

THE SUM OF ALL CORRUPTION:
A GROUNDED THEORY OF
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS

PHD THESIS

Final thesis for the degree of PhD in Criminology
at the University of Portsmouth

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19-03-11

Number of words:

79 726

ABSTRACT

Of all the issues faced by society, corruption is one of the most difficult to properly address. Corruption is also a phenomenon that most people have an intuitive idea and a subjective opinion about. Whether or not that opinion is commonly shared is another question. This research asks: how can perceptions of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption strategies? By presenting a grounded theory that underpins human behaviour classified as 'corrupt', the research strives to increase our understanding of corruption. Corrupt behaviour is conditioned by an understanding of an action as being deviant, i.e. illegal or immoral. Consequently, increasing the understanding of corruption makes it easier to combat. Reflecting the ambition to reach a high level of abstraction, the method used is Grounded Theory, modified with a unique system for treating literature. The method is applied within an ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist paradigm.

The scientific contribution of this research is a unique methodology providing an original contribution to knowledge in the form of the self-interest utility maximisation theory, a creative contribution via the 'at-least-level' assumption and an innovative contribution through the application of the findings to a situational crime prevention matrix. The self-interest utility maximisation theory is based on the premise that motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a degenerated decision-making process. Given that an opportunity is perceived as advantageous and that it can be rationalised or neutralised, corruption may be a rational choice. With opportunity identified as a central driver for corruption, the source of motivation is hypothetically explained by gaining an advantage 'at least-level', i.e. the action causing the smallest cognitive dissonance which can be rationalised and neutralised while at the same time providing the largest advantage. Situational crime prevention, which in its simplest form can be seen as synonymous with opportunity reduction, is presented as a framework for anti-corruption measures. It is recognised that an application of the self-interest utility maximisation theory through situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes requires further empirical research and real world testing.

The findings indicate that, given the latent nature of motivation and its susceptibility to rationalisation by neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption is opportunity. Regardless of motivation, and irrespective of ability to rationalise and neutralise - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Corruption is a crime above all where effective prevention is regulated primarily by controlling and reducing opportunity.

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

The author hereby declare that this submission is his own work and to the best of his knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UoP or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the dissertation. Any contribution made to the research by others is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. The author also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of his own work and give permission that it may be photocopied and made available for UoP library loan.

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2019-03-03

"Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not been submitted for any other academic award."

FOREWORD

Once upon a time there was a student who confidently knocked on the door of the wizard-like chambers of his professor.

The professor, who wasn't much for the professional epithet, gestured the student to enter. The room was small, no more than three strides across but required careful manoeuvring through several waist high piles of folders and papers. Careful not to tip anything over, the student took a seat in a black leather office chair across the professor's desk. The professor himself sat in what can only be described as a small rigid armchair, rather uncomfortable from the looks of it. From this reversed seating arrangements, the student explained his call. The desire was to do two master's degrees in tandem, an endeavour that was theoretically ambitious but practically impossible, explained the professor. The student was; however, welcome to enrol next year for another degree - irrespective of the outcome of the current one. Another option, albeit dependent on the outcome of his masters' studies, was to apply for a position as a PhD student. Even though the chances of success were slim, made even slimmer by the fact that only a fully-funded bursary could financially sustain the student and his family, an application was concocted. The professor explained that if successful, the PhD-dragon was one the student would have to slay himself but that the training and weapons of the trade would be provided. This all sounded good to the student, but he was also wary of the many tales of academic mentor-mentee relationships turning sour, where the student was effectively left alone and defenceless against the vicious and unforgiving creature that is doctoral research. When finally granted the fully-funded bursary, these worries became a thing of the past, as the professional bonds forged with the professor were strong. With wisdom continuously passed down and mischievous curiosity passed up, the student soon forgot the tales of malevolent supervisors. With an unwavering focus on reaching the goal, the student spent endless hours preparing, reading and learning all for the final battle. And now here we are, at the end of the line, face to face with the PhD-dragon. Surrender is not an option, nor is defeat. Everything that has led to this point is valued, the top-notch facilities of the university, the helpful senior academics, the friendly administrative staff, the motivation of fellow students, the informative and cooperative participants, the experiences and acquaintances from conferences all over the world, and last but certainly not least, the exceptional support of the professor, as supervisor, as mentor and as friend.

The thesis in your hands tells a great story, not only of academic research but also of a student becoming a researcher. One that will happily do research ever after...

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I. INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a phenomenon about which most people have a subjective opinion. Whether or not that opinion is commonly shared, universally applicable, or even contextually appropriate is another question. One thing is certain, corruption is a substantial concept and when colloquially spoken about, the discussion often pertains only to a smaller part, limited by any combination of concept, context or intellect. This work strives to enlighten the reader on the last of those limitations, in an effort to increase our understanding of corruption. By searching for a grounded theory that would underpin human behaviour classified as 'corrupt', the idea is to supersede contextual restraints - at least partially. There is, however, no escape from establishing conceptual limitations by clearly defining corruption as a conceptual boundary in which the theory resides.

For this to effectively increase our understanding of corruption, it will have to provide a simplified map of reality - a theory. What cartography has in common with cognition is that it relies on simplifications of reality to allow us to see where we are, and where we are going. Explicitly formulated theories can help guide behaviour, through a maze of hidden assumptions, biases and prejudice that otherwise could corrupt our actions. Thus, according to Huntington (1997) explicit or implicit theories are needed to: order and generalise about reality; understand causal relationships among phenomena; anticipate and predict future developments; distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and show the paths that should be taken to achieve certain goals. The theory produced in this research is intended as an abstraction for an increased understanding of a particular behaviour in a particular context. As the resolution of a map can change and provide a varied level of detail with some details more useful for some purposes than others, so can the conceptual resolution of a theory. The more detailed a map is, the more fully it reflects reality: the same is true for a theory. Nonetheless, an extremely detailed map may not be useful for all purposes. Hence, the challenge is to find a theory that portrays reality while at the same time simplifies it in an appropriate way.

This research has been undertaken in an EU context, which within the given time frame of three years of data collection and theory development implies definitive geographical boundaries, a degree of cultural homogeneity and an overarching political will to combat corruption expressed by the EU. In 2014, the first EU Anti-corruption report was published and when introducing the report, the then Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström stated:

"Corruption seriously harms the economy and society as a whole. Many countries around the world suffer from deep-rooted corruption that hampers economic development, undermines democracy, and damages social justice and the rule of law. The Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality. Corruption varies in nature and extent from one country to another, but it affects all Member States. It impinges on good governance, sound management of public money, and competitive markets. In extreme cases, it undermines the trust of citizens in democratic institutions and processes." (Malmström, 2014)

Corruption is a relatively new priority on the political agenda, but has over the last three decades gained attention from both citizens and politicians. The reason for this is the increasingly clear message that corruption is detrimental to society and the true impact of corruption is now widely acknowledged. Corruption distorts markets and competition, breeds cynicism among citizens, undermines the rule of law; damages government legitimacy; and corrodes the integrity of the private sector (Heineman & Heimann, 2006). Further, corruption diminishes development and increases social inequalities and poverty. It also channels criminal activity, such as terrorism, organised crime, drug and human trafficking, and deters foreign direct investment by acting as an additional expense or tax for investors. Finally, corruption diverts government funds away from essential sectors, such as health and education, and enhances the public's distrust towards political and government authorities (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011). In short, three particular consequences flow from corruption: diminished economic development and growth, increased social inequality, and further distrust of government (Delaney, 2005).

Corruption is a global problem and of all the issues faced by society, it is one of the most difficult to properly address (R. A. Johnson & Sharma, 2004; Schwartz, 2011). Thus, it is a problem for all nations, and for the EU this means that corruption is a serious obstacle to the effective exercise of fundamental rights. Corruption is effectively widening the gap between the theoretical framework, i.e. the legal rules and regulations in the EU Member states, and the practical reality with which European citizens are faced. Therefore, the prevention, detection and control of corruption should be, and in many ways is, a priority for the EU, as it deprives EU citizens of a fully functioning system based on fundamental rights, the rule of law and good (and fair) governance.

The citizens of the EU could and should expect the EU to lend its political weight to the fight against corruption, with a significant majority being of the opinion that the EU institutions and member states are ill-equipped to prevent corruption (Eurobarometer, 2013b). While the

EU Anti-corruption report concludes that Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments and institutions to prevent and fight corruption, the results they deliver are not satisfactory across the EU. Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, systemic problems are not tackled effectively enough, and the relevant institutions do not always have sufficient capacity to enforce the rules. Declared intentions are still too distant from concrete results; and genuine political will to eradicate corruption often appears to be missing (COM(2014) 38). Consequently, there is an increasing demand to strengthen the role of the EU in terms of anti-corruption measures. The EU should raise public attention to the issue of corruption and catalyse change to restore trust, integrity and accountability vis-à-vis the Union as an anti-corruption actor, its member states and the public at large. Effective anti-corruption measures will ultimately give confidence to EU citizens that their individual and collective rights under EU rules will be upheld.

"The battle against corruption has not only become more urgent, it has also become more obvious as the extent of its reach is growingly apparent. Not only does corruption impoverish economies, threaten democracy and undermine the rule of law, it channels terrorism, organised crime and human trafficking. These far reaching consequences clearly indicate that the war against corruption cannot be fought at the national level alone. Corruption is without a doubt a problem of international interest as it touches developed and developing countries alike and respects no borders." (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011, p. 105)

Essentially corruption is about money and power and through perpetuation the EU is being robbed of both. When corruption undermines the rule of law and good governance, power is effectively lost. When corruption leads to the misallocation and misuse of EU funds, it acts as a serious distortion of fair competition within the internal European market, and money is lost. For those reasons, sometimes dressed up in various shrouds in contextual, contemporary, and politically correct rhetoric, the EU has an obligation to make corruption a primary concern in all of its policies.

The concept of corruption is as firmly lodged as its definition is fleeting in the minds of most, as a result definitions are often distinctly different. At the outset of any journey down the lines of fighting or measuring corruption let alone understanding it, definitions must be clarified. Such an endeavour may be easier said than actually done, as this chapter will show. This is mainly because corruption is broad in its reach, permeating both high-level societal interaction all the way down to an individual level, involving as few as two persons. What may constitute corruption to some may not to others. Add to that the contextual aspect that

where in one case, corruption is clear-cut but in another the same actions may be seen as acceptable and perhaps even morally justified.

Overview of thesis

In this thesis, the first chapter is an introduction also serving as a literature review to, and of, corruption. Here, some of the classifications of corruption are examined, leading to a definition of corruption for the purposes of this research. The cost of corruption is explored, and the intricacies of measuring corruption explained. Three international frameworks for combatting corruption are then examined.

The second chapter outlines the philosophy and methodology of the research, which is a modified Grounded Theory. The philosophical paradigm of this research is ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist. The theory developed within this paradigm combines explanatory power with a high level of abstraction. The chapter also presents a novel tool to handle literature within Grounded Theory.

The third chapter presents research findings in the form of a substantive theory. Based on interviews with 21 anonymised key informants, it describes how, from a certain point of view, motivation for corrupt behaviour is a constant, grounded in human nature. Motivation for self-interest utility maximisation is a latent variable and unethical behaviour can appear as a rational choice. These 'choices' are evaluated within a bounded rationality framework and the logic is that, regardless of motivation, an agent must be presented with an opportunity for deviancy in the form of corruption. Engaging in such deviancy is explained as a degenerated decision-making process conditioned by the situation in which it occurs.

The fourth chapter applies the theory within the behavioural approach of situational crime prevention. The chapter presents an adaptation of traditional situational crime prevention to the particular phenomenon of corruption. It highlights how preventive anti-corruption strategies based upon criminological theory can be applied. The chapter includes historical and theoretical accounts of the development of situational crime prevention and how it can be contextualised for corruption prevention purposes.

The thesis concludes with a summary discussion and some final remarks. The research findings are discussed and the work's contribution to knowledge described together with a qualitative evaluation of the validity and reliability of the study. Moreover, the impact and wider implications of the research are discussed before the entire thesis is closed with some final remarks on the author's journey to become a professional researcher.

1.1 The dual nature of this chapter

"A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness." (Korzybski, 1933, p. 58)

This research aims to lift both the discussion as well as the definition of corruption as high as possible in an effort not to leave the complexities behind but rather to find a vantage point where theory supersedes capricious interpretations. For many, yet not all, research projects of this type the way there is by first reviewing extant literature on the subject matter. The available body of knowledge may or may not contain the answer to many of the questions generated by the aims and objectives of the research and the only way to find out is by review. This is true for most cases, however, not for this one. Using a grounded theory approach partly informed by the early works of Barney Glaser, arguably one of the first to discover, and in many ways, define grounded theory as a research methodology, the review of literature is complicated to say the least. Thus, a large section of the next chapter on methodology is devoted to explain, expand and ameliorate the contentious concept of reviewing literature within a grounded theory framework. In short, this study takes on a uniquely developed method in relation to any and all literature used for the development of theory. In this chapter, relatively few sources are analysed in the creation of the conceptual cornerstones of the work. The strength of this method is qualitative in areas such as control mechanisms, constant comparison and theoretical sampling and in the permitting of resources excluded at one point to be included at another. These mechanisms as well as others are further explained in the next chapter, creating the mould for an in-depth analysis of the sources that actually are chosen for inclusion. Such depth also allows for initial coding to begin at the outset of the study.

Considering that this chapter will serve as both an introduction and a literature review, one must understand the confines of this literature review. A traditional literature review tries to refine the research question, determine gaps in earlier research and identify a suitable design, and data collection method, providing the rationale for further research. It might also clarify what light has been shed on this particular area of research before and whether the question posed by the study has been asked and answered before. It is that latter rationale for reviewing literature, even given the particular methodology of this study, that must be answered to give due validity to the research.

Thus, during the limited yet focused literature review that follows, any indication of research already done directly on or on the tangent of this study must be followed, but

followed carefully. All methodological constraints will apply, and it is important to not overly bias the researcher and consequently contaminate the entire research. A corollary of the methodological mechanisms of the resource selection system used coupled with constant comparison and theoretical sampling is the inclusion of previously dismissed sources. Once understood, this will prevent any misconception of sources being 'missed' altogether and where sources are dismissed that this is permanent. With that the literature can be established with a twofold purpose: mainly to determine to what extent the research question has already been addressed and as a secondary product to establish a fundamental context for the question itself.

To immediately satisfy the curious mind and save some time for the scrutiny of the critical reader, there is no indication that the specific research question posed here has already been addressed elsewhere. Research whose posture initially resembled this one turned out to be something else and of more or less use for theory-building in this study. Particular examples are discussed in more detail in the following sections, especially on the issue of the perception of corruption. Therefore, it is with confidence given by the literature reviewed, data assimilated, and indications given stated that this approach to the phenomenon of perception of corruption is *truly* unique. The word truly in italics was added in post interview write-up as a result of all interview data directly or indirectly corroborating the uniqueness of the approach. This uniqueness does, to some extent, rationalise the execution of the study in the first place. As for actual validity, the theory must be put to the test. This research does develop an insightful and interesting theory, but its universality and usability can only be assessed by the test of time.

There certainly have been studies on the subject in a broader perspective (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman & Truex, 2012), but none that takes exactly the same approach as this one. The study of corruption in its various forms, its causes and consequences, have been flourishing in the disciplines of economics, comparative politics and policy studies, sociology and international relations, and international law (Abbott & Snidal, 2002). However, most studies are either descriptive, providing overviews of the international legal framework and its origins (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011; Wouters, Ryngaert, & Cloots, 2012), or they examine the causes, manifestations and consequences of corruption in one or more countries (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013; Anagnostou, Psychogiopoulou, Khaghaghordyan, & Wagner, 2014). Considering that the issue of corruption has only been recognised as an issue, at least politically, since the 1990's, this is a reflection of the position that corruption now has gained on

the global agenda. International organisations with worldwide reach, like the United Nations [UN] and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] have established conventions that require, or at least encourage, their members to enact laws on corruption. Financial institutions like the World Bank have also developed programs designed to combat corruption in various ways, including using measurements of perceived levels of corruption. The EU is moving along the same lines, launching both measurement instruments in the fight against corruption and most recently, in producing in 2014 an anti-corruption report. Further, non-governmental organisations [NGO] have also joined the fight, most prominently Transparency International, conducting analysis and advocacy throughout the world. Last but certainly not least, the international media is increasingly directing attention to corruption scandals. So, what actually is corruption?

1.2 What is corruption?

"...there remains a striking lack of scholarly agreement over even the most basic questions about corruption. Amongst the core issues that continue to generate disputes are the very definition of "corruption" as a concept..." (P. M. Heywood, 2014, p. 1)

In spite of the fact that most people have their own idea of what corruption is, the answer to the question 'what is corruption?' will probably differ from person to person, organisation to organisation, country to country and so on. Adding to the complexity is the interpretive nature of the concept. Even if the same written definition is used, often unclear boundaries to what that definition implies lead to different interpretations. How corruption is conceptualised and defined is obviously important and has implications for the compatibility and potential effectiveness of international norms and conventions (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 11). Further, a fundamental and shared understanding of the concept is a prerequisite for theory-building in the following chapters. Four cornerstones are dealt with here. First, an overview of the current classifications of corruption is given which, if nothing else, gives an indication of the breadth of the concept. Second, drawing upon the essence of the various classifications a definition of corruption is developed suitable for this research. Third, looking at the root causes of corruption, a short comment is provided as to the various determinants of corruption. Fourth, an examination of the cost of corruption is made from the perspectives of money, power and trust.

Holmes (2015) notes that corruption, having existed since the beginning of human history has always been a problematic issue, not only due to its intrinsic qualities but also due to disagreement on what it actually is. Commonly, corruption involves the abuse of a position of trust in order to gain an undue advantage. This involves the conduct of two parties: that of the actor who abuses the position of trust as well as that of another actor who seeks to gain an undue advantage by this abuse - or the other way around. It is by this multi-actor nature that corruption can be difficult to detect as it always involves two or more actors entering into a (more or less) secret agreement.

Corruption can occur in relation to officials as well as between private persons. It is particularly prevalent in certain kinds of transactions (for example, when awarding public contracts), in certain economic sectors (for example, in extractive industries), and in certain countries. Corrupt practices can range from small favours in anticipation of a future advantage to the payment of large sums of money to senior members of governments. The prevalence of corruption and its tendency to spread have led to analogies with 'disease; for example, the

common case of 'cancer' discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, as the following discussion around the definition will show the analogy is flawed, as it implies lack of choice. Seldom if ever has it been in anyone's self-interest to choose to get cancer, and even if it was, the choice rarely lies in the hand of the ones afflicted.

A distinction is typically drawn between grand corruption involving high-ranking officials with discretionary power over government policy, and petty corruption. The latter refers to the exchange of small amounts of money or minor favours (these may be referred to as 'grease' or facilitation payments) between citizens and lower level officials who often control access to basic services such as health or education. Corruption also has an active and a passive dimension, capturing the offer and the acceptance of a bribe respectively. In countries afflicted by high levels of systemic corruption, corrupt practices may also occur in the judiciary, undermining the independence and accountability of judges (Anagnostou et al., 2014).

In their research on corruption Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, and Søreide (2000, p. 14) divide corruption into four main forms: bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion. While this too is a limited perspective on a vast phenomenon it does give some idea of the concept. In Andvig et al.'s formulation bribery is described as a payment, not necessarily in money, which is given or taken in a corrupt transaction. There are many equivalent terms for bribery, such as kickbacks, commercial arrangements or pay-offs. The notion of bribery as corruption is money or favours needed or demanded to make things move more swiftly, smoothly, favourably, or at all. Embezzlement is the theft of resources by those who are responsible for administering them, e.g. an employee stealing from its employers. From a generalised level point of view this is not considered corruption, but its inclusion is argued for, in a broader definition of the concept. Andvig et al. (2000) also includes fraud under the umbrella of corruption as an economic crime that involves some type of deceit. Hence, it can involve manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise by public officials for their own profit, putting it closer to corruption. Lastly, extortion is money or other resources extracted through the use of some type of coercion.

Building upon these divisions, some examples of corruption may be useful. This is however is by no means an exhaustive account of what constitutes corruption but is presented more for the purpose of contextualising the phenomenon. To give an idea of the various types of corruption, examples are: where government officials accept bribes in the form of money or favours to circumvent competition; bureaucrats who favour suppliers for the promise of a lucrative job once they leave their current position; judicial authorities such as

judges ruling in favour of a party because it employs a relative; a customs official speeding up the administrative process for an import shipment and in return receiving part of that shipment; or a health and safety inspector approving a subpar restaurant in return for free meals.

Although it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between where public corruption ends and private violations begin, a common understanding is that corruption is limited to violations of public trust. This may have its root in the world famous index produced by Transparency International on the perception of corruption in the public arena. The same organisation has also provided the most commonly used definition of corruption in "Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2017b). As will be examined in more detail in a later section, the index does not measure actual corruption but rather the perception of corruption as the abuse of public power for private benefit. Thus, corruption would occur if a government official has the power to grant or withhold something desired by the petitioner and then acts in contradiction to the rules and regulations, trading that for something of subjective value to the official. That 'something of subjective value' is considered a bribe making the whole transaction corrupt by bribery. Among corrupt acts, bribery gets much attention, but corruption can also include nepotism, official theft, fraud, certain patron–client relationships, and extortion. Also, Brunelle-Quraishi (2011) maintains that It has been widely maintained that public corruption refers almost exclusively to bribery and that it is the most identified form of corruption.

It can be contended that bribery has over time become almost synonymous with corruption. This unfortunate outcome restricts the scope and reach of anti-corruption tools, ignoring other activities enabling personal enrichment through the misuse of authority, which therefore should fall under a broad concept of corruption. There is a wide array of opinions on what constitutes public corruption; some are more inclusive or broader than others. There is indeed a lack of uniformity among international instruments regarding the scope of the crime, and the often broad or unspecific language used allows for differing interpretations. This complicates harmonisation efforts, due to differing interpretations of the offence, causing different standards – both legal and moral. The distinctions in what, for example is considered a facility payment or a culturally accepted bribe is of less interest for this research as it is first when an act becomes a perceived misappropriation that they become a corrupt act adding to the perception of corruption. In short, corruption is an outcome - a reflection of legal, economic, cultural and political factors amongst others. This research concedes that scholars

have time and again noted the far-reaching qualitative and quantitative differences in the nature and scope of the same phenomenon often referred to as bribery and corruption. This is, however, of less relevance for achieving the aim of this study. If it could be established, a comparison of the perception of corruption from a grounded theory perspective would be derived universally from the behaviour of the people interviewed, rather than hinging on the existence or non-existence of a conceptual description that all could subscribe to. Regardless of the definition used by the person interviewed, the theory abstracted should be universal for any interviewee - something that will be tested if such a theory would emerge.

This should circumvent any criticism of the international normative standards in this area that are arguably devised without specifically taking into account the cultural context and background of the societies that are expected to put those into practice as this theory would actually be useful in creating universal international norms for good governance and anti-corruption strategies (at least the fundamentals thereof).

Classifications of corruption

Before elaborating various conceptions of corruption so as to develop the definition used in this research, it is worth considering some of the classifications previously developed by analysts with similar interests. The shared interest and ambition are to better understand corruption, be it either for conceptual understanding from a more general public perspective or for methodological reasons to facilitate research. The upside with any classification is the possibility to sort and arrange the characteristics of a phenomenon in order to place the event within a certain bracket. The downside, consequently, particularly when dealing with phenomena whose characteristics are inherently fleeting and where interpretations are highly contextual, is the forced placement of things that do not easily fit into a single bracket. This research is an example of the latter where the epistemic foundation of this research does not rely on corruption being classified at all. Having said that there are still some benefits of exploring and explaining some of the existing classifications, one being that it provides a narrative backdrop to the forthcoming discussion on the adequate definition of corruption.

A common tripartite classification still widely used or at least referred to is the distinction made by Heidenheimer (2001), separating 'black', 'white' and 'grey' corruption. Based on the assumption that experts and ordinary citizens sometimes perceive phenomena in different ways, Heidenheimer defined black corruption as activities that most of both expert and citizen members would condemn and see punished. Whereas, white corruption refers to

activities that, while still formally perceived as corruption, are more or less tolerated by both groups. The final type of grey corruption refers to activities about which the experts and the general public would have differing views, or about which there are significant differences of opinion, including intra-group ambivalence.

Perhaps even more commonplace are the various binary classifications where for example, separation is made between extortive and transactive corruption, active and passive corruption, or petty and grand corruption. The distinction between extortive and transactive corruption is that in the former one party exerts pressure on the other to indulge involuntarily in corrupt acts. In the latter, the two parties are more equal, albeit not entirely but both willing to negotiate a deal by means of corruption. A derivation often found in official anti-corruption documents is the distinction between active and passive corruption. The first typically describes the act of offering a bribe and the second refers to either the rather simple acceptance or the more complex eliciting of a bribe. This distinction, however, can prove to be problematic as the connotation of the term passive may imply less responsibility for the corrupt act, which is not always true as in the case where a bribe is intentionally and actively elicited.

Another popular way to differentiate various forms of corruption is by dividing it into petty and grand corruption. The distinction between petty and grand corruption is perhaps most relevant to this research as the notion appeared in several of the interviews and became one of the central themes of the analysis. The distinction is primarily a reference to size, where petty corruption includes situations the ordinary citizen is likely to encounter in everyday life that relates to normality but contradicts what is perceived as fair. It occurs when citizens interact with public officials in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other bureaucratic agencies. If money is involved, and it often is, the scale of monetary transaction involved is small and the impact is on an individual level. It also disproportionately affects the poor (UNDP, 2008, p. 8).

Grand corruption, as its name suggests, refers to corruption at a higher level, often involving local or national state type authorities. It refers not so much to the amount of money involved as to the level at which it occurs (where policies and rules may be unjustly influenced). The kinds of transactions that attract grand corruption are usually large in scale. Although rare in occurrence, larger in scope involving several elements that are perceived as subnormal particularly as this concerns entities presumably held to a higher moral standard.

This research advances an additional dimension of 'closeness' to the event, a theme to be explored further in the analysis section.

These classifications are not the only ones available for those inclined to bracket conceptualisations of corruption. Depending on the field of research and methodology there may be others that prove to be useful. Such is the distinction between 'administrative corruption' and 'state capture' developed by Hellam and Kaufmann (2000) or the more complex typology produced by Karakins (2002). The point, however, is that some methodologies do not require a stringent classification to produce viable theory. This research, although ultimately re-translating the theory produced into a classification type matrix, does not rely on an initial separation of the elusive characteristics of corruption.

The main reason for leaving the phenomena of corruption largely unclassified, that is for example confining it to a table with clear-cut definitions and borders, is that this research focuses not so much on what the perception of corruption is but rather 'why' it is. The fundamental underpinning for Heidenheimer's (2001) divisions, also prevalent in some of the binary classifications, is that perceptions between experts and citizens vary. Recent research, however, points to the contrary. Published in 2015, Charron (2015) quite specifically addressed some of the early concerns relevant for this research. The shared inquiry was: how well do corruption perception measures reflect the actual levels of corruption? This is one of the fundamental tenets of this research and in many ways a cornerstone to its theory construction. Critics argue that perceptions, particularly those of outside experts, do not reflect actual corruption. Nevertheless, by a systematic analysis of the empirical strength of corruption measures in Europe, one of Charron's findings is that the consistency between citizen and expert perceptions of corruption is high. Thus, in chorus with Charron, the conclusion is that concerns regarding the validity and bias of perceptions may have been overstated.

With people's perception of corruption being, neither entirely free from, nor excessively tainted by bias, the focus for this research is in the opinions, experiences and perceptions of experts, i.e. those that are assumed to be rich sources of data. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that even in omitting a classification for corruption, an adequate definition thereof cannot be neglected. As the next section will show, it is only by dissecting the various definitions and their underpinnings that the core concept can be uncovered and suitably formulated into an understandable and workable definition of corruption.

Definition of corruption

Defining corruption is arguably the foundation for a doctoral research project in and by itself. The discussion above on the classifications of corruption is an indication of the broad nature of the phenomenon. This research recognises the wide spectrum of activities that may be considered corrupt, legal and/or morally. In establishing a definition turning to academia lends little comfort as the study of corruption embeds itself in a wide array of disciplines such as philosophy, law, sociology, economy, psychology, history, politics and criminology - to name some, but certainly not all. Despite the fact that the phenomenon of corruption cuts across several of the disciplines, however, it is not unusual to see it rooted in some kind of rational choice-based perspective (see e.g. Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2010 and Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). This research shares that perspective. Regardless, it is important not only to acknowledge the difficulties inherent in defining corruption, but also to make a strong case for the definition used and avoiding just picking a preferred definition and simply moving on. As Harrison states (2007, p. 675) "in classifying corruption as a simple phenomenon, the diverse ways in which people engage with morality are overlooked. Comprehension of how opportunities are shaped, both to engage in and to escape from corruption, is important." Thus, this research sets out to research corruption as a phenomenon from a general and universal perspective as a basis for understanding regardless of how it manifests itself.

First, there is no international or universal consensus on the definition of corruption. This ambiguity has led to a number of difficulties for the anti-corruption agenda and community. For example, due to the wide nature of deviant behaviour possibly classifiable as corruption it is all but impossible to deliver accurate and objective measurements of the phenomenon. Aside from objective data being in and by itself hard to obtain, not having a clear-cut definition makes it even harder to know whether whatever data there may be is relevant. Consequently, the prevailing measurement systems are instead based on subjective data and may give limited information on actual levels of corruption within the confines of the measurement; even more so when aggregate indices are subject to global comparison. There is more discussion on this in the section on the measurement of corruption. Briefly, the literature commonly defines corruption as the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff, 2008, p. 16). These type of 'corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain' definitions of definitions are useful but understanding corruption in this way does not fully allow for an adequate appreciation of context, partly because they imply a firm dichotomy between the public and the private spheres. In that sense, definitions are powerful and once accepted and constantly repeated, the problems of actually understanding them may be overlooked, effects that can be compounded by the popularity (and over-reliance) of certain measurements of corruption,

subscribing to just such a definition, like the Corruptions Perceptions Index (discussed further in the next section). It is less that there is not one definition of corruption, and more that, there are several ways of perceiving corruption and therefore an overly precise definition may not travel well between contexts. On the other hand, an overly inclusive definition runs the risk of being watered down to the point of not conveying much information at all, rendering the conceptual definition useless. The point is that context and perceptions matter and that they affect the assumptions about what is and is not appropriate behaviour, i.e. what can be understood as corrupt and why. As expressed by Harrison (2007, p. 672) "there is a need to destabilise 'taken for granted' assumptions about what corruption is and how it operates. This means generating an understanding of how meanings of corruption vary...". The argument is that perceptions of corruption matter, that all perceptions develop out of context, and that context varies.

This research therefore requires a definition that will facilitate an exploration of the perceptions of corruption, which is what corruption means for different people in different contexts. As Pardo (2004, p 2) puts it: "corruption is a changing phenomenon, some of its aspects and received morality are culturally specific and its conceptualization is affected by personal interest, cultural values and socio-economic status. In this key sense, corruption needs to be treated contextually...".

Second, one must understand that corruption is regarded as far more than a question of bribery. For the most part, contemporary corruption in the West, Member States of the EU included, is not the exchange of brown envelopes of cash, but the corruption of influence, formulated by Cockroft and Wenger (2017) as the buying of influence and the selling of power. Here government and its institutions, associations, organisations and industry interests are captured for illicit gains, which in other words could be described as undue advantages. Corruption can also take the form of collusion between individuals or groups that leads to a misappropriation of goods, tangible and intangible alike. Some activities will balance on a legal borderline with lobbying, political campaign contributions and revolving door allocation of assignments as shining examples. The difficulty in defining, let alone regulating corruption, becomes crystal clear. This difficulty is sometimes aggravated by the mistrust in using subjective data for use in measuring corruption, but as argued by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), all efforts to measure corruption using any kind of data involve an irreducible element of uncertainty. There is more discussion of this this in the next section on measuring corruption,

but it is relevant at this stage to note that when defining corruption, one must consider the subjective nature of the phenomenon.

In a traditional sense, Holmes (2015) refers to corruption as moral impunity, as a continuation of Anagnostou et al.'s (2014) argument that corruption is deeply rooted in a wide range of cultural and economic practices, where large variation in its nature and scope across countries has rendered its conceptualisation and definition difficult. The World Bank is a significant contributor in the anti-corruption arena (Marquette 2003; Polzer 2001), strengthening the economic perspective. Corruption is something that is not only legitimate but also expected, for the World Bank to address, precisely because it is defined as an economic concept. The formula developed by Klitgaard (1998, p. 4) "corruption may be represented as following a simple formula: $C = M + D - A$. Corruption equals Monopoly plus Discretion minus Accountability' - is often cited. This research adopts a position somewhat similar to this, at least in essence, and claims it is rather simple to give a universal definition with appropriate caution due to the risk of that definition being overly general to the extent of not being very useful. On the other hand, a simple yet universal definition is necessary as a common ground to build a theory explaining corrupt behaviour.

As outlined by Hough (2017) there are in essence four types of contemporary definitions of corruption. First there are those based on legal understandings, second those that centre around abuse of enthused power, third those that involve business transactions, and four, those that have been termed 'legal corruption' (p.35). Most definitions of corruption have defined the phenomenon as the abuse or misuse of public office for private gain (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013). There are several issues with using a definition along those lines for the purpose of this research. Firstly, the concept of abuse does not necessarily imply private gain. The actor engaging in corrupt behaviour may be clinically insane and engage in corruption, with private gain defined as nothing but the self-interest of a madman. Similarly, the concept of misuse has its shortcomings in the apparent lack of intent. Under the banner of misuse, corruption may be the result of incompetence rather than deliberate intention. For those reasons, using a word like misappropriation would probably be better, although it too does not fully encapsulate the decision-making process behind deviant behaviour. Further the definition has to be appropriately expanded beyond public corruption to also include private corruption, resulting in something like: corruption is the misappropriation of power for private gain. This would answer the questions of 'what', 'how' and 'why' with 'misappropriation', 'power', and 'private gain'. The issue of the underlying decision-making process, however, is

not solved by such a definition. Fortunately, there is a definition developed by Dutch academic Petrus van Duyne that is centred around the decision-making process:

"Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents or demands to deviate from the criterion, which should rule his decision making, in exchange for a reward, the promise or expectation of it." (Duyne, 2001, p. 3)

The definition is suitable for this research for at least four reasons. Firstly, it is broad enough to facilitate an unrestricted development of theory that may or may not reside within that which is enshrined by the traditional definitions. Secondly, it focuses on behavioural aspects and brings in a normative aspect rather than the static descriptive characteristics of those preceding it. Thirdly, by its formulation a higher level of abstraction is achieved, letting the definition supersede cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption such as *blat* or *guanxi*. Fourthly, the definition is adequately open to encapsulate the concept of perceptions playing an important part in a decision-making process. As this research focuses on perceptions and what people think of corruption, this is of the utmost importance so as, not to partly or even unintentionally discard or disregard perceptions, but instead embrace them in order to understand the role of perceptions in corruption. Although our focus is on the European context, this definition does lend strength to further extended intercontinental research. Having said that, in line with the discussion by Brooks et al. (2013), corruption is an analytically diverse matter and a definition that is too inclusive runs the risk of being somewhat meaningless. An overly encapsulating definition of corruption may well lead to a failure, intentional or otherwise, to effectively engage in a specific discussion on the subject. The chapter on applying the emergent theory to existing criminological theory is partly intended to address such concerns.

¹ The Russian concept of *blat*, is a term that has changed its meaning in recent years, but in Soviet times referred to informal agreements between people to help each other through non-monetary exchange. It was a coping mechanism in a system where there was a shortage of public goods. Also, the concept involves the development of personal relations, most notably trust and a sense of reciprocity. The Chinese concept of *guanxi* also refers to relationships that develop between individuals or groups, and that involve potentially long-term mutual obligations - reciprocity. See Holmes (2015).

Determinants of Corruption

Despite many studies examining hypotheses on causal linkages between corruption and various socio-economic determinants, there is still no commonly accepted explanation of the root causes of corruption (see e.g. Alt & Lassen, 2003). Corruption impacts society on all levels: individual, group, organisation, local, national, international and even supranational and global. Many have fallen victim to nepotism, been damaged by social injustice, seen their economic development hampered, expressed outrage at the absence of the rule of law, stood impuissant to the undermining of democracy, had their trust in the political constructs eroded and watched as the world seem to morally decay.

The Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality. Corruption varies in nature and extent from one country to another, but it affects all Member States. While many of its effects are obvious, others are less so. There are so many ways in which corruption can negatively impact on society that its consideration must be undertaken with some type of delimitation. For the sake of a clearer exposition, this section considers the negative impacts of corruption in broad terms of social, environmental, economic, politico-legal, security-related and international implications. Bear in mind that in the real world, the impact of corruption often affects several areas simultaneously. Therefore, any one singular variable that might provide at least a partial explanation for corrupt behaviour, may lose its significance when other variables that are present are considered (Li, Xu, & Zou, 2000).

The difficulty of establishing a root cause relationship for corruption is naturally tied into the difficulty of establishing a common definition of the same. Nevertheless, research has, and continues to, identify certain national attributes that correlate with greater amounts of perceived corruption in an attempt to explain why some nations suffer from more corruption than other. Research includes examination of income levels, literacy, hostile environments, legal systems, religion, freedom of press, etc. The list goes on and is continuously increasing, as corruption is rarely static: in the absence of an effective anti-corruption drive, it tends to change and often worsen over time (the “ratchet effect”²). For example, corrupt officials continuously seek to increase inclusivity and complexity of laws, creating monopolies that restrict legal, economic and social activities, with ever-increasing extraction of advantages in the form of bribes, influence and favours.

² see eg. Choi and Thum (2003).

According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, all of the countries with the highest levels of perceived corruption are developing or transition countries (Transparency International, 2017a). There are further similarities such as that many are governed, or have recently been governed, by socialist governments. Also, with few exceptions, the most corrupt countries have low-income levels and corruption is closely related to GDP per capita and to human capital. It can be noted that these correlations also are consistent with the economic and human capital theories of institutional development (Svensson, 2005). Treisman, (2000) discussing the causes of corruption, argues that it is less prevalent if economic policies stimulate long-term growth and prosperity regarded by the population as being shared fairly. Corruption is further reduced, Treisman continues, if these conditions are also accompanied by better education, increased democratisation, and civic engagement for monitoring corruption. The strong relationship between income and corruption is consistent with the theories of corruption that argue that institutional quality is shaped by economic factors (Svensson, 2005). However, it must be considered a weak test of these theories, since economic development not only creates a demand for good government and institutional change but may also be a function of the quality of institutions.

Considering some of the findings from the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International, 2013) may provide some intuitive insight to the determinants of corruption. Take the following seven findings from the report. First, corruption through bribery is widespread. A little over one in four people (27 %) reported having paid a bribe in the past year when interacting with public institutions indicating a weakness in political institutions. Second, public institutions primarily entrusted to protect people suffer the worst levels of bribery. There were eight services evaluated and among them the police and judiciary are those seen as the most susceptible to corruption through bribery. The estimate of those that when coming into contact with the police also having to pay a bribe is 31%. The corresponding figure for the judiciary is 24%. These figures are interpreted as 'capture' of important state functions. Third, following the possible capture of the state, governments are not considered to be doing enough to hold the corrupt to account. In fact, the majority of respondents around the world believe that their government is ineffective at fighting corruption. Further, they consider corruption to be getting worse, which may be a reflection of a lack of political commitment. Fourth, the democratic pillars of societies are viewed as the most corrupt. On a global scale political parties, who should be the main driving force for democracy, are perceived to be the most corrupt institutions, indicating a lack of trust in the democratic state. Fifth, personal connections are seen as corrupting the public administration.

Many of the people surveyed regard corruption in their country as more than just paying bribes: almost two out of three people believe that personal contacts and relationships help to get things done in the public sector in their country, indicating corruption is being addressed too narrowly. Sixth, powerful interest groups are considered to be driving government actions, as opposed to it being driven by the public good. Over half the respondents' regard groups acting in their own self-interest rather than for the benefit of society at large largely or entirely run their government. This indicates a lack of transparency, for example, in lobbying and in the legislative process. Seventh, lastly and perhaps most importantly, people state they are ready to change this status quo. Nearly 90% of those surveyed said that they would act against corruption. The majority of people said that they would be willing to speak up and report an incident of corruption, indicating the lack of an outlet for whistleblowing such as a free press.

How these intuitive connections between the common features of high versus low levels of corruption compare with more scientific measurements and research is beyond the scope of this study, partly for reasons discussed in the section on measuring corruption and issues pertaining to the accuracy and applicability of such measurements. Theories about the determinants of corruption also emphasise the role of economic and structural policies and the role of institutions. These theories are best viewed as complementary: after all, the choice of economic and structural policies is one channel through which institutions influence corruption (Svensson, 2005). It is nevertheless clear that corruption increases the level of what can be thought of as a kind of societal uncertainty that subsequently forces governments, organisations and individuals to expend extensive effort in attempts to reduce this uncertainty. Otherwise, as discussed in the next section, the cost of corruption can be great.

The cost of corruption - Money power, and trust

Over the last decade evidence and theories have aligned, pointing unequivocally towards corruption delaying and distorting financial and political development. These findings focus on real processes and systematic, measurable consequences, rather than specific and/or hypothetical accords in isolation (Rose-Ackerman, 2011).

To get an idea of the cost, three major factors can be discerned: money, power and trust. A growing body of research shows that corruption has an adverse impact on a country's economy, not only by reducing economic growth but also by worsening the distribution of income (the poor must pay bribes but rarely receive them). Added to this, the adverse impact on governance processes where corruption undermines the citizens' confidence that

democratic success results from individual effort rather than from bribery or political connections. Finally, corruption tends to reduce the confidence that citizens have in their own government and subsequently society as a whole - an erosion of social trust. The phenomenon of corruption can and often will have implications that pertain to more than one of the factors. But the examples that follow are to get an idea of the enormous impact corruption has on society. Note that they provide a perspective with a high level of generality and give few answers as to the underlying causes of corrupt behaviour. Those will be developed in the coming chapters.

Money

It is difficult to quantify the financial cost of corruption in the Member States of the EU, and even more so when looking globally. Corruption does, however, introduce and reward inefficiency in dealings between state and private actors (Rose-Ackerman, 2011) and there is little question that it incurs a heavy financial burden on society (see e.g. Mauro, 1995 and Tanzi, 1998). In 2004 the World Bank estimated that public officials worldwide receive more than \$1 trillion in bribes each year, a figure that does not include embezzlement. According to a 2005 survey by the Russian think-tank INDEM, a large portion of that would pertain to Russia with more than \$300 billion in bribes paid annually. (INDEM, 2005). Also, more than half of all Russians have at some point been asked for a bribe. The idea that half of the Russian population is subject to corruption may not come as a surprise, but the trend persists also in other contexts. According to the 2005 Volcker-report on the UN's former oil-for-food program, more than 2,000 companies participated in the oil-for-food program and almost half of those may have been involved in kickback schemes (Heimann, Heimann, & Pieth, 2017). In the corruption-sensitive area of public procurement the costs added to a contract as a result of corrupt practices may amount to between 20% to 25%, and in some cases even 50% of the total cost of the contract according to a 2008 research project (Arnáiz, 2008). In another study published in 2013 on identifying and reducing corruption in public procurement the overall direct cost of corruption for five sectors (including the construction sector) in eight Member States ranged from € 1,4 billion up to € 2,2 billion (European Commission, 2017). Europe, generally seen as an area where corruption is low, is still playing a high monetary price as the 2014 EU Anti-corruption report states that corruption costs the European economy about EUR 120 billion a year (COM(2014) 38, 2014).

Corruption could conceivably, yet seldom practically, have positive effects on economic growth. The proponents of "efficient corruption" claim that bribery may allow firms to get

things done in an economy plagued by bureaucratic hold-ups and bad, rigid laws (Huntington, 2006). However, these arguments typically take the distortions circumvented by the corrupt actions as given. In most cases, distortions and corruption are caused by, or are symptoms of, the same set of underlying factors, leaving bribes and extortion as an expensive way to obtain results (M. Johnston, 2005), and there is no evidence that corruption "cuts through red tape" (Mauro, 1998, 2002). In fact, surveys indicate that where corruption is extensive the bureaucratic burden, and associated costs, tends to be greater, not less (Reinikka & Svensson, 2002; J. Hellman & Kaufmann, 2004).

In most theories that link corruption to slower economic growth, the corrupt action by itself does not impose the largest social cost. Instead, the primary social losses of corruption come from the propping up of inefficient firms and the allocation of talent, technology and capital away from their socially most productive uses (Svensson, 2005). According to the encyclopaedia of social problems (Parrillo, 2008) even crude analysis points to a significant negative relationship between corruption and the level of economic development. Figure 1 shows the relationship between Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index and income per capita adjusted for differences in the cost of living (purchasing power parity [PPP]) for 150 countries.




Figure 1: Relationship between the CPI and income per capita for 150 countries (Parrillo, 2008).

The conclusion from the figure above is that there are no very corrupt rich nations and there are no very honest poor ones. If studying the numbers behind the figure, the correlation between perceived corruption and income per capita is -0.8 . As always correlation should not be mistaken for causation, and it is possible that the causation runs the other way, i.e. that low

incomes provide a fertile environment for corruption (see UNDP, 1994). Corruption is more and more perceived as a cause of underdevelopment and poverty: “[c]orruption is now seen as a cause of poverty, not merely a consequence It is no longer possible to justify corruption and oppression on the grounds that they are part of the culture” (Sandgren, 2005, p. 717). It should, however, be pointed out that the discussion of corrupt nations is somewhat moot, particularly from the perspective of this research, as there are no corrupt nations, only corrupt individuals. The point, however, is that gone are the days when some pundits seriously argued that corruption was an efficient corrective for over-regulated economies or that it should be tolerated as an inevitable by-product of intractable forces (Heineman & Heimann, 2006). The individual and often collective corrupt behaviour carries a cost, both in terms of money but also in terms of abuse of power.

Power

Besides its financial costs, corruption tends to deteriorate democratic processes and divert power away from its rightful holders (Doig & Theobald, 2000; M. Johnston, 2005). Corruption lies at the heart of politics in many countries, and EU Member States are not categorically exempt from this reality. Somewhat simplified, this can be understood by looking at Klitgaard's (1988, p. 75) famous equation for corruption, stating “Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.” In Dahl's (Dahl, 1973) perspective on the development of polyarchy, corruption expressed as undue influence and lack of accountability would counter the opportunities for the people to signify preferences and to have those preferences weighed equally by those in power. While Klitgaard's equation is not without critique (see e.g. Stephenson, 2014) it does convey the point that some corruption arises because unaccountable officials have the sole power to make discretionary decisions. Further, political party donors are buying influence and politicians are selling power. As a consequence, large-scale donors may override the electorate. This process, often shrouded under the concept of lobbying, effectively pushes agendas that are not necessarily in line with the prosperity of society as a whole. Even if they were it is not by virtue of power exercised by the hands of the people. As will be shown, neither democracy, nor affluence are by themselves evidence of a country not suffering corruption problems (M. Johnston, 2005).

In their book, “Unmasked - Corruption in the west” Cockcroft and Wegener (2017) outline the rising price of power in Europe. Only Sweden and Germany have some sort of regulated cap on party donations. Nonetheless, Cockcroft and Wegener make a compelling and well-founded argument for corruption being a recurrent phenomenon despite such limits.

They note that, the currently relatively well-governed nation state, Germany, has regulation on party financing largely as a result of corruption cases that characterised the late 1990s. In the UK the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000, based on Canadian legislative practise - at the time considered from an Anglo-Saxon perspective to be the best - is subject to significant rule-bending. The Italian system, often described as a web of favours, was riddled by corruption during the nine years of Silvio Berlusconi's government. Controlling a business empire whose economy was larger than that of the country itself, Berlusconi wielded financial and political power that was abused throughout his mandate. The Italian context naturally also involves the mafia:

...a constant thread in Italy's government since the 1950s has been the reality of the continued effectiveness of organised crime and the need for government in power to deal with it directly or indirectly. This is not "machine politics" but the politics of two different kinds of business empires: in the case of the mafia, this represents blatant corruption; in the case of the Berlusconi empire, it represents the politics of private interests. (Cockcroft & Wegener, 2017, p. 31)

Another nation with a long history of political corruption is Spain. With the huge scandal of 2014 in which the Minister of Health, Ana Mato, was forced to resign, Spaniards came to grips with the fact that the democracy installed in 1978 was riddled with corruption (Iglesias Carrera, 2017). Politics in western Europe is subject to both subtle and not so subtle forms of corruption, and it certainly seems to be pervasive.

In each of the cases discussed by Cockcroft and Wegener (2017) there are powerful forces abusing power within the electoral system that undermine the democratic promise. The corruption in established democracies such as the Member States of the EU may incur more damage to democratic values than actual law-breaking (D. Thompson, 1993). Thus, the extent of "capture" varies but there is no question that corruption is commodified through the buying of influence and selling of power: a systematic cost that is born by society.

Trust

Where corrupt practices occur to any significant or widespread degree, they undermine citizens' trust and confidence in the established institutions and rules, and prevent a sense of social justice from taking hold among the society at large (Anagnostou et al., 2014). Research on corruption identifies trust as both cause and consequence of corruption (Morris & Klesner, 2010). Unsurprisingly, trusting societies have less corruption (Uslaner, 2004). Societies where citizens have faith in others are more likely to endorse strong standards of moral and legal

behaviour (Uslaner, 1999b, 1999a). Subsequently, societies where citizens believe that the legal system is fair and impartial are more likely to trust their fellow citizens (Rothstein, 2000).

The theoretical reason trust is important comes from “the problem with many names” in the social sciences. Among these names are social dilemmas, the problem of collective action, the provision of public goods, the tragedy of the commons, and the prisoners’ dilemma (Ostrom, 1998). Behind all these metaphors lies a problem that can be described as follows: a group of agents know that if they can collaborate, they will all gain. However, this collaboration is not costless but carries economic burdens or other effort for all involved. Without the contribution of (almost) all agents, the good will not be produced because it makes no sense for the individual agent to contribute if she or he does not trust that (almost) everyone else will contribute. Moreover, what is going to be produced is, by definition, a public good and can thereby be consumed by everyone regardless of whether or not any given individual has contributed. There is thus always a risk that agents will act opportunistically, hoping that they can reap the benefits of the good without contributing. Without trust that most agents will refrain from such treacherous behaviour, most agents will not contribute to the good in question. The end result of this lack of trust is that everyone in the group stands to lose, although all know that if they could trust each other they would all be better off.

On a more practical level, social trust is important because it relates to a number of variables that are desirable for a prosperous and well-governed society, i.e. a non-corrupt society. As measured by surveys, at an individual level, people who believe that most other people in their society in general are trustworthy are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic institutions. Trusting people also have a more optimistic view of their possibility of influencing their lives and subsequently their societies (Uslaner, 2002; Delhey & Newton, 2005; Helliwell, 2006). Similarly, on a societal level, cities, regions and nations with more trusting people are more likely to have more open economies with greater economic growth, better working democratic institutions and less crime - including corruption (Keefer & Knack, 2008; Uslaner, 2008; Sean, 2009; Bjørnskov, 2012).

Corruption seems to have a detrimental effect on trust, on an individual but also on a societal level. As Johnston (2005), argues in his book *Syndromes of Corruption*, that if politics builds only on a limited public trust and commitment, citizens may see the process as a rich man’s game and their own choice at election time as unconnected to the wellbeing of society. When there is widespread belief that corruption prevails and the powerful in particular are able to get away with it, people lose faith in those entrusted with power (Hardoon &

Heinrich, 2013). It is, however, interesting and relevant to this research to take note of a point made by Rothstein (2011), that when the social trust research agenda went comparative, the Nordic countries came out on top irrespective of what measures were being used. This is relevant for this research with its origins in the Nordic countries: the research question in a sense is born partly out of this fact. But to understand why the Nordic countries excel, one would first have to examine the way in which corruption is measured: the focus of the next section.

1.3 Measurement - the perception of corruption

"In this messy controversy about quantification and its bearing on standard logical rules we simply tend to forget that concept formation stands prior to quantification. "

(Giovanni, 1970, p. 1039)

It is important to remember that there is no international consensus on the definition of corruption. Even locally, where an accepted definition may apply, the interpretation and meaning of the concept could still vary quite significantly. Even so there are at least three reasons as to why corruption should be measured accurately (P. Heywood, 2015). First, it is important to assess the scale of the issue; second, to determine patterns, and third, to identify variables that will aid understanding of why and where corruption occurs. 'Measure' and 'accurately' are, however, two notions not easily combined.

Given the clandestine nature of corruption, the lack of definition, variance in interpretation and meaning, corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. Further complexity is added when attempting to measure corruption across countries and cultures, both due to the secretive nature of corruption and the variety of forms it takes. However, since corruption reflects an underlying institutional framework, different forms of corruption are likely to be correlated (Svensson, 2005).

The number of corruption indices, however, is constantly growing but can be grouped according to three types (UNDP, 2008). One, perceptions- and/or experience-based indicators; two, single source or composite indicators; and three, proxy indicators. Perceptions-based indicators are derived from the opinions and perceptions of corruption expressed by citizens and experts for a particular country or context. Experience-based indicators measure individual experiences of actual corruption, e.g. whether having been offered or given a bribe. Indicators based on a single data source are produced without recourse to third-party data whereas composite indicators aggregate and synthesise different measures generated by various third-party data sources. Partly due to their near global coverage, composite indicators remain the most widely used measurement tools (Rohwer, 2009). Lastly, proxy indicators try to measure corruption indirectly. Measurements can, for example, aggregate subjective and objective data, or make estimations by measuring "opposites" of corruption such as anti-corruption regulation, good governance and transparency.

The most prominent measurements of the perception of corruption is presented and critically evaluated below, and then some of the difficulties surrounding this approach are

discussed. Lastly, some other measurement techniques are introduced to situate the measurements behind this research and its subsequent theory.

The perceptions-based measurements of corruption

The leading method of measuring corruption from the mid-1990s up until recently has been perception-based cross-national composite indices drawn from a range of surveys and expert assessments. Most prominently featured in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bank Group's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The CPI and the WGI are both composite indicators, made up of distinct component data sources that assess a wide and differing range of corruption (Knack, 2006, p. 15; UNDP, 2008, p. 6). Such indices have proven immensely important in raising awareness of the issue of corruption, as well as forming the basis of cross-country comparisons (Transparency International, 2009). Yet, despite the important task of raising awareness, there are also some well-established concerns around these types of measures as inherently prone to bias, difficulties in longitudinal comparisons, and imperfections as proxies for actual levels of corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010; P. Heywood & Rose, 2014; Charron, 2015). Broadly, indications of corruption tend to be biased towards a specific and often contextual dimension of corruption. Using the aforementioned composite indices as examples, the CPI measures corruption only in the public sector whereas the WGI also includes governance.

The fundamental purpose of composite perceptions-based indices - to raise awareness of corruption and to provide researchers with better data for analysing the causes and consequences of corruption (Knack, 2006, p. 16), - has largely been fulfilled. The question is then if they still serve the same purpose or if they can be used to extrapolate further information that is useful for the anti-corruption efforts around the world. For instance, the ranking systems do allow limited comparisons between countries and the subsequent shaming of corrupt governments; however, they still remain based largely on the perceptions of experts. The limitation in comparison stems from the breadth of the concept of corruption when calculating aggregated corruption indices. It is unclear what the corruption indices actually tell us because the types of corruption and their meaning vary from one country to the next (T. Thompson & Shah, 2005, p. 8). Further, experience is a poor predictor of perceptions and that 'the "distance" between opinions and experiences vary haphazardly from country to country' (Weber Abramo, 2008, p. 6). Hence, the indices fall short in both specificity and transparency (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017). This implies significant challenges in terms

of discerning what actually needs to be done to create an effective anti-corruption framework. What follows is an outline of some of the challenges intrinsic to composite perceptions-based measurements of corruption, and why they shed little light in terms of understanding how to combat corruption, where corruption occurs and identifying relevant changes as they happen.

Corruption can be measured; the question is how to measure it accurately and the practical utility of the measurement. Analysing the two main composite perceptions based indices, the CPI and the WGI, reveals some pertinent points of critique and distinct limitations. Leaving aside the difficulties of measuring something that lacks a uniform definition, there are also issues with method. The CPI methodology can be summarised as follows. The index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist. It is a composite index, i.e. a poll of polls. Corruption-related data is drawn from expert and business surveys from a variety of independent and (more or less) reputable institutions. The views reflected in the CPI are from around the whole world, but primarily from surveys of experts living in the countries evaluated.

On the other hand, the methodology of the WGI adopted the basic approach of the TI CPI but attempted to improve on it in several respects (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999) in their initial Worldwide Governance Indicators project. The project reported aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories over the period 1996–2008, for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability/Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. Examining both indicators further reveals that the WGI measures corruption as perceived by experts and opinion polls in both the public and private sector, whereas, the CPI measures of corruption are limited to the public sector, as perceived by experts only.

The challenges of perceptions-based indicators

As mentioned above, both indices are based on perceptions-based indicators, and there are at least two reasons for this. One, objective criteria are hard to collect and, two, available objective data is often misleading. Considering that the aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of entities such as, citizen and expert survey respondents. In turn, the individual data sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations. By using this data from carefully constructed surveys, perceptions measures about corruption

may possibly reflect realities of life better than objective measures. Perception-based indicators will, however, always reflect perceptions. Therefore, their reflection of reality depends on whether perceptions reflect reality, and perceptions can change faster or more slowly than reality (Maurseth, 2008, p. 27). There are other risks as Apaza (2009, p. 141) has pointed out., By collapsing different data sources – often selected only on the basis of convenience rather than theoretical justification – the aggregation models are unable to offer any nuance on the nature, category, or concept of corruption. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the underlying accuracy or what is actually measured. Therefore, even if consensus and high correlations exists between the CPI and WGI, this is not necessarily indicative of validity or reliability:

”In a nutshell, data on corruption suffer from a fundamental problem, the fact that different data sets used in quantitative research are routinely associated with different findings, and that the relative validity of different measures of corruption and hence of the different findings is not readily apparent.” (Hawken & Munck, 2009, p. 2).

The task of measuring corruption in general, and by developing cross-national data comparisons, is laudable and probably necessary to keep the issue alive politically. This is in spite of methodological constraints where variations in reported levels of corruption may be a product of the prevailing methodologies as opposed to actual levels of corruption. Resonating with the Glaserian tenet that 'everything is data' (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001), the injunction offered by Hawken & Munck (2009, p. 21) is to 'know your data'. Thus, despite any possible shortcomings, available data should not be jettisoned out of hand, but instead employed to generate a better index, through sensitive analysis of methodological choices on the basis of available data. Further, there should be more control of the criteria and of the methods of obtaining aggregated indicators to better understand what they are measuring, and to determine (roughly) their degree of interdependence.

Another problem highlighted by Heywood (2015) with the CPI that also resonates with the WGI relates to the question of how to properly and accurately gauge and interpret what respondents to the various surveys actually understand by corruption. It is difficult to ascertain whether the expert respondents share a common understanding of what constitutes corruption in a particular location at a particular time on a highly subjective scale; what seems low, modest or very high levels of corruption may not resonate harmoniously throughout the population of respondents. The same question can be posed for the correlation of expert respondents' perceptions to the experiences of ordinary citizens, i.e. actual corruption.

An answer to how well corruption perception measures reflect actual levels of public sector corruption is provided by Charron (2015). Given the amount of theoretical and empirical scrutiny that the prominent cross-national perceptions-based corruption measures have suffered in recent years, the implications for the validity and reliability of the data are significant. Critics argue that perceptions, in particular, those of outside experts do not reflect actual corruption in that they are far too 'noisy' or simply biased by external factors. Moreover, Charron, continues, a number of empirical studies on developing areas have produced evidence that external expert assessments of corruption correspond poorly, if at all, with the experiences of actual citizens. Such lack of correspondence generates pessimism for perceptions-based measurements. The study undertaken by Charron offers a systematic analysis of the empirical strength of corruption perception measures in a previously unexplored area in this debate – Europe, an area that corresponds almost perfectly with the scope of this research., But whereas this study uses a small N with little over 20 respondents, the data used by Charron is based on 85,000 European respondents in 24 countries. The findings provide strong counter-evidence to the prevailing pessimistic claims of non-correlation of experts and citizens perceptions on corruption. The consistency is remarkably high and such perceptions are swayed little by 'outside noise'.

From this discussion there is value in perceptions-based measurement tools that aggregate a number of data sources, like the CPI or WGI. Both have their strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, composite indicators can be useful in summarising large quantities of information from several sources. Further, they can limit the influence of measurement error in any one individual indicator and thus potentially increase the accuracy of measuring corruption. On the other hand, one can run the risk of losing conceptual clarity. In line with the conclusive remarks by Hawken and Munch (2009, p. 24), it is at this point where it would be preferable to test theories about the causes and consequences of corruption with a smaller N than is provided by the CPI and the CCI. This could lead to a greater certainty that at least the data is more valid. This research answers exactly such a preference, which is part of the fundamental rationale for this work discussed at the end of this chapter. There are, however, other ways of measuring corruption - some of them mentioned in the following section.

Other measurement proxies of corruption

There are other methods to measure corruption such as those used by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995), based on indicators of corruption assembled by private risk-

assessment firms. From these, it would seem that the corruption indicator published in the International Country Risk Guide has become the most popular, probably due to better coverage across time and countries. Moving chronologically there is also Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) who derive a complementary measure, Control of Corruption, drawn from a large set of data sources. With a broader definition of corruption and including most cross-country indices that rank countries on some aspect of corruption they use a different strategy than Transparency International to aggregate the corruption indicators. Nevertheless, as Svensson (2005) observed, definitions and aggregation choices seem to matter only marginally. The simple correlation between the results of the different methods is relatively small. Svensson also makes the important observation that the aggregation procedures used by both Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) and Transparency International presume that the measurement errors associated with each sub-indicator are independent across sources. This assumption allows them also to report measures of the precision or reliability of the estimates. In reality, the measurement errors are likely to be highly correlated, because the producers of the different indices read the same reports and most likely gauge each other's evaluations (Svensson, 2005).

In the introduction to "A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption" (UNDP, 2008) Heller states that one could persuasively argue that the science of measuring corruption is more an art form than a precisely defined empirical process. She also claims that no single data source or tool will offer a definitive measurement. Note that the highly qualitative nature of this research originates in a school of thought more often associated with art than its quantitative counterpart, acknowledging the art in it while also striving for empirical precision. The argument built up by Heller, however, leads to the conclusion that it is only through the careful parsing and comparison of the available tools that we can arrive at a more accurate measurement. The guide then goes on to examine fifteen different corruption indices in an attempt to outline actionable measurements as a road map for reform.

Not included among these indices but worthy of mention is the work on financial tracking in China by Li (2001, 2002). It is based on and around the dual-track system, a hallmark of the Chinese reform but one that is also believed to have increased corruption. Li (2001) describes the dual track system as "a hybrid economic system under which traditional central planning (the plan track) and the emerging product market (the market track) coexisted as means of resource allocation". Using data from a survey of state-owned

manufacturers supplemented by aggregate input-output data, Li (20002) finds that the leakage in the plan became more significant after the introduction of the dual-track system.

Broadly, and as outlined by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), corruption is being measured in three ways. Firstly, by gathering the informed views of relevant step holders; secondly, by tracking countries' institutional features; and thirdly, by careful audits of specific projects. A year prior, the same authors had provided an exhaustive list of 22 different sources that provides data on corruption (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). Here, examples of measuring institutional features include the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability [PEFA] framework, and the Public Integrity Index of Global Integrity. Examples of audits include Olken's (2005) research in Indonesia and Hsieh and Moretti's (2006) study on Iraq's relationship with the UN. The PEFA initiative on monitoring fiscal procedures in the public sector bears resemblance to Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys [PETS] and is sometimes accompanied by Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys [QSDS]. These are tools that seek to document service delivery on the supply side, used in scenarios with systemic corruption such as Uganda (see e.g. Emmanuel and Reinikka, 1998). These types of surveys have two broad uses. They serve as a tool to gauge service delivery, enabling the analysis of public expenditure, taking into account the implementation capacities of governments. In addition, they provide primary data on service providers for empirical research purposes. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) provide an overview of the diagnostic, data collection and research benefits of these tools along with the potential for capacity building. Fuller discussion lies outside the scope of this research, but nevertheless could benefit from the findings of perceptions-based research like this.

Having explored a number of ways of measuring corruption it is important to acknowledge the fact that subjective corruption measurements spawn ordinal indices, although quite often these are mistaken by media and academics alike as cardinal. This is important to keep in mind, particularly when attempting to interpret trends or changes in the indices over time or across countries. The macro-level rankings of countries as more or less corrupt based on subjective judgments as such cannot be used to quantify the magnitude of corruption. Nor does this research attempt to do so. Instead the focus resides in individuals' perspectives in an effort to understand corruption rather than measure it. This research encompasses the individual perspective by including participants' interpretations of the indices. Such interpretations are intrinsically subjective and fundamentally created on an individual level where the focus of this research primarily resides, not only for one particular country, at a

particular time or compared to another particular country, but from a holistic perspective. The laudable struggle to accurately measure corruption goes on and is perpetually fuelled by the urge (at least by some, and hopefully most) to combat corruption. The next section discusses various efforts to do just that.

The role of perception in this research

While there have been developments in terms of the development of corruption measurements proxies (see e.g. Fazekas, Cingolani, & Tóth, 2016) the composite indices still play a major role in forming public opinion and subsequent policy. In 2007 Urra (2007) examined how the different corruption measurement frameworks are built and defined the main problems that corruption measurement encounters. These are labelled as the “perception” problem; the “error” problem; and the “utility” problem. To summarise the - still valid – arguments, firstly, the perceptions problem is based on the unanimous acceptance of perception as a relevant factor in corruption. Relevance, however, does not translate into real; but perceptions-based indices are sometimes read as literal accounts of actual levels of corruption. Also, the complex statistical constructions of composite indices using aggregate indicators can easily create an illusion of quantitative sophistication. Such sophistication can be misunderstood or even wilfully misused and interpreted as an indication of actual levels of corruption. Secondly, the error problem is still one of the most challenging when it comes to the actual accuracy of perceptions-based composite indices. Social science in general has to consider a level of confidence and a subsequent margin of error. Corruption composites have a supplementary challenge in that the data used already include, sometimes large, margins of error. Thirdly, one of the main reasons for the increase in corruption research is the interest of policymakers. This in turn has not always led to efficient policies, and the corruption indices have been criticised for being difficult to convert into concrete anti-corruption efforts. This is obviously not always the sole or even main purpose of the indices, but it is clear that measurement does not necessarily mean utility (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007).

It has been shown that indicators can provide statistically reliable measurements, but what they reliably measure is not so clear (Langbein & Knack, 2010, p. 365). Rather it has been argued that the indicators are poorly defined and may be meaningless (Thomas, 2010). The UNDP (2008, p. 26) commented that “by aggregating many component variables into a single score or category, users run the risk of losing the conceptual clarity that is so crucial”. If users are unable to understand or unpack the concept that is being measured, their ability to draw out informed policy implications is severely constrained (P. Heywood, 2015) Thus, in line with

a central statement in the UNDP's (2008) Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption, there is little value in a measurement if it does not indicate what needs to be fixed.

Given the current and seemingly continued prominence of the perceptions-based indices and the issues raised by Urra (2007), the next section is devoted to clarifying some issues around perceptions-based indices. This will also serve as an important intellectual backdrop to this research as it is to some extent, although quite differently, perceptions-based. One of the fundamental drivers of this research project is to increase understanding and enhance anti-corruption activities through theoretical development. Theory is derived and developed from the subjective accounts of participants, rendering it to an extent perceptions-based. As previous sections have shown, understanding and subsequently using perceptions-based aggregate indicators can be problematic. That does not mean that perceptions should not be taken seriously nor completely discarded from the corruption research agenda. If anything, the opposite is true: there is still much to discover and learn from the analysis of perceptions in the fight against corruption. As Hough (2017, p 69) points out - and very much in line with the aim of this research - the measurement of corruption is not an exact science. While perhaps not providing definitive answers, perceptions-based research can help in providing explanations of what might be causing corruption.

1.4 Corruption and rational choice

“Being the rational animal, man must be capable of thinking if he really wants to. Still, it may be that man wants to think, but cannot.” (Heidegger, 1972)

This research is about individuals, their perception and decisions, thus a rational choice perspective is used. This section will explain and justify that assumption. After an introduction to the relationship (at least academically) between corruption and rational choice, the section will provide a background to the rational choice paradigm. The positioning of this research within the rational choice paradigm is then discussed. Finally, there is an exploration of some of the issues with a rational choice approach.

Rational choice theory is based on the expected utility principle in economic theory (Akers et al. 2017: 24). The expected utility principle states that an agent will make rational decisions based on the extent to which the decision (or rather the outcomes thereof) is expected to maximise gain and minimise loss. Rational choice theory formulated around individual motivation and as a reflection of self-interest marks a distinct shift in focus and thus appears to have some credence for explaining human behaviour. Relevant to this research and outlined by Bronfenbrenner (1979) individuals inhabit ecological systems composed of numerous dynamics, that in turn are based on the way that the system operates. These dynamics include macro, meso and micro factors. Whilst this research puts emphasis on the latter, that is not to say that the other two factorial levels are irrelevant. The macro level is commonly used in estimates of corruption via composite indicators such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, (see section 1.3). Therefore, this perspective is largely used to generalise macro level developments of corruption from the perspective of the nation state. While this in certain contexts can be a useful level of categorisation it does not lend itself well to an analysis based in rational choice theory. The other two levels, however, do.

While this research is primarily based on a micro perspective of rational choice, i.e. the individual level of decision making, the relevance of the meso level i.e. the collective level, is still worthy of examination. Analysis at this level is largely based on micro perspective fundamentals. The relevance of rational choice-based theorising in corruption, and anti-corruption, research is exemplified by the work of Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2010) and Marquette and Peiffer (2015). In “The failure of Anti-Corruption policies, a theoretical mischaracterisation of the problem” Persson, Rothstein and Theorell (2010) examine the anti-corruption movement in Africa from what can be interpreted as a meso level perspective. The

question posed by the authors is “Why does corruption in Africa prevail despite a large number of efforts to fight it?” (p. 2). Providing a convincing argument for collective action theory, the findings are perhaps best summed up by Klitgaard’s (1988) famous statement that “corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability”. Under rationalist logic this implies that corruption is likely where agents hold monopoly over a product, service or scarce resource; where agents have the discretion to decide and control distribution; and where accountability and transparency is weak. Now, rational choice theory in and by itself may be inadequate to explain the failure to successfully implement anti-corruption reforms in Africa. Thus, a meso perspective is of utmost importance to address a number of additional factors associated with the cost and benefit of deviance such as self-control, moral beliefs, strains, emotional state and association with delinquent peers (see Clarke and Cornish, 1986). A singular perspective, as opposed to a multiple lens perspective, may be intrinsically limiting - an argument supported by Marquette and Peiffer (2015). It is, however, necessary that all lenses in such an approach are clear in order to not distort the entire picture. Hence, the importance of research like this work with its focus on the micro lens.

In “Corruption and Collective Action” Marquette and Peiffer (2015) draw upon rational choice theory to look at what shapes the individual propensity for certain decisions. They argue that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is context- dependent and that under certain circumstances principal-agent theory provides better explanations of deviant behaviour than collective action theory. Expanding the perspective of the self-interested individual to reflect on how ground dynamics shape actions. The analysis emanates from “The Logic of Collective Action” by Olson (1965) and its claim that collective action becomes problematic when some members of the collective fail to act in accordance with the common (collective) goal. On one hand, Marquette and Peiffer (2015) challenge the fundamental principles of rational choice theory and focus on the collective rather than the individual choice. This makes sense since individuals rarely exist apart from some sort of collective context. As Heidegger (1996) states man is thrown into the world and has to make sense of it. This sense-making process does not occur in isolation and an overly instrumental rational choice theory approach would thus run the risk of ignoring how individuals are socialised. On the other hand, it is important not to misinterpret self-interest. This concept is treated twice in chapter three in two different yet conceptually similar instances. As noted by Agnew (2014 REF) self-interest is a core assumption of criminology, yet nonetheless it is arguably an ideological construct. As useful as it can be on an individual level, it becomes increasingly obstructive when moving up the scale towards a macro perspective.

From the examples above and others we will discuss later, it is clear that rational choice theory has a role to play in explaining corruption, but it remains unclear exactly what that role is. There is no doubt about the individual element as part of the degenerating decision-making process that leads to corruption; but there is also little doubt that this degeneration takes place in a social context. Here the individual is more or less part of some collective that influences decisions and shape outcomes. Thus, whether rational choice theory can predict if an agent calculates before acting that the benefits outweigh the costs depends whether one subscribes to pure or partial rationality. This research maintains that it is the latter that will prevail. It does not require much consideration to realise that from a perspective of an agent choosing deviancy based upon perfect knowledge and untethered free will, taking into account only accurately estimated objective and subjective costs and benefits, the rational choice theory would hold little, if any, empirical value. The purely rational (and accurate) calculation of the probable consequences of a decision is arguably a rarity for decision-making in general, including non-deviant decisions. In a study, albeit on burglary, Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991) found that a completely rational decision-making process cannot be supported, and that opportunity and situational factors often plays a vital part. In essence, that is why this research expands the scope of a pure and narrow interpretation of rational choice to incorporate a more comprehensive and subsequently more complex iteration. This interpretation can be better appreciated by first looking at the historical development of rational choice theory within criminology.

The origins of the rational choice paradigm

There is a large and diverse body of literature on and around the topic of rational choice theory. With its roots in economic theory most of it pertains to the economic domain, but it has also expanded to include political theory as well as being an integral part of Game Theory. Rational choice theory also has its place in criminology.

Indeed, Akers (1990) noted that rational choice theorising is a return to classical criminology where, the literature emphasises limitations and constraints on rationality. The criminological literature on rational choice theory describes a complex phenomenon of perception and motivation. The phenomenon is explored and analysed, deconstructed and reconstructed to facilitate anti-corruption efforts.

From a criminological perspective, the concept of humans as rational actors where criminal actions is committed to maximise pleasure (benefit) and avoid pain (cost) can be

traced back to the eighteenth century and the advent of the Classical School of criminology. During the enlightenment, contemporary influencers like Bentham and Beccaria inaugurated a new set of characteristics for offenders, well-captured in the following route by Cornish and Clarke; "Offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal behaviour; that this involves the making of decisions and choices, however rudimentary on occasion these processes might be; and these processes exhibit a measure of rationality, albeit constrained by the limits of time and the availability of information" (2014, p. 1). The quote encapsulates some of the important limits to rationality and how it is bound, a theme developed further in section 3.4. A key assumption of rational choice theory is that the decisions an agent makes are "purposive". That is, they are "deliberate acts, committed with the intention of benefitting the offender" (Clarke & Cornish, 2001: 24 in Lilly 2015 p. 363). Thus, a rational agent is generally doing the best it can within the context of the limited time and information resources, available to it. This is why the decision-making is characterised as rational, albeit in a limited way. This is an excellent lead into the position of this research within the rational choice paradigm - to explore the limits of rationality within the context of corruption.

Central to Bentham's writing in the late 18th century was the pleasure and pain principle - the idea that human behaviour is generally directed at maximising pleasure and avoiding pain.

"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as we as determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it." (Bentham, 1789/1973: 66)

Similarly, while Beccaria in a criminological sense may be best known for his ideas around the certainty, celerity and severity of punishment - concepts generally associated with deterrence theories - these are fundamentally underpinned by the notion of a rational actor. As the logical conclusion around this thinking, Beccaria simply stated, "it is better to print crimes than to punish them" (Beccaria, 1764/1963: 93). Some 250 years later his statement still resonates through this research.

By the second half of the twentieth century, the genealogy of rational choice theory can be found in the writings of Matza and Sykes. Here the idea was that crime has a purpose rooted in the desires of an agent who seeks benefits in the form of acquisition (Matza, 1964). In this research, questions are raised around what that purpose might be and what an

abstraction of the essence of that which is acquired would be. To limit the potentially criminogenic nature of rational choice theory, Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed crime prevention measures and various sanctions for committing crime, where the former resulted in an audit of the situation in which the deviant act occurred. Similarly, this research applies a situational crime prevention approach to corruption.

The position of this research within the rational choice paradigm

The defining feature of this research in relation to its application of rational choice theory to corruption is the criminological underpinning. Where most rational choice approaches stem from either economics or political sciences, this research has different roots. While much of the theorising around rational choice is similar across disciplines, it is highly relevant to understand and to some degree, at least epistemologically, adopt its origins. This is because there may be small yet important variations in the usage and meaning of various elements in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of theory - processes that play a methodological role when research is informed by grounded theory. This research is a purely qualitative piece of research on the perception of corruption drawing upon the criminological underpinnings of rational choice theory. In doing so, it provides an addition to the already large and somewhat diverse literature on perceptions, rational choice and its role in corruption.

Deviance is thus not considered solely from underlying motivations or predispositions, but as also including a choice, or often more precisely a sequence of choices. It is this sequence that then, from the perspective of corruption as a degenerated decision-making process, which results in the transformation of motivation into corruption. From that perspective the rational choice paradigm invites contemplation as to how motivation is created and in turn how this can be used to predict where decision-making degeneration and subsequent deviance occurs. As Clarke and Cornish (2001) argue, the tradition of rational choice points toward being more interested in the “wider social and political contexts that mould beliefs and structure choice. Consequently, they have taken little interest in the details of criminal decision-making”. In contrast, for this research, and as Clarke and Cornish continues, “it is these details that must be understood” (p. 32).

Alternatively, and perhaps as an intermediary step in reaching this understanding, one can turn to an adjacent yet related theory - routine activities theory. Routine activities theory does not, to the same extent, rely on an exact interpretation of what motivates an agent to

deviance. It argues only that for particular acts of deviance to occur a motivation of some sort must be present. Conceivably, this perspective could be further elaborated along the lines of other motivational theories of crime, such as social learning theory, strain theory, etc. but such systematic exploration lies beyond the scope of this research. Instead, in using rational choice theory this research draws on the implicit (or sometimes explicit) view used in routine activities theory that an agent seeking an advantage wishes to “gain quick pleasure and avoid imminent pain” (Felson, 1998, p. 23). This point about advantage-seeking agents is why both rational choice theory and routine activities theory, lead to policy recommendations that fight crime through “situational crime prevention” measures (See Lilly, Cullen and Ball, 2015). The approach in this research bears some resemblance to Wikström’s (2005) “situational action theory”, which attempts to reconcile an agent’s motivation with the context of routine activities and situations. For Wikström (2005), the likelihood of engaging in crime is based on the interaction of an agent’s level of self-control, moral judgment, and situational factors. Preliminary empirical tests by Wikström and his colleagues have yielded some support for this extension of the routine activities’ framework (Wikström, 2009, 2012; Wikström et al., 2012), which, due to its similarity to the idea of interacting decision-making, motivation and situations, lends some validity to the conclusions drawn later in this research. The key point is, as behavioural economics shows, all decision-making is shaped by a complex process that sometimes does not lend itself well to being simplistically reduced to just utility - costs and benefits (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Nevertheless, by elevating this reductionism to that of a search for advantages, what research discovers is, why, from a rational choice perspective, corruption happens.

Addressing some of the issues with a rational choice approach

There are a number of studies that part with the rational choice paradigm, at least in its simplest and most pure neo-classical interpretations. For Hellmann (2017), the analysis of corruption has undergone radical revision increasingly emphasising a move away from studying corruption as an individual act of deviant behaviour. The argument instead is that corruption can be institutionalised as informal rules and routines putting pressure on behaviour in accordance with these norms. Hellman’s exploration is, however, focused on the developing world and although it is pointed out that similar arguments have been made by scholars exploring corruption in post-communist societies (see. Ledeneva, 2006 and Roman, 2014), these too are somewhat different from the context of the European Union. Further, as Hellman concludes, the choices leading to the institutionalisation of corruption were

conditioned by the political market place and could be described as an expression of an “elite cartel” searching for advantages. While the corrupting effect of this search is influenced by the historical sequence of institutionalisation of the political market place, it is nevertheless the search for advantages that ultimately corrupts.

The sequencing of institutionalisation is something that has been studied before. In a contextually interesting article appropriately called “Becoming Denmark” the performance of historical governance achievers is explored (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014). The focus is diverted from the present organisation of legislation and political institutions as a cause for good and corruption-free governance, as these act more for the maintenance, rather than the actual creation of good governance. The early achiever Denmark exemplifies successful establishment of good governance in modern times. Using the best in class benchmarks of good governance when modernising in those nation states where corruption is more prolific seems to have a limited effect. As Mungiu-Pippidi (2014) concludes “modernisation in itself does not bring good governance” (p. 2). Rather, it is important to understand the framework created by the institutions in which agents are expected to make their decisions. Institutions, while partly but not solely, responsible for enforcing some sort of societal ethical universalism must be examined from a historical perspective to see what sequence they followed. This goes to better understanding the situation in which the decision-making process is taking place and where the same process sometimes degenerates. This macro perspective is very much similar to the micro, i.e. individual perspective used in this research.

The point of a strictly individualistic perspective cannot be stressed enough when exploring, examining and ultimately evaluating the conclusions drawn in this research. In a review of a number of corruption-related sources that more or less rely on some sort of rational choice assumption, Hopkin (2002) argues that the rational choice approach to the study of the state is fundamentally flawed. Further, it fails to provide a satisfactory account of cross-national variations in levels of corruption and state capacity. It is clear that a rational choice approach is less suited to macro level analysis. Such findings direct microanalysis research endeavours such as this one to maintain and limit the scope of both analysis and conclusions drawn. Further direction is provided by Sutherland Award-winning scholar Daniel Nagin, who argues for moving choice to centre stage in criminological research and theory (Nagin, 2007). Individual agents should not be portrayed as propelled in and out of deviancy by forces over which they have absolutely no control. Human agency is of utmost importance when elaborating a criminological theory based on a rational choice perspective and the failure

of the same perspective to provide macro explanations should not divert us from its potential on an individual level to explain how perceptions could influence decision-making.

As summarised in Lilly, Cullen and Ball (2015, pp. 365-366) there are qualms about what is rational. It can be difficult to provide clear criteria as to whether or not a choice is considered rational. Sometimes it seems as if the mere fact that agents makes a certain choice is used as a basis for the assertion of rationality. If no standards are presented to judge rationality, then a certain choice cannot be shown to be irrational either. In such cases the thesis that offenders make rational choices becomes an assumption that is difficult, if not impossible, to falsify. Even when, as in this research, adding the notion of bounded rationality it can be hard to outline the contribution made from studying the rational component of decision-making. This is due to the decision-making process being influenced by a wide range of factors and only by studying each factor individually and then as part of a complex system could any deductions be made. In this research the intricacies of such an analysis is bypassed by elevating the analysis to a higher level of abstraction where the influential factors are subject to an internal analysis towards a decision being perceived as advantageous. Thus, instead of getting bogged down in whether deviance is the result of an agent holding anti-social values, wish to relieve strain, etc. which may distort more than it illuminates, this research focuses on how the end calculus is perceived - as either advantageous or not.

This indicates that the issue around rationality arguably also extends to the realm of social psychology. Within this discipline it has since long been established that decisions are systematically biased by the methods employed by agents making choices (see e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). In certain circumstances it is all but impossible to weigh all information available in what could be considered a rational manner. Rather than being strictly rational, i.e. accurately weighing costs and benefits, agents employ a rule of thumb to facilitate a good enough decision. On a fundamental level, "good enough" ensures survival. These mental short cuts are what are referred to as "heuristics", allowing decisions to be made quicker, and are discussed further in several sections of this research. Here the point is that, from a purely objective standpoint, these choices would be seen as irrational, but from the perspective of the individual as the most advantageous. Since human judgements are shaped by complex biological, psychological, and sociological factors, this complexity must be appreciated and investigated (Nagin, 2007). This research is one of those appreciations and investigations. And so, what of the role of institutions and governance in a rational choice-based approach to studying corruption? As Hough (2017, p. 88) writes, the rational choice

approach makes sense in a setting where the rule of law is strong, public officials work in a climate of transparency and accountability, and there is widespread trust in government (generally) doing the right thing. Such a setting is embodied in this research by the Member States of the EU, where in a global context there, are few if any weak states where corruption is the norm.

1.5 Combatting corruption

“Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.”
(Nietzsche, 1886 - Aphorism 146)

Little over a decade ago the review of anti-corruption frameworks would probably have led to some conclusions along the lines that the existence of tangible evidence on how to combat corruption was scant (Svensson, 2005). Since then anti-corruption research has increasingly become in vogue. The profound recognition of the threat that corruption poses to institutional integrity, economic development, and to the rule of law and democracy, not only in developing countries but also at the very heart of developed European democracies, has instilled a strong determination to create rules and mechanisms to fight against it (Heineman & Heimann, 2006, pp. 75-76).

While the purpose of this research is to generate theory to facilitate a greater understanding of corruption, in order for that understanding to have any anti-corruption bearing the theory must be placed in an anti-corruption framework. It is therefore only logical to first examine the already existing frameworks for combatting corruption. As the scope of this research extends only as far as the Member States of the EU, the choice of frameworks to examine is somewhat delimited: a point that also holds true for the future applicability of the theory. Therefore, some conventions on corruption are excluded, perhaps most notably the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) and African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Instead the frameworks examined are: first, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; second, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC); and third, the Council of Europe's Criminal and Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Finally, this section concludes with an examination of the EU's efforts to curb corruption within its Member States as stated in the 2014 EU anti-corruption report.

An overview of global Anti-Corruption frameworks

Just as the establishment of the idea of corruption being widespread, the subsequent consensus on its deeply detrimental effects on society is relatively new. So is the proliferation of conventions, normative declarations and other standardised frameworks and activities among the international community of states. The ANTICORRP Background report on International and European Law Against Corruption provides a comprehensive overview of the historical development of international anti-corruption frameworks (Anagnostou et al.,

2014). The report sets out the development of international standards and rules against corruption; work that accelerated from the end of the Cold War and the associated geopolitical developments in Europe. Driven by the opening-up of markets and the growing privatisation of state companies, the costs to business of engaging in corrupt practices increased. Financial support for corruption-ridden regimes in allied countries in the Third World also lost momentum after the Cold War ended (Kubiciel, 2012, pp. 421-422). It was only in the 1990s that the first international norms and conventions in this area were drafted and adopted. The ANTICORRP Background report cites this as partly responsible for the pronounced paucity of studies exploring state compliance with and implementation of international anti-corruption norms, in stark contrast to a burgeoning scholarship of state compliance with international law more broadly (Anagnostou et al., 2014). There is an assumption, even an explicit argument, that international anti-corruption norms and values - designed to promote the creation and strengthening of national legal and regulatory frameworks - make a positive contribution in tackling state-level corruption (at least to some degree) (Wolf, 2010).

With movements towards single-market-type socio-economic structures, interdependence, through increased internationalisation via the free movement of people, goods and services, increases. This increase revealed unilateral nation-based measures were insufficient in addressing transnational corruption (Anagnostou et al., 2014). Bringing together actors from opposite ends of the corruption continuum, both conceptually and practically, makes corruption difficult to detect - and even more so when opportunities are amplified by globalisation (Williams & Beare, 1999). The mobilisation of public opinion created momentum to set up international rules discrediting corruption. Such mobilisation was partly facilitated by campaigns headed by NGO's like Transparency International. Founded in 1993 by Peter Eigen it has established an impressive worldwide presence, including chapters in several European countries. The activity by NGOs has been and arguably still is a significant catalyst in the anti-corruption societal reaction. Abbott and Snidal (2002) convincingly demonstrate that both instrumental motivations and value-based commitments on the part of state and non-state actors coexisted and were closely intertwined in the process that led to the internationalisation and legalisation of anti-corruption norms.

The first global instrument against corruption, or more specifically bribery, was agreed in 1997 when 28 states signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public

Officials in International Business Transactions. The scope has been criticised for being somewhat narrow:

"...take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business." (OECD, 2009 - Article 1)

The convention is still relevant as to date the 35 OECD countries and 8 non-OECD countries - Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Lithuania, Russia, and South Africa - have adopted this Convention (OECD, 2017) From the perspective of international business and global markets this is important because the states host some of the world's largest multinational corporations. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make this effective.

Through a peer-driven monitoring mechanism established by the convention, the thorough implementation and enforcement of the obligations, recommendations and related instruments of the signatories is ensured. Monitoring is performed by the OECD Working Group on Bribery made up of representatives from the States Parties to the Convention and meeting four times a year in Paris. The monitoring program involves country visits by experts from peer governments and meetings with local prosecutors and representatives from the private sector and civil society. The resulting country monitoring reports contain recommendations formed from examinations of each country. By probing the State Parties to determine whether their governments have legal loopholes (such as short statutes of limitations), whether they provide sufficient resources for enforcement, and whether local corporations have adequate compliance programs, the reports also create incentives for improvement (Heineman & Heimann, 2006).

In contrast to the OECD convention, UNCAC can create a truly global framework for combating corruption because its 140 signatories include both developed and developing nations. It also covers a much broader scope of issues: extortion in addition to bribery, payoffs to the private sector as well as to public officials, and both domestic and foreign corruption. UNCAC also includes a wide range of preventive measures, including the establishment of

anticorruption agencies, anti-money-laundering rules, conflict-of-interest laws, legal assistance among states for the extradition of suspects and for evidence-gathering abroad, and the means to recover funds deposited by corrupt officials in foreign banks.

Four main areas can be identified in the UNCAC, each divided into separate chapters: preventive measures, criminalisation, international cooperation, and asset recovery. These issues are the UNCAC's founding pillars. The purposes of the convention as stated in its first chapter are to: (a) 'promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively'; (b) 'promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery'; (c) 'promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property' (UNODC, 2003).

"This Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called "active corruption" or "active bribery", meaning the offence committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with "passive bribery", the offence committed by the official who receives the bribe. The Convention does not utilise the term "active bribery" simply to avoid it being misread by the non-technical reader as implying that the briber has taken the initiative and the recipient is a passive victim. In fact, in a number of situations, the recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and will have been, in that sense, the more active." (OECD, 2009, p. 14)

The UNCAC attempts to create global anti-corruption standards and obligations, and with its claim to universality, some argue, it is positioned as the leading international anti-corruption tool (Low, 2006). The ANTICORRP Background report cites the Council of Europe as taking the leading role in the 1990s in developing a political strategy and a comprehensive set of norms and rules against corruption in Europe (Anagnostou et al., 2014).

The Council of Europe [CoE] is the continent's leading human rights organisation. It includes 47 member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union. Within the CoE there is The Group of States against Corruption [GRECO]. Established in 1999 by the CoE one of the purposes with GRECO is to monitor states' compliance with the organisation's anti-corruption standards. GRECO's objective is to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption standards through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for the sharing of best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption.

Membership in GRECO, which is an enlarged agreement, is not limited to Council of Europe Member States. Currently, GRECO comprises 49 Member States (48 European States and the United States of America). Any state, which took part in the elaboration of the enlarged partial agreement, may join by notifying the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Moreover, any state, which becomes party to the Criminal or Civil Law Conventions on Corruption automatically, accedes to GRECO and its evaluation procedures.

Thus, a major achievement for the international community of states in terms of combatting corruption has been the development and adoption of several conventions. The conventions are designed to aid the signatory states by filling gaps in existing national anti-corruption law. Compliance with the conventions is however difficult to ascertain. The bodies overseeing the conventions have little or no powers of enforcement. Instead by more or less voluntary monitoring programs it can to some extent be determined whether governments fully enact and implant the conventions' provisions. Such monitoring, creating publicity and peer pressure disclosing governments' shortcomings and even failures, and calling for corrective action, is the only tool available to hold signatory states to their undertakings (Heineman & Heimann, 2006).

In 2011, in its Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU (COM(2011) 308), the European Commission set up a new mechanism, the EU Anti-Corruption Report (COM(2011) 376). Supported by an expert group and a network of researchers, the EU Anti-Corruption Report aims to monitor and assess Member States' efforts against corruption, and consequently encourage more political engagement. The report seeks to: (a) provide a fair reflection of the achievements, vulnerabilities and commitments of all Member States; (b) identify trends and weaknesses that need to be addressed; and (c) stimulate peer learning and exchange of best practices. The report also came with its own perceptions-based index on how the Member States ranked in terms of corruption. Using a methodology not dissimilar to the CPI, the report explicitly acknowledged the potential limits in interpreting the results and encouraged further research into both indicators for an increased understanding of corruption.

The EU Anti-Corruption Report states that corruption continues to be a challenge for Europe and costs the European economy approximately €120 billion per year (COM(2014) 38). According to ANTICORRP calculations, if EU Member States would all manage to control corruption at the Danish level as a benchmark, tax collection in Europe would bring in yearly about €323 billion more, so the double of the EU budget for 2013 (Mungiu-Pippidi &

Kukutschka, 2013). Arguments like this make a strong case for an EU anti-corruption mechanism.

It must, however, be remembered that none of the aforementioned conventions directly applies to laws but only indirectly as guidance for national legislation. Existing studies have debated the effects of legal regulation and the effectiveness of complying with international treaties (Kubiciel, 2012; Wolf, 2010). There are also those that question the effectiveness of the legal approach to regulating corruption (see e.g. Bryane, 2010), partly because the ratification of treaties has not led to any discernible reduction in national levels of corruption, at least not as captured in the various indices. Hence, despite a proliferation of laws and well-developed legal frameworks in some states, adopted in compliance with EU accession-related criteria or international treaties to fight against it, corruption remains rampant (Batory, 2012).

There seems to be a supposition that through measurement, and establishment of supranational guidelines, a form of modernisation of society will occur, that in turn inexorably will work to reduce corruption. Naturally the counter-supposition also exists, that anti-corruption campaigns however well intended act mainly as a discursive expression of contested public values - themselves very much a product of that same modernisation. However, from the perspective of a Weberian norm, there are doubts that the success of anti-corruption efforts can be determined by extrapolating any usable generalisations from history. While accepting the importance of measuring or combatting corruption, it is worth noting that this research is not about measuring corruption, nor about what works in terms of fighting corruption. It is perhaps tempting to see the international discourse on corruption, which also include that on anti-corruption, as the changing course of "public values" (Johnston, 1996). It is here with those values that attempt to establish the right ways of thinking and acting that this research begins. The generated theory stemming from this research provides value-added by its possible effective application for anti-corruption purposes. This possibility is proposed and discussed in later chapters, but ultimately determined only by future application and evaluation.

1.6 This research

"As countless surveys show, the EU remain a more trusted set of institutions than national institutions across swathes of Eastern Europe, in part because it is seen as a bulwark against the self-interest and venality of their governments. At a time when the EU is struggling to win over hearts and minds in its traditional heartlands, a strong voice and visible presence in fighting corruption is the best bet to ensure its continued relevance and legitimacy." (Dolan, 2017b)

In an effort to contribute to the anti-corruption agenda, the European Commission adopted the Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU in 2011. This established the EU Anti-Corruption report as an instrument to monitor and assess the Member States' level and efforts in the area of corruption. This also included a revision of the Public Procurement Directives, including oversight of implementation of public procurement regulation, red-flagging and other alert systems allowing early detecting of corruption. These efforts are undertaken by the EU with a view to stronger political engagement to address corruption effectively. It is, however, difficult to address a problem that is not fully understood. Things that are not recognised as corruption may slip through the most rigorous early detection systems. This calls for an increased understanding of corruption. The first (and only) EU Anti-Corruption Report states that the European Commission intends to analyse feedback in relation to the report, reflect on possible gaps and errors, and to learn lessons for the second report. The methodology would be revised with special attention directed to the possibility of developing new corruption indicators (COM(2014) 38).

In early 2017 the European Commission communicated the disbandment of the second EU anti-corruption report (Timmermans, 2017). This move puzzled not only the anti-corruption establishment with the Director of Transparency International EU stating that "the gap between the rhetoric from President Juncker and Vice-President Timmermans and the reality on the ground is striking" (Dolan, 2017a);, but also the European Parliament itself. In a parliamentary question a number of MEPs questioned the Commission's decision as it was taken despite previous assurances that the Commission would publish a second report in 2016, and despite Parliament's explicit call for publication (European Parliament, 2016). Another consequence of the non-publication of a second report is that the anticipated internal assessment of EU institutions originally meant to be a part of the first report, was dropped too. The communiqué from Vice-President Timmermans does however conclude by saying:

"I would like to stress that the Commission remains fully convinced of the need to combat and prevent corruption and is committed to continuing its work in this field, it is in the common interest to ensure that all Member States have effective anti-corruption policies and that the EU supports the Member States in pursuing this work. An effective fight against corruption within the EU remains essential - delivered, through the right vehicle." (Timmermans, 2017)

There are many possible reasons why the second report was scrapped; perhaps it will be resurrected given time. While waiting, the intention of this research is to provide not only the EU but all with a vested interest with the component parts to create "the right vehicle" to combat corruption; one part being an increased understanding of corruption.

Rationale for the research

Increasing the understanding of corruption would arguably make it easier to combat. Although it may sometimes make sense to talk about corrupt countries, or organisations, it is important to remember that the smallest elements of analysis when it comes to corruption are individuals. Given that it does take at least two persons for corruption to have any significant meaning, it is still something that stems from the individual level. The individual may very well be influenced by context, but their actions still emanates from themselves. As discussed earlier, many of the measurements of corruption are perceptions-based. If those very individuals have a different understanding of corruption, their perceptions consequently vary as well. The end-result is an abstract picture of a very complex phenomenon not really lending itself to the development of effective countermeasures, at least not without a proper understanding of the behaviour of the individual decision-making process: its motivation, rationalisation and subsequent actions. Thus, this research starts and ends at the individual level in attempting to understand the behaviour connected with deviancy in general, and corruption in particular.

It is instructive to look at some of the findings in the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer produced by Transparency International (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013). First of all, it is acknowledged that corruption is regarded around the world as a serious, and in many cases very serious, problem for society. Using a scale of one to five, where one signifies that corruption is not a problem at all and five that corruption is a very serious problem, the average score was 4.1. The survey also found that over half of the people surveyed think that corruption has increased over the two last years. It is established that corruption can occur not only at any level in society, but also in any type of society. When comparing some of the

OECD countries, including some of the largest economies in the world which might be taken to exemplify good governance including anti-corruption, the perceptions of state capture is significant:

"While only five per cent of Norwegians see their government captured by special interests, this goes up to more than two-thirds in countries where the economic crisis highlighted deep-rooted failures of governance, such as Greece, Italy and Spain (66%), but also includes Belgium and Israel. This suggests that there are important lessons to be learned within the group of OECD countries from Norway and other Scandinavian countries about how to run one's government so that it is seen by most to serve the overall public good." (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013, p. 14)

The question remains, however, what can be learned from Scandinavian countries if they themselves do not fully understand corruption, or at least to the level where a lack of comprehension may render the low perception of it problematic? Cultural contrasts aside, corruption is generally and quite universally considered reprehensible and at least some extent criminalised around the world. This applies despite the difficulties surrounding the lack of consensus in defining corruption, let alone corrupt behaviour. In other words, what may be considered deviant and corrupt behaviour in one country, culture or context may very well be acceptable in another. In an assessment of the relevance and efficacy of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption Brunelle-Quraishi (2011) builds on this line of argument concluding that in order to successfully create consensus among states, international treaties must consider the many possible definitions of corruption. Arguably, the same is true for corrupt behaviour and while most cultures seem to renounce corruption, context remains as a critical differential and opinions may vary on what falls within the borders of illegality and/or immorality.

The final veil to be lifted then would be to go beyond context and see if there are truths to be found that would explain corrupt behaviour in Europe. Such work would need to be valid not only be for countries or contexts where corruption is perceived as high, like Spain or public procurement, but also in Scandinavian countries and possibly all of the world. In other words: a universal theory of corrupt behaviour.

Scope and focus

Limits in scope are a natural fact when conducting doctoral research. Being confined to the borders of the EU is a limitation in scope but there are still large enough variations of perceived corruption within the EU to warrant the analysis. Take for example the two countries Sweden and Spain. As mentioned earlier, the former comes out on top in terms of levels of perceived corruption almost regardless of which indicator is used. This is corroborated by the EU anti-corruption report, which confirms that low levels of corruption are perceived and experienced. According to the report, and others, Sweden is among the least corrupt countries in the EU. It has taken a leading role in combating corruption on a national and municipal level with several anti-corruption initiatives carried out or underway. In Spain, on the other hand, corruption in a broader sense is a serious concern. Even though an anti-corruption legal framework is largely in place, there are still a number of deficiencies, mostly pertaining to public procurement processes at both regional and local level. Corruption is perceived to be pervasive (COM(2014) 38).

There is, however, more than meets the eye when comparing these two countries. This can be seen by studying the two extensive polls presented as integral parts of the EU anti-corruption report (Eurobarometer, 2013a, 2013b). Here a rather small percentage of Europeans, around 4%, claimed that they had been asked or expected to pay a bribe in the past year, whereas in Sweden, the corresponding percentage was significantly lower - less than 1%. This, however, appears somewhat contradictory to other figures, saying that 18% of Swedes say that they personally know someone who takes or has taken a bribe, well above the EU average of 12%. Similarly, in Spain 95% of Spanish citizens agree that corruption is widespread in their home country and 63 consider that they are affected by corruption in their everyday life. Yet counter-intuitively only 2% report that they have been asked or expected to pay a bribe in the past year. Contradictions like these lead to the focus of this research in understanding individual behaviour.

A typology developed by Rusch (2016) in his work on the psychology of corruption identifies at least six types of faulty intuition that influence corrupt behaviour. The first type is the overconfidence effect where a person's subjective confidence in their judgment is greater than the objective accuracy of those judgments (Pallier et al., 2002). This can create a gap between how people believe they would behave and how they actually behave (Nohria, 2015). Bribery prosecutions highlight some key factors here, such as the intense business negotiations involved in high-value contracts, licenses, or concessions (Rusch, 2016) - all

inherent parts of the procurement process. The second type is reciprocation, where people try to repay in-kind, what another person has provided for them (Cialdini, 1993). This not only increases susceptibility to corruption but also may sustain a corrupt relationship. The third type is scarcity, where the perceived opportunity to freely choose something of value is threatened through some type of scarcity, e.g. limited time or resource availability. Research shows that when under extreme time pressure, unethical behaviour is more likely (Nohria, 2015), and possibly exacerbated by “loss aversion” - an unconscious bias that makes people weigh losses more heavily than gains (Kahneman, 2011). The fourth type is commitment and consistency with past behaviour, i.e. once a decision is made it creates an internal pressure to behave consistently with that commitment (Cialdini, 1993). This can sustain long-term commitments to corrupt behaviour through 'ethical fading' - the ability to behave unethically or overlook the unethical behaviour of others 'while maintaining a positive self-image' (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). In short, if a positive image of oneself as ethical is maintained, one may infer that one's actions are consistent with that self-image. The fifth type is social proof, which is the tendency, in ambiguous or confusing situations, to take cues from others in the vicinity on how to act (Cialdini, 1993). This coupled with "pluralistic ignorance³" can lead to an unintended diffusion of responsibility where no action is taken against blatantly corrupt behaviour. The sixth and final type is confirmation bias, prompting an individual to look for confirming evidence of a decision before seeking conflicting evidence (Kahneman, 2011). This is important when observing ongoing corruption where confirmation bias is likely to affect the ability to process and act on that initial observation. Consistent with ethical fading, it does so by influencing the observer to seek out and accept less malign explanations for the observed corrupt behaviour enabling the reinforcement of an ethical self-image.

This goes to show that corrupt behaviour is largely conditioned by an understanding of actions as being illegal or immoral. Far more prominent researchers than the author of this study, Nobel Prize economist Hebert Simon and Stanley Milgram to name a few, have asserted the effects that various forms of pressure can have on deviant behaviour. Consequently, any anti-corruption endeavour should acknowledge and put to use all the available tools, behavioural criminology included. It is the increased understanding of individual behaviour when it comes to corruption that is the focus of this research.

³ Pluralistic ignorance means that an individual rather than realising that the other silent individuals are being silent for exactly the same reasons, the individual tends to conclude that these others think that the act is an acceptably moral one and are keeping silent for that reason. See Darley (2005).

Problem definition and research question

In its most general formulation the aim of this research is, partly according to the teachings of Glaser (1992), to systematically collect data to produce a conceptual theory. Epistemologically, the research takes on Feldman's (2003) 'standard view' i.e. what ordinary people believe as common sense, with an initial slant towards the 'relativist view'. Note, that it is only a slant and the author take issue with the concept of the non-existence of a higher moral standard. Instead the problem is defined around the central tenet that there is behaviour belonging to some type of axiological supremacy - however hard to define. Consequently, not understanding the immorality of corrupt behaviour does not mean that there is no truth to the fact that there is an axiological high ground to be found. With values reduced to facts about the conscious experience, the axiological terrain can be visualised in what Harris (2011) refers to as a moral landscape, with peaks and valleys, where increased spatial elevation corresponds to a societal state of moral, non-corrupt, behaviour on both an individual and collective level. Decisions and subsequent actions determine movement over the moral landscape, with distinct right and wrong answers to how to behave in order to reach any of the peaks. It is this view that changes morality from something largely intangible to something quantifiable - with room for debate on the expectations of optimal behaviour.

The problem, in an equally generalised form, is that of corruption and the perception thereof. The definition commonly used for corruption, "abuse of power for private gain", an intentionally broad formulation to facilitate theoretical integration is amplified by the more complex formulation of van Duyne "Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents or demands to deviate from the criterion, which should rule his decision making, in exchange for a reward, the promise or expectation of it" (van Duyne, 2001, p. 3). The scope is limited geographically to the European Union and conceptually to the individual level. The rationale is derived from inconsistencies shown most prominently in the perceptions-based indices that dominate the view on levels of corruption. A lack of understanding hampers the development of a coherent approach towards imposing minimum moral standards and raising awareness on corruption where both are fundamental to an effective anti-corruption framework. Further, although the EU Report on Anti-Corruption attempts to identify measures likely to give added value in addressing issues in regard to preventing and fighting corruption, it does not go into detail and is aimed at tangible changes on the ground

(COM(2014) 38) Those tangible changes on the ground must be underpinned by a greater understanding of the phenomenon itself.

There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Such interviews could shed light on the theory behind perceptions of corruption and whether that theory corresponds with the 'reality' found in the surveys. Similarly, to the EU report on Anti-Corruption, the purpose would be to stimulate a constructive forward-looking debate on the extent of corruption, as well as the best ways of addressing it. It is proposed to accomplish this specifically by providing a substantial theory as an answer to the question:

How can the perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption?

Aims and objectives

- Develop a substantive theory around the behaviour associated with corruption within the Member States of the EU.
 - In depth interviews, complementing and contrasting previous surveys.
- Create a foundation for further integration towards formal theory around the behaviour associated with corruption within the Member States of the EU.
 - Substantive grounded theory building from interviews
 - Recommendations for design and direction of additional research.

1.7 Chapter one summary

This chapter has presented corruption as a phenomenon that most people have an intuitive idea and a subjective opinion about. Corruption is a substantial concept and when colloquially spoken about, the discussion often pertains to a smaller part, limited by any combination of concept, context or intellect. This work strives to increase our understanding of corruption., To do this, it will have to provide a simplified map of reality - a theory.

The chapter has served as both an introduction and a literature review. Using a grounded theory approach partly informed by the early works of Barney Glaser, the review of literature is complicated to say the least. As described further in Chapter Three on methodology, this problem is solved by a system for reviewing literature. It has been established that corruption is a relatively new priority on the political agenda, but has over the last three decades gained attention. In spite of the fact that most people have their own idea of what corruption is, answers to the question 'what is corruption?' will probably differ. Corruption is therefore problematised not only due to its intrinsic qualities but also due to disagreement on what it actually is.

Some of the classifications of corruption were examined. The upside with any classification is the possibility to sort and arrange the characteristics of a phenomenon in order to place a specific item within a certain bracket. The downside, consequently, particularly when dealing with phenomena whose characteristics are inherently fleeting and whose interpretation may be highly contextual, is the forced placement of things that do not easily fit into a single or particular bracket. The epistemic foundation of this research does not rely on corruption being classified at all. Nevertheless, there are still some benefits of exploring and explaining some of the existing classifications; one being that it provides a narrative background to a discussion on the adequate definition of corruption.

There is no international consensus on the definition of corruption. This ambiguity has led to a number of difficulties for the anti-corruption agenda and community. The definition used is centred on the decision-making process. Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents or demands to deviate from the criterion which should rule his decision making, in exchange for a reward, or the promise or expectation of it. This definition is suitable for this research for at least three reasons. Firstly, it is broad enough to facilitate an unrestricted development of theory that may or may not reside within that which is enshrined

by the traditional definitions. Secondly, it focuses on the behavioural aspect of corruption introducing a normative aspect rather than the static descriptive characteristics of those preceding it. Thirdly, by its formulation a higher level of abstraction is achieved, allowing the definition to supersede cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption.

There is still no commonly accepted explanation of the root causes of corruption. Corruption impacts society on all levels, the Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality. The difficulty of establishing a root cause relationship for corruption is tied into the difficulty of establishing a common definition. Nevertheless, research identifies certain national attributes that correlate with greater amounts of perceived corruption in an attempt to explain why some nations suffer from more corruption than other. This chapter has explored the cost of corruption from the perspectives of money, power and trust.

The intricacies of measuring corruption have also been explored. Given the clandestine nature of corruption, its lack of definition, and variance in interpretation and meaning, corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. Even so there are at least three reasons why corruption should be measured accurately. First, it is important to assess the scale of the issue; second, to determine patterns and; third, to identify variables that will aid understanding of why and where corruption occurs.

The measurement of corruption is a means to an end: that of combatting corruption. The profound recognition of the threat that corruption poses to institutional integrity, economic development, and to the rule of law and democracy, not only in developing countries but also at the very heart of developed European democracies, has instilled a strong determination to create rules and mechanisms to fight against it. Just as the establishment of the idea of corruption being widespread and the subsequent consensus on the deeply detrimental effects on society is relatively new, so is the proliferation of conventions, normative declarations and other standardised frameworks and activities among the international community of states.

Three international frameworks for combatting corruption have been examined: first, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; second, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC); and third, the Council of Europe's Criminal and Civil Law Convention on Corruption. In addition, the chapter has identified the EU's efforts to curb corruption within its Member States as stated in the 2014 EU anti-corruption report noting that the successor report was scrapped.

An increased understanding of corruption would arguably make it easier to combat. This research proposes to advance understanding focusing on the individual level.

There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Such interviews could shed light on the theory behind the perception on corruption and if that theory corresponds with the 'reality' found in the surveys. Similarly, to the EU report on Anti-Corruption, their purpose would, be to stimulate a constructive forward-looking debate on the extent of corruption., as well as the best ways of addressing it. This is achieved specifically by providing a substantial theory as an answer to the question:

How can perceptions of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption?

The generated theory stemming from this research is value added by its possibility to be effectively used for anti-corruption purposes. A possibility that is proposed and discussed in the chapters to follow, but ultimately determined only by future application and evaluation.

2. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY

What follows is a deep dive into the methodology used for this study. Primarily to give an understanding of the complex and in-depth nature of the methodology applied but also to lend validity to the findings presented.

For a structured approach to research with a certainty of process and enough flexibility to let the research phenomenon speak for itself, the method used is a modified Grounded Theory. When a problem has been identified, the researcher must select a suitable tool or method to investigate it. Grounded Theory provides a set of procedures which are ways of putting into practice the requirement to actively engage in close and detailed analysis of data to stimulate and discipline the theoretical imagination (Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997, p. 255). The quantitative qualitative divide perpetually persists and any choice of method, pure or mixed must be justified. For the purpose of this research the following generalisation may illustrate the inclination for a qualitative method. Quantitative research is mainly concerned with the degree in which phenomena possess certain properties, in this case the phenomenon is corruption and the property is perception. Conversely, qualitative research on the other hand, is mainly concerned with the properties themselves emphasising the process and most importantly meaning.

"Quantitative research methods are primarily intended to test theory; the researcher works deductively and is outcome orientated. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, are concerned with the meaning of the phenomena and the lived experiences, which is not a readily observable process; there is attention to the social context in which events occur and have meaning, and there is an emphasis on understanding the social world from the point of view of the participants in it." (Labuschagne, 2003 np.)

Since the aim is to explain the phenomenon of perception of corruption the chosen method is a suitable choice because of the unique nature of Grounded Theory methods. Conveniently Birks and Mills (2011) indicates three instances as appropriate for Grounded Theory. The first instances being, when little of the area of study is known. As the literature revived in the introduction revealed, little has been investigated with regards to perceptions relation to reality (and behaviour) when measuring corruption. Note that the use of literature is perhaps one of the most contentious aspects of this approach to research. The position taken in this research suggests that a controlled preliminary literature review can be beneficial, promoting an early enhancement of theoretical sensitivity rather than researcher bias. This will be further explored in the chapter on the literature review dilemma when doing Grounded

Theory. The second instance is when the generation of theory with explanatory power is a desired outcome. It is this explanatory aspect this research aims to take advantage of in order to significantly promote the understanding the perception of corruption. The phenomenon has been previously described and explored; this is an attempt to explain. This reflects the desire to go beyond being merely a descriptive thematic analysis to reach a higher intelligible abstraction. The third instance is when an inherent process is embedded in the research situation that is likely to be explicated by Grounded Theory methods. The context to such process and the interrelationship there between is elaborated in a later section.

Though, as a first flicker of reflexivity, being an accolade of Grounded Theory, all academic postulates for good research are strived for but there are arguably as many versions of Grounded Theory as there are grounded theorists (Dey, 1999) - this is one of them.

This chapter will start by laying a philosophical foundation for the research and the move on to introduce the qualitative research method known as grounded theory. The next section is devoted to explaining and coming to terms with the literature review dilemma when doing grounded theory. Lastly the version of grounded theory used for this study is described in detail and discussed in terms of appropriateness and efficacy.

2.1 Philosophical nucleus

"The unexamined life is not worth living." (Socrates, cited in Woods & Pack, 2007, p. 16)

The notion of a paradigm as an overarching framework which structures the approach to existing in the world is rather commonplace since Kuhn published 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' in 1962. Scholars and philosophers alike have entrenched themselves in more or less justifiable paradigms orbiting core philosophical questions. Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue that inquiry paradigms may be viewed as sets of basic beliefs about the nature of reality and how it may be known; and that these beliefs are thrown into relief by three fundamental and interrelated questions. Such questions can be formulated as: (1) the ontological question, 'What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there than can be known about it?'; (2) the epistemological question, 'What is the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known'; and (3) the methodological question, 'How can the inquirer... go about finding out whatever it is that he or she believes can be known about?'

Adding to the account of ontology, epistemology and methodology is axiology, which is an essential defining characteristic of an inquiry paradigm. The axiological question asks what sort of knowledge, if any, is intrinsically valuable. Consequently, the conceptual inquiry, 'what exists?', 'how do we know?' and 'what is valuable?' are the three questions that sensibly form the philosophical trinity of this research. All three pertain to distinct yet interwoven disciplines of philosophy, and each is a discipline in its own right.

- The interrelation of ontology, epistemology and axiology is sometimes referred to as philosophical alignment. However, as this nomenclature implies a linear structure an alternate rendition is offered. A philosophical nucleus can be conceptually visualised by placing ontology, epistemology and axiology in an equilateral triangle individually expanding their realm spherically. The convergence in the centroid of the triangle is where the trinity combines. This is the epicentre from which this research draws its philosophical quintessence., Axiology as an intrinsic part of ethics, will only be briefly addressed in this section but is further explored in the chapter on the ethical dilemma. The meaning of ontology and epistemology are considered in the next section, both in general terms and from the specific position of this research. From this the philosophical properties will emerge and be described to clearly position both the research and the researcher, the later examined in a final section on reflexivity before moving on to methodology.

Ontological and epistemological orientation

Ontology, the study of the nature of reality and epistemology, the nature of justifiable knowledge, are intrinsically linked. The ontological orientation provides an answer to what exists, the form and nature of reality and what can be known about it. Epistemology explores knowledge, the relationship between the knower and what can be known. To ensure a robust research design, the research must follow a paradigm that is congruent with the researcher's beliefs about the nature of reality. Consciously subjecting those beliefs to an ontological interrogation will illuminate the epistemological and methodological possibilities that are available (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006). Accordingly, the paradigm of this research is ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist - a statement that requires further explanation.

The fundamental ontological question is whether or not there is a 'real' world that is independent of our knowledge of it. As a manifestation of the researcher's own philosophical orientation, this research is ontologically relativistic in so far as it claims reality and truth to be understood "as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society or culture. . . there is a non-reducible plurality of such conceptual schemes" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 8). Individuals who deny the existence of an objective reality assume a relativist ontological position (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Although sharing some similar traits, this relativist position should not be confused with that of anti-fundamentalism. The idea behind anti-fundamentalism is that all social phenomena are socially constructed and as such must be appropriately positioned in time and space, taking into account the cultural contrasts these variables imply. Further, the social phenomena can be deconstructed into smaller components, all individually valid, presupposing particular space-time boundaries. So far notions are shared, but anti-fundamentalism also holds that a set of phenomena derived in an appropriate manner are acceptable at the time at which they are put forward. Since there is no prospect of ever completing our understanding of the natural world, we will later replace them with different ones. However, since there is no question of our transcending the situation we are in at any time, there is no perspective from which we can regard them as only relativistically valid. Here the relativist and anti-fundamentalist ontologies diverge, and this research subscribes to the proposition that reality consists of multiple individual truths influenced by context. This rather innocuous relativistic standpoint stems from 'the standard view' as described by Feldman (2003), but contains certain important distinctions. Whereby, in line with the reasoning of Charmaz (2000), changing the conception of truth, from an

objectively real world waiting to be discovered, to a world made real in the minds and through the actions of its inhabitants. This position subsumes data being generated with the researcher as a subjective active participant. In the words of Heron (1996, p. 11), "worlds and people are what we meet, but the meeting is shaped by our own terms of reference". The sceptic might stand stumped before the conundrum of asserting what is known of meeting anything or anyone, if the meeting is always given our own shape. Presenting an alternative but supplemental paradigm, Heron and Reason (1997, p. 13) provides the following answer to the conundrum: "When we open ourselves to meeting 'the given' we are arrested by the presence of 'other'; or put another way, the 'other' declares itself to us so that we resonate with its presence in the world".

Any scientific endeavour can be conceived as an either knowledge-producing or knowledge-improving enterprise. By solidifying the free-flowing thought processes within such an enterprise into systems comprised by interrelated finite elements, many labels have been assigned. Positivism, feminism, idealism and symbolism are just a few of the labels used in sociology. These different perspectives can be identified, examined, discussed, but also in a sense assessed in terms of their effectiveness in accomplishing various social projects. There is however, no limit to the number of systems, which can be invented or proposed. Yet, Hill (1984) points out that it is dichotomising persiflage to suggest that only one epistemological conceptualisation of sociology is legitimate while all others are illegitimate. Hill continues saying that, to so suggest is a mistake that does not only eject charlatans, but also dismisses serious, creative thinkers in the same throw.

It is understandable that those wholeheartedly subscribing to positivism are not disposed to especially wide interpretation. Given the propensity of positivism the point to be made is that there are alternative viewpoints in sociology with equal claims to be considered scientific. Developing this into an epistemological argument, each system of knowledge production or improvement, comprises of three basic components: meta-scientific world-views, methodologies and theories (Hill, 1984). The meta-scientific worldview provides the context in which specific methodologies and theories are developed and evaluated. This reasoning harmonises well with the ontologically relativist position and conditions the methodology. As the procedural rules set within this context, the methodology guides the researcher in the active exploration of theory. In this sense, a theory is a content-oriented concept formulated under the auspices of the context. It can be seen as a device that conceptually explains selected properties and dimensions of a phenomenon. Following the logic of these

components will condition and guide the philosophical orientation of this research to an epistemological anchor in a constructivist paradigm.

Constructivism has a long and distinguished history, going back to seminal authors such as Dewey and Piaget, and over the years has come to accommodate the coexistence of many perspectives and interpretations. The common denominator and core of constructivist theory is that knowledge is not found, it is constructed (Boghossian, 2006). Constructivism shifts the focus from knowledge as a product to knowing as a process, an understanding of relevant structures of meaning derived from interactions in the world. Epistemologically, constructivism emphasises the subjective interrelationship between researcher and that which is researched - usually human participants- and the co-construction of meaning. The logic of such subjective co-construction is internal and cannot be constructively judged on external epistemological grounds. This position does not, however, argue for a state of intellectual anarchy in which anything is deemed valid. Nevertheless, this research is regarded as only being epistemologically accountable to its own rules of structure and logic.

Constructivism as a research paradigm denies the existence of an objective reality, "asserting instead that realities are social constructions of the mind, and that there exist as many such constructions as there are individuals (although clearly many constructions will be shared)" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 43). Thus, there can be many such constructed realities; and they may be conflicting and incompatible. Constructions are not more or less 'true', but rather more or less sophisticated and informed. Further, Guba and Lincoln (1989) stressed the importance of not judging constructivist evaluations using positivistic criteria or standards. Consequently, they devised evaluation criteria derived from what they construed as central and critical features of a constructivist evaluation. This is sometimes referred to as fourth generation evaluation [FGE], where the three first generations pertain to a positivist scientific approach which posits that there is an objective truth or reality that can be measured. Notwithstanding, when exploring the applicability of FGE methods Lay and Papadopoulos comes to the following conclusion:

"FGE methods bring many benefits and to a wider group of stakeholders compared to conventional positivist evaluation methods. We therefore recommend that managers and commissioners who have the power to support or reject its utilisation take a leap of faith in order to embrace it. Projects and programmes under highly autocratic, hierarchical management systems could benefit most from the empowering effect of FGE" (Lay & Papadopoulos, 2007, pp. 503-504)

This adopted paradigm and resulting methodological framework suggest adequate applicability when analysing the perception of corruption in the Member-States of the EU. To reiterate: fundamentally this research is ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist. It seeks to establish and identify relationships between context and process and acknowledges that within the paradigm, there are conditions, interactions and consequences.

The theory developed within this paradigm is aimed to have explanatory power with a high level of abstraction. The key to achieve this is well illustrated in the work of Guba and Lincoln (1994) in their contribution to describing and differentiating competing paradigms in qualitative research. They state that one of the fundamental qualities of the constructivist paradigm is that it is self-reflexive, a quality with which this research aligns. Treated as both central and vital to the understanding of the codes, categories and theory surrounding the phenomenon of the perception of corruption, reflexivity will be addressed.

The methodology ultimately manifesting within these ontological and epistemological parameters aligns with the later work of Corbin and Strauss (2008) in their advancement of Grounded Theory. Their work not only acknowledges the existence of multiple realities and truths, recognising the importance thereof (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1994, 1998). As a chronological account, the work of Corbin and Strauss undoubtedly demonstrates a mixture of language that vacillates between post-positivism and constructivism, with a reliance on terms such as 'recognising bias' and 'maintaining objectivity' when describing the position of the researcher in relation to participants and data (Birks & Mills, 2011). Moreover, this research also draws epistemological influences from the constructivist Grounded Theory perspective as described by Charmaz (2000) revealing the researcher as a participating author in a co-construction of meaning. The Grounded Theory methodological framework that follows is therefore just that, a strategy for creating and interrogating the data, rather than a route to knowing an objective external reality (Charmaz, 2008). Within these parameters, it is the ambition of the researcher to uphold what Robson (2011) refers to as a scientific attitude: being systematic, sceptical and ethical.

Methodological acknowledgements

Reflecting on the ontological and epistemological orientation it must first be acknowledged that not all knowledge-producing or knowledge-improving systems are equally well-suited for every social project. As a method of inquiry Grounded Theory generates theory in part by an interpretive way of thinking with roots going back to the philosophy of

symbolic interactionism. Interpretations of a phenomenon are inevitably influenced by social interactions and the sociocultural environment. The intention of the previous section was to articulate ontology and epistemology in such way that made it inevitable that constructivism simply emerged in a similar fashion to that of the theory to come. However, as Charmaz (2008) succinctly points out, in actuality, few grounded theory studies build theory, though many provide an analytical handle on a specific phenomenon. This research, though aiming for theory, will most likely fall into the latter category. It is also possible that, even when adding the phenomenologically complex axiological considerations, another perspective would have been more suitable. However, a thorough examination of the entire philosophical nucleus for this research makes it unlikely.

The researcher acknowledges his own bias and by thoughtful use of analytical tools as heuristic devices promoting interaction between researcher and data and assisting in understanding possible meaning, hopes to foster awareness of how that bias influences the research. There is the additional problem of accepting one's own interpretation of what is being analysed; that is, assigning meaning without careful exploration of all possible meanings (Corbin & Strauss, 2008)). There is a need for the grounded theorist not only to acknowledge prior and tacit knowledge, but also to bring such knowledge into the open and discuss how it may have affected the development of theory; and to allow the researcher's creativity to explore and articulate theoretical links (Cutcliffe, 2000). To establish a foundation for such a discussion, both externally and internally, it was decided that an early literature review was necessary: a decision to be further explained and justified in the following sections.

Ultimately the entire research process encompasses an ever-present acknowledgment of the researchers' bias and its influence on the selection of the data collection sites, the data collection process, the process of coding and analysis, and the compilation of results. This influence is however partly traceable and verifiable through the analytical memos.

2.2 Introduction to Grounded Theory

Merton never reached the notion of the discovery of grounded theory in discussing the "theoretic functions of research". The closest he came was with "serendipity"; that is, an unanticipated, anomalous, and strategic finding gives rise to a new hypothesis. This concept does not catch the idea of purposefully discovering theory through social research... Thus, he was concerned with grounded modifying of theory, not grounded generating of theory." (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 2)

Before elaborating further on the details of the methodological elements it is important to reiterate the underlying fundamentals of Grounded Theory and what it means to generate theory from data. What follows is a presentation of a methodology designed to produce theory, and on that note, it may be useful to clarify what is meant by theory. According to Strauss and Corbin (1994) a theory is a set of relationships that offer a plausible explanation of the phenomenon under study. Morse (cited in Goulding, 1999, p. 7) extends this interpretation proposing "a theory provides the best comprehensive, coherent and simplest model for linking diverse and unrelated facts in a useful and pragmatic way. It is a way of revealing the obvious, the implicit, the unrecognised and the unknown. Theorising is the process of constructing alternative explanations until a 'best fit' is obtained that explains the data most simply. This involves asking questions of the data that will create links to established theory."

Essentially the methods elaborated on throughout this research are intended to go beyond simple description and exploration. Grounded Theory differs from other approaches to research in that it serves to explain the phenomenon being studied (Birks & Mills, 2011). The strategies used in data collection and analysis results in the generation of theory that explains a phenomenon from the context of the subjacent data. Directly abstracted from, or grounded in, the data. the aim is to produce theory by systematically collecting data (Glaser, 2010). It is a comparative, iterative and interactive method that begins but does not end with inductive inquiry (Charmaz, 2012). Because Grounded Theory is initially inductive, existing ideas should be shaped, or even rejected, if not confirmed by the data. In short, the essence of Grounded Theory is the inductive-deductive interplay, beginning with a research situation rather than a hypothesis.(McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007). This inductive-deductive method may confuse many PhD committees who are more comfortable with induction, specifically when it comes the rather peculiar relationship to extant literature. Extant literature certainly holds the potential to mislead novice grounded theorists since even respected

leaders in any discipline can be mistaken (Nathaniel, 2006). To avoid being misled, a large part of this chapter is devoted to explaining the strategy used for using extant literature in a beneficial way.

A Grounded Theory researcher is oriented to discover the basic social processes and the interactive layers of context that people use to deal with situations in which they find themselves and that are not necessarily understood by them at the conscious level (Hinds, Chaves, & Cypess, 1992; Benoliel, 1996). However, basic social processes changes over time and a major concern is determining how contextual features of the environment influence the direction and form of the identified social process. Grounded theory has certain distinctive features that distinguish it from other forms of qualitative analysis (Weitz et al., 2011). Charmaz (2012) characterises these features as providing explicit tools for studying processes while promoting an openness to all possible theoretical understandings. This foster developing tentative interpretations about the data through coding and categorising, as well as building systematic checks and refinements of the researcher's major theoretical categories. These features make Grounded Theory an almost perfect fit for the purposes of this research.

The methods used both for data collection and analysis, have been somewhat modified to suit the practicalities dictated by the research as well as the philosophical orientation of the researcher. Modifications are also made in order to avoid an overly dichotomous position with regards to the Glaser and Strauss divide in Grounded Theory. The aim is rather, a balanced view, as few things are black and white, especially when it comes to research with an overtly interpretative component (Birks & Mills, 2011). Throughout the development of this methodology, the seven essential attributes for a sound methodology as laid out by Hitchins (1992) have permeated both the theoretical and practical aspects. The attributes for a good methodology are that it applies to any system, is simple, comprehensive, creative and innovative, supported by tools and methods and is proven in practice. The last of these attributes is perhaps the only one that arguably is not fulfilled in this work, at least not at the development stage, but a section in a later chapter covers an extended discussion on post hoc method appropriateness.

Historical account of Grounded Theory

Grounded Theory was originally developed by the two sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss as a method that allowed them to move from data to theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The theory would be grounded in the data from which it had emerged rather than rely on analytical constructs from pre-existing theories. Hence, in contrast to theory obtained by logico-deductive methods, it is theory grounded in data which has been systematically obtained through 'social' research (Goulding, 1999). Glaser & Strauss (1967) initially sought to correct an imbalance, as they described it, created by an over-emphasis on verification of theory in sociological research. They recognised the primacy of the quantitative paradigm in sociology research at that time and highlighted the need to achieve a more equitable balance for those researchers who wished to focus on the generation of theory.

Since the publication of 'The discovery of Grounded Theory' by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, the Grounded Theory method has undergone a number of revisions. Most significantly, Glaser and Strauss themselves parted ways and each proposed his own interpretation of what it is to do Grounded Theory. This mainly related to the treatment of extant literature and the early review thereof; a notion that is thoroughly examined and addressed in the section on the literature review dilemma in Grounded Theory. After the split from Glaser, Strauss teamed up with Corbin to develop a new slightly different strand of Grounded Theory.

Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory by Strauss and Corbin was first published in 1990 with a second edition published in 1998. In essence, the book presents numerous tools that researchers can use. However, the structure of the book, with great detail in some areas and less in other, sometimes makes it difficult to understand how some of the techniques should be employed. Nevertheless, many reviewers contend that the most useful aspects of the book is its functionality (Allen, 2010), which also includes criteria for judging Grounded Theory research.

Although the original work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) assumed a social constructionist approach to the empirical world although it did not attend to how they themselves affected the research process, produced the data, represented the research participants and positioned there analysis (Charmaz, 2008). Glaser and Strauss laid the foundation for constructing sound grounded theory methods as well as analyses but they did tend to emphasise generality rather than relativity and objectivity rather than reflexivity. As a response to this Constructing Grounded Theory by Kathy Charmaz, was first published in 2006 and a second edition published in 2014. The approach advocated by Charmaz offers an interpretative portrayal of

the studied world, not an exact picture of it (Charmaz, 2006). Philosophically, this resonates with the paradigm of this research, where the researcher is not considered to be separate from the developed theory but constructs it through interaction with data.

Where the objectivist Grounded Theory of Glaser (1978) seeks explanations and prediction at a general level, separated and abstracted from the specific research locale and process, the constructionist Grounded Theory of Charmaz (2006) emphasises abstract understanding of empirical phenomena and contend that this understanding must be located in the specific circumstances of the research process. The two however, are not entirely mutually exclusive. Even from a constructivist perspective, as taken in this research, the understanding and explanation offered by the Grounded Theory can move from local worlds to a more general conceptual level. The next section will describe the fundamentals of Grounded Theory that aims to build a foundation for a generic statement by qualifying the research according to particular temporal, social and situational conditions.

2.3 Fundamental principles of Grounded Theory

"Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behaviour we are studying." (Simon, 1985, p. 303)




Figure 2: The six key components of Grounded Theory+

Grounded Theory is the practice of identifying, refining and integrating categories of meaning stemming from data. It provides an explanatory framework, - a theory, by which to understand the phenomenon under investigation. Category identification in Grounded Theory is very different from content analysis, with which it should never be confused. Content analysis makes use of categories that are defined before data analysis commences and which often are designed to be mutually exclusive. This is to say, the same data cannot be allocated to more than one category, thus static by both definition and procedure. By contrast, categories in Grounded Theory emerge from the data, and consequently evolve throughout the research process.

The process of category and ultimately theory development is facilitated by a number of key strategies or perhaps more appropriately, analytical constructs. These are the writing of reflexive memos, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis, coding for an increasing level of abstraction, data saturation, and the treatment of literature. as illustrated in Figure 2.

Writing reflexive memos

Memos are created as written records of the thought process during the entire undertaking of the research. Essentially memos are thoughts and ideas, which have been noted during the data collection process. Analytical ideas in the pertinent memos are sorted and ordered in line with the present direction of the emerging theory. By explaining decisions, the researcher can gain control over the subject matter and the next analytical or methodological move (Charmaz, 2008). In addition, summary memos are used to synthesise individual resource memos. Thus, throughout the process of data generation and analysis, a written record of theory development is maintained. This can include writing definitions of categories and justifying the label chosen, tracing the emergent relationships amongst categories and keeping a record of the reflexive process of progressive integration towards an increasing level of theory abstraction. Memos provide information not only about the substantive findings of the study but also about the research process itself.

Reflexivity is an important tool for the researcher to be able to identify the effect of the researcher him/herself, as they will affect what is researched and subsequently the eventual grounded theory developed. Carefully recorded in memos this information can inform theoretical sensitivity and can itself be checked against data in a process of constant comparative analysis. This allows the researcher to remain focused on the data and the development of the theory rather than in self-analysis or allowing analysis to be derailed by preconceived ideas. It thus addresses Glaser's concerns about reflexivity potentially distracting the focus away from the data. The challenge of at what point or level of detail reflexivity stops being helpful and becomes destructive can easily be managed by including reflective memos in the constant comparative analysis.

Data collection through unstructured, or even semi-structured, interviews is heavily dependent on the researcher-participant relationship (Neill, 2006). Reflections on this relationship recorded in memos provide a way of identifying and monitoring the effect. Therefore, memos are written immediately after, or even simultaneously with, data collection as a means of documenting the impressions of the researcher and describing the situation. Memos provide a bank of ideas which can be revisited in order to map out the emerging theory (Goulding, 1999).

Theoretical sampling

In Grounded Theory, the process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory (Glaser, 1978). Theoretical sampling denotes a process of data collection where the researcher simultaneously collects, codes and analyses the data in order to decide what data to collect next. This means collecting further data in light of the categories that have emerged thus checking the emerging theory against reality by sampling that which may challenge or elaborate its development.

"The general procedure of theoretical sampling is to elicit codes from the raw data from the start of data collection through constant comparative analysis as the data pour in. Then one uses the codes to direct further data collection, from which the codes are further developed theoretically with properties and theoretically coded connections with other categories until, each category is saturated. Theoretical sampling on any category ceases when it is saturated, elaborated and integrated into the emerging theory." (Glaser, 1992, p. 102).

Theoretical sampling is essential to remain attached to the epistemological underpinnings postulated in this research. As Becker (1993) comments on common pitfalls in published Grounded Theory research, using selective sampling rather than theoretical sampling yields description instead of discovery. Selective sampling involves a calculated decision about not only the initial, but also succeeding, data sources prior to the onset of data collection. Similar but not identical to selective sampling is purposeful sampling, although it is sometimes erroneously used interchangeably with selective or theoretical sampling (Coyne, 1997). The logic behind purposeful sampling is to choose information rich sources to learn about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, (Patton, 1990). Then, as the study progresses, new categories may be discovered which would lead the researcher to more sampling in that particular dimension (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973). Some may argue that this is not completely different from that which happens in theoretical sampling, and that all sampling in qualitative research is purposeful (Patton, 1990; Sandelowski, 1995). However, Coyne (1997) concludes that theoretical and purposeful sampling are different types of sampling and that purposeful sampling is not always theoretical sampling. She goes on to say that theoretical sampling is purposeful selection of a sample according to the developing categories and emerging theory. Theoretical sampling may therefore be seen as a variation within purposeful sampling. Chenitz & Swanson (1986) state that in theoretical sampling, the sample is not selected from the population based on certain variables prior to the study, rather the initial sample is determined to examine the phenomena where it is found to exist. Then, data

collection is guided by a sampling strategy called theoretical sampling, fundamentally different from selective sampling.

As might also be expected when doing Grounded Theory, the researcher is forced to determine the initial sample by means of purposeful sampling. Therefore when a grounded theorist is commencing data collection the process is entered by purposeful or sometimes selective sampling which is then superseded by theoretical sampling as the data highlight the direction which subsequent sampling needs to follow (Cutcliffe, 2000). Thus, the initial sample is determined by purposeful sampling, primarily guided by the early literature review, a concept to be further elaborated later in the thesis, and subsequent samples by theoretical sampling. This makes for an ongoing process of data collection where sampling is determined by the emerging theory and therefore cannot, or at least should not, be predetermined.

Integral to theoretical sampling is theoretical sensitivity, the ability to generate concepts from data, where the researcher moves from a descriptive level to an analytical level by interacting with the data. The researcher asks questions of the data; questions that then themselves are modified by the emerging answers (including the original research question), . . . As Grounded Theory involves an emergence of theory from data, the problem must also emerge from the data, and is subject to a similar type of development as the theory itself. Consequently, even if the problem is well-defined at the onset of data collection, it must be allowed to evolve to not lose that precious theoretical sensitivity and openness to the emerging theory. The process is about using personal attributes consciously to facilitate the analytical process (Neill, 2006).

Theoretical sampling is essential to the inductive-deductive process characteristic of Grounded Theory. The inductive process involves the theory emerging from the data and the deductive process involves the purposeful selection of samples to check out the emerging theory (Becker, 1993). Theoretical sampling encourages asking increasingly focused questions and seeking answers as the inquiry progresses. It builds systematic checks into the analysis, hence putting emerging theory to the empirical test. Further, theoretical sampling also allows for flexibility during the research process (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) where a tracing of the theoretical sampling decisions acknowledges theory refinement (Cutcliffe, 2000), a process largely facilitated by the use of memos.

Constant comparative analysis

Fundamental to Grounded Theory, unlike most other research methods, is that it merges the process of data collection and analysis. This means that the search for meaning through the interrogation of data commences at the very onset of data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Birks & Mills, 2011). Concurrent data generation and analysis ensures that the coding process maintains its momentum by moving back and forth between the identification of similarities among and differences between emerging categories. Codes are compared to codes and categories, categories to categories and both to the emerging Theory. Constant comparative analysis ensures that categories are not merely built up but also broken down into smaller units of meaning. This process diversifies the data and counteracts homogenisation. The ultimate objective of constant comparative analysis is to link and integrate categories in such a way that all instances of relevant variation are captured by the emerging theory.

"The main intellectual tool is comparison. The method of comparing and contrasting is used for practically all intellectual tasks during analysis: forming categories, establishing the boundaries of the categories, assigning the segments to categories, summarizing the content of each category, finding negative evidence, etc. The goal is to discern conceptual similarities, to refine the discriminative power of categories, and to discover patterns." (Tesch, 1990, p. 96)

Thus, the quality of data analysis depends on the process of systematic and repeated comparison of the data. It is, however, important to subject the process of comparison itself to thorough analysis and to consider how the data will be treated within it. This ensures that the analytical procedures applied are in keeping with the overall philosophy of the study and fall within both its conceptual and practical scope. As Hewitt-Taylor (2001) outlines the use of constant comparative analysis in qualitative research, successful analysis and presentation of qualitative data requires a systematic and ordered approach so that complex data emerging from a variety of sources can be collated and presented in a manageable form.

The issues addressed here are firstly, the subject of the comparison in an attempt to identify exactly what it is that is compared; and secondly, when this comparison occurs and how it is chronologically structured. A purposeful approach used by researchers will not only systematise their work, but will also increase traceability when they describe how they used and implemented the approach in their research practice (Boeije, 2002). Adopting a systematic approach will ultimately help to make the unclear process of constant comparative analysis more transparent.

Having established that by comparing facilitates theory development through coding, categorising and connecting codes and categories, it is now time to describe in more detail how. Some state that each data snippet must be compared with every other relevant snippet of data (e.g. Morse & Field, 1996). Although this is true for most Grounded Theory studies, it is not completely clear on how to apply this rule. The exact level of comparison is obviously a question at each Grounded Theorist's discretion and thus subjective as it may be the main rule remains: everything has to be compared to everything.

In this study the comparisons are done on three levels, where the first is, comparison within a single interview; the second, comparison between previous interviews individually; and the third, comparison between all previous groups of interviews. The first level is probably the easiest to understand and involves a process of coding the interviews by labelling snippets of data. This process is called open coding, described in further detail in the following section. Then, by comparing the different codes from the interview, the interview as a whole is examined in terms of context, coherence and consistency. This internal comparison aims to interpret the parts of the interview in the context of the entire story as the interviewee has told it. At their inception all new interviews are first treated like this. The second step occurs when more than one interview has been conducted, allowing for interviews to be compared. All new interviews are compared with all previous interviews individually. Here codes from the different interviews are compared and sometimes combined, into what are referred to as categories. As categories emerge all codes are compared to all categories in an effort to indicate any relationships between them. Establishing these relationships is known as axial coding, where the goal is to further conceptualise the emerging theory. This process is explained more in the next section,

For the third and final level of comparison the analysis becomes somewhat more demanding, not necessarily in complexity but certainly in time. This is where all new codes must be compared not only to the previous interviews but also the previous groups of interviews created at the second level of comparison. To exemplify this, let's use the case of the fourth interview. The first level of comparison involves the internally comparison of the codes of the fourth interview in isolation. Then, a second level follows, where the fourth interview is compared to the first, second and third interviews individually. At the third and final stage the fourth interview is also compared to the group of first and second interviews, as well as the group of the first, second and third. The time required for any number of

interviews analysed this way, given a set time for each analytical step is therefore ever-increasing as illustrated by figure 3.

The figure uses the approximate value of one day required for the analysis of each level. This could obviously vary throughout the study but does serve as a good enough approximation. Particularly if the point is to show that regardless of unit of time the 15th interview will require 28 times as much time to analyse as the first. Thus, as this research encompassed 21 interviews, the last took about two months to analyse with analysis making up roughly 50% of the workday.




Figure 3: Increase in time required per interview using constant comparison.

Note that the third level of comparison does not necessarily provide new codes but is rather aimed at deepening insights and adding to gaps in the information about the emerging theory. As a consequence, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that saturation will be determined as a result of the third level of comparison. But it does add to the sensitivity of the emerging theory which in turn is severely restricted if the researcher does not undertake analysis throughout so it can guide the process of data collection (Becker, 1993). Thus, even though the word 'constant' may be considered an exaggeration if interpreted in absolute terms, the comparative and interactive nature of Grounded Theory at every stage of analysis, even if in discrete level and numbers, makes the method explicitly emergent.

Coding for an increasing level of abstraction

Less dichotomising than the literature dilemma there are also discrepancies between the different schools of Grounded Theory when it comes to coding, where some of it appears to be more semantic than anything else. Informed by the literature, particularly Walker and Myrick's (2006) exploration of process and procedure in Grounded Theory, this research employs three levels of coding, labelled as; open, axial and theoretical. Coding in grounded theory is the process of analysing the data involving the researcher as an integral part of that process. As succinctly expressed by Glaser (1978), codes represent the essential relationship between data and the theory. As data is collected it is immediately analysed for all possible interpretations in the search for meaning and ultimately theory. This involves utilising particular coding processes, which begins with open coding. Open coding is the process of breaking down the data into distinct units of meaning. As the name implies, the idea of open coding is to analyse and code the data in as many ways as possible keeping an open mind to any emerging concepts.

As data collection and analysis simultaneously continues, concepts are identified. Concepts are progressions from merely describing what is happening in the data - the key feature of the open coding process - to explaining relationships between and across data units. It is from these concepts that categories are later formed. This requires a different, more sophisticated, coding technique referred to as axial coding, involving an incremental level of abstraction. Axial coding is the appreciation of concepts in terms of their dynamic relationships (Goulding, 1999). These relationships are established by examining three aspects of the phenomenon: the conditions or station in which the phenomenon occurs; the actions and interactions of the people in relation to what is perceived to happen in the situations; and, the result and consequences of the actions or inactions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This level is axial because it delineates and extricates relationships on which the axis of the category is the focus. Note that this level of analysis is, like reality itself, inherently complex and as stated by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Nevertheless, the attention to context, conditions and consequences makes good heuristic sense (Dey, 1999).

In the final level of coding, theoretical coding, the task is to organise and integrate the data around a core category to generate a theory. This process utilises theoretical codes to conceptualise how the codes and categories relate to each other as hypotheses to be integrated into a theory (Glaser, 1978, p. 72). In short, theoretical coding is the process of integrating and refining theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143). Strauss and Corbin (1990)

note that theoretical coding is similar to axial coding, except that the integration occurs at a more abstract level of analysis. While theoretical coding is focused around a core concept, the key is that the researcher is coding for a higher level of abstraction. Admittedly, as the research progress and the amount of data grows the lines of the three phases are somewhat blurred and may even be carried out concurrently. Nonetheless, each phase requires a different form of intervention on part of the researcher.

To exemplify the different levels of coding consider the following example adapted from Wolfswinkel, Furtmueller and Wilderom (2013). When applying open coding to a number of initial datasets (e.g. interviews) the codes 'car' and 'truck' appears. These codes represent information on transportation vehicles with at least four wheels. Based on this, the concept 'means of transportation' is identified. The concept 'means of transportation' is a 'category', i.e. a higher level of abstraction. Categories can have 'properties'. In this case, 'means of transportation' has the property of having at least four wheels. The researcher then conducts another interview in which the code 'motor-bikes' appear. Since the 'motorbikes' have less than four wheels, the researcher needs to change the properties of the category 'means of transportation'. Enter constant comparison: and when revisiting earlier coding, this is easily adjusted. With the intention of both cars and motorbikes to transport people another category is developed 'person transportation'. This category can however be treated as a sub-category to the higher order 'means of transportation'. It is when establishing these types of relationships that axial coding is in play. The higher-order categories will eventually themselves be consolidated and as key categories start to emerge, theoretical coding will allow the researcher to unify them all around a core category.

Data saturation

Data saturation or theoretical saturation is integral to naturalistic inquiry (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, as outlined by Bowen (2008) saturation remains conceptually unclear and the process lacks systematisation. Saturation is reached when the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns: when nothing new is being added. Claims of saturation should and will be supported by an explanation of how saturation was achieved and substantiated by clear evidence of its occurrence. Saturation is essential to knowing when enough data has been collected and therefore has far-reaching implications for research designed to produce a theory grounded in the data.

Ideally, the process of data collection and data analysis continues until theoretical saturation has been achieved. However, theoretical saturation should be seen as a goal rather than a reality. This is because, even though the researcher strives for saturation of categories, modifications thereof, temporal or otherwise, that may change the perspective is always possible. This is especially the case from a constructivist perspective where data may be interpreted in new ways (Charmaz, 2006), and saturation most often refers to occurring only within the confines of the particular research. It is therefore important to note that data is gathered until no new properties of the categories emerge, which means that the properties of the category is saturated, not the data. Bowen (2008) also points out that this includes the researcher not trying to saturate the study participants. Returning to interview key participants for a second or third time is oriented toward eliciting data to expand the depth or address gaps in the emerging analysis while interviewing additional participants is for the purpose of increasing the scope, adequacy and appropriateness of the data (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002).

Charmaz (2012) claims that qualitative researchers often report that they stop data collection when the stories in the data became repetitive, and she explains in an earlier publication, saturation calls for fitting new data into categories already devised (Charmaz, 2003). In accordance with the operationalization of saturation as suggested by Bowen (2008), this study contains some guidelines for saturation. A category is considered saturated if it is reflected in more than 70 % of the interviews, confirmed by member checks, resonate with key informants and research advisors, and made sense given prior research. Supporting data from the early and continuous review of literature will also be taken into account. Also, just as Bowen (2008) points out, caution must be taken against assuming that qualitative data, such as a certain percentage of interviews is necessary for determining saturation. Nonetheless, it stands to reason that, as stated by Morse (1995), saturation of all categories signifies the point at which to end the research.

Literature review in Grounded Theory

In their original publication, Glaser and Strauss (1967) explicitly advised against conducting an early literature review in the substantive area of research at an early stage off the research process. Consistent with the original, purist Glaserian perspective, and unlike most approaches to research, still, Grounded Theory requires that literature is not reviewed before commencing the research. The rationale is that to do so could lead the researcher into making misconceived assumptions about what issues warrant further investigation. Normally

the literature review is perceived as a process that begins before any data is collected with the aim of refining the research question, determining gaps in earlier research and identifying a suitable design and data collection method, and providing the rationale for further research (Hickey, 1997; Hallberg, 2010). Grounded Theory, as originally described by Glaser and Strauss, posits that by avoiding a literature review at the beginning of a study it is more likely that the emergent theory will be Grounded in the data, rather than to fit some preconceived theory. Hence, the risk of an early literature review, as pointed out by Hickey (1997), is that the researcher may focus the research process on assumptions highlighted by the literature rather than grounded in the data. However, Antoinette McCallin (2003), Cairán Dunne (2011), Robert Thornberg (2011), Kathy Charmaz (2012), and numerous others, including myself, have taken issue with Glaser's (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978, 1998; B. Glaser, 2001) insistence on delaying the literature review to avoid preconceiving data analysis. Therefore, the next section is devoted to first describing the various issues associated with review of literature in Grounded Theory and then proposes a strategy to ameliorate the issue.

2.4 The literature review dilemma

"The question continually arises when doing ground theory as to what is the best pacing for reading and using the related professional literature in the substantive area under study. We are all used to the normal, extensive literature review to ascertain gaps to fill in, hypotheses to test, and ideas to contribute to, in descriptive and verificational studies. In contrast the dictum in grounded theory research is: There is a need not to review any of the literature in the substantive area under study." (Glaser, 1992, p. 31)

The dictum of not reading literature in the substantive area until the final stages of analysis, as advised by Glaserian Grounded Theory, is problematic for at least six reasons outlined by Thornberg (2011). First, if this dictum is taken seriously, it makes it impossible for researchers to conduct studies in their own areas of expertise, which appears odd and counter-intuitive. Second, the dictum can easily be used as an excuse for lazy ignorance of the literature, which may lead to the belief and accusation that such research is "easy" and "atheoretical". Third, if researchers avoid reading literature in the field but at the same time read literature in other unrelated fields, in accordance with Glaser's (1978) recommendation for enhancing theoretical sensitivity, and then, at the end of the analysis, begin to review the field literature, they will soon drive themselves into a corner during their research career because of the cumulative reduction of possible research fields, which they still have not read literature about. And if the researchers want to do more studies in the same field, preconceptions are indeed inevitable. Fourth, as several grounded theorists have noticed, before the research begins, the researcher has to prepare proposals for the purpose of receiving funding for the project and undergo an ethical review. Hence, for pragmatic and strategic reasons, the researcher has to begin theorising and reading literature before starting any data collection and analysis, because, in these review processes, an overview or summary of related literature is normally required to acquire approvals. Fifth, ignoring established theories and research findings implies a loss of knowledge. Knowledge can help the researcher to formulate relevant research questions and make constant comparisons between data and literature to elaborate, revise or criticise pre-existing knowledge and extant theories. Sixth, the dictum of not reading literature early on in the research process as a solution to the fear of contamination and forcing is an extreme position that underestimates researchers' ability to reflect upon the links between extant theories and their gathering and analysis of data, and to appreciate extant theories and concepts without imposing them on the data.

With the researcher an integral part of the research process and product this approach always reflects value positions. This underlines the importance of identifying these positions and weighing the effect on the research practise rather than denying their existence (Charmaz, 2008). Consequently, the position of this research disavows the idea that researchers can or will begin a study without any prior knowledge and theories about the research topic. This study does not subscribe to the risk of an early literature review contaminating the research being anything other than manageable. Few, if any, grounded theorists can be thought so devoid of introspective capacity to be unable to critically and creatively exercise a level of control. The introspection does, however, require a certain amount of reflexivity, discussed in some depth in this chapter. Also, even if there is agreement between Glaserian and classic grounded theorists that a literature review should not be undertaken at the beginning of a study, there is disagreement about when it actually should begin. Hence, the crux of the matter is not whether a literature review should be conducted - there is actually a consensus that it should - but rather when it should be conducted and also how extensive it should be (Hickey, 1997; Cutcliffe, 2000; Andrew, 2006; McGhee et al., 2007). From the purists' perspective, concerns relate specifically to conducting a literature review in the substantive area of study at an early stage of the research process, while openly acknowledging the important role of extant literature in later stages of a Grounded Theory study (Dunne, 2011). Glaser (1992) cautions against reviewing the literature until the emerging theory has developed sufficiently. Only then should a relevant literature review be conducted and interwoven into the emerging theory. That is when a hypothesis, model or theory that is grounded in a core variable and an emerging integration of categories and properties can be discerned in the data. It could be argued, however that this is impossible since most researchers are already working within their respective field of research and already are familiar with major theories.

Glaser's fundamental arguments stem from concerns that an early literature review can contaminate and impede the generation of theory. In contrast to Glaser, Strauss and Corbin (1990) advocate reviewing the literature as the study progresses arguing that since literature in Grounded Theory is a source of data it is possible to review literature relevant to the concepts emerging from the data. Glaser's main objection to an early literature review is that the researcher may be side-tracked by received knowledge and interpretations that support assumptions already taken for granted and that are not necessarily relevant to the area of study. However, when the research goal is to explore the main concerns of participants and to find out how they continually resolve that concern, energy need not be wasted on overly

speculating on the problem (McCallin, 2003). In this particular case, the study does not focus upon the intricacies of the underlying problem of corruption but rather perceptions thereof.

It has even been argued that the injunction that no literature that relates to the phenomena should be studied before coding the data is one of the most wide-spread reasons for the lack of use of Grounded Theory (Urquhart, 2007, p. 351). Accordingly, this research strives to push the temporal limits of the literature review even further to promote an early literature review, albeit modified to fit the purposes of this version of Grounded Theory. This is not an entirely novel idea and has been advocated by Thornberg (2011). Several scholars have argued for the relevance and necessity of an early literature review to find out if the planned study, or something similar has been published before (Goulding, 1999; McCallin, 2003; Hallberg, 2010; Dunne, 2011).

Doing an early literature review does not absolve the researcher from using literature during the entirety of the research process, especially as theory begins to emerge. This expands horizons with Cutcliffe (2000), for example, arguing for a second stage of literature review, additional to that done prior to the research. The idea is rather for the literature to be the logical starting point of the study, for it to accompany the entire research process continually, and for it to be given more and more emphasis as the theory emerges. Reference to extant literature should thus be made wherever possible in an effort to identify comparisons or contradictions within the emerging codes and categories. As explained by Stern (2007), a literature review which ensues from the emergent Grounded Theory is essential not only for academic honesty, but in order to demonstrate how the study builds and contributes to extant knowledge in the field.

For this research, a number of arguments about the timing and nature of literature review were critically analysed. This analysis is basically an expansion of a line of argument presented by Dunne (2011), and reaches the same conclusion; that the arguments in favour of undertaking a literature review in the substantive area before commencing data collection and analysis are compelling. The fundamental point is not whether previous knowledge should be used in data analysis; the important insight lies rather in how to make proper use of previous knowledge (McCallin, 2006; Strübing, 2007) and that sound preliminary work goes some way to demonstrate that the researcher knows what he or she is doing even if not knowing exactly what he or she is looking for (McCallin, 2003).

The development of categories is conditioned by the early establishment of those preconceptions, identified and examined in the early literature review. This allows for the

literature to seamlessly take its place as part of the macro-context shaping a study, or to be woven into the micro-context if it is relevant to emerging concepts (McCallin, 2003). In a response to McCallin, Andrew (2006) states that central to Grounded Theory is the idea that the literature is not used as a source for concepts. This statement not only goes against Glaser's fundamental principle that everything is data (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001), but also although it is unlikely that the early literature review will spawn new concepts at least existing ones will be mapped and understood allowing their subsequent use to contextualise the new emerging ones. As Dunne (2011) suggests, perhaps there is a way to monitor and counteract the threat of contaminating the research which is less extreme than the initial abstinence from literature.

Each researcher must make an informed and justifiable decision not only regarding when extant literature will be employed in a Grounded Theory study but also how. Dunne (2011) may have answered the question of when but the question of how remains largely unanswered, or is at least not equally structured. By thorough reading in the field of Grounded Theory methodology, with an emphasis on reviewing how other researchers have practically sought to address the issue, what follows is an attempt to answer how to do an early literature review in a Grounded Theory study. This section does not necessarily provide new information but rather collates and rearranges existing material for a different perspective and ultimately practical usability. It outlines three building blocks creating a bridge over the rift of opinions on how literature review in Grounded Theory should be undertaken.

The first building block is reflexivity, already an integral part of any Grounded Theory study and particularly those from a constructivist perspective, which is meticulously applied here to maintain scientific rigour. The second building block is memos, also already one of the most important features when conducting a scientifically sound Grounded Theory study. Thus, the first two building blocks are just adaptations of already existing tools within Grounded Theory. The third building block is somewhat novel, introducing an additional tool to the Grounded Theory researcher by presenting a structured resource selection system.

Reflexivity

The first step to counteract the possible negative impact of early engagement with extant literature on the Grounded Theory research process is the idea of reflexivity (Dunne, 2011). Reflexivity is defined by Robson (2011) as an awareness of the ways in which the researcher as an individual with a particular social identity and background has an impact on the research process. As Cutcliffe (2000) claims, few would dispute that qualitative methods invariably involve interaction between the researcher and the data. The potential impact of the researcher needs to become part of the research record in order to be explored through constant comparative analysis (Neill, 2006), allowing for the explicit treatment of preconceptions in the study. Whilst the researcher's own creativity is an integral part in the emergence of categories, these categories must be inductively derived from the data and not forced by preconceived notions held by the researcher (McGhee et al., 2007). An early literature review can help identify and examine such notions. Martin (2006) explains the read-or-not-to-read quandary in Grounded Theory methodology as one of pacing, thinking of the initial phase as 'non-committal' helps focus on the principle Glaser wants to convey: a distancing from pre-defined problems and concerns.

A methodological framework, however well-constructed is only an instrument to be used by the researcher whose capacity for thinking will lie at the heart of the process. Grounded Theory thinking goes beyond the practicalities of literature review and its timing (McCallin, 2006), shifting the focus from the methodology to the reflexively thinking researcher. Grounded Theory coding is inductive, comparative, interactive and iterative - and later - deductive. Does that coding process begin as a tabula rasa, encased in theoretical innocence and substantive ignorance? Charmaz (2012, p. 4) answer to that question is: not a chance. According to Thornberg (2011) this tabula rasa approach is dangerous because it leaves the analyst prone to all manner of prejudice and preconceptions, which are no less powerful for remaining subliminal. Instead, as suggested by Henwood and Pidgeon's (2003) taking a stance of theoretical agnosticism is more appropriate. This approach does not advocate that the researcher ignore existing theories, but rather avoid the imposition of specific theoretical frameworks, as this may cause researcher to analyse the data through a specific theoretical lens. They argue further that grounded theorists should subject prior theories to rigorous critical analysis rather than denying them. The trick in theoretical agnosticism is to treat all extant theories and concepts that one already knows or might

encounter during the pre-study or on-going literature review as provisional, disputable and modifiable conceptual proposals (Thornberg, 2011).

In the early literature review, where empirical findings and theoretical ideas are identified and accessed as deemed necessary constant reflection on how such data might impact the research is pragmatic. This is analogous to, and for this methodology identical with, the constant comparison method: a built-in mechanism forcing regular reflection and justification for decisions on how to progress the study, for drawing certain conclusions and propounding specific arguments, all captured in an analytical trail of memos. This mechanism also provides the researcher with flexible choices among different extant concepts and ideas, a theoretical pluralism. Inviting theoretical pluralism during the analysis is a way of initiating a critical, creative and sensitive conversation between different and even conflicting theoretical perspectives to explore and interpret data and at the same time avoiding a forcing of the data (Thornberg, 2011).

Although Glaser (2001) warns against reflexivity paralysis where the researcher becomes so reflexive as to stifle creativity and fail to produce a theoretical account, instead producing description only, it is clear that there is a need for the researcher to be self-aware. Rather, the self-destructive introspective compulsion to locate their work within a particular theoretical context (McGhee et al., 2007), is expanded to refer not only to the work but also the researcher within a philosophical paradigm as well as to the fundamental concepts and research processes. Arguably it is the reflexivity and the researcher's creativity within this reflexivity that makes Grounded Theory valuable (Cutcliffe, 2000). Nevertheless, the researcher must be careful not to be too ambitious in developing the early literature review such that it causes too much reading and literature overload, stealing precious time from data gathering and analysis, which is and remains at the core of Grounded Theory.

Memos

Memos are fundamentally based on reflective thinking and register the internal dialogue between the researcher and the data at a certain point of time. The self-awareness captured in reflexivity is embodied through an honest memo writing, integral to the process of reflexivity, enabling the researcher to turn back on initial reactions (McGhee et al., 2007). Memos thus form an integral component of an early literature review, whereby the researcher could reflect on the ideas while engaging with existing literature (Dunne, 2011). When analysing documents, as opposed to conducting interviews, the immediate feedback loop of

information sharing is closed, making the construction unilateral and putting an even larger emphasis on researcher reflexivity. This is addressed partly by maintaining an audit trail in the form of reflexive memos, which also acts as a mechanism for tracing and re-reflecting on interactions with data.

Some insights recorded in memos may have been unreflectively jotted down but still harbour the potential to unexpectedly rise to more prominence (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). As the study progresses and the memos are synthesised by constant comparison, these insights may contribute significantly to the richness and depth of the emerging theory. Effective qualitative inquiry in general, and the development of a Grounded Theory in particular, draws on critical thinking as well as creative thinking. Creativity is a vital component of the Grounded Theory method as it forces the researcher to break through assumptions (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Constructing theory is not a mechanical process and Charmaz (2006) advocates what she calls theoretical playfulness, where creative and imaginative thinking helps the researcher to move beyond descriptive cataloguing. As suggested by Thornberg (2011) this research expands Charmaz notion of theoretical playfulness by also inviting extant theories and concepts in this playfulness, i.e. playing with them in new, innovative, creative and unorthodox ways during the process of constant comparison. All of this is carefully captured and documented in the memos written during the early literature review.

The memos contain substantive rationale for the item resource being reviewed as well as cogent grounds for subsequent theoretical selections. Memos also include insights and reflections on the definitions of key concepts in the area of research. Perhaps most importantly the memos can manifest and acknowledge prior knowledge and theoretical understanding: an important feature to discern when doing Grounded Theory. With the stance of this research acknowledging the need for constant reflexivity instead of denying prior knowledge and perspectives, and pretending to be without preconceptions and theoretical influences, the memos serve an invaluable role as a monitoring tool. The researcher must remember that the main focus is on data, not on literature, and that every code, concept or theoretical idea constructed must be grounded in the data. Prior knowledge must never be used as an excuse for poor analysis of data as it can never replace the work of constant comparison (Thornberg, 2011). Memos are an excellent way of keeping track of the focal point for the researcher's attention as well as monitoring the direction and constant course adjustments of the entire research process. Further it allows the researcher, if losing their way, to back-track to a familiar point and restart the investigative journey. The key to doing a good

Grounded Theory study and overcoming the potential problem of reviewing the literature prior to data collection is to maintain theoretical sensitivity through constant comparison and memo writing particularly (Andrew, 2006).

Hence, whenever reviewing literature, be it early or late in the research process, writing memos will serve the process well. Reflective moments combined with the aforementioned constant reflexivity will help the researcher to explicitly compare and contrast concepts when engaging with extant literature, both with each other and acquired data as well as emerging theory. Further it will uphold a theoretical agnosticism and help the researcher stay grounded all the while documenting all the ongoing processes, practical and theoretical alike. The traceability of memos allows for a reflective analysis during the research process as well as afterwards to make sure that pre-existing concepts are not used as forcing concepts, only as flexible, modifiable and sensitive ideas, creative associations and heuristic tools. Memos are therefore an integral part of reviewing literature in this version of Grounded Theory lending the existing literature for expanded, rich and grounded analysis and conceptualisation.

Resource selection system/criteria

Even classical Grounded Theory promotes reading but how does a researcher choose the resources to read in the literature review? Theoretical sampling will obviously allow the researcher to narrow the available resources but even so, given some research area variations, there will be plenty to choose from. The actual selection of relevant literature for the purpose of a literature review is a non-trivial task as many literature reviews do not offer clarity about how and why the specific literary resources were obtained (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013).

Typically, sources other than peer-review journal and conferences papers, monographs and book chapters are not seen as acceptable data for scholarly purposes. Yet, as Glaser (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001) accurately claims, in terms of Grounded Theory everything is data, and may thus contribute to the emerging Theory. The point of caution is naturally that the researcher needs to be aware of or at least able to analyse the limitations of obtained data. Therefore, when selecting documents, the four quality control criteria developed by Scott (1990) are used and intended as reference points for the reflective process. The criteria are: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.

Authenticity is a fundamental criterion. Questionable sources of data can mislead the researcher, unless they are aware of their inauthenticity. Consideration of the authenticity of a document concerns to what extent it actually is or represents what it claims to be. Unless able

to come to a conclusion about the authenticity of the data, there is no possibility of an informed judgement about the quality of the Theory eventually constructed. When analysing official documents, the authenticity of the source may be easily established while the intricacies of its purported purpose might be more challenging.

Credibility refers to the extent to which data is undistorted, sincere and free from error. From a constructivist perspective all documents containing an account of social events are to some degree distorted. There is always an element of selective accentuation in the description of social reality. Therefore, it must be established to what extent the source and data content is an honest and objective account to be taken as *prima facie* credible.

Representativeness refers to the assessment of the 'typicality' of sources and data. Although assuming typical data is not always to be desired, it is important to gauge how typical a source is in order to discern the limits of its implications and any subsequent conclusions drawn from it. This heuristic task will generally form part of any strategy of documentary sampling, as it is seldom possible to consult all existing documents of relevance.

Meaning is the extent to which the data is comprehensible to the researcher, who is limited to only being able to assess that which is understood. The predicament to elicit meaning arises on two levels, the literal and the interpretative. In short, the literal meaning of the words in a document gives only its face-value meaning: the raw material from which real significance must be reconstructed. Interpretative understanding is the end-product of a hermeneutic process in which the literal meaning is related to the context in which it resides. This ties in closely with the previously mentioned emphasis on researcher expertise as well as the succeeding discussion on reviewing literature.

Selected documents should also, though perhaps to a lesser extent, be assessed for completeness, in the sense of being comprehensive - covering the topic completely -, or selective, covering only some aspects of the topic. Another consideration to assess is whether the documents are even - balanced, or uneven - containing great detail on some aspects and less or none on other aspects (Bowen, 2009). The reason why completeness does not qualify as a fully-fledged selection criteria is that there may be some rather useful data in documents that are considered anything but complete.

The selection of resources, be it interviewees or documents, is conducted according to the overarching Grounded Theory methodology allowing theoretical sampling to encompass literary resources. This goes on until the collated corpus of research literature represents a saturated sample of applicable knowledge of the substantive area. Selected documents are not

treated as necessarily precise, accurate or complete accounts. The research method does not simply lift words, phrases and passages from the documents, but rather establishes meaning and the contribution to the explored topic. Throughout this process, the researcher should be well-aware of the fact that if the literature is inaccurate it will be constantly corrected, put in perspective and weighed in relevance by the constant comparative method (Glaser, 1998). This is an argument as good as any for not tip-toeing around the literature: everything is data and with careful application of theoretical sensitivity and reflexivity the researcher must be confident that constant comparison will bring out the relevant theory.

2.5 Modified Grounded Theory - GT+

"...science is simply common sense at its best, that is, rigidly accurate in observation, and merciless to fallacy in logic." (Huxley, 1880, p. 789)

This section will describe the details of the methodological version of Grounded Theory applied in this study. There is no such thing as a single unified, tightly defined and clearly specified methodology called Grounded Theory (Dey, 2004). Therefore, it is imperative when employing this methodology to be well versed in the topic in order to take a, perhaps unique, position on how to apply Grounded Theory, that is both informed and defensible. Like most research methodologies, Grounded Theory has been refined since its inception. This is a natural development when introducing a methodology so leaving it open to be adapted and employed differently, even beyond the horizon envisaged by its originators. The nature of Grounded Theory is determined in part by the questions asked of the data. As Cutcliffe (2000) posits, provided that the researcher explains what has been done and how it was done, straying outside of the boundaries of one particular version of Grounded Theory is less of an issue than limiting the potential depth of understanding that strict adherence to one version would produce. As Morse (2009, p. 14) stated "Every application, every time Grounded Theory is used, it requires adaptation in particular ways as demanded by the research questions, situation, and participants...". Therefore, every researcher will need to tailor the approach to suit the specific research purpose creating a unique version of Grounded Theory methodology.

The particular version of Grounded Theory used in this work is called GT+ with the '+' indicating the addition of not only an early literature review as previously formulated, but also a method of continuously treating and integrating extant literature. As the Grounded Theory approach to research will undoubtedly continue to evolve, it is important to maintain a close eye on that evolution for it may go so far as to develop an entirely new species of Grounded Theory application. The treatment of literature as proposed by this study does not constitute such a transgression of the boundaries of the contemporary methodology that is Grounded Theory. Maintaining the inductive and deductive interplay entered around the data, the analysis still claims to be grounded, as the defining feature is that the Theory still emerges inductively. For many, if not most, Grounded Theory researchers an initial theoretical sensitivity is inevitable regardless of if an early literature review has been conducted. It is therefore important to recognise, despite the controversy surrounding the place of the literature review, that the debate really concerns the need to stay open minded (McGhee et al., 2007).

From the ontological perspective of this research there was just no legitimate alternative to conducting an early literature review, albeit in a format fully compatible with the paradigms of constructivist Grounded Theory. Johnson, Long and White (2001) posit that merging distinct approaches, including Grounded Theory, does not compromise methodological purity but can actually enhance rigour. In short, a systematic review of the literature as described by this section is unlikely to contaminate the Grounded Theory study but will rather strengthen both research and researcher as a whole. The method is influenced by Thornberg's (2011) Informed Grounded Theory described as in contrast to the classic GT tradition, but in accordance with the constructivist GT tradition. An informed grounded theorist sees the advantage of using pre-existing theories and research findings in the substantive field in a sensitive, creative and flexible way instead of seeing them as obstacles and threats. These are not uncritically adopted in the analysis but are judged in terms of relevance, fit and utility, nor is the literature used as forcing applications or deductions, but rather as a guide using a set of data sensitising principles.




Figure 4: GT+ at the core of the three main strands of Grounded Theory.

The inception of GT+, as with Informed Grounded Theory, springs from the epistemology and the intrinsic nature of the view of the researcher's position, and is in many ways an elaboration of the constructivist Grounded Theory. There are however, several traits

from other versions of Grounded Theory and in other ways GT+ stays close to the classic version. The position of GT+ can be illustrated from the perspective of the currently three main versions of Grounded Theory. Firstly, the classical Glaserian version represents the fundamental idea of theory generated from and Grounded in data. Secondly Strauss and Corbin's more structured and systematic approach, presents a set of procedures for doing Grounded Theory. Although designed not to be followed dogmatically but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers as they deem appropriate (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), the procedures in many ways make the approach more accessible but also run the risk of being too stringent and forcing data. Thirdly, the flexible constructivist approach of Charmaz (2006) with its epistemological foundation very close to that of GT+, emphasises researcher interaction with data.

The assimilation of an early literature review pushes GT+ away from the purist Glaserian version of Grounded Theory and ends up in between Strauss and Corbin, and Charmaz. This position is justified and further explained by looking at the three other major issues around which the debate and evolution of Grounded Theory revolves. The issues are the role of induction, discovery versus construction and the focus on social process versus individual experience. On the role of induction, which is the analytical perspective from which GT+ primarily operates, Strauss and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998) introduced a deductive element in their coding paradigm. The intention is to ensure that the researcher is looking for the manifestation of particular patterns in the data and is sensitised to those aspects of the data that are considered to be essential to understanding. For example, Strauss and Corbin's (1990) axial coding is by design specifically apt for the purpose of coding for process, something that otherwise can easily be omitted or done very arbitrarily. This is incorporated also in GT+ which, however, does not go as far as the application of the overly prescriptive Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 181) conditional matrix. As for discovery versus construction the position of GT+ is highly influenced by the philosophical paradigm and moves towards the social constructivism presented by Charmaz (2000, 2006, 2008, 2014). The main argument is that categories and Theory are not discovered in data but emerge as a co-construction of researcher and data interaction. On the last issue of social process versus individual experience, the original aim of Grounded Theory was for the emerging theories to explain social process and its consequences. In order to explain the relevant process, the researcher engaged in a cyclical interpretative inquiry. More recently, researchers have used Grounded Theory as a method of data analysis only, with data being subject to Grounded Theory-inspired coding in order to produce a systematic representation of a phenomenon. Such use

of Grounded Theory shares some features with phenomenology and since that is not the intent of GT+, its roots within the classical Glaserian approach remain. Having said that, the time frame for the study did not allow for the proffered line-by-line coding. The deviation is kept as small as possible and can be described as 'phrase-by-phrase coding', particularly useful when coding un-transcribed interviews from audio only. That way, many code labels are kept 'in vivo' - that is, the labelling utilises unaltered words and phrases as they occur in the data. Further, Coding favours the use of gerunds, the noun form of verbs, as these build action and meaning directly into the codes. Hence, coding in gerunds allows us to see processes that otherwise might remain invisible (Charmaz, 2012).

Although being highly conditioned by its philosophical nucleus, it is the intention of GT+, even if largely stripped from its epistemological shroud, to deliver a flexible strategy for sound research practice that can be used to produce useful and innovative analyses. While effectively mixing three strands of Grounded Theory methodologies, it is not done without acknowledgement, which could contaminate the methodology (see Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). Rather the somewhat similar methodologies are explained and parts are selected and combined explicitly, avoiding method slurring (S. Baker & Edwards, 2012). The qualitative nature of the paradigm in GT+ focuses on the search for meaning and understanding to build innovative theory and not universal laws. It is important to recognise that enquiry is always context-bound and facts should be viewed as both theory-laden and value-laden. Therefore, the focus becomes one of how people behave within an individual and social context.

Framework for initial sample and sample size

Previously the concept of data saturation was explained and operationalized for the purposes of this study. Now the same will be done with the framework for both the initial sample and the sample size. The initial sample of participants, or interviewees will be a fairly small non-random set of individuals. The sample size will then successively grow as a result of theoretical sampling and the constant comparative method. In their work on trying to determine an adequate sample size, both in terms of initial sample size and total sample size [N], Francis et al. (2010) suggest two principles. The first is to specify a minimum sample size for the initial analysis, the initial analysis sample, and the second is to specify how many more interviews will be conducted without new ideas emerging. Fundamentally, the principles are based on arguments revolving around deciding when data saturation occurs in theory-based interview studies, the 'stopping' criterion. Although it is clearly acknowledged that this

approach was not specifically developed for Grounded Theory, , the principles may still be appropriate and the basic tenets with some adjustments are adopted in this study.

Before discussing the initial analysis sample and the stopping criterion in more depth, let us recapitulate the idea of theoretical sampling and how it affects the sample size. Firstly, with the initial sample not being random, but instead purposefully selected and then expanded, the method of theoretical sampling addresses the problem of infinite regress. Where even if one has a random sample of a defined population, that population is almost certainly a non-random subset of a more general population. Secondly, in the sampling strategy as proposed in this research, the researcher does not necessarily, and certainly not immediately, seek generalisability but rather representativeness and therefore focuses less on sample size and more on sampling adequacy. Sample size is important only as it relates to judging the extent to which issues of saturation have been carefully considered. During the coding process, the size of the sample may be increased in order to collect additional data until there is redundancy of information. However, increasing the sample size is not always necessary (Bowen, 2008). Thirdly, theoretical sampling means sampling for the development of a theoretical category, not sampling for population representation (Charmaz, 2012). Another argument may be constructed that reasons in favour of a more narrow or focused sample, rather than maximum variation. Since the researcher in Grounded Theory is concerned with uncovering the situated, contextual, core and subsidiary social processes, the social processes need to be shared and experienced by the individuals providing the data (Cutcliffe, 2000). The fourth and final note - yet another argument in favour of an early literature review - stems from Lincoln & Guba (1985). They claim that for optimal theoretical sampling a subsequent sample should only be selected once the current one has been analysed. Consequently, each prior sample acts as a gatekeeper for the next. If the first unit of a sample only has limited experience of the social process being studied, Cutcliffe (2000) argues that the subsequent theoretical sampling would also reflect the limited experience. This in turn is yet another argument for an early literature review, to facilitate the determination of a suitable initial sample and its size.

For the initial analysis sample and stopping criterion, turning back to Francis et al. (2010), the specific numbers will depend on the complexity of the research questions, the interview topic guide, the diversity of the sample and the nature of the analysis. The suggestion, however, is an initial analysis sample of 10 interviews with a stopping criterion of three consecutive interviews without additional material. These numbers are derived from analysis of two studies of their own but also in large part from the work of Guest, Bunce & Johnson

(2006), where 92% of all codes were identified after 12 interviews and 97% of the 'important' codes were identified within these 12 interviews. In another Grounded Theory study by Furniss, Blindfold & Curzon (2011) a more modest initial analysis sample of four is used, subsequently expanded in accordance with methodological congruence. Bowen (2008) argues that if emphasis is on quality rather than quantity, the objective is not to maximise sample size but rather to become 'saturated' with information on the topic. As suspected, finding the appropriate size for the initial analysis sample is a rather difficult task, which is confirmed by Baker and Edwards' (2012) paper on how many qualitative interviews is enough. They gathered together a set of succinct 'expert voice' contributions from 14 prominent qualitative methodologists and five 'early career reflections' from those embarking on academic careers. The recurring answers to the question 'how many' was 'it depends'. Nevertheless, the advice is to consider both philosophical as well as practical issues and to make an informed decision.

For this study, such an informed decision includes taking into account Charmaz' (2006) suggestion that a small study with 'modest claims' might achieve saturation quicker than a study intended to describe a process that spans several disciplines. Cited in Mason's (2010) insightful article on sample size and saturation in PhD studies, using qualitative interviews, Jette, Grover and Keck (2003) suggest that expertise in the chosen topic can reduce the number of participants needed in a study. In the same article Lee, Woo and Mackenzie (2002) suggest that studies using multiple interviews with the same participant requires fewer participants. The question of sample size is also important because the use of an N larger than needed may be nothing but a waste of research funds and participants and researchers' time. On the other hand, an N smaller than needed may pose a scientific issue, that of not being informative due to a sample size so small that the results reflect idiosyncratic data. This study, although not lacking ambition, does however aim to describe a single discipline process. Further, all participants will more often than not, be well versed in terms of the chosen topic, corruption and subsequently the perception thereof. Lastly, the intention is after completing the initial analysis sample to revisit those participants as deemed necessary. Ergo, this speaks for achieving the theoretical outcome with fewer participants, permitting the discussion to proceed to establishing what this actually means in absolute numbers.

Mason (2010) having studied 560 PhD studies using qualitative interviews found that a large portion of the samples, around 80%, adhered to Bertaux's (1981) guidelines of 15 being the smallest number of participants for a qualitative study irrespective of the methodology. While this guideline is not intended to be a faultless reference tool for selecting qualitative

sample size, there is support for saturation being achieved at a relatively low level (e.g. Guest et al., 2006). It is, however, important to point out that new data, especially when theoretically sampled, will always add something new, but there are diminishing returns, and the cut off between adding emerging findings and not, might be considered inevitably arbitrary (Mason, 2010). In the end, one can even argue that the sample size becomes irrelevant as the quality of data is the measurement of its value.

Taking this entire discussion into consideration for this particular study, the initial analysis sample is set to 2 interviews. The total sample size will be set by the methodological instruments, constant comparison and theoretical sampling and unfortunately conceivably restricted by time and resources limitations. If this is the case, perhaps the researcher will be left with no other choice than to settle for a theoretical scheme that is less developed than desired. The aim, however, for the entire study is to constitute excellence rather than adequacy and will strive to conduct as many interviews as needed to achieve it.

Initial sample selection strategy

The selection is conceptually driven by the theoretical framework as constructed by the methodology, hence by the evolving concepts that arise from the early literature review. This means that any and all inclusion, as well as exclusion, criteria will be defined and described in the analytical memos. The idea is not necessarily to create a homogenous sample universe but rather to focus on attributes contributing to the quality of data. This approach aligns with the variation sampling technique as described by Strauss and Corbin (1998). The rationale for using a more heterogeneous sample is that any commonality found across a diverse group of cases is more likely to be a generalisable phenomenon than a commonality found in a homogenous sample (Robinson, 2014). Cross-cultural qualitative research, with its similarity to this research, is another instance that calls for a demographically and geographically heterogeneous sample. There are, however, challenges inherent to using a heterogeneous sample with the sheer diversity of data lessening the likelihood of meaningful themes being found during analysis. Therefore, careful consideration is applied in delineating the boundaries of the sample universe to be coherent both with the theoretical aspects of the research aim, but also the practical limitations of finite resources. In the final stages of the research process, a meta-synthesis of the analytical memos, particularly for this purpose, will ultimately define the sample universe used in the study.

As previously discussed, this study will apply a purposive sampling strategy informed by the early literature review. It is not impossible that even the initial sample selection will change as a result of constant comparison and theoretical sampling, but it is not likely. There are three fundamental guidelines to the selection of the initial sample for this study. The first is that, since a rather small number of participants are to be studied intensively, it is important to carefully and purposefully choose those participants. Each choice should be informed, reflexively analysed, described and justified in a documented analytical memo. This point is emphasised by Cleary et al. (2014), to not only justify the sample size but also the sample content, i.e. the participants on the grounds of quality data - something that will be clearly reflected in the presentation of the study's findings. Secondly, participant selection must be congruent with the conceptual framework of the research as a whole, such that participants are likely to generate rich and focused information on the research topic. This is largely facilitated by the early literature review, aligning participant selection with the emerging themes and allowing the researcher to provide a convincing account of the phenomenon studied.

The search for participants in the research is also question of access. It may very well be that a suitable participant is identified but declines or is unable to participate. Because the emphasis was on quality rather than quantity, the objective is not to maximise participant numbers but rather for the research to become 'saturated' with information on the topic (Bowen, 2008). Thus, the research focuses on participants that are considered to be key informants. As Payne and Payne (2004) describe it; key informants are those whose social positions in a research setting give them specialist knowledge about other people, processes or happenings that is more extensive, detailed or privileged than ordinary people; and who are therefore particularly valuable sources of information to a researcher, not least in the early stages of a project.

Interview design, structure and execution

Interviewing has long been a useful data-gathering method in various types of qualitative research. Intensive interviewing permits an in-depth exploration of a particular topic or experience and thus, is a useful method for interpretative inquiry. The in depth nature of an intensive interview fosters eliciting each participant's interpretation of his or her experience. (Charmaz, 2006). Interviewing is a flexible, emergent technique where ideas and issues emerge during the interview and the interviewer can immediately pursue these leads. Also, greater reliability can be placed on the data gathered in an interview over self-completion questions in a survey (Allan, 2003). The interview strategy proposed is designed to help the researcher go

beyond common-sense tales and subsequent obviously, low-level categories that add little or nothing new. The goal is not to draw out facts about corruption but rather focus on the participant's behaviour, beliefs and attitudes, i.e. their perception of the phenomenon.

Interviewing fits grounded theory methods particularly well. Both grounded theory methods and intensive interviewing are open-ended yet direct, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet unrestricted. Mainly the format of the interviews will draw upon the Charmaz', outline of how interview questions in a grounded theory study may be framed and ordered. This process includes setting the tone, seeking information in depth, feeling and reflection, searching for the narrative and ending on a positive note (Charmaz, 1994). The main rationale for using intensive interviews as outlined by Charmaz is that it allows the research participants to tell their stories and given them a coherent frame. It also allows them to reflect on earlier events and choose what to tell and how to tell it. The participants do not only share significant experience but also teach the interviewer how to interpret them. Perhaps most importantly to this research, is that they are allowed to be experts and express thoughts and feelings disallowed in other settings (Charmaz, 2006).

Chenitz & Swanson (1986) examine two approaches to interviewing in grounded theory: the formal and the informal qualitative interview. In considering the formal interview two types are noted: structured and unstructured. Where the latter is seen as most commonly utilised in the collection of qualitative data and therefore considered as the formal interview of grounded theory. The informal interview is likened to an everyday conversation for the purpose of both collecting and validating data. These are unplanned encounters in a field, important to the area of inquiry. However, unlike an ordinary conversation, an interviewer can shift the conversation and follow hunches (Charmaz, 2006). Consequently, an interview, albeit informal, can go beneath the surface of an ordinary conversation. Another possible benefit of the informal interview is that in a formal interview professionals may recite public relations rhetoric rather than reveal personal views, much less a full account of their experiences: this arguably happens less in an informal setting conditioned by mutual trust (Charmaz, 2006). Thus both types will be used and as May (1991) indicates, more than one style of interviewing can be employed in a research study. Further, both the formal and informal interview constitute the approach taken at appropriate stages of theoretical sampling in the research process.

Nevertheless, there has to be some agenda for research as time and resource constraints prohibits unfocused investigation. Therefore, the scope of the research has been

narrowed to a focal point where interviews can be focused by open stimuli, which are open-ended questions within a defined confine. The predicate of open-ended questions, however, is not axiomatic but rather an initial entry point for the development of a more discursive style of interviewing. This interviewing style is suitable when having participants that are professional, articulate, and will defend their views as well as making their experience understood (Furniss et al., 2011). Naturally some interviews will be more open than others due to confidentiality issues, familiarity with the researcher and the way that different personalities interact. It is, however, quite clear that the participants in this research will be fairly well educated, opinionated and confident, all factors favouring a more discursive style of interviewing.

"...an interview should not be conducted using a prescribed formal schedule of questions. This would defeat the objective, which is to attain first hand information from the point of view of the informant. Nonetheless, this is easier in theory than in practice. Informants usually want some guidance about the nature of the research and what information is sought. Totally unstructured interviews therefore cause confusion, incoherence, and result in meaningless data. Structured interviews, on the other hand, may be merely an extension of the researcher's expectations. The art lies therefore in finding a balance which allows the informant to feel comfortable enough to expand on their experiences, without telling them what to say." (Goulding, 1999, p. 8)

The interviews seek to elicit the genuine views and feelings of respondents. This may, however, be difficult to achieve if the process has a predetermined structure. With this said the interviews, particularly the formal ones do have an overarching structure. The interviews are structured according to a three-stage process, which begins by establishing the context of the interviewee's experience, through to a construction of the experience and finally a reflection on the meaning it holds. Such an interview may be seen as formal. However, the progression of the interview will still be influenced by the nature of the relationship/interaction that occurs. This strategy, coupled with the possible need for flexibility with respect to interviewing as the research progresses, means that it is hard to outline a typical pattern for the interview process (Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). Therefore, on one hand, submitting a detailed description of the interview is inconsistent with the emergent nature of qualitative research in general and grounded theory in particular. On the other hand, given that an interview should not be conducted using a prescribed formal schedule of questions, as this would defeat the objective which is to attain first-hand information from the point of view of the informant. This, however, is easier in theory than in practice. Informants usually want some guidance about the nature of the research and what information is sought. Totally unstructured interviews therefore cause confusion, incoherence, and result in meaningless data. Structured interviews, on the other hand, may be merely an extension of the

researcher's expectations. The art lies therefore in finding a balance which allows the informant to feel comfortable enough to expand on their experiences, without telling them what to say (Goulding, 1999).

Charmaz (2006) suggests that for a Grounded Theory study, a few broad, open-ended questions be devised. Interview questions should then be focused to invite detailed discussion of topic. Neutral questions do not necessarily mean a neutral interview. The sample questions below are proposed to outline the intrinsic nature of the interviews: adequately illustrating that the intention is that no harm will befall the participants. Still, questions are open enough to allow unanticipated material to emerge during the interview. Shortcomings in interviewing techniques can be refined and as for bias, a working awareness of bias is imperative in all interview-based research. Checking the recordings for context and content accuracy, possibly even before any coding begins, facilitates such awareness.

Given the open structure of the interviews, all interviews are recorded, as the otherwise copious note taking might inhibit the flow of the interview (Payne & Payne, 2004). Glaser (1978, 1998) argues taking notes enables the researcher to record the essentials without becoming lost in details. Notwithstanding, as Charmaz (2014) points out, such notes can miss many situational details as well as the construction of the interview. The recordings also serve as a source for reflection on which questions worked and which did not, for the novice grounded theorist this is a very useful lesson. Nevertheless, heed is taken to Glaser's caution and the researcher must be vigilant, avoiding forcing interview data into preconceived categories. There are, however, other benefits to record the interviews such as that when analysed, special attention can be directed to find questions that did not work as intended as well as data possibly being forced. Recording also lends attention to the participant's language, allowing for questions in subsequent interviews to bridge their experience with the research questions. This is to learn about the participant's meaning of words rather than making assumptions about what they mean. It is safe to assume that the research participants will not always describe themselves, their actions and situations in the same way as the researcher. Instead, recording permits the interview participants' terms to be used and explored to elicit meaning. It is noted that lack of rigour due to careless interview techniques and the introduction of bias are common pitfalls to the validity of qualitative research. Both issues can be mitigated by careful and purposeful analysis of the recordings.

This strategy, coupled with the possible need for flexibility with respect to interviewing as the research progresses, means that it is hard to outline a typical pattern for the interview in

qualitative research (Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). Nevertheless, each interview will be prepared with an interview guide with well-planned open-ended questions and ready probes conditioned by the emerging theory. As the research progresses, and the focus of the interviews increases by engaging in theoretical sampling, the researcher may assume a more active role in the interviews and ask more direct questions than in earlier interviews (Charmaz, 2014). It is recognised that using an overly direct line of questioning with Grounded Theory objectives of studying process and of developing theoretical analysis raises a potential dilemma. The researcher concentrating on the emerging theory may not give sufficient concern for how this investigation affects the research participants. In this case, the problem is partly bridged by the collaborative elements of the constructivist position, fostering a more egalitarian exchange. That said, particularly regarding the possible discovery or probing of sensitive information, the researcher always strives to strike a balance between the participant's comfort level and obtaining informative data. All interviews are also intended to always end on a positive note, and not abruptly - allowing the participants to feel that there is time to express and possibly even discuss any concerns.

Theory integration

When developing a theory that is grounded in the data, Goulding (1999) argues that there are three basic stages that need to be addressed. The first deals with the collection and interpretation of data and is primarily concerned with demonstrating how, why and from where early concepts and categories were derived. In accordance with one of the fundamental principles of the grounded theory method the use of memos through the research process allows any theory to be traceable back to the data. As analysis proceeds there will be specific memos particularly addressing the relationship between concepts, categories and the data. The second stage is the process of abstraction of the concepts in a search for theoretical meaning. This is the stage where the concepts are sufficiently developed- even in a purely Glaserian version of Grounded Theory - to warrant re-evaluation in conjunction with extant literature. The third and final stage should present the theory, uniting the concepts and integrating them into one, or a few, core categories, which have explanatory power within the specific context of the research. In addition to memos diagrams and other visual aids are used to illustrate the emergence of theory, and to point to critical junctures and breakthroughs in terms of theoretical insights, thus carefully documenting all stages of the process.

Many Grounded Theorists are often deservedly criticised for moving too quickly from the specific study to a general level (Charmaz, 2008). This is an important point to bear in

mind when striving for theory integration. Any qualitative study without extensive data can make only limited claims. The small interview sample of this particular research precludes the making of too general claims. The idea is for the generality of the claims to be proportionate to the data in terms of sample size, thoroughness of collection, depth of analysis and consideration to time variables. Data analysis is like a discussion between the actual data, the created theory, the memos and the researcher (Backman & Kyngäs, 1999). As for the coding part, the data analysis is software supported insofar as it is organised, structured and visualised in NVivo., However, all actual analysis is made by the researcher and none of the query functions within the software is used to elicit meaning or generate Theory. The use of computers for data analysis in Grounded Theory studies can result in flat and oversimplified descriptive results (Becker, 1993). The possible role of computer assisted Grounded Theory analysis is nonetheless discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.

The process of theory integration for this research is guided by four theoretical concerns; theoretical plausibility, direction, centrality, and adequacy. These concerns should be seen as overarching the interviewing process as an aid to abstract and construct theory. Theoretical plausibility is a construct closely related but not identical to the concept of accuracy in qualitative research. A quest for accurate statement is naturally merited, but only when the study indicates its necessity. This methodology, however, generally attends more to whether interview statements are theoretically plausible than to whether the research participants have constructed them with unassailable accuracy. Theoretical direction is the patterns that begin to emerge and shape the research as the interviews are conducted and analysed. These patterns inform the researcher as to what the study aims to accomplish in subsequent interviews and prompts thinking about how to accomplish those aims. Thus, the shape of data collection, and interviews evolve with the study. Theoretical centrality relates to those ideas and areas of inquiry that merit pursuit through the research. Certain less compelling lines of inquiry may be dropped in favour of nascent analytical constructs showing more promise and theoretical relevance to the emerging theory. Theoretical adequacy is where the content of later interviews includes questions that get at the core of the emerging categories. In many ways this resembles theoretical sampling making the theoretical categories robust, perhaps even drawing out the core category or categories. As Charmaz (2014, pp. 87-89) points out these four theoretical concerns are not delineated and expressed as a set of external criteria, but rather to offer a language for developing theory and drawing attention to the significance of reflexive and theoretical thinking.

From a constructivist perspective member checking or respondent validation is perhaps the most developed form of assessment as this enables the participants to check the rendering of data (Furniss et al., 2011). The investigator-as-expert relationship is reversed when the interpretation is presented to the participants. Inviting the participants to assess whether the analysis is an accurate representation of their accounts helps establish credibility. This is done before the interpretation is abstracted to a conceptual level and therefore becomes less meaningful to the individual. Ultimately, when using the grounded theory method, the researcher has an obligation to 'abstract' the data and to think 'theoretically' rather than descriptively (Goulding, 1999). This external validation of the output is especially particularly important as some of the analytical process is hidden within the complex and creative thought process of the researcher. Although captured to some, hopefully large, extent by the analytical and reflexive memos, the mechanics linking data to ideas transforming into theory may be hard to describe and thus hard to inspect.

2.6 Method appropriateness

"Grounded theory will not appeal to the researcher in search of absolute certainties, neatly defined categories and objectively measured explanations. Its appeal is more to those whose view of behaviour allows for process, change and ambiguities, and to those who hold a desire to explore meaning and experience and are willing to engage in a sometimes eclectic manner with complementary theories which often fall outside of the immediate field of study." (Goulding, 1999, p. 19)

There are several reasons for Grounded Theory to be the method of choice for this research where the main argument undoubtedly is the stark qualitative contrast against the already existing quantitative data. The clearly stated ambition is to discover an answer that goes beyond the descriptive question of what is going on to a higher level of abstraction answering the how and why. Outcomes from description and discovery differ, where the former is a narrative report of pertinent categories and sometimes their interlinkage. In the latter, however, a conceptualisation of tentative relationships among variables is constructed, and a core category that accounts for a major portion of the variation is identified (Becker, 1993).

Often Grounded Theory is recommended when little is known about a research phenomenon, but the approach may also be used when there is some knowledge about the research phenomenon but a new point of view is sought (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This research aims to offer exactly such a new point of view, a new point of reference when dealing with the perception of corruption. Grounded Theory allows new theories to emerge from data through an inductive process. One problem associated with induction is the role of the researcher, especially if taking a purely positivist standpoint where the data should speak solely for itself. However, as critics of positivism have argued convincingly (Willig, 2013), all observations are made from a certain perspective and many of the truths we cling to depend greatly on our own point of view.

"Even if we accept the (doubtful) proposition that categories are discovered, what we discover will depend in some degree on what we are looking for - just as Columbus could hardly have 'discovered' America if he had not been looking for the 'Indies' in the first place." (Dey, 1999, p. 104)

Grounded Theory is based on the belief that, as individuals within groups comprehend events from a personal perspective, common patterns of behaviour can be discovered (Glaser, 1998). The methodology has the potential to explain what is actually happening in practical

life, rather than describing what should have been going on (McCallin, 2003). Thus, facilitating the move from description of what is happening to an understanding of the process by which it is happening (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

In terms of the methodology presented, a key tenet is that categories do not emerge from the data because they did not exist before the analysis but rather are constructed by the researcher interacting with the data during the research process. In other words, the research aims to explain constructs of social reality not in absolute terms but as inevitably shaped by the researcher's knowledge, assumptions and expectations. This does not make the theory any less relevant as the researcher, by reflexivity, is as grounded in the data as the theory itself. Consequently, the methodology is appropriate for investigations of an uncharted area or to gain a fresh perspective on a familiar situation (Stern, 1995).

Context and process

As stated, this research is partly designed around the work of Corbin and Strauss, with one rationale being their view on context and process. Context is defined as the structural conditions that shape the nature of problems to which interactive responses are made. The flow of such interaction is referred to as process. It is assumed that interactions have an intrinsic sense of purpose and continuity. Context and process are related because interactions are made in response to an incident. This definition translates perfectly to the phenomenon at hand, the perception of corruption. When analysing data for process, there is, however, an important distinction to be made between a phenomenon and a process. A phenomenon is the more or less abstract major idea or goal whereas the process is the way of getting there. In an example given by Corbin and Strauss (2008) involving Vietnam veterans, 'survival' is described as a 'phenomenon' and 'process' as the strategies attempted to handle the problems standing in the way of survival. Both context and process are perception dependent and will vary accordingly, but this will be addressed more explicitly at a later stage. That is why one sees so much variation in interaction in similar situations: the definition and meaning of a problem will vary. Consequently, if more than one person representative of a certain perception is acting together to manage a problem, the interactions must be aligned, or the flow and continuity will be disrupted.

To establish and identify relationships between context and process, one must first create an overarching framework that structures the research approach. This is often referred to as the research paradigm. A paradigm is a particular perspective, a set of questions to guide

the researcher to a level of abstraction from which data can be scientifically analysed. Corbin and Strauss (2008) explain the basic components of a paradigm with three postulates. Firstly, there are conditions. These allow a conceptual way of processing data in relation to the basic information-gathering questions about who, what, where, when, why, and how, revealing the conditions specific to the data. Secondly, there are interactions. These are the meetings between individuals or groups and the world, be it situations, problems, happenings, incidents or events. Thirdly, there are consequences. These are the outcomes of those meetings and answer questions about the result of interactions and emotional responses. Consequently, context does not determine experience nor set the course of action, but it does identify the set of conditions in which meetings arise, the following interaction and finally the consequences that in turn might go back to impact the conditions. The continual flow of interaction and emotion – 'process' - can now be analysed and explained using Grounded Theory methods. However, those methods themselves are grounded within the philosophical aspects of the paradigm and a solid understanding of the philosophical nucleus is indispensable.

2.7 Chapter two summary

For a structured approach to research with a certainty of process and enough flexibility to let the research phenomenon speak for itself, the method used is a modified Grounded Theory. Since the aim is to explain the phenomenon of perception of corruption, the chosen method is a suitable choice because of the unique nature of Grounded Theory methods. Somewhat unusual for a Grounded Theory study, the position taken in this research suggests that a controlled preliminary literature review can be beneficial, promoting an early enhancement of theoretical sensitivity rather than researcher bias.

The paradigm of this research is ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist. The research is ontologically relativistic in so far as it claims reality and truth to be understood "as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society or culture. . . there is a non-reducible plurality of such conceptual schemes" (Bernstein 1983). Added, the common denominator and core of constructivist theory is that knowledge is not found, it is constructed.

Epistemologically constructivism emphasises the subjective interrelationship between researcher and that which is researched, usually human participants, and the co-construction of meaning. The logic of such subjective co-construction is internal and cannot be constructively judged on external epistemological grounds. This position does not, however, argue for a state of intellectual anarchy in which anything is deemed valid. Nevertheless, this research is regarded as only being epistemologically accountable to its own rules of structure and logic.

The theory developed within this paradigm is aimed to have an explanatory power with a high level of abstraction. A theory, in the context of this research, provides the best comprehensive, coherent and simplest model for linking diverse and unrelated facts in a useful and pragmatic way. Thus, as a Grounded Theory researcher the endeavour is oriented to discover the basic social processes and the interactive layers of context that people use to deal with situations in which they find themselves and that are not necessarily understood by them at the conscious level. Grounded theory provides explicit tools for studying processes while promoting openness to all possible theoretical understandings. It fosters developing tentative interpretations about the data through coding and categorising, as well as building systematic checks and refinements of the researcher's major theoretical categories. This makes Grounded Theory an almost perfect fit for the purposes of this research. Even so, the

methods used both for data collection and analysis have been somewhat modified to suit the practicalities dictated by the research as well as the philosophical orientation of the researcher.

Grounded Theory is the practice of identifying, refining and integrating categories of meaning stemming from data. It provides an explanatory framework - a theory - through which to understand the phenomenon under investigation. The process of developing categories and ultimately theory is facilitated by a number of key strategies or perhaps more appropriately, analytical constructs. These are the writing of reflexive memos, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis, coding for an increasing level of abstraction, data saturation, and the treatment of literature. The dictum of not reading literature in the substantive area until the final stages of analysis, as advised by Glaserian Grounded Theory, is problematic. Each researcher must make an informed and justifiable decision not only regarding when extant literature will be employed in a Grounded Theory study but also how. Three building blocks are used in this work to create a bridge over the literature review divide in Grounded Theory. The first building block is reflexivity, - an integral part of any Grounded Theory study and particularly those from a constructivist perspective., In this work reflexivity is meticulously applied to maintain scientific rigour. The second building block is memos, also already one of the most important features when conducting a scientifically sound Grounded Theory study. Thus, the two first building blocks are just adaptations of already existing tools within Grounded Theory. The third building block is somewhat novel, introducing an additional tool to the Grounded Theory researcher in the form of the structured resource selection system.

When selecting documents, the four quality control criteria developed by Scott (1990) are used, intended as reference points for the reflective process. The criteria are: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. This particular version of Grounded Theory is called GT+ with the '+' indicating the addition of not only an early literature review as previously formulated, but also a method of continuously treating and integrating extant literature. As the Grounded Theory approach to research will undoubtedly continue to evolve, it is important to maintain a close eye on that evolution for it may go so far as to develop an entirely new species of Grounded Theory application. The treatment of literature as proposed by this study does not constitute such a transgression of the boundaries of the contemporary methodology that is Grounded Theory. Maintaining the inductive and deductive interplay entered around the data, the analysis still claims to be grounded, as the defining feature is that the Theory emerges inductively. For many, if not most, Grounded Theory

researchers an initial theoretical sensitivity is inevitable regardless of if an early literature review has been conducted. It is therefore important to recognise, despite the controversy surrounding the place of the literature review, that the debate really concerns the need to stay open minded

The inception of GT+, as with Informed Grounded Theory, springs from the epistemology and the intrinsic nature of the view of the researcher's position, and is in many ways an elaboration of a, constructivist Grounded Theory. There are, however, several traits consistent with other versions of Grounded Theory and in other ways GT+ stays close to the classic version. The position of GT+ can be illustrated from the perspective of the currently three main versions of Grounded Theory. First the classical Glaserian version which represents the fundamental idea of theory generated from and grounded in data. Secondly Strauss and Corbin's more structured and systematic approach, which presents a set of procedures for undertaking Grounded Theory. These are designed not to be followed dogmatically but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers as they deem appropriate (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The procedures in many ways make the approach more accessible but also run the risk of being too stringent and forcing data. Thirdly, the flexible constructivist approach of Charmaz (2006) with its epistemological foundation very close to that of GT+, emphasises researcher interaction with data.

Although being highly conditioned by its philosophical nucleus, it is the intention of GT+, even if largely stripped from its epistemological shroud, to deliver a flexible strategy for sound research practice that can be used to produce useful and innovative analyses. While effectively mixing three strands of Grounded Theory methodology, it is done with acknowledgement, so as to avoid contaminating the methodology (see Wimpenny and Gass 2000). Rather the somewhat similar methodologies are explained, and parts selected and combined explicitly, avoiding method slurring (Baker and Edwards 2012). The qualitative nature of the paradigm in GT+ focuses on the search for meaning and understanding to build innovative theory and not universal laws. It is important to recognise that enquiry is always context-bound, and facts should be viewed as both theory-laden and value-laden. Therefore, the focus becomes one of how people behave within an individual and social context.

3. FINDINGS

This chapter will present the findings of the research in the form of a substantive (and perhaps also somewhat tentative) theory. The theory is appropriately named the Self-interest Utility Maximisation theory or SUM-theory for short. Key concepts pertaining to the theory are presented as a foundation, building up to the theory itself. It is by fusing these existing concepts and theories with the discoveries made in this research that the SUM-theory is born. Thus, it is possible to argue that in and by itself it is not a new theory but rather an extension of previous thinking from a different perspective. In any case, this stretch of the imagination based on the findings in this research is a contribution to knowledge and subsequently of value in the fight against corruption.

The chapter will begin by building an argument based upon the research process covering the various steps that the resulting theory came to rest upon. This does not mean that this was the order in which they were initially conceived in the research process. The truth is quite the opposite, where the emerging theory took several turns until it settled around the core category and came into a more tangible form. This awkward journey, however, is for the author to bear alone and now having reached what seems to be a final destination, the reader is presented with a much more manageable map to follow. As discussed in the introduction, the map should not be mistaken for the territory. What is presented next should be viewed exactly like a map, a necessary simplification of reality that allows us to see where we are and understand how the choosing different routes will lead to different places.

"Explicit or implicit theories are needed to: one, order and generalize about reality; two, understand causal relationships among phenomena; three, anticipate and predict future developments; four, distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and five, show what paths that should be taken to achieve certain goals" (Huntington, 1997, p. 30).

The final sections of this chapter will satisfy the curious minds of those more methodologically inclined with a detailed account of how the core category emerged from the data using Grounded Theory+. This is where the codes from the interviews converge. The reason why codes and categories are scarcely discussed throughout the thesis is a natural by-product of the methodology. Thus, this section should be taken for what it is and one of the downsides of the methodology, as discussed in more detail later, proved to be the difficulty to effectively explain every single developmental step of the theory in the research process. Even

so, an attempt is made, and the reader intellectually strengthened by the preceding sections should be able to follow the development of the core category. It will also produce an exploration of some of the findings on the fringes of the study that, if corroborated by further research, would pin-point the theory in terms of where it resides in decision-making. Also, and perhaps, more importantly it gives a snapshot of Grounded Theory+ at work and an idea of how the methodology was applied. Even in the hands of an early career researcher, it makes for a powerful tool.

The first part of this chapter covers the analytical prerequisites for any highly theoretical discussion around behaviour and decision-making, consisting of a contextual outline of free will, self-interest and human nature. The chapter then moves on to the theoretical underpinnings more specific for the theory to come, which manifested itself around three other theories: rational choice, routine activities, and situational factors. From there it is necessary to reconcile some of the fundamental concepts of the theory namely motivation and self-interest. These concepts themselves are subject to scrutiny, debate and, by some, even rejection. That they are used as cornerstones for this research invites the sceptic to question the very fundamentals of the theory. Thus, an in-depth manifestation of interpretation and application is provided as justification. That in turn, provides the backdrop for the next section in which the general theory behind the specific theory developed by this research is developed. The concept of bounded rationality is outlined in order to explain some core propositions that are based in evolutionary biology. Returning to its criminological roots, the chapter then turns to two other concepts that probably are familiar to most criminologists. The concepts of rationalisation and neutralisation are discussed in the light of the theory. The chapter then concludes with sections discussing the core category, how it was developed and how the theory is influenced by findings on the fringe. The chapter ends with a short discussion around the implications of the theory, a discussion that is furthered in the next chapter where those implications are explored in terms of anti-corruption applicability.

3.1 Analytical prerequisites

"No man is just of his own free will, but only under compulsion, and no man thinks justice pays him personally, since he will always do wrong when he gets the chance" (Plato, 2007, p. 43).

The quote above is uttered by Adeimantus in Plato's 'The Republic' and similarly, the core concept that came from the research is that everyone has the potential to be corrupt. Intrinsic to human nature there is a fundamental drive for self-preservation that sometimes takes the shape of self-optimisation by acts deemed as corrupt. This analysis will not address the normative aspects of corruption but rather acknowledge that in the pursuit of certain goals, agents are motivated -through more or less rational deliberation - to behave in ways that are corrupt. It can be useful to reiterate the working definition of corruption used for this analysis:

"Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents or demands to deviate from the criterion, which should rule his decision making, in exchange for a reward, the promise or expectation of it." (Duyne, 2001, p. 3)

The decision-making process as interpreted in this research, however, is based on two fundamental tenets. Firstly, agents have a free will or at least believe they do; and secondly, that there is a self-interested element involved in individual behaviour. Both assumptions deserve further justification despite the limitation of space and words.

Free will

About 150 years ago, Charles Darwin published *On the Origins of Species* (Darwin, 1859) and set in motion an intellectual revolution. It did not take long before others began drawing upon its implications. One of those was Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton who argued that, if humans have evolved then mental faculties like intelligence (and subsequently decision-making faculties) must be hereditary (Galton, 1869). The 'nature versus nurture' term was coined, and a debate started that would ensue until the present day, splitting philosophers, scientists and theologians into at least two schools of thought. The question is important, because after all, morals are fundamentally based on the assumption that actions are subject to a decision-making process and that agents can freely choose between (subjective) right and wrong. The philosopher Immanuel Kant reaffirmed this connection between freedom of choice and goodness arguing that without free will it would make no

sense to say that an agent ought to choose the path of righteousness (Scruton, 2001). Consequently, evidence has accrued for both sides and setting aside fatalism, an intellectual fallacy not developed further here, the only thing tying them together is an assumption that actions must be determined by something.

The concept of free will in this research was something that did not appear from the very beginning. At least it was not identified or coded as 'free will' until the later stages. Somewhere in the axial and coding interplay, a picture started to emerge and once it did, several codes and categories just made more sense. Low level codes, like "self-censorship" and "the will to be corrupt" became interconnected to codes belonging to a higher level of abstraction such as "fear" and "stigma". There was already a code for "decision-making". The process can be described something like this: if there is a will to be corrupt then an agent may abstain from deviancy as the result of the fear of stigma through some sort of self-censorship. The choice for self-censorship may have a number of precipitators but it is nonetheless taken out of free-will.

In contrast some argue that it has already been proven that there is no such thing as free will often referring to the Libet-experiment (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). The experiment concluded that the onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act. Thus, the conscious experience of actually deciding to act associated with free will appeared as retrospective reconstruction of events occurring after the brain has already set the act in motion. Nevertheless, for the confines of this research, both philosophically and practically, it does not actually matter if agents truly possess free will or not, as long as they act as if they do. As research by Vohs and Schooler (2008) on how moral behaviour draws on a belief in free will, it seems that belief in free will corresponds to an agent's subjective perception of accountability for actions. The list goes on: believing that free will is an illusion has been shown to make people less creative, more likely to conform, less willing to learn from their mistakes, and less grateful toward one another (Baumeister, 2008). In every regard, it seems, when we embrace determinism, we indulge our dark side, making it even more important in a corruption context. Even if the deterministic side ends up being scientifically or philosophically proven to be the 'be all and end all' of the free will discussion, it may still be, as argued by Waller (1990), that free will and determinism are not opposites but rather describe behaviour at different levels. For the premise of the arguments presented here and to quote one of the

greatest thinkers of our time, the late Christopher Hitchens (2012), on belief in free will; "I have free will; I have no choice but to have it".

Self-interest - part one

The second assumption, that there is a self-interested element involved in individual behaviour, is an equally complex question particularly from a rational choice perspective. Taking a rational choice approach, the self-interest assumption is often a target of criticism and perhaps sometimes rightly so. It is thus important to clearly state what such an assumption entails and what it excludes. Most importantly, it does not say anything about motivation, only the structure of preferences. Consequently, this thesis will address the two concepts of motivation and rationality separately and independently before tying them both back together. The assumption here is one of instrumental rationality combined with calculative and strategic decision-making; where the extent of the latter two is a matter of degree ranging from fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) to carefully weighing considerations (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010).

Being self-interested agents with free will the question is; what are those interests and how is free will exercised in terms of achieving them? Within the confines of this research - to the (shifting) borders of the EU - the answer can be summed up in a self-interest based theory. Fundamentally, such a theory would be less concerned about the sources of motivation and more about the existence of motivation, and what causes readiness to commit a crime. Nonetheless, in true grounded theory tradition and to further ground the theory, an argument for how agents try to achieve that which is perceived as valuable (i.e. not only to value that which they happen to want) is presented.

It is argued that stemming from the evolutionary pursuit of survival and reproduction, two primary facilitators to those ends in modern day Europe are often power and wealth. Striving for power and wealth does naturally not necessarily mean that an agent will act corruptly. The meaning of an agent maximising the utility of self-interest does, however, encompass a certain measure of rationality when weighing the benefits and costs of future actions before deciding on behaviour. Thus, knowingly or unknowingly, legally or illegally, morally or immorally, the behavioural traits are such that maximising utility in terms of resources, tangible and intangible, be it for the survival and reproduction or one of many intermediates, may involve decisions resulting in corrupt behaviour. This conclusion does not just make sense intuitively but is also supported by research. Extensive analyses of interviews

with key informants all over Europe point in the same direction. Every single one, without exception.

One may question the significance of the opinions and thoughts of key informants, the so-called experts, recalling the extensive study by Tetlock (2006) on expert predictions. While clearly illustrating both the conceptual and practical limits of expert opinion and appealing to the development of standards for judging expert decision-making, no such standard has yet been adopted in the anti-corruption policy arena. European policy is still mainly the concern of think-tanks, policy analysts, political advisors and the like. This thesis does not intend to either evaluate or critique the qualities of that state but does acknowledge its existence as a justification to focus on the theoretical constructs that arose from the interviews with said experts.

A prominent concern for the future of anti-corruption policy and subsequent instruments is the intrinsic nature of the behaviour causing acts of corruption. This is clearly illustrated by more and more codes falling into the category of "corruption available to all". More specifically, the source of motivation residing within individuals is apparently constant, resting latent awaiting the right triggers to drive urges of immorality to the surface. With everyone potentially corrupt, the amount, level, and complexity of control mechanisms designed to repress these urges increases. There is, however, another side to the repressive coin which is expressed as 'prevention'. Some would even argue that prevention is more effective than repression: but the trick is naturally knowing how to prevent with equal or greater efficiency. If the conclusion that from a certain point of view motivation for corrupt behaviour is a constant grounded in human nature, then it would suggest something about how anti-corruption policy makers may capitalise on that fact.

Human nature contextualised

When the end-game is a theory on deviant behaviour designed to reduce corruption and improve the world, it is important to establish an understanding of the concept of "human nature". This is particularly true since the previous discussion may be mistaken for taking a step back to some sort of neo-classical economic view that is considered to be outdated. It is nothing of the sort and some of the possible critiques must be addressed and central issues expanded and understood. Only then can the concept of self-interest as defined in this research make sense.

The concept of a basic human nature has a long history in the social sciences with many researchers attempting to resolve the issues surrounding it: Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Peter Richerson, to name a few. To summarise, the simplistic idea of humans as "homo economicus" has largely been refuted. The results from survey-based fieldwork, and clinical research speaks clearly against humans as solely a utility maximising rational agent. Self-interest is still an important factor when it comes to decision-making; but less important than has generally been portrayed in neoclassical economics. Yet, the theory of this research is built upon exactly this self-interested and utility maximising agent. The rationale is simple - the self-interest utility maximisation factor is still strong enough to significantly influence peoples' behaviour and thus potentially reduce corruption. This is undeniably partly an argument of convenience as otherwise there would be no remedy for corruption to be found in human nature and that does not rhyme well with the findings of this research.

"If all agents acted according to the template prescribed in neoclassic economic theory, they would sooner or later outsmart themselves into a suboptimal equilibrium. This is a "social trap" type of situation, where all agents would be worse off because even if they know they would all gain from cooperation, lacking trust in the others' cooperation, they would themselves abstain from cooperating."
(Rothstein, 2013, p. 1022)

As per this research, human behaviour seems to a large extent to be determined by a forward-looking strategically thinking agent - an advanced version of homo economicus. That is, an agent thinking and behaving also in relation to what other agents are thinking or doing. Thus, instead of looking inwards, and erroneously backwards, to variations in behaviour caused by historically- or culturally-induced factors, the important thing is to observe and understand how an agent's perceptions about "other people" are constructed. This insight is reinforced by research showing that people update their perceptions based on new information (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010). Research also shows that people are willing to engage in what may look like altruistic cooperation for common goals even if they do not personally benefit from this materially (Levi, 1997). Corruption, however, is about so much more than material benefit and the narrow scope of looking at, for example, monetary benefits, is not only myopic in an intellectual sense but also counterproductive from a practical anti-corruption perspective. Human nature as self-interest utility maximisation is about the actions that are perceived as being advantageous to an agent in relation to other agents. Personal material gain may not be in the interest of a particular agent when put in relation to the interests of other agents and/or

the common good. The point, however, is that the agent still acts according to what is perceived as most advantageous in terms of maximising the utility of their own self-interest. How an agent in isolation, i.e. not in relation to other agents would behave is considered a highly theoretical case as it rarely or never occurs in reality.

3.2 Theoretical underpinnings

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." (Lord Acton, 1887)

Having established that all are susceptible to corruption given the opportunity, the next step is to create a theoretical foundation for how this knowledge can be utilised in a constructive way for the development of an anti-corruption framework. Given the premises that motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a degenerated decision-making process, a suitable starting point in terms of criminological models is routine activity theory. Not only does routine activity theory assume motivation to be ever-present but also has its roots in rational choice theory, where the intricacies of decision-making are at the forefront. To fully appreciate how these previous models build towards the Self-interest Utility Maximisation [SUM] theory - the end product presented in this thesis - the model must be explained and contextualised.

Rational choice

To reiterate, traditionally routine activities theory does not explain why an offender is motivated to commit a crime instead assuming that in various ways motivation is ever-present (Clarke, 1983). To fully understand this concept, it can be useful to revisit its origins in rational choice theory. Originally developed by economists⁴, rational choice theory grew out of utilitarian philosophy and was later expanded into the social sciences and criminology (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2003). It provides a perspective on why individual offenders decide to commit specific crimes with rationality as a central premise of the theory. Thus, in terms of offending, whether or not it is done knowingly or unknowingly, rational choice theory posits that offenders weigh the associated potential benefits and consequences of an action and then make a rational choice based on this evaluation. It is not that rational choice theory is without critique (see e.g. McCumber, 2011), but as an abstract philosophical theory rational choice makes sense. In their work on the limitations of rational choice theory de Haan and Vos (2003) correctly point out that any endeavour to empirically test the rational choice theory itself is impossible. This is because rational choice theory is not actually a theory in a strict scientific sense but rather a heuristic model, which, by definition, cannot be refuted but only evaluated in terms of its usefulness. For this context that is enough, as rational choice theory

⁴ Topically covered to great extent by Nobel laureate Kahneman (2011).

focuses on the latent motivation and opportunity structured by situational variables, leading to routine activities theory where motivation and choices merge with opportunity.

Routine activities

Routine activities theory derives from Hawley's (1950) theory of human ecology where the key principles of collective human activities are identified. Later Cohen and Felson (1979) adapted these principles to introduce routine activities theory into the study of criminal behaviour. The theory presumes that some individuals will be motivated towards deviant behaviour and act on these motivations when an opportunity, perceived or real, is presented. Aligned with arguments presented later in this thesis, the dimension of motivation is expanded by Comish and Clarke (2003) to be situationally dependent. Thus, motivation itself is a dynamic variable changing throughout the entire process of deviant behaviour. This includes the early precipitating stage where motivation may either decline in such a way that the offender is dissuaded, or conversely increase to the point where the offender is not only readied but also actively seeking and possibly even taking measures to create opportunity for deviant behaviour.

Routine activities theory differs from other criminological theories that focus on the characteristics of the offender as it examines the situational context in which the deviant behaviour is perpetrated. Thus, it is a theory of place, where different social agents intersect in space and time. Specifically, it focuses on the intersections of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians. It is important to note that routine activities theory offers suggestions about the probability of criminal behaviour rather than making definite claims about when crime will occur. The presence of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and a lack of guardianship do not mean that crime is inevitable. Instead, the theory argues that the likelihood of crime increases or decreases based on the existence of these three elements.

Situational factors

Prevention techniques are consequently either aimed at increasing the level of guardianship, decreasing the influence of motivation or controlling the number of suitable targets, i.e. reducing opportunities. Following the assumption that motivation, though variable, is constantly present, which for this context is axiomatic, the logical outcome is a crime prevention model that address the situational parameters rather than the offender's

disposition. This position is fuelled by codes pointing towards corrupt agents perceiving themselves "above the law" and thus rendering the judicial system weak and the potential for situational cues for behavioural change as the last line of defence. The fundamental idea of introducing situational factors for crime is not new as the concept can be traced back to Sutherland (1949). However it was another four decades until Clarke (1983) thoroughly defined the theory of situational crime prevention, where the focus resides with the event of the crime rather than the perpetrator. Hence, once an offender is ready to commit an act of deviancy, in this case corruption, the actual process of actualisation is determined by instrumental considerations and opportunity alone. Conceptually, situational crime prevention does not address how 'readiness' is achieved, maintained or reduced. Simply put, it presumes a motivated offender and concentrates on disrupting the subsequent decisions made in conjunction with the act of deviance itself (Cornish & Clarke, 2003).

It is argued that acts of deviance referred to as corruption fit well into this category for at least three reasons: first, the notion of a presupposed and ever-present motivation, a concept whose characteristics will be further explored; second, the case for acts of corruption being viewed as instrumentally rational, at least from a subjective perspective; and third, the susceptibility for acts of corruption to be rationalised by neutralisation.

3.3 Reconciliation of motivation and self-interest

"A just system must generate its own support. This means that it must be arranged so as to bring about in its members, the corresponding sense of justice, an effective desire to act in accordance with its rules for reasons and justice. Thus, the requirements of stability and the criterion of discouraging desires that conflict with the principles of justice put further constraints on institutions. They must not only be just but framed so as to encourage the virtue of justice in those who take part in them." (Rawls, 2005, p. 261)

The following section will move through the central structure for the argument of corruption as an opportunity-based crime. Firstly, motivation, although variable, is considered as an ever-present, highly susceptible factor for deviant behaviour. Secondly, the concept of rational choice which is a wide applied and sometimes misunderstood and therefore critiqued behavioural theory but where properly defined and contextualised lends validity to the SUM-theory. Thirdly, bridging motivation and opportunity lies the concept of 'rationalisation through neutralisation'. Lastly, there is the element of opportunity, a somewhat overlooked, or at least not fully utilised, aspect of anti-corruption policy. This is where the gist of this research resides, and a policy focus shift is suggested to better balance anti-corruption efforts towards a comprehensive and more effective equilibrium. The following discussion is presented in a fairly linear format for the sake of intellectual accessibility but is not to be confused with the multidimensional nature of reality where other less probabilistically consequential factors can and will be of significance. Accordingly, this makes for a more complex stochastic system but which nevertheless, is bound to and largely operating along similar lines.

Motivation

The first premise of a rational choice approach is that deviant decision-making in acts of corruption is a multi-stage process. Once motivation is stimulated, offenders become ready to commit a particular act of deviancy if that act effectively can be rationalised in the context of the stimuli, i.e. the real or perceived opportunity. Motivation can arguably take two forms. The first form, positive motivation, where situational precursors drive an agent into deviant behaviour. And the second form, negative motivation, where there is an absence of situational precursors, appealing to the values and norms held by the agent that nominally would inhibit deviant behaviour (Agnew, 1995). Both cases presuppose an underlying latent motivation played upon by external, i.e. situational factors. As has been touched on earlier, , the concept

of motivation is something that is intrinsic to all human beings. It is an evolutionary by-product of our striving for survival and thus an inseparable part of human nature. The biological perspective of motivated behaviour, as (partly) separated from the social context, is an established field of research (see e.g. Wong, 2000).

It is a great challenge within the confines of this research to adequately and convincingly establish this premise, but an attempt is made, as it is the conceptual foundation for the framework of situational prevention of corruption. Without getting overly eclectic, there is a surmised agreement on the role of motivation in causal explanations of purposive actions. Examining why a person engages in a specific action is equivalent to an examination of motivation (Mook, 1996). The underlying reasons for behaviour are what constitutes motivation. According to Wong (2000) these reasons can be analysed at least two levels, only one of which is relevant at this stage: that is the explanation of behaviour in terms of motivational mechanisms, referred to as ultimate causation. The other - proximate causation - has to do more with how certain activities come about and is in this context dealt with vicariously through rationalisation and neutralisation. Claiming that ultimate causation is an evolutionary part of human nature does require some justification, as to what specific function was served by that specific behaviour? It is to say that behaving according to motivational cues led to some type of evolutionary advantage, with motivation loosely defined as being the need or desire to do something, to behave a certain way in order to achieve a goal. Such behaviour is guided by its consequences and is related to some end point linked with biological requirements (2000). Such biological requirements are in their purest form referred to as instincts - complex yet unlearned behaviour with a fixed pattern throughout a species (Lawman, 2005, p. 93).

An outline to this affect is presented by Maslow (1943) in his hierarchy of needs. While one may argue that the modern human moves rather freely and not necessarily consecutively through some of the upper levels of the hierarchy, the jumping decreases as the fundamentality of needs increase. The hierarchy does, however, illustrate that there is a pattern, a structure to motivated behaviour. Ultimately it all boils down to survival and reproduction, and it is suggested that the way to get to any of those is through self-interest utility maximisation: that is, to achieve the greatest possible outcome from the least possible resource investment, creating an advantage for those behaviourally motivated to act accordingly. Now this does not imply that people always possess the cognitive resources nor the environmental context to actually maximise each decision (see e.g. Simon, 1957, 1982).

Nonetheless all active decisions (thus excluding instinct) for behaviour are based on choices perceived to be more or less rational. Motivated behavioural patterns, however, are always the products of an intimate interaction between the organism and its environment (Wong, 2000). Therefore motivation for offending can be supplied by situational precipitators alone, rather than brought to a crime setting by a previously motivated offender (Cornish & Clarke, 2003).

Self-interest - part two

The implication of this is that through the innate drive for self-interest utility maximisation, all humans harbour a default motivation to realise goals in this pursuit, and that situations influence the decision-making governing actual behavioural outcomes. Situational factors can effectively distort the reasoning process, permitting individuals to engage in what would otherwise have been forbidden behaviour. The human mind is highly malleable and sensitive to both the physical and social context in which behaviour is realised (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). Hence, many features of situations that may precipitate or enhance motivation for acts of corruption are imaginable in the absence of a consciously pre-existing motivation on part of the offender (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). So, in a Humean adaptation (1739) reason is a slave of the passions and the objective of reasoning is to secure a need or desire. So, when, by chance or its own accord presented with an opportunity for deviant behaviour, the human mind will facilitate self-interest utility maximisation through rationalisation.

It is acknowledged that there is no single self-interest assumption and it is therefore essential to establish a common understanding of the type and role the assumption plays here. Further, any self-interest assumption may be false as a universal description of human nature while still being sufficiently correct in a certain context. The certain context for this thesis is confined to the geographical boundaries of Europe and ideologically to a secular liberal democratic perspective. Within this context, rational choice comes down to something very basic, namely self-interest, usually in the form of wealth and power (Eriksson, 2011).

Reconciliation

It is possible that the striving for power and wealth is not something that has anything to do with natural selection, and instead is a by-product of something that in fact is selected for. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins (2006) provides a plausible explanation for a similar and in too some extent related phenomenon - that of religion (see also Rothstein & Broms, 2017). The analogy used is that of a moth flying into a flame and perishing. Natural selection did not select suicidal moths, instead it selected for a form of navigation e.g. heeding for a fixed point of light such as the moon. The by-product of this selected behaviour is nonetheless that when moths navigate towards a lit candle they die. Dawkins goes on explaining that children need to acquire a lot of information very quickly if they are to have a good chance of survival. For several reasons, a child cannot carefully reason through every decision and has to develop a sense of trust in those in their vicinity who are older and obviously capable of some level of survival. Thus, as proven by research, humans have a propensity for trust (Rothstein, 2000; Uslaner, 2004; Sean, 2009; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Rothstein, 2011, 2013). This feature can also have its downside: if humans are placed in contexts where corrupt behaviour is the norm, the propensity for trust may be a vulnerability.

In this context it is not hard to imagine wealth and power as (perceived) vehicles to realise the most basic of human needs, even as fundamental as survival and reproduction. Indeed, it would be strange to imagine a human being with absolutely no regard for their own interests, particularly if those interests were survival and reproduction. Therefore, the self-interest assumption is:(1) focused on the extent to which people are self-interested; and (2) clarifying the rather vague concept of self-interest. There is a stark distinction between being self-interested and being selfish.

"We shall occasionally say that people who act in accord with their preferences are self-interested. As already noted, this does not require us to assume that people are selfish in the ordinary sense of that word. ... We assume that people pursue the things that they regard as important, which may include empathy for family, friends, whales trees or random strangers. We believe that an individual's conception of self is reflected in his or her preferences and priorities. Pursuit of those preferences and priorities is self-interest at work." (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997, p. 17)

The central point is that people, here referred to as agents, are self-interested because they choose to maximise their own satisfaction, but that that satisfaction can stem from anything - including altruistic motives (Riker, 1990). Treating the satisfaction of needs and

desires as a utility, the end-product is an agent motivated to SUM-behaviour. Note that in spite of the deterministic phrasing in 'maximisation', there are significant challenges to actually maximising the self-interest utility in absolute terms. Ultimately, notwithstanding limitations in the decision-making process discussed in the next section, what remains intact as the underlying motivation for SUM-behaviour is a subjective notion of maximisation.

3.4 The theory behind SUM-behaviour

"The apparent methodological difficulty with this [denial of responsibility] and several other techniques of neutralisation, both at the level of on-the-spot observation and in the analysis of survey data, is that they may appear only after the delinquent act(s) in question has been committed. They may thus, be seen as after-the-fact rationalisations rather than before-the-fact neutralisations. The question boils down to this: Which came first, the delinquent act or the belief justifying it?" (Hirschi, 1969, pp. 207-208)

To say that an agent is pursuing self-interest utility maximisation is not to say that everyone is completely self-interested in all contexts all the time. Rather the statement carries an assumption that agents are more self-interested in some context than others and that the ability to act rationally upon whatever level of self-interest there is may be significantly limited. It is thus of interest to see what type of decision-making process will dominate when? This helps to understand the governing mechanisms behind why in the pursuit of self-interest utility maximisation, agents sometimes act corruptly. When it comes to rationalisation or neutralisation, the sometimes contentious issue of timing is of less concern in this particular application. Whereas social learning theorists based on the theories of Akers (Akers, 1985) may claim that deviancy must be neutralised before committing a crime, research by Minor (1984), Hamlin (1988) and Pogrebin, Poole and Martinez (1992) indicates that neutralisation follows rather than precedes deviancy.

Further research by Cromwell and Thurman support Hirschi's claim that the assumption that delinquent acts come before justifying beliefs is the more plausible causal ordering. More importantly, the research of Cromwell and Thurman also suggests that rationalisation and neutralisation essentially are the same behaviour at different stages in the event of deviancy (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003, pp. 547-548). For the purposes of understanding corruption as the result of SUM-behaviour, however, the timing of rationalisation and neutralisation matters less. The important thing, to establish how it influences behaviour, is that they occur. From a rational choice perspective an act deemed as corrupt is one that is in contradiction with the values and norms held by the agent, a realisation that could occur pre- or post-hoc requiring a level of rationalisation by neutralisation.

To fully understand rationalisation by neutralisation in this context it is convenient to first step back to the fundamentals of what it is to be rational. Given most of the books and articles on rational choice are based on some assumption similar to self-interest utility maximisation, some further exploration may be required. Rationality in decision-making is not as simple as it

would seem and is thus not without critique, where the limits of rationality may be significantly narrower than one would think. As Harding (1997) argues, it is rational to act for the sake of self-interest, extra-rational to act for the sake of one's group interest, and irrational to act for neither self-interest nor group interest. There are numerous studies showing our propensity for irrationality, for example demonstrating that people make radically different choices about scenarios depending on whether it is described in terms of risk or gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1992) and that anchoring bias is a highly significant and a determinative aspect⁵ (Quattrone, 1982; Plous, 1989; T. D. Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Critics may also say that the rational choice approach is significantly limited since much behaviour is driven by motives other than self-interest. Nonetheless, even if acknowledging the tenet of other undefined sources of motivation, it would be of little consequence to the construct of corruption as an opportunity-based crime.

⁵ See also Chapman & Johnson (1994) and Brewer & Chapman (2002) for the limits of anchoring.

Bounded rationality

Rationality is about intentional, or in the phrasing of Merton (1936), purposive action: behaviour is interpreted as action and is explained by referring to the underlying reasons for performing it (Elster, 2007). This is not a new idea: Weberian⁶ interpretive sociology also emphasises the rationality assumption as necessary for interpreting behaviour as action, and shares with the rational choice approach a commitment to methodological individualism (Eriksson, 2011). Thus, it is the individual within a situation that is central to how goals are deliberately pursued. Here situation is understood not as an absolute reality but as subjectively perceived. In terms of rationality that is, if deconstructed, it is rational for that individual in that situation, given that the individual a) possesses all the relevant information, b) the capacity to correctly process that information and, c) enough time for that process. This is naturally not the case in any real situation and the response to this was, most notably, developed by Simon (1997) in his work on bounded rationality. The concept builds upon the following proposition for a), b) and c). Decision-makers have to work under three unavoidable constraints: a) only limited, often unreliable information, is available regarding possible alternatives, their outcome and consequences; b) the human mind has limited capacity to evaluate and process the available information; and c) only a limited amount of time is available to make a decision. Therefore, rational choice decision-making in a complex situation (i.e. with any combination of conditions a, b and c) and is confined to satisficing rather than maximising choices see figure 5.




Figure 5: Decision-making reduced to satisficing through bounded rationality.

⁶ For an excellent introduction to Weber, see Poggi (2006).

Note that, in figure 5, the bracket of sub-optimal division extends outside of the elliptically illustrated perceived rationality into what can be considered as absolute or actual rationality. This means that although the division is made to be 'good enough', it may very well be optimal or closer to it than initially calculated within the confines of the bounded rationality. Furthering the concept of limited calculation capabilities, sometimes heuristic shortcuts are applied. This is well illustrated by Gigerenzer and his research team (1999) in their work on "fast and frugal heuristics", where good decision-making is facilitated in spite of the bounded reality.

This can be explained as follows:

"...during evolutionary times, there has been selection for the ability to solve certain decision problems quickly and reliably, and we are thus equipped with heuristics for estimating things that it would take enormous information or calculating capability to decide in the traditionally rational way." (Eriksson, 2011, p. 47)

Although it is infamously difficult to prove how anything in fact has evolved, it can be said that for a trait to be selected it must be beneficial to survival and reproduction. As discussed earlier, humans have always striven, by self-interest toward utility optimisation, survival and reproduction. Two traits that have persisted throughout modern history as vehicles in that pursuit are power and wealth. The research findings underpinning this thesis, point towards motivation for self-interest utility maximisation with both power and wealth as latent variables. That does not mean that an agent is constantly preoccupied with either of the two but much like survival and reproduction the underlying latent striving for power and wealth is always there, primarily influenced by situational precipitators, i.e. individual and contextual triggers that stimulate incentives. This position also indirectly addresses several points of critique: where to position calculated vs. un-calculated decision-making, and to what extent the latter is rational.

Calculated decision-making involves more intricate reasoning, not necessarily including all cost and benefits but certainly including consequences where uncalculated decisions refer to emotional reactions, i.e. instinct which is often but not always irrational. However, emotionally motivated decision-making persists for the same reason that altruistic cooperation has: it provides an evolutionary advantage. How exactly is for evolutionary game theorists and biologists to discover but reduced to the simplistic prisoner's dilemma, if defecting is often a better strategy than cooperating, over time, cooperation should have been selected against, i.e.

gone extinct. But as seen in the tit-for-tat experiment there is a strategy for cooperation that may supersede defection, particularly in the long run. And that is where we, in a sense, are, at the end of that long run, where some certainty can be placed in acknowledging that previous behaviour has been conducive to survival and reproduction - the ultimate self-interest utility maximisation of any species. Otherwise we would not be here. What remains is then to show how, from a self-interest utility maximisation perspective, it would be rational to pursue power and wealth; and how this may lead to acts of corruption.

Expressions of survival and reproduction through power and wealth

It is important to note that this research does not intend to make a causal connection between the striving for survival and reproduction to that of power and wealth. The discussion should by no means be seen as a conclusive account of the root causes of corruption but rather as a possible explanation that makes intuitive sense and, more importantly is grounded, in the data. What is drawn empirically from the research is a striving for power and wealth and unfortunately the achievement of power and wealth is often realised by corrupt behaviour. Although the nature of such behaviour varies, both from a normative as well as a descriptive perspective, the fundamentals tie in to the central tenet of this discussion. Individuals do not necessarily need to consciously try to maximise their chances of survival and reproduction, but if they behave in a way that does not, they will have fewer offspring on the whole and that behaviour will be selected against. The same goes for the pursuit of any goal. If the behavioural traits associated with that goal were not beneficial, they would be selected against, implying an evolutionary push for, in this case, the vehicles of power and wealth. It is however important to maintain focus on what this thesis sets out to do as well as what it does not:

"One thing about which the rational choice approach has very little to say is about the deliberation of goals. A framework about instrumental rationality takes goals as given, and concerns deliberation about how to achieve those goals. How then can such a framework account for the search for what goals to have? The answer is simple: it cannot." (Eriksson, 2011, p. 94)

Now, one may not agree that power and wealth are effective instruments for either survival or reproduction., However the research indicates that the striving appears omnipresent in modern society. So, if the argument that power and wealth as contemporary vehicles to survival and reproduction create latent motivation for achieving goals in line with the associated needs and desires - then unethical behaviour could appear as a rational choice and corruption would be pervasive. Thus, corruption is pervasive and this is concluded by

several scholars (Erickson & Hills, 2006; Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Persson et al., 2013), officially stated by EU ministers (Malmström, 2014) and echoed by several of the interviewees for this research -

3.5 Rationalisation and neutralisation

“One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we’ve been bamboozled long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle. We’re no longer interested in finding out the truth. The bamboozle has captured us. It’s simply too painful to acknowledge, even to ourselves, that we’ve been taken. Once you give a charlatan power over you, you almost never get it back.” (Sagan, 1996, p. 237)

With any afflicted system, recognising and admitting its deleterious state is always the first step to recovery. In this case that means acknowledging the pervasiveness of corruption in modern society. The second step differs., Sometimes the system requires immediate treatment of the symptoms, often in the shape of post-hoc repressive measures. Unfortunately, the resources invested in the search for root causes often seems to be inversely proportionate to the success of the treatment of symptoms. Thus, it is not uncommon to encounter little or no interest in finding out or understanding why corruption permeates the system as long as the symptoms are kept in check. Keeping the system alive is arguably the highest priority, so as a means to an end this is not all bad. Nonetheless, the argument presented here is that once the system is stable enough or if the symptoms of corruption do not threaten the existence of the system as a whole, then root causes must be understood and addressed. In the rational choice context presented here, the first part of that argument, understanding root causes, posits the question: what are the primary mechanisms by which unethical, i.e. corrupt behaviour, becomes a rational choice?

The answer lies partly in the concepts of rationalisation and neutralisation. Rationalisation is the cognitive process whereby individuals maintain their perceptions of themselves as moral actors by constructing justifications for their deviancy (Cressey, 1953). The earliest writings about rationalisation were published over a century ago by psychoanalyst Ernest Jones (1908). Broadly, Jones described rationalisation as a (false) explanation of behaviour with a plausible ring of rationality that is in agreement with the individual’s normative ideas. In short, it is a cognitive distortion which bends the dominant normative structure (Hollin, 2007), i.e. a reconciliation between actions and norms. There are scholars that have criticised rationalisation theory (see e.g. Goldstraw-White, 2012, p. 28). The concept however, remains valid and as Cressey (1953) notes, rationalisations are verbalisations, and the interpretations thereof are the only means to gain an insight into the perceptions of the individual. These accounts are the explanations of deviant behaviour which bridge the gap

between actions and normative expectations (M. B. Scott & Lyman, 1968). The structural integrity of that bridge can be partly explained by neutralisation theory.

The origins of the underpinning theory for neutralisation can be traced back to Sykes and Matza (1957) outlining five neutralisation techniques used for rationalising behaviour. Sykes and Matza's theory is an elaboration of Edwin Sutherland's (1947) proposition that individuals can learn criminal techniques. Since its original formulation, neutralisation theory has been frequently cited in sociology and criminology. Perhaps, Maruna and Copes (2005) provide the most comprehensive summary to date. Fritsche (2005) articulates some common misunderstandings around neutralisation theory. Overall, research has produced mixed results leading some to conclude that neutralisation theory may not be powerful enough to stand alone, notwithstanding that it is incorporated into a variety of other theories (Copes & Deitzer, 2015).

Around the same time as Sykes and Matza (1957) presented their theory on delinquency introducing the concept of neutralisation, Festinger (1957) presented a very similar notion in his concept of cognitive dissonance. The theory behind cognitive dissonance may seem somewhat counterintuitive as it proposes that actions can influence subsequent beliefs and attitudes for example, toward corruption. This is counterintuitive because it would be logical to consider actions as the result of beliefs and attitudes rather than the cause of them. The theory does, however, have appeal in that it addresses the pervasive human tendency to neutralise.

Cognitive dissonance is conceptually based in three fundamental assumptions. Firstly, humans are assumed to be sensitive to inconsistencies between actions and beliefs: secondly, recognition of this inconsistency will cause dissonance, and will motivate an agent to resolve the dissonance; and thirdly, this dissonance can be resolved in one of three basic ways. Those ways are: change beliefs, change behaviour; or change perception of the behaviour. Note that dissonance theory does not state that these modes of dissonance reduction will actually work; only that agents who are in a state of cognitive dissonance will take steps to reduce the extent of their dissonance.

What follows is a brief overview of mechanisms that allows deviant behaviour to be aligned with rational choice theory, rationalisation and neutralisation. The concepts and their intricacies are not of primary concern in this research and thus not subject to in-depth scrutiny, nor are they completely absolved from critique when adapted and applied to the context at hand.

The effect of neutralisation on moral judgment

Table 1: The four stages of moral judgement contextualised for corruption

Component	Description	Contextualised for corruption
Recognising a moral issue	The ability to neutralise will have a negative effect on moral judgments (attitudes) and allow unethical alternatives to be perceived as less problematic.	When faced with a situation involving decisions that are recognised as being corrupt - i.e. paying a bribe.
Moral judgment	When a moral judgment is in favour of ethically superior choices, the ability to neutralise will increase the likelihood that an agent will form inconsistent moral intentions.	Moving beyond recognising the moral issues to exploring what actions are morally justifiable - i.e. to pay or not to pay.
Resolving concerns	When moral intentions are in favour of ethically superior choices the ability to neutralise will increase the likelihood that an agent will submit to situational constraints or opportunities that inhibit him or her from acting upon those positive intentions.	This is where a prioritisation of values occurs. Generally moral values are prioritised over other personal values, but neutralisation may lead to situational influence - e.g. here bribes are commonplace.
Acting on moral concerns	The use of neutralisation techniques following actual behaviour (if successfully internalised) will reduce the likelihood that an agent will recognise a moral dimension to a similar problem in the future.	If the deviant actions are fully neutralised the likelihood that the agent will recognise the moral issues with paying a bribe in a similar situation in the future is reduced.

Nonetheless, there are ways to effectively apply neutralisation theory to the context of corrupt behaviour through a series of conceptual steps. First, one must accept the tenet that the need for neutralisation presumes that behaviour violates some type of norm. Second, empirical research points to the efficacy of neutralisation techniques as an inverse function of the absolute deviance from the norm. That means that the extent to which people effectively neutralise deviant behaviour is greater for relatively small breaches, rather than those clearly deviant (Bersoff, 2001; Fritsche, 2005). In several of the interviews conducted in this research the participants allude to notions abstracted as 'gradually corrupt', indicating a succession of rather small normative breaches; and 'unknowingly corrupt', as a lack of subsequent change in attitude towards the breach. Highlighting the usefulness of neutralisation, Chatzidakis et al. (2004) states that neutralisation represents a psychological process capable of restoring equilibrium without attitude change, more widely applicable in small ethical breaches than in clearly deviant activities. Third, the concept of neutralisation must be elevated to a higher level of abstraction, i.e. viewed as an underlying structure for ethical decision-making. To illustrate this in the context of corruption the research findings are applied to a four-stage model of

moral judgement, informed by the work of Rest (1979). The model outlined in table 1. should not be considered linear as components are interactive.

Neutralisation techniques

It is established that when it comes to ethical behaviour, social and personal norms play a crucial role (Janette, Gordon, & John, 2002; Davis, Riske-Morris, & Diaz, 2008). When those norms are insufficient to guide behaviour, an agent may apply coping strategies to soften or eliminate the impact of the norm violating behaviour (Grove, Vitell, & Strutton, 1989). This is something that, to an extent, challenges everyone all the time in everyday life where behaviour has to be rationalised as a result of various irrationalities of the human psyche. It only becomes a problem when the actions rationalised are either, by definition, illegal or immoral to an extent that is (subjectively or collectively) unacceptable. Immoral and illegal acts are more commonly a result of neutralising rationalisations rather than a fundamentally deviant psychology (Heath, 2008). Note that even if rationalisation is a common cause of deviant behaviour, it does not mean that it is the only cause. As discussed with reference to bounded rationality, the fact that an agent may know a lot about acceptable norms does not imply that everything is known. Thus, contrary to the viewpoint that deviant behaviour is solely based on deviant norms, it is suggested that an agent rationalises behaviour through a set of neutralisation justifications (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

It is through neutralisation techniques, that an agent can reconcile deviant behaviour. Hence, the individual may remain committed to the value system of the particular situation while committing criminal acts without experiencing the cognitive dissonance that might be otherwise expected. This can be understood from the flexibility of the normative systems in contemporary societies where norms act as "qualified guides for action, limited in their applicability in terms of time, place, persons, and social circumstances" (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 666), rather than being categorical imperatives. For example, taking lives may be justified in times of war, and in the context of corruption, adopting situationally conditioned behavioural patterns that facilitate corruption by qualifying those actions as acceptable thus conceptually, though not practically, remaining within the normative system. Sykes and Matza (1957) outlined five neutralisation techniques: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victims, appeal to higher loyalties, and condemnation of condemners. Similarly to other studies seeking to adapt these techniques to a particular context (e.g. Strutton, Vitell, & Pelton, 1994) the techniques here are contextualised specifically for corruption in table 2.

Table 2: The five neutralisation techniques contextualised for corruption

Neutralisation technique	Description	Contextualised for corruption
Denial of responsibility	A circumstance in which an agent argues no personal accountability for norm-violating behaviour because factors beyond control were operating.	"Here everyone is paying bribes and if you want to succeed you will have to do it too..."
Denial of Injury	A circumstance in which one contends that personal misconduct is not really serious because no party directly suffered as a result of it.	"What is wrong with hiring your nephew? He is a good guy and the job gets done."
Denial of Victim	A circumstance in which one counters the blame for personal actions by arguing the violated party deserved whatever happened.	"Due to us knowing the purchaser the other company didn't stand a chance. They didn't deserve it anyway since they shafted us on the previous deal".
Condemning the condemners	A circumstance in which one deflects accusations of misconduct by pointing out that those who would condemn engage in similarly disapproved activities.	"The top brass wouldn't dare to launch an investigation into what we are doing since they then themselves could be subject of suspicion and we all know how they operate."
Appeal to higher loyalties	A circumstance in which one argues that the norm-violating behaviour is the result of an attempt to actualise some higher order ideal or value.	"The reason we paid these bribes was for a good cause. Without us people would have starved, can you live with that?"

Corruption made rational

The logical conclusion of the arguments presented is that decisions, including those for deviant behaviour, are almost always perceived to be rational. Now, most work based on the rational choice approach is used to explain collective outcomes and aggregate phenomena. If the phenomenon examined is that of corruption it should arguably be possible to deconstruct the elements to better understand the individuals behind the corrupt behaviour. Through direct or vicarious interactions in everyday life, an individual is notified of a wide range of possible choices - some corrupt, most not - by the needs, desires and beliefs in the pursuit of self-interest utility maximisation. The choices of interest here are those potentially leading to acts constituting unethical behaviour and corruption. These choices are evaluated within a bounded rationality on the basis of whether an individual is willing and able to put them into practice. Where deviant behaviour is being contemplated, the choice structuring properties of the actions being evaluated are also relevant (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, 1989). That is, for

example, if normative values such as morals are an issue for the individual, they too will pertain to the process of choice evaluation. If the choice is made in favour of deviant behaviour as being the most suitable course of action for achieving the individual's goals, then he or she is said to be ready - i.e. having achieved readiness (Cornish & Clarke, 2003).




Figure 6. Neutralisation in the moral judgement process.

Building upon that, illustrated by figure 6, it is by combining the content of the table 1 and 2 that one can clearly see how rationalisation and neutralisation works to sustain and perpetuate corrupt behaviour feeding into the entirety of the moral judgment process leading to a decision. perceived to be rational, but which is deviant,

Given the latent nature of motivation and how it is highly susceptible to rationalisation and neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption is opportunity. The logic is that regardless of motivation, and irrespective of rationalisation and neutralisation ability - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Naturally, an agent can arguably be sufficiently motivated to create an opportunity: but the opportunity itself is nevertheless an essential necessity.

3.6 Opportunity

"Out of clutter, find simplicity; from discord make harmony; In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity." (Einstein quoted by Wheeler, 2004)

This is where the codes from the interviews converge, some more obviously than others. The reason why codes and categories are scarcely discussed throughout the thesis is a natural by-product of the methodology. To reiterate the fundamentals of Ground Theory it is the practice of identifying, refining and integrating categories of meaning stemming from data, to provide an explanatory framework - a theory. It is not intended to simply lift statements out of the verbatim accounts of the participants., The core category emerged from the data as the result of the inductive-deductive interplay that is Grounded Theory. Therefore, the theory is abstracted from the data and allowed to evolve throughout the entire research process. Thus, the "theory", halfway into the research process -to the extent that more or less embryonic formulations can be called a theory- may say very little about the phenomenon under investigation compared to the end result. Nonetheless, while the previous sections in this chapter have built a strong intellectual argument, building upon existing theories and research, this section will focus on the developmental stages of the core category from a strictly methodological perspective. This section will cover the core category 'opportunity' and how it emerged from the data. To conceal and protect their identities, participants have been codified by a number instead of names.

The early codes

Going through every single code that came about, was relabelled, or even discarded would not be feasible given the confines of this thesis, nor would it be helpful for the reader to understand the end result of the research process. Instead, by looking at a number of early codes and how they evolved through the reflexive process into the core category, the reader can hopefully appreciate both method and result. Hence, this section will first introduce a number of early codes, explain them and how some of them relate to each other. Then moving on to how and why categories were formed and finally how those categories in turn relate to the core category.

Some of the early codes were; **reciprocal corruption** and **economy of favours**. Where reciprocal corruption was described as: "There is a reciprocity in corruption - both parties get (to a greater or lesser extent) something they want" (Participant 27). The economy of favours was similarly described as "You are never independent as you must work the economy of

favours (at some level)" (Participant 26). These early codes pointed towards what came to one of the first categories - **cronyism**. The category appeared very prominently as a code in the second interview performed with Participant 819. A reflexive memo read: "Cronyism seems very important to Participant 819. Why? How important is this?". The memo acknowledges a recognition of a phenomenon important to the participant but that the researcher at this point does not fully understand it. It is, however, through memos like this that the researcher is allowed to follow-up on this through subsequent interviews and extant literature. according to the resources selection system developed for Grounded Theory+.

Other early codes were: **market place of power** and **value laden results**. The 'market place of power' meant that "everything in the world in terms of exchange there is a marketplace. Corruption is the perverted marketplace of power (and money). A black market can only exist where the white market is seriously/fundamentally flawed" (Participant 26). With 'value laden results' indicating that "the result/effect of corruption is value laden. It maybe a new phenomenon as the result of a more globalised world. Perhaps, nowadays we are compared abasing a different set of standards?" (Participant 819). This would point to corrupt norms and values somehow seeping into a particular social context and distorting it to the point where the decision-making processes degenerate. That social context later became a category that intrigued many memos, many of which posed questions about what was particular to the social context that lead to corruption becoming the rational choice.

The answer to the particulars of a social context that endorses corruption came indirectly from a number of codes pertaining to the internalisation of deviancy, such as **fear**, **stigma**, and **pride**. Fear has both pros and cons in terms of countering corruption. While "fear of allegations is a powerful counter agent, and the fear of being accused of being corrupt acts as self-defence, self-perseverance" (Participant 418), at the same time: "the fear of going into clinch keeps us quiet" (Participant 819). The concept of fear also came back in conjunction with another code **naivety** and Participant 819 stated that: "we are not always naive - sometimes we are afraid". The memos after the coding obviously read: "fear of what?" The answer became clear through testimonies like: "the foundation for self-censorship is fear and practically it is more often a question of passivity rather than activity." The self-censorship being a form of self-preservation the next memo read: "What does the passivity that participant talks about refer to, mean? Passivity from what?". Together with the code, 'pride' and "the desire to find not only things but also yourself the way you want it to be" (Participant 1662) led to the conclusion that there was an element of integrity involved in the social

context. This integrity seemingly guided the decision-making process, but as memos reveal, the question then becomes where does the integrity and subsequently the decision-making process break down?

The later categories

Integrity being sorted under the category 'social context' led to one of the first higher order categories, one under which other categories started to align. Another category aligned with social context was **awareness**, which was made up of codes such as **myopia** and **blinkers**. The code for myopia is well illustrated by Participant 719 stating that "if you believe all public servants to be clean you do not see when they are not - if you believe in clean your ability to see what is going on is impaired." Also, blinkers were a testament to the effects of a "weak culture that in spite of a relatively good ethical compass is naive to corruption" (Participant 1013). Further, it is here where the codes of **naivety** and **awareness of naivety** reside. These were codes that featured prominently in early memos, perhaps partly as this has been and to some extent continues to be an explanation for corruption occurring in Sweden.

Another category whose content played well with social context was **normality**, made up of only three codes - the first two **ordinary life** and **forgetting criminality** are possibly not the two best labels but remember that for many of the codes, in vivo labelling was used. That is, the words used by the respondents were mirrored in the labelling as a methodological tool so as not to lose meaning at an early stage. As codes and categories were abstracted, labels naturally evolved with the analysis, while remained rooted in the original in vivo labels. Ordinary life provided a "perspective that is affected by the notion of business as usual and the strive for (profit) maximisation. This is fuelled by a lack of (political) commitment from the public sphere added with a 'not-in-my-back-yard' perspective" (Participant 118). Another participant used the 'frog in the pot' analogy and went on to say that "people become used to the evils they know and are familiar with" (Participant BF). This "normality leads to forgetting the criminality of an act and you persuading yourself that you are not corrupt" (Participant 418). The ensuing memos revolved around the concept of 'normality' as being highly contextual depending on circumstances and the opportunity to be corrupt. This is the first time in the research process that the analysis alludes to the idea of opportunity playing a role.

Normality is conditioned by a number of codes, some of them sorting under another higher order category **influences**. Influence is partly described as "the large group influencing the small group" (Participant 1662). Categories under influences include **political influences**,

which in turn is formed of codes such as *paying lip service* and *lack of commitment*. "There are different drivers at different levels. From desperation to desires to personal gain, to peace and quiet - where corruption is seen as long-term form of taking responsibility. In some ways there are good intentions. Politicians want to appear as decisive and gain a good reputation" (Participant 1211). It is when this political structure fails to serve the public good that people due to a sense of *lack of inclusion*, for different reasons may consider themselves *above the law*. "The people are as corrupt as the system allows them to be" (Participant 132). The word 'allows' was explored in a memo, where it was considered to have many possible meanings. It could mean allow as in 'grant access' for those willing to engage in corruption, but it also means that it allowed those forced into corruption as well as those unknowingly corrupt. The memo concluded that 'allow' bore striking resemblances in contextual meaning with 'opportunity' and questioned the source(s) of motivation.

When exploring motivation, at first the classic codes appeared such as *greed over need* and *forced corruption*, where the latter was mentioned to describe the type of corruption that did not exist to a great extent neither of the two were surprising to find within a European context of corruption. There was, however, also another aspect of forced corruption where an agent could be "sucked into corruption and feel a pressure to keep up appearances" (Participant 26). The previous codes on *self-preservation* and *self-censorship* also reappear here as some sort of behavioural constraints on what otherwise appeared to be an underlying *will to be corrupt*. Motivation was obviously a function of the category attitude to corruption, made up from codes including expectations "corruption is very common and there are no incentives to do anything preventative about that" (Participant 118) and *expression of dissatisfaction* strengthening the notion of lack of inclusion. There was also an expression of *results over ethics* where "the focus on results overshadow morals and one turns the blind eye not daring to ask questions" (Participant 27). Elements of fear and self-preservation also present, it would seem that career "longevity is not equal to responsibility" (Participant 26).

The roots on motivation kept enticing the research process where on one hand there were codes sorted under the categories *creeping corruption* and *unknowingly corrupt*. A "succession of small decisions over time. Gradually becoming corrupt. Easier to be unaware, but also easier to rationalise the small steps" (Participant 4). There were, on the other hand, also indications of large transgressions also being available as viable choice. "Institutionalised corruption vs. opportunistic - it is different in how it is perceived and how easy or hard it is to rationalise." (Participant 1312). The concluding memo in the exploration of motivation simply

read "while taking many forms motivation for corruption somehow always seem to be present". In an attempt to shed some light on how this motivation was raised into actions the direction of the research process was towards "opportunity".

The core category

The core category in this research for understanding corruption is "opportunity". This is rooted all the way back into the early codes such as ***unfair allocation of services*** and ***unique benefits***. The idea of the process behind unfair allocation of services is "if you have a system with a process that is supposed to be democratic - then the interests of the different parts of society would sort of be interested in deciding in the outcome, and the outcome would not be good for everyone because that is not possible but it is good for the majority" (Participant 1923). Unique benefits, similarly implies "you receiving something that no-one else does - unless they do the same" (Participant 27). The codes categorised under equality: but as the memos testify - equality of what? Is it equality of rights, or is it equality of outcomes? Constant comparison with an early stage interview provided the answer in "opportunity is connected to motivation" (Participant 418), as it being about equality of opportunity. It is now that opportunity starts to rise in the level of abstraction with codes and categories neatly ordering beneath it.

Several categories were directly linked to opportunity. The category ***attitudes towards corruption*** is conditioned about the perception of opportunity for corruption. The category ***creeping corruption*** needs opportunity to creep in the first place. All codes sorted under the complex ***decision-making process*** are dependent on an opportunity to realise any deviant decision. Some categories were more indirectly linked to opportunity: ***influences*** and ***awareness*** are examples where opportunity is more of an underlying than an overarching factor, nonetheless intrinsic to the process perpetuating deviancy in the form of corruption. "Willingness and unwillingness are dictated by circumstances. Those circumstances may refer to opportunity" (Participant 418).

The literature

Before discussing the literature on opportunity and corruption a note about the use of literature in Grounded Theory+ may serve as a useful reminder. All literature used has passed through the resource selection criteria presented in Chapter 2. Further, as pointed out by Glaser (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001) everything is data, and therefore not only peer-reviewed

journals and monographs have been used to support and validate the findings presented in this research. Having said that, an omnipresent reflective process governs the entire data selection process, partly captured in the memos, to delineate the limits of data used.

Looking at the literature of criminological theories of deviancy, there are a variety of assumptions around the role played by opportunity. Perhaps not as obvious as one would think, Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990) argue that opportunity is necessary for a crime, as do Schuchter and Levi (2015). Thus, 'readiness' does not in and by itself facilitate action as it also requires opportunity. Whether an agent enters a setting readied for deviancy or whether readiness is precipitated by the setting itself is generally an important aspect in criminal decision-making (see e.g. Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Wortley, 2010). In this context however, it is of less significance since according to Cornish and Clarke (2003), readying events prior to the rational choice process, although possibly affecting the process, do not necessarily determine the behavioural outcome. It is important to remember the central argument is that motivation for possibly deviant, i.e. corrupt SUM-behaviour, intrinsically remains ever-present though dynamic. Consequently, the common denominator of either a mundane agent being presented with an opportunity as opposed to a predatory agent purposefully creating an opportunity, is just that: opportunity.

An agent more or less randomly presented with an opportunity for corruption would seek to commit actions that are easily rationalised. That is, in a view consistent with the rational choice approach, to suggest that the ability to rationalise would be an additional requirement to the basic decision-making task. In contrast, a predatory agent would engage in activities such as the conscious search, manipulation, or invention of opportunities for deviant SUM-behaviour. Nevertheless, both categories of agents would exist in a condition of 'qualified readiness', more-or-less susceptible to various precipitators. Wortley ((cited in Cornish & Clarke, 2003, p. 42) identifies four type of precipitators⁷ - prompts; pressures; permissions; and provocations. Each of these may provide situationally-generated motivation to the hitherto unmotivated.

⁷ Moreover Wortley (2010) also argues for precipitators being equally important to control as opportunity.

The result

Basically, any agent is continually sensitive to situational cues connected to the individual agent's ability to rationalise deviant behaviour. Such cues may cause the agent perceive the rational choice to also be the legal and/or moral choice where the likely effectiveness of such situational cues will be determined both by the extent of the offender's readiness to offend, and by the strength of the techniques in question (Cornish & Clarke, 2003).




Figure 7: The central position of opportunity in SUM-behaviour driven acts of deviancy.

Although opportunity is partly grounded in objective facts (a bribe is either offered or it is not), perception of opportunities and their use or rejection is subjective and depends on the characteristics of the agent interwoven with a particular context. These will determine the extent to which cues of opportunity are desired, detected, sized, sought, manipulated, manufactured and otherwise related to the agent. The relationship between an agent and the opportunity cues is not only determined by the impact of a single situation but also prior experience of a particular behaviour (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). Imagine, private citizens finding themselves somehow excluded from opportunity, be it for common goods or business ventures, because of a cost in resources, be it time, money or another hurdle. In order to

facilitate access to a seemingly unachievable yet perceived fair opportunity, the citizens are faced with another option - to engage in corruption. If through bribes and other forms of corruption the opportunity is granted, it is not certain that the citizens would view the situation as anything but (subjectively) advantageous.

As illustrated by figure 7, the latent motivation for SUM behaviour and the propensity for rationalisation by neutralisation taken together, opportunity control is left as the final frontier (or in a sense the first frontier) for effective prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. Coupled with the assumption a rational agent of free will, echoing Gottfredson and Hirshi's (1990) seminal yet contested self-control theory, the underlying assumption is an agent rational in choice to perform an action. Where rationality is under heavy fire from externalities in interplay with the agent's decision-making processes; the breakdown of society may effectively free an agent for deviant behaviour as described by control theory (Hirschi, 2001). Group dynamics may change perceptions of deviancy as describe by social learning theory (Akers, 1990)., As explained by general strain theory, deviant behaviour becomes an inevitable outcome of the toxic situational combination (Agnew, 1992). Thus, when the environment in which the agent resides does not provide a subjectively adequate means to achieve SUM goals and desires by moral means the opportunity for immoral ones is more or less consciously sought (and contemplated).

3.7 The "At Least Level"-assumption

"Making of rules and social symbolic order is a human industry matched only by the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing, and unmaking of rules and symbols in which people seem almost equally engaged." (Moore, 1978, p. 1)

This section will further explore the source of motivation for deviant and corrupt behaviour. Regardless of rational choice theory and the idea of homo economics there must be something that drives decision-making, particularly when talking about conscious and contemplated decision-making, the type of thinking that generally precedes an act of deviancy that results in being corrupt. Given that on some occasions instinct and sub-conscious reaction may lead to corruption, it does not generally seem to be the case. The point is that it seems to matter less as there is something else at the core of motivation for corruption. "People do not think about their opportunity for corruption" (Participant 214). Even though the analysis on this point is definitive, the discussion is nevertheless both interesting and relevant. As one participant expressed it, "opportunity is central for rationalisation but hard to describe further than that", alluding to the sources of motivation; and then went on to say "in scientific articles about corruption people start with the idea that if you can you will be corrupt" (Participant 1923). This does tie in with rational choice, but the ties seem weak; surely, not all share the will to be corrupt, yet many end up being it. The assumption is therefore that there is a much smaller element of analysis available to explain the source of motivation and cause of corruption on an individual level.

Given the pervasiveness and ubiquity of corruption in society, questions to where it all begins are appealing to those with a vested interest in fighting corruption. It is sometimes said that corruption is like cancer, a statement perhaps coined or at least made famous in 1996 by then President of the World Bank James D Wolfensohn (1996). The implicit assumption of the analogy that corruption can be cured is not supported by the findings in this research. If the metaphor is to have any value, it is important understand where the corruption is located in the "societal body". As Rothstein (2017), insightfully and colourfully comments that just as a cancer patient asking her doctor for a possible cure is not helped by the advice that she should have chosen other parents, researchers often confuse the notion of statistical significance with policy significance. There are further problems with this analogy⁸. First: there is the question of choice and although several risk factors associated with cancer are known, all

⁸ For an interesting in-depth account on the "cancer is corruption" analogy fallacy see Heywood (2017).

are not. Although some of the known facts can be avoided, it is still hard to conceive an agent deliberately setting out to get cancer. The same cannot be said for corruption. Even if some corruption arguably occurs under what this research codes as "unknowingly corrupt", there is still a fairly conscious decision-making process involved in many cases. Thus, the analogy with cancer erroneously suggest that corruption has more to do with randomness than with purposive actions and omnipresent risk that some unfortunately fall victim to. Secondly, cancer is clearly defined and, in all cases, involves abnormal cell growth and reproduction within a body. There is no equivalent factual description of corruption, instead, as discussed in an earlier section - the definition remains disputed. Given the complex nature of corruption this is perhaps irresolvable. Further, cancer starts and ends with one single body and is not contagious in any way. Corruption on the other hand, can be seen as highly contagious as by definition it involves more than one person, Thus, when claiming that corruption is spreading like cancer throughout society, society is considered to be an individual "body". It is too easy to start talking about corrupt organisations, sectors or even countries, when in fact there can only be corrupt persons.

Identifying the individual as the smallest common denominator of corruption does not answer the question of where in the decision-making process the deviancy begins. While the findings of this research clearly outline opportunity as a central driver for corruption the source of motivation to do so is less clear. Even so, there are some indications that when put together offer a plausible explanation. Put simply, corruption is about gaining an advantage. To look for advantages in terms of survival and reproduction is obvious for the survival of any species, and thus consistently searching for disadvantages would inexorably lead to extinction. That is not to say that there has to be constant search for advantages but rather that the advantages obtained must outweigh the disadvantages. The previously established connection between survival and reproduction and its vehicles in modern society, money and power, thus suggests that the smallest element of analysis for corrupt behaviour is a perceived advantage. Note that the choice to pursue a perceived advantage under the constraints of bounded rationality may very well ultimately lead to a disadvantage. In an anti-corruption perspective, it would therefore be equally important to influence the perception of advantages and well as the actual access to undue advantages. The smallest element, however, remains as the smallest perceived advantage that an agent can rationalise (and neutralise). Thus, the decision-making process degenerates at the 'at least level' [ALL], where this refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised.

It is easy to confuse the semantics of the concept of ALL with something that is very small and that develops gradually. That, however, is not necessarily the case for corruption. The peripheral findings of this research, confirmed by the research of Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti & van Lange (2017), indicate that the evolutionary steps of corruption may be large. The starting point is the commonly used explanation for how corruption can emerge in society by the slippery-slope metaphor. The metaphor is designed to illustrate, for example, how those in power progressively neglect the interest of their office and charge, instead pursuing undue advantages driven by self-interest. The progressives of these actions make the decision-maker "slide" deeper and deeper into deviancy and corruption. In explaining why people engage in corruption, this research suggests SUM-behaviour, which includes the importance of maintaining a positive self-image (see e.g. Leon Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). As research shows, people can indulge in minor acts of deviancy while retaining a positive moral self-image (Ariely, 2012). On the other hand, more severe transgressions require some sort of adjustment to the self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008), embracing the previously discussed concept of cognitive dissonance. This is often explained as the result of a gradual process where in small increments the corrupt become more corrupt: a slippery slope (cf. Darley, 2005). While this explanation does have some intuitive appeal what Köbis et al. did was to test it empirically. Their experimental study revealed a higher likelihood of severe corruption when participants were given this opportunity compared to when previously having engaged in minor forms of corruption. Thus, the conclusion is that contrary to the persuasive nature of the slippery-slope metaphor corruptions leads over a steep cliff rather than a slipper-slope. This indicates that the least level of corruption may be a rather high level - given the opportunity.

3.8 Implications of SUM-theory

"...a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted." (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 17-18)

The arguments presented do generate some rather noteworthy questions such as: what does this potentially mean for anti-corruption work and where does the SUM-theory fit in related anti-corruption policy development? Before embarking on a discussion revolving around those question, the limits of the SUM-theory must be acknowledged. By the methodological decree of grounded theory, the theory presented should be regarded as substantive and if nothing else providing a theoretical framework in which a more formal theory can reside. Having said that, a substantive theory, one that is limited to specific area of, is not totally useless. Firstly, it does hold within its own context, in this case the EU: and is thus arguably relevant to EU anti-corruption policy, a rather significant policy area. Secondly, per definition, a substantive theory may not be generalisable but is on the other hand certainly transferable. This suggests that the central tenets of the theory within in its own context may be transferable to characteristically similar settings. The validity of this transferability is nevertheless something for a future project and the SUM-theory is presented as a foundation on which to build, a perspective from which to analyse, and a starting point from which to begin.

The main point with the SUM-theory is to indicate that corruption is a crime for all preventatively regulated primarily by opportunity. Beginning with the conceptual problem of corruption and the perception thereof with a broad and rather vague definition used for corruption in "abuse of power for private gain". As pointed out by Fukuyama (2013) this conceptualisation lacks precision. Thus, an inevitable initial deliverable of this research was to lift another more suitable definition to the fore. The rationale was that there is a lack of a coherent approach towards imposing minimum standards and understanding of corruption, partly because of the lack of a commonly accepted and, more importantly, properly understood, definition of corruption. Further, although the EU Report on Anti-Corruption attempts to identify measures likely to give added value in addressing issues in regard to preventing and fighting corruption, it does not go into detail and is aimed at tangible changes on the ground (COM(2014) 38). Thus, it is by better understanding how corruption is perceived, understood and most importantly, acted upon, that effective strategies for anti-corruption may be developed. This applies both on an academic level with theoretical crime

prevention models but also on a more practical level for national and supranational policy development.

Given both the instrumentality of rational choice and the situational dependency of the SUM-theory, it is not a big step to suggest that the findings be applied to some sort of behavioural approach of situational crime prevention. In an adaptation of Clarke's (1983) model for situational crime prevention, a strategy for a preventative framework could be developed. This is an illustration of the main message of adequately balancing prevention with repression as an optimal approach to anti-corruption building upon the principles of an underpinning motivation for SUM-behaviour. The inception of the idea for an application of situational crime prevention techniques as a preventive anti-corruption framework is an advancement of the underlying analytical process for the development of the SUM-theory.

This process began with theoretical constructs arising from grounded analysis and can thus best be described as, at least initially, an inductive process. As the constructs became less and less abstract, a deductive step was necessary to reach a higher level of abstraction but not before the underpinnings were properly defined. The two main pillars supporting the conceptualisation of the situational anti-corruption framework are: firstly, the reconciliation of motivation and opportunity; and secondly the role of rationalisation and neutralisation. Such an applied adaptation would attempt to demonstrate that the theory accurately reflects the specific concept that it seeks to address, thus facilitating identification of anti-corruption priorities for a balanced and consequently more comprehensive approach.

3.9 Chapter three summary

This chapter has presented the findings of the research in the form of a substantive theory. The theory is named the Self-interest Utility Maximisation theory or SUM-theory for short. It is by fusing existing concepts and theories with the discoveries in this research that the SUM-theory is born. Thus, it is possible to argue that in and by itself it is not a new theory but rather an extension of previous thinking from a different perspective. Nonetheless, the map should not be mistaken for the territory. What is presented should be viewed like a map, a necessary simplification of reality that allows us to see where we are and understand how deciding on different routes will lead to different places.

The decision-making process was interpreted in this research is based on two fundamental tenets. These were: one, that agents have a free will or at least believe they do; and, two that there is a self-interest element involved in individual behaviour. The concept of free will is complex and even if the deterministic side end up being scientifically or philosophically proven, it may still be that free will and determinism are not opposites but rather describe behaviour at different levels. Given a self-interested agent with free will the question is: what are those interests and how is free will exercised in terms of achieving them?

It is argued that stemming from the evolutionary pursuit of survival and reproduction, two primary facilitators to those ends in modern-day Europe are often power and wealth. Naturally, striving for power and wealth does not necessarily mean that an agent will act corruptly. The idea of an agent maximising the utility of self-interests does, however, encompass a certain measure of rationality when weighing benefits and costs of future actions before deciding on behaviour. Also, if the conclusion is that from a certain point of view motivation for corrupt behaviour is a constant grounded in human nature then it would suggest something about how anti-corruption policymakers may capitalise on that fact. The point, however, is that the agent still acts according to what is perceived as most advantageous in terms of maximising the utility of their own self-interest.

Given the premise that motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a degenerated decision-making process, a suitable starting point in terms of criminological models is routine activity theory. Not only does this theory assume motivation to be ever-present but also has its roots in rational choice theory, where the intricacies of decision-making are at the forefront. Nevertheless, to say that an agent is pursuing self-interest utility

maximisation is not to say that everyone is completely self-interested in all contexts all of the time.

Although it is infamously difficult to prove how any human trait has evolved, it can be said that for a trait to be selected it must be beneficial to survival and reproduction. As discussed earlier, humans have always striven to survive and reproduce, and two traits that have persisted throughout modern history as vehicles in that pursuit are power and wealth. The research findings underpinning this thesis point towards motivation for self-interest utility maximisation for both power and wealth as latent variables. That does not mean that an agent is constantly preoccupied with either of the two but much like survival and reproduction, the underlying latent striving for power and wealth is always there. It is important to note that this research does not intend to make a causal connection between the striving for survival and reproduction to that of power and wealth. The discussion should by no means be seen as a conclusive account of the root causes of corruption but rather as a possible explanation.

If the argument that power and wealth as contemporary vehicles for survival and reproduction create latent motivation for achieving goals in line with the associated needs and desires - then unethical behaviour could appear as a rational choice and corruption would be pervasive. That this is the case is the conclusion of several scholars, officially stated by EU ministers and echoed by several of the interviewees for this research -. The logical conclusion then, is that decisions, including those for deviant behaviour, are almost always perceived to be rational. If the phenomenon examined is that of corruption, it should arguably be possible to deconstruct the elements to better understand the individuals behind the corrupt behaviour. Through direct or vicarious interactions in everyday life an individual is notified of a wide range of possible choices - some corrupt, most not - by the needs, desires and beliefs in the pursuit of self-interest utility maximisation. The choices of interest here are those potentially leading to unethical acts and corruption. These choices are evaluated within bounded rationality on the basis of whether an individual is willing and able to put them into practice.

Given the latent nature of motivation and how it is highly susceptible to rationalisation and neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption is opportunity. The logic is that regardless of motivation, and irrespective of rationalisation and neutralisation ability - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Naturally, an agent can arguably be sufficiently motivated to create an opportunity but the opportunity itself is nevertheless an essential necessity. Given the latent motivation for SUM behaviour and the propensity for rationalisation by neutralisation, opportunity control is left as the final frontier

(or in a sense the first frontier) for the effective prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption.

When the environment in which the agents resides does not provide a subjectively adequate means to achieve SUM goals and desires by moral means, the opportunity for immoral ones is more or less consciously sought (and contemplated). But identifying the individual as the smallest common denominator of corruption does not answer the question of where in the decision-making process the deviancy begins: what is it that is being sought? While the findings of this research clearly outline opportunity as a central driver for corruption to perpetuate, it does not with equal clarity point towards the source of motivation to do so. Even so, there are some indications that when put together offer a plausible explanation. Put simply, it is about gaining an advantage.

In an anti-corruption perspective, it would therefore be equally important to influence the perception of advantages as well as the actual access to undue advantages. The smallest element, however, remains as the smallest perceived advantage that an agent can rationalise (and neutralise). Thus, the decision-making process degenerates to the at least level [ALL], where this refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised. It is easy to confuse the semantics of the concept of ALL with something that is very small and that develops gradually. That however is not necessarily the case for corruption. The least level of corruption may be a rather high level - given the opportunity. The main point with the SUM-theory is to indicate that corruption is a crime above all that may be prevented and regulated primarily by opportunity. Given both the instrumentality of rational choice and the situational dependency of the SUM-theory it is logical to suggest that the findings be applied to some sort of behavioural approach of situational crime prevention.

4. APPLICATION

The argument that prevention is better than a cure may be a worn one, but it remains true in many cases, and certainly as far as this analysis goes for corruption. As indicated by the previous chapter on SUM-behaviour, corruption truly is a crime affecting everyone, and prevention is regulated primarily by opportunity. If corruption is considered largely as an opportunity-based crime, the question is how to prevent the deviant behaviour, that creates corruption? This chapter will present an adaptation of traditional situational crime prevention to the particular phenomenon of corruption. Following Graycar and Prenzler (2013), this chapter sets out an approach to corruption prevention which is systematic and theoretically informed. Their application of regulatory theory to a situational crime prevention framework for preventing corruption is here supplemented with behavioural theory. This approach should be seen as complementary to any and all other practices and actors identified for anti-corruption purposes, including anti-corruption institutions, legislation, the judiciary, audit functions, and the police to name but a few. As this chapter will elaborate, there should be an intricate balance between preventive and repressive measures, and this is but a theoretical exploration of the effective use of the former.

The application of situational crime prevention techniques as a preventive anti-corruption framework flows from the SUM-theory. The chapter will highlight how preventive anti-corruption strategies based on criminological theory can be applied. The discussion also sheds light on how this potentially can influence and enhance the development of effective anti-corruption policy. This chapter will put the SUM-theory into theoretical context, a notion that may not sound necessarily contradictory, but it could certainly be questioned what good this type of theoretical exercise serves. First, one must understand the theoretical foundation of the SUM-theory itself; secondly it is about recognising the behavioural aspect of corruption as partly inescapable; and thirdly the significance of the situation in which corruption exists must be examined. It is through this latter that the criminological theory of Situational Crime Prevention [SCP] comes into the picture. Going back to the first requirement, the fundamentals of SUM-theory dictate human nature to be conducive to the search for advantages 'at least level'. Through an array of psychological operations conceptually described by rationalisation and neutralisation (with room for more) that search sometimes results in immoral and corrupt behaviour. Critics may defer to issues raised around the prevalent focus on self-interested and rational actors, and the associated principal-agent approach in objection to this (see e.g. Persson et al., 2013). It is therefore important to stress that the basis of

behavioural science in conjunction with anti-corruption is built around the fact that agents are subject to bounded rationality, sometimes interpreted as nothing but irrationality. Consistent with the second requirement above, it would make sense to further investigate the role of behavioural mechanisms and their influence on corruption. Insights from behavioural science allow us to make suggestions for improved anti-corruption work through improved policies and instruments. This rather uncharted territory has been touched upon by Lambsdorff (2015) who looked at preventing corruption by promoting trust. .

There is naturally a distinction to be made between preventive and repressive anti-corruption measures. Preventive methods include rewarding ethical behaviour, seeking to advance positive values and norms, inducing people to behave honestly and contribute to corporate and social values (Heineman & Heimann, 2006). On the other hand, repressive methods, equally important for fighting corruption, rely on the perceived substantial risk of detection and punishment or the threat of being publicly shamed. The question of how policies should balance a trustful attitude towards the trustworthy many with the repression that is needed for disciplining the potentially corrupt few, is raised by Lambsdorff (2015) with the answer that ideally, preventive methods should deter the potentially corrupt while leaving the trustworthy unaffected. It is here that a situational prevention of crime becomes useful, as it effectively sidesteps the psychology of the offender while focusing on the situation for prevention. Thus, at a more-or-less conscious level, it promotes and nudges actors within a situation towards moral and non-corrupt behaviour.

Situational crime prevention in its simplest form can be seen as synonymous with opportunity reduction. Where traditionally criminology primarily sought to understand offenders and the psycho-social underpinnings of criminal behaviour, situational crime prevention is concerned mainly with the situation, i.e. the immediate circumstances under which a criminal act is performed. This chapter will provide an introduction to situational crime prevention with a further discussion of the conceptual suitability of its being integrated within the SUM-theory. A classification within the five-by-five situational crime prevention matrix is briefly explored from an anti-corruption perspective. It is through this examination that the true scope of using situational crime prevention in an anti-corruption context becomes somewhat clearer. Finally, there is a discussion as to the implications for anti-corruption policy and instruments.

4.1 Introduction to situational crime prevention

"Corruption, embezzlement, fraud, these are all characteristics which exist everywhere. It is regrettably the way human nature functions, whether we like it or not. What successful economies do is keep it to a minimum. No one has ever eliminated any of that stuff." Greenspan (2017, p. 147)

Fundamentally, the prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption can be achieved in two ways; either by changing the agent's motivation or by removing the opportunity. Thus, if an agent is unmotivated to act deviantly even in the presence of the opportunity to do so, or conversely if a highly motivated agent is not presented with an opportunity, no corruption will occur. The core of situational crime prevention is a belief that deviant behaviour can be reduced by effectively altering the situation and subsequently reducing opportunity. This is in contrast with many other theories of crime prevention that instead focus on changing a potential offender's personal disposition. There are those that claim situational crime prevention provides the most important framework internationally for developing effective crime-prevention strategies; and that it can also be used for corruption prevention (see e.g. Graycar & Prenzler, 2013).

Looking at the literature there are at least two reasons to at least consider opportunity as conducive to corruption. There is a large body of evaluated case studies showing substantial reductions in specific types of crime as the result of situational crime prevention (see e.g. Clarke, 1997). There are methodological issues to be raised around these studies in terms of transferability to the concept of corruption, but overall, they point towards opportunity as a control for criminal behaviour. Further, in experiments and interviews by and with researchers, offenders often testify to opportunity playing a large role in their behaviour (Wright & Decker, 1994; Ariely, 2012). There is obviously a level of uncertainty regarding to what extent such accounts can be trusted, but it does provide strong presumptive evidence that opportunity incites immoral and corrupt behaviour. This notion is supported by the findings of this research where one participant somewhat humorously claimed that "It has been said that 'corruption is like adultery: ninety per cent of it is a matter of opportunity. If you eliminate the opportunities, you eliminate the crime'" (Participant 26). In the situational crime prevention model, opportunity plays a determining role, both in terms of the time and place of criminal behaviour but also in eliciting that very behaviour in the first place. Adapting Clarke (Clarke, 2005, p. 42) opportunity does so in four ways Firstly, immorally disposed agents will commit a greater number of corrupt acts if they encounter more opportunities. Secondly, regularly

encountering such opportunities could lead these actors to actively seek out even more opportunities. Thirdly, agents without pre-existing dispositions can be drawn into immoral and corrupt behaviour by a proliferation of opportunities (and temptations). Fourthly, agents who are generally moral can be drawn into committing specific forms of immoral acts if regularly exposed to easy opportunities for this type of behaviour. The central role of opportunity makes situational crime prevention a suitable theoretical framework for this research. But the framework as it looks today and the form in which it is applied to this research, had a somewhat different form at its conception.

The development of SCP

At its conception situational crime prevention struggled to gain acceptance within mainstream academic criminology and had a somewhat controversial development. The reason is that the approach of situational crime prevention clashes in significant ways with those of traditional criminological theory. The general search for understanding the offender is replaced with a concern only for the situation in which the offender acts. Neither social reforms nor offender rehabilitation, although central and important themes in general, are advanced by situational crime prevention. For these reasons, situational prevention is sometimes treated with scepticism and suspicion by other criminologists, and is somewhat disparagingly classified as 'administrative criminology' (Wortley, 2010). As explained by Clarke (2005), nobody familiar with criminology including advocates of situational crime prevention can deny the importance of root causes of crime, nor does this researcher. Nevertheless, this research does put opportunity at the forefront of the prevalence, pervasiveness and perpetuation of corruption. Corrupt acts are the outcome of an interaction between a rational yet deviant disposition and situational opportunities, and the actor's decision-making is the medium through which these factors bring their unethical influence to bear.

Situational crime prevention has its origins in research undertaken by the Home Office Research Unit in the 1970s. Little over a decade later, Clarke presented a crime prevention approach divided into three categories of measures; degree of surveillance, target hardening and environmental management (Clarke, 1983, p. 223). Then in 1992, Clarke published a basic list of twelve techniques designed to reduce the occurrence of a variety of offences. On the basis of further research together with Homel, the list was expanded from twelve to sixteen techniques (Clarke & Homel, 1997). This also meant including a fourth category - removing excuses - which increased the scope of situational crime prevention to include a broader range of crimes committed by ordinary people as much as career criminals. The inclusion of

ordinary people harmonises well with the ideas underpinning this research - that corruption is a crime available to all. In an answer to Wortley's (2001) critique, yet another category was added by Cornish in collaboration with Clarke (2003). By adding the category of 'reducing provocations', the number of techniques increased to twenty-five.

When discussing the development of situational crime prevention it is worth having a closer look at the critique⁹ presented by Wortley (2001). On one hand, together with the response from Cornish and Clarke (2003), it illustrates the flexibility of the situational crime prevention framework and its ability to adapt. On the other hand, it also outlines a number of issues with situational crime prevention that needs to be addressed. This section concludes with a brief outline of Wortley's critique and the response by Cornish and Clarke. This provides an example of how the framework adapted strengthening the argument for suggested future adaptation in relation to the prevention of corruption. Wortley's critique mainly revolves around what is considered an undue (and potentially damaging) preoccupation with opportunity variables when discussing decision-making from a situational prevention perspective. The relative neglect of other situational forces termed 'precipitators' is also highlighted. The types of precipitators identified are: prompts, pressures, permissions, and provocations - each argued as being able to provide situationally generated motivation for the hitherto unmotivated. The precipitation factors together with regulation factors form the basis of a two-stage model, where temporal priority is given to the influence of precipitators in motivation, followed by the influences of opportunities when regulating whether or not deviancy actually occurs. The point made by Wortley is that controlling precipitators is just as important as regulating opportunity. They conclude by offering an additional and complementary set of situational crime prevention techniques designed around controlling precipitators.

By academic timescales the response from Cornish and Clarke was immediate, published only two years later, in which the gradual widening of the remit of situational crime prevention was welcomed. It is recognised that precipitators are useful and perhaps essential to adequately address the problem of reducing motivation for deviancy in some environments. The main purpose of the response is to explore how, if at all, Wortley's suggestions can be placed within the context of the existing theory.

⁹ A thorough review of the critiques against Situational crime prevention is found in Appendix VIII.

"Techniques of precipitator control offer an exciting new direction in both the theory and practice of situational prevention, and one that promises new ways of thinking about manipulating situational factors for crime control. The fact that the techniques are directed at the motivational side of the person-situation interaction rather than the opportunity side offers an expanded role for the field." (Cornish & Clarke, 2003, p. 91)

An increase in available techniques does not necessarily convey a similar increase in the effectiveness of situational crime prevention. That only follows if the additional techniques are: one, distinguishable from existing ones; and two, as effective or more effective than existing ones. With the susceptibility to deviancy also being a product of the theoretical orientation of the observer, the task of determining the efficacy of a particular technique is difficult. Cornish and Clarke do, however, embrace a better understanding of issues concerning the different available techniques that may offer a more nuanced use of situational prevention in relation to particular settings and types of agents. Precipitator control - not necessarily coterminous with opportunity control - does, however, provide for crime prevention, particularly for the unmotivated or unready agent in whom the drive for deviancy may yet be weak. Nonetheless, the concept of precipitators is included in the matrix under a new category. Thus, by examining the critique by Wortley and the ensuing response by Cornish and Clarke it does seem likely that with time and the development of research and technology, the matrix will keep growing. The current version, however, consists of five categories with five techniques each for a total of twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention aimed to reduce opportunity. It is, nevertheless, this capability to adapt and grow that may invite research like this to be merged with situational crime prevention theory, not necessarily in an effort to expand the matrix itself by adding new categories or techniques, but rather to refine the measures for an effective anti-corruption framework.

The principles of SCP

Situational crime prevention can be characterised by the following three types of measures; one, those directed at highly specific forms of crime; two, those that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible; and three, those that reduce the opportunities for crime and increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 1983). The theoretical underpinnings of situational crime prevention stem from three main sources: rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Clarke & Felson, 1993); crime pattern theory (Brantingham &

Brantingham, 1993), and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2000). Routine activity, as previously discussed, is a 'macro' theory that seeks to outline how societal changes can influence opportunities which in turn are mediated through the availability of suitable targets and the supply of capable guardians. On a 'meso' level, crime pattern theory focuses on communities (or similar) and seeks to explain how actors either seek or stumble across opportunities for deviant behaviour in everyday life. Lastly, the rational choice perspective, as previously discussed, provides a 'micro' level of detail, pertaining to the decision-making processes of an individual agent.

The taxonomy of situational crime prevention varies between scholars and it is important to clearly outline the hierarchy before setting out to discuss various parts in detail. The entire matrix is what constitutes the **framework** and within it are 25 **techniques** organised under 5 **categories**. Each technique consists of a number of tentative **measures**, see figure 8.




Figure 8: The taxonomy of the situational crime prevention matrix.

In its current form, the situational crime prevention is modelled through a five by five matrix - the situational crime prevention framework, with the five rows categorised as: Increase the Effort, Increase the Risks, Reduce the Rewards, Reduce Provocations, and Remove Excuses. The subsequent 25 brackets represent specific classifications of techniques, where several are particularly relevant to preventing corruption. The categories are briefly outlined below, both from a classic situational crime prevention perspective coupled with a

conceptual adaptation for prevention of corruption opportunity. An important note, also stressed by Graycar and Prenzler (2013), in their book *Understanding and Preventing Corruption*, is that the matrix should be seen as a guide to thinking about solving crime problems - rather than providing off-the-shelf one-size fits all anti-corruption solutions and measures.

4.2 The SCP-matrix contextualised

"When a man is denied the right to live the life he believes in, he has no choice but to become an outlaw." (Mandela, 2008, p. 154)

In this section, the 25 techniques of the Situational Crime prevention matrix will be contextualised for corruption from a SUM-theory perspective. The measures within each technique will be briefly discussed, taking into account the 'at least level' assumption. Where appropriate, some techniques are discussed in more depth than others to better illustrate the possible effects of reducing situational opportunity on corruption. What is presented here is largely a theoretical discussion with little or no empirical evidence to support the adaptation or its potential efficacy. The idea is rather to explore how the situational crime prevention categories can be adapted for anti-corruption purposes by outlining some creative and hopeful inspirational ideas. This section should be considered more as an academic thought experiment than anything else.

"What can be changed? Primarily your own behaviour. There are parameters inductive to corruption just as there are parameters that are not. It is even more important with these parameters when governance is weak and for example there is a lack in the political will. It is about keeping a clean house - to create long term confidence. To do that you have to begin in the right end, prioritise the risks and always start with yourself. This is because corruption is built upon human nature - Maslow's hierarchy of needs against some type of self-realisation." (Participant 1312)

Table 3 is the classical five by five situational crime prevention matrix in its most recent form. Examples of classical measures are given for each of the techniques to contextualise the adaptation to anti-corruption measures. To further aid this contextualisation the following sections will describe the classical conceptualisation of each technique and its transition to an anti-corruption context. Then, before identifying and explaining anti-corruption measures for each technique, some of the critiques of situational crime prevention will be addressed.

Table 3: The twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention with classical measures.

Increase the Effort	Increase the Risks	Reduce the Rewards	Reduce Provocations	Remove Excuses
1. Target hardening - Steering column locks and immobilisers - Anti-robbery screens - Tamper-proof packaging	6. Extend guardianship - Take routine precautions: go out in group at night, leave signs of occupancy, carry phone - "Cocoon" neighbourhood watch	11. Conceal targets - Off-street parking - Gender-neutral phone directories - Unmarked bullion trucks	16. Reduce frustrations and stress - Efficient queues and polite service - Expanded seating - Soothing music/muted lights	21. Set rules - Rental agreements - Harassment codes - Hotel registration
2. Control access to facilities - Entry phones - Electronic card access - Baggage screening	7. Assist natural surveillance - Improved street lighting - Defensible space design - Support whistle-blowers	12. Remove targets - Removable car radio - Women's refuges - Pre-paid cards for pay phones	17. Avoid disputes - Separate enclosures for rival soccer fans - Reduce crowding in pubs - Fixed cab fares	22. Post instructions - "No Parking" - "Private Property" - "Extinguish camp fires"
3. Screen exits - Ticket needed for exit - Export documents - Electronic merchandise tags	8. Reduce anonymity - Taxi driver IDs - "How's my driving?" decals - School uniforms	13. Identify property - Property marking - Vehicle licensing and parts marking - Cattle branding	18. Reduce emotional arousal - Controls on violent pornography - Enforce good behaviour on soccer field - Prohibit racial slurs	23. Alert conscience - Roadside speed display boards - Signatures for customs declarations - "Shoplifting is stealing"
4. Deflect offenders - Street closures - Separate bathrooms for women - Disperse pubs	9. Utilise place managers - CCTV for double-deck buses - Two clerks for convenience stores - Reward vigilance	14. Disrupt markets - Monitor pawn shops - Controls on classified ads. - License street vendors	19. Neutralize peer pressure - "Idiots drink and drive" - "It's OK to say No" - Disperse troublemakers at school	24. Assist compliance - Easy library checkout - Public lavatories - Litter bins
5. Control tools/ weapons - "Smart" guns - Disabling stolen cell phones - Restrict spray paint sales to juveniles	10. Strengthen formal surveillance - Red light cameras - Burglar alarms - Security guards	15. Deny benefits - Ink merchandise tags - Graffiti cleaning - Speed humps	20. Discourage imitation - Rapid repair of vandalism - V-chips in TVs - Censor details of modus operandi	25. Control drugs and alcohol - Breathalysers in pubs - Server intervention - Alcohol-free events

Increase the Effort

From a classic situational crime prevention perspective these techniques are often considered the most basic. These include target hardening, deflection of offenders and control measures. Examples of such measures are physical: like locks, tamper-proofing and shatter proof glass; deflection of potential offenders through segregation from opportunity and temptation; and effort control measures, increasing the difficulty by which an offender can access vital instruments. The direct application of these measures to the concept of corruption may not appear immediately obvious, a common denominator with more of the classifications, but as will be shown there is scope for corruption to be included. The opportunity for corrupt behaviour can be influenced by classical target hardening measures, and deflection through the clear provision of moral alternatives is also possible. The same goes for control measures, popularly embodied through transparency, that arguably also increase the risk of getting caught. Increasing the effort is increasingly also a question of information and cyber security, as corrupt behaviour today is largely facilitated by digital things more so than locks and bolts.

Hardening targets in terms of preventing corruption can be seen from two distinct perspectives, one incorporating hard measures and the other soft. The hard measures are those most commonly associated with situational crime prevention and target hardening in general. The equivalence of adding physical security measures can easily be envisaged in terms of digital locks and safeguarding the corruption context. The brute force required to break a lock is similar to that of cracking a password and may leave just as evident signs of a break-in. Digital footprints could be stored and used as evidence for investigating, identifying and prosecuting an offender. When it comes to soft measures, one must consider that the 'target' of corruption is an individual, or a group of individuals. Therefore, it is arguably also possible to harden those targets in terms of preventing corruption. Target hardening in this sense could include traditional measures such as ethical training and communication of anti-corruption policy; but also, more unorthodox techniques like psychometric evaluations and aptitude tests. Such tools could guide those responsible for anti-corruption in the further design of training programs and policy development.

When adapting the control of access to facilities it is important to remember that the agents of corruption are individuals. So, in a sense that would mean restricting the access to certain individuals, or at least the uncontrolled access. It is recognised that the lobbying industry is highly influential in policy making (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009), with its connection to both money and power also an area susceptible to corruption.

Some push to require lobbyists to declare certain information about themselves, their funding and agenda e.g. ALTER EU. The situational crime prevention technique possible here is restricting access of those lobbyists that do not comply with this request of information and thus restricting their access to policy- and decision-makers. Another way to prevent corruption is to regularly record discussions with decision-makers. While it would not imply a physical restriction of access to the decision-maker, it would mean a significant restriction in access to the opportunity of corruption. As one participant stated, "people are as corrupt as they are allowed to be" (Participant 26).

The mapping of where individuals that are engaged in businesses prone or susceptible to corruption could be another way to prevent corruption. If the proverbial exits were screened there would be a track-record of the movement of an agent. The spatial data could then be mapped against other agents in order to investigate with whom contact has been made. Contact does obviously not imply corruption but coupled with the required recording of any such meeting mentioned above there could at least be cause for concern. The possible repercussions thereof could be a disincentive to corruption. For obvious reasons it is easy to criticise such monitoring with a Big Brother type of argument. Perhaps, more realistic and viable would be the incorporation of a digital control system that would tag certain data, PDF:s, spread-sheets, etc. When a controlled environment is exited, an alert is triggered. This would reduce the opportunity to accidentally or intentionally divulge sensitive information: for example, in a procurement process.

The deflection of potential offenders can be seen as both an exclusive and inclusive operator. From an exclusion standpoint one could consider those that have been convicted or suspected of corruption to be excluded from any discretionary function. Thus, for example, ruling out certain individuals involved in policymaking or certain sub-contractors in a public procurement process. Conversely, it can also be seen from an inclusive perspective where power or financial disparities are bridged by a 'benefit of the doubt' approach. As a less invasive preventative method is to engage and encourage decision-makers to be partners in the fight against corruption. Then their subjective insights can be collated. This could in turn be the basis for excluding (or even sanctioning) corrupt behaviour.

This is arguably a classification where situational crime prevention is somewhat more difficult to apply. The reason is simply because no particular tools or weapons are needed to be corrupt. The only requirement is free will, a concept previously discussed and considered to be under the command of any sane actor. Classic situational crime prevention talks about

disabling stolen cell phones where the cell phone is the tool controlled; it is obviously harder to disable free will. It is possible to imagine measures such as the four-eyes principle where a second actor must verify a decision before it is implemented. Intuitively it would seem more difficult to corrupt two persons than one, a belief which in its intuitive persuasiveness is widely held (Six, van der Veen, & Kruithof, 2012). The effects of the four-eyes principle are however questionable, particularly from a SUM-theory perspective. Motivated primarily by distrust, it may reduce intrinsic motivation for moral behaviour (Lambsdorf, 2015). Further, groups of people often express more immoral SUM-behaviour than individuals (Charness & Sutter, 2012). Moreover, the resulting diffusion of responsibility feeds rationalisation and neutralisation of deviant behaviour. Indicative research actually points towards the four-eye principle often being ineffective and even increasing corruption (Schickora, 2011; Frank, Li, Bühren, & Qin, 2015). It is quite possible that there is a place for the four-eyes principle in a comprehensive anti-corruption framework. However, it is important to acknowledge that distrusting employees and inventing methods for reducing their discretionary power can easily backfire (Lambsdorf, 2015).

Increase the Risks

Most offenders in general and those engaged in corruption in particular are more concerned about the risk of getting caught than about the potential consequences. From a classical perspective, this stems from the fact that once apprehended, consequences - given a functional judicial system - are inevitable. The offender can do little to prevent them, thus the focus is on not getting caught. This prompts for an increased guardianship and increased surveillance and community awareness. The case for corruption is perhaps somewhat different, where many of those clearly engaged in corruption are also under the dark embrace of impunity (Núñez, 2007), rendering the concern about consequences after being caught less important. There is however a strong societal push, both locally, nationally and perhaps most strongly on supranational levels for these type of acts to be stigmatised (M. Johnston, 2005). Therefore, similar measures in terms of increased guardianship, natural as well as digital surveillance, and a deeper understanding of the detriments and perils of corruption, can be applied for preventative purposes.

As discussed under the previous classification of controlling tools and weapons, it is not enough to simply extend the guardianship by dividing the decision-making capacity between two actors. One would be caught in a loop of infinite regression if saying that three decision-makers would be better than two, making four better than three and so on. The argument is

not to include every possible decision-maker in every possible decision. If guardianship is interpreted as a common responsibility, then it should be extended to the point where it encompasses everyone involved. A shared understanding of norms, values and corruption would certainly go a long way, but perhaps not all the way. This is because it is also possible that the shared morals are not optimal. While there certainly are universal norms and values conducive to preventing corruption, they must be dealt with differently depending on context (Stiernstedt and Button, 2017) . Nonetheless, there is a valid argument for extending the moral guardianship, based on universal morals that are contextually adapted and shared by everyone involved.

The assistance of natural surveillance making it obvious to those involved when acts of deviancy are conducted is another anti-corruption measure. A comparison with improved streetlighting to make behaviour clearly visible to others can be made. It does, however come with two important caveats. First, there must be observers and those observers must be able to act upon those observations. Also, even if there are observers present, they must not, for various reasons, choose to turn a blind eye. This again calls for an ethical culture where a shared understanding of the detriments of corruption create incentives for non-corrupt behaviour. Following the SUM-theory definition, the rationale is that it must be perceived as advantageous to refrain from acts of deviance. For the observers to be able to act on observations there must be an established routine of doing so, a reporting system that connects the observers with either an internal or external audit function. This function already exists to some extent and is generally referred to as a whistle-blower function. For a whistle-blower function to work efficiently there has to be an audit function that has the mandate to investigate and the ability to control or even power to sanction those responsible for the deviancy. Furthermore, the actor blowing the whistle must be afforded adequate protection and remain anonymous.

The other side of protecting the identity of whistle-blowers is clearly establishing the identity of the decision-makers. This connects with transparency, a concept that could prove effective in reducing corruption under certain circumstances. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) found that just making information available will not prevent corruption if conditions for publicity and accountability, media circulation and free and fair elections are weak. Further, transparency measures implemented by the actor itself are less effective compared to independent transparency institutions, such as a free press. The implication of this is that transparency should be accompanied by measures also directed at strengthening the capacity

to act upon the information made available through transparency. Examining the limits of transparency, De Vries and Sobis (2016) concluded that while transparency plays a crucial role in explaining and reducing corruption, in practise it always occurs in combination with something else. This makes it difficult to ascertain the value of transparency as a standalone function, an assertion that may be of less interest as a comprehensive anti-corruption package seldom contains a single measure thought of as a panacea for the problem of corruption. There is, however, room for a reduction in anonymity, also at a lower level, by for example wearing uniforms to facilitate identification an actor. An example brought by Participant 921 is in the transgressions conducted by UN-soldiers in Africa, whose identity was easily established allowing for repression of the deviant behaviour.

In classic situational crime prevention this includes measures such as CCTV, buddy work systems and rewarding vigilance. There is perhaps little evidence for the implementation of CCTV preventing corruption given the dubious evidence for the efficacy of CCTV of preventing crime in general (Gill & Spriggs, 2005). The place manager could instead be thought of as an external observer, but how this would be different from external audit in general has to be highly context dependent. In sensitive areas, such as certain stages of the procurement process, one could imagine an external auditor being required to approve the decisions being taken. The subject expertise of such an auditor could naturally come into question and it would be important that the auditor would only judge the decisions from previously established universal and easily interpreted and applied criteria. This may be a tall order and, in reality, very hard to implement. On the other hand, rewarding vigilance is easy. Rewards should, however, be kept proportional to avoid ambitious informers who by means of perceived advantages, overload the system creating an anti-corruption white noise that hides the actual corruption. The same goes for rogue or deviant informers setting up scenarios in which other actors are seduced to deviancy allowing for rewards by reporting them. There probably is a place for utilising place managers for preventing corruption, but it is probably not as evident as for classic situational crime prevention.

The concept of formal surveillance differs from the natural surveillance in that it is not dependent on already present observers but the insertion of new observers for the specific purpose of surveillance. Classic situational crime prevention talks about speed cameras, intrusion detection systems and private security guards. Formal surveillance is perhaps best understood through already existing audit functions. These functions could, however, be further developed and tailor-made for anti-corruption purposes. Within the public

procurement process, an area identified as particularly susceptible to corruption (see e.g. Søreide, 2002), there are certain stages that could call for additional audits. Just as an intrusion detection system sends an alert when activated, so could digital systems, calling for special attention. The danger, with these types of measures that conceptually are part of a compliance system, is the creation of 'compliance fatigue' where observations of corruption are inconvenient mostly because they increase compliance costs (Ernst & Young, 2008, 2014). In line with the SUM-theory, the longevity of a compliance system is naturally that the long-term benefits of compliance do match their costs, i.e. creating an advantage. As argued by Lambsdorff (2015, p. 5), a balance must be found between trusting the many intrinsically honest people and distrusting the corrupt few where intrinsic motivation is not crowded out by an extrinsic substitute.

Reduce the Rewards

An important part of the situational crime prevention focuses on decreasing the benefits crime offers. As established by the SUM-theory, actors are constantly seeking advantages - some sort of benefit from their actions, be it material, physical or emotional. There are five strategies under this heading: conceal targets, remove targets, identify property, disrupt markets, and deny benefits. 'Concealing targets' does not necessarily mean the concealment of the actual target, like parking an expensive car in the garage rather than leaving it on the street but can also include the concealment of the possible proceeds from exploiting the opportunity for deviancy. 'Identifying property', classically achieved by vehicle licensing and property marking, can be extended to tagging certain financial transactions, thus reducing incentives. 'Disrupt markets' is the effort to effectively disrupt or destroy the market for illegally or immoral obtained advantages. This can be achieved through monitoring those generally in possession of illicit advantages and by promoting a strong ethical culture. 'Deny benefits' is a concept perhaps more difficult to translate to immorality, nonetheless, an argument will be made for some strides to be made also in this area.

Concealing the targets in an effort to prevent corruption would imply either to conceal the giver or taker of an undue advantage. In well governed processes the actors are generally concealed, bids are submitted anonymously and the final decision-maker on the side of the tenderer remains unknown to the bidders. The reality is sometimes quite different and there are possibly more instances where this is not the case, than there are those in line with optimal concealment. The issue becomes even more complicated when looking at situations that are less governed, like nepotism or clientelism, not to mention the extremely opaque

corruption occurring in the Swedish 'friendship' culture. According to Participant (214) "(Swedish) cronyism cannot be measured but should be called corruption even if it lies outside of what you can be convicted for". It is probably very difficult to effectively conceal targets as a means of preventing corruption but that should not mean that no efforts are made to that end. Public procurement processes should be kept anonymous and any deviation from this should have consequences. When suggesting an intermediary that would act as an anonymiser for such a process there is nothing to say that such a function would not run the same risk of capture as the original process. For the even more clandestine friendship-type corruption, no such intermediary would be feasible.

In classic situational crime prevention, the targets are physically removed, such as removing the radio from the car. Removing the target renders impossible an offence involving that particular target. It has been argued that this leads to displacement: the search for another car radio to steal, thus just moving the offender from one target to another. Removing the targets in a SUM-theory based anti-corruption context would mean removing the decision-makers, i.e. removing individuals. But that would also mean that you would remove the decision itself, obviously making any immoral decisions impossible but the same is true for any decision at all and the argument becomes moot. By removing one target, that for whatever reason is considered more prone to deviant behaviour, and replacing it with another, could possibly reduce corruption, at least temporarily. But replacing targets is not the same as removing them altogether.

Regarding the identification of property, classic situational crime prevention defers mostly to physical assets, such as vehicle licensing and cattle branding. In an anti-corruption context this could be applied on two levels. The first one is to tag the decisions taken by an individual and the other would similarly apply to organisations. This already occurs to the extent that those with discretion are required to sign certain documents, thus verifying and simultaneously tagging the decision. The same would go for decisions taken more collectively as long as they would sort under an organisational brand that would effectively tag any decision made, collective or otherwise. The limits of tagging are, however, quite clear as many corrupt decisions are not done by acts of signing anything but rather secret agreements behind lock and key. Those type of decisions are hard if not impossible to somehow tag for future identification. Nonetheless, there is room for decisions to be categorised according to discretion, i.e. if a certain state function is responsible for one type of decisions and it is clear that its actions are corrupt, then there could be a public naming and shaming of that function,

forcing anti-corruption reforms through public opinion. By clearly identifying to whom a certain decision belongs, there is scope for anti-corruption incentives to be effective by establishing accountability.

The market for corruption is wide, arguably encompassing the entire world. Having said that there are places, settings and individuals that are both more prone and susceptible to corruption than others. To disrupt those markets, i.e. where the corruption occurs, one would first have to identify and understand those markets. This is because even if there are universal norms and values to be found and that subsequently would be the bases from developing an ethical and non-corrupt policy framework, those universal morals have to be dealt with differently depending on context. Once identified and understood, however, there is room for an army of anti-corruption measures to be put in place in order to disrupt a corrupt market. Imagine a setting where corruption is pervasive through an abundance of opportunity for undue advantages through immoral behaviour, the very epitome of SUM-behaviour. That market could be disrupted by changing the perception of those undue advantages to appear less advantageous or even disadvantageous. Thus, possible anti-corruption measures are only limited by how well the problem is understood, the resources available (time included) and the creativity of those responsible for implementation.

The denial of benefits resides under the heading of reducing the rewards and classic situational crime prevention includes measures such as speed bumps on roads and in tags on clothes. Speed bumps would undeniably reduce the rewards of speeding if it damaged the car in the process; the same goes for the theft of clothes that would be irrevocably stained with blue ink. The total denial of benefit is somewhat different. The benefit of speeding is not denied if it allows getting to the destination in time regardless of the condition of the car. Nor is the benefit of stealing clothes denied if it prevents hypothermia - albeit in an unfashionable manner. The denial of benefits can thus be seen as the end point of sliding scale of benefit reduction. For anti-corruption one way to deny the benefits is through effective repression. If deviant acts are associated with proportionate punishment expedited by an effective and fair judicial system, punishment could include the ability to repossess, revoke or, in short, reset any undue advantages. Accordingly, and in line with SUM-theory, while it may be harder to preventatively deny the advantages of corruption, the capacity to quickly and effectively reset those advantages could act as prevention in and by itself.

Reduce Provocations

The 'reduction of provocations' focuses on the emotional side of deviancy. By reducing provocations, actors are less likely to engage in deviant acts. Here another five headings are presented: reduce frustrations and stress, avoid disputes, reduce emotional arousal, neutralise peer pressure, and discourage imitation. An underlying driver of the SUM-theory is undeniably emotional where these significantly influence our bounded rationality, and possibly also the source of what can be labelled as rational irrationality (Caplan, 2008). This is about controlling the availability of, access to and influence from provocations for undue advantages. Classic techniques like the immediate repair of vandalism to prevent further degradation also have significance in preventing corruption.

Provocations and temptations are an integral part of behavioural theory, SUM-theory included. Frustration and stress are not uncommon in situations related to corruption. A decision-maker may be highly frustrated over the fact that things are not going as efficiently as they should and therefore decides to indulge a deviant behaviour in order to facilitate the process and relieve some of the internal frustration. Another decision-maker is under a lot of stress and with deadlines fast approaching decides to clear some of the tasks in a less than optimal way succumbing to corrupt behaviour. Research has shown that people tend to act more unethically under pressure, from the external pressure illustrated by the famous Milgram experiment (1974), to time pressure (see e.g. Moberg, 2000; Andiappan & Dufour, 2016) or performance (see e.g. Mitchell, Baer, Ambrose, Folger, & Palmer, 2017). So, by reducing frustration and stress it is quite possible that this would have an impact on levels of corruption. If this is achieved by the application of a classic situational crime prevention technique such as soothing music, requires more research - but it would be very interesting if it proved that it did.

Classically 'avoiding disputes' includes the separation of for example soccer fans to reduce the opportunity for offending. In corruption it is more difficult to effectively separate the actors in a corrupt transaction. Disputes, on the other hand, could be avoided in a corruption context, particularly those arising from corruption as the end product of misunderstood values and norms and the lack of a shared culture. That 'shared culture' must be a culture that from a universally moral standpoint is conducive to prosperity and governance, both on an individual and collective level. Thus, the equivalence of a fixed cab fare to avoid disputes would be fixed channels for discretion. An example would be merit-based recruitment that follows pragmatic, rather than political, guidelines. This type of problem can

and has occurred in the highest of echelons like the UN. One example was where the head of OIOS, the internal audit of the UN, failed to appoint the most meritorious candidate for head of investigations, blocked by none other than the Secretary-General himself (Ahlenius & Ekdal, 2011). This example points to the difficulties of addressing this problem, but it should be kept in mind that few if any organisations are as complex as the UN. It is therefore probably easier to avoid similar disputes in other situations, as long as one recognises, understands and adopts universal morals for, and contextually adapts them toward, the promotion of shared norms and values.

Emotions are an integral part of behaviour and as explained earlier a source for primarily irrational behaviour. Whether or not corruption can be sorted under irrational behaviour is examined in more detail in the discussion around the critiques of situational crime prevention. In short, corruption is largely not the end-product of irrational behaviour, although it is as any other decision-making process, confined by the limits expressed by bounded rationality. Driven by SUM-behaviour to obtain advantages, both the chase and the advantage itself may cause emotional arousal fuelling deviancy. This could possibly be countered by an increased stigmatisation of the acts of corruption. Deviancy that is associated with heavy social stigma is naturally curbed, perhaps driven further into obscurity, but also away from any situation that has a degree of transparency and where the action runs the risk of being exposed. Such exposure reduces the emotional arousal obtained from gaining the advantage or at least make it short-lived and could possibly prevent the act in the first place.

In line with increasing the social stigma of engaging in corruption, peer pressure can also be reduced by similar mechanisms. This concerns creating a culture that does not condone corruption by anyone, anywhere, at any time. Part of this culture could be to clearly negatively reinforce bad behaviour through campaigns analogous to "Idiots drink and drive" where decision-makers are reminded of the perils of deviant behaviour. Important to this is that the alternative to the deviant behaviour must be clear as well. The peer pressure can also be positively reinforced similar to the "It's OK to say No" campaign whose equivalent could be something like "it is OK to blow the whistle". Behavioural research by the World Bank may serve as an example. The World Development Report sought to "enhance the understanding of how collective behaviours — such as widespread trust or widespread corruption — develop and become entrenched in a society" (World Bank, 2015, p. 2). Various mechanisms could promote a future with both push and pull effects on deviant behaviour, nudging decision-makers towards moral behaviour.

There are two sides to 'discouraging imitation'. While there is behaviour that is deviant where imitation should be discouraged, there is also morally aligned behaviour that should be imitated. In classic situational crime prevention we know examples of discouraging imitation would be censoring details as to the modus operandi and the broken-windows theory. The former is directly applicable to anti-corruption for obvious reasons and the latter, developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), advocates the immediate repair of damages caused by vandalism. It has proved effective in a classical sense and could have similar beneficial effects when applied to anti-corruption where the damage caused by corruption is immediately mended. There is also a strand of behavioural science, with roots in bounded rationality, that recognises the importance of trust (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer, 2011). The fact that an actor is responsive to encouragement, praise, expressions of gratitude and criticism (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003; Grant & Gino, 2010), could be used to reinforce the tone at the top. A recent experiment by d'Adda, Darai, Pavanin and Weber (2017) on how leaders affect ethical conduct, proved to be of utmost importance for anti-corruption.

Remove Excuses

The fifth and final classification also rhymes well with the theoretical underpinnings provided by the SUM-theory, focusing on the rationalisation and neutralisation in an actor's psyche. Classic situational crime prevention lists efforts like setting rules, posting instructions, alerting conscience, assisting compliance, and controlling substance abuse. The establishment of agreements between parties can be as simple as a rental contract, but also between foreign aid donors and recipients regarding ethics and corruption. Making anti-corruption policy easily available is similar to posting a "No parking" sign, and having a decision-maker sign a compliance statement similar to alerting drivers to the upcoming speed cameras. Assisting compliance is achieved through making policy and compliance documents understandable to the actors affected by them. The control of substance abuse hopefully requires little if any justification in terms of its detrimental effect on judgment.

If there are no rules set then the behaviour has only to be rationalised according to an individual set of rules, i.e. morals, and those could obviously vary. Also, the neutralisation process becomes significantly easier if in lieu of rules, the benchmark against which actions conflict of is unclear according to the rules. The absence of rules thus facilitates deviant behaviour, for both the agent, who regardless of knowing that an action is immoral seizes an opportunity to gain an undue advantage as well as the agent unknowingly engaging in corrupt behaviour. It is therefore, important not only to set rules but also to communicate and if necessary, educate those affected by the rules. The prevention of corruption equivalent to rental agreements and hotel registration forms are most obviously policy documents. It is, however, vital to make sure that those operating under the rules are fully aware of the rules, something that can be achieved partly through the 'tone-at-the-top' discussed earlier. Further, rules must be fully understood, which in many cases can be somewhat difficult given the complexity generated by variety in, for example, culture and history. Some policy documents themselves are very complex and not easily understood. Therefore, training and education in the rules may be required in many settings.

"Corruption is very common and there are no incentives to do anything preventive about that over and above what other firms are doing."(Participant 118)

Building further on the concept of setting rules, if rules are set, practical or moral, then a prompt drawing attention to those rules can prevent deviant behaviour. As exemplified by experiments, described by Ariely (2012), the prompts can be very simple yet still effective. A

pair of eyes over a tray of doughnuts with a jar next to it, where one can voluntarily put money, can increase the amount of money in the jar. This obviously nudges people into taking less advantage of opportunity for an undue advantage. From a critical standpoint an argument can be made that it is important that nudging would only occur if the actor understood both the social norm of how to act and the implied meaning of the watching eyes. This is perhaps a somewhat unlikely scenario, but in the more complex real world and particularly in terms of corruption, there could certainly be situations where a lack of shared norms and values could lead to posted instructions being misunderstood and therefore having little effect. As one participant explained, "To understand corruption one must understand motivation and there isn't a full understanding of corruption because peoples' motivation change" (Participant 418). Establishing the universal morals (less subject to change) according to which behaviour is expected and sometimes required could make the use of posting instructions useful in an anti-corruption setting.

Actors in corruption-prone situations are often requested, expected and sometimes required to sign compliance statements. 'Reminding' officials and employees of moral duties is a widespread method of diverting attention away from purely self-serving goals (Lambsdorf, 2015). As mentioned earlier compliance statements can sometimes be very lengthy and hard to understand. The result is that the actors risking corruption have not read or understood well the statement. Thus, the message conveyed is that comprehension of the statement is not a prerequisite for signing. Rather, it can be interpreted as pointless formality, or a diffusion of responsibility diverted from the top to the decision-makers and thus not in line with the concept of the 'tone at the top'. A SUM-theory based approach would instead provide very short, easily understood, moral reminders at a time when they are salient to decision-making. This approach has empirical grounding where alerting conscience in different ways has proven to improve ethical behaviour (see e.g. Mazar et al., 2008; Resnik & Curtis, 2011). This measure, adapted for anti-corruption purposes, would consequently be to let decision-makers sign a compliance statement at the time of the decision-making.

It is important to remember that people are not intrinsically evil, and that this is not a claim supported by the SUM-theory. Instead people do behave in a way that gives them a perceived advantage of some sort, and the pursuit of such advantages can sometimes lead to corrupt behaviour. It is, however, not the unavoidable endpoint of SUM-behaviour. Instead the SUM-theory leaves room for ethical and non-corrupt behaviour where the search for advantages does not mean that all advantages sought are necessarily deviant. In fact, it would

arguably be the opposite, where most decisions take by an actor conform to universal norms and by all accounts would be considered non-corrupt. There are those that argue ardently for the fact that behaviour can be conditioned and thus lead people to better (less deviant) decisions (see e.g. Pink, 2011; Lambsdorf, 2015). From that perspective it is important to facilitate desired behaviour. From a SUM-theory perspective the fundamental idea would be to create an environment in which it would be, or at least perceived to be, as advantageous to be compliant with the established non-corrupt norms and values.

This final classification requires little justification in almost any crime prevention endeavour. Behaviour may be difficult to predict in general, and certainly not simplified by being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. With room for the possible exception, judgment is impaired by using drugs and alcohol, and bounded rationality becomes even more constrained by the added effects of a toxic substance. Not only can this provide the decision-maker with an expanded array of possible actions in pursuit of advantages, many of which are deviant and to the unaffected mind clearly corrupt, and some that are just plain irrational. As with most vital functions in society, things operate better in the absence of intoxicated agents. It is, however, acknowledged that in terms of corruption, drugs and alcohol probably play a less significant role than say, for example, in violence crime. Nonetheless, the message is: avoid drugs and alcohol for better anti-corruption.

4.3 Application of the matrix

"The concerns and approaches of situational prevention contrast in significant ways with those of traditional criminological theory. Where criminology generally seeks to understand offenders and the social and psychological forces that create them, situational prevention is concerned only with the immediate circumstances under which crime is performed. The situational approach promotes neither social reform nor offender rehabilitation, both central themes elsewhere in criminology. Instead, situational theorists and researchers actively engage with police and other governmental agencies to help tackle immediate crime problems. For these reasons, situational prevention is often treated with scepticism and suspicion by other criminologists." Wortley (Wortley, 2010, p. 1).

There is evidence for situational crime prevention reducing deviancy. In the book *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*, Clarke (1997) provides 23 examples of such reductions. Two of those case studies relate to corruption. The first, based on research by Knutsson & Kuhlhorn (1997) revolves around reduction of cheque fraud in Sweden. When identification became a requirement in the late 1970s for cashing cheques worth more than 300 SEK, cheque fraud offences fell by 86%. The previous system, which relied on repression through complex police investigations and prosecutions - both expensive and ineffective - was largely superseded by a situational measure based on reducing anonymity. A second example is an evaluation of the impact of data matching on fraud in housing subsidies. Here the ability to cross-reference databases reduced the opportunity for deviancy by increasing formal surveillance and improving access control. These case studies have a number of implications for preventing corruption related to situational techniques such as increasing the effort, increasing formal surveillance, and reducing anonymity.

Finding the most effective techniques, Clarke (1997) argues, is best achieved through an action research paradigm. Action research is a broad concept with a complex history because it is not a single academic discipline but an approach to research that has emerged over time from a wide range of fields (see Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & Maguire, 2003). There are many definitions of action research, individually more or less appropriate for a certain context (see e.g. Gilmore, Krantz, & Ramirez, 1986; Reason & Bradbury, 2001). Put simply, action research involves 'learning by doing'. What separates this type of research from general professional practices, consulting, or daily problem-solving is the emphasis on scientific study, which is to say the researcher studies the problem systematically and ensures the intervention is informed by theoretical considerations (O'Brien, 2001). For the purposes of this research

and in line with its philosophical paradigm action research is interpreted as practitioner/researcher collaboration and the involvement of stakeholders in an applied research process. Clarke (Clarke, 1997, p. 15) sets out five stages analogous with action research for the implementation of a situational crime prevention project. Firstly, the collection of data about the nature and dimensions of the specific crime problem. Secondly, the analysis of the situational conditions that facilitate the committing of the crime in question. Thirdly, the systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for these particular crimes, Fourthly, the implementation of the most promising, feasible and economic measures. Fifthly, the monitoring of results and dissemination of experience.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the measurement of corruption required for this type of action research paradigm is problematic. While the intricacies of measuring corruption and developing adequate indicators are largely omitted from this project, there is much research and some progress in both areas. Consequently, there is hope for an ever-increasing reliability of estimates of corruption which would be beneficial when considering situational prevention techniques as part of an anti-corruption strategy. The application of SUM-theory to situational crime prevention theory at this point should thus be seen as a theoretical exercise, nonetheless an interesting one, perhaps inspiring and fundamental to future research projects.

It deserves to be repeated that the exploration of the classifications should by no means be considered as a complete account. Under many of the classification headings there is much more to be done, and under some, the proposals feel somewhat forced. The matrix, however, should not be seen as a list of 25 unique techniques with measures that can be taken in isolation. The idea is to view the matrix as a mesh framework with an array of measures applied collectively, that interact and reinforce the total effect, in this case the prevention of corruption.

It is recognised that an application of situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes require significant empirical research and real world testing before any solid conclusions can be drawn. The main point, however, is that since prevention is better than cure, it is worth considering fringe ideas like this to break out from silo thinking and being stuck in the same tracks. Note that when it comes to effectively fighting corruption there nonetheless has to be a balance between preventive and repressive measures. This idea is not to completely remove or make obsolete control mechanisms and repressive after-the-fact instruments in a utopian search for prevention by opportunity reduction while still preserving freedom of choice. While advancing prevention as important, there should be no doubt that

repression and punishment have to contribute to anti-corruption (see e.g. Lambsdorf, 2015). One can only hope that perhaps some a researcher, policy-maker or other anticorruption advocate looks at this and gets an idea that in fact will improve the corruption situation somewhere.

4.5 Chapter four summary

This chapter has presented an adaptation of traditional situational crime prevention to the particular phenomenon of corruption. It highlighted how preventative anti-corruption strategies based upon criminological theory can be applied. Prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption can be achieved in two ways: either by changing the agent's motivation or by removing the opportunity. Situational crime prevention in its simplest form can be seen as synonymous with opportunity reduction. There are at least two reasons to at least consider opportunity as conducive to corruption. One is that there is a large body of evaluated case studies showing substantial reductions in specific forms of crime as the result of situational crime prevention. The other is that in experiments and interviews by and with researchers, offenders often testify to opportunity playing a large role in their behaviour. The approach of situational crime prevention clashes with those of traditional criminological theory. The general search for understanding of the offender is replaced with a concern only for the situation in which the offender acts. Situational crime prevention can be characterised by the following three measures; one, directed at highly specific forms of crime; two, that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible; and three, so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders. In its current form, situational crime prevention is modelled through a five-by-five matrix, the situational crime prevention framework, with the five rows categorised as: increase the effort, increase the risks, reduce the rewards, reduce provocations, and remove excuses.

From a classic situational crime prevention perspective, the techniques to increase the effort are often considered the most basic. These include target hardening, deflection of offenders and control measures. The opportunity for corrupt behaviour can be influenced by classical target hardening measures, and deflection through the clear provision of moral alternatives is also possible. The same goes for control measures, popularly embodied through transparency, but arguably that also increase the risk of getting caught. Increasing the effort is increasingly also a question of information and cyber security. Most offenders in general and those engaged in corruption, in particular, are more concerned about the risk of getting caught than about the potential consequences. If the offender can do little to prevent the consequences the focus is on not getting caught. The case with corruption is perhaps somewhat different, where many of those clearly engaged in corruption may also enjoy some degree of impunity (Núñez, 2007). There is however a strong societal push, both locally,

nationally and perhaps most strongly at the supranational level for these types of acts to be stigmatised (M. Johnston, 2005). Therefore, similar measures in terms of increased guardianship and natural as well as digital surveillance can be applied for preventive purposes. Furthermore, an important part of the situational crime prevention focuses on decreasing the benefit that criminal behaviour offers. As established by the SUM-theory actors are constantly seeking advantages from their actions: be it material, physical or emotional. This is closely connected to the 'reduction of provocations', which focuses on the emotional side of deviancy. By reducing provocations actors are less likely to engage in deviant acts. Also, the fifth classification, 'removing excuses', rhymes well with the theoretical underpinnings provided by the SUM-theory, focusing on the rationalisation and neutralisation processes in an actor's psyche. Classic situational crime prevention lists efforts like setting rules, posting instructions, alerting conscience, assisting compliance, and controlling substance abuse. These are converted to facilitating ethical decision-making and assisting compliance.

There is evidence for situational crime prevention reducing deviancy. Finding the most effective techniques is best achieved through an action research paradigm. The application of SUM-theory to Situational crime prevention theory at this point should thus be seen as a theoretical exercise. Thus, the exploration of the classifications in a SUM-theory based theoretical framework should by no means be considered a complete account. It is recognised that an application of situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes require significant empirical research and real world testing before any solid conclusions can be drawn.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research has been to generate a conceptual theory for how the perception of corruption influences behaviour. There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering the topic of corruption, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. This research strives to close that gap by shedding some 'qualitative' light on the 'reality' found in the surveys. The primary aims are thus to develop a substantive theory around the behaviour associated with corruption; and to create a foundation for further integration towards formal theory around the behaviour associated with corruption. As a secondary objective, the research asks the following research questions: how can the perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption; and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption strategies. . This chapter will provide a discussion around to what extent these aims, and objectives have been fulfilled.

The research started with an intuitive idea of corruption and an ensuing discussion of the concept, its context and the understanding thereof. In an effort to increase our understanding of the phenomenon a grounded theory methodology was developed to establish a theory that would underpin human behaviour classified as 'corrupt'. The theory is intended to, at least partially, supersede context, and while some things are omitted, others distorted or obscured it provides a mapping of behaviour and corruption. To effectively increase our understanding of corruption, it is necessary for the theory to represent a simplification of reality. The theory produced is therefore a formula for increased understanding of a particular behaviour. Herein, the discussion revolving around the development of that theory, from the design of the methodology to the application in situational crime prevention, is (just as the theory itself) presented from a higher level of abstraction.

There are clear boundaries to the research in both space and time, as it was undertaken within the nation states of the EU over little over three years. Importantly there is, however, a degree of cultural homogeneity and an overarching political will to combat corruption expressed by the EU. Corruption, while a relatively new priority on the political agenda, has over the last three decades increasingly gained attention from citizens, politicians and academics alike. Given the specific nature of corruption it is arguably one of the most difficult issues to properly address. On the one hand, the citizens of Europe expect the EU to wage war against corruption. On the other, the EU Anti-corruption reports concludes that Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments and institutions to prevent and

fight corruption. The results they deliver, however, are not satisfactory across the EU. Essentially corruption is about money and power and through its continuation the EU and its constituents are being robbed of both.

Increasing the understanding of corruption would arguably make it easier to combat. The understanding developed here occurs on an individual level. Although it may sometimes make sense to talk about corrupt countries, or organisations, it is important to remember that corruption stems from individuals. It is therefore not surprising that the SUM-theory has its roots in the fundamental motivational drivers of individuals. It is those individuals that in turn create cultures and although most cultures seem to renounce corruption, context remains as a critical differential as opinions may vary on what is illegal and/or immoral. Cultural contrasts aside, corruption is generally considered reprehensible and to some extent criminalised. Thus, the research goes beyond context and attempts an explanation of corrupt behaviour in Europe.

This chapter will first provide a summary of the entire research with comments of a more discursive nature throughout. Then there is an overview of the contribution to knowledge provided by this research; a discussion of the utility of grounded theory for this type of project; a consideration of the contribution of the SUM-theory and the peripheral findings; as well as a proposal of an agenda for future research. Next, the implications and impact of the study is discussed, including a section on limitations and weaknesses. The penultimate section covers issues of validity and reliability from a purely qualitative perspective, covering truth value, consistency, applicability and conformability. The chapter is then closed with a subjective oration on the journey as PhD student and some lessons learned.

5.1 Summary of research

"In qualitative data analysis, the main focus is not on quantification of facts, but rather on identifying the meanings and values attributed by individuals in real-life situations, with idiosyncratic and personal views forming an important part of the overall picture." (Hewitt-Taylor, 2001, pp. 41-42)

This section will summarise the research process while also containing comments and claims which serve as a holistic assessment of the whole research project., Including reflexive thoughts elevates the section beyond a mere descriptive summary. This summary does not however include the methodology as this is discussed in-depth in a following section.

This research is about corruption with the research questions: how can the perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption? Of all the issues faced by society, corruption is one of the most difficult to properly address. Corruption is a substantial concept and when colloquially spoken about the discussion often pertains to a smaller part, limited by any combination of concept, context or intellect. This work strives to enlighten the reader on the last of those limitations, intellect, in an effort to increase understanding of corruption. By generating a grounded theory that would underpin human behaviour classified as corrupt, the idea is to supersede contextual restraints, at least partially. There is, however, no escape, from establishing conceptual limitations. In spite of the fact that most people have their own idea of what corruption is, the answer to the question 'what is corruption?' will probably differ from person to person, organisation to organisation, country to country and so on.

Although it may sometimes make sense to talk about corrupt countries, or organisations, it is important to remember that the smallest elements of analysis when it comes to corruption are individuals. The individual may very well be influenced by context, but the actions still emanate from the individual. It is an increased understanding of individual behaviour when it comes to corruption that is the focus of this research. Further, corrupt behaviour is largely conditioned by an understanding of the actions as being illegal or immoral. Far more prominent researchers than the author of this study have asserted the effects that various forms of pressure can have on deviant behaviour. Arguably, increasing the understanding of corruption would make it easier to combat it. Consequently, when a problem has been identified, the researcher must select a suitable tool or method to investigate it. For a structured approach to research with a certainty of process and enough flexibility to let the research phenomenon speak for itself, the method used is a modified

Grounded Theory. This also reflects a desire to go beyond a merely descriptive thematic analysis to reach a higher intelligible abstraction. In choosing to do Grounded Theory one of the biggest challenges to the entire research process revealed itself. Normally doctoral research commences with an early literature review. The early literature review, however, is perhaps one of the most contentious aspects of Grounded Theory. To ameliorate this a unique system of handling literature was developed and the position taken in this research suggests that a controlled preliminary literature review can be beneficial.

Using Grounded Theory also required a research paradigm with a solid philosophical foundation. Enter ontology, epistemology and axiology. The interrelation of these fundamental building blocks is sometimes referred to as philosophical alignment. As this nomenclature implies a linear structure an alternate rendition has been offered. The genesis of a philosophical nucleus can be conceptually visualised by placing ontology, epistemology and axiology in an equilateral triangle individually expanding their realm spherically. The convergence in the centroid of the triangle is where the trinity combines forming an inseparable actuality. This strong interaction is the epicentre from which this research draws its philosophical quintessence as ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist. The research is ontologically relativistic in so far as it claims reality and truth to be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme given that there is a non-reducible plurality of such conceptual schemes. Thus, this research subscribes to the notion that reality consists of multiple individual truths influenced by context. Changing the conception of truth, from an objectively real world waiting to be discovered, to a world made real in the minds and through the actions of its inhabitants, assumes data being generated with the researcher as a subjective active participant. The research is epistemologically anchored in a constructivist paradigm, shifting the focus from knowledge as a product to knowing as a process with meaning derived from interactions in the world. Linked to its ontological stance, epistemologically constructivism emphasises the subjective interrelationship between researcher and that which is being researched, usually human participants, and the co-construction of meaning. The logic of such subjective co-construction is internal and cannot be constructively judged on external epistemological grounds. This position does not, however, argue for a state of intellectual anarchy in which anything is deemed valid. Nevertheless, this research is regarded as only being epistemologically accountable to its own rules of structure and logic.

The theory developed within this paradigm is aimed to have an explanatory power with a high level of abstraction. Few grounded theory studies build theory, but many provide an analytical handle on a specific phenomenon. As this discussion progresses it is indicated that, and explained how, this research does produce both a theory, the SUM-theory, as well as an analytical handle on the phenomenon. The SUM-theory is based on the premise that motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a degenerated decision-making process. In contextualising the theory, a suitable starting point in terms of criminological models is routine activity theory. Not only does it assume motivation to be ever-present but also has its roots in rational choice theory, where the intricacies of decision-making are at the forefront. The first premise of a rational choice approach is that deviant decision-making in acts of corruption is a multi-stage process. Motivation can arguably take two forms. The first form, positive motivation, where situational precursors drive an agent into deviant behaviour. And the second form, negative motivation, where there is an absence of situational precursors, appealing to the values and norms held by the agent that nominally would inhibit deviant behaviour. Both cases presuppose an underlying latent motivation played upon by external, i.e. situational factors - embodying the foundational essence of the following assertion. The concept of motivation is something that is intrinsic to all human beings - it is an evolutionary by-product of our striving for survival and thus an inseparable part of human nature. The implication is that all humans through an innate drive for self-interest utility maximisation harbour a default motivation to realise goals in this pursuit, and that situations influence the decision-making governing the behavioural outcome thereof. The human mind is sensitive to both physical and social context, and situational factors can effectively distort the reasoning process permitting individuals to engage in what otherwise would have been forbidden behaviour.

To say that an agent is pursuing self-interest utility maximisation is not to say that everyone is completely self-interested in all contexts all the time. Rather, the statement carries an assumption that agents are more self-interested in some contexts than others and that the ability to act rationally upon whatever level of self-interest there is, may be significantly limited. Even acknowledging the tenet of other more or less defined sources of motivation that may drive behaviour is of little consequence for the construct of corruption as an opportunity-based crime. The notion of all being susceptible to corruption came as somewhat of a revelation to the author as it contradicted the common idea of 'bad apples' and instead pointed to 'bad barrels'. The contextual seemed somehow to supersede the individual: the first seed of the SUM-theory. The SUM-theory stipulates that given an opportunity that is

perceived as advantageous and that can be rationalised, corruption may be the rational choice. Rationality is about intention and purpose where behaviour is interpreted as action and it is explained by referring to the underlying reasons for performing it. This is not a new idea: Weberian interpretive sociology also emphasises that the rationality assumption is necessary for interpreting behaviour as action, and shares with the rational choice approach a commitment to methodological individualism. Thus, it is the individual within a situation that is central to how goals are deliberately pursued with 'situation' understood not as an absolute reality but as subjectively perceived. In terms of rationality that is, if deconstructed, it is rational for that individual in that situation.

In an effort to explain the rationality behind SUM-behaviour attention was turned to evolution. Despite the difficulty of proving how anything in fact has evolved, it can be said that for a trait to be selected it must be beneficial to survival and reproduction. As discussed earlier, humans have always striven by self-interested utility optimisation to survive and reproduce, and two traits that have persisted throughout modern history as vehicles in that pursuit are power and wealth. The research findings underpinning this thesis point towards motivation for self-interest utility maximisation for both power and wealth as latent variables. That does not mean that an agent is constantly preoccupied with either of the two but much like survival and reproduction the underlying latent striving for power and wealth is always there. It is important to note that this research does not intend to make a causal connection between the striving for survival and reproduction to that of power and wealth. The discussion should by no means be seen as a conclusive account of the root causes of corruption but rather as a possible explanation that makes intuitive sense and, more importantly is grounded, in the data. What is drawn empirically from the research is a striving for power and wealth; and unfortunately, the achievement of power and wealth is often realised by corrupt behaviour. One may not agree that power and wealth are effective instruments for either survival or reproduction. However, the research indicates that the striving appears omnipresent in modern society. So, if the argument that power and wealth as contemporary vehicles to survival and reproduction create latent motivation for achieving goals in line with associated needs and desires, then unethical behaviour could appear as a rational choice and corruption would be pervasive: and corruption is pervasive.

The logical conclusion of the arguments presented is that decisions, including those for deviant behaviour, are almost always perceived to be rational. Through direct or vicarious interactions in everyday life an individual is aware of a wide range of possible choices in the

pursuit of self-interest utility maximisation. The choices of interest here are those potentially leading to actions of unethical behaviour and corruption. These choices are evaluated within the restriction of rationality on the basis of whether an individual is willing and able to put them into practice. The restrictions of rationality are that a) only limited, often unreliable information, is available regarding possible alternatives, their outcome and consequences; b) the human mind has limited capacity to evaluate and process the available information; and c) only a limited amount of time is available to make a decision. This is referred to as bounded rationality and the suboptimal choices are thought of as satisficing rather than maximising. In turn, the governing mechanism turning corrupt behaviour into rational choice is rationalisation and neutralisation.

Rationalisation is the cognitive process whereby individuals maintain their perceptions of themselves as moral actors by constructing justifications for their deviancy. The earliest writings about rationalisation were published over a century ago. In short, rationalisation is a reconciliation between actions and norms. The idea behind neutralisation theory is similar to that of cognitive dissonance based on three fundamental assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that humans are sensitive to inconsistencies between actions and beliefs. Secondly it is assumed that recognition of this inconsistency will cause dissonance and will motivate an agent to resolve the dissonance. And thirdly, this dissonance can be resolved in one of three basic ways. Resolution may come through a change of beliefs, changing behaviour or change in the perception of the behaviour. Note that dissonance theory only states that agents who are in a state of cognitive dissonance will take steps to reduce the extent of their dissonance, not that these modes of dissonance reduction will actually work. This concept of resolving friction between actions and norms is key to the theoretical underpinnings for the findings in this research in that it addresses the inescapable human tendency to neutralise.

Given the latent nature of motivation and how it is highly susceptible to rationalisation by neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption is opportunity. The logic is that regardless of motivation, and irrespective of rationalisation and neutralisation ability - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Naturally an agent can arguably be sufficiently motivated to create an opportunity but the opportunity itself is nevertheless an essential necessity. An agent more or less randomly presented with an opportunity for corruption would seek to commit actions that are easily rationalised. This is consistent with the rational choice approach, suggesting that the ability to rationalise would be an additional requirement to the basic decision-making task. Consequently, the common

denominator of either a mundane agent being presented with an opportunity or a predatory agent purposefully creating an opportunity, is just that: opportunity.

Although opportunity is partly grounded in objective facts (a bribe is either offered or it is not), perception of opportunities and their use or rejection is subjective and depends on the characteristics of the agent interwoven with a particular context. These will determine the extent which cues of opportunity are desired, detected, sized, sought, manipulated, manufactured and otherwise related to the agent. Thus, the first steps are taken towards an approach where the particular context is at the forefront. This will later be developed into the framework for the situational prevention of corruption. Where opportunity control is left as the final frontier for effective prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. Identifying the individual as the smallest common denominator of corruption, however, does not answer the question of where in the decision-making process the deviancy begins. While the findings of this research clearly outline opportunity as a central driver for corruption, it does not identify the source of motivation. Even so, there are some indications that when put together offer a plausible explanation. Put simply: it is about gaining an advantage.

That is not to say that there has to be constant search for advantages but rather that advantages obtained must outweigh disadvantages. The smallest element of analysis for corrupt behaviour is thus a perceived advantage. Note that, the choice to pursue a perceived advantage under the constraints of bounded rationality may very well ultimately lead to a disadvantage. In an anti-corruption perspective, it would therefore be equally important to influence the perception of advantages as well as the actual access to undue advantages. The smallest element, however, remains as the smallest perceived advantage that an agent can rationalise and neutralise. Accordingly, the decision-making process degenerates 'at least level', where the 'at least level' refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised. The at least level of corruption may, nevertheless, be a rather high level - given the opportunity.

Corruption is consequently a crime for all, where prevention is regulated primarily by opportunity. If corruption is considered largely being an opportunity-based crime, the question is how to prevent deviant behaviour, thus preventing corruption? The fundamentals of SUM-theory dictate that human nature to at least level is conducive to the search for advantages. Through an array of psychological operations conceptually described by rationalisation and neutralisation (with room for more), that search sometimes results in immoral and corrupt behaviour. Given both the instrumentality of rational choice and situational dependency of the

SUM-theory it is not too far a step to suggest the findings be applied to some sort of behavioural approach of situational crime prevention. One such theoretical framework is embodied in situational crime prevention which could allow for adaptation into opportunity controlling preventative strategies for corruption.

Situational crime prevention in its simplest form can be seen as synonymous with opportunity reduction. Where traditional criminology primarily sought to understand offenders and the psycho-social underpinnings of criminal behaviour, situational crime prevention is concerned mainly with the situation, i.e. the immediate circumstances under which a criminal act is performed. Fundamentally deviant behaviour in the form of corruption can be achieved in two ways: either by change the agent's motivation or by removing the opportunity. The core of situational crime prevention is a belief that deviant behaviour can be reduced by effectively altering the situation and subsequently reducing opportunity. There are at least two reasons to at least consider opportunity as conducive to corruption. Firstly; there is a large body of evaluated case studies showing substantial reductions in specific types of crime as the result of situational crime prevention. Secondly, in experiments and interviews by and with researchers, offenders often testify to opportunity playing a large role in their behaviour.

In its current form the situational crime prevention is modelled through a five-by-five matrix - the situational crime prevention framework, with the five rows categorised as: increase the Effort, Increase the Risks, Reduce the Rewards, Reduce Provocations, and Remove Excuses. The subsequent 25 brackets represent specific classifications of techniques, where several are particularly relevant to preventing corruption. An important note is that the matrix should be seen as a guide to thinking about solving crime problems - rather than providing off-the-shelf one-size-fits-all anti-corruption solutions and measures. Thus, the classifications should by no means be considered as a complete account. Under many of the classification headings there are much more to be done, and under some the proposals may even appear somewhat forced. The matrix, however, should not be considered in isolation. The idea is to view the matrix as a mesh framework with an array of measures applied collectively that interact to reinforce the total effect: in this case, the prevention of corruption.

It is recognised that an application of the SUM-theory whether or not through situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes requires significant empirical research and real world testing before any further solid conclusions can be drawn. The main point, however, is that since prevention is better than cure, it is worth considering fringe ideas like this to break out from silo thinking and being stuck in the same tracks. Perhaps, policymakers

will look at this very thesis and gets an idea that in fact will improve the corruption situation somewhere.

The answer to the research question

The research question read: "How can the perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption?" The answer, developed through qualitative analysis of a number of interviews with key anti-corruption policy participants, lies in an increased understanding of the motivation for corruption, the importance of opportunity for corruption and a situational crime prevention approach for corruption. The answer can be summed up under the following three headings: corruption is a rational choice, corruption is an opportunity-based crime, and corruption is situationally preventable. The choice, i.e. decision-making process is rooted in a bounded rationality perspective, where the SUM-theory states that an agent will act upon what is perceived to be the most advantageous of available choices. An analogy is offered between the striving for survival and reproduction and that for power and wealth, where the latter is highly conducive to corruption. This presupposes the tenets of free will and a self-interested agent, but not that these two tenets necessarily produce an optimal outcome. Instead, deviant behaviour is rationalised at least level, i.e. the most advantageous yet deviant behaviour that causes the least cognitive dissonance is neutralised and realised. Yet, it can only be realised given the opportunity, thus making the decision-making process susceptible to the situation in which actions are to be realised. This points towards corruption being preventable through situational design where measures are applied to either reduce the ability for an agent to rationalise the perceived opportunity for deviant behaviour or to physically prevent an agent from acting upon an opportunity to illicitly gain a perceived advantage. This insight is contextualised in a thought experiment where the SUM-theory is applied through the situational crime prevention matrix.

5.2 Contribution to knowledge

"...an original contribution requires a certain amount of risk-taking in choosing a topic and approach..." (Baptista et al., 2015, p. 56)

Doctoral research, by definition, involves a contribution to knowledge. While considered an essential component, the contribution itself is difficult to define and quantify. Commonly found in literature on doctoral education are concepts of originality, creativity and innovation (Baptista et al., 2015). These concepts are often defined with reference to each other, indicating their interrelation. Originality can be defined as something that is new or novel, but not necessarily applicable or relevant. Herein lies the difference with creativity which according to Bennich-Björkman (1997) and Beghetto (2013) respectively has to be relevant and applicable. Such notions of relevance and applicability highlight a need for the research to be fit for purpose, which in turn is addressed by the concept of innovation. Involving the transformation of theoretical research findings into something practically applicable, innovation is linked to academic research "to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century" (EUA, 2007, p. 2). Together these concepts can be illustrated as in Figure 9. Broadly, originality in this research can be interpreted through the SUM-theory, creativity through the ALL-assumption and the SCP-matrix through innovation, the following sections will however provide far more detail than that.




Figure 9: The relationship between originality, creativity and innovation for doctoral contribution.

Adapted from (Baptista et al., 2015)

In this section the outcome and the contribution to knowledge from different stages of this research are outlined and summarised. Moreover, the implications of this research for theory, practice and further research are discussed. In doing so, both the development of the methodology and the findings from the qualitative interviews are taken into account. The methodological development is particularly important for at least two reasons: first at the outset of the research project, the original interpretations of the methodology precluded an early literature review - uncommon to most research projects. When finally, a methodology was developed to allow for a limited literature review, the time available to do so was also limited. Added to this the exponential increase in time required to apply the constant comparison method made for further time related constraints. The literature review related to the particular topic under investigation normally establishes what is currently known as well as what counts as knowledge in that area of discourse - enabling the argument that the project in question constitutes a contribution to knowledge. In this case, as a result of the literature review dilemma, and in the time given also considering the existence of a vast published literature and that 'everything is data', there is a significant possibility that the author has not read and reviewed everything that is theoretically available on the topic. Thus, as noted in the section on reviewing literature, the claim here is that in the literature reviewed and the data collected there is nothing to suggest that this is not an actual contribution to knowledge. The contribution to knowledge resulting from this research is therefore twofold. On one hand, there is the development of a methodology and on the other there are the findings. The first is primarily of academic interest for those about to use or already using grounded theory as a means of investigation. The second contribution to knowledge is also of interest to academics looking to further develop the theory but perhaps more importantly, it has possible implications for practitioners in anti-corruption. The breadth of the knowledge contribution thus encompasses both academia and industry, and if in time influenced policy involving governments, a triple helix¹⁰ would be complete.

Utility of grounded theory for this type of research

In designing their methodology, some research projects follow the prescription of other more or less similar projects. Sometimes following a previously established methodology to the letter is a requirement for reliability and comparability with other results, sometimes it is

¹⁰ The concept of the 'triple helix' of academia-industry-government relationships interprets the shift from a dominating industry-government dyad in the 'industrial society' to a growing triadic relationship between academia-industry-government in the 'knowledge society'.

simply out of convenience. There are, nonetheless, another group of research projects, those that devise an entirely, or at least partly, new method for investigating a particular topic. It may also be the application of an existing methodology that has not been previously used for this purpose and requires some adaptation for application. Where there is a considerable field of knowledge and a broad body of literature about the topic, one way of approaching the investigation of a phenomenon within that topic is to propose a framework for reviewing that knowledge and literature. Further, as with GT+, the framework can also highlight an area, in which despite an abundance of research there is a relatively limited understanding of certain aspects of the topic. In such cases, the methodology and framework itself is a contribution to knowledge. This research is such a case.

Even so, there is still something to be said about the utility of GT+ for this type of research. In an attempt to address the overly generic use of the term 'grounded theory' and confusion regarding alternative epistemological approaches to qualitative research, Suddaby (2006) outlines six common misconceptions. These misconceptions about grounded theory are an excellent starting point to discuss the pros and cons of the methodology developed for this research. According to Suddaby, grounded theory is not: (1) an excuse to ignore the literature; (2) presentation of raw data; (3) theory testing, content analysis or word counts; (4) simply routine application of formulaic technique to data; (5) perfect; and (6) easy. To address the first issue, this research involved the development of a new framework as a tool for handling literature in grounded theory. Secondly, avoiding the presentation of raw data, the account of the analysis and subset net findings are largely devoid of the underpinning 'raw' codes. Thirdly, while the theory is adapted and applied to a framework of situational crime prevention this cannot by any scientific degree be considered 'theory testing', and is instead described and labelled as a thought experiment. The constructivist epistemology of the research naturally places the emphasis on the thoughts of researcher and participants., The fourth misconception is addressed by a constant attention to reflexivity through both abstract contemplation and physical memos. The answer to whether this has led to a perfect account of the phenomenon and behaviour under study is unequivocally no. This is an important lesson that may surprise the novice researcher and is a fact that one must be able make peace with for grounded theory to be a satisfactory choice. Sixth and lastly, using GT+ has not been easy, and the immense time consumed has led to a trade-off between breadth and depth. For a project where depth is more important than breadth, GT+ is a suitable candidate, although not the only one; and it is worth considering if a much simpler content analysis approach may suffice.

In addition to the issues above and as discovered in using this methodology, while grounded theory is highly focused on the discovery and construction of theory, it pays less attention to the deconstruction of theory. As stated in the opening section on findings, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain where relevant information has come from. Is this data snippet from an interview, the literature review (to the extent that this is being done) or is this an abstraction, elaborated in co-construction between data and researcher? While it is possible to argue that this is partly addressed by reflexive memos, in practical terms this would put an immense stress on the level of detail included in the memos. For them alone to bear the burden of guiding an evaluator through the reverse engineering and deconstruction of theory would require the memos to be very long, highly structured and formatted. Such requirements could in effect defeat the purpose of the reflexive memos in the first place. The memos, while providing an account of the thought process of the researcher's analytically journey across the data towards theory is one thing, using this, as an exact map is another.




Figure 10. A conceptual overview of the GT+ coding process.

In Grounded Theory everything is data, but there is no clear distinction between the origins of that data. As illustrated by figure 10, data, regardless of origins is broken down into codes. In open coding, the codes are combined and compared to create concepts, in axial coding the concepts are combined and compared (to both themselves and the codes) to create categories, and in theoretical coding the categories are compared and combined (with all previous elements) to form a core category around which a hypothesis is formed. Figure 10

would indicate that abstraction only occurs at the end but in fact, abstraction occurs at each level of the various coding processes. The abstraction is what creates the depth of the analysis but does not lend itself well to being deconstructed. Grounded theory is about behaviour and designed to go deep, generating a theory at a high level of abstraction: For this it is useful but not for much else.

The contribution of SUM-theory

The SUM-theory is the pinnacle of this research endeavour, offering an explanation of motivation, neutralisation and opportunity in relation to sought advantages resulting in corrupt behaviour. While there is room for improvement and refinement of the theory, discussed in the following section on the way forward, the theory as it stands still holds the potential to make a contribution that is both academic and theoretical as well as applicable and practical. Understanding the mechanisms behind deviant behaviour resulting in corruption is relevant both from a criminological and psychological perspective as well as that of providing an effective framework for anti-corruption. For the former, the SUM-theory breaks new ground in terms of in-depth qualitative analysis of a phenomenon commonly studied by quantitative means. As for the latter, the SUM-theory clearly indicates the centrality of opportunity in situationally dependent acts of corruption. As discussed in the section on impact, the SUM-theory has the capacity to inform and significantly improve anti-corruption frameworks. Although actual policy changes may be a bit far-fetched at the moment, the shifting of focus from corruption as a by-product of 'bad apples' to the situationally dependent 'bad barrels' is an important one, particularly when dealing with the large global instruments like the ones discussed in the introduction. Because, as Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, p. 38) states if incentives remain one set of 'bad apples' will be replaced by new – i.e. the very essence of 'bad barrels'.

While the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the Council of Europe's Criminal and Civil Law Convention on Corruption, all set the tone for anti-corruption frameworks at the very top, the SUM-theory can aid in guiding effective implementation on the ground – at the level of the individual. The usefulness of adding qualitative elements as the result of research and thought experiments similar to this project can only be judged by results. Ironically, those results may probably be best measured by quantitative means. Nevertheless, the SUM-theory contributes value added to anti-corruption practice and may also lead to other researchers and practitioners drawing new

ideas rooted from the orations of this research, for example developing some of the peripheral findings such as the ALL-assumption.

Peripheral findings - the allure of the ALL-assumption

The ALL-assumption is an exploration of what it is that drives decision-making leading to deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. In the grounded theory tradition, the appropriate approach is for such an assumption to have a high level of abstraction. Further, even if derived from a methodology designed to generate theory this is not a theory and is instead labelled as an assumption. This indicates that it is a 'peripheral finding', in need of further research to reach the level of 'theory'. Nevertheless, it was interesting to see how not only the SUM-theory grew from the core category but also how there was something else hidden in the data. As discussed earlier, the conclusions drawn at this point are that in the search for advantages as dictated by the SUM-theory the decision-making process degenerates at least level, where the least level refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised. It degenerates in the meaning that the advantages sought are considered undue, leading to deviant behaviour. So, while the SUM-theory arguably provides opportunity as an answer to the key element for corruption to occur, the ALL-assumption suggests an answer to the subsequent question: an opportunity for what? An opportunity to gain an advantage that is smaller than the agent is capable of neutralising. It would, however, be very interesting to explore this further. For example, what are the implications of several choices for undue advantages that all fall within an agent's capability neutralise? It could also be interesting to see how the collective may influence the individual perception of the least level of an undue advantage; if the scope for altruism could increase and decrease with a strong sense of a collective direction. Note that, if so, this would not contradict the SUM-theory as the individual would still act in what is perceived as the most self-interest utility maximising manner, only that the self-interest would be an altruistic one. This somewhat counterintuitive notion is discussed in more depth in previous sections of the thesis and it may be worth revisiting if one would embark for an ALL-assumption exploration. There are, however, other venues for further research worth considering.

Way forward and future research

This is a piece of research that stems largely from the anti-corruption work by the EU as embodied in the first EU-anticorruption report published in 2014. As such, a range of incentives can and have been proposed for increased effectiveness for the European anti-corruption agenda. First and foremost, it is important for both the EU as a supranational institution as well as its constituent Member States to continually demonstrate political will and concrete action against corruption. The EU and national governments should speak and act against corruption to confirm a high-level political commitment. This includes positive incentives like 'naming and faming' well-performing Member States, institutions or individuals and highlight whatever works in the fight against corruption. At the same time, politicians and key stakeholders should not shy away from also bringing up issues and systemic weaknesses where those occur, even within the own ranks. For democracy and transparency to prevail there may in some cases be a need for increased supranational governance and impartial mechanisms through which sanctions could be imposed. In other cases, support of national or local efforts may be the solution through established anti-corruption funds where, for example, resources can be drawn for awareness and education campaigns.

Given this premise, where does this research come in and how can it be furthered to aid in the fight against corruption? There are several different elements of this research that could be envisaged in future and further research. The first of these is the methodology; the second is the main findings and improvement of the SUM-theory; the third, an exploration of the peripheral findings and the ALL-assumption; the fourth, a refinement of the applied situational crime prevention matrix for corruption; and the fifth, empirical research involving the application of the SUM-theory for anti-corruption purposes.

The methodology used is uncommon, given its limitations perhaps rightly so, but as demonstrated not only by this research there are truths to be found also by qualitative means. Developing a similar methodology, based on, and most importantly still rooted in, grounded theory that somewhat could allow for large data sets could be highly interesting. Purists would conceivably claim that it would not be 'real' grounded theory, but as long as the theories generated held their scientific ground and stood the test of time and scrutiny then it could still be useful. This, in turn, could allow for further research around the SUM-theory through additional and follow-up interviews as well as negative case analysis. Improving the theory in this way would be analogous with adding digits to pi. Calculating the circumference of a circle using 3,14 as an approximation of pi rather than 3 would give mathematically more accurate

results, and 3,1415 would be even better still. The SUM-theory as it stands could probably benefit from having some decimals added. The same goes for the ALL-assumption that with further research could be incorporated in the SUM-theory, or possibly established as a theory of its own. From there, the situational crime prevention matrix adapted for corruption could be improved as well. There is already a potential for the matrix to be used for effective prevention of corruption as will be discussed more in the section on impact. With the matrix applied to various contexts, it could be interesting to go back to the roots of SUM-theory and investigate the results and effectiveness of the different measures in different situations. Lastly, the application of the SUM-theory for anti-corruption purposes can be researched from an axiological perspective. Going deeper into the psychological, behavioural and even neuroscientific aspects of the SUM-theory may reveal discoveries for an even more effective instrumentalisation of anti-corruption efforts. Thus, future and further research based on this project may cover theoretical aspects, practical applications, implications and even suggest policy recommendations. A final note is that his research is based upon interviews with people about other peoples' behaviour. It would be interesting to apply the same or similar methodology in interviewing those that actually have engaged in corruption. Getting to such individuals and convincing them to participate may obviously pose some rather significant challenges: an interesting possibility nevertheless.

5.3 Impact and implications

“For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For the want of a horse the rider was lost,
For the want of a rider the battle was lost,
For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.” (Franklin, 1758)

Impact in doctoral research is often as important as it is undefined, not so much as a concept but as a demonstrable metric. On the website of the Economic and Social Research Council [ESRC] guidance on research impact is offered. There it is stated that the Research Councils UK (RCUK) defines research impact as “the demonstrable contribution that excellent research makes to society and the economy” (ESRC, 2018). This can involve academic or societal impact, or both. Academic impact is the demonstrable contribution that the research does in terms of scientific advancement, whereas societal impact refers to the benefits the research has on society and the economy therein. As with most doctoral research projects, dissemination is substantial; however, this does generally not count as impact. This project has been presented at numerous conferences and there have been several impact indicators (i.e. media coverage) mainly in Sweden where the SUM-theory and situational crime prevention approach to corruption has been initially tested. This is not to be confused with impact evidence (i.e. policy change) but given the complexity of the phenomenon of corruption as discussed in the introduction, policy change is something that moves slowly. Anyone involved in policymaking knows that these things do not change rapidly, and the life cycle of policy change often far exceeds that of a full-time PhD project.

Nevertheless, this research has had an impact that is demonstrable, and in a sense is still in progress. The impact has been realised through the application of a situational crime prevention package for anti-corruption purposes based on the SUM-theory delivered to Swedish municipalities. As outlined by other studies the Swedish municipalities are considered particularly susceptible to corruption (see e.g. Bergh, Erlingsson, Sjölin, & Öhrvall, 2016). Supporting the governance of the municipalities is the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions [SKL] with a strong commitment to fighting corruption. That top level political leadership commitment is something that in many developing countries cannot be taken for granted (Svensson, 2005). A centralised national office, or at least some sort of national coordination, is critical to lauding an anti-corruption package like this. In Assessing the

Relevancy and Efficacy of the United Nations Convention against Corruption the importance of such coordination through a national body or agency is stressed. They are described as the intermediary between governments and public opinion, making their political independence very important (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011, p. 108). Therefore, being able to provide the applied findings of this research to such a body signifies a societal impact. The provisions were not administered through SKL but with permission directly to the local municipalities. Two municipalities were approached: and both committed to testing the anti-corruption package.

A successful anti-corruption campaign has to take into account the particular context be it cultural, political, historical or economical. This is made evident by, for example, work in Hong Kong by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, and the same goes for any endeavour in a country like Sweden. Most importantly, lasting results rest upon a change in the culture of corruption. There are obviously other important factors like institutional change, improved governance, and transparency to name a few. Further, a free press that seeks to expose corruption at every level is critical to changing the culture, and the anti-corruption package did get some well-deserved media coverage at its onset. Whether or not the anti-corruption package will proceed to more and possibly all municipalities remains to be seen. If it stalls it would not be the first to do so, particularly given the environment where political agendas often trump practical benefits. On the other hand, if it works, it should be scrutinised as to clearly establish how well and why it worked as it did, and in a way measuring the impact.

Work with Swedish municipalities is still in progress and the end result yet to be determined. It is however refreshing to see the formal enforcement measures through rules and regulations to be complemented by preventive action. As discussed throughout the thesis, the multifaceted nature of corruption demands that if not only looking for short-term solutions, sustainable anti-corruption also involves the pursuit of extensive preventive measures. Where such measures are lacking, reliance is habitually placed on more-or-less defined offences and a variety of sanctions in cases of violation. However, this type of approach does not serve as a strong deterrent in practice (Carr, 2006). As supported by the findings of this research, prevention is therefore necessary to deny deviant behaviour its breeding ground and to address the issue of corruption before it takes root. One of the most central questions facing the anti-corruption establishment is thus how to create an environment, both politically and practically, that can make both the policies of enforcement and prevention effective. Heineman and Heimann (2006, p. 85) argue, each institutional actor

will have to overcome its long-standing internal cultural problems. Developed nations, like Sweden, that want to be in the forefront of the fight against corruption, must show the political will to investigate and prosecute corruption, not only in national transgressions but also in multinational corporations when they engage in bribery abroad, and most importantly within the domestic state functions. Even in the face of political friction and resistance this is the way to change the mindset and culture of corruption. Being able to contribute to such a change is a significant contribution to the anti-corruption agenda - the essence of impact.

5.4 Validity and Reliability

"There is general agreement that all research studies must be open to critique and evaluation. Failure to assess the worth of a study – the soundness of its method, the accuracy of its findings, and the integrity of assumptions made, or conclusions reached – could have dire consequences. Traditionally, such evaluation has centred on assessment of reliability and validity." (Long & Johnson, 2000, p. 30)

Validity refers to the degree to which this, or any research, accurately reflects the specific concept that it attempts measure or answers the question, or questions, posed. While its dizygotic twin, reliability, is concerned with the precision of the procedure, validity is concerned with the research's success in measuring what it set out to measure or answering what it set out to answer.

An excellent metaphor to understand the relationship between validity and reliability is that of archery. The centre of the archery target board is considered to represent the concept being evaluated. For each snippet of data that is measured, evaluated and incorporated an arrow is let loose towards the target. If a perfect representation of the concept the arrow hits the centre of the target and the more off it goes the less accurately it reflects the concept.




Figure 11. Illustration of archery analogy for relationship between validity and reliability.

Figure 11 illustrates four possible outcomes. From left to right, in the first the target is hit consistently but hits are grouped off centre. That means that all data evaluated is systematically yielding values that are consistent but not in support of the null hypothesis. Note that in Grounded Theory establishing a null hypothesis in the first place is extremely rare. The second outcome shows hits randomly distributed across the target board. This type of result can be useful for broad generalisations that may hold macro validity but would break down on micro, i.e. individual data source, level. If this was the result of the initial sample using Grounded

Theory it would be hard, although not impossible, to discern where to direct the theoretical sampling for the next data set. From these two outcomes alone, it is possible to see some difficulties when applying validity and reliability to qualitative research in general and Grounded Theory in particular. Thus, it is pertinent to ask the question: to what extent are validity and reliability relevant to ensure credibility in this qualitative research project?

For the novice researcher, undeniably including this researcher, it is challenging to demonstrate rigour when undertaking purely qualitative research because the lack of consensus about the standards by which such research should be judged (Rolfe, 2006). Qualitative research is sometimes criticised for lacking scientific rigour, poor justification of methods and analytical transparency (Sandelowski, 1993): in sum being nothing more than a collection of personal opinions subject to researcher bias. There is an ongoing debate about the role and relevance of validity and reliability as appropriate to evaluate qualitative research (see e.g. Long & Johnson, 2000). As argued by Noble and Smith (2015) in their paper 'Issues of validity and reliability in qualitative research', qualitative methods inherently differ from quantitative methods in terms of philosophical position as well as purpose which implies an alternative framework of evaluation.

As argued by Long and Johnson (2000, p. 35) regarding the alternative terms for reliability and validity in qualitative research: "The need is not for new criteria or novel terms but for different means of addressing existing criteria." Therefore, in light of critiques directed at validity and reliability, and the rigour of qualitative research in general, the classifying terminology used must be explained. Taxonomy is the science of classification, intelligibly described by Dawkins (1996, chapter 10) from where the following discussion is drawn. Dawkins claim that some associate taxonomy this with the inner workings of a museum, the preservation and presentation of ancient things and creatures, perhaps due to confusion with the similarly sounding taxidermy - the art of preparing, stuffing, and mounting animals with lifelike appearance. In any case, orderly classification is a practical necessity in many instances. The books in a large library would be nearly impossible to effectively use unless arranged in some non-random way. There is, however no single, unique, or most importantly, universally correct way of solving the problem of organising books in a library. Librarians can and probably do have vivid discussions and sensible disagreements with one another about how books should be organised. The arguments, however, will not be won or lost based a criterion of 'truth' of one classification system over another. Rather the criteria could involve concepts such as 'convenience for library visitors' and 'speed of finding a particular book'. As pointed

out by Dawkins, in this sense the taxonomy of books in a library can be said to be arbitrary but that does not mean that it is unimportant to devise a good classification system. The same is true for qualitative research in general and, from the subjective perspective of the author, for this research in particular.

The classifications for assessing the rigour of the research are not completely arbitrary. Instead it is based on a framework devised by Lincoln and Guba (1985) where the classification headings are: truth value, consistency, neutrality and applicability. Table 4 lists these headings with explanations adapted from Noble & Smith (2015).

Table 4: Terminology and criteria used for qualitative research evaluation.

Quantitative research terminology and application to research	Alternative terminology associated with qualitative research
<p>Validity The accuracy of concept. The precision of the findings accurately reflecting the data collected and analysed, and the extent the findings satisfy the research question(-s).</p>	<p>Truth value (Credibility) Recognises that multiple realities exist; outlines the researcher's philosophical position (that may have resulted in methodological bias)</p>
<p>Reliability The extent to which the results are believable within the research paradigm. The rigour and consistency of the analytical procedures, including accounting for personal and research method biases that may have influenced the findings</p>	<p>Consistency (Dependability) Relates to the 'trustworthiness' by which the methods have been undertaken and is dependent on the researcher maintaining a 'decision-trail'. Ultimately an independent researcher should be able to arrive at similar or comparable findings.</p>
<p>Generalisability The transferability of the findings to other settings and applicability in other contexts</p>	<p>Applicability (Transferability) Consideration is given to whether findings can be applied to other contexts, settings or groups</p>
	<p>Neutrality (Confirmability) Achieved when truth value, consistency and applicability have been addressed. Centres on acknowledging the complexity of engagement with participants and that the methods undertaken, and findings are intrinsically linked to the researchers' philosophical position, experiences and perspectives.</p>

Truth value (Credibility)

The purpose of this research, and consequently design, is solely to generate substantive theory. The process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides which data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, whether substantive or formal (Glaser, 1978).

Notwithstanding, the qualitative researcher is expected to seek convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods (Bowen, 2009). Validity and reliability can be strengthened by further research and methodological triangulation i.e. the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon (Denzin, 1970). The truth value involves establishing that the result of the research is believable from the perspective taken by the research paradigm. Since it is from this perspective that the research is to understand and describe the phenomena of interest it is also the only perspective that can legitimately judge the truth value the results. Revisiting the writings on paradigm, the theory and the development thereof certainly concurs with the philosophical disposition presented and is thus considered, at least from this particular standpoint, credible. The ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist philosophical paradigm of this research asserts that realities are social constructions of the mind and that there exist as many such constructions as there are individuals. Note that rejecting the idea of the existence of a single objective reality is not the same as to say that there are no universal truths to be found that overarch subjective realities.

The argument here is that there are universal truths about moral, SUM-theory driven yet non-corrupt, behaviour to be found. Just as the laws governing gravity are clear and indisputable, and certainly not versions of the truth, recalling a documentary stating: "Gravity is not a version of the truth. It is the truth. Anyone who doubts it is invited to jump out a tenth-storey window" (Dawkins, 2009). This can be visualised in what Harris (2011) refers to as a moral landscape, with peaks and valleys, where increased spatial elevation corresponds to a societal state of moral, non-corrupt, behaviour on a both individual and collective level. Decisions and subsequent actions determine movement over the moral landscape, with distinct right and wrong answers as to how to behave in order to reach any of the peaks. It is this view that changes morality from largely intangible to certainly quantifiable - with room for a debate on expectations of optimal behaviour. Also, there are most certainly universalistic truths that can be defined for a moral peak: SUM-behaviour being one of them. The tools to reach that peak, however, are not the same all over the world. The point is, that there are universal laws to be found and that behaviour according to those laws must be dealt with differently in the highly varied cultural context of the world, as long as one remembers, acknowledges and takes into considerations those universal laws.

Observe that even if given an explanation for behaviour in the SUM-theory that holds truth value, being true relative to a context of use is not the same as to a context of

assessment. As Dummett (1959) observes in his classic article 'Truth', one could in principle learn which positions in chess and other games were 'winning' without having any understanding of the significance of winning. It is therefore of interest to further expand the remit of the SUM-theory, test it empirically and dive deeper into the intricacies of the ALL-assumption. Notwithstanding further research, given the research paradigm of this research the SUM-theory and ALL-assumption hold a certain degree of credibility and truth value.

Consistency (Dependability)

Consistency is the qualitative counterpart to reliability. The latter is a common term in research contexts. Traditionally, reliability is based on the assumption of replicability or repeatability, which essentially means whether the same results would be obtained if the observed phenomenon were observed again. In qualitative research with diverse paradigms, such definition of reliability is challenging and epistemologically counter-intuitive (Leung, 2015). The essence of reliability therefore lies more within the concept of consistency (see e.g. Grosseohme, 2014). In general, something that is reliable means dependable or trustworthy and in research this is interpreted as repeatability or consistency. A finding is thus considered reliable and consistent if it would yield the same result again, and more so if repeatedly tested with different methods. This assumes that what is measured is not changing over time or that time dependency is irrelevant. This is not the case for the phenomenon of corruption. Further, the paradigm of this research makes such an assumption somewhat difficult as from a constructivist perspective the perceived reality and subsequently the phenomenon is in constant flux. To get around this dependence on subjectivity the argument for consistency must emphasise the need to account for the ever-changing context within which the research occurs. Silverman (Silverman, 2009, p. 472) has proposed a number of approaches in enhancing the reliability of process and results where constant data comparison is one, a fundamental pillar to Grounded Theory. So, for the research to be able to describe the phenomenon at hand, grounded theory provides the leverage to raise the theory to a level of abstraction less influenced by these changes.

Therefore, even if power and wealth are contemporary vehicles to realise SUM-theory based behaviour resulting in deviant behaviour in pursuit of perceived advantages, it is not given that they always will remain such. For example, if society would dispense of the notion of money, would corruption automatically stop? Possibly, but probably not. There would be other prevailing advantages to the human striving for survival and reproduction that arguably could lead to deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. The deviancy itself is also a

normative concept and susceptible to change: however, the fundamental tenet of the SUM-theory would still hold true. It is therefore likely that other researchers using the same or at least similar methods would reach the same conclusion. As for distinctly different, e.g. purely quantitative methods, the author dares not to make assumptions. Partly because even within the method applied here there is a methodological risk to consistency due to its unique incorporation of literature in a grounded theory study. This further fuels the conjecture that qualitative studies are more difficult to repeat and are inherently less reliable. While this does not automatically mean that any such project cannot be consistent, it does issue caution in establishing overall credibility. Nonetheless, if the SUM-theory survives not only the test of time but also continued research, hopefully by other researchers, there is a good chance that there are some very useful truths to be found for the anti-corruption establishments.

Applicability (Transferability)

The degree to which results of qualitative research can be generalised, or transferred, to other contexts or settings can be referred to as transferability. For the transferred results to have any significance they must somehow be applied to that particular context, or settings, ergo the applicability. The quantitative counterpart is generalisability, sometimes also referred to as external validity. From a qualitative perspective applicability is primarily the responsibility of the one doing the applying, however the process of generalisation can be facilitated by a thorough description of the research paradigm, context and central assumptions. From there, the person who wishes to apply or transfer the findings to another context is then ultimately responsible for explaining and justifying how sensible the manoeuvre is. In that sense the nature of applicability is twofold: where on one hand, it is the responsibility of the researcher to provide evidence that the findings of the research could be transferred and applied to another context. On the other hand, since the researcher cannot prove that the findings will be applicable, "it is, in summary, not the naturalist's task to provide an index of transferability, it is his or her responsibility to provide the data base that makes transferability judgements possible on the part of potential appliers" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 316).

There are three elements of this research that aid in establishing applicability. The first is the thoroughly explained research paradigm, the second is the adaptation and advancement of the grounded theory methodology and lastly the level of abstraction on which the findings are presented. Compared to much quantitative research on corruption the philosophy of the research paradigm in this qualitative project is far more thoroughly explained. Coupled with a robust and detailed account of a rather complex methodology, the findings in its resulting

theory is lifted to a high level of abstraction. This elevation is intended to supersede the cultural and social context that surrounded data collection. Whether or not this is actually the case, will be up to subsequent researchers to either confirm or falsify. The information provided in the thesis can, however, guide such researchers to construct a setting where the findings of this research have meaning. Although researchers themselves make the final applicability and transferability judgements, the essence of this research is still captured. The SUM-theory is by any Grounded Theory account at best substantial, consequence of a conscious decision to not pursue a formal theory: and has clear delimiters in terms of conceptual scope. Yet, the results, given their level of abstraction, indicate sensible applicability to other contexts in conjunction with further research or real world application and evaluation.

Neutrality (Confirmability)

Neutrality or Conformability is the criterion when evaluation research that is unique to qualitative research. It could be associated with the quantitative idea of objectivity but that is a concept that would not mean anything in a constructivist qualitative paradigm, where researcher interaction is inevitable (see e.g. Patton, 1990). Having said that, there is nothing stopping someone from also evaluating quantitative research in terms of neutrality. However, it would probably have less meaning than for a qualitative project. Neutrality is considered when truth value, consistency and applicability have been addressed. It centres on acknowledging the complexity of engagement with participants and that the methods undertaken, and findings are intrinsically linked to the researchers' philosophical position, experiences and perspectives. Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2013) consider the extent to which the researcher admits predispositions a key criterion for confirmability.

Even though the paradigm of this research postulates that each researcher brings a unique perspective to a study, confirmability refers to the degree to which others could corroborate the results. There are a number of strategies for enhancing confirmability applied in this research project. First, by carefully documenting the procedures and checking and re-checking the data in the constant comparison of grounded theory throughout the research the promise of confirmability is enhanced. Second, the research involved an active search for negative data that would contradict prior analytical conclusions. Third, academics and professionals in various disciplines were constantly probed when discussing the findings in order for them to play 'devil's advocate' in a search for non-conformance. Fourth, research caveats and design shortcomings are identified and described to counter potential bias or

distortion, for example, the time dependency of the phenomenon under study vis-à-vis the time consumption of the methodology can make the research findings obsolete post-haste.

Even so, knowledge related to the past can not only satisfy an intellectual curiosity about corruption in a particular setting during a certain period, but a historical perspective of corruption (as well as anti-corruption) and its associated behaviour can also provide information about the continuities and discontinuities regarding patterns and practices of corruption as well as of policies and tools developed to prevent and repress it. In that sense, an almost historiographical account of corruption and its related behaviour can help in understanding the various roots and roles of corruption in a contextualised manner. Therefore, even as time passes, the then historical findings of this research may provide a glimpse into a complex phenomenon that in turn could open up some small yet significant path towards a better of understanding of contemporary corrupt practices by making connections and comparisons with legacies (and theories) of the past.

5.5 Conclusion

"Often it is not so much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which he finds himself that determines how he will act." (Milgram, 1974, p. 205)

What began as an exposé of the perception of corruption by contrasting two countries in a particular sector ended up spanning far more than just two nation states and certainly more than one sector. The research generated an overarching substantive theory of human behaviour as an explanation for corrupt behaviour. Having established that this is a qualitative research project within a constructivist paradigm with the researcher as an integral part of the process this final section of the thesis will focus more on the author. The section will provide a subjective account of the author's journey and lessons learned, some reflections on what in retrospect could have been done differently and some thoughts on the future.

One of the first questions that had to be answered when applying for the funding for this research was 'why does this research project matter?'. The answer went something along the lines of this being a novel perspective on an old phenomenon previously covered mostly by quantitative studies. Then as the project progressed and evolved it found its academic (and scientific) place in answering the question 'How can the perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption?' At this point, over two hundred pages of describing how the answer was reached later, there is one more important outcome of this project that must not be forgotten. It has forged an academic researcher. The author has every intention to continue this mission of academic research, to explore strange new phenomena, to seek out new perspectives and to boldly state the findings - whatever they are and however inconvenient they may be.

The project, if absolutely nothing else, has been an immense learning experience for the author and the amount of knowledge accrued is staggering. Not only have the depths of the phenomenon that is corruption been explored, but the philosophical core of what reality is has been questioned, probed and grounded. The behavioural sciences have been introduced and proved relevant not only to the development of the research but also to the development of the author as a researcher. Added to this the author has been provided with a number of opportunities to engage in other criminological projects related to private security regulation, industrial espionage and security management, to name a few. In a sense this research is about vulnerable situations, and to those routines of everyday life which create

criminal opportunities and corruption as a sometimes unintended by-product. The overall effect however is much larger, and the project has allowed the author over the years grow both as an individual as well as an academic.

Are there things that could have been differently? Yes. There are obviously other methods and approaches that could have been used for a similar investigation of the phenomenon. Are there things that would be done differently if given the opportunity to do a similar project in the future? Most likely. For one, the author's free advice to anyone considering using grounded theory as the method of choice should not underestimate the time consumed in constant comparison analysis. It is probably easy to loosen the noose of 'constantly comparing everything to everything' and go for a more relaxed, 'comparing most things to most things' and from there to 'comparing new things only to the relevant things' - it is a slippery slope from there and will quickly taint the beauty of the Grounded Theory methodology. Properly applied, the rigour created by constant comparison is second to none and while it may be questioned in terms of time efficiency it is and unequivocally remains an integral part of Grounded Theory.

So, who cares about this research and perhaps more importantly who should care? For one the author cares. As mentioned, this has been irreplaceable experience on an individual level, but what about beyond that? Will this research be of use for other academics, practitioners or even policy makers? The answer is that it should. For grounded theorists the literature treatment system is unique and can provide valuable insight on how the methodology should be applied in other circumstances. Practically it is the author's ambition to continue implementation of the anti-corruption framework in Swedish municipalities. After evaluation and refinement this should be of interest to not only other municipalities or similarly structured organisations but also other anti-corruption practitioners. As for policymakers the implications are uncertain but there is at least a possibility for interaction and synergies between this research and policy. The author hopes that this work contributes such that one day there would be a unified theory of corruption that would set the global agenda for fighting corruption. The theory would be unified in that it would provide not only a universally accepted definition but also describe corruption in a way that recognises both the role of agency and social context. It is possible that such a unified theory of corruption is the only solution to curb corruption in a consistent and long-lasting way.

The final note draws its inspiration from an article by Garland (1996) on the limits of the sovereign state. In discussing an increasingly dualistic, polarised and ambivalent criminology the

distinction between a criminology of self and of the other is made. The criminology of self characterises deviant agents as rational consumers - just like you and me. From that perspective a highly interesting text is brought up as an example that also fits perfectly as a swan song for this project and its outcomes. The text in question is the *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis*, written in 1795 by Patrick Colquhoun.

Colquhoun's *Treatise* sets out an analysis of crime and a programme for its prevention arguing that increased crime is a consequence of a multiplication of temptation and opportunity. The analysis has nothing to do with individual abnormality or poor socialisation and deals with criminal opportunities rather than criminal dispositions. The common sense of Colquhoun's day was that no special theory of criminal motivation was necessary to explain the crimes of some classes of people: their law-breaking was a rational and situationally intelligible consequence of their social and economic position. Colquhoun's remedy for dealing with the crime focused upon the problem of prevention and opportunity reduction. This tentative conclusion drawn over two hundred years ago is qualitatively supported by this research and is a further testament to corruption as an opportunity-based crime.

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APPENDIX

I - Data management policy

All data will be stored and managed in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. All original field data will be collected electronically or digitised post collection. Hard copies of data will be destroyed immediately after being digitised. All electronic data will be stored on a laptop, backed up onto an external hard-drive, both encrypted and accessible only by the researcher. No data will be located on any remote server. None of the original data will be shared. Participants will have the right to access their own data and will be able to withdraw permission any time during the data gathering phase, at which time they will be asked to confirm their permission. In accordance with the UK Data Protection Act (1998), original data will be destroyed either when permission is withdrawn or 6 years after completion of the thesis with exception of the consent form that is stored for 30 years after completion. The identities of individuals and organisations will be coded to create anonymity in the raw data. Role and organisation descriptions will be sufficiently vague to prevent traceability, for example, "architect, personal assistant or construction company".

Published information output from the research will be in the form of a thesis, journal articles and presentations. This information will therefore be in the public domain, however untraceable anonymity will be maintained by continuation of the coding arrangements. It will also be necessary to ensure that participants cannot be identified through triangulated data. For example, any data in the public domain, which signals the identity of an anonymous participant, has to be equally disguised or discarded.

II - Ethics protocol matrix

The approach to the research ethics is based on the guidance issued by British Psychological Society [BPS] (2014). The research will involve the collection of confidential organisational information and limited personal data. It is essential that disclosures do not cause harm to the participants or their organisations. All of the participants will be experienced, professional volunteers. They will be experienced in and accustomed to maintaining confidentiality.. They are not be considered vulnerable individuals. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the table below, there is a low residual vulnerability risk from inappropriate disclosures. The main objective at all times is for no harm to befall the participants, the researcher or other involved entities.

Participant risks	Control functions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Breach of confidentiality by improper disclosures. • Disclosure of incriminating information. • Disclosure of career limiting criticisms. • Disclosure of proscribed behaviour of organisation. • Disclosure of information, which is part of an on-going criminal investigation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus of research is on perception rather than contact with corruption. • Participants are accustomed to confidentiality issues. • Disclosure of risks and control measures in participant invitation information form. • Obtain signed consent. • Participant can withdraw at any time during an interview. • Permission to use data already obtained can be withdrawn up to the end of the data gathering phase. • Participant is anonymous. • Employing organisation is anonymous.
Researcher risks	Control functions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participant recalls data. • Data ethically unusable. • Disclosure of proscribed behaviour could cause breach in researcher / participant confidentiality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remind participants of risks at start of interview. • Warn participants of risks of inappropriate disclosures in writing and verbally. • Sensitivity to when inappropriate disclosures are imminent, interrupt interviews or dialogue, change focus or terminate. • All data not in the public domain is anonymous. • Data in the public domain, which is traceable to an anonymous participant, is anonymised. • Anonymity in coding arrangements. • As last resort, discard data as unusable.

III - Consent form



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Supervisor:
Professor Mark Button
mark.button@port.ac.uk

CONSENT FORM

Study Title:

Widespread corruption within the Member States of the EU - perception or reality?

REC Ref No: 14/15:37

Please initial each box

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any point before the data is analysed time without giving any reason.

I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at by individuals from the University or from regulatory authorities. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data.

I agree to my interview being audio recorded and to take part in the above study.

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Participant name]
Stiernstedt

[Date]

Peter



IV - Information sheet

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Supervisor:

Professor Mark Button
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Study Title:

Widespread corruption within the Member States of the EU - perception or reality?

REC Ref No: []

You have agreed to take part in my research study and I would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve for you. Please feel free to talk to others about the study if you wish and do not hesitate to ask if there is anything that is not clear.

This study focuses on the perception of corruption in the Member States of the EU.

The following pages contains information about the study and its outcomes as well as details on your participation and contribution to it. Please take the time to carefully study the given information carefully and bring any question that you might have to the attention of the researcher.

Thank you vey much for agreeing to met with me and participate in the study.

Peter Stiernstedt

Brief summary of the study

Corruption seriously harms the economy and society as a whole. Many countries around the world suffer from deep-rooted corruption that hampers economic development, undermines democracy, and damages social justice and the rule of law. The Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality. Corruption varies in nature and extent from one country to another, but it affects all Member States. It impinges on good governance, sound management of public money, and competitive markets. In extreme cases, it undermines the trust of citizens in democratic institutions and processes.

EU Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments and institutions to prevent and fight corruption. However, the results they deliver are not satisfactory across the EU. Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, systemic problems are not tackled effectively enough, and the relevant institutions do not always have sufficient capacity to enforce the rules. Declared intentions are still too distant from concrete results, and genuine political will to eradicate corruption often appears to be missing.

There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Such interviews could shed light on the theory behind the perception on corruption and if that theory corresponds with the 'reality' found in the surveys. The purpose would, similarly to the EU report on Anti-Corruption, be to stimulate a constructive forward-looking debate on the extent, as well as the best ways of addressing, corruption. Specifically by providing a substantial theory as an answer to the question:

The purpose of the study

In terms of outcomes, the study aims to by the analysis of in depth interviews, complement and contrast previous surveys and the 'reality' found therein. This is done by developing a substantive theory for the perception of corruption in public construction procurement within the EU. Ultimately the theory developed in this study could inform the attitude towards not only corruption within the Member States of the EU but also how it is measured. Such theory could also create a starting point for further integration towards formal theory of the perception of corruption within the EU. Thus, a substantive grounded theory built from interviews could act as foundation for recommendations to design and direction of additional research.

Why you have been invited

The primary technique for the research will be semi-structured interviews. The interviews are planned with those that are believed to be able to provide high quality information on the topic. In essence this means that you are considered to have specialist knowledge about either the people, processes or happenings that is more extensive, detailed or privileged than ordinary people, and are therefore particularly valuable sources of information.

Voluntary participation

It is up to you to decide to join the study. When we meet I will take you through the study, explain the contribution you will be asked to make and then I will then ask you to sign a consent form if you wish to proceed. The study does not seek organisational information in any shape or form, the research is solely and absolutely focused on individual perception, therefore it does not seek the consent of any participant's employer or host organisation.

What happens if you participate

I would like to conduct an interview with you, which will take approximately 60 minutes. Subject to your consent I will make an audio recording of the interview and will later transcribe that so that I can compare and analyse the various responses from all of the interviews I will conduct. Whilst the interview will be stored with a reference to help me identify your name, after the data has been analysed and if your data appears in my final thesis, it will be entirely anonymous. I expect that my research will take a number of years to conclude but your involvement will be limited to the 60 minutes whilst I conduct the interview. It is also possible that I will call upon you to do an additional follow-up interview, naturally such participation is completely voluntary.

Your expected contribution

I have a schedule of open-ended questions and I am interested in your responses, opinions and attitudes to those questions. The questions are intended to instigate a normal but focused conversation rather than a formal interview. The main topic will be corruption and the perception thereof. You will not be asked to provide any information which is confidential or which would embarrass you professionally or constitute a breach of confidentiality or breach of fiduciary duty. If I suspect that any information provided in the interview represents such a breach I will pause the interview to ensure that my research does not rely on information provided in error.

The possible disadvantages of participating

You will be inconvenienced for about 60 minutes but I cannot envisage any other disadvantage or risk.

The possible benefits of participating

There will be no financial reward for participation but you may well benefit from the knowledge that you are contributing to research, which may advance or improve the fight against corruption, stimulate further educational research or generate policy documents or greater awareness of the issue.

Why your participation is kept confidential

When you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be seen by authorised persons from the University of Portsmouth. Because the research is supervised, others may look at the data to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All of those

people will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and will do their best to meet this duty.

Subject to the provision that any offer of confidentiality may sometimes be overridden by law, your confidentiality will be safeguarded during and after the study. The interview will be audio recorded (with your consent) and then transcribed and analysed using a software programme called NVivo. At all times the data will be stored securely and it will be retained only until the final thesis is approved. At that point it will be destroyed. At any time before destruction, my research supervisor may review your data to ensure the study is proceeding correctly.

What will happen if you want to discontinue your participation

You may withdraw from the study at any time prior to providing consent and until the data from any interview has been analysed, at which time it will be anonymous but may have been integrated with other responses from other interviewees and so will be difficult to exclude from the study.

If you have questions or concerns

If you have a question or concern about any aspect of this study, you may speak with me or write or speak to Professor Mark Button, my supervisor. We will both do our best to answer your questions. Professor Button can be reached by e-mail at mark.button@port.ac.uk or by telephone on 023 92843923. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this either by writing to Dr Jane Winstone, the Faculty Ethics Committee Chair who can be reached at jane.winstone@port.ac.uk or by writing to Dr Phil Clements, the Head of Department who can be reached at phil.clements@port.ac.uk.

What happens to the results of the study

Generally you will be notified when the thesis is published although it will be several years before the research is complete. You will not receive any information unless you have given your consent to receiving such information.

The organising and funding entity for this study

The University of Portsmouth has granted the researcher a full bursary to complete this study.

Ethical review of the study

Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion.

V - Invitation letter



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INVITATION LETTER

Study Title:

Widespread corruption within the Member States of the EU - perception or reality?

REC Ref No: 14/15:37

Dear [Name]

Further to our recent conversation I would like to confirm your agreement to participate in a research study that I am engaged in as part of a PhD research project into the perception of corruption. Corruption varies in nature and extent from one country to another, but it affects all Member States of the EU. There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Therefore the study aims to by the analysis of in depth interviews, complement and contrast previous surveys on corruption and the 'reality' found therein.


Attached to this letter is a information sheet providing clarification of several pertinent issues regarding the study and your participation. Should there be any questions please contact me.

I look forward to meeting you on [date] at [time] in [location].

Yours sincerely

VI - Sample memos

Example of handwritten memo in Swedish from the author's personal note book and an excerpt of a memo recorded in the NVivo software. The images have been redacted to



150916 - [REDACTED] (Participant)

Pre-interview notes:

This is an interview that can as a lead from [REDACTED], the very first interview done in this project. [REDACTED] has been busy and summer came in between pushing this interview to this time. The truth is that I think that coincidence is for the better in terms of research contribution. Now having interviewed several international participants it is going to be highly interesting to tie this back to Swedish context. I have several concepts that I hope to develop with [REDACTED] in this interview.

Post interview notes:

It turned out that [REDACTED] also has an academic background and was as such highly receptive and understanding to what I was doing. That opened for a very friendly interview and once again I was able to (quite easily) establish a more conservatory style of interviewing although not to the same extent as with [REDACTED]. Which is better I leave undecided at this point but it is an interesting question what balance to strike in terms of interview style.

Analytical notes:

Due to the short time span between this and the previous interview with [REDACTED] these interviews will more or less be analysed concurrently. In sequence yet, this one will be analysed, after the actual interview with [REDACTED] has already happened thus that information will undoubtedly influence the analysis. Hence I will, if necessary jump between the two interviews when analysing them. Hopefully seamlessly connecting them to each other as well as the overall analysis.

maintain participant confidentiality.

VII - Interview schedule with sample questions



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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Study Title:

Widespread corruption within the Member States of the EU - perception or reality?

REC Ref No: 14/15:37

As conditioned by the methodology the nature of the questions will evolve but there are two main theme that will permeate all of the interviews. Those are.

- The perception of corruption.
- The linkage between the perception of corruption and reality.

Sample questions

What is corruption to you?/How do you define corruption?

What is your perception of corruption?/What do you think of corruption?

How do you believe that perception corresponds with corruption in reality?

What may be the issues with the linkage between the perception and reality of corruption?

In your opinion, what are the main drivers of corruption?

In your opinion, what are the main counter measures to corruption?

Etc.

VIII - Critiques of situational crime prevention

The thesis, having explored each of the classifications of the Situational crime prevention matrix from a SUM-theory perspective, providing some examples of how the use of various measures within this classification can contribute to preventing corruption this section acknowledge some of the criticisms that has been directed at Situational crime prevention as well as the responses thereto.

Several decades after Situational crime prevention was first introduced there were still issues raised around the theory. In an effort to straighten out some of the misconceptions of situational prevention (seven of them to be exact) Clarke wrote a chapter in the Handbook of Crime prevention and Community Safety (Clarke, 2005). Here Situational crime prevention was referred to as both the science and art of reducing opportunities for crime. Science because there was and is a large body of research into the concept of Situational Crime prevention (many reviewed for this research), and art because despite this research those implementing situational crime prevention measures still had to rely on judgment and experience. It was argued that situational crime prevention was mostly implemented without adequate knowledge of its scientific underpinnings. The knowledge deficit, however, did not impede the growth of situational crime prevention, but did result in some rather poorly thought through crime prevention initiatives. Such failures obviously fuelled the criticism of Situational crime prevention, but as argued by Clarke (2005, p. 39) these criticisms are overstated and generally misconceived. It is, nonetheless, important to be familiar with these criticisms and the defence mounted by Clarke and others to add to the viability of the concept as a whole but also to highlight its potential use in an anti-corruption context.

Note that all critique was not designed to necessarily overthrow the entire idea but to highlight its limits and also identifying shortcomings expanding its scope. As discussed, one of the main critics Richard Wortley, being indirectly responsible for the increase from 16 to 25 classifications, wrote a summary of the critique against situational crime prevention in 2010. Here he states that "Criticisms of situational crime prevention are of two broad sorts – those questioning the theoretical and conceptual adequacy of the approach, and those attacking the ethical foundations and social outcomes of situational interventions." (Wortley, 2010, p. 1). The following review of critique follows Wortley's structure, expanded to encompass how these critiques and the responses thereto relate to the concept of corruption.

Theoretical and conceptual criticisms

Bar some disciplinary differences in underlying assumptions, criminological theories explain deviant behaviour as either the response of an actor to social, cultural, or economical factors; or as an expression of a more or less intrinsic criminal disposition created by an actors biology and/or experiences. Situational crime prevention does not analyse the sociological context of deviance nor the development of a deviant disposition. Unsurprisingly some of the criticisms directed at Situational crime prevention are directed at these omissions. The four main criticisms discussed here are; one, the situational approach is sterile, simplistic, and atheoretical; two, situational prevention ignores the root causes of crime; three, situational prevention will only displace crime; and four, situational approaches are not appropriate for 'irrational' crime.

1. The situational approach is atheoretical and simplistic

This critique implies that Situational crime prevention does not have the same sophistication and complexity that some of the other criminological theories have. Situational crime prevention was and is based on a fundamental tenet that all behaviour arises from a person-situation interaction. From the ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist perspective of this research the person-situation interaction and subjective interpretation thereof is fundamental - and there is nothing simplistic about it. Here situations are not just space in which crime occurs but it may also play a causal role in both initiating and shaping deviancy. That is a sophisticated process that is complicated to adequately grasp. Further critique along similar lines of simplicity, is that referring to Situational crime prevention's over reliance on target-hardening. While target-hardening in fact is only one out of 25 techniques of situational prevention. Where application of each technique, target-hardening included, is preceded by an analysis of the problem that is to be addressed. So the idea that Situational crime prevention is nothing more than common sense and a simplistic response to a complex social problem do not seem to rhymes well with the theoretical underpinnings previously discussed.

2. Situational prevention ignores root causes of deviancy

Given the deep rooted theoretical base on which Situational crime prevention rests upon there are factors that are omitted from the theory, particularly facts that are sometimes seen as root causes of crime. Examples are, societal governance, economic inequality, family structure, etc. A critique can then be formulated around Situational crime prevention only

addressing the symptoms and not the underlying, often more systemic, causes, thus providing a shallow solution to problems of deviancy. It is, however a fallacy that understanding and changing underlying causes of behaviour is a prerequisites to changing behaviour. The role of situations in behaviour is but one cause irrespectively of other arbitrarily chosen root or non-root causes, and conversely other criminological theories could be accused of not including situational factors. While this research is about increasing the understanding of corruption, it focuses on the behavioural aspects not the root causes. The central point in the context of Situational crime prevention, however, is that understanding is not essential for situational cues to work and consequently reduce corruption.

3. Situational prevention will only displace deviancy

If validity is given to a situational approach actually being able to prevent deviancy another critique is that, even if situationally prevented in one place the behaviour it would move to another. This stems from situational prevention not addressing the agent's underlying disposition for deviancy. Thus, if prevented from acting on this disposition in one place the agent would seek out another location, time, target or tactics to realise the deviant act. In a worst case scenario this can even be thought to worsen the gravity of the deviancy by acting as a catalyst for bad behaviour. In terms of applied situational crime prevention in general and to corruption in particular the critique carries a superficial logic that is easily refuted. Consider the opposite, if no security precautions were taken, if nothing was done to thwart corruption, would related deviancy increase? If the answer is yes then taking precautions prevents rather than displaces deviancy. Also empirically it has been found that displacement is unusual and in fact the reverse effect is some times observed - that situational measures designed to reduce for a particular type of deviancy can have preventive effects beyond the original design (S. D. Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2014).

4. Situational approaches are not appropriate for 'irrational' crime

The classification of various forms of deviancy as pertaining to rational and others to irrational behaviour is perhaps useful in some contexts but less so here. The critique goes to show that some deviancy prudent in nature, like shoplifting is more susceptible to situational cues than crimes of passion, such as for example sex offences. The latter sometimes caused by psychological deficiencies such that behaviour control is beyond rational choice and subsequently less influenced by situational factors. Explored in-depth in previous sections of this research the debate on the rational/irrational divide in deviancy is as interesting as it is futile for the purposes of effectively preventing corruption through situational intervention. It is

true that early situational interventions were largely applied to acquisitive crimes such as burglary. The decision-making process even of irrational crime, as previously more adequately described - rational yet limited by bounded rationality, can be sensitive to situational factors. Moreover there are ways to merge the rational with the non rational in decision-making theory, thus bringing rational choice theories minimal attention to the affective components of decision-making (see e.g. Walters, 2015). The final note is that for situational measures to effectively prevent corruption, even if executed as a crime of passion, the SUM-theory only presupposes an agent of perceived free-will in search of a self-interest oriented advantage.

Social and ethical criticisms

Situational crime prevention does not promote social reform, and lack the theoretical commitment to social causes of deviancy as well as the ideological commitment to social justice. Both generally embraced by social scientists, criminologists included. There can be many explanations for this; suspicion of government authority, scepticism of neo-classical economics, fear of corporate power, distaste of inequality, distrust of wealth and (often radically misplaced) sympathy for the offender. This surmounts to the control agenda associated with Situational crime prevention being at least philosophically uncomfortable, and often cast as a politically conservative approach promoting Orwellian solutions to deviancy. The resulting five criticism discussed here are; one, situational prevention uncritically supports the status quo; two, access to situational prevention will become the privilege of the rich; three, situational prevention blames the victim; and four, situational prevention is invasive and oppressive; and five, situational prevention will create a fortress society.

I. Situational prevention uncritically supports the status quo

With its roots in work commissioned by the British Home Office critics have asserted that situational intervention is a tool by and for the authorities. A tool that can be used to promote the interest of the political and social elite instead of serving the broader public good. This critique is further rooted in the early applications of situational crime prevention against crimes generally associated with those pertaining to the lower echelons of society; burglary, theft and the like. While this may be true, it should be noted that crimes perpetrated by those lower in the social hierarchy also primarily target their peers. Thus preventing that type of deviancy would in fact protect the poor and disadvantaged rather than a societal elite. Moreover, this very section of this research is effectively a move towards addressing deviancy that does include the political and social elite, as corruption in those arenas is just as pervasive

and perhaps even more detrimental to society. Achieving better governance by preventing, thus reducing corruption can not be considered as maintaining status quo.

2. Access to situational prevention is a financial strength based privilege

As expressed in the paper "The evolution of security industry regulation in the European Union" (Button & Stiemstedt, 2016b), state-driven security with policing as one of its primary weapons of choice is no longer enough, and in many member states the private security industry has assumed a substantial position in the provision of policing. With private security on the rise and increasingly more societal security functions being privatised raises the issue of whether or not financial strength is largely the key to being able to afford counter measures. The possible consequence is that the situational prevention techniques develop into something only accessible to those with sufficient financial strength. Thus, creating an inequality in protection and subsequently in victimisation as perpetrators would seek out other, less protected, targets. The charge of displacement has been previously addressed together with its limited negative effect on situational crime prevention in general and for corruption in particular. As for those with more financial strength being able to buy more protection in the form of situational crime prevention, the claim is correct. Given the discussion on displacement the argument, however, would be that the more anyone invests in situational crime prevention measures the better for everyone. Regarding issues surrounding the privatisation of security the solution argued by the author of this research and others is primarily the more efficient regulation thereof (see e.g. Button & Stiemstedt, 2016a).

3. Situational prevention places the burden on the victim

The techniques applied by situation crime prevention originates from individuals taking precautions. Often precautions against their own victimisation, shifting focus from offender to victim. From certain points of view such shifting of responsibility can be morally indefensible. A good example is how rape victims sometimes are blamed for their lack of applying situational crime prevention in condemning the provocative clothes they wore. This type of victim blaming is appalling and should not be associated with what the situational approach is interpreted as achieving in the context of this research. In daily life humans adopt a number of situational prevention strategies and this is nearly a guide that suggest what measures can be effective in the context of anti-corruption frameworks. Here in some cases it is perhaps more appropriate to blame the victim, i.e. to penalise organisations that has not taken adequate measures to prevent corruption from occurring. This is exactly what can be observed in recent legislation like the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [FCPA] and the British

Bribery Act. Where the FCPA establishes that a company subject to US jurisdiction can be held vicariously liable for acts of its employees and agents, and similarly the UK Bribery Act creates a strict liability corporate offence for failure to prevent bribery.

4. Situational prevention can be invasive and oppressive

Some of the techniques included in the vast array available in the situational crime prevention approach may stir concerns about insidious social control. Any type of surveillance may be used for good, i.e. the prevention of deviancy, but may also infringe on personal freedoms and convey an invasion of privacy if misused. The key word here is misused. There has to be a system governing the application of the techniques and acting as control and fail safe in society to protect the citizens both in the intended way and also from unintended consequences. Personal freedoms must not be unduly curtailed and there should be no unnecessary invasions of privacy. Note that if there are obvious benefits to the potential inconvenience of a situational technique it will hopefully be tolerated by most people that are interested in their own well being and that of their fellow man. Take the example of airport screening to prevent terrorism, an inconvenience accepted by most - the efficacy of such screening can however be subject to debate (see e.g. Stewart & Mueller, 2008).

5. Situational prevention creates a fortress society

The logical endpoint for some critics is that situational crime prevention will create a society that is ran by fear and distrust full of obtrusive security measures. A segregated society where an elite live in safety and the rest in uncertainty. As noted earlier, the situational approach is more than just target hardening and some situational techniques actually involves "softening" the environment, as will be discussed further later in the thesis. In short, some classic techniques like improved street lightning may reduce the fear of crime without coming close to what can be labelled a fortress society. More contextually for corruption another example "extending the guardianship" which will promote the collective sharing of good norms and values that will not only prevent deviancy but that potentially can also bring a community or organisation closer together. It is important to understand that the situational crime prevention approach does not advocate segregation of the deviant but rather arguing that measures can be deployed on the basis that the motivation for deviancy is available to all and by restricting opportunity deviancy can be prevented.

It has been show that the major criticisms can be addressed and that situational crime prevention still holds some value. It has also been established how these criticisms relate to the prevention of corruption, and the particular implications that this can have as well as an

exploration of a response thereto. Whether or not new criticisms directed directly at the application of situational crime prevention techniques to prevent corruption can, and hopefully will, be the result of future empirical research. Critique that, just like the criticisms against situational crime prevention theory will instigate further development and adaptation of the SUM-theory for greater efficacy in the fight against corruption.

IX - REC approval document



Mr Peter Stiernstedt
PhD Candidate
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies
University of Portsmouth

REC reference number: 14/15:37
Please quote this number on all correspondence.

26th March 2015

Dear Peter,

Full Title of Study: WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION WITHIN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU-
PERCEPTION OR REALITY?

Documents reviewed:

Consent Form
Interview Schedule
Invitation Letter
Participant Information Sheet
Protocol

Further to our recent correspondence, this proposal was reviewed by The Research Ethics Committee of The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.

I am pleased to tell you that the proposal was awarded a favourable ethical opinion by the committee.

Kind regards,

FHSS FREC Chair
Dr Jane Winstone

Members participating in the review:

- Richard Hitchcock
- Patricia Shamai
- Geoff Wade
- Jane Winstone

X - Form UPR16 - Research Ethics Review Checklist

FORM UPR16

Research Ethics Review Checklist



Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the Research Degrees Operational Handbook for more information)

Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information		Student ID:	up710478	
PGRS Name:	Peter Stiernstedt			
Department:	ICJS	First Supervisor:	Mark Button	
Start Date: (or progression date for Prof Doc students)	September 2014			
Study Mode and Route:	Part-time <input type="checkbox"/>	MPhil <input type="checkbox"/>	MD <input type="checkbox"/>	
	Full-time <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PhD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Professional Doctorate <input type="checkbox"/>	

Title of Thesis:	The SUM of ALL corruption
Thesis Word Count: (excluding ancillary data)	79981

If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee for advice. Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University's Ethics Policy and any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study

Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s).

UKRIO Finished Research Checklist:

(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: <http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/>)

a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and within a reasonable time frame?	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged?	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication and authorship?	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it remain so for the required duration?	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements?	YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>

Candidate Statement:

I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully obtained the necessary ethical approval(s)

Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from NRES/SCREC):	14/15:37
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If you have *not* submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered 'No' to one or more of questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so:

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Signed (PGRS):		Date: 2018-04-14
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