on your daily practice are invaluable to understanding the delivery framework such discourse entails.

What happens next if I take part in the project and what will I have to do?

If you agree to take part an audio recorded, semi structured 1:1 interview will take place which will be approximately 1-hour long. Although there will be a set of questions being utilised the conversation will not be restricted to them. During this process the researcher would like to talk about PREVENT, your understanding of it and how it is implemented in the work that you do. The interview process as a whole will involve interviewing personnel from within the local authority that hold a safeguarding responsibility, for example: Teachers, and Community group facilitators as well as personnel from relevant NGOs. **All participants will have to obtain the consent of the organisation they speak for where appropriate.**

All participants will be offered full anonymity, regardless of their role within their organisation or the community. Participants will also be given the opportunity to review the information they have given before it is used in analysis. As participation is entirely voluntary, participants can withdraw from the research process at any time with the proviso that they're time limitations in terms of removal of data, for instance, if the data has already been used in analysis. **Each participant will be given 20 working days' notice before analysis to review their participation.**

What information will be collected and how will it be managed?

The interviews will be audio recorded, transcribed and thematically analysed. All audio files, transcripts and associated data will be encrypted, and password protected on the University of Portsmouth secure drive. Any written or physical data will be kept under lock and key. All data will be destroyed after publication.

Complaints procedure

If you have any concerns relating to this study, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher and/or the project supervisor using the contact details below. If for any reason during the duration of the study you wish to raise a complaint as a participant, please contact the project supervisor Dr. Naheem Jabbar.

CONSENT FORM

Project title: Delegated Safeguarding or Surveillance by Proxy? The Problem with Prevent – A Critical Discourse Analysis of Community-level Counter-Radicalisation Strategy.

Student Investigator: Aram Ghaemmaghmi

Email: aram.ghaemmaghmi@port.ac.uk

Telephone: 07889814684

1st Supervisor: Dr. Naheem Jabbar

Email: naheem.jabbar@port.ac.uk

Telephone: 023 9284 6093

Ethics Committee Reference Number: FHSS 2018-044

Please
initial
boxes
below

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason before the data analysis phase.

3. I understand that data collected during this study, *could* be requested and looked at by regulatory authorities. I give my permission for any authority, with a legal right of access, to view data which might identify me. Any promises of confidentiality provided by the researcher will be respected.
4. I understand that the results of this study may be published and / or presented at meetings or academic conferences. I give my permission for my anonymous data, which does not identify me, to be disseminated in this way.
5. I consent for my interview to be audio recorded. The recording will be transcribed and analysed for the purposes of the research.
6. I understand that the researcher is duty bound to report any information I might divulge detailing illegal activity to the relevant authorities.
7. I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant:

Date:

Signature:

Name of interviewer:

Date:

Signature:

Appendix 4: Ethics Committee Acceptance Letter



UNIVERSITY OF
PORTSMOUTH

Professor Matthew Weait,
BA (Hons) MA MPhil DPhil FAcSS
Professor of Law and Society
Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and
Social Sciences

T +44 (0)23 9284 6012
E matthew.weait@port.ac.uk

Faculty of Humanities and Social
Sciences
Park Building
King Henry I Street
Portsmouth PO1 2DZ

T: +44 (0)23 9284 8484
port.ac.uk/fhss

FAVOURABLE ETHICAL OPINION (with conditions)

Name: Aram Ghaemmaghani

Study Title: The Road to Radicalisation in the UK: A Contrastive Analysis of Modelling and Impact of Counter-Terrorism Strategy at the Local Community Level.

Reference Number: FHSS 2018-044

Date: 02/07/2018

Thank you for resubmitting your application to the FHSS Ethics Committee and for making the requested changes/ clarifications.

I am pleased to inform you that FHSS Ethics Committee was content to grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the basis described in the submitted documents listed at Annex A, and subject to standard general conditions (*See Annex B*). With this there are a number of ethical conditions to comply with, and some additional advisory notes you may wish to consider, all shown below.

Condition(s)¹

1. Participant Information Sheet: please fully complete as per the template provided and do not delete any sections. For example, it is lacking complaints information as well as some explanation as to how the whole interview process will take place.
2. Host organisation agreement for participants: normally, we would expect that the researcher would request host organisation permission, but in many cases, where we might have one person from multiple organisations, it will be considered sufficient if we request participants to confirm that they have secured permission for taking part in the research. However, this process needs to be made clear in both the Participant Information Sheet and the consent form.
3. Formalising host organisation agreement: As Portsmouth and Tower Hamlets Councils have provisionally agreed to participate in the study this will be formalised in writing before interviews are scheduled

Advisory Note(s)²

1. Research questions: we advise that we feel that the research questions could be broken down into more questions as there seem to be multiple questions in one question

¹ A favourable opinion will be dependent upon the study adhering to the conditions stated, which are based on the application document(s) submitted. It is appreciated that Principal Investigators may wish to challenge conditions or propose amendments to these in the resubmission to this ethical review.

² The comments are given in good faith and it is hoped they are accepted as such. The PI does not need to adhere to these, or respond to them, unless they wish to.

Please note that the favourable opinion of FHSS Ethics Committee does not grant permission or approval to undertake the research/ work. Management permission or approval must be obtained from any host organisation, including the University of Portsmouth or supervisor, prior to the start of the study.

Wishing you every success in your research



Chair

Dr Jane Winstone

Email: ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk

Annexes

A - Documents reviewed

B - After ethical review

ANNEX A - Documents reviewed

The documents ethically reviewed for this application

| <i>Document</i> | <i>Version</i> | <i>Date</i> |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Application Form | 2 | 11/06/2018 |
| Invitation Letter | 2 | 11/06/2018 |
| Participant Information Sheet | 2 | 11/06/2018 |
| Consent Form | 2 | 11/06/2018 |
| Interview Questions / Topic List | 2 | 11/06/2018 |

ANNEX B - After ethical review

1. This Annex sets out important guidance for those with a favourable opinion from a University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee. Please read the guidance carefully. A failure to follow the guidance could lead to the committee reviewing and possibly revoking its opinion on the research.

2. It is assumed that the work will commence within 1 year of the date of the favourable ethical opinion or the start date stated in the application, whichever is the latest.

www.port.ac.uk

3. The work must not commence until the researcher has obtained any necessary management permissions or approvals – this is particularly pertinent in cases of research hosted by external organisations. The appropriate head of department should be aware of a member of staff's plans.

4. If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study beyond that stated in the application, the Ethics Committee must be informed.

5. Any proposed substantial amendments must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for review. A substantial amendment is any amendment to the terms of the application for ethical review, or to the protocol or other supporting documentation approved by the Committee that is likely to affect to a significant degree:

- (a) the safety or physical or mental integrity of participants
- (b) the scientific value of the study
- (c) the conduct or management of the study.

5.1 A substantial amendment should not be implemented until a favourable ethical opinion has been given by the Committee.

6. At the end of the work a final report should be submitted to the ethics committee. A template for this can be found on the University Ethics webpage.

7. Researchers are reminded of the University's commitments as stated in the [Concordat to Support Research Integrity](#) viz:

- maintaining the highest standards of rigour and integrity in all aspects of research
- ensuring that research is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks, obligations and standards
- supporting a research environment that is underpinned by a culture of integrity and based on good governance, best practice and support for the development of researchers
- using transparent, robust and fair processes to deal with allegations of research misconduct should they arise
- working together to strengthen the integrity of research and to reviewing progress regularly and openly.

8. In ensuring that it meets these commitments the University has adopted the [UKRIO Code of Practice for Research](#). Any breach of this code may be considered as misconduct and may be investigated following the University [Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research](#). Researchers are advised to use the [UKRIO checklist](#) as a simple guide to integrity.

Appendix 5: UPR16 form: Research Ethics Review Checklist

FORM UPR16

Research Ethics Review Checklist



Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the Research Degrees Operational Handbook for more information)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information | | Student ID: | 250102 |
| PGRS Name: | Aram Ghaemmaghani | | |
| Department: | EDSOC | First Supervisor: | Dr. Naheem Jabbar |
| Start Date: (or progression date for Prof Doc students) | 30.09.2016 | | |
| Study Mode and Route: | Part-time <input type="checkbox"/> | MPhil <input type="checkbox"/> | MD <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | Full-time <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | PhD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Professional Doctorate <input type="checkbox"/> |

| | |
|---|---|
| Title of Thesis: | Delegated Safeguarding or Surveillance by Proxy? The Problem with Prevent – A Critical Discourse Analysis of Community-level Counter-Radicalisation Strategy. |
| Thesis Word Count: (excluding ancillary data) | 85,836 |

If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University's Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

| | |
|--|--|
| UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: (If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/) | |
| a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame? | YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? | YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication and authorship? | YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it remain so for the required duration? | YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements? | YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> |

| | |
|---|--|
| Candidate Statement: | |
| I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) | |
| Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from NRES/SCREC): | FHSS 2018-044 |
| If you have <i>not</i> submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered 'No' to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so: | |
| n/a | |
| Signed (PGRS): | <i>Aram Ghaemmaghani</i> Date: 06.09.2020 |